

# Deconstructing Community Development Employment Projects: a “revolution” in Indigenous employment policy (1997-2009)

---

**Master of Research Thesis**

**Macquarie University**

**Faculty of Arts**

**Department of Modern History, Politics and International  
Relations**

**October 2014**

**David Coombs**

## Abstract

Building on the research of William Sanders (2008; 2010), this thesis argues that a fundamental change in the way the Federal Government approached Indigenous affairs occurred over the period 1997-2009. The systematic way in which the government undermined and then abolished the Community Development Employment Projects scheme (CDEP) supports this contention. The incommensurable nature of the causal stories and problem representations of CDEP that appear in the parliamentary debates of 1977 compared with those from 2007 is used as evidence of an ideological transformation in Indigenous affairs public policy. Although Hall's (1993) concept of the policy paradigm shift evokes the sense of dramatic change that the Howard years entailed, Streeck and Thelen's (2005) institutional layering explains the process of change in a more theoretically convincing way. This is demonstrated by the gradual yet revolutionary process in which CDEP was subsumed by Work for the Dole. The original contribution of this thesis is found in its application of theories of the policy process and policy change to the Australian Indigenous affairs context.

### **Candidate's statement**

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution and that the work of others, where it has been used, has been referenced accordingly.

David Coombs

10 October 2014

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
Candidate's statement.....	3
I. Introduction .....	6
William Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis .....	6
This thesis's approach.....	7
Competing principles, generational revolutions and ideology in policy.....	9
CDEP and its place in the generational revolutions .....	10
Parliamentary debates.....	14
Methodological choices .....	15
Ideology defined.....	16
The importance of ideology in public policy .....	17
Thesis structure.....	18
Figure 1: Timeline of CDEP's rise and fall: .....	21
II. Literature review.....	22
Post-positivist insights .....	22
Paradigm shifts and institutional layering.....	25
Hall's policy paradigms.....	26
An alternative explanation of change: institutional layering.....	29
The usefulness of this literature .....	32
III. Self-determination and the inception of CDEP .....	33
The rise of self-determination .....	33
From civil rights to Indigenous rights .....	34
The Indigenous sector.....	35
CDEP and self-determination.....	36
The official account of Aboriginal unemployment: evidence from parliamentary debates.....	37
The Fraser Government's solution to Aboriginal unemployment.....	39
Later debates under a new minister.....	41
Deconstructing the story.....	43
Sanders' competing principles in action.....	45
Dissenting voices.....	48
Conflicting problem representations and causal stories.....	50

1977-1983: dominant principles .....	51
IV. The expansion of CDEP and the introduction of Work for the Dole 1983-2009.....	53
The historical development of CDEP .....	53
An alternative system, not a replacement .....	54
Into cities and towns .....	54
CDEP's new home and redefined purpose.....	55
Continued expansion .....	56
The end of an era .....	56
Work for the Dole: a competing institution is born .....	58
Further reform .....	59
CDEP follows suit.....	60
Mutual obligation .....	61
Social ills .....	62
Shared goals and rationales .....	63
Mainstream services and paternalistic guidance.....	63
V. The NTER and the unravelling of CDEP .....	65
CDEP undermined prior to the Intervention .....	65
Bipartisan support for mainstreaming .....	68
Narrative legacies, government obligation and recalcitrant prejudice.....	69
Intervention debates and government discontentment with CDEP .....	71
In principle support, but with reservations .....	74
A new paradigm? .....	77
Competing institutional layers.....	79
Mainstreaming continues under Labor .....	80
Conclusion.....	82
References.....	85

## I. Introduction

### William Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis

William Sanders, a Senior Fellow at the ANU's Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, advanced an intriguing hypothesis in 2008 for explaining two dramatic periods of policy change in Australian Indigenous affairs. He described how two “generational revolutions” occurred in the last 50 years of Australian Indigenous affairs public policy. These shifts comprised the following elements: the repeated condemnation of past policy approaches as having “failed”; moral calls for radical policy change made by members of government, prominent academics and Indigenous leaders; and a marked “ideological swing” from right to left or vice versa.

Sanders (2008, 200-1) contended that the first revolution occurred in the 1970s, when Indigenous self-determination was embraced by the Federal Government, when land rights were legislated and Indigenous-specific services and organisations were established (Bennett 1999, 61-3). The second generational revolution occurred under the Howard government, coming to a head in the form of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) – commonly referred to as the Intervention – of 2007 (Sanders 2008, 201). Unsurprisingly, Sanders (2008, 199) suggested that the Intervention signalled “a generational swing ... back from the dominance of the liberal left towards some greater influence for the once-dominant, directive or protective right”.

Sanders is not alone in his quest to explain the core characteristics of two opposed standpoints in Indigenous affairs policy. In a similar way to Sanders, Tim Rowse explains how after the tumultuous 1960s and early 70s, Indigenous affairs policy-makers began to recognise Aboriginal Australians as “peoples” with special political rights to self-

determination (2012, 17-18). Conversely, the only thing the Howard Government recognised was the statistical differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, defining Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders as *populations*, that were in need of government assistance (Rowse 2012, 5-6). Henry Reynolds (1996, 136-138) contends that the Federal Government supported self-determination because it agreed that Aboriginal people possessed a special status of Aboriginal people as original occupiers of Australia. On the other side of the policy debate, in the more assimilationist camp, sat those who promoted equal rights for all ethnic groups, regardless of historical or cultural connections to the continent (Reynolds 1996, 136).

In a subsequent publication, Sanders (2010) expanded upon his *generations* account (2008) of Indigenous affairs policy change, contending that the Federal Government's approach to Indigenous affairs is governed by three competing principles: choice, equality and guardianship. He asserted that at different periods since the 1930s one or other of these principles has dominated the Indigenous affairs policy landscape. By emphasising choice, guardianship or equality, Indigenous affairs policy-makers have aligned themselves with certain priorities and adhered to particular problem understandings that validate their policy proposals. Sanders argued that during the 1970s choice was promoted under the banner of Indigenous self-determination (2010, 316). During the 2000s a return to more guardianship-orientated policies in Indigenous affairs was noticeable (Sanders 2010, 317).

### **This thesis's approach**

This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the literature by applying theories of the policy process and models of policy change to the case of Australian Indigenous affairs. This will involve an examination of two things: firstly, Sanders' (2008) claim that

in the last 50 years two 'generational revolutions' have occurred in the federal public-policy approach to Australian Indigenous affairs; and secondly, that one of the distinguishing characteristics of these revolutions has been a marked ideological shift. In evaluating Sanders' hypothesis and searching for evidence of 'ideological shifts' I draw on the insights of post-positivist policy theory to give focus to a historical-textual analysis of parliamentary debates. In particular, I make use of Deborah Stone's (1989) explanations of the importance of causal stories and scrutinise, following Carol Bacchi (2009; 2012), federal parliamentarians' problem representations of Indigenous issues.

In an attempt to provide a complementary theoretical explanation of the changes that Sanders dissects, this study will also consider Peter A. Hall's (1993) concept of a policy paradigm shift. In addition, Streeck and Thelen's (2005) institutional layering model will be applied to the policy changes of the second 'generational revolution', providing a detailed and alternate theoretical explanation of these transformative policy changes. Using Sanders' framework as a starting point from which to analyse the public debates that centred on Indigenous issues, it becomes possible to paint a clearer picture of how and why the over-arching goals of policy altered.

The central aim of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of how ideology has affected policy change in Australian Indigenous affairs. A careful analysis of the federal parliamentary debates that surrounded the introduction of CDEP in 1977 and their subsequent abolition in 2007 illuminates the ideological underpinnings of that process of policy change. A critical and detailed textual analysis of parliamentary transcripts, in light of the historical context in which these debates took place adds additional evidence in support of this theoretical interpretation. Federal parliamentarians' representations of Indigenous *problems*, and the causal explanations they offer for them are of

fundamental importance to this study; linguistic tools and *cause-and-effect* delineators are vital mechanisms by which policy change is effected. But while familiarity with the dominant and recurring causal stories goes some way towards a better understanding of how policy is made, established ideological imperatives frame those elements.

### Competing principles, generational revolutions and ideology in policy

The *generational revolutions* thesis, combined with the *competing principles* framework, is insightful because it draws our attention to the fundamental connection between policy and ideology. Scholars working in the field of post-positivist policy analysis have also made this connection (Fischer 2003; Bacchi 2009; Stone 1989) but Australian Indigenous affairs policy has received very little post-positivist attention. Sanders (2008) *generational revolutions* thesis illustrates some of the ways that morally-charged arguments for change are often indicative of ideological discordance. This observation sits well within a post-positivist epistemology since the primary units of analysis for post-positivists are *arguments* themselves (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009, 28). Analysing arguments, for both Sanders and post-positivists, is an insightful method by which to discern ideology's influence.

Sanders' (2010) *competing principles* framework is useful because it clearly demarcates a set of ideological tendencies and draws attention to the core principles around which Indigenous affairs policy has been organised. Sanders shows how policy decisions are always influenced by ideological understandings of economic and social issues and highlights the weaknesses of the "evidence-based policy" discourse that has emerged in the last decade (2010: 321-2). The decision to champion one guiding principle over another is an act of *subjective judgment*, which has been defined as one of the ways that politics and norms manifest themselves in justifications of policies (Gee 2004: 2).

Concluding that evidence is always couched within an argument or a political debate and therefore cannot be separated from ideology, Sanders makes a strong case for the ideological basis of policy decisions (2010: 321-2).

Sanders' conclusions are obviously based on a deep knowledge of Indigenous affairs history and a nuanced understanding of the subjective biases that influence policy-makers, but his conclusions are offered up with minimal evidence. For example, in his competing principles framework, he does not spell out in detail how he arrived at the idea that during one historical period or another, one particular guiding principle dominated policy thinking. This is why a more in-depth study in which the words of influential members of the Federal Government and Opposition are given careful scrutiny is warranted.

In Chapters III and V of this thesis, substantial evidence – drawn from federal parliamentary debates – of arguments founded on a belief in choice, guardianship or equality is assembled and analysed. In this way, traces of the ideological bases of Indigenous affairs policy and its fluctuation are highlighted and critiqued. Such a study assisted in an evaluation of the extent to which a broad ideological adherence to one guiding principle over another is – or is not – observable across an entire 'generation' of politicians. By analysing the arguments of federal MPs this thesis sought to test the plausibility of Sanders' (2008) explanation of the policy changes that occurred in Australian Indigenous affairs during the 2000s.

### **CDEP and its place in the generational revolutions**

In analysing Sanders' (2008) claim that two major ideological shifts have occurred within Indigenous Affairs policy-making in the past 50 years, this paper uses the

Community Development Employment Projects scheme (CDEP) as a case study. It analyses the causal stories and problem representations that were employed by federal parliamentarians during the establishment of this employment policy in 1977 and its subsequent rollback beginning in 2007. The thinking that led to CDEP's implementation and the reasons for its abolition can be found in federal parliamentary debates. The justifications for and evaluations of CDEP offer valuable insights into the ideological tendencies of the policy-makers that participated in what Sanders' (2008) describes as two generational revolutions.

CDEP provided funds for development and employment projects that were to be designed and implemented by Indigenous communities themselves (Altman & Jordan 2009, 1; Broome 2010, 260-61). The scheme was introduced, in part, as a way for Aboriginal Australians to play a more active role in the future development of their communities (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921) and allowed Indigenous Australians to exercise collective decision-making (Rowse 2002, 177). This new Aboriginal employment program was introduced during a time when a commitment to Aboriginal self-management was highly endorsed in federal politics and policy (Robbins & Summers 2010, 510; Bennett 1999, 63). Policy-makers in the 1970s believed that empowering Indigenous Australians to exercise collective decision-making would generate positive outcomes for the wellbeing of Indigenous communities (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921-2; Ruddock, HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1866). Faith in Indigenous people's *agency* and decision-making contributed to the establishment of CDEP. This scheme, and the justifications for its creation, embodies the approach to Indigenous affairs of the self-determination/self-management era, and for this reason,

analysing CDEP-focused debates is an appropriate method of assessing the ideological currents of the era.

Parliamentary debates about CDEP also possess particular relevance to Sanders' second "generational revolution". The arguments used to justify the abolition of CDEP were indicative of a broader policy shift, which Sanders characterised as a move *away* from self-determination, and *towards* paternalistic protectionism, mainstreaming and assimilation (2008, 199; 2010, 317). Assimilation was also the policy mantra of a previous era of Indigenous affairs between roughly 1930 and 1960 (Sanders 2010, 316). Other commentators have similarly argued that Indigenous affairs took a turn toward assimilation and paternalism during the years of the Howard Government (Grant et al. 2008, 20-21; Dodson 2008, 31-2; Maddison 2011). Indigenous self-determination was most definitely wound back during Howard's tenure, most undeniably by the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2005 (Gunstone 2008). Howard contended that self-determination had failed, implying that Indigenous people were to blame for their problems, opening the door for a new phase of paternalistic government intervention (Maddison 2011, 75). The logic used to justify the 2007 NTER, which included the abolition of certain CDEP schemes in the Northern Territory, exemplified this reversion to a more paternalistic policy approach (Anderson 2007, 135). Evidence of this policy reversion has been sourced from the parliamentary debates of 2007 is presented in Chapter V.

The raft of policies related to the NTER was justified on the grounds that there was "widespread" child abuse going on in certain Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory and that drastic action was therefore required of the government (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 10). But many were critical of the Intervention because of

its racially discriminatory nature and because a number of its measures seemingly had very little to do with protecting children (Vivian 2010, 46; Altman 2010, 2; Nancarrow 2007; Snowden, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79). The abolition of CDEP was perhaps one of the most discordant of those controversial measures, all of which prompts the unavoidable question; if these changes were *not* to do with protecting vulnerable children, what were they designed to achieve?

The idea that Aboriginal people could not be trusted to look after their own affairs and act in their own best interests was what arguably drove the Federal Government to intervene (Maddison 2011, 71; Sanders 2010, 317). Furthermore, proponents of the Intervention championed market mechanisms as the best way of securing social and economic advancement for Indigenous Australians (Langton cited in Maddison 2009, 67; Grant et. al. 2008, 21). The abolition of the CDEP was justified on the grounds that the program had not led to the creation of “real jobs” (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7). Communities where CDEPs operated were deemed out of step with the wider economic orthodoxy, and CDEPs were condemned for preventing entrepreneurship, investment and mainstream employment (Hughes 2007; Scullion, HoR Debates 16 August 2007, 202-3). A belief in the positive impact of free-market forces for Aboriginal communities and a scepticism of Indigenous-specific programs and decision-making mechanisms were the ideational cornerstones of the second generational revolution, of which the abolition of CDEP was arguably a microcosm.

The establishment and subsequent abolition of CDEP also fits within Sanders' (2008) analytical timeframes. These two instances of policy change are treated as case studies for testing the validity of Sanders' *ideological swings* hypothesis. Casting a critical eye

over parliamentary discourses that relate to CDEP clarifies the role of ideology in both the establishment and the abolition of CDEP.

### Parliamentary debates

The Federal Hansard transcript is the repository of the causal stories and problem representations upon which Governments rely in the manufacture of policy in every realm. Those stories and representations provide the clearest indication of the reasoning, the arguments, the values and imperatives that inform policies and legislative changes. Parliamentary debates are, in many cases, instances of *ideology in action*. The Hansard transcripts are the most accurate record of politicians' arguments in their own words. They are recorded verbatim by trained stenographers as debates unfold in Parliament House and have not been interpreted or altered by the media or other political commentators. This is not to say that other sources, such as media reports, are not meaningful repositories of ideals, moral judgement and ideological thought. However, for reasons of brevity, source reliability and analytical focus this study is based on the transcripts of federal parliamentary debates.

