CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS OF EMOTION AND NARRATIVE REALISM IN *MIDDLEMARCH* AND *ANNA KARENINA*

KAMILA WALKER, B.A. Honours
(Macquarie University)

Macquarie University, Sydney, Department of English
July 2013

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the conventional conceptual metaphors and metonymies of emotions in George Eliot's *Middlemarch* and Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, by relying on synthesized ideas from Cognitive Linguistics, Literary and Cultural Studies and Psychology, whilst remaining sensitive to the specific historical-cultural settings in which the novels are embedded. The task of this interdisciplinary approach is to bring to light the consistency of English and Russian speakers' common conceptions of shame, pride and anger, by discussing the fictional narratives as instantiations of typical modes of comprehending and talking about emotions.

The metaphorical representations of emotions are argued here to give an account of the distinct spatial-temporal context in which they arise, but the inescapable, universal embodied experience causes these representations not to betray any totally unexpected motivational sources: the unity of metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is essentially amenable to actual human physiology. Within this orientation, an inquiry into the biological basis of the figurative language embedded in realist discourse reveals that the novel contributes more to a broader understanding of the so-called "experiential cognition" across the two cultures (tacit knowledge of certain physiological patterns and instinctual impulses specific to a particular emotion) – the larger project of Cognitive Linguistics – than has been previously acknowledged.

This study makes use of current Conceptual Metaphor Theory as part of a literary analysis of the two focal novels, to address the questions: 'In what way do metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* conform to the universality of biological experience?' and 'How is this metaphoric language of the novels indispensable for communicating a standard for moral conduct in any particular situation?'. It thereby explores how Eliot's and Tolstoy's construction of language is motivated – and constrained – by fairly calculable physiological reactions, and offers a fresh literary analysis that considers the generation of metaphors to be an individual act of artistic creation, one nevertheless that is less distinctly cultural and more definitively biologically-determined.

I certify that this thesis is my own work and it has not been previously submitted, in part or in whole, for assessment in any formal course of study.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have various acknowledgements to make. This thesis was completed with the financial aid of an MQRES scholarship granted to me by Macquarie University in Sydney. I have also had the good fortune to receive an additional grant from the Department of English used for the most valuable and exciting week's field research in Moscow and St Petersburg. I'm grateful to the Departmental Administrator, Frances Thompson, for kindly helping me with the application process. It was a privilege and pleasure to work in the supportive environment of the English Department, which offered continuous guidance and professional advice.

I should like to thank Dr Marika Kalyuga (Department of International Studies, Macquarie University), my Associate Supervisor, for insightful lectures and conversations about emotions through the prism of the Russian language. Dr Kalyuga also read a number of translations and made useful suggestions. Any errors, however, both in translation and analysis, are my own.

I am particularly indebted to Professor Anna Wierzbicka (Department of Linguistics, Australian National University) for allowing me, over the course of six months, to join her excellent seminars on emotions, thereby offering the full benefit of close analyses of the NSM approach.

Much as I have enjoyed working on the thesis, I have appreciated even more the many hours of fruitful discussions with my Principal Supervisor, Professor Antonina Harbus (Department of English, Macquarie University), who first suggested and then scrupulously monitored the project. Her expert assistance, superlative navigation through disparate disciplinary fields, generous feedback on my work, editorial contribution, keen interest and enthusiasm for the thesis, as well as words of encouragement in times of struggle and self-doubt, are all beyond valuation.

Finally, I owe special thanks to my husband, Lance, for his help with the formatting of the thesis and also for his patience and constant support throughout my candidature.

NOTES ON EDITIONS AND SYSTEM OF REFERENCES USED

In order to provide a cross-section of responses to the challenges of translating emotion words, and variations in the responses to this challenge, three translations of *Anna Karenina* are cited, identified by their abbreviated titles:

> Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude, introd. E. B. Greenwood (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 1999) – hereafter (L&AM)
>
> Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larrisa Volokhonsky, pref. Richard Pevear (New York: Penguin, 2000) – hereafter (RP&LV)
>
> Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) – hereafter (AK)

This extended resource pool is employed not to portray individual linguistic quirks as the direct consequence of what might be called "rounding" procedures in which the translator bypasses the idiosyncrasies of the Russian language to deliver the novel in standard English. Rather, the aim is to highlight larger translation difficulties that stem from the very phenomenon of untranslatability of cross-lingual literary texts. When a page number is given, the reference is to Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, the Garnett translation signaled by the abbreviation (*AK*). It has often been necessary to cite Tolstoy's original novel using the Russian language, in which case the authoritative text Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) is used, indicated by a Cyrillic abbreviation (*АК*), followed by a page number. Whenever the original text is quoted, it is immediately followed by one of the translations listed above, indicated by the initials of the book's title (*AK*) to refer to Constance Garnett's translation, or otherwise identified by the initials of the translators' names – (L&AM) for Louise and Aylmer Maude, and (RP&LV) for Richard Pevear and Larrisa Volokhonsky. My own proficiency in both English and Russian languages expands the range of literary translations to include my own translation of *Anna Karenina* used throughout without annotation. A final note on referencing: as is conventional in Slavic scholarship published by linguists, a standard academic system of transliteration is used, except in larger stretches of discourse. Exceptions occur when fictional names are quoted (for example, Kitty) or when a secondary text is cited that has used a different transliteration system. Proper names like Tolstoy and St. Petersburg are used with their commonly accepted English spelling.

ABBREVIATIONS

AK	Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003).
AK	Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010).
AB	George Eliot, *Adam Bede* 1859, ed. Stephen Gill (London: Penguin, 1985).
BK	Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* 1878-80, trans. and introd. David McDuff (1993; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2003).
CP	Fyodor Dostoyevsky. *Crime and Punishment* 1865-6, trans. and introd. David McDuff (1991; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2003).
DS	Gogol, Nikolai. *Dead Souls* 1842, trans. and introd. David Magarshack (London: Penguin Books, 1961).
HT	Lermontov, Mikhail. *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, trans. and introd. Paul Foote (1966; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2001).
L&AM	Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude, introd. E. B. Greenwood (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 1999).
M	George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003).
P&P	Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice* 1813, ed. Vivien Jones (London: Penguin, 2003).
RP&LV	Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Richard Pevear and LarrisaVolokhonsky, pref. Richard Pevear (New York: Penguin, 2000).
OED^{2}Online	*The Oxford English Dictionary Online*, 2nd edition.
ORD^4	*The Oxford Russian Dictionary*, 4th edition.
EEBO	*Early English Books Online*, available at http://eebo.chadwyck.com

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

For all biblical references, the King James Version of the Bible is used.

1

INTRODUCTION: MAPPING PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION IN CROSS-LINGUAL LITERARY TEXTS

This study investigates conceptual metaphors for emotions in two canonical realist novels, George Eliot's *Middlemarch* (1871-2) and Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* (1875-7). It will take for its methodological framework Conceptual Metaphor Theory and deploy some key ideas from Literary and Cultural Studies and Psychology, in order to explore the curious fact that, despite a lack of correlation between their linguistic backgrounds, Eliot and Tolstoy persist in using similar metaphors of shame, pride and anger. These metaphors are nontrivially coherently organized into distinct conceptual groups, by and large, according to their capacity to make manifest these emotions' physiological and behavioural symptoms. This interpretive model, however, does not discount Eliot's and Tolstoy's artistic idiosyncrasy of expression. Its aim is rather to argue that the metaphoric language of the novels arises from embodied experience and the embeddedness of that experience in everyday emotional discourse and idiomatic language generally. That is, both authors assimilate their tacit knowledge of universal bodily functions to their own conceptualizations of emotions in a manner that promotes the generation of broadly familiar figurative expressions to make easier the processing of information about the characters' particular psychological conditions.

That the linguistic choices of Eliot and Tolstoy can be shown to be in part biologically-guided allows us to identify a striking characteristic of realist discourse. The representation of affective states within narrative discourse is contended to begin with logical, deep-seated conceptual schemas which are then exploited as the novelists individually manipulate conceptual metaphors to invite from the reader the kind of emotional reactions that most likely accord with their own moral points of view. In the portrayal of how *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are the products of the so-called "cognitive unconscious" of their respective cultures, there is an opportunity to pursue a new line of literary inquiry that theorizes a physiological basis of metaphoric construction to be an essential part of established conventions of the realist novel. This contention is sufficiently important to require restatement: the novel is not claimed to distinguish itself from other literary forms

fundamentally due to the connection it establishes between conventional metaphoric language and realist representation; the point is rather that any theory of the literary narrative will have to come to terms with the fact that this connection exists and is characteristic of the genre.

This linguistically- and culturally-informed approach is of particular value, because of its interdisciplinary nature: linguistic/cognitive and cultural aspects previously excluded from considerations of realist aesthetics may be fruitfully applied to the analysis of fictional representation of mental states by means of culturally-universal conventional metaphoric paradigms. It also proves potentially useful to those cultural linguists who tend to marginalize the impact of biology on language, insofar as it provides evidence that emotion concepts across different cultures are, to a large extent, conventionally metaphorically structured. Since they show a considerable overlap between conceptual metaphors of shame, pride and anger, evidently conditioned by human physiology, Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels emerge as reliable reconstructions of the embodied, culturally neutral, mode of thinking about these emotions.

Middlemarch and *Anna Karenina* have long been considered to be among the most dominant novels of nineteenth-century England and Russia, generating a great variety of critical responses, including a focus on Realism (Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth [1983], Jeremy Tambling [1990], Henry Staten [2000]; Anthony Thorlby [1987]; Harold K. Schefski [1981][1]); feminist criticism, which described the novels as ideologically transcendent or developmental, in that they question a pre-existing social order or inaugurate a new one (Gillian Beer [1986], Kristin Brady [1992]; Amy Mandelker [1993][2]); and finally, structuralist and post-structuralist criticism, which sought to define them as multitudinously approachable or indeterminist, novels that resist conclusions, by virtue of their 'experimental style, complex interaction of ideas, and layers of resonant allusions'[3] (Barbara Hardy [1982]; Karen Chase [2006]; Gary

[1] Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *Realism and Consensus in the English Novel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); Jeremy Tambling, '*Middlemarch*, Realism and the Birth of the Clinic', *ELH* 57.4 (1990): 939-960; Henry Staten, 'Is *Middlemarch* Ahistorical', *PMLA* 115.5 (2000): 991-1005; Anthony Thorlby, *Leo Tolstoy: Anna Karenina*, Landmarks of World Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Harold K. Schefski, 'Tolstoy's Urban-Rural Continuum in *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*', *South Atlantic Review* 46.1 (1981): 27-41.
[2] Gillian Beer, *George Eliot* (Brighton: Harvester, 1986); Kristin Brady, *George Eliot* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); and Amy Mandelker, *Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993).
[3] Nancy Henry, *The Cambridge Introduction to George Eliot* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 208.

Saul Morson [2007][4]). Though all of these critical perspectives are tenable and have the merit of pointing out a number of ways to consider the development of our ideas about the nineteenth-century novel in both England and Russia, their content-oriented architecture entails abstaining from discussing other interesting aspects of the novels. In particular, it seems that in the process of forming these post-formalist arguments, the language of the novels, the most immediate vehicle for representing culturally specific mental constructs of emotions, has become subsidiary to such categories as plot and character.

In effect, there is no shortage of ideological analyses of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* whose purpose is the reconstruction of the novels' connections both with their authors' lives and with the social and historical climate in which they developed. Neither can we detect a lack of interest amongst recent critics in demonstrating the relevance of English and Russian classics to our time, by probing into the way in which the novels speak to present-day issues of class, gender and national identity. However, little serious critical attention has been given to the novels theorized as repositories of what is typically known in the conceptual metaphor literature as "folk understandings"[5] of emotions. There has therefore been thus far only limited contribution from literature to the currently enormously expanding multi-strand, cross-linguistic, cross-cultural and also psychologically-orientated research on the common, hard-wired pattering of emotions embedded in everyday conceptual metaphors. A corollary of that negligence is a notoriously slow progress in accounting for how cross-lingual realist texts can be effectively incorporated into a study of the shared conceptual models amongst different language communities, and how bilingual (or ideally multilingual) readers can provide an understanding of the manner in which literary texts self-consistently convey conceptual sameness across metaphors of emotions, rather than a peripheral contrast.

In order to address this gap in scholarly inquires, this thesis will utilize the "cognitive linguistic view of metaphor" first introduced by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their pioneering study: *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), and subsequently expanded by Zoltán Kövecses – most notably by developing sophisticated cross-cultural analyses of metaphors – to argue that the cognitive principles involved in the structuring of emotions in *Middlemarch*

---

[4] Barbara Hardy, *Particularities: Readings in George Eliot* (London: Peter Owen, 1982); Karen Chase, ed. *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007).
[5] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 170.

are strikingly similar to that involved in *Anna Karenina*. The concern of this study, then, is to offer support from insights of Literary Studies to an enterprise which has been going on in Linguistic Studies for over three decades, by testing Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels for their conceptual consistency based on culturally universal knowledge of the basic functioning of the human body.

The aim thereby is properly to show, using cross-lingual literary texts, how the English way of understanding and metaphorically configuring emotions is maximally coherent with that of Russian. The argument, that the fictional representation of emotional experience proceeds ultimately from the immediately present biological awareness, displaces the traditional assertion that the novelistic discourse, as an artistic creation, rises above the ordinary linguistic forms of expression, thus foregrounding the originality and perhaps radicalism of this study. This paradigm seeks to contribute to literary analysis a theory of language designed to demonstrate that the routine use by Eliot and Tolstoy of conventional metaphors presupposes creativity which, although always individually inspired, almost invariably points to an organized textual product that is physiologically coded. So viewed, the realist novel can be shown to exhibit conceptual regularity that makes manifest its biological predeterminations.

This focus on conceptual metaphor will contribute to and develop a recent trend in Eliot and Tolstoy criticism toward a renewed interest in the mimetic possibilities of realistic fiction. This new approach seeks to examine as part of realistic conventions the centrality of metaphor and metonymy in the fictional structuring of emotional experience. The mimetic is achieved through the production with sufficient regularity of figurative expressions for emotions actually known to and used by different language readers. Rather than trying to describe or reproduce an emotion by a discursive practice traditionally referred to as "transparency" and "totalism",[6] the authors move to a more cognitive level and write on the basis that certain conceptual knowledge is shared amongst readers and that this common way of knowing is likely to induce certain emotional reactions as a matter of habit. The novels'

[6] A development of modern critical theory, especially the impact of structuralist, New Historicist and feminist thinking, has brought any notion of realistic representation as being either 'naively *transparent* and malignantly *totalistic*' almost to a point of vanishing (Harry E. Shaw, *Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot* [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999] 9).

‘vivid realism’ that aims to ‘place the reader within a scene or character by appealing first to the reader’s own sense perceptions and memories’[7] is due in part to Eliot’s and Tolstoy’s literary talents, as recognized by generations of critics, but more specifically to the way in which language is used to represent and arouse the emotions. Without exposure to this particular type of discourse that draws the reader’s attention to established conceptual models of emotions that are severely constrained by the nature of our cognition (our unconscious knowledge and processing of logical relations in the physical world), we would not be able to discern the kind of feelings the characters have, let alone form any emotional attachment to them.

This familiarly ordered rhetoric is treated in this study as an example of Eliot’s and Tolstoy’s novelistic experimentation within the representative genre, in the sense that the novelists require that the reader activates universal physiologically-driven cognitive mechanisms of comprehension whilst interpreting the emotional behaviour of fictional characters. This assumed reliance of Eliot and Tolstoy on the reader’s accommodation of their own mental abilities to encompass aspects of the emotional experience embedded in the texts has the related benefit of also helping substantiate otherwise a far less convincing argument that the implicit goal of a realist composition is rhetorically to blur the boundaries between real and imagined emotional universes. The extended mimetic range of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, on this reading, begins to assert itself not through the novels’ pursuit of social and historical accuracy, but rather through their discursive storing of comparative cognitions, or an intuitive grasp, of emotions via the transmission and even foregrounding of dominant conceptual frames.

Contemporary critics of Eliot and Tolstoy have made explicit the formal classification of their narrative fiction, repeatedly emphasizing Realism as a principal mode of representation. John Peck observes that in the critical discussion of how nineteenth-century novels were influenced in form and content by the contemporary doctrines of science, philosophy and psychology

[7] Donna Tussing Orwin, ‘Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 49-62, at 54.

> no novel has been referred to more frequently than *Middlemarch*, partly at least because it seems to carry representative status as the central Victorian text and also the most ambitious English-language realistic novel.[8]

Conversely, the supremacy in Tolstoy's depiction of emotional experience has led Gary Saul Morson to the opinion that *Anna Karenina* and *War and Peace*

> are typically considered to be among the finest, if not the very finest, novels ever written and Tolstoy ranks among the world's greatest authors . . . Tolstoy has struck writers and readers for the unsurpassed realism of his two great novels.[9]

These particular nineteenth-century novels have more in common than their popularity and critical acclaim. Structurally, both afford us with 'a model for the expansive form, in [their] large scope, multitude variation, and freedom from the restrictions of either aesthetic or ideological form';[10] both subscribe to realistic convention of locating a female protagonist in the centre; and both exceed their peers in their consideration and representation of human psychology. The chief result of this focus on the inner life is the provision of a means of characterizing and communicating a broad spectrum of nuanced human emotions. Alongside the more apparent architectural features of the novels – their sheer expansiveness, freedom of composition, and their concentration on the feminine as well as the psychological complexity by means of which the fictional reality is made life-like – they appear, more intensely than other Victorian novels, to affect readers by their dramatic and highly emotive storylines. Since they 'speak to universal human experiences',[11] *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* embody a socio-historical microcosm in which are reflected, not as abstractions but encoded in language, psychodynamic themes of universal import – duty, love, betrayal, revenge – as well as the whole range of corresponding human emotions (shame, pride and anger) to which the reader can easily relate. It is precisely the combination of the shared structural and affective characteristics of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* that make them especially suitable to be discussed together from a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective.

---

[8] John Peck, 'Introduction', in *New Casebooks: Middlemarch*, ed. John Peck (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 1-18, at 1.
[9] Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) 9.
[10] Barbara Hardy, *Particularities: Readings in George Eliot* (London: Peter Owen, 1982) 15.
[11] Henry ix.

Conceptual metaphors in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are claimed in this study to be creatively exploited in the representation of the effects upon nineteenth-century English and Russian people of their own shared, and in principle already established, configurations of emotions which are integral to their thinking and ways of behaving. The mental construction of shame, pride and anger, specifically categorized and circulated within a wider social and historical context will be textually simulated, or recreated, in the sense that the novels describe their characters as amalgams of human characteristics and situate them within a system of values and behavioural rules that correspond to cultural norms that define a real 'social knowledge system'.[12] There have been several interpretations of this highly polysemic term, Schütz's being most relevant to the current discussion. One of Schütz's main ideas, as neatly summarized by Philip Riley, is that the stability of meanings within a culture or idealized 'collective mode of reasoning'[13] depends crucially upon

> *commonsense* knowledge, what 'everybody knows' in a given group or society. This shared knowledge provides the basis of social reality, the beliefs and values, the social objects and institutions which inform our daily lives and behaviour, as well as the practical reasoning processes we employ continually to 'make sense' of specific real-life situations.[14]

An interrogation of folk theories of emotions in the novels, therefore, will involve not the tracing of peculiar or "abnormal" properties of metaphors of emotions, that is, minor points at which they depart from conventionally accepted cognitive templates for emotion concepts, but precisely of standard, customary ways of interpreting and describing them. Reflection on the discursive and cognitive basis of human feeling in English *Middlemarch* and Russian *Anna Karenina* in turn should contribute to our understanding of how Eliot and Tolstoy cannot use figurative language except that which reveals constraints that *a priori* knowledge of emotions in their respective cultures imposes. That is, without denying that there are indeed 'genuine intercultural differences in the phenomenology of the emotions',[15] their characterization in

---

[12] For a very good discussion of the term "social knowledge system", see Philip Riley, *Language, Culture and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), esp. Chapter 2 by the same title (21-67). Most commonly, it is used in reference to the task of analyzing 'the historical and social processes through which knowledge is established and communicated from individual to individual, from group to group and from generation to generation' (5). The understanding of this transference is essential when one is to make interpretations of emotions in cross-linguistic and comparative literature.
[13] James W. Underhill, *Ethnolinguistics and Cultural Concepts: Truth, Love, Hate and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 44.
[14] Riley 5, the emphasis is original.
[15] Carroll E. Izard, *The Face of Emotion* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971) 281.

terms of a class of equivalent conceptual schemas can productively suggest a cross-cultural universality.

In the examination of folk theories of emotions, it becomes particularly important to incorporate in the discussion elements from Cognitive Linguistics, given the close relationship existing between 'emotion-related cognitions'[16] (basic/habitual/deep-seated/non-negotiable organization by the mind of any given emotion) and the way these cognitions are expressed linguistically; this relationship between thoughts and their expression is the core, but not exclusive, focus of this field. Aside from their similar architectural arrangements and equally measurable power to engage us at an emotional level, the novels are inscribed in the language of prose, whereby conventional, if highly formal, English and Russian syntax and semantics are deployed. The language of the novels is not poetic yet makes use of the figurative modes of thought that are motivated by unconscious mental processes, much of which is conceptually based.[17] The observation that Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels do not depend for their impact on a departure from the common metaphorical conceptualizations of emotional experience manifested through their languages has serious implications for the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic comparative study of these literary texts. *Middlemarch* is written in standard literary English; *Anna Karenina* is written in standard literary Russian. Their meanings arise from the distinct linguistic systems of the languages and 'different value systems [these languages] involve'.[18]

Notwithstanding the novels' divergent linguistic and cultural features, they are claimed in this study to be metaphorically stagnant, emphatically not creative in their use of their own languages. The range of metaphors and metonymies for shame, pride and anger deployed highlights, at least conceptually, some urge or tendency of Eliot and Tolstoy never to quite dispense with the conventional linguistic expressions typically used by two cultures to capture these emotions. Both authors deploy everyday metaphors and common conceptualizations in their otherwise extraordinary discursive practices. This persistence of commonplace figurative

[16] Izard 280.
[17] The principal hypothesis that 'our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of', but something however that restricts the way we think and articulate our ideas in both everyday and literary discourse is essentially George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's (*Metaphors We Live By* [Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980] 3).
[18] Daniel Chandler, *Semiotics: The Basics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) 197.

language, even if somewhat reinvigorated within realist discourse, results demonstrably in the restriction by Eliot and Tolstoy of their schematic frameworks of mental states to roughly homogenous conceptual configurations in the communication of their moral messages. Despite their culturally-specific emotion lexicons, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are argued to assemble not a random collection of original metaphors, but a unified system of culturally-neutral, '*automatic*, unconscious mappings'[19] that are rudimentarily universal and internally coherent, particularly by virtue of the relation of the novels' languages to shared physiological and behavioural responses to emotions (discussed below, pp. 24-25). This study, in other words, primarily seeks to account for what may be called "a cognitive isomorphism", a near-direct correlation between the English and Russian metaphoric representation of emotions as emerging from biology-determined intuitions spontaneously projected upon the narrative discourse.

The Language of Emotions

The reconstruction and comparison of the linguistic products of that embodied mind on the evidence of cross-lingual literary texts is an interpretive practice demanding reading of the original texts in their host languages. Just as it is impossible to understand English and Russian novels without knowing English and Russian, so it is limiting to try to explain how the novels conceptually structure emotional meanings in their respective cultures and how they serve to index cultural identity – without relating them to the connotative systems of the English and Russian languages. Appreciating *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* requires a nuanced understanding of their original languages in which they were written. This does not mean that reliance upon translations of the novels cannot guarantee the reader an immensely rewarding engagement with them: with the aid of the talents and faculties of the most dedicated translators, many people 'will perceive the [texts], emotionally and artistically, in a manner that [closely] parallels and corresponds to the esthetic experience of [their] first readers'.[20] But this engagement with the novels is fragmentary. Reading the novels in translation, however seriously committed it is to '[celebrating] the differences among languages and the many varieties of human experience and perception they can express',[21] is

[19] Antonio Barcelona, 'Introduction: The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy', in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective*, ed. Antonio Barcelona (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003) 1-28, at 5.
[20] Edith Grossman, *Why Translation Matters* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010) 7.
[21] Grossman 17.

still not the kind of experience from which one could derive a most comprehensive interpretation of the works as culturally and linguistically unique. In Anna Wierzbicka's words, to understand *Anna Karenina* more fully, in particular how this novel describes and conceptualizes emotions,

> we need to take an interest in the emotion concepts lexicalized in other languages of the world. We need to try to understand those concepts from a native's point of view, to try to enter the conceptual world of other peoples and abandon our Anglo perspective in interpreting that world.[22]

Wierzbicka's recommendation comes from her excellent linguistic study entitled 'Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts', whereby she discusses language in relation to culture, and provides a framework that serves as an empirical tool for the analysis of the semantic components of emotion words to indicate a distinct interpretation of the world specific to a given community. This non-"Anglocentric"[23] approach means taking into consideration both the '*affective lexicon*'[24] of a particular language and the significance that this lexicon gives rise to, and then applying this information to the construction of cultural identity. According to Wierzbicka's theory, which ultimately goes back to the pioneering and still durable 'Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis',[25]

---

[22] Anna Wierzbicka, 'Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts', in *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence*, eds. Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Rose Markus (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994) 133-196, at 139.

[23] Anna Wierzbicka, 'A Conceptual Basis for Research into Emotions and Bilingualism', *Bilingualism: Language and Cognition* 11.2 (2008): 193-195, at 193.

[24] Wierzbicka, 'Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts', 136.

[25] Most scholars working in anthropological linguistics would agree that Anna Wierzbicka's idea that 'language is shaped by culture' (*Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations* [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992] 21), was set by Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf in their well-known "Sapir-Whorf" theory (1956), according to which

> we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages . . . Every language contains terms that have come to attain cosmic scope of reference, that crystallize in themselves the basic postulates of an unformulated philosophy, in which is couched the thought of a people, a culture, a civilization, even of an era . . . And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.

(Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality*, ed. John B. Carroll [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1956] 213, 61, 252).

Wierzbicka's theory now offers a far more interesting approach to the study of the relationship between language and culture in that it incorporates into it cognitive models of language and thought. As a cultural linguist, Wierzbicka seeks to illuminate the role language plays in shaping the ways in which a particular culture relates to the world, to itself and to other cultures.

> Każdy język ma swoje charakterystyczne słowa, słowa nie posiadające dokładnych odpowiedników w innych językach. Zazwyczaj takie słowa stanowią klucze do kultury i historii narodu, który tym językiem mówi.[26]
>
> (Every language has its own characteristic words, words that do not have their exact equivalents in other languages. Usually such words are the keys to the culture and the history of the nation which speaks this language).

Here, Wierzbicka is making a philosophical point, but she is also stipulating what counts as a cross-cultural analysis of language of emotions. Her position is that distinct emotions do not always have corresponding words in any particular language, but the absence of a word in one language to designate the particular emotion does not mean that people in cultures that use a different language do not experience that emotion. What this means is that whilst from the phenomenological point of view there is no stopping people from feeling a particular emotion, 'every language imposes its own classification upon human emotional experience'.[27] It is therefore a mistake to assume that emotion terms have the same meaning across different languages or that emotions themselves, such as shame or embarrassment, are experienced and conceptualized in a culturally universal way. Wierzbicka is formulating this hypothesis when she poses one of her most original questions:

> What is the meaning of such words as *joy, sorrow, regret, fear, irritation, admiration, jealousy, pity, gratitude, worry*? Is it possible to define these words, i.e. to explain their meaning by means of semantically simpler ones and to make manifest the structural relations which obtain between the names of various emotions?[28]

Her response is that emotion terms are best understood as 'shorthand abbreviations for complex expressions, i.e. descriptions of some kind'.[29] These somehow self-explanatory (simplified) definitions refer precisely to the ability of non-native speakers to reconstruct, with

---

[26] Anna Wierzbicka, *Mały Portret Języka Polskiego dla Młodzieży w Krajach Anglosaskich* (Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, no date) 7, my translation.

[27] Wierzbicka, 'Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts', 139. This idea is most clearly elucidated by Wierzbicka in her study entitled 'Talking about Emotions: Semantics, Culture, and Cognition', whereby she argues that

> The absence of universal emotion terms does not mean that there cannot be any universal emotions, or that certain emotions cannot be matched, all over the world, with certain identifiable facial expressions. It only means that *if* there are certain emotions which can be matched, universally, with the same (identifiable) facial expressions, these emotions cannot necessarily be identified by means of English emotion terms, such as *sadness* or *anger*, because these terms embody concepts which are language- and culture-specific.

('Talking about Emotions: Semantics, Culture, and Cognition', *Cognition and Emotion* 6. 3/4 [1992]: 285-319, at 287).

[28] Anna Wierzbicka, *Semantic Primitives*, trans. Anna Wierzbicka and John Besemeres (Frankfurt/M: Athenäum Verlag, 1972) 57.

[29] Wierzbicka, *Semantic Primitives*, 59.

the use of universally interpretable and intuitively intelligible mini-words and mini-grammar, standard scenarios in which particular emotions usually occur. Thus the social definition of, for example, the concept of *anger* is embedded in the situational context: 'X feels angry = X feels as one does when one thinks that someone has done something bad and when one wants to cause this person to do something he doesn't want to do'.[30] Simply put, Wierzbicka's theory – which is by now well established as the NSM approach (Natural Semantic Metalanguage, a methodology referred to in Chapter 4 below) – encourages us to verify in ourselves the emotions we experience when we are in circumstances equivalent to those described. Underlying this reciprocity of human emotional perspectives is the author's conviction that

> thoughts have a structure which can be rendered in words, but feelings, like sensations, do not. All we can do, therefore, is to describe in words the external situations or thoughts which are associated in our memory or in our imagination with the feeling in question and to trust that our reader or listener will grasp what particular feelings are meant.[31]

Wierzbicka thereby claims that the linguistic repertoires for expressing emotions that different cultures have at their disposal testify more often than not to the cultural specificity or uniqueness of people's fundamental conceptual models, their own ethnocentric presuppositions and their own unconscious expectations about the kinds of emotional interpretations that are typically made by members of that group. Wierzbicka's comments contain a valid point, namely that exploring the foundations of the culturally-specific discourse of emotions can bring us closer to the normative systems that allow for a diagnosis of what is valued and important to a particular culture. But the literary scholar may find evidence for the methodological problem inherent in her linguistic project: the basic assumption – guided perceptibly by the exclusion of the widespread preoccupation with the embodiment of emotions – that the conceptualization of emotions across cultures reveals assemblies of mental schemas which are anything but universal. This study aims to overcome this emphasis on non-universality of mental constructions of emotions, by demonstrating the biological basis of conceptual thought, as indicated by Eliot's and Tolstoy's individual selections of roughly the same conceptual metaphors for emotions. The figurative language of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is thus argued to be grounded in an awareness of instantaneous, and usually uncontrollable, physiological changes evoked by emotional states,

[30] Wierzbicka, *Semantic Primitives*, 62.
[31] Wierzbicka, *Semantic Primitives*, 59.

irrespective of what other kind of evidence, such as cultural determinants, may seem to be against it.

Literary scholars have expressed great interest in the two ideas, firstly that emotions tend to require the substantiation in language that is always and necessarily culture-specific, and secondly that emotions may be best defined by recognizable physiological response patterns. For well over a decade scholars from different social science disciplines including cultural and social psychology, psychological anthropology and linguistics have been paying increased attention to the study of emotions and emotion terms, forging a robust interdisciplinary field of enquiry. By reviewing the history of emotions and reinterpreting the traditional notions that construe emotions as contingent upon the bodily or physiological factors, they have promoted divergent theories on human emotional functioning from various perspectives: the cognitive and linguistic, the social, cultural and historical. While motivations and methodology have varied, two common lines of argument have been endorsed by many of those working in these disparate fields: (1) human emotions are at once bodily reactions and social and cultural acts, whose 'display is subject to rules and conventions',[32] and (2) human emotions are linguistically relative, that is, each language encodes emotional experience differently, because each language has a unique semantic range of its own emotion terms. These ideas are particularly useful in the establishment of new methods for investigating the way in which narrative fiction instantiates and depends upon such an intriguing analogy as that between body and language: the prevalence in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* of metaphors that arise from common embodied experience indicates that Eliot's and Tolstoy's own habits of thought about emotions assume this correlation, despite the limited linguistic overlap of English and Russian emotion terms.

At this point a special word about the category of emotions under scrutiny is needed, as it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the full range of emotions expressed through the conceptual metaphors of the novels. In making the selection of particular emotions to focus on, I have relied on an oft-repeated idea that shame, pride and anger, despite their negative connotations, describe more vigorously than other emotion terms the common moral

[32] W. Gerrod Parrott and Rom Harré, 'Introduction: Some Complexities in the Study of Emotions', in *The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions*, eds. Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 1-20, at 1.

consciousness that is an essential part of Western (and Westernized) civilization grounded in Judao-Christian ideals, and to which the moral writers of the nineteenth century, out of their respect for moral law, were especially responsive. Shame and pride were viewed by novelists traditionally as forms of moral standards founded upon some preconceived ideal of the proper conduct and actualized through the collective obligation to belong – in Antonio R. Damasio's influential configuration proposed in *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of the Consciousness* they fall into the category of '*secondary* or *social emotions*'.[33] Anger, on the other hand, was conceived of as an emotion more characteristic of human nature – and is hence classified by Damasio as a '*primary* or *universal emotion*'.[34]

In the passionately dramatic novelistic representations of human interactions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* these emotions are central to the novels' plots. They occur pervasively and are indicative of the bourgeois societies and their institutive practices as depicted in the texts. There seems to be – and it is the metaphorical language that suggests it – a fundamental ambivalence about the expression of pride and anger in English and Russian cultures. In other words, the novels are argued figuratively to draw a distinction between an appropriate and an inappropriate display of these emotions. In this schema, the virtuous suppression of angry feelings is contrasted with a merely permissible anger as a response to a perceived slight; and an empty or vainglorious pride derived from an indulgence in one's

[33] Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness* (London: Vintage, 2000) 51.

[34] Damasio 50. Damasio was not the first to classify anger as a universal emotion. The major argument of Charles Darwins's evolutionary theory, in this regard, was that certain emotions, anger amongst them, are innate and instinctive, that is, they are 'part of the bioregulatory devices with which we come equipped to survive' (Damasio 53). Although Darwin (1872) acknowledged some differences in facial and behavioural expressions of this emotion across different species, Darwin nevertheless emphasized a great degree of consistency. He wrote: 'Rage, anger, and indignation are exhibited in nearly the same manner throughout the world' (*The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 3rd ed. Paul Ekman [London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1872/1998] 242). In this famous work, he proposed that the human expression of anger where the teeth are exposed, eyes brightened, and the nostrils flared has roots in animal's aggressive facial behaviour intended to threaten an enemy and to issue a warning of the intention to attack. Darwin's view of emotions, which has become known as the "universality theory", and which provoked considerable controversy over the years in academic circles, is basically the first hypothesis developed in a systematic way and with direct evidence that primary emotions and their physical expressions – as biologically motivated impulses – are universal, that is, 'the same in all humans independent of age, gender, race and culture' (Paula M. Niedenthal et al., *Psychology of Emotion: Interpersonal, Experimental, and Cognitive Approaches* [New York and Hove: Psychology Press, 2006] 122). It is important to note that this study does not revise Darwin's theory, but rather it employs a judgement that the distinctive, physiologically-based character of metaphors of emotions used in everyday speech by different cultures derives, at least in part, from the observance of the remarkable uniformity in the way people around the world experience and rationalize emotions.

material possessions is conceptually organized to differ from the concept of proper pride, interpreted as evidence of one's superior qualities.

Conceptual metaphors of emotions found in Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels are examples of universal rules of thinking to elicit the moral value in displayed emotion from a context in which there could just as well under the circumstances be demonstrated other, less strongly motivated affective responses. This metaphorically projected dualism of emotion is guided by the presupposition of culturally-prescribed canons of behaviour. Anger, for example, the ambivalence toward which Eliot and Tolstoy locate realistically in metaphors, is an emotion that is not exclusively judged negatively. The positive appraisal of anger stems in principle from the right it seeks to establish. This study attempts to relate cross-linguistic and cross-cultural analyses of conceptual metaphors of emotions of the kind first demonstrated by Lakoff and Johnson to the nineteenth-century high point of the novel characterized by Realism in which *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* belong (discussed in detail in Chapter 2 below), and to the framework of standard and oftentimes contradictory construals of emotions which are largely due to already historically distributed incongruous meanings that these novels particularly exemplify.

Conceptual Metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson, in *Metaphors We Live By*, directly contradict the traditional view of metaphor as a merely poetic device used for ornamentation by claiming that (1) 'metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action';[35] (2) it is unavoidable, used regularly and spontaneously, as part of our ordinary language; (3) 'our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, fundamentally metaphorical in nature';[36] (4) conceptual metaphors are the product of cognitive processing that functions in ways that we are largely unconscious of; (5) the role of conceptual metaphors is to categorize concepts into classes and subclasses via systematically gathering together "metaphorical linguistic expressions";[37] and (6) through their conventional use, a community of speakers consistently embraces metaphoric concepts that force them into distinctive structures of thought and behaviour. So, the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR (the very

[35] Lakoff and Johnson 3.
[36] Lakoff and Johnson 3.
[37] Lakoff and Johnson 7.

first of their examples) that arises from the regular occurrence of common expressions, or mini-metaphors, such as making "*indefensible*" claims, "*demolishing*" another person's point of view, "*winning*" an argument with the opponent, employing effective "*strategies*" to increase one's chances of success in an argument, predisposes us mentally to act when we argue as though we were actually fighting battles. In other words, Lakoff's and Johnson's own goal is fundamentally to put forward a conception of metaphor as a useful construct serving the purpose of fashioning, via metaphorical linguistic expressions which are themselves the source of a corresponding conceptual metaphor, the diverse and idiosyncratic ways of 'how we perceive, how we think, and what we do'.[38] To appreciate the significance of the Lakoff-Johnson theory in the context of this study, we need to take into account its particular suitability and effectiveness in comparing metaphors cross-culturally. When perceived as such, Lakoff's and Johnson's insights are potentially a useful entry to an examination of the contents of the nineteenth-century English and Russian minds in terms of the actual ideas that members of these cultures presumably had about their emotions. The scope of this theory, moreover, demands that the interpretation of metaphors in literary texts (poetic or other) be drawn from the effort to comprehend them in just the same way as in ordinary speech, in the sense of assigning them no great originality except that which authors purposely accord them.[39]

If there are relatively few cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies on the use of conceptual metaphor in the novel, it is probably because the problems of aesthetic form, in the wake of the rediscovery of Russian Formalism, have dominated critical attention. Traditionally, there has been the common notion of Formalism as a literary movement which primarily emphasized 'the formal, intrinsic qualities of the literary work'[40] (such as grammar and syntax) and minimized its background conditioning that emerged through the interplay of historical, biographical and cultural context, with the resultant inclination 'to turn literature into precisely the kind of artifact that means little in relation to the world and tends to obscure the worldly relations that inform the text and its production'.[41] This preoccupation with

[38] Lakoff and Johnson 4.
[39] For the development of this idea see George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).
[40] Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, 'Fear of Formalism: Kant, Twain, and Cultural Studies in American Literature', *Diacritics* 27.4 (1989): 46-69, at 46.
[41] Dillon 46.

structural properties of literary texts whilst neglecting the diversity of cultural and historical assumptions which informed them, has led to a situation where literary critics, driven 'not by curiosity about literature and history in the past so much as deep embarrassment about the marginality of literary history',[42] embraced an urgency to develop a new way of theorizing the relationship between form and content. Recent developments in literary criticism have already proved influential and productive in the search for an adequate theory of literature. The starting point of this emerging approach to literary form, New Formalism, is neither an attempt to completely suppress earlier formalist approaches, nor a treatment of literary texts merely as '"bundles of historical and cultural content"' (both of which *New* Historicism simultaneously seems to have taken to promote).[43] Rather, it is an acknowledgment that a commitment to form is also at the same time a commitment to cultural-political practices united with an assiduous attention to ideological means. In order to reduce the potential distortion of the definition of New Formalism, which due to its complexity has already been recognized as 'a very mixed bag'[44] and something that 'can be many things',[45] it is best to understand New Formalism as a renewed interest in formal features or techniques of the literary work – 'textual, aesthetic, and every other kind'[46] – serving to restore the text's contextually-embedded truth, 'values forgotten, rejected, or vulgarized'[47] due to the rapidly shifting political and ideological climate.

---

[42] Alan Liu, 'The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism', *ELH* 56.4 (1989): 721-771, at 722.

[43] Marjorie Levinson, 'What Is New Formalism', *PMLA* 122.2 (2007): 558-569, at 561. Levinson, drawing on Richard Strier's distinction between *New* Historicism and New *Historicism* (the exchangeable use of italics indicates two distinct branches of New Historicism), argues that, unlike *New* Historicism which acknowledges both structural and contextual aspects of a literary text, New *Historicism* 'flatly refuses the meaningfulness of form, of the aesthetic, and of literature except as mystification; it will not credit, much less explore, the reality of that institutional and phenomenological appearance' (Levinson 565). For the relationship between literature and history within an alternative variety of New Historical Criticism, see Ellen Spolsky's valuable argument that

> many of the historical and cultural critics reveal a parallel between their attempts to listen to the voices of others who share their current historical context and their listening to the voices of the past by vigorous and colourful personifications of these voices . . . a text was once a passive object, often a reflecting mirror located on the wall of social space. It is now an active, thinking participant.

(*Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993] 177).

[44] Levinson 562.

[45] W. J. T. Mitchell, 'The Commitment to Form; or, Still Crazy after All These Years', *PMLA* 118.2 (2003): 321-325, at 324.

[46] Levinson 562.

[47] Levinson 561.

The Cultural Specificity of Emotion Words

This study makes the similar point that formalists do in considering emotive vocabulary of the maximally naturalized discourse of the realist novel to be an appropriate entry point to the enquiry into cultural psychology, our own and foreign. It is the customary contention of linguists that emotion words, such as English *shame* or its Russian closest equivalent *styd* rely for their meaning on the 'the conceptual content' that designates these emotions 'in particular languages'.[48] They are the signs of the broad variation in the interpretation of these emotions, commonly referred to as folk philosophies, produced by native speakers strictly within the bounds of what Wierzbicka would be inclined to call English and Russian distinct 'ethnopsychology'.[49] It is difficult to see how the entire linguistic project of investigating emotions could be subjected to the exploration of culturally-specific connotations of emotion terms, given their disproportionately small number in our emotion lexicons. Emotion-related metaphorical terms and expressions are shown to be pervasive examples of remarkably coherent mind schemas which are very nearly universal and make it possible to identify the compartmentalization of emotional meanings into a series of categories which themselves are analogous or conformable to our common understanding of the laws of nature. Emotion words, however, have the priority of access to the culturally diverse conceptions of emotions understood as behaviours that are displayed in order to achieve some socially-oriented end.

The following section will not address the novels themselves, but rather look at culturally-specific experiences and expressions for emotions in a broader sense. Contrasting English and Russian emotion words and their semantic structures will suggest subtle but crucial differences between these two cultures in terms of their ideas about the acceptable standards that govern social interactions. A good example of cultural variation in the basic conceptualization of emotional experience may be provided by the English concept of *shame*, a much more basic (but not necessarily more commonly used) word in English than *embarrassment*. The situation in which a student is caught cheating during an examination would be perceived by the majority of English people as shameful rather than embarrassing. In contrast, forgetting a host's first name would most likely leave a guest with a feeling of

[48] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 8.
[49] Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture and Cognition*, 34.

embarrassment, and not *shame*.[50] Experiences of this kind alter the ways emotions are understood and interpreted because they assume a concept of cultural construction, or 'social constructionist perspective',[51] that is very different from the 'essentialist approach',[52] once the dominant choice for theorizing emotions. An essentialist approach considers emotional meaning as fundamentally 'psychobiological processes, internal, irrational, natural, and universal'.[53] A social constructivist perspective, in contrast, portrays emotions as 'shaped by the cultural systems of an individual's society'.[54] The social constructionist perspective does not completely and irrevocably abandon the biophysiological and unconscious aspects of emotions, but

> because it views the expressed emotion as a learnt response, it encourages the investigation of how emotions obtain their meaning, how they are used in interpersonal relationships, and how the various emotions intersect in daily life.[55]

Although emotions indisputably arise from bodily changes that are free from human control, such as sweating, hormonal reactions or muscle tensions,[56] they are too produced by

---

[50] Most psychologists investigating shame and embarrassment have agreed that

> shame is appropriate in cases of serious derelictions that would, if publicly noticed, lead to assessments of character so unfavourable as to permanently depreciate one's honour. Embarrassment is the emotion proper to the violation of mere convention, a code of manners.

(Rom Harré, 'Embarrassment: A Conceptual Analysis', in *Shyness and Embarrassment*, ed. W. R. Crozier [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990] 181-204, at 197).
Therefore, in general,

> Public revelation of relatively awful actions such as cowardly failing to render emergency aid to an accident victim, or infecting a spouse with a sexually transmitted disease caught from a prostitute, would presumably cause shame, not embarrassment.

(Rowland S. Miller, *Embarrassment: Poise and Peril in Everyday Life* [New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1996] 21).
In contrast, tripping in public, falling off a chair in class, spilling a drink all over one's shirt, or throwing up on a date are typical situations instigating embarrassment (Miller 48, 51, 53, 55).
[51] Linda A. Pollock, 'Anger and the Negotiation of Relationships in Early Modern England', *The Historical Journal* 47.3 (2004): 567-590, at 568. The number of publications on cultural construction of emotions is already enormous and seems to be increasing exponentially. For the most popular, see Michelle Z. Rosaldo, *Knowledge and Passion: Ilonglot Notions of Self and Social Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Rom Harré, ed., *The Social Construction of Emotions* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), esp. Chapter 1, 'An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint' (2-14); Catherine A. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1988); and Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[52] Pollock 568.
[53] Pollock 568.
[54] Pollock 568.
[55] Pollock 569.
[56] Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens*. Physiological response patterns have long been thought to be an important aspect of emotion, but much controversy still centres on the issue of their importance. This controversy is explored at length in D. K. Candland, 'The Persistent Problems of Emotion', in *Emotion*, eds. Douglas K. Candland et al. (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1977) 1-84; and Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott, eds., *The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions* (London: Sage Publications, 1996).

cultural and social determinations that are non-uniform and often conflicting, that permeate language use, and inflect their specific cultural orientations and historical circumstances.[57] According to Elspeth Probyn, a contemporary scholar who seeks to reconcile the extreme positions, the social constructionist perspective of emotions is precisely constructionist for it builds the bridge between the biological and social aspects of emotions through the recognition that they arise not from a separation but from 'a collision of bodies, ideas, history, and place'.[58]

An analysis of cultural diversity demonstrates that emotions and their conceptualizations are relative to the social and historical context in which people live. For example, S. Kitayama and T. Masuda consider emotions 'as much more social, mediated significantly by tacit cultural knowledge and attendant practices of everyday life'.[59] From this constructionist perspective, emotions are viewed

> as an assortment of socially shared and collectively enacted scripts, which are made up of physiological, subjective, and behavioral components, but which are also embedded in and, further, importantly constituting the immediate sociocultural, semiotically constituted environment.[60]

In short, emotions 'develop as individuals actively – both personally and collectively – adapt and adjust to this cultural environment'.[61] Human emotions are involuntary, but determinate, self-reflexively measured against distinctive social rules, values and 'conventions governing the acceptable demonstration of emotion'.[62] It is well known that realist fiction has the potential to transmit culturally specific expectations about forms of expression and the regulation of emotions. One function of this Realism is the sensitization of audiences to a range of socially preferable behaviours, that is, with provoking readers to make a moral judgement and supplying instruction on the ethical models to be followed. This idea can be

---

[57] For example, according to Peggy A. Thoits, 'historical and cultural variability suggests that, to an important degree, subjective experiences and emotional beliefs are both socially acquired and socially structured' ('The Sociology of Emotions', *Annual Review of Sociology* 15 [1989]: 317-342, at 319). An individual has to learn and conform to the prevailing social norms 'in order to behave in socioculturally appropriate ways' (Thoits 327). In effect, emotions are characterized by the absorption of various linguistic materials and cultural scripts 'that constitute an important aspect of [a given culture's] way of life' (Sally Planalp, *Communicating Emotion: Social, Moral, and Cultural Processes* [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999] 196).
[58] Elspeth Probyn, *Blush: Faces of Shame* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005) 149.
[59] Shinobu Kitayama and Takahiko Masuda, 'Reappraising Cognitive Appraisal from a Cultural Perspective', *Psychological Inquiry* 6.3 (1995): 217-223, at 219.
[60] Kitayama and Masuda 219.
[61] Kitayama and Masuda 219.
[62] Pollock 569.

expanded to include a discussion of the power and effectiveness of the figurative language used to communicate those emotion norms.

The point of departure of this study is to contend that the metaphoric representation in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* of mental states is largely subconscious and complements, if it does not actually precede, the authors' choice of emotion terms. The metaphors of shame, pride, anger, and presumably of many other emotions, are the result of the synthesis of a variety of homogeneous mental images associated with these emotions. This homogeneity across different cultures is due ultimately to a consistent similarity in the conceptual categorization of emotions (such as for example 'ANGER IS HEAT'[63]) which is determined by the universal cognizance of an emotion's physiological and behavioural manifestations. To insist upon a universe of conceptual categories in the sense of types or 'image schematic structures'[64] (that are habitual and fixed) as the source of shared meanings for the speakers of different languages, is not at the same time to neglect the distinctive connotative content of emotion terminology that the users of a particular language understand and utilize to express and communicate their own culturally-specific meanings.

If local vocabularies of a culture can be used as a guide to the distinct semantic fields of emotions, then different cultures construe emotional meanings in a variety of dissimilar ways. In English society, *shame* implies a judgment and even punishment (this person broke a legally and morally imposed code of conduct, and thus is expected to make compensation as part of their rehabilitation [a dishonest student may do so by sitting a much more difficult exam or by foregoing a turn, for example]),[65] whereas *embarrassment* is compatible with a social faux pas and self-reproach.[66] *Shame* can be felt indefinitely and can incur a social stigma (of a cheater); *embarrassment* is short-lived and is normally quickly forgotten. In the

---

[63] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986) 13. Following the conventions of cognitive linguistics, small capital letters are used to indicate conceptual metaphors.

[64] The phrase is from George Lakoff, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor', in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 202-251, at 215.

[65] The second edition of *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (OED^{2}Online), for example, defines *shame* as 'a fact or circumstance which brings disgrace or discredit (to a person, etc.); matter for severe reproach or reprobation' (OED^{2}Online, s. *shame* n. 5a).

[66] In her innovative research on how emotion serves as a basis for social interaction and communication, Sally Planalp observes that 'embarrassment occurs primarily in public . . . and usually we do something that projects the wrong social image to others – most often we feel foolish'. Therefore when people show embarrassment, 'they are not just expressing their personal feelings. They are also enacting socially prompted, socially defined, and socially sanctioned rituals for repairing social gaffes' (Planalp 155, 156).

English language, the pronouncement of another person's disgrace usually takes the form of an accusative statement – *Shame on you!* or *You should be ashamed of yourself!* to denote 'adjuration or remonstrance'[67] – whereas in the Russian language it takes the form of a rhetorical question: *Kak tebe ne stydno?* (roughly translated as *How is it that you are not ashamed?*). Although it is possible within an English-speaking context to pose a question *Aren't you ashamed of yourself?* it does not mean the same as the question *Kak tebe ne stydno?*, as each encodes a different way of thinking about shame and each 'encourages a certain perspective on human actions and events'.[68] The question *Aren't you ashamed of yourself?* is based on the judgment that "in light of prevailing social standards you did something wrong"[69] and anticipates a compliant response. On the other hand, the question *Kak tebe ne stydno?* is usually triggered by the absence of any displayed regret over one's shameful behaviour and registers the observer's act of lamenting in that regard. The English question *Aren't you ashamed of yourself?* might seem at first glance to correspond exactly to the Russian question *Kak tebe ne stydno?* in view of the fact that both are seen as having moral condemnation as their basis. However, the former question presupposes an intention to intensify a disgraced person's sense of shame by eliciting the open acknowledgment of the moral breach; the latter assumes a direct (and often desperate) appeal to another person's moral sensitivity. This discrepancy of purpose demonstrates a rather different place that these two seemingly correlative interpretations of the concept of *shame* occupy in the English and Russian speakers' mental apparatus. The difference in the meaning of the English *Aren't you ashamed of yourself?* and the Russian *Kak tebe ne stydno?* should in turn serve as 'a warning to all those who are inclined to absolutize *shame* as a "universal human emotion'".[70]

---

[67] OED[2]Online, s. *shame* n. 13b.
[68] Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 5.
[69] According to A. Wierzbicka, 'in current usage, *shame* often [but not exclusively] refers to something bad that we have done, and it often goes hand in hand with *remorse*'. In fact 'people can also be *ashamed* of something for which they are not in any way responsible, for example, they can be *ashamed* of their parents, or of their origin. Furthermore, we can be *ashamed* of our shortcomings, of our inability to spell correctly, of our clothes'. In this sense, the semantic content of *shame* extends from "someone did something wrong" to include the component '"people can know something bad about me"' (Anna Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999] 109).
[70] Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures, 111.

While *shame* has ‘a transcultural core meaning’, it evidently also has ‘some culture-specific meanings or emotion-related cognitions of significance for intercultural understanding and communication’.[71] There are, however, emotion concepts whose emphatic ethnocentric character precludes the search for alternative labels in other languages in the hope that they would be closely analogous to, that is, expressive of, with the same level of particularity, essentially the same psychic entity. For example, the Russian language does not a have a word for the concept like *embarrassment*. Instead, it has a word for the concept of *zamešatel'stvo* (roughly translated by the fourth edition of *The Oxford Russian Dictionary* [ORD^4] as ‘confusion; embarrassment’). Despite having an apparently similar semantic range, however, this word does not have the same connotations as the English word embarrassment. *Zamešatel'stvo* differs from *embarrassment* in that it is less likely to lead to self-criticism and more to mental discomfort. This is because, unlike the concept of *embarrassment*, *zamešatel'stvo* is not connected to any inadequacies in social behaviour. A person who could be described as experiencing *zamešatel'stvo* is, for example, one who is suddenly and randomly asked an unforeseen question (such as an unexpected marriage proposal), mentally struggling to comprehend the surprising nature of the question itself. Typically, *embarrassment* brings to mind the image of a person sheepishly smiling at people in the hope that their social misdemeanour will be perceived as such and subsequently ignored. *Zamešatel'stvo*, on the other hand, manifests itself in serious consternation and physical discomfort. The implicit goal of *embarrassment*, therefore, is to change the situation by encouraging people not to react when a wrongdoing has occurred, whereas the implicit goal of *zamešatel'stvo* is to cope with one’s sense of uncertainty in unpredictable circumstances.

The question whether emotion and its expression are universal or culture-specific has been repeatedly debated within the academic community and, in at least some respects, finally affirmed. The general consensus of opinion is that emotions are to a large extent culturally-specific, because the domains of experience are never the same in all cultures. Lyn H. Lofland expresses the growing consensus most clearly: ‘It is not a question of *whether* all humans are like or unlike all other humans. Rather, it is – and this is far more complex – a question of *how* humans are alike and *how* they differ’ (‘The Social Shaping of Emotion: The Case of Grief’, *Symbolic Interaction* 8.2 [1985]: 171-190, at 172). In thinking about the degree to which we share emotional meanings across cultures and history, Sally Planalp (234) issues a warning parallel to that of Wierzbicka’s:

> The danger is that when we emphasize differences, the contrast makes others seem nonhuman and threatening, but when we emphasize similarities, we may assimilate them into our own narrow view of what is human and fail to understand or appreciate the variations in human emotional experience and expression.

A useful discussion on the cross-cultural and trans-historical emotional meanings can also be found in Catherine A. Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, ‘The Anthropology of Emotions’, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986): 405-436, esp. 408; and John Leavitt, ‘Meaning and Feeling in the Anthropology of Emotions’, *American Ethnologist* 23.3 (1996): 514-539, esp. p. 515.

[71] Izard 281.

Whilst it is obviously of little surprise that the English and Russian languages do not pattern identically in terms of their emotive vocabulary, it is intriguing to observe the similarity in people's everyday reckoning, and metaphoric structuring, of the experience of emotions. Such is the peculiar nature of emotion language, and it follows that, although "*affective lexicons*"[72] of different languages suggest different connotative meanings of emotions, nevertheless the internal organization and conventional use of metaphors point to substantial regularities in conceptualization of emotions across cultures. We can thus legitimately speak of the linguistic representation of emotions as involving an asynchronous mutual relationship between, on the one hand, emotion words whose semantic content varies cross-culturally and, on the other hand, figurative expressions that, as evidently guided by the fundamental functioning of the human body, can be, and are, nearly universal. This claim corresponds to an expectation on the part of cognitive linguists of an allocation of a non-peripheral role to metaphors in the consideration of the mental schematization of emotions based on language.

Indeed, in the course of thinking about verbal expression of emotions, a growing number of scholars have come to appreciate that 'emotion language [cannot consist] only in literal emotion words, such as *fear*, *anxiety*, *terror*, *apprehension*, that classify and refer to a preexisting emotional reality',[73] because human emotional experience, as an intangible entity, is most fully conveyed by metaphorical rather than literal means. Among those who subscribe to this view is the prominent metaphor theorist, David Punter, who suggests that 'where a concept, an idea, an emotion may be hard to grasp in [literal] language, then a metaphor, an offering of perceived resemblances, may enable us the better to "come to grips with" the issue in hand'.[74] In conjunction, L. David Ritchie observes that 'although some metaphors seem flat and one-dimensional, metaphors often allow us to express subtle nuances of thought and feeling that would otherwise be inexpressible'.[75] However conventional and simple the structure of metaphors may be, it is not arbitrary. Metaphoric language communicates abstract concepts such as emotional feelings on the basis of selective perception of aspects of the

[72] Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition*, 20.
[73] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, xi.
[74] David Punter, *Metaphor: The New Critical Idiom* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 13.
[75] L. David Ritchie, *Context and Connection in Metaphor* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006) 2.

physical world, a perception that is internalized and 'understood by the members of a speech community who share relevant mutual knowledge'.[76]

This dependence of metaphor on the basic sensory experiences shared by individuals within a culture brings us back to the important argument made earlier – that, despite their non-poetic language, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* each craft their own metaphors that are part of stable but generative conceptual systems that group emotional concepts into separately structured schematic configurations motivated to a great extent by associated physiological patterns. To illustrate this now well established theory of conceptual metaphor, it has been noted that anger tends to induce physically an increase in bodily temperature. This physiological response to anger in principle provides the basis for a conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT that triggers such metaphorical expressions as Eliot's 'The fire of Dorothea's anger was not easily spent, and it flamed out in fitful returns of spurning reproach'[77] and Tolstoy's 'Anna razgorjačilas′ tak, čto ej potom sovestno bylo vspominat′'[78] ('Anna got heated to such a degree that she was afterwards ashamed to remember it'). Given the existence of this biological constraint on the production of affective discourse, it is proposed that realist texts exhibit the linguistic habit of compiling a static, indeed distinctly limited, inventory of conceptual metaphors to describe emotions. The resultant effect is that of representing, at least in a literary context, how English and Russian nineteenth-century cultures unconsciously and automatically express all mental phenomena systematically in highly restrictive metaphorical terms. This cultural predilection for conventional figurative language in thinking and talking about emotions is especially evident in realist novels which, by enacting 'the normal linguistic experience of native speakers',[79] legitimize their own aptness for prompting emotional responses in readers, whilst also propagating to them contemporary norms for orderly behaviour.

It may be objected, quite reasonably but too hastily, that if realist fiction exploits its affective and didactic potential primarily in virtue of the deployment of ordinary metaphorical

---

[76] Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, 'How Metaphors Work', in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 401-424, at 422.
[77] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 787.
[78] Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) 147. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
[79] Andrew Ortony et al., *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 10.

expressions, and is per se structurally reflective of conceptualized physiology, then we are left with only the narrated awareness of the bodily behaviour elicited by an emotion, as well as an absurd conception of the novels as unimaginative rhetorical universals, united in their linguistic reduction of an emotional reality to mere perceptions of certain unvarying facts of nature. This study rejects such a conclusion. The pervasiveness in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* of major widespread metaphors of shame, pride and anger is considered here to be a quite transparent revelation of textual codification and perpetuation of 'folk theories/models, cultural models, or idealized cognitive models'[80] for these emotions – an idea that does not invalidate but, on the contrary, supports and preserves the realist novel's claim to life-likeness achieved through an appropriately controlled creativity and strategically deployed idiomatic language.

Theories of Translation

The history of conventions governing literary translation is important here so as to explore the complexity of translating figurative language, and especially the challenge of communicating across languages conceptual models of emotional states as they are expressed via metaphor. The implications of the translators' preordained tendency to translate indigenous lexicons with the most suitable, yet still highly inadequate, equivalents available in another language have been considered for quite some time. The effect of translations on native speakers has usually been identified with disappointment and confusion. Invariably,

> They perceive a mutation as the words and concepts, the feelings and the phrases, are coloured by translation. Concepts seem to couple together differently. The translated words set off different networks of associations. At this stage, it is clear that the translator has made the jump between worldviews at the level of the language system.[81]

Nowadays, it is fairly widely accepted that the actual possibility of transference of a literary text across different language speaking cultures does not lie in any ill-fated attempt to overcome problems of linguistic non-equivalence. Rather, translation entails the transposition (via conceptual translation) of folk meanings, worldviews and values (and ideas about them),

[80] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 114. By culturally constructed folk theories of emotions is meant precisely 'some shared, structured knowledge that in many cases can be uncovered on the basis of ordinary language' (114).
[81] Underhill 214.

as they have taken 'root in the mindset of a culture'.[82] Wierzbicka and many other linguists and anthropologists have convincingly shown that it is impossible to examine the culture-specific meanings of emotions by studying emotion words in isolation from their native origin.[83] They thereby advocate the adoption of more reliable translation methods that would stretch beyond that of simply replacing ethnocentric concepts with the nearest English labels. On this view, translators are faced with the difficulty of reconciling 'cross-linguistic differences in lexical semantics, the intricacies of the semantic structure of emotion words, and semantic processing'.[84] Translation, moreover – and more importantly for the purpose of this study – can be a major obstacle to the consideration of cross-linguistic similarities in metaphorical conceptualization, the schematized and embodied nature of emotion concepts, and cognitive processing. Before we consider the wider implications of the conversion of *Anna Karenina* into English, we need to establish what has been historically and what is today understood by the term "translation". The connotations of this term are particularly significant, because it is obvious, but by no means discreditable, that most contemporary Western critics of Tolstoy depend on the availability of English translations.

Value judgements and principles of translation have evolved over the centuries, just as the principles adduced as relevant to understanding literary works have been redefined and reinterpreted. Jurij D. Levin, an expert on the history of translation in Russia, points to the existence of a variety of different types of translation: 'стихотворные и прозаические, буквальные и вольные, поэтичные и косноязычные. Встречаются и курьезы'[85] ('verse and prose, literal and free, poetic and crude. There could even be found oddities'). The driving force behind new approaches to translation has been, according to Levin, 'борьба и смена

---

[82] Underhill 215.

[83] There is an abundance of comprehensive articles available on this subject. For example, see Anna Wierzbicka, 'Human Emotions: Universal or Culture-Specific?', *American Anthropologist* 88.3 (1986): 584-594; A. Wierzbicka, 'Japanese Key Words and Core Cultural Values', *Language in Society* 20.3 (1991): 333-385; A. Wierzbicka, 'Russian Emotional Expression', *Ethos* 26.4 (1998): 456-483; A. Wierzbicka, 'Russian Cultural Scripts: The Theory of Cultural Scripts and Its Applications', *Ethos* 30.4 (2002): 401-432; Carmella C. Moore et al., 'The Universality of the Semantic Structure of Emotion Terms: Methods for the Study of Inter- and Intra-Cultural Variability', *American Anthropologist* 101.3 (1999): 529-546; J. A. Russell, 'Culture and the Categorization of Emotions', *Psychological Bulletin* 110.3 (1991): 426-450; and Catherine A. Lutz, 'The Domain of Emotion Words on Ifaluk, *American Ethnologist* 9.1 (1982): 113-128.

[84] Aneta Pavlenko, *Emotions and Multilingualism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 83.

[85] Jurij D. Levin, 'Russkie Perevody Šekspira', in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1966* (Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1968) 5-25, at 6. An extensive comparative study of the techniques and aims of literary translations in Russia and America already exists. All quotations of the Soviet translators presented here with some modifications and occasional expansions appear either in full or in part in Lauren G. Leighton, *Two Worlds, One Art: Literary Translation in Russia and America* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991).

стилей и направлений в русской литературе'[86] ('the struggle and change of styles and trends in Russian literature'). The variety of literary styles and the diversity of assumptions which informed them have inevitably produced distinct translation paradigms:

> Классицизм, романтизм, реализм и т. д. в разные эпохи определяли стиль как оригинальной литературы, так и переводной, причем это проявлялось не только в выборе произведений для перевода, но и в переводческих принципах.[87]
>
> (Classicism, Romanticism, Realism, and so forth, in different periods, defined the style of original literature as well as that of translation, and this has manifested itself not only in the selection of works to be translated, but also in the principles of translation).

Each period – Classicist, Romantic and Realist – constructs a different style of translation, because each presupposes different aesthetic standards and theoretical paradigms dominating at the time. In Classicism, the distinction between original text and translation hardly existed at all. Between Classicism and Romanticism, there existed a consensus among writers and translators that 'translations were identical to original works – they were both considered a product of imitation'.[88] "Translational loyalty",[89] which was expected of every writer, required mechanical, word-for-word conveyance of form and content by copying that which the author expressed directly or through implication. Romantic translators, like Classicist ones, had to submit to the original writer's work, but unlike the Classicists, they were encouraged to do so without violating their own artistic integrity. It follows, then, that the traditional distinction between the original author and the translator broke down, and the relationship between original text and translation which Romantics subsequently conventionalized and reinforced could only ever amount to co-creativity. As Levin explains:

> Романтическим является также перевод, создатель которого стремится к самовыражению, к воссозданию идеала, субъективно им понятого, открывающегося ему в момент творческого вдохновения. По методу такой перевод ближе к классическому, ибо допускает отступление от оригинала во имя приближения к идеалу, но иное, субъективное понимание идеала трансформирует и метод перевода. Переведенное произведение становится как бы результатом сотворчества двух поэтов на равных правах.[90]

---

[86] Jurij D. Levin, 'Ob Istoričeskoj Èvoljucii Principov Perevoda', in *Meždunarodnye Svjazi Russkoj Literatury* (Moskva and Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963) 5-63, at 6.
[87] Levin, 'Ob Istoričeskoj Èvoljucii Principov Perevoda', 6.
[88] Leighton 133.
[89] Di Jin, *Literary Translation: Quest for Artistic Integrity*, ed. and introd. William McNaughton (Manchester, UK and Northampton MA: St. Jerome Publishing, 2003) 44.
[90] Levin, 'Russkie Perevody Šekspira', 13.

> (The translation is also romantic when the creator strives toward self-expression, toward a recreation of an ideal which he understands subjectively, and which unfolds before him in the moment of creative inspiration. Such translation, in method, is closer to the Classical, for it permits departures from the original in the name of approximation to an ideal, but another, subjective understanding of the ideal transforms the method of translation as well. The work translated, as it were, becomes the result of the co-creativity of two poets whose rights are equal).

The resistance to compromise their own individual aesthetic was for Romantic translators a way of uniting in the artistic endeavour to co-operatively reproduce the original text, as opposed to merely imitating it. The recognition that original Romantic texts were most artistically effective as joint reconstructions was precisely the affirmation of a refusal to grant them a special privilege, and also an acknowledgement of their susceptibility to the potential distortion by the translator's own worldview and personal taste. It was not until a radical change in the dominance of genres in the nineteenth century that a clear distinction was drawn between original texts and their translations:

> В дальнейшем же переводная литература все более отделялась от оригинальной, переводчик – от самостоятельного творца. Это выражалось не только в появлении профессиональных переводчиков, но и в том, что у писателей, занимавшихся переводом, перевод и оригинальное творчество разделились, стали представлять собой обособленные сферы их деятельности.[91]
>
> (Subsequently, translated literature was further separated from original literature, and the translator from the independent creator. It expressed itself not only in the rise of professional translators, but also in the fact that for the writers engaged in translation practices, translation and original works were separated, they came to represent distinct spheres of operation).

This separation, as the pioneer translator and the leading theorist of the new Soviet school,[92] Ivan Kaškin, pointed out, if properly addressed by a professional literary critic, would very

---

[91] Levin, 'Ob Istoričeskoj Èvoljucii Principov Perevoda', 7.

[92] The Soviet school of translation was founded in the 1920s as a consequence of 'a tradition of great respect for the art' (Leighton 5). Language reform, which in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries encompassed the systematization and simplification of the convoluted Old Church Slavonic, was part of the passionate determination of Peter the Great to increase the sophistication of native Russian culture. This revolutionary tsar clearly recognized the value of education as evidence of the country's political relevance and its level of social development. Since the Petrine regimentation of language, vast attention has been paid to the theory of literary translation, and to various problems regarding conversion of indigenous concepts in the absence of semantic equivalents. For details, see Caryl Emerson, *The Cambridge Introduction to Russian Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. Chapter 4, 'Western Eyes on Russian Realities: The Eighteenth Century' (80-98). The previously unprecedented availability of Western European literature and the increasingly more effective translation procedures made translation 'a chief vehicle of Westernization' (Leighton 5). In the course of developing into a series of forms over time, 'translation was granted official status and the high prestige of art' (Leighton 5) in the nineteenth century.

likely give occasion for recognizing the proportionate efforts of both authors and translators. A comprehensive critical analysis of literary works, Kaškin asserted

> . . . влияла бы на общий уровень перевода, помогая переводчику выявить свои возможности, помогая читателю оценить работу не только автора, но и переводчика.[93]
>
> (. . . would have influenced the general level of translation by helping the translator manifest his potential and by helping the reader evaluate the work not only of the author, but also that of the translator).

Broadly speaking, there was manifest a collective urge to dispel both literalist translations committed to capturing 'the original text's quiddities [by naïvely striving] to reproduce them [lexically and syntactically] as accurately as possible in the translated language'[94] and free translations popularized in Romanticism, which were less concerned with '"word-for-word" equivalence'[95] and more with the expression of the translator's individual self. The Realists' rejection of the so-called "robotic" transference of words and grammar across two disparate language systems and their deep suspicion of subjective reproductions culminated in formulating what is now termed by Soviet translators "realist translation" (*realističeskij perevod*) or "artistic translation" (*hudožestvennyj perevod*), a method that came to dominate Western translation theory and practice in the nineteenth century and has persisted through to the present time.

"Realist translation" differs from its predecessors in that the translator strives to reach out beyond the work itself, in order to produce effect (rhetorical and didactic) analogous to that of the original, and to convey faithfully the reality presented there. To translate faithfully means to convey by means of another language not the words of the original author, but

> the same thoughts and concepts [the translator] finds before him . . . with similar emphasis, in other, equivalent signs accepted by, used by, and known to a nation, so

[93] Ivan Kaškin, 'Kritiki Est′ i Net Kritiki', in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1964* (Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1965) 5-11, at 7.
[94] James Wood, 'How *War and Peace* Works', *The New Yorker*, 26 November 2007, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2007/11/26/071126crat_atlarge_wood
[95] Jin 52.

> that the concept or thought underlying both signs makes the same impression on the reader's feelings.[96]

The whole art of translating rests now on the translator's ability to probe into specific discursive movements, philosophical interests and background conditions of the literary milieu. This skill is a necessary condition for performing an act of translating the contextual significance of the work, 'the nature of [its] subject, the terms of [its] art',[97] its symbolism – explicit and implicit – and its contemporary currency, never losing 'the genius and sense of [the] author'.[98]

The main goal of a faithful translation is to approximate the impact the original work aspires, or purports, to make on its reader. One strategy for attaining such resemblance is persistently to return to considerations of specific cultural discourses in relation to identifiable historical events, prevailing ideologies, widespread sentiments and traditions. The translator, in other words, must communicate to the reader the fully actual influences and formal causes of the original in a context-dependent manner. Outside this realist emphasis on causal antecedents of the work of art, Kaškin sought to overcome the translation inaccuracy by insisting on a greater sensitivity to the national otherness of the original creation, and the preservation of the internal laws of the language to which the indigenous reader is accustomed and enslaved:

> Художественный перевод должен показать читателю чужую действительность и ее «чужеземность», донести до него стилистическое своеобразие подлинника, сохранить текст «в его народной одежде». Однако творческие возможности русского переводчика проявляются им в умелом оформлении русского языкового материала. Как произведение на русском языке, художественный перевод, сохраняя национальные особенности подлинника в отношении бытовых и исторических деталей и общего колорита, все же по возможности избегает «чужеязычия», подчиняясь внутренним законам русского языка (в частности, его грамматическому строю, интонации и ритму речи).[99]
>
> (An artistic translation must show to the reader the foreign reality [of the original work] and its "foreign otherness", convey to him the stylistic peculiarity of the

---

[96] Johann Jacob Breitinger, cited in André Lefevere, *Translating Literature: The German Tradition from Luther to Rosenzweig* (Assen and Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977) 24.
[97] John Dryden, cited in Grossman 72.
[98] John Dryden, cited in Grossman 72.
[99] Ivan Kaškin, 'Voprosy Perevoda', in *Dlja Čitatelja-Sovremennika: Ctat'i i Issledovanija* (Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1968) 435-472, at 457.

> original, preserve the text "in its native clothing". However, the creative potentials of the Russian translator manifest themselves in his skilful handling of the Russian language. As the literary work in the Russian language, an artistic translation, although it preserves the national features of the original in relation to its everyday and historical details and general colour, it nevertheless as much as possible, avoids "foreign language-ness", by subordinating itself to the internal laws of the Russian language [in particular, its grammatical formation, intonation and rhythm of speech]).

Under the regime of "realist translation", which the contemporary translation theorist, Lawrence Venuti, equates to "domesticated" translation,[100] the translator labours to '[forcibly replace] the linguistic and cultural differences of the foreign text with a text that is intelligible to the translating-language reader'.[101] Artistic translators, it seems, aim to convey the distinctive character of the original text by shaping it in the image of their own distinctive cultural and linguistic interpretations.

Moreover, there appears to be a tradition of replicating the impression of foreignness that the native-tongue reader would have ideally received upon reading the original. Underlying this shared practice of translation is Pavel Antokol′skij's and his colleagues' idea that the translation, when it does not actually compromise the unique national spirit of a work, must highlight and even exaggerate its cultural distinctiveness. They briefly explain:

> Это значит, что переводчик должен обнаружить в оригинале его социальную сущность, его историческую обусловленность, его народные корни. Не только обнаружить, но и с возможно большей яркостью показать их читателю. Это задача первейшая и, следует добавить, самая трудная.[102]
>
> (It means that the translator should reveal in the original its social essence, its historical conditionality, its native roots. Not only reveal, but also show them to the reader with the greatest possible vividness. This is the first task and, one should add, the most difficult one).

It is in this sense that Antokol′skij's model radically moves translation from simply engineering linguistic substitutions toward the function of preserving the cultural identity of foreign texts. The most authentic translations, on this interpretation, must not rely for their impact on the comparison with their indigenous predecessors, but rather on the degree to

---

[100] Lawrence Venuti, *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2008) 19.
[101] Venuti 14. In clarifying the process of "domesticating" the foreign text, Eugene A. Nida and Jan de Waard explain that 'the translator must be a person who can draw aside the curtains of linguistic and cultural differences so that people may see clearly the relevance of the original message' (Nida and de Waard, quoted in Venuti, 16).
[102] Pavel Antokol′skij et al., 'Hudožestvennye Perevody Literatur Narodov SSSR', in *Voprosy Hudožestvennogo Perevoda* (Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1955) 5-44, at 22.

which they succeed in bringing 'a cultural other'[103] encoded in the original text over to the target audience. The result is a translation that is not so much a lexically analogous text as a transposition, however radical or provocative, of the source-text's cultural context.

A somewhat different attitude towards literalism was expressed by the Russian poet and translator, Boris Pasternak, in whose view linguistic knowledge is subordinate to the rendering of the truth that corresponds to the predicated reality of the original work. A legitimate translation, from this perspective, ensures that the "target-text" reader takes away similar impressions and reacts emotionally to the translated text in the same way and possibly with the same aesthetic judgements as the "source-text" reader. This equivalence of thought and feeling is not achieved by 'a diligent, even slavish familiarity with dictionaries',[104] but rather by the extent to which the translator is committed to reduplicating sensitively the interpretation of reality as offered in the original work. In his famous essay 'Translating Shakespeare', Pasternak expresses his conviction:

> I believe, as do many others, that closeness to the original is not ensured only by literal exactness or by similarity of form: the likeness, as in a portrait, cannot be achieved without a lively and natural method of expression. As much as the author, the translator must confine himself to a vocabulary which is natural to him and avoid the literary artifice involved in stylization. Like the original text, the translation must create an impression of life and not of verbiage.[105]

The implied primitive type of translation incurs a charge of infidelity as a result of striving after an illusory verbal equivalence, as opposed to replicating – through the naturalization of

---

[103] Venuti 14.
[104] Grossman 63.
[105] Boris Pasternak, 'Translating Shakespeare', trans. Manya Harari, in *I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography*, gen. trans. David Magarshack (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1983) 123-152, at 125.
Katharina Reiss, a pioneer author in the discipline of Translation Studies in German, offers a corresponding comment with regard to the translation of form-focused texts:

> There the chief requirement is to achieve a similar esthetic effect. This can be done by creating equivalents through new forms. Thus in a form-focused text the translator will not mimic slavishly (adopt) the forms of the source language, but rather appreciate the form of the source language and be inspired by it to discover an analogous form in the target language, one which will elicit a similar response in the reader.

Therefore a literary translation

> [does] not simply exercise an influence over the subject matter, but [goes] beyond this to contribute a special artistic expression that is contextually distinctive and can be reproduced in a target language only by some analogous form of expression. Therefore, the expressive function of language, which is primary in form-focused texts, must find an *analogous form* in the translation to create a corresponding impression, so that the translation can become a true equivalent.

(*Translation Criticism – The Potentials and Limitations: Categories and Criteria for Translation Quality Assessment*, trans. Erroll F. Rhodes [Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2000] 33, 32).

the language of the translation – the reality originally produced in the maternal language. Pasternak's advocacy of lexical adjustments to obtain an imitation of spontaneity is an appeal for the same critical sentiment with which S. Lipkin, in his 'Perevod i Sovremennost′', approached the naïve kind of translation criticism. Vigorously opposing the literary critics who subjected translations to the tyranny of words, the Russian specialist brought a bitter accusation against them:

> Некоторые рецензенты, знающие два языка, обычно ограничивают свою работу в критике переводов следующим: сверяют перевод с подлинником и устанавливают: вот здесь отступление, вот здесь точно, – и выносят свой приговор. Такие рецензенты не вправе считать себя критиками художественных произведений. Их установки применимы – и то не всегда – при разборе переводов произведений политических, научных и т. д. Они считают, такие критики, что надо переводить слова, а не мысль.[106]
>
> (Some reviewers, who know the two languages, usually restrict their labour of translation criticism to the following: they check the translation against the original and ascertain: here is a deviation, here is an exact copy – and announce their verdict. Such reviewers have no right to regard themselves as critics of literary works. Their directives are applied – and not always – to the analysis of translation of texts that are political, scientific etc. They believe, these critics, that the word, not the thought, is what should be translated).

Pasternak's and Lipkin's emphasis on the transplantation into the receiving culture of an entire textual ensemble rather than merely the intricacy of its lexicon tends to promote translations that are received inherently unlike the foreign originals. For quite a number of theorists, however, this outcome is thought to be ideal, especially when they (Lipkin very emphatically) wish their readers to acquire a habit of consistently discriminating the translation they are reading from the original composition.

While many scholars, as both the Soviet and Western ideas about translation indicate, have accepted as likely the possibility of a fairly faithful translation, a great deal of theorizing is still employed in resisting this conclusion. The revisionist arguments are based on the modern formula 'Each translation is a re-authoring',[107] a notion that has been widespread in translation criticism ever since Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian cultural theorist, announced his

---

[106] S. Lipkin, 'Perevod i Sovremennost′', in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1963* (Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1964) 13-52, at 19.
[107] Chandler 197.

concept of "double-voicedness".[108] Despite contemporary translators' success at clarifying more effectively the process of translation and despite their broad consensus on trying 'to communicate the source text (ST) in as unmediated a way as possible',[109] there still remains the basic difficulty of dealing with the language barrier. George Steiner, a major contributor to Western translation theory, voices such concerns in his discussion of some of the linguistic and cultural problems of translation:

> There are no total translations: because languages differ, because each language represents a complex, historically and collectively determined aggregate of values, proceedings of social conduct, conjectures on life . . . No language, moreover, however comprehensive, however resourceful and inclusive its syntax, covers more than a fraction of human realisation. There are, at every moment and on every horizon, worlds beyond our own words.[110]

Steiner's skepticism towards the possibilities of a faithful literary translation is a strikingly contemporary stance, adumbrating some of Wierzbicka's positions: the notion of the existence of unique lexical categories within languages which '[reflect] human conceptualisation, human interpretation of the world'.[111] In the most general terms, Steiner's assumption about translation is a pragmatic acknowledgment of untranslatability, a conviction that the translative mission 'to cross the barriers of national speech'[112] cannot be accomplished except by the means of interpretative devices such as compensation, paraphrasing, substitution and omission. Because literary translation necessarily 'infuses a language with influences, alterations, and combinations that would not have been possible without the presence of

---

[108] Central to Bakhtin's theory of translation is his belief that a literary text 'can never be completely translated' (Mikhail M. Bakhtin, 'The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philosophy, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis', in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee, eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986] 103-131, at 106). Literary translation exhibits "double-voicedness", the influential term Bakhtin develops to refer to the degree of falsification of the original work by the translators' infusion into it of their own subjective interpretations. In addition, the unfamiliarity with the political, ideological and philosophical context of the text's production leads, in Bakhtin's view, to the translators' largely unconscious 'slippage to or projection of contemporary concerns' of their own time (Karine Zbinden, 'The Bakhtin Circle and Translation', *The Yearbook of English Studies* 36.1 [2006]: 157-167, at 160). The translator's limited knowledge and experience, which ultimately affect 'the conscious choices he/she makes to improve readability', subject the original work to a struggle between its own and the translator's theoretical orientation (Zbinden 160).
[109] Zbinden 160.
[110] George Steiner, 'To Traduce or Transfigure: On Modern Verse Translation', *Encounter* 27.2 (1966): 48-54, at 49, 50.
[111] Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition*, 7.
[112] Steiner 50.

translated foreign literary styles and perceptions',[113] it is not possible to speak of literary translation as an entirely 'neutral' or 'disinterested'[114] enterprise.

By virtue of a lexical, grammatical, cultural and philosophical contribution of the translator as well as through a common translation practice of 'utilizing existing concepts and conventions',[115] a translated work appears to us as the always-already-interpreted or as the always-already-recoded: we comprehend it through a prism of the individual judgements, choices, presuppositions and reading histories of the translator. From such a point of view, the language of the translation is released from what must otherwise seem to be the inferior status of a mirror, and instead becomes understood as a form of art in its own right. The original author still receives full credit for the whole range of skills and inspirations involved in an act of imaginative creation. However, the translator takes on a role of an autonomous cross-linguistic and cross-cultural elaborator of the author's creativity, ultimately to make it accessible and meaningful to the target readership. Edith Grossman makes a relevant observation:

> [The chief goal of the translator] is making the second version of the work as close to the first writer's intention as possible . . . But what never should be forgotten or overlooked is the obvious fact that what we read in a translation is the translator's writing. The inspiration is the original work, certainly, and thoughtful literary translators approach that work with great deference and respect, but the execution of the book in another language is the task of the translator, and that work should be judged and evaluated on its own terms.[116]

Translators, in Grossman's view, perform what has been variously referred to as subjective '"recreation", "transcreation", "transillumination", and most provocatively, "transluciferation mephistofaustica"',[117] in a respectful manner and to the extent of their own individual ability, of the actual inimitability of the original work. They have developed, partly as a response to their perceived professional marginality as well as persistent invisibility, a terminology of their own to remove all possible suspicion of their identification with the original authors and their translations with the originals. The dialogical nature of translation

---

[113] Grossman 16.
[114] Chandler 197.
[115] Chandler 196.
[116] Grossman 31-32.
[117] Edwin Gentzler, 'Metaphor and Translation', in *Encyclopedia of Literary Translation*, vol. 2, ed. Olive Classe (London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000) 941-945, at 944.

requires that the procedures be understood as techniques that are habitually flexible and various, but always justified by textual demands which are met according to the translator's own level of expertise and virtuosity. On the basis of this approach, translations are not to be viewed in terms of their provision of their own product that is foreign to the original. The aim is rather to accept that 'translations are different in intention and effect from original compositions, and this generic distinction is worth preserving as a means of describing different sorts of writing practices'.[118]

The development of translation theories has been useful to literary criticism as it has provided an insight into the way in which literary translations were encoded and treated by their contemporary audiences. Over the centuries, literary interpretation of foreign texts was dependent upon the availability of translations, ideally of multiple translations. One possible disadvantage of the circulation of a manifold of renditions is the projection of the different levels of acquaintance of translators with nuanced and figurative idioms of the language to which they are translating, thereby disguising, in various ways, the actual language of the original. In spite of best linguistic efforts such as the minimization of a word-for-word translation in favour of that of a 'sense-for-sense',[119] the overlapping or common conceptualizations of metaphorical expressions for emotions can be lost. Obviously, there must be some adequacy in translating figurative expressions, but the absence of semantic alignment between the two vocabularies in question implicitly testifies to the tendency to project linguistic habits that will be readily processed by the intended audience. The point here is not that the translators produce metaphorical substitutions in any ad hoc way simply to facilitate comprehension across the target-text readership. Rather, they tend to reconstruct, via mechanisms of the translating language, the coherence of the context that gives emotions a specific meaning, and not to translate in a way that dissects their essential conceptual categorization. Admittedly, good literary translations grant us access to a remarkably consistent manner in which cultures naturally and conventionally describe emotions, but it also seems obvious that this access is already suspect, if only because it is provided by means of another language. As a result of the gulf between grammatical and lexical categories of different languages, the translator is constrained by the linguistic resources available in the

[118] Venuti 6.
[119] Kirsten MalmkjÆr, 'Translation Theory', in Classe, 1417-1420 at 1418.

receiving culture. Consequently, foreign conceptualizations of emotions can be conveyed only approximately through an appeal to allowable alternatives.

This inherent barrier between different languages is one reason why reading Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* in the native language is especially beneficial for critical discussion. Firstly, it permits us to savour firsthand the novel's ideological subtleties and linguistic nuances characteristic of, and known to, the nineteenth-century Russian mind. Secondly, it prevents us from reducing the foreign literary discourse to 'the common denominator or intersection with [the translator's] own'.[120] Finally, it ensures direct engagement with the perspectives and perceptions of people from social and historical contexts distant from our own. From the perspective assumed here, however, the significance of proficiency in the novel's first language does not consist in demonstrating *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* to be semantic juxtapositions, by contrasting the individual lexical items, most notably, untranslatable emotion words. Rather, it resides in the ability to perceive corresponding, experientially acquired mind schemas that provoke cultures to speak and think about emotions in certain and much the same ways.

This study adopts a perspective of *embodied* emotions, by examining a biologically determined uniformity in the metaphorical representation of emotions as evidenced in the two lexicons. It thereby looks at how emotions are performed and conceptualized similarly in the English and Russian languages. The discussion below foregrounds its main premise, namely, that emotions invoke specific conceptual profiles, learned and stored in long-term memory in part through biological preconditioning, in part through social interaction, and that the possibility of decoding these profiles rests on direct access to indigenous, linguistically unfiltered expression of emotions. What is of interest in the following chapters, then, is not the lexical non-equivalence of emotion words, but rather their similar conceptual architecture from the native speaker's point of view.

[120] Catherine A. Lutz, 'Enthnopsychology Compared to What? Explaining Behaviour and Consciousness Among the Ifaluk', in *Person, Self, and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies*, eds. G. M. White and J. Kirkpatrick (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) 35-79, at 69.

This Study

A cross-linguistic and cross-cultural study of conceptual metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* can be said to fit well within New Formalist practices of literary criticism as it adopts a structural approach – the tracing of a general schematization, essentially mechanical and taken-for granted, of emotion concepts – to probe into the specific 'manner in which [nineteenth-century English and Russian people] understand reality and [behave] with respect to it'.[121] However, in order to take the New Formalist debate forward, this study admits into discussions of literary fiction recent relevant research in Cognitive Linguistics. It is itself a relatively new discipline with an enormous empirical and theoretical force which opens useful avenues for an informed exploration of how literary practices across two cultures and two languages are basically effects of "imaginative rationality"[122] arising from the embodied underpinnings of conceptual metaphor that structures thought and expression.

One of the aspirations of contemporary literary scholarship is to 'return a genuine interdisciplinarity to Victorian studies',[123] to cultivate the cross-fertilization of the theoretically distinct fields, thereby actively extending the interpretation of the nineteenth-century literary texts to the interdisciplinary research enterprise. This study shows that using recent findings of cognitive sciences can be an extremely powerful tool for complementing the investigation of metaphorical foundations of literary texts, and confirms the suitability of the realist novel for the transmission of a broadly universal conceptual hard-wiring. As a result, the following discussion has the immediate benefit of contributing to ongoing vigorous debates about the unique capacity of narrative fiction to communicate (via conventional metaphorical language) across cultures shared – analogously schematically ordered – emotional reality.

An Overview of the Individual Chapters

To emphasize, the purpose of this study is to provide a cognitive-linguistic perspective on metaphorical representations of fictional emotions, whereby the figurative creativity of

---

[121] John B. Carroll, 'Introduction', in Whorf, 1-34, at 23.
[122] Lakoff and Johnson 193.
[123] Jonathan Loesberg, 'Cultural Studies, Victorian Studies, and Formalism', *Victorian Literature and Culture* 27.2 (1999): 537-544, at 537. By "genuine interdisciplinarity" Loesberg means precisely 'the participation of scholars from different disciplines with different and possibly conflicting grounding questions, concerns and modes of analysis in the study of the same subject matter' (537).

Eliot and Tolstoy is determined simultaneously by the wealth and limits of conventional metaphorical structures that are widespread in English and Russian. Its agenda is to trace a conceptual framework that draws together the core cultural ideas or 'folk theories'[124] of emotions based on language, and to explore how these folk conceptualizations of emotions can influence the meaning of literary texts. In order to equip the reader to assimilate two apparently divergent lines of argument, this study will examine the conjunction of two major but not immediately interlocking themes. The first of these treats existing research on conceptual metaphor and emotions (and from which the methodology is borrowed), and the other centres on the notion of how metaphoric concepts inscribed in cross-lingual realist novels arise from the actuality of having a human body. The rationale behind the overall structure of this thesis is to achieve a coherent integration of a number of unrelated areas of scholarly enquiry which combined provide an interesting and surprising perspective from which to view specifically realist narrative fiction. They will now be briefly introduced.

Chapter 2 provides a broad social and historical perspective into the rise and development of English and Russian realist novels. The discussion commences with an analysis of conflicting values enshrined in the criteria that earlier critics brought to assess the conventions of nineteenth-century Realism. It is then followed by a review of the contribution of several contemporary critics to the clarification of the general partiality and inadequacy of the traditional critical apparatus, and concludes by offering an alternative set of reference terms within which the various innovations in the genre across centuries and countries may be systematized, justified and activated. The most important idea of this discussion is that *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* belong to the strict (but not restrictive) generic category of the classic realist novel. Both Eliot and Tolstoy drew upon metaphorical terms and expressions provided by idiomatic resources of their native languages, rather than manufacturing innovative figurative expressions. The fact that the language of the novels avoids excursions outside the range of the accustomed conceptualizations of the English and Russian speakers is held to foster an instinctive understanding and to affect emotional involvement.

Although the immediacy of realist discourse has frequently been brought up for consideration, it is useful to reiterate the critical consensus that only in a narrow sense could

[124] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 114.

we regard Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels as inherently equipped to reproduce culturally specific ideas about emotions expressed through conventional metaphorical language. The notion of the texts being constructed discourses rather than spontaneous speech acts has given rise to the promotion of the distinction between real language and its *appearance*. Discursively, then, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* can only be claimed to imitate or enact, rather than autonomously exemplify, common intuitions about emotions as expressed in figurative language. Finally, that realist fiction traditionally describes 'the range of human experience'[125] is the legacy bequeathed by eighteenth-century developers of the genre which culminates in Eliot and Tolstoy. The question of the actual centrality of psychological preoccupation in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* arises in view of the historical literary models developed in succession by earlier novelists. In other words, the novels' particular interest in the complexity of inner life, while it can be analyzed by reference to the metaphoric language of emotions, nevertheless arises from the evolution of the genre.

The second section of Chapter 2 will consider the birth of the English novel in relation to Daniel Defoe's pioneering preoccupation with 'the presentation of people's lives *to themselves* in something like a direct manner'[126] during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, despite the more distant antecedents that can be found in world literature. It is an undeniable achievement of Defoe to have launched a socially-oriented mode of writing in the course of releasing the pent-up literary energy brought about by the beginnings of large-scale imperial expansion and the progressively better educated British bourgeoisie newly rising to prominence. Yet, it is the later novels of Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding that can be seen in retrospect to add to the comprehensive understanding of the novel and to its future development. Whilst Defoe's fiction could be said to have initiated the widespread cultural practice of writing on social and economic conditions of early industrialization, Richardson's and Fielding's novels might be said to have legitimized a variety of artistic aims and techniques which helped recognize Realism during the eighteenth century to be specifically tailored to representing the immediate experience of their contemporaries. By immediate experience is meant in part the adjustment of British culture to the rapid transformation of the Empire, and in part the subsequent emergence in the nineteenth century of the concept of

[125] Morson 9.
[126] Grahame Smith, *The Novel and Society: Defoe to George Eliot* (London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., 1984) 66, italics in original.

individualism that, it will be argued in the last section of this chapter, the realist novels like George Eliot's were intended to uphold. This category of individualism continued to dominate narratives up until the twentieth century and beyond. Mental struggle, which in substance grew out of the changing perception of the individual self, remained one of the central tenets of nineteenth-century fictional prose. The idea supremely developed in *Middlemarch*, that the individual has an inner life separate from the social consciousness, consequently, would come to represent the normative orientation of the Victorian realist novel in the form of a thoroughly standardized, semantically domesticated emotion language which renders the realm of 'an "I's" experience'[127] as persistently inaccessible to others and even infrequently unrecognizable to oneself.

The third section of Chapter 2 will propose that, in Russia, the origin of the novel is almost certainly at least two-fold. The first phase occurred during the dawn of the new times, in the first quarter of the eighteenth century (amongst the raised cultural and economic expectations of Peter the Great's reforms, and also against the background of the consistent transformation of Russian into a proper literary language as a result of a direct influence of eighteenth-century Sentimentalism and Romanticism). The second phase took place throughout the1840s, when 'the firm foundations of a national literature'[128] were laid, that is, when the writers began consciously to marginalize the so-called "higher-order" forms of artistic creativity (such as poetry) and regard literary practice as primarily concerned with the portrayal of a distinct way of Russian life. Despite the sufficiently vigorous production of poetry, it was evident towards the end of that decade that its influence was on the wane. Interest in the formal design of the verse was displaced by a new emphasis in realistic prose that centred on the extraction and promotion of the value of the actual (not idealized) experience of the masses, a change of focus which also provided a preliminary indication of the utilitarian aspects of the novel.

Insofar as Russia, prior to Alexander Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov, had any sense of prose fiction, it was only rudimentary. Before the development of modern literature with a

---

[127] Kay Young, *Imagining Minds: The Neuro-Aesthetics of Austen, Eliot, and Hardy* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2110) 194.
[128] Richard Peace, 'The Nineteenth Century: The Natural School and its Aftermath, 1840-55', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 189-248, at 247.

distinctly literary language that started in the early eighteenth century, and was virtually completed by the nineteenth, the pre-modern literary forms may be described as following what has come to be known as "folkloric tradition".[129] What constituted folkloric tradition were primitive poetic patterns that were not sufficiently rhetorically powerful to encompass and represent the burst of cultural energies in a newly modern and westernized Russia. The point will be made that both Pushkin and Lermontov – Russia's two most important poets of the early nineteenth century (Lermontov is generally credited as the founder of the Russian psychological novel) – were the forerunners of Russian Realism. Realism is to be understood here not as a radical move away from writing in verse, but conversely a mode of expression that could extend to poetry via the use of ordinary language, a higher level of characterization and a more intense 'emotional atmosphere'.[130] Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, accredited as the first "novel in verse" (1825-1832), although transformational itself, was not sufficiently progressive to satisfy existing demands for a higher set of literary goals under the stewardship of the leading Russian literary critic, Vissarion Belinsky, who insisted that the novel must become the chief testimony to social truth. This directive concomitantly suggested the need for a greater range of social consciousnesses to be explored through narrative fiction. It was not until Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy – whose literary reigns mark the zenith of the novel in Russia (1855-1880) – that the description of innermost feelings was the most thorough. The majority of scholars would agree that whatever else Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy used the novel as the vehicle for, they utilized the genre as a method for projecting the intricacy of conflicting states of mind.

Chapter 3 contends that reading the classic realist novel is especially desirable on the grounds that the genre potentially activates the reader's empathic abilities and encourages a personal connection with the characters. This chapter therefore shifts the focus to the reader's emotional engagement with literary fiction and considers how imagining fictional characters in an emotional state triggers our own empathic responses. Eliot and Tolstoy are themselves shown to have avowedly put forward a similar view on the purpose of the realist novel to provoke a sympathetic reflection upon the experience of another individual consciousness – a supplementary principle of their morality. This assertion of the novel's power to evoke the

[129] Jostein Børtnes, 'The Literature of Old Russia, 988-1730', in Moser, 1-44, at 43.
[130] D. S. Mirsky, *A History of Russian Literature: From Its Beginnings to 1900*, ed. Francis J. Whitfield (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1958) 91.

reader's feelings has been made against the backdrop of the current philosophy of mind that imagines 'a form of complex psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of others'.[131] Cognitive theoreticians of narrative fictions, Lisa Zunshine amongst them, maintain that readers' ability to decode specific emotions of fictional characters (accurately or not) derives, at least in part, from their everyday practice of mentally simulating themselves in the position of others. This self-reflective knowledge of the psychic life of others is commonly referred to as "simulation theory" or more simply put, 'in-his-shoes imagining'.[132]

From the outset, I endorse the widespread notion amongst psychologists that emotions are separate from and independent of language, but 'the most readily available nonphenomenal access we have to them is through language'.[133] The verbal expression of emotions is bound up with the social and temporal uses of any natural language. It is frequently the case, as emphasized repeatedly by Anna Wierzbicka, that single lexical items for a particular emotion in one language do not preserve their range of connotations when counterchecked against another language. Semantic differences across cultures occur simply as a result of the existence of 'an obvious [disparity in the] classification of values at a given period of human history'.[134] The description of a specific emotion may never be a perfect match cross-culturally and over time. But conceptual representation of each emotion in a particular culture tends to arise from the way our cognition is biologically adapted to function. The second part of Chapter 3 supports this argument by recourse to George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's original claims (1980) that (1) all language has its basis in our background knowledge of bodily phenomena and cultural situatedness; and (2) that all consistency and any contradictions within 'historically transmitted patterns of meaning'[135] can always be accommodated by methods of conceptual reconstruction. In short, I put forward the idea that metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, however literarily elaborated, are primitively intuitive. This means that they can be deciphered on the basis of some settled rules of sense-making in the course of deducing a relevant interpretation. As part of proposing this

[131] William Ickes, 'Introduction', in *Empathic Accuracy*, ed. William Ickes (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1997) 1-16, at 2.
[132] Peter Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 177.
[133] Ortony et al., *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*, 8.
[134] Vladimir Nabokov, quoted in Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures Through their Key Words*, 2.
[135] Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures Through their Key Words*, 21.

hypothesis, I will set out to elucidate, through a basic example of the excitement metaphor, how conventional metaphoric language in Tolstoy's novel is conceptually underpinned simultaneously by physiological functioning as well as customary cultural constellations of associations that the Russian mind has been brought up to subconsciously integrate.

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the novel as emphasizing shame to be the most important and the most characteristic emotion conspicuously reflective of nineteenth-century English and Russian patriarchal realities. Shame-regulated behaviours are asserted to extend from individual female consciousness to group psychology, fulfilling ideological functions of a primarily ethical sort – instructive and corrective. It is stressed, in other words, that the representation of a woman in shame did not emerge in realist texts in any way independent of the prevailing form of social organization and its associated clearly defined codes of moral conduct. The second part of the chapter, more practical than theoretical, demonstrates the method of linguistic analysis of the concept of shame expressed by figurative language, and how this methodology can be used to explain the processes of literary construal. More specifically, this part of the chapter reviews the range of conceptual metaphors of shame in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* that supplies the grounds for the acknowledgement of certain similarities of mental models across these two cultures as stemming from basic biological functioning embedded in the immediate cultural context. These complex ideas have found support in the cognitive linguistic school of George Lakoff and his followers, which has long advocated that nearly all metaphorical language can be traced back to conceptual frameworks derived from human experience in nature and culture.[136] What seems to be an essentially reductionist critical practice will paradoxically lead us to the most liberating conclusion. *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are imaginative products effortlessly interpretable by virtue of their common conceptual frame of reference: they are claimed to be conventionally expressed in ordinary English and Russian languages that ultimately result from embodied human consciousness. Creative discourse of the realist novel is thus first and foremost a ready-made linguistic and cognitive legacy of a culture.

Chapter 5 examines Eliot's and Tolstoy's conceptual metonymies and metaphors of pride in both its positive and negative connotations. It deploys the conventional psychological

[136] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*.

terminology for these two sides of pride – 'authentic' and 'hubristic'[137] – to argue that the linguistic representation of this dual-faceted emotion arises from recognizable postures and gestures spontaneously displayed by individuals experiencing pride. Psychologists have shown that this emotion is biologically based and can be accurately identified via a distinct 'behavioural configuration',[138] namely, features such as an expanded chest, a backward-tilting head, and a beaming face[139] – an idea that can be appropriated for literary analysis in order to shed light on motivated linguistic choices. The physical reactions that typically attend pride are recognized cross-culturally and are spatially associated in English and Russian nineteenth-century secular contexts with an experience of being on top, with dominance and generally having an inflated view of oneself. In some non-prototypical cases, however, exhibitions of pride are indicative of a self-assessment characterized by a masked diminution of one's sense of personal worth.

A discussion of the figurative language of pride will start in the context of the Seven Deadly Sins, of which pride, in the Judao-Christian tradition, is the gravest, denounced as a serious breach of God's law.[140] This culturally powerful construction of pride has provided the impetus for the dominance of the negative side of this emotion since the early Middle Ages. It is the task of this chapter to investigate this long-standing Christian view of this emotion, as it had become a crucial component of the conceptual matrix from which metonymies and metaphors for pride originated. The perception of pride as a precondition of the Fall of Man likewise had become a point of reference for the standard differentiation of the modern English concept of *authentic pride* from *hubristic*, and the Russian concept of *gordost'* from *gordynja*. *Authentic pride* and *gordost'* are considered to be equivalent inasmuch as they are both associated as a positive emotion, while *hubris* (the influential patristic Gregory the Great

---

[137] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'Emerging Insights into the Nature and Function of Pride', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16.3 (2007): 147-150.
[138] Jessica L. Tracy and David Matsumoto, 'The Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays', *PNAS* 105.33 (2008): 11655-11660, at 11658.
[139] See Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer, 'Developmental Transformations in Appraisals for Pride, Shame, and Guilt', in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995) 64-113; Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'The Prototypical Pride Expression: Development of a Nonverbal Behavior. Coding System', *Emotion* 7.4 (2007): 789-801; and Jessica L. Tracy and Christine Prehn, 'Arrogant or Self-Confident? The Use of Contextual Knowledge to Differentiate Hubristic and Authentic Pride from a Single Nonverbal Expression', *Cognition and Emotion* 26.1 (2012): 14-24.
[140] Matthew Baasten, *Pride According to Gregory the Great: A Study of the Moralia* (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986).

favours the synonymous terms *superbia* and *elatio*[141]) and *gordynja* concern a narcissistic and self-aggrandizing view of oneself, and are conventionally identified with sin.[142]

Eliot's and Tolstoy's metaphoric language of pride, it is suggested subsequently, reflects the authors' tacit acknowledgement of the culturally universal nonverbal display known to characterize this emotion. Our interpretation of the bodily expression of pride does not, in principle, come about uniquely, but is rather culturally constructed. In spite of the ever-present possibility of personal associations, there is an *a priori* consensual way of morally assessing, say, a person with their chest puffed out or their posture held overly erect. We are, in a present-day psychological terminology, unconsciously susceptible to 'culturally transmitted scripts'[143] about what kind of feelings a person who is exuding unreasonable confidence has been customarily expected to evoke in us. Literary scholars have already, at least partially, explored the idea that the novel has an inherent quality to predispose us to tap into our evolutionarily adapted skill of intuitively reading embodied emotion, consequently training our minds to make sense of, and respond to, narrated bodily experience. The analysis of how the exploitation by narrative fiction of the behaviour-motivated conceptual structure of two types of pride permits the form of emotional contagion is a contribution to that project.

In *Middlemarch*, as in *Anna Karenina*, characters who have metaphorically (and metonymically) been constructed to experience hubristic (exaggerated) pride – those who persistently engage in 'judging [themselves] to be physically larger or more powerful than [their adversaries]'[144] – will be shown to invite less sympathy from the reader, whereas characters driven towards manifesting '"balanced" forms of pride'[145] – that which are based on a proper (objective) evaluation of one's own merits – are those with whom we more naturally and immediately connect.

Chapter 6 focuses on clusters of conventional metaphors of anger functioning in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* as the linguistic representation of condemnatory strategies

---

[141] Baasten 15-18.
[142] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'The Psychological Structure of Pride: A Tale of Two Facets', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92.3 (2007): 506-525; and Anna Gladkova, 'A Linguistic View of "Pride"', *Emotion Review* 2.2 (2010): 178-179.
[143] Azim F. Shariff et al., 'Further Thoughts on the Evaluation of Pride's Two Facets: A Response to Clark', *Emotion Review* 2.4 (2010): 399-400, at 400.
[144] Shariff et al. 400.
[145] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 30.

endorsed by English and Russian cultures towards this emotion. In both cultures, this attitude of disapproval results in the promotion of the inhibition of intense emotions generally, an ideal previously subscribed to by the promulgators (and founders) of the great philosophical traditions (including Stoic) of consciously and rigorously moulding a virtuous, emotionally-controlled character. This chapter considers this history, and also diachronic accounts of anger in terms of their influence on the development of a modern theory of this emotion, in order to trace the significance of its dual representation in the focal novels of this study. Distinctions will be shown as historically made, first, by ancient philosophers, and second, by the fathers of the early Christian Church, between justified anger – that which arises from proper causes – and illegitimate anger, regarded as a sinful compulsion to excess and a means of achieving domination. This chapter contends that Eliot and Tolstoy subconsciously deploy figurative language to differentiate between these two enduring types of anger, and thereby to communicate to the reader, by means of conceptual metaphors and metonymies, the culturally- and gender-neutral vulnerability of people to the destructive influence of anger and to the practice of self-restraint as the proper aim of ethical behaviour.

Nineteenth-century highly civilized and increasingly more industrialized societies such as Victorian England and post-Petrine Russia are found to be broadly familiar with the ideas of rationality-based assessments, brought about by the European Enlightenment. According to these ideas, the rightness of an angry response consists in the fact that anger involves a conscious reflection, and it is not produced upon impulse or from a self-indulgent motive of revenge or punishment. This set trend of prioritizing rational over emotional evaluations in an act of judgement became relevant in the nineteenth century to the newly self-assigned task of strengthening family relations as part of social and economic development. An excellent elaboration of this position is that of Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, who argue that the control of anger in Victorian homes seemed to contemporary moralists instrumentally valuable to capitalist enterprise, insofar as it aimed to neutralize an increased stress associated with work. As a result, there developed as part of public policy a gendered expectation to condemn women for feeling and openly expressing anger by classifying their unchecked behaviour as unfeminine and even deviant, and conversely to dismiss irascible men as shamefully undisciplined and tragically unreasonable. This chapter takes this argument forward, by launching a systematic search for a metaphoric language of anger as credible

evidence of the nineteenth-century apprehension of virtue in terms of self-regulation. The metaphoric language of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, it is proposed, testifies to Eliot's and Tolstoy's endorsement of the ethic of moderation as the primary means of morally instructing excessively fiery citizens, an endorsement encoded in their linguistic choices.

The metaphors of anger in *Middlemarch* demonstrate a non-trivial conceptual convergence with the metaphors of anger in *Anna Karenina*. The underlying assumption here is that the English and Russian minds must share habits of thought about this emotion that reveal the influence of the universal experience of embodied anger – the involuntary mounting of bodily heat proportionately with the intensity of the emotion. The actual physiology of anger, then, is suggested to cognitively predispose these two cultures – and probably others, given the particularly strong biological basis of this emotion – to conceive of anger characteristically as that which, like the temperature itself, has the potential to rise and fall. This mentally rehearsed property of anger is in turn intuitively expected to guide the linguistic representation of this emotion within the novels. In other words, it is argued that Eliot and Tolstoy use figurative language that configures a typically angry person to have features similar to that of a PRESSURIZED CONTAINER,[146] capable of retaining accumulated energy (that is, having a certain capacity) except beyond the critical release point. This contention implicitly foregrounds a literary creativity of relatively limited conceptual potential, where the cross-cultural representation of mental states is restricted by a consistently mechanistic, physiologically-based imagination. This conceptualization, it is proposed, is the product not only of normalized bodily responses, but also of ways of thinking that have become customary both within a particular cultural situation, and in an individual mind.

The metaphors of anger noticeably occupy a considerably larger space in the novels, a prominence that necessitates the disproportionate length of this chapter. This extensive discussion of this dominant emotion completes the analytical scope of this thesis.

[146] Zoltán Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger: A Psycholinguistic Analysis', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. (New York: Springer, 2010) 157-174.

2

REALISM AND EMOTION IN THE NOVEL

Realism and the Nineteenth-Century Novel

Middlemarch and *Anna Karenina* depend upon or, at least, produce – as an automatic consequence of the conventional metaphoric language of emotion – an impression of a shared linguistic universe. One of the most important effects of a simulated global intelligibility is the way it enables novelists to communicate the stereotyped and commonplace ideas about emotions encapsulated in pre-established conceptual frameworks. A largely subconscious act of encoding universal meanings – and manipulating those meanings – in a fairly limited repertoire of standard figurative expressions is an important design-feature of Realism. The remarkably settled network of conventions, definitions and interpretations that routinely come under the umbrella term "Realism", though, is too complex to admit of an exclusively linguistic approach. In order to link *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* to English and Russian enculturated modes of cognition and to consider this linkage as an essential part of realist aesthetics, it is necessary to look at certain distinctive, if familiar, characteristics of Realism. A brief overview of conventional understandings of this literary concept will provide a useful context in which to accommodate an argument that emotional categories and their representations are embedded in everyday metaphors we have come "to live by" (as Lakoff and Johnson call them). As might be expected, a chapter will not be sufficient to explain in detail how narrative Realism in England and Russia has progressively developed and what connotations this label has variously induced. It will therefore very selectively identify some of the most salient and most immediately defining components and functions of classic realist texts that can be traced through English and Russian literary histories.

When categorizing nineteenth-century prose fiction, literary critics persistently favour the idea of the mimetic representation of the world as the principal interpretive platform for Victorian texts. The expression of a sense of social and historical immediacy in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* presupposes the development of a longer literary tradition – that of the novel – while the novels' particular kind of representational aesthetics assumes the

development of a cluster of effects subsumed under the descriptive label of Realism.[1] The conception of nineteenth-century Realism, to clarify, did not arise immediately fully formed. Its emergence was the result of the process of evolution that began in the eighteenth century, but it was not until the Victorian period that the full-scale codification of the novel took place, in close connection with the prodigious production of increasingly homogenous fictional discourse. Despite the change in points of emphasis and the supply of new elements since its early days, Realism remained fundamentally an expressive designation for the claim of the omniscient narrator to objectively record the reality of a modern individual embedded in 'a new and varied but still common [social] experience'.[2]

Realism, taken in this way, aimed to represent the broad spectrum of contemporary life, but this precise account of various experiences of life, although it encouraged reliance on the perspective of the characters, was nevertheless always (more or less visibly) mediated, and stylized, by a narratorial consciousness. The realist novel in the traditional sense therefore would require that we read it as an imitation of past events and past culture achieved through a large incorporation of factual and descriptive details that enhance credibility, whereby the discernible presence of the storyteller would ensure entry to otherwise inaccessible social, political and ideological space. The ascendency of Psychological Realism in Victorian fiction established a more sophisticated version of a realist representation centrally 'concerned with the workings of consciousness and motive, analyzing an inner life richer than any mere plot could describe'.[3] This improvement was not an opposition to the schematic paradigm of earlier Realism, but a discursive innovation introduced by leading novelists in response to 'the wild

---

[1] In *Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1993), Amy Mandelker contends that the Russian realist novel was the outcome initially of a conscious imitation, and later of transcendence, of the Western realist novel. This is not simply to say that

> Russian writers have always had the Western tradition at the back of their minds, and woven it into their own tradition, trying to overcome . . . the anxiety of influence.

(Malcolm V. Jones, 'Introduction', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998] 1-17, at 1).
The case is rather that the success of the Russian nineteenth-century novel depends to a considerable degree on earlier techniques of novel writing which most Western novelists had previously used and perfected. In keeping with Mandelker's view, this study postulates that, in terms of its structural properties, *Anna Karenina* is a Russian version of what is generally considered to be the English novelistic form.
[2] Raymond Williams, *The English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971) 10.
[3] Nicholas Dames, '"The Withering of the Individual": Psychology in the Victorian Novel', in *A Concise Companion to the Victorian Novel*, ed. Francis O'Gorman (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 91-112, at 92.

proliferations of psychology in the nineteenth century'.[4] Psychological Realism was to expand mightily, but its development has to be discussed in the context of the progression of realist aesthetics, for the roots of psychological enquiry into the human mind are to be found, prior to the era's fascination with the subject, in the far more modest achievement of the novel, namely its capacity 'to [engage] its readers' feelings'.[5]

The centrality of Realism in the fictional prose of the nineteenth century has been identified by present-day scholarship as one of the defining characteristics of popular literature of the era. 'The age of Realism in Russian nineteenth-century literature', Richard Freeborn contends, 'was the age of the realistic novel',[6] and if an abstract term such as Realism is to denote anything in particular, it should be treated as a literary practice that is best exemplified by the focal authors of this study, George Eliot and Leo Tolstoy. Since the term Realism generally acquired negative connotations in some quarters of twentieth-century criticism,[7] much intellectual effort has been invested to reinstate its high status on the grounds of its commitment to accurate exploration of a new industrial society with agendas, worldviews, and literary tastes that were markedly – and quite naturally – different from those that came later.

---

[4] Dames 93.

[5] Francis O'Gorman, '"A Long Deep Sob of that Mysterious Wondrous Happiness that is One with Pain": Emotion in the Victorian Novel', in O'Gorman, 253-270, at 269.

[6] Richard Freeborn, 'The Nineteenth Century: The Age Realism, 1855-80', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 248-332, at 329.

[7] In the twentieth century, Realism was defined specifically in opposition to the nineteenth-century classic Realism. The latter was dismissed by literary critics on the grounds of its arrogant confidence 'that reality can be known, that the truth about human affairs can be told, and that such knowledge and truth can be shared collectively' (David Lodge, *Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002] 49). It is perhaps Walter Allen's criticism of George Eliot's writings that delineates most clearly the differentiation between the progressive Realism from the conventional:

> George Eliot tells us much more, in her own voice, about her characters than any modern novelist would. It is she who tells us what they think and feel, and she comments on their thinking and feeling; she passes judgement on them continually, interrupts the action to deduce a general law from what one of them has said or done . . . The reader of a modern novel is in much the same position as the spectator in a cinema: he is watching an action which is going on as he watches. In a novel like *Middlemarch*, the action has been completed before the reader takes the book up; George Eliot is telling him of what has already happened and therefore, as she describes the characters and their doings, she interrupts them, moralizes about them, generalizes on them while she is reporting her story.

(*Reading a Novel* [London: Phoenix House, 1963] 44, 45). In Allen's statement, which may well be understood as reactionary to earlier Realism, we can identify an alignment with a modern*ist* project of situating

> the construction of the real within the individual's consciousness, the difficulty of communication between these separate mental worlds, the distorting effects of the unconscious on consciousness, and the limits of human understanding.

(Lodge, *Consciousness and the Novel*, 49-50).

At a most general level, Realism in literature across Western European cultures has been equated with *mimesis*, a mode of representation characterized by '*showing* (as opposed to telling)'[8] which creates 'a sense of multifaceted and multidimensional reality based on detailed description, character-enhancing dialogue, a multiplication of locales and the use of such locales as settings for portraiture'.[9] Critical terminology used to describe the mimetic process – visual "verbs such as 'reflect', 'mirror', 'portray', and 'picture', and their noun equivalents"[10] – functions to designate credibility as the chief preoccupation of novelists, 'even [their] slavish adherence to describe things as they are'.[11] The recognition by literary critics of the importance that nineteenth-century authors attached to truth has led to a fundamental and an enduring conviction that a faithful 'representation is the primary interest of realistic fiction, and the two chief objects of representation are the character and the social milieu'.[12]

Increasingly, however, this axiom, if not fiercely attacked, has at least been modified and expanded. The versatility and sheer expansiveness of Realism has given rise to variants such as Romantic Realism, often used interchangeably with fantastic or Gothic Realism of Dostoevsky and Gogol; Objective Realism, which revealed the ills of social life and affirmed methods of repair; and Psychological Realism, which explored the hidden recesses of individual minds (the latter two are the confirmed hallmarks of Eliot's and Tolstoy's fictional prose).[13] Obviously, the kinds of Realism that were cultivated in British and Russian literature remained a matter of the writers' individual and often contradictory views of reality, and which method they thought was the most appropriate for accurate representation. Behind the specificity of Eliot's and Tolstoy's subjectivized psychological Realisms, however, there lurks a reverse type of goal inscribed in their fiction, one that would command *Middlemarch* and

---

[8] Alan Palmer, *Fictional Minds* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 20.
[9] Freeborn, in Moser, 329.
[10] J. Paul Hunter, 'The Novel and Social/Cultural History', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 9-40, at 30.
[11] Hunter, 'The Novel and Social/Cultural History', 30.
[12] Paris J. Bernard, 'Form, Theme, and Imitation in Realistic Fiction', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 1.2 (1968): 140-149, at 142.
[13] For more on these distinctions, see Caryl Emerson, *The Cambridge Introduction to Russian Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. Chapter 5, 'The Astonishing Nineteenth Century: Romanticisms' (99-124); and Chapter 6, 'Realisms: Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov' (125-165). See also Gary Saul Morson, *Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potentials in "War and Peace"* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987); and Michael Davis, *George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the Unmapped Country* (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).

Anna Karenina to conform to a dominant trend of making the world seem real. With this constraint in mind, it is necessary here to recognize the reality principle or the reality effect to be a philosophically contested idea, the outcome of several decades of polemical debates, speculation and grappling with the various schools of criticism and aesthetic demands, repeatedly readjusted and revalorized over the course of history and against the backdrop of a series of ideological changes in literary outlook.

David Lodge's approach to realist novels is that of displacing the orthodox categories by which realist texts have been conventionally identified, offering thereby a radical alternative. For Lodge, Realism is defined primarily in terms of a self-conscious perpetuation by literary texts of their internal consistencies rather than their focus on reduplicating life. In this schema, realist novels bear similarities not so much to the external world as to one another.[14] Roland Barthes seems to concur: 'the age-old aesthetic of "representation"',[15] to use his phrase, fades away as soon as the genre refrains from its own peremptory proclivities in order to make inter-textual connections with neighbouring fictional discourses. Through these assertions, novelistic Realism is not perceived as limited to a set of formal properties – stylistic and thematic – that are consistent with an established ideal of a well-executed genre. Rather, the form comes to be understood and interpreted in terms of the textual projection of an impulse to make itself redolent of what constitutes, at the time, an aesthetic and ideological synthesis. Under Lodge's and Barthes's guidance, the expectations-based definition of Realism develops effectively into an acknowledgment of a trans-discursive imitation.

Eliot's unsurpassable realist technique deployed in her mature *Middlemarch* did not need to fall back on the earlier models in order to protect its integrity. But what basic principle of Realism was established in her first novel, *Adam Bede* (1859), would forever function as a representative or anticipatory formula of her fiction. For Eliot, Realism essentially means striving towards an accurate representation of life, an aspiration

[14] David Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1977) 25.
[15] Roland Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989) 148.

> to give more than a faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored themselves in [her] mind. The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes be disturbed; the reflection faint or confused; but [she feels] as much bound to tell [us], as precisely as [she] can, what that reflection is, as if [she] were in the witness-box narrating [her] experience on oath.[16]

To Eliot, the mental picture she visualizes in her mind gives much scope for artistic creativity. The subjective image of social reality is provoked by an awareness of its existence, but simultaneously a new expression of social reality is created, transformed or infused with meaning. For Eliot, then, the act of individual perception in her novels becomes the departure point for her forceful invitation to the reader to adopt her own personal interpretation of the imagined world.[17] To capture the crucial moments of the human experience and to create an illusion of ordinary personalities is the goal, but it is of most importance to 'show it sufficiently',[18] to make it credible to the reader.

In contrast to Eliot's perceived motivation to produce a text whereby her social concern is modified by a superior consciousness of the narrator, Tolstoy's model of Realism aims to minimize narratorial mediation and maximize the impact of direct discourse. This technique, previously executed with considerable success by Gustave Flaubert in *Madame Bovary* (published in 1856 in serial, and 1857 in book form), allows the representation of the characters as speaking for themselves through dialogue, thus freeing the narrator from the temptation to intervene. What has typically been referred to as cult of impersonality or authorial abstentionism had become Tolstoy's iconic aesthetics during the *Karenina* years. In 1853, long before writing the novel, Tolstoy made a reference to the attitude that the author must adopt in order to achieve a distance that he identified with objectivism. Tolstoy's personal taste in literary works is a good summation of the basic principle of his Realism: 'the

---

[16] George Eliot, *Adam Bede* 1859, ed. Stephen Gill (London: Penguin, 1985) 177.

[17] Wolfgang Iser draws a distinction between the author-reader relationship of nineteenth-century novels and those of twentieth-century novels, arguing that, unlike the latter which requires of a reader to autonomously unravel the mysteries of a narrative through exclusive reliance on their own faculties of perception, the nineteenth-century novel offers the reader considerable assistance by deploying a variety of narrative strategies (satire, irony, methods of characterization, etc.) which propel the reader towards the "right" conclusions. See Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) 101-102.

[18] George Eliot's review of Kingsley's *Westward Ho!*, cited in Ian Gregor and Brian Nicholas, *The Moral and the Story* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961) 254.

most pleasant [works] are those in which the author seems to hide his personal viewpoint but remains consistent in it wherever it appears'.[19]

Tolstoy's ambition to depersonalize his art by effacing his voice and empowering the character is most succinctly expressed by Richard Freeborn in his essay about Realism in the nineteenth-century Russian novel:

> Tolstoy achieved to a remarkable degree a realism which depicted both the good and evil in human life but which worked to remove the author from the scene entirely: in his earlier works readers often feel that they are perceiving reality unmediatedly, experiencing his characters' emotions without any barriers.[20]

Notwithstanding Tolstoys's declarations of scrupulous impartiality, he was never prepared to remove himself entirely from his novelistic universe; quite the contrary, he was determined to exert the control it afforded him. Impersonal dialogues might have seemed aimed to obscure the author and to stage characters as the only ones who talk, much to the purpose of creating the community of sympathetic listeners who were more likely to be immediately responsive to multitudinous perspectives. But the better Tolstoy's dialogues perform their function, the more subjective the process of Tolstoy's realist representation threatens to become, because 'once located imaginatively within the perspective of a given character or narrator, the reader will identify with his thoughts as well'.[21] Even when Tolstoy, in trying to expound his own doctrine of objectivity, seeks to disappear, his 'judgment is always present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it'.[22]

Anna Karenina relies for its rhetorical effect on this technique of placing the character at the centre. It features characters who are victims of their own consciousness rather than external forces, a dramatic method which tends to ambush those readers who seek to restrict the destiny of those characters to the already-given, the already-assumed. By the time of the publication of the novel in 1875-7, Tolstoy was perfectly aware of the ripeness of great Realism of the nineteenth century: the prevalence of transparency, the establishment of the

---

[19] Tolstoy, quoted in Donna Tussing Orwin, 'Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 49-62, at 55.
[20] Freeborn, 'The Nineteenth Century: The Age of Realism, 1855-80', in Moser, 249.
[21] Orwin, 'Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure', in Orwin, 55.
[22] Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (1961; rev. ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983) 20.

rhetoric of instruction and utility, stereotypical female characters that are paragons of virtue or culprits guilty of transgression.[23] By rendering the nature of human utterance as persistently unreliable, Tolstoy situated his narrative control within the framework of a contrast between illusion and reality: between what seems and what is; and, in view of his 'exceptionally powerful . . . sense of moral concern',[24] between what is and what he thought ought to be. Exploiting the codes of language in order to obliterate his own authorial speech was Tolstoy's way of extending the limits of conventional Realism, which, toward the end of the nineteenth century, was already showing the signs of the need for modernization.

It has long been recognized, of course, that the discernible authorial presence by which realist novels are broadly characterized is principally a mode of perception, a means by which the novelists, in their different ways, communicate their philosophical stance and express their moral judgements. This self-conscious assertion of authority in representation, although 'an essential ingredient of all fiction',[25] has nevertheless become the very reason for both earlier and contemporary anxieties about Realism. The main criticism of Realism offered is that it is difficult to clearly define. In *Fictional Minds*, Alan Palmer describes it as 'a notoriously slippery concept'.[26] In *Humanism*, Tony Davis associates Realism with one of those tricky words 'whose range of possible meanings runs from the pedantically exact to the cosmically vague'.[27] In discussions of the novel, the term has become normative, so that novels tend to be identified strictly according to the degree of the author's control to be traced in each, as if the reduced obtrusiveness were to lead to the text's increased aesthetic quality. The proliferation

---

[23] In their classic book, *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination*, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar argue that, with the exception of occasional attempts by great novelists such as George Eliot to subvert the stereotypical place of women in society, traditional Victorian novels are 'dedicated to dramatizing the discrepancy between [fallen women and] angelic Madonna[s]' (496). By "angelic Madonnas" they presumably mean 'stereotypical Victorian heroine[s]: pious, domestic, self-sacrificing, emotionally uninhibited in response to people and ethical questions', who are expected 'to abstain from all practical activity, be removed from all industrial occupations, and be excluded from every kind of political activity in order that they might the better wear an aspect remote enough to seem worthy of worship' (Elizabeth Ammons, cited in Gilbert and Gubar 482; Lloyd Fernando, *"New Women" in the Late Victorian Novel* [University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977) 3. In contrast, "fallen women" are those who seek to challenge the prevailing sexual codes of the Victorian era, according to which '[women] are driven by an intense need for male approval and [men] are locked into a harsh, self-justifying code of honour' (Gilbert and Gubar 492).
[24] Anthony Thorlby, *Leo Tolstoy: Anna Karenina*, Landmarks of World Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 16.
[25] Bernard 143.
[26] Palmer, *Fictional Minds*, 91.
[27] Tony Davis, cited in Pam Morris, *Realism: The New Critical Idiom* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) 2.

of contradictory definitions of Realism proves to complicate even the categorization of such emblematic novels as *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* which have maintained their canonical status largely as a result of their discernible realist characteristics. Certainly, it is always possible and tempting in the process of cultural change to re-conceptualize the genre by highlighting some features and neglecting others. But any attempt to defy orthodox assumptions about the realist novel, however significant it is in widening the horizon of literary criticism, removes us too far from the importance of the novelistic tradition that shapes texts as distinct products of cultural and literary history. Before we can probe in more detail into the emergence of the novel, what purpose it served, what values it represented and what type of audience it attracted, we must pause to consider the critical resurgence of Realism, the mode of representation which, as it has already been noted, is explicitly central to canonical nineteenth-century novels.

Toward the Rehabilitation of the Realist Novel

Although critics express divergent opinions on which stylistic category *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* belong to – realist, symbolic, or mythical – it is certainly true that the disagreement about the labeling arises from a considerable degree of misunderstanding. There are two readily distinguishable causes of this confusion. Firstly, theoreticians and analysts of realist fiction have paid too little heed to the positive factors which motivated its original invention and subsequent development; and secondly, the critics' disparate and antagonistic accounts of the novel are always determined or at least oriented by their specific areas of expertise, intentions and interests linked to positions in their respective fields and associated points of view. The endeavour to reconcile the many classifications of Eliot's and Tolstoy's works – most adequate, some directly contradictory – forces us into participating in the unavoidably partial interpretive contest 'with competing critics pulling the [novels] a dozen different ways until everyone has his [own distinct] claim upon [them]'.[28] The resistance of some critics to recognize *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* to be realist novels is based mainly on the shared assessment of the category of Realism as overly prescriptive, and involves a form of liberal reductionism to malleable forms, the flexibility and lack of concreteness of which has the effect of obscuring the significance of these complex and dynamic novels. From both cultural and linguistic perspectives, there are serious difficulties with this position.

[28] Damian Grant, *Realism* (London: Methuen, 1970) 54-55.

Surely, it is unthinkable in the current environment of critical sophistication to submit *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* entirely to the kind of interpretation that Realism encourages, but it is also a mistake to seek the novels' value completely outside its boundaries, given its primary orientation – so this study argues – toward instantiating the cognition and conceptual systems of a culture. The social function of realist aesthetic is thereby re-creating, through habitual modes of discourse, the culturally- (and biologically-) inherited knowledge of the English and Russian people. Realism *is* prescriptive, but only to the extent that it frames within linguistic structures certain tendencies of the locally enculturated mind.

In this conviction, I raise no objections to Barbara Hardy's assertion that Eliot's presentation of characters in *Middlemarch* 'is not realistic, [and that] George Eliot is mixing with her realistic conventions other devices of the not always classic realistic novel, devices of stylization, exaggeration, and symbolic character'.[29] Nor do I question Amy Mandelker's argument that *Anna Karenina*

> is not a realist novel, although it has come to be read that way. Rather, it reflects on every level, both thematic and formal, Tolstoy's polemic with realism and with Victorian literature, and his quest for mythopoesis as an alternative.[30]

On the contrary, I find stimulating the energy with which both Hardy and Mandelker press their points. Undoubtedly, the significance of Eliot's and Tolstoy's choice of details in their novels is based on their strict relatedness to the rest of the narrative world, and also on the elaboration of their symbolic and mythical value. But I am sceptical about the polemic against Realism, since this prejudice pushes us towards the restricting dichotomy between two kinds of fiction – Realist and Other – only the second of which we are persuaded to appreciate. This Realism/Other opposition is, in view of the recent development of an interest in the reformulation and re-evaluation of realist aesthetics, misguided, and so necessitates clarification.

A large portion of critical wariness toward aesthetic and formal conventions of the novel stems from the ambivalent attitudes towards nineteenth-century realist literature as a form of art, which were surfacing even when the genre was at its peak. Victorian critics

---

[29] Barbara Hardy, *Particularities: Readings in George Eliot* (London: Peter Owen, 1982) 14.
[30] Amy Mandelker, *Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993) 67.

accepted as a fact that in the novels 'the literary or aesthetic ambitions are most clearly subordinate to political or social concerns'.[31] The fundamental framing of meanings within fictional texts and their thematic content, consisted, in their opinion, of plot structures derived from 'exploitative relationships, social advancement, material wealth, and the merely empirical truth of facts'.[32] In other words, realist novels, were traditionally concerned with the simulation of 'the actual social setting in which their personages exist',[33] and associated thereby with the commitment to assert the primacy of 'truth to life/experience/observation in representation'.[34] In view of this singular focus, they have been relegated by earlier critics to the sphere of the prosaic, the ethical, the material, and their form concomitantly pronounced guilty of "naïve transparency", "malignant totalism"[35] and "excessive rationalization".[36] The political and economical dynamism of nineteenth-century England and Russia placed on the novelists not the luxury, but more accurately the *requirement* of portraying the turbulent social scene. The novel was equipped with the means and expected to comment on contemporary affairs. Despite the genre's capacity to promote relevant social experience and to consolidate for its readers their shared areas of interest, critics[37] often remained sceptical of Eliot's and

---

[31] Josephine M. Guy, *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: The Market, The Individual and Communal Life* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996) 26.
[32] J. Jeffrey Franklin, *Serious Play: The Cultural Form of the Nineteenth-Century Realist Novel* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) 30-31.
[33] C. P. Snow, *The Realists: Portraits of Eight Novelists: Stendhal, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Galdós, Henry James, Proust* (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1978) 8.
[34] Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing*, 23.
[35] 'Realist representation' is often considered to be 'naïvely *transparent* and malignantly *totalistic*', in a sense that it supposedly offers us 'literal transcriptions of reality, forms in which, as it were, reality writes itself' (Harry E. Shaw, *Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot* [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999] 9; and Tony Bennett, *Formalism and Marxism* [London: Methuen, 1979] 24).
[36] Franklin 23.
[37] For example, Susana Onega and José Ángel García Landa have pigeonholed George Eliot's and similar realist texts into

> a psycho-social study, one that reveals new truths about human feelings and relationships . . . [one that] has a theme and is linked to a well-defined moral intention, an authorial stance towards that theme, which is easily identified, whether it is conveyed by direct or by indirect means.

('Introduction', in *Narratology: An Introduction*, eds. Susana Onega and José Ángel García Landa [London and New York: Longman, 1996] 1-41, at 17).
Two decades earlier, Reginald Brimley Johnson accused Eliot's works of resembling a 'tragic or subdued melancholy' that results partly from the author's 'uncertainty . . . about faith and her passionate sense of justice, so relentless in its demand for the punishment of sin; partly also from that tinge of sadness which overshadows the narrow, old-fashioned dogma by which her own childhood was moulded' (*The Women Novelists* [New York: Haskell House, 1972] 221). In Johnson's view, Eliot's endorsement of inauthentic human righteousness, together with her strong dogmatism limit the scope of her intellectual freedom and blunt the spontaneity of the imaginative vision, both of which are essential to great art. Johnson is clearly repeating the assumptions made by the assistant editor of the *Westminster Review* who earlier pointed to Eliot's

Tolstoy's shift to 'the world around and how it impinged with its specific gravity, its full concreteness, on consciousness'.[38] Rather than pointing at nineteenth-century novelists' practical impossibility, critical orthodoxy has referred instead to their '[inability] to break through the confines of their own immediate experience'.[39] This is not to say that realist novels implied, by definition, the re-creation or the replication of the aspects of nineteenth-century English bourgeois and Russian traditional aristocratic ideologies, but that the contemporary discourse must have been strategically deployed to meet their requirements.

If it was not its nature or content, it was the novel's structural composition that was under attack. Victorian criticism appreciated the debt that the nineteenth-century novel owed to Eliot and Tolstoy. But new literary trends in twentieth-century literature, which now positioned fiction to 'examine . . . an ordinary mind on an ordinary day',[40] rendered highly suspicious 'the apparently diffuse and rambling structure of novels with multiple plots'.[41] Already in 1873 Henry James found *Middlemarch* to be 'a treasure-house of details, but [nevertheless] an indifferent whole . . . It sets a limit, [he thought], to the development of the old-fashioned English novel. Its diffuseness . . . makes it too copious a dose of pure fiction'.[42] For W. C. Brownell (1902) too, Eliot's novel remained at once a book

---

> . . . curious naïveté in the whole impression [her] novels convey . . . The ethical law is, in her universe, as all powerful as the law of gravitation, and as unavoidable. Remorse, degeneration of character, and even material loss, are meted out for transmission with the rigid and childlike sense of justice which animated the writers of the Old Testament. Her temper was Hebraistic, and goodness was more to her than beauty. It may be doubted whether in the world, as we see it, justice works as impartially and with such unmistakable exactitude, whether the righteous is never forsaken, and evil always hunts the wicked person to overthrow him.

(cited in *The Women Novelists*, 215; no publication details of the *Westminster Review* provided).
By the same token, Anthony Thorlby, criticized the nineteenth-century Russian novel for its 'moral realism, [evidently] untouched by a suspicion that any view of reality may be arbitrary' (16), advocating instead an incorporation of existential 'doubts . . . characteristic of modern styles of writing' (16). Appreciative of the twentieth-century modernist innovation, Thorlby judges the meaning and literary style of *Anna Karenina* by paying excessive attention to 'what Tolstoy imagines to be real' and 'what he believes to be moral' (16, 17) and by giving insufficient thought to the novel's contextual significance.

[38] Robert Alter, *Partial Magic: The Novel as a Self-Conscious Genre* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) 87.

[39] György Lukács, 'Realism in the Balance', in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001) 1033-1058, at 1040.

[40] Virginia Woolf, *Collected Essays*, vol. 2 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1966) 106.

[41] Barbara Hardy, *The Novels of George Eliot: A Study in Form* (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1963) 2.

[42] Henry James, 'The Review of *Middlemarch* (1873)', in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical Reader*, ed. Stephen Regan (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) 79-85, at 79, 85.

> inspired by the wish to be pointed, to be complete, to give an impeccable equivalent in expression for the content of thought, to be adequately articulate [and also the epitome of] the formal sententiousness – now epigrammatic . . . and now otiose and obscure – because of the writer's exclusive consecration to the content, which itself varies, of course, from the pithy to the commonplace.[43]

James's and Brownell's critical backhandedness in initially patronizing Eliot's composition in preparation for a more forceful condemnation inevitably brings the recollection of how James himself (in his letter to Hugh Walpole in 1912) assessed Tolstoy's *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*:

> Tolstoi [is] fluid pudding, though not tasteless, because the amount of [his] own [mind] and [soul] in solution in the broth gives it savour and flavour, thanks to the strong, rank quality, of [his] genius and [his] experience. But there are all sorts of things to be said of [him], and in particular that we see how great a vice is [his] lack of composition, [his] defiance of economy and architecture . . . There is nothing so deplorable as a work of art with a *leak* in its interest; and there is no such leak of interest as through commonness of form.[44]

J. Jeffrey Franklin has already sought in his *Serious Play* theoretically to articulate the 'gulf between nineteenth-century Realism and twentieth-century theory'.[45] In light of his discussion, James's treatment of the classic realist novel would appear as only superficially objective, as it was determined by his individual creative aesthetic, and his own personal conception of art as '[living] upon discussion, upon experiment, upon curiosity, upon variety of attempt, upon the exchange of views and the comparison of standpoints'.[46] What James expected and demanded of the novel in order for it to be recognized as one of the fine arts was

---

[43] W. C. Brownell, cited in Derek Oldfield, 'The Language of the Novel: The Character of Dorothea', in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: Critical Essays and Documents*, ed. Arnold Kettle (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972) 224-247, at 224.

[44] Henry James, 'Letter to Hugh Walpole, The Reform Club, 19 May 1912', in *Henry James Letters 1895-1916*, vol. 4, ed. Leon Edel (London: Harvard University Press, 1984) 618-620, at 619. James's original letter to Hugh Walpole assesses as much Tolstoy's as Dostoevsky's powers of novelistic composition.

[45] Franklin's distinction between nineteenth- and twentieth-century Realism involves not the repeat of the kinds of opposing schools into which they have frequently been divided, but rather a consideration of the poor formulation of their contrast. In terms of function, twentieth-century Realism offers no novelty; it is still, like old Realism, 'centrally concerned with issues of representation and signification that impinge upon the problem of mimesis' (Franklin 22). In the Victorian period, George Eliot wishes to write 'a faithful account of men and things', acknowledging that the account can never be written except as 'defective', 'disturbed', 'faint or confused' (Adam Bede 1859, ed. Stephen Gill [London: Penguin, 1985] 177). In the age of Modernism, Virginia Woolf's desire is to represent life as "very far from being 'like this'"; to record 'a myriad of impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel . . . however disconnected and incoherent in appearance' (Woolf 106, 107). In this divergence of creative aspirations, the difference in the mode of storytelling is only the background for what is insistently constant and overlapping: the familiar phenomenon of the reality re-constructed or re-produced, the effort to recreate the real 'as faithfully as possible' (Lodge, *Consciousness and the Novel*, 64), and the impossibility of ever fully achieving that goal.

[46] Henry James, 'The Art of Fiction (1884)', in Regan, 69-78, at 69.

the dismissal of a simple descriptive mediocrity that assumes a 'correspondence-theory of truth' or posits 'a simple *adequation* between words and things'.[47] In its place he appealed for the endorsement of the spontaneity of '[flying] in the face of innumerable presumptions',[48] of 'freedom to feel and say',[49] and of absolute liberty for 'experiments, efforts, discoveries, successes',[50] all of which reflect the autonomy evidenced in modernist texts. In short, James's repudiation of conventional textual strategies that characterize nineteenth-century Realism is theoretically naïve, because it tends to ignore the peculiar ferment of the epoch, the spiritual consciousness of contemporary readers, their needs, anxieties and ambitions out of which the form and content of the genre organically emerges.

Matthew Arnold, too, seems to have embraced the commonplace view of the novel as artistically inadequate. With his excellent but exclusively classical training, he formed the conclusion that in proportion to the extent to which nineteenth-century civilization had developed, the need for philosophy and religion had declined. In the context of this assumed intellectual and moral deterioration, Arnold asserted that 'more and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us',[51] thereby failing to recognize that the genre of the novel could claim this potential. Arnold made his anti-Realism bias obvious by declaring that in *Anna Karenina* there were 'too many [characters] if we look in it for a work of art in which the action shall be vigorously one, and to that one action everything shall converge'.[52] Tolstoy's multi-layered and densely crowded novel, in which the author makes no gesture in the direction of offering a single convergence, was not to be taken 'as a work of art, [but] as 'a piece of life'.[53] Such vigorous critiques of the novel as a form drew motivated reactions from both Tolstoy and Eliot. They culminated in

[47] Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (London: Fontana Press, 1987) 54.
[48] James, 'The Art of Fiction (1884)', in Regan, 78.
[49] James, 'The Art of Fiction (1884)', in Regan, 73.
[50] James, 'The Art of Fiction (1884)', in Regan, 73.
[51] Matthew Arnold, cited in Kerry McSweeney, *George Eliot: A Literary Life* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991) 129.
[52] Matthew Arnold, 'Fortnightly Review of *Anna Karenina* (1887)', in *Tolstoy: The Critical Heritage*, ed. A. V. Knowles (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) 352-362, at 353.
[53] Arnold, in Knowles, 353.

Tolstoy's own condemnation and ultimate detraction from its principles.[54] Conversely, Eliot withdrew from 'a more straightforward, accessible and realist representational style toward more intellectually dense and allusive prose',[55] which later came to be derogatorily called "decadent".[56]

These early judgments reveal, among other things, that literary practices, overlaid by the distinctiveness of society and shifting assumptions about the most effective way to create an appearance of real life, are selective and particularly representative of a historical cultural tradition. In other words, nineteenth-century prose fiction, like any other literary genre, is first committed to making itself relevant to the contemporary reading public that, as culturally- and historically-conditioned, has specific expectations and aesthetic preferences. As critical interest in the realist novel has grown over the course of the the twentieth century, the definition of Realism and also the understanding of how literary meaning is produced have changed. In view of more recent critical paradigms, the potential of the realist novel to be, 'the peculiar hallmark of the nineteenth-century period',[57] finally acknowledged its rhetorical qualities and the fact that it is embedded in its historical cultural context. With the publication

---

[54] The change in Tolstoy's attitude to the classical realist aesthetics is best summarized by the Russian literary historian, Dmitry S. Mirsky:

> In his early work he [Tolstoy] was a representative man of the Russian realist school, which relied entirely on the method of "superfluous detail" that had been introduced by Gógol. It was "superfluous" detail that gave the particular and individual convincingness that is the very essence of the realistic novel. The general effect of such detail is to bring out the particular, the individual, the local, and the temporary at the expense of the general and the universal . . . This particularity which excludes a universal appeal and emphasizes social and national differences was what the old Tolstóy condemned in the methods of realistic fiction. In his early work he had entirely adopted them and carried them farther than his predecessors.

(*A History of Russian Literature: From Its Beginnings to 1900*, ed. Francis J. Whitfield [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1958] 262-263).

[55] Nancy Henry, *The Cambridge Introduction to George Eliot* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 108.

[56] In reference to Eliot's alleged artistic decline in her later novels, W. J. Dawson observes that '*Romola* marks her decadence . . . in *Middlemarch* this decadence is still more pronounced, and it is complete in the utterly tedious *Daniel Deronda*'. See W. J. Dawson, cited in Henry 108. The term "decadence" curiously establishes a clash of critical evaluations. For Dawson, Eliot's "decadence" corresponds to a deteriorated system of representation in which the author pays scant attention to linear arrangements and maximally non-mediated relationship to reality. At the other end of the spectrum, Sally Ledger sees Eliot's "decadence" in association with the *fin de siècle* movement, implying neither a diminution of form nor a moral decline, but rather an embryo of a progressive new aesthetics in which – through '*Middlemarch's* nebulously ambitious Dorothea Brooke and *Daniel Deronda's* sexually recalcitrant Gwendolen Harleth' – literature could launch a political activism in relation to coming to focus, at the turn of the century, on "the 'wild woman', the 'glorified spinster', the 'advanced woman', the 'odd woman'; the 'modern woman'", all manifested as various guises of what in 1894 came to be known as "New Woman" (*The New Woman: Fiction and Feminism at the Fin de Siècle* [Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997] 2, 3).

[57] Pamela Gilbert, *Disease, Desire, and the Body in Victorian Women's Popular Novels* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 29.

of *Discourse in the Novel* in 1934, Mikhail M. Bakhtin initiated a second-phase approach to literary texts, by incorporating into the study of fictional prose extra-linguistic principles for sense making. He believed that no meaning can exist independently of what he called 'dialogized heteroglossia',[58] a theoretically loaded term which, in a very few words, refers to the system of a language that is comprised not of "neutral' words and forms",[59] but rather of words that are consistent with and expressive of the lived reality of contemporary folk, words that have "taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour".[60] Against this background, the dialogic orientation of Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels could therefore be appropriately defined in terms of the extent to which their individual language 'tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life'.[61]

The diversity of social discourse within the focal novel has a significant bearing on the practice of cross-cultural representation of the contemporary world. While the novels are not seen as holding the best prospects for eschewing 'a direct and unmediated expression of authorial individuality',[62] neither are they thought to be dominated by the authors' desires to 'express [themselves] in them'.[63] Realist novels, in Bakhtin's view, belong to the socio-verbal histories which have the power to exhibit the unique

> diversity of social speech types [social dialects, characteristic group behaviour, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour] and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized.[64]

The stylistic uniqueness and artistry of form are therefore to be found in the multiplicity of language and its reflection of 'a specific conceptual horizon'[65] of the reader. From this, perspective, the realist novel, which had previously been denied entry to the temple of fine art

---

[58] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001) 1190-1220, at 1200.
[59] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1214.
[60] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1214.
[61] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1214.
[62] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1195-96.
[63] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1219.
[64] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1192.
[65] Bakhtin, '*From* Discourse in the Novel', in Leitch, 1206.

on the grounds of its naïve pretensions to 'provide a convincing illusion of life',[66] is finally permitted right of passage as a mirror of context-specific vocabularies.

However influential has proved to be the deconstruction of Realism by later critics, there still is felt a strong predilection for searching for alternative ways of reading them. Both Hardy and Mandelker have undertaken the arduous task of liberating *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* from the shackles of Realism, trying to show in them discursive elements that allow the transcendence of their archetypal qualities. Hence they propose that Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels are better understood as symbolic or mythical representations, and should not therefore be judged solely in terms of their 'narrative apparatus as the means of implying that [they are] simply [the windows] onto historical events and real lives'.[67] Rather, they should be appreciated in terms of their ability to project the shared cultural characteristics and value systems to be uncovered in 'traces of the language, narrative structure and archetypal imagery'.[68] The identification of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* as literary works that do not conform to the established tradition of the realist novel, but instead acquire their significance through the centrality of the representation of cultural meanings (as opposed to the previous reliance on mirroring their immediate cultural environment itself), is *in theory*, a vindication of their realist status.

Indeed, only in theory, because, although the novels may be read outside their generic designations which they, according to Hardy and Mandelker so brilliantly typify, they nevertheless cannot be discredited for what they essentially are: the books of

> the concrete world, the world of physical fact, the shapes of society . . . [In them] the people have to be projected, not only as novelists, major and minor, have tried to project them, but also examined with the writer's psychological resources and with cognitive intelligence. Both these components are features of realism.[69]

In other words, for a literary critic to declare that they value *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* without appreciating the texts' conformity to the orthodox realist aesthetic is, adapting Eliot's own playful metaphor, 'the same sort of thing as to say that you like eating a peach but don't

---

[66] John Peck and Martin Coyle, *Literary Terms and Criticism* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1984) 115.
[67] Franklin 25.
[68] Amy Mandelker, 'The Woman with a Shadow: Fables of Demon and Psyche in *Anna Karenina*', *A Forum on Fiction* 24.1 (1990): 48-68, at 48.
[69] Snow 8.

like its flavour'.[70] How, then, to reconcile the various categories into which the novels have been so convincingly classified? To promote *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* as either symbolical or mythical is not equivalent to substituting Realism with alternative representative labels. Realism is, in fact, the mode of reading reduced to no single method of approach, as has often been fixedly and deceptively associated with verisimilitude. Rather, it encompasses

> a bundle of shifting, historically specific, and potentially contradictory textual strategies operating simultaneously at multiple levels ranging from the word to the cultural form. To recognize this is to eschew the pitfalls of critical condensation by giving realists texts credit for using all of their strategies and levels: those that add to the illusions of verisimilitude and those that disrupt it, those that disguise the narrative apparatus and those that call attention to the dilemmas of mimesis, those that enlist readers in the dominant ideologies of the time and those that provide us with the opportunity to congratulate ourselves for seeing through those same ideologies.[71]

Middlemarch and *Anna Karenina* are therefore characteristically open-ended and accommodating texts, inasmuch as they invite readers to continually integrate the contexts of meaning which they themselves purposely validate.

As an analyst of conceptual metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* (I hereby foreground interpretive preoccupations that are my own in a limiting way), I emphasize primarily a feasibility and a potential of realist discourse to create an impression of the conceptual frameworks hard-wired in English and Russian minds that arise from common embodied experience and cultural embeddedness. This cognitive-linguistic approach to cross-lingual literary texts permits a proper specification of the novel as an excellent vehicle for obtaining evidence of cross-cultural similarity in conceptualizing and discussing emotions. This analysis assumes that the broadly universal way in which different cultures conceptualize emotions accounts for the convergence in emotional responses across linguistically different readers. In order to appreciate this affective impact, we first need to look at how the characters' emotions are recreated in the mind of the reader, the focus of Chapter 3. Before the discussion moves to that topic, though, it needs to consider the development of the genre in England and Russia.

[70] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 458.
[71] Franklin 204.

A Sketch of the History of the English Novel

The long-lasting but now waning perception that the novel reflects reality has been based on a misconception. The notion implies not only a standardized and formulaic '*ideology* of representation',[1] but also the institutionalized criteria of critical evaluation. Thus far, we have witnessed that the impetus for the literary rehabilitation of Realism may be found in the growing conviction that modern critics of nineteenth-century realist fiction, privileging non-mimetic textual strategies for representing reality, such as authorial distance, literary polysemousness and a limitless freedom of expression, have, as a result, 'tended to obscure primary values [of the novel] and to make inappropriate demands'.[2] If such a conclusion were satisfactory, then nineteenth-century Realism would be treated at best as a reformed culprit, whose guilt of existence has been removed by the generosity of a more liberal contemporary criticism.

As literary histories generally maintain, Realism has been to the nineteenth-century novel a blueprint for its future, and to resist to uphold this truism would mean to dismiss as irrelevant over one hundred years of the English literary tradition. Most basically, there is a broad consensus of opinion that it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the British novel achieved its due recognition, but it had already established a firm history during the eighteenth century. Realism from the outset was not some enduring caprice deployed in the English novel by writers as if by a sudden collective inspiration. It was consolidated alongside a pattern of historical events and a mode of literary production that had great value for the rapidly growing British readership in the early eighteenth century, in fact capitalizing on its commercial success. Realism, then, derives from the nexus between historical circumstances and public taste, and is best understood as an experimental literary construct devised for a specific 'moment in time and a historical consciousness'.[3] A fundamental assumption of this chapter is that the development of the novel and the techniques of literary Realism are inextricably linked. In order to recognize and appreciate *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* as essentially realist texts, it is necessary first to explore the immediate context of the history of

---

[1] Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (London: Fontana Press, 1987) 54, italics in original.
[2] Paris J. Bernard, 'Form, Theme, and Imitation in Realistic Fiction', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 1.2 (1968): 140-149, at 140.
[3] J. Paul Hunter, *Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990) x.

the novel, and then to reassess Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels in light of a reexamination of Realism in nineteenth-century England and Russia.

Several literary historians have made attempts to map out the origin of the novel, each producing quite different results. For example, in her influential book, *The True Story of the Novel*, Margaret Anne Doody argues that the novel 'grew among a motley collection of various peoples living in the [ancient] Mediterranean basin',[4] attracting readers in upper Egypt and Alexandria. The distinguished American novelist and literary critic, Jane Smiley, contends however that 'the novel was invented several times – most notably in 1004 by Murasaki Shikibu [and her *The Tale of Genji*] in what later became Kyoto, Japan, and once again in the thirteenth century in Iceland, in the form of the Icelandic saga'.[5] Michail Bakhtin puts forward yet another contrasting hypothesis, namely that the tradition of the novel begins in earnest with the Hellenic period, gaining dominance again 'during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, but with special force and clarity beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century'.[6] The disparate accounts of the history of the novel have shown not only that identifying origins is a matter of opinion, but more importantly, that this mode is not as recent a practice as many literary histories would suggest. Smiley seems most articulate in explaining that the novel has a far longer ancestry than nineteenth-century France and Britain. In *Thirteen Ways of Looking at the Novel*, she calls attention to the facts, first, that over the centuries, collections of ancient mythic tales and folk fables have continued their cross-cultural journeys, permeating various languages; and second, that since the spread of "print culture",[7] the extensive translation of novels has allowed cross-linguistic, cross-thematic and cross-stylistic

---

[4] Margaret Anne Doody, *The True Story of the Novel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996) 9.
[5] Jane Smiley, *Thirteen Ways of Looking at the Novel* (London: Faber and Faber, 2006) 57. Smiley's book is a product of the author's self-appointed task of reading and interpreting a hundred novels, in the course of which she assesses their origin, nature and function. Smiley begins her critical inquiry with Murasaki Shikibu's *The Tale of Genji*, an emotionally evocative story of social arrangements in the tenth-century Japanese court, followed by Snorri Sturluson's *Egilsaga*, a history of a great warrior and his family set against the backdrop of the Viking world of ninth-century Norway. Smiley's analysis of the novels and their distinct narrative techniques serves to demonstrate how, from its earliest days, the novel had been used to reflect how an individual relates to a particular moment of history, and how this relatedness reveals the character of this historical period.
[6] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, 'Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the study of the Novel', in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981) 3-40, at 5.
[7] Here, the concept of "print culture" refers to the mass circulation and popularization in the eighteenth century of various kinds of published material. An interesting and useful discussion on the importance of the printing press in England is offered by Jeremy Hawthorn in *Studying the Novel*, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 2001), esp. Chapter 2, 'History, Genre, Culture' (15-44).

influence to occur. Smiley uses testimonies of the major world novelists to document their own reading choices and potential influences:

> Forster read James, James read Dickens, Dickens read Smollet, Smollet read Cervantes, Cervantes read Marguerite of Navarre, Margueritte read Bocaccio, (and, of course, Forster read Cervantes, Dickens read Scott, Scott read Bocaccio, Scott read Cervantes, Fielding read Cervantes, Dickens read Cervantes, Woolf read Austen, Dickens, and James, Stendhal read Marguerite, Balzac read Stendhal, James read Balzac, Turgenev read Stendhal, Stendhal read Madame de La Fayette, Madame de La Fayette read Marguerite of Navarre, Dostoevsky read Turgenev, Tolstoy read Turgenev, Gogol read Turgenev, Turgenev read Lermontov, Lermontov read Scott, Tenizaki read Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Lady Murasaki, and so forth).[8]

Moreover, as Smiley suggests, features that we today ascribe to the conventional nineteenth-century English novel can be detected in narrative forms as remote as thirteenth-century Icelandic writing, and even earlier in the literature of ancient Japan. Smiley's brief survey of international canonical and other prose fiction across history (the primary goal of her book) lends support to the conclusion that the novel as an artistic form cannot be confined to a single period or to the literature of a single nation. Rather, it is best understood in historical perspective as an intertextual artifact that can occur at any point in time and in any culture. For Smiley, the novel may not have a 'natural or positive existence',[9] but its appearance marks the emergence of human aspirations to represent an objective world by means of subjective observation. Whilst Smiley's views are largely in accord with other contemporary accounts of the novel, which treat this mode as a 'true reflection of the world, regardless of when the work was created',[10] she also emphasizes the importance of what might be called a "familiarization procedure" – a notorious assimilation (conscious or intuitive) of the elements that earlier novels had previously made original and memorable.

For a formal description of the novel, it is necessary to reiterate the opening characterization of its origin as a contested rather than a settled matter. It has proved difficult for literary historians to determine and agree upon when the genre first arose because there is no general agreement as to what precisely constitutes the novel. The literary theorist, Terry Eagleton, expresses this critical commonplace in observing that

---

[8] Smiley 128.
[9] Walter L. Reed, *An Exemplary History of the Novel: The Quixotic versus the Picaresque* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981) 24.
[10] Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 57.

> the novel is a mighty melting pot, a mongrel among literary thoroughbreds. There seems to be nothing it cannot do. It can investigate a single human consciousness for eight hundred pages. Or it can recount the adventures of an onion, chart the history of a family over six generations, or recreate the Napoleonic wars . . . The novel is an anarchic genre, since its rule is not to have rules. An anarchist is not just someone who breaks rules, but someone who breaks rules as a rule, and this is what the novel does too.[11]

The novel, as Eagleton sees it, is a discourse that cannot be described in a single sentence or marked by a definition so complete as never to disrupt any of the existing literary paradigms. It is a liberal form, a mixed genre in which multiple other genres and literary categories – 'letters, diaries, journalism, fairy tale and romance'[12] – blend and clash. Reading a novel, as we have already learned from Smiley, is rarely a question of following standard rules predetermined by novelistic convention. Since the convention is 'self-grounding and self-determining',[13] it inflects the changing social values that it encodes, and requires a 'particular way of seeing the world'.[14] The novel does not evoke a specific place at a particular point in time, but the culture's shifting sense of it – 'the way in which the world comes into being only by our bestowing form and value upon it'.[15] As a product and an emblem of cultural history, the novel reflects in its focus, style and voice the constantly evolving material and cultural conditions in which it was written and read.

Smiley and Eagleton present ideas that have been common knowledge for some time. They characterize the novel as primarily a modern phenomenon, itself originating from and drawing upon an available collection of earlier works, and not as an earlier tradition of sustained development. If defined through reference to literary status, it is seen as evolving toward a concrete form achieved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In John Richetti's words,

> What we now think of as the novel – a long prose narrative about largely fictional if usually realistic characters and plausible events – did not actually solidify in the minds of readers and writers as a literary type or a set of expectations for narrative in the English-speaking world until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Jane Austen and Walter Scott flourished, and when the novel in our current sense of it was widely accepted in Britain and elsewhere in Europe as a major literary form . . .

---

[11] Terry Eagleton, *The English Novel: An Introduction* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005) 1-2.
[12] Pam Morris, *Realism: The New Critical Idiom* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) 48.
[13] Eagleton 7.
[14] Eagleton 6.
[15] Eagleton 17.

> Eighteenth-century "novels" such as we now read and study represent part of the "prehistory" of novelistic development; they constitute the early and truly formative phase of the novel as a genre of prose fiction that has since then come to dominate readers' sense of what literary narrative should be.[16]

Richetti suggests that it is not until the nineteenth century that the basic aesthetic tendencies aimed to define the essence of the novel is staked out. In the early eighteenth century, we encounter a set of preliminary artistic conceptions that accelerate in the nineteenth century, namely the tendency toward social Realism with verisimilitude at its base. For all the future mutations upon the form of the genre, or mode of the novel, what came to be established as its fixed formula has been re-adjusted, re-orientated, polemicized, even rebuked, but has nevertheless remained durable.

A widely accepted view of the modern novel considers its establishment and development alongside the birth of the modern period, which in Europe coincides with great cultural transformation, followed by the great fourteenth-century plague, the Black Death,[17] and which in England runs parallel with "the steady and visible growth of the prosperity of the newly united kingdom in the years following the 'Glorious Revolution' [1688] and the Act of Union [1707]",[18] characterized by the rise of Protestantism, capitalism, widening commerce, increasing population and the spread of literary culture and literacy.

In trying to pinpoint which texts are to be counted as part of the prehistory of the English novel, J. Paul Hunter recognizes a great deal of difficulty, and sees the emergence of the modern novel as ultimately only a two-stage process. The first stage dates back to the period stretching from the 1690s to the 1720s, culminating in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), *Moll Flanders* (1722) and Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726); while the

---

[16] John Richetti, 'Introduction', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1-8, at 1.

[17] Smiley 57. The effect of the European plague was demographically devastating, killing as much as a third and a half of its population. Florence, a commercially successful Italian city and the home of Giovanni Boccaccio, was badly affected. It is on the basis of the medieval model of folk tales that Boccaccio had fashioned his own fictional form by means of which he sought to communicate moral messages in response to human disaster. *The Decameron* (c.1348-53), inspired by the writer's gruesome experience, is a story of ten male and female refugees who flee into the countryside to entertain themselves with humorous stories. Whilst isolating themselves from the devastation, the entertainers do not forget or trivialize the implications of the spreading disease, but rather they 'reconstitute what it means to be human and civilized even while civilization is disintegrating around them' (Smiley 273).

[18] Andrew Sanders, *The Short Oxford History of English Literature*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 302, 303.

second stage, between the 1740s and 1750s, was distinguished by a self-conscious process of theorizing the novel by English writers such as Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding who demonstrated in *Clarissa* (1748) and *Tom Jones* (1749) respectively the development of a more critical understanding of the kind of writing in which they were engaging.[19] Although these early novelists did not on the whole supply manifestos as a way of explaining or justifying their artistic practice, they nevertheless refused to embrace the terms "novel" or "romance" for their narratives, or at any rate 'simply failed to refer to their novels *as* "novels"'.[20]

Social and economic revolution, characterized by the increase of literacy of the middle class,[21] sprang inevitably from commercial publishing by the powerful bourgeoisie. A decline in interest in romantic poetry was brought about by 'new readers, new modes of literary production, changing tastes, and a growing belief that traditional forms and conventions were too constrained and rigid to represent modern reality'.[22] Traditional forms of literature such as poetry and drama were perceived to '[require] a taste educated by classical learning and cultivated leisure'.[23] As the eighteenth-century middle class grew in wealth, so synchronously did literacy and opportunity for amusement, but the genre that developed in response to a new demand became synonymous with chronicles and documentaries. Eighteenth-century literary forms, thus, are notable for the shift from allegorical representations of the ideals of chivalry, courtly love, and the knightly order of the past – a mode of interpreting individual and

---

[19] For a discussion of the two stages in the development of the novel, see Hunter, *Before Novels*, esp. Chapter 1, 'What Was New About the Novel?' (3-28).

[20] Brean Hammond and Shaun Regan, *Making the Novel: Fiction and Society in Britain, 1660-1789* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 15. J. Paul Hunter argues that at the turn of the seventeenth century, frequently 'the terms "romance" and "novel' were used interchangeably' and no theoretical distinction was made between them (Hunter 25).

[21] The conventional view is that the history of the modern novel in England begins in earnest in the eighteenth century, and that it was predominantly the middle class who took special interest in the genre. The literary historian, Andrew Sanders, neatly summarizes these points:

> That the art of prose fiction developed prodigiously in the years 1720-80, and that its potential as both instructor and entertainer was readily recognized by a new body of largely middle-class readers, are matters of little debate . . . Those readers who had been alienated from courtly styles either by an inherited Puritan earnestness or by the simple fact of their social class and education, proved particularly receptive to an easily assimilated, but morally serious, "realist" literature.

(*The Short Oxford History of English Literature*, 303, 304).

[22] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 10.

[23] Morris 77.

historical patterns typical of the medieval period[24] – to a faithful recording of the apparently more sophisticated contemporary culture, 'which emphasized the significance of private experience'.[25]

While recent critical theory acknowledges the rich legacy of Romance, from which the modern novel derives, it nevertheless still seems fairly easy to distinguish the imaginative authenticity in the modern novel from the folkloric myth of its predecessors. It is towards this authenticity that the modern novel aspires, although it frequently utilizes the narrative strategies of Romance (such as allegory or symbolism) in its search to represent the real. The form of the English medieval Romance has traditionally involved the supernatural to

> celebrate the putative ancestors of prominent aristocratic families, [and to glorify] eponymous heroes [who] face a series of dire challenges during their respective quests to prove themselves and the quality of their love [as, for example, in *Bevis of Hampton*, or *Guy of Warwick*].[26]

As the novel developed to reflect a more rational discourse, it moved away from conventional features of Romance, such as fantasy and sentimentalism, on which it had earlier relied. Alongside the new literary orientation, directly there was a broad tendency for eighteenth-century writers to present their works as secure from 'the torments of soul of young men with too much imagination', 'tortured phraseology and ideas', and 'romantic psychology',[27] and to keep the modern age free of courtship entanglements, fantasy, and great heroism, all of which are elements of what Arnold Kettle calls 'a pseudo-world'.[28] One leading representative of this tendency is Richardson, who indignantly remarked in his letter to Miss Mulso in 1752: 'What a duce, do you think I am writing a Romance? Don't you see that I am copying Nature'.[29] Likewise, in response to a perceived promotion by fictional narratives of mere escapism, contemporary moralists such as Fielding felt compelled to protect contemporary readers from

---

[24] Sanders 41. According to Sanders, numerous fourteenth-century English poems are especially known for their employment 'of the device of a dream-allegory, whether, as a modified love-vision such as Chaucer's own *Book of the Duchess*, or as a religious revealing such as *Pearl*, a poem generally ascribed to the so-called *Gawain*-poet' (41).
[25] Sanders 304.
[26] Sanders 42.
[27] These quotations appear in Dennis Walder, 'The Genre Approach', in *Approaching Literature: The Realist Novel*, ed. Dennis Walder (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 3-30, at 26.
[28] Arnold Kettle, *An Introduction to the English Novel: To George Eliot*, vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1951) 30.
[29] Samuel Richardson, 'Letter to Miss Mulso, 5 October 1752', quoted in Miriam Allott, *Novelists on the Novel* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) 41.

the 'Swarm of foolish Novels, and monstrous Romances',[30] by introducing to the public a 'hard-headed realist'[31] mode of writing designed 'to portray people in their social context'.[32]

As much as eighteenth-century writers wished to emphasize their departure from Romance, they tried to foreground their approximation to history – 'the dominant written form during the period associated with the rise of the novel'.[33] The repudiation of romantic aesthetics accompanied by the prevailing negative attitudes towards the novel, which were manifested in the minimalist and derogatory definition – 'A trashy piece of fiction fit only for servants and females'[34] – motivated the writers of the period to call their works "histories", "lives", "expeditions", or "memoirs" (for example, the sub-title of Richardson's *Clarissa* was *The History of a Young Lady*, and the full title of Fielding's *Tom Jones* was *The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling*). Eighteenth-century literature made no formal pretension to be anything more than a 'supposedly factual reportage'[35] of the life of ordinary people, describing situations that 'pass every day before our eyes, such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves',[36] a claim which, a century later, will be thought to be characteristic of the English realist novel. It was in fact by virtue of bearing resemblance to histories, biographies, autobiographies and travel books that the novel gained its lasting appeal, hence a convention of the eponymous protagonists. The progression from traditional tales of idealized individuals to probable stories full of circumstantial detail indicates why the novel was typically considered a factual narrative and not a fictional genre.

