

# Japan's Defence Diplomacy in South East Asia.

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## **Abstract**

This thesis conducts an empirical case study analysis of Japan's defence diplomacy in the South East Asian nations of Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam during the period from 2006 to 2016. Defence diplomacy is an element of statecraft that uses a nation's military and security institutions in a non-coercive, peaceful manner to enhance military cooperation and to seek military reform with another nation. This thesis traces the evolution of Japan's defence diplomacy in its evolving security environment and identifies its character based on See Seng Tang and Bhubhindar Singh's typology of "pragmatic" or "transformative" defence diplomacy. This thesis contributes important elements in the study of Japan's defence diplomacy strategy and engagement in South East Asia.

## **Statement by the Author**

I hereby declare that this thesis is the product of a research process done exclusively and entirely during my candidature for the degree of Masters of Research at Macquarie University. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or at any other institution. Except where otherwise acknowledged, this thesis is comprised entirely of my own work.

Daniel Foulkes León

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*A mi madre, la persona que mas admiro.*

*Por su gran amor y cariño.*

*Su fortaleza, honradez y dedicación siempre me han impulsado a dar lo mejor de mi.*

*Un mundo mejor y diferente no solo es posible, sino que necesario.*

## Chapter One: Introduction

In May 2017 Japan's largest naval vessel in the Maritime Self Defence Forces, the JS Izumo, arrived in Vietnam as part of the Pacific Partnership naval exercise, focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).<sup>1</sup> This multilateral naval exercise led by the United States with Australia, the United Kingdom and Japan as participating countries, involved a series of host nations in professional training opportunities, workshops and field training exercises. In March 2017, the Philippine Navy had also received two patrol aircrafts from Japan with the purpose of aiding its future maritime patrol and HA/DR capabilities<sup>2</sup>. Philippine navy pilots undertook training in Japan from November 2016 to March 2017. Additionally, at the beginning of 2017, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Indonesia and met with President Joko Widodo to discuss the deepening of political and economic ties between the two nations.<sup>3</sup> During this meeting, they declared their intention to deepen their defence cooperation and military exchanges, specifically addressing the issues of maritime security and the territorial disputes with China.<sup>4</sup> These developments occurred alongside the political and strategic debate about the need for Japan to increase its regional defence activities amidst China's growing influence in South East Asia.

Against this background, this dissertation examines the evolution of Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia between 2006 and 2016. It examines Japan's defence diplomacy during this period through three case studies, namely, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It addresses three key research questions:

- Which theoretical and analytical concepts of defence diplomacy exist to explain the Japan's conduct of its defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia?
- What are their relative strengths and weaknesses?
- How did Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam evolve between 2006 and 2016, and why?

The study aims to make a contribution to two critical academic debates. The first is the study of Japan's defence diplomacy. This research takes an empirical approach to Japan's defence diplomacy activities in South East Asia, a region where Japan has vital security interests.<sup>5</sup> The second debate concerns itself with academic theories of defence diplomacy. Much of the literature on defence diplomacy delves into its effects and composition, yet fails to provide a theoretical base that would elevate the level and scope of research on the subject.<sup>6</sup> Different

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<sup>1</sup> Franz-Stefan Gady, "Vietnam: Japan's Largest Aircraft Carrier Participates in Major Naval Exercise," *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/vietnam-japans-largest-aircraft-carrier-participates-in-major-naval-exercise/>.

<sup>2</sup> Frances Mangosing, "Navy Gets Two Patrol Planes from Japan," *Inquirer*, <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/153953/navy-gets-two-patrol-planes-japan>.

<sup>3</sup> Niniek Karmini and Stephen Wright, "Indonesia, Japan Affirm Deeper Ties During Abe's Asian Tour," *USNews*, <https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-01-15/indonesia-japan-affirm-deeper-ties-during-abes-asian-tour>.

<sup>4</sup> PressTV, "Indonesia, Japan to Bolster Military Ties," *PressTV*, <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/01/15/506302/Japan-Indonesia-defense-cooperation>.

<sup>5</sup> Kei Koga, "Beyond the Horizon? Japan's Strategic Interests over the South China Sea (Draft)," (South China Conference: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).

<sup>6</sup> Gregory Winger, "The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy," in *What do Ideas Do?*, ed. A. Lisiak and N. Smolenski (Vienna, Austria: IWM Junior Visiting Fellow's Conferences, 2014).

conceptualisations of defence diplomacy translate into different approaches of how it is used by nations as a tool of statecraft, and how its results are measured.

This dissertation employs the conceptualisation of defence diplomacy as a tool of statecraft specifically oriented towards the foreign policy goals of creating cooperative relations with other states and promoting military reform. The other contesting view of defence diplomacy sees it as a tool of statecraft that can be used in foreign policy for any particular objective. This different view may seem very similar initially, but given its broader applicability of defence diplomacy, it loses focus and precision in determining certain activities can produce expected results.

Japan's security policy has been subject of study and debate in various fields of study.<sup>7</sup> From a perspective of international relations and security studies, it is recognised that Japan is undergoing significant changes in its approach to its national security.<sup>8</sup> Evidence of this can be seen in Japan's changing involvement in its regional and global security agenda, as it is confronted with an evolving and continuously challenging regional security environment.<sup>9</sup>

Scholars focused on Japan's security have adduced varying competing explanations for Japan's behaviour, and their theses can range from diagnosing Japan with a remilitarisation agenda<sup>10</sup>, as a nation seeking a resurgence to a leading role in the region,<sup>11</sup> to one seeking to normalise itself through different paths and opportunities.<sup>12</sup> These different results are all seeking to provide an answer to the question of: What will be Japan's role in the security of Asia?

Through an empirical study of Japan's defence diplomacy in a region vital to its security<sup>13</sup>, this thesis strives to contribute significant considerations in the study of Japan's defence diplomatic strategy and engagement in South East Asia.

This thesis proceeds as follows: The current chapter constitutes the research statement. It first defines the object of study and its importance. Secondly, it describes the research method employed in this thesis. Finally, it explains the analytical tool employed in this thesis, a typology of "transformative" or "pragmatic" defence diplomacy as developed by See Seng Tan and Bhuhindar Singh.<sup>14</sup> The third chapter, a literature review first explores the conceptualisations and definitions of defence diplomacy. It is followed by a description of the different characterisations of defence diplomacy and their use in South East Asia. The last segment of the literature review is an exploration of Japan's defence cooperation and

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<sup>7</sup> For a comprehensive take on Japan's history and trajectory towards the twenty first century, see the seminal work of Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, First Edition ed. (Massachusetts, United States of America: Public Affairs, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Leif-Eric Easley, "How Proactive? How Pacifist? Charting Japan's Evolving Defence Posture," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (2016).

<sup>9</sup> William H. Overholt, *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics* (United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> Rajesh Kapoor, *Japanese (Re) Militarization and Asia*, 1st ed. ed., Japanese Remilitarization and Asia (New Delhi, India: Pentagon Press, 2011).

<sup>11</sup> Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-Emergence as a Normal Military Power*, ed. International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 368, Adelphi Paper (New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006).

<sup>13</sup> Koga.

<sup>14</sup> See Seng Tan and Bhuhindar Singh, "Introduction," *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012).

exchanges, and how they are elements of defence diplomacy. Chapter four is comprised of the research results and analysis of the aforementioned case studies. It starts by providing context on Japan's security environment and the background of its relationship with the countries studied. This chapter then showcases the general trends in Japan's defence diplomacy and continues to build independently on the results of its relationship with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam in that order. Chapter five, the final chapter, contains the conclusions of the thesis, and explains the character and type of Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia.

The final elements of this thesis are the Bibliography and Annex 1: Matrix of Defence Diplomacy Activities.



## Chapter Two: Research Design

### Importance of Research and Objectives

This thesis is a study of Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia and how it has changed and evolved during the 2006 to 2016 period. The purpose of this section is to describe how this research is structured. The research question of this thesis is: How has Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia evolved between 2006 and 2016?

This thesis tests the assumption that *Japan's exercise of defence diplomacy has been pragmatic and reactive, progressively adopting a transformative character in response to China's growing assertiveness in the region.*

The main and specific objectives in this thesis follow the research question mentioned above as well as the secondary questions outlined in the introduction.

#### Main Objective

- Determine the evolutionary path of Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia during the period 2006-2016 and ascertain the character of its changes.

#### Specific objectives:

- Discuss the main conceptualisations of defence diplomacy in Security Studies.
- Identify the type of defence diplomacy Japan has employed in South East Asia during the research timeframe.
- Infer the relation between the changes of Japan's defence diplomacy and its security environment vis-à-vis China's assertive actions in South East Asia.

The situation in East Asia is one of ongoing transformation in the geopolitical order and the power balance established by the United States after the Second World War and the Korean War.<sup>15</sup> China's recent actions in the South China Sea, specifically its land reclamation and militarisation projects<sup>16</sup>, and territorial disputes<sup>17</sup>, pose a risk not only to the smaller nations in South East Asia, but also to the rules-based order in the region.<sup>18</sup> These developments affect Japan too, since its energy and trade supplies are dependent on the Sea Lanes of Communication in the South China Sea.<sup>19</sup>

A sign of the mounting challenges to the region's security is the rate at which South East Asian nations have experienced an exponential increase of their military spending. South East Asia has seen a 67 percent increase in military expenditure during the ten-year period studied in this dissertation<sup>20</sup>; this is a significant increase compared to the previous decade's increase of

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<sup>15</sup> Overholt.

<sup>16</sup> AMTI Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, "The Paracels: Beijing's Other South China Sea Buildup," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://amti.csis.org/paracels-beijings-other-buildup/>.

<sup>17</sup> Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes, and Owen Bowcott, "Beijing Rejects Tribunal's Ruling in South China Sea Case," *The Guardian* (2016), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china>.

<sup>18</sup> Renato Cruz De Castro, "China and Japan in Maritime Southeast Asia: Extending Their Geo-Strategic Rivalry by Competing for Friends," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 34, no. 2 (2013).

<sup>19</sup> Koga.

<sup>20</sup> The region has seen an increase from USD \$25 billion in 2006 to USD \$41.9 in 2016. SIPRI, "Sipri Military Expenditure Database," ed. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2017).

17 percent. In recent years, South East Asian nations have undergone a process of militarisation<sup>21</sup>, at the risk of a potential arms race.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, there has been an increase of diplomatic competition in the region, as the United States, with Japan as its main Asian ally, focuses its efforts to gain influence over the region of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) whilst China seeking to do the same regarding ASEAN.<sup>23</sup>

Given the scenario of increasing international tensions and the region's continued increase of military capabilities, defence diplomacy in South East Asia has grown in prominence and pertinence.<sup>24</sup> Defence diplomacy has long been an element of international relations<sup>25</sup> and with the end of the Cold War, its uses and opportunities have expanded significantly. This expansion in scope and activities gave way to an "old" and "new" defence diplomacy that do not supplant each other but instead function in an overlapping manner.<sup>26</sup> Before the end of the Cold War, defence diplomacy was used as a way to enhance the capabilities of allied nations or to facilitate weapons exchanges between friendly states. After the Cold War ended, a "new" defence diplomacy appeared, providing a new avenue of diplomatic relations and military cooperation between nations that were former enemies or were in need of support to transform the structure of their military.<sup>27</sup>

Defence diplomacy, with its focus on the activities between military and security institutions of different nations in times of peace, offers a much-needed insight into the study of the region's security. Much of this study is focused on "big issues" regarding China's rise, territorial tensions and military build-up, but not on how the growing military forces of South East Asian nations are used.<sup>28</sup> Defence diplomacy offers a complementary lens to study what types of relations are being forged amongst nations and with what characteristics.

Studying the evolution of Japan's defence diplomacy in the region aids in bringing Japan's role in the broader geopolitical shift into focus, a pressing issue in the study of Japan's security.<sup>29</sup> Defence diplomacy is neither the main reason for which militaries are formed and maintained,

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<sup>21</sup> Alex J. Bellamy and Bryn Hughes, "Emancipation and Force: The Role(S) of the Military in Southeast Asia," in *Critical Security in the Asia Pacific*, ed. Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (New York, United States of America: Manchester University Press, 2007). And Siemon T. Wezeman et al., "Developments in Arms Transfers, 2015," in *Sipri Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, ed. Ian Davis (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>22</sup> Christian Le Mièrre, "The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race," *Survival* 56, no. 1 (2014).

<sup>23</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Competitive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Strategic Comments* 19, no. 7 (2013).

<sup>24</sup> Evan A. Laksmana, "Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012).

<sup>25</sup> Juan Emilio Cheyre, "Defence Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, ed. International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 365, Adelphi Paper (New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Bellamy and Hughes.

<sup>29</sup> The issue of Japan's defence posture orientation and its evolution has led to several relevant publications, amongst them: Easley, Hughes, 368. and David A. Welch, "Embracing Normalcy: Towards a Japanese 'National Strategy'," in *Japan as a 'Normal Country': A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, ed. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch (United States of America: University of Toronto Press, 2011; reprint, 2012).

nor has Japan had a concise policy that defines and guides its use.<sup>30</sup> As militaries have now become routinely involved in activities besides the use of force, such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief efforts<sup>31</sup>, the definitions that countries give to defence diplomacy gain in importance.

## Research Design

This empirical, qualitative study uses a multiple case study approach. This thesis studies the evolution and changes over a ten-year period of Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia, and will employ the case study format of "process tracing". Crasnow demonstrates<sup>32</sup> how process tracing case studies contribute valuable information to the causality between independent variables and the dependent variable. Process tracing can be forward or backward oriented; forward oriented consists in the cause being the starting point and the research seeks to find the effects, backward oriented consists in the search for causes to already established effects.<sup>33</sup> The theory testing aspect of process tracing is described by George and Bennet: "Process-tracing attempts to empirically establish the posited intervening variables and implication that should be true in a case if a particular explanation of that case is true."<sup>34</sup>

The case studies were selected based on a criterion of value diversity. This is a selection of cases that represent a broad range of values in the particular outcome or the specific assumption to investigate.<sup>35</sup> For this research, this meant selecting countries with different levels of engagement with Japan in terms of defence diplomacy: Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia is the country in South East Asia with the largest population<sup>36</sup> and has had a moderate defence diplomacy engagement with Japan. The escalation of tensions and Vietnam's and the Philippines' clashes with China in the South China Sea have drawn more attention to the nature and character of military activities in the region. In contrast, Indonesia's tensions with China regarding South China Sea territorial claims have been less intense. The selection of these three countries therefore offers a wide range of defence diplomacy activities conducted with Japan.

This research tests, via backwards oriented process tracing case studies, the assumption that Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia is gradually changing from a transformative to a pragmatic defence diplomacy in reaction to China's actions in the South China Sea. This thesis adopts the conceptualisation of defence diplomacy as a tool for the specific foreign

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<sup>30</sup> Michito Tsuruoka, "Japan's Defence Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond," in *Whitehall Report*, ed. Jonathan Eyal, Michito Tsuruoka, and Edward Schwarck (United Kingdom: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015).

<sup>31</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>32</sup> Sharon Crasnow, "Process Tracing in Political Science: What's the Story?," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 62 (2017): 7.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (United States of America: MIT Press, 2005), 147.

<sup>35</sup> John Gerrig, "Chapter 28: Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009), 650.

<sup>36</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Indonesia," in *The World Factbook* (United States of America: Central Intelligence Agency, 2017).

policy objectives of promoting a reform of another nation's military and the institution of cooperative relations with other states.<sup>37</sup>

The primary sources for this research are Japan's government reports on the activities and exchanges that Japan has taken part in with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These are primarily the Ministry of Defence White Papers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Blue Book, along with other official reports. Additionally, a wide range of secondary sources such as academic journals, research centre publications and news outlets focused on Asian security will provide additional information and aid in contextualising Japan's defence diplomacy activities. These sources contribute to the assessment of Japan's defence diplomacy activities, as proactive or reactive, vis-à-vis China's disruptive activities in the region.

This thesis studies Japan's defence diplomacy activities conducted with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam between 2006 and 2016. It considers three independent variables in the study of Japan's defence diplomacy: (1) Japan's policies and regulations on defence diplomacy activities, (2) changes in the security environment of Japan and South East Asia, and (3) Indonesia's, Philippine, and Vietnamese interests in conducting defence diplomacy activities with Japan. This research categorises each defence diplomacy action according to Tan and Singh's typology of proactive-transformative defence diplomacy<sup>38</sup>, making it an intervening variable. China's actions in the South China Sea, its territorial claims, land reclamation and militarisation projects and other disruptive actions are the condition variables for this study.

