EPISTEMIC JUSTICE

Confronting implicit bias, explicit prejudice, and epistemology of oppression

Muhammad Mehdi
41688287

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Research
Philosophy Department, Faculty of Arts
Macquarie University, 2016

Table of Contents

Summary 3
Statement of Authorship 4

1. Introduction 5
2. Fricker's notion of testimonial (in)justice 10
3. Virtues rather than virtue of testimonial justice 15
4. Fricker's non-individualistic concerns 23
5. Explicit prejudice and the Grand Cyclops example 30
6. From implicit bias to explicitly held prejudice to epistemology of oppression 36
7. John Doris' collaborative account of agency 48
8. The virtue of condemning and reacting to vices 54
9. Group virtues and system-level virtues 58
10. Conclusion 68

Bibliography 69

Summary

This thesis attempts to further develop Fricker's notion of epistemic justice. Fricker defines epistemic justice, in the Aristotelian tradition, as a virtue of character. However, given that epistemic justice is also a corrective measure to the various forms of epistemic injustice, it seems as an inadequate corrective response in its current individualistic and virtue-theoretic form. Keeping the virtue-theoretic form of epistemic justice – though briefly alluding to its inadequacies as well, I explore various different social roles that can cultivate this virtue as a corrective to epistemic injustice. I do so by horizontally and vertically expanding the social landscape where epistemic injustice occurs. Horizontal expansion reveals that every instance of epistemic injustice includes three distinct social roles that consists of the perpetrator, the victim and possibly the audience or witnesses of the injustice. Certain epistemic justice virtues can be construed for each of these roles. Vertical expansion reveals three distinct layers in the social system where epistemic injustice can be located; namely the layer where individual agents perform, the layer where collectives are formed and operate, and the broader social system. A socially situated view of epistemic injustice allows imagining non-individualistic virtues, such as the virtues of groups and the virtues that exist in the social systems.

Statement of Authorship

I hereby certify that the following thesis is my own original work, and has not been submitted in full or in part for a higher degree to any other university or educational institution. All sources of information used in this thesis have been indicated, and full acknowledgement has been given to the work of others.

Muhammad Mehdi, 2016
41688287

Introduction

Miranda Fricker proposes the concept of epistemic injustice in her book *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)*[1] to capture two distinctively epistemic kinds of injustice that people experience. Fricker calls them testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice is when someone is silenced by having their words dismissed based on some negative identity prejudice that their audience hold against them. For example, a black man makes a knowledge claim but is not believed because his audience perceive blacks as not intelligent. Hermeneutical injustice is when that black man has a social experience that is of intimate significance for him, but he is unable to communicate it because he cannot articulate his experience into words, and thus is unable to talk about it (p1). Fricker does not locate the determining factors of injustice in what happens to the victims; she locates it in the attitude of the hearers. In other words, epistemic injustice is what the hearers inflict upon the speakers (pp60-66; pp61-68).

Fricker identifies the source of testimonial injustice in the negative stereotypes prevalent in society, which influence the negative judgments that hearers make about speakers' credibility. It is the responsibility of hearers to detect and neutralize these malicious influences on their thoughts; they can do so by developing the virtue of testimonial justice that consists of being critically self-aware of negative stereotypes affecting their minds (p86-97). She identifies the source of hermeneutical injustice in the structure of society. For example, unequal distribution of opportunities for participation in knowledge producing industries such as schools, universities, journalism etc. results in certain social groups not being able to produce some important

[1] I extensively draw on Fricker's thoughts, among other sources, and it is not limited to her book *Epistemic Injustice* (2007) only but also various other articles and book chapters that are duly acknowledged.

knowledge about and for themselves. Subsequently, when people from these disadvantaged groups try to communicate about those experiences of theirs but face difficulty to do so, they tend to get dismissed and judged not credible by privileged hearers. The injustice of hermeneutical injustice occurs when inarticulate speakers receive deficient credibility judgment. To prevent committing hermeneutical injustice hearers should keep in mind that inarticulate speakers do not necessarily lack credibility; perhaps they lack the necessary epistemic resources to appropriately explain themselves. The virtue of hermeneutical justice is being critically aware of speakers' socio-epistemic disadvantages as hearers and avoiding deficient credibility judgments towards inarticulate speakers (pp169-175).

Fricker conceives epistemic injustice to occur during communicative exchanges, and therefore concentrates on preventing them from occurring precisely in those communicative moments. Her strategy is likewise to equip hearers with preventive virtues that should enable them to be mindful of their own attitudes towards their speaking interlocutors in order not to commit epistemic injustice towards them.

Although I appreciate Fricker's description of hermeneutical injustice in terms of the background conditions of inequality, I believe her treatment of this phenomenon at the communicative or testimonial level renders it no different to her account of testimonial injustice. Therefore, my focus in this thesis is largely on testimonial injustice, and I will employ the notions of epistemic injustice and testimonial injustice interchangeably.

This thesis attempts to further develop Fricker's notion of epistemic justice. Fricker defines epistemic justice, in the Aristotelian tradition (Huang 2007), as a virtue of character. However, given that epistemic justice is also a corrective measure to the various forms of epistemic injustice, an individualistic virtue that is preventive in nature seems a very inadequate response.

My first suggestion is that epistemic justice measures should consist of various different virtues. These virtues should not only be preventive in function, i.e. tasked with preventing an injustice; rather they should also be reparative, i.e. notice an injustice after it has occurred and ameliorate it. Such an ameliorative measure is not necessarily limited to undoing the harm inflicted to the victim; it can extend to the whole community as an epistemic responsibility, as in a perpetrator educating the community about the conditions that lead to an instance of epistemic injustice so as to prevent it in future.

Next I turn to the impossibility of cultivating epistemic justice measures in cases where perpetrators refuse epistemic responsibility for their epistemic harms. Borrowing an example from relevant literature, I explain that this impossibility arises in cases where epistemic injustice occurs not by an individual alone but by an individual as a member of a collective body; but more importantly where it is based on explicitly held prejudice rather than implicit bias – that Fricker problematically bases her account of testimonial injustice upon. To deal with such cases, I suggest, we should go beyond individual level virtues and conceive of epistemic justice measures on the level of collectives. I further explore the tensions that Fricker's use of implicit bias creates for her account of epistemic injustice in the following section, and argue why it is important not only to include implicit bias but also explicitly held prejudices as a basis for epistemic injustice. However, expanding our understanding of epistemic injustice to include explicit prejudice creates further implications. Explicit prejudices tend to be expressed collectively and can develop into oppressive systems. Such oppressive systems have a distinctively epistemic nature and are therefore relevant for our account of epistemic justice. I maintain that epistemic justice measures can't counter oppressive epistemic systems purely through epistemic means. It might require being complemented with material means of fighting oppression.

In the next two sections I return to individualistic measures of epistemic justice but show how we can conceive of individual virtues such that they are not focused on perpetrators of epistemic injustice alone. Rather, viewing perpetrators in relation to their victims should allow us to imagine virtues that can enable the victims to respond to the injustice.

In the final section of this thesis I sketch a preliminary picture of how we can conceive of virtues as exhibited by groups and social systems within which groups operate. I maintain that group level virtues and the virtues exhibited in the broader social systems are intimately connected; this is something not very clear in the thought of Miranda Fricker and Elizabeth Anderson. I propose that by taking into account system-level virtues, the distinctive function of virtues on these two levels can be better delineated.

As a final point, this thesis is an attempt to highlight the social situatedness of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice in order to seek further appropriate responses that can be taken towards the injustice. My inspiration for doing so comes from my dissatisfaction with Fricker's exclusive focus on the perpetrators of epistemic injustice in proposing what can be done do counter and address the injustice. Therefore, the important question for me is what the victims or the witnesses of epistemic injustice can do, or should do? I discuss this question in the first four sections of this thesis. However, this question becomes more difficult to discuss when the source of the injustice is located not in individual agents, but rather in the social structures. Miranda Fricker and Elizabeth Anderson discuss the role of groups and institutions in relation to epistemic in/justice where injustice is rooted in social structures. I continue this line of debate, but also add that conceiving a layer above the layer of collective agents can help further the debate by opening up a space to think about the collaborative nature of group behaviour and the relevant characteristics and attitudes of groups that form social systems. This I hope can allow thinking about another point of intervention for the purposes of addressing epistemic injustice, besides the individual and group level interventions. It should however be noted that Kristie Dotson (2012 & 2014)

has proposed a layered approach to understanding epistemic injustice as well. Her approach identifies the nature of epistemic resources and the scope of change that is required in the epistemological landscape to address epistemic injustices. My concern in this thesis however is more about the agential and social location for taking action towards epistemic justice and cultivation of certain virtues helpful for that purpose.

Fricker's notion of testimonial (in)justice

According to Fricker testimonial injustice is giving a deficient credibility assessment to a speaker due to prejudice against their social identity. A now famous example she uses to illustrate her case is that of Tom Robinson's trial in Harper Lee's *To Kill a Mockingbird* (2007, p23). Robinson is a black man, who is on trial for the assault of a white woman. All the evidence shows that he is not guilty, but the jurors cannot believe his testimony on why he visited the victim. Robinson claims that he visited her because he felt sorry for her, but the jurors cannot believe that a black man could feel sorry for a white person. Therefore, they see him to be lying and judge him guilty.

Another central example that Fricker draws upon is the character of Marge Sherwood who suffers from testimonial injustice in Anthony Minghella's screenplay for *The Talented Mr Ripley* (p86). Marge's lover Dickie Greenleaf disappears in suspicious circumstances, and Marge suspects that he has been murdered. Dickie's father, Herbert Greenleaf, although desperate to find what has happened to his son, regards Marge as a poor source of knowledge. He not only assumes that Dickie would have kept hidden the sordid aspects of his character from his girlfriend but also finds Marge's suspicion as that of a hysterical and over-emotional woman, at one point telling her "Marge, there's female intuition, and then there are facts" (p14). Having her well-founded suspicion repeatedly dismissed and silenced, Marge eventually surrenders to the self-fulfilling power of the prejudice she is subjected to, and becomes hysterical and unable to control her emotions.

On studying Fricker's case for testimonial injustice two important questions need to be considered. How is testimonial injustice wrong, and how does it affect the speaker? And to what degree can a hearer be held responsible for

attributing deficient credibility, particularly if they were in no position to have corrected their prejudice?

Fricker makes the case for testimonial injustice in terms of the harm done to the speaker. The primary harm includes that of mistrusting a speaker's competence or sincerity as a giver of knowledge. This in effect amounts to undermining one's capacity for reasoning, as the capacity for imparting knowledge is a significant aspect of the capacity for reasoning. There are also secondary harms that she identifies as practical and epistemic in nature. Practical harms include loss of life as in the case of Tom Robinson, or the loss of mental health and well being as in the case of Marge Sherwood. Epistemic harms can be the loss of epistemic self-confidence and self-trust. Epistemic self-confidence is an essential condition of knowledge, it is the trust we have in our intellectual ability in the absence of which our sense of certainty about our beliefs can diminish. Fricker rightly associates the loss of epistemic self-confidence with mal-development of intellectual courage, which is "the virtue of not backing down in one's convictions too quickly in response to challenge" (p49).

Next is the issue of responsibility on the part of the hearer. For Fricker, the question is how far and in what manner a hearer is responsible for the inadvertent operation of prejudice in his/her thinking? Distinguishing between culpable responsibility and non-culpable responsibility, Fricker holds the jury in Robinson's trial as culpably responsible for failing to believe Robinson's testimony. Her reason for holding the jury as culpably responsible, although perhaps also controversial, is that the jury failed to meet the demands of their duty.[2] Which was that, being part of the jury in a court of law they were under an obligation and had a duty to examine the evidence put before them in an unprejudiced manner. In other words, they had a duty to detect and neutralize the socially prevalent prejudice against

[2] As I will discuss later, the manner in which the perpetrator is held responsible has consequences for how they are expected to respond to the injustice they commit.

Robinson's social identity, since they failed to do so they are culpably responsible (pp89-91).

On the other hand, Fricker holds Herbert Greenleaf as non-culpably responsible for inflicting testimonial injustice to Marge Sherwood. Although Herbert is responsible for the harm he inflicts, he is non-culpably so; because he was in a sexist culture and it would have required him to make unusually heroic efforts to detect the prejudice influencing his thinking and behaviour and to prevent himself from inflicting testimonial injustice to Marge (pp33-34). She further distinguishes between two kinds of non-culpable responsibility depending on whether the culpability is attributable to one's personal failure or to the structural and environmental conditions. An example of a non-culpable responsibility due to personal failure would be the following one. A moral philosopher, with specialty in say fictionalism, enters into a dialogue with someone whom she mistakenly believes to be a non-specialist in a similarly relevant area of moral philosophy. During the conversation, to her surprise, the interlocutor expresses a forthright critical view of fictionalism, to which she affords lower credibility owing to her belief that the interlocutor is a non-specialist in the subject matter or any relevant area. However, unbeknownst to her the interlocutor is a specialist in moral philosophy, but due to her mistaken belief she has attributed him a deflated level of credibility. This would be a non-culpable case of epistemic injustice, because the hearer inflicts harm due to an innocent epistemic error. Although there is an epistemic error on the part of the hearer, the hearer does not commit a moral error; Fricker says that, for a harm to count as testimonial injustice it is necessary that the hearer can be held both epistemically and ethically responsible. In the above example although the hearer is epistemically culpable she is not ethically culpable. Therefore, there is no culpable responsibility for the testimonial injustice (p22).

