

# **Hugo Chávez, Populism and the Emotions**

Elena Beatriz Escalante-Block

BJ/BA, MIR

Department of Modern History, Politics, and International Relations

Faculty of Arts

Macquarie University, NSW, Australia

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Research

24 April 2017

## Table of Contents

Table of Contents .....	2
List of Figures .....	4
List of Tables .....	4
Abstract .....	5
Authors Consent .....	6
Acknowledgements .....	7
Introduction .....	8
Chapter 1: Theoretical Explorations on populism and emotional appeals .....	14
1.1 Theories of Populism .....	14
1.2 Theories about Emotional Appeals .....	22
1.3 Methodology .....	29
Chapter 2: Studies on Chávez's use of discourse .....	32
2.1 Chávez and the use of Simon Bolivar in his discourse .....	34
2.2 Using discourse as a strategy .....	35
2.3 Chávez's reliance on history in his discourse .....	37
2.4 The use of metaphors and religion .....	38
2.5 Chávez and nationalism .....	40
2.6 Chávez and <i>Aló Presidente</i> .....	42
2.7 Affect in Chávez's discourse .....	44
Chapter 3: Populist and negative emotional appeals in Chávez's discourse: Analysis of the Data (2000-2009), Discussion and Conclusions .....	47
3.1 Results .....	48
3.2 Discussion .....	56
3.3 Variables of Aversion (Anger and Rage) .....	57

3.4 Other variables on negative emotional appeals: Anxiety and Fear .....	59
3.5 Variables of populism.....	62
3.6 Further examination of the Data: A qualitative interpretation .....	63
Conclusion.....	67
Bibliography.....	70
Appendix A.....	83

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1: Correlations between anger appeals and popularity .....	53
Figure 2: Correlations between anxiety appeals and popularity .....	54

## **List of Tables**

Table 1: Data from the polling company Datanalysis on Chávez's popularity .....	49
Table 2: Count of Emotional and Populist appeals in Chávez's <i>Aló Presidente</i> speeches .	51
Table 3: Results .....	53

## **Abstract**

The aim of this Master of Research thesis is to examine discursive strategies deployed by populist leaders in order to garner support. The thesis uses Hugo Chávez as a case study to understand how and when the President chose certain discursive strategies to maintain his popularity. What were Hugo Chávez's discursive strategies? What emotions did he decide to use to appeal to his audience with his speeches? Did Chávez choose to 'attack' his opponents when he was lagging behind in the opinion polls? The thesis answers these questions by using theories and frameworks of emotional appeals (Brader 2006), affective intelligence (Marcus, Neumann & Mackuen 2000) and theories of populism as a form of communication (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). The study uses content analysis to identify words that appeal to either negative (fear, anger, anxiety, rage) or positive emotions (enthusiasm, pride, amusement and sympathy) and populist appeals (colloquialisms, appeals to the people and anti-elitism). The main finding shows that Chávez used anger appeals when his popularity was lower in the polls. By evoking anger, Chávez the 'communicational master' (Block 2015), was able to collectivise emotions across millions of people in Venezuela who felt at first connected emotionally and then ideologically with his Bolivarian revolution.

## **Authors Consent**

I certify that this thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Research, in the Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University. The thesis titled 'Hugo Chávez, Populism and the Emotions' is my own work and the product of my own research. This work was written during my Master of Research and does not contain any material previously published or submitted to any other university. Any material and resources used for this thesis is cited in the Bibliography section of this work.

24 April 2017

Elena Escalante-Block

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express my gratitude to those who have helped me complete this thesis. First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Lloyd Cox for his encouragement to study Hugo Chávez through the use of emotions, as well as for his guidance and criticisms, which helped me develop and complete this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Alessandro Nai who has been a boss, a mentor and a friend. Thank you for encouraging and helping me whenever I needed it.

I am also thankful to Macquarie University as their support has encouraged me to pursue academia and helped me focus entirely on researching and writing this dissertation.

I would also like to thank Gerardo González and Saul Cabrera from Consultores 21, as well as the people from Datanalisis, for their accurate and timely data about Chávez's popularity. I am very grateful to Ms Shauna Parks and Ms Vivienne Chavez for their patience in proofreading and editing my work. I would like to thank a few people from my family: my mother, Dr. Elena Block, my inspiration and role model: my dreams and achievements are yours; my step-dad, John Fraser, who always makes me laugh and whose support and love has been invaluable; my dad Ricardo Escalante for his guidance and love; and finally my partner, Ezekiel French, who has been supportive, caring and patient with me throughout this entire process.

## Introduction

"You are ignoramus, you are a burro, Mr Danger... or to say it to you in my bad English:  
[switching languages] You are a donkey, Mr Danger. You are a donkey, Mr George W  
Bush."

"You are a coward, a killer, a [perpetrator of] genocide, an alcoholic, a drunk, a liar, an  
immoral person, Mr Danger. You are the worst, Mr Danger. The worst of this planet... A  
psychologically sick man, I know it"

- Hugo Chávez during his weekly show *Aló Presidente* in March 2006

The late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez relished undermining the imperialistic government of the United States of America (Cole 2007, p. 493) and his opposition, who he believed represented the extreme right 'bourgeoisie'. Chávez has been characterised for his polarising rhetoric (Ellner & Hellinger 2004), as the two quotes above demonstrate. These are just two examples of the emotional and confrontational tone that defined Chávez's political speeches and *Aló Presidente*, the weekly TV program produced and conducted by Chávez during his presidency in Venezuela (Constantini 2014). The show aired every Sunday at 11:00 A.M. and lasted an average of 6 hours. The show was filmed in various locations around Venezuela and showed Chávez inaugurating several factories, universities and social programs (Constantini 2014). The quotes above also illustrate some of the words often used by Chávez that will be analysed in the current study. Words such as "coward", "killer", "alcoholic", "drunk" or "sick man" were used to trigger an emotional response in his followers. Indeed, one of Chávez's strategies was to attack his opponents with specific words designed to elicit strong negative emotions among his constituents. This strategy may have contributed to the polarisation of Venezuelan society, in addition to reflecting that polarisation.



The use of emotive words is one strategy that Chávez adopted to maintain popularity among his followers. Another strategy, also used by fellow Latin American presidents Correa and Morales, was to engage in constant political campaigning and electioneering (De La Torre & Arnson 2013). In Venezuela, during the 15 years of Chávez's regime, there were 15 different types of electoral processes, which "amounted to plebiscites on Chávez's rule" (De La Torre & Arnson 2013, p. 9). This strategy allowed Chávez to feel like the constant 'winner'. The ongoing political campaigning was used by Chávez to attack his opponents and to maintain his popularity among voters. Chávez was a mastermind of communication style (Block 2015). The President built a new hegemonic discourse by delegitimising the opposition and justifying the Bolivarian revolution (Romero 2005). More recently, populist elected leaders from the right have also adopted this strategy. For instance, President Trump ran a campaign rally for the 2020 US election just one month after being elected (Hamblin 2017). Populist leaders such as Hugo Chávez or Donald Trump might turn to permanent campaign strategies as a mechanism by which to maintain their popularity and to use "attack politics" against their enemies. Indeed, politicians tend to "attack" when they wish to decrease the popularity of their opponents (Nai & Martinez i Coma 2016).

The thesis will use Hugo Chávez as a case study to understand how and when certain discursive strategies can be used to emotionally appeal to one's followers. More specifically, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: What were Hugo Chávez's discursive strategies? When did he decide to appeal to certain emotions in his audience? To whom were these strategies aimed? When did President Chávez apply a more negative rhetoric? Did Chávez choose to 'attack' his opponents when he was lagging behind in the opinion polls? Did Chávez's discursive tone shift when he was losing popularity? Or was his confrontational tone a permanent political strategy to gain

and maintain power? The answers to these questions will help inform our general understanding of populist discursive strategies.

The main argument of the study is that Chávez manipulated his communicational style to both gain popularity and to make his opponents weaker. This study will evaluate Chávez's polarising discourse against his major enemies, the Venezuelan opposition, the US and private multinational corporations. In each phase of his government, Chávez had the opportunity to manipulate his discourse as a function of his popularity rating in the polls, whether or not an election was approaching. At times, Chávez used a language of unification rather than polarisation with slogans such as "*Venezuela ahora es de todos*" ("Venezuela is now of everybody"). But, when was this the case? That is, when did Chávez decide to choose words to unify or polarise Venezuelans? This study will draw on political psychology and political communication approaches to provide a novel insight into Chávez's use of emotion in discourse.

A methodological perspective will be adopted that has rarely been used in the existing literature. This perspective is based on the theories and frameworks of emotional appeals and affective intelligence developed by Marcus and colleagues (see Brader 2006; Marcus, Neumann & Mackuen, 2000; MacKuen et al. 2007), among others. By identifying words that seek to appeal to negative emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, rage, and positive emotions such as enthusiasm, pride, amusement and sympathy, this dissertation will determine how Hugo Chávez altered his discourse as a function of his current popularity. It will also measure populist appeals in order to understand whether Chávez's populist style of communication was a strategy that he deployed throughout his presidency or whether this was a strategy dependent on his popularity. The overall aim of this study of research is therefore to provide insight into how populist leaders manipulate their language and maintain popularity.

The mixed method used in this analysis relies on a comprehensive database provided from DataAnalysis, one of the most influential opinion poll companies in Venezuela. They provided a group of national opinion polls, carried out between 2000 and 2009, which measured Hugo Chávez's popularity. The percentage popularity of Chávez provided by this poll will serve as the independent variable. The dependent variable will be new data gathered through the analysis of Chávez's speeches in his weekly TV show, *Aló Presidente*. Only speeches that follow the release of opinion polls will be used. This method draws on Hawkins's (2009) work on Chávez's populist discourse, in which Chávez's speeches were coded to examine his populism in comparison to other political leaders in Latin America and the world. Here, Chávez's speeches will be coded, using Brader's (2006) work on emotional appeals, to determine whether his speeches aimed to elicit emotions such as anger, sympathy or enthusiasm. This study will also code populist rhetoric using Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) definition of populism as a communicational style. After coding, regression analysis will be run on STATA to determine if any statistical associations exist between the variables (emotional appeals and populism) and popularity opinion polls.

Chávez succeeded in polarising the nation by using words that elicited emotions in the Venezuelan audience. While a significant body of work on Chávez's political discourse already exists, to my knowledge, the present study provides a unique approach to the subject by conducting a comprehensive analysis of Hugo Chávez's *Aló Presidente's* speeches in direct relation to his popularity at the polls and his use of emotional appeals. Previous studies have shown that changes in opinion polls may serve as incentives for politicians to either begin attacking their opponents or run less negative messages in their campaigns (Nai & Martinez i Coma 2016). For example, an increased chance of losing an election may trigger a politician to run negative messages and to attack their

opponents (Blackwell 2013; Skarpedas & Grofman 1995; Walter et al. 2014). Chávez demonstrated on several occasions that he paid attention to opinion polls on the performance of his regime and often verified his popularity among voters (Chávez 2012). He continuously mentioned the opinion polls during *Aló Presidente*. An example of this can be seen in episode no. 199, 27<sup>th</sup> of July 2004, when he stated:

In 1998, Datanálisis said with 8 days to go to the presidential election that ‘Frijolito’ (an adversary of Chávez for the 1998 election) was about to catch up with Chávez in the polls, that we had practically a tie and then it so happens that one week after there was 20 points of difference between the two of us.<sup>1</sup>

He also mentions Datanálisis during shows 26, 27, 110, 195, 197, 199, 249, 251, 274 and 275 of *Aló Presidente*.<sup>2</sup> As such, Chávez may have *actively* selected certain words in his discourse to manipulate his audience and gain popularity during specific times in his presidency, in this case when he was lagging behind at the polls. The constant mention of popularity polls also illustrates that surveys can become political instruments and not merely measures of popularity.

Recently, there has been a worldwide upsurge in support for populist leaders and political parties. This work aims to further contribute to the literature on populism by understanding how populist leaders like Chávez might strategise their discourse and how these strategies conform or depart from what the current literature typically views as “populist”. The first chapter will provide a theoretical framework on populism and

---

<sup>1</sup> Chavez *Aló Presidente* n. 95 – 27<sup>th</sup> June 2004, available at:

<http://www.todochavez.gob.ve/todochavez/3749-alo-presidente-n-195>

<sup>2</sup> All the *Aló Presidente* speeches are available at:

<http://www.todochavez.gob.ve/todochavez/#categoria=1>

emotional appeals and will describe the methodology in detail. Chapter two will include a brief historical overview of Venezuela as well as a literature review on studies examining Chávez's discourse. Finally, Chapter three will outline the key findings to determine whether Chávez increased his use of negative emotional appeals and populist appeals when he was less popular at the polls. Conclusions will then be drawn from the current study and suggestions will be made for future research in the field of emotional appeals and attack politics in populist discursive strategies.

## **Chapter 1: Theoretical Explorations on populism and emotional appeals**

Theories on populism and emotional appeals were used to develop the methodological model in this dissertation. In the past, studies have joined theories on emotions and theories of populism to study how voters emotionally react to populist messages on social media (Mancosu 2016). Emotional appeals such as anger, fear and resentment are critical in political mobilisation as these appeals affect how voters judge populist leaders (Salmela & Von Scheve 2017). Indeed, studying these negative emotional appeals is key to understanding why citizens have been able to tolerate Donald Trump's lies or exaggerations throughout his campaign and since his presidential inauguration (Salmela & Von Scheve 2017). The recent US election campaign parallels Venezuela circa 1998 before Hugo Chávez was elected, that is, "bias operates when the relevant emotions are shared across social groups" (Salmela & Von Scheve 2017). Therefore, theories on populism and emotions must be considered together in order to understand populist phenomena and its current rise throughout the world. First, this chapter will explain populism from a variety of angles and then arrive at the conclusion that populism is a form of communication rather than a strategy or ideology. Then, theories on affect and emotional appeals will open the way for examining the methodology that will be deployed in this study.

### **1.1 Theories of Populism**

Populism has been studied for over 50 years. However, in recent years there has been a proliferation of the analysis of populism in both advanced western economies and in lesser-developed countries. The definition of populism has been a contentious issue since the late 1960s. Populism has been defined as an ideology, a movement, a political party, or as a threat to democracy and a communication strategy. As a term, it is difficult to define and theorise because it is usually regarded as vague (Berlin et al. 1968;

Canovan 1999). Indeed, there is general agreement that populism is dependent on context and culture and is often a confrontational and 'chameleonic' term (Arter 2010). The first efforts to define populism were collated in a book by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969). Around the same time, other authors have argued that populism should be defined as a response to a group of individuals who seek change (Berlin et al. 1968). That is, populism arises as a consequence of a specific point in history when people believe that change is necessary. It can often lead to nationalism, socialism or peasantism (Berlin et al. 1968).

