

Terrorism and the Australian Media: From the Hilton Bombing to the eve of 9/11

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Summary

This thesis seeks to fill a gap in scholarly literature on both terrorism and Australian history by examining the reporting and reactions of a selection of Australian newspapers regarding a set of terrorist incidents, from the 1978 Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing to an attack allegedly planned for the Sydney 2000 Olympics against the Lucas Heights Reactor. Newspaper material is also employed to further explore attitudes towards terrorism throughout the examined period, and how terrorism coverage was framed. In addition to examining reports and editorials, this thesis also examines printed letters to the editor, feature articles, and the response (within reportage) from major figures within the Australian political and security fields. This examination finds that, in reporting on and discussing terrorism, the selected newspapers frequently emphasised the facets of ethnicity, geographic distance, and 'otherness'. Terrorism was framed as an activity carried out by foreign agents in response to events occurring outside of and distant from Australia, and coverage frequently conflated terror with 'ethnic violence', a trend which grew in prevalence from the 1980s onwards. Additionally, major political and security sources were rarely questioned on their claims regarding terrorism, with newspapers often reporting their statements uncritically.

Preface

This thesis is entirely the work of the author, Mathew Henry, and does not contain any material written or produced by any other author or organisation except for where otherwise stated, and that all such material has been referenced and credited to the best of the author's ability and belief. This thesis has not been previously submitted for any degree or diploma at any university or similar institution.

(Signed):

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Introduction: “The Stepchild of the Media”? Terrorism and the Media: The Research

Terrorism as a phenomenon has emerged to become an influential source of concern for all kinds of populations across the globe. From the general public attempting to navigate their daily lives to the spheres of governmental policy-making, security theory, and academia, terrorism has been recognized as a major concern and issue facing societies across the world today. This overwhelming concern has been reflected heavily in news media outlets across the world: news cycles from broadcast, internet, and print-based media focus regularly upon terrorism and the concerns surrounding it, promoting and discounting attitudes, solutions, and associations. In this array of news media, newspapers have played a long and historically significant role in presenting terrorism to the public. It is this relationship, between terrorism and its image in the media, that has demanded examination by academics.

Terrorism has come to command a significant amount of attention from the academic world, especially in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001.¹ However, much of the academic attention on terrorism has tended to focus on terrorism as a de-historicized phenomenon, with some even contending that ‘new terrorism’ in the wake of September 11, totally different from what had come before, had “wiped the slate clean”.² Furthermore, studies on terrorism have generally been dominated by fields such as social and political sciences.³ Furthermore, the field of terrorism studies has displayed what Giovanni Mario Ceci has called an “extraordinarily ‘lopsided’ focus upon topics such Islamist terrorism, or on methods such as suicide tactics.”⁴ As a consequence of this de-historicizing approach, important academic perspectives and insights on terrorism have been lost.

While the continuing development of a historical approach to investigating terrorism (and especially Australian terrorism) is important, it is not the sole focus of this study. Another chief field to consider in developing a study on terrorism is the role of the media. Media

¹ Giovanni Mario Ceci, “A ‘Historical Turn’ in Terrorism Studies?”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 51 (4), (2016), p. 888.

² Ibid, p.889.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, p.888.

must be understood not simply as a passive and value-free transmitter of information, but as a system that serves as a distributor of ideology.⁵ According to Abraham Miller, the media and terrorism have long held a symbiotic relationship with each other; indeed, Miller went further in describing that terrorism was a “stepchild of the media”.⁶ The influence of the media on terrorism is enhanced by the knowledge that our own knowledge and understanding of terrorism rarely arises out of direct experience, but instead emerges from the ways it has been portrayed and framed by media producers.⁷ Media representation, and the process of media framing, further works to shape not only wider images of terrorism but also how societies and populations manage and negotiate information regarding terror.⁸ Part of this media framing also entails not simply working to define the problem of terrorism, but also in defining what solutions to that problem might be, or to put forward judgements on the events and the people caught within them.⁹ The power of media frames in shaping thought is notable and journalists themselves not immune to being manipulated by framing, with the sources they employ for their reporting (especially in the case of ‘elite’ governmental sources) imposing their own frames on news events, and heavily influencing journalistic judgements.¹⁰ Likewise, the importance of taking media into account in investigating terrorism is the potential role that media plays in not simply framing the issue, but in influencing how people such as policy makers understand and produce policy in response to these events.¹¹ As such, research and investigation into the relationships between media and terrorism (and how these relationships have evolved or showed continuity over time) may provide a variety of insights into how terrorism has been conceptualized and imagined as a problem.

⁵ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003), p.2.

⁶ Abraham Miller quoted in Kimberly Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11”, *Communication Studies*, Vol. 62 (1), (2011), p.91.

⁷ Mary Brinson & Michael Stohl, “From 7/7 to 8/10: Media Framing of Terrorist Incidents in the United States and the United Kingdom” in *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. David Canter, (Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: 2009), p.229.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Robert M. Entman, quoted in Mary Brinson & Michael Stohl, “From 7/7 to 8/10: Media Framing of Terrorist Incidents”, p.229.

¹⁰ Robert M. Entman & Andrew Rojecki, “Freezing out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement”, *Political Communication*, Vol.10 (2), (1993), p.155.

¹¹ Jacqui Ewart, “Framing an Alleged Terrorist: How Four Australian News Media Organizations Framed the Dr. Mohamed Haneef Case”, *Journal of Media and Religion*, Vol. 11 (2), (2012), p.93.

One of the major issues mentioned with regards to both the academic study and media coverage of terrorism has been how this coverage has unmoored terrorism from history. Part of this issue may be the difficulties in defining terrorism to start with: as Michael Frank has argued, the word 'terrorism' has deployed from its earliest uses in describing the Great Terror of the French Revolution as a specific tool to delegitimize one's political opponents.¹² As the usage of the term to delegitimize groups continued into the 20th century, Rudolf Walther argues, the terms 'terror' and 'terrorism' became de-historicized and could thus be employed to describe "any given enemy" of the term's user.¹³ Within the context of the September 11 attacks, such can be seen in the media's uncritical reporting of George W. Bush's statements on the terrorists as 'evil' and that the attack took place within a greater 'conflict of good against evil'.¹⁴ These governmental narratives of terrorism, reported uncritically by the media, are neither new nor unique to America: as Matthew Carr has noted, the British Government's testimony of the Irish Republican Army has employed language such as calling IRA members "servants of the devil", and furthermore that they had "taken evil into their souls".¹⁵ The usage of such language, Richard Jackson argues, is critical to the process of de-historicizing terrorism: by simply framing terrorism as 'acts of evil', it is voided of all political content and historical context.¹⁶ Such media coverage has produced images of terrorism that are strongly de-historicized, and are more employed to deal only with terrorism as directly defined by either security concerns, or to justify and legitimize governmental actions and abuses such as torture and indefinite detention.¹⁷ As such, media narratives contribute strongly to popular ideas of terrorism being unmoored from wider historical and political circumstances, along with the sense of terrorism as a constantly 'new' or 'unprecedented' phenomenon.

¹² Michael C. Frank, *The Cultural Imaginary of Terrorism in Public Discourse, Literature, and Film: Narrating Terror* (Routledge, 2017), p.38-39

¹³ Ibid, p.39

¹⁴ Richard Jackson, "Explaining Torture in the War on Terrorism", Working Paper, University of Otago, January 2005, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242161159_Explaining_Torture_in_the_War_on_Terrorism, p.10-11

¹⁵ Matthew Carr, *The Infernal Machine: An Alternative History of Terrorism* (London, Hurst & Company, 2011), p.10

¹⁶ Richard Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology and Counter-Terrorism: Writing Wars on Terrorism From Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr.", *Studies in Language and Capitalism*, Vol.1 (1), p.180

¹⁷ Richard Jackson, "Explaining Torture in the War on Terrorism", p.10

Likewise, within the world of academia, focus upon the September 11 terrorist attacks has presumed that terrorism “began on September 11”.¹⁸ In doing so, the field has ignored both the history of terrorist incidents that had come before and the experiences of non-American countries, instead privileging the American experience.¹⁹ Furthermore, this research has often been geared more towards solving the problems of terrorism in the current day.²⁰ As Marie Breen Smyth argues, terrorism research has been state-centric, with the information gathered and research centred along the lines of dealing with terrorism as it has been defined by the state.²¹ This body of research, Smyth further argues, has been coloured by a sense of ‘moral certainty’, and especially so in the period of the War on Terror.²² Such approaches rarely seek to investigate terrorism’s roots, or potentially even the role the state may have played in terrorism’s development.²³ Beyond this, Smyth argues that what papers do seek to look into the roots of terrorism may instead site it within pathology, a ‘terrorist personality’ and psychology.²⁴ Such approaches have been employed by researchers for decades: as Matthew Carr has noted, investigations into the Baader-Meinhof Gang members ended with scientists removing brains and claiming to find evidence of ‘pathological modifications’.²⁵ Otherwise, the sense of moral certainty that Smyth has noted produces material which classifies terrorists as ‘evil’, despite the fact that such judgements are entirely unscientific.²⁶ Through such exercises, academic research has not only dispensed with any historical or contextual factors for terrorism, but has also sought to render it as being ultimately inexplicable and beyond any real understanding.²⁷ Like media coverage, then, academic research on terrorism has often ultimately served to produce analyses of terrorism that are strongly de-historicized, employed to deal with terrorism often only as defined within a given security and governmental framework.

¹⁸ Marie Breen Smyth, “A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror”, *European Political Science*, Vol. 6 (3), (2007), p.260

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Robert Gerwarth & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Internationalising Historical Research on Terrorist Movements in Twentieth-century Europe”, *European Review of History—Revue europe'enne d'Histoire*, Vol. 14 (3), (2007), p.275

²¹ Marie Breen Smyth, “A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror”, p.261

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Mathew Carr, *The Infernal Machine*, p.1

²⁶ Marie Breen Smyth, “A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror”, p.261

²⁷ Ibid.

Just as a significant portion of media coverage and scholarship on terrorism has failed to provide a historical context for terrorism, it has also contributed to a failure to focus on and understand pre-9/11 events. Commenting on the state of terrorism research, Marie Breen Smyth has expressed concerns about the field's "worrying tendency to 'wipe the slate clean'" in regards to not only accepting divisions between 'old' and 'new' terrorism, but in devaluing 'old' terrorism scholarship.²⁸ Such an approach can contribute to major misunderstandings in thought: as Gerwarth and Haupt have argued, research both prior to (and especially in the wake of) the September 11 attack has treated phenomena such as transnational terrorism as historically 'new'.²⁹ In particular, they have argued that (in a critique that echoes the concerns of Smyth), such perceptions of 'newness' in the context of European transnational terrorism are also tied with terrorism research's focus on individual national case studies.³⁰ These judgements about the 'newness' of terrorism have also been often repeated within official government statements, with Richard Jackson's examination of the Reagan administration recording that the threat and scale of terrorism was constantly described in governmental releases as 'new'.³¹ With both such mistaken perceptions of terrorism, and the constant repetition of terrorism as a new phenomenon being common in both the media and academia, there's a need to examine terrorism (and coverage of terrorism) within the pre-9/11 world. This work would also need to question whether 9/11 truly represents a moment of 'newness' and as such a break with the past within the wider history of terrorism. With such factors in mind, Gerwarth and Haupt have noted the utility of historical comparisons over a given time period in order to investigate the relationships between regimes and terrorist violence.³² Ultimately, there is a need for scholarship that is able to question the divisions established in the field and to bridge the intellectual gaps that have been established within it.

Research into the relationships between terrorism and media (along with media framing) has been carried out extensively in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and a sizable body of investigative research exists. Kimberly Powell's work, for example, has focused upon terrorism in the American context and the differences in media framing between incidents of Islamic terrorism versus reporting on domestic terrorism, and in how one set

²⁸ Marie Breen Smyth, "A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror", p.260-261

²⁹ Robert Gerwarth & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Internationalising Historical Research", p.275

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Richard Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology and Counter-Terrorism", p.167-168

³² Robert Gerwarth & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Internationalising Historical Research", p.276

of events and suspects was portrayed as of more danger and significance than the other.³³ Other research has focused itself upon specific events terrorist, such as Brian Monahan's investigation into the media reporting and framing surrounding the September 11 attacks and their immediate aftermath.³⁴ Some of this academic research has focused specifically upon the Australian context in these relationships: Ewart, Pearson, and Lessing have investigated how governmental and legal pressures affected the business of media reporting on terrorism.³⁵ Less academically-inclined work, such as Matthew Carr's *The Infernal Machine: An Alternative History of Terrorism*, has also brought some attention to the relationship between terrorism, news and popular media, governmental narratives and antiterrorist policy.³⁶ However, much of the research carried out has focused upon the post-September 11 time period. Furthermore, as Kate O'Donnell and Jacqui Ewart have noted, little academic attention has been devoted to how Australian media covered and framed terrorist incidents prior to this time.³⁷ Their own study on the Bunbury bombing in Western Australia, and the conflicts between whether the incident was framed as terrorism or criminal sabotage, remains (as of time of writing) as one of the only pieces of work focusing on the period.³⁸ In their work, they have also called for more research work to be developed focusing upon the pre-September 11 period in Australia.³⁹ In investigating media reporting on terrorism from the occurrence of the 1978 Sydney Hilton bombing to before 9/11, this study attempts to work to fill in the gap Ewart and O'Donnell have identified.

Moreover, Australia's own knowledge of its own history of terrorism in general has been limited. As Sean Brawley and Ian Shaw have noted, there is the perception within wider Australian society that there has been only one terrorist incident in Australia's history: the

³³ Kimberly Powell, "'Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11", in *Communication Studies*, Vol.62 (1), 2011, p.90-91

³⁴ Brian Monahan, *The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11*, (New York, New York University Press: 2010), p.55

³⁵ Jacqui Ewart, Mark Pearson & Joshua Lessing, "Anti-Terror Laws and the News Media in Australia Since 2001: How Free Expression and National Security Compete in a Liberal Democracy", *Journal of Media Law*, Vol. 5 (1) p.130-131

³⁶ Matthew Carr, *The Infernal Machine*, p.3-4

³⁷ Kate O'Donnell & Jacqui Ewart, "Reassessing the Bunbury Bombing: Juxtaposition of Political and Media Narratives", *Salus*, Vol. 5 (1), (2017), p.28

³⁸ Ibid, p.28

³⁹ Ibid, p.41

bombing of the Sydney Hilton on February 13, 1978.⁴⁰ Brawley and Shaw have further contended that while Australia does have a long history of politically-motivated violence, such violence has not generally been labelled as 'terrorism' by either the public or academia.⁴¹ When attention has reached Australian terrorism, it has generally tended to focus specifically upon the Hilton bombing, and often such scholarship has come from scholars of law. Works such as Michael Head's, while placing the Hilton bombing as a historical event, analyse it more for its influence on the development of Australian security powers and antiterrorist policing.⁴² Such work has also approached the Hilton bombing as a legal mystery and conspiracy, pursuing whether there was a cover-up and frame-up involved in the incident.⁴³ Attention from the general public has also tended to focus upon the Hilton Bombing, again focusing upon the incident as a 'mystery'. Rachel Landers' book, *Who Bombed the Hilton?* opens with questions like these, investigating the claims and twists of the bombing investigation and news coverage of the Hilton bombing. In this investigation, she opens with the questions of police corruption, conspiracy theories, the pursuit of Ananda Marga, ultimately leading to "Who did bomb the Hilton?".⁴⁴ Such questions focus more upon the Hilton bombing as a mystery case rather than focusing upon its place in the development of Australian terrorism. Such approaches have been compounded by works of public history such as Daryl Dellora's 1994 documentary *Conspiracy*, which again posed the event as an unsolved mystery: indeed, the film's *Film Art Media* page describes the event as "Australia's most notorious unsolved crime" rather than as a terrorist event.⁴⁵ Ultimately, events beyond the bombing of the Sydney Hilton have received little dedicated academic attention, and what attention has been received has focused more towards the angle of presenting incidents as 'mysteries' rather than as acts of terrorism.

A long-standing point of contention in the field of terrorist studies has been the difficulty in defining the word 'terrorism'. As of 2017, major international organizations such as the

⁴⁰ Sean Brawley & Ian Shaw, "Echoes of Distant Thunder: Musings on a History of Terrorism in Australia" in *Doomed to Repeat? Terrorism and the Lessons of History*, ed. by Sean Brawley, (Washington, DC, New Academia Publishing: 2009), p.217-218.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.217

⁴² Michael Head, "Thirty Years Since Sydney's Hilton Hotel bombing: Unanswered Questions", *Legal History*, Vol. 12 (2), (2008), p.242-243

⁴³ Ibid, p.249-253

⁴⁴ Rachel Landers, *Who Bombed the Hilton?*, (Sydney, NSW; Newsouth Publishing, 2016), p.18

⁴⁵ "Conspiracy", Film Art Media, accessed March 6, 2018, <https://www.filmartmedia.com/projects/conspiracy/>.

United Nations have still been unable to reach a universally agreed-upon definition of the term.⁴⁶ Occasionally, difficulties around the definition of the term have led to it being declared 'analytically useless' by some researchers.⁴⁷ While questions surrounding the definition of terrorism are important, the issue of whether an incident is perceived and framed as an occurrence of terrorism is of greater importance to this work. As O'Donnell and Ewart's research has shown, media framing plays a determining role in whether an incident is defined as terrorism or not.⁴⁸ Indeed, O'Donnell and Ewart's research has shown that there may be attempts to change narratives around specific events, and that these attempts may be embraced or denied by major media channels.⁴⁹ Part of the work of this study is in evaluating whether a particular incident of political violence is referred to as terrorism or not, and whether other incidents not usually understood as terrorism may be framed by news media channels as such.

Furthermore, in investigating the links between terrorism, the media, and history in the Australian context, further blind spots within the research emerge. As such, academic knowledge of Australian terrorism has generally been lacking. Attempts at a more-encompassing history of terrorism in Australia have been made by Stuart Koschade, who wrote in 2007 an article cataloguing and categorizing incidents of terrorism in Australia.⁵⁰ Koschade's work does attempt to provide a set of historical contexts in which events of terrorism within Australia can be placed.⁵¹ In establishing such contexts, Koschade has sought chiefly to help spur the development of interdisciplinary approaches to "understand, explain and predict terrorism in Australia".⁵² Furthermore, this work places a greater emphasis on events of Islamic terrorism, categorizing the post-1990 period as the era of "21st Century Islamic Extremism".⁵³ In doing so, such pieces tend to reflect their own attitudes as to what kinds of incidents are classified as 'terrorist'. Focusing upon Islam in

⁴⁶ "Differing Views on How to Preserve Stability amid Existential Threats, as General Debate Considers Security, Human Rights, International Law", United Nations, accessed February 17, 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ga11952.doc.html>.

⁴⁷ Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "How New Is the New Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (5), (2004), p.440

⁴⁸ Kate O'Donnell & Jacqui Ewart, "Reassessing the Bunbury Bombing", p.35-36

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Stuart Koschade, "Constructing a Historical Framework of Terrorism in Australia: From the Fenian Brotherhood to 21st Century Islamic Extremism", *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, Vol. 2 (1), (2007) p.54-76

⁵¹ Ibid, p.54

⁵² Ibid, p.71

⁵³ Ibid, p.56

the 1990s period, for example, ignores potential acts of terrorism such as the 1995 firebombing of the French consulate in Perth. Likewise, Brawley and Shaw have criticized Koschade's approach due to its limited selection of events that have parallels with more contemporary acts of terrorism.⁵⁴ A 'deeper investigation of Australia's past', Brawley and Shaw contend, would also serve to challenge the categories of terrorism that Koschade sought to establish.⁵⁵ Brawley has also produced other research on earlier terrorist incidents within Australia, noting the numerous incidences of left-wing terrorism.⁵⁶ However, as Brawley notes, many of these incidences of terrorism were never covered in the press, and that they may have been downplayed by the government of the day.⁵⁷ As a result, these incidences of terrorism by themselves are largely beyond the scope of this work, although references to them in the course of reporting on terrorist events during the period will be noted.

Concerns regarding Islam and race and their connection with Australian media discourses around terrorism have also been examined by Anne Aly. Aly has argued that post-9/11 media has framed Islam specifically as backward, oppressive, and violent, but has also stated that post-Gulf War discourses posed Islam as a dangerous threat to Australia.⁵⁸ Keeping in mind that media framing also seeks to appoint blame and responsibility, this work will keep in mind the argument put forward by Andrew Markus that racial questions and issues began taking on much greater prominence in Australian politics through the 1980s, the middle of the examined period.⁵⁹ As such, the presence of race and ethnicity in media framing (if present) must be noted, along with how newspapers respond to these issues of race and what solutions they propose.

With the knowledge of relationships between terrorism, the media, and media framing in mind, this work seeks to examine how the Australian media has responded to incidences of terrorism within Australia. This study will examine how a selection of major Australian newspapers has covered and represented the issue of terrorism. In investigating

⁵⁴ Sean Brawley & Ian Shaw, "Echoes of Distant Thunder", p.220

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Sean Brawley, "Days of Rage Down Under: Considering American Influences on 'Home-Grown' Terrorism and ASIO's response in 1970s Australia", *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 47 (2), (2016), p.297

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.298

⁵⁸ Anne Aly, "Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media", *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 42 (1), (2007), p.29-30

⁵⁹ Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, (Crows Nest: NSW, Allen & Unwin, 2001), p.222

newspapers, one has access not only to the news coverage of an event, but also the reactions to those events in the form of editorials, comments, and letters to the editor. In focusing upon the period from the 1978 bombing of the Hilton to before the events of September 11 2001, this study seeks to attempt to somewhat remedy the gap identified by O'Donnell and Ewart.

The thesis attempts, more specifically, to remedy this knowledge gap by investigating the media coverage provided by a selection of Australian newspapers. The newspapers selected for this study of the Australian media are the *Age*, *The Australian*, the *Canberra Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, with supplemental material coming from the *Australian Jewish Times* and the *West Australian*. These newspapers have been selected in order to provide a broad spectrum of political and social opinions and understandings within the Australian news media of the time. Additionally, the chief newspapers for this thesis possess a national scope and outlook and possess a metropolitan outlook in reporting. Data for these newspapers will be taken from microfilm collections assembled by the State Library of New South Wales. Additionally, the *Canberra Times* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* both possess accessible online archives (up to the year 1995) which permit for a range of search tools to be employed to enhance data collection, such as word lookup and searching by year and date. This has permitted for some greater ease in looking up coverage of events that did not fall within the original period of news coverage.

Care will be taken to avoid a 'presentist' approach when analysing these newspapers. It must be kept in mind at all times that the newspapers involved in the study have changed significantly over time. The *Australian*, for example, should not be understood and read as an always-conservative newspaper, but as occupying a more politically centrist ground with conservative outbursts between 1975-1988.⁶⁰ Likewise, values have shifted over time with changes in editors as with the *Age*, which according to Sybil Nolan experienced struggles with its values under the 1992-1995 editorial leadership of Alan Kohler.⁶¹ What these points hope to illustrate are that newspaper politics and values are historically

⁶⁰ Nicholas Rothwell, "Australian", in *A Companion to the Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (North Melbourne, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing: 2014), p.37

⁶¹ Sybil Nolan, "Age", in *A Companion to the Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (North Melbourne, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing: 2014), p.13

situated, and that the values and positions these papers may hold today should not be read into these same newspapers in any decade during the examined period.

The investigative framework of media framing will be employed. To frame something, Entman writes, is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.⁶² Entman further defines salience as material that is made ‘relevant’ or ‘meaningful’ to audiences.⁶³ Additionally, this thesis will follow Todd Gitlin’s understanding of the media as an active system for the distribution of ideology and “orchestration of daily consciousness”.⁶⁴ Gitlin posits that mass media produces ideology through a variety of functions including not simply through words and pictures along with statements and omissions, but additionally through also producing “fields of definition and association”.⁶⁵ Following the framework provided by both Gitlin and Entman, this piece will thus investigate the language employed by newspapers in both describing and defining terrorism as a phenomenon. Additionally, it will focus on what associations were made with terrorism, and how those were described. More particularly, when an incident is framed as an incident of terrorism, attention will be focused upon greater questions of association and problem sourcing. These questions would focus upon facets such as who or what was held responsible, what the source, cause, or history behind this incident (if provided) had been, why it was able to occur, and what the nature and extent of measures to prevent the problem from happening again are. Another site of investigation is in seeing what events and stories media framing attempted to connect these incidents to, or to what threats or national/international situations a selected incident was imagined to be attached to, and who was under threat. In investigating this, attention will be focused on how newspapers connected the events together, along with how it treated the groups it viewed to be victims, perpetrators, or otherwise involved in the selected terrorist event.

This thesis will examine not simply news article coverage of terrorism, but additionally editorials and commentaries regarding the event. Through these, one can also examine how news media has historically framed terrorism in relation to other issues of policy, and

⁶² Robert Entman, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43 (4), (1993), p.52

⁶³ Ibid, p.53

⁶⁴ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching*, p.1-2

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.2

to see how these pieces attempted to affect forward policy development in a given direction. Letters to the editor will also be examined somewhat in this thesis, where they appear. While representing to some extent the opinions of 'ordinary' Australians, letters are more often reflections of newspaper editorial policy, as Grey and Brown have noted.⁶⁶ Additionally, examining editorials and letters offers an insight into the formation and perpetuation of images and stereotypes surrounding terrorism that existed at a given historical moment. Focus on a terrorist incident will cover not simply initial coverage, but additionally articles related to the event and follow-up coverage of the incident including further developments in the case and further responses by the Australian Government or security forces (as reported by the media). Some of this follow-up coverage will have been located via the aid of digital look-up assistance.

Furthermore, coverage of news articles will pay attention to the role of 'elite sources' in informing and framing stories. 'Elite sources', as defined by Entman, are those individuals who have the power to influence policy decisions and outcomes, as well as groups who may have the power to influence decisions on policy making.⁶⁷ Examples of elite sources Entman gives are of senior political representatives and think tank groups.⁶⁸ Within the context of reporting on terrorism, Brinson and Stohl further define that elite sources may not only include politicians, but also security and authority figures and representatives, as well as terrorism 'experts'.⁶⁹ These individuals and groups interact with and inform the media in order to affect and influence policy outcomes, advancing or hindering policy outcomes according to a variety of political agendas.⁷⁰ Brinson and Stohl further state that elite sources have enhanced power to influence media framing due to assumptions by the media that elite sources possess "enough knowledge to provide a complete story" and thus fail to adequately interrogate their claims and assumptions.⁷¹ As such, this thesis will take special note of elite sources regarding what they say about terrorism in Australia, as well as how newspaper media responds to those statements.

⁶⁶ David L. Grey and Trevor R. Brown, "Letters to the Editor: Hazy Reflections of Public Opinion", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 47, (1970), p.450-453

⁶⁷ Robert Entman, *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989) p.19

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Mary Brinson & Michael Stohl, "From 7/7 to 8/10: Media Framing of Terrorist Incidents", p.230

⁷⁰ Robert Entman, *Democracy Without Citizens*, p.19

⁷¹ Ibid.

In analysing news coverage, feature articles, editorials, and letters, chief focus will be placed upon the language and terminology they employ. Through examining the terms they employed to describe terrorism (such as 'foreign' or 'ethnic') these terms can be used to examine attitudes to terrorism. Examining the terminology used to define terrorism will also pay attention to what terms are used at a given period in time, as well as how this language changed (or remained stable) over time. By noting patterns of language usage over time, this data may be then used to examine whether wider media attitudes and framing surrounding terrorism changed over time, at what times over the study this framing changed, and in what ways this framing changed over the period.

Such investigations also hope to reveal how these images, stereotypes, and understandings of terrorism have evolved throughout the pre-September 11 period.

Chapter 1: “Things Will Never Be The Same Again”: The Late 70s and the Hilton Bombing

Early in the morning on February 13, 1978, while collecting rubbish outside the Hilton Hotel on George Street in Sydney, a team of garbagemen would set off a bomb placed inside a bin. The blast, which would go on to claim three lives, marked a major point in the history of terrorism within Australia. General consensus on the bombing itself held that it had been carried out by an Indian religious sect known as Ananda Marga and aimed towards assassinating then-Indian prime minister Morarji Desai.¹ While political violence had long been present in Australia, it would be this moment that for many Australians would be marked as the definitive arrival of terrorism within their country. As New South Wales premier Neville Wran commented on February 14th, “[F]or the first time in our history, terrorism, against innocent and uninvolved people, has become a fact of life in our country”.² Later, too, the incident would be remembered as the moment in which “terrorism had arrived in Australia”.³ Yet contemporary media reactions to the incident did not quite treat the affair as a totally new event. Coverage of the event would also touch upon a range of other frames: about how Australia was now part of a larger world, the need for security, and the foreignness of ‘terrorism’.

One of the major themes that emerges from press coverage of the event is the ‘newness’ of terrorism to Australia: as the New South Wales police superintendent Reg Douglass put it, “in this country we’ve never had such a thing before”.⁴ This ‘newness’ was common in elite sources: not simply Neville Wran, but additionally the Federal Director of the Liberal Party Tony Eggleton was driven to comment that “Violence, commonplace in other parts of the world, has now come to Australia”.⁵ Minister for Defence James Killen wrote an opinion piece for the *Australian* regarding terrorism entitled “This is a new kind of world warfare”, noting the growing development of terrorist incidents throughout the world.⁶ Even the other leaders present at the CHOGRM meeting would be brought into attest to the newness of Australian terrorism, expressing shock that if terrorism had “spread to a

¹ Phillip Ayres, *Malcolm Fraser: A Biography*, (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1987), p.376

² “Terrorism now ‘Fact of Life’”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.2

³ Malcolm Fraser and Margaret Simmons, *Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs* (Carlton, Vic: The Miegunyah Press, 2010), p.497

⁴ Michelle Grattan and Gregg Borschmann, “Police Saw No Threat in Bins”, *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.5

⁵ “Things Will Never be the Same Again”, *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.1

⁶ James Killen, “This is a New Kind of World Warfare”, *Australian*, February 15, 1978, p.2

peaceful country like Australia” then wider international action against terror was needed.⁷ In particular, this action needed to be aimed against foreign “terror havens”, with the article specifically highlighting Libya, Algeria, and “some South American countries”.⁸ As such, elite opinions (such as Australian political leaders) generally presented a united opinion on the novelty of the Hilton bombing, pushing forward the idea not only of terrorism as new to Australia, but additionally of Australia now entering a new age and being caught up within a larger, worldwide struggle.

However, some articles ran counter to this established theming. At the same time that elite sources were proclaiming the novelty of terrorism, other articles pointed to longer histories of the phenomenon within Australia. Writing for the *Australian*, even the title of John Hallow’s article “Bombs... the not-so-new terror” directly challenged claims as to the novelty of the situation.⁹ In this article, Hallow would note that Australia had a longer history of bombings than simply the Hilton event, bringing up incidents such as the 1972 Yugoslav travel agency bombing and the 1976 Bunbury Bombing.¹⁰ The *Canberra Times* would similarly claim that terrorism “is in Australia, and has in fact been here for quite some time already”.¹¹ This claim was, however, made without reference to any specific event. However, the *Canberra Times* ran on the same day an article pointing to more specific events of terrorism: in particular, it noted the occurrences of attacks on Yugoslav, Indian, and Soviet properties.¹² With these attacks taken into account, there was the impression given that Australia had long served as a ground for international political violence, and that the Hilton bombing was merely another event within this field.

At the same time as placing this event within a wider context of bombings, many initial articles and editorials within print media still ran with the theme of newness in their own coverage of the event. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, while acknowledging that Australia “was not entirely a stranger” to acts of terror, nevertheless held that there was an “ugly new dimension” to the event.¹³ Likewise the *Daily Telegraph*, while acknowledging that bombs had been employed before in Australia, stated that the Hilton bombing “was the

⁷ Grahame Morris, “Leaders Want End of Terror Havens”, *Australian*, February 15, p.1

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John Hallow. “Bombs... The not-so-new Terror”, *Australian*, February 14 1978, p.9.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “The Urban Terrorist”, *Canberra Times*, February 14 1978, p.2.