We might ask how do cases of testimonial injustice due to culpable responsibility look like? When can subjects who commit testimonial injustice be held as culpably responsible? Considering attribution of credibility deficit

due to social identity prejudice as the central case of testimonial injustice Fricker notes judgements "(typically) culpably resistant to the evidence and thus irrational" (p34) as cases of culpable responsibility. These are cases where a prejudice is actively maintained despite countervailing evidence. In the case of Tom Robinson, his lawyer Atticus Finch puts enough countervailing evidence before the jury to believe Robinson's testimony on his innocence. Despite all the evidence his testimony was not believed. Fricker takes this to be a case of testimonial injustice involving culpable responsibility due to active resistance to counter-evidence by the jury in maintaining their racial prejudice. What can cause active resistance to counter-evidence can be what Fricker calls 'ethically bad affective investments' that comes in various forms such as racial hatred, misogyny, or heterosexism etc. (p35)

Having outlined Fricker's account of testimonial injustice, let us review her notion of the virtue of testimonial justice that she proposes as a remedy for testimonial injustice. The virtue of testimonial justice is concerned with agents preventing themselves from committing testimonial injustice; they are able to do so because the virtue enables them to detect and neutralize their negative identity prejudices that they might have against their interlocutors.

Fricker characterizes testimonial injustice as a credibility deficit; her remedial account is likewise concerned with the reversal and correction of this deficit. As a result, her proposal is that hearers should correct for the effects of the prejudice negatively influencing their credibility assessments by inflating their assessments. The hope is that this will compensate for or defuse the effects of the prejudice operative on the hearer's judgment. But how might a hearer be able to do so? Fricker thinks that a virtuous hearer should develop "reflexive critical social awareness" (p91), which is a sensibility operative in testimonial exchanges that involves acknowledging and developing awareness that our social identities in relation to our interlocutors impact our credibility assessments. This awareness is supposed

to give a self-critical edge to our credibility attributions. Where due to some existing prejudices we as hearers would have given a speaker deflated credibility judgment, our ability for reflexive critical social awareness could stop us from making such a deflated assessment, and could possibly lead us to seek counter evidence for our unreflective judgments.

Fricker holds that we need to train our epistemic sensibilities to develop the ability for critical openness. Normally we make our judgments based on the available heuristics, but these heuristics are likely to be loaded with negative identity prejudices that can distort our credibility assessments of speakers and their claims. That's why we should train our testimonial sensibilities to detect prejudicial stereotypes, for example, by acquiring more intimate knowledge about the various social groups against whom identity prejudices exist, or by self-reflectively learning about our negative identity prejudices against people from such groups and inflating those judgments (p96).

In the next section I will turn to critically examining Fricker's approach to addressing epistemic injustice.

Virtues rather than virtue of testimonial justice

In this section I show that Fricker's account of the virtue of testimonial justice as a single virtue is inadequate to address the problem of testimonial injustice. Although Fricker posits testimonial justice as a corrective virtue to prevent and counter testimonial injustice from occurring, this approach fails to redress the problem of testimonial injustice if we try to apply the virtue of testimonial justice as a reparative measure in cases where testimonial justice has already occurred. Distinguishing between preventive and reparative measures required to address the problem of testimonial injustice, I will conclude by emphasizing that we need more than a single individualistic virtue of testimonial justice to correct for our own implicit biases.

Recall the case of Marge Sherwood and Herbert Greenleaf. Fricker claims that it is not reasonable to expect Herbert to have been able to correct his habits as a hearer. This is due to the fact that Herbert's habits as a hearer were saturated with the sexist constructions of gender prevalent during his time, such as female intuitiveness being an obstacle to rational judgment, and women's susceptibility to hysterics etc. It is difficult to see how he could have resisted the sexism that was prevalent during his time. Therefore, although Herbert Greenleaf is at fault for inflicting testimonial injustice he is not culpable for it (Fricker 2007, pp89-91).

But if he recognizes and acknowledges his fault, according to Fricker's thesis of the virtue of epistemic justice, there are certain things that Herbert can do to mitigate or ameliorate the harms of the epistemic injustice that he inflicted upon Marge. He can apologize to her and reverse his judgement about her assertions. He will also have the obligation to try to raise awareness about the kind of epistemic injustice that his sexist society is so prone to inflicting against women. But we can very reasonably worry that Herbert may take all these actions only once he recognizes the wrong that he has committed. We

can also imagine reasons that a typical person with a socially privileged position as that of Herbert does not easily yield to pressures that challenge his sense of self-righteousness. So unless he recognizes his action and behaviour as being wrong, which is not very likely, there is no possibility that he would take any corrective measures. Therefore, the more important question is not what someone like Herbert may do in terms of correcting for an epistemic injustice but how might he arrive at the recognition that what he has done is a wrong that he should be sorry for.

Fricker's answer for this problem is that people should try to cultivate the virtue of being critically self-aware about the negative identity prejudices that may be influencing their thoughts and actions via introspective means and also by learning from other sources of knowledge. Once they detect any such biases, they should then neutralize them using whatever knowledge or psychological techniques they find effective. How might this advice work in the case of Herbert? How might he acquire the virtue of testimonial justice?

With a degree of arbitrariness, this is how I assume Herbert may acquire the virtue of testimonial justice. I think we can still imagine the possibility of him becoming a virtuous hearer despite inflicting testimonial injustice to Marge, or perhaps precisely due to this incident. Although we think that he failed to detect the effects of implicit bias during his interactions with Marge, he may be able to detect this afterwards. He may experience a dissonance between his beliefs about Marge's suspicion, and this could be a reason for him to doubt his rejection of her suspicion as unreasonable. A lot of the times we learn about our mistakes after we have already committed them. So if through some turn of events he learns that Marge's suspicion was right and he was wrong, he would then have a serious reason to believe that he has been prejudiced towards her. Suppose this happens and that instead of arrogantly ignoring this new piece of moral knowledge he humbly takes it upon himself to acknowledge that his attitude towards Marge was unfair. Further, let us also assume that he not only gathers the moral courage to apologize to Marge but that he also decides to be intellectually courageous

and tries to diagnose and better understand the cause of what made him inflict epistemic injustice upon Marge. Through subsequent introspection or some other sources of knowledge he learns that he behaved the way he did due to implicit bias or sexism that has been influencing his thinking and judgments. Following this revelation he decides to make efforts to correct the influences of the implicit bias on his intellectual behaviour. So he starts making efforts to increase his knowledge about the negative stereotypes prevalent in his social world and how they affect people's intellectual behaviour. With increased knowledge and sensitivity towards implicit bias he is now more likely to be able to mitigate the effects of prejudice on his thinking and actions, and so he is more likely to succeed in being a virtuous hearer.

I agree that there are a lot of assumptions in imagining Herbert acquiring the virtue of testimonial justice, but I think it can still be a useful exercise for uncovering those assumptions. First and foremost is the idea that although Herbert's case shows clearly how testimonial injustice looks like, it also shows that it is not so easy construing an account of epistemic justice by thinking about how might Herbert not have done what he did. As I show there are too many assumptions and possibilities that we have to take for granted in order to imagine Herbert cultivating the virtue epistemic justice. Besides, Fricker claims that Herbert's act of epistemic injustice was non-culpable, which means that Herbert could not have prevented himself from inflicting epistemic injustice. The non-culpable nature of Herbert's epistemic insult implicates how we can imagine Herbert becoming a virtuous agent. It restricts us to think that Herbert could only become a more virtuous hearer after the incident and because of the incident. If it was not possible for him to prevent himself from committing a wrong, then instead of preventive virtues we need a set of reparative virtues that encourage agents to set right some inevitable wrongs that are committed. In other words, we also need to think about epistemic justice in terms of reparative measures that should be available in non-culpable cases such as that of Herbert, who has done a

wrong and now needs to be encouraged to take those measures to compensate for it and also try to prevent it from future occurrences.

We might think that if one is willing and truly wants to prevent oneself from committing testimonial injustice, one would also repair and compensate for a testimonial injustice that one commits. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish between preventive and reparative aspects of the virtue of testimonial justice. The point I want to make is that in non-culpable cases of testimonial injustice such as that of Herbert and Marge, it is not so much about the prevention of a wrong since the wrong has already occurred. Rather, it is more about repairing the wrong that has been inflicted, and preventing the future wrongs of similar kind. The significance of this point is that repairing an epistemic wrong, particularly if it is judged to have occurred non-culpably, requires much more than the virtue of testimonial justice to correct for implicit bias.

Highlighting the preventive and the reparative dimensions of epistemic justice as distinct from each other allows us to see not only the various different virtues and measures required in order to counter epistemic injustice, but also their interactive and inter-dependent nature. In her book *Epistemic Injustice* (2007) Fricker calls the virtue of epistemic justice a corrective virtue that is supposed to operate at the individual level of self-reflection. In the case of testimonial justice this virtue allows the agent to "neutralize(s) the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgments" (p92).[3] These corrective virtues are supposed to prevent one from committing epistemic injustice. However, in the non-culpable cases of epistemic injustice, such as that of Herbert where the injustice could not have been prevented, the reparative sense of epistemic justice is much more salient – rather should be made more salient. The preventive sense of bringing about epistemic

[3] And in the case of hermeneutical justice it is supposed to "neutralize the impact of structural identity prejudice on one's credibility judgment" (pp173-170)

justice crucially depends on whether Herbert acknowledges the injustice and takes responsibility for it or not.

To proceed with Herbert's example I want to suggest that it is not wise to assume that perpetrators of epistemic injustice are prone to responding virtuously to their reparative epistemic obligations[4]. That would be assuming that in his heart Herbert really wants to be a virtuous person and a virtuous hearer, and that he also has the courage to challenge his self-image and doubt his self-knowledge. This is a problematic assumption, given that we have reasons to believe that the responses we are generally prone to give when our self-image is threatened is to defend ourselves self-righteously; and that doing the right thing is rather an exception than a norm. Empirical evidence (See for example Stewart 2005, Nadav & Nicholas 2016, and Keczer et al 2016) shows that we do not behave virtuously by default; and that is sufficient reason to doubt that we will voluntarily choose to accept the obligations accruing from our wrongs and also that we will be self-critical in order to be aware of our prejudices. Even if one does recognize the harm of epistemic injustice that one has inflicted and is also clean of any socially bad affective investments, one may still avoid responding to that recognition for various reasons, for example due to cowardice or arrogance.

Therefore, assuming that someone like Herbert would correct for his epistemic injustice were he only critically self-aware of his prejudices fails to consider that other character or intellectual flaws might have still prevented him from responding in an epistemically just manner. For example, what Alessandra Tanesini (2016) calls intellectual arrogance, could have as much contributed not only to hurting Marge at the first place but also to Herbert's

[4] My criticism of Fricker's assumption regarding one's failure to recognize one's own epistemic injustice mainly derives from an ethically critical and skeptical view of individual characters in redressing a moral wrong. However, similar criticisms can be found in Pohlhaus 2012; Mason 2011; and Medina 2012, who's criticisms are directed mainly towards Fricker's claim in relation to the source of hermeneutical injustice – the source being a gap in collective hermeneutical resources preventing certain intimate social experiences of socially marginalized peoples from being articulated into propositional knowledge understood by themselves and by others. Thanks to Kristie Dotson for raising this point.

avoidance of taking reparative epistemic obligations. According to Tanesini intellectual arrogance fosters "the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents… (it) produces ignorance by silencing others… and by fostering self-delusion in the arrogant themselves" (p71). Moreover, the vice of epistemic arrogance, or what Kate Moran (2014) calls self-conceit, is able to not only hurt others but also sustain a self-delusional belief that one's wrongful ethico-epistemic attitude is in fact a virtue. In other words, it can curtail one's virtuous sensitivity to the influences of negative identity prejudices in one's environment. As Moran says:

> "the tendency to reconstruct evidence and rationalize so that one may be convinced of one's own virtue. While the conceited agent may ultimately impose her judgement upon others, she does so in order to preserve her delusion of virtue" (p419).

Acknowledging the ubiquity and prevalence of the many causes for attribution of unfair epistemic credibility, and avoidance of taking epistemic responsibility, demands that we avoid relying upon cultivation of one single virtue in a perpetrator to try to bring about epistemic justice. We need to be more sensitive to the various ways that bringing about justice could fail. Fricker herself espouses this approach, she says:

> When thinking about the intersections of epistemology, ethics, and political life, it is often revealing to start with the negative, with how ideals tend to fail; and it is a good idea to be explicit about this failure-first methodological approach. (Fricker 2015, p73)

I take the failure-first methodological approach to also be a sceptical position towards the nature of our moral behaviour when we are thinking about the question of how might people behave morally and epistemically better. Such a position would dictate, at the minimum, that we shouldn't assume that we are prone to behaving virtuously by default and automatically on our own. In order to perform a virtuous action or behaviour we generally require being prompted either by ourselves, by others or by cues in our environments;

such as the threat of feeling uncomfortable on refusing others' reasonable requests that encourages us to assist them (Flynn & Lake, 2008).

