

**RACIAL EQUALITY BILL: JAPANESE PROPOSAL AT PARIS PEACE  
CONFERENCE: DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES; AND REASONS FOR  
REJECTION**

By

Shizuka Imamoto

B.A. (Hiroshima Jogakuin University, Japan),  
Graduate Diploma in Language Teaching  
(University of Technology Sydney, Australia)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Honours) at  
Macquarie University.

Japanese Studies,  
Department of Asian Languages,  
Division of Humanities,  
College of Humanities and Social Sciences,  
Macquarie University,  
Sydney Australia.

2006

## DECLARATION

I declare that the present research work embodied in the thesis entitled, **Racial Equality Bill: Japanese Proposal At Paris Peace Conference: Diplomatic Manoeuvres; And Reasons For Rejection** was carried out by the author at Macquarie Japanese Studies Centre of Macquarie University of Sydney, Australia during the period February 2003 to February 2006. This work has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution. Any published and unpublished materials of other writers and researchers have been given full acknowledgement in the text.

Shizuka Imamoto

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
SUMMARY	ix
DEDICATION	x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	xi
INTRODUCTION	1
1. Area Of Study	1
2. Theme, Principal Question, And Objective Of Research	5
3. Methodology For Research	5
4. Preview Of The Results Presented In The Thesis	6
End Notes	9
CHAPTER ONE	
ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND WORLD WAR ONE	11
Section One: Anglo-Japanese Alliance	12
1. Role Of Favourable Public Opinion In Britain And Japan	13
2. Background Of Anglo-Japanese Alliance	15
3. Negotiations And Signing Of Anglo-Japanese Alliance	16
4. Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance	17
5. Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance	18
Section Two: Japan's Involvement In World War One	19
1. Applicability Of Anglo-Japanese Alliance And Japan's Position	19
2. Britain's Request For Cooperation, And Japan Prepares For War	20
3. Japan's Declaration Of War On Germany	21
4. Anglo-Japanese Campaign And Further Decline Of The Alliance	22
5. Call For Expansion Of The Alliance	24
6. Anglo-Japanese Secret Agreement of 1917	25
7. Japan's Gains From World War One And British Disenchantment	27
8. Japan's Unpopularity And Liquidation Of Anglo-Japanese Alliance	28
Section Three: Japan Australia Relation During World War One	30
1. Convoying Of Anzac Troops By Japanese Warships	30
2. Patrolling Of Australian Coastline By Japanese Warships	31
3. Instances Of Unfriendly Australian Attitude During The Alliance	32
3.1. Australian Hostility At Fremantle Port	32
3.2. The <i>Ibuki</i> Restrained By Australian Captain Of The <i>Melbourne</i>	33

End Notes	34
CHAPTER TWO	
FEAR OF JAPAN IN AUSTRALIA	40
1. Introduction Of Indentured Labour And Rise Of Racism	40
1.1. Introduction Of Japanese Labour	42
2. Sino-Japanese War And Fear Of Japan	43
2.1. Other Factors That Compounded Fear Of Japan	44
2.2. <i>Nan'yoo</i> And Fear Of Japan	45
3. Immigration Restriction Act	46
4. Fear Of Japanese In Queensland	47
5. Immigration Restriction Act Becomes White Australia Policy	49
6. Passport Agreement With Japan	49
7. Russo-Japanese War And Intensification Of Fear Of Japan	50
7.1. Australia Appeals For Extension Of Monroe Doctrine	50
7.2. Australia Proposes Its Own Navy Against Japan	51
7.3. Voluntary Associations Spread Fear Of Japan	52
7.4. Voices Of Reason Drown In Racist Frenzy	53
8. The Shield Is Forged	53
9. Rumours Of Japanese Espionage	55
10. Fear Of Japan In Australian Literature	56
11. Fear Of Japan Influences Foreign Policy Analysis	57
12. Fear Of Japan Continues Despite Japanese Protections In World War One	59
End Notes	60
CHAPTER THREE	
WILLIAM MORRIS HUGHES	64
1. Hughes, The Politician	64
2. Leadership Of Hughes During The Wars	65
3. Hughes And White Australia Policy	66
4. Hughes At Paris Peace Conference	68
5. Only Britain Could Have Restrained Hughes	71
End Notes	72
CHAPTER FOUR	
JAPAN'S PROPOSAL AND DIPLOMACY AT PARIS	74
1. Preparations For Paris Peace Conference	75
2. Formal Appointments For The Peace Conference	77

3. Strong Japanese Press And Public Opinion To Gain Racial Equality	77
4. Proposal On Abolition Of Racial Discrimination	78
5. The US Politics Of Race And Wilson	79
6. Informal Talks With The United States And Britain	80
7. Proposal To The League Of Nations	83
8. Racial Equality Issue Becomes Public And Japanese Efforts Outside The Conference	85
9. Japan's Expanded And Intensive Negotiations	87
10. Further Revisions To The Proposal	89
11. Negotiations With The Prime Ministers Of The British Empire	90
12. Negotiations To Obtain The Support Of Australian Prime Minister	91
13. Presentation Of The Proposal At The League Of Nations Commission	94
14. Discussion On The Proposal	96
15. Vote On The Proposal	97
16. Rejection Of The Proposal	98
17. Japanese Preparation For The Plenary Session	99
18. Declaration Of The Japanese Plenipotentiary	100
19. Failure Of Racial Equality Bill And Fulfilment Of Other Demands	101
End Notes	102
CHAPTER FIVE	
REASONS FOR REJECTION: A DISCUSSION	114
1. Prejudices Against The Japanese	114
2. British Reluctance To Support Japan	117
3. Wilson's Ruling And Lack Of US Support	118
4. Role of British Dominions	120
5. Tactical Mistake By The Japanese In Negotiations At Paris Peace Conference	120
5.1 Japanese Reliance On The US	120
5.2 A Significant Delay In Opening Negotiations With The British	121
6. Errors In Diplomacy By The Japanese	122
6.1 Compromises And Postponements By The Japanese Delegates	122
6.2 An Inappropriately Worded Speech By The Japanese	125
7. Weak Presentation And Extreme Modesty	125
7.1 Weak Language And Communication Skills	125
7.2 Extreme Modesty And Lack Of Firmness	125
8. Inexperienced Diplomacy	126

8.1 Japan's Absolute Trust In Anglo-Japanese Alliance	127
End Note	127
CONCLUSION	132
1. A Combination Of Factors Defeated Racial Equality Proposal	132
2. Inexperience In International Diplomacy	135
3. Pernicious White Australia Policy	136
BIBLIOGRAPHY	137
1. References In English	137
1.1 Articles And Books	137
1.2 Documents From National Archives Of Australia	144
1.3 Documents From National Library Of Australia	145
2. References From Published Sources In Japanese	146
3. References From Unpublished Sources In Japanese	150
4. Articles In Newspapers	150
4.1 Japan Times & Mail	151
4.2 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun	157
APPENDIX	161
COMMENTS FROM THE JAPANESE PRESS	161
Section One: Report And Analysis From Japan	162
Shock And Disappointment In Japan	163
1. Shock In Japan	163
2. Results Of The Vote	163
3. A Snub To Japan	164
4. Spirit Of Unrest In Japan	165
5. Japan Is Disgraced	166
Japan Must Rouse Public Opinion In Britain	166
1. Japan Must Rouse Public Opinion In Britain	166
Criticism Of Japan And Japanese Delegates	168
1. 'Rather Leave The League Of Nations'	168
2. Japan Government Blamed	169
3. Criticism Of The Japanese Delegates	169
4. Japan Delegates A Dismal Failure	170
5. Japan Delegates Advised To Redouble Efforts	170
6. Japan Was Not Firm	170
Praise Of Japan And Japanese Delegates	171

1. 'Japan Amendment Lacks General Approval'	171
2. Japan's Position Enhanced	172
3. Recognition For Japanese Delegates	172
4. Praise For Japan	173
Criticism Of The West	173
1. Humanity And Justice Not Respected In The West	173
2. Only The US and Britain Gain	173
3. Disbelief Of The West	174
4. Audacity Of The Anglo-Americans	174
5. 'Anglo-Saxons Want To Dominate The World'	174
6. Allies Claims A Pretension	175
7. Distrust Of England And America	176
8. World Sees The Rejection	176
Criticism Of Hughes	176
1. England Embarrassed By Hughes	176
2. Hughes Hopes Japan And Australia To Remain Friends	176
Criticism Of Wilson And The US	177
1. America Criticised	177
2. Wilson Looked Down On Japan	177
3. Wilson's Unfair Ruling	178
Criticism Of Britain	178
1. British Siding With Hughes	178
Criticism Of, And Call To Leave, The League Of Nations	179
1. Japan Advised To Leave The League	179
2. Japan Must Not Make Concessions	180
3. Japan Considers Withdrawal	180
4. No More Concessions	180
5. Call For Boycott	180
6. Japan Advised To Quit	181
7. Japan Should Not Join The League	181
8. League No Panacea	181
9. Covenant Wordy But Poor In Substance	181
10. Nothing To Rejoice	182
Section Two: Report From Australia	182
1. Australia-Japan Relation May Suffer	182

2. Hughes Motions To Keep Immigration Out	183
3. ‘Australia Solid Behind Hughes’	183
Section Three: Report From The US	183
1. US Press Sympathises With Japan	184
2. ‘Coloured People Of America’ protest	184
Section Four: Report From Britain	184
1. Commission Impressed By Japanese Delegates	184
2. Without Racial Equality, Covenant Incomplete	184
Section Five: Report From France	185
1. Wilson’s Ruling Criticised	185
2. Tribute To Japanese Delegates	185
3. French Public Opinion Supports Japan	185
4. French Sympathise With Japan	186
End Notes	186



## SUMMARY

Japan as an ally of Britain, since the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, entered World War One at British request. During the Great War Japan fought Germany in Asia and afforded protection to Australia. After the conclusion of the war, a peace conference was held at Paris in 1919. As a victorious ally and as one of the Five Great Powers of the day, Japan participated at Paris Peace Conference, and proposed racial equality to be enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Racial Equality Bill, despite the tireless efforts of the Japanese delegates who engaged the representatives of other countries in intense diplomatic negotiations, was rejected. The rejection, a debatable issue ever since, has inspired many explanations including the theory that it was a deliberate Japanese ploy to achieve other goals in the agenda.

This thesis has researched the reasons for rejection and contends that the rejection was not due to any one particular reason. Four key factors: a) resolute opposition from Australian Prime Minister Hughes determined to protect White Australia Policy, b) lack of British support, c) lack of US support, and d) lack of support from the British dominions of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa; converged to defeat the Japanese proposal. Japanese inexperience in international diplomacy evident from strategic and tactical mistakes, their weak presentations and communications, and enormous delays in negotiations, at Paris, undermined Japan's position at the conference, but the reasons for rejection of the racial equality proposal were extrinsic.

## **DEDICATION**

**Dedicated to my parents:  
Mr Yukio Imamoto and Mrs Kazuko Imamoto.**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to my supervisor Dr Misuzu Hanihara Chow, Director of MJS Centre of Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, for accepting my research proposal and my candidature for the higher degree of Master of Arts (Honours) (Research) in Japanese Studies. I am thankful to Dr Chow for encouraging me in my research efforts throughout the duration of the master's programme. I am particularly grateful to Dr Chow for her constructive criticisms and wise counsel in writing my thesis.

I gratefully acknowledge a Teaching Development Scholarship offered by the Japanese Studies Centre of Macquarie University for the academic years 2003 and 2004. The scholarship is a part of the Nippon Fellowship Foundation Fund.

I am grateful to my teacher Dr Nachiketa Das, Director-International of Bridge Business College of Sydney, Australia, for his help and support during my research.

I am thankful to Dr Kay-Wah Chan and Mr Susumu Takita, Lecturers at Japanese Studies, Department of Asian Languages for their constructive criticism and advice on various issues related to my research project.

I am indebted to my teachers Mr Liam Morgan and Ms Kerry Laws, Lecturers at Faculty of Education of University Technology, Sydney, for writing references for me in support of my applications for pursuing a master's degree at MJS Centre.

I am thankful to Mr Greg Wilson of the Manuscript Section of the National Library of Australia, Canberra, for sending photocopies of manuscripts from the library that I had requested for my research. I also thank Mr Wilson for his clarifications on the authorships of some of the documents of the library.

I am thankful to Mr Graeme Powell, Manuscript Librarian of Australian Collection and Reader Services of the National Library of Australia, Canberra for confirming the non-existence of 'any records of either informal conversations or of formal meetings' between the Australian Prime Minister Mr William Morris Hughes (or the Australian delegation) with the leaders and the delegations from other countries during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, at the National Library of Australia where 'the Hughes Papers (MS 1538)' are lodged.

I am thankful to Mr Mark Beasley of the National Archives of Australia, Melbourne, for providing me with the requested photocopies of the documents for my research project.

I am thankful to the staff of the National Archives of Australia, Canberra for helping me in getting the relevant materials for my research degree.

I am thankful to the staff at the National Diet Library of Tokyo for helping me in getting the relevant materials for my research project.

I am thankful to the staff at the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan at Tokyo for their help in arranging for the relevant materials for my research work.

I am thankful to Mr Kenichi Koyama of the *Denshi Media Shitsu* (Internet Section) of The Japan Times for his prompt response in clarifying my doubts about the change of name the newspaper went through in the last century.

I am thankful to the staff members of the library of Macquarie University, of the Japan Foundation Library of Sydney, and the State Library of New South Wales at Sydney for helping me in conducting my literature survey for my research degree.

I am grateful to my friend Miss Yukie Matsumoto and her parents Mr Yukio Matsumoto and Mrs Asako Matsumoto for their most loving hospitality during my long stays with them in their home in Tokyo that I visited to conduct my research at the National Diet Library and the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan at Tokyo.