Two historical periods have been selected in which to conduct a documentary analysis. The first period is 1977-1983: the years in which CDEP was in its infancy. The government's original motivations for establishing CDEP are most easily discerned during this initial period. Also, by 1977 the philosophical dominance of self-determination/self-management was well established, as has been convincingly argued by a number of respected scholars (Broome 2010; Chesterman 2005). After 1983 CDEP began to expand, evolve and take on new significance, as is shown in Chapter IV.

The second period of analysis is in the year 2007, from the moment that the phase-out of CDEP in non-remote communities was announced in February until the entry into office of the Rudd Government in December. The Northern Territory Emergency Response was initiated in the middle of these two aforementioned events and included the abolition of CDEP in a number of remote Indigenous communities. This second set of temporal parameters has been chosen because the NTER arguably represents the critical moment in the shift from self-determination to paternalism. It was during the debates surrounding NTER legislation that CDEP was most vociferously criticised.

The second revolutionary period receives closer analytical attention than the first. Snapshots from two “generations” of parliamentary documents have been reviewed, and Sanders’ second period of generational shift – that which this paper demonstrates as having occurred from 1997 to 2009 – has been evaluated. Sanders (2008, 200-202) envisages two “generational revolutions” in Indigenous affairs policy. He contends that the first revolution began in the mid-1960s and ended in 1976. This policy transformation has been well-documented in the Indigenous affairs literature by scholars such as Richard Broome (2010). Sanders argues that the second revolution occurred between 2000 and 2007 and that it entailed a resurgence of the previously discredited assimilationist and paternalistic ideas of 1930-1960. But this paper, for reasons to do with brevity and academic rigour, explores only the second of these “revolutions” in detail.

### **Methodological choices**

This study's focus on parliamentarians excludes much of the input of other important actors who contribute to the process of interpreting Indigenous affairs issues and policies. These groups include the media, Indigenous organisations, political activists

and NGOs. This study is not broad enough to conclusively determine whether the policy changes really were 'revolutionary' and accompanied by a marked ideological shift at a societal or macro-political level. However, this thesis does offer a detailed analysis of the arguments that were employed by politically powerful actors when justifying significant policy changes in Indigenous affairs. It goes some way in expanding our knowledge of how political argument was utilised to make change possible during two instances of noteworthy policy change in Australian Indigenous affairs.

There is one common potential problem for historians in the field of social policy research: context. When working with the Hansard transcripts of parliamentary speeches and debates, analysis of these texts outside of their original context was – perhaps needless to say – inevitable. This was a particular problem for the earlier period of analysis, as the debates in question occurred more than 35 years ago. And as Widdowson (2007, 70) points out, we cannot infer an obvious underlying meaning of a text simply from its wording. Context is an essential variable to consider when undertaking a textual analysis. To minimise the effects of this constraining limitation, secondary source material was used to provide a sense of the socio-political context in which the arguments for policy change were advanced.

### **Ideology defined**

Sanders writes of ideology in terms of the conventional right-left dichotomy between conservatism and socialism. However, the kind of change that he describes in his generational revolutions thesis involves a much more macro-political level of ideological change than can be accounted for by differences in the political-party ideologies of Liberal and Labor alone. In this paper, those ideological concepts are interpreted more broadly. *Ideology* is the stuff of *argument*; it forms the basis on which causal stories are

founded, it underpins peoples' understandings of the world and its problems and it gives shape to their visions – and politicians' visions – of what might be an ideal society. And so *ideology* leads inevitably to *policy*.

An abiding theme of Sanders' analysis of Indigenous affairs is that shifts in the direction of policy are made in a morally charged environment. Previous policies are denigrated as having *failed*. So *revolutionary* change is justified because governments have to do *what is right*. And an ideologically-driven "moral" imperative is commonly, if not invariably, claimed by those instigating the changes (Sanders 2008, 188).

For the purposes of this thesis Andrew Heywood's (2003, 12) definition of ideology will be used. He defines an ideology as a set of ideas that: a) explains the world as it currently exists b) describes an ideal vision of the "good society", and c) details a series of steps for realising this vision. Ideology forms the basis of all organised political action. Descriptive, prescriptive and action-oriented, it is inherently imbued with subjective bias. Ideology also involves a struggle over truth and what is right and therefore also involves a struggle over power and legitimacy (Heywood 2003, 16). Heywood's three facets of an ideology, and their effect on legitimising certain policies, inform my analysis of the parliamentary documents.

### The importance of ideology in public policy

Post-positivism – in essence, a social constructivist epistemology which looks at issues such as bias and the role of *values* in the policy process – contends that ideology is an important factor to consider in the study of public policy. One of post-positivism's preeminent policy theorists, Frank Fischer (2003: 50-51), maintains that public policy, like all social processes, is constituted by the assignment of *meaning* to social action. The

goal of the policy analyst should be to explain why influential actors attribute particular meanings to certain policy issues. To do this it is imperative that these actors' socially constructed understandings of the policy issue in question be weighed against their objectives and ideological standpoints (Fischer 2003, 50-51). Post-positivist theory explains the many ways that beliefs, values and ideologies influence policy. These normative elements can be observed in the political arguments that politicians advance when they attempt to convince political rivals and the general public of the validity of their policies. In this way, policy is a product of discursive practices and contests that are heavily influenced by ideas and ideology (Lejano 2006: 93).

Sanders (2008) has argued that dramatic policy change has been accompanied by a marked ideological recalibration twice during the last 50 years. He also underlines the arguments for radical policy change and accusations of policy failure that characterise these two revolutionary periods in Indigenous affairs history. Post-positivism explains that argument and rhetoric are often manifestations of ideological thought or beliefs. Therefore it is understandable that a period of ideological fluctuation will be accompanied by calls for dramatic policy change and denouncements of prior policy approaches. Argumentation and ideology are deeply intertwined; ideology provides the conceptual basis on which arguments are formed. *Ideology* is thus at the heart of policy change.

## Thesis structure

Chapter II introduces the theoretical material that is used in this thesis' analysis of the CDEP case study. It critically reviews some key perspectives in the post-positivist literary canon, explaining their relevance to this study of Indigenous affairs policy change and to the study of public policy in general. Additionally, two analytical

frameworks from the policy change literature – Hall's (1993) *policy paradigm shift* theory and Streeck and Thelen's (2005) *institutional layering* – are introduced and expounded.

Chapter III begins by outlining the historical context of the development of the self-determination/self-management era. It then moves on to an analysis of the parliamentary debates that dealt with CDEP in the period 1977-1983. This chapter highlights the core principles on which the Fraser Government based its CDEP policy and points to a number of serious objections that were raised by the Labor Opposition. The concurrent existence of Sanders' (2010) three competing principles during this period is observed.

Chapter IV charts the historical development of CDEP and Work for the Dole (WFD). The key events in this process are shown in figure 1. Using Streeck and Thelen's (2005) institutional layering theory, the significance of the introduction in 1997 of a rival employment scheme in the eventual demise of CDEP is explored. The chapter outlines the major developments in the life of CDEP from 1983 to 2009, historically linking the two periods of arguably revolutionary policy change on which the documentary analyses of Chapters III and V are focused. The chapter provides context against which to evaluate the Howard Government's decision to abolish CDEP in 2007.

Chapter V delves into the parliamentary debates of 2007 that occurred after the announcement of CDEP's abolition in urban and remote. It shows how neo-liberal market-rationalism and a fervent commitment to mainstream employment were strong features of the Howard Government's descriptions of CDEP. Crucially, this chapter demonstrates how CDEP increasingly came to be understood by both major parties as a

stepping stone to mainstream employment. The discrepancies between the Liberal and Labor representations of CDEP and the employment situation in remote Aboriginal communities are examined in this chapter. The chapter concludes by explaining the significance of the recalibration of CDEPs goals for Sanders' generational revolutions' hypothesis.

This thesis concludes with a reflection upon Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis. The merits of Hall's policy paradigm shift concept are compared to those of Streeck and Thelen's institutional layering. Ultimately this thesis contends that the process of change that Sanders has described was more incremental than abrupt and therefore the process of layering better describes the shift.

### Figure 1: Timeline of CDEP's rise and fall:

- January 1977**- Senior public servant HC 'Nugget' Coombs begins advocating an employment scheme for remote Aboriginal communities
- 26 May 1977** – Aboriginal Affairs Minister Ian Viner introduces Fraser Government's CDEP scheme to Parliament
- 5 March 1983**- The Labor Party, under the leadership of Bob Hawke, is elected
- 1983** – Hawke Government begins considering an enlarged version of CDEP
- 1985** – The Miller Report, a review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs, recommends CDEP be expanded
- 1987** – Hawke Government responds to Miller report by launching the Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP), recommending CDEP be introduced beyond remote areas
- 1990** – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission inherits administration duties of CDEP
- 20 December 1991** – Paul Keating makes a successful challenge for leadership of the Labor Party and becomes Prime Minister
- 1990-2004** – CDEP expands into more remote communities as well as rural and urban areas. It becomes the biggest single policy in the Indigenous Affairs budget
- 2 March 1996** – The Liberal Party, under the leadership of John Howard, triumphs with a substantial majority at the federal election
- 1997** – Work for the Dole (WFD) program announced
- 2000** – Reference Group on Welfare Reform hands down its final report (the McClure Report) that emphasised incentives for moving from welfare to work
- 2005** – ATSIC abolished by Howard Government and administration of CDEP transferred to Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
- 17 February 2007** – Minister Joe Hockey announces that CDEP will be removed from rural and urban areas with "strong labour markets"
- 21 June 2007** – Prime Minister Howard announces 'emergency measures' to be applied to Northern Territory Aboriginal communities in response to the Little Children are Sacred Report
- 7 June 2007**- Legislation that embodied the Northern Territory Emergency Response introduced to the lower house of parliament
- 23 July 2007** – Ministers Hockey and Mal Brough announce that a further step of the NTER will be to abolish CDEP in the NT and move people onto WFD
- 18 March 2009** – Labor's Minister for Indigenous affairs Jenny Macklin announced that from July 2009 new participants on CDEP would receive income support instead of wages, fundamentally altering the scheme's operation

## II. Literature review

This section introduces the theoretical material that informs this thesis' approach and methods. Here, the usefulness of the post-positivist epistemological perspective on politics and policy is expounded. In light of Sanders contention that dramatic policy change in Indigenous affairs often features ideological swings and changes in the ways influential actors describe and evaluate policies, the link between values, ideology and policy is explicated, and the power of language in the policy change process is illustrated with reference to post-positivism. In addition, two theories of policy change are introduced, improving our understanding of the processes involved in dramatic policy change in Indigenous affairs.

### Post-positivist insights

Ideology undoubtedly has an impact policy. Post-positivist policy analysts argue that human subjectivity affects every aspect of social life. Public policy, therefore, cannot be analysed in isolation from norms, ideas, politics and morality because it too is part of social life. For the policy process to be fully comprehended the policy analyst must take into account the subjective biases of those involved in the policy process, attempting to explain why these actors behave the way they do by considering their actions in light of political goals and beliefs. (Fischer 2003: 50-51).

Fischer (2003) argues that the quest to uncover causality should not be the goal of policy analysis. He contends that since public policy is a process of assigning meaning to social action, and because people's socially-constructed understandings of social phenomena are constantly shifting and being redefined, this makes a positivist or empiricist analysis of cause and effect in policy impossible (Fischer 2003: 51). The work of Fischer stresses the *critical* objectives of policy analysis and urges policy analysts to

scrutinise the political considerations that impact upon the construction of meaning in public policy. This explanation of the policy process will form the epistemological base upon which my analysis of the ideological factors that impact upon Australian Indigenous affairs public policy will be built.

Fischer's post-positivism stems from Max Weber's concept of *Verstehen*, which can be defined as the process of "rendering facts understandable by interpreting their meanings in the light of relevant social goals and values" (Fischer 2003, 50). The *facts* under scrutiny in this case will be Indigenous affairs-related governmental policies. In examining the relationship between policy change, political argument and ideology in line with Weber's *Verstehen* concept, the *meanings* that have been attached to Indigenous affairs policies and the *problems* they are designed to address become crucially important. In particular, the goals (deeply associated with politics) and values (closely tied to ideology) that were relevant to the decisions set up and later abolish CDEP are scrutinised.

This post-positivist understanding of the nature of politics and public policy is very useful in fleshing out and testing Sanders' generational revolution hypothesis. Sanders (2008) refers frequently to "the idea of past policy failure", and "arguments for radical change", indicating that he gives significant weight to the power of language in the process of redefining the meanings attached to social phenomena. Ideology is another factor considered by Sanders in accounting for major policy shifts in Indigenous affairs (2008, 187). Sanders attributes significant influence to ideas and rhetoric in the process of policy change – a view shared by post-positivist scholars such as Fischer.

Carol Bacchi (2009; 2012) makes a valuable contribution to the post-positivist policy analysis literature and her methodology of critique has been utilised in this thesis. Bacchi focuses in particular on the issue-framing stage of public policy and asks the question: what's the problem *represented* to be? Her approach is useful in that it highlights the need to scrutinise the underlying assumptions that form the basis of problem *representations*, emphasising the normative aspects of problem *definition*. Bacchi (2009) contends that public policy and the “problems” that it aims to address are the products of a process of social construction based on the interests and values of policy-makers and, to a certain extent, the wider community. Bacchi states: “the aim is to understand policy better than policy-makers by probing the unexamined assumptions and deep-seated conceptual logics” that reside within *problem representations* (Bacchi 2012, 22). The kinds of policies that policy-makers propose reveals what these policy-makers’ judge to be problematic or in need of reform (Bacchi 2012, 21). Policy proposals, therefore, are a valuable indication of policy-makers’ priorities, which are shaped, to an extent, by ideology. Bacchi’s approach informs us of the link between human subjectivity and policy, of which ideology forms a part.

As Osborne has argued, governments must necessarily “problematise” their realm of policy before work can begin (cited in Bacchi 2009, x). Values and political interests will always be influential in this process of creating public problems (Fischer 2003, 11). Thus, ideology and other political considerations will always have a hand in public policy decisions. Making sense of the ways that problems are represented is an important part of this study since it looks at ideology and the other political drivers that inform representations of social problems. Moreover, if an obvious rethink of problem definition can be discerned before and after the “generational revolutions” then this will

lend credence to Sanders' hypothesis. Identifying the politically-charged problem representations that emerged during the generational revolutions is one of the core objectives of this paper.

Thomas Kaplan (1993) maintains that policy-makers construct narratives about their favoured policies that depict reality and social problems in ways that are most beneficial to those policy-makers' interests. Deborah Stone (1989) has theorised about a similar issue: the construction of 'causal stories'. These stories are ways that policy-makers link the existence of social conditions or situations to human action, attributing cause, blame and responsibility (Stone 1989: 282). Stone's theory explains how issues come to be defined as problematic and amenable to government intervention (1989: 282). Causal stories can be strategic devices used by those wanting to implement particular policies (Kingdon, cited in Stone 1989: 283). Identifying causal stories is a useful method for understanding how and why certain policies are linked with certain problems.

### **Paradigm shifts and institutional layering**

Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis is concerned with periods of monumental change. The following section of this thesis introduces two distinct theoretical accounts of revolutionary policy change: Hall's (1993) "policy paradigm shift" and Streeck and Thelen's (2005) "institutional layering". The appropriateness of the two frameworks to the case of generational revolutions in Australian Indigenous affairs is explained and the link between Sanders' writing and the concepts raised by Hall and Streeck and Thelen is canvassed.

