Heidegger's concept of fundamental ontological transcendence in the late 1920s

In the late 20s Heidegger begins to speak continually of something called 'transcendence' and of its radical centrality to the problem of fundamental ontology. In particular he connects this problem back to the terse, enigmatic and somehow almost buried analysis of SZ sect69. There has long been evidence for the importance of this problem for Heidegger, and there is mounting evidence for its centrality to the problem of division three of Being and Time. -- And yet, as a question, transcendence has received even less dedicated attention than the similarly decisive problem of temporality. This thesis seeks to remedy the above deficiency by applying itself wholly to the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence. -- This thesis is divided into three parts. The first offers a preliminary sketch for the problem by discussing Being and Time in general, along with the problems of the surrounding world in particular and the history of the concept of world. The second part is concerned with the unity of the problem and this means with the interpretation of transcendence as a radicalisation of the existential concept of world. The third part is concerned with the completeness of the phenomenon, thus it unfolds the previously won unity according to its connection with the problems of freedom, selfhood, historicity and the question of being. Throughout the whole analysis the phenomenon of transcendence will be clarified, and through this, the problem and the import of transcendence will be demonstrated.