Refining the risk of chemical and biological terrorism: what is the nature of the gap between academic and policy perspectives on chemical and biological terrorism and how might this begin to be bridged?

To better understand and ultimately respond to chemical and biological terrorism, academic and law enforcement communities need to establish a closer interaction between their respective realms. This paper attempts to bridge strategist scholarly and policy considerations on chemical and biological terrorism into one unique risk-assessment. The paper has devised a novel approach and reconstructs the phases of commission – firstly, the acquisition of knowledge on chemical and biological (CB) agents, secondly, the acquisition of CB materials, thirdly, the development of the CB weapon and finally, the execution of the attack – that constitute the key units for the analysis. At each perpetration phase the discussion analyses the challenges that the offenders need to tackle. By way of a case study the thesis then evaluates the effectiveness of the respective Australian and EU-level counter CB terrorism provisions to pinpoint their vulnerabilities. The analysis has attempted to identify unregulated or insufficiently regulated areas of the aforementioned counter strategies and has suggested where policy gaps can be addresses by academic considerations.