Besides, we know from intuition and from empirical evidence (Spiekermann 2016) that when facing costly normative demands we tend to strategically and systemically avoid such demands by unconsciously manipulating relevant information. Empirical evidence also shows us that when we find ourselves involved in mishaps, such as motor vehicle crashes (Stewart, 2005; Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny, 2008) we generally tend to avoid attributing responsibility to ourselves. That's why I believe it would be naïve to rely on agents' own – to borrow from Mcnamara (2011) – 'first-personal practical uptake' of their faults where there is reason to believe that this will not yield a reliable enforcing mechanism for bringing about epistemic justice.

The implication of accepting the idea that we are not generally prone to responding virtuously to our own acts of epistemic injustice is that we cannot rely only on advocating the single virtue of critical self-reflection in addressing epistemic injustices. It would be necessary then to construe an account of epistemic justice that allows seeking and bringing about epistemic justice regardless of whether or not an agent possesses the virtue of critical self-reflection. We can begin by asking what could be done to redress the injustice where cultivation of critical self-awareness is not an option? What forces could encourage or compel a perpetrator or the audience witnessing the injustice, or help the victim of the injustice to repair the wrong and bring about justice? I argue that we need to consider other possibilities and mechanisms that can encourage perpetrators to accept responsibility where they hesitate or refuse to take responsibility. As a result, I suggest that we should use the notion of epistemic justice as an umbrella term that includes a variety of virtues and practices, the virtue of cultivating critical self-awareness and other-awareness – as in testimonial justice – being only one of them.[5]

[5] This is also a question that Benjamin Sherman (2016) explores in relation to Fricker's notion of epistemic justice, and which I will discuss in detail further below.

Fricker uses the notion of testimonial or epistemic justice as a corrective virtue, in line with Aristotle's idea of justice as a virtue (see for example Williams 1980, Huang 2007). This corrective virtue is supposed to prevent a virtuous individual from committing epistemic injustice. However, considering that epistemic justice should also include reparative and restorative measures, we need to include virtues relevant for these other aspects of the problem as well. This is important because in redressing an epistemic injustice we not only need preventive measures that can impede future and other epistemic injustices of the same kind, but also reparative measures to mitigate or ameliorate the situation at hand. This need to add to the repertoire of the virtues of epistemic justice is particularly important in cases where a perpetrator actively resists any anti-prejudicial influences, and where encouraging him to self-reflectively see the wrong of his prejudicial attitude might only reaffirm his belief and commitment towards the prejudice.

In what follows I will further study Fricker's thoughts on how might we conceive of other virtues and add them to our repertoire of the virtues of epistemic justice. I believe that Fricker's own thoughts provide for this possibility, but they need to be highlighted so they can be further developed.

However, unlike Sherman who thinks that we should abandon the notion of the virtue of epistemic justice and instead pursue 'a wide variety of moral and epistemic virtues' (p246), I think we should retain the notion of epistemic justice as an umbrella term incorporating a wide variety of virtues. Because this notion can guide our research for articulating an ethico-epistemic ideal of fair and just epistemic practices that we should strive for at various levels in our social lives, be it at the individual, collective, or institutional level.

Fricker's non-individualistic concerns

In the preceding section I tried to show that the virtue of testimonial justice as posited by Fricker is overly reliant upon individuals themselves to correct for their own prejudices. It not only relies on individuals to detect and neutralize their own prejudices, but also where individuals have committed testimonial injustice, it fails to factor in the possibility that reasons other than ignorance of one's own implicit bias can prevent one from taking responsibility for testimonial injustice and for repairing the wrong one has inflicted. A remedy for this problem could be to construe non-individualistic virtues. However, for now I return to Fricker to show that there are non-individualistic aspects of her thought that gestures at how this issue can be taken further.

As already discussed, Fricker sees a virtuous hearer as one who is critically on the lookout for cues that may distort the credibility assessment he is giving to his interlocutor. She suggests that one may be 'reflectively aware at the time that prejudice is shaping one's perception of an interlocutor' (Fricker 2007, p97), and so one may be able to try to prevent committing testimonial injustice or correct it afterwards. This suggestion seems questionable, and critics such as Alcoff (2010) raise doubt whether doing so is possible. Because stereotypes and prejudices operate on a non-conscious level and are effectively outside our volitional control. We do not have a univocal empirical support for the argument that we can consciously monitor or control our prejudices (Munroe 2016). However, in response to Alcoff, Fricker says:

> It is entirely possible that the lesson of critical reflection in some range of cases might be that one would do better to stop reflecting on one's likely prejudices and instead go in for some sort of unreflective psychological work-out involving anti-prejudicial priming

> techniques…We should do whatever works, within the bounds of practicality. (2010, pp165–166)

Fricker seems to suggest that countering prejudice is not merely a matter of bringing an unreflective activity of mind such as implicit bias into the grasp of our conscious reflection. She concedes that trying to do so may not work. Therefore, we should seek anything practically possible as a psychological self-management technique that can help with anti-prejudicial priming to prevent testimonial injustice from occurring. The virtue of testimonial justice does not necessarily resolve the problem of being prejudiced; rather it is primarily concerned with detecting and neutralizing the influence of negative identity-prejudice in our credibility assessments. If that can be done through some unreflective psychological technique, a virtuous hearer should adopt that technique.

It might seem that, according to Fricker, the problem of epistemic injustice due to negative identity prejudice can only be resolved at the level of individual agents through their own self-reflective and self-development techniques. Nonetheless, we can also find in Fricker the idea that cultivating the virtue of epistemic justice is not solely a matter of self-development, rather a responsible epistemic agent also tries to improve his/her epistemic environment. Despite the predominantly individualistic account of the virtue of epistemic justice that we get in *Epistemic Injustice* (2007), in a later writing Fricker (2016) implies the influence of an epistemic agent's community in shaping and recalibrating epistemic behaviour by holding oneself responsible for being ignorant of implicit bias. This idea however needs further development, and in what follows I will suggest how we can do that.

Fricker (2016) discusses this matter in a recent paper by outlining an account of *no-fault responsibility for implicit prejudice*, and talks about the appropriate epistemic behaviour epistemic agents should express upon recognizing the influence of implicit bias on their intellectual behaviour. An agent, who realizes that they have committed an epistemic injustice, should

recognize their immediate and non-immediate responsibilities and obligations. She says that a virtuous epistemic agent, upon realizing that they have given an unfair credibility assessment, should experience epistemic agent-regret, which is "a feeling of guilt for harm done, though clearly not of a kind entailing culpability" (forthcoming). An agent experiencing epistemic agent-regret then accrues certain immediate obligations that relates to making amendments for the harm that the agent has caused. These amendments may be corrective in nature, such as the initial assessment being withdrawn if possible. But more importantly, the agent is also subject to certain non-immediate obligations that may not be strictly corrective in nature but are nevertheless as important. These obligations extend to more general aspects of the case, such as raising greater awareness about the issue and its causes so that it can be prevented in similar instances in future; in other words, making efforts to improve the epistemic environment that allowed for the epistemic injustice to occur through one's own actions. These efforts may constitute:

> "the taking of steps to minimise the influence of prejudice in similar processes — perhaps institutional measures such as the removal of names at the top of writing samples for long-listing purposes in appointment processes" (forthcoming).

Fricker uses Bernard Williams' idea of 'agent-regret' to articulate the notion of 'epistemic agent-regret' as a space primarily for a first-personal reflexive attitude, where the agent as perpetrator reflects on what attitudes of his lead to the injustice and thereby feels remorse and expresses regret. But it is also an attitude that allows others to take the agent expressing the attitude accountable to his own standards. An agent expressing epistemic agent-regret not only feels guilt for the harms he has non-culpably done, but also by expressing that he is going through this first-personal reflexive experience of regret he opens himself for others to hold him accountable through and in virtue of the agent expressing *epistemic agent-regret*. By being held accountable the agent is in a way made to feel obliged to share the lessons he has learnt from his experience, and if he has not learnt any lessons then this

is the moment he should try to learn by reflecting on what went wrong. She says:

> Carving out the space for this emotion allows us to do two things. First, it enables us to represent her as *non-culpable and yet responsible* for her prejudiced thinking. Second, it also allows us to see specific *epistemic obligations* as applying to her, through responding to which she may better 'own' what she has done and put some reasonable effort into putting things right (forthcoming).

The significance of what Fricker does is to carve out a space of responsibility where an individual accrues certain obligations towards his community as a whole, just by feeling and expressing 'epistemic agent-regret'. These obligations are accrued regardless of whether or not one is culpable. In fact, we might think that anyone who falls within this space of responsibility incurs certain obligations. We know from experience that a lot of the times even when we are not directly involved in an incident we may feel regret just by being a witness. So even perhaps an onlooker who is not directly involved in the epistemic injustice, but who has seen what causal chain has lead to an epistemic injustice, and who by virtue of acquiring this insight, incurs a responsibility to pass it on to the relevant community so that certain preventive measures may be put in place.

The idea is that this way of holding an agent responsible allows for obliging the agent to take some appropriate compensatory measures if possible, and also for those who fall within the zone of responsibility to take some collective efforts to minimize the potential for similar cases of injustice in future. As Fricker acknowledges, an individual's power to ameliorate situations is limited and broader social and institutional changes require collective efforts (forthcoming). Nonetheless, for any changes and for any collective efforts there should be individuals pushing for change by raising awareness towards certain collective obligations and by creating agitations. Holding each other responsible for our mistakes is one formidable tool for

pushing for some collective efforts that we as individuals can use within our communities.

So although we find in Fricker an emphasis on individual epistemic capacities to monitor and prevent ourselves from giving deficient credibility assessments, we can also see how she tries to expand this individualistic view by situating the individual within its social relations and by suggesting how those relations might influence individuals to seek personal and collective change in their environment. Nonetheless, Fricker remains mainly concerned with how the actions of virtuous epistemic agents who recognize and act on their obligations can generate collective actions to improve their faulty epistemic environment. Her argument rests upon the idea that individuals who feel and express epistemic agent-regret open themselves up to be held accountable by their community members for an ameliorative epistemic obligation that they themselves confess to have accrued. They accrue such an obligation because of their own acknowledgement of being non-culpably responsible for an epistemic injustice. Thus, an individual with a no-fault epistemic responsibility for an instance of epistemic injustice owes his community the epistemic obligation of raising awareness and making efforts to prevent future potential injustices of similar kind; though of course this is besides his obligations to the victim to make whatever amendments are possible. As such we do find in Fricker the idea that being a virtuous agent is not all about one's own efforts to cultivate virtuous character traits, rather in virtue of belonging to a community one's epistemic responsibilities can be invoked and one should be open to any such calls from his or her community. That is to say, that when those responsibilities accrue, a virtuous agent should recognize them and respond to them accordingly.

However, as already discussed, in situations where individuals commit epistemic injustice intentionally and culpably due to explicitly held prejudice, Fricker's account of epistemic justice fails to help. Since in such situations a person's action is not due to ignorance or implicit bias, he cannot be expected to express remorse for what he has done. Thereby the possibility of any

epistemically just measure arising from his 'first-personal practical uptake' of his wrong is already foreclosed. Even though others might see such an agent responsible for the instance of epistemic injustice, there can be no hope of any ameliorative measures because the agent himself would not accept any ameliorative obligations. According to Fricker's perpetrator-centred view of epistemic justice, the uptake of ameliorative measures depend upon the perpetrator accepting responsibility for his epistemic harm and accepting the ensuing ameliorative obligations. If the individual fails to or does not wish to accept these responsibilities, there seems to be no hope for epistemic justice.

My understanding of this impasse in bringing about epistemic justice is because Fricker's theory revolves around a central presupposition that epistemic injustice is primarily a case of individual bad luck; a position argued by Kristie Dotson 2012[6]. That is why it fails to effectively take into account those instances of epistemic injustice that may not be recognized or acknowledged by its perpetrators or that happen culpably and out of wickedness. That is why it also fails to articulate measures of epistemic justice for the purposes of amendment or amelioration of such cases. As I will explain later, what should motivate us to take corrective measures against epistemic injustice, regardless of whether or not we are the perpetrator, should be reasons that have a degree of enforceability from outside our own agency. We should not merely rely on personal virtues of individuals in order to bring about epistemic justice. Not all our good deeds are a result of our good characters; oftentimes we behave in an epistemically just manner due to expectations that others – our peers & community members – have of us. This interdependent aspect of our virtuous actions and behaviours can inform conceiving an account of epistemic justice that can remain useful even when the perpetrating agent fails to take responsibility for his or her actions.