¹² “A New Low for Indiscriminate, Mindless Slaughter”, *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2

¹³ “Terrorism”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14 1978, p.9

first time a bomb had been used with such deadly effect for a seemingly political purpose".¹⁴ Furthermore, the *Telegraph's* editorial stated that the bombing was "a scene Australians hoped, no, earnestly believed – could never happen here".¹⁵ Within the *Age*, the Hilton bombing was described as being separate from previous attacks due to whom it was believed to have targeted: it was in 'the international league' due to 'the standing of the men whose lives it touched'.¹⁶ The *Australian*, in relaying Tony Eggleton's statements on terror, ran with the headline "Things Will Never be the Same Again", a title positing a strong break with previous history.¹⁷ The *Canberra Times*, while positing a longer history of terrorism in Australia, at the same time downplayed the importance of a sense of history through stating that it was "less important to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the deaths of two people and the maiming of several".¹⁸ It, too, found reasons to state that the bombing (despite Australia's long history of them) was unique; in an article entitled "A new low for indiscriminate, mindless slaughter", the 'new element' introduced being the 'lack of discrimination used by the bombers'.¹⁹ While there was an attempt to add a sense of history to the bombing and to note that neither terrorism nor bombings were by any means new to the Australian scene, these claims were at the same time partially undermined by the consistent emphasis across newspapers as to the 'new' dimensions of the Hilton bombing. Furthermore, such coverage did little to explore why these terrorist attacks had occurred, or to place them in wider contexts rather than simply listing them: the *Canberra Times*, while mentioning an attack on the Soviet Embassy, could only say that it was carried out by "a Bulgarian with a grievance".²⁰ This also occurred within the *Age*, with an editorial referring to Croatian terrorism as simply "blood feuding by Yugoslav factions".²¹ Ultimately, while newspapers, in some limited fashion, did attempt to place the Hilton bombing within a wider historical context, at the same time they still echoed elite opinions of the bombing as a novel event and of the birth of a new age for Australia.

Another theme that ran through coverage of the event was the sense of Australia being brought into a much larger world. Indeed, some articles were critical of Australia's

¹⁴ "Deadly List of Horror", *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.4

¹⁵ "Security Rethink Needed", *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.6

¹⁶ "An Attack of Madness", *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

¹⁷ "Things Will Never be the Same Again", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.1

¹⁸ "The Urban Terrorist", *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2.

¹⁹ "A New Low for Indiscriminate, Mindless Slaughter", *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "An Attack of Madness", *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

perception of being isolated from the world's problems: as an editorial in the *Age* by Tony Walker, entitled "World's curse is here: terror" argued, Australia was found to be 'no less vulnerable to terrorism' than other nations.²² The *Canberra Times*' own editorial piece on February 14 argued much the same, stating that the bombing signalled an end to the 'naivete' of isolationist sentiment and that "anything that happens elsewhere in the world can also happen here".²³ The *Sydney Morning Herald* would also report that Australia was not "immune to the international disease of terrorism and violence, and that Australians could no longer simply assume that "it can't happen here".²⁴ For the *Daily Telegraph*, not only was the bombing the mark of 'belonging to the international community', but one that came at the 'heavy price' to Australians in the form of the "diminution of their personal freedoms".²⁵ The *Australian* stated the same, claiming that the bombing "savagely demonstrated our vulnerability to terrorist attack and our unpreparedness to meet it".²⁶ These editorials (coming from across such a range of newspapers) served to frame the problem of terrorism as one that came particularly from abroad, and of an Australia which had now been stripped of its naivete and was now, particularly, as vulnerable as any other nation to the threat of terrorism.

Tied with this expression that Australia was being brought into the world and had contracted this 'international disease' was the also-expressed belief of terrorism and terrorist violence of being imported into Australia. *Australian* journalist George Negus, in commenting on the Australian history of terrorism, noted specifically that "imported political violence is not new to Sydney streets".²⁷ This claim was reiterated by David Elias in an article on the leader of Ananda Marga, stating "Australia is growing accustomed to the imported violence of bomb and knife".²⁸ While the *Australian* did consider the potential for the terrorists involved in the bombing to be local Australians, it still pointed to a sense of foreignness by commenting the bombing was "modelled on the methods of international terror".²⁹ This feeling was also put forward by members of the public in printed letters to the editor: in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Campbell Greenland lamented that "it seems

²² Tony Walker, "World's Curse is Here: Terror", *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

²³ "The Urban Terrorist", *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2.

²⁴ "Terrorism", *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.9

²⁵ "Security Rethink Needed", *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.6

²⁶ "Fighting Terrorism", *Australian*, February 24, 1978, p.6

²⁷ George Negus, "Set Barbour on Terrorists' Trail", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.3

²⁸ David Elias, "Baba, The Clerk who has Sparked a Crusade", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.9

²⁹ "Stop Knocking the Security Services", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.8

tragic that we have imported terrorists in our wonderful country”.³⁰ A letter printed in the *Australian*, titled “Stop the importing of undesirable scourges”, echoed the same, blaming immigrants for committing an “act of barbarous terrorism” on “innocent Australians”.³¹ This sense of Australia being brought into the world through terrorism (and of being influenced or even ‘infected’ by it from abroad) would be influential in shaping not just reader opinion, but additionally policy solutions proposed by the press.

This sense of the ‘foreignness’ of terrorism was also reiterated through the comparisons and language employed. The bombing and security measures taken were compared often with other national experiences such as Ireland’s, with an article on February 14th entitled “Witness reminded of Northern Ireland”.³² This framing continued into February 15, with another article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* entitled “Bowral – for a little girl it’s a town like Belfast”.³³ The *Canberra Times* employed the same imagery, stating the bomb was “placed... with the sort of bloody-minded callousness much admired by the Irish Republican Army”.³⁴ The *Daily Telegraph* drew upon Northern Ireland not simply as a comparison, but as a potential future threat to Australia, stating in an editorial “we cannot and will not countenance the upsurge in Australia of the bloody violence and terror that has torn Northern Ireland asunder”.³⁵ These comparisons helped, in a fashion, to reinforce the idea of terrorism as something foreign and imported into Australia.

Focus quickly fell upon the Ananda Marga religious sect as a chief suspect in the bombing mystery. Even before the bombing, the *Sydney Morning Herald* reported upon Ananda Marga as a group of interest, noting its suspected role in attacks on Indian government officials both in Australia and abroad.³⁶ It was, however, the *Australian* which focused upon the group the most, providing a brief history of group founder Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, and his founding of the sect based upon his teachings of a set of occultist and mystical beliefs he developed while working as a railway clerk.³⁷ Noting Sarkar “[N]ow uses the name Anand Murtiji – superhuman of eternal bliss”, the article noted that his release from

³⁰ Campbell Greenland, Letter to the Editor, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.9

³¹ Jean Williams, Letter to the Editor, *Australian*, February 18, 1978, p.8

³² Peter Logue, “Witness Reminded of Northern Ireland”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.2

³³ Carolyn Parfitt, “Bowral – for a Little Girl it’s a Town Like Belfast”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 15, 1978, p.2

³⁴ “A New Low for Indiscriminate, Mindless Slaughter”, *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2

³⁵ “Security Rethink Needed”, *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.6

³⁶ Jeff Penberthy, “Security Like Fort Knox on Sydney Summit”, *The Sun-Herald*, February 12, 1978, p.3, 38

³⁷ David Elias, “Baba, The Clerk who has Sparked a Crusade”, *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.9

an Indian jail was now “the fanatical objective of his followers across the world”.³⁸ The group’s heavy association with terrorism was noted, focusing particularly on how the group had been banned in its native India out of fear that it was preparing to engage in a “campaign of assassination”.³⁹ Also noted was the sect (described as “the spawn of jailed Baba”) and its association with further groups of interest such as the Proutist Revolutionary Front and the Proutist Forum of Australia.⁴⁰ ‘Proutist’ itself referred to the group’s socio-economic beliefs, called Progressive Utilisation Theory (or PROUT).⁴¹ Of special note was the group’s beliefs in the destruction of ‘an oppressive elite’ and the reformation of society.⁴² This belief in violence, the *Australian* claimed, was present in some of the literature the group disseminated: Ananda Marga pamphlets such as *The Way of Peace* including information promoting violence, “physical revolution” and terrorist acts.⁴³ Ananda Marga’s own Australian spokesman, Tim Anderson, was reported as also going by the name “Govinda” (“one of the names of Krishna”).⁴⁴ Likewise, the group’s repeated association with terrorism was emphasised somewhat through its Indian roots: while the Australian branch of the sect was noted as having initially “started without these sinister trappings” of terrorist action, this soon changed as the Australian branch began sending disciples to India, noting “some of them were getting in trouble with the law”.⁴⁵ The group’s troubles with the Indian law (and its ability to drag Australians into trouble) were illustrated through the stories of Australian members Andre Colbert and ‘Sister Didi’, who had been in trouble with the Indian law for suspected subversion.⁴⁶ The *Australian* also connected the group with a series of attacks upon Indian Government officials and facilities throughout Australia, noting incidents such as the damaging of the Indian High Commission in Canberra through fire and a kidnap attempt upon an Indian official in 1977.⁴⁷ These attacks were emphasised as occurring even on a global scale, with attacks and threats upon Indian officials in places as far away as London, New York, and

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ John Blaxland and Rhys Crawley, *The Secret Cold War: The Official History of ASIO, 1977-1989*, (Crow’s Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2016), p.84

⁴² David Elias, “Baba, The Clerk who has Sparked a Crusade”, *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.9

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Stockholm being attributed to the sect.⁴⁸ Altogether, the depiction of the group put forward by the *Australian* portrayed an alien sect given strongly to ideals of revolutionary and religious violence. Furthermore, the article continued the trend of placing terrorism as something that came from without to infiltrate Australia, even going so far in this instance as to transform Australian citizens into potential terrorist agents.

Later events would, in the eyes of certain newspapers, cement the link between the Hilton bombing and Ananda Marga further. On February 17, newspapers would report on a trio of Ananda Marga members (two of whom were Australians) who had been picked up by the Thai government over possession of explosives.⁴⁹ The *Australian* would directly connect the events immediately, reporting that Australian police wished to speak with the Thai government over the three, especially given their membership in the sect.⁵⁰ The *Daily Telegraph* would follow suit, noting additionally Ananda Marga's links with attacks on Indian officials, and further adding that they were suspected of plotting attacks on embassies in Bangkok.⁵¹ However, such framing was not universal: the *Age*, in contrast, emphasised the angle given by one of the accused's parents, in an article titled "Sect man's arrest a frame: mother".⁵² The interview's scepticism regarding the charges extended to other Ananda Marga members, with the sentiment being raised that they were being framed "all the time".⁵³ The *Sydney Morning Herald* emphasised the same, running an article titled "Framed, say Australians on explosives charge".⁵⁴ Furthermore, the *Herald* made no connections to the Hilton bombing, noting instead only that the Australian police were "very interested in the arrests of two Australians in Bangkok over explosives charges".⁵⁵ In this instance, then, one can see not simply a difference in framing on the matter of Australians involved with Ananda Marga, but also something of a dismissal of linkages between the sect and terrorist acts.

A side event that would eventually come into the orbit of the Hilton bombing was the arrest and conviction of three Ananda Marga members (Timothy Anderson, Paul Alister, and Ross Dunn) for a planned bombing of an Australian National Front member. The bombing

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "Thais Called on Bomber Hunt", *Australian*, February 17, 1978, p.1

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "Three on Bomb Count", *Daily Telegraph*, February 17, 1978, p.2

⁵² John Teerds, "Sect Man's Arrest a Frame: Mother", *Age*, February 17, 1978, p.3

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ "Framed, Say Australians on Explosives Charge", *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 17, 1978, p.1

⁵⁵ Ibid.

was allegedly intended to kill National Front leader Robert John Cameron and his family due to Cameron's 'outspoken racist beliefs'.⁵⁶ At the time, the bombing was considered a separate incident, with the *Canberra Times* going so far as to state "The charges have nothing to do with the Hilton Bombing".⁵⁷ Later occurrences would connect the two, with police informant Richard Seary naming the trio as the men who had 'fixed' the blast.⁵⁸ The *Australian* also connected the two events by drawing upon Seary's testimony that a member of Ananda Marga had told him that the group was behind the bombing, although there was "concern" about the blast at "sect headquarters".⁵⁹ *The Australia* additionally continued to frame Ananda Marga as a dangerous group, noting they "did not regard their plan as a murder" and that Seary feared for his life in disputing their interpretation.⁶⁰ Coverage of the trial was used by *The Weekend Australian* to position Ross and Dunn as members of a "suicide squad" for Ananda Marga, The *Sydney Morning Herald* would, at the conclusion of the trial, draw upon the quote of Justice Lee to declare the event a 'terrorist act', carried out by "men who resort to the bomb".⁶¹

A further significant theme, established across the days after the immediate coverage of the bombing, was the criticism of security arrangements at the event. Coverage of the event continued with the CHOGRM summit's visit to the country town of Bowral. Reacting to the need for security on short notice, the government deployed troops to patrol the town. This deployment of the army as part of security detail for the CHOGRM council attracted considerable criticism. The *Australian* ran a front-page article on the army's deployment in Bowral, with reactions such as questioning "is this Australia?" and commenting on the sense of the unreality of events being presented.⁶² Michelle Grattan, in her commentary response, brought up concerns of civil rights and whether the deployment set "a dangerous precedent for the use of the army".⁶³ These concerns were, however, tempered by the observation that the Fraser Government had to be seen to be doing something to

⁵⁶ Simon Balderstone, "Sect Three in Kill Bid: Police", *Age*, June 17, 1978, p.3

⁵⁷ "Sect Member Tells Of \$100 Payment", *Canberra Times*, July 27, 1978, p.8

⁵⁸ "Court Told Men Had 'Fixed' Hilton Blast", *Canberra Times*, February 28, 1979, p.1

⁵⁹ "Witness Feared Ananda Marga Death Threat", *Australian*, July 27, 1978, p.3

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "'Little Mercy' For Men Who Resort to The Bomb", *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 9, 1979, p.3

⁶² Philip Cornford, "Deadly Tiptoe Through the Tulips", *Australian*, February 15, p.1

⁶³ Michelle Grattan, "Bombing Reaction Mark of Inexperience", *Age*, February 16, 1978, p.5

provide maximum protection, and raised concerns as to how the government would attract accusations of 'slackness' if further attacks occurred.⁶⁴

These themes, established through the framing and coverage of the incident, reflected themselves in the problem diagnoses and policy solutions that print media sources advocated. Many of these solutions focused strongly on security and on the wider security debates occurring at the time of the bombing. Some of these debates centred around the role of the Police Special Branches and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), which had itself just emerged from a Royal Commission led by Justice Robert Hope.⁶⁵ The then-planned investigation into ASIO and the investigation into the police special branch in SA also attracted special attention from sections of the press. At this time, the South Australian Police Commissioner, Harold Salisbury, had been sacked by SA Premier Don Dunstan over a security scandal involving the Police Special Branch, in which Salisbury had withheld information from the Government and denied its existence.⁶⁶ Furthermore, there had been claims by former SA premier Steele Hall that ASIO had been using the Police Special Branches to collect and prepare files for them on individuals.⁶⁷ SA's investigation into its Police Special Branch was being followed up by an NSW investigation ordered by Premier Wran into suspected connections between NSW Opposition Leader Peter Coleman and ASIO.⁶⁸ The *Australian*, in its editorial the day after the bombing, focused on this conflict in criticizing NSW and SA premiers Wran and Dunstan for their roles into the investigations of both security agencies.⁶⁹ The duo were accused of engaging in 'political one-upmanship', and they (along with 'other shadowy and sinister figures') had been "using the political dogfight over security to denigrate the security forces".⁷⁰ In doing so, the two were 'fiddling with the big league of terrorism'.⁷¹ The theme of Australia now being connected to the wider world through terrorism was also employed in policy solutions, with the *Australian's* February 16 editorial stating "The Hilton incident must be the spur that goads Australia, the latest victim, into international counteraction".⁷² The *Age* concurred with this, arguing for "renewed commitment by

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Rachel Landers, *Who Bombed the Hilton?*, (Sydney, NSW: Newsouth Publishing, 2016), p.51

⁶⁶ Ted Knez, "Judge to Watch Over Police, Says Dunstan", *Australian*, January 24, 1978, p.1

⁶⁷ Greg Hartung, "ASIO-State Link Scrutiny Likely", *Australian*, January 24, 1978, p.2

⁶⁸ "Guarding the Guardians", *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 13, 1978, p.9

⁶⁹ "Stop Knocking the Security Services", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.8

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Now is the Time to Reject Terror", *Australian*, February 16, 1978, p.8

responsible nations against terrorism”.⁷³ The *Daily Telegraph* also put forward its own security plans, calling for a reassessment of security measures; additionally, however, they connected the problem to foreign influences, calling for ‘tighter immigration controls’ and improved surveillance at airports and ocean terminals.⁷⁴ The scope of this security overhaul also expanded, with the *Australian* running a piece by Greg Hartung positing that Parliament House, while presenting ‘the ultimate target’ to terrorists, had weak security arrangements.⁷⁵ The Hilton bombing, Hartung alleged, had become the catalyst required to make “necessary changes” to the state of security in Australian public buildings.⁷⁶

Opinion toward the development of security anti-terrorist measures was not universally behind the increased development of law and security, however. The *Canberra Times* warned that the expansion of state security powers in responding to public calls for protection could lead to the ‘insidious effect of gradually curtailing essential freedoms’.⁷⁷ The *Canberra Times* would continue its warnings about overreactions in the name of security in an editorial regarding parliamentary security, warning even that relying too strongly upon “security in situations that do not warrant an ostentatious display of force” could in fact encourage violent action.⁷⁸ It went further even in stating that creating a security force that could counter all ‘would-be terrorists’ was not only impossible, but unacceptable in terms of the loss to civil rights.⁷⁹ The *Age*, too, ran an article titled “The Security Debate”, presenting the opinions of Malcolm Fraser and Opposition Leader Bill Hayden, with the newspaper reporting Hayden’s concerns regarding sending security personnel to train overseas.⁸⁰ In particular, Hayden voiced his concerns on Australian personnel being involved in fighting terrorism overseas, an action whose results “would be to inject polarising sectarian influences in the Australian community”.⁸¹ These sentiments reflected not simply again that terrorism was an outside threat, but that acknowledging that threat in the wrong way risked infecting Australia with extra external threats such as sectarianism and community hatred.

⁷³ “An Attack of Madness”, *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

⁷⁴ “Security Rethink Needed”, *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.6

⁷⁵ Greg Hartung, “Parliament House – The Ultimate Target”, *Australian*, February 24, 1978, p.3

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ “The Urban Terrorist”, *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2.

⁷⁸ “Unacceptable Fortress”, *Canberra Times*, February 22, 1978, p.2

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ “The Security Debate”, *Age*, February 24, 1978, p.10

⁸¹ Ibid.

However, opinions on security coverage were united on one event: the security review that took place in the wake of the Hilton Hotel bombing. In the wake of the bombing, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser sought the services of veteran British policeman and former head of Scotland Yard Sir Robert Mark to undertake a review into Australia's police forces.⁸² The *Age* ran an editorial praising the Government's appointment of Sir Mark, who had "led the drive against the madmen of the provisional IRA" with "an absolute minimum of reactive violence" and a "mixture of firmness and patience".⁸³ The *Age's* concern for civil rights was also salved, with the editorial stating Sir Mark's appointment was the "defusing" of a potential "bomb", an "overreaction" which would lead to the develop of "draconian anti-terror legislation".⁸⁴ The *Australian*, too, praised the Government for seeking help from overseas experts and undertaking a review into police equipment and communications, noting that the bomb "savagely demonstrated both our vulnerability to terrorist attack and our unpreparedness to meet it".⁸⁵ Even here, the *Australian* reiterated that terrorism was a foreign phenomenon, carried out either "foreign extremists as the overflow of some conflict overseas" or as the result of the "lunatic fringe imitating today's trend to political violence".⁸⁶ Fraser also proposed an increase in communication between The *Sydney Morning Herald*, praised Fraser's proposals as "reasonable enough" and as something "that can only be welcomed".⁸⁷

As time and the investigation into the bombing went on, coverage of the event died down in papers. Security continued to be something of a focus in this period of later coverage, with the *Herald* lamenting the continuing laxity of security around Parliament House.⁸⁸ After a protest incident by a member of the Ananda Marga sect at Parliament House, the *Sydney Morning Herald* drew upon the statement of "an MP" in noting that the demonstration "showed how simple it would be for a terrorist to get into the House".⁸⁹ While security reforms from the bombing would take time to be implemented, they fundamentally shifted the nature of law enforcement in Australia. As an ultimate result of Sir Robert Mark's investigation into the police force, it was suggested ultimately that the

⁸² "Yard's Super Sleuth for Terror War", *Daily Telegraph*, February 24, 1978, p.2

⁸³ "PM Defuses A Bomb", *Age*, February 24, 1978, p.9

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ "Fighting Terrorism", *Australian*, February 24, 1978, p.6

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Better Security", *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 24, 1978, p.6

⁸⁸ "Loose Safety Check for Law Makers", *Sun-Herald*, August 20, 1978, p.4

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Commonwealth Police and A.C.T. Police be dissolved and merged into a new body.⁹⁰ The ultimate result of this review was the dissolution of the two bodies, and the subsequent formation of the Australian Federal Police.⁹¹ This action has been one of the most lasting results of the Hilton Hotel bombing and went on to affect how terrorism was tackled by the nation in future.

⁹⁰ Australian Federal Police, *Australian Federal Police: Annual Report 1979-1980* (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra: Union Offset Co. Pty. Ltd., 1981), p.1

⁹¹ Ibid.

Chapter 2: “Is our period of immunity coming to an end?”: Terrorism in the 80s

For Australia, the 1980s was marked by the occurrence of a number of significant acts of terrorism, and continuing discussions about the roles of security. In this decade, four incidents stood out as major terrorist attacks and formed part of Australia’s history of terrorism: the 1980 assassination of the Turkish Consul-General, the 1982 bombings of the Westfield Tower in Kings Cross and the Bondi Hakoah Soccer Club, and the 1986 bombing of the Turkish Consulate on Toorak Road in Melbourne. Unlike the Hilton Hotel bombing, however, these incidents have attracted significantly less lasting attention from both the scholarly and public fields, leaving their effects upon the history and development of attitudes towards terrorism in Australia largely unexplored. These incidents would also solidify the media framing, associations, and narratives surrounding terrorism in Australia. This framing would further establish terrorism as something foreign and invasive to Australia, emanating from overseas and transmitted through Australia’s ethnic communities.

1980 Sydney Turkish Consul-General Assassination

On the morning of 17th of December 1980, the Turkish Consul-General to Australia, Şarık Ariyak, was shot to death along with his bodyguard as he left his home to go to the consulate.¹ The assassination, claimed by the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide as their doing, was part of a wider international series of attacks upon Turkish diplomatic staff that had been occurring since 1973.² The incident was not only quickly posed as a terrorist act, but was additionally proclaimed by the *Australian* as the nation’s first political assassination.³ While there was a large manhunt, no perpetrators were ever caught and nobody was ever brought to trial over the incident.

Coverage of the event focused quickly upon the issue of security. Particularly, Australia’s readiness in the face of terrorist action was an issue, with the *Australian* running an article titled “Terrorism was predicted by top police officers”.⁴ Australia was posed as a prime and

¹ Richard Carey, “Street Execution”, *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.1

² Rod Usher, “Revenge Taken for a Wrong of Long Ago”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.1, 4

³ Richard Carey, “Street Execution”, *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.1

⁴ Malcolm Andrews, “Terrorism was Predicted by Top Police Officers”, *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.5

easy target for terrorism, citing a quote from just the previous month by Victorian CIB Detective Chief Superintendent Phil Bennett stating “The experts had expected it. Australia is a soft political country and an ideal refuge for dangerous dissidents”.⁵ The article drew upon a January 1980 quote from the head of counter-terrorism training in the Federal police, Chief Superintendent Jack Fletcher, “There is direct evidence that international terrorists have an interest in Australia”.⁶ Terrorism was not only something that Australia was vulnerable to, but a near-inevitable arrival: Detective Sergeant John Burke of the hold-up squad observed, “As much as I hate to say it, I think we (in Australia) are going to experience terrorism in the not-too-distant future”.⁷ Another article in the *Australian* further framed Australia as soft and unready, drawing upon a ‘senior policeman’ source that claimed Australia had not only just begun to take terrorism seriously since the Hilton bombing, but that the nation was “ten years behind in intelligence”.⁸ The *Age* also reported on the status of security in the nation, with journalist Roy Eccleston citing Australian Federal Police Commissioner Sir Colin Woods’ statement, “Europeans have been at the sharp end – dealing with this reality – for the past decade”, Australians had “learned the lesson” but at the same believed that “it could not happen here”.⁹ While the *Age* reported that Australia was “as well prepared as almost any nation in the world to deal with terrorist assault on a foreign embassy or government office”, It also reported that it was “impossible to predict which people from which missions” could be attacked.¹⁰

Also prominent in the coverage of the event was the assassination as symbolic of the infection of Australia with ‘ethnic violence’, posing terrorism again as something that came to Australia from abroad. The *Age* took the lead in this, stating that the assassination was merely “just another of a succession of politically inspired attacks among Sydney’s ethnic communities in recent years”.¹¹ In an editorial, the *Australian* also posed the assassination as a foreign event, that it was “inevitable that the rancors of other worlds, of other enmities would some day spill blood on Australian streets”.¹² Ongoing coverage of the event also focused upon the incident’s potential to stoke tensions within Sydney’s ethnic communities.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Toni McRae, “Envoy’s Murder Blamed on a Failure of Security”, *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.6

⁹ Roy Eccleston, “Police had Warned of Terrorism”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.5

¹⁰ “Terror Battle Goes on Around Clock”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.5

¹¹ “A City Plagued by Ethnic Violence”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.4

¹² “This is no Time for Emotional Racism”, *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.8

The *Australian* was particularly concerned about the potential harm of these tensions, warning in an editorial that an emotional “overreaction could “do enormous harm to our multi-racial society”, especially at a time when that society was “struggling to coalesce to form a mixture of nationalities into an Australia identity”.¹³ This sense of struggle in the face of ethnic tensions was also repeated in the *Age* and from political elites, with the Commissioner for Community Relations, Al Grassby, cited as saying the incident was the “worst single event in the past 30 years in Australia”.¹⁴ The *Australian*, covering a Turkish protest march against the assassination, reported that “angry Turks are threatening reprisals against Armenians, and police are taking no chances of today’s protest rally turning into a lynch mob”.¹⁵ This assassination and ethnic violence was further framed as being beyond any easy understanding, with the paper warning that police faced a daunting task of “unravelling the complex web of Middle East intrigues” if the terrorists were foreign-based.¹⁶ While the Justice Commandos claimed responsibility for the incident, speculation was rife as to which group was ‘actually’ behind the attacks. In an article covering police speculation wondering as to the source of the assassins, the *Australian* again framed terrorism as something foreign in asking whether the attackers were “local killers” or “foreign terrorists”.¹⁷

The *Canberra Times*, too, joined in framing the incident as another occurrence of international terrorism, of which the Sydney Hilton bombing was supposedly another example.¹⁸ Further reinforcing this image of terrorism as something foreign was the comparison drawn between the assassination and the bombing: that both events were “the transport of simmering hatreds, often to areas remote from the origins of these hatreds”, and a “willingness to extract vengeance for wrongs, real or imaginary”.¹⁹ The *Age*, like the *Australian*, also imagined the attack as perhaps being a part of a complicated plan within Middle Eastern politics, running an article theorising that the attacks were

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ “Turks Shocked and Angered”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.5

¹⁵ Ted Knez, “Turks to March Today in Protest Against Terror”, *Weekend Australian*, December 20-21, 1980, p.1

¹⁶ Richard Carey and Ted Knez, “Listed for Death”, *Australian*, December 19, 1980, p.2

¹⁷ Ted Knez, “Local Assassins Suspected”, *Weekend Australian*, December 27-28, 1982, p.1

¹⁸ “Terrorism in Sydney”, *Canberra Times*, December 18, 1980, p.2

¹⁹ Ibid.

carried out on the orders of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in order to threaten Western-allied nations in the region.²⁰

This awakening to the power of terrorism was to be countered by a variety of security shake-ups, new squads, and increased training. The *Australian* reported on these developments, stating that anti-terrorist efforts would be “greatly boosted” by the Government increasing overseas mission security while working to “enlarge rapidly the corps of highly-trained Federal Police”.²¹ In responding to these increases, an editorial in the *Age* praised the security forces for the measures they had already taken but questioned the predictive powers of the security forces, asking “to what extent can such actions be anticipated?”.²² Furthermore, the editorial worried about the potential for the loss of freedom of the “right to movement” through security measures that sought to protect politicians, envoys, and public servants.²³

However, coverage surrounding the assassination also attempted to provide some historical context to the event. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, in an article regarding the “web of old and bitter hatred”, focused chiefly on the Australian context by noting that Armenian hatred of Turks had “surfaced in Sydney two years ago” after the screening of the film *Midnight Express*.²⁴ The *Age* provided a more global context when it ran a short column discussing the events of the Armenian genocide, the growth of Armenian nationalism and the acceptance by Armenian nationalists of violence for political purposes.²⁵ The *Canberra Times* did likewise, running an article that provided both the Turkish and Armenian viewpoints on the event, along with a discussion of surrounding ethnic tensions in the region.²⁶ However, while providing a historical background to the event, the *Canberra Times* also argued in an editorial that this sense of history was unimportant: that it was not useful to “canvas the rights and wrongs of that time”.²⁷ Furthermore, the editorial argued this history “should have been buried along with the

²⁰ “Tangled Terror”, *Age*, December 19, 1980, p.2

²¹ Ted Knez, “Anti-Terror Measures Get Big Boost”, *Australian*, December 22, 1980, p.1

²² “The Spectre of Terrorism”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.13

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Susan Molloy, “Untangling the Web of Old and Bitter Hatred” *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 18, 1980, p.2

²⁵ Tom Ormonde, “Old Hatreds Renewed”, *Age*, December 20, 1980, p.13

²⁶ “Today’s Hatreds Fuelled by Injustices of Yesteryear”, *Canberra Times*, December 18, 1980, p.2

²⁷ “Terrorism in Sydney”, *Canberra Times*, December 18, 1980, p.2

other millions of dead from all sides in that conflagration”.²⁸ Such sentiments showed a sense of both isolationism and the desire for immigrants to ‘move past’ their histories and forge new identities. Additionally, while bringing up the history behind the event, the *Canberra Times* ultimately chose to discard its importance of that history through the statements made in its editorial piece, even as it failed to “bury” the past by writing an informational article on it.²⁹

1982 Israeli Consulate and Bondi Hakoah Soccer Club Bombings

Troubles with terrorism in the 1980s would not end with the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General. On the 23rd of December, 1982, bombs would detonate at two locations: the first at the Israeli Consulate located in Westfield Tower in Kings Cross, followed later by further explosions at Sydney’s Hakoah Club in Bondi.³⁰ While the bombs caused some damage to facilities, they only significantly injured one person and did not cause any fatalities.³¹ In the wake of the incident, responsibility was claimed by a number of organisations and people calling on the behalf of organisations, including the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.³² However, coverage also focused significantly on another group calling itself the Organisation for the Liberation of Lebanon of Foreigners.³³ Ultimately, although one person was arrested and tried for the bombings, they were released and the ultimate perpetrators behind the attack were never found.

Just as with the coverage of the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General, the bombings were swiftly categorised as foreign terrorism, alien to Australia. Particularly strong in this was the sense that Israel, Israelis, and the Jewish population were under attack: the *Age* reported in an editorial that the bombings were “certainly evidence that the Israeli-Arab conflict has reached out to involve Australia” and that Australia was “as much at risk from terrorists as any other country with a Jewish population and Israeli Government representatives”.³⁴ The *Canberra Times* echoed both these sentiments, noting that Australia did not want the “deplorably vicious Israeli-Arab conflict of several decades nor

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Neil Mercer and Mark Coultan, “Terror in Sydney”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 24, 1982, p.1

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Simon Clarke, Kate Legge, and Tom Ormonde, “Blasts: Terrorists Blamed”, *Age*, December 24, p.1

³⁴ “Terrorism Strikes Home”, *Age*, December 27, 1982, p.7

the violence that has ravaged Northern Ireland transported into this country”.³⁵ The *Canberra Times* reinforced this further through running an article on Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s response to the event, stating that he “pledged to do everything possible to protect Australia’s Jewish community”.³⁶ The *Australian* was particularly prominent in framing the attack as directed against the wider community, even giving the article the headline “Anti-Jewish terror blasts in Sydney”.³⁷ This article, in addition to providing coverage of the event, emphasised the fact that the building housing the Israeli Consulate was owned by the Westfield Corporation, which “had strong Jewish interests”.³⁸ The *Daily Telegraph* was even more emphatic in raising the prospect of ‘ethnic troubles’, arguing in an editorial that carrying out the attack so close to Christmas was “an insult to both our nation and our beliefs”.³⁹ Christmas was presented as a time “usually respected by Australians from whatever background”, because those who had made the choice to “make Australia their home” wished to “share the Australian way of life”.⁴⁰ The failure to respect Christmas was presented then as a failure of integration – of an inability to “become Australian” and “respect all that we hold sacred”.⁴¹ In line with the *Canberra Times*, the *Daily Telegraph* also desired to put the event at a distance, emphasising that the bomb attack was “alien to Australia”, that the nation had “never sought to take sides”, and that it “took no sides in this condemnation”.⁴²

Newspaper coverage across the board furthermore drew heavily upon Israeli governmental and community sources, with newspapers quoting extensively from figures such as Israeli Consul-General Moshe Liba.⁴³ In a *Sydney Morning Herald* article, Liba publicly blamed the Palestinian Liberation organisation for the attacks, stating that he knew “the people who put bombs all over the world are the PLO and the people on the service of the PLO”.⁴⁴ The *Australian* extended the scale of the struggle by additionally quoting Liba in stating that the bombing was a matter of concern “not only to Israel, but to

³⁵ “A Deplorable Attack”, *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.2

³⁶ “PM’s Promise on Jewish Security”, *Canberra Times*, December 29, 1982, p.1

³⁷ Martin Kelly and Bruce Newton, “Anti-Jewish Terror Blasts in Sydney”, *Australian*, December 24, 1982, p.1

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.3

³⁹ “Christmas Outrage”, *Daily Telegraph*, December 24, 1982, p.10

⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁴² *Ibid*.

⁴³ “Bombs Blast Israeli Centres”, *Canberra Times*, December 24, 1982, p.1

⁴⁴ Neil Mercer and Mark Coultan, “Terror in Sydney”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 24, 1982, p.1

the entire world”.⁴⁵ The *Australian*’s coverage drew upon additional key figures within the Australian Jewish Community, such as the president of the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Leslie Kaplan. Kaplan downplayed and decontextualized the bombing, stating that not only did he have no idea who was behind the attack, but that he could not understand the motivation and that “no one can understand terrorism”.⁴⁶ At the same time, however, many of the newspapers involved went beyond simply relying upon elite sources from within the Jewish community: in particular, the PLO spokesman Ali Kazak was also sought for comment on the bombings.⁴⁷ Quoted in the *Sydney Morning Herald* article with Liba, Kazak not only denied that the PLO was responsible for the attacks, but claimed that the attacks were planned to “damage our cause” and alleged that Israel was the chief beneficiary of such actions.⁴⁸

This sense of the Jewish population being targeted was extended to an upcoming Jewish sporting event, the 50th Jewish Maccabi Games, opening on 27th December. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, reporting on security arrangements for the games, noted that while security arrangements at the games were “extensive” they were, according to police security head Sergeant Kevin Andrews, “fairly low key”.⁴⁹ The *Canberra Times* broadly concurred with this in reporting that the bombings had only made the security organisers “more vigilant and observant to what is going on around us” according to carnival manager Michael Wrublewski.⁵⁰ The *Age*, too, quoted Australian Maccabi Federation president Joe Bos that while the bombings “reinforced their suspicions that this kind of activity would turn up in Australia”, he was not convinced that it was “part of a concentrated terrorist plot”.⁵¹ These articles also emphasised both the strength and resilience of the Australian Jewish community, with the *Age* reporting that organisers were very pleased with tickets at the opera house opening ceremony being sold out, viewing such as a show of solidarity from the Jewish community.⁵² Likewise, the *Canberra Times* emphasised that while those attending the event were made aware of the circumstances, the atmosphere “had been

⁴⁵ Martin Kelly and Bruce Newton, “Anti-Jewish Terror Blasts in Sydney”, *Australian*, December 24, 1982, p.3

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ “Bombs Blast Israeli Centres”, *Canberra Times*, December 24, 1982, p.1

⁴⁸ Neil Mercer and Mark Coultan, “Terror in Sydney”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 24, 1982, p.1

⁴⁹ “Jewish Games Get Tight Security Net”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 28, 1982, p.3

⁵⁰ “Tight Security Prevails at Opera House”, *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.14

⁵¹ Kate Legge, “Security Tight for Jewish Carnival”, *Age*, December 28, 1982, p.3

⁵² Ibid.

very good” and the potential terror problem “did not dampen their spirits”.⁵³ Such reporting also tended to reinforce the notion that it was the Australian Jewish community as a whole that was under threat from terrorism. Coverage and representation of the event differed significantly and was not totally uniform between newspapers, however. In contrast to the coverage of the other newspapers, the *Australian* reported security was in place to prevent a potential massacre, quoting Michael Wrublewski that “we do not want a repeat of the Munich games”.⁵⁴ This was further reinforced through an article the next day stating the games were held in “virtual secrecy because organisers fear more anti-Jewish bomb attacks”.⁵⁵ The *Australian* further emphasised this threat by citing carnival spokesman Mike Swibel who stated, “We have told all competitors to be aware. It is the main thing we have stressed to them”.⁵⁶

Reactions from media within the Jewish community echoed many of the same sentiments expressed in more ‘mainstream’ media. Reporting on the events, the *Australian Jewish Times* drew upon Dr. Liba in stating that the “Middle East war should not be transported by the Palestine Liberation Organisation or any other terrorist organisation to the shores of Australia”.⁵⁷ This coverage also focused heavily upon the culpability of the PLO, with Dr. Liba stating that the PLO was “the centre of international terrorism”, linked to the left and right across the world.⁵⁸ The *Australian Jewish Times* likewise focused on both the atmosphere of terror created by the bombings. In an article regarding security arrangements at the Maccabi Games, the paper cited Rabbi Brian Fox in stating that “There is the atmosphere of fear and nervousness where the next bomb is expected and who is the next target”.⁵⁹ This was likewise contrasted with Jewish resilience, with Rabbi Fox quoted as also stating that Jews were “used to terror” and that “We have not been intimidated in the past and nothing will intimidate us now”.⁶⁰

Another facet to newspaper coverage of the event, however, was that the bombings were perceived as being somehow fundamentally new and unprecedented in Australia. In an

⁵³ “Tight Security Prevails at Opera House”, *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.14

⁵⁴ Jacky Archer and Martin Kelly, “Stringent Checks as Jewish Games Open”, *Australian*, December 28, 1982, p.3

⁵⁵ Bruce Newton, “Jewish Games Held in Virtual Secrecy”, *Australian*, December 29, 1982, p.1

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ “State, Federal Ministers Condemn Bombings”, *Australian Jewish Times*, January 6, 1983, p.1

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ “Carnival Sabbath Sermons Highlight Security Risks”, *Australian Jewish Times*, January 13, p.3

⁶⁰ Ibid.

editorial on the event, the *Sydney Morning Herald* contended that the bombs represented a new frontier of terrorism in “their effects were indiscriminate and could not have been otherwise”, as opposed to previous instances in which “particular targets were discernible”.⁶¹ The *Age*, too, noted that while Australia had been “relatively free from the activities of terrorists”, it questioned whether the attacks signified: “Is our period of immunity coming to an end?”.⁶² As such, terrorism was posed as a phenomenon that came from without to ‘infect’ Australia. While acknowledging Australia’s previous terrorist incidents, the *Canberra Times* editorial column remarked that while Australia “had been regarded as a safe posting” for foreign diplomats, recent events (such as the Hilton Bombing and the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General) “have altered this perception to some extent”.⁶³ Ultimately, the *Canberra Times* expressed its desire that the Australian people “never have to suffer the daily horror that life has become for the ordinary people of Belfast”.⁶⁴

Reporting from the *Canberra Times*, while matching some trends seen in the other newspapers, differed strongly in some facets of its coverage of the bombing. Initial coverage of the event was very reluctant to use the term ‘terrorism’, describing the two incidents only as ‘bombings’.⁶⁵ This reluctance in assigning the label of terrorism continued with their coverage on the 26th of December, noting only that police were interviewing people and flights into and out of Sydney and noting that Dr Moshe Liba was under guard.⁶⁶ Even in its editorial, the *Canberra Times* stated that police were investigating the possibility that the Westfield Tower bomb could have been an act intended for the offices of the Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking (housed in the same building).⁶⁷ Furthermore, the editorial argued that while bombings could be seen as terrorism due to the events suggesting “the responsible wanted to damage Jewish property and at least frighten and possibly kill or injure Jewish people”, “one anonymous phone call to the police is no base upon which to erect any supposition”.⁶⁸

⁶¹ “Terror in Sydney”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 24, 1982, p.6

⁶² “Terrorism Strikes Home”, *Age*, December 27, 1982, p.7

⁶³ “A Deplorable Attack”, *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.2

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Bombs Blast Israeli Centres”, *Canberra Times*, December 24, 1982, p.1

⁶⁶ “50 on Bomb Case”, *Canberra Times*, December 26, 1982, p.1

⁶⁷ “A Deplorable Attack”, *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.2

⁶⁸ Ibid.

The arrest of a suspect in connection with the Hakoah Club bombings would attract some minor press coverage. The *Canberra Times* noted that Beydoun, a man who “had an Australian and a Lebanese passport”, was refused bail and that police had a “strong circumstantial case” against him.⁶⁹ The *Sydney Morning Herald* followed much the same line, noting additionally that Beydoun had lived in Australia for 11 years.⁷⁰ The *Australian*, in contrast, noted only that Beydoun was a 32-year-old Lebanese man.⁷¹ Coverage further stated that:

“Security authorities are on alert in case of retaliation by international terrorists because of the arrest, and that police fear that if the man is connected with an organisation – which has not been established – fanatics might try to take hostages and hold them to ransom for the safe return of their arrested comrade”.⁷²

The *Australian* further stated “It is believed all airlines flying to Australia have been warned of the possibility of a terrorist hijacking”, and even that Minister for Administrative Services Kevin Newman had refused to comment “on the possibility of reprisals and arrangements to counter it”.⁷³ Such coverage emphasised not only the international aspect of terrorism, but also posited that all Australians were now possibly under threat. Additionally, coverage from the *Australian* failed to provide any sources for its claims of imminent terrorist activity.

1986 Melbourne Turkish Consulate Bombing

The latter half of the 80s would witness yet another incident of terrorism strike Australia. On November 23, 1986, a bomb exploded in the basement parking lot underneath the office building containing the Turkish Consulate at South Yarra in Melbourne, Victoria.⁷⁴ The explosion killed one person (would-be bomber Hagop Levonian, an Armenian) when the bomb he was priming detonated prematurely. In the immediate wake of the attack, an organisation purporting to call itself the ‘Greek-Bulgarian-Armenian Front’ phoned the Agence-France Presse news agency in Sydney, claiming responsibility for the attack.⁷⁵ A

⁶⁹ “Man Charged Over Bombing at Club”, *Canberra Times*, February 2, 1983, p.10

⁷⁰ “No Bail for Man on Bomb Charge”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 2, 1983, p.3

⁷¹ “Bomb Arrest Sparks Security Fears”, *Australian*, February 2, 1983, p.3

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Tom Noble and Michael Carrick, “Threat of New Terror Attacks”, *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.1

⁷⁵ Jane Howard and Russell Grimmer, “Bombers Threaten to Strike Again”, *Australian*, November 24, 1986, p.1

police investigation followed and on December 26 an Armenian named Levon Demirian was arrested, charged, and later ultimately convicted for his role in attempting to bomb the Turkish Consulate after supplies of gelignite and detonators, along with other bomb-making materials, were found at his residence and his place of work.⁷⁶

Much like as with previous terrorist incidents, media reaction to the blast emphasised the international aspect of terror and Australia's vulnerability to terrorism. This was captured in an editorial in the *Australian* stating, "We must now reluctantly admit that, after almost a dozen terrorist incidents involving foreign diplomats or their homes and offices over the past 16 years, Australia is no longer able to claim to be divorced from the mainstream of international terror".⁷⁷ The *Sydney Morning Herald* did the same, stating that the bombing "should be a lesson to those, especially those in authority, who blithely assert that Australia is not threatened by international terrorism".⁷⁸ Expertise on these matters was also sought: the *Age*, citing criminologist Grant Laidlaw, posited that it was difficult to stop bombings in Australia because "they were likely part of an international terrorist program" and that "the plans are not being hatched here".⁷⁹ The *Australian* also drew upon expert opinion to conclude that the attacks were foreign, citing 'terrorism experts' who argued that the blast was the work of an "Armenian hit team of international terrorists" who had been brought to Australia for the "express purpose" of blowing up the Turkish consulate.⁸⁰ The *Sydney Morning Herald*, while arguing that whether or not terrorists were domestic or international was "immaterial", still immediately classified the blast as an incident of international terrorism.⁸¹ Concerns that terrorism came from without were further amplified by reports from the *Age* on statements from the Turkish community, with Council of Australian Turks head Kemal Howard Gurpinar stating the Australian Government had "brought terrorism to Australia" in granting political asylum to "people with known anti-Turkish sentiments".⁸² Gurpinar was also quoted as saying that the Turkish community were "living in fear" and were angered "because some people have brought their historical hatred to Australia".⁸³

⁷⁶ Marshall Wilson, "Extradition Sought Over Blast", *Australian*, December 27, 1986, p.3

⁷⁷ "Too Many Unsolved Terrorist Acts", *Australian*, November 25, 1986, p.14

⁷⁸ "Terror Returns to Australia", *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 25, 1986, p.18

⁷⁹ Catherine Menagh, "Agenda for Terrorism Set Overseas: Criminologist", *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.6

⁸⁰ Jane Howard and Russell Grimmer, "Bombers Threaten to Strike Again", *Australian*, November 24, 1986 p.2

⁸¹ "Terror Returns to Australia", *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 25, 1986, p.18

⁸² Christobel Botten, "State's Turks Hit out at Government, Police", *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.6

⁸³ Ibid.

Claims that the “Greek-Bulgarian-Armenian Front” were behind the attacks were met quickly with scepticism from news sources. The *Age* cited Gulpinar, stating, “This name has been made up like stew”, drawing upon all groups that could possibly hate Turkey.⁸⁴ In searching for potential suspects, the *Australian* pointed to potential threats within the Turkish community itself, with an article claiming Turkish extremists were active within Australia.⁸⁵ This group, the Grey Wolves, was noted by the paper for its willingness to attack Turks who failed to adhere to fundamental Islam, with the paper drawing upon Australian Turkish Workers Union Official Necdet Acan: “They are fanatics who treat anyone not related to Islam as an enemy”.⁸⁶ Such reporting placed the threat of hostile terrorism strongly within Australia’s Turkish community.

Commentary and suggestions for future security developments were also a strong feature in coverage. An editorial in the *Australian*, in keeping with its framing of the attacks as resulting from ‘international terrorism’, argued that a key post in any anti-terrorism measure would be the reform and tightening of immigrant screening, arguing that such was “an effective weapon in the containment of terror”.⁸⁷ The *Daily Telegraph* was more outspoken in defining the incident as foreign, geographically distant and alien to Australia, arguing that the nation had previously condemned terror “From the comfort of our afforded by our geographic “cushion””(sic).⁸⁸ This foreignness was magnified by the statement that while “there can be no justification for any acts of terror, this is especially the case in Australia”.⁸⁹ Concerns similar to those raised in 1980 and 1982 were also raised via comparisons to the Middle East and Northern Ireland, and the prospect of the nation falling victim to those who would use violence to “settle old scores”.⁹⁰ The *Sydney Morning Herald* called instead for terrorism to be combated through “well-funded and expert police and intelligence work” that would monitor and even infiltrate “suspected or potential terrorist groups”.⁹¹ These strategies had been hampered, however, by both the loss of senior staff from ASIO due to its headquarters moving from Melbourne.⁹² Further framing terrorism as an invading foreign force, the *Sydney Morning Herald* also stated that the

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Marshall Wilson, “Turkish Extremists ‘Active’”, *Australian*, November 26, 1986, p.3

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “Too Many Unsolved Terrorist Acts”, *Australian*, November 25, 1986, p.14

⁸⁸ “Old Scores”, *Daily Telegraph*, November 24, 1986, p.10

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ “Terror Returns to Australia”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 25, 1986, p.18

⁹² Ibid.