Insistence that the primary responsibility of a novel was to authenticate its fictional world and to remain reliable, and that the fundamental duty of a reader was to attempt to discount falsity, was widely endorsed as commonsense practice in the eighteenth century.[37] Whether their preference was for an autobiography or a travel book, the reader of the novel was likely to demand a certain degree of accuracy from it, if only to approve or discount it on

---

[30] Henry Fielding, *The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling* 1749, introd. Martin C. Battestin, ed. Fredson Bowers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) vol. 1, IX, i, 487.
[31] Eagleton 3.
[32] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 39.
[33] Walder 27.
[34] Eagleton 11.
[35] Eagleton 23.
[36] Clara Reeve, 'The Progress of Romance (1785)', vol. 1. *Evening vii*, quoted in Allott, 47.
[37] Kate Loveman, *Reading Fictions, 1660-1740: Deception in English Literary and Political Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 20.

the grounds of fidelity when compared with the presumably accepted historical facts. Even limited experience with the relativism of truth or the subjectivity of perceived fact would allow one to recognize that such a criterion of value in this genre is deeply flawed. All fiction is equipped to make claims for some sort of truth. By the same token, no truth is ever absolute or impersonal. Thus the term "history" that most often labelled narratives of the period confirms a habitual yearning of reading audiences for actuality. But "actuality" here can only mean a truthful invention, and it is exclusively in this sense that it has relevance as applied to fiction.

The practice of construing these texts as other than fictional has long been abandoned. The novel might make claims to present fact, or to be faithful, but was routinely read as an imaginative construction. Above all, rather than offering a historical recount of 'things as they really were and of events as they really happened',[38] it would provide entertainment[39] and also 'serve as [a lecture] of conduct'[40] – although, in the eyes of traditionalists, such as Samuel Johnson, who wished to protect literature from the invasion of popular culture, the latter benefit was 'chiefly to the young, the ignorant, and the idle'.[41] As the novel invited a belief in its authenticity through the ritual of situating the fictional story within the realistically-framed background, so concomitantly, contemporary readers developed corresponding reading habits. An eighteenth-century reader, picking up a novel, would not be likely to investigate if the characters and narrated events were real or pure invention. Readerly satisfaction came to rely on discerning the points at which the represented reality of the novel coincided with knowledge of the actual world. The credibility of the novel was assured by appeals to a range of familiar situations of daily life, and notoriously involved the promotion of emotional

---

[38] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946) 246. Irina Reyfman offers a more contemporary revision of the role of literary historians, by extending it to

> the task of reconstructing the past from traces of past events contained in the present, that is, from the end products of past events and accounts of these events presented by contemporaries.

(*Vasilii Trediakovsky: The Fool of the 'New' Russian Literature* [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990] 1).

[39] J. Paul Hunter emphasizes that what was characteristic about the readership of novels was not only their wide social range – 'English men and women of all classes' (9) – but also broad use as entertainment:

> Readership of novels extended down the social scale to include not only clerks, trades-people, and those who had taught themselves to read for pragmatic purposes, but considerable numbers of domestic servants, both men and women, and people who – with so much new reading material available – had learned to read for pleasure.

('The Novel and Social/Cultural History', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996] 9-40, at 19).

[40] Samuel Johnson, *The Rambler*, vol. 1, 'No. 4. Saturday, March 31, 1750' (London: F. C. and J. Rivington, 1820) 16-22, at 18.

[41] Johnson 18.

alignment with characters who struggled against recognizable cruelties and injustices of the time. What seemed believable, in other words, was 'the recognition of a part of oneself in a fictional other who might take a different course or come to a different end, [as well as the confrontation with] people quite unlike oneself'.[42]

As contradictory as it seems to us, the celebration of emotion in the eighteenth-century novel did not preclude the active historical reading of it. In Defoe's works, which 'were plausibly presented and received as histories when they first appeared, and only subsequently read into novelistic discourse',[43] it is evident that the focus on emotions was a constitutive factor in his use of the genre. Though historical narratives can be argued to have existed before Defoe, the originality of his aesthetic techniques remains apparent. Whether or not Defoe invented "social history"[44] as a literary form, he must have believed what he was doing was new. His cautioning of readers against placing *Moll Flanders* amongst 'Novels and Romances'[45] indicates that he conceived of his enterprise as sufficiently experimental to necessitate such an attempt to direct his readers as to how his works were to be read. *Moll Flanders*, classified by Defoe himself as an anti-novelistic and anti-romantic discourse, whose 'difference lyes not in the real worth of the Subject so much as in the Gust and Palate of the Reader',[46] responds to contemporary gender restrictions, by showing that a woman, as belonging to an unprivileged sector of society, has to be dexterous and resourceful, in order to make her way in the patriarchal world of perpetual insecurity and exploitation. 'Quick wits, ruthlessness, resourcefulness, adaptability, a thick skin and a smooth tongue, a keen sense of self-interest'[47] and even readiness to enter a path of criminality, if forced by necessity, are all the necessary qualities that increase the chances for female prosperity and independence. Eighteenth-century readers who were familiar with the consequences of economic and social deficiencies and who themselves suffered first-hand from 'a terrible crime wave'[48] that swept millenarian London, presumably saw nothing untrue or unrealistic in Defoe's detailed

---

[42] Hunter, 'The Novel and Social/Cultural History', 22.
[43] Robert Mayer, *History and the Early English Novel: Matters of Fact from Bacon to Defoe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 183.
[44] In 'The Novel and Social/Cultural History', J. Paul Hunter uses the generic term "social history" to characterize and classify Defoe's fiction.
[45] Daniel Defoe, 'The Preface' to *Moll Flanders: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Sources, Criticism*, ed. Edward H. Kelly (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973) 3-6, at 3.
[46] Defoe, 'The Preface' to *Moll Flanders*, 4.
[47] Eagleton 39.
[48] Mayer 201.

description of the peculiarities of being female in the criminal underworld. It is also highly likely that such readers regarded the account of Moll's life as a sincere attempt to report actual events. Given the volume of accurate geographical and circumstantial detail that Moll provides, there was no motivation for readers to doubt the genuineness of her criminal autobiography. Moll's adventures strike the reader as genuine, partly because they are recounted by a woman who was 'an object lesson, a satirist upon herself and those of her tribe',[49] and partly also because her responses to her personal circumstances appear so rational and so reasonable. This dual strategy has the capacity both to convince sceptical readers of the reliability of the story and to create a sympathetic audience. It is in the belief that 'Facts that are form'd to touch the Mind, must be done a great Way off, and by somebody never heard of',[50] that Defoe invites the reader to admire Moll's optimism, determination and rational thinking, whilst at the same time telling us that she has embarked on vile illegal exploits to profit criminally from society.

The techniques used to create credibility in fictional narratives will naturally differ from one author to the next, yet despite this variability, there is a certain consistency in the attempts to achieve a reality effect. For Clara Reeve, as for Defoe and many other writers of the period, fiction is most likely to gain credence when it sets itself in direct opposition to Romanticism. In Reeve's dialogue-based novel *The Progress of Romance through Times, Centuries and Manners* (1785) one of her three characters, Euphrasia, draws a distinction between the novel and Romance:

> The Romance is an heroic fable, which treats of fabulous persons and things. – The Novel is a picture of real life and manners, and of the times in which it is written. The Romance in lofty and elevated language, describes what never happened nor is likely to happen. – The Novel gives a familiar relation of such things, as pass every day before our eyes, such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves; and the perfection of it, is to represent every scene, in so easy and natural a manner, and to make them appear so probable, as to deceive us into a persuasion (at least while we are reading) that it is all real, until we are affected by the joys or distresses, of the persons in the story, as if they were our own.[51]

A true story, in Reeve's view, is one that records what is likely to happen to ordinary people in real life. When she contends that, unlike Romance, the novel persuasively recounts probable

[49] Max Novak, 'Defoe as an Innovator of Fictional Form', in Richetti, 41-71, at 57.
[50] Daniel Defoe, 'Robinson Crusoe's Preface' to *Serious Reflections During the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe: With his Vision of the Angelick World* (London: W. Taylor, 1720) no page numbers.
[51] Reeve, quoted in Allott, 47.

events using the idiomatic language of everyday life, she suggests that her narrative is realistic precisely because it aims to engage the reader emotionally to invest their interest in specific characters and their actions. Although Reeve herself does not seem to be using her romance/novel distinction as grounds for establishing contemporary artistic methods, she nevertheless indicates the fundamental characteristics of fiction that became popular towards the end of the eighteenth century. Reeve's description of the novel obscures the features that novels essentially share with romances – 'romantic heroes and villains, wish-fulfilments and fairy-tale endings [that now] have to be worked out in terms of sex and property, money and marriage, social mobility and the nuclear family'.[52]

In this sentiment, Reeve can be seen to be anticipating later developments in the novel. The impulse towards Realism in prose fiction was motivated by the ambition of later writers to replace the regime of tradition with the regime of change. Asserting discontinuity with the romantic past meant no less than securing the dominance of the innovation. An escape from older

> heroic romance [filled with] giants . . . knights . . . personages in deserts . . . [and] imaginary castles' [towards] the works of fiction, with which the present generation seems more particularly delighted, [and which] exhibit life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily happen in the world,[53]

supported claims for forging a new 'Species of writing'[54] that was 'affirmed to be hitherto unattempted in [the English] Language'.[55] While stressing, not without a considerable degree of naivety as Margaret Doody would suggest,[56] its complete transformation and redirection, the eighteenth-century novel tended to proclaim any change as improvement or progress.

---

[52] Eagleton 2.
[53] Johnson 16-17.
[54] Henry Fielding, 'Preface' to *Joseph Andrews* 1742, ed. Martin C. Battestin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 3-11, at 10.
[55] Fielding, 'Preface' to *Joseph Andrews*, 10.
[56] Margaret A. Doody believes that no novel is so truly original that it cannot be traced to any previous literary forms:

> To put it simply, nineteenth-century novels were written by writers who had strong contact with writers of the eighteenth century. Those eighteenth-century writers, like Prévost, Marivaux, Richardson, and Fielding, had strong contact with seventeenth-century novels influenced by and adapted from everything from *Satyricon* to *Amadís* and *Célie*. And eighteenth-century novelists, at least until 1760 or 1770, came of age in a period when translations of the novels of antiquity were commonly accessible, and treated as current literature . . . The Novel's genetic inheritance has always been present, even if certain characteristics have been suppressed, or seen as sources of embarrassment.

(*The True Story of the Novel*, 298).

In the revolutionary scheme of the English eighteenth-century novel, the sidelining or masking of precursive romantic traditions was used as a point of access to cultural and historical difference. For the novel to justify its newly invented title of a truly 'new Province of Writing',[57] it now had to appeal to a growing reading public. In turn, in order to attract the interest of the contemporary readership, it had to achieve several goals simultaneously. First, it had to vividly depict a familiar 'world of everyday reality governed by predictable laws',[58] thus invoking the larger known context. It also had to present credible human conditions and circumstances – but again 'of a global rather than local kind'[59] – to weave the intricacies of the plot 'within the Bound of Possibility';[60] to portray recognizable character types; to trick the reader into believing that everything they witnesses is 'an imitation of reality';[61] and finally, through all the above, to immerse the reader so deeply in its fictional world as to ensure their emotional involvement. These features allowed the eighteenth-century novel to be recognized as a new genre with distinct characteristics of its own – a combination of innovative elements that underscored its peculiar quality, whilst also stressing its potential for future growth and development.

For much of the period and beyond, the tendency to present "social histories" encouraged the fates of their heroes and heroines to be considered as sources of immediately applicable models of social behaviour. This rhetoric of didacticism (carried over into the nineteenth century) has become an increasingly important staple of novelistic discourse, and as a result of this invitation to the reader to perceive social interrelatedness has become progressively conventionalized. By being entertained, historically informed, and ethically instructed, readers were actively participating in the interpretation of history from which they should learn moral lessons. "Social history" was therefore an act of fabrication, a bundle of facts or familiar occurrences of life strategically manipulated 'to awaken the imagination and stimulate the sensibility'.[62] In this sense, "social history" can be seen as a coercive manner of ensuring British homogeneity both through the creation of the illusion of historical fact and through the regulation of public sentiment. Whilst equating eighteenth-century "social history"

---

[57] Henry Fielding, *The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling* 1749, introd. Martin C. Battestin, ed. Fredson Bowers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) vol. 1, II, i, 77.
[58] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 31.
[59] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 33.
[60] Fielding, *The History of Tom Jones*, vol. 1, VIII, i, 397.
[61] Walder 18.
[62] Karen O'Brien, *Narratives of Enlightenment*: *Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 7.

at best with fiction and at worst with a textual hoax or a fake, it is important not to lose sight of how significant such an analysis has proved to be in the study of the realist novel.

Today we would probably dismiss as theoretically naïve Defoe's claim to be presenting a register of facts. Historical writing, as Hegel claims and modern criticism endorses, is always a fictive construct, precisely to the extent that it 'unites the objective and the subjective side, and denotes . . . not less what *happened* than the *narration* of what happened'.[63] Making a similar point, though in different terms, the narratologist Monika Fludernik explains that history is necessarily

> a constructed discourse, and this discourse may 'lapse' into fictionalizing tendencies: [s]tories, lives, the products of conversation are all concepts of the human mind, the result of cognitive parameters which we bring to bear upon the flux of unknowable and indivisible being, upon our exposure to the world.[64]

While the category of "history" still exists (all historical narratives defend their authenticity on the basis of their ability to establish a certain authentic sequence of events), our access to it is constrained by 'interpretive narrativization',[65] a subjective perception of a reality forced upon the consciousness of the narrator who has set out to represent it. The nature of the relationship between the historical and the fictive has remained a crucial one in discussions of the eighteenth-century realist novel, and has been largely responsible for forging a paradigmatic model for the future of the genre. Historical narratives presuppose new attitudes toward historical detail, a new adherence to facts anchored in the belief that "in historical accounts 'truth' [is] equivalent to 'fact'".[66] They also presume that they are releasing the stories of the people of the past without reference to the present. In addition, the fictional world is no longer confined 'to the protagonist's confrontation with the unexpected, miraculous or absurd; on the contrary, fictional characters increasingly become autonomous agents whose wit, sophistication and resourcefulness propel the action forward'.[67] It is their believable response to the challenges of life that supports the new narrative structure, and 'not their encounter of

---

[63] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, quoted in Shoshana Felman, '*Camus*' The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing', in *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History*, eds. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) 93-119, at 93, italics in original.
[64] Monika Fludernik, *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 41.
[65] Felman 94.
[66] Mayer 9.
[67] Fludernik 129.

unexpected strokes of fate to which they react'.[68] There is often an assumption that the authors of historical narratives seek to control the meaning of their works, and that their aim is to provide, in various measures, entertainment and moral education. As a consequence, eighteenth-century authors seem to imply that historical narratives are 'relevant to the diagnosis of social and cultural issues'.[69] If we accept these innovations, eighteenth-century novels presented as histories can be understood as initiating what later in the history of the novel will develop into the tradition of the realist novel, and our perception of it will be adjusted in relation to that view.

This brief overview of the aims and developments of eighteenth-century literary strategies leads us to conclude that the novel emerged as an anti-Romantic discourse in opposition to Sentimentalism and individualism, offering instead the authentic representation of 'general truths about men and women [public sphere], which are more weighty and enduring than local ones' [private sphere].[70] The seemingly objective portrayal of what is typical of rather than specific to the human condition was achieved through the immediacy of factual description, commonly referred to as 'a degree zero style'.[71] This technique of representation became the distinct characteristic of eighteenth-century novels, whereby writers 'presented [their] texts to readers as works of history and only gradually and very problematically were they read into the tradition of the novel'.[72] It was not, however, the birth of the novel that was gradually problematical, but its cultural acceptability and popularization that both took time and did not go unchallenged. For Homer Obed Brown, eighteenth-century texts actually acquired stability and the official status of novel a century later:

> . . . what we now call "the novel" didn't appear visibly as a recognized single "genre" until the early nineteenth century, when the essentially heterogeneous fictional prose narratives of the preceding century were grouped together institutionally under that name . . . Thus it can with some accuracy be said that the eighteenth-century novel was invented at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[73]

---

[68] Fludernik 129.
[69] Martin 19.
[70] Eagleton 57.
[71] Eagleton 23. A "degree zero" style refers to a high level of emotional distance on the part of the narrator from what is observed and narrated.
[72] Mayer 154.
[73] Homer Obed Brown, *Institutions of the English Novel: From Defoe to Scott* (Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997) xvii-xviii, 183.

In making these observations, Brown does not suggest that eighteenth-century writers were mistaken to call their works histories, but rather that they 'became "novels" only in retrospect'.[74] Admittedly, by the end of the eighteenth century, the novel was 'already significantly fractured, into a mainstream model of realistic fiction',[75] but it was not until the beginning of the next century that the process of generic categorization became a common practice. Alongside the classification of similar or related literary works as novels emerged 'the concurrent formation of a privileged, higher brow canon of eighteenth-century novels',[76] by which was meant precisely 'those English novels that are admitted as models'.[77]

Assigning authority and value to popular British works, which at the turn of the eighteenth century included those of Defoe, Richardson, Fielding and Smollett,[78] was not only a matter of recognizing their artfulness, but also, and not less importantly, of confirming their commercial success. In her essay 'On the Origin and Progress of Novel Writing' (1810), Anna Barbauld made a general, if minimalist, report of the critical assessment of the eighteenth-century novel:

> The first author amongst us who distinguished himself by natural painting, was that truly original genius De Foe. His Robinson Crusoe is to this day an unique in its kind, and he has made it very interesting without applying to the common resource of love. At length, in the reign of George the Second, Richardson, Fielding, and Smollet, appeared in quick succession; and their success raised such a demand for this kind of entertainment, that it has ever since been furnished from the press, rather as a regular and necessary supply, than as an occasional gratification.[79]

In Barbauld's overview, the success of Defoe and his successors was due in part to the invention of a new form in response to the increasingly unfashionable Romantic mode, and in part to the rapid growth of public interest in its consumption. Her allusion to the high-scale commercial publishing of novels implies that the eighteenth-century novel became a commodity which belonged to 'a [modern] world of speed, ephemerality and disposability',[80] and which appreciated in value 'with the growth for the first time of a large, widely distributed

---

[74] Eagleton 22.
[75] Hammond and Regan 239.
[76] Hammond and Regan 239.
[77] *The British Critic*, 8 (November, 1796), cited in Hammond and Regan, 239.
[78] Anna Letitia Barbauld, *The British Novelists: With an Essay and Prefaces, Biographical and Critical*, vol. 1 (London: F. C. and J. Rivington, 1810) 17. The typographical errors introduced in the "print on demand" copy of this book used have been silently corrected.
[79] Barbauld 17.
[80] Eagleton 11.

reading public'.[81] Mass-produced, and popular, from this time forward the innovative genre would be considered as 'one of the most successful products to have been manufactured within Britain's new, commercial economy'.[82] Once the novel became central to the growth of national wealth, it was readily integrated into the cultural fabric of British middle-class society.

In trying to identify a time in literary history when the novel was at its peak, it has become conventional to point to the nineteenth century, 'the period in which the realistic novel flourished'.[83] Probably, the most significant contribution of this era to the fortunes of the novel was the focus on 'the unique, individual experience as the source of truth and identity'.[84] Unlike the eighteenth-century novel, which emphasized 'what was typical about human beings, not . . . what was peculiar about them',[85] nineteenth-century fictional prose conversely concentrates on individual experience. What matters is not simply to provide the reader with 'recognizable people in a world we know',[86] but to make them engagingly individual as well. As Ian Watt informs us, it was this new orientation – depicting in detail the intricacies of individual life within a specific social and cultural environment – that 'distinguished [the nineteenth-century novel] from other genres and from previous forms of fiction'.[87] Watt's discussion of the novel is as much informative as it is conceptually limited. In his classic study, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding*, he uses the term "formal realism", to refer to the special kind of representation which positions the novel

> under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, details which are presented through a more largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms.[88]

Although Watt associates "formal realism" principally with the eighteenth-century novel, there is no reason why the term cannot be extended to the nineteenth century, when the interest in the character's psychology is especially prominent and reader alignment invited by

---

[81] Kettle, *An Introduction to the English Novel*, 28.
[82] Hammond and Regan 241.
[83] Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *Realism and Consensus in the English Novel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) ix.
[84] Walder 20.
[85] Eagleton 57.
[86] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 37.
[87] Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding* (1957; repr. London: Pimlico, 2000) 17-18.
[88] Watt 32.

means of narrative techniques such as sustained focalization by the main protagonists. In fact, settling for "formal realism" or any other narrative mode – "subjectivity", "journalism", or "sensationalism" – as the defining feature of the eighteenth-century novel would in fact '[diminish] the very idea of the novel and [trivialize] the conception of a literary species'.[89] If the novel is 'the most hybrid of literary forms',[90] it is because it brings together into unique patterns of arrangement a broad array of genres and textual strategies, the constitution and combination of which is flexible and possesses significance that varies in accordance with the reading practices and expectations of different audiences. Realism, then, is not a category of the novel of a particular period; it is a historically and ideologically determined property of all novels, which is designed to 'imitate ways of thinking and speaking about reality'[91] at a given time. In principle, and in practice, there are as many different types of Realism as there are epochs and textual instantiations of the mode.

As discussed above, eighteenth-century Realism is concerned with how the character under scrutiny is not unique, but typical of their kind. Nineteenth-century Realism, in contrast, aims to establish how the social is experienced at an individual level, by 'showing how completely we are one, and so to give us not only the temporary delight of listening to a pleasant tale, but also a permanent good of an increased sympathy with our kind'.[92] The process of generating sympathy, a preoccupation typically associated with George Eliot, exemplifies 'the negotiability and precarious contingency of social reality'.[93] If the novel is to represent a recognizable reality, and hence to seem to be authentic, then it must describe the human 'motives and influences'[94] that 'spring organically out of a concrete social-historical

---

[89] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 22-23.
[90] Eagleton 5-6.
[91] David Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1977) 25.
[92] E. S. Dallas, unsigned review of *The Mill on the Floss*, *The Times* 19 May 1860, in *George Eliot: The Critical* Heritage, ed. David Carroll (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971) 131-137, at 132.
[93] Jeffrey J. Franklin, *Serious Play: The Cultural Form of the Nineteenth-Century Realist Novel* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) 27.
[94] In her famous essay, 'The Natural History of German Life', George Eliot defines the role of the novelist:

> The thing for mankind to know is, not what are the motives and influences which the moralist thinks *ought* to act on the labourer or the artisan, but what are the motives and influences which *do* act on him. We want to be taught to feel, not for the heroic artisan or the sentimental peasant, but for the peasant in all his coarse apathy, and the artisan in all his suspicious selfishness.

('The Natural History of German Life', in *Essays of George Eliot*, ed. Thomas Pinney [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963] 266-299, at 271, italics in original).

basis'.[95] From its origins, the novel has been used to depict 'typical characters under typical circumstances',[96] thereby encouraging a sense of affinity between the characters and readers. Because novels offered a fictionalized version of real people and real-life situations, it made sense for authors to give their characters everyday names and to name their works after the central protagonists (hence, Richardson's *Pamela*, Austen's *Emma*, Eliot's *Adam Bede*, and Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*). This naming practice suggests how often eighteenth and nineteenth-century novelists, in producing personal histories, saw their function largely in terms of "[extending] our sympathies".[97] From a psychological point of view, readers '[found] it easier to empathize with the single individual who [was] usually the subject of a particular novel', and were probably also more inclined to '"identify" with a hero or heroine, fantasize themselves into particular circumstances, or even consciously compare their own situations with those in novels'.[98] Through the employment of narrative techniques, such as naming the novels after the central characters, the realist novel 'directly [enacted] its own thematic and [positioned] readers to participate in that enactment'.[99] Eliot's stylistic habit of pairing the characters' names with formulaic phrases such as "poor"[100] can be said to aim to '[change] the reader's relationship to the consciousness of [these characters], so that we are trained to involve ourselves more sympathetically than critically in the inward experience a novel has to offer'.[101] When the character is fallible, in other words, Eliot's narrator intervenes to invite certain judgmental re-evaluations.

This salient feature of Eliot's characteristic rhetoric may be seen as a new tenet of realistic fiction, which played a role in further experiments with the novel's form. Throughout several decades of the nineteenth century, the realistic mode of *Adam Bede*, *The Mill on the Floss*, *Silas Marner*, *Romola* and *Felix Holt* encouraged its audience to respond emotionally to the situation of the fictional characters. But it was a discursive development of her later novel,

---

[95] Geörgy Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, pref. Fredric Jameson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) 190.
[96] Friedrich Engels, 'Letter to Margaret Harkness (April 1888)', cited in Harry E. Shaw, *Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999) 12.
[97] Eliot, 'The Natural History of German Life', 270.
[98] Hunter, *Before Novels*, 41, 91.
[99] Franklin 28.
[100] The frequency of occurrence in *Middlemarch* of the phrase "poor he/she" is striking. Examples abound: 'Poor Mr Casaubon' (85, 197, 375), 'Poor Lydgate' (714), 'Poor Dorothea' (198, 374), 'Poor thing [Dorothea]' (540), 'Oh, poor mother, poor father [the Garths] (253), 'Poor Mary' (250), 'Poor fellow [Fred]' (270) and 'Poor Rosamond' (781). According to Dwight H. Purdy's calculations, there are 145 instances of the usage of the epithet "poor": 'Rosamond gets the adjective 26 times, Dorothea 22, Casaubon 12, and Lydgate 9'. See '"The One Poor Word" in *Middlemarch*', *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 44.4 (2004): 805-821, at 805.
[101] Marilyn Butler, *Jane Austen and the War of Ideas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 166-167.

Middlemarch, that introduced its readers to an even more nuanced way of representing emotional experience, a depiction that stressed the need for a degree of scepticism when it came to registering mechanically what seemed to be a quite precise impression of the character's feelings, whilst also alerting readers to the danger of 'the muddles that can arise when we are inadequately aware of our own emotions'.[102]

The opening pages of *Middlemarch* illustrate this danger. The narrator first describes Dorothea Brooke as possessing

> that kind of beauty which seems to be thrown into relief by poor dress. Her hand and wrist were so finely formed that she could wear sleeves not less bare of style than those in which the Blessed Virgin appeared to Italian painters; and her profile as well as her stature and bearing seemed to gain the more dignity from her plain garments, which by the side of provincial fashion gave her the impressiveness of a fine quotation from the Bible, – or from one of our elder poets, – in a paragraph of to-day's newspaper.[103]

This description may not be sufficient at this early stage to exceptionally individualize Dorothea's psychological state, but what comes into play in this scene is the narrator's ironic glorification of Dorothea's emotional nullity. Dorothea is, as the narrator immediately adds, 'usually spoken of as being remarkably clever' (*M* 7), yet in the majority of her significant appearances in the novel she remains subdued in response to the nineteenth-century social convention which determines that a woman of higher moral pretensions is firmly constrained behaviourally. Eliot shows convincingly the stringency of Dorothea's emotional celibacy, and her habit of suppressing her individual free spirit, by rejecting almost all of her mother's jewellery, by wearing plain clothes, by renouncing the pleasure of horse-riding, by self-enclosure in the gloomy Casaubon house, or abandoning the energizing commitment to a larger social cause.

The narration of Dorothea's extremely ascetic behaviour, at times frustrating to the reader, is not an indication of an absence of her own selfhood – she will never grow to resent her 'inward fire' (*M* 14) – but in fact the result of a prolonged emotional starvation, of which the most natural defensive mechanism is the public performance put on automatically to mute the deep suffering of the soul. The reader is invited to believe that, without realizing it,

---

[102] Jennifer Uglow, *George Eliot* (London: Virago Pioneers, 1987) 205.
[103] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 7.

Dorothea has been so starved of emotional gratification that she no longer recognizes the feeling of hunger. This invitation is made partly through the motivated use of metaphoric language, including expressions to do with enclosure. One such metaphor is EMOTIONAL CONSTRAINT IS PHYSICAL INCARCERATION. Dorothea's more frequent visits to her imprisoned 'best soul' (*M* 426) could have released her from the self-protective 'jar of her whole being' (*M* 426). However, her destructive compulsion for inconsistency causes her randomly to go back and forth to that confined soul, and it happens when she is most delayed for such a visit of the heart that she mistakes her love for Will for a genuine friendship and her covert desire for his innocence for simple jealousy. Such emotional misconstruals proliferate endlessly in *Middlemarch*, dramatizing, in a host of characters, a self-defeating tendency to train one's conscious psyche to deafen its own despairing voice so that inward turmoil may never surface. Eliot draws attention to the consequences of persistent emotional repression. Dorothea is (by generosity of nature) inclined to reflection, interiority, and self-knowledge, and is physically and socially well favoured – she is beautiful, aristocratic and notoriously intense. Nevertheless, she gives priority to collateral responsibilities and dependencies that gradually annihilate the truth and curiosity of her private self.

By denying her characters the privilege of trusting (and acting upon) the fidelity of their acknowledged emotions, Eliot has created narrative tension between emotional experience and circumscribed outward expressions of that experience. She thereby creates a sense of tragedy arising from an unacknowledged awareness of the contradictory claims of truthfulness and propriety. The late nineteenth-century *Middlemarch* was ahead of its time, as it pushed the representation of mental states beyond those of contemporary literary texts. Eliot thereby transcends conventional realist frameworks by approaching the psychological life through destabilizing any existing preconceptions about emotional states and their representation in fiction.

As this sketch of the rise and development of the English novel suggests, Realism is not an accumulation of firm rules; rather, the term is 'used in the neutral, descriptive sense to mean that the [fictional] discourse is broadly consistent with historical fact as known and mediated by the contemporary historical consciousness'.[104] So understood, Realism appears

[104] Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing*, 25.

not as a prescriptive literary convention applied to describe reality only in certain ways: there is no universal sense of reality, because 'history [continually] undermines the naturalness and self-evidence of received modes of representing the real'.[105] Realism is a characteristic of a variety of fictional texts that tend to show concern for the real, where readers and writers alike broadly agree about what constitutes the real within shifting periods of history. If Realism is understood as a 'method of art [that necessarily submits itself to its own] set conventions, devices, and exclusions',[106] then we are led to the conclusion that realist novels in general produce narrative spaces that reflect not only their cultures, but also their own biases and priorities in their selection and deployment of particular reality effects.[107] Nineteenth-century Realism in general, and George Eliot's in particular, innovated the representation of mental states to the point where exceptionally executed portrayals of recognizable emotional dilemmas have achieved the status of cross-cultural resonance, authenticity and timelessness. This conclusion serves to reinforce the idea that, whilst Realism suggests an attempt at approximating real life, it may also indicate the huge range of variations within the super-category of the novel and the many manifestations of the formal content and experimentation within it, in order to encourage belief in the narrated emotional states.

---

[105] William B. Warner, *Licensing Entertainment: The Elevation of the Novel Reading in Britain, 1694-1750* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) 35.

[106] René Wellek, *Concepts of Criticism*, ed. Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963) 254.

[107] According to Alan Palmer, a reality effect has been conventionally thought of as a particular set of strategies deployed by writers of a period based on a shared conception of what constituted a narrative reality at that point in time,

> for example, the modernist emphasis on stream of consciousness and interior monologue has often been described as more "realistic" than writing that is geared to the intentional acting pole.

(*Fictional Minds* [Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004] 91).

A Sketch of the History of the Russian Novel

The age of the novel in Russia – typically referred to as "The Golden Age" (1855-1880) – the fruits of which were to affect sensibility, moral conduct, the general worldview, and above all, the nation's values, came into Russia in a manner quite different from that in which it lodged itself in domestic affairs and the consciousness of England. Before the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire was economically and culturally backward by comparison with its Western counterparts. The idea, that 'a general sense of lagging behind the West [precipitated social change and] was the principal stimulus and shaper of nationalism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries',[1] has hardly been contested. Equally widespread amongst literary historians has also been the consensus that a network of social, economic and national aspirations encouraged the rise and development of the realist novel by means of which Russia's pressing needs could be transmitted, popularized and debated.[2] In order to balance the presentation of the history of the English novel, and to orient the non-Russian specialist, this chapter discusses a series of realist techniques deployed and gradually expanded by Russian writers. These techniques enabled the novel to heighten within the Russian nation a dawning awareness of their close links with the West – the inevitability of foreign influence – whilst also sharpening a sense of their own distinct identity – 'love for the Russian people, for Russian life, and for the Russian character'.[3]

---

[1] Charles Ruud, 'Pre-Revolutionary Russian Nationalism', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 1.2 (1974): 274-286, at 276.

[2] The mature realist novel was written and used primarily with the view to communicating and shaping social and political change. Amy Mandelker expresses a widely-held view of Tolstoyian Realism, according to which it is a technique for recording

> the reconstructionist period of Russian history following the sweeping reforms of the 1860s: the emancipation of the serfs, the restructuring of regional and local government, the institution of reforming committiees, church and estate reform, the opening of the universities and professions to non-nobles and to women.

(Amy Mandelker, 'Introduction' to *Anna Karenina*, xiii-xxvii, at xiii).

The great achievement and merit of Russian realist writers, however, is not simply the extent of the incorporation into their novels of subjects discussed widely across contemporary Russia, but rather the degree of their commitment to representing interests of a particular social group or a whole human race. As W. Gareth Jones observes,

> from the very beginnings of modern Russian literature, Russia's writers have consciously dealt with politics . . . [They] were not content with being mere reflectors of the political scene, but chose to play an active part in the political process.

(W. Gareth Jones, 'Politics', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998] 63-85, at 63).

[3] Alexander Herzen, cited in Howard F. Stein, 'Russian Nationalism and the Divided Soul of the Westernizers and Slavophiles', *Ethos* 4.4 (1976): 403-438, at 424.

The socio-political sphere of early modern Russia was dominated by the figure of Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725); religious and intellectual life was under the spiritual guidance of the Russian Orthodox Church. The serious social and political problems of Russia, which Peter the Great recognized partly during his travels to Western Europe,[4] prompted him to step outside traditional Russian values and the native way of life, thereby transforming an essentially medieval country into a nation resembling the modern West. The process of Westernization, although initially met by Russian communities with reluctance and anxiety,[5] changed forever the essence of Russian life, at least amongst élite communities. With the imposition of the revolutionary ideology operative under the flag of Russia's civilizing mission, the country underwent a radical political, social and religious transformation, imparting to its citizens the knowledge of European manners, the intended outcome of which was the redefinition of the status of women. The drastic social reforms, 'enforced by a reign of terror',[6] urged the

[4] Breaking the Russian tradition of royal seclusion, Peter made two trips to the West – first in 1697-1698, and second in 1717 – with the purpose of studying shipbuilding and expanding his knowledge of efficient technologies to be employed in a vast range of fields, including industrial, administrative, commercial and military defence. For a discussion of Peter the Great's travels to the West in general, and to England in particular, see Janet M. Hartley, 'England "Enjoys the Spectacle of a Northern Barbarian": The Reception of Peter I and Alexander I', in *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on Eighteenth-Century Russia,* Gergnano, 1994, eds. Maria di Salvo and Lindsey Hughes (Rome: La Fenice, 1996) 11-18; and Sergej O. Androsov, 'Petr Velikij v Venecii', in di Salvo and Hughes, 19-36. See also Anthony Cross, *Peter the Great Through British Eyes: Perceptions and Representations of the Tsar since 1698* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. Chapter 1, 'Peter in England, January – April 1698' (16-39); Ian Grey, 'Peter the Great in England', *History Today* 6.4 (1956): 225-234; Leo Loewenson, 'People Peter the Great Met in England: Moses Stringer, Chymist and Physician', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 37.89 (1959): 459-468; and Leo Loewenson, 'Seme Details of Peter the Great's Stay in England in 1698: Neglected English Material', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 40.95 (1962): 431-443.

[5] A sudden removal of certain behavioural restraints was apt to confuse and even outrage women who, through the principles of the Russian Orthodox faith, were expected to adopt an attitude of submission, seclusion and self-abnegation. For direct expressions of women's loyalty to older cultural traditions and their frequent resistance to change, see Barbara Alpern Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. p. 14:

> Some women reacted with distaste to fashions that required them to display their bodies in a manner that just a few years earlier would have shamed the woman and dishonored her family. "In my old age", complained the 31-year-old Daria Golitsyna around 1700, "I was reduced to showing my hair, arms and uncovered bosom to all of MOSCOW . . . the only advantage I see [in this change] is to offend modesty, the treasure that every woman should boast".

See also Barbara Alpern Engel, 'Transformation versus Tradition', in *Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation,* eds. Barbara Evans Clements et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 135-147.

[6] Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) 145.

> [adoption of] European-style dwellings and clothes; smoking tobacco and drinking hard liquor or imported wines instead of native beer and mead; allowing women to participate in social events (balls, dinner parties, receptions); and being conversant in at least one foreign language, usually French or German.[7]

When change finally gained wide acceptance within Russian society, 'it was books that most often introduced it'.[8] Studies of the history of the book have made it clear that 'books are made by history: that is, they are shaped by economic, political, social, and cultural forces'.[9] Intense intellectual curiosity and literary interest were awakened as a result of Russia's new emphasis on cultural development. All knowledge of Western philosophy, history and natural sciences, which had continued vigorously to flow from Western European literature, were made widely available but 'only after a whole series of political and administrative reforms and cultural and educational legislation put through in the first quarter of the eighteenth century by Emperor Peter I',[10] and then further supported by three empresses, Anna (r. 1730-40), Elizabeth (r. 1741-62), Catherine II (r. 1763-96), and most prominently by Peter III (r. 1762).

The secularization of Russian literature and education – the single most important development of Peter the Great – as well as the steadily growing access to the Europeanized type of literature in later years, encouraged the emergence of the Russian intelligentsia, which was soon to endorse Western modes of thinking with its 'ideas about a more humane and just way of life'.[11] The Russian writers reflected the life and values of contemporary Russians, but the assessment of those cultural habits and attitudes changed in the direction of an increasingly influential European behavioural models. Although early nineteenth-century Russian communities maintained strong traditional values, Western rules of mannerly conduct embedded in Sentimentalism, and subsequently in Romanticism, encouraged a move toward a category of individualism – which was exemplified by a change in perception and a new valorization of women. Romanticism which, above all,

---

[7] Victor Terras, *A History of Russian Literature* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991) 115.
[8] Engel, *Women in Russia*, 32.
[9] Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose, 'Introduction', in *A Companion to the History of the Book*, eds. Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 1-6, at 1.
[10] Ilya Serman, 'The Eighteenth Century: Neoclassicism and the Enlightenment, 1730-90', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 45-91, at 48.
[11] Barbara Alpern Engel, *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 20.

> stressed the primacy of feeling and subjective experience . . . prompted some men of the intelligentsia to renounce the traditional patriarchal and sometimes brutal pattern of male-female relationships that many had experienced firsthand between their parents and instead to use women in their quest for self-perfection.[12]

This exposure of Russia to new intellectual currents was a significant factor in the shift to actual efforts being mobilized to defy domestic despotism, and therefore to break down 'the old byt [old way of life] and the prejudices it bred'.[13]

There was as much political ideology as social activism in the doctrines of Sentimentalism and Romanticism: the two trends had since propelled Russian society toward articulating of unashamed emotions, hitherto felt, but notoriously internalized. The enduring legacy of these literary movements was an emotional 'language that encouraged the cultivation and expression of feeling'.[14] The language of humility and self-depreciation that Russian women conventionally used whilst conversing with their husbands was replaced by the sensuous language of love enriched by the phrases of endearment: in their private correspondence Russian spouses frequently declared being "madly in love", "passionately in love", "adoring", and addressed each other as "my dearest treasure", "my dear friend" and "my joy".[15] Although the traditional patriarchal system had gone fundamentally unchallenged, the new emotionalism represented a reappraisal of behavioural standards and a promotion of 'the emotional importance of marriage and close and loving family relations'.[16] This emphasis on romantic tenderness between spouses in turn gave rise to a popular literary theme of an idealized domesticity, which Natalia Grot has described in the nineteenth century as 'patriarchal, full of love, peace, and piety'.[17]

Throughout the 1730s and 1790s, history reigned in lyrical genres. The leading literary forms of mid-eighteenth century Russia – epics and tragedies – were concentrated primarily on the celebration of the great achievements of the Russian Empire and the glorification of the

---

[12] Engel, *Mothers and Daughters*, 21.
[13] Xenia Gąsiorowska, *Women in Soviet Fiction, 1917-1964* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968) 19.
[14] Engel, *Women in Russia*, 33.
[15] Phrases of endearment exchanged by Russian spouses, quoted in Engel, *Women in Russia*, 31, 33.
[16] Engel, *Women in Russia*, 33.
[17] Natalia Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, trans. Lesli LaRocco, eds. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) 220-241, at 225.

Emperors who contributed to the greatness of the country. Antochius Kantemir's *Petrida* (1730) is considered to be 'the first exercise in Russian literature in composing a historical poem in the spirit of classicism'.[18] This epic, which was a redeeming reflection of Peter the Great's reforms and which promoted the Emperor himself as 'the true enlightened despot who converted barbarism into civilization',[19] took a fierce patriotic hold on the contemporary readership. Its alignment with history was now so firmly anchored in literary aesthetics (even in the second half of the nineteenth century Tolstoy's *War and Peace* would be welcomed with great awe and adoration, despite its perceived failure to conform to any recognized literary genre[20]) that 'Kantemir had to explain carefully to the readers of his satires that his characters were but literary creations'.[21] Unlike literary works in prose which most readers believed they knew and understood, a verse form such as *Petrida* posed an intellectual challenge. For the sake of comprehension, it had to be supplemented by the author's prose commentary that would explain the stylistic procedures employed. Once the reading public absorbed the novelty of metre and rhyme, fully appreciating thereby the connection between form and content, it soon developed a taste for structural precision, stylistic purity and simplicity, all of which became the salient features of high art, such as that exemplified in the early nineteenth century by Pushkin.

From approximately 1808 (the appearance of Zhukovsky's first ballad) to 1831 (the death of Delvig) poetry swept Russian literature, according to Mirsky. The fruit of that period

---

[18] M. A. S. Burgess, 'The Age of Classicism (1700-1820)', in *Companion to Russian Studies: An Introduction to Russian Language and Literature*, vol. 2, eds. Robert Auty and Dimitri Obolensky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 111-131, at 114.

[19] W. H. Zawadzki, 'Untitled Review of *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History*', *The English Historical Review* 103.407 (1988): 515-516, at 516.

[20] On the complexities of the design of *War and Peace*, see Gary Saul Morson, *Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potentials in "War and Peace"* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), esp. Chapter 2, 'Formal Peculiarities of *War and Peace*' (37-65). Tolstoy has been accused of reading history selectively for the purpose of foregrounding his own views on warfare by Henry Gifford in his book *Tolstoy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), esp. p. 29:

> Neither the historians nor the surviving witnesses of the 1812 campaign could accept Tolstoy's presentation. He had read deeply, but not widely; he was not above juggling with facts; and he claimed for the artist in his treatment of history a freedom denied to the scholar.

Notwithstanding these well-grounded accusations, *War and Peace* has often been seen as the greatest achievement of Russian realist fiction. Extensively researched, this quasi-historical novel incorporates into its fictional world characters, both real and imagined, to represent the course and impact of the Napoleonic invasion. Dmitry S. Mirsky, a distinguished historian of Russian literature, has described *War and Peace* as 'the most important work in the whole of Russian realistic fiction', and 'a tremendous "heroic idyl" of the Russian nobility' (*A History of Russian Literature: From Its Beginnings to 1900*, ed. Francis J. Whitfield [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1958] 270, 273).

[21] Serman 45.

coincided with the great production of romantic poetry in Western Europe, but even when the genre remained the same, Russian was 'far more *formal*, active, selective – in short, *classical* – than any other nineteenth-century school of poetry'.[22] Despite the prevailing climate of strict censorship imposed on all written material by of Nicholas I,[23] poetry ripened so fully that its large-scale quality production has by common consent been called '"The Golden Age" of Russian poetry'.[24] Works in verse – amongst the most prominent that of Zhukovsky, Baratynsky, Kozlov, Krylov, Ryleev, Pushkin, Yazykov, Vyazemsky and Delvig – were employed to express personal ideas and feelings. Emphatic as they were of their own originality and conventions, they all addressed one type of reading public. The high society city dwellers were the popular writers' main clientele. With its audience limited exclusively to educated élite who had direct access to the local literary texts of the Russian intelligentsia, and also in varying degrees to English and French literature, Russian poetry had great expectations to live up to. The sophisticated audience set high standards of craftsmanship in poetry. The artists, desirous of cultivating their creative talents, and invariably motivated by the prospect of financial gain, raised them. By the 1830s, the reading public lost its infatuation with poetry, the limits of which the better writers expanded and even transcended. Since the period between 1830 and 1840, the novel had begun to assume a central place in Russian literature. In contrast to Europe, the novel had not yet spread evenly throughout Russia, nor did it become its leading genre. Russian writers mainly turned to narrative poetry – in Bakhtin's more specific and more commonly used term to the '"novelized" poem'[25] – which was not yet fiction in the strict sense, but certainly the literary form that '[revolted] from an ideal of unified order and [pushed] verse into semi-fictional and extra-literary spheres by incorporating a diversity of discursive practices'.[26]

---

[22] Mirsky 73, italics in original.

[23] The tyrannical regime of Nicholas usually brings to mind the reactionary policy implemented by this Tsar in response to Decembrist revolt in 1825, which ended with a total defeat of the rebels. To prevent the spread of the political propaganda, 'Nicholas imposed stringent censorship on all publications, established the Third Section, a political police force, and tried to impose military discipline on every branch of state service and every sector of society' (Engel, *Mothers and Daughters*, 20). Much of the poetry of the period is the expression of the poets' revolutionary zeal and their allegiance to the cause of freedom.

[24] John Mersereau Jr., 'The Nineteenth Century: Romanticism, 1820-40', in Moser, 136-188, at 138.

[25] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981) 5.

[26] Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 19.

Traditionally, the starting point for a categorization and assessment of literary genres has been the grouping of literary texts into thematically and aesthetically homogeneous works.[27] As a response to this form-and-content-based generic identification, there sequentially emerged the alternative critical approach, one that moves away from, on the one hand, reducing literary texts to 'explicit, formalized, durable'[28] systems of classifications, and on the other hand, from defining them outside a unified 'set of conventions and highly organized constraints on the production and interpretation of meaning'.[29] The implication of this developmental trend is that genre has ceased to be regarded as a coherent rubric to which texts fit seamlessly or to which they conform broadly. Literary texts are more usefully thought of as transcending the logic of over-schematic classifications, by showing specific features that serve only as the precondition for interpretation. What used to be 'a rigid trans-historical class exercising control over the texts'[30] is now 'a shared convention with a social force'.[31] On this interpretation, the early nineteenth-century novelized poem needs not to be classified 'in the straightforward sense of being accepted as standard or definitive both within the framework of Russian literature and in terms of its influence'.[32] Rather, this new literary construct may be seen to greater advantage in light of a realist method, which it can be claimed to have only started to experiment with in response to the emerging pressures to raise the national tone of elevated poetic forms by moving them towards a modern and populist style.

The rise of the novel in Russia, in its fully solidified and culturally-influential form, is conventionally viewed to be intertwined with the cultural and political reorganization of Russia commencing with the reign of Emperor Nicolas I (1825-55) and continuing through to a period of far-reaching reforms under the leadership of the Alexander II (1855-81). From the second quarter of the nineteenth century, it became widely popular as a result of its potential

---

[27] A prominent Franco-Bulgarian literary and cultural theorist, Tzvetan Todorov, elegantly puts the case:

> When we examine works of literature from the perspective of genre, we engage in a very particular enterprise: we discover a principle operative in a number of texts, rather than what is specific about each of them.

(*The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre*, trans. Richard Howard [Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1973] 3).

[28] John Frow, *Genre: The New Critical Idiom* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) 52.

[29] Frow 10.

[30] Frow 23.

[31] Frow 102.

[32] Richard Freeborn, 'The Classic Russian Novel', in *Reference Guide to Russian Literature*, eds. Neil Cornwell and Nicole Christian (London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998) 25-29, at 25.

to be 'a vehicle for "official nationality',[33] capable of addressing the vexing questions of the millieu:

> what was Russian nationality (i.e. *narodnost*, or "folkness")? Was it a quality totally reserved to the *narod*, the folk, the great masses of the illiterate Russian peasantry who were in bondage to their more educated and often Europeanized masters; or was the culture of the French-speaking elite of Russian society also part of the concept? What was Russia's national identity? Was Russia to be inward and backward-looking, or did it belong to Europe?[34]

Clearly, the dominant genre promulgated the aesthetics of a confused Empire, already devoted to its native soil and traditions, but aspiring towards a new and higher level of civilization. This intrinsic literary rationale gradually reversed the course of Russian literature. Increasingly, the 'escapist entertainment and aesthetic pleasure'[35] of the poetry of the 1820s began to be displaced by a more serious interest in the issues of everyday life. *Narodnost'*[36] soon became the watchword of a literary generation, and a strict partition between Slavophiles and Westernizers appeared as a category of early modern writings. Both parties regarded *narodnost'* as a central component of Russian literature, but they disagreed upon its meaning. Slavophilism represented an uncompromising philosophy that basically aimed to see Russia's future 'in the values of the simple Russian people, in the ideal of communality, Russian religion, the irrational, and the peasant commune with its communal ownership of property'.[37] The Westernizers, in contrast, embraced a more conciliatory attitude by promoting the intersection of Russia's ancestral culture and spiritual heritage with Western 'laws, innovations, and values such as individualism and rational thought'[38] in its quest for 'its own national version of that civilization'.[39] It was in relation to these two camps that nineteenth-century writers always situated themselves, at first involuntarily, but later quite deliberately.

---

[33] Richard Peace, 'The Nineteenth Century: The Natural School and its Aftermath, 1840-55', in Moser, 189-247, at 191.
[34] Peace, in Moser, 191.
[35] Layton 19.
[36] *Narodnost'* refers to the core values of Russian culture. Because of its cultural specificity, it has been perennially difficult to precisely translate. John Mersereau Jr., for example, translates it roughly as "national identity" or "national culture" ('The Nineteenth Century: Romanticism, 1820-40', in Moser, 136-188) 143.
[37] Ellen B. Chances, 'The Superfluous Man in Russian Literature', in Cornwell and Christian, 29-35, at 30.
[38] Chances, 'The Superfluous Man in Russian Literature', in Cornwell and Christian, 30.
[39] Gene V. Palmer, ed., *Russian Literature: Overview and Bibliography* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002) 9.

The Slavophiles versus Westernizers polarity was the guiding principle of all ideas in *Anna Karenina*, which partly explains why the novel coexisted comfortably with most of what was published in the second half of the nineteenth century. From the beginning of writing *Anna* Tolstoy was propelled by his desire to point to the ideological differences that divided the nation, without actually denying the validity of any of the two doctrines (although we have reasons to believe that it is Levin's Slavophilism that the narrator continues to support). His hero, Levin, like the author himself, believes in the basic values of the Russian people, a belief enacted by his emphasizing and giving authentic meaning to concepts like hard work and 'honorable generations'[40] with attached responsibilities 'to live the same family life as his farther and forefathers – that is, in the same condition of culture – and to bring up his children in the same' (*AK* 730). Levin, the conservative idealist, was bound to be contrasted with the opposing kind of revolutionary leader, the westernized Stiva, who, apparently dissatisfied with, and inconvenienced by, traditional ways of life, saw it more practical to accept the premises and accomplishments of the West, most notably its liberal ideas of marriage, expansion of capitalism, and most of all, the relaxed attitude of a civilized society, the chief aim of which was 'to make everything a source of enjoyment' (*AK* 36). Tolstoy's novel never quite settles the question of whether Russia's traditional values were to be cultivated or overturned and undermined, but once it had set in motion a controversial debate about the claims of Slavophiles and Westernizers, it certainly foreshadowed future social and political changes which, though inevitable, were difficult for Russian traditionalists to accept. Given their social class and personal circumstances, neither Levin, nor Stiva, were likely to choose political opinions other than what they did. Levin, as a descendant of an old, noble Moscow family, country gentleman, and a successful landowner naturally remained an advocate of the collective labour which created wealth for himself, and also an enemy of urban authority that would threaten the old-fashioned but profitable way of life. Equally rational seems the liberalism of Stiva, who, forever reliant for his advancement on his relatives' powerful connections, tired of his marriage, and constantly in debt, developed a habit of believing in a modern Russia propelled by a capitalist economy capable of being rapidly transformed into a society of prosperity.

[40] Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 161.

It has been generally accepted that the development of the novel in Russia falls into three distinct stages, of which *Anna Karenina* is a representative of the third: the Romantic Realism of Aleksander Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov within the decades between 1820 and 1840; the Fantastic Realism of Nikolay Gogol that flourishes from 1840 to 1855, a time 'in which critics and ideas [under the spell of the legacy of its major literary critic, Vissarion Belinsky] shape literature and point the way to the creation of a great literary tradition';[41] and the Objective Realism that spans the period from 1855 to1880, the era during which the literary climate was dominated by the towering figures of Fyodor Dostoevsky[42] and Leo Tolstoy. If the rise of the novel in Russia is to mean the designation of a single work immensely influential on later developments of the genre, then the first stage of '*permanent* fiction'[43] has to be associated with the publication of Pushkin's novel in verse, *Eugene Onegin* (1823-31).[44] Although *Onegin*'s structural assemblage was devised so that it would fit the style of eighteenth-century neoclassical poetry, its radical experimentation nevertheless resulted in the formulation of a new way forward. In order to account for how *Onegin* can be regarded as the precursor of the Russian realist tradition, 'it is paradoxically necessary to define what [it] was not, for it is what [it] *did not do* that so much of [its] literary influence

---

[41] Peace, in Moser, 247.

[42] It is not the purpose of this study to offer a full or even preliminary consideration of Dostoevsky's Objective Realism, although this is not to deny its importance in the discussion of the Russian realist novel as a whole. The theoretical path chosen here aims to indicate the linear (but by no means comprehensive) progression of evolution that has led to the ultimate form and complexity of Tolstoy's novel, rather than surveying the highly experimental work of individual novelists at the genre's zenith.

[43] Mirsky 120, italics in original.

[44] As early as 1914, Maurice Baring definitively states that

> *Onegin* is a novel. Eugene Onegin is the name of the hero. It is, moreover, the first Russian novel; and as a novel it has never been surpassed. It is as real as Tolstoy, as finished in workmanship and construction as Turgenev. It is a realistic novel; not realistic in the sense that Zola's work was mis-called realistic, but realistic in the sense that Miss Austen is realistic.

(*An Outline of Russian Literature* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1914/15] 74).

Joe Andrew observes that Pushkin is universally recognized as the only Russian writer of the nineteenth century who deserves the title "father":

> Pushkin is often considered a starting-point in Russian literature. He is the father of Russian literature, the creator of modern literary Russian, the first national writer; indeed nineteenth-century Russian literature and culture cannot be understood without a thorough knowledge of his writings.

(*Writers and Society during the Rise of Russian Realism* [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980] 1).

Amongst more contemporary supporters of this idea are Andrew Wachtel, 'Psychology and Society', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 130-149; and Susanne Fusso, 'The Romantic Tradition', in Jones and Miller, 171-189.

seems to reside'.[45] *Eugene Onegin*, reportedly inspired by Byron's *Don Juan*,[46] did not depict anything conventionally resembling 'the individual spirit, generally the extraordinary man who stood in some way above society, who had something peculiarly his own to offer'.[47] Nor, in fact, did it grant much to the romantic readers who needed a positive hero to discover and consolidate within themselves the strength of Christian faith (*Eugene Onegin*, in fact, flirts with the pagan idea of fortune-telling and the concept of a pre-determined fate which Tatiana, the first heroine, graciously comes to accept).

As the modern period of the 1820s advanced, the romantic elements of martyrdom and heroism became more subdued, and tended gradually to give way to a style that aimed to plunge the reader into the midst of the immediate socio-historical context. Given Pushkin's acute '"sense of history" [as well as his] natural propensity for *seeing* and recording the concrete detail',[48] it was by conscious effort rather than chance that he initiated something that later became standard for the nineteenth-century literature, namely 'the placing of the character in a recognizable, authenticated background'.[49] According to the calculations of John Mersereau Jr., in *Onegin* 'over one hundred persons are mentioned by name, including authors, literary characters, and acquaintances'[50] – Ovid, Rousseau, Homer, Yazykov, Delvig, Faublas, Armida, Chaadaev and Kaverin, to name just a few. An impression of authenticity is created by the vivid and detailed portrayal of provincial Russia and St Petersburg, their respective ways of life, local traditions and codes of conduct. Indeed, this depiction is so realistic that Vissarion Belinsky, the influential literary critic of the 1840s, equated it with a superb panorama of social history:

---

[45] Richard Freeborn, 'Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn', in *Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn*, ed. Richard Freeborn (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976) 1-18, at 5.
[46] In a frequently quoted letter to Vyazemsky, Pushkin declares the adoption of the Byronic model in *Eugene Onegin*: 'I am writing, not a novel but a novel in verse – a devil of a difference. It's in the genre of *Don Juan*' ('Letter to Peter Andreevich Vyazemsky, Odessa, 4 November 1823', in *The Letters of Alexander Pushkin*, trans. and ed. J. Thomas Shaw [Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967] 141).
[47] Mersereau Jr., in Moser, 136.
[48] Georgette Donchin, 'Pushkin', in *Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn*, ed. Richard Freeborn (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976) 19-38, 28.
[49] Donchin, in Freeborn, 28.
[50] Mersereau Jr., in Moser, 142.

> Итак, в лице Онегина, Ленского и Татьяны Пушкин изобразил русское общество в одном из фазисов его образования, его развития, и с какою истиною, с какою верностью, как полно и художественно изобразил он его.[51]
>
> (Thus, [Belinsky was in owe of] how truthfully, fully and poetically, in the characters of Onegin, Lensky and Tatiana, Pushkin managed to give a picture of the whole Russian society in one of the phases of its formation, its development).

In a similar spirit, Belinsky continued:

> «Онегина» можно назвать энциклопедией русской жизни и в высшей степени народным произведением.[52]
>
> (*Onégin* may be called an encyclopedia of Russian life, and a national work in the highest degree).

The characteristic "Onegin stanzas" (consisting of 'fourteen lines of iambic tetrameter ending in a couplet'[53]) in which Pushkin frames his plot and characters, though designed to accommodate a range of points of view, do not operate on their own without the help of the voice of the narrator. The narrator's role as a participant in the story is not only to describe the characters and their behaviours, but also to give a taste of social commentary, whether it is expressed consummately in the form of irony, parody, or through more subtle allusions to current states of affairs. Pushkin is not lecturing the reader on ethics in the manner Tolstoy will, nor, like some of his realist successors, is he infecting his characters with the spirit of social and political initiative. *Onegin* undeniably still '[looks] upon authorship as a pleasant pastime and profitable exercise of wit'.[54] But it too, although it is not yet so apparent, develops a concern with the observation of the details of everyday life, testing thereby for the first time the propensity of literature for 'inculcating and propagating [social] truths'.[55]

Conspicuously de-romanticized, a new kind of poetry (which even Pushkin by this time knew was falling hopelessly out of fashion despite its innovations) can be said to have established its own hegemony in the literary arena as the precursory realist mode, in that it is the first existing example of a Russian literary work employing realist details. Mirsky

---

[51] V. G. Belinskij, 'Stat′ja Devjataja: *Evgenij Onegin*', in *Polnoe Sobranie Sočinenij*, vol. 7 (Moskva: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1955) 473-504, at 502.
[52] Belinskij 503.
[53] Mersereau Jr., in Moser, 142.
[54] Palmer, *Russian Literature*, 22.
[55] Palmer, *Russian Literature*, 21.

articulates what would be reoccurring assessment of *Onegin* as realistically pioneering, most notably through

> the kind of realism first introduced in it, the style of character drawing, the characters themselves, and the construction of the story that are to be regarded as the fountainheads of the later Russian novel. The realism of *Onégin* is that peculiarly Russian realism which is poetical without idealizing and without surrendering anything of reality. It is the same realism that will live again in Lérmontov's novel, in Turgénev, in Goncharóv, in *War and Peace*, and in the best of Chékhov – though its legitimacy outside the perfect poetical form given it by Púshkin is open to doubt.[56]

Concerned principally with the life of so-called "real" people, *Onegin* 'is a novel of manners . . . though only of the upper class, a family novel, a love novel, a bildungs- and desillusionsroman, a literary and society roman à clef, and above all an autobiographical novel'.[57] The eponymous protagonist, Eugene Onegin, is a St Petersburg dandy who, bored with a glamorous society of the fashionable city, seeks entertainment in his country estate. His neighbour, a young poet, Vladimir Lensky, introduces Onegin to his fiancée, Olga Larina, a classical blue-eyed beauty, the portrait of whom the reader is invited to locate in any conventional novel. Olga's elder sister, Tatiana, is a 'wayward, silent, sad' girl 'of contemplative disposition',[58] fond of Richardson's and Rousseau's novels. Under their influence, she imagines Onegin to be her destined lover. Against all rules of propriety, she confesses her love to him in a letter. But Onegin is ill-equipped to valorize such forthright sincerity. In response, he scorns Tatiana for her indiscretion. Onegin flirts with Olga at a ball, the behaviour which provokes a duel between the two friends. After killing Lensky, Onegin spends a few years travelling, eventually returning to the high social circles of St Petersburg. In one of its greatest salons, Onegin finds Tatiana, married and well-adjusted to the fashions of *beau monde*. Onegin wakes up to the knowledge that he loves her, but the latter's 'fate is settled' (VIII, stanza 47, line 3). For Pushkin, Tatiana's impulsiveness and instinctiveness is not incompatible with moral superiority. It is at this crucial moment of Onegin's emotional outpouring that we learn of Tatiana's strengths. Although she confirms her love for Onegin, she nevertheless fulfils her marital duty, by vowing to remain forever faithful to her husband.

---

[56] Mirsky 91.
[57] Terras, *A History of Russia Literature*, 213.
[58] Alexander Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin*, *Eugene Onegin* 1833, trans. and introd. Stanley Mitchell (London: Penguin, 2008) II, stanza 25, line 5; II, stanza 26, line 1.

Although in method *Onegin* slips back and forth between classical frames and romantic ideals celebratory of the artist's freedom of creativity,[59] the subject-matter and characterization were very different from anything that any of the major literary figures was attempting at the time. To begin with, Onegin and Tatiana are profoundly revolutionary heroes, indeed they are, as Mirsky observes, 'the ancestors of a whole race of characters in Russian fiction'.[60] They are essentially stereotyped and reflect the traditional Russian values and those coming from the West. To depict Onegin and Tatiana convincingly as a representative of each, Pushkin worked in the direction of either mocking or mythologizing those values. Onegin is a product of the westernized society of St Petersburg of the early 1820s – sufficiently self-aware, but too priggish and too blasé for 'an effort of the heart and mind'.[61] This particular combination of intellect and spiritual weariness in a character has certain points of contact with the "Byronic hero"[62] – a specific character type which after Turgenev's work *The Diary of a Superfluous Man* (1850) became known in Russian literature as "*lišnij čelovek*" ("the superfluous man"), conventionally denoting an 'intellectual incapable of action',[63] or 'a hero who is sensitive to social and ethical problems, but who fails to act, partly because of personal weakness, partly because of political and social restraints on his freedom of action'.[64] Complementing (by virtue of contrast) what essentially comprises a weak and ineffective man, there is a woman of spiritual energy and strength. Whilst Onegin, caught in his own tragic duality, fails to measure up to his own strong sense of morality, the pure and responsible Tatiana embodies a 'mythologized ideal of Russian feminine virtue'.[65]

---

[59] Pushkin's attitudes towards the commercial aspect of art are perhaps best expressed in 'A Conversation between a Bookseller and a Poet' (also known as 'The Dialogue of Poet and Bookseller') with which he prefaced *Onegin*. The bookseller insists that the poet should use his talents to please the public. The poet finds the idea repugnant, situating art, in the spirit of Romanticism, idealistically outside the sphere of material gain, arguing for the independence from 'the patronage of the great and the censure of self-appointed critics' (John Bayley, *Pushkin: A Comparative Commentary* [London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971] 148). The bookseller is a realist who is convinced that it is money and not ideals that gives freedom to the artist. They reach an agreement: 'the poet's inspiration is without price but his works are not, and he should get the best bargain he can for them' (Bayley 148). Given Pushkin's desperate financial situation and the new trend of writing literature as a profession, the compromise to write for the consumer's taste was his way to prevail both artistically and financially.
[60] Mirsky 92.
[61] Terras, *A History of Russia Literature*, 213.
[62] Chances, 'The Superfluous Man in Russian Literature', in Cornwell and Christian, 11.
[63] Thomas Winner, cited in Ellen B. Chances, *Conformity's Children: An Approach to the Superfluous Man in Russian Literature* (Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 1978) 17-18.
[64] William Harkins, cited in Chances, *Conformity's Children*, 18.
[65] Terras, *A History of Russia Literature*, 213.

Mikhail Lermontov's *A Hero of Our Time* (1840), despite a considerable portion of criticism it received in respect to its artistic inferiority, is almost more significant than *Eugene Onegin* in its influence on later development of the realist novel. Due to the assumed convergence of the origins of Pushkin's and Lermontov's titles of their novels,[66] and the shared focus on "the superfluous man", *A Hero of Our Time* (1840) may appear to have been written to resemble *Eugene Onegin*. It went on cultivating the seed of social criticism first planted in literature by Pushkin, in that it depicted, in a realistic manner, 'the sincerity of the man who so ruthlessly exposed his own failings and vices'.[67] But this new type of Realism did more than merely showing (and apparently mocking, as *Onegin* does) these failings and vices in the character. It aimed rather at awakening a spirit of compassion in readers by means of arguments that 'we practically always excuse things when we understand them'.[68] This focus of *A Hero of Our Time* on the sympathetic depiction of the corrupted man through 'a direct dissection of his mind'[69] reveals an attempt to establish a new function of literature, invoked by the assertion in the "Preface" that 'people have been fed on sweets too long and it has ruined their digestion. Bitter medicines and harsh truths are needed now'.[70] The novel clearly recognized the fundamental ills of society, but offered no solutions to its own identified problems. The narrator appeals to the reader with a hint of cynicism: 'please don't imagine that the present author was ever vain enough to dream of correcting human vices' (*HT* 4). The moral purpose of *A Hero of Our Time* was a rung above that of Pushkin's *Onegin*, and although it had remained a rung below that of Gogol's *Dead Souls* (1842), it had done enough to encourage this future agenda to endure throughout the nineteenth century.

---

[66] Speculating upon the genesis of *A Hero of Our Time*, Victor Terras makes a valid observation that

> the hero's name, Pechorin (from Pechora, a river in northern Russia), suggests that he is meant to be a successor to Onegin (from Onega, another northern river).

('The Realist Tradition', in Jones and Miller, 190-209, at 197).

[67] Foreword to "Pechorin's Journal", in Mikhail Lermontov, *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, trans. and introd. Paul Foote (1966; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2001) 55-56, at 55.

[68] Foreword to "Pechorin's Journal", 65. The mid- and late-nineteenth-century Russian novel has survived in literary criticism partly because of its ambivalent portrayal of characters whose moral worth is open to dispute, thereby sustaining its original intention to infect the reader with the spirit of understanding and sympathy, to get them to respond emotionally to fictional characters based on our belief they are created to resemble the sort of people we ourselves are. Good-hearted murderer, Rodion Raskolnikov, selfless prostitute, Sonia Marmeladova, sensitive adulteress, Anna Karenina, short-sighted traditionalist, Konstantin Levin, psychotic femme fatale, Nastasya Filippovna, virtuous temptress, Grushenka, and many others, are classic fictional creations constructed on a principle of moral contradiction, the complexity of which still attracts such excellent critics of Russian literary texts as Gary Saul Morson.

[69] Mirsky 164.

[70] Preface to Mikhail Lermontov, *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, 3-4, at 3.

The hero of the novel, Pechorin, is a military officer in the Caucasus, but really 'a portrait . . . not of a single person. It is a portrait of the vices of our whole generation in their ultimate development'.[71] Despite Lermontov's denial that his hero is a replica of himself, the biographical evidence that perennially presents him as 'precocious, morbidly self-conscious and highly sensitive'[72] shows that Pechorin's eccentricities might be recognized as particularly Lermontov's. In its own characteristic fashion, *A Hero of Our Time* submits itself to no single consciousness, but a multiplicity of points of view. Pechorin, whose personality is conveyed through a number of different perspectives, is a supreme example of an intelligent man of great sensitivity, but who is nevertheless extremely arrogant and suffering from upper-class ennui. With a despondent attitude that his existence is too futile even to allow the desire for emotional fulfillment, he devotes his energies to flirt with a woman he himself considers to be unworthy of his attention. When Pechorin finally finds himself in the grip of a genuine love and has to make a vital decision – a critical situation which in his future is yet to repeat – the tide of cynicism catches up and engulfs him to the effect that he sees no hope in life, and therefore no chance of redemption for a fallen, good-for-nothing social *neudačnik* (the man who is prone to failure and bad luck, a social cripple, a loser) like himself.

Pechorin, naturally, embodies an utterly un-heroic hero whose continual moral capitulation leads to a sharpened awareness of his own wickedness, arrogance, superficiality and emotional impotence – a set of conventional qualities of his herd, which he himself despises but has no strength or motivation to fight. The novel lacks an explicit didactic conclusion, and like its predecessor, it 'has no beginning or end',[73] leaving largely unresolved the problems presented there. But the absence of moralistic instruction within the frame of the novel does not preclude the author from didactic philosophizing outside it. Both the preface to the novel and the foreword to "Pechorin's Journal" serve above all as external structures to which Lermontov attaches his own attitudes and ideas, most notably his distaste with the contemporary readership's lack of literary sophistication:

[71] Preface to Mikhail Lermontov, *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, 3-4, at 4.
[72] Terras, *A History of Russian Literature*, 227.
[73] Terras, 'The Realist Tradition', 198.

> [In our country] the reading public is still so naïve and immature that it cannot understand a fable unless the moral is given at the end, fails to see jokes, has no sense of irony, and is simply badly educated. It still doesn't realize that open abuse is impossible in respectable society or in respectable books, and that modern culture has found a far keener weapon than abuse.[74]

As a crucial part of the prehistory of the novel as a literary genre, Lermontov's concern with educating his readers to acquire superior interpretive skills – by encouraging them not to fall into a habit of forming an aversion against Pechorin for fear that he 'he comes too close to the bone'[75] – had placed future realist prose into a pattern of intertwining good and evil. As is often the case with the precursors of great literary traditions, the relevance of Lermontov's simultaneously anti-heroic and pro-humanist fiction can, perhaps, be more appropriately tested against its global rather than purely national impact. In the late 1840s and 1850s, the English social-problem novel,[76] now suggestively reminiscent of original aspirations of *A Hero of Our Time*, was further refined in novels by Elizabeth Gaskell, Charles Kingsley, Charles Dickens and George Eliot, among others.

If the shift from the Romanticism of maturity to the Realism of youth is only Lermontov following the steps already marked by Pushkin, what then is his claim to the appellation of the uncontested initiator of the new literary epoch? The answer to this question would have to be a reiteration of John Mersereau Jr.'s recognition of *A Hero of Our Time* as 'the first fully developed novel of psychological realism in Russian literature'.[77] Although Lermontov still enclosed his novel in the realm of feelings, as had previously been the case in former romantic writings, his creative manner was developing towards a motif of search for *naznačenie* ('one's purpose in life'[78]). This thematic switch resulted partly from the gradual rise to prominence of Realism in Russian literature, and partly also from the increasingly socio-political character of literary texts. The period of *prokljatyh voprposov* ('accursed questions'[79]) had begun; influential pro-Western Russian thinkers such as Herzen and Belinsky appreciated the novel's transitional value, primarily because they coupled

---

[74] Preface to Mikhail Lermontov, *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, 3-4, at 3.
[75] Preface to Mikhail Lermontov, *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, 3-4, at 4.
[76] For the most important survey of various accounts of the Victorian social-problem novel, see Josephine M. Guy, *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: The Market, the Individual and Communal Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
[77] Mersereau Jr. 187.
[78] Andrew 49.
[79] Andrew 54.

‘Pechorin’s search for a meaning to an absurd, meaningless and godless world’[80] with the now more pressing question over the course of Russia’s destiny. Although the present study cannot even begin to explore how Pechorin’s voyage of discovery could be a manifestation of this anxiety that was beginning to visibly surface between the third and fourth decade of the nineteenth century, it does go some way toward demonstrating the extent to which the literary focus changed during that time. Lermontov’s novel – because it contains a contemporary hero whose experiences are exclusively those which a typical Russian reader might imaginably share, has been declared to be the culmination of romantic literary tradition and the advent of a literature of the people.

In 1841 Lermontov died, and with his death ended the transitional stage in Russian literature: the age of the realist novel had arrived. As has been suggested in the earlier section of the chapter, Richardson’s and Fielding’s works in the eighteenth century continued to exert their influence until the novel had legitimized ‘the didactic potential of the form’.[81] In Russia, by comparison, the novel, under Pushkin and Lermontov, had evolved into a kind of Realism that involved the inclusion of social issues, though exclusively those to do with upper classes. This was to change radically. Ever since the early 1840s literary modernizers, typically referred to by Russian literary historians as “the Belinsky generation”, had been concerned to develop ‘the “natural school”, “a by-product of Gogol’s presumed concern for “the little man” and his interest in sordid environments’.[82] The more radical among these modernizing writers, Vissarion Belinsky, thought this as most useful if a new kind of Realism – Critical – was adopted to reflect ordinary people in native dress, giving rise to the impression of the authentic experience across a wide spectrum of contemporary Russians. The novel, in this sense, was a purposeful act, committed to achieving a relevance to the main problems of the day. The vision of Belinsky and his disciples thereby reflected an unshakable conviction in regard to advancing literature that ‘Life was more important than Art’.[83]

Few experts in Russian literature would disagree today with the general view most succinctly expressed by Joe Andrew that ‘apart from Pushkin, Belinsky was the most

---

[80] Andrew 54.
[81] Cheryl L. Nixon, ed., *Novel Definitions: An Anthology of Commentary on the Novel, 1688-1815* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2009) 23.
[82] Mersereau Jr., in Moser, 188.
[83] Baring 143.

influential individual in nineteenth-century Russian cultural life'.[84] Specifically, Belinsky felt he had to rescue Russia from an international embarrassment, a feeling reflected in a bitter question such as the following: 'What are the reasons for such emptiness in our literature? Or *do we in fact have no literature*? . . . *Yes – we have no literature*'.[85] He sought to invent new forms that would transmit Western moral ideas and modes of thinking, but which were nevertheless manifestly Russian. As a major literary critic of the day, he promoted these forms in two literary magazines of which he was an editor "Notes of the Fatherland" and "The Contemporary" (also known as *Otechestvennyje Zapiski* and *Sovremennik*).[86] Belinsky's efforts at creating literature sympathetic to the plight of the masses has earned him a critical reference as a founder of literary tradition belonging to "*raznochintsy*", a term that came to denote Russian intellectuals of different, non-noble ranks, quite literally, as Victor Terras observes, 'the sons of parish priests, merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans'.[87] This literary reorientation prompted by Belinsky was guided by the fact that he himself represented the non-aristocratic class, but it was also, and more significantly, a result of his conviction that populist literature frames imaginative reflections of life appropriately to distinctive Russian conditions.

Scholars interested in Belinsky's formal qualifications and professional expertise as a literary critic have noted how obsessive he became with current Western philosophical theories, Hegelian idealism being the most notorious import of the late 1830s. The Hegelian dialectic, which crusaded under the banner of 'All that is real is rational, all that is rational is real',[88] at least initially, was imposed wholesale on Russian literature as it inspired an aesthetics that would flesh out the naked truth of Russian reality. But the vision of literature as

---

[84] Andrew 114.

[85] Belinsky, cited in Irina Reyfman, *Vasilii Trediakovsky: The Fool of the 'New' Russian Literature* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990) 18, italics in original.

[86] Belinsky's writings on literature were as much a set of aesthetic principles as an institutional entry pass to the patronage networks guaranteeing, if not complete financial security, at least partial support and an opportunity for self-promotion. As Joe Andrew has noted, 'all the leading young writers of the day – [Goncharov, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Nekrasov, Grigorovich, Herzen and others] – published in *The Contemporary*' (*Writers and Society During the Rise of Russian Realism*, 136-137). Grossly politicized and fiercely biased, the journal excluded from publishing non-conformist texts, as if saying "If your aesthetics coincides with mine, your work is valuable and thus deserves to be popularized. If your aesthetic revises earlier literary traditions or inaugurates a philosophy with a bent other than that centered on *narodnost'*, then your genius becomes irrelevant and therefore must remain private".

[87] Terras, *A History of Russian Literature*, 169.

[88] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, quoted in John L. Scherer Jr., 'Belinskij and the Hegelian Dialectic', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 21.1 (1977): 30-45, at 31.

merely 'reflecting, even championing, the *status quo*',[89] was still essentially non-reformist, and thus offered no suggestions on social progress. In 1840, Belinsky's reverence for German thought began to gradually subside; the Russian intellectual was to end his days as a supporter of French socialism. By the time of Belinsky's death in 1848, the novel – permeated by ideological and aesthetic directives of his natural (i.e., realist) school – would be disciplined to perform a utilitarian function of remoulding the present backward world into a more progressive humanitarian form of society (a didactic phrase of the propagandists of Western ideas[90]).

Richard Peace observes that it was the French socialists from whom Belinsky learned the terms "society" and "nationality", however only in order to ultimately create the concept of *narodnost'* ("Russian soul", "national spirit") – a crucial pillar of aesthetic rule that demanded the portrayal of 'an objective universal reality'.[91] It was universal in the sense that, rather than focusing exclusively on either ordinary folk or educated superiors, 'it embraced *everybody* within the nation'.[92] This all-inclusive character of literature was to prove a very fruitful one in later realist prose. Any fictional character would be invested with greater significance and a separate consciousness irrespective of their positioning on the social ladder. Tolstoy, who at the time of writing *Anna Karenina* largely endorsed Belinsky's aesthetic recommendations, affords his hero, Levin, the right to inherit not only the great estate equipped with an army of serfs, but also an associated conviction that, as long as he '[does not try] to increase the difference of position between [them] and [him, he has] duties both to the land and to [his] family',[93] even if it means the sustenance of the long-held tradition of human exploitation. Equally valid is Malthus's view of life. Regarded as 'a well-known capitalist' (*AK* 542), he is inclined toward the maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of others to commercialize the railway for the benefit of the public, but more so for the private.

---

[89] Peace, in Moser, 193.
[90] For a discussion of opposing ideologies of Slavophiles and Westernizers which came axiomatically to denote '"Barbarous" Russia and "Civilized"' Europe, see Howard F. Stein, 'Russian Nationalism and the Divided Soul of the Westernizers and Slavophiles', *Ethos* 4.4 (1976): 403-438.
[91] Andrew 143.
[92] Peace, in Moser, 194, italics added.
[93] Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 544.

The more one pursues Belinsky's literary criticism, the quicker one realizes that it is par excellence an expression of the romantic tradition and conventional aestheticism that his "natural school" was dedicated to break. Belinsky's model of a socially-conscious literature,[94] in view of its curious resemblance to Russia's civilizing mission of Peter the Great, might be termed "aesthetic totalitarianism". Belinsky's fierce criticism of serfdom, along with 'his looking to the West, his anticlericalism, his desire for radical reform, material progress and the spread of education',[95] had become from the 1840s onward the main stimuli for novelists to take upon themselves the task of introducing or antagonizing – in either case sensitizing – the nation to the changing conditions of nineteenth-century Russia. Belinsky's prescription, that literature should have a message, was a major corrective in the literary context, where previously there had been excessive emphasis on artistry at the expense of responsibly addressing contemporary social problems. In Belinsky's aesthetic regime, the novelists were no longer mere observers, ready to enact ordinary social dramas; rather, they considered themselves to be useful citizens involved in the guardianship of Russia's future. As much as all writers now felt they had a social obligation for writing as they did, some of them, Tolstoy among them, often rose up precisely to overthrow Belinsky's progressive vision for the country.

One of the leading representatives of the natural school of Russian Realism and one perhaps most written about is Nikolai Gogol. Gogol's Realism, made famous through his greatest work *Dead Souls* (1842), did not yet possess, like Dostoevsky's and Tolstoy's full-blown Realism later would, a high degree of psychological development of his characters, or a personal engagement with them, but it may nevertheless be said to anticipate these developments. What first strikes the reader of *Dead Souls* (the St Petersburg censorship would not allow the publication of the novel unless under the main title of *The Adventures of Chichikov*, to be followed by a sub-title *Dead Souls*) is the dense everyday detail, 'ample prosaic *realia*',[96] that envelop every event and character within it. The narrator is extremely meticulous about describing, in a satirical manner, the physical appearance and the behaviour of the characters: the sound of a trumpet that accompanies the blow of Chichikov's nose; two

[94] In biographical literature Belinsky has gone on record as denouncing as impracticable any literary works that were enjoyable and self-indulgent rather than responsible and didactic. For example, although Belinsky recognized Pushkin's and Gogol's individual talents, he nevertheless dismissed them for being too artistic, and insufficiently critical of contemporary life. See Baring 143.
[95] Andrew 131.
[96] Terras, 'The Realist Tradition', 198.

hairs sticking out of it that need plucking; the personal odour of Petrushka, his valet; 'a woman's face in a bonnet, as long and narrow as a cucumber'; the skirts of Plyushkin's dressing-gown that conspicuously '[fly] open, revealing a garment not quite proper for inspection'; the 'jungle' of a beard that Chichikov grows during his illness; and finally 'a mixture of milk and figs' with which he gargles to treat the cold.[97] These supremely colourful descriptions, however absurd and exaggerated, are a sign of Gogol devising a basic technique of realist representation. Indeed, his heightened sensitivity to 'the art of the portrait' as Richard Peace has called it,[98] 'became the most important force in the evolution of the Russian technique of novel-writing well before the novel gained recognition from thousands of bemused readers on the world scene'.[99] What Gogol lost by this technique was the harmony of the plot, but what he gained was the immediacy of description by means of which he at least thought he could give a penetrating critique of the traditional Russian mentality.

In Gogol's aesthetic scheme, satire occupies a privileged position. The hero of *Dead Souls*, Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov, can be described as characteristically impossible to exactly define, the sort of "in between man": 'not handsome, but neither . . . particularly bad-looking'; 'neither too fat, nor too thin'; not necessarily 'old, but . . . not too young either'; someone who always speaks 'neither too loudly nor too softly' (*DS* 17, 28). It is not until the last chapter of *Dead Souls* that the narrator discloses the hero's plan of purchasing, cheaply – preferably for nothing – the certificates of deceased serfs or "souls" who have not yet been struck of the census, in order to mortgage them to the Treasury. Upon his distasteful trade-related arrival in the provincial town of N., Chichikov makes acquaintance with a number of gentry landowners, ultimately making them his business partners: Manilov, the sentimental fool 'with eyes as sweet as sugar' (*DS* 26); Korobochka, the old cautious 'blockhead' (*DS* 61); Nozdryov, the aggressive ruffian under the disguise of a 'happy-go-lucky fellow' (*DS* 27); Sobakevich, the disillusioned '*kulak*', visualized in terms of 'a medium-sized bear' (*DS* 113, 103); and finally Plyushkin, the isolated miser, whose extreme spendthrift habits bewilder even Chichikov who, as the narrator reminds us, '[has] met a great number of all sorts of people' in his life (*DS* 125). In order to achieve the desired effect of "'the sub-human'

[97] Nikolai Gogol, *Dead Souls* 1842, trans. and introd. David Magarshack (London: Penguin Books, 1961) 20, 23, 30, 103, 132, 222, 221.
[98] Peace, in Moser, 199.
[99] Robert Belknap, 'Novelistic Technique', in Jones and Miller, 233-250, at 240.

personalities of the characters",[100] or 'even dehumanized, caricatures',[101] Gogol furnishes a series of clues which aim to prompt the reader to interpret them as symbolic enactments of evil and filth. For example, readers familiar with the Russian language are very likely to instantly draw parallels between Sobakevich and canine behaviour, and to associate Nozdryov with germs, for the Russian words from which their names derive – *sobaka* and *nozdrja* – mean precisely "dog" and "nostril". Gogol's talent for creating great comic characters has attracted comparisons with that of Charles Dickens, whose faculty for drawing idiosyncratic and memorable characters has been widely acknowledged.[102]

In the range of responses to Gogol's novel, or 'epic poem' as he preferred to call it,[103] one was the refusal 'to acknowledge the significance of the artist's seemingly lowly and comical creations'.[104] If there was an implied truth in *Dead Souls*, it was believed to be not 'a heterogeneous crowd' of 'the whole of Russia',[105] but conversely that element of genuine artistic thought, that fantasy-laden, rather than mimetic, engineering of Russian reality.[106] Through the depiction of Chichikov and the provincial town of N., Gogol hoped to carry out the realist program, by making *Dead Souls* a masterly exposé of Russia's *pošlost'*, the Russian

---

[100] Alexander F. Boyd, *Aspects of the Russian Novel* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972) 52.
[101] Mirsky 155.
[102] On Dickens's caricature characterization, see Richard L. Stein, 'Dickens and Illustration', in *The Cambridge Companion to Charles Dickens*, ed. John O. Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 167-188; Andrew Sanders, 'Dickens and the Idea of the Comic Novel', *The Yearbook of English Studies* 36.2 (2006): 51-64; David Gervais, 'Dickens's Comic Speech: Inventing the Self', *The Yearbook of English Studies* 25 (1995): 128-140; and Alexander Bove, 'The "Unbearable Realism of a Dream": On the Subject of Portraits in Austen and Dickens', ELH 74.3 (2007) 655-679.
[103] Although the tremendously successful part I of *Dead Souls* brought Gogol fame and prestige, he believed it to be only a promise of a much greater work yet to come, indeed

> a pale introduction to the great epic poem which is taking shape in my mind and which will finally solve the riddle of my existence.

(Nikolai Gogol, cited in David Magarshack, 'Introduction' to *Dead Souls*, 7-15, at 11).
[104] Anne Lounsbery, '"Russia! What Do You Want of Me?": The Russian Reading Public in *Dead Souls*', *Slavic Review* 60.2 (2001): 367-389, at 377.
[105] When Gogol first began writing *Dead Souls*, he was, as he confided in Zhukovsky, determined to achieve a coherent picture of nineteenth-century Russian reality:

> If I do this work as it ought to be done – oh, what an enormous, what an original subject! What a heterogeneous crowd! The whole of Russia will appear in it.

(Gogol, quoted in Magarshack, 9).
[106] In *Lectures on Russian Literature*, Vladimir Nabokov presents concrete facts demonstrating Gogol's distinct lack of familiarity with provincial Russia and her ways of life, primarily as a result of his constant absence. See Vladimir Nabokov, *Lectures on Russian Literature*, ed. and introd. Fredson Bowers (London: Pan Books, 1982), esp. p. 15:

> And if you want "facts", then let us inquire what experience had Gogol of provincial Russia. Eight hours in a Podolsk inn, a week in Kursk, the rest he had seen from the window of his traveling carriage, and to this he had added the memories of his essentially Ukrainian youth spent in Mirgorod, Nezhin, Poltava – all of which towns lay far outside Chichikov's itinerary.

denoting vulgarity and commonness. At the same time, however, as Vladimir Nabokov, protests, there are sufficient reasons to raise doubt as to whether *Dead Souls* satisfies a standard definition of Realism which, by convention, provides "a matter-of-fact description of existing conditions' with '"real people" and "real crime" and a "message'".[107] For one, the novel is a reenactment of Gogol's own fantasy, through a depiction of 'introspective caricatures of the fauna of his own mind',[108] essentially an 'exteriorization of his own "ugliness" and "vices"',[109] rather than human figures of contemporary Russia. In addition, it contains a discourse that altogether lacks 'any real Russian locale or ambiance'.[110] That being so, *Dead Souls* becomes a means for manufacturing something else: "ostentatious exhibition of the wealth of the Russian language through proverbs, sayings, idioms, jargon, and catalogs of words (Gogol's 'verbal glutony')".[111]

The Fantastic Realism of Dead *Souls* is arguably an unprecedented, highly original form in which the narrator strives to achieve linguistic credibility at the expense of factual accuracy and explicit moral instruction. The reader quickly realizes that the novel is not a reflection of contemporary life, but rather a testing ground for the narrator's ability to flick the switch of verbal volume to disguise a fundamentally thin texture of events. It is not the dystopian realm of the town of N., but the idiosyncrasy of the Russian language that opens up access to the prevailing Russian culture:

> Just as a countless multitude of churches and monasteries with their cupolas, domes, and crosses is scattered all over holy, pious Russia, so a countless multitude of tribes, generations, peoples appears in colourful crowds, rushing hither and thither over the face of the earth. And each of these peoples, bearing within itself the pledge of its powers, full of its own creative and spiritual faculties and of its own visibly marked idiosyncrasies and other divine gifts, has distinguished itself in its own original fashion by its own word, which, whatever the subject it describes, reflects in its description a part of its own character. A knowledge of the heart and a wise comprehension of life will find expression in the sayings of a Briton; the Frenchman's short-lived phrase will flash like a gay dandy and then be lost for ever; the German will invent his involved, thinly intellectual sayings which are not understood by everyone; but there is not a word that is so sweeping, so vivid, none that bursts from the very heart, that bubbles and is tremulous with life, as a neatly uttered Russian word (*DS* 118).

---

[107] Nabokov 17.
[108] Mirsky 152.
[109] Mirsky 152.
[110] Terras, *A History of Russian Literature*, 262.
[111] Terras, *A History of Russian Literature*, 261-262.

In the Gogolian scheme, the appeal of the realist novel, its capacity to provoke the emotions and to penetrate the mind – Russian or other – is attributed to a belief that cultural reality can always and primarily be accessed through language. Gogol's fascination with his native tongue can be seen as revolutionary, in the sense that it anticipates an alternative branch of Realism for a considerable number of later nineteenth-century writers who wished to embed recognizable cultural traits in their novels. Moreover, Gogol's speculation on the potential of the novel to supply linguistic instantiations of collective identity has proved to be one of the necessary prerequisites for fictional texts more widely. His supposition that language – the characteristic speech acts performed by native speakers – is a reflection of mental models especially characteristic of and resonant with a specific native audience, would provide a platform for a method of linguistic analysis designed to reveal the cultural mindset, propensities and behaviour which were, if not shared by most contemporary Russian readers, at least readily comprehensible to them.

By general acceptance, the era of Russian Realism par excellence began after the death of Gogol in 1852, when it became clear that the novel, rather than merely commenting on contemporary affairs and issues of relevance to its audience, it now needed more philosophical depth, greater rhetorical artistry, and an increased degree of moral significance.[112] Consistently demonstrated, these features have amounted to the absolute high point of Russian Realism comprising works of two of the most highly recognized and globally influential Russian writers, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy, whose methods of representation 'established new standards of psychological portraiture and ideological debate in the Russian novel'.[113] The works of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, stylistically, thematically and philosophically, are too diametrically opposed to fit into the same rubric of fictional prose. To begin with, Dostoyevsky has earned his place amongst the most celebrated nineteenth-century novelists as a purveyor of human consciousness, whilst Tolstoy's work is distinguished from all others by

---

[112] Many thematic critics have already pursued this line of scholarly enquiry. For the most powerful and theoretically sophisticated discussions, see Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time*; Judith M. Armstrong, *The Unsaid: Anna Karenina* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), esp. Chapter 8, 'The Rhetoric of Morality' (161-185); C. J. G. Turner, 'Psychology, Rhetoric and Morality in *Anna Karenina*: At the Bottom of Whose Heart?', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 39.2 (1995): 261-268; Logan Speirs, *Tolstoy and Chekhov* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), esp. Chapter 7, 'Tolstoy's Morality in *Anna Karenina* and in *A Confession*' (117-127). The influential essay on Tolstoy's self-searching nature as well as his attitude to art and life is offered by Tolstoy himself in 'My Confession: Introduction to the Critique of Dogmatic Theology and Investigation of the Christian Teaching' (1879-1882), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 13, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener (1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968) 3-90.

[113] Freeborn, 'The Classic Russian Novel', in Moser, 28.

its supreme representation of emotional states. As much as both authors infused their works with realistic representations of the psychology of their characters, each gave their characters a different experience of everyday life, derived at least in part autobiographically. For example, a plausible explanation for Rodion Raskolnikov's extreme urban poverty in *Crime and Punishment* or Prince Myshkin's progressing epilepsy in *The Idiot*, and conversely, Konstantin Levin's rural prosperity and his belief in living off the fruits of the land in *Anna Karenina* can be partly found in the personal circumstances of the authors themselves. Tolstoy, we are told,

> was the incarnation of health, and is above all things and pre-eminently the painter of the sane and the earthly. Dostoevsky was an epileptic, the painter of the abnormal, of criminals, madmen, degenerates, mystics. Tolstoy led an even, uneventful life, spending the greater part of it in his own country house, in the midst of a large family. Dostoevsky was condemned to death, served a sentence of four years' hard labour in a convict settlement in Siberia, and besides this spent six years in exile; when he returned and started a newspaper, it was prohibited by the Censorship . . . [114]

The living conditions under which both authors wrote provide a further point of contrast. Tolstoy was too much of a patriotic moralist to be a suspect; drew a steady income from an entirely self-sufficient country estate; wrote when he pleased; and what he wrote was worshipped by the public. Dostoyevsky, on the other hand,

> underwent financial ruin; his first wife, his brother, and his best friend died; he was driven abroad by debt, harassed by the authorities on the one hand, and attacked by the liberals on the other; abused and misunderstood, almost starving and never well, working under overwhelming difficulties, always pressed for time, and ill requited for his toil.[115]

Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, in almost every respect antithetical to one another, responded, through their writing, to the conditions in which they lived in two ways: the former was summoning up his creative powers to give expression to the struggle and uncertainty of the working classes, and the latter used as his inspiration the effect of the insuperable power of nature and human society over the wishes of the individual, to which he responds by showing that humans need to be reconciled to the hardship of existence. Despite the forthright and sometimes even arrogant manner in which both authors defended their antagonistic conceptions of life, their mutual refusal to give credence to the other's point of view in fact betrayed their fear of a potentially corrupting influence that one kind of reality may have had

[114] Baring 211.
[115] Baring 211.

on another. Dostoyevsky's and Tolstoy's devaluation of each other's artistic goals, in order to defend their own literary agendas, was a direct result of the divergence of their experienced realities, a broad discrepancy that nevertheless demonstrates the philosophical capaciousness of the novel.

Neither Dostoyevsky nor Tolstoy established the monumental Russian realist tradition. They extended, with their own respective original genius, the profound developments of both Pushkin (who was a particular favourite of Tolstoy) and Gogol (from whose school Dostoyevsky is commonly thought to derive). Because it is Tolstoy who is the focal author of this study, Dostoyevsky's peculiar kind of Realism, though complex and highly intriguing, and certainly itself worthy of comparison with Tolstoy's,[116] will be excluded from this discussion.

In the second half of the twentieth century a consensus developed amongst Russian and Western critics that Tolstoy's Realism can be most readily distinguished from the many other Realisms by its merit of emphasizing the detailed observation of the psychic aspects of human experience. Part of a consensual critical response to Tolstoy has been to acknowledge him 'as a pioneer in the exploration of the mysterious relationship between thought and language'.[117] For example, D. S. Mirsky remarked that

> The universality of Tolstóy's realism is increased by his concentration on the inner life, and especially on its more elusive experiences. When arrested and expressed in words, they give a particularly keen feeling of unexpected familiarity, for it seems that the author is aware of the reader's most intimate, secret, and inexpressible feelings.[118]

Subsequently, Vladimir Nabokov chose to substitute the word Realism for the misleading term "Stream of Consciousness or Interior Monologue" and concluded that it is from Tolstoy that

---

[116] Mirsky offers a wonderful contrasting analysis of Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's methods of psychological portaiture:

> Tolstóy dissects the soul in its vital aspects; he studies the physiological basis of the mind, the subconscious workings of the will, the anatomy of the individual act. The higher spiritual states, when he comes to them, are discovered to be *outside* and on a different plane from life. They have no dimensions; they are entirely irrational to the ordinary stream of experience. Dostoyévsky, on the contrary, deals in those psychic strata where the mind and will are in constant contact with higher spiritual entities, where the ordinary stream of experience is constantly deflected by ultimate and absolute values and agitated by a never subsiding wind of the spirit.

(*A History of Russian Literature*, 284-285, italics in original).

[117] Liza Knapp, 'The Development of Style and Theme in Tolstoy', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 161-175, at 162.

[118] Mirsky 263.

James Joyce had taken the idea of the maximally unmediated realm of human thought and feeling:

> The Stream of Consciousness or Interior Monologue is a method of expression which was invented by Tolstoy, a Russian, long before James Joyce, character's mind in its natural flow, now running across personal emotions and recollections and now going underground and now as a concealed spring appearing from underground and reflecting various items of the outer world. It is a kind of record of a character's mind running on and on, switching from one image or idea to another without any comment or explanation on the part of the author.[119]

Nabokov's idealistic argument for a revolutionarily minimal authorial omniscience in Tolstoy's evocation of human experience is the classical abolition of all orthodox and, in this instance, of more objectively true, arguments for what is basically the supreme refinement of the technique of traditional, narrator-led, story-telling. The powerful novelty of Tolstoy's psychological analysis, as Gary Saul Morson has observed, consists in the disruption of steady streams of consciousness, where a continuous flow of thought is broken down into a series of fleeting moments of sudden pangs of new awareness:

> As Dostoevsky specializes in the unconscious, Tolstoy shows us the overlooked complexities of consciousness. Between two thoughts that apparently follow immediately one upon the other, Tolstoy sees several steps. He notices a series of almost instantaneous mistaken interpretations that we reject too fast to remember. He knows the tiniest moments of his characters' conscious processes better than the characters themselves ever could. He describes what takes place at the periphery of their attention, which, by definition, never comes into sufficient focus for conscious recollection.[120]

The most conspicuous way in which Tolstoy encodes a new awareness of a character's mental states is through the use of apparently insignificant, yet actually strategically deployed small (though loaded) words as revisionary afterthoughts. Tolstoy is especially skilful at inserting, seemingly carelessly, items of micro-vocabulary that reveal or sometimes even conceal characters' delayed inner thoughts of considerable significance. The function is quite clear: the recurrence in Tolstoy's novel of spontaneous speech acts that the characters are incapable of controlling – is central to the representation of the dual nature of emotion, which is discerned through the subsequent separation of actual feeling from the first interpretations of it. *Anna Karenina* abounds in such examples, one of which will illustrate the point.

---

[119] Nabokov 183.
[120] Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time*, 10.

In an early railway scene in which Stiva confides in Anna everybody's hopes for the marriage of Vronsky and Kitty, all she utters is a questioning "Yes?" (*AK* 63), after which she quickly changes the subject of conversation. At first glance, the word carries no special meaning, except for the polite acknowledgment of the pleasant news. The detail attracts little attention of the reader, who is already engrossed in Anna's 'tossing her head, as though she would physically shake off something superfluous oppressing her' (*AK* 63). The narrative task of working out the novel's plot – the linking of the death of the railway guard with the future fate of Anna – takes precedence over the discursive interpretation of the quiet "yes". Because there appears to be no expressive symbolism in the single word, the reader is in danger of ignoring its emotional significance. By the time Stiva mentions Kitty, Anna scores not once, but three times in successfully flinging Vronsky 'the ball of coquetry' (*AK* 61). And we observe the effect upon Vronsky as she 'deliberately . . . [shrouds] the light in her eyes, but it [shines] against her will in the faintly perceptible smile' (*AK* 59). In descriptions like these Tolstoy has done little more than represent a familiar feeling of intense mutual attraction, but it is through Anna's "yes?" that he communicates a quite precise impression of her psychological state. Contrary to its primary application, the question conveys neither curiosity (it is too quiet to express a genuine desire to know), nor acceptance (the question mark signals the requirement of an answer), but rather it contains an unacknowledged sense of sexual desire and readiness to act upon it. The moment Anna stamps Stiva's hopes with her "yes?", she no longer holds a conversation with her brother; she, albeit subconsciously, mentally prepares herself for a personal challenge of converting Vronsky's and Kitty's much anticipated marriage into just a wishful arrangement.

When Tolstoy invites the reader to notice the high salience and multiple connotations of the word "yes", he applies the principle of what the Formalisc critic, Victor Shklovsky, famously referred to as '[making] the familiar seem strange', or 'defamiliarization'.[121] The contrivance of such semantic disharmony in a simple context is Tolstoy's method of '[removing] the automatism of perception'.[122] Since the reader's habitual way of thinking usually involves 'calling complex things by their accepted name',[123] Tolstoy's narrator

[121] Victor Shklovsky, 'Art as Technique', in *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, trans. and introd. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, ed. Paul A. Olson (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965) 3-24, at 13.
[122] Shklovsky 22.
[123] Mirsky 263.

intervenes to lead the reader away from superficial narrative tracking towards the reflective apprehension of psychological life. This is a particularly discordant literary perspective of the world compared with that of other nineteenth-century realists who observed objective reality from the vantage point of disguised appearances. Tolstoy's practice is much more akin to the perspective of Modernists, who conceived of objective reality as almost always different to the perceived world. Tolstoy's 'dissecting and atomizing method'[124] of representing emotional states makes explicit the complex sequence of mental operations that underlie Anna's unravelled psychology. He uses such brief words as "yes" to signify a not-yet-acknowledged (by the character) consciousness of a rising sexual attraction felt by his eponymous character towards Vronsky, an emerging state of affairs of which the reader is forewarned by the subconscious priming triggered by this motivated use of highly salient micro vocabulary. His "defamiliarization" of the commonest of all verbal expressions, it turns out, offers 'not the spontaneous revelation of the subconscious [a literary forte unquestionably belonging to Dostoyevsky] but the conquest of the subconscious by lucid understanding'.[125]

Much could be said about this discursive situation, which like the whole of *Anna Karenina*, is saturated with moral implications – beyond its non-affective content. One could point to the correlation it draws out between quietness and evil (the danger of suppressed illicit excitement and the expectation of perverse pleasure are suggestively indicated by Anna's momentary lapse into a state of quiet self-indulgence); or else to the ironic contradiction it sets between the innocence of conduct and the sin of thought (the impropriety of Anna's behaviour resides not so much in committing an act of gross indecency, but in concealing the desire of its occurrence). In view of the focus of the present study, however, it seems more pertinent to stress the fact that Tolstoy's novel, for all its apparent narrative and discursive simplicity, means to continually challenge the reader with this multiple voicing within a single line of narration.

The foregoing consideration of the peculiar rise and development of the novel in England and Russia suggests that this literary mode did not express a monolithic social psychology, nor a submission to some kind of universal artistic enterprise, or even a degree of experimentation, but rather the written transcription of the specific cultural, social, economic

[124] Mirsky 263.
[125] Mirsky 265.

and political experience of both nations. Moreover, there is an intrinsic literary rationale evident in the directions taken by English and Russian nineteenth-century prose fictions: Realism was (and is) a frame for exploring and representing culturally-constructed imaginations, which, like human consciousness itself, operates as a subjective experience of the immediate social reality. Social reality meant, as the pre-history of the English and Russian novel indicates, a self-perpetuating energy mobilized toward progress, often anxiously anticipated, sometimes loathsome, but never controllable. In effect, social reality – the explosion of a modern industry, urbanization, the propagation of bourgeois values, restructuring of the family unit, spread of education, church reform and the emancipation of the serfs (the latter two referring to the Russian context only) – was an imposition of extrinsic and intrinsic forces to which English and Russian citizens as readers were called to respond. One of the most flexible and nuanced fora in which that response could occur was the novel, whose use of language in general, and metaphor in particular, could represent and engage the emotions to an extent, and with a degree of delicacy, that was unique and pushed to new limits by George Eliot and Leo Tolstoy.

3

EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH LITERARY FICTION: CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR

It has become a defining characteristic of the novel that its mimetic representation of an external world is strategically employed to invite in the reader emotional engagement. But the realist novel is not to be taken as a repository of explanations for characters' states of mind both embraced and repressed or avoided. Part of the appeal of this study's focal novels *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is their contribution as new variants of the psychological novel, an innovation that literary critics often understand as the encouragement of cognitive participation by a reader in their storylines, by 'attempting to follow the workings of the fictional minds contained in them'.[1] Eliot and Tolstoy evoke emotional connection by the reader with their characters by mimetically simulating, through a range of narrative strategies, including the use of conceptual metaphor, authentic emotional states.

It is proposed here that the fictional realities of both *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* impose specific metaphorical patterns that enable us to establish an emotional as well as an intellectual transaction between fiction and the real world. More precisely, the shared cultural models of emotions embedded in conceptual metaphors activate the reader's own embodied consciousness of emotional states, thereby orchestrating a potential for affective alignment and in turn an empathetic response towards fictional characters. This response is invited because the conceptual frameworks of emotions vividly realized in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* entail routine habits of perception, the inherent logic of which precludes the reader's 'explosions of irrationality',[2] instead prodding them toward selecting, from the range of possible emotional responses, the ones most appropriate to the fictional situation being communicated. Such frameworks are thereby as much signals of particular emotions, as organizing procedures for rendering them intelligible in a textual context.

---

[1] Alan Palmer, 'Storyworlds and Groups', in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) 176-192, at 177.
[2] Patrick Colm Hogan, 'On Being Moved: Cognition and Emotion in Literature and Film', in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) 237-256, at 241.

The distinct histories of the English and Russian novels have both enacted a broad implicit consensus in which the genre is considered to have distinguished itself from other literary forms principally by its mimetic qualities and the extent to which it promotes the reader's emotional engagement. Despite the strong emphasis of modernist critics on dis-allegiance from Realism, the mode has become too much of a pattern of the narrative process to interrupt a certain regularity in the emotional expectations that it has self-consciously foregrounded. Without referring to the term itself, Gregory Currie has identified the primary reasons for reading novels, motivations which he discernibly discloses as rigorously pro-mimetic and pro-affective:

> We read novels not merely to find out what is true in them, or to decide whether the author has done a decent job of plot construction, or to study the characteristics of a certain genre. We read them because we hope they will engage us, that we will be caught up in their plots, that we will be concerned – perhaps intensely concerned – for their characters, what they do and what is done to them.[3]

Don Kuiken and his colleagues, likewise, evaluate novels in terms of their potential to generate a feeling in the reader:

> The complex situations, motives and actions, described in literary fiction may nurture the reader's empathic abilities; the presentation of convincingly developed characters may provide models the reader can emulate; the portrayed consequences of character actions may implicitly convey the cultural norms that shape the reader's activities; and the comparison of various characters' demeanor vis-à-vis a common dilemma may enrich the reader's reflection on the ethical principles that guide moral conduct.[4]

Neither Currie nor Kuiken and his colleagues strive to add a new dimension to the reading of the realist novel, nor attempt to provide literary critics with an original interpretive theory that ignores the genre's governing system of assumptions. Rather, central to their interest in the mainstream effects of the novel – 'aesthetic qualities of narrative that open the way to personal involvement'[5] – is the idea of fictional prose as a particular branch of literature that recognizably prioritizes making believable the illusion of emotionally-charged situations. Whether we believe in, and are affected by, the rhetoric of 'psycho-narration'[6] depends, to a

---

[3] Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 182.
[4] Don Kuiken et al., 'Locating Self-Modifying Feelings within Literary Reading', *Discourse Processes* 38.2 (2004): 267-286, at 267.
[5] Suzanne Keen, 'A Theory of Narrative Empathy', *Narrative* 14.3 (2006): 207-236, at 216.
[6] Keen 219. '*Psycho-narration*, or the narrator's generalizations about the mental states or thoughts of a character' (Keen 219), has been recognized by narrative theorists such as Wayne Booth and Dorrit Cohn as a prominent feature of the novel that facilitates our emotional reaction to fictional characters.

large extent, on the precision with which fiction aligns a 'symmetry between characters' and readers' emotions'.[7] Currie's is, in fact, a commonly shared assumption that the novel has the capacity to '[contribute] to empathetic experiences, [open] readers' minds to others, [change] attitudes, and even [predispose] readers to altruism',[8] by virtue of its reliance on readers' irresistible 'tendency to imaginatively transpose [themselves] into fictional situations'.[9]

Just such an argument is found in Lisa Zunshine's *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel* (2006), a book that adapts key ideas from Theory of Mind to explore how emotions of fictional characters can be analyzed in terms of their observable physical behaviour, which then allows the reconstruction of their underlying 'thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires'.[10] In explaining a character's emotion based on its outward manifestation, Zunshine appears to have drawn in part on the current simulation theory of mind reading, according to which 'we understand others' thoughts by *pretending* to be in their "mental shoes", and by using our own mind/body as a model for the minds of others'.[11] A character's emotional state, in other words, can only be discerned when their observable bodily signals – body posture, facial expressions and mannerisms – are '[verified] in ourselves when we are in circumstances equivalent to those of the observed individual'.[12] One of the chief attractions of the novel, according to Zunshine, is being stimulated to pick up various textual clues in order to test one's ability to determine what goes on inside narrated minds. Indeed, readers' capacity for inferring the feelings and motivations of fictional characters provides an assurance that

---

[7] Amy Coplan, 'Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62.2 (2004): 141-152, at 148.
[8] Keen 213.
[9] Mark H. Davis, *Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach* (Madison, WI and Dubuque, IA: Brown and Benchmark, 1994) 57.
[10] Lisa Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006) 6.
[11] Vittorio Gallese et al., 'The Mirror Matching System: A Shared Manifold for Intersubjectivity', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 25 (2002): 35-36, at 36. For an idea that humans are biologically evolved to interpret the emotions of others, see Gallese's argument, as reported by Raymond W. Gibbs that

> there are dedicated brain structures, called "mirror neurons", that underpin a direct, automatic, nonpredictive, and noninferential simulation mechanism, by means of which the observer would be able to recognize, understand, and imitate the behavior of others. Research suggests that a mirror matching system could be at the basis of our capacity to perceive in a meaningful way, not only the actions, but also the sensations and emotions of others.

(Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., *Embodiment and Cognitive Science* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006] 36). For a more detailed treatment of this simulation theory, see Vittorio Gallese and Alvin Goldman, 'Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 2.12 (1998): 493-501.
[12] Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness* (London: Vintage, 2000) 83.

their mechanisms of rational inference 'must be functioning quite well',[13] in addition to the benefit of emotional engagement throughout reading. This is not to suggest that the emotionally evocative genre has a sort of in-built licence to secure an emotional response of a particular kind. Nor is it the case that the novel is constructed with a view to being read completely outside any presumed authorial intent. As Currie points out, 'fictions do sometimes express or suggest, and may be valued because they express or suggest, [emotions] of one kind or another'.[14] What is at issue is not the reader's restriction to feel a recommended emotion, but rather the recognition that the novel has a manipulative competence to prompt it.

Eliot and Tolstoy themselves repeatedly emphasize the centrality of 'a "fellow-feeling"'[15] to novel reading, making the generation of empathy in the reader forefront in the order of their artistic priorities. From Appendices to Sofia Tolstaya's *Diaries*, we learn that Tolstoy, whilst marshalling his ideas about *Anna Karenina*, confided in his wife that

> . . . he had had the idea of writing about a married woman of noble birth who ruined herself. He said his purpose was to make this woman pitiful, not guilty, and he told [her] that no sooner had he imagined this character clearly than the men and the other characters he had thought up all found their place in the story.[16]

Sofia Tolstaya advances some extremely valuable information about what Tolstoy intended to make readers feel toward the protagonist. He insisted that empathy be accorded a central role in the process of decoding the text's moral message, despite his own evident antipathy for the character manifested in micro telling counterpoints.

This idea gains currency, especially in consideration of this biographical information. According to factual information supplied by *Tula Provincial Herald* of 4 Jan 1872, a suicide took place of A. S. Pirogova (in her account of the event, Sofia Tolstaya uses the name Anna Stepanovna), the mistress and housekeeper of A. N. Bibikov, with whom Tolstoy was acquainted. Jealous of the attractive German governess to whom Bibikov had proposed, Anna Stepanovna threw herself under a train. In Sofia Tolstaya's recollection of the tragedy,

---

[13] Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction*, 18.
[14] Currie 52-53.
[15] Davis 3.
[16] Sofia Tolstaya, 'Various Notes for Future Reference, Yasnaya Polyana, 24 February 1870', in *The Diaries of Sofia Tolstaya*, trans. Cathy Porter, introd. R. F. Christian, eds. O. A. Golinenko et al. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) 845.

> Then there was a post mortem. Lev Nikolaevich attended, and saw her lying there at the Yasenki barracks, her skull smashed in and her naked body frightfully mutilated. It had the most terrible effect on him. Anna Stepanovna was a tall, plump woman with a typically Russian temperament and appearance. She had dark hair and grey eyes, and although she wasn't beautiful she was very pleasant-looking.[17]

This assumed genesis of *Anna Karenina* – the story of the temperamental female taking her life under the influence of strong emotion – allows us to treat Anna, the character, not as a disguised replica of a real person (although when judged by the close similarities in the condition of the psyche and physical appearance between Anna Pirogova and Anna Karenina, one may certainly get the impression of the former being an antecedent of the latter), but rather as Tolstoy's covert insistence on 'acts of signification that [he intends] readers to perform'.[18] Tolstoy may not explicitly declare empathy to be essential to reading his novel. But readers' habituated reliance on the logic of comparison and contrast causes them spontaneously to connect the suicide of Anna Pirogova with that of Anna Karenina and, in the process of making this connection, '*respond* to the character's situation emotionally'.[19] In this instance, feeling empathy for a literary persona – 'what we call "involvement" or "sympathy" or "identification"'[20] – is the kind of act of assimilating gesture that Wayne Booth has identified as potentially 'many reactions to author'.[21] The audience's deep affection for the fate of Anna Karenina is ultimately a reaction to Tolstoy's recorded pity[22] towards Anna Pirogova.

---

[17] Sofia Tolstaya, 'Why Anna Karenina was called "Anna", and What Suggested the Idea of Her Suicide', in Golinenko et al., 855.
[18] Peter J. Rabinowitz, *Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998) 77.
[19] Coplan 147.
[20] Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (1961; rev. ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983) 158.
[21] Booth 158.
[22] There has been a strong scholarly interest in the standard conceptualization of the emotion *zhalost'* in general, and Tolstoy's nuanced understanding and use of it in particular. One important source of the (traditional versus modern) connotations of this term is David S. Danahar's distinction between the semantics of the English emotion term *pity* and the Russian *zhalost'*. The difference between these emotion concepts calls for recognition of a conventional Russian association of *zhalost'* predominantly with a sympathetic attitude toward the person who experiences pain, essentially with an attempt 'to reach out and alleviate the object's suffering – by physical comfort, by touch'. English *pity*, on the other hand, at least in its negative connotation, is regarded as invoking feelings of *contempt*, *scorn*, *anger* and *annoyance*, and hence we suppose that 'the subject is more likely to feel disgust for the object and experience a desire to physically turn away'. These (and other) semantic discrepancies are responsible for the problems associated with readings of Tolstoy in translation. See David S. Danaher, 'The Semantics of *Pity* and *Zhalost'* in a Literary Context', *The Slavic and East European Language Resource Center* 3 (2002): 1-26, at 20.

Although Booth may be partly correct when he asserts that 'the emotions and judgments of the implied author are . . . the very stuff out of which great fiction is made',[23] there is no guarantee that individuals' emotions evoked during reading will coincide with authorial intentions. The discrepancy between the author's and readers' emotional perspectives is what Suzanne Keen terms "emphatic inaccuracy" – that which occurs when readers have affective experiences that are 'against authors' apparent or proclaimed representational goals'.[24] One example from *Middlemarch* should clarify how the reader's empathetic response may run counter to Eliot's calculated characterization.

Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg have considered *Middlemarch* to be the mimetic representation of character types, 'serving mainly to polarize the reader's emotions'.[25] Eliot's narrative empathy is repeatedly extended to Dorothea, whose disappointing marriage to the middle-aged Reverend and Classical scholar, Edward Casaubon, brings her to the painful realization of her unfulfilled desires. In their Continental honeymoon, the reader is introduced to Dorothea's recognition of the gradually surfacing difference between the reality of 'her wifely relation' and how 'it had been in her maiden dream'.[26] Having chosen Casaubon for his knowledge and assumed affection, an inexperienced bride comes 'to find herself a mere victim of feeling' (*M* 198). There is no explicit reference to the marriage bed, even as obliquely as occur in *Anna Karenina*. Anna's erotically off-putting characterizations of Karenin – his protruding ears, 'frigid figure', 'big, tired eyes'[27] and 'hands with their swollen veins' (*AK* 393) – obscure but do not efface the existence of sexual intimacy between the spouses, judging by her husband's entrance into their bedroom, at an early point in the novel, 'freshly washed and combed', 'with a meaning smile' (*AK* 105). The absence of passages of this kind in *Middlemarch* in the context of what is said indicates that Dorothea's marriage to Casaubon is erotically unsatisfying and perhaps even unconsummated. The seemingly casual reference to the thinness of the clergyman's legs, representing not 'much more than the shadow of a man' (*M* 68), is the strongest way of Eliot's implying, as the propriety of the era allows, Casaubon's

[23] Booth 86.
[24] Keen 223.
[25] Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 102.
[26] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 194.
[27] Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 97.

impotence.[28] Even when Dorothea strives, through her commitment to 'higher duties' (*M* 41), to hold at bay 'her confused thought and passion', she produces 'a self-accusing cry', thereby intensifying the overwhelming 'feeling of desolation' (*M* 192). Involved in the conflict of priorities – 'that devotedness which was so necessary a part of her mental life' (*M* 194) – Dorothea suppresses 'inward fits of anger of repulsion' (*M* 196), and unsuccessfully attempts to 'shake off what she inwardly called her selfishness, and [turn] a face all cheerful attention to her husband' (*M* 198).

In Dorothea's own 'candle-flame vision'[29] of her marriage, Casaubon is shown in all his personal inadequacies, inviting the reader to squirm with discomfort. The Reverend's role as an unsatisfactory husband is implied by imagery which associates him with decomposition, death and darkness: his mind, exhausted by fruitless research, 'had long shrunk to a sort of dried preparation, a lifeless embalmment of knowledge' (*M* 196), his soul 'went on fluttering in the swampy ground where it was hatched, thinking of its wings and never flying (*M* 279), he walked through the Roman library 'with his taper stuck before him, [forgetting] the absence of windows', and while perpetually 'lost among small closets and winding stairs' of the building, 'he had become indifferent to the sunlight' (*M* 197) – his whole presence was simply 'rayless' (*M* 209). In order to sustain the motif of enclosure and decay, there is a deliberate accentuation of the material details of Casaubon's house, as if his surroundings reflected his severity and spiritual limitations. As Dorothea inspects her future marital home, she observes that the manor-house is 'not ugly, but small-windowed and melancholy-looking' (*M* 73), with 'an air of autumnal decline' (*M* 74). Inside of her private room-to-be, 'the chairs and tables [are] thin-legged and easy to upset' (*M* 75) and there is no view outside, for it is obstructed by 'the avenue of limes [that] cast shadows' (M 76).

Recurring images of this type may be systematized, insofar as their emotive function is to pose a simple dichotomy between, on the one hand, the light, the passionate and the victimized; and on the other hand, the dark, the dispassionate and the evil, thereby invoking a

---

[28] For more on Casaubon's sexual impotence and Dorothea's thwarted passions – spiritual and physical – see Barbara Hardy, *Particularities: Readings in George Eliot* (London: Peter Owen, 1982), esp. Chapter 1, 'Implications and Incompleteness in *Middlemarch*' (15-36); T. R. Wright, *George Eliot's Middlemarch* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), esp. Chapter 2, 'The Construction of Character' (39-51); and also Abigail S. Rischin, 'Beside the Reclining Statue: Ekphrasis, Narrative, and Desire in *Middlemarch*', *PMLA* 111.5 (1996): 1121-1132, at 1129.

[29] David Parker, *Ethics, Theory and the Novel* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 85.

respective range of conventionalized emotional responses. The descriptive method of associating Dorothea with light and liveliness, and creating a negative ambience around Casaubon implies Eliot's certain degree of awareness of 'unspoken agreements to get [her] readers to apply the correct rules of signification to [her novel]'.[30] By means of evocative imagery, Eliot attracts anticipated feelings, through an appeal to habitual associations and ways of decoding imagistic signs. Here the author's expectation – and based on orthodox readings of *Middlemarch*, is a fulfilled one – is for the reader to take Casaubon's rotting environs as symbolic of his personality and hence to feel repulsed. In addition, the sustained representation of Dorothea as a female who is routinely victimized positions the reader to see her as worthy of pity and compassion. In other words, the reader's impulse to empathize with Dorothea and resent Casaubon suggests a certain emotional determinacy of the fictional representation which entails

> the joining of a particular social/interpretive community; that is, the acceptance of the author's invitation to read in a particular socially constructed way that is shared by the author and his or her expected readers.[31]

Notwithstanding this characterization and motivated invitation to meaning making, Eliot protested that her intentions were otherwise. As so often with moralist writers who work, above all else, to 'enlarge men's sympathies',[32] Eliot is typically prone to catch herself out in what could be an intended contradiction when she claims that her

> function is that of the *aesthetic*, not the doctrinal teacher – the rousing of the nobler emotions, which make mankind desire the social right, not the prescribing of special measures, concerning which the artistic mind, however strongly moved by social sympathy, is often not the best judge.[33]

Even when she tries to '[create] a balance of sympathies in characterization'[34] and to enhance the appeal of Casaubon, usually by shifting from a narratorial omniscience to the Reverend-bound focalization, 'these sympathetic addenda are far less effective than her imagery, which

---

[30] Rabinowitz 78.
[31] Rabinowitz 22.
[32] George Eliot, 'Letter to Charles Bray, Wandsworth, 5 July 1859', in *The George Eliot Letters 1859-1861*, vol. 3, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 110-111, at 111.
[33] Eliot, 'Letter to Mrs. Peter Alfred Taylor, 18 July 1878', in *The George Eliot Letters 1878-1880*, vol. 7, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 44.
[34] Edwina Jannie Blumberg, 'Tolstoy and the English Novel: A Note on *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*', *Slavic Review* 30.3 (1971): 561-569, at 566.

works against a favorable evaluation of him'.[35] The interpretive conventions of novel reading, it appears, moves the reader of *Middlemarch* to respond to the emotional pull of the narrative with respect to Dorothea and Casaubon, maintaining the binary oppositions that Eliot herself presupposes to be ideal.

Implicit in the symbolism of Casaubon's appearance is the assumption that references to Reverend's 'sallowness' (*M* 24), 'blinking eyes and white moles' (*M* 278) are sufficiently numerous and sustained 'to stand metaphorically for [his] inner quality'.[36] This consistency does not disallow contrary perceptions of Casaubon and the potential for a more sympathetic alignment with this character. The reader who does not necessarily interpret these characteristics as negative is likely to dismiss as too schematic the association of Casaubon with evil. Despite his physical shortcomings and personal failures in interior decorating, he 'had not actively assisted in creating any illusions about himself' (*M* 195). Beside his weak bodily frame and unsophisticated living arrangements, he has 'a sensitiveness to match Dorothea's' (*M* 200) and 'an intense consciousness within him' (*M* 278) that his wife,

> instead of observing his abundant pen scratches and amplitude of paper with the uncritical awe of an elegant-minded canary-bird, seemed to present herself as a spy watching everything with a malign power of inference (*M* 200).

Casaubon's depression, all the more poignant for the insufficient reasons for her self-recrimination, renders Dorothea, through a curious reversal, 'blind to his inward troubles' and overall too indifferent to '[learn] those hidden conflicts in her husband which claim our pity' (*M* 200). This sympathetic portrayal of Casaubon seems to be 'at cross-purposes with [Eliot's original] intentions'.[37] An emotionally resonant characterization in *Middlemarch*, no matter how explicit it is about a likely anticipated emotional response, cannot hinder the reader from experiencing feelings contrary to those suggested. By the same token, it is not a great step to assume that there is no requirement to take issue with or resist authorial propositions. What counts is the concurrence and/or the contradictions produced by, first, our discrimination and appreciation of the author's emotional responses, and second, by the degree to which we embrace feelings that arise spontaneously in the course of novel reading.

---

[35] Blumberg 566.
[36] Rabinowitz 86.
[37] Keen 222.

The preceding discussion concerns the explicit goal of realist fiction to engage readers emotionally without addressing the deeper problem of how it happens at all that we feel any emotions towards characters we know to be imaginary. Several theories have been advanced to explain this psychological oddity. Very roughly, one can discriminate amongst them a double focus. On the one hand, a realist narrative might be perceived as drawing the reader into an emotional connection with the fictional world by using the representational technique of depicting the imaginary as the reconstructed real. Pursuing this line of inquiry, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* do not represent real people with whom we instinctively empathize, but rather project human figures with characteristics and motivations that are themselves convincing enough to pass for real. Our response to fictional characters at the time of reading thus matches feelings we would potentially experience when confronted with real people. Scholars from disparate fields, such as for example narratology, (Alan Palmer), and cognitive psychology, (Andrew Ortony), unite in the view that fictional characters are not whole human beings but imaginative appropriations of human shapes and personalities, the artistic execution of which draws out emotional correspondences and connections between them, regardless of apparent ontological differences. Since both approaches insist on the centrality of mind reading as the mechanism for the construction of emotional experience, it is not surprising that they seek to address just how this mechanism functions in fictional texts:

> The writer describes a situation that readers recognize as being *important* to a character in the sense that it has important implications with respect to the goals, standards, or attitudes that the character is known or assumed to have. Then, the character is portrayed as correctly or incorrectly construing the situation as good or bad relative to these goals or standards or attitudes, and typically is described as having, or is assumed to have, a valenced (i.e., a positive or negative) *reaction* to the situation. Finally, the construal together with the reaction usually results in some sort of change in the character's judgment or *behavior*.[38]

This theory can be illustrated using fragments of the plot of *Middlemarch*. Based on Dorothea's strong determination to marry Casaubon despite the future implications that have been diplomatically laid out by her uncle, and the forceful objections of her sister, the reader assumes that the actual moment at which the decision is taken is crucial to Dorothea. She marries a man much older than herself 'out of sheer eagerness to learn from him'.[39] She

[38] Andrew Ortony et al., *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 3, italics in original.
[39] Alan Horsman, *The Victorian Novel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 317.

incorrectly construes Casaubon's scholarly achievements as significant, giving her 'whole soul' to a man who she thinks will open 'a fuller life before her . . . Now she would be able to devote herself to a large yet definite duties; now she would be allowed to live continually in the light of a mind that she could reverence' (*M* 44-45). The involuntary acquisition of greater objectivity and self-knowledge soon destroys Dorothea's illusions, leaving her on the brink of despair. Not only does she come to question the utility of her husband's life-long production of his magnum opus 'Key to all Mythologies' (*M* 417), but she is denied any active contribution to his 'intellectual labours' (*M* 417) as a result of his egotistic 'certainty that she judged him, and that her wifely devotedness was like a penitential expiation of unbelieving thoughts' (*M* 418). Casaubon's jealousy of Dorothea's 'opinion, the sway that might be given to her ardent mind in its judgments, and the future possibilities to which these might lead her' (*M* 419) gives rise to his sense of injury at the (unfounded) suspicion of his young cousin Will Ladislaw who he suspects of aiming 'to defy and annoy him, [by winning] Dorothea's confidence and [sowing] her mind with disrespect, and perhaps aversion, towards her husband (*M* 375). The outcome is 'a dramatic deterioration in judgment and a correspondingly drastic action'.[40] Casaubon writes a humiliating codicil which excludes Dorothea from access to his estate in the event that she should ever marry Will. Casaubon's malicious counter-move against an anticipated future event stems from his perceptive act of mind-reading. His suspicious interpretation of Will's intentions concerning Dorothea cannot, of course, be taken as an instance of the universal functioning of human consciousness (the conclusions deduced from our observations of the actions of others are not necessarily always reliable), but it 'is surely a "good enough" cognitive scenario, of the kind that we live with daily'.[41] Casaubon's arrival at his (well-founded) belief through consulting his purely subjective (and prejudicial) intuitions about Will's greater appeal alerts the reader to the habits of their own psychological reasoning. It is a persistent inclination of the mind to regard as mental facts the inferred contents of the minds of others. Eliot thereby shows a fictional representation of a perfectly rational human being, such as Casaubon, to redirect his own behaviour based on his perceptions, comparative self-assessment, mindreading, and emotionally motivated reactions.

[40] Ortony et al. 3.
[41] Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction*, 60.

The process of establishing a 'sense of character as person'[42] – practically a given of 'intelligent beings who produce a variety of mental representations such as beliefs, wishes, projections, intents, obligations, dreams, and fantasies'[43] – appears to be an essential aim of George Eliot. It takes the form of presenting an affective scenario whose nuanced details are assumed – on the grounds of our experience of the world and personal reading histories – to induce these mental representations. This strategy points to the fact that the novelists 'use an implicit theory that individual emotions can be specified in terms of personal or interpersonal situational descriptions that are sufficient to produce them'.[44] Although Eliot does not develop a strictly deterministic psychological system, at least she strongly emphasizes the role of an obvious cause-and-effect dynamics in human nature. Evidently, it is not chance that stimulates behaviour and gives rise to the feelings of Dorothea and Casaubon, but their subjective assessments of their external realities. Eliot does not need constantly to label her characters' emotions, because by offering plausible explanations for all their actions and feelings, and credibly showing these actions and feelings developing progressively in stages – by providing 'the *eliciting conditions* for a particular emotion'[45] – she equips the reader with sufficient tools to cognitively deduce and perhaps even to create these emotions. It seems accurate, then, to conclude that the evocative capacity of the genre – to the effect of "a world that we might 'imagine ourselves into'"[46]and "a 'reliable evaluation' of events in life, of how things (inwardly) are"[47] – is in reality reliant upon the discursive categories intended to blur the insistent polarity between fiction and real life. The rapport that the novel builds between readers and fictional characters is clearly one of emotional proximity and similarity rather than of distance and difference. An impression of affective genuineness, then, is one aspect of the observation that 'if literature is a microcosm of the real world, it has to be recognizable as such'.[48]

On this account, novelists can present the reader with convincing details of their characters' mental functioning, thus '[conveying] to [them] the sense that at the center of this

[42] Christopher Nash, *World Postmodern Fiction: A Guide* (London and New York: Longman, 1993) 14.
[43] Alan Palmer, *Fictional Minds* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 188.
[44] Ortony et al. 3.
[45] Ortony et al. 3.
[46] Nash 7.
[47] Nash 4.
[48] Ortony et al. 3.

universe there resides an actual or real world, a realm of factual states or events'.[49] On the other hand, Colin Radford's and Michael Weston's pioneering essay 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?' 1 (1975), has given rise to an opposing proposition that Gregory Currie would later effectively capture in a single term 'the *quasi-emotions*'[50] – understood as those sense impressions that resemble the emotions we feel towards fictional characters despite an awareness of their non-existence. Radford and Weston maintain that 'our being moved in certain ways by works of art . . . involves us in inconsistency and so incoherence'.[51] Our emphatic reaction to Anna Karenina's suicide presupposes logical instability because, although affected by it, we do not for a moment believe her death to be true reportage. We pity Anna, as other tragic characters, but "only to the extent that . . . we are 'caught up' in the [narrative world], and see [them] as persons, real persons, though to see them as real persons is not to believe that they are real persons".[52]

To add theoretical weight to Radford's and Weston's otherwise abstract argument, again rather unsubstantiated in Radford's 'Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy' (1995),[53] Amy Coplan has recently consolidated and re-examined empirical research on emotion engagement in literary fiction, customarily but confusingly referred to as "empathy" or "identification". Coplan, significantly and usefully, ultimately offers a theoretical adjustment in the form of a proposal of a "self-other differentiation".[54] Most important is her distinction between "empathy" and "sympathy", which Radford and Weston probably had in their minds when formulating their views about the reader's capacity to experience different emotions in response to fiction. For Coplan, "sympathy" is that which 'involves caring about another individual – feeling *for* another'.[55] It is the non-'get "inside" the other'[56] affiliation with someone who suffers pain or distress. Genuine sympathy towards other people 'means having concern for another's well-being',[57] not sharing or *understanding* their emotions. "Sympathy" is thus separated from "empathy", the latter which Coplan defines as the affective state that

---

[49] Palmer, *Fictional Minds*, 188.
[50] Currie 183-184.
[51] Colin Radford and Michael Weston, 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 49 (1975): 67-93, at 78.
[52] Radford and Weston 78.
[53] Colin Radford, 'Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53.1 (1995): 71-75.
[54] Coplan 144.
[55] Coplan 145.
[56] Davis 5.
[57] Coplan 145.

results when we 'take up [another's] psychological perspective and imaginatively experience, to some degree or other, what he or she experiences'.[58] Moreover, Coplan contends that empathizing with the fictional character involves enacting that character's emotional perspective, simultaneously preserving a separate version of one's own experience. So, the reader may share with Karenin his misery at being a betrayed husband, through the self-reflective understanding of such a position, while simultaneously having a sense of satisfaction at his wretchedness. As this example shows, the complex and even conflicting emotions evoked during reading capture at once the character's psychological state and also aspects of the personal feelings of the reader, even if they are contradictory.

This study draws primarily on the former approach to the emotions of characters in fiction – of affective proximity and similarity between representation and reading – but focuses more closely on the impact of emotional language, of conceptual metaphor in particular, in order to explore how that proximity is effected. The conceptual metaphors of shame, pride and anger in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* reflect the shared conceptual structures of these emotions held by the authors and their readers in both host cultures. Eliot's and Tolstoy's metaphors are predictable and cognitively relatively unchallenging because they originate from embodied and cultural experience to which the reader is already subconsciously attuned.

The Effective Use of Everyday Metaphors in Narrative Discourse

As discussed in Chapter 1 above, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown that that all language, not just literary, is inherently metaphoric. They argue that the language of fiction is a *priori* dependent on the speakers' inherent, always-already constituted conceptual system which organizes, systematizes and structures our experience.[59] Within their framework, language – both everyday and that characteristic of creative imagination – uses metaphor universally, in that, pre-organized overarchingly metaphorical structures of thought give rise to individual conceptual metaphors. These linguistic articulations originating from shared cultural models of perception can be categorized and clustered. For instance, the

[58] Coplan 143.
[59] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) 3.

metaphorical concept EXCITEMENT IS HEAT has evolved into a linguistic convention in English-speaking cultures with subordinated individual instantiations:

EXCITEMENT IS HEAT[60]

She was *flushed* with excitement.

He was *aflame* with passion.

She was all *aglow*.

He was all *fired up*.

The atmosphere in the room became *overheated*.

He was told to *cool* it.

Idiomatic expressions like these hardly seem to be conceived at random. Our notions of excitement are rooted in culturally-specific conventions in conjunction with recognizable embodied experience. In the physical realm, a natural sign of excitement is bodily heat. So, it becomes conceptually logical to express excitement via combustible terms: flush, flame, glow, and fire. These preliminary examples of conceptual metaphors of excitement obviously require further theoretical detail, which is provided below. Nevertheless, for the moment, it is worth recognizing that, collectively, there is ample evidence that the structure of language is a consequence of the way a culture is accustomed to cognitively processes environmental and bodily information.

It would not be an exaggeration to state that Lakoff's and Johnson's theory has marked the beginning of a revolution in the definition and understanding of metaphor. The study of this trope has moved from the mainly linguistic approach that held that metaphor provided embellishment and obscurity in poetic language, to a theory of metaphor as a conceptual device, pervasive in everyday language and arising from deep-seated cognitive structures. Since at least the time of Aristotle, metaphor has typically been associated with 'a *deviant* figure, a non-standard usage that achieves its effects precisely by subverting the normal economy of sense, or refusing the established (literal) relation between signifier and

[60] In general, italicized words are classified as metaphorical linguistic expressions that help identify conceptual metaphors and metonymies, which are conventionally indicated by the use of small capitals.

signified'.[61] Lakoff and Johnson have reversed this perspective, by considering metaphor to be a means of bringing about and synthesizing our fairly well-adapted

> internal 'representation of knowledge about the world', i.e. 'conceptual knowledge' (whereby the notion of the 'world' includes not only the physical world – 'external reality' – but also the social and the psychological world).[62]

Lakoff's and Johnson's new conception of metaphor has given rise to a substantial body of literature in its own right, not only in cognitive linguistics, but also in cultural and social psychology and anthropology. The esteemed cognitive linguist, Zoltán Kövecses, affirms the significance of Lakoff's and Johnson's pioneering model in declaring that

> with the publication of *Metaphors We Live By* . . . they made the claim that metaphors are conceptual in nature, that is, that they reside in the conceptual system, and not just in language (i.e., in linguistic meaning). To be sure, they were not the first to claim this. (Anthropologists have always thought of metaphor as a powerful conceptual device, rather than just a linguistic ornament). They were the first to claim it in a systematic, generalizable, and experimentally testable way.[63]

Gerard J. Steen, who belongs to the same philosophical camp, emphasizes the theory's pervasive and durable influence. Steen acknowledges that

> the theory of conceptual metaphor has been firmly established as one important component of a general theory of metaphor, providing one of the main inspirations to cognitive linguistics as a general approach to language.[64]

This recognition is partly perhaps due to the most fundamental premise of Lakoff and Johnson on the nature of conceptual metaphors, specifically the impossibility of separating metaphorical patterns from common embodied and cultural experience. In their own formulation, 'the kind of conceptual system we have is a product of the kind of beings we are and the way we react with our physical and cultural environments'.[65] Each community of speakers builds its own conceptual models based on the conventional evaluations of their

---

[61] Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (London: Fontana Press, 1987) 82, italics in original.
[62] Eric Pederson and Jan Nuyts, 'Overview: On the Relationship between Language and Conceptualization', in *Language and Conceptualization*, eds. Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 1-12, at 1.
[63] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 9.
[64] Gerard J. Steen, 'From Linguistic to Conceptual Metaphor in Five Steps', in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*, Amsterdam, July 1997, eds. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1997) 57-77, at 57.
[65] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 119.

existential reality operative in their own culture. The meaning of metaphors should make sense strictly according to the deeply-entrenched (usually unconscious) structures of thought whose ultimate source is the familiar world.

To return to one of this study's focal novels, it can be claimed that Tolstoy's metaphors in *Anna Karenina* embody common perceptions held within its nineteenth-century Russian community, which impose a certain 'conceptual perspective on life'[66] and construct experience in an organized way. In Part I, Chapter 31, for example, when describing his close acquaintance, Countess Lidia Ivanovna, Karenin uses the metaphorical expression 'Наш милый самовар'[67] ('Our dear samovar') to capture, as the narrator further explains, the woman's typical behavioural style – 'она всегда и обо всем волновалась и горячилась' ([*АК* 143] 'she was always getting excited and heated up about everything'). Certainly, Tolstoy's metaphor takes it for granted that the readers of his novel understand the Russian word "samovar" (a large metal container used especially in Russia for making tea), and are thus equipped to call to mind exactly the cluster of attributes of the samovar that are being recruited to characterize – by analogy – Countess Ivanovna. The chief point about the literal use of the word "samovar" is that it makes most salient an image of boiling water when heated, relegating other qualities of the container to the periphery of attention. This image comes to mind by virtue of a direct experience – mentally stored associations from actual familiarity with the container invoked – which readers themselves fall back upon whilst working out the metaphor appropriating a motivated set of associations triggered by the use of the term "samovar" in the context.

It is here that Antonio Damasio's two main observations about the nature of language in connection with its processing in the mind take on a suggestive force. First, 'most of the words we use in our inner speech, before speaking or writing a sentence, exist as auditory or visual images in our consciousness';[68] otherwise it would not be possible to process certain expressions that call for a particular (prototypical) meaning of a word. And second, antecedently existing mental images duly commit speakers of a community to the adoption of

---

[66] Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 5.
[67] Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) 143.
[68] Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994) 106.

a system of implications about the word that are commonly accepted. So, the image of the samovar, stored in memory supplies the key feature of this vessel that is extrapolated across to the characterization, delimited by conceptual clues, of Countess Ivanovna. Rather straightforwardly, the reader interprets the metaphor by selecting those categories of specificity that best suit the context in which the metaphor was used. On this occasion, it would be quite irrelevant to associate Countess Ivanovna, a woman 'всем до нее не касавшимся интересовавшаяся ([*АК* 144] 'who was interested in everything that did not concern her' (*AK* 101), with the possible connotations of the word "samovar" other than the most salient one here, associated with extreme heat and the risk of burning. Implied in Karenin's slightly patronizing tone when he metaphorically describes Countess Ivanovna is the norm of a certain degree of coolness and self-restraint in public – which allows the reader to register his cynical metaphor as condemning a failure to meet this culturally-prescribed demand.

As we have seen, Tolstoy's metaphor operates by means of association (as it activates our '*imaginative rationality*'[69] to make the comparison of two otherwise disparate concepts in terms of salient common qualities) with the intention of expressing a character's emotional temperament, as well as communicating those social meanings that are related to displays of intense excitement. But we still have to resolve the issue of what drives the consensus about which clusters of qualities are more appropriate than others in a particular context. The constructivist approach to metaphor as espoused by Lakoff and Johnson is grounded in the belief that perceptual access to the world and acts of communication about it are open only by means of cognitive models of thought and language. A development of this theory of metaphor has been subsequently formulated, namely the refined cognitive linguistic view that values metaphor as a linguistic and cognitive phenomenon, but also simultaneously as a neural and bodily entity. The idea, that the physiology of our bodies has a verifiable relation to a structure of our thought and expression, thereby explaining and even providing motivation for the metaphor, was again well theorized and later revised by Lakoff and Johnson (1980,

[69] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 193.

1999),[70] Lakoff (1987)[71] and Zoltán Kövecses (1995, 2005).[72] Part of Kövecses' study is the outlining of the relationship between metaphors and physical aspects of the human body and sensory experience. He investigates the biology of human bodies (such as increase in blood pressure and muscular pressure) to establish a certain coherence with the way we construct metaphors. Just as our human bodies all operate principally by means of the same physiological mechanisms, so the metaphors based on embodied sensation are, by extension, potentially universal. However, to extend the widely accepted claim that the human body always and necessarily functions in accordance with its surrounding environment, Kövecses introduces a contingency that

> embodiment can have several *distinct components* [such as differential '*social-cultural experiences*'[73]], and there can be *multiple aspects* of embodiment. These differential components and aspects can lead to *alternative (and often congruent) metaphors*.[74]

What is potentially radical here is the idea that there are other criteria for metaphorical conceptualization than those that assume a direct correlation between embodied experience and language. Kövecses' strictures on the qualities of a conceptual metaphor aim not to undermine all fixed orders of human physiology which have been commonly regarded as sources of similarity among people, but rather to accommodate social-cultural adjustments, that are always required in order to produce and comprehend the metaphor.

To appreciate the full effect (and most probably, motivation) of Tolstoy's samovar metaphor it will be useful to consider the folk theory of the physiological evidence of excitement. Typically, when we feel excited, our body responds in the form of an automatic and involuntary increase in bodily heat. This internal physiological reaction is usually

---

[70] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
[71] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).
[72] Zoltán Kövecses, 'Anger: Its Language, Conceptualization, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence', in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, eds. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995) 181-196; and Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[73] Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 286, italics in original.
[74] Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 293, italics in original.

accompanied by external signs, most notably, tremor, flushing, pallor and perspiration.[75] As a result of our common biological functioning, we can expect that, as the emotion grows in intensity, so its physiological display becomes more apparent. The excitement/heat cannot be decoupled; they correlate on the grounds of 'a unique pattern of physiological activity (of the sympathetic nervous system) associated with each specific emotion'.[76] Perceived physical changes related to excitement can be supposed to have provided the main motivation for the conceptual metaphor: EXCITEMENT IS HEAT and the conceptual metonymy: PHYSICAL HEAT STANDS FOR EXCITEMENT.[77] The recognition of the common quality among excited bodies (raised temperature) is precisely what grants the EXCITEMENT IS HEAT metaphor an *embodied* currency of meaning. Given both the visual image of the samovar as hot and bubbly and the popular use of this boiling apparatus in Russia, Tolstoy's metaphorical expression, 'Наш милый самовар' ('Our dear samovar') used to describe an habitually over-excitable Countess Ivanovna, seems to be an example of a cultural '[instantiation] of a single underlying "master metaphor"':[78] EXCITEMENT IS HEAT. It is undeniable that language in *Anna Karenina* sometimes incorporates metaphor for the purpose of creative decoration, foregrounding its figurative and poetic aspects. However, it also – and more prominently – seeks confirmation of its own profundity in literalizing the metaphor, showcasing it as a trope tending toward a predictable, even automatic aspect of thought which gives rise to innovative expressions, to facilitate conceptual understanding.

To the extent that the object of this study is not to summarize or elaborate the existing paradigms of conceptual metaphor, but to relate the theory to an analysis of metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, the grouping of the next three chapters, separately treating shame, pride and anger, deploys key ideas from conceptual metaphor

---

[75] On the physiological signals of excitement, see Michael J. Apter's observation that, when excited,

> one will typically experience a number of bodily symptoms which represent the way in which the body is becoming activated. Thus one may detect a pounding of the heart, and deepened breathing (even gasping); one's mouth may become dry; there may be a sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach; one may start to perspire; and so on.

These are bodily reactions of 'the *automatic nervous system*' that are not obvious to us

> except when we become aroused, and which are generally not under our conscious control (e.g., the rate at which the heart beats, and the amount of saliva being released into the mouth).

(*The Dangerous Edge: The Psychology of Excitement* [New York: The Free Press, 1992] 12-13, italics in original).

[76] Ortony et al. 12.

[77] The theoretical distinction between metaphor and metonymy will be made in Chapter 4.

[78] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 61.

theory in order to interpret texts in a literary-linguistic manner. A large corpus of conceptual metaphors within the novels is regarded to be not so much the product of Eliot's and Tolstoy's intuitive genius, but more so as the subconscious engagement of the authors with given frameworks of the social, cultural and embodied experience.

The principal argument of this study, that the figurative language of emotions in the focal novels is motivated largely by norms arising from both nature and culture, does not necessitate a diminution of authorial creativity. The basic structure of thought that underpins the metaphors used by Eliot and Tolstoy originates from sensory input from the world, but also – in equal measure – from culturally-inscribed beliefs about the nature of that world, beliefs shared by the authors and their readers. The stocks of lived experience, called upon in both contexts, including the ability of fictional narrative discourses to reliably communicate and trigger emotions, are conventionalized in their respective languages. In other words, it is suggested here that there exists a universal language of emotion across English and Russian cultures (and no doubt others too) whose meaning depends upon 'basic conceptual metaphors [which] are part of the common conceptual apparatus shared by members of a culture',[79] and beyond that, to members of the same species with similarly evolved biological and psychological structures.

To explore how that affective and linguistic consistency plays out, the following chapters will trace the ways in which Eliot and Tolstoy create and deploy metaphors of the specific emotions of shame, pride, and anger, by relying on shared cultural models of these emotions and recognizable, though surprisingly, cross-culturally similar conceptualizations of them, even when apparently highly context-specific affective states (such as shame and pride in particular) are at issue. Beyond the representation of such states, there are further considerations, such as the generic – in the case of the Realist novel – and the interpretive – in the case of the specific invitation to meaning making that the novel extends. In seeking to shed light on this complex of ideas using both linguistic and literary analytical methods, this study will make a contribution to our understanding of the role of metaphors of emotions in the practice of creating literary Realism.

[79] George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) 51.

4

SHAME IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PROSE FICTION: BIOLOGY, CULTURE AND METAPHOR

There are at least two cogent reasons – thematic and linguistic – for opening the discussion of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* with shame. First, there is broad critical consensus that shame is thematically significant: it is an emotion particularly emphasized and reflected upon in the nineteenth-century realist novel. This preoccupation with shame mirrors the culturally-enshrined importance of that emotion, in terms of its causes and consequences. The novel was a particularly flexible and expressive vehicle for representing and exploring matters such as how social standards of the time determined members of that society to feel about the failure to maintain a proper public image, thus violating the socially-accepted norms of conduct. This focus on the need for constraint in order to avoid experiencing shame has yielded a theory of moral literature as explicitly gendered, a phenomenon that has been subjected to a great deal of critical scrutiny. What a well-established feminist reading of the politics of sexual oppression in the novels of the milieu reveals is that the gendering of shame was as much a method of encouraging the sexual surveillance of women, as it was a way of socializing them to enact certain versions of sexuality and to dispel others.[1]

[1] The coupling of gender and genre has long been a standard critical practice, leading to an immense wealth of related literature. Important studies include: Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000); Nina Auerbach, 'The Rise of the Fallen Woman', *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 35.1 (1980): 29-52; Nina Auerbach, *Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Nancy Armstrong, 'The Rise of Feminine Authority in the Novel', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 15.2 (1982): 127-145; Nina Auerbach, *Romantic Imprisonment: Women and Other Glorified Outcasts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Nancy Armstrong, *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Kimberley Reynolds and Nicola Humble, *Victorian Heroines: Representations of Femininity in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Art* (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993); Deborah Anna Logan, *Fallenness in Victorian Women's Writing: Marry, Stitch, Die, or Do Worse* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998); and Alison A. Case, *Plotting Women: Gender and Narration in the Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century British Novel* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999). For more recent publications on radical shifts in the nineteenth-century sexual politics, expressed both bluntly and subtly, see, respectively, Edwina Cruise, 'Women, Sexuality, and the Family in Tolstoy', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 191-205; and Katherine Dunagan Osborne, 'Inherited Emotions: George Eliot and the Politics of Heirlooms', *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 64.4 (2010): 465-493.

The second reason may be said to have evolved along with the progress of linguistic history of the concept of shame. The English word *shame*, and the equivalent Russian word *styd* 'are cultural artefacts of the English [and Russian] language'[2] with their own distinct '"ethnopsychology"',[3] thereby inviting a careful examination of the cultural aspect of these terms and the values they embody and codify. For cultural linguists like Anna Wierzbicka and her colleagues, each language involves its speakers in the subconscious recollection of what culturally-specific words are programmed to mean in their folk minds. Given that, essentially, 'every word is a cultural invention',[4] capable of annexing 'a particular linguistic and cultural slant',[5] the only reliable reconstruction of the conceptual content of lexical items from the point of view of a native speaker is by means of the 'maximally self-explanatory and at the same time maximally culture-independent'[6] universal concepts, 'present as words in all languages, such as DO and HAPPEN, WANT , SAY and FEEL, SOMEONE and SOMETHING, and 60 or so others'.[7] Wierzbicka's approach is valuable, since it provides rigorously analytical and critical demonstrations that, as cultural products, English emotion terms such as *shame* and its closest Russian equivalent *styd* offer proof of a non-universal way of understanding and interpreting emotional reality across cultures, as well as indicating the difficulties involved in a word-by-word translation.

One of the most inspiring developments in the interdisciplinary field of language and emotion, and a possible solution to the problem of untranslatability is a linguistic theory with its finely-tuned methodology, known as NSM (Natural Semantic Metalanguage), used for contrastive analyses of emotion concepts that aim at explaining them to non-native speakers without 'cultural admixtures'[8] inherent in different languages. Technically, NSM applies to the 'breaking down [of the] complex language-specific meanings and ideas into extended explanatory paraphrases (explications) which are readily cross-translatable into any

---

[2] Anna Wierzbicka and Jean Harkins, 'Introduction', in *Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective*, eds. Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001) 1-34, at 12.
[3] Wierzbicka and Harkins 9.
[4] Merlin Donald, *A Mind so Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness* (New York and London: Norton, 2001) 291.
[5] Anna Wierzbicka, 'Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research', *Emotion Review* 1.1 (2009): 3-14, at 7.
[6] Wierzbicka and Harkins 9.
[7] Anna Wierzbicka, 'The "History of Emotions" and the Future of Emotion Research', *Emotion Review* 2.3 (2010): 269-273, at 270.
[8] Wierzbicka, 'Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research', 6.

language'.[9] These descriptions appear to us in a somewhat unmediated way, since they consist of a narrow range of conceptual universals – '*tertium comparationis*'[10] – absolutely neutral (i.e., culture-independent) mini-words that are present in all languages. Within the framework of NSM, the definition of *shame* in English has been constructed as follows:

> (X is) *ashamed*
> X thinks something like this:
> people can know something bad about me
> because of this, people can think something bad about me
> I don't want this
> because of this, I would want to do something
> I don't know what I can do
> because of this, X feels something bad.[11]

This explication conflates the following expressions: "*I* did that horrible thing";[12] "Someone thinks I am bad. Everyone is looking at me";[13] "I cannot be seen like this"; "One option is to withdraw – escaping the shame-inducing situation and hiding the horrible self from the view of others";[14] "I feel small, I am in a state of hopelessness". These shame-related attitudes, representative of how English people typically understand this emotion, are only marginally, if at all, different from the phenomenological experience of shame by Russian people, and can therefore serve as the basis for similarity in Eliot's and Tolstoy's fictional episodes of shame, despite the difference of 'culturally-situated meanings of culturally salient words used in the '"emotion talk" in different cultures'.[15]

A proliferation of empirical evidence for the culturally-specific nature of emotion words, however extensive and rigorous, does not coincide with the exhaustive treatment of the metaphorical representation of emotions across different cultures, creating an all the more pressing demand for further study of how metaphorical language is related to the way members of a culture apprehend their physical and psychological realities. There are countless

---

[9] Wierzbicka, 'The "History of Emotions" and the Future of Emotion Research', 270.
[10] Wierzbicka and Harkins 9.
[11] Anna Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 133.
[12] June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt* (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2002) 25.
[13] Karen Caplovitz Barrett, 'A Functionalist Approach to Shame and Guilt', in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995) 25-63, at 43.
[14] Tangney and Dearing 92.
[15] Wierzbicka and Harkins 25.

human emotions whose complexity and intensity cannot be captured in a single word, regardless of its expressive potency. This is not to suggest that, as soon as we recognize an emotion term to be too limited in its semantic capacity hence insufficiently powerful to express our actual mental state, it suddenly becomes impossible for us to linguistically reconstitute and articulate that state.

The realist novel, in particular, takes into account the value and suitability of metaphorical language to evoke emotional experiences that are inaccessible or understated via means of the standard emotion lexicon of a language. Two pertinent examples from *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* should make this frequently-voiced argument clear.[16] First, when Dorothea dejectedly reconciles herself to a role of a meek wife of a second-rate scholar, she finds herself involuntarily beginning to take pity on Casaubon: 'she felt something like the thankfulness that might well up in us if we had narrowly escaped hurting a lamed creature'.[17] As a second example, Karenin, when be becomes acutely aware of his spiritual disconnection from his wife as her love-affair progresses, he despairs about a future marriage of loneliness: 'Теперь он испытывал чувство, подобное тому, какое испытал бы человек, возвратившийся домой и находящий дом свой запертым'[18] ('He now experienced a feeling such as a man would feel, returning home and finding his house locked up'). Eliot's and Tolstoy's metaphors in these instances can be thought to act as substitutes for the English word *relief* and for the Russian phrase '*gluboko nesčastlivyj*' ([*AK* 250] – variously translated as 'profoundly miserable' [*AK* 188], 'deeply unhappy' [RP&LV 202] and 'profoundly unhappy' [L&AM 199]) – when they appear too crude as descriptions of what readers are invited to imagine Dorothea and Karenin presumably feel at the time.

Whilst the NSM framework allows the dissection of culturally-specific emotion concepts linguistically, it is engaged in a strictly deterministic rather than a philosophical enquiry of the human emotional experience. It describes, via unarguable linguistic terms

---

[16] For example, see David Punter, *Metaphor* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), esp. p. 13:

> Where a concept, an idea, an emotion may be hard to grasp in language, then a metaphor, an offering of perceived resemblances, may enable us the better to 'come to grips with' the issue in hand.

Compare with Zoltán Kövecses's position that we use metaphors

> when the focus of understanding is on some intangible entity, such as time, our inner life, mental processes, emotions, abstract qualities, moral values, and social and political institutions.

(*Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005] 2).

[17] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 427.

[18] Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) 187.

(‘conceptual primes’[19]) – rather rigidly and fixedly – idealized affective states recognizable to community members, thereby categorically retreating from the possibility that such a severely uncompromised method of analysis might prove insufficient in tracing ways of feeling outside the boundaries of social homogeneity: no emotion is felt in exactly the same way by all representatives of a culture. The premise of the ‘common human experience (reflected in languages)’[20] implies a reference to the collective psychology of the immediate group, leaving largely out of sight variation, potential or actual, in the individual conceptualization of emotions. Singular emotionally-weighty words – such as *shame*, *pride* and *anger* and their single-word near-equivalents (at least according to the fourth edition of *The Oxford Russian Dictionary* [ORD[4]]) *styd*, *gordost'* and *gnev* – presuppose a culturally-nuanced, yet definitive range of assigned (core and extended) meanings. Metaphors, in contrast, as transcendental cognitive elaborations, have the potential to generate an infinite number of unassigned meanings, so long as the speaker’s semantic innovations do not extend too far beyond the shared conventional conceptual systems. Because Eliot’s figurative expression used in relation to Dorothea’s state of mind is framed on the model of metaphors as ‘perceptions of relations in the world’,[21] it can be plausibly interpreted in connection with a culturally-cultivated and socially-promoted sensibility that requires a compassionate attitude towards animals, the absence of which should, in principle, invoke shame and even self-loathing. This example shows that standard procedures of sense-making are employed in decoding Eliot’s metaphor; there are evident social awareness and tacit knowledge of certain behavioural norms essential to its understanding.

A cross-linguistic and cross-cultural study of metaphors of emotions in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* warrants research into the English and Russian emotional lexicons (two distinct sets of pre-existing emotion words that English and Russian speakers have at their disposal [the linguistic context]) in conjunction with the consideration of the people who use these vocabularies (the cultural context), as it is assumed in this study that the fundamental meanings of emotion words are conditioned to a large extent by the social function they are culturally-designated to fulfil. In the English context, the word *shame* as the Victorians

[19] Wierzbicka, ‘Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research’, 8.
[20] Wierzbicka, ‘Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research’, 10.
[21] Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) 191.

understood it – (1) 'the passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost; the passion expressed sometimes by blushes', (2) 'disgrace, ignominy', (3) 'reproach'[22] – found itself in operation in periods well before the nineteenth century, specific meanings of which, were codified and naturalized, prior to Spenser (1), by writers such as Shakespeare (2) and Ecctus (3). The second edition of *The Oxford Dictionary Online* (OED^{2}Online) first glosses this noun as 'the painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one's own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or disgrace one regards as one's own), or of being in a situation which offends one's sense of modesty or decency'.[23] Then, the modern semantic range extends to include a second and third connotation of the word *shame*, respectively, 'fear of offence against propriety or decency, operating as a restraint on behaviour; modesty, shamefastness',[24] and also 'disgrace, ignominy, loss of esteem or reputation'[25] – each separately legitimatized by examples found in earlier writings up until the nineteenth-century.

Obviously, *shame* has always had a moral undertone and has long been theorized as brought on by behaviours, actions and thoughts unfavourably received in one's own social environment. The nineteenth-century realist novel has typically been credited with a commitment to send 'its message of self-restraint',[26] modesty and observance of the male-centered power structures, without ever suggesting the possibility of approbation of a new unashamed culture. *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* both register the adverse consequences of the 'love of extremes' in Dorothea (*M* 9), a young woman who 'cannot imagine [herself] living without some opinions' (*M* 40); and conversely, of Anna's frivolous 'emancipation' ([*AK* 543] Tolstoy uses the word *osvobožděnie*, lit. liberation). The point, however, is not that shame counted for little in the large pool of emotions to be fostered in earlier generations of readers, but that readers of novels three quarters of the way through the nineteenth century, under the influence of the discourses of shame operating around them, were accustomed to think of this emotion as central to remedying fractures in social and moral life.

---

[22] Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language in which the Words Are Deduced from their Originals, Explained in their Different Meanings, and Authorized by the Names of the Writers in whose Works They Are Found* (London: Longman etc., 1824) s. *shame*.
[23] OED^{2}Online, s. *shame* n. 1a.
[24] OED^{2}Online, s. *shame* n. 2.
[25] OED^{2}Online, s. *shame* n. 3a.
[26] Barbara M. Benedict, *Framing Feeling: Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction 1745-1800* (New York: AMS Press, 1994) 17.

Capable of performing various didactic and propagandistic functions, 'domestic fiction mapped out a new domain of discourse as it invested common forms of social behaviour with the emotional values of women'.[27] Although such textual intervention frequently took the form of directing public and family life by challenging traditional frames of social relations, it nevertheless drew the reading audience predominantly into traditional patterns of behaviour associated more closely with the culture of the middle-class that was created as a result the larger cultural preoccupation with social progress. In a sense, family novels – conservative in spirit, and expressive of the anxiety about the insidious spread of the new ideas that were beginning to throw into doubt the received system of male dominance – exercised a form of discursive ideology by linguistically exerting their regulatory influence on behaviour. As far as possible, a thematic focus on interpersonal relationships, an emotionally-charged storyline and a moralistic tone were strategically employed by writers to achieve what could be construed as a literary recuperation of the Aristotelian belief that 'by encouraging people to act in socially appropriate ways, the emotions of social control help to build the habits that constitute a virtuous character'.[28] Less conspicuously, the novels featured metaphoric language (and other means) that served to provide women with guidelines and expectations, compelling them thereby to assess their conduct against formidable narrative frames of decorum and propriety, if need be by shaming them back into decency and duty.

It is now widely recognized that the discourse of shame in the nineteenth-century novel was constructed to fortify a patriarchal system, 'organised via very strictly demarcated gender roles'.[29] Women were stimulated to act conservatively (or radically) by means of powerful renditions of social stratification, confining them in 'the private domestic sphere that was woman's proper realm'.[30] This clear-cut classification was often simultaneously proselytized and attacked by such politically-involved novelists as Eliot. Traditional patriarchal families are the pillars of social order in *Middlemarch*, but behind the façade of domestic stability there are

---

[27] Armstrong, *Desire and Domestic Fiction*, 29.
[28] W. Gerrod Parrott and Rom Harré on Aristotle's conception of emotions: 'Introduction: Some Complexities in the Study of Emotions', in *The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions*, eds. Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 1-20, at 3.
[29] Josephine M. Guy, *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: The Market, the Individual and Communal Life* (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1996) 134.
[30] Anonymous foreword to Natalia Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', trans. Lesli LaRocco, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) 217-219, at 219.

hidden emotional dissonances and frustrations, silenced disappointments and physical ruin. The privileges attendant on the role of husband grants Casaubon licence to enforce Dorothea into wifely submission, which she accepts merely to keep the peace. Conversely, the responsibility of the husband as provider commands Lydgate to sacrifice his medical ambitions and make do with a mediocre career as a general practitioner, after being married to a woman who he cynically describes, via the botanical metaphor, as 'his basil plant', meaning, 'a plant which had flourished wonderfully on a murdered man's brains' (*M* 835).

Nineteenth-century theories of shame held women directly responsible for the culture's moral integrity or decline. Thus the theoretical framework – within which were embedded injunctions against female shameless behaviour, as a radically efficient strategy in governing public and private affairs – was customarily presented as one where women acted in accordance with, or in contradiction to, the functions their culture had specified for them. The promotion of an exclusively domestic fate was, according to Kimberley Reynolds and Nicola Humble,

> emblematic of the mental processes of the Victorian feminine ideal, the virtuous wife-mother, centre of hearth and home, repository of the conscience of the bourgeois industrialist state, devoted to the domestic crafts, entirely without sexual impulses.[31]

In an age where the falling outside 'the pattern of normal femininity'[32] was expected to occur, but not at all condoned, patriarchal marriage, motherhood and maternal instincts comprised the core criteria against which a woman's worth was measured. In the moral regime of *Middlemarch*, 'women were expected to have weak opinions' (*M* 9). Dorothea, with her moderate fondness for children and a habit of 'never [calling] everything by the same name that all the people about [her] did' (*M* 537), is generally less favourably esteemed in her social set than her 'amiable' sister Celia (*M* 9), who perfects the female stereotype by enacting her wifely subservience except in the domain of child rearing. The tendency of thinking of ideal women in terms of desexualized "Madonnas" or "angels of renunciation"[33] was a common one, perhaps most strongly expressed in the stern injunction of the Victorian moralist, William Cobbett (1830):

---

[31] Reynolds and Humble 11.
[32] Nancy L. Paxton, *George Eliot and Herbert Spencer: Feminism, Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction of Gender* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991) 76.
[33] See Gilbert and Gubar, *The Madwoman in the Attic*, esp. Chapter 14, 'George Eliot as the Angel of Destruction' (478-535).

> Chastity, perfect modesty, in a word, deed, and even thought, is so essential, that without it, no female is fit to be a wife. It is not enough that a young woman abstain from everything approaching indecorum in her behaviour towards men . . . she ought to appear not to understand it, and to receive from it no more impression than if she were a post.[34]

Cobbett not only recapitulates a standard definition of gender, according to which women are expected to demonstrate strong 'individual resilience'[35] in the face of their (theoretically denied but apparently existing) sexuality, but also adopts a commanding tone as a shaming strategy to reinforce obedience among those women whose behaviour is at odds with prevailing ideological formulations.

The perpetuation of gendered shame was not, of course, exclusive to the cultural practices of Victorian England. The shaming culture of nineteenth-century Russia generated intensified levels of moral vigilance, interpreted as a fear of disgrace, against actions and desires to break away from the conventional constraints. Autobiographies of Natalia Grot and Praskovia Tatlina – gentry and middle-class born women whose personal memoirs derive from their individual lives and history-determined views on a woman's customary sphere and responsibilities – are good statements of compliant reactions among Russian women to impositions of gendered limits and boundaries. In her criticism of progressive education being extended to women, Natalia Grot, herself a graduate of the Smolny Institute,[36] and a proponent of traditional moral values, advised that:

> We need educated women far less than intelligent mothers, housewives, and workers in various fields who will enlighten and purify all the dark and dirty corners of life in our

---

[34] William Cobbett, *Advice to Young Men and (Incidentally) Young Women* (1830), cited in Reynolds and Humble, 11.

[35] Valerie Sanders, 'Marriage and the Antifeminist Woman Novelist', in *Victorian Women Writers and the Woman Question*, ed. Nicola Diane Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 24-41, at 24.

[36] The Smolny Institute, a selective Russian school for girls of noble birth, was founded by Catherine the Great as a consequence of the need 'not only to prepare capable wives and mothers but also to provide the students with an education of high quality and to instill in them a taste for reading and intellectual work' (Barbara Alpern Engel, *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983] 23). Under the guardianship of Empress Maria Feodorovna, inherited immediately after the death of Catherine the Great, the educational aims of Smolny were restricted to '[training] girls [solely] for domesticity' (Engel, *Mothers and Daughters*, 24). In line with the established curriculum, she counselled the graduates of Smolny

> as daughters, to be obedient and respectful; as wives, to be faithful, virtuous, tender, modest, diligent and useful, and to promote the honor of the person with whom [they] have linked [their] fate . . . to be conscientious about the order, comfort and well-being of [their] household, and as mothers to try to combine warmth towards [their] children with sensible concern about their future well-being

(Empress Maria Feodorovna (1804), quoted in Engel, *Mothers and Daughters*, 24).

> society with their own example and good works . . . God Himself and nature have summoned woman, not to the narrow calling of abstract knowledge, but rather to the more exalted, more aesthetic calling of the heart and feeling . . . In a word, there are corners of domestic life and society where nothing can replace a woman's gentle hand – doing good works, comforting, reassuring, raising children, restraining the younger generation – where a woman can apply her labor and her activity without rivaling men and giving precisely that which men cannot give. But for that women need true religious feeling, not merely the show of it; they need the firm morals that are lacking in our society. The most important task of women's education is not to instill knowledge, but rather to arouse the will toward good, toward industrious activity devoid of any sort of display, insincerity, and vanity; it must arouse a will toward purity of thought and life.[37]

In contrast to Natalia Grot, who insisted that mothers adapt the education of their sons and daughters to their respective roles, Praskovia Tatlina believed throughout her entire life in the great value of 'an enlightened education',[38] considering it to be women's only avenue for freedom. Unlike most women of the era, she was sufficiently courageous to declare in writing her doubt about marriage as a source of happiness. However, despite her direct repudiation of the suppression or deterrence of women from intellectual pursuits, she nevertheless, remained most fundamentalist in her commitment to marriage, which is supportive of the recognition and enforcement of the traditional behavioural norms:

> I have always been convinced that a married woman interested in romantic adventures is a complete fool, a woman incapable of exercising her mind or finding a serious purpose in life.[39]

Underlying these and other such statements was a model of femininity which instructed women to think of themselves as significant only in terms of possessing a moral faculty. This counsel of a restricted utility was a warning that shame of any pleasure-seeking or intellectual extravagance was likely to spread. This potential contamination meant that the whole family could fall into disgrace for not addressing a woman's fanciful imaginings in the first instance before they could be enacted and therefore become the source of the more serious and far-reaching shame for the whole group. In the outside world, moral transgression (one's own as well as committed by members of a family) warranted public disapproval, scorn, ridicule and even ostracism.

---

[37] Natalia Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', trans. Lesli LaRocco, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) 220-241, at 240-241.
[38] Prascovia Tatlina, 'Reminiscences', trans. Judith Vowles, in Clyman and Vowles, 243-280, at 255.
[39] Tatlina 254.

It appears that it is in the fear of such hostile social reactions that Alexey Alexandrovitch demands that Anna is discreet about her love affair, vowing even to tolerate it 'до тех пор, пока свет не знает этого, пока имя [его] не опозорено' ([*AK* 384] 'so long as his social circle knows nothing of it, so long as [his] name is not disgraced'). Karenin uses the derivative form of the word *pozor* (connoting a mental state stronger than shame) presumably in reference to a social stigma he knows he would have to bear as a consequence of the improper conduct of his wife. *Pozor* is a distinctly Russian word, the modern meaning of which 'refers back to the custom of marching the accused to the town square and roping them to the pillory as punishment for a misdemeanour or crime'.[40] This 'public spectacle' attracted the attention of a considerable number of '*pozoriteli*', an obsolete word of old Russia which later became '*zriteli*' (onlookers, spectators).[41] A morality grounded in *pozor* is therefore related directly to avoiding public disgrace and protecting all transgressions from external scrutiny. Karenin's manifest leniency towards his unfaithful wife stems less from his transient 'velikodušie' ([*AK* 510] 'magnanimity' or, literally, 'a great soul'), and more from his fear to lose his fine reputation.

When discussed against culturally-enshrined gender frames, both English and Russian nineteenth-century cultures share the tendency to base their interpretations of shame upon the domestic agendas of sexual politics. It is not that women did not have moral standards of their own; the point was rather that, in the context of rapidly intensifying notions of female oppression, the valorization of exemplary moral rectitude was utilized to limit and prevent any future initiatives by women to change existing social structures. Inasmuch as the function of shame within the English and Russian communities points to one considerable ideological overlap (the subjugation of women), the register of lexical variants of shame in the Russian language demonstrates just how salient this concept is for the members of that culture. In *Ključevye Idei Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira*, Anna A. Zaliznjak makes the important distinction between two Russian emotion words with connotations similar to those of the English word shame: *stydno* and *sovestno* (both of which usually translate into English as *to be ashamed*). She defines the former as belonging to the more general category which she calls 'чувство стыда, относящееся к числу фундаментальных и универсальных

[40] A. K. Birih et al., *Russkaja Frazeologija: Istoriko-Ètimologičeskij Slovar'* (Moskva: Astrel', 2005) s. *pozor*.
[41] Birih et al. s. *pozor*.

человеческих эмоций'[42] ('the feeling of shame, one that refers to a number of fundamental and universal human emotions'), and the latter as an emotion term which 'заключает в себе специфически русский концепт и переводится на европейские языки лишь в той мере, в которой оно синонимично *стыдно* – ср. предлагаемые словарями переводы для *совестно*: англ. *to be ashamed*, нем. *sich schämen*, фр. *avoir honte*'[43] ('invokes a specific Russian concept which translates into European languages only to the extent to which it is synonymous with *stydno* – compare the propositions of dictionary translations for *sovestno*: Eng. *to be ashamed*, Ger. *sich schämen*, Fr. *avoir honte*'). The semantic proximity of *stydno* to *sovestno* results from the fact that most blameworthy actions may result in the individual experiencing either the feeling of *stydno* or *sovestno*. However, whilst one may feel *stydno* without even committing an actual transgression, as a result, for example, of one's awareness of another's wrongdoing, *sovestno* involves a self-reflective disapproval of one's own moral conduct. And so, a woman who has a deceitful husband may feel *stydno*, but not *sovestno*. But a husband who deceives his wife may feel either *sovestno* or *stydno* (because marital infidelity is considered to be an inappropriate moral behaviour). The point here is that the Russian emotion word *stydno*, like the English phrase *to be ashamed*, may or may not have moral connotations; *sovestno*, in contrast, approximates itself to its English counterpart only insofar as it 'предполагает апелляцию к морали'[44] ('presupposes an appeal to moral principles').

The emphasis on the moral component, however, has not always been part of the semantic range of *sovestno*. Zaliznjak, in fact, turns to the writings of Tolstoy, Chekhov and Aksakov, in order to demonstrate the previous connotations of the word *sovestno*, which did not include its present-day association with 'a breach of a fundamental standard of conduct':[45]

---

[42] Anna A. Zaliznjak, 'O Semantike Ščepetilʹnosti (*Obidno*, *Sovestno* i *Neudobno* na Fone Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira)', in *Ključevye Idei Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira* (*Key Ideas of the Russian Linguistic Picture of the World*), eds. Anna A. Zaliznjak et al. (Moskva: Jazyki Slavjanskoj Kulʹtury, 2005) 378-397, at 393.
[43] Zaliznjak 393.
[44] Zaliznjak 394.
[45] This definition of shame comes from Rowland S. Miller's consideration of Arnold Buss's earlier description of this emotion. See *Embarrassment: Poise and Peril in Everyday Life* (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1996) 21.

(15) При нем мне было бы *совестно* плакать (Л. Толстой);
([lit.]. In his presence I would be ashamed to cry [L. Tolstoj]).
(16) Егорушке было *совестно* раздеваться при старухе (Чехов);
([lit.] Egoruška was ashamed to undress in the old woman's presence [Čehov]).
(17) Через несколько минут вошел Толстой и сказал, что Соллогуб стоит в лакейской и что ему *совестно* войти (С. Аксаков).
([lit.] In a few minutes entered Tolstoy and said that Sollogub is waiting in the servant's quarters and he is ashamed to enter [S. Aksakov]).[46]

These examples allow us to appreciate the shift in the folk understanding of the concept of *sovestno* over time. In the nineteenth century and throughout a large portion of the twentieth, it was possible to use this word in so-called "blame-free", and "non-self-evaluative" contexts, when referring simply to emotional states of discomfort typical for embarrassment. But to present-day speakers of Russian, this emotion word resonates strongly with the notion of self-judgement – 'строгий внутренний судья'[47] ('severe inner judge'). The use of *sovestno* in statements (15) and (16) illustrates the sense of inappropriateness of certain behaviours in particular situations. Example (17) highlights the awareness of a restrictive code of social conduct and potentially unpleasant consequences if ignored. There is no violation of moral law implied in either of these scenarios, in which case the parameters of present-day Russian call for a different emotional vocabulary: in place of "*совестно* плакать", "*совестно* раздеваться" and "ему *совестно* войти" enter '*стыдно плакать*, *неудобно* (*неловко*) *раздеваться* и *ему неудобно* (или *он стесняется) войти*'[48] (roughly, "to be ashamed to cry", "to feel embarrassed [awkward] to undress", and "he feels embarrassed [or he is too shy] to enter").

Metaphors of Shame in Middlemarch and Anna Karenina

There is a considerable convergence between scholarly disciplines that emotions are bodily processes of motivational response to circumstantial stimuli, that their experience and display are subject to cultural influence, and that most emotion concepts are thought of and expressed metaphorically.[49] More relevant to the current discussion, however, is a common view shared by cognitive linguists that all (normal) people have minds that are obliged to

---

[46] Zaliznjak 395.
[47] Apresjan, cited in Zaliznjak, 393.
[48] Zaliznjak 395.
[49] See Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. p. 6:

> Conceptual metaphors arise when we try to understand difficult, complex, abstract, or less delineated concepts, such as love, in terms of familiar ideas, such as different kinds of nutrients.

operate through an involuntary process of categorization and association,[50] that their conceptual thinking – present as folk models, conceptual frameworks or mental schemas – is unlikely to generate categories in ways that fundamentally conflict with biological facts and cultural experience (shared cultural values),[51] and finally that thinking figuratively is central to explaining the activities of mind and the logic of our emotional experience.[52] This chapter makes explicit the shared diagrams of shame in the English and Russian minds through a consideration of how biological hardwiring in conjunction with cultural factors energize and at the same time constrain the conceptualization of this emotion in these cultures. It will be demonstrated that the figurative language of shame in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, by virtue of having arisen similarly from social experience and also, to a large extent, from the universal nature of our physical bodies, is organized in essentially the same way, thereby accounting for the common interpretation of these cross-lingual literary texts.

In order to explore the similarities in the norms and values which give meaning to shame in English and Russian cultures, a brief stocktake of the causes of shame as shown in the novels should be considered. The kinds of situations which the narrators report to bring shame upon the characters are varied, yet involve the cognitions that are sufficiently compatible to allow their division into the following categories:

(1) Breach of established social/moral values: Bulstrode hides the truth before his wife and the Middlemarch community about his former shady, possibly criminal, activities; Anna Karenina commits adultery and abandons her husband and son.

---

[50] See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), esp. p. 19:

> Living systems must categorize. Since we are neural beings, our categories are formed through our embodiment. What that means is that the categories we form are *part of our experience!* They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience. It is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in.

[51] The idea that our conceptual systems arise simultaneously on the basis of our biology and in response to social context has been articulated in many different ways by various scholars, including Andrew Goatly, *Washing the Brain – Metaphor and Hidden Ideology* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2007), esp. Chapter 6, 'Are Metaphorical Themes Universal?' (217-279); and Zoltán Kövecses, 'Anger: Its Language, Conceptualization, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence', in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, eds. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995) 181-196. See also Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*.

[52] See Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

(2) Social position/class: Rosamond suffers the sting of being the daughter of a just town manufacturer; Dolly is ashamed of her impoverished condition in the glamorous house of the Vronskys.

(3) Disappointment concerning one's own achievements: The awareness of having a second-rate mind fills Casaubon with dread; Lydgate dies considering himself 'a failure' (*M* 835) for not accomplishing what he had intended; Vronsky is ashamed of losing the horse race through his own error.

(4) Being related to someone whose conduct is assumed to be shameful: Rosamond is forced to jointly bear her husband's disgrace of bankruptcy; Karenin is ashamed of his wife when her infidelity becomes public knowledge.

(5) (Public/private) humiliation: Casaubon's codicil offends Dorothea's dignity as it casts aspersions on her virtue. Kitty is struck by a pang of shame when Vronsky publicly flirts with Anna at a momentous ball; Vronsky is inwardly ashamed of his own small moral stature when he judges his deceit against the magnanimity of Karenin.

As these taxonomies indicate, shame is a morally significant emotion, as it involves each character in thinking that they, one way or another, 'must have violated a standard one takes to be *important*, as moral standards are'.[53] For Rosamond, bankruptcy seems, oddly enough, disagreeable; Dolly's poverty weighs heavily upon her both because it is socially embarrassing, and also because she blames herself for choosing an irresponsible husband. But the characters' shame represents more than a failure to meet their own personal moral standards or expectations; it reflects, no less prominently, a lack of what they themselves are socially-calibrated to value. To clarify, if English and Russian cultures did not recognize, say, loyalty, truthfulness, pursuit of knowledge and self-integrity, it would tend to follow that Anna, Bulstrode, Casaubon, Lydgate, Kitty and Vronsky have no true cause for shame. Simply put, whether their behaviour and actions are deemed shameful depends on whether they are currently held to belong to the wrong set of values. Of course, this inventory of circumstances is not restricted to evoking shame only; it may be argued, and quite easily supported by textual evidence, that Rosamond's awareness of social inferiority causes her also to be jealous of the higher breeding of Dorothea. For the purpose of the present argument, however, it is more

[53] Andrew Ortony et al., *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 142, italics in original.

useful to accept that in these instances shame is the emotion the narrators are particularly aiming to convey, both metonymically and metaphorically.

According to Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, to whom we are primarily indebted for modern distinctions between metaphor and metonymy, the prevalence of metonymical patterns over metaphorical 'underlines and actually predetermines the so-called "realistic trend"'.[54] In narrating their novels, rather than testing the reader's capacity to understand 'one thing in terms of another'[55] (A *is* B), grounded in our discrimination of a fundamental similarity (metaphorical process), Eliot and Tolstoy invite us to establish 'contiguous relationships'[56] between things – anticipatory connections that can be reasonably inferred from our passive observations of the external world (metonymical process). In other words, throughout *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, Eliot and Tolstoy 'conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to something else'[57] (A *stands for* B[58]), thereby 'metonymically [digressing] from the plot to the atmosphere and from the characters to the setting in space and time'.[59] In order to illustrate the internal coherence and the non-arbitrary structure of metonymies of shame in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, our first task is to identify the physiological reactions that are customarily assumed to accompany this emotion. According to Darwin's theory, today substantiated and refined by analyses carried out under laboratory conditions, the characteristic bodily responses of shame are low heart rate and facial blushing.[60] By following a methodological procedure like that first proposed by Lakoff and Johnson in *Metaphors We Live By*, it can be demonstrated that Eliot's and Tolstoy's highly conventional conceptual metonymies of shame – which evidence pervasive physical signs of this emotion – are characterized by an extremely low creativity, precisely because they fundamentally feature our shared knowledge of these recognized bodily signals. *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* can therefore both be tracked to show how imaginatively-generated shame

[54] Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language* ('S-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1956) 78.
[55] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) 36.
[56] Jakobson and Halle 78.
[57] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 39.
[58] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987) 288.
[59] Jakobson and Halle 78.
[60] Barrett, in Tangney and Fischer, 43.

scenarios are driven through the constant reference to the basic metonymic paradigm 'THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION':[61]

BLUSHING STANDS FOR SHAME

> When she first learns about her husband's discrediting codicil to his will, 'the blood *rushed* to Dorothea's *face and neck* painfully' (*M* 490). Left alone, she considers if Will would 'hear of the fact which made her *cheeks burn* as they never used to do' (*M* 496). When Will realizes that Mr Brooke tries diplomatically to take the *Pioneer* of his hands, the narrator registers 'the quick *colour coming in his face*' (*M* 508). Mary Garth similarly is reported to have 'started up and *blushed*' (*M* 514) when Mr Farebrother approached her not to cross out Fred Vincy from a list of possible suitors.[62]

The narrator in Tolstoy's novel seems to adhere to the same metonymic principle:

> Anna Karenina *flushes* when caught out by her husband with regard to Vronsky's unauthorized visit to their marital home: 'Я хотела, я только… – *вспыхнув*, сказала она' ([*АК* 434] 'I meant, I only … – she said, *flushing*'). The gossip about Anna's infidelity had spread as far as the office of Petersburg lawyer, whose inability to repress his malicious smirk causes Karenin's face to grow *red in patches*. The lawyer, who instructs Karenin on the laws of divorce, 'продолжал, изредка взглядывая только мельком на *покрасневшее пятнами лицо* Алексея Александровича' ([*АК* 439] 'acontinued, only occasionally glancing at Alexander Alexandrovitch's *face*, which *had grown red in patches*').[63]

When investigating the conceptual basis of linguistic structure of emotion concepts, 'we speak of conceptual metonymy when an emotion is represented by its physiological

---

[61] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986) 40.

[62] As is conventional, all emphases are used to indicate single instantiations of metonymies and metaphors of shame.

[63] A single conceptual metonymy has the force of invoking a diversely suggestive set of connotations that facilitate characterization. In *Middlemarch*, Eliot deploys the conceptual metonymy BLUSHING STANDS FOR SHAME specifically to intensify Dorothea's terrible sinking feeling of a betrayed wife and also to point to her fiery temperament; Will's observable blushing, in this instance, suggests a strong distaste for dishonesty. In *Anna Karenina*, the same conceptual metonymy is used to represent, in Anna's case, a yearning to escape from a loveless and inconvenient marriage and, perhaps more obviously, a shame of infidelity, whereas Karenin's red patches are linked to the image of a deceived, yet pitiful, husband.

effects or by behavioural reactions it generates'.[64] What these examples have in common is that the metonymical conceptualization of shame in both novels is characterized by being conceived of as due to 'our most common everyday embodied experience of functioning in the world'.[65] When Eliot's and Tolstoy's narrators refer to Dorothea's cheeks as *burning* or to Karenin's face as mottled *red*, it is apparently because of the deeply entrenched ways in which English and Russian people think about shame.[66] The reciprocally acknowledged physiological effects of shame facilitate the formation of shared strategies of categorization, inevitably influencing the narrators to produce a system of analogies in direct relation to the folk presuppositions regarding this emotion. Cross-cultural conceptual parallelism invites a simplifying generalization: shared biology underpins the generation of conceptual metonymies in *Middlemach* and *Anna Karenina* and invokes the universal rather than culturally-specific aspect of their novelistic discourses. In keeping with this understanding, shame-related metonymic arrangements in the novels can be seen as part of universal emotion vocabulary that is 'profoundly influenced by certain universal properties of the human body'.[67] This emphatic reference to the bodily internal workings can be used to establish a new context for discussing realist texts as instantiations of biologically-based conceptual thinking.

Metonymies for shame in the novels are not exclusively motivated by the physiology of the human body; they are too partially based on our universal awareness of certain behavioural signals of shame. There is a considerable consensus amongst emotion theorists that shame involves an impulse coordinated by a central nervous system to keep head low and

---

[64] Ulrike Oster, 'Using Corpus Methodology for Semantic and Pragmatic Analyses: What can Corpora Tell Us about the Linguistic Expression of Emotions?', *Cognitive Linguistics* 21.4 (2010): 727-763, at 741.
[65] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 151.
[66] Conventional shame metonymies can easily be found in both English and Russian poetry of earlier periods. For example, in the orchard scene, Juliet tells Romeo of her delightful embarrassment at his courtship: 'Thou knowest the mask of night is on my face; / Else would a maiden *blush bepaint my cheek*'. See William Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, II. 2. 85-86. In Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* (1833), Tatiana, anxious and ashamed, awaits Onegin's reply to her love letter:

> The day flowed by, there came no letter / Nor anything the following day. / Since morning dressed, pale as a spectre, / Tatiana waits for a reply. / Olga's adorer drove up. 'Tell us, / Where's your companion?' came the zealous / Inquiry from the châtelaine. / 'He has forgotten us, that's plain.' / Tatiana trembled, *flushed*, uneasy [originally, 'Татьяна, *вспыхнув*, задрожала'] / 'He promised that today he'd come.' / Lensky replied to the old dame: / 'No doubt the post has kept him busy.' / Tatiana *cast a downward look*, [originally, 'Татьяна *потупила взор*'] / As though she'd heard a harsh rebuke.

(Alexander Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin* 1833, trans. and introd. Stanley Mitchell [London: Penguin, 2008] III, stanza 36). A reliable scholarly Russian edition of *Onegin* and other Pushkin's works is Aleksandr Puškin, *Stihotvorenija, Poèmy, Evgenij Onegin, Dramatičeskie Proizvedenija. Proza* (Moskva: Èksmo, 2011).
[67] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 146.

legs and arms pulled up very close to the body.[68] Another important behavioural characteristic of shame is related to people's readiness 'to escape or to hide – to sink into the floor and disappear'.[69] In reference to this escapist response, James Macdonald provides an origin of the word shame, arguing that it 'is in fact thought to derive from an Indo-European word meaning *hide*, and the idea that shame motivates hiding and concealment is a central defining component of shame for most theorists'.[70] Indeed, a similar assumption underlies the majority of theoretical models of shame. For example, Karen Caplovitz Barrett surveys a range of behavioural responses to shame, and concludes that 'the shameful person avoids looking at others, hides the face, slumps the body, lowers the head, and/or withdraws from contact with others', all of which 'communicate deference and submission to others, and indicate that the person feels "small", "low", or unworthy, in comparison to those others'.[71] Because shame usually involves a sense of moral failures or discreditable deficiencies, it typically makes individuals 'feel dissolute and deeply flawed'.[72] People's negative self-evaluation in turn leads, in most cases, to depression[73] and also to anger 'at both themselves and others'[74] (Anna Karenina is a classic example of an individual who is distinguished by the inner experience of shame, coupled with a deep (although denied) concern for what others are thinking of her). Given the common perception of the relation of shame to specific behavioural tendencies, it is only expected to find instances in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* of conceptual metonymies that make manifest that perceptual knowledge.

In particular, Eliot's and Tolstoy's conceptual metonymies used to fictionally represent shame call attention to the assumed correspondence 'THE BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION'[75] accorded by the standard rule of metonymy, as articulated by Kövecses. In both novels, the behavioural impulse of shame-stricken characters to hold their heads low constitutes a basis for the conceptual metonymy DOWN STANDS FOR SHAME. In order to make this intuition explicit, it is necessary to review the scattered, though

---

[68] Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition*, 130.
[69] Tangney and Dearing 18.
[70] James Macdonald, 'Disclosing Shame', in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, eds. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 141-157, at142.
[71] Barrett, in Tangney and Fischer, 41.
[72] Miller 26.
[73] Michael Lewis, *Shame: The Exposed Self* (New York: The Free Press, 1992) 2.
[74] June Tangney's research findings as reported by Miller 23.
[75] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 41.

fairly representative, instantiations of this singular conceptual paradigm. Again, we start with *Middlemarch*:

HEAD HELD LOW/MAKING ONESELF SMALL

> When Fred Vincy irresponsibly loses the money borrowed from Mr Garth whose daughter he hopes to one day marry, he is convinced that 'he must now inevitably *sink* in her opinion' (*M* 243). Lydgate, bankrupt and suspected (wrongly) of taking a bribe from Bulstrode, initially rejects Dorothea's financial support, saying that he 'must not at least *sink* into the degradation of being pensioned for work that [he] never achieved' (*M* 768). Ladislaw, whose great pride matches that of Lydgate's, plans to leave Middlemarch on the grounds that his prospective marriage to a wealthy widow would earn him the label of 'a fellow with *low* designs' (*M* 604). Bulstrode, shamed by the Middlemarch community, is pitied by his wife who is narrated sympathetically to observe that he 'sat with his *eyes bent down*, and as she went towards him she thought he *looked smaller* – he seemed so *withered* and *shrunken*' (*M* 750).

Anna Karenina offers a set of parallel behaviour-based metonymies for shame:

> Upon the consummation of her illicit love affair, Anna betrays her feelings of shame through bodily movement prompted by Vronsky's voice: 'Но чем громче он говорил, тем *ниже* она *опускала свою* когда-то гордую, веселую, теперь же постыдную *голову*, и она вся сгибалась и падала с дивана, на котором сидела, на пол, к *его ногам*; она упала бы на ковер, если б он не держал ее' ([*АК* 190] 'But the louder he spoke, the *lower* she *drooped* her once proud, gay, now *shame-stricken head*, and she *writhed* and *slipped* from the sofa on which she was sitting, *down* on the floor, at *his feet*; she would have fallen on the carpet if he had not held her'). Humbled by Karenin's superior morals, Vronsky feels 'его высоту и свое *унижение*' ([*АК* 490] 'his elevation and his own *abasement*').

By identifying in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* parallel behavioural reactions that Eliot and Tolstoy reference to depict the characters' shame, we arrive at four main conclusions about the conceptual structure of this emotion. Firstly, the mental imagery associated with the emotion of shame is similar in English and Russian cultures. The reason for this consistency is

relatively easy to explain. When the novelists metonymically represent shame as referring to the behavioural foundations of this concept, at least in cases of the kind we have been analyzing, they are mentally adopting and further embedding this constraint. Such behaviourally-determined metonymies, as they might be called, give the concept of shame a restricted meaning, a visual explanation of what shame is. Secondly, partly as a result of universal knowledge where shame is construed as a deeply negative emotion rather than a positive one, the concept of shame is characteristically spatially distinguishable from other emotion concepts in its vertical orientation downwards. Such a vector, although it exists only in imagination, becomes one condition for universal rules of understanding. The behavioural evidence of shame has accustomed English and Russian minds to spatialize this emotion in a certain way. This imaginative spatialization of shame is fundamentally consistent, primarily because the human mind cannot function separately from 'pretty much the same embodied basic-level and spatial-relations concepts'.[76] There is, so to speak, an innate stock of cognitions in terms of which emotion concepts can be explained. These cognitions are hard-wired into codes to the point of discounting any possibility of autonomously switching from existing conceptual frameworks to entirely different ones. This mental hard-wiring implies, thirdly, that behavioural metonymies for shame are never completely spontaneous, but on the contrary, are highly predictable, and 'made intuitively sense of'[77] through the force of our shared spatial-orientational reasoning. This argument leads to the fourth assumption on which all metaphorical processing relies, namely, that interpreting figurative discourse always involves the activation of our experiential knowledge via the synthesis of what is mutually known and intuited by all people. From this perspective, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are claimed to represent a range of sub-conscious embodied cognitions that are congruent with what is observed and logical in the world.

One thing to notice about this part of the discussion is that shame in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is represented metonymically similarly in the two texts in terms of its associated physiological and behavioural reactions. The question naturally arises, Would the metaphoric representation of shame be just as conventional and automatic when considered in abstraction from such embodied motivations? An analysis of the conceptual metaphors of shame in the focal novels will assist in illustrating the existence of other categories, no less

[76] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 107.
[77] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 6.

coherent, in terms of which Eliot and Tolstoy conceptualize shame. The disclosure of this coherence is immediately useful for accounting how *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* might be productively used as sources for evidence of the shared mental grasp of anger, thereby further supporting the claim of fixed and static rather than conceptually ambiguous categorizations across the two cultures. As shame takes many forms – there is a shame that weighs heavily upon us when we feel immoral, or it can be hidden deep down when 'our self-esteem is severely wounded'[78] – it is bound to be thought of via different image-schemas, depending upon which associative content facilitated by an image is primarily suited to deliver the satisfactory meaning in a given context. When analyzing the metaphors, no distinction will be made between the concepts of shame and disgrace, as the latter is a reflection of the same conceptual schema in the English mind – a schema aimed to help us protect ourselves from scrutiny.

Bulstrode, in *Middlemarch*, is the most representative example of shame. Eliot describes his public disgrace via the use of the widespread conceptual metaphor

'SHAME IS AN ILLNESS'/PAIN[79]

> When John Raffles, Bulstrode's ex-business partner, arrives in Middlemarch to blackmail him in relation to his previous profession, Bulstrode's growing mortification is such that the narrator only manages to convey it through comparison to the fast-developing disease: 'And now within all the automatic succession of theoretic phrases – distinct and inmost as *the shiver and the ache of oncoming fever* when we are discussing abstract pain – was the forecast of disgrace in the presence of his neighbours and of his own wife' (*M* 525-526).

There is hardly any novelty in this metaphor. Shame is described as an external force, very much like bacteria that insidiously invades the person, inflicting pain. What triggers this type of conceptualization is the tacit acknowledgement that 'metaphors cross-over such categorical divides as animate/inanimate, cosmic/biological, human/animal by recourse to

[78] Middelton-Moz, Jane. *Shame and Guilt: The Masters of Disguise* (Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc., 1990) 28.
[79] 'SHAME IS AN ILLNESS' is one of the many generic-level master-metaphors, as proposed by Kövecses's (*Metaphor and Emotion*, 32).

associative and sensory logic'.[80] Eliot's understanding of shame is intensely reliant upon metaphorical links to knowledge and bodily experience of sickness. This perceptually-based generation of the metaphor takes us beyond the physiological and behavioural bases considered earlier. It is as much a result of people's deeply-entrenched associations of sickness with an autonomous entity that is invasive, paralyzing and contagious, 'as it is caused by full-blown metaphoric representations in their heads'.[81] Shame is also known, and linguistically expressed, as an emotion that one passively undergoes, something that affects us involuntarily. Whilst the doctor examines an ill Kitty, she feels humiliated by her nakedness, and is accordingly described by the narrator as being left 'растерянной и *ошеломленной от стыда*' (*AK* 155), which Garnett casts as 'the bewildered patient, *dazed with shame*' (*AK* 111). Garnett's translation obviously avoids a slavish adherence to the conventional metaphor of shame as a sickness, as do other translations, as evidenced by L&AM and RP&LV versions of the novel.[82] All these translations tone down the severity of the experience in their choice of terms, as *ošelomlennyj ot styda* connotes a more extreme state of being overwhelmed by this emotion to the point where one's rational faculties are temporarily suspended.

Another everyday metaphor that Eliot and Tolstoy employ to convey the experience of shame is the commonly used and well understood by most speakers of English and Russian SHAME IS A HEAVY OBJECT, better known as 'SHAME IS A BURDEN'[83]

> Bulstrode's wife decides to share the burden of her husband's shame: 'They could not yet speak to each other of the *shame which she was bearing* with him' (*M* 750).
>
> Anna and Vronsky each inwardly experience shame: 'Стыд пред духовною наготою своей *давил* ее и сообщался ему' ([*AK* 191] '*Shame* at their spiritual nakedness *pressed down hard against* her and infected him').

---

[80] Brenda E. F. Beck, cited in Cristina Cacciari, 'Why Do We Speak Metaphorically?: Reflections on the Functions of Metaphor in Discourse and Reasoning', in *Figurative Language and Thought*, eds. Albert N. Katz et al. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 119-157, at 122.
[81] Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., 'Taking Metaphor out of our heads and Putting it into the Cultural World', in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*, Amsterdam, July 1997, eds. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999) 145-166, at 159.
[82] For example, Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky translate this metaphorical expression as 'bewildered and stunned with shame' (RP&LV 117), whereas Louise and Aylmer Maude briefly as 'stupefied with shame' (L&AM 115).
[83] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 32.

Eliot's and Tolstoy's instances of the conventional metaphor follow the general outline of SHAME IS A HEAVY OBJECT, but the different mental images they invoke suggest that they are used in more than one sense. In Eliot's variant of the metaphor, shame is interpreted according to the imaginary WEIGHT that the Bulstrodes have to jointly CARRY. This metaphor reflects an aspect of permanence in shame that is characterized by an appraisal of misbehaviour of such proportions that it attaches to a person to be carried throughout their lifetime. In *Anna Karenina*, the WEIGHT takes the form of an image denoting a solid mass that presses down upon the adulterous woman. The specific experience of shame is reactive: that of being overwhelmed by the enormity of one's own wrongdoing. In this novel, where the railway images are dominant,[84] the metaphor of SHAME IS A HEAVY OBJECT grotesquely foreshadows and parallels Anna's death whereby she gets crushed beneath a train. The realist novel is not designed to set conceptual traps along its discourse; rather, the cultural assumptions conveyed by ordinary metaphors, that shame requires condemnation for the sake of justice, are usually automatically grasped and readily accepted by the reader. When we read about Anna's tarnished reputation as a result of her love affair, and the necessity for the Bulstrodes to leave their home town to reduce the impact of their public disgrace, we are made aware of an emphasis of shame on the burden it represents. Social awareness, awareness of social repercussions of shameful actions derived from observed or lived experience, is the kind that this metaphor has led us to rely on most. Given the conventional use and the reader's familiarity with the meaning of the metaphor SHAME IS A HEAVY OBJECT, the experience of reading this emotion in English and Russian is fairly mechanical and hardly unique. This metaphor, although it is divided by Eliot and Tolstoy into two variations according to the characters' individual experience of shame, is nevertheless cross-culturally intelligible because it is consolidated by the corresponding social experiences as shared by different cultures. On that score, shame as represented in *Middlemarch* is felt to be a conceptual analogy of shame narrated in *Anna Karenina*.

There is a considerable agreement among psychologists that one powerful reaction to shame is a feeling of exposure, of being naked in a crowd. In all probability, it is based on such standard characterization of shame that Tolstoy conceptualizes this emotion in terms of the metaphor

[84] See Gary R. Jahn, 'The Image of the Railroad in *Anna Karenina*', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 25.2 (1981): 1-10.

SHAME IS NAKEDNESS[85]

> At the sight of dying patients taking advantage of the German spring waters, an extremely healthy Prince Shcherbatsky feels ill at ease: '. . . ему теперь как будто неловко и совестно было за свою сильную походку, за свои крупные, облитые жиром члены. Он испытывал почти чувство человека, *неодетого в обществе*' ([*АК* 280] 'he now felt somehow awkward and ashamed of his vigorous stride and his large, fat-enveloped limbs. He experienced the feeling almost akin to that of a man *undressed in public*').

For Kövecses, this conceptual metaphor is not culturally-specific and it originates from the shared belief that 'having no clothes on is a potential cause for shame and is typically associated with shame'.[86] It thereby has the advantage of being familiar to speakers of different languages. Apart from its cross-cultural intelligibility, SHAME IS NAKEDNESS has a further benefit of more significantly accounting for how conceptualization of this emotion arises from our conscious awareness of everyone around us. Generally, we choose to be in places with the expectation of belonging in order to avoid the discomfort of alienation. For Prince Shcherbatsky, the condition of successful social blending is that he should, as a rule, remain in conformity with his surrounding environment. Forced by the circumstances to temporarily dwell amongst sickly people, the strong and healthy Prince is represented as strikingly at odds with the convalescent circle, hence his sense of 'appearing in company *without clothes*' (L&AM 224). Shame in this instance becomes part of a broad social inventory of standard behaviours which is theoretically no different to positing as highly likely certain reactions under a set of given circumstances. Typically, those who experience shame persistently 'indicate that they want to disappear; they want very badly not to be seen'.[87] To them, shame is 'a moment when they wish a hole would open up and swallow them'.[88] Continued witnessing of others attempting to hide when ashamed has led us to develop the habit of predicting such occurrences. Tolstoy's own perception of this regularity is represented in Kitty's hasty withdrawal to the quiet corners of the room when Vronsky, to her horror, pays

---

[85] This conceptual metaphor is also known in related critical literature as 'A SHAMEFUL PERSON IS A PERSON HAVING NO CLOTHES ON' (Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 32).
[86] Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, 48.
[87] C. E. Izard, quoted in Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition*, 130.
[88] Donald L. Nathanson, *Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992) 158.

her no attention at the ball. Kitty's revealing dress extends, through literal parallelism, the underlying metaphor SHAME IS NAKEDNESS. Here this garment stresses her shame, not only of the increasing awareness of being of high value in the marriage market, and yet being rejected by Vronsky, but also of entering the dangerous territories of sexual politics. On this account, the metaphor SHAME IS NAKEDNESS proceeds from intuitively-taken-for-granted patterns of behaviour towards a shared consciousness within which we can all in the same way build corresponding perceptual and conceptual harmonies. Simply put, standard behaviour becomes universal thought.

It is not, of course, always the case that all stereotyped metaphorical expressions that Eliot and Tolstoy use to denote shame are members of high-level generic metaphors. However, even if low-level generic metaphors are deployed, it does not immediately follow that they hinder our mechanical comprehension or that they specifically show a low degree of productivity. A few examples should suffice. In *Middlemarch*, Eliot uses simultaneously the SHAME IS (UNPLEASANT) BODILY SENSATIONS and SHAME IS (DISTASTEFUL) FOOD conceptual metaphors particularly in order to comment on the mechanism of memory designed to re-awaken in us all that has hitherto been concealed under the cloak of shame:

> With memory set smarting like a reopened wound, a man's past is not simply a dead history, an outworn preparation of the present: it is not a repented error shaken loose from the life: it is a still quivering part of himself, bringing *shudders* and *bitter flavours* and the *tinglings* of a merited shame (*M* 615).

In *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoy, via the use of the metaphors SHAME IS AN ENEMY and SHAME IS DIRTINESS, aims to convey Levin's liberation from a sense of humility – it took a while for Levin to accept his defeat as an eligible bachelor, but eventually 'Он не испытывал того стыда, который обыкновенно *мучал* его после падения, и он мог смело смотреть в глаза людям' ([*АК* 194] 'He was not experiencing that shame that usually *tortured* him after a fall, and was able to look everyone boldly in the eye'); and conversely, to render Vronsky's attempted suicide as a convenient way of appeasing his guilty conscience – 'Он этим поступком как будто *смыл с себя стыд и унижение*, которые он прежде испытывал' ([*АК* 510] 'By his action he had, as it were, *washed away the shame and humiliation* he had felt before').

Such varied and not necessarily all prototypical source domains – as bodily sensations, food, an enemy, and dirtiness – by means of which Eliot and Tolstoy metaphorically represent shame, have performed essentially the same function: to give a coherent description of shame as an extremely undesirable emotion that is ideally removed. The expansion of conceptual boundaries for the concept of shame has been effective, because the meanings produced manifestly correspond at least approximately to the information encoded in the primary conceptualizations of this emotion. A fundamental presupposition about shame as indicated earlier is that it is related closely (in part, socio-culturally) to mental images of being small, low, pressed down upon and exposed. Eliot and Tolstoy, aware of certain logical restrictions to which their metaphoric structuring of shame must submit, take these common conceptualizations as a reference point to which their more innovative conceptual construals (elaborations) in general conform. Admittedly, the metaphorical instantiations of the minor master metaphors of shame that Eliot and Tolstoy artistically produce may or may not coincide with their high-frequency usage or even their actual employment in everyday English and Russian language. But, by virtue of their potential for immediate decoding, they are expected to appear almost universally in all conventional realist discourse.

In summary, three distinct frameworks of unity for metonymies and metaphors of shame have been catalogued: (1) biological unity; (2) behavioural unity; and (3) unity through direct observation, providing evidence of a non-arbitrary and justifiable motivation of Eliot's and Tolstoy's figurative language of emotion. The conclusion, that metaphors of shame in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are conceived – and we claim to understand them – as they occur in direct connection with the incontrovertible orders of nature and culture, is not a relegation of the novel to a tangle of antecedently accepted meanings, but rather a result of a progressive interpretive practice aiming to trace the conceptual systems that underpin realist discourse. To the extent that it exhibits recurrent correspondences to truths collectively established from the conscious and unconscious experience of the world, we are inclined to speak of the metaphoric language of shame as fundamentally biologically- and culturally-determined. This assertion, moreover, as sharply distinguished from powerful arguments of critical orthodoxies, gives precedence to the dependency of realist texts on universal meanings

over fully-fledged creativity: in the process of metaphoric construction, hard-wired conceptual structures override any individual tendencies toward idiosyncrasies.[89]

[89] This is by no means a reductionist standpoint. To argue for a great dependence of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* for their realist effect on conventional conceptual metaphors of emotions is not to deny the authors' participation in artistically extending, elaborating and compressing figurative language to pattern in an unusual way emotional experience. There is a wealth of fascinating discussion on the textual practices of metaphor, symbol and motif that serve to provide the motivation for finding patterns of organization of the multiplicity of meanings. See, for instance, Gary R. Jahn, 'The Image of the Railroad in *Anna Karenina*', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 25.2 (1981): 1-10; Amy Mandelker, 'The Woman with a Shadow: Fables of Demon and Psyche in "Anna Karenina"', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 24.1 (1990): 48-68; David S. Danaher, 'Tolstoy's Use of Light and Dark Imagery in *The Death of Ivan Il'ič*, *The Slavic and East European Journal* 39.2 (1995): 227-240; James M. Curtis, 'Metaphor Is to Dostoevskii as Metonymy Is to Tolstoi', *Slavic Review* 61.1 (2002): 109-127; David S. Danaher, 'A Cognitive Approach to Metaphor in Prose: Truth and Falsehood in Leo Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Il'ič*', *Poetics Today* 24.3 (2003): 439-469; Alyson Tapp, 'Moving Stories: (E)Motion and Narrative in *Anna Karenina*, *Russian Literature* 61.3 (2007): 341-361; Josephine McDonagh, *George Eliot* (Plymouth, England: Northcote House, 1997), esp. Chapter 1, 'Vague Dreams: Realism and the Drama of Details' (14-40); David Paxman, 'Metaphor and Knowledge in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*', *Metaphor and Symbol* 18.2 (2003): 107-123; and Barbara Hardy, *George Eliot: A Critic's Biography* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), esp. Chapter 5, 'Illness and Death' (132-146) and Chapter 6, 'Objects, Words and Metaphors' (147-164).

5

FIGURING THE TWO FACETS OF PRIDE TO RECRUIT EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The causes, qualities and consequences of the emotion of pride are well represented throughout nineteenth-century English and Russian novels, though perhaps nowhere more fully than in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*. The assumption that pride featured prominently in literary contexts from the beginning of this era is hardly in dispute, for it appears from the very title and the narrative plot of that evidently influential and iconic novel, *Pride and Prejudice* (1813) that late Victorian interest and fascination with this social-moral emotion must have been part of an inherited tradition in which this novel is an outstanding example. This thematic focus is still dominant in late nineteenth-century prose fiction, but the discursive representation of psychological experience is far more nuanced than in earlier novels, even when pride was the subject of consideration, as in *Pride and Prejudice*.

Jane Austen's novel was published approximately fifty-two years years prior to George Eliot's *Middlemarch* – and fifty-seven prior to the last instalment of *Anna Karenina* – and seemed to some critics practically a guidebook of contemporary etiquette and patterns for acceptable behaviour in which Austen took up the subject to admit a variety of ways in which the concept of pride was widely understood. A definition of pride as distinct from vanity, which sounds conspicuously lexicographical, is provided by Mary, a character known for her extensive reading and conservative opinions:

> Pride . . . is a very common failing, I believe. By all that I have ever read, I am convinced that it is very common indeed, that human nature is particularly prone to it, and that there are very few of us who do not cherish a feeling of self-complacency on the score of some quality or other, real or imaginary. Vanity and pride are different things, though the words are often used synonymously. A person may be proud without being vain. Pride relates more to our opinion of ourselves, vanity to what we would have others think of us.[1]

Implied in this statement is a typical nineteenth-century recognition of the essence and function of pride. In Austen's view, which bears an obvious resemblance to that expounded earlier by the eighteenth-century philosopher of emotions David Hume, 'pride arises from an

[1] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice* 1813, ed. Vivien Jones (London: Penguin, 2003) 21.

innate propensity'[2] which is common to all people and is adapted, in present-day terminology, 'to bolster one's sense of self-worth [even if it is anchored in fantasy] and to direct one's actions toward behaviors that conform to social standards of worth or merit'.[3] In *Pride and Prejudice* there is also an identifiable tendency – one that seems to have originated from the ancient practice of Aristotle – to contrast pride as involving 'the [proper] evaluation of the self by the self'[4] with vanity, which is an obsession of consciousness to mobilize and affect in others desirable judgments of ourselves. Austin's conception of pride was evidently too well-considered to narrow it to a single-faceted, unambiguous emotion: not all pride is a defect. Mary's broad assertion that pride is a widespread failing is undercut by Miss Lucas's opinion of Mr. Darcy, an exceedingly wealthy gentleman, in which she expresses her justification, if not approval, of his pride in view of his class and status:

> His pride . . . does not offend *me* so much as pride often does, because there is an excuse of it. One cannot wonder that so very fine a young man, with family, fortune, every thing in his favour, should think highly of himself. If I may so express it, he has a *right* to be proud (*P&P* 21).

Based on the psychology of emotions such as was available and promulgated in early nineteenth-century England, there are two kinds of pride of which Mr. Darcy is representative of the first: legitimate (justifiable) – that which derives from the privilege appropriate to aristocratic society for which it is reserved; and false (unreasonable/undignified) – generated by the mentality of inferior social groups whose shortcomings give rise to a desire for undue recognition. In short, in this formulation, pride is biologically universal, but socially selective: we are each of us naturally predisposed towards pride, but society defines us as either entitled or forbidden to manifest it in particular contexts and to varying degrees, depending on our social and economic status.

Notwithstanding the resonances of these ideas in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* and while it would be tempting to view them as illustrations of theories of pride elaborated in

---

[2] Christopher J. Finlay, *Hume's Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in A Treatise of Human Nature* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007) 95.
[3] Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer, 'Developmental Transformations in Appraisals for Pride, Shame, and Guilt', in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995) 64-113, at 66.
[4] Michael Lewis, 'Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt', in *Handbook of Emotions*, eds. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1993) 563-573, at 568.

Pride and Prejudice, it will be more useful to focus, at least in the first part of the chapter, on recent advances made in fields beyond literary studies in our understanding the emotion of pride. We can thereby consider how, in their aesthetic practices, George Eliot and Leo Tolstoy were ahead of the psychology of their time, and how recent theories of emotion drawn from psychology can better position us to make informed pronouncements on their characters' mental states. This cross-disciplinary approach provides new support for the argument that mimetic Realism is a unique apparatus for compelling the reader's affective response. The following section will explore the non-prototypical cases of pride in order to show how this response is triggered by representations of unusual pride in action. In particular, it will consider how Edward Casaubon's pomposity reveals for instance what Richard S. and Bernice N. Lazarus refer to as acting 'in defense of a vulnerable ego';[5] how George Eliot depends on Dorothea to show that pride at times correlates with moral superiority, insofar as it indicates a measure of satisfaction at what is conventionally discredited, but what would be the reason for utmost approval if understood; and how Tolstoy writes the experience of Dolly who, in the midst of poverty and an unhappy marriage, feels pride because of what Gabriele Taylor calls an inclination to 'value some other features of the situation, a duty well performed, perhaps, or [her] ability as an organizer'.[6] The argument here is not, of course, that Eliot's and Tolstoy's character portraiture is predicated on these later psychological theories but that their fully-blown mimetic discourse of emotional states is capable of inviting interpretation that is more productively cross-disciplinary than hitherto had been available.

These psychoanalytical scenarios, which Eliot and Tolstoy fictionally construe, are enlisted to frame our knowledge of nineteenth-century notions about pride. In fact, they will indicate that nineteenth-century realist novels permit the exposure of cultural resistance to grouping complex emotions such as pride into uniform, clear-cut categories. For, despite standard theoretical assumptions that pride and shame are two directly opposite human

[5] Richard S. Lazarus and Bernice N. Lazarus, *Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 102.
[6] Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 25.

emotions,[7] the particular case of Casaubon seems to define pride in terms of characteristics normally ascribed to shame – 'a painful negative scrutiny of the entire self – a feeling that "*I* am unworthy, incompetent, or bad person"'.[8] The present discussion will show, in other words, that the emotion of pride does not have to involve one's sense of superiority; at times pride can be acted out in the hope of disguising feelings of inferiority or self-underestimation.[9]

Pride in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is conceptualized as an emotion involving a twofold distinction – authentic pride and hubristic pride – and it is proposed in the second section of this chapter that the metaphorical language of the novels reflects this dichotomy. In the English context, authentic pride (also often labelled as proper pride) 'is associated with feelings of confidence, self-worth, and productivity, and positively related to a socially desirable personality profile characterised by extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and high implicit and explicit self-esteem',[10] whereas hubristic pride (also frequently referred to as "overweening pride"[11]) is linked to 'words like *arrogance*, *boastful*, and *egoistical*; and negatively related to self-esteem and agreeableness but positively related to

---

[7] Donald L. Nathanson, a distinguished psychiatrist, makes this point succinctly:

> Shame, of course, is the polar opposite of pride. Where pride allows us to affiliate with others, shame makes us isolate ourselves from them. All our actions are capable of being viewed along a shame/pride axis, a yardstick along which we measure our every activity. By this shame/pride axis we decide whether we have come closer to our hoped-for personal best or to our dreaded personal worst.

(*Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self* [New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992] 86).

[8] June Price Tangney, 'Perfectionism and the Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride', in *Perfectionism: Theory, Research, and Treatment*, eds. Gordon L. Flett and Paul L. Hewitt (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002) 199-215, at 201.

[9] Contrast this contention with a popular definition of pride as proposed by Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer who understand pride as an emotion 'generated by appraisals that one is responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a socially valued person' ('Developmental Transformations in Appraisals for Pride, Shame, and Guilt', 66). Another psychologist, Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, analyzes pride in a strikingly similar way:

> Pride does not necessarily presuppose exclusivity, but it presupposes some sense of a comparatively high value and often also superiority. We may be proud of something many people have, for example, our health or the fact that we belong to a certain nation. Although we share the object of our pride with many people, we are still in a better position than others with whom we can compare ourselves.

(*The Subtlety of Emotions* [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000] 492).

Gabriele Taylor proposes that arrogant pride is tied to a self-aggrandizing view of oneself:

> The arrogantly proud . . . see themselves as being on a different plane, as being superior and unique. The referend of the personal pronoun 'I' is, in their view, a different sort of being from that which is indicated by 'you' or 'they'. This makes them moral solipsists and – as the other side of the coin – moral sceptics about other minds.

(*Deadly Vices* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006] 74-75).

[10] Jessica L. Tracy and Christine Prehn, 'Arrogant or Self-Confident? The Use of Contextual Knowledge to Differentiate Hubristic and Authentic Pride from a Single Nonverbal Expression', *Cognition and Emotion* 26.1 (2012): 14-24, at 15.

[11] Lazarus and Lazarus 101.

narcissism and shame-proneness'.[12] The speakers of Russian seem to recognize the dual-faceted nature of pride in a similar way. According to the Russian investigator of emotions, Svetlana Malahova, the concept of *gordost'* (pride), likewise, can be represented by two groups of synonyms:

> 1) отрицательно окрашенные синонимы: *высокомерие*, *заносчивость*, *спесь*, *кичливость*, *надутость*, *напыщенность*. Данные синонимы в количественном отношении представлены наиболее полно. По значению они ближе к этимологии слова гордость и отрицательному отношению к проявлению эмоции гордости.
>
> 2) положительно окрашенные синонимы: *чувство собственного достоинства*, *самолюбие*.[13]
>
> ([1] synonyms with negative connotations: *arrogance*, *haughtiness*, *undue arrogance*/*cockiness*,[14] *conceit*, *puffed up with pride*, *pomposity*. Collectively, these synonyms are sufficient to represent the semantic range of this aspect of pride. In meaning, they are closer to the etymology of the word *gordost'* and to the negative facet of the emotion of pride.
>
> [2] synonyms with positive connotations: dignity, self-respect).

The discussion below focuses on the metonymic and metaphoric language of pride with the aim of illuminating Eliot's and Tolstoy's subconscious structuring of pride in terms of the collective understanding of emotion as comprising two antagonistic sets of components. An outline of folk (English and Russian) conceptualizations of pride will be achieved by means of tracing throughout *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* conventional metaphors of the two conceptual facets of pride, in order to argue that Eliot and Tolstoy rely on stock figurative expressions that resonate with us as readers, with the result of stimulating our emotional responsiveness – evoking favourable and unfavourable feelings – towards their fictional characters. The authors' use of familiar rather than unexpected, idiosyncratic language to invite emphatic response effectively supports an up-to-date revision of the aesthetics of

---

[12] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'The Prototypical Pride Expression: Development of a Nonverbal Behavior. Coding System', *Emotion* 7.4 (2007): 789-801, at 791.

[13] Svetlana Malahova, 'Ličnostno-Èmocional′nye Koncepty «Gordost′» i «Styd» v Russkoj i Anglijskoj Lingvokul′turah', published excerpt of an unpublished graduate dissertation, Volgograd, 2009, 1- 24, at 13.

[14] If *spes'* means *arrogance* of some kind – perhaps something conceptually not far remote from '*gordost'*, *nadmennost'*, *vysokomerie*, *kičenie*, *nadutost'*, *čvanstvo*, *tščeslavie*' – it evidently does not mean *arrogance* in the sense a '*nadutyj*, *nadmennyj*, *zanosčivyj*' person is *arrogant*. It has a legitimacy factor. Whereas *gordost'* or *vysokomerie* presuppose a certain basis for self-regard, *spes'* bears a close resemblance to one's undue (unmerited) sense of personal worth ('*glypoe samodovol'stvo*'). *Spes'* involves 'considering oneself higher than others', 'putting on airs' and 'holding one's nose too high in the air', and *spesivyj čelovek* ([*spesivec/spesivica*] a person who displays *spes'*) is 'glypo *napyščennyj* sam soboju' (blindly [lit. stupidly] stuck-up). For these and other connotations of *spes'*, see V. I. Dal′, *Tolkovyj Slovar′ Rysskogo Jazyka: Illjustrirovannoe Izdanie* (Moskva: Èksmo, 2012) s. *spes'*.

mimetic representation which aspires, according to received orthodoxy, towards a convincing imitation of reality partly through the naturalization of language. Ordinary, everyday metaphors contained in the novels appear natural to the reader, and are therefore likely to engage them emotionally, because they operate in reference to the kind of conceptual systems they intuitively accept and anticipate, rather than posing a conceptual hurdle like that frequently associated with poetic contexts. Eliot and Tolstoy, in other words, exercise their psychological influence by linguistically reproducing the conceptualizing habits of the common mind.

Metaphors of emotions, in the context of cognitive linguistics, function as linguistic signs of the thought of the experiencer. To capture pride linguistically, we first need to have a mental picture of it in our minds – a host of specific associations, recollections and conceivings in relation to that emotion, which themselves have a locus not only in our typical behavioural reactions in response to pride, but also in the various cultural constructs of pride set in motion by dominant ethical ideologies of a given historical period. For example, the Christian moral ethos, explained in a rudimentary way (and expanded below), urges believers to renounce pride in favour of a commitment to a life of modesty and humility, for the rejection of pride is a test of their submission to God.[15] Pride, in pre-modern Western societies, on the other hand, is a mark of magnanimity, and typically takes the form of patriotism, honour, courage and social solidarity.[16] An alternative account of pride – which came with the socialization process and economic development in modern civilized societies,

[15] The third edition of *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, ed. E. A. Livingstone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) defines *pride* as 'the first of the seven deadly sins, being the inordinate love of one's own excellence. It is traditionally believed to have been the sin of the angels and the first man, and is denounced as a vice particularly repugnant to God throughout the OT and NT (e.g. Prov. 16: 18; I Pet 5: 5)' (1324). Humility and self-abasement, in obedience to God, are hence essential for all those who venture to earn his favour. For a general discussion of the seven deadly sins (septem peccata mortalia), and in particular of pride (superbia), see Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Grand Rapids: MI: Baker Book House, 1986) 280-281. On the importance of the seven deadly sins in medieval culture, their origin, non-arbitrary number and order, as well as their social function and influence on art and imaginative literature, see Morton W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State College Press, 1952); and Siegfried Wenzel, 'The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research', *Speculum* 43.1 (1968): 1-22.

[16] According to Gabriele Taylor, amongst the most suitable candidates for this category of pride 'are those whose way of life sets them apart from people leading ordinary lives, namely, the heroes, saints, and martyrs'. Taylor's only objection, however, is that despite their noble motives, 'they may strike others as being sinfully proud, and may themselves wonder whether their dedication to a cause is a means to self-admiration rather than an end in itself' (*Deadly Vices*, 77).

early eighteenth-century England and France in particular[17] – registers the emotion's utility for both suppression of self-degrading feelings and '*enhancement of one's personal worth by taking credit for a valued object or achievement*'.[18] Whether perceived as the effect of the human selfish ego, or as heralding a positive view of one's self and one's actions and possessions, pride is expressive of our relationship to currently operative cultural interpretations of this emotion. Therefore, the metaphoric language of pride cannot be analyzed outside the horizon of the cultural world and ideas of pride circulating in that world at that time.

This chapter cannot focus on the history of emotions and psychology, but nor can it entirely pass over these two diverse streams of scholarship, because these developments were broadly shared by nineteenth-century English and Russian societies, and also ultimately directed toward the continuance of the morality tradition. First of all, Eliot's and Tolstoy's connotations of pride derive to some extent from a certain criteria of value which have developed largely through disassociation with the Judao-Christian doctrine of sin. While the discussion of 'the deadliest of the deadly sins'[19] in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* must in ways be related to religious beliefs of the novelists, they seem far less obviously valid for the literary representation of the emotion, since both authors have long been proclaimed by biographers and critics as feverishly committed, through their lives and writing, to questioning the received dogmas of the Christian Church. Except perhaps in the case of a few religiously motivated characters, such as saintly Alexey Karenin in his early days, pride in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* will be demonstrated to be conceptually arranged to highlight the cultural resolve to abandon the theological element hitherto implied in this concept in favour of practising something of a reversal or even defiance of what we may call Old Morality. Public declarations of Eliot's and Tolstoy's religious transformation merit special attention, as they

---

[17] Finlay, *Hume's Social Philosophy*, esp. Chapter 5, 'Pride and Esteem' (86-104). According to David Hume, and as summarized by Finlay, pride operates through the response to 'manifest historical variations in human tastes, behaviour and social organization' (96). It can be admitted as fact, Finlay recalls Hume's example, that ancient Spartans and republicans of Rome were considered to be models of temperance and austerity: 'riches and sumptuary possessions, far from being sources of pride, were widely regarded as causes of dishonour' (96). Pride, naturally, acquired a different meaning in eighteenth-century Europe, where the commercialization and urbanization of English and French states redefined wealth and ambition as indispensable means of prosperity and social advancement. Along with the 'growth in material culture' (96), there was an increase in demand for goods and a proliferation of desires for luxury. These excessive refinements were almost inevitably perceived as valuable and therefore became causes for pride if possessed, unlike in previous centuries, where they were not even remotely accessible to the broader public, hence simply irrelevant.
[18] Lazarus and Lazarus 100, italics in original.
[19] Taylor, *Deadly Vices*, 70.

indicate the ethical function of their novels which is quite different from the intention that motivated the popular morality genres of nineteenth-century England and Russia.

Eliot's and Tolstoy's Non-doctrinal and Non-dogmatic Faiths

Eliot and Tolstoy, giants among nineteenth-century moral writers, were people of unconventional religious beliefs. They each, at different stages of their lives and for different reasons, abandoned the principles, respectively, of evangelical faith and the abstract doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church and replaced them with their own versions of religion – George Eliot of 'humanity';[20] Tolstoy of social justice and 'Christian asceticism'.[21] Eliot thought of herself as the enemy, not of conventional religion, but of its facile form. She had vehemently taken the role of a disapprover of the doctrinal creed that preferred the fanaticism of reverence to the moral emotions involving 'the sympathetic impulses that need no law'.[22] Her purpose was to propagate a steadfastly humane moral outlook which she had inherited, if only in part, from secularism, notably that of Rousseau, Spinoza, Hegel, Shakespeare, Goethe, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Mill and Carlyle,[23] and also from the radicalism of Charles Christian Hennell, Strauss and Feuerbach.[24] An open admittance of the sin of ambition, such as the following in a letter to her aunt Elizabeth Evans (1839), is an important preliminary indication of Eliot's unorthodox approach to religion. It stresses an aspiration for personal fulfilment and public recognition rather than adoption of Christian humility, and as such, runs counter to a common religious consciousness:

> Instead of putting my light under a bushel, I am in danger of ostentatiously displaying a false one. You have much too high an opinion my dear Aunt, of my spiritual condition and of my personal and circumstantial advantages . . . I feel that my besetting sin is the one of all others most destroying, as it is the fruitful parent of them all, Ambition, a desire insatiable for the esteem of my fellow creatures. This seems the centre whence all my actions proceed.[25]

---

[20] Peter C. Hodgson, *Theology in the Fiction of George Eliot: The Mystery beneath the Real* (London: SCM Press, 2001) 1.
[21] Rosamund Bartlett, *Tolstoy: A Russian Life* (London: Profile Books, 2010) 3.
[22] George Eliot, *Romola* 1862-3, ed. Andrew Sanders (London: Penguin, 1980) 151.
[23] Hodgson 11.
[24] Nancy Henry, *The Cambridge Introduction to George Eliot* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 19.
[25] George Eliot, 'Letter to Mrs. Samuel Evans, 5 March 1839', in *The George Eliot Letters 1836-1851*, vol. 1, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 18-20, at 19.

The subsequent pursuit of a literary career was motivated by what Eliot believed to be her chance 'of so presenting our human life as to help [her] readers in getting a clearer conception and a more active admiration of those vital elements which bind men together and give a higher worthiness to their existence'.[26] Eliot's iconic aesthetics would be grounded in religious ideas more infinitely profound than that of veneration and self-denial. She would always strive toward writing a morality that seemed to share much with rational knowledge centered upon the eradication of unquestioning faith. Any religion which informed her moral principles would be a derivative from the common moral consciousness that one must treat human beings sympathetically as duplicates of our own erring selves. It was thus inevitable perhaps that Eliot, as evident in her private correspondence, sought in her novels both to bring an ethics derived from traditional Christian values into contact with 'the present life', and to extend 'doctrinal belief into the condition of fellowship', in order to teach a moral lesson – especially fit for socially-orientated nineteenth-century culture –

> that the faith and life of the early Christians were entirely based on the idea of the special and the exceptional, whereas the essence of modern advancement is the recognition of the general and invariable.[27]

Whereas Eliot's moral outlook can be said to be the product of her formidable intellect, Tolstoy's spirituality may be thought of as tied to his heightened sensitivity. We learn from numerous sources that in childhood Tolstoy was prone to weeping even at the slightest provocation. In 'Tolstoy as Believer', Martin Green depicts 'a hypersensitive child, he was known to the rest of his family as "*Lyova Ryova*" (Leo the cry-baby) because of his emotional responses to others' sufferings (and joys)'.[28] Even as a young child, Tolstoy was apparently motivated by a deep sense of compassion and by the urgency to ameliorate suffering. Scolded by a stable-hand for whipping an old horse, little Leo had a sense of guilt and, 'kissing the animal on the neck, begged his pardon for mistreating him'.[29] This childlike emotionalism helps in part to explain Tolstoy's subsequent attitude towards the poor and the exploited, as

---

[26] George Eliot, 'Letter to Clifford Allbutt, August 1868', in *The George Eliot Letters 1862-1868*, vol. 4, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) 471-473, at 472.
[27] George Eliot, 'Draft for J. Chapman to J. Martineau, 29 August 1851', in *The George Eliot Letters 1840-1870*, vol. 8, ed. Gordon S. Haight (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978) 25-27, at 26.
[28] Martin Green, 'Tolstoy as Believer', *The Wilson Quarterly* 5.2 (1981): 166-177, at 166.
[29] Leo Tolstoy, *The Old Horse* (1872), an autobiographical story for children, cited in Henri Troyat, *Tolstoy*, trans. Nancy Amphoux (London: Penguin, 1967) 37.

well as his missionary zeal for remedial action.[30] With a philosopher like Tolstoy, who became increasingly obsessed with having to exercise strictly didactic writing, it was only to be expected to find a conviction that his life itself had to strike the contemporaries as somehow exemplary. His puritanism carried him far beyond wild eccentricities that were reportedly hateful to his wife and most bizarre to his friends. The particular behaviours most frequently mentioned in biographical literature include the minimal usage of his inherited title and money management, vegetarianism, avoidance of alcohol, preference for peasant clothes, cobbling and his refusal to hunt. Towards the end of Chapter 10 of 'My Confession', Tolstoy testified to his spiritual transformation:

> What happened with me was that the life of our circle, – of the rich and the learned, – not only disgusted me, but even lost all its meaning. All our acts, reflections, sciences, arts, – all that appeared to me in a new light. I saw that all that was mere pampering of the appetites, and that no meaning could be found in it; but the life of all the working masses, of all humanity, which created life, presented itself to me in its real significance. I saw that there was life itself and that the meaning given to this life was truth, and I accepted it.[31]

Tolstoy's primitivism – in some way utopian, in many ways hypocritical – was sufficiently notorious and fervent in the phase following *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina* to form the basis of a kind of personal religion which became enshrined in Tolstoy's later polemical texts.[32] This credo meant 'to expose the falsity of the Church's doctrine' and 'to reveal the true meaning of Christianity, as set out in the Gospels'.[33] Peter Caws refers us to five rules, inspired by Christ's five commandments delivered in the Sermon on the Mount, that pertain to Tolstoy's code of ethics: 'in abbreviated form they are (1) no anger, (2) no impurity, (3) no oaths, (4) no resistance to violence, and (5) no enemies'.[34] Two conflicting explanations may be given of Tolstoy's abandonment of the dogmatic theology of the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand, Tolstoy's favouring of Christian asceticism can be perceived as 'an

---

[30] For Tolstoy's active involvement in hunger relief in local territories as one form of genuine philanthropy, see, for example, Donna Tussing Orwin, 'Introduction: Tolstoy as artist and public figure', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 49-62, at 56.
[31] Leo Tolstoy, 'My Confession: Introduction to the Critique of Dogmatic Theology and Investigation of the Christian Teaching' (1879-1882), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 13, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener (1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968) 3-90, at 60-61.
[32] Tolstoy's polemic writings – 'My Confession' (1879-1882), in Wiener, vol.13, 3-90; 'Critique of Dogmatic Theology' (1881-1882), in Wiener, vol. 13, 93-451; 'My Religion' (1884), in Wiener, vol. 16, 3-221; 'What Shall We Do Then?' (1886), in Wiener, vol. 17, 3-340; and 'Resurrection' (1899), in Wiener, vol. 21, 3-527 – served mainly to repudiate the State with its legal institutions and the false doctrine of the Orthodox Church.
[33] Bartlett 301.
[34] Peter Caws, 'Moral Certainty in Tolstoy', *Philosophy and Literature* 24.1(2000): 49-66, at 64.

orgy of masochistic pride',[35] a self-indulgence of a hypocritical martyr, the ultimate purpose of which was to increase his already massive popularity. Or it may be the case that biblical humility fortified Tolstoy against the corruption of nineteenth-century civilization and allowed him to reinstate the cardinal principles of a religious tradition which he was certain contemporary Russians had either forgotten or failed to uphold.

Christian Views on Pride

The authors engage with and transmit culturally-embedded views on pride that have a long history extending back to the early Christian tradition and even earlier to classical times, whereby conflicting agendas, theological and moral, over the centuries, have made it a polysemous term. Nineteenth-century difficulties with forging a single universal concept of pride may arise from two divergent sets of connotations, 'one of which is definitely positively valued [and contains such virtues as Magnanimity, Honor, Dignity, Self-respect, Self-confidence, Reserve]', while the other is regarded to comprise 'definitely offensive qualities [like Vanity, Conceit, Arrogance, Boastfulness, Haughtiness and Priggishness]'.[36] This well-known ambivalent character of pride has been of longstanding interest to psychologists and experts in Religious Studies,[37] though in contemporary secular contexts it tends to be identified with an assertive emotion, 'pride in one's accomplishment – the pride one feels in

---

[35] Troyat 549.

[36] Arindam Chakrabarti, 'Individual and Collective Pride', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29.1 (1992): 35-43, at 38.

[37] The concept of pride has been historically understood as occurring essentially in two different forms. For the influential Father of Christian Church, Gregory the Great, in the 6th century, pride can be assigned two types of meaning, both of which 'affect in some way man's relationship with both God and other men, but it is safe to say that the first type, the carnal, has more to do with the dealings of the proud with their fellow creatures, while the second, the spiritual, refers more to the relationship of the proud and God'. In Gregory's view, "carnal pride" is an emotion 'that causes Christians, particularly those who are engaged in worldly pursuits or who are beginners in moral progress, to be elated on account of their earthly glory', whereas "spiritual pride" is one 'that causes Christians, particularly the spiritually minded and the virtuous, to be elated on account of their acquisition of virtue' (Matthew Baasten, *Pride According to Gregory the Great: A Study of the Moralia* [Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986] 28, 44). For a detailed discussion of the authentic/hubristic pride dichotomy, supported by empirical evidence, see Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'The Psychological Structure of Pride: A Tale of Two Facets', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92.3 (2007): 506-525; and also Jason A. Clark, 'Hubristic and Authentic Pride as Serial Homologues: The Same but Different', *Emotion Review* 2.4 (1010): 397-398.

A similar differentiation has been made by a number of researchers of emotions. Amongst these are June Price Tangney who makes the distinction between 'pride in self ("alpha" pride) and pride in behavior ("beta" pride)', and Michael Lewis who suggests two distinct but connected emotions: pride, which is 'experienced when one's success is attributed to a specific action or behavior' and hubris (pridefulness), which 'arises when success is attributed to the global self'. For Lewis, moreover, hubris promotes an inflated perception of oneself which tends to be short-lived and so individuals are motivated to repeatedly engage in fantasy construction in order 'to recreate this transient emotion'. See June Price Tangney, 'The Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride', in *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. Tim Dalgleish and Mick J. Power (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) 541-568, at 559.

being successful in fulfilling a particular goal and activity'.[38] Excessive pride, however, is socially unacceptable, and so, has its costs, such as the loss of credibility and popularity (in the sense that we are most of us suspicious of claims that are shown off, as they invariably betray 'an undue preoccupation with [one's] own importance'[39]). This negative form of pride traces its origin in the Western tradition to the Christian construction of this emotion as the chief sin, 'an unholy expression of pure egotism'.[40]

Quintessential Christian morality is commonly known to be centered on ideas of modesty, moderation and self-restraint, a humble trio that relies on continuous vigilance, as recorded in literary documents in English from the Middle Ages to the modern era. As the second edition of *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (OED^{2}Online) indicates, pride in the early fourteen century through to the late twentieth, might have been understood as a noble emotion, which, by standards of a secular existence, meant 'a consciousness of what benefits, is due to, or is worthy of oneself or one's position; self-respect; self-esteem, esp. of a legitimate or healthy kind or degree'.[41] The same source, however, draws us back to a diachronic list of proverbs which illustrate pride as 'the first of the seven deadly sins',[42] thereby revealing how fiercely denounced pride was even in the earliest days of Christianity. The influential fourth-century Father of the Christian Church, Saint Augustine, defines pride in his *Confessions* as referring to something that 'imitates what is lofty'[43] and speaks of the abandonment of 'all the empty hopes and lying follies of hollow ambitions'[44] before he pledges his 'preference to the Catholic faith'.[45] Two centuries later, Gregory the Great considers pride to be 'the queen of sin', 'the beginning of all sin', and also 'the root of all evil'.[46] The great value placed on the propagation of Christian faith in seventeenth-century England produced many books on pride as the chief vice of humanity. In *Early English Books Online* (EEBO),[47] we find numerous reported accounts of how pride was seen before the

[38] Michael Lewis, 'Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt', 569.
[39] Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 16.
[40] Judith N. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984) 97.
[41] OED^{2}Online, s. *pride* n. 3a.
[42] OED^{2}Online, s. *pride* n. 1c, d.
[43] Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. and introd. Henry Chadwick (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 31.
[44] Augustine 104.
[45] Augustine 95.
[46] Gregory, cited in Baasten 79, 66, 78.
[47] Available at http://eebo.chadwyck.com

eighteenth century strictly as a site of sin. Religious writers such as William Gearing (*Arraignment of Pride* [1660][48]), Andrew Jones (*Morbus Satanicus* [1677] [49]) and George Whitehead (*A Seasonable and Christian Caution against the Provoking Sin of Pride and other Manifest Evils* [1693][50]) demonstrated in their didactic works that, in the seventeenth century, pride in general and material corruption in particular, as one of its fundamental manifestations, were to be considered as an obstacle to salvation, because power, possessions, beauty and earnestness of passion (or at least the perception of these) were linked to chief abominations of God.[51] Taking a regular recourse to the Bible, the anonymous writer known as Compassionate Conformist (1683) cautioned the nobility and gentry against the dangers of pride:

> Pride is a disease that breads in course and branney Spirits (the very Scrapings of dame Natures trough) and blisters ever from the corrupted blood. Tis Humility is the Glory of the Great and the Noble, their only unalterable Dress, that is ever in fashion amongst them. The very Rubbies they wear would wax pale at the draught of the Venom, and Pearls themselves would blush for shame at the imputation of such a Foppery.[52]

A similar appeal by the same author is extended to the inhabitants of both city and country:

> Come now you that would pass for Noble and good natured men, come you sweet natured and tender-hearted women, consider well I pray you with me, what shall we think of this our foul sinful and hateful behaviour toward our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ. Let us lay aside our gorgeous Apparel, all our splendid Pomp & Vanity. And

---

[48] The full title of William Gearing's work is *Arraignment of Pride, or, pride set forth, with the causes, kinds, and several branches of it: the odiousness and greatness of the sin of pride: the prognisticks of it, together with the cure of it: as also a large description of the excellency and usefulness of the grace of humility: divided into chapters and sections*, 2nd ed. (London: Printed by R. White, for Francis Tyton, 1660).

[49] The full title of Andrew Jones's work is *Morbus Satanicus: the devils disease, or, The sin of pride arraigned and condemned*, 25th ed. (London: Printed by W. L. and T. J. for W. Thackery, Phil. Brooksby, John Williamson and J. Hose, 1677).

[50] The full title of George Whitehead's work is *A seasonable and Christian caution against the provoking sin of pride and other manifest evils, and of the judgements threatned because thereof, compassionately tendered to the inhabitants of London, and elsewhere concerned, as a warning to repentance* (London: Sold by Randal Tayler, 1693).

[51] The Bible speaks of the seven things that God abhors, pride being the first one: 'A proud look, a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood, An heart that deviseth wicked imaginations, feet that be swift in running to mischief, A false witness that speaketh lies, and he that soweth discord among brethren' (Proverbs 6.16-19). The Old and New Testaments teach that a man who seeks to be like God (his model) must reject pride, 'For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Faher, but is of the world' (I John 2.16). Within himself he has to seek humility, thereby escaping condemnation: 'A man's pride shall bring him low: but honour shall uphold the humble in spirit' (Proverbs 29.23). Psalm 12.3 issues a warning to the proud in the form of a physical threat: 'The Lord shall cut off all flattering lips, and the tongue that speaketh proud things'.

[52] Compassionate Conformist, *Englands vanity or The Voice of God against the monstrous sin of pride, in dress and apparel: wherein naked breasts and shoulders, antick and fantastick garbs, patches, and painting, long perriwigs, towers, bulls, shades, curlings, and crispings, with an hundred more fooleries of both sexes, are condemned as notoriously unlawful. With pertinent addresses to the court, nobility, gentry, city and country, directed especially to the professors in London* (London: Printed for John Dunton, 1683) 25.

> totally humble ourselves inside and outside, all Gallantry must be put off, Sackcloth put on; we must mortify our carnal bestial Lust, and let our Eyes brake forth into fountains of tears, to wash away the lothsom filth thereof.[53]

As these and several other pious exhortations of the period indicate,[54] Christian teaching and its attendant ethical code overtly espouses an austere moral attitude that bids believers to commit themselves to a heroic tetrad of poverty, sexual abstention, humility and self-mortification, all of which help to reinforce their conscious resistance to a life of pleasure. Such an attitude allies practices of self-abasement and servitude, since to preclude pride is to be assured, not of one's own, but of 'God's glory and greatness, and of his infinite perfections'.[55] Simple virtue, in this religious schema, requires an endorsement of a biblical prerogative – 'Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall' (Proverbs 16.18) – and thereby a dedication to a higher purpose: the struggle to prove one's loyalty to God which involves an effort of will and endurance, as the story of Job clearly shows.[56]

Russian Orthodox Christianity which provides the context for Tolstoy, similarly condemns what the English mind categorizes as "hubristic pride",[57] because it is associated with a man's rebellion against God's original creation of humanity as inherently inferior and subservient. There is an emphasis on *gordynja* – a negatively regarded emotion which 'is viewed as a sin and is conceptually close to *pride, hubris* and *superbia* in English',[58] and

---

[53] Compassionate Conformist 43.

[54] George Whitehead's condemnation of pride chiefly as insubordination is not any less forceful:

> Pride in Root and Branch, in Heart and Habit with its Immodesty, Vanity and Foolishness in Apparel, and the evil Example thereof, is altogether and expressly forbidden of God and his Christ, and directly contrary to the Holy Scriptures.

(*A seasonable and Christian caution against the provoking sin of pride and other manifest evils*, 1).

[55] Gearing, *Arraignment of Pride*, 10.

[56] The Book of Job is the story of a pious and rich servant of God, named Job, whose prosperity makes God want, especially after Satan's promptings, to test Job's virtue. Satan, as a trial, sends Job a string of calamities, initially to do with the loss of his wealth, which Job withstands without forsaking God. In the second phase of the trial, Job is afflicted by 'sore boils' (Job 2.7) which only cause him to strengthen his faith. In proportion as the pain intensifies, Job's endurance weakens. After a period of excruciating pain, he eventually breaks down, cursing the day he was born (Job 3.1-3). God counsels Job by questioning his fitness to pronounce judgments upon his divine creation, and recommends that he eschews his pride and instead works to 'Cast abroad the rage of [his] wrath: and behold every one that is proud, and abase him' (Job 40.11). A reformed Job goes on living with God's blessing, privileged to enjoy even a larger family and a greater fortune than ever before.

[57] Jessica L. Tracy et al., 'A Naturalist's View of Pride', *Emotion Review* 2.2 (2010): 163-177, at 164. In their article, Jessica L. Tracy, Azim F. Shariff and Joey T. Cheng articulate a well-known polarized classification of pride. They differentiate "authentic pride" from "hubristic pride". The former, in their account, 'includes words such as "accomplished" and "confident", and fits with the pro-social, achievement-oriented conceptualization of pride', whereas the latter 'includes words such as "arrogant" and "conceited", and fits with a more self-aggrandizing conceptualization' (164).

[58] Anna Gladkova, 'A Linguist's View of "Pride"', *Emotion Review* 2.2 (2010): 178-179, at 178.

which can be defined in Christian terms as an insolent self-esteem, an arrogant ambition to be equal with God, whilst forgetting one's own pre-determined sinfulness and liability to error.[59] *Gordynja* is what Svetlana Malahova (in her article 'Ličnostno-Èmocional′nye Koncepty «Gordost′» i «Styd» v Russkoj i Anglijskoj Lingvokul′turah'), has identified as part of the traditional Russian religious view of pride:

> В религиозном дискурсе гордость – грех, величайшее потрясение божественного порядка. Многочисленные упоминания гордости, как порока, или порочной страсти, в теологических текстах связаны с идеей пути, или пространственной метафорой Верха и Низа. Мотив возвышения в описаниях действий и последствий гордыни постоянно соседствует с мотивом падения. В богословских текстах встречается призыв испытать подобно Христу безчестье, униженность и стыд, чтобы уничтожить грех гордыни («униженные возвысятся»).[60]
>
> (In religious discourse, pride means sin, the greatest offence against God's order. Numerous references to pride, as a vice or depraved passions, are linked in theological texts to the idea of a journey or a special metaphor of Up and Down. In descriptions of actions and consequences of *gordynja*, the theme of elevation is continually presented as closely related to the idea of a fall. In these texts there can be found an appeal to the experience of a feeling similar to that felt by Jesus Christ: dishonour, humility and shame, in order to help oneself to expunge the sin of *gordynja* ["elevation through humility"]).

The clear implication here is that he who relinquishes "gordynja" or "hubristic pride" is a man of faith, and a precipitous decline in faith was bound to come when it proceeded to challenge, rather than support, a newly established modern lifestyle.

In both cultures, the end of the seventeenth century can be argued to mark a change in the value of pride that transformed it into a particularly attractive emotion. Indeed, the beginning of the eighteenth century was the time when the developing economy progressed towards a maximum focus on modern trade and scientific research for the nations who adopted the ideology of capitalism. The orthodox doctrines of contempt for material acquisition and personal merit lost their salience as sources of virtue in countries which suddenly offered their citizens extensive opportunities for the rapid accumulation of wealth, as well as possibilities of

---

[59] An appropriate sense of one's excellence is theoretically impossible within Pope Gregory's concept of obedience:

> obedience indicates a willingness to "humbly submit to the voice of another". In obedience, man acknowledges that he is aware of his position vis-à-vis God. Man, though created in the image of God, must still recognize that he is "under God".

(Baasten 23).

[60] Malahova 7.

education and a life of luxury. The advancements of modern civilization, 'particularly those associated with taste and refinement, had obtained an importance to eighteenth-century consumers as indicators of social and financial power'.[61] Not only were poverty and intellectual deficiency to be avoided; the poor and the uneducated became intended victims of social repression. Pride, a concept necessary to the success of the capitalist regime, now had been forced to push its conventional Christian connotations to the periphery and instead to privilege a new, or rather ancient, meaning closer to the Aristotelian sense of proper pride, which the philosopher himself accepted and even extolled.

In Aristotle's view, proper pride is a trait of 'the "great-souled person", or the "magnanimous man"' who '"thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them"'.[62] The virtuously proud people are explicitly said to be 'neither arrogant and vain nor pusillanimous and humble; rather they are proudly modest about their own achievements'.[63] Excessive pride leads to vanity and a vain person is described as 'foolish or silly':[64] one who claims more than his due. On the other hand, someone who gives himself less credit than he really deserves has the vice of unwarranted humility, which in comparison with vanity is 'both commoner and worse'.[65] Christian humility, both in practice and in common understanding, was by the early eighteenth century an obsolete value, and the revived Aristotelian sense of pride quickly developed into an established emotional schema of highly prosperous and highly cultivated nineteenth-century empires. This change was so widespread and forceful that, generally, within the upper echelons of society, assertion of one's superiority (and hence the debasement of another), even if it be based purely on moral grounds in relation to, for example, an unfaithful spouse, had become the virtually universal social expectation.

As the predicament of the deceived Karenin illustrates, neither forgiveness, nor generosity, nor pity, nor even love could release him from the duty of maintaining his pride in public. Happy as Karenin was to remain in his saintly delirium,

---

[61] Finlay 94.
[62] Aristotle, quoted in Michael Eric Dyson, *Pride: The Seven Deadly Sins* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 15.
[63] Aristotle, quoted in Kristján Kristjánsson, *Aristotle, Emotions, and Education* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 141.
[64] Aristotle, quoted in Dyson 15.
[65] Aristotle, quoted in Dyson 16.

> He felt that besides the blessed spiritual force controlling his soul, there was another, a brutal force, as powerful, or more powerful, which controlled his life, and that this force would not allow him that humble peace he longed for. He felt that every one was looking at him with inquiring wonder, that he was not understood, and that something was expected of him.[66]

In other words, if Karenin, in a rush of Christian feeling, resolves against judgement and condemnation of his disgraced wife, he has to do so privately.

Some of the Complex Facets of Pride in Middlemarch and Anna Karenina

Pride as Shame Camouflaged

The emotion of pride is found to be operating in ways contradictory to those often supposed. It has recently been proposed that in function it may not be strictly opposite to shame. Like shame, pride may offer a refuge against the disclosure of one's own limitations or personal inadequacies, 'in which case it expresses an underlying doubt about one's value as a person'.[67] It is those who 'are unable by [their] own efforts to demonstrate [their] competence, thus giving [themselves] a sense of healthy pride' that are likely to be motivated to 'borrow pride and prestige through some sort of identification with others whose efficacy [they inwardly] admire'.[68] By projecting an identity that is customarily thought to be in some respect admirable or worthy, although they know deep down it is false, they seek to 'protect and enhance [their own] personal identity'.[69] George Eliot's Casaubon, an amateur scholar, is a prototypical example of this kind of pride. Whether 'working on the shapeless Key to All Mythologies is a labor of sheer love',[70] as Nina Auerbach firmly believes, or a monstrously obsessional neurosis, it is nevertheless undeniably still a sham. Edward Casaubon, the Reverend, a bishop-to-be and a man who is publically known to have 'great studies',[71] is no Alexey Alexandrovitch, himself a victim of his own motto "unhasting and unresting" (*AK* 103), whose active political career, at least in its heyday, shows traces of practical usefulness. Casaubon is consistently presented as 'a born loser'[72] – doomed 'always to be scholarly and uninspired, ambitious and timid, scrupulous and dim-sighted' (*M* 280), altogether lacking in a

---

[66] Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 389.
[67] Lazarus and Lazarus 102.
[68] Nathanson 353.
[69] Lazarus and Lazarus 101.
[70] Nina Auerbach, 'Dorothea's Lost Dog', in *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Karen Chase (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 87-105, at 87.
[71] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 39.
[72] David Trotter, 'Space, Movement, and Sexual Feeling in *Middlemarch*', in Chase, 37-63, at 40.

set of superior qualities that Dorothea, a lay enthusiast of knowledge, ironically possesses: an 'ardent mind' (*M* 419) and an instinct to recognize and repudiate an academic mission that is fruitless. His tightly guarded *Key*, a theory that aimed to recover 'the seed of all tradition' (*M* 478), in view of its privacy and inherent arrogance, is visualized in terms of birth and infertility imagery. Significantly, this life-long work is conceived of as that which 'was already withered in the birth like an elfin child' (*M* 478), showing virtually no potential of ever fertilizing 'the embryos of truth' (*M* 478) – a claim which seems to be supported by two important facts. First, Casaubon's Magnum Opus originated from 'a vigorous error' (*M* 478), and second, although the project itself was often spoken of by the author in terms of notebooks that 'wanted digesting' (*M* 201), there was never any talk 'of the writing that is to be published' (*M* 201), thereby proving not at all 'useful to the world' (*M* 200).

Thanks to the image of a prodigious intellectual 'a little buried in books' (*M* 39) that Casaubon forced upon the parishioners of Middlemarch – '(Mr Casaubon was nervously conscious that he was expected to manifest a powerful mind)' (*M* 279) – he was so predefined by his own role-play that he had no alternative except either to assume a false appearance of an expert in antiquity, or conversely to accept himself a hypocrite and act his part of a slave to solemn rituals of research. The more outwardly absorbed Casaubon was in his studies, the more urgently he felt the need to put up 'a passionate resistance to the confession that he had achieved nothing' (*M* 417).

What provokes Casaubon's pride is not his assessment of himself as praiseworthy, but rather an internalized self-reproach. Absurd as this may seem, there actually is a clear psychological explanation for such a diagnosis. Michael Lewis, in his 'Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt', observes that 'when shamed repeatedly, people do employ strategies to rid themselves of this feeling, including a variety of disassociative behaviors',[73] such as for example we might suppose, the enactment of the feeling of pride. In the absence of self-satisfaction, Casaubon's (put on) pride is his way of coping with 'the inward sores of self-doubt and jealousy' (*M* 377). However low his view of himself is, Casaubon is too much of a man of 'self-preoccupation' and 'egoistic scrupulosity' (*M* 279) to be satisfied with the virtue of humility. 'Failing in [his] lifelong quest for the

[73] Michael Lewis, 'Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt', 569.

experience of efficacy',[74] he resorts to boosting his 'ego-identity'[75] in a twofold manner: by idolizing scholarly pursuits in order to conceal the shame of not measuring up to his fellow researchers, and by exercising power over the non-specialist Middlemarch community (perhaps excluding the capable and honest reviewer Carp) whom he can mislead by pretending to be one. In this sense, Casaubon's is the most odious of all types of pride because, although it reflects his sensitivity to his own failings, it reveals no inhibition about the deceitful masking of them, mainly to enjoy prestige and opportunities which would be otherwise inaccessible to him. The wish to hide one's insecurities and failures is not an uncommon inclination of human nature; quite the opposite: it has evolved as an adaptive mechanism of self-preservation. The problem arises, as Eliot demonstrates through the extreme example of Casaubon, when this instinctual hiding becomes the sole focus in life. The discipline of denying shameful feelings anticipates death from physical and mental exhaustion: physical, because out of anxiety and stress Casaubon develops a degenerative heart disease, and mental, because he dies never having achieved a favourable self-evaluation.

Pride Independent of the Social World

David Hume's writings, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/1888) in particular – which seem to have formed the basis for most of the leading modern theories of emotions as the robust present-day scholarly referencing and summations indicate – exerted perhaps a more enduring influence on the developmental discussions of emotions than any other philosopher of Enlightenment. According to Gabriele Taylor, Hume (1711-1776), whose ideas are still standard reference for transformative analyses of pride, makes an important mistake in the second of his two conditions that he believes to be strongly conducive to the experience of pride: (1) acceptance of a fixed, conventional evaluation of human actions (to elaborate, an achievement by virtue of the investment of one's efforts is generally considered to be a legitimate cause for pride, whereas the accomplishment of the same goal in the absence of exclusive responsibility – say, many people have contributed to the outcome – constitutes an insufficiently solid basis for pride); and (2) the belief that an object of our pride must also and necessarily be broadly comprehensible and congruent with what others customarily approve of and rate highly.[76] Of course, Taylor's model of pride does not assert that we tend to be proud

[74] Nathanson 354.
[75] Lazarus and Lazarus 102.
[76] Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 24-25.

of things that people, through social interaction, have learned to disdain, but it argues that we sometimes may be.

The case in point is Eliot's Dorothea, whose obscure spiritual religion – which she herself cultivates and cherishes – is thought in her social circles to bring out only undesirable traits or behaviours, and thus is a justifiable object of reproof. Dorothea exercises the virtue that is obviously alien to those around her. Her aim is to attain a 'submergence of self in communion with Divine perfection' (*M* 25), by which she means 'desiring what is perfectly good, even when we don't quite know what it is and cannot do what we would', as in doing so 'we are part of the divine power against evil – widening the skirts of light and making the struggle with darkness narrower' (*M* 392). Dorothea's faith is not what ignorant or more-down-to-earth Middlemarchers variously describe as 'the fanaticism of sympathy' (*M* 219), 'a beautiful mysticism' (*M* 392), 'a flighty sort of Methodistical stuff' (*M* 58) or dangerously 'taking up notions' (*M* 36). Rather it is, as Peter Hodgson beautifully articulates,

> a concrete way of life, a spirituality oriented to reality and the mystery beneath it. It entails not so much prayer as it does a return away from self-centeredness to the needs of others.[77]

It is her mind that 'yearned by its nature after some lofty conception of the world' (*M* 8), combined with the naivety of her youth, that prompted Dorothea toward the idealistic philanthropy (drawing up plans for labourers' cottages on Sir James's own and neighbouring estates) and that also led to the tragic overestimation of the supposedly 'great soul' (*M* 20) of Casaubon. When Mrs Cadwallader, after Casaubon's death, finds fault with Dorothea's moral principles, in particular her exuberant and self-destructive rejection of clearly defined Middlemarch attitudes, thereby forcing upon her conformity and submission, the latter is stung into a stout self-defense:

> No . . . I still think that the greater part of the world is mistaken about many things. Surely one may be sane and yet think so, since the greater part of the world has often had to come round from its opinion (*M* 537).

If Dorothea resists public pressure to abstain from what is conventionally regarded as 'nonsense' (*M* 58) and stubbornly directs no blame at herself, then this obstinacy must somehow reflect the fact that she considers her goals worthy of pursuit and herself perhaps

[77] Hodgson 122.

'more perceptive or less prejudiced than others and so see value where others do not'.[78] Dorothea is subconsciously aware that her religion of instinctive goodness is antithetical but superior to ethical universals of her environment. Middlemarchers are reformers of a strikingly conservative kind, still not in the habit of professing even the smallest contributions toward another's welfare, as these acts of selfless generosity are thought of at worst as futile and at best impractical. Presumably then, her pride is due to a belief that 'if only others were more intelligent or less trivially minded they, too, would come to value [her altruism], or at least come to see that it might be valued'.[79] On this interpretation, what Dorothea is proud of, although it is not fully understood by others, precedes and therefore cannot be based on, standard and socially-imposed reasons for pride.

No Longer the Pleasure of Pride, but Pride in Displeasure

Experiences of pride have typically been construed as involving the belief that one is '[responsible] for accomplishing a socially valued outcome or being a socially valued person',[80] the awareness of which is invariably accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. In *Anna Karenina*, Darya Alexandrovna is a fictional confirmation of the more recent recognition that the source of pride could also be the cause of a great deal of psychic pain and inner conflict. Dolly is destined to spend most of her youth looking after her many children fathered by a notoriously adulterous and negligent husband who, 'in spite of [his] efforts to be an attentive father and husband . . . never could keep in his mind that he had a wife and children' (*AK* 243). As a responsible and loving mother, she disassociates herself from the artificial values of a culture of leisure to which her spendthrift husband belongs. Instead, she looks upon herself as called by duty to run the impoverished household as cheaply as possible, to nurse her children through chronic illnesses, to attend to their education and to raise them generally to become 'decent people' (*AK* 561). Dolly obviously prides herself in having, as she likes to think, 'charming children, all six of them in different ways, but a set of children such as is not often to be met with' (*AK* 245), but her achievement obviously comes at a price, which she admits to herself in a moment of doubt:

> And all this, what's it for? What is to come of it all? That I'm wasting my life, never having a moment's peace, either with child, or nursing a child, forever irritable,

[78] Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 26-27.
[79] Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 27.
[80] Mascolo and Fischer, in Tangney and Fischer, 65.

> peevish, wretched myself and worrying others, repulsive to my husband, while the children are growing up unhappy, badly educated, and penniless (*AK* 561).

In the intensity of self-pitying reflection Dolly gives herself to frustrated indignation, but her willingness to sacrifice her physical beauty and also to forgo her own unarticulated desires both in order to secure the stability of the home, raises her to the dignity of what Gary Saul Morson refers to as "the prosaic hero".[81] Dolly embraces the struggle of ordinary life and accepts, it seems, what George Eliot regards to be 'the highest "calling and election'" of human existence, which 'is to *do without opium* and live through all our pain with conscious, clear-eyed endurance',[82] taking credit for relentlessly carrying out the routine activities of motherhood.

The first observation to make in response to Dolly's kind of pride is that it entails the dutiful obedience to the precepts of the institution of marriage. Dolly continues with her suffering in the service of The Family for the sake of the hoped-for reward – 'that the children don't die, and [she brings] them up somehow' (*AK* 561). This perseverance is third in line behind acquiescence and self-sacrifice, nineteenth-century feminine qualities deemed worthy of praise and emulation. The second observation is to acknowledge Dolly as a case of merely '"contented" or "quiet pride"'[83] by virtue of her utility in the secular world (giving birth to, feeding and raising as many children as possible was, at least according to Tolstoy, the most important duty of a woman[84]), quite independently of the suffering she endures in her situation. Gabriele Taylor puts it concisely: 'We prize or value what we are proud of, and this is different from, and may not coincide with, finding it pleasant'.[85] Dolly, 'looking back over

---

[81] Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) 38.

[82] George Eliot, 'Letter to Mme Eugène Bodichon, 26 December 1860', in *The George Eliot Letters 1859-1861*, vol. 3, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 365-367, at 366, italics in original.

[83] Patricia S. Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification* (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) 47.

[84] Tolstoy's expressed ideal of womanhood, in keeping with the earlier tradition, was extreme. In his philosophical work 'What Shall We Do Then?' (p. 335-336), he preached that

> Every woman, no matter how she may be dressed, what she may call herself, or how refined she may be, is a whore if she does not abstain from sexual intercourse, and yet abstains from childbirth.
>
> And no matter how fallen a woman may be, if she consciously abandons herself to bearing children, she performs the best, the highest act of life, in that she is doing God's will, and she has no one above her.
>
> If you are such, you will not say after two, nor after twenty children, that it is enough to bear children, just as a labourer of fifty years will not say that it is enough for him to work, so long as he continues to eat and sleep, and his muscles demand for work . . .

[85] Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 24-25.

her whole existence during those fifteen years of married life', certainly finds nothing pleasant about an intolerable 'pregnancy, sickness, mental incapacity, indifference to everything, and most of all – hideousness', all followed by 'the birth, the agony, the hideous agonies, that last moment … then the nursing, the sleepless nights, the fearful pains', such as 'the pain from sore breasts' (*AK* 560). When to these silent complaints Dolly adds an inward exclamation – 'what agonies, what toil! … One's whole life is ruined!' (*AK* 561) – motherhood comes to assume the proportions of every woman's tragedy. What predisposes Dolly to experience pride is evidently not a triumphant accomplishment that makes her feel pleasure, 'but one that confirms or enhances [her] sense of personal worth'.[86] This sort of pride is hence quite incompatible with being a successful person. Rather, it arises in response to a conviction of doing the right thing.

Metaphors of Pride and the Structuring of Emotional Response

The languages of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* reflect the special prominence of the emotion of pride in Eliot's and Tolstoy's cultural milieux respectively. A word-search in *The Literature Network's* electronic edition of *Middlemarch* tracks in total 73 occurrences of the English word *pride* (together with its adjectival and adverbial forms, *proud* and *proudly*), significantly more than as common a noun as *home*.[87] By the same token, Publičnaja Èlektronnaja Biblioteka reveals 74 instances of the Russian word *gordost'* (including other forms of this term[88]) in *Anna Karenina*, an even greater density than that of the word *sem'ja* (family)[89] which appears, quite naturally, at a high frequency in the sub-genre of the family novel. The disproportionate number of times Eliot and Tolstoy use the words *pride* and *gordost'* in their works is not indicative of Eliot's and Tolstoy's careless style of composition (there is a wealth of biographical evidence that supports the claim that both writers were in fact extremely particular in their selection of ideas and even words to achieve a desired moral

[86] Lazarus and Lazarus 100.
[87] There are 64 recorded uses of the word *home* in *Middlemarch*, data collected via *The Literature Network*, available at http://www.online-literature.com/booksearch.php
[88] See http://public-library.narod.ru/. For ways of translating the word *gordost'*, but also other related forms existing in Russian, such as *gordist'sja* (to be proud), see *Nacional'nyj Korpus Russkogo Jazyka Online*, s. *gordost**, 216-217; *and gord**, 349-350, available at http://ruscorpora.ru/. The numbers here refer to entries that contain translations directly from *Anna Karenina*. The "parallel" option should be selected to search similar contexts.
[89] *Anna Karenina* has, by Publičnaja Èlektronnaja Biblioteka's quick count, in total 57 occurrences of the word *sem'ja*.

content[90]). Neither can it be simply identified with being a result of a merely accidental linguistic repetition. Rather, the numerical disproportion might be illustrative of the identification by both English and Russian cultures of pride as especially important to them, this salience providing, in part, an explanation for Eliot's and Tolstoy's choice in making pride the dominant emotion in their novels. In the narratives' plots and in the characterization, there is a clearly discernible focus on pride, apparently in view of the stereotypical and distinctive association of this emotion with didacticism in nineteenth-century realist fiction. Traditionally, writers of these texts place demands upon their readers to make evaluations of the characters' actions on moral grounds as well as in light of social norms.

The established causal parameters for authentic and hubristic pride in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are so fixed and consequential that justifiably proud characters are ones rewarded in the end with greater emotional stability, whereas those egotistically proud are punished with the feeling of anguish, death, or a future in exile. Celia and Dorothea are proud

---

[90] Scholars interested in Eliot's and Tolstoy's stylistic techniques are drawn to *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, as both authors are known to have revised their early drafts repeatedly. When on 24 July 1871 Eliot wrote to her publisher, John Blackwood, about the difficulty of making omissions in her lengthy portions of writing, she was seeing herself as achieving a high standard of composition:

> I don't see how I can leave anything out, because I hope there is nothing that will be seen to be irrelevant to my design, which is to show the gradual action of ordinary causes rather than exceptional, and to show this in some directions which have not been from time immemorial the beaten path – the Cremorne walks and shows of fiction. But the best intentions are good for nothing until execution has justified them. And you know I am always compassed about with fears. I am in danger in all my designs of parodying dear Goldsmith's satire on Burke, and think of refining when novel readers only think of skipping.

('Letter to John Blackwood, 24 July 1871', in *The George Eliot Letters 1869-1873*, vol. 5, ed. Gordon S. Haight [London: Oxford University Press, 1956] 168-169, at 168-169).

As is well known, Tolstoy rewrote the first part of *Anna Karenina* ten times in order to ensure that the names, function, and the relations of characters to one another were exactly as he intended. When Katkov, Tolstoy's editor, stigmatized the murder-like consummation of Vronsky's sexual desire (Part II, Chapter 11) as the scene charged with excessively 'vivid realism', and suggested a less dramatic interpretation, Tolstoy is reported to have flatly "refused to change a single word, however, arguing that this was one of those parts on which the 'whole novel' depended" (Bartlett 237). After *Anna Karenina* was completed, S. A. Rachinsky, an editor and educator of the masses, expressed his reservations as to the novel's construction. He accused Tolstoy of magnificently developing 'two themes' that otherwise lacked connection. In response to Rachinsky's criticism, Tolstoy famously emphasized that it was for the sake of 'an inner link' that *Anna Karenina* was written:

> Your opinion about *Anna Karenina* seems to me wrong. On the contrary, I'm proud of the architecture – the arches have been constructed in such a way that it is impossible to see where the keystone is. And that is what I was striving for most of all. The structural link is not the plot or the relationships (friendships) between the characters, but an inner link. Believe me, this is not unwillingness to accept criticism – especially from you whose opinion is always too indulgent; but I'm afraid that in skimming through the novel you didn't notice its inner content.

('Letter to S. A. Rachinsky, 27 January 1878', in *Tolstoy's Letters 1828-1879*, vol. 1, trans. and ed. R. F. Christian [London: The Athlone Press, 1978] 311-312, at 311). See also Christian's footnote 4 (p. 311) for the exact wording of Rachinsky's complaint.

of their good birth; Caleb Garth of non-profitable commitment to activities that benefit others; Mary of being the offspring of two hard-working and honest parents; Dolly of her good-natured children; Levin of his ancestry and its attached duties. At the other end of the spectrum, Casaubon takes pride in his illusory academic career; Anna, as she herself on one occasion tries but fails to explain, of her degrading adulterous position: 'Я горда своим положением, потому что… горда тем… горда…'[91] ('I am proud of my position, because… proud of being…proud…'). In the event of Anna's verbal paralysis, the narrator intervenes to clarify that 'она не договорила, чем она была горда' ([*AK* 381] 'she did not finish saying what she was proud of'). Vronsky, according to Dolly, is proud of his financial security endowed upon him: 'Она считала его очень гордым и не видела в нем ничего такого, чем он мог бы гордиться, кроме богатства' ([*AK* 720-721] 'she considered him to be very proud, and saw nothing in him of which he could be proud except his wealth').

The accumulation of the causes that make the characters of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* proud (virtuously or unduly) must now be extended to cover spontaneous action tendencies typically associated with pride, as this behavioural information gives us a clue to the nature of the cognitive process which fashioned the linguistic representation of the two opposing facets of this emotion. Recent psychological research has repeatedly commented on the capacity of the human body to express pride via movement and gesture, construing a cluster of action tendencies that are believed to be a fairly reliable means of communicating both kinds of pride to the observer. Amongst the most prominent are: a small smile,[92] beaming face, erect/expanded posture, head being held high, and an ostentatious manner of walking – all accompanied by a thought of being 'taller, stronger, or bigger'.[93] Considered on the basis of a highly prototypical nonverbal expression of pride, the metaphoric language of this emotion in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* – very much like the metaphoric language of shame – reduces the seduction of artistic representation of pride, and rather displays the summation of a common experience, one partly derived from typical human behaviour and culture. In this formulation, unlike the biological and behavioural bases of shame, the foundations of pride are more exclusively behavioural.

---

[91] Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) 381.
[92] Because a wide smile has been identified as a recognizable component of other various emotion categories, such as happiness and joy, this facial expression has been dismissed as a signature index of pride.
[93] Mascolo and Fischer, in Tangney and Fischer, 67.

Recent findings in psychology that confirm a cross-culturally recognizable nonverbal expression of pride[94] suggest that the structure of pride metaphors in the novels will demonstrate largely culturally-universal conceptualizations of this emotion across English and Russian speakers. The behavioural display of pride (certain motor responses) across these two cultures, certainly aware of one another, is more than likely to indicate homogeneity, especially when judging against 'a highly isolated, preliterate tribal culture in Burkina Faso, where individuals with virtually no exposure to the Western world were shown to accurately identify the expression'.[95] This collective association of the emotion of pride with a distinguishable set of bodily behaviours, through our faculty of embodied reasoning,[96] gives rise to coherent image schemas that in an act of verbal expression becomes a standard metaphoric language of pride. Below, the dominant behavioural paradigms will be deployed not only to provide evidence of universality of metaphors of pride across the two cultures, but also to show how the reader's emotional response to the characters is constructed via textures of figurative language within which these paradigms are always embedded.

The investigation of metaphors of pride will, of course, encompass a range of related emotion words that belong to the conceptual domain of pride such as *self-satisfaction*, *conceit*, *vanity*, and *arrogance*, in *Middlemarch*, as well as *čestoljubie*, (ambition), *samodovol'stvo* (smugness), *hvastat'sja* (to boast), in *Anna Karenina*, clearly because, rather than considering pride as a having a single status with a single label, Eliot and Tolstoy seek to describe and represent various dimensions of pride by means of these very concepts. Their tacit recognition that the emotion of pride can appear, and notoriously does, in the guise of any single one of

---

[94] See Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'The Nonverbal Expression of Pride: Evidence for Cross-Cultural Recognition', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 94.3 (2008): 516-530, esp. their concluding statement on p. 528:

> In summary, we view the present findings as the first evidence in support of Darwin's (1872) claim about pride. Pride is uniquely different, in many ways, from the basic emotions, and even its expression is somewhat different, requiring the body as well as the face. However, these findings suggest that, at least from a behavioral perspective, pride may be as much a part of human nature as any other emotion.

See also Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, 'Emerging Insights into the Nature and Function of Pride', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16.3 (2007): 147-150; and J. L. Tracy and D. Matsumoto, 'The Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays', *PNAS* 105.33 (2008): 11655-11660.

[95] Tracy and Robins, 'The Prototypical Pride Expression', 789. In the same article, these two psychologists present a graph of prototypical emotion expressions that shows that the mean recognition rate for pride is a high 83%, 50% above the coincidental recognition rate in the sample of 500 study subjects.

[96] For a full discussion of how the mind is controlled by the normal functioning of the body, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

them perhaps finds its best articulation in Zoltán Kövecses' argument put forward in *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love* that all of these concepts, although they are not synonymous, can nevertheless be traced back to a core meaning of the cardinal concept of pride since 'they can all be referred to by the word *pride* (if the context requires, with some qualification like *justified*, *too much*, etc.)'.[97]

Vronsky: A Classic Example of Hubristic Pride

Collectively, metaphors of pride in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are designed to have a generative function of inducing a vast range of emotional reactions to fictional characters. One can speak of these reactions strictly as metaphorically stimulated, in that the reader seeks to interpret the narrated mental states directly in terms of their broadly internalized and automatically retrievable conceptual system that is always at the ready:[98] the use of the figurative language of pride as a reflection of pride-related patterns of behaviour almost automatically generates certain emotional attitudes, but not others. Eliot and Tolstoy communicate their characters' emotions metonymically, from posture, dress, or gesture, so that readers are invited to activate their sympathy in response to the partial clues offered by the novels. These clues are often conceptual metaphors that provide key information about which category of pride (hubristic or authentic) the characters are textually intended to display. Morally, Alexey Vronsky is a villain,[99] whose spiritual corruption, rather than openly condemned, is consistently conveyed through the deployment of the figurative language which in Vronsky's case involves a striking paradox: perking himself UP/HIGH, whilst relying on reverence by esteemed women to assure himself of his merit and influence, a standard pattern of behaviour that looks like the first form of hubristic pride – conceit.[100] Vronsky is 'one of the finest specimens of the gilded youth of Petersburg' (*AK* 40) who, due to his inherited inclination for dwelling in 'the light-hearted, pleasant world' (*AK* 107), has no intention to marry. When he realizes his new power to captivate the young and impressionable Kitty, intensely vulnerable to the ease of his manners and the dazzle of his military glamour –

[97] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986) 39.
[98] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
[99] The most penetrating discussion of Vronsky's morality is Gary Saul Morson's counter-intuitive reading of *Anna Karenina*, where he shows conclusively that 'Vronsky's moral obtuseness' is a direct consequence of the lack of family life and his mother's failure to imbue him with values other than a relish of life that is mindlessly ignorant of the needs and feelings of others (*Anna Karenina in Our Time*, 97-98).
[100] Kövecses 53.

especially after Stiva's insinuation 'that he may be able to win Kitty as a sexual conquest'[101] – he adopts the posture and the mental attitude of a conqueror:

> То, что он сейчас узнал про Кити, возбуждало и радовало его. *Грудь его невольно выпрямлялась и глаза блестели. Он чувствовал себя победителем* (*АК* 93).[102]
>
> (What he had just heard about Kitty excited and delighted him. *His chest involuntarily swelled, and his eyes flashed. He felt himself a victor*).

Had it not been for Vronsky's triumphant act of self-assertion, the reader would be more inclined to excuse him on the grounds of his pitiful ignorance of the full consequences of his actions. But this opportunity is lost when he launches yet another attack on female honour, thereby publicizing his colossal selfishness. The first stage of seduction of Anna, a swamp of conceit into which Anna is all too willing to plunge herself, is, again, linked in Vronsky's mind with power and greatness:

> Вронский ничего и никого не видал. *Он чувствовал себя царем* не потому, чтоб он верил, что произвел впечатление на Анну, он еще не верил этому, – но потому, что впечатление, которое она произвела на него, давало ему счастье и гордость. Что из этого всего выйдет, он не знал и даже не думал. *Он чувствовал, что все его доселе распущенные, разбросанные силы были собраны в одно и с страшною энергией были направлены к одной блаженной цели*. И он был счастлив этим (*АК* 141).
>
> (Vronsky saw nothing and no one. *He felt himself a tsar*,[103] not because he believed that he had made an impression on Anna – he did not believe that yet – but because the impression she had made on him gave him happiness and pride. What would come of it all he did not know and nor did he even consider. *He felt that all his forces, hitherto dissipated and scattered, were now pooled and focused with terrible energy toward one blissful goal.* And he was happy with that).

The love affair progresses, and Vronsky claims his rights to a woman who legally belongs to Karenin. But the PRIDE IS LIGHT IN THE EYES metonymy (its generic version is 'BRIGHTNESS OF THE EYES')[104] betrays that Vronsky is not entirely in control of the power he believes he possesses. When he accidentally meets Karenin in the latter's own house – during his private visit which Karenin has absolutely forbidden – the most he can manage is the psychological

---

[101] Alyson Tapp, 'Moving Stories: (E)Motion and Narrative in *Anna Karenina*', *Russian Literature* 61.3 (2007): 341-361, at 348.
[102] Examples of conceptual metonymies for pride are italicized for immediate identification.
[103] Translators, Constance Garnett (AK); Louise and Aylmer Maude (L&AM); and Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (RP&LV) all render the Russian word *цар* (Eng. *tsar*, the traditional title of the emperor of Russia) as *king*, a familiar correlation, one which nevertheless lacks a culturally-specific resonance.
[104] Kövecses 41.

intimidation of the rightful husband in the consciousness of his own arrogance and pretence, through a display of the physical attributes of pride: 'Брови его были нахмурены, и *глаза блестели злым и гордым блеском*' ([*АК* 426] 'His eyebrows frowned, and *his eyes shone with a proud and angry light*').[105]

The facial expression of dominance, the legitimacy of which is undermined by the very need to project it, ties Vronsky to the sickly miser of *Middlemarch*, Peter Featherstone, who seems to relish a situation in which he can offend Fred Vincy's pride in order to realize himself in his own sense of that emotion. Fred is not a shameless materialist, and so finds painful his role as a hungry dog that has been thrown a bone. No sooner does Fred feign, in a gentlemanly manner, his disappointment with just 'a little sheaf of notes' (*M* 134) than we are left with an image of Featherstone which echoes the metonymic characterization of Vronsky, similarly calculated to decrease his popularity with the reader. At the thought of Fred's reluctant financial dependence, '. . . *the old man's eyes gleamed with a curiously-mingled satisfaction* in the consciousness that this smart young fellow relied upon him, and that the smart young fellow was rather a fool for doing so' (*M* 135).

Just as Vronsky's firm adherence to his own monumentally hypocritical "code of principles"[106] appears to him as in itself a praiseworthy conduct which enables him to '*высоко носить голову*' ([*АК* 368] '*carry his head high*'), so Anna has her pride sketched out metonymically in similar terms. Since Tolstoy wished to emphasize, clearly for moral purposes, the parallels between Vronsky's and Anna's conceit, he seems to have subconsciously depicted those kindred behavioural postures that are passively recognized to accompany pride – 'HEAD HELD UNNATURALLY HIGH',[107] for Vronsky, and 'ERECT

---

[105] Very similar examples of linguistic expressions have already been compiled under the heading of 'BRIGHTENESS OF THE EYES' conceptual metonymies for pride. See Kövecses 41.

[106] The narrator comments:

> These principles laid down as invariable rules: that one must pay a cardsharper, but need not pay a tailor; that one must never tell a lie to a man, but one may to a woman; that one must never cheat any one, but one may a husband; that one must never pardon an insult, but one may give one and so on (*AK* 284).

[107] Kövecses 42. In *Middlemarch*, we find a remarkably similar example of the HEAD HELD UNNATURALLY HIGH conceptual metonymy used in reference to the proud Lydgate who is under the town's suspicion of taking a bribe from Bulstrode. The public sentiment is expressed by Mrs Sprague:

> Nobody supposes that Mr Lydgate can go on *holding up his head* in Middlemarch, things look so black about the thousand pounds he took just at that man's death. It really makes one shudder (*M* 744).

POSTURE',[108] for Anna. She is constantly seen standing 'как и всегда, *чрезвычайно прямо держась*' ([*АК* 113] '*extremely erect*, as always'), so that our eyes must look upwards to meet hers. Anna's unhealthy obsession to glorify her adultery, which most often afflicts women who feel guilty of transgression, and which is visually signalled by the 'CONCEITED PERSON IS UP/HIGH' conceptual metaphor,[109] is suggestive of the beginning of Anna's self-deception that Vronsky's love might save her from moral degradation:

> Если она моя, то *я чувствую себя так высоко*, так твердо, что ничто не может для меня быть унизительным (*АК* 381).
>
> (If it is mine [Vronsky's love], *I feel myself so high*, so firm, that nothing can be humiliation to me).

Consequently, we tend to associate these characters both with the idea of pomposity and exaggeration, which pulls our sympathies away from them: we naturally 'react negatively to showing off or self-aggrandizement, which puts others in a one-down position'.[110]

Critics have frequently interpreted Vronsky's final settlement with Anna and his efforts to create a home, along with his day-to-day involvement in matters of public concern, however disagreeable to himself, as a sign of his revolt against falsity. From this perspective, the submission to duty and the anticipation, surely, of misery, both compel our admiration which is also gained, by virtue of self-sacrifice, by the noble man, who might otherwise have walked away.[111] On the other hand, Vronsky's secret drops in self-esteem strip away the accretion of respect, reinstating the former accusation of duplicity. Vronsky, who we know has been throughout his entire life gnawed by 'червь честолюбия' ([*АК* 370] 'a worm of ambition'), has recently suffered the debilitating feeling of worthlessness. The military career has slipped away, the excitement of his glamourous liaison with a distinguished lady has long worn off and

---

[108] Kövecses 41.
[109] Kövecses 53.
[110] Lazarus and Lazarus 101.
[111] For example, the literary critic Anthony Thorlby comments:

> Anna is too radiant and too likeable a figure for us to disapprove of her, and her behaviour is inspired by a quality of love too soul-possessing, too superior to worldly circumstance and considerations of self-interest for us to regret that she does not simply turn her back on it. The same rather fine impression is made by Vronsky, whose pursuit of Anna is represented with barely a hint of any selfish or ignoble motive, and who is ready to sacrifice his life, and does sacrifice his career, for the sake of his love.

(*Leo Tolstoy: Anna Karenina*, Landmarks of World Literature [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987] 21).

> He felt that this independent attitude of a man who might have done anything, but cared to do nothing was already beginning to pall, that many people were beginning to fancy that he was not really capable of anything but being a straightforward, good-natured fellow (*AK* 285).

At this time, when public opinion must sway his way, his aspiration and actual ability are objects of close scrutiny. Serpuhovskoy, a school friend of Vronsky, has just been promoted to the rank of general and is duly acclaimed as 'a newly risen star of the first magnitude' (*AK* 286), which leaves Vronsky, 'a cavalry captain' (*AK* 286), little to recommend himself. The latter is now full of regrets and terrified of losing relevance. By justifying his decisions on the grounds of genuine love and public utility, Vronsky hopes to earn a new reputation for being an excellent husband and public benefactor. But these self-proclaimed roles suit him no more than priesthood suits Fred Vincy. When Dolly visits Anna at Vronsky's grand country estate, she praises his recent refurbishment of the house and is surprised to see, given his pride, how much pleasure her approval gives him. On hearing the compliments, Vronsky felt a surge of excitement, and

> Видно было, что, посвятив много труда на улучшение и украшение своей усадьбы, Вронский *чувствовал необходимость похвастаться ими* пред новым лицом и от души радовался похвалам Дарьи Александровны (*АК* 721).
>
> (It was evident that, having devoted great pains to the improvement and beautification of his estate, *Vronsky felt a need to boast of them* before a new person, and was glad at heart at Darya Alexandrovna' s praise).

Vronsky's desire to show off his home-bound productivity (which he himself considered only a year ago to be absurd trivialities of ridiculous people), unexpected and uncharacteristic of him as it is, makes us wonder, especially that we now know of his decision to retire from the army in favour of the full absorption in domesticity and local politics, whether there cannot be found in Vronsky the same juxtaposition of grandiosity and insecurity as was previously shown in Casaubon, whether his fresh interest is not a '[development of] a false self'[112] to cover up his failure to champion the old one.

Fred Vincy: A Transition from Hubristic to Authentic Pride

'Our vanities', George Eliot writes in *Middlemarch*, 'differ as our noses do: all conceit is not the same conceit, but varies in correspondence with the minutiae of mental make in

[112] Jane Middelton-Moz, *Shame and Guilt: The Masters of Disguise* (Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc., 1990) 29.

which one of us differs from another' (*M* 149), thereby suggesting, by means of this physiognomy-inspired metaphor, that all fictional characters differ in their psychology and potential to attract the reader's sympathy. What Alexey Vronsky, a Russian aristocrat, and Fred Vincy, a son of a well-to-do English manufacturer, have in common is a hefty dose of hubristic pride that involves them in a life of leisure and absurd desires, the emptiness and danger of which they likewise are unable to immediately recognize. Where they differ is an unequal measure of authentic pride, the favourable disproportion of which wins the reader's affection over to Fred's side. Fred, 'like many a plucked idle young gentleman' (*M* 140) – apparently well-meaning, but nevertheless utterly irresponsible – is not delivered from the narcissistic fixation on the self that is commonly placed towards the top of the list of the defining characteristics of hubris. Nor is he cut off from the want of ten thousand pounds of inheritance that would enable him, 'without study or other inconvenience' (*M* 343), to do exactly nothing: to

> hunt in pink, have a first-rate hunter, ride to cover on a fine hack, and be generally respected for doing so; moreover . . . to pay Mr Garth, and that Mary could no longer have any reason for not marrying him (*M* 342-343).

Certainly, the blow that Fred receives as a result of his uncle's most unanticipated last will and testament would have been less sharp if he had not previously found himself unable to service the debt for which Mr Garth had signed as guarantor upon Fred's assurance of his ability to pay it off on time. Although Fred's frustration with his situation 'beforehand had consisted almost entirely in the sense that he must seem dishonourable' to the Garths rather than in an appreciation of 'the inconvenience and possible injury that his breach might occasion them' (*M* 248), this pain alone indicates that he has tried but failed, first to '[reach] "other", then self-related expectations'.[113] This fear of negative evaluations from others, in turn, because it does not yet sponsor the atonement for what Fred has done, confirms not an occurrence of guilt, but of *wounded* pride. Eliot, in fact, employs this popular 'PRIDE IS A PERSON'[114] conceptual metaphor on two occasions to make sardonic comments on Rosamond – an extraordinarily vain woman who takes an immense pleasure in the view of herself as the greatest possible attainment of any high society man, and who remains to the end bound to the falsity of that conviction. The first instance is when, upon Rosamond's inability to confirm at

[113] Middleton-Moz 17.
[114] Kövecses 49.

the early stages of courtship her engagement to Lydgate, '*her pride was hurt*' (*M* 297). The second use of the metaphor is in relation to Will's choice of Dorothea as "the 'preferred woman'", the unscrupulousness of which 'had *bruised her pride* too sorely' for her to feel heartbroken or even guilty of flirtation (*M* 793).

When Mary, long before the whole money affair, declares that she would disgrace her family if she married an idle man, thus implying that Fred is one, the latter is analogously metaphorically reported to be '*stung*' (*M* 140). He soon stakes and loses all the savings of the Garths to help himself out of the financial difficulty. Already burdened with what he really knows to be a well-founded accusation, Fred is moved to a self-demeaning confession: '*I am a good-for-nothing blackguard*' (*M* 252). No doubt Fred's conclusion, tarnishing as it does his wholesome gentlemanly image, brings to mind, at least on a conceptual level, a depreciation in the public estimation of Vronsky, which is best articulated by Dolly who comforts a humiliated and abandoned Kitty: 'Он *не стоит* того, чтобы ты страдала из-за него' ([*АК* 162] 'He *is not worth* your suffering over him'). This PEOPLE ARE COMMODITIES metaphor persuades us to credit Fred with the value of a man with the potential of reform, and even allows a strong-headed Mary to entertain the notion that she has influenced Fred towards his final conversion:

> How can you bear to be so contemptible, when others are working and striving, and there are so many things to be done – how can you bear to be fit for nothing in the world that is useful? And with so much good in your disposition, Fred, – *you might be worth a great deal* (*M* 255).

Fred's lofty and at any rate overly ambitious aim – 'of saving almost all of the eighty pounds that Mr Garth offered him, and returning it, which he could easily do by giving up all futile money-spending, since he had a superfluous stock of clothes, and no expense in his board' (*M* 671)' – itself creates a slight impression of his self-deception.

But despite Fred's particular proneness to delusion, his worthy resolve still commands our sympathy, for it is evident that Fred is, against all scepticism, morally improved. As we approach the "Finale", we rejoice that Fred has finally succeeded in making his '*value felt*' in Middlemarch (this metaphoric expression is taken here in George Eliot's own sense, as she uses it in Chapter 58 [*M* 543] in reference to Dorothea's expressed hope for Will Ladislaw's advancement in the world). Fred was not destined to be rich, but he deserved Mary's hand,

produced three sons, became a good farmer and 'owner of the stock and furniture at Stone Court' (*M* 834), and generally 'remained unswervingly steady' (*M* 833). These achievements represent ultimately the honour and dignity that come of, in Mr Garth own words, 'a certain pride which is proper' (*M* 410). In the end, Fred's moral rehabilitation lies in his willingness to forsake both his grandiose goal of 'becoming better than others'[115] and the artificial flattery of wearing 'beautiful white trousers' (*M* 572) in return for achieving conventional respectability.

Lydgate: A Complex of Authentic and Hubristic Pride

Generations of critics have found Tertius Lydgate, an aspiring provincial doctor, particularly difficult to ultimately admire or condemn. Peter J. Capuano praises Lydgate for his 'enthusiastic and sympathetic sense of duty beyond himself'.[116] T. R. Wright charges Lydgate not with a lust for wealth, often granted by his profession, but rather with '[falling] short of his ambitions, acting in opposition to his own highest ideals and taking on a different significance . . . both in his own eyes and in those of others, from what he had intended'.[117] The reason for the divergence in sentiment is the fact that 'he had two selves within him apparently' (*M* 152), both miserably impossible to reconcile. Barbara Hardy calls '*homo duplex*' Eliot's fictional character whose motives move along parallel lines but in opposite directions: 'by the urge of self-interest and the urge of social impulse'.[118] Lydgate's introduction to Middlemarch is grand and his expectations of himself are high. Admirable at the starting-point of Lydgate's career are his ambition 'above all to contribute towards enlarging the scientific, rational basis of his profession' (*M* 147); his dedication 'to do good small work for Middlemarch, and great work for the world' (*M* 149); and also a distaste for 'empty bigwiggism, and obstructive trickery' (*M* 174) both of which are known in London to be effective strategies of forging ahead. It is clear from Mr Farebrother's advice to Lydgate

---

[115] Middleton-Moz 18.
[116] Peter J. Capuano, 'An Objective Aural-Relative in Middlemarch', *Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 47.4 (2007): 921-941, at 932.
[117] T. R. Wright, *George Eliot's Middlemarch* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 41.
[118] Barbara Hardy, *The Novels of George Eliot: A Study in Form* (1959; repr. London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1963) 78. The hero of Tolstoy's *Resurrection* (1899) – the proud and selfish prince Nekhlyudov who seduces an innocent young maid, thereby ruining her – similarly exhibits two poles with contrary spiritual qualities:

> In Nekhlyúdov, as in all people, there were two men; one the spiritual man [*duhovnyj čelovek*], who sought his well-being in such matters only as could at the same time do other people some good, and the other the animal man [*životnyj čelovek*], who was looking out only for his own well-being, ready for it to sacrifice the well-being of the whole world.

(Tolstoy, 'Resurrection' [1899], in Wiener, 78).

not to 'slip out of service' from pride 'and become good for nothing' (*M* 174) that he did suppose there was some value in Lydgate's revolutionary ardour, and that the reader would not be put off, as the narrator is, by 'Lydgate's conceit [which, expressed by the CONCEIT IS A PERSON metaphor,] was of *the arrogant sort, never simpering, never impertinent*, but *massive in its claims* and *benevolently contemptuous*' (*M* 149-150). With his unbending idealism Lydgate may be heroic in that he maintains his independence, but he is not heroic in the sense that he can expect to triumph professionally without surrendering 'to wear the harness' (*M* 174) of the medical association. Just as Lydgate has no respect for the world-old process of launching a career – transitory conformity which gradually dispels the suspicion of 'foreign ideas' (*M* 157) that initially always seem disruptive to established conventions – so also he has no grasp of his ill-defined modesty. Lydgate, the narrator tells us, favours practicality over extravagance and

> he would have despised any ostentation of expense; his profession had familiarized him with all grades of poverty, and he cared much for those who suffered hardships. He would have behaved perfectly at a table where the sauce was served in a jug with the handle off, and he would have remembered nothing about a grand dinner except that a man was there who talked well. But it had never occurred to him that he should live in any other than what he would have called an ordinary way, with green glasses for hock, and excellent waiting at table (*M* 348).

Reflecting upon this famous passage, Gillian Beer aptly observes that 'Lydgate's acceptance of these bourgeois necessities marks him out as one readily deflected from [medical] reform',[119] just as, we may add, his rather hypocritical tolerance for hardship corresponds exactly with the egoism of Vronsky, who is not offended by the poverty of others because he himself has immeasurably greater (and obviously taken-for-granted) homely comforts in which to indulge.

Restoring Lydgate to the dignity of holding proper pride would demand that he sustains his passion for medicine which is, in his view, 'the grandest profession in the world' (*M* 458), but at the same time David Kurnick appeals that 'we should recognize that ambitions are often most keenly felt as compulsions of the flesh'.[120] Lydgate's physical attraction to Rosamond, who has the power of producing 'the effect of exquisite music' (*M* 94), is not a

[119] Gillian Beer, 'What's not in Middlemarch', in Chase, 15-35, at 32.
[120] David Kurnick, 'An Erotics of Detachment: Middlemarch and Novel-Reading as Critical Practice', *ELH* 74.3 (2007): 583-608, at 602-603.

free act. He was born ‘an emotional creature, with a flesh-and-blood sense of fellowship which withstood all the abstractions of special study’ (*M* 145) and ‘whose better energies’, as a result, are now ‘liable to lapse down the wrong channel’ (*M* 149) when distracted. A secondary association of Lydgate, besides that of a dedicated reformist genetically susceptible to female seduction, is with egotistic folly and arrogance, the opposite of humility and symbolic of pride, adumbrating the biblical principle that ‘Pride must have a fall’ (*M* 744). The PRIDE IS QUANTITY (WHICH A HEALTHILY PROUD PERSON STRIVES TO KEEP IN BALANCE) metaphor enables us to see Lydgate’s pride as something that can be measured: Mrs Bulstrode, although she appreciates the cleverness of the medical man, she fears that ‘there is *too much pride* of intellect’ (*M* 296) in him to expect ‘true religious views’(*M* 296). In the narrator’s assessment, Lydgate is ‘*a little too self-confident* and disdainful’ (*M* 149), both faults of which

> were marked by kindred traits, and were those of a man who had a fine baritone, whose clothes hung well upon him, and who even in his ordinary gestures had an air of inbred distinction (*M* 150).

The narrator’s concern here is with developing a contrast between a promising doctor with a strong sense of purpose, and an ordinary, well-bred man, anxious to display his inherited upper-class qualities. The fact that Rosamond takes pride in just these latter Lydgate’s traits functions only to bring that polarity out. By the time Lydgate marries Rosamond, the failure of Dorothea and Casaubon to achieve greatness has created a pattern that he is destined to follow. Indeed, textually, the doubt cast on Dorothea and Casaubon as agents of success provides the opportunity for the reader to draw comparison. Dorothea’s romantic fulfilment in the “Finale” is an index of her commitment to lower-order ambitions – she has, after all, no cottages to build. And we have seen, too, how Casaubon deludes himself in his self-regard as an accomplished scholar. Dorothea’s and Casaubon’s wasted potential provides the template for abandoning any naïve hope for Lydgate’s future effectiveness. The only way to sympathize with Lydgate is to share with him his disappointment of being an ardent researcher ‘who spends the reminder of his life not in original and important research [the discovery of a primitive tissue], as he had hoped and as his intellectual capacity had promised he might, but in the treatment of gout’.[121] Away with Lydgate’s scientific aspirations goes an egotistical dream of domestic bliss: ‘the tender devotedness and docile adoration of

[121] Felicia Bonaparte, *Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George Eliot’s Novels* (New York: New York University Press, 1975) 42.

the ideal wife must be renounced'; instead, as in the Christian scheme of things, 'life must be taken up on a lower stage of expectation' (*M* 652). By comparison with his counterpart in *Anna Karenina*, Levin, Lydgate is a defeated husband, psychologically trapped with no alternative but to yield or else become guilty of neglecting 'one's proper responsibilities (to family, tenants, church, etc.)'.[122]

One way of summarizing the mimetic Realism of *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is to say that Eliot's and Tolstoy's habits of figurative expression intuitively imitate English and Russian readers' binary view of the concept of pride. Both cultures, based on the metaphors underlying their conceptual mindset in relation to the range and boundaries of this emotion, recognize 'negative synonyms of pride – arrogance, vanity, and hubris – and positive cognates of pride, such as self-respect, self-esteem, and dignity'.[123] There is a striking similarity in the conceptualization of false and authentic pride in *Middlemarch* and in *Anna Karenina*. This means that linguistic expressions of the novels are motivated logically in much the same way in order to conceptually differentiate these two sorts of pride. The advantage of a tendency to deploy mechanistic metonymies and metaphors for pride is that it allows access to the characters' mental states, drawing us into the kind of pride they represent. Predictably, Eliot and Tolstoy, by metaphorically harnessing the reader to existing conceptual frameworks that encapsulate fixed associations of pride with self-flattery of varying status and degree, provoke a series of favourable, hostile or mixed emotional reactions to their characters. The prototypical positive and negative connotations of pride are derived metaphorically and metonymically from associative behaviours, forcing the reader's mind routinely to configure this concept into patterns so self-consistent that, by virtue of their familiarity and inherent suggestiveness, they help develop a bias against those characters whose main failing is the construction of the giant (ego-centered) self.

The set of conceptual metonymies and metaphors for hubristic pride – ERECT POSTURE, HEAD HELD UNNATURALLY HIGH, PRIDE IS LIGHT IN THE EYES, CONCEITED PERSON IS UP/HIGH – have functioned visually to make the reader challenge or altogether dismiss Vronsky's claim to importance and greatness; to develop an aversion to Anna's exaggerated self-confidence; and overall to subject the reader to the stifling oppression by the atmosphere of triumph they

[122] Daniel Siegel, 'Losing for Profit', in Chase, 157-176, at 167.
[123] Dyson 6.

both create. By the PEOPLE ARE COMMODITIES metaphor we have been encouraged to see the vain Fred Vincy initially as lacking in value and in need of improvement and, as his moral quality increases, with a possibility of redemption. And finally the combination of commonplace metaphors used to characterize Lydgate – CONCEIT IS A PERSON and PRIDE IS QUANTITY (WHICH A HEALTHILY PROUD PERSON STRIVES TO KEEP IN BALANCE) – has evoked for the reader an earlier reference to the biblical fate of a proud man with unrestrained desires, which is also at the same time analogous to the mythological destiny of the young Icarus who experiences, at the cost of his own destruction, the pleasure of flying too high.

By using conventional metaphors of pride – in the process of characterization – Eliot and Tolstoy make reference to inherited conceptual schemas that the reader is largely unaware of, but unthinkingly susceptible to, thus encouraging their subconscious responsiveness. The emotional disconnection from excessively proud characters, in other words, is psychologically orchestrated because the reading audience has already involuntarily submitted itself to the pressure of the manner with which its own culture has come to cognitively schematize, and linguistically express, widespread assessments of emotions.

6

ANGER METAPHORS: THE RHETORIC OF SELF-RESTRAINT

For a nineteenth-century realist novel in which anger is universally recognized as archetypically portrayed, one would need to look beyond England, to Russia, and beyond the pages of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*. It is in *Crime and Punishment* (1865-1866) that anger is probably one of the highest on the list of emotions to which Fyodor Dostoyevsky attends, and where the most typical examples of metaphors and metonymies of anger are to be found. The moral rebel and murderer, Rodion Raskolnikov, is continually presented metonymically and metaphorically as either a sarcastic and demonically proud speaker who has 'lost his self-control and *glared* at [his interlocutor] viciously *with black eyes* that *burned with anger*',[1] or conversely a semi-delirious criminal petrified by the idea of being unmasked, 'feeling even before he had thought it to what *heights of rabid fury and rage* it was capable of leading him, feeling that he might even *go mad with rage*' (*CP* 411). The physical correlates of anger – such as trembling, glistening eyes, making loud sounds and the increased production of saliva – associated with the ANGER-AS-OBSERVABLE MANIFESTATIONS metonymy, become even more prevalent: 'Suddenly *his lips* [Raskolnikov's] *began to quiver*, *his eyes burned with fury*, and *his voice*, which until now had been restrained, *began to boom*' (*CP* 408). Raskolnikov's friend, Razumikhin, is described at some point as 'practically *frothing at the mouth*' (*CP* 305).

Whilst the psychology of anger can be considered to be a prominent topic of thought peculiar to Dostoyevsky's realist discourse, the conceptual metaphors employed to convey the experience of this emotion are a not specific to this context. Rather, they arise as linguistic instantiations of 'biologically based universality in the expression and recognition of anger'.[2] Anger metaphors, as specific figurative expressions, have been found to be commonly used across culturally diverse communities by virtue of their correspondence to an ingroup and intergroup consensus about the non-verbal expression of anger and its physiological distinctiveness.

---

[1] Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *Crime and Punishment* 1865-6, trans. and introd. David McDuff (London: Penguin, 1991; rev. 2003) 299.

[2] David Matsumoto et al., 'The Expression of Anger Across Cultures', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. (New York: Springer, 2010) 125-137, at 125.

Anger in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* – novels infinitely more concerned with the refinement of manners within high class social circles – is less evident than in *Crime and Punishment*, but the conceptual model of anger deployed by Dostoyevsky can be seen to provide metaphorical prototypes that are also part of lexical habits of the embodied minds of Eliot and Tolstoy, a phenomenon manifested in their own personal linguistic choices. By and large, the prototypical figurative model of anger is a representation of the physical processes which are generally identified with this emotion. They are characterized, on the one hand, physiologically by 'muscle tension, general restlessness, an increase in heart rate and the face feeling hot';[3] and, on the other hand, behaviourally by 'self-assertion, ranging from statements of appropriate self-assertion and defense of one's self to harmful aggressive actions',[4] impaired judgement,[5] and also a tendency to 'act on impulse and without reflection'.[6] This coherent, and usually automatic, response pattern leads to the expectation that metaphors of anger in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* arise from the way people are biologically hard-wired to react to anger-eliciting events.

It is within this framework of embodied cognition that the metaphoric and metonymic language of anger in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* is proposed in this chapter to be a result of a cultural and social sharing of mental conceptions about this emotion. This unified interpretation of the physiologically-situated emotion of anger has been most singularly captured in the widespread metaphor: 'THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER'.[7] The strikingly uniform and systematic conceptualization of anger in both English and Russian

---

[3] Leonard Berkowitz, 'Anger', in *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. Tim Dalgleish and Mick J. Power (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) 411-428, at 412. The distinct physiology of anger has received an extraordinary amount of attention. Gerhard Stemmler ('Somatovisceral Activation During Anger', in Potegal et al., [103-121, at 104]) best describes just how popular this subject has been in recent times by providing a numerical evidence of his own research findings:

> There are hundreds of studies on the psychophysiological anger response. At the time of this writing, PsycINFO lists 603entries for "anger and cardiovascular," 510 for "anger and blood pressure," 494 for "anger and (biology or biological)," 322 for "anger and (psychophysiology or psychophysiological)," and 1,029 for "anger and (physiology or physiological)."

[4] David Schultz et al., 'State and Trait Anger, Fear, and Social Information Processing', in Potegal et al., 311-325, at 312.

[5] See, for example, Russell L. Kolts, *The Compassionate-Mind Guide to Managing Your Anger* (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 2012) 19-20; and also Charles D. Spielberger and Eric C. Reheiser, 'The Nature and Measurement of Anger', in Potegal et al., 403-412, at 404.

[6] Michael Potegal, 'The Temporal Dynamics of Anger: Phenomena, Processes, and Perplexities', in Potegal et al., 385-401, at 386.

[7] Zoltán Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger: A Psycholinguistic Analysis', in Potegal et al., 157-191, at 157.

(and presumably other) cultures has its basis in 'the universal embodiment of anger'[8] and its external manifestation – in facial,[9] gestural,[10] and vocal expressions.[11] We are accustomed to discern common physiological reactions that are sufficiently identifiable and coherent to warrant at least a partial explanation for cognitive representations of this emotion. The physical experience of such embodied anger – by which is understood a conscious or intuitive awareness of the biologically-conditioned and universally-produced heat in the body – has, from at least Aristotle onwards, been explained in terms of 'a boiling of the blood and hot stuff

---

[8] Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger', in Potegal et al., 157.

[9] Darwin has first suggested (*The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 1872) and modern authority on facial behaviour seems very much to agree (Ekman [*Emotion in the Human Face*, 1972; *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life*, 2003]; and Izard [*The Face of Emotion*, 1971; *Human Emotions*, 1977]) that basic emotions (such as joy, anger, fear, disgust and sadness) have a reliably recognizable facial signature – certain involuntary muscular reactions – to be identified with a considerable degree of universality across Western and non-Western cultures. A repertoire of facial expressions associated with anger as provided by David Matsumoto et al. ('The Expression of Anger Across Cultures', in Potegal et al., 125- 137, at 126) includes a range of covert elements that are not essential to, but highly characteristic of, the facial behaviour of anger. Describing four pictures (of which the first two are originally Ekman's) that represent the prototypical facial expression of anger, Matsumoto and his colleagues write:

> Figure 8.1 shows three examples of the universal facial expression of anger in humans. In all of them, the brows are pulled down and together by the action of the corrugator muscles. In Fig. 8.1a, b, this action is accompanied by the raising of the upper eyelid, which produces a staring quality to the eyes. In Fig. 8.1c, the corrugator action is accompanied by a tensing of the lower eyelid. In all expressions, the lips are tightened. In Fig. 8.1a, c, the mouth is closed, as if the expresser is trying to control an impending outburst. In Fig. 8.1b, the mouth is open, as if the outburst is occurring. For comparison purposes, we include a fourth picture of a primate (rhesus monkey *Macaca mulatta*) open mouth threat face, which is used by dominant animals to keep others away (Fig. 8.1d).

[10] The emblematic gestural expression of anger has been reported to involve 'an impulse to move forward toward the target of anger', and also a tendency to raise hands to signal an intention to strike (Paul Ekman, *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life*, 2nd ed. [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003] 135, 26). These highly recognizable bodily movements, perceived to be oriented towards inflicting harm, 'show that angry feelings are paralleled by aggression-related motor impulses' (Berkowitz, in Dalgleish and Power, 425).

[11] One of the most characteristic features of anger recognized across cultures is the high-pitched tone of voice such as that produced during yelling, shouting or screaming. James A. Green et al. (in 'Vocal Expressions of Anger', in Potegal et al., 139-156, at 139), demonstrate that there is a considerable similarity in the ways people vocally express anger worldwide:

> The linkage between shouting and Anger has, of course, a basis in the empirical literature. Speech identified as angry has generally been found to be fast, loud, and often has a rising melody type. Further, Anger can be identified at above chance levels from vocal expressions alone, and there is cross-cultural generality in the ability to recognize Anger from speech alone. These general findings have led many researchers in the field to the conclusion that specific emotions (e.g., anger, fear, joy) are the result of specific physiological conditions, conditions which give rise to specific patterns of energy in the acoustic waveform of the vocalizations produced during those emotions.

For a convincing argument that the vocal expression of emotions is, like facial, subject to universal recognition, see also Rainer Banse and Klaus R. Scherer, 'Acoustic Profiles in Vocal Emotion Expression', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70.3 (1996): 614-636.

about the heart'.[12] This physiological pattern mentally schematizes a human being as resembling a hydraulic pressure system in which the temperature of fluids progressively rises and which, upon reaching a critical point, has to be violently released. That this accumulation of energy is noticeably gradual for the experiencer (and often for the observer) enables the speakers of a language to cognitively *gradate* anger as an emotion that can escalate, in English, 'from mild irritation or annoyance to intense fury and rage',[13] and, in Russian, from '*razdraženie* [irritation] or *gnev* [anger] to *bešenstvo* [rage] and *jarost'* [fury]'.[14] A representative linguistic example from *Crime and Punishment* of anger denoting a mechanism that 'works like a pressure cooker',[15] chosen in view of its potential to be called the paradigm metaphor against which *Middlemarch*'s and *Anna Karenina*'s own subtle variants will be continually referenced, may serve as an illustration of a near-universal conceptualization of anger as correlating with the physics of water movement in a hermetic container:[16] 'Но это *еще более подкипятило злобу Раскольникова*, и он уже никак не мог удержаться от насмешливого и довольно неосторожного вызова'[17] ('But all this merely *set Raskolnikov's rage boiling even more fiercely*, and by now he was quite unable to restrain himself from issuing a mocking and somewhat incautious challenge'). Dostoyevsky's metaphor for Raskolnikov's rage comes from a fixed mental representation of anger which is anchored in

---

[12] Aristotle, *De Anima (On the Soul)*, trans. with introd. and notes, by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1986) 129 [I. 1]. Contemporary theorists of emotions, too, have typically linked anger with bodily heat. For Carroll E. Izard, anger is bound up with the physical sensation that, inside us, 'the blood "boils", the face becomes hot, the muscles tense. There is a feeling of power and an impulse to strike out, to attack the source of anger' (*The Psychology of Emotions* [New York and London: Plenum Press, 1991] 241).

[13] Spielberger and Reheiser, 'The Nature and Measurement of Anger', in Potegal et al., 403.

[14] Anna D. Mostovaja, 'On Emotions That One Can "Immerse into", "Fall into" and "Come to": The Semantics of a few Russian Prepositional Constructions', in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998) 295-329, at 298.

[15] William Gray DeFoore, *Anger: Deal with It, Heal with It, Stop It from Killing You* (Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc., 1991; rev. ed. 2004) 2.

[16] Much of the cognitive linguistic research on anger has conclusively demonstrated that shared biology (which motivates the ANGER IS HEAT conceptual metaphor) constitutes a considerable part – but only a part – of a metaphoric conceptualization of this emotion across different cultures. See, for example, Zouhair Maalej, 'Figurative Language in Anger Expressions in Tunisian Arabic: An Extended View of Embodiment', *Metaphor and Symbol* 19.1 (2004): 51-75; Agnieszka Mikołczak, 'The Metonymic and Metaphorical Conceptualisation of *Anger* in Polish', in Athanasiadou and Tabakowska, 153-190; John R. Tylor and Thandi G. Mbense, 'Red Dogs and Rotten Mealies: How Zulus Talk About Anger', in Athanasiadou and Tabakowska, 191-226; Antonio Barcelona and Cristina Soriano, 'Metaphorical Conceptualization in English and Spanish', *European Journal of English Studies* 8.3 (2004): 295-307; Ning Yu, 'Metaphorical Expressions of Anger and Happiness in English and Chinese', *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 10.2 (1995): 59-92; and Keiko Matsuki, 'Metaphors of Anger in Japanese', in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, eds. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995) 137-151.

[17] Fedor Dostoevskij, *Prestuplenie i Nakazanie* (*Crime and Punishment*) 1865-6 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2012) 356.

the feeling of 'greater blood pressure and heightened bodily tension'[18] that people typically report when they are overwhelmed by this emotion.

Ancient Views on Anger

Modern Western ideas of embodied anger, and reflections on the diverse dimensions of this emotion, were inherited from philosophical texts of antiquity, where a non-arbitrary biologically-based conceptual construal of this emotion was implied. Aristotle may have been among the first to construe bodily heat as the dominant component of what has become known as the conventional, culturally universal conceptualization of anger. But apart from helping to standardize the pairing of anger with increased blood flow, the Greek philosopher also advanced a set of explicit propositions concerning this emotion that have proven, at least in literary contexts, to be enduring. Ancient philosophy, in other words, contributed the first essential interpretations of anger – culturally specific and historically-situated patterns of thought – from which later established traditions of anger conceptualization, including the Judao-Christian underpinnings of Western culture, proceeded.

The constant preoccupation of classical and early Christian writers with the harmful effects of anger indicates that the tradition of anger control must have been developed by the Hellenistic Age, and resulted, as the inherited social significance of self-restraint in due course solidified, in an extensive anti-anger body of literature in religious contexts. Ancient ideas about anger – with which Christian thinkers and theologians were well acquainted and frequently alluded to in their criticism – wielded an influence that continued long after the end of antiquity, well through to the rise of modern Western civilization. The damaging consequences that resulted from the habitual surrendering of ancient cultures to the forces of anger (commonly believed to activate irrational impulses and promote vengeful thinking) provided the members with a strong motivation for imposing sanctions against socially inappropriate forms of display, chiefly to establish order in otherwise irascible communities. Despite the shared assumption of ancient Greeks and Romans that anger was a proper response to a slight from another person, perceived in light of one's own self-proclaimed superiority, the need for a conscious inhibition of vigorous emotions exerted itself even more powerfully. This social constraint was normalized in Greco-Roman and later cultures despite

[18] Berkowitz, in Dalgleish and Power, 412.

the features of anger that it shared with Aristotle's "admirable pride", an emotional state that entails a due sense of one's own worthiness[19] and that oftentimes was seen as a moral right bestowed upon military victors.[20]

Present-day discussions on Classical anger, such as that by William Harris (2001),[21] Robert A. Kaster (2005)[22] and David Konstan (2006),[23] repeat the dualistic conception of anger as a violent emotion which can be judged justified or unjustified, but which is generally assessed as the least destructive when repressed. Their recurrent argument, though, is that the

---

[19]Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) 1729-1867. *Nicomachean Ethics* is a work most frequently referred to by scholars in their discussions of Aristotle's conception of anger and pride.

[20] David Konstan, 'Anger, Hatred, and Genocide in Ancient Greece', *Common Knowledge* 13.1 (2007): 170-187. In this article Konstan examines Greek notions of violence, in particular, the liberty to vent anger and express hatred with little censure or public reprobation. In the ancient Greece, both emotions functioned as 'catalysts of or excuses' (p. 3) for mass-murder of the defenseless enemies, under the prevailing laxity that existed in war regulations and virtually no abolitionist movements conspired to give rise to anything akin to present-day interpretations of human rights.

[21] There has been a surge of interest in the representation of anger in ancient times. William V. Harris's *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001) is especially significant for the study of the emergence and persistence, from Homer onwards, of the boundaries of anger which could not be overstepped without potentially incurring public outrage. Harris suggests, on the basis of ancient philosophical and imaginative literature, that the restraint of anger was not expected to be exercised equally across all classes. Unjustified and unrelenting anger of state rulers ran counter to a newly created – and monopolized by Greek and Roman writers – image of a good-natured monarch, though moderate anger of kings was considered an auxiliary to their exclusive royal powers. At the same time, it was the slave's lot to be the victim of the master's rage and repress his own feelings of anger, despite their inevitable emergence in response.

[22] Robert A. Kaster's book *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), although it is not in itself a study of a cluster of negative emotions that move Romans in the late Republic and early Empire to physical aggression or revenge (such as anger or hatred), it nevertheless focuses on a group of other, less "violent" or "stormy" social emotions involving peace and uniformity as goals – in particular, *verecundia* and *pudor* (roughly translated as *respect* and *shame*); *paenitentia* (close in meaning to English *regret*); and also *invidia* and *fastidium* (customarily taken to be broad equivalents of *hostility* and *revulsion*). By functioning either as a check upon unworthy actions (one's own) or to undercut an unmerited good fortune (someone else's) – that is, 'by exerting the normative pressure' (4) – these emotions are argued to be responsible for cultivating moral virtue in an orderly community of regulated behaviour and fairness.

[23] In Chapter 2, 'Anger' (41-76) of *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), David Konstan draws on a range of ancient literary texts to distinguish the conception of anger which prevailed at the time of Aristotle from the modern. The divergence between Greek anger and ours is summarized via a colour spectrum metaphor on p. 48 as follows:

> But even on the basis of what we have already noted, it would seem that Aristotle's notion of anger relates to our own in something like the way that indigo does to blue: they overlap in part, but do not have the same extension (see chapter 1, p. 5).

The perceived discrepancy is due in part to disparate socio-cultural contexts, and also partly as a result of an absence of an exact semantic correspondence between the Greek and English emotional vocabularies. The tracing of the differences in the cognitive content of emotion words, such as *orgê* and *anger* – which is well known to be the crux of Anna Wierzbicka's ongoing research project (her insights in respect to anger in English and Russian are discussed later in this chapter) – is undertaken by Konstan to convincingly demonstrate a non-universality of an experience of anger, by providing evidence for only a relative (as opposed to absolute) conceptual stability around concepts across the two cultures.

moral values and the distinct emotional lexicons of ancient cultures fail to correspond with our own, and so this divergence must be accounted for in attempting to make valid comparisons. For these authors, the expression of anger (and other emotions) seems to be associated with social adaptation. What they believe takes place within communities is the intuitive enactment of the cultural scripts (a culture's own '*display rules*'[24] in the form of 'role performances'[25] to be acted out in specific situational contexts) that have been imposed by, and acquired through, the condition of belonging. Culturally variable manifestations of anger, to put it in terms imported from Social Psychology are part of

> the normative framework that describes the range of acceptable behaviors, given the social circumstances, and the humans have the cognitive abilities with which to learn and engage these norms in making decisions concerning situation-appropriate behaviors when anger is elicited.[26]

This culture-specific view, however, does not invalidate biological grounding of anger which presupposes a cross-cultural consistency in physiological patterns associated with this emotion. The remarkable extent of correspondence in the repertoire of hot anger metaphors between ancient cultures and our own, made evident through Harris's and Kaster's careful translations of selected literary texts of antiquity, in fact invites and even necessitates the definition of this steamy emotion as a simultaneously embodied universal and also a culturally-specific phenomenon.

Ancient concern with the control of anger inspired a theology in the Middle Ages that 'distinguished between a vice that was self-indulgent and could be recklessly destructive and a righteous zeal that could marshal passion and thus focus energy to fight constructively against evil'.[27] By the time of the Christian era, noble anger was integral to Christian ideology, partly because of the clerical effort to exert control over the religious community, but it nevertheless failed to achieve a privileged status. Maimonides (1135-1204), an influential medieval Jewish philosopher, provides what can be taken as a fair summation of the Christian stance on anger

---

[24] Display rules, Paul Ekman explains, are 'socially learned, often culturally different, rules about the management of expression, about who can show which emotion to whom and when they can do so' (*Emotions Revealed*, 4).
[25] David Matsumoto and Jessie Wilson, 'Culture, Emotion, and Motivation', in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition across Cultures*, eds. Richard M. Sorrentino and Susumu Yamaguchi (New York: Elsevier, 2008) 541-563, at 541.
[26] Matsumoto et al., in Potegal et al., 133.
[27] Lester K. Little, 'Anger in Monastic Curses', in *Anger's Past: The Social Issues of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998) 9-35, at 12.

that, on the one hand, was inclined to accept this emotion as part of the campaign against sin; and, on the other hand, to promote – by forging for the laity a path to holiness – the monastic emphasis on the total elimination of anger as evidence of a proper exercise of free will. For Maimonides, the manifestation of man's wisdom is his ineptitude to

> be irascible and easily angered, nor like a corpse who feels nothing, but in between; he shall only become angry about a large matter that deserves anger so that something like it not be done again.[28]

But it is through the complete disavowal of anger that he warrants salvation for himself, because '. . . Whoever moves away from a haughty heart to the opposite extreme so that he is exceedingly lowly in spirit is called a pious man; this is the measure of piety'.[29] The control of emotions became a recurrent theme in nineteenth-century novels which dealt with forms of anger to explain and even dictate a new spirituality and behavioural ideals to the civilized society now poised to expand its modern secular rationality. However, the conclusion to which the historical evidence points is that this narrative quest for the rhetorically-motivated moulding of resentment towards hostile feelings was to a great extent indebted to the earlier appropriation by the Christian Church of ancient Greek and Roman notions about anger.

The acknowledgement of Classical anger, and subsequent reactions of the Christian Church against it, will take us further toward an understanding of nineteenth-century writers' discernible moral intent in their nuanced use of conceptual metonymies and metaphors for anger. A consideration of the figurative language in the indisputably didactic novels, *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, aims to illuminate how the authors subconsciously engage with classical traditions of anger conceptualization, in order to communicate to their readers the ethical messages of their own social and cultural milieux. In particular, this chapter will show how Eliot and Tolstoy, in their twin aesthetic efforts to marginalize anger as a religious sin, instead propagating a new concept of anger as a social transgression, participated in the widespread tendency among positivist and pragmatist communities, in England, and already

[28] Maimonides (*Hilkhot De'ot* I.4), quoted in Daniel H. Frank, 'Anger as a Vice: A Maimonidean Critique of Aristotle's Ethics', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7.3 (1990): 269-281, at 273.
[29] Maimonides (*Hilkhot De'ot* I.5), quoted in Frank, 274.

maximally Westernized, in Russia,[30] to secularize negative emotions. The contention here, in other words, is that Eliot and Tolstoy educate their audiences to regulate their angry emotions through the metaphorical representation of that regulation as a laudable characteristic of the modern civilized society.

Perhaps the most influential model to be found in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* has been an ancient 'controversy about the moral status of anger'[31] which involves a dualism of perspectives: one kind of consideration classifies anger as a potentially appropriate emotion, and the other as a deadly sin, as espoused by central promulgators of the opposite ends of the spectrum, Aristotle and Seneca (the term "deadly sins" itself was an invention of early Middle Ages and used, especially since the end of the epoch, interchangeably – though erroneously – with "cardinal" or "capital" sins[32]). The existence of these two competing viewpoints – righteous versus sinful anger – imposed upon the fathers of the Christian Church in the early Middle Ages a choice (because it was precisely through the selection of exclusively one of these developments that the ideological message of Christian doctrine could be unambiguously communicated to believers). This non-negotiable choice is worthy of pursuit, because much of Eliot's and Tolstoy's metaphorical thought is argued here to have developed in response to these rivalling attitudes toward anger, with the result that some notions (and not others) became permanently embedded in the conceptual schemas of both English and Russian cultures.

---

[30] Culturally, though not economically, nineteenth-century Russia was already a part of an advanced Western world and, at least outwardly, meeting high western European standards of acceptable social behaviour. Although early eighteenth-century elite groups initially did not adapt well to the cultural reforms of Peter the Great, they certainly did so towards the end of the century. Cultivated Russians were to evolve, alongside the spirit of the Age of Enlightenment, into the rationally-thinking, free from prejudice and morally conscious members of the State, ultimately through

> the process of westernization that – as far as the cultural life of the upper class is concerned – was virtually complete at the moment the intelligentsia made its appearance in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

(Marc Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966] 4).

[31] Kristján Kristjánsson, *Aristotle, Emotions, and Education* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 67.

[32] Morton W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State College Press, 1952), esp. Chapter 2, 'The Origins of the Seven Cardinal Sins' (43-67). Having changed the sequence and reduced the number of sins to seven from the earlier Evagrius of Pontus' list of eight, Gregory the Great, in the late sixth century, nominated anger as occupying the third position in line, following pride and envy (46).

Christian Views on Anger

It would be misleading to overestimate, without qualification, the enduring influence of Christian ideas about anger, for by the time of the development and secularization of modern Western civilization which progressed slowly over many centuries – confidently judged to have begun in the twelfth – their influence was in the reverse direction. Patristic creeds in the medieval West were, among other things, official instructions of anger control indoctrinated by the early Church for the benefit of followers who were encouraged to strictly subordinate themselves to the religious discipline of meekness and humility. These instructions were sufficiently powerful to anchor a residual conceptual resonance, though insufficiently philosophical to challenge the fast-flowing intellectual currents that eventually pushed religious ideas into the periphery of a broadly transformed, secular life. On this interpretation, the radical change in creedal influence (as opposed to the gradual changes which had already been taking place over a very long time) took place at the height of Western modernization, largely between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in connection with the Industrial Revolution's spread of "'technological rationality' (i.e., instrumental, utilitarian or 'engineering' ways of thinking".[33] A new industrial citizen did in fact endorse elements of Christian morality, such as restraint of anger, but in doing so he did not see himself as reaffirming the Church's doctrinal precepts. Living within a capitalist frame of mind (I use the term "capitalist frame of mind" as a synonym for entrepreneurship), without any new theology more relevant to the era, caused him to mythologize the traditional religious injunctions and to approve of anger as an emotion that had functional value for coping in a new industrial realm, a realm that now called for virtues of dominance and self-assertion. Admittedly, there was no reason during the period of intensifying industrialization for which to revive the former prestige of Christian virtues, but their impressive and uncontested durability encouraged the formation of semi-stereotyped universalistic ethics of self-restraint that was later metaphorically expanded by the agency of realist discourse.

The early Church vigorously denounced anger as sinful, and moved decidedly in the direction of hampering irascible emotions as a sign of resistance to temptation. In the fourth century St. Augustine of Hippo stated unequivocally, in his peremptory summons, that anger is a negative emotion to be repressed because of its evil tendency to exceed its limits.

---

[33] Don Cupitt, *The Sea of Faith* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984) 36.

However, this prominent early Christian theologian allowed anger to be directed at oneself for one's own sins:[34]

> It is better not to allow anger, however just and reasonable, to enter at all, than to admit it in ever so slight a degree; once admitted, it will not be easily expelled, for, though at first but a small plant, it will immediately grow into a large tree.[35]

Augustine's criticism of anger, expressed via the ANGER IS A FAST GROWING OBNOXIOUS PLANT conceptual metaphor, was an early endeavour of the Church to prevent the spread of contradiction, and to foster sustained vigilance, already deeply entrenched in its ascetic and uncompromising (one-sided) doctrine.

By the sixth century, there arose a variant view of anger, notably expressed by Pope Gregory the Great. His position on this emotion recognized anger as either constructive – that which 'we adopt as an instrument of virtue'[36] – or as destructive – that which 'is engendered of evil'.[37] Western Christianity, as this double-edged account of anger indicates, had apparently carried over from its classical antecedents a settled ambivalence about this emotion, articulated much earlier by Aristotle: 'The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised'.[38] By the same token, blamed are those who 'are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons'.[39] This inheritance by the Middle Ages of Greco-Roman and Stoic traditions included, amongst others, the idea that anger (variously referred to by different sources as wrath or ire) is also necessarily a vice insofar as it 'prevents the angry man from enjoying the tranquility associated with virtue'[40] – this tranquility being essentially a

---

[34] Saint Augustine tolerates anger only insofar as the Bible conditionally allows it: anger with oneself is justified and even required for redemption. He states in his *Confessions*, trans. and introd. Henry Chadwick (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 161:

> (10) I read 'Be angry and sin not' (Ps. 4: 5). How was I moved, my God! I had already learnt to be angry with myself for the past, that I should not sin in the future. And I was right to be angry. For it was no race of darkness of another nature sinning through me, as the Manichees say, who feel no anger against themselves and yet 'treasure up for themselves anger in the day of wrath and of the revelation of your just judgement' (Rom. 2: 5).

[35] St. Augustine, quoted in *The Catholic Church: The Teacher of Mankind*, vol. 1, ed. Jeremiah C. Curtin (New York: The Office of Catholic Publications, 1905) Ch. V. 67-148, at 83.

[36] St. Gregory the Great, *Morals on the Book of Job*, trans. with notes and indices by John Henry Parker and J. G. F. and J. Rivington (Oxford, 1844), V. 83.

[37] Gregory, V. 82.

[38] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1776 [IV. 5].

[39] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1777 [IV. 5].

[40] L. van Hoof, 'Strategic Differences: Seneca and Plutarch on Controlling Anger', *Mnemosyne* 60 (2007): 50-86, at 67.

Senecan standard and also a preferred psychological state that an Aristotelian *hot-tempered* man is theorized to speedily regain after a violent outburst.[41]

One of the major edicts the Western tradition imported from Medieval Christianity was an insistence on the need above all to 'restrain the turbulent motions of the mind under the virtue of mildness',[42] as through this very practice, we are afforded the wisdom of divine judgement very much like that of our Creator. This injunction in fact seems to be one of the most prevalent throughout the Old and New Testaments, given the plentitude of Biblical exhortations such as: 'Wherefore, my beloved brethren, let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath: For the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God' (Jam 1.19-20); 'A soft answer turneth away wrath: but grievous words stir up anger' (Proverbs 15.1); 'A wrathful man stirreth up strife: but he that is slow to anger appeaseth strife' (Proverbs 15.18); 'Even a fool, when he holdeth his peace, is counted wise: and he that shutteth his lips is esteemed a man of understanding' (Proverbs 17.28); 'A fool uttereth all his mind: but a wise man keepeth it in till afterwards' (Proverbs 29.11); 'Be not hasty in thy spirit to be angry: for anger resteth in the bosom of fools' (Ecc 7.9). These proverbial ideas have become part of traditional folk theories (subconscious paradigms used for the interpretation) of anger in Western cultures. Similarly, Russian proverbs and sayings on anger, as provided by *Tolkovyj Slovar' Rysskogo Jazyka* (2012), seem to have picked up on Christian themes and become prominent in the moral thought of religious folk: '*Ne karaj vo gnevu*. *Pereloži gnev na milost . . . Gde gnev, tam i milost*. *Pokornoe slovo gnev ukroščaet*. *Gneva ne pugajsja, a na lasku ne kudajsja*. *Gospodin gnevu svoemu, gospodin bsemu*. *Ne nalagajte gneva, naložite milost'*"[43] (roughly translated as '*Don't punish in anger*. *Substitute anger with mercy . . . Where there is anger, there is mercy*. *A humble word tames anger*. *Fear anger not, nor take to kindness too freely* (i.e., *Let wisdom, not passion, sway*). *He who governs his anger is the master of all things*. *Do not repay anger with insult, but with a blessing*').

[41] In his *Nicomachean Ethics* (1777 [IV. 5]), Aristotle theorizes that

> *hot-tempered* people get angry quickly and with the wrong persons and at the wrong things and more than is right, but their anger ceases quickly – which is the best point about them. This happens to them because they do not restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper, and then their anger ceases.

[42] Gregory, V. 78.

[43] See V. I. Dal', *Tolkovyj Slovar' Rysskogo Jazyka: Illjustrirovannoe Izdanie* (Moskva: Èksmo, 2012) s. *gnev*.

As a result of the transmission across Western cultures of powerful images of anger in association with irrationality, madness and even imbecility, a conception developed of a human existence ideally focused on the maintenance of an emotional equilibrium, which anger was certain to disrupt. Unlike Augustine who condemns anger primarily on account of God's instruction to love our neighbour,[44] Gregory speaks of what can plausibly be taken as explicit instructions for anger regulation. For Gregory, the virtue of anger depends on the degree to which it dominates the mind. In the section of his *Morals on the Book of Job* entitled "On Anger", he cautions the members of his congregation against losing one's rational faculties in the heat of the moment:

> But when the spirit is stirred by zeal, it is needful to take good heed, that the same anger, which we adopt as an instrument of virtue, never gain dominion over the mind, nor take the lead as mistress, but like a handmaid, prompt to render service, never depart from following in the rear of reason. For it is then lifted up more vigorously against evil, when it does service in subjection to reason; since how much soever our anger may originate in zeal for the right, if from being in excess it has mastered our minds, it thereupon scorns to pay obedience to reason, and spreads itself more shamelessly, in proportion as it takes the evil of a hot temper for a good quality; whence it is necessary that he who is influenced by zeal for right should above all things look to this, that his anger should never overlap the mind's control, but in avenging sin, looking to the time and the manner, should check the rising agitation of his mind by regulating it with nicety of skill, should restrain the heat of temper, and control his passionate emotions in subjection to the rule of equity, that the punisher of another man may be made more just, in proportion as he has first proved the conqueror of himself; so that he should correct the faults of transgressors in such away, that he that corrects should himself first make advancement by self-restraint, and pass judgment on his own vehemency, in getting above it, lest by being immoderately stirred by his very zeal for right, he go far astray from the right.[45]

In what seems to be routine moral teaching, Gregory gives strategic directions for how to nobly administer punishment. If they be legitimate Christian guardians of what is good and right, men are commanded to moderate their own anger towards transgressors so as not to pervert the course of justice. The punisher acts righteously to the extent that he subsumes his own anger under the laws of reason; conversely, he commits an injustice insofar as he cannot maintain a neutral stance towards the offender.

Early Christian writers defined anger chiefly as the prime adversary of reason. At the same time, it was obvious to them that the mind of every person was not in actual practice

---

[44] Augustine, *Confessions*, for example pages 215 and 266.
[45] Gregory, V. 83.

possessed by this emotion in one and the same way. Anger, in other words, could be experienced and manifested in many different forms. In Gregory's philosophy, the angry are arranged in four distinct categories, a classification which unmistakably echoes Aristotle's well-known fourfold division of people into *hot-tempered*, *choleric*, *sulky* and *bad-tempered*:[46]

> But we are to know that there be some, whom anger is somewhat prompt in inflaming, but quickly leaves them; while there are others whom it is slow in exciting, but the longer in retaining possession of. For some, like kindled reeds, while they clamour with their voices, give out something like a crackle at their kindling: those indeed speedily rise into a flame, but then they forth with cool down into their ashes; while others like the heavier and harder kinds of wood, are slow in taking fire, but being once kindled, are with difficulty put out; and as they slowly stir themselves into heat of passion, retain the longer the fire of their rage. Others again, and their conduct is the worst, are both quick in catching the flames of anger, and slow in letting them go; and others both catch them slowly, and part with them quickly.[47]

The injunctions against demonstrations of anger continued to be promulgated throughout subsequent periods of time, and generally had the effect of laying down regulations about acceptable social behaviour, and also of stabilizing – and conventionalizing – their linguistic expression. The language of anger, such as that persistently used by Gregory the Great, was a strictly propagandist device designed for the inculcation of authoritative doctrine. This propaganda relied for its effect on the consistency of relatively fixed metaphorical expressions which arose from the embodied experience of anger. Anger metaphors continued to animate Gregory's religious exhortations and made, by means of coalescing into a distinctive conceptual core – heat – a significant and lasting contribution to the standardization of language for a concept of anger.

Early Modern Views on Anger

Anger, no matter the form, continued to be viewed as a moral flaw derived from hubris,[48] and expressions of intolerance appeared frequently in the works of Christian

---

[46] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1777 [IV. 5].
[47] Gregory, V. 80.
[48] For many seventeenth-century theologians anger was hubris, an excessive sort of pride in another form, a selfish passion that could be conquered only by demonstrating virtues of meekness, patience and humility. See, for example, Henry Newcome, *A plain discourse about rash and sinful anger* … (London: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1693), p. 6:

> Men are the most mistaken in their Judgments in this thing, to count him a poor pusillanimous Man, that is not angry when provoked and injured; it is not weakness of Mind, but great strength and mightiness; he is better than the mighty, and is liker to God, and in greater honour with God, Angels and good Man, than the most valiant Man; and *he that ruleth his Spirits, than he that taketh the City*. He that can keep out of Anger, or can keep it down, is a mighty Conqueror.

demagogues, in the seventeenth century.[49] But the seventeenth-century Christian Church, it must be stressed, was already an entirely transformed religious institution. The ascetic thought that had prevailed among the orthodox fathers began to be gradually displaced by rigorous philosophical contemplation that included intellectual assessments of abstract concepts such as morality and sin. Based on Carol Zisowitz Stearns' and Peter N. Stearns' rough estimate, 'after about the twelfth century, [subsequent to the rise of scholasticism in the West,] Catholic emphasis on humility in saints, particularly that sort of humility that would entail anger control, declined markedly; holiness and anger were often quite compatible'.[50] Whilst anger was no longer considered a deadly vice, the pursuit of the ideal disposition, characterized by evenness of mind, persisted throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, progressively becoming an important element in the formation of new, emotionally-balanced modern societies. The

---

It is in the spirit of the attitude that "strength lies in moderating inordinate passions", derived in part from injunctions of the Bible such as: 'Proud and haughty scorner is his name, who dealeth in proud wrath' (Proverbs 21.24) – that Newcome warns his readers to relinquish the excess of anger:

> And the Truth is, the danger is greater, because men are loath to be in a fault for Excess this way, and so to humble themselves, as they should do, that they may obtain mercy and favour of the Lord (28).

[49] *Early English Books Online* (EEBO), available at http://eebo.chadwyck.com, is a rich source of these works. For a seventeenth-century definition of anger that covers its two dimensions, a warning against it, as well as advice on how to control it, as a guide for private families, see Samuel Cradock, *A Supplement to Knowledge and practice: wherein the main things necessary to be known and believed in order to salvation are more fully explained* … (London: Printed for Thomas Simmons, 1679), esp. chapter 9, 'Of Anger' (366-380).
On "just" versus "sinful" anger, with special emphasis on, firstly, the causes, requirements and aims of virtuous anger, and, secondly, on the causes, properties, and types of sinful anger, and also its accompanying vices and suggested remedies, see John Downame, *Foure treatises: tending to disswade all Christians from foure no lesse hainous then common sinnes* … (London: Imprinted by Felix Kyngston, for William Welby, 1608), esp. the postscript 'A treatise of Anger, wherein the lawfull use, and unlawfull abuse of this affection is shewed out God's word' (1-81). Downame, although he speaks of anger as 'a perturbation of the mind' (7), he nevertheless believes that not all anger is a sin. If 'temperate and moderate' (7),

> it is not onely just and lawfull, but commendable, profitable, and very necessary, as being the whetstone of true fortitude, whereby we are stirred up and encouraged to maintaine the glory of God, and our owne persons and states, against the impietie and injustice of men (6).

In *The unreasonableness of anger: a sermon preach'd before the Queen at White-hall, July 29, 1694* (London: Printed for Tho. Warren, for Thomas Bennet, 1694), Lancelot Blackburne defines anger as an affliction which, under different guises – 'whether of Malice or Clamour, Evil-speaking or Revenge' (15) – is responsible for 'subverting our Reason' (12), and which, by distorting our faculty of accurate judgement, causes us to inflict otherwise preventable injury upon our neighbour:

> The disorder it causes in our Minds, our Blood, and our Spirits, deserves indeed all the Resentment it raises; but the Passion is to irregular to be so well directed, and we are too much heated to judge so truly of its Application: we blindly mis-place it on our innocent Neighbour, and lay the weight of that on our Brother, which is only due to our own Pride or ill Nature (8).

Daniel Burgess, too, perceives anger as a triumph of unreason and conceptualizes this emotion as a force which takes possession of the mind. See his statement in *Hastiness unto Anger described and disgraced* … (London: Printed for Jonathan Robinson, 1698), p. 2:

> Our Ministering Spirits are no more good and faithful Servants: No, but do traitorously usurp and tyrannically domineer . . . Our Affections should rise, stand, and fall, as our Minds direct and Wills require. But, having broke their Bonds, they do fall upon their Masters, and do together blind our Understandings, and bind our Wills.

[50] Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America's History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986) 21.

cultural reorientation embraced by eighteenth-century Europe – the Enlightenment – compelled a religious person towards a practice of rational thinking. Efforts in this direction involved the regulation of anger, dictated by the "doctrine of Reason" which tended to distrust passions as proof of inadequate self-control.[51] That regulation acquired another dimension during the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth-century, where the emergent utilitarian way of thinking produced a near universal accord that untamed anger was a threat to a civilized and orderly society built upon principles of disciplined behaviour, social and economic stability, and domestic harmony. The early Christian conceptualization of anger as an emotion that 'steals away peace of mind'[52] prevailed, but with the secular mindset of industrial societies, the emotion became scientifically analyzed, psychologized, a matter of public concern, and reflective of the extent to which an individual functioned appropriately in a collective environment.

The Victorian Model of Anger

For many scholars, the regular control of heated emotions in Victorian England was due to the culture's increased focus on 'the importance of rationality and calculation, which fits a century devoted increasingly to business planning, growing organizational sophistication, and heightened faith in formal education'.[53] Commercial considerations, modern ideas of refinement and the shared concern with public image in a new industrial world led the contemporary bourgeois to encourage level-headedness as a dignity mark of productivity and respectability. In fact, the distinction between those in control of their anger and those easily swept away by it was second in social importance only to that between being born with good or bad connections. In spite of the official promotion of anger restraint across the spectrum of society, a gap existed in the tolerance between anger expressed, on the one hand, by élite groups and, on the other, by the common folk.

---

[51] For an argument that passions have been, since the earliest of Western thinking, considered as a symptom of a disrupted rationality, see, for example, Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), esp. 'Introduction: Reason and the Passions' (1-25). For more recent accounts of this idea, grounded in early philosophical interpretations of emotions, see A. W. Price, 'Emotions in Plato and Aristotle' (121-142); Christopher Gill, 'Stoicism and Epicureanism' (143-165); and also Peter King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought' (167-187), all three in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions*, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[52] Gregory, V. 78.
[53] Peter N. Stearns, *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994) 18.

In George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, Dorothea confesses to others that she is 'angry and naughty – not like [her sister] Celia: [she has] a great outburst, and then all seems glorious again'.[54] Her quickness of temper, although it is frowned upon as contrary to behavioural standards socially prescribed for a woman, it is nevertheless tacitly excused on the grounds of certain eccentricities permissible in a woman of high social standing. *Middlemarch* illustrates these class-specific anger flare-ups, not by evidence of Dorothea's enactment of a maxim, "Be angelic and you will be well-to-do" (she is, already when we first meet her, in possession of upper-class assets of birth and inheritance), but rather by her application of practical wisdom, "I am well-to-do, and therefore I can afford to be demonic".

In general, English patriarchal society required that a woman should consciously suppress spirited emotions, her submission towards her father and husband being best proof of her love and obedience. The domestic realm therefore created the angel in the house stereotype, and also provided part of the explanation why most Victorian resentment against unrestrained emotions occurred in the form of persuasions that were gender-specific. For instance, in the fictional representation of early-nineteenth-century Middlemarch, the most frequent assertion by opponents of spontaneous impulses was that female docility and perfect composure would contribute to domestic happiness and to society at large. Women such as Rosamond Vincy came to be regarded as perfect home companions to working men, and ultimately as bulwarks against the demands of rampant industrialization. Rosamond is manifestly in possession of the appropriate temperament: not at all 'a fiery young lady', but rather marked by 'her habitual control of manner' (*M* 297). This placid disposition was acquired through the formal study of social etiquette (Mrs Lemon's school which Rosamond attended is described by the narrator as offering teaching that 'included all that was demanded in the accomplished female – even to extras, such as the getting in and out of a carriage' [*M* 96]). Anger-free wives were thus called upon by duty to contribute their special virtue of temperance to counterbalance the stress associated with men's vigorous professional and public activities.

Important work on the history of anger (most notably by Carol Zisowitz and Peter N. Stearns) suggests that the Victorian model of this emotion was not a linear progression from a

[54] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton (London: Penguin, 2003) 220.

lower to higher awareness of how to control it (we have seen examples of stout advocacy of anger restraint in both the Middle Ages and the Ancient World), but rather it reflected the Victorians' obsessive preoccupation with 'searching anxiously for solutions to new emotional problems generated by the home/work dichotomy'.[55] The impact the Industrial Revolution had on family life was one of division between the warm nest of intimacy and the uncongenial working environment which drew men out of that nest and subjected them to the pressures of the new industrial economy. The family effectively became, in the Stearnses' geographical metaphor, 'an island of safety',[56] a refuge from the chaos of the world outside, and a woman's role was to preserve the sanctity of this domestic sanctuary. Nineteenth-century practical advice on household management maintained, in line with that conceptualization, that women were to refrain from displays of anger and conversely were bound to act submissively, never showing any hostile emotions to their spouse, because 'men find so little sincere friendship abroad, so little true sympathy in the selfish world, that they gladly yield themselves to the influence of a gentle spirit at home'.[57]

It is in line with this official "emotionology"[58] that Lydgate, in *Middlemarch*, contemplates Rosamond's quietude as the key to happiness in marriage, whilst remaining critical of Dorothea's excessively ardent nature:

> She did not look at things from the proper feminine angle. The society of such women was about as relaxing as going from your work to teach the second form, instead of reclining in a paradise with sweet laughs for bird-notes, and blue eyes for a heaven (*M* 95).

This passage suggests that the need to control feelings of angst within the Victorian home/work division was in principle applied specifically to women. The stability of home and patriarchal order was held to be dependent upon a woman's capacity to harness all negative and capricious emotions. A virtuous wife was supposed to inhibit the outward expression of anger and turn her frustrations inward, in order to bring relief and pleasure to her husband who had to endure the burden of a working routine. One obvious goal of socializing women for emotional passivity was the prevention of any confusion of gender roles. Man's destiny was to venture out into the world and earn a living; conversely a woman's future was to make the

[55] Stearns and Stearns 37.
[56] Stearns and Stearns 36.
[57] Reverend Daniel Wise, *Bridal Greetings* (1852), cited in Stearns and Stearns 39.
[58] The term is from Stearns and Stearns.

home a pleasant retreat, where a husband could relax in comfort and peace. It appears, then, that the change in nineteenth-century attitudes towards anger marks not the cementing of 'already-brewing efforts to constrain impulse and rigidify emotional and physical habits',[59] but rather it relates to the unprecedented degree to which women, in direct response to social norms, were primed to disproportionately restrain the experience and expression of intense feelings.

This gendered behaviour has been explored in canonical feminist literary criticism, such as Gilbert's and Gubar's *The Madwoman in the Attic* (1984),[60] Armstrong's *Desire and Domestic Fiction* (1987)[61] and Reynolds' and Humble's *Victorian Heroines* (1993).[62] These key texts account for the persistence of, and the shift in, gender conceptualizations according to the idea of separate spheres that classified men as properly responsible for performing significant tasks and women as naturally domestic. The culture's perpetuation of what Kimberley Reynolds and Nicola Humble describe as 'the Victorian feminine ideal, the virtuous wife-mother, centre of hearth and home, repository of the conscience of the bourgeois industrial state, devoted to the domestic crafts, entirely without sexual impulses'[63] has been, according to Gilbert and Gubar, the key factor in foreclosing the avenues for female authors' professional advancement. Insofar as women participated in public life, they had to do so without expectation of any recognition for intellectual merit:

> Whether she is a passive angel, or an active monster, in other words, the woman writer feels herself to be literally or figuratively crippled by the debilitating alternatives her culture offers her.[64]

Confinement to the household, intellectual marginalization and the unequal distribution of professional opportunities are shown to lead to women's disappointment and to cultivate the frustrations that produce anger.

---

[59] Stearns, *American Cool*, 16.
[60] Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination*, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).
[61] Nancy Armstrong, *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
[62] Kimberley Reynolds and Nicola Humble, *Victorian Heroines: Representations of Femininity in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Art* (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
[63] Reynolds and Humble 11.
[64] Gilbert and Gubar 57.

The canon of angelic virtue, which crystalized into a gender stereotype, was not strictly uncontested as women were far more politically active than orthodox Victorians would have liked to assume. Perceived female resistance to an ethos of domesticity stimulated vigorous discussions among gender theorists. The inevitable result of that non-compliance has been identified by Auerbach, in her *Woman and the Demon* (1982),[65] and by Logan, in her *Fallenness in Victorian Women's Writing* (1998).[66] Both authors show convincingly that women who did not conform to the prevailing social stratification were cast by influential moral writers as either "harlots", "monsters" or 'beasts"[67] – if brought to sin by extreme sexual behaviour (sometimes eligible for atonement through motherhood) – or alternatively as "demons", "serpent-women" or "fallen women"[68] – if determined to make use of their (culturally-fantasized, rather than actual) special powers to undermine the patriarchal status quo. The condemnation by novelists of their rebellious heroines, most commonly by means of sexualized metaphors of corruption, was pursued as a response to general expectations of Victorians of high moral ground. The significance of Auerbach's and Logan's feminist literary criticism goes beyond an exploration of the Victorian discourse of deviance. Their research into nineteenth-century symbolic representations of monstrous women who refuse to accept as absolute the given ideal of femininity instantly alerts us to the possibility of a female emotionalism outside the prescribed pattern of self-inhibition.

There was, of course, a universal consensus that family considerations were far more important than business commitments, and that there was no genuine domestic harmony without men's own competence to deal with their anger at home. Within the set of qualities required to be a good husband, gentleness occupied the pride of place, partly because of nineteenth-century English culture's preservation of the theological interpretation of a Christian God, heralded in the Bible as a severe but merciful father. In this regard, the emotional constitution of a Victorian husband had more in common with the *image of* a gentleman of past centuries than with contemporary notions of an authoritarian spouse, defined by Mr Brooke early in *Middlemarch* as one who 'likes to be master' (M 41).

---

[65] Nina Auerbach, *Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979).
[66] Deborah Anna Logan, *Fallenness in Victorian Women's Writing: Marry, Stich, Die, or do Worse* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1998).
[67] See Logan, esp. Chapter 3, 'Victorian Silences' (1-26).
[68] See Auerbach, esp. Chapter 2, 'The Myth of Womanhood: Queens' (35-62), and also Chapter 3, 'Angels and Demons: Woman's Marriage of Heaven and Hell' (63-108).

In the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, etiquette manuals strongly advised that a man of good breeding should cultivate self-restraint and remain immune to provocation, in keeping with the (thoroughly unAristotelian) mannerly prescription that 'there was no truer gentleman than one who was sovereign over his own passions and who displayed his calm indifference to attempted injury and insult'.[69] In *Middlemarch*, George Eliot depicts the kind of self-restraint required, in the eyes of society, for the acquisition of masculine virtue. During their first quarrel in marriage, Dorothea enrages Casaubon by denouncing his work as fruitless. In an instant, his 'face had a quick angry flush upon it'. He opens his reproachful speech with a patronizing tag 'My love', and then continues 'with irritation reined in by propriety' (*M* 200). Likewise, Lydgate rises to the major challenge of continually holding back, so as to behave in a civilized manner towards his obstinate wife. When Rosamond first provokes him by her insistence to involve other family members in the handling of their outstanding debts, Lydgate's expression of anger is reduced to 'a more peremptory emphasis' (*M* 595), the perceived harshness of which has the effect of his 'trying to be gentle again' (*M* 596). When she is similarly uncooperative at a later date, Lydgate avoids eye contact with his wife, as 'he preferred not looking at her and not speaking, until he had got over the first spasm of vexation' (*M* 656). Finally, when Lydgate learns about his wife's secret acts to obtain money, this Victorian paragon initially thunders, but immediately

> checked his speech and turned his back on her – then wheeled round and walked about, sat down, and got up again restlessly, grasping hard objects deep down in his pockets. He was afraid of saying something irremediably cruel (*M* 664).

These examples call attention to the focal interest of the novels in representing the unequal distribution in Victorian culture of the responsibility to control anger within marriage. A woman is thought to be a source of tranquility for the husband and so must remove anger from her mind and heart, in order to perform her duty of making herself pleasing to him. A man, meanwhile, may be angry, but is expected to 'display the justification of a patently unreasonable wife'[70] and to keep his emotion in check, mainly to reduce the likelihood that his anger will be shown with an inappropriate intensity. The venting of anger, in other words, was reserved for the spouse standing on the privileged side of the sexual division. These gendered standards meant that women who slipped into emotional immoderation were publicly

---

[69] Stephen Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994) 64.
[70] Stearns and Stearns 48.

proclaimed as women of bad character. Moreover, women who were suspected of illicit emotional reactions consistently showed signs of chronic anxiety aroused by fearful thoughts of causing permanent damage to their marital relationships. Dorothea's guilty mentality which involves taking the blame for marital disagreements for fear of rejection by her husband is a good case in point.

The way the Casaubons' end their first quarrel illustrates well how women were psychologized into penitence for their angry impulses. Casaubon feels absolutely justified in his coldness towards Dorothea after she audaciously questioned the usefulness of his written material. They do not exchange apologies; he sententiously accepts hers: 'My dear Dorothea – "who with repentance is not satisfied, is not of heaven nor earth"' (*M* 210). Dorothea's readiness to 'exaggerate her own fault' (*M* 210), partly with a view to receiving forgiveness, and partly also to prompt her husband (ineffectively) to take his due share of the blame, reinforced rather than undermined cultural expectations about a woman's responsibilities as an amiable wife. Contemporary novelists paid much attention to latent hostility existing between a husband and wife, obviously in order to encourage a subconscious disapproval of anger in marriage (or marriage-equivalents). As this scene shows, the great realist novelists, including Eliot, took upon themselves the task of the thematization of a didactic warning against demonstrations of unchecked anger. Dorothea's and Casaubon's; Rosamond's and Lydgate's; and Anna's and Vronsky's are each stories of a tragic end brought about by combustible relationships. The rapid or premature demise of one of the spouses (or partners) in the novels may be viewed as the result of the dangerous interference with the established ideology of patriarchy, constructed around nineteenth-century notions of idyllic domesticity.

Children were initiated into this ideology of domesticity through exposure to language that gently advocated the control of anger. The period between the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution is notable for the practice of strengthening family relations. Practical advice to parents concerning proper social conduct that included an informed upbringing of children was given by means of a new vocabulary of a softening and specialized kind, which by the nineteenth century was already entrenched in the everyday use of the household, but which did not become formally part of the English emotional lexicon until the beginning of the twentieth. In England, the neologism "tantrum" with its contemporary connotations of

anger displayed by children has been nominated by the Stearnses to date from the early 1900s, a time when it first appeared in dictionaries, though they cite a variety of British plays – '"None of your fleers! Your tantrums! You are grown to be headstrong and robust for me!" or "Treating him with some contempt when he is in his tantrums." – to show that the earlier use of the word originally 'always in the plural, to criticize adult outbursts'[71] was in the air as early as the end of the eighteenth century. The second edition of *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* provides an even earlier occurrence of the emotion term "tantrum" used in that sense. 1714 has the first recorded instance of this word denoting 'an outburst or display of petulance or ill-temper; a fit of passion': 'Our lady has had some of her tantrums as Vapors comeing out etc.'.[72] Whatever the precise date is of the first recorded occurrence, the use and semantic range of this term suggest that there was a tendency to capture strongly pejorative connotations of it in the eighteenth century. For the Stearnses, this habit of adding new anger-related words to a standard operative language of emotions, and also of expanding the semantic boundaries of already existing emotion terms – for example the attribution in the eighteenth century of negative connotations to the word "temper" – had two important social implications. Significantly, it stretched the former discourse on anger to 'include specific injunctions against anger, as part of the larger emphasis on affection and on mutuality of obligations among family members'.[73] In addition, mainstream collective views on anger facilitated by the New Language were extended to incorporate the re-evaluation of what comprised children's quite normal and potentially deviant behaviour. Angry children were no longer wicked monsters with devilish propensities; they were termed – partly due to Darwin's influential theory of anger as an evolved emotion essential to survival – extreme examples of biological conditioning. There was also a shift away from the assumption that anger in children was inbred, and hence necessarily a permanent trait, to a view that emphasized parental upbringing inducing good habits. A humorous scene from *Middlemarch* sums up this Victorian attitude in a delightfully exaggerated manner. It is apparently for the sake of giving a stimulating lesson, whilst at the same time developing a closer relationship with her notoriously argumentative children – Rosamond and Fred – that Mrs Vincy advocates a peaceful reconciliation: 'Bless you both, my dears, and don't quarrel' (M 100).

---

[71] Stearns and Stearns 29.
[72] OED^{2}Online, s. *tantrum* n.
[73] Stearns and Stearns 29.

In *American Cool*, Peter Stearns has proposed two phases of the development of the Victorian model of anger throughout the nineteenth century, their emergence reflecting the Victorians' changing responses to stabilizing industrialization. The first phase which emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century stressed absolute prohibition of anger in support of the (largely mythical) sanctity of the home. The second phase was the "mature Victorianism"[74] of the remaining decades which has come to indicate the widespread recognition of the commercial utility of anger in a free market economy. The acceleration of capitalist enterprise, the development of competitive mentalities, the uninhibited individualism in industry, the unprecedented level of entrepreneurship and a heightened focus on profit all necessitated emotions that would protect and also give strength to men competing for success. The use of anger for gaining a competitive advantage coexisted alongside Darwin's theory of this emotion as functionally adapted to evoke behavioural tendencies of confrontation with the antagonist in the natural environment. The exclusive legitimization of masculine anger outside the home meant a further polarization from the 1850s onwards of the emotional experience between men and women:

> anger was a bad emotion at home, but it was a vital emotion in the world of work and politics. Women should remain anger free, in keeping with their domestic roles, but men were set the challenging task of curbing their anger within the family while utilizing its potential to spur actions necessary to competition or social justice.[75]

Fear-inducing anger for commercial purposes, however, should be interpreted less as an example in the English history of gender segregation, and more as a management tool to advance the cause of economic endeavour.

As religion was still the platform on which the Victorians built their moral values, 'a pervasive reminder [– stimulated by the Christian doctrine –] that the stern man might be deficient, indeed unjust',[76] had a strong hold across the social spectrum. But the experiences of men under Industralization had a powerful impact, leading to the socialization of men into a new confident culture, their frequent aggressive behaviour indicating that they did not believe they could achieve their economic goals by rejecting anger as a means. The ultimate result of this conviction was that the religious aspect of anger declined – from the viewpoint of the

[74] Stearns, *American Cool*, 29.
[75] Stearns, *American Cool*, 29.
[76] Peter N. Stearns, *Be a Man!: Males in Modern Society* (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979) 27.

modern commercial elite – practically to the point of vanishing; indeed, 'the "soft" men were not those who found favor among the general society'.[77] The prejudice against masculine weakness that developed among the Victorians can reasonably be thought to have stemmed in large part from their loyalty to the ideology of separate spheres, which narrowed the range of appropriate emotions for men and women by emphasizing their respective roles.[78] An absence of hot tempers in men failed to achieve dominance and even respectability within the mid- and late-Victorian community, 'for gentleness – a sense of yielding to emotion and a sensitivity to the emotions of others – was defined more completely as a female specialty than ever before'.[79] Two antagonistic gender expectations: on the one hand, male dominance and strength, and on the other hand, female submission and meekness, were reinforced by durable images incorporated within realist novels. The writers' representation of emotional contrasts, and their implications, caused men to strive after an ideal type, potentially to the absurd degree that

> the gentle man might easily wonder if something was wrong with him, if he did not fit the mold, and so seek to toughen himself or just abandon the pretense of being a real man among men.[80]

In sum, the Victorian model of anger did not include the capacity for any signs of hostility at home, instead particularly stressing the need for the expression of this emotion at work. It primarily served to separate private from public life, without devising a new gender order: a virtuous Victorian could only feel anger, and express it, in accordance with the behaviours appropriate to their allotted role. But however useful anger was as a supporting pillar for the patriarchal system, it created the problem in that it did not establish a sense of great moral improvement. Hence the serious concern with self-restraint, and the strong disapproval of uncontrollable passions. Anger was modern in the sense that this emotion represented a modern industrial society, but it was certainly not modern in the sense that it was still believed to dangerously reduce a self-management capacity, leading to destructive actions and vicious crimes like that characteristically associated with remote, barbaric cultures. With the consolidation of anger as an emotion especially requiring conscious regulation, the

---

[77] Stearns, *Be a Man!*, 51.
[78] For the discussion of the concept of "separate spheres" in the early and mid-nineteenth-century England, see Nancy F. Cott, *The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1835* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
[79] Stearns, *Be a Man!*, 50-51.
[80] Stearns, *Be a Man!*, 51.

theoretical (if not practical) preoccupation with self-restraint became almost routine in countries which pledged allegiance to what Norbert Elias famously referred to as in his book by the same title, "the civilizing process".[81]

Nineteenth-century Russia, most notably up until the sixth decade, represents a society intellectually aware of, but only moderately inspired by, Western European ideas on the control of emotions. The educated élite, which included the aristocracy and gentry (whether landed or not), was explicitly and implicitly relied on to sustain the old patriarchal system, partly in response to the position of traditionalists who did not wish to see Russia fundamentally changed. At the same time, the ruling classes were made responsible for the strengthening of the domestic economy which at that time depended heavily upon serfdom, probably as a consequence of the burden of the practices of the autocratic state. Within these strict ideological and economic boundaries, the adoption of temperizing qualities by patriarchs and landowners was not conceived as practically desirable or especially important in Russia; on the contrary, demonstrations of anger to ensure discipline confirmed and promoted the pattern that already existed. These élites, from the seventeenth century right through to the nineteenth, saw Western Europe as the principal supplier of ideas on how to behave in a socially-correct manner, ultimately to transplant to the Russian soil the corresponding modern patterns of behaviour. Being at odds with their Western counterparts politically but not intellectually, the Russian upper classes remained intensely drawn but largely unaccustomed to the new humanistic approach, and to living with the same degree of ethical concern that existed in Western Europe (an attitude that was forever changed by Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy). Anger control was limited, and the majority of unrestrained impulses occurred repeatedly in connection, firstly, with the traditional predetermination that women (and other members of the family) were subordinate to men and, therefore needed to be shown their right place, and secondly, with conventional social norms which said that serfs were born slaves to be whipped into efficiency and submission. A comparatively free expression of anger in nineteenth-century Russia is thus proposed to have developed in the context of the specific Russian socio-economic conditions that existed to justify, rather than to restrict, ways of behaving that were utterly unacceptable by Western European standards. In the section below, a catalogue of enacted anger will be offered, in order to argue that nineteenth-century Russian culture not

[81] Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994).

only defined this emotion as a proper reaction to an undesired event, but consciously made use of it as a powerful tool (1) to perpetuate a social hierarchy, in relation to both class and family; (2) to satisfy a desire for revenge; (3) to apply remedial justice; and (4) to promote moral outrage in reaction to an obvious slight to oneself.

Anger in Modern Russia

Just as anger was reinterpreted in early modern England to reflect the new moral model, so too was Petrine Russia willing to incorporate a higher degree of anger control that would integrate the new message on good manners into the old social order. An essential component of what has come to be known as Peter the Great's "forced modernization" or instantaneous Europeanization" [82] of backward Russia was a national goal to adopt certain European attributes of restraint so as to promulgate the country's new image. For Russia to be recognized as semi-Westernized it had to be progressively educated, tolerant and free from prejudice, thereby intellectually adequate and worthy of placement amongst the greatest and most powerful modern nations. Particularly relevant to this cultural development was the endorsement of behavioural norms that instructed the reformed élites to simply see blatant demonstrations of anger as bad taste. Quite ironically, as much as Peter the Great proceeded

---

[82] For detailed discussions of the nature and social consequences of changes (administrative, institutional and attitudinal) introduced by Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725), with a view to secularizing and Europeanizing Russia, see *Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary?*, ed. Marc Raeff (Lexington, MA: D.C Health and Company, 1963); Marc Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966); Marc Raeff, *Imperial Russia 1682-1825: The Coming of Age of Modern Russia*, vol. 4, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (New York: Knopf, 1971); also and *Peter the Great Transforms Russia*, ed. James Cracraft, 3rd ed. (Lexington, MA and Toronto: D. C. Health and Company, 1991).
On controversial reservations in regard to the innovation, effectiveness and durability of Peter's reforms, see esp. S. F. Platonov, 'Peter the Great Not a Revolutionary Innovator', in *Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary?* (88-90); and also Marc Raeff, 'Peter's Domestic Legacy: Transformation or Revolution?', in *Peter the Great Transforms Russia* (286-301).
For direct effects of these changes on women, see Dorothy Atkinson, 'Society and the Sexes in the Russian Past', in *Women in Russia*, eds. Dorothy Atkinson et al. (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1978) 3-38; and Barbara Alpern Engel, 'Transformation versus Tradition', in *Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation*, eds. Barbara Evans Clements et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 135-147.
In surveying the evolution of the perception of Peter the Great through time, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky has stressed that the achievement of this radically innovative tsar was due primarily to his commitment, inquisitive nature, deployment of rational solutions, psychological power and love of his own country, despite the emperor's counter-productive autocracy, forceful and frequently non-feasible legislation, despotism and hot-headedness. Riasanovsky's conclusion may serve as the summary of what was, in the Enlightenment era, a standard assessment of Peter:

> Peter the Great was a man of action rather than a man of thought; a practitioner, not a theoretician. He was also something of a visionary. With grandeur and optimism, themselves typical of the age, he foresaw the image of a modern, powerful, prosperous, and educated country; and it was to the realization of that image that he dedicated his life.

(*The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought* [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985] 10).

with extraordinary zeal to accomplish his self-assigned task of transforming barbaric and fiercely superstitious Russians into a refined and rational – Western-like society – it was his uncompromising character and violent temper that set him apart from his royal contemporaries in the West.[83] Indeed, this revolutionary tsar was persistently perceived by his foreign contemporaries as being

> constantly at the boiling point, possibly on the verge of a breakdown or madness; all his life he struggled against his emotions, rage especially, but repeatedly lost that struggle.[84]

Although there was nothing exemplary about Peter's high proclivity to sudden violent rages, he himself must have viewed a lack of self-control as an obstacle to what he understood to be the cultural progress of the nation. This belief was clearly reflected in the introduction of social changes that made Russia resemble the civilized Western world far more closely than ever before. Strictly speaking, then, it was under Peter that Russia made the first serious steps towards formulating behavioural standards that proved far more humane than those of pre-Petrine order.

In Women in Russia, 1700-2000, Barbara Alpern Engel has argued that the unprecedented centrality of the family and closer spousal intimacy inspired the Russian nobility to attempt to promote loving husband-and-wife and parent-child relations.[85] This new ethical system, although it desired, and was assumed to encourage, a violence-free domestic environment, did not however insist that anger be altogether removed or even disapproved of, for the fathers and husbands who had largely unrestricted control over other family members (inherited from the established patriarchy) felt particularly authorized to express this emotion.

---

[83] Bishop Burnet (1883) described Peter metaphorically as a 'man of a very hot temper, soon inflamed and very brutal in his passion'. See *Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time*, quoted in Janet M. Hartley, 'England "Enjoys the Spectacle of a Northern Barbarian": The Reception of Peter I and Alexander I', in *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Gargnano, 1994, eds. Maria di Salvo and Lindsey Hughes (Rome: La Fenice, 1996) 11-18, at 11.

[84] Riasanovsky 5. For the British people's impression of Peter as an exotic emperor with a heightened propensity for extreme anger, formed during his first educational visit to England (January-April 1698), see Anthony Cross, *Peter the Great through British Eyes: Perceptions and Representations of the Tsar since 1698* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[85] Barbara Alpern Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 1, 'The Petrine Revolution: New Men, New Women, New Ideas – Women in Public and the New Domesticity' (5-26), and Chapter 2, 'The Petrine Revolution: Noblewomen at Home' (27-47).

Tellingly, at no time in Russia's efforts to implement the domestic reforms were the social structure and attitudes strained so far that the patriarchs renounced their inherent rights. In her old age, Praskovia Tatlina (1808-1899), a Russian middle-class woman, retrospectively considers in her diary the link previously existing between the masculine authority and the free expression of anger:

> In marriage, woman is a slave. A husband can even strike his wife in the heat of anger or in a drunken stupor (such behavior is treated lightly here in Russia), and the old women will say soothingly: "You can't keep count of every kick".[86]

What Tatlina seems to be distinctly recalling is the lack of explicit regulation of anger within domestic contexts. Triviality and even the anticipation of a husband's kick are strongly reminiscent of and no less vigorously sustained than the conditions of the sixteenth-century *Domostroj*.[87] This treatise imposed on a husband whose wife was perceived as disorderly the 'responsibility to discipline her physically. If the problem was serious, she was to be lashed, blouse removed; but this was to be done privately, "politely" and without anger'.[88]

Needless to say, anger management was infinitely more unregulated with respect to the peasant who, under the agrarian reforms initiated by Peter the Great, was stripped virtually of all civil rights, and 'in so far as his *legal* status [was] concerned (though not his social or economic condition), he [could] scarcely be distinguished from a slave'.[89] Anger, so formidable a strategy for maintaining discipline at home, was practically lavished upon the servants of the household and the peasants of the landed gentry, mainly in order to enforce the existing hierarchical structure. Violent outbursts of anger by master against subordinate were

---

[86] Praskovia Tatlina, 'Reminiscences', trans. Judith Vowles, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby Clyman and Judith Vowles (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996) 243-280, at 265.

[87] *Domostroj* was a sixteen-century church-regulated, patriarchy-promoting set of guidelines that defined the role and ways of acceptable behaviour expected of a married women of the upper classes in the traditional Muscovite household. A principal obligation of an élite Muscovite woman was to undertake submissive domestic activities that revolved around ensuring effective household management and preparing her daughters in a material sense for future marriage. For a brief account of this discipline of dutiful servitude to husband and children, see Dorothy Atkinson, 'Society and the Sexes in the Russian Past', 3-38, at 15:

> A woman was to devote herself entirely to domestic duties and the supervision of servants, and was to follow the instructions of her husband in all matters. She was to avoid social contacts outside the home and was even to go to church only when her husband deemed it appropriate. Her conversation with guests was to be restricted to discussion of household routine . . . [In the *Domostroj*], the mother's essential relationship with her children, as presented here, is not emotional or spiritual but material; her function is to provide the comforts of a well-run home and to accumulate a dowry for her daughters.

[88] Atkinson 15.

[89] Richard Pipes, 'The New Service State', in Cracraft, 105-113, at 110.

common in Russia prior to the formal abolishment of serfdom in the second half of the nineteenth century.[90] Serf-owners, who were bound by State law to repress their anger, as well as being constantly reminded by the church of the need to perform conscious acts of mercy, in reality often subjected peasants to extremely cruel physical abuse provoked by this emotion.

This split between officially-denounced anger and real-life experience is vividly illustrated by Tolstoy. In *Anna Karenina*, Levin remembers well the involvement of his elder brother, Nikolay, in 'the scandal over a boy, whom he had taken from the country to bring up, and, in a fit of rage, had so violently beaten that proceedings were brought against him for unlawfully wounding' (*AK* 80). Despite the legal condemnation of excessive anger and inhumane treatment of serfs resulting therefrom, the everyday practices of upper-class Russians, confirmed merely theoretical, rather than actual, efforts to inhibit explosions of uncontrolled rage. Consequently, early modern Russia's transition from very primitive patterns of behaviour to more sophisticated codes of conduct was only superficial.

Outside the literary context, Liubov Nikulina-Kositskaia (1827-1868), a peasant woman by birth, records in her autobiography memories of notorious cases of anger-related violence directed against the representatives of her class under serfdom:

> We were the houseserfs of a master whom folk called a dog. As children we were frightened of his very name, and he himself was fear personified. I was born in the house of that lord, on land covered with the blood and tears of poor peasants. I remember frightful tortures, I remember the groans of those punished – they ring in my ears to this day! My God, what fear he inspired in all his vassals! Whenever he left the house to walk around the estate, children hid in fear under gates and under benches, and those who didn't succeed were sure to be beaten. He used to say that he wasn't sated unless he had found someone to harass and that for him dinner wasn't in the eating![91]

Clearly, for Russian culture, based on feudal values, the question of the entitlement of a master to freely administer punishment on a peasant was theoretically absurd, and at any rate too long a part of historical-cultural tradition to be pondered upon. Acts of horrifying brutality performed by simmering masters seemed logical, however only insofar as they did not spur

[90] The social, political and economic reform responsible for the emancipation of the serfs in Russia ("krest′janskaja reforma") was introduced in 1861, considerably later than in Western Europe – in England serfdom was abolished as early as in 1574 (by Elisabeth I); and in France in 1789 (an achievement of the French Revolution).
[91] Liubov Nikulina-Kositskaia, 'Notes', trans. Mary F. Zirin, in Clyman and Vowles, 112-157, at 112.

peasant revolts but merely ensured the preservation of the status quo. The savage beatings and regular terrorizing received not so much public approbation, as were tolerated largely as a result of a general attitude of indifference.

In this cultural context, Dostoyevsky, the relentless purveyor of literary representations of anger mentioned above is worth considering further. His peculiarly dark Realism characterized by a high-degree of social pessimism is certainly one of the gloomiest of all Realisms of nineteenth-century Russia. His prose delivers neither a grotesque distortion of reality in the manner of Gogol, nor a fierce social criticism achieved through the technique of contrasting human types that is essentially Tolstoyian. What deserves consideration here, if only briefly, is Dostoyevsky's exceptional talent for the representation of hostile emotions. For Dostoyevsky, the realist novel was the means for the externalization of his belief in man's fundamentally animalistic nature and his revulsion to standard cultural behaviours, most notably, the traditional reliance of the Russian people on anger for relief. It is in fact highly characteristic of Dostoyevsky's characters to exhibit this emotion – calculated or impulsive – towards animals and children. For example, in *The Brothers Karamazov* (Book V, Chapter 4, "Mutiny"), the narrator makes an emotionally evocative reference to Nekrasov's poem *Before Twilight* (1859), especially macabre in its description of a small horse whipped mercilessly for its weakness. In Dostoyevsky's novel, the habit of venting one's anger through inflicting physical pain achieves a national status:

> In our country the torture of flogging is a historical, direct and most intimate source of pleasure. Nekrasov has some lines about a muzhik lashing his horse with a knout on the eyes, "on its meek eyes". Who has not seen such a thing, it is a *russime*.[92]

Dostoyevsky's recognition of flogging as a distinctly native practice is based on the assumption that Russians can be adequately described by the range of behaviours they typically engage in and a repertoire of emotions that usually accompany them. From this perspective, the excessive expression of anger, if not participation in blatant acts of aggression, is a necessary criterion, a defining feature of membership in Russian society. The result is a totalizing classification of this culture as exceptionally angry and gratuitously violent.

---

[92] Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* 1878-80, trans. and introd. David McDuff (London: Penguin, 1993; rev. 2003) 314.

Animals were not the only victims of anger-driven tyranny. Parental anger was universally thought to be an essential method of effective upbringing adopted chiefly with a view to instilling fear and fostering absolute obedience across young children and adolescents of all classes. In the mindset of Dostoyevsky's contemporaries, including the vast number of fellow members of the Russian intelligentsia, neither was there any recognized special need to inhibit the enraged gentlemanly father (joined on occasion in his disciplining ritual by his equally strict wife), nor the target of the instrumental anger would ever marvel at the painful event with bewilderment: it was too much of an ordinary folk practice to do so. Dostoyevsky details such an episode:

> And so here we have a cultured gentleman of progressive education and his lady wife flogging their own daughter, a babe of seven years, with the birch – I have a detailed account of it noted down. The dear papa is glad the twigs have knots in them, "it will sting more", he says, and then he begins to "sting" his own daughter. I know for a certainty that there are floggers of a kind who grow excited with each blow to the point of voluptuous pleasure, quite literally voluptuous pleasure, increasingly with each consecutive blow, progressively. They flog for a minute, they flog for five, they flog for ten, onward, harder, faster, more and more painfully (*BK* 315).

If legal actions that were brought against the father for causing bodily harm to his daughter were indicative of only marginal behavioural refinement (which the fully westernized Russia claimed already to have accomplished), they certainly did not strip him of the credit for achieving a morally acceptable end through instructive bashing, 'so ordinary and based in family life' (*BK* 315).

Since the late seventeenth century externalized and internalized evenness of temper was on the agenda, although Russian society remained loyal to the old habits and the restraint of anger and the repudiation of violence were reduced to a trivial set of idealistic values devoid of relevance to contemporary patriarchal ways of life. Anger control, at root, to emphasize, was a political act intended to boost the image of Russia internationally. Once that goal was assumed to be virtually complete in the nineteenth century, there was not much motivation to pursue the conceptualization of emotions along foreign lines. Official sanctions against excessive anger would hardly have been a desired outcome, given that this emotion was highly valued as a positive resource in the maintenance of discipline and obedience. In short, the patriarchal context favoured an anger-oriented pedagogy. As a result, its related strategies were more than likely to obtain common consent: after all, Dostoyevsky is quick to

report that 'the members of the public roar with happiness that the torturer has been acquitted' (*BK* 315).

Nineteenth-century Russian women's autobiographies provide further support for Dostoyevsky's suggestion that the expression of fierce anger towards children was not at all gender-specific, but was rather the default means of their admonishment. Nikulina-Kositskaia, as a seven year old in 1834, slyly took two candies that belonged to the landlady's daughter and was caught in the act. 'She glanced at me: guilt was written on my face', the transgressor recorded in her notes, recalling that

> She grinned, seized my head in both hands, and hurled me out the door. I hit my head against the wall. She beat me until I blacked out, and therefore I don't know how much and how long she revelled in my torments. I was brought home half-dead, and my ears bled for a whole week.[93]

Blind rage undermines the utility of anger as an instrument for character building. Theft, as a rule, should not escape punishment, but it is among the tasks of the arbitrator to determine the degree of the thief's culpability. The emphasis here is on the reasonableness and the grant of due leniency when appropriate (in effect, relenting anger). The relevant facts of this case are: one, the circumstances particularly conducive to theft (the absence of witnesses); and two, the thief's very young age, typically 'not noted for either piety or wits'.[94] The woman's drastic measures, if they are to be considered as undertaken to correct defects in the girl's character, prove conceptually misguided, because the child's character does not display features that would prompt its classification as fundamentally flawed. The act of stealing sweets does not result from vice, nor is it motivated by malice; rather it arises from an ethical ignorance and social inexperience characteristic of childhood. Based on contextual information provided by Nikulina-Kositskaia, it seems that the landlady's furious lashing out at the serf child serves but one purpose: to get square with the girl's father for previously injuring her own foot whilst trying to hit him with a saucepan. The woman's past experience of anger has led over time to a Homeric pleasure of looking forward to 'exacting revenge'[95] on the original culprit, which she does not gain until her sadistic impulses are fully satisfied through the brutality meted out on the child. Anger, in this instance, is not designated to facilitate moral improvement; it is rather

[93] Nikulina-Kositskaia114.
[94] Nikulina-Kositskaia114.
[95] Harris 134.

construed as communicating wickedness via an unharnessed propensity for perverse self-indulgence.

Some other manifestations of anger were less extreme, involving only verbal abuse. Shortly after Nikulina-Kositskaia turned twelve, her own mother, an incessant 'grumbler',[96] as the former called her, accused her daughter of selfishly losing her health, bringing the imaginary transgression down to a matter of recklessness, rather than of actual physical exhaustion. The mother's annoyance continued, to the point that, when the girl was scolded for careless ironing despite her best efforts, the latter charged her parent with attempts at inflicting physical injury accompanied by the use of harsh language: 'she tried to hit me and even reproached me for being a parasite'.[97] Outward displays of aggression were a synonym for barbarity, and their notoriously bad repute gradually resulted in the increase of practices of verbal intimidation. The heavy use of the vernacular was a specific reaction in modern Russian societies to restrictive rules for anger release intended to reduce violence. Rich linguistic repertoires of assault offered fiery individuals an alternative outlet for their anger enabling them to diminish their uncontrollable physical acts. The patriarchal rules still condoned, even required, anger in the context of behaviour correction through discipline, but large sections of society increasingly substituted savage beatings with gesticulated yelling. Whilst this means was considered to be quite effective in deflecting more violent angry outbursts, there was evidently much optimism in the expectation that it would be consistently applied at all times. Revealingly, the bitter reproach that the mother directs at Nikulina-Kositskaia could be considered as an attempt at mildness, if it had not been for the fact that she had first tried, but failed, to viciously hit her daughter.

A quite interesting though most bizarre case of female wrath manifested via heated words involved a mother who was no longer able to berate her deceased adult daughter for the latter's outright disrespect whilst still alive. Addressing her reader, Anastasiia Verbitskaia (1861-1928) described how her sister, prior to poisoning herself, wrote a suicide note to her mother, failing to acknowledge the latter's authority in the form of an imposed pre-signature line '" your loving and respectful daughter …"'[98] (there is no disclosure whether this omission

[96] Nikulina-Kositskaia122.
[97] Nikulina-Kositskaia122.
[98] Anastasiia Verbitskaia, 'To My Reader', trans. Judith Vowles, in Clyman and Vowles, 337-380, at 366.

was meant to be deliberate). Deeply offended, the mother launched into a sharp tirade against Verbitskaia who tried to plea for the dead:

> Don't dare speak of her! . . . She's no daughter of mine! . . . How dare she sign herself Sasha! Just as though we were equals. . . .[99]

For the mother, death seemed a poor defensive argument against such intolerable conduct:

> Silence! Silence! What's being dead got to do with it? She should have remembered she was writing to her mother. . . .[100]

By upbraiding Verbitskaia for her unwarranted intervention, the mother soothed her injured pride, whilst also communicating to her daughter that all behaviour contradictory to her expectations would result in irreparable damage to their relationship. The mother's anger, in this case, functioned to protect what was customarily regarded as a proper parent-child relationship. Any level of tolerance for insubordination within the family unit would have resulted (in her mind) in an inappropriate laxity of familial decorum, and consequently a lessening of her authority as a mother. The mother's anger, on this interpretation, was a way of maintaining her due status in the family.

Metaphors of Anger in Anna Karenina and Middlemarch

Keeping in mind the respective socially prescribed norms relating to both the experience and expression of anger, the following discussion will consider their representation and linguistic expression in fictional texts. Metaphors of anger in *Anna Karenina* and *Middlemarch* are argued here to be conceptually limited, inspired, to a large extent, by a reliance on analogies with the physical body. Although English and Russian emotion terms that belong to the broad category of anger differ in their semantic scope and their context of usage, they are nevertheless pointing to one essential cross-cultural similarity, as reflected in the metaphorical language of the novels. The mental image of *wrath* of the English speaker closely corresponds to the mental image of *gnev* of the Russian speaker – both linguistic cultures conceptualize intense anger in terms of boiling or burning. The significance of this correspondence is that it encourages the expectation that the metaphoric representation of both emotions in different languages will have common physiological processes as its source. The universal awareness of the generation of bodily heat when angry becomes nontrivial, indeed

[99] Verbitskaia 366.
[100] Verbitskaia 366.

highly relevant in the projection of the way in which English and Russian speakers similarly convey the presence of anger by figurative means. To explore this linguistic phenomenon, therefore, rather than focus exclusively on the non-equivalence of English and Russian emotion words, it is more useful to concentrate on this inadequacy in conjunction with the analysis of Eliot's and Tolstoy's metaphors which are themselves a linguistic reflection of the novelists' habits of thought acquired through their physiological experience of anger.

The important fact to acknowledge at this point is that the folk construal of *gnev* does not entirely correspond to the emotional experience captured by the English *anger*, though bilingual dictionaries customarily treat the two terms as equivalents. Anna Wierzbicka has offered a detailed analysis of the discrepancy between the denotation of the words *gnev* and *anger* in their respective cultures, arguing that '*gnev* does not mean the same as *anger*, and in some respects it is closer to the archaic English word *wrath*'.[101] Her standardized (semantic primitives-based) explication of the word *gnev* portrays its meaning as that which concerns a mixture of feelings that are highly compatible with the states of mind associated with *anger*. *Gnev*, like *anger*, is an emotion experienced in response to our perception of another person's wrongdoing aimed at stimulating a positive change, but unlike anger, it is a kind of dignified feeling designed to actively assign moral defects to another, as *wrath* is typically known to connote. The prototypical emotional experience of *anger*, in Wierzbicka's view, shares more representational characteristics with the emotional experience encoded in the semantics of the Russian verb *serdit'sja* (usually translated into English as "to be angry"), which is extensively used in both moral and non-moral contexts, though *serdit'sja* is subject to one crucial constraint: regarding another to be somehow in the wrong is a fundamental prerequisite for understanding what the Russian speaker probably means by saying that one *serdit'sja na rebënka* (is angry at a child).

That the Russian verb *serdit'sja* is nearest in meaning to the English noun *anger* does not mean that they differ exclusively in their part-of-speech status. According to Wierzbicka, the use of *serdit'sja* (like *radovat'sja* ["to rejoice"] or stydit*'sja* ["to be ashamed"]) in angry contexts reflects the tendency of Russian speakers to think of anger as an emotion one

[101] Anna Wierzbicka, '"Sadness" and "Anger" in Russian: The Non-universality of the so-called "Basic Human Emotions", in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998) 3-28, at 19.

generates, rather than is passively gripped by it – the dynamism which would probably be best compared to the quality of active involvement inherent in the English verbs "to rejoice" or "to grieve".[102] In her effort to show that the English word *anger* does not match the Russian word *gnev*, Wierzbicka explicitly takes up the moral aspect as a principal point of difference, thereby grossly overstating the extent to which one should restrict the semantic range of *gnev*. In fact, there can be found in *Anna Karenina* evidence of a wider usage of *gnev*, extending its meaning to include *detskij gnev* (Book II, Chapter 35), literally translated as "childish anger", which implies a naïve, tantrum-orientated kind of anger, as opposed to that stimulated by ethical considerations. The idea here is that explanations of Russian emotion terms should not be narrowly prescriptive, always assuming that *gnev* strictly means one thing or another. Rather, the translation of foreign emotion terms is more effective and reliable when focused on the conveyance of the closely comparative kind of feeling by means of the appropriate linguistic resources available to English speakers.

Righteous Anger

Anna Karenina metaphorically reverses the convention by which women conceal their angry feelings and men exhibit frequent displays of wrath. The novel famously opens with the spectacle of a wife lost in rage at the discovery of her husband's love affair with the governess. During the spousal argument that follows, the guilty but shameless husband cares little even to '[adapt] his face to the position in which he was placed towards his wife by the discovery of his fault' (*AK* 6). Indeed, under interrogation,

> instead of being hurt, denying, defending himself, begging forgiveness, instead of remaining indifferent even – anything would have been better than what he did do – his face utterly involuntarily (reflex spinal action, reflected Stepan Arkadyevitch, who was fond of physiology) – utterly involuntarily assumed its habitual, good-humored, and therefore idiotic smile (*AK* 6).

Stiva's unintentional facial behaviour is a provocative stimulus which triggers Dolly's equally impulsive physiological and behavioral reactions that are visible signs of fury. Four of the commonly recognized effects of intense anger seem to be involved in Tolstoy's metonymic

[102] For the development of this idea, see Anna Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 18.

representation of Dolly's frustrated emotion: 'AGITATION', 'BODY HEAT',[103] VERBAL OUTBURST DIRECTED AGAINST THE OFFENDER and also COMPULSION TO RAPID MOVEMENT:

> Увидав эту улыбку, Долли *вздрогнула, как от физической боли, разразилась, со свойственною ей горячностью, потоком жестоких слов и выбежала из комнаты*.[104]
>
> (Catching sight of that smile, Dolly *shuddered as if from physical pain, burst with her characteristic heat into a flood of cruel words, and rushed out of the room*).

On another occasion, when Dolly initially scorns Karenin for not trusting his own wife, apart from AGITATION, another common component of anger physiology is included to describe her pent-up emotion, namely PALENESS IN THE FACE:

> Дарья Александровна была твердо уверена в невинности Анны *и чувствовала, что она бледнеет и губы ее дрожат от гнева* на этого холодного, бесчувственного человека, так покойно намеревающегося погубить ее невинного друга (*АК* 466).
>
> (Darya Alexandrovna was firmly convinced of Anna's innocence and *she felt herself growing pale and her lips quivering with wrath* at this cold, unfeeling man, who was so calmly intending to ruin her innocent friend).

In nineteenth-century Russia, physical unattractiveness as a result of multiple pregnancies was evidence of virtue, as married women were valued chiefly for bearing children. Dolly's awareness of her own disadvantaged appearance in comparison with that of the young governess, because it constitutes a threat to a personal pride, impels feelings of competition and rivalry. These categories are social-cognitive correlates of anger, types of self-protective action to which one tends to commit oneself in the presence of perceived or actual danger. The mistress is dangerous insofar as the liaison with the man of the house compromises the public image of the Oblonsky family. Rivalry and competition prove sadly inadequate means of dealing with the apparently superior opponent. Dolly's recognition of the governess to be more attractive than herself triggers the emotion of anger whose 'basic message is one of protection, for [oneself] certainly, but also for others'.[105] The shame of having to reassert herself and to reclaim her husband prevents her from readily welcoming any consolation from her sister-in-law. Knowing that the governess will most likely become a

---

[103] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986) 12.
[104] Lev Tolstoj, *Anna Karenina* 1875-7 (Moskva: Èksmo, 2010) 29.
[105] Karla McLaren, *The Language of Emotions* (Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2010) 169.

passing fancy and the future probably promises a repetition of the past, Dolly cannot help but externalize her anger during an emotional outpouring to Anna. Her fury at Anna's suggestion of forgiveness shows up in the singular metonymic category FLASH OF LIGHT IN THE EYES: 'Опять *ненавистью зажглись ее глаза*' ([*АК* 102] 'Again, *her eyes glowed with hatred*').

The metonymic representation of Dolly as seething with rage '(high intensity anger)'[106] at her unfaithful husband reveals the breakdown in standard expectations of female behaviour in modern Russia. Old patriarchal rules that confined women to passive obedience and forbade them to experience a full range of natural human feelings were modified to accept as fact women's intense vulnerability to anger. The result was the cultivation of Russian consciousness that tolerated, whilst it did not actually promote, feminine wrath when morally justified. Tolstoy shows that Dolly, being more involved in marital duty than Stiva, usurps the right to 'the rage of hostility'[107] as a way of getting her revenge for having been wronged. Her negative frame of mind, conveyed metaphorically, is caused by feelings of her superiority provoked by thoughts that her husband is to blame and she herself is in the right. In the official morality of nineteenth-century Russia which framed marriage explicitly within the bounds of reproduction and respectability, there could be no disagreement that Dolly is an irreproachable

---

[106] Matsumoto and Wilson, in Sorrentino and Yamaguchi, 551. Psychological literature persistently sensitizes to the danger of interchangeable use of anger with rage, as these two emotion terms denote mental states that vary at points other than mere intensity. Helen Robinson, for example, subsumes rage under the category of negative emotions, and conversely identifies anger as belonging to the family of potentially positive emotions (*Rage* [Port Melbourne: Lothian Books, 1999] 4):

> Rage sometimes has no bounds. Rage has different styles. It can be loud, quiet, abusive, physical, unexpressed, vicious, sadistic, used over years to torment, taunt and control. It can be sudden or predictable, vengeful, malicious. Its causes may come from a long time back, or it can manifest itself unexpectedly as a result of a sudden change in circumstances. It can arise from unresolved conflict or perceived unfairness. It can be red hot, or white, icy and deliberate.

Anger, in contrast,

> is a healthy emotion when you express it appropriately and do not hurt others. When used constructively, anger can contribute towards your emotional wellbeing and positive mental health. Anger was seen negatively in the past, as something to be suppressed; but because it was not expressed it led to pent-up feelings that turned into a more violent state of rage. People can feel anger for a number of reasons: when they are criticised, when they feel they have been let down, been rejected, over the death of a partner, when envious, or when unemployed. Anger can be mild annoyance, and it can escalate from mild irritability to absolute fury. However, it does not always become rage.

For Michael Lewis ('The Development of Anger', in Potegal at al., 177-191, at 177), the difference between anger and rage lies principally in the earlier childhood development of the former as well as the disparate triggers of each. Apart from anger being a milder form of rage that generally lasts for shorter periods, it

> is the consequence of the blockage of a goal-oriented action, while rage is the consequence of shame and is, therefore, a failure in the child's ability to maintain its self-esteem . . . shame cannot emerge until after the development of consciousness. Rage, therefore, cannot occur until shame arises, sometime after the second year of life (Lewis, 1992).

[107] Robinson 7.

wife dishonourably deceived by her philandering husband. Her anger is thus excused on the grounds of a perceived injustice and the violation by her husband of her principles and belief system, enacted as retaliation.

In suggesting that 'in anger the other's action is not merely perceived as unjust but also as depreciating our position',[108] Aaron Ben- Ze'ev is clearly not breaking any new ground, for this implied function of anger to restore one's own sense of personal worth partially overlaps with Aristotle's appraisal of self-assertion as an act of wisdom, 'for those who are not angry at the things they should be are thought to be fools'.[109] These ancient considerations are useful in further explaining how traditional Russian society could possibly assess Dolly's anger as positive, thereby demonstrating its efforts at judging this emotion favourably according to its noble purpose. Stiva's intimate relations with a French girl in Dolly's own house mean an overt depreciation of the latter's worth publically before her family members and the whole household. Dolly's wrathful reaction to personal insult enables her to preserve her self-esteem. Her culture does not approve of explosive behaviours in women but it certainly understands the righteousness involved in trying to defend their honour. Even when a wife's anger is extreme, society is likely to see that kind of excess as unfeminine, overly dramatic, or simply negatively affecting the household routine (as Dolly's servants do), rather than utterly inappropriate. Harmed and humiliated by a blameworthy husband, Dolly feels justified in her desire to avenge what she considers to be an 'undeserved offence',[110] believing that in doing so she reinstates her matriarchal authority. By fiercely expressing her outrage, Dolly 'has at least attempted to assert herself and show the other to be wrong, and in thus relieving her feelings has at least declared her own position and so has taken a step towards re-establishing herself'.[111]

Illegitimate Anger

Just as there is figurative language employed in *Anna Karenina* to potentially increase the social value of anger, so there are examples of Tolstoy's subconscious use of metaphors to raise doubt about the benefits of open displays of this emotion. The shared social reality of

---

[108] Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000) 380.
[109] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1777 [IV. 5].
[110] Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions*, 380.
[111] Gabriele Taylor, *Deadly Vices* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 86.

nineteenth-century Russians is figuratively shown by Tolstoy to be lacking in situations which could be regarded as subversive of the existing husband/wife behavioural norms. Reactionary as Anna's disorderly fits of passion may seem, they are not part of a general desire of contemporary moralists to revise the conventional codes of spousal conduct. On the contrary, it is precisely because the failure of the eponymous character to rein in her angry feelings is incongruent with an accepted social standard that – it might be suspected – Tolstoy identifies as the source of Anna's tragedy her emotional pathology.

Amy Mandelker has made a distinction between the first representation of Anna as capable of that Victorian norm of consciously surrendering to duty when she is in a passionless, but stable and apparently satisfactory relation with Karenin, and the second portrayal of Anna as anxious to externalize her inner world of feeling after the appearance of Vronsky:

> Anna enters the novel as a Victorian stereotype of the "Angel in the House", making peace in the Oblonsky household, surrounded by a bevy of children. She is almost immediately transformed into the demonic siren of femme fatale possessed by passion in the tradition of the mid-Victorian novel of adultery, such as *Wuthering Heights* or *Lady Audley's Secret*.[112]

This psychological separation is portrayed as indicative of Anna's moral deterioration. The central focus of her life is to lead an intimate life with Vronsky. This aspiration is corrupting insofar as she selectively filters her states of mind, from disappointment and loneliness to unfulfillment and expectation, in order to perceive herself as a victim. So long as Anna regards her own marriage to be the burden, stifling and oppressive, her pleasurable transgressions can be morally justified. Anna has a self-regarding motive for pursuing what she has convinced herself to be her right to happiness. The romantic-heroic mission allows her to extricate herself from the inconveniences of her empty shell marriage and to assume (an undue) superiority over her husband. Her public indecency continues and Karenin is forced to directly confront her about her failure to maintain a proper sense of decorum. Anna cannot keep the lid on her simmering rage. What induces her *zloba* – the Russian term for hateful anger, variously translated as anger (RP&LV, 363; L&AM, 358) and hatred (as rendered by Constance Garnett, *AK* 340) – is her biased and irrational – even delusional – evaluation of her own conduct as

[112] Amy Mandelker, 'The Woman with a Shadow: Fables of Demon and Psyche in "Anna Karenina"', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 24.1 (1990): 48-68, at 56.

above that of her husband – an arrogant mindset required for anger to occur, according to Aristotle. Karenin accuses Anna of shamelessly publicizing her infidelity, rather than striking out against her infidelity per se. This perceived hypocrisy reaffirms Anna's reasons to so behave, propelling her towards self-defensive anger. The furious attack is expressed via the ANGER IS AN UNCONTROLLABLE FORCE conceptual metaphor:

> Это хуже жестокости, это подлость, если уже вы хотите знать! – *со взрывом злобы* вскрикнула Анна и, встав, хотела уйти (*АК* 434).
>
> ("'It is worse than cruelty – it is baseness, if you want to know!" Anna exclaimed, *in a rush of anger*, and getting up, she was meaning to leave').

Anna, obscurely believing in her own virtue, rages with contempt at her husband's reprimand. At the same time she prepares to flee. It is not typical of angry people to be sending a message of withdrawal from a position of dominance in an atmosphere of conflict. Since the infuriated Anna has even greater reason to stay and defend her actions, by attempting to leave, she makes obvious her concealed feeling of shame.

At this moment in time, Karenin is consumed by his wrath, not because he fails to terminate Anna's indecent behaviour by appealing to her reason (he had previously attempted to do so several times), but because of being compelled reluctantly into the vengeful act of commencing divorce proceedings that her deviant behaviour has provoked. Here, Tolstoy represents the implications of anger in ways that align with the findings of modern psychology. Anger, Ben-Ze'ev explains, is usually experienced in response to harm but it can also stem from feelings of disgust at one's own retaliatory initiatives. In this psychologist's own words,

> Both anger and hate may occur not only as a result of the hurt that other people inflict upon us but may also be a consequence of the hurt that we inflict upon them. We blame them for putting us in a situation in which we do not want to be, namely, a situation in which we were forced to hurt them.[113]

Anna has done Karenin great harm: she robbed him of her love and exposed him to public humiliation. Divorce, which entails stripping Anna of legal rights to her son, is the only means by which he can appease his pride and regain an inner state of calm. Angered by Dolly's

[113] Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions*, 382.

references to Anna as being innocent, Karenin responds scornfully in relation to his wife, but with such sincerity that it dispels Dolly's initial suspicion of deliberate malice on his part:

> Она не исполнила самого легкого требования – соблюдения приличий, – говорил он, *разгорячаясь* (*АК* 468).[114]
>
> ('"She [Anna] did not fulfil the simplest of requirements – the observance of propriety" – he said, *getting heated*').

As a result of this personal impact, Karenin is shown to experience a surge of hot anger: we need only our human experience of physiological changes in the body during this emotion to understand this metaphor. The narrator's extension of the master-metaphor 'ANGER IS HEAT'[115] which takes in this instance the form of the biological fact WHEN ANGER INTENSIFIES, THE BODILY HEAT RISES, opens the possibility for the delineation of the degree to which Karenin consciously allows his anger to escalate as his awareness of the subjective impact grows. Instinctively wary of, and generally hostile to, uncontrollable impulses of others (especially crying), and being himself an embodiment of unassailable self-possession, Karenin (like Casaubon in *Middlemarch*) is not frequently given to excessive emotional expressions. Like all human beings, he experiences the mounting of heat in the body, but as a member exclusively of a civilized society, he invests a great deal of mental effort to arrange his conduct around considerations of self-restraint that have historically drawn the individual away from actions beyond that advised by fully conscious (moral) judgment.

Tolstoy uses figurative language to show that the doctrine of moderation to which Karenin – most of the time – subscribes is not exactly what he abides by when he, full of toxic venom, prepares himself to deliver an ultimatum to his wife as a consequence of her invitating Vronsky into the marital home (Anna's reaction to which we know from the description above). Two conceptual metaphors deployed together – (1) ANGER IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER[116] (and its consequential derivative WHEN INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE PRESSURE IN THE CONTAINER RISES), and (2) ANGER IS LIQUID IN A CONTAINER – signal Karenin's intention of finally getting his frustration with his wife out of his system:

---

[114] In Russian, the verb *goret'* literally means "to burn".
[115] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 13.
[116] This is a reduced version of the general metaphor 'THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER', as articulated by Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger', in Potegal et al., 158.

> Он не спал всю ночь, *и его гнев, увеличиваясь в какой-то огромной прогрессии, дошел к утру до крайных пределов*. Он поспешно оделся и, *как бы неся полную чашу гнева и боясь расплескать ее*, боясь вместе с гневом утратить энергию, нужную ему для объяснения с женою, вошел к ней, как только узнал, что она встала (*АК* 433).
>
> (He did not sleep the whole night, and *his wrath, growing in a sort of vast progression, had reached its highest limits by the morning*. He dressed in haste, and *as though carrying a cup full of wrath, and fearing to spill it*, fearing to lose with his wrath the energy he needed for the interview with his wife, he went to her as soon as he knew that she was up).

If there is such an intensification of fury in Karenin, it is due, according to Gary Saul Morson, who enthusiastically took up the debate, to the fact 'that she [Anna] has disregarded his one request. He senses, beyond the pain caused by the affair, a severe insult to his dignity that could easily have been avoided. He confronts her angrily'.[117] There is in fact another way of understanding Karenin's expression – and the preservation for later – of his anger (as the metaphor of the careful handling of the liquidized emotion suggests), one that lies outside the standard view of anger as arising from the recognized 'violation of important personal expectation' and 'a loss of personal pride'.[118] Karenin passes away the night, we are told, internally mobilizing his wrath, and in the morning he ensures it is not assuaged. Because the (psycho-) neurophysiological constitution of the human being is such that 'the stronger the anger the stronger and more energetic the person feels',[119] it might be reasonably suspected that Karenin consciously and cold-bloodedly clings to his wrath allowing it to fester as a kind of emotional armament. This logic might be expressed in Karenin's realization: "If I persist in anger, then it might just steel me with the determination and perhaps even cruelty needed to end my marriage; otherwise I will not be able to condemn to poverty and social ostracism the woman I love, despite her culpability, and thus continue in my misery". It is only recently that Karenin has committed his energy to verbally disciplining his recalcitrant wife. Knowing that his placid disposition might influence him to patiently endure Anna's immorality without actually permitting it, he turns to anger in order to cope more easily with the task at hand. On this view, Alexey Alexandrovitch's anger might be said to be a confidence-inducing emotion which stems from an acknowledged weakness of his own character.

---

[117] Gary Saul Morson, *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) 110.
[118] Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish, *Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder* (1997; repr. Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press Ltd., 1998) 308.
[119] Izard, *The Psychology of Emotions*, 241.

Conventional metaphoric language used in Anna *Karenina*, we are led to realize, cannot be properly considered to be Tolstoy's own characteristic model for psychological depiction, but rather as a self-consistent system which he as a speaker of Russian has assimilated, and mentally rehearsed. The apparent effect of this linguistic resource is the restriction of the discourse of anger to a set of fairly standard associations that this emotion is commonly known to trigger, ultimately propagating new behavioural standards.

Jealous Anger

Different emotion theorists have persistently noted that anger is not jealousy, but it is often fueled by it, providing consistent support for the idea that individuals who are overly possessive of their partners (even in the absence of a real rival) demonstrate a strong inclination towards jealous rage.[120] An extreme version of this view is represented within Tolstoy's novel by Anna who debilitates Vronsky by the frenzy of her pathological suspicions. Their mutual experience of divergence between expectations and reality leads in this couple's case to the early cooling of their passion. Vronsky has already felt the first pangs of regret and Anna's fear of loss of his affection has reached such enormous proportions that the literary analyst, Judith Armstrong, finds it difficult to appropriately label:

> What comes between Anna's meeting with Vronsky and her final act is an interlude of passion, followed by the visible transformation of that passion into something so neurotic, obsessional and destructive that we are uncertain whether it can still be called by the same name.[121]

By the time the Vronskys settle down together in their luxurious country estate as self-proclaimed husband and wife, the life of suffocating isolation does not satisfy Anna. She torments Vronsky with constant comparisons of his passionless devotion with what she thinks love should be. Inwardly, she rages against his freedom to which she frequently alludes with bitter sarcasm and righteous indignation. The projected stories in her mind of what he is doing

---

[120] Angry reactions associated with jealousy have received copious attention in works where anger is framed to be an outcome of romantic and sexual jealousy. For example, Eugene W. Mathes, *Jealousy: The Psychological Data* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); and Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, 'Jealousy and Romantic Love', in *Handbook of Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Multidisciplinary Approaches*, eds. Sybil L. Hart and Maria Legerstee (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 40-54. In the same volume, Sybil L. Hart, explores a child's jealousy triggered by the preoccupation of its caregiver with another child. She describes episodes of angry jealousy involving her nine-year-old daughter disturbed by her perceived exclusion from a motherly focus. Violent displays of possession by children confirm that anger is a major component of jealousy that is not exclusive to adults ('A Theoretical Model of the Development of Jealousy: Insight through Inquiry into Jealousy Protest' (331-361).

[121] Judith M. Armstrong, *The Unsaid: Anna Karenina* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) 71.

when he is not with her (which the reader knows to be unfounded) cause her each time to reach an utterly heedless fury. Since 'a consequence of the ungrounded nature of morbid jealousy is the jealous person's attempt to provide a basis of reality to the feelings',[122] Anna anchors her jealousy in her false belief of Vronsky's ignoble motives, fantasizing that he is trying to intentionally hurt and humiliate her. The ANGER IS BAD WEATHER INSIDE A PERSON conceptual metaphor is effectively incorporated into one of their later fights to prove that Anna has the mental capacity to control her anger at will, to instantly '[смирить] в себе внутреннюю бурю' (*АК* 861) 'subjugate the storm within her', if required. She was previously faced with the choice of incurring Vronsky's anger if she went on the attack, accusing him of cold indifference, or seeing herself go mad if he left home unperturbed. Now she faces a similar choice: if she goes off again in a fit of jealousy, she may lose his love, but otherwise he may walk away to seek happiness elsewhere. The urge to act on her jealous anger attests to the kind of choice Anna makes when she imagines the young Princess Sorokina to be the cause of Vronsky's postponement of their trip to the country:

> На мгновенье она очнулась и ужаснулась тому, что изменила своему намерению. Но и зная, что она губит себя, она не могла воздержаться, не могла не показать ему, как он был неправ, не могла покориться ему (*АК* 855).
>
> (For a moment she recovered herself and was horrified at having failed to keep her own resolution. But, even though she knew she was ruining herself, she could not restrain herself, could not forbear from showing him that he was in the wrong, could not submit to him).

What is depicted here is a shift in actual manageability of jealous anger: Anna is no longer able to rationally deploy a control strategy and in effect defuel her angry fires. Rather, she is in too tight a grip of paranoia to consciously search for more positive responses to anger-arousing events. The result is 'a deeply changed ("crazy"), anxiety-ridden person', lost forever in 'the omnipotence of [her own irrational] thoughts'.[123]

Vronsky himself is not described as quick to anger upon provocation. Among the textual examples in support of this characterization is the metaphor 'INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER'[124] (which implies the process of building up to the boiling point

[122] Power and Dalgleish 342.
[123] Hildegard Baumgart, *Jealousy: Experiences and Solutions*, trans. Manfred and Evelyn Jacobson (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) 48.
[124] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 15.

beyond which anger escapes) produced to showcase Vronsky's self-restraint when Anna mockingly challenges his claims to modesty and truthfulness:

> Я никогда не хвастаюсь и никогда не говорю неправду, – сказал он тихо, *удерживая поднимавшийся в нем гнев* (*АК* 855).
>
> ('"I never boast and never tell lies", he said quietly, *restraining the anger that was surging up in him*').

Vronsky warns Anna of the limits of his patience, but it is not the harshness of his words, but the look of his face that communicates to her that he is beyond crossing what Karla McLaren terms a personal 'boundary-defining anger'.[125] Metonymically, Vronsky is represented to display the facial behaviour characteristic of hatred:

> Что вы хотите этим сказать? – вскрикнула она, с ужасом вглядываясь в явное выражение ненависти, которое было во всем лице и в особенности в жестоких, грозных глазах (*АК* 855).
>
> ('"What do you mean by that?" she cried, glancing with terror *at the undisguised expression of hatred that was on his whole face, and especially in his cruel, menacing eyes*').

Vronsky constantly refrains from acting out his angry impulses, and his suppressed anger, as it expands and becomes even more internalized, transforms from a transient state of irritation into a permanent and even uglier emotion of hatred. To the end Vronsky remains a gentleman of good breeding, but his unexpressed feelings of mental exhaustion and worry, accumulated over the course of his relationship with Anna, subconsciously motivate him to terminate intimacy and to create a psychological situation in which he allows his anger to develop into intense resentment.

Jealousy over Vronsky is not a foreign emotion to Anna (we recall how the pretty Italian nurse subjected Anna to the pain of the "narcissistic wound"[126] in their happy days), but previously she has always been able to mask it, to affect a falsified detachment, or failing to do so, to extract from him a declaration of love, for the illusion of romantic fulfilment is ultimately more emotionally gratifying to Anna than an honest admittance of mutual disappointment. David M. Buss speaks of constructive jealousy when it is 'an anticipatory

---

[125] McLaren 170.
[126] The phrase is from Gregory L. White and Paul E. Mullen, *Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Clinical Strategies* (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1989) 21.

response, a preemptive strike to prevent an infidelity that might occur'.[127] According to this interpretation, jealousy is a positive emotion in the sense that it 'can head off an infidelity that might be lurking on the horizon of a relationship'.[128] The specific type of romantic jealousy that Anna is so transparent to have now developed – pathological – is not 'designed to deal with real relationship threats',[129] but rather it refers to the things she is prepared to sacrifice to eliminate those threats. Tolstoy shows that her jealousy is deviant in that, although it quite naturally anticipates anger at a suspected loss of a desired object, the appeasement is sought in the insatiable desire for revenge, if only through suicide:

> " . . . To die! and he will feel remorse; will be sorry; will love me; he will suffer on my account". With the trace of a smile of commiseration for herself she sat down in the armchair, taking off and putting on the rings on her left hand, vividly picturing from different sides his feelings after her death (*AK* 686).

Tolstoy's depiction of Anna's suicide, the orthodox criticism maintains, responds to the demands of the tragic plot of the novel of adultery that precipitate female self-destruction of a purely incidental nature. As Konstantin Leontiev states, 'Anna leaves the house without any plan or decision; her decision is made almost instinctively, under the influence of chance impressions'.[130] Given that Anna is described as indulging in a sweet contemplation of the effects of her death on Vronsky as she sadistically imagines him to crush under the burden of her tragedy, it is difficult to understand how critics can attribute mere impulse to her consciously engineered death. Anna's design of her suicide results not from any long-held idea of dying beneath a train, but rather from harbouring her anger and galvanizing the thoughts of revenge that energize her to act out what has been portended in her fantasy. Almost invariably, malicious, well-planned acts are dealt with less harshly if they are conceived of as committed in the absence of one's mental faculties. Tolstoy's conceptual lexicon is the backbone of a convincing portrayal of Anna's psychological disturbance, intuitively deployed potentially to speculate upon the extent of her moral blameworthiness in the context of her demonstrably compromised sanity.

---

[127] David M. Buss, *The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy is as Necessary as Love or Sex* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000) 9.
[128] Buss 9.
[129] Buss 40.
[130] Konstantin Leontiev, quoted in Amy Mandelker, *Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993) 98.

Vronsky is used to and is intimidated by Anna's unbridled passion, but knows nothing about her suicidal thoughts. As he departs in ignorance to see his mother, she is preoccupied with her own hateful feelings, as well as with the actions of Vronsky that she believes to be all attempts at betrayal. Following this personal logic, she thinks of all his bad qualities and blames him for her misfortune – the state of mind that triggers her jealous flight accompanied by a desire to inflict retributory pain. She is determined to pursue him, plainly in order to make an angry attack. She goes to her upstairs room and immediately storms out of it, we are informed in metaphorical terms, bent on vengeance, as her emotional temperature has risen above a level of rational control:

> А, если так, то я знаю, что мне делать, – сказала она, и, *чувствуя поднимаюшийся в себе неопределенный гнев и потребность мести*, она взбежала наверх . . . Никогда никого не ненавидела так, как этого человека! (*АК* 874)
>
> ("Ah, if it is so, I know what I must do", she said, and, *feeling a vague fury surging up in her and a need for revenge*, she ran upstairs . . . Never have I hated anyone as I hate that man!).

Anger, in the Aristotelian sense, is based on the intent to hurt an individual proportionally (or disproportionally) to the slight received. Ancient belief maintained that excess of anger is a negation of rationality. It propels the raging person towards thoughts and actions that are deficient in objectivity and fairness. Anna, who is now compulsively suspicious and distrustful of everything that Vronsky does, overlooks, in her acute uncontrollable anger, the simple fact that he has not yet had the chance of responding to her summons, for her letters bidding him to return had not yet reached him. Tolstoy thereby depicts Anna's judgement as evidently marred by wrath and stemming from her delusional state and obstinately held convictions of infidelity rather than clear-headedness and a rational assessment of the situation. Vronsky's departure, which in truth serves the sole purpose of obtaining money from his mother, becomes transformed in a manner dictated by Anna's prevailing emotional disposition into a (real to her) conspiracy aimed at courting Princess Sorokina, thus further humiliating her. By the time she gets to the station, she is too much of a captive of her hostile feelings to retract from the premeditated action designed to secure the pleasure of revenge. Insofar as Anna kills herself in a state of indignation to leave Vronsky to his mortification, Tolstoy shows her to perform just what Ben- Ze'ev affirms to be the purpose of anger: 'in anger we want to personally punish the other person who is seen as deserving of

punishment'.[131] In allowing Anna, prior to the very end, to recover herself and to regret her deadly leap – presumably as part of the book's moral message – Tolstoy manages to arouse in the reader a feeling of doubt as to the compensatory value of Vronsky's suffering in return for the pain that he has inflicted. A loss of life seems to be the high price Anna pays for indulging herself in a woeful act of embittered self-congratulation.

An immediate comparison to Anna's rage of jealousy is provided by Levin, who manufactures his own reasons for anger through empty (though not implausible) imaginings of his new bride's infatuation with an uninvited guest, Vassenka Veslovsky – himself introduced by the narrator as 'a brilliant young gentleman in Petersburg and Moscow society' (*AK* 526). Levin's mental projections of what Kitty's is thinking about the attractive visitor develop and provoke delusions of infidelity (if only spiritual), making him feel entirely falsely 'a deceived husband, looked upon by his wife and her lover as simply necessary to provide them with the conveniences and pleasures of life' (*AK* 530). Tolstoy subconsciously casts Levin's jealousy in the specific class, unique in its thriving on what the psychologist, Albert Ellis, terms 'irrational Beliefs'[132] which are typically associated with the emotions of anger, rage, obsession, and – in extreme cases such as Levin's – with anxiety neurosis. His experience of jealous feelings precipitates standard emotional attitudes of a resentful kind: '"Isn't it *awful* that he or she is interested in someone else! I *can't stand* it! What an incompetent and a slob I am for allowing him or her to get so absorbed elsewhere! And how can that ungrateful louse do a thing like that to me!"'.[133]

Too 'warm and gallant [an] air' with which Veslovsky kisses Kitty's hand (*AK* 527), too 'smiling and admiring eyes' that follow her (*AK* 529), too handsome a face, too fashionable a style of dress – all these ignite Levin's jealous anger and move him towards action whose goal is the elimination of his (imagined) enemy. When Veslovsky, 'utterly unsuspecting the misery his presence had occasioned' (*AK* 529), looks at Kitty with admiration, Levin seethes with rage, his emotion being prompted by considerations of a potential threat to his status as a husband. The narrator uses both the anger-related metonymy

---

[131] Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions*, 384.
[132] Albert Ellis, 'Rational and Irrational Jealousy', in *Jealousy*, 3rd ed., eds. Gordon Clanton and Lynn G. Smith (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 170-179, at 174.
[133] Ellis, in Clanton and Smith, 174.

PALENESS IN THE FACE STANDS FOR ANGER and the prosaic 'ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER'[134] conceptual metaphor to figuratively project how Levin sees his personal worth and sexual dominance diminished, supposedly by a rival of little merit, and how, it can be inferred, this diminishment warrants (delusional) disgrace (similar jealous thoughts cause Casaubon to attach a codicil to his will preventing Dorothea's association with his young cousin):

> Левин видел этот взгляд. *Он побледнел* и с минуту не мог перевести дыхания. «Как позволить себе смотреть так на мою жену!» – *кипело в нем* (*АК* 666).
>
> ('Levin saw that look. *He turned pale* and for a minute he could hardly breathe. "How dare he look at my wife like that!" – *boiled within him*').

The Russian verb *kipet'* literally means to over-boil a liquid: 'достигнув высшей степени согревания; волноваться от порывающегося с исподу пара; клокотать от жару'[135] ('to reach the highest degree of heat; the roiling caused by the surge of steam; to bubble from high temperature'). When angry, people universally experience bodily changes that resemble the behaviour of hot liquid in a kettle. Tolstoy's representation of Levin's steamy anger, naturally, grows out of and is consistent with that physical correlation. Levin demands that Veslovsky leaves his estate, partly because of his personal prejudice against his guest, 'with whom, as he fancied, she [his wife] was in love' (*AK* 529), and partly due to his outrage at the shared household belief according to which he, Levin, should be rather flattered by the attentions of the worldly intruder. Having ordered the horses for Veslovsky, Levin is vaguely aware of his sense of guilt, yet he continues to maintain his self-justification, which he finds in his secret self-image of being deprived of 'the love object already felt to be [his] possession'.[136] Levin's physical signals of high level anger communicate to Veslovsky that he is expected to depart almost immediately: the look of Levin's *блестящих глаз, тихого голоса и дрожащих скул* убедили Васеньку больше слов' ([*АК* 700] *gleaming eyes, the soft voice, and quivering jaws*, convinced Vassenka more than the words'). In the culture with broadly Western standards of behaviour to which Levin belongs, the curtailment of ant-social emotions like anger or jealousy is virtually de rigueur, and so their outward demonstrations are

---

[134] Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger', in Potegal et al., 159. An earlier version of this metaphor is 'ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER' (Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 14).
[135] Dal', *Tolkovyj Slovar' Rysskogo Jazyka*, s. *kipet'*.
[136] Melvin R. Lansky, 'Jealousy and Envy in *Othello*: Psychoanalytic Reflections on the Rivalrous Emotions', in *Jealousy and Envy: New Views about Two Powerful Feelings*, eds. Léon Wurmser and Heidrun Jarass (New York: Analytic Press, 2008) 25-47, at 28.

not likely to gain community approval. On hearing the news of Vassenka being turned out of the house, Stepan Arkadyevitch, practically an expert in 'a menu of choices of behaviors',[137] expresses his great dismay in French: "'Well, this I didn't expect of you! *On peut être jaloux, mais à ce point, c'est du dernier ridicule!*"' (*AK* 558).[138] Implied in Stiva's condemnation of Levin's overreaction to his guest's inconsequential amusement is the social requirement that one ought not to neglect the proper fulfilment of one's duty as a polite host in order to relieve oneself in anger.

Resentful Anger

The most obvious way in which the depiction of female anger in *Middlemarch* differs from that in *Anna Karenina* is the concealment – but not eradication – of a woman's hysterical behaviour. Dorothea Brooke is not nearly as neurotic as her Russian counterpart, Anna; neither, however, is she totally in command of herself, especially when screened from public view. Already during her honeymoon, she is disillusioned with her 'expecting a response to her feeling from Casaubon' (*M* 211) and depressed by the prosaic servitude to which Casaubon has reduced her by commanding intellectual debasement. With a disappointment of her marital expectations, Dorothea realizes that her initial perception of 'some spiritual communion' (*M* 22) with Casaubon was false, and this pang of awakening leads her to becoming

> more and more aware, with a certain terror, that her mind was continually sliding into inward *fits of anger* or repulsion, or else into forlorn weariness (*M* 196).

A tangential comment might usefully be made here. In using the expression "fits of anger", which could be construed as an instance of the metaphor ANGER IS AN ILLNESS, the narrator hints that Dorothea's temper is a symptom of psychological deficiency. Dorothea is conditioned by social conventions to contain her 'inward fire' (*M* 14) – a compulsory suppression that the narrator nevertheless repeatedly emphasizes to be contradictory to her nature.

[137] The phrase is from Matsumoto and Wilson, in Sorrentino and Yamaguchi, 551.
[138] On the same page Constance Garnett offers the translation from French: 'One can be jealous, but to this extent, it's ridiculous to an extreme! (Fr.)'.

Dorothea is never totally out of control to the point of irrationality, like Anna tends to be, but like her Russian counterpart, she engages in the emotional behaviour that corresponds exactly with what Peter van Sommers'a metaphorically terms '"incubation" of hostility'.[139] An example of this propensity for internally storing negative feelings is when she erroneously regards herself betrayed by Will Ladislaw and develops, in reaction to her 'jealous offended pride'(*M* 787), an aversive prejudice against him. Inside herself, Dorothea angrily despairs against the blow of 'a detected illusion' (*M* 787), and especially against her suspicions of Will's illicit intimacy with Rosamond. This internalized rage is expressed via the conceptual metaphor 'ANGER IS FIRE',[140] which is, along with 'ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER',[141] one of the two main subgroups of the mega-metaphor ANGER IS HEAT:

> *The fire of Dorothea's anger was not easily spent*, and it *flamed out* in fitful returns of spurning reproach. Why had he come obtruding his life into hers, hers that might have been whole enough without him? Why had he brought his cheap regard and his lip-born words to her who had nothing paltry to give in exchange? (*M* 787).

In adopting a bottled-up style of anger – repressed rather than confrontational – Dorothea psychologically matches the profile of the embittered, that is, 'those who suppress their animosity and keep up their anger for a long time. They have to digest it internally and so labour under the weight of resentment'.[142] To the extent that Dorothea withholds her anger, she appears behaviourally elegant and altogether unaffected, when privately she is fuming with jealousy, because an air of indifference is required to conceal her subconsciously intensified feelings of passion and love.

Once she returns home from her wedding journey, Dorothea is no longer capable of basing her attitude toward her husband on the former respect for his superior knowledge. Nor is she agonizing over why marriage has not brought her intellectual rewards. She knows that a good deal of useful things can be done in the world and is frustrated that Casaubon prevents her from exploring the various possibilities through imposing self-serving prohibitions of potentially inspiring discussions with Will Ladislaw. In anger, she sees her husband as 'stupidly undiscerning and odiously unjust' (*M* 282), fails on this occasion – in the plain form of the metaphor ANGER IS BAD WEATHER INSIDE A PERSON – to "'*stride the blast*'" of the '*storm*

---

[139] Peter van Sommers, *Jealousy: What is it and Who Feels it?* (London: Penguin, 1988) 42.
[140] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 13.
[141] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 13.
[142] Taylor 85.

within her' (*M* 282), and then shifts to making peace, as a result, it is implied, of being aware of how an outburst of anger can generate fatal electricity in a marriage. It is often the case that people who experience intense anger are sufficiently rational not to act on this feeling, believing that a balanced state of mind can greatly facilitate the accomplishment of their goals. The intentionally calculated calm is, according to Kövecses, conceptualized metaphorically as a monitored release 'ANGER CAN BE LET OUT UNDER CONTROL',[143] a figurative category which can be modified, by conceptual analogy, to encompass deliberate restraint. The proposed extension of this metaphor – ANGER CAN BE CONTROLLABLY SUPPRESSED – is strategically placed by the narrator to disclose Dorothea's conscious self-control in order to reap the benefits of domestic harmony:

> There had been no clashing of temper between Dorothea and her husband since that little explosion in Rome, which had left such strong traces in her mind that it had been easier ever since to *quell emotion* than to incur the consequence of *venting it* (*M* 282).

Dorothea's effort to live up to a stereotyped model of a dutifully congenial wife has two results. Firstly, she spends much time ruminating over what has made Casaubon dissatisfied with her, focusing on both his insensitivity and indifference. As a consequence of this self-focus, she is ignorant of the signs of misery in his life. Secondly, vigilant prevention of anger from surfacing gets Dorothea into the habit of consciously accumulating it in her mind. When her dying husband rejects her gestures of genuine sympathy, Dorothea becomes so enraged – partly from her disgust with Casaubon's 'unresponsive hardness' (*M* 425), partly from self-pity – that an overwhelming anger takes over her undetected by others:

> She was in the reaction of a rebellious anger stronger than any she had felt since her marriage. Instead of tears there came words: –
>
> 'What have I done – what am I – that he should treat me so? He never knows what is in my mind – he never cares. What is the use of anything I do? He wishes he had never married me' (*M* 426).

Dorothea's eruption may be interpreted as Eliot's exploration of the problems of repressed anger, artificial calm and a forced complacency in a marriage. Dorothea submits to irascible emotion clearly under the impulse of rebellion, for historically 'she had never deliberately allowed her resentment *to govern her* in this way before' (*M* 426). Dorothea takes Casaubon's resistance to accept any comfort from her as a calculated insult that is beyond her endurance.

[143] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 18.

Realizing, in a fit of petulance, that Casaubon's isolation is even more offensive and hurtful than were his patriarchal expectations, she rages in solitude against her unrequited self-sacrifice as a domestic martyr who has gone so far as to perfect the act of giving in to please her husband. Dorothea's anger – metaphorically constructed as reaching the point beyond conscious control, thus conceptually classified as exerting pressure in the manner of an outside FORCE – is a result of her not receiving any due recognition.

In moving away from resentful anger induced by disappointed expectations to a consideration of anger brought on by unfortunate circumstances that place an individual at a disadvantage, it is revealing to examine the feelings of Will Ladislaw, which are based on his sense of insecurity about being outstripped by competitive others. There is an early enumeration of Will's inadequacies identified by the Middlemarch community: he is not of good stock, has 'no means but what [Casaubon furnishes]' (*M* 81), displays 'a dislike to steady application' (*M* 82), has fallen into a disconcerting habit of 'calling himself Pegasus, and every form of prescribed work "harness"' (*M* 82), and on top of all, 'declines to choose a profession' (*M* 81). Will's own characterization of himself – 'A man with only a portmanteau for his stowage' (*M* 544), and an unlikely achiever who 'could not offer [himself] to any woman, even if she had no luxuries to renounce' (*M* 811) – is conclusive evidence of his insecure self-image. The wound of poverty, which is a common basis of jealousy, generates a rivalry prejudice against the rich Casaubon, who, although highly regarded in élite social circles, is in Will's estimation an unworthy possessor of the object of his love. 'Almost like a lover who is cut out by another',[144] Will makes of the Reverend a 'dried-up pedant, this elaborator of small explanations about as important as the surplus stock of false antiquities kept in a vendor's back chamber' (*M* 205), mainly to justify his '"hostile feelings toward the preferred rival"'.[145] By pointing out his opponent's deficiencies, Will implicitly elevates himself, supposing that the denigration of Casaubon will make a difference to his own crippled self-esteem. Nothing in the future will perhaps aggravate him more than a consciousness, during his final interview with Dorothea, of his material inadequacy and of having no credence upon which to override Casaubon's codicil. The 'ANGER IS AN OPPONENT

[144] Baumgart 158.
[145] Baumgart 158.

(IN A STRUGGLE)'[146] metaphor offers a perfect illustration of Will internally wrestling with the thought of having to renounce Dorothea due to his unsuitability as a suitor:

> He went and leaned on the back of the chair again, and seemed *to be battling with his own anger*, while she looked towards him sadly (*M* 811).

Since Will had previously been judged according to conventional standards as a man of little value, he devotes himself entirely to what is related to a standard conception of worthiness. He had taken a steady job in the local newspaper, indicating thereby his active involvement in the affairs of the town. Will's exaggeration of Dorothea's virtues, which Robert J. Sternberg and Karin Sternberg would be likely to designate as part of his 'love-prejudice',[147] motivates his commitment to act as Dorothea should expect of him to act, in order to earn her respect and hopefully even affection.

So, when Will Ladislaw is caught, by a stroke of bad luck, in an intimate conversation with Rosamond, although it is completely innocent, his blood is up once he realizes he has become a victim of intrigue. A series of stock metonymic expressions that apply to anger show that Ladislaw experiences a full-blown version of this emotion and ruthlessly expresses it. In order of appearance they are: 'AGGRESSIVE VERBAL BEHAVIOR STANDS FOR ANGER',[148] THE CHANGE OF COLOUR IN THE FACE STANDS FOR ANGER and 'AGGRESSIVE VISUAL BEHAVIOR STANDS FOR ANGER':[149]

> *'Don't touch me!' he said, with an utterance like the cut of a lash*, darting from her, and *changing from pink to white and back again*, as if his whole frame were tingling with the pain of the sting. He wheeled round to the other side of the room and stood opposite to her, with the tips of his fingers in his pockets and his head thrown back, *looking fiercely not at Rosamond but at a point a few inches away from her* (*M* 777).

Psychological folk theory maintains that a desire for confrontation is intrinsic to anger as this emotion is designed biologically 'to help us deal with setbacks, with things that thwart us from pursuing what we want, and with a range of threats to our survival. Anger prepares us to engage – to force a change – and it does this by getting our bodies ready for *action*'.[150]

---

[146] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 22.
[147] Robert J. Sternberg and Karin Sternberg, *The Nature of Hate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 45.
[148] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 25.
[149] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 25.
[150] Kolts 13, italics in original.

This insight that 'anger often leads one to approach the object of hate'[151] has risen by virtue of its persistent repetition to the status of a psychological truism. It helps explain why Will, being so horribly full of wrath as to attack Rosamond verbally, decides to linger in her house and to have a full and frank discussion with her. Two conceptual metaphors ANGER IS A HEAVY OBJECT and ANGER IS AN ACCUMULATED FORCE THAT NEEDS RELEASING are meant jointly to communicate his firm resolution to make Rosamond aware that her contrivance is certain to tarnish his reputation and reduce his chances of ever proving worthy of Dorothea's love:

> It would have been safer for Will in the first instance to have taken up his hat and gone away; but he had felt no impulse to do this; on the contrary, he had a horrible inclination to stay and *shatter Rosamond with his anger*. It seemed as impossible to bear the fatality she had drawn down on him without *venting his fury* as it would be to a panther to bear the javelin-wound without springing and biting (*M* 778).

Here, Will's anger is at its highest, and the significance attached to his treatment of Rosamond is that of the contemporary concerns with social etiquette and proper conduct.

That Victorian society dealt harshly with irascible gentlemen and severely judged their unguarded anger is suggested by the herculean effort Will makes to maximally restrain his violent outburst. The 'INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM'[152] and 'ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL'[153] conceptual metaphors are entwined in the description of the near heroic repression of such anger by Will:

> *He was fuming* under a repressive law which he was forced to acknowledge: *he was dangerously poised*, and Rosamond's voice now brought the decisive vibration (*M* 778).[154]

If it had not been for the sound of Rosamond's voice, Will most probably would have limited himself to sternly rebuking her for having acted irresponsibly and without concern for others and subsequently to cordially explaining to her the practical necessity to end their friendship. But Rosamond bites back with an icy retort and her speech only provides further fuel that ignites Will's anger.

---

[151] Sternberg and Sternberg 62.
[152] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 15.
[153] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 25.
[154] A variation of the ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL metaphor reappears in reference to anger of Caleb Garth, whereby the narrator states that 'Caleb's *wrath was stirred*' (*M* 696), subsequently rendering the delivery of his speech as one characterized by indignation.

Provoked by Rosamond's haughty cynicism, Will lashes out despite himself and against all Victorian norms of self-restraint. To signify this explosion, the narrator marshals a range of familiar metaphors and metonymies into a compound which designates Will's state of mind as commoner than that of individuals of so-called excellent character. On hearing Rosamond's sarcastic suggestion that he pursue Dorothea and declare his preference, Will furiously exclaims: "'Go after her!' *he burst out, with a sharp edge in his voice*" (*M* 778). Will's vocal expression of anger is accompanied by a display of animal-like behaviour intended at physical injury: '*He began to move about with the restlessness of a wild animal that sees prey but cannot reach it*' (*M* 778). Rosamond's condescending tone gives new impetus to Will's otherwise subsiding anger: 'He found another *vent for his rage* by snatching up Rosamond's words again, as if they were reptiles to be throttled and flung off' (*M* 778). As might be expected of a man looking to display the kind of behaviour associated with good manners and cultivated taste, Will calms down and even attempts a gesture of reconciliation. Before he takes leave of Rosamond, we are told, 'he felt checked and stultified in his anger' (*M* 779), though the narrator reveals, through the 'ANGER IS FIRE'[155] metaphor, that '*the vindictive fire was still burning in him*, and he could utter no word of retraction' (*M* 779). Since the narrator, just a moment earlier, had insisted that it be

> forgiven to Will that he had no such movement of pity. He had felt no bond beforehand to this woman [Rosamond] who had spoiled the ideal treasure of his life, and he held himself blameless. He knew that he was cruel, but he had no relenting in him yet (*M* 779),

it might be deduced that it was considered in Victorian culture to be pardonable (if justified), even acceptable (if instructive) to engage in a certain cruelty unleashed by righteous anger, but one had to overcome venomous feelings, as Will eventually does, if one's proper emotional decorum were to be maintained.

Eliot's standard metaphoric language for analyzing demonstrations of anger serves as a visual reminder of the shared responsibility of individuals to refrain from expressing negative feelings in an uninhibited fashion. The ideal behaviour, in this restrictive schema, involves cultivating emotional states that reflect rational thoughts and moderation. Eliot, as an English writer, and as a promulgator of realist aesthetics in particular, was not completely at liberty to

[155] Kövecses, *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love*, 13.

invent radically new ways of conceptually representing anger. Her formation of ideas of self-control in *Middlemarch* has been shown to be principally based on instantly familiar configurations of anger. These assumed cognitions allowed her to fictionally construct emotional events to reflect socially embedded beliefs.

This discussion has concentrated on the textual evidence for the conceptualization of anger by English and Russian cultures in terms of heat that exerts pressure on a container, causing it to explode. The individual selection and deployment by Eliot and Tolstoy of conceptual metaphors for anger in their novels encourages a conclusion that both authors represent this emotion as consisting in a sub-conscious reaction by the mind to physiological changes in different parts of the body. The remarkable consistency of such embodied representation demonstrates the fact that the mental models (the organization and categorization) of anger are not constructed in an ad hoc manner, but are based on what is universally known about the physiology of anger (such as wild fluctuations of body temperature). What is known, and felt (and sometimes even observed in others) comprises a necessary restriction – 'the constraining effect of universal embodiment',[156] as Kövecses calls it – that provides the cognitive motivation for cross-cultural conceptualization of the angry person predominantly as having a body congested with internal pressure.

The scope of conceptual thinking about anger in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, however, extends beyond the instances of the great generic metaphor 'THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER'.[157] We have witnessed how Eliot and Tolstoy effectively make use of other main (archetypal) metaphors for anger that are widespread in everyday English and Russian, by deploying those familiar figurative expressions which have been assembled together by cognitive linguists into the unitary metaphors ANGER IS A HEAVY OBJECT, ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) or ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL. Notwithstanding the variety in their selection of types of metaphors to fictionally depict anger, Eliot's and Tolstoy's linguistic representation of this emotion nevertheless fundamentally consists of metaphorical and metonymical expressions that are demonstrably sub-metaphors, or satellite instantiations, of the ANGER IS HEAT master-metaphor and are intelligible primarily in the light of that metaphor. The implication seems to be that there is no single identifiable origin or

[156] Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger', in Potegal et al., 162.
[157] Kövecses, 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger', in Potegal et al., 157.

source from which spring Eliot's and Tolstoy's ways of conceptualizing anger, but rather there are many such motivations, not entirely cultural (the influence of biology on the development of habitual language patterns accounts for the similarity in the novels) – the experiential sensation of embodied anger being the most dominant.

Middlemarch and *Anna Karenina*, in their recurrent utilization of metaphorical clichés of anger, are narrative expositions of the tendency of both English and Russian minds to habitually associate anger with the internal accumulation of negative energy. Moreover, the socially-prescribed vigilance to ensure that this built-up energy is ideally universally suppressed rather than uncontrollably released communicates the nineteenth-century gender-neutral paradigms for checked behaviour (significantly Victorian novels provide a plethora of examples of authorial approbation given to righteously angry characters. After all, even Eliot's and Tolstoy's most praiseworthy female characters show a propensity for occasional bursts of bad temper, though there can be little doubt that the authors had the principle of moderation in mind when they constructed representations of ways in which society punishes neurotic females for their indulgence in exhibiting untrammelled anger). These paradigms for behavioural constraint may be summarized under the following five categories: (1) The feeling and expression of anger in both nineteenth-century English and Russian cultures are not characteristic of gender, though in the traditional behavioural model women are supposed to monitor and control their emotions more scrupulously than men. Dolly, Anna and Dorothea who are socialized into behavioural scripts that theoretically preclude outward displays of anger each subjectively experience and differently express this emotion. The representation of primary motivations upon which their types of anger are based has the effect of confirming the expected utility of the novel, first, to legitimize justified female outbursts, as in the case of Dolly, and secondly, to rigidify the social norm of denouncing angry females as irrational or embittered – labels that can be respectively applied to the psychological conditions of Anna and Dorothea. (2) Anger is as much an evolutionary adaptation designed to facilitate the attainment of certain goals, as it is a social emotion. In effect, despite anger's biological origin, the exhibition of this emotion in civilized cultures of the modern West pertains to matters of ethics bequeathed by an early Christian tradition of inhibition. What stops Alexey Karenin and Will Ladislaw from engaging in aggressive acts of rage is not an automatic de-activation of their angry impulses by means of an innate or hard-wired embodied check on

excess, but rather their conscious awareness and enactment of the constrains on behaviour imposed upon men accredited with the highest standards of ethical comportment. (3) A mere belief that one has an obligation to act on one's anger, as Levin does when he falsely suspects betrayal, is not sufficient grounds on which Russian culture is prepared to excuse anger-motivated behaviours. Anger involves the authority of collective judgement, in the sense that the assessment of others is essential to anger being identified as either an appropriate or an inappropriate reaction. (4) Levin's angry explosions are his defence against jealousy, which itself stems partly from fantasized and partly misinterpreted events. Angry behaviour which involves the treatment of another without rational consideration can never be right, and so is found culpable from a moral point of view. (5) In cultures as strongly norm-regulated as nineteenth-century England and Russia, a wilful neglect of the rules of mannerly conduct – the failure to keep one's emotions controlled within the limits of reason – anticipates a series of social repercussions on the disorderly individual: in the context of the novels that impact manifests as criticism, ostracism, or at least reproach.

Admittedly, there is nothing specifically unconventional in the way *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* organize the experience of anger. Out of this ordinary process emerges the possibility of discerning a particular cultural attitude towards inflammatory emotions that manifests as the canonical behavioural scripts to which realist discourse sub-consciously alludes. The pervasiveness and consistency of metaphors of anger in Eliot's and Tolstoy's novels construct a regime of conceptual understanding of narrated mental states, whilst also providing linguistic evidence of cross-cultural commitment to emotional sophistication through the practice of self-restraint.

7

CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown that linguistically different cultures can conceptualize emotions in fundamentally similar ways, and that the metaphoric expression of emotion can play a significant role in textual Realism. This does not mean that the relationship between metaphor and Realism is an exclusive province of the novel, but rather that the realist novel makes use of the figurative nature of thought in a particular way that this study has sought to disclose. The chapters above have argued that the language of emotions used in the realist novel and the mental representations conjured in response can be analyzed as a means of understanding one important aspect of reality beyond fiction – established figurative patterns of conceptualizing those emotions. The main aim of this study has thereby not been only to contribute to the already formidable amount of exegesis of the two focal texts, but also to trace a new interpretation that usefully incorporates current and widely accepted theories of conceptual metaphor with those treating the realist effect in novelistic discourse. Its examination of the ways in which the emotions of shame, pride and anger have been conceptualized and represented in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* has pointed to cross-cultural and cross-linguistic consistencies rather than differences in English and Russian, and the fundamentally embodied basis of figurative expressions for emotions in both contexts, a physical origin that is perhaps deployed subconsciously within the enterprise of crafting realist fiction.

In this combination of conceptual threads, this thesis has sought to stimulate synergetic discussions between Literary Studies and many different fields, by demonstrating the potential and productiveness of employing literary texts in a cross-disciplinary study of contexts – linguistic and other – from which can be derived the conceptual paradigms and cognitive capacities of a culture. This exploration can be construed as a response to the appeal of F. Elizabeth Hart, who, greatly enthused about the increasingly sophisticated and multi-pronged as the study of literary texts is rapidly becoming, urges that ‘our approaches to literary

questions can and should be enriched by an acknowledgement of how the enabling and constraining behaviours of brains and minds contribute to literary practice'.[1]

Potentially auxiliary to this appeal has been the provision by this cross-linguistic and cross-cultural analysis of shame, pride and anger in fictional texts of further evidence for the claim that the language of emotions in English and Russian cultures is conventionally metaphorically structured, restricting the principles for representation to non-arbitrary patterns of thought motivated to a considerable degree by common embodied experience. The exploration of the conventional uses of metaphorical expressions through the tracing of the combinations of textual examples has confirmed that Eliot and Tolstoy are, although largely subconsciously, directly attuned to these biology-based mental configurations. In light of the evidence gathered and consolidated here, novelistic metaphoricity is able to bring to light the authors' intuitive grasp of human biological functioning and their automatically constrained consciousness as a result of their own biological conditioning. Through this biological determinism – an asserted root of universality in the representation of emotions in cross-lingual literary texts – the bilingual reader is stimulated to view the novels in terms of what we may express via some such contradictory phrases as controlled spontaneity, or free deployment of antecedent rules of understanding. In other words, we subordinate the creativity of the novelists to the domain of non-arbitrary structures of thought grounded in their unconscious awareness and mental processing of the intrinsic properties of all human bodies.

Although *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* are contended to exemplify a high-degree of mimesis which in itself is the most striking testimony to the full maturation of the realist tradition in the nineteenth century, the appropriation of the insight from Cognitive Linguistics that language is biologically (and psychologically) hard-wired is a bold contribution to the established doctrine of mimetic representation. Conventional metaphorical language of emotions is not primarily a regime of imitation of human emotional experience but, to the extent that it instantiates and transmits – and even demands familiarity with – 'people's fundamental conceptual models',[2] it leads to a new paradigm of the relation of the realist

[1] F. Elizabeth Hart, cited in Antonina Harbus, *Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2012) 181.
[2] Anna Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 10.

discourse to shared mental schemas in connection with emotion concepts. It is precisely by virtue of having arisen organically in response to the universality of bodily processes that the ordinary metaphorical language of the novel is calculated to serve the needs of its recipients. Eliot's and Tolstoy's habits of thinking about shame, pride and anger directly correspond to the constellations of ordinary associations that English and Russian readers have about these emotions, and so everyday conceptual metaphors which are products of that thinking operate in the sphere of sense making. We understand each of them because of our own embodied experience of emotions, and because we are always aware and reminded (through dominant cultural ideologies) of their social impact. The figurative structures Eliot and Tolstoy tend to favour – demonstrably those which assume basic experiential correspondences between an emotion and its physiological and behavioural symptoms – impose limits to meanings that they can generate, but they also constitute the effective strategy that these authors deploy when seeking to elicit emotional engagement and enforce behavioural norms.

It lies outside legitimate speculation to determine the degree of consciousness with which Eliot and Tolstoy constructed their metaphors in their respective languages, but analyses of the figurative expressions used allow us to draw certain conclusions about the direct influence of those expressions on the reader's engagement in a moral evaluation of the characters and their emotional response toward them. In *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina* Eliot and Tolstoy persuasively portray their characters ambivalently as sympathetic or of questionable merit; likewise, behaviourally-conscious or socially inadequate, by situating them in a variety of conventional conceptual frames that reflect the accepted interpretations of emotional behaviours within English and Russian linguistic communities. This seems at face value a very fruitful technique for convincingly depicting and encouraging judgements upon the character's mental states, however in reality it stretches beyond that imitative function to include the reenactment, by means of figurative language, of the archetypal, idealized reasoning about emotions characteristic of English and Russian people manifested as 'the organized network of folk-theories'[3] which guide their understanding and behaviour. This linguistic reenactment is an important component of realistic illusion.

[3] James W. Underhill, *Ethnolinguistics and Cultural Concepts: Truth, Love, Hate and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 227.

As we have seen, there is a strong preference in both novels for the conceptualization of anger in terms of mounting heat in a pressurized container, allowing in particular the development of a discourse of self-restraint via use of associated metaphorical expressions that render the energized mental state variously as explosive, boiling or simmering. Numerous clusters of commonplace metaphors of anger have been shown to exist independently of biological analogies, instead originating from '*perceived* similarities or resemblances, i.e. in the perception of common characteristics or structures between different entities or areas of experience'.[4] ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL, for instance, was strategically placed to capture the component of unacceptable aggression contained in anger, whereas ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) personified anger as an enemy against whom certain characters fought, thus communicating to the reader their conscious effort at self-control. Even though there is a very extensive occurrence of conceptual metaphors that have non-biological and non-behavioural bases in *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*, they are nevertheless largely dominated by conceptualizations that arise from an embodied context, as has been the case with widely prevalent sets of metonymic ensembles for shame and pride. This expansive tendency of the English and Russian novel toward universal metaphorical repertoires, despite linguistic barriers, represents a highly significant change in thinking about the traditional nineteenth-century novel, which is now in a position to claim for the genre a conceptual consistency and rigour – embodied creativity – it had not been previously recognized to manifest. The reliance of the novel for its rhetorical impact on 'the experiential, body-linked, physical core of metaphoric reasoning abilities'[5] of the reader is the new conception of realist aesthetics.

[4] Elena Semino, *Metaphor in Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 7.
[5] Brenda E. F. Beck, 'Metaphors, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence', in *Cognition and Symbolic Structures: The Psychology of Metaphoric Transformation*, ed. Robert E. Haskell (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1987) 9-30, at 11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aksakov, K. S. 'On Tolstoy's Powers of Analysis (1857)', in *Tolstoy: The Critical Heritage*, ed. A. V. Knowles. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 63-64.

Allen, Walter. *Reading a Novel*. London: Phoenix House, 1963.

Allott, Miriam. *Novelists on the Novel*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.

Alter, Robert. *Partial Magic: The Novel as a Self-Conscious Genre*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Andrew, Joe. *Writers and Society during the Rise of Russian Realism*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980.

Anonymous foreword to Natalia Grot. 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', trans. Lesli LaRocco, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. 217-219.

Antokol′skij, Pavel et al. 'Hudožestvennye Perevody Literatur Narodov SSSR', in *Voprosy Hudožestvennogo Perevoda*. Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1955. 5-44.

Apter, Michael J. *The Dangerous Edge: The Psychology of Excitement*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. 1729-1867.

_____. *De Anima (On the Soul)*, trans. with introd. and notes, by Hugh Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin, 1986.

Armstrong, Nancy. 'The Rise of Feminine Authority in the Novel', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 15.2 (1982): 127-145.

_____. *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Armstrong, Judith M. *The Unsaid: Anna Karenina*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

Arnold, Matthew. 'Fortnightly Review of *Anna Karenina* (1887)', in *Tolstoy: The Critical Heritage*, ed. A. V. Knowles. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 352-362.

Athanasiadou, Angeliki and Tabakowska, Elżbieta. Eds. *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998.

Atkinson, Dorothy et al. Eds. *Women in Russia*. Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1978.

Atkinson, Dorothy. ‘Society and the Sexes in the Russian Past’, in *Women in Russia*, eds. Dorothy Atkinson et al. Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1978. 3-38.

Auerbach, Nina. *Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979.

_____. ‘The Rise of the Fallen Woman’, *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 35.1 (1980): 29-52.

_____. *Romantic Imprisonment: Women and Other Glorified Outcasts*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

_____. ‘Dorothea’s Lost Dog’, in *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Karen Chase. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 87-105.

Augustine, Saint. *Confessions*, trans. and introd. Henry Chadwick. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Austen, Jane. *Pride and Prejudice* 1813, ed. Vivien Jones. London: Penguin, 2003.

Auty, Robert and Obolensky, Dimitri. Eds. *Companion to Russian Studies: An Introduction to Russian Language and Literature*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Baasten, Matthew. *Pride According to Gregory the Great: A Study of the Moralia*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986.

Bakhtin, Mikhail M. ‘Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the study of the Novel’, in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981. 3-40.

_____. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981.

_____. ‘The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philosophy, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis’, in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee, eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. 103-131.

_____. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee, eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.

_____. ‘*From* Discourse in the Novel’, in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001. 1190-1220.

Banse, Rainer and Scherer, Klaus R. ‘Acoustic Profiles in Vocal Emotion Expression’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70.3 (1996): 614-636.

Barbauld, Anna Letitia. *The British Novelists: With an Essay and Prefaces, Biographical and Critical*, vol. 1. London: F. C. and J. Rivington, 1810.

Barcelona, Antonio. 'Introduction: The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy', in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective*, ed. Antonio Barcelona. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003. 1-28.

_____. Ed. *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective*, ed. Antonio Barcelona. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003.

_____ and Soriano, Cristina. 'Metaphorical Conceptualization in English and Spanish', *European Journal of English Studies* 8.3 (2004): 295-307.

Baring, Maurice. *An Outline of Russian Literature*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1914/15.

Barnes, Jonathan. Ed. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Barrett, Karen Caplovitz. 'A Functionalist Approach to Shame and Guilt', in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995. 25-63.

Barthes, Roland. *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989.

Bartlett, Rosamund. *Tolstoy: A Russian Life*. London: Profile Books, 2010.

Baumgart, Hildegard. *Jealousy: Experiences and Solutions*, trans. Manfred and Evelyn Jacobson. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Bayley, John. *Pushkin: A Comparative Commentary*. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Beck, Brenda E. F. 'Metaphors, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence', in *Cognition and Symbolic Structures: The Psychology of Metaphoric Transformation*, ed. Robert E. Haskell. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1987. 9-30.

Beer, Gillian. *George Eliot*. Brighton: Harvester, 1986.

_____. 'What's not in Middlemarch', in *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Karen Chase. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 15-35.

Belinskij, V. G. 'Stat′ja Devjataja: *Evgenij Onegin*', in *Polnoe Sobranie Sočinenij*, vol. 7. Moskva: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1955. 473-504.

Belknap, Robert. 'Novelistic Technique', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, ed. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 233-250.

Benedict, Barbara M. *Framing Feeling: Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction 1745-1800*. New York: AMS Press, 1994.

Bennett, Tony. *Formalism and Marxism*. London: Methuen, 1979.

Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron. *The Subtlety of Emotions*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.

_____. 'Jealousy and Romantic Love', in *Handbook of Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Multidisciplinary Approaches*, eds. Sybil L. Hart and Maria Legerstee. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 40-54.

Berkowitz, Leonard. 'Anger', in *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. Tim Dalgleish and Mick J. Power. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999. 411-428.

Bernard, Paris J. 'Form, Theme, and Imitation in Realistic Fiction', *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 1.2 (1968): 140-149.

Birih, A. K. et al. *Russkaja Frazeologija: Istoriko-Ètimologičeskij Slovar'*. Moskva: Astrel', 2005.

Blackburne, Lancelot. *The unreasonableness of anger: a sermon preach'd before the Queen at White-hall, July 29, 1694*. London: Printed for Tho. Warren, for Thomas Bennet, 1694.

Bloomfield, Morton W. *The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State College Press, 1952.

Blumberg, Edwina Jannie. 'Tolstoy and the English Novel: A Note on *Middlemarch* and *Anna Karenina*', *Slavic Review* 30.3 (1971): 561-569.

Bonaparte, Felicia. *Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George Eliot's Novels*. New York: New York University Press, 1975.

Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. 1961; rev. ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Boyd, Alexander F. *Aspects of the Russian Novel*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1972.

Børtnes, Jostein. 'The Literature of Old Russia, 988-1730', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 1-44.

Brady, Kristin. *George Eliot*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.

Brown, Homer Obed. *Institutions of the English Novel: From Defoe to Scott*. Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

Burgess, Daniel. *Hastiness unto anger described and disgraced: pleas for it exposed and prescriptions against it ministered: to which is added, An address unto all the faithful ministers of the land*. London: Printed for Jonathan Robinson, 1698.

Burgess, M. A. S. 'The Age of Classicism (1700-1820)', in *Companion to Russian Studies: An Introduction to Russian Language and Literature*, vol. 2, eds. Robert Auty and Dimitri Obolensky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 111-131.

Buss, David M. *The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy is as Necessary as Love or Sex*. London: Bloomsbury, 2000.

Butler, Marilyn. *Jane Austen and the War of Ideas*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Cacciari, Cristina. 'Why Do We Speak Metaphorically?: Reflections on the Functions of Metaphor in Discourse and Reasoning', in *Figurative Language and Thought*, eds. Albert N. Katz et al. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 119-157.

Candland, D. K. 'The Persistent Problems of Emotion', in *Emotion*, eds. Douglas K. Candland et al. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1977. 1-84.

Candland, Douglas K. et al. *Emotion*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1977.

Capuano, Peter J. 'An Objective Aural-Relative in Middlemarch', *Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 47.4 (2007): 921-941.

Carroll, John B. 'Introduction', in Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality*, ed. John B. Carroll. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1956. 1-34.

Carroll, David. Ed. *George Eliot: The Critical* Heritage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.

Carson, Thomas L. and Moser, Paul K. Eds. *Morality and the Good Life*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Case, Alison A. *Plotting Women: Gender and Narration in the Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century British Novel*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999.

Caws, Peter. 'Moral Certainty in Tolstoy', *Philosophy and Literature* 24.1(2000): 49-66.

Chakrabarti, Arindam. 'Individual and Collective Pride', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29.1 (1992): 35-43.

Chances, Ellen B. *Conformity's Children: An Approach to the Superfluous Man in Russian Literature*. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 1978.

_____. 'The Superfluous Man in Russian Literature', in *Reference Guide to Russian Literature*, eds. Neil Cornwell and Nicole Christian. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998. 29-35.

Chandler, Daniel. *Semiotics: The Basics*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

Chase, Karen. Ed. *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Christian, R. F. Ed. *Tolstoy's Letters 1828-1879*, vol. 1, trans. R. F. Christian. London: The Athlone Press, 1978. 311-312.

_____. Ed. *Tolstoy's Letters 1880-1910*, vol. 2, trans. R. F. Christian. London: The Athlone Press, 1978.

Cruise, Edwina. 'Women, Sexuality, and the Family in Tolstoy', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 191-205.

Clanton, Gordon and Smith, Lynn G. Eds. *Jealousy*, 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998.

Clark, Jason A. 'Hubristic and Authentic Pride as Serial Homologues: The Same but Different', *Emotion Review* 2.4 (1010): 397-398.

Classe, Olive. Ed. *Encyclopedia of Literary Translation*, vol. 2. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000.

Clements, Barbara Evans et al. Eds. *Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Clyman, Toby W. and Vowles, Judith. Eds. *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996.

Collingwood, R. G. *The Idea of History* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Compassionate Conformist. *Englands vanity or The Voice of God against the monstrous sin of pride, in dress and apparel: wherein naked breasts and shoulders, antick and fantastick garbs, patches, and painting, long perriwigs, towers, bulls, shades, curlings, and crispings, with an hundred more fooleries of both sexes, are condemned as notoriously unlawful. With pertinent addresses to the court, nobility, gentry, city and country, directed especially to the professors in London*. London: Printed for John Dunton, 1683.

Coplan, Amy. 'Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62.2 (2004): 141-152.

Cornwell, Neil and Christian, Nicole. Eds. *Reference Guide to Russian Literature*. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998.

Cott, Nancy F. *The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1835*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Cracraft, James. Ed. *Peter the Great Transforms Russia*, 3rd ed. Lexington, MA and Toronto: D. C. Health and Company, 1991.

Cradock, Samuel. *A Supplement to Knowledge and practice: wherein the main things necessary to be known and believed in order to salvation are more fully explained, and several new directions given for the promoting of real holiness both of heart and life: to which is added a serious disswasive from some of the reigning and customary sins of the times, viz. swearing, lying, pride, gluttony, drunkenness, uncleanness, discontent, covetousness and earthly-mindedness, anger and malice, idleness*. London: Printed for Thomas Simmons, 1679.

Cross, Anthony. *Peter the Great through British Eyes: Perceptions and Representations of the Tsar since 1698*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Crozier, W. R. *Shyness and Embarrassment*. Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Culler, Jonathan. *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction*. London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

Cupitt, Don. *The Sea of Faith*. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984.

Currie, Gregory. *The Nature of Fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Curtin, Jeremiah C. Ed. *The Catholic Church: The Teacher of Mankind*, vol. 1. New York: The Office of Catholic Publications, 1905.

Curtis, James M. 'Metaphor Is to Dostoevskii as Metonymy Is to Tolstoi', *Slavic Review* 61.1 (2002): 109-127.

Dal′, V. I. *Tolkovyj Slovar′ Rysskogo Jazyka: Illjustrirovannoe Izdanie*. Moskva: Èksmo, 2012.

Dalgleish, Tim and Power. Mick J. Eds. *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999.

Dallas, E. S. Unsigned review of *The Mill on the Floss*, *The Times* 19 May 1860, in *George Eliot: The Critical* Heritage, ed. David Carroll. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. 131-137.

Damasio, Antonio R. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994.

_____. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness*. London: Vintage, 2000.

Dames, Nicholas. '"The Withering of the Individual": Psychology in the Victorian Novel', in *A Concise Companion to the Victorian Novel*, ed. Francis O'Gorman. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 91-112.

Danaher, David S. ‘Tolstoy’s Use of Light and Dark Imagery in *The Death of Ivan Il'ič* ’, *The Slavic and East European Journal* 39.2 (1995): 227-240.

_____. ‘The Semantics of *Pity* and *Zhalost'* in a Literary Context’, *The Slavic and East European Language Resource Center* 3 (2002): 1-26.

_____. ‘A Cognitive Approach to Metaphor in Prose: Truth and Falsehood in Leo Tolstoy’s *The Death of Ivan Il'ič*’, *Poetics Today* 24.3 (2003): 439-469.

Darwin, Charles. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 3rd ed., with an Introduction, Afterword and Commentaries by Paul Ekman; Essay on the History of the Illustrations by Philip Prodger. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1872/1998.

Davis, Mark H. *Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach*. Madison, WI and Dubuque, IA: Brown and Benchmark, 1994.

Davis, Michael. *George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the Unmapped Country*. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.

Defoe, Daniel. ‘Robinson Crusoe’s Preface’ to *Serious Reflections During the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe: With his Vision of the Angelick World*. London: W. Taylor, 1720. No page numbers.

_____. ‘The Preface’ to *Moll Flanders* [1722]*: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Sources, Criticism*, ed. Edward H. Kelly. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973. 3-6.

DeFoore, William Gray. *Anger: Deal with It, Heal with It, Stop It from Killing You*. Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc., 1991; rev. ed. 2004.

Dillon, Elizabeth Maddock. ‘Fear of Formalism: Kant, Twain, and Cultural Studies in American Literature’, *Diacritics* 27.4 (1989): 46-69.

Donald, Merlin. *A Mind so Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness*. New York and London: Norton, 2001.

Donchin, Georgette. ‘Pushkin’, in *Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn*, ed. Richard Freeborn. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976. 19-38.

Doody, Margaret Anne. *The True Story of the Novel*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. *Crime and Punishment* 1865-6, trans. and introd. David McDuff. 1991; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2003.
_____. *Prestuplenie i Nakazanie*. Moskva: Èksmo, 2012.

_____. *The Brothers Karamazov* 1878-80, trans. and introd. David McDuff. 1993; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2003.

_____. *Brat'ja Karamazovy*. Moskva: Èksmo, 2011.

Downame, John. *Foure treatises: tending to disswade all Christians from foure no lesse hainous then common sinnes; namely, the abuses of swearing, drunkennesse, whoredome, and briberie. Wherein the greatnes and odiousnesse of these vices is discovered; and the meanes and remedies, which may either preserue, or weane men from them, are propounded. Whereunto is annexed a treatise of anger*. London: Imprinted by Felix Kyngston, for William Welby, 1608.

Dyson, Eric. *Pride: The Seven Deadly Sins*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Eagleton, Terry. *The English Novel: An Introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005.

Edel, Leon. Ed. *Henry James Letters 1895-1916*, vol. 4. London: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Ekman, Paul et al. *Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelines for Research and an Integration of Findings*. New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1972.

Ekman, Paul. *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life*, 2nd ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003.

Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994.

Eliot, George. *Adam Bede* 1859, ed. Stephen Gill. London: Penguin, 1985.

_____. *Romola* 1862-3, ed. Andrew Sanders. London: Penguin, 1980.

_____. *Middlemarch* 1871-2, ed. Rosemary Ashton. London: Penguin, 2003.

_____. *The Literature Network* Electronic Edition of *Middlemarch*, available at http://www.online-literature.com/booksearch.php

_____. 'The Natural History of German Life', in *Essays of George Eliot*, ed. Thomas Pinney. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 266-299.

_____. 'Letter to Mrs. Samuel Evans, 5 March 1839', in *The George Eliot Letters 1836-1851*, vol. 1, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1954. 18-20.

_____. 'Draft for J. Chapman to J. Martineau, 29 August 1851', in *The George Eliot Letters 1840-1870*, vol. 8, ed. Gordon S. Haight. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978. 25-27.

_____. 'Letter to Charles Bray, Wandsworth, 5 July 1859', in *The George Eliot Letters 1859-1861*, vol. 3, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1954. 110-111.

_____. 'Letter to Mme Eugène Bodichon, 26 December 1860', in *The George Eliot Letters 1859-1861*, vol. 3, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1954. 365-367.

_____. 'Letter to Clifford Allbutt, August 1868', in *The George Eliot Letters 1862-1868*, vol. 4, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. 471-473.

_____. 'Letter to John Blackwood, 24 July 1871', in *The George Eliot Letters 1869-1873*, vol. 5, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. 168-169.

_____. 'Letter to Mrs. Peter Alfred Taylor, 18 July 1878', in *The George Eliot Letters 1878-1880*, vol. 7, ed. Gordon S. Haight. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. 44.

Eliot, Simon and Rose, Jonathan. 'Introduction', in *A Companion to the History of the Book*, eds. Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 1-6.

_____. Eds. *A Companion to the History of the Book*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

Ellis, Albert. 'Rational and Irrational Jealousy', in *Jealousy*, 3rd ed., eds. Gordon Clanton and Lynn G. Smith. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 170-179.

Emerson, Caryl. *The Cambridge Introduction to Russian Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

_____ and Holquist, Michael. Eds. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.

Engel, Barbara Alpern. *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

_____. 'Transformation versus Tradition', in *Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation*, eds. Barbara Evans Clements et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 135-147.

_____. *Women in Russia, 1700-2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds. *Realism and Consensus in the English Novel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Felman, Shoshana. '*Camus*' The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing', in *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History*, eds. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub. New York and London: Routledge, 1992. 93-119.

Felman, Shoshana and Laub, Dori. Eds. *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History*. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

Fernando, Lloyd. *"New Women" in the Late Victorian Novel*. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977.

Fielding, Henry. 'Preface' to *Joseph Andrews* 1742, ed. Martin C. Battestin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 3-11.

_____. *The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling* 1749, introd. Martin C. Battestin, ed. Fredson Bowers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

Finlay, Christopher J. *Hume's Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in A Treatise of Human Nature*. London and New York: Continuum, 2007.

Flett, Gordon L. and Hewitt, Paul L. Eds. *Perfectionism: Theory, Research, and Treatment*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002.

Fludernik, Monika. *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Frank, Daniel H. 'Anger as a Vice: A Maimonidean Critique of Aristotle's Ethics', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7.3 (1990): 269-281.

Franklin, J. Jeffrey. *Serious Play: The Cultural Form of the Nineteenth-Century Realist Novel*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.

Freeborn, Richard, 'Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn', in *Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn*, ed. Richard Freeborn. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976. 1-18.

_____. Ed. *Russian Literary Attitudes from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976.

_____. 'The Nineteenth Century: The Age Realism, 1855-80', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 248-332.

_____. 'The Classic Russian Novel', in *Reference Guide to Russian Literature*, eds. Neil Cornwell and Nicole Christian. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998. 25-29.

Frow, John. *Genre: The New Critical Idiom*. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Fusso, Susanne. 'The Romantic Tradition', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 171-189.

Gallese, Vittorio and Goldman, Alvin. 'Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 2.12 (1998): 493-501.

Gallese, Vittorio. et al. 'The Mirror Matching System: A Shared Manifold for Intersubjectivity', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 25 (2002): 35-36.

Gąsiorowska, Xenia. *Women in Soviet Fiction, 1917-1964*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968.

Gearing, William. *Arraignment of Pride, or, pride set forth, with the causes, kinds, and several branches of it: the odiousness and greatness of the sin of pride: the prognisticks of it, together with the cure of it: as also a large description of the excellency and usefulness of the grace of humility: divided into chapters and sections*, 2nd ed. London: Printed by R. White, for Francis Tyton, 1660.

Gentzler, Edwin. 'Metaphor and Translation', in *Encyclopedia of Literary Translation*, vol. 2, ed. Olive Classe. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000. 941-945.

Gervais, David. 'Dickens's Comic Speech: Inventing the Self', *The Yearbook of English Studies* 25 (1995): 128-140.

Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

_____. *Embodiment and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

_____. 'Taking Metaphor out of our heads and Putting it into the Cultural World', in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*, Amsterdam, July 1997,eds. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999. 145-166.

_____ and Gerard J. Steen. Eds. *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*, Amsterdam, July 1997. Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 1999.

Gifford, Henry. *Tolstoy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Gilbert, Paul and Andrews, Bernice. Eds. *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Gilbert, Sandra M. and Gubar, Susan. *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination*, 2nd ed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000.

Gilbert, Pamela. *Disease, Desire, and the Body in Victorian Women's Popular Novels*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Gill, Christopher. 'Stoicism and Epicureanism', in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions*, ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 143-165.

Gladkova, Anna. 'A Linguistic View of "Pride"', *Emotion Review* 2.2 (2010): 178-179.

Glucksberg, Sam and Keysar, Boaz. 'How Metaphors Work', in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 401-424.

Goatly, Andrew. *Washing the Brain – Metaphor and Hidden Ideology*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2007.

Gogol, Nikolai. *Dead Souls* 1842, trans. and introd. David Magarshack. London: Penguin Books, 1961.

Goldie, Peter. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

_____. Ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Golinenko O. A. et al. Eds. *The Diaries of Sofia Tolstaya*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1985.

Grant, Damian. *Realism*. London: Methuen, 1970.

Green, Martin. 'Tolstoy as Believer', *The Wilson Quarterly* 5.2 (1981): 166-177.

Green, James A. et al. 'Vocal Expressions of Anger', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 139-156.

Greenspan, Patricia S. *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification*. New York and London: Routledge, 1988.

Gregor, Ian and Nicholas, Brian. *The Moral and the Story*. London: Faber and Faber, 1961.

Gregory the Great, Saint. *Morals on the Book of Job*, trans. with notes and indices by John Henry Parker and J. G. F. and J. Rivington. Oxford, 1844.

Grossman, Edith. *Why Translation Matters*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010.

Grot, Natalia. 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, trans. Lesli LaRocco, eds. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. 220-241.

Guy, Josephine M. *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: The Market, the Individual and Communal Life*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996.

Haight, Gordon S. Ed. *The George Eliot Letters 1836-1851*, vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

_____. Ed. *The George Eliot Letters 1859-61*, vol. 3. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

_____. Ed. *The George Eliot Letters 1862-1868*, vol. 4. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

_____. Ed. *The George Eliot Letters 1869-1873*, vol. 5. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

_____. Ed. *The George Eliot Letters 1840-1870*, vol. 8. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978.

Hammond, Brean and Regan, Shaun. *Making the Novel: Fiction and Society in Britain, 1660-1789*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Harbus, Antonina. *Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2012.

Hardy, Barbara. *The Novels of George Eliot: A Study in Form*. 1959; repr. London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1963.

_____. *Particularities: Readings in George Eliot*. London: Peter Owen, 1982.

_____. *George Eliot: A Critic's Biography*. London and New York: Continuum, 2006.

Harkins, Jean. and Wierzbicka, Anna. Eds. *Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001.

Harré, Rom. Ed. *The Social Construction of Emotions*. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

_____. 'Embarrassment: A Conceptual Analysis', in *Shyness and Embarrassment*, ed. W. R. Crozier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 181-204.

_____ and Parrott, W. Gerrod. Eds. *The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions*. London: Sage Publications, 1996.

Harris, William V. *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Hart, Sybil L. 'A Theoretical Model of the Development of Jealousy: Insight through Inquiry into Jealousy Protest', in *Handbook of Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Multidisciplinary Approaches*, eds. Sybil L. Hart and Maria Legerstee. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 331-361.

Hart, Sybil L. and Legerstee, Maria. Eds. *Handbook of Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Multidisciplinary Approaches*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Hartley, Janet M. 'England "Enjoys the Spectacle of a Northern Barbarian": The Reception of Peter I and Alexander I', in *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Gargnano, 1994, eds. Maria di Salvo and Lindsey Hughes. Rome: La Fenice, 1996. 11-18.

Haskell, Robert E. Ed. *Cognition and Symbolic Structures: The Psychology of Metaphoric Transformation*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1987.

Hawthorn, Jeremy. *Studying the Novel*, 4th ed. London: Arnold, 2001.

Henry, Nancy. *The Cambridge Introduction to George Eliot*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Hodgson, Peter C. *Theology in the Fiction of George Eliot: The Mystery beneath the Real*. London: SCM Press, 2001.

Hogan, Patrick Colm. 'On Being Moved: Cognition and Emotion in Literature and Film', in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 237-256.

Hoof, L. van. 'Strategic Differences: Seneca and Plutarch on Controlling Anger', *Mnemosyne* 60 (2007): 50-86.

Horsman, Alan. *The Victorian Novel*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Hunter, J. Paul. *Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990.

_____. 'The Novel and Social/Cultural History', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 9-40.

Ickes, William. 'Introduction', in *Empathic Accuracy*, ed. William Ickes. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1997. 1-16.

_____. Ed. *Empathic Accuracy*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1997.

Iser, Wolfgang. *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

Izard, Carroll E. *The Face of Emotion*. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971.

_____. Ed. *Human Emotions*. New York: Plenum Press, 1977.

_____. *The Psychology of Emotions*. New York and London: Plenum Press, 1991.

Jahn, Gary R. 'The Image of the Railroad in *Anna Karenina*', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 25.2 (1981): 1-10.

Jakobson, Roman and Halle, Morris. *Fundamentals of Language*. 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1956.

James, Henry. ‘Letter to Hugh Walpole, The Reform Club, 19 May 1912’, in *Henry James Letters 1895-1916*, vol. 4, ed. Leon Edel. London: Harvard University Press, 1984. 618-620.

_____. ‘The Review of *Middlemarch* (1873)’, in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical Reader*, ed. Stephen Regan. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. 79-85.

_____. ‘The Art of Fiction (1884)’, in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical Reader*, ed. Stephen Regan. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. 69-78.

Jin, Di. *Literary Translation: Quest for Artistic Integrity*, ed. and introd. William McNaughton. Manchester, UK and Northampton MA: St. Jerome Publishing, 2003.

Johnson, R. Brimley. *The Women Novelists*. New York: Haskell House, 1972.

Johnson, Samuel. *The Rambler*, vol. 1, ‘No. 4. Saturday, March 31, 1750’. London: F. C. and J. Rivington, 1820. 16-22.

_____. *A Dictionary of the English Language in which the Words Are Deduced from their Originals, Explained in their Different Meanings, and Authorized by the Names of the Writers in whose Works They Are Found*. London: Longman etc., 1824.

Jones, Andrew. *Morbus Satanicus: the devils disease, or, The sin of pride arraigned and condemned*, 25th ed. London: Printed by W. L. and T. J. for W. Thackery, Phil. Brooksby, John Williamson and J. Hose, 1677.

Jones, Malcolm V. ‘Introduction’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 1-17.

_____ and Miller, Robin Feuer. Eds. *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Jones, W. Gareth. ‘Politics’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 63-85.

Jordan, John O. Ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Charles Dickens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Kaškin, Ivan. ‘Kritiki Est′ i Net Kritiki’, in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1964*. Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1965. 5-11.
_____. ‘Voprosy Perevoda’, in *Dlja Čitatelja-Sovremennika: Ctat′i i Issledovanija*. Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1968. 435-472.

Kaster, Robert A. *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Katz, Albert N. et al. Eds. *Figurative Language and Thought*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Keen, Suzanne. 'A Theory of Narrative Empathy', *Narrative* 14.3 (2006): 207-236.

Kettle, Arnold. *An Introduction to the English Novel: To George Eliot*, vol. 1. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1951.

_____. Ed. *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: Critical Essays and Documents*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972.

King, Peter. 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions*, ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 167-187.

Kitayama, Shinobu and Markus, Hazel Rose. Eds. *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994.

_____ and Masuda, Takahiko. 'Reappraising Cognitive Appraisal from a Cultural Perspective', *Psychological Inquiry* 6.3 (1995): 217-223.

Knapp, Liza. 'The Development of Style and Theme in Tolstoy', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 161-175.

Knowles, A. V. Ed. *Tolstoy: The Critical Heritage*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Kolts, Russell L. *The Compassionate-Mind Guide to Managing Your Anger*. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 2012.

Konstan, David. *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.

_____. 'Anger, Hatred, and Genocide in Ancient Greece', *Common Knowledge* 13.1 (2007): 170-187.

Kövecses, Zoltán. *Metaphors of Anger, Pride, and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986.

_____. 'Anger: Its Language, Conceptualization, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence', in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, eds. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995. 181-196.

_____. *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

_____. *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

_____. *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

_____. 'Cross-Cultural Experience of Anger: A Psycholinguistic Analysis', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 157-174.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. *Aristotle, Emotions, and Education*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.

Kuiken, Don et al. 'Locating Self-Modifying Feelings within Literary Reading', *Discourse Processes* 38.2 (2004): 267-286.

Kurnick, David. 'An Erotics of Detachment: Middlemarch and Novel-Reading as Critical Practice', *ELH* 74.3 (2007): 583-608.

Lakoff, George. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.

_____. 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor', in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 202-251.

_____ and Johnson, Mark. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

_____ and Johnson, Mark. *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books, 1999.

_____ and Turner, Mark. *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.

Lansky, Melvin R. 'Jealousy and Envy in *Othello*: Psychoanalytic Reflections on the Rivalrous Emotions', in *Jealousy and Envy: New Views about Two Powerful Feelings*, eds. Léon Wurmser and Heidrun Jarass. New York: Analytic Press, 2008. 25-47.

Layton, Susan. *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Lazarus, Richard S. and Lazarus, Bernice N. *Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Leavitt, John. 'Meaning and Feeling in the Anthropology of Emotions', *American Ethnologist* 23.3 (1996): 514-539.

Ledger, Sally. *The New Woman: Fiction and Feminism at the Fin de Siècle*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Lefevere, André. *Translating Literature: The German Tradition from Luther to Rosenzweig*. Assen and Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977.

Leighton, Lauren G. *Two Worlds, One Art: Literary Translation in Russia and America*. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991.

Leitch, Vincent B. Ed. *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001.

Lermontov, Mikhail. *A Hero of Our Time* 1840, trans. and introd. Paul Foote. 1966; rev. ed. London: Penguin, 2001.

Levin, Jurij D. 'Ob Istoričeskoj Èvoljucii Principov Perevoda', in *Meždunarodnye Svjazi Russkoj* Literatury. Moskva and Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963. 5-63.

_____. 'Russkie Perevody Šekspira', in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1966*. Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1968. 5-25.

Levinson, Marjorie. 'What Is New Formalism', *PMLA* 122.2 (2007): 558-569.

Lewis, Michael. *Shame: The Exposed Self*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

_____. 'Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt', in *Handbook of Emotions*, eds. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1993. 563-573.

_____. 'The Development of Anger', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 177-191.

_____ and Haviland, Jeannette M. Eds. *Handbook of Emotions*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1993.

Lipkin, S. 'Perevod i Sovremennost′', in *Masterstvo Perevoda 1963*. Moskva: Sovetskij Pisatel′, 1964. 13-52.

Little, Lester K. 'Anger in Monastic Curses', in *Anger's Past: The Social Issues of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. 9-35.

Liu, Alan. 'The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism', *ELH* 56.4 (1989): 721-771.

Livingstone, E. A. Ed. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Lodge, David. *Language of Fiction: Essays in Criticism and Verbal Analysis of the English Novel*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.

_____. *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature*. London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1977.

_____. *Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Loesberg, Jonathan. 'Cultural Studies, Victorian Studies, and Formalism', *Victorian Literature and Culture* 27.2 (1999): 537-544.

Lofland, Lyn H. 'The Social Shaping of Emotion: The Case of Grief', *Symbolic Interaction* 8.2 (1985): 171-190.

Logan, Deborah Anna. *Fallenness in Victorian Women's Writing: Marry, Stich, Die, or do Worse*. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1998.

Lounsbery, Anne. '"Russia! What Do You Want of Me?": The Russian Reading Public in *Dead Souls*', *Slavic Review* 60.2 (2001): 367-389.

Loveman, Kate. *Reading Fictions, 1660-1740: Deception in English Literary and Political Culture*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Lukács, Geörgy. *The Historical Novel*, pref. Fredric Jameson. Boston: Beacon Press, 1983.

_____. 'Realism in the Balance', in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001. 1033-1058.

Lutz, Catherine A. 'The Domain of Emotion Words on Ifaluk, *American Ethnologist* 9.1 (1982): 113-128.

_____. 'Enthnopsychology Compared to What? Explaining Behaviour and Consciousness Among the Ifaluk', in *Person, Self, and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies*, eds. G. M. White and J. Kirkpatrick. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. 35-79.

_____. *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory*. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1988.

_____ and Geoffrey M. White, 'The Anthropology of Emotions', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986): 405-436.

_____ and Abu-Lughod, Lila. Eds. *Language and the Politics of Emotion*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Maalej, Zouhair. 'Figurative Language in Anger Expressions in Tunisian Arabic: An Extended View of Embodiment', *Metaphor and Symbol* 19.1 (2004): 51-75.

Macdonald, James. ‘Disclosing Shame’, in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, eds. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Magarshack, David. ‘Introduction’ to Nikolai Gogol, *Dead Souls* 1842, trans. and introd. David Magarshack. London: Penguin Books, 1961. 7-15.

Malahova, Svetlana. ‘Ličnostno-Èmocional′nye Koncepty «Gordost′» i «Styd» v Russkoj i Anglijskoj Lingvokul′turah’, published excerpt of an unpublished graduate dissertation, Volgograd, 2009. 1- 24.

MalmkjÆr, Kirsten. ‘Translation Theory’, in *Encyclopedia of Literary Translation*, vol. 2, ed. Olive Classe. London and Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000. 1417-1420.

Mandelker, Amy. ‘The Woman with a Shadow: Fables of Demon and Psyche in “Anna Karenina”’, *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 24.1 (1990): 48-68.

_____. *Framing Anna Karenina: Tolstoy, the Woman Question, and the Victorian Novel*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993.

_____. ‘Introduction’ to Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003. xiii-xxvii.

Martin, Wallace. *Recent Theories of Narrative*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Mascolo, Michael F. and Fischer, Kurt W. ‘Developmental Transformations in Appraisals for Pride, Shame, and Guilt’, in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995. 64-113.

Mathes, Eugene W. *Jealousy: The Psychological Data*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992.

Matsuki, Keiko. ‘Metaphors of Anger in Japanese’, in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, eds. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995. 137-151.

Matsumoto, David and Wilson, Jessie. ‘Culture, Emotion, and Motivation’, in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition across Cultures*’, eds. Richard M. Sorrentino and Susumu Yamaguchi. New York: Elsevier, 2008. 541-563.

_____ et al. ‘The Expression of Anger Across Cultures’, in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 125-137.

Mayer, Robert. *History and the Early English Novel: Matters of Fact from Bacon to Defoe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

McDonagh, Josephine. *George Eliot*. Plymouth, England: Northcote House, 1997.

McLaren, Karla. *The Language of Emotions*. Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2010.

McSweeney, Kerry. *George Eliot: A Literary Life*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1991.

Mersereau John Jr. 'The Nineteenth Century: Romanticism, 1820-40', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 136-188.

Middelton-Moz, Jane. *Shame and Guilt: The Masters of Disguise*. Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc., 1990.

Mikołczak, Agnieszka. 'The Metonymic and Metaphorical Conceptualisation of *Anger* in Polish', in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998. 153-190.

Miller, Rowland S. *Embarrassment: Poise and Peril in Everyday Life*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1996.

Mirsky, D. S. *A History of Russian Literature: From Its Beginnings to 1900*, ed. Francis J. Whitfield. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1958.

Mitchell, W. J. T. 'The Commitment to Form; or, Still Crazy after All These Years', *PMLA* 118.2 (2003): 321-325.

Moore, Carmella C. et al. 'The Universality of the Semantic Structure of Emotion Terms: Methods for the Study of Inter- and Intra-Cultural Variability', *American Anthropologist* 101.3 (1999): 529-546.

Morris, Pam. *Realism: The New Critical Idiom*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Morson, Gary Saul. *Hidden in Plain View: Narrative and Creative Potentials in "War and Peace"*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987.

_____. *Anna Karenina in Our Time: Seeing More Wisely*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007.

Moser, Charles A. Ed. *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Mostovaja, Anna D. 'On Emotions That One Can "Immerse into", "Fall into" and "Come to": The Semantics of a few Russian Prepositional Constructions', in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998. 295-329.

Muller, Richard A. *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology*. Grand Rapids: MI: Baker Book House, 1986.

Nabokov, Vladimir. *Lectures on Russian Literature*, ed. and introd. Fredson Bowers. London: Pan Books, 1982.

Nacional'nyj Korpus Russkogo Jazyka Online, available at http://ruscorpora.ru/.

Nash, Christopher. *World Postmodern Fiction: A Guide*. London and New York: Longman, 1993.

Nathanson, Donald L. *Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.

Newcome, Henry. *A plain discourse about rash and sinful anger: as a help for such as are willing to be relieved against so sad and too generally prevailing a distemper even amongst professors of religion: being the substance of some sermons preached at Manchester in Lancashire*. London: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1693.

Niedenthal, Paula M. et al. *Psychology of Emotion: Interpersonal, Experimental, and Cognitive Approaches*. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, 2006.

Nikulina-Kositskaia, Liubov. 'Notes', trans. Mary F. Zirin, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby Clyman and Judith Vowles. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. 112-157.

Nixon, Cheryl L. Ed. *Novel Definitions: An Anthology of Commentary on the Novel, 1688-1815*. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2009.

Norris, Christopher. *Derrida*. London: Fontana Press, 1987.

Novak, Max. 'Defoe as an Innovator of Fictional Form', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 41-71.

Nuyts, Jan and Pederson, Eric. Eds. *Language and Conceptualization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

O'Brien, Karen. *Narratives of Enlightenment*: *Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

O'Gorman, Francis. '"A Long Deep Sob of that Mysterious Wondrous Happiness that is One with Pain": Emotion in the Victorian Novel', in *A Concise Companion to the Victorian Novel*, ed. Francis O'Gorman. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 253-270.

_____. Ed. *A Concise Companion to the Victorian Novel*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

Oldfield, Derek. 'The Language of the Novel: The Character of Dorothea', in *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: Critical Essays and Documents*, ed. Arnold Kettle. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972. 224-247.

Olson, Paul A. Ed. *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, trans. and introd. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

Onega, Susana and Landa, José Ángel García. 'Introduction', in *Narratology: An Introduction*, eds. Susana Onega and José Ángel García Landa. London and New York: Longman, 1996. 1-41.

_____. Eds. *Narratology: An Introduction*. London and New York: Longman, 1996.

Ortony, Andrew. Ed. *Metaphor and Thought*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

_____ et al. *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Orwin, Donna Tussing, 'Introduction: Tolstoy as Artist and Public Figure', in *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 49-62.

_____. Ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Osborne, Katherine Dunagan. 'Inherited Emotions: George Eliot and the Politics of Heirlooms', *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 64.4 (2010): 465-493.

Oster, Ulrike. 'Using Corpus Methodology for Semantic and Pragmatic Analyses: What can Corpora Tell Us about the Linguistic Expression of Emotions?', *Cognitive Linguistics* 21.4 (2010): 727-763.

Palmer, Gene V. Ed. *Russian Literature: Overview and Bibliography*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002.

Palmer, Alan. *Fictional Minds*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.

_____. 'Storyworlds and Groups', in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 176-192.

Parker, David. *Ethics, Theory and the Novel*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Parrott, W. Gerrod and Harré, Rom. 'Introduction: Some Complexities in the Study of Emotions', in *The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions*, eds. Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott. London: Sage Publications, 1996. 1-20.

Pasternak, Boris. 'Translating Shakespeare', trans. Manya Harari, in *I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography*, gen. trans. David Magarshack. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1983. 123-152.

_____. *I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography*, gen. trans. David Magarshack. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Pavlenko, Aneta. *Emotions and Multilingualism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Paxman, David. 'Metaphor and Knowledge in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*', *Metaphor and Symbol* 18.2 (2003): 107-123.

Paxton, Nancy L. *George Eliot and Herbert Spencer: Feminism, Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction of Gender*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Peace, Richard. 'The Nineteenth Century: The Natural School and its Aftermath, 1840-55', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 189-247.

Peck, John. 'Introduction', in *New Casebooks: Middlemarch*, ed. John Peck. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 1-18.

Peck, John. Ed. *New Casebooks: Middlemarch*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

_____ and Coyle, Martin. *Literary Terms and Criticism*. London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1984.

Pederson, Eric and Nuyts, Jan. 'Overview: On the Relationship between Language and Conceptualization', in *Language and Conceptualization*, eds. Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 1-12.

Pinney, Thomas. Ed. *Essays of George Eliot*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.

Pipes, Richard. 'The New Service State', in *Peter the Great Transforms Russia*, 3rd ed. James Cracraft. Lexington, MA and Toronto: D. C. Health and Company, 1991. 105-113.

Planalp, Sally. *Communicating Emotion: Social, Moral, and Cultural Processes*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Platonov, S. F. 'Peter the Great Not a Revolutionary Innovator', in *Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary?*, ed. Marc Raeff. Lexington, MA: D.C Health and Company, 1963. 88-90.

Pollock, Linda A. 'Anger and the Negotiation of Relationships in Early Modern England', *The Historical Journal* 47.3 (2004): 567-590.

Potegal, Michael. 'The Temporal Dynamics of Anger: Phenomena, Processes, and Perplexities', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 385-401.

_____ et al. Eds. *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*. New York: Springer, 2010.

Power, Mick and Dalgleish, Tim. *Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder*. 1997; repr. Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press Ltd., 1998.

Price, A. W. 'Emotions in Plato and Aristotle', in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions*, ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 121-142.

Probyn, Elspeth. *Blush: Faces of Shame*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005.

Punter, David. *Metaphor: The New Critical Idiom*. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

_____. *Metaphor*. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

Purdy, Dwight H. '"The One Poor Word" in *Middlemarch*', *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 44.4 (2004): 805-821.

Pushkin, Alexander. 'Letter to Peter Andreevich Vyazemsky, Odessa, 4 November 1823', in *The Letters of Alexander Pushkin*, trans. and ed. J. Thomas Shaw. Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. 141.

_____. *Eugene Onegin* 1833, trans. and introd. Stanley Mitchell. London: Penguin, 2008.

_____. *Stihotvorenija, Poèmy, Evgenij Onegin, Dramatičeskie Proizvedenija*. *Proza*. Moskva: Èksmo, 2011.

Rabinowitz, Peter J. *Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998.

Radford, Colin. 'Fiction, Pity, Fear, and Jealousy', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53.1 (1995): 71-75.

_____ and Weston, Michael. 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 49 (1975): 67-93.

Raeff, Marc. Ed. *Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary?*. Lexington, MA: D.C Health and Company, 1963.

_____. *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966.

_____. *Imperial Russia 1682-1825: The Coming of Age of Modern Russia*, vol. 4, ed. Michael Cherniavsky. New York: Knopf, 1971.

_____. ‘Peter’s Domestic Legacy: Transformation or Revolution?’, in *Peter the Great Transforms Russia*, 3rd ed. James Cracraft. Lexington, MA and Toronto: D. C. Health and Company, 1991. 286-301.

Reed, Walter L. *An Exemplary History of the Novel: The Quixotic versus the Picaresque*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Regan, Stephen. Ed. *The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.

Reiss, Katharina. *Translation Criticism – The Potentials and Limitations: Categories and Criteria for Translation Quality Assessment*, trans. Erroll F. Rhodes. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2000.

Reyfman, Irina. *Vasilii Trediakovsky: The Fool of the ‘New’ Russian Literature*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Reynolds, Kimberley and Humble, Nicola. *Victorian Heroines: Representations of Femininity in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Art*. New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Richetti, John. ‘Introduction’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, ed. John Richetti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 1-8.

_____. Ed. *The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

_____. *Language, Culture and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective*. London and New York: Continuum, 2007.

Rischin, Abigail S. ‘Beside the Reclining Statue: Ekphrasis, Narrative, and Desire in *Middlemarch*’, *PMLA* 111.5 (1996): 1121-1132.

Ritchie, L. David. *Context and Connection in Metaphor*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006.

Robinson, Helen. *Rage*. Port Melbourne: Lothian Books, 1999.

Rosaldo, Michelle Z. *Knowledge and Passion: Ilonglot Notions of Self and Social Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Rosenwein, Barbara H. Ed. *Anger’s Past: The Social Issues of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Russell, J. A. ‘Culture and the Categorization of Emotions’, *Psychological Bulletin* 110.3 (1991): 426-450.

Ruud, Charles. 'Pre-Revolutionary Russian Nationalism', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 1.2 (1974): 274-286.

Salvo, Maria di and Hughes, Lindsey. Eds. *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Gargnano, 1994. Rome: La Fenice, 1996.

Sanders, Valerie. 'Marriage and the Antifeminist Woman Novelist', in *Victorian Women Writers and the Woman Question*, ed. Nicola Diane Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 24-41.

Sanders, Andrew. *The Short Oxford History of English Literature*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

_____. 'Dickens and the Idea of the Comic Novel', *The Yearbook of English Studies* 36.2 (2006): 51-64.

Schefski, Harold K. 'Tolstoy's Urban-Rural Continuum in *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*', *South Atlantic Review* 46.1 (1981): 27-41.

Scherer, John L., Jr. 'Belinskij and the Hegelian Dialectic', *The Slavic and East European Journal* 21.1 (1977): 30-45.

Scholes, Robert and Kellogg, Robert. *The Nature of Narrative*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Schultz, David et al., 'State and Trait Anger, Fear, and Social Information Processing', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 311-325.

Semino, Elena. *Metaphor in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Serman, Ilya. 'The Eighteenth Century: Neoclassicism and the Enlightenment, 1730-90', in *The Cambridge History of Russian Literature*, ed. Charles A. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 45-91.

Shapin, Stephen. *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Shariff, Azim F. et al. 'Further Thoughts on the Evaluation of Pride's Two Facets: A Response to Clark', *Emotion Review* 2.4 (2010): 399-400.

Shaw, J. Thomas. Trans. and ed. *The Letters of Alexander Pushkin*. Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.

Shaw, Harry E. *Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Shklar, Judith N. *Ordinary Vices*. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984.

Shklovsky, Victor. 'Art as Technique', in *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, trans. and introd. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, ed. Paul A. Olson. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. 3-24.

Siegel, Daniel. 'Losing for Profit', in *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Karen Chase. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 157-176.

Smiley, Jane. *Thirteen Ways of Looking at the Novel*. London: Faber and Faber, 2006.

Smith, Grahame. *The Novel and Society: Defoe to George Eliot*. London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd., 1984.

Snow, C. P. *The Realists: Portraits of Eight Novelists: Stendhal, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Galdós, Henry James, Proust*. London: Macmillan Ltd., 1978.

Solomon, Robert C. *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.

Sorrentino, Richard M. and Yamaguchi, Susumu. Eds. *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition across Cultures*. New York: Elsevier, 2008.

Speirs, Logan. *Tolstoy and Chekhov*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Spielberger, Charles D. and Reheiser, Eric C. 'The Nature and Measurement of Anger', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 403-412.

Spolsky, Ellen. *Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Staten, Henry. 'Is *Middlemarch* Ahistorical', *PMLA* 115.5 (2000): 991-1005.

Stearns, Peter N. *Be a Man!: Males in Modern Society*. New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979.

_____. *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style*. New York and London: New York University Press, 1994.

Stearns, Carol Zisowitz and Stearns, Peter N. *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America's History*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Steen, Gerard J. 'From Linguistic to Conceptual Metaphor in Five Steps', in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics*

Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997, eds. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen. Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1997. 57-77.

Stein, Howard F. 'Russian Nationalism and the Divided Soul of the Westernizers and Slavophiles', *Ethos* 4.4 (1976): 403-438.

Stein, Richard L. 'Dickens and Illustration', in *The Cambridge Companion to Charles Dickens*, ed. John O. Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 167-188.

Steiner, George. 'To Traduce or Transfigure: On Modern Verse Translation', *Encounter* 27.2 (1966): 48-54.

Stemmler, Gerhard. 'Somatovisceral Activation During Anger', in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, eds. Michael Potegal et al. New York: Springer, 2010. 103-121.

Sternberg, Robert J. and Sternberg, Karin. *The Nature of Hate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Tambling, Jeremy. '*Middlemarch*, Realism and the Birth of the Clinic', *ELH* 57.4 (1990): 939-960.

Tangney, June Price. 'The Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride', in *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. Tim Dalgleish and Mick J. Power Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999. 541-568.

_____. 'Perfectionism and the Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride', in *Perfectionism: Theory, Research, and Treatment*, eds. Gordon L. Flett and Paul L. Hewitt. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002. 199-215.

_____ and Fischer, Kurt W. Eds. *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995.

_____ and Dearing, Ronda L. *Shame and Guilt*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2002.

Tapp, Alyson. 'Moving Stories: (E)Motion and Narrative in *Anna Karenina*', *Russian Literature* 61.3 (2007): 341-361.

Tatlina, Praskovia. 'Reminiscences', trans. Judith Vowles, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby Clyman and Judith Vowles. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. 243-280.

Taylor, Gabriele. *Deadly Vices*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.

Taylor, John R. and MacLaury, Robert E. Eds. *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995.

Terras, Victor. *A History of Russia Literature*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991.

_____. 'The Realist Tradition', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, ed. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 190-209.

Thoits, Peggy A. 'The Sociology of Emotions', *Annual Review of Sociology* 15 (1989): 317-342.

Thompson, Nicola Diane. Ed. *Victorian Women Writers and the Woman Question*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Thorlby, Anthony. *Leo Tolstoy: Anna Karenina*, Landmarks of World Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Todorov, Tzvetan. *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre*, trans. Richard Howard. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1973.

Tolstaya, Sofia. 'Various Notes for Future Reference, Yasnaya Polyana, 24 February 1870', in *The Diaries of Sofia Tolstaya*, trans. Cathy Porter, introd. R. F. Christian, ed. O. A. Golinenko et al. London: Jonathan Cape, 1985. 845.

_____. 'Why Anna Karenina was called "Anna", and What Suggested the Idea of Her Suicide', in *The Diaries of Sofia Tolstaya*, trans. Cathy Porter, introd. R. F. Christian, ed. O. A. Golinenko et al. London: Jonathan Cape, 1985. 855.

Tolstoy, Leo. *Anna Karenina*, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude, introd. E. B. Greenwood. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 1999.

_____. *Anna Karenina*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larrisa Volokhonsky, pref. Richard Pevear. New York: Penguin, 2000.

_____. *Anna Karenina*, trans. Constance Garnett, introd. Amy Mandelker. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003.

_____. *Anna Karenina* 1875-7. Moskva: Èksmo, 2010.

_____. 'My Confession: Introduction to the Critique of Dogmatic Theology and Investigation of the Christian Teaching' (1879-1882), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 13, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968. 3-90.

_____. 'Critique of Dogmatic Theology' (1881-1882), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 13, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968, 93-451.

_____. 'My Religion' (1884), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 16, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968. 3-221.

_____. ‘What Shall We Do Then?’ (1886), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 17, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968. 3-340.

_____. ‘Resurrection’ (1899), in *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vol. 21, trans. and ed. Leo Wiener. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968. 3-527.

_____. ‘Letter to S. A. Rachinsky, 27 January 1878’, in *Tolstoy’s Letters 1828-1879*, vol. 1, trans. and ed. R. F. Christian. London: The Athlone Press, 1978. 311-312.

_____. ‘Letter to N. V. Mikhaylov, Moscow, 16 February 1889’, in *Tolstoy’s Letters 1880-1910*, vol. 2, trans. and ed. R. F. Christian. London: The Athlone Press, 1978. 439-441.

Tracy, Jessica L. and Robins, Richard W. ‘Emerging Insights into the Nature and Function of Pride’, *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16.3 (2007): 147-150.

_____ and Robins, Richard W. ‘The Prototypical Pride Expression: Development of a Nonverbal Behavior. Coding System’, *Emotion* 7.4 (2007): 789-801.

_____ and Robins, Richard W. ‘The Psychological Structure of Pride: A Tale of Two Facets’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92.3 (2007): 506-525.

_____ and Robins, Richard W. ‘The Nonverbal Expression of Pride: Evidence for Cross-Cultural Recognition’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 94.3 (2008): 516-530.

_____ and Matsumoto, David. ‘The Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays’, *PNAS* 105.33 (2008): 11655-11660.

_____ et al. ‘A Naturalist’s View of Pride’, *Emotion Review* 2.2 (2010): 163-177.

_____ and Prehn, Christine. ‘Arrogant or Self-Confident? The Use of Contextual Knowledge to Differentiate Hubristic and Authentic Pride from a Single Nonverbal Expression’, *Cognition and Emotion* 26.1 (2012): 14-24.

Trotter, David. ‘Space, Movement, and Sexual Feeling in *Middlemarch*’, in *Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Karen Chase. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 37-63.

Troyat, Henri. *Tolstoy*, trans. Nancy Amphoux. London: Penguin, 1967.

Turner, C. J. G. ‘Psychology, Rhetoric and Morality in *Anna Karenina*: At the Bottom of Whose Heart?’, *The Slavic and East European Journal* 39.2 (1995): 261-268.

Tylor, John R. and Mbense, Thandi G. 'Red Dogs and Rotten Mealies: How Zulus Talk About Anger', in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998. 191-226.

Uglow, Jennifer. *George Eliot*. London: Virago Pioneers, 1987.

Underhill, James W. *Ethnolinguistics and Cultural Concepts: Truth, Love, Hate and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Venuti, Lawrence. *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

Verbitskaia, Anastasiia. 'To My Reader', trans. Judith Vowles, in *Russia through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*, eds. Toby Clyman and Judith Vowles. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. 337-380.

Wachtel, Andrew. 'Psychology and Society', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel*, eds. Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 130-149.

Walder, Dennis. 'The Genre Approach', in *Approaching Literature: The Realist Novel*, ed. Dennis Walder. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. 3-30.

_____. Ed. *Approaching Literature: The Realist Novel*. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

Warner, William B. *Licensing Entertainment: The Elevation of the Novel Reading in Britain, 1694-1750*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Watt, Ian. *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding*. 1957; repr. London: Pimlico, 2000.

Wellek, René. *Concepts of Criticism*, ed. Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963.

Wenzel, Siegfried. 'The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research', *Speculum* 43.1 (1968): 1-22.

White G. M. and Kirkpatrick, J. Eds. *Person, Self, and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

White, Gregory L. and Mullen, Paul E. *Jealousy: Theory, Research, and Clinical Strategies*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1989.

Whitehead, George. *A seasonable and Christian caution against the provoking sin of pride and other manifest evils, and of the judgements threatned because thereof, compassionately tendered to the inhabitants of London, and elsewhere concerned, as a warning to repentance*. London: Sold by Randal Tayler, 1693.

Whorf, Benjamin Lee. *Language, Thought and Reality*, ed. John B. Carroll. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1956.

Wiener. Leo. Trans. and Ed. *The Complete Works of Count Tolstoy*, vols. 13, 16, 17, 21. 1904; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1968.

Wierzbicka, Anna. *Semantic Primitives*, trans. Anna Wierzbicka and John Besemeres. Frankfurt/M: Athenäum Verlag, 1972.

_____. 'Human Emotions: Universal or Culture Specific?', *American Anthropologist* 88.3 (1986): 584-594.

_____. 'Japanese Key Words and Core Cultural Values', *Language in Society* 20.3 (1991): 333-385.

_____. *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

_____. 'Talking about Emotions: Semantics, Culture, and Cognition', *Cognition and Emotion* 6. 3/4 (1992): 285-319.

_____. 'Emotion, Language, and Cultural Scripts', in *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence*, eds. Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Rose Markus. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994. 133-196.

_____. *Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

_____. '"Sadness" and "Anger" in Russian: The Non-universality of the so-called "Basic Human Emotions", in *Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualisation and Expression*, eds. Angeliki Athanasiadou and Elżbieta Tabakowska. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998. 3-28.

_____. 'Russian Emotional Expression', *Ethos* 26.4 (1998): 456-483.

_____. *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

_____. 'Russian Cultural Scripts: The Theory of Cultural Scripts and Its Applications', *Ethos* 30.4 (2002): 401-432.

_____. 'A Conceptual Basis for Research into Emotions and Bilingualism', *Bilingualism: Language and Cognition* 11.2 (2008): 193-195.

_____. 'Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research', *Emotion Review* 1.1 (2009): 3-14.

_____. ‘The “History of Emotions” and the Future of Emotion Research’, *Emotion Review* 2.3 (2010): 269-273.

_____. *Mały Portret Języka Polskiego dla Młodzieży w Krajach Anglosaskich*. Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, no date.

_____ and Jean Harkins, ‘Introduction’, in *Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective*, eds. Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001. 1-34.

Williams, Raymond. *The English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1971.

Wood, James. ‘How *War and Peace* Works’, *The New Yorker*, 26 November 2007, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2007/11/26/071126crat_atlarge_wood

Woolf, Virginia. *Collected Essays*, vol. 2. London: The Hogarth Press, 1966.

Wright, T. R. *George Eliot’s Middlemarch*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

Wurmser, Léon and Jarass, Heidrun. Eds. *Jealousy and Envy: New Views about Two Powerful Feelings*. New York: Analytic Press, 2008.

Young, Kay. *Imagining Minds: The Neuro-Aesthetics of Austen, Eliot, and Hardy*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2110.

Yu, Ning. ‘Metaphorical Expressions of Anger and Happiness in English and Chinese’, *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 10.2 (1995): 59-92.

Zawadzki, W. H. ‘Untitled Review of *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History*’, *The English Historical Review* 103.407 (1988): 515-516.

Zbinden, Karine. ‘The Bakhtin Circle and Translation’, *The Yearbook of English Studies* 36.1 (2006): 157-167.

Zaliznjak, Anna A. ‘O Semantike Ščepetilʹnosti (*Obidno*, *Sovestno* i *Neudobno* na Fone Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira)’, in *Ključevye Idei Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira* (*Key Ideas of the Russian Linguistic Picture of the World*), eds. Anna A. Zaliznjak et al. Moskva: Jazyki Slavjanskoj Kulʹtury, 2005. 378-397.

Zaliznjak Anna A. et al. Eds. *Ključevye Idei Russkoj Yazykovoj Kartiny Mira* (*Key Ideas of the Russian Linguistic Picture of the World*). Moskva: Jazyki Slavjanskoj Kulʹtury, 2005.

Zunshine, Lisa. *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006.

_____. Ed. *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.