In this section I discussed Fricker's notion of epistemic agent-regret that she proposes to be the appropriate response to one's no-fault responsibility for

[6] Thanks to Kristie Dotson for referring me to her 2012 article where she makes a rigorous argument for this position.

implicit bias. But I maintained that although expressing epistemic agent-regret allows for agents to take non-culpable responsibility, and subsequently obliges one to one's peers and one's community to take appropriate corrective and ameliorative measures; the real issue of how might an agent arrive at recognizing, acknowledging and taking epistemic responsibility for his or her epistemic harm still remains. We cannot resolve this issue through an individualistic approach, i.e. encouraging individuals to cultivate virtues to enable themselves to take epistemic responsibility for their own wrongs, particularly if there are strong countervailing reasons for them not to do so.

In the following section I will elaborate on this problem using an example from Benjamin Sherman (2016) to show that besides individual vices that can prevent one from taking responsibility for one's wrong, there could also be other more systematic barriers.

Explicit prejudice and the Grand Cyclops example

Let's consider this example used by Benjamin Sherman (2016) about the Grand Cyclops of the Ku Klux Klan. Sherman asks us to imagine the Grand Cyclops as someone who tries to practice testimonial justice, and tries to neutralize his habits of hearing that can cause him to give deficient credibility assessments to his interlocutors and speakers. But his effort to be testimonially just does not extend beyond the members of his own clan or group and it definitely does not include those he hates. When he thinks about whether his judgment of groups such as Blacks, immigrants, queer people etc. are fair, he only comes to reaffirm his already formed judgments and attitudes that he has towards them. According to Sherman, such a person upon self-reflection may even find his attitude towards stereotyped groups as being testimonially just and unproblematic:

When the GC considers his stereotypical views, and asks himself whether they are just, he compares his idea of testimonial justice to his reactions to those he stereotypes, and finds a good fit. The result is that, when he reflects on it, he sees his prejudicial reactions as instances of testimonial justice; he reaffirms them, and is proud of them (p238).

The Grand Cyclops (GC) presents a case that does not involve non-culpable responsibility for testimonial injustice, because there is an active exercise of resistance to counter-evidence. What we would call a wrong and deem as blameworthy in testimonial injustice – i.e. the prejudicial assignment of deficient credibility to a knower or speaker – the GC considers it as praiseworthy and fair when practiced against black people or homosexuals for example. The GC case constitutes perpetration of testimonial injustice every time the GC interacts with the stereotyped groups, but it is not based on implicit bias, rather the bias is explicitly socially held. The GC and other members of his group hold an explicit commitment to an ideology and a belief system that is inherently prejudicial.

The issue then is how do we characterize the epistemic or testimonial injustice perpetrated in the GC case? It should obviously be a culpable one since there is active resistance to counter-evidence and an ethically bad affective investment in a racist ideology. A more important question however is whether the virtue of testimonial justice as proposed by Fricker can be useful in redressing this epistemic injustice?

As the GC's prejudiced attitude is not due to ignorance or mistaken belief, rather due to his ideological commitments, it is unreasonable to think that he could genuinely cultivate the virtue of testimonial justice on his own. Unless of course he recognizes and acknowledges it as wrong, and takes responsibility for his unfair prejudicial attitude. Therefore, it would be misguided to imagine the GC regretting or having remorse over his attitude towards stereotyped groups, because he thinks his attitude towards them is reasonable and the credence he lends them is appropriate and fair.

Let's compare the GC case with the two central cases that Fricker uses to illustrate her accounts of testimonial injustice and testimonial justice. Fricker analyzes the two cases of Marge vs. Herbert and Robinson's jury as based on implicit bias. Holding implicit bias involves being ignorant of the prejudicial inclinations influencing one's intellectual behavior. Characterizing a case of epistemic injustice as perpetrated due to implicit bias effectively reduces it to a personal problem of self-ignorance. Fricker's efforts in construing her account of the virtue of epistemic justice have likewise been to counter a problem of self-ignorance. I can agree with her proposition that cultivation of critical self-awareness towards one's own social position and privilege and others' social identity, and the stereotypes held against them, allows one to be an epistemically virtuous listener or agent. However, the cultivation of this virtue itself seems impossible in cases such as the GC's where the affective investment of community members in their socio-cultural environment is so strong that to try to cultivate any virtues that might denounce the ruling ideology is equal to reneging on one's community.

What I want to show with the GC example is that the epistemic injustice perpetrated here is not due to self-ignorance; rather it is an actively and consciously constructed self-knowledge based on prejudice that is collectively sustained. In fact I am tempted to add that to characterize the GC, and his community, as suffering from self-ignorance would be a condescending judgment, it would be denying them their moral agency.

If we consider the GC as a case of explicitly held bias rooted in ideological commitments it helps settle the problem of agents not accepting responsibility for the wrong they inflict. We can conclude that the possibility of recognizing or accepting deficient credibility judgments as testimonial injustice due to prejudice is not available to agents who explicitly hold such prejudices. While on the one hand this reveals a problematic assumption in Fricker's theory of epistemic injustice; namely that cultivation of the virtue of testimonial justice is possible for all perpetrators of epistemic injustice. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, accepting the idea that cultivation of the Frickerean virtue of testimonial justice is not possible in certain cases of testimonial injustice allows us to seek other mechanisms and measures – virtue-theoretic or otherwise – for addressing the problem of testimonial injustice. These could be construing virtues that encourage other individuals and groups besides the perpetrator to react to epistemic injustice and help in preventing or redressing it.

Another important factor that the GC case highlights in relation to testimonial injustice is the collective nature of the perpetration of injustice itself. Fricker rightly refers to a similar feature of testimonial injustice as the systematic nature of testimonial injustice. By that she means that the prejudice against a person's social identity that subjects him to testimonial injustice tracks him in various spheres of his social life – such as economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on – and renders him susceptible to various other forms of injustices as well (Fricker 2007, p27). However, I want to distinguish the collective nature of perpetrating

testimonial injustice by noting that the GC manages to perpetrate testimonial injustice not as an isolated individual in a vacuum but in social space occupying a social position that has the support and endorsement of his community. In other words, what the GC does is what is expected of his social membership and social role in his group. He is collaborating in sustaining his community's social imaginary that is inherently prejudiced.

Prejudice in the GC case functions as a harmful social value collectively endorsed by his community. His epistemic attitude is shared across the group, so is his belief that the testimonies of people from certain social groups do not deserve equal credibility. In this case when the GC expresses his racist attitude, he gets support from within his community; and perhaps some condemnation from outside his community. However, racist imaginations tend to also suffer from the vice of being closed to any condemnations from out-groups. Nevertheless, situating the GC within his group means that his racist attitude is not purely an individual matter; rather it is also a response to the expectations of others and the norms and conventions of his group. As it will be elaborated later on in discussing John Doris' collaborative view of agency, recalibration of individual agencies in terms of social norms and conventions is part of the social dynamics of a group. Therefore, an appropriate analysis of the prejudicial epistemic attitude of the GC means that we should take into account the fact that this prejudicial attitude is not merely an individual belief or perception, but that it is also something that he is expected to express and uphold.

I think bias or prejudice such as that expressed in the GC case is not best understood in terms of implicit bias because his expressed commitment to prejudice demonstrates a doxastic performance that underpins his prejudicial attitude. Implicit bias is about an incongruity between one's explicit cognitive commitments and one's non-deliberate contradiction of those commitments in practice. As Kelly et al., point out in relation to racial cognition in America: most people are "explicitly racially unbiased while being implicitly racially biased" (2010, p456). As though agents whose

thoughts and actions are influenced by implicit bias normally lack control over detecting and neutralizing its influence unless they manage to acquire some additional help such as psychological knowledge or training etc. This does not seem to be the case with the GC.

The prejudice found in cases such as the GC of Ku Klux Klan where it is collectively endorsed and incorporated into the social fabric of the community is not like an unrevealed influence secretly operating at the back of our conscious deliberations. It is an explicit moral force that guides the ethos and interactions of a community, and that's why it is more like a negative moral value collectively sustained and promoted. Therefore, addressing it requires more than encouraging individual members of the community to engage in self-reflective approaches of noticing and neutralizing their individual prejudices. There needs to be social and institutional mechanisms to remedy the issue. For that to happen the issue needs to be formulated in social terms as well, by locating the source of the problem not only in the individual minds but also in the social relations and social imaginary. For as long as these social phenomena are prejudiced members of the society are always exposed to develop prejudiced attitudes.

What I have shown in this section is that the explicitly held form of social identity prejudice and the fact that they are sustained by collective efforts pose serious challenges to Fricker's account of testimonial justice. By positing Sherman's example of the Grand Cyclops I have shown that testimonial injustice could also arise from explicitly held prejudices that are collectively endorsed. Taking into account the collective and the explicitly endorsed nature of testimonial injustice as shown in the GC example has implications for how we should understand addressing the problem of epistemic injustice. One implication is that we should include various different virtues – such as personal and institutional virtues, to constitute how epistemic justice may be brought about. As relying on individual perpetrators to take personal initiatives to prevent themselves from committing a wrong or repairing a wrong they have committed is not a viable option, as shown in the GC

example. Also, we'll have to account for the possibility that epistemic justice may not be limited to virtue epistemic measures and may require material ways of redressing the injustice as well.

I will now turn to further elaborate on these two aspects of epistemic injustice; namely, the explicitly held and the socially and institutionally entrenched form of prejudice. What I want to show is that explicit prejudice, as compared to implicit prejudice, has the political power to institutionalize itself; i.e. to get control of the social institutions and systematically entrench itself deep into the socio-cultural life of a society. This leads to, what Kristie Dotson calls, epistemic oppression (2014).

From implicit bias to explicitly held prejudice to epistemology of oppression

We may want to confine testimonial injustice to cases of implicit bias only, and think that a prejudice that is explicitly held and collectively sustained does not constitute a case of testimonial injustice. It may seem that the problem of explicitly held prejudice where it is entrenched in the social norms and institutions, such as the apartheid or slavery, is not so much of a concern for our discussions of epistemic or testimonial injustice. Perhaps because what we are concerned here is about behaviours or attitudes and interactions at the level of epistemic agents and how the problem of prejudice may be dealt with at the agential level. So the problem of explicitly held prejudice is better understood and addressed in terms of the broader social and institutional factors and perhaps better redressed by seeking changes at that level. The problem with such a view is that it fails to see prejudice as both a personal and a social problem simultaneously, and as an issue that requires addressing at both the structural level and the individual level at the same time.

This view seems to be found in Fricker as well. She confines her account of epistemic injustice as arising out of implicit bias only. This however creates a tension in how she treats the problem of testimonial injustice in one of her central cases, i.e. the trial of Tom Robinson; which is very similar to the GC example mentioned above. She does not characterize the jury as suffering from implicit bias despite maintaining her general account of epistemic injustice as being caused by residual prejudicial stereotypes or implicit bias. In relation to Robinson's trial she says that:

> in this example the jurors' perceptions are shaped *inter alia* by prejudiced beliefs; the prejudicial racial stereotype determining their credibility judgments is in part doxastically mediated. But our focus

> will be chiefly on the operation of prejudice at the non-doxastic level (Fricker 2007, p36).

Although she acknowledges the doxastic nature of prejudice prevalent in Robinson's trial, she discounts the significance of doxastically mediated prejudice in relation to epistemic injustice in favor of those types of prejudices that are non-doxastically mediated, or that exist at the level of implicit bias and not fully formed beliefs. She continues to says that:

> Many instances of testimonial injustice will be importantly unlike Tom Robinson's case, for many cases will be owing not to prejudiced beliefs at all but only to stealthier, residual prejudices, whose content may even be flatly inconsistent with the beliefs actually held by the subject. Certainly we may sometimes perpetrate testimonial injustice because of our beliefs; but the more philosophically intriguing prospect is that we may very frequently do it in spite of them (ibid).

However, despite acknowledging that in the Robinson case prejudice existed at the level of belief, she continues with a problematic diagnosis of the case as an individual level problem of self-ignorance that the members of the jury suffer from. As she says that:

> the judgment of the jurors of Maycomb County is so distorted by prejudicial racial stereotype that they cannot, in that courtroom context, perceive Tom Robinson as anything but a lying Negro (ibid).

What is wrong with that diagnosis is that it is not that the jurors *cannot see* Robinson as anything but a lying Negro but that they *do not want to see* him as anything but a lying Negro. This resistance to seeing Robinson as anything but a lying Negro is not a failure in overcoming their ignorance of an implicit bias. Rather, it is due to their affective investment in their social environment and their active effort towards its preservation. As Wayne Riggs (2012) says, their resistance to counter-evidence may have been influenced by their desire to preserve community solidarity and "loyalty to family and friends who have always treated blacks this way, and to begin to doubt that this way

of treating blacks is appropriate is akin to betrayal of that loyalty" (p158). Nonetheless, what we can learn from the jurors' active resistance to counter-evidence is that they perform a doxastically mediated active exercise of prejudice, not a distorted judgment. It is not a distorted judgment because they morally knowingly inflict harm on an innocent person from the socially disadvantaged group in order to preserve the self-interests of their own social group. Implicit bias is a misnomer in Robinson's case.

Fricker rightly judges the jury in Robinson's trial as culpable, and although I agree with her judgment I disagree with the reason she gives for her judgment. She holds the jury culpable because they did not respond appropriately to the evidence put before them. She says they not only had a duty in virtue of being in the formal context of a courtroom to reflect actively, but also had "ample opportunity to grasp and make good the conflict between the distrust which their corrupted sensibility spontaneously delivers and the trust which a proper attention to the evidence would inspire" (2007, p90). Fricker argues that the jury is culpably responsible for committing epistemic injustice, and maintains that the jury should have exercised the virtue of testimonial justice as critical self-awareness so that they could neutralize the effects of their prejudice. What I find problematic in her judgment is that she fails to call the jury culpable for their complicity in maintaining a racist system. Instead of identifying the racist jury duty as in and of itself an act contributing to the preservation of a racist system, Fricker highlights the personal failure of members of jury in overcoming their self-ignorance. Featuring what is an active social performance in preserving a systematic prejudice as only a personal level passive failure discounts the ethical significance of the act. It fails to note that the jury is lending its consent to the racist ideology by actively choosing to remain ignorant of the fact that they are prejudicially committing epistemic injustice to Robinson.

Contrary to Fricker who finds the doxastically reproduced prejudices as philosophically less intriguing, I think we should include both doxtically and non-doxastically reproduced prejudice in our construal of epistemic injustice.

In fact as I discussed earlier, she herself uses a doxatically mediated epistemic injustice, albeit misconstruing it as a case of implicit bias. A proper reading of the Robinson case as I suggested is to view it as a doxastically mediated epistemic injustice. Isolating epistemic injustice as arising from non-doxastically mediated prejudices leads to problematic understanding of the problem.

Prejudice can be found as wielding influence with various degrees of force in our social lives. It can be found implicitly operating as a residual bias, such as where the explicitly held prejudicial beliefs may have been proven false and dismissed but the residual prejudice continues to influence people's intellectual behavior without their own conscious awareness of it. The relevant example Fricker mentions is that of a woman:

> who has freed herself of sexist beliefs—a card-carrying feminist, as they say—and yet her psychology remains such that in many contexts she is influenced by a stereotype of women as lacking the requisite authority for political office, so that she tends not to take the word of female political candidates as seriously as that of their male counterparts (Fricker 2007, p37).

In terms of addressing epistemic injustices arising out of implicit bias, there are various personal and collective measures that Fricker discusses as strategies that can help. On a personal level, a person such as the woman in the abovementioned example can cultivate critical self-awareness to meliorate for the possibility of committing epistemic injustice. On structural and collective level, policies and procedures could be put in place to mitigate for the possibility of epistemic injustice; such as putting in place explicit and objective measures for conducting employment decision making to prevent the influence of prejudice (see for example Fricker 2010a, Elizabeth 2012). However, for cases such as the GC's or Robinson's jury, epistemic justice measures will have to be more comprehensive. That is because the nature of prejudice in these cases is not only explicit, but also collectively and publically expressed. The Robinson case exemplifies an institutionalized

exercise of prejudice by the court of law. This publically entrenched nature of prejudice in the social institutions of a society is radically different from implicit bias. Epistemic ameliorations should be exercised at the personal and social level simultaneously to correct for this degree of epistemic injustice; so that prejudice is addressed not only in personal mentalities but also the social structures and social imaginaries.

In cases where prejudice is so deeply socially and institutionally entrenched, such as the Apartheid, that a virtue-theoretic approach would be insufficient, then although the injustice may seem to include an important epistemic dimension to fight against, it would not only require various different virtues of epistemic justice to counter the injustice but also more material means such as fighting with one's life against an injustice. This point is aptly made by Allo (2016) in his analysis of the 1963-1964 trial of Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders by the Apartheid government of South Africa. Allo characterizes Mandela's speech "I am prepared to die" during the trial as an epistemic resistance against the white supremacist ideology. As he says:

> I want to read Nelson Mandela's counter- historical mobilization of lived experiences and memories of Africans – the scars, chains, the rage and Apartheid's unlivable juridical bind – as an act of epistemic resistance that re-opened epistemic battles and effected epistemic renegotiations (2016, p1).

Mandela's epistemic resistance however was more importantly a material fight as well that he fought with his life and for which, as we know, he received a life sentence.[7]

[7] It is worth quoting Allo in full length here in relation to the 'I am prepared to die' speech:
As Joel Joffe, one of the attorneys for the Rivonia defendants writes in his memoir, the evidence was so overwhelming and so conclusive that a guilty verdict was the only possible outcome for most of the accused. Thus, as far as the lawyers were concerned, the case was a legal battle to prevent "the death sentence being carried out." But as the defense lawyers found out later, the accused had a more ambitious and profound cause than preventing the death penalty: "They did not appear to be much concerned with the legalities of the charge. They were concerned with the politics of it." Questioning the authority of the South African social order to call them

Prejudice in these cases, even though structurally more explicit and salient, they cause the same ethico-epistemic harm that implicit bias does at the agential level. It causes the same dysfunction in the testimonial and epistemic interactions; and although it is structurally rooted and socially reproduced, it is materialized at the agential level. Therefore, it requires an agential description of a socially reproduced prejudice. In other words, it needs taking into account that where prejudice is systematically prevalent and socio-culturally established in the institutions of a society, such as the Apartheid, individual agents can contribute to the sustainability of the racist system merely by going about their daily lives and ignoring the prevalence of prejudice or racism, such as performing a jury duty. In such cases the degree of responsibility on part of the agents who function within the system, and even unintentionally contribute to preserving the system is much higher than a mere failure to overcome one's self-ignorance.

Although Fricker judges Robinson's jury as culpable for their act of testimonial injustice, she does not attribute their culpability to a bad will. Perhaps she wants to avoid blaming the individual jury members as carrying a bad will against Robinson and his social group because that is a difficult claim to maintain and prove. But regardless of whether or not the individual jurors had any bad will, the jury as a group expressed a doxastic attitude of racism and ill intention. And my point is that Fricker dislocates the proper place of blame by not attributing culpability to the doxastically mediated preservation of the racist social imaginary by the jury. She does so by attributing their racist behavior to their ignorance of the prejudicial racial stereotype influencing them, to their failure in detecting and neutralizing their prejudice. This dislocation of the cause of testimonial injustice implicates her choice of corrective measures: which is the virtue of testimonial justice as cultivation of critical social self-awareness. Where

---

to account, they refused to let the *raison d'être* of the political trial – "the public proclamation of dissent" – to be turned into a spectacle of legality that would legitimize and vindicate a pernicious system. (2016, pp2-3)

agents actively and willingly participate in sustaining a system of ignorance, it is unwarranted to rely on their cultivation of critical self-awareness in redressing epistemic injustice.

I agree that it is difficult to hold individual jurors as personally culpable, or fully culpable, for failing to neutralize their prejudice by arguing that their judgment was performed within a racist social imaginary the influence of which was difficult to dispel, or that there was overwhelming community pressure upon the jury members to behave the way they did. It is of course difficult to determine the degree to which a juror or any agent of testimonial injustice could have acted freely and independently in such a situation. However, the socially and systematically significant nature of testimonial injustice in cases such as Robinson's requires that the issue of doxastic complicity – individually or collectively conducted – should not be undervalued for the sake of avoiding to place the central locus of culpability directly[8] on a personal level. Because any change should eventually arise from a personal level and spread to a social and systematic level. It is important that any description of culpability should highlight and emphasize the agential role and its epistemic responsibility, as Fricker says, and I concur:

> Since my aim is to highlight the injustice that is occurring, and the sense in which the hearers are preventing the speakers from conveying knowledge, it is the agential description that is most relevant here. (Fricker 2007, p91)

[8] Although Fricker holds the jury culpable, she does so in an indirect manner as if to accommodate the fact that the jurors were to a degree not free and unable to resist the influence of the racist imaginary. She maintains that their act of injustice was due to their failure to detect and neutralize their implicit prejudice where it was their duty to do so and they also had the opportunity for that purpose. This makes it sound like the jury did not really and intentionally want to wrong Robinson; it was the system that harmed Robinson and was the real source of injustice. However, such a view makes light of the fact that the system is but the individual acts of racism perpetrated on a personal level. Every act of racism is an effort in preserving the system; and from the point of view of correcting the injustice, whether or not individuals participate in such acts intentionally and voluntarily or not is not significant, what is significant is that they intentionally resist it and adopt an epistemically responsible attitude.

What I have highlighted so far in this section is the relevance of explicitly held prejudice and how it is actively and collectively sustained. I also want to emphasize the social and collective nature of implicit bias, in order to show that what causes prejudice to ascend from one extreme of implicit bias to the other extreme of explicitly held prejudice is associated with the degree that prejudice is socially and collectively entrenched. The more a prejudice becomes entrenched in the social institutions and collective actions and behaviors of a society the more likely it is that the prejudice becomes overt and dangerous. This is relevant to our understanding of epistemic injustice in that the more overtly a prejudice is prevalent in a society and entrenched in its social institutions the more difficult it is to redress its epistemic oppressions through epistemic means only. What I am gesturing at by saying that is that explicit prejudices in the form of the Apartheid or the Hitlerean anti-Semitism require more than epistemic struggles to fight against or to remedy, such struggles require crucial material components of resistance to it, as shown by the struggles against the Apartheid and exemplified by Mandela trial of 1963-64 mentioned above. But more importantly, the epistemic fight against systemic explicit prejudices need a shift in worldviews and reconstruction of the dominant epistemology. In the following section I will elaborate on this point.

In her article *Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression* (2014), Kristie Dotson distinguishes between three orders of epistemic injustice. What Fricker calls testimonial injustice – the allocation of deficient credibility – is an expected outcome of the unjust distribution of credibility in the socio-political landscape of the society. Those with more socio-political power have more credibility as speakers and epistemic agents; this corresponds to and explains the deficiency in the credibility of the underprivileged who have less epistemic agency and lower levels of credibility as speakers. Similarly, what Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice is also a result of the unfair distribution of the capacity to produce knowledge, generate understanding and develop concepts. According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice is the injustice of

having some significant area of one's social experience obscured from collective understanding (Fricker 2007, pp154–155). This obscurity of some significant area of one's social experience is due to one's inability in articulating them into propositional knowledge. Instead the disadvantaged epistemically surrenders to those with more social power, allowing them to impose their way of understanding the world upon those who lack the capacity to generate their own knowledge of the world. The privileged can do so simply by producing epistemic resources excessively and distributing them widely. Dotson calls this the second order of epistemic oppression.

The first and second order oppressions are reducible, as the privileged can carry out these forms of epistemic oppression because they have the socio-political and economic means of keeping the oppressed epistemically disadvantaged. Dotson characterizes the injustices of the first two orders as reducible to non-epistemic factors but describes the epistemic oppression of the third order as the oppression of an epistemological system that exists independent of the reducible factors. The third order epistemic oppression is that of a resilient epistemological system that contains within itself the means and resources for preserving itself and legitimizing its perpetration of oppression.

The three orders of epistemic oppression could perhaps be discerned in terms of the severity of epistemic suffering. In the first order the speech of the oppressed is rendered unintelligible. In the second order the oppressed is rendered unable to articulate their experience into knowledge. In the third order the oppressed themselves are employed in service of preserving and running the oppressive system.

The struggle for achieving epistemic justice in the first and in the second order can be fought at the socio-political level. At the first level, it can be encouraging the agents of oppression to be mindful of the prejudices that influence their intellectual behavior, and to cultivate critical self-awareness and awareness of others. At the second level, it can be providing the social

space for the disadvantaged to produce their own knowledge of their own experiences, and allowing their knowledge to be added to the dominant social imaginary. At the third level however, the whole epistemology of oppression requires transformation. This could be confrontational, as even the mere attempt to break free of the epistemology is threatening to the system and could be dangerous – such as helping a Jew in Nazi Germany.

What distinguishes the third order epistemic oppression from the other two orders is not that there are no socio-political factors involved in the third order – in fact the third order is socio-politically as significant as the other two orders. Rather, it is "the character of the resistance to change, or in other words, differing causes of inertia" (Dotson 2014, p3) that distinguishes the third order epistemic oppression from the other two orders. An example that can perhaps aptly capture the epistemic character of resistance against third order epistemic oppression is that provided by Jacques Ranciere in *Proletarian Nights: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth Century France* (2012/1981). In that book Ranciere provides a view of the epistemically emancipatory struggles of workers in nineteenth century France. He curates a series of paraphrases, quotations and summaries of the writings of workers in that era in France, and sketches their early struggles towards class-consciousness. These writings show the struggles of workers, doomed to remain workers by an oppressive system, dis-identifying themselves from the imposed identity and producing their own knowledge of their socio-political conditions. It depicts their thoughts on their socio-political exclusions and economic exploitations, as well as their aesthetic productions and appreciations. These writings show the intimate interplay between the epistemic and the non-epistemic factors in resistance against epistemology of oppression. It not only shows how the workers had to reconfigure their material and socio-political conditions but also exercise the reconstruction of their epistemic agencies by breaking the chain of oppression that their working conditions imposed on them. As Ranciere notes:

> In order to reframe the space-time of the "occupation," the workers had to invalidate the most common partition of time: the partition

> according to which workers would work during the day and sleep during the night… That basic overturning involved a whole reconfiguration of the partition of experience. It involved a process of dis-identification, another relation to speech, visibility and so on. (Ranciere 2005, p13)

The significance of these writings however is as much in depicting the workers' exercise of their epistemic agency:

> For the workers of the 1830s, the question was not to demand the impossible, but to realize it themselves… workers had never needed the secrets of domination explained to them, as their problem was quite a different one. It was to withdraw themselves, intellectually and materially, from the forms by which this domination imprinted on their bodies, and imposed on their actions, modes of perceptions, attitudes, and a language. (Ranciere 2012, p. ix)

What I have shown in this section is the distinction between two forms, or degrees, of explicit prejudice. One is the collaboratively reproduced prejudice in a community's social imaginary, such as the GC's community; a prejudice that is not yet materially institutionalized and has not acquired a dominating force. The other is a socio-politically and institutionally entrenched explicit prejudice as seen in the Tom Robinson case. The distinction is important to take into account when we are construing a comprehensive understanding of epistemic justice and the various virtue-theoretic and non-virtue-theoretic measures that it may constitute.

I note here, that from the perspective of epistemic justice allowing oneself to be used at the service of the epistemology of oppression is an active participation in preserving the oppressive system. Epistemic responsibility in such scenarios demands that one should, at the least, avoid participating in preserving the system. It is for this reason that I see Robinson's jury more as active conductors of a racist system, than merely a group of people failing in their personal moral and epistemic responsibility. The ethico-epistemic

failure of the feminist woman who allows herself to give in to the influence of implicit sexist bias by taking female political candidates not as seriously as their male counterparts is a failure in overcoming a personal epistemic vice. However, were she actively resisting the overcoming of her personal vice due to an affective investment in the systemic vice prevalent in her society, her epistemically unjust judgment of female political candidates would not be just failing in her personal epistemic responsibility, it would be an active participation in preserving the oppressive system as well.

The fight against epistemic injustice does not have to be always so revolutionary. In other socially less critical forms of epistemic injustice, such as implicit bias or explicitly held prejudice that are not systemically entrenched in the social and political institutions of a society, virtue-theoretic epistemic justice measures can be largely effective. However, such measures still require more than the individualistic approach that Fricker presents in her account of the virtue of epistemic justice. In the following section I will discuss a collaborative view of agency that can help go beyond an individualistic view of the virtue of epistemic justice.

John Doris' collaborative account of agency

One helpful way to advance the discussion about epistemic justice is to consider our epistemic behaviors not purely in individualistic terms but rather as reflective of collaborative influences, as indicated by Natalia Washington (2016) in her response to Sherman. A collaborativist view of agency is provided by John Doris in his book *Talking to Ourselves* 2015, where he argues that our epistemic behavior is developed and refined in virtue of the epistemic collaborations we receive from others. Doris suggests that we acquire and sustain our agency in these epistemic interactions that we have with others. Since others are in a better position to assess our values in comparison to our epistemic positions, their judgments can inform us whether our actions accurately represent the values we hold. Therefore we should think of achieving a morally and epistemically optimum epistemic position as a collaborative group work. John Doris says:

> …optimal reasoning is socially *embedded*. That is, human beings typically reason best when reasoning takes the form of an ongoing social process. Sociality is not merely a *precondition* of optimal reasoning, like adequate sleep and nutrition; optimal reasoning is itself characteristically social. (2015, p115)

In his book Doris criticizes an influential conception of agency that he calls reflectivism. It is the idea that we exercise our agency through reflections upon our attitudes and behaviors, which are expressed in what we think and do. However, based on empirical evidence from social psychology Doris argues that such a conception of agency is untenable. Because we are regularly influenced by features of our environment that we would have disavowed were we explicitly aware of them. For example, the empirical evidence that shows that when images of eyes are displayed near the coffee service area in an office, contributions to a donation box are three times larger. Such unreflective and self-ignorant ways of acting shows that not all

our actions are under our conscious and reflective control. But that does not mean that we do not have agency, or the notion of agency is undermined. Rather, as Doris proposes, we should understand agency as an exercise of a person's values; and insofar as a person's behaviors, thoughts and action express his values he can be seen as exercising his agency, and be seen as responsible for them.

More importantly, although the unreflective and self-ignorant thoughts and actions do not form agency, they allow for a crucial space of social interaction and collaboration where individuals can negotiate and realize the thoughts and behaviors that best express their values. Through such interactions we engage in rationalizations in order to make our actions and our behaviors make sense to others (p141) and to ourselves. From these rationalizations we form personal narratives or biographies that in turn shape our thoughts and behaviors by motivating us to reduce any dissonances between who we think we are, our personal narrative, and what we do (pp144-147). It is in such a social space of negotiation and rationalization where our agency emerges. As Doris says:

> The optimistic thought is that one's biography helps tie one to the mast, and secures behavior expressing one's values even in the face of unfavorable circumstance or unstable inclination. That one understands one has *made* a promise, and further understands oneself to be a person who *honors* her promises, may help ensure that the promise is *kept*. One's understanding of one's biography, then, shapes what one does (p144).

The idea is that agency is not only maintained in spite of self-ignorance but that it is in fact obtained in virtue of self-ignorance. Self-ignorance allows us to confabulate or come up with socially sanctioned rationalizations for our actions and behaviors, which then influence our future thoughts and actions. Doris maintains that these rationalizations are not meant to show the causal history of an action; rather their purpose is to sketch our biographies and construct our values. For example, a couple who tell the story of how their

relationship began by saying “it was love at first sight” may be totally inaccurate, but it nonetheless reinforces their commitment to a healthy relationship by reflecting – to themselves and to others – that they value their relationship. Consider a rationalization such as "I wasn't much drawn to your father, but I hadn't been on a date in 17 months", although perhaps more accurate, fails to facilitate the realization of what a couple may value in their relationship (ibid p147). It is in these spaces for rationalizations that we come to construct our values and our self-narratives that constitute our agency. Although these rationalizations may be inaccurate compared to the causal chain that led to an action and therefore may seem to be illusions rather than reality. According to Doris, that is not a problem, rather that is precisely the conditions that enable the construction of values and personal narratives; and hence the emergence of agency. The idea is that we negotiate the contours of our biographies in interaction with others; in turn, these interactions affect our exercise of agency and the values we get to express in our lives (ibid p153).

What is important to note is the interaction between our acts of rationalizing and the influence they receives from the social milieu within which they are performed. On the one hand, by rationalizing our behaviors we write our self-narratives such that they can express our values. On the other hand, “a central function of explaining one’s behavior is ‘managing social interaction’” (p142). Therefore, by rationalizing we not only try to present our behaviors as expressing our values so that we are seen as subjects in control of our behaviors, but we also try to present our rationalizations in a way that they are understood and accepted by others so that we are seen as fit partners for reciprocal social exchange.

The extent of influence that the social milieu exercises upon one’s rationalizing is such that if it is not understood or accepted by others the result can have diminishing effects upon one’s agency. As noted by Matthew Van Cleave (2016), there are two ways that agency can be circumscribed according to Doris; one is when others, such as one’s interlocutors, do not

accept one's rationalizations. For example a woman who tries to make sense of her thoughts and actions in terms of her biography but due to a stereotype – say women being emotional and irrational – her rationalizations towards her self-narrative are rejected. Sexism and "inequalities of power may impede the exercise of agency" (Doris 2015, p149) by silencing women's voices in their attempts to construct their own self-narratives. As such the woman whose rationalizations are rejected due to a stereotype does suffer in terms of exercising her agency. The flip side of this is the normative demand rationalizing places on rationalizers. That is to say that as rationalizers we are aware of this influence and try to measure up to it by producing rationalizations that are acceptable.

Another important observation that Doris makes is about the importance of one's culture and socio-epistemic environment in relation to one's capacity to rationalize and produce a self-narrative and thus exercise and sustain one's agency. Doris's point is that the disintegration of one's socio-epistemic environment can diminish one's rationalizing capability if the space where one's rationalizations made sense is no longer available. Doris makes his case for the culturally contingent nature of agency by using the example of Ishi, the last of the Yahi people – native Californians – who were all probably killed by the settlers (p179). Ishi, as the lone survivor of his people, was found by an anthropologist who took him to San Francisco's anthropology museum where he performed traditional songs and assisted as a custodian at the museum. According to Doris, although Ishi's biographer writes that he gracefully acclimated to life in the museum and "remained himself – a well-born Yahi", the loss of Ishi's history and the socio-cultural discontinuity of his community must have gravely impacted his agency. Because:

> personal continuity is predicated on psychological continuity, and psychological continuity is sustained by societal continuity, so if cultural devastation is substantial enough, personal continuity may be compromised, physical survival notwithstanding (p183).

Following Doris, we can imagine that if the disintegration of a culture can handicap and diminish people's agential capacity, the transformation of a culture can have similar effects in transforming people's agency. If for example, certain elements and features of a culture that provides a space for exercising racist agency is identified, and diminished or replaced by ethically acceptable ones, it can complement those individual agential virtues such as the virtue of critical self-reflection in countering epistemic injustices. For example, human sociability and ethical behavior could significantly transform how people relate across racial boundaries if their social imaginaries valued sympathetic imagining of others. In other words, a culture that values empathy is better able to manage racial tensions and remedy residual prejudice (see Linker 2011 & Churcher 2016). At times changing and transforming certain features and elements of a socio-epistemic environment or a social imaginary might be as necessary as the advocacy of individual agential virtues.

In conclusion, to exercise agency one needs to be able to express one's values, and that in turn depends on a continuous engagement with one's culture where those values have a meaning. Consequently, if one's ability to express one's values is diminished, according to Doris, one's agency is undermined. This inhibition to exercise the expression and nourishment of one's values and the consequent undermining of one's agency is portrayed markedly in Ishi's example. However, it should be noted that one's culture and/ or social imaginary doesn't have to be wiped out to compromise one's agency. Usually it is unjust and oppressive norms such as negative prejudices that facilitate the development and sustainability of harmful values, and allow for ethically questionable thoughts and actions to persist. Therefore, for the purpose of studying various different epistemic justice measures, we should not confine ourselves with individual agential level vices and virtues, rather we should also consider the virtues, norms and values that shape the ethical characteristics of our cultures and social imaginaries and provide the environment for us to exercise our values.

Let me return to Fricker to look at how might a collaborative view of agency help us in exploring further measures for addressing the problem of epistemic injustice.

The virtue of condemning and reacting to vices

Situating a perpetrator in a collaborative space means considering him in relation to the position of the victim and also those who might witness the epistemic injustice and be its audience. Such an ecologically broader view of the space where epistemic injustice occurs allows us to see the other social roles that exist in that space and affords us to think about possible ethical responsibilities that might incur upon them. In other words, we might ask what could be a virtuous reaction for the audience or the victim of an epistemic injustice to express. One intuitively possible option would be to charge the perpetrator of epistemic injustice with vice and support his or her epistemic punishment.

Being responsive and reactionary in whatever capacity possible towards a vice is itself a virtue. Although I admit that a lot more work is required to properly articulate this responsiveness as a virtue. But I will proceed with this thought that the practice of charging epistemic agents with ethico-epistemic vices could be another virtue besides the virtue of cultivating critical self-awareness. As advocated by Ian James Kidd (2016), vice-charging is the act of attributing a vice to an agent, it can "contribute to the ameliorative task of improving both our epistemic characters and the epistemic dynamics of our communities" (p181). It challenges the target to defend his epistemic behavior, and prompt the audience to reflect on the vice and their own behaviors in relation to the vice. According to Kidd, vice-charging has a normative force and rhetorical power because it is a "direct criticism of a person qua epistemic agent [such as accusing you of dogmatism], an attribution not only of fault or folly, but of vice" (p189). I agree with Kidd's call that given the ubiquity of epistemic viciousness in the world vice-charging can help in promoting and practicing a socially responsible epistemic citizenship (p185). Evidence shows that arguing and confronting an epistemic vice due to implicit bias can reduce its influence,

whereas turning a blind eye can increase its effects (see for example Czopp et al., 2006; Rasinski et al., 2013). Therefore, I think it can be another virtue or practice that could be promoted under the umbrella notion of epistemic justice. The importance of this practice of vice-charging is that it is not purely focused on the self-correction of (potential) perpetrators. It is a practice that the victims and the audience of an epistemic injustice are encouraged to cultivate to resist an epistemic injustice. Despite any reluctance on the part of perpetrators in accepting responsibility for their act of epistemic injustice, vice-charging can compel them to respond to the charge and explain their behavior.

I agree with Kidd (2016) that there is more work that needs to be done on this; such as producing theoretically more robust arguments and mechanisms for recognizing, identifying and challenging varieties of epistemic vices. This knowledge is important in order to articulate the virtues and other strategies that are required to counter epistemic vices. Quassim Cassam (2016), for example, has taken up the work of studying epistemic vices;[9] he calls it vice epistemology and defines it as:

> "the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual vices that are also character traits… The proposal is that intellectual character vices are intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry" (p159).

Knowledge of epistemic vices can certainly help in identifying and recognizing them; however, in order to counter vices such as prejudice and closed-mindedness simply knowing about them is not sufficient. We need cultivation of relevant virtues with sufficient emotive force to enable a

[9] In a recent interview he mentions that he is working on a monograph called *Vices of the Mind*. See http://www.thefreethinktank.com/interview-professor-quassim-cassam/ [accessed 7/10/2016]

conscientious response from the audience or the victim. They could be faculty virtues such as perceptiveness or a trait-virtue as conscientiousness; and could be developed without worrying about the reliabilists and responsibilists strands of virtue epistemology (Greco and Turri 2016) – as they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The virtue of vice-charging then can be understood in terms of an unwillingness and refusal to tolerate a vice, and a disposition to speak out against what one judges as a vice. One needs to be equipped not only with the intellectual knowledge to recognize a vice, but also have the relevant sentiments and emotions to respond to it and try to curtail its influences. This responsiveness to epistemic vices can constitute an epistemic virtue in itself.

The virtue of being critically self-aware, as Fricker proposes, can constitute one of the virtues present in the repertoire of epistemic justice measures, and the virtue of responding to vices could be another. The point is that a single virtue of critical self-awareness concerned with individuals preventing themselves from perpetrating epistemic injustice is insufficient in order to bring about epistemic justice or to sustain epistemically just attitudes and behaviors. There should be varieties of virtues that are available to guide the behavior of individuals in various different epistemic roles, be it in the role of a (potential) perpetrator, a victim, or a witness.

In the case of Marge and Herbert, charging Herbert with a vice, could have put pressure on him to reflect on his attitude. But perhaps Marge had charged him with a vice, and it still did not affect him. Now imagine that Herbert somehow learns that Marge's suspicions were right and he was wrong; this should create a dissonance between his previous prejudice-laden belief about Marge's suspicion and his current belief about her suspicion that is now validated. Such a dissonance I believe makes a person epistemically vulnerable, and more prone to the effects of vice-charging. So vice-charging can be more effective in persuading someone to doubt their sense of self-

righteousness and be responsive to the demands of justice; this could be particularly helpful when they are epistemically vulnerable.

What warrants us to think that vice-charging can help in addressing the problem of epistemic injustice is the collaborative nature of our agency. Unless someone is in a position of power to be able to disregard the whole socio-epistemic structures or social reality that allows the formation and perpetuation of our agencies, we are right to think that vice-charging could be effective, at least to some degree, in countering the problem of epistemic injustice.

So far in this section I have explore the possibility of developing virtues that are not mainly or only concerned with perpetrators of epistemic injustice. I have show that one such virtue could be the virtue of being responsive to epistemic vices by charging a perpetrator for his or her vice. From a collaborative point of view of agency, vice-charging can directly affect people's rationalizations and constructions of their self-narratives. It can encourage perpetrators to recalibrate their rationalizations and self-narratives to the one that is more aligned to their social milieu.

However, as you might imagine, a further problem that arises is what if a racist imaginary dominates the social milieu? In such a scenario vice-charging might as well be a virtue in service of preserving a vice. My understanding is that individual virtues need to be complemented with non-individual or supra-individual virtues such as virtues of groups or institutions, system level virtues or civic virtues. These shall be virtues that influence the attitude and behaviour of groups and institutions, the character of a society's social imaginaries and the values its culture encourages its members to uphold. In the following last section of this work, I'll sketch a picture of how these supra-level virtues can look like through some examples and cases, and hope it will help in further conceptualization of these virtues.

Group virtues and system-level virtues

To return to the Grand Cyclops example, a collaborativist view of agency should help us see that the conditions that sustain the wrong ethico-epistemic attitude of the GC as an individual go beyond his individual power. That's why epistemic justice as a merely perpetrator-focused virtue is unhelpful. To address the issue we should appropriate our account of epistemic justice such that it concerns not only an individual perpetrator, but be concerned with a situated individual within a collective. There is a limit to how much we can expect an individual's behavior to change all through his own personal efforts, but viewing an individual within his collaborative networks allows us to see further possibilities for his change of behavior. So, an individualistic conception of epistemic justice that emphasizes critical self-reflection can work only to a limited degree and may not be effective in the GC case at all due to the fact that the collective nature of the vice in this case is more salient.

If the case of the GC's was an individualistic problem of implicit bias or explicit prejudice, such that he was not situated in a racist group operating under a racist imaginary, we could have adopted individualistic epistemic justice measures. As previously discussed, self-development strategies can be relatively successful in helping overcome one's ignorance of implicit biases. For example, one may learn about one's own ignorance towards an implicit bias by self-reflectively examining one's deliberative attitudes and by increasing one's knowledge about implicit bias in general and also particular biases that are found influencing one's thoughts and actions. Furthermore, by increasing ones contact and interaction with people against whom there is prevalent negative prejudice can help in minimizing the chances of perpetrating epistemic injustice. Even if the GC was someone publically expressing explicit prejudice towards a particular group but was situated in a socially favorable or virtuous milieu, the collaborative view of agency tells us

that his social environment could have changed his epistemic attitudes for the better. However, his case is not that of an individual perpetrating epistemic injustice, rather it is of a group adhering to a racist imaginary. As long as others in his group accept and endorse his racist rationalizations he, along with his comrades, will continue expressing racism as an acceptable rationalization.

From the point of view of collaborative agency, perhaps the only way it can be hoped for the GC to be brought to realize and acknowledge his perpetration of epistemic injustice is that some elements from within his group challenge the prevalent belief and reveal the inconsistency in its definition of fairness. And question the double standard used to evaluate the testimony of in-group members and those of stereotyped out-groups. I agree that this might seem impossible given the insular tendencies of racist imaginaries. Therefore, epistemic justice measures should constitute not only individualistic virtues but also group-level virtues to correct for groups becoming prejudicially bound up in their own imaginaries. One such group-level virtue that could be useful in the GC case is the virtue of receptiveness towards out-group criticisms. Such a virtue should allow infiltration of critical outside knowledge in a group, and allow a group to undergo a process of moral learning. Yet how might we understand such a group-level virtue, as groups do not seem to possess virtues apart from their members?

Although we can imagine that racist and epistemically insular groups do not have to remain intellectually closed-minded forever and stay prejudicially bound up in their own imaginations. As Anderson (2016) posits, from history we can learn that social groups can undergo processes of moral learning when elements from within those groups start questioning the unjust status quo – perhaps by receiving inspirations from outside their community. Consider for example, the prevalence of the institution of slavery until three centuries ago in most of Europe and America that was seen as a fair and just practice (Anderson 2016). It was made possible to abolish the institution of slavery in the West when elements from within challenged the fairness of the

practice, although perhaps inspired from the outside world. Such social transformations would not have been possible if elements from within these societies had not developed a critical stance to their groups' moral worldview. Even though individual-level criticisms of group ethos do not constitute group receptiveness to out-group criticisms, they do contribute to producing a group-level affective state appropriate for initiating a change. As Mallet et al. (2008) show, processes of social change in cases such as the abolition of slavery are largely attributed to the affective states of group-based guilt or anger etc. that the privileged groups develop in relation to the subordinate ones.

Miranda Fricker and Elizabeth Anderson posit a non-individual-based account of institutional virtues and vices. Anderson referring to Margaret Gilbert's notion of plural subjects[10] claims that collectives can manifest nearly any type of mental states that can be attributed to individuals. This could be group members committing to uphold institutionalized principles for achieving unbiased judgments by giving hearers enough time to make unbiased decisions (Anderson 2012, p168); or likewise, by giving speakers enough time and support to explain themselves. Institutions can put in place corresponding structural conditions to facilitate the realization of these joint commitments. But institutional virtues are not the mere presence of certain just and fair institutional structures and conditions; rather institutions are virtuous when those just conditions facilitate individual agents to behave virtuously. Fricker (2010a) likewise suggests a non-individual based group virtue by saying that institutional virtues and vices can be understood in terms of the presence or absence of certain institutional structures and procedures. She however also acknowledges that as important as those structural conditions are, institutional virtues also importantly depend on whether the relevant individual agents or groups realize those structures, or bring them to life. Virtues or vices cannot be attributed to institutions purely procedurally because institutions are not agents, they do not have will, and can not be held praiseworthy or blameworthy similar to how individuals can

[10] Margaret Gilbert (2000)

be blamed or praised. It is eventually individuals or groups of individuals in an institution who realize, or fail to realize, certain procedures; and it is those individuals who have to be credited for virtues or vices exhibited institutionally. (Fricker 2010a, p249)

Although from Fricker and Anderson it seems that we can think of groups or institutions as possessing virtues or vices in virtue of the conditions that are created through policies and procedures in order to elicit virtuous or vicious behaviors from its individual members.[11] However I will show that besides the internal conditions that groups can cultivate or curtail within themselves, there is also the broader social system external to groups that not only influence the social perception of groups but also their internal dynamics.

The important point to note at this stage is that collectives, be it organized formal institutions such as a court of law in the Robinson case or a community such as the GC's, play an important role in perpetration and perpetuation of epistemic injustice; and also in bringing about epistemic justice. Elizabeth Anderson makes a distinction between transactional injustice and structural injustice. She suggests that although Fricker's virtue of epistemic justice may help compensate for an injustice at the transactional level, i.e. it may compensate for a credibility deficit in an instance of testimonial exchange between for example two individuals; it might not be up to the task of addressing an injustice that is generated by a system of unjust rules and has global effects (2012, p164). The full force of certain forms of epistemic injustices cannot be accounted for at the transactional level; since they become visible only once we look at the cumulative effects of a series of transactions of testimonial exchanges. In order to address epistemic injustice at this level we need to shift our focus to the structural and systemic level conditions that provide the ethical grounds for the

[11] Although it seems that institutions as epistemic agents are different to other groups such as the GC's community, perhaps due to their formal organizational structures. I believe that for our purposes of studying the possibility of group-level virtues, institutions' formalized policy and procedural structures can in fact better highlight the internal dynamics of groups in general.

transactional level exchanges. The need to conceive of virtues of groups and institutions and to counter collectively perpetrated vices through structural means arises from the acknowledgement that the power and influence that groups and institutions can exercise is much greater than what a single individual can normally counter or resist. Therefore to counter structural vices, redressing efforts must be made at the structural level.[12] Anderson refers to the issue of segregating schooling along the lines of race and class in the United States, which has profound effects in preserving the unequal distribution of educational and knowledge producing capacities of groups:

> If group segregation is the structural ground of the types of epistemic injustice discussed above, then group integration is a structural remedy – a virtue of epistemic institutions (p171).

Group behavior on a systemic or structural level is akin to the intervention of central banks that Anderson refers to as altering "interest rates and the aggregate money supply to prevent or reverse recessions" (p164). Although she misses to note that besides central banks other state institutions regulating the economy such as the treasury and the department of finance should also coordinate their behaviors. Nonetheless, what is obvious is that groups play a significant role in the epistemic life of a society. In reference to John Doris' account of collaborative agency, I think we should view group level agency in a collaborative light as well. Because their epistemic roles in a social system cannot be understood as purely in terms of the internal group structures, hierarchical arrangements of roles and responsibilities, or the policies and procedures that are put in place. Likewise, the virtues or vices they exhibit are also prone to influence by the forces present in the broader social system.

[12] We cannot "count on the practice of individual epistemic justice to correct for all of these global effects. Rather, the larger systems by which we organize the training of inquirers and the circulation, uptake, and incorporation of individuals' epistemic contributions to the construction of knowledge may need to be reformed to ensure that justice is done to each knower, and to groups of inquirers." (Anderson 2012, p165)

Therefore, I suggest that we should not discount the importance of the social imaginary of groups and its interactive relation to other social imaginaries[13]. This allows us to see how groups develop certain characters or attitudes not only as an aggregate of its individual members' characters but also as responses to the influences and changes coming from the broader social system. If for example, on the structural and systemic level there is a segregationist policy towards groups and collectives, then obviously groups will have little opportunity to interact with alternative imaginaries. This keeps groups insular and leaves out the opportunity for epistemic friction – to borrow from Jose Medina (2011). However, if the social system encourages integration of different groups, there will be epistemic exchanges and flow of knowledge and cultural elements. As Medina notes:

> Alternative social imaginaries can serve as correctives of each other, epistemic counterpoints that enable people to see limitations of each viewpoint, creating beneficial epistemic friction. (Medina 2011, p29)

What I have shown so far in this section is the relational nature of the epistemic life of groups with each other and with the wider social system. My own understanding is that groups cannot have virtues similar to how individual agent's can; any virtues or vices exhibited by groups should be viewed in relation to the groups' internal and external dynamics. To further elaborate on the dynamic and relational nature of group virtues, let me refer to another example that Fricker (2012) uses to discuss the issue of institutional racism and how it can silence the testimony of individuals who belong to a group subject to identity prejudice.

