Tokenized, Decentralized, Democratized? Market Microstructure and Exchange Innovation in Digital Asset Trading

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation examines the evolving market microstructure of digital assets, focusing on transaction costs, liquidity provision returns, and the development of innovative exchange mechanisms. In three essays, the research provides empirical evidence on digital asset trading in both traditional and emerging decentralized market architectures. Each essay addresses previously unresolved questions, offering valuable insights for researchers, practitioners, and regulators to better understand and manage the benefits, costs, and risks of trading in digital asset markets.</p><p dir="ltr">The first essay examines the cost of trading across digital assets in traditional centralized limit-order-book exchanges and a nascent, decentralized market architecture: the Automated Market Maker. By employing a novel methodology the study extends prior research that relies on less detailed, low-frequency information. The findings reveal transaction cost advantages for Automated Market Makers with remarkable stability across varying levels of market volatility, trading volume, and market capitalization. These results offer practical insights into execution venue selection and market design considerations.</p><p dir="ltr">The second essay explores the evolution of Automated Market Makers, using the introduction of a new generation of these exchange architectures as a case study. In addition to documenting their technical advancements, the research shows that asset pairs migrate to the new Automated-Market-Maker models based on asset-specific fundamentals. The study makes key contributions through two experimental setups, demonstrating that reductions in inventory costs and the introduction of flexible fee tiers deliver welfare benefits for both liquidity demanders and providers. These findings enrich the broader discussion on market design and highlight the potential for innovative mechanisms to enhance efficiency in both decentralized and traditional financial systems.</p><p dir="ltr">The third essay sheds light on liquidity provision in Automated Market Makers. Leveraging granular profitability data, the study finds that a small subset of liquidity providers dominate liquidity provision. These sophisticated agents achieve significantly higher absolute and relative profits compared to retail participants, while demonstrating a high level of skill. The emergence of these de-facto intermediaries challenges the decentralized finance ethos of disintermediation, highlighting that liquidity provision, even in decentralized markets, remains dominated by specialists. Understanding the composition of participants in these nascent markets is not only crucial for practitioners but also regulators, enabling them to develop targeted and effective policies that promote fair and competitive market environments.</p>