<p dir="ltr">As the scale of model parameters continues to grow, the demand for large amounts of data in modern machine learning models has increased, raising significant concerns over data security. Distributed learning methods, such as Federated Learning, have been introduced to mitigate these concerns by keeping data on every user’s device. However, recent studies have shown that these methods are vulnerable to data reconstruction attacks through gradient inversion, leading to data leakage risks as private data can be reconstructed from shared gradients. In this work, we extend research on attack and defense strategies for such data reconstruction attacks in the context of training language models. </p><p dir="ltr">On the <i>attack </i>side, unlike previous efforts that typically use gradients from all model parameters, we hypothesize that most involved modules, or even their sub-modules, are at risk of training data leakage. We validate these vulnerabilities across various intermediate layers of language models. Our experiments reveal that gradients from a single Transformer layer, or even a single linear component with just 0.54% of the parameters, are susceptible to training data leakage, in the worst case being of the same magnitude as information from all layers. Additionally, we observe that a weighted combination of key modules enhances the attack. </p><p dir="ltr">On the <i>defense </i>side, we examine the effect of Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) against this new data leakage threat and find it challenging to balance privacy protection with downstream utility. As an alternative, we propose and validate a selective noise-adding paradigm, which achieves comparable defense performance while offering more flexibility by targeting specific components of SVD-decomposed gradients. This method demonstrates an improved balance between privacy and utility, potentially inspiring future research aimed at improving differential privacy practices.</p>
History
Table of Contents
1. Introduction -- 2. Literature Review -- 3. Data Leakage from Partial Gradients -- 4. Defense Against Data Reconstruction Attacks -- 5. Conclusion -- References
Awarding Institution
Macquarie University
Degree Type
Thesis MRes
Degree
Master of Research
Department, Centre or School
School of Computing
Year of Award
2025
Principal Supervisor
Mark Dras
Additional Supervisor 1
Qiongkai Xu
Rights
Copyright: The Author
Copyright disclaimer: https://www.mq.edu.au/copyright-disclaimer