I am thankful to my friends Dr Hazel Scott Hall and Dr Christopher Dorman for their hospitality and help during my stay in Canberra that I undertook in connection with my research at the National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia. I also thank Mr and Mrs Hari Madan, Mrs Jackie Yuen, Mrs Moko Eade, and Mrs Chizuru Irwin of Canberra for their help during my sojourn at their city.

I am thankful to my parents Mr Yukio Imamoto and Mrs Kazuko Imamoto, my grandmother Mrs Tomoe Imamoto, my sister Miss Sachiko Imamoto, and my brother Mr Kazushi Imamoto for their constant help and encouragement in my pursuit of my higher degree.

I thank my friends Mrs Tamae Hasegawa, Mr Takayuki Minowa, Mrs Yoshie Minowa, Mrs Yukie Nagato of Otsuka Seminar Australia at Chatswood; Mrs Linda Young, Mr Young, Miss Alice Young, Mr Mark Young, Mrs Akiko Reid, Mrs Yuki, Mr John Kuchtin, Mrs Tomoko Kuchtin of Riverwood; Mrs Noriko Kojiro-Brown, Mrs Chie Asano, Mrs Yumiko Murai, Mrs Hiromi Shizuka of Sydney Saturday School of Japanese; Mrs Eiko Onishi of Cremorne, Miss Miho Kikushima of Lane Cove, Australia; Dr (Miss) Miho Nagase, Miss Toshika Ono of Kure City; Miss Maki Ito, Mrs Mika Minami of Hiroshima; Mrs Kaoru Ishihara of Fukuoka; Tadashi Awane Sensei, Miss Asuka Todo, Mrs Yoko Miwa of Mihara; Miss Mika Hirata of Nagoya; Miss Fumiko Iguchi, Miss Naoko Arikawa of Matsumoto; Miss Ai Aoki, Mr Takanori Aoki of Litto: for encouraging me in pursuing my research project.

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Area Of Study:

World War One broke out on 4 August 1914 and raged for four years and four months, causing eight million deaths and twenty million injuries<sup>1</sup>. After the cessation of hostilities of the war, a peace conference was convened to be held in Paris<sup>2</sup>. Paris Peace Conference commenced on 18 January 1919 and concluded on 28 April 1919, after some three and a half months of intense debate, discussions and negotiations among the representatives of various participating countries. Japan as one of the Five Powers of the day, with Britain, the US, France and Italy, and also as one of the victorious allies, had representatives on the Council of Ten<sup>3</sup> at the conference, which discussed the terms of peace.

The Government of Japan made elaborate preparations to attend the conference. On 27 November 1918, before any of the other Powers had formally appointed their delegates, Government of Japan informally designated their plenipotentiaries. On 13 January 1919, Government of Japan formally appointed Prince Kimmochi Saionji as the chief plenipotentiary and Baron Nobuaki Makino, Sutemi Chinda (Ambassador to Britain), Keishiro Matsui (Ambassador to France) and Hikokichi Ijuin (Ambassador to Italy) as plenipotentiaries to Paris Peace Conference<sup>4</sup>. Japan's agenda for Paris Peace Conference contained essentially three items, namely, a) to secure territorial and other rights in Shantung province in China, b) to secure the cession of the Pacific islands north of the Equator seized from Germany, and c) to make the League of Nations adopt the Japanese proposal on racial equality. On all other issues, the Japanese Government explicitly instructed its delegation, a) to follow always fair and moderate principles, and b) to keep constantly in close contact with the representatives of Britain and other Allied and Associated Powers<sup>5</sup>.

In 1919 Japan and Britain were bound by Anglo-Japanese Alliance presently in its seventeenth year. First signed on 30 January 1902 and later renewed twice, Anglo-Japanese Alliance had constituted the backbone of Japanese foreign policy from the Meiji Era (1868-1912) to the Taisho Period (1912-1926). As a signatory to Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan had responded to British requests of combating German troops in East Asia, as the hostilities in Europe commenced leading to declarations of wars in 1914 that later came to be known as World War One. Consequently Japanese troops attacked German position in Tsingtao on 26 September 1914 under protection from the Japanese and British fleet<sup>6</sup>. The German forces surrendered on 7 November 1914. During the course of the war the Japanese fleet sailed south and captured the German held islands of Jaluit, Yap, the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the East and West Carolines in the Pacific. The Japanese navy joined the British to pursue German men-of-war and convoyed troopships from British colonies to Europe. Moreover

Japanese navy in European waters fought German submarines, and in the Indian Ocean pursued and destroyed German cruisers, thus making a significant contribution to the Allied victory in the war.