Populism has been named "the redemptive style" of politics, as it emerges from "tensions that build up in democracies" (Canovan 1999, p. 9). Chávez, Iglesias from the Podemos political party in Spain and even Trump in the US are testament to this statement. The tension often results from historical factors. For example, in Europe, there is a persistence of the 'old Europe' without globalisation. The rise of populism therefore comes as a response to Europe's desire to return to what it was in the past (Žižek 2006). In Venezuela, tension has been increasing since colonisation, which created a strong class divide that has persisted in Venezuelan society.

Scholars in this field often fail to reach a consensus on the concept of populism. It appears that the only agreed concept in the literature is populist's association with a vague idea of 'the people' (Ionescu & Gellner 1969). However, the term 'the people' is itself dynamic and its concept depends on who uses it and in what context (Canovan 1999). Still, most scholars would agree that populism worships the people (Ionescu & Gellner 1969). The other pattern that is recurrent in the literature is that populist leaders and parties position themselves against political elites. Populist parties represent the alternative, the 'anti-group' to which 'the people' belong (Deiwiks 2009, p.1). This is illustrated through Chávez's tone each time he refers to the establishment.

He tends to demonise his enemies by making statements such as: “Señora canciller se puede ir a... Y no voy a decir más porque es una mujer. Ella es de la derecha alemana, la misma que apoyó a Hitler y la misma que apoyó al fascismo”; translated into English as “Lady Chancellor you can go to... I am not going to say anything else because she is a woman. She is from the right of Germany, the same one that supported Hitler and the same one that supported fascism” (Chávez 2008). In this sentence, Chávez refers to Angela Merkel, who, for him, represented one of his enemies from the neoliberal imperialistic world. By drawing a distinction between himself and the capitalists, he clearly maps those who belong to his anti-group and those who belong to ‘the people’. His attack on Merkel divides those who are from the right side of politics (like Merkel) and those who are with him on the left in both international and domestic politics.

A mechanism to understand populism is to categorise it using three main populist approaches: populism as an ideology, as a discourse and as a political strategy (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). The latter, populism as a political strategy, has attracted the attention of certain scholars who view populism as a tool with which to mobilise individuals and politically strategise. For these scholars, populism can be used as a strategy to mobilise the masses, policy choices and political organizations (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). One of these scholars is Madrid (2008), who has described how leaders from Latin America strategise through populist policies that aim to economically distribute goods and nationalise natural industries to assemble the masses (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). However, rather than a strategy itself, populism is “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and dominant ideas and values of the society” (Canovan 1999, p. 3). Populism therefore does not form part of the ‘structure’ of the elite group that holds power but it is of ‘the people’, as it seeks to challenge those who form part of the establishment (Canovan 1999). These “appeals to



the people” are communicated through populist rhetoric and expressions that represent the ‘the people’. Therefore, populism is a communicational approach and forms part of a broader political strategy, rather than being a strategy itself.

Populism is also seen as a type of a political organization (Taggart 1995). This understanding of populism usually emphasises the leader’s identity and their relationship to other political actors (Taggart 1995). Populist parties are believed to form part of organizational structures that are headed by a charismatic leader (Taggart 1995). The study of populism and the role of the leader have contributed significantly to the current understanding of populism (Laclau 2005; Bradley 1987).<sup>3</sup> Charismatic populist leaders construct ‘the people’ and the idea of what ‘the people’ want for their nation (Laclau 2005). Populist leaders can be either fascist or communist yet still be charismatic (Laclau 2005). Charismatic leaderships often appear under the following conditions: 1) when the demands of the people have not been satisfied, 2) during the realisation of certain common symbols, or 3) during the emergence of a leader who reincarnates a process of political identification (Laclau 2005). Chávez rose as a leader and was considered charismatic because his speeches resonated with certain sections of the Venezuelan society who felt ignored. Chávez’s charisma was a reflection of the people who saw in him someone that looked, behaved and expressed himself just like them. Chávez’s polarising speeches resonated with a rage that lay underneath the surface in Venezuelan society. This is perhaps what makes certain populist leaders more

---

<sup>3</sup> It is important to note that not all populist groups have a charismatic leader (Barr 2009; Burack & Snyder Hall 2012), however, studies made in this regard have further contributed to how certain populist movements are understood.

appealing in certain societies than in others, depending upon the time during which they rise. The context in which Chávez came to power in 1999 provided the perfect conditions for his success: there existed a tired sector of Venezuelan society who felt disenchanted with the elites and the ruling establishment.

Mudde (2004) was the first to define populism as an ideology. He described it as a thin-centred ideology and its politics express the general will of the people. This ideology focuses on two homogenous and antagonistic groups, which he describes as “the pure people” versus the “corrupt elite”. The term ‘ideology’ is also understood as a “bundle of loosely interrelated ideas” (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013, p. 6). Thin-centre ideologies are those that do not necessarily provide all the answers to central political questions. They can go hand-in-hand with other ideologies such as liberalism and socialism (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). Therefore, populism can form part of a broader ideology and political spectrum, such as right- or left-wing populism (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). The ideological thinness of populism illustrates how the term behaves like a parasite and ‘sticks’ to a variety of ideologies including socialism (such as Chávez) or right-wing ideologies based on economic liberalism (such as Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom or Marine Le Pen in France).

Populism has primarily been defined as an ideology in academic works that deal with right-wing populist political parties (Hawkins 2010; Mudde 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; Pankowski 2010; Pauwles 2011; Rooduijn, De Lange, & Van Der Brug 2014; Stanley 2008). Defining populism as an ideology allows for the dominant unit of analysis to be the political actors (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). In the current study, the primary unit of analysis is not the actors themselves but the populist rhetoric and the use of emotional appeals to further the politician’s own popularity at the polls. Rather than studying the populist leaders, this study focuses on the study of the communicational

tools that lay beneath their populist speeches. This is one of the main reasons why the present study does not consider populism as an ideology but rather as a communicational style. Moreover, populism always exists beside an already defined ideology. For example, in the case of Hugo Chávez, populism is a communicational style found within a socialist ideology and for Marine Le Pen (leader of the National Front in France), populism is also a form of communication, which forms part of a nationalist/extreme conservative ideology.

Populism has also been defined as a discursive style, specifically a “rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between ‘the people’ and the oligarch” (De la Torre 2010, p. 4).<sup>4</sup> Populism should therefore be analysed from a discourse perspective because the historic revision of the term is not sufficient to define populism as a political regime or a strategy of power (Charadeau 2009). Populism, as a form of discourse, is defined by Hawkins (2010, p 5) as:

A set of fundamental beliefs about the nature of the political world a worldview or, to use a more rarefied term, a ‘discourse’ that perceives history as a Manichean struggle between Good and Evil, one in which the side of the Good is ‘the will of the people’, or the natural, common interest of the citizens once they are allowed to form their own opinions, while the side of Evil is a conspiring elite that has subverted his will.

Others explain populism as a language that is used by the majority. These authors analyse texts, speeches and public discourses but do so usually through interpretative textual analysis (Kazin 1995). Extending on the works of populism as a discursive style, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) created a broader definition of populism as a communicational style. Populism is understood not only through the use of populist

---

<sup>4</sup> For this study populism will be understood as both a discourse and a communicational style.

words but also through the act of communicating more generally. The present study is not a linguistic approach of Chávez's discourse, rather it uses content analysis techniques to provide a broader understanding of his use of certain words to appeal to his audience. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) created a content analysis technique that analyses populist speech and this will be used to define "the people", "colloquialisms" and "appeals to the people" in the content analysis of this project.

Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) definition of populism is essential to this dissertation, as it explains populism as a communicational style. Specifically, populism is defined as a form of communication by political actors that make reference to 'the people' and is used to speak like 'the people' (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). Populism is, therefore, a communicative tool that politicians choose to adopt, which can materialise in different forms. Populist leaders can speak in a more colloquial form or dress informally. However, the key element of this form of communication is the content of the discourse (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). Indeed, populism is 'parasitic' on other ideologies rather than it being the ideology itself. Analysing populism as a communication 'style' also renders the term less vague (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). When populism is understood as a form of communication, the term can be applied to different ideologies and different leaders and contexts. For example, Trump and Chávez have different ideologies and yet they share the same style of populist communication. Populism is a form of communication that forms part of a broader political strategy to achieve success and popularity.

By understanding populism as a communicational style, the following questions can now be answered: What were Hugo Chávez's communicational strategies? When did he decide to appeal to certain emotions in his audience? At whom were these strategies aimed? Did Chávez choose to 'attack' his opponents when he was lagging behind in the opinion polls? Did Chávez's discursive tone change when he was losing popularity? How

did he use populist discourse, as described by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), to appeal to his audience?

Populist communication emphasises the power of ‘the people’ and seeks to give power to them. Populist leaders “frequently use words such as (the) people, (the) public, (the) citizen(s), (the) voter(s), (the) taxpayer(s), (the) resident(s), (the) consumer(s) and the population” (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 323). These leaders speak and communicate like the common citizen to show that they represent and listen to ‘the people’ (2007, p. 323). For this study, Chávez’s reference to “el pueblo” (‘the people’) in *Aló Presidente* are particularly important as it reflects an attempt to make his followers feel that they are being talked to directly by Chávez. Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) insight on populist discourse strategies will be applied to Chávez’s speech in *Aló Presidente* to measure the degree of populism in his speech.

The present rise of populism worldwide highlights the urgent need to understand populism as a communicational style (Aalberg et al. 2016). Indeed, the study of populism as a way of communication might explain the current popularity of populism (Aalberg et al. 2016). The strength of this approach derives from its ability to be applied to a number of political parties and leaders who have adopted a similar style of communication. This approach to populism also removes the challenge of defining such a thin concept. Defining populism as a communication style means that populism can appear anywhere in the world and in any ideology. If populism is only understood as an ideology, like Mudde (2004) argues, then it is limited to a certain region of the world and, in turn, this limits our knowledge about populism.

To summarise, populism can be understood in several ways, including as a strategy, an ideology, a political organisation and as a communicational style. Those who understand the term as a strategy believe that populism is able to mobilise the masses through

policy choices and political organisations (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013). However, populist strategy is not a clear definition because populism forms part of a broader political strategy, rather than being the strategy itself. Second, populism as an ideology is composed of two groups: homogenous and antagonist (the pure people versus the corrupt elite). However, even though populism does have a clear pattern of having an “us” versus “them”, it is not an ideology itself as populism usually accompanies another ideology (e.g: socialism, communism, or fascism). Third and last, populism as a communicational style is the most comprehensive approach to populism for this dissertation. The definition of populism as a communication style provided by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) encompasses several characteristics of the other definitions. For example, populism seeks to divide and constantly makes reference to ‘the people’ (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). Understanding populism as a communication style may provide a broader perspective on how and why populists use this form of communication and also allows for a definition that can be used across ideologies, strategies and leaders from different parts of the world.

By investigating the communication style of Chávez, including his choice of positive or negative discourse in response to changes in his popularity, this study will provide important insight into how populist leaders choose to communicate with their followers. The definition of populism as a communicational and rhetorical style will assist in understanding how the elites use emotional appeals to connect with other elites. The next section will introduce emotional appeals and their use as a tool to spread populist rhetoric.

## **1.2 Theories about Emotional Appeals**

Emotional appeals can be used as a tool by populist leaders to spread populist rhetoric. Around 20 years ago, there was little emphasis on the role of emotions and politics in

the literature because emotions were typically associated with “romantic and utopian conceptions” rather than political science (Demertzis 2013, p.1). However, today, political sociologists and psychologists are attempting to apply emotion to the world of politics. Examples range from studies in acts of revenge made by states (Cox & Wood 2016), how highly emotional events shape public sentiment (Ross 2013), the contribution of emotion to democratic politics (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000) and connections between affect and cognition and their effect on politics (Redlawsk 2006). In addition, other research has investigated how feelings towards political actors shape the way citizens process information on policy issues (Capelos 2010) as well as the existence of rage and shame in conflictive regions (Scheff 2011). The work of Demertzis (2013) is also highly influential, as it addresses the political-emotional nexus at both the individual and mass level by addressing issues such as the Arab Spring and the Greek crisis.

Two types of theoretical approaches and perspectives exist for the relationship between emotion and politics (Demertzis 2013). One is the political emotions perspective, from the school of political sociology, which focuses on historical, cultural and psychoanalytical concepts (Demertzis 2013). The second is founded in political psychology<sup>5</sup> and understands emotional appeals as attempts “to stir the feelings of the audience while delivering a political message” (Brader 2006, p. 4). This is a key concept

---

<sup>5</sup> This dissertation draws its theoretical framework from both approaches, as they are not mutually exclusive.

for the current study as it seeks to understand how Chávez manipulated the feelings of his audience via his speeches.<sup>6</sup>

George Marcus, one of the most influential writers on political psychology and emotion, attempted to integrate neuroscience into the study of political science (Demertzis 2013). George Marcus's theory of affective intelligence is explained by Nai (2013, p. 48) who states:

individuals react to information stimuli through the activation of different emotions, which can be classified as 'positive' (pride, hope, enthusiasm and amusement) or 'negative', either 'anxiety' (anxious, afraid and worried) or 'aversion' (anger and rage).

These emotions "subsequently shape the behaviour of those who experience them" (Nai 2013, p. 48). Voters' emotions, whether they are enthusiastic or indifferent, could therefore change the outcome of a campaign (Marcus, Neumann & Mackuen 2000). This finding clearly demonstrates that voters behave differently depending on their emotional state. Leaders may therefore attempt to tap, and elicit through their speech, certain emotions to influence voter behaviour.

---

<sup>6</sup> Differences between emotions and affect have been widely discussed within the political psychology literature. For the purpose of this study, emotions are defined as "specific sets of physiological and mental dispositions triggered by the brain in response to the perceived significance of a situation or object for an individual's goal" (Jamtøy 2012, p. 4), while affect "is an umbrella term referring to an entire class of phenomena that is often taken to include emotions, feelings and moods, but also pain, pleasure and basic human drives" (Jamtøy 2012, p. 4). (See Jamtøy (2012) for more information on the difference between the terms (including feelings and moods):<http://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-research-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/conferences/2012/papers-2012/jamtoey.-wshop1pdf.pdf>)



Affective intelligence theory has also been used to scientifically analyse the effect of emotional appeals on political advertising and its influence on voter behaviour. Indeed, the use of images and music can evoke certain emotions in voters (Brader 2006). Brader's (2006) study differs from that of Marcus, Neumann and Mackuen (2000) in that he examines the influence of politicians in creating campaigns that manipulate voters' emotions and possibly even change their political behaviour. Politicians can therefore achieve their goals by appealing to the emotion of the public through political campaign advertising (Brader 2006). In this sense, Brader's (2006) approach can be used to explore how politicians influence the public or, in this case, how Chávez tried to influence his followers through the use of emotional appeals in his discourse.

