

Violent Extremism Intervention – the Social versus the Ideological Approach

Submitted in part fulfilment of the Masters in
Research Degree, 2018.

Lindsay Rogerson, Student Number 42361419, Bachelor of
Social Science, Department of Security Studies &
Criminology, submission date: 23 November 2018.



Table of Contents

Abstract.....	4
Statement of Originality.....	5
1.0 Introduction	6
1.1 Background	6
1.2 Research Gap	8
1.3 The Project	9
1.4 Research Question and Aims.....	10
1.5 The Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program	11
2.0 Methodology.	13
2.1 Introduction.....	13
2.2 Research strategy.....	13
2.3 Research method – Qualitative versus Quantitative.....	13
2.4 Research approach and data collection.....	15
2.5 Research process.....	15
2.6 Ethical considerations.....	18
2.7 Research Limitation	18
3.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.....	19
3.1 Introduction.....	19
3.1 Counter Narratives	21
3.2 The Public Health Model.....	24
3.3 Sociological Intervention Programs	26
3.4 Concepts in Violent Extremism	29
3.5 Terrorism	29
3.6 Radicalisation.....	30
3.7 Counter-Radicalisation, Deradicalisation and Disengagement.....	31
4.0 Program Evaluation	34
4.1 Introduction.....	34
4.2 Common characteristics of Intervention Programs.....	35
4.3 Approaches: Custodial or Non-Custodial Program	36
4.4 Voluntary or Non-Voluntary.....	36
4.5 Deradicalisation or Disengagement	36
4.6 Is the Program Subject of a Grant?	36
4.7 Does the program adopt a sociological or an ideological approach, or is it non-specific?	37
4.8 New South Wales Programs.....	37
4.9 Living Safe Together Program	39
4.10 Non-government Agencies	39
4.11 Victoria and other Australian States	41
4.12 Australian Multicultural Foundation.....	42
4.13 Australian Muslim Youth Leadership and Peer Mentorship Program	42
4.14 International Programs.....	43
4.15 Norway	44

4.16	Sweden	45
4.17	Denmark.....	45
4.18	Germany	46
4.19	Los Angeles	47
4.20	Common Characteristics of CVE Intervention Programs	48
4.21	Grounded Theory	51
4.22	Models of Radicalisation	52
4.23	Precht's Model of A Typical Radicalisation Model.....	53
4.24	Pre-radicalisation.....	54
4.25	Conversion and Identification with Radical Islam	54
4.26	Indoctrination and increased group bonding.....	55
4.27	Actual Acts of Terrorism	55
4.28	Moghaddam's Model of the Staircase to Terrorism	56
4.29	Pro-Integration Model	57
4.30	Social Relations	59
4.31	Coping.....	59
4.32	Identity.....	59
4.33	Ideology	60
4.34	Action orientation	60
4.35	Push, Pull and Personal Factors	60
4.36	Intervention Programs – use of Push, Pull factors	62
4.37	Los Angeles – Mental Health Approach	63
4.38	The Community Support Intervention Program (CISP) of Victoria.....	63
4.39	Overview.....	65
5.0	Program Evaluations	66
5.1	Introduction.....	66
5.2	Evaluating Intervention Programs.....	67
5.3	Non-Government Agencies	69
5.4	Ideology	70
5.5	Sociological Approach	72
5.6	The Public Health Approach.....	75
5.7	Overview	75
6.0	Conclusion.....	78
	Reference List.....	83

Abstract.

The approach of this thesis is to compare the ideological and sociological approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE) intervention. The radicalisation of people to violent extremism has been a significant problem for Western governments for several decades. Successful deradicalisation of extremists has not been an easy task, as it requires the person to change their ideology that is often deeply ingrained in their psyche. The traditional approach to deradicalisation has been the use of counter-narratives, which has drawn criticism due to the poor preparation and lack of consultation with religious leaders and academics.

Recently there has been a shift towards disengagement from violent extremism, which allows the person to maintain their extremist beliefs, but refrain from engaging in violence. My research begins with an analysis of existing CVE programs, nationally and internationally, to determine what interventions are commonly used. This includes government and non-government operated programs. Grounded theory is used to identify key attributes of successful programs.

The research indicates the use of 'push, pull and personal factors' in developing interventions has a higher likelihood of success. However there is still a need for the ideological approach, especially when providing advice and guidance, however it should be supplemented with social support for stability.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed)____Lindsay Rogerson____Date: 23 November 2018_____

Candidate's name

1.0 Introduction

This thesis will conduct research in the field of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), specifically the areas of disengagement, radicalisation and deradicalisation. The goal of the research is to determine which is the best approach CVE intervention. There has already been considerable research conducted on radicalisation and deradicalisation. However, there has been much less research conducted on disengagement from violent extremism (Horgan, 2009). This is mainly because the terminology is relatively new and reflects a new approach by those who had previously viewed deradicalisation as the answer to violent extremism. This thesis will attempt to add to the currently scant literature on disengagement by comparing the ideological and sociological approaches to disengagement. Unfortunately there is no sharp distinction between deradicalisation and disengagement in practice. Quite often the two terms are interchangeable and there is not enough open source information to be able to assess program mechanics or outcomes. This means the researcher has to rely on basic details that are openly available and compare these with theories of radicalisation, deradicalisation and disengagement.

Deradicalisation from violent extremism has received some criticism because it requires a change in the mindset of the subject, which is not easily achieved. Disengagement, on the other hand, allows the subject to maintain their extremist viewpoints, as it only requires the subjects to refrain from violence. There are critics to this course of action because it might mean that there are radicalised people showing incredible restraint within the community with the potential of sliding back into extremist violence.

1.1 Background

The radicalisation of vulnerable people to violent extremism has been a significant problem for Western governments for several decades. Many young people are considered vulnerable due to a number of social factors, such as their lack of identity (McDonald, 2011:178). McDonald (2011:185) further describes the lack of identity leading to a crisis of identity of their self and their relationships with others. Identifying methods to successfully deradicalise vulnerable people has proved difficult. However, this may be due to the approach to the problem. People can be considered vulnerable to radicalisation due to their ethnic, religious, and political or profession group (Young et al, 2015:3). Members of minority groups are often excluded from or discriminated by mainstream society, because of their differences. This results in not receiving support from healthcare, education, democratic representation and not being respected for their beliefs (Day and Kleinmann (2017:21).

The radicalisation of would-be terrorists was considered to be largely due to religious or ideological beliefs. The solution to counter this belief was a counter argument or narrative. This practice was used to dissuade the would-be terrorist from engaging in violent behaviour. However, Day and Kleinmann (2017:14) have argued that countering violent extremism (CVE) should avoid ideology and belief and instead focus on affective bonds, social practices and friendships, as they argue that these are more significant factors.

Over the past 15 years, Western governments have spent vast amounts of time and resources into combating or countering violent extremism (Harris-Hogan and Barrelle, 2016:1). Day and Kleinmann (2017:20) argue that CVE programs should stop trying to debate the finer points of Islamic theology, as this is more likely to create a backlash from fence sitters. The term 'fence sitters' refers to members of the Muslim faith who are undecided about the intentions of the government, but as a result of government interference in their religion take away their support from the government. Another result of these efforts is that they distance governments from mainstream Muslim communities, because terrorism or extremism is seen as

an Islamic problem. Grossman and Tahiri, (2015:18) also found that some community members felt that reactive counter-narratives had lost their effectiveness.

Thus, in more recent times, the focus has swung away from deradicalisation to disengagement. Disengagement entails a change in one's behaviour, such as refraining from using violence as an outlet for extremism ideology, but does not necessarily change the subject's beliefs (Rabasa et al, 2010:5). People may still hold extremist views but these views do not lead to violence. Disengagement is largely seen as a preventative measure, which occurs before a crime has been committed. It provides alternatives for governments through prevention rather than incarceration if an offence had not been committed. Disengagement can also occur post offence as a means of rehabilitation.

The Pro-Integration Model (PIM), developed by Barrelle (2015:129), recommends disengagement from extremism, rather than deradicalisation. The PIM identifies 5 domains that affect a person's disengagement from violent extremism. These domains are social relations, coping, identity, ideology and action orientation. The sociological approach does consider ideology and religion, however it holds no more weight than the other domains. Barrelle (2016:130) illustrates that disengagement might mean a complete break from the social norms, values, attitudes, relationships and social networks in order to split from the group. Support from the program is important during this process in order for success. The PIM serves as the theoretical framework for the Australian Federal Government's intervention programs, also known as early intervention (Australian Government 2015:3. PIM has been adapted as a risk assessment tool, known as the 'Radar Tools'.

1.2 Research Gap

Barrelle (2015:130) states there are less than 20 empirically based publications on individual disengagement in a Western Democratic context. The PIM is the only government operated individual disengagement program currently operating in Australia. This means there is very little data available to measure the effectiveness of intervention programs. This research project will attempt to evaluate evidence that will help to better understand the effectiveness of intervention programs.

The importance of successful intervention programs cannot be stressed enough. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has seen many Australian citizens travel to the conflict zone as foreign fighters in support of the Islamic State (Zammit 2015:7). Those that cannot make the trip to the conflict zone have been encouraged by the Islamic State to undertake terrorist acts on home soil. Two examples of this are the Lindt Café Siege in 2014 (Zammit 2015:2) and the shooting of New South Wales Police Accountant Curtis Cheng in 2015 (NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard 2016:1). Another important consideration is that returning foreign fighters from the conflict zone will have to be reintegrated back into the community. Similarly, their children, whether born in Australia or in the conflict zone, will also have to integrate into the community. The participation in a disengagement program may facilitate this process.

1.3 The Project

This research project seeks to analyse and compare the social and ideological approaches to disengagement from violent extremism. The social approach to disengagement uses a range of interventions including identity, coping, social relations, as well as ideology, whereas the ideological approach focuses entirely on political or religious dialogue. Whilst the ideological approach does possess some of the characteristics of deradicalisation, there is some distinction on how the programs are administered.

An example of the difference in administration can be seen with the implementation of the Australian Attorney General's Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program (Australian Government, 2015:1) in New South Wales and Victoria. The program is also known as the Early Intervention Program and has been delivered to all the states and territories of Australia. In NSW, the program is administered by the Department of Justice, which chairs a committee of government service providers. In Victoria, the program is led by the State Police, but the day-to-day running was controlled by the Islamic Council of Victoria (Le Grand & Urban, 2017), but is now controlled by The Australian National Imam's Council (ANIC). ANIC is the only central Islamic body that holds key representation from Australian-based Muslim Clerics. ANIC was established in 2006 (ANI website 2018).

1.4 Research Question and Aims

Is the social approach to disengagement from violent extremism more effective than the ideological approach? How is success measured in intervention programs?

The aim of the research is to measure the frequency and type of interventions selected for the participants during CVE Intervention programs. The result will provide empirical evidence of what is effective in the disengagement process. The evidence maybe used by governments and academia to effectively tailor their countering violent extremism policy. The research will also serve as a useful comparative study as there has been a dearth of in-depth studies on Australian intervention programs.

Another goal in this project is to determine how success is measured within the intervention program. For example, completion of all the activities in a program might be considered a success, depending on what the baseline behaviour was of the participant. Observable disengagement from violent extremism would be an ideal outcome, however this may not be observable during the length of the program.

1.5 The Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program

In 2015, the Australian Government's Attorney General's Department (2015:1) launched the Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program. The program has been or is being implemented in each state and territory of Australia. The program identifies at-risk individuals, and provides tailored services to address the root causes of their radicalisation (Australian Government 2015:1). The rollout of the program has been prioritised to the more populated states of New South Wales and Victoria. The demographics of each state vary, so the program is adaptable to the population of each state. For example, if Western Australia experiences a high risk of terrorism from white supremacy groups, the program can be targeted towards that group.

A set of risk assessment tools, known as the Radar 'Tools' (Australian Government 2016:7) were developed using a set of indicators based on the 5 domains of the PIM. These tools are used during the risk assessment process of the program and during the individually tailored case management plans to connect participants with services such as mentoring and coaching, counselling, educations and employment support (Australian Government 2015:1). Referral to the program can occur in a number of ways- either through State and Federal Police Forces, community leaders, family members, teachers, or other concern people (Australian Government 2015:1).

Key to the program is the establishment of the position of State Intervention Coordinator. The Intervention Coordinator is responsible for screening participants, conducting risk assessments, identifying intervention activities and managing the participant through the process. The occupant of the position varies from state to state. In NSW, it is occupied by a police officer, whilst in Victoria the position is occupied by a civilian. Both states are oversighted by the Australian Federal Police. The qualitative data required for this project was to have been obtained from the Intervention Coordinators. The coordinators record the data from the program as part of the overall process of managing the caseload. The data is also used to report to the Federal Government on the performance of the program.

It was originally envisaged to analyse data from the Early Intervention Programs in the both Victoria and New South Wales. However, due to the confidentiality of the information held by the two organisations, this was not feasible. Therefore this project will now conduct an analysis of CVE programs, nationally and internationally, to determine what interventions are commonly used in intervention programs and how their effectiveness is measured.

This project will also evaluate how success is measured within the intervention programs studied. One major success is observable disengagement from violent extremism, however this may not be observable during the course of the program. The program coordinators may measure success through different methods. For example, completion of all the activities in a program might be considered a success, depending on what the baseline behaviour was of the participant.

This project will use a qualitative approach using open sources to compare the implementation of the intervention program in two different states, which may allow us to determine the most effective approach.

2.0 Methodology.

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to compare different approaches to countering violent extremism through intervention. Currently, the two main approaches are deradicalisation and disengagement. The latter is the strategy adopted by the Australian Attorney General's CVE Intervention Program. (Australian, Government, 2018). Commenced in 2015, all the states and territories of Australia have adopted the program. There has been a significant swing away from deradicalisation to disengagement. Disengagement from violent extremism differs somewhat from deradicalisation in that it focuses on a number of other dimensions, rather than just focusing on the ideological aspect. Unfortunately, the majority of CVE programs in the past have focussed mainly on deradicalisation, which has meant that the majority of the literature has also focused on this.

2.2 Research strategy

Through a case study approach this thesis will compare the sociological and ideological approaches to CVE intervention. Whilst the Australian Attorney General's CVE Intervention Program is the primary activity in Australia, there are other CVE programs operated by government and non-government organisations (NGO) at the community level. These programs also contribute to CVE efforts at local and state levels. This thesis will analyse programs at the state, national and international levels to establish their approaches to CVE intervention.

2.3 Research method – Qualitative versus Quantitative

Koehler (2017:189) suggests three ways of evaluating deradicalisation programs; integrity, qualitative and quantitative. Integrity evaluation scrutinises the organisational set up, whether it is a government or non-government agency. In this context integrity means that the program is operated ethically, there is no misinterpretation of qualitative data and each step on the case management process is documented. Qualitative evaluations assess what methods and tools are used in the program, for instance, the 'Radar Tools' mentioned in the previous chapter. 'Radar' is the assessment tool used in the Government's national CVE Intervention Program (Attorney General's Department, 2016).

Quantitative evaluation measures all the verifiable and relevant data in the programs output (Köehler, 2017:189-190). In this case, quantitative data would include the number of people recommended for the program, the number who agree to participate and those that actually agree to participate as well as the activities undertaken as part of the treatment in the program. Unfortunately, the population may be as little as 12 participants, which is too small for true representative analysis.

I initially considered that obtaining quantitative data for the thesis would be easier and timely given the short timeframe for the thesis. However obtaining data from government sources has proved more difficult than first thought, given the confidential nature of the intervention program. This thesis thus uses a qualitative approach by analysing government reports, academic papers and media articles. It also adopts a case study to better understand the common themes and how CVE programs can be improved. This type of approach does not require ethics approval, but will still provide sufficient analysis for the needs of the thesis. Qualitative analysis will give a clearer picture of what interventions both programs have used and can be more readily obtained in the timeframe available to the research project.

2.4 Research approach and data collection

This thesis will adopt a deductive approach to the research question. The research question specifies there are two approaches to CVE intervention to be studied. The methods used by New South Wales have indicated they are using the sociological approach, which focuses on a holistic approach to disengagement while Victoria uses the ideological approach in disengagement.

This thesis will analyse open source secondary data from government agencies, academic institutions and reports from non-government agencies involved in the CVE process. All evidence will be collected through official channels from the source.

2.5 Research process

The research process begins with clarification of the terms used in CVE intervention. Due to the recent nature in this area of research, some of the terms used can be interchangeable and are often mistaken. This thesis will rely heavily on the collection of documents from government and non-government sources. This will provide primary evidence of the activities of intervention programs at state, national and international levels. The majority of these documents will be from open sources, with some being sourced through open media.

Given the highly political nature of the CVE programs, some states or jurisdictions may not be forthcoming with the necessary primary empirical data. The programs are often considered to be highly political due to the constant threat of terrorism and the programs are a move away from detention towards voluntary disengagement. However, there is sufficient data and information from open

sources to form a qualitative assessment. Whenever a program participant offends or reoffends, there is significant media coverage as it highlights a possible government failure in providing protection of the public from violent extremists.

The analysis of data obtained during the qualitative process often includes surveys and in-depth interviews with program participants. The data is then coded into pre-determined categories that allow the researcher to classify the information or data. Unfortunately this thesis is relying on analysing data that already exists in documents and does not have the benefit of creating an appropriate tool to conduct interviews. Therefore document analysis will be the major form of data collection.

I consider that grounded theory is an appropriate school of thought to further analyse the findings of the research component of this thesis. Grounded theory allows a wider range of documents to be included in the research process, such as newsletters, memos and media items. The aim of grounded theory is to help generate theory rather than simply providing mechanistic processes to undertake analysis (Walter ed. 2012: 423). However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, it will only use grounded theory to illuminate analysis.

Grounded theory is an inductive approach to research, in which hypotheses and theories are generated from the data collected (Clamp & Gough 1999). I consider this a more effective research approach in answering the research question, as it is not based on assumption, but rather analysing the data. Engward (2013:37) considers that grounded theory provides the researcher the opportunity to use any data collection method that best addresses the research question. The results of a grounded theory study are expressed as a substantive theory (Engward 2013:40).

Grounded theory is often used where there is not a hypothesis before analysis of the data. The researcher can use any data collection method that best addresses the research question (Engward (2013:38). Grounded theory emphasises the importance of writing memos throughout the research process (Walter 2010:423). This method was used to gather the information about the intervention programs I will identify in chapter 4.

The value of grounded theory here is that it avoids making assumptions by adopting a more neutral approach of human action (Engward 2013:37). The researcher can use many forms of information for data analysis, including newsletters, newspapers and websites. I will be using the principles of grounded theory in order to inform an objective, pragmatic assessments of program performance and efficacy. However I am not proposing a theory, but rather identifying those characteristics that enhance the intervention process.

It is normal to discuss research findings in light of a particular theoretical approach. However given the infancy of CVE initiatives, within the CVE literature there has been a push towards understanding the effectiveness of these initiatives. CVE scholars and practitioners have attempted to construct metrics and frameworks that can be used in the field for evaluation purposes (Home Office 2016: 1).

Radicalisation is not short of theories and models depicting the path to violence. Individuals may not fall completely within a particular model and therefore their motivation may be different, requiring differing approaches to disengagement.

Koehler (2018:69) recognises four main theoretical schools dedicated to the process of radicalisation; the sociological, social movement, empirical, and psychological. The sociological school identifies the cause of radicalisation as lying with the individual claiming a lost identity in a hostile world. The social movement claim that radicalisation is caused by group dynamics, peer pressure

and a constructed identity. Empiricists seek to identify individual level motivations by classifying different roles within a group, whilst the psychological schools believe that no terrorist profile has been found. John Horgan is one of the main authors on this school of theory (Koehler 2018:70) and also the main author on disengagement rather than deradicalisation.

As indicated earlier, the intervention program utilises varying approaches and each approach may fall within a different school of thought. The pro-integration model also recognises differing approaches to intervention. The thesis will show how the intervention activities as linked to the Pro-Integration Model and how that links in with the different schools of thought discussed earlier. This approach should identify the causes behind the participant's motivation and in due course disengagement.

2.6 Ethical considerations

Whilst this project will not be conducting interviews to gather data, one must still consider the quality of documents analysed. Ideally, peer-reviewed books and articles provide empirical research that can be relied upon. Whilst media articles do not possess the same academic rigour they can be relied upon to a certain extent in regards to accuracy. Information contained on websites alone should be scrutinised for qualifying information, such as the author's identification details, the date of writing or posting and the originating website. Another consideration is the perceived knowledge of the author writing about violent extremism, given the complexity of the language surrounding the subject, although this should become evident during the process of analysis.

2.7 Research Limitation

Most information held by law enforcement bodies regarding violent extremism is classified as confidential, which affects public release of the information. Koehler (2018:194) describes that the highly political nature of deradicalisation programs might prevent key stakeholders from supporting independent and effective evaluations. This is also true with the Australian intervention program. Due to the large sums of money being laid out, there is political pressure to see the successful implementation and tangible results. To address this, Koehler (2018:195) suggests that commonly accepted standards should be discussed, set and implemented. This will be highlighted in the following chapters when discussing the results.

3.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.

3.1 Introduction

This thesis will study intervention programs for countering violent extremism (CVE). The literature review will examine CVE programs in Australia and abroad that have been documented and peer reviewed. CVE programs vary in their approach to deradicalising or disengaging people from violent extremism.

The Australian Government describes violent extremism as the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals (Baker 2017:1). Countering violent extremism is the non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or group from mobilizing towards violence (Weine et al: 2017:54).

A person that is prepared to undertake violent extremism is said to have been 'radicalised'. Radicalisation is defined as the support for violent behaviour as a means in hostile inter-group political actions. However, radicalisation of opinion does not necessarily lead to radicalisation of behaviour and vice versa (McCauley: 2017; Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018: 95). This view is shared by Young et al (2015:3) who recognises that radicalisation can, but does not always, lead to terrorism, just as disengagement can, but does not always mean that an individual or group will no longer hold radical views.

There have also been significant studies and literature on the topics of radicalisation, counter radicalisation, deradicalisation and disengagement. As such, definitions of the concepts of radicalisation, deradicalisation, extremism and counter-extremism often vary considerably (Butt & Tuck 2014:2).

Academics, policy-makers and practitioners cannot identify one single cause that contributes to individuals becoming radicalised, but rather a number of factors that over time can alter an individuals behaviours and beliefs (Butt & Tuck 2014:2).

Similarly, methods of deradicalisation are varied and administered in various fashions. Some programs that attempt to counter radicalise or deradicalise cover a broad range of activities, including communication between state, civil society and individuals. They may also include engagement and outreach programs, community development programs and law enforcement (Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018:96).

Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018:96) classifies the scope of these programs into macro, meso and micro levels. At the macro level is public diplomacy and online intervention. At the meso level is community outreach and dialogue. At the micro level are intervention programs. Butt & Tuck (2014:7) state that the 'Amsterdam

Together Forum' used the same three levels to develop the 'Slotevarrt Action Plan.

Weine et al. (2017:210) identifies first and second waves of CVE in the United States of America. First wave CVE is broad-based community engagement, which is largely run by law enforcement and featured large-scale engagement. Unfortunately, this had the adverse effect of stigmatising Muslim communities. The second wave is specifically based on intervention of the individual. Wine et al (2017:211) thinks that CVE programs do not need to be framed by law enforcement, but instead could be managed through a public health framework, involving disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communications, education and public policy. This change in approach or waves followed the White House CVE Summit in 2015 (Weine et al 2017:209).

A similar ecological model consisting of four levels of interpersonal violence is recognised by Eisenman & Flavahan (2017:342). The four levels are the individual, the relationship, the community and the societal. The first level examines biological and person history factors that increase the risk for violent extremism; the second level, or relationship level, examines close relationships that may increase the risk of perpetration (Eisenman & Flavahan 2017:34). The community examines environments, such as schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods in which social relationships occur. The fourth or societal level looks at the macro level such as domestic economic, educational health and social policies as well as global political, social and military policies (Eisenman & Flavahan 2017:343).

3.1 Counter Narratives

Counter narratives are by far the most common form of deradicalisation or intervention. Counter-narrative is frequently advanced as a principle means of

preventing terrorism/violent extremism. It is firmly entrenched in government policy, political activism and in public debate in a number of Western countries (Glazzard 2017:5). In addition, foundational CVE initiatives have focussed on the macro level, with policies aimed at addressing entire national populations (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016). Counter narrative spans the three levels of CVE- macro, meso and micro. At the macro level, governments promote counter narrative online, at the meso level, counter narrative is promoted as a form of community engagement and at the micro level there are intervention programs.

It is not surprising that counter-narratives are so commonly used as it is widely recognised that terrorist groups utilize an extensive range of communicative strategies to promote strategic objectives, one of the most pervasive of which involves the use of narratives (Braddock & Horgan 2015:381). Violent extremists recruit followers through promoting an ideological worldview that is encapsulated in what is often termed the 'jihadi narrative' (Glazzard 2017:3). The narratives have a common theme, that Muslims are under attack from the West; they must fight to defend themselves; the West is an enemy of Islam; and that violence is not only necessary for survival but is also a route to salvation.

Glazzard (2017:3) claims that alternative narratives that are more compelling, truthful and promote human values can defeat this narrative. However, Glazzard (2017:3) is critical of the current counter-narrative approach and suggests that it lacks a fully articulated theory, as it is largely the product of government policy-makers and civil society practitioners, rather than academics. This may be due to the significant involvement of law enforcement in most CVE programs this should be supplemented by the insights of academics, educators and community leaders to afford a multi-disciplinary approach to CVE policy (Macnair & Frank 2017:162).

The tendency for CVE counter-narrative programs to focus on Islamic extremism may have the adverse effect of creating religious and social discrimination which

may ironically lead to an increase in social conditions that breed extremist attitudes (Macnair & Frank 2017:152). Aside from potentially spreading Islamophobia, CVE programs that focus on Islamic extremism and promote community engagement are often met with suspicion by Muslim communities because they are seen as another form of surveillance (Lakhani, 2012; Cohen, 2016; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016 & Macnair & Frank 2017). Similarly, programs that identify with engaging with vulnerable communities have been criticised as stigmatising a particular community (Young et al. 2015:3).

Githens-Mazer & Lambert (2010:889) are particularly critical of some politicians, the media and some academics, which they feel are relying on simple narratives to explain how an individual departs from point A ('a good Muslim boy') and arrives as point B ('a suicide bomber'). Such explanations rely on assumptions and 'conventional wisdom' rather than testable and falsifiable empirical research and methods. Moreover, the counter narrative approach is losing its appeal due to the adverse effects of focussing entirely on Muslim communities. Finally, any well-grafted CVE program should be effective against all types of extremism, not just the Islamic variant. (Macnair & Frank 2017:162).

