Human dignity: useless rhetoric or substantive concept?

Human dignity is typically understood as the intrinsic worth or value of all human beings, the possession of which entitles them to respect and fundamental rights. It is widely referenced in a variety of fields including human rights, international and constitutional law, bioethics, and political science. This thesis examines the question of whether human dignity is a substantive concept, with clear content and the ability to provide normative guidance, or merely useless rhetoric. The focus is primarily on the relationship between the state and the individual vis-à-vis human dignity and aims to answer the following questions: What does human dignity actually encompass, and what implications does this have for states' treatment of individuals? The historical and contemporary understandings of human dignity and their connection to one another are analysed, and the criticism that human dignity is too vague a notion to direct legal rulings and political legislation is challenged. Christopher McCrudden's 'core' idea of human dignity is expanded and utilised in regard to the German Aviation Security Case to demonstrate how human dignity is capable of informing such decision-making. The aim of this thesis is to show that human dignity is a substantive concept by responding to criticisms, elaborating on the core idea of human dignity and showing how this 'core' is robust enough to provide practical, normative guidance.