## Hall's policy paradigms

Covering arguably comparable ground to Sanders, Hall (1993) writes of a concept that he terms a shift in the policy paradigm. The paradigm shift concept was originally developed by Thomas Kuhn (1970), writing about how scientific facts were established via consensus among intellectual elites, and not via the discovery of objective universal truths. For a paradigm shift to occur it is necessary to change important people's minds. A policy paradigm shift happens when governments recalibrate the hierarchy of goals around which policy is organised; alternate frameworks of ideas are legitimised and new understandings of policy problems gain traction (Hall, 1993: 279).

Hall's concept of a shift in the policy paradigm, also termed third order change, and Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis appear to address similar sorts of change. A policy paradigm shift signifies a revision of a government's entire approach to and way of understanding a policy field. Such change can be 'revolutionary' in the sense that Sanders evokes because it involves the introduction of new guiding principles and ushers in a new era of public policy thinking (Hall 1993: 279). Hall's paradigm shift could perhaps explain in greater depth the change in governmental approach to Indigenous affairs that Sanders outlines.

Hall posits three prerequisites for an established policy paradigm to be discredited and then replaced by another: the repeated appearance of damaging policy consequences that contradict or undercut the intellectual coherence of the previous paradigm; the enunciation of convincing arguments for change by people in politically and institutionally powerful positions; and a change in the locus of policy expertise (Hall 1993: 280). Sanders' generational revolution analysis similarly addresses the impact of arguments for change and discusses the effect of damaging policy consequences.

Importantly, both these frameworks stress the power of *political argument* in the process of policy change. This thesis, in its analysis of the generational shifts in Indigenous affairs, also tackles the issue of how argumentation drives policy change.

Arguably, effective political argumentation plays a crucial part in all three of the aforementioned prerequisites for a paradigm shift. In the first case, damaging policy consequences only become thus once an astute political actor has attributed blame for their existence to a particular policy. A causal story must be constructed linking the negative outcome with a public decision (Stone 1989). Similarly, well-crafted arguments determine the locus of expertise in a particular policy field. Political actors bestow authority upon experts of their choosing and must offer coherent arguments justifying their decisions (Hall 1993, 280). In the case of CDEP it is easy to observe instances wherein causal stories linked problems in Aboriginal communities to past policy approaches, and political actors legitimised experts that promoted policy approaches that were sympathetic to the government's ideological leanings. Examples of these tactics are provided in Chapter V.

Hall, more so than Sanders, gives a detailed account of the political and ideational processes that drive and constitute policy change. Sanders (2008) maintains that in the Australian Indigenous affairs context, on two separate occasions in the last 50 years, the Federal Government has broken with previous policy approaches and adopted new problem understandings. Hall's theory would likely explain these changes as having occurred through a process of political contestation and social learning. Hall defines social learning as "a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information" (1993: 278). Social learning can precipitate third order policy change. However, this process is not completely rational

or scientific, but more political in nature (Hall 1993, 280). This is due to the central role played by politicians in deciding which experts should be given authority and, therefore, which ideas should inform policy (Hall 1993, 280). Paradigm shifts are ultimately contingent upon political decisions and thus will be unavoidably affected by subjective biases of decision-makers, as post-positivist scholars illustrate.

In Hall's explanation of policy change, much like Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) theory of "punctuated equilibrium", paradigmatic change is an uncommon occurrence.

According to these two broadly commensurable accounts, public policy typically involves prolonged periods of stability only sporadically disrupted – punctuated – by bursts of dramatic change. Generally, Hall argues, policy change is incremental and conservative, with stable policy goals being pursued over long periods of time (1993, 280-281). As policies are adapted to accommodate changing circumstances, policy-makers generally make minor adjustments to the 'settings' of existing policies – for example altering interest rates – or use new policy 'techniques' or 'instruments' to try to achieve the government's long-term goals (Hall 1993, 278). Hall refers to these kinds of incremental change as first and second order changes respectively (1993, 281). Third order change, when it does happen, is rapid and dramatic and leads to the institutionalisation of new policy goals and the creation of new policy instruments. The conceptualisation of policy development as generally incremental and occasionally revolutionary has been widely accepted by policy scholars and is now the orthodox view in the field (Howlett & Cashore 2009, 34).

A more nuanced explanation of the policy revolutions that Sanders addresses flows from a better understanding of the ways in which the Australian Government has defined the problems facing Australia's Indigenous peoples. Sanders (2010) writes of a

governmental approach guided by the principle of guardianship replacing a previous framework of ideas that centred on the goal of self-determination. Gaining a better understanding of how this move from one framework of ideas – or policy paradigm – to another took place entails an analysis of the prerequisites that Hall has described. These are: convincing arguments for change, damaging policy anomalies and changing loci of expertise (Hall 1993, 280). These are important features of policy revolutions and they therefore warrant meaningful consideration.

### **An alternative explanation of change: institutional layering**

Streeck and Thelen have mapped out five types of 'gradual transformative' change whereby incremental modifications over long periods of time can have the cumulative effect of causing a break in the continuity of institutional structures and rationales (2005, 8-9). Their models of incremental institutional change challenge the widely accepted punctuated equilibrium model (2005, 1-2). Old institutions can gradually wither away, new ones can arise slowly and undermine the status of existing arrangements, and institutional structures can be redeployed incrementally for new purposes (for a concise explanation of the five different models see Streeck & Thelen 2005, 31.). Transformative institutional change is not necessarily dramatic and abrupt but can be incremental and subtle.

Streeck and Thelen define institutions as *regimes* of formalised rules that can be enforced by third parties – e.g. the courts or other regulatory bodies (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 10). The institutions under analysis here are most likely to be laws and public policies. However, because of the scope for variation of actors' behaviour under institutions, the formalised rules themselves are not the only factors requiring analysis. This is because "*the practical enactment of an institution is as much a part of its reality as*

*its formal structure*" (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 18, emphasis in original). For 'real' change to occur, an exogenous shock, as in punctuated equilibrium, is not always necessary. The way the majority of actors behave within an institution will ultimately determine its functions, meanings and consequences. If this pattern of behaviour changes over time, this constitutes 'real' institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 18).

Deeg calls the dominant pattern of behaviour within an institution its 'logic of action' (cited in Streeck and Thelen 2005, 18). Streeck and Thelen contend that this logic acts as a "meta-rule" governing the continued interpretation of the institutional structure, which is never self-evident and must be constantly realised in practice (2005, 18). Gradual changes to the way institutions are interpreted and constituted through endogenous behaviour patterns, which in turn alter outcomes, can eventually lead to a breakdown or dramatic revision of the formalised institution itself. If the institution's original goals no longer marry up with the most widely-accepted understanding of the institution's purpose – its logic of action – then the long-term stability of the formalised institution may be undermined. Institutions "are the object of ongoing skirmishing as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals" (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19). Behavioural change can have real consequences for formal structures when enough people mobilise in new ways.

Of the five models of incremental change that Streeck and Thelen (2005) explicate, layering is the one that is most applicable to the case of the demise of CDEP. Layering involves the mechanism of *differential growth* in which a new institutional layer is established and then grows at a faster rate than an existing layer, with the former eventually assuming the dominant position in the policy field (Rothstein cited in Streeck

and Thelen 2005, 23). Initially the introduction of the new institutional layer does not appear to threaten existing arrangements and appears of minor significance (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23). However, fundamental change can be achieved via the differential growth of old versus new institutions, which can result in a 'siphoning off' of political support towards the more recent institution (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23). Political actors are able to introduce these new layers by 'selling' them as refinements or corrections to the status quo. In this way they are able to set in motion new institutional dynamics that operate according to different logics to existing layers (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23). The effect is that old institutional layers stagnate and are supplanted by newer, faster growing formalised institutional layers.

In Chapter IV, the concept of layering illustrates the process by which the CDEP was gradually overtaken by a competing institutional layer – Work for the Dole – that operated according to a contradictory logic. For three decades CDEP provided stable employment for Aboriginal people in many communities. Government resources subsidised the salaries of these people while they worked on community-determined projects. Conversely, WFD obliged unemployed people to do community service work in exchange for the continued receipt of welfare payments based on the assumption that this was 'fair', and that it would lead to increased participation in the mainstream labour market. One system was based on reliable and continued government funding whereas the other sought to eliminate this 'welfare dependency' and promote self-sufficiency through engagement in the market economy. The two logics were contradictory and the logic of WFD fitted better alongside the Howard Government's neo-liberal agenda (Anderson 2007, 134). The government cultivated the WFD scheme; it subsequently grew at a faster rate to CDEP and would eventually subsume the older institution.

## The usefulness of this literature

Hall's theory of shifting policy paradigms gives importance to ideas and political argumentation in the process of policy change. He also shows how contradictory policy consequences can discredit existing policy paradigms and create political space for new approaches to become dominant. Post-positivist theorists would argue that a problem only becomes the consequence of a certain policy once an argument or a "story" has been constructed to create such a link (Stone 1989). Thus, damaging policy consequences can be viewed as just another part of political argumentation; they are causal stories very deliberately constructed with political results in mind. Hall also alleges that a change of the locus of expertise is necessary for a paradigm shift. Post-positivists would argue that expertise is a subjective category that is sustained by arguments and claims of legitimacy. What this hints at is that the paradigm shift is fundamentally driven by politics, which, in turn, is given its impetus by ideology. The writings of Hall and numerous post-positivist scholars give credence to Sanders' contention that radical policy change is accompanied by marked ideological shift. Post-positivist theory makes it difficult to envisage how a dramatic redesign of a policy approach could occur without an associated ideological alteration.

The account of institutional transformation offered by Streeck and Thelen (2005) is particularly illuminating in the case of CDEP's downfall. Competition between Work for the Dole and CDEP – institutions and with contradictory logics and divergent goals – destabilised and undermined the political legitimacy of the CDEP and eventually led to its destruction. This process is detailed in Chapters IV and V.

### **III. Self-determination and the inception of CDEP**

This chapter begins by surveying the historical rise of the concept of self-determination in Indigenous affairs public policy. The relationship between CDEP and self-determination is also explained. The bulk of the chapter is made up of a critical analysis of the parliamentary debates of 1977-1983 that discuss CDEP. The ideological content of these debates and speeches is scrutinised and the differences between the causal stories and problem representations of the Labor and Liberal Parties are compared. To finish, the presence of Sanders' three competing principles is assessed and the reasons for political disagreement over CDEP are considered.

#### **The rise of self-determination**

The era of self-determination Will Sanders refers to in his generational revolutions hypothesis (2008) emerged after a prolonged period of civil-rights campaigning by Indigenous activists and their non-Indigenous supporters during the 1950s and 60s (Broome 2010). The achievement of equality before the law for Indigenous Australians meant that they could finally enjoy the full suite of rights that were already afforded other citizens. After the equal wages decision of 1966 and the removal of the last discriminatory provision in the Commonwealth's social security legislation in the same year, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people could qualify for social security benefits and employers could no longer legally pay Aboriginal workers less than non-Aboriginal workers (Chesterman 2005, 78 & 52).

From 1965 in all states and territories, apart from parts of Western Australia and on reserves in South Australia, Aboriginal people could legally possess, purchase and consume alcohol, like the rest of the over-18-year-old Australian population (Chesterman 2005, 111-176). The Commonwealth Government gave Indigenous

Australians the right to vote at federal elections in 1962 and the Queensland government, in 1965, became the last of the state governments to enfranchise its Aboriginal constituents (Australian Government 2013). The 1960s was a time when Aboriginal people won hard-fought legal gains and the Federal Government was starting to change its approach to Indigenous rights.

### **From civil rights to Indigenous rights**

And the fight for civil rights of the 1950s and 60s would feed into the 1970s push for Indigenous-specific rights and recognition of sovereignty (Chesterman 2005, 27-8). Once Aboriginal people had been granted equal citizenship rights, they wanted their special status as Australia's original inhabitants – and their associated cultural affiliation with the land – to be recognised by law (Burgmann 2003, 67). Before the 1970s both sides of politics had followed a policy of assimilation. But in 1971, the ALP changed its stance. Federal Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam, who would lead his party into government in December 1972, adopted a policy of self-determination, calling for Aboriginal land rights and the protection of sacred sites (Bennett 1999, 60-61; Gunstone 2008, 2).

The Fraser Government continued the trend by promoting Aboriginal self-management, enacting Aboriginal land rights and introducing CDEP. During the 1980s and 90s the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments also continued a commitment to Indigenous rights and self-determination (Bennett 1999, 62). The establishment of ATSIC, the handing back of Uluru to traditional owners, increased spending on Indigenous Australians and the codification of Native Title judicial determinations were policy decisions that acknowledged Indigenous difference (Bennett 1999, 62). So through a

series of related measures, the 1970s marked the beginning of the era of self-determination in Indigenous affairs policy (Broome 2010, 230; Rowse 2012, 17).

A number of powerful criticisms of assimilation gave the Whitlam Government a strong intellectual platform on which to justify the abandonment of assimilation in favour of self-determination. The philosophy of *assimilation* had failed because of the social and economic exclusion it engendered and the severely disadvantaged position of the majority of Indigenous Australians that persisted even after much of the discriminatory legislation had been repealed (Robbins & Summers, 2010: 504). Assimilation had failed to achieve the objectives which its name had implied and was condemned for the alleged cultural obliteration that it would engender (Robbins & Summers, 2010: 504). Reformers called for more Aboriginal participation in the decision-making process, so that Indigenous communities could determine their future development (Robbins & Summers, 2010: 504). The rhetorical and argumentative manoeuvres of anti-assimilationists in the lead-up to Whitlam's election in 1972 contributed to the political viability of a new approach to Indigenous affairs (Robbins & Summers, 2010: 504).

### The Indigenous sector

The “Indigenous sector” – made up of organisations such as The Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Service (ACCHS), The Northern Land Council, the Aboriginal Legal Service, the Central Land Council and a raft of other statutory and government-funded groups – also began to gather momentum in the early 1970s (Rowse 2002, 1). The emergence of this new web of community organisations and lobby groups - “in part a reflection of the aspirations of Aboriginal people for self-determination” (Grant et al. 2008, 7) - drove a greater awareness among Aboriginal organisations of their own capacity for political involvement and propelled the Federal Government towards a new

understanding of the benefits of a differentiated service provision – via programs designed specifically and exclusively for the benefit of Aboriginal people. CDEP was fundamentally important part of this sector, with each CDEP scheme possessing significant political authority and autonomy (Rowse 2002, 72).

The Indigenous organisations charged with administering CDEP in their communities could define what could constituted work under the scheme and justify their decisions based on either the pursuit of labour market outcomes or non-labour market outcomes such as community development or social and cultural objectives (Rowse 2002, 72-3). CDEP gave Indigenous organisations a continued funding base and allowed them considerable autonomy in deciding which programs they would promote and what kind of work community members could engage in (Rowse 2002, 73). Indigenous communities with CDEPs gained an increased ability to utilise their own resources, including government funding and the use of local labour. Under CDEP, Aboriginal people were being afforded the opportunity to participate actively in the management of this bold new government initiative.

### **CDEP and self-determination**

Sanders (2008; 2010) has argued that the 1970s was a time when Aboriginal self-determination was being embraced by government. One of the explicit objectives of the CDEP pilot program was spelled out by Aboriginal Affairs Minister Ian Viner in a speech to the Parliament in May 1977. CDEP, Minister Viner declared, had the potential to "maximise the capacity of Aboriginal communities to determine the use of their workforce" (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). This is a very clear policy enunciation of Aboriginal communities being encouraged to take a leading role in the management of their futures. This statement could be interpreted as evidence that the

self-determination or self-management paradigm was now firmly established.

Importantly though, *self-management* differed from self-determination in that Aboriginal people would be given responsibility for deciding their future, but would also be held accountable for the success or failure of their decisions (Bennett 1999, 63).

Complete Indigenous autonomy still had a way to go.

### **The official account of Aboriginal unemployment: evidence from parliamentary debates**

Minister Viner painted a stark picture of the employment situation and prospects facing Australia's original inhabitants. According to the Minister, an estimated 50% of the Indigenous labour force was unemployed and that this situation was deteriorating, despite the prolonged efforts of government (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). He also emphasised the limited employment opportunities in remote Aboriginal communities, linking this to the absence of a traditional labour market (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921-2). Viner connected this dire economic outlook and the high number of people receiving welfare payments to serious social problems such as: alcoholism and associated violence; child neglect; juvenile delinquency; and adverse attitudes to work and education (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). Viner also contended that leading a "traditional Aboriginal lifestyle" was a virtual impossibility in most areas because of environmental factors and the impact of settler practices such as cattle grazing; and Aboriginal peoples' newfound dependence on the cash economy for survival (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). The story that the government was telling about Indigenous unemployment was one of cultural destruction, market failure, welfare dependency and resultant social dysfunction.

Viner posed a troubling hypothetical: "What incentive is there for an Aboriginal child to succeed in his educational studies if his father is unemployed and there is every likelihood that the child may not be able to obtain employment at the conclusion of his or her education?" (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). The government's answer to this question involved the conversion of welfare monies into funding for jobs for Aboriginal people who would do work of benefit to their communities (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921-2). This policy was called the Community Development Employment Projects scheme and followed the logic of a similar proposal from senior public servant HC "Nugget" Coombs (Sanders 2012, 374). In the face of serious social problems associated with the absence of work in a traditional labour market, the government sought to create another kind of work, based on community development.

CDEP provided Aboriginal workers with a substantial amount of flexibility. Its part-time nature meant that people could engage in traditional economic activities such as wildlife harvesting and gathering bush food, while participating in paid work in the community. This produced benefits not only for Indigenous people, but for the environment and the Australian economy (Altman 2001; Altman, Linkhorn & Clarke 2005, 20). Effective CDEPs also tried to accommodate Aboriginal cultural commitments, such as the attendance of ceremonies (Altman & Johnson 2000, 16). This increased the well-being – in a holistic sense – of Indigenous individuals and communities (Altman & Jordan 2009, 2). These multifaceted benefits led Jon Altman (2001) to push for a type of "hybrid economy" where the role of the customary economy was supported alongside commercial enterprises and government-funded programs such as CDEP. However, for reasons of focus and space constraints this will not be discussed further here.

Viner argued that in the process of working for their income, Aboriginal people would gain work readiness skills, Aboriginal communities would benefit from the work undertaken by CDEP participants and the social ills associated with the receipt of unemployment payments – or "sit down money" – would be minimised (Viner, HoR Debates 12 Oct 1977, 1940; Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). Aboriginal councils were to be allowed to determine which projects to support and how to allocate the use of local labour, thus supporting self-management (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). Introducing the CDEP scheme to parliament, the government first outlined the problems facing Aboriginal communities, their causes, and then proposed a logical solution based on this understanding of cause and effect. Viner had begun to craft an effective *causal story* (Stone 1989).

### **The Fraser Government's solution to Aboriginal unemployment**

The fundamental gist of the government's employment and community development strategy was that CDEP grants would be paid to local Aboriginal councils – in amounts that "should not exceed the total entitlement of individual members to unemployment benefits" (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). These grants were to be used to pay unemployed community members to work on projects such as: "economic ventures; town management activities; social advancement; and environment improvement" (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). It was hoped that the reduction in both unemployment and welfare payments, and the initiation of projects designed to improve the social and physical environment of Aboriginal communities would minimise the "deleterious effects" of social problems in Aboriginal communities and "progressively improve community stability" (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922).

In subsequent parliamentary discussions of CDEP, other Liberal Party members described the Aboriginal employment situation in similar terms to Viner. Not surprisingly, members of the same political party shared a common understanding of the "employment problem with Aboriginals" (Ruddock, HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1865) and its causes, and held compatible views as to the best way of solving it. Phillip Ruddock, for example, spoke on more than one occasion about the lack of job opportunities in remote Aboriginal communities, stressing the undesirability of welfare payments because of their link to social problems, and stated CDEP would promote Indigenous self-management (HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1865-6; HoR Debates 28 September 1978, 1565-6). This is the same argument that Viner made when he introduced the CDEP scheme to parliament.

Ruddock posited: "The important aspect of this program is that it enables or encourages Aboriginals in a community to manage their own affairs" (HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1866). It is important to note that self-management was not being promoted as an end in itself but as a means of achieving employment equality and the creation of safe and harmonious communities. So it can be seen as an example of the government pursuing its self-designated role of *guardianship* by providing Indigenous communities with what it hoped would be the means to tackle unemployment and the social ills which are perceived to flow therefrom.

Ruddock stated simply that Aboriginal councils would be "encouraged to determine projects which would be beneficial to the community" (HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1866). The principle of choice was present in self-management but its facilitation was not the overriding objective of the government. Equality and guardianship were at this time the more dominant of Sanders' (2010) three competing principles.

A year later, the Liberal Member for Casey, Peter Falconer briefly surveyed the decline in traditional forms of employment for Aboriginal people in remote communities, framing the problem in economically liberal terms. Falconer was deeply concerned about the economic situation in remote regions, stating: "One has to look at the nature of a number of Aboriginal communities in outback areas and wonder about their long term economic viability" (HoR Debates 10 October 1978, 1647). Falconer also noted the negative social effects of this decline in employment (HoR Debates 10 October 1978, 1647). Rural recessions, rises in award wages and the increasing mechanisation of pastoral and farm work led Falconer to believe that "many of the pastoral managers in these areas find it impossible to continue to employ any labour at all, and in particular Aboriginal labour" (HoR Debates 10 October 1978, 1647). This was presented as an objective fact, as an unavoidable economic reality that would hamper any government efforts at bettering the employment situation in remote Aboriginal communities and stifle the potential effectiveness of CDEPs. The presentation of events as inevitable or removing the contention surrounding their meaning, as Falconer does, has been referred to as "decontestation" and is typical of ideological lines of argument (Freedden 2003, 54-5).

### Later debates under a new minister

Western Australian Liberal Senator Fred Chaney, who took over from Viner as Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in December 1978, continued disseminating important aspects of the government's causal story. Chaney posited that CDEP "arose from an Aboriginal desire to have work rather than unemployment benefit or sit down money because of the bad social effect that simply receiving money and having not much to do was having on particular communities" (Senate Debates 12 September 1980, 900). He went on to say that in remote communities there was "neither a pattern of work nor work

available" (Senate Debates 12 September 1980, 901). Interestingly, however, when speaking of the results of CDEP more than five years after it had been introduced, Chaney makes no mention of the community or cultural development aspirations of the program, preferring to concentrate on the employment-related objectives (Senate Debates 9 September 1982, 769-770). Chaney simply described CDEP as "a program which provides funds to communities to enable them to provide employment in lieu of unemployment" (Senate Debates 9 September 1982, 769). If Chaney's statements were indicative of the government's understanding of CDEP at that time, then this suggests that it had significantly diminished the scheme's objectives.

Yet it does seem as though increased mainstream economic participation for Aboriginals weighed heavily on the minds of government MPs from the time of the CDEP's initiation. This is indicated by the importance attributed to vocational training and the facilitation of Aboriginal uptake of jobs in the traditional labour market (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922-3; Ruddock, HoR Debate 11 October 1977, 1866; Ruddock, HoR Debates 28 September 1978, 1566). Notwithstanding, work of any form was preferable to unemployment payments in the eyes of Liberal party members, with Victorian Liberal Senator Margaret Guilfoyle claiming that CDEP was "an opportunity to provide the dignity of work for Aborigines" (Senate Debates 6 October 1977, 1151). The act of working was judged to possess an intrinsic value and would have a positive effect on Aborigines' self-esteem.

What this evidence from parliamentary debates suggests is that although there were minor discrepancies between Liberal Party members over the most important function of the CDEP scheme, there was general consensus on the causes of unemployment and social problems. Some speakers focussed more on creating employment and others

focussed more on creating stable communities and promoting self-sufficiency.

Nevertheless, the government's overarching ideological position was one based on the idea that the lack of jobs and the resultant reliance on social welfare payments were the root causes of social dysfunction in Aboriginal communities. The traditional labour market had failed in these remote areas, necessitating government intervention.

Through working and taking control of their own affairs, Aboriginal people could lead better lives. Providing work and encouraging self-sufficiency was the secret to improving the quality of life for Indigenous people.

### Deconstructing the story

The Fraser Government constructed a causal story that linked unemployment and social problems in remote communities with the lack of a traditional labour market and widespread dependence on unemployment payments (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921; Viner, HoR Debates 12 Oct 1977, 1940). Based on this understanding of the problem, a solution was proposed – the creation of jobs by government around projects aimed at enhancing community stability (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921-2).

This *story* opened up the possibility for some sort of policy-based remedy because the government controlled the provision of social welfare payments and was capable of creating employment. A social phenomenon was thus transformed into a public problem. The questionable nature of Viner's causal story is indicated by its lack of a detailed explanation of the essential connection between unemployment, the receipt of the unemployment benefit and socially destructive behaviour. *Correlation* was established but *causality* was more tenuous.

Although the Fraser Government did not provide an empirical link between unemployment and social problems, its proposed CDEP pilot scheme seemed to have

Indigenous backing. It was stated that a number of Aboriginal communities had expressed their dissatisfaction with the payment of unemployment benefits and had asked the government to devise an alternate arrangement (Viner, HoR Debates 31 May 1977, 2173; Chaney, Senate Debates 12 September 1980, 900). In response, the government devised CDEP. Indigenous communities' lack of satisfaction with welfare payments convinced the government that these monies were problematic and gave the government's causal story of Indigenous unemployment an air of legitimacy.

An analysis of this government's proposed solution to the high levels of unemployment amongst Australia's remote-dwelling Indigenous populations, using Bacchi's methodology (2009; 2012) offers a sense of its understanding of the underlying causes of Indigenous unemployment. The government maintained that the high levels of unemployment in remote Aboriginal communities were the result of the absence of jobs provided by a traditional labour market. So the government, therefore, would create *new jobs in a different* kind of labour market.

What was not said was that numerous other factors contributed to the high levels of Indigenous unemployment. For example, Minister Viner did not mention Australian Aboriginal peoples' history of social marginalisation and systematic exclusion from mainstream institutions, or their low rates of numeracy and English literacy (Jordan & Mavec 2010, 23). Nor did he mention the cultural incompatibility between certain forms of employment and Indigenous aspirations (Jordan & Mavec 2010, 23). Also ignored were factors specifically concerning economic development in remote communities on Aboriginal land, such as the relatively late establishment of colonialism in these areas, the later conferral of citizenship rights to people there, and the subsequent cultural robustness of these Indigenous communities (Altman 2001, 3). The lack of government

services in remote communities and their geographical isolation from major economic centres are two other factors that could have – even *should* have – been mentioned in the causal story of Aboriginal unemployment (Altman, Linkhorn, & Clarke 2005, 7). But none of these factors figured in Minister Viner's representation of the problem of Indigenous unemployment and were therefore not addressed in the subsequent policy remedy. Ignoring those parts of the narrative reflects the Minister's – and the Government's – circumscribed representation of Indigenous issues.

It is almost impossible to determine whether the exclusion of these factors was due to a lack of understanding, a judgement that these causes were beyond the scope of government action, or a conscious decision not to implicate the government in any historical wrongdoing or negligence. Nevertheless, these omissions do illustrate the fundamental interrelationship between problem representations and the range of possible policy solutions that may be adopted by government.

### **Sanders' competing principles in action**

Even though the Federal Government envisaged a central role for Aboriginal councils in determining the nature of CDEP, it still had clear priorities when it came to eliminating 'social problems' within Aboriginal communities. Viner stated: "my Department will encourage the inclusion of projects such as youth activities and alcoholic rehabilitation measures. Projects such as the destruction of pests and afforestation to improve the physical and social environment will also be encouraged" (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). Aboriginal councils and other Indigenous organisations would be empowered to tackle the employment-problems facing their communities, but it seemed the government had already made up its mind as to where the heart of the problem lay.

A conflict is observable in the government's enunciation of its preferences for the types of CDEP schemes decided upon by Indigenous community organisations. This is a tension, as Sanders has outlined (2010), between the principle of choice and the principle of guardianship. By promoting CDEP the government appeared to be supporting Indigenous choice through giving Aboriginal councils the power to make decisions on the development of CDEP. However, Viner and his Department were also expressing a concern for protecting certain vulnerable members of Indigenous communities (young people and alcoholics). One interpretation of this concern is that it stems from a commitment to a guardianship/protector role for government. The example of CDEP, wherein the Federal Government attempted to balance the principles of choice and guardianship, lends credence to Sanders' (2010) competing principles framework.

In accordance with the principle of choice, participation in CDEP would be voluntary for Indigenous communities. The scheme had been developed in response to the desires of Aboriginal people for an alternative to the continuation of welfare payments (Viner, HoR Debates 31 May 1977, 2173) and would be, Viner contended, "a positive demonstration of the Government's policy of encouraging Aboriginals to manage their own affairs" (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1921). The government's new employment strategy was designed to create an alternative system to the widespread receipt of unemployment payments and to strengthen the social fabric of remote Indigenous communities by empowering them. Importantly, Indigenous communities would not have CDEP imposed upon them but would be given the choice to opt in.

The Fraser Government's initiative of providing vocational training for Indigenous people, which would be instigated in conjunction with CDEP, also exhibited a

commitment to the principle of choice (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). This training was designed to give Aboriginal people the *choice* between either taking over the skilled jobs currently performed by non-Indigenous workers in remote communities or leaving these communities to join the mainstream workforce (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). Even though the *choice* here is merely presented as a decision between one form of work and another it does facilitate Aboriginal people's choice of where to live and in this way also respects Indigenous cultural considerations. The government's novel work and training initiative – CDEP – allowed Indigenous people to live and theoretically gain skilled employment on their traditional 'country'. Moreover, since land and place play such a central role in Indigenous culture (Mackean & Watson 2004, 19), this initiative is a significant example of government respecting and supporting Aboriginal peoples' right to choose where to work and live, and giving due importance to the influence of cultural considerations.

Equality, the most important of the three guiding principles in Sanders' (2010) framework, also features prominently in early parliamentary discussions of CDEP. The government was particularly worried about the unemployment situation in "remote areas or separate communities where normal job opportunities are inadequate" (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). The first stated objective of the CDEP program was to: "provide employment opportunities thereby reducing the need for unemployment benefit for unemployed Aboriginals within the community at a cost approximating unemployment benefits" (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). A desire to see greater *equality* between Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment rates weighed heavily on the government's decision to introduce CDEP.

The Fraser Government also justified CDEP on the basis that it would lessen the imbalances in incomes that existed in remote Aboriginal communities, reaffirming its commitment to the principle of equality (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). The document that outlined CDEP's guidelines stated that substantial income inequality existed between different remote Aboriginal communities, and between individual Aboriginal people residing in these communities (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). The experimental work program that The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs was proposing sought to "progressively eliminate the imbalances in incomes" within remote communities (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). The government's expressed desire was that, at least within the remote-dwelling Aboriginal population, there should be equality in *income*.

The Fraser Government established CDEP and in the process increased Indigenous choice. Communities could choose whether to adopt CDEP and Aboriginal community members could choose whether to participate in the scheme or remain on social security payments. This policy strove to achieve, among other things, the goal of *equality* in terms of employment participation rates. But at the same time, the long-held government imperative of *guardianship* over Aboriginal affairs remained uppermost in the minds of some MPs.

### Dissenting voices

At the same time, the Labor Party was singing quite a different tune. Its consistent line was that the Fraser Government was not doing enough to help Aboriginal Australians, with funding cuts reducing the effectiveness of government programs. Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam was highly critical of the Fraser Government's new Indigenous employment strategy, condemning the response to high Indigenous unemployment as

both inadequate and late (HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1925). The government had first exacerbated the levels of Aboriginal unemployment through cutting funds to employment projects and then less than made up for this financial austerity by offering jobs to a small number of Aboriginal people (Whitlam, HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1863-4). "If the problem were not so tragic in human terms, such a record could only be described as pitiful", Whitlam said of the government's Indigenous affairs policies including CDEP (HoR Debates 11 October 1977, 1864).

Labor Senator Jim Cavanagh was another outspoken critic of the CDEP scheme, accusing the government of breaching federal legislation by attempting to employ Aboriginal people at rates below the award wage (Senate Debates 6 October 1977, 1151). ALP member for Grey, Laurie Wallis contended that the rates of pay for CDEP workers should be at award rates (HoR Debates 12 October 1977, 1939). Wallis concluded that federal funding should be increased in order for appropriately remunerated work to be created for all unemployed members of remote Aboriginal communities (HoR Debates 12 October 1977, 1939). In the eyes of Cavanagh and Wallis work in itself was not good enough – it had to be at award rates. For Cavanagh and Wallis, and for others in the Labor Party, equality was not to do only with the provision of jobs that Indigenous people could either choose to accept or not; the only realistic measure of equality was wages equality.

Similarly, Labor's Doug Everingham criticised the government's decision to allow Aboriginal people to be employed at below award wages, contending that Australia was out of step with international employment standards (HoR Debates 28 September 1978, 1563-4). Everingham went one step further than Whitlam, Cavanagh and Wallis, equating CDEP with unemployment payments, also arguing that the money taken up by

CDEP payments would be better spent on occupational training for Aboriginal people (HoR Debates 28 September 1978, 1564).

All but one of these Labor parliamentarians saw a problem not with the kind of work that was being proposed under the CDEP scheme but with the amount of financial reward Aboriginal people were being offered in return for their labour. The Labor Party, like its Liberal Party opponents, understood the unemployment problem in Aboriginal communities to be a serious one and saw work as preferable to unemployment payment. For example, Wallis affirmed: "I agree that it is a lot better to provide finance that would provide work for these people than everybody to receive unemployment benefits" (HoR Debates 12 October 1977, 1939). However, Labor had a slightly different vision for the future: a scenario in which Aboriginal people had jobs and also received award wages for any work they carried out. For this reason Labor politicians in the 1970s and early 1980s voiced their concern with the Fraser Government's proposed CDEP scheme.

### **Conflicting problem representations and causal stories**

Both parties agreed that the unemployment problem within Aboriginal communities and its associated social problems needed to be confronted. Labor saw the need to provide employment with working and wage conditions that were equivalent to the minimum legal standard in the mainstream economy in accordance with the principle of wage equality, whereas the Liberals contented themselves with creating a system whereby Aboriginal people would be protected from the pitfalls of welfare dependency and empowered through work at any rate of pay. The Liberal Party was more concerned with avoiding the social ills associated with long-term unemployment and the receipt of social security payments and therefore pushed for equality in terms of workforce

participation rates. Liberal and Labor agreed that Aboriginal employment needed to be addressed, but differed over the appropriate course of action.

The ALP voiced its objections early on in the history of CDEP. However, after it was confirmed by the Government that CDEP wages would be based on a basic award rate for around 15-16 hours of work per week (Sanders 2012, 380), Labor would eventually accept CDEP and expand the scheme to into both rural and urban settings when in government. One way of interpreting this change of heart is to see it as a new policy paradigm establishing itself after an initial period of resistance to revolution. However a more convincing explanation of this change is that it was more incremental, with each successive government adding new elements to the existing institution (CDEP), in a process of “layering” that gradually changed the structure and status of CDEP (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 22-4). This process of layering will be expanded upon in the following two chapters.

### 1977-1983: dominant principles

This chapter has shown how the recognition of Indigenous people’s right to self-determination came to form a central part of government policy in the 1970s and 80s. It also demonstrated how enhancing the range of *choices* available to Indigenous Australians was as strong motivator in the Fraser Government’s policy decisions. Both parties strove to achieve greater *equality* between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, but did not agree as to what most important kind of equality might be. *Guardianship* influenced policy to a certain extent – CDEP was developed as a way of protecting Indigenous communities from the social problems associated with welfare dependency – but this was not pursued in a paternalistic fashion. The government

sought to empower Indigenous communities to find solutions to problems on their own.

*Choice* was promoted in the pursuit of *equality* and community development.

## **IV. The expansion of CDEP and the introduction of Work for the Dole 1983-2009**

The previous chapter outlined the reasons for CDEP's introduction and the arguments used to promote it. This chapter canvasses the evolution and expansion of CDEP and highlights the changing interpretations of its objectives. By using the theory of institutional layering (Streeck & Thelen 2005) the chapter also explains the significance of Work for the Dole in the eventual collapse of CDEP.

### **The historical development of CDEP**

When Labor, under charismatic former ACTU chief Bob Hawke, was returned to power in 1983, the Government decided that CDEP should be enlarged (Sanders 1993, 5). This followed on from substantial Indigenous enthusiasm for participation in the scheme and numerous calls for its expansion (Altman & Gray 2005, 400; Jordan 2012, 32). Allowing CDEP to grow coincided with a Department of Finance decision to allow the Department of Aboriginal Affairs an open-ended budget for the payment of CDEP wages, because of the scheme's notional link with the social security entitlement (Sanders 1993, 4). The Department of Finance reasoned that if CDEP were to operate as an effective equivalent to social security payments then the DAA would need an unrestrained budgetary capacity in order to respond to changing participation numbers (Sanders 1993, 4). This determination gave the DAA significant scope to expand CDEP beyond its initial remote locations. As Sanders observes (1993, 5), neither the Fraser Government in its final days, nor the newly-elected Hawke Government could see any reason why CDEP should not be offered to more communities.

## An alternative system, not a replacement

At that time, it was agreed that CDEP would exist alongside social security payments and not replace them (Sanders 2012, 380). It was an alternative to the mainstream social security system and gave Aboriginal people more choice. Following this decision, the number of communities and individual participants on CDEP increased fourfold over the next four years to include around 60 communities and 6000 participants (Sanders 2012, 380). The funds expended on CDEP now constituted 10% of the entire DAA budget (Sanders 2012, 380). CDEP was becoming a very significant item in the government's Indigenous affairs portfolio.

## Into cities and towns

After a review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs in 1985 (the Miller Review) the government decided to extend CDEP beyond remote Aboriginal communities (Sanders 2012, 380). This decision came as part of the government's Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP), which picked up on a theme of Miller's review – that Aboriginal people had the right to choose a lifestyle (Rowse 2002, 8). The AEDP pursued 'equity' for Aboriginal Australians – understood in terms of socio-economic indicators such as school retention, housing standards, employment rates and income – via empowering their choice (Rowse 2002, 8). Rowse notes that these dual policy objectives made outcomes hard to evaluate, as choice and socio-economic 'equity' or equality are not always mutually-reinforcing. A common question amongst Indigenous policy researchers assessing the AEDP was to ask whether the continued discrepancies between Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment rates constituted a success for Indigenous choice or a failure for Indigenous equity (Rowse 2002, 8). Here we see two of Sanders' competing principles – choice and equality – coming into play

once more, demonstrating the lack of consensus as to what the ultimate objective of Indigenous affairs policy should be.

### **CDEP's new home and redefined purpose**

In 1989 the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was established, and inherited responsibility for administering CDEP (Sanders 2012, 380). This new Indigenous representative body was set up both to perform the administrative functions of the former DAA and to advocate for Indigenous interests (Bradfield 2006, 87). One would imagine that the transfer of CDEP to ATSIC would have furthered Indigenous self-management. However, ATSIC was still subject to government control and thus CDEP was not administered in a radically different way by this new Indigenous body (Bradfield 2006, 88). A criticism has been levelled at CDEP that could also apply to ATSIC, for imposing white bureaucratic structures of accountability onto Indigenous communities and perpetuating Indigenous dependence on government welfare (Bernardi cited in Broome 2010, 260). So arguably, the creation of ATSIC led to the creation of yet another layer of government *machinery*, further entrenching CDEP and increasing Indigenous dependence on government rather than empowering Aboriginal self-determination.

Other scholars have made the case that after the inception of the AEDP in 1987 the CDEP scheme was increasingly defined as a 'labour market program' rather than as a way of furthering Indigenous social or cultural objectives (Altman & Smith cited in Rowse 2002, 67). Smith (1994, 3) pointed to both government and ATSIC publications that had defined CDEP as a way of developing 'sustainable economies' and transitioning Indigenous participants into full-time jobs in the mainstream labour force. This increased labour-market focus continued through the late 1990s particularly after 1997

when an independent review of CDEP – the Spicer review – pushed for a greater emphasis on employment outcomes in the traditional labour market (Hunter & Gray 2012, 7; Sanders 2007, 6; Jordan 2012, 33). The goals of CDEP were gradually being redefined to line up with a more economically liberal conception of the role of government and the proper functioning of an economy.

### Continued expansion

Nevertheless CDEP continued to expand across the country in the late 1980s and 1990s, reaching coastal New South Wales and Victoria by 1989 and Redfern in Sydney's centre by 1991 (Sanders 2012, 380). The scheme would eventually reach its peak level of participation in 2002-3 with over 35,000 participants (Hunter and Gray 2012, 7). The majority of CDEP schemes still operated in remote locations but the project had expanded from 10 communities in 1978 to a scheme delivered by around 300 Indigenous-run organisations in remote, rural and urban locations in 2004 (Jordan 2012, 32). It had also become the largest single program in the Federal Government's Indigenous affairs budget (Jordan 2012, 32). CDEP expanded dramatically in the late 1980s, through the 1990s and into the 2000s even if its goals were being redefined or repurposed.

### The end of an era

The rise of CDEP came to an end in 2004 alongside the demise of ATSIC (Altman 2007, 33). The Department of Employment and Workplace relations assumed administrative control of the scheme, reinforcing a view that CDEP should focus on mainstream employment outcomes for Indigenous people (Jordan 2012, 33). The Howard Government began to describe CDEP as a stepping-stone to non-CDEP employment (Sanders 2007, 6). CDEP was dealt a significant blow in 2007 when it was announced

that all CDEP schemes in urban and rural locations with "established economies" or "strong labour markets" would be closed down (Hunter & Gray 2012, 7; Altman 2007, 33; Sanders 2007, 7). By 2009 the withdrawal of CDEP from these areas was complete, leaving only remote CDEP schemes in operation (ANAO cited in Hunter & Gray 2012, 7).

On 23 July 2007, as part of the Intervention, it was announced that a number of CDEPs in the Northern Territory would cease (Jordan 2012, 37). The rationale behind this decision was dubious to say the least, for nowhere had a link been established, nor even indicated, between CDEP and the abuse of children, the problem which the NTER was instigated to tackle (Snowdon, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79). The Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Mal Brough, said that CDEP had "become another form of welfare dependency for many people. Instead of creating new opportunities for employment, it has become a destination in itself" (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7).

Brough summed up the government's appraisal of the situation by saying: "The combination of free money (in relatively large sums), free time and ready access to drugs and alcohol has created appalling conditions for community members, particularly children" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 2). The Howard Government's definition of CDEP as "free money" is instructive; what had started out as a way to provide Indigenous people with genuine and meaningful "work" was now being characterised as just another handout. Arguably, the Howard Government's "solution" was simply to recast the issue in terms which were compatible with its ideology. Henceforth, Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory would be subject to the same rules and structures as all other Australians. If they wanted a handout, they would have to work for it. To rectify the injustice of "free money", Indigenous people would be

moved into Work for the Dole programs and Structured Training and Education Projects – but the Government went a step further; under the NTER, incomes would be “quarantined”, which effectively determined how government-provided incomes had to be spent.

In the lead-up to the 2007 election, Labor vowed to reinstate CDEP in the Northern Territory if it were elected, but once in government it failed to restore funding to all the CDEPs that had been affected by the Intervention (Jordan 2012, 37). Subsequently, Labor's new Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Jenny Macklin announced that the dismantling of CDEP in non-remote areas would continue, finishing off the work that the Howard Government had begun (Macklin, HoR Debates 18 March 2009, 3026; Altman & Jordan 2009). From July 2009 new participants on CDEP could no longer receive wages, instead receiving income support, and were no longer counted as being employed (Macklin, HoR Debates 18 March 2009, 3026; Sanders 2012, 384; Jordan 2012, 38-9; Hunter & Gray 2012, 7). This marked the end of CDEP as it had historically operated.

### **Work for the Dole: a competing institution is born**

In February 1997, the same year in which Ian Spicer would hand down his review of CDEP, the Howard Government announced that a trial Work for the Dole (WFD) scheme would commence (Bessant 2000, 18). WFD applied to all eligible jobseekers, not just Aboriginal people looking for work. The new policy would see jobseekers obliged to work a certain number of hours a week on community activities in exchange for unemployment benefits (Henman 2004, 184). WFD started small. It was initially aimed only at young people in rural areas who had been unemployed for a year or more (Bessant 2000, 18). However, the scheme was subsequently expanded to apply to people up to the age of 49, with varying weekly activity requirements for different age brackets

(Henman 2004, 184). The kind of work that jobseekers were contracted to do included maintaining community facilities, gardening, environmental work, tourism, heritage and history projects, and the provision of community services (Muller et. al. 2006, 47). Weekly work requirement were roughly equivalent to the number of award-rate hours needed to make up participants' unemployment payments (Henman 2004, 184). Under WFD, now operating nationally, the unemployed were - and still are - obligated to perform tasks "that will generate outcomes to benefit the community" (Department of Employment 2014) in order to qualify for continued income subsidies.

The proclamation of this new workfare scheme came straight off the back of the Coalition's 1996 'Reforming Employment Assistance' strategy, which saw a reduced amount of labour market programs (jobs created by government) available for young people and the privatisation of employment services under the auspices of the Job Network (Carson et al. 2003, 20). Potential 'job service providers' competed for government contracts under which commission would be paid for achieving certain 'outputs' such as placing someone into training or a job (Sanders 2012, 382).

### Further reform

Further welfare reform was expected in 1999 when the Minister for Family and Community Services, Jocelyn Newman, asked a government-appointed Reference Group on Welfare Reform to enquire into, among other things, "Options for change to income support arrangements aimed at preventing and reducing welfare dependency" (Reference Group on Welfare Reform 2000, Attachment A). The government provided the Reference Group with a list of six principles to guide its enquiries. The fourth was: "Expecting people on income support to help themselves and contribute to society through increased social and economic participation in a framework of Mutual

Obligation" (Reference Group on Welfare Reform 2000, Attachment A). The government was concerned by what it saw as the potential for an over-reliance on the social safety net, and sought to prevent this by modifying the behaviour of the unemployed.

The Reference Group, chaired by ex-priest Patrick McClure, handed down its final report in mid-2000 and recommended the social support system needed to better encourage economic and social participation (Dawkins 2001, 87). The McClure Report made recommendations for reforming government employment services but also stressed the need for policies that increased the incentives for moving from welfare to work (Dawkins 2001, 87). The government agreed with this notion (HREOC 2001, 37). The Government's response to the report, a welfare reform package dubbed *Australians Working Together*, established the Personal Support Programme and the Transition to Work Programme to assist people with personal problems, parents, carers, and mature workers with their re-entry into the workforce (HREOC 2001, 37). The reform package also increased WFD places and provided more opportunities for people to do community work (HREOC 2001, 37).

### **CDEP follows suit**

These changes foreshadowed comparable amendments to CDEP's operation, when in 2006 a competitive tendering process was introduced for CDEP provider organisations (Sanders 2007, 7). Additionally, from July 2007 CDEP organisations would receive "outcomes payments" for placing jobseekers into ongoing mainstream employment (Sanders 2012, 382-3), mirroring the marketised incentive structure that had already – from the late 1990s – been implemented in the broader employment services system. CDEP participants in non-remote areas were later required to register with a Job Network provider from 2006 (Sanders 2007, 6), directly linking CDEP with mainstream

employment services. The Howard Government intended to utilise market incentives to inspire both mainstream job agencies and CDEP providers to place jobseekers – both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal – into ongoing employment. The differences between government treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous jobseekers were disappearing.

### **Mutual obligation**

The WFD program was justified according to the principle of mutual obligation. It holds that people who are unemployed and receiving financial assistance from tax-payer-funded government sources have an obligation to actively pursue employment and give something back to the community that provides them with financial support (DEWRSB cited in Muller et. al. 2006, 47). The explicit aims of the program were: "to give job-seekers valuable work experience opportunities, help them develop good work habits, involve local communities in providing quality activities which support job-seekers, and provide local communities with facilities and services of value to them" (DEWRSB cited in Muller et al. 2006, 47). WFD aimed "to invigorate, through work, a young person's failing sense of responsibility and obligation" with the hope of compelling them to find jobs, thus lessening welfare dependency (Warburton & Smith 2003, 774-5).

Central to the principle of mutual obligation is the paternalistic assumption that the state has the duty to direct citizens who are not exercising "self-regarding and socially responsible choice" towards a more righteous path (Yeatman quoted in Bessant 2000, 19). That is to say, people who can work must be compelled to do so if they want to enjoy the benefits of living in society. In liberal contractarian theory, employment plays a crucial role in the legitimisation of citizenship rights and serves as a demonstration of commitment to self-reliance, personal responsibility and the fulfilment of obligations to the community (Bessant 2000, 20). By engaging in paid employment one is indicating to

society that he or she is capable of exercising responsible choice and should be afforded all due rights and benefits. On the other hand, when people are unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits, they have a moral obligation to 'give something back' by participating in community service (Warburton and Smith 2003, 774). Under WFD the state compels welfare recipients to engage in active work based on the understanding that this protects the community from exploitation, promoting moral behaviour and fairness (Bessant 2000, 20).

### Social ills

The rationale of WFD attaches a type of social pathology to welfare recipients in general. It sends a message to long-term welfare recipients that it is a personal failing of theirs that is preventing them from finding employment. WFD links a person's unemployed status with ideas of welfare dependency, a lack of work ethic and poor work skills (Henman 2004, 185). According to this rationale, unemployment is not caused by the market/state failing to provide sufficient employment for all community members or by historical-structural factors but by the social deviancy of certain community members who refuse to look for and take up regular work. The punitive nature of WFD associates an image of a bad or undeserving citizen with anyone who is not undertaking paid or unpaid work (Warburton & Smith 2003, 774). The logic behind WFD places responsibility for unemployment in the hands of the unemployed themselves and urges them to fulfil their social obligations through working (Bessant 2000, 22). This was also the case for Shared Responsibility Agreements applied to Indigenous communities and the conditional welfare clauses of the NTER (Maddison 2011, 76). The blame for social problems was placed on Aboriginal people.

### Shared goals and rationales

The reasoning underlying both the Howard Government's introduction of WFD and its changes to CDEP indicate a common rationale driving the two processes. Paternalism, mutual obligation and the social pathology of welfare recipients were strong themes in WFD and also featured prominently in the government's justifications for the NTER (Maddison 2011, 76). In the lead-up to the Intervention, members of the Howard government spoke at length about the problem of welfare dependency and social dysfunction in remote Aboriginal communities. Brough stated in his Second Reading Speech for the *Social Security and Other Legislation Reform (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007* – one of the central pieces of legislation of the Intervention – that: "The government believes that the right to welfare comes with obligations" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 2). He went on to say that in a number of remote Indigenous communities "normal community standards and parenting behaviours have broken down" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 2).

### Mainstream services and paternalistic guidance

The Howard Government redefined CDEP as welfare instead of work, alleged that remote Aboriginal communities were rife with social pathologies and maintained that the paternalistic influence of government was needed in order to reinforce "an appropriate balance between entitlements and responsibilities" (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 2). The effect of this change was that Indigenous people would no longer be working for organisations that considered cultural factors and kin-based responsibilities alongside work obligations; they would now be working for "the neo-paternalistic state" that was pursuing mainstreaming and increasing Indigenous people's dependence on the state in the process (Altman 2007, 35). As part of the

Intervention, Work for the Dole was to be expanded to get Indigenous "prepared for the workplace", while CDEP was to be abolished for allegedly having failed to do the same (Scullion, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 204).

What this process indicates is that the period of special treatment of and self-determination for Aboriginal people was coming to an end. WFD and other market-oriented mainstream job services were promoted as the best way to get Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people alike to make good on their civic responsibility to work. Assimilationist in nature, these policies prescribed just one rough-cast model of social existence for all of Australia's citizens, irrespective of cultural, social and historical difference.

## V. The NTER and the unravelling of CDEP

This chapter shows how the goals of CDEP were recast during the months before and after the NTER. It illustrates the level of convergence between the goals that the two major parties' ascribed to CDEP but uncovers a disparity between their problem representations. The parliamentary debates from 2007 exhibit a rethink of the causal stories and problem representations attached to CDEP, lending credence to the *revolutionary* aspect of Will Sanders' (2008) hypothesis.

### CDEP undermined prior to the Intervention

From February 2007, when the cessation of CDEP in rural and urban locations was announced (AAP 2007) members of the governing Liberal-National Coalition began forming a new causal story involving CDEP and Aboriginal unemployment. CDEP participation was no longer being described as work and the word 'job' was carefully avoided when referring to a CDEP positions. Speaking of proposed changes to Indigenous education legislation, Minister for Education Julie Bishop outlined how CDEP "places" were going to be converted into ongoing "jobs" in the education sector (HoR Debates 23 May 2007, 1). The Minister for Ageing Christopher Pyne also made a calculated distinction between "real jobs", this time in community care, and subsidised CDEP "positions" (HoR Debates 29 May 2007, 185).

Bishop elaborated that the funding of these new "jobs" would provide CDEP "participants" (note the avoidance of the term workers) with "the full benefits of employment including wages, leave, superannuation, training and professional development" (HoR Debates 23 May 2007, 1). Bishop and Pyne's statements indicate the government viewed employment in the mainstream economy as something that would

benefit Indigenous Australians, and suggest ministers were deliberately crafting an image of CDEP as something other than work.

Six days later, Bishop was once again speaking about the conversion of CDEP 'positions' into 'jobs' in education (HoR Debates 29 May 2007, 75). Moreover, on top of providing funding for this employment transformation, the government had committed "\$50 million in additional funding for boarding schools that accommodate Indigenous students" (Bishop, HoR Debates 29 May 2007, 75). The government was promoting both mainstream employment and young Indigenous people moving away from their home communities for long periods of time to be educated in what were most likely mainstream institutions. Bishop concluded that these changes would "support increased choice and mobility in education and training for Indigenous young people" and also posited that education was the key to providing Indigenous people with "the opportunity for economic independence" (HoR Debates 29 May 2007, 75).

Another interpretation of the policy proposals Bishop outlined is that the government was in fact circumscribing the range of choices available to Indigenous Australians. It did so by devaluing CDEP, promoting mainstream employment and encouraging young Aboriginal people to leave the communities that were stifling their chances of achieving "economic independence" in a neo-liberal sense. It is clear which choices the government wished Indigenous people to make. At no point was it stipulated that it was acceptable for Indigenous Australians to continue to participate in CDEPs that operated somewhat apart from the mainstream economy. Nor would traditional Indigenous forms of knowledge attainment be given government support. In essence the government was pushing assimilation.

Not only was CDEP not worthy of the title of employment, it was also alleged to be hampering mainstream economic participation. When explaining his department's decision to discontinue CDEP in areas with an unemployment rate of less than 7%, the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations Joe Hockey contended that "CDEP had become a continuous program of support which left people falling into a cargo net from which they were rarely able to climb out" (HoR Debates 12 June 2007, 164). While "real jobs" were available, supposedly, the CDEP was implied to be a nothing more than a welfare trap constraining Aboriginal employment. Specifically, Hockey stated that the recent policy reforms were designed to "get people off CDEP and into work" (HoR Debates 12 June 2007, 164). Yet another government minister was making an obvious rhetorical distinction between CDEP and work.

One final expression of contempt for CDEP from a Government Minister is illuminating. Asked by Labor MP Warren Snowdon about the possibility of creating 'real jobs' for Aboriginal rangers, who would otherwise be on CDEP, in the government's northern Australian quarantine arrangements (HoR Debates 12 June 2007, 166) the Government's Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Minister Peter McGauran encapsulated the Howard Government's lack of regard for CDEP. "If the member is suggesting that we should—and I am sure he is not—employ people to solve a social or employment problem, then I do not think I am going to be of a great deal of assistance", Minister McGauran replied (HoR Debates 12 June 2007, 166). This response indicates a governmental antipathy towards one of the central objectives of the original CDEP scheme: the alleviation of social problems through the creation of employment (Viner, HoR Debates 26 May 1977, 1922). Government priorities had changed remarkably since the days of CDEP's formulation.

## Bipartisan support for mainstreaming

In the first half of 2007, prior to the 21 June announcement of the Intervention, the Labor Party was pledging its support for the conversion of CDEP jobs into full-time government jobs (Macklin, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 44; Crossin, Senate Debates 13 June 2007, 23). In addition, members of the opposition framed CDEP as fundamentally a work readiness scheme (Smith, HoR Debates 29 May 2007, 61; Crossin, Senate Debates 13 June 2007, 23) and expressed their commitment to placing Indigenous people in 'real jobs' in the mainstream workforce (Macklin, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 42-3; Crossin, Senate Debates 13 June 2007, 20). The government and the opposition expressed bipartisan support for 'real or 'mainstream' employment and had ceased to define CDEP as work.

In yet another display of bipartisanship in representations of CDEP, Jenny Macklin articulated Labor's desire "to encourage the decision to study and to work, not the reverse" and affirmed the necessity of assessing the "major payment systems, whether it is social security, CDEP or the tax system, to make sure that they encourage people to work and that they do not have serious disincentives that discourage people" (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 43-44). Although she conveyed the sentiment in far less strident terms than Hockey, Macklin did indeed intimate that CDEP was a disincentive to mainstream employment. Furthermore, Northern Territory Labor Senator Trish Crossin expressed support for increased funding for Indigenous people who chose to relocate for education and training, in the hope of gaining employment (Senate Debates 13 June 2007, 20). Crossin shared Bishop's enthusiasm for the economic benefits of relocating to engage in mainstream education. This convergence between the two major parties' Indigenous affairs policy priorities suggests the beginning of a 'generational revolution'.

### Narrative legacies, government obligation and recalcitrant prejudice

Although there was substantial bipartisanship over the nature and objectives of CDEP, the Labor opposition did acknowledge the lack of mainstream employment opportunities in many remote communities, unlike the government (Macklin, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 44; Snowdon, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 63; Snowdon, HoR Debates 12 June 2007, 163-4). This insistence on the lack of jobs in remote areas resembled Fraser Government's causal story of market failure from 30 years earlier. At least part of the problem representation of the previous *generation* persisted.

The opposition also highlighted a number of serious non-market barriers to Indigenous employment. Labor's Jenny Macklin stated: "The ingredients of poor education, poverty, racism and being socially marginalised pose significant barriers to Indigenous young people in our cities" (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 43). Nevertheless, Macklin focused the rest of her speech on the need to increase investment in education and training, perhaps because poverty, racism and social marginalisation seemed less amenable to public action.

Warren Snowdon also offered a more holistic picture of the impediments facing Indigenous job seekers. He underlined the impact of limited access to education and training, location, life experiences, identity, and family and carer responsibilities on workforce participation (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 62). However, he too, like Macklin saw increased access to education and training as the most important step to take towards achieving higher Indigenous employment levels (Snowdon, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 64). Members of the Labor Party argued that for Indigenous Australians to enter the mainstream workforce they would have to overcome many more obstacles than just the alleged welfare trap of CDEP. Nevertheless, when presented

with the opportunity of proposing inventive policy measures that might lessen the disadvantaged position of Indigenous jobseekers, both Snowdon and Macklin reverted to the conventional wisdom that education and training would suffice.

Snowdon and Macklin also used the language of mutual obligation but, unlike Brough, focused on the government's side of the bargain rather than what was required of welfare recipients. Macklin argued that if unemployed people were obliged to fulfil "participation requirements" then the government should be obliged to provide the unemployed with "training or study opportunities" that would "foster their independence" (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 44). Continuing this line of argument, Snowdon stated that while the unemployed had an obligation to look for work and engage in vocational training, the government had "a responsibility to ensure that people have access to the vocational education and training opportunities that they require" (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 62). The Labor opposition reminded the government that mutual obligation was "a two way street" (Snowdon, HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 62) but maintained its in-principle support for this highly conditional form of welfare provision.

Following the decision to demolish CDEP in urban and rural areas, Labor frontbencher, the Member for Sydney, Tanya Plibersek despaired at the loss of important services in urban Aboriginal communities such as Redfern. She also contested the likelihood of the removal of CDEP from urban areas leading to increased Aboriginal employment in the mainstream economy. Plibersek contended: "An Aboriginal person who says they live on the Block in Redfern and wants a job serving customers in David Jones perhaps has a couple of barriers to overcome before they are treated in the same way as any other potential employee turning up for the job" (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 110).

Plibersek insisted that racism and discrimination were still serious mitigating factors preventing increases in Aboriginal employment rates, even in urban areas, and for this reason urged the government to restore funding for urban CDEPs (HoR Debates 15 February 2007, 110). Plibersek was filling in some of the gaps in the Howard Government's problem representation of Indigenous unemployment and offered an alternative causal story. Not all MPs believed the market and mainstream employment services would lead to increases in number of Aboriginal employed.

### **Intervention debates and government discontentment with CDEP**

Subsequent to the announcement of the Northern Territory Intervention on 21 June 2007, the government's criticisms of CDEP became more vehement. Mal Brough declared that CDEP had "not provided a pathway to real employment" and had "become another form of welfare dependency" (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7). Members of the government contended that CDEP was originally designed as a stepping stone to mainstream employment (Scullion, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 201; Haase, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 83), ignoring the community development objectives of the scheme. Minister Brough asserted: "The Community Development Employment Projects program has become the destination for far too many. It is where people end their working lives, not where they start it" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 11). This new causal story saw the reason for Aboriginal unemployment relocated in the inability of CDEP to move people into mainstream employment.

The high rates of CDEP participation, which the government now viewed as welfare dependency, were used as evidence that CDEP had become a policy *failure*. The government delegitimised CDEP by repeatedly stating that it had failed to achieve one of the core objectives of the government – mainstream employment. This is a common

tactic in the process of policy evaluation, which often occurs because a policy does not fit within the ideological schema of a political group (Bovens and t'Hart 1996, 10). The Howard Government's criticism of CDEP in 2007 could reasonably be interpreted as one of these ideologically driven policy evaluations.