This is evident in the 'Exit' Programs developed by the governments of Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Whilst their main concern is right-wing supporters and Neo-Nazis, the process of deradicalisation is similar to that of terrorism (Butt & Tuck 2014:23). There are similar arguments to be had when a person is attempting to leave a right wing or extremist group.

Whilst it is perhaps undeniable that the involvement of law enforcement agencies to some extent is necessary for CVE programs, many have argued that this approach alone is not enough to yield significant results (Cohen, 2016; Selim, 2016). It has been suggested that in order to be more successful, CVE initiatives must move away from this macro-level perspective towards one that is more

individualistic or community based (Baker, 2017; Dalgaard-Neilsen, 2013 & Macnair & Frank 2017).

What is also lacking in the literature is the evaluation of CVE programs, particularly programs using counter-narratives. This may be due to the lack of indicators depicting the progress of the program participant or it may be that a change in their attitude is sufficient to claim success.

3.2 The Public Health Model

More recently there has been a call for the adoption of the Public Health Model approach to CVE intervention. Eisenman & Flavahan (2017:341) suggest that the field of CVE should align with the broader field on violence prevention in programme, policy and research. They state that policy makers and professionals who work to prevent ideologically motivated violence are looking towards the Public Health Model for frameworks and collaboration.

The research in the CVE field is sparse in the area of systematically accounting for whether a violent extremist has been exposed to violence, either as a victim, or an offender. (Gill; Horgan, & Deckert 2017:342). An early exposure to violence as a victim or offender may increase the likelihood of a person resorting to violence - a concept recognised in domestic violence. Terrorism studies have long taught that terrorists were rational actors, not driven by mental illness. However, important new research has discovered that up to 40% of lone wolf terrorists had identifiable mental health problems (Weine et al 2017:55). Whilst this might not apply to all violent extremists it does provide an insight into the individual's mental health.

Weine et al (2017:211) therefore believe that CVE programs do not need to be driven by law enforcement, but instead could be managed through a public health framework. The public health system in many countries has been dealing with victims and offenders of domestic violence for many years. Violent extremism is another form of violence and the treatment of such could benefit from lessons learnt in domestic violence. To support this proposition, Weine et al (2017:211) explains that public health involves diverse disciplines relevant to CVE, such as psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communications, education and public policy. These components are mirrored in CVE intervention, however with a greater emphasis placed on security and intelligence.

In a similar vein, Eisenman & Flavahan (2017:345) draw comparisons between violent extremists and gang members, although there is little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. The same scholars also describe gang intervention across the micro, meso and macro levels of an ecological model, comparable to the CVE model illustrated by Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018:96). While this approach is not fully supported by empirical evidence, the position is not so preposterous when you consider that 'exiting' from right-wing and neo-Nazi groups is a similar process to deradicalising or disengaging from violent extremism.

Eisenman & Flavahan (2017:342) recognise four levels within an ecological model that depicts four levels of interpersonal violence- the individual, the relationship, the community and the societal. The first level identifies biological and person history factors that increase the risk of violent extremism in people exposed to radical viewpoints, whereas the second or relationship level examines close relationships that may increase the risk of perpetration by persons joining terrorist groups (Eisenman & Flavahan 2017:343).

When violent extremism is reframed as a violence prevention program, it becomes obvious that expertise in violence prevention should be at the table (Eisenman &

Flavahan 2017:346). Practitioners that deal with domestic violence on a daily or regular basis may have the certain expertise necessary to deal with violent extremism. At the very least, their expertise should not be ignored.

Eisenman & Flavahan (2017:346) also point out the downside to the public health model. CVE funding that is used to bolster violence prevention funds may cause distrust in the community as the funding is coming from a government focussed on counter-terrorism.

3.3 Sociological Intervention Programs

The public health model has a number of characteristics that are similar to the sociological approach to intervention, such as providing a tailored approach for each individual. Traditional foundational CVE initiatives are broad based on a macro level, with policies aimed at addressing entire national populations (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016). The sociological model differs from the traditional counter narrative approach, in that it is not entirely focussed on ideology, but rather includes it as one element to be considered in the tailored approach.

Gøtzsche-Astrup, (2018:98) came to a similar conclusion stating, that at the micro level, the evidence suggests by providing participants with basic security, a predictable worldview and a sense of meaning is sufficient to protect them from radicalisation. One-on-one intervention programs are being touted as the way forward in deradicalisation and disengagement. The sociological approach to intervention provides support to radicalised individuals in multiple areas, such as employment, housing and education. Williams (2016:154) states that tailored interventions are at the heart of the UK's 'Channel' Program, as well as the 'Exit' Programs of Sweden, Germany, and the USA.

The Prevent Program in the United Kingdom has an intervention component known as “Channel” which, consists of a voluntary mentoring program for individuals judged to be at risk of radicalisation (Innes et al, 2017:259). Those identified as requiring Channel support receive a tailored package of support. The types of support available include educational, vocational, mental health and other vulnerabilities. Ideological mentoring is common (Home Office 2017:6). The literature is unclear as to the content of the mentoring program whether it uses counter narrative alone or provides other activities. Channel was criticised as it is closely aligned with surveillance activities under the Prevent umbrella. However, after a review in 2011, issues of integration and cohesion were separated out to the Department of Communities and Local Government, whilst local practitioners continued to manage local problems, such as Islamophobic hate crime (Innes et al, 2017:262).

The governments of Sweden, Denmark and Germany have developed ‘Exit’ Programs. Whilst their main concern is right wing supporters and Neo-Nazis the process of deradicalisation is not dissimilar to that of terrorism (Butt & Tuck 2014:23). The European Exit Programs generally place less emphasis on ideology and instead focus on practical and economic assistance, psychological counseling and assistance with forming new social ties outside the extremist group (Dalgaard-Neilsen, 2016:100).

Williams, (2016:154) points out that the main purpose was to develop a local CVE framework to emphasise tailored interventions. As the field of CVE evolves, the emphasis has been placed on the development of interventions tailored to the individual needs of the programs’ participants. However, Williams (2016:154) is critical of the programs, as he believes there is scant research, empirical or experimental regarding the psychological mechanisms that either bolster, or hinder the effectiveness of such interventions.

The 'Pro-Integration Model' (PIM), is a new conceptualisation of disengagement from violent extremism and reintegration into society, based on empirical and theoretical literature (Barrelle, 2015:133). The PIM is used in the Australian CVE Intervention Program and forms the basis of the 'Radar Tools', a risk assessment tool used to assess entrants to the program. PIM, and the 'Radar Tools' assess the domains of social relations, coping, identity, ideology, and action orientation (Barrelle, 2015:133). Ideology is just one component of five but does not dominate the assessment process.

The majority of the literature focuses on using counter narratives as an intervention aimed at radicalised individuals. This was largely due to violent extremism being viewed as a Muslim problem that required a counter argument to persuade the individual from engaging in violence. As the counter narratives were aimed at Muslim extremists, this seemed to condemn entire Muslim communities. The other issue that arose was the quality of the counter narrative. Often it was not based on any empirical research, rather relying on assumptions or conventional wisdom. Counter narratives are today considered out of date and counter productive.

The Public Health Model is relatively new and does not appear to be in wide spread practice in Australia, except perhaps for corrective services. It treats violent extremism as any other form of violence, rather than clouding the issue by including the religious or ideological narrative. Mental health is considered as a significant factor in preventing all types of violence.

Finally, the Sociological Model of intervention in Australia uses the 'Pro Integration Model' that analyses five domains as part of the risk assessment and treatment process. Ideology represents only a fifth of the areas treated. The model has only been operating for approximately 3 years and is still in its infancy. The literature

available does not explain in detail what interventions are used and how success is measured.

3.4 Concepts in Violent Extremism

The language surrounding violent extremism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is a relatively new field and the terminology is somewhat interchangeable (Baker 2017:1). In order to fully understand this thesis the concepts used are documented below.

3.5 Terrorism

The word 'terrorism' has been the subject of debate by academics for many years (Carver 2016:124), with no consensus being reached. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001 most Western governments avoided legislating a legal definition of terrorism, choosing to use the definitions of the United Nations. Terrorism offences included hijacking, hostage taking and assassination (Carver 2016:124-5).

These definitions had little reference to religious extremism. Schmid's definition (Carver 2016:127) focuses on the victim's characteristics, rather than those of the perpetrator. Ganor (2001) warns against participating in the terrorist versus freedom fighter debate, which might have once been true, but now it only serves to water down the definition of terrorist. Terrorist groups will naturally try to align themselves with the freedom fighter image in order to romanticise their recruitment.

Both Canada and Australia have challenged the idea that terrorism was indefinable by including a definition in their Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Carver 2016:125). Australia's Anti-Terrorism legislation is contained in Section 100.1 of Criminal Code Act, No. 12, 1995.

Under section 100.1 of the Criminal Code, a 'terrorist act' is defined as an action or threat of action where the act is done or threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of: coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth, State, Territory or foreign country (COAG 2016:12).

3.6 Radicalisation

Before 2001, the term 'radicalisation' had been used informally in academic literature to refer to a shift towards more radical politics, usually not referring to Muslims (Kundnani 2012:7). However, by 2004 the term had acquired a new meaning of psychological or theological process by which Muslims moved towards extremist views. The majority of definitions now used by academics now refer to an ideological shift or following. A simple definition is offered by Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018:94), radicalisation to violence is characterised by engaging with a culture of violence, peer pressure and a focus on in-group status. This version excludes an ideological reference. Kundnani (2012:14) recognises that the more complex models of radicalisation focus not only on religious ideology, but takes into account an interactive process between theological and social-psychological journeys.

The change in definition has led Western governments to focus on 'home grown' Islamic political violence. The concept of radicalisation has provided a new lens to view Muslim Communities in a poor light (Kundnani 2012:3). Muslim populations

are seen as 'suspect communities'; leading to civil rights abuses and a failure to understand the nature of political conflicts. Western Governments are using indicators of radicalisation as a means to construct an early warning system to detect theological violence (Kundnani, 2012:6). The indicators are not regarded as being sufficient to produce a terrorist, but are considered as indicators of risk (Kundnani, 2012:11). This has led to greater surveillance of Muslim communities in the Western world.

3.7 Counter-Radicalisation, Deradicalisation and Disengagement

The Australian Government defines counter-radicalisation as preventing a person from being radicalised; whilst deradicalisation is the process of reversing radicalisation once it has occurred (Baker, 2017:1).

Counter-radicalisation is concentrated on the prevention of radicalisation, prior to an individual adopting a radical view (Butt & Tuck, 2014: 3). Counter-radicalisation can be achieved at the macro or meso level through government messaging. It is not as commonly used as it was, with the current focus on individual tailored mentoring programs.

Deradicalisation is not too different to counter-radicalisation, whereas it seeks to reverse the process by helping to refute extremist ideologies and facilitate the departure of individuals from extremist groups (Butt & Tuck, 2014: 3). The messaging used in both processes is not too dissimilar, though in both cases, the audience is already committed to a belief system.

Disengagement is the term used to describe when a person stops using violence but may still maintain a radical ideology. When they change or moderate their beliefs and no longer subscribe to a radical ideology, it is called deradicalisation

(Attorney Generals Department 2015:17). It is disengagement that most modern day interventions programs seek to achieve.

In the next two chapters the research will evaluate the program variables of intervention programs operating in Europe, the United States of America, England and Australia. These variables include whether the program is aimed at deradicalisation or disengagement, voluntary or non-voluntary, government or NGO led, operating under a grant scheme and whether it uses the sociological or ideological approach.

4.0 Program Evaluation

4.1 Introduction

As indicated earlier, deradicalisation and other similar programs have been in existence since 2001. In contrast Australia has been tardy in some respects, having only implemented a formal disengagement program in 2015 (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit 2015). Prior to that, several projects had attempted broad based deradicalisation programs.

It is only in recent years that the main focus of Western governments has moved from deradicalisation to disengagement. Deradicalisation is aimed at changing a person's radical views to ones that are not radical, whilst disengagement allows the person to maintain their radical views but would disengage from violent behaviour. There have been a number of articles published on the implementation and success of deradicalisation programs, in particular, the Exit Programs of Europe (Bjørge 2011).

This thesis will now look at intervention programs and models to determine what is essential to achieve deradicalisation or disengagement. To do so, this chapter will compare the common components of programs at state, national and international levels. The aim is to identify key characteristics and approaches in the programs to determine whether the sociological, which focuses on a holistic interventions or the ideological approach, which focuses on ideology alone, or a combination of both has proved more successful.

Governments are not the only operators of intervention programs. Non-Government Organisations may be more active in deterring violent extremism because they have initial exposure to persons at risk. It is more likely that

governments will concentrate their efforts in one direction, or with specific individuals, only after such at-risk individuals have come under the notice of the authorities. Several NGOs may operate programs in the same space as government agencies. NGOs are often not as restricted as government agencies when it comes to operating community programs, as they do not carry administrative and governance burdens and often enjoy the confidence of the community, whereas people are often suspicious of government efforts. This is especially true when it comes to terrorism and violent extremism, as the affected communities may perceive government efforts as spying.

4.2 Common characteristics of Intervention Programs

A range of programs will be analysed by the absence or inclusion of certain characteristics to provide some form of measurement. Each program will be assessed on the following characteristics:

- Is it a government or non-government agency operating the program?
- What is the approach of the program?
- Is the program voluntary or non-voluntary?
- Is the aim of the program to disengage or deradicalise the participant?
- Is the program the subject of a grant, on going funding or start-up funding?
- Does the program adopt a sociological or an ideological approach, or is it non-specific?