---

[13] See for example this quote from note 9 in Medina 2011:
Of course, alternative social imaginaries are not sealed off from each other and they have noticeable influences upon one another, typically with those more mainstream and socially empowered exerting a more pervasive and hard-to-escape influence. As a result, there are often assumptions and limitations that all the closely related social imaginaries will share; and even the most marginal standpoint and the most eccentric alternative way of imagining social reality may reproduce important aspects of the mainstream.

In 1993 in London a small gang of racist white teenagers attacked two black teenagers, named Stephen Lawrence and Duwayne Brooks. Stephen Lawrence died due to stab wounds while his friend Duwayne Brooks, who was the chief witness to the incident, survived the attack. When the police arrived they failed to give comfort or any treatments to Duwayne, rather they proceeded on the assumption that Stephen's death had been due to a fight to which Duwayne was a part of. More importantly, not only was he not treated properly as a victim, he was not treated properly as a witness either. The mishandling of the case by the police resulted in an independent inquiry in 1998, the report of which was published as 'The Macpherson Report'. Fricker quotes from the report:

> … the officers failed to concentrate upon Mr. Brooks and to follow up energetically the information which he gave them. Nobody suggested that he should be used in searches of the area, although he knew where the assailants had last been seen. Nobody appears properly to have tried to calm him, or to accept that what he said was true. To that must be added the failure of Inspector Steven Groves, the only senior officer present before the ambulance came, to try to find out from Mr. Brooks what had happened. (McPherson 1999, 5.11)

The McPherson report identifies London's Metropolitan Police Service as institutionally racist. Both Fricker and the McPherson report underline the important distinction between racist attitudes held at the individual level and the racist attitudes held at the group level. Institutional racism can involve many individuals who are not racist as individuals, but being part of the institution they might nonetheless behave in a way influenced by the racist culture of the institution that has trained them and expects them to behave a certain way. Institutional racism is not merely about the presence of some racist individuals in the institution, it is more about the procedures and the culture of the organization that can be discriminatory towards certain groups of people (Fricker 2012, pp295-297). The institutionally constructed racist processes and mechanisms are complex and hard to change, but as the report notes the change can begin by the organization openly and adequately

recognizing the existence of racism and addressing it by policy, example and leadership (McPherson 1999, 6.34). [14]

Fricker (2012) uses the case to highlight that testimonial injustice perpetrated by institutions can be as a result of the absence of certain group virtues. My interest in the case is to study how can institutional vices be addressed and the usefulness of the concepts of group and system level virtues highlighted.

Following the discussion about the virtue of vice-charging presented earlier, I would like to draw attention to how the act of vice-charging through the McPherson report exhibited on the level of a democratic system, encouraged a process of reform by and within a guilty institution. I take it as an example of civic virtue or system level virtue upheld by groups on the level of broader social system. Similarly, on the level of the relations between an institution and its service recipients, Fricker notes the absence of this same virtue. She refers to it as the virtue of contestability the absence of which causes testimonial injustice to Duwayne Brooks by the police. By contestability she means a citizen's power to contest wrongful treatment (2010a, p250). I'd like to take her point further and suggest that this same virtue of contestability can be seen as exhibited at the system level when another state institution vice-charges the institution of police and the guilty institution accepts that charge. As we can see, same virtues can be conceived as operating at various different levels in the social system. A comprehensive account of epistemic justice needs to take this into account in order to be able to advise concerted ameliorative measures at all levels.

[14] As paragraph 6.34 the McPherson report says: "It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behavior which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people… It persists because of the failure of the organization openly and adequately to recognize and address its existence and causes by policy, example and leadership. Without recognition and action to eliminate such racism it can prevail as part of the ethos or culture of the organization. It is a corrosive disease."

I would like to make a last point in relation to group virtues or vices and in particular in relation to the charge of institutional racism that London Metropolitan police was given. By brief review of Anna Souhami's examination of whether the series of reform efforts initiated by the McPherson report 1999 have actually worked in her article *Institutional Racism and Police Reform: An Empirical Critique* (2014). She notes that following the report various important initiatives as "in relation to the reporting and recording of racist incidents, responses to hate crime more broadly, liaison and consultation with local communities and stop and search practices" (p3) were undertaken by the police. Furthermore, although the charge of institutional racism, and indeed the use of that very concept, was intended to divert attention away from the internal police culture and "from a pre-occupation with the language and behavior of individual staff"; it was precisely the "organizational life felt by police staff" that become the intense focus of reform efforts (ibid). She attributes this problem, at least partly, to the problematic nature of seeing groups as vicious in virtue of their internal dynamics. But at the same time though she also notes how group level-vice charging can have repercussions throughout the social system and to the other groups in the system:

> It would appear that, as the Inquiry had intended, its use of the concept has transformed the terms within which debates about racism occur throughout British institutions. At the least, 'institutional racism' has become a charge that organizations are eager to avoid. (p17)

Relevant for my concluding remarks however is her highlighting of the conceptual inadequacy in articulating a group level vice in terms of its structures and internal mechanisms. Her point shows a critical problem in understanding group virtues or vices as non-individual based virtues or vices. This I think is relevant to Fricker's account of group virtues, i.e. her articulation of group virtue in terms of its internal structures and conditions while reducing the reference point for any institutional blame or praise down

to the individual members of the institution. Referring to the concept of institutional racism, Souhami says that:

> The concept therefore identifies the problem whilst at the same time obscuring the determinants. (p6)

The conclusion I would like to draw is this; despite the usefulness of conceptualizing group behaviors as virtuous or vicious and associating such characteristics to the internal dynamics of those groups, it is also important to situate groups in their broader social systems. Group behaviors similar to individual behaviors are collaborative, and the terms of collaboration are found in the broader system where these groups exist. Attempts to correct group level vices, if confined to group structures and internal dynamics, will lead to the paradoxically rational but unintended conclusion of holding the individual members responsible for change and reform. Perhaps defining groups in collaborative terms, similar to collaborative view of individual agency, can properly account for the more intangible elements of norms, values and prevalent perceptions etc. that characterize the group identity and behavior. This allows us to see the interactions between the social imaginaries of groups and to see whether or not the broader social system facilitates any such interactions.

Conclusion

This thesis has been an attempt at developing Fricker's notion of epistemic justice by exploring various different forms of virtues that can meliorate the effects of implicit bias, explicit prejudice, and systematically entrenched epistemic oppression. Although recognizing that epistemology of oppression cannot be countered in purely epistemic terms, encouraging interactions between various epistemic collectives can be one way to meliorate the degree of the entrenched prejudices within collectives.

Virtues at group-level and system-level cannot be defined in the same manner that individual level virtues can be, but their function in countering epistemic injustice are as important as those at the individual level. This work has been an attempt at showing how these virtues might look like in different social levels and social roles.

Bibliography

Alcoff, L. M. (2010). Epistemic identities. *Episteme*, *7*(02), 128-137.

Allo, A. (2016). The courtroom as a site of epistemic resistance: Mandela at Rivonia. *Law, Culture and the Humanities*.

Anderson, Elizabeth (2012). Epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions. *Social Epistemology*, *26*(2), 163-173.

Anderson, Elizabeth (2016) *The Social Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery.* In: Fricker, Miranda and Brady, Michael, (eds.) The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Cassam, Q. (2016). Vice epistemology. *The Monist*, *99*(2), 159-180.

Churcher, M. (2016). When Adam met Sally: The Transformative Potential of Sympathy. *Social Epistemology*, *30*(4), 420-439.

Czopp, Alexander M. et al. (2006). "Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through Interpersonal Confrontation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* l90.5: 748-803.

Doris, J. M. (2015). *Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency*. OUP Oxford.

Dotson, K. (2012). A cautionary tale: On limiting epistemic oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, *33*(1), 24-47.

Dotson, K. (2014). Conceptualizing epistemic oppression. *Social Epistemology*, *28*(2), 115-138.

Flynn, F. J., & Lake, V. K. (2008). If you need help, just ask: underestimating compliance with direct requests for help. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *95*(1), 128.

Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford University Press.

Fricker, M. (2010). Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on epistemic injustice. *Episteme*, *7*(02), 164-178.

Fricker, Miranda (2010a). Can There Be Institutional Virtues? In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 3--235.

Fricker, M. (2012) 'Silence and Institutional Prejudice', in Crasnow, S.L. and Superson, A.M. (eds.) *Out from the shadows: Analytical feminist contributions to traditional philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press

Fricker, M. (2015) 'Epistemic contribution as a central human capability', in Hull, G. (ed.) *The equal society: Essays on equality in theory and practice*. Lexington Books.

Fricker, M. (2016) Fault and No-fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice--A Space for Epistemic Agent-regret. In: Fricker, M. and Brady, M., (eds.) The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Mind Occasional Series . Oxford University Press , Oxford

Gilbert, Margaret (2000). *Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Goldberg, S. C. (2016, June). II—Arrogance, Silence, and Silencing. In *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* (Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 93-112). The Oxford University Press.

Greco, John and Turri, John, (Winter 2016 Edition). "Virtue Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-virtue/>.

Huang, X. (2007). Justice as a virtue: An analysis of Aristotle's virtue of justice. *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, *2*(2), 265-279.

Keczer, Z., File, B., Orosz, G., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2016). Social Representations of Hero and Everyday Hero: A Network Study from Representative Samples. *PloS one*, *11*(8), e0159354.

Kelly, D., Machery, E., and Mallon, R. (2010). "Race and Racial Cognition." In J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds), *The Moral Psychology Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 433–72.

Kidd, I. J. (2016). Charging others with epistemic vice. *The Monist*, *99*(2), 181-197.

Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2016). Maybe holier, but definitely less evil, than you: Bounded self-righteousness in social judgment. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *110*(5), 660.

Lee, Harper. (1960) *To Kill a Mockingbird*, London: William Heinemann.

Linker, Maureen (2011). Do Squirrels Eat Hamburgers?: Intellectual Empathy as a Remedy for Residual Prejudice. *Informal Logic* 31 (2):110-138.

Macnamara, C. (2011). Holding others responsible. *Philosophical Studies*, *152*(1), 81-102.

Macpherson, Sir William, (Feb 1999). *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny*, advised by Tom Cook, The Right Reverend Dr John Sentamu, Dr Richard Stone. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf [accessed 09/11/2016]

Mallett, R. K., Huntsinger, J. R., Sinclair, S., & Swim, J. K. (2008). Seeing through their eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an outgroup. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *11*(4), 451-470.

Mason, R. (2011). Two kinds of unknowing. *Hypatia*, *26*(2), 294-307.

Medina, José (2011). The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary. *Social Epistemology* 25 (1):15-35.

Medina, J. (2012). *The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and the social imagination*. Oxford University Press.

Minghella, Anthony, (2000) *The Talented Mr Ripley — Based on Patricia Highsmith's Novel,* London: Methuen

Moran, K. (2014). Delusions of Virtue: Kant on Self-Conceit. *Kantian Review*, *19*(03), 419-447.

Munroe, W. (2016). Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *46*(6), 924-947.

Pohlhaus, G. (2012). Relational knowing and epistemic injustice: Toward a theory of willful hermeneutical ignorance. *Hypatia*, *27*(4), 715-735.

Rancière, J (2005) "From Politics to Aesthetics?" *Paragraph* 28, no. 1: 13.

Rancière, J. (2012). *Proletarian Nights: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-century France*. Verso Books.

Rasinski, H., Geers, A. and Czopp, A. (2013) "'I Guess What He Said Wasn't That Bad" Dissonance in Nonconfronting Targets of Prejudice."' *Social Psychology Bulletin* 39.7: 856-869.

Riggs, Wayne. "Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic?." *Social Epistemology* 26.2 (2012): 149-162.

Shepperd, J., Malone, W., & Sweeny, K. (2008). Exploring causes of the self-serving bias. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(2), 895-908.

Sherman, B. R. (2016). There's no (testimonial) justice: Why pursuit of a virtue is not the solution to epistemic injustice. *Social Epistemology*, *30*(3), 229-250.

Souhami, A. (2014). Institutional racism and police reform: an empirical critique. *Policing and Society*, *24*(1), 1-21.

Spiekermann, Kai (2016) *Self-interested Epistemic Bias and Institutional Obligations.* In: Fricker, Miranda and Brady, Michael, (eds.) The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Stewart, A. E. (2005). Attributions of responsibility for motor vehicle crashes. *Accident Analysis & Prevention*, *37*(4), 681-688.

Van Cleave, M. (2016) *Review - talking to our selves - philosophy*. Available at: http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=7612 (Accessed: 9 November 2016).

Washington, Natalia (2016). I Don't Want to Change Your Mind: A Reply to Sherman. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.

Williams, Bernard (1980). Justice as a Virtue. In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press 189-200.