Department of Foreign Affairs paid insufficient attention to terror, stating that “while a dozen or so officers busy themselves with peace and disarmament, only one deals exclusively with terrorism”.⁹³ An editorial in the *Age*, in contrast, argued that while the Government could expand protections on consuls and embassies, prevention of terrorist attacks was a difficult task as “terrorist incidents are very difficult to anticipate” and “even round-the-clock surveillance” was no guarantee of immunity to attack from a “dedicated terrorist group”.⁹⁴ Instead, it argued that if “there was a role for the public in all this”, it was to cooperate with police through “reporting behaviour of a suspicious or aberrant nature”.⁹⁵

The capture and arrest of the bomber was also met with some interest. The *Age*, in addition to noting that Demirian had a family, noted that slain bomber Hagop Levonian was married with two children, and identified him as an Australian of Armenian descent.⁹⁶ In contrast, the *Australian* reported that “two ethnic men” were sought over the bombing.⁹⁷ Upon Demirian’s arrest, the *Australian* described him initially as both “an Armenian” and an “Australian Armenian”.⁹⁸ Later coverage, however, would refer to him purely as an Armenian.⁹⁹ Levonian was likewise referred to only as “an Armenian”.¹⁰⁰ Such naming conventions showed some level of distancing Australia (and Australians) from any connection to (or culpability for) any terrorist acts.

The conclusion of the 80s would see terrorism firmly associated with ethnic communities and terrorism framed as stemming from ethnic violence. Concerns arose that Australia’s security would be compromised as it found itself drawn into conflicts it viewed as alien and totally distant from it, and moved more firmly into the ‘infection from outside’ model.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ “Questions Raised by Bomb Attack”, *Age*, November 25, 1986, p.12

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Tom Noble, “Sydney Man Charged Over Consulate Bomb”, *Age*, November 27, 1986, p.1

⁹⁷ Marshall Wilson, “Two ‘Ethnic’ Men Sought in Bombing”, *Australian*, November 25, p.3

⁹⁸ Marshall Wilson, “Extradition Sought Over Blast”, *Australian*, November 27, 1986, p.3

⁹⁹ Carmel McCauley, “Armenian ‘Headed for Beirut’ Before Arrest”, *Australian*, November 28, 1986, p.1

¹⁰⁰ Marshall Wilson, “Extradition Sought Over Blast”, *Australian*, November 27, 1986, p.3

Chapter 3: “If you can’t live in peace here, go”: Terrorism in the 90s

The 1990s were a period of continued disturbance for Australia when it came to terrorism. It was early within this decade that the Iranian embassy in Canberra was attacked by opponents of the Iranian government. The decade would later see the firebombing of the honorary French consulate in Perth (an act that was carried out by Australians in the service of popular Australian interests at the time), an incident which attracted significant attention from the national media. Finally, an incident in 2000 involving a potential security and terrorist threat to Sydney’s Lucas Heights nuclear reactor, attracted some minor media attention. It would be within this decade that perceptions and framings of terrorism within newspapers would begin to shift, with the potential for terrorism both arising from within Australia or directly targeting it both entering more fully into media discourses.

1992 Iranian Embassy Assault, Canberra

The beginning of the decade and the immediate post-Gulf War period saw concerns about international terrorist violence and security reach as far as Australia. It was in 1992 that Australia experienced an incident of terrorism that was quickly tied to both this post-war period and the security anxieties surrounding it, when the Iranian embassy in Canberra was attacked on April 6th.¹ The attack on the embassy in Canberra was part of a much wider coordinated assault upon a host of Iranian embassies throughout both Europe and North America.² Events would be complicated by the emergence of the detail that the Iranian embassy in Australia had warned Australian security forces of the attack in advance, yet these security forces failed to take adequate and timely action to prevent the attack.³ These factors would extensively shape the framing and reporting of the issue, focusing heavily upon the security failings present within Australia’s counter-terrorism apparatus.

The attack itself was carried out by a band of Iranians associated with a rebel Iranian political group, the Mujahedeen (El) Khalq, or People’s Mujahedeen.⁴ The ethnicity of the

¹ Nicholas Johnston, “Iranians Slam Security”, *Age*, April 7, 1992, p.1

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Don Woolford, “Australia Face to Face With Terror”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 8, 1992, p.10

attackers and the perceived nature of the attack was a feature in reporting, editorials, and letters to the editor. Letters to the editor, in particular, focused heavily on what was to be done: on April 8th, under a section of the letters page titled “Expel foreign political thugs”, the *Age* noted “Those responsible for the attack on the Iranian embassy in Canberra should be deported, readers say”.⁵ These calls for deportation were also expressed in an editorial in the *Age*, in order to show that the nation would not “tolerate ethnic and tribal violence by émigré groups in Australia”.⁶ The editorial described the incident as proof that “the opposition mujideen[sic] had exported its terrible blood feud” with Iran to Australia.⁷ A letter in the *Sydney Morning Herald* also took this line, stating that the perpetrators of the attack had “damaged Australia’s reputation as a safe place for foreign representatives”.⁸ Furthermore, the attack had done damage to Australia’s “fragile multicultural society”, ultimately stating “If you can’t live in peace here, go”.⁹ A later letter followed the same argument, arguing that deporting the perpetrators was not too harsh and that, if Iranians felt so strongly about these affairs, “shouldn’t they return home to take up arms against the aggressors?”.¹⁰ Elite sources drawn upon for comment reinforced the idea that this incident of terrorism was a force from outside that must be expelled: the *Daily Telegraph Mirror* drew upon then-NSW Premier Nick Greiner, who described the incident as “un-Australian”.¹¹ Greiner was further quoted as stating that “My view would be that if these people who are not Australian citizens are convicted, they ought to be deported”.¹² Mirroring sentiments that were expressed in letters, other elite government figures such as Immigration Minister Gerry Hand, who was quoted as stating that he would “deport attackers if they were found to be illegal immigrants”.¹³ What these newspapers conveyed, through public and elite sources, was the foreign nature and distance of this terrorist threat, through proposing that it could be solved through measures such as expulsion.

Other newspapers followed this ethnic line: an editorial in the *Daily Telegraph Mirror* stated the incident was “was an ugly betrayal of hospitality afforded to people from troubled

⁵ “Expel Foreign Political Thugs”, *Age*, April 8, 1992, p.12

⁶ “An Affront to Our Values”, *Age*, April 8, 1992, p.13

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ F. Shelley, “Letters”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1992, p.14

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Don Buffer, “Letters”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 10, 1992, p.10

¹¹ David Ikin, “Police Guard on Suburbs”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 8, 1992, p.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Cheryl Critchley and Glenn Stanaway, “Kerin Blasts Dad’s Army approach to Diplomatic Security”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 8, 1992, p.4

regions overseas, hospitality extended on the understanding that they leave those battles in their native lands.”¹⁴ This notion of these battles being far removed from Australia was also emphasised by the *Age* in an article providing historical background, stating that “the attack on the Iranian embassy in Canberra this week is rooted in distant enmities”.¹⁵ In providing a brief history of terrorism in Australia, the *Canberra Times* linked the vast majority of terrorist incidents to “international causes”, which had their origins in “modern and ancient histories far away from Australia”.¹⁶ The *Canberra Times* also, in explaining the security response somewhat, posed terrorism (and especially Middle Eastern terrorism) as unknowably vast and composed of “so many sects, splinter groups, factions and fractions” which “defied classification or close study” to all but “close neighbours” within the Middle Eastern region.¹⁷ The *Daily Telegraph Mirror* also provided a history, more strongly connecting terrorism and ethnicity by writing that Australia had generally been a safe posting for diplomats, “despite the multicultural society”.¹⁸ The *Australian*, while raising concerns of ethnic violence, disputed that the incident would lead to further incidents; instead, it stated that the incident reconsidering the question of “political feuding among refugees and within the ethnic community” was “premature”.¹⁹ While deeming additional governmental concern ‘premature’, however, it still tied refugees and ethnic community violence more widely to terrorism.

Along with ethnicity, the fact that the incident was targeted against the Iranian government attracted significant attention from the media. This Iranian connection was seen to some extent to pose Iran as being itself somewhat ‘responsible’ for the attack: The *Australian* ran an editorial titled “Iran’s foes imitate its methods”, stating that Iran had itself been involved in extrajudicial murders within Europe and North America.²⁰ While the editorial stated “the lawless of Tehran, of course, cannot excuse attacks on its embassies”, the editorial continued that Iran “could not be surprised its opponents “have started to emulate, in a “modest” manner so far, its own methods of terror”.²¹ The *Sydney Morning Herald* went further, stating that Iran had not “been the most faithful adherent to the Vienna

¹⁴ “Wave of Violence Hits Home”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 7, 1992, p.10

¹⁵ Tony Walker, “Critics Fear Long Arm of Mullah’s Law”, *Sunday Age World*, April 12, 1992, p.5

¹⁶ “A Complete Failure of Security Systems”, *Canberra Times*, April 8, 1992, p.8

¹⁷ “Security Agencies ‘Caught Napping’”, *Canberra Times*, April 8, 1992, p.1

¹⁸ “Safety Lapses on Record”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 7, 1992, p.5

¹⁹ “Iran’s Foes Imitate Its Methods”, *Australian*, April 8, 1992, p.12

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

Convention”, and further argued that the People’s Mujahedeen had “legitimate grievances against Iran’s government”.²² An article in the *Daily Telegraph Mirror* even questioned if the incident itself was a terrorist attack at all, consulting a “security expert” who stated that the perpetrators should not “strictly speaking” be regarded as terrorists because “unlike trained terrorists, they lacked sophisticated weapons”.²³ Ongoing coverage of the event additionally often referred to the perpetrators using terms that did not always label them as terrorists: the *Australian*, for example, referred to the raid as being carried out by “Iranian dissidents”.²⁴

Security was the most dominant facet of coverage as the story continued to develop. Very quickly, newspapers such as the *Sydney Morning Herald* moved to highlight the inadequacy of security, with the paper running an editorial entitled “Asleep on the security job”.²⁵ The editorial, while downplaying the Iranian attack as being carried out “by relative amateurs in the field of international terrorism”, this was cause for concern regarding what would happen “if this had been a professional terrorist hit-squad”.²⁶ Extending the furthest in its attack on the security services was the *Canberra Times*, running an editorial titled “A complete failure of security systems”, in which it argued for significant reform (and even for scrapping some security bodies) in order to achieve something “better coordinated and perhaps cheaper”.²⁷ An investigative article from *The Sunday Age* simultaneously highlighted and criticised Australia’s security systems, stating the incident largely occurred because of the “costly, pompous-sounding and immensely cumbersome apparatus” intended to prevent terrorism.²⁸ While highlighting these weaknesses, the article also noted additional weaknesses caused by attitudes to terrorism within the security system; stating that institutes like ASIO held “glamorous” and “fantastical” images of terrorism in which they expected threat tip-offs to come more from overseas intelligence agencies like the CIA or Mossad, which ASIO would then act upon.²⁹

²² “Asleep on the Security Job”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1992, p.14

²³ Don Woolford, “Australia Face to Face With Terror”, *Daily Telegraph Mirror*, April 8, 1992, p.10

²⁴ Tony Parkinson, “Government Admits ‘Dad’s Army’ response”, *Australian*, April 8, 1992, p.1

²⁵ “Asleep on the Security Job”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1992, p.14

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ “A Complete Failure of Security Systems”, *Canberra Times*, April 8, 1992, p.8

²⁸ Brian Toohey, “Best-laid plans were no Match for a Gang of Angry Iranians”, *Sunday Age*, April 12, 1992, p.17

²⁹ Ibid.

1995 Perth French Consulate Bombing

In 1995 Australia was dealing with the prospect of France looking to conclude nuclear testing with test detonations in the Pacific region.³⁰ While Australian tensions with this testing were expressed in a variety of ways, one of the most significant was the firebombing of the Honorary French Consulate in Perth on June 17.³¹ A group calling itself the 'Pacific Popular Front' would claim responsibility for the attack, stating that the attack was due to "French belligerence" in testing at Mururoa Atoll.³² Following police investigation and raids, however, the 'Pacific Popular Front' was revealed to be composed solely of two individuals, Bosco Boscovich and Maya Catts, who had no involvement with any wider anti-nuclear movement groups.³³

Elite sources reacted to the blast in a mixed fashion. Some elite reactions downplayed the nature or severity of the blast: Prime Minister Paul Keating was "disturbed and disappointed" by the fire, and stated that this protest against French nuclear testing plans "must be condemned for the extreme form it has taken".³⁴ Opposition Leader John Howard concurred, stating that "the deliberate destruction of property is not part of the Australian way of life" and that such property destruction was to be rejected "on every occasion".³⁵ Federal National Party leader Tim Fischer also followed this line, stating "I greatly regret the action of the idiot or idiots" and expressing his desire to see them caught soon.³⁶ These statements, while condemning the attack, framed them as either a protest gone too far or as simple property damage. In contrast, West Australian Premier Richard Court took the strongest approach, openly calling the firebombing "an act of terrorism".³⁷

The seriousness of the event was also downplayed strongly in some media coverage. A *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial declared that the firebombing "had the unfortunate effect of providing French authorities with a chance to express their moral outrage at an act of terrorism", and that the incident's seriousness was "hardly equivalent" to France's plan to

³⁰ "French Consul Bomber Hunt", *Sun-Herald*, June 18, 1995, p.1

³¹ Ibid.

³² "An Act of Terrorism", *Age*, June 18, 1995, p.1

³³ "Arrests Over Consulate Fire", *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 28, 1995, p.4

³⁴ "Jodie Brough, "French Consulate Burns", *Canberra Times*, June 18, 1995, p.1

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "Paris Calls for Swift Action", *West Australian*, June 19, 1995, p.4

³⁷ "An Act of Terrorism", *Age*, June 18, 1995, p.1

restart nuclear testing.³⁸ Another editorial from *The Sun-Herald*, while stating that “violent protests, involving life and property, have no place in this society”, would accuse the French Government of engaging in regional neo-colonialism and even employed the term “gallic menace”.³⁹ An editorial in the *Age* from Padraic McGuinness framed the incident as essentially a criminal action, arguing that while this was the “only aspect of the response to the French tests” for which “serious sanctions” were appropriate, was “a crime”.⁴⁰ In dealing with this incident, “no additional legislation other than the normal criminal law” was necessary, arguing further that while “the fact it is a political crime may make it especially detestable” it did not make it “more of a crime”.⁴¹ Even a later, more sympathetic editorial in the *Age* continued to frame the incident as essentially criminal, noting that reactions to the nuclear testing announcements had ranged from “absurd” to “criminal”.⁴² The editorial stated that “such behaviour is simply unacceptable”, further arguing that there was a “racist edge to some of the media comment and symbolic gestures of hostility aimed at the French”.⁴³

However, other elite sources took a different view as to who the chief potential victims of the attack could be: Pacific Islands Affairs Minister Gordon Bilney, responding to the attack, stated his concerns that the incident “could provoke retaliation overseas”.⁴⁴ Although Bilney stated that the attack was “barbaric”, he tempered this by stating that the attackers should have thought “about the welfare of their fellow Australians”, especially those overseas, and that France “had no shortage of terrorism”.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the ultimate result of this act would be that Australians overseas “would have to look more carefully behind them as they go down the street to work”.⁴⁶ Such statements from elite sources reinforced the notion of terrorism as something that was located overseas, but threatened Australians. These sentiments were taken even further through the *West Australian's* reporting on statements provided by the Independent Peace and Conservation network, which alleged that French agents had started the fire themselves in order to encourage

³⁸ “No Bombs, Anywhere”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 19, 1995, p.12

³⁹ “Breach of World’s Trust”, *Sun-Herald*, June 18, 1995, p.32

⁴⁰ Padraic P. McGuinness, “French Test Run Confirms Race Hatred Law Isn’t Needed”, *Age*, June 20, 1995, p.10

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Giving the French Stick”, *Age*, June 27, 1995, p.15

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Tom Salom, “Bilney Fears Revenge”, *West Australian*, June 19, 1995, p.4

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

police to stifle future anti-nuclear protests.⁴⁷ Furthermore, this group would connect the consulate firebombing with the bombing of the Greenpeace Ship, the *Rainbow Warrior*, stating it was part of France's "history of terrorism".⁴⁸ This again situated terrorism as something foreign to Australia, carried out by foreign powers against the nation.