Government or non-Governmental

This is relevant in establishing how the program was established, who is funding it, and how it is operated. In comparison, NGOs are not likely to have access to relevant intelligence on the background of the participant.

4.3 Approaches: Custodial or Non-Custodial Program

Whilst the clientele are somewhat different, intervention programs were established to operate in the pre-crime area as a means of prevention. However the custodial program may use the same indicators as non-custodial programs.

4.4 Voluntary or Non-Voluntary

If the program is voluntary, then it is more than likely that those participating will engage more freely than those who are required to engage. It also means that there is possibly a large number of people that have been identified as suitable but who would be left untreated.

4.5 Deradicalisation or Disengagement

Is the aim of the program to disengage the participant from violent extremism or is it to deradicalise the participant? As discussed earlier, the current focus is on disengagement, yet there are still numerous programs that aim for deradicalisation. To the practitioner there is little difference in deradicalisation or disengagement, compared to the academic's point of view. Broadly speaking, any effort to change or direct views can be considered as deradicalisation (Horgan 2009:3)

4.6 Is the Program Subject of a Grant?

Is the program the subject of a finite grant by the government or NGO, and what will happen when the money runs out? It is possible that some programs may be absorbed into the annual budget of the organisation, or some might just stop

being funded, which would mean the end of such programs (Multicultural NSW 2018).

4.7 Does the program adopt a sociological or an ideological approach, or is it non-specific?

Recently developed programs have generally adopted a more holistic approach focussing on more social issues rather than concentrating on ideology alone. This is especially true with Government operated programs. Ideologically focused programs concentrate on the single issue that has caused the participant to become violent. This form of program might be typically found in a religiously operated program. Non-specific focused programs are more likely to be operated by community groups and initiate activities that encourage participation.

4.8 New South Wales Programs

Commencing in 2015, the New South Wales Government Department of Justice implemented the Australian Attorney General's Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program, also colloquially known as the 'Early Intervention Program' (Barker 2017:1). The program is considered to be part of the National Disruption Group, which brings together a conglomeration of Federal and State agencies to form a consolidated approach to violent extremism.

The Australian Federal Police leads the National Disruption Group (NDG), a multi-agency approach to disrupting terrorism. There are a number of participating agencies which form the NDG who consolidate agency capabilities to prevent, disrupt and prosecute Australian nationals who travel to attempt to travel overseas and engage in hostilities. Those agencies include Attorney Generals, Crime

Commission, Immigration, Border Protection, taxation, defence, and state/federal police (AFP 2018).

The Diversion Team looks for alternatives to prosecution, by dealing with those who are considered vulnerable to radicalisation through early intervention (AFP 2018). The Early Intervention Program sits within that framework and is established in each state and territory of Australia. The Jurisdictional coordinator is the liaison person between the state and the Diversion Team.

Whilst the AFP has overall coordination of the intervention program, how the program is implemented in each state is left to state authorities. This allows each state to implement the program subject to the demographics of its' population. In New South Wales, the program has been coordinated by the Department of Justice, with two committees being formed, one to conduct risk assessments and the other to provide services to the participants. The latter included representatives from Health, Education, Corrective Services, juvenile justice and police.

The risk assessment is conducted by the committee using the 'Radar Tools', which as indicated earlier are based on the five domains of radicalisation described in the Pro-Integration Model. Those five domains are: social relations, coping, identity, ideology and action orientation (Barrelle 2015:129). The Jurisdictional Coordinator then uses the information from the assessment and assessment committee to develop individually tailored intervention plans. More often than not the intervention required or used does not relate to ideology, it is more likely to be a social aspect, such as identity, copying or social relations (Barrelle 2015). Hedayah (2018) generically describes the programs as consisting of individually tailored case management plans to connect individuals with services such as mentoring, coaching, counselling, education and employment support. Hedayah (2018) describes the program as the Australian Government

working with states and territories to provided effective diversion, referral and support programs.

4.9 Living Safe Together Program

Although not really an intervention program in its truest form, the Living Safe Together Program is recognised by Hedayah (2018) as being a capacity building program to build resilience against violent extremism. The program provides grants to community organisations that have a CVE capacity (Attorney General's Department 2018).

4.10 Non-government Agencies

In 2016, Multicultural NSW launched the Compact Grants Program (COMPACT), which provided funding to NSW NGOs to build their capacity in dealing with young people who are vulnerable to violent extremism. The NSW State Government, through Multicultural NSW, granted 8 Million dollars to community groups over a two-year period followed by an evaluation. The grants are an annual event. The goal of the grants has been to safeguard Australia's peaceful and harmonious way of life against extremist hate and violence (Multicultural NSW 2018).

The objectives of COMPACT are to build community harmony and resilience through sports and physical diversion, creative communications and active counter narrative, as well as education and community awareness.

Some of the recipients and purposes of COMPACT grants relevant to violent extremism include: -

- United Muslim Women's' Association (UMWA) – *Moving towards middle ground informing, engaging and evolving perspectives on violent extremism*. The UMWA's primary role is to protect women from domestic violence and in doing so contact hundreds of Muslim women in Sydney. The COMPACT Grant is being used to development counter narratives that strengthen the community's capacity to deal with the negative messaging many Muslim people receive as a result of negative publicity.
- Police Citizens Youth Clubs (various locations) and the NSW Police Force Youth Command – *Community Resilience Engaging Solutions Together (CREST)*. The funding from the grant was used to develop youth related activities to build trust between the police and youths in the areas of Liverpool, Belmore and Parramatta.
- All Together Now with Youth Action, Western Sydney University and Macquarie University – *Community Action for Preventing Extremism (CAPE) NSW: promoting resilience and response to far-right extremism*.
- Bankstown Youth Development Service with Bankstown City Council, Bankstown Poetry slam, Sir Joseph Banks High School, Together for Humanity, and other local partners – *Inclusion: Celebrating Stories of Strength*. The grant funding was used to create an intergenerational oral history project, which involves the participants interviewing their parents to understand their experiences in Australia.
- NSW Auburn Islamic Cultural Centre (Auburn Gallipoli Mosque) – *5 by 5 Youth Leadership Program*. Completion of a youth centre enabling young people from the local and other areas to engage in social activities. By meeting in the youth centre the young people are not exposed to people with radical ideas.
- Lebanese Muslim Association with Islamic Council of NSW – *IQRA: Educating Young Muslim Australians*. Many young Muslim men struggle with identity in Australia. The program tackles the social issues surrounding Muslim identity in Australia.

(Multicultural NSW COMPACT Partners 2016).

Hedayah (2018) recognises Multicultural NSW as providing a service to individuals and families of individuals who have been exposed to overseas conflicts, such as the war in Syria. The program provides a range of psychosocial and health services. COMPACT takes a distinctly sociological approach aimed at disengagement.

4.11 Victoria and other Australian States

Victoria, as with all other states of Australia, was subject of the implementation of the Early Intervention Program from 2015 onwards. However Victoria Police was already operating the Community Support Intervention Program (CISP), which was aimed at the rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists and offers a holistic approach to rehabilitation, including pre and post-release components. The program used religious and social engagement to rehabilitate and regenerate convicted terrorists and prisoners assessed as holding radical views. The Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV) operated the program. Upon introduction of the Early Intervention Program, the CISP was modified to include community members.

Houston and Donnelly (2017) indicated that CISP was developed by the Global Terrorism Research Centre at Monash University in Victoria, which receives funding from the Australian Research Council. In 2017, there were 22 people participating in CISP. For the 7 years leading up to 2017, the program has been operating in prisons. Following the fatal shooting of a participant, Khayre, in 2017, the Islamic Council of Victoria ceased their involvement with the program, on grounds that it was developing its own community based program. Professor Greg Barton was sceptical the program could continue effectively without ICV involvement (Le Grand & Urban 2017).

The Australian Attorney Generals Department's objective in the CISP program is to encourage radical Islamists to disengage from violent extremism through a mix

of religious, psychological and social strategies. The ICV was critical of the CISP only focussing on Islamist extremism and not right-wing extremism. Following the departure of the ICV, another Muslim organisation, the Imam's Council of Victoria, has taken over the role left by the ICV. Since announcing the departure of the ICV from the CISP there has not been any open source information released on the change.

4.12 Australian Multicultural Foundation

The Australian Multicultural Foundation (AMF) is an NGO, incorporated as a company in Victoria. Whilst the organisation does not operate an intervention program, it does provide training to organisations and community groups on how to recognise the early stages of violent extremism. The AMF provides this training in person as well as through online education. The training is delivered throughout the country, and is not limited to Victoria. The course provides the basic skills to enable participants to identify violent extremism in its early stages.

Early identification is paramount for people working in front line service providers as it may enable them to identify certain problematic behaviours and prevent their escalation. One recipient of the training in Sydney was the United Muslim Women Association that provides shelter for victims of domestic violence. The training is crucial for this group as many of the participants are mothers who might be the first to notice a change in their children's behaviour. The training gives mothers the skills to identify extremist behaviour and the awareness of how to report this to government or non-government organisations.

4.13 Australian Muslim Youth Leadership and Peer Mentorship Program

The program is a twelve-month course run in Victoria to broaden the social participation of young Muslims leaders. It is run in conjunction with the Islamic Council of Victoria and targets men and women aged between 25 and 30 years of age. The program's objectives are to: -

- Connect with at-risk young Muslims to reduce their sense of alienation;
- Establish alternative narratives that challenge extremist ideologies;
- Create opportunities for participants to engage with the broader community;
- Develop skills to identify and mentor other at risk Muslim youth;
- Develop media and communications skills to undertake speaking engagements to increase the public's awareness of Islam.

(AMF 2018).

4.14 International Programs

Exit programs have been operating in some European countries, such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Germany since the 1990s (Bertram 2015:134). The programs in all four countries are operated by private entities or NGOs, which collaborate with government agencies to tackle the problem of far-right extremism. The objective of deradicalisation is achieved through three means: (1), individual ideological deradicalisation, using religious and psychological counselling; (2) Collective deradicalisation using political negotiations to change a type of behaviour; and (3) Individual ideological deradicalisation using psychological measures and activities to engage the participant in new social situations and interactions (Schmid 2013:41).

As programs need to be able to meet the needs of individual disengagement and deradicalisation, and must also correspond with the political, social and cultural context, the programs are not necessarily interchangeable between countries (Bjørge and Horgan 2009, Barrelle 2014).

4.15 Norway

Professor Tore Bjørgo of the Norwegian Police University College first developed the Exit Program in Norway in 1997. Bjørgo was conducting research into racist and right-wing violence in Scandinavia when he realised that one of his contacts wanted to leave the movement, which led him to develop the program (Stern 2014:448).

The Exit Program has adopted an approach that young people become ideologically convinced because of their involvement in the group, often by charismatic people within the group. Members of the group are motivated by idealism, a strong sense of justice and responding to the suffering of others (Bjørgo 2011:280). The program places significant importance on social issues as a reason for the person's participation and focuses on group dynamics as the root cause of participation (Bjørgo 1997).

The program provides support to young people wishing to disengage from racist and other violent groups, as well as support for parents of children involved in racist groups by establishing support groups. The program also disseminates knowledge and experience to other professionals working in that area of occupation (Bjørgo, Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009:135).

One of the key lessons learnt is that successful intervention can have a stronger and positive influence if government agencies coordinate their efforts through or with community groups and NGOs. Another is that it is important to find ways to reintegrate youths back into mainstream society (Bjørgo 2006).

4.16 Sweden

The Exit Program in Sweden was established in 1998, following the success of the program in Norway. The program has similar goals to the Norway Program, sharing the same approach to radicalisation and an individual's reasons for participation. The program started with mostly former neo-Nazis as their clients.

Exit is a self-help program requiring the individual to be motivated to disengage from the racist group, both mentally and socially. The program is staffed with psychiatrists, therapists, social workers, teachers and police. Bjørge & Horgan (2009:46) state that due to privacy regulations people completing the program are not tracked, therefore it is impossible to determine if they re-offend. The program boasts it has assisted over 600 people to leave right wing racists groups.

The program identifies 5 stages on exiting groups: -

1. The person starts to question their involvement with the racist group and contacts Exit.
2. The person makes a decision to leave.
3. The person makes the break from the group.
4. The person reflects on their activities whilst in the group and may experience psychological problems.
5. The person stabilises and commences a normal life.

(Bjørge, Donselaar & Grunenberg 2009:135).

4.17 Denmark

Denmark's struggle has been with the extremist left, causing street fights and upheavals. In 2007, the pilot project of "Deradicalisation – Targeted Intervention" was launched. The program is run in conjunction with Police Intelligence, East

Jutland Police and the municipalities of Copenhagen & Aarhus, the second largest city in Denmark (Karpantschof 2014). The program's approach is to reach out to those at risk of religious and political extremism. Social skills are developed into tools to give young people support to distance themselves from extremism. In 2011, the program began to focus on people going or returning from the war in Syria. The approach is similar to the public health model in that radicalisation is treated as a risk, similar to other influences, such as abuse (Bjørge & Horgan 2009, Horgan 2009, Barrelle 2014). The program has been criticised for potential discrimination against Muslims because of their risk-based approach towards people at risk of radicalisation.

People can be considered vulnerable to radicalisation due to their ethnic, religious, and political or profession group (Young et al 2015:3). By identifying that Muslims are at risk or vulnerable to violent extremism it is identifying that part of the population is responsible for terrorism. This creates a problem for governments attempting to implement CVE strategies, because they can no longer say they are supporting people vulnerable to extremism, but instead must discretely identify those people or communities in need of intervention.

4.18 Germany

Germany has been struggling with the right wing for several decades. Since 2003, Federal or Regional Security Services, the National Police, Ministries, and NGOs have operated projects targeting disengagement. Exit Germany is operated by an NGO with a network of partners (Köhler 2016). The program provides assistance to individuals, families and communities. Another program titled 'Hayat' was introduced in 2011 to target returning freedom fighters from the Middle East and providing counselling to family members through a hotline.

Hayat is described by Hedayah (2018) as being a deradicalisation and rehabilitation program implemented by an NGO, the ZDK Society Democratic Culture (Hedayah 2018). Hayat has also partnered with the German Federal Office for Immigration to implement a national counselling hotline. Following the first contact to the hotline a risk assessment is conducted to determine the type of counselling required and whether the person is presently or will become a threat. This is followed-up by the counsellor, who will implement a step-by-step program to prevent further radicalisation or to stop and reverse the process (Hedayah 2018).

4.19 Los Angeles

In 2011, the White House released the interagency national strategy titled, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism (Whitehouse 2011).

The strategy detailed a multi-faceted approach to violent extremism in all states of America. Unfortunately little funding accompanied the strategy, meaning that agencies had to implement the strategies within existing budgets. Los Angeles has adopted a mental and public health approach to CVE following community feedback, that earlier efforts focussing on radicalisation were stigmatising the Muslim community. In 2018, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has formed a partnership with the US Department of Mental Health to introduce a new intervention model called Recognising Extremist Network Early Warnings (RENEW) (NAP 2018:38).

The new model means that referrals are dealt with in one of three ways, following assessment: they receive psychological counselling, are treated and released as an outpatient, or they receive social services. If the person is identified as being a threat to themselves or the community they can be held for an evaluation, under

the mental health provisions. Once considered safe they are released with the support mentioned above.

The RENEW program has a high government and law enforcement involvement which is due to the need for mental health and intelligence assessments of the participants. However there is also a Muslim Advisory Board that meets regularly with LAPD to discuss the progress of the program (NAP 2018:38).

4.20 Common Characteristics of CVE Intervention Programs

In analysing the CVE programs described above, it becomes apparent that there are certain common characteristics: -

- (1) Is the program described as a disengagement or deradicalisation program?

As indicated in the literature review, deradicalisation programs have been in existence longer than disengagement programs. This is largely due to the belief that violent extremists needed to be deradicalised before they could return to mainstream society. This belief led to the development of conceptual frameworks in the form of diagrams, largely by academics, depicting the radicalisation process, mainly as a circle where it was alright to be on the outer circle, but dangerous to be in the inner circle. The goal of a deradicalisation program has been to steer the alleged radicalised person into the outer circle.

In the case of disengagement, it was recognised that the goal would be for the person to be disengaged from violent behaviour, even if he/she remained radicalised. The Pro-Integration Model (PIM) utilises the domains, other than ideology to persuade the person to disengage.

- (2) Is the program effective on the far right, the far left and violent radical Islamists?

As described earlier, the Exit Programs of Europe were mainly focussed on the far right because that was the problem these countries were experiencing when the programs were developed. However the Exit Program of Denmark has been adapted to use on outlaw motorcycle gangs (Bjørge 2017:33). The Australian Attorney General's Intervention program is promoted as being effective against all extremists. This becomes evident when looking at Western Australia, which has had a more noticeable problem with far right fanatics.

- (3) At what level, i.e. macro, meso or micro, does the program operate?

Ideally an intervention program should operate at the micro level to provide an individual tailored program. Yet some locations, such as Los Angeles and Australia operated additional programs at the meso level by providing community hotlines for concerned people to report concerning behaviour. Whilst hotline programs are not considered intervention programs it is possible that someone who is reported on a hotline may later become the subject of an intervention program.

- (4) Is the program designed for someone at risk of radicalisation?

The Denmark Exit model was criticised by targeting people at risk of radicalisation as it may draw unwarranted attention to certain community groups or it may highlight that certain members of the communities are the root cause of violent extremism. (Bjørge & Horgan 2009, Bjørge 2001, Horgan 2009, Barrelle 2014). Some jurisdictions overcome this dilemma by identifying their target audience as people displaying concerning behaviour.

Governments, more than NGOs, need to be conscious of the language used to avoid drawing unwarranted attention to particular parts on the community.

(5) Does the program adopt the sociological or ideological approach?

This is the primary research question for this thesis. Can a program be entirely sociological in approach or must it contain some aspect of ideology?

When looking at the Exit programs of Europe there is an ideological component in the treatment, because for someone to adopt an extreme right or left wing view, there must be a driving force to support the ideology of the group. If a treatment plan only addresses the ideological cause and that cause is removed, it is plausible that the person will no longer support said cause.

Programs that counter violent extremism have been in existence for nearly 20 years in Western countries. Programs vary with their methodology depending on the environment they operate in. The Exit programs of Europe have been very effective combating left and right wing violence. To a lesser degree, individual intervention programs have been operating in Australia for the past 5 years with mixed results. Whilst intervention programs may be transferrable between countries, they still require some modification to suit the conditions and legal environment.

Non-government organisations have been successful in discouraging violent extremism at the community level. Many of these programs have been the subject of government funding, both state and federal. This combined approach to CVE intervention has largely proved effective in reducing the problem, although without proper evaluation it is difficult to be accurate in this determination.

4.21 Grounded Theory

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the best approach to disengaging from violent extremism, whether this should be through the sociological or the ideological approach. In order to achieve this goal, I will use the principals of grounded theory to identify the most common and effective components of both approaches to disengagement.

This chapter begins with a look at the radicalisation process and then the model of disengagement from violent extremism, using three models to illustrate the process. Firstly, Precht's model of a Typical Radicalisation Pattern (Precht 2007) which is a linear model explaining the process of radicalisation, will be examined. Secondly, the chapter will evaluate Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism (Moghaddam 2005:161), which explains the progression to becoming a terrorist. The third model that will be used is Barrelle's Pro-Integration Model (PIM), which identifies the five areas, or domains that are targeted in the disengagement process. The model is not a reversal of the deradicalisation process, but a standalone process to disengage from violence.

It is important for the reader to understand the radicalisation process in order to grasp the principles of disengagement. Due to the multiple uses of terminology in the field of radicalisation, as described in the literature review, it is necessary to describe the radicalisation process at the beginning. The deradicalisation process is not simply a reversal of the radicalisation process (Moghaddam 2015). A person

may disengage for any number of reasons. The disengagement process allows the subject to retain their radical mindset, but aims to change their attitude towards violence. Hopefully the subject will settle their grievances through non-violent means.

The difference with deradicalisation is that disengagement refers to the cessation of action only; accordingly, a radical can stop active participation without denouncing radical views. There may in fact be no correlation between deradicalisation and disengagement (Bertram 2015:125). However there are some common threads between deradicalisation and disengagement. Using the PIM, I will explain the process of radicalisation and identify these common threads.

4.22 Models of Radicalisation

The process of radicalisation has been variously illustrated as linear, circular, triangular and that of a staircase. Yet it does not appear that one needs any special qualifications to describe the process. Borum (2012:46) explains that despite the surge in terrorism-related publications since 2001 and the burst of recent interest in radicalisation, there is little empirical evidence supporting the process described in those models.

Borum (2012:46) believes that some of the radicalisation models were developed by simply fitting information into pre-conceived notions. However, the models have proved useful in conceptualising the radicalisation process to practitioners, family and community members. There has been no more recent models of radicalisation displayed in the current literature, so there has not been any further development of the models used in this thesis.

Most, if not all, models of radicalisation depict a process with a start and finish point, although there is no pathway illustrated for deradicalisation. At the starting point is a person with no signs of radicalisation, then a process of increasing awareness of violent extremism leading to the finishing point of radicalisation.


Two conceptual, yet practical radicalisation models that have gained credibility with governments and law enforcement through their apparent effectiveness are Precht's Model of Typical Radicalisation and Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism (2005). The former is a four-phase pattern of radicalisation, which parallels the conceptual models developed by the FBI and New York Police Department (Borum 2012:16).

These models also involve a four-step process, however the stages are named differently, with Pre-radicalisation, Self-Identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization. Precht's model is labelled more appropriately for academic research. Law enforcement and government have largely accepted the models because they enable a novice to develop a basic understanding of the radicalisation process in a relatively short period of time.

4.23 Precht's Model of A Typical Radicalisation Model

According to Precht (2007), issues such as belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in the radicalisation process. Whilst religion does play an important role, it is often used as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals (Borum 2012:43). Religion is usually dishonestly used to persuade a vulnerable person to consider violent extremism. Precht's model is illustrated below in figure 1 (Borum 2012). It is obvious that this model is skewed towards radical Islam, rather than taking a neutral approach to ideology.

Figure 1 - Precht's Model of Radicalisation.



Source: Borum 2007:42

4.24 Pre-radicalisation

Pre-radicalisation describes an individual's personality, religion, education and social status prior to the start of the radicalisation process. It is this point where the individual may develop a grievance with society that influences them towards the path to radicalisation. Ideally the pre-radicalisation stage is the position the individual might return to following disengagement.

4.25 Conversion and Identification with Radical Islam

This model was developed for radical Islam and not other forms of extremism, although the journey to radicalisation may well be the same. At this point the

individual may be introduced to a charismatic religious leader who can influence them to follow a radical form of the religion or ideology (Vergani et al, 2018:10).

4.26 Indoctrination and increased group bonding

At this point the individual has formed close ties with the group and feels the need to belong by adopting their beliefs above their own (Vergani et al, 2018:3).


4.27 Actual Acts of Terrorism

It is at this point the individual has made up their mind to commit an act of violent extremism. They further alienate themselves from family and friends, spending more time with their group (Borum 2012: 37).

The model has been criticised for suggesting a clear causal link between ideology and a terrorist act, where no link exists (Borum 2011). The model also shows linear progression from start to finish, but does not suggest the subject can stop along the way. Nonetheless, this model proved useful as it gave the practitioner a basic understanding of the process of radicalisation.

4.28 Moghaddam's Model of the Staircase to Terrorism

Figure 2: Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism



Source: Borum 2007:40

The next model of radicalisation is Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism, which depicts a more complicated process of radicalisation to that of Precht, but with the same result of performing a terrorist act. Moghaddam (2005:161) describes the staircase as having 6 steps, which narrow towards the top. The subject starts their journey up the staircase with a grievance they cannot resolve, though there is no violence involved at this stage. Some of the subjects stop ascending as they discover alternatives to violence to resolve their grievance. Those who reach the top step are more likely to engage in a terrorist act because they have not been able to resolve their grievance without violence.

To develop the model Moghaddam (2005) observed societal variables such as lack of democratic process, and social inequality as examples that may anger people who in turn look for ways to settle their grievance. The grievance can be some of social injustice that acts as a catalyst for the individual to turn towards violence to resolve the injustice. Moghaddam (2005) states the model is not a formal one, but should be used for providing a general framework.

Mogahaddam describes terrorism as a moral problem with psychological foundations (Mogahaddam 2005).

The steps in Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism are: -

1. Perceived interpretation of material conditions.
2. Perceived options to fight unfair treatment.
3. Displacement of aggression.
4. Moral engagement.
5. Solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of terrorist organisation.
6. The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms.


Moghaddam (2005) believes a cure to the problem is to prevent disaffected youth and others from climbing the staircase by building a solid foundation of contextualised democracy.

4.29 Pro-Integration Model

Apart from the radicalisation models, there are also models of disengagement, such as the well-regarded Pro-Integration Model (PIM) by Barrelle (2015).

The model is depicted in figure 3 (Barrelle 2015) and describes a holistic approach to disengagement from violent extremism. The model has been adopted by the Australian Attorney General's Department as the risk assessment tool for the Early Intervention Program (AG 2015).

Figure 3 : Barrelle's Pro-Integration Model of Disengagement.



Source: Barrelle 2015:135

Disengagement from violent extremism through the Pro-Integration Model addresses five domains, including ideology. These domains are then measured in degrees of engagement from minimal, through cautious to positive (Barrelle 2015:133). PIM is not linear or staged (Barrelle 2015:134).

4.30 Social Relations

Barrelle's research indicated that social relations played a key role in not only forming the group, but also the motivation for disengaging from the violent extremist groups (Barrelle 2015: 135). When the subjects become disillusioned with the group leaders and members, they start to question their involvement. This is a push factor that may start the process of disengagement. The other theme is social relations with others, the disengaged individual might look upon old social groups as being a better alternative to their radical group and seek to re-engage.

4.31 Coping

Being a terrorist or violent extremist can take its toll on the physical and psychological wellbeing of a person. Being pursued by law enforcement, practicing clandestine activities engaging in warfare, such as the war in Iraq, can lead to mental health issues, and physical injury. Often the subjects have left their homes, so there is a lack of social support, which they may not receive from the group. Successful violent extremists need to possess or build resilience to cope with day-to-day activities. (Barrelle 2015:136).

4.32 Identity

Barrelle (2015: 136) recognises that identity is a key factor in the personality of violent extremists, as it defines who they are and who they are within the group. One of the hardest things to do when leaving the group is to undertake an identity change. As the subject undertakes the disengagement path their identity reconnects with society and this is accompanied by a re-emergence of their personal values and beliefs (Barrelle 2015:136).

4.33 Ideology

A violent extremist's disillusionment with radical ideas can become a push factor in starting the process of disengagement, especially if they have realised that the rhetoric they have been hearing for an extended period of time is challenged or found to be untruthful. This is not uncommon when false and misleading interpretations of the Quran is used to influence Islamists. Similar to identity, their disillusion with radical ideas may lead to the re-emergence of personal values and beliefs. This in turn leads to greater acceptance to other people's views (Barrelle 2015:136).

4.34 Action orientation

A key component in disengaging from violent extremism is diminishing or ceasing the violence. The subject may stop using radical or violent methods for a number of reasons; they have been detained, under police surveillance or they have left the group. The subject may also have other demanding issues, such as caring for a family, which prevents them from engaging in violent action (Barrelle 2015:137).

4.35 Push, Pull and Personal Factors

Push and Pull factors are referred to in Barrelle' (2015) as being themes which change during the disengagement process. They are also relevant in the radicalisation process, but are not evident in either Precht's or Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism. Push, Pull and Personal factors are the main influencers for a person to engage in violent extremism (Palm 2017). A third driver of violent extremism was recently identified as personal factors (Vergani et al 2018:3). Push factors towards extremism include: state repression, poverty and injustice,

resulting in the subject forming a grievance and the first step in the pathway to radicalisation. Pull factors capture the aspects that make the extremist lifestyle appealing and include ideology, and group belonging (Vergani et al 2018:3). The third factor, which is personal, includes psychological issues, personality traits and traumatic life experiences (Vergani et al, 2018:3). Push factors have often been the root cause of pull and personal factors when the subject cannot resolve their grievance without resorting to violent extremism.

Vergani et al (2018:3) has aligned the push, pull and personal factors with the three levels of analysis or intervention. At the macro level are the push factors or structural grievances, such as poverty or state repression as mentioned above. These are major issues that the subject wants to change. Pull factors are situated at the meso or group level social cognitive issues, while at the micro level there are the personal issues that may involve psychological and biographical issues that increase the subject's vulnerability to violent extremism (Vergani et al 2018: 4).

Vergani's research (2018:8) discovered that the most common form of push factors was the deprivation of a social group, whilst the most common pull factor was extremist propaganda, group dynamics and propaganda whilst the major personal factor was that of the 'lone wolf'.

Borum (2011:49), Bjørgo (1997) and Horgan (2016) suggest that just as "push" and "pull" factors operate in the radicalisation process they work equally as well in the disengagement process. Push factors in the disengagement process include disillusionment with reaching the group's goals, the realisation that the use of violence was not legitimate, as well as disillusionment with the leadership, membership, or just burnout (Bjørgo 1997). The loss of faith in the group's ideology can also lead to disengagement.

Horgan (2016:64) identifies pull factors as encompassing factors from outside the group that draw people to move away from the group. These factors, which lure them away, include relationships, starting a family, a change of lifestyle, particularly if they are burnt-out, or getting a job (Bjørge 1997). In order for a disengagement program to be successful, it should target their strategies or activities towards the relevant push and pull factors. It is unlikely that any one factor will cause a person to radicalise; therefore it may take a number of attempts or strategies for the person to disengage.

The use of these factors can be seen in a number of disengagement and/or deradicalisation programs. I mention the latter because push/pull factors are a major contributor to the radicalisation process and should not be ignored in the development of interventions (Horgan 2014:64).

4.36 Intervention Programs – use of Push, Pull factors

These intervention programs aim to disengage, not deradicalise and they recognise the push/pull factors to facilitate disengagement. The Exit programs of Europe place importance on social issues, in particular group dynamics (Bjørge 2011:280). The longer the subject is involved with the group, the more likely they will find fault with the activities of the group and often its leadership. Just as the groups' purpose or ideals were a pull factor to join the group, their failure to achieve those goals acts as a push factor away from the group. Strategies that reconnect the subject with mainstream and non-violent community members or groups should act as a pull factor away from the violent group. This is an important intervention and should be included in any intervention program. Exit programs have operated in some countries of Europe since the late nineties. Their main focus has been right wing extremists, however the programs have also been used for left wing and Islamist extremists (Butt & Tuck). The programs offer support through push factors at the meso level for people withdrawing from

extremist groups. Individual micro support is offered to prevent individuals from continuing to offend with such offences as vandalism.

4.37 Los Angeles – Mental Health Approach

As indicated earlier in chapter 4, Los Angeles has adopted a mental health approach to their disengagement program. This approach to countering violent extremism is not discussed in great detail, however the approach is identified in the literature review. The Los Angeles Police Department has developed the Providing Alternatives to Hinder Extremism (PATHE) program, which utilises mental health and religious counselling to prevent acts of terrorism (Lopez & Drechsler 2017:1). PATHE is the same program as Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings (RENEW) (Price 2010:1), but with a name change. Mental health assessment early in the disengagement process can provide a good starting point for effective interventions. Religious counselling is available if required, however it appears that the main focus is on the mental health of the subject. As with many intervention programs, actual figures as to the number of candidates on the program are not published, however those responsible for the program are promoting the program to the media in positive terms.

4.38 The Community Support Intervention Program (CISP) of Victoria

The CISP operated in partnership with an Islamic NGO, the Imam's Council of Victoria and provided support to participants through religious and social engagement. The literature does not specify if the program utilises push /pull factors. The very fact that it partners with an Islamic organisation in the rehabilitation of convicted terrorists labels terrorism as an Islamic issue. The Islamic Council of Victoria criticised CISP, saying that the program only catered for Muslims and not right-wing extremists. This is an example that any disengagement program needs to have the appearance of being non-partisan so

as not to be perceived as biased against any religious or ethnic group. Unfortunately the program has been labelled a Muslim reintegration program, so there is no hiding from that fact. It is probably best that the program is renamed and operated as an open program for all extremists. After a few positive results, the program may gain the support from the general community.

As indicated in Chapter 4.2, the Australian Government delivered the Early Intervention Program in all states, including Victoria. The program uses the Pro Integration Model, which as depicted in Figure 3 uses five areas or domains to assess the necessary interventions. The five areas are measured for degrees of severity in the levels of engagement; minimal, cautious and positive. These three levels indicated the intensity of engagement. Push/pull factors are identified in all five areas, and concentrate on the subject's disillusionment with group members, group leaders, radical ideas and radical methods. Interventions are structured around those 5 domains for individual programs to be developed (Barrelle 2015:140).

Generally program participants have positively accepted the interventions. This was identified in a 2015 study by Monash and Australian National University researchers who identified CISP as a rare, successful countering violent extremism program (Le Grand & Urban 2017). However there have been setbacks on several occasions, for instance, when participants resort to violence, such as the Brighton incident in Victoria, described in Chapter Four. On 5 June 2017, police killed Yacqub Khayre after he allegedly killed a man and took a woman hostage (Houston and Donnelly (2017). Despite the criticism from the media levelled at the program, it continues to operate, learning from past experiences. Indications from the literature and review of the program show that no intervention program is perfect. However doing something in good faith is better than doing nothing and the fact that the program participant is engaging with someone outside of their immediate group is encouraging.

4.39 Overview

Analysis of these 'common threads' should be useful in determining what types of interventions are used more frequently and whether they are one of the factors identified above. Therefore when reading the research question for this thesis, the inquirer might be tempted to assume that the sociological approach is more appropriate given that it is the newer concept, however after appropriate analysis the answer might be not what was expected.

The process of disengagement from violent extremism is not an exact science. As observed earlier in this chapter, the process of radicalisation is progressive and may not result in a person committing a terrorist act because their grievances have been satisfied in a non-violent manner and they become disengaged from violent extremism. It should be a consideration that any future intervention program be able to offer assistance to a person situated anywhere along the line or staircase, prior to the commission of a terrorist act.

The PIM appears to have a more structured approach to disengagement, as it does not just rely on ideological disengagement. The key to disengagement may well be to firstly identify the relevant push/pull factors and create a tailored intervention plan to gain the most leverage. Disillusionment with the group, its' leaders or its' activities can be capitalised upon using government or preferably non-government agencies. Language surrounding the program should be carefully structured so as to not identify a particular group of people that might be vulnerable to violent extremism.

5.0 Program Evaluations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter returns to the research question of determining which approach to CVE, the ideological or the sociological, is the best, or more effective. So far the thesis has identified a number of CVE programs, both in Australia and overseas and analysed what their approach to intervention is and who delivers it. Whilst it would be easier just to focus on disengagement programs, rather than deradicalisation programs, the line or difference between the two is blurred due to the misuse of the terminology in CVE intervention.

The recognition of push/pull factors in both the ideological and the sociological programs (Borum 2011, Bjørgo 1997 & Horgan 2016) is an essential tool in most, if not all, intervention programs. The ideological approach is more focussed on the religious aspects of the program, however proper religious instruction does act as a 'pull' factor, when someone is leaving violent extremism. Often the person was originally persuaded to engage in violence for ideological reasons. Therefore by obtaining proper instruction the person can see a different approach and as a result distances themselves from the radical influences.

The easiest way to determine which style, the sociological or ideological, was more effective would be to compare the two styles through a common evaluation method. However, this point is where the confusion starts, as there is no common method to evaluate CVE programs. Attempts by academics to suggest comprehensive evaluation tools for deradicalisation programs have largely gone unnoticed and have failed to become practice (Koehler 2017:164).

Horgan & Braddock (2010:268) share this frustration indicating that thus far, it has

been practically impossible to ascertain what is implied and what is expected from programs that claim to deradicalise suspected terrorists. No such program has formally identified valid and reliable indicators of successful deradicalisation, or even disengagement, whether ideological or sociological based. Consequently any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of any such program is beset with a myriad of challenges, both conceptually and practically (Horgan & Braddock 2010:268).

5.2 Evaluating Intervention Programs

Program evaluation occurs or should occur at all three levels of CVE intervention; the macro, meso and micro levels. Denmark has achieved a good balance of intervention, by developing a three-tiered approach: -

1. Macro level: - building resilience to extremist propaganda. Focus on inclusion, democracy and civic citizenship.
2. Meso level: - a more specific focus on vulnerable groups, particularly youth.
3. Micro level: - intervention to revert the radicalisation process. (Fink et al. 2013:10).

A comparison of state CVE practice indicated that many states pursue multileveled CVE initiatives encompassing strategic communications, community engagement and individual-level interventions (Fink et al. 2013:11).

At the policy or macro level, CVE programs can be particularly difficult to evaluate as messaging and activities are aimed at the wider population and there is limited capacity to record results, except for perhaps creating a metric to record the number of times engagement occurred at that level. Fink et al. (2013:6) believes that the impact of individual projects at the macro level might be easier to measure as CVE efforts. An example of this is the 'Living Safe Together' grants distributed to NGO's to combat violent extremism. Each project under the program

is required to conduct an evaluation or assessment to determine their success or otherwise. (Australian Government 2018).

A similar challenge arises in evaluating CVE engagement at the community or meso level (Fink et al. 2013:5). Community engagement activities involving groups often occur in an open setting where the engagement activity is not measurable, but equally as important to influence the wider community away from violent extremism. It might be the case that a presentation given contains information that might act as a 'pull' factor in steering someone away from radicalisation. However the interaction is not recorded or assessed as being an intervention activity.

Interestingly, Fink et al. (2013:6) states that the USA has shifted its focus in its CVE efforts at the meso level from vulnerable communities to populations, which have expressed sympathy and support for terrorist groups. The US has designated one lead government agency to develop programs with clearly defined objectives whose program effectiveness can be defined against them (Fink et al. 2013:6). This has the added advantage of not specifying a general community as being responsible for terrorism. This also avoids the criticism made by specific communities that they are being labelled as 'vulnerable' to violent extremism.

CVE programming needs to be flexible and responsive to developments at the neighbourhood level. Under these circumstances, the tools of social science must often yield to the "art" of understanding how the target audience in specific communities is impacted (Fink et al. 2013:9). For police officers on the beat, success may be determined by more invitations by communities to interact, or an increase in calls with information or requests for assistance (Fink et al. 2013:7).

At the micro level of CVE intervention is the individual programs that attempt to disengage or deradicalise the troubled individual. It is here that we see the two main approaches of sociology and ideology presented for comparison. There are numerous models of programs existing in the Western world. However as Horgan and Braddock (2010: 286) point out, what works in one region could not necessarily be expected to work in another (Horgan & Braddock 2010:286). Even the Exit Programs from Europe are not carbon copies of each other; the programs must be modified to work in adjoining countries.

The Australian Government's CVE Intervention Program (Australian Government 2018) was developed as a central program, but flexible in the implementation stage to meet the needs of the various states of Australia. Therefore the reporting methods differ and so do the results, making evaluation of the program problematic, as one is not comparing the same activity. Evidence of what behaviour that was identified in the program participant, followed by what interventions were used and what was the outcome would be sufficient to measure effectiveness. This knowledge would provide researchers and practitioners with valuable information on how to identify and treat violent extremism. In contrast, a qualitative study might only serve to glean the program participant's point of view, which may vary from region to region as stated by Horgan & Braddock (2010:286). The difficulty relates to information, owned by the government, being released for analysis for external agencies, such as academia and the media.

5.3 Non-Government Agencies

Non-Government Agencies (NGOs) often play an important role as a cushion between the community and government. NGOs can make significant contributions to CVE programs because of their vast programmatic experience, local knowledge, and community access on which to draw (Fink et al. 2013:12).