Although the NTER imposed restrictions on the ways that welfare money could be spent in certain parts of the NT, people formerly receiving CDEP wages would now receive mainstream unemployment payments such as Newstart Allowance and be placed into mainstream 'job-readiness' schemes such as Work for the Dole (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7-8). Increasingly, the Howard Government viewed the existence of a separate system of employment for Aboriginal Australians as unacceptable and aimed to have the same system of welfare payments available to people across the board (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7-8). The government believed mainstream employment services to be superior to CDEP (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 17) and the new goal was to get Aboriginal people into mainstream jobs through the Job Network, Work for the Dole and Structured Training and Education Projects because CDEP had allegedly failed in this endeavour (Scullion, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 201).

After announcing the NTER, the government continued its push for the conversion of "CDEP positions" into "real jobs" (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 8). It argued that where CDEP participants had been carrying out work that should have been done by local, state or Federal Government agencies, these people should have been offered full time jobs with all the appropriate benefits (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 7-8; Scullion, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 200-1). State and Federal Governments would no longer be permitted to pay Indigenous people a fraction of what they were really due for administering government services.

However, as Greens and Labor MPs noted at the time, in remote NT communities there were not enough of these 'real jobs' in government service provision to make up for the loss of employment caused by the abolition of CDEP (Crossin, Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 94; Siewert, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 123). Even with the creation of more 'real jobs' in government there would still be an overall increase in the number of people on unemployment payments after CDEP was discontinued.

On top of this, a form of market rationalism was imposed onto Indigenous organisations that administered CDEP (Scullion, Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 202-3). These were organisations that were in many cases never established with the express purpose of becoming economically viable or profitable, but served to further advance Indigenous self-determination and fill the void left by a lack of government services (Rowse 2002, 1). Referring to such CDEP delivery organisations, Liberal Senator Nigel Scullion said: "There are a number of organisations that may be on the cusp of becoming profitable. We want to ensure that those supported businesses become real businesses. When I say 'real businesses' I mean that they employ people on real wages" (Senate Debates 16 August 2007, 203). Scullion wanted Indigenous organisations to be run like mainstream enterprises and envisaged a more businesslike employer-employee relationship between Indigenous workers and CDEP organisations. Comments such as these, coupled with the withdrawal of funding for CDEP meant that Indigenous organisations and enterprises would be exposed to the harsh realities of the free market, or lack thereof in remote Aboriginal communities.

The new causal story of Aboriginal unemployment was all about the failure of CDEP. The government now championed 'real jobs' and mainstream employment services as the solution to Indigenous employment problems. The government no longer acknowledged

the social and cultural objectives that were originally associated with CDEP nor did it acknowledge the lack of mainstream jobs in remote Aboriginal communities. The Howard Government's new narrative was that the problem of Indigenous unemployment lay with the ineffective vocational training services of CDEP and with its inability to facilitate mainstream employment. Therefore, the solution was to abolish this Indigenous-specific employment scheme and funnel Aboriginal people into the employment services, welfare payments and workfare schemes that were available to all Australians. CDEP participants were no longer to be treated differently from other unemployed Australians and Indigenous organisations were to become self-sufficient, profit-generating units of economic productivity.

However, as was the case during CDEPs initiation, the causal story that implicated CDEP in the Indigenous unemployment problem was only one of many possible problem representations. Trish Crossin underlined the contestable nature of causal stories when she questioned the fairness of quarantining the incomes of Indigenous welfare recipients and not the incomes of wage earners. Crossin criticised the lack of evidence showing more responsible spending patterns of the latter (Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 95). Crossin's objection highlights the contestable nature of cause and effect in politics and policy and points to the subjective nature of problem representations.

### **In principle support, but with reservations**

Once it was revealed that the CDEP would be abruptly cut off in the communities affected by the NTER, the Labor Party began emphasising the negative side effects that could arise from this policy. Warren Snowdon pointed out that one of the immediate effects of the end of CDEP in the NT would be "to put more than 8,000 Aboriginal people out of work and on the dole" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79). Snowdon also

underlined the valuable services that were threatened by the axing of CDEP, proffering this:

"the immediate impact on communities and community programs will be dramatic. It will spell the death knell of many programs, it will see the erosion of the effectiveness of night patrol community safety efforts, it will erode the profitability of community stores and therefore jobs in the stores, it will make it difficult for homeland outstation support and enterprises generated by CDEP will have no guarantees of continued support" (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79)

Snowdon explained how the end of CDEP would increase unemployment and undermine the homelands movement in general. He also foresaw housing and social problems stemming from the likely influx of people from outstations into major population centres such as Alice Springs and Katherine (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79). Snowdon envisaged a multitude of problems stemming from the end of CDEP in the NT. Crucially, he maintained that this policy measure would not achieve the increases in Indigenous employment rates that were so desired.

Other members of the Labor Party were also worried that the end of CDEP in the NT could threaten the homelands and outstations movement. Trish Crossin was one of them, declaring: "the scrapping of CDEP with the resultant reduction in funding and loss of activity payments will be potentially disastrous to the homelands and the outstation movement" (Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 94). She also contested the likelihood of the government achieving its core objective, saying: "this move will do little to protect children. Indeed, if it forces Aboriginal people to move away from homelands to larger communities with more crowded housing, it may do the opposite" (Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 94). While Labor shared its Liberal counterparts' preference for mainstream over CDEP jobs, it still saw a place for the latter.

Labor Party members defended CDEP for its positive community, social and cultural aspects. Many of these benefits would most likely disappear if CDEP funding were withdrawn. CDEP allowed young Indigenous people to do positive community work in areas such as education, aged care or working in community stores (Snowdon, HoR Debates 15 August 2007, 64). Other people worked as rangers or in health centres (Snowdon, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79). Trish Crossin feared that the unexpected withdrawal of CDEP funding would cause the collapse of many Indigenous organisations (Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 94). If these organisations collapsed then the services and active work engagement that Indigenous communities enjoyed under CDEP would also likely vanish.

As well as these obvious benefits for the smooth operation of communities and work creation, CDEP had a political function, as Rowse notes (2002, 72). This function was to empower Indigenous communities to deal with their own problems and set out their own development priorities. With the end of CDEP, Indigenous organisations would have to engage in a tendering process to become Work for the Dole or STEP providers (Stephens, Senate Debates 8 August 2007, 58). As Labor Senator Ursula Stephens noted: "if an interstate provider wins those tenders it will lead to the disempowerment of local communities to engage in developing solutions" (Senate Debates 8 August 2007, 58). Communities would no longer be able to develop their own agendas for future projects but would be beholden to the priorities of outsider organisations and indirectly the government.

One final point of contention for Labor was the suspicion that CDEP was only being abolished in the Northern Territory so that the Government could quarantine the incomes of greater numbers of people. Although a minority of CDEP workers were to be

moved into ongoing employment the remainder would be placed on Work for the Dole or other welfare payments and would therefore be subjected to income management (Brough, HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 8). Both Warren Snowdon (HoR Debates 7 August 2007, 79) and Trish Crossin (Senate Debates 13 August 2007, 95) protested that the government had decided to abolish CDEP in prescribed communities simply to facilitate increased government control over Indigenous people's spending habits. Indeed Mal Brough explicitly stated this motivation, saying: "Moving CDEP participants on to income support will allow a single system of income management to apply to welfare payments" (HoR Debates August 7 2007, 8). Snowdon and Crossin's suspicion that government policy was motivated by more than just the desire to create mainstream employment appears to have been justified.

### **A new paradigm?**

The link between the end of CDEP and income management illustrates the central importance of Sanders' (2010) principle of guardianship in informing the Howard Government's approach to Indigenous affairs. This paternalistic income quarantining privileges guardianship over the individual choice of Indigenous people and also imposes a separate regime of rights on Indigenous communities, limiting their legal equality. The level of paternalism and mainstreaming evidenced in the Northern Territory Emergency Response and the end of CDEP makes clear that Indigenous choice was no longer an influential guiding principle. A new era of Indigenous affairs paternalism, with the government playing the role of guardian and protector, was well and truly established by the time the NTER came into effect in 2007.

CDEP was being dismantled because it was not working to achieve the goals that the Howard Government had in mind for Indigenous Australians. This occurred even

though CDEP was originally set up with a range of goals, with mainstream labour market outcomes only constituting one sub-set of these. The argument had changed from one of market failure to one of Indigenous people being held back by a government program that inappropriately mitigated the incentives of the free market. The Coalition under Howard was committed to reducing Indigenous cultural difference and more concerned with social and economic statistical equality rather than enabling Indigenous self-governance (Bennett 1999, 66-7). Howard focused on the problems facing Indigenous communities, stressing the need for policy that would remedy the serious levels of Indigenous disadvantage and achieve statistical parity. The government had to lead Indigenous Australians down the virtuous path towards work, responsibility and fulfilling social obligations, the same pathway prescribed for non-Indigenous Australians.

Hall's (1993) policy paradigm shift can perhaps explain the overall shift in policy objectives that occurred in Indigenous affairs during the Howard era. Then, the goals around which policy was organised were reorganised, as is predicted in paradigmatic/third order policy change. But in the case of CDEP's abolition the process was more incremental than abrupt. The accumulated effect of numerous policy revisions and the long-term political effects of the growth of a competing institution eventually took their toll on the stability of CDEP. Between 1997 and 2007 this particular Indigenous affairs policy was affected more by first and second order changes – changes to policy settings and instruments – than by an overarching recalibration of goals as in a paradigm shift. Hall's (1993, 285) explanation of third order change precipitated by policy *anomalies* or exogenous shocks does not apply to the abolition of CDEP because

no remarkable anomalies existed. It was ultimately transformed incrementally, through institutional layering as is explained below.

### Competing institutional layers

With the promotion of Work for the Dole over CDEP we see the interaction of competing employment-related institutions. The Howard Government clearly favoured increased Indigenous participation in the mainstream economy over the continuation of government-funded work projects in the form of CDEP. The Work for the Dole scheme operated according to a different logic to CDEP and the Howard Government attempted to instil the logic of the former into the operation of the latter. This had the effect of undermining the institutional stability of CDEP. Since this Indigenous-specific scheme was initially established with a number of complementary goals in mind, with the overarching goal arguably being the enhancement of community stability through self-management and work, the imposition of a new hierarchy of goals did not sit well with the existing institutional arrangements and stakeholders.

The competing goals of the two schemes led to the goals of CDEP eventually being redefined and the institution eventually breaking down because of the disconnect between what had been happening under CDEP and the government's new set of desired outcomes. This process has been explained in detail by Streeck and Thelen (2005). They refer to it as *layering*. In this process a new institutional layer redirects support away from an old layer (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23). This process is one of differential growth wherein the new institutional layer grows at a faster rate than the old layer and absorbs much of its political support (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23).

Work for the Dole runs according to the principle of mutual obligation and is promoted as a work-readiness program. The government provides welfare payments to people without work, as long as those people are prepared to work a certain number of hours per week doing things determined by government. By contrast, CDEP was originally about government providing work to Indigenous communities and facilitating their self-management. The provision of work and the ability to decide what kind of work that might be is quite different to enforcing work in government-determined activities. It is easy to see why CDEP broke down once it became clear that the government's new objectives for the scheme could not be imposed onto decades-old institutional structures. New priorities and logics did not fit old patterns of operation and the existence of new institutional arrangements undermined CDEP's stability.

From the time Work for the Dole was institutionalised, as Sanders notes (2012, 385), the demise of CDEP was inevitable. This is because the CDEP scheme as it was originally envisaged – with its strong focus on community stability, cultural appropriateness and self-management – did not fit into the Howard Government's new priorities for the future of Indigenous Australians and society in general. CDEP was effectively transformed into Work for the Dole in the sense that participants could no longer earn top-up money for extra hours worked or receive wages (Jordan 2012, 39). WFD was a competing employment institution that operated according to a different logic to that of CDEP. Over a ten-year period WFD became ever more entrenched and overtook CDEP as the main source of *work-like activity* for unemployed Indigenous Australians.

### **Mainstreaming continues under Labor**

After Labor took office in late 2007, it was hoped CDEP might be saved. During the election campaign, Kevin Rudd had promised to restore CDEP in the NT. Funding was

restored for the majority of these programs in July 2008 (Jordan 2012, 37). But further mainstreaming had already been signalled in May 2008, when the government released a discussion paper – *Increasing Indigenous Economic Opportunity* – which asked, as Sanders has observed (2012, 384), how the CDEP could be “better linked to the Government’s universal employment services model” (Gillard, Macklin & O’Connor 2008, 1). In government, Labor would eventually withdraw support for CDEP in “non-remote areas with established economies” (Macklin & O’Connor quoted in Jordan 2012, 38). At the same time, significant changes to remote CDEP programs would reduce participation eligibility (Jordan 2012, 38).

It was not a surprise, then, when in March 2009 the government’s Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin announced in parliament that CDEP “participants” could continue to receive wages only “until 30 June 2011, when continuing participants will transfer to income support” (HoR Debates 18 March 2009, 3026). The Rudd Government now viewed mainstream income support as preferable to CDEP wages, demonstrating a commitment to mainstream services. Macklin and her colleagues were no longer perturbed – as the Fraser Government had been – by the by the assumed link between social problems and the receipt of welfare payments. Perhaps they believed the new incentive structure of mutual obligation introduced by WFD would prevent such dysfunction. Whatever the case, by 2009 there was bipartisan disdain for CDEP and a new ideological paradigm had been established.

## Conclusion

Will Sanders (2008) argued that the transformative Indigenous affairs policy changes that occurred during the years of the Howard Government constituted a “generational revolution”. He located the key moment of policy reversal in the NTER of 2007. This thesis has argued that the changes to Indigenous affairs’ guiding principles, embodied in the abolition of CDEP, were indeed revolutionary in an ideological sense, especially if viewed in light of that scheme’s original objectives. By applying post-positivist analysis to the case study, this thesis has further been able to demonstrate the nature of the ideological revolution in some detail.

Thirty years after CDEP was introduced, the Howard Government would nominate equality – employment equality, and social and cultural equality – as a guiding principle of its Indigenous affairs policy. However, in the pursuit of its “practical reconciliation” stance, the Howard administration would revert far more overtly to *guardianship*-type measures. The objective of employment equality has remained consistent between 1977 and 2009, but the means of achieving this end has been dramatically reformed. Both Fraser and Howard enacted policies aimed at increasing Aboriginal employment rates but only Fraser was prepared to create employment directly in this endeavour. It is important to remember that employment creation was not the only goal of CDEP when it was initiated and, arguably not even its most important ambition. For the Fraser government, employment was conceived of as another means of achieving the ultimate end of creating stable and self-managing communities. For Howard, as Chapter V explored, employment arguably served as another way of *assimilating* Indigenous Australians. This strongly suggests that the ideologies of these two generations were at loggerheads.

In 2007, the Howard Government advanced a causal story that cast CDEP as the villain in a tale of reckless government meddling in the proper operation of free-market principles, leading to intractable Indigenous unemployment. This narrative is completely at odds with the causal story of the Fraser government, which portrayed CDEP as the solution to the failure of mainstream labour markets to provide sustainable employment for Indigenous Australians. For policymakers of the Fraser Government, it was the economy – not the government – that had failed Indigenous Australians. Conversely, for the Howard Government it was CDEP – a policy devised by a previous generation of MPs and public servants – that had failed.

