Models of neural computation ;: an examination of David Chalmers’ causal theory of the mind

David Chalmers has defended a causal version of the Computational Theory of the Mind (CTM) by formulating an abstract computational object called a Combinatorial State Automata (CSA) which he argues can cover the structure of different abstract computational objects such as Finite State Automata, Turing Machines, Cellular Automata etc. He views implementation as the bridge between formal computation and physical computation. He defines implementation as an isomorphism between causal processes of a physical object and the formal structure of a computation. He uses his causal version of CTM to connect computation and cognition by defending a thesis of computational sufficiency and uses computation as an explanatory framework for cognitive processes and behaviour. In my thesis I examine Chalmers’ views to see whether his argument stands up to scrutiny and whether his views are supported by the data of neuroscience. Where there are shortcomings I modify and extend Chalmers’ theory to make it compliant.