Independent Variable	Independent Variable	Independent Variable
Japan's policies and regulations on defence diplomacy activities	Changes in the security environment of Japan and South East Asia	Indonesia's, the Philippines' and Vietnam's attitudes towards defence diplomacy activities with Japan
Condition Variable	Intervening Variable	Dependent Variable
China's disruptive actions in South East Asia (2006-2016 period)	Pragmatic-Transformative defence diplomacy	Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia

The use of an established typology of defence diplomacy allows for a focus on the clarifying and explanatory aspects of the typology. This requires an understanding of the characteristics of the typology in order better to answer the research question. Given that this typology is used as the main analytical tool in this research, the following segment is dedicated to

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<sup>37</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>38</sup> Tan and Singh.

exploring the conceptual basis and theoretical grounding behind it. The elements and composition of this typology are addressed in this research following the steps of typology creation by Collier, Laporte and Seawright<sup>39</sup>, examining the way the concepts of pragmatic and transformative are formed and their provenance.

### Pragmatic versus Transformative Defence Diplomacy

There are two main conceptualisations of defence diplomacy in security studies. The first considers defence diplomacy a tool of foreign policy for multiple objectives. The second defines defence diplomacy as a tool for two specific objectives: the promotion of military reform and the establishment of cooperative practices with militaries of other states. Following this last definition, Cottey and Forster list the different activities that can be conducted in defence diplomacy.<sup>40</sup> Based on this definition of defence diplomacy, Tan and Singh<sup>41</sup> developed a typology of defence diplomacy as being either “pragmatic” or “transformative.”<sup>42</sup> This typology and its framework are the main analytical tools in this research, applying it with the objective of characterising Japan’s behaviour through its defence diplomacy activities.<sup>43</sup>

Tan and Singh<sup>44</sup> expose two contrasting ways of conceptualising defence diplomacy from which they give meaning to their transformative and pragmatic categories. They link the term transformative to the conceptualisation by the Ministry of Defence of the UK’s policy paper on defence diplomacy<sup>45</sup> where the defence diplomacy activities by the armed forces can be employed to advance democratic values and aid in the process of security sector reform. The term pragmatic is associated with the explanation offered by former Major General Ng Chee Khern, director of Singapore’s external intelligence agency (the Security and Intelligence Division) and former chief of the air force of Singapore, who sees cooperation between ASEAN nations and their militaries as contributing elements for stability in the region.<sup>46</sup>

The transformative or pragmatic character of a country’s defence diplomacy is defined by the type of effects each activity has on the nature and capabilities of the participating militaries.

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<sup>39</sup> Collier, Laporte and Seawright highlight the importance that typologies have in social research as well as the special attention that must be paid to the formation of concepts and variables, as they will define the capabilities of the typology to not only serve a descriptive function, but an explanatory one. David Collier, Jody Laporte, and Jason Seawright, "Chapter 7: Typologies: Forming Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>41</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>42</sup> Tan and Sing first describe how modern diplomacy has taken these facets. The usage of these particular terms is based on the initial coinage of them by Wesley. Michael Wesley, "Session 3: Defence Diplomacy" (paper presented at the 13th Asia Pacific Programme For Senior Military Officers (APPSMO), Singapore, 2011).

<sup>43</sup> Following the academic objective of testing a theory in political science research explained by Van Evera, this research seeks the testing of a specific typology since there is no theory of defence diplomacy. Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, United States of America: Cornell University Press, 1997), Book.

<sup>44</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>45</sup> Ministry of Defence, "Paper No.1: Defence Diplomacy," Policy Papers (London, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, 2000).

<sup>46</sup> "In defence diplomacy, we seek to develop mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed forces to contribute to a stable international and regional environment." Khern, cited by Chong et al. in Tan and Singh, 225.

Exchanges that improve interoperability, preparedness and joint operations are pragmatic whilst those that seek to change the civil-military relations of a nation, the enhancing of humanitarian capabilities, promoting democratic ideals and other western values, and security sector reform are transformative activities.<sup>47</sup>

The previous explanation of the typology to be used in this research albeit functional to differentiate defence diplomacy exchanges is still superficial and fails to provide enough of a theoretical context and framework for its application. Collier's methodological steps of typology creation provide the necessary depth when they are applied as questions to an already established typology.<sup>48</sup> The steps to construct typologies, reframed as leading questions are:

- Where are the concepts coming from?
- What is the semantic field of conceptual reasoning?
- What step are they placed to in the ladder of abstraction? (if applicable)

The final question is to define the overarching concept of the typology, which in this case is a typology of defence diplomacy. The first three questions thus provide an avenue for the dissection and analysis of the elements within Tan and Singh's typology of defence diplomacy.

Tan and Singh utilize the terms pragmatic and transformative based on their considerations of modern diplomacy. Their concept of a pragmatic diplomacy comes from Hedley Bull's view of the international system and its practices as oriented towards preserving its status quo of a system with an anarchic nature.<sup>49</sup> Bull posits that the continued adoption of archaic European based procedures on diplomacy by the international sphere's growing number and diversity of actors is evidence of an acceptance to the concept of international society. The procedures and protocols within this international society provide a basic common structure of action and hold symbolic significance for the nations involved. The notion of a transformative diplomacy is explained by Tan and Singh as one "...that seeks to revise the domestic political order within states while fundamentally keeping the international order more or less intact."<sup>50</sup> Tan and Singh identify as an example of transformative diplomacy former US president George W. Bush's initiative for a new American diplomacy. This new diplomacy would, through a focus on joint partnership instead of paternalism, build and sustain democratic, well-governed states. The transformative aspect is evident as it seeks to use the existing system to promote changes in the nature of states.

The second step to construct a typology is to define its semantic field of conceptual reasoning. The semantic field constitutes the framework and logic of the terms employed in a typology.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Wesley is the source for the coining of these terms and their use on defence diplomacy. He explains that pragmatic defence diplomacy has six rationales: capacity building and interoperability enhancement among allies, create strategic depth in complex environments, the gaining of influence over the military nations that rely on it as a cornerstone of their political system, the understanding of another state's cultural characteristics of strategic value, the forging of crisis-resilient bilateral relations and networks and capacity building for future joint efforts. Wesley.

<sup>48</sup> Collier, Laporte, and Seawright.

<sup>49</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1977).

<sup>50</sup> Tan and Singh, 223.

<sup>51</sup> Collier, Laporte, and Seawright.

This is a broader scope than just the origin of the terms utilised in the typology, expanding the contextual background for the topic they address. In the case of Tan and Singh's typology, they consider three aspects of security that affect the categorisation of defence diplomacy. These closely interrelated aspects are: first, that the nature of what security is has changed along with its challenges; second, that the security of states is impossible to guarantee unilaterally; and third, that the role and activities of militaries have changed after the Cold War.

Tan and Singh refer to the changes in the nature of security as to how states must now address non-traditional security challenges,<sup>52</sup> such as those related to environmental factors, economic disruptions and food supplies.<sup>53</sup> Buzan,<sup>54</sup> who acknowledges the contested nature of security, posits that the definitions of security will change depending on the subject to be secured, defining it as the freedom from threat. Following Waltz's levels of analysis,<sup>55</sup> Buzan explains how security will have different conceptualisations when seen from an international perspective to a state-level view. With the end of the Cold War, the question of human security gained prominence exploring and expanding the factors to consider when placing individuals as the elements to be secured.<sup>56</sup> These non-traditional security challenges have deep implications to the structure of states and their security. Environmental threats for example, will have different spanning effects regardless of national borders, the same way that addressing poverty as a security challenge will challenge the notions of development for a nation.<sup>57</sup>

To Tan and Singh, the security challenges to states are evolving in a way that stretches beyond borders and have broader implications on how they must be faced. The growing international nature of security challenges makes multilateral approaches necessary along with multilateral diplomacy to facilitate them.<sup>58</sup> They show as evidence the rise in multilateral structures addressing security in South East Asia, many of them considered elements of defence diplomacy.<sup>59</sup>

The final aspect of the semantic field of Tan and Singh's typology is focused on the changing role and activities of militaries. Tan and Singh address how the primary purpose of waging war against other armed forces has changed into activities like "humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, peacekeeping duties, and greater engagement in defence diplomacy".<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>53</sup> For a view on the evolution of the theorization of security, and how new security concepts are being brought forward, see David. A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997).

<sup>54</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2 ed. (England, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2007).

<sup>55</sup> Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, United States of America: New York : Columbia University Press, 2001).

<sup>56</sup> For more on the expanding nature of security studies and new elements to consider in individual security see Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction.*, Second Edition ed. (New York, United States of America: Routledge, 2015).

<sup>57</sup> For more on Poverty as a security issue, see Caroline Thomas and Paul. D Williams, "Poverty," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>58</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>59</sup> Evan A. Laksmana, "Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> See Seng Tan and Bhubhindar Singh, "Introduction," *ibid.*: 225.

Nevertheless, whilst their attention to new activities of the militaries is closely related to the previous two aspects of security, the broader situation of the evolving role of the militaries is linked also to how security threats have evolved over time.<sup>61</sup>

The final step in the analysis of a typology is to identify where its concepts stand in the typology's ladder of abstraction. A ladder of abstraction denotes the hierarchical order in which the different elements studied are arranged. The structure of Tan and Singh's typology has as a unique starting element a single non-coercive military to military activity during peacetime. A higher level of abstraction is the understanding of multiple previous activities as part of a general strategy in the execution of defence diplomacy, as well as the pragmatic or transformative character it has. Whilst Tan and Singh's typology reaches only this level, this research sees the execution of a country's defence diplomacy as part of the actions executed to secure a nation's interests and national security, placing these at the next step in the ladder of abstraction. This additional step of abstraction allows for the analysis of a nation's defence diplomacy as an explanatory element of its behaviour towards its national security and their interests.

This analysis of Tan and Singh's typology of defence diplomacy allows us not only to categorise different activities of defence diplomacy as transformative or pragmatic, but also to identify different degrees of intensity in each action and how they reinforce a particular orientation when grouped with other activities over time. The use of this typology to categorise the activities of defence diplomacy that Japan has had with the case studies of Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia during the 2006-2016 period allows for a process-tracing study of Japan's defence diplomacy.

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<sup>61</sup> This aspect is explained in depth by Smith, who posits that as conflict has evolved from states fighting one another to non-state actors, we are faced now with "war amongst the people". Where the utility and application of force by the military must change in order to be effective. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (United States of America: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).



## Chapter Three: Literature Review

This section reviews the existing literature on defence diplomacy and its relation to Japan's security, it also examines the two main approaches to defence diplomacy regarding its conceptual definition as well as the limitations that these views offer. This literature review also presents the definition of defence diplomacy that this thesis utilises. This section will examine the two main approaches to defence diplomacy within the area of security studies and address two other new approaches, a critical perspective from cultural studies and an exploratory study on defence diplomacy as soft power.

The study of defence diplomacy has a very clear impediment, and that is the lack of a clear theorisation on the concept. There is no theory of defence diplomacy to explain its characteristics, approaches nor, as the literature on the subject is clear to point, the process of causality expected from activities of defence diplomacy and its results. Although an established theory of defence diplomacy would not rid the concept of its limitations and misconceptions entirely, it would greatly benefit its study and application.

The lack of a theory of defence diplomacy has not stopped its evolution nor its execution. The adoption by the UK Ministry of Defence of the term in 1998 was the first time the term was defined as a priority for national defence. Defence diplomacy was given a strategic value as a core mission of the armed forces.<sup>62</sup> According to Sending, Pouliot and Neumann, the advent of globalisation has meant an expansion of the traditional ways of political interaction in state centred diplomacy.<sup>63</sup> Whilst it is possible to track the practice of defence diplomacy to Napoleonic times<sup>64</sup>, the end of the Cold War is recognised as a turning point for the practice of defence diplomacy; breaking with a model that considered defence diplomacy as only applicable to friendly or allied nations and providing an avenue to establish some sort of military based dialogue with former enemies and nations considered previously as antagonists.<sup>65</sup>

As different governments around the world started exploring the utility and potential of their military and security apparatus with parallel institutions of other nations during times of peace, literature and policy regarding defence diplomacy came to accept a series of activities as elements that composed defence diplomacy. Nevertheless, Sending, Pouliot and Neumann<sup>66</sup> posit that the study of diplomacy should be done by recognising diplomacy not only as a practice, focused on the activities, processes and the general understanding of diplomatic work, but also as its own category of analysis, considering the broader political and social contexts in which diplomacy operates. A study of defence diplomacy, notwithstanding the varying definitions of it, should be performed in a framework that recognises defence diplomacy as driven by processes and the progression of activities over time.

The existing literature on Japan's defence diplomacy is limited, focusing on the evolution of Japan's diplomacy and the role of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF). Study of its

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<sup>62</sup> Ministry of Defence, "Strategic Defence Review," ed. Ministry of Defence (London, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, 1998).

<sup>63</sup> Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, "The Future of Diplomacy," *International Journal* 66, no. 3 (2011).

<sup>64</sup> Cheyre.

<sup>65</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>66</sup> Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann.

defence diplomacy is contemporary, as it is only after 2007 that Japan's newly established Ministry of Defence became involved in Japan's foreign policy.<sup>67</sup> Research on the execution of defence diplomacy in South East Asia, which is the area of interest for this study, has focused mostly on the multilateral initiatives in the region, namely the relations that ASEAN has with the non-member actors of China and the United States. This emphasis follows what Bellamy and Hughes call an obsession over certain issues in the study of the region's security, great power relations, balances of power and the risks of future wars.<sup>68</sup> Japan's defence diplomacy in South East Asia has been analysed at this multilateral level, not focusing specifically on the bilateral defence diplomacy Japan has in the region. This research will study Japan's defence diplomacy with Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia in a systematic way.

### Conceptualisations of Defence Diplomacy

Within security studies, the literature defines defence diplomacy as a diplomatic tool of foreign policy through a group of activities of defence diplomacy, or as a series of defence diplomacy activities taken towards improving military cooperation and promoting military reform. In other words, one sees defence diplomacy as a tool to achieve different types of policy objectives whilst the other sees defence diplomacy as activities undertaken for two specific policy objectives.

Policy driven defence diplomacy and action driven defence diplomacy are the two main conceptualisations in security studies literature. In its literature, defence diplomacy does not necessarily differ in the activities that form it, but their role as a tool for statecraft does differentiate given their varying purpose. This study will follow the conceptualisation of defence diplomacy posited by Tan and Singh, of a "transformative" and "pragmatic" defence diplomacy, which is oriented closer to the latter concept of activities towards specific policies.<sup>69</sup>

In conceptualising defence diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy, different policy objectives are pursued through the execution of activities considered to be part of defence diplomacy. This construct places the focus of defence diplomacy on the political objectives that have been decided by policymakers and leaders, the activities of defence diplomacy are the means into which to achieve them. Examples of use of this conceptualisation are found in Cheyre, who sees defence diplomacy as a component of public diplomacy<sup>70</sup>, De Castro, who sees it as a mechanism for balancing against China<sup>71</sup>, and Son, who notes the need for broader strategic goals to orient maritime security initiatives between ASEAN and Japan.<sup>72</sup>

This conceptualisation has as an advantage the positioning of defence diplomacy within a broader context of diplomacy, allowing for multiple policy objectives to be pursued, along with the inclusion of non-state actors and other organisations as potential partners. The limitations stem from these same traits, like the problem of efficiently linking all the state and non-state actors to the defence diplomacy process. There is also the absence of a clear

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<sup>67</sup> Tsuruoka.

<sup>68</sup> Bellamy and Hughes.

<sup>69</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>70</sup> Cheyre.

<sup>71</sup> De Castro.

<sup>72</sup> Nguyen Hung Son, "Asean-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Maritime Security and Cooperation," in *Beyond*, ed. Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya (Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2013).

causality between defence diplomacy activities and its broader objectives. This last limitation, shared by the following conceptualisation of defence diplomacy is due to the general theoretical gap within defence diplomacy.

The conceptualisation of defence diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy for multiple purposes is vague and abstract as a subject of study, requiring researchers that have adopted this conceptualisation to narrow their scope of research to single elements of defence diplomacy or a single foreign policy objective. In this sense, De Castro's study of defence diplomacy activities in South East Asia is seen exclusively as a measure to balance against China.<sup>73</sup> This compromises De Castro's focus on defence diplomacy, by disregarding the potential of defence diplomacy activities as mechanisms to engage China and as a path to reduce miscommunication.<sup>74</sup> A clearer example of the limitations that this conceptualisation holds on the literature that adheres to is found in Cheyre's approach. Cheyre's chapter provides a rich historical context of defence diplomacy, seeing its evolution as a process that was led by the expanding scope of action of defence attaches.<sup>75</sup> Although he considers other actors that contribute to the exercise of a nation's defence diplomacy, his focus on defence attaches acts as a narrowing element. Cheyre's focus on defence attaches aids in understanding the execution of defence diplomacy activities throughout history, and it recognizes how network defence diplomacy has come to thrive in international conferences and multilateral spaces.<sup>76</sup> Instances like the Shangri-La Dialogue continue to play a more significant role in the direction of defence diplomacy.

The other conceptualisation of defence diplomacy within Security Studies is that it is a tool of foreign policy with the specific objectives of establishing cooperative relations with other states and promoting military reform. Cottey and Forster have been highly influential in defining the widely accepted set of activities recognised as elements of defence diplomacy and the aforementioned objectives of it.<sup>77</sup> From this conceptualisation, other authors have narrowed down the concept in different ways. Du Plessis narrows the concept to strictly non-coercive measures<sup>78</sup>, Capie<sup>79</sup> draws from Forster in defining it as a method for pursuing foreign and defence policy objectives<sup>80</sup>, and Floyd sees it as a concept to be used only for engagement cooperation, relief and assistance, and intervention operations.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> De Castro.

<sup>74</sup> Exner-Pirot writes on the limited reach of defence diplomacy activities in the Arctic as tension diffusing measures, particularly how Search and Rescue exercises and agreements can be weak from an international legal standpoint but: "an excellent opportunity by which states can cooperate across military and civilian boundaries and reduce both the possibility of miscommunication and the perception of hostile intentions." Heather Exner-Pirot, "Defence Diplomacy in the Arctic: The Search and Rescue Agreement as a Confidence Builder," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 18, no. 2 (2012).

<sup>75</sup> Cheyre.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 379.

<sup>77</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>78</sup> Anton du Plessis, "Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 30 (2008).

<sup>79</sup> David Capie, "Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia's Defence Diplomacy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2013).

<sup>80</sup> Anthony Forster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Quoted in Capie.

<sup>81</sup> Nicholas Floyd, "Dropping the Autopilot: Improving Australia's Defence Diplomacy," in *Policy Brief* (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2010).

Cottey and Forster advance significantly the state of the field with their conceptualisation of defence diplomacy as an action driven process. The concept of defence diplomacy that they posit allows for a richer analysis of defence diplomacy activities on several levels, such as studying its evolution and character, but also that of its activities. Nevertheless, two important obstacles remain present with this conceptualisation. The first obstacle is the apparent selective nature of the objective of defence diplomacy that seeks military reform. Seeking military reform adds the standard of an ideal model of military and state security structure that implies and is linked to western notions of democracy and human rights. This objective is treated as optional since its pursuit may oppose its other objective of improving cooperative relations. Promotion of military reform is a source of tension on multiple instances, from the countries that will oppose defence diplomacy activities that they perceive as going against their own sovereignty, to tensions that arise within democratic nations that ignore human rights violations and democratic crises, when they engage with authoritarian or repressive regimes. The second obstacle is that as the studies on defence diplomacy activities continue, the process of causality remains diffuse. This creates uncertainty on the reliability and effectiveness of defence diplomacy, particularly on the use of defence diplomacy towards creating cooperative relationships with other states.

Barkawi<sup>82</sup> provides a different conceptualisation by recognising defence diplomacy as a mechanism of asserting hegemonic power and dominance between nations. This definition adopts Cottey and Forster's definition on the activities that make defence diplomacy, but places the dynamic between nations in an international context not based on anarchy but on hierarchy.<sup>83</sup> Barkawi considers the current categories of study of diplomatic practice as misleading and analytically insufficient, where the use of force is organised through militaries modelled by colonial powers. This view is highly critical of defence diplomacy and its activities, but at the same time it contributes to placing defence diplomacy in a broader framework. A framework that considers power disparities and the likely distortions to the state's functioning. Nevertheless, the scope becomes so wide it makes the study of defence diplomacy arduous as it veers away from the issues of security and into cultural studies and sociology.<sup>84</sup>

The final conceptualization of defence diplomacy is posited by Winger<sup>85</sup>, who realises the difficulties in proving causality and focusing on a subject of study without a solid theoretical basis. Winger thus attempts to theorise the subject as an element of soft power, following Joseph Nye's three-tiered conception of power.<sup>86</sup> Winger identifies several problems

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<sup>82</sup> Tarak Barkawi, "'Defence Diplomacy' in North-South Relations," *International Journal* 66, no. 3 (2011).

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Barkawi notes that the term defence diplomacy is more commonly associated with images of military attaches and peacekeeping operations in an international setting, leading to an incomplete appreciation of the potential impacts that defence diplomacy activities have for the nation on the receiving end. In a context of strong-weak power relations, these activities have severe transformative effects, as Barkawi notes: "It is not El Salvador that trained US forces to defeat a rebellion in the US in the 1980s, but the other way around" *ibid.*, 13.

<sup>85</sup> Winger.

<sup>86</sup> Joseph Nye develops a concept of power and three ways of employing it. Hard power, economic power and soft power. According to Nye, hard power relates directly to the use of force and the threats of its use, economic power is related to the ensuring of obedience or compliance to certain activities by economic means, either by rewards or threats of sanctions and soft power is a diffuse way of power that seeks to control another countries' activities through co-opting their ideas and culture. For more on these types, see Nye's seminal work, Joseph S.

stemming from a lack of theoretical depth of defence diplomacy. One of them is how an objective led approach to defence diplomacy allows for a series of ambiguities in the concept, meaning the focus of defence diplomacy focuses more on the achievable results than on how they are to be obtained. Winger considers that “each study of defence diplomacy exists within a vacuum – detailing a specific instance or case while doing little to deepen our understanding of the concept.”<sup>87</sup>

Although Winger’s approach seeks to resolve the limitations brought from the diffuse and varied conceptualisations of defence diplomacy, he errs in his categorisation of defence diplomacy as soft power. The non-confrontational nature of defence diplomacy must not be mistaken for soft power, as the specific units that execute the defence diplomacy activities are those meant primarily for the use of force and violence. The enhancement and exchanges of a nation’s capability or proclivity to wage war against another nation, conceptualise its security or structure its military forces are some of the results pursued by the objectives of defence diplomacy, and they fall outside the scope of co-option through soft power. Barkawi’s<sup>88</sup> arguments, stemming from a critical perspective that sees defence diplomacy as a mechanism of dominance and hegemony, offer additional reasons of how the effects of defence diplomacy is explicitly coercive and has a direct transformative effect on states.

This research seeks to study Japan’s defence diplomacy with three case studies, based on the conceptualisation and typology of defence diplomacy established by Tan and Singh<sup>89</sup> where defence diplomacy is employed with two distinct views. These are views of a transformative, and a pragmatic defence diplomacy. Transformative defence diplomacy has a clear purpose in achieving defence sector reform and changing the nature of civil-military relations. Pragmatic defence diplomacy prioritises increasing joint capabilities with allies, the better understanding of the strategic culture of other militaries and contributing to the capabilities of other militaries with the purpose of performing joint tasks.<sup>90</sup> These specific policy objectives for defence diplomacy align with the classification of defence diplomacy as an action driven process.

Tan and Singh’s conceptualisation proves optimal for this study as it recognises the not only the palpable benefits that arise from defence diplomacy, in the shape of additional machinery and equipment to a nation’s military or the improved training of their forces, but the influential role that the military takes as an element not just of foreign policy, but the internal structure of the state. Their conceptual approach to defence diplomacy provides important tools for the study of defence diplomacy.

The transformative aspect of defence diplomacy was recognised in the UK’s Strategic Defence Review of 1998, where defence diplomacy was linked as a supporting and non-confrontational mechanism to advance Security Sector Reform<sup>91</sup> through three basic set of

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Nye, *Bound to Lead : The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York, United States of America: New York : Basic Books, 1990).

<sup>87</sup> Winger, 5.

<sup>88</sup> Barkawi.

<sup>89</sup> Tan and Singh.

<sup>90</sup> Wesley in *ibid.*, 225.

<sup>91</sup> Defence, "Strategic Defence Review."

activities, arms control, non-proliferation policies and confidence and security-building measures.<sup>92</sup>

## Definitions

Cheyre defines defence diplomacy as the peace time interaction of the defence resources of one nation with others.<sup>93</sup> He starts from a position where defence diplomacy is a significant element in state policy, and places the figure of the military attache as the central player in charge of the planning and execution of defence diplomacy. As part of official diplomatic missions, they maintain the relations between the different armed forces and also steer the nature of the exchanges between them.

Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster<sup>94</sup> define defence diplomacy as the use of the armed forces and their infrastructure as a tool of foreign and security policy during times of peace. They see it as being used since the 1990's as a mechanism to build cooperative relations with other states and promote military reform. Defence diplomacy is to be understood as a complementary set of activities to the more traditional roles of the armed forces, such as warfare and national defence activities.

Cheyre considers defence diplomacy as a part of a modern public diplomacy and, as part of it, national militaries have a predominant role in how a country is presented in the international stage. Research and studies on the relations between militaries focused mainly on the classic military field until the end of the Cold War. The rise of interdependence and changes in security after this period provided defence diplomacy with a new "network" approach instead of that of a "club."<sup>95</sup> This means that its activities could be used with more than allied nations, allowing for new engagement opportunities with former adversaries and opposing nations. Anton Du Plessis<sup>96</sup> sees defence diplomacy as a type of diplomacy that is underestimated in its scope and utility. He differs from Cheyre in categorising defence diplomacy exclusively as a peaceful dimension of diplomacy, in doing so he also separates it from other activities that have an implicit coercive approach, such as naval diplomacy or actions of force projection.

Cheyre considers that the broadening of the scope of defence diplomacy after the end of the Cold War placed new tasks on military attaches. These activities are the coordination of peacekeeping operations with other states and international organizations, to ascertain the nature of militaries across the globe, to determine opportunities for trades in military equipment, and to identify defence systems for home deployment and the exchange of information on non-traditional threats.<sup>97</sup>

Cottey and Forster note that what is now called defence diplomacy was previously described as military cooperation or military assistance.<sup>98</sup> Cheyre points out that the United States calls defence engagement activities such as the support of democracy, economic aid and its

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<sup>92</sup> "Paper No.1: Defence Diplomacy."

<sup>93</sup> Cheyre, 369.

<sup>94</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>95</sup> Cheyre, 369.

<sup>96</sup> du Plessis.

<sup>97</sup> Cheyre.

<sup>98</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

interaction with other militaries.<sup>99</sup> Cottey and Forster provide a list of the activities that form defence diplomacy, these include: bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military officials; the appointment of defence attaches, defence cooperation agreements, training of military and civilian defence personnel, exchanges between military personnel and units, port calls, embedding of military personnel in partner countries' armed forces or ministries, joint military exercises, and the provision of military equipment and related material aid.<sup>100</sup>

Capie not only provides a definition of defence diplomacy, he also seeks to map the trajectory of defence and military diplomacy in Asia, along with an exploration of the difficulties it has encountered and its relative laggard.<sup>101</sup> Defining defence diplomacy, he starts from Forster's description of it as "the non-operational use of the armed forces by the government in order to pursue foreign and defence policy objectives".<sup>102</sup> He recognises that the British approach, in their Strategic Defence Review, became a reference point for defence diplomacy activities in Asia Pacific countries but that this view also had a clear liberal mandate that highlighted and sought to enforce western principles. In East Asia, defence diplomacy is generally used for trust building measures and avoids foreign intervention on domestic issues of other nations.<sup>103</sup>

In Asia, Capie notes how defence diplomacy is becoming more common yet the relationships that achieve a greater degree of closeness are those that have as a background other security structures, such as the degree and scope of their security alliance with the United States. At the same time, he notes how ASEAN, through the creation of new fora like the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings and a series of Informal Meetings, has gradually adopted elements of defence diplomacy.<sup>104</sup> Capie identifies how, in the case of Asia, defence diplomacy has undergone a process of institutionalisation and formalisation that reflects the regional militaries focus on "new non-traditional roles and functions".<sup>105</sup> This is a development for the study of defence diplomacy, since Capie analyses its progress of it from an executing agency perspective. In doing so, Capie provides a unique insight on the internal obstacles that states face in the exercise of defence diplomacy. From bureaucratic limitations as state entities find themselves without a policy framework that validates their activities, to how engaging in defence diplomacy activities leads to competition between state agencies.<sup>106</sup>

Floyd proposes a series of measures that address Capie's obstacles to defence diplomacy in his proposal to enhance Australia's foreign policy.<sup>107</sup> These are the use of strategic, objective led exercise of defence diplomacy, a simplified continuous communication between the ministry of foreign affairs and trade and the ministry of defence, cost sharing between ministries on defence diplomacy activities, joint planning of activities, the pairing and

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<sup>99</sup> Cheyre.

<sup>100</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>101</sup> Capie.

<sup>102</sup> Anthony Forster on *ibid*.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>106</sup> Capie illustrates this with Canada's absence from the Shangri La Dialogue until 2008. Canada's Foreign Ministry was in a direct competition with the Defence Ministry over which institution would headline the nation's engagement in Asia. *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>107</sup> Floyd.

coordination of efforts with other international partners, and the adoption of a doctrine that conceives defence diplomacy as an interagency effort.<sup>108</sup> Floyd's policy based orientation provides a series of clear cut measures to improve defence diplomacy but still fails to provide a causality in defence diplomacy activities and its expected results.

As a subject of study, Floyd defines defence diplomacy as military to military relations with a high value on the reputation and networks of senior officials.<sup>109</sup> Floyd defines the strands of defence diplomacy as: "diplomacy (narrowly defined), engagement and cooperation, relief and assistance, and the diplomatic component of intervention operations".<sup>110</sup>

Some of the literature on defence diplomacy addresses this concept as oriented towards security sector reform, it is thus pertinent to allow for a brief definition of the term in the context of defence diplomacy.<sup>111</sup> Security Sector Reform is the term for the type of military tasks outside the coercive aspects of the military, linked to the general democratisation of the state as well as the push for an increased transparency and accountability of the armed forces. Security sector reform activities are related to the education and training of other militaries, with objectives like the professionalisation of military forces and the formalisation of a military structure under civilian control.<sup>112</sup> Ford addresses the use of defence diplomacy for these purposes and its limitations.<sup>113</sup> His framework of study is through the analysis of British defence engagement in Security Sector Reform, but clearly recognises defence diplomacy as a political tool where different circumstances will yield different types of results.<sup>114</sup>

Ford's case studies in British defence diplomacy contribute greatly to the literature on defence diplomacy, as it exposes the effects that defence diplomacy has on a state's stability and progression to democratic order. Ford's analysis draws an important distinction as it categorizes defence diplomacy as a form of intervention from one state to another.<sup>115</sup> Ford's study provides an avenue of further research that considers power relations in defence diplomacy and its effect on a state's autonomy within security studies but considering the aspects of power relations posited by Barkawi.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 9-11.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> One such example comes from Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh. In their article, the security sector is described by the British Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short as reaching beyond paramilitary and military forces, encompassing police and civilian structures. They consider that the work of the security sector would also include civil society in measures such as the civilian control over the military, training of military personnel in humanitarian law and human rights, increased parliamentary oversight of the security institutions, civilian watchdog institutions over the security sector and the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, "Security-Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies," in *Centre for Defence Studies Working Papers*, ed. Paul Cornish (London, United Kingdom: The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2002).

<sup>112</sup> Alice Hills, "Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform," *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 1 (2000).

<sup>113</sup> Matthew Ford, "Building Stability Overseas: Three Case Studies in British Defence Diplomacy – Uganda, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 3 (2014).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 598.

<sup>116</sup> Barkawi.



## Characterisations of Defence Diplomacy

Hills acknowledges the importance that Security Sector Reform has as a core element of defence diplomacy. She points out that the political understanding and drafting of policy on defence diplomacy by the UK's Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence Review of 1998 brings together a number of "disparate activities that have been brought together, rebalanced, and presented as a core military activity expressed in political terms."<sup>117</sup>

Hills' appraisal of defence diplomacy highlights how it is employed as a policy mechanism without a full understanding the multiple variations and aspects of security that occur in the countries where Security Sector Reform (SSR) is being advocated and enforced, yielding deficient and incomplete results.<sup>118</sup> A similar criticism to defence diplomacy is made by Floyd, where he addresses the perception that Australia's defence diplomacy has been pursued following a prefixed route that lacks coordination with wider foreign policy objectives.<sup>119</sup> Hills addresses the incongruences that arise from the use of defence diplomacy towards SSR on militaries that lack the structure and personnel to effectively change the structure of their security sector, highlighting the necessity to adapt defence diplomacy on a per case basis instead of blindly adopting a western model of reform to be imposed overseas. Hills does not question the notion of a western model of SSR, but the "evangelical" use of it.<sup>120</sup>

Hills does venture into making a comparison of defence diplomacy uses in SSR through the experiences of the UK's Good Governance Programmes and the USA's defence diplomacy. In her view, the Good Governance Programmes follow the same line as the UK's Overseas Development Administration programmes but in a much more specialised view. They seek the transformation of security sectors around the world based by promoting practices of good governance and transparency. On the other hand, the United States' defence diplomacy has had its own definition, named for some time as defence engagement. This type of engagement is understood as having two forms, Foreign Military Interaction<sup>121</sup> and 'defence diplomacy'.<sup>122</sup> This defence engagement is recognised unofficially as the military and defence support of foreign policy during times of peace, yet unlike Foreign Military Interaction activities, 'defence diplomacy' "...usually occur(s) in a vacuum. They often remain undeveloped, usually lack established funding sources, and are not based on legislation."<sup>123</sup>

Criticism towards defence diplomacy comes primarily from a position where the effectiveness of it as a method towards strategic policy objectives is unclear or insufficient.

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<sup>117</sup> Hills.

<sup>118</sup> One of these aspects is that whilst the importance of the security sector in African nations is recognised including the policing roles that militaries adopt in multiple occasions, it fails to recognise that African police forces are under-resourced as they pose a risk to the ruling elite. This elite in turn, appoints individual officers in positions of power to control and monitor any risks and threats to the ruling power. Another aspect is the privatisation of security forces and services. Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Floyd.

<sup>120</sup> Hills, 63.

<sup>121</sup> This includes: "military assistance, military education, joint planning, and exercises and operations." Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

White<sup>124</sup> provides a view on the limits of defence diplomacy by pointing to the sense of false complacency that leads policymakers to misjudge the limitations that it has encountered by listing several scenarios where it has had little effect. The gap in pinpointing causality when assigning a strategic role to defence diplomacy, beyond the more evident tactical level benefits was one of the central arguments behind Baldino and Carr's analysis of Australia's defence diplomacy.<sup>125</sup> Their analysis of Australia's military to military exchanges shows how it is impossible to define a clear relationship or a bridging process between tactical exchanges and changes in fundamental differences amongst competitive states.

Baldino and Carr point towards the fragility of several defence diplomacy activities in Asia, both as permanent spaces of defence diplomacy and their binding power.<sup>126</sup> This is a concept in which Bisley and Taylor expand on<sup>127</sup>, their article studies the types of engagement China has had in the iconic defence diplomacy event of the Asia Pacific, the Shangri-La Dialogue, highlighting how powerful countries still block and shape the agendas of multilateral defence oriented events. They base their approach in characterising China's foreign policy posture through the type of exchanges that it has in a multilateral setting.<sup>128</sup>

Defence diplomacy activities are selected and conducted in consideration of the participating countries' level of trust and attitudes towards one another regarding defence cooperation. Cottey and Forster consider this in their exposition of the underlying tensions in the defence cooperation initiatives that Western countries have with Russia and China.<sup>129</sup> They also mention how the United States' defence diplomacy activities with nations in South America are conducted with consideration of the precedent of its Cold War support of the region's authoritarian and repressive regimes.<sup>130</sup> Ford's analysis of the UK's defence diplomacy with Zimbabwe highlights how the results of the UK's defence diplomacy activities were hindered by "intransigent, unwilling or insincere partners."<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Hugh White, "Grand Expectations, Little Promise," *The Centre of Gravity*, no. 17 (2014), <http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/1826/defence-diplomacy-game-worth-candle>.

<sup>125</sup> Daniel Baldino and Andrew Carr, "Defence Diplomacy and the Australian Defence Force: Smokescreen or Strategy?," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 2 (2016).

<sup>126</sup> For example, they view how military led talks in the Asia Pacific still tend to be ad-hoc and vulnerable to power struggles. Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Nick Bisley and Brendan Taylor, "China's Engagement with Regional Security Multilateralism: The Case of the Shangri-La Dialogue," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2015).

<sup>128</sup> Their study of China's engagement in the Shangri La Dialogue, develops a typology of China as a blocker, a socialized member, a shaper and an opportunistic partner. China can block efforts from being pursued, subverting the purpose of the multilateral setting. It can be a supporter of certain spaces where its interests are being pursued, acting as a socialized actor regarding its security policy. China is seen as a shaper in the instances where it has sought to define and steer the agenda of the Shangri-La dialogue and as an opportunistic participant where it engages "in a selective manner to take advantage where it is available". Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365, 17.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 41. See also India's appreciation of Australia's defence diplomacy initiatives as a norm entrepreneur in the Indian Ocean. Andrew Carr and Daniel Baldino, "An Indo-Pacific Norm Entrepreneur? Australia and Defence Diplomacy," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 11, no. 1 (2015): 37.

<sup>131</sup> Ford, 598.

The scope and character of a country's defence diplomacy activities are determined by its internal policies and regulations. Hills explains that defence diplomacy can be limited domestically, and lead to resource competition within a country, if it is not adequately incorporated in the country's defence and security policies.<sup>132</sup> Domestic policies can also change to improve or provide additional defence diplomacy activities. In this sense, Cottey and Forster mention how Czech Republic abolished its military conscription and is restructuring its military to enhance their contribution to peacekeeping operations.<sup>133</sup>

### The South East Asian Context

Bellamy and Hughes provide criticism to scholarly research of military affairs in South East Asia. They recognise two critical aspects of traditional East Asian studies, first that there is a clear proclivity to studies on great power relations, their balance of power, and that this has meant a delayed academic focus on terrorism and other non-state violence in the region. The other aspect is that the militaries in this region have until recently, focused on the maintaining of a certain military elite in power, or a specific form of government. "The military plays these types of role in Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia. In short, rather than protecting their citizens, in practice the region's militaries have expended more effort controlling, killing, torturing and arbitrarily imprisoning them [civilian population]."<sup>134</sup> Their analysis of defence diplomacy tries to widen the scope of analysis to include historical and political developments in the region. Unlike Ford's analysis of specific instances of defence diplomacy<sup>135</sup>, Bellamy and Hughes trace the evolution of military development and cooperation in South East Asia to discern its origin.

Bellamy and Hughes consider that the approaches to security in the region have as a central tenant the principles of non-interference and non-use of force; enabling and legitimising the acquisition and deployment of military force but not its use against external threats.<sup>136</sup> They posit that as a consequence of this, a militarisation process has been legitimised in the region. It is through this critique that they consider measures of Security Sector Reform and defence diplomacy as the means for emancipatory reform to be pursued in South East Asia.<sup>137</sup> Their critique provides insight on discerning the political reasons behind defence diplomacy, and how it is possible to transform them as well as the regional security scenario.

Blaxland discusses how through an extended investment in defence diplomacy with Thailand Australia gained its support as the first ASEAN country to participate in its peacekeeping operations in East Timor.<sup>138</sup> He supports defence diplomacy as a mechanism for states to gain not only goodwill and support in military operations, but also as a way of making sure that other countries are aware of the capabilities that one nation has, deterrence through defence diplomacy.<sup>139</sup> Bisley sees defence diplomacy as a subset of broader forms of cooperation in

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<sup>132</sup> Hills, 51.

<sup>133</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365, 57.

<sup>134</sup> Bellamy and Hughes.

<sup>135</sup> Ford.

<sup>136</sup> Bellamy and Hughes.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> John Blaxland, "Defending Defence Diplomacy," *The Centre of Gravity*, no. 17 (2014), <http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/1826/defence-diplomacy-game-worth-candle>.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

Asian security<sup>140</sup>, with examples like the Shangri-La Dialogue<sup>141</sup>, the RIMPAC military exercises and the ASEAN Regional Forum amongst others.<sup>142</sup>

Bisley expands on the results that defence diplomacy delivers. These include the reduction of tensions and points of friction between defence personnel and diplomats, enhancing information flows, gaining a deeper understanding of the different limits and capabilities between states, and the setting of platforms for the discussion and debate about security issues amongst nations.<sup>143</sup> Continuing that same reasoning, in his publication with Taylor on the limits of action at the Shangri-La Dialogue<sup>144</sup>, Bisley pays notice to the impression of policy makers that its possibility for communication on strategic policy is being side-lined for a strategic grandstanding by Japanese and American heads of state or high ranking officials, showcasing their individual interests as regional ones. They note how through keynote addresses, some representatives at the Shangri-La Dialogue opt to showcase and amplify their differences and growing concerns regarding China.<sup>145</sup>

To Capie, the slow adoption of multilateral mechanisms to address security in the region means there are limited possibilities for change in the way defence diplomacy is undertaken in the region, by focusing primarily on bilateral opportunities and activities.<sup>146</sup> Penghon Cai looks at the similar process of integration and dialogue occurring within ASEAN from a perspective that considers China's obstacles in engaging with the region.<sup>147</sup> He pays close attention to the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and how it has provided a space for China to work with the United States despite tensions in the South China Sea. Even though he considers this space to be an option for dialogue to occur amongst military officials, he identifies the degree of dependence that some ASEAN countries have with the United States as a challenge to China's military diplomacy, as conflict shifts from being between some ASEAN countries and China to the United States and China.<sup>148</sup> To Cai, this is an unsurprising challenge for China, as he sees defence diplomacy as a realpolitik tool with an objective to "intensify group unity into a consolidated alliance."<sup>149</sup>

Studying the evolution and progression with the region of South East Asia of China's defence diplomacy is the main objective of Storey.<sup>150</sup> Whilst having the same definition on defence diplomacy and its global trends as Cottey and Forster<sup>151</sup>, he identifies the policy goals that China is pursuing through defence diplomacy, such as the building of cooperative relations,

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<sup>140</sup> Nick Bisley, "The Possibilities and Limits of Defence Diplomacy in Asia," *ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> David Capie and Brendan Taylor review the origin and function of the Shangri-La Dialogue as well as explore the opportunities it has taken advantage in order to become a prime space for Defence Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. David Capie and Brendan Taylor, "The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defence Diplomacy in Asia," *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 3 (2010).

<sup>142</sup> Bisley.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> Bisley and Taylor.

<sup>145</sup> Bisley.

<sup>146</sup> Capie.

<sup>147</sup> Penghong Cai, "Asean's Defense Diplomacy and China's Military Diplomacy," *Asia Policy* 22 (2016).

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> Ian Storey, "China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012).

<sup>151</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

increasing transparency, and exposure of its “peaceful development” thesis, and to address the anxieties that its rising power provokes on nations in South East Asia.<sup>152</sup> He considers that these activities have evolved at a slower pace than the economic and political integration with the region, and that it also responds to the same behaviour of other great powers in the sense that their historical use of defence diplomacy has consisted mostly of aiding Communist non-state actors and governments with similar policies and threat perceptions.<sup>153</sup>

Storey analyses how China’s defence diplomacy involvement in the region has followed a path of progressive and incremental integration into the spaces of ASEAN, and the establishment of broader multilateral and bilateral cooperative activities related to security. This integration is evidenced by China’s annual defence consultations, academic and research oriented exchanges, joint exercises and discussions on collaborating through with ASEAN’s defence industries.<sup>154</sup> Although Storey notes how these elements evidence the progression from a model of defence diplomacy that sought to enhance the abilities of strategic partners to a wider scope of activities in times of peace, he makes two important observations. First, that there is a dual purpose in China’s defence diplomacy, as it has as a purpose the reassuring of neighbouring countries about its intentions but it also showcases its military power, assuring its status of a great power but also a deterring factor. Second, it recognises defence diplomacy as a long-term process, evidencing how the study of defence diplomacy requires a wider time frame for its analysis, and how it must be studied as a process based mechanism.<sup>155</sup>

### Japan’s Defence Cooperation and Exchanges

Literature on Japan’s defence diplomacy is limited, being composed mainly on the study of measures and activities executed by Japan that are considered defence diplomacy by other scholars. This means that generally, the study of defence diplomacy activities executed by Japan does so without directly employing the conceptualisations of defence diplomacy. The most direct analysis of its defence diplomacy comes from Tsuruoka<sup>156</sup>, he examines the activities that Japan has had and the potential opportunities with the UK. The government of Japan uses the term defence exchange and defence cooperation instead of defence diplomacy.<sup>157</sup>

Tsuruoka acknowledges that outside Japan, the term defence diplomacy is used interchangeably with defence engagement, military cooperation and military engagement. He explains that defence diplomacy has no single international definition of the term, and thus allows for a highly inclusive concept.<sup>158</sup> The loose terminology regarding defence diplomacy is addressed by Baldino and Carr, who note how military diplomacy and defence engagements are synonymous with defence diplomacy.<sup>159</sup> Cottey and Forster also provide insight on how terms like military cooperation and military assistance were used to describe

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<sup>152</sup> Storey.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Tsuruoka.

<sup>157</sup> Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan - Annual White Paper," ed. Ministry of Defense of Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2014). And Tsuruoka, 35.

<sup>158</sup> .

<sup>159</sup> Baldino and Carr, 140.

what is now considered defence diplomacy, and its synonym, defence engagement.<sup>160</sup> Tsuruoka considers it a tool for foreign relations that Japan use albeit with a limited use due to its own political restrictions: "Defence diplomacy, after all, wholly depends on the country's political willingness to remain engaged in international security."<sup>161</sup>

Japan changed the structure of its security institutions, upgrading from a Defence Agency to a cabinet level Ministry of Defence in 2007. After this, Japan increased the intensity in its approach to external security policy.<sup>162</sup> Japan increased its involvement in multilateral meetings on security issues, high level meetings amongst defence personnel, capacity-building assistance programmes and defence equipment transfers<sup>163</sup>, all elements of defence diplomacy.<sup>164</sup>

Dennis Yasutomo explores Japan's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq as a way of understanding the transformations of Japan's Defence Policy.<sup>165</sup> He addresses Japan's defence diplomacy activities through the framework of civilian power.<sup>166</sup> In this sense, Yasutomo explores the origin and nature of Japan's civilian power diplomacy, which he defines as a type of diplomacy based on persuasion and the use of non-military diplomatic instruments, mainly through development mechanisms (like the Official Development Assistance programmes) with a "reluctance and resistance to utilizing the SDF except as a residual or last result instrument in environments defined as military operations other than war."<sup>167</sup>

When analysing Japan's involvement within the framework of ASEAN and its spaces related to security, opposing views are found in the appraisal of Japan's role. Nguyen Hung Son posits that Japan's cooperation with ASEAN around maritime security has no clear goal nor strategy.<sup>168</sup> He considers this to be so despite Japan's assistance to littoral states through capacity building, training exercises, and the conducting of seminars by Japan's Coast Guard. Son considers that Japan needs to extend maritime cooperation into areas such as terrorism and maritime crimes but also non-traditional security issues like environmental protection and disaster relief.<sup>169</sup>

Contrasting Son's view, Tomotaka Shoji considers that Japan has approached multilateral arenas to include the issue of maritime security and highlighting the importance of upholding the rule of law as a peaceful way of resolving conflicts.<sup>170</sup> He considers that Japan's active engagement in ASEAN has oriented security dialogues to include these aspects, and the proposal at the East Asia Summit of 2011 to establish a forum of maritime security are

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<sup>160</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365, 6, 34.

<sup>161</sup> Tsuruoka.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365.

<sup>165</sup> Dennis T. Yasutomo, *Japan's Civil-Military Diplomacy: The Banks of the Rubicon* (New York, United States of America: Routledge, 2014), doi:10.4324/9781315884615.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Son.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Tomotaka Shoji, "The South China Sea: A View from Japan," *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 15 (2014).

evidence of Japan's broader objectives.<sup>171</sup> Shoji recognizes that Japan faces mixed reactions with this approach, with some ASEAN nations remaining cautious towards any perceived interference on issues like the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where Japan as a non-claimant sees its efforts hindered as an actor at the side-lines.<sup>172</sup>

Shoji's research has focused on the development of opportunities and strategic options in Japan's relation with ASEAN.<sup>173</sup> He analyses the growth in qualitative and quantitative terms of its security cooperation, paying special attention to its participation in the ADMM-Plus process and its capacity building assistance programmes.<sup>174</sup> These programs, along with the increased bilateral support that includes transfers of defence equipment and technology with the ASEAN nations of Vietnam and the Philippines are considered by Shoji as part of the diversification of Japan's growing involvement with the region.<sup>175</sup>

Although these scholars effectively study and analyse the impact of activities that are elements of defence diplomacy, they still hold an action oriented focus. De Castro tackles the evolution of Japan's security involvement with ASEAN not as an exercise of defence diplomacy but as Sino-Chinese competition for influence in the region.<sup>176</sup> He considers the evolution of Japan's policy towards South East Asia as focused on balancing the growing power of China by the creation of economic partnerships with nations in the region and joint military activities and confidence building measures with multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum.<sup>177</sup>

## Chapter Four: Case Studies

### Context: Japan's Changing Security Environment

Japan's security structure is one of a series of peculiarities, exceptional situations and contradictions. In its post-World War II constitution, Japan renounced the right to wage war and established a pacifist orientation for the whole state. Japan's Yoshida Doctrine, named after its first Prime Minister, was based on its pacifist constitution and its reliance on the United States for national security.<sup>178</sup> This set the baseline for a series of policies that carefully limited the use of force by Japan and the exceptional situations under which it can be used. Nevertheless, the United States shifted its approach to Japan during the early years of the Cold War, seeking an ally against Soviet and Communist expansion in Asia.

In 1954, Japan established its Self Defence Forces (SDF) and gradually, through a series of constitutional reinterpretations and several revisions of its Defence Guidelines with the United States, underwent a process of enhancing their defensive capabilities and transition

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> "Japan's Security Cooperation with Asean: Pursuit of a Status as a "Relevant" Partner," *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 16 (2015).

