

Migrants' Settlement Intentions in Host Cities in China

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Declaration

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled ‘Migrants’ Settlement Intentions in Host Cities in China’ has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as a part of requirement for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University and Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences under a cotutelle agreement.

I also certify that the thesis is an original research and it has been written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research program and the preparation of the thesis have been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all sources, information and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

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Date: 30 / 11 / 2017

Abstract

Patterns of human mobility and settlement are connected to the evolution of a society and the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. Urbanization, rural–urban migration and settlement are important aspects in China’s profound social change and economic reforms in recent decades. Due to its decades–long institutional constraints, the majority of rural–urban migrants prefer temporary migration or circular migration to permanent settlement if the household registration status is concerned. Research on China’s internal migration to date have mainly focused on the role of institutional constraints on people’s mobility and settlement. This thesis provides a new perspective in understanding migrants’ settlement intentions and patterns, which is centred on migrants’ settlement strategies in the context of economic transition and *hukou* reforms. The thesis examines how migrants intend to achieve permanent settlement by bypassing or overcoming *hukou* constraints. Based on the data from the ‘Migrant Survey of Ningbo’ conducted in 2014 and the ‘Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey’ conducted in 2013, this thesis found that the economic transition and *hukou* reforms provided migrants with opportunities to obtain full citizenship that is separated from their *hukou* status, which broadened the channels of achieving permanent settlement (Chapter 2). Particularly, the marketisation of the urban labour market improved migrants’ socio-economic status and granted them with improved employment conditions, and therefore increasing the likelihood of their settling permanently and successfully via obtaining permanent residence, transferring their *hukou* status or owning local housing at the destination (Chapter 3). In addition, the urban housing market provided migrants with opportunities to achieve permanent settlement without having to transfer their *hukou* status. A new concept of ‘*de facto permanent settlement intention*’ was introduced to understand the diverse channels of permanent settlement based on the relaxed *hukou* constraints and the rise of urban housing market (Chapter 4). Further, regional differences in *hukou* premiums affected settlement intentions. Regions with high ‘*hukou premium*’ and quality social benefit entitlements were highly attractive to migrants, even

though governments at all levels try to encourage migrants to permanently move to small- to – median cities (Chapter 5). The results of this study extend the application of migration theory in a society where profound social changes and rapid economic growth have been taking place in recent decades. The results provide a better understanding of migration and settlement decision making, which could inform policy formulation in the future.

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List of Abbreviations

CNSB: Chinese National Statistical Bureau

CPC: Communist Party of China

Hukou: Household Registration System in China

NHFPC: National Health and Family Planning Commission

PPS: Probability Proportionate to Size Sampling

SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Science

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Chapter 1 : Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Patterns of human mobility and settlement are connected to the evolution of a society and the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. Permanent migration, temporary migration and circular migration are the three dominant patterns of migration. International migrants to destination countries, such as Germany, South Korea and the United States, tend to choose permanent settlement, while internal migrants in Indonesia prefer circular migration, which refers to the individual moving back and forth between their original home and their migration destination (Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991; Hugo, 1982; Lim, 2008; Massey, 1986). With the rapid economic development and urbanisation of China, a proliferation of research has been focusing on the ‘temporary’ nature of Chinese migration, particularly rural–urban migration (Chan, 1994; Hare, 1999; Sun & Fan, 2011; Wang & Zuo, 1999). Although urban China has witnessed a soaring increase in rural–urban migration, from 22 million in 1990 to 253 million in 2014, the majority of these migrants prefer temporary migration or circular migration to permanent settlement at the urban destination. In 2014, the central government of China implemented a new urbanisation plan, encouraging eligible rural migrants to settle in small- and medium-sized cities while maintaining strict entry criteria in major cities (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council, 2014). However, migrants, particularly rural migrants, reported a weak intention of transferring their household registration from original place to the destination place even if their household registration (*hukou*)¹ status could be transferred freely (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). At the same time, an increasing number of migrants have demonstrated a tendency to long-term residence at the destination places. In a recent nationwide survey, Chinese rural migrants reported a preference for long-term residence,

¹ For definition of *hukou*, please see the section 1.5.

and it was found that 55 per cent had lived in their current destination as migrants for more than three years, and 27 per cent had lived at their destination for five years or more. Long-term duration of residence increases intentions for permanent settlement, and half the migrants surveyed stated that they intended to remain in their destination for a long term (National Health and Family Planning Commission [NHFPC], 2015). The diverse settlement intentions among Chinese migrants call for comprehensive updated studies.

In existing literature, the fundamental root cause of the temporary nature of rural to urban migration in China is attributed to China's household registration system (the *hukou* system),² which has been in place since the 1950s (Chan, 1994; Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Liang, 2007; Fan, 1999; Solinger, 1999b). Under the *hukou* system, the Chinese population is classified into two categories: urban *hukou* holders (urban residents) and rural *hukou* holders (rural residents) (Chan, 1996). Rural residents suffered strict restrictions of mobility in the context of the traditional planning system, resulting in the rural residents being exploited for the state's industrialisation programmes in cities. Based on the *hukou* regulations, residents who stayed three or more days outside their original registration place had to report to the local household registration authority while those who stayed more than three months had to receive official approval (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 1958). Restricted by the *hukou* constraints, there were few opportunities for rural residents to leave farmland and move to urban areas for searching non-agricultural works (Cai, 2001; Chan, 1996). Moreover, eligibility for access to state-provided supplies of daily necessities (e.g., food stuff and cooking oil) and social benefits, including public education, housing, medical services and social insurance, were available only for urban residents with urban *hukou* status, while rural residents without the basic necessities could not survive in an urban destination even if they did move to urban areas (Fan, 1999; Solinger, 1999b). The system of *hukou* constrained the rights of rural residents to move freely between rural areas and urban areas.

² The detailed explanation of the *hukou* system is found in Section 1.5.

Through the economic reforms implemented in China in the 1970s, the restrictions of rural–urban migration have now been relaxed. However, migrants, particularly the majority of rural migrants, still suffer restrictions in obtaining urban *hukou* at the urban destination. Such migrants are classified as ‘temporary migrants’ or ‘non-*hukou* migrants’. In contrast, migrants who have received formal approval to alter their *hukou* (from rural *hukou* to urban *hukou*) are classified as ‘permanent migrants’ or ‘*hukou* migrants’³ (Chan & Zhang, 1999; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991; Sun & Fan, 2011). Since the 1970s a series of economic reforms in rural and urban areas, including the introduction of the household responsibility system, the expansion of the non-state sector and the commercialisation of daily necessities, has promoted rural–urban migration across regional boundaries. Although rural–urban migration is permitted in China, the strict criteria for altering *hukou* status excludes rural migrants from becoming permanent urban residents, regardless of how long they have lived in the destination cities. The narrow channels that allow rural residents to obtain urban *hukou* are through state labour recruitment or job assignments based on college graduation and the majority of rural residents are excluded from these channels (Christiansen, 1990; Fan, 1999). The classification of ‘permanent migrants’ and ‘temporary migrants’ depends not only on the duration of residence, but also on formal legitimacy of citizen status and rights to permanent residence (Fan, 1999). This is different from internal or international migration in many other countries, in which permanent settlement is associated with the desire to stay and the length of stay (Massey, 1986, 1987). Due to *hukou* constraints and the disparity between rural migrants and urban residents, many studies examining the intentions of permanent settlement in China assume that permanent settlement through obtaining formal urban *hukou* is the final stage of migration, and that the intention to gain local *hukou* is an essential indicator of permanent settlement intention (Fan, 2011; Hu et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011). Based on this perception of permanent settlement intention, the majority of rural migrants in China are classified as temporary migrants, and their migration

³ The *hukou* system defines the place of registration (*dengjidi*) and the *hukou* type (*hujileixing*). This research principally focuses on the change of *hukou* type (from rural *hukou* to urban *hukou*) among Chinese rural migrants, although this is connected to the change of registration place.

status is classified as temporary because they do not possess the legitimate residence rights associated with the urban *hukou* status.

The temporary nature of rural–urban migration in China is caused not only by the lack of legitimate residence rights but also by ineligibility of these rural migrants to gain citizenship as urbanites at the destination (Chan et al., 1999; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991; Solinger, 1999b). The concept of citizenship emphasises social membership in a community, and eligibility for social rights and privileges within a specific geographic boundary. Smart and Smart (2001) note that citizenship in China is focused more on welfare entitlements than on formal citizenship. Due to the absence of the possibility of obtaining urban *hukou* at the destination, it is impossible for temporary migrants to be granted the full citizenship that would allow rural migrants to gain equal status with urban residents in employment rights and entitlement to access to social benefits and social rights. Temporary migrants are considered ‘second–class citizens’ at the urban destination, and have fewer rights than the urbanites in privileges of access to high quality employment opportunities and social benefits (Chan, 1996). Compared to urbanites, temporary migrants are worse off in a number of aspects in the places of destination. They tend to have fewer and disadvantaged job opportunities, poor and temporary housing arrangements, and are ineligible for education and medical services and other social benefits (Guo & Ireland, 2004; Wang & Zuo, 1999; Shen, 2002). Ineligibility for citizenship contributes to temporary migrants’ inferior social status, resulting in their preference to remain temporarily at the destination (Chan, 1994; Cheng & Selden, 1994; Wang & Zuo, 1999; Solinger, 1999b).

As stated, the inferior economic and social status of temporary migrants manifests in discriminatory treatment in the urban labour market, housing market, and employment and other social benefits due to the *hukou* constraints. Temporary migrants’ economic status in the urban labour market and their associated employment benefits are severely restricted under the *hukou* constraints. Temporary migrants are denied access to employment in the formal sector, which guarantees better working conditions, higher earnings, labour contract cover and other

social benefits and entitlements. Second, the jobs available to temporary migrants are mainly from the informal sector, and usually have poorer working conditions and lower earnings. There are few opportunities for migrant workers in the informal sector to access employment-related benefits, such as labour-contract coverage, pensions, medical insurance, permanent employment benefits, and housing subsidies (Meng, 2012; Yang & Guo, 1996). The dichotomy of the formal and informal sectors based on the *hukou* system enforces the segmentation of the labour market, whereby urban workers hold superior status, and the majority of rural migrants suffer insecure employment and a lack of associated benefits that exist in the urban labour market (Knight et al., 1999; Meng & Zhang, 2001). This inferior employment status and the absence of employment protection under the segmented labour market explain why temporary migrants are inclined to keep their migration temporary and maintain close connections to their place of origin (Fan, 2011; Huang, 2008; Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007).

The poor living arrangements at the urban destination represent an obstacle for temporary migrants making the decision to settle permanently. Housing is conventionally considered an area of disadvantage for rural migrants in host cities because it is often unaffordable and inaccessible. Given institutional constraints, temporary migrants often endure overcrowded living spaces (e.g., dormitories provided by employers) or marginal locations (e.g., villages in urban fringe areas), which foster and reinforce the marginalisation and lack of mobility of this group (Shen, 2002; Zheng et al., 2009). Housing was regarded as a welfare benefit rather than a ‘commodity’ until the urban housing reforms in 1999. Under the government-based subsidised housing system and the work units (*danwei*)-based housing distribution system, the majority of rural migrants without urban *hukou* status were excluded from access to housing allocation, subsidised rental housing and housing provident funds at the urban destination (Huang & Clark, 2002; Lin & Zhu, 2010). After 1999, the traditional housing distribution system ended and the commodity housing sector was opened up to the entire population through market mechanisms. However, even if temporary migrants were permitted access to the commodity housing market, the high cost of commodity housing prevents them from gaining

home ownership (Wu, 2004). Thus, the absence of stable and secure living arrangements at the urban destination deters this group from desiring for permanent settlement.⁴

In addition to the inferior status in the urban labour market and the inaccessibility to the urban housing market, temporary migrants are excluded from the social benefit entitlements in their daily life, such as compulsory education for children and no minimal living allowance (Connelly et al., 2012; Zhang, 2014). Due to the lack of local urban *hukou* status, migrant children face difficulties in receiving local compulsory education. Even if migrant children are permitted to receive local education, they must return to their original home to sit for college entry examinations. Thus, *hukou* constraints to education access are one reasons of temporary migrants to return to their original home (Connelly et al., 2011, 2012).

Furthermore, temporary migrants must overcome regional institutional barriers to achieve permanent settlement because the municipal government has the economic and financial autonomy to set specific *hukou* thresholds and criteria to access to local social benefits (Zhang, 2015). Small- and medium-sized cities (e.g., Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province) tend to adopt a reform that permits eligible migrants with stable employment and domicile to apply for urban *hukou*, while major cities (e.g., Shanghai and Beijing) allow this only to highly educated and highly skilled migrants (Cai, 2011). In addition to the right to change *hukou* status, eligibility for access to social benefits and services is controlled by the municipal government. Given that the quality of social benefit entitlements is the key attracting factor in settlement decision making (Connelly et al., 2011; Tang & Feng, 2015), the regional differences in access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants can either encourage them to permanently settle or impede them from achieving permanent settlement. The regions with better urban welfare benefits (e.g., good education for children and advanced medical services for the elderly) are more attractive for temporary migrants to move to or settle in, and the regions without this

⁴ Some studies demonstrate that the temporary settlement plan contributes to temporary migrants' choice of informal living arrangements (e.g., living in a dormitory) at the urban destination. It has been found that temporary migrants with circular or temporary settlement strategies prefer flexible and affordable housing arrangements, such as low-cost dormitories or rental housing (Liu et al., 2016; Tao et al., 2015).

quality of social benefits create an unwillingness in temporary migrants to achieve permanent settlement (Connelly et al., 2011; Tang & Feng, 2015; Wang & Fan, 2006). Regional differences involving thresholds of *hukou* transfer and access to local social benefits result in geographical selectivity of permanent settlement among temporary migrants.

These regional variations explain the geographical preference of permanent settlement and they are connected with diverse *hukou* reform costs in regions. Given the high concentration of temporary migrants in the major cities in China that have better social benefit entitlements, the local governments in these cities tend to set high thresholds for obtaining local *hukou* status and access to social benefit entitlements. Conversely, small- and medium-sized cities with few or low quality local social benefits are more likely to open city gate to permit temporary migrants to obtain local urban *hukou*. However, temporary migrants report a low intention of permanent settlement in cities with low thresholds for *hukou* entry (Wu & Zhang, 2010). The quality of local urban social welfare is the key factor in attracting temporary migrants to pursue permanent settlement (Connelly et al., 2011; Tang & Feng, 2015). The qualification or the cost of obtaining local urban *hukou* status is an indicator of *hukou* value of a region, which varies among different regions. The municipal governments guarantee those migrants who receive local urban *hukou* status to access to equal social benefit entitlements as local residents. Under local pilot schemes of *hukou* reform, the highest *hukou* value or *hukou* reform costs are found in the major cities such as Beijing, which had a cost of 7697 *yuan* in 2011, five times that of Shijiazhuang)⁵ (Qu & Cheng, 2013).

Thus, the temporary nature of rural–urban migration is attributed to temporary migrants’ unequal treatment in the labour market and their access to urban social benefit entitlements as a result of not having access to full citizenship in the urban destinations. The unequal treatment in the urban labour market and the ineligibility for access to urban housing, compulsory

⁵ Some scholars measure ‘*hukou* value’ or ‘costs in *hukou* reform’ by dividing the core financial expenditure closely related to migrants’ daily life, including employment, education, medical services, social security and minimum living security, by the population of urban residents (Qu & Cheng, 2013).

education for children, medical services and other social benefits encourage these migrants to migrate or move back and forth between their place of origin and their destination. This means that migrants consider their destination as a place of work and their place of origin as their permanent home (Cai, 2001; Fan & Wang, 2008). This temporary settlement pattern explains the family strategy of maintaining rural *hukou* status and land tenure, the preference for individual migration over family migration, and the prevalence of sending remittances to build or renovate the home in the place of origin (Fan et al., 2011; Roberts, 1997; Wang & Zuo, 1999). Given the ineligibility for citizenship associated with the lack of access to employment-related benefits and social benefits, temporary migration has become a rational choice and a usual pattern for rural migrants without local urban *hukou* status.

The close relationship between permanent settlement intention, *hukou* constraints and eligibility for citizenship warrants comprehensive research of permanent settlement intention within the context of economic transition and *hukou* reforms. The interplay of economic transition and *hukou* reforms can affect the social climate and economic conditions of settlement decision-making process (Cai, 2011; Wang & Fan, 2006). Instead of regarding migrants as passive players, it is reasonable to assume that migrants actively cope with institutional constraints to achieve permanent settlement responding to the process of market orientation transition (Tao et al., 2015). In the context of economic transition, temporary migrants would be capable of coping with the difficulties associated with the institutional legacy and utilising available resources under marketisation to achieve permanent settlement through their own efforts. In contrast, the migration direction and intention of settlement among temporary migrants can motivate the central government and municipal governments to undertake corresponding changes to migration policies and implement *hukou* reforms to attract potential settlers and achieve the central government's urbanisation plan, particularly given the widespread shortage of the labour force in cities since 2003.

Few studies focus on temporary migrants' permanent settlement intention making from the perspective of economic transition and institutional reforms. Prior literature principally focuses on the effects of *hukou* constraints on the temporary nature of migration at the urban destination, and considers these restrictions key to explaining settlement intentions among migrants (Cai, 2001; Wang & Fan, 2006). Some scholars believe that *hukou* constraints prevent migrants, particularly rural migrants, from obtaining local urban *hukou* (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* suffer discrimination associated with employment availability, job security and social services, which prevents them from settling permanently in destination cities (Sun & Fan, 2011; Wang & Fan, 2006). Cai (2001) viewed that even if temporary migrants who intend to be permanent settlers that are endowed with human and social capital, the probability of success does not depend on their efforts, but is restricted by the institutional system. The attitude towards the efforts of *hukou* reform since the 1990s that have aimed to abolish rural and urban inequality are demonstrated in the following proverb: 'the thunder is loud, but the raindrops are tiny' (*leisheng da, yudian xiao*) because the high and restrictive threshold of obtaining local urban *hukou* registration continues to impede temporary migrants from obtaining urban *hukou* (Chan, 2010; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Less research attention has been paid to the ongoing *hukou* system reforms to date and temporary migrants' citizenship endeavours under the institutional mechanisms and market forces, particularly when some social rights and public-service entitlements are gradually being separated from *hukou* status. In addition, given that municipal governments have the political and financial power to conduct experimental *hukou* reforms, the eligibility for access to social benefit entitlements, one of the key determinations of permanent settlement, should be discussed not only at the level of the central government but also at the level of municipal government.

It can be assumed that enhancing temporary migrants' citizenship under economic transition and *hukou* reforms, thus improving their status in the labour market and granting their eligibility for access to social benefits (e.g., urban housing ownership) would strongly

encourage permanent settlement intentions. Previous studies generally attribute Chinese temporary migrants' inability to permanently settle in the destination location to their marginalised status in the urban labour market. The formal–informal dichotomy in the segmented labour market has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers, and many studies examine discrimination against temporary migrants engaged in informal employment in China's segmented labour market (Fan, 2002; Meng, 2001; Tao & Zhou, 1999; Wang et al., 2015). Inferior employment status and the absence of employment protection explain why temporary migrants are inclined to keep their migration temporary or maintain close connections with their place of origin (Fan, 2011; Huang, 2008; Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007). However, few studies observe the marketisation process in the urban labour market, and its contribution to the improvement of temporary migrants' employment status and outcomes (Cai, 2011; Zhang, 2015). For example, the implementation of the 'Labour Contract Law' in 2008, and the enactment of the 'Social Insurance Law' in 2010 formally confirmed employment rights related to access to labour contracts and basic pensions, as well as to basic medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance. It can be assumed that policies that improve temporary migrants' employment status and grant them equal employment rights and benefits will reduce discrimination under the informal and formal dichotomy and encourage this group to achieve permanent settlement at their place of destination. Examining whether improvements in the employment status lead to changes in permanent settlement intentions of migrants requires empirical analysis.

In addition, although some scholars note that institutional constraints are overstated as causes of temporary settlement strategies among migrants (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010), there is inadequate research examining individual efforts of temporary migrants to achieve permanent settlement within the context of economic transition and *hukou* reforms. Some recent studies have begun to explain the settlement decision-making processes of Chinese migrants beyond the institutional framework (Tang & Feng, 2015; Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). The temporary nature of migration is determined by the economic fluctuations and low income level

of migrants in the market, which cannot be changed merely through obtaining urban *hukou* status (Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007). However, few studies have examined changes in permanent settlement intentions under the *hukou* reforms and access to market mechanisms that provide temporary migrants in China the opportunity to overcome the *hukou* barriers in relation to obtaining local urban *hukou* status. Specifically, given the rise of the urban housing market since 1999, it is possible for temporary migrants to purchase local housing or rent housing in the housing market regardless of their *hukou* status.⁶ Before the urban housing market reform, housing ownership at urban destinations was even regarded as the passport to access to local urban *hukou*. As migrant homeowners were permitted to apply for the local urban *hukou* or ‘blue stamp’ *hukou*⁷, it was possible for these homeowners to become urban residents (Hu et al., 2011). After the marketisation of urban housing and the relaxation of institutional constraints, the direct attachment between *hukou* constraints and urban housing ownership was weakened. It is possible for temporary migrants to broaden their housing choices in the urban housing market regardless of their *hukou* status. They could now choose to purchase commodity housing or rent housing in a secondary market if they had stable employment and were covered by the local social insurance programme. Because purchasing housing ownership is not necessarily connected to the local urban *hukou* status, this opportunity for housing ownership in destination cities is no longer considered a ‘passport’ to local urban *hukou*. Although some studies connect migrants’ housing plans with their settlement intentions (Lin & Zhu, 2010; Tao et al., 2015), few directly use housing ownership intention in destination cities as a major indicator explaining permanent settlement intention. Given that the urban housing market provides an available channel to access ownership of local property through temporary migrants’ own efforts, their legitimate rights of residence and the eligibility for access to some

⁶ There are regional variations in the criteria for purchasing urban housing. Some regions (e.g., Beijing) require temporary migrants that do not have local urban *hukou* status to provide certification of local social security or personal-income tax for purchasing commodity housing, while Shanghai sets restrictions for migrants in relation to access to housing ownership. In the majority of small- and medium-sized cities, the urban housing market is accessible to temporary migrants.

⁷ After the implementation of the ‘Work-Related Injury Insurance Regulations’, the Labour and Social Security Ministry issued the ‘Notice about Rural Migrants’ Participation in the Work-Related Injury Insurance’ that officially confirmed the eligibility of temporary migrants to access to work-related injury social benefits.

urban social benefits are guaranteed.⁸ The willingness to own local housing among temporary migrants should be considered in the context of whether these homeowners or potential homeowners have the ability and intention to settle permanently in the urban destination. The existing literature has not provided adequate understanding of how housing-ownership intention fits into the classification scheme of settlement intention. Therefore, the connection between housing ownership, obtaining local urban *hukou* and permanent residence intention warrants further investigation. Under the urban housing market mechanism, temporary migrants without local *hukou* status are eligible to access housing ownership in most regions of China. Thus, it can be assumed that there would be diverse settlement-intention patterns among temporary migrants beyond those relating to institutional constraints.

Moreover, as previously discussed, the Chinese Central Government initiated a new plan of urbanisation in 2014 that encourages eligible rural migrants to settle in small- and medium-sized cities, while major cities retain a high threshold for obtaining local urban the *hukou* and access to social benefit entitlements for temporary migrants. However, regardless of their high thresholds of obtaining local urban *hukou* it is evident that major cities with better employment opportunities and social benefits are still more attractive for migrants in choosing permanent settlement (Zhu & Chen, 2010). Nevertheless, existing research on settlement intentions principally focuses on the Chinese Central Government's institutional barriers (Fan, 2011; Wang & Fan, 2006), and neglects examining the effects of regional variations in *hukou* reforms on permanent settlement intentions. The regional variations in the *hukou* reforms that involve different criteria for the change of *hukou* and access to social benefits among temporary migrants should be examined at the municipal government level.

As municipal governments have diverse policies and initiatives to conduct *hukou* reforms based on the local benefits, temporary migrants therefore confront different criteria for

⁸ For example, since 2013, the local government of Ningbo has allowed migrant children to enter senior school and sit college examinations at the destination if their parents can provide certifications of stable employment and domicile.

obtaining local urban *hukou* and access to social benefits. This generates regional diversity in the cost of obtaining local urban *hukou*, or *hukou* value, which in turn may affect temporary migrants' settlement intentions. It is evident that *hukou* value or cost of obtaining local urban *hukou* is affected by the administrative level of cities. A higher *hukou* value exists in the major or large cities that provide high quality local social benefits and life experiences (Wang et al., 2013), and these cities have higher costs for obtaining a local urban *hukou* (Qu & Cheng, 2013). However, there has not been adequate research examining the geographic selectivity of permanent settlement among temporary migrants on the basis of regional variations. These regional variations are measured by '*hukou* premiums'⁹. At the municipal government level, the eligibility for employment benefits, housing ownership and other social benefits (e.g., establishing a health record) are separate from urban *hukou* status, while the eligibility for access to a minimum living standard, housing subsidises (welfare housing), and entry examinations for colleges at the destination are based on local *hukou* status. Measuring the *hukou* premium would capture both the attractiveness and costs of receiving local urban *hukou* that local *hukou* status in some regions guarantees eligibility for access to the same social benefit entitlements as local residents while in other regions local *hukou* status brings much less benefits. These *hukou* premiums in different regions could work as an important factors in affecting temporary migrants' decisions of permanent settlement.

This study provides a new perspective on understanding the settlement intentions of temporary migrants in China in the context of its economic transition and the *hukou* reform. From this perspective, the function of the *hukou* system should be reconsidered. Prior studies draw heavily on temporary migrants' ineligibility for full citizenship as urban residents, forcing them to choose temporary migration as the normal pattern in migration. However, few studies focus on the citizenship endeavour of temporary migrants within the wider scope of *hukou*

⁹ The '*hukou* premiums' refers to the social and economic return that a local *hukou* can bring to the recipient and the costs regarding to obtaining a local *hukou*. It measures both the attractiveness and cost of obtaining a local urban registration.

reforms and the changes in urban labour market and urban housing market. This study considers that improved employment status and eligibility for access to urban social benefits would strongly encourage permanent settlement. If the wider scope of *hukou* reforms and the positive progress of marketisation are taken into consideration, permanent settlement intention should be understood beyond the conventional scheme of ‘obtaining urban *hukou* to achieve permanent settlement’ or ‘without obtaining urban *hukou* to reluctantly choose temporary settlement’. This study examines permanent settlement intentions beyond the conventional scheme (e.g., the obtaining of local urban *hukou* status) using three indicators (permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention) to capture the complexity of settlement intentions. Moreover, this study directly explains the geographical selectivity of permanent settlement based on the regional variations in the thresholds of *hukou* transfer and eligibility for access to social benefit entitlements at the municipal government level. The regional variations of *hukou* premiums would have diverse effects on temporary migrants’ permanent settlement intentions. Rethinking the correlation between *hukou* constraints and the eligibility for citizenship and permanent settlement intention, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of rural to urban migration and the permanent settlement intention of temporary migrants in China.

1.2 Research Objectives

To address the gaps in the existing literature discussed above, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants in China by examining the decision-making process and the coping strategies adopted by temporary migrant groups in the context of institutional legacy and economic transition. More specifically, this paper aims to achieve the following research objectives:

- To reconceptualise the function of the *hukou* system and the eligibility for citizenship of temporary migrants in the context of economic transition and *hukou* reforms

- To challenge the assumption that *hukou* reforms have little effect on the eligibility for citizenship of temporary migrants, particularly rural migrants
- To discuss settlement intentions in the context of the progress of *hukou* reforms, and any changes in citizenship status associated with mobility rights and the eligibility for employment and other social benefits in China's three phases of economic and social transition
- To fill the gaps in the literature by discussing local citizenship involving eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements and regional variations of permanent settlement intentions
 - To challenge the assumption that rural migrants working in the informal sector are bound to a marginalised status, which determines their temporary settlement intentions in migration process
 - To investigate the complexity of settlement intention using improved methodologies and indicators (such as permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and urban housing ownership intention)
- To examine the effects of the formal and informal employment on temporary migrants' settlement intentions and the determining factors of settlement strategies among temporary migrants with different employment statuses
 - To fill the gaps in the literature by rethinking the effects of social-insurance cover on the settlement intentions of temporary migrants
- To challenge the assumption that migrants only have two possible settlement options: either settling permanently by transferring *hukou* to the destination or staying temporarily at the destination without *hukou* transfer (including circulation by moving back and forth between place of origin and destination or returning to original home)

- To introduce a new dimension to the conventional settlement categories, ‘*de facto permanent settlement intention*’, that is related to housing ownership at the destination
- To examine the effects of institutional factors on temporary migrants’ housing decisions, and the effects of housing ownership on their permanent-settlement intentions
- To present a framework highlighting temporary migrants’ efforts to achieve permanent settlement and overcome *hukou* barriers associated with the obtaining of urban *hukou* status
- To investigate regional variations of settlement intention under the diverse thresholds of *hukou* transfer and eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements in regions:
 - To examine regional variations in eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements of temporary migrants.
 - To examine the diverse *hukou* premiums in regions and the effects on permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants

1.3 Research Questions and Significance

1.3.1 Research questions

This study aims to answer the following questions:

- In what way does the eligibility of citizenship of temporary migrants contribute to their intention of permanent settlement at the urban destination in the context of China’s economic transition and *hukou* reforms?

- What are the strategies adopted by temporary migrants to strive for citizenship at the destination under three phases of economic transition and *hukou* reforms?
- In what way does regional citizenship variations in eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements contribute to the geographical selectivity of migration and permanent settlement?
- To what extent does employment status in formal and informal employment sectors affect the permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants through diverse channels?
 - To what extent does social insurance coverage increase the likelihood of permanent settlement among temporary migrants?
 - With the availability of social insurance programs how do traditional formal and informal employment sectors contribute to the permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants?
- To what extent do the factors associated with purchasing local housing contribute to migrants' permanent settlement intentions?
 - What is the role of *hukou* in affecting migrants' permanent settlement intentions in the destination city?
 - What are the settlement strategies adopted by migrants to overcome institutional constraints involving obtaining urban *hukou* status?
- To what extent do regional *hukou* premiums affect temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions?
 - What are the regional variations in *hukou* premiums?

- What is the role of regional differences in *hukou* premiums in determining access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants?

1.3.2 Research significance

This study of migrants' permanent settlement intentions at the urban destination in China has theoretical and practical significance. In the traditional framework of understanding settlement intentions, temporary or circulation migration are considered a step towards permanent settlement during the process of urbanisation (Skeldon, 1990), although circulation migration is itself a usual pattern of migration (Hugo, 1977, 1982). Migration patterns in China are distinguished from those of other countries due to China's institutional context, which has a great effect on migration direction and the settlement plans of migrants. In the Chinese migration context, particularly in rural to urban migration, migrants' mobility is characteristically temporary in nature because these migrants have traditionally been ineligible for citizenship and their opportunities at the urban destination are constrained by the *hukou* system (Fan, 1999, 2011). Whether a migrant is granted local urban *hukou* establishes a clear classification of temporary and permanent settlement, and the intention to obtain local urban *hukou* is considered an essential indicator of permanent settlement intention (Chan, 2009; Xu et al., 2011; Zhu, 2007). However, in the context of China's economic transition and social reforms, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of permanent settlement intention of temporary migrants beyond the traditional constraints associated with obtaining local urban *hukou* by examining indicators related to permanent residence and the ownership of property at the destination. Combining the three indicators (permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention) into one classification scheme of settlement intentions provides a much nuanced understanding of Chinese rural–urban migration and settlement process.

Moreover, the examination of settlement intention in the context of economic transition and institutional reforms emphasises the change of socio-economic status of rural migrants

compared with urban residents in migration process. Although some studies compare the situation of Chinese rural migrants with that of undocumented international migrants (Roberts, 2000; Solinger, 1999a), the cultural and institutional segmentation between Chinese rural migrants and urban residents (such as the different rights of mobility and the eligibility of employment protections and urban house ownership between rural migrants and urban residents) has changed over time. Distinguished from the racial and/or religious segregation, the differences related to eligibility for citizenship between rural migrants and urban residents could be significantly reduced through institutional reforms and the efforts that migrants made within the market mechanism (e.g., purchasing property at the destination).

This study also has practical significance. The functions of the *hukou* system have been criticised since the beginning of China's economic reforms in the 1970s as it is one of the last legacies of socialist planned system and incompatible with the economic reforms. Since then, some important reforms to the traditional *hukou* system and its associated schemes have been taken place. This analysis not only provides an updated knowledge on *hukou* reforms and pays attention to the changes in migrants' social status under the institutional legacy and market forces, but it also explores the effects of *hukou* reforms and marketisation on migrants' employment status, housing ownership and social benefit entitlements (e.g., migrant children's eligibility for compulsory education) at the destination, which could inform a policy formulation to further reform of *hukou* and welfare systems in China. In addition, the comprehensive examination of migrants' settlement intentions based on regional variations could inform policymakers when considering urbanisation plans (which encourage migrants to move to and settle in small- and medium-sized cities) that major cities with high-quality social benefits attract migrants to settle permanently, while small or medium-sized cities without high-quality social benefits are less attractive. Reforms and urbanisation development should consider migrants' settlement intentions and preferences.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Different theories in the literature are used to explain permanent and temporary migration. The first theoretical approach is based on neo-classical economic theory, and focuses on migrants' human capital investment and their economic activities during migration. According to this theory, individuals' benefit expectations in the labour market are based on rational economic considerations. Therefore, migration is perpetuated when migrants can meet their monetary expectations at destinations (Harries & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). Studies attribute temporary migration to unfulfilled monetary expectations or to the unstable, poor working conditions of migrants in the industrial sector at destinations (Nelson, 1976; Todaro, 1969). Piore (1979) applies the dual labour market theory to explain migrants' temporary residence based on the labour demand perspective. Migrants are attracted to work in the labour-intensive, secondary sector in destination city while native workers dominate the capital-intensive, primary sector. As migrants plan to go back to their home of origin eventually once they met target earnings, they could tolerate the disadvantaged jobs that native workers do not accept. The second theoretical approach is based on new economics of labour migration, argues that the decision to migrate is taken in consideration of the household rather than of the individual. Temporary migration is considered a household strategy for minimising risks and maximising income benefits in migration (Stark, 1991). In this form of migration, it is possible for temporary migrants to maintain original resources (e.g., land tenure at their place of origin) to avoid risks during the migration process and to utilise diverse employment opportunities to maximise their income at destinations (Hugo, 1981).

In addition, migration streams are stimulated by social networks related to family, friendship and community ties in the place of origin and destination (Gillespie & Browning, 1979; Lim, 1987). These interpersonal relationships shape migration outcomes, directions and settlement (Boyd, 1989; Massey, 1987). A family is a unit that connects kinship, friendship and community ties in the place of origin and destination across time and space, and it provides

information and practical assistance, which affects migrants' decision making during migration (Boyd, 1989). Frequent social activities with local residents encourage migrants' integration at the destination, while close attachments to the place of origin (e.g., remittance to place of origin) bridge the connection between migrants and their original home, encouraging intention to return (Fan, 2015).

These two theoretical approaches explain international migration or internal migration in developing countries from the perspective of economic expectations and family strategies. The political economy perspective argues that the institutional system determines migrants' socioeconomic status (e.g., employment status and social benefit entitlements), which contributes to the settlement intention of migrants. Fan and Wang (2006) argue that the settlement decisions of rural migrants in China must be understood in the context of the Chinese social and economic transitional context and in relation to institutional constraints. In addition to the effects of economic motivation, human capital endowment and social networks on migrants' settlement decision making, a framework should be established that examines interplay of institutional factors and driving market forces on temporary migrants' permanent settlement intention. It can be assumed that under the marketisation mechanism, the effect of institutional factors on temporary migrants' employment status, housing arrangements and eligibility for social benefit entitlements (e.g., education services for migrant children) would be reduced. Temporary migrants are now capable of gaining citizenship status, improving their social status and facilitating their intention of permanent settlement through more available and diverse channels (Tang & Feng, 2015). Specifically, the improvement of economic and social status related to employment and eligibility for access to urban housing, interplaying with human capital endowment and social networks, has a positive effect on temporary migrants' self-identification at the urban destination. If supported by positive self-identification and evaluation of the destination, temporary migrants would be more capable of and more likely to achieve permanent settlement and break the traditional institutional barriers associated with obtaining urban *hukou* status. Furthermore, the regional variations in institutional constraints

on local social benefit eligibility foster the distinction of ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’ at the municipal government level, reinforcing the importance of local citizenship. These regional variations, along with the traditional institutional constraints affect the settlement intention of temporary migrants.

The theoretical framework presented below will guide the analysis in this thesis to understand settlement intentions among temporary migrants in the context of the progress of China’s *hukou* reforms and marketisation. The institutional factors make an effect on other variables, including human capital endowment and social networks in both places of destination and origin. Regional variations of institutional effects affect the other variables at the same time. All these independent variables associated with institutional factors, regional institutional factors, human capital endowment, and social networks at destination and origin are determinations of migrants’ economic and social status and housing ownership at destination. This in turn contributes to their local wellbeing and social identity, making an effect on their permanent settlement intention. Through applying and examining this framework, this study could also explain the reasons for the high concentration of migrants in China’s major cities. The regional variations in thresholds for *hukou* transfer and eligibility for access to local social benefits play an important role in migrants’ permanent settlement decision making, and this study offers a comprehensive understanding of migrants’ settlement intentions by examining the combined effects of *hukou* reforms, marketisation and individual factors (including human capital endowment and social network factors) (see Figure 1-1).




Figure 1- 1 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

1.5 Key Concepts

1.5.1 Household registration system (*hukou* system)

China's household registration system was implemented in the 1950s with the aim of controlling migration from rural areas to urban areas. The *hukou* system records an individual's household registration type (i.e., rural or urban) and the registration place (usually the birth place). Oriented by the traditional planning system, urban residents with urban *hukou* status were entitled to state-funded benefits and welfare, while rural residents received fewer state-funded benefits and were largely bound to farming and were often exploited in the state's industrialisation programmes in cities (Cai, 2001; Chan et al., 1999; Cheng & Seldon 1994; Fan, 1999; Mallee 1995). Given that there have been several difficulties associated with receiving official approval to change *hukou*, rural migrants have had limited access to urban employment opportunities, particularly in the state sector, and to the distribution of the food quota, housing, medical care and children's education. It has often been impossible for rural residents to survive in urban destinations without these necessities, even though rural to urban

migration was permitted. The *hukou* system created a dualistic framework based on the segmentation of rural migrants and urban residents (Chan, 1996).

Since the 1980s, China's stringent control of rural to urban migration based on the *hukou* system has been slightly relaxed. Both the central government and municipal governments applied a series of measures to conduct *hukou* reform. For example, the central government relaxed the restriction that rural migrants were allowed to establish small businesses in cities only on the condition of having self-sufficient food and housing (*zili kouliang*). In addition, the system of temporary resident permits (*zan zhu zheng*) was introduced to allow temporary residents to temporary residence at the urban destination, although these residents were not eligible for access to urban social benefits, such as housing subsidises or children's education, in the urban destination. Furthermore, given that China's municipal governments have decision-making power in *hukou* reforms, local urban *hukou* status could be accessed by paying several thousand *yuan* or tens of thousands of *yuan* for migrants, depending on the administrative level of the urban destination. It is easier for migrants to obtain access to the local urban *hukou* in small- or medium-sized cities rather than it is in the major cities. This *hukou* status entitles migrants legitimate residence rights and some of the social benefits to which urbanites are entitled (e.g., the rights to send children to public school).

This study analyses the function of the *hukou* system not only in controlling rural to urban migration or setting barriers for eligibility for access to social benefits, but also in relation to the wider scope of its effects (through reform) on easing disparity and discriminatory treatment of migrants. Since 2003, a series of discriminatory regulations related to *hukou* have been abolished. The implementation of 'Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations', 'Labour Contract Law' and 'Social Insurance Law' formally admit temporary migrants' rights of access to social insurance and labour contracts, and separate rights of access to social benefits from the rights associated with *hukou* status.

In this study, '*hukou*' refers to people's household registration. 'Urban *hukou*' is associated with status of urban household registration while 'rural *hukou*' is rural household registration based on the household registration system. Due to the variations of municipal government's local *hukou* reforms, 'local urban *hukou*' refers to the urban household registration in the specified city, which emphasizes the different status of urban *hukou* in cities. These definitions will be applied in the following chapters.

1.5.2 Floating population/temporary migrants

A migrant population in international context refers to a 'population with a change of usual place of residence that involves mobility across an administrative boundary and a permanent change of residence' (Van et al., 1982). The definition of a floating population (*liudong renkou*) is associated with the *hukou* system in China, which refers to migrants who move to the destination without changing their *hukou* status or obtaining official approval from the relevant government (Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991). Under the *hukou* constraints, migrants who have gained formal *hukou* status are considered 'permanent migrants', while the majority of rural migrants with original *hukou* status are considered 'temporary migrants', regardless of how long they have lived in the destination (Chan, 2009; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991). Some scholars have adopted antithetical concepts to distinguish migrants that have gained a permanent change of *hukou* status from who have not, for example, permanent migration versus temporary migration, *hukou* migration versus non-*hukou* migration and official migration versus unofficial migration, (Chan, 1999; Fan, 2011).

The definition of the Chinese migrant population is based on its geographical location and administrative management. The Sixth National Population Census conducted by the Chinese National Statistical Bureau (CNSB) defines two statistical criteria of migrants. The first defines migrants as those who have left the registered place for more than six months, and their current residence place is different from their *hukou* registered place. The second defines migrants as

those whose place of residence is different from their registered place, excluding those moving within the city boundary. This study focuses on rural–urban migrants and includes an examination of urban–urban migrants for comparison. The second calibre of the Sixth National Population Census is adopted so that migrants moving within the city boundary are not defined as temporary migrants. In addition, permanent migrants who have successfully transferred rural *hukou* to urban *hukou* are not considered in this study and survey collection, which is accordance with the definitions of migrants proposed by the CNSB.