There are two fundamental systems in the decision-making and behavioural process. When activated, one of the systems creates a response of joy or enthusiasm (Brader 2006). The other system is activated when a threat is perceived, which in turn creates a response of fear or anxiety (Brader 2006). Therefore, the brain has two main emotional responses to its environment: if it deems its environment as positive then it experiences enthusiasm or joy (or any other positive emotion such as hope or elation) and if it perceives any threat, then the brain experiences fear or anxiety. The negative emotions of fear and anxiety cause individuals to be more attentive to their environment and promote breaking from one's habits to search alternative courses of action in response to the perceived threat (Brader 2006). Studies on negative emotions of aversion (such as anger or rage) also demonstrate that these emotions can motivate people to be involved in politics (Drutman 2011). Appealing to anger can cause voters to seek further political information (Valentino et al. 2011; Nabi 2002). These appeals may therefore be used as a way to mobilise people and as an 'emotional appeal' for the benefit of the politician (Valentino et al. 2009). Therefore, if Chávez used certain words to trigger anger within

his followers, his ultimate goal could have been to mobilise them to vote against the enemy (the opposition).

The prospect of losing voters has been shown to trigger reactions in political actors (Walter, Van der Brug, & van Praag 2014). Therefore, politicians tend to run negative campaigns and attack their opponents as a strategy to diminish their adversaries appeal to voters (Nai & Martinez i Coma 2016). This shows that opinion polls may be triggers for politicians to respond in a certain manner. This dissertation will determine whether Chávez used aggressive discourse when he was lagging behind in the opinion polls in order to mobilise his voters against the Venezuelan opposition.

Emotion in political science and international relations has also been studied from a number of different perspectives (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008). However, there are methodological limitations in both the quantitative and qualitative study of emotions in politics. For example, some studies have measured emotion via physiological conditions, such as an increase of blood pressure, heart rate or sweat, when fear is apparent (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008). However, this offers a limited perspective on understanding the involvement of emotions in politics. Specifically, the physiological reactions of an individual may not explain how these feelings are collectively spread across a multitude of people. Indeed, “emotions are inherently internal we can only know them through practices of representation, through narratives, gestures or other ways of communicating feelings and beliefs” (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008, p. 129). This means that we can understand how an emotional appeal is spread to others by studying discourse.

Chávez used certain words in his discourse to appeal to the mass audience who, together, collectivised their emotions. Collective emotions can be defined as “manifestations of widely shared feelings, as group interests and aims are pursued” (Sullivan 2015, p. 383). As a result of identifying with a group of people with similar

interests, individuals come to share similar emotions (Ray, Mackie & Smith 2014). That is, individuals who feel part of a group will behave, think, act and feel as a group (Tuomela 2013). Theories on collective emotions explain how individuals, who form part of a group, experience either positive or negative feelings collectively even when they are not physically together. That is, once each individual goes home, the collective emotion remains within each one of them. The emotions elicited in Chávez's speeches created a sense of collective emotion and made Chávez a "Saint" figure among his followers (Krauze 2009, p. 81). Even after his death the slogan "Chávez vive" ("Chávez lives") reminds Venezuelans that Chávez's cult is still alive (Schipani & Mander 2013). This cult, created by the former President, is illustrated by several shrines that were built after his death in 2013 that show his face next to the religious figures of Jesus and the Virgin Mary (Schipani & Mander 2013). The devotion of Chávez was no doubt increased by the collective emotion expressed in his devotees.

There are three perspectives on how emotions become collectivised (Von Scheve & Ismer 2013). The first argues that emotions are spread through physical proximity (through face-to-face interactions between individuals), for example, during protests or riots (Von Scheve & Ismer 2013). The second understands emotional contagion through culture and shared knowledge, which allows individuals to collectively feel similar emotions to relevant events (Von Scheve & Ismer 2013). The third argues that collective emotion occurs when a group of people respond with the same emotion to a particular event (Von Scheve & Ismer 2013). For collective emotions to exist, all participants must share the same concerns or goals (Von Scheve & Ismer 2013). Psychological studies have demonstrated that both negative and positive emotions can be spread between individuals (Barsade 2014). The existence of collective emotions indicates that emotional appeals by politicians can be very effective. When a leader's intention is to

evoke certain emotions in their audience, these emotions do not simply stay in each individual but also “spread” and create a contagion that allows for a group of individuals to feel connected and part of the same homogenous group. For instance, Chávez created the perception of the “us” and the “I” group versus the “other” by collectivising emotion, which caused supporters to feel a connection that is at first emotional but then it becomes ideological.

In summary, the study of emotions in politics is becoming more popular among scholars of both political psychology and sociology. The brain reacts differently when it experiences positive versus threatening or negative events. In the former, the brain reacts with positive emotions of hope, elation or joy while in the latter, it reacts with negative emotions such as anxiety or fear (Brader 2006). These emotions can influence voter behaviour. For example, anger triggers mobilisation in voters (Drutman 2011). Previous studies have shown that the prospect of losing voters can trigger reactions in political actors (Walter, Van der Brug, & van Praag 2014). Therefore, opinion polls may be triggers for politicians to respond in a certain manner. Here, Chávez’s emotional appeals will be analysed in response to reductions in his popularity in the polls. Chávez appealed to certain emotions in his audience and then the masses collectivised these emotions to create a shared feeling among them (Sullivan 2015). As a result, Chávez built a national identity and ‘Chavistas’ were born who shared a similar passion for the Bolivarian revolution. Chávez’s followers connected not just ideologically but also emotionally. This explains their strong and passionate relationship to Chávez; indeed, he became almost Saint-like (Cawthorne 2013). Did Chávez use anger appeal as a way to mobilise his voters? This question will be addressed in the present study. The next section of this dissertation will explain the methodology of the project.

### 1.3 Methodology

The methodology for this thesis relied on a mixed method analysis based on a comprehensive database provided by Datanalysis and transcripts from the *Aló Presidente* episodes aired on television between 2000 and 2009. This method aims to determine how Chávez used different appeals to influence his voters and followers. Through a regression model, this study identified whether Chávez changed his rhetoric to a more aggressive tone, via eliciting emotions such as anger, when he was declining in the polls and also whether he became more populist in his speeches. The independent variable is the aggregate percentage of 54 polls conducted by Datanalysis. The dependent variable is a content analysis of *Aló Presidente* and the sentence is the primary unit of analysis. The analysis occurred in the following stages:

1. Compiling the data from the opinion polls. Datanalysis, an established opinion poll company in Caracas, Venezuela, provided the data for this study.
2. Gathering the *Aló Presidente* broadcasts for the years 2000–2009. These broadcasts were available online through the organisation, “[TodoChavez.gob.ve](http://TodoChavez.gob.ve)”
3. Analysing 1000 words randomly selected from the speech that followed each survey. The surveys were released on the last Friday of every month.
4. Analysing the speeches following the instructions of a Coding Guide. The Coding Guide explained when a sentence attempted to elicit certain emotions in the audience such as fear, anger, anxiety, rage, enthusiasm, pride, amusement and sympathy. The Coding Guide also included Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) definition of populism to code Chávez’s mention of ‘the people’ or every time the President made a populist remark.
5. Finally, examining the associations between the polls and Chávez’s speeches using regression analysis.

The coding of the speeches was based on Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) content analysis on the speeches of the populist parties in Belgium and Hawkins' (2009) study about populism and Chávez's speeches. Hawkins (2009) illustrated the degree of populism found in Chávez's speeches compared to other leaders in the world. His coding was based on 'holistic grading' where the unit of measurement was the whole text. The coding for this dissertation differs from that of Hawkins (2009) in that the measurements were the words in the text. The content analysis was classical rather than computer-based, and adopted coding guidelines based on Rooduijn and Pauwels's (2011) work on content analysis and populism.

Certain emotions were coded specifically to a target audience. For example, fear appeals were coded as "every time he mentions the word "expropriate" to the Venezuelan opposition or private industries". This means that fear appeals were aimed at the opposition. By contrast, anxiety or anger appeals were guided towards his own followers to create a different response.<sup>7</sup> It is also important to note that polls are not the only factors likely to have influenced or affected Chávez's speeches. The model presented in this study controlled for several alternatives that might explain why Chávez chose to speak with specific words to appeal to certain feelings at given times. Specifically, this study controlled for three additional variables: homicide, inflation and unemployment rates. Election dates were also included as these could also potentially influence Chávez's discourse. The inclusion of these control variables improves the internal validity of the study and ensures that the main relationship between popularity and anger was not spurious. The next section provides an overview of the history of

---

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation on how each emotion was coded for this study.

Venezuela to better understand why Chávez's discourse was so appealing to Venezuelans in his 1998 election campaign. Before analysing the data, this dissertation will give an overview of Venezuela's history and review the literature.

## **Chapter 2: Studies on Chávez's use of discourse**

Before expanding on the literature review for this dissertation, it is important to mention that Chávez's discourse did not occur in a vacuum. The success of Chávez's discursive speech cannot be explained without understanding Venezuela's socio-economic situation before 1998 (the year when Hugo Chávez was elected president). The election of Hugo Chávez was the product of the two-party system born from the 'Punto Fijo' pact in 1958 (Jorquera 2003) following the fall of the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez in the same year (McCoy 2000). The Punto Fijo pact was an arrangement made by the three main political parties, Acción Democrática (AD), Social Christian Party (COPEI) and Unión Republicana Democrática, to preserve democracy (McCoy 2000). The pact signified a peace agreement between Venezuelan political parties to respect the election results (McCoy 2000). The agreement achieved democratic stability in Venezuela for over 40 years but it also resulted in the hegemonic dominance of the two main political parties in Venezuela, AD and COPEI (Jorquera 2003).

Before the 1998 election, many Venezuelans were disappointed with AD and COPEI. The political parties were seen as corrupt and they maintained centralised power. Their policies were also foreign to the needs of certain sections of the country (McCoy & Myers 2004). By 1989, the liberal economic policies of the then President Carlos Andres Pérez relied on cutting back government spending and opening up markets to be competitive in the neoliberal world (Branford 2016). Through these policies thousands lost their jobs and by February 1989 Venezuelans protested in one of the worst riots in Venezuela's history where 300 people died (Branford 2016). Chávez's first appearance on the political scene was 6 years before the presidential elections of 1998. In 1992, Chávez was an army lieutenant colonel who conducted two failed coup attempts against the government (McCoy 2000) resulting in his imprisonment until President Caldera



released him in 1994 (Diario La Republica 2013). President Caldera denied the 1992 coup was a criminal act thereby absolving the militarists involved and releasing Chávez and others involved in the coup from jail (Cannon 2004). This allowed Chávez to have a certain democratic credibility during the subsequent 1998 elections (Philip & Murillo 2004). After the coup, Chávez organized political movements within the country that later helped him to obtain his candidacy in 1998 (Philip & Murillo 2004). During Calderas' term in the mid 90s Venezuela saw a 70% annual inflation rate (Quirk and Evans 1995). The years between 1984 and 1995, before Chávez rose to power, saw the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty rise from 36% to 66% (McCaughan 2011). By 1998, Chávez belonged to a new political party that he created called the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). The movement was meant to signify a new constitutional period that departed from the Punto Fijo pact (McCoy 2000). Chávez ran a political campaign based on change and he sought to depart from the two main political parties who were associated with corruption (McCoy 2000). His election represented a clear dismantling of the traditional political parties in Venezuela (Drake & Hershberg 2006). Studies conducted in 1996, by the think tank "Pensamiento y Acción" (Keller 1996), showed that by then, Venezuela's least trusted institutions were the political parties, parliaments, trade unions, the police and the judiciary (Block 2015). This clearly indicates the country's disappointment in the political institutions, which paved the way for Hugo Chávez to arrive to power.

This short historical background illustrates why Chávez's discourse resonated with certain sections of Venezuela's people. Chávez's populist discourse resonated among Venezuelans in 1998 more than it would have ever before, as many were tired of the two-party system that arose from the Punto Fijo pact and with the elites that were ruling the country at the time. Chávez was able to elucidate the problems that

Venezuelan society was facing then and explode issues of race and class in the political sphere, which made his populist rhetoric appealing to many. Nowadays, we also see that populist styles of communication resonate in other parts of the world, such as in the US. Donald Trump highlighted the problems that the US was facing before his election in 2016. While Donald Trump and Hugo Chávez had ideological differences, their populist style of communication resonated among their constituencies at a particular time when people felt fed up with the establishment. In both instances, Trump and Chávez's populist discourses appear as a consequence of the socio-political and economic situation of their countries.

The literature on Hugo Chávez is abundant and continues to expand even 4 years after his death. These studies are diverse. For example, some have analysed Chávez's use of Simon Bolívar (the Liberator of many Latin American countries against the Spanish Colonialists) as a figure to legitimise his actions and policies as President (Chumaceiro Arreaza 2003). Others have described Chávez's use of historical anecdotes that emphasise class differences. Chávez attacked the privileged 'bourgeois' class (the Spanish colonisers) and favoured the less privileged 'el pueblo' (the colonised and oppressed indigenous communities), which further divided his followers and opponents (Cannon 2008; Peña Angulo 2012; Romero 2005). Finally, others have examined how Chávez used discourse as a strategy to manipulate and promote fear in order to justify voting for him as president (Bolívar 2013). The present study will expand on the existing literature by studying *Aló Presidente* and Chávez's use of emotional affects.

## **2.1 Chávez and the use of Simon Bolívar in his discourse**

Chávez used Simon Bolívar (the Liberator of many Latin American countries against the Spanish Colonialists) as a strategy to polarise Venezuelan society: those who were with the government of Chávez and the opposition (Chumaceiro Arreaza, 2003). The figure of

Simon Bolívar in Chávez's speeches served two main purposes. First, it legitimised Chávez's actions and policies as President and, second, Chávez used it as a strategy to draw together his followers to support his "Bolivarian revolution" (Chumaceiro Arreaza 2003, p. 22). Chávez used Bolívar and historical narratives to create an identity within Venezuelans (García Montesdeoca 2015). This identity was based on the belief that everyday Venezuelans could become like Simon Bolívar and fight against the oppression; for Chávez, this meant the oligarchy and the opposition.

From 1998 Chávez used Simon Bolívar as the central figure in his political campaign speeches to appeal to the audiences' shared perception of 'togetherness' and 'Venezuelaness' by evoking 'primordial national' instincts in his followers (Sanoja 2009). Chávez was not the only president in Venezuela to have done so as other leaders such as Antonio Guzmán Blanco, Cipriano Castro, Juan Vicente Gómez, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Carlos Andrés Pérez also used Bolívar in their discourses (Eastwood 2006). Chávez used Simon Bolívar's work and life anecdotes that he regarded as suitable to discuss with his audience in both his television show and political campaign rallies (Sanoja 2009). For example, he deconstructed Simon Bolívar's letters as part of his public addresses (Sanoja 2009) to illustrate the moral of the story; much like a priest using his bible to give a sermon in church. Simon Bolívar's ideas about Venezuela as a nation came from the European Enlightenment, which argued that a centralised unitary system should be followed (Rivero 1988). His thoughts on equality and freedom were based on social contract theory (Carrera Damas 1993), which were key to the Bolivarian discourse.

## **2.2 Using discourse as a strategy**

Hugo Chávez adopted several techniques to persuade Venezuelans through his speeches, which was one of his key political strategies (Molero 2001). One of the ways he

persuaded Venezuelans was through the creation of his own political party, “The United Socialist Party of Venezuela” (PSUV) (Cortés, Materán & Méndez 2008). He constantly used discursive techniques to legitimise the creation of his political party and to attract voters (Cortés, Materán & Méndez 2008). Not only did his discourse serve to legitimise the creation of the PSUV but his speeches also served as a persuasive tool to validate his actions and policies (Cortés, Materán & Méndez 2008). An example of this was the creation of the Bolivarian Social Missions, which were a series of social programs designed to help the poor (Block 2015). The Bolivarian Social Missions included free medical and educational institutions, as well as other social programs for the benefit of the lower class of Venezuelan society (Block 2015; Penfold-Becerra 2005). The Bolivarian Social Missions were used in his discourse as a way for Chávez to further his power and construct Venezuelan identity (Block 2015).

Lula Da Silva (Brazil’s president from 2003-2010) and Chávez used their discourse in a similar manner. They both offered themselves as the leaders for change and improvement in their respective countries (Molero & Bolívar 2007). The Latin American Presidents’ most common persuasive tools included “polyphony, solidarity, victimisation and coercion” (Molero & Bolívar 2007, cited in Moreno 2008, p. 19). Both Presidents also presented the economic crisis as a direct consequence of bad management from previous political parties and both portrayed their oppositions as the enemy and depersonalised the “other” (the opposition) (Molero & Bolívar 2007). Chávez and Da Silva constructed a discourse based on the creation of the “I” versus “The Other” (Molero & Bolívar 2007). For Chávez specifically, this strategy allowed him to further polarise Venezuelan society and create tensions among Venezuelans.

Other strategies used by President Chávez in the international arena can be seen in analyses conducted on the 2007 Ibero American Summit (Bolívar 2007). During the

event, King Juan Carlos I of Spain said to President Chávez “why don’t you shut up” (Bolívar 2007). The King was responding to President Chávez’s constant interruptions during the speech of the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The phrase “Porque no te callas?” (“why don’t you shut up”) became a news sensation. The phrase and the dialogue that occurred between the world leaders in the summit evoked memories of the Spanish domination over Latin America (Bolívar 2007). By creating a struggle, Chávez finally achieved what he intended; he “demonstrated” in his own way that the King of Spain still assumed to have some kind of authority over Latin American leaders, even if just discursively.

Chávez also implemented other discursive strategies in the domestic arena. During his political campaign in 2012, against the opposition leader Henrique Capriles, there were constant attacks from both political leaders (Bolívar 2013). Opposition leader Capriles became part of Chávez’s discursive game by counter-attacking Chávez during the election campaign. Analyses made by Venezuelan scholars reveal that Chávez used his discourse as a manipulative tool that aimed to promote fear in order to justify voting for him as president (Bolívar 2013).

### **2.3 Chávez’s reliance on history in his discourse**

History was a main component of Chávez’s discourse (Cannon 2008) and it is impossible to understand a country’s history and its political development if the discourse of the political actors is ignored (Peña Angulo 2012). Chávez drew on the Venezuelan historical divide of class and race to further polarise society. His discourse and policies were highlighted by class differences through constant attacks on the privileged bourgeois class and favouring of the less privileged ‘el pueblo’ (‘the people’) (Cannon 2008). Chávez’s discourse reflected the underlying problems in Venezuela yet his construction of class and race further divided and polarised Venezuelan society.

Historical memory is extremely important in shaping political discourse. History becomes a discursive tool used by leaders to further their political game as it helps them to construct the country's present reality. This means that political actors like Chávez construct and even manipulate historical events and narratives in order to advance their own political interests.

Chávez reorganised the Venezuelan political process by restructuring the historical political discourse in the country (Romero 2001). By 1998, Venezuelans were losing hope in the political process and, at the time, candidate Chávez brought a new style of communication that the Venezuelan people understood and appreciated. Chávez was therefore able to rupture and restructure political discourse in the country (Romero 2001). This rupture of the elite power politics that existed before Chávez and the emergence of a new form of power driven by his rhetoric are clearly visible and mark a new time in Venezuelan political history (Romero 2001).

Chávez attempted two different historical discursive strategies (Romero 2005). First, he took advantage of the feelings of rejection expressed by the common Venezuelan folk against traditional forms of political expression and he used this to create new emotional domains (Romero 2005). Second, he claimed that issues arising from Venezuelan independence remained unresolved (Romero 2005). The struggles that emerged from the colonisation and independence periods were used in Chávez's discourse to divide his followers and he used this rhetoric as a strategy to maintain his hegemony and further his Bolivarian revolution among his followers (Romero 2005).

#### **2.4 The use of metaphors and religion**

President Chávez continuously promoted his Bolivarian revolutionary politics "anchored in charismatic and messianic frames" that contributed to the rhetoric on the salvation from oppression in Latin America (Zúquete 2008, p. 115). Through political

religious frames, Chávez continued to support the Bolivarian revolution to emancipate and create the “new” Venezuela (Zúquete 2008).

The socialist revolution of Hugo Chávez was different to his fellow revolutionaries, such as Marx, Stalin, and Castro, in that he strongly believed in Christianity. Following his re-election in December 2006, President Chávez stated “The Kingdom of Christ is the kingdom of love, of peace; the kingdom of justice, of solidarity, brotherhood, the kingdom of socialism. This is the kingdom of the future of Venezuela” (Chávez, cited in Smilde 2007). This quote demonstrates how Chávez used religion in his language as part of a discourse focused on identity, nationalism and culture (Smilde 2007). Throughout his political campaigns and government, Chávez frequently used religious imagery and nationalist slogans inspired by Simon Bolívar and other historical figures in Venezuela’s independence from the Spanish colony (Smilde 2007). The religious and nationalistic frames used in Chávez’s discourse struck a chord among Venezuelans who needed a saviour and felt ignored by previous governments (Smilde 2007).

President Chávez not only made religion a part of his discourse but he also created a number of policies that diminished Catholicism and increased evangelical power in Venezuelan society (Smilde 2007). For example, in 1999, he put into action a law that permitted evangelicals to teach religious education in public schools, a role that in Venezuela was mostly performed by the Catholic Church (Smilde 2007). Chávez’s use of religion in both policies and discourse connected to a part of Venezuelan society that valued words and images from a mix of Christian, afro-Venezuelan and indigenous beliefs and traditions (Smilde 2007).

Metaphors also featured highly in Chávez’s speech as they allowed him to present the opposition as “the enemies of the nation” (Moreno 2008, p. iv). Chávez created the representation of the opposition as the enemy of Venezuela “by making explicit

references in his discourse about the revolution as the continuation of Simon Bolívar's wars of independence" (Moreno 2008, p. iv). That is, Chávez used Simon Bolívar and the war of independence as a metaphor for his revolution's struggle against the elite. Chávez constructed a highly polarised discourse through the use of three main metaphors: 1) the nation was a metaphor for a person who was "reborn" thanks to the Bolivarian government, 2) the revolution, which was a metaphor for war, and 3) the opposition depicted as war combatants or criminals (Moreno 2008). Simon Bolívar forms part of the collective imagination of Venezuelan society and President Chávez used his revolution as a continuation of Simon Bolívar's emancipation for Venezuela's freedom (Moreno 2008). Indeed, President Chávez tapped into nationalistic Venezuelan values, which strongly resonated with his followers. The next section will further explore the literature on Chávez and nationalism.

## **2.5 Chávez and nationalism**

Nationalism is both an integrated and a divisionary ideology. Chávez was able to socially construct an "imagined community" (Anderson 2006) based on nationalism. An imagined community permits political leaders to specify who forms part of the unified group and who does not belong to that national identity. Indeed, Chávez classified the 'in' and 'out' groups even among Venezuelans themselves. Nationalism was another tool used by Chávez to build an identity among Venezuelans and to identify Venezuelan national interests. Chávez divided Venezuelan society and appealed to emotions of anger by attacking the "out" group and by encouraging the 'in' group to do so as well. Therefore, by attacking his opponents, Chávez was in turn becoming stronger.

Nationalism and populism go hand in hand. Populism can rise over nationalist nostalgia at times, for example, the wish in European countries to return to the 'old Europe' (Žižek 2006) rather than a Europe with immigration that threatens their culture. In Venezuela,



Chávez focused on the poor and the ethnic minorities such as ‘mestizos’ or ‘pardos’ (De La Torre 2007). Through his nationalistic-populist discourse, Chávez mobilised the marginalised sectors of society and divided those who belonged with ‘the people’ and those who were part of the ‘demonic’ elite that previously ruled Venezuela (De La Torre 2007). Nationalism was used in populist discourse as a way of unifying and giving “el pueblo” one voice (De la Torre 2007).

Populist leaders tend to rhetorically link the past with the present. The formation of present day Venezuela took place between the 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries when a generation saw the end of the Spanish imperialism (Eastwood 2006). Chávez constantly reminded Venezuelans of Spanish colonisation and of the struggles of Venezuelan emancipator Simon Bolívar and others who led the independence of Venezuela. Chávez framed his discourse around struggle, independence and national autonomy. All sections of this literature (religion, metaphors, *Aló Presidente*, Simon Bolívar, affective emotions and discursive strategies) share nationalism as a key factor. Anxieties towards the American empire have fuelled Venezuelan nationalism (Wright 2013). Chávez was not the only leader in Venezuela to have a discourse against the United States. Cipriano Castro the 38<sup>th</sup> president of Venezuela (1899-1908) was openly against the hegemonic powers of the US, Britain, Germany and other European powers (Wright 2013). In 1906, former President Cipriano Castro made anti-USA propaganda a key feature of his nationalistic appeal to his followers (Wright 2013).

Venezuelan nationalism is “collectivistic”, that is, the nation imagines itself as “a unity or a body that exists above its individual members” (Eastwood 2006, p. 154). For this reason, Venezuela remains predisposed to authoritarianism (Eastwood 2006). Venezuelan collectivistic nationalism provides a more hospitable environment for charismatic leaders compared to other types of nationalism (such as nationalism that is

embedded with more right-wing liberal ideologies). This is evident throughout history when leaders such as Carlos Andrés Pérez and, more recently, Hugo Chávez are considered (Eastwood 2006). Nationalism in Venezuela emerged from the idea that all Venezuelans could be equal; an idea that continues to appeal today. Simon Bolívar was himself a nationalist and his discourse was based on two key principles of nationalism: equality and sovereignty (Eastwood 2006). Bolívar's principles have served as inspiration for several presidents of Venezuela including Antonio Guzmán Blanco, Cipriano Castro, Juan Vicente Gómez, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Carlos Andrés Pérez (Eastwood 2006).

## **2.6 Chávez and *Aló Presidente***

Analyses of *Aló Presidente* have identified different types of discourse that have produced two effects: cohesion between Chávez's followers and reinforcing the existing division of class that polarised the country (Bolívar 2013). Every Sunday during his television show, the President maintained a relationship of proximity with his listeners and supporters and further alienated and excluded those who opposed him (Erlich 2005a). Chávez shared his personal life with his audience in *Aló Presidente* to boost his public image and establish differences between his followers and those from the opposition (Caimi & Erlich 2005). By connecting with his audience and sharing personal anecdotes, Chávez's interpersonal relationship with his followers grew (Caimi & Erlich 2005). An extreme example of this was in his June 2009 speech, where he described suffering from diarrhoea and not being able to find a toilet during the recording of *Aló Presidente* (Chávez 2009).

*Aló Presidente* served to promote his power, to establish a direct participatory relationship with his audience and to further his Bolivarian revolution (Frajman 2014). It served as a communication strategy for the President, which sought to establish a

direct relationship with its viewers. *Aló Presidente* was “directed to Chávez’s followers, divided into specific target groups, in a hierarchical fashion in which he occupies the power position” (Frajman 2014). Therefore, *Aló Presidente* served as a tool to reassure his position of power in society and was the centrepiece of Chávez’s media strategy (Frajman 2014). The television show was a unique creation of Chávez and his Bolivarian revolution and allowed Chávez to improvise but it also provided a structure with time restrictions, which the President sometimes did not follow (Frajman 2014). Studies of the transcripts of the *Aló Presidente* show a constant battle between Chávez and the producers of the program, as the president liked to talk for hours (Frajman 2014). These tensions demonstrate that the Bolivarian revolution and ‘Chavismo’ were “the personal property of Hugo Chávez” (Frajman 2014, p. 525); Chávez, as a figure, was crucial to the spread of both ‘Chavismo’ and the Bolivarian revolution.

The television show played a fundamental role in “articulating the identity of a public that shared the values and ideas of Chávez’s hegemonic project” (Constantini 2014). *Aló Presidente* and the Bolivarian revolution go hand-in-hand and define each other (Constantini 2014). The co-relation between *Aló Presidente* and the Bolivarian revolution strengthened Hugo Chávez’s authoritarian tendencies and helped him secure his position as the sole authority and leader of the Bolivarian revolution (Constantini 2014). Through the creation of *Aló Presidente*, Chávez aimed to give a voice to those who did not have one. The television show created an illusion that he was listening to every day Venezuelan problems and that he was directly in charge of solving them. His followers therefore remained faithful and viewed him as the saviour to all of their problems. The direct dialogue that Chávez created between himself and his listeners was unprecedented and was crucial for the marginalised sectors of Venezuela.

## **2.7 Affect in Chávez's discourse**

The study of emotions has influenced the study of linguistics (Bolívar 2016). The use of affect or emotion in language is an effective strategy to persuade people and win an advantage over adversaries (Bolívar 2016). For example, scholars have analysed the construction of fear and its use in language in the 2006 political campaign for the presidential election in Mexico (Plantin & Gutiérrez Vidrio 2009).

Affect is a central category of Chávez's discourse (Bolívar 2016). It serves as a motive to change the social interaction between Chávez and his followers as well as against his opposition (Bolívar 2001; 2005; 2007; 2009a; 2009b). Indeed, Chávez used emotions to legitimise his own ideological views (democracy, revolution and socialism) and delegitimise his opponents' views (capitalism and neoliberalism) (Bolívar 2016). Emotion had a clear strategic function in Chávez's discourse (Bolívar 2016). For instance, Chávez speaks positively of the "I" and "us" but negatively when referring to the "they" and "other" (Bolívar 2016). The use of fear and the rhetoric of the 'us' versus 'them' has been associated in the literature with populist discourses (Canovan 1999).

Politicians use negative affects to emotionally destabilise the opponent. An example of this is the previously mentioned 2007 Ibero American Summit, where Chávez used the word "fascist" when referring to former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of Spain during Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero's speech. In this instance, Chávez not only used verbal negative emotional appeals but also physical appeals by interrupting in order to provoke and cause a reaction (Bolívar 2016). This caused the King of Spain to interrupt Aznar's speech to tell Chávez to shut up. Chávez also used fear as a strategy in his 2012 political campaign by referring to the opposition candidate as "the enemy" (Bolívar 2016).

The tone in Chávez's political campaign was aggressive and disruptive, which differed from previous electoral processes (Petkoff 2010). In 1998, his constant attacks on the established political parties AD and COPEI during the election campaign marked the beginning of the end for the Punto Fijo Pact. However, this aggressive tone was in tune with the anti-establishment feelings that the Venezuelan public was experiencing at the time (Petkoff 2010). The emotional and confrontational speeches in Chávez's 1998 campaign resonated the most with those who felt that there was no alternative to the two-party established system. Chávez's arrival to power was characterised by a discursive strategy, which used the "emotionalisation" of Venezuelan politics (Block 2015, p. 96). His strategy to win support in 1998 was based on cultural emotional appeals which in turn were based on Bolívar, anti-politics and Christianity (Block 2015). Once he was elected, Chávez expanded his emotional appeals against the Punto Fijo Pact, the establishment that was ruling Venezuela before he came to power (Block 2015). Throughout his presidency, he also continued to use Simon Bolívar as a way to emotionally connect with his constituents (Block 2015).

To summarise, authors have understood and studied Chávez and his discourse from a variety of approaches. Studies have revealed that since 1998 the leader of Venezuelan independence, Simon Bolívar, was central to Chávez's speeches (Sanoja 2009). Simon Bolívar also served as a strategy to polarise Venezuelan society: there were those who sided with the Chávez's government and those who did not (Chumaceiro Arreaza, 2003). Others have studied Chávez's discourse as a strategy itself by stating that it served as a persuasive tool to validate his actions as well as his policies (Cortes, Materán & Méndez 2008). He was also able to pursue the masses through constructing a discourse based on the "I" versus "The Other" (Molero & Bolívar 2007). Ultimately, the literature on the strategies of discourse illustrate how Chávez used his discourse as a manipulative tool

that aimed to promote fear in order to justify voting for him as president (Bolívar 2013). The literature also describes Chávez's constant reliance on Venezuelan history in his speeches. The President used the Venezuelan historical divide of class and race to further polarise society (Cannon 2008) as well as political religious frames to promote the Bolivarian revolution and emancipate the "new" Venezuela (Zúquete 2008) and metaphors to represent the opposition as "the enemies of the nation" (Moreno 2008, p. iv). The literature also focuses on his ability to frame his discourse in struggle, independence and national autonomy. Key works on *Aló Presidente* reveal that Chávez maintained a relationship of proximity with his listeners and supporters and further alienated and excluded those who were against him (Erich 2005b). The television show allowed him to promote his power by establishing a direct participatory relationship with his audience, which furthered his Bolivarian revolution (Frajman 2014).

Finally, Bolívar (2001; 2005; 2007; 2009a; 2009b; 2016) has been the major contributor to the literature presented in this dissertation. Her extensive work on Chávez and his discourse has also recently involved the influence of affective theories. Specifically, she has found that Chávez used emotions to legitimise his own ideological views (democracy, revolution and socialism) and delegitimise his opponents' views (capitalism and neoliberalism) (Bolívar 2016). Therefore, emotion had a strategic function in Chávez's discourse (Bolívar 2016). The utilisation of this strategy began during his 1998 political campaign, where he "emotionalised" Venezuelan politics with the use of Simon Bolívar, anti-political rhetoric and Christianity in his speech (Block 2015). Following this literature review, the next section will describe and discuss the results of the analysis conducted on Chávez's speeches in his weekly TV show *Aló Presidente*.

### **Chapter 3: Populist and negative emotional appeals in Chávez's discourse:**

#### **Analysis of the Data (2000-2009), Discussion and Conclusions**

The literature discussed in this dissertation presented six different approaches to the study of Chávez's discourse and communication style. Most of the literature on Chávez and his use of discourse have been studied through qualitative lenses. The aim of this dissertation was to expand on the existing literature and to examine the communication style of one of the most controversial presidents of Venezuela using a novel approach that included both quantitative and qualitative analyses of Chávez's discourse. Using this approach, the content of 54 episodes of Chávez's *Aló Presidente* speeches were analysed to determine variations in his speech, relative to his popularity ratings.

The premise of this dissertation is based on the idea that Chávez constantly verified his popularity to determine the performance of his regime. Therefore, as part of a dynamic strategy, Chávez may have manipulated his discourse depending on whether he was more or less popular. Constant campaigning was a strategy used by Chávez in order to maintain popularity. Indeed, during his 15 year rule Venezuela experienced a total of 14 elections. Previous studies have shown that polls can predict a candidate's use of negative discourse during political campaigns (Blackwell 2013). This dissertation used studies of negative campaigning and negative emotional appeals to determine if Chávez adopted a more negative strategy based on the popularity polls. One of his strategies was the use of anger appeals, which he used to attack his opponents in order to appeal to anger in his followers. Anger appeals often motivate people to be involved in politics (Drutman 2011). Therefore, this thesis examined if Chávez used certain words to trigger anger within his followers in order to mobilise them to vote against the enemy (the opposition), particularly when he was unpopular in the opinion polls.

### **3.1 Results**

The first stage was to gather Hugo Chávez's popularity polls to determine when his popularity was at its lowest and highest. As illustrated in Table 1, Chávez's approval ratings were at their lowest in September 2003 with 30.8% and their highest in February 2010 with 76.8%, which was the same popularity he enjoyed in his first months in office after being elected in February 2000. Overall, his popularity was maintained above 41% except during 2002 and 2003. This is consistent with the state of Venezuela during this period as, in April 2002, the military attempted a coup against President Chávez. I therefore hypothesise that during this time (2002-2003), Chávez used anger appeals more often to mobilise his audience and to strengthen his power.



**Table 1: Data from the polling company Datanalysis on Chávez's popularity**

<b>Date of Poll release</b>	<b>Number of people interviewed</b>	<b>Data Analysis Poll: Chávez's popularity (2000-2009) Are you happy with Chávez's performance in power? Yes/No</b>
25/2/00	1300	76.8
28/4/00	1300	61
26/1/01	1300	64
29/6/01	1300	58
28/12/01	1300	35.5
22/2/02	1300	34
26/4/02	1300	44.7
28/6/02	1300	34.5
26/7/02	1300	35
30/8/02	1300	35
25/10/02	1300	34.8
29/11/02	1300	35
31/1/03	1300	35
28/2/03	1300	35.5
30/5/03	1300	36
25/7/03	1300	37
29/8/03	1300	36
26/9/03	1300	30.8
30/10/03	1300	35.5
26/12/03	1300	41.9
26/3/04	1300	41.4
30/4/04	1300	42
25/6/04	1300	44
29/7/04	1300	44.8
24/9/04	1300	54.8
25/2/05	1300	69
29/4/05	1300	70.5
24/6/05	1300	71.8
29/7/05	1300	70
23/9/05	1300	71
25/11/05	1300	67
30/12/05	1300	73.6
27/1/06	1300	72
24/2/06	1300	71.6
31/3/06	1300	72
26/5/06	1300	70
28/7/06	1300	70
23/2/07	1300	62
25/5/07	1300	55.8
27/7/07	1300	62.5
28/9/07	1300	61
25/1/08	1300	52
29/2/08	1300	55.8
25/4/08	1300	54
29/8/08	1300	59
28/11/08	1300	57.9
27/2/09	1300	61
29/5/09	1300	52.3
26/6/09	1300	57.3
31/7/09	1300	53
28/8/09	1300	53
25/9/09	1300	48
27/11/09	1300	47
28/12/09	1300	44.3
25/2/10	1300	76.8

Selected speeches from the Datanalisis survey were analysed to observe if Chávez used emotional appeals during certain times of his presidency. The first speech analysed took place on the 27<sup>th</sup> February, 2000, the last Sunday of the month, and like all speeches analysed for this study, it consisted of 1000 randomly selected words. The analysis was performed following a set of instructions (see Appendix A), which indicated whether Chávez tried to elicit a certain type of appeal in his speech sentences. Then, the number of times the President tried to elicit negative and positive emotions as well as populist appeals in each episode were counted. The emotional appeal variables (fear, anger, anxiety, rage, enthusiasm, pride, amusement, sympathy) were coded following Brader's (2006) study of emotional appeals. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen's (2000) study of affect theories also was used, which explains the functional specificity of emotions and stated that greater political "intelligence" is achieved by emotions. Finally, the study used the variables of 'colloquialisms', 'anti-elite speech' and 'appeals to the people' that followed Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) theory of populism as a communicational style.

**Table 2: Count of Emotional and Populist appeals in Chávez's *Aló Presidente* speeches**

Date	Fear	Anger	Anxiety	Rage	Enthusiasm	Pride	Amusement	Sympathy	Anti-elitisms	Appeals to the people	Colloquialism
27/2/00	1	5	0	0	0	5	0	3	0	5	1
30/4/00	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	5	7	0
11/2/01	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	5	0
21/7/01	8	11	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
6/1/02	0	13	4	0	2	5	0	0	13	7	0
24/2/02	0	4	3	0	5	5	0	2	0	14	0
28/4/02	0	5	7	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0
30/6/02	0	4	6	0	1	3	0	4	0	11	0
25/8/02	0	11	4	0	5	1	1	0	0	3	2
8/9/02	3	13	12	0	0	7	0	0	1	6	0
24/11/02	4	12	12	2	0	0	0	0	1	5	0
1/12/02	1	6	7	0	4	3	0	0	0	9	1
23/2/03	0	8	15	0	8	0	0	0	0	4	0
2/3/03	2	6	7	1	9	1	0	1	1	9	7
1/6/03	0	15	14	3	0	4	0	0	0	16	0
27/7/03	16	22	4	0	1	5	0	0	0	1	1
21/9/03	0	21	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0
26/10/03	3	18	1	0	3	0	0	0	4	5	0
2/11/03	0	0	0	0	12	9	0	2	0	7	0
28/12/03	0	5	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	7	1
28/3/04	0	5	0	0	5	4	0	0	3	10	0
23/5/04	0	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	1
25/7/04	0	10	7	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1/8/04	0	5	0	0	1	8	0	1	0	5	0
24/10/04	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0
20/3/05	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0
8/5/05	0	7	0	0	0	4	0	1	2	4	0
26/6/05	0	2	0	0	1	8	0	6	0	4	0
31/7/05	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	4	0
25/9/05	0	3	0	0	3	5	1	0	0	13	0
18/12/05	0	0	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	10	0
8/1/06	0	5	0	0	4	15	3	0	0	1	5
19/2/06	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1
26/3/06	0	2	0	0	3	5	0	0	0	2	0
23/4/06	0	13	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	1	0
28/5/06	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	2
20/8/06	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	0
25/2/07	0	6	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
17/6/07	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	12	1
29/7/07	0	4	0	0	1	1	3	1	0	3	1

Date	Fear	Anger	Anxiety	Rage	Enthusiasm	Pride	Amusement	Sympathy	Anti-elitisms	Appeals to the people	Colloquialism
30/9/07	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	3
24/2/08	1	8	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	13	0
2/3/08	0	29	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0
27/4/08	8	5	3	0	7	2	5	0	0	6	4
31/8/08	0	31	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2
21/12/08	0	23	5	0	0	4	0	3	0	6	3
1/3/09	0	10	13	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	5
31/5/09	0	12	4	0	4	8	3	0	0	0	4
28/6/09	0	7	14	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	2
6/8/09	1	11	7	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	6
20/9/09	1	10	13	0	3	1	2	0	3	5	1
25/10/09	0	5	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	0
29/11/09	0	14	2	4	1	3	0	0	11	9	1
10/1/10	4	14	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	2

The statistical software STATA was then used to detect any statistical associations between the popularity rating polls and the number of negative appeals used in the *Aló Presidente* speeches. Table 3 illustrates the associations between the 11 variables of interest and “popularity” as well as the associations between the control variables and popularity. Statistical significance is represented in the table by the “p” values;  $p < 0.05$  (\* less than 5 in a 100 chance of an error),  $p < 0.01$  (\*\* less than 1 in a 100 chance of an error) and  $p < 0.001$  (\*\*\*) less than 1 in a 1000 chance of an error). The standard error value is represented in parenthesis underneath the regression coefficient value.


**Table 3: Results**

VARIABLES	(1) Anxiety	(2) Anger	(3) Fear	(4) Rage	(5) Enthusiasm	(6) Pride	(7) Amusement	(8) Sympathy	(9) Anti- elitism	(10) Appeals to the people	(11) Colloquialism
Popularity	-0.31 (0.07)	-0.38 (0.12)	-0.35 (0.05)	0.23 (0.02)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.33 (0.03)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.03)
Unemployment Rate	* 0.49 (0.30)	* -0.63 (0.48)	† -0.19 (0.22)	0.63 (0.08)	0.28 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.27)	-0.38 (0.08)	† 0.01 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.47)	-0.07 (0.14)
Inflation Rate	† -0.06 (0.15)	* 0.76 (0.23)	0.24 (0.11)	* -0.02 (0.04)	0.27 (0.10)	0.04 (0.13)	0.12 (0.04)	0.18 (0.05)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.19 (0.22)	0.09 (0.06)
Homicide Rate	0.52 (0.17)	*** -0.65 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.13)	0.67 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.34 (0.15)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.19 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.28 (0.26)	0.34 (0.08)
	†	*		†							
Observations	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54
R-squared	0.41	0.46	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.06	0.18	0.13	0.02	0.07	0.20


Standard errors in parentheses underneath the results

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$


**Figure 1: Correlations between anger appeals and popularity**



**Figure 2: Correlations between anxiety appeals and popularity**



**Figure 3: Correlations between Anger appeals and Inflation Rates**



The primary statistical associations of interest for this study were between popularity and negative emotional appeals (mainly of aversion). The results from Table 3 suggest a trend that Chávez used more anger and anxiety in his speeches when his popularity was lower in the polls in comparison with other emotional appeals. Emotional appeals of fear and sympathy also showed a negative correlation with popularity, however, these correlations did not reach statistical significance ( $p < 0.1$ ). Indeed, scatter plots (see Figures 1 and 2) revealed a negative correlation for both the anger and anxiety variables.<sup>8</sup> This is consistent with the hypothesis that Chávez tried to elicit anger in his followers when he was lagging behind in the polls.

The analysis also controlled for other variables that might have influenced the way Chávez used his discourse. These control variables were unemployment, inflation and the homicide rate. The aim of the control variables was to ensure that the main relationship between popularity and anger was not spurious and to understand whether factors other than popularity polls could have influenced Chávez's use of emotional or

---

<sup>8</sup> For more information on scatter plots see:

<http://mste.illinois.edu/courses/ci330ms/youtsey/scatterinfo.html>

populist appeals. As shown in Table 3, a highly significant positive correlation was found between inflation rate and anger appeals. The results hint to the fact that Chávez not only appealed to anger when he was lagging behind in the polls but also when inflation rates were high. Other variables suggest that Chávez adopted anger appeals when unemployment and homicide rates were high. Also, the results signal that he used rage when the unemployment rate was high.

To summarise, this study conducted a content analysis of 54 speeches from *Aló Presidente* and examined variations in Chávez's speech during his presidential term based on the results of popularity polls. This work was founded on Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) and Bolívar's (2016) work on affective theories. Specifically, these theories provided the analysis with a total of 8 emotional appeals (fear, anger, anxiety, enthusiasm, pride, amusement and sympathy) and 3 populist (anti-elitism, appeals to the people and colloquialism) variables, which followed Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) definition of populism. It was found that anger and anxiety appeals were negatively associated with Chávez's popularity, that is, consistent with the hypothesis; Chávez was more likely to use negative appeals when he was rated low in the polls. However, a more significant correlation was found between inflation rate and Chávez's use of anger appeals.

### **3.2 Discussion**

Previous research has revealed that Chávez and other Latin American presidents, such as Rafeel Correa from Ecuador and Evo Morales from Bolivia, used constant political campaigning as a strategy to maintain their high ratings (De La Torre & Arnson 2013). During campaign times, politicians tend to use attack strategies during their political speeches (Nai and Martinez i Coma 2016). In Chávez's case, constant campaign tactics were applied for the entirety of his presidency. This allowed him to hinder the



popularity of his opponents. Chávez's relentless attacks form part of a wider strategy of constant campaigning. Studies on negative political campaigning, 'attack politics' and emotional appeals can therefore help in understanding the intricacies of Chávez's political strategy. When did he attack during his constant campaigning years? What discursive strategies did Chávez implement when he was not as popular? The aim of this Master of Research thesis was to examine the strategies implemented by Chávez in his discourse to maintain popularity and garner support.

The results from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses show that, during times of low popularity ratings, Chávez evoked anxiety in his followers in order for them to be more cautious against their common enemy. He also relied on anger appeals designed to attack his opponents when he was less popular. Appealing to anger was therefore a strategy implemented by Chávez when he felt weak. Together, these results indicate that his aggressive tone was not a permanent strategy but rather it fluctuated depending on how popular he was in the polls. Chávez's discourse strategies were therefore intended to create a feeling of unification in his followers and to instigate fear in his opposition.

### **3.3 Variables of Aversion (Anger and Rage)**

The primary aim of this study was to understand how populist leaders use emotional appeals to favour their ratings. The hypothesis was that President Chávez used anger appeals and attacked his opponents more when he was lagging behind in the polls. The results of this study support this hypothesis and suggest that Chávez integrated more anger appeals in his speeches when his popularity was low. Therefore, he may have known when to use attacks against his enemies and when to appeal to the deepest sentiments of anger within his followers. This is consistent with previous studies that have demonstrated that appealing to anger mobilises people to vote and reassures their own political viewpoints. That is, angry voters are more prone to stay loyal to their own

political viewpoints rather than to try and understand the opposition's viewpoint (MacKuen et al. 2010). By appealing to anger and attacking his opponents, Chávez maintained his followers' loyalty to the Bolivarian revolution.

According to theories of emotional appeals, leaders tend to use negative appeals of aversion when they wish to reduce attention to the political landscape and make voters rely on political partisanship (MacKuen et al. 2010). Anger is often elicited as a response to a threat, which, in this case, is the loss of points in popularity (MacKuen et al. 2010). Feelings of anger are associated with perceptions of unfairness and are usually released when the person finds another's viewpoint different to or inconsistent with his or her own (MacKuen et al., 2010). Anger also causes people to stick to their own political beliefs more strongly and remain loyal to their political party (MacKuen et al. 2010). Therefore, could Chávez have tried to elicit anger in order to influence his followers to remain loyal to his political party? The results of the analysis indicate that this appears to be the case, as anger appeals were highly correlated with his popularity ratings. Consistent with the hypothesis, Chávez used more anger appeals when he was experiencing a decline in the polls. The direct relationship between the increase in anger appeals and the loss of popularity indicates that Chávez may have known when to elicit anger in order to mobilise his audience. Moreover, Chávez may have knowingly polarised Venezuelan society through eliciting anger in his speeches when he was not as popular in the polls. An example of an anger appeal can be seen in Chávez's attacks directed towards his enemies. For example, in episode 306 of *Aló Presidente*, President Chávez referred to the then Colombian president Álvaro Uribe as a "lacayo de los Estados Unidos" (servant of the United States) and as a "mentiroso" or liar. Chávez aimed to elicit anger in his audience towards the Colombian leader and make it clear that Uribe was the enemy. Sentences such as these were coded as 'anger' appeals in the

present study. Other variables have also been shown to increase the reliance on political habits and decrease attention to what is happening in the political world (Brader 2011). For example, enthusiasm causes voters to rely on old habits and stick to their ideological identities. However, for this specific analysis, there was no relation between Chávez's decline in the polls and the enthusiasm variable.

The strongest statistical correlation found overall in this study was between inflation rates and anger appeals. That is, when the inflation rate was high, Chávez used more anger appeals. By attacking his opponents and evoking anger in his followers, Chávez may have intended to divert attention from the high inflation rate. Therefore, attacks could be used to make his followers ignore the problematic economics of the country or to blame these problems on the enemy rather than his government. For instance, in episode 376 of *Aló Presidente* Chávez states "La inflación venezolana, claro que sigue siendo alta, ah, ¿me la van a achacar a mí? Cuando en el período anterior del doctor Caldera, llegó hasta 100 por ciento en un año", which translated is "The Venezuelan inflation rate, of course it is still high, ah, are you going to blame it on me? When with the previous regime of Dr. Caldera, inflation rates went up to a 100 percent in one year". Here, it is clear that he is using the inflation rates as a way not to blame his own government but rather attack the previous president. This allows Chávez's followers to believe that he is innocent and not to blame for the current economic position of Venezuela. Rather, it is the fault of the establishment's political parties who Chávez believed destroyed the country.

### **3.4 Other variables on negative emotional appeals: Anxiety and Fear**

The second strongest association detected when compared to Chávez's popularity was anxiety appeals. Anxiety appeals, like anger appeals, are included within the negative emotional appeals spectrum. However, anxiety appeals are intended to create different

responses to anger appeals, in that they lead voters to seek out alternative sources of information (Drutman 2011). As such, evoking anxiety helps individuals to carefully analyse threats and resolve dangerous situations (Brader 2011). The present analysis found that anxiety was negatively correlated to Chávez's loss in popularity in the polls; this statistical association was not as strong as the association between anger variables and Chávez's loss in popularity. Nevertheless, like anger, Chávez used anxiety appeals more often when his popularity was low. Examples of anxiety appeals in *Aló Presidente* can be seen in one of his last Sunday shows of March 2003. Here, Chávez stated "...because now certain sectors [of the opposition] are desperate as they failed the coup d'état, they failed in the sabotage against the oil sector so then they opted for terrorism and they are putting bombs and they are threatening us ..." (Chávez in *Aló Presidente* episode 141, 2003). This quote clearly illustrates how the President evoked anxiety in his audience to make them feel more cautious towards the enemy or the opposition. Anxiety appeals were coded as appeals that Chávez considered were targeted specifically at him and his followers. That is, anxiety appeals were coded in sentences where Chávez mentioned any crime attempts made by the opposition (or any other of Chávez's enemies) against him, the government or his followers. Anxiety appeals were also coded in sentences where Chávez mentioned Venezuela having an economic crisis or lack of resources as a result of neoliberalism and bad management from previous governments in Venezuela.

Overall, anxiety appeals aim to make Chávez's followers anxious towards the opposition and the neoliberal world. This marks a clear distinction from fear appeals. Fear appeals were coded in Chávez's discourse towards his enemies. For example, each time a sentence in Chávez's speech included a threat to his enemy then it was coded as a fear appeal. Research has shown that eliciting fear and anxiety creates a similar behavioural

response in voters (Brader 2011). Chávez may therefore have used anxiety to ensure that his followers were cautious of the enemy whereas he used fear to ensure that his enemies were cautious of him. This demonstrates that his appeals were guided towards different audiences, yet in both cases the aim was to make the audience feel cautious. However, in the present study, fear and popularity were not strongly correlated.

Nevertheless, Chávez clearly used techniques aimed at appealing to the fears of his public, mostly threatening them that he would expropriate opposition businesses or properties. For example, in episode 327 of *Aló Presidente* (2009) he stated:

The company 'Polar' is going to obey the law, go on fellows, that is obey the law. The other transnational Cargill well we are going to expropriate their company, and if they are funny about it we will expropriate even more, I have no problems, no problems at all, what is of the country is of the people.

The company, Polar, is the biggest beer producing company in Venezuela and the owners, the Mendonza family, were rivals of Chávez. The owner of the company, Lorenzo Mendoza, was and still is cast as a “symbol of callous capitalism and architect of an ‘economic war’ against socialism” (Oré 2016). The previous quote by Chávez illustrates how he appealed to fear in his enemy by threatening the Polar Company or the transnational Cargill with expropriation if they did not follow his orders. Indeed, threatening companies with expropriation was his most notable technique to induce fear in his opposition. He reaffirmed his power over the country by stating that if he wanted he could destroy their businesses or force them to become part of the public sector.

To summarise, Chávez used threats in his fear appeals to maintain his leadership over the country and anxiety appeals to make his followers more cautious about the opposition.

### 3.5 Variables of populism

In addition to emotional appeals, the theoretical framework for this thesis included three populism variables (colloquialism, anti-elitism speech and appeals to the people). This classification followed Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) definition of populism as a communicational style. First, these variables were studied separately (see Table 2) and no association was found. Another analysis, including all three variables, was then performed to determine if populist appeals were used more often when Chávez was less popular. Again, no association was found. It therefore appears that Chávez used populist appeals throughout his presidential term, regardless of his popularity in the polls. The use of populist appeals was a constant discursive technique to maintain his positive stance among Venezuelans. This is in contrast to anger or anxiety appeals, which were used in response to a decline in popularity ratings and higher inflation rates.

An example of a populist appeal can be seen in episode 91 of *Aló Presidente* aired in 2002, where on several occasions Chávez mentions "el pueblo". In one instance he states, "Triunfo en la calle con el pueblo dando ejemplo de coraje de persistencia de calidad revolucionaria" which translates to "Triumph on the streets with the people, they are giving an example of courage, of persistence of the revolutionary quality" (Chávez in *Aló Presidente* episode 91 2002). Here, he mentions the 'people' and aims to encourage his supporters to go onto the streets to support him and the Bolivarian revolution. Chávez also referred to Simon Bolívar using populist discourse stating that "Bolívar is not another thing but the people" (Chávez in *Aló Presidente* episode 192 2004). As such, Chávez is directly comparing Bolívar to the average Venezuelan to create a collective sense of direction and identity (Block 2015), which plays a key role in the collective emotion created by Chávez among his followers. The constant sense of

belonging in his followers' collective emotions is what maintained the hopes and promises of the Bolivarian revolution even after his death.

### **3.6 Further examination of the Data: A qualitative interpretation**

The next part of the analysis aimed to bring a qualitative understanding to the study of the *Aló Presidente* transcripts. Chávez's transcripts reveal other discursive strategies used by the President to maintain his popularity. For example, the speeches that followed the coup d'état of April 2002, which saw president Chávez leave office for 47 hours (Wilpert 2007), tend to be more aggressive and he mentions the "golpistas" ("participants of the coup") in almost every speech that followed that year. For example, in episode 118 of *Aló Presidente* aired in September 2002, Chávez refers directly to his audience about the coup when he states "Here today in the show we have Venezuelan victims of the coup of the 11<sup>th</sup> of April, some of them are still recovering from the serious injuries of that savage outrage from the participants of the coup that coldly planned the horrible event". When talking about the coup and acknowledging what happened, Chávez phrases his words in ways that are meant to divide. In the previous quote, we can see that the 'bad guys' are the golpistas, those who participated and/or instigated the coup of 2002. By discussing the conflict and making his followers the victims, Chávez further polarised the already divided Venezuelan society.

The study of 54 speeches of *Aló Presidente* conducted for this Master of Research thesis confirms Moreno's (2008) findings that Chávez makes reference in his discourse to the revolution as a continuation of Venezuela's independence war fought by Simon Bolívar. This reassures his followers that they still form part of the war of independence that began centuries ago and that continues with Chávez and his Bolivarian revolution. For example, in January 2004 episode no. 178, Chávez stated that "the Bolivarian revolution of today is the continuation of the independence, it is the continuation of the fight for

dignity, for the liberty, for the equality and for the justice and peace". Here, he tells his followers that the battle that started with Simon Bolívar in the 1800s is still alive in Chávez's socialism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In another of the *Aló Presidente* episodes (teórico no. 6) in August 2009, Chávez praised some of the qualities of Simon Bolívar, those he believed every Venezuelan should strive for: "Simon Bolívar thoughts and ideologies were based on equality. Equality is the law of all laws and equality is the base of socialism". Chávez used Bolívar and historical narratives to create an identity within Venezuelans as suggested by other studies (García Montesdeoca 2015). This identity is based on the belief that everyday Venezuelans can strive to embody some of Bolívar's traits such as values of equality and freedom.

Chávez used the slogan "*Venezuela ahora es de todos*" ("Venezuela is now of everybody"). However, Chávez is only referring to his followers as Venezuela does not include everyone, only those who believe in Chávez. However, by using certain appeals, Chávez created a sense of collective emotions and, for those who did belong to Chávez's Venezuela, it really 'felt' like the revolution was all Venezuelans. Previous political parties in Venezuela had not appealed to the emotions of the 'left behind' or marginalised who needed someone to follow and who needed to feel like their needs were being heard and met, which Chávez achieved. The collective emotion that he created allowed for Chávez's followers to be faithful to the Bolivarian revolution and to their leader. His followers felt a sense of unity that they have never felt before, as previous Venezuelan political parties seemed too elite and out of touch with the average Venezuelan.

In addition to using emotional appeals when he was lagging behind in the polls, Chávez also used the coup attempts in 2002 as a way to legitimise his power and to attack his enemies. As the literature suggests, Chávez also used Simon Bolívar as part of a populist



communicational strategy for Venezuelans to have a common goal and hero and as an example of who they should aim to be. More importantly, it is argued that by using Simon Bolívar and Jesus Christ in his discourse, Chávez himself became those characters to his followers. This sense of identity that Chávez created for himself allowed him to become a cult figure (Schipani & Mander 2013). Indeed, he created a sense of collective emotion among his followers during his presidential years that persisted even after his death in 2013. Afterwards, Chávez's followers joined in expressing their deep pain together and mourned the death of their hero and saviour (Schipani & Mander 2013). This is perhaps one of his most remarkable strategies; by using heroes and spreading the values of Christianity (and Jesus) and liberty from Simon Bolívar, Chávez became a hero that transcended his own life. His legacy remains strong because of the emotion that he inspired in his followers through the use of these characters and the values that they represented for the Bolivarian revolution.