One factor that strongly separated coverage of the Perth consulate firebombing from previous terrorism coverage was the prominence of letters to the editor, with several letters focusing on the incident being printed in a number of newspapers. A constant theme within these letters was the comparison to the *Rainbow Warrior* incident, and French handling of the affair: a letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, asked whether the French desire for punishment of the perpetrators would involve them being provided with "an AO" and a "Club Med membership".⁴⁹ This occurred across newspapers: the *Age* likewise printed a letter that connected the incidents more directly, stating that while the perpetrators should be punished, "perhaps, like the *Rainbow Warrior* bombers", any sentence should have the possibility of being commuted to "10 days at a resort in New Zealand".⁵⁰ More direct still was a letter in the *West Australian*, stating "I was outraged at the burning of the French Consulate until I remembered the *Rainbow Warrior*".⁵¹ the *Australian* also joined, running a letter stating "'Australia condemns the firebombing of the French Consulate in Perth. Australia does not honour those who bomb civilian targets in time of peace. *Vive la difference*".⁵² This usage of the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing was used throughout letters to downplay the significance of the embassy firebombing, while additionally posing France as having no room to display outrage in regard to the incident.

While newspapers generally constructed the consulate firebombing as being connected historically to the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior*, the *Age* ran an article that provided an alternative historical background: instead, the *Age* placed the incident within Australia's wider history of terrorist incidents.⁵³ The article took as its historical starting point the 1966 letter-bombing of a "major pro-Yugoslav figure", stating that this bomb "delivered a message that Australia was no longer isolated from international terrorism".⁵⁴ In doing so,

⁴⁷ Rebecca Rose, "Police Study N-Protest Film", *West Australian*, June 30, 1995, p.10

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ A.E. Dix and M.J Winn, "Letters to the Editor", *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 20, 1995, p.12

⁵⁰ Judy Twiss, "Letters to the Editor", *Age*, June 20, 1995, p.10

⁵¹ Alan Clive Cooper, "Letters to the Editor", *West Australian*, June 21, 1995, p.12

⁵² David Phillips, "Letters to the Editor", *Australian*, June 21, 1995, p.8

⁵³ Sue Hewitt, "Bomb Blast a Reminder of Terrorism at Home", *Age*, June 18, 1995, p.14

⁵⁴ Ibid.

while framing the firebombing as a 'terrorist incident', it placed the event more specifically within the context of 'international terrorism'. The article further stated that there were several incidents "involving Middle Eastern, Jewish, Serb and Croat communities", thus further connecting terrorism to these ethnic communities.⁵⁵ As such, terrorism was still posed as either non-serious, or as connected to 'foreign' or 'ethnic' sources.

The arrest of Bosco Boscovich and Maya Catts attracted some further media attention. Most notable in this coverage was the *Age*, which ran a short biography of Boscovich some time after his arrest.⁵⁶ This biography described Boscovich as having been "a caring person" with a "highly-tuned sense of responsibility" in his childhood, and that his actions were "completely out of character".⁵⁷ Furthermore, Boscovich's defence attorney Richard Utting was reported describing him as "a gentle person, not some crazed Balkans bomber".⁵⁸ The *Canberra Times* followed the same angle, covering the story in an article titled "Consulate bomber 'talented'", further repeating Utting's statements that Boscovich "was a gentle and talented student".⁵⁹ This coverage additionally positioned terrorism as foreign: the attack was carried out by "no international organisation, no sinister foreign gang", but simply Boscovich and Maya Catts.⁶⁰

2000 Sydney Olympics 'Bomb Plot'

As the 90s ended, concerns of a potential terrorist attack appeared once more in Australian newspapers. This incident, however, differed from previous attacks in that it was caught early and may not even have existed at all, a product of conjecture and theorising from media and security agencies.⁶¹ Sometime in March 2000, New Zealand police forces raiding a property in Auckland as part of an investigation into an "immigration racket" found materials, such as notebooks and maps, that seemed to indicate that an attack on Sydney's Lucas Heights nuclear reactor may have been planned.⁶² Media coverage identified this group not simply as a people-smuggling ring, but as potential

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Duncan Graham, "A \$1.25 Terrorist Act", *Age*, August 28, 1995, p.11

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ "Consulate Bomber 'Talented'", *Canberra Times*, July 22, 1995, p.10

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Martin Chulov and Robert Garran, "Police Rule Out Kiwi Olympics Terror Plot", *Australian*, August 28, 2000, p.1

⁶² Jacquelin Magnay, "Anger Over Canberra Reactor Secrecy", *Age*, August 28, 2000, p.9

followers and supporters of “Afghan terrorist Osama bin Laden”.⁶³ The potential terror attack attracted little focused media attention, and coverage a day later even focused on reporting that the affair was not connected to any terrorist plots at all.⁶⁴ Of special interest was the fact that the police raid, which occurred in March, was only reported on towards the end of August due to governmental security concerns.⁶⁵ The event only attracted brief media coverage and vanished from newspaper pages within a matter of days.

One of the chief features of this coverage was the focus on governmental security concerns. In initial coverage, the *Canberra Times* would highlight the level and depth of security operations being put in place regarding the Olympics, focusing on the arrangements. A day later, the focus on security would turn, with anger being expressed towards the Australian government’s failure to disclose a potential terrorist plot against the Sydney Olympics.⁶⁶ The *Canberra Times* stated that the government had been “accused of putting secrecy before public safety”, also reporting the “anger” of Lucas Heights residents in failing to be informed of a potential terrorist threat.⁶⁷ The *Age* followed the same angle, using much the same words but adding that Lucas Heights residents were completely unaware of any terror threat until the plot had been reported a day earlier in the *New Zealand Herald* newspaper.⁶⁸

The incident’s significance was downplayed strongly by figures within both newspapers and elite sources. Federal Science Minister Nick Minchin was quoted as stating that there was a “very low” threat to the Lucas Heights reactor.⁶⁹ Attorney General Daryl Williams did the same, stating that “the revelations posed no credible threat to the reactor’s operation”, and Health Minister Michael Wooldridge stated it was essential to keep the reactor open for cancer research.⁷⁰ The *Australian* also downplayed any potential terrorist threat, giving the article covering the affair the title “Police rule out Kiwi Olympics terror plot”.⁷¹ Most notable about the coverage provided by the *Australian* was its discounting of framing the

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Martin Chulov and Robert Garran, “Police Rule Out Kiwi Olympics Terror Plot”, *Australian*, August 28, 2000, p.1

⁶⁵ “Alleged Terrorist Plot Sparks Furious Reaction”, *Canberra Times*, August 28, 2000, p.1

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Jacquelin Magnay, “Anger Over Canberra Reactor Secrecy”, *Age*, August 28, 2000, p.9

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Martin Chulov and Robert Garran, “Police Rule Out Kiwi Olympics Terror Plot”, *Australian*, August 28, 2000, p.6

⁷¹ Ibid, p.1

incident as a potential terrorist incident at all: instead, the paper emphasised that the threat “pointed only to a people-smuggling racket”.⁷² Furthermore, the paper identified the maps found at the property not as terrorist materials, but “showed areas smugglers could use as thoroughfares”.⁷³ Follow-up coverage from the *Canberra Times* also moved to frame the incident more as a people-smuggling operation, noting that no terrorism-related arrests were made and that New Zealand Police had broken an “immigration racket” in which a “group of Afghan refugees” were involved.⁷⁴

In contrast to this, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* coverage alternated between discounting and affirming the significance and potential risk the incident posed to the Olympics. The paper quoted the vice-president of the International Olympic Committee, Jacques Rogge, in stating that there were terrorist groups and that the Olympics was “the most wonderful platform” for terrorist action due to extensive media coverage of the event, making it ideal for “any terrorist or ideological group to make a statement”.⁷⁵ Follow-up coverage from the *Sydney Morning Herald* emphasised the potential danger by reporting that Sutherland Shire had sent an “urgent fax” to the Prime Minister, “urging him to close the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in case of any terrorist threat during the Olympics”.⁷⁶ Councillor Ken McDonnell made statements that emphasised the seriousness of the threat, with the paper quoting, “We now know that the reactor has been identified as a potential target” and that the reactor should be shut down to “remove any terrorist threat”.⁷⁷ Initial coverage from the *Age* also emphasised the risk the attacks posed to the Olympics, with Afghan diplomat Mahmoud Saikal quoted saying that the Olympics were a “golden opportunity for terrorists to come and do something and turn the world upside-down”.⁷⁸

A further facet of media coverage focused upon its possible connections to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban who ruled Afghanistan at the time. The *Age's* coverage, especially, would focus strongly upon the role of bin Laden in the potential ‘attack’. In initial coverage, the *Age* would dedicate the most time and space to bin Laden, using a picture of him on

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ “Olympic Plot ‘False Propaganda’”, *Canberra Times*, August 29, 2000, p.6

⁷⁵ Ellen Conolly, David Lague, and Jacquelin Magnay, “We’ve Foiled any Terrorist Threat: NZ Police”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 28, 2000, p.9

⁷⁶ “Mayor Pleads with PM to Shut Reactor for Games”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 29, 2000, p.6

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Larry Schwartz, “Diplomat Warns on Bin Laden Sympathies”, *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.4

the front page and describing him as the “world’s most wanted terrorist”.⁷⁹ He would here be introduced as the alleged mastermind behind the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.⁸⁰ Indeed, the paper would dedicate an entire news article to him, in which he was described as being (according to the US) “the principal sponsor of international terrorism” and being “listed as the world’s most wanted man” by Western authorities.⁸¹ Mentioning that bin Laden was once “a US ally of sorts”, it tied him to helping establish a “highly effective organisation” for recruiting foreign fighters, Maktab al-Khidamat, or “Services Office”.⁸² Furthermore, bin Laden was connected to the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, the 1993 Mogadishu Incident (in which he allegedly trained Somali fighters), the 1995 Riyadh bombing, and attacks on “moderate Islamic governments” in the Middle East.⁸³ At the same time, however, the article would also posit that some had claimed Bin Laden’s influence had been “exaggerated by the US”, enhancing both his fame and notoriety.⁸⁴

An additional article would connect the potential threat posed by Bin Laden to Australia through the Australian Muslim community, noting the potential role of religion and religious affiliation in terrorism.⁸⁵ The article posed that, according to Afghan diplomat Mahmoud Saikal, Australian Muslims might be influenced by Bin Laden’s “sloganist campaign” that posed the United States as “oppressing Muslims”, and warned the Australian Muslim community to not be “unduly influenced” by him.⁸⁶ Potential religious links were further probed with the article additionally quoting Afghan Australian Welfare Association leader Farooq Mirraney, who stated that there could be support for Bin Laden with “some fundamentalists”, although he personally “did not think so”.⁸⁷ Religion was not, however, the only given source of support: “expert in Afghan affairs” and associate professor of politics William Maley was noted for responding that while Australia contained pro-Taliban Muslims, their allegiance was based on ethnic lines rather than religious ones.⁸⁸ Terrorism

⁷⁹ Frank Walker, Simon Crittle, and Brendan Nicholson, “Olympics Terror Plot Uncovered”, *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.1

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Brendan Nicholson, “International Terrorism’s Most Wanted”, *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.4

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Larry Schwartz, “Diplomat Warns on Bin Laden Sympathies”, *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.4

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

was also tied to refugees, with *The Sunday Age* stating that officers believed “some refugees granted asylum” may have previously been fighters overseas in “hot spots” such as Iraq, Sri Lanka, or Somalia.⁸⁹ These links firmly framed bin Laden’s support as arising from ethnic and religiously-aligned communities, while also linking refugees to this terror threat.

Such framing would contrast heavily with follow-up articles. The *Age*, reporting the next day, described Bin Laden simply as an “Afghan terrorist”.⁹⁰ This description would be shared by the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which also identified Bin Laden using the same terms.⁹¹ Further follow-up coverage from the *Age*, focusing on the Taliban’s denial and disavowal of any terrorist attack plans, downplayed the role of Bin Laden even further, merely identifying him as “Saudi-born dissident Osama bin Laden”.⁹² Initial coverage from the *Canberra Times* would likewise initially refer to Bin Laden as an “infamous terrorist”.⁹³ Later, the *Canberra Times* would follow the same framing as the *Age* in describing Bin Laden as an “Afghan terrorist”, but provided a small historical background in mentioning that he was “suspected by the United States of masterminding the 1998 bombings of two embassies in Africa that killed more than 200 people”.⁹⁴ The paper would further downplay the significance of Bin Laden by running a later article quoting Sydney Olympic Village mayor Graham Richardson that “a lone nutter with a bomb” was a far greater terrorist risk to the games.⁹⁵ On the other hand the *Australian*, even as it otherwise downplayed the significance of the event, referred to bin Laden as “the world’s most wanted terrorist”.⁹⁶ Ultimately, the media was able to keep bin Laden at a distance: while newspapers initially described him as the “world’s most wanted terrorist”, within two days his importance had been downplayed to being a simple dissident, if his name was mentioned at all.

At the beginning of the decade, Australian media framing of terrorism continued to perceive of terrorism as a force ‘infecting’ Australia from outside, a result of “alien histories”

⁸⁹ Frank Walker, Simon Crittle and Brendan Nicholson, “Olympics Terror Plot Uncovered”, *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.1

⁹⁰ Jacqueline Magnay, “Anger over Canberra Reactor Secrecy”, *Age*, p.9

⁹¹ Ellen Conolly, David Lague, and Jacquelin Magnay, “We’ve Foiled any Terrorist Threat: NZ Police”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 28, 2000, p.9

⁹² “Lucas Heights ‘Plot’ Rejected”, *Age*, August 29, 2000, p.11

⁹³ “Olympics Plot”, *Sunday Canberra Times*, August 27, 2000, p.1

⁹⁴ “Olympic Plot ‘False Propaganda’”, *Canberra Times*, August 29, 2000, p.6

⁹⁵ “Lone Nutter with Bomb is Greatest Risk: Mayor”, *Canberra Times*, August 31, 2000, p.5

⁹⁶ Martin Chulov and Robert Garran, “Police Rule Out Kiwi Olympics Terror Plot”, *Australian*, August 28, 2000, p.1

and foreign grudges and imagined that same outside world to be a haven for terror. By the end of the decade and the arrival of the Sydney Olympics, however, Australia had begun to imagine itself more as a target in of itself, rather than simply as an additional battleground in terrorist struggles.

Conclusion: “I think we are going to experience terrorism in the not-too-distant future”: Development of Perceptions and Media Framing of Terrorism from 1978-2000

In the aftermath of the bombing of the Sydney Hilton Hotel on February 13, 1978, Australia imagined itself entering a new age in which it was no longer safe from what the *Sydney Morning Herald* dubbed the “international disease of terrorism and violence”.¹ This new period marked a breaking point in which Australia was awakened from the belief “it can’t happen here”.² By 2000, Australia was still grappling with the issue of how to perceive terrorism, and major newspapers were only just at that time beginning to imagine that terror was not totally distant and disinterested, attached only to ‘ethnic conflicts’. Between those two times, what arose was a media framing of terrorism as decidedly foreign, alien, and ‘ethnic’ in character, a risk arising from those who could not, or would not, abandon their histories and ‘ancient hatreds’ to embrace their new Australian identities. Terrorism was something that was framed as ‘distant’ from Australia in the geographic, mental, and moral senses: the problem of faraway lands and the psychologies and grudges of those people who came from those countries. The prominence of ethnicity in newspaper framing of terrorism developed strongly across the period and especially during the 80s reflecting a wider contemporary politics in which, Andrew Markus has argued, race and racial issues took on increasing importance.³ What furthermore emerged was that newspapers were not only reliant upon elite sources from within the political and security fields for stories, but that they actively took on their framing patterns for themselves, emphasising the threat terrorism posed to Australia. Another notable feature of this media framing was its consistency across the range of examined newspapers. The political stance of a given newspaper did not express a significant effect upon framing of terrorism: The *Age*, generally perceived as a more left-leaning newspaper, was just as given to portraying terrorism as ‘ethnic violence’ as more centrist/conservative-inclined newspaper the *Australian*. Indeed, it was the *Age* which directly linked the two phenomena together with

¹ “Terrorism”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.9

² Security Rethink Needed”, *Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1978, p.6

³ Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, (Crows Nest: NSW, Allen & Unwin, 2001), p.222

its story on Sydney being in the grip of ethnic violence as it reported on the Turkish consul-general's assassination.⁴

