Intelligence-Led Policing:
Interpretation, Implementation and Impact

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Master of Research (Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism)

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2019

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACIM	Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACPOS	Association of Chief Police Officers of Scotland
ACT	Australian Capital Territory
BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
CHIS	Covert Human Intelligence Source
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
COP	Community-Oriented Policing
DED	Drug Enforcement Department of the MPS
DIKI Continuum	Data, Information, Knowledge, and Intelligence Continuum
DO	Duty Officer
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCPD	Family and Child Protection Department of the MPS
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate Constabulary
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
IC	Intelligence Cycle
ILP	Intelligence-Led Policing
ISLES	Institute for Security and Law Enforcement Studies
IQ	Interview Questions
LEIU	Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit
MNDF	Maldives National Defence Force
MPS	Maldives Police Service
NCISP	National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
NDP6	Sixth National Development Plan 2001 – 2005
NDP7	Seventh National Development Plan 2006 – 2011
NIM	National Intelligence Model

NSS	National Security Service
NYPD	New York Police Department
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAD	Public Affairs Department
PCC	Police Communication Centre
PESTEL Analysis	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal and Environmental Analysis
PESTELO Analysis	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal, Environmental, and Organisational Analysis
PID	Police Intelligence Department
PIMS	Police Information Management System
PLAN	Proportionality, Legitimacy, Authority, and Necessity (mnemonic)
POP	Problem-Oriented Policing
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SOCD	Serious and Organised Crime Department
SOD	Specialist Operations Department
SP1	MPS Strategic Plan 2007 – 2011
SP2	MPS Strategic Plan 2011 – 2013
SP3	MPS Strategic Plan 2014 – 2018
SPC	Scottish Police College
SPU	Strategic Planning Unit
ST&CG	Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group
SWAT team	Special Weapons and Tactics Team of the MPS
SWOT analysis	Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats analysis
T&C	Tasking and Coordination
T&CG	Tasking and Coordination Group
TT&CG	Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
UWS	University of Western Sydney
WAPol	Western Australia Police Force

ABSTRACT

The resurgence of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in policing policies and scholarship after the 9/11 attacks saw the introduction of new models and interpretations of this philosophy, which added more ambiguity to an already nebulous construct. This research is motivated by this conceptual ambiguity. The objective of this thesis is to analyse ILP through studying its interpretations, implementation, and the perceived impact on policing. The research used the Maldives Police Service (MPS) as a case study.

The analysis revealed that the MPS misinterpreted ILP as operating the agency by its intelligence function (sector) by collecting information covertly and disseminating those for tactical operations or supporting investigations (evidence gathering). The MPS held such a narrow definition of ILP due to the lack of adequate effort to educate its staff on ILP, and a failure to introduce the necessary changes to its training materials. The impact of ILP in the MPS was found to be minimal from the perspective of practitioners as: (1) a majority believed that ILP was mainly being used as a tool against political opponents rather than in actual policing, and (2) intelligence generated was largely unactionable. However, in a real sense, the drive to ILP brought a huge change in the MPS as the generation of intelligence products became a regular practice only after the move towards ILP.

The ILP literature examined for this thesis pointed to three broad problems. First, the definitional, conceptual and theoretical ambiguity of ILP has made the ILP philosophy not only nebulous for practitioners but also academics and policymakers. Due to this, many agencies adopted the ILP moniker but not the philosophy. Second, *National Intelligence Model*, the most embraced version of ILP, was too complex for many agencies, including the MPS, encumbering implementation and practice. Third, excessive emphasis on technology in ILP resulted in many agencies becoming fixated with acquiring technical gadgetry, ignoring other important aspects. Consequently, ILP had little positive impact on operational policing in agencies that adopted it.

In order to alleviate these problems, this thesis suggests co-practising other policing philosophies with ILP to maximise efficiency and promote democratic values. The American Model of ILP prescribes this principle, but does not delineate it in a way it can be operationalised. This thesis proposes a new ILP model which consolidates the American Model by creating a framework that can be operationalised by any agency based on its context and need.

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled "Intelligence-Led Policing: Interpretation, Implementation and Impact" has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Intelligence work is often considered as the "world's second oldest profession" (Davies & Gustafson, 2013, p. 9). Yet it was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that police agencies realised the effectiveness of intelligence in crime control and order maintenance. Consequently, intelligence concepts used in the military were adopted by the police. In the new scheme, intelligence work mainly revolved around supporting reactive investigations (Grieve, 2009; Reiner, 2010; Weston & Wells, 1970). Although intelligence's contribution to efficient policing was recognised to some extent by policymakers and police administrators, intelligence work was surrounded by mistrust and suspicion due to its misuse by those in authority infringing on the civil rights of individuals, particularly in privacy (D. L. Carter, 2005). Furthermore, closing the growing distance between the police and public preceded relying on intelligence in crime control in both policing policy and scholarship,[1] though in a real sense information acquired through community outreach officers and coordinators formed community intelligence that steered the decision-making process, especially in operational policing.

After the 9/11 attacks, policymakers began to realise that existing policing philosophies, which were centred on traditional responses to the community or its problems, were incapable of responding to the challenges of the modern era. As a result, the focus on intelligence and proactive policing by policymakers and police administrators increased significantly (Belur & Johnson, 2016; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2016; Richards, 2010). The construct of 'intelligence' was promoted with much enthusiasm, almost as a new addition to the policing lexicon (for details, see Chapter Two). In such discourses, the dominating themes were national security intelligence and the importance of sharing timely intelligence among relevant agencies. Policymakers were keen to incorporate intelligence (sharing) into policies and at the same time develop the intelligence functions of key enforcement agencies for capability

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[1] Reforms in contemporary policing was initially guided by a 'community-oriented' direction or 'problem-oriented' direction. The first reform was based on the assumption that closer police-public relationship would facilitate the police in achieving its mission (viz. creating a safer environment for all), while the latter intended to develop capability of the agencies to identify and respond to problems significant to the community. For details, see Goldstein (1979); Mastrofski (1993); Reiss (1992).

management against increasing risks and demands (for exmaple, Australian Government, 2012; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003; IACP, 2002; MPND, 2007).

The *Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit* held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in March 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks recommended adopting intelligence-led policing (ILP) by all member agencies. The participants articulated a vision for improved collection, analysis, dissemination and use of intelligence across US policing agencies, and ILP was envisioned as that medium (IACP, 2002). The vision was translated to a plan, called the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* (NCISP) in 2003 (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003). Subsequently, under the auspices of the US Department of Justice, a guide was published to direct "all sizes" of US policing agencies "to develop and reinvigorate their intelligence function" (D. L. Carter, 2004, p. iii). The IACP provided directions for policing agencies to "enhance their intelligence operations for homeland security and traditional enforcement and crime prevention" (Peterson, 2005, p. 1). However, instead of elucidating what ILP is, the IACP attributed to ILP all policing strategies that relied on intelligence (including problem-oriented approaches and 'zero tolerance policing') (IACP, 2002, p. 13). Many interpretations of ILP exist, of which a definition relevant to this thesis and often cited is:

> Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 89).

Though the 9/11 attacks were the catalyst for the wider recognition of ILP as the new policing paradigm in the US and many other countries, the UK had by then rolled out its *National Intelligence Model* (NIM), an ILP framework (NCIS, 2000). Thus, the UK was the first country to move from a community centred form of policing to an intelligence driven form. The UK's Audit Commission (1993, p. 32) had recognised a need to move towards an intelligence-based approach to catch offenders in the act or "to build a robust case against them after the crime has occurred". The Audit Commission's report *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively*, published in 1993, promoted proactive policing and emphasised the importance of crime prevention. However, it was the publication of the thematic inspection report *Policing with Intelligence* in 1997 by Her Majesty's Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC) that pushed ILP

as a new policing philosophy into British police agencies (HMIC, 1997a; Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 28). This shift was due to a demand for increasing internal accountability from government policies and oversight mechanisms; proactively managing risks against terrorist and lone wolf attacks; reducing the officers' workload in recording events and activities performed on the job; overcoming the limitations in the traditional policing model; easing the challenges posed by organised and transnational crime; and assimilating technological developments in managing, mapping, and communicating information (Ratcliffe, 2016, pp. 13–19). However, it was only in April 2004 that the British government directed all police agencies in England and Wales to implement NIM by November 2005, upon realising its perceived benefits (NCPE, 2005c, p. 8).

Since the change of global and national security landscapes after the 9/11 attacks, more agencies have embraced ILP. Australian police agencies (state and federal) adopted ILP by 2003, while New Zealand committed to ILP in 2002 (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 4). The 9/11 attacks entrenched ILP in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), where ILP had been launched in December 2000 (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007). Following the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the European Union (EU) also realised the importance of exchanging information within the law enforcement community. In November 2004, the European Council decided to implement ILP at the EU level. In the next year, the EU adopted its own version of ILP called *European Criminal Intelligence Model* based on NIM (Brady, 2008; European Commission, 2005). As a result, ILP has become the most widely practised policing model throughout the Global North. Following their footsteps, assuming ILP to be a smarter form of policing, countries beyond the *West*, such as Kenya (Mabia, Iteyo, & Were, 2016), Maldives (MPS, 2010e), Mauritius (Mauritius Police Force, 2010), Serbia (Kostadinović & Klisarić, 2017), and Zimbabwe (Mugari, Maunga, & Chigariro, 2015), among other countries, have also adopted ILP.

Owing to ILP's dependence on data and information collected through different overt and covert methods to inform police operational and strategic decisions, ILP literature acknowledges the possibility of breaches to individuals' privacy and other rights while collecting and processing data and information (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003; NPIA, 2010b; OSCE, 2017). Hence, establishing policies and practices that protect civil rights and liberties is considered essential at the very outset of the implementation of ILP (BJA, 2008; D. L. Carter, 2009; Peterson, 2005). Considering the

earlier misuse of intelligence, the NCISP emphasised protecting privacy and prescribed that agency chiefs should consider individuals' rights and constitutional liberties as vital at all times and protect them within the 'intelligence process' (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003, pp. v–vi). To overcome this concern, the US stressed on educating the public to remove the notion that intelligence activities routinely violate privacy and individuals' rights (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 115). The updated version of NCISP, published in 2013, mandated agencies to develop a privacy policy, and to wholly implement the policy (Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013).

1.2 Research Problem

Despite the growing popularity and scholarly focus ILP has garnered, concerns remain. These range from difficulties in defining ILP (Alach, 2011; James, 2003), understanding its essential components (Alach, 2011; Cope, 2004; Potparič, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2008a, pp. 80–81), preference given to intelligence products instead of officers' knowledge and professional judgement (James, 2017), to a "lack of a clear evidence-based methodology based on evaluated good practice" (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 57). Some of these issues have been briefly examined by scholars (Alach, 2011; Collier, 2006; Innes & Sheptycki, 2004; Kleiven, 2007; Potparič, 2014; Viaene et al., 2009), providing a cause to further explore ILP theory and practice. Furthermore, there are variances in its implementation and theory due to the misconstruction of ILP (Crous, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2005; Stockdale, Whitehead, & Gresham, 1999).

Beyond the genesis that ILP emerged from an operational tactic followed by the Kent Police (UK) in the mid-1990s to reduce crime (Amey, Hale, & Uglow, 1996; Hale, Heaton, & Uglow, 2004; M. Maguire & John, 2004; OSCE, 2017; Peterson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008a; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012) and its intelligence-centric philosophy (Bell & Congram, 2013; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; Cope, 2004; Flood & Gaspar, 2009; M. Maguire & John, 2006; Potparič, 2014), there is no consensus (Alach, 2011; James, 2014; Ratcliffe, Sorg, & Rose, 2015), especially on the definition of the construct and how to customise it to the different contexts and needs of different agencies eager to adopt it. To address this problem, some efforts have been made (inlcuding BJA, 2009; Čavkov & Gačanin, 2014; Gill, 1998; OSCE, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2003, 2016; UNODC, 2011b), but which have not solved this complex problem. The problem is further augmented by a lack of consensus on a definition of 'intelligence' (Alach, 2011;

Harfield & Harfield, 2008b, p. 54; Rolington, 2013, p. 17), particularly among academics (for details, see Chapter Five—Theme 2). The participants of the *Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit* recognised the burden in promoting ILP without a common understanding of intelligence, and cited appropriate definitions for intelligence, bearing in mind the need to protect individuals' civil rights in ILP (IACP, 2002). Even after this endeavour, there still exists disagreement on a definition of intelligence predominantly in academia, aggravating the problem.

The ambiguity surrounding ILP has resulted in multiple definitions (James, 2014; Quarmby & Young, 2010), based on need, use, and understanding. For example, the Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) of the US Department of Justice approved two different definitions, one for general use and the other, called a narrow definition, for ease in allowing police agencies to implement ILP. In the standard version, ILP is understood as "A collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving policing, information sharing, and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations", while in the narrowed definition, it is defined as "the executive implementation of the intelligence cycle to support proactive decision making for resource allocation and crime prevention" (BJA, 2009, p. 4).

Apart from the various definitions, a number of models of ILP have made its understanding problematic for scholars as well as practitioners (Alach, 2011; James, 2003, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2016, pp. 60–61). Commonly referred models are the 3-i Model, American Model,[2] Cybernetic Model, and NIM. The NIM could be considered as the most widely practised model as most agencies adopted a derivative of it, customised it to their needs (Crous, 2011; James, Phythian, Wadie, & Richards, 2017). These models will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Besides these models, there exist models that treat the implementation of the Intelligence Cycle (hereafter referred to as IC or intelligence process) as implementation of ILP (for details, see Chapter Two).

In addition to the definitions, the difference in opinion about ILP has aggravated the understanding of its theory. For some theorists, it is a business model structured on information collection and intelligence dissemination (Gill, 1998; Hale et al., 2004; Innes, Abbott, Lowe, & Roberts, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2016; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008),

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[2] The author adopted this term to differentiate the version of ILP promoted by the US Department of Justice and research funded by the Department of Justice from other ILP models. David L. Carter is the forerunner in advocating this variant.

while others refer to it as a philosophy that has absorbed other policing paradigms for improved policing with intelligence at its centre, supporting the decision-makers in making informed decisions (D. L. Carter, 2004, 2009; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; Crank, Kadleck, & Koski, 2010; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). As mentioned earlier, other interpretations exist, which will be discussed in Chapter Two. This thesis adopts the second interpretation and would argue, to a vast extent in Chapter Two, that stacking all previous policing paradigms is essential for policing today's 'risk society'.[3] Such diverse interpretations are often justified by stating that the construct of ILP is evolving, as it was applied only to prolific offenders and organised crimes until very recently (OSCE, 2017, p. 18; Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 6). The newest transformation in ILP was seen in 2016 when Ratcliffe (2016) updated his 3-i Model with a new 4-i Model, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe developed its model in 2017 based on the 4-i Model and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's *Police Information and Information Systems* (OSCE, 2017).

As seen above, most of the scholarship on ILP has been on its practice in the Global North, perhaps due to less implementation of it in the rest of the world, limited research opportunities in other regions, or restricted access to agencies due to repressive policies. Few exceptions identified during the course of this research include a study in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The Zimbabwe study analysed ILP through surveying the Bindura district (Mugari et al., 2015), while the Kenyan study assessed ILP's impact on domestic violence crimes in Kakamega County (Mabia et al., 2016). As ILP has been mostly examined in the context of the experiences of police agencies in the Global North, this study intends to narrow that gap by analysing how ILP is practised in a police agency in a country in the Global South—the Maldives, which has been practising ILP since 2011 (MPS, 2010e). The Maldives Police Service (MPS) has not acknowledged any of the challenges in its struggle to practise ILP, and no research has been undertaken to assess the way the MPS practises ILP or its approach to customising ILP to the local context and needs.

Before formally adopting ILP as a business model or policing philosophy in 2011, official documents in the Maldives had used the term ILP since 2007 as a strategy against organised crime and terrorism (MPND, 2007; MPS, 2010b; President's Office, 2009a). Since this issue

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[3] Risk society was a term coined in the 1980s and it is associated with several scholars, particularly Ulrich Beck, a German scientist. Ericson and Haggerty Ericson and Haggerty (1997, p. 6) used it to refer to the negative aspects in a society by focussing on "fear and social distribution of 'bads' more than on progress and social distribution of 'goods'".

requires a detailed examination, it will be elaborated upon in Chapter Four. This narrow interpretation of ILP in the official documents of the Maldives implies that political leadership and police administrators were not exposed to the core aspects of ILP theory. As executive familiarity and commitment to ILP is essential to implement and sustain its practice (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009; HMIC, 1997a; James, 2013; OSCE, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2016; Walsh, 2015), this thesis will be able to examine the impact of executives' limited knowledge of ILP on its practice in the Maldives, if the leadership that implemented ILP was not sufficiently conversant with the fundamentals of ILP. The earlier interpretation seen in the country's official documents may have been revised when it implemented ILP in 2011. However, such a revision looks like a distant possibility owing to reasons identified below.

The interpretation of the term 'intelligence' offered by the Commissioner of MPS, Hussain Waheed (now dismissed from office) in 2015 also makes such an examination essential. On 30 January 2015, at a press conference to inform the public about the reasons for raiding the residence of a serving cabinet minister, Commissioner Waheed stated that the MPS had received "intelligence" about the presence of weapons and explosives in a house, and that the MPS was unaware of whose residence it was before the raid. Replying to a reporter's question regarding the house and its resident (it was the residence of the Minister of Defence), he said, "police does not have to find whose dwelling it was, before conducting a search" (Waheed, 2015), thereby removing the processing/analysis phase of the intelligence process. This response from the (then) police chief casts doubts on whether the MPS implemented ILP as a business model or an intelligence-based initiative against a particular problem or set of problems.[4] In ILP, information is required to be "thoroughly validated" before acted upon and the action performed must be proportional to the potential harm (Brodeur & Dupont, 2008, p. 29). As mentioned earlier, implementing an intelligence driven approach against a particular problem has often been misunderstood by police agencies as implementation of ILP, perhaps due to its complexity or lack of awareness of the construct within the leadership.

In spite of the application of ILP in several police forces and the scholarly attention ILP has received, scholars have not sufficiently explored how revolutionary ILP is (Alach, 2011; James, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2002). This deficiency is partly because of the minimal impact of policing

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[4] An alternative inference drawn from the description of the police raid could be a justification of a politically targeted dubious operation. Even in such a context, this description confirms that the police chief was not conversant with the fundamentals of the intelligence process or ILP.

strategies on crime rates (Edwards, 2011; Heaton, 2000) and limited scholarship on ILP. Bayley (1994, p. 10) argues that "social conditions outside the control of the police, as well as outside the control of the criminal justice system as a whole, determine crime levels in communities". Nevertheless, more than any other component of the criminal justice system, the police can contribute to reducing the number of people in conflict with the law, though police and the criminal justice system springs to action after the occurrence of crime to identify and prosecute the offender (Edwards, 2011, pp. 49–50). The emerging wisdom is that police can prevent crimes through problem-solving initiatives designed to respond to "crime-producing situations and dynamics", as found by the participants of Harvard's 2015 Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety (Braga, 2015, p. 1). As ILP employs "scientific approach to problem solving" in analysing information to provide actionable knowledge to decision-makers (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 9), ILP can influence some if not all causal factors of crime.

Figure 1.1: **Crimes reported to the MPS from 2000 to 2016.**
Adapted from MPS (2011f, 2013i, 2014i); National Bureau of Statistics (2017).

Apart from this, there is a second opinion that police can affect crime rates by targeting repeated offenders (Cope, 2004; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Heaton, 2000; HMIC, 1997a; Ratcliffe, 2008a; Wood & Shearing, 2007). Some ILP commentators argue that a small number of offenders are responsible for a larger chunk of the crime numbers (HMIC, 1997a; Keane &

Kleiven, 2009; M. Maguire & John, 2006; Tilley, 2008b; Wood & Shearing, 2007), signifying the effect on the volume by targeting those individuals (Audit Commission, 1993; Heaton, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2008c, 2016). Despite this theoretical dimension, crime trends in the Maldives failed to depict a positive change (downward trend) immediately after the country adopted ILP (see Figure 1.1). In fact, in the first two years after ILP was implemented, crime rates rose substantially (15.22% in 2012 and 6.69% in 2013) before taking a downward curve. Hence, contrary to scholarly wisdom, ILP had no positive impact on the criminal environment in the Maldives, at least during the first two years of its practice. Why was it so, is a question that must be explored, and whether ILP was responsible for the reduction of crime from 2014 onwards also requires examination. The increase in crime rate (in the first two years) could be an artefact of improved data collection that resulted in increased detections, or challenges in operationalising ILP.

In spite of the dip in the crime rate from 2014 onwards, the official narrative on organised crime (particularly gang-crimes) and the threats of terrorism imply that the crime environment in the Maldives had not improved; in fact, the impression is that it deteriorated (DJA, 2016; Juvenile Justice Unit, 2016, p. 2; MoF&T & UNDP, 2014; MPS, 2014h, pp. 17–18; President's Office, 2016e; World Bank, 2014; Yameen, 2018b). In 2017, the MPS was forced to appeal to the public to report crimes to the MPS without fear, instead of posting them on social media (Ahmed, 2017; Saeed, 2017).

A major driving factor for the Maldives adopting ILP was the looming threat of terrorism and religious extremism (MPND, 2007). Since 2011, new legal instruments,[5] new establishments,[6] and new policy documents[7] have been introduced to reduce risks and threats and achieve greater policy coherence on terrorism and religious extremism. Significant changes were also introduced to the MPS. In 2012, the Intelligence Department of the MPS was expanded, and it

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[5] On 17 September 2011, the Religious Unity Protection Regulation came into force to address the gaps in the Religious Harmony Act. A new Penal Code was ratified on 13 April 2014. On 5 January 2015, two new laws, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and Extradition Act, became effective. The most important change was the enactment of a new Terrorism Prevention Act on 25 October 2015, replacing the aged terrorism law (No: 10/90) that was ratified in 1990. A policy paper was published by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs on 10 April 2018 to address issues on extremism and to inform the public about the intent of the government to develop harsher penalties for Maldivians travelling to war-torn countries to participate in wars (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 2018).

[6] The National Counter Terrorism Centre was created on 25 February 2016 (President's Office, 2016b), while the Supreme Council for Islamic Fatwa came into existence on 11 May 2016 (President's Office, 2016c).

[7] The country published its first National Security Policy in 2012 (President's Office, 2012), followed by the articulation of a National Policy against Terrorism and Violent Extremism in 2016 (President's Office, 2016e), and the National Strategy on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2017 (NCTC, 2017).

was elevated to the level of a command, called the Directorate of Intelligence (MPS, 2013p, pp. 30–31). The Criminal Intelligence Department, Counter Terrorism Department, and Intelligence Support Department were constituted under the Directorate to distinctly focus on criminal intelligence, terrorism intelligence, covert policing, and developing the intelligence function. Yet, the threat is increasing, making it an overriding issue for the government (DJA, 2016; NCTC, 2017; President's Office, 2016d, 2016e). It is not known how far the reorganisation of the intelligence function to distinctly focus on relevant tasks, risks and threats helped the MPS achieve its objectives and mitigate risks. By examining the use of intelligence in/by the MPS, this thesis reveals the extent to which the agency operationalised intelligence in its decision-making processes. The findings can be used as a baseline by policymakers and administrators in future efforts to enhance the efficacy of their services.

Unlike many other countries, the Maldives has no effective oversight mechanism for holding police leadership accountable to financial and management issues. So far, only four studies have been conducted to assess management practices in the MPS. The first two studies were funded by the MPS soon after its inception to review its frontline areas for introducing required improvements (which are Ingram, 2007; Robertson, 2006). The third study was in 2009 by two experts from the UK, Sir Dan Crompton and Superintendent Gareth Wynne, sponsored by the UK government. Based on their discoveries, the UK experts urged the MPS to urgently implement a mechanism to review its operational performance (Crompton & Wynne, 2009). They also expressed concerns about the nonexistence of a police authority or board in the Maldives (for additional information on their assessment, see Chapter Four). The last study, conducted in 2011, made a number of recommendations to the MPS and the government as it found that the MPS Strategic Plan 2007–2011 (hereafter referred to as SP1) was partially implemented (Srivastava & Kotwal, 2011). Since the shift of the MPS from community-oriented policing (COP) to ILP, no study has been undertaken to assess compliance or efficacy of the new model in policing the Maldives.

Much before the term ILP or 'policing with intelligence' emerged, police agencies across the world have been using proactive strategies, though in the periphery of reactive policing (IACP, 2002; Reiner, 2010; Sherman, 1986). In the Maldives, such practices have been noticed before implementing ILP, in some of the anti-drug and counter-terrorism operations (MPS, 2011h, pp. 3–4; President's Office, 2012, p. 22). The MPS never claimed ILP for any successful organisational objectives (viz. strategic objectives in strategic plans and annual operational

priorities), except pointing to the use of intelligence in anti-drug or counter-terrorism operations.[8] Furthermore, the activities listed in the MPS Business Plan 2014 as measures to continue with the practice of ILP for predicting crime "through predictive policing methods" implied fundamental issues in its ILP practice (MPS, 2014g, p. 33). The Plan recognised the importance of developing intelligence collection plans and tactical intelligence (MPS, 2014g, p. 34), which are essential components in ILP, three years after implementing ILP.

In the Maldives, there exist no clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls to ensure intelligence collection practices do not undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect. Amid a weak legal regime, the MPS must have a strong privacy policy to safeguard the rights of citizens, especially the right to privacy, which is protected by the Maldives' Constitution. The importance of developing and following a privacy policy has been essentially emphasised in ILP literature (for details, see Chapter Three). Based on the confession of President Abdulla Yameen, in a national address in 2015, stating that his deputy, Ahmed Adeeb (now impeached and imprisoned) had abused police intelligence (Yameen, 2015), the robustness of the privacy policy followed in the MPS for protecting rights of individuals can be questioned.

Hence, it is not clear the extent to which ILP contributed to policing in the Maldives, and there are reasons indicating ILP was not widely understood in the MPS, some of which are highlighted above and some in the following sections.

1.3 Advancing Knowledge on Policing

The ambiguity surrounding conceptual understanding of ILP was one of the factors that motivated this research. Hence, an effort is made to understand how practitioners in the Maldives interpret ILP and the circumstances that made them perceive the construct from that lens. Neo-institutionalism is adopted in the thesis as the theoretical framework to assess

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[8] In cases where exploitation of intelligence was highlighted in terrorism offences, most of the operations were conducted against politicians, which were often considered as politically motivated cases by local as well as international observers. For instance, intelligence played a prominent role in bringing criminal charges against Mohamed Nazim (Defence Minister), Muhthaz Muhusin (former Prosecutor General sentenced under terrorism law for 17 years in 2016), Faris Maumoon (Member of Parliament, arrested for bribing other lawmakers to win a motion of no-confidence against the Speaker of *People's Majlis*), Chief Justice Abdulla Saeed and Supreme Court Judge Ali Hameed (for accepting bribes to release political prisoners through a court order), among others.

whether the MPS adopted ILP to professionalise the force (normative isomorphism), attain legitimacy (coercive isomorphism), or mimic a model practised in other police forces (mimetic isomorphism). Neo-institutionalism was developed to examine the behaviour of agencies in the 1970s by Meyer and Rowan (for details, see Chapter Three). By applying the findings and common principles of ILP models, the intent is to contribute to the theory of ILP by consolidating existing interpretations. As mentioned earlier, the author is of the opinion that stacking the strengths of previous policing styles or philosophies is essential to maintaining peace and rule of law in today's 'risk society'.

The second factor was the attractiveness of ILP to police agencies despite a lack of empirical knowledge about its effectiveness in proactive policing. As highlighted earlier, the numerous models and lack of consensus (both on ILP and 'intelligence') have made the ILP construct obscure. ILP strategies have often been associated with and influenced by existing problems, processes, structures and systems of operation. James (2003) noticed this trend in the police forces in the UK, despite the standards and processes advocated in the NIM. Based on a study on four British police forces, Collier (2006) found that NIM processes were implemented ineffectively due to cultural resistance to change, technological problems, and the bureaucratisation of processes. He noticed "an absence of rigorous evidence linking actions, results and contextual issues" in the agencies he visited (Collier, 2006, p. 115). The term ILP has been applied to a variety of crime control strategies such as crime-mapping, pattern analysis, and problem-oriented approaches (IACP, 2002; James, 2014, p. 79; M. Maguire & John, 2006). Stockdale et al. (1999, p. 5) found that the terms 'intelligence-led' and 'proactive' were used interchangeably "to describe practices which frequently contrast starkly with reactive, demand-led policing". Similarly, a 2009 study on Western Australia Police by Jennings found that decision-makers and staff lacked an understanding about ILP (cited in Crous, 2011). Ratcliffe (2005, p. 435) evaluated the intelligence function in three New Zealand districts and concluded that the leadership lacked a clear understanding of ILP, paving the way for "a negative effect on the ability of the organisation to positively impact on the crime environment". A research project on the Slovenian police found that ILP was not fully operational in the agency despite having the necessary mechanisms, as those mechanisms were not sufficiently interconnected (Potparič, 2014). Studies also show that ILP had little positive impact on operational policing (for example, D. L. Carter, Chermak, McGarrell, Carter, & Drew, 2012; Cope, 2004; Crous, 2011; Innes & Sheptycki, 2004; James, 2013; Kleiven, 2007;

M. Maguire & John, 2004; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012). In the UK, where NIM was welcomed by the police forces, James (2016, p. 74) noticed:

> Rather than using NIM to deliver better outcomes, many forces implemented just enough of the model to provide a veneer of compliance that insulated them from sanction, and no more. Fundamentally, there never was the support for NIM that the rhetoric suggested; many saw its merits, but few, if any, were prepared to make the significant structural changes to their forces that full compliance with the model demanded. Police commanders did not intend to mislead. Equally, time and events have shown that there was no political will to call them out for their prevarication. The Home Office and police authorities largely were passive, content to trust the professional judgement of the police.

The third motivation for this thesis grew from these discoveries, especially in well-resourced agencies in the Global North that have been developing their intelligence functions through research and identifying weaknesses by national commissions and bodies. Countries in the Global South are also adopting ILP, despite their ill-experience with the COP philosophy when COP was imported from the Global North (for a discussion, see Brogden, 2004; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005). ILP practice in Zimbabwe was marred by resource constraints (Mugari et al., 2015). Moreover, the Zimbabwean study did not assess the extent to which participants were familiar with the ILP construct or whether the required processes were in place in Zimbabwe. The Kenyan study credited intelligence-driven strategies such as targeting prolific offenders, linking series of crimes based on patterns, and focusing on hotspots, as ILP (Mabia et al., 2016), all of which are essentially intervention strategies of ILP. Both these studies emphasised the need to obtain technological systems for (effectively) practising ILP. This need has been stressed by other scholars (Cope, 2008; Dannels & Smith, 2001; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Gill, 1998; Ratcliffe, 2002, 2016; Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015), sometimes giving the impression that professional judgement and officer experience have no role in ILP (James, 2017). Technology is only one part of the ILP equation; there are other elements in developing, implementing, and sustaining ILP in a police agency (Collier, 2006; Prox & Griffiths, 2015). Organisational context, police culture, and functional differentiation decide police technologies and shape intelligence production (Sanders & Condon, 2017, p. 238). With these, there exist the belief that technological changes in policing are driven by three imperatives: "to improve effectiveness and efficiency, to satisfy the demands of external agencies for information, and

to meet the requirements of new forms of police management and accountability" (Chan, 2001, p. 140). These imperatives are intertwined with ILP due to the efficiency attached to ILP in crime control, the strong emphasis on collecting and sharing information within and across partner agencies in ILP, and ILP being the newest business model for police agencies (Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2016). As the MPS had acquired technical systems for its intelligence function before the implementation of ILP (for details, see Chapter Three), it would be interesting to determine whether the availability of technical accessories and systems is more crucial than a receptive organisational environment to practise ILP. Owing to the significance attached to technical systems in ILP literature, a hypothesis based on technology is used to delve further into the research topic.

Police culture—a subject of intense interest since 1960s—arises from the common tensions associated with the duties of a police officer (Chan, 1997; Crank, 2004; Reiner, 2010; Skolnick, 1966). Mastrofski and Willis (2010) identified three types of police culture: *occupational* (the values and beliefs that differentiate police occupation from other occupations and the general public), *organisational* (the culture distinct to each police agency), and *subculture* (the distinct beliefs, values, and perceptions held by police officers in their daily work). Owing to the scope of this thesis, the latter two types are recognised in the definition of police culture. Therefore, police culture is a complex of "values, beliefs, attitudes, expectations and norms shared between police officers and which can influence their approach to policing and their professional practices" (C. Atkinson, 2017, p. 235). Police culture influences changes in police and policing (Chan, 1997; Sanders & Condon, 2017; Sanders et al., 2015). This research will reveal any impact of police culture on ILP uptake in the MPS. Police culture is "widely recognized as inherently difficult to penetrate or change, and it is often acknowledged in the literature that police officers will attempt to, over time, refute, and disassociate themselves with directives that they feel do not complement with their core activities" (Harrison et al., 2018, p. 8). To overcome this challenge (and other external drivers) in improving proactivity against organised crime, many police agencies revised their training curriculum to facilitate strategic and operational assault on the causal factors of criminality and public disorder (see J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Harrison et al., 2018; Management Audit Unit, 2006; Telep, Ready, & Bottema, 2017; Walsh, 2017).

The third motivation for this thesis, therefore, is the desire to examine the ILP framework in a resource scarce and organisationally challenging environment beyond the Global North. To

meet this intent, ILP interpretation, implementation, and practice was studied in the Maldives, a developing island nation that is practising ILP. As the MPS is a young agency, formed only in 2004, its intelligence system was expected to be frail, at least prior to becoming an ILP agency, compared to the Western nations' intelligence architecture and culture. Hence, a study of ILP practice and perception in the Maldives would contribute to ILP literature and those agencies in the Global South that aspire to adopt ILP.

Most ILP models prescribe a standard conceptual framework fit for all agencies, irrespective of the political and social context within which the agency operates (see Gill, 1998; NCPE, 2007; OSCE, 2017; Peterson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2003, 2016). The fact that ILP must be tailored according to the organisational needs, capacity, complexity of the threat environment, local political environment, and geography is often overlooked. There cannot be a "one single solution, simple solution that 'fits all' the problems of crime and disorder" as policing is complicated by an amalgamation of social, economic, political, legal, and demographic problems (Gunn, 2003, p. 159). Most policing agencies, such as those in Australia, Kosovo, Macedonia (James et al., 2017), New Zealand (Evans, 2009; New Zealand Police, 2002, 2005; Tibbott, 2014), Sweden (OSCE, 2017), and Serbia (Kostadinović & Klisarić, 2017) customised ILP (more appropriately NIM) to fit to their needs and context.

The MPS confirmed its intent to customise ILP in its *Strategic Plan 2011–2013* (hereafter referred to as SP2) and confirmed that it is still practising ILP in its newest *Strategic Plan 2014–2018* (hereafter SP3). The SP2 was "mindful of the need to apply a workable intelligence-led policing framework in the context of the Maldives" (MPS, 2010e, p. 9). However, neither the details of the customisation nor the contextualised model has been published. These details are important mainly for two reasons. First, the SP2 adopted an action framework based on NIM's 'tactical menu', which lists the operational interventions available to a decision-maker upon receipt of intelligence to address a specific police problem. Converting an operational tactic to a strategic intervention in SP2 without attributing it to NIM makes it important to examine whether NIM was able to enhance proactive policing efforts of the Maldives and protect the community against various threats, as expected. Second, whether the architects of ILP in the MPS were sufficiently well-versed with NIM to introduce a customisation not seen anywhere else is also a question that needs exploration. The absence of a focus to develop the intelligence function and create awareness of ILP within the agency in

the SP2 makes this examination important to promote ILP in the MPS. Such an analysis will also contribute to ILP literature.

1.4 Research Question

This thesis is an effort to analyse ILP through studying its interpretation, implementation, and perceived impact on policing and crime control from the ranks and files of the police. The thesis attempts to investigate the ILP practice and its effect on policing and crime control, and contrast its critical factors laid out by the BJA (2009) against practices within the MPS, a national police agency, in order to understand how ILP contributes to the realisation of the organisational goals of the police. ILP is often considered as a means for optimum utilisation of resources to deliver efficient and effective services in an environment of increasing demands and limited resources (James, 2013; Kostadinović & Klisarić, 2017).

The primary research question guiding this thesis is, "What are the factors that facilitate or impede the effectiveness of ILP in crime control and order maintenance, and how are the key elements of ILP perceived and practised by the police?" This research question will be analysed through an exploratory case study analysis of the MPS, by investigating its existing practices, protocols, and practitioners' perceptions towards ILP. Based on this research question and through a case study inquiry, this research seeks to examine the following questions:

1. How do members of the MPS perceive ILP, and why do they perceive ILP in that form?
2. To what extent are the existing crime control practices within the MPS consistent with ILP?
3. What are the factors that facilitate or impede the development and effectiveness of ILP in the Maldives?

Research Question 1:

   How do members of the MPS perceive ILP, and why do they perceive ILP in that form?

As previously noted, there are numerous interpretations of the ILP construct, based on need, context, and understanding. This research question will provide answers regarding how officers within the MPS perceive ILP. To practise ILP, an understanding of its essential features and

components would be crucial, especially at the managerial and executive decision-making levels. Without an understanding of its basic components, decision-makers would have no idea of what kind of intelligence assessments to ask for and how to guide the agency through a 'control strategy' to achieve its annual and long-term goals.[9] Though the MPS has not published any information regarding its way of practising ILP or how NIM was contextualised, the agency always confirmed that ILP has been the policing philosophy underpinning its service delivery (MPS, 2010e, 2014o). Despite this, a pending concern is the way the MPS initially attempted to adopt ILP (through its Business Plan 2010 by referring to ILP as a strategy). Under its SP1, it planned to implement ILP as a strategy against organised crime. It is not clear whether this interpretation was corrected when it migrated from COP to ILP in 2011 or it adopted a specific intelligence driven approach (strategy) to combat a particular crime. A blurriness is further created by an audit of the Institute for Security and Law Enforcement Studies (ISLES), the educational and training wing of the MPS, conducted in 2014 by the University of Western Sydney, Australia. The audit report stated that the MPS was practising COP (UWS, 2014). This revelation implies that the teaching materials were applying COP tenets, instead of ILP principles, contradicting its strategic documents SP2 and SP3 and Business Plan 2014.

Research Question 2:

To what extent are the existing crime control practices within the MPS consistent with ILP?

Minimum requirements exist for the implementation of ILP (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2004, 2009; NCPE, 2005b, 2005c, 2007). In case of NIM, which is the most widely contextualised form of ILP, requirements were established to improve the intelligence process and products. More than 135 specific standards were prescribed for practising NIM (NCPE, 2005c) at the time the MPS implemented ILP as its business model. However, in 2012, after a service-wide consultation in the UK, the NIM minimum standards were revised to four (James, 2016, pp. 76–78):

- The agency must have governance and command structures in place;
- The agency must be able to manage knowledge;

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[9] The long-term goals are the goals the MPS aspired to achieve through its strategic plans – SP1, SP2 and SP3, while the annual goals are those listed in its Business Plans or Operational Priorities set for a year.

- The agency must collect information and make use of intelligence;
- The agency must have the tasking and coordination (T&C) processes.

Studies conducted on UK police agencies before this period showed significant variations in NIM framework and practise (Collier, 2006; John & Maguire, 2004; Kleiven, 2007; M. Maguire & John, 2006) despite a well-laid out framework to practise NIM through official guidance materials (NCPE, 2005b, 2005c, 2006b, 2007; NPIA, 2008). Similarly, the police agencies that adopted NIM (contextualising their needs and circumstances) also exhibited such traits (for example, Crous, 2011; Potparič, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2005). A lack of an understanding of key tenets was a recurring theme in all these studies, perhaps due to the complexity of the NIM framework (prior to simplification). This is the first research of this nature conducted on the MPS. Therefore, the findings could be similar to the outcomes of research conducted on other agencies.

This thesis realises the varied requirements of different police agencies based on resource availability, criminal environment, risks, geography, and political environment. Irrespective of the interpretation held by police practitioners, this research question will explain the ILP framework within the MPS and the parallels it has with NIM standards or any other ILP model. The implementation of ILP must be "to enhance proactive policing efforts and further the positive outcomes of law enforcement actions toward reducing crime and protecting the community against a variety of threats" (BJA, 2009, p. 5). It remains to be assessed whether the MPS was able to tailor NIM according to the organisational needs, capacity, geography, and the threats of crime, or whether the MPS adopted ILP due to political or institutional pressures. An examination of the extent its practices on crime control and order maintenance are consistent with the existing literature on ILP will also establish how ILP contributes to the organisational goals of the MPS, both in formulation and realisation.

Research Question 3:

What are the factors that facilitate or impede the development and effectiveness of ILP in the Maldives?

The SP2, which is the bedrock of ILP in the MPS, was layered in two sections. The first section provided a 'Strategic Assessment', undertaken through a PESTELO (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal, and Organisational) analysis, while the second

section presented the 'strategic actions' for achieving its strategic goals. Three themes were identified from a 'risk' focused Strategic Assessment: tackle crime, improve community safety and partnership, and achieve governance and management of the highest standard (MPS, 2010e, p. 6). The Strategic Assessment aimed to guide the MPS judiciously to achieve its strategic goals through "intelligence-led priorities" for "resource allocation to bring optimum results" (MPS, 2010e, p. 11). The PESTELO analysis should have been carried out adhering to NIM minimum standards as NIM requires an examination PESTELO issues associated with each crime and disorder problem in the Strategic Assessment (NCPE, 2005c, p. 66).

Though the SP2 states that a PESTELO analysis was employed to derive the Strategic Assessment (MPS, 2010e), it appears that a PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) analysis was actually used instead of a PESTELO analysis, as the *organisational* dimension was altogether missing in the SP2, thereby ignoring organisational challenges (for details, see Chapter Five). If the organisational dimension was omitted during the analysis, it would create problems for the agency to understand existing problems in the agency and how those problems could hamper or promote the new policing initiative or strategy. The absence of 'organisational' analysis in the SP2 and absence of a policy document to migrate to ILP appeals for an evaluation of ILP practice in the MPS.

The SP2 aimed to "redefine intelligence and improve strategic, operational and tactical analysis and assessments" to cater to the need of applying a "workable" ILP framework based on the context of the Maldives (MPS, 2010e, p. 9). It stressed to improve intelligence collection and sharing under the first two themes in the second section of the Plan. However, there was no focus on developing the intelligence function or intelligence process within the theme of governance in the Plan. Intelligence was limited to tackling crimes and the SP2 lacked a vision to develop the intelligence function. This could potentially affect ILP uptake in the MPS.

Based on these observations, even before conducting the research at the MPS, it is apparent there were factors within the MPS and its policymaking circle that could possibly affect ILP diffusion within the agency. This is not new in ILP literature; earlier studies have established such factors within the agencies, such as culture (C. Atkinson, 2017; Collier, 2006; Cope, 2004; Sanders et al., 2015), unfamiliarity with elements of ILP at the leadership level (Amey et al., 1996; Crous, 2011; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2005), variation in the quality of intelligence generated (Belur & Johnson, 2016; Cope, 2004; John & Maguire, 2004; Potparič, 2014), lack of adequate number of analysts (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015), absence of internal

policies within agencies that reconcile with broader national plans (D. L. Carter et al., 2012), and environmental stability (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015), among other problems.

The third research question, linked directly to the previous two research questions, will provide the details about the factor(s) that affect ILP practice in the MPS. The details will contribute to ILP literature as this could be the first comprehensive analysis of ILP practice in a country in the Global South. It will also provide answers to other agencies desiring to implement ILP and the factors or internal machinery they should focus on, for effective exploitation of their intelligence infrastructure. The MPS leadership may use this research to find issues that need their intervention to practise ILP in the most efficient way. This interest of the agency was expressed when it endorsed the research proposal. The third question is also expected to provide answers for the misinterpretation of the term intelligence by the Commissioner of Police.

1.5 Definition of Key Terms

The pertinent terms are explained in this section to aid in a common understanding, especially for those related to intelligence due to various interpretations of those in the scholarship. This is not a glossary of the thesis but definitions of the concepts and terms vital to understanding the thesis. Other terms will be defined as the need arises.

5x5x5 Report is an "an information/intelligence report in which the source, the intelligence and the way in which the material should be disseminated (known as the handling code) have all been evaluated and assigned a grading between 1 and 5" (NCPE, 2005c, p. 192). In the MPS, this report was referred as 'Information Collection Form'.

Community intelligence is "local information, direct or indirect, that when assessed provides intelligence on the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups, that informs both the strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities" (HMIC, 1997b, p. 47).

Control strategy identifies the strategic policing priorities for national and regional levels of the agency and is usually developed every six to twelve months. It is set at the strategic decision-making level of the agency using the Strategic Assessment, and serves as a framework

for grounding decisions of the executive level in prioritising problems when allocating resources.

Crime control refers to the effort of the police to repress criminal activity in the community.

Information refers to "pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identifies persons, evidence, events, or illustrates processes that indicate the incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a criminal event" (D. L. Carter, 2004, p. 9). Information is gleaned from open sources, community (through outreach programmes and other means), cases (confessions, statements, descriptions of styles and behaviour, criminal associations, and markets), police duties (patrols, vehicle stops, forensic analysis, and suspicious information), calls for service, and covert methods (human, physical, and technical surveillance).

Intelligence is the information that has been transformed into "insight or understanding on a current or future threat, methodology, vulnerability or opportunity which is developed through analysis of available information and provides direction for action" (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, 2013, p. 7). Hence, intelligence is considered as a product—output generated through the 'intelligence process'. Intelligence is used in this thesis to refer to criminal intelligence or law enforcement intelligence, which is different from national security intelligence. Criminal intelligence pertains to crime, disorder, and emerging threats to the society, while national security intelligence pertains to threats to the national security of a country, that "meets stated or understood needs of policymakers" (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 1). Both types are syntheses of data or information on which analytical reasoning has been applied. To distinguish the two types, 'national security intelligence' will be used where the topic is not about criminal intelligence or law enforcement intelligence. Considering the type of agency under examination in the thesis, three types of intelligence are recognised, which are tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence.

Intelligence culture is used to refer to a tradition of developing the intelligence function, processes (particularly collection and analysis), and systems over the years.

Intelligence function is the functional entity of the agency that has an overall responsibility to the intelligence process. The intelligence function will be responsible for gathering, evaluating, and disseminating products relevant to decision-making. It is also responsible for predicting future problems and planning for future contingencies. It must generate intelligence for supporting prevention efforts as well as developing response strategies.

Intelligence personnel include intelligence analysts, intelligence officers (all non-analyst positions, including undercover police officers, with a direct role in the intelligence function), intelligence support officers (who provide administrative support to the intelligence function), intelligence coordination officers (deployed in police stations to coordinate local intelligence operations with frontline teams or units), focal points (appointed by the intelligence sector to specialist crime departments), intelligence supervisors, intelligence managers, and principal analysts. Intelligence supervisors lead intelligence units and are responsible for managing intelligence officers and analysts of the unit, while intelligence managers are responsible for managing the intelligence function often operated as a department, which comprises more than one unit. The principal analysts have a responsibility to the overall intelligence function of the agency, which is structurally identified in the MPS organigram as Directorate of Intelligence.

The **intelligence process** is a "continuous process comprising of many cycles operating at different levels and speeds" (Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 53) to deliver timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence for use in all levels of decision-making in the police. It is described in chapter two at great length. It is alternatively referred as the Intelligence Cycle (IC). Its individual tasks are discrete, yet they overlap and coincide so that they are often conducted concurrently, rather than sequentially.

The **intelligence requirement** provides direction to the intelligence personnel as well as frontline officers. It clearly states the type of information that must be collected in relation to the set priorities (control strategy) as well as the kind of information the agency would require based on emerging crime/incident trends. It impacts policing strategies (such as patrolling plan and forensic strategy) based on an understanding of crime and disorder problems (NCPE, 2005c, p. 78). For instance, the patrolling strategy could be changed based on a geographical understanding of the problem, while forensic strategy can be changed following the identification of trends in criminality to focus more on the examination of a specific type of crime or crimes.

The **intelligence system** includes the intelligence function (sector), information systems in the agency that must be accessible to intelligence personnel, intelligence dissemination systems (both electronic and manual), and personnel involved in the intelligence process. This definition is broader than the definition used by scholars as they used it to refer to the intelligence function and to differentiate it from information systems (see Bouza, 1976; Campbell, Sahid, & Stang, 1969; Dintino & Martens, 1983; Sweeney, 1924).

Knowledge-based policing refers to policing philosophies (or models) that use a scientific approach and use knowledge (and not just police information) in decision-making. With this definition, all modern policing philosophies such as COP (for basing decisions on knowledge acquired through interactions with the community), problem-oriented policing (for basing decisions on the knowledge unearthed by studying police problems), CompStat (knowledge created through technology such as hotspots and patterns), and ILP are included within it.

Operational intelligence supports the managerial level of the agency in making decisions for implementing preventive responses. The difference between tactical and operational intelligence is that tactical intelligence addresses localised criminal activities or specific cases, while operational intelligence addresses regional crime problems or criminal groups.

Paradigms are worldviews or conceptual frameworks approved by a particular scientific community. Paradigms differentiate one scientific community (or sub-community) from another. A scientific paradigm can be models (such as a planetary model of atoms), theories, concepts, assumptions, values, and knowledge (Kuhn, 1996). Paradigm shifts occur when existing knowledge or universally agreed views/frameworks fail to explain the 'anomalies', causing a displacement of an existing paradigm by another (Kuhn, 1996).

Police information comprises information collected by operational policing units during routine policing duties, information about incidents and events reported to the police, and evidence associated with particular crimes. It, however, does not include information gathered through targeted collection by intelligence personnel.

The **Strategic Assessment** is a forecast for the coming months produced (usually every six to twelve months) by the intelligence function by examining emerging trends and information about past incidents/crimes to inform the executive leadership in deciding organisational priorities for intelligence, prevention, and enforcement. It includes analysis of crimes, incidents, intelligence, demographic statistics, and an environmental scan that identifies any problems for tensions or threats.

Strategic intelligence refers to intelligence generated to assist executives in developing strategy, policy, and long-term capability development. It not only supports planning, but also allocating resources to meet the demands of emerging threats.

Tasking and coordination (T&C) is the means of manoeuvring the agency. The T&C process coordinates all the different elements of ILP. This objective is achieved by at least two groups

that operate at different levels of the agency: Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG) and Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG). The ST&CG operates at the command level (or strategic level) of the agency, while the TT&CG is responsible for making tactical/operational decisions. The TT&CG and ST&CG are linked through the control strategy, decided at the strategic level so that the intelligence requirement is also clear for the TT&CG. The control strategy and intelligence requirement regarding individual crime and disorder problems are actioned by the TT&CG. The ST&CG must assess the progress made by the agency (TT&CG) in realising the current control strategy and amend the control strategy based on the Strategic Assessment.

Tactical intelligence supports officers engaged in front-line areas, case officers or managers, and other operational policing units in operational interventions. It provides descriptions about imminent or near-term threats and enables the TT&CG in choosing options from the 'tactical menu'. Hot intelligence, passed directly to operational teams or units to attend instant threats or disorder problems to mitigate or prevent those, are also a form of tactical intelligence.

Tactical menu is an intervention framework for all crime and disorder problems, comprising of three options for the TT&CG: *prevention*, *intelligence* and *enforcement*. When the TT&CG opts for *prevention*, the intelligence specialists and other concerned officers must coordinate with units responsible for crime prevention to take appropriate prevention tactics to address the crime or disorder problem. The option of *intelligence* is mostly used when there are gaps in the intelligence generated. To cater to (new) requirements, the intelligence requirement must be revised. *Enforcement* is the tactical intervention to tackle a specific crime or disorder problem. The enforcement tactics could be arrest of suspects, interview of suspects, execution of search warrants, covert policing techniques, targeted patrolling or overt policing techniques, and inter-agency operations (NCPE, 2005c).

1.6 Thesis Structure

This thesis is developed in eight chapters. Chapter One (Introduction) describes the problem statement, rationale, and purpose of the research, followed by a description of the key terms used in the thesis.

Chapter Two explores existing scholarship on intelligence, ILP, and challenges to the sustained practice of new strategies such as ILP in police agencies. The main intent in examining intelligence and ILP is to identify inconsistencies in the limited, though growing, literature on police intelligence work. Nevertheless, attention was not given to examining the apparent criticisms surrounding the misuse and shortcomings of intelligence. The notion followed is that police agencies must develop workable, rational and just policies to respond to threats and crimes. Since Chapter One covered pertinent findings from previous studies, to avoid reiteration, reviewing previous ILP studies is given less attention in Chapter Two. Intelligence studies being "still dominated by work on Anglosphere" (Gill & Phythian, 2018, p. 468), the inclination of this thesis is towards that region. The chapter begins by exploring the concept of intelligence in police work over the years, before examining ILP and its different models. It relates whether intelligence in police work encouraged in developing a policing model that entirely revolved around intelligence, and whether there was any change from how early scholars instructed to use intelligence in policing in the newly developed construct of ILP and its models. The chapter assesses the implementation of ILP as an overarching police strategy and its impact, and identifies the likely factors affecting its operationalisation to derive positive results. The interest to look into this factor arose due to the emphasis laid by the BJA (2009) on leaders' commitment to successfully implementing ILP in any agency and the impediments other researchers identified, some of which have been stated in the problem statement. By reviewing the literature, it was found that 'policing with intelligence' is not as new as most scholars argue, though ILP as a distinct policing style was a late addition to policing literature.

Chapter Three explains the research design, methodology, and the approaches that underpin the research. This thesis follows an interpretive research paradigm blended in a case study inquiry. To answer the research questions a qualitative approach was selected. As previously mentioned, the case study chosen was the MPS, the national police force of the Maldives, which is also recognised in the country's Constitution as one of the two *Security Services*.[10] The research is underpinned on a neo-institutionalist theoretical framework. BJA's elements of ILP were used as the analytical framework. BJA's elements of ILP also enabled in situating the research, developing hypotheses, developing interview questions, and formulating a coding structure. A total of 48 participants were interviewed for the research. Among them three were retired police officers. For that reason, in calculating percentages of practitioners' perceptions,

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[10] The other Security Service is the military force, Maldives National Defence Force.

the number of participants (*n*) was considered as 45 (and not 48). The retired practitioners' responses were primarily used in explaining incidents that occurred and practices in which they were personally involved.

Chapter Four provides background information on the MPS and its operational environment. Such a description was required to make the reader aware of the context and highlight the need to contextualise policing style, whether ILP, COP or any other policing paradigm. Policing small communities (islands) will have factors that are different to large cities, such as difficulties in handling informants and monitoring subjects as people in small communities often know others living in that community, what they do, where they live, and who is an outsider. Some attention is given in this chapter to portray the societal and political changes in the Maldives during the wheeling out of the MPS as a civil agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2004, as policing in the Maldives was previously a responsibility of the National Security Service (NSS, now renamed as Maldives National Defence Force), a military force under the Ministry of Defence and National Security. In presenting the changes the MPS underwent, attention is given to its organisational structure, owing to the importance attached to T&C processes in ILP, to assess whether any T&C processes were or could be mediated by any of its internal boards or committees. The emergence of intelligence in police work is also examined, mainly to understand the intelligence culture and system before the MPS adopted ILP. Since privacy protection is a vital component of a resilient and accountable intelligence function, the legal and institutional remedies to prevent potential abuse is also looked in, which confirmed that no legislative standards were in place for protecting privacy of the people. To overcome the limitation of lack of documentation on the development of the police intelligence function, the participants who had experience in intelligence work were asked about the developments they had witnessed. Their responses were principally used in mapping the development of the Directorate of Intelligence—the MPS intelligence sector or branch. As previously highlighted, the Maldives had advocated using ILP as a crime fighting strategy before 2011 in its national and policing plans. Those assertions are also examined in this chapter to understand the corrections it incorporated when ILP was implemented as its business model or philosophy in 2011.

Chapters five to seven explore the three research questions; each chapter is dedicated to one research question. In analysing the responses for the research questions, both inductive and deductive reasoning are applied. Five hypotheses are used in finding answers to the research

questions. Chapter Five focuses on assessing the perception of intelligence and ILP within the files and ranks of the MPS. It was established that a majority of practitioners were not familiar with intelligence and ILP to such an extent that they can apply the concepts in their work, either due to shortcomings in training, lack of attention given to educate them, or absence of a structured approach to implement ILP.

Chapter Six analyses the second research question and intends to find the similarities in the practise of ILP in the MPS with ILP literature. An important discovery was that the MPS predominately relied on covert collection for information and seldom used police information and information from the community (including its non-intelligence personnel). The intelligence personnel and most of the senior officers (commissioned officers) were not familiar with the basic concepts of intelligence work such as collection plans and different types of intelligence (assessments), due to which intelligence disseminated was mostly non-useful for operational teams. Consequently, strategic assessments and strategic intelligence was alien to most in command positions. The agency also lacked a T&C process, which is the vehicle for practising ILP.

Chapter Seven is devoted to examining the factors influencing ILP in the MPS (third research question). Diffusion of ILP in the MPS is hindered by the lack of executives' commitment to the change, and later to sustain it. Their commitment to ILP is affected by their lack of knowledge about it. As a result, they devised no specific objectives for ILP, and they held a notion that in ILP the intelligence sector manoeuvres the police, favouring the intelligence sector rather than the products or processes. As expected, this approach detached the intelligence function from the decision-making process, both at the strategic and operational levels.

The eighth and final chapter summarises the research findings, addresses the research questions, briefly mentions the unrelated problems uncovered that are not directly related to ILP, and suggests recommendations for the Maldives to strengthen its ILP architecture and processes. Other agencies can use the research to inform their own implementation or to highlight potential problems and opportunities in diffusing ILP. A recurring theme throughout the literature was that ILP had little positive impact on operational policing in almost all the agencies where it was implemented due to: its definitional, conceptual, and theoretical ambiguity; complexity of the construct (particularly NIM, the most adopted version of ILP); and excessive emphasis on technology to practise ILP, causing agencies to ignore other

important aspects, such as training and professional development, creating and establishing appropriate channels for information collection and dissemination, and designing appropriate decision-making processes. This chapter reinforces the need to co-practise other knowledge-based policing models with ILP to maximise efficiency and promote democratic values.

CHAPTER 2:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

How police should respond to crime is a question that has faced practitioners and scholars persistently for centuries,[1] and still remains an important topic of discussion in academic discourse and policymaking. Prevention and detection of crime has always been at the crux of such discourse, ever since the establishment of modern policing in London (as the Metropolitan Police) in 1829. Many policing concepts are examined from multiple sources within the scope of this thesis and synthesised in this literature review.

This chapter consists of four sections and it aims to assess and analyse the output of previous scholarship and to introduce the concepts of intelligence and intelligence-led policing (ILP), paradigm shifts in policing, and application of intelligence in policing. To achieve this, the origin of intelligence in policing is first examined, followed by a discussion of the intelligence function. The third section elaborates the five different models of ILP and the inherent problems in each, while the fourth section examines the implementation of ILP. The final section summarises the chapter as a whole.

2.1 Origin and Use of Intelligence

2.1.1 Undercover practices

Undercover policing is believed to have been first institutionalised in France at the end of the seventeenth century (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 3). Following the creation of the first modern type police agency in Paris, the new agency adopted covert means to collect information about dangerous individuals and families (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 2). All the 20 police inspectors of the agency (*bureau de sûreté*) regularly operated as undercover agents and used informants.

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[1] Some scholars believe this question is as old as a few decades (see Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 1), but it is much older. For example, the inception of statistical criminology began after André-Michel Guerry presented a compelling manuscript on crime figures in France titled *Essai sur la Statistique Morale de la France* to the Académie française des sciences on 2 July 1832 (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). As policymakers, Britain's Houses of Commons and Lords were worried about the state of policing in London following the Gordon Riots of 1780, and as a solution to the problem, Lord Shelburne recommended adopting a French style of policing (Lyman, 1964, pp. 143–144). The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and concerns of ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle regrading 'what is right' and 'what is law' take this discussion to the pre-medieval period (Schafer, 1969). If sin—from which the concept of crime emerged (Schafer, 1969, p. 19)—is taken within this context, this debate is as old as human civilisation (for a discussion, see Maine, 1861).

It was estimated that there were 10,000 informers throughout France in the mid-eighteenth century, used by various agencies (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 5). As revolutionaries detested the undercover policing system, undercover policing came to a halt for a short period, to be revived with the establishment of a national police system in France. In the new setup, Eugène François Vidocq (1775–1857), an ex-convict, played an important role. He was appointed to head the *bureau* in the *prefecture de police* of Paris in 1811 (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 5), and is often cited to support the precept "set a thief to catch a thief" (Weston & Wells, 1970, p. 2). Vidocq[2] directed a squad of selected ex-convicts to investigate crime and criminals for the Police Prefecture from 1811 to 1827 and again in 1832 (Weston & Wells, 1970).

In Germany, Justus Gruner organised a secret police network in 1811 and deployed spies in Prussia as well as in foreign lands (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 6). Unlike these institutionalised systems, the English practised a 'snitching' process from which informers and handlers benefitted, mainly to effect arrests (Marx, 1988; Schulz & Norton, 1968). The London Metropolitan Police used its first undercover officer, Sergeant William Popay, in 1833 to collect information on the National Political Union for conspiring against the government (Mather, 1959, p. 193; Weston & Wells, 1970, p. 5). Popay's identity was discovered (by chance), which caused public indignation, resulting in the prohibition of undercover police officers for information collection for several years (Mather, 1959, pp. 193–194). After a hiatus, the Home Secretary approved the use of detectives on 20 June 1842 for collecting information about crimes and criminals for detecting and tracing offenders (Weston & Wells, 1970, p. 5).

By the early nineteenth century, undercover policing had become a routine strategy of policing in continental Europe (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 15). The introduction of undercover practices was a late addition to the United States (US) policing environment (Marx, 1988) due to the non-inclusion of covert means in the report *European Police Systems* by Raymond Fosdick (1915), who undertook an investigation of policing frameworks in Europe in 1912 for the US Bureau of Social Hygiene. Nevertheless, following the development of detective units in police departments in large US cities, the use of informers and undercover practices emerged as a systematic phenomenon by the early twentieth century (Weston & Wells, 1970). However, deceptive practices began to increase following the growth of federal police agencies in the

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[2] Admirers of Vidocq portray him as the founder of undercover policing, though in reality, he continued the practices followed in the *bureau de sureté*, created in the eighteenth century. However, his creativity and skilfulness gave undercover practices a formal recognition (for details, see Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 5).

second half of the nineteenth century (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995, p. 15). For intelligence work, police agencies borrowed the 'dossier system',[3] an old practice followed in the military where unprocessed data about people were contained in a file (D. L. Carter, 2004, 2005). The dossier system became prominent in the 1930s, when supporters of communism were called to be expelled from all public posts and the entertainment industry. Police agencies began to create intelligence dossiers (called Red Files) on persons suspected to be communists or communist sympathisers. Intelligence dossiers were later used in the 1960s as tools against those involved in the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements (D. L. Carter, 2005). Though these were unconstitutional, the police continued the dossier tool on the grounds of national security (against the communist threat) and threats against 'mainstream' society. The US Supreme Court objected to the practice of police maintaining information on activists not related to any specific crime. The Court's judgment in *Monroe vs. Pape* (in 1961) allowed police officers to be sued for misuse of power, opening a floodgate of complaints against the police (and other agencies). The courts repeatedly found that police kept intelligence dossiers of people against whom there was no evidence of criminality and consequently ordered such dossiers to be purged from police records and the claimants to be compensated. Consequently, police intelligence operations were reduced or eliminated (D. L. Carter, 2005, pp. 51–54). Though undercover practices were part of normal policing practices in western Europe before the US systematically employed such practices, the innovative covert tactics followed in the US were later imported to Europe (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995).

In UK policing, each Criminal Investigation Department (CID)[4] office maintained a 'card index' of local thieves from the 1920s till the 1960s (Grieve, 2009). Following the massive rise of crime after World War II, undercover officers were formally enlisted in the CID,[5] recruited from experienced detectives for the purpose of "acquiring information concerning the activities of criminals" (Grieve, 2009, p. 30). The four undercover officers of the CID proved effective

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[3] Intelligence dossiers primarily contained a Dossier Running Sheet, precis sheet, organisational history sheet, criminal record card, criminal and general information form, numbered 'sub files' which may consist of copies of intelligence reports and documents related to a specific event in which the subject was involved, newspaper clippings, publications, and index cards (which were created before creating a dossier). The Dossier Running Sheet provided a summary of the activities of the individual in chronological order. Precis Sheets contained the date, dossier number, passport number, place of issue of the passport, name of the individual with aliases, place and date of birth, address, contact numbers, information of family members (spouse, children, siblings, and parents), nationality, occupation, information of driver's licence, personal description, criminal history, political affiliation, memberships, and summary of activities (NSW Police, 1938).

[4] The CID was created in Scotland Yard in March 1878, and Howard Vincent, a barrister, was appointed as its first director.

[5] Before this, detectives (or investigators, as they were then called) in plain clothes were authorised to collect information.

as they solved 1,506 cases, apprehended 789 persons, and recovered stolen property worth £253,896.00, while the Metropolitan Police invested £25,000.00 as reward money for informers over the three years and nine months it functioned (James, 2013, p. 44). The number of undercover officers was eventually increased in the 1950s to cater to the increasing demands and sophistication of crimes committed (Grieve, 2009). During that time, the Metropolitan Police formed a specialised branch called 'C9', which acted as the focal point for investigators probing country house burglaries by criminals based in London. The C9 branch was primarily responsible for intelligence about serious and organised crime. It, consequently, had a limited role in routine policing functions. C9 represented the earliest inception of the intelligence system in the UK (James, 2013, p. 45). By 1960, C9 had grown to 'C11' (Criminal Intelligence Branch 11), and is currently known as the Metropolitan Intelligence Branch (James, 2013), while parts of it became components of the National Criminal Intelligence Service[6] (Grieve, 2009), which launched the *National Intelligence Model* (NIM) in 2000.

2.1.2 Origin of Intelligence

Intelligence, long before its application in policing, played a role in warfare. The earliest form was the observation of soldiers or cavalry, such as marching troops, supply dumps, fortifications, campfires, smoke, noise, and the smell of cooking.[7] These are referred to as 'physical intelligence' and it was the main source of information for the first 4,000 years of warfare till the start of World War I (Kahn, 2009). New inventions such as aeroplanes and cameras provided more physical intelligence, the growth of which was outshined by the increase and quality of information contained in 'verbal intelligence' from sources such as reports generated to accountable institutions, wiretaps, interception of radio messages, and parliamentary debates (Kahn, 2009). During the war, intelligence emerged as a distinct professional discipline, first in Britain, from three previous disciplines: diplomacy, reconnaissance, and internal security (Warner, 2009).

The modern concept of intelligence, first as 'military intelligence' emerged in the military forces across the participating nations during World War I (Finnegan & Danysh, 1998). Before the war, the military lacked a coordinated information system. In April 1917, the intelligence

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[6] The agency was replaced in 2006 by Serious and Organised Crime Agency, which was again renamed in 2013 as the National Crime Agency.

[7] The earliest accounts of collecting information about the enemy is possibly in the Bible. It is recorded that Jehovah directed Moses to send people to Canaan to spy on the people and the country.

function of the US military was negligible (Finnegan & Danysh, 1998; Sweeney, 1924). To assess the enemies' situation correctly and estimate their plans and intentions, the military had to ensure all information gained was available at all times, at any place of the command element. To meet this need, information systems were established to take care of the mechanical part of the intelligence function (Sweeney, 1924).

During this time, the term intelligence was used to refer to information regarding the enemy, to the unit responsible for the intelligence function, and the process through which intelligence (products) was generated (Sweeney, 1924, p. 13). To create a distinction between the different attributions of intelligence, Sweeney (1924, p. 14), who had served in the US military (mostly in intelligence units) from 1899 to 1940, defined intelligence as "information of the enemy or military forces of the enemy that has been collected, tabulated, measured as to its possible value, classified as to its reliability, and made ready for use in military plans or operations". The conversion of information into intelligence is performed by specialists tasked especially for it (Sweeney, 1924, p. 26). The value of the information is expressed after assessing it, and the three classifications used were (1) accepted as true or verified, (2) indicated and probably true or partially verified, and (3) rumoured and possibly true or unverified (Sweeney, 1924, p. 163). On 22 March 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (US) released a 'top secret' *Strategic Intelligence Field Manual*, which described the process of evaluating information to convert it into intelligence (Office of Strategic Services, 1944). Despite these efforts, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities (1955, p. viii) in its Report on Intelligence Activities in the US found that the term intelligence was subjected to varying interpretations. It was used for the 'ability to learn' in one context, 'intellect' or 'ability to meet a new situation' in another context, as well as 'common sense'. A review of Australian police agencies in 1994 also found such conceptual differences within agencies (Review of Commonwealth Law Enforcement Arrangements, 1994, p. 152).

After World War II, many returning officers, some of whom had participated in intelligence operations, joined law enforcement agencies (Schulz & Norton, 1968). They wanted to apply military intelligence in policing, and small intelligence units began to emerge in US law enforcement agencies. On 29 March 1955, a group of officers from 26 police and sheriffs' departments met to exchange confidential information and organise a central information clearing house (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 24). Towards this purpose, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) was established for "gathering, recording, investigation and exchanging of information concerning local or any known individuals and organizations whose

background, activities or associates identify them with" ten types of serious organised criminal activities (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 25). This structure advanced police operational intelligence (Weston & Wells, 1970, p. 173). However, D. L. Carter (2005, p. 58) argues that until the Warren Commission's 1964 report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, intelligence units remained as information clearing houses that were "reactive in nature", and viewed often as information repositories rather than proactive agencies. The Warren Commission called for better coordination and increased information sharing between federal and local agencies. However, in a true sense, the resurgence of police intelligence in the US began with the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice's report, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*. The Commission (1967, p. 204) recommended establishing a special intelligence unit at all police departments in major cities, and to create a central computerised office at the federal level into which other federal agencies can feed crime intelligence pertaining to organised crime. Surprisingly, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* also used 'intelligence' to refer to information obtained from informants as well as the intellectual ability of the officers. A year later, the US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) recommended police agencies establish an intelligence system to institute effective control measures in civil disorders.

When police agencies began to use intelligence, they borrowed the military's dossier system (D. L. Carter, 2004), and later the Intelligence Cycle (IC), to generate intelligence following the institutionalisation of dedicated intelligence units. The IC is often considered as the engine of the intelligence function. For the military, the IC was a continuous four-step cycle based around the commander's mission for (1) collection of information, (2) processing of the collected information, (3) dissemination and use of the resulting intelligence, and (4) planning the collection effort and orders (Department of the Army, 1963; Glass & Davidson, 1948). The IC was created to generate tactical intelligence (Rolington, 2013, p. 36). The origin of the IC is unclear, but it is believed to have been first used in the US Army (Powell & Bradford, 2000; Rolington, 2013). The earliest mention of the IC is in the seminal *Intelligence for Commanders* by two lieutenant colonels, Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: **The first graphic representation of the IC.**
Source: Glass and Davidson (1948, p. 5)

One of the earliest manuscripts on police intelligence for general reference—*Police Operational Intelligence*—by Donald O. Schulz and Loran A. Norton, adopted the military's IC and listed its processes as 'intelligence action phases'. The different action phases were "(1) the *collection* of information; (2) the *processing* of the collected information; (3) the *use* of information produced from the processing component; and (4) [the] continuous *direction* of the collection effort" (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 40, original emphasis). This is the first publicly available description of the IC for policing (even though they referred to it as action phases). In 1971, the IC underwent a fundamental change, with the addition of 'analysis' and 're-evaluation' as specific processes (Godfrey & Harris, 1971, p. 34), as shown in Figure 2.2. In the previous version of the IC, Schulz and Norton had clubbed evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation within the *processing* phase. Schulz and Norton's manuscript addressed the importance of operationalising intelligence in policing by defining intelligence, explaining the forms intelligence, and describing the purpose of the intelligence process, with a brief description on how to administer an intelligence unit.

Figure 2.2: **Earliest depiction of the IC for police work.**
Source: Godfrey and Harris (1971, p. 34)

Instead of the first diagrammatic representation of IC for police work (by Godfrey and Harris, shown in Figure 2.2), scholars opted for the military's IC (e.g. D. L. Carter, 2004, 2009; Chantler & Thorne, 2008; Coyne & Bell, 2015, p. 135; Fuentes, 2006, p. 6; Gill, 1998; Innes, Fielding, & Cope, 2005; Richards, 2010, p. 10). This cyclic process has remained more or less the same, except for the time to time disintegration of one or two of its processes, though scholars often raise concerns about its sequential framework, arguing that dialogue at various stages is vital for generating useful intelligence (Gill, 2009; Marrin, 2009; OSCE, 2017; Phythian, 2013; Quarmby & Young, 2010; Ratcliffe, 2016; Richards, 2010, pp. 15–16; Rolington, 2013, pp. 62–63). For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) has been using the cyclic intelligence process in its manuals for line staff, analysts, and managers (UNODC, 2006, 2010, 2011a), while NIM guidance materials also recognise the strictly sequential flow of the processes in its IC. The components of the cycle in NIM guides are direction, collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, dissemination, and direction (NCPE, 2007, p. 11; NPIA, 2008, pp. 10-11), while UNODC identifies tasking, collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, inference development, and dissemination as its sub-processes. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces' *Criminal Intelligence Manual* identified

a five-phased cyclic process consisting of planning and tasking, information gathering, assessment and analysis of information, dissemination, and feedback (Čavkov & Gačanin, 2014).

Figure 2.3: **The Standard IC.**
Source: NPIA (2008, p. 11)

The standard IC (shown in Figure 2.3) typically begins with *directions* provided by decision-makers, who identify the need for information (UNODC, 2011a, p. 10). Hence, the direction sets the objectives and scope of the task (NPIA, 2008, p. 11). The cycle then proceeds to the information *collection* stage. At this stage, based on the requirements set by the decision-maker, information collection plans and methods are determined and information is gathered through those methods and approaches. Information collection involves identifying and gathering information from relevant open as well as closed sources. In order to maintain focus on the requirements put forth by the decision-maker, analysts use 'collection plans' that provide structure on the terms of reference and information sources (NPIA, 2008, p. 25). Then the cycle enters the *collation* stage, where collected information and data are organised in a logical order, converted into a useable form, and stored in an appropriate form retrievable for analysing. Collated information is annotated, categorised (based on corporate standards), and labelled according to an existing manual or scheme for subsequent and future use (NPIA, 2008, pp. 27–29). In order to achieve the objectives of collation and present the products in usable forms, analysts must be aware of information sharing problems or viability (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 128). Then comes the *evaluation* stage, where the "reliability and validity" of all information collected is assessed prior to use to evaluate its usefulness to the task (NPIA, 2008, p. 29). The completeness, credibility, extent it can be corroborated by other sources, relevance, impact on the analysis, accuracy of the sources, and thoughtfulness of the sources are evaluated during

this stage. After evaluation, the information is subjected to *analysis* through various analytic techniques and tools to interpret and find information gaps. Different analytic techniques maybe combined to develop the analysis and "develop inferences and theories" (NPIA, 2008, p. 32). The inference generated from the analysis is finally *disseminated* to the decision-maker (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 105). The finished inference, generated as intelligence, must report beyond the known facts (NPIA, 2008). Based on the value of the product disseminated, new directions or requirements would be forwarded, possibly as a new task for the IC to start again.

Figure 2.4: **The IC (with core functions).**
Source: Ministry of Defence (2011, p. 54)

The IC is a tool for producing intelligence. As a result, one of the earliest works on 'police operational intelligence' defined intelligence as "the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of criminal activity and which is immediately or potentially significant to police planning", adopted from the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 27). Most depictions of the IC in police intelligence manuscripts used the sequential processes, with close resemblance to Figure 2.3, rarely with minor variations in the number of stages or processes, both in academic scholarship (Clark, 2013, pp. 4–5; Coyne & Bell, 2015, p. 87; McDowell, 2009; Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 12; Ratcliffe, 2009b, pp. 6–7; Rolington, 2013, p. 131) and practitioners' reports (Australian Government, 2012; BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009; Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013; Fuentes, 2006; NCPE, 2007; NPIA, 2008; OSCE, 2017; UNODC, 2010, 2011a, 2011b), with

few exceptions: a descriptive analysis by James (2016, p. 8) and the FBI's IC (cited in D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 75). James reproduced the IC developed by Britain's Defence Ministry in 2011 (see Figure 2.4). Hence, the military's update has again begun to influence police intelligence function and studies to improve imperfections.

2.2 Intelligence as a Function

Information collected from informants and other covert practices are useful in making decisions to tackle organised criminal activities and other threats. The need to assess such information and the importance given to "foreknowledge" before making decisions made the application of intelligence essential for police work (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 28), at least that was how its earliest advocates promoted it. Recognising the importance of formalising intelligence function in policing, the US Justice Department contracted two former national security intelligence professionals, E. Drexel Godfrey and Don R. Harris, to develop a manual for the police in 1970. Their manual, *The Basic Elements of Intelligence*, published in 1971 and later revised in 1976, became the reference point for intelligence work in policing (Dintino & Martens, 1983). In the first version of the manual, intelligence was defined as an output of the 'intelligence process' (Godfrey & Harris, 1971, p. xiii). However, in the revised edition by Harris (1976), the definition was removed. Harris opted for a 'concept of intelligence' to avoid the confusion surrounding the term intelligence (Dintino & Martens, 1983). It was defined as "the end of a complex process, sometimes physical but always intellectual" (Harris, 1976, p. 2).

From a product (output of the IC) and a process (the IC itself), intelligence progressed as a specific function (or unit) of the agency that was responsible for generating intelligence. As a product, based on the level of decision-making for which the products are created, intelligence used to be categorised as strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence (Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013; Dintino & Martens, 1983; Glass & Davidson, 1948; Harris, 1976; Ratcliffe, 2009b). However, the new scholarship recognises a third type of intelligence—operational intelligence (Australian Government, 2012; D. L. Carter, 2009; Čavkov & Gačanin, 2014, p. 13; Coyne & Bell, 2015; Fuentes, 2006; James, 2016; Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 5; Richards, 2010). The early literature's definition of strategic intelligence was inasmuch as the newly used operational intelligence. NIM also recognises three types of intelligence in four

broad categories. It refers to operational intelligence as 'tactical assessment', while the tactical intelligence is referred to as 'problem profiles' and 'target profiles'[8] (NCPE, 2005c, 2007).

Intelligence as a process involves collection of information, evaluation of that information to assess its accuracy and usefulness, collation, analysis to derive meaning, reporting of the findings, and re-evaluation of the entire process to assess the weak areas and at the same time determine the efficiency of the intelligence function to its assigned role (Harris, 1976, p. 4). Intelligence as a function was responsible for generating useful intelligence through effective and efficient utilisation of the intelligence system. Schulz and Norton's (1968, p. 184) work was an effort to create an awareness of intelligence concepts among police leaders (administrators) and motivate them to establish a dedicated intelligence function or unit to "increase the probability of accuracy in operational staff decisions" to counter the growing threat of organised crimes. The essential components of an intelligence unit, without which the unit would be crippled, according to Harris (1976, p. 7), are cross-referenced files based on criminal activity, continuous flow of raw information into the unit, and analysts "capable of developing patterns, networks, connections and new areas of organised crime penetration from file records and incoming raw information". The primary responsibility of the unit was to support the chief of the agency, as argued by military strategists (see Glass & Davidson, 1948; Sweeney, 1924).

> The absence of an intelligence capacity within law enforcement organization will seriously impede the ability of law enforcement to define what it is that they are trying to control, or measure the effects of its control efforts. Law enforcement administrators, in their quest to responsibly manage police resources, must avoid permitting self-serving interests and bureaucratic parochialism to affect their decision-making qualities, particularly if the police are to be recognized as a *legitimate* institution of social control. Our society has become too diversified and sophisticated to accept yesterday's responses to tomorrow's problems. Society's knowledge and understanding of the criminal justice process mandate a higher degree of sophistication on the part of criminal justice administrators. Intelligence, if *properly* operationalized, could conceivably provide this greater understanding.
>
> (Dintino & Martens, 1983, p. 9, original emphasis)

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[8] Target profiles are sometimes referred to as subject profiles.

Dintino and Martens (1983) identified seven factors that affected police leaders from recognising the potential of intelligence in their agencies. The first factor was the failure of government officials and police leaders to recognise organised crime as a problem. The authors illustrated this through a statement made by the former Attorney General of New Jersey in 1968 despite the increased activities of crime syndicates in New Jersey since 1920. Likewise, in the Maldives, the officials of the current administration have been denying the existence of criminal gangs (since 2013) by calling gangs "neighbourhood groups" (Yameen, 2018a), even though a study by the Asia Foundation (2012) indicates otherwise. Nobody has contested the position of the government, perhaps due to fear of retaliation or fear of losing political advantage (in elections). The failure to recognise organised crime seriously impedes "the acquisition of valuable information which would provide a better understanding" (Dintino & Martens, 1983, p. 19). Second, police administrators have not developed a system to measure cost-efficiency based on past experience. They are unaware of the time, money, and human resources expended by switching to modern covert techniques. Third, they lack the required level of formal education to appreciate the importance of research. Fourth, "the paramilitary structure of most law enforcement agencies mitigates against critical and serious policy analysis" (Dintino & Martens, 1983, p. 20). Police officers had in the past resisted the advice of experts for fear of losing their absolute control over the decision-making process to a body of specialists. The fifth reason was that the actions of police agencies were primarily reactionary, responding to situations upon occurrence. Sixth, analysing an enforcement decision in terms of other disciplines, such as sociology, criminology, economics, psychology, and political science (which are regarded as anti-law enforcement), was perceived as inimical. As a result, they chose to avoid intelligence that was in conflict with their self-imposed mandates. Last, police administrators preferred to take a defensive position due to the misuse of intelligence in the past.

Due to all or some of these factors, it became apparent that not all police agencies, even in the Global North, had a purposeful intelligence unit or system. The US National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) proposed to establish an intelligence function in every police agency with more than 75 personnel (McGarrell et al., 2007) and every state to collect and disseminate information on offenders (Porter, 2008). The Commission also suggested that every state should establish a central clearing system (Porter, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 25). Despite many efforts to enhance the intelligence function of police departments, until the twenty-first century, in the US, intelligence units remained as

information clearing houses that were "reactive in nature" (D. L. Carter, 2005, p. 58). Though there was some focus on developing intelligence units in policing, the predisposition has always been towards citizen engagement. For instance, in the 'priorities for action' of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973), community crime prevention (through increased citizen contribution) dominated, while application of intelligence remained in the periphery of the discussion.

2.3 ILP Interpretations

Even in the mid-1970s, most police agencies throughout the globe, including those in the Global North, were reactively responding to incidents and situations (Sherman, 2013), though many in the Global North were deeply involved in surveillance to the extent a police station was considered as "an icon of surveillance" (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997, p. 58). The standard tactics included *random patrol* over a large geographic area, *rapid response* upon the occurrence of incidents or crime, and *reactive investigations* (Ratcliffe, 2008a; Sherman, 2013; Thomas, 2016; Weisburd & Eck, 2004), due to which some scholars described it as the 'three Rs' (Sherman, 2013; Thomas, 2016).

Research proved the ineptness of the reactive model (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974; Sherman, 1995; Spelman & Brown, 1981; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Amid this, questions were raised about the role of police in a democratic society following the inappropriate responses of the police to social unrest in the larger states of the US during late 1960s (Community Policing Consortium, 1994; Zhao, Lovrich, & Thurman, 1999) as well as police behaviour towards juvenile offenders in the UK (Schaffer, 1980) amid other administrative problems (for details, see Ratcliffe, 2008a). Rising crime rates and widespread disorder left many practitioners losing confidence in traditional policing methods (Audit Commission, 1993; Heaton, 2000; Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Ratcliffe, 2008a). These issues and the degradation of public confidence in police meant the police leadership required innovative means to gain legitimacy and public confidence (M. Maguire, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2008a; Skogan, 2006; Tilley, 2008b; Zhao et al., 1999).

Until ILP emerged as the newest paradigm shift, three other paradigm shifts occurred in modern policing: Community-Oriented Policing (COP), Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), and

CompStat (Ratcliffe, 2008a; Tilley, 2008b; Wood & Shearing, 2007). The general characteristics of these policing models are listed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: **Some general characteristics of the four knowledge-based policing models**

	COP	POP	CompStat	ILP
Easily defined?	No	Fairly easy	Yes	No
Easily adopted?	Superficially	Difficult	At the technical level, but managerially challenging	Highly challenging
Orientation?	Neighbourhoods	Problems	Police administrative units	Criminal groups, trends, problems and threats
Hierarchical focus?	Bottom-up	As appropriate for the problem	Top-down	Top-down
Who determines properties?	Community concerns/ demands	Sometimes crime analysis, but varies from problem to problem	Police management from crime analysis	T&C groups based on intelligence
Target?	Unclear	Crime and disorder problems, and other areas of concern for police	Crime and disorder hotspots	Recidivists, organised criminals, threats, and policing problems
Criteria for success?	Satisfied community	Reduction of problem	Lower crime rate	Detection, reduction or disruption of criminal activity, problem, or threat
Expected benefit?	Increased police legitimacy	Reduced crime and other problems	Reduced crime (sometimes other problems)	Reduced crime, harm, and threat

Note: The basic structure of the table and characteristics of police models except ILP are adopted from Ratcliffe (2008a, pp. 72–73; 2016, p. 54).

The reports *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively* and *Policing with Intelligence* are identified as the original source of ILP articulation (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 83). The concepts were first operationalised by the Kent Police under four broad themes: targeting prolific and serious criminals, screening crime to assess solvable crimes, greater use of surveillance and informants, and positioning intelligence as the hub for operational policing (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 63). These concepts were further revised as the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in the UK in 2000 (NCIS, 2000). NIM intended "to professionalise intelligence practice across the country and to integrate criminal intelligence into the central framework of all business and decision-making" (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 39).

There is, however, no single approach to ILP. Amid its numerous interpretations, some scholars used other terms to refer to ILP. For instance, Curtis Clarke (2006) used proactive policing to refer to ILP, while Taylor and colleagues expanded ILP as 'information-led policing' (Taylor,

Kowalyk, & Boba, 2007). Jason Weber (2013) believed CompStat was a form of ILP. Some practitioners considered POP and 'zero tolerance policing' as forms of ILP (IACP, 2002, p. 13). Other such references have been listed in Chapter One. To reduce such ambiguities, a book on intelligence and ILP, authored by eminent scholars, adopted the title *The Handbook of Intelligent Policing* (Harfield, 2008).

Other than NIM, ILP is mainly conceptualised in four models, namely, the standard IC, Gill's Cybernetic Model, Ratcliff's 3-i Model (or 4-i Model, as revised in 2016), and the American Model, of which the leading models are NIM and the 3-i Model. The newest model by the OSCE, developed in 2017 is not included in this list as it was derived from the 4-i Model (OSCE, 2017). Except for their intelligence-centric philosophy, these models embody different traits for practical application, which makes it important to differentiate each model to correlate with the practice of ILP as a philosophy and business model.

2.3.1   Standard IC

The standard IC is occasionally linked to ILP as a model or framework to practise ILP (D. L. Carter, 2004; Dannels & Smith, 2001; C. Gibbs, McGarrell, & Sullivan, 2015; Gill, 1998; Richards, 2010, p. 12). Ratcliffe (2016) criticised such explicit linking, arguing that the IC is merely a tool for analysts and not a business model for police agencies. He contended that such an "approach emphasises the *intelligence* in 'intelligence-led policing' rather than the *policing*" (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 61, original emphasis).

The absence of a standard theory of intelligence (Davies, 2009; Gill, 2009; Gill & Phythian, 2018; Marrin, 2007; Richards, 2010, pp. 3–4)[9] and certain traits of the IC could be the reason for treating it as an ILP model. Two key traits of the IC are believed to cause this (mis)interpretation. First, the IC is responsible for three types of intelligence in order to manoeuvre the scheme of activities within a police agency, namely, strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence (Čavkov & Gačanin, 2014; James, 2016; Quarmby & Young, 2010). Strategic intelligence assessments must have the "required focus to permit accurate judgements that are necessary to set priorities and commit resources" (NCIS, 2000, p. 11). "High quality information about current and emerging criminal trends,

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[9] Some scholars have opted for the four phases of the IC to theorise intelligence (see Sims, 2005), while others have adopted a theoretical framework around issues in intelligence literature such as cooperation, failure, oversight, and others (for a discussion, see Marrin, 2018).

methodologies and accurate assessments of the vulnerabilities of institutions, systems, and processes to criminal attack" are essential for "quality strategic planning and thinking" in policing (Review of Commonwealth Law Enforcement Arrangements, 1994, p. 151). Second, tactical intelligence enables targeting offenders, management of crime and disorder, investigation of linked crimes and incidents, and proactive preventive measures (NCIS, 2000). As a result, intelligence research as well as intelligence doctrine also has a "sharp tactical focus" (Coyne & Bell, 2015, p. 2), centred on information collection, collation, and generating analysis for frontline needs, i.e., street policing and case management (Coyne & Bell, 2015; M. Maguire, 2000; M. Maguire & John, 2006; McGarrell et al., 2007; NCIS, 2000; NCPE, 2005c; Peterson, 2005; Tilley, 2008b). Due to these traits of the IC, a research project on ILP implementation in an environmental crime agency used the IC as late as in 2015 as its research framework, referring to the standard IC as ILP (C. Gibbs et al., 2015).

Owing to the above highlighted reasons, the standard IC is also used in policy documents as a direct reference to ILP. For instance, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in its guide to implement ILP in police agencies, defined ILP as "a business process for systematically collecting, organizing, analyzing, and utilizing intelligence to guide law enforcement operational and tactical decisions" (BJA, 2009, p. 3), which is nothing more than the IC. Likewise, 'version 2' of the US National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) defined ILP as "the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels" (Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013, p. 46). The NCISP (first published in 2003) is considered as the cornerstone of ILP in the US (for details, see Section 2.3.5). The *Australian Criminal Intelligence Model* (ACIM) has also ingrained the traditional conception of the IC within it, beyond a series of steps in creating intelligence (see Figure 2.5). The ACIM uses the standard IC to direct the development of intelligence capabilities, strategic objectives, and strategy initiatives (ACIC, 2017, p. 3; Australian Government, 2012, p. 4). The IC of ACIM comprises five processes, endorsed by all the involved agencies, which are described as (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, 2013, pp. 60–61):

1. Plan, prioritise, and direct: discussions held to identify issues or themes that require further investigation;
2. Collect and collate: Search for data and information that is grouped to identify intelligence gaps and convergences for further analysis;

3. Analyse and produce: Assess, validate, add value to, and judge information to transform it into intelligence for reporting purposes;

4. Report and disseminate: Share intelligence to support and advance the decision-making process vis-à-vis the formal dissemination of reports and products; and

5. Evaluate and review: Re-examine activities and the value of intelligence outcomes for identifying opportunities for improvements.

Figure 2.5: **Australian Criminal Intelligence Model.**
Source: Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (2017, p. 3)

In another variation from the traditional understanding, the BJA adopted an exclusive definition just to allow easy navigation of ILP within police agencies, giving reasons to believe that the IC is still considered synonymous to ILP. The BJA (2009, p. 4) defined ILP as the "executive implementation of the intelligence cycle to support proactive decision making for resource

allocation and crime prevention".[10] In this definition, the BJA overlooked the fact that the IC was developed for "immediate response" (Rolington, 2013, p. 36) and not for depicting developing threats.

2.3.2 Cybernetic Model

In 1998, upon recognising the centrality of intelligence to the efforts of the police to combat organised crime and adapt intelligence techniques to persistent local crime problems, Gill (1998) applied a cybernetic[11] system model on the intelligence process. He applied cybernetic concepts to matters of organisational politics (which he called power screens), as shown in Figure 2.6. The 'power screens' manifest individuals or structures. As individuals, these power screens can block, divert, or accelerate the passage of information within the agency. As structures, these can be "routinised institutions, procedures and practices that both empower and constrain" individuals, and can be altered over time by the actions of the individuals (Gill, 1998, p. 304).

***Figure 2.6:* Cybernetic Model.**
Source: Gill (1998, p. 305)

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[10] The BJA adopted this narrow definition only for the purpose of implementing the ILP framework within police agencies. The BJA maintains another definition for other purposes.
[11] Karl Deutsch defined cybernetics as "the systematic study of communication and control in organizations of all kinds" (cited in Gill, 1998, p. 300). Deutsch comprehensively applied it to matters of government.

Gill applied a cybernetic model over the IC, which he referred to as an intelligence system. Hence, it is a graphical representation of the IC with organisational filters (power screens) that may affect the flow of information across the agency as well as within the intelligence function. These filters predict the possible systemic and internal issues that can affect the intelligence function (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 107). Gill (1998, p. 303) developed the model as an "analytical framework" that can be used in intelligence units, but it does not link decision-making and the utilisation of intelligence. Consequently, the model does not reflect the entire ILP, but serves as a useful guide for intelligence managers and analysts. The cross-communication within 'collection' and 'analysis' must have been a relief to analysts as inter-communication is essential for generating quality assessments.

2.3.3 The 3-i Model

The 3-i Model, developed by Jerry H. Ratcliffe in 2003, redefined the processes in ILP. Ratcliffe (2009b, p. 9) argued that the standard IC "fails to emphasise the vital role of decision-making context in determining the outcome of intelligence work", and its use has been limited to training purposes and conceptualising the analytical phases. As a solution to existing problems in the standard IC, he simplified the processes in ILP, as shown in Figure 2.7, by explicitly incorporating decision-making into the process (Ratcliffe, 2008a). He argued that the 3-i Model provides an edge over the IC and Cybernetic Model as those two models give the impression to the analysts that "their work is divorced from the action component of policing", while the 3-i Model "gives both analysts and executives a clear indication of their respective roles" in ILP (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 112).

Figure 2.7: **The 3-i Model.**
Source: Ratcliffe (2003, p. 3)

The 3-i Model requires intelligence analysts to *interpret* the criminal environment by actively seeking information without waiting for information to come to them and *influence* the thinking of the decision-makers; it also requires decision-makers to use the crime intelligence to have a positive *impact* on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2003, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2009b, 2016). As a result, it is an incident-driven model that assesses incidents or crimes committed to *interpret* the criminal environment for informing decision-makers to *influence* their thinking and strategies so as to bring a positive *impact* on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2008a, pp. 111–112).

As police agencies have a myriad responsibilities, many of which do not involve crime or criminals at all (James, 2017), analysing the existing criminal environment alone will not be sufficient to address developing policing problems. Top police executives ought to manage threats to the public, anticipate criminal inventiveness, and manage risks while justifying their decisions (Ratcliffe, 2009b, p. 2). Police agencies must therefore anticipate crime for proactive action, and the intelligence generated must serve that purpose. Intelligence managers are required to organise the production of intelligence (Crous, 2011; Krizan, 1999; O'Shea & Nicholls, 2003). Typical methods of assigning tasks to analysts are by target, jurisdiction, technicality, or policy problem (Krizan, 1999). Through the 3-i Model, analysts can generate assessments for the first three task types, but they cannot prolifically contribute to strategic or policy problems as the intelligence generated within a 3-i Model is tactical or operational for predicting criminal behaviour from "identification of patterns" (Ratcliffe, 2009b, p. 2). For strategic issues, emerging problems and issues beyond the criminal environment, such as political, economic, social, technological, legal, and organisational issues, must be assessed and anticipated by the intelligence function so that the agency can plan in advance and allocate or obtain necessary resources to prevent or mitigate the problem.[12] To identify those developing or persisting problems, environmental scans (Heldon, 2009; Quarmby, 2009; Quarmby & Young, 2010), beyond the sphere of crime must be performed for the Strategic Assessment (Coyne & Bell, 2015, p. 139; NCPE, 2007; Phillips, 2008). For the intelligence function to support in delivering a strategic response against crime and disorder problems, it must explore "the problems of demand management, changing criminal environment, and inadequacy of the

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[12] According to Quarmby (2009, p. 168), to estimate the strategic future, inferences must be drawn from the environment (facets of which may include political, social, economic, threat, and technological), the stakeholders who inhibit that environment, forces and factors of change, and possible change over time. It may be argued that the PESTEL analytical method can be used to examine such factors. PESTEL analysis is used to assess the external factors (political, economic, sociological, technological, environmental, and legal) that may affect the crime or disorder problem that has been found in the criminal environment (Heldon, 2009).

existing criminal justice framework" so as to make recommendations (Phillips, 2008, p. 25). Due to this inherent limitation, the 3-i Model can only be useful for operational policing to tackle recidivism and prolific offenders in specific criminal environments (Coyne & Bell, 2015, p. 33). The adaptation of the 3-i Model by New Zealand Police in 2005 to its operational needs and not to overall policing (New Zealand Police, 2005) indicates this weakness in catering to all threats in the operational environment.

As a philosophy, ILP must be able to serve policy needs (strategic planning) as well as operational objectives. Agencies introduce changes internally as well as externally to realise their vision. Lasswell (1971) divided the policy process into seven phases: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. In this construct, the policy process begins with intelligence.

> It then moved to the promotion of particular options by those involved in making the decision. In the third stage the decision-makers prescribed a course of action. In the fourth stage the prescribed course of action was invoked alongside a set of sanctions to penalize those who fail to comply with these prescriptions. The policy was then applied by the courts and the bureaucracy and ran its course until it was terminated or cancelled. Finally, the results of the policy were appraised or evaluated against the original aims and goals. (Howlett, 2011, p. 18)

In state police forces and national agencies, the analyst, at the utmost, can be involved up to stage three, until the decision-maker decides on the course of action to be taken, to influence the criminal environment. Before deciding new strategies, the decision-maker must know the effectiveness, ineffectiveness, or gaps of previous strategies. Thus, a strict dividing line exists between intelligence and policymaking (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 3).[13] To provide those answers, an analysis beyond the criminal environment is essential, as prescribed by Lasswell. As a remedy for such issues, and to generate useful strategic intelligence and keep abreast of technological and global social changes created by the information revolution, Rolington (2013) developed a *post-modern strategic intelligence method*. The elements of this model are

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[13] Ratcliffe argues that in policing, unlike in the defence sector, such a clear dividing line between intelligence and policymaking does not exist because defence managers are educated to appreciate intelligence, while police commanders are less likely to have undergone such a training to act upon complex intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2009b, p. 9). This must not be the case because police commanders are entrusted not only with maintaining law and order but also respecting the fundamental rights of people. Through their ignorance, they cannot justify taking wrong decisions (whether proposed by analysts or superiors) and violating people's right to privacy and freedom of movement. If they lack the knowledge required to perform their role, then they must undergo additional training and get themselves familiarised with key ILP literature (BJA, 2009).

a mission and vision created by policymakers; daily briefing and discussions with policymakers; the IC; long-term future and scenario planning (using forecasting models); adopting a Mosaic Method with historic, current, future, and strategic perspectives of the different views of the different players; and convening planning meeting where results, problems, and processes are discussed every four to six weeks (Rolington, 2013, pp. 166–171).

The 3-i Model is isolated from other paradigm shifts—COP, POP, and CompStat. Ratcliffe (2008a, 2008b) views all these policing philosophies independently of one another and each operating by itself on its own precepts. However, there are number of scholars who find a strong connection between COP and ILP (D. L. Carter, 2009; Chappell & Gibson, 2009; Dannels & Smith, 2001; McGarrell et al., 2007). Ratcliffe (2008b, p. 271) believes that the "community's concerns are not permitted to perpetually trump an objective assessment of the criminal environment". The inability to practise ILP, articulated solely on intelligence, divorced from any expectations of the community, has been experienced in the UK due to which the UK introduced 'reassurance policing' and 'neighbourhood policing' (NCPE, 2006a), which are variations of COP (Bullock, 2013; M. Maguire & John, 2006; Tilley, 2008a; Tuffin, Morris, & Poole, 2006). Similarly, New Zealand Police also practised POP and COP tenets within its ILP framework (New Zealand Police, 2005). Research has also established that absorbing neighbourhood policing in ILP results in efficiency (Bullock, 2013). Despite the 3-i Model's tenets, Ratcliffe (2003) acknowledged that a broader approach will be important to provide the appropriate context for ILP to be successful.

The 3-i Model intends to influence the decision-makers to impact the criminal environment. A continual approach to alter the criminal environment by analysing that environment could cause the agency to divert from its (long-term) objectives, provided the decision-maker follows the recommendations of the analyst. To avoid such a mishap, intelligence must be aligned with the business of the agency, rather than the decision-maker's (NCPE, 2007; Viaene et al., 2009). The model devalues the 'direction' phase of the IC and the necessity to establish an intelligence requirement. The model was revised in 2016 to allow two-way communication between the 'crime intelligence analyst' and the decision-maker (see Figure 2.8). The revised 4-i Model is identical to the adaptation followed in 2005 by New Zealand Police (2005, p. 14).

In explaining the 4-i Model, Ratcliffe (2016, pp. 83–84) stated:

> … as police leaders gain experience in their role, they are better prepared to direct the intelligence system, ensure their intentions are explained and understood, and provide

vital advice and guidance on their priorities and major responsibilities. It is often emblematic of weak police decision-making systems that analysts task themselves or take the lead in determining strategic priorities. Police leaders in mature decision-making systems take more direct role in conveying their intent by tasking the intelligence and analysis unit. While remaining open to being influenced about emerging threats that might not be on their radar, experienced commanders do not leave the analysis arm of the police department foundering without guidance, but rather provide supervision and direction. This results in an arrow leading from the decision-maker to the crime intelligence analysis box, labelled 'intent': a 4-i Model.

Figure 2.8: **The 4-i Model.**
Source: Ratcliffe (2016, p. 83)

Ratcliffe (2005, p. 439) claims that the inclusion of the decision-maker in the model demonstrates "the ability of the decision-makers to formulate effective crime reduction strategies" by focusing on the leadership ranks of the agencies, away from intelligence, unlike in NIM. In this respect, it must be noted that not all the decision-makers who can initiate an *impact* on the criminal environment operate within the police (Harfield & Kleiven, 2008, p. 242). The failure to recognise this affects the potential of the 3-i and 4-i Models.

Based on the 4-i Model, the OSCE formulated its ILP model. The components of this variant are tasking, analysis, generation of intelligence products, making decisions based on the intelligence, and performing operational activities (OSCE, 2017). The OSCE model added tasking to the 4-i Model and removed the restriction on the analysts to focus on the criminal environment.

2.3.4 NIM

NIM was an attempt to bring the best practices in ILP to achieve results, address new and emerging threats, provide strategic and operational focus to the agency, and use community intelligence (NCIS, 2000, p. 7). It provided a clear framework of analysis of information and allowed embedding a problem-solving approach to 'crime control' (NCPE, 2005b). In order to achieve the objective of moving from "the businesses" to "the outcomes" of improved community safety, and reduction of crime and disorder, the initial version of NIM consisted of the following four primary components (NCIS, 2000, p. 9):

- Tasking and coordination (T&C) process;
- Four key intelligence products (strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles, and problem profiles);
- Knowledge products to facilitate and support organisational learning; and
- System products that support NIM infrastructure.

Figure 2.9: **The NIM Business Process.**
Source: NCPE (2005c, p. 14)

With standardisation, NIM elements were increased to eleven (NCPE, 2005c), as shown in Figure 2.9. The first four elements—knowledge, system, source, and people—are called

'assets', which are considered as its foundation. Knowledge assets refer to the professional knowledge needed by the officers for effectively performing their responsibilities, while system assets cover the infrastructure required for the intelligence function along with the rules and policies for secure collection, recording, storage, and use of information. Source assets refer to sources of information, and people assets are the staff of the agency. Elements five (information sources), six (information and intelligence recording), and seven (research and development) are the processes involved in converting information into intelligence. Research and development (analysis) culminates in the development of four types of intelligence (Strategic Assessment, tactical assessment, problem profiles, and subject profiles). The T&C groups at the strategic level, called Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG), and at the tactical level, called Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG), make and communicate decisions based on the intelligence disseminated to them. The T&C groups also perform setting, reviewing, and revision, when necessary, of the control strategy and intelligence requirement. The ST&CG must meet once in every twelve months to set the control strategy and intelligence requirement based on the Strategic Assessment, while the TT&CG must meet every two weeks and is driven by the tactical assessment. The tactical resolution identifies the tactics that can be used to resolve a policing problem. As the final element of NIM, the effectiveness of operational intervention on identified problems and targets are evaluated through result analysis and debriefing (NCPE, 2007).

NIM operates at different levels of the agency. Level one operates at the basic command unit or small force area, level two at the agency or region level, and level three at the national or international level (NCIS, 2000; NCPE, 2005c). Intelligence is fed to the management groups that operate at these levels in making decisions about how and where to allocate resources. The T&C process takes into account the planning needs as per governmental and local (organisational) requirements, solves management issues, and directs the intelligence function (NCPE, 2006b).

NIM is sometimes considered broader than ILP per se due to the management of the whole agency in NIM (Flood & Gaspar, 2009; Kleiven, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2016). Yet, some of NIM's advocates claim it "does not explicitly examine the strategies chosen to manage criminality and disorder" even though it provides relevant intelligence structures, processes, and products (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 438). This issue can be resolved through the 'operational review' element by informing the T&C group about the results of operational interventions. Hence, as argued by John and Maguire (2003, p. 38):

It is in essence a *business model*—a means of organising knowledge and information in a way that the best possible decisions can be made about the use of resources. It ensures that actions are coordinated between the various levels of delivery, and that lessons are continually learnt and fed back into the system.

A major criticism of NIM and ILP in general is its management of knowledge (Collier, 2006; James, 2017) by restricting knowledge to information about police manuals, legislations, force polices, and guidance materials (NCPE, 2005c, 2007). It was due to this reason that Ratcliffe (2016, p. 80) believed the concept of knowledge in NIM does not relate to a deeper understanding of the criminal environment.

The knowledge assets of NIM fall within the category of *explicit* knowledge, as this category can be codified and transmitted in formal and systematic language (Bowers, 2008; Kelly, 2008). On the other hand, *tacit* knowledge "is personal, context specific and therefore hard to formalise and communicate" (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59, cited in Kelly, 2008, p. 257). This challenge can be diminished by applying processes to the internal environment, such as creation of appropriate organisational structures, imbedded with a culture of encouraging and rewarding collaborative working relationships (Kelly, 2008).[14] Collier and colleagues learnt that tacit knowledge was embedded in the intelligence produced by the agency, though there exist limitations in other areas of policing where uptake of tacit knowledge into the agency was affected (Collier, Edwards, & Shaw, 2004). Since the focus in NIM is on the operational environment, police agencies continually develop 'new knowledge' to cope with rapid and unexpected changes in their operating environment, instead of relying solely on their staff's knowledge (Bowers, 2008), though to some extent tacit knowledge enters into the system in the analytic phase[15] and the T&C process (Collier, 2006). According to Gottschalk (2009), technology can be used to capture knowledge through a model consisting of four stages: officer to technology systems, officer-to-officer systems, officer-to-information systems, and officer-to-application systems. In the first stage, end-users are provided with the necessary tools, such as a networked computer with productivity tools to create and share tacit

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[14] The thesis holds the view that not all experience can and should be considered in decision-making as decisions must be made through conscious reasoning. Such experiences include gut feeling, sudden impulses, intuition, loyalty to colleagues, and normative affinity with crime control (Gundhus, 2012, p. 183). However, formal competence, standards, loyalty to truth and science, and principles of due process should come into play in decision-making (Gundhus, 2012).

[15] Experience and personal judgement (as knowledge) of the analysts are absorbed into intelligence in the DIKI (Data, Information, Knowledge, and Intelligence) Continuum. For details on the DIKI Continuum, see Ratcliffe (2016, pp. 72–73).

knowledge. The 5x5x5 Report of NIM could be considered such a tool. At the second stage, "information about who knows what is made available to all", and a computer mediated discussion forum could be one such way for officers to reach others (Gottschalk, 2009, p. 166). At the next stage (officer-to-information), information can be stored in a retrievable manner for those who need to use it. He suggests using data mining techniques to find relevant information and combining those to view meaningful patterns. Information systems solving knowledge problems are made available to solution seekers at the last stage.

Other criticisms surrounding NIM include creating surplus data (James, 2016), not returning value for money (D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009), having complicated processes (James, 2016; Sheptycki, 2004), and viewing NIM as a management tool (Richards, 2010, p. 81). To reduce the challenges towards operationalising NIM, after extensive consultations with related agencies in 2012, the minimum standards of NIM were reduced from 135 to four (James, 2016, p. 78). As these problems and new standards have already been discussed in Chapter One, further iteration here is avoided. In spite of these problems, NIM has contributed to policing in other countries (Bell, Dean, & Gottschalk, 2010; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; Gruszczak, 2013; James et al., 2017; Ratcliffe, 2008a), and may be considered the "most comprehensive articulation of a robust intelligence architecture outside" the military domain (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 55).

2.3.5 American Model

Following the 9/11 attacks, US authorities recognised a need to introduce constructive changes to the intelligence functions of its enforcement agencies (D. L. Carter, 2004). A national blueprint, known as the NCISP, was developed in 2003 to guide enforcement agencies at all levels to improve their intelligence function and ILP practice (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003). Though it was considered as the cornerstone of ILP in the US (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003, p. iv), the NCISP did not identify the elements of ILP. Hence, how ILP can be practised was not clear to police administrators.

In 2004, the *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies* was published under the auspices of the US Department of Justice to assist in developing and reinvigorating the intelligence function of law enforcement agencies. The Guide was directed towards senior officers responsible for the intelligence function. The NCISP was ingrained in the Guide, and it referred to ILP as the integration of COP and

intelligence. It recognised the importance of instilling a "scientific approach to problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communications with the public, fear reduction, and community mobilization to deal with problems" (D. L. Carter, 2004, p. 40). Hence, this new ILP model was threat-driven, unlike the crime centric 3-i Model.

The pertinent components of the new model are the standard IC, and tenets of COP and CompStat, applied with problem-solving techniques. Though 'direction' was not included within the IC in the Guide, the model emphasised collecting information based on requirements (D. L. Carter, 2004, p. 149). It is worth noting that in the IC adopted in the NCISP, the intelligence process begins with the 'planning and direction' phase (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003, p. 3).

CompStat was incorporated primarily within crime analysis, while problem-solving methods were proposed to "reconcile community conditions that are precursors to crime and disorder" (D. L. Carter, 2004, p. 42). COP features incorporated in the model were:

- Community involvement: to gain information from the communities to define the parameters of community problems.
- Community partnership: to seek information about offenders and conduct crime prevention initiatives.

In January 2009, a revised edition of the Guide was published, capturing the changes since 2004. In the revised version, the IC was modified to include 'direction' process (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 58). The components of ILP were identified for the first time in this Guide: commitment to ILP by the chief of the agency, partnerships, information sharing, operation plan, analytic capability, and tactical and strategic response alternatives (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 111). In April 2009, the BJA published *Navigating Your Agency's Path to Intelligence-Led Policing*, an overarching guidance to agencies on how to implement ILP. This manuscript rephrased the ILP elements of the 2009 Guide as executive commitment and involvement; collaboration and coordination throughout all levels of the agency; tasking and coordination; collection, planning, and operation; analytic capabilities; awareness, education, and training; end-user feedback; and reassessment of the process (BJA, 2009). As this thesis adopted these elements as its analytical framework, these elements have been elaborated in Chapter Three. The lessons learnt from POP and CompStat were further ingrained in ILP (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009) to the extent that POP was embedded in the construct itself:

A collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving policing, information sharing, and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations (BJA, 2009, p. 4).

Though the American Model laid out essential elements of ILP, that depiction did not cater to the requirements of a manual to practise ILP (D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009). The American Model intended to retain the effective qualities of previous policing paradigms without explaining the methodical flow of all the processes within the systemic environment. In other words, the processes were not laid out in a way adequate enough to operationalise the model. The components evident in the model are that IC sits at the heart of the model (D. L. Carter, 2004; J. G. Carter, 2016; J. G. Carter & Carter, 2012; IALEIA, 2005; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012), while COP principles posit at the periphery, limited to information absorption into agencies (D. L. Carter, 2004; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015), and CompStat was instilled within the analytic process to generate actionable intelligence (D. L. Carter, 2009; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009). How POP tenets fit in the Model remains unclear, and the best guess is that POP can be used in crime prevention measures. The importance attached to intelligence fusion centres[16] across the US,[17] to which law enforcement agencies have access to support their analytic function (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015), further complicated the diffusion of ILP throughout enforcement agencies. As a result, ILP diffusion within American agencies was severely limited and ILP principles were not fully embraced (Police Executive Research Forum, 2014; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012). The changes observed in the US agencies "seem to be guided by a pragmatic interest in the utility of intelligence rather than a theoretically guided approach based on the principles or core works of ILP" (Schaible & Sheffield, 2012, p. 781).

When New Jersey State Police operationalised ILP, it opted for the 3-i Model (Fuentes, 2006), perhaps due to the limited description on operationalising ILP. When OSCE developed its own version of ILP, it did not consider the American Model as a specific national example.

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[16] A fusion centre is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the centre with the intention of maximising the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.
[17] There are at least 77 fusion centres in the US.

2.4 ILP Implementation and Impact

Strategy implementation has earned less academic attention than strategy formulation (H. Atkinson, 2006; Bell et al., 2010; Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009), even though strategy implementation (i.e. making the strategy work throughout the agency) is more difficult than formulation (Cāndido & Santos, 2015; Verweire, 2014). This gap is attributed to a range of problems, from lack of conceptual models for grounding research to communication difficulties (H. Atkinson, 2006). One of the key challenges researchers still face is how to ensure the successful implementation of strategy (Cāndido & Santos, 2015, p. 238). H. Atkinson (2006, p. 1445) reported six impediments to strategy implementation: top-down senior management style, unclear strategic intentions and conflicting priorities, an ineffective management team, poor vertical communication, weak coordination across functions, businesses, or borders, and inadequate down-the-line leadership skills development. Bell et al. (2010, p. 344) added "correct diagnosis of the issues surrounding the implementation of an intelligence strategy" to Atkinson's list.

The BJA (2008) studied successful implementation of ILP in some of the agencies in 2008 that were geographically diverse and varied in size and resources available to them. Different agencies exhibited different operational practices and organisational styles. The BJA was able to glean the commonalities in these agencies as 'lessons learned' for the successful implementation of ILP. The commonalities found in them were commitment of leadership, clarity of problems confronting the agency, active collaboration among partner agencies and departments, dissemination of actionable intelligence to frontline and investigations, sharing information across departments and partners, well-defined goals that that are easily measurable, use of results-oriented tactics and strategies to accomplish planned goals, carrying out holistic investigations to find associations and pursue those linkages, accountability of officers, and continuous assessment of approaches and systems to maintain vigour and viability.

Crous (2010) proposed eight components of intelligence practice and management, which resemble the BJA factors to a great extent. The components are executive leadership, intelligence leadership, commitment, collaboration, coordination and partnerships, T&C, collection management, analytical capabilities, and training and education. He argued that these components must be developed to enforce the mission of the police. As the BJA factors are elaborated in chapter three, these components will not be elaborated here. Other than these, the guidelines of the OSCE are the only available strategies for national police agencies that

aspire to implement ILP at the time of writing. The OSCE (2017, p. 42) rules for the successful implementation of ILP are:

- Clear legislative framework for ILP in which powers and processes to collect, analyse, and share intelligence are clearly stated;

- Creating organisational structures that facilitate strategic direction and operational approaches along with the processes required for multi-agency coordination and appropriate oversight;

- Interoperable systems that allow information sharing;

- Imparting relevant knowledge and skills to staff; and

- "A collaborating culture of intelligence sharing to support decision-making across operating domains".

As discussed in Chapter One and to some extent in this chapter, ILP has not been fully operationalised in police agencies, even in the Global North. Crous (2011, p. 17) argued that "implementation of police strategies often fails as the decision makers in the organisation do not have a thorough understanding of the requirements and the demands of the envisaged strategy for successful implementation". Ratcliffe (2016, p. 191) also emphasised on the necessity of leadership's support to ILP for sustaining ILP practice. Numerous studies have established executives' awareness and commitment to the philosophy for affecting ILP practice in agencies (Amey et al., 1996; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009; James, 2016; John & Maguire, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2007, 2008a). Knowledge gap, especially within analysts, was also a concerning factor (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Ratcliffe, Strang, & Taylor, 2014), along with devaluing intelligence by officers preferring their experiential knowledge (Belur & Johnson, 2016; Bullock, 2013; Cope, 2004; Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007; John & Maguire, 2004). Some of the other factors include undervaluing community intelligence (Bullock, 2013), weak assessments (Fraser & Atkinson, 2014), unsupportive technological infrastructure (Dannels & Smith, 2001; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012; Mabia et al., 2016; Mugari et al., 2015; Potparič, 2014), cultural resistance (Collier, 2006), and resource constraints, excluding technological gadgetry (C. Gibbs et al., 2015).

Some of these problems fall within the eleven organisational pathologies in police intelligence systems identified by Sheptycki (2004). Those are digital divide (lack of interoperable systems due to different data formats, communications protocols, or any other reason); linkage

blindness (failing to spot a crime series due to insufficient data); noise (abundance of low-quality intelligence, making it difficult to locate high-quality intelligence); intelligence overload (analysts assigned additional and less-relevant tasks to their profession); non-reporting and non-recording relevant information (due to multiple data entry or poor designing of software/systems); intelligence gaps (between different levels of criminality); duplication (due to the interest of more than one agency on one subject); institutional friction; intelligence-hoarding and information silos; defensive data concentration (duplication of data due to unvetted collection plans); and the differences of occupational subculture.[18]

2.5 Summary

Police agencies have been using undercover practices to solve crimes and apprehend suspects ever since modern policing came into existence. Deceptive strategies became a systematic practice, at least in the Global North, by the early twentieth century. Undercover practices increased following the growth in organised crime and large protests. Following the lessons learnt during World War II on the effectiveness of 'foreknowledge' in operational planning, police practitioners (many of whom had served in the military during the war) and national commissions promoted the concept of intelligence in police work. At that time, the concept (intelligence) was not clear as it was used to refer to information, processed information, and the mechanism through which the process took place, among many other things. As a result, the intelligence units remained as information clearing houses. In an effort to professionalise intelligence work in policing, the standard IC used in the military was borrowed into policing literature, first by Schulz and Norton in 1968.

The US Department of Justice recognised the potential and use of intelligence in policing in 1970, and contracted with two professionals to develop a manual on police intelligence. The first police intelligence manual, developed by Godfrey and Harris was published in 1971, which was revised in 1976. It became the reference document for police intelligence. Following this manual, the IC was institutionalised in police. Since then, police manuals and manuscripts have been using the military's IC, rarely with variations, and adding one or two additional

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[18] These eleven pathologies were organised into three categories by Richards (2010, p. 45), namely, volumes of information (intelligence overload, noise, and intelligence gaps), how intelligence moves (digital divide, linkage blindness, non-reporting, and duplication), and cultural issues (institutional friction, defensive data concentration, intelligence hoarding, and information silos).

processes to it. Though scholars and reformers often criticise the sequential flow of processes in the standard IC, except the FBI, it is not known whether any other police agency modified the IC over this criticism to present a (more) practical model.

ILP is believed to be originated in the UK, and it spread from there to the rest of the world. The UK's version of ILP, called NIM, has been extensively customised by other countries. Other ILP models include the standard IC, Cybernetic Model, 3-i Model (revised in 2016 as the 4-i Model), and the American Model. ILP's appeal increased after 9/11. Till then, different agencies practised different policing paradigms, a mix of various paradigms, or the traditional reactive policing. Each paradigm shift, whether COP, POP, or CompStat, has its own benefits and lacunae. To overcome the anomalies in each paradigm, effective precepts of the other paradigms were adopted (in case of COP) or an effort was made to devise a new philosophy more relevant to the era and the challenges of that time.

Standard IC is still used as a distinct ILP model, and the most recent adoption was in a 2015 study. IC has been at times misrepresented as ILP even in policy documents, though it cannot be considered as a form of ILP because the cycle presents the processes for developing intelligence. In short, it is a means for generating an output, and constitutes one element of ILP and does not represent the whole ILP. Intelligence, in various forms and documents, enables the practise of ILP (Čavkov & Gačanin, 2014, p. 79). The IC fails to explain how strategic allocation of organisational resources to target specific crime and disorder problems could take place, which is a central tenet of ILP.

The Cybernetic Model is an extended version of the standard IC as it applies a cybernetic system on the intelligence process. The model, thus, has less practical application. The 3-i Model is widely applied, and often seen in smaller jurisdictions (not in national or federal agencies). The model is based on the tenet of interpreting the criminal environment to influence the thinking of the decision-maker to make an impact on that criminal environment. Hence, the 3-i Model is crime-centric, and therefore cannot provide any inference to the decision-maker beyond the criminal environment in a specific geographic area, thereby affecting its ability to support policymaking or strategic planning. The 3-i Model's approach is very much in line with the CompStat paradigm.

The American Model of ILP has the IC at its core, with COP, POP and CompStat precepts. Though it was a requirement under the NCISP to adopt ILP, there existed no guide to inform the agencies on how to operationalise the American Model. With the conceptual disagreements

around COP and ILP paradigms, it was not fully clear how ILP and COP integrate and function together, other than by seeking information from the community for the intelligence function.

Implementing any strategy is challenging. Hence, introducing ILP as a business model (decision-making framework) requires the agency to adopt new management methods as well as a suitable legislative framework for limiting risks of potential abuse (OSCE, 2017). Different scholars advocate different standards. Nevertheless, a common factor in all major suggestions was executives' commitment and support to implement and sustain the practice of the strategy. For achieving that, they must be exposed to the concepts of ILP and be able to appreciate it to an extent that they are willing to take the time and effort to translate the strategy to specific achievable objectives or actions. The OSCE (2017) rules were the simplest and a vital set of guidelines for any agency aspiring to implement ILP.

Amid a lack of consensus on the elements of different policing paradigms, the construct of ILP has also been understood differently and the construct has remained nebulous. The popularity of ILP was due to the shift in the global security landscape after the 9/11 attacks, and coercive isomorphism (for an explanation, see Chapter Three) in the UK and US agencies, believing that ILP offered better options in preventing or mitigating risks and threats. Nonetheless, due to limited scholarship and the field still being relatively young, scholars have not been able to forward a doctrine—"a good operational practice against published and evidence-based research" (Phillips, 2008, p. 25). The closest to a doctrine is NIM. One of the criticisms of ILP, and in particular NIM, is its incapability to accommodate officers' personal experience (knowledge accumulated through years of service) and the emphasis on intelligence in decision-making, excluding officers' judgment in the process. Personal judgments, based on personal experience, come into play at decision-making through the T&C process and, before that, at the analytic phase the analysts' judgment (depending on the technique adopted) gets embedded into the product. To further ingrain the tacit knowledge of officers, technology can be used under Gottschalk's (2009) four-staged model (officer-to-technology systems, officer-to-officer systems, officer-to-information systems, and officer-to-application systems) to resolve some of the concerns, if not all.

Contrary to the common belief that intelligence and ILP were a recent addition to modern policing, the concepts are much older. There have been numerous calls to exploit intelligence in fighting crime and disorder, though the term ILP appeared in literature recently. Those calls were, most of the time, not clear, and in those instances in which they were clear, they were

not loud enough due to the primitiveness of the intelligence discipline, intelligence misuse, and unfamiliarity of police leadership and policymakers with the concept. Furthermore, policymakers were more concerned with democratic principles and obtaining legitimacy for police actions, which made them prioritise close collaboration with the community in delivering policing services. As a result, intelligence took a backseat in research and police reforms until the 9/11 attacks.

The first manual on police intelligence, *Basic Elements of Intelligence*, described the theoretical aspects of intelligence (especially the processes and products), the structure of an intelligence setup (function), upskilling and maintaining skilled intelligence personnel, and protection of the intelligence function from unlawful interference. That manual could be considered as the foundation of ILP, particularly due to the theoretical stance seen in some of the scholarship on policing with intelligence (such as ACIC, 2017; Australian Government, 2012; BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2004; Dannels & Smith, 2001; C. Gibbs et al., 2015; Gill, 1998). Though the manual did not use the term ILP, it referred to intelligence as a "weapon" to combat organised crime (Godfrey & Harris, 1971, p. 1) inasmuch as today's parlance. Before this manual, US national commissions had also been advocating the effective use of intelligence, following which Schulz and Norton (1968) published their seminal work on 'police operational intelligence'. Hence, from 1968, scholars have been advocating intelligence-driven approaches against organised crime and disorder, without using the concept of ILP. To this construct, NIM, through its T&C process, provided further direction on 'policing with intelligence'. The next add-on to ILP, in clear terms, was seen with the birth of the American ILP Model, which posited the COP, POP, and CompStat precepts within the ILP philosophy. However, before D. L. Carter (2004, 2009) explicated this concept, it was recommended as early as 1969 in a staff report articulated for a US national commission established to investigate and prevent violence in the society:

> A major weakness of many police departments is the absence of a reliable intelligence system. The absence has gravely handicapped police and public officials in anticipating and preventing trouble, and in minimizing and controlling a disorder that has broken out. In large part, this happens because of a failure to learn about and to understand neighborhood problems and grievances and to develop reliable information concerning community organizations and leaders. Related to this problem is the need for a reliable mechanism to monitor, to collect and to evaluate rumors and also the need for an

effective program to counter false and provocative rumors which can aggravate tension and incite violence. (Campbell et al., 1969, p. 312)

It is, therefore, important that ILP be viewed as a philosophy within which COP, POP, and CompStat precepts can be practised to improve the quality of life in communities and neighbourhoods. The ILP framework must not be rigid (as the initial minimum standards of NIM), but be more flexible so that police agencies can customise it to deliver their services even in the most challenging environments, including remote communities, culturally and ethnically diverse urban locations, resource scarce agencies, and politically and socially divided communities. IC can be situated at the centre of the framework, supported by a T&C process sufficient enough for the mandate of the agency. Use of IC alone will not be sufficient to address the needs of police agencies, whether big or small, rural or urban. To direct the agency towards the broader interest of the leadership (vision), a control strategy derived from the Strategic Assessment will be essential. To develop the control strategy, agencies must look beyond the criminal environment (at least through a PESTELO analysis). The intelligence system must be designed to accommodate problem-solving models and community intelligence so that non-intelligence personnel and the community can also provide information, enabling to identify threats, risks, and law-breakers within the community.

Amid the looming threats of terrorism and notorious organised crime syndicates, a policing model detached from the community and its support will not be effective to perform policing. To overcome this limitation, this thesis recommends using the tenets of all other knowledge-based policing models (COP, POP and CompStat) in ILP.

CHAPTER 3:
METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the research methodologies and approaches that underpin this research. The chapter comprises seven sections. The first section describes the research design used, while the second section details the theoretical framework underpinning this research. The next section covers aspects related to the research method. Here, the analytical framework is expounded along with the unit of analysis, three levels of hypotheses proposed in exploring the case study inquiry, research plan, and data collection process. The fourth section elaborates the analysis method, while the fifth addresses the validity of the research within an interpretive paradigm of research. The sixth section outlines ethical aspects, and the final section concludes the chapter with a summary of the research methodology.

3.1 Research Design

Blended in the case study inquiry, the research design has adopted an exploratory and interpretive research paradigm. As interpretivism assists qualitative analysis, to analyse a complex phenomenon, a qualitative approach was elected. Qualitative methods have been used previously by scholars researching intelligence-led policing or ILP (J. G. Carter, 2016; Coyne & Bell, 2015; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; James, 2013; John & Maguire, 2004; Kleiven, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2005; Viaene et al., 2009).

Though electing a qualitative research method could be attributed to many factors, such as restricted access of official documents due to sensitivity and privacy (Ratcliffe, 2009a, p. 117) and the challenge in quantification of influence or success of ILP (Bell et al., 2010; den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012, pp. 191–193; HMIC, 1997a, p. 21), the main reason to adopt a qualitative research approach in this thesis was the ability to explore deep nuances in the phenomenon under evaluation (Best & Kahn, 1998). In qualitative research, the participant of the research while answering questions provides "an accurate portrayal of the causes, events, and outcomes relevant in the case" that the participant understands to be the reality (Woodside, 2010, p. 8). Also, qualitative research allows to present the complexity of a problem (Ratcliffe, 2009b, p. 117; Yin, 2009, p. 133), such as the phenomenon this thesis explores.

Interpretivism was chosen for this research as 'perspective' being the focus of the research, interpretivism was believed to provide the best results for the research questions. In the interpretivist paradigm, "knowledge is relative to particular circumstances – historical, temporal, cultural, subjective – and exists in multiple forms as representations of reality (interpretations by individuals)" (Benoliel, 1996, p. 407). Interpretivism is based on the belief that people construct and reconstruct interpretations (worldviews) from their social environment and experiences (Blanche & Durrheim, 2007; Neuman, 1997). With this perspective, the researcher must focus on the features: social and interpersonal context, intentionality and conscious construction of the meaning, experience, and reflective intelligence and conscious choice (Wilsom & Hutchinson, 1991, cited in Benoliel, 1996, p. 407).

Interpretivism also allows inductive reasoning to be applied, beginning with "vague speculations" about the research question in the data collection process, and making sense of the situation later (Blanche & Durrheim, 2007, p. 7), enabling new questions to be introduced during the process of interviewing. The causal factors for selecting interpretivism for this research can be summarised as:

- From an ontological view, the interpretivist belief holds that the person (researcher) and reality are inseparable (Blanche & Durrheim, 2007). This belief is rooted in the notion that "our perceptions about the world are inextricably bound to a stream of experiences we have had throughout our lives. The life-world has both subjective and objective characteristics. The subjective characteristics reflect our perceptions about the meaning of some world. The objective characteristics reflect that we constantly negotiate this meaning with others with whom we interact" (R. Weber, 2004, p. v).

- From an epistemological view, "knowledge of the world is intentionally constituted through a person's lived experience" (R. Weber, 2004, p. iv). The knowledge made by making sense of the world reflects the interpretivists' goals, culture, history and other things (Neuman, 1997; R. Weber, 2004). ILP being a new concept introduced into the Maldives Police Service (MPS), not many officers, even at influential positions, may be aware of the actual conceptual framework of ILP or NIM. The reason for sending only three officers to the UK to learn ILP, the extensive time taken to implement ILP, and the meaning of intelligence held by the (former) Commissioner of Police Hussain Waheed (for details, see Chapter One) further validate this perspective. Hence,

practitioners' understating of the key concepts and elements of ILP could provide potential prospects for refining ILP in the future and ways for optimising existing resources and infrastructure.

- Interpretivists seek to find the truth as the intentional fulfilment, where "interpretations of research object match the lived experience of the research object" (R. Weber, 2004, p. iv). This is important for this research as the intention of the thesis is to determine how key elements of ILP are perceived and practised within the police hierarchy, by using the MPS as a case study, in order to identify the perceived impact of ILP on crime control and order maintenance so as to further develop the ILP framework by finding weaknesses in the current business processes.

- Interpretivism allows data collection techniques that can be used to find answers to the 'why' and 'how' questions of a problem (Neuman, 1997; Yin, 2009). Since crime statistics cannot give a true picture of the effectiveness in policing (Sparrow, 2015), the study requires the use of other data collection methods for corroboration or data triangulation purposes, even though such fields also cannot ascertain the success of ILP. Interpretivism allows the use of a case study approach and other methods such as reviewing documents (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006, p. 199).

- From a data validity perspective, the knowledge acquired through interpretivism are defensible (R. Weber, 2004). This meta-theoretical feature, though not a significant reason for choosing interpretivism for this research, is worth citing, as other interpretivist researchers should be able to establish the validity of the outcome of the research through an examination of the evidence collected in the research, the process used in the research, the context of the research, and possibly some aspects of the researcher's experience. Even if other interpretivist researchers cannot agree with the claims of the research, they must "be willing to concede that the researcher's conclusion are plausible, at least from the perspective of the researcher herself or himself" (R. Weber, 2004, p. viii).

- Reliability is an important meta-theoretical element of any research. Unlike positivists, "interpretivists believe that research is reliable if researcher can demonstrate *interpretive awareness*", by introducing subjectivity to the research process and taking "steps to address the implications of their subjectivity" (R. Weber, 2004, p. ix, original emphasis). Hence, it allows the researcher to withhold personal suppositions based on his experience at the MPS while seeking to understand ILP practices and narratives in

the MPS, remain open throughout the research process to alternative explanations observed, focus initially on description then on explanation, and constantly check the plausibility of alternative explanations observed.[1]

This research aims to analyse how ILP is perceived and practised by the police by using a case study of the MPS. Case study research is an approach in social science research that may be selected when the research seeks to answer 'how' or 'why' questions, and "the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context" when/where the behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin, 2009, p. 6). It is a popular method in psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, and many other disciplines to contribute to knowledge, and is highly relevant in exploratory research (Yin, 2009). Case study research may be followed when the objective of the research is to describe, understand, predict, or control the process, individual, group, entity, culture, nature, organisation, or nationality (Woodside, 2010). It provides "rich, deep insights into what is happening and why it is happening" (Woodside, 2010, p. 35). It "probes deeply and analyzes interactions between the factors that explain present status or that influence change or growth" (Best & Kahn, 1998, p. 248). Yin (2009, p. 8) defined case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Case studies can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Exploratory studies may be preferred when the researcher seeks to find answers for 'what' questions and questions that seek to inquire the extent of a problem or phenomenon (Yin, 2009).

As this thesis embarks into a relatively unknown area of research, an exploratory method was used within the interpretive paradigm. This allowed for the use of an open, flexible, and inductive approach in the search for new insights into the phenomenon (Cope, 2008; Durrheim, 2007). Through the exploratory method, a series of observations were made to generate a generalised hypothesis. The exploratory research design required the researcher to clearly establish the data collection techniques and methods and where the data can be found (Durrheim, 2007; Yin, 2009). As hypotheses are used in this study, deviating from the common approach followed in interpretive research (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Williamson, Burstein, & McKemmish, 2002), deductive analysis was also incorporated.

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[1] The example used by R. Weber (2004) is customised to the research question of this thesis.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

Neo-institutionalism (alternatively known as new institutionalism) was selected as the theoretical framework for the thesis. The absence of a standard theory of intelligence (Gill & Phythian, 2018; Richards, 2010), existence of variant models or theories of ILP (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009; C. Gibbs et al., 2015; Gill, 1998; NCPE, 2005c; OSCE, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2016), and the relevance of the neo-institutionalist theoretical framework to this research facilitated this selection. Neo-institutionalism integrates the formal institutional rules and structures with actions of the individuals for exploring how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures affect the choices and actions of individuals within an institution (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The old or traditional institutionalism "is a cultural theory that centers on values and norms (of what ought to be done), whereas the new institutionalism is a cognitive theory concerned with classifications and scripts (of what can be done)" (Deflem, 2008, p. 149). Neo-institutionalism was developed to examine the behaviour of agencies in the 1970s by Meyer and Rowan (J. G. Carter, Phillips, & Gayadeen, 2014). They argued that the formal structures of many agencies "dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). For this argument, they posited that "institutional rules may have an effect on organizational structures and their implementation in an actual technical work which are very different from the effects generated by the networks of social behavior and relationships which compose and surround a given organization" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341).

> A sharp distinction should be made between the formal structure of an organization and its day-to-day work activities. Formal structure is a blueprint for activities which includes, first of all, the table of organization: a list of offices, departments, positions, and programs. These elements are linked by explicit goals and policies that make up a rational theory of how, and to what end, activities are to be fitted together. The essence of a modern bureaucratic organization lies in the rationalized and impersonal character of these structural elements and of the goals that link them.
>
> (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 341-342)

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), structural inconsistencies are institutionalised in an agency when its activities and demands conflict with existing ceremonial rules, and rules based on myths that conflict with one another. While studying the reason for the extensive similarities

in agencies (theoretically known as isomorphism), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) found that rational actors were responsible for isomorphism. Though bureaucracy remains as the common organisational form, structural changes occurring within agencies appear to be less driven by competition or efficacy. Agencies subscribe to symbolic myths to attain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and through subscribing such institutional myths into the structures and activities within police agencies, the police agencies attain recognition as a legitimate or "true police agency" by the actors in the institutional environment (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, p. 342).

For police agencies, legitimacy is essential for securing the resources required for security and existence, argued Crank and Langworthy (1992). According to them, a police agency's organisational "structure, policies and operations strategies have a great deal to do with institutional values in its environment and very little to do with production economies or technical capabilities" (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, p. 342). Police appearance (such as titles, rank, uniform, badges, and insignia), police structure (showing what the police should do, as opposed to what they actually do, with specialised units or departments for justifying budgets and resources), preventive patrol (even though random patrol is ineffective in preventing crime), and rapid response systems influence how police agencies are perceived by other actors in their institutional environment (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, pp. 342–343).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 147) argue that in highly structured organisational fields, individual efforts to deal with uncertainty and constraints rationally "often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output". Homogenous practices or isomorphism occur when agencies rationalise 'legitimacy' or acceptance. Hawley (1968) described isomorphism as a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (cited in DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). The two types of isomorphism are institutional and competitive. Institutional isomorphism occurs when agencies benchmark other agencies' working models or processes for political power and institutional legitimacy, while competitive isomorphism materialises from market competition and measures adopted for economic viability. Institutional isomorphism occurs due to three main changes: (1) coercive (due to political influence and problems pertaining to legitimacy), (2) mimetic (due to standard responses against uncertainty), and (3) normative (due to the professionalisation of the agency) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Therefore, agencies display mimetic behaviour of copying successful practices at other agencies as response against uncertainty (E. R. Maguire &

Mastrofski, 2000), normative behaviour when professionals cross/transfer between agencies, and coercive behaviour when they respond to external regulatory structures such as laws, court rulings, regulations, amended mandates, and policy statements (Deflem, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In coercive isomorphism, the changes agencies adopt can be figurative or substantive. Figurative changes relate to those made to the symbolic and ceremonial activities adopted by the agency, whereas substantive changes are the instrumental changes adopted genuinely for achieving a purpose (Deflem, 2008).

3.3 Research Method and Research Plan

As mentioned earlier, an exploratory interpretive paradigm has been elected for a case study analysis—inquiring into the implementation of ILP in the MPS. With that research paradigm at the background, the thesis applied neo-institutional theoretical framework. This enabled understanding the theoretical factors for the MPS' behaviour in the implementation of ILP, and directed the research in finding answers to the research questions.

3.3.1 Analytical Framework

Under the theoretical framework proposed above, it is examined whether the MPS implemented ILP due to coercive modelling, as a response to political pressure posited in the *Seventh National Development Plan 2006–2010* (NDP7) and the *National Framework for Development 2009–2013*; mimetic, due to the perceived success of NIM or ILP in the Global North in countering terrorism and organised crime; or normative, in the effort to professionalise the force in crime control and order maintenance.

The elements of ILP advocated by the Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) of the US Justice Department were used as the framework of analysis. The elements of ILP proposed by the BJA (2009) are: (1) commitment and involvement, (2) collaboration and coordination, (3) tasking and coordination, (4) collection, planning, and operation, (5) analytic capabilities, (6) awareness, education and training, (7) end-user feedback, and (8) reassessment of the process. These elements enabled in situating the research, developing interview questions, and developing a coding structure.

Commitment and Involvement:

> Successful implementation and sustainment of the ILP framework within a law enforcement agency require strong commitment by the agency's leadership. The agency leader should be able to clearly articulate the goals of ILP: how it will address the agency's priorities, how it will affect agency operations, and how the agency will benefit from its use. Executives must lead by example—fully integrating intelligence into their strategic, operational, and tactical decisions—thereby demonstrating their confidence in the ILP approach and providing evidence of how using intelligence leads to better decisions. (BJA, 2009, p. 7)

Since ILP is an agency-wide endeavour, to implement and sustain it, awareness should be carried-out throughout the agency by the leadership. This would facilitate a cultural change required in redefining organisational procedures on crime control in order to change officers' attitudes, values, and beliefs regarding policing processes. To institutionalise ILP, the leadership must develop and effectively communicate a vision founded upon ILP, continually demonstrate the need of the intelligence, allocate sufficient resources, customise and develop an ILP framework for the needs of the agency, and develop and amend the agency's policies to promote and practise ILP (BJA, 2009).

Collaboration and Coordination: Agencies must collaborate and coordinate with stakeholders and other agencies to have strategic understanding with them for successfully practising ILP. Such interactions and partnerships will create "valuable conduits for future information and intelligence sharing" (BJA, 2009, p. 10). ILP requires the use of problem-solving approaches in crime and threat prevention (D. L. Carter, 2004, 2009; D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; McGarrell et al., 2007; NCPE, 2005c, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008a) and coordination with other agencies facilitating easy access to the concerned departments for addressing criminogenic factors (BJA, 2009; NCPE, 2005c; Ratcliffe, 2007).

In this regard, a key document that must be developed and communicated would be a privacy policy, which must detail the utilisation of the ILP framework (BJA, 2009; OSCE, 2017). The intelligence process of ILP requires information or data from the community. To increase the flow of information, the community needs to be made aware of the systems in place and the type of information expected (for example, 'see something, say something') for them to contribute positively to crime control and public safety (BJA, 2009). The NIM guides do not

stress on developing or updating existing privacy policy, perhaps due to the strong legislative standards in the *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000*, which regulates the powers of enforcement agencies in carrying-out surveillance, interception of communications and investigations. However, following the discovery of information management issues through the Bichard Inquiry (2004), the Home Secretary issued a statutory *Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information* in 2005 (NPIA, 2010b, p. 7) setting out the "principles governing the management of information (including personal information) which the police service may need to manage" (NCPE, 2005a, p. 3). Codes of practices on the management of police information are also in place for Britain's police forces (Home Office, 2015, 2016a; NPIA, 2010a).

Tasking and Coordination (T&C): The command level should allow ILP to define the command and control functions of the agency so that commanders, managers, supervisors, analysts, investigators, and other officers can appreciate and adopt a centralised T&C function (BJA, 2009). Police officers are expected to perform a myriad of functions beyond law enforcement, and this might scatter police resources and concentrations. To overcome those challenges, ILP encourages the establishment of a T&C system to provide focused operational efforts by aligning resources towards the strategic, operational, and tactical goals of the agency (BJA, 2009; NCPE, 2005c, 2006b; OSCE, 2017). To build the T&C function, the BJA recommended that commanders adopt "direct analytical resources to produce specific threat assessment for the jurisdiction", identify command priorities by using threat assessments, establish a T&C group to assist command level staff, and coordinate T&C meetings among officers to identify gaps, coordinate resource allocation, task intelligence requirements, and ensure command priorities are performed (BJA, 2009, p. 11)

Collection, Planning, and Operation: The capacity of the agency to collect relevant and required information is an essential need of ILP. Police agencies should, therefore, possess the capacity to collect information from open sources, community, acquisition and analysis of physical evidence, interviews and interrogation, financial inquiries, surveillance, covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), electronic surveillance, and undercover operations. Other than these sources, police agencies also obtain direct information through policing activities such as vehicle stops and calls for services that provide opportunities for intelligence (BJA, 2009). Information collection is an agency-wide responsibility and not a "voluntary occupation alongside other work" limited to enthusiasts (Phillips, 2008, p. 30). Systems must be set in a way that allow information to be gleaned from all sources: cases (confessions, statements,

descriptions of styles and behaviour, criminal associations, and markets), police duties (patrols, forensic analysis, and suspicious information), and covert methods (human sources, and physical and technical surveillance) (Phillips, 2008). Unlike military and national security intelligence agencies, police agencies must be able to obtain and channel information for its intelligence from the community that is being policed, a great extent of the information from volunteered members of the community, and very little from covert methods (MacVean, 2008).

Analytic Capabilities: The ILP framework requires some level of analytic capability within the agency to support decision-making processes "by providing the right information to the right person, at the right time" (BJA, 2009, p. 12). Hence, the leadership must develop its own analytic capability. Steps involved in the development of analytic capability are:

- Collection plan development: Once the intelligence requirement is decided, a collection plan must be primed (Dintino & Martens, 1983; OSCE, 2017; Phillips, 2008). "A collection plan identifies priority information that should be collected, outlines the process for gathering relevant information from all law enforcement sources, and describes how that information is developed into an intelligence product" (BJA, 2009, p. 12). The collection plan is associated with the strategic priorities through "intelligence requirements by collecting targeted information about threats from both strategic and tactical perspectives" (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 107).

- Analysis: An ILP framework without effective analytic capability cannot depict an accurate picture of crime in the environment (D. L. Carter & Carter, 2009). Information is converted to intelligence through analysis. Broadly, there are three types of analyses: crime pattern analysis, intelligence analysis, and strategic analysis (HMIC, 1997a). The purpose of analysis is to enable identification of potential and future threats and risks, assist the decision-makers in responding to those threats according to perceived risk, inform potential issues and challenges, and allow proactive measures (BJA, 2009). Intelligence personnel must possess the necessary analytic and reporting skills required to produce meaningful intelligence products (D. L. Carter, 2009). They must be able to link "visible criminality with criminal networks and criminal methodologies" (Phillips, 2008, p. 31) through deep, thorough, and creative analysis.

- Intelligence products: The value of different intelligence products must not only be recognised in the agency, but intelligence must also be disseminated in a timely and comprehensive manner (D. L. Carter, 2009). The effectiveness of ILP is directly related

to intelligence, and the effectiveness of intelligence is directly related to the quality of information and analysis performed on the information. Hence, a prime objective of the police agency (at all levels) must be to sustain the quality of intelligence (BJA, 2009).

- Operational responses: The police must be able to act on intelligence to prevent or mitigate the risk, threat, or crime. Therefore, the intelligence generated must be purposeful enough to drive operational responses against threats and strategic planning for achieving long-term (organisational) goals (D. L. Carter, 2009). When the decision-maker is informed of potential threats, mitigation or response strategies must be developed (BJA, 2009). To implement operational responses, resources and funds are required. The intelligence function should be able to guide prioritising and focusing of resources for implementing intervention strategies for the optimised use of resources (D. L. Carter, 2009, p. 109).

- Review of the process: To assess what intelligence has been developed and check for gaps, a review process must take place (NCPE, 2005c; Phillips, 2008). Through a review, new or emerging information gaps can be identified, and efficiency of the analytical process could be evaluated to find whether the right issues are addressed at the right time for the right purpose (BJA, 2009).

Awareness, Education, and Training: Decision-makers must, at a minimum, possess knowledge pertaining to the intelligence process, threat indicators, legal and privacy issues, and information networks and resources. If they lack a sufficient level of knowledge, then they must undergo additional training (BJA, 2009). Leaders must also become familiarised with key ILP literature—in the case of the MPS, it would be the NIM standards and guidelines. The privacy policy, if existing, must be amended to ensure the protection of individuals' civil rights and liberties. In cases where no privacy policy exists, one should be formulated. The privacy policy needs to be communicated throughout the agency and officers should be made to understand its significance and sensitivity (BJA, 2009). Similarly, all officers should be educated on information collection and sharing standards for maintaining information security and safe handling. Based on job roles, officers must be trained on information collection, analysis, development of intelligence products, and evaluation of their work to provide necessary skills and professionalism (BJA, 2009).

End-User Feedback: Review of end-user feedback is a method of analysing the success of ILP implementation. End-users can be: analysts (as they receive raw data), commanders (as

they review the analytical products), chiefs of police (as they review intelligence), and field agents or officers (as they receive orders or collection guidelines). Each one of them will contribute a unique perspective to the intelligence function of the agency (BJA, 2009).

> Incorporating this feedback into the evaluation process will help agencies improve their ILP process by continuously providing new information on which processes and products can advance, and users can see ILP implementation from the collection of information to the products resulting from this information. If intelligence products cannot be translated into operational and tactical strategies, then the products need to be redesigned. (BJA, 2009, p. 14)

Reassessment of the Process: The leadership must assess the conformity of business activities to the agency's strategic priorities. Therefore, agencies must measure their performance as it could be a consistent process to evaluate the progress in ILP implementation or determine the adjustments to intelligence driven strategies. The agency's performance must be measured constantly to introduce changes to unproductive strategies or to sustain/improve efficiency within the agency (BJA, 2009). The ultimate objective of the assessment process is to strengthen analytic capacity, produce superior intelligence, and enhance operational responses to effectively tackle threats, risks, and crime (BJA, 2009; Harris, 1976).

3.3.2   Unit of Analysis and Sources of Data

To evaluate complex phenomenon under investigation, the most suitable unit of analysis would be interviewing practitioners, to determine their views, experiences, expectations, and knowledge of ILP. Other sources, especially documentary sources, can be used to corroborate/triangulate the data. Through the practitioners as the primary unit of analysis, the practice of ILP may be interpreted against its theory, making contributions to both the scholarship and efficacy of ILP strategy within the MPS.

Semi-structured questionnaires allowed the researcher to analyse the perception and inherent features of ILP existing in the MPS to determine the extent to which practices within the MPS resemble ILP literature; the reason(s) for recognising ILP in a particular way or approach; the perceived impact of ILP on organisational objectives; the possible factors that facilitate or inhibit the MPS from practising ILP; and the approaches that can be used to optimise resources. Data gathered through interviews are contrasted and corroborated/triangulated with MPS

policies, procedures, force reports (most of which were accessed at the MPS library), annual reports (prepared as per Law Number 2/68 to send to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the President's Office), meeting minutes, and annual documentary videos on the MPS published on each Police Day (29 March) from 2011 to 2016. Face-to-face interviews were not limited to serving officers. Three retired officers who held senior positions were interviewed. Some of the participants, especially serving at management positions, had previously worked in the intelligence sector. To overcome the limitation in understanding the intelligence culture of the Maldives and to map the development of the intelligence function, they were asked about the developments they witnessed at the intelligence sector during their time. Their insights are used to map the development of the intelligence function.

The exploratory approach requires the use of multiple data collection techniques. This framework permits the use of inductive reasoning to supply facts and factors for deriving answers to the research questions. Other documentation obtained includes legislation and case laws, and manuals related to crime control and training, agendas, and minutes of the Management Board and Executive Board.[2]

An application was lodged with the MPS on 1 June 2016 to access relevant police data, documents and staff (see Appendix A for a copy of the email). The MPS gave its consent on 16 June 2016 (attached at Appendix B). Data collection began after obtaining approval from Macquarie University's Human Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix C).

3.3.3   *Linking Logic and Hypotheses*

The concerns highlighted in the problem statement (Chapter One), such as the misconstruction of ILP in police agencies (Ratcliffe, 2005; Stockdale et al., 1999), misinterpretation of intelligence by the chief of police (Waheed, 2015), and discrepancies in the MPS Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (for details, see chapters one, four, and five) imply that ILP as perceived and practised in the MPS would have substantial inconsistencies with the ILP literature. It was due to this reason the different ILP models were discussed in detail in the previous chapter to illustrate the variances in those models and elucidate ILP as perceived in the MPS in other sections of this thesis. Therefore, the research did not compare NIM minimum standards and codes of conduct issued to the British police forces with the practices in the MPS even though

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[2] The MPS provided the agendas of the boards' meetings, but access to the minutes of all sessions was not possible due to the inability to locate some of those (hard copies).

the MPS adopted NIM (MPS, 2013o, p. 14). The thesis realises the varied requirements of different police agencies based on resource availability, criminal environment, risks, geography, and political environment.

As ILP perceived in the MPS was expected to be different to ILP literature, this research attempted to find (1) the reasons for this variation, and (2) whether the MPS model facilitated the achievement of its organisational goals. As highlighted in Chapter One, policing plans (MPS, 2014g, 2017), annual reports of institutions in the criminal justice system (DJA, 2016; Juvenile Justice Unit, 2016), policy papers (MoF&T & UNDP, 2014; NCTC, 2017; President's Office, 2016e), and news media articles (Ahmed, 2017) imply that ILP has not substantially changed the operational environment and, therefore, it has very less positive impact on the organisational objectives of the MPS. Given this scenario where ILP has brought no significant impact to policing in the Maldives, certain factors would have affected its promotion in the MPS. Efforts were made to assess such factors that hinder (or promote) ILP in the MPS to understand whether it is cultural (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Sanders & Condon, 2017), organisational (Collier, 2006; Cope, 2004; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2005; Viaene et al., 2009), theoretical (M. Maguire & John, 2006), or a combination of these factors (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015).

3.3.4 Hypotheses

According to Best (1977), a hypothesis "is a shrewd guess or inference that is formulated and provisionally adopted to explain observed facts or conditions and to guide in further investigation" (cited in Singh & Nath, 2007, p. 117). For a hypothesis to be testable, its outcome must be explored and explained through a relationship of two or more variables that are "operationally defined" (Best & Kahn, 1998, p. 11).

This thesis proposes hypotheses at three levels: organisational, command, and field officer levels. These hypotheses may be considered as 'vague speculations' formed to make sense of the 'problem statement' and the research questions to study "*meaningful social action*, not just the external or observable behavior of people" based on the context and experience of the respondent (Neuman, 1997, p. 69, original emphasis).

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL HYPOTHESES:

- H1: Adoption of ILP in the MPS was either coercive (figurative) or mimetic, as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), but not due to a normative isomorphic approach towards professionalisation of the force.

- H2: Owing to a lack of understanding of intelligence and ILP within the MPS (agency-wide), adequate attention was not given to the elements of ILP, impeding the development of ILP and the intelligence function of the agency.

Based on these hypotheses, the research sought to determine whether sufficient effort was made to ingrain ILP within MPS policies, laws and regulations, manuals and training curricula, technological innovations, organigrams since 2011, and force strategies such as Strategic Assessments and control strategy. The analysis and practitioners' viewpoint produced an outcome with which the hypotheses could be tested. This approach also provided answers for the first research question and contributed to the second research question. Since the background for the hypotheses has been sufficiently elaborated above, while linking the logic of the research questions, further elaboration was avoided.

COMMAND LEVEL HYPOTHESIS:

- H3: A majority in the command level were unaware of the control strategy (priorities) and intelligence requirements, resulting in misuse or non-use of the ILP framework or resources to achieve the organisational goals of the MPS.

- H4: Technological innovations within the MPS were not directly linked to its organisational goals or ILP needs.

These hypotheses informed answers for the second and third research questions. Hypothesis H4 is based on the absence of specific activities to develop the agency's technology infrastructure on its long-term plans, before putting into practice. Details relevant to H4 can also be found under the next hypothesis.

FIELD OFFICER LEVEL HYPOTHESIS:

- H5: Field officers (patrol officers, watch-house officers, crime prevention staff, scene of crime officers, investigators, and traffic staff) did not realise that they have a role to perform in the intelligence function of the MPS, and they perceived that intelligence

collection as a responsibility of the intelligence units (within the Directorate of Intelligence) because of which the MPS lacked an integrated approach for data collection. This hypothesis is relevant to the first two research questions.

ILP is a technology-driven form of policing, and to a large extent depends on technological systems (Brodeur & Dupont, 2008; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; James, 2017, p. 5; Ratcliffe, 2002, 2008a). In 2010, the MPS acquired an Oracle® Exadata Machine, an expensive high-tech system that features industry-standard servers and intelligent storage, with state-of-the-art flash technology (Oracle, 2014). By 2014, the MPS was able to run most of its business processes and many services on the digital platform, providing instant access to staff records, detainee records, crime records, and other related business functions (MPS, 2013p). Such transitions to digital technology point out that the MPS had acquired significant developments in modernising the force, which would be integrated into the ILP infrastructure following the shift to ILP as its new business model.

3.3.5 Research Plan

The research plan will provide a logical sequence for this research, consistent with the research design and methodology. The research will be conducted in six stages. Throughout the research process, the researcher took notes of key points, decisions, initial thoughts, appointments, and anything that required to be recorded for enhancing the reliability and credibility of the research.

STAGE 1: In the first stage, relevant literature was reviewed. The initial focus of the literature review was to locate the key literature on ILP and review current issues in ILP. Significant energy has been put to examine the variances in ILP within the literature. Other themes covered in the initial stage include other policing paradigms (COP, POP, and CompStat) as ILP is an intelligence-driven business philosophy that adopts problem-solving and partnerships (D. L. Carter, 2004). Parallel to reviewing the literature on policing and ILP, publications on/of the MPS were also studied. The MPS website, www.police.gov.mv, and the subdomain of the Attorney General's Office, http://mvlaw.gov.mv, provided most of the police regulations and force publications. The sub-domain of the MPS website, Police Life (www.policelife.mv), provided police plans, reports, speeches, and other information required at the initial phase of the research.

Next, a review of the thematic literature was drafted, covering the main themes and subjects. Emerging literature and themes relevant to this thesis were continually monitored and the draft was updated.

STAGE 2: The research methodology and the data collection tool were formulated at this stage. Thus, the development of the semi-structured interview was the key activity at this stage. The data collection instrument was developed by taking into consideration the relationship between the research questions and the 'interview interventions' or 'interview questions' (IQ) as shown in Figure 3.1. The analytical factors explained above were used to devise interview questions based on the research questions. The interview questions were in plain language, and not in 'theory language'. The interview guide (see Appendix D), containing interview questions and probing questions to extract specifics, was designed with a thematic as well as a dynamic focus. Thematically, the questions "relate to the topic of the interview, to the theoretical conceptions at the root of investigation, and to the subsequent analysis" (Kvale, 1996, p. 129). Dynamically, the questions "promote a positive interaction; keep the flow of the conversation going and motivate the subjects to talk about their experiences and feelings" (Kvale, 1996, p. 130).

Figure 3.1: **Pyramid model of co-determination of informant questions by theory questions.**
Source: Wengraf (2001, p. 157)

In semi-structured interviews, open-ended questions were planned and probe questions were prepared to capture the experience and perception of the interviewee, following the guidance

of Perry (1988). In developing the interview instrument, the 'spectrum from unstructured interviewing and possible relationship to phases in the development of a theory' (see Figure 3.2), proposed by Wengraf (2001) and Maxwell's Interactive Model of Research Design (Maxwell, 1965, p. 5, cited in Wengraf, 2001, p. 58), was also used to guide the interview questions.

Figure 3.2: **Spectrum from unstructured to fully structured interviewing, and possible relationship to phases in the development of a theory.**
Source: Wengraf (2001, p. 61)

Wengraf (2001) argued that interviews can vary from unstructured to fully structured based on the purpose and focus of the research. At the beginning of the research cycle, the focus can be to build a theory or model of a specific reality, requiring an unstructured or a lightly structured interview. When the model or theory is built, heavily structured or fully structured interviews can be used to test the model or theory, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.3: **Maxwell's Interactive Model of Research Design.**
Source: Maxwell, 1965, p. 5, reprinted in Wengraf (2001, p. 58)

The data analysis method was also developed during this stage, which will be explained while discussing the analytic process (in Stage 4). The interview guide was translated to Dhivehi (language of the Maldives) to overcome any communication barriers. A flyer was designed to inform and attract the participants (see Appendix E).

STAGE 3: During this stage, the case study inquiry was conducted. A semi-structured interview was conducted by the researcher with the staff of the MPS. The interviews were taped with an audio recording device, unless the participant objected. When a participant refused voice recording, detailed hand-written notes were taken. While this process was ongoing, other documentary sources required for the study were also collected from the MPS and elsewhere.

A preliminary analysis of the interviews was conducted during this stage to identify the participants who needed to be approached for a second interview. Field notes were taken to record the conditions of the session (where it took place, if anyone else was there other than the interviewee), behaviour of the respondent (relaxed, hurried, or distracted), and interruptions (mobile phones, children bursting in, alarm, or any other event).

STAGE 4: The interviews and the documentary data were analysed at this stage. Except for three participants, everyone else chose to speak in Dhivehi. As a result, the interviews were first transcribed in Dhivehi, then translated to English. It was noticed that many English terms, and at times full sentences, were used by the participants in their responses. To make the translations as accurate as possible, the English terms used by the participants were maintained in the English version and to identify such terms, those were italicised. The translated interviews (or interviews in English) were studied to assess the analytic factors and recurrent themes. It must be noted that some level of analysis was undertaken during the previous stage in order to cover all themes relevant to the topic under investigation, achieve data saturation, and identify potential key respondents who could provide additional or unique insights to the research. The broader approach taken in analysis was the procedure used in abstracting intelligence, which involves condensing the information collected, comparing that summary with expectations (derived on the hypotheses), and explaining the results of this comparison (Harris, 1976, p. 30). A summary of the key findings is attached in Appendix H.

STAGE 5: Drafting relevant parts of the thesis was a continual process throughout the research. Drafting the thesis as a whole document, linking the various sections, and checking for flow of information was the main task after analysing the data.

STAGE 6: At this stage, proof-reading and other activities were undertaken before submission of the final thesis.

A timeline of the research is attached in Appendix I.

3.3.6 Data Collection and Sampling

How data was collected has been discussed previously. The documents and information required for the research were obtained from the MPS, while interviews were conducted where the respondent desired (mostly public places or places where police officers meet), where environmental factors did not obstruct in interviewing and where the interview could be recorded in a suitable form with clarity. This flexibility allowed interviewing the hesitant officers. The broad structure of the interview was based on the position or rank of the officer. That does not mean three different sets were developed for the three levels, but some questions, such as T&C meetings and aspects related to strategic directions, were not posed to junior officers.

In-depth interviews were limited to executives, management-level officers, and officers who had retired from key positions. Depending on their responses, they were probed for their own insights regarding certain events and occurrences. Such interviews were extended for more than one sitting, though rarely was there such a need. However, even if a key respondent could be of critical value, the researcher used his personal knowledge and judgement not to be overly reliant on them (Yin, 2009). In-depth interview is a data collection method employed when the researcher believes certain individuals can contribute to providing insights into a particular phenomenon or activity through their "unique and important knowledge about the social world that is ascertainable through the verbal communication" (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. 119). Such interviews would be favoured to obtain "rich qualitative data, from the perspective of selected individuals" on issues (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. 120) centred on ILP.

As there exists no detailed documentation on the development of the MPS intelligence machinery, officers who had experience in the intelligence sector were questioned to map its development and explore the intelligence culture in the Maldives. Their disclosures are mainly used in Chapter Four in depicting the development of the MPS intelligence sector (Directorate of Intelligence). The retired officers also contributed to this need and gap in literature on police intelligence.

Sampling:

The research aimed to interview 50 practitioners with sufficient policing background. Considering the dynamic dimension of the interviews, and to achieve data saturation, the MPS staff were categorised into four groups.

- Category 1: This cohort consists of supervisory, managerial, and command level positions of the MPS. In the MPS, command level officers are officers who hold positions of Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner(s) of Police, Assistant Commissioners or Heads of Commands/Directorates, and Deputy Heads of Commands/Directorates. Managerial officers usually hold the ranks of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents, and their positions are Head of Department/Division and Deputy Head of Department/Division. There are different levels of supervisory staff based on the responsibilities of the Department and the number of staff performing a particular function. For this research, commissioned officers holding positions of Head of Unit and In-Charge of Police Stations are considered supervisory staff. The rank structure of the MPS is attached in Appendix J. The research initially planned to interview 26 practitioners, but 23 participants were interviewed. This has had no adverse impact on the research as data saturation had taken place.

- Category 2: This cohort consisted of investigation officers and intelligence personnel. Twelve officers were interviewed in this category.

- Category 3: This category consists of qualified police officers (not probationers) from the frontline sectors, who do not belong to the second category. For unsworn members, the participant must have at least a year's experience at the MPS. Twelve practitioners belonging to this category were initially planned to interview. However, only 10 members were interviewed.

- Category 4: Retired officers who had served at key posts. In this respect two former Commissioners and one of the architects of the MPS Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (SP2) were interviewed.

Research has shown that gender and police culture affect the integration of intelligence analysts into intelligence work (C. Atkinson, 2017; Cope, 2004, p. 202). However, the sex and age of the participants was not considered as a concern for this research as that was not expected to influence the responses, primarily because this research is on ILP diffusion and uptake in a hegemonic male dominated agency where all executives and those leading the intelligence sector were men. Also, the research is not seeking to understand how the analytic profession of the MPS integrates within the decision-making process, and by virtue of this reason the number of participants selected for the second cohort (intelligence personnel and investigators) was twelve. The probability of infantilising against femininity and young analysts appeared dim as the agency itself is very young (just 14 years), unlike in mature agencies such as the

Scotland Police, where such attitudes had been identified (C. Atkinson, 2017). The researcher also considered the fact that the intelligence function of the MPS took a professional approach towards producing intelligence only in 2012 (MPS, 2013p, pp. 32–35), a year after implementing ILP. Therefore, in the ethics application submitted before the Human Research Ethics Committee of Macquarie University, it was stated that the gender of the participants was not expected to affect the outcome of the research.

A mixed sampling approach was adopted for the research by combining probability sampling with purposive sampling. As the probability sampling method, random sampling was used, and as the purposive type, 'snowball sampling' was opted for. Random sampling was used in selecting participants from the first and third categories, while snowball sampling guided in selecting the participants for the second and fourth categories. Snowball sampling allowed source anonymity and any limitations the MPS could put on those representing the category that might otherwise affect the outcome of the research.

Since all the names of units, police stations, departments, divisions, commands, and directorates are publicly available and listed in the organigram of the MPS (see Appendix K), the supervisory, managerial and command positions (for example, Head of Crime Investigation Command, Deputy Head of Crime Investigation Command, Head of Drug Enforcement Department, Deputy Head of Drug Enforcement Department, Head of Victim Support Unit, In-charge of Maafannu Police Station, etc.) were written as a list, providing a serial number for each position. Listing did not follow any (alphabetical) order, and names were added to the list according to the organigram of the MPS. Three lists, namely, command, managerial, and supervisory level were created. From each list, based on the number of positions, the percentage (of 26) was calculated to find the number of participants for each level. This approach covered all the vertical levels of the MPS hierarchy. For selecting potential participant from this category, the website www.random.org was used to generate random integers, ranging from one to the last serial number of the list (number of positions listed).

For selecting potential participants from the third category, the same website was used to generate random integers with four digits beginning with 1001 to the figure representing the 'Service Number'[3] of the most recently qualified police officer.[4] The first 24 officers, assigned

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[3] Every staff of the MPS is given a unique identifying number, called 'Service Number' generated automatically and is currently a four-digit number (e.g. 2345).
[4] A qualified police officer is an officer who has undergone the Police Basic Course and completed the probationary duration and requirements.

to frontline work, whose Service Numbers matched the list were considered as potential participants. Twenty-four (double the required sample number) was selected assuming their reservation to participate in the study. As expected, many of them, especially officers serving at the junior-most two ranks, expressed reluctance (see Appendix J for the MPS rank structure). For selecting potential participants from the second category, snowball sampling was used so that the researcher could access practitioners within the group without any other party knowing their identity. The researcher personally reached the retired officers.

In order to inform the staff of the MPS about the research and the possibility of the researcher contacting them, a flyer was circulated agency-wide (see Appendix E) by the MPS, designed and submitted by the researcher. The flyer was uploaded to the MPS *e-noticeboard* and all the staff had access to it. The flyer encouraged the staff to contact the researcher if they were interested in participating. Thereafter, the researcher approached potential participants either through phone (as MPS maintains an officer phone directory available to all senior officers), or at their work sites such as administrative offices or police stations. A total of 48 participants were interviewed, and 45 of them were serving officers. This figure is considered apt according to Perry (1988) as he proposed that a sample size of 35 to 50 as a suitable figure for a doctoral research. Furthermore, data saturation occurred, removing all suspicions of any effect on the outcome, as participants selected possessed a high degree of competence for the inquiry (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).

3.4 Analysis

As qualitative research requires data analysis to commence in the field during the collection process (G. Gibbs, 2009), analysis started as soon as receipt of data, including documentary sources and with the first interview itself. At the preliminary stage, the intention was to identify potential gaps and ensure data saturation. At the analysis phase, patterns were looked and explanations were produced (G. Gibbs, 2009), as analysing is "to separate something into parts and elements" (Kvale, 1996, p. 184).

All the interview recordings were transcribed. In order to generate the meaning of the interviews through identifying patterns and separating the 'parts and elements' within it, transcribed interviews were condensed, categorised, structured (based on the narrative), and interpreted. This constitutes the five approaches to interview analysis proposed by Kvale (1996,

pp. 190–209). The analytic factors and themes identified previously constituted categorisation. A form (named as Interview Analysis Form) was used for each interview (see Appendix G) with these 'approaches'.

> *Meaning condensation* entails and abridgement of the meanings expressed by the interviewees into shorter formulations. Long statements are compressed into briefer statements in which the main sense of what is said is rephrased in a few words. *Meaning categorisation* implies that the interview is coded into categories […]. *Narrative structuring* entails the temporal and social organization of a text to bring out its meaning. It focusses on the stories told during an interview and works out their structures and their plots. If there are no stories told spontaneously, a narrative analysis may attempt to create a coherent story out of the many happenings reported through-out an interview. *Meaning interpretation* goes beyond a structuring of the manifest meanings of a text to deeper and more or less speculative interpretations of the text.
>
> (Kvale, 1996, pp. 192–193)

In analysing the data, colour codes were used for similar themes, and all the common themes, called codes in qualitative literature, were tabled in an Excel Worksheet. The response of each participant for the same theme was entered in it. For ease in handling the data, three different worksheets were used for the three categories. To differentiate between the common themes and the analytical factors, 'codes' were used only for the analytical factors, while common themes were referred to as 'themes'. The themes define the data by categorising the text within an analytical framework of thematic ideas (G. Gibbs, 2009; Neuman, 1997). At the beginning of the analysis, the intention was to find patterns and themes common. Themes were used to establish data saturation, find gaps in the hypotheses, establish relationships with each other, and answer the research questions.

Initially, to identify and "bring themes to the surface from deep inside the data", *open coding* was performed to condense the mass of data into categories (Neuman, 1997). This helped identify common and emerging themes, and generate a list of all possible themes and patterns. In the next phase, of *axial coding*, the initial themes and patterns were organised to form sets or preliminary concepts to identify the axis of key concepts. The "causes and consequences, conditions and interactions, strategies and processes, and categories or concepts that cluster together" were found out to assess the possibility of breaking-down existing concepts into

sub-categories, combining closely related concepts to form general concepts or categories, and organising categories into a logical sequence based on context and relationship (Neuman, 1997, pp. 423–424). By the end of axial coding, the themes that can be dropped and examined in detail were known. The evidence for the consolidated themes or core themes was built around those. The 'codes' were compared with the 'themes' to assess ILP elements in practice, at *selective coding*.

Upon attaching all evidence, a narrative was developed for each hypothesis and research question. To derive themes relevant to the second research question (similarities in the practice and theory of ILP), the core themes that emerged during coding were compared with ILP elements (all models). In calculating the figures on the prevalence or absence of certain features in the MPS, the responses of Category Four participants were not used as they were mainly interviewed to understand the actual migration from COP to ILP, rather than understanding the common belief within the agency. However, the descriptive details they provided were used where relevant. Hence, for the purpose of calculations, the number of participants (*n*) was 45.

3.5 Research Validity and Reliability

Some aspects related to the validity, reliability, and integrity of this research have already been discussed, which will not be further repeated. Being a qualitative study, focused on one case study, this research accumulated a large amount of information on the case, reaching greater depth into the issues and factors (Neuman, 1997, p. 331), providing the required insights into the case to present a complex problem (Yin, 2009).

The research provides reliable knowledge that is "checked and controlled, undistorted by personal bias and prejudice" so as to provide objectivity in the conception of 'freedom from bias' (Kvale, 1996, p. 64). The research also affords 'intersubjective knowledge' (objectivity) as other research of the same phenomenon is expected to provide the same data. In valuing the third conception of objectivity, 'reflecting the nature of the object' researched (Kvale, 1996), the participants were allowed to speak adequately on the topic to obtain objective knowledge of the ILP practice and the interviews were concluded after giving each participant the opportunity to provide any objective information to the interview that was missed or un-questioned. In instances where the participants exceeded the time limit, the researcher did not stop or interrupt them and did his best to capture all issues, practices, and ideas.

Limiting the research to one case could be a concern for some, as generalisation of a phenomenon or problem to a single case could imply there exists little basis in the research (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Arguably, like scientific experiments, case studies can be "generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes" for analytic generalisation and not statistical generalisation to enumerate frequencies (Yin, 2009, p. 15). Case studies produce "context dependent-knowledge", which is vital to deliver expert opinions, which in turn creates generalised knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221). Hence, this research also contributes to ILP literature through a context-specific case study inquiry.

Though interpretive research usually does not specify formal hypotheses (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 53; Williamson et al., 2002, p. 32), hypothesis can be used (Grinnell & Unrau, 2011, p. 573; Neuman, 1997, p. 419). In this research, hypotheses were used to discover the meaning of the practice of ILP in a specific social context and to "comprehend or mentally grasp the operation of the social world, as well as get a feel for" (Neuman, 1997, p. 55) ILP interpretation in the MPS. The analytical factors and the hypotheses have guided: in developing the data collection tool (interview questionnaire), ensuring that important factors were not overlooked to identify interim constructs to be investigated, in developing a coding scheme, and facilitated in the interpretation of key aspects for ILP implementation. This approach accords Klein and Myers' (2001, p. 231) argument that every interpretive research needs to be "guided by (or at least informed by) one or more social theories". This approach is grounded on the epistemic feature of interpretivism (and also positivism) that sees all "research as constantly moving, evolving, changing, asking new questions, and pursuing leads. Current knowledge or research procedures are not 'set in stone' and settled. They involve continuous change and an openness to new ways of thinking and doing things" (Neuman, 1997, p. 84).

Yin (2009) argued that the credibility of qualitative research can be enhanced through a rigorous research design. This research satisfies that criteria. This research used different types of questions (introducing questions, follow-up questions, probing questions, specifying questions, direct questions, indirect questions, structuring questions, silence, and interpreting questions) where relevant to understand the phenomenon, clarify meaning, obtain disambiguation of statement made, and provide reliable points of departure for analysis (Kvale, 1996). Hence, the 'quality criteria' of Kvale (1996, p. 145), listed below, was used as a guideline:

- The extent of spontaneous, rich, specific, and relevant answers from the interviewee.

- The shorter the interviewer's questions and the longer the subject's answers, the better.

- The degree to which the interviewer follows up and clarifies the meanings of the relevant aspects of the answers.

- The ideal interview is to a large extent interpreted throughout the interview.

- The interviewer attempts to verify his or her interpretations of the subject's answers in the course of the interview.

- The interview is "self-communicating"—it is a story contained in itself that hardly requires much extra descriptions and explanations.

Each interviewee was assessed during the interview for the possibility of bias, and when required test questions were introduced such as repeating key question(s) to test the (dis)similarity in responses. Kvale argued that interviews can be explorative, and hypothesis testing and interviews are often applied in case studies. The purpose of an interview-based research can be to develop knowledge about one specific agency or individual, or "use the case study to illustrate more general phenomena" (Kvale, 1996, p. 98). Each interview question has been evaluated with respect to thematic and dynamic dimension, and each interview question would "contribute thematically to knowledge production and dynamically to promoting a good interview interaction", as prescribed by Kvale (1996, p. 129). The large number of participants selected for the research was to increase the accuracy of the research outcome as sampling size affects the accuracy of the results, and "larger samples generate more precise estimates and smaller samples generate less accurate estimates—regardless of the size of the larger population" (Morgan, 2008, p. 798).

The interviews recorded in Dhivehi were transcribed in Dhivehi and to reduce de-contextualisation, field notes were added. These were thoroughly checked before translating to English. Since transcribing and translation was done by the researcher himself, there is little possibility of fading away of the "lived meanings of the original conversation" (Kvale, 1996, p. 167). Positionality and its influence on the research was considered by the researcher at the very outset of the research. Reflexivity was followed throughout the research process, and the ethical clearance required from Macquarie University's Human Research Ethics Committee facilitated this at the very beginning of the research process, before commencing data collection. In the Participant Information and Consent Form (see Appendix F), it was specifically stated that the research was part of academic undertaking which was not associated with the researcher's position in the MPS. The MPS authorised this research on the condition

that the researcher provide findings to the agency upon completion of the degree. Hence, a set of recommendations for the MPS are put forth in the final chapter of the thesis, and a copy of the thesis will be provided to the MPS. Other aspects related to positionality have been covered earlier in this section and in the next section.

The researcher received the 'pre-read' information pack on NIM presented to the architects of SP2 from one of the participants. The 'pre-read' materials were given to the draftsmen of SP2 when they arrived at the Scottish Police College (SPC). The documents in that pack included Background of the virtual town Brookbank, Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland's (ACPOS) Scottish Strategic Assessment 2010/2011, ACPOS Scottish Business Assessment 2010/2011, Brookbank Divisional Strategic Assessment, Brookbank Divisional Tactical Assessment, Problem Profile (Anti-social Behaviour), Target Profile (of John Smith), Brookbank Divisional Control Strategy, Brookbank Intelligence Requirement (for current reporting period), materials for T&C meeting, and NIM presentation slides. There is chance of not getting this information pack by future researchers as according to him, that was the only pack they received. The researcher also received a copy of the presentation delivered to the MPS management by two UK experts on NIM from a police officer who was involved in organising the event, and this presentation was not preserved in the MPS.

The research paradigm accepts that every situation is unique, and every phenomenon has its own logic and intrinsic structure. Therefore, the research does not intend to claim universal generalisation of its findings. However, based on the similarities and differences of another situation with the researched environment, analytical generalisation will be possible. Analytical generalisation "involves a reasoned judgement about the extent to which the findings from one study can be used as guide to what might occur in another situation" (Kvale, 1996, p. 233).

3.6 Ethics

The "value of advancing knowledge against the value of non-interference in the lives of others" must be balanced in ethical research (Neuman, 1997, p. 445). Adhering to the Macquarie University Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2015) and the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007), prior voluntary consent was secured before interviewing, due attention and respect was given to each participant, and necessary measures were taken to secure the private details of the participants and the information they shared to

maintain source confidentiality. An application regarding the research was submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee, Macquarie University on 17 June 2016, which was approved on 10 August 2016 (see Appendix C). Upon conclusion of the field work, the Final Report was submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee on 29 August 2017, which has also been approved.

Even though the researcher intensely interacted with the participants to collect data, necessary care and effort was taken throughout the interview process to limit to the needs of the research. The participants could withdraw from the interview process at any time, and anyone who wanted a copy of their interview was provided with one at no cost to them. They were informed of the objective of the study at the initial contact. Their identification details were not used, except the tier they belonged to (e.g. deputy head of department or head of command without giving reference to the name of the department/command/directorate), rank, or job role (e.g. analyst, investigation officer, or intelligence manager), and voice recording was discarded after the completion of analysis for those participants who asked to do so. In the thesis, when direct quotes of participants are used, they are referred to using a predesigned alphanumeric code (beginning with the letter R and three digits, such as R001), rank, or position. In instances where their identity could be guessed, that alphanumeric is replaced with the rank or position.

Officers at certain departments or designations had unintentionally divulged restricted information, attributing information (to/of others) or operational details, and at such instances, that information was omitted. The MPS was not provided with any details regarding the number of participants, personally identifying information of the participants, and the information of the staff who opted to or not to participate in the study. The raw data (interview) was not shared with any other party, including the MPS, to maintain source confidentiality and anonymity.

3.7 Summary

This chapter provided the research methodologies and research design adopted to find answers for the research questions. It laid out the reasons for selecting different approaches and methods to establish the theoretical and epistemological view of the researcher. An analytic framework was adopted and hypotheses were formulated based on the theoretical and analytical framework. As a result, inductive and deductive reasoning were applied as the intent of the research was to explore a relatively under researched topic, in an un-researched context—

analysing ILP as perceived and practised in the Maldives (as the field of study) within the bounds of neo-institutional theory (a well-established social theory) by applying relatively new elements as factors of analysis. Data analysis, which "involves examining, sorting, categorizing, evaluating, comparing, synthesizing, and contemplating the coded data as well as reviewing the raw and recorded data" (Neuman, 1997, p. 427), was also discussed. Similarly, implications for validity and reliability of this research was also covered. Establishing validity "involves issues of truth and knowledge" (Kvale, 1996, p. 236). Attention was given to establishing a reliable research methodology that can be validated at all stages.

CHAPTER 4:
POLICING CONTEXT IN THE MALDIVES

This chapter describes the policing environment in the Maldives. The intent is to add relevant contextual information to the research questions to inform about the geographical and socio-political situation in the operational environment.

The chapter is developed in five sections. The first section focuses on the operational environment and appraises the challenges in the policing environment. The second section delves into the Maldives Police Service (MPS), providing a brief account of its history and an examination of its structure. The next section describes the development of police intelligence function. Since not much has been written about intelligence work in the Maldives, the descriptions provided by the participants (of this research) are used to portray the development of the intelligence function. The third section examines the national policies on policing, while the fourth section analyses the agency's strategic directions. These two sections—the third and fourth—explain the underlying philosophy behind the initial intent to adopt ILP in the Maldives. The concluding section summarises the key findings of the chapter.

4.1 Operating Environment

4.1.1 Geography and Society

The Maldives consists of 1,190 islands formed on 26 natural atolls, across the equator, in the Indian Ocean (Ministry of Defence and National Security, 2012). It spans across an area of 859,000 square kilometres in the Indian Ocean, of which the land mass is 300 square kilometres (Government of Maldives, 2010). The 26 natural atolls are arranged into 20 administrative atolls for administrative purposes (MPHE, 1998). In each atoll, one island is designated as the capital of the atoll. People live on 188 islands (President's Office, 2010, 2013a, 2014), while another 126 islands are leased as tourist resorts (Ministry of Tourism, 2017). The remaining are uninhabited, except for 34 islands allotted for industrial use (Government of Maldives, 2010).

The population of the Maldives is 407,600, including 63,637 expatriates (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017), and it has been visited by more than a million tourists annually since 2013

(Ministry of Tourism, 2016). Of the inhabited islands, 123 islands have fewer than 1,000 residents, of which 56 islands have fewer than 500 residents. There are 45 islands with a population ranging from 1,000 to 2,000. Other than the national capital Malé, there are only three islands with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants. Including Malé, only two islands have a population of more than 10,000 inhabitants. Over 38% of the population lives in Malé, which has a population density of 65,201 per square kilometre, making it one of the most densely populated cities in the world (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015a). Providing police services to all the islands has been challenging, due to which prioritisation was initially given to establish police stations in the atoll capitals and populous islands. Upon achieving this objective, in 2012, the MPS planned to establish a police station in every electoral constituency (MPS, 2013p, p. 28). By 2016, there were 103 police stations to serve the people living in the atolls (MPS, 2015d). The current government pledged to establish 'police outposts' in all islands with a population of more than 1,000 people by 2018 (PPM, 2013).

Unemployment is negligible according to government statistics (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015b). Yet, a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation (2012) identified unemployment as a key factor in driving youth into criminal gangs. It was estimated in 2012 that in Malé alone, there were 20 to 30 criminal gangs, with membership of some gangs as high as 400 (Asia Foundation, 2012). The *National Security Policy* of the Maldives also linked unemployment to increase in crime (President's Office, 2012). The Policy identified high levels of criminality as the foremost internal threat (President's Office, 2012). Drug related crimes, such as theft and gang violence, have been increasing, resulting in fear and insecurity in the society (MoF&T & UNDP, 2014). In May 2017, the MPS appealed to the public to report crimes without fear, following increased posting on online social networking sites of mugging incidents in daylight in Malé (Ahmed, 2017; Saeed, 2017).

The dispersal of the population across a large area and the smallness of the islands pose immense challenges to the inhabitants, society, and government in transport, health, and security. Similar social and physical infrastructure must be established in each island,[1] requiring a huge cost for providing and maintaining communal services—almost four to five times more than continental developing countries and many other island states (MPND, 2001, p. 14). The geographic layout and the disconnection of a large part of the population from Malé

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[1] Under the Constitution (article 123), the government has the obligation to provide public infrastructure, such as harbours, electricity, clean water, health centres, schools, administrative offices, police stations, etc., to the 123 islands with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants in the same way it would provide to the larger populations.

has made access to government institutions, including institutions in the criminal justice system, difficult and expensive (Knaul, 2013).

4.1.2 Politics and Legal Reform

Unlike most other former British colonies in the region, the Maldives did not inherit a modern legal or political system when it attained independence in 1965.[2] Instead, it attained political independence with its prevailing traditional systems and customs (President's Office, 2007). President Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom ruled the country for 30 years, inheriting an autocratic governance system from his predecessor in 1978. Gayyoom expanded the executive powers through constitutional changes implemented in 1998.[3] Under his rule, the country saw fast economic and social progress compared to its neighbours, albeit little progress was made in governance and the judicial process. Hence, the citizenry demanded democratic reforms in governance and judiciary (NDI, 2004). On 17 June 2001, a petition to establish political parties was submitted to the government (MDP, 2008; Zahir & Naseer, 2005). Though it was deliberated at a session of the *People's Majlis* (the unicameral parliament), permission to form political parties was denied (President's Office, 2006). Despite obstructions and political intimidations, public demand for reforms continued (NDI, 2004).

In response to civil unrest, and domestic and external pressure, in 2004 President Gayyoom eventually initiated a democratic reform process. He pledged to create a more representative political system, implement legal reforms, and increase transparency and responsiveness (Gayyoom, 2004). He also pledged to establish a civil policing body (as policing was previously a function of the military), reform governance and the judiciary, and assemble a *People's Special Majlis* or Special Constitutional Assembly to amend the Constitution (Gayyoom, 2004). In December 2004, the Maldives drew up a five-year action plan for the criminal justice system, the *National Criminal Justice Action Plan 2004–2008,* to reduce and prevent crimes and enhance public confidence in the legal and judicial system (Attorney

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[2] The Maldives became a British Protectorate in 1887.

[3] The Maldives adopted a new constitution on 1 January 1998 (popularly known as the 1997 Constitution as it was ratified in 1997). It made provisions for the president to appoint the cabinet, judges, and one-sixth of the Parliament. It vested the power of administering justice in the president and courts, subjecting the judiciary to executive control. As the highest authority in administering justice, the president was empowered to review High Court decisions. The president was made the supreme authority to propagate the tenets of Islam. President Gayyoom created a super powerful executive arm to rule with absolute power (for details, see NDI, 2004, pp. 7–8).

General's Office, 2004). It aimed to solve the need identified by Professor Paul Robinson in his study of the Maldives' criminal justice system:

> […] the Maldivian criminal justice system systematically fails to do justice and regularly does injustice, that the reforms needed are wide-ranging, and that without dramatic change the system and its public reputation are likely to deteriorate further (Robinson, 2004, p. 4).

It was after the first report of Robinson (2004), defendants were allowed to have legal representation during police investigation for the first time (Attorney General's Office & UNDP, 2015, p. 25). Subsequently, forming political parties and engaging in political activities was legalised on 2 June 2005 (President's Office, 2007), and liberal democratic changes were introduced. The most momentous change of the reform process was the adoption of a modern Constitution on 7 August 2008, which guaranteed democratic governance through the separation of powers among the three branches of government: Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary (Attorney General's Office, 2016). It ensured the independence of the courts and judges (Knaul, 2013), and facilitated evidence-based investigation by limiting the admissibility of confessional statements to those statements made in courts (Attorney General's Office & UNDP, 2015). Two months after the ratification of the Constitution, when the Maldives held its first multiparty election, Gayyoom lost to Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldivian Democratic Party (Knaul, 2013).

After the 2008 Presidential Election, political activism reduced briefly, until the 2009 Parliamentary Election. Since then, political chaos kept looming over the country, which led to a change of power in 2012 following the resignation of President Nasheed (CoNI, 2012). Even after fresh elections in 2013, the political situation has not stabilised, and many political opponents are being held in detention, including former presidents Gayyoom (in prison) and Nasheed (living in exile in the UK following a jail sentence), mostly on terrorism charges; at least 12 parliament members were facing trial at the time of writing. Owing to the increased pressure from the Commonwealth of Nations over corruption and the deteriorating human rights in the Maldives, on 13 October 2016 the Maldives left the 53-member organisation (Najar, 2016; President's Office, 2016a). In view of the degradation of democratic principles and rule of law in the Maldives, the European Union on 16 July 2018 adopted a framework for targeted sanctions (Council of the European Union, 2018).

4.2 Maldives Police Service

4.2.1 Inception

As pledged in the Presidential Address 2004, the MPS was created as a civil law enforcement body on 1 September 2004 under the Ministry of Home Affairs (President's Office, 2006). Until then, policing was carried out by *Police Headquarters*, a small unit under the National Security Service (NSS, now renamed as the Maldives National Defence Force—MNDF), which functioned under Ministry of Defence and National Security. The MPS was formed without constituting the necessary legal framework, which affected its administration (MPS, 2007a). Its parent body, the Ministry of Home Affairs, did not have jurisdiction over the regions (or atolls) outside Malé as the mandate of the Ministry was limited to Malé, and the Ministry of Atolls Administration was responsible for all matters related to atolls (under Article 6 of Law Number 4/68). The Atolls Minister consequently delegated the powers vested in the Ministry to the MPS to police the atolls (MPS, 2007a, p. 16). This process remained until the ratification of the Police Act on 5 August 2008.

The Police Act was enacted four years after the establishment of the MPS, to avoid a legal vacuum that would be created with the ratification of the new Constitution (on 7 August 2008). As a result, it lacked important aspects of policing such as powers, discretions, and intelligence work. These areas were later addressed through regulations that were made deriving powers from the Police Act. To overcome these issues and align policing to constitutional requirements and international best practices, a new police bill was submitted to the *People's Majlis* in 2012, which failed to pass (CHRI & MDN, 2015).

Adam Zahir, the first Commissioner of the MPS, led the agency from its inception until he retired on 18 November 2008, following the change of government (MPS, 2013j). When the MPS commenced with 400 personnel, without adequate infrastructure, there were numerous challenges for the police leadership (Brown & Brown, 2006; MPS, 2013p). It had to start many technical functions from scratch, and align itself to best practices in an environment where (indirect) accountability and political tension were high. There was a need to acquire technical equipment, vessels, vehicles, and infrastructure, and to train and professionalise officers. It also had to initiate a major recruitment drive to increase its strength to 2,000 officers by 2007 (Brown & Brown, 2006). Owing to the failure in recruiting educated people to the agency, the

qualifications required to be a police officer were lowered.[4]

4.2.2 *Centralisation*

Since its creation, the MPS became the principal law enforcement body of the Maldives. It is also one of the two Security Services recognised in the Constitution.[5] The primary responsibilities of the police, according to Article 244 of the Constitution are (Hussain, 2008, pp. 84–85):

(a) maintain public order and safety;

(b) protect and secure all people in the Maldives, and their property;

(c) investigate crime, conserve evidence and prepare cases for disposition by the courts; and

(d) uphold the law.

On 29 September 2004, Commissioner Zahir created an internal advisory committee called the Management Board, comprising department heads, to offer advice in enhancing service delivery (MPS, 2004, p. 1). Other committees were also created to streamline and administer the MPS, of which the notable committees were Technical Board (to advise the Commissioner on developmental changes), Scholarship Board (to nominate officers for various training opportunities), Welfare Board (to decide staff welfare support such as housing related issues and medical treatment), Disciplinary Board (to hear administrative offences against staff), Promotion Board (to award promotions, colours and ribbons), Training Evaluation Committee (to assess training standards), and Finance Committee (to advice on budgetary issues) (MPS, 2007a). With this setup and establishment of the Regional Police Department to oversee the management of the police stations in the atolls, i.e. outside Malé region (MPS, 2007a), all its decision-making authority was centralised in Malé.

Following the expansion of the force and increase in the number of senior officers, on 29 March 2007 the Management Board was renamed Executive Board (MPS, 2008a). The newly established Executive Board, comprising senior commissioned officers, was tasked the functions of the Management Board and Technical Board (MPS, 2008a). The Management

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[4] According to respondent R001, when the Commissioner took that decision, people were protesting on the streets at that very moment. Only 10 applicants met the criteria when the MPS put the recruitment ad twice for hiring 200 police officers. After repeated efforts, when qualified applications were not received, the Commissioner instructed to hire all the persons who had applied for the job, ignoring their qualifications.

[5] As per the Constitution (2008), the Security Services are the military (MNDF) and the police force (MPS).

Board was re-established on 10 November 2008 as a platform to update the leadership on the efforts and important activities addressed by the departments (MPS, 2009a). The Management Board and Executive Board were formalised in police regulations, and the *Police Employment Regulation* defined the roles of these two Boards. The difference in their roles is that the Executive Board's membership is held by executive officers (MPS, 2009c) and it assesses the realisation of the objectives set out in MPS strategic plans (MPS, 2012h). The responsibilities of the Management Board are (MPS, 2010c, p. 1):

- Advise the Commissioner of Police and Executive Board on organisational issues pertaining to police responsibilities and staffing,
- Propose recommendations to police regulations, commissioner's orders, force policies, procedures and force manuals,
- Propose recommendations for the development of the MPS and to enhance public confidence,
- Perform the activities to assess the performance of the MPS and identify issues that require to be resolved, and
- Perform other activities mandated to the Board through regulations and commissioner's orders.

The Commissioner's Order on the Executive Board (Number 1/2012) requires decisions of the Executive Board to be shared with the members of the Management Board before implementation, if that involved a change to a core policy of the MPS. Both these Boards are chaired by the commissioner. Members of the Executive Board are also members of the Management Board (MPS, 2010c). The responsibilities of the Executive Board are (MPS, 2012h, pp. 1–2):

- Advise the Commissioner of Police in setting strategic directives,
- Propose recommendations to police procedures (including policies), when amendments are required,
- Advice the Commissioner of Police in assessing the progress of the organisational objectives devised in the strategic plans and implementing activities required to realise those objectives, and
- Discharge the duties assigned to the board in police regulations.

For policing purposes, the country was divided into seven divisions, excluding Greater Malé

region.[6] The regional divisions were coordinated and administered under two command elements, namely, North Operations Command and South Operations Command (see Appendix K for the Organigram of 2016). The two command elements operate from Malé and report to the commissioner. Until May 2016, the regional divisions were managed under one command element (MPS, 2016b).

Therefore, the MPS maintained a centralised form of governance throughout, even at the time it practised community-oriented policing (COP), which required decentralisation (Bayley, 1994; Community Policing Consortium, 1994; COPS, 2014; Correia, 2000; Diamond & Weiss, 2009). To migrate from COP to intelligence-led policing (ILP), the MPS was not required to incorporate specific changes into its governance structure. Unlike COP, ILP required centralisation to create specialist teams (Hale et al., 2004, p. 303).

4.2.3   Formalisation

The Police Act gives the authority and responsibility to formulate and issue 'regulations' to the minister, while the commissioner can "formulate and implement the standards and policies necessary for the execution of the role of the police, and for the maintenance and advancement of standards of services rendered by the police" (Phairoosch, 2009, pp. 20–21). Out of the 17 regulations that must be issued pursuant to Article 17(c) of the Police Act, the only regulation relevant to operational policing was *Regulation on Police Powers and Discretions*. The Regulation, signed by the Minister on 2 November 2008, addressed procedural aspects on stop and search, arrest, searching premises and vessels, summoning, interviewing and interrogating, and evidence collection. In Article 49(a), it prescribes the threats or risks against which "intelligence" can be collected and analysed, which are: in the interest of national security, for protecting religious harmony, maintaining law and order, for safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the Maldives, for detecting criminal offences, for protecting the rights of individuals, and for protecting public health (MPS, 2008c). Though the Police Act does not stipulate anything specifically on intelligence, it authorises the MPS to "gather, compile, examine information necessary for performing the role of the police, and commence necessary action", in Article 6(13), while describing the responsibilities of the police (Phairoosch, 2009, p. 4). The Law prescribes no further details regarding the circumstances or measures in

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[6] Greater Malé Region, consisting of Malé Island, Hulhulé Island, Huhumalé Island, Vilimalé Island (fifth Ward of Malé), and Thilafushi Island falls within the jurisdiction of Malé City Police.

applying this power. Nevertheless, Article 13(a) limits the powers and discretions of the police within the boundary of the Constitution, laws, and regulations.

For tackling drug offences, the Drug Law (Number 17/2011) authorises the MPS to intercept telephone communications.[7] Article 153 of the Drug Law authorises the use of pseudo purchasers in covert drug operations; beyond that scope, no other law or regulation addresses informant handling. The Criminal Procedure Act (ratified in 2016) permits law enforcement officers to intercept communications and correspondences of individuals against whom an enforcement agency has evidence sufficient to believe they are involved in homicide, organised serious crime, terrorism, money-laundering and terrorism financing, human trafficking, and drug crimes. In that Article (Number 74), the Criminal Procedure Act uses the term 'surveillance' as a synonym for communication interception (wiretaps and postal communications), and requires the enforcing agency to provide the following details in the application for the court warrant: name and address of the person on whom "surveillance" will be conducted, suspected offence, evidence acquired about that offence, period for seeking "surveillance", and name with rank and service number of the law enforcement officer conducting the "surveillance". In defining the term "surveillance" in Article 213(o) of the Act, observation of people, their actions, intrusive surveillance techniques, and interception of telecommunication were encompassed, but the interception of correspondence (and written communication including email) was amiss in this definition. The Act established no oversight mechanism to restrict the misuse of powers, making it impossible to uncover chances of abuse. Another gap is the absence of legislative protection for privileged contents (such as medical, religious and legal defence, and journalistic conversations). The intelligence processes addressed in legislation were limited to these four legal instruments—Police Act, Regulation on Police Powers and Discretions, Drug Law, and Criminal Procedure Act.

The commissioner issued numerous orders prescribing procedures and processes for various policing activities. Most of these orders are related to general administration, such as allowances, fitness, requirements of probationary police officers, staff welfare, etc. The orders relevant to actual policing work were fewer. Most Departments and all police Divisions lack operational procedures or manuals. Only seven Departments had approved operational procedure manuals, of which the Police Communication Centre's (or Police Command Centre,

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[7] Article 148(c) of the Drug Law directs the MPS to enact a regulation that elaborates the procedures on communication interception. The MPS has not formulated a specific regulation to meet the requirements of that article.

as it is popularly known) manual was withdrawn for review. According to a Duty Officer (DO), it has been more than a year since that manual was withdrawn, and that decision was not formally communicated within the agency. The Centre is responsible for handling calls for service, dispatching teams to scenes, coordinating operational responses, and live monitoring of police security camera feeds. The DO, as the senior-most officer of the Centre, is a commissioned officer, with authority to make decisions relevant to mitigate or attend any problem reported to the MPS. Nevertheless, due to the lack of an operational procedure manual, often managers and other commissioned officers override the DO's decisions (R015; R053; R035).

The MPS is yet to adopt a manual on investigation. The MPS Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (SP3) recognised this weakness (MPS, 2014o, p. 30), and planned to resolve the problem by developing an investigation manual in 2014 (MPS, 2014g, p. 31). This issue was brought to the attention of the Criminal Court in 2015 in the case of *Mohamed Nazim vs State*, in which the defendant claimed that the MPS failed to follow its investigation manual. As the investigation manual was not endorsed by the MPS leadership (according to the prosecution), the Court ruled in favour of the State, stating that the (unapproved) manual was not required to be followed ("Mohamed Nazim vs State," 2015). At the appeal court (High Court), that point was again raised, but the appellant court's judgment did not provide a remedy for the issue ("Mohamed Nazim vs State," 2016). Following the brutal murder of a popular blogger, Yameen Rasheed on 23 April 2017, the press release issued by the President's Office stated that the government was reviewing "police operating procedure on investigating" such grave crimes (President's Office, 2017).[8]

4.2.4 Structural Differentiation

The functional and command structure of the MPS has undergone massive changes since its establishment. When the MPS was formed in 2004, there were a handful commissioned officers to lead the various sectors.[9] This limitation required the agency to be functionally arranged under few departments. As a result, the MPS consisted of 13 departments: Administration

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[8] The President's Office had the Press Release (No. 2017/03) in English and Dhivehi. In the English version, this information was retracted.

[9] By 31 December 2006, the number of commissioned officers at the MPS were 34 (Commissioner – 1, Senior Deputy Commissioner – 1, Deputy Commissioner – 1, Assistant Commissioners – 2, Superintendents – 1, Chief Inspectors – 3, Inspectors – 9, and Sub Inspectors – 14) (MPS, 2007a, p. 21).

Department, Capital Police (renamed later as Malé City Police), Criminal Investigation Department, Detention Department (renamed as Police Custodial Department), Forensic Support Department, Internal Intelligence Department, Internal Affairs Department, Law Enforcement Training Centre, Planning and Development Department, Public Affairs Department, Regional Police Department, Special Operations Department, and Technology Department (MPS, 2005, 2007a). The senior officers, including the deputy commissioners, were also responsible for specific departments, like other commissioned officers. Within four years of inception, the flat structure, comprising departments reporting directly to the commissioner, was changed due to the increase of staff, specialisation, and workload by creating two command structures—called 'Administrations' and 'Operations'— above the departments (MPS, 2009a, p. 6). This change resulted in a distinction in the powers and role of the senior commissioned officers as it segregated managerial and executive responsibilities.

Following the change of presidency in 2008, police leadership was also changed. The new Commissioner brought significant changes to the organigram in line with the new government's manifesto. Command elements were increased from two to five on 1 February 2009. The three new commands were the Specialist Crime Command (earlier called Criminal Investigation Department), the Ethical Standards Command (earlier known as Internal Affairs Department), and the Area Command. The 'Operations' command was renamed as Specialist Operations Command, while the 'Administrations' command was renamed as the Administrative Services Command (MPS, 2010a, pp. 5–10). The Area Command was responsible for divisional policing as well as enforcing law in Malé. Previously, divisional policing was performed under five policing regions (currently called divisions) aligned with the Seventh National Development Plan (NDP7).[10] The new government's *National Development Framework 2009–2013*, which replaced the NDP7, proposed to establish seven regions (President's Office, 2009a, p. 162). In the new setup, the Area Command was responsible for managing the seven regions as well as Greater Malé. The Drug Enforcement Unit, which functioned under the Criminal Investigation Department, was raised to the level of a department as narcotics was a priority for the new government (MPS, 2010a; President's Office, 2009a).

Following the appointment of three officers to the rank of deputy commissioner (second

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[10] The MPS had established five policing regions to align with NDP7 on 30 April 2007 (MPS, 2008b, p. 88). Greater Malé was excluded from the regions, and the Capital Police was responsible for enforcing law in the Greater Malé region.

senior-most police rank) in 2010, the MPS organigram was adjusted accordingly and three 'new' commands were created, one command for each deputy commissioner (MPS, 2011e). The previous 'command' structures were downplayed as 'directorates', managed by assistant commissioners or chief superintendents. With this change, the Police Command Centre was renamed *Operational Tasking and Coordination Centre* (MPS, 2011e, p. 12). The reduction of the number of deputy commissioners to one in 2012 again resulted in changes. With the latest changes, the *commands* and *directorates* were considered as structures of the same level— command elements, where 'command' was used to denote operational policing functions while 'directorate' was used for the support sectors (MPS, 2012g).

Table 4.1: **MPS Administrative Positions**

Level	Ranks / Positions
Executive Leadership (political appointees)	Commissioner of Police
	Deputy Commissioner of Police
Executives or Command Level Officers (Heads of Commands or Directorates, Deputy Heads of Commands or Directorates)	Assistant Commissioner of Police
	Chief Superintendent
	Acting Heads and Deputies of Commands/ Directorates are officers holding ranks of Superintendent and above.
Managers (Heads of Departments or Division Commanders, Deputy Heads of Departments or Deputy Division Commanders)	Superintendent of Police
	Chief Inspector of Police
	Acting Heads or Deputy Heads of Departments or Divisions are officers holding ranks of Inspector of Police and above.
Heads of Units (Supervisory Level 1) (Heads of Units or Atoll Commanders[11])	Inspector of Police
	Sub Inspector of Police
Supervisors (non-commissioned level) (Section In-charges, Police Station In-charges, Shift In-charges)	Police Chief Station Inspector
	Police Station Inspector
	Police Staff Sergeant
	Police Sergeant

Adapted from MPS (2015g).

From January 2011, the changes brought to the organisation structure were many. In March 2011, the Strategic Planning Unit (under the Commissioner's Directorate) was elevated to the level of a department (called Strategic Planning Department) and it was moved out of the Commissioner's Directorate. The units created within it were the Performance Audit Unit and the Legal Unit (MPS, 2012g). On 28 November 2011, the Strategic Planning Department was

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[11] Atoll Commanders are responsible for all the police stations in the atoll. Each division comprises more than one atoll.

lifted to command level and renamed as Strategic Planning Directorate (MPS, 2012g). Other changes brought to the support services were considered insignificant to this study, and the reason for highlighting the changes to the strategic planning function was due to their possible importance to sustain and promote ILP practices within the agency, following ILP adoption in January 2011. However, to appreciate the organisational changes brought to the agency since ILP was adopted, the organigram of the MPS by the end of 2010 and 2016 can be seen at Appendix L and K, respectively.

In the latest organigram, 'commands' and 'directorates' are led by executive officers or 'heads of commands or directorates' holding the ranks of Chief Superintendents or Assistant Commissioners. Departments are managed by 'heads of departments', while 'divisions' by 'division commanders'. These two entities are of the same level. Under departments, there are units, which are held by supervisors (called head of unit), mostly commissioned officers holding ranks inspectors or sub inspectors. Some of the larger units have 'sections' within it. 'Sections' and (duty) shifts are supervised by non-commissioned officers holding the ranks of sergeant and above (see the MPS rank structure in Appendix J). The categorisation of ranks and positions is listed above in Table 4.1.

As of 2016, the MPS organigram comprised 12 command elements (viz. Commands and Directorates), which managed thirty-two Departments and seven Divisions. Under these Departments, there were 102 Units and 103 regional police stations operating in the Divisions. There were another sixteen Units under the direct supervision of various command elements (MPS, 2016b).

4.3 Development of the Intelligence Function

Dedicated officers were assigned to collect information for the first time in the Maldives in 1999. Prior to that, officers were assigned for specific activities to "gather information for specific tasks, until the conclusion of that task" (R016). With the advent of religious extremism and the rising demand for the right to dissent in 1999,[12] four uniformed officers were assigned to collect information in plain clothes (R016; R029). They reported to the In-charge of Criminal

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[12] Until July 2004, dissidents were prosecuted as the old Penal Code inhibited the scope for dissent (President's Office, 2006, p. 9).

Investigation Division, and were designated as *administrative officers* working at the Administrative Section of the Division. They spent most of their time at places where people regularly gather, and generated reports daily based on what they saw and heard (R001; R002; R012; R015).

Following the submission of a petition to form political parties in 2001 and organised efforts to create space for dissent, the undercover collection was semi-formalised in the agency and additional manpower was allocated (R002; R029). As a result, the entire focus of the undercover officers was on politics—to monitor dissidents. The undercover officers worked as desk officers at the *Police Headquarters* in the morning, and collected information in the evening or night by spending long hours at places where people often spend their leisure time (such as cafés and parks) (R016; R029). In the morning, they "read newspapers and newsmagazines to find whether there was anything on politics" (R029).

Owing to increased political activism and to strategise for the 2003 Presidential Election, the first intelligence setup was created in the Maldives (R015; R029). The new setup was called *Omega* as the political leadership did not want to use the term 'intelligence' (R001; R002; R015). The initial task of *Omega* was to assess the support among the citizenry for President Gayyoom before the election and perform other tasks, such as monitoring dissidents and transcribing conversations that were important to the President (R015). It was more like a special project initiated to support President Gayyoom's election campaign. During this time, Islamic extremism was increasing on the one hand, while Christian missionaries were attempting to convert citizens to Christianity on the other. As a result, the mandate of *Omega* was expanded to monitor these three types of activities (R012; R016; R029; R081). Due to the need to have timely information on political activism, *Omega* was formalised in the organisation structure in 2003 as the Police Intelligence Division (PID) with proper office setups and resources (R015; R016). Special funds were allocated for the first time for information collection following this change (R002). Nevertheless, *Omega* remained on the PID's nameboard and other officers of the agency knew it by that name, even after this change. "Use of the term intelligence outside the perimeter of the section and use of it on documents sent to other sections was completely prohibited" by the executive leadership (R002).

As the primary responsibility of the PID was to monitor politicians and dissidents, it generated "political briefs" that provided information on "offences against the state" (R002). The in-charge of PID briefed the commissioner every day, and the commissioner reported to the

president twice a week (R002). Other than them, no other personnel had access to 'intelligence briefs'. The PID primarily depended on human sources (paid informants and surveillance officers) for information (R001; R012; R015; R016; R059). When the police was separated from the military in 2004, the PID was renamed as the Internal Intelligence Department. The term *internal* was used in its name "to reduce any possible opposition from the military and political sphere" as the military leadership was keen to relocate the intelligence function into the military at the time of the separation of the police from the military (R002).

In 2006, a major effort to restructure and professionalise the department took place. For this, an expert from Sri Lanka was brought to Malé and all the officers working in the intelligence department were explained the role of intelligence by this expert. After the training, separate desks were created to focus on various activities such as the "counter terrorism desk, criminal intelligence desk, political intelligence desk, records desk", and others (R012).

> It was a major transformation, from the way it was conducting its business. Till then, there was a surveillance team, technical section, and a records section. The method of operation of the department was like this: the surveillance team gets tasks; they generate a report after attending that task or monitoring the subject; that report will be collected in a safe-house by a staff of the records section; an investigation will commence based on that report; it will be investigated by the investigation team comprising of XX1 and XX2 [officers' names omitted]. Therefore, investigations were based on the reports produced by the surveillance team. The technical side (team) does a totally different type of work. They would run the website *** [name of site retracted] and did things like that. They also provided technical support to surveillance. R012.

The Sultan Park bomb blast on 29 September 2007 facilitated the intelligence department to engage with western intelligence and security agencies from countries such as the UK and the US. The manpower of the department was also increased, and Desks were elevated to Units. Despite these changes, the internal operation remained chaotic due to a lack of proper separation of responsibilities and procedures (R012; R015). The situation began to improve after the department was changed to a command level entity in 2012 (R053). With this change, the command was made responsible for covert policing to reduce recidivism and organised criminal activities (MPS, 2013h), and it was named *Intelligence and Covert Policing Command* (MPS, 2013h). In the next year, it was renamed as the *Directorate of Intelligence* (MPS, 2014f). The mandate of the Directorate was to prevent criminal offences, identify offenders involved

in organised crimes and recidivism, provide intelligence support to frontline officers and investigation officers, collect national security intelligence and determine counter measures for preventing or reducing threats, advise the commissioner, government and Executive Board, and develop the intelligence function of the MPS (MPS, 2014f, pp. 1149–1150). The structure of the Directorate is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: **Directorate of Intelligence.**
Adapted from MPS (2016b)

Though the Directorate was following an internal procedure, that procedure was not formally approved.[13] On 5 August 2012, the Executive Board approved the staff competency framework of the Directorate (MPS, 2013p, p. 35), following which it was able to recruit civilian staff. Under this new framework, civilians were recruited for the first time in 2013. Five non-uniformed members were employed and among these, two posts were dedicated to intelligence analysis, while the remaining three were support positions (MPS, 2014f, p. 1156). The MPS conducted its first 'Intelligence Foundation Course' on 3 May 2012 for a duration of three weeks (Atheef, 2012; MPS, 2013p, p. 32).

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[13] The Standard Operating Procedure of the MPS used by the National Integrity Commission does not even cover the intelligence function of the MPS (see MPS, 2014j). It is often believed that the knowledge of MPS operational procedures was limited mainly to its senior officers (Srivastava & Kotwal, 2011, p. 2).

Efforts were underway to provide actionable intelligence to divisions (or atolls) through the Divisional Intelligence Unit (MPS, 2016b, p. 321). For this purpose, intelligence coordinators were stationed in most of the populous islands. To strengthen the function, in 2012 an Intelligence Cell was established at Addu City,[14] in the southern-most region of the country. This was the first Intelligence Cell established outside Malé (MPS, 2014f, p. 1152). In November 2013, a second cell called Upper North Intelligence Cell was established in Kulhudhuffushi Island to cater to the needs of the Upper North Region, the northernmost region of the Maldives (MPS, 2014f). It was not clear whether the MPS established any new intelligence cells after 2013 as the annual reports of the MPS provide no such information.

4.4 National Policies on Policing

Policing was not a priority area in the national development framework until 2000. As a result, police presence (in the form of officers of the NSS) was mainly limited to Malé and a few larger islands.[15] In the *Sixth National Development Plan 2001–2005* (NDP6), the importance of expanding police services to all regions of the country was recognised (MPND, 2001, p. 103). The NDP6 envisaged the establishment of another NSS Centre in the north. It also proposed to "determine strategic locations to establish police and military presence" (MPND, 2001, p. 103). Though the term 'intelligence' was not in use in the police then, NDP6 proposed to "provide the necessary equipment, facilities and training for police to strengthen intelligence and investigation skills" (MPND, 2001, p. 103).

The NDP6 and the *Vision 2020 Statement* did not foresee a need to separate the policing function from the military. Even after the announcement of the decision to relocate the police as a civilian body to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 26 February 2004 (Gayyoom, 2004, p. 5), and the establishment of the MPS within six months, the change did not affect NDP6. The only concern relevant to policing was the exponential rise of drug crimes from 2000 to 2004 as the figure tripled during that period (MPND, 2006).

Through NDP7, the government planned to increase police responsiveness to the victims of

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[14] Even before this, an impromptu intelligence setup existed at Addu City.
[15] The first NSS centre established outside Malé region was in Gan Island (an industrial island where people do not live), Addu City, on 6 October 1993 (MPS, 2007a, p. 300). It was responsible for investigating offences and maintaining order in the atoll.

crime and develop the capacity of police investigators (MPND, 2007). Due to the increase of drug crimes and its damaging effects on the society, 'narcotics control' was emphasised in the plan, and policies and strategies were developed to counter the drug menace. In order to reduce the supply of drugs and control trafficking, not only was the importance of the capacity building of the MPS recognised, but also the need to expand surveillance and acquire new technologies were underlined (MPND, 2007, p. 153). Key strategic activities the MPS must espouse were (MPND, 2007, pp. 190–191, author emphasis):

- Adopt the MPS *Way Forward* framework.
- Strengthen information exchange between the police and public to allow better reporting of incidents, crime, and information.
- Strengthen information and intelligence systems to support *intelligence-led policing.*
- Set up, expand, and strengthen regional police stations strategically to increase accessibility to all the atolls and islands and improve the services provided.
- Introduce COP in the islands to manage community safety and fear of crime.
- Use evidence-based investigation methods solve crime.
- Develop and implement the *Maldives Police Service Policy, Orders, and Procedures Manual*.
- Develop and implement an effective governance framework to direct and control the policing functions to achieve corporate goals.
- Revise the MPS organisational framework to align it to the *contemporary model of policing* (i.e., COP).

The government also committed to the capacity development of the MPS in all areas, including the enactment of a police law and acquiring infrastructure and equipment for providing responsive service (MPND, 2007, p. 190). The NDP7 stated that the MPS will make a headway to ILP, though that assertion came without understanding the challenges in embracing the philosophy (R002). ILP was proposed by the MPS as a means of retaining the intelligence function at the time of separating from the NSS by linking 'intelligence' with 'policing'. Participant R002 provided a circumstantial summary about it:

> A huge rivalry erupted between police and MNDF [Maldives National Defence Force, which was earlier known as NSS] when the police was relocated from Defence Ministry to Home Ministry as a civil agency in 2004. That rivalry is still prevalent. Intelligence is a sector which was highly sought by the military. They wanted to be the agency

responsible for intelligence. If that had happened, then funding we get for intelligence work will be wholly diverted to them. In such a scenario, intelligence activities cannot be conducted with the budget codes allocated to the police. Therefore, it was important for the police to get acceptance of all levels on the need of intelligence in police work, and get their confidence and endorsement. This could only happen when policing and intelligence are connected. To convince a group of people who were unaware of policing theories, in a politically correct way, we had to show them a policing model that was in practice in modern democratic countries. Due to that, police wrote to the Planning Department [under Ministry of Planning and National Development] on the interest to implement intelligence-led policing, when they consulted to know the transformations police wanted to achieve. […] This produced result, as no one opposed to carrying out intelligence work.

Before the end of NDP7, the government changed in 2008 following elections. The new government replaced NDP7 with the *National Framework for Development 2009–2013*, based on its election manifesto. 'Prevention of narcotic abuse and trafficking' was one of the five key pledges of the new government. Hence, eliminating the illegal supply of drugs and other illicit substances emerged as a key goal, and monitoring suspects and their surveillance dominated in the 'intervention list' of the plan (President's Office, 2009a, pp. 104–113). To achieve this pledge, the mandate of drug intelligence and investigation was assigned to the Drug Enforcement Department (DED) (President's Office, 2009a, p. 108). As mentioned previously, it was due to this directive that the MPS elevated its Drug Enforcement Unit to a department (DED) in 2009. After this change, the Drug Intelligence Unit was also moved to the DED from the main intelligence department. The Unit was again relocated to the main intelligence component in December 2011 due to a failure to achieve results and allegations of corruption within it (R002; R015).

'Rule of Law and Justice' was another key area of concern for the new government, particularly due to the inadequate legal setup in addressing terrorism, maritime piracy and other maritime challenges, lack of professional expertise and technological infrastructure in the judicature, and the need to improve access to justice. As remedial measures for the sector, reforming law enforcement agencies and strengthening evidence-based investigation were itemised in the development framework (President's Office, 2009a, pp. 120–125). The strategies through which law enforcement agencies were to be "reformed to respond to the increase in criminal offences and address law and order situation" were (President's Office, 2009a, pp. 140–141):

- Promote and practise ILP as a means of detecting crime.

- Strengthen intelligence information sharing [across agencies].

- Reduce incidences of crime and anti-social behaviour, and pursue effective crime prevention and community safety outcomes.

- Develop a national crime prevention framework.

The new government of President Abdulla Yameen, which assumed office on 17 November 2013, is yet to publish its national development plan, like the previous governments. In the election manifesto of President Yameen, the Progressive Party of Maldives committed to (PPM, 2013, pp. 36–37):

- Establish a "world-class police academy" (as the substandard academy was torched in the riots of 8 February 2012),

- Ensure a safe environment for the community by:
  - o Enacting required laws and regulations,
  - o Police capacity-building,
  - o Rehabilitating criminal gang members and assisting their employment,
  - o Establishing "police outposts" on all islands with a population exceeding 1,000 people, and
  - o Increasing traffic police officers to ensure road safety.

- Remove all openings for drugs and illicