

**‘Warfare of the Most Dreadful Description’:
A Comparative Study of Settler Colonial Violence
in Connecticut and Tasmania.**

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Abstract

The Pequot War in seventeenth-century Connecticut and the Black War in nineteenth-century Tasmania were key moments in American and Australian history, respectively. Separated by two hundred years and 17,000 kilometres, they nonetheless followed remarkably similar trajectories; relative peace followed by aggressive settler expansion, the clash of two radically different military cultures, and the physical removal of the remaining indigenous survivors. Using the innovative field of settler colonial studies, this thesis will comparatively examine settler colonial violence in Connecticut and Tasmania. As a burgeoning number of works in the field have shown, settler colonial studies lends itself well to global and comparative approaches, as well as transtemporal ones. However, to date, there have been very few studies of the latter.

This project will analyse the structural attributes of settler colonial violence comparatively *and* transtemporally to identify the ways in which they manifest in different cultural contexts and temporal frameworks. More broadly, it will seek to provide a detailed analysis of how the operative logic of settler colonialism can inform and shape seemingly unrelated events, and further the understanding of this distinctive and pervasive process.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed) _____ Date: _____

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Introduction

In the year 1636 the English colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, Plymouth, and Saybrook rallied for war. Seeking to avenge the death of one of their own and suppress any opposition to their hegemony, they took to the field against the powerful Pequot tribe in what is now the American state of Connecticut.¹ The resulting conflict would go down in history as the Pequot War. Nearly two hundred years later, in 1828, the British colony of Van Diemen's Land, Australia, took similar action. Having encountered violent resistance to their territorial expansion, the British waged a prolonged and bloody war against the indigenous Palawa nations in the eastern half of the island.² This struggle would be infamously remembered as the Black War.

Though separated by two centuries and 17,000 kilometres, the Pequot War and the Black War followed very similar historical trajectories. In both cases, periods of relative peace between the indigenes and settlers were brought to an end as the latter's desire to acquire land and consolidate their hegemony began to threaten the very survival of the former. Neither the indigenes nor the settlers desired war at first, instead employing punitive measures to punish the other's transgressions and assert their own authority. However, as this pattern of violence escalated their vastly different military cultures began to clash without restraint, with the evasive and irregular tactics of the indigenes competing with the settler's methods of total war and open confrontation. By the time each war had ended the indigenes had suffered severe depopulation and near cultural extinction, with the survivors being physically removed so that their ancestral lands could be settled without opposition.

¹ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania*. (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 1.

² Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating & Empire Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 38.

This thesis is concerned to explore these comparisons further, with a view to considering the nature of settler colonial violence. How does settler colonialism inform the violence which eventuates in these contexts? What form does the violence take? And does it have lasting legacies? Using the insights of the emerging and innovative field of settler colonial studies, this thesis provides a transnational and transtemporal examination of settler colonial violence in Connecticut and Tasmania.

The Pequot War and the Black War were early chapters in the long histories of American and Australian frontier violence and, as they ended centuries of indigenous autonomy and ushered in new eras of settler dominance, both have been considered pivotal moments in the foundational years of their respective nations. As such, each has been the subject of numerous historical studies, which began before the centuries they had occurred in had come to pass. In seventeenth century America, the Puritan minister Increase Mather, who was born the year after the Pequot War ended, included a detailed overview of the conflict in his highly regarded 1676 work *A Relation Of the Troubles which have hapned in New-England, by Reason of the Indians There*.³ In nineteenth century Tasmania, the Black War featured in an array of historical works, including Henry Melville's *The History of Van Diemen's Land From the Year 1824-1835*, written just three years after the conflict's end, and James Bonwick's 1870 book *The Last of the Tasmanians*.⁴

By and large, the historians of both settler communities shared the view that colonisation was an inevitable process. But due to the eras and contexts they were writing in, they differed greatly in their perception of the violence that accompanied it. Influenced by the zealous convictions of Puritan society, Mather's analysis represented the Pequot people as treacherous Satanists and

³ Increase Mather, *A Relation of the Troubles which have Hapned in New-England, by Reason of the Indians There, from the Year 1614 to the Year 1675* (New York: Arno Press, 1676).

⁴ Henry Melville, *The History of Van Diemen's Land* (Sydney: Horwitz Publications and The Grahame Book Company, 1965); James Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians* (London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, 1870).

the war against them as both a defensive action and a justified conquest.⁵ Writing in the wake of the growing British humanitarian movement, Melville, Bonwick, and other Tasmanian authors adopted a sympathetic approach to the Palawa, depicting them as naturally peaceful people who were driven to violence by settler depredations.⁶

These different interpretations of culpability contributed to the development of contrasting foundational narratives in the United States and Australia. According to Gregory Smithers, notions of native savagery in America supported the belief that inflicting violence upon indigenes was “a ‘just’ means for settler colonialism to expand from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.”⁷ This eventually led to the nineteenth-century concept of Manifest Destiny, which promised white American dominance of the continent and presented the violent dispossession of native peoples as both inevitable and justified.⁸ This was very different in Australia, where, according to Johanna Perheentupa, the frequent victimization of indigenes by colonial historians resulted in the construction of “Aboriginal people as a part of nature” and the denial of “their humanity and role as active subjects.”⁹ Further more, the responsibility for the dispossession of indigenes was deflected through the mistaken belief that Aboriginal Australians were naturally fated to (or in the case of the Palawa, already victims of) extinction. These views found resonance in the concept of terra nullius, the justification for British sovereignty in Australia till the late twentieth century. Translated as ‘land belonging to no-one’ this conveniently denied Aboriginal inhabitants any claim to land or even personhood. It also denied them the status of active resisters and masked the act of colonial invasion. British sovereignty in Australia came to be founded on the myth of peaceful settlement which, when mixed with extinction, silenced frontier conflict.

⁵ Increase Mather, *A Relation of the Troubles which have Hapned in New-England, by Reason of the Indians There, from the Year 1614 to the Year 1675* (New York: Arno Press, 1676), 59.

⁶ Johanna Perheentupa, ‘Victims of the Past? : White-Aboriginal Relations in Australian Historiography in the Nineteenth Century,’ *Zeitschrift für Australienstudien* 23, no. 22 (2009): 36

⁷ Gregory D. Smithers, “Rethinking Genocide in North America,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 333.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Johanna Perheentupa, ‘Victims of the Past? : White-Aboriginal Relations in Australian Historiography in the Nineteenth Century,’ *Zeitschrift für Australienstudien* 23, no. 22 (2009):

These narratives were reflected in the historiographies of the Pequot War and the Black War. Notions of indigenous savagery and culpability in the Pequot War resonated with American historians in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries. Even as late as 1965, Alden Vaughan claimed that “most of the blame for the war must fall on the Pequots,” describing them as “guilty of blatant and persistent aggression.”¹⁰ In Tasmania, the representation of the pre-colonial landscape as a vacant space resulted in the war fought for its possession disappearing from popular history in the early twentieth-century. Clive Turnbull’s 1948 book *Black War* did bring the conflict some academic attention, but also repeated the erroneous belief that the Palawa had been driven to complete extinction, stating “by 1876, the last of them was dead.”¹¹

During the 1970s and 1980s, these historiographies underwent significant revisions as American and Australians alike began to reconsider their pasts. Specifically, the political climate produced by the global process of decolonisation led many scholars to reinvestigate colonial history and uncover the stories of the indigenous people who had previously been silenced.¹² In America, works such as Francis Jennings’ *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (1975) dismissed the notion that the Pequots were the aggressors in the conflict, and instead identified the main instigation as being the “Puritan appetites for land.”¹³

In Australia, the subject of Aboriginal resistance and survival became highly topical. Works like Henry Reynolds’ *The Other Side of the Frontier* (1981) demonstrated that indigenous people had opposed colonisation across the continent, while Lyndall Ryan’s *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, published in the same year, proved that, contrary to popular belief, the Palawa people had not

¹⁰ Alden Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp, 1965), 135-136.

¹¹ Clive Turnbull, *The Black War* (Melbourne: Cheshire Ltd, 1948).

¹² Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 4.

¹³ Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: The Norton Library, 1975), 179.

died out.¹⁴ From the 1970s to the 1990s historians 'broke the silence' about Australia's bloody frontier as numerous local and regional studies demonstrated that violence was an everyday part of colonial settlement.¹⁵ Even more significantly, this historiography demonstrated that Indigenous Australians fought back across the continent. Wherever settlement spread, Aboriginal people resisted.¹⁶ This simultaneously broke the longstanding view of Aboriginal passivity.

Importantly, this revisionist trend challenged the myth of peaceful settlement that had underpinned Australia's claims to sovereignty, and eventually became the focus of a series of political and academic debates dubbed 'the history wars.'¹⁷ These debates were about the nature and scale of the conflict. Those opposing revisionist scholarship argued that the historians had exaggerated conflicts that were small scale and not to be confused with actual warfare. Spearheading this reactionary movement, Keith Windschuttle went as far to claim that the revisionists had fabricated the history to peddle an ideological agenda.¹⁸ One of the outcomes of these rhetorical conflicts was that they focused attention on Tasmania, long considered the 'cradle of race relations' and important to the foundational narratives of the nation. The competing interpretations of what happened there demonstrated the investment in origins and particularly versions of Tasmania's history. Those who denied the violence trenchantly resisted any notion that Australia was founded on genocide. Further,

¹⁴ Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier* (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1981); Lyndall Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981).

¹⁵ WEH Stanner, *After Dreaming: Black and White Australians- An Anthropologist's View* (Boyer Lectures Series: ABC, Sydney, 1969), p, 25; Bruce Elder, *Blood on the Wattle: Massacres and Maltreatment of Australian Aborigines since 1788* (Frenchs Forest: Child & Associates, 1988), 170; Jan Critchett, *A Distant Field of Murder: Western District Frontiers, 1834-1848*. (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 1990).

¹⁶ Al Grassby and Marji Hill, *Six Australian Battlefields: The Black Resistance to Invasion and the White Struggle Against Colonial Oppression* (St Leonards: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1988), 34-69. Noel Loos, *Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-European Relations on the North Queensland Frontier 1861-1897* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981).

¹⁷ Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, *The History Wars* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 147.

¹⁸ Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, Volume One: Van Diemen's Land, 1803-1847* (Paddington: Macleay Press, 2002).

the Black Line- a major military operation against the Palawa- was dismissed as a mere aberration.

While these debates were something of an obstacle to revisionist scholarship and did disrupt an incredibly productive field of historical research, they also led to more focused studies and reappraisals of colonial violence. One of the more recent outcomes of this has been the effort of Ryan and her team to digitally map frontier massacres in eastern Australia.¹⁹ These have highlighted the intensity of violence in that section of the continent, while her earlier 2013 analysis of the Black Line confirmed that it was far from an aberration. Rather it was very similar to strategies used in overseas colonial conflicts as instruments of dispossession.²⁰

Overall, these revisions resulted in important reevaluations of indigenous-settler violence in Tasmania and Connecticut. However, colonisation was a process that took many different forms, and attempts to examine them under a single field of study runs the risk of overlooking the cultural distinctions produced by different colonial formations.

During the 1990s, a new theoretical model emerged which re-energised interest in both wars, and produced some further notable works of revision. At this time an increasingly large number of scholars “began to view the singular category of ‘colonialism’ as too blunt a tool” to sufficiently analyse colonial formations driven by the annexation and settlement of land.²¹ Patrick Wolfe was perhaps the most important of these, with his 1998 book *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* being highly influential in transforming settler colonial studies from a subset of colonial history into an independent discipline. Its method of distinguishing colonial and settler colonial processes is of great importance to this thesis, as it contrasts the different ways in which settlers

¹⁹ “Colonial Massacres in Eastern Australia 1788-1872,” The Centre for 21st Century Humanities, accessed September 21 2017. <https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/colonialmassacres/>

²⁰ Lyndall Ryan, “The Black Line in Van Diemen’s Land: success or failure?” *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 3-18.

²¹ Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey, “A New Beginning for *Settler Colonial Studies*,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 1 (2013): 2.

treated indigenes.²² In most colonial endeavors, an indigenous population is something to control and exploit, with the colonist seeking to supplant pre-existing leaderships and establish a master-servant relationship in his favour.²³ In a settler colonial endeavor, the primary objective is the acquisition of land rather than the exploitation of the people living there. As such, settler colonialism is essentially a “winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement.”²⁴

Settler colonialism has thus been defined as a unique historical process. As a leading expert in the field, Lorenzo Veracini argues, though they intersect in a number of ways, settler colonialism is a completely distinct process and field of study from colonialism.²⁵ He does acknowledge the overlap between the two in his definition of a ‘colony,’ which is described as the “localised ascendancy of an external element.”²⁶ Ultimately their distinctions are highlighted in his description of the types of colonial communities that each process constructs, with colonialism resulting in “a political body that is dominated by an exogenous agency” and settler colonialism leading to “an exogenous entity that reproduces itself in a given environment.”²⁷ Writing of settler colonialism in the North American context, Walter Hixson defines it as “a history in which settlers drove indigenous populations from the land in order to construct their own ethnic and religious national communities.”²⁸ It is an inherently land-based enterprise, characterised by settlers inserting themselves into foreign landscapes via the eradication or expulsion of the pre-existing populations.

Settler colonialism thus offers a particularly useful model for historians interested in colonial violence between settlers and indigenous peoples.

²² Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassell & Co., 1999), 163.

²³ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁵ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁸ Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4.

In both America and Australia, understanding that territorial expansion begat violence has allowed both nations' histories of frontier warfare to be understood on similar terms. Writing in 2013, Hixson argued that "American settler colonialism ultimately drove an ethnic cleansing of the continent" as it provoked violent encounters between indigenes and settlers, the latter of whom would "accept nothing less than removal of Indians and complete control of the land." The settlers of America are further described as possessing "a propensity for waging indiscriminate violence against their savage foes" that would manifest "over the sweep of US history and help define an "American Way of War" in the process."²⁹

In the Australian context, James Belich's *Replenishing the Earth* (2009) examines the invasion of the continent as one part of a much larger 'settler revolution,' which saw British settler colonies undergo explosive increases in size and population. His analysis of these 'booms' helpfully highlights the correlation between land acquisition and war in settler societies, noting "that most, though not all, spasms of intense Aboriginal resistance correlate with booms." Through this examination of settler colonialism, Belich demonstrates that, while Indigenous Australians were able to achieve "a degree of coexistence with normal European settlement," the mass appropriation of their lands resulted in them offering resistance that was "intense, courageous, and well-organized, though ultimately unsuccessful."

Works dedicated specifically to Connecticutian and Tasmanian colonial experiences have also been shaped by settler colonial theory in recent years, with perhaps the most notable example coming from Lyndall Ryan, who had noticed that "new approaches developed" in the decades since *The Aboriginal Tasmanians* was first published.³⁰ Coming to the conclusion that settler colonialism offered a "more encompassing approach to understanding how the Tasmanian Aborigines were nearly wiped off the face of the earth within a generation," she adopted it as the theoretical framework for her 2012 book

²⁹ Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1.

³⁰ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), xvii.

Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803.³¹ Of particular note is her description of settler colonialism in Tasmania as a “structured process” that could be achieved “only by completely dispossessing the native peoples,” which gives the strong suggestion that the British colonists should be interpreted as having seen their war against the Palawa as a justified and necessary action taken to ensure their own survival and entrepreneurial success.³²

Nicholas Clements’ book *Black War: Fear Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (2014) further examines this interpretation. With half the book dedicated to chronicling settler attitudes and experiences during the war, Clements clearly demonstrates how the settler mentality refused to see the indigenes as anything other than a threat that needed to be removed if settlement was to succeed.³³ Andrea Robertson Cremer’s 2008 contribution to *Early American Studies* makes similar observations within the context of the Pequot War. In her article *Possession: Indian Bodies, Cultural Control, and Colonialism in the Pequot War* she is quick to observe that “settler colonies offer a unique environment where cultures collided,” and that the repercussions of these collisions did not end with the cessation of hostilities.³⁴ Though the Pequots had been thoroughly defeated by 1638, the men of the tribe “continued to be treated as hostile and threatening” by the English, resulting in them being “physically removed from New England” so that settlement could continue unimpeded.³⁵

Clearly, settler colonial studies has provided an important new model for rethinking colonial history. One of its most useful aspects, for the purposes of this thesis, is that it opens the possibility for comparative and transnational approaches. As described by Patrick Wolfe, settler invasion is “a structure not an event,” and this structure is one that cannot be confined to any single period or

³¹ *Ibid.*, xvii.

³² *Ibid.*, xvii.

³³ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania*. (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 43.

³⁴ Andrea Robertson Cremer, “Possession: Indian Bodies, Cultural Control, and Colonialism in the Pequot War,” *Early American Studies* 6, no. 2 (2008): 296.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 299.

location.³⁶ This perspective gives the field the potential to draw connections between historical events divided by continents and centuries, with Hixson even arguing “settler colonial studies facilitate comparative analysis that reveals surprisingly similar histories evolving at different places and at different times.”³⁷ Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson define settler colonialism as being “cultural and symbolic as well as physical,” capable of engendering a distinctive mentality in settlers from as far afield as “the United States, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, Argentina, and Australia.”³⁸ Indeed, they highlight how settler colonial practices throughout history, from the arrival of Dutch immigrants in seventeenth century South Africa, to the contemporary Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory have been driven and influenced by remarkably similar beliefs and attitudes.³⁹

Notably, the number of comparative and transnational histories has grown in the last decade. As Alison Holland recently noted, many settler colonial scholars have also realised the benefit of this comparative approach in “highlighting historical processes that transcend nation states,” and have taken to applying it to topics as diverse as “law (including policing) and politics, the military, marriage and intimacy, Indigenous activism and humanitarianism.”⁴⁰ Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington’s 2011 edited book *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture* is representative of this trend. Strongly interdisciplinary, it draws upon a wide variety of literature to assess the “distinctive features of settler colonialism” as a means of “identifying the shared histories and parallel experiences of settler colonies, in various temporal, geographical, and cultural circumstances.”⁴¹

³⁶ Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassell & Co., 1999), 163.

³⁷ Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7.

³⁸ Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson, “Settler Colonies,” in *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, ed. Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 362.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 361.

⁴⁰ Alison Holland, ‘Learning and Teaching Indigenous History in Transnational and Comparative Frame: Lessons from the Coalface,’ *History Australia* (forthcoming, 2018): 9-11.

⁴¹ Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, “Introduction,” in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3.

Warfare is one of the least frequently compared topics in settler colonial studies. That is not to say that the violence that typically followed settler colonial expansion has been completely omitted from transnational comparative analyses. Rather, it has instead been largely examined under different research topics. One notable example of this can be found in Amanda Nettlebeck's *Fragile Settlements: Aboriginal People, Law and Resistance in South-West Australia and Prairie Canada*, which compares the violent contests between settlers and indigenes in Canada and Australia as part of a study of settler law and sovereignty.⁴² Likewise, Ashley Riley Sousa's article *A Comparative Study of Genocide in California and Tasmania* compares the Black War with the violent settlement of California with an emphasis on ethnic cleansing rather than warfare.⁴³

Research dedicated to settler colonial warfare tends to have a more domestic focus, and studies of the Pequot War and Black War are no exception to this. In his military history *The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838* John Connor stated that Australia's history of frontier warfare "should be put into the context of military operations in other parts of the British Empire."⁴⁴ And yet, the section dedicated to the Black War makes no attempt to compare the conflict with overseas examples.⁴⁵ Likewise, the attempts to contextualize the violence of the Pequot War, such as Alfred A. Cave's *The Pequot War* and Bernard Bailyn's *The Barbarous Years*, do so by exclusively examining the cultural and political environment of colonial New England.⁴⁶ A comparison of the Pequot War and the Black War has the potential to broaden this parochial approach and add a new dimension to settler colonialism's emerging comparative trend.

⁴² Amanda Nettlebeck, *Fragile Settlements: Aboriginal People, Law and Resistance in South-West Australia and Prairie Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

⁴³ Ashley Riley Sousa, "They Will Be Hunted Down Like Wild Beasts and Destroyed!": A Comparative Study of Genocide in California and Tasmania,' *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no. 2 (2004).

⁴⁴ John Connor, *The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), xii.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 84-101.

⁴⁶ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 11; Bernard Bailyn, *The Barbarous Years* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 444.

However, such a study also demands a trans-temporal approach, for the structure of settler colonialism transcends time as well as geography. This approach offers even further potential for settler colonial studies, with Bateman and Pilkington highlighting how the comparison of different temporal contexts can be used to identify “the character and consistency of settler colonialism as a phenomenon.”⁴⁷ In their article *A New Beginning for Settler Colonial Studies* practitioners Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey see the drawing of connections between “temporal locations that otherwise would not have been seen as related” as being one of the field’s “most innovative new directions.”⁴⁸ Yet, trans-temporal approaches are still relatively rare in settler colonial studies. One recent example comes from Ann McGrath, whose prize-winning book *Illicit Love: Interracial Sex & Marriage in the United States and Australia* (2015) compares marriages between settlers and indigenes in early nineteenth century America and early twentieth century Australia.⁴⁹ In it, she argues that a transtemporal approach can prove ideal for tracking the historical trends of significant phenomena.⁵⁰ However, she also describes how “historians can be very reluctant to compare similar themes across different nations, let alone different centuries.”⁵¹ Thus, trans-temporal analyses represent an underdeveloped opportunity to enrich the understanding of the settler colonial process.

As a result, the trans-temporal approach adopted in this thesis is where it will make its most useful contribution. By comparing wars fought in different centuries, it will expand upon the continued growth in comparative research in settler colonial studies and put the largely theoretical transtemporal comparative approach into practice. Its specific focus on warfare and conflict is equally important. Arguing that settler colonial violence is just as distinct a

⁴⁷ Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, “Introduction,” in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3.

⁴⁸ Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey, “A New Beginning for Settler Colonial Studies,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 1 (2013): 2.

⁴⁹ Ann McGrath, *Illicit Love: Interracial Sex and Marriage in the United States and Australia* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 397.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

phenomenon as the colonial formation that triggered it, this thesis will aim to identify its fundamental features through an analysis of the common occurrences and themes within the Pequot and Black Wars. Expanding on the works of Belich, Veracini, and countless other researchers of indigenous-settler interaction, it will demonstrate the precise ways in which the structure of settler colonialism informed violent events and practices in different cultural contexts and historic timeframes.

Methodology

As its title states, this thesis will be comparing the experiences, rhetoric, and ideology of those who fought in the Pequot War with those who participated in the Black War. On a more technical level it will be conducted as a mechanistic comparison. This comparative method involves analysing social institutions and practices to, in the words of Matthew Lange, determine “whether the absence or presence of mechanisms helps to explain similar or different outcomes among multiple cases.”⁵² The mechanism featured in this study is settler colonialism and the processes of permanent settlement and indigenous dispossession that it instigated. By focusing on how this distinct colonial formation manifested in each context this comparative study will aim to identify the structural similarities of each conflict and, through them, the inherent attributes of settler colonial violence.

Taking advantage of the ever-growing body of literature dedicated to the Pequot War and the Black War, this thesis will use an array of secondary sources to develop a holistic and up to date overview of the two conflicts. Its intention, therefore, is not to shed new light on each war individually. Instead, its innovation lies in the employment of a transtemporal comparative approach, which will highlight their similar features and use the theoretical insights of settler colonial studies to consider their implications.

Nonetheless, primary sources will be used throughout this study. Government correspondences and declarations, along with eyewitness accounts, provide a detailed insight into both wars. More private documents, such as letters and

⁵² Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013), 101.

journal entries, are similarly useful. For the Tasmanian context, colonial newspapers will be accessed as well. The emphasis on settler-made sources, rather than Indigenous voices, is intentional. It is not, however, about silencing or ignoring them. Rather, as an effort to discern the influence of settler colonialism on frontier violence, focusing on the rhetoric and actions of those who possessed its eliminatory logic is essential.

Chapter Overview

To succinctly analyse settler colonialism's influence in producing a distinct pattern of violence, this thesis will be divided into three chapters that chronologically break down the course of the Pequot and Black Wars. The first of these will be analysing the cause of each conflict, determining the exact means by which the settler colonial process provoked interracial violence in Connecticut and Tasmania. The second chapter will focus on the progression of the wars, comparing and contrasting how settlers and indigenes actually fought one another, and how the collision of cultures structured the pattern of frontier warfare. The third and final chapter will be concerned with the aftermath of settler colonial violence, and will identify how settler colonial logic influenced the treatment of indigenes upon the cessation of conflict.

A Note on Terms

Though the settlers of both seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania both came from what is now the United Kingdom, this thesis will refrain from conflating the two groups and avoid ignoring the cultural and political differences between them. Given that the 1707 Act of Union, which brought England and Scotland into a single kingdom, occurred between the Pequot War and the Black War, the term 'English' will be reserved for the seventeenth-century settlers, while those in the nineteenth-century will be referred to as 'British.' When described collectively, the terms 'settlers' or 'Anglo' will be used.

Geographically, 'Connecticut' will refer specifically to the area where the Pequot War was fought, while 'New England' will refer to the broader region and the general English population that lived there. 'Tasmania' will likewise be used to

describe the island where the Black War was fought, while 'Van Diemen's Land' will refer to the colonial institutions and populations that existed at the time.

Chapter One: Cause

Settler colonialism often brought indigenes and settlers to war, but rarely did this happen instantly. This chapter will be examining how seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania came to be engulfed in frontier warfare. The exact procedures by which this process instigated violence will be analysed, as will their consistency between the two eras.

Background and Context

The seeds of the Pequot War and the Black War were sown the moment settlers inserted themselves into New England and Van Diemen's Land. To no surprise, though perhaps to some apprehension, the lands selected for settlement were already inhabited, and had been since ancient times. The ancestors of the Pequot people, for instance, made the lands now known as south-eastern Connecticut their home over 12,000 years ago, while archaeological evidence suggests that the Palawa habitation of, or visitation to, Tasmania began 40,000 years in the past.¹ Over the course of their long histories both the Pequots and the Palawa faced many changes to their environment, including the exodus of caribou from New England and the flooding of Bass Strait in Tasmania, with their cultures and lifestyles adapting to each one successfully.² But by far the greatest and most calamitous change came with the landing of the settlers. The indigenes of both Connecticut and Tasmania had encountered Europeans prior to the arrival of permanent newcomers. French and Dutch explorers had visited both locales, while the Spanish has also probed the east coast of America, with their interactions with indigenes varying from friendly to hostile. But of all the European pioneers, it was those from Great Britain who ultimately came to stay.

¹ Dena F. Dincauze, "A Capsule Prehistory of Southern New England," in *The Pequots in Southern New England: The Rise and Fall of an American Indian Nation*, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 19; Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 3.

² Dena F. Dincauze, "A Capsule Prehistory of Southern New England," in *The Pequots in Southern New England: The Rise and Fall of an American Indian Nation*, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 21.

It is fairly significant that the settlers of seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania came from the same island in Western Europe, given that nation's propensity towards migration and permanent settlement. In Hixson's words, settler colonialism "was primarily a British project, with practices distinct from those of France or Spain."³ Like the other two nations, Anglo colonists "embraced patriarchy, private property, and Christianity, but the emphasis on the settlement of families and communities distinguished them."⁴ As Belich notes, Britons were far from the only European people to engage in settler colonialism. But they were the most extensive and successful of its practitioners, emerging at the dawn of the twentieth-century as "the clear winners of the race, measured in either numbers or wealth of settlers."⁵ The reason for this lies in the distinctive disposition of Anglo settlers to include women and families among their number, as "one female settler was worth several males" in producing a native-born generation and securing the future of a permanent community.⁶ The Anglo tendency to populate lands they annexed was noted by Philip Vincent. A contemporary commenter on the Pequot War, he attributed the steady growth of the settler population in New England to "a faculty that God hath given the British islanders, to beget and bring forth more children than any other nation of the world."⁷

The settlement of Connecticut and Tasmania can thus be understood as two chapters in Britain's long history of settler colonialism. However, it is also important to distinguish between the two endeavors, and recognise that they took place in different phases of a larger narrative. The seventeenth-century Englishmen and women who set out to settle Virginia and New England were tentatively venturing into a hemisphere that had been dominated by Spanish colonialism for more than a hundred years, with England being something of a

³ Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁷ Philip Vincent, "A True Relation of the late Battell fought in New England," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 110.

latecomer to the colonial game.⁸ According to Belich, the Anglo people first began to emerge as a global colonial power in the 1780s when, having lost their American colonies to revolution, they strived to “never again have all their eggs in one political basket” and instead transformed their nation into “a transcontinental, transnational entity,” extending its reach and sending its people to the far corners of the world.⁹ This can be seen clearly in the settlement of Tasmania, which was undertaken by a nation far more experienced in settler colonialism, and more ambitious to outcompete other nations in that field, claiming the antipodean island before their French rivals could.¹⁰

There is also a notable difference in the intention behind each settlement. The key drivers of the English settlement in Connecticut, and New England more generally, were Puritans, a religious faction that felt the English Reformation of the sixteenth-century had not gone far enough and sought to ‘purify’ the church of its lingering Catholic influences. Considered an extremist minority, their pilgrimage to New England was intended to provide them with a new homeland where they could, in the words of New England historian Alexander Young, “enjoy the liberty of their own persuasion in matters of worship and church discipline, without disturbance of the peace of the kingdom, and without offence to others not like minded with themselves.”¹¹ Contrasting strongly with this pious purpose, the annexation of Tasmania was intended to provide the British with another place to settle the criminals of their society who had been fortunate enough to escape the death penalty. As described by colonial historian Henry Melville, Van Diemen’s Land spent the first fourteen years of its existence as “a penal settlement of the Sister Colony [*Sydney*]; it was at first a jail, and *nothing but a jail* on a large scale, and for many years no free emigrant was allowed to settle therein.”¹²

⁸ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁰ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 43.

¹¹ Alexander Young, *Chronicles of the First Planters of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1623-1636* (Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1846), 29.

¹² Henry Melville, *The History of Van Diemen’s Land* (Sydney: Horwitz Publications and The Grahame Book Company, 1965), 105.

These colonial endeavors evidently had their fair share of contrasts, which is unsurprising, given that they occurred in very different eras and environments. But despite these differences, both projects were nonetheless connected by the operative logic of settler colonialism, which placed great emphasis on the creation of permanent settlements and the self-sufficiency of those who came to inhabit them. The success of Connecticut and Tasmania's colonisation, therefore, would be measured by the resilience of the settlers in their new environment rather than the financial benefits awarded to the nation they had left. Such a goal invariably produces a volatile relationship between settlers and indigenes, as the former's success is not dependent on the cooperation or contribution of the latter. In fact, it often necessitates their removal or eradication. This premise is directly at odds with franchise colonialism, where European sojourners, such as traders, merchants, and even slavers, required indigenes in one way or another in order for their expeditions to remain profitable.

Other European powers showed these capital-driven interests in New England and Tasmania, contrasting greatly with the practices of the Anglo colonists. In Connecticut, the Dutch were solely interested in the lucrative fur trade, which, as Neal Salisbury notes, required them to "maintain friendly relations with stable Indian groups," and assured that their settlements would "not supersede the economic nexuses established with Indian bands."¹³ As a result, they only built one outpost in the Connecticut River Valley, which came to be known as the House of Good Hope. The English were not unmindful of the benefits of engaging in trade with the local indigenous nations, and their decision to position themselves in the valley was indeed partly motivated by a desire to repay the financial backers who had made their voyage to America possible. But in the end, traded goods were considered to be "useful by-products of expansion," and the English instead devoted most of their efforts to "exploiting resources such as fish and sassafras that did not require native cooperation."¹⁴ In particular, they sought to make "Indian land available to Englishmen for farming," and as the

¹³ Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 85.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

fertile Connecticut River Valley presented a tantalizing alternative to the stonier and less productive lands of Massachusetts Bay and the Plymouth Colony, the English settlement of Connecticut was far more extensive and explosive than that of the Dutch.¹⁵ It did not take long for the isolated House of Good Hope to be outnumbered by the settlements of Wethersfield, Windsor, and Hartford.

A similar distinction in colonial practice can be seen in the early days of the British settlement of Tasmania, which the French explorer Nicolas Baudin was notably critical of. In a letter to Lieutenant-Governor David Collins, Baudin warned the British that it would be far better for them to “mould for society the inhabitants of its own country over whom it has rights, rather than wishing to occupy itself with the improvement of those who are very far removed from it by beginning with seizing the soil which belongs to them and which saw their birth.”¹⁶ Unwavering in his settler colonial convictions, Collins either ignored or dismissed Baudin’s critical suggestions and continued to transform the newly claimed island into a growing penal settlement. Other British leaders in Tasmania followed suit. On the banks of the Derwent River, John Bowen neglected to seek contact with the conspicuously absent Palawa people, firmly rejecting the idea that “they would be of any use to us” and considering himself “well off if I never see them again.”¹⁷ James Bonwick provides the best summation of the British colonial mission when recounting the arrival of the first settlers in *The Last of the Tasmanians*: “They came not as curious visitors, but to make a home in the land. They came not to share the soil with the dark men, but to appropriate it.”¹⁸ Such intentions betray the unyielding ambition of the archetypal settler. Without need to rely upon, and therefore negotiate with, indigenes for long-term success, their acquisition of land could only lead to interracial violence on the frontier. It was only a question of when, and to what scale, the conflict would occur.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ James Boyce, *Van Diemen’s Land* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2008), 21.

¹⁷ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 47.

¹⁸ James Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians* (London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, 1870), 28.

Pre-War Relations

Violence between indigenes and settlers was a present feature in New England and Tasmania, and had been since the earliest years of their colonisation. Given that two completely alien cultures had come to inhabit the same landscape, each with incompatible intentions and claims to the territory, such deadly encounters were hardly surprising or unexpected; and even when violence did not manifest openly, the threat of it certainly loomed large in the minds of many. Prominent Plymouth colonist William Bradford was one such anxious figure, believing that the “savage barbarians” the pilgrims encountered on their first landing in America “were readier to fill their sides full of arrows than otherwise.”¹⁹ Though unfounded at the time, his concerns later became more credible. Barely more than a year after its foundation, the colony of Plymouth was presented with “a bundle of arrows tied about with a great snakeskin” from the Narragansett people, being informed by their interpreters that this “was a threatening and a challenge.”²⁰ The English responded by sending “the snakeskin back with bullets in it,” and though this successfully cowed the Narragansetts into revoking their threat, tensions and occasional clashes continued in the region.²¹ One notable episode was the killing of smuggler John Stone and seven of his crew by Pequot warriors in 1634 following an attempt by the Englishmen to capture indigenous guides. Mistaken for a Dutchmen, for whom the Pequots had developed an enmity, these men’s deaths would have a great impact in the coming years.²²

Violence was even more pronounced in early nineteenth century Tasmania, much to the dismay of the British colonial authorities. Palawa blood had been shed as early as May 1804, when several soldiers under the command of Lieutenant William Moore opened fire on a large native hunting party on the banks of the Derwent River, killing an unknown number of them in what later became known as the Risdon Cove Massacre.²³ Like the English at Wessagusset,

¹⁹ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 70.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 106

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 59-60.

²³ James Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians* (London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, 1870), 33-34.

they had mistaken the large body of indigenes for an imminent attack. Hostilities and murders continued after this macabre incident, ignited usually by competition over game or the abduction and assault of Palawa women by the sex-deprived British convicts.²⁴ Bushrangers, comprised mostly of those convicts who had managed to escape from society's grasp, also became infamous for their sadistic treatment of indigenes. The British authorities attributed their actions with engendering Palawa hostility towards the settlers.²⁵

However, while violence was definitely a noteworthy component of indigenous-settler relations during the formative years of New England and Tasmania, it is important to note that these bloody encounters were not acts of war. Most examples of bloodshed were small in scale, and usually took the form of personal disputes that ended as quickly as they started, and without bringing the two sides to war. As a result, the indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants of both locales and eras were, prior to the onset of the Pequot War and the Black War, able to achieve a degree of harmonious co-existence. Even with the onset of war many English chose to reminisce over the peace that had once held sway in the colonies. One such recollection comes from Philip Vincent, who insisted that the local indigenous tribes had "showed themselves very loving and friendly," to the point that "much hath been written of their civility and peaceful conversation, until this year."²⁶ More than a century later, historian Benjamin Trumbull credited the Puritan practice of taking "every Precaution to settle any apparent Matters of Difficulty upon the first notice" with enabling them to live "in tolerable Harmony and Friendship with their rude neighbours for near Twenty Years" prior to the Pequot War.²⁷

²⁴ James Boyce, *Van Diemen's Land* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2008), 58-61; Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 68-71.

²⁵ George Arthur to George Murray, 15 April, 1830, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 15.

²⁶ Philip Vincent, "A True Relation of the late Battell fought in New England," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 99.

²⁷ Benjamin Trumbull, *A Compendium of the Indian Wars in New England* (Hartford: Edwin Valentine Mitchell, 1926), 13.

In Tasmania, the establishment of cordial interracial relations was not just a goal, but also a duty. Lord Robert Hobart, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies and the namesake of the colony's capital, had written to Lieutenant Governor Collins, instructing him "to endeavor by every means in your power to open an intercourse with the Natives, and to conciliate their good will, enjoining all persons under your government to live in amity and kindness with them."²⁸ Anglo-Palawa relations never came close to being that idyllic, but even when the black and white inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land came to blows, they managed to avoid sustained conflict. This was a fact that a later Governor, William Sorrell, remarked upon in 1819, assuring his subjects that "if the natives were intent upon Destruction," their acts of violence "would be increased a Hundred Fold."²⁹

In the absence of war, both the settler and the indigene learned to benefit from the other's presence in several ways. The Pequots in particular rose to an unprecedented level of power among the native tribes of southern New England by maintaining a trading relationship with European colonists. It was, in fact, the Pequots who first initiated an intercourse with the English, with a small delegation travelling to Boston in 1634 to, in the words of Massachusetts Bay's governor John Winthrop, "desire our friendship."³⁰ Since their relationship with the Dutch had turned hostile, the Pequots "could not trade safely anywhere," and sought to enter into a political and economic partnership with the settlers of Massachusetts Bay.³¹ "They offered us also," wrote Winthrop, "all their right at Connecticut, and to further us what they could, if we would settle a plantation there."³² That the Pequots would offer the lands of their tributaries to these new comers spoke volumes of their desire to facilitate a stable relationship, and a treaty was signed between the two parties soon after.

²⁸ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 48.

²⁹ Report of the Aboriginal Committee, 19 March 1830, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 15.

³⁰ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 139.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, 139-140.

Negotiations between the Palawa and the British were largely unofficial and piecemeal, but not uncommon. Early tensions over the British hunting of native game were tempered by the trading of dogs to the local indigenous bands, who were happy to receive these useful contributions to their hunter-gather lifestyle.³³ Through these amicable, or at least tolerable, intercourses, the British and Palawa were able to find themselves living in a state of relative security that would contrast with the war years to come. James Bonwick related the story of one settler who “spoke of the Natives occasionally coming down to his hut, as early as 1814,” while others insisted that they “were able to travel about the Bush in perfect security between that period and 1822.”³⁴

There were even numerous instances where the settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania spoke highly of their indigenous neighbours, in ways that provide a shocking contrast to later wartime accounts. In his *New England's Prospect* colonial writer William Wood described the Pequots as “a stately warlike people of whom I never heard any misdemeanor,” ultimately judging them to be “just and equall in their dealings; not treacherous either to their Country-men, or English: Requirers of courtesies, affable towards the English.”³⁵ Likewise, an 1824 edition of the *Hobart Town Gazette* assured its readers that, despite the occasional robbery or raid, “the sable natives of this Colony are the most peaceable creatures in the universe.”³⁶ It even went as far to claim that the Palawa “have never committed any acts of cruelty, or even resisted the whites, unless when unsufferably goaded by provocation.”³⁷

Marked by both violence and good will, the state of affairs in New England and Tasmania prior to the Pequot and Black Wars cannot be wholly summarised as either a time of peace or a state of war. Instead, a complex blend of hostility and hospitality came to define interracial relations in the pre-war years of both

³³ James Boyce, *Van Diemen's Land* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2008), 58-61; Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 65-66.

³⁴ James Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians* (London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, 1870), 43.

³⁵ William Wood, *New Englands Prospect* (London: Thomas Cotes, 1634), 64.

³⁶ *Hobart Town Courier*, 16 July 1824.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

colonies, with ambivalence quickly becoming the status quo; indigenes and settlers cooperated when it was convenient, fought when it was not, and largely remained wary and cautious of one another. This was a tentative balance, and as much as the settlers may have enjoyed it, their actions would ultimately prove to be its undoing.

Explosive Settlement

Good relations between settlers and indigenes in New England and Tasmania were possible because both colonies began as small-scale ventures. The importance of these slow beginnings in maintaining peaceful relations was noted in hindsight by several historians. Cave contends that “the physical separation of Puritan and Pequot territory prevented an immediate confrontation,” while Belich relates how the British and Palawa had “little need to clash” prior to the late 1820s as the former’s settlement “barely encompassed a quarter of the island.”³⁸ As long as settlement was gradual, the Pequots and the Palawa were able to adapt to it and accommodate it into their lives without disruption. Likewise, the Anglo settlers, concerned as they were with ensuring their settlements lived to see another year, had little need, desire, or ability to dispossess entire nations just yet. But settler colonialism is a process that rarely thrives on racial equity and modest growth, and when it inevitably accelerated, violence almost always followed. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the outbreak of war in Connecticut and Tasmania was directly preceded by a sudden growth in population within the settler communities.

Stories of the success of the New England colonies had made their way back to the mother country, prompting many desperate English to cross the Atlantic in search of a new life. The result of this was a ‘Great Migration,’ in which more than 21,000 new settlers arrived in New England during the 1630s.³⁹ This inflow of

³⁸ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 149; James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 274.

³⁹ Katherine Grandjean, “New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War.” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (2011): 81

colonists began to increase dramatically in 1634, a mere two years prior to the outbreak of war with the Pequots. In that year alone, some 2,000 to 2,500 people, representing upwards of ten percent of the total number of migrants arriving that decade, disembarked upon the shores of New England and made it their new home.⁴⁰ Two hundred years later, a similar development unfolded in Tasmania. Following the cessation of the Napoleonic Wars, more and more Britons began to overlook Van Diemen's Land's unsavory reputation as a penal settlement, resulting in an unprecedented number of free settlers and families making their way there. More than 1,500 such migrants arrived in between 1817 and 1824, bringing the colony's population from a mere 2,000 settlers to around 12,643.⁴¹ This increase continued throughout the 1820s and even into the Black War, with the colony boasting a population of 23,500 settlers by 1830.⁴²

In New England, territorial expansion soon became a desperate necessity, as the dramatic increase in the population of the colonies began to have adverse effects. Though William Wood wrote *New England's Prospect* with the intent of praising life in the colonies, he nonetheless admitted "that of late time there hath been great want," which he attributed to the "many hundreds" of migrants who had arrived without bringing food or provisions, making "things both deare and scant" throughout New England.⁴³ Faced with famine, the English sought to intensify their agricultural pursuits, and for that, they needed more land. The Connecticut River Valley, distinguished by its fertility and recently depopulated through disease, appealed to many, especially those living in the less bountiful lands of Massachusetts Bay. Leaving their homes in Newton, Dorchester, and Watertown, these adventurous English migrated west into Connecticut, creating new settlements in what are now Wethersfield and Windsor.⁴⁴

In Tasmania, settler expansion into the island's inland began to boom dramatically in the early 1820s, and continued to do so at a steady rate for the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴¹ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 74.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ William Wood, *New Englands Prospect* (London: Thomas Cotes, 1634), 50.

⁴⁴ William A. Adler, "Religious Justification for War in American History. A Savage Embrace: The Pequot War 1636-1637" (master's thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 54.

rest of the decade. This development was largely triggered by the influx of sheep into the colony, with shepherding quickly becoming the main industry in Van Diemen's Land. Meeting the demands offered by British factories, the number of sheep in Tasmania rose from 54,600 in 1816 to 200,000 in 1823, and British settlements began to cover more and more territory to accommodate the colony's rapidly growing pastoralism.⁴⁵ This seizure of pastoral land was nothing short of excessive, with the colonial administration granting more than 175,704 hectares of land to more than a thousand recipients who hoped to make their fortune in wool in 1823 alone.⁴⁶ Forests were avoided in favour of open grasslands, with the latter being more suitable to the grazing of sheep. As a result, vital Palawa hunting grounds constituted much of the appropriated lands.

Laying Claims

In an effort to satiate their expansionist ambitions, the settlers of both New England and Tasmania went to great lengths to justify why they deserved their desired lands more than its previous occupants did. Confident in their racial and cultural superiority, both generations of Anglo colonists perceived their indigenous counterparts to be living in a savage state of squalor and anarchy- a perception that served to nicely validate their initial arrival on these foreign shores. As described by William Bradford, the English puritans, already living in exile in the Netherlands, desired an exodus to "the vast and unpeopled countries of America," considering them to be "fruitful and fit for habitation, being devoid of all civil inhabitants, where there are only savage and brutish men which range up and down, little otherwise than the beasts of the same."⁴⁷ Similar sentiment was applied to Tasmania two centuries later. Following his voyage to the island, just a few years prior to the permanent settlement of it, explorer Matthew Flinders reported that though "Van Diemen's Land appears to be superior in fertility to the same space of land in any known part of New South Wales," its

⁴⁵ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 74.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 26.

aboriginal inhabitants possessed “less ingenuity, and are more destitute of comforts and conveniences” than the natives of mainland Australia.⁴⁸

Of course, such anarchic perceptions could not have been further from the truth, with the indigenous nations of New England and Tasmania possessing sophisticated social structures. Like most of the Algonquian-speaking people of north-eastern America, the Pequot tribe, numbering about 16,000 people at the time of English settlement, was divided into a number of bands or villages, mostly consisting of several extended family groups.⁴⁹ Each of these bands was lead by a sachem, who acted as a day-to-day civic leader and maintained his or her position through the consent of their people and their own charisma.⁵⁰ Unlike the Pequots, the Palawa did not exist as a singular entity, but rather consisted of nine distinct nations covering Tasmania, with an island-wide population between 3,000 and 7,000 people.⁵¹ Each nation consisted of a number of clans, each of which inhabited a specific territory and was led by a male elder, or ‘chief’, renowned for their prowess as a hunter and warrior.⁵² Through their observations of the indigenes, many of the Anglo colonists of New England and Tasmania conceded that their initial perceptions had indeed been wrong and wrote extensive, if often incorrect, descriptions of their social structures.

However, though there was some recognition of its merits and complexity, settlers largely considered the social structures and lifestyles of Tasmania and New England’s indigenes to be inferior to their own. There was particularly strong criticism directed towards the indigenous management and cultivation of land, which often served as a justification for its appropriation by the supposedly more deserving settlers. Winthrop in particular drew a sharp distinction

⁴⁸ Matthew Flinders, *Observations on the Coasts of Van Diemen’s Land, on Bass’s Strait and its Islands, and on Part of the Coasts of New South Wales* (London: John Nichols, 1801). Project Gutenberg eBook.

⁴⁹ William A. Starna, “The Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in *The Pequots in Southern New England: The Rise and Fall of an American Indian Nation*, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 40-41.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

⁵¹ Murray Johnson and Ian McFarlane, *Van Diemen’s Land: An Aboriginal History* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2015), 32.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 37.

between the practices and rights of the English and the Indians; though hunter-gatherers may have had a 'natural right' to any given territory, this was immediately superseded by the 'civic right' of more developed communities, who could use that land for worthier pursuits such as animal husbandry or agriculture.⁵³ This rhetoric was frequently used to discredit native land claims and management. Even effective examples of indigenous cultivation, such as the use of fire to shape the landscape, failed to impress. "We did not," wrote Reverend John Cotton, "conceive that it is a just Title to so vast a Continent, to make no other improvement of millions of Acres on it, but onely to burn it up for past time."

Such disavowal of indigenous land rights was even more prevalent in Tasmania, where the Palawa people subsisted entirely on a hunter-gatherer lifestyle and migrated, as Governor Arthur put it, "over extensive tracts of country, without cultivating or permanently occupying any portion of it."⁵⁴ Like many Britons in Tasmania, Arthur did not think highly of this lifestyle; indeed, he considered it something to be saved from, and hoped to lead the Palawa "to habits of labour, industry and settled life."⁵⁵ He definitely did not consider it as valid a claim to land as the British practices of agriculture and shepherding, as he revealed in the midst of the Black War. In order to end the bloody territorial conflict, he proposed ceding to the Palawa "a portion of the south-east quarter" of the island—a concession he was more than willing to make, since that region contained "many thousands of acres of most unprofitable soil for Europeans" while apparently being "well suited for the purpose of savage life."⁵⁶ The implications of this proposal are clear; whenever the land rights of the indigenes and settlers

⁵³ William A. Adler, "Religious Justification for War in American History. A Savage Embrace: The Pequot War 1636-1637" (master's thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 95.

⁵⁴ Proclamation, 17 April 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 15.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Arthur to Murray, 20 November 1830, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 59.

stood opposed, priority was given to the latter. The Palawa would have to make do with whatever land the British did not, or could not, use.

Over all, despite their unique specificities, the Anglo settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania adhered to very similar principles in their annexation of indigenous territories. For the English, the principle of *vacuum domicilium* (empty domicile) proved useful for presenting desired lands as vacant spaces and justifying the settler colonial practice of forming permanent settlements. This philosophy recognised the indigenes' right to their farmlands, but declared their other territories to be unoccupied.⁵⁷ Two hundred years later, the colonisation of Tasmania would also be premised on the belief that the land was unused and unowned, with *terra nullius* (nobody's land) being invoked in spirit if not by name.

Breaking Point

Disavowed and dismissed, the Pequots and Palawa evinced concerns for, or outrages at, the loss of their lands to these expansionist and increasingly numerous newcomers. Though they had yet to cede any of their personal territory to the English, the Pequots were certainly mindful of the possibility that the rapidly growing settler population would eventually dispossess them and appropriate their lands. This is most clearly seen in the early stages of the conflict, where the Pequots attempted to defy old tribal rivalries by inviting the Narragansetts to join in their war with the English. According to Bradford, the Pequots attempted to gain their former rival's support by warning them that "the English were strangers and began to overspread their country, and would deprive them thereof in time, if they were suffered to grow and increase."⁵⁸ They believed that all indigenous nations of southern New England, whatever their traditional affiliations, were threatened by the expansionist ambitions of the English settlers. Though this argument failed to secure an alliance with the

⁵⁷ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 35.

⁵⁸ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 329.

Narragansetts, and was deemed by Bradford to be “very pernicious,” it ultimately proved to be highly prophetic.⁵⁹

For the indigenous tribes of Tasmania, the loss of land and resources to the settlers was not a concern, but a reality. In an 1828 despatch to Viscount Goderich, Arthur informed his correspondent that the Palawa “already complain that the white people have taken possession of their country, encroached upon their hunting grounds, and destroyed their natural food source, the kangaroo.”⁶⁰ Such complaints were not unwarranted. The spread of free settlers into the island’s interior, and the system of pastoralism they brought with them, resulted in many of the Palawa people’s favoured hunting grounds and water sources being repurposed into plots for sheep grazing. As famed conciliator and humanitarian George Augustus Robinson was informed, outrage towards the whites who “have usurped their territory, have driven them into the forests, have killed their game and robbed them of their chief subsistence” grew immensely.⁶¹

These fears and outrages were reflected in the settler communities of New England and Tasmania. In the former, many English had in fact been reluctant to settle in Connecticut because of its indigenous population, “the fear of whom was an obstacle.”⁶² It took a devastating epidemic, in which many “Indians were swept away,” to ease their concerns.⁶³ Even then, they were not completely assured. As Cave puts it, puritan identity was grounded heavily in “the idea of savagery in opposition to civilization.”⁶⁴ As such, when rumors of an impending Pequot attack arrived, by way of the Mohegans, they were readily believed. Not

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 4.

⁶¹ Norman Plomey (ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 88.

⁶² William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 314.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 18.

helping this anxiety was the refusal of the Pequots to hand over John Stone's killers, which had been an English demand in the 1634 treaty.⁶⁵

As continued immigration to Connecticut forced the two cultures into closer proximity this unresolved point of contention contributed to the deterioration of Anglo-Pequot relations. These only worsened when the trader John Oldham was killed by Niantics, tributaries of the Pequots, on Block Island. The English represented these deaths as the primary cause of the subsequent war, but given that neither man was well respected in puritan society, with both men having even received banishments, the true cause is considered by many to be far more complex.⁶⁶ In addition to the aforementioned psychological fear of the 'Indian threat,' the English likely recognised the Pequots as the biggest obstacle to the territorial expansion needed to facilitate their growing population. Furthermore, as Katherine Grandjean argues, simple hunger also served as a powerful motivation. "The Pequot War," she writes, "arrived in a season of want," and the coveting of Pequot resources undoubtedly hastened the English march to war.⁶⁷

Two hundred years later, the Palawa proved themselves capable of invoking similar feelings of fear and provoking comparable responses- although in this instance, indigenous attacks were not a rumor, but a very real danger, with the Palawa violently resisting the appropriation of their lands and the killing of their people. Reflecting upon Tasmania's indigenous peoples, colonial historian John West wrote that "their appearance is offensive, their proximity obstructive."⁶⁸ Such feelings of insecurity had increased in the mid 1820s, eventually giving way to panic as Palawa raids began to double in frequency each year from 1825 to 1828.⁶⁹ Fearful settlers now demanded protection from the vengeful people they had dispossessed, with the *Colonial Times* dramatically announcing "THE

⁶⁵ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 139.

⁶⁶ Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 190.

⁶⁷ Katherine Grandjean, "New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (2011): 81

⁶⁸ John West, *The History of Tasmania* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1852), 333.

⁶⁹ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 42.

GOVERNMENT MUST REMOVE THE NATIVES- IF NOT THEY WILL BE HUNTED DOWN LIKE WILD BEASTS AND DESTROYED!"⁷⁰ Taking heed of these demands, Governor Arthur issued a proclamation in 1826 outlining the conditions in which settlers were permitted to use violence to defend themselves. But war had, in a sense, already begun in the interior, and in the face of formidable indigenous resistance Arthur's efforts proved to be a half-measure. One dissatisfied settler privately wrote that such proclamations "might as well be directed to the shark in Bass's Strait," and in May 1828 the *Colonial Advocate* rhetorically asked "*In the name of Heaven is it not high time to resort to strong and decisive measures?*"⁷¹ Charged with safeguarding the colony's inhabitants, and facing increasing pressure from to take action, Arthur finally declared martial law in the 'Settled Districts' on 1 November 1828.

The transtemporal comparison of the Pequot War's inception with that of the Black War reveals a similar instigating factor for these otherwise disparate conflicts; the sudden increase in each settler community's rate of immigration and territorial annexation. Incremental settlement had facilitated a degree of intercultural adaptation, but the former eventually gave way to explosive settlement, which outpaced the latter and forced settlers and indigenes into a rude collision of incompatible cultures. As the next chapter will demonstrate, this cultural clash would continue to inform how each war was actually fought.

⁷⁰ *Colonial Times*, 1 December 1826.

⁷¹ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 44; *Colonial Advocate*, 1 May 1828

Chapter Two: Progression

The acceleration of the settler colonial process had plunged both seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania into war. This chapter will now analyse how each conflict played out, paying particularly close attention to how settlers and indigenes fought one another, and how they understood their wartime experiences. It will demonstrate that, by drawing completely alien cultures together, settler colonialism produced a distinct type of warfare defined by the contrasting martial traditions of its belligerents. In particular, its comparative approach will be used to highlight the remarkable consistency with which this occurred in different times and places, and to bring two apparently unrelated events into a similar frame of understanding.

In the introduction to this thesis I identified several distinctions between settlers and other types of colonists. Another important distinction, equally relevant to this study of settler colonial violence, is the difference between settlers and emigrants. Though both titles reference an individual's permanent departure from their homeland, and were used interchangeably by Europeans for centuries, settlers are ultimately distinguished from emigrants by their behavior upon their arrival in their new home. As summarised by James Belich, "an emigrant joined someone else's society, a settler or colonist remade his own."¹ This theme of social reproduction underpinned the formation of settler societies in both the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Neither the English in Connecticut nor the British in Tasmania had any intention of submitting themselves to the laws and customs that had governed those lands for millennia. By creating their own communities, they imposed their authority upon their newly acquired territories and, in their eyes, superseded any preexisting institutions.

It was this settler colonial logic that shaped the opening actions of both the Pequot War and the Black War. For the settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania, the

¹ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 53.

shedding of European blood by native hands, whatever the context, was a transgression that necessitated an imposition of settler justice upon an unruly native people. In the aftermath of the trader John Oldham's death, a militia force of ninety men under the command of John Endecott set out from Massachusetts Bay to launch two punitive missions- the first against the Niantics of Block Island, where Oldham had died, and the second against the Pequots, who had failed to deliver Stone's killers.² This expedition has since been considered the opening action of the Pequot War; even in its immediate aftermath, Plymouth's governor accused Massachusetts Bay of having "occasioned a war, etc., by provoking the Pequods, and nothing more."³ But such was not the intention of the expedition against the Pequots. Confiding in his journal, Winthrop insisted "we went not to make war upon them, but to do justice."⁴ Such a claim could be seen as an attempt to save face, but some corroboration can be found in other accounts. A leading figure in the expedition, Captain John Underhill recounted how "the governors of the bay sent us to demand the heads" of Stone's killers, given that "it was not the custom of the English to suffer murderers to live."⁵

Strong parallels to this punitive rhetoric can be found within George Arthur's administration, though with less emphasis on delivering capital punishment. Just as the English repeatedly defined Pequot behavior as 'insolent,' so too were Palawa actions labled as 'outrages' or 'mischiefs' by the British.⁶ In many instances the indigenes were equated with, or even compared unfavorably to, the bushrangers who had previously terrorised Van Diemen's Land, with an 1827 edition of the *Colonial Times* reporting that "another no less terrible evil has broken out" following the suppression of the criminal bandits.⁷ Martial law

² William Adler, *A Savage Embrace: The Pequot War 1636-1637* (Kansas: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2012), 63.

³ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 194.

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ John Underhill, "Newes From America," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 56.

⁶ George Arthur to Viscount Goderich, January 10, 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 3.

⁷ *Colonial Times*, 5 January 1827

had been used to great effect against a bushranger epidemic in 1816. As Palawa attacks mounted throughout 1827 and 1828, it again appeared to be the best means of restoring order. Just two days before its declaration, the Executive Council of Van Diemen's land labeled the elusive and cunning movements of the Palawa warriors as "impediments to the ordinary modes of enforcing the law," before finally declaring "the powers of the common law wholly inadequate to the suppression of these evils" the following day.⁸ The Palawa were seen as criminals of the highest degree, necessitating the severest punitive action available.

Impelled by the imperatives of settler colonialism, the settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania interpreted their indigenous counterparts as not just engaging in acts of hostility against them, but also reveling in a state of treachery and lawlessness. Confident in their ability to deliver civilisation out of chaos, their early actions against the Pequots and the Palawa were aimed at restoring order on their terms and reinforcing their authority as the dominant powers of their respective regions. This, they assumed, was something they could achieve quickly. In organising the expedition against the Niantics and Pequots, Winthrop insisted that Massachusetts Bay had "intended at the first to send only to Block Island," and that the follow up mission to the Pequots "was with hope to draw them to parley, and so to some quiet end."⁹ Likewise, Arthur had hoped that the implementation of martial law would be "the means of putting a speedy stop, without much bloodshed, to the lawless warfare which has been lately carrying on between the Natives and the settlers and stockmen."¹⁰ These expectations convey the arrogance and naivety that drove settler actions in the opening engagement of the Pequot and Black Wars. They had been arrogant to assume the indigenes would adhere to settler law, and naïve to believe their hostility

⁸ Extract from the Minutes of the Executive Council, 30th October 1828. Minutes. Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, 9.

⁹ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 214.

¹⁰ George Arthur to George Murray, November 4, 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 9.

would be quelled through by a single action. Both Winthrop and Arthur came to realise this in time.



Governors John Winthrop (left) and George Arthur (right).¹¹

Guerilla Warfare

In 1642, the Connecticut Council asked Winthrop, again governor of Massachusetts Bay, to commit with them to a preemptive attack on some supposedly disloyal natives- a proposal that troubled Winthrop greatly. "We might," he responded, "destroy some part of their corn and wigwams, and force them to fly into the woods, etc., but the men would be still remaining to do us mischief, for they will never fight us in the open."¹² This reasoning prevailed, and the attack was aborted. In 1835, Arthur also expressed concerns, this time over the imminent settlement of South Australia. Writing to British politician and humanitarian Thomas Buxton, he warned that the indigenous peoples of Australia were "the native burghers of this wilderness and every contest with them must be fought within those confines, which they have inherited from their

¹¹ "John Winthrop." School of Sir Anthony Van Dyck, c.1625-1649. Portrait. Retrieved from Encyclopaedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Winthrop-American-colonial-governor>. (Accessed October 1, 2017); "George Arthur." J.W. Beattie, 1896. Portrait. Retrieved from the Australian Dictionary of Biography, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/arthur-sir-george-1721>. (Accessed October 1, 2017).

¹² Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1210.

ancestors.”¹³ Both of these apprehensions were derived from experience. Winthrop and Arthur had served as political leaders during the Pequot War and Black War, respectively, and in these positions they had learned a hard truth: however entitled the settlers may have felt towards the land in Connecticut and Tasmania, the Pequots and Palawa simply knew it better. And armed with this knowledge, they engaged in a mode of warfare that would cause the Anglo settlers of both locales no shortage of grief.

The general unwillingness of the New England tribes to partake in an open battle, and their frequent successes at avoiding one, were frustrations that plagued the English since their expedition to Block Island. Though they initially tried to repulse the English landing with their arrows, the Niantics, in the words of Captain John Underhill, “retired into the swamps, so as we could not find them.”¹⁴ Unable to attain their pound of flesh, the English vented their frustrations through the destruction of property, shelters, and crops. But throughout this, the natives “kept themselves in obscurity.”¹⁵ The follow up mission to the Pequots was barely more successful. Deflecting criticism for the anticlimactic effort, Winthrop wrote that the Pequots had “fled from us, and we could not follow them in our armour, neither had any to guide us in their country.”¹⁶ The British soldiers in Tasmania, assigned by Arthur to apprehend the Palawa or drive them beyond the settled districts, had no more luck than the English had on Block Island. According to conciliator George Augustus Robinson, “the natives have the advantage in every respect” when it came to warfare in the bush, particularly since “they know the passes and are well acquainted with the topography of the country.”¹⁷ Confiding to his journal, he asked himself “what if an armed party was to pursue a band of aborigines, could they capture them?” It was a question he answered quickly and decisively. “No! The whole face of the

¹³ Henry Reynolds, *Forgotten War* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2013), 70.

¹⁴ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 54.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ John Winthrop, *Winthrop’s Journal: “History of New England,” 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 194.

¹⁷ Norman Plomey (ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 552.

country (with few exceptions) serves as a secure retreat.”¹⁸ Robinson described such futile efforts as “a battle with a shadow,” and it is hard to conceive of a more fitting description of the conflict.¹⁹

Indigenous warriors thus typically enjoyed advantages in stealth, swiftness, and geographical knowledge over their settler enemies. When they took advantage of these factors, the wars they waged against the invaders of their homelands were usually unconventional and unpredictable in form. Following Endecott’s expedition the Pequots, in Underhill’s words, “set upon a course of greater insolence than before, and slew all they found in their way.”²⁰ The attack had angered them without weakening them, and soon the settlers of Connecticut found themselves paying the price for the actions of Massachusetts Bay. Lion Gardiner, commander of the garrison at Fort Saybrook, had even warned John Endecott that his expedition would “raise these wasps about my ears.”²¹ His vision was as accurate as his metaphor was appropriate, given that the fort found itself under near-constant siege by the Pequots. The tribe’s warriors remained as elusive as ever, “lying hovering about the fort” as they made opportunistic attacks upon whoever dared to leave the safety of its perimeter.²² One such occurrence was on February 22, 1637, when Gardiner and nine other men gave chase to three Pequots who had been spotted nearby. Before long, as Winthrop recounted, the English “were brought into an ambush of fifty, who came upon them, and slew four of their men.”²³ The other six were able to fight their way back to the fort.

In their attempt to secure an alliance with the Narragansetts, the Pequots assured their traditional enemies that “they should not fear the strength of the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 556

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 552

²⁰ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 60.

²¹ William Adler, *A Savage Embrace: The Pequot War 1636-1637* (Kansas: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2012), 60.

²² John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 61.

²³ John Winthrop, *Winthrop’s Journal: “History of New England,” 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 208.

English, for they would not come into open battle with them but fire their houses, kill their cattle, and lie in ambush for them as they went abroad upon their occasions.”²⁴ This outline more or less summarises Pequot strategy in the early stages of the war. For instance, when Fort Saybrook received reinforcements from upriver and the Pequots, noticing the fort’s growing strength, “forebore drawing near it as before.”²⁵ What is truly remarkable about this strategy outline, however, is that it could be used just as accurately to describe the means by which the Palawa fought against the British in the Black War. As Robinson noted, the Tasmanian aboriginal’s “mode of attack is by surreptition. They lay in ambush for some time before they make their attack, a sudden and unperceived invasion, or by surprising.”²⁶ Led by capable warriors, such as Tongerlongter of the Oyster Bay Tribe, the Palawa sometimes spent days scoping out viable targets. Isolated huts, as well as solitary shepherds and labourers, were particularly vulnerable, and frequently preyed upon.²⁷ The constant harrying of the interior settlements provoked no shortage of fear and frustration from the British population of Van Diemen’s Land. “This species of warfare which we are carrying on with them,” lamented Arthur, “is of the most distressing nature; they suddenly appear, commit some act of outrage and then as suddenly vanish.”²⁸ Unlike the English in Connecticut two hundred years earlier, the British in Tasmania now had a word to describe this “species of warfare.” Having observed similar behavior from the Spanish in the war against Napoleon, they recognised the conflict as a *guerilla* war.


²⁴ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 294.

²⁵ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 61.

²⁶ Norman Plomey (ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 552.

²⁷ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 82.

²⁸ Henry Reynolds, *Forgotten War* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2013), 87.



Attack on Settler's Hut: Such guerilla raids became common in the Tasmanian interior.²⁹

In spite of themselves, some settlers in both Connecticut and Tasmania came to admire the abilities of their indigenous enemies in this covert form of combat. Gardiner notably gave the Pequots a favourable comparison to the Spanish, while the *Colonial Times* credited the Palawa with “a cunning and superiority of tactic which would not disgrace even some of the greatest military characters.”³⁰ More common, however, was the tendency of settlers to equate their foes with predatory animals, whether it be Underhill describing the Pequots as “roaring lions, compassing all corners of the country for a prey, seeking whom they might devour,” or the *Hobart Town Courier* attributing a “more savage rage than the hyena or the ravenous wolf” to the Palawa.³¹ This animal imagery is very suggestive of the mindset settlers in the midst of a guerilla war on the frontier would have likely possessed. In the apparent wilderness, it would have been all too easy for them to imagine the unseen and unpredictable warriors as predators, and themselves as the prey.

²⁹ *Attack on Settler's Hut*. Unknown Artist, 1870. Photograph. Retrieved from the National Library of Australia, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-135224743/view>. (Accessed October 1, 2017).

³⁰ *Colonial Times*, 16 July 1830

³¹ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 66; *Hobart Town Courier* 13 November 1830.

Economic Warfare

There was one guerilla tactic employed during the Black War that is deserving of special mention. Though they were their principle source of antagonism, the British settlers of Van Diemen's Land were not the only targets of Palawa raids and ambushes. In the Tasmanian interior, livestock were just as likely, if not more so, to fall victim to the spears and waddies of the indigenous insurgents as their owners were.³² Sheep were the most commonly targeted species, and given that their introduction had triggered much of the annexation of Palawa hunting grounds and the diminishment of the kangaroo, they would appear to be an obvious target. But there was a curious, recurring feature in the attacks launched upon these animals. Giving evidence before the Committee for the Affairs of Aborigines in 1830, a settler by the name of George Espie testified that, from what he had witnessed, "none of the sheep killed by the Natives were eaten." Instead, most were left lying where they had been killed, and occasionally "spears were left in some of them."³³ So although they had become the most common game in eastern Tasmania, these animals were not being hunted as an alternate food source to the kangaroo. Instead, the Palawa, who sought to deprive their enemies of an important food source and their key livelihood, were systematically dispatching them. According to Clements, this inflicted "a costly burden on many settlers."³⁴ This method of resistance saw widespread usage throughout Australia, where, according to John Connor, "food gathering became a form of warfare and the Aborigines developed effective tactics to raid farmhouses and farms."³⁵ He describes this development as a "tactical innovation" and further argues that "these tactics deserve to be recognised as a new form of warfare: Australian frontier warfare."³⁶

³² Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 97.

³³ *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee for the Affairs of Aborigines*. Minutes. Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, 47.

³⁴ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 97.

³⁵ John Connor, *The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), 21.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Connor is certainly correct in crediting the Indigenous people of Australia with independently conceiving this method of economic warfare, and his efforts to have it recognised as an innovative development are both admirable and much needed. But applying the title of “Australian frontier warfare” to it runs the risk of ignoring two important facts; first, that this style of combat was not uniquely Australian; and second, that it can only really be considered a “new form of warfare” in an Australian context. Indeed, a close analysis of the Pequot War reveals a very similar style of economic warfare being put into practice on the other side of the world, a full two hundred years prior to its use on the Australian frontier. Like the Palawa, the Pequots also had no qualms in targeting the livestock of their settler enemies, their tactics demonstrating what historian Virginia DeJohn Anderson calls “a keen understanding of colonial dependence on livestock.”³⁷ During their siege of Fort Saybrook, Pequot warriors called out to Gardiner and his men, saying “we will go to Conectecott,” promising that, in addition to killing all English regardless of age and sex, they would “take away the horses, cows and hogs.”³⁸ They made good on this threat during their attack on Wethersfield in April of 1637, in which twenty cattle and one horse were slain alongside nine English casualties.³⁹ Like the sheep in Tasmania two centuries later, these beasts of burden were not killed for their meat.

Along with burning homes and ambushing vulnerable travellers, the killing of cattle had been one of three means of combatting the English advocated by the Pequots to the Narragansetts. During those futile negotiations, the Pequots promised that this economically focused form of guerilla warfare would ensure that “the English could not subsist but they would either be starved with hunger or be forced to forsake the country.”⁴⁰ The Pequots’ defeat came too quickly for such methods to have any real impact on the war, but the logic of this strategy

³⁷ Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 182.

³⁸ Lion Gardiner, “Leift Lion Gardener his relation of the Pequot Warres,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 132.

³⁹ Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 182.

⁴⁰ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 294.

was vindicated during the Black War. In this more prolonged conflict, the loss of livestock, as well as crops and farming materials, hit many Britons hard. One such settler wrote a letter to the *Colonial Advocate*, complaining that, thanks to the Palawa attacks, it was “useless to attempt to keep stock.” So great was his frustration, that he considered “it better to drive the stock into town, and sell it for any price, than allow it to be made the prey of this accursed race!”⁴¹ As demonstrated by its consistency in both seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania, economic warfare was a key component of settler colonial violence, with the indigenes adjusting their tactics to effectively combat the unique threat settlers and their stock presented. The Pequots and Palawa arrived at this decision independently, but were inspired by a common realisation that remained as true in the nineteenth-century as it had been in the seventeenth; that their best chance of defending their lands was to jeopardize the settlers’ ability to live upon it.

Settler Responses

Despite their technological advantage over the indigenes, the English in Connecticut and the British in Tasmania felt little confidence in their respective conflicts. The attacks of the partisans were described, sometimes correctly, as indiscriminate assaults aimed at the entirety of the white populations of each colony. John Higginson in particular advised the inhabitants of Boston against thinking that the “warre is farre enough from them,” warning that the actions of the Pequots was a “universal deluge creeping and encroaching on all the English in the land.”⁴² Arthur made similar observations, crediting the Palawa with displaying an “intention to destroy, without distinction of sex or age, all the white inhabitants who should fall within their power.”⁴³ The tendency of settler colonial logic to imagine indigenes as threats had expanded greatly once the

⁴¹ *Colonial Advocate*, 1 May 1828.

⁴² John Higginson, *John Higginson to John Winthrop*. Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 405.

⁴³ George Arthur to George Murray, April 11, 1828, in *Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 9.

Pequots and Palawa showed considerable skill in combat. The settlers' hopes for a speedy restoration of order had evaporated in the face of this fierce indigenous resistance, being quickly replaced by concerns of an impending annihilation. Mason, for instance, firmly believed that the Pequot nation "resolved to Destroy all the English and to Root their very Name out of this country."⁴⁴ Tasmanian settlers held comparable views, and many advocated the eradication of the Palawa in order to, as one settler put it, "save ourselves a similar fate."⁴⁵

Faced with the near-constant threat of attack, the fearful settlers adopted various means of protecting themselves. Perhaps the most common solution was to travel or work armed. Whether they were English matchlocks or British flintlocks, European muskets had a significant edge in range, power, and psychological impact over native weaponry, and though the Pequots and Palawa had shed much of their superstitious perceptions of these weapons, they remained wary of them. As hostilities with the Pequots reached new heights in 1637, the Connecticut Council declared "none should go to work, nor travel, no, not so much as to church, without arms."⁴⁶ The Executive Council in Van Diemen's Land made no such official declaration, but nor did they need to. Settlers had begun arming themselves at their own initiative, and the council's minutes take note of how "the settlers were unable with safety to carry on their necessary advocations without fire-arms, even in the immediate neighborhood of their houses."⁴⁷

Guns may have provided some security, but actually combatting indigenous resistance required settlers to be more pro-active and innovative, and both the English in Connecticut and the British in Tasmania attempted to adapt and

⁴⁴ John Mason, "A Brief History of the Pequot War," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 35.

⁴⁵ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 45.

⁴⁶ Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1202.

⁴⁷ *Extract from the Minutes of the Executive Council, 30th October 1828*. Minutes. Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, 10.

respond to the guerilla tactics of their enemies. As early as the Block Island mission, Captain Underhill realised that “the Indian’s fight far differs from the Christian practice; for they most commonly divide themselves into small bodies.” As a result, he and the other English present were “forced to neglect our usual way, and to subdivide our divisions to answer theirs.”⁴⁸ During Fort Saybrook’s lengthy siege, Gardiner realised the importance of adapting to these partisan tactics. In one instance, he set forth with his men “to fire some small bushes and marshes whear we thought the enemie might have lien in ambush.”⁴⁹

The colonists of Van Diemen’s Land also took to forming small, armed groups for the express purpose of tracking Palawa and suppressing their resistance. Soldiers in the interior were typically organised into two groups; pursuit parties, which gave chase to Palawa raiders and spent twelve to forty-eight hours in the field, and roving parties, which actively scoured the bush for weeks, looking for any and all indigenes.⁵⁰ More deadly than either of these, however, were the vigilante parties formed by vengeful civilian colonists. In contrast to the daytime attacks of the Palawa, these parties sought out their quarry by night, often by spotting their campfires.⁵¹ The brutalities meted out against the Palawa in such camp raids were extreme, and the exact death toll remains unknown.

Despite their best efforts, however, settlers largely remained at a tactical disadvantage in frontier warfare. In Connecticut, Underhill’s attempts to respond in kind to native war parties failed to deliver the desired outcome, while Gardiner’s efforts to deny the Pequot warriors concealment ultimately brought him and his men into the ambush that claimed six of their lives.⁵² In Tasmania, the armed parties were frequently outmaneuvered, with Robinson describing how pursued Palawa would often “secret themselves and allow their pursuers to

⁴⁸ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 51.

⁴⁹ Lion Gardiner, *Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr.* Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 381.

⁵⁰ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 71-72.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁵² Lion Gardiner, *Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr.* Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 381.

pass them by.”⁵³ On the occasions where the British did locate their enemies, it was not uncommon for them to accidentally give themselves away and lose the advantage of surprise. Even the vigilante parties failed more often than not, with Clements identifying the frequency of their attacks, rather than their quality, as the cause of the considerable indigenous death toll they produced.⁵⁴

Breaking Resistance

The outcome of the Pequot War was decided, bloodily and decisively, on the morning of May 26, 1637. Ninety English militiamen under the command of Captains Mason and Underhill, along with seventy Mohegan warriors lead by their sachem Uncas, had arrived, after a lengthy march, at a fortified Pequot village by the Mystic River.⁵⁵ In an earlier letter to Winthrop regarding the hostilities of the Pequots, Edward Winslow promised “onece they be routed we know their courage will fail.”⁵⁶ Following this line of thought, the English and their allies had set forth to commit what Cave described as “an act of terrorism intended to break Pequot morale.”⁵⁷ The event that followed would be remembered as the Mystic massacre. On October 7 1830, the British too gathered in force as Lieutenant-Governor Arthur’s master plan came to fruition. A motley crew of soldiers, free settlers, convicts and ex-convicts, totaling 2,200 men, was gathered at the northern and western ends of the Settled Districts.⁵⁸ Their plan, as described by Ryan, was to “form a human cordon” and then “proceed on foot in a pincer movement south and east across the Settled

⁵³ Norman Plomey (ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 536.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 77.

⁵⁵ Philip Vincent, “A True Relation of the Late Battell Fought in New England,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 102.

⁵⁶ Edward Winslow, *Edward Winslow to John Winthrop, Jr.* Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 420.

⁵⁷ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 151.

⁵⁸ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 126.

Districts,” driving the Palawa before them.⁵⁹ This, it was hoped, would result in “the Aborigines hemmed in and ready to be driven forward to Tasman Peninsula.”⁶⁰ The operation was very similar to others the British had used to remove indigenous resistance fighters in South Africa and Sri Lanka, and would go down in history as the Black Line.⁶¹

The English faced some early setbacks in their attack on Mystic. Though they had successfully entered the village’s palisades, strong resistance from the alarmed Pequots forced them to beat a hasty retreat.⁶² Thus, the original plan- which was, in Mason’s words, to “destroy them by the Sword and save the Plunder”- quickly became unfeasible.⁶³ Seeing this, Mason and Underhill “devised a way how we might save ourselves and prejudice them,” and had the wigwams of the Pequots set alight.⁶⁴ The resulting inferno “blazed most terribly, and burnt all in the space of half an hour,” killing a great many of the fort’s inhabitants.⁶⁵ The English, blocking both entrances to the fort, “received and entertained with the point of the sword” any who tried to flee the fire, slaughtering scores of men, women, and children.⁶⁶ An outer cordon of Mohegan and Narragansett warriors dispatched those that escaped. Few of Mystic’s inhabitants survived this devastating attack. Though accounts vary, Mason records that the Pequots had been killed “to the Number of six or seven Hundred,” with “ only seven taken captive, and about seven escaped.”⁶⁷

⁵⁹ Lyndall Ryan, “The Black Line in Van Diemen’s Land: success or failure?” *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 10.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁶² Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 149.


⁶³ John Mason, “A Brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 28.

⁶⁴ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 80.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁶⁷ John Mason, “A Brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 31.



The Mystic Massacre: the English and their Native allies surround and destroy the Pequot village.⁶⁸

The initial outcome of the Black Line was almost the exact opposite. While there were apparently only seven escapees from the Mystic Massacre, the ambitious British expedition only managed to capture two Palawa and kill two more.⁶⁹ The human cordon had been beset by bad weather and tough terrain in its southeastern advance and, taking advantage of this, the Palawa “made repeated efforts to burst through the line.”⁷⁰ Though Arthur was confident that “the advance of the forces had effectively hemmed in the two worst tribes,” these indigenous bands did, with some difficulty, successfully avoid being corralled.⁷¹

⁶⁸ “The figure of the Indians’ fort or palizado in New England and the manner of the destroying it by Captayne Underhill and Captayne Mason.” Connecticut, 1638. Photograph. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2001695745/>. (Accessed October 1 2017).

⁶⁹ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 88.

⁷⁰ Memorandum, in *Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 73.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

With the Palawa still at large after six weeks of combing the bush, Arthur was eventually forced to have his operation “terminated without the capture of either of the Native Tribes.”⁷² Following the conclusion of the Black Line, many of the British in Tasmania believed “the whole scheme proved a most complete failure.”⁷³ Though, as Lyndall Ryan has pointed out, the operation had more long-term success than it is usually credited with, and played an important role in ending the Black War.⁷⁴

On the surface, the Black Line was everything the Mystic Massacre was not. The latter was short, wantonly bloody, and was an unquestionable triumph for the English.⁷⁵ The former was prolonged, designed to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, and was incorrectly believed to be a costly fiasco by most of Van Diemen’s Land.⁷⁶ But both campaigns were, in reality, just different solutions to similar problems. As their frustrations mounted, the settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania came to realise that indigenous resistance was not something that needed to be safeguarded against, or met on equal terms. It was, rather, something that needed to be quickly and decisively broken. That they possessed greater might and force of arms than their native enemies was something the settlers strongly believed and rarely questioned, with there being some evidence to support this view. For instance, the Pequots had ended their siege of Saybrook when reinforcements from Connecticut arrived, and instead turned their attention to the less well-defended settlements upriver.⁷⁷ Likewise, the Palawa consistently avoided the highly visible British soldiers whenever they could, and

⁷² George Arthur to George Murray, 1 January 1831, in *Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 74.

⁷³ Henry Melville, *The History of Van Diemen’s Land* (Sydney: Horwitz Publications and The Grahame Book Company, 1965), 105.

⁷⁴ Lyndall Ryan, “The Black Line in Van Diemen’s Land: success or failure?” *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 3-18.

⁷⁵ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 81.

⁷⁶ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 140-141.

⁷⁷ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 61.

were notably resultant to attack armed groups consisting of as little as three men.⁷⁸

As indigenous raids intensified, both settler populations brought this might to bear and attempted to end their respective wars with one decisive effort. For the seventeenth-century puritans, who were utterly convinced that God sanctioned their actions, this meant delivering a deadly and unsparing blow to their satanic enemies.⁷⁹ For the nineteenth-century British, living in a world touched by the enlightenment and humanitarian movements, this meant forcibly evicting the supposedly wretched savages, apparently for their own good.⁸⁰ These efforts certainly took very different forms, manifesting in accordance to whatever was deemed appropriate or necessary at the time. But at their core they can both be understood as ‘knock-out blows,’ enacted in the hopes of subduing an otherwise elusive enemy and bringing each war to a quick close.

Military Cultures

The Pequot and Black Wars both demonstrate a remarkable clash of wartime practices that had developed in isolation from one another. The Anglo settlers introduced many things into Connecticut and Tasmania, but warfare was definitely not one of them. The Pequots in particular had, by 1634, subdued and made tributaries of many neighbouring tribes through their feats on the battlefield, with Plymouth puritan Nathaniel Morton describing them as “a stout and warlike people” who were “puffed up with many victories.”⁸¹ That the name ‘Pequot’ translates into English as ‘the destroyers’ is also telling of their

⁷⁸ George Arthur to George Murray, April 11, 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 9.

⁷⁹ John Mason, “A Brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 35.

⁸⁰ *Extract from the Minutes of the Executive Council, 27th August 1830*. Minutes. Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, 64.

⁸¹ Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1191.

reputation. War was also an ever-present part of life for the Palawa, as Robinson observed many times in his journeys among the native tribes of Tasmania. In his own words, a great number of the indigenes he encountered possessed “scars which had been inflicted in their wars with other nations or tribes,” and on many of the nights he spent in their care he was regaled by enthusiastic tales of battlefield heroism, reenacted primarily through song and dance.⁸²

The intertribal wars of the Pequots and Palawa were, however, much smaller in scale than those of the Europeans they later battled with. A keen observer of Native American customs, Roger Williams wrote of how “their Warres are farre lesse bloody, and devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe” with “seldome twenty slain in a pitch field.” Even when a warrior was wounded, “unlesse he that shot followes upon the wounded, they soone retire and save the wounded.”⁸³ In Tasmania, Robinson also witnessed and heard of small-scale hostilities among the indigenes. He encountered a Palawa warrior returning from a battle with “the natives of the lakes” that ended when “they killed three of that people and the rest fled.”⁸⁴ He heard of another battle that saw only two men killed, and still ended with “the enemy’s revenge being satisfied” and the victors “exalting in the bloody deed.”⁸⁵

The settlers of both Connecticut and Tasmania were none too impressed by these restrained modes of war. Upon witnessing “the nature of the Indian war,” Captain Underhill dismissively claimed “they might fight seven years and not kill seven men.”⁸⁶ His fellow captain John Mason shared the sentiment, believing native warfare “did hardly deserve the Name of Fighting.”⁸⁷ Criticism of Palawa warfare was more indirect. Writing of British casualties in the Black War, J.E.

⁸² Norman Plomey(ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 424; 495.

⁸³ Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1191.

⁸⁴ Norman Plomey(ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 262.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 392.

⁸⁶ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 82.

⁸⁷ John Mason, “A brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 41.

Calder claimed to “know of no trustworthy record of more than one, two, three, or at most four persons being killed in any one encounter.”⁸⁸ For the Palawa, this was standard wartime practice. For Calder, it was “a petty affair.”⁸⁹

The differences in scope and scale between indigenous and settler military cultures was clearly significant. As shown by their disparaging remarks, the settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania were quick to present the difference as a matter of quality, accusing the Pequots and Palawa of lacking courage or determination. In reality, the reasons were more quantitative in nature. As Belich puts it, “war is the most expensive of human activities; it is therefore very difficult for tribal people to sustain for long.”⁹⁰ Martial traditions evolve to fit within the logistical constraints, and meet the cultural needs, of those that practice them. As the indigenous societies of Connecticut and Tasmania functioned on a smaller scale than the nations that settled their lands, it stands to reason that their wartime practices would be more restrained. Assessing the situation in pre-colonial New England, Adam J. Hirsch observed that since the Pequots and their neighbours possessed “ample land and a system of values by and large indifferent to material accumulation,” their intertribal conflicts “rarely harbored the economic and political ambitions that fueled European warfare.”⁹¹ Connor’s analysis of Indigenous Australian warfare arrived at a similar conclusion, noting that fighting “a war of territorial conquest,” as was customary in European military cultures, “was beyond the resources of these small Aboriginal groups.”⁹²

⁸⁸ James Calder, *The Native Tribes of Tasmania* (Hobart: Henn and Co., 1875), 8.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 53.

⁹¹ Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1190.

⁹² John Connor, *The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), 2.

Military Acculturation

Throughout history, tribal societies have typically been burdened with logistical limitations that restricted their capacity to resist the relentless spread of settler colonialism. The imbalance that emerged from the meeting of such different military cultures had a profound influence on the structure and outcome of settler colonial conflicts. This is, perhaps, best seen in the seasonal patterns of violence that emerged in both the Pequot War and the Black War. In March of 1637 Gardiner wrote to Winthrop, enthusiastically thanking the “goodnes and mercy” of God for granting him and the Saybrook settlers “rest from the Indians all this winter butt one of the 22th of last moneth.”⁹³ The fort, which had been practically besieged by Pequot warriors, seemed to have been given a respite during the colder months. In July of 1828 Arthur reported a similar development to Secretary Huskisson, informing him that the Palawa “have not since shown themselves in any force, nor committed any violence.”⁹⁴ Though probably just as grateful for the wintertime relief, Arthur was less willing than Gardiner to attribute it to divine intervention, and instead believed it to “be accounted for by their custom of resorting to the coast in the winter season.”⁹⁵ His belief was validated several months later, reporting to Murray “that the spring had no sooner commenced than the Natives renewed their hostile attacks.”⁹⁶

The wars did not end during these seasonal hiatuses. Unlike the settlers, the Pequots and Palawa simply did not have the resources to support a professional, full-time military or sustain a perpetual offensive. Whether it be hunting, planting, or keeping up with seasonal migrations, each part-time indigenous

⁹³ Lion Gardiner, *Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr.* Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 381.

⁹⁴ George Arthur to Secretary Huskisson, 5 July 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 8.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ George Arthur to George Murray, 4 November 1828, in *Van Diemen's Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 9.

warrior had other duties that needed to be fulfilled, and they could not afford to suspend them in order to commit to a sustained conflict. Indigenous Australian wars, for instance, were noted by Connor to be typically “limited in the duration of the fighting because warriors had to stop campaigning to resume food gathering.”⁹⁷ This limitation did not disappear with the coming of settlers, and it came to hit the Palawa particularly hard, with the plundering of supplies eventually replacing the killing of Britons as their standard practice in the Black War.⁹⁸ The Pequots were equally susceptible to these constraints, and several months after Winthrop received Gardiner’s report on Saybrook’s winter reprieve, Winslow informed him “the Pecoats follow their fishing and planting as if they had no enemies.”⁹⁹ Though odd to the English, this was both normal and necessary to the Pequots.

Part-time warriors accustomed to fighting short, restrained conflicts were at a serious disadvantage to their settler enemies, who possessed a more vigorous approach to war and the logistical ability to pursue it to its fullest degree. The Pequots and Palawa were certainly able to adapt their tactics and rise to many of the new challenges settler colonialism presented; their targeting of livestock, for instance, more than proves that. But in the long run, the sheer scale of European warfare proved to be too insurmountable an obstacle, and their encounters with it were devastating and traumatic. Though they had little reason to sympathise with their longstanding enemies, the Native Americans allied to the English were nonetheless horrified by the wholesale slaughter of Pequots in the Mystic Massacre, crying out “Mach it, mach it; that is, it is too furious, and slays too many men.”¹⁰⁰ Likewise, “the great military operations” of the Black Line had “the effect of frightening” the Palawa who, as Melville reminds his readers, “could

⁹⁷ John Connor, *The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), 3.

⁹⁸ Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 88.

⁹⁹ Edward Winslow, *Edward Winslow to John Winthrop, Jr.* Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 420.

¹⁰⁰ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 84.

not understand the meaning of such warlike movements on the part of men they have been accustomed to make war against when acting in small numbers.”¹⁰¹

In 1988 Hirsch defined the “interaction of military cultures” in the Pequot War to be an example of “military acculturation.”¹⁰² This cross-cultural interaction, described as having “shaped the history of conflict between colonists and Indians in early America,” is one of the most consistent features of settler colonial violence, informing confrontations between settlers and indigenes in nearly every era and location where settler colonialism was practiced.¹⁰³ This is largely due to the emphasis of the process on the attainment of land above all else, which made the meeting of proportionately disparate military cultures a near inevitable outcome. According to Donald Denoon, “the most obvious pre-condition of a settler society is the fragility of pre-existing social formations.”¹⁰⁴ Though the description of indigenous societies as ‘fragile’ is hardly accurate, his account of settler selectiveness is otherwise correct. As he relates, places where “indigenous communities were densely settled, and sufficiently malleable to sustain European merchants or planters as merely an additional imposition,” fell under the thrall of franchise colonialism.¹⁰⁵ Settler colonialism was reserved for places “where indigenous societies could not carry such a burden” and, in the eyes of the settlers, had nothing valuable to offer but their lands.¹⁰⁶ The smaller populations and levels of subsistence found among these targeted indigenes often assured that their warrior traditions functioned at a level of intensity far below that of the newly arrived settlers, turning any following conflict between the two societies into an act of military acculturation.

The consistency with which this interaction played out in seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania is remarkable. A comparison of

¹⁰¹ Henry Melville, *The History of Van Diemen’s Land* (Sydney: Horwitz Publications and The Grahame Book Company, 1965), 105.

¹⁰² Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1187.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Donald Denoon, “Understanding Settler Societies,” *Historical Studies* 18, no. 73 (1979): 512.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

the Pequot and Black Wars, therefore, makes it possible to see the ways in which settler colonialism can inform geographically and temporally distanced conflicts, reinforcing its status as a structure, not an event. And as the next chapter will explore, this influence extended to the treatment of indigenes after the cessation of each conflict.

Chapter Three: Aftermath

The military cultures of the Anglo settlers had devastated the indigenes of Connecticut and Tasmania, sending both into disarray. This chapter will now focus on the legacies and effects of the Pequot and Black Wars, beginning in the immediate aftermath of the Mystic Massacre and the Black Line. Through its comparative analysis it will identify the ways in which the operative logic of settler colonialism informed the treatment of indigenous peoples in a post-war environment and how this manifested in different cultural contexts.