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> De Castro.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ashley J. Tellis et al., eds., *Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific*, Strategic Asia 2015-2016 (United States of America: Seattle Washington, D.C. : The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015), 74.

into a nation with considerable military power.<sup>179</sup> Japan underwent a period of economic and political stagnation after the end of the Cold War, labelled the “lost decade”, where the opportunity for Japan to rise as a top global player faded.<sup>180</sup> The extent of Japan’s changing defence diplomacy and defence engagement became evident at the turn of the century, with Japan’s deployment of Self Defence Forces to peace keeping operations and anti-piracy efforts, and the SDF deployment to non-combative support roles in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.<sup>181</sup> Joint US-Japan declarations have signalled the mutual commitment to expand their security relationship and become actively engaged in global security issues. Enhancing their involvement in initiatives that go beyond humanitarian relief operations and support, into activities such as missile defence and maritime security operations.<sup>182</sup>

Currently, Japan is faced with a deteriorating security environment.<sup>183</sup> The main reasons for this are the continued expansion of the North Korean nuclear programme and the rise of China as a geopolitical competitor, asserting power over regional neighbours both through political and economic means, and by seeking military superiority.<sup>184</sup> Japan has reacted to these challenges internally by enhancing the capabilities of its Self Defence Forces and by strengthening the security relationship with the United States.<sup>185</sup>

In particular, developments in North Korea and China contributed to Japan’s current uncertainty and shifts in its security policy. North Korea’s first nuclear test and subsequent missile tests in the Sea of Japan in 2006 escalated Japan’s threat perception of North Korea and its environment. This led to Japan to performing a series of upgrades to its missile defence systems and accelerated the upgrade of Japan’s Defence Agency to a Ministry of Defence in 2007. This provided Japan with a greater control over the direction of its defence operations.<sup>186</sup> The other situation was the territorial crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010, where fishing vessels from China clashed with Japan’s Coast Guard. This led Japan to take measures to defend its outermost territories, to take a stronger stance on maritime security<sup>187</sup>, and for the first time, address China as a “threat” in its Defence White Paper of 2011.<sup>188</sup> This territorial incident is seen as the trigger for the incremental shift in Japan’s balancing strategy against China.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Kapoor, 80.

<sup>180</sup> Pyle, 3.

<sup>181</sup> Yasutomo.

<sup>182</sup> Nicholas Szechenyi, "A Turning Point for Japan's Self-Defense Forces," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 140.

<sup>183</sup> Oros provides a deep analysis of the changes in Japan’s security identity in Andrew L. Oros, "Japan's Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?," *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 2 (2014). And Easley analyses Japan’s evolving defence policies and posture in Easley.

<sup>184</sup> Tellis et al.

<sup>185</sup> Sheila A. Smith, *Japan's New Politics and the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (New York, United States of America: New York : Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

<sup>186</sup> Easley, 73.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan - Annual White Paper," ed. Ministry of Defense of Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2011).

<sup>189</sup> Koga explains this concept with the example of how Japan engages China in an economic level but continues to rely on the United States for its security, balancing the risks that can surface from Chinese threats. Kei Koga,



China's actions in South East Asia during the same time period have also been a source of concern for Japan. China's ongoing land reclamation and militarisation projects in the South China Sea since 2013<sup>190</sup> pose a growing threat to Japan's security. The building and deployment of military equipment in this area threatens the security of Sea Lanes of Communication that Japan's economy and energy depend upon.<sup>191</sup> The building of artificial islands comes in hand with territorial claims that go against the UN convention on Law of the Seas, undermining the rules based order that Japan has promoted and backed in the region.

Japan increased its efforts to ensure maritime security in South East Asia through cooperation with ASEAN in 1998. It continued to increase the capabilities of nations in South East Asia beyond anti-piracy efforts, such as the gifting of patrol vessels to Indonesia in 2006 as a way to balance against China's naval expansion.<sup>192</sup> As part of the aftermath of the Senkaku 2010 crisis and the rising of tensions in the South China Sea during this same period<sup>193</sup>, Japan's Prime Minister Abe promulgated his policy of "proactive peace diplomacy."<sup>194</sup> This policy from 2014 describes the abandonment of a passive security policy of over-relying on the United States by having a stronger military and security policies, with a greater focus on Japan's contribution to regional stability.<sup>195</sup> In 2015, Japan changed its Official Development Assistance charter to include training and equipment of other nation's coastguards and their HA/DR operations.<sup>196</sup> Japan's defence diplomacy has been affected by this changing security scenario, and the adoption of a "proactive peace diplomacy" is evidence of its changing profile.

### Case Studies Background

Japan currently enjoys positive relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, with post war relations improving due to Japan's extensive economic cooperation in the region, its support for the ASEAN formation and consolidation process, and its involvement in the Cambodian peace process.<sup>197</sup>

After Japan's defeat in the Second World War, the attitudes of Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam were shaped initially by the damages left by Japan's colonial and military occupation. Japan's rule in Indonesia fuelled its independence movement, the Philippines developed a security partnership with the United States and Vietnam had separate governments in the South and North of the country.<sup>198</sup> Japan signed reparations agreements with the Philippines

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"The Rise of China and Japan's Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures and Policy Shifts in the 2010s," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 101 (2016).

<sup>190</sup> Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

<sup>191</sup> Koga, "Beyond the Horizon? Japan's Strategic Interests over the South China Sea (Draft)."

<sup>192</sup> Yoichiro Sato, "Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation," (DTIC Document, 2007), 4. And Annex 1, action 5.

<sup>193</sup> Celine Pajon, "Japan and the South China Sea: Forging Strategic Partnerships in a Divided Region," *Asie Visions* 60 (2013).

<sup>194</sup> Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Policy Towards the South China Sea – Applying "Proactive Peace Diplomacy"?", (Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2016), 2.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Easley, 77.

<sup>197</sup> Pajon, 6.

<sup>198</sup> K. V. Kesavan, *Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia, 1952-60 : With Particular Reference to the Philippines and Indonesia* (Bombay, India: Bombay : Somaiya Publications, 1972), 32. Ken'ichi Gotō, *Tensions of Empire:*

in May 1956, with Indonesia in January 1958 and with South Vietnam in 1959. These reparations were specified in the San Francisco Peace treaty and provided Japan with an opportunity to expand its economic influence with these countries.<sup>199</sup>

The reparations and further economic involvement by Japan in the region, in the shape of Official Development Assistance programmes, were deemed as aggressive by the nations of South East Asia, leading to protests during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to Thailand and Indonesia in 1974.<sup>200</sup> South East Asian nations considered at the time that Japan's economic ODA programmes would cause an economic and technological dependence to Japan. Although the Fukuda Doctrine, initiated in 1977, sought a more balanced approach<sup>201</sup>, the economic dependency on Japan continued to deepen, reaching a point of dependency for nearly all the nations in the region by the end of the Cold War.<sup>202</sup>

In South East Asia overall, the relationship with Japan had been based on the pursuit of joint economic prosperity. Japan had a relatively smooth transition in recognising the government of North Vietnam after the Vietnam War, but those relations reached a stalemate with Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia. Vietnam's removal of the Khmer Rouge government, and deployment of mines in the Cambodia-Vietnam border were some of the reasons for Japan to fully suspend aid to the country in 1979.<sup>203</sup>

Japan-Vietnam relations improved after the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords of Cambodia. These accords provided Japan with an opportunity to engage in the security of the region, where for the first time it took part in Peacekeeping operations.<sup>204</sup>

In 2002, Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi started a larger engagement with ASEAN<sup>205</sup>, looking to create an economic partnership and an "East Asian Community".<sup>206</sup> This was a reaction to three main causes, the expectation of a larger involvement by Japan after the late 1997 ASEAN economic crisis, China's approach and establishment of a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, and the focus by the United States to approach the region on anti-terrorism issues.<sup>207</sup>

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*Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 252.

<sup>199</sup> Masaya Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam, 1951-1987* (New York, United States of America: Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), 14.

<sup>200</sup> Pajon, 14.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Dewi Fortuna Khaidir-Anwar, *Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia*, ed. Centre for Strategic International Studies (Jakarta, Indonesia: Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 64.

<sup>203</sup> Le Hong Hiep, "The Strategic Significance of Vietnam-Japan Ties," *ISEAS Perspective* 23 (2017): 3.

<sup>204</sup> Pajon.

<sup>205</sup> Vietnam had become a member in 1995. Sadhavi Chauhan, "Vietnam's Role in Asean," East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/23/vietnams-role-in-asean/>.

<sup>206</sup> These efforts are not to be confused with the 2009 efforts of Japan's then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama towards an East Asian Union modelled after the European Union. Kevin Brown, "Japanese Pm Pushes for East Asian Union," *Financial Times*, 24 October 2009. For more on these efforts see: Yukio Hatoyama, "Japan's New Commitment to Asia - toward the Realization of an East Asian Community," ed. Speeches and Statements (Tokyo, Japan: Prime Minister and Cabinet of Japan, 2009).

<sup>207</sup> Pajon.

## Japan's Defence Diplomacy

Through a comprehensive analysis of Japan's annual Defence White Paper, the Diplomatic Bluebook, and Official Development Assistance White Paper for the years of 2006 to 2016 it is possible to determine Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam during that period. The data gathered was also cross checked with the East Asian Strategic Review publications for the same time period. This is the main publication by the National Institute of Defence Studies, the principal policy research and study institution within the Ministry of Defence of Japan.

Results for 2016 are tentative as the international editions of the Ministry of Defence's White Paper detailing the activities for that year have not been published yet<sup>208</sup>, although the 2016 Diplomatic Bluebook by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides rich data on the state of Japan's defence diplomacy and evolution for that year. The 2016 Diplomatic Bluebook's data evidences new defence diplomacy activities compared to the previous decade.

Japan's defence diplomacy has been categorised in eight different types of activities: Defence Equipment Transfers, Working Level Meetings, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Bilateral Relations - Partnership Status and International Relations, Port Calls, High Level Meetings, Military Exercises, and Training and Capacity Building activities. These activities can occur in a multilateral setting (e.g. within the ASEAN structure or a multi nation military exercise) or a bilateral one. This allowed the consideration of multinational activities where Japan and only one or two nations were participant.

The discerning factor for selecting multilateral activities was based on the consideration of how much value did the event have on the bilateral process of defence diplomacy instead of a multinational process. As all the nations selected in this study are part of ASEAN, many of the multinational activities studied come from this structure, but others have been excluded as they fall outside the scope of research of the case studies and fall into Japan's defence diplomacy process with ASEAN. Each action was analysed to determine its pragmatic, transformative or mixed profile based on the typology framework posited by Tan and Singh.

Japan conducted a total of 241 defence diplomacy activities during the 2006-2016 period.<sup>209</sup> These show a sharp increase for the year 2011, just after the Senkaku Crisis of 2010.

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<sup>208</sup> The international editions of the White Paper had not been published by September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2017.

<sup>209</sup> These include the tentative results of the defence diplomacy activities during 2016.

Table 1. Japan's defence diplomacy activities per year.<sup>210</sup>

Japan's defence diplomacy activities per year	
Year	Activities
2006	13
2007	14
2008	10
2009	9
2010	15
2011	29
2012	23
2013	37
2014	30
2015	35
2016*	26
TOTAL	241
*Tentative results for 2016	

The turning point in Japan's defence diplomacy was in 2011, with a sharp increase of defence diplomacy activities conducted with all three countries. The total number of defence diplomacy activities for this period was 107 with Indonesia and the Philippines and 101 with Vietnam. These include specific activities where at least one of the countries studied was a participant, including activities in a multilateral setting where more than one country was involved in. For example, these types of activities can be multilateral exercises or high-level meetings where Japan interacted through one action with all countries, counting once for each country.

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<sup>210</sup> See Annex 1.

Table 2. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with each country per year<sup>211</sup>


Japan's defence diplomacy activities per year			
Year	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2006	7	7	2
2007	5	7	5
2008	5	5	5
2009	6	3	4
2010	6	5	8
2011	14	10	13
2012	10	9	11
2013	16	14	15
2014	16	18	13
2015	9	15	16
2016*	13	13	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>101</b>

\*Tentative results for 2016

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
<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

Chart 1. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam <sup>212</sup>



The increase in the number of activities corresponds primarily to bilateral activities, with the number of multilateral activities increasing gradually over time and peaking in 2014 with 12 multilateral activities.

Chart 2. Japan's bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy activities<sup>213</sup>



<sup>212</sup> This chart does not show the tentative results for 2016. The Linear (Total Activities) series is the trendline for the total activities. Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, Ibid.

These changes are consistent with Japan's efforts on strengthening relationships with other nations in the aftermath of the Senkaku Crisis with China. Japan increased relations with countries in the region with the purpose of creating a consensus on maritime security and freedom of navigation issues. This is exemplified in the February 2012 speech given by Japan's Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defence at the Shangri-La Dialogue titled "Protecting Maritime Freedoms"<sup>214</sup>, where he emphasised Japan's value of freedom of navigation, good seamanship and practical cooperation for the region. This multilateral defence diplomacy action is transformative since it is utilising an existing institution to seek policy change and the promotion of democratic values. All three nations are considered in this action, as the Shangri-La Dialogue is a space for high level meetings and the outlining of national security interests and policies. Japan's prioritising of the aforementioned values was further extended with Abe's 2014 policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace."<sup>215</sup>

### Japan's Defence Diplomacy with Indonesia

Japan's defence diplomacy engagement with Indonesia is characterised by a baseline of shared multilateral military exchanges. The multinational annual military exercise held in Thailand, Cobra Gold<sup>216</sup>, provides a constant opportunity for Indonesia's and Japan's personnel to interact. The number of military exercises where these nations interact rose significantly in 2011 with the Second ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise held by Indonesia and Japan.<sup>217</sup> Indonesia and Japan conducted three high level meetings in 2012 and ten in 2013, this presented the sharpest rise in this category of all nations during the 2006-2016 period. The rise in Japan's number of high level meetings is present in all three countries, but not at the same time for all of them. Indonesia was the last country to have this increased rate of activities.

In 2013 Japan's Prime Minister Abe travelled to Indonesia on his first trip overseas since returning to office. During his visit, he emphasised on the importance of Japan's relations with ASEAN states, singling out Indonesia as a key partner to secure peace in the region.<sup>218</sup> Following Abe's visit, Japan's Ministry of Defence informed US media that it had planned to double the budget of military aid to Indonesia for 2014.<sup>219</sup>

Japan's two defence equipment transfers to Indonesia occurred only at the beginning of the studied time frame, in 2006<sup>220</sup> and 2008<sup>221</sup>, as Official Development Assistance Loans and Grants. The first was a grant for the construction of patrol vessels, and the second one a loan that supplied climate change and maritime security countermeasures.<sup>222</sup> The last defence

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<sup>214</sup> Ibid. 94.

<sup>215</sup> Drifte, 2.

<sup>216</sup> Annex 1, activities 4, 25, 30, 38, 51, 66, 95, 154, 187 and 222.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid 67.

<sup>218</sup> Prime Minister of Japan's Press Office, "Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting, Speeches and Statements," news release, 18 January, 2013, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/diplomatic/201301/18indonesia\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/diplomatic/201301/18indonesia_e.html).

<sup>219</sup> Pewarta Fardah, "Indonesia, Japan to Start New Era of Military Cooperation," Antara News, <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/87216/indonesia-japan-to-start-new-era-of-military-cooperation>.


<sup>220</sup> Annex 1, activity 5.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid 33.

<sup>222</sup> These included the deployment of weather radar stations, which have the ability to also detect aircrafts. Svetlana Bachmann et al., "Techniques for Detecting and Tracking Airplanes Using Weather Radar Wsr-88d" (paper presented at the Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, 2004).

diplomacy activity conducted with Japan related to the transfer of defence equipment was the start of negotiations for a new exchange in 2016<sup>223</sup>, these negotiations discussed broader areas of cooperation, namely cyber security, and search and rescue operations.<sup>224</sup>

Chart 3. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Indonesia<sup>225</sup>



<sup>223</sup> Annex 1, action 224.

<sup>224</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "Japan, Indonesia Eye Stronger Defense Ties," in *Asia Defence*, ed. The Diplomat (2017).

<sup>225</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, see Annex 1.




Table 3. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Indonesia<sup>226</sup>

Categories	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*
Defence Equipment Transfer	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Working Level Meeting	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
HA-DR	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Bilateral Relations and Partnership Status - International Relations	0	0	1	0	2	3	2	0	0	1	0
Port Call	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
High Level Meeting	3	2	1	3	2	2	3	10	10	6	0
Military Exercises	1	2	1	1	1	5	4	4	3	2	9
Training and Capacity Building	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	2	2	0	3
Total	7	5	5	6	6	14	10	16	16	9	13
*This table shows tentative results for 2016											

Regarding the type of defence diplomacy that Japan and Indonesia have in terms of its transformative, pragmatic or mixed value, the changes during the 2006-2016 period show a shift towards a pragmatic defence diplomacy. During the 2006-2010 period, the number of activities was balanced between mixed and pragmatic activities. The permanent change happened from 2013 onwards, where the activities became primarily pragmatic. The number of transformative-only activities never exceeded more than two activities per year.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

Chart 4. Japan's type of defence diplomacy activities with Indonesia<sup>227</sup>



Japan's relationship with Indonesia coincides with the distribution of defence diplomacy activities by type, showing an orientation towards a pragmatic defence diplomacy. Japan's participation in military exercises with Indonesia increased substantially in 2011, with the execution of five activities, in comparison with only one the previous year. The aforementioned military exercises in 2011 were all part of multilateral events. During the increase of defence diplomacy activities between both nations in 2011, the character of their exchanges aligned with the previous years.