This incommensurable difference between the problem representations which two generations of policy-makers uses to characterise Indigenous unemployment offers strong evidence for the existence of an ideological swing. Based on Heywood's definition of an ideology, the Fraser and Howard Governments disagreed on the first facet: they did not explain the world in the same way. The aspect of the world that concerned these policy-makers (Aboriginal unemployment and its causes) was explained in two irreconcilable ways. The two generations differed ideologically. This aspect of Sanders' generational revolutions hypothesis stands up to scrutiny.

Importantly, the destruction of CDEP was not as sudden and dramatic as Sanders' implies. Rather, the process resembled less the "punctuated equilibrium" or "paradigm shift" model, where transformative change occurs quickly after a period of long stability, and more a process of incremental adjustment, consistent with Streeck and Thelen's "institutional layering" explanation. The three principles of choice, guardianship and equality were constantly competing and the complete dominance of one over the other two is never complete, as Sanders (2010; 2014) recently reaffirmed. Competing

institutional *logics* and evolving government priorities were the crucial mechanisms in the process in which WFD was able to slowly erode the position of CDEP. By using institutional layering as a theoretical framework for explaining the changes to CDEP this thesis has clearly demonstrated the incremental process, which began as early as 1997, and led inexorably to the crumbling of the CDEP from 2007.

Although the events of 2007 seem dramatic and rapid, they were the culmination of a gradual process of policy redefinition that began in the 1990s. *Equality* was redefined in terms of equal access to mainstream services, *choice* was repurposed to mean the same choices available for all Australians, and *guardianship* was reinterpreted so that a government-knows-best attitude was allowed to prevail. Based on the evidence from parliamentary debates, the Howard Government's definitions of Sanders' guiding principles would not have been acceptable in the 1970s. The NTER and the abolition of CDEP marked the end of a revolutionary epoch in Indigenous affairs public policy, but it had been a long time in the making.

## References

- AAP 2007, 'Hockey panned over indigenous 'escape hatch'', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 February, viewed 24 September 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/hockey-panned-over-indigenous-escape-hatch/2007/02/17/1171405498521.html>
- Altman, J & Johnson, V 2000, *The CDEP in town and country Arnhem Land: Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 7 October 2014, [https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41428/2/2000\\_DP209.pdf](https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41428/2/2000_DP209.pdf)
- Altman, J & Jordan, K 2009, *The untimely abolition of the Community Development Employment Program*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 7 October 2014, <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2009T15.php>
- Altman, J 2001, *Sustainable Development Options on Aboriginal Land: The hybrid economy in the twenty-first century*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 12 September 2014, [http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/2001\\_DP226.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/2001_DP226.pdf)
- Altman, J, Linkhorn, C & Clarke, J 2005, *Land rights and development reform in remote Australia*, Oxfam Australia, Melbourne, viewed 9 August 2014, [http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/2005\\_DP276.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/2005_DP276.pdf)
- Altman, J 2007, 'Neo-paternalism and the destruction of CDEP', *Arena Magazine*, No. 90, August-September, pp. 33-35.
- Altman, J 2010, *Income Management and the Rights of Indigenous Australians to Equity*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 28 September 2014, viewed 7 September 2014, [http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/topical/Topical\\_Altman\\_Equity\\_0.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/topical/Topical_Altman_Equity_0.pdf)
- Altman, J & Gray, M 2005, *The Economic and Social Impacts of the CDEP scheme in Remote Australia*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 30 September 2014, [http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Altman/Journal/2005\\_AusJofSocialIssues.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Altman/Journal/2005_AusJofSocialIssues.pdf)
- Anderson, I 2007, 'Health Policy for a Crisis or a Crisis in Policy?' in J Altman & M Hinkson (eds.), *Coercive Reconciliation: Stabilise, Normalise, Exit Aboriginal Australia*, Arena, North Carlton.
- Australian Government 2013, *Reconciliation*, Australia.gov.au, last updated 9 August, viewed 8 September 2014, <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/reconciliation>
- Bacchi, C 2009, *Analysing policy: what's the problem represented to be?*, Pearson Education, Frenchs Forest.
- Bacchi, C 2012, 'Introducing the 'What's the Problem Represented to be?' approach', in A Bletsas & C Beasley (eds.), *Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic Interventions and Exchanges*, University of Adelaide Press, Adelaide.
- Baumgartner, F & Jones, B 1993, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Bennett S, 1999, *White Politics and Black Australians*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.

- Bessant, J 2000, 'Civil conscription or reciprocal obligation: the ethics of 'work-for-the-dole'', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 15-33.
- Bishop, J 2007a, 'Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Amendment (2007 Budget Measures) Bill 2007: Second Reading Speech', *House of Representatives Debates 23 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1-2.
- Bishop, J 2007b, 'Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Amendment (2007 Budget Measures) Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 29 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 74-77.
- Bovens, M & t'Hart, P 1996, *Understanding Policy Fiascoes*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick.
- Bradfield, S 2006, 'Separatism or Status Quo? Indigenous Affairs from the Birth of Land Rights to the Death of ATSIC', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 52, no. 1. pp. 80-97.
- Broome, R 2010, *Aboriginal Australians: A history since 1788*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
- Brough, M 2007, 'Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007 & The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007: Second Reading Speeches', *House of Representatives Debates 7 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1-17.
- Burgmann, V 2003, *Power, profit and protest: Australian social movements and globalisation*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
- Carson, E, Winefield, A, Waters, L & Kerr, L 2003, 'Work for the Dole: A Pathway to Self-esteem and Employment Commitment, or the Road to Frustration?', *Youth Studies Australia*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 19-26.
- Cavanagh, J 1977, 'Questions without notice: Discrimination Against Aborigines', *Senate Debates 6 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 1151.
- Chaney, F 1980, 'Questions without notice: Community Development Employment Project', *Senate Debates 12 September*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 900-901.
- Chaney, F 1982, 'Questions without notice: Aboriginal Self-Management', *Senate Debates 9 September*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 769-770.
- Chesterman, J 2005, *Civil Rights: How Indigenous Australians Won Formal Equality*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.
- Crossin, P 2007, 'Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007, The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate', *Senate Debates 13 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 91-96.
- Crossin, P 2007, 'Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Amendment (2007 Budget Measures) Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate' *Senate Debates 13 June*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 19-23
- Dawkins, P 2001, 'The Case for Welfare Reform as Proposed by the McClure Report', *The Australian Economic Review*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 86-99.

- Department of Employment 2014, *Work for the Dole*, Australian Government, last updated 14 May, viewed 3 October 2014, <https://employment.gov.au/work-dole>
- Dodson, P 2008, 'Reconciliation', in R Manne (ed.), *Dear Mr Rudd: Ideas for a better Australia*, Black Inc, Melbourne.
- Everingham, D 1978, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1978-79: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 28 September*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1563-1564.
- Falconer, P 1978, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1978-79: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 10 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1646-1647.
- Fischer, F 2003, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
- Freedon, M, 2003, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Gee, J 2004, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and method*, Routledge, New York and London.
- Gillard, J, Macklin, J & O'Connor, B 2008, *Increasing Indigenous Economic Opportunity: A Discussion Paper on the future of the CDEP and Indigenous Employment Programs*, Commonwealth of Australia, May, viewed 8 October 2014, <http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/increasing-indigenous-economic-opportunity.pdf>
- Grant, M, Wronski, I, Murray, R & Couzos, S 2008, 'Aboriginal Health and History', in S Couzos & R Murray (eds.), *Aboriginal Primary Health Care: An Evidence-Based Approach*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Guilfoyle, M 1977, 'Questions without notice: Discrimination Against Aborigines', *Senate Debates 6 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 1151.

- Gunstone, A 2008, 'Over a decade of despair: the Howard Government and Indigenous Affairs 1996-2007', *Australian Political Studies Association Conference*, University of Queensland, viewed 1 October 2014, <http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/apsa2008/Refereed-papers/Gunstone.pdf>
- Haase, B 2007, 'Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 7 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 80-83.
- Hall, P 1993, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 275-296.
- Henman, P 2004, 'Targeted!: Population Segmentation, Electronic Surveillance and Governing the Unemployed in Australia', *International Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 173-191.
- Heywood, A 2003, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Hockey, J 2007, 'Employment and Workplace Relations Portfolio: Main Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 12 June*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 163-164.
- Howlett, M & Cashore, B 2009, 'The Dependent Variable Problem in the Study of Policy Change: Understanding Policy Change as a Methodological Problem', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 33-46.
- Howlett, M, Ramesh, M & Perl, A 2009, 'Understanding Public Policy: Theoretical Approaches', in *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2001, *Social Justice Report 2001*, HREOC, Sydney, viewed 15 September 2014, [https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/social\\_justice/sj\\_report/sjreport01/sjreport.pdf](https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/social_justice/sj_report/sjreport01/sjreport.pdf)
- Hughes, H 2007, *Lands of Shame: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 'Homelands' in Transition*, Centre for Independent Studies, St Leonards.
- Hunter, B & Gray, M 2012, *Continuity and change in the CDEP Scheme*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 9 September 2014, [http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/WP/WP84\\_Hunter\\_&Gray\\_CDEP.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/WP/WP84_Hunter_&Gray_CDEP.pdf)
- Jordan, K & Mavec, D 2010 *Corporate Initiatives in Indigenous Employment: The Australian Employment Covenant Two Years On*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 3 October 2014, <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/WP/2010WP74.php>
- Jordan, K 2012, 'Closing the Employment Gap through Work for the Dole? Indigenous Employment and the CDEP Scheme', *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, no. 69, pp. 29-58.
- Kaplan, T 1993, 'Reading Policy Narratives: Beginnings, Middles, and Ends', in F. Fischer & J. Forester (eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, Duke University Press, Durham.
- Kuhn, T 1970, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
- Lejano, R 2006, *Frameworks for Policy Analysis: Merging Text and Context*, Routledge, New York.

- Mackean, T & Watson, M 2004 'Indigenous Sovereignty and Indigenous Health', *Indigenous Law Bulletin*, vol. 6, no. 7, pp. 19-20.
- Macklin, J 2007, 'Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Vocational Rehabilitation Services) Bill 2006: Second Reading Debate' *House of Representatives Debates 15 February*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 42-46.
- Macklin, J 2009, 'Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment (2008 Budget and Other Measures) Bill 2009: Second Reading Speech', *House of Representatives Debates 18 March*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 3026.
- Maddison, S 2011, *Beyond White Guilt: the Real Challenge for Black-White Relations in Australia*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
- McGauran, P 2007, 'Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Portfolio: Main Committee' *House of Representatives Debates 12 June*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 166.
- Muller, J, Goddard, R, Creed, P, Johnson, K & Waters, L 2006, 'Gender Differences in the Impact of the 'Work for the Dole' Program on Wellbeing and Latent Access to Benefits', *Australian Journal of Career Development*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 46-54.
- Nancarrow, H 2007, 'The Emergency Response to Family Violence in the Northern Territory: Where's the Evidence?', *Indigenous Law Bulletin*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 14-16.
- Plibersek, T 2007, 'Statements by Members: Community Development Employment Projects', *House of Representatives Debates 15 February*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 110.
- Pyne, C 2007, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2007-2008: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 29 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 181-185.
- Reference Group on Welfare Reform 2000, *Participation Support for a more Equitable Society: Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform*, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra, viewed 29 September 2014, [http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nphwb/20000806130000/http://www.facs.gov.au/wr\\_int\\_rep/toc.htm](http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nphwb/20000806130000/http://www.facs.gov.au/wr_int_rep/toc.htm)
- Reynolds, H 1996, *Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections of race, state and nation*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
- Robbins, J & Summers, J 2010, 'Indigenous affairs policy', in D Woodward, A Parkin & J Summers (eds.), *Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia*, Pearson Australia, Frenchs Forest.
- Rowse, T 2002, *Indigenous Futures: Choice and Development for Aboriginal and Islander Australia*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney.
- Rowse, T 2012, *Rethinking Social Justice: From 'Peoples' to 'Populations'*, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra.
- Ruddock, P 1977, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1977-78: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 11 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1865-1866.
- Ruddock, P 1978, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1978-79: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 28 September*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1564-1566.

Sanders, W 1993, *The rise and rise of the CDEP scheme: an Aboriginal 'workfare' program in times of persistent unemployment*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 25 September 2014,  
[http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/1993\\_DP54.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/1993_DP54.pdf)

Sanders, W 2007, 'CDEP under DEWR: Policy changes and the new contractualism', *Impact Magazine*, Autumn, pp. 6-7

Sanders, W 2008, 'In the name of failure: A generational revolution in Indigenous affairs' in C Aulich, & R Wettenhall (eds.), *Howard's Fourth Government: Australian Commonwealth Administration 2004-2007*, UNSW Press, Sydney.

Sanders, W 2010, 'Ideology, Evidence and Competing Principles in Australian Indigenous Affairs: From Brough to Rudd via Pearson and the NTER', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 307-331.

Sanders, W 2012, 'Coombs' Bastard Child: The Troubled Life of CDEP', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 371-391.

Sanders, W 2014, 'Experimental Governance in Indigenous Affairs: From Coombs to Pearson via Rowse and the Competing Principles', *CAEPR Seminar Series 2, 2014*, 13 August, Canberra, accessed 28 August 2014,  
[http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Seminars/presentations/CAEPR%20seminar\\_Sanders.mp3](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Seminars/presentations/CAEPR%20seminar_Sanders.mp3)

Scullion, N 2007, 'Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007: In Committee', *Senate Debates 16 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 199-204

Siewert, R 2007, 'Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007: In Committee', *Senate Debates 16 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 121-124.

Smith, D 1994, *'Working for CDEP': a case study of the Community Development Employment Projects scheme in Port Lincoln, South Australia*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra, viewed 28 August 2014,  
[http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/1994\\_DP75.pdf](http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/1994_DP75.pdf)

Smith, S 2007, 'Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Amendment (2007 Budget Measures) Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 29 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 60-65.

Snowdon, W 2007, 'Employment and Workplace Relations Portfolio & Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Portfolio: Main Committee' *House of Representatives Debates 12 June*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 163-166.

Snowdon, W 2007, 'Australian Technical Colleges (Flexibility in Achieving Australia's Skills Needs) Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2007: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 15 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 61-65.

Snowdon, W 2007, 'Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Vocational Rehabilitation Services) Bill 2006: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 15 February*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 60-64.

- Snowdon, W 2007, 'Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007: Second Reading Debate', *House of Representatives Debates 7 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 76-80.
- Stephens, U 2007, 'Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill: Second Reading Debate', *Senate Debates 8 August*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 56-59.
- Stone, D 1989, 'Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 104, no. 2, pp. 281-300.
- Streeck, W & Thelen, K 2005, 'Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', in W Streeck & K Thelen (eds.), *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Viner, I 1977, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1977-78: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 12 Oct*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1939-1942.
- Viner, I 1977, 'Aboriginal Employment: Ministerial Statement', *House of Representatives Debates 26 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1920-1924.
- Viner, I 1977, 'Questions without notice: Community Development Employment Projects Scheme', *House of Representatives Debates 31 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 2173.
- Vivian, A 2010, 'The NTER Redesign Consultation Process: Not very special', *Australian Indigenous Law Review*, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 46-70.
- Wallis, L 1977, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1977-78: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 12 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1937-1939.
- Warburton, J & Smith, J 2003, 'Out of the Generosity of Your Heart: Are We Creating Active Citizens through Compulsory Volunteer Programmes for Young People in Australia?', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 772-786.
- Whitlam, G 1977, 'Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 1977-78: In Committee', *House of Representatives Debates 11 October*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1863-1865.
- Whitlam, G 1977, 'Aboriginal Employment: reply to Ministerial Statement', *House of Representatives Debates 26 May*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1925-1927.
- Widdowson, HG 2007, *Discourse Analysis*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