Japan also responded to British request to defend Australia and New Zealand during World War One. Japan dispatched a number of ships and personnel from her Imperial navy to Australia. Despite the deep suspicion and fears of Japan <sup>7</sup>, Australia accepted Japanese naval help. The powerful Japanese battle cruiser *Ibuki* escorted and convoyed ANZAC troops from Australia to Egypt. During the war years, a great part of patrolling the Australian coastline was done by Japanese navy. Japan's contribution to the war, given in allegiance to Anglo-Japanese Alliance benefited Britain and British dominions of Australia and New Zealand.

Japan considered Britain as her great ally. Perhaps on the strength of this presumed intimacy Japan felt encouraged to propose an amendment for incorporation in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The initial draft of the Japanese proposal read:

‘The equality of the nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree that concerning the treatment and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories, they will not discriminate, either in law or in fact, against any person or persons on account of his or their race or nationality’ <sup>8</sup>

and came to be known as Racial Equality Bill, and also referred to as Japanese proposal on racial equality.

In the early stages of Paris Peace Conference President Woodrow Wilson of the US appeared sympathetic towards Japanese proposal and so were the British. The majority of the nations at the conference expressed and maintained their support for Japanese proposal. However the Prime Minister of Australia William Morris Hughes whose country had received substantial naval help and protection by the Japanese in the just concluded World War One, mounted a vigorous campaign against Japanese proposal creating an impasse. Consequently Japanese delegates modified their proposal and wished to insert it into the preamble of the Covenant as:

‘by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals’ <sup>9</sup>.

This modified proposal received the support of eleven members out of the sixteen members in attendance, excluding the chairman, of the League of Nations Commission which was preparing the Covenant. However, because of resolute opposition from the Prime Minister of Australia, Japanese proposal on racial equality failed to obtain unanimous

approval at the League of Nations Commission. President Wilson, as the chairman of the Commission, rejected the Japanese proposal since the vote was not unanimous.

Despite Japan's significant contributions to World War One as a partner of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan's proposal was defeated by its own allies and Japan was utterly rebuffed. This raises the obvious question, why and how could this happen, particularly when so many rounds of behind the scenes diplomatic negotiations and delicate manoeuvres went on in Paris, between Japanese diplomats and their counterparts from other nations during the conference.

The existing literature on Japanese proposal on racial equality, to quote Shimazu<sup>10</sup> 'adopts a certain analytical position in examining the issue'. A Japanese scholar, Ikei<sup>11</sup>, contends that racial equality proposal was aimed at 'resolving the anti-Japanese immigration problems in Anglo-Saxon countries'. Sissons<sup>12</sup> discussed the racial equality proposal from Australian immigration perspective. Lauren<sup>13</sup> investigated racial equality proposal from a racial discrimination and racism point of view. Mamiya<sup>14</sup> and Nakanishi<sup>15</sup> studied racial equality proposal from the perspective of some leading Japanese personalities who participated in Paris Peace Conference. An international lawyer, Onuma<sup>16</sup> investigated racial equality proposal without any obvious analytical bias. Shimazu interested in investigating why Japan submitted racial equality proposal focused on five aspects namely: 'immigration, universal principle, great power status, domestic policies, and politics of bargaining'. MacMillan<sup>17</sup> looked at racial equality proposal in the context of the Paris Conference's attempt to end war. But none of the researchers have proposed a total picture as to what were the reasons for rejection of Japanese proposal on racial equality.

Ever since the rejection of Japan's Racial Equality Bill on 11 April 1919 at the League of Nations Commission, critics in Japan as well as outside have tried to discredit the Japanese delegation. Within Japan the expressions of shock, disbelief and anger were aired in the media. These critics claimed that Japan was not serious about racial equality issue, and Racial Equality Bill was perhaps a bluff at best or a tool for bargain at worst. Some argued that Japan neither did expect nor did intend to get its proposal on racial equality accepted. These critics accused Japan of raising racial equality issue to embarrass the Anglo-Saxons to secure its demands on territorial rights on Shantung Province and the Pacific islands<sup>18</sup>. Shimazu has used the phrase 'bargaining chip' theory to label this accusation against the Japanese delegates, and in a series of well-constituted logical arguments has demonstrated that the bargaining chip theory 'was a way of discrediting the Japanese', and the accusation of bargaining is incorrect.

Japan did secure its demands on territorial rights on Shantung Province and the Pacific islands; and Britain, France, the US and others did yield to Japanese demands on territorial rights rather easily because they wanted to appease the Japanese delegates so that they did not boycott or quit the fledgling League of Nations like the Italians had already done and the Belgians were about to do. But the Japanese delegates never had a strategy of sacrificing Racial Equality Bill to secure demands on territorial rights on Shantung and Pacific islands. Japanese delegates immediately responded to these charges of conspiracy, and utterly and firmly refuted them with strong evidences. Western sources confirmed the Japanese evidences, and one observer expressed that the Japanese argument ‘pulverised’<sup>19</sup> the critics.