The character of their defence diplomacy relationship has been one where Japan sought to strengthen pragmatic cooperation and defence exchanges through military exercises. Indonesia has welcomed these activities over time, with its cooperation gradually increasing. In 2014 both countries held "2+2" foreign and defence ministerial talks to strengthen their comprehensive strategic partnership, signalling an intent to counter Chinese actions in the Pacific.<sup>228</sup>

The pragmatic character of Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia prioritised cooperation on maritime security, with the main risks being piracy, maritime terrorism and weapons smuggling, and strengthening the resilience to climate change and environmental hazards. Indonesia received disaster relief support from Japan in the aftermath of the 2006 earthquake.<sup>229</sup> Japan also provided Indonesia with several instances for training and capacity building in humanitarian assistance efforts.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>227</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Jane's Defence Weekly, "Japan to Boost Defence Sales in Asia-Pacific Region as Part of Diplomacy Strategy," in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (Jane's IHS, 2017).

<sup>229</sup> Annex 1, action 6.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid 91.

Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia reflects a process of bilateral pragmatic exchanges that have expanded to include transformative activities. These activities occurred after their transformative objectives had been explored first at multilateral spaces, such as ASEAN.

Gradual changes in the character of Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia gained strength after the signing of a memorandum between the two countries on further defence cooperation in 2015.<sup>231</sup> In 2016 Japan and Indonesia started negotiation rounds on the matter of new transfers of defence equipment.<sup>232</sup> To this point, Indonesia had largely remained at the side-lines of the South China Sea territorial disputes with China for most of the 2006-2015 period. Indonesia's President Joko Widodo attempted to mediate these disputes<sup>233</sup> and continued Indonesia's general posture of taking a moderate, non-conflicting stance on territorial disputes with China.<sup>234</sup>

In 2016 Indonesia adopted a more assertive stance on the protection of its territorial waters, with its Foreign Minister refusing to acknowledge the validity of China's territorial claims and stated that they could only be made on the basis of international law.<sup>235</sup> This led to a more active response in the protection of its territorial waters from Chinese fishing boats<sup>236</sup>, arresting illegal fishermen and firing on their boats.<sup>237</sup> Japan and Indonesia announced at the end of 2016 their intention to create a Maritime Forum, and supporting Jakarta's actions to safeguard its maritime sovereignty.<sup>238</sup>

### Japan's Defence Diplomacy with the Philippines

Japan's defence diplomacy with the Philippines is distinguished from the exchanges with Vietnam and Indonesia, by the clear shift in the character of its defence equipment transfers during the period of study. In 2007, the Philippines received funds in the form of Official Development Assistance from Japan to improve the infrastructure of the Philippines Coast Guard's communications systems.<sup>239</sup> The focus on maritime security is consistent in all the defence equipment transfers from Japan to the Philippines. The remaining defence equipment transfer activities occurred at the end of the study period, in 2013<sup>240</sup> and 2016<sup>241</sup>, where Japan signed the transfer of patrol boats, established a transfer agreement that places defence transfers with the Philippines at the same level as transfers with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and France, and on naval aircrafts to be transferred to the

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid 195.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid 224.

<sup>233</sup> Toko Sekiguchi, "Japan, Indonesia Strengthen Defense Ties," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-indonesia-strengthen-defense-ties-1427112568>.

<sup>234</sup> Evan A. Laksmana, "The Domestic Politics of Indonesia's Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and the South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 38, no. 3 (2016).

<sup>235</sup> Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Indonesia Says No 'Overlapping' South China Sea Claims with China," (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016).

<sup>236</sup> Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, "Breaking the Silence: Indonesia Vs. China in the Natuna Islands," in *Features, Security* (The Diplomat, 2017).

<sup>237</sup> Corporation.

<sup>238</sup> Keita Ikeda, "Japan, Indonesia to Set up Maritime Forum," Jakarta Post, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/20/japan-indonesia-to-set-up-maritime-forum.html>.

<sup>239</sup> Annex 1, action 14.


<sup>240</sup> Ibid 147.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid 223.

Philippines' navy. The 2016 defence equipment transfer agreement marks a considerable change in the Philippines' defence transfers with Japan. Before this exchange, Japan's defence equipment transfers with the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam had been directed to their coast guard.

Japan's interaction with the Philippines in military exercises increased in both rate and number of activities between the years of 2011 and 2013. The rate of these activities remained constant throughout the following years. In 2012 Japan participated for the first time in the Balikatan table top military exercises.<sup>242</sup> Japan continued to increase its presence in multilateral exercises with the Philippines, such as PHIBLEX 15<sup>243</sup>, but also with a bilateral military exercise between the Navy of the Philippines and the Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) in May 2015.<sup>244</sup>

Chart 5. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with the Philippines.<sup>245</sup>



<sup>242</sup> Ibid 99.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid 172

<sup>244</sup> Ibid 197.

<sup>245</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, Ibid.

Table 4. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with the Philippines.


Categories	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*
Defence Equipment Transfer	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Working Level Meeting	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
HA-DR	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bilateral Relations and Partnership Status - International Relations	1	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	0
Port Call	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
High Level Meeting	1	2	2	2	1	4	4	7	11	8	1
Military Exercises	0	2	0	1	0	2	3	5	5	4	5
Training and Capacity Building	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	3	3
*This table shows tentative results for 2016											

The type of defence diplomacy that Japan has with the Philippines is predominantly pragmatic, with only three years presenting more mixed activities than pragmatic ones, 2009, 2010 and 2014. The Philippines experienced an increase in the number of defence diplomacy activities in 2011, transformative-only activities became constant in 2012 and never accounting for more than 2 activities per year. An example of these activities is the multilateral 2012 Shangri-La dialogue where Japan's Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defence delivered a speech emphasising the importance of freedom of navigation, good seamanship and practical cooperation amongst nations.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Ibid 94.

Chart 6. Japan's type of defence diplomacy activities with the Philippines<sup>247</sup>



In 2006, Japan sent experts to the Philippine island of Mindanao to monitor the ceasefire established in 2004 between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.<sup>248</sup> This was in tandem with the creation of the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development later in the year.<sup>249</sup> These activities show the transition from defence diplomacy activities to foreign aid by Japan, and contained both pragmatic and transformative elements. This action is a clear example of the level of closeness that these two nations have reached in their relationship over time, despite the level of interaction decreasing during the first years of the time period. The character of Japan's defence diplomacy engagement until 2012 was focused mostly on sustaining bilateral exchanges and matching of priorities in anti-piracy efforts and capacity building for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.

With the security environment changing for Japan in 2010 and its push for a broader security engagement with South East Asian nations in the years that followed, the character of Japan's defence diplomacy with the Philippines changed. An early indicator of this shift was the declaration of their relationship as a "Strategic Partnership" in 2011, and the agreement to deepen their exchanges.<sup>250</sup> Japan became the second country to have such level of partnership with the Philippines, after the United States.<sup>251</sup> In 2012, Japan and the Philippines held discussions on defence equipment transfers, oriented to assist the modernisation

<sup>247</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, see Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid 7.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid 13.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid 76.

<sup>251</sup> Julius Cesar I. Trajano, "Japan-Philippines Strategic Partnership: Converging Threat Perceptions," *RSIS Commentary*, no. 146/2013 (2013), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13146.pdf>.

process of the Philippines' coast guard. The Philippines had voiced its intent to modernise its coast guard capabilities since 2008.<sup>252</sup>

The first of the military exchanges between the two countries after enhancing their relationship to a strategic partnership occurred in 2012, when Japan took part for the first time in the Balikatan exercises conducted by the Philippines and the United States.<sup>253</sup> During the visit of Japan's foreign minister to Manila in 2013, both countries expressed their desire to strengthen security affairs due to tensions in the South China Sea.<sup>254</sup> Additionally, in December 2013 Japan implemented an ODA project for patrol vessel procurement by the Philippines.<sup>255</sup>

Japan's defence diplomacy with the Philippines refocused in reinforcing the maritime security and capabilities of the Philippines. Japan's highly pragmatic engagement was enhanced by the relationship both countries have with the United States. 2014 saw the first trilateral good will exercises between these nations<sup>256</sup>, as well as Japan's participation in the PHIBLEX 15 exercises as observers.<sup>257</sup> In 2015, Japan held for the first time a bilateral military exercise with the Philippines<sup>258</sup> and in April 2016 for the first time in 15 years, MSDF destroyers made a port call at Subic Bay with following visits later in the year.<sup>259</sup>

During the period of study, the strengthening of the defence diplomacy relationship between Japan and the Philippines was intended to counter China's assertiveness in the South China Sea.<sup>260</sup> The Philippines' relationship with Japan emerged as a complement for its relationship with the United States. Philippines President Aquino's declarations following the Japan-Philippines summit in Tokyo in 2015<sup>261</sup> highlighted the Philippines interest in signing a Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan, allowing for SDF personnel to visit and use its military bases.<sup>262</sup> The Philippines has similar accords with the United States and Australia.<sup>263</sup>

### Japan's Defence Diplomacy with Vietnam

Japan's defence diplomacy relationship with Vietnam presents a clear focus on training and capacity building activities. This type of activity from between the two countries became constant in 2011 and increased on the following years, peaking in 2013 with 5 different training and capacity building activities. The areas of focus for these activities are range from diving medicine, oceanography, flight safety, and training in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response. Unlike the Philippines and Indonesia, Vietnam's defence diplomacy

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<sup>252</sup> Jon Grevatt, "Philippines Politicians Call for Coastguard Modernisation," in *Jane's Defence Industry* (Jane's IHS, 2008).

<sup>253</sup> Annex 1, action 99.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid 115.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid 147.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid 173.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid 172.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid 179.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid 228.

<sup>260</sup> Jon Grevatt, "Japan, Philippines Agree to Enhanced Links for Maritime Security," in *Jane's Defence Industry* (Jane's IHS, 2015).

<sup>261</sup> Annex 1, action 205.

<sup>262</sup> Jon Grevatt and James Hardy, "Japan, Philippines Sign Defence Trade and Technology Deal," in *Jane's Defence Industry* (Jane's IHS, 2015).

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

relationship with Japan does not include humanitarian assistance or disaster relief activities during the 2006-2016 period.<sup>264</sup>

Japan signed a defence cooperation memorandum with Vietnam in 2011<sup>265</sup>, after that, both nations raised the profile of their partnership in 2014 to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership”.<sup>266</sup> This gradual upgrading of their partnership was done in tandem with an increase in the number of annual high-level meetings between the two countries since 2010. Japan’s defence diplomacy with Vietnam shows the largest overall transformation of the case studies. The visit of high level officials from Japan to Cam Ranh Bay in 2013<sup>267</sup>, and the 2016 port calls to the Cam Ranh Bay by the MSDF are evidence of this.<sup>268</sup>

The strengthening of Japan’s relationship with Vietnam has served a dual purpose for Japan. It has helped Japan become a partner for Vietnam in curbing China’s influence in the South China Sea<sup>269</sup>, with both nations sharing the position that territorial disputes must be resolved without violence and in the basis of international law.<sup>270</sup> Additionally, Japan’s stronger defence diplomacy relationship with Vietnam has been used as an argument by Japan’s Prime Minister Abe in his push towards a change in Japan’s policies and legislation. Prime Minister Abe has highlighted the delays in executing its defence equipment transfers to Vietnam as a consequence of the increased surveillance burden on Japan’s Coast Guard in the region, and the need for Japan to expand its capabilities.<sup>271</sup> Vietnam’s interest in defence cooperation with Japan interlocks with Prime Minister Abe’s goal of “normalising” Japan’s defence posture.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> This is not to say that Vietnam has not suffered from any natural disasters. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Dung communicated in 2012 that on average 430 people have lost their lives in Vietnam each year due to natural disasters between 2007-2011. Reuters Editorial, “Landslides, Floods Kill 29 in Vietnam,” (Reuters, 2012).

<sup>265</sup> Annex 1, action 83.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid 157.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid 140

<sup>268</sup> Ibid 231.

<sup>269</sup> Jon Grevatt, “Japan, Vietnam Pave Way for Further Defence Collaboration,” in *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (Jane’s IHS, 2016).

<sup>270</sup> Carl Thayer, “Vietnam’s Extensive Strategic Partnership with Japan,” in *Flashpoints* (The Diplomat, 2014).

<sup>271</sup> Koh Swee Lean Collin, “The Japan-Vietnam Maritime Security Relationship,” in *Features* (The Diplomat, 2015).

<sup>272</sup> Hiep.



Chart 7. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Vietnam.<sup>273</sup>




Table 5. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Vietnam


Categories	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*
Defence Equipment Transfer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Working Level Meeting	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
HA-DR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bilateral Relations and Partnership Status - International Relations	1	0	1	1	3	1	3	0	1	0	0
Port Call	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
High Level Meeting	0	2	0	2	2	6	6	6	6	11	0
Military Exercises	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	4	3	1	3
Training and Capacity Building	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	5	3	3	3
*This table shows tentative results for 2016											

Japan's overall engagement with Vietnam has a majority of pragmatic activities, with only two instances of a majority of mixed type activities happening in 2013 and 2014. The activities between these countries doubled from 2009 to 2010 with an equal number of mixed and pragmatic activities. The single transformative-only action that involved Vietnam for the years between 2006 and 2011 was the multilateral ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime

<sup>273</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, see Annex 1.

Security where Japan assumed the joint chair along with Indonesia in 2008.<sup>274</sup> Japan and Indonesia's transformative-only defence diplomacy activities increased during the following years, with 2015 having three exchanges of this type. 2015 saw the lowest number of mixed defence diplomacy activities since 2007 and the highest number of pragmatic-only activities with 12.

Chart 8. Japan's defence diplomacy activities with Vietnam.<sup>275</sup>



Although Japan's relationship with Vietnam shows a high frequency of pragmatic exchanges, the character of their exchanges has been shaped by highly effective and influential transformative activities. The relationship between these two nations shifted its character to a more active engaging in defence and security related matters after the signing of a memorandum on defence exchanges, and after establishing a "Strategic Partnership" in 2009.<sup>276</sup> This made Japan the second nation to have this level of partnership with Vietnam after Russia.<sup>277</sup>

The establishment of Vietnam and Japan's strategic partnership was followed by annual "Strategic Partnership Dialogues", with the first one occurring in December 2010.<sup>278</sup> The relationship between these two countries improved quickly, in 2011 at the Shangri La Dialogue, both countries agreed to increase their cooperation due to the tensions surging in

<sup>274</sup> Ibid 28.

<sup>275</sup> This chart shows tentative results for 2016, see Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid 41.

<sup>277</sup> Thayer.

<sup>278</sup> Annex 1, action 61.

the South China Sea.<sup>279</sup> In October 2011, Vietnam's Minister of Defence visited Tokyo, 13 years since the previous official visit.<sup>280</sup>

Vietnam's attempts to secure a weapons transfer agreement from Japan in 2013<sup>281</sup> are a clear example of the transformative power in Japan's defence diplomacy. Due to Japan's ODA regulations at the time, defence equipment transfers could not be received by another nation's military.<sup>282</sup> Vietnam decided to remove its coast guard from the direct administration of the ministry of defence and modified its composition to add responsibilities to the government and legislative bodies. Even though Vietnam's minister of defence still exercises considerable power over the nation's coast guard, this changing of the security structure of another nation is a clear example of transformative defence diplomacy.

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<sup>279</sup> Ibid 71.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid 83.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid 140.

<sup>282</sup> Japan updated in 2014 its Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, but still imposes several restrictions on any transfer of defence equipment. National Institute for Defense Studies, "East Asian Strategic Review," ed. Ministry of Defense of Japan (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times, 2014).

## Chapter Five: Conclusions

Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam has changed significantly in recent years. An analysis of Japan's 241 defence diplomacy activities with the three selected countries during the 2006-2016 period shows a change in the strategic use of defence diplomacy. Japan's core strategy is to position itself as a nation committed to regional security and the upholding of international law, freedom of navigation and rules based behaviour amongst nations in South East Asia, and to counter China's disruptive role in the region. These strategic goals are sought through activities that enhance the defensive and maritime monitoring capabilities of countries in the region, and signal a common understanding of the security challenges of the region, seeking to balance against common threats.<sup>283</sup> The use of defence diplomacy for this strategic purpose coincides with Cottey and Forster's definition of an "old" defence diplomacy focused on the countering of enemies and realpolitik ethos.<sup>284</sup> A deeper analysis of the activities that Japan has with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam evince how the "new" defence diplomacy that supports human rights, good governance and security self-sufficiency on a national level is also pursued,<sup>285</sup> but not as its principal approach.