1.5.3 Permanent settlement intention and temporary settlement intention

In countries outside of China, the traditional approach for understanding the perpetuation of migration is associated with migrants' desire to stay and their length of stay (Massey, 1986, 1987). Some studies in China use the desire to stay permanently at the destination as an indicator of permanent-settlement intention (Connelly et al., 2011). However, in contrast with other countries, permanent settlement intention is constrained by *hukou* status in China, particularly in rural–urban migration. Due to the economic disparity between rural and urban areas, permanent settlement with obtaining formal urban *hukou* is viewed as the final stage of migration, while the intention to obtain local *hukou* is an essential indicator of permanent settlement intention. The desire to obtain local urban *hukou* is considered to indicate intention of permanent settlement at the destination and the desire to maintain original *hukou* status is considered to demonstrate temporary migration intention (Fan, 2011; Hu et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010).

Housing ownership at destination is also connected to settlement decision making in international migration study (Turner, 1968). It has been found that migrants prefer to search for better quality rental accommodation or invest in existing accommodation until they decide to settle permanently. In China, several studies have suggested that housing decisions among migrants are closely related to settlement intentions due to the marketisation of housing in 1999

(Tao & Feng, 2015; Wu, 2004). Under the marketisation of the urban housing market, temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* are eligible for housing ownership in most regions of China (Tao et al., 2015). Due to relaxed institutional constraints and housing marketisation, this study considers housing ownership intention as an indicator that fits into the traditional classification scheme of settlement intention.

1.6 Methodology and Data Analysis

1.6.1 Research methods

This study mainly adopts a quantitative approach to analyse the settlement intentions of internal migrants, particular rural–urban migrants, in China. The quantitative approach includes logistic regression (i.e., binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression), factor analysis and basic descriptive analysis to measure settlement intentions. The binary logistic regression model is adopted in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of the study. The analysis in Chapter 4 uses multinomial logistic regression to examine the diverse and available channels of achieving permanent settlement. In addition to adopting the multinomial logistic regression model, Chapters 4 and 5 employ factor analysis through a five-point Likert scale. Factor analysis is employed in these chapters to measure temporary migrants’ willingness to socialise with locals and their self-identification and self-evaluation in relation to the destination.

This study principally used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 22.0 software, one of the frequently used instruments in quantitative analysis. The author of this thesis received permission to use the databases of the Migrant Survey of Ningbo of 2014, and the Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey of 2013. Data clearance and analysis of the two datasets were completed by the author.

1.6.2 Data source

Multiple sources of data were used in this study, including, two sets of survey data. The first set of survey data is from the ‘Migrant Survey of Ningbo’ conducted in 2014 by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in the city of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. This study chose to use the survey data from the ‘Migrant Survey of Ningbo’ for several reasons. Ningbo city is located in one corner of the Yangtze River Delta, Zhejiang Province, and has attracted a vast number of migrants since the pre-1970 period. Ningbo is renowned for its active manufacturing, commercial and trading activities, which makes it appealing for migrants. In 2014, there were 4.2 million migrants living and working in Ningbo, which is approximately 42 per cent of the entire population of Ningbo. In addition, in medium-sized cities such as Ningbo, migration policies related to access to social provisions (e.g., access to compulsory education for migrant children) are not as strict as they are in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Examining a medium-sized city such as Ningbo allows this study to gain a better understanding of the effects of institutional legacy and market mechanisms on migrants’ permanent settlement intention. The ‘Migrant Survey of Ningbo’ collected demographic, employment, income, housing, social-network and settlement-intention data, which were examined principally in Chapter 4.

Supported by a team of trained interviewers from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) of Ningbo and the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, face-to-face interviews were conducted in August 2014. Using official data from the PSB of Ningbo as a sampling frame, a multistage stratified sampling process was conducted. First, 100 neighbourhoods were selected randomly in a total of six districts, two counties and three county-level cities in Ningbo. These neighbourhoods included residential neighbourhoods, village neighbourhoods and industrial parks, which all constitute major destinations for migrants. Thereafter, in each selected neighbourhood, 20

migrants were randomly selected. The survey yielded a total of 1,659 valid questionnaires based on the research aims and the criteria of temporary migrants.¹⁰

The second set of data is a part of the ‘Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey’ conducted in 2013. This survey gathered demographic, employment, income, housing, social integration and settlement intention information from migrants in Suzhou, Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha, Xi’an Quanzhou, Songjiang district in Shanghai and Xianyang, and was conducted by the NHFPC in May 2013. The sample was collected using a multistage and random cluster process. The survey gathered information on 14,929 rural–urban migrants and 1,892 urban–urban migrants. The information collected includes personal characteristics such as personal and household information, as well as information about employment, wages, social security, social networks and integration, which are essential variables for examination in the present study. The official sources of the NHFPC were used to construct a sampling frame, and stratified sampling and probability proportionate to size sampling (PPS) were used to select respondents for the survey. Two thousand migrants and 1,000 local residents were selected randomly from Suzhou, Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha, Xian Quanzhou and the Songjiang districts in Shanghai, and 1,000 migrants and 600 local residents were selected at random from the city of Xianyang. These data are principally analysed in Chapters 3 and 5 of the present study.¹¹

The present study also analysed data and information from the central government and local government sources. Using data on the regulations of the central government and data from the websites of local governments, the local education bureaus, the local PSB and the statistical yearbooks assisted the analyses related to the particular policies and regulations in

¹⁰ To address the research questions presented in Chapter 3, migrants were defined as individuals aged 15 years or older (4 per cent of migrants of age 15 are engaged in employment in Ningbo) whose *hukou* was not registered in the city of Ningbo at the time of the survey, and who had been absent from their place of *hukou* registration for more than six months.

¹¹ Based on the specific research objectives, there were different response criteria for Chapters 3 and 5. Migrants had to meet the following four criteria in Chapter 3: must be age 15–59 years in May 2013; must be without local urban *hukou*; must have resided in the destination city for more than six months; must be engaged in employment in the destination city in May 2013. A total of 14,716 valid responses were elicited from the questionnaires based on the criteria of migrants. Migrants had to meet the following three criteria in Chapter 5: must be age 15–59 years in May 2013; must be without local urban *hukou*; must have resided in the destination city for more than six months. A total of 16,596 valid responses were selected from the questionnaires.

migration (conducted in Chapters 2, 3 and 5) and measurement of *hukou* premiums (conducted in Chapter 5). News reports from the mass media were analysed as additional data in Chapter 1 to examine updates on the progress of reforms relating to the *hukou* system and the welfare system in China. The adoption of multiple sources of data aims to address different and specific research objections, which provides clear and comprehensive perspectives of complicated process of settlement decision-making among migrants in China. For example, to address the first and the fourth research objections, Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 mainly adopted the ‘Migrant Survey of Ningbo’. The one city study in a medium-sized city (such as Ningbo) contributes to a better understanding of the effects of institutional factors and the marketization on migrants’ settlement intentions, which could show differences compared with mega cities (such as Beijing and Shanghai) . In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, the second and the third research objections were addressed based on the ‘Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey’, which emphasizes the regional variations of institutional impacts on settlement intentions in eight cities or regions (Suzhou, Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha, Xi’an, Quanzhou, Songjiang district in Shanghai and Xianyang) of China. The geographical selection of migrants in settlement because of the regional variations could be examined based on the data of ‘Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey’ with eight cities’ information.

The survey data from Ningbo provides clear and comprehensive information of migrants’ settlement intentions, which contributes to the

1.7 Research Contribution and Limitations

1.7.1 Research contributions

This study makes theoretical and practical contributions to research on human mobility and the settlement intention of migrants, particularly to understanding rural to urban migration in China. The wider scope of *hukou* reforms should be acknowledged as moving *hukou* from impeding rural to urban migration to guaranteeing temporary migrants in China eligibility for

basic social welfare and social rights. While recognising that the eligibility for *hukou* transfer remains dependent on specific criteria, particularly in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, this study emphasises the progress of *hukou* reforms and marketisation, which have provided temporary migrants with opportunities to receive certain social benefits (e.g., access to social insurance) at the urban destination. As eligibility for access to social-benefit entitlements is gradually being separate from *hukou* status, legitimate citizenship status is no longer unavailable for Chinese rural migrants without urban *hukou* status.

This study contributes to establishing a research framework that provides a better understanding of migrants' settlement intentions, demonstrating that temporary migrants are capable of breaking institutional barriers associated with urban *hukou* through the use of market forces (e.g., obtaining stable employment status or purchasing housing ownership at the destination). This study also advances a rethinking of two conventional assumptions related to the temporary nature of migration. The first assumption is that migrants working in the informal sector are bound to a marginalised status, contributing to their temporary settlement. However, it is possible to assume that under the marketisation of the urban labour market in destination cities in China, the effect of the formal and informal dichotomy on migrants' settlement intention would be weakened. Through gaining social-insurance cover at the destination, it is possible for migrants to change their marginalised status and achieve permanent settlement if they have a stable employment status. The second assumption is that temporary migrants have only two possible settlement strategies: settling permanently by transferring *hukou* to the destination or staying temporarily without transferring *hukou* to the destination (including engaging in circulation migration by moving back and forth between their place of origin and their destination city or returning home to live permanently). However, qualified migrants are able to break the institutional restrictions associated with obtaining urban *hukou* to become permanent settlers. It is possible for them to utilise market forces and individual effort to achieve permanent settlement either through acts such as residing permanently at the destination or transferring *hukou* to the destination or obtaining urban home ownership at the

destination. Based on the framework of this study, a multidimensional definition of settlement intention is adopted, including permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention to reflect migrants' diverse settlement strategies in the context of China's market forces and institutional legacies. In addition, this study introduces the concept of local citizenship, which refers to granting the eligibility of citizenship to migrants associated with the urban social welfare entitlements in the specific cities or regions, to understand regional variations of thresholds for receiving local *hukou* status and eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements based on the segmentation between 'local residents' and 'outsides'. These regional variations are measured by *hukou* premiums, which capture both the attractiveness and costs of receiving local *hukou* status, and the associated eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements. This study fills the gap in the literature by directly explaining the effects of regional variations in relation to *hukou* entitlement on migration and settlement intentions.

This research has several potential practical implications for future *hukou* reforms and China's new urbanisation plan, which aims to encourage eligible migrants to become permanent residents. Under this new urbanisation plan, it is possible for qualified temporary migrants to achieve permanent settlement. Especially in the relative relaxed *hukou* policy, granting eligibility for equal employment status and social provisions would be preferred by temporary migrants. Once their economic situation is stabilised and social welfare is enhanced in the destination city, they would be likely to choose permanent settlement. In addition, to promote the social integration of migrants in destination cities, it is important to ensure that both the governments and local urban residents have accepting attitudes towards migrants.

1.7.2 Research limitations

This study has a number of limitations. First, it is important to note that the single city study (principally related to Chapter 4) may not be generalisable to all regions of China because in other regions, migrants might experience different settlement decision-making processes in

response to their social and policy environment. For example, Shanghai has established a residential permit system, while the local urban housing market sets specific restrictions on migrants' access to housing ownership. Second, because of its reliance on cross-sectional survey data, this study cannot capture migrants' settlement behaviour over time. The strong permanent settlement intentions identified do not necessarily mean there will be an outcome of settlement. Available longitudinal data should be employed to explore migrants' settlement decisions or actions, as opposed to their intentions.

In addition, this study is subject to the effects of the reverse causality relationship between social networks and self-identification among migrants. Migrants who have a stronger willingness to participate in social activities are more likely to self-identify as local residents, while this self-identification would encourage migrants to establish close attachments with the urban destinations and the local urbanites, and thus participate in social activities. This study does not address this reverse-causality relationship in a technical manner. Nevertheless, this study sheds light on the determinants of institutional factors, employment status, housing ownership, social networks and social identification as part of the mechanisms of Chinese rural migrants' permanent settlement decision making.

1.8 Thesis Structure

This thesis comprises six chapters, which follows the format of Thesis by Publication permitted by the Macquarie University. Except the Chapter 1 (Introduction) and Chapter 6 (Conclusion), the other four chapters are primarily based on four self-contained papers, some of which were presented at conferences or currently under review by academic journals.

Chapter 1 presents the research background, objectives, research questions, research significance, theoretical framework, key concepts, data sources and contributions and limitations.

Chapter 2 conducts a policy analysis of three phases of China's economic transition and social reforms since the early of 1980s. Using the city of Ningbo as the case study, this chapter presents a direct and comprehensive illustration of the mobility and settlement intentions of migrants during the course of *hukou* reforms and their endeavour of pursuing citizenship. Chapter 3 uses the Logistic regression model to examine the effects of social insurance coverage at the destination on migrants' permanent settlement intentions under the reforms of urban labour market. Chapter 4 applies a Multinomial Logistic regression model to introduce a new concept of settlement intention, *de facto* permanent settlement intention, and explores the determinants of diverse settlement intentions based on the relaxed *hukou* constraints and the rise of urban housing market. Chapter 5 adopts the concept of hukou premium to examine the costs and benefits of obtaining the local *hukou* status and analyzes the effects of regional variations in *hukou* premium on settlement intentions of migrants.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusion of this doctoral thesis. It summarizes and synthesizes the key findings of each chapters, elaborates the theoretical and practical implications and explores the further research directions based on this study. A series of detailed materials, such as survey questionnaires, are attached as appendixes.

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Chapter 2 : Institutional legacy, citizenship and the changing settlement intentions of migrants in China

Abstract

It is a common consensus that China's household registration (*hukou*) system has functioned as an essential institutional restriction to rural–urban migration since the 1950s. Unlike the previous literature, which has focused on the inferior socio-economic status of migrants under institutional restrictions, this paper discusses the attitude and policy changes of both the central government and municipal governments during the implementation of the *hukou* reform. During the different economic transition phases and the *hukou* reform stages at the both the central and municipal government levels, migrants experienced changes from being second-class citizens to citizens with more equal civic rights, including mobility, employment and social welfare entitlements. In addition, the shift to marketisation also provided migrants with opportunities to strive for citizenship beyond institutional constraints, which contributed to their settlement decision-making. This paper also explores regional variations in settlement intention in relation to entitlements of local citizenship. Given regional differences, employment-related welfare, as well as local rights and other social welfare entitlements, should be granted to both local residents and migrants, which would ease the emerging differential citizenship between 'outsiders' and 'locals'. Using the case study of Ningbo, in Zhejiang Province, the present paper discusses the settlement intentions of migrants and their striving for citizenship in the context of the *hukou* reforms and marketisation.

Key words: citizenship, *hukou* system reforms, settlement intentions, central government, municipal government

2.1 Introduction

Internal migration in China has drawn much attention over recent decades, owing to its large scale and long-lasting influence on China's rapid economic growth, urbanisation and social transformation. Responding to the economic reforms and relatively relaxed migration policies put in place since the 1970s, increasing numbers of rural migrants have voluntarily moved from rural to urban areas, pursuing non-agricultural employment opportunities and earning a higher income (Chan, 2010; Liang & Ma, 2004; Wang et al., 2002). The data from the Fifth Population Census of China in 2000 showed that the size of the migrant population rose to 79 million, then soared to 273.9 million in 2014, tripling in a decade¹. No country other than China has experienced internal labour migration and rapid urbanisation on this scale in contemporary times.

It has been stated that the institution of the household registration system (the *hukou* system) functions as a badge of citizenship, which determines the entire life chances available to a person, such as their social status and eligibility for social welfare (Solinger, 1999). The concept of citizenship emphasises the social membership of a community and eligibility for social rights and privileges within specific boundaries. Smart and Smart (2001) point out that in China, citizenship is more focused on welfare entitlements than on formal citizenship itself. Solinger (1999) and Robert (2000) compare the status of migrants in urban destinations in China with that of undocumented migrants in international migration, and conclude that these two groups share similarities, in that they are denied basic rights and entitlement to social benefits. One of the key reasons of ineligibility for citizenship among Chinese migrants lies in the *hukou* system, which establishes proof of identity, citizenship and official social status (Cheng & Sheldon, 1994). The *hukou* system separates the Chinese population into two categories of citizens: rural *hukou* (or agricultural *hukou*) holders and urban *hukou* (or non-agricultural *hukou*) holders

¹ Data sources are from the Fifth Census of China in 2000 and *Nongmingong jiancei baogao* (Monitoring Report of Rural Migrants) in 2014 from National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/>.

(Chan & Zhang, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Wang et al., 2002). As there are strict thresholds of changing household registration, migrants who move to destination cities are not permitted to change their household registration to their destination. The majority of migrants, who lack the corresponding change in their formal *hukou* status, have been called ‘temporary migrants’ or the ‘floating’ population (Chan, 1996; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991). Temporary migrants share the features of un-rooted and underclass citizens because the *hukou* system restricts their mobility, and more importantly, denies their welfare entitlements, full citizenship and permanent settlement after migration (Chan & Buckingham, 2008, Wang & Zuo, 1999; Solinger, 1999). This paper explores the endeavours of acquiring citizenship among temporary migrants under the context of the *hukou* reforms and economic transition, which could change their decision-making and settlement at the urban destination.

In the literature on the settlement intentions of temporary migrants the influence of institutional constraints, particularly the *hukou* control, is heavily focused on (Cai, 2001; Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Fan, 2011, Sun & Fan, 2011). Due to the absence of urban *hukou* at urban destinations, it is impossible for temporary migrants to be granted full citizenship and thus access to social benefits and rights. This second-class status of temporary migrants results in their fewer job opportunities, poor and temporary housing arrangements and ineligibility for education, medical services and other social benefits (Wang & Zuo, 1999; Guo & Ireland, 2004; Shen, 2002). Their inferior and marginalised status encourage temporary migrants to settle temporarily or move back and forth between their place of origin and their destination (Wang & Fan, 2006). However, the citizenship eligibility for temporary migrants, which determine their settlement decisions, have changed during the transition from a socialist economy to a market-oriented economy. Responding to this marketisation, both the central and municipal governments have attempted to conduct various *hukou* system reforms, which not only attempt to eliminate the separation of rural and urban *hukou* but also gradually grant temporary migrants the same rights and urban social welfare as urban residents (Cai, 2011; Zhang, 2014). The

reforms related to *hukou* transfer and eligibility for social benefit entitlements at both the central government and the municipal government affect the settlement intentions of migrants.

The effects of these *hukou* reforms and eligibility for citizenship on temporary migrants have been debated at length. On the one hand, the *hukou* reforms instituted from the 1990s aimed to abolish rural and urban inequality, but are viewed as ‘the thunder is loud, but the raindrops are tiny’ (*leisheng da, yudian xiao*), as the threshold of *hukou* transfer has continuously impeded the efforts of temporary migrants to obtain urban *hukou* (Chan, 2010; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). On the other hand, Cai (2011) and Zhang (2014) argue that these reforms gradually provide channels for temporary migrants to access urban social benefits, such as medical services, pensions and access to labour contracts at urban destinations under the transition from the socialist economy to a market economy. This progress motivates increasing numbers of migrants to choose permanent residence and re-unite their families at urban destinations. The main difference between these two views lies in the scope of the *hukou* system. The basic functions of the *hukou* system are described as the collection of information on residents, the management of migration and serving as a basis for the delivery of social welfare (Wang, 2010). However, the eligibility for entitlement to social benefits based on *hukou* status has changed under the reforms and the market mechanism (Zhang, 2015). Thus, it is necessary to understand that the *hukou* system has reduced its function in delivering social welfare, as the eligibility for access to basic social entitlements is gradually being detached from *hukou* status (i.e., the labour contract coverage of migrants is guaranteed by the ‘Labour Contract Law’). If the wider scope of the function of *hukou* is recognised, this significant change in temporary migrants’ settlement intentions under enhanced citizenship, together with China’s economic marketisation, should not be neglected.

In order to comprehensively understand migrants’ endeavours of pursuing citizenship in the context of marketisation and the progress in *hukou* reforms, the present study divides China’s economic transition into three phases: Phase I, the stringent restriction phase; Phase II,

the emergence of the *hukou* relaxation phase; and Phase III, the comprehensive *hukou* reform phase. First, during the stringent restriction phase (Phase I) between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, the *hukou* system was maintained under the constraints of the central planned economy, which restricted rural–urban migration and granted temporary migrants second-class status. Second, motivated by the orientation towards economic development, the *hukou* system was increasingly relaxed during the mid-1990s to 2003 (Phase II), which permitted migrants to move from rural areas and work at urban destinations. After 2003 (Phase III), the reforms entered a vital stage. A series of positive regulations and policies were instituted with the aim of establishing an integrated urban labour market and granting temporary migrants the same social benefits and privileges as those of urban citizens. In contrast to the existing literature (Chan, 2010; Chan & Buckingham, 2008), which emphasises the ineffectiveness of the *hukou* reforms, as temporary migrants continuously suffer difficulties in receiving urban *hukou* status, this paper focuses on the *hukou* system reforms to date and discusses temporary migrants’ endeavours of acquiring citizenship under the existing institutional mechanisms and market forces, especially as certain social rights and public service entitlements are now detached from *hukou* status. Moreover, as municipal governments have the political and financial power to conduct experimental *hukou* reforms, the diversity in eligibility for social benefits contributes to the dichotomy between ‘outsiders’ and ‘locals’. This study aims to discuss variations in settlement intentions in regions on the basis of local citizenship. Using the case of Ningbo in Zhejiang Province, an attractive destination for temporary migrants, this paper explores the settlement decisions of temporary migrants under the implementation of *hukou* reforms and the change in citizenship associated with mobility rights and eligibility for employment and other social benefits.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After discussing the impact of *hukou* constraints on migrants’ citizenship during the stringent institutional restriction phase, the paper will then explore the relationship between the *hukou* reforms and the endeavours of acquiring citizenship among temporary migrants under migration relaxation and the comprehensive

reform phase. As the dichotomy between ‘local’ and ‘outsider’ relates to the eligibility for local urban social benefits, local citizenship at the municipal government level is discussed. Based on the case of Ningbo, this paper studies the relationship between the citizenship status of temporary migrants and their settlement strategies in the different phases of the reforms. Possible policy responses will be presented in the concluding section.

2.2 Acquiring Citizenship: Phases of *Hukou* Reforms and Marketization

2.2.1 Phase I: Stringent restrictions on migration

Migration in China, especially rural–urban migration, was heavily restricted before the economic reforms. Oriented towards the traditional planning system, the *hukou* system was established to control migration from rural areas to urban areas. Under this system, rural residents were ready to be exploited for the state’s industrialisation programme in cities. They were bonded by the agricultural system to deliver farm products at state prices (Cai, 2001). As it was extremely difficult to receive official approval of *hukou* transfer, rural residents had limited access to urban employment opportunities, the distribution of food quotas, housing, medical care and education for their children, and were unable to survive even though rural to urban migration was permitted (Solinger, 1999). The *hukou* system set barriers in place to inhibit rural to urban migration and exclude rural residents from access to state-oriented social benefits. On the basis of *hukou* status, the dichotomy between rural and urban residents existed largely in mobility rights and eligibility for access to urban social rights and privileges. Therefore, the *hukou* system not only classified all residents’ *hukou* type based on their place of residence, but also determined their citizenship and social status (Chan, 1997; Solinger, 1999).

Since the 1980s, a series of economic reforms in both rural and urban areas has promoted migration across regional boundaries. First, the household responsibility system was introduced in late 1970. Improved agricultural productivity resulted in surplus rural labourers and rural

residents were encouraged to search for non-agricultural work. Second, given the increasing desire of rural labours for non-agricultural work, the restrictions to rural–urban migration began to be relaxed in that rural residents were permitted to work in nearby small towns in 1984 (Stats Council, 1984). Furthermore, the central government further relaxed these restrictions, and rural migrants were allowed to set up small businesses in cities, on the condition of being self-sufficient for their food and housing needs (*zili kouliang*) (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1984). These relaxed restrictions created the conditions that allowed rural residents to leave their home villages and migrate towards the cities. However, even though there were a series of relaxations in terms of rural–urban migration, the *hukou* system continued to rank migrants, especial rural migrants, as second-class citizens. The privileges of urban residents showed in their employment opportunities in the state sector of the urban labour market and their entitlement to employment security and urban public services (Chan, 1999). During this period rural migrants were encouraged to work in the non-state sector, such as for private entrepreneurs and in self-employment, but they were excluded from employment protection related to their work unit (*dan wei*) and were denied the majority of the privileges attached to urban *hukou* status, including quality education and medical care, housing subsidises and social insurance coverage. Under these constraints, those migrants without urban *hukou* status were regarded as ‘temporary migrants’, regardless of whether they had been their destinations long-term or not (Chan, 2009; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991).

Guided by the planned economy, permanent settlement by temporary migrants was strictly circumscribed by the *hukou* system. As there were few employment opportunities in the state sector, the majority of temporary migrants were engaged by the non-state employment sector, such as by private enterprises or in self-employment. However, their jobs were considered as ‘3D’ (Difficult, Demanding, Dangerous) positions that were not wanted by local residents. Workers engaged in informal employment were not granted labour contracts, which meant that they had no job security and were unable to access state enterprise-provided pensions, healthcare, housing and education. Conversely, the access to employment in the state sector and

its associated social welfare entitlements were available to local urban residents (Chan, 1996; Guo & Iredale, 2004; Solinger, 1999). The insecure employment and limited social benefit entitlements under these institutional constraints drove temporary migrants to regard migration as a temporary device (Shen, 2002; Wang & Fan, 2006). Keeping economic and social attachments to their origins, such as their land tenure and leaving their family members in their place of origin, were necessary for their eventual return (Fan, 2011).

During this period, the only channel by which temporary migrants could receive local urban *hukou* was through limited urban labour recruitment or job assignment, or for intellectuals and family reunion (Christiansen, 1990; Fan, 1999). However, the majority of temporary migrants were excluded from these channels. Some local governments sold the right of local urban residence to temporary migrants. In the early months of 1994, three million temporary migrants received urban resident household registration through this channel (Chan, 1999). However, when the economic situation worsened, the opportunity to purchase local urban residence rights closed. Permanent settlement remained a distant dream for the majority of temporary migrants.

2.2.2 Phase II: The emergence of institutional relaxation

In the 1990s, the Chinese government aimed to establish a market economy, and this period is regarded as the accelerated period of the *hukou* system reforms and urban labour market development. Motivated by the new market orientation, the government enforced a host of measures to remove institutional barriers and promote rural–urban migration, together with the development of labour–intensive and export–oriented sectors. A series of institutions that deterred the mobility of the population were abolished during this period. For example, the abolishment of the rationing system in 1993 removed an essential obstacle to rural–urban migration. Through these reforms migrants’ mobility rights and their eligibility for certain social welfare provisions were legitimised.

First, the central government started to establish a unified urban labour market, which contributed to the improvement of temporary migrants' employment status at urban destinations. Driven by the orientation towards a market economy, temporary migrants were encouraged to join the urban labour markets across regional boundaries and move across enterprises, sectors and forms of ownership. More importantly, the long-lasting 'iron rice bowl' of the state-owned enterprises was broken in the late 1990s, which symbolised the distribution of employment beginning to be transferred from the government to the labour market. As a consequence of the breaking of the 'iron rice bowl', there were huge lay-offs and high levels of unemployment in the urban state sectors, which encouraged the development of an improved set of subsidy programmes separated from the state sector, such as an unemployment insurance system, a basic pension and medical insurance system, and a minimum living standard programme. Supported by these programmes, a unified labour market was established (Cai, 2011). This resulted in the removal of employment-related subsidies, the separation of welfare from the state-owned enterprises and opened the traditional insurance regime to all labourers, including temporary migrants. Although these measures were initiated to protect the laid-off urban workers, eligibility for access to pensions, medical insurance, unemployment insurance and other employment-related benefits is now legitimately available to temporary migrants. The distinction between this phase and the first phase lies in that the employment-related inequality between local urban labourers and temporary migrants was eased through these *hukou* reforms and the labour market reform.

Moreover, in this phase of the reforms, the threshold for obtaining urban *hukou* was not as high as that in the first phase. The central government explored the *hukou* reforms since 1997 in 382 small towns and applied them to all small towns nationwide in 2001. The change of *hukou* status was relaxed so that temporary migrants who had a stable income source and domicile were permitted to apply for urban *hukou*. However, there are regional variations in the implementation of this *hukou* reforms. The municipal governments set different criteria for a 'stable income source' and 'stable domicile' according to the level of local economic

development and labour force demand. For example, Zhejiang Province set the threshold such that only homeowners were eligible to apply for urban *Hukou* (Zhejiang Provincial Government, 2000). On the other hand, some municipal governments had set lower urban *hukou* thresholds. For example, Shijiazhuang, in Hebei Province, permitted temporary migrants with stable employment (i.e., employed at a destination for more than one year) and a stable domicile (i.e., renting) to apply for urban *hukou*. These reforms made it possible for temporary migrants to become urban residents and achieve permanent settlement through their own efforts.

However, fewer temporary migrants reported their intention to obtain urban *hukou* than were expected (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). Chan and Buckingham (2008) pointed that local rural residents were more likely to benefit from *hukou* reform during this period since the majority of rural residents from nearby villages tended to become permanent settlers at urban destinations. In terms of temporary migrants across city boundaries, the *hukou* system still worked as an obstacle to impede their eligibility for citizenship, resulting in migrants retaining temporary residence. Their ineligibility for citizenship resulted in unequal treatment in terms of access to employment-related and other social benefit entitlements. First, there was competition between urban labourers and migrant workers, especially in the state sector. Although the ‘iron rice bowl’ of the state-owned enterprises had collapsed and the government had introduced policies aiming to eliminate employment discrimination on basis of *hukou* status, migrants still suffered difficulties and were still excluded from privileged employment positions (Guo & Iredale, 2004; Yang & Hu, 2006). More importantly, without formal *hukou* status, temporary migrants were generally the first to be expelled by local governments when the economy confronted crises or fluctuations (Cai, 2003). In addition, the employment protection systems officially included labourers with urban *hukou* status and excluded temporary migrants, although temporary migrants were legitimately entitled to access employment benefits. For example, the unemployment insurance regime was only open to local urban labourers in practical terms. Temporary migrants were treated as outsiders and denied access to privileged

employment opportunities and employment protection programmes, which decreased their intention to settle permanently (Zhu, 2007).

Given the unequal treatment in terms of employment at the destination, temporary migration was regarded as a reasonable choice for migrants. The existing literature mainly attributes the temporary nature of migration to the unstable employment status and inferior social status of temporary migrants (Cai, 2001; Chan, 1994; Fan, 2003; Xiang, 2007; Zhu, 2007). Zhu (2007) stated that the unstable and temporary nature of migration is closely related to the unstable employment status of rural migrants. This is particularly notable in the private sector and in small labour-intensive industries, such as manufacturing, where temporary migrants were less likely to hold labour contracts as their term of employment depended on market demand. This unstable employment status meant that temporary migrants tended to regard their place of origin as their permanent settlement destination. In addition to their insecure employment status, the majority of temporary migrants were confronted with inequalities in access to urban welfare provisions, which deterred them from settling at their destination (Connelly et al., 2011; Xiang 2007). For example, temporary migrants' children had limited opportunities for education in public schools at their destinations (Zhu, 2007). It was thus reasonable for them to leave family members behind and send remittances to their original homes due to the *hukou* constraints (Cai 2001, Connelly et al., 2011, Fan & Wang, 2008; Shen, 2002; Smart & Smart, 2001). These instabilities in the economic and social aspects at urban destinations forced temporary migrants to prepare for their eventual return to their place of origin (Wang & Zuo, 1999).

Although temporary migrants confronted difficulties in permanent settlement due to *hukou* constraints, it is necessary to admit that Phase I of the reform of the *hukou* system and the unified employment protection programmes legitimised temporary migrants' employment status and eligibility for employment-related benefits. Phase II is distinct from Phase I in that in Phase II temporary migrants were permitted to move to urban areas to seek non-agricultural

work without the restriction of rationing of food and other necessities. Moreover, a basic pension and medical insurance system and a minimum living standard programme were established to assist the development of a unified urban labour market, which legitimised equal employment protection to all labour forces, including temporary migrants. The citizenship of temporary migrants was enhanced by these reforms, improving their economic and social status. On the one hand, oriented by the marketization, the central government explored to eliminate the different citizenship status between temporary migrants and urban residents. On the other hand, this relaxed migration climate provided migrants with more opportunities to work, live and even achieve permanent settlement at urban destinations. Although temporary migrants' intention of permanent settlement was not as strong as had been expected, permanent settlement at their destination cities was no longer a distant dream for temporary migrants (Cai, 2001, 2011).

2.2.3 Phase III: The integration of the labour market and comprehensive hukou reforms

Since 2003, given the changes in the urban labour market the government had an even stronger motivation to reform the *hukou* system. Evidence showed that the wages of workers rose because the growth in labour demand exceeded that of labour supply (Cai & Wang, 2010). A general labour shortage arose and difficulties in hiring migrant workers became widespread. In response to these changes, the central government made a series of efforts to improve the working and living conditions of temporary migrants, with the aim of attracting more migrant workers to move to urban destinations. First, there was a clear orientation towards building a unified urban labour market, which provided employment protection to temporary migrants. Guided by the marketisation orientation and the goal of liberalising labour under the new employment protection mechanisms, the 'Work-Related Injury Insurance Regulations' were

issued in 2004 (State Council, 2004), which covered migrant workers². Following the implementation of these regulations, other social insurance programmes were made available to temporary migrants as well. The ‘Labour Contract Law’ came into effect in 2008, and granted all employees the right to signing labour contracts, regardless of their *hukou* status. The rate at which temporary migrants signed labour contracts rose significantly in this period, increasing from 12.5 per cent in 2004 to 42.1 per cent in 2009 (Zhang & Hou, 2011).

Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Social Insurance Law’ in 2010 symbolised a landmark improvement in temporary migrants’ social status and social rights (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2010). This law ended the differences in access to social insurance between urban workers and temporary migrants. Prior to the implementation of the Social Insurance Law, the central government permitted municipal governments to conduct pilot schemes offering social insurance to temporary migrants. Some provinces designed specific social insurance programmes for migrant groups according to the availability of local funds. These local policies and pilot schemes have since ended and the treatment of social insurance for temporary migrants should follow the Social Insurance Law. This law clearly states that rural residents who work in cities should participate in the social insurance scheme, which confirms the legitimate right of temporary migrants to access the social insurance system at their urban destination. In addition, the ‘Interim Measures on the Transfer of Continuation of Basic Pension for Urban Enterprise Employees’ law, passed in 2011, guarantees temporary migrants the right to a continuing pension when they cross provincial boundaries, which aims to encourage more temporary migrants to participate in the basic social insurance programme (Cai, 2011). Since the implementation of these laws and regulations, there has been much progress in temporary migrants’ participation rates in urban social insurance programmes. For example, the participation rate in work-related injury insurance among

² ‘Blue stamp’ *hukou* or ‘*lanyin*’ *hukou* is a household registration system that granted holders similar social rights as those of urban residents, and is regarded as a semi-permanent urban *hukou* (Tang & Feng, 2015). The holders are primarily major investors, property owners and professionals.

temporary migrants increased from 19.2 per cent to 42 per cent during this period. Their participation rate in pension programmes doubled from 10.7 per cent in 2006 to 26.1 per cent in 2011 (Zhang, 2015). These regulations and measures not only further promoted the establishment of a unified labour market, but also raised temporary migrants' social status and their eligibility for social benefits and privileges at their destinations.

In addition, the citizenship status of temporary migrants was highlighted through the market channel. Under marketisation, more social benefits and services were detached from the *hukou* status. For example, the reforms of the urban housing market in 1999 opened the commodity sector to both urban residents and migrants. Before the urban housing market reform, the housing distribution was closely connected with employment in work units (*dan wei*), which excluded temporary migrants due to their lack of urban *hukou* status (Fan & Wang, 2008; Li, 2003; Wu, 1996; Zheng et al., 2009; Zhu, 2007). Housing ownership at urban destinations was even regarded as the passport to access to local urban *hukou*. As migrant homeowners were permitted to apply for the local urban *hukou* or 'blue stamp' *hukou*³, it was possible for these homeowners to become urban residents (Hu et al., 2011). However, after the marketisation of urban housing and the relaxation of institutional constraints, the direct attachment between *hukou* constraints and urban housing ownership was weakened. Temporary migrants had broadened their housing choices in the urban housing market regardless of their *hukou* status. They could now choose to purchase commodity housing or rent housing in a secondary market if they had stable employment and were covered by the local social insurance programme. Although temporary migrants still confronted difficulties in obtaining urban housing, urban residents had to overcome these difficulties as well. Moreover, self-employed migrants with high income-earning capacity were more likely to own urban property or already be homeowners at their destination (Cao et al., 2015; Wu, 2004). Through the urban housing

³ After the implementation of the 'Work-Related Injury Insurance Regulations', the Labour and Social Security Ministry issued the 'Notice about Rural Migrants' Participation in the Work-Related Injury Insurance' that officially confirmed the eligibility of temporary migrants to access to work-related injury social benefits.

market, it was possible for temporary migrants to become homeowners or even permanent settlers without obtaining urban *hukou* status. Better employment opportunities in the unified labour market and improved social benefit entitlements at their destinations motivated temporary migrants to settle permanently. The division in citizenship status, especially involving employment opportunities and social benefit entitlements, between temporary migrants and urban residents was eased.

To tackle the labour shortage and spur economic development, from 2003 on, both the central government and local governments have motivation to equalise social welfare provisions and ease the criteria for obtaining urban *hukou* in order to attract migrants to settle at their urban destination. For example, in the city of Ningbo, migrants who had stable labour contracts, participated in the local social security programme and held formal property rental contracts and temporary residence certification were able to send their children to local schools. Thus, if some urban services are gradually detached from local *hukou* status, it is possible for temporary migrants to find different channels by which they can achieve permanent settlement. It has been demonstrated that self-employed migrants with stable economic conditions and close attachments to their destinations were more likely to be permanent settlers (Cao et al., 2015). This equal entitlement to urban employment and social provisions promotes economic and social stability and a sense of belonging at the destination, which increases their likelihood of intending to settle permanently.

Although the differences in citizenship status between urban residents and temporary migrants have eased, there are institutional variations in terms of eligibility for social benefits at the municipal government level. Whether people are eligible to social rights and benefits is more connected to their 'local' or 'outsider' status, instead of the traditional dichotomy of urban or rural *hukou* status. This differential citizenship between 'locals' and 'outsiders' associated with local social benefit entitlements merits further discussion.

2.3 Acquiring Local Citizenship: Regional Variations

In China, local citizenship is associated with welfare entitlements at the local level. Regional variations of welfare entitlements exist. As the central government encourages the municipal governments to conduct pilot schemes of *hukou* reforms, diverse policies and measures have been established at the local level, resulting in differences in local social benefit entitlements across regions (Smart & Smart, 2001). In some cities, the delivery of social welfare is decentralised according to local citizenship, rather than universal (Zhang, 2015). Some coastal cities in particular, such as Shanghai, set relatively strict thresholds in 2013 that only allowed highly educated or skilled migrants and homeowners to apply for residential certification (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2013). The holders of residential certification were granted the same local social benefits and services as those of urbanites. However, Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province, permitted temporary migrants who had been residents for more than one month and had a stable domicile and income source to apply for residential certification, which guaranteed the holders' basic local social benefits (Wuhan Municipal Government, 2011). Access to local social welfare benefits is based on the principle of local citizenship, which varies between regions.

The rise of local citizenship is attributed to the local policy experiments of various pilot schemes for *hukou* reforms conducted by the municipal governments and the limited budget available at the local level. Prior to these reforms, the central government guided the scales of wages and distribution of social benefits nationwide. The provincial and municipal governments had neither the power nor the budget to control the distribution of social benefits. After the reforms began in 1978, on the basis of their economic and financial autonomy, the municipal governments accepted the responsibility for local economic growth and the wellbeing of their residents. It was thus possible for municipal governments to set specific *hukou* thresholds and the criteria to access local social benefits, or to exclude or attract temporary migrants based on their own economic considerations (Wang, 2009; Zhang, 2015).

Specifically, if there were heavy financial burdens and large numbers of temporary migrants at the destination, the local governments were inclined to set high barriers for *hukou* transfer and eligibility for local social benefits, such as the eligibility for migrant children to sit the college entrance examination. For example, since 2003, the city of Zhengzhou in Henan Province has opened the city's gates to allow homeowners, investors or highly educated temporary migrants to become local urbanites⁴ (Henan Provincial Party Committee of Communist Party of China & Henan Provincial Government, 2003). However, this *hukou* reform in Zhengzhou was suspended in 2004, as the municipal government could not provide enough education opportunities in public schools for the children of these 'new urbanites' (Zhengzhou City Public Security Bureau, 2004). Due to the absence of uniform guidelines and financial support from the central government, it is reasonable for the municipal governments assume the responsibility for their residents with local *hukou* status.

In addition, the uneven economic development in the regions and the migrant population pressure reinforces the distinction between 'locals' and 'outsiders', which in turn is connected to the direction of migration and settlement decision-making. As previous discussed, the initiatives of *hukou* reforms in the major cities are different to those of the small or medium-sized cities or towns. To guarantee benefits for local residents, the major cities with quality social benefit entitlements tend to set stringent criteria for access to social welfare (Wang et al., 2012). Eligibility for social benefits and other services is based on local *hukou* status and those without local *hukou* are excluded, including those temporary migrants with rural *hukou* and those with another city's urban *hukou* (Zhang, 2015). Temporary migrants are more likely to concentrate in the developed and major cities, although the institutional barriers at these destinations are higher. Based on the Chinese Census data collected in 2010, the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and eastern regions were the most attractive destinations for temporary migrants. Compared to the data from 2000, increasing numbers of temporary

⁴ These criteria were further reduced such that temporary migrants with relatives at destinations were permitted to obtain local urban *hukou* in 2003.

migrants moving to the major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. The greater employment opportunities and better quality social benefits at these destinations are the major driving factors that attract temporary migrants to choose to work or even permanently settle at these destinations (Tang & Feng, 2015; Wang et al., 2012). However, the central government plans a new urbanisation process that encourages eligible migrants to settle in small and medium-sized cities, while major cities retain their high entry criteria. Given the previous discussion, this urbanisation plan is not consistent with migrants' preferences in terms of migration or settlement destinations. Responding to this conflict, the *hukou* reforms call for uniform and nationwide guidelines and financial supports instead of relying on local experimental reforms.