Surrender

Neither the Mystic Massacre nor the Black Line of 1830 brought an immediate end to their respective conflicts, but they did determine their outcomes. For all the disparities between the conduct and results of these campaigns, they each produced similar developments that became apparent in the weeks following their conclusions. In June of 1637, just a month after the atrocities at Mystic, Roger Williams wrote to Winthrop to inform him that “not a Pequot is to be found” following the flight of their sachem Sassacus.¹ In January 1831, two months following the end of the Black Line, the *Colonial Times* rhetorically asked “what has become of all the Aboriginal tribes? Were they all killed or taken prisoner during the late expedition?”² The situation was the same in both colonies. The indigenes, who had previously represented a very real and present danger to the settlers, had suddenly become scarce. Given the enormity of the campaigns waged against them, this is hardly surprising. Sassacus had been spared from the Mystic slaughter because he, with numerous other Pequot men, had been away from the fort. Upon learning of the attack he “was all for blood,” but those with him, having seen “what advantage the English lie,” reasoned that it would be better to “save some than lose all.”³ Thus the surviving Pequots, while still offering some resistance, spent much of the remainder of the war

¹ Roger Williams, *Roger Williams to John Winthrop*, Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 427.

² *Colonial Times*, 28 January 1831

³ John Underhill, “Newes From America,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 85.

being pursued by the English and their allies, with some seeking refuge with friendly tribes. The Black Line, far from being the failure which, until recently, it was frequently interpreted to be, had a similarly sobering effect on the Palawa. Though capturing only two people, the scale of the campaign had struck a psychological blow to the already war-weary nations in the Settled Districts.⁴

In both Connecticut and Tasmania, bold demonstrations of the settler's capacity for war had demoralized the targeted indigenes and hamstrung their resistance. Continued offensives from the Anglo invaders only hastened the inevitable. According to Vincent, "it is not good to give breath to a beaten enemy," and as Pequots survivors attempted to flee following Mystic "small parties of them were since destroyed."⁵ One such killing occurred at a hiding place called Cuppacommock, where 120 English under Captain Israel Stoughton "killed some and took others."⁶ The Pequots, who had become "so broken and Scattered," were also "exposed continually to the Revenge and Cruelty of the Mohegans on the One Hand and the Naragansets on the other."⁷ Even those who had taken refuge with neutral tribes were not safe. Sassacus himself had, with forty other Pequots, fled to the Mohawk people, who "cut off his head and sent it to Hartford."⁸ More interested in earning good graces of the English than sheltering Pequot refugees, the Mohawks had, according to Vincent, sent this grisly gift as "a testimony of their love and service."⁹ In Tasmania, the cessation of the Black line brought no respite to the Palawa and, as Ryan has convincingly argued, proved to be just the first of three such operations enacted over a fifteen-month period that ultimately brought about a British victory in the Black War.¹⁰ The second of

⁴ Lyndall Ryan, "The Black Line in Van Diemen's Land: success or failure?" *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 4.

⁵ Philip Vincent, "A True Relation of the late Battell fought in New England," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 106-107.

⁶ Lion Gardiner, "Leift Lion Gardener his relation of the Pequot Warres," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 138.

⁷ Benjamin Trumbull, *A Compendium of the Indian Wars in New England* (Hartford: Edwin Valentine Mitchell, 1926), 29.

⁸ Lion Gardiner, "Leift Lion Gardener his relation of the Pequot Warres," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 138.

⁹ Philip Vincent, "A True Relation of the late Battell fought in New England," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 107.

¹⁰ Lyndall Ryan, "The Black Line in Van Diemen's Land: success or failure?" *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 4-5.

these engagements saw resistance leader Montpelier and his clan come under attack from fifty Britons who “killed one woman and a man” before forcing an inland retreat.¹¹ Later, more than 200 settlers and soldiers cordoned off an isthmus in the hopes of trapping Tongerlongter and his people on the Freycinet peninsula.¹² Failing after only four days, this effort had nonetheless harried the already exhausted indigenes to breaking point.

To many of the indigenes on the receiving end of these offensives, surrender was the only foreseeable way to survive. Faced with the threat of death from all sides, the Pequots had little choice but “to Submit themselves to the English.”¹³ In June Williams had written to Winthrop, commenting on how it had “again pleased the most High to put into your hands another miserable drove of Adam’s degenerate seede,” and this accumulation of captives only continued throughout the summer of 1637.¹⁴ In Tasmania, Palawa surrender was as much enticed as it was forced. Again playing the role of conciliator, George Augustus Robinson led a peaceful mission to contact and negotiate with the indigenes of the Settled Districts. Promising resources and safety to the long-suffering people, many he encountered eventually agreed to surrender, with one band having even “broke all their spears and threw away their waddies” in what Robinson described as “a proof of their desire to conform.”¹⁵

These periods of denouement and surrender demonstrated the heavy toll that the Pequot and Black Wars had taken on the indigenous populations that fought in them. Following their struggle with the English the Pequots were, according to Vincent, “nothing but a name, for not less than seven hundred are slain or taken

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

¹² Nicholas Clements, *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2014), 166-167.

¹³ Benjamin Trumbull, *A Compendium of the Indian Wars in New England* (Hartford: Edwin Valentine Mitchell, 1926), 29.

¹⁴ Roger Williams, *Roger Williams to John Winthrop*, Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 436.

¹⁵ Norman Plomey (ed.), *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 567.

prisoners.”¹⁶ Disease had already reduced their population to a fraction of its pre-colonial level. War had simply, and horrendously, reduced it further. The populations of the eastern Palawa tribes had similarly dropped as the violence of the Black War inflicted considerable casualties. While Arthur, just prior to the Black Line, had estimated there to be around 2,000 indigenes inhabiting the Settled Districts, the number was more likely around 250.¹⁷ This became evident to the British upon the surrender of the partisans, with the *Hobart Town Courier* reflecting on how “the very small number too, which is now found to compose these tribes must strike many of our readers, especially those who supposed them to amount to thousands.”¹⁸ The indigenes who had lived to see the end of the Pequot War and the Black War were survivors in every sense of the word. The unyielding formation of settler colonialism had brought an unrelenting form of war down upon them and left them in disarray. Unfortunately, the cessation of war was not the end of their troubles.

Ethnic Transfer

Following the surrender and eventual dissolution of the Pequot tribe, Captain John Mason was quick to thank God for the good fortunes of the English. “Thus,” he wrote, “the Lord was pleased to smite our Enemies in the hinder Parts, and to give us their Land for an inheritance.”¹⁹ More than 400 years later, Richard Drinnon responded to this audacious claim, undermining Mason’s perceived crusade in the process; “Thus was God a mercantilist, he could have said, for on the economic level that is exactly what the Pequot War was about: the acquisition of Block Island and Connecticut.”²⁰ To that end, the English did indeed have cause to celebrate. As Alden Vaughan summarised it, “the destruction of the Pequots cleared away the only major obstacle to Puritan

¹⁶ Philip Vincent, “A True Relation of the late Battell fought in New England,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 107.

¹⁷ Lyndall Ryan, “The Black Line in Van Diemen’s Land: success or failure?” *Journal of Australian Studies* 37, no. 1 (2013): 9.

¹⁸ *Hobart Town Courier*, 14 January 1832

¹⁹ John Mason, “A Brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 44.

²⁰ Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating & Empire Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 46.

expansion.”²¹ Not only were the Pequots themselves reduced to a straggling entity, but the display of English military might had a sobering effect on the other New England tribes, even those who had joined the fight against the Pequots. English hegemony, and survival in the new world, had been secured.

The conclusion of the Black War 194 years later delivered similar rewards and reassurances to the British. At the height of the conflict in 1830, the *Hobart Town Courier* described the indigenous partisans as the “only drawback to the advancement of the colony,” which needed to “be at once removed” lest the settlers be forced to abandon much of the island.²² The author, like many Britons, considered the war with the Palawa to be “the important crisis on which the future rise or fall of this beautiful colony is to be determined.”²³ Thus, when the Palawa surrendered to Arthur, the colony appeared to be saved, and its prosperity assured. Writing just a week after the surrender of Tongerlongter and his followers, the *Courier* now promised its readers that “the large tracts of pasture that have so long been deserted owing to their murderous attacks on the shepherds and stockhuts, will now be available.”²⁴ Whether it was in seventeenth-century Connecticut or nineteenth-century Tasmania, the feeling among the victorious settlers was the same. Since they had defeated the indigenes, the land, described by Wolfe as “the primary object of settler-colonization,” was now inarguably theirs.²⁵

Even in these moments of triumph, however, the Pequots and Palawa were still something of an obstacle to the Anglo settlers. Though they now presented little physical threat, their presence, as West would describe it in Tasmania, nonetheless “renders everything insecure.”²⁶ The possibility of a resurgence in indigenous resistance weighed heavily in the minds of some settlers, and more

²¹ Alden Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1965), 153

²² *Hobart Town Courier*, 11 September 1830

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Hobart Town Courier*, 14 January 1832

²⁵ Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassell & Co., 1999), 163.

²⁶ John West, *The History of Tasmania* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1852), 333.

broadly it was difficult to imagine the settlement process ever being completed so long as the land's original possessors remained upon it in significant force. The deportation of the defeated and severely depopulated indigenes from the contested spaces thus appeared to be the most desirable approach in each circumstance, even though the methods used to achieve this differed greatly between them.

The removal of the defeated Pequots was brought about by a radical shift in their status, with their defeat transforming them from enemy combatants to spoils of war. Those tribespeople that surrendered to, or were captured by, the English were summarily enslaved and divvied up between the victorious parties. Recounting the climatic English triumph at Fairfield swamp in July 1637, Mason noted that "the Captives we took were about One Hundred and Eighty; whom we divided, intending to keep as Servants."²⁷ Providing further details, Winthrop writes that the soldiers "sent some to Connecticut, and some to Massachusetts."²⁸

Many captives were also sent to the Mohegans and Narragansetts. A meeting between these two tribes and the Connecticut colonies on September 21 1638 produced the Treaty of Hartford, which brought the Pequot war to an official close and formalized the distribution of captives.²⁹ According to its text, the English granted the Narragansetts enough slaves "to make up the number of Eighty with the Eleven they have already," with the Mohegans receiving a comparable number.³⁰ The most extreme form of indigenous removal, however, was the selling of Pequot men and boys into slavery in the Caribbean. Of the tribespeople that surrendered after the fight at Fairfield, the English "sent fifteen of the boys and two women to Bermuda."³¹ An extract from a letter, sent to Winthrop by a colonist named Hugh Peter, also includes the reminder "I wrote to

²⁷ John Mason, "A Brief History of the Pequot War," in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 39.

²⁸ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 227.

²⁹ Katherine A. Grandjean, "The Long Wake of the Pequot War," *Early American Studies* 9, no. 2 (2011): 391.

³⁰ Alden Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1965), 431.

³¹ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630-1649* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1908), 227-228.

you for some boyes for Bermudas, which I thinke is considerable.”³² Throughout all this the expulsion of the defeated tribe was enacted in no uncertain terms, with the Treaty of Hartford expressively forbidding the Pequots from living “in the country that was formerly theirs but is now the Englishes by conquest.”³³

The removal of the Palawa from Tasmania was not so severe, but no less total. As early as 1828, increasing levels of interracial violence had left Arthur “convinced of the absolute necessity of separating the Aborigines altogether from the white inhabitants,” noting that though it may be “painful and distressing to banish the Natives from their favourite haunts,” there was otherwise “no occasion that His Majesty’s Government should be apprehensive” in the matter.³⁴ For much of the ensuing war, however, he believed that it was possible for a part of the Tasmanian mainland to be left as a native reserve; the Black Line, for instance, had been enacted with the intent of driving and confining the indigenes to the Tasman peninsula.

However, as the violence in the interior escalated, both sympathisers and detractors of the Palawa began to advocate for their offshore relocation to Bass Strait. By 1830 the *Hobart Town Courier* considered “planting a small colony of instruction for them on one of the small and secure islands of the Straits” to be their “long wished for favourite scheme.”³⁵ Arthur likewise wrote to Murray the following year and affirmed his new belief, inspired by Robinson’s suggestions, that the Palawa “should be removed to Gun-Carriage Island, which is situated in Basses Straits... or on some other island which, on examination, might be found more eligible for the purpose.”³⁶ Flinders Island, and the settlement of Wybalenna upon it, eventually came to be the final destination for many of the

³² Hugh Peter, *Hugh Peter to John Winthrop*, Letter. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers*, 450.

³³ Alden Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1965), 431.

³⁴ George Arthur to Secretary Huskisson, 17 January 1828, in *Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 5.

³⁵ *Hobart Town Courier*, 11 September 1830

³⁶ George Arthur to George Murray, 4 April 1831, in *Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of all Correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Subject of Military Operations Recently Carried on against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land*, introduced by AGL Shaw (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1971), 78.

surrendering Palawa. Here, Robinson promised them “uninterrupted tranquility in the society of their kindred and friends.”³⁷ Instead, their time there was characterised by disease, minimal supplies, and a continued decline in population.

On the surface, these methods of physical removal would appear to be very different from one another, and in many ways they were. Writing to Winthrop in February of 1638 Roger Williams insisted that “the Most High delights in Mercy” and that “great revenge hath been already taken,” suggesting to him that the Pequot captives ought to “become subjects to yourselves in the Bay and Connecticut” rather than having them “incorporate with the natives in either place.”³⁸ But these apprehensions remained the only serious opposition to the enslavement and division of the entire Pequot populace, with the English by and large lacking any qualms in the matter. Concerns were not quite so scarce in Tasmania two hundred years later. Though Palawa women and children had previously been unofficially abducted and forced into sexual and domestic servitude, the end of the Black War saw no such mass enslavement of the surrendering indigenes.

At the height of the conflict, the *Colonial Times* had even written at length about how “the Aborigines have never been called upon, nor their persons seized, nor their native freedom curbed, that they might thereby be rendered slaves to us, and toil under a burden, and cultivate the soil.”³⁹ After all, the Britain of the early 1830s was a nation that had been touched by the abolitionist and humanitarian movements. And though the efforts of these groups did not halt the dispossession and exploitation of indigenous peoples in the British Empire, they did bring an end to slavery the year following the Black War’s conclusion. With such an event on the horizon, enslavement would have been a controversial and largely unfashionable move.

³⁷ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 220.

³⁸ Roger Williams, *Roger Williams to John Winthrop*, Letter. Providence: Narragansett Club, *Letters of Roger Williams: 1632-1682*, 87-88.

³⁹ *Colonial Times*, 30 April 1830.

Thus, on an operational level, the deportation of the Palawa to Bass Strait bears little resemblance to the earlier condemnation of the Pequot people to slavery. But as was the case with the Mystic Massacre and the Black Line, this contrast masks a structural similarity between the temporally distanced and ideologically distinct practices. In his theoretical overview of settler colonialism, Veracini noted how “the settler colonial situation is primarily defined by an inherent drive towards supersession” and that indigenous peoples “challenge with their very presence the basic legitimacy of the settler entity.”⁴⁰ To overcome this challenge, settlers typically initiate a process known as ‘ethnic transfer,’ which is defined as “when indigenous communities are forcibly deported, either within or without territory claimed or controlled by the settler entity.”⁴¹ This was exactly what happened to both the Pequots and the Palawa who had surrendered to the colonial authorities. It was not enough for either the English or British to defeat their indigenous foes. Just as they had moved themselves into their new lands, they each found themselves moving the indigenes away from their old ones, thus vacating the previously contested territories and assuring that their hegemony would remain unchallenged. Whether this ethnic transfer took the form of slavery or salvation was dependent on the standards and sensibilities of the era in which it was practiced. But in the aftermath of settler colonial violence, such transference was a highly probable outcome, one way or another.

The perceived importance of ethnic transfer to the success of the settler colonial mission was so great that any effort made by the indigenes to return to their native lands was met with passionate opposition. When a group of Pequots defied the Treaty of Hartford by returning to Connecticut and establishing a village at Powcatuck, the English were quick to send out “forty men under the Command of Captain John Mason” to forcibly expel them, with a hundred Mohegan warriors under Uncas “going also to assist in the service.”⁴² When the Eastern Niantics, who thought these Pequot survivors to be under their protection, protested this action, Mason “informed them, That the Pequots had

⁴⁰ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 33.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴² John Mason, “A Brief History of the Pequot War,” in *A Brief History of the Pequot War*, ed. Charles Orr (: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 40-41

violated their promise to the English, in that they were not their to inhabit, and that we were sent to supplant them.”⁴³ The English and Mohegans subsequently “fired all the wigwams in their view” and proceeded to dismantle this remnant of Pequot independence.⁴⁴ Opposition to indigenous repatriation was not so violent in Tasmania, nor was it officially sanctioned. But it was, nonetheless, persistent. The decision to return Palawa survivors from Bass Strait to the Tasmanian mainland in 1847 caused much outrage among the settler population as, though these indigenes were a mere forty-seven in number, “the dreadful state of affairs” experienced during the Black War proved to be “too vivid in the memory of old colonists to ever be forgotten.”⁴⁵ Some 200 men in Launceston drafted a petition to stop the repatriation, recalling their own wartime experiences to warn of what could happen “when uncivilized creatures with all their blood-thirsty and savage propensities are admitted to escape into the bush to perpetrate all sorts of depredations and atrocities.”⁴⁶

The settler societies of Connecticut and Tasmania eventually came to soften their stances on Pequot and Palawa repatriation, with small and heavily controlled indigenous populations coming to reside in each colony. Nonetheless, even in their victory, the settlers had proven themselves wary. The original possessors of the contested lands were an obstacle to settlement, and within the constraints of settler colonial logic they could scarcely be imagined as anything else. Though they had been reduced to a handful of survivors, the possibility of them residing in their ancestral country was nonetheless something that the victorious and zealous settlers could barely abide. After all, as noted by Veracini, “settler colonial projects are specifically interested in turning indigenous peoples into refugees.”⁴⁷ It was this specific interest that structured the aftermath of the Pequot War, the Black War, and an uncountable number of other frontier conflicts. Such is the legacy of settler colonial violence.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁵ *Examiner*, 2 October 1847.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 35.

Disavowal

The cultural legacies of the Pequot War, the Black War, and, more broadly, settler colonialism in Connecticut and Tasmania are long, complicated, and partially encapsulated in the anecdotes of two non-indigenous historians from each state. In 1987 Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., named by the New York Times as the “leading non-Indian writer about Native Americans,” recalled a visit made thirty-six years earlier to a museum in his hometown of Greenwich, Connecticut. While there, he was “informed, regretfully but authoritatively, by a curator who had the mournful look of an undertaker, that all Indians in Connecticut were extinct.”⁴⁸ This lesson was not exclusively reserved for him, as “for decades the knowledgeable experts at the museum had been reassuring hordes of wide-eyed Greenwich school children that there was no longer any danger of their being scalped by skulking savages in their state.”⁴⁹ Henry Reynolds, a leading expert on the Australian frontier wars, recalled similar lessons from his school days. “My Tasmanian education,” he writes, “taught me a little about the Black War and there seemed to be a general community recognition of the conflict which accompanied pioneer settlement.”⁵⁰ In an Australian context this curriculum content would seem odd, given the historiographical tendency to downplay or ignore indigenous resistance. The exception was made because, in Reynolds’ words, “it was widely accepted that the Tasmanian Aborigines were extinct,” and therefore the “past violence seemed to have little continuing relevance” and posed no threat to the status quo of the present.⁵¹

These twentieth-century tales of indigenous extinction, as untrue as any of the ethnocentric propaganda produced in the seventeenth and nineteenth-centuries, were not merely the result of the devastating losses suffered by the Pequot and Palawa peoples during their respective fights against settler colonialism. They are instead the end result of a systematic process of disavowal that began in the

⁴⁸ Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., “New England Indians: Then and Now,” in *The Pequots in Southern New England: The Rise and Fall of an American Indian Nation*, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Henry Reynolds, *Why Weren’t We Told? A Personal Search for the Truth About our History* (Ringwood: Penguin Publishing, 2000), 139.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

immediate aftermaths of each settler colonial conflict and have only recently started to be seriously challenged. In Connecticut, the attempted erasure of the Pequot people was enacted with a great degree of deliberation on behalf of the English. In addition to robbing them of their lands, the Treaty of Hartford attempted to remove all traces of the Pequot nation itself, declaring that those who had survived the war “shall no more be called Peaquots but Narragansetts and Mohegans.”⁵² As Katherine Grandjean notes, this act was taken to assure that “*Pequot* as a name, an identity, a territory, would cease to exist.”⁵³ She also notes, however, that it was unsuccessful, as “a piece of parchment could hardly erase the hundreds of surviving Pequots who were now spread out across the Northeast.”⁵⁴ In Tasmania, the dissolution of Palawa culture was certainly desired and coerced by the paternalistic British, who had hoped that “their savage habits may be forgotten, and their minds enlightened to the enjoyments of civilized life.”⁵⁵ Their supposed physical extinction, however, was ordained as an inevitable, and natural, outcome. Writing five years after the repatriation of the Palawa survivors, West recorded that “the advances towards the final extinction of the natives, have been more rapid than was expected; but the certainty of that event was never the subject of doubt.”⁵⁶ When the long-suffering Bruny Island woman Truganini drew her last breath in 1876, the settlers finally, and erroneously, declared the Aborigines of Tasmania an extinct race.⁵⁷

The Pequots and the Palawa may have been pushed to the brink of extinction, but neither indigenous population actually crossed that point of no return. But, as Veracini points out, settler colonial logic is “directed at disallowing the very existence and persistence of indigenous presence and claims.”⁵⁸ Thus the disavowal of an indigenous presence in the present remains one of the more persistent legacies of settler colonial violence. The disavowal of indigenous

⁵² Alden Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Comp., 1965), 431.

⁵³ Katherine A. Grandjean, “The Long Wake of the Pequot War,” *Early American Studies* 9, no. 2 (2011): 394.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 392.

⁵⁵ *Hobart Town Courier*, 11 September 1830

⁵⁶ John West, *The History of Tasmania* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1852), 314.

⁵⁷ Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines: A History Since 1803* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 269.

⁵⁸ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 81-82.

presences in the past is not unheard of either, and was in fact a popular practice in many a colonial historian's retelling of the settlement of Connecticut and Tasmania. In the former location, this wasn't achieved by denying the presence of the Pequot people, but instead by calling their indigeneity into question. William Hubbard, for instance, described them as invaders who "came down out of the more inland Parts of the Continent, and by Force seized one of the goodliest Places near the Sea."⁵⁹ Archeological evidence has since debunked this theory, but it remained popular in the Pequot War's historiography for centuries. In Tasmania, where Palawa indigeneity remained unquestioned, it was more common for nineteenth-century historians to, as Johanna Perheentupa describes it, portray "the Australian natural landscape as wilderness and the Aboriginal people as part of it."⁶⁰ This habit of rendering indigenes "indistinguishable from the environment" served to validate the concept of terra nullius and present settlement as a struggle against nature rather than man.⁶¹

Settler colonial violence had taken the lives of many Pequot and Palawa people, and the influence of settler colonialism continued to disenfranchise and disavow these indigenous groups long after the Pequot and Black Wars had ended. Peace on settler terms rarely bode well for defeated indigenes, and to this day organisations such as the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre strive to heal the wounds inflicted by this deadly and distinctive mode of warfare.

⁵⁹ William Hubbard, *The History of the Indian Wars in New England: From the First Settlement to the Termination of the War with King Philip in 1677* (Roxbury: W.E. Woodward, 1865), 2: 6.

⁶⁰ Johanna Perheentupa, 'Victims of the Past? : White-Aboriginal Relations in Australian Historiography in the Nineteenth Century,' *Zeitschrift für Australienstudien* 23, no. 22 (2009): 36.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated that the Pequot War and the Black War followed very similar patterns of violence, and produced very similar results, in spite of their significant geographical and temporal separation. For seemingly unconnected events, their comparable points are indeed numerous and noteworthy, especially in why they broke out, how they were fought, and what legacies they left behind. But what is the significance of this observation? After all, similarities between the British invasion of Australia and the New England frontier have not gone completely unnoticed. In his notes on settler conduct during the Pequot War, Richard Drinnon wrote “though the English were centuries away from colonizing Australia, when they ultimately went down under they acted not unlike the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay.” He described these “parallels across time and space” as being suggestive of “the permanency of English forms of treating, feeling and viewing nonwhite peoples.”¹

Drinnon’s observations are astute, but also limited, given that he was writing before the emergence of settler colonial studies as an independent field of study. By utilising the theoretical framework offered by this new and innovative field, the similarities of the Pequot War and the Black War can not only be identified, but also rationalized and contextualized. To put it simply, these two conflicts were the products of similar circumstances brought about by the same colonial formation that prioritised the attainment of land and the creation of permanent settler communities above all else. As such, they can ultimately be seen as different chapters within the centuries-long history of settler colonialism, with their settler combatants being guided by the same logic that rendered indigenous populations as something to be dispossessed and replaced rather than exploited. Sharing this common foundation, settler colonial violence in Connecticut and Tasmania was structured by three main attributes that were analysed in detail within the three chapters of this thesis.

¹ Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating & Empire Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 246.

The advent of settler colonial violence is brought on by *explosive settlement*, which sees successful settler societies undergo sudden growths in population, territorial expansion, and commercial intensification. This phenomenon has been extensively documented by James Belich, who describes it as a 'settlement boom,' and was the primary instigating factor of both the Pequot War and the Black War.² Prior to its occurrence, the indigenes and settlers of Connecticut and Tasmania had far less sanguinary relations. While they did not avoid violence or interracial tensions all together, conflict was nonetheless proportionate to the level of settlement. While the latter remained limited, so too did the former. As neither group completely disrupted the interests or lifestyles of the other, the indigenes and settlers could learn to benefit from one another or, at least, avoid each other. As described by Belich, indigenes generally "could cope with normal European colonization; it was *explosive* settlement that proved too much for them."³

Indeed, when the Anglo populations of Connecticut and Tasmania boomed, war with the Pequots and Palawa quickly followed. Violent contests over space were the logical consequence of this development, with the exponential population increases in 1630s New England and 1820s Tasmania bringing the vastly different communities into an uncomfortable proximity with one another and inflaming preexisting tensions. The temporary cooperation, or toleration, between the indigenes and settlers was thus ended. Their long-term interests ultimately proved incompatible with one another, especially as the latter sought to sustain their growth by rapidly annexing territory at the former's expense and eliminating any obstacle to their development.

Military acculturation is the second inherent attribute of settler colonial violence, informing how such conflicts were actually fought. Coining the term in 1988, Adam J. Hirsch described the meeting of indigenous and settler societies as a "cultural maelstrom," with the collision and adaptation of different wartime

² James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

³ *Ibid.*, 181

customs forming “one pattern in the mosaic of cultural contact.”⁴ In the Pequot War, this resulted in both Pequot and English combatants acting “in response to the psychological shock of collision with what each perceived to be a strange alien counterculture.”⁵ And as demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the same interaction took place between Palawa guerillas and British troops in the Black War two hundred years later.

Perhaps the most influential and consistent of all three attributes, this acculturation ensured that each settler colonial conflict would be fought by societies with very different ideas on how the ensuing war would, or should, be fought. The Pequot and Palawa warriors found themselves fighting an uphill battle as they struggled to adapt to not just the invader’s technology, but the greater intensity of their wartime practices as well. Indigenous and settler military cultures had evolved in accordance to different needs and constraints, and in a settler colonial context their collision was near inevitable. Had the Pequots and Palawa possessed the resources, populations, and social structures necessary for maintaining a standing army and conducting war on a European scale, then they would have been subjected to exploitation and incorporation rather than dispossession and attempted eradication. Instead, the propensity of settlers to migrate to lands where indigenous populations were thin and often decentralized effectively ensured that their expansionist efforts would be countered by logistically constrained peoples accustomed to waging war on a much smaller scale.

The third and final inherent attribute of settler colonial violence, manifesting in the aftermath of indigenous-settler warfare, is *ethnic transfer*.⁶ Settler colonialism thrives on the transference of human populations from one place to another, and just as the mass migration of settlers initiates frontier violence, the widespread displacement of indigenes ultimately concludes it. The Pequot and Black Wars had awarded the contested lands to the victorious settlers, and given that each territory’s worth was dependent on its ability to sustain permanent

⁴ Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (1988): 1187.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1212.

⁶ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 35.

settlements, they had to be cleared of their original inhabitants. As a result, the defeat of the Pequot and Palawa peoples was quickly followed by their expulsion, with these ancient custodians essentially becoming, as Veracini described it, refugees.⁷ Both seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania saw this process of transference taken to extreme levels, with overseas deportation and, in Connecticut, the mandated dissolution of an indigenous identity being used to ensure that opposition to settler hegemony would remain unchallenged. These measures, along with the strong opposition to indigenous repatriation, demonstrate the integral position ethnic transfer held in the settler colonial process.

Each of these individual traits has been identified and extensively analysed, particularly, as has already been mentioned, by Belich, Hirsch, and Veracini. While identifying similarities between events can be an interesting exercise, it offers little new insight on its own. However, when compared transnationally and transtemporally within a settler colonial framework, the significance of these similarities becomes evident. Through their detailed analysis, the concept of settler colonialism informing seemingly unconnected practices becomes less theoretical and more demonstrable. The presence of these three, fundamental features show the exact mechanics by which this unique colonial formation influences disparate communities and, in this particular instance, produces a distinct pattern of violence worthy of specialised analysis.

It is tempting to promote determinism or deliberate mimicry as a means of explaining the recurrence of these three attributes. Such explanations, however, are unsustainable with the available evidence. Instead, as Donald Denoon put it, the structural similarities between settler societies were “not a consequence of conscious imitation, but of separate efforts to resolve very similar problems.” In other words, peoples of different cultural backgrounds, possessing different values, and operating in completely different eras independently adopted similar wartime practices when faced with the unique demands of settler colonialism. The consistency with which they did so in both the Pequot War and the Black

⁷ *Ibid.*

War is testament to the resilience of settler colonialism's foundational structure, while the differing manifestations of the same core traits in each conflict is indicative of the long-term historical development of settler colonial violence.

In summary, the Pequot War and the Black War were temporally and geographically distanced events that were nonetheless informed by the common logic of settler colonialism. Just as this colonial formation constitutes a distinct process, so does the type of violence it produces, being triggered by explosive settlement, guided by military acculturation, and ending in ethnic transfer. While these fundamental features may take different forms or be applied in contrasting ways, they nonetheless remained a persistent influence on the contested frontiers of seventeenth-century Connecticut and nineteenth-century Tasmania, transcending the centuries to produce parallel patterns of violence in otherwise unrelated circumstances. The identification of these fundamental features in both contexts has considerable academic implications. The previously unconnected Pequot and Black Wars can now be understood as different incarnations of the same violent structure and situated within a broader historical narrative. Likewise, the identification of settler colonialism's exact influences on disparate events enriches the understanding of this distinct process and facilitates the continued growth of settler colonial studies. Ultimately, whether it occurred in the Pequot War or the Black War, settler colonial violence ended millennia of indigenous hegemony, assisted in the development of new nations, and unfolded in a remarkably consistent pattern across time and space.

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