Tsuzuki<sup>20</sup> in his book *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan: 1825-1995*, has stoked the old accusations with a twist by saying that Japan’s ‘proposal for racial equality was in fact an after thought, derived from an apprehension of possible discrimination on the Council of the League’. The author would like to counter this accusation by recording that in December 1914, only a few months after the outbreak of World War One, when France offered Japan to make a reasonable demand in return for sending Japanese troops to Europe, Japan’s main proposal was removal of racial discrimination against Japanese people settled in the foreign lands of British colonies<sup>21</sup>. Japan had time and again pointed out the issue of racial discrimination in order for its elimination. When, however, the Entente powers met in London in January 1915 to discuss what compensation could be offered to Japan, the main Japanese proposal, removal of racial discrimination against Japanese in British colonies, was quietly dropped<sup>22</sup>. So it is important to remember that Japan proposed removal of racial discrimination in British colonies, which was essentially the precursor to Racial Equality Bill, as early as 1914, even much before the Anglo-Japanese secret agreement of 1917, where Japan proposed for the cession of German islands in the south Pacific, and territorial rights in Shantung Province in China. These three Japanese demands, one of 1914 and two of 1917 of the World War One years, were to form the Japanese agenda for Paris Peace conference in 1919.

Shimazu has attempted to paint ‘a subtle and complex’ picture of Japan with her assertion ‘Japan as an arrogant, yet insecure power, dismissive of, yet sensitive to international opinion’. Shimazu concerned with the question ‘why’ Japan proposed Racial Equality Bill argues that Japan did so essentially for three reasons namely, great power status, immigration, and domestic politics. This thesis is focused on demonstrating the reasons for failure of Racial Equality Bill and therefore does not conflict with the research endeavours of Shimazu. Since the focus of this thesis lies elsewhere, an attempt at negation or affirmation of Shimazu’s<sup>23</sup> as well as Tsuzuki’s contentions, is beyond the scope of this thesis.



Shimazu's belief that Japan's racial equality proposal was not intended as a demand for universal racial equality because the Japanese continued to practise discrimination against the Chinese and Koreans is again beyond the scrutiny of this thesis.

This thesis has researched the recorded historical facts, published as well as unpublished, and the diplomatic negotiations to present a total picture of the reasons for rejection of Japan's Racial Equality Bill proposed to the League of Nations at Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

## **2. Theme, Principal Question, And Objective Of Research:**

Presented below are the theme, the principal question, and the objectives of research.

**Theme:** Investigation of historical facts and diplomatic negotiations to present a total picture of the reasons for rejection of Japan's Racial Equality Bill proposed to the League of Nations at Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in the aftermath of World War One.

**Principal Question:** What were the reasons for rejection of Japan's Racial Equality Bill presented to the League of Nations at Paris Peace Conference in 1919?

### **Objective Of Research:**

a) To identify the reasons for Australia's opposition to Japan's Racial Equality Bill presented to the League of Nations at Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

b) To demonstrate that the then prevailing White Australia Policy was responsible for a determined Australian opposition led by Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes to scuttle Japan's Racial Equality Bill presented to the League of Nations.

## **3. Methodology For Research:**

### **a) Collection Of Information From Published Sources:**

Bulk of the research for this thesis involves a detailed investigation of the published literature in both English and Japanese languages on the subjects of: Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Japan's involvement in World War One; Australia Japan cooperation during World war One; Fear of Japan in Australia, William Morris Hughes; Japan's preparation, negotiation, and presentation of Racial Equality Bill at the League of Nations in 1919; and the eventual rejection of Racial Equality Bill at Paris Peace Conference.

Another published primary source tapped for materials for this thesis is a range of newspapers of Japan of relevant periods of time, currently lodged in microfilm formats in National Diet Library of the Government of Japan at Tokyo.

### **b) Collection Of Information From Unpublished Sources:**

Research into the unpublished materials that exist in archives, in the form of letters, correspondences and newspaper articles, both in Japan and Australia, is conducted for a systematic collection of historical facts, and for a comprehensive understanding of diplomatic

negotiations and delicate manoeuvres to shed new lights on all the subjects detailed in previous paragraphs.

Bulk of the information on intricate negotiations between Japanese diplomats and other parties during Paris Peace Conference, and descriptions of proceedings of the events at Paris Peace Conference, have been collected from an authentic unpublished primary source, the Diplomatic Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan, presently lodged in the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tokyo. The three main documents that constitute this primary source are 1. *Jinshuteki Sabetsu Taiguu Teppai Mondai Sookatsu Hookoku*, October 1919, *Kokusai Renmei: Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai*, Vol. 3; 2. *Jinshuteki Sabetsu Teppai Ni Kansuru Mondai, Taiheiyoo Mondai Kenkyuu Shiryoo*, Vol.4, 20 Sept 1921, *Kokusai Renmei: Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai*, Vol. 3, 3. *Matsui to Uchida, Kokusai Renmei: Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai*, Vol. 2.