The most recent progress in the *hukou* reforms is the introduction of the residential permit system (*juzhuzheng zhidu*)⁵ in 2016 (State Council, 2016). The central government implemented a resident permit system that aimed to equalise the right of access to social benefits and services based on residential status. Under this mechanism, resident permit holders are granted access to employment supports, basic medical services, family planning services, cultural and entertainment services and the right for their children to receive compulsory education regardless of their *hukou* status. If the resident permit system is successfully established at the nationwide level, temporary migrants will enjoy equal social benefit entitlements to those of urbanites without changing their *hukou* status. This equalisation would significantly reduce the role of *hukou* and equalise the basic social benefits beyond local citizenship, which represents a significant easing in the distinction between the different *hukou* statuses. Furthermore, through their improved social status and greater security in their living and working conditions, temporary migrants will be better able to achieve permanent settlement by their individual efforts. For example, permanent settlement could be achieved via long-term

⁵ The recent *hukou* reforms and residential permit system (*juzhuzheng zhidu*) are conducted by the central government in 2016. Under this mechanism, resident permit holders are granted access to employment supports, basic medical services, family planning services, cultural and entertainment services and the right for their children to receive compulsory education regardless of their *hukou* status. However, whether this reform policy has granted migrants with the eligibility to attend the colleague entrance examination is still unclear as only compulsory education is included in the policy details.

residence or purchasing local property. In the next section, the changes in permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants during the different phases of these reforms will be discussed, and the evidence from a study of one city, Ningbo, will be presented.

2.4 Case Study: Ningbo

The city of Ningbo in Zhejiang Province will be used as a case study to investigate the changes in temporary migrants' settlement intentions in the context of institutional reforms and transitional citizenship. Ningbo was chosen for several reasons. First, being located in one corner of the Yangtze River Delta, the geographical advantage of Ningbo has meant that it has been an appealing destination for migrants since the pre-1970 period. Second, Ningbo is renowned for its active manufacturing, commercial and trading activities, which require a large labour force. Second, Ningbo's migration policies involving access to social provisions, such as access to compulsory education for migrant children, are closely related to the local economic development level and the demand for labour. The local government has a relatively open attitude to temporary migrants and the migration policies are not as strict as those in other major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. A case study of Ningbo will allow the observation of the transition in social status among temporary migrants during the different phases of urbanisation and marketisation, which will allow a comprehensive understanding of the changes in migrants' decision-making regarding permanent settlement.

From a careful examination of various sources of data, including public records and statistics published by the Bureau of Statistics of Ningbo, a number of observations could be made. Ningbo has experienced industrialisation, particularly the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) since the 1950s. The development of TVEs required a labour force within and beyond the city boundaries. Given this demand for labour, migration policies were relaxed to permit rural migrants to move to the urban areas of Ningbo (Ningbo Bureau of Security, 2013). However, in Phase I of the *hukou* reforms (the early 1980s to mid-1990s) temporary migrants had no opportunity to obtain urban *hukou* status and the citizenship status

of urban residents, let alone achieving permanent settlement. The *hukou* constraints remained, although rural-urban migration was permitted. First, temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* status were excluded from employment under a formal labour contract and insurance coverage. The private enterprises employing the majority of the temporary migrants could not provide the employment security to guarantee their stable living and working conditions. Second, as the development of TVEs was limited to small towns and villages, there were no adequate employment opportunities for temporary migrants. According to the data from the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo in 1990, temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* status accounted for 3 per cent of Ningbo's total population (Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, 1991).

It is observed that the city of Ningbo also experienced rapid development of TVEs and private enterprises between 1990 and 2000 (Phase II), which encouraged the local government to open the city gates to migrants. Data from the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo (Ningbo Bureau of Security, 2013) shows that at this time there were 1,135,000 temporary migrants in Ningbo, of which 55 per cent were migrants from across the city boundaries but within the province. Guided by the *hukou* policies from the central government and the municipal government, the city of Ningbo permitted qualified migrants to obtain local urban *hukou*. However, there were diverse criteria of *hukou* entry within the city boundaries. The areas with the higher administrative levels set more stringent *hukou* thresholds. For example, in 2001, the central area of Ningbo merely permitted homeowners with a housing space of more than 100 square metres or a house value exceed 250,000 *yuan* to apply for local urban *hukou*. During this period, the majority of temporary migrants were unable to own local housing, and only 33,000 temporary migrants were able to transfer their original place of registration to Ningbo. Conversely, the county-level city, such as Fenghua, allowed homeowners to apply for local urban *hukou* without specific requirements for housing space or value. In addition to these institutional constraints, temporary migrants in Ningbo reported low intentions of obtaining local urban *hukou*, based on the data from *Renmin Ribao* in 2001. Temporary migrants were hesitant to obtain local urban

hukou due to the economic benefits attached to their original *hukou* status. If obtaining urban *hukou* came at the cost of giving up their land tenure and collective bonuses from their original homes, temporary migrants, especially rural migrants, were more likely to retain their rural *hukou* status to maximise their economic benefits and prepare for their eventual return. This tendency to maintain rural *hukou* status was reported by Zhu (2007). It should be noted that the restrictions in rural–urban migration were relaxed during this period, although the *hukou* constraints forced migrants to stay only temporarily in Ningbo.

The citizenship status of temporary migrants was significantly enhanced after 2004 (Phase III), which encouraged them to consider permanent settlement. At the beginning of the 21st century the local government of Ningbo started to grant social benefits to temporary migrants. For example, the education reforms (*mingxin jihua*) conducted in 2000 aimed to grant educational opportunities to the majority of migrant children, both in public and private schools. Free vocational training was provided to migrants with stable employment status. However, there was no uniform formal system that guaranteed temporary migrants' social benefits, including social insurance, labour contracts, housing subsidies and other social benefits and services. In 2004, the local government implemented 'The Regulation of Providing Compulsory Education among Migrant Children' (*guanyu qieshi zuohao jingcheng wugongjiuye nongmingzinv yiwujiaoyu de shishi yijian*). This regulation clearly states that migrant children should be granted the right to compulsory education if their parents had held temporary residence certification⁶ for one year or longer. In addition, the tuition fees for migrant children in public schools should be the same as those for local residents' children, while those private school dominated by migrant children would receive financial support from the local institutions. The right of migrant children to receive compulsory education was thus formally confirmed at the legislative level. Furthermore, equal employment status and employment rights were guaranteed for temporary migrants since 2007, when 'The Regulation of Social

⁶ Based on policies from the government of Zhejiang Province in 2004, migrants who had stayed at their destination for more than 30 days without local *hukou* status should apply for temporary residence certification.

Insurance for Migrants' (*wailai wugong renyuan shehui baoxian zanxing banfa*) came into effect. The local government also designed a special social insurance scheme that granted eligibility for pensions, medical insurance, work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance for migrant workers who did not hold local urban *hukou* status. In the same year, temporary migrants were formally granted the right to labour contracts, which confirmed their equal employment status and eligibility for access to social insurance. Moreover, the payment of migrant workers was guaranteed as no less than the minimum wage in Ningbo, and arrears of wages were prohibited based on 'The Regulation of Wage Payment Security System' (*guanyu jingyibu wanshan wailai wugong renyuan gongzi zhifu baozhang zhidu de tongzhi*) in 2007. These series of policies (see Table 2-1) created a significant improvement in the social status of temporary migrants, regardless of their *hukou* status.

Table 2- 1 The Social Benefit Entitlements of Temporary Migrants in Ningbo by Phases

	Phase I: Stringent restrictions (early 1980s to the mid-1990s)	Phase II: Emergence of <i>hukou</i> relaxation (the mid-1990s to 2003)	Phase III: Comprehensive <i>hukou</i> reforms (since 2003)
<i>Hukou</i> transfer	Restricted	Partly restricted	Partly restricted
Compulsory education	Restricted	Low criteria for accessibility	Low criteria for accessibility
College examination entrance	Restricted	Restricted	Low criteria for accessibility
Social insurance	Restricted	Restricted	Accessible
Labour contracts	Restricted	Restricted	Accessible
Wage payment security	Restricted	Restricted	Accessible
Other benefits	No	No	Housing subsidies for qualified migrants ⁷

Source: Author's own analysis based on information available at www.gtog.ningbo.gov.cn.

In response to the relaxed living and working conditions and the employment opportunities in Ningbo, a growing migrant population flowed into this destination, with long-term residents dominating the migration stream. Based on the data from the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo in 2015, the size of the migrant population rose from 1.3 million in 2002 to 4.2 million in 2014, and reached a peak of 4.8 million in 2012. Their eligibility for social benefits related to daily life was the essential attractive factor. Based on a survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, in 2013 approximately 69 per cent of migrants held labour contracts, and more than 80 per cent of employed migrants reported being covered by social insurance, including urban resident pensions, urban resident medical insurance, work-related injury insurance and rural cooperative medical insurance. Furthermore, the quality and availability of compulsory

⁷ In 2006 the local government of Ningbo planned to lower the threshold for access to housing subsidies that provided disadvantaged local rural residents, graduates and elite migrants with housing subsidies.

education services in Ningbo is also regarded as a motivation for permanent settlement among migrant parents. As compulsory education for migrant children was made available in 2004, increasing numbers of migrant children were able to access local quality compulsory education. Specifically, 265,800 migrant children were receiving compulsory education in Ningbo at the end of 2015. More than 80 per cent of migrant children could access education in public schools regardless of their *hukou* status with a figure increasing by 20 per cent between 2006 and 2015 (see Figure 2-1)⁸. Moreover, in 2013 the local government of Ningbo permitted migrant children to enter senior school and sit their college examination if their parents could provide certification of a stable domicile and employment. Given this secure and relaxed living and working climate and their improved social status, temporary migrants were able to focus on education and the development opportunities at their destination, which determined their settlement decision-making (Connelly et al., 2011; Tang & Feng, 2015). In 2014, more than 65 per cent of migrants reported a length of residence of more than six months, while more than half of migrants reported having a long-term residence plan. The tendency to permanent settlement is closely connected with temporary migrants' social status and their access to local social benefits at their destination, which have all benefited from their eligibility for citizenship under the context of relaxed institutional constraints and the transitional marketisation.




Figure 2- 1 Migrant Children Receiving Compulsory Education in Ningbo

⁸ Data related to compulsory education of migrant children in Ningbo are unavailable between 2007 and 2009.

2.5 Conclusions

Since the 1970s China has experienced major economic transition and an enormous flow of rural–urban migration. The inferior social status of migrants, especially temporary migrants without urban *hukou* status, is attributed to the *hukou* constraints, which force them to regard migration as a short-term option (Cai, 2001; Chan & Buckingham, 2008, Wang & Fan, 2006). Consequently, the normal pattern is that temporary migrants are excluded from full citizenship at their destination. This paper discusses the citizenship of temporary migrants under the wider scope of the function of *hukou* system and the context of the economic and social transitions that have occurred over recent decades. Motivated by economic development and the demand for a large labour force, both the central government and the municipal governments have put in place initiatives to conduct a phased reform of the *hukou* system to grant temporary migrants mobility rights and eligibility to access at least a part of the local social benefit entitlements. These reforms have accompanied the different economic marketisation phases, and the implementation of the associated regulations has weakened the attachment between *hukou* status and eligibility for social benefit entitlements. In the present paper, the wider scope of *hukou* function, which is not necessarily linked to eligibility for social benefits, forms the basis of a discussion of the significant changes in temporary migrants' settlement intentions under the market mechanism and *hukou* reforms.

In Phase I of this reform process, due to competition between urban residents and temporary migrants for employment opportunities and welfare entitlements under the limited public resources available, rural–urban migration was maintained under stringent control. Responding to the orientation towards marketisation, rural–urban migration was legitimised in the mid-1990s (Phase II). Although temporary migrants continued to endure limited access to employment opportunities in the state sector, as well as to the majority of the social welfare programmes, it should be noted that during this period social protection mechanisms were

established, including an unemployment insurance system, the basic pension and medical insurance system and a minimum living standard programme. Although these programmes officially protected urban labours with urban *hukou* status, the privileges of urban workers in state-owned enterprises were weakened while temporary migrants' employment-related benefits and protections were legitimised. Since 2003 (Phase III), a set of measures aimed at improving the working and living conditions of temporary migrants was implemented because the rapid economic growth had created a widespread labour shortage (Cai, 2011; Cai & Wang, 2010). These measures marked a significant enhancement in the citizenship status of temporary migrants, and an improvement of their economic and social status. Permanent settlement at their destinations was achievable and no longer a distant dream, although temporary migrants continued to hold little intention of settling permanently at their urban destinations.

In addition to the improvement of their social status as a result of these institutional reforms, marketisation has provided temporary migrants with available and diverse channels to enjoy urban social benefits and privileges. During the marketisation process (e.g., the urban housing marketisation), some urban social benefit entitlements (e.g., access to urban property) are no longer attached to *hukou* status. This means that obtaining urban *hukou* status is not the only channel by which migrants can receive urban social benefits and be granted equal social rights as urbanites. Given the availability of social benefits and rights beyond the *hukou* barriers, temporary migrants are encouraged to achieve permanent residence or become local homeowners. Permanent settlement is no longer strictly connected with obtaining urban *hukou* status; instead, these institutional barriers can be broken by migrants' enhanced citizenship rights and their individual efforts.

The case study of Ningbo evident that migrants, especially rural-urban migrants, are granted the full or part of local citizenship in Ningbo in phases of economic and *hukou* reforms. Responding to economic development and demands of labour force, the Ningbo municipal government have conducted a series of *hukou* reforms. The phased *hukou* reforms not only

grant migrants with mobility rights, but also grant their access to social benefits entitlements step by step, which contributes to migrants' eligibility of access to social welfare provisions in Ningbo (for example migrant children could receive local compulsory education) without necessarily transferring *hukou* to Ningbo. Data from Ningbo Statistics Bureau shows that a growing migrants flowed into Ningbo with permanent residence plan in response to the improved living and working conditions. It is possible for migrants to acquire citizenship and achieve permanent settlement intentions under the relaxed institutional mechanisms and market forces, especially as *hukou* status is detached with the eligibility of social welfare entitlements.

Although the distinction between rural and urban *hukou* has been reduced, there are various criteria for eligibility for access to social benefits at the municipal government level. Marketisation has created the incentive for *hukou* reforms by the central government and the municipal governments, but the municipal governments have a diverse range of motivations to conduct these reforms. As a result of their political and financial autonomy, local governments are inclined to take responsibility for local residents with local *hukou* status. They have conducted local policy experiments of *hukou* reforms that set the criteria for *hukou* transfer and the eligibility for access to local social benefits based their availability. In addition to these local policy experiments, uneven economic development in the regions and the migrant population pressure ensured that local governments had to guarantee their local residents' social benefit entitlements based on their local *hukou* status. Thus, the separation between 'locals' and 'outsiders' was created. Furthermore, the unequal social benefit entitlements of 'locals' and 'outsiders' has led to a geographical selectivity of permanent settlement destinations in the regions. The superior local citizenship rights in major cities, which provide high quality social benefit entitlements, are more likely to attract migrants, including temporary migrants.

The geographical selectivity of permanent settlement destinations is inconsistent with the new urbanisation plan from the central government that encourages temporary migrants to settle in small or medium-sized cities and towns. In response to the demands of temporary migrants,

future reforms should call for uniform financial support at the central government level, instead of depending on the local policy pilot schemes. At the beginning of 2017, the residence permit (*ju zhu zheng*) system was implemented, which aimed to grant permit holders equal social benefits and services related to employment, social insurance, public medical services and education. If temporary migrants are entitled to receive equal social benefits via this system instead of through obtaining urban *hukou* status, it could be expected that the role of *hukou* would be significantly reduced, including its effects on the segmentation between rural and urban *hukou* status and differential local citizenship. Thus, temporary migrants will be able to achieve permanent settlement through a wider range of channels with access to all the associated employment and security benefits. It is important to note that the resident permit system should be the future direction of reforms. The local experimental reforms relying on *hukou* transfer are inconsistent with temporary migrants' preferences, as they show a strong preference for access to high quality social benefits and services instead of merely receiving urban *hukou* status itself. If small or medium-sized cities provide few or no local social benefits, they will be unattractive destinations for temporary migrants. To attract temporary migrants to move or settle permanently in the small and medium-sized cities of the central and western regions, it will be necessary to improve and distribute the social welfare entitlements in these regions evenly, easing the population pressure in the metropolis and coastal cities.

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Chapter 3 : Employment status, labour market outcomes and settlement intentions of migrants in China¹

Abstract

As a response to economic reforms and the relatively relaxed migration policies that have been in place since the 1970s, Chinese rural–urban migration has had long–lasting effects on the employment landscape in migrants’ destination cities. Employment in formal sectors, with eligibility for labour contract protection and social insurance coverage, is ranked as ‘superior’ in the urban labour market. However, the majority of rural migrants without urban hukou status are not able to enter into formal sectors but are instead employed in informal sectors without employment protection, which hinders their permanent settlement intention at destinations. The adoption of the ‘Social Insurance Law’ in 2010 may have effects on migrants’ permanent settlement intentions. However, there has been inadequate research on the effects of social insurance coverage. Based on data from the 2013 Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey in China, this paper examines the effects of social insurance coverage at destinations on migrants’ permanent settlement intentions. The analysis finds that the segmentation between the formal and informal sectors is weakened. Self-employed migrants would like to become permanent settlers given their strong economic capacities while migrants employed in the informal sector could achieve permanent settlement through social insurance protections.

Keywords

Chinese labour market, employment status, labour contract, settlement intentions

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3.1 Introduction

Human migration and settlement is closely associated with the labour market at migrant destinations. This has been observed in the international migration between the US and Mexico (Roberts, 2007), as well as in internal migration such as that in China and Indonesia (Cai & Wang, 2008; Hugo et al., 1987). Much of the existing empirical studies focus on economic considerations, where interactions between the labour market and state institutions are uncommon (Stark, 1991; Todaro, 1969). However, in the case of China, marketization and state control of migration, especially rural–urban migration, co-exist, which complicates our understanding of migration and individual decisions regarding permanent settlement. Increasingly, rural migrants have been granted more equal employment status and the associated social benefits in the urban labour market although their rural household registration status remains unchanged. Responding to market forces and institutional legacy, rural migrants' individual decisions regarding permanent settlement may be changed.

The international literature on the settlement intention of migrants focuses heavily on human capital and labour market segmentation. The motivation and behaviour of migration and settlement are considered as an investment of human capital and a rational calculation of costs and benefits during migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969). On the other hand, the bulk of recent studies articulate the relationship between the segmented labour market and the labour market outcome of rural migrants (Harries & Todaro, 1970; Piore, 1979). The labour market at the place of destination is divided into formal and informal sectors. Rural migrants are the dominant labour force in the informal sector, which is characterized by unskilled jobs, low income and poor employment security and protection. They are excluded from jobs in the formal sector, which is organized, registered and protected (Berman, 1976; Meng, 2001).

Labour market segmentation theory in Chinese rural–urban migration has highlighted two ways in which institutions are important. The first deals with the marginalized status of rural migrants in the urban labour market under institutional control, especially the household

registration (*hukou*) system. Owing to the absence of urban *hukou* status, rural migrants are denied access to prestigious and desirable jobs in the formal sector, which are only available to urban residents. Instead, the jobs available to rural migrants, those in the informal sector, tend to low-income, without labour contract protection and beyond state control (Meng, 2001). Secondly, rural migrants working in the informal sector are excluded from social benefits related to employment such as housing allocation, pensions, medical services and other social benefit entitlements (Cai, 2002; Meng & Zhang, 2001). Under this formal and informal dichotomy, urban residents are afforded high-ranked status while rural migrants are marginalized both with regards to employment and social benefit entitlements. These institutional constraints reinforce the formal and informal dichotomy in urban China and foster further segmentation of the labour market.

It has been argued that rural migrant workers cannot achieve permanent settlement in destination cities due to their marginalized employment status (Fan, 2002; Zhu, 2007). Facing segmentation in the urban labour market, rural migrants are disadvantaged. They are excluded from particular jobs in the formal sector while the jobs available to them come without pensions, medical services, labour contracts and equal pay. Their marginalized status in the labour market contributes to their inferior socio-economic status at destinations and hinders their integration into destination cities (Solinger, 1999). Owing to the difficulty in changing rural *hukou* status under existing policies, it is impossible for rural migrants with marginalized employment status to achieve permanent settlement. In addition, rural migrants' marginalized status at destinations strongly encourages them to regard migration as a short-term device for temporary employment and to maintain permanent ties in their rural origins (Fan & Wang, 2006). When migration occurs on a temporary basis, maintaining connections in their place of origin is a rational choice for migrants. In the interests of minimizing risks and maximizing benefits, this rational strategy based on the household in place of origin explains why rural migrants maintain their rural *hukou* status and send money to family members remaining at their place of origin for building or renovating their homes (Fan et al., 2011; Roberts, 1997).

This study argues that the human capital and labour market segmentation approaches are inadequate in understanding migrants' permanent settlement intentions. An approach based on the marketization of the labour market and institutional constraints, which play an important role in individual settlement decision-making, is adopted in this study. It emphasizes the labour market outcomes and socio-economic status of rural migrants in response to the changes in urban labour market and *hukou* reforms. On the one hand, it has been argued that *hukou* reforms would have little effect on improving rural migrants' socio-economic status until they are granted urban local *hukou* through available channels (Chan, 2010). Under existing institutional constraints, their temporary settlement strategy would not be changed due to marginalized employment status. On the other hand, sets of policies are implemented to promote migrant workers' employment status and employment rights. Regulations that discriminated against migrant workers and restricted them from particular sectors and positions were abolished in 2003. More importantly, the implementation of the 'Labor Contract Law' in 2007 and the 'Social Insurance Law' in 2010 granted all labourers, including migrant workers, equal employment opportunities and employment rights, such as the right to be protected by labour contracts, pensions and medical insurance, regardless of *hukou* status. Some studies provide evidence that there has indeed been a rise in labour contracts and social insurance coverage (e.g., pensions and medical insurance) among rural migrants following the implementation of these laws (Cheng et al., 2015, Gao, 2014, Zhang, 2015). Increasingly, migrants report a willingness toward permanent settlement at destinations in the marketization process. Cao et al. (2016) claim that self-employed migrants are the most capable and willing group of settling permanently in cities. Some qualified migrants are likely to and capable of purchasing property at destinations because the urban housing market has opened the door to rural migrants (Tao et al., 2015).

Previous studies mainly attribute the marginalized status of rural migrants to employment obstacles such as job insecurity, lack of contracts, pensions and medical services and their inability to permanently settle at places of destination. It is possible to assume that policies that

improve rural migrants' status and grant them employment rights would reduce discrimination under the informal and formal dichotomy and encourage them to achieve permanent settlement at their place of destination. A detailed examination of settlement intention should be understood in the context of marketization and institutional constraints in China. Although rural *hukou* status would remain and affects the permanent settlement intentions of rural migrants, the reformed labour market and the development of the urban housing market could provide diverse channels for achieving permanent settlement beyond institutional legacy. In this study, migrant workers' settlement intentions are examined based on the Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey conducted in eight Chinese cities by the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) in 2013. The main difference between previous studies and the present one is that this study focuses on the employment outcome of migrants in the context of marketization. It is expected that employment status and social insurance coverage of rural migrants would affect their employment outcome, which would in turn affect their settlement intention at destinations. Secondly, instead of narrowly using *hukou* transfer intention as an indicator of permanent settlement intention (Hu et al., 2011), this paper adopts a multi-dimensional definition of settlement intention, including permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention, which reflects migrant workers' diverse settlement strategies under market forces and institutional legacy.

The main objective of the paper is to challenge the assumption that rural migrants working in the informal sector are bound to marginalized status, which determines their temporary settlement intention. It is possible, however, to assume that under the marketization of the urban labour market at destinations, the effect of formal and informal dichotomy on migrants' settlement intentions would be weakened. In addition, this paper aims to highlight the effects of social insurance coverage on the settlement intention of migrants. Through social insurance coverage at destinations, it is possible for rural migrants to change their marginalized status and achieve permanent settlement with stable employment status. Accordingly, their reliability on original attachments during migration would be replaced with employment security and

protection at destinations, which would promote their positive integration at their place of destination.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the employment outcomes of migrants since the 1970s and their effect on permanent settlement intentions. Following a discussion of the data and methods employed in this paper, descriptive statistics are presented. The main data analysis is divided into two parts: the first examines the effects of diverse employment status on permanent settlement intention and the second focuses on the determinations of social insurance coverage on settlement intentions. The main findings show to what extent migrants' settlement intentions are affected by employment outcomes, which are not only associated with employment status but also with social insurance coverage at destinations. The final section concludes by situating the findings within the theoretical viewpoints and presents implications for policymakers.

3.2 Review of Related Work

3.2.1 Research on settlement intentions of migrants

Many studies, focusing on the settlement intentions of migrants, have attempted to understand the process of urbanization and migrants' integration into their places of destination (Massey, 1986, 1987; Nelson, 1976). The research on settlement intentions centers on the question of whether migrants intend to permanently settle down or temporarily reside in their places of destination (Massey et al., 1993). In international migration, permanent settlers are generally understood to be those who have the desire to stay or have achieved permanent residence at their place of destination. Temporary migrants, on the other hand, are those who have no intention of achieving permanent settlement at their destination or who intend to move back and forth between their places of origin and destination (Goldstein, 1978, 1993; Hugo, 1977; Massey et al., 1993).

There are different theories that explain permanent and temporary migration in the literature. The first theoretical approach is based on neo-classical economic theory, which focuses on migrants' human capital investment and their economic activities during migration. According to this theory, individual benefit expectations in the labour market are based on rational economic considerations. Migration is therefore perpetuated when migrants can meet their monetary expectations at destinations (Harries & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). Studies attribute temporary migration to unfulfilled monetary expectations or to the unstable, poor working conditions of migrants in the industrial sector at destinations (Nelson, 1976; Todaro, 1969). The second theoretical approach, the new economics of labour migration, argues that the decision to migrate is taken with consideration to the household rather than the individual. Temporary migration is considered to be a household strategy to minimize risks and maximize income benefits (Stark, 1991). It is possible for temporary migrants to maintain original resources, such as land tenure at their place of origin, to avoid risks during the migration process and utilize diverse employment opportunities to maximize income at destinations (Hugo, 1981).

The two theoretical approaches explain international migration or internal migration in developing countries from the perspective of economic expectations and family strategies. However, Chinese rural–urban migration is more complicated, and is associated with the interaction of migrants, the labour market and state institutions (Fan, 2002; Solinger, 1999). The political economy perspective argues that the institutional system determines migrants' socio-economic status (employment status and social benefit entitlements), which contributes to the settlement intention of migrants. Fan and Wang (2006) argue that the settlement decisions of rural migrants need to be understood in the context of the Chinese social and transitional context and in relation to institutional constraints. It is well established that the core of the institutional constraints is the household registration system (*hukou*) (Chan, 1996, 2010; Fan & Wang, 2006; Wang & Zuo, 1999). The Chinese government set restrictions on registration transfer from rural origins to urban destinations, although rural migrants without local urban *hukou* are allowed to work in cities. Rural migrants' economic status in the urban labour market

and their social benefit entitlements are severely restricted under the *hukou* constraints. Firstly, rural migrants are denied access to employment in the formal sector (Meng, 2012; Shen, 2002; Yang & Guo, 1996). The jobs available to rural migrants, those in the informal sector that are rejected by urban workers, are regarded as '3-D' (Dirty, Difficulty and Dangerous) (Chan et al., 1999; Meng, 2001). It is suggested that the institutional effects of the *hukou* system contribute to a segmented labour market. Under this segmented labour market, urban workers hold superior status, which includes stable employment in the state sector with high wages and employment benefits including labour contracts, pensions, medical care and other social insurances. On the other hand, the majority of rural migrants who are employed in the informal sector are excluded from secure employment status and its associated benefits. The segmented urban labour market is fostered under this formal and informal dichotomy.

A dual society is established given a segmented labour market, which constrains employment status and associated social benefits entitlements of informal migrant workers, the majority of whom are rural migrants (Chan, 1996). Rural migrants in China are regarded as second-class citizens due to the absence of urban *hukou*, which restricts the likelihood of their settling down permanently at migration destinations (Chan, 2010; Shen, 2002; Wang & Fan, 2006). They are encouraged to temporarily migrate or move back and forth between places of origin and destination. Migrants therefore regard places of destination as places of work and their place of origin as their permanent home (Cai, 2001; Fan and Wang, 2008). This temporary settlement pattern explains the family strategy of maintaining rural *hukou* status and land tenure, the preference for individual migration instead of family migration and the prevalence of sending remittances for building or renovating housing home (Fan et al., 2011; Roberts, 1997; Wang & Zuo, 1999). Given the inferior socio-economic status under the segmented labour market and institutional constraints, temporary migration has become a rational choice and a normal pattern for migrants.

Existing studies emphasize the core role of *hukou* status in settlement intention (Chan, 2010; Shen, 2002; Wang & Fan, 2006; Wang & Zuo, 1999). The prevalence of temporary migration is attributed to rural migrants' marginalized status in the urban labour market and their inferior socio-economic status in the society of their destination. However, there have been insufficient studies that explain settlement intentions in the marketization context. Given the marketization of the urban labour market and the relaxed migration policies, it is possible to assume that improved status in the labour market and the granting of social benefit entitlements would contribute to the increased likelihood of permanent settlement. Beyond *hukou* status, it is suggested that migrants should be encouraged to achieve permanent settlement at destinations through diverse channels.

3.2.2 Definition of settlement intention in the literature

Given the different approaches for understanding settlement intention outlined in the previous section, it is necessary to explore the definition of settlement intention in international and internal migration in other countries and internal migration in China. As in other countries, the traditional approach for understanding the perpetuation of migration in China is associated with the desire to stay and the length of stay (Massey et al., 1993; Wu, 2006). The desire to stay permanently at destinations is regarded as an indicator of permanent settlement intention (Connelly et al., 2011). In a recent nationwide survey the migrant population reported the tendency of long-term residence. 55% migrants had lived at current destinations for more than three years while 37% had lived five years and above. The long duration of residence increased the permanent settlement intention that half of the migrants intended to stay long termly at their destinations (HFPC, 2015).

In contrast with other countries, permanent settlement intention is constrained by household registration status in China, especially in rural–urban migration. The *hukou* system not only separates the population into rural *hukou* holders and urban *hukou* holders but also grants urban *hukou* holders access to formal employment, housing subsidies, medical services,

social insurances and children's education (Chan, 1996; Chan, 2009; Connelly et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2011). Under these constraints, those with formal *hukou* status are regarded as 'permanent migrants' while the majority of rural migrants with original *hukou* status are regarded as 'temporary migrants', regardless of whether they have been in their destination long term or not (Chan, 2009; Goldstein and Goldstein, 1991). Owing to the economic disparity between rural and urban areas, it is assumed that permanent settlement with formal urban *hukou* is the last stage of migration while the intention to receive local *hukou* is an essential indicator of permanent settlement intention (Xu et al, 2011; Zhu, 2007). Responding to the labour shortage that has been in evidence since 2003, some areas and cities have conducted *hukou* reforms that permit qualified temporary migrants to be permanent residents with formal *hukou* registration through a 'points system' (*jifen zhi*). However, even in light of these reforms, temporary migrants report a low intention to transfer original *hukou* to places of destination (Fan, 2011; Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010).

Housing ownership at destinations is also connected to settlement decision making. In international migration studies, migrants tend to save to purchase a new house or renovate their existing house at their place of origin (Piore, 1979). Migrants prefer to search for better quality rented accommodation or invest in their existing accommodation until they decide to settle permanently (Turner, 1968). In China, a few studies suggest that housing decisions among migrants have been closely related to diverse settlement intentions since the marketization of housing in 1999 (Tao and Feng, 2015; Wu, 2004). Under the marketization of urban housing market, temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* are eligible for housing ownership in the majority of regions. However, it is suggested that the housing ownership decisions of temporary migrants are not associated with their *hukou* status (Tao et al., 2015). Driven by relaxed institutional constraints and housing marketization, it is thus necessary to take housing ownership intention as an indicator that fits into the traditional classification scheme of settlement intention.

Overall, temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions show variations in the literature. For example, around 24% of temporary migrants reported keeping their original *hukou* status in a survey conducted in Fujian in 2006 while 78% of temporary migrants intended to stay indefinitely at their destination (Cai & Wang, 2010; Zhu & Chen, 2010). These diverse responses call for a comprehensive understanding of settlement intentions. This paper will focus on how temporary migrants achieve permanent settlement through diverse channels responding to labour market reforms and institutional constraints.

3.2.3 Emergence of labour market reforms: role of social insurance and labour contract scheme

The temporary nature of migration in China is largely attributed to migrants' inferior and discriminated against status in the segmented labour market. Discrimination toward migrants, especially temporary migrants without urban *hukou* status, are based on the *hukou* system. Although temporary migrants have been encouraged since the 1980s to move to urban cities in search of non-agricultural work, the *hukou* system set restrictions against them to enter urban sectors, especially the formal sector. The jobs in the formal sector guarantee better working conditions, higher earnings, labour contract coverage and social benefit entitlements, such as pensions, medical insurance, permanent employment and housing (Knight et al., 1999; Meng & Zhang, 2001). Owing to the absence of urban *hukou*, the jobs taken by temporary migrants are themselves temporary, with poor working conditions, and more importantly, lacking labour contracts, social protection and state-sponsored social assistance. These jobs are part of the informal sector scheme, which includes self-employment (Cai & Chan, 2009).

The formal–informal dichotomy in the segmented labour market has attracted attention from researchers. A large number of studies examine the discrimination against temporary migrants experienced in the segmented labour market in China (Fan, 2002; Meng, 2001; Tao & Zhou, 1999; Wang et al., 2015). Inferior employment status and the absence of social

protection explain why temporary migrants are inclined to keep their migration temporary or maintain close connections with their place of origin (Fan, 2011; Huang, 2008; Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007).

Increasing attention has been paid to the development of the urban labour market (Cai, 2011; Zhang, 2015). The milestone of the development is the breakdown of the 'iron-rice bowl' in the state sector in the mid-1990s. Responding to the economic transition process, the employment and social benefit system has shifted from state-oriented toward marketization. As a result, unemployment subsidies, a basic pension scheme, basic medical insurance and a minimum living standard program have been established. Under this labour market development, workers are protected and are entitled to access social benefits, although temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* status are continuously excluded from these protections (Gao et al., 2012). Because *hukou* transfer is restricted and temporary migrants are denied access to social benefits, some researchers argue that the development of the urban labour market merely benefits urban residents and the reforms do not improve temporary migrants' employment status (Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Cai & Wang, 2010). If temporary migrants continue to suffer insecurity in employment and are excluded from social protections, it is rational for them to maintain their rural *hukou* status and associated land tenure rights, leaving some family member behind in their place of origin (Xiang, 2007; Zhu, 2007).

Few studies observe the marketization process in the urban labour market, which contributes to the improvement of temporary migrants' status and outcomes in urban employment (Cai, 2011; Zhang, 2015). Two important efforts have contributed to the marketization of the urban labour market. Firstly, the implementation of the 'Labour Contract Law' in 2008 grant workers with rights of signing labour contract with enterprises, regardless of their *hukou* status. Under this legitimate scheme discrimination related to exclusion from labour contract protection among temporary migrants has been abolished. Empirical studies show that over 90% of migrants have signed formal contracts with large-scale enterprises and

65% report formal contract coverage in medium and small-scale enterprises, compared with 20% labour contract coverage before the implementation of the ‘Labour Contract Law’ (Hua, 2008). Secondly, the enactment of the ‘Social Insurance Law’ in 2010 entitles all workers, including temporary migrants, access to a basic pension, basic medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work injury insurance and maternity insurance (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2010). This scheme actually grants temporary migrants equal rights to social insurances related to employment. Furthermore, the publication of ‘*Interim Measures on the Transfer of Continuation of Basic Pension for Urban Enterprise Employees*’ in 2010 encourages all migrants to participate in the basic pension scheme, which guarantees migrants being able to continue their pension in a new working destination if they move across provincial boundaries. These developments have fundamentally improved the employment status of temporary migrants.

Given these changes in the development of the urban labour market, there has been inadequate research in understanding temporary migrants’ status and their employment outcomes in different employment sectors. The changes would affect individual decisions regarding permanent settlement either through permanent resident at the destination, or transferring *hukou* to the destination or owning urban housing at places of destination. This paper therefore aims to answer three questions. First, to what extent does employment status in formal and informal employment sectors affect the permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants through diverse channels? Second, to what extent does social insurance coverage increase the likelihood of permanent settlement among temporary migrants? Third, under social insurance protections, to what extent do employment sectors under the traditional formal and informal dichotomy contribute to the permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants?

3.3 Data and Method

3.3.1 Data sources

The empirical data in this study come primarily from the Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey, conducted in 2013 by the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) of China in eight Chinese cities. Based on official sources from the NHFPC Stratified Sampling and Probability Proportionate to Size Sampling (PPS) method were used to select respondents in the survey. Two thousand migrants and 1000 local residents were selected randomly from Suzhou, Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha, Xian Quanzhou and the Songjiang district in Shanghai while 1000 migrants and 600 local residents were selected at random from the city of Xianyang. To comprehensively understand the migrant group, this survey captured different employment status in diverse communities in destination cities, including residential neighbourhoods, village neighbourhoods and dormitories. This survey provided settlement intention information mainly concerning rural migrants, although a small number of urban migrants were included. The two migrant groups provide a comparison of *hukou* effects on permanent settlement intentions associated with permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership intentions. Selected migrants had to meet three criteria: they had to be aged 15–59 years in May 2013, they had to be without local urban *hukou*, and they must have resided in the destination city for over six month. A total of 14,716 valid responses were elicited from the questionnaires. Of the sampled migrants, 27.5% were self-employed while 72.5% were wage earners, of which 22.2% were employed in the formal sector.

There were many common features between the basic demographic characteristics of the sampled migrants and those of the total Migrant Population Report from the NHFPC in 2012. In the present study, the average age of the migrants was 32.3 years (28 years in the NHFPC) and the 16–45 age group accounted for 92.0% of the population (82.7% in the NHFPC). In our

survey, 54.6% of surveyed migrants were male (53.9% in the NHFPC) and 86.7% held senior school or below education (70.4% received senior and below education in NHFPC).

3.3.2 Variable specification and methods

Three indicators were used to measure temporary migrants' settlement intentions in this study². The first was the permanent residence intention, which was captured by asking migrants whether they planned to reside long termly at their destination in the future three years (yes, intention to reside long termly at the destination in the future three years; no, no intention to reside long termly at the destination in the future three years). The second indicator was associated with the intention of transferring original *hukou* to the destination (yes, intention to transfer *hukou* to the destination, no = no intention to transfer *hukou* to the destination). The third indicator involved housing decisions at the destination, which was captured by asking whether migrants or their household had plans to acquire local housing at the destination (yes, intention to own housing at the destination; no, no intention to own property at the destination).

Five independent variables may affect migrants' settlement choices under institutional and market mechanisms. The first concerns employment status – self-employed, wage earner in the formal sector or wage earner in the informal sector. The second refers to migrants' pension and medical insurance coverage at destinations. The third involves institutional barriers, the *hukou* type (rural *hukou* and urban *hukou* of migrants). In previous studies, the absence of local urban *hukou* status among temporary migrants was at the root of their informal employment status and lack of social insurance coverage; therefore temporary migration was a normal settlement choice (Hu et al., 2011). The fourth is associated with human capital factors, including education, income level, duration of residence at destinations and time spent working continuously at destination cities. Stronger human capital endowment, longer duration of

² This chapter examined migrants' settlement intentions associated with permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and urban housing ownership. The interactions of the three dimensions of settlement intentions was examined in the Chapter 4.

residence and longer working time at the destination have been found to encourage migrants to make permanent settlement decisions (Cao et al., 2015). The fifth involves economic and social attachments in places of origin and destination³. Attachments in places of destination include the variables of free vocational training and presence of family members at the destination. Variables associated with attachments in places of origin include land tenure, sending remittances home in the past year, and housing ownership in origin and migration distance (intra-provincial migration or inter-provincial migration). Last, demographic control variables that included age, gender and marital status and regional variables of east, middle and west regions, were included in the analysis.

To capture the complexity of settlement intentions, a logistic regression model with two steps was adopted to examine temporary migrants' settlement decisions. Three indicators involving permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention were examined separately. In the first stage of the empirical analysis, employment status, institutional variables, demographic variables, human capital and economic and social attachments at places of destination and origin were considered. In the second step the variable of pension and medical insurance coverage at destination was added into the logistic regression model. Through the two-step analysis, it could be expected that there would be changes of effects on the permanent settlement intention of migrants under the marketization of the urban labour market.

³ In the fifth group involves economic and social attachments in places of destination, labour contract coverage of migrants is added into the analysis of section 3.4.3. In addition, as self-employed migrants are not covered by labour contract generally, the available of labour contract coverage is only applied to wage earners in the section 3.4.3.

3.4 Empirical Findings

3.4.1 Descriptive analysis – demographic characteristics of migrants

Temporary migrants with self-employed status showed different settlement intentions to those with employed status (see Table 3-1). More than half of the temporary migrants reported intentions to permanently reside and transfer *hukou* to their destinations. Nearly 30% of temporary migrants either displayed an intention to own housing or had already become homeowners at their destinations. More than 30% of temporary migrants had been at their current destination for more than five years and the average continuous working time was approximately four years, which indicates stability of residence and working status. This tendency toward permanent residence is consistent with that reported in the Migrant Population Report in 2012 from the NHFPC. However, self-employed migrants tended to settle down through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or purchasing property at destinations while employed migrants engaged in the formal sector held stronger intentions of *hukou* transfer and housing ownership, compared with their informal employed counterparts. Temporary migrants with different employment status are therefore likely to utilize diverse channels to achieve permanent settlement.

Table 3- 1 Settlement Intentions in Migrants' Employment Status (%)

	Permanent residence intention		<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention		Housing ownership intention	
	Stay	Not Staying	Transferring	Not transferring	Purchasing	Not purchasing
Self-employed	67.505	32.495	56.953	43.047	40.438	59.562
Employed						
<i>Formal sector</i>	50.857	49.143	56.992	43.008	31.269	68.731
<i>Informal sector</i>	45.703	54.297	48.711	51.289	20.471	79.529
Total	53.228	46.772	52.987	47.013	28.735	71.265

Source: The Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey in China, 2013.

Table 3-2 shows that 29.2% of migrants were self-employed while 22.6% were wage earners engaged in the formal sector. Male and married migrants dominated the self-employed group while migrants in the youth age group (15–24) and with high school and above education level were more likely to be formal wage earners. Self-employed respondents reported having spent more than six years residence and continuous working experience at their place of destination. The higher income, 4327.6 yuan monthly, and longer residence and working time at destinations indicated stronger human capital endowment among the self-employed group. The advantages enjoyed by the self-employed group were evident in economic and social attachments at destinations as well. In the self-employed migrant category, 44% reported having a family companion at their destination. On the other hand, wage earners in the formal sector were more likely to be granted free vocational training and pension and medical insurance coverage at destinations, through which to deepen the attachments. In terms of original attachments, wage earners were more likely to maintain land tenure and housing in their place of origin than their self-employed counterparts. It is reasonable to assume then that human capital and social and economic attachments at destinations motivated self-employed migrants to have permanent settlement intentions through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and local housing ownership.

Table 3- 2 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables Used in Regression

Variables	Full example		Self-employed		Employed_formal		Employed_informal	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Settlement intention								
Permanent residence intention	53.228		67.505		50.857		45.703	
<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention	52.987		56.953		56.992		48.711	
House ownership intention	28.735		40.438		31.269		20.471	
Institution								
Rural <i>hukou</i>	89.103		90.159		84.778		90.489	
Demographic characteristics								
Youth group 15–24	21.882		7.966		29.323		26.814	
Middle age group 25–39	54.264		59.609		55.158		50.613	
Old age group 40–59	23.853		32.425		15.519		22.573	
Male	55.542		61.612		51.850		53.600	
Married	79.625		93.971		72.620		74.238	
Human capital								
Primary and below	13.121		14.003		7.394		15.272	
Secondary school	53.027		57.945		41.268		55.565	
High school	23.544		21.738		33.333		20.048	
Colleague and above	10.308		6.314		18.004		9.115	
Local duration time (years)	5.404	4.483	6.230	4.985	5.227	4.319	4.951	4.129
Continuous working duration time at destinations (years)	5.134	4.386	6.283	4.966	4.775	4.121	4.608	3.985
Monthly individual income (<i>yuan</i>)	3492.819	2299.714	4327.597	3317.7143	3319.730	1837.856	3073.466	1466.174
Monthly individual income (log)	8.034	0.468	8.180	0.597	8.015	0.405	7.954	0.378
Social insurance coverage								
Pension at destination	4.968		1.843		10.344		4.420	
Medical insurance at destination	25.052		7.803		58.240		20.402	

Pension in origin	64.914	71.835	52.086	66.539
Medical insurance in origin	19.941	29.895	8.320	19.137
Economic and social attachments at destinations				
<i>Economic attachments</i>				
Free vocational training at destination	12.652	11.065	16.476	11.820
With family members at destination	25.943	44.081	17.077	38.842
Economic attachments in origins				
With land tenure in origin	82.040	79.665	82.346	83.333
Sending remittance to origin in the past year	76.459	74.680	79.609	76.060
Owning house in origin	97.655	96.553	98.015	98.154
Intra-provincial migration	35.608	50.291	28.090	30.248
Other variables				
East regions	79.681	59.026	93.143	85.867
Middle regions	16.262	33.636	5.113	10.976
West regions	4.057	7.338	1.744	3.156
Total	14716	4293	3325	7097

Source: The Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey in China, 2013.

3.4.2 Employment status and diverse settlement intentions

Compared to wage earners, self-employed migrants held stronger permanent settlement intentions either through permanent residence or *hukou* transfer or urban housing ownership. The results in Table 3-3 show that self-employed migrants were more likely to choose to settle down through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and property ownership at destinations (taking employed migrants in the formal sector as a reference). Compared to the reference group, permanent settlement intentions were negatively connected with the informal sector in employment. Employed migrants in the informal sector were cautious about embracing permanent residence, transferring *hukou* and owning housing at destinations. These findings are consistent with those of Cao et al. (2014). This suggests that self-employed migrants held the strongest permanent settlement intentions at destinations, followed by employed migrants in the formal sector, and employed migrants in the informal sector.

Rural *hukou* status was negatively connected with permanent settlement intention, which is consistent with Zhu (2007) and Zhu and Chen (2010). Comparing with urban migrants, rural migrants intended to choose temporary settlement. The possible drivers of their temporary migration lay in their socio-economic attachments in their place of origin. By maintaining land tenure, sending money to relatives, house ownership and intra-provincial migration over a short distance, the ties between migrants and their places of origin were bridged.

In contrast, receiving positive economic and social support in their destinations motivated temporary migrants to achieve permanent settlement. For example, receiving free vocational training from local governments helped them to become qualified workers. This economic integration would raise the likelihood of their permanent residence, transferring *hukou* or owning local housing at destinations. In addition, family support at destinations encouraged them to utilize local economic resources and psychologically integrate into their urban destinations, which raised their intention to settle permanently. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, a higher educational level, longer duration of residence, continuous working

experience at destinations and higher income level played a positive role in permanent settlement intentions.

Evidence so far suggests that self-employed migrants are more likely to be permanent settlers while employed migrants in the informal sector are cautious of permanent settlement. Rural *hukou* did not significantly promote permanent settlement intentions involving permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership. Economic and social attachments at places of destination positively promoted temporary migrants to be permanent settlers while deep attachments with places of origin drove them to temporarily settle at destinations.

Table 3- 3 Logistic Regression of Employment Status and Settlement Intentions

Variables	Permanent residence intention (Stay=1, not stay=0)	Hukou transferring intention (Transferring=1, not transferring=0)	House ownership intention (Purchasing=1, not purchasing=0)
Employment Status (ref.=wage earner in the formal sector)			
Self-employed	0.614 (1.847)***	0.116 (1.123)**	0.382 (1.466)***
Wage earner in the informal sector	-0.023 (0.977)***	-0.130 (0.878)**	-0.246 (0.782)***
Institutional			
Rural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=urban <i>hukou</i>)	-0.213 (0.808)**	-0.382 (0.683)***	-0.309 (0.734)***
Demographic			
Age group (ref.=youth group 15–24)			
Middle age group 25–39	0.019 (1.019)	0.165 (1.179)**	0.007 (1.007)
Old age group 40–59	-0.179 (0.836)**	-0.072(0.931)	-0.216 (0.861)
Male (ref.=female)	-0.090 (0.914)**	-0.039(0.962)	-0.259 (0.722)***
Married (ref.=unmarried)	0.281 (1.324)***	0.134 (1.143)**	0.614 (1.847)***
Human Capital			
Education (ref.=primary school and below)			
Secondary school	0.185 (1.203)**	0.299 (1.348)***	0.621 (1.861)***
High school	0.469 (1.599)***	0.668 (1.950)***	1.445 (4.241)***
Colleague and above	1.357 (3.855)***	1.091 (2.976)**	2.453 (11.627)***
Local duration time (years)	0.037 (1.038)**	0.026 (1.026)***	0.051 (1.052)***
Continues working time at destinations (years)	0.035 (1.036)***	0.012 (1.013)	0.031 (1.032)**
Ln income	0.124 (1.132)**	0.049 (1.051)	0.440 (1.552)***
Economic and social attachments at destination			
Free vocational training at destination (ref.=without vocational training at destination)	0.380 (1.462)**	0.314 (1.369)***	0.230 (1.259)***

With family members at destination (ref.=without family members at destination)	0.738 (2.093)***	0.544 (1.723)***	0.734 (2.084)***
Economic and social attachments in origin			
With land tenure in origin (ref.=without land tenure)	-0.126 (0.881)**	-0.120 (0.887)**	-0.256 (0.774)***
Sending remittance to origin in the past year (ref.=without sending remittance to origins)	-0.185 (0.831)***	0.027 (1.027)	-0.088 (0.916)*
Owning house in origin (ref.=without house in origins)	-0.924 (0.397)***	-0.568 (0.567)***	-0.642 (0.526)***
Intra-provincial migration (ref.=inter-provincial migration)	0.198 (1.220)***	0.069 (1.072)	0.482 (1.619)***
Other variables			
East regions (ref.=west regions)	0.083 (1.086)	0.144 (1.155)	0.230 (1.258)**
Middle regions	0.080 (1.083)	-0.355 (0.701)***	0.314 (1.369)**
Number			14716

Notes: the table reports the coefficients of logistic regression models and brackets report the odd ratios. Standard errors are omitted owing to space limitations.*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.001.

3.4.3 Welfare, social insurance and settlement intention

The next step of the empirical analysis examines whether social insurance coverage at destinations contributes to the permanent settlement intentions of temporary migrants. It was found that social insurance coverage at destinations significantly encouraged temporary migrants to be permanent settlers. The positive role of social insurance was particularly relevant with regard to medical insurance. Temporary migrants who were covered by medical insurance at their destination intended to choose permanent settlement, through channels of permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or property ownership at destinations. Because medical insurance coverage increased their economic stability and improved their marginalized status in the urban labour market, it was possible for them to be economically and socially integrated into their destinations and hold permanent settlement intentions. In addition, pension coverage of temporary migrants improved their stability at destinations through the *hukou* transfer.

Unlike the models in Table 3-3, after adding the variables of social insurance coverage into the analysis, the effects of employment status on permanent settlement intentions changed. Employed migrants in the informal sector and self-employed migrants were both more likely to be permanent settlers, taking employed migrants in the formal sector as a reference (e.g., employed migrants in the informal sector to choose permanent residence is 1.178 times higher compared to employed migrants in the formal sector; self-employed migrants to choose permanent residence is 2.203 times higher compare to employed migrants in the formal sector). This implies that the availability of insurance programs to employees in informal sector and self-employed has played a more important role in facilitating settlement than for those in formal sector as employees in formal sector have had access to insurance programs already. In addition, there was no significant difference in the housing ownership intention of temporary migrants at destinations, regardless of their employment status in the urban labour market. The results suggest that through pensions and medical insurance coverage at destinations, it is possible for employed migrants in the informal sector to achieve equal employment status,

which contributes to their permanent settlement at destinations. The traditionally inferior status of the informal group had been changed through access to social insurance coverage, particularly the pension and medical insurance coverage that was closely related to employment. However, if temporary migrants had medical insurance in their place of origin, they preferred temporary settlement at destinations. These results suggest that social insurance coverage provides a social security safety net for migrants and whether they were covered by social insurance at destination played an essential part in their settlement decision.

More importantly, social insurance coverage at destinations changed migrants' economic attachments with their place of origin. On the one hand, compared to the analysis results in Table 3-3, the negative role of land tenure in origin on permanent settlement intention was reduced in Table 3-4. In Table 3-4, which considers the effects of social insurance coverage at destinations, owning land in places of origin did not significantly drive migrants to be temporary settlers, although the driving force of land tenure still showed in housing ownership intention. The traditional protection role of land tenure was replaced by social protection from pensions and medical insurance coverage at destinations. On the other hand, attachments in origins including sending money to relatives, owning property in places of origin and migration within provinces had positive effects on the temporary settlement intentions of migrants.

Similar to the analysis in Table 3-3, economic and social supports involving free vocational training and family company at the destination increased the likelihood of permanent settlement associated with permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and urban housing ownership. As indicated in the results in Table 3-4, labour contract coverage is negatively connected with permanent residence and housing ownership intention. This implies that those who do not have a labour contract tend to have stronger permanent settlement intention than those who have a labour contract. This seemingly contradictory finding could be explained by the employment structure of migrants. A large proportion of migrants, who are self-employed and tend to hold stronger intentions to become permanent settlers than employed migrants, do not normally have a labour

contract. In addition, the effects of institutional constraints and human capital were consistent with the findings presented in Table 3-3. Temporary migrants with rural *hukou* status were less likely to be permanent settlers, comparing with migrants with urban *hukou* status. Higher educated and economically advantaged migrants and those who spent longer at their destination and who had continuous working experience intended to and were capable of becoming permanent settlers at the destination.

Table 3- 4 Logistic Regression of Social Insurance Coverage and Settlement Intentions

Variables	Permanent residence intention (Stay=1, not stay=0)	Hukou transferring intention (Transferring=1, not transferring=0)	Housing ownership intention (Purchasing=1, not purchasing=0)
Employment Status (ref.=wage earner in the formal sector)			
Self-employed	0.705 (2.023)***	0.942 (2.566)***	0.381 (1.464)
Wage earner in the informal sector	0.164 (1.178)***	0.122 (1.130)**	0.008 (1.008)
Social insurance coverage			
Pensions at destination (ref.= without pensions at destination)	0.117 (1.125)	0.237 (1.268)**	-0.164 (0.849)
Medical insurance at destination (ref.= without medical insurance at destination)	0.398 (1.488)***	0.324 (1.382)***	0.879 (2.408)***
Pensions in origin (ref.= without pensions in origin)	-0.086 (0.918)	-0.098 (0.907)	-0.127 (0.881)
Medical insurance in origin (ref.= without medical insurance in origin)	-0.273 (0.761)***	-0.126 (0.882)**	-0.387 (0.679)***
Institutional			
Rural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=urban <i>hukou</i>)	-0.303 (0.739)**	-0.562 (0.570)***	-0.220 (0.803)**
Demographic			
Age group (ref.=youth group 15–24)			
Middle age group 25–39	0.038 (1.039)	0.146 (1.158)*	-0.032 (0.968)
Old age group 40–59	-0.112 (0.894)**	-0.018 (0.983)	-0.250 (0.779)*
Male (ref.=female)	-0.079 (0.924)	0.051 (1.053)	-0.225 (0.799)***
Married (ref.=unmarried)	0.198 (1.219)**	0.098 (1.103)	0.658 (1.932)***
Human Capital			
Education (ref.=primary school and below)			

Secondary school	0.104 (1.110)	0.237 (1.267)**	0.700 (2.013)***
High school	0.333 (1.395)***	0.699 (2.012)***	1.528 (4.607)***
College and above	1.130 (3.095)***	0.872 (2.392)***	2.518 (12.399)***
Local duration time (years)	0.046 (1.048)***	0.028 (1.029)**	0.081 (1.084)***
Continues working time at destination (years)	0.019 (1.019)	0.001 (1.001)	0.009 (1.009)
Ln income	0.138 (1.148)*	-0.062 (0.940)	0.225 (1.252)**
Economic and social attachments at destination			
Labour contract coverage	-0.186 (0.831)**	-0.026 (0.974)	-0.275(0.759)**
Free vocational training at destination vocational (ref.=without free training at destination)	0.450 (1.568)***	0.292 (1.339)***	0.235 (1.265)**
With family members at destination (ref.=without family members at destination)	0.722 (2.059)***	0.610 (1.841)***	0.727 (2.069)***
Economic and social attachments in origin			
With land tenure in origin (ref.=without land tenure)	-0.023 (0.977)	-0.042 (0.959)	-0.221 (0.802)**
Sending remittance to origin in the past year (ref.=without sending remittance to origins)	-0.240 (0.787)***	0.093 (1.098)	-0.168 (0.846)**
Owing house in origin (ref.=without house in origin)	-0.925 (0.396)***	-0.638 (0.528)**	-0.631 (0.532)**
Intra-provincial migration (ref.=inter-provincial migration)	0.288 (1.334)***	0.096 (1.101)	0.600 (1.822)***
Other variables			
East regions (ref.=west regions)	-0.520 (0.595)***	-0.202 (0.817)	-0.232 (0.793)
Middle regions	-0.361 (0.697)**	-0.520 (0.595)**	0.322 (1.380)
Number			14716

Notes: the table reports the coefficients of logistic regression models and the brackets report odd ratios. Standard errors are omitted owing to space limitations.*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.001.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper focuses on temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions in China, where the marketization of the urban labour market and institutional constraints to rural–urban migration co-exist. By comparing with existing research in the previous era, the results from this paper suggest that the recent marketisation in urban labour market that improves temporary migrants' socio-economic status and grants them equal employment rights, seems to motivate their integration into destinations and increases their likelihood of settling permanently at their places of destination. Through permanent residence, transfer of *hukou* or by owning local housing, temporary migrants with stable employment status and associated benefits are capable of achieving permanent settlement, and reducing their reliability on economic and social resources at their places of origin. The empirical results of this paper support the argument that the traditional approaches of human capital and labour market segmentation are inadequate and that the labour market outcome under the approach of marketization and institutional constraints is important to understand the settlement intentions of rural migrants.

Previous studies of settlement intention have claimed that migrants' settlement intentions are based on human capital investment and rational calculation of cost and benefit during migration (Nelson, 1976; Todaro, 1979). The application of labour market segmentation theory in China highlights temporary migrants' marginalized employment status in the labour market at destinations, in which temporary migrants are denied from taking on high-status and desirable jobs with social benefits in the formal sector due to their rural *hukou* status. This approach emphasizes the relationship between the informal and formal dichotomy and temporary migrants' temporary settlement intentions under this institutional mechanism but downplays the effects of the marketization of the labour market in China. In this study, an approach based on the marketization of the labour market and institutional legacy is adopted. It is important to focus on the improved employment status and employment rights of temporary migrants under

the marketization mechanism. Given this marketization progress, and following the implementation of the “Labour Contract Law” in 2007 and the “Social Insurance Law” in 2010, discrimination between the formal and informal sectors has been reduced and temporary migrants are now granted labour contracts and social insurance.

The empirical results indicate that temporary migrants who have different employment status reported diverse settlement intentions at destinations. Self-employment was positively connected with permanent settlement intention. Self-employed migrants held the strongest intentions to be permanent settlers through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or housing ownership at destinations, followed by employed migrants in the formal sector. Employed migrants in the informal sector were less likely to choose permanent settlement. Labour contract seems to be negatively associated with permanent settlement intention, which could be due to the dominance of self-employed persons among migrants who by and large do not have labour contract as a condition of employment. Strong economic and social attachments with places of origin were negatively correlated with permanent settlement intentions while attachments in places of destination significantly encouraged temporary migrants to be permanent settlers. These results were analyzed by considering employment status, institutional factors, human capital and economic and social attachments in places of origin and destination.

However, this study found that social insurance coverage was extremely important in the decision to settle permanently in places of destination. Temporary migrants who were covered by social insurance were significantly encouraged to be permanent settlers. Practically, medical insurance coverage at destinations raised the likelihood temporary migrants settling permanently while pension coverage had positive effects on the intention of transferring *hukou* to places of destination. More importantly, because social insurance coverage at destinations changed the marginalized status of temporary migrants in the informal sector and granted them equal employment rights, both self-employed and employed migrants in the informal sector were capable of and willing to achieve permanent settlement through permanent residence and

hukou transfer. These results support the argument that the marketization of the labour market reduces discrimination in the formal and informal sectors through opening the gate to social insurance coverage at destinations, especially pensions and medical insurance. Under this marketization process, temporary migrants improve their employment status at destinations, which promotes their willingness to settle permanently.

In addition, the effects of close economic attachments to places of origin, for example, land tenure, were reduced for those migrants with social insurance at their destination. This suggests that the traditional role of economic and social resources in places of origin to minimize risks was replaced by employment protections via social insurance coverage at destinations.

From a theoretical point of view, the findings in this study reinforce the marketization context in China. The changes in urban labour market affect temporary migrants' employment outcomes and their permanent settlement intentions. Empirical evidence supports that self-employed and employed in the formal and informal sectors can achieve permanent settlement through diverse channels. Social insurance coverage helps temporary migrants break down discrimination in the segmented labour market; therefore temporary migrants are capable of and willing to achieve permanent settlement through improved socio-economic status under this marketization mechanism. From the perspective of policymakers, the findings suggest that permanent settlement is a normal pattern among temporary migrants. Achieving improved employment status, obtaining equal social benefit entitlements and access to the urban housing market would attract qualified migrants to be permanent residents across *hukou* barriers. Some cities, such as Tianjin and Shenzhen, have begun to explore reforms such as the residential permit system (*juzhuzheng zhidu*), which grants qualified residents equal social benefit entitlements, regardless of *hukou* restrictions. These social benefit entitlements, such as medical services and compulsory education for migrant children, would be the best strategy to help rural migrants successfully integrate into their urban destinations.

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Chapter 4 : Breaking the barriers: How urban housing ownership has changed migrants' settlement intentions in China¹

Abstract

Since the abolition in China of unequal regulations and controls over urban labour market and rural–urban migration in recent years, attention has been paid to migrants' settlement intentions and their integration into destination cities. Settlement channels have become more diverse and more accessible to migrants, because of relaxed institutional constraints and the advanced market mechanism. The changes of institutional and economic context are essential to the process of urbanisation, the development of urban infrastructure, and welfare and public provisions in destination cities. Using data from a survey conducted by the Institute of Population and Labor Economic of Chinese Academic of Social Sciences in Ningbo in 2014, this study examines migrants' various settlement intention patterns, including permanent settlement intention involving the transfer of one's hukou; de facto permanent settlement intention through purchasing local residential housing; and long-term temporary settlement intention and short-term temporary settlement intention not involving the transfer of one's hukou. The paper contributes to the study of migration in China by introducing a new concept of settlement intention, de facto permanent settlement intention, which has not yet been investigated empirically in the existing literature. This paper finds that hukou status has a limited impact on permanent settlement intention, and rural migrants tend to achieve permanent settlement through more flexible channels, such as purchasing residential housing in their destination cities, thereby avoiding the institutional hurdle of obtaining a local urban hukou.

Keywords

Permanent settlement intentions, migration, institutional constraints, housing ownership, China

¹ An early version of this chapter is currently being revised and re-submitted of *Urban Studies*.

4.1 Introduction

As a response to economic reform and the relatively relaxed migration policies that have been in place since the 1970s, China's migrant population increased from 22 million in 1990 to 253 million in 2014 based on the data from Liang and Ma's estimation (Liang & Ma, 2004)² and the Health and Family Planning Commission of China. This large growth is closely associated with the country's urbanisation and social transformation. The Chinese central government has promoted 'people oriented urbanisation' reform, which encourages eligible rural residents to become urban residents (CPC Central Committee, 2013). In addition, reforms in household registration (*hukou*) since 2003 have aimed to decrease inequalities associated with *hukou* status and promote public services, including housing and social security networks, to be available to all urban residents and rural migrants (Cai, 2011). Since then, increasing attention has been paid to understanding migrants' settlement intentions in general, and how the temporary nature of settlement intentions affects their integration into destination cities in particular (Fan, 2008; Zhu, 2007).

The conventional explanation for the temporary or 'floating' nature of migration is that migrants, especially rural migrants, are restricted from becoming permanent residents in destination cities. In the decades since the 1950s, institutional mechanisms, mainly through the *hukou* system, limit migrants' channels of changing their original *hukou* status and obtaining *hukou* status at their intended destination (Cheng & Seldon, 1994). Those migrants without locally registered *hukou* are defined as 'temporary migrants' or 'non-*hukou* migrants' (Chan & Zhang, 1999; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991; Sun & Fan, 2011). *Hukou* constraints over migrants are also reflected in the exclusion of migrants from certain sections of the urban labour market

² Data resources are from three Chinese censuses in 1982, 1990 and 2000 from 1% sample data in 1995 from Chinese State Bureau of Statistics. Based on the definition of migrant population from 1982's and 1990's Census, migrants refer to those who across country boundary resident at destination more than one year and without local household registration and those resident at destination less than one year but leave the place of household registration more than one year. In 1995's 1% sample, the definition of migrant population changed to those who across town boundary and resident at destination more than six months without local household registration.

and social provisions. These *hukou* constraints result in fewer job opportunities, poor and temporary housing arrangements, ineligibility for education, and lack of social protection and medical services (Guo & Ireland, 2004; Shen, 2002; Wang & Zuo, 1999). Owing to employment instability and inferior social and economic status in cities, migrants without urban *hukou* tend to regard themselves as temporary settlers and regard their destination cities merely as places of work. Their migration pattern therefore tends to be temporary in nature. It is also sometimes circular if they move back and forth between their place of origin and their destination city.

However, settlement intention is more complicated than the ‘migration-to-settlement’ or the ‘migration-to-return’ pattern under institutional restrictions in China (Fan & Wang, 2006). A few studies explain the temporary nature of migrants’ settlement intention beyond the institutional framework (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). They show that if permanent settlement intention is defined as the intention to transfer one’s *hukou* registration to the place of destination, temporary migrants report a low intention of changing *hukou* status when they are allowed to do so. In a study conducted in Fujian Province in 2006, only 23.8% of temporary migrants intended to move their whole family to their destination city and 34.8% of temporary migrants reported *hukou* transfer intention for all their family members if the *hukou* status could be transferred freely (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). Through the temporary migration strategy of keeping their rural *hukou* at their place of origin, it is possible for migrants to minimise the risks and maximise the economic benefits of migration, which explains migrants’ caution when obtaining the urban *hukou* status (Fan, 2011; Zhu, 2007). In contrast with *hukou* transfer intention, Hu (2007) suggests that migrants report stronger intentions of permanent residence at their destination.

Not enough attention has been paid to changes in migrants’ settlement strategy in response to recent institutional reforms and urban housing marketisation. Housing is conventionally viewed as a disadvantage for migrants in destination cities because it is often unaffordable and

inaccessible. Given institutional constraints, temporary migrants have to endure overcrowded living spaces (i.e. dormitories provided by employers) or marginal locations (i.e. urban villages), which foster and re-enforce their marginalisation and lack of mobility. Unlike urban homeowners who have formal *hukou* registration, renting is the main housing tenure choice for temporary migrants without local urban *hukou* registration (Li et al., 2009; Tao et al., 2015; Wu, 2004). A few studies explain housing tenure choices based on migrants' settlement plans in destination cities. Temporary migrants with circular or temporary settlement strategies prefer flexible and affordable housing arrangements, leading to a preference for low-cost dormitories or rental housing (Liu et al., 2016; Tao et al., 2015). The inclination toward permanent settlement encourages migrants to seek formal housing access in destination cities (Liu et al., 2016).

However, migrants have recently been encouraged to be homeowners in destination cities because of the rise of the private urban housing market. Migrants' property ownership tendency, either intending to purchase housing in destination cities or having become homeowners, deserves more attention from researchers. In some small to medium-sized cities where the housing market is more open and affordable, migrants without local *hukou* registration have the option to purchase urban housing or rent housing in urban housing market. Those migrants with permanent settlement intentions tend to be homeowners in their destination city. Instead of regarding migrants as passive players, it is reasonable to assume that migrants actively cope with institutional constraints to achieve permanent settlement through various channels responding to the process of market-orientation transition (Tao et al., 2015).

Drawing on results from a 'Migrant Survey of Ningbo' conducted in Ningbo City in 2014, this paper investigates the diverse settlement intentions of migrants in China. The main difference between previous research and this study is that the present study goes beyond the conventional understanding of permanent settlement involving the transfer of one's *hukou* registration to a host city destination. Instead of using one indicator of settlement intention –

transferring one's *hukou* registration – the paper uses three indicators to capture the complexity of settlement intention, namely, permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention. This will provide a comprehensive understanding of the different coping strategies adopted by migrant groups under institutional legacy and market forces. This paper has two major objectives. Firstly, it challenges the assumption that temporary migrants have only two possible settlement strategies: settling permanently by transferring *hukou* to the destination or staying temporarily without transferring *hukou* to the destination (including engaging in circulation migration by moving back and forth between their place of origin and their destination city or returning home to live permanently). It is possible, however, to assume that some qualified migrants are able to break institutional restrictions to become permanent settlers without obtaining local urban *hukou*. Secondly, this paper aims to highlight migrants' settlement strategy of utilising the market mechanism and achieving permanent settlement through urban home ownership and overcoming institutional constraints.

4.2 Review of Related Literature

4.2.1 Prior studies on settlement intention of Chinese migrants

As in China, in other parts of the world there are also various patterns of international and internal migration. Most international migrants to Germany and South Korea, for example, tend to prefer permanent settlement even though most of them are engaged in low-skilled work (Lim, 2008). This is also the case in Mexico–US migration (Massey, 1986). However, the majority of internal migrants in Indonesia report a circular migration pattern between their original home villages and cities because their migration motivation is mainly work. They regard their home villages, where their spouse, children and possessions remain, as their permanent home (Hugo, 1977).

There are some similarities between international migration and internal migration in other countries, and settlement decision-making among Chinese rural–urban migrants. Studies have

identified that the endowment of human capital and social capital and the effects of social identity contribute to the settlement intention of migrants in China (Tang & Feng, 2015; Wang, 2013). For example, younger migrants with higher educational levels are more likely to be permanent settlers (Tang & Feng, 2015). Self-employed migrants have more opportunities to utilise economic and social paths to live longer and co-reside with family members than other migrants. Those migrants who are more engaged in local social networks have a higher possibility of positively integrating into destination cities because their stable economic status and local self-identification increases the possibility of permanent settlement (Cao et al., 2015).

However, prior literature mainly focuses on the effects of institutional constraints on the temporary nature of migrant in destination cities and considers institutional restrictions as the key to explaining settlement intention among migrants (Cai, 2001; Fan & Wang, 2006; Hu et al., 2011). Some scholars believe that institutional constraints prevent migrants, especially rural migrants, from obtaining urban *hukou* (Cai & Wang, 2008; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Temporary migrants without urban *hukou* suffer discrimination associated with employment availability, job security and social services that prevents them from settling permanently in destination cities (Fan & Wang, 2006; Sun & Fan, 2011). Even if temporary migrants who intend to be permanent settlers with the endowment of human capital and social capital, the probability of success is not dependent on their efforts but is restricted to the institutional system (Cai, 2001).

Recent studies have begun to explain the settlement decision-making processes of Chinese migrants beyond the institutional framework (Tang & Feng, 2015; Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). The majority of migrants engaged in labour-intensive sectors, such as the manufacturing industry, are confronted by instability due to fluctuation in economic and market conditions. This employment instability leads to the decision to not settle in destination cities (Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007). Moreover, the low-income level among migrants, which results from the urban–rural income gap and an insufficient rural labour force, leads to temporary residence in

destination cities and taking full advantage of resources, such as land tenure, in their place of origin. The temporary nature of migration is determined by the economic fluctuations and low income level of migrants in the market, which cannot be changed merely through obtaining urban *hukou* status (Shen, 2002; Zhu, 2007). Although these studies claim that institutional constraints are overstated in terms of temporary settlement strategy among migrants (Tang & Feng, 2015; Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010), there is inadequate research examining individual efforts of temporary migrants to achieve permanent settlement within the context of economic transition and *hukou* reforms. The effects of marketization (e.g. marketization of the urban housing market) on settlement-decision making of temporary migrants call for empirical studies.

4.2.2 Emerging trends of settlement intention: The role of the housing market

In addition to other factors, housing affects migrants' settlement intention. According to new economics theory of migration, migrants tend to save to purchase a new house or invest in existing housing at their place of origin (Piore, 1979). Those migrants who intend to return to their place of origin tend to pay less attention to housing conditions, such as facilities, locations and associated services, in their place of destination, and, thus, improving housing in their place of origin becomes a priority. This in turn has an impact on optimal migration duration (Mesnard, 2004; Djajić & Vinogradova, 2014). Conversely, when migrants plan to settle permanently, they prefer to improve the condition of their housing at their place of destination. They do this by searching for better rented accommodation or by investing in private housing (Turner, 1968). Therefore, housing conditions and the rate of home ownership by migrants in destination cities is dependent on whether they want to be permanent settlers.

Studies on migrant housing ownership in China mainly focus on institutional constraints, which contribute to their lack of access to housing in destination cities. Housing was regarded as a welfare benefit instead of a 'commodity' until the reforms since 1999. Under the government-based subsidised housing system and work units based housing distribution system, the majority of migrants without urban *hukou* status were excluded from access to housing

allocation, subsidised rental housing and housing provident funds in destination cities (Huang & Clark, 2002; Lin & Zhu, 2010). After 1999 the traditional housing distribution system came to an end and the commodity housing sector was opened up to the entire population through market mechanisms. However, even if temporary migrants are permitted access to the commodity housing market, the high cost of commodity housing deters them from housing ownership (Wu, 2004). This housing ownership in destination cities is even regarded as a ‘passport’ to local urban *hukou*³ (Hu et al., 2011).

A few studies suggest that housing decisions among migrants go beyond institutional constraints and are closely related to different settlement intentions (Tao et al., 2015; Lin & Zhu, 2010). Driven by institutional reforms and the rise of the urban housing market, housing ownership eligibility is not associated with *hukou* status in the majority of regions.⁴ Migrants have the option to purchase housing or rent private housing through the urban housing market. Tao et al. (2015) regard migrants as ‘enabling agents’ rather than passive players under institutional constraints and suggest that, instead of *hukou* status, household strategies, affordability, ties to place of origin and job opportunities have a greater effect on the settlement plans and housing tenure choices of migrants in destination cities.

Although some studies link migrants’ housing plans with their settlement intention (Lin & Zhu, 2010; Tao et al., 2015), few directly use housing ownership intention in destination cities as a major factor explaining permanent settlement intention and fit housing ownership intention into settlement intention classification scheme. Some scholars suggest that granting urban *hukou* status to migrants has little effect on their decision to settle permanently and buy property in destination cities (Liu et al., 2016; Tao et al., 2015). Migrants with permanent settlement

³ In some areas, purchasing local property is associated with the application of local urban *hukou* or ‘blue stamp’ (*lanyin*) *hukou*. Blue stamp *hukou* is a household registration system that grants holders social rights and entitlements at destination cities, and is regarded as a semi-permanent urban *hukou*. The holders are primarily major investors, property owners and professionals (Tang & Feng, 2015).

⁴ According to property market policies in municipal cities in 2016, migrants without local urban residence are permitted access to housing ownership in destination cities if they can provide continuous tax certification or social insurance certification at their place of destination.

intention tend to expand their access to formal housing markets. It is necessary to note that given the rise of the urban housing market since 1999, it is possible for temporary migrants to purchase local housing or rent housing in the urban housing market regardless of their *hukou* status⁵. Because purchasing housing ownership is not necessarily connected to the local urban *hukou* status, this opportunity for housing ownership in destination cities is no longer considered a ‘passport’ to access local urban *hukou*. Although some studies connect migrants’ housing plans with their settlement intentions (Lin & Zhu, 2010; Tao et al., 2015), few directly use housing ownership intention in destination cities as a major indicator explaining permanent settlement intention. Given that the urban housing market provides an available channel to access ownership of local property through temporary migrants’ own efforts, their legitimate rights of residence and the eligibility for access to some urban social benefits are guaranteed⁶. The willingness to own local housing among temporary migrants should be considered in the context of whether these homeowners or potential homeowners have the ability and intention to settlement permanently in the urban destination. Housing ownership, obtaining local urban *hukou* and permanent settlement intention therefore warrant further investigation. Under the market mechanism, migrants without local *hukou* status have access to housing ownership in most regions. It is thus possible to assume that there are diverse settlement intention patterns among migrants beyond institutional constraints. Empirical evidence will be obtained to verify whether the intention of transferring one’s *hukou* to places of destination is the key to achieving permanent settlement among migrants. This study will also examine if migrants have diverse settlement choices under market forces, how human capital, social ties in places of origin and destination, and social identity affect migrants’ settlement intentions.

⁵ There are regional variations in the criteria for purchasing urban housing. Some regions (e.g., Beijing) require temporary migrants that do not have local urban *hukou* status to provide certification of local social security or personal-income tax for purchasing commodity housing, while Shanghai sets restrictions for migrants in relation to access to housing ownership. In the majority of small- and medium-sized cities, the urban housing market is accessible to temporary migrants.

⁶ For example, since 2013, the local government of Ningbo has allowed migrant children to enter senior school and sit college examinations at the destination if their parents can provide certifications of stable employment and domicile.

Based on the preceding discussion, this study aims to answer three questions. First, to what extent does the role of *hukou* affect migrants' permanent settlement intentions in a destination city? Second, to what extent do the factors associated with purchasing local housing contribute to migrants' permanent settlement intentions? Third, what are the settlement strategies adopted by migrants to overcome institutional restrictions?

4.3 Data and Method

4.3.1 Data sources

The data in this study come from a survey conducted in 2014 by the Institute of Population and Labor Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in the city of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. Ningbo was chosen for several reasons. Located in one corner of the Yangtze River Delta, Zhejiang Province has attracted a huge number of migrants since the pre-1970 period. Ningbo is renowned for its active manufacturing, commercial and trading activities, which makes the city appealing to migrants. In 2014, there were 4.2 million migrants living and working in Ningbo, approximately 42% of the entire population of Ningbo (see Figure 4-1). In addition, in medium-sized cities such as Ningbo, migration policies related to access to social provisions (such as access to compulsory education for migrant children) are not as strict as those in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai.

According to data from the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, the size of the migrant population has decreased in the last few years, from a peak of 4.8 million in 2012 to 4.2 million in 2014 (see Figure 4-1). Based on data from the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo in 2013, 65% of migrants reported a length of residence of more than six months while 6% had been in Ningbo for more than five years. Although there is a tendency toward long-term residence, migrants make different choices in terms of settlement. More than half of the migrants surveyed in Ningbo in 2014 were planning a short-term stay while 45% preferred permanent settlement in Ningbo.




Figure 4- 1 Population Changes in Ningbo from 2002 to 2014

Source: Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, 2015.

Supported by a trained team from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) of Ningbo and the Statistics Bureau of Ningbo, face-to-face interviews were conducted by the researchers in 2014. Using official data from the PSB of Ningbo as a sampling frame, a multistage stratified sampling process was carried out. Firstly, 100 neighbourhoods were selected randomly in a total of six districts, two counties and three county-level cities in Ningbo. These neighbourhoods included residential neighbourhoods, village neighbourhoods and industrial parks as independent districts, all major destinations for migrants. Thereafter, in each selected neighbourhood, 20 migrants were randomly selected. We defined migrants as individuals aged 15 years or older whose *hukou* was not registered in the city of Ningbo at the time of the survey, and who had been absent from their places of *hukou* registration for more than six months. The aim of the survey was to collect demographic, employment, income, housing, social network and settlement intention data.

The survey yielded a total of 1659 valid questionnaires. To test the validity of the data, we compared a number of demographic characteristics between the sample data and official data from the Health and Family Planning Commission (HFPC) of Ningbo in 2013. There were close similarities between our sample data and official figures. The average age of the sampled migrants was 35.2 years and 80.6% were aged 16–45 (82.7% in the HFPC data). Of these, 55.5% were male (53.9% in the HFPC data), 82.2% were married and 82.3% had received senior

school or below education (70.4% in the HFPC data). Although the survey had a minor overrepresentation of married and less educated migrants, there is no reason to believe that the survey is not representative of population of Ningbo. This survey ensured that migrant-concentrated neighbourhoods were equally likely to be selected based on the PPS⁷ sampling frame.

4.3.2 Variable specification

Guided by the above review and discussion, three indicators were used to measure the settlement intentions of migrants in this study. The first is the permanent residence intention, which was captured by asking migrants whether they planned to live permanently in the destination city (yes, being intention to live permanently in the destination city; no, being no intention to live permanently in the destination city). The second indicator is associated with *hukou* transfer intention (yes, being with intention to transfer original *hukou* to destination; no, being with no intention to transfer original *hukou* to destination). The last indicator involves housing decisions in the destination city, which was captured by asking whether migrants were intending to own local housing (yes, being with intention to own housing in the destination city; no, being with no intention to own housing in the destination city).

Four groups of independent variables may affect migrants' settlement intentions. The first group concerns institutional constraints, specifically *hukou* registration (rural *hukou* and urban *hukou*). In previous literature a lack of local urban *hukou* has been found to be an obstacle to migrants' stable employment opportunities and access to social provisions in destination cities. These economic and social instabilities steer migrants, especially rural *hukou* holders, away from permanent settlement (Fan & Wang, 2006; Sun and Wang, 2011).

⁷ The Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) sampling is to assign probabilities proportional to the size of samples. As the sample unit with larger size is expected to have greater contribution to the total samples, the selection bias of this sampling is at minimum.

The second group is associated with human capital and employment status, which captures migrants' economic achievements that contribute to their settlement decision-making (Cao et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2010). Migrants' formal education experience is measured by their educational level, which is categorised as primary school and below, secondary and high school and above. In addition, length of residence in the destination city indicates intention of permanent settlement (Ren, 2006; Wu, 2006). Income level, employment status and engagement of labour contract capture migrants' economic achievements and integration in the labour market of the destination city.

The third group involves housing arrangements in the place of destination and origin, which are connected to migration patterns and the settlement intention of migrants (Liu et al., 2016; Tao et al., 2015). Housing arrangements in the destination city include free or rental dormitories, private house rental and private house ownership while housing in the place of origin is associated with owning or building a house in one's original home.⁸

The fourth set of variables measures migrants' social networks in destination city and in place of origin and their social identity in the destination city (Cao et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016). Three variables are used to measure social networks in the destination city. First, interactions with local relatives or friends capture the local social networks of migrants. Second, experiences of receiving help from locals and a willingness to socialise with locals⁹ capture migrants' social attachments in the destination city. Third, sending children to receive local compulsory education and with family members at their destination may promote migrants' permanent settlement intention (Fan, 2011; Xu et al., 2011). In contrast, social networks and attachments in original villages, including frequent visits home and land tenure in place of origin may reduce the possibility that migrants will become permanent settlers. Migration within the same

⁸ The housing arrangement variables are only applied to the indicators of settlement intention associated with permanent stay intention and *hukou* transferring intention in the empirical analysis.

⁹ Willingness to socialise with locals is measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 indicating 'highly unwilling to socialise' and 5 indicating 'highly willing to socialise'. Two main factors were included in the empirical analysis throughout the factor analysis. One is associated with the willingness to socialise with locals, including chatting, working together, being neighbourly and friendly, and the other relates to a willingness to intermarry with locals.

province may make it easier for migrants to utilise original networks, and facilitates their intention to migrate temporarily (Zhu & Chen, 2010). Moreover, migrants' social integration in the destination city is captured by social identity¹⁰ and self-evaluation of the destination city.¹¹ Finally, we control the demographic variables including age, gender and marital status in the analysis.

This study applied logistic regression model to examine the determinations on permanent settlement intentions associated with intentions of permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and urban housing ownership. Furthermore, a multinomial regression model is adopted to examine the interactions of the three dimension of settlement intentions and the attracting factors to permanent settlement intentions among migrants.

4.4 Empirical Findings

4.4.1 Descriptive analysis: Demographic characteristics of migrants

Table 4-1 shows that rural migrants are cautious about transferring *hukou* to their destination city. Only 12.8% of migrants with rural *hukou* status reported their intention to transfer *hukou* to their destination while 30% of urban *hukou* holders expressed their intention to transfer *hukou*. Yet, 47.6% of rural migrants intended to stay permanently in their destination city. Of these rural migrants without *hukou* transfer intention, the priority was to keep the original rural *hukou* (55.2%) or to transfer *hukou* to cities in their original province (25.4%).¹²

¹⁰ Self-identity I indicates that migrants identify themselves as locals or outsiders and self-identity II is associated with their identification as urbanites or rural people.

¹¹ The self-evaluation variable asked respondents 'do you feel better in social and economic aspects following your migration to Ningbo?' This variable is measured on five-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating 'strongly disagree' and 5 indicating 'strongly agree'. Two main factors of evaluation were included in the analysis after the factor analysis. One is relevant to employment conditions in the city and the other is associated with social provisions conditions and development in the city, including social security, children's education, housing, entertainment and further development.

¹² The cross-tabulation results of *hukou* status and consideration of keeping original *hukou* are omitted owing to lack of space.

Contrary to existing studies that found permanent settlement is closely related to the formal transfer of one's *hukou* (Hu et al., 2010; Tang & Feng, 2015), in this study migrants reported diverse intentions of *hukou* transfer and permanent residence. Nearly half of the migrants reported their intention to permanently settle in their destination city while approximately 86% of migrants chose to retain their original *hukou* status rather than transferring *hukou* to their destination, regardless of whether they were urban *hukou* or rural *hukou* holders (Table 4-2). In addition, there were diverse settlement intentions among migrants with different housing arrangements. 45% of migrants who lived in dormitories or rented private houses reported permanent residence intention while only 10% of migrants who lived in dormitories or rented private housing tended to transfer *hukou* to their destination city.¹³ It is possible that migrants' housing decisions at their destination could be connected with their permanent settlement decision-making.

Table 4- 1 Permanent Residence Intention and *Hukou* Transferring Intention by *Hukou* Type (%)

	Permanent residence intention		<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention	
	Stay	Not stay	Transfer	Not transfer
Rural <i>hukou</i>	47.6	52.4	12.8	87.2
Urban <i>hukou</i>	62.8	37.2	31.8	68.2
Total	48.8	51.2	14.3	85.7

Source: Migrant survey of Ningbo, 2014.

Table 4- 2 Mean of Variables Used in Regression Analysis

Variables	Mean
Settlement intention	
Permanent residence intention	
Permanent stay intention (%)	48.8
No permanent stay intention (%)	51.2
<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention	
<i>Hukou</i> transfer intention	14.3
No <i>hukou</i> transfer intention	85.7
Institution	
Agricultural <i>hukou</i> type	92.2
Demographic	
Age (years)	35.22
Male (%)	57.4
Married (%)	82.2
Human capital	
Education (%)	
Primary school and below	24.0

¹³ The cross-tabulation results of housing arrangement and settlement intention are omitted owing to lack of space.

	Secondary school	58.3
	High school and above	17.7
	Income (%)	
	<2500	29.4
	2500<≤3000	30.4
	3000<≤4000	22.7
	>4000	17.5
	Employment status (%)	
	Employee	63.2
	Part-time employee	20.2
	Self-employed	16.6
	With labour contract (%)	59.0
	Local duration time (years)	7.07
Housing	Housing at destination (%)	
	Free or rental dormitories (%)	21.0
	Renting private house (%)	75.2
	Owns private house (%)	3.8
	Housing in place of origin (%)	
	Owns or building private house	96.0
Social network at destinations	With relatives or fellows (%)	26.1
	With local friends (%)	55.7
	Receiving local help (%)	28.6
	Children receiving education at destination (%)	25.3
	With family members at destination (%)	82.1
Social network in origin	With land tenure (%)	75.9
	Interprovincial migration (%)	90.1
	Returns several times in a year (%)	78.8
Social identity	Self-identity I (Identifying as local) (%)	9.8
	Self-identity II (Identifying as urbanite) (%)	11.0
Sample size		1659

Source: Migrant survey of Ningbo, 2014.

4.4.2 Institutional legacies and permanent settlement intention

When it comes to diverse patterns of settlement intention, *hukou* transfer is not the only way for migrants to achieve permanent settlement, especially among rural migrants. The results in Table 4-3 show that rural *hukou* has negative effects on the settlement intentions of transferring *hukou* to the place of destination while there is no significant correlation between the *hukou* type and the permanent residence intention. Compared to migrants with urban *hukou*, the likelihood of migrants with rural *hukou* status to transfer *hukou* to the place of destination are 0.664 lower. Migrants with rural *hukou* status are cautious about transferring *hukou* registration

compared with their urban counterparts. This finding is consistent with Zhu (Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). The consideration of land tenure in original home is a possible explanation for this. The model results reveal that migrants with land tenure in their place of origin are more likely to temporarily remain in their destination city without the intention of permanent residence and *hukou* transfer.

In contrast, the establishment of social networks and social attachments in the destination city motivates migrants to achieve permanent settlement. Sending children to receive compulsory education in the destination city is a positive influence, and encourages migrants to transfer *hukou* to their destination (1.849 higher likelihood compared to the reference group). A positive attitude toward interaction with locals in daily life and intermarriage with locals also facilitates social integration, which increases their *hukou* transferring intention. In addition, compared to factors related to income level, employment status and labour contract engagement, the intention of permanent residence is more attached to social networks at the destination city. Those migrants who have relatives or friends in the destination city or who have received help from locals are more likely to permanently reside in the destination city. With regard to social identity, migrants who self-identify as urbanites have a more positive sense of social belonging and adaption toward their destination city. Therefore, through active social adaptation associated with urban identification, migrants tend to achieve permanent settlement through permanent residence or *hukou* transfer. Moreover, migrants who have been in the destination city for a longer period of time are more likely to stay permanently, which is consistent with prior studies (Connelly et al., 2011; Ren, 2006), though this effect is not significant on people's intention of *hukou* transfer.

More importantly, the results suggests that migrants' housing decisions are important determinants of settlement intention. In contrast to those who live in dormitories, migrants who rent private housing are more likely to consider permanent residence in the destination city. Furthermore, migrants who own their private property in the destination city are more inclined

to be permanent settlers. The latter are more likely to choose permanent residence and transfer *hukou* to their destination city, although only a small sample reported housing ownership in the destination city. However, housing arrangements in place of origin are negatively related to migrants' settlement intentions involving permanent residence and *hukou* transfer, but none of the coefficients are significant. As ownership in place of origin is usual practice for the majority of migrants in China, it does not influence them in making specific settlement decisions.

Evidence so far indicates that permanent settlement intention is not only restricted to *hukou* transfer, but also involves diverse patterns under institutional legacy and the urban housing market. Rural *hukou* status does not significantly promote the *hukou* transferring intention of rural migrants. Instead, housing arrangements in the destination city are an important factor affecting permanent settlement decision-making. Through private renting, migrants take the first step toward permanent residence while housing ownership in the destination city contributes to their permanent residence and *hukou* transferring intention. It is possible to expect that urban housing owners or migrants with housing ownership intention have the economic and social ability to adapt to their destination city, which contributes to their intention to permanently settle. Given the varying settlement patterns of migrants, we ran a further multinomial regression model to examine diverse settlement intentions involving permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership under the interactions of market and institutional mechanisms.

Table 4- 3 Logistic Regressions of Permanent Residence Intention and *Hukou* Transferring Intention

Independent variable	Permanent residence intention	<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention
<i>Institutional</i>		
Rural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=urban <i>hukou</i>)	0.505 (1.057)	-1.090 (0.336)**
<i>Demographic</i>		
Age (years)	-0.034 (0.967)	0.064 (1.066)
Age square (years)	0.001 (1.011)	-0.001 (0.999)
Male (ref.=female)	0.335 (1.398)*	0.765 (2.148)**
Married (ref.=unmarried)	0.558 (1.746)*	-0.943 (0.389)*
<i>Human capital</i>		
Education (ref.=high school and above)		
Primary school and below	-0.078 (0.925)	-0.164 (0.949)
Secondary school	-0.574 (0.563)**	-0.575 (0.983)
Income (ref.= ≤2500)		
2500 < ≤3000	0.255 (1.290)	0.004 (1.004)
3000 < ≤4000	0.019 (1.019)	-0.089 (0.915)
>4000	0.352 (1.022)	-0.553 (0.975)
Employment status (ref.=part-time employee)		
Employee	0.373 (1.052)	-0.469 (0.986)
Self-employed	0.270 (1.109)	0.614 (1.048)
With labour contract (ref.=without labour contract)	0.085 (1.089)	0.408 (1.004)
Local duration time (years)	0.030 (1.030)*	0.027 (1.027)
<i>Social networks at destination</i>		
With local relatives/fellows (ref.=without local relatives/fellows)	0.717 (2.049)**	0.525 (1.091)
With local friends (ref.=without local friends)	0.118 (1.126)	-0.493 (0.991)

With local help (ref.=without local help)	0.422 (1.525)*	0.440 (1.052)
Place of children's education (ref.=education beyond destination)	0.317 (1.073)	0.615 (1.849)*
Family migration (ref.=without family members at destination)	-0.158 (0.954)	0.528 (1.095)
Willingness to join in activities with locals		
Daily life	-0.113 (0.993)	0.452 (1.571)**
Intermarriage	-0.053 (0.949)	0.482 (1.620)***
<i>Social networks in place of origin</i>		
With land tenure (ref.=without land tenure)	-0.372 (0.689)*	-0.587 (0.556)*
Inter-provincial migration (ref.=intra-provincial migration)	-0.123 (0.985)	0.948 (1.081)
Several times a year for return (ref.=once in several years)	-0.370 (0.691)*	-0.407 (0.996)
<i>Social identity</i>		
Self-identity I (ref.=identity as an outsider)	0.078 (1.082)	-0.444 (0.941)
Self-identity II (ref.=identity as a rural person)	0.995 (2.704)**	1.027 (2.792)**
Self-evaluation of destination		
Benefiting employment condition	-0.061 (0.941)	-0.088 (0.916)
Benefiting social security condition	0.122 (1.127)	0.272 (1.012)
Housing		
Housing at destination (ref.=free or rented dormitory)		
Rent private housing	0.422 (1.525)*	0.329 (1.090)
Owns property	0.757 (2.132)*	1.635 (5.131)**
Owns property in place of origin (ref.=without property in origin)	-0.062 (0.940)	-0.383 (0.982)
Constant	-0.851 (0.957)	-2.502 (0.082)
Number 1659		

Notes: The table reports the coefficients of logistic regression models and the figures in brackets report the odd ratios. Standard errors are omitted due to lack of space.*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.001.

4.4.3 New dimension of settlement intention: Urban housing ownership intention

As indicated in Table 4-3, housing ownership in the destination city significantly increases the permanent settlement intention of migrants. As discussed in previous sections, owning a house in destination cities is not an impossible dream for migrants because of the marketisation of urban housing. Those migrants who plan to permanently settle down tend to invest in urban housing in destination cities; otherwise, they prefer to improve their existing house or build a new house in their place of origin (Wu, 2004; Zheng et al., 2009). Given the close connection between housing ownership decisions and settlement intention, housing ownership intention should be an additional category of settlement intention.

As Table 4-3 demonstrates, migrants are not limited to *hukou* transfer to realise permanent settlement in a destination city. By considering the three indicators – permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership, four patterns of settlement intention can be identified. Migrants in each pattern satisfy the three conditions simultaneously: 1) if migrants reported their permanent stay intention and *hukou* transfer intention but not housing ownership consideration in the host city, their intention is classified as traditional permanent settlement intention (pattern 1). In addition, some respondents (7.48%) reported their permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention, as well as housing ownership consideration, this pattern is also classified as traditional permanent settlement intention (pattern 1). 2) Migrants with *de facto* permanent settlement intention through housing ownership (pattern 2) are migrants who reported their intention of residing permanently and owning housing in the host city, but are not considering *hukou* transfer. 3) Long-term temporary settlement intention (pattern 3) indicates permanent residence intention but without considering either *hukou* transfer or housing ownership in the host city. 4) If migrants reported temporary residence intention without consideration for permanent residency, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership, this intention is classified as short-term temporary settlement intention (pattern 4) (see Table 4)⁹. These four categories are mutually exclusive. Migrants shown in one settlement pattern would

not be included in the other three patterns. For example, the pattern 1 only captures migrants who followed the traditional settlement pattern with both *hukou* transfer and permanent residence intentions, while pattern 2 includes only those who reported both intentions of permanent residence and housing ownership but without intentions of *hukou* transfer. Migrants in the pattern 3 are only those with considerations of permanent residence but did not have *hukou* transfer and housing ownership intentions while migrants in the pattern 4 only considers the short-term residence at the destinations without intentions of permanent residence, *hukou* transfer, or housing ownership. (see Table 4-4).

Table 4-5 indicates the diverse choices of migrants to achieve settlement based on the new classification scheme. Under this scheme, 11.9% of migrants reported traditional permanent settlement intention involving permanent residence and *hukou* transfer while 10.2% of migrants intended to own local housing and stay permanently in the destination city without necessarily transferring their *hukou* registration. Considering migrants' multiple choices of settlement intention, we used a multinomial regression model to further examine settlement intention patterns beyond the traditional *hukou* scheme.

Table 4- 4 Classification of Settlement Intention with Permanent Residence, *Hukou* Transfer and Property Ownership Intention

Settlement intention	Intention to own housing in destination city	No intention to own housing in destination city
Permanent residence and <i>hukou</i> transferring intention	Pattern 1 (Traditional permanent settlement intention)	Pattern 1 (Traditional permanent settlement intention)
Permanent residence intention but no <i>hukou</i> transferring intention	Pattern 2 (De facto permanent settlement intention)	Pattern 3 (Long-term temporary settlement intention)
No permanent residence intention but <i>hukou</i> transferring intention	N/A	N/A
No permanent residence intention and no <i>hukou</i> transferring intention	N/A	Pattern 4 (Short-term temporary settlement intention)

Note: 'N/A' refers to the disapplication in settlement intentions.

Table 4-5 Descriptive Statistics for Four Patterns of Settlement Intention

Settlement intention	%
Pattern 1 <i>Traditional permanent settlement intention</i>	11.9
Pattern 2 <i>De facto permanent settlement intention</i>	10.2
Pattern 3 <i>Long-term temporary settlement intention intention (%)</i>	31.1
Pattern 4 <i>Short-term temporary settlement intention</i>	46.8

Source: Migrant survey of Ningbo, 2014.

Table 4-6 shows the multinomial regression results of the determinants of different settlement intentions. In stark contrast with previous settlement studies (e.g., Wang & Zuo, 1999), the absence of urban *hukou* status is not the foremost barrier to migrants' permanent settlement intentions. Migrants with rural *hukou* status, compared with urban migrants, prefer to achieve permanent settlement through diverse channels such as local house ownership, permanent residence and *hukou* transfer. Some rural migrants report *de facto permanent settlement intention* (pattern 2) because they intend permanent residence and own local housing but have not necessarily transferred *hukou*. Some others with *long-term temporary settlement intention* (pattern 3) prefer permanent residence but do not consider *hukou* transfer or local housing ownership. The results suggest that it is possible for 'temporary migrants' to be permanent settlers through urban house ownership instead of through transferring to urban *hukou* status. Obtaining local urban *hukou* is not the only channel through which to achieve permanent settlement.

Human capital factors facilitate migrants to make varying settlement decisions. In addition to employment status and labour contract engagement, the educational level of migrants has a positive effect on permanent settlement. Migrants with a higher level of education intend to be permanent settlers with *de facto permanent settlement intention* (pattern 2), owning housing in their destination city but without the *hukou* transferring intention. For permanent settlement intention involving *traditional permanent settlement intention* (pattern 1) and *de facto permanent settlement intention* (pattern 2), migrants with a secondary education are inclined to be temporary stayers while those with a higher education are more likely to be permanent settlers. Moreover, those migrants who have been living in the destination city for a long time are more likely to be permanent settlers involving permanent residence and *hukou* transferring intention (pattern 1). These results are consistent with the general trend that the length of time spent at the destination increases migrants' permanent settlement intentions (Ren, 2006; Connelly et al., 2011).

Determinants beyond institutional constraints also lie in migrants' social attachments in their destination city. Social interactions at the destination strongly encourage migrants to choose *traditional permanent settlement intention* (pattern1). Migrants who receive help from local residents and report a willingness to join social activities with locals and who also have the companion of their family members are more attached to their destination. These social attachments therefore encourage permanent settlement. Compared with the short-term stay group (pattern 4), migrants who identify themselves as urban show a strong intention toward permanent settlement, either through *hukou* transfer, housing ownership or even merely permanent residence. With local self-identification, migrants are more likely to settle through owning a local house (*de facto permanent settlement intention*, pattern 3). Not surprisingly, social provisions in the destination city regarding children's compulsory education raise the possibility of *traditional permanent settlement intention* or *de facto permanent settlement intention*. With regard to original attachment, consistent with our previous analysis, land tenure in place of origin drives migrants to choose temporary settlement, suggesting that close attachment in the place of origin decreases the possibility of permanent settlement intention.

In sum, migrants in our sample hold diverse settlement intentions beyond *hukou* restrictions. Rural *hukou* holders are more likely to own local housing or stay permanently without necessarily transferring *hukou*. Through the urban housing mechanism, it is possible for migrants with rural *hukou* status, a high level of education and higher income to achieve *de facto permanent settlement intention*. Human capital and social attachments in the destination city encourage migrants to be traditional permanent settlers or 'de facto' permanent settlers while social attachments to place of origin, such as land tenure, discourage permanent settlement intention. We observe that urban self-identification plays an important role in increasing migrants' willingness to be permanent settlers through diverse channels.

Table 4-6 Estimates of multinomial logistic regression of settlement intentions in Ningbo (Ref = pattern 4)

	Pattern 1		Pattern 2		Pattern 3	
	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odd ratio	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odd ratio	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odd ratio
Institutional						
Agricultural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=non-agricultural)	-0.175(0.436)	0.983	2.164(0.397)**	8.709	1.470(0.327)**	4.348
Demographic						
Age (years)	0.020(0.160)	1.020	0.088(0.199)	1.092	-0.061(0.082)	0.982
Age square (years)	0.001(0.002)	0.996	-0.001(0.003)	0.999	0.001(0.001)	1.001
Male (ref.=female)	1.147(0.407)**	3.150	-0.176(0.393)	0.938	0.246(0.212)	1.079
Married (ref.=unmarried)	-1.116(0.676)*	0.928	0.834(0.470)*	2.304	1.004(0.412)**	1.385
Human capital						
Education (ref.= high school and above)						
Primary and below	-0.654(0.557)	0.925	-2.183(0.334)**	0.113	0.386(0.414)	1.072
Secondary school	-1.533(0.467)***	0.216	-1.562(0.470)***	0.210	-0.199(0.371)	0.920
Income (ref.= ≤2500)						
2500<≤3000	0.139(0.495)	1.150	0.226(0.542)	1.153	0.374(0.260)	1.054
3000<≤4000	-0.113(0.503)	0.894	-0.112(0.474)	0.994	-0.093(0.285)	0.911
>4000	0.237(0.582)	1.068	1.014(0.474)*	2.756	0.372(0.343)	1.050
Employment status (ref.=part-time employee)						
Employee	0.254(0.515)	1.089	-0.112(0.408)	0.994	-0.532(0.310)*	0.987
Self-employed	-0.273(0.699)	0.961	-0.394(0.470)	0.975	-0.684(0.453)	0.950
Labour contract (ref.=without labour contract)	0.287(0.404)	1.042	0.131(0.443)	1.140	0.056(0.218)	1.058
Local duration time (years)	0.081(0.037)**	1.085	0.043(0.040)	1.044	0.031(0.021)	1.032

<i>Social networks at destination</i>						
With local relatives/fellows (ref.=without local relatives/fellows)	1.052(0.413)**	2.864	1.241(0.423)**	3.436	0.583(0.279)**	1.792
With local friends (ref.=without local friends)	-0.196(0.406)	0.922	0.172(0.436)	1.188	0.063(0.223)	1.065
With local help (ref.= without local help)	0.608(0.399)*	1.837	1.131(0.441)	1.140	0.169(0.268)	1.184
Place of children's education (ref.= education beyond destination)	1.031(0.406)**	2.803	0.949(0.430)**	2.583	0.018(0.249)	1.018
Family migration (ref.=without family members at destination)	1.126(0.352)*	3.083	-0.467(0.312)	0.987	-0.167(0.300)	0.946
Willingness to join in activities with locals						
Daily life	0.474(0.240)*	1.607	-0.210(0.219)	0.991	-0.176(0.117)	0.939
Intermarriage	0.614(0.179)***	1.848	0.128 (0.187)	1.136	-0.214(0.110)	0.908
<i>Social networks in place of origin</i>						
Land tenure (ref.=without land tenure)	-1.001(0.413) **	0.368	-1.182(0.416)**	0.307	-0.504(0.273)*	0.604
Inter-provincial migration (ref.=intra-provincial migration)	-0.088(0.646)	0.916	-1.073(0.541)**	0.342	0.486(0.537)	1.025
Several times within a year for return (ref.=once within some years)	-0.745(0.406)*	0.475	-0.706(0.427)*	0.494	-0.238(0.240)	0.983
Owning property in place of origin (ref.=without property in origins)	-0.367(0.465)	0.993	0.219(0.447)	1.045	-0.117(0.302)	0.889
<i>Social identity</i>						
Self-identity I (ref.=outsider identity)	0.009(0.401)	1.009	0.953(0.581)*	2.593	0.303(0.473)	1.054
Self-identity II (ref.=rural person identity)	2.260(0.406)***	9.586	1.580 (0.428)**	1.728	1.295(0.495)**	3.649
Self-evaluation of destination						
Benefiting employment condition	0.201(0.201)	1.023	0.335(0.229)	1.398	0.017(0.115)	1.017

Benefiting social security condition	-0.155(0.184)	0.958	0.088(0.202)	1.092	-0.214(0.110)	0.972
Constant	-1.543(2.981)		-3.255(3.774)		-1.188(1.782)	
Number						1659

Note: The table reports the coefficients and odd ratios of the logistic regression model, and the figures in brackets report standard errors. *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.001. The Nagelkerke R Square of the model that examines permanent residence intention was 0.179 while the Nagelkerke R Square of the model of *hukou* transfer intention was 0.164.

4.5 Conclusion

In recent decades, China has undergone rapid industrialisation and economic development, and the rise in rural–urban migration represents the country’s growing urbanisation and modernisation. Persistent migration has gained the attention of scholars and policy-makers. Whether migrants, primarily rural–urban migrants, plan to permanently settle or not has a significant influence on the process of urbanisation, the development of urban infrastructure, as well as welfare and social provisions in destination cities. Temporary migrants, those without local urban *hukou* status, suffer economic instability and lack of social support in destination cities; therefore their migration is classified as temporary in nature without the expectation of permanent settlement (Fan, 2008; Shen, 2002). However, few studies have addressed the diverse patterns of settlement intention under the interaction of institutional constraints and marketisation. The rise of housing marketisation has broadened housing choices for migrants, encouraging settlement intention to be a more complicated process. This paper has examined the varying patterns of permanent settlement intention including permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership in destination cities.

Based on a survey of migrants conducted in Ningbo in 2014, the findings in this paper support theoretical analyses that Chinese migrants hold more diverse and available channels for achieving permanent settlement in their destination city. Nearly half of the migrants intend to stay permanently in the destination city while the majority of them hesitate to transfer their *hukou* registration. Rural *hukou* holders are cautious about transferring *hukou*, as land tenure is an important economic safety net and a social tie to their place of origin. This economic and social attachment means that rural migrants tend to keep their original rural *hukou* instead of obtaining local urban *hukou*. However, *hukou* transferring intention does not comprehensively indicate permanent settlement intention. Through private renting, migrants take the first step toward permanent residence while housing ownership in the destination city contributes to their permanent residence and *hukou* transferring intention. Those migrants who plan to purchase

housing or who have already become home owners in the destination city, are likely to become and are capable of being permanent settlers. Owing to strong economic capability and social adaptation, they could achieve permanent settlement through market channels without necessarily transferring *hukou*. Housing ownership intention in the destination city should therefore be incorporated into the traditional classification scheme of settlement intention.

Given the broad settlement choices including house ownership, permanent residence and *hukou* transfer, it is safe to say that rural migrants prefer to use flexible channels through which to achieve permanent settlement. Conventional wisdom states that hesitance in transferring *hukou* to the destination city indicates a temporary settlement intention, and obtaining local urban *hukou* is regarded as the last stage of the settlement process (Wang & Zuo, 1999). However, it is the urban housing market that facilitates *de facto permanent settlement intention*, which contributes to a balance between permanent settlement and maintaining rural *hukou*. It is possible for migrants to keep rural *hukou* and maintain socio-economic attachments, such as land tenure, in their place of origin to maximum benefits. The market mechanism broadens settlement patterns and breaks institutional barriers to permanent settlement intention. The strategy of *de facto permanent settlement intention* adopted by migrants could indicate the weakened *hukou* effects on migrants' settlement decision-making, which could not be possible in the previous era as suggested in the previous studies (Zhang, 2015).

Different determinants of human capital, social attachment and social identity on settlement intentions show varying coping strategies among migrants beyond the effects of *hukou*. High education level and strong economic capacities significantly drive migrants to settle with *de facto permanent settlement intention*. Migrants with housing ownership intention or those who have already become home owners in the destination city are more capable of becoming permanent settlers who are economically and socially integrated. Through social support and social provisions in destination cities, such as compulsory education for children, '*de facto*' permanent settlers are able to achieve permanent settlement without necessarily transferring

their *hukou* to the place of destination. In terms of ‘traditional permanent settlement intention’, migrants with long-term residence and those living with family members are more likely to be attached to the destination city, increasing their willingness for both permanent residence and *hukou* transfer. Moreover, urban self-identification plays an important role in permanent settlement, encouraging permanent settlement through diverse channels.

There are several implications for the process of ‘people-oriented urbanisation’, which aims to encourage eligible migrants to become permanent residents. Firstly, as *hukou* transfer is not necessarily connected to permanent settlement, if housing ownership access is more available and affordable to migrants, it is possible for them to break institutional barriers through individual efforts to realise *de facto permanent settlement*. Since 2016, increasing number of medium-sized cities have permitted migrants without local *hukou* status to access to housing market while some cities require migrants to provide local social security or personal tax income certification to access to housing market. One could expect that if the housing policies are further relaxed in medium-sized cities, migrants would be strongly motivated to own local urban housing and settle permanently at these destination cities.

Secondly, future institutional reforms and urbanisation should pay attention to the coping strategies of migrants to achieve permanent settlement. In the *hukou* reform process, instead of relying on -granting *hukou* status to migrants at destination cities-, the government should focus on granting the eligibility of equal employment status and social provisions, such as education of migrant children. Once migrants’ economic situation is stabilised and social welfare is enhanced in the destination city, they would be likely to become permanent residents even without the local urban *hukou* status. This focus would positively weaken conventional *hukou* constraints on permanent settlement. In addition, apart from stable economic conditions, a healthy social network in the destination city and urban self-identity facilitate the permanent settlement intentions of migrants. In promoting the social integration of migrants in destination

cities, accepting attitudes of local government and local residents to migrants would also be important.

It is important to note that this single city study may not be generalisable to all regions of China, where migrants might experience more complicated settlement decision processes. For example, Shanghai has established a residential permit system while the local urban housing market sets specific restrictions on migrants' housing ownership access. In addition, this study is subject to the effects of the reverse causality relationship between social networks and self-identification among migrants. Migrants who have a stronger willingness to participate in social activities are more likely to self-identify as local residents, while this self-identification would encourage migrants to establish close attachments with the urban destinations and the local urbanites, and thus participate in social activities. This study does not address this reverse-causality relationship in a technical manner. Despite its limitations, this study of one city provides comprehensive information on Chinese rural migrants' settlement decision-making processes oriented by institutional reforms and market development and sheds light on their determinants of institutional factors, employment status, housing ownership, social networks and social identification as part of the mechanisms of permanent settlement decision making. Examining the nationwide settlement intentions of migrants based on regional differences associated with migration and related regulations would be important topics for future research.

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Chapter 5 : Regional variations, social benefit entitlements and settlement intentions of migrants in China¹

Abstract

The migration policies and institutional reforms underway in China since the 1970s have had long-lasting effects on migrants' permanent settlement intentions at destinations. Previous studies focus on the difficulties rural migrants face in acquiring local urban household registration (*hukou*) after migration. Under the *hukou* constraints, rural migrants have limited access to the social benefits provided for urban residents, which largely determines the temporary nature of internal migration in China. As municipal governments have the economic and financial autonomy to set *hukou* entry thresholds and policies involving access to local social benefits, temporary migrants confront regional variations regards to *hukou* constraints. However, there has not been adequate research examining the geographic selectivity of permanent settlement among temporary migrants on the basis of regional variations. The 'hukou premium' is introduced to capture the effects of regional variations on migrants' permanent settlement intentions. Determining whether diverse *hukou* premiums on the basis of regional variations in the reforms encourage or prohibit migrants' permanent settlement intentions calls for further empirical studies. Based on data from the 2013 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey in China, this paper examines regional variations involving both the attractiveness and costs of obtaining local urban *hukou* status in eight cities. The analysis finds that migrants are more likely to permanently settle at the destinations where *hukou* premiums are high. The available channels to access social insurance programmes and residence certification are pull factors in destinations with high *hukou* premiums.

Keywords:

Chinese rural–urban migration, the *hukou* system, social benefit entitlements, settlement intention, regional variations

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5.1 Introduction

Temporary migration (or circulation) and permanent migration are the dominant patterns of migration. In contrast to permanent migration in relation to the duration of residence in international migration, Chinese rural–urban permanent migration or settlement is closely associated with the household registration system (*hukou* system) (Chan, 1996; Chan & Zhang, 1999; Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Massey et al., 1993). The majority of rural migrants do not have urban *hukou* status and are defined as ‘temporary migrants’. They are marginalised in the urban labour market and excluded from access to social benefits at destinations, which constitutes a challenge for social stability and integration (Wang & Fan, 2012). In 2013, the Chinese central government promoted ‘people-oriented urbanisation’ reforms, which encourage eligible rural residents to become urban residents (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council, 2014). Given the institutional system and urbanisation plan, understanding migration flows and the settlement pattern of temporary migrants is of great importance for both academic studies and policymaking.

Existing studies have examined the direction, major destinations and determinants of the settlement decision of temporary migrants from the perspective of *hukou* constraints (Fan, 2005, 2011; Wang & Fan, 2006; Zhu & Chen, 2010). With institutional barriers to rural–urban migration and difficulties in obtaining urban *hukou* status, temporary migrants are forced to adopt a short-term strategy of migration, continuing to regard their rural residence as their permanent home. However, settlement decision-making is complex, requiring an understanding of the institutional and transitional context. Recently, the Chinese central government has initiated a new plan of urbanisation, which encourages eligible rural migrants to settle in small and medium cities, while major cities retain a high threshold for *hukou* transfer and providing access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants. Small and medium cities reduce the *hukou* threshold, such as Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province, which permit migrants

with stable employment and domicile to apply for urban *hukou* status. Major cities tend to set a series of restrictions against the settlement of ordinary workers; for example, Shanghai uses a ‘point system’ (*jifenzhi*) to identify temporary migrants’ eligibility to access local social benefit entitlements. However, there is evidence that major cities with better employment opportunities and social benefits are attractive for migrants in choosing permanent settlement (Zhu & Chen, 2010). Nevertheless, existing research on settlement intentions mainly focuses on the central government’s institutional barriers, and neglects the effects of regional variations in *hukou* reforms on permanent settlement intentions at the municipal government level (Fan, 2011; Wang & Fan, 2006). The present study argues that there are considerable regional variations in the *hukou* reforms involving different criteria for *hukou* transfer and access to social benefits among temporary migrants based on the local experimental reforms of *hukou* system, although the central government has aimed to improve the living and working conditions of temporary migrants at urban destinations since 2003.

It is commonly acknowledged that the key to overcoming institutional barriers is to grant temporary migrants the urban *hukou* status, especially the urban social benefit entitlements attached with the *hukou* status, which has led to studies exploring regional variations in the *hukou* reform process (Cai, 2010; Qu & Cheng, 2013; Tang & Feng, 2015). As the municipal government has the economic and social autonomy in *hukou* reforms, diverse thresholds for *hukou* transfer and access to local social benefits are set based on local economic benefits. Based on these local *hukou* entry thresholds in regions, the ‘*hukou* value’ or cost in *hukou* reforms are examined. Wang et al. (2013) state that a high *hukou* value exists in the major or large cities, which provide quality local social benefits and life experiences. While major cities provide quality urban social benefits and adequate employment opportunities, these cities tend to suffer high costs in *hukou* reforms if they attempt to include temporary migrants into the local social benefit scheme (Qu & Cheng, 2013). This paper, focuses on the regional ‘*hukou* premium’ and the associated with both the costs and benefits of obtaining local *hukou* status.

At the municipal government level, the eligibility for employment benefits, housing ownership and other social benefits (e.g., establishing a health record) are separated from urban *hukou* status, while the eligibility for access to a minimum living standard, housing subsidises (welfare housing), and entry examinations for colleges at the destination are based on local *hukou* status. Measuring the *hukou* premium would capture both the attractiveness and costs of obtaining local urban *hukou* on the basis that local *hukou* status in some regions guarantees eligibility for access to the same social benefit entitlements as local residents. While better social benefit treatments in destination regions are attractive for temporary migrants, destinations with a concentration of temporary migrants set strict thresholds on access to the local urban *hukou* status and local social benefits to ease the financial burden. Thus, a *hukou* premium could work as an attracting or impeding factor in decision-making regarding permanent settlement among temporary migrants.

The present paper analyses the determinants of permanent settlement intentions in the given institutional and transitional context. Unlike the existing literature, which focuses on the *hukou* reforms at the central government level, the present paper examines decision-making regarding permanent settlement based on regional variations. To bridge the gap in the literature, we investigate the regional *hukou* premium and its effects on permanent settlement intentions. As social benefit entitlements are an essential determinant in permanent settlement decision-making, differences in access to social benefit entitlements across regions are examined.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews theories on settlement intentions in studies of international migration and the literature on Chinese rural–urban migration. Empirical analyses are based on the 2013 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey in China. In the third section, the data source and variables are introduced. This study reports the main empirical findings in the fourth section, and conclude by situating the findings within the wider literature and presenting the implications for policymakers in the final section.

5.2 Literature Review

5.2.1 *Institutional reforms and settlement intentions in China*

Based on the cases of Indonesia and Europe, permanent migration and non-permanent migration (i.e., circulation and temporary migration) have been identified as common patterns of international migration (Constant & Massey, 2003; Hugo, 1981). Three main theories are used to explain the motivations and determinants of migration decision-making. First, neo-classical economic theory emphasises the economic motivation of migrants, who aim to maximise the return on their human capital and expected economic benefits (Constant & Massey, 2003; Todaro, 1969). Specially, migrants with a stable employment status, higher educational levels and longer duration of residence are more willing to permanently settle at destinations (Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). Second, new economics of labour migration states that decision-making regarding migration is based on the household aiming to minimise risks and maximise benefits (Stark, 1991)—migrants must maintain their original economic resources to avoid risks during the migration process (Hugo, 1981). The third theory emphasises the social conditions in places of destinations and origins—developing deep attachments at destinations, such as building social ties with locals and enjoying the company of families, encourages permanent migration, while well-developed social attachments in the origins reduce the probability of permanent migration (Constant & Massey, 2003).

Chinese rural–urban migration is deeply rooted in the institutional and transitional context, and much attention has been drawn to the role played by institutional constraints on rural–urban migration and settlement intentions of Chinese migrants (Chan, 1996; Wang & Zuo, 1999; Solinger, 1999). In contrast to the definition of ‘permanent migration’ related to the duration of residence in international migration, permanent migration or settlement in China is closely associated with the household registration system (*hukou* system). Based on this institutional

system, which has been in effect since the 1950s, urban residents with urban *hukou* status have access to formal jobs, housing, education and other resources and social benefits, while migrants are barred from urban citizenship and benefit entitlements (Chan, 1996; Solinger, 1999; Wang & Fan, 2006). Under these constraints, those with formal *hukou* status having equal entitlements in the urban labour market and urban social welfare system are regarded as ‘permanent migrants’, while the majority of rural migrants with original *hukou* status are regarded as ‘temporary migrants’. Temporary migrants are second-class citizens in destination regions, with marginalised status regarding employment opportunities and eligibility for social benefits, regardless of how long they have been at the destination (Chan, 2009; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991; Solinger, 1999). In the mid-1980s, in response to the improvement in agricultural productivity, many rural residents were encouraged to move to urban areas to search for non-agricultural work (Cai, 2010). Faced with this, the central government relaxed migration controls and encouraged rural residents to work in urban areas; however, strict control of *hukou* transfer remained. Thus, the direction, scale and success of migration have been determined by the *hukou* constraints and the associated migration policies, which vary within the institutional and transitional context (Cai, 2001).

Temporary migrants’ inferior status at urban destinations and their temporary migration strategy reflect institutional constraints. First, the *hukou* system guarantees priority for urban residents in access to employment in formal sectors. Temporary migrants are excluded from formal employment opportunities, and their only available employment options are unstable, low-paid and lacking in employment protections, resulting in an inferior status in the urban labour market (Meng, 2012). Municipal governments are inclined to protect local workers and restrict temporary migrants’ employment opportunities in particular sectors and positions when the economic environment deteriorates. For example, jobs closed to outside workers increased seven-fold, from 15 to 103, between 1996 and 2000, in response to the unprecedented increase in the number of lay-offs (Cai & Chan, 2000). Second, the *hukou* system excludes temporary

migrants from obtaining social benefit entitlements at urban destinations. Based on the *hukou* system, urbanites are granted access to pensions, medical insurance, housing, compulsory education and other social benefits, while temporary migrants are excluded from these entitlements. Xiang (2007) stated that the school enrolment rate and the number of hospitals per thousand people are based on the permanent population with local urban *hukou* status. Migrant children are forced to return to their places of origin to receive compulsory education in order to attend the college entrance examination at the places of origin, even if they have been admitted to schools at the urban destination. The absence of equal employment opportunities and access to social benefits among temporary migrants contribute to their inferior socio-economic status, which encourages temporary migration, or mobility back and forth between the places of destination and origin.

Responding to economic development and marketisation, the central government has started to improve the living and working conditions of temporary migrants at destinations. Since 2003, discriminatory policies involving restricting access to jobs in particular sectors and positions among temporary migrants have been abolished. The implementation of the Labour Contract Law and Social Insurance Law grant temporary migrants legitimate rights involving signing labour contracts and social insurance coverage regardless of their *hukou* status (Cai, 2011). However, institutional constraints to rural–urban migration remain at the municipal government level. Guided by the central government, municipal governments have the economic and financial autonomy to make decisions on the *hukou* reforms, and set different thresholds for *hukou* transfer. Small towns and cities reduce the *hukou* threshold, to permit migrants who have stable employment and legal domicile to apply for the urban *hukou*. Medium-sized cities, including the capital cities of some provinces, such as Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province, tend to adopt a reform model that permits eligible migrants with stable employment and domicile to apply for the urban *hukou*. While small, medium and even large cities in some central, western or even coastal regions open the city gates, major cities, such as

Shanghai and Beijing, only give the green light to highly skilled migrants (Cai, 2010). These cities set a high threshold through imposing a series of restrictions on settling down or setting a ‘point system’ (*jifenzhi*) to introduce highly skilled migrants and exclude ordinary workers.

Temporary migrants have to overcome regional institutional barriers to achieve permanent settlement. The regional institution determines their different responses to permanent settlement in regions. Empirical evidence showed that 24% of temporary migrants reported keeping their original *hukou* status in a survey conducted in Fujian in 2006, while more than 75% of migrants intended to stay permanently in Beijing instead of returning home in 2006, despite suffering various difficulties in living and working in Beijing (Hu, 2007; Zhu & Chen, 2010). Different settlement decisions might be attributed to regional variations not only associated with *hukou* transfer but also with the distribution of welfare provision and resources.

5.2.2 Regional variations, the hukou premium and social benefit entitlements

Regional differences in the *hukou* reforms are attributed to local experiments, uneven economic growth, varying regional population pressures and the public finance system (Xiang, 2007; Zhang, 2015). Since 2001, the central government has encouraged municipal governments to conduct the *hukou* reforms in small towns and cities. Guided by the reforms, local governments set diverse thresholds. For example, the city of Shanghai uses a ‘point system’ (*jifenzhi*) to allow the highly educated, highly skilled and homeowners to be urban residents², while some central cities open the city gates for migrants with a stable income source and domicile. For example, migrants resided in the city with resident population of 5 to 10 thousand in the Jiangsu Province could who apply for transferring *hukou* to the destination with the condition of stable domicile and employment and joining in the local social insurance scheme for certain years

² Migrants in Shanghai could apply for the resident permit. However, the threshold of granting migrants with social welfare provisions is high. Migrants have to achieve 120 points based on a series criteria (i.e. age, education level, professional skills and the year of being covered by social insurance) (Shanghai municipal government, 2015).