Often NGOs fill the gap between the two to allow intervention programs to operate without friction.

Participating in programs is voluntary and sometimes government programs are avoided for fear of being spied upon by those running the program. The head of one NGO, active in CVE engagement and programming, suggested that governments might consider transferring some of the expertise and data that may be inaccessible to civil society actors, but necessary for evaluations (Fink et al. 2013:7). However, there arises issues' surrounding privacy and the release of confidential information to members of NGOs.

5.4 Ideology

The ideological approach to disengagement could be considered as a contradiction of terms. Essentially when you adopt the ideological approach you are looking to change the program participant's radical beliefs, with a view that it will change their behaviour. This means you are trying to deradicalise which will in turn cause them to disengage from violent behaviour. The ideological approach relies largely on counter narratives to persuade the program participants to alter their beliefs. However, the counter narrative approach is losing its appeal due to the adverse effects of focussing entirely on Muslim Communities (Macnair & Frank 2017:161). Counter narratives might best be left for NGO's with a religious capacity, so as not to arouse suspicion from the community and avoid criticism that they are ineffective because government policy makers and not academics developed them (Glazzard 2017:3).

Many scholars have argued that the best way forward is to leave ideology out of disengagement and deradicalisation programs, an approach which is much more effective as seen in the Exit Program of Sweden. However as many of the program participants are prepared to commit violent crimes in the name of

ideology, the approach still remains in many programs (Koehler 2017: 83). The ideological approach was the original approach to deradicalisation possibly due to the fact that most concepts of radicalisation relied on religious or ideological beliefs. It stands to reason that if a person has become radicalised simply due to an ideological fallacy then proper and correct ideological instruction may be all that is required to prevent radicalisation.

When looking at the Victorian implementation of the Australian Attorney General's Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Program, it is clear that the program is focussed on Muslim disengagement. The Community Integration Support Program (CISP) is the extension of the CISP in Victorian prisons. The program seeks to rehabilitate and reintegrate convicted terrorists into the community (Hedayah 2017). This is achieved with participants through religious and social engagement. The Victoria Police in partnership with the Imam's Council of Victoria, a religious body, leads the program.

In July 2017 the CISP advertised for a Case Manager to work at the Melbourne office (Ethical Jobs Advertisement 2017). The position description stated the position was in a dynamic community-lead and multi-agency case management, Muslim reintegration and support program with community and custodial intervention. The case manager's position oversees a caseload of clients in custody and community settings. The position will also develop and deliver a range of evidence based welfare and support interventions (Ethical Jobs Advertisement 2017).

The advertisement tells the reader that the CISP is a not for profit organisation led by the Muslim community and involves multi-agency case management. It is designed to address the specific needs of Victorian Muslims. Hedayah (2017) indicates the Australian Attorney General's department funds the program. The

Age Newspaper (2017) indicates that the Victorian Government has allocated almost \$4.6 million to fund the program over the next four years.

The Age Newspaper (2017) also states that the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV) is scaling back its' involvement in the program in favour of running their own program targeting extremism. The ICV considered the program could also be used for right-wing extremism. The Australian Newspaper (2017) indicates that the ICV had given Victoria Police until August 2017 to find another partner in the CISP. The new partner in the program is the Australian National Imam's Council (ANIC). ANIC is a central Islamic body that represents key Muslim clerics from Australia (ANIC 2018).

Essentially the Victorian CISP is a government funded program, led by the Victoria Police and operated by an Islamic partner organisation. There is no attempt to conceal that the program targets Islamic prisoners and parolees in custody and in the community. There is no attempt to conceal the program is for Muslims only and not right or left wing extremists, possibly signalling to the public that extremism is a Muslim problem.

5.5 Sociological Approach

The sociological approach to disengagement from violent extremism looks at pull factors aside from ideology, including psychological and sociological factors. The aim of the sociological approach is to restore the program participants' place in society by giving them an alternative to violence.

Barrelle (2015) identifies 4 areas or domains that influence a person's attitude toward violence, these being coping, action orientation, employment and education. Treatment under the sociological approach might include getting the

participant a job, re-enrolling them in school, engaging them in a sporting club or access to treatment for mental health issues (Australian Government 2018). The sociological model does have the capacity to include ideological input if the program participant requires it. In most cases program participants are assessed for their mental health at the commencement of the program. Many of the NGOs which received a COMPACT grant from Multicultural NSW utilise aspects of the sociological approach to achieve the objectives of their programs (Multicultural NSW Brochure). The United Muslim Women's Association use community engagement to build resilience in Muslim women, to rebut negative community attitudes towards Muslim people subsequent to terrorist attacks and arrests of people for the terrorist related offences. This resilience extends to negative media portraying Muslims as terrorists, which grossly affects young Muslim Men. There is no attempt by the Muslim Women's Association to disguise the organisation from being identified as being for Muslims.

The COMPACT grants for several branches of the Police Citizen Youth Clubs are used to build trust between youth and the police. These social activities fall within the sociological aspect of countering violent extremism and do not possess an ideological component. Bankstown Youth Development Services are located in the heart of South Western Sydney where community engagement for violent extremism is paramount. In conjunction with their project partners they provide an outlet for young people in that area. The Youth Leadership Program at the Auburn Islamic Cultural Centre provides alternative venues for youth to 'hang out', avoiding the hard core gyms in the area that might be considered a 'hot bed' of extremism.

The community based programs such as those identified earlier in the COMPACT Program do not appear to have an issue with identifying that the program is focussed mainly on Muslim youth. This is in contrast to other government run programs that often stigmatise Muslims by labelling violent extremism as associated with the Muslim communities. (Weine et al, 2017:210). This is possibly due to the fact that COMPACT Programs are being operated by community

members rather than by governments. Whilst the COMPACT grants are designed to promote community harmony and resilience, they are aware of the issues affecting Muslim youth and rather than discussing terrorism, they thus approach the issue through sociological means by building community resilience.

The community-based programs aim their activities at the meso or community level of engagement. This has the effect of providing 'pull factors' against the threat of violent extremism. Group activities offer the program participant the opportunity to engage with people of a similar demographic and gain an understanding of how to resolve their grievance (push factor) in a peaceful manner.

At the micro level of CVE intervention are the personalised individual intervention plans. The majority of programs aimed at this level are operated by governments or NGOs working on behalf of governments, such is the case with the Victorian CISP. The NSW Early Intervention Program is an example of a government operated program operating at the micro level.

As indicated in chapter 4, the composition of the assessment committee consists of government services that can be tailored for the individual. NSW Health provides psychiatric assistance in the form of assessment of the candidates who agree to participate in the program. This activity falls within the 'personal' factors away from violent extremism and assesses their ability to cope with disengagement (Barrelle 2015:135).

Gaining employment is seen as a significant pull factor away from violent extremism. As a person becomes more involved in violent extremism most of their time is devoted to the group, however as their disillusionment with the group increases there is a need to fill that space (Barrelle 2015:136). Once the

candidate is fit for work, gaining a job is an excellent form of disengagement. It is also a way of returning to normality by associating with people not affected by violent extremism.

Similarly, returning to the school environment is an excellent pull factor. Not only does the candidate gain the obvious benefits of learning and making friends, there is the added bonus of removing them from the group influence. Once in the school environment there is increased supervision and access to counselling.

5.6 The Public Health Approach

Whilst the public health approach to countering violent extremism is not the subject of this thesis, it is worth a mention to identify the use of push/pull/personal factors in their treatment. The PATHE Program, operating in the City of Los Angeles is primarily focussed on using a mental health approach to violent extremism at the micro level (Weine 2017). Upon entry to the program, the candidate receives a mental health assessment, which dictates the next step in intervention. Ideally the candidate receives social services or psychological counselling. They may be detained at an institution if they are a threat to themselves or others. The use of social services, which may mean a job or housing, falls within the realm of pull factors, whilst the provision of mental health counselling falls within the personal factors. Whilst ideology is not mentioned in the main part of the program, there is access to religious counselling through the Muslim Advisory Board, if it is considered necessary. Unfortunately there is no evidence of results in open source material.

5.7 Overview

There appears to be a general reluctance on the part of governments to release quantitative data from intervention programs for proper evaluation (Koehler, 2017:164). Without that information, analysts and academics will not have the capacity to fully evaluate CVE programs. There is the rare occasion when governments release statistical information as a result of an incident, such as the police shooting of Khayre in 2017 that exposed some operational details of the program. Both the Age and Australian newspapers reported on the incident in 2017. Khayre had participated in the Victorian Community Integration Support Program (CISP), whilst in prison for armed robbery and assault. Upon his release, he did not continue in the CISP program in the community. The reason for this is unknown. Victorian Police killed Khayre on 5 June 2017 after he killed a man, took a woman hostage and wounded three police officers. The Victorian Corrections Minister released this information (Houston & Donnelly 2017) & (Le Grand & Urban 2017).

Ideally the details of what interventions are used at the micro level would assist in determining what activities work and what do not. The sociological approach to disengagement from violent extremism does address more of the push/pull factors than the ideological approach. This is achieved by providing candidates with jobs, education, sporting opportunities and/or a new circle of friends, which seems more inviting than a chat about religion or ideology. Government-run intervention programs operating under the sociological model also have greater access to more of the services mentioned above than community based programs. However it appears that community based programs may be better suited to addressing ideological issues without stigmatising a particular ideology.

This thesis originally set out to compare the sociological and ideological approaches to disengagement, however, due to years of misperception, deradicalisation should also be addressed as it is probably only at the academic level that the difference is noted. Practitioner and government documents still

refer to programs for deradicalisation when in fact they represent different approaches to disengagement.

The concept of deradicalisation involves the candidate changing or mellowing their extremist point of view. This may best be achieved through an ideological approach, due to the candidate not requiring the social aspects offered by the sociological approach. As the candidate deradicalises, their attitudes towards societal views should mellow. Whereas with the Pro-integration Model, the candidate's attitude may not mellow at all, however the sociological aspects of the model may serve to keep the candidate from using violence.

6.0 Conclusion

As indicated in the introduction, the radicalisation of young people into violent extremism has been a significant problem for several decades. Over the past 15 years, Western Governments have placed a large amount of time and resources into the combating of countering violent extremism. Their focus has largely been based on deradicalising extremists; however there has not been much success. This is largely due to the difficulty associated in persuading someone to change or modify their beliefs. More recently, the focus has moved towards disengagement rather than deradicalisation. Disengagement recognises and accepts that a person may still hold extremist views, however denounces violent behaviour.

The literature review identified three methods of disengagement or deradicalisation, being counter narratives, the public health model and sociological intervention. It has been necessary to include deradicalisation in this research project because there is still some confusion and criticism as to the differences in approaches. There is significant and current material discussing disengagement and deradicalisation in the same context, especially amongst practitioners. Unfortunately, as identified earlier, there is no sharp distinction between the two approaches and there is not enough open source information to properly assess program mechanics or outcomes.

Once a person has determined or made up their mind to disengage from violent extremism, support is needed from the program providers to facilitate their exit. In the sociological model this support may be in the form of interventions identified in the Pro-Integration Model (Barrelle 2015) of identity, coping or social relations, or a combination of these. Whereas, if the program is based on the ideological model then the provision of religious counselling may be considered appropriate for the candidate's disengagement to begin.

The most significant implication of this research is the emphasis on disengagement over deradicalisation and the use of interventions addressing the use of push, pull and personal factors. The use of these factors should enhance the individual's chances for disengagement, by providing an alternative environment to the violent one they were used to.

In my opinion, the sociological model of disengagement provides greater support for the individual, as well as offering more areas for interventions to be developed. The ideological model is somewhat limited in the services they can provide, if they focus only on religious or ideological discussion.

Due to the limitations of time allocated for this study to be completed, it was not viable to develop and apply for ethics approval. Had this not been the case then it was my intention to interview service providers to ascertain, in more detail, the types of interventions used and the results.

The future of countering violent extremism treatment may well lie with the Public Health Model, as it is a proven method for treatment for other forms of violence, such as domestic violence. This type of treatment is being used in Los Angeles and prisons in NSW. Over the years, the strong focus on religion and ideology has clouded the waters over issues surrounding violent extremism. The Pro-Integration Model does provide a holistic approach to disengagement, but still maintains an ideological capacity. However the public health model starts with a psychological assessment and treatment flows from there.

Below is a list of attributes I consider necessary for a successful disengagement program: -

- The program should not identify as a 'Muslim' only program, this is especially true if the government operates the program, as potential candidates are wary of spying in such programs.
- Non-Government organisations have the capacity and experience to operate disengagement programs from within a community setting. As observed with the COMPACT grants it is quite acceptable for community programs to identify as a particular religion without compromising their effectiveness.
- Not only should a particular religion not be identified but also participants should not be identified as being vulnerable to radicalisation. As this may serve to label a particular group as being responsible for violent extremism. This could be considered as a form of discrimination as it labels some groups as disadvantaged due to of their ethnic, religious, political or professional group.

This thesis evaluated existing intervention programs located in Australia and abroad. The programs address violent extremism from religious and ideological sources. Whilst most of the programs are directed at particular elements of the community they can be effective on all types of extremism. Grounded theory is then used to explore the identification of interventions used by programs. The analysis identifies the targeting of push, pull and personal factors in individuals affected by violent extremism. This appears to have the best results in disengagement, as it provides support to the individual during the period of change.

