Epistemic justice: confronting implicit bias, explicit prejudice, and epistemiology of oppression

This thesis attempts to further develop Fricker's notion of epistemic justice. Fricker defines epistemic justice, in the Aristotelian tradition, as a virtue of character. However, given that epistemic justice is also a corrective measure to the various forms of epistemic injustice, it seems as an inadequate corrective response in its current individualistic and virtue-theoretic form. Keeping the virtue-theoretic form of epistemic justice - though briefly alluding to its inadequacies as well, I explore various social roles that can cultivate this virtue as a corrective to epistemic injustice. I do so by horizontally and vertically expanding the social landscape where epistemic injustice occurs. Horizontal expansion reveals that every instance of epistemic injustice includes three distinct social roles that consists of the perpetrator, the victim and possibly the audience or witnesses of the injustice. Certain epistemic justice virtues can be construed for each of these roles. Vertical expansion reveals three distinct layers in the social system where epistemic injustice can be located, namely the layer where individual agents perform, the layer where collectives are formed and operate, and the broader social system. A socially situated view op epistemic injustice allows imagining non-individualistic virtues, such as the virtues of groups and the virtues that exist in the social systems.