During the first years of the 2006-2016 period of study, Japan's involvement with the case studies was composed by a reduced use of pragmatic or mixed defence diplomacy activities. These activities were focused mainly on Humanitarian Assistance-Disaster Relief activities, and capacity building and training in areas like prevention of piracy and maritime terrorism. Prime Minister Abe reconfirmed Japan's commitment to the security of the region on these aspects in his 2007 visit to Indonesia.<sup>286</sup> Indonesia had received the previous year an Official Development Assistance grant for the construction of non-military vessels.<sup>287</sup> The change in Japan's defence diplomacy strategy occurred in 2011, a year after the Senkaku Crisis with China, and shows a clear reformulation in Japan's use of defence diplomacy. Japan's changes to its defence diplomacy have been in response to China's growing assertiveness, but the changes amount to more than a balancing effort from Japan in the region, Japan's defence diplomacy is oriented towards strengthening the existing rules based order in the region.

The changes in Japan's use of defence diplomacy go beyond the sharp increase in the number of defence diplomacy activities. Japan opted for a deepening in scope and reach of both defence diplomacy objectives. By increasing the instances of high level meetings between defence and security officials, Japan managed to expand the SDF's involvement in multilateral military exercises as well as expanding the scope of the training and capacity building activities with the nations in South East Asia. Seminars and other courses held by Japan's Ministry of Defence in diving and submarine medicine, oceanography and aviation law complemented courses and seminars already given in areas such as the enhancement of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts and peacekeeping operations. This transition is also

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<sup>283</sup> Koga, "The Rise of China and Japan's Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures and Policy Shifts in the 2010s," 789.

<sup>284</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365, 8.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Annex 1, action 27.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, 5.

indicated in the manner that Japan's bilateral defence diplomacy activities increased at a higher rate than the multilateral ones.

Indications of Japan's deepening involvement with ASEAN are inferred through the research data despite being outside the scope of study in this research, this is seen in the progression of activities such as the continuation of the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue<sup>288</sup> and the ASEAN Defence Minister Meetings Plus field training exercises on HA-DR.<sup>289</sup> Japan's participation in multilateral exercises evidences a strategy of projecting broad and ambitious goals for regional security in multilateral scenarios first, and exploiting the opportunities to develop on those goals with receptive nations on a bilateral level at a later stage. This two tiered approach provides a greater degree of transparency and accountability to Japan's defence diplomacy, as other countries in the region are aware of the priorities and intentions of Japan. Japan received declarations of support from countries in ASEAN in 2007 with the creation of a Ministry of Defence<sup>290</sup>, confirming regional awareness and support to the changes occurring in Japan's security structure.

Japan's limitations on the use of force, the transfer of military equipment and other policy regulations create important distinctions in the type of defence diplomacy employed. Vietnam's changes to its coast guard's organizational structure and institutional hierarchy to secure an ODA cooperation of patrol boats is a clear example of this. In this exchange, a mostly pragmatic defence diplomacy activity became highly transformative, requiring Vietnam's reform of elements in its security sector to receive defence equipment from Japan.

Japan's start of negotiations for a new defence equipment transfer with Indonesia in February 2016<sup>291</sup> follow the placement of bilateral relations between these nations on a "Strategic Partnership" level in late 2015<sup>292</sup>, Indonesia was the last case study to reach this level.<sup>293</sup> These activities hold a mixed value since Japan's transfer of defence equipment and bilateral partnership status are done in a framework of understanding of regional security threats. It is during this period that Indonesia becomes more involved in the South China Sea disputes between ASEAN nations and China. Japan's growing involvement in military exercises with the Philippines also hold a transformative dimension, as they are mostly oriented towards gaining interoperability capabilities in HA-DR.

The aforementioned activities show the varying degree in which Japan has pursued transformative objectives in its defence diplomacy. They showcase the considerable influence that Japan wields in transforming the defence and security elements as its defence diplomacy partners, despite its limited involvement. Japan's pragmatic defence diplomacy activities serve a dual purpose: First in enhancing the effect of the transformative aspects in the defence diplomacy relations with the case studies, and second in strengthening Japan's role as a reliable partner in regional security. Pragmatic defence diplomacy seeks to improve

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid 165.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid 131, 232.

<sup>290</sup> Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan - Annual White Paper," ed. Ministry of Defense of Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2007).

<sup>291</sup> Annex 1, action 224.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid 210.

<sup>293</sup> Vietnam upgraded its relationship with Japan to this status in 2009 and the Philippines in 2011. Ibid 41, 76.

cooperative relationships amongst nations, including the capabilities for cooperation in a state of crisis.

The accumulation and increased frequency of capacity building efforts and military exercises by Japan, whether in anti-piracy, disaster relief, and maritime security, amongst others, are evidence of a clear desire to create a series of customs and joint practices with each of the countries studied. The addition of new variants in these types of engagements helps identify the broader security objectives in Japan's defence diplomacy. The expansion of pragmatic exchanges to include bilateral military exercises and port calls by Japan's MSDF vessels are clear indicators of Japan's intent in improving the image of its security forces in the region and deepening the level of cooperation with other countries.

These actions have a balancing effect against China's activities in the South China Sea. Japan's support to the stances from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam of resolving territorial disputes through the mechanisms of international law and the enhancement of its maritime security capabilities are a "calibrated escalation" in the region.<sup>294</sup> Japan's involvement in the region is significant, since it has larger resources and maritime security capabilities than Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam combined. It is also an involvement in the region's security by an ally of the United States, a status no country in the region has.

Although each of the case studies holds a different level of closeness and security cooperation with Japan, the pathway of cooperation is the same. The high-level meeting led process of progressively upgrading to a "Strategic" or "Extended Strategic" partnership is consistent across all cases. This provides Japan with an opportunity to standardise its defence diplomacy with South East Asian countries in a way that it takes advantage of multilateral security initiatives. In South East Asia, Japan's defence diplomacy engagement is thus seen as a consistent and equally accessible process for all countries, oriented in reaching a consensus on the security challenges and threats for the region and enhancing the maritime security capabilities of each nation.

This research reveals that Japan's defence diplomacy with the Philippines is oriented towards enhancing and complementing the security relationship that the United States has with the Philippines. The results in this thesis challenge the possible assumption that Japan has prioritised its defence diplomacy engagement with the Philippines over the other countries in the region. This assumption is based on the fact that both countries share the same stance of upholding the rule of law in resolving the South China Sea territorial disputes and that the Philippines has already sought UN arbitration on the issues. Instead, Japan's defence diplomacy with Vietnam has seen the largest transformation and intensity over the 2006-2016 period. Japan has been the main ODA donor of Vietnam for several years, reaching 148.5 billion Yen in 2012.<sup>295</sup> Additionally, no other country in the region has upgraded its relationship with Japan to an extended security partnership. Japan's defence diplomacy with Indonesia started gaining prominence in 2015, as Indonesia started taking a stronger posture regarding the South China Sea disputes. Japan's defence diplomacy is mainly oriented on the parameters of the "old" defence diplomacy, based on the realpolitik reasoning of enhancing the capabilities of allied states against a common enemy or threat.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> IBRU, "Japan Strengthens South China Sea Ties with the Philippines and Vietnam," in *Boundary News* (United Kingdom: Durham University, 2015).

<sup>295</sup> Clint Richards, "Vietnam's Role in Japan's Southeast Asia Strategy," in *Tokyo Report* (The Diplomat, 2014).

<sup>296</sup> Cottey and Forster, 365, 14.

This thesis' initial assumption was that Japan has changed from a transformative to a pragmatic defence diplomacy in response to China's actions in the South China Sea. However, this thesis' results prove instead that Japan's defence diplomacy is changing from an infrequent, mostly pragmatic defence diplomacy to a frequent defence diplomacy engagement that is mainly pragmatic with strong transformative characteristics. This change was provoked as a response to the Senkaku 2010 crisis and China's assertive actions in the South China Sea, but is oriented towards a broader objective than just seeking to balance China's power. Japan's defence diplomacy is oriented towards the promotion of Japan as a reliable and transparent partner in regional security affairs and securing in the region a rule based system that subscribes to international law.

High level meetings and bilateral partnership agreements are at the cornerstone of Japan's defence diplomacy, gradually widening the types of activities to military exercises, capacity building and trainings, and defence equipment transfers. Japan's increased execution of these activities at a bilateral level indicate the orientation that Japan has taken. Japan's changes in its use of defence diplomacy evince that it has committed to this resource of international statecraft in a broad, ambitious and calculated manner. Japan has a carefully executed defence diplomacy that is coherent with Japan's security interests and priorities in the region, but that it is, at the same time, also conscious of its own limitations.

The study of a nation's security through their execution of defence diplomacy provides results that aid in the assessment of a country's changes in its defence and security policies. Defence diplomacy has limitations in its theoretical grounding and its concept holds diverse interpretations by prominent scholars. Nevertheless, the analysis of a country's defence diplomacy based on empirical data helps understand the uses and limitations not only of the country's defence diplomacy activities, but also of its process of conception, its capacity as an influence wielding action and the power relationships with other nations.

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## **Annex 1**

Matrix of Defence Diplomacy Activities.

These actions are the product of an analysis of: Defence of Japan - Annual White Papers for the years of 2006-2016, East Asian Strategic Review for the years 2007-2017, Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook for the years 2007-2017, Annual White Papers on Development Cooperation for the years 2007-2015, the JICA Loan Ex Ante Evaluations for Indonesia and the Philippines and a JICA Grant Ex Post Evaluation for the Philippines.

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2006	1		Seminar in Tokyo on Chemical and Biological Terrorism Preparedness and Crisis Management.	Training and Capacity Building	1	1			1	1	1
2006	2		Meeting with representatives from the Philippines (Foreign Affairs-Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2006	3		Meeting with representatives from the Philippines (Defence – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2006	4	May	Cobra Gold 2006 with Indonesia	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2006	5	June 15	Japan provides Indonesia with grant aid of 1,921 million yen for the project for Construction of Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons. Official Development Assistance	Defence Equipment Transfer				1	1		
2006	6	June 16-22	Japan dispatches relief SDF personnel to Indonesia for earthquake aftermath support. Provides medical service to 3759 people.	HA-DR			1		1		
2006	7	July	Japan sends experts to Philippines (Mindanao). Reconstruction assistance and monitoring team.	HA-DR			1			1	
2006	8	August	Summit between ministers of defence of Japan and Indonesia. Discussion on fields of maritime security and disaster relief.	High Level Meeting			1		1		
2006	9	September	ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (Philippines and Vietnam sign accord, Indonesia did not sign).	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations	1		1			1	1
2006	10	November	Visit by the Deputy Defence Minister of Indonesia.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2006	11	November	Visit by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Indonesia.	High Level Meeting		1			1		

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2006	12	December	Meeting President of the Philippines and Japan's Prime Minister.	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2006	13	December	Japan implements the Bansamoro initiatives in Mindanao.	HA-DR		1				1	
Totals 2006					3	7	5	1	7	7	2

2007	14		Japan grants aid to the Philippines for implementation of The Project for Enhancement of Communications System for Maritime Safety and Security. Communications equipment for the Philippine Coast Guard. Official Development Assistance	Defence Equipment Transfer				1		1	
2007	15		Visit by the President of the Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2007	16		Visit by the President of Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2007	17		Defence Ministers meeting with the Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2007	18		Meeting with representatives from Vietnam (Foreign Affairs – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2007	19		Meeting with representatives from Vietnam (Defence – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2007	20		Meeting with representatives from the Philippines (Foreign Affairs – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2007	21		Meeting with representatives from the Philippines (Defence – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2007	22		Meeting with representatives from Indonesia (Defence – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1			1		
2007	23	January	MSDF Chief of Staff visits Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2007	24	March	GSDF Chief of Staff visits Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2007	25	May	Cobra Gold 2007 Exercises with Indonesia and Japan. Purpose to enhance multinational	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	



Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
			functional cooperation. Philippines as observer.								
2007	26	July	Japan provides the in Kuala Lumpur the Seminar on Prevention and Crisis Management of Chemical and Biological Terrorism.	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2007	27	August	Prime Minister Abe visited Indonesia, reconfirming the commitment to cooperation in areas involving security of the region.	High Level Meeting			1		1		
Totals 2007					2	10	3	1	5	7	5

2008	28		Japan Assumes joint chair of the ARF's Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (shared with Indonesia and New Zealand).	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations	1			1	1	1	1
2008	29	February	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of Indonesian Navy	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2008	30	May	Cobra Gold 2008 Exercises with Indonesia and Japan. Purpose to enhance multinational functional cooperation. Vietnam as observer.	Military Exercises	1		1		1		1
2008	31	May	ASDF Chief of Staff visits Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2008	32	June 10	ASEAN +3 Workshop on HA-DR cooperation.	Training and Capacity Building	1		1		1	1	1
2008	33	August	Japan provided a loan from the Climate Change Program to support climate change countermeasures. Supporting amongst other issues, disaster countermeasures and maritime safety. Official Development Assistance	Defence Equipment Transfer			1		1		
2008	34	October	Administrative Viceministerial Meeting with Viceminister of defence of the Philippines	Working Level Meeting		1				1	

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2008	35	November	Meeting with representatives from Vietnam (Foreign Affairs – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2008	36	November	Meeting with representatives from Vietnam (Defence – Defence).	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2008	37	December	Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force	High Level Meeting		1				1	
<b>Totals 2008</b>					<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

2009	38	February	Cobra Gold 2009	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2009	39	May	Japan Co-hosts ARF Field exercise on Disaster Relief	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2009	40	October	Japan dispatches SDF personnel and a rescue team to Indonesia	HA-DR			1		1		
2009	41	May	Meeting with Minister of National Defence of Vietnam, agree on the drafting of a memorandum on defence exchanges and Placement of their Relationship on a level of "Strategic Partnership"	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations		1					1
2009	42	May	Japan's Parliamentary Secretary for Defence visits Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2009	43	May	Japan's Parliamentary Secretary for Defence visits the Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2009	44	March	Visit by Secretary General of the Department of Defence of Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2009	45	August	Pacific Armies Chief's Conference in Japan. Visit by Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, Commander of the Philippine Army, Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People's Army	High Level Meeting	1		1		1	1	1
2009	46	October	12th CHOD Commander of the Indonesian National Military	High Level Meeting	1	1			1		
<b>Totals 2009</b>					<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2010	47		Japan participates in Pacific Partnership Exercises	Military Exercises	1		1				1
2010	48	January	Administrative Vice Ministerial Meeting Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2010	49	January	Visit to Vietnam By Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1					1
2010	50	February	Visit to Vietnam by MSDF Chief of Staff	High Level Meeting		1					1
2010	51	February	Cobra Gold 2010	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2010	52	March	2nd Meeting of Senior Defence Officials on Common Security challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (held in Japan) Attended by Indonesian Vice Minister of Defence, Philippine Vice Minister of Defence, Vietnamese Vice Minister of Defence.	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations	1		1		1	1	1
2010	53	April	6th Japan-Vietnam Foreign-Defence Ministry Dialogue	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2010	54	April	6th Japan -Vietnam Defence Ministry Dialogue	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2010	55	June	Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff (at the Shangri La Dialogue)	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2010	56	August	4th Japan-Philippine Politico-Military Consultations	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2010	57	August	4th Japan-Philippine Military-Military Consultations	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2010	58	September	3rd Consultation amongst Defence Authorities Indonesia	Working Level Meeting		1			1		
2010	59	October	First ADMM Plus meeting in Vietnam	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations	1		1		1	1	1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2010	60	October	13th CHOD Chief of Staff level meeting with Chief of the General Staff of the Filipino National Armed Forces.	High Level Meeting	1		1			1	
2010	61	December	1st Japan Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations			1				1
<b>Totals 2010</b>					<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>

2011	62	January	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence visited the Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2011	63	January	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence visited Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2011	64	January	Visit by Indonesias Defence Minister. Exchange of opinions regarding defence ministers meeting regularly.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2011	65	February	ASEAN held a seminar for officials from South East Asia dealing with counter terrorism.	Training and Capacity Building	1	1			1	1	1
2011	66	February	Participation in Cobra Gold 11	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2011	67	March	Second ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, by Japan and Indonesia.	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2011	68	April	At the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting Plus, it was decided that Japan will co-chair with Singapore the Experts Working Group on Military Medicine.	Training and Capacity Building	1		1		1	1	1
2011	69	June	Indonesia's President Visits Japan Japan Indonesia Summit, Agree to host ministerial consultations to enhance the "strategic partnership"	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations		1			1		
2011	70	June	Indonesia's President Visits Japan Japan Indonesia Summit, Agree to host ministerial	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status -		1			1		

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
			consultations to enhance the "strategic partnership"	International Relations							
2011	71	June	Japan Vietnam Ministerial Meeting - Exchange of views on defence cooperation and South China Sea situation. Agree on deepening defence cooperation of both countries. Held during the Shangri La Dialogue	High Level Meeting		1					1
2011	72	June	Pacific Partnership, reduced participation due to Great East Japan Earthquake (Japan contributes crew of approximately 10)	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2011	73	June	Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone training in Thailand (Japan contributes crew of approximately 10)	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2011	74	July	Multilateral Joint Training (Japan contributes small crew of 2)	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2011	75	July	7th PACC Meeting the Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2011	76	September	Visit to Japan by Philippine's President and Joint Statement where they place their relationship as "Strategic Partnership", they welcome the Japan-Philippines Dialogue on Maritime and Oceanic Affairs and agree on exchange and coopeartion such as port calls and reciprocal visits.	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations		1				1	
2011	77	September	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence Bilateral talks with Indonesia - During ADMM	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2011	78	September	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence Bilateral talks with the Philippines - During ADMM	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2011	79	September	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence Bilateral talks with Vietnam - During ADMM	High Level Meeting		1					1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2011	80	September	Visit to Japan by Philippine Department of National Defence Undersecretary	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2011	81	September	Administrative Vice Minister Meeting in Tokyo	High Level Meeting		1					1
2011	82	October	Vietnam's Prime Minister Visits Japan	High Level Meeting		1					1
2011	83	October	Vietnam's Minister of Defence Visits Tokyo. First Time in 13 years. Memorandum of Defence Cooperation and Exchange	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations		1			1		
2011	84	November	1st Japan Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation	Working Level Meeting		1			1		
2011	85	November	4th Japan Indonesia Military Military Consultation	Working Level Meeting		1			1		
2011	86	November	Consultation among the foreign affairs and defence authorities in Tokyo	Working Level Meeting		1				1	
2011	87	November	Administrative Chief of Staff meeting in Manila	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2011	88	December	2nd Japan Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue MSDF Chief of Staff meeting with Vietnam's counterpart	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations			1				1
2011	89	December	7th Consultation among the defence authorities in Tokyo	Working Level Meeting		1					1
2011	90	December	Consultation among the foreign affairs and defence authorities in Tokyo	Working Level Meeting		1					1
<b>Totals 2011</b>					<b>7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>
2012	91		Seminars part of small scale programme Indonesia	Training and Capacity Building				1	1		
2012	92		Pacific Partnership 2012, MSDF Transport Vessel, SDF Medical Team, ASDF transport aircraft.	Military Exercises	1		1			1	1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2012	93	January	Meeting of the Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence of Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2012	94	February	IISS Shangri La Dialogue, Japan's Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defence gave a speech titled "Protecting Maritime Freedoms". Emphasises freedom of navigation, good seamanship and practical cooperation.	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations				1	1	1	1
2012	95	February	Cobra Gold 12, Approximately 70 Participants from Japan	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2012	96	February	Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone training (Shanti Doot-3), 2 crew	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2012	97	February	Meeting Between Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defence and Indonesian Minister of Defence.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2012	98	February	Meeting of Vice Minister of Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2012	99	April	First Time Japan participates in tabletop exercises with US and Philippines. Balikatan, 3 crew.	Military Exercises			1		1	1	
2012	100	April	Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy visits Japan	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2012	101	May	Chief of Staff Meeting in Hanoi	High Level Meeting		1					1
2012	102	May	Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention, 20 crew	Military Exercises	1	1			1	1	
2012	103	June	ADMM-Plus meeting with Senior Vice Minister of Indonesia and release of a memorandum on defence cooperation	High Level Meeting			1		1		
2012	104	June	Visit in Manila by Senior Vice Minister of Japan.	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2012	105	June	Visit by the Joint Chief of Staff to the Philippines	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2012	106	June	Administrative Vice-Ministerial meeting in Singapore	High Level Meeting		1					1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2012	107	June	ASDF Chief of Staff meeting in Japan	High Level Meeting		1					1
2012	108	June	Visit by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defence and Air Force	High Level Meeting		1					1
2012	109	July	Defence Ministers of Japan and the Philippines meet and sign a "Statement of Intent on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges"	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2012	110	October	Seminars part of small scale programmes Vietnam. Diving medicine.	Training and Capacity Building				1			1
2012	111	October	First meeting of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, held by Japan.	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations	1		1		1	1	1
2012	112	November	Japan's Parliamentary Vice Minister visits Vietnam and discuss cooperation options in capacity building	High Level Meeting		1					1
2012	113	December	3rd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations			1				1
Totals 2012					5	13	7	3	10	9	11

2013	114	January	Japan's PM visits Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	115	January	Foreign Minister of Japan visits Philippines. Agreeing to strengthen security affairs due to tensions in the South China Sea.	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	116	January	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence Meeting	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	117	January	Japan's PM visits Vietnam and announces shared principles on the South China Sea	High Level Meeting			1				1
2013	118	January	Chief of Staff Joint Staff	High Level Meeting		1			1		



Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2013	119	January	GSDF Chief of Staff visits Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	120	February	Seminar on oceanography as support in maritime security	Training and Capacity Building		1			1		
2013	121	March	Practitioners from Vietnam People's Army received short training on peacekeeping operations	Training and Capacity Building				1			1
2013	122	March	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence Meeting	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	123	April	Japan participates in the US-Philippines Balikatan Tabletop Exercise ("Shoulder to Shoulder"). A multilateral tabletop exercise, Japan and eight other countries also took part. The purpose of the field exercises and civil support activities was promotion of HA/DR, but they most likely had the additional purpose of displaying to China the close US-Philippine military cooperation against the backdrop of South China Sea tension.	Military Exercises	1		1			1	
2013	124	April	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	125	April	Chief of Staff, MSDF visits Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2013	126	May	Chief of Staff, ASDF visits Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2013	127	May	Chief of Staff, ASDF Meeting	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	128	May	Thailand and Korea Co-host the Third ARF Field exercise on Disaster Relief. Japan Sends 50 Personnel and one aircraft.	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2013	129	May	Seminar on submarine medicine	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2013	130	June	Chief of Staff ADSF	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	131	June	First ADMM Plus field training exercise on HA-DR	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2013	132	June	Japan Indonesia Defence Ministers Conference during the 12th Shangri La Dialogue	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	133	June	Defence Minister of Japan meets with Philippines counterpart to promote maritime defence cooperation and HA-DR capacity building.	High Level Meeting			1			1	
2013	134	July	Japan's PM visits Philippines and announces the provision of ten patrol boats as Official Development Assistance	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	135	July	Seminar on oceanography as support in maritime security	Training and Capacity Building				1	1		
2013	136	August	Second Vice Ministerial Meeting Japan-Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2013	137	August	Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Visits Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2013	138	August	Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Meeting	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	139	September	Seminar on submarine medicine	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2013	140	September	Defence Minister talks and shared awareness of South China Sea issues and visit to Cam Ranh Bay. Inspection of the defence of the Spratly Islands setup. Coast Guard Transfer Discussion	High Level Meeting			1				1
2013	141	September	Participation in ASEAN Expert Working Groups tabletop exercises on Counter Terrorism. Held in Indonesia	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2013	142	September	Seminar on Flight Safety for Vietnam	Training and Capacity Building			1				1
2013	143	November	Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defence meets Deputy Minister of Defence of Indonesia	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	144	November	Vietnam Observers to HA-DR response exercise of the GSDF	Training and Capacity Building			1				1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2013	145	November	Assistance for Typhoon Damage in the Philippines, 1200 SDF personnel deployed.	HA-DR			1			1	
2013	146	December	Japan ASEAN commemorative summit. After Japan's PM Visited all the member states. Declaration of Partners for Peace and Stability. Interest in promoting defence cooperation.	Military Exercises	1			1	1	1	1
2013	147	December	Official Development Assistance Project for vessel procurement by the Philippines. 18.732 million Yen loan for 10 MRRVs (40m class)	Defence Equipment Transfer		1				1	
2013	148	December	Minister of Defence Meeting whilst SDF were doing HA-DR in the country	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2013	149	December	Chief of Staff MSDF	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2013	150	December	Japan Indonesia Summit Meeting	High Level Meeting		1			1		
<b>Totals 2013</b>					<b>5</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>

2014	151		Japan Philippines Summit Meeting	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	152		Japan ASEAN Viceministerial Defence Meeting	High Level Meeting	1	1			1	1	1
2014	153	January	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	154	February	Cobra Gold 2014	Military Exercises	1		1		1		
2014	155	February	Training in Oceanography, Flight Safety and Civil Engineering	Training and Capacity Building		1			1		
2014	156	March	Participation in ASEAN Komodo Exercises, hosted by Indonesia	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2014	157	March	Vietnam's President Visits Japan and upgrades bilateral relationship to a "Extensive Strategic Partnership"	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations		1					1
2014	158	March	Seminar on underwater medicine	Training and Capacity Building		1					1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2014	159	March	Seminar on Flight Safety	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2014	160	March	Administrative Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2014	161	April	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2014	162	April	Meeting between Ministers of Foreign Affairs, discussion of regional situation	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	163	April	Joint Staff Council Participated in ASEAN HA-DR Exercise	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	1
2014	164	May	Prime Minister Abe presents the "Three principles on the Rule of Law at Sea" and reaffirms decision to provide vessels to the Philippines	High Level Meeting	1		1		1	1	1
2014	165	May	9th ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue	High Level Meeting	1	1			1	1	1
2014	166	June	Visit by ASDF Chief of Staff	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2014	167	June	Pacific Partnership 2014. Participation of SDF medical personnel, GDSF repair crews, MDSF vessel and an ASDF transport aircraft.	Military Exercises	1		1			1	1
2014	168	June	Seminar on Mindanao Peacebuilding	Training and Capacity Building			1			1	
2014	169	July	Foreign Minister Visits Vietnam and announces provision of used vessels to Vietnam	High Level Meeting			1				1
2014	170	September	Seminar on Capacity Building in Maritime Security and Disaster Relief.	Training and Capacity Building	1			1	1	1	1
2014	171	September	Chief of Staff visit to Philippines, First to do so.	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	172	September	4 GDSF officers participate in exercise PHIBLEX15 as observers	Military Exercises	1		1			1	
2014	173	October	MSDF Destroyer Sazanami participates in the First Trilateral Goodwill Exercises in Manila (with US)	Military Exercises	1		1			1	

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2014	174	October	Japan ASEAN Defence Vice-Ministerial Forum in October.	High Level Meeting	1		1		1	1	1
2014	175	November	Japan's PM meets Philippines President at the sidelines of ASEAN meeting	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	176	November	Meeting between Ministers of Foreign Affairs, discussion of regional situation	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2014	177	November	Japan Indonesia Summit.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2014	178	November	Meeting of Foreign Ministers, will to strengthen strategic partnership and undertake cooperation in maritime field	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2014	179	November	17th Japan ASEAN Summit submits a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime	High Level Meeting	1		1		1	1	1
2014	180	December	AirAsia Relief operations. SDF Maritime Unit, Two destroyers, three helicopters.	HA-DR			1		1		
Totals 2014					12	17	12	1	16	18	13

2015	181		PKO Training	Training and Capacity Building				1			1
2015	182		Seminar on International Aviation Law	Training and Capacity Building		1				1	
2015	183	January	Defence Ministry Meeting, signing of memorandum on defence cooperation and exchanges.	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	184	January	Vice Minister of Defence Visit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	185	January	Vice Minister of Defence Visit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	186	January	Vice Minister of Defence Visit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	187	February	Cobra Gold 15	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	
2015	189	February	MSDF Chief of Staff Visit	High Level Meeting		1				1	

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2015	190	February	Seminar on International Aviation Law	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2015	191	February	Seminar on International Aviation Law, Maritime Security	Training and Capacity Building		1				1	
2015	192	February	Visit by Vietnamese Naval Commander. Agree to strengthen service to service exchanges	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	193	March	Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	194	March	Commander of Philippine Air Force Visits Japan	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	195	March	Japan Indonesia Summit. Statement supporting the further strengthening of their strategic partnership.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2015	196	April	Indonesia Japan Summit at the sidelines of the Asian African Conference.	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2015	197	May	MSDF Philippines joint training	Military Exercises		1				1	
2015	198	May	MSDF Visit to Vietnam	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	199	May	Chief of Staff ASDF Visit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	200	May	ASDF Chief of Staff Visit	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	201	May	Vice Minister of Defence	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2015	202	May	ARF-Disaster Relief Exercises 2015, 10 Personnel sent	Military Exercises	1			1	1	1	1
2015	203	May	Shangri La Dialogue presentation by Japan's Minister of Defence "New Forms of Security Collaboration in Asia"	High Level Meeting	1			1	1	1	1
2015	204	May	Pacific Partnership 2015. Medical and engineering personnel	Military Exercises	1		1			1	
2015	205	June	Japan Philippines Summit	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	206	June	Seminar on International Aviation Law	Training and Capacity Building		1				1	
2015	207	July	Japan Vietnam Summit	High Level Meeting		1					1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2015	208	September	Japan Vietnam Summit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	209	September	Vietnam's General Secretary Visit	High Level Meeting		1					1
2015	210	September	Japan and Indonesia place their bilateral relations as a "Strategic Partnership"	Bilateral Relations & Partnership Status - International Relations			1		1		
2015	211	November	Japan Indonesia Summit at the sidelines of an ASEAN event	High Level Meeting		1			1		
2015	212	November	Philippines Japan Summit, Broad Agreement	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2015	213	November	Seminar on International Aviation Law	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2015	214	November	Japan Vietnam Defence Ministers Meeting. Agreement on Port Calls and military exercises on HA-DR	High Level Meeting			1				1
2015	215	November	Delivery of 4 of the 6 used patrol boats agreed in 2014 to Vietnam's Coast Guard.	Defence Equipment Transfer		1					1
2015	216	December	First Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting. Indonesia welcomed Japan's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" policy.	High Level Meeting			1		1		
Totals 2015					4	27	5	3	9	15	16

2016	217		MSDF Destroyer sub sequential visits at Subic Bay	Port Call		1				1	
2016	218		MSDF Vessels sub sequential visits at Subic Bay	Port Call		1				1	
2016	219		Participation in Indonesia's International Fleet Review	Military Exercises			1		1		
2016	220		RIMPAC 2016 Cruise training on the voyage from Japan to Hawaii	Military Exercises		1			1		
2016	221	January	Ministry of Defence held a seminar with the UK on HA-DR for ASEAN	Training and Capacity Building	1			1	1	1	1

Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2016	222	January	Cobra Gold 2019	Military Exercises	1	1			1		
2016	223	February	Signs Agreement concerning Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, this project will transfer up to 5 naval TC-90 training aircraft. They have longer range than the small planes currently used by the Philippine Navy	Defence Equipment Transfer	1	1				1	
2016	224	February	Initiated negotiations for the transfer of defence equipment	Defence Equipment Transfer		1			1		
2016	225	February	P-3C Patrol aircraft of MSDF dispatched to Danang in Central Vietnam for a joint table top exercise	Military Exercises		1					1
2016	226	March	Seminar on Underwater Medicine	Training and Capacity Building		1					1
2016	227	March	Seminar on Oceanography	Training and Capacity Building		1			1		
2016	228	April	2 MSDF Destroyers dock at Subic Bay on the Philippines for the first time in 15 years	Port Call		1				1	
2016	229	April	Komodo Military Exercises.	Military Exercises			1		1		
2016	230	April	Western Pacific Naval Symposium 2016 Ship Rider Program voyage from Indonesia to the Philippines on board a MSDF Destroyer with Seminars at sea. / Training and Capacity Building	Military Exercises	1		1		1	1	
2016	231	April	2 MSDF Destroyers make their first port call in Cam Ranh Bay	Port Call	1	1					1
2016	232	May	MSDF Dispatched one destroyer and 360 personnel on ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise	Military Exercises		1			1	1	1
2016	233	May	2 MSDF Destroyers make their first port call in Cam Ranh Bay	Port Call	1	1					1



Year	Number	Time	Defence Diplomacy Activity	Category of Exchange	Multilateral	Type			Country		
				Criteria		Pragmatic	Mixed	Trans-formative	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
2016	234	May	Japan Philippines Defence Ministerial Telephone Conference	High Level Meeting		1				1	
2016	235	June	Seminar on HA-DR	Training and Capacity Building				1		1	
2016	236	June	SDF Participate in Pacific Partnership 2016	Military Exercises			1		1	1	1
2016	237	July	Japanese Coast Guard makes port call in Danang	Port Call	1	1					1
2016	238	July	Provided Capacity Building Support for the maintenance of ship diesel engines	Training and Capacity Building		1			1	1	1
2016	239	July	Anti Piracy Drill by the Japanese Coast Guard and Philippine Coast Guard	Military Exercises	1	1				1	
2016	240	August	MSDF Goodwill Exercises	Military Exercises			1		1		
2016	241	September	MSDF Goodwill Exercises	Military Exercises	1		1			1	
2016	242	October	Anti Piracy Drill by the Japanese Coast Guard and Indonesian Coast Guard	Military Exercises		1			1		
<b>Totals 2016</b>					<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>

<b>Total in all Years</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>101</b>
			<b>Total</b>	<b>241</b>		<b>Total</b>	<b>314</b>