This study also indicates that populist variables were a constant strategy throughout Chávez's presidential years with the main populist variable of 'appeals to the people' being present in almost every episode of *Aló Presidente* analysed for this thesis. That is, Chávez maintained his mention of 'the people', making populism a discourse strategy that was consistent rather than dependent on his popularity rating. By contrast, anger was most strongly correlated to his popularity. The weaker he was in the polls, the more he resorted to anger appeals. Anxiety was the second most used emotional appeal in his speeches when he was lagging behind in the polls. He appealed to anxiety in his followers as a way of making them aware of the opposition and to insist that they learn about the threat that the opposition represented. Both anger and anxiety variables were targeted toward his audience but for different reasons. Anxiety appeals made his audience cautious about the enemy while anger appeals caused them to remain loyal to

the Bolivarian Revolution.

These strategies are consistent with the current understanding of populist leaders and, more specifically, of Chávez. Findings on Chávez's use of Bolívar, his attack politics and use of negative emotional appeals are in agreement with previous studies of Chávez and his discourse (Bolívar 2007; 2016; García Montesdeoca 2015). However, this study reveals that Chávez manipulated his communication style depending on his current popularity; that is, when he was under threat (lower in the polls) or when he was more comfortable in his role as President (higher in the polls). This case study increases the understanding of how populist leaders communicate and illustrates that the use of attacks is not just 'irrational' but can be strategic and planned.

Populist leaders play with the root of what 'the people' understand: emotions. The objective of this thesis was to show that negative emotional appeals are at the core of populism and their use is strategic. By appealing to negative emotions of aversion, Chávez's further polarised Venezuelan society through his attacks on his enemy during specific times of his presidency (when he was less popular), which allowed him to further delegitimise the opposition. Indeed, this study demonstrates that President Chávez manipulated his communicational style in order to both gain popularity and to make his opponents weaker. Finally, this dissertation also found that the strength of populist leaders relies on 'unifying' those who are in the "in" group. Populist leaders and parties have the ability to create a sense of identity between them and their followers. Through the development of this identity, a collective emotion is also created. In Chávez's case, collective emotions caused his followers to feel more faithful to the Bolivarian revolution and this promoted a sense of unification in his followers that they had not felt under the elites who previously ruled Venezuela.

## Conclusion

Overall, this work provides an overview of how populist leaders attempt to stir feelings in their audience through the delivery of their political message, in this case: Chávez vive! (Chávez lives!). The repercussions of the populist discourse of Hugo Chávez remain alive. With his successor still in power, Maduro is trying to continue the legacy of Chávez, which will remain with Venezuelans for decades. It is important that populist political figures who have the ability to change the history of a country for better or worse are studied. Indeed, Chávez changed not only Venezuelan history but also Latin American history. Chávez's use of anger appeals in his discourse is likely to have further polarised the country. Indeed, anger appeals cause increased loyalty of people's belief systems. That is, when voters are angry they tend to stick to their ideological group, and not see eye to eye with those from the opposition. The interesting finding of this study is that Chávez did so possibly knowingly. The data suggest that every time he lost popularity in the polls, he used more anger appeals. Anger appeals therefore form part of several discursive strategies implemented by Chávez to maintain his power over his followers. Other significant correlations in this study have demonstrated that Chávez used anger appeals not only when his popularity was low at the polls but also when unemployment and inflation rates were high. Inflation rates showed the strongest regression coefficient when associated with emotional appeals in this study. Nevertheless, aversion appeals, such as anger or rage also allowed Chávez to blame any problems on the enemy and to keep his hands "off the dirt" when inflation or unemployment were high.

Chávez arrived on the political scene in 1998, a time where his populist-nationalistic discourse resonated among Venezuelans who were deeply dissatisfied with the two-party system that arose from the Punto Fijo pact in 1958. The marginalised sectors of

Venezuelan society identified with Hugo Chávez, a different leader who spoke the language of the people through the use of colloquialisms and who was not afraid to say what he thought even if it meant that he had to offend those who had a different perspective than his own. He created the television show *Aló Presidente*, a medium designed to directly listen and talk to the people who needed him and who saw him as a saviour of all of their problems. This direct dialogue that Chávez created between him and his listeners was unprecedented. The marginalised groups of Venezuelan society therefore felt connected with Chávez and felt part of the 'in' group in the imagined community created by the Bolivarian Revolution.

What makes certain populist leaders more appealing than others in different countries is the context in which they appear. Populist leaders are a product of the history, the society and the economic situation in which they are created. The context in which Chávez came into power contained the perfect conditions for his success: a tired marginalised sector of Venezuelan society who felt disenchanted with the elites who had held power for many years before 1998. Chávez used a populist style of communication to reach the hearts of the people. The use of emotional appeals in Chávez's populist discourse became key for his hegemonic dominance of Venezuelan politics.

By using Simon Bolívar and Jesus Christ in his speeches, Chávez was able to become those figures to his followers. These characters were used in Chávez's speech to create values of liberty and love for the poor, which struck an emotional chord among his followers. Chávez created his own identity as well as that of his followers. His followers emotionally fed off each other and spread devotion towards Chávez and hatred towards the opposition. These collective emotions started from Chávez's appeals to his audience and allowed him to become a martyr, an idol and a cult leader during his presidency and even after his death. When Chávez died, his followers chanted "Chávez esta vivo"

("Chávez is still alive"). This strong bond between Chávez and his followers was arguably only possible because of his ability to elicit emotions in his audiences.

Populist leaders are becoming successful worldwide and many of these leaders show a remarkable ability to appeal to the emotions and passions of their followers. Populism creates a collective emotion among a constituency of individuals so strong that it transcends time and history. Indeed, the emotional bond and repercussions of Chávez's discourse will live with Venezuelans for the rest of its history. The elites within both the government and in academia may tend to dismiss or underestimate the intellectual capacity of these leaders but, in fact, they use discourse as a way to manipulate and push their agenda. The rise of populism parties and techniques worldwide indicates a deep dissatisfaction with the elites and with previous forms of liberal governments. Populist leaders flaunt this dissatisfaction by using emotional appeals that allow those who feel ignored by the system to believe that they have a voice. Understanding emotional appeals and their important role in how voters react helps to explain the phenomenon of populism more broadly.

By evoking emotional reactions in his audiences, Chávez, the communicational master, collectivised emotions across millions of people in Venezuela who felt connected emotionally and ideologically with him. In order to understand populism, we must acknowledge the emotions at the core of our human biology that are deeply embedded in our capacity to process information. Voters' behaviours are managed by populist leaders in such a way that those who follow them feel strongly connected to a leader who can do no wrong in their eyes. If the establishment were to try to regain power from populist leaders, they must understand the key functions of how the human brain is wired and how populist leaders have been able to tap into voter's emotions.

## Bibliography

- Aalberg, T, Esser, F, Reinemann, C, Stromback, J & De Vreese, C (eds) 2016, *Populist political communication in Europe*. Routledge, New York, NY.
- Anderson, B 2006, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, Verso Books, New York, NY.
- Arreaza, IC 2003, 'El discurso de Hugo Chávez: Bolívar como estrategia para dividir a los venezolanos', *Boletín de Lingüística*, vol. 20, pp. 22-42.
- Arter, D 2010, 'The breakthrough of another West European populist radical right party? The case of the True Finns', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 484-504.
- Barr, R 2009, 'Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics', *Party Politics*, vol. 15, no.1, pp. 29-48.
- Barsade, S 2014, 'Faster than a Speeding Text: "Emotional Contagion" at work', *Psychology Today*, viewed 20 March 2017, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-science-work/201410/faster-speeding-text-emotional-contagion-work>
- Berlin, I, Hofstadter, R & MacRae, D 1968, 'To define populism', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 137-180.
- Blackwell, M 2013, 'A framework for dynamic causal inference in political science', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.57, no. 2, pp. 504-520.
- Bleiker, R & Hutchison, E 2008, 'Fear no more: emotions and world politics', *Review of international studies*, vol. 34, no. S1, pp. 115-135.
- Block, E 2015, *Political communication and leadership: mimetisation, Hugo Chávez and the construction of power and identity*, Routledge, New York, NY.
- Bolívar, A 2001, 'Changes in Venezuelan political dialogue: the role of advertising during electoral campaigns', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 23-45.

- Bolívar, A 2005. Descortesía y confrontación política', *Estudios de la (des) cortesía en español. Categorías conceptuales y aplicaciones a corpora orales y escritos*.  
Dunken, Buenos Aires.
- Bolívar, A 2009a, 'El análisis del discurso político: discurso populista, discursos alternativos y accidentes discursivos', *Discurso & Sociedad*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 220-223.
- Bolívar, A 2007, '*Análisis del discurso.¿ Por qué y para qué*', Editorial CEC, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Bolívar, A 2016, 'El discurso de la afectividad en la interacción política', in A Bañon Hernandez, M Espejo Muriel, B Muñoz-Cobo and JL López Cruces (eds.), *Oralidad y análisis del discurso: homenaje a Luis Cortés Rodríguez*, Universidad de Almería, Almería, Andalusia.
- Bolívar, A 2013, 'La construcción discursiva de la revolución bolivariana. Polarización y manipulación en la campaña electoral de 2012', *Temas de Coyuntura*, vol. 67, pp. 131-163.
- Bolívar, A 2009b, '¿ Por que; no te callas? : El alcance de una frase en el (des) encuentro de dos mundos', *Discurso & Sociedad*, vol 3, no. 2, pp. 224-252.
- Brader, T 2006, *Campaigning for hearts and minds: how emotional appeals in political ads work*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Brader, T 2011, 'The political relevance of emotions: "Reassessing" revisited', *Political Psychology*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 337-346.
- Bradley, RT 1987, *Charisma and social structure*, Paragon House, New York, NY.
- Branford, S 2016, 'Hugo Chavez fails to overthrow Venezuela's government', *The Guardian*, viewed 3 March 2016,  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/05/hugo-chavez-venezuela-failed-coup-1992>

- Burack, C & Snyder-Hall, RC 2012, 'Introduction: Right-wing populism and the media', *New Political Science*, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 439-454.
- Caballero, M 2010, *Historia de los Venezolanos del siglo XX*, Editorial Alfa, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Caimi, G & Erlich, FD 2005, 'Dinámica interactiva y argumentativa en un debate político: Aplicación del modelo pragmadialéctico', *Núcleo*, vol. 17, no. 22, pp. 85-102.
- Cannon, B 2008, 'Class/Race Polarisation in Venezuela and the Electoral Success of Hugo Chávez: a break with the past or the song remains the same?', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 731-748.
- Cannon, B 2004, 'Venezuela, April 2002: coup or popular rebellion? The myth of a united Venezuela', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 285-302.
- Canovan, M 1999, 'Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy', *Political studies*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 2-16.
- Capelos, T 2010, 'Feeling the Issue: How Citizens' Affective Reactions and Leadership Perceptions Shape Policy Evaluations', *Journal of Political Marketing*, vol. 9, no. 1-2, pp. 9-33.
- Carrera Damas, G 1993, 'La reformulación del proyecto nacional venezolano en perspectiva histórica', *Venezuela del Siglo XX al Siglo XXI: un Proyecto para Construirlo*, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Cawthorne, A 2013, 'To supporters, "Saint Chavez" watches over Venezuela vote', *Reuters*, viewed 15 November 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-Chavez-idUSBRE93D05020130414>
- Charaudeau, P 2009, 'Reflexiones para el análisis del discurso populista', *Discurso & Sociedad*, vol. 3 no. 2, pp. 253-279.



- Chávez, H 2012, 'Chávez habla sobre las encuestas', *Dailymotion*, viewed 26 September 2016, [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtxz83\\_video-Chávez-habla-sobre-las-encuestas\\_news](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtxz83_video-Chávez-habla-sobre-las-encuestas_news)
- Chávez, H 2009, 'La diarrea y Chávez – Alo Presidente' *Youtube*, viewed 23 October 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DpGviR5kkw>
- Chávez, H 2008, 'Las frases más explosivas de Chávez: de Bush a Insulza', *Guioteca*, viewed 20 March 2017, <https://www.guioteca.com/internacional/las-frases-mas-explosivas-de-chavez-de-bush-a-insulza/>
- Chirinos, A & de Cabeza, LM 2007, 'La imagen del yo y del otro: construcción de identidades en los discursos de toma de posesión de los presidentes de Venezuela y Brasil', *Boletín de lingüística*, vol. 19, no. 27, pp. 70-93.
- Chumaceiro Arreaza, I 2003, 'El discurso de Hugo Chávez: Bolívar como estrategia para dividir a los venezolanos', *Boletín de Lingüística*, vol. 20, pp. 22-42.
- Cole, S 2007, 'Hugo Chávez and President Bush's Credibility Gap: The Struggle Against US Democracy Promotion', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 493-507.
- Constantini, S 2014, *The political communication of Hugo Chávez: the evolution of Aló Presidente*, PhD thesis, University of Kent.
- Cortés, R, Materán, R, y Méndez, M 2008, 'Análisis de la estrategia discursiva de Hugo Chávez de cara a la creación del PSUV', *Anuario Electrónico de Estudios en Comunicación Social "Disertaciones"*, vol. 1, no. 1, Artículo 3.
- Cox, L & Wood, S 2017, 'Got him': Revenge, emotions, and the killing of Osama bin Laden', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 112-129.
- De la Torre, C 2007, 'The resurgence of radical populism in Latin America', *Constellations*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 384-397.

- De la Torre, C 2010, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH.
- De La Torre, C & Arnson, C 2013, *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MA.
- Deiwiks, C 2009, 'Populism', *Living Reviews in Democracy*, vol. 1, pp. 1-9.
- Demertzis, N 2013, *Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Diario La Republica 2013, 'Un día como hoy hace 19 años Chávez salió de la cárcel de yare: Así habló', *Diario La Republica*, viewed 29 September 2016, <http://www.diariorepublica.com/politica/un-dia-como-hoy-hace-19-anos-Chavez-salio-de-la-carcel-de-yare-asi-hablo>
- Drake, P & Hershberg, E 2006, *State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crisis*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA.
- Drutman, L 2011, 'Anger, Politics and the Wisdom of Uncertainty', *Pacific Standard*, viewed 11 December 2016, <https://psmag.com/anger-politics-and-the-wisdom-of-uncertainty-b6104d463d17#.tsl4obcha>
- Eastwood, J 2006, *The rise of nationalism in Venezuela*, University Press of Florida, Florida, FL.
- Ellner, S & Hellinger, D 2004, *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: class, polarization, and conflict*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO.
- Erllich, F 2005a, 'Características y efectos del discurso auto centrado en Aló Presidente', *Boletín de Lingüística*, vol. 17, no. 24, pp. 287-302.
- Erllich, F 2005b, 'La relación interpersonal con la audiencia: El caso del discurso del presidente venezolano Hugo Chávez', *Revista signos*, vol. 38, no. 59, pp. 05-10.
- Frajman, E 2014, 'Broadcasting populist leadership: Hugo Chavez and Alo Presidente', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 46, no. 03, pp. 501-526.

- García Montesdeoca, JM 2015, 'Simón Bolívar como instrumento ideológico en el discurso de Hugo Chávez, para articular la identidad nacional de los venezolanos (1998-2002)', PhD Thesis, Universidad Casa Grande, viewed 25 August 2016, [https://library.sydney.edu.au/subjects/downloads/citation/Harvard\\_Complete.pdf](https://library.sydney.edu.au/subjects/downloads/citation/Harvard_Complete.pdf)
- Gidron, N & Bonikowski, B 2013, 'Varieties of Populism; Literature Review and Research Agenda', *Scholars at Harvard*, viewed 23 August 2016, [http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron\\_bonikowski\\_populismreview\\_2013.pdf](http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismreview_2013.pdf)
- Hamblin, A 2017, 'Trump 2020 Florida 'campaign' rally: Too soon or about time?' *The San Diego Union Tribune*, viewed 20 February 2017, <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/the-conversation/sd-trump-florida-rally-20170217-htmlstory.html>
- Hawkins, KA, 2009, 'Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 42, no. 8, pp. 1040-1067.
- Hawkins, K 2010, *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
- House, RJ, Spangler, WD & Woycke, J 1991, 'Personality and charisma in the US presidency: A psychological theory of leader effectiveness', *Administrative science quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 364-396.
- Ionescu, G & Gellner, E. (eds.) 1969, *Populism: its meaning and national characteristics*, Macmillan, London, Greater London.
- Jagers, J& Walgrave, S 2007, 'Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 319-345.
- Jamtøy, A 2012, *Emotion and cognition in political communication*, Work in Progress, University of Oslo, Oslo.

- Jorquera, J 2003, *Venezuela: The Revolution unfolding in Latin America*, Resistance Books, Sydney.
- Kazin, M 1995, *The populist persuasion: An American history*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
- Keller, A 1996, *Cultura Democratica en Venezuela: Informe Analitico de Resultados*, Fundacion Pensamiento y Accion, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Krauze, E 2009, 'The Shah of Venezuela', *The New Republic*, vol. 240, no. 5 p. 29.
- Laclau, E 2005, 'Populism: What's in a Name?', in D Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, Verso, London, Greater London.
- Lau, RR 1982, 'Negativity in political perception', *Political Behavior*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 353-377.
- McCaughan, M 2011, *The battle of Venezuela*, Seven Stories Press, New York, NY.
- MacKuen, M, Marcus, GE, Neuman, WR & Keele, L 2007, 'The third way: The theory of affective intelligence and American democracy', in W R Neuman, GE Marcus, M Mackuen, & AN Crigler (eds.), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL .
- MacKuen, M, Wolak J, Keele L & Marcus, GE 2010, 'Civic engagements: Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 440-458.
- Madrid, RL 2008, 'The Rise of ethnopopulism in Latin America', *World Politics*, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 475-508.
- Mancosu, M 2016, 'Populism, selective exposure, and emotional appeals in social media: a comparative approach using Facebook reactions', SISP Conference, Milano, viewed 3 December 2016, [https://www.sisp.it/docs/convegno2016/125\\_sisp2016\\_comunicazione-politica.pdf](https://www.sisp.it/docs/convegno2016/125_sisp2016_comunicazione-politica.pdf)

- Marcus, GE, Neuman, WR & MacKuen, M 2000, *Affective intelligence and political judgment*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- McCoy, J 2000, 'The demise of a regime: the transition from Punto Fijo to the fifth republic in Venezuela', *Proceedings of LASA 2000 Congress*, Latin American Studies Association, Miami, FL, pp. 15-18.
- McCoy, J & Myers, D 2004, *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, London, Greater London.
- Meny, Y & Sorel, Y 2002, *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, NY.
- Molero, L 2001, 'Formas y estrategias de persuasión en el discurso político venezolano. La construcción del 'yo' y del 'otro' bajo un enfoque semántico pragmático', *Revista iberoamericana de Discurso y Sociedad*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 79-106.
- Molero, L & Bolívar, A 2007, 'La imagen del yo y del otro: construcción de identidades en los discursos de toma de posesión de los presidentes de Venezuela y Brasil'. *Bolitin de Lingüística*, vol. 19, no. 27, pp. 70-93.
- Moreno, MA 2008, *Metaphors in Hugo Chávez's political discourse: Conceptualizing nation, revolution, and opposition*, PhD thesis, University of New York, NY.
- Morgan, RL & Heise, D 1988, 'Structure of emotions', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, vol. 51, pp.19-31.
- Mudde, C 2007, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Mudde, C 2004, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 542-563.
- Mudde, C & Kaltwasser, CR 2012, *Populism in Europe and the Americas*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

- Nabi, RL 2002, 'Discrete emotions and persuasion', *The persuasion handbook: Developments in theory and practice*, vol. 289, p.308.
- Nai, A 2013, 'What really matters is which camp goes dirty: differential effects of negative campaigning on turnout during Swiss federal ballots', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 52, pp. 44-70
- Nai, A & Martinez i Coma, F 2016, *Frantic losers, anxious campaigners, and the decision to go negative*, Work In Progress, University of Sydney, Sydney.
- Óre, D 2016, 'Venezuela's 'beer war' mirrors hostile politics', *Reuters*, viewed 20 March 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-beer-idUSKBN13K1NU>
- Pankowski, R 2010, *The populist radical right in Poland: the patriots*, Routledge, New York, NY.
- Pauwels, T 2011, 'Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 21, no.1, pp. 97-119.
- Peña Angulo, J 2012, 'Chávez en tres discursos', *Revista Venezolana de Ciencia Política*, no. 41, pp. 11-25
- Penfold-Becerra, M 2005, 'Social funds, clientelism and redistribution: Chávez's 'Misiones' programs in comparative perspective', *World Bank*, viewed 3 December 2016, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/1149208-1147789289867/IIIWB\\_Conference\\_Clientelism\\_and\\_Social\\_FundsREVISED.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/1149208-1147789289867/IIIWB_Conference_Clientelism_and_Social_FundsREVISED.pdf)
- Petkoff, T 2010, *El chavismo como problema*, Editorial Libros Marcados, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Philip, G & Murillo L 2004, 'El Estado y el problema de la legitimación democrática en Venezuela bajo el sistema "Punto Fijo"', *Foro Internacional*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 150-169.

- Plantin, C & Gutiérrez Vidrio, S 2009, 'La construcción política del miedo' in P Bentivoglio, FD Erlich & M Shiro (eds.), *Haciendo discurso, Homenaje a Adriana Bolívar*, Fondo Editorial de Humanidades, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Quirk, PJ and Evans O 1995, *Capital account convertibility: review of experience and implications for IMF policies*, International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 131.
- Ray, DG, Mackie, DM & Smith, ER 2014, 'Intergroup emotion: self-categorization, emotion, and the regulation of intergroup conflict', in C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (eds.), *Collective Emotions, Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Redlawsk, D 2006, *Feeling politics: Emotion in political information processing*, Springer, New York, NY.
- Rey, JC 2002, 'Consideraciones políticas sobre un insolito golpe de Estado', *Analítica*, viewed 20 August 2016, [www.analitica.com/bitblío/juan\\_carlos\\_rey/insolito\\_golpe.asp](http://www.analitica.com/bitblío/juan_carlos_rey/insolito_golpe.asp)
- Rivero, MR 1988, *La república en Venezuela: pasión y desencanto (Vol. 1)*, Cuadernos Lagovén, Caracas, Distrito Capital.
- Romero, JE 2001, 'El Discurso Político de Hugo Chávez (1996-1999)', *In Espacio Abierto*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 229-245.
- Romero, JE 2005, 'Discurso político, comunicación política e historia en Hugo Chávez - Uses and interpretations of the history of venezuela in the thought of Hugo Chávez', *Ámbitos*, vol. 13-14, pp.357-377.
- Rooduijn, M & Pauwels, T 2011, 'Measuring populism: Comparing two methods of content analysis', *West European Politics*, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 1272-1283.

- Rooduijn, M, De Lange, SL & Van Der Brug, W 2014, 'A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe', *Party Politics*, vol.20, no.4, pp. 563-575.
- Ross, A 2013, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Salmela, M & Von Scheve, C 2017, 'Emotional dynamics of right wing political populism', *Oxford Academic Blog*, viewed 5 March 2017, <https://blog.oup.com/2017/01/emotional-dynamics-right-wing-political-populism/>
- Sanoja, P 2009, 'Ideology, institutions and ideas: Explaining political change in Venezuela', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 394-410.
- Sargsyan, IL & Bennett, A 2016, 'Discursive emotional appeals in sustaining violent social movements in Iraq, 2003–11', *Security Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 608-645.
- Scheff, TJ, 2011, 'Social–emotional origins of violence: a theory of multiple killing', *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 453-460.
- Shipani, A & Mander, B 2013, 'Viva Hugo: the cult of Chávez lives on in Venezuela', *Financial Times*, viewed 5 March 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/afac6754-0503-11e3-9ffd-00144feab7de>
- Skaperdas, S & Grofman, B 1995, 'Modeling negative campaigning', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 01, pp. 49-61.
- Smilde, D 2007, 'The Gospel according to Hugo', *Trinity College*, viewed 20 March 2017, <http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol9No3/GospelAccording%20to%20Hugo.htm>
- Stanley, B 2008, 'The thin ideology of populism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 95-110.



- Sullivan, GB 2015, 'Collective emotions', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 383-393.
- Taggart, P 1995, 'New populist parties in Western Europe', *West European Politics*, vol. 18, no.1, pp. 34-51.
- Trice, HM & Beyer, JM 1986, 'Charisma and its routinization in two social movement organizations', *Research in organizational behaviour*, vol. 8, pp. 113-164.
- Tuomela, R 2013, *Social ontology: Collective intentionality and group agents*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
- Valentino, NA, Brader, T, Groenendyk, EW, Gregorowicz, K & Hutchings, VL 2011, 'Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 156-170.
- Valentino, NA, Gregorowicz, K & Groenendyk, EW, 2009, 'Efficacy, emotions and the habit of participation', *Political Behavior*, vol. 31, no. 3, p. 307.
- Von Scheve, C & Ismer, S 2013, 'Towards a theory of collective emotions', *Emotion Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 406-413.
- Walter, A, Van der Brug, W & van Praag, P 2014, 'When the stakes are high: party competition and negative campaigning', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 550-573.
- Weyland, K 2003, 'Economic voting reconsidered crisis and charisma in the election of Hugo Chávez', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 36, no. 7, pp. 822-848.
- Wilpert, G 2007, 'The 47-hour coup that changed everything', *Venezuelanalysis*, viewed 5 December 2016, <http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2336>
- Wright, WR 2013, *Café con leche: Race, class, and national image in Venezuela*, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX.
- Žižek, S 2006, 'Against the populist temptation', *Critical inquiry*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 551-574.

Zúquete, JP 2008, 'The missionary politics of Hugo Chávez', *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 91-121.

## Appendix A

### CODING GUIDE:

#### **Instructions:**

- You are about to read an extract from one of the Alo Presidente's episodes.
- For every sentence, the reader should try to determine if this sentence evokes either one of the emotional appeals or populist appeals.
- The reader should try to actively see any specifications about the narratives implied in the sentence in order to understand Chávez use of language as a strategy.
- Who are these speeches aimed at? How do these strategies conform or depart from what we think about populism?

#### **Emotional appeals:**

**Fear (emotional appeals):** This sentence shows a threat to a target audience (either a person or a number of people from the opposition). More specifically, every time he mentions the word "expropriate" to the Venezuelan opposition or private industries.

**Anger (emotional appeals):** This sentence elicits anger and outrage by talking about a division of the "us" vs "them". Also, if the speaker chooses to attack a politician, a leader or a group of people by calling it names and degrading a person, group or country (e.g., United States). Also, if he makes any mention of colonisation or the Spanish colony in Venezuela.

**Enthusiasm (emotional appeals):** The president states that he is very happy or filled with joy over any event or situation in his life and he encourages his audience to be excited about the **future**. The sentence might have exclamation marks as a way of suggesting encouragement. He talks about liberty; about finally being free from the

empire and from capitalism. He talks about a future with unity, unity between people from different backgrounds and social classes.

**Pride (emotional appeals):** This sentence talks about the Bolivarian movement and the revolution as the best thing that has happened to the country. It shows a high-level or appreciation for Venezuela as a country. The sentence has a very patriotic-nationalistic tone. He praises someone in his government or the Bolivarian revolution. This sentence describes an achievement made by the Bolivarian government in the *past or currently ongoing* and it states good social deeds made by the government or by president Chávez himself.

**Amusement (emotional appeals):** This sentence includes a joke told by the president to amuse his audience, which also happens every time he sings. The sentence might be a personal anecdote with expressions that aim to make the audience laugh.

**Anxiety (emotional appeals):** This sentence cites a crime or any occurrence related to crime. It also states any criminal attempts against the president or against Venezuelan citizens either made by the opposition or the United States. It states any type of occurrence in regards to the instability of the capitalist world order and terrorist threats. It may also mention the lack of resources in Venezuela as part of an economic crisis caused by neoliberalism. This emotional appeal is aimed towards his followers.

**Rage (emotional appeals):** This sentence incites people to go out on the street against the “bourgeois” class, to protest against capitalists and the opposition and to defend the Bolivarian revolution. Every time he urges people to go and ‘battle’ the enemy (the enemy can be capitalists, the opposition, the media, big corporations).

**Sympathy (emotional appeals):** In this sentence, the president talks about the poor and the vulnerable (it might be one or many people and he might also refer to a member

of his family or the cabinet and not only to 'poor' or underprivileged citizens). This sentence elicits sympathy by showing any sign or display of a sad situation.

### **Populism<sup>ii</sup>:**

**Anti-elitism (populism):** Every time the speaker refers to the elites or the "bourgeois", "capitalists", "the rich" or is indirectly referring to any type of elite (whether it is the elite of the country or the United States as the hegemon or previous 'world' elite).

**Appeals to the people (populism):** This sentence mentions either "El pueblo" ("the people"), "The citizens, the voters", "the taxpayers", "the consumers", "Venezolanos", "Compatriotas" or "Revolucionarios". He also tries to refer to Venezuelans in general by addressing them directly for example: 'look at your Venezuelan father or mother taking care of your son or daughter' (Alo Presidente, 1999, episode 4). He also mentions Bolívar as an example or a metaphor of how Venezuelans were able to liberate themselves from the Spanish colonisation and how, now, Venezuelans can liberate themselves from capitalism. The sentence has populist connotations with phrases such as: "I am just like you" and "I will give power to the people".

**Use of colloquialism (populism):** This sentence shows 'Venezuelan slang', with phrases such as "chamo", "vale" or other colloquialisms used in the daily life of the average Venezuelan citizen.

---

### **Notes**

<sup>i</sup> These descriptions were based on Ted Brader's (2006) definition of each emotional appeal as it appears in his book "Campaigning for the hearts and minds: How emotional appeals in Political Ads works"

---

<sup>ii</sup> These descriptions followed Hawkins (2009), Jagers and Walgrave (2007) and Rooduijn and Pauwels's (2011) work on content analysis and definitions of populism. They served as guidelines to create the codebook and what to look for in Chávez's populist speech.