(Jiangsu Provincial Government, 2010). In Wuhan city of Hubei Province and Xi'an city of Shanxi Province, migrants who have resided more than 30 days and with stable domicile and employment could be granted the local resident permit. The permit holders have the equal eligibility of accessing to local social welfare provisions (Shanxi Provincial Government, 2015; Wuhan Municipal Government, 2011). In addition, the eligibility of access to social benefits and services is controlled by municipal governments. For example, the city of Chengdu designed a special social insurance scheme for temporary migrants, who are treated differently from their urban counterparts. As the distribution of financial resources is strictly defined at the provincial level, municipal governments can only take responsibility for urban residents with local urban *hukou* status (Xiang, 2007). It is reasonable for those areas with an outflow of migrants to take measures to relax *hukou* restrictions, to entice migrants to return (Cai, 2011). Conversely, areas with a high concentration of temporary migrants have no responsibility for migrants without local urban *hukou* status; therefore, their benefits are not considered at the local level. Especially when there is competition between urban residents and temporary migrants for the limited budget available for local social benefits, urban residents are given priority. For example, access to compulsory education is available for urban children while migrant children are excluded in some major cities, including Shanghai.

The quality of social benefit entitlements is the key attracting factor in the settlement decision-making of temporary migrants; however, they are not granted the equal urban benefits at destinations. The regional difference in access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants is regarded as a double-edged sword. While it has been found that migrants tend to move to or settle down at destinations with better urban welfare benefits, such as good education for children and advanced medical services for the elderly (Connelly et al., 2011; Tang & Feng, 2015), because of the high concentration of temporary migrants in the major cities, the local governments are inclined to set high thresholds for *hukou* transfer and access to social benefit entitlements. The absence of social benefits results in incapacity and

unwillingness of migrants to achieve permanent settlement in urban regions (Wang & Fan, 2006). Regional differences in the *hukou* reforms result in geographical selectivity of permanent settlement among temporary migrants. Major and higher administrative cities are attractive for migrants to permanently settle down in, as these regions provide higher incomes, better urban welfare benefits and worthwhile life experiences (Tang & Feng, 2015; Zhu & Chen, 2010). Temporary migrants are not attracted to small and medium cities, although the *hukou* threshold in these regions is lower. It is possible that regional differences involving the *hukou* threshold and the differential social benefit entitlements have an effect on temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions.

It is thus necessary to examine the *hukou* premium in regions associated with the regional variations of obtaining local urban *hukou* status. Although the eligibility for employment benefits (e.g. access labour contract or social insurance), housing ownership and other social benefits (e.g., establishing a health record) are separated from urban *hukou* status, the eligibility for access to a minimum living standard, housing subsidises (welfare housing), and entry examinations for colleges at the destination are based on local *hukou* status. The measurement of *hukou* premium at the municipal government level could capture the attractiveness and costs of obtaining local urban *hukou* status and associated eligibility for access to local urban social benefits as local urban residents. In addition, there is a close correlation between city type and the *hukou* premium—big cities and cities with a high administrative level have a high *hukou* premium, indicating they are attractive destinations for temporary migrants. The cities with lower *hukou* premium are small-sized and less attracting for temporary migrants (Wu et al., 2010). The diverse *hukou* premium across regions may attract or impede temporary migrants in choosing permanent settlement. Qu and Cheng (2013) measured by dividing the core financial expenditure closely related to migrants' daily life, including employment, education, medical services, social security and minimum living security, by the number of urban resident population. The *hukou* premium of Beijing was the highest, 7697 yuan in 2011, five times that

of Shijiazhuang. Major cities or regions with high *hukou* premiums have high concentrations of temporary migrants.

Given diverse *hukou* premiums across different regions, there has been inadequate empirical research towards a comprehensive understanding of temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions. Few studies focus on the differential thresholds for *hukou* entry and access to social benefits among temporary migrants based on regional variations. The *hukou* premiums in some regions would attract or impede temporary migrants to settle permanently. In addition, regions with different *hukou* premiums set diverse thresholds, which would make an effect on the eligibility for social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants. This paper therefore aims to answer three questions. First, are there regional differences associated with the *hukou* premium? Second, to what extent do regional *hukou* premiums have an effect on permanent settlements intentions? Third, to what extent do regional differences play a role in determining access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants?

5.3 Data and Methodology

5.3.1 Variables and measurements

Three indicators were used to measure migrants' settlement intentions in this study. The first was permanent residence intention, captured by asking migrants whether they planned to reside at their destination long term (yes, intention to reside long term at the destination; no, no intention to reside long term at the destination). The second indicator was the intention to transfer original *hukou* to the destination (yes, intention to transfer *hukou* to the destination; no, no intention to transfer *hukou* to the destination). The third indicator involved housing decisions at the destination, captured by asking whether migrants or their household had plans to acquire local housing at the destination (yes, intention to own housing at the destination; no, no intention to own property at the destination).

Among the determinants of settlement intentions, the *hukou* types and *hukou* premium capture the institutional controls from the state and the local municipal government that may influence permanent settlement intentions. Based on the previous discussion, municipal governments have differing attitudes to *hukou* reforms, although the state aims to grant temporary migrants social benefit entitlements at destinations. Granting social benefits to temporary migrants, especially benefits related to employment, social security, public education and public medical services, is key to the *hukou* reforms. These benefit entitlements are closely related to daily life, and hence influence temporary migrants' settlement decision-making. This study divides the financial expenditure by municipal governments on employment, social security, public education and public medical services by the number of urban residents to capture the *hukou* premium that temporary migrants may be benefited if they were permitted to obtain urban *hukou* status.

The education level, duration of residence at destination, income level and employment status at destination are included to capture human capital endowment. Greater human capital endowment and longer duration of residence at destination have been found to encourage migrants to make permanent settlement decisions (Cao et al., 2015). In addition, attachments to destinations are included in two sets of variables, which are consistent with social benefit entitlements and social attachments at destination. Pensions³, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, employment-injury insurance, housing subsidies, free vocational training and residence certification coverage were included to capture the social benefits that temporary migrants are granted at destinations. These benefits boost their stability and improve their socio-economic status at destinations, potentially increasing their willingness to settle

³ Some temporary migrants reported that they were covered by pensions both in places of destination and origin, although this 'double coverage' is not permitted. The variable of pension coverage was categorised into four categories: pension coverage in both destination and origin, pension coverage in destination, pension coverage in origin and no pension coverage in either destination or origin. The tendency for double coverage was not present in the coverage of other types of insurance in the survey.

permanently. Variables associated with social attachments at destinations were captured by integration status, presence of family members at destinations, self-evaluation of destinations and self-identity among temporary migrants. The variables for economic and social attachments in places of origin include pensions and medical insurance coverage and land tenure, house ownership and migration distance (intra-provincial migration or inter-provincial migration). Last, demographic control variables, including age, gender and marital status, and regional control variables, the ratio of temporary migrants to urban residents in each city, were included in the analysis.

To capture the complexity of settlement intentions, two logistic regression models were adopted to examine migrants' settlement decisions and access to social benefit entitlements in regions. In the first model, the three indicators for permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention were examined separately. The regional *hukou* premium, institutional variables, human capital, economic and social attachments at places of destination and origin and controlling variables were considered. In the second model, we further examined the social benefit entitlements of temporary migrants, particularly the entitlements of resident certification, medical insurance coverage and health record coverage at the destinations. We expected that the empirical analysis would show that the regional effect played a role in permanent settlement intentions and the social benefit entitlements of temporary migrants.

5.3.2 Data sources

The empirical data in this study are primarily from the Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey of China, conducted in 2013 by the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) of the People's Republic of China in eight Chinese cities. Based on official sources from the NHFPC on constructing a sampling frame, stratified sampling and probability proportionate to size sampling was used to select respondents. 2000 migrants and 1000 local residents were

selected randomly from Suzhou, Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha, Xi'an, Quanzhou and the Songjiang district in Shanghai, while 1000 migrants and 600 local residents were selected at random from the city of Xianyang. Different communities, including residential neighbourhoods, village neighbourhoods and dormitories, were captured in order to comprehensively understand the migrant group. This survey provided settlement intention information, mainly concerning rural migrants, although a small number of urban migrants were included. Selected migrants had to meet three criteria: they had to be aged 15–59 years in May 2013, they had to be without local urban *hukou* and they had to have resided in the destination city for over six months. A total of 16,596 valid responses were selected from the questionnaires.

There were many common features between the basic demographic characteristics of the sampled migrants and those of the total Migrant Population Report from the NHFPC in 2012 (NHFPC, 2012). In the present study, the average age of the sampled migrants was 32.3 years (28 years in the NHFPC), and the 16–45 age group accounted for 92.2% of the population (82.7% in the NHFPC). In our study, 51.2% of surveyed migrants were male (53.9% in the NHFPC), and 66.3% held a senior school or below level of education (70.4% in the NHFPC).

5.4 Empirical Findings

5.4.1 Descriptive analysis: demographic characteristics of migrants

Temporary migrants showed different settlement intentions through diverse channels (see Table 5-1). More than half of the temporary migrants reported intentions to settle permanently and transfer *hukou* to their destinations. Nearly 30% of temporary migrants either displayed an intention to own housing or had already become homeowners at their destinations. The average duration of residence was five years, which indicated stability of residence among temporary migrants. Consistent with the findings reported in the Migrant Population Report in 2014 from

NHFPC, an increasing number of temporary migrants showed a tendency towards permanent residence at destinations.

Table 5- 1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables Used in Regression

Variables	Full sample		Low <i>hukou</i> premium		Middle <i>hukou</i> premium		High <i>hukou</i> premium	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Settlement intention								
Permanent residence intention	54.592		44.659		65.314		55.444	
<i>Hukou</i> transferring intention	53.999		40.118		59.794		59.170	
Housing ownership intention	30.030		22.465		33.826		32.527	
Institutional								
Rural <i>hukou</i>	88.947		91.138		92.174		86.328	
Demographical characteristics								
Age (years)	32.189	8.808	32.920	9.247	33.426	8.919	31.248	8.404
Age square	1113.733	602.175	1169.206	637.126	1196.843	616.593	1047.064	567.447
Male	51.155		56.107		51.088		48.444	
Married	80.599		76.278		87.184		80.119	
Human capital								
Primary and below	13.323		13.692		14.538		12.590	
Secondary school	52.982		52.282		61.747		49.570	
High school	23.431		25.568		18.187		24.521	
Colleague and above	10.263		8.458		5.528		13.320	
Local duration of residence (years)	5.386	4.441	4.427	4.194	5.456	4.546	5.832	4.441
Monthly individual income (<i>yuan</i>)	3475.359	2314.401	3279.125	1991.443	3324.029	2270.642	3649.188	2482.134
Monthly individual income (log)	8.025	0.475	7.978	0.464	7.980	0.478	8.071	0.475
Employee	69.691		63.580		62.531		76.301	
Family helper	5.766		6.904		6.004		5.007	
Self-employed	24.543		29.518		31.466		18.691	
Social welfare benefits at destination								
Pensions at destination and origins	4.608		7.371		1.963		1.734	

Pensions at destination	22.977		32.437		20.654		7.736	
Pensions in origin	20.265		16.976		15.789		29.804	
No pensions neither at destination and origin	52.149		43.216		61.593		60.726	
Medical insurance at destination	30.104		12.438		24.744		42.197	
Unemployment insurance at destination	23.385		6.984		19.215		34.430	
Work related injury insurance at destination	30.098		21.203		24.074		37.626	
Housing subsidize at destination	11.347		3.267		6.993		17.702	
Health record at destinations	18.727		19.342		28.082		14.337	
Free vocational training at destination	11.931		13.328		13.962		10.280	
Resident certification	85.755		66.789		88.056		95.249	
Social attachments at destination								
Good integration at destination	69.926		69.126		75.235		68.071	
Family migration	27.440		24.513		38.060		24.461	
Local language proficiency	33.347		53.440		38.900		19.830	
Self-identity as locals	49.688		42.531		56.911		50.533	
Economic attachments in origins								
New rural cooperative medical insurance in origin	64.845		81.808		62.787		56.040	
Medical insurance for urban residents in origin	2.741		3.711		1.495		2.745	
Land tenure in origin	81.574		80.294		81.062		82.504	
Owning house in origin	97.475		98.075		95.383		98.049	
Intra-provincial migration	64.220		45.793		54.588		78.588	
Other variables	79.681		59.026		93.143		85.867	
Ratio of migrants to urban residents	0.453	0.178	0.282	0.625	0.303	0.008	0.612	0.984
Total	16596		4622		3617		8356	

Source: The Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey in China, 2013.

Following Qu and Cheng (2013) this study divides the financial expenditure of each municipal government on employment, social security, public education and public medical services by the number of urban residents to calculate the *hukou* premium of the eight cities.

There were regional differences in the *hukou* premium across the eight cities (see Table 5-2). *Hukou* premiums exceeding 5000 *yuan* were categorised as high, including those in the Songjiang district of Shanghai and Suzhou. Destinations with a medium *hukou* premium, 3000–5000 *yuan*, included Wuxi, Wuhan, Changsha and Xi'an. Quanzhou and Xianyang had the lowest premiums, of 2604 *yuan* and 2318 *yuan*, respectively.

Table 5- 2 Settlement Intentions and *Hukou* Premiums (%)

	City	<i>Hukou</i> premium (<i>yuan</i>)	Ratio (%)
High <i>hukou</i> premium	Songjiang district of Shanghai	10137.069	41.078
	Suzhou	6021.807	65.990
Medium <i>hukou</i> premium	Wuxi	4442.321	30.769
	Wuhan	4338.623	29.195
	Changsha	3359.655	22.114
	Xian	3170.127	21.214
Low <i>hukou</i> premium	Quanzhou	2604.006	34.299
	Xianyang	2318.035	20.960

Source: *Hukou* premiums are calculated by the author. The financial expenditures are from Statistics Yearbook of eight cities in 2014, and the ratio of temporary migrants to urban residents in 2013 are from the local Public Security Bureau.

The Songjiang district of Shanghai had the highest ratio of temporary migrants to urban residents, which reported the highest *hukou* premium, while Xianyang was less attractive to temporary migrants, with the lowest *hukou* premium (see Figure 5-1). In terms of the relationship between the *hukou* premium and settlement intentions of temporary migrants, temporary migrants in regions with high or medium *hukou* premiums, such as the Songjiang district of Shanghai and Wuhan, reported stronger permanent settlement intentions, involving permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership intentions.




Figure 5- 1 *Hukou* Premiums and Settlement Intentions in Eight Cities

Source: *Hukou* premiums are calculated by author. The financial expenditures are from Statistics Yearbook of eight cities in 2014, and the ratio of temporary migrants to urban residents in 2013 are from the local Public Security Bureau.

5.4.2 *Hukou* premium and diverse settlement intentions

Regional differences in the *hukou* premium played a role in determining temporary migrants' intentions to permanently settle. Temporary migrants in the regions with high *hukou* premiums tended to hold stronger permanent settlement intentions compared to their counterparts in regions with medium and low *hukou* premiums (see Table 5-3). Settling through permanent residence and *hukou* transfer in regions with high *hukou* premiums were preferred by temporary migrants. Conversely, temporary migrants in regions with low *hukou* premiums were less likely to achieve permanent settlement through either permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or housing ownership at destinations (using regions with medium *hukou* premiums as the reference).

In terms of other determinants of settlement intentions, temporary migrants with rural *hukou* status (compared to temporary migrants with urban *hukou* status) were more likely to choose temporary migration without considering permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or housing ownership at destinations. This temporary migration pattern was consistent with the results of Zhu (2007) and Zhu and Chen (2010). The social benefits at destinations were

positively correlated with permanent settlement intentions. The positive role of benefit entitlements was evident in the medical insurance coverage among temporary migrants—migrants who had been covered by medical insurance at destinations had stronger intentions to permanently settle through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership. Pension coverage did not have a significant impact—temporary migrants were less likely to be encouraged by the prospect of pensions, which would not take effect until retirement (Tang & Feng, 2015). In addition, unemployment insurance coverage encouraged temporary migrants to purchase housing at the destination, while housing subsidies promoted intentions of permanent residence and housing ownership. The social benefits related to setting up health records and receiving free vocational training among temporary migrants increased their likelihood of permanent settlement through different channels. The access to temporary resident certification raised temporary migrants' willingness to transfer *hukou* to destinations, although access to temporary resident certification was negatively related to housing ownership intention at destinations.

Deep social attachments in destinations significantly increased migrants' intentions of permanent settlement. Migrants with the company of family members, proficiency in the local language, presenting positive evaluations of destinations and identifying as locals showed stronger intentions of permanent settlement. Conversely, close attachments with places of origins explained why some temporary migrants were more likely to maintain their rural *hukou* status and temporary migration pattern. Medical insurance coverage in origins, regardless of whether it was new rural cooperative medical insurance or medical insurance for urbanites in origin, significantly reduced willingness to settle permanently.

Temporary migrants in regions with high *hukou* premiums held stronger intentions to be permanent settlers, while their counterparts in low *hukou* premium regions were more likely to choose a temporary settlement pattern. Among the determinants of settlement intentions,

medical insurance coverage at destinations was considered a safety net for temporary migrants, and significantly promoted permanent settlement intentions involving permanent residence, *hukou* transfer and housing ownership. Conversely, medical insurance coverage in origins was positively related to temporary settlement at destinations. In contrast to pension coverage, which is connected to benefits in the future, medical insurance is a better measure of benefit entitlements in daily life. It is safe to say that medical insurance coverage significantly influenced settlement decision-making. The psychological integration and deep social attachments with the destinations raised the likelihood of permanent settlement.

Table 5- 3 Logistic Regression of *Hukou* Premiums and Settlement Intentions

Variables	Permanent residence intention (Stay=1, not stay=0)	<i>Hukou</i> transfer intention (Transfer=1, not transfer=0)	Housing ownership intention (Purchasing=1, not purchasing=0)
<i>Hukou</i> premium (ref.=medium <i>hukou</i> premium)			
Low <i>hukou</i> premium	-0.765 (0.465)***	-0.681 (0.506)***	-0.398 (0.672)***
High <i>hukou</i> premium	0.446 (1.562)***	1.170 (3.221)***	0.075 (1.078)
Institutional			
Rural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=urban <i>hukou</i>)	-0.102 (0.903)	-0.399 (0.671)***	-0.218 (0.804)**
Demographic			
Age	0.030 (1.031)	0.071 (1.073)***	0.016 (1.016)
Age square	-0.001 (0.999)**	-0.001 (0.999)***	0.001 (0.999)
Male (ref.=female)	-0.038 (0.962)	0.016 (1.016)	-0.159 (0.853)**
Married (ref.=unmarried)	0.199 (1.220)**	0.007 (1.007)	0.518 (1.679)***
Human Capital			
Education (ref.=primary school and below)			
Secondary school	-0.008 (0.992)	0.124 (1.132)*	0.420 (1.522)***
High school	0.161 (1.175)*	0.383 (1.467)***	1.106 (3.022)***
Colleague and above	1.001 (2.720)***	0.644 (1.905)***	1.985 (7.281)***
Local duration of residence (years)	0.055 (1.057)***	0.028 (1.029)***	0.053 (1.054)***
Ln income	0.163 (1.177)**	0.082 (1.085)*	0.444 (1.558)***
Employment status (ref.=unemployed)			
Employee	-0.587 (0.556)***	-0.289 (0.749)**	-0.940 (0.391)***
Self-employed	-0.054 (0.947)	-0.350 (0.705)**	-0.153 (0.858)
Family helper	0.115 (1.121)	-0.191 (0.826)	-0.146 (0.864)
Social welfare benefits at the destination			

Pensions (ref.=pension in origin)			
Pension at the destination and origin	-0.378 (0.685)**	-0.184 (0.832)	-0.447 (0.640)**
Pension at the destination	-0.185 (0.831)	-0.017 (0.983)	-0.287 (0.750)**
No pension neither at the destination and origin	-0.012 (0.979)	-0.083 (0.920)	-0.006 (0.994)
Medical insurance at destination	0.242 (1.273)**	0.170 (1.185)*	0.659 (1.933)***
(ref.=no medical insurance at destination)			
Unemployment insurance at destination	0.181 (1.198)*	-0.075 (0.928)	0.348 (1.416)***
(ref.=no unemployment insurance at destination)			
Work-related insurance at destination	-0.010 (0.990)	0.105 (1.111)	-0.245 (0.783)**
(ref.=no work-related injury insurance at destination)			
Housing subsidize at destination	0.164 (1.178)**	0.087 (1.091)	0.485 (1.624)***
(ref.=no housing subsidizes at destination)			
Health record at destination	0.169 (1.185)**	0.063 (1.065)	0.265 (1.303)***
(ref.=no health record at destination)			
Free vocational training at destination	0.195 (1.215)**	0.069 (1.071)	-0.038 (0.963)
(ref.=no free vocational training at destination)			
Resident certification	0.109 (1.115)	0.130 (1.138)**	-0.136 (0.873)*
(ref.=no resident certification at destination)			
Social attachments at the destination			
Good integration at destination	0.427 (1.533)***	0.018 (1.018)	0.026 (1.026)
(ref.=not good integration at destination)			
Family migration	0.645 (1.907)***	0.440 (1.552)***	0.602 (1.825)***
(ref.=no family members at destination)			
Local language proficiency	0.133 (1.143)**	0.100 (1.105)**	0.395 (1.485)***
(ref.=without local language proficiency)			
Self-evaluation of destinations			

Willing to daily association with locals (ref.=not willing to daily association)	0.244 (1.276)***	0.216 (1.241)***	0.175 (1.192)***
No felling of discriminations from locals (ref.= felling discriminations)	0.139 (1.149)***	0.068 (1.071)***	0.111 (1.118)***
Self-identity as locals (ref.= identity as an outsider)	0.996 (2.707)***	0.917 (2.501)***	1.282 (3.602)***
Economic and social attachments in origin			
New rural cooperative medical insurance (ref.=no rural medical insurance in origin)	-0.086 (0.917)*	-0.065 (0.937)	-0.209 (0.811)***
Medical insurance for urban residents in origin (ref.=no urban medical insurance in origin)	-0.171 (0.843)	-0.489 (0.613)***	-0.193 (0.824)
Land tenure in origin (ref.=no land tenure in origin)	-0.142 (0.868)**	-0.140 (0.869)**	-0.249 (0.780)***
Owning house in origin (ref.=no house in origin)	-0.884 (0.413)***	-0.387 (0.679)**	-0.651 (0.521)***
Intra-provincial migration (ref.=inter-provincial migration)	-0.074 (0.929)	0.078 (1.081)	-0.360 (0.698)***
Other variables			
Ratio of migrants to urban residents	-2.512 (0.081)***	-3.791 (0.023)***	-0.330 (0.719)
Constant	-0.426 (0.653)	-0.178 (0.837)	-4.961 (0.007)***
Number			16596

Notes: The table reports coefficient of logistic regression models and brackets report odd-ratios. Standard errors are omitted due to space limitations. *P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.

5.4.3 Regional variations and social benefit entitlements of migrants

The next step of the empirical analysis examined whether social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants have regional differences (see Table 5-4). In particular, we examined the coverage of temporary resident certification, medical insurance and health record coverage, which were closely connected with temporary migrants' daily life and their permanent settlement intentions, and found there were differences in social benefit entitlements across regions. Taking Wuhan city, with a medium *hukou* premium, as the reference, the destinations of the Songjiang district of Shanghai, Suzhou and Wuxi, where the *hukou* premiums are higher, were positively related to the temporary resident certification coverage of temporary migrants. Temporary migrants were less likely to access the temporary resident certification at the city of Xianyang, which has the lowest *hukou* premium.

There were similar tendencies in the coverage of medical insurance at destinations. Temporary migrants who settled in cities, such as the Songjiang district of Shanghai, Suzhou and Wuxi, were more likely to access the local medical insurance, while this probability was lower for counterparts in Xian and Xianyang, which had lower *hukou* premiums. However, the health record coverage among temporary migrants showed different features. Cities with lower *hukou* premiums, such as Changsha, Xian and Xianyan, had high levels of health record access for temporary migrants. Conversely, the Songjiang district of Shanghai and Suzhou had lower levels of health record coverage. It is possible that temporary residents were granted temporary residence certification and medical insurance in regions with higher *hukou* premiums when the threshold of these benefits was reduced. Although regions with lower *hukou* premiums were less attractive regions for temporary migrants to settle, the benefit entitlements of health record coverage were available for temporary migrants.

In terms of medical insurance and health record coverage at destinations, access to temporary residence certification has an important effect. Temporary migrants granted a

temporary residence certification were more likely to be covered by medical insurance and health records at destinations. It is possible to expect that some part of benefit entitlements would be unattached from *hukou* status to some extent, even though the change of *hukou* status is not easy in major cities. The impact of *hukou* status on social benefit entitlements was reduced. One expectation lay in the medical insurance coverage. Rural *hukou* was negatively correlated with the medical insurance coverage at destinations compared with urban counterparts, consistent with Zhu (2007). A possible explanation lies in the low human capital endowment among rural migrants. Educated migrants are more likely to access medical insurance entitlements. Compared to urban *hukou* holders, there were high rates of unemployment among rural migrants (Zhu, 2007). In terms of employment status, temporary migrants with a stable employment status, regardless of whether they were employed or self-employed, were positively related to medical insurance coverage at destinations (taking unemployed migrants as the reference).

In addition, some studies attributed the low coverage rate of medical insurance to the high mobility rate of migrants and their low willingness to be covered (Cheng et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2011; Zhu, 2007). We found that the benefit entitlements involving temporary resident certification, free vocational training and setting up health records at destinations improved temporary migrants' socio-economic status, which raised their willingness and ability to be covered by medical insurance. However, the impact of economic and social attachments in origins on medical insurance coverage was complex. While migrants with medical insurance coverage in origins were less likely to be covered by medical insurance at destinations, land tenure in origins was positively related to temporary resident certification and medical insurance coverage at destinations. It showed the essential role of land tenure plays as a safety net among temporary migrants, especially rural migrants. Maintaining rural *hukou* status and associated land tenure increased the likelihood of joining in the social benefits at destinations if permitted.

Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 show the results on the determinants of settlement intentions and access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants. The regional differences associated with social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants explained their diverse choices regarding settlement intentions in different regions. Temporary migrants showed stronger intentions to be permanent settlers in regions with higher *hukou* premiums—high-quality and available channels of social benefit entitlements were essential attracting factors. Migrants would like to settle at destinations where they can access benefit entitlements to improve their socio-economic status and urban life experience. Although regions with lower *hukou* premiums provide health record coverage to migrants, the attractiveness of permanent settlement is not comparable to the higher *hukou* premium regions, which provide social benefits including temporary residence certification and medical insurance coverage.

Table 5- 4 Logistic Regression of Social Benefit Entitlements and Regional Variations

Variables	Resident certification (Yes=1, no =0)	Local medical insurance (Yes=1, no =0)	Local health records (Yes=1, no =0)
Regions (ref.=Wuhan city)			
Songjiang district of Shanghai city	2.736 (15.420)***	1.515 (4.549)***	-1.720 (0.179)***
Suzhou city	2.018 (7.521)***	1.232 (3.428)***	-0.542 (0.581)***
Wuxi city	2.487 (12.023)***	0.687 (1.988)***	0.411 (1.509)***
Changsha city	-0.832 (0.435)***	-0.145 (0.865)	0.229 (1.258)**
Xian city	0.213 (1.237)	-1.177 (0.308)***	0.704 (2.022)***
Quanzhou city	0.264 (1.302)**	-0.214 (0.807)	-0.900 (0.407)***
Xianyang city	-0.670 (0.512)**	-0.891 (0.410)*	0.787 (2.198)**
Institutional			
Rural <i>hukou</i> (ref.=urban <i>hukou</i>)	-0.070 (0.932)	-0.610 (0.543)***	0.038 (1.039)
Demographic			
Age	0.103 (1.109)***	0.110 (1.117)***	0.001 (1.002)
Age square	-0.001 (0.999)***	-0.002 (0.998)***	0.001 (0.999)
Male (ref.=female)	0.063 (1.065)	-0.111 (0.895)**	-0.197 (0.821)***
Married (ref.=unmarried)	0.053 (1.055)	0.065 (1.068)	0.001 (1.001)
Human Capital			
Education (ref.=primary school and below)			
Secondary school	0.151 (1.163)	0.532 (1.702)***	0.024 (1.024)
High school	0.154 (1.166)	1.551 (4.716)***	0.035 (1.035)
Colleague and above	-0.087 (0.916)	2.130 (8.417)***	0.274 (1.315)**
Local duration of residence (years)	0.046 (1.047)***	0.039 (1.039)***	0.023 (1.023)***
Ln income	0.051 (1.052)	0.074 (1.077)	0.017 (1.017)
Employment status (ref.=unemployed)			

Employee	0.109 (1.115)	2.188 (8.917)***	0.077 (1.080)
Self-employed	0.270 (1.309)	0.587 (1.798)***	0.390 (1.477)**
Family helper	0.248 (1.282)	-0.026 (0.975)	0.133 (1.142)
Social attachments at the destination			
Family migration (ref.=no family members at destination)	0.121 (1.129)*	0.122 (1.130)**	0.229 (1.257)***
Resident certification (ref.=no resident certification at destination)		0.288 (1.334)***	0.214 (1.239)**
Health record at destination (ref.=no health record at destination)		0.528 (1.695)***	
Free vocational training at the destination (ref.=no free vocational training at destination)		0.626 (1.870)***	0.741 (2.097)***
Medical insurance at destination (ref.=no medical insurance at destination)			0.541 (1.717)***
Economic and social attachments in origin			
Land tenure in origin (ref.=no land tenure in origin)	0.132 (1.141)*	0.162 (1.176)**	-0.276 (0.759)***
Intra-provincial migration (ref.=inter-provincial migration)	0.296 (1.345)***	-0.281 (0.755)***	-0.064 (0.938)
New rural cooperative medical insurance in origins insurance) (ref.=no rural medical in origin)		-0.774 (0.461)***	0.076 (1.079)
Medical insurance for urban residents in origin (ref.=no urban medical insurance in origin)		-0.955 (0.385)***	0.032 (1.033)
Constant	-1.992 (0.136)**	-5.944 (0.003)***	-1.845 (0.158)***
Number			16596

Notes: The table reports coefficient of logistic regression models and brackets report odd-ratios. Standard errors are omitted due to space limitations. *P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.

5.5 Conclusion and discussion

Based on data from the 2013 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey in China, the present paper examined the regional variations in the *hukou* premium and its effects on settlement intentions of temporary migrants. The measurement of the regional *hukou* premium was based on the assumption that social benefit entitlements would be granted to temporary migrants if they could obtain local urban *hukou* status in local pilot schemes of *hukou* reforms. While existing studies mainly focus on the *hukou* effects arising from the central government on settlement intentions (Sun & Fan, 2011; Wang & Zuo, 1999), this study revealed that the regional differences in the *hukou* premium had an effect on settlement intentions. The results indicated that temporary migrants were attracted to permanently settle down in regions with higher *hukou* premiums, such as Shanghai and Wuxi. Temporary migrants moving to regions with lower *hukou* premiums were more likely to choose temporary migration without considering permanent residence, *hukou* transfer or housing ownership, although the threshold for obtaining urban *hukou* in these regions was lower.

Furthermore, the paper extended the existing literature by revealing the determinants of the settlement intentions of temporary migrants. Access of social benefit entitlements played a positive role in permanent settlement intentions, consistent with Tang and Feng (2015). Specifically, medical insurance coverage at destinations significantly influenced permanent settlement decisions, while the effect of pension coverage was insignificant. In contrast to pension coverage, which provides benefits in the future, medical insurance coverage at destinations provides essential security for temporary migrants. In line with expectations, deep social attachments with destinations, such as family company, positive evaluation of destinations, self-identity as locals and proficiency in the local language, drove temporary migrants to choose permanent settlement. While attachments with destinations played a positive

role in permanent settlement intentions, attachments with origins, such as land tenure and housing ownership, reduced the likelihood of permanent settlement.

In order to further understand the complex mechanisms involved in the settlement decision, the present paper shed light on regional differences in access to social benefit entitlements. Our findings implied that regions with higher *hukou* premiums were positively associated with access to particular social benefits, temporary residence certification and medical insurance at destinations. While the temporary residence certification and medical insurance were more readily available in regions with higher *hukou* premiums, regions with lower *hukou* premiums had a lower threshold for health record coverage among temporary migrants. This finding contrasts with those in existing studies, that major cities with higher *hukou* premiums are inclined to set higher *hukou* entry barriers (Qu & Chen, 2013). As a range of social benefit entitlements are set at the provincial level, municipal governments have the power to set diverse thresholds in terms of access to social benefits based on the budget plan and the local development plan. High-quality, readily available social benefits encouraged temporary migrants to settle permanently, and was evident in regions with high *hukou* premiums. In contrast, temporary migrants were not enthusiastic about settling down in regions with low *hukou* premium, although they were permitted to access some benefits, such as health record coverage at destinations. Regions with available channels providing social benefit entitlements were highly attractive; regions with limited social benefit entitlements were relatively unattractive.

Results suggest that the direction of *hukou* reforms and future urbanisation plans require careful reconsideration. The key attracting factor for permanent settlement are readily available and high-quality social benefit entitlements at urban destinations. Although the threshold for *hukou* transfer is high in these regions, temporary migrants are able to overcome *hukou* barriers through obtaining eligibility of social benefits at destinations to achieve permanent settlement.

Granting temporary migrants, especially rural migrants, equal social benefits to those of urbanites is more important than merely granting them urban *hukou* status in the settlement decision-making. In addition, major cities with better urban social benefits are attractive for permanent settlement, although the urbanisation plans aim to introduce temporary migrants to settle at small and medium cities or towns. Given the results in the present paper, regional variations are rooted in the different regional policies associated with *hukou* transfer and access to social benefit entitlements among temporary migrants. The central government should play a role in reducing regional variations through providing nationwide guidelines and financial support.

The effects of the residential permit system (*juzhuzheng zhidu*), introduced in 2016, are still unknown. The states are exploring granting residential permit holders, regardless of *hukou* status, equal access to social services, such as public employment services, compulsory education services and public medical services. The 2013 survey data used in this paper could not capture the effects of the residential permit system on equal eligibility for social services among temporary migrants and subsequent changes in permanent settlement intentions. If the residential permit system grants quality social services and benefits to all regions, it is reasonable to assume that regional differences would be reduced, encouraging temporary migrants to settle in small and medium cities. Further studies, therefore, may continue to explore the effects of regional variations associated with social benefit entitlements; specifically, whether the residential permits reduce regional variations, and whether available social services in all regions change temporary migrants' settlement decisions.

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Chapter 6 : Conclusion

6.1 Overview of the Study

In studies of international migration and settlement decisions, cost–benefit calculations at the individual and household level are often used to explain migrants’ behaviours (Harries & Todaro, 1970; Stark, 1991; Todaro, 1969). The structural perspective highlights the socio-economic context within which structural forces operate at the national or international level to understand how migration and settlement decisions are made (Fan, 2002; Massey et al., 1993; Papademetriou & Martin, 1991). In Chinese migration studies, extensive research has been undertaken to gain an understanding of the settlement decisions of migrants within the scope of institutional constraints, particularly in relation to the restrictions of the *hukou* system. In this socio-economic context, temporary migration is viewed as a reluctant choice because of the *hukou* constraints. An individual’s *hukou* or resident status not only symbolises that person’s geographical origin, but also indicates that person’s citizenship status (i.e., it specifies an individual’s social membership within a specific boundary and an individual’s eligibility to gain social benefit entitlements) (Fan, 2001; Solinger, 1999a). As it is difficult for temporary migrants who do not have urban *hukou* status, particularly rural–urban migrants, to access to full citizenship, their migration is often viewed as temporary or circular in nature (Fan & Wang, 2006; Hu et al., 2011; Wang & Zuo, 1999). This thesis adopted a structural perspective to explain temporary migrants’ settlement intentions. This perspective not only considers temporary migrants’ settlement intentions in a structural context, it also considers the role of temporary migrants, who work as enabling agents instead of passive players, in their endeavour to acquire citizenship and the settlement decision-making process.

The thesis starts with a premise that temporary migrants' endeavour to gain citizenship status in destination cities is no longer subjected to the only channels through being granted local urban *hukou*. Rather, temporary migrants' endeavour to pursue citizenship depends on their responses to government policies interaction with other members of society (e.g. local urban residents), as well as their own efforts. As the *hukou* system has for decades affected individuals' eligibility for citizenship and their associated eligibility for social benefit entitlements, *hukou* status is still viewed as the key criteria for full citizenship and determines migrants' socio-economic status at their destination. Settlement strategies have often been categorised into two main patterns that are based on the acquisition of urban *hukou* status: (i) 'circulation or temporary settlement or return to origins—without obtaining urban *hukou* status'; and (ii) 'permanent settlement—with obtaining urban *hukou* status' (Hu et al., 2010; Wang & Fan, 2006; Wang & Zuo, 1999). This thesis reconceptualised migrants' eligibility for full citizenship by highlighting the role of China's economic transition from a planned economy to a market one and the *hukou* reforms in creating new channels for permanent settlement. The *hukou* reforms and market mechanisms have entitled temporary migrants to access some urban social benefits and entitlements regardless of their *hukou* status; thus, market forces and individuals' efforts play an increasingly important role in migrants' endeavour to pursue citizenship. Consequently, the *hukou* system is not the only mechanism for determining temporary migrants' decision-making of settlement.

It was within this context that this thesis examines the *permanent* settlement intentions of traditionally known *temporary* migrants at urban destinations. This study has reached four key conclusions in relation to the settlement intentions of Chinese temporary migrants. These conclusions provide insights into the effects of the institutional legacy, market forces and individuals' efforts on the settlement decision-making process. First, the economic transition and the *hukou* reforms provided temporary migrants with opportunities to pursue full citizenship, as their eligibility for access social benefit entitlements were not necessarily related

to their *hukou* status. As a result of economic marketisation and the *hukou* reforms, temporary migrants were directly granted some social rights (e.g., formal residence rights) and access to urban social benefits (e.g., social insurance, labour contracts and urban housing ownership) regardless of their *hukou* status. More importantly, the marketisation process actually weakened the privileges and rights of urban residents with urban *hukou* status. Thus, migrants' eligibility for full citizenship (which is associated with access to urban social benefit entitlements) was not merely determined by migrants' *hukou* status. Endeavours to acquire full citizenship broadened the channels to achieve permanent settlement open to temporary migrants.

Second, this thesis found that the marketisation of the urban labour market improved temporary migrants' socio-economic status and granted them improved employment rights, thus motivating their integration into the host society and increasing the likelihood of their settling permanently and successfully at their places of destination. Obtaining permanent residence, transferring their *hukou* status or owning local housing enables temporary migrants (with stable employment and associated benefits) to achieve permanent settlement and reduces their reliance on economic and social resources at their places of origin. This study emphasised the importance of social insurance coverage, particularly medical insurance, at the urban destination in migrants' settlement decisions. Because social insurance coverage at the destination changed the marginalised status of employed migrants in the informal sector and granted them improved employment rights, both self-employed and employed migrants in the informal sector were able and willing to achieve permanent settlement via permanent residence and *hukou* transfer. A traditional dichotomy of formal and informal employment sectors based on the *hukou* scheme in explaining temporary migrants' employment status was challenged.

Third, this study proposed that housing ownership intention should be incorporated into the traditional classification scheme of settlement intentions. Migrants' *hukou* transfer intention did not necessarily indicate their permanent settlement intentions. Migrants who planned to

purchase urban property or who had already become homeowners at their destination city were likely to become and are capable of becoming permanent settlers. As market channels provided temporary migrants with opportunities to have strong economic capability and social adaptation without having to transfer their *hukou* status, they could achieve permanent settlement by breaking the *hukou* barriers in obtaining of urban *hukou* status. Thus, it was necessary to introduce a new concept of settlement intention (i.e., '*de facto permanent settlement intention*') to understand the diverse channels of permanent settlement based on the relaxed *hukou* constraints and the rise of the urban housing market. This type of settlement includes those migrants who had permanent residence and housing ownership intentions, but who did not necessarily intend to change their *hukou* status. It was the urban housing market that facilitated '*de facto permanent settlement intention*', which enable migrants to achieve permanent settlement while maintaining their rural *hukou* and the socio-economic attachments (e.g., land tenure) to their origin.

Fourth, this thesis concluded that as there were regional variations in the thresholds for *hukou* entry and the criteria used to access local urban social benefit entitlements, temporary migrants had to overcome local *hukou* barriers at the municipal level to receive local *hukou* status and the associated social benefit entitlements. Regional differences in the *hukou* premium affected migrants' settlement intentions. This thesis showed that temporary migrants tended to permanently settle in regions with higher *hukou* premiums. However, temporary migrants who moved to regions with lower *hukou* premiums were more likely to choose temporary migration without considering permanent residence, *hukou* transfer, or housing ownership. This occurred even when there were lower thresholds for obtaining urban *hukou* status in these regions. Additionally, regions with higher *hukou* premiums were positively associated with access to particular social benefits, such as residence certification and medical insurance at the destination. Regions with available channels that provided social benefit entitlements were

highly attractive to temporary migrants while regions with limited social benefit entitlements were relatively unattractive to them.

The remainder of this chapter will review the main findings of this research and elaborate on the four conclusions reached in this thesis. The research implications will then be discussed. Finally, the limitations of this research and future research directions will be outlined and presented.

6.1.1 Citizenship endeavour under the economic transition and the hukou reforms broadens migrants' permanent settlement channels

The eligibility for full citizenship is an important factor in the permanent settlement decisions of temporary migrants who do not have formal urban *hukou* status. This thesis discussed the close interactions between temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions, their eligibility for full citizenship and the *hukou* constraints within the context of the economic transition in China and the *hukou* reforms. The *hukou* reforms were based on the concept that the function of delivering urban social welfare should not be only related to an individual's *hukou* status. The ineligibility of temporary migrants for full citizenship has changed in recent years. The recent policy changes that individuals' eligibility to access urban social benefit entitlements was separated from their urban *hukou* status provided a starting point for examining temporary migrants' endeavours to pursue full citizenship. This thesis challenged the assumption that the *hukou* reforms have made little progress in the improvement of socio-economic status of temporary migrants and that temporary migrants do not have any opportunities to acquire full citizenship because of their temporary *hukou* status at urban destinations. The settlement intentions of temporary migrants were discussed in relation to the transition of the Chinese economy and the *hukou* reforms. The effects of acquiring citizenship on the permanent settlement intentions of migrants in different economic transition phases were also discussed.

In Chapter 2, a policy analysis was undertaken to analyse the changes in pursuing full citizenship by temporary migrants in relation to the three phases of economic transition and the *hukou* reforms. Since the early 1980s, there have been three phases of economic transition: (i) the stringent restriction phase (phase I), (ii) the emergence of *hukou* relaxation phase (phase II) and (iii) the comprehensive *hukou* reforms phase (phase III). Rethinking the functions of the *hukou* system provided the basis for discussion of the eligibility for full citizenship and temporary migrants' settlement intentions. This chapter argued that in response to the increasing economic marketisation, individuals' eligibility for access to social benefit entitlements was not necessarily attached to their *hukou* status. In phase I (from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s), rural-urban migration was strictly controlled because of the competition between urban residents and temporary migrants for employment opportunities and welfare entitlements under the plan economy and limited public resources. Rural migrants (without local urban *hukou* status) were categorised as temporary migrants and could not access to social benefit entitlements related to equal employment status, quality education, medical care services, housing subsidies and social insurance coverage. Because of the strict *hukou* restrictions and temporary migrants' ineligibility for full citizenship, permanent settlement was a distant dream for them.

With further progression in the marketisation and the *hukou* reforms in phase II (from the mid-1990s to 2003), temporary migrants were gradually granted legitimate employment status and social benefits. First, the distribution of employment and employment-related benefits based on state enterprises (the '*iron rice bowl*') was broken in response to the development of the market economy. The introduction of subsidy programmes (including unemployment insurance systems, basic pensions, medical insurance systems and minimum living standard programmes) encouraged the establishment of a unified labour market that in principle granted employment status and employment-related benefits to all workers, including migrant workers. Further, the *hukou* constraints on rural to urban migration were not as strict as those in the phase

I, especially in relation to the constraints in small towns and some medium-sized cities (i.e., *Shijiangzhuang*). However, temporary migrants continued experience discrimination and faced difficulties in accessing employment opportunities within the state sector and under social welfare programmes. It was during this period that social protection mechanisms were established. Under social welfare programmes, the privileges of urban workers in state-owned enterprises were weakened while the employment-related benefits and protections of temporary migrants finally become legitimate. One benefit that arose as a result of the relaxation of *hukou* constraints and marketisation was that temporary migrants were likely to become eligible for acquiring citizenship at the urban destinations. This enhanced their economic and social status and provided them with opportunities to achieve permanent settlement.

One of the focuses in the chapter 2 was on the citizenship enhancement that temporary migrants experienced in phase III (i.e., since 2003). In response to the economic growth and the widespread labour shortage, a set of measures was implemented (e.g., the ‘Labour Contract Law’ in 2008 and the ‘Social Insurance Law’ in 2010) by the governments to improve the working and living conditions of temporary migrants. This set of measures represented a significant enhancement in the citizenship rights of temporary migrants and improved their economic and social status. Under the reforms introduced in this phase, the eligibility of temporary migrants for employment-related benefits was detached from their urban *hukou* status. In addition, it became possible for temporary migrants to be granted social benefits via market mechanisms, such as purchasing property in the urban housing market. Allowing temporary migrants to access the urban housing market was significant, as owning housing was traditionally viewed as an urban benefit or even a ‘passport’ for urban *hukou* status (Hu et al., 2011). Increasing available employment opportunities in the unified labour market and social benefit entitlements at the destination motivated temporary migrants to settle permanently. The differential citizenship between temporary migrants and urban residents, especially those related to employment opportunities and social benefit entitlements, decreased.

Further, the Chapter 2 identified regional variations at the municipal or city level. Because of their political and financial autonomy, municipal governments often set specific criteria that individuals must meet to transfer their *hukou* status or to be eligible to access any local social benefits that are based on local benefits. The unequal social benefit entitlements granted to ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’ (based on a local citizenship distinction) led to the geographical selection of permanent settlement destinations among temporary migrants. The superior local citizenship offered by some major cities ensured the provision of high-quality social benefit entitlements and was thus attractive to temporary migrants.

In the Chapter 2, the city of Ningbo was used as a case study to present a direct and comprehensive illustration of the mobility and settlement intentions of temporary migrants during the processes of *hukou* reforms and marketization. This case study was also used to illustrate the endeavour and strategies of temporary migrants adopted to acquire citizenship during the three phases. If temporary migrants could receive equal social benefits without having to obtain urban *hukou* status, it is likely that the role of *hukou* would decrease significantly. Future *hukou* reforms should call for uniformity in relation to financial support at the central government level. Reforms that aim to improve temporary migrants’ employment and living security would encourage temporary migrants to settle permanently.

6.1.2 The reformed urban labour market encourages temporary migrants with diverse employment statuses to achieve permanent settlement

One important factor in the settlement decisions of migrants is economic security. In Chinese rural–urban migration, due to *hukou* constraints and the segmented urban labour market, the dichotomy between formal and informal employment sectors could explain much of the disadvantages in the employment status and employment outcomes of temporary migrants. This thesis examined temporary migrants’ permanent settlement intentions in relation to the improvement of employment outcomes among the temporary migrants who benefited from the

hukou reforms and the marketisation of the urban labour market. The assumption that temporary migrants who are engaged in the informal employment sector are bound with marginalized status and the pattern of temporary migration is challenged.

Chapter 3 used a logistic regression model to examine the effects of social insurance coverage on migrants' permanent settlement intentions at destinations under the urban labour market reforms. This chapter argued that migrants are benefited from the reformed urban labour market, which granted them with equal employment rights, motivated their integration into destinations and increased the likelihood of permanent and successful settlement at their places of destination. Through permanent residence, the transfer of *hukou* status or by owning local housing, temporary migrants with stable employment status and associated benefits were capable of achieving permanent settlement. This also reduced their reliance on economic and social resources at their place of origin. The empirical results of this chapter supported the argument that the traditional approaches of understanding human capital and labour market segmentation were inadequate and that the labour market outcome under the framework of marketisation and institutional constraints was important to understand the settlement intentions of rural migrants in the context of China.

Previous studies have emphasised the application of labour market segmentation theory in China. This theory highlights temporary migrants' marginalised employment status in the urban labour market in which high-status and desirable jobs with social benefits in the formal sector were not accessible to temporary migrants due to their rural *hukou* status. This theory emphasised the effects of the dichotomy between the informal and the formal employment sector on temporary migrants' settlement intentions under the institutional mechanism, but downplayed the effects of the marketisation of the labour market in China. This chapter adopted a framework based on the marketisation of the labour market and the institutional legacy. The implementation of the 'Labour Contract Law' in 2008 and the 'Social Insurance Law' in 2010

reduced discrimination between the formal and the informal sectors by making temporary migrants eligible to access labour contracts and social insurance at their urban destination. To reflect migrant workers' diverse settlement strategies under the market forces and institutional legacy, this study adopted a multi-dimensional definition of settlement intention that included permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention and housing ownership intention which reflected migrant workers' diverse settlement strategies under market forces and institutional legacy.

This chapter examined temporary migrants' employment outcomes at their destination (especially in respect of those who had and those who did not have access to local social insurance) and the effects of social insurance coverage on their permanent settlement decisions. If access to local social insurance was not considered, self-employed migrants (followed by employed migrants in the formal sector) were found to hold the strongest intentions to become permanent settlers through permanent residence, *hukou* transfer, or housing ownership at the destination. Conversely, employed migrants in the informal sector were less likely to choose permanent settlement. Strong economic and social attachments to their places of origin were negatively correlated with permanent settlement intentions, while attachments to places of destination significantly increased temporary migrants' intentions to become permanent settlers. These results were analysed in relation to employment status, institutional factors, human capital and temporary migrants' economic and social attachments to their place of origin and destination.

However, if the effects of social insurance coverage were considered in the examination of permanent settlement intentions, this chapter found that social insurance coverage was extremely important in determining the decisions of temporary migrants' permanent settlement at their destination place. Having social insurance significantly increased the intentions of temporary migrants to become permanent settlers. Practically, medical insurance coverage at

destinations raised the likelihood that temporary migrants would settle permanently while pension coverage had positive effects on their intentions to transfer their *hukou* status to their destination place. More importantly, because social insurance coverage at the destinations changed the marginalised status of temporary migrants in the informal sector and granted them equal employment rights, both self-employed and employed migrants in the informal sector were capable of and willing to achieve permanent settlement through permanent residence and *hukou* transfers. Further, under the marketisation of the labour market, the effects of close economic attachments in places of origin (e.g., land tenure) were reduced among temporary migrants who were eligible for social insurance at their destination. This suggests that the traditional role of economic and social resources in places of origin in minimising risks was replaced by the employment protections provided by the social insurance coverage offered at the destination place. These results supported the argument that the marketisation of the labour market reduced discrimination in the traditional dichotomy between formal and informal employment sector via the provision of social insurance coverage, especially pensions and medical insurance, at destinations. Under this marketisation process, temporary migrants improved their employment status at their destination, which in turn increased their willingness to settle permanently.

The findings in this chapter reinforced the role of marketisation in China and provided insights into the effects of labour market outcomes on temporary migrants' settlement intentions. The empirical evidence showed that self-employed and employed migrants in the formal and informal sectors could achieve permanent settlement through diverse channels. Social insurance coverage helped temporary migrants address discrimination in the traditional formal and informal dichotomy under labour market segmentation theory. Thus, temporary migrants were capable of and willing to achieve permanent settlement through improved socio-economic status under this marketisation mechanism.

6.1.3 Housing ownership as a ‘de facto’ permanent settlement channel

Under the new economic theory of migration, housing decisions affect migrants’ settlement intentions. In China, housing is conventionally viewed as either a form of welfare that is unavailable to temporary migrants or a ‘commodity’ that is inaccessible and unaffordable to temporary migrants. This thesis presented a framework that highlighted the market force of the urban housing market and the efforts undertaken by individuals to achieve permanent settlement and overcome the *hukou* barriers that prevented them from obtaining urban *hukou* status. This thesis challenged the assumption that migrants only have two possible settlement options, that is, to settle permanently by transferring their *hukou* status to their destination place or to stay temporarily at their destination place without transferring their *hukou* status. In relation to the latter strategy, this can include migrants moving back and forth between their origin and destination places or returning to their original homes. Permanent settlement is not necessarily connected to temporary migrants’ obtaining their urban *hukou* status. Thus, a new dimension to the traditional settlement category was introduced (i.e., ‘*de facto permanent settlement intention*’) that relates to housing ownership at the urban destination.

Chapter 4 adopted a multinomial logistic regression model to introduce this new concept of settlement intention (i.e., ‘*de facto permanent settlement intention*’) in the analysis. It also explored the determinants of migrants’ diverse settlement intentions based on the relaxed *hukou* constraints and the rise of the urban housing market. Based on a survey administered to temporary migrants in Ningbo in 2014, this chapter examined the diverse patterns of temporary migrants’ settlement intentions and the effects of institutional constraints and marketisation. An examination of the varying patterns of temporary migrants’ permanent settlement intentions, including those related to permanent residence, *hukou* transfer, and housing ownership in destination cities, showed that Chinese migrants had diverse and available channels for achieving permanent settlement at their destinations. Nearly half of the migrants surveyed

stated that they intended to stay permanently at their destination; however, the majority of the migrants surveyed were hesitant about transferring their *hukou* registration. Rural *hukou* holders were cautious about transferring *hukou*, as land tenure provided an important economic safety net and represented social ties to their places of origin. Because of these economic and social attachments, rural migrants tended to retain their original rural *hukou* status and do not seek to obtain local urban *hukou* status.

However, the results also showed that temporary migrants' *hukou* transfer intentions did not necessarily indicate that these migrants had any permanent settlement intentions. Conventional 'temporary migrants', who are without the local urban *hukou*, could now achieve 'permanent settlement' through their individual efforts and the market channel without considering their connections to urban *hukou* status, a condition that was often emphasized in the conventional approach. Migrants who planned to purchase housing or who had already become homeowners at their destination were likely to become and were capable of being permanent settlers. They also benefited from strong economic capabilities and social adaptation skills and could achieve permanent settlement through market channels without necessarily transferring their *hukou* status. The intentions of migrants to purchase housing at their destinations was thus incorporated into the traditional settlement intention classification scheme.

Given the broad settlement choices, including those of house ownership, permanent residence, and *hukou* transfer, it appeared that temporary migrants preferred to use flexible channels to achieve permanent settlement. Hesitance in transferring *hukou* status to an urban destination indicated a temporary settlement intention and obtaining local urban *hukou* status was regarded as the last stage of the settlement process (Wang & Zuo, 1999). However, it was the urban housing market that facilitated '*de facto permanent settlement intention*', contributing to a balance between temporary migrants' intentions towards permanent settlement while

maintaining their rural *hukou* status. It enabled temporary migrants, especially rural migrants to retain their rural *hukou* status and maintain their socio-economic attachments, such as land tenure, to their places of origin to maximise their benefits. The market mechanism broadened settlement patterns by breaking institutional barriers related to obtaining urban *hukou* status for permanent settlement intentions. The strategy of adopting '*de facto permanent settlement intention*' might indicate the weakened *hukou* effects on migrants' settlement decisions, which would not be possible previously.

In addition, migrants with varying coping strategies reported that determinants other than *hukou* status (e.g., human capital, social attachment and social identity) affected their settlement intentions. Notably, a high level of education and strong economic capacities drove migrants to settle with '*de facto permanent settlement intention*'. Migrants with housing ownership intentions or those who had already become homeowners at their destination were more capable of becoming permanent settlers if they were economically and socially integrated into the host society. The social support and social provisions offered at destinations, such as compulsory education for children, enabled '*de facto*' permanent settlers to break institutional barriers and settle permanently. In relation to migrants with '*traditional permanent settlement intention*', those with long-term residence who lived with family members were more likely to be attached to the destination and this increased their willingness to seek permanent residency and *hukou* transfer.

6.1.4 Regional variations in 'hukou premium' as a determinant of migrants' settlements intentions

Eligibility to access urban social benefit entitlements was a key factor in temporary migrants' settlement decisions. Because of regional variations in the threshold for *hukou* entry and the criteria for accessing local urban social benefit entitlements, temporary migrants were confronted with *hukou* constraints at both national and regional levels. This thesis investigated

the *hukou* premium in regions to assess the attractiveness and costs of obtaining local urban *hukou* status. Under local pilot schemes for *hukou* reforms, full citizenship (which entitled individuals to access employment benefits, a minimum living standard and housing subsidises, and to sit entry examinations for colleges) was primarily based on an individual's local *hukou* status. In relation to regional variations in the eligibility of migrants for access to local urban social benefit entitlements (as attached to their local *hukou* status), this thesis examined temporary migrants' geographical selection for permanent settlement.

Chapter 5 applied the concept of *hukou* premium to examine the costs and benefits of obtaining local urban *hukou* status and analysed the effects of regional variations in *hukou* premiums on the settlement intentions of temporary migrants. Based on data from the 2013 'Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey' in China, this chapter examined the regional *hukou* premiums that captured both the benefits and costs of obtaining local urban *hukou* status. The starting point of this analysis was that temporary migrants had to address local *hukou* constraints to receive local *hukou* status and any associated social benefit entitlements. A logistic regression revealed that the regional differences in *hukou* premiums had an effect on migrants' settlement intentions. Previous studies had largely focused on the effects of *hukou* status on migrants' settlement intentions under the central government (Wang & Zuo, 1999; Sun & Fan, 2011); however, this chapter showed that temporary migrants were attracted to permanently settle in regions with higher *hukou* premiums, such as Shanghai and Wuxi. Further, temporary migrants who moved to regions with lower *hukou* premiums were more likely to be engaged in temporary migration and were not considering permanent residence, *hukou* transfers or housing ownership even if the threshold for obtaining urban *hukou* status in these regions was lower.

This chapter also extended the existing literature by presenting the determinants of the settlement intentions of temporary migrants. Access to social benefit entitlements played a positive role in temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions. Notably, medical

insurance coverage at destinations significantly influenced temporary migrants' permanent settlement decisions. Conversely, the effect of pension coverage was insignificant. Unlike pension coverage (which provides benefits in the future), medical insurance coverage at the destination provided essential security for temporary migrants. In accordance with expectations, deep social attachments to the destination, including an attachment to a family company, a positive evaluation of a destination, self-identifying as a local or some proficiency in the local language, drove temporary migrants to choose permanent settlement. However, while attachments to the destination played a positive role in temporary migrants' permanent settlement intentions, attachments to origins, such as land tenure and owning housing, ultimately reduced the likelihood of permanent settlement.

To understand the complex mechanisms involved in temporary migrants' settlement decisions, the present study sought to shed light on regional differences in accessing social benefit entitlements. The findings implied that higher *hukou* premiums in regions were positively associated with access to particular social benefits, temporary residence certification and medical insurance at destinations. Temporary residence certification and medical insurance were more readily available in regions with higher *hukou* premiums; however, regions with lower *hukou* premiums had a lower threshold for health record coverage among temporary migrants. These findings can be contrasted to those of previous studies that showed that major cities with higher *hukou* premiums were more likely to set higher *hukou* barriers (Qu & Chen, 2013). As the range of social benefit entitlements are set at the provincial level, municipal governments have the power to set diverse thresholds for accessing social benefits based on their budgets and local development plans. High-quality, readily available social benefits encouraged temporary migrants to settle permanently, which were evident in regions with high *hukou* premiums. Conversely, temporary migrants were not enthusiastic about settling in regions with low *hukou* premiums, even if they were permitted to access some benefits, such as setting up health records at these destinations. Regions with available channels that provided

social benefit entitlements were highly attractive for temporary migrants. Conversely, regions with limited social benefit entitlements were relatively unattractive for them.

6.2 Research Implications

6.2.1 Theoretical implications

In international studies of migration and settlement, permanent migration, temporary migration or circulation and return migration represent the dominant migration patterns (Hugo, 197; Massey et al., 1993; Wang & Fan, 2006). Under traditional frameworks, temporary or circulation migrations are viewed as a step towards permanent settlement during the process of urbanisation (Skeldon, 1990) while circulation is viewed as a normal pattern of migration (Hugo, 1977, 1982). Unlike other countries, the institutional and transitional context in understanding rural–urban migration should be emphasised in the context of China. Under China’s economic transition and the *hukou* reforms, understandings of the eligibility criteria for citizenship shed light on the migration directions and settlement plans of Chinese temporary migrants, especially in relation to rural migrants who did not have urban *hukou* status. Previous studies have compared temporary migrants in China with the undocumented immigrants, as there are distinctions in the eligibility of rural migrants and urban residents’ for citizenship (Roberts, 2002; Solinger, 1999b). However, the eligibility differences between these two groups for citizenship have changed over time. The eligibility of temporary migrants for citizenship in China should be understood as a dynamic process that involves interactions between *hukou* reforms, marketisation and individuals’ endeavours for citizenship. The process that temporary migrants are required to undergo to pursue full citizenship status based on *hukou* constraints differs from the process that individuals seeking citizenship based on racial or religious segmentation in international studies elsewhere, as the function of *hukou* is separated from migrants’ eligibility for basic social welfare and social rights to some extent. For example,

as a result of the institutional reforms and the individual efforts of temporary migrants under the market mechanism, the access to urban property at the destination has been gradually detached from temporary migrants' *hukou* status. Further, legitimate citizen status is no longer unavailable to rural migrants who do not have urban *hukou* status. From this perspective, the differences related to the eligibility for citizenship between rural migrants and urban residents is decrease significantly reduced. The eligibility of temporary migrants for citizenship and the *hukou* reforms could be reconceptualised within the wider scope of economic transition and institutional reforms.

In addition, the classifications for temporary migrants' settlement intentions need to be reconceptualised. Temporary migrants without urban *hukou* status are considered as temporary in nature, as their ineligibility for citizenship and the opportunities available to them at their urban destination are constrained by the *hukou* system (Fan, 2011). The decision of an individual to receive (or not receive) local urban *hukou* status is a clear indication of that individual's intentions towards temporary or permanent settlement (i.e., if an individual intends to receive a local urban *hukou* status, this is regarded as a key indicator of the individual's permanent settlement intention) (Chan, 2009; Xu et al., 2011; Zhu, 2007). However, it was found in this study the market mechanism and the *hukou* reforms have granted temporary migrants urban social benefits regardless of their *hukou* status. This study adopted a multi-dimensional definition of settlement intentions that included permanent residence intention, *hukou* transfer intention, and housing ownership intention. Unlike the definitions provided under traditional institutional frameworks, this definition also emphasised the market force and individuals' efforts. Any definition that only considers individuals' intentions to receive urban *hukou* status fails to comprehensively take into account the settlement intentions of temporary migrants. Temporary migrants that do not intend to obtain local urban *hukou* status may not necessarily indicate their temporary settlement plans to reside or settle at the urban destinations.

This multi-dimensional definition reflects the complicated process of temporary migrants' settlement decisions in China.

Further, the definition of a 'temporary migrant' should be reconceptualised. The traditional definitions of temporary migrants or permanent migrants were based on their *hukou* status (Chan et al., 1999; Goldstein & Goldstein, 1991). Permanent settlement can be achieved through the market mechanism and by the efforts that individuals undertake to address *hukou* barriers. Thus, definitions of migrants should be separated from whether or not they obtain *hukou* status at their destination. Indeed, any definitions of permanent migrants and potential permanent settlers should use criteria that consider a migrants' period of residence or whether or not the migrant has plan to own urban housing. Such a classification approach is similar to that adopted by international migration studies (Massey et al., 1993; Mesnard, 2004) and is also close to the reality of migration and settlement features among migrants in China.

6.2.2 Practical implications

China has undergone rapid industrialisation and economic development in recent decades. The rapid in rural–urban migration in China reflects the country's growing urbanisation and modernisation. Whether migrants, primarily rural–urban migrants, plan to settle permanently at a destination or not has a significant effect on the process of urbanisation, the development of urban infrastructure, and the welfare and social provisions enacted at destinations. Future reforms should seek to meet the demands of temporary migrants' settlement decisions in relation to the four main potential conclusions highlighted in this study.

Hukou Reforms

This role of the *hukou* system in citizenship eligibility has been weakened. The eligibility for equal employment status, employment-related benefits and social benefits have gradually been detached from an individual's *hukou* status; however, access to college entry examinations,

minimum living standard programmes and housing subsidises continue to depend on an individual's local *hukou* status at the municipal government level. In relation to settlement decisions, granting temporary migrants, especially rural migrants, social benefits equal to those of urbanites is more important than merely granting them urban *hukou* status. Further, *hukou* constraints remain present at the municipal government level and contribute to an individual's eligibility for local citizenship. These constraints require that diverse *hukou* entry thresholds be met before an individual can access local social benefits. Thus, future reforms should call for uniform financial support at the central government level to ensure that the eligibility for access to local social benefit entitlements does not continue to be dependent upon local pilot schemes.

At the beginning of 2017, a residence permit (*ju zhu zheng*) system was implemented that aimed to grant equal social benefits and services related to employment, social insurance, public medical services, education and social insurance to holders of resident permits. If temporary migrants receive equal social benefits under this system (rather than by obtaining local urban *hukou* status), the role of the traditional *hukou* system on the differential eligibility for citizenship between rural and urban *hukou* status and the different forms of local citizenship, will be significantly reduced.

Urban Labour Market Reforms

The findings set out in this study strongly suggest that permanent settlement has become a normal pattern among temporary migrants. Achieving improved employment status and obtaining equal employment-related benefits and other social benefit entitlements should attract qualified migrants to become permanent residents across *hukou* barriers. Comprehensive employment protections are required, such as stricter policy reinforcements, to guarantee the eligibility of migrants to access labour contracts, pensions and medical insurance at their destination. These employment benefit entitlements and employment protections would ease the disparities between migrant groups and urban labourer groups. Further, improving the

employment status of temporary migrants' in the urban labour market would stabilise employment and provides migrants with greater security to achieve permanent settlement at their urban destination.

Urban Housing Market

The rise of housing marketisation has broadened migrants' housing choices; however, it has also complicated the settlement process. *Hukou* transfers are not necessarily connected to permanent settlement. If access to housing ownership is more available and affordable to migrants, it may enable them to break institutional barriers through their individual efforts and to realise '*de facto permanent settlement*'. Under housing market regulations in the majority of Chinese cities, temporary migrants are eligible to purchase commodity housing in urban destinations without having local *hukou* status. The housing policies in China should be relaxed in medium-sized cities to motivate temporary migrants to purchase local urban housing and settle permanently in their destination city. Unlike thresholds for urban *hukou* entry, an open housing market with more eligible and affordable housing access would provide migrants with a broad channel for permanent settlement (a preference for temporary migrants, especially rural migrants with rural *hukou* status).

The Urbanisation Plan

The interactions between institutional constraints and marketisation have created diverse patterns in migrants' settlement intentions; thus, the process of 'people-oriented urbanisation' should be rethought. The major factor affecting migrants' intentions for permanent settlement is the availability of high-quality social benefit entitlements at urban destinations. The new urbanisation plan introduced in 2014 encourages eligible migrants to settle in small and medium-sized cities. However, although the entry criteria for major cities remains high migrants prefer to settle in these major cities (e.g., Beijing and Shanghai). The urbanisation plan at the central government would be inconsistent with temporary migrants' considerations of

permanent settlement. Temporary migrants have shown a stronger preference toward major cities with high-quality social benefits and services compared with small or medium-sized cities with very few or low-quality local social benefits. To attract temporary migrants to move or settle permanently in small or medium-sized cities in the central and western regions of China, it is necessary to improve and distribute social welfare entitlements evenly across regions to ease the population pressures in the metropolises and coastal cities. The central government should play a role in reducing regional variations by providing uniformed and nationwide guidelines and financial supports.

6.3 Limitations and Further Research

This study had a number of limitations. First, it is important to note that a single city was considered in the case study in Chapter 4. Thus, the results of this case study may not be generalisable to all regions of China, as migrants might experience more complicated settlement decision processes in different regions. For example, Shanghai has specific criteria for access to the local urban housing market. These specific restrictions may affect migrants' access to housing ownership. The 'Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey' (see Chapters 3 and 5) considered some major cities and regions; however, the 'Migrant Survey of Ningbo' focused on one medium-sized city in a coastal area of China. Data should be gathered from other major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. This would allow comparisons to be made of migrants' permanent settlement intentions between different cities with diverse administrative levels.

Second, this study could not trace migrants' actual settlement behaviours based on the cross-sectional survey data. Strong intentions towards permanent settlement do not reflect actual settlement outcomes. Longitudinal data is required to explore actual settlement outcomes. This longitudinal data would provide insights into migrants' complicated decision-making processes. An analysis could also be undertaken that compared migrants' ideal

intentions towards permanent settlement with their actual behaviours (i.e., the settlement outcomes).

Third, based on the two data sets collected in 2013 and 2014, this study could not determine the effects of the residential permit (*ju zhu zheng*) system that was introduced in 2017. If the residential permit system were to grant social services and benefits to all permit holders, it is reasonable to assume that the role of traditional *hukou* status on migrants' settlement intentions would be further reduced. If data related to the residential permit system were available, the study of migrants' settlement intentions based on the residential permit system reforms would deepen understandings of the future reform directions that need to be implemented in institutional and urban welfare systems.

Finally, there would be the reverse causality relationship between social networks and self-identification among migrants. Migrants who are more willing to participate activities are more likely to self-identify as local residents. Such self-identification could encourage migrants to form close attachments to their urban destinations. This study did not address this reverse causality relationship. Future studies should investigate the interplay among social networks, self-identification and migrants' settlement intentions. Data should be gathered about migrants' settlement intentions before and after migration to examine this reverse causality. Nonetheless, the present study did shed some light on the effects of institutional factors, employment status, housing ownership, social networks and social identification on the settlement decisions of migrants in China.

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Appendix Questionnaire I (in English)

Questionnaire of Migrant Dynamics Monitoring Survey (A)

(2013)

Respondent criteria: male and female migrant population (born between July 1953 and May 1998) who has lived at this destination for more than one month and his/her household registered location does not belong to this destination.

Dear Sir/Mrs/Miss:

We are investigators from the National Health and Family Planning Commission. We would like to take some of your time to fill out a questionnaire about you. This is an important survey to gain an understanding of living standard of migrant population, providing policy suggestions to the government and associated institutions. Your information is very valuable to us. We would appreciate if you could provide your real information and views and there is no truth or false in each question. We promise that any information you provided will not be disclosed to anyone else except for the researchers. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation!

The National Health and Family Planning Commission

May, 2013

Current address: _____ Neighborhood Committee, _____ Street (Town/Village),
_____ District (Town/City), _____ City (Location), _____ Province (District/City)

Sample Code [_][_][_]

Location Type 1 Neighborhood Committee 2 Village Committee []

Individual Code [_][]

Completed Date: _____ Month, _____ Day Investigator signature _____

A. Basic Information

101 Please provide information about YOURSELF, SPOUSE and CHILDREN (including living at the place of destination and origin and other places) and other family members LIVING TOGETHER at the destination:

ID	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
	Relationship 1. Yourself 2. Spouse 3. Children 4. Children in-law 5. Parents/parents in-law 6. Siblings 7. Grand-children 8. Grand-parents	Gender 1. Male 2. Female	Date of birth Month/ Year	Nationality 1. <i>Han</i> (please see codes below)	Education 1. Illiteracy 2. Primary 3. Middle school 4. High school 5. Secondary 6. College 7. Under-graduate 8. Graduate	Household type 1. Rural 2. Urban 3. Others	Marital status 1. Unmarried 2. First-married 3. Re-married 4. Divorce 5. Widowhood	<i>Hukou</i> registration location (please see codes below)	Residence place 1. Destination 2. Place of <i>hukou</i> registration	Migration distance 1. Inter-provincial 2. Intra-provincial 3. Within city	Time of current migration Month/ Year	Migration reason 1. Working 2. Reunion 3. Marriage 4. Removing 5. Reunion 6. Study 7. Born here 8. Others
1.												
2.												
3.												
4.												
5.												
6.												
7.												
8.												
9.												
10.												

Notes: D) Nationality: 02 Mongolian, 03 Manchu, 04 Hui, 05 Tibetan, 06 Zhuang, 07 Uygue, 08 Miao, 09 Yi, 10 Tujia, 11 Buyi, 12 Dong, 13 Yao, 14 Korean, 15 Bai, 16 Hani, 17 Li, 18 Kazakhs, 19 Dai, 20 Others.

H) *Hukou* registration place: 11 Beijing, 12 Tianjin, 13 Hebei 14 Shanxi, 15 Neimenggu, 21 Niaoanin,g 22 Jilin, 23 Heilongjiang, 31 Shanghai, 32 Jiangsu, 33 Zheijiang, 34 Anhui, 35 Fujian, 36 Jiangxi, 37 Shangdong, 41 Heinan, 42 Hubei, 43 Hunan, 44 Guangdong, 45 Guangxi, 46 Hainan, 50 Chongqing, 51 Sichuan, 52 Guizhou, 53 Yunnan, 54 Tibet, 61 Shanxi, 62 Gansu, 63 Qinghai, 64 Ningxia, 65 Xinjiang, 66 Bingtuan, 71Taiwan, 81 Hongkong, 82 Macao.

B Employment, Income and Cost

201 When did you migrate for employment and leave the origin at the first time?

[_][_]Month [_][_][_][_]Year

202 Which type of valid document of the following do you hold? []

1 Residence permit or work and residence permit

2 Temporary residential permit

3 None of both

203 Did you work for more than one hour with payment before this First May? []

(Including family business and self-employed)

1 Yes (*to 206*) 2 No

204 What is the reason of your unemployment? []

1 Being incapacitated

2 Retirement

3 Household/ Taking care of children

4 Searching for job at current

5 Losing jobs for employers' reasons

6 Losing jobs for individual reasons

7 Pregnancy or lactation

8 Others (please specify) _____

205 Have you searched for jobs in the last month? []

1 Yes 2 No

(If no, please complete 205 and jump to 214)

206 What is your current occupation? []

10 Manager of state institution, party institution, enterprise and public institution

20 Professional

30 Civil servant, clerk and other staff

41 Businessman

42 Peddler

43 Catering

44 Housekeeping

45 Clean-keeping

46 Security

47 Decoration

48 Commercial and service personnel

50 Agricultural personnel

61 Producer

62 Transportation

63 Construction

64 Other relevant operators about production and transportation equipment

70 Rolling stone

80 Others (please specify) _____

207 Which industry of your work unit belongs to?

[]

01 Manufacture 02 Digging 03 Agriculture 04 Construction

05 Production and supply of electric, gas and water

06 Wholesale and retailing 07 Accommodation and catering

08 Social service 09 Financial/insurance and real estate

10 Transport, storage and communications

11 Health, sports and social welfare

12 Education, culture and the radio, film and television

13 Scientific research, technical services

14 Party and government organs and social organizations

15 Others (please specify) _____

208 Which employment sector of your work unit belongs to? ☐

01 Land contractor 02 Civil servant 03 State and state-owned enterprise

04 Collective enterprise 05 Self-employed entrepreneur

06 Private business 07 Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan enterprises

08 Japanese and South Korean enterprises

09 European and American enterprises

10 Sino-foreign joint venture

11 Others (please specify) _____

209 What is your current employment status? ☐

1 Employee 2 Employer 3 Self-support 4 Household workers

210 How long have you continuing worked in the local? ☐☐years

211 When did you start the current job?

☐☐Month☐☐☐☐Year

212 How many days did you work in each week of the last month on average?

☐ days

213 How many hours did you work (or your last employment) each day of the last month on average? ☐☐hours

214 What is your income in the last month (or your last employment) (excluding household workers)?

[][][][][][]yuan

215 What are your family's monthly food expenditures at the destination?

[][][][]yuan

216 What is your family's monthly housing rent at the destination (including instalment payment)?

[][][][]yuan

217 What are your family's monthly total expenditures at the destination?

[][][][][][]yuan

218 What is your family's monthly general income? [][][][][][]yuan

(Including salary, operating income, property income and transfer earnings and so on)

C Public Services and Social Security

301 Which type of your current housing belongs to? [][]

01 Renting housing from work unit or employer

02 Renting private housing

03 Low-rent housing from the government

04 Public rental housing from the government

05 Free housing from work unit or employer

06 Purchasing policy-related housing

07 Purchasing commercial housing

08 Staying housing

09 Employment place

10 Self-establish housing

11 Others informal housing

302 Which of the following social security have you participated in places of origin? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Not sure)

- A New rural cooperation medical system ☐
- B Urban worker medical treatment insurance ☐
- C Urban residents medical treatment insurance ☐
- D Commercial insurance ☐
- E Work-related injury insurance ☐
- F Unemployment insurance ☐
- G Birth insurance ☐
- H Housing fund ☐
- I Urban lowest social security ☐
- J Rural lowest social security ☐
- K Urban state pension insurance ☐
- L Rural pension insurance ☐
- M Others (please specify) _____ ☐

303 Which of the following social security have you participated at the destination? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Not sure)

- A Urban state pensions ☐
- B Urban worker medical insurance ☐
- C Urban residents medical insurance ☐
- D Commercial medical insurance ☐
- E Work-related injury insurance ☐
- F Unemployment insurance ☐
- G Birth insurance ☐
- H Housing fund ☐

M Others (please specify) _____

[]

Questionnaire of Floating Population Dynamic Survey (C)

(May, 2013)

Respondent: Those respondents that have completed part A of this questionnaire in Songjiang district of Shanghai, Suzhou and Wuxi of Jiangsu province, Quanzhou of Fujian province, Wuhan of Hubei province, Changsha of Hunan province and Xian and Xianyang of Shanxi province please continue to complete this part C.

E Social Integration

501 Why do you choose the current destination to residence?

(Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No)

- A More job and earning opportunities ☐
- B Learning skills and expanding horizons ☐
- C Taking care of family members/family reunion ☐
- D Mutual care of relatives and friends at the destination ☐
- E Receiving better education for children ☐
- F More friendly to outsiders ☐
- G Introduction from family/friends ☐
- H Short distance to the place of origin ☐
- I Others (please specify) _____ ☐

502 In what way do you find the current job? ☐

01 Government institutions 02 Job agents

03 Local acquaintances 04 Nonlocal acquaintances

05 Family/relatives 06 In-fellow/friends/classmates

- 07 Internet 08 Media and advertising
09 Job fair 10 Self-employed
11 Depend on myself 12 Others (please specify) _____

Please check 209 of part A. If the answer is 1, to 503; otherwise, please jump to 504.

503 Which type of contract have you signed with your employer? ☐

- 1 Permanent contract
2 Fixed-term contract
3 A one-time task or probation period
4 No contract
5 Not sure
6 Others (please specify) _____

504 Have you received vocational training established by the local government at the destination in recent three years?

1 Yes 2 No ☐

Please check 303, B section of part A. If the answer is 1, please jump to 506.

505 Why do you not participate in the local urban worker medical treatment insurance at the destination? ☐

- 1 Not familiar with this insurance scheme
2 Participating in other medical treatment insurances in the place of origin
3 High fee standard
4 Employer do not pay
5 Be confident to one's healthy
6 Complicated process of insurance transformation

7 Inapplicability

Please complete the questions below

506 Monthly expenditure on study, training and education of your family at the destination	A Yourself and spouse [][][][]yuan B Children [][][][]yuan
507 Monthly expenditure on transportation and communication of your family at the destination	[][][][]yuan
508 Medical expenditure of your family at the destination last year (individual burden)	A Yourself and spouse [][][][]yuan B Children [][][][]yuan
509 Expenditure on dinners and gifts of your family at the destination last year	[][][][][][][][]yuan
510 How much did you mail or remit money (and gifts) to your place of origin totally last year? (including money and gifts to your spouse's original home)	[][][][][][][][]yuan
511 How much money did other family members deliver to your family last year?	[][][][][][][][]yuan
512 The total income of your family in the place of origin last year?	[][][][][][][][]yuan
513 The general expenditure of your home in the place of origin last year?	[][][][][][][][]yuan

514 In addition to work time, who are you frequently socialising with at the destination?

(Multiple choice, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Inapplicability)

- A Relatives that work together []
- B Fellows that work together []
- C Relatives with local household registration []
- D Friends that work together []
- E Colleagues with local household registration []
- F Government administrator []

- G Local classmates/friends (excluding colleagues) ☐
- H Not socialise with others frequently ☐
- I Others (please specify) _____ ☐

515 Who would you generally turn to help when you encounter difficulties at the destination?

(Multiple choice, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Inapplicability)

- A Relatives that work together ☐
- B Fellows that work together ☐
- C Relatives with local household registration ☐
- D Friends that work together ☐
- E Colleagues with local household registration ☐
- F Administrative officials ☐
- G Local classmates/friends (except colleagues) ☐
- H Village/community committee, property management staff and landlord ☐
- I Rarely turn for help ☐
- J Others (please specify) _____ ☐

516 Which type of community are you living in currently? ☐

- 1 Villa community or commercial housing communities
- 2 Affordable housing communities
- 3 Agencies and institutions communities
- 4 Mining enterprises communities
- 5 Old communities without reconstruction
- 6 Urban villages or shantytowns
- 7 Rural-urban fringe communities
- 8 Rural communities
- 9 Others (please specify) _____

517 Who is your mainly neighborhoods? ☐

1 Outsiders 2 Local residents

3 Approximate the same number of the outsiders and local residents

4 Not sure

518 What do you usually do at leisure time? (Please choose three options based on participation frequency) ☐☐☐

1 Watching movies/ TV/ videos 2 Playing chess/playing cards/gambling

3 Shopping/walking in the park 4 Reading books/newspapers/studying/exercising

5 Surfing the Internet/playing computer games

6 Chatting with family and friends 7 Relaxing/sleeping

8 Doing household 9 Others (please specify) _____

519 Have you been one of members of the following institutions at the destination? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No)

A Labour union ☐

B Volunteer association ☐

C Mobile party (league) branch ☐

D Local party (league) branch ☐

E Chamber of commerce in the place of origin ☐

F Students association ☐

G Fellow association ☐

H Others (please specify) _____ ☐

520 Did you participate in the following activities at the destination last year? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Never participate)

A Cultural activities in communities ☐

- B Public benefit activities in communities ☐
- C Election (Village/community committee, labour union) ☐
- D Assessment selection ☐
- E Activities of strata council ☐
- F Management activities of community committee ☐
- G Others (please specify) _____ ☐

521 Where do you usually shopping (expect purchasing food) at the destination?

(Please choose three options based on going frequency) ☐☐☐

1 Shopping mall 2 Exclusive shop 3 Supermarket 4 Wholesale market

5 Online shopping 6 Boutique 7 Street vendors

8 Others (please specify) _____

522 What are your main consumption desires in the next three years? (Multiple choice,

please choose three options) ☐☐☐

1 Advancing diet structure 2 Purchasing costume and jewelry

3 Increasing education expenditure of children

4 Individual education and interest cultivation

5 Increasing entertainment expenditure (tour and relaxation, purchasing new digital products and so on)

6 Household decorates or decoration, purchasing furniture or appliances

7 Beauty fitness

8 Purchasing car/housing

9 Others (please specify) _____

523 Do you usually company with children, such as studying, playing games, bringing children to parks and visiting expenditures? ☐

1 Frequently 2 Sometimes 3 Almost no (please specify the reason: _____)

4 Inapplicability (young children, grown children or no children)

524 What extent do you grasp the local language? ☐

1 Able to understand and speak

2 Able to understand and speak some

3 Able to understand but unable to speak

4 Not understand the local language

525 Which dialect do you usually speak when communicate with the locals? ☐

1 Mandarin 2 Native dialect 3 Local dialect 4 Depends

526 What do you think of the issue of 'reproduction'? ☐

1 Only sons could carry on the family line

2 Both sons and daughters could carry on the family line

3 There is no of the issue

527 What do you think of your future retirement? (Please choose three options based on dependency level) ☐☐☐

1 Depend on myself 2 Depend on the government 3 Depend on sons

4 Depend on daughters 5 Have not considered

528 Are there distinct differences between you or your fellows and local residents in the following aspects? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No)

A Diet customs ☐

B Costumes ☐

C Health habits ☐

D Festivals and customs ☐

E Interaction ☐

F Views and opinions []

G Others (please specify) _____ []

(If all the answers are '2 No', please jump to 530)

529 What are your or your fellows' attitudes and actions in view of these existing differences?

[]

1 Seeking to narrow differences but lack time and energy

2 Seeking to narrow differences but have no idea

3 Trying to narrow differences

4 Dose not matter

530 Are you agree with the following opinions?

A I am willing to be neighborhoods with the locals	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
B I am willing to be friends with the locals around	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
C I am willing to integrate into the community/work unit and be one of them	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
D I have a sense of belonging of the local in the destination city	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
E I and my relatives would like to marry with the locals	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
F I think that the locals would like to accept me as one of them	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
G I think that the locals would not like to be neighborhood with me	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	
H I think that the locals dislike or look down upon outsiders	1 Totally disagree 2 Disagree 3 Basically agree 4 Totally agree	

531 Do you think you and your family associate well with the locals? []

1 Very well 2 Quiet well 3 well 4 Not well 5 Few association

532 Are you willing to live permanently at the destination? []

1 Yes 2 No

533 Where do you plan to purchase or build housing? []

- 1 Building housing in the village or town of the place of household registration
- 2 Purchasing housing in town (city/district) of the place of household registration
- 3 Purchasing housing in prefecture-level city of the place of household registration (not current residence destination)
- 4 Purchasing housing in provincial capital city of the place of household registration (not current residence destination)
- 5 Purchasing housing at the destination
- 6 Have not considered
- 7 Others (please specify) _____

534 Where do you plan to retire? []

- 1 Retirement in the village or town of the place of household registration
- 2 Retirement in town (city/district) of the place of household registration
- 3 Retirement in prefecture-level city of the place of household registration (not current residence destination)
- 4 Retirement in provincial capital city of the place of household registration (not current residence destination)
- 5 Retirement at the destination
- 6 Have not considered
- 7 Others (please specify) _____

535 What do you think of yourself belong to? []

- 1 Local 2 New-local 3 People from the place of origin (hometown)
- 4 No idea

536 If there is no restriction, are you willing to transfer your *hukou* to the destination? 1 Yes 2 No []

537 Are you planning to bring family members (e.g. spouse, unmarried children and parents if unmarried) to the destinations in next three years? ☐

1 Already at the destination

2 Yes, bringing all of them

3 Yes, bring some of them

4 No

5 Depends (please specify) _____

538 How many acres of land in your place of *hukou* registration? ☐☐☐☐ acres

539 How large of your housing in your place of *hukou* registration?

☐☐☐ Square meter

540 What make you annoying related to your place of origin currently in? (Multiple choices, 1 Yes 2 No 3 Inapplicability)

A Taking care of aging ☐

B Taking care of children ☐

C Education expenditures of children ☐

D Living alone of spouse ☐

E Wok manpower shortage ☐

F Lack of money in family sickness

G Others (please specify) _____ ☐

Thank you for your cooperation!