Across time, incidents were frequently portrayed as the result of "distant struggles" which were alien and beyond understanding to Australia, or the result of foreign plots and infection from without. This framing was common across all newspapers, with the sense of 'foreignness' being expressed as early as 1978 by newspapers like the *Age*, which imagined an Australia that had now fallen victim to the "world's curse" of terrorism.⁵ A 1978 editorial from the *Australian*, focused on combatting terrorism, put the phenomenon at such a distance from Australians that the "local lunatic fringe" would resort to it only in imitation of the "trend to political violence".⁶ That same editorial posed Australia not as a primary target for terrorism but suffering from it due to the "overflow of some conflict overseas".⁷ Likewise the *Sydney Morning Herald's* editorial described terrorism as a disease, with Australia no longer being immune to it.⁸ The 1980 Turkish Consul-General assassination threatened to pull it into a "complex web of Middle Eastern intrigues" beyond the nation's understanding.⁹ Reporting on the 1986 bombing of the Turkish Consulate also expressed this theme, with articles with titles such as "Agenda for terror set overseas" continuing to portray the phenomenon as something dangerous, foreign, and unnatural to Australia.¹⁰ Even when the terrorism in question was carried out by 'white' Australians, distancing was employed: newspaper letter sections in the wake of the 1995 French consulate firebombing pointed instead to the incident of the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing. Elite political sources employed by newspapers also pointed towards the true site and origin of terrorism as being overseas: Pacific Islands Affairs Minister Gordon Bilney, quoted in newspapers, even located terrorism directly within France, which had "no shortage of terrorism".¹¹ Statements such as Gordon Bilney's, which positioned terrorism firmly outside Australia, displayed another feature in how newspapers represented terrorism. From 1978 through to 1995, terrorism was not seen as being contained to and necessarily emanating from one geographical region or ethnicity. Reports from the time of

⁴ "A City Plagued by Ethnic Violence", *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.4

⁵ Tony Walker, "World's Curse is Here: Terror", *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

⁶ "Fighting Terrorism", *Australian*, February 24, 1978, p.6

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Terrorism", *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 14, 1978, p.9

⁹ Richard Carey and Ted Knez, "Listed for Death", *Australian*, December 19, 1980, p.2

¹⁰ Catherine Menagh, "Agenda for Terrorism Set Overseas: Criminologist", *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.6

¹¹ Tom Salom, "Bilney Fears Revenge", *West Australian*, June 19, 1995, p.4

the Hilton hotel bombing were different in that newspapers, quoting elite political sources such as then-Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, could locate terrorism as emanating from particular perceived “terror havens”, such as Libya or Algeria, or the South American region.¹² News articles, however, also made comparisons to Northern Ireland in reporting on the bombing.¹³

These “distant struggles” were framed not simply as an unwanted intrusion into Australia from a problem-plagued world, dragging Australia into conflicts not of its choosing. This theme developed and maintained a constant presence over time: while the Hilton bombing ‘merely’ introduced Australia to terrorism, incidents such as the Israeli consulate and Hakoah Club bombing, according to the *Age*, threatened to pull Australia into the Israeli-Arab conflict.¹⁴ This theme continued into 1986, but here concerns were also sourced from the ethnic communities themselves: the Turkish community was consulted by newspapers to speak of how Australia had been caught up in terrorist violence due to granting asylum to “people with known Anti-Turkish sentiments”, who could not let go of their “historical hatreds”.¹⁵ Such reporting connected concerns of being caught up in foreign conflicts with a perceived failure of immigrants to ‘properly’ assimilate, and at governmental failures to keep perceived terrorist infection out.

This sense and framing of terrorism as being both “foreign” and “distant” would find itself embodied in concerns about ‘ethnic’ Australians and “ethnic violence”. In 1978, this was expressed through framing histories of terrorism prior to the Hilton bombing as expressions of ethnic violence, such as the *Age* framing earlier Croatian terrorism as “blood feuding by Yugoslav factions”.¹⁶ The *Canberra Times* would do the same in its history of terrorism, reporting an attack on the Soviet embassy as merely the result of “a Bulgarian with a grievance”.¹⁷ This sense of ethnicity and terrorism became more important in the 80s: the *Age*, reporting on the assassination of the Turkish Consul General in 1980, ran news articles tying the incident to Sydney’s “growing ethnic violence” problem.¹⁸ This ‘ethnic’ framing of terrorism would continue through even into 2000, in

¹² Grahame Morris, “Leaders Want End of Terror Havens”, *Australian*, February 15, p.1

¹³ Carolyne Parfitt, “Bowral – for a Little Girl it’s a Town Like Belfast”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 15, 1978, p.2

¹⁴ “Terrorism Strikes Home”, *Age*, December 27, 1982, p.7

¹⁵ Christobel Botten, “State’s Turks Hit out at Government, Police”, *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.6

¹⁶ “An Attack of Madness”, *Age*, February 14, 1978, p.9

¹⁷ “A New Low for Indiscriminate, Mindless Slaughter”, *Canberra Times*, February 14, 1978, p.2

¹⁸ “A City Plagued by Ethnic Violence”, *Age*, December 18, 1980, p.4

which concerns that there were potential religious or ethnic allegiances within the Australian Muslim community to Osama bin Laden were put forward by the *Age*.¹⁹ The media connection between terrorist violence and ethnic communities was absent only in the one instance carried out by white Australians: the firebombing of the French consulate in Perth.

The 'ethnic' framing did more than simply connect perceptions of terrorism to ethnic communities and histories: it also helped dictate what issues were brought up in media discussions and informational articles on terrorism. While present in 1978, talk of ethnicity and race not only increased during the 80s (reflecting Markus' argument), but the way these concerns were voiced became more diverse, showcasing a nationalistic discrimination in which immigrants were presented to host societies via a variety of fashions.²⁰ Notable among these forms are accusing 'outsiders' ('ethnic' Australians) of having 'unacceptable cultural practices', and the insistence upon a universal, unitary Australian culture.²¹ This was reflected in editorial pieces such as that run by the *Australian* in the wake of the Turkish consul-general assassination; the paper warned that "emotional over-reactions" would undermine not just "Australia's multi-cultural society" but its hopes in forging a "national identity".²² Furthermore, Markus notes this discrimination was marked by an unwillingness to understand other cultures.²³ This was likewise reflected in a historical article run by the *Canberra Times* which while covering the Armenian genocide story, ultimately argued this history "should have been buried".²⁴ This likewise carried an implied call for unity: a call for Armenians to abandon their pasts and become Australians. These calls lacked any specific focus beyond a general 'ethnic' target in the 80s and early 90s. There were, however, rising instances of mentioning 'radical sects of Islam' as the 90s continued, a finding somewhat in line with Anne Aly's arguments regarding Australian Muslims (and Islam) being presented by media increasingly as a threat during the 90s period.²⁵ Newspaper coverage tempered these claims somewhat: while reporting in 2000 on the potential Lucas heights 'bomb threat', the *Age* employed elite sources to present

¹⁹ Larry Schwartz, "Diplomat Warns on Bin Laden Sympathies", *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.4

²⁰ Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, p.9, 222

²¹ Ibid.

²² "This is no Time for Emotional Racism", *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.8

²³ Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, p.9

²⁴ "Terrorism in Sydney", *Canberra Times*, December 18, 1980, p.2

²⁵ Anne Aly, "Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media", *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 42 (1), (2007), p.29

Afghan Australians as potential Taliban supporters due as much to 'ethnic allegiances' as to religious affiliation.²⁶ This represents something of a split with post-9/11 media framings, but at the same time an underlying constancy in the mechanics behind Australian media framing of terrorist incidents. Of the 2007-2010 Dr. Mohamed Haneef case in Australia, Ewart notes that early media coverage focused heavily on both the threat posed to Australia by the alleged terror suspects and their religious beliefs, conflating Islam with terrorism.²⁷ In coverage such as that surrounding the 1980 Turkish consul-general assassination or the 1986 Turkish consulate bombing the same underlying mechanic was employed, with a heavy focus on both the new threats Australia faced as well as the 'ethnic connection' and 'alien histories' of the groups involved. While post-9/11 news coverage may focus on and associate Islam with terrorism, the framing mechanics behind such associations were already well-developed and ultimately conflated terror much more generally with questions of ethnicity and integration.

By 1992 the *Australian* had, as it did in 1980, cautioned against Governmental over-reaction in reconsidering the "general question of political feuding among refugees and within the ethnic community".²⁸ This position was not always consistent, though: the idea that terrorism infiltrated Australia through immigrants (and that immigration measures were part of Australia's toolset against terrorism) were expressed by the *Australian* in the wake of the Turkish consulate bombing.²⁹ Calls for deportation grew over time, voiced as a desire to avoid 'unwanted conflicts' through expelling those from the ethnic community. In an editorial which wrote of terrorism as "ethnic and tribal violence" (vocabulary also constant across time), described the Mujahedeen al-Khalq's 1992 attack to the Iranian embassy in Canberra as having "exported" a terrible blood feud" to Australia.³⁰ This solution framing was reinforced through editorial choices regarding which letters to the editor were published: the Iranian embassy attack, in particular, brought forth a host of printed letters prescribing deportation for those who had damaged the "fragile multicultural society" and could not "live in peace here".³¹ Shown here is not simply media framing and perceptions about terrorism as being brought in from outside, but also concerns about

²⁶ Larry Schwartz, "Diplomat Warns on Bin Laden Sympathies", *Sunday Age*, August 27, 2000, p.4

²⁷ Jacqui Ewart, "Framing an Alleged Terrorist: How Four Australian News Media Organizations Framed the Dr. Mohamed Haneef Case", *Journal of Media and Religion*, Vol. 11 (2), (2012), p.101

²⁸ "Iran's Foes Imitate Its Methods", *Australian*, April 8, 1992, p.12

²⁹ "Too Many Unsolved Terrorist Acts", *Australian*, p.14

³⁰ "An Affront to Our Values", *Age*, April 8, 1992, p.13

³¹ F. Shelley, "Letters", *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1992, p.14

Australia's identity itself: terrorist violence was framed as something of a failure from 'ethnic Australians' to properly and correctly distance themselves from their pasts and embrace their new 'Australian' identity. Also displayed was something of an evolving solution framing, in which Australia was called to move from merely encouraging integration and urging ethnic communities to abandon their previous connections to actively calling for the removal of those it felt would not (or could not) comply.

Interactions with political figures, security forces, and terrorism 'experts' were a noted constant across both incidents and newspapers. The findings generally reflected what Brinson & Stohl have written about the power of elite sources to inform and set framing, and when it came to framing terrorism, elite sources from within police and security services were consulted heavily.³² In many instances, newspaper articles and editorials were supportive of security developments: the *Australian's* 1978 editorial in the wake of the Hilton bombing, notably, used the bombing to call for the public to stand behind ASIO and the police special branches.³³ Support for the security services was not generally so direct, however: rather, newspapers would argue in support for the development of additional security measures and bodies. It was only in 1978, though, that support from newspapers was strong for Australia to enter into a wider alliance against international terrorism.³⁴ Otherwise, involvement with wider terrorist struggles was seen as unwise and to be avoided. In the wake of the 1982 bombings, Israeli Consulate-General Dr Moshe Liba was quoted calling for Australia to enter into action against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, describing the organisation as the source (or employer) of "those who put bombs all over the world".³⁵ Despite this, however, by this time editorial policy had moved more firmly behind a more isolationist viewpoint, with the *Canberra Times* especially warning against "importing" the conflict.³⁶

Elite sources from within the political and security fields consistently framed the nation as needing to be fearful and cautious of terrorism. From James Killen's article in the *Australian* in the wake of the Hilton bombing to concerns from Gordon Bilney regarding

³² Mary Brinson & Michael Stohl, "From 7/7 to 8/10: Media Framing of Terrorist Incidents in the United States and the United Kingdom", in *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. David Canter, (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: 2009), p.230

³³ "Stop Knocking the Security Services", *Australian*, February 14, 1978, p.8

³⁴ Grahame Morris, "Leaders Want End of Terror Havens", *Australian*, February 15, p.1

³⁵ Neil Mercer and Mark Coultan, "Terror in Sydney", *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 24, 1982, p.1

³⁶ "A Deplorable Attack", *Canberra Times*, December 28, 1982, p.2

Australians overseas being targeted for retaliation by the French in the wake of the French consulate firebombing, elite sources sought by newspapers re-iterated the dangers of terrorism to ordinary Australians. These voices were especially pronounced in the 1980s, with concerns coming from Australia's then-new Federal Police leaders (such as Chief Superintendent Jack Fletcher) that international terrorists had an interest in Australia.³⁷ Newspapers did not merely follow this elite source framing on this affair but actively employed it themselves: potential concerns regarding the safety of a Jewish sporting carnival in the wake of the 1982 bombings was magnified by the *Australian*, which reported organisational fears of "another Munich" massacre.³⁸ This was also evidenced by follow-up coverage from the *Australian* of the bombing, in which Australians were warned about potential massive retaliation in the form of hijackings and kidnappings after the arrest of a suspect in the case.³⁹ Other newspapers engaged in this as well: the *Age* drew upon sources that stated the Turkish community in Australia was "living in fear" after the Melbourne consulate bombing.⁴⁰ These fears were also connected with a fear of terrorist infection from the outside world, and concerns that security systems and the government had not gone far enough in maintaining and screening immigrants, an attitude that, while present since 1978, would express itself much more strongly in the 90s.

This newspaper press framing of terrorist action differs greatly from the images and associations of terrorism presented by media sources in the pre- and post-study dates. Jacqui Ewart and Kate O'Donnell's work on the 1976 Bunbury bombing (prior to the study period) showed distinct differences and resistance between the political, 'elite source' framing of terrorism presented by West Australian Premier Sir Charles Court and the criminal framing provided by the *West Australian*.⁴¹ In contrast, from the 1978 Hilton bombing through to the 2000 Olympics 'terror plot', elite political and security sources had a greater ability to define how events were framed, and the claims these sources made were rarely questioned or contested by newspapers. In the case of the 1995 French Consulate firebombing, the divisions in elite source opinion, (WA Premier Richard Court's

³⁷ Malcolm Andrews, "Terrorism was Predicted by Top Police Officers", *Australian*, December 18, 1980, p.5

³⁸ Jacky Archer and Martin Kelly, "Stringent Checks as Jewish Games Open", *Australian*, December 28, 1982, p.3

³⁹ "Bomb Arrest Sparks Security Fears", *Australian*, February 2, 1983, p.3

⁴⁰ Christobel Botten, "State's Turks Hit out at Government, Police", *Age*, November 24, 1986, p.6

⁴¹ Kate O'Donnell & Jacqui Ewart, "Reassessing the Bunbury Bombing: Juxtaposition of Political and Media Narratives", *Salus*, Vol. 5 (1), (2017), p.35-36

openly calling the incident a terrorist attack being a minority opinion) newspapers downplayed the significance and seriousness of the bombings.⁴² When security sources also denied that an incident was terrorist in nature (as occurred with the 2000 Sydney Olympics 'terror plot') newspapers such as the *Australian* followed suit, instead running the police line that the incident was only an 'immigration racket'.⁴³ This willingness to accept the official line put forward with regards to accepting an incident as 'terrorist' or not, and that attacks were a major risk in future, showed a marked split with the framing patterns uncovered by Ewart and O'Donnell in their study on the 1976 Bunbury bombing. Ewart and O'Donnell found that the newspaper, the *West Australian*, deviated from the official political line and portrayed the incident as a criminal act.⁴⁴ This general acceptance of elite source framing around terrorist incidents continued throughout the period, from 1978 to 2000. Such findings generally fall in line with Ewart's 2009 findings that editors and reporters displayed a tendency to follow elite governmental and dominant political discourses on a given event.⁴⁵

What this study has sought to show is the media framing of incidents of terrorism in Australia by major newspapers of the Australian press. What stands out and most prominently characterises this framing is the distance that Australian newspapers put between terrorism and Australia, speaking of alien histories, ancient hatreds, and convoluted politics behind the acts. Further distancing was employed by associating and referring to terrorism as an 'ethnic' crime, using charged language such as "blood feud" or "grudge" when describing terrorist incidents. Connected to these concerns were fears regarding Australia's identity: that Australia, in taking in what it perceived to be 'ethnic' immigrants, would be trapped and drawn into conflicts which it saw to be utterly distant from itself. These histories were framed as posing a danger to Australia if they were not forgotten or left behind, and assimilation into the 'Australian identity' was not only the ideal, but also the path that would protect Australia from terrorist violence.

⁴² "An Act of Terrorism", *Age*, June 18, 1995, p.1

⁴³ Martin Chulov and Robert Garran, "Police Rule Out Kiwi Olympics Terror Plot", *Australian*, August 28, 2000, p.6

⁴⁴ Kate O'Donnell & Jacqui Ewart, "Reassessing the Bunbury Bombing", p.40.

⁴⁵ Jacqui Ewart, "Framing an Alleged Terrorist", p.101.

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