How do prudential regulators discuss and mitigate short-termism?

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 has been correlated with excessive risk-taking and disaster myopia in financial firms. Responses to those forms of short-termism include remuneration principles, attention to culture in firms, and upgraded corporate governance requirements. This thesis provides a cohesive analysis of regulatory responses to short-termism focused on the voice of prudential regulators. The method is structured, focused comparison of prudential regulators public messaging across four jurisdictions - Australia, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom - from 2008 to 2018. The thesis confirms and expands elements from Dallas's (2012) framework of information problems, structural problems and individual incentives as causes of short-termism. The thesis finds regulators discussing the components as forming a cohesive whole rather than as discrete elements, consistent with prior research that characterises financial markets as a complex adaptive system. Regulators usually justify the components by referring to international peers, and this thesis recommends they could broaden their sources of knowledge to consider lessons from other complex adaptive systems.