Just as push and pull factors contributed to a person's radicalisation they ought be used in intervention strategies to reverse the effect, by providing support during their period of disengagement.

Despite the negative comments regarding ideology, especially about the development of counter narratives, there should be an ideological component or capacity in the program to enable advice, guidance and possibly counselling. This is due to the fact that many individual radicalised due to persuasive ideological arguments from terrorist recruiters and a similar approach may be needed to change their point of view.

As identified in the Public Health Model, psychological assessment and support for program participants is paramount, by providing a sound platform to commence treatment. The Pro-Integration Model provides psychological and physical support. This sort of treatment is available in government-operated programs at the micro level, however it may not be so readily available for an NGO operated programs at the meso level. It is a factor that needs to be considered when constructing the program. What also needs to be considered is a response to a program participant who is radicalising, rather than deradicalising on the program. There needs to be a link to law enforcement to report such concerns.

Governments can utilise community support to assist with building relationships for participants as they return to a life of normality. These activities have been supported by the provision of the COMPACT and 'Living Safe Together' grants by state and federal governments. Community agencies often have the social capital within their community to provide support in the form of pull factors by providing social networks, employment and education.

In conclusion, whilst the ideological approach to disengagement and deradicalisation has been the primary form of countering violent extremism for several decades, the sociological approach has gained support due to its comprehensive approach. The main form of deradicalisation was the use of

counter narratives, which have not been effective, mainly due to the fact that they are poorly constructed. The sociological approach, on the other hand, is more holistic addressing the underlying causes and other key factors. This approach has a number of methods accessible to steer the candidate towards disengagement increasing the likelihood of success.

Future research in this field could be directed at ascertaining what actual intervention activities are used in programs and what success they have had. This research can be gleaned from government programs as well as non-government organisations operating under government funding. This is necessary due to the lack of information of such activities that has been released by government organisations on the basis that the participants are security risks. Whilst this thesis analysed a number of intervention strategies in use in Western societies, not knowing the 'nuts and bolts' of how individual programs work was a disadvantage. The way forward would be to conduct research in parallel with intervention programs and where possible, conduct interviews with the participants, law enforcement, security agencies, community leaders and others to understand the impact more widely. This will provide the empirical evidence upon which such programs can be made more effective.

Reference List.

Attorney General's Department 2016, Review of the Criminal Code Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Australian Government, Canberra, viewed 30 October 2018,

<https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjSko-pssveAhXHV30KHW0nCGgQFjAAegQIBxAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aph.gov.au%2FDocumentStore.ashx%3Fid%3D7e6a5793-47cf-437e-a548-a7e5ddc01dbe%26subId%3D414713&usg=AOvVaw2-VLjjlD8Sxk8GUemOrNw>.

Australian Attorney General's Department 2018, Living Safe Together website, viewed 5 September 2018,
<https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx>.

Australian Federal Police 2018, viewed 5 September 2018,
<https://www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/crime-types/fighting-terrorism/national-efforts>.

Australian Government, Attorney Generals Department, 2018, CVE Intervention Programs, viewed 7 March 2018,
<https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/Intervention-programmes.aspx>.

Australian Multicultural Foundation website 2018, viewed 11 September 2018,
<http://amf.net.au/entry/australian-youth-leadership-and-peer-mentorship-program>.

Australian National Imams' Council website, 2018, viewed 25 October 2018,
<http://www.anic.org.au>.

Baker, C 2017, 'Update on Australian Government measures to counter violent extremism: a quick guide', Research Paper Series 2017-18 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra.

Barrelle, K 2015, 'Pro-Integration: Disengagement and Life After Extremism', Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 129-142, viewed 1 October 2017, Doi 10.1080/19434472.2014.988165.

Barrelle, K 2015, 'Pro-Integration Model: Disengagement and Life After Extremism', Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 135, digital image, viewed 1 October 2017, Doi 10.1080/19434472.2014.988165.

https://www.google.com/search?q=pro-integration+disengagement+from+and+life+after+extremism&client=safari&rls=en&source=lnms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjmr-vmq9DdAhUKUN4KHZSKCg8Q_AUIDygC&biw=1552&bih=783#imgsrc=H_fYIYs_XmYTOM.

Bertram, L 2015, 'How Could a Terrorist be De-Radicalised?' *Journal for Deradicalization*, vol. Winter 15/16, no. 5, pp. 120–149.

Bjørger, T 1997, *Racist and Right Wing Violence in Scandinavia, Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses*, Tano Ascheougs Foneniserie.

Bjørger, T & Horgan, J (eds.) 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, Routledge, New York.

Bjørger, T 2011, 'Dreams and Disillusionment: Engagement in and Disengagement from Militant Extremist Groups', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 277–285.

Bjørger, T. 2016, 'Organised Crime Originating from Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs', *Preventing Crime, Crime Prevention and Security Management*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Borum, R 2012, 'Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 37-62.

Braddock, K & Horgan, J 2015, 'Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counter-Narratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 381-40, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116277.

Butt, R & Tuck, H 2014, 'European counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation: A comparative evaluation of approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany', *Institute for Strategic Dialogue Cross-Country Evaluation Report*, viewed 9 May 2018, https://www.eukn.eu/fileadmin/Files/News/De-radicalisation_final.pdf.

Carver, A 2016, 'Parliamentary Attempts to Define Terrorism in Canada and Australia', *Journal of Applied Security Research*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 124-138, DOI:10.1080/19361610.2016.1137173.

COAG Counter-Terrorism Review Committee 2016, 'COAG Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation, viewed 8 November 2018, <https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/COAGCTReview/LawCouncilSubmission.pdf>.

Cohen, JD 2016, 'The Next Generation of Government CVE Strategies at Home: Expanding Opportunities for Intervention', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 668, no.1, pp.118–128. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0002716216669933>.

Community Integration Support Program, 26.07.2017, Case Manager, digital image, *Ethical Jobs.com.au*, viewed 4 March 2018, <http://www.ethicaljobs.com.au/emailmarketer/link.php?M=2264905&N=3822&L=81531&F=H>.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A 2013 'Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 99–115.

Day, J. & Kleinmann, S 2017, 'Combating the Cult of ISIS: A Social Approach to Countering Violent Extremism', *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp.-23 viewed 4 October 2017, Doi: 10.1080/15570274.2017.1354458.

Fink, N, Pomanluk, P & Barakat, R 2013, 'Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programing: Practice and Progress', *Center on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation*, September 2013, viewed 28 September 2018, http://www.globalct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_20131.pdf.

Ganor, B 2002 'Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter'? *Police Practice and Research*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 287–304.

Gill, P, Horgan, J & Deckert, P 2014, 'Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists', *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, vol. 59, No 2, pp. 425–435.

Githens-Mazer, J & Lambert, R 2010, 'Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse', *International Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 889–901.

- Glazzard, A 2017, 'Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent Extremism', ICCT Research Papers, vol. 8 no. 5, pp. 1–21.
- Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., 2018, 'The Time for Causal Designs: Review and Evaluation of Empirical Support for Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation', *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, vol. 39, pp. 90–99.
- Grossman, M & Tahiri, H 2015, 'Community perceptions of radicalisation and violent extremism: an Australian perspective', *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 14-24, viewed 22 October 2017, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2015.101028773.
- Harris-Hogan, S & Barrelle, K 2016, 'Assisting Practitioners to Understand Countering Violent Extremism', *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-5, viewed 9 October 2017, Doi: 10.1080/19434472.2015.1104711.
- Harris-Hogan, S, Barrelle, K & Zammit, A, 2015, 'What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia', *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, vol. 8 no.1, pp. 1–19.
- Hedayah, Countering Violent Extremism website 2018, viewed 12 September 2018, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/ftfprograms/program/countering-violent-extremism-intervention-programs/>.
- Home Office United Kingdom, 2017, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016, *Statistical Bulletin*, vol. 23, No. 17, viewed 4 February 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677646/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf.
- Horgan, J 2009. 'Deradicalization or Disengagement'? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation', *Revista de Psicología Social*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 291–298.
- Horgan, J., 2009, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, Routledge, London & New York.
- Horgan, J, Altier, M, Shortland, & Taylor, N 2017, 'Walking Away: the Disengagement and De-radicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist',

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 63–77, DOI:10.1080/19434472.2016.1156722.

Horgan, J. & Braddock, K., 2010, 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 267–291.

Houston, C & Donnelly, B 2017, 'Brighton Terrorist Blocked from Deradicalisation Programs,' *The Age Newspaper*, 8 June 2017, viewed 6 September 2018, The Age data base, <https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/brighton-terrorist-blocked-from-deradicalisation-programs-20170607-gwmjnj.html>.

Innes, M, Roberts, C & Lowe, T 2017, 'A Disruptive Influence? "Preventing" Problems and Countering Violent Extremism Policy in Practice', *Law & Society Review*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 252–281.

Karpantschov, R 2014, 'Violence That Matters! Radicalization and De-radicalization of Leftist, Urban Movements – Denmark 1981–2011', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, vol. 7 no. 1, pp. 1–18.

Koehler, D 2017, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*, Taylor & Francis Group, New York.

Kundnani, A 2012 *Radicalisation: the journey of a concept*, *Race and Class*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 3–25.

Le Grand, C & Urban, R 2017 *Muslim Mentors Walk Away from Jail deradicalisation program*, *The Australian Newspaper*, 9 June 2017, viewed 6 September 2018, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/muslim-mentors-walk-away-from-jail-deradicalisation-program/news-story/9411aadf130f14ed39f0254975d53782>.

McCauley, C & Moskalenko, S 2017, 'Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model', *American Psychologist*, vol. 72 no. 3, pp. 205–216.

McDonald, LZ 2011, *Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for Security*, *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 39, no. 2–3, p. 177–189, viewed 6 March 2018, DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2011.584712.

Macnair, L & Frank, R 2017, 'Voices Against Extremism: A Case Study of a Community-Based CVE Counter-Narrative Campaign', *Journal for Deradicalization*, vol. Spring 2017, No. 10, pp. 147–174.

Moghaddam, F 2005, 'The Staircase to Terrorism – A psychological Exploration,' *American Psychologist*, vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 161-169, viewed 10 October 2018, <http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/1256627851.pdf>.

Multicultural NSW website, COMPACT Partners, viewed 10 September 2018, https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/communities/compact/compact_program/.

The National Academies Press website, viewed 12 September 2018, <https://www.nap.edu/read/24638/chapter/4#34>.

New South Wales Legislative Assembly Hansard, 12 May 2016 Proof, Tribute to Curtis Cheng, viewed 12 March 2018, <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardResult.aspx#/docid/HANSARD-1323879322-73093>.

Palm, ML 2017, 'Re-Purposing the Push-Pull Model to Describe Signature Patterns of Terrorist Disengagement by Group: A Validation Study', *Journal for Deradicalization*, vol. Fall 2017, no.12, pp. 85–118.

Precht's Model of a Typical Radicalisation Pattern, 2007, digital image, viewed 10 October 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Prechts-Model-of-a-Typical-Radicalization-Pattern_fig4_241835430.

Price, M 2016, 'New Counterterrorism Program in Los Angeles: Suspicious Thought Reporting', Brennan Center for Justice, 18 October 2018, <https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/new-counterterrorism-program-los-angeles-suspicious-thought-reporting>.

Rabasa, A, Pettyjohn, SL, Ghez, JJ & Boucek, C 2010, 'Deradicalizing Islamic Extremists', RAND National Security Research Division, p. 5. Santa Monica, California, viewed 9 March 2018, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1053.html>.

Rascoff, SJ, 2012, 'Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization', *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 125–189.

Schmid, AP 2013 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review', ICCT Research Papers, 4(2), pp. 1–91.

Stern, J.E., 2014, 'X: A Case Study of a Swedish Neo-Nazi and His Reintegration into Swedish Society', *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 440–453.

Walter, M (ed.) 2012, *Social Research Methods*, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, Victoria.

Weine, S, Eisenman, DP, Kinsler, J, Glik, DC & Polutnik, C 2017, 'Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 208–221.

Weine, SM, Stone, A, Saeed, A, Shanfield, S, Beahrs, J, Gutman, A Mihajlovic, A 2017, 'Violent Extremism, Community-Based Violence Prevention and Mental Health Professionals,' *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, vol. 205, no. 1, pp. 54 – 57.

Weine, s, Eisenman, DP, Jackson, T, Kinsler, J & Polutnik, C 2017, 'Utilizing Mental Health Professionals to Help Prevent the Next Attacks', *International Review of Psychiatry*, vol. 29, no. 4, ,pp. 334–340.

Williams, MJ 2017, ' Pro-Social Behavior Following Immortality Priming: Experimental tests of factors with implications for CVE interventions', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 153-190 DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2016.1186718.

Young, HF, Rooze, M & Holsappel, J 2015, 'Translating Conceptualizations Into Practical Suggestions: What the Literature on Radicalization Can Offer to Practitioners', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vo. 21, no. 2, pp. 212–225.

Vergani, M, Iqbal, M, Ilbahar, E & Barton, G 2018 'The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal, A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, viewed 30 October 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326585283_The_3_Ps_of_radicalisation_push_pull_and_personal_A_systematic_scoping_review_of_the_scientific_evidence_about_radicalisation_into_violent_extremism.

The White House, 'Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States', August 2011, pp. 2–3, viewed 4 November 2018, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.

Zammit, A 2015, 'Australian Foreign Fighters: Risks and Responses', *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, viewed 8 March 2018, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/australian-foreign-fighters-risks-and-responses.pdf>.