Appendix Questionnaire I (in Chinese)

流动人口动态监测调查问卷（A）

（2013年）

调查对象：在本地居住一个月及以上，非本区（县、市）户口的男性和女性流动人口（2013年5月年龄为15~59周岁，即1953年6月至1998年5月间出生）

尊敬的先生/女士：您好！我们是国家卫生和计划生育委员会的调查员。为了解流动人口生存发展状况，向政府相关部门提供决策依据，帮助流动人口解决一些实际问题，我们组织此次调查，需要耽误您一些时间，希望得到您的支持和协助。对每个问题的回答没有对错之分，只要您把真实情况和想法告诉我们即可。调查结果仅供研究使用，我们绝不会泄露您的任何个人信息。对您的配合和支持我们表示衷心感谢！

国家卫生和计划生育委员会

2013年5月

现居住地址_____省（区、市）_____市（地区）

_____区（市、县）_____街道（镇、乡）

_____居（村）委会

样本点编码□□□□

样本点类型 1 居委会 2 村委会□

个人编码□□

调查完成日期： 月 日 调查员签名 调查员编码□□

一、 基本情况

101 请谈谈您本人、配偶和子女（包括在本地、老家和其他地方的）以及与您在本地同住的家庭其他成员的情况

成员 序号	与被访者 关系 1本人 2配偶 3子女 4媳婿 5父母/公婆 / 岳父母 6兄弟姐妹 7孙辈 8（外）祖 父母 9其他	性别 1 男 2 女	出生年月 （阳历）	民族 01 汉 （其他民族 代码见表下 选项）	教育程度 1未上过学 2小学 3初中 4高中 5中专 6大学专科 7大学本科 8研究生	户 口 性质 1 农业 2 非农业 3 其他	婚姻 状况 1未婚 2初婚 3再婚 4离婚5丧偶	户籍地 （各地代码 见表下选 项）	现居住地 1 本地 2 户籍地 3 其他（选 择2、3的跳 问下一位家 庭成员情 况）	本次流 动范围 1 跨省流 动 2 省内跨 市 3 市内跨 县	本次流入 本地时间	本次流入 原因 1务工经商 2 随迁 3婚嫁 4拆迁 5投亲 6学习 7出生8 其 他
1	11	11	111111 年1111月	1111	111	111	111	1111	111	111	111111 年1111月	111
2	11	11	111111 年1111月	1111	111	111	111	1111	111	111	111111 年1111月	111
3	11	11	111111 年1111月	1111	111	111	111	1111	111	111	111111 年1111月	111
4	11	11	111111 年1111月	1111	111	111	111	1111	111	111	111111 年1111月	111

5	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>
6	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>
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8	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>
9	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>
10	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> 年 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 月	<input type="text"/>

D: 02蒙03满04回05藏06壮07维吾尔08苗09彝10土家11布依12侗13瑶14朝鲜15白16哈尼17黎18哈萨克19傣20其他

H: 11北京 12天津 13河北 14山西 15内蒙古21辽宁 22吉林 23黑龙江31上海 32江苏 33浙江 34安徽 35福建 36江西 37山东

41河南 42湖北 43湖南 44广东 45广西 46 海南 50重庆 51四川52贵州 53云南 54西藏 61陕西 62甘肃 63青海 64宁夏 65新疆66兵团 71台湾 81香港 82澳门

二、就业与收入支出

201 您第一次离开老家（县）外出找工作是在什么时候？|_|_|_|_|年|_|_|月

202 目前您是否持以下有效证件？|_|

1居住证或工作居住证 2暂住证 3两种证件都没有

203 您今年“五一”节前一周是否做过一小时以上有收入的工作？（包括家庭或个体经营）

1是 2否

204 未工作的主要原因是什么？|_|

1丧失劳动能力 2退休 3料理家务/带孩子

4没找到工作 5因单位原因失去原工作 6因本人原因失去原工作

7怀孕或哺乳 8其他（请注明）_____

205 您上个月是否找过工作？|_|

1是 2否

(回答205后跳问214)

206 您现在的主要职业是什么？|_|

10国家机关、党群组织、企事业单位负责人 20专业技术人员 30公务员、办事人员和有关人员

41经商 42商贩 43餐饮 44家政 45保洁 46保安 47装修 48其他商业、服务业人员

50农、林、牧、渔、水利业生产人员

61生产 62运输 63建筑 64其他生产、运输设备操作人员及有关人员

70无固定职业 80其他（请注明）_____

207 您现在就业的单位属于哪个行业？|_|

01制造业02采掘03农林牧渔04建筑05电煤水生产供应06批发零售07住宿餐饮
08社会服务09金融/保险/房地产10 交通运输、仓储通信 11卫生、体育和社会福利
12教育、文化及广播电影电视 13科研和技术服务14党政机关和社会团体 15其他

208 您现在就业的单位性质属于哪一类? |__|

01 土地承包者 02 机关、事业单位 03 国有及国有控股企业04 集体企业
05 个体工商户 06 私营企业 07 港澳台企业 08 日/韩企业
09 欧美企业 10 中外合资企业 11 其他（请注明）_____ 12 无单位

209 您现在的就业身份属于哪一种? |__|

1 雇员 2 雇主 3 自营劳动者 4 家庭帮工

210 您在本地已经连续工作了多少年? |__||__|年

211 您是何时开始从事目前工作的? |__||__||__||__|年|__|_|月

212 您上个月（或上次就业）平均每周工作几天? |__|天

213 您上个月（或上次就业）平均每天工作几小时? |__|_|小时

（填写以下各题时请右对齐）

214 您个人上个月（或上次就业）的收入是多少钱？（家庭帮工不填） |__|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|元

215 您家在本地的每月食品支出是多少钱? |__|_|_|_|_|_|元

216 您家在本地每月缴纳的住房房租是多少钱？（包括分期付款） |__|_|_|_|_|_|元

217您家在本地的每月总支出是多少钱? |__|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|元

218 您家在本地的每月总收入是多少钱? |__|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|元

（包括工资收入、经营收入、财产收入、转移收入等）

三、公共服务与社会保障

301 您现在住房属于下列何种性质？ |__|

- 01 租住单位/雇主房
- 02 租住私房
- 03 政府提供廉租房
- 04 政府提供公租房
- 05 单位/雇主提供免费住房（不包括就业场所）
- 06 已购政策性保障房
- 07 已购商品房
- 08 借住房
- 09 就业场所
- 10 自建房
- 11 其他非正规居所

302 您在老家（户籍地）有何种社会保障？（多选，提示。1有2无3不清楚）

- A 新农合 |__|
- B 城镇职工医保 |__|
- C 城镇居民医保 |__|
- D 商业医保 |__|
- E 工伤保险 |__|
- F 失业保险 |__|
- G 生育保险 |__|
- H 住房公积金 |__|
- I 城镇低保 |__|
- J 农村低保 |__|
- K 城镇养老保险 |__|

L 农村养老保险 ☐

M 其他（请注明） _____

303 您在本地有下列何种社会保障？（多选，提示。1有2无3不清楚）

A 城镇养老保险 ☐

B 城镇职工医保 ☐

C 城镇居民医保 ☐

D 商业医保 ☐

E 工伤保险 ☐

F 失业保险 ☐

G 生育保险 ☐

H 住房公积金 ☐

I 其他（请注明） _____

流动人口动态监测调查问卷（C）

（2013年）

调查对象：参加流动人口动态监测——社会融合专题调查的上海市松江区、江苏省苏州市、无锡市、福建省泉州市、湖北省武汉市、湖南省长沙市、陕西省西安市、咸阳市的调查对象在回答完流动人口动态监测调查问卷（A）卷后，继续回答本卷问题。

尊敬的先生 / 女士：

我们在本地还在开展促进流动人口社会融合的专题调查，还要耽误您一些时间，请您继续回答下面一些问题，再次感谢您的配合和支持！

国家卫生和计划生育委员会

2013年5月

五、社会融合

501 您为什么选择现居住地？（多选，提示。1是2否）|__|

- A 有工作机会、挣钱多
- B 能学技术、开眼界
- C 照顾家庭成员/家庭团聚
- D 亲朋好友多，可相互照应

E 孩子可以接受更好的教育

F 对外地人比较友善

G 家人/朋友介绍

H 离老家近，比较方便

I 其他（请注明）_____

502 您目前的工作是通过何种途径找到的？|___|

01政府相关部门

02社会中介

03本地熟人

04外地熟人

05家人/亲戚

06同乡/朋友/同学

07网络

08传媒广告

09招聘会

10自主创业

11 自己找到

12其他（请注明）_____

（请检查A卷209题，若选1，询问503，否则，跳问504）

503 您当前与工作单位签订了何种劳动合同？|___|

1 无固定期限

2有固定期限

3 完成一次性工作任务或试用期

4未签订劳动合同

5不清楚

6其他（请注明）_____

504 近三年中，您在本地接受过政府提供的免费培训吗？|__|

1是 2否

（请检查A卷303题B项，若选填1者跳问506）

505 您没有参加本地城镇职工医疗保险的最主要原因是什么？|__|

1不了解

2在老家参加了其他医疗保险

3缴费标准高

4单位不给缴

5对自己身体有信心

6转移接续麻烦

7不适用

506 您家在本地每月用于学习、培训、教育的支出	A 本人及配偶 _ _ _ _ _ 元
	B 子女 _ _ _ _ _ 元
507 您家在本地每月的交通、通讯费	_ _ _ _ _ 元
508 去年您家在本地的医疗相关支出（自己负担部分）	A 本人 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
	B 其他成员 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
509 去年您家在本地用于请客送礼的支出	_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
510 去年您家寄回或带回老家的钱（物）合计多少钱？ （包括给夫妻双方老家的钱和物）	_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
511 去年您家其他成员给您（或您家）多少钱	_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
512 去年您老家的总收入	_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元
513 去年您老家的总支出	_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 元

514 除上班时间外，您在本地平时与谁来往比较多？（多选，提示。1是 2否 3不适用）

A一起出来打工的亲戚 |__|

B一起出来打工的同乡 |__|

C本地户籍亲戚 |__|

D其他一起打工的朋友 |__|

E本地户籍同事 |___|

F 政府管理服务人员 |___|

G本地同学/朋友（不包括同事 |___|

H跟人来往不多 |___|

I 其他人（请注明）_____

515 在本地遇到困难时，您一般向谁求助？（多选，提示。1是 2否 3不适用）

A一起出来打工的亲戚 |___|

B一起出来打工的同乡 |___|

C本地户籍亲戚 |___|

D其他一起打工的朋友 |___|

E本地户籍同事 |___|

F行政执法部门人员 |___|

G本地同学/朋友（不包括同事） |___|

H村/居委会、物业人员、房东 |___|

I很少找人 |___|

J其他人（请注明）_____

516 您目前居住在什么样的社区中？ |___|

1别墅区或商品房社区

2经济适用房社区

3机关事业单位社区

4工矿企业社区

5未经改造的老城区

6城中村或棚户区

7城乡结合部

8农村社区

9其他（请注明）_____

517 您的邻居主要是谁？ |___|

1外地人

2本地市民

3前两类人口差不多

4不清楚（不读）

518 您休闲的时候主要干什么？（根据参与的频繁程度由多到少依次选择三项） |___||___||___|

1看电视/电影/录像

2下棋/打牌/打麻将

3逛街/逛公园

4读书/看报/学习/锻炼

5上网/玩电脑游戏

6与家人朋友聊天

7闲呆/睡觉

8做家务

9其他（请注明）_____

519 您目前在本地是否是以下组织的成员？（多选，提示。1是 2否）

A工会 |___|

B志愿者协会 |___|

C流动党（团）支部 |___|

D本地党（团）支部 |___|

E家乡商会组织 |___|

F同学会 |___|

G老乡会 |___|

H其他（请注明）_____

520 去年您在本地参加过以下哪些活动？（多选，提示。1参加过 2没参加过）

（若今年刚来，问今年情况）

A社区文体活动

B社会公益活动

C选举活动（村/居委会、工会选举）

D评优活动

E业主委员会活动

F居委会管理活动

G其他（请注明）_____

521 您在本地经常去哪些场所购物（除购买食物外）？|__||__||__|

（根据去的频繁程度由多到少依次选择三项）

1大型商场

2专卖店

3超市

4批发市场

5网络购物

6小商店

7地摊

8其他（请注明）_____

522 未来三年您的最主要消费愿望有哪些？(多选，选择三项)|__||__||__|

1改善食品结构

2购置服装首饰

3增加孩子教育花费

4个人教育与兴趣培养

5增加娱乐消费（旅游休闲、购买新款数码产品等）

6家居装修或装饰、购置家具或家电

7美容健身

8购车/买房

9其他（请注明）_____

523 您平常是否陪孩子学习、玩游戏、带孩子去公园、看展览等？|___|

1经常

2偶尔

3几乎没陪过（请注明原因：_____）

4不适用（孩子太小、孩子已经大了或没有孩子）

524 您对本地话的掌握程度如何？|___|

1 听得懂且会讲

2 听得懂，也会讲一些

3听得懂一些但不会讲

4不懂本地话

525 在与本地人交流时，您一般说哪个地方的话？|___|

1 普通话

2 家乡话

3本地话

4视情况而定

526 您是怎么看待“传宗接代”这个问题的？|___|

1只有儿子才能传宗接代

2儿子和女儿都能传宗接代

3不存在传宗接代的问题

527 对您自己未来的养老，您有什么考虑？（根据依靠程度由大到小依次选择三项）|___||___|

1靠自己

2靠政府

3靠儿子

4靠女儿

5还没考虑（不读）

528 您自己或外来的同乡与本地市民在以下方面有无较大差别？（多选，提示。1有2无）

A饮食习惯

B服饰着装

C卫生习惯

D节庆习俗

E人情交往

F观念看法

G其他（请注明）_____

（若全部选“2 无”，请跳答530题）

529 对于存在的差别，您或您的老乡通常采取什么样的态度或行动？|___|

1想缩小差别，但没有时间和精力

2想缩小差别，但不知怎么做

3努力缩小差别

4似乎无所谓

530 您是否同意以下一些说法？

A我愿意与本地人做邻居	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
B我愿意与我周围的本地人交朋友	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
C我愿意融入社区/单位，成为其中的一员	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
D我对目前居住的城市有归属感	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
E我愿意自己或亲人与本地人通婚	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
F我觉得本地人愿意接受我成为其中一员	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
G我感觉本地人不愿与我做邻居	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意
H我感觉本地人不喜欢/看不起外地人	1完全不同意2不同意3基本同意4完全同意

531 您觉得自己或家人与本地人相处得好不好? |___|

1很融洽

2比较融洽

3一般

4不融洽

5来往很少

532 您是否打算在本地长期居住? |___|

1是 2否

533 您未来打算在哪里购房、建房? |___|

1回户籍地的村或乡镇建房

2回户籍地的县（市、区）或乡镇购房

3回户籍地所属的地级市购房（非现流入地）

4回户籍地所在省的省会城市购房（非现流入地）

5在本地购房

6 没有打算

7其他（请注明）_____

534 您将来打算在哪里养老? |___|

1回户籍地的村或乡镇养老

2回户籍地的县（市、区）或乡镇养老

3回户籍地所属的地级市养老（非现流入地）

4回户籍地所在省的省会城市养老（非现流入地）

5在本地养老

6 没有打算

7其他（请注明）_____

535 您认为自己现在已经是哪里的人? |__|

1是本地人

2是新本地人

3是流出地（老家）人

4不知道自己是哪里人

536 若没有任何限制，您是否愿意把户口迁入本地? |__|

1是 2否

537 在未来3年内，您是否打算把家庭成员（配偶、未婚子女、未婚者父母）带到本地? |__|

1已都在本地

2是，全部都带来

3是，带一部分来

4否

5视情况而定（请注明）_____

538 您家在户籍地有多少亩田地? |__|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|亩

539 您家在户籍地的住房面积有多少平方米? |__|_|_|_|_|_|平方米

540 目前在您老家，主要有哪些事情让您操心?（多选，提示。1是2否3不适用）

A老人赡养

B子女照看

C子女教育费用

D配偶生活孤独

E干活缺人手

F家人有病缺钱治

G其他（请注明）_____

谢谢您的合作!

Appendix Questionnaire II (in English)

Questionnaire of Migrant Survey of Ningbo

Respondent Name: _____ Tel No.: _____

Respondent address: _____ Neighborhood Committee, _____ Street/Village

_____ District (Town/City)

Investigation Date: _____ Day _____ Month, 2014

A Basic Information

A1. Your place of household registration: _____ City (State/Location),

_____ Province (Autonomous/Municipalities)

A2. What is the type of your place of household registration?

1. Neighborhood committee of community in street
2. Administrative villages in street
3. Neighborhood committee of community in town
4. Administrative villages in town
5. Township

A3. Why did you migrate to this destination?

1. Born in here 2. Working
3. Job transfer 4. Distribution of employment
5. Education and training 6. Removing
7. Marriage 8. Staying with relatives or business trip
9. Others (please specify) _____

A4. Have all your family members migrated to Ningbo?

1. Yes, all in here, totally _____
2. No, part of them migrated, _____ live in here at current
3. No, only myself

A5. How often do you come back home in general after migrating to Ningbo?

1. Once every few years
2. Once or two times every year
3. Two-five times every year
4. More than five times every year

A6. Do you have contracted tenure in the place of origin?

1. Yes, _____ *acres*
2. No

A7. If you have contracted tenure, who is farming the land?

1. Family members
2. Others
3. Renting to others
4. Nobody
5. All or part of the land requisitioned
6. No land

A8. Please provide details of yourself and other family members who are LIVING WITH YOU in Ningbo:

Members	A Relationship 1. Yourself 2. Spouse 3.Children/ children in-law 4.Parents/parents in-law 5.Grandparents 6.Grandchildren 7.Brothers/Sisters	B Gender 1. Male 2.Female	C Date of Birth	D Education 1. No schooling 2.Primary 3. Secondary 4. High school 5.Secondary technical 6. College 7. Graduate 8. Postgraduate	E Martial status 1. Unmarried 2.First- married 3. Re-married 4. Divorce 5. Widowhood	F <i>Hukou</i> registration 1. Rural 2. Urban 3. Others	G Migration type 1. Inter- provincial 2. Intra- provinciap 3. Within city	H Income/month (Only including salary, bonus, overtime pay, allowance and operation revenue; no earners is 0)	I Migration time
1									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
2									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
3									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
4									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
5									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
6									<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

B Employment

B1. Your employment status in Ningbo is:

1. Employee 2. Labor dispatching 3. Employer
4. Family business 5. Part-time employee 6. Household workers
7. Unemployed and searching for jobs (*to B6*)
8. Unemployed and doing housework (*to B9*)
9. Self-support (including collecting scrap)
10. Others (please specify) _____

B2. Your current occupation is:

1. State or social manager 2. Manger 3. Private entrepreneur
4. Professionals 5. Clerk 6. Individual businessman
7. Service employee 8. Industrial workers 9. Farmer
10. Rolling stone 11. Others (please specify) _____

B3. Your industry of personal or family business is:

1. Agriculture 2. Mining 3. Manufacturing 4. Construction
5. Production and supply of electric power, gas and water
6. Wholesale and retail sales 7. Hotel and catering services
8. Social services 9. Financial, insurance and real estate
10. Transportation, warehousing and postal services
11. Health, sports and social welfare
12. Education, culture and the radio, film and television
13. Scientific research, technical services and geological prospecting
14. Water resources, environment and public facilities management
15. Resident services and other services (including collecting scarp and cleaner)

16. Party and government organs and social organizations

17. Public management and social organization

B4. If you are employed by individuals, enterprise, public institution or service company, the employment sector of your employers is:

1. Self-employed entrepreneur 2. Private business
3. Village industry 4. Foreign or joint ventures
5. Corporate enterprise 6. Urban collective-owned enterprise
7. Stated-owned enterprise 8. Private institution
9. National institution 10. Government agency
11. Others (please specify) _____

B5. If you are employed by individual, enterprise, public institution or service company, your employment contract status is:

1. Regular employee or permanent contract 2. Long-term contract (more than one year)
3. Short-term contract (less than one year) 4. Without contract
5. No fixed work unit 6. Employer or self-employed

B6. When did you migrant to other locations (leaving your place of household registration) at the first time? And where is it?

, _____ City(State), _____ Province (Autonomous/Municipality)

B7. Have you participated in the following insurance/allowance (please tick it)?

Categories	Participation	No participation	Not Sure
1.Work-related injury insurance			
2.New rural cooperation medical system			
3.Urban worker/residents medical insurance			
4.Medical insurance designed by the local government			
5.Unemployment insurance			
6.Housing fund			

7.Birth insurance			
8.New rural endowment insurance			
9.Urban state basic pension insurance			
(If you do not participate or are not sure, jump to C1)			

B8. Have you transferred the pensions to the place of destination? [___]

1. No 2. Yes (*to CI*) 3. Participated in the local insurance (*to CI*)

B9. Why have you not transferred the pensions to the place of destination? [___]

1. Not sure of relevant policies 2. Complicated processing
3. Bringing a loss 4. Too little pensions and no need
5. Others (please specify) _____

C Housing

C1. Which is the type of your housing currently at the place of destination? [___]

1. Renting a house from work unit or employer
2. Free housing from work unit or employer
3. Low-rent housing from the government
4. Renting a private house
5. Purchasing commercial house
6. Purchasing affordable housing
7. Living with relatives
8. Others (please specify) _____

C2. Which is the type of your house in the place of origin? [___]

1. Self-establish housing 2. Purchasing commercial housing
3. No housing 4. Others (please specify) _____

C3. How many people are living in your current house? _____

C4. How large is your current house? _____ Square mete

D Migration intention

D1. Do you plan to stay in this city in next three years? |__|

1. Yes 2. No

D2. Are you willing to get access to local *hukou*? |__|

1. Yes 2. No

D3. If you are willing to get access to local *hukou*, what is your main consideration? |__|

1. Better job opportunity
2. Enjoy the local social security (including endowment insurance and medical care insurance)
3. Better education for children
4. Enjoy the indemnificatory housing benefits
5. Enjoy the local life-style

D4. If you own the rural *hukou* and are unwilling to get access to the local *hukou*, what is your main consideration? |__|

1. Be unwilling to lose the land use rights
2. Prefer to get access to urban *hukou* at original locations
3. Prefer to get access to urban *hukou* at Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou
4. Prefer to get access to urban *hukou* at capital cities within original provinces
5. Prefer to get access to urban *hukou* at capital cities excluding original provinces
6. Prefer to get access to urban *hukou* at small-scale cities or towns within original provinces
7. Others (please specify) _____

D5. If you are unwilling to get access to urban *hukou*, what is your main consideration? |__|

1. Willing to own land use rights
2. No effect of urban *hukou*
3. Complicated precession
4. Original social security can not be connected
5. High housing price in cities
6. Less pressure in original life-style
7. Others (please specify) _____

D6. If you are willing to settle in cities within original provinces, what is your main consideration? [____]

1. Be able to own land use rights
2. Better job opportunities
3. More convenient to pay the social insurance
4. Children be able to receive education
5. Less life pressure
6. Connection with relatives and friends
7. Others (please specify) _____

D7. If you own the urban *hukou* and are unwilling to get access to the local *hukou*, what is your main consideration? [____]

1. Unwilling to lose original *hukou*
2. Willing to get access to *hukou* at Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou
3. Willing to get access to *hukou* at capital cities within original provinces
4. Willing to get access to *hukou* at other small-scale cities
5. Others (please specify) _____

D8. Are you intend to stay in this destination city permanently? [____]

1. No, temporary stay

2. Intend to stay there within one year
3. Intend to stay there within one or three years
4. Intend to stay there more than three or five years

D9. Do you or your family have a plan of purchasing house in this destination city? |___|

1. Intend to purchase within one year
2. Intend to purchase within two years
3. Intend to purchase within three years
4. Intend to but do not have a plan yet
5. No intention
6. Depends

E Social life

E1. How many your relatives live in Ningbo? |___|

1. None
2. About _____

E2. How many fellow-villagers from your place of origin that have transferred *hukou* to Ningbo?
|___|

1. None
2. About _____

E3. How many your friends and acquaintances (except relatives and fellow-relative) live in Ningbo? _____

E4. Does these friends and acquaintances include Ningbo locals?

1. No (*To E6*)
2. Yes, about _____

E5. In what way do you know these locals? |___|

1. Job or business

2. Neighborhood (including landlord or tenement)

3. Introduction

4. Others (please specify) _____

E6. Are you willing to participate in these activities with locals?

Categories	1. Very willing 2. More willing 3. Not too much 4. Not willing 5. Hard to say
1. Chatting	<input type="text"/>
2. Working together	<input type="text"/>
3. Being neighborhood	<input type="text"/>
4. Being close friends	<input type="text"/>
5. Being relatives in-law	<input type="text"/>

E7. In the past year, had you received help (for example, borrowing money or things, taking care of babies or business)?

1. During this year, I have received _____ help

2. No appropriate people to turn for help (*to E10*)

3. Do not need (*to E10*)

E8. If you had received help in the past year, how many these supports were from the locals?

1. None 2. _____ from the locals

E9. Do you adapt to the Ningbo's life?

1. Yes, more adapt to the local life 2. No, more adapt to the life in the place of origin

E10. In your view, which level is your economic-social status belongs to the destination city?

1. Up 2. Middle and upper 3. Middle 4. Middle and lower 5. Low

E11. Have your life been improved after migrating to Ningbo?

Categories	1. Much better 2. Better 3. No change 4. Worse 5. Much worse
1. Overall condition	<input type="text"/>

2. Job opportunity	<input type="text"/>
3. Work environment	<input type="text"/>
4. Social security level	<input type="text"/>
5. Children education condition	<input type="text"/>
6. Housing condition	<input type="text"/>
7. Cultural and entertainment level	<input type="text"/>
8. Further development opportunity	<input type="text"/>

E12. Based on your current condition, what do you think of yourself, being a local or being an outsider?

1. Local 2. Outsider 3. Hard to say

E13. What is your main consideration of being an outsider?

1. Rural *hukou* registration
2. Root in rural areas
3. Relatives and family in rural areas
4. Being used to rural life style
5. Being excluded by the locals
6. Following the government's regulations
7. Others (please specify) _____

E14. What do you think is the main condition of being a local?

1. Attaining a local *hukou*
2. Purchasing a local housing
3. A stable local occupation
4. High income level
5. Marring with a local
6. Speaking the local language
7. Having plenty of local friends or acquaintances
8. Others (please specify) _____

E15. Based on your current condition, what do you think of yourself, being an urbanite or being a rural people?

1. Urbanite 2. Rural people 3. Hard to say

E16. How many days did you work in the last month? _____ days.

E17. How many hours did you work every day on average in the last month?
_____ hours.

E18. Your general income in the last month is _____ yuan.

E19. Do you think the outsiders suffer discriminations from the locals?

1. Very serious discrimination 2. Serious discrimination
3. Not too much discrimination 4. No discrimination 5. Hard to say

E20. About the details of your children under 16:

Children	Gender	Date of Birth	Where receiving education at the time of investigating	Education level
	1. Male 2. Female	<input type="text"/>	1.Origin 2. Local 3. Others	1.Preschool 2.Primary 3.Middle School 4.High School
1.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5.	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Appendix Questionnaire II (in Chinese)

宁波市外来人口调查问卷

被访者姓名：_____ 电话号码：_____

被访者现居住地：_____区（县、市）_____街道乡镇_____居（村）委会

调查时间：2014 年_____月_____日

A. 基本信息

A1. 您的户籍所在地是：_____省（自治区/直辖市）_____市（盟/州/地区）

A2. 您的户籍所在地（原籍）的类型是？|__|

1. 街道的居委会社区 2. 街道的行政村 3. 镇的居委会社区
4. 镇的行政村 4. 乡

A3. 您在本市居住的原因：|__|

1. 出生在本地 2. 务工经商 3. 工作调动 4. 分配录用 5. 学习培训 6. 拆迁或搬家
7. 婚姻嫁娶 8. 投靠亲友 9. 出差 10. 其他（请注明）_____

A4. 您全家都来宁波了吗？|__|

1. 是，全家都来了，共_____人 2. 部分家人来了，目前在宁波共_____人 3.
一个人在宁波

A5. 您来本地务工后，多久返回一次老家？|__|

1. 隔几年回去 1 次 2. 一年 1 或 2 次 3. 一年 2-5 次 4. 一年 5 次或更多

A6. 您在老家还有承包地吗？|__|

- 有，_____亩 2. 没有

A7. 您老家如果还有承包地，现在由谁来耕种？ |__|

1. 由自己/家人耕种 2. 由他人代为耕种 3. 租给他人耕种 4. 无人耕种 5. 全部
/部分土地被征用 6. 未曾有耕地

A8. 请谈谈您本人及与您 *在本地同住* 的其他家庭成员的一些情况 (在本地有几人同住填答几行):

成员	A 与被访者关系	B 性别 1 男 2 女	C 出生年月 (阳历)	D 教育程度 1 未上学 2 小学 3 初中 4 高中 5 中专 6 大专 7 本科 8 研究生	E 婚姻 状况 1 未婚 2 初婚 3 再婚 4 离婚 5 丧偶	E 户口 1 农业 2 非农 3 其他	F 流动类型 1 跨省流动 2 省内跨市 3 市内跨县	H 月收入 (只包括个人工 资、奖金、加班 费、津贴及营业收 入; 无收入者填 0)	I 迁移时间
1	本人		____年____月						____年____月
2	配偶		____年____月						____年____月
3	子女/媳婿		____年____月						____年____月
4	父母/公婆/岳父母		____年____月						____年____月
5	(外) 祖父母		____年____月						____年____月
6	孙辈		____年____月						____年____月

B. 就业状况

B1. 您目前在本地的就业状态是：|__|

1. 受雇他人 2. 劳务派遣工 3. 当雇主 4. 家庭经营 5. 打零工 6. 给别人
做家庭帮工 7. 给别人家做保姆 8. 没工作，正在找工作（跳问 B6）
9. 不工作，做家务（跳问 B9） 10. 自营劳动者（包括收废品）
11. 其他（请注明）_____

B2. 您的工作岗位为：|__|

1. 国家与社会管理者 2. 经理人员 3. 私营企业主 4. 专业技术人员
5. 办事人员 6. 个体工商户 7. 商业服务业员工 8. 产业工人 9. 农业劳动者
10. 无固定职业 11. 其他（请注明）_____

B3. 您个人工作或您家庭经营的行业是：|__|

1. 农林牧渔业 2. 采矿业 3. 制造业 4. 建筑业
5. 电力、燃气及水的生产和供应业 6. 批发和零售业 7. 住宿和餐饮业
8. 社会服务业
9. 金融/保险/房地产业 10. 交通运输、仓储和邮政业 11. 卫生、体育和社会福利业 12.
教育、文化及广播电影电视业 13. 科学研究、技术服务和地质勘查业
14. 水利、环境和公共设施管理业 15. 居民服务和其他服务业（包括收废品和清洁员）
16. 党政机关和社会团体 17. 公共管理与社会组织

B4. 如果您是受雇于他人、企事业单位或劳务公司，您的雇主（或工作单位）是：|__|

1. 个体户 2. 私营企业 3. 村办企业 4. 乡镇办企业 5. 外资或合资
6. 股份制企业 7. 城镇集体企业 8. 国有企业 9. 民办事业单位
10. 国家事业单位 11. 政府机关 12. 其他（请注明）_____

B5. 如果您是受雇受雇于他人、企事业单位或劳务公司，您与雇主或雇佣单位签订劳

动合同的情况：|_|

1. 固定工或无限期合同 2. 长期合同（一年及以上） 3. 短期合同（一年以下）
4. 单位不给签合同 5. 没有固定工作单位 6. 雇主或个体身份不需劳动合同

B6. 您第一次外出务工（离开户籍地所在县/市）是什么时候？务工地点是哪儿？

|_|_|_|_|年|_|_|月， 省（自治区、直辖市） 市（盟、州）

B7. 您是否参加了以下保险/补贴？（打√）

保险/补贴类别	参加了	没参加	不知道
1. 工伤保险			
2. 新型农村合作医疗			
3. 城镇职工/居民医疗保险			
4. 当地政府为农民工建立的医疗保险			
5. 失业保险			
6. 住房公积金			
7. 生育保险			
8. 新型农村养老保险			
9. 城镇基本养老保险（如答 2 “否” 或 9 “不清楚”，请跳问 C1）			

B8. 您的养老保险是否已经转移到本市/县/区？|_|

1. 未转移 2. 已转移（跳问 C1） 3. 在本地参加养老保险（跳问 C1）

B9. 您没有把养老保险转移到本市/县/区的原因是什么？|_|

1. 不知道相关政策 2. 手续太复杂 3. 办理会带来损失
4. 养老保险金太少，没必要办理 5. 其他（请注明）_____

C 居住情况

C1. 您现在住房属于哪种情况？|_|

1. 租住单位/雇主房 2. 单位/雇主提供免费住房 3. 政府提供廉租房
4. 租住私房 5. 已购商品房 6. 已购经济适用房 7. 寄住亲友家住房
8. 其他（请注明）_____

C2. 您在老家的住房属于哪种情况? |__|

1. 有自建房 2. 已购商品房 3. 没有住房 4. 其他（请注明）_____

C3. 现在住房共住多少人? _____人

C4. 现在住房面积多大? _____平方米

D 迁移意愿

D1. 近三年内，您是否打算继续居住在宁波? |__|

1. 是 2. 否

D2. 您是否愿意将户口转入宁波? |__|

1. 是 2. 否

D3. 如果您愿意将户口转入宁波，主要考虑是什么（多选）？

1. 能够获得更好的就业机会|__| 2. 充分享受宁波的养老/医疗等社会保险
|__|

3. 子女能够在宁波接受更好的教育|__| 4. 能够享受宁波的保障性的住房待遇|__|

5. 充分享受宁波的城市生活|__| 6. 其他（请注明）_____

D4. 如果您现在是农业户口，而且不愿意将户口转入宁波，主要考虑是什么
（多选）？

1. 不愿意失去农业户口|__| 2. 想在户籍地（街道或乡镇层次）农转非
|__|

3. 想落户在京上广 |__| 4. 想落户在家乡的省会城市|__|

5. 想落户在家乡之外的省会城市|__| 6. 想落户在家乡的县城或小城市|__|

7. 其他原因（请注明）_____

D5. 如果您不愿意失去农业户口，主要考虑是什么（多选）？

1. 想保留土地 ☐ 2. 城市户口没太大作用 ☐ 3. 农转非手续繁琐 ☐
4. 原有农村社保无法接续☐ 5. 城市房价太高☐ 6. 农村生活压力小 ☐
7. 其他（请注明）_____

D6. 如果您想愿意落户家乡省份的城市，主要考虑是什么（多选）？

1. 可以保留土地☐ 2. 就业机会更好☐ 3. 缴纳养老/医疗等社会保险更方便 ☐
4. 孩子可以入学☐ 5. 生活压力更小☐ 6. 生活方式更习惯☐
7. 亲戚朋友都在那☐ 8. 其他（请注明）_____

D7. 如果您现在是非农业户口，而且不愿意将户口转入宁波，主要考虑是什么（多选）？

1. 不愿意失去老家户口☐ 2. 想把户口迁移到京上广之类的特大城市☐
3. 想把户口迁移到省会城市☐ 4. 想把户口迁移到其他中小城市☐
5. 其他原因_____

D7. 您是否愿意长期在宁波居住？ ☐

1. 目前只是暂时居住，没有长期打算 2. 一年内要在宁波居住
3. 一到三年之内要在宁波居住 4. 三到五年或更长时间，要居住在宁波

D8. 您家有在宁波购买住房的打算吗？ ☐

1. 打算一年内购买 2. 打算两年内购买 3. 打算三年内购买
4. 有购房打算，但暂时不会购买 5. 没有购买住房的打算 6. 不好说

E 生活和交往

E1. 在宁波，您有属于本地人的亲戚吗？ ☐

1. 没有 2. 有, 大约_____人

E2. 在宁波, 您有已经获得本地户籍(户口已迁入)的老乡吗? |__|

1. 没有 2. 有, 大约_____人

E3. 在宁波, 您的各类朋友或熟人(不含亲戚、老乡)大约有多少人? _____人

E4. 在这些朋友或熟人中, 有宁波本地人吗? |__|

1. 没有(跳问 E6) 2. 有, 大约_____人

E5. 您是通过什么方式认识这些宁波本地人的?(可多选)

1. 工作关系或业务关系|__| 2. 邻里关系(包括房东或租房关系)|__|

3. 他人介绍或通过他人认识 |__| 4. 其他(请注明) _____

E6. 您愿意与本地人做以下事情吗?

类别	1 很愿意 2 比较愿意 3 不太愿意 4 很不愿意 5 不好说
1. 聊天	__
2. 一起工作	__
3. 成为邻居	__
4. 成为亲密朋友	__
5. 结成亲家	__

E8. 过去一年中, 有人实际帮过您吗(借钱物、帮助照看小孩、代料理生意等)? |__|

1. 一年中, 共有约_____人帮助过我

2. 找不到合适的人寻求帮助(跳问 E10) 3. 不需要别人帮助(跳问 E10)

E9. 过去一年中如果您接受过帮助, 给予您帮助的人有多少是宁波本地人? |__|

1. 没有宁波本地人给予帮助 2. 有宁波本地人给予过帮助, 共有约_____人

E10. 您适应本地的生活吗? |__|

1. 是, 更适应本地生活 2. 否, 更适应老家生活 3. 说不清

E11. 您觉得自己的社会经济地位在本地大概属于哪个层次? |__|

1. 上 2. 中上 3. 中 4. 中下 5. 下

E12. 您认为来本地务工以后, 您的生活有改善吗?

评价类型	1 好多了 2 好一些 3 无变化 4 差一些 5 差多了
1.总体状况	_
2 就业机会	_
3.工作环境	_
4.社会保障水平	_
5.子女教育状况	_
6.住房条件	_
7.文化娱乐	_
8.发展机会	_

E13. 就您目前的生活状况来说，您认为自己是本地人，还是外地人？ |_||

1. 是本地人 2. 是外地人 3. 不好说

E14. 您认为自己是外地人的主要原因是（多选）？

1. 自己是农村户口|_| 2. 根在农村|_| 3. 亲戚家人在农村|_|
4. 习惯了农村的生活方式|_| 5. 本地人不接纳自己|_|
6. 政府这么规定的|_| 7. 其他（请注明）_____

E15. 您认为要成为本地人最重要的条件是什么（多选）？

1. 获得本地户口|_| 2. 在本地购买住房|_| 3. 在本地有稳定的工作|_|
4. 收入高|_| 5. 与本地人结婚|_| 6. 会说本地话|_|
7. 在本地有很多朋友熟人|_| 8. 其他（请注明）_____

E16. 就您目前的生活状况来说，您认为自己的城里人，还是农村人？ |_||

1. 是城里人 2. 是农村人 3. 不好说

E17. 您上个月工作多少天？ _____天

E18. 您上个月平均每天工作几小时？ _____小时

E19. 您上个月的总收入为_____元

E20. 您觉得本地人对外地人的歧视严重吗？ |_||

1. 很严重歧视 2. 比较严重歧视 4. 不太歧视 5. 完全没有歧视 6. 不好说

E21. 请回答 16 岁以下正在读书的子女情况：

子女	性别 1 男 2 女	出生年月	调查是在哪里读书 1 老家 2 本地 3 其他	受教育程度 1 学龄前 2 小学 3 初中（中专） 4 高中（大专）
1	_	_ _ _ 年 _ 月	_	_
2	_	_ _ _ 年 _ 月	_	_
3	_	_ _ _ 年 _ 月	_	_
4	_	_ _ _ 年 _ 月	_	_
5	_	_ _ _ 年 _ 月	_	_