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Bank loan covenants, lending relationships and covenant violations

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thesis
posted on 28.03.2022, 11:23 by Yi Zheng
Using a large sample of U.S. corporate bank loans, we investigate the influence of lending relationships on loan covenants and covenant violations. Consistent with the information asymmetry argument, we find that lending relationships substitute for financial covenants in loan contracts. In addition, the effect of lending relationship intensity on the total number of financial covenants included in a loan package is U-shaped. It appears that lending relationship intensity acts as an indicator of covenant violations. Specifically, an increasing lending relationship intensity decreases the likelihood of covenant violations, but relationship borrowers who have access to the public debt market or are of a large size in their industry are subject to a high probability of covenant violations. Overall, relationship borrowers with different levels of relationship intensity and financing capacity are subject to a distinct probability of covenant violations.

History

Table of Contents

1. Introduction -- 2. Theories and hypothesis development -- 3. Data and measurement -- 4. Analyses of lending relationships and financial covenant strictness -- 5. Analyses of lending relationships and covenant violations -- 6. Additional tests -- 7. Conclusion -- References.

Notes

Bibliography: pages 59-64 Empirical thesis.

Awarding Institution

Macquarie University

Degree Type

Thesis MRes

Degree

MRes, Macquarie University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Applied Finance

Department, Centre or School

Department of Applied Finance

Year of Award

2019

Principal Supervisor

Jing Shi

Additional Supervisor 1

Qing Zhou

Rights

Copyright Yi Zheng 2019. Copyright disclaimer: http://mq.edu.au/library/copyright

Language

English

Extent

1 online resource (iii, 64 pages) tables

Former Identifiers

mq:70918 http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/1269014