#### **4. Preview Of The Results Presented In The Thesis:**

A thorough investigation of historical facts, and a critical examination accompanied by a new interpretation of diplomatic negotiations relevant to the presentation of Japan's Racial Equality Bill to the League of Nations at Paris Peace Conference in 1919, conducted in this thesis, has revealed some interesting new findings. The research reveals that the Japanese proposal was not rejected because of any one particular reason. A number of factors combined to defeat the adoption of racial equality by the League of Nations. In fact, in the final session of the League of Nations Commission on the evening of 11 April 1919, when Japanese plenipotentiary Baron Nobuaki Makino proposed a vote for and against the Japanese proposal, out of the sixteen members in attendance excluding the chairman, eleven members raised their hands in favour. Those in favour included the two French delegates, two Italian delegates, and one delegate each from Greece, China, Serbia, Portugal, Czechoslovakia and the two Japanese delegates. Only five delegates, one each from Britain, the United States, Poland, Brazil and Romania, voted against the proposal<sup>24</sup>. Yet the chairman President Wilson of the US overruled the wish of the majority and decreed that as the Japanese proposal was not unanimously agreed upon. He declared that he had no choice but to regard it as to have failed to be adopted. Wilson, however, on two earlier occasions, after debates to decide two vital issues, location of the League of Nations, and insertion of special reservation clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations to protect the validity of Monroe doctrine that was proposed by the Americans and vehemently opposed by the French, had taken the decision on the basis of simple majority rather than unanimity.

The key factors that came together to defeat the Japanese proposal could be listed as:  
a) resolute opposition to Racial Equality Bill from the Prime Minister of Australia determined

to protect White Australia Policy; b) opposition by the British; c) lack of US support; and d) sympathy of British dominions of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa with Australia. Hughes's determined opposition provided the convenient excuse to Britain and the US to defeat the Japanese proposal. To make matters worse the Japanese delegates, inexperienced in international diplomacy, at Paris Peace Conference appeared pliable with their numerous changes to the text of the racial equality proposal; and presented their case poorly. The existence of entrenched prejudices against the Japanese did not help their cause either. Japan failed to cultivate the British support during World War One years, a vital issue that was publicised in a letter cabled from the London correspondent of the Tokyo *Asahi* and published in *Japan Times & Mail* of 11 May 1919, the text of which is presented in Appendix I under the caption Japan Must Rouse Public Opinion in Britain. It is also important to record that Japanese diplomats during Paris Peace Conference failed to garner British support. Moreover the Japanese diplomats failed to counter Hughes and that doomed the adoption of Racial Equality Bill at the League of Nations.

The results of the systematic investigation presented in the thesis are offered in five chapters, starting from Chapter One to Chapter Five. Chapter One entitled, Anglo-Japanese Relations And World War One, has three sections, Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Japan's involvement in World War One; and Japan Australia Relation during World War One. This chapter reveals that Anglo-Japanese Alliance, on the basis of which Japan became involved in the war, had been reached due to a favourable British opinion of Japan that prevailed during the 1890s. In the second decade of its existence, particularly during the war years, the alliance declined in popularity in Britain. Once the alliance lost the support of the British, it was liquidated. These facts are used to demonstrate the importance of British support, lack of which ensured the failure of Japanese proposal on racial equality at the League of Nations.

Chapter Two entitled, Fear Of Japan In Australia, reveals and analyses the fear of Japan and grave prejudices against Japanese people that prevailed in Australia. The fear of Japan and prejudice against the Japanese, determined Australia's immigration, defence and foreign policies; and eventually led to the creation of White Australia Policy as a shield to protect Australia. Chapter Three bearing the title, William Morris Hughes, reveals fear of Japan that Australian Prime Minister William Hughes nursed. Chapter Three also demonstrates that Hughes, a champion of White Australia Policy, resolutely opposed Japan's Racial Equality Bill because he saw it as a grave threat to the very foundation on which Australia stood. Chapter Three also speculates that perhaps only Britain could have restrained Hughes from his intense opposition to the Japanese Racial Equality Bill, just as the British

Prime Minister Lloyd George had squashed the demands of Hughes in November 1918 when Hughes had hinted at reneging on Anglo-Japanese secret agreement of 1917.

Chapter Four entitled, Japan's Proposal And Diplomacy At Paris, opens with a discussion on the elaborate Japanese preparation for participation in Paris Peace Conference, and then describes the intricate and intense diplomatic negotiations conducted by the plenipotentiaries of Japan with the representatives of other participating countries, in order to get Racial Equality Bill adopted by the League of Nations. Chapter Four also presents the convergence of the key factors: resolute opposition to Racial Equality Bill from the Prime Minister of Australia determined to protect White Australia Policy; opposition by the British; lack of US support and President Wilson's decision to overrule the wishes of the majority of the delegates; and sympathy of British dominions New Zealand, Canada and South Africa with Australia; to defeat the Japanese proposal.

Chapter Five entitled, Reasons For Rejection: A Discussion, presents a detailed discussion and critical analysis of the main factors that combined to defeat Racial Equality Bill at the conference. This chapter also demonstrates that Japanese delegates although made genuine efforts at negotiations at Paris for the adoption of racial equality proposal by the League of Nations, because of their inexperience in international diplomacy committed strategic and tactical mistakes, and made some diplomatic errors that undermined their case. This chapter, moreover, presents discussions to demonstrate that inexperienced Japanese diplomacy, particularly Japanese inability to rouse British support in its favour, significantly contributed to the ultimate rejection of racial equality proposal. In the absence of a strong support from the British, Racial Equality Bill succumbed to the resolute opposition of Australian Prime Minister Hughes that spearheaded the other factors that combined to defeat the Japanese bill.

Conclusion of the thesis presents a summation of the four factors that combined to defeat the Japanese proposal on racial equality at the League of Nations.

The thesis also presents a substantial bibliography in the general area of study of the research. Certain phrases and terms such as white countries, White Australia Policy, coloured people, yellow race, etc. although sound awkward and even unpleasant, have been used in the thesis, following wide spread uses by many of the respected researchers in the area of study, liberally quoted in the present thesis.

The Appendix contains, Comments From The Japanese Press, highlighting the reactions in Japan and Australia, as gauged from the newspaper reports and articles, to the rejection of the Japanese proposal at Paris Peace Conference. This section drew materials

from a primary source, a range of newspapers of the era from Japan. The relevant newspaper reports, often in their entirety, are presented in the Appendix.

#### End Notes:

1. Alan John Percivale Taylor, *English History, 1914-1945* (Oxford University Press, 1965).
2. Morinosuke Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan: 1894-1922*, Vol. II (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1978).
3. William G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan*: 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1991), 207.
4. Morinosuke Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan: 1894-1922*, Vol. III (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1980).
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid.*
7. Neville Kingsley Meaney, *Towards a New Vision: Australia & Japan: Through 100 Years* (Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 1999).
8. *Jinshuteki Sabetsu Taiguu Teppai Mondai Sookatsu Hookoku* (Summary of the Report of Abolition of Racial Discrimination), October 1919, p.2 in *Kokusai Renmai* (The League of Nations): *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai* (Abolition of Racial Discrimination), Vol.3, Diplomatic Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan.
9. Morinosuke Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan: 1894-1922*, Vol. III (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1980), 411.
10. Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London: Routledge, 1998), 4.
11. Masaru Ikei, “*Pari heiwa kaigi to jinshu sabetsu teppai mondai* (Paris Peace Conference and Abolition of Racial Discrimination)”, *Kokusai seiji* (International Politics), 1962, vol.23, 44-58.
12. David C. S. Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919”, *History Section* 26/821, Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, 1971.
13. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
14. Kunio Mamiya, “*Okuma Shigenobu to jinshu sabetsu teppai mondai* (Okuma Shigenobu and Abolition of Racial Discrimination)”, *Waseda daigakushi kiyoo* (History Bulletin of Waseda University), 1989, vol. 22, 213-37.
15. Hiroshi Nakanishi, “*Kanoe Fumimaro ‘Eibei hon’i no heiwashugi o haisu’ rombun no haikai* (The Background of Kanoe Fumimaro’s Paper ‘Discard British and the US Proposed

- Rules for Peace’”), *Hoogaku ronsoo* (Discussion on Japanese Studies), 1993, vol. 132, 225-58.
16. Yasuaki Onuma, “*Haruka naru jinshu byoodoo no risoo* (A Far Away Ideal Racial Equality)”, in *Kokusaihoo* (International Law), *Kokusai rengoo to Nihon* (The League of Nations and Japan), ed. Yasuaki Onuma (Tokyo: Koobundoo, 1987).
  17. Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray Ltd., 2001).
  18. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
  19. Emile Joseph Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920).
  20. Chushichi Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan: 1825-1995* (Oxford University Press, 2000), 208.
  21. Ian Hill Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23* (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 151.
  22. *ibid.*, p.151.
  23. Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London: Routledge, 1998), 2.
  24. *Jinshuteki Sabetsu Taiguu Teppai Mondai Sookatsu Hookoku* (Summary of the Report of Abolition of Racial Discrimination), October 1919, p.13-14 in *Kokusai Renmai* (The League of Nations): *Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai* (Abolition of Racial Discrimination), Vol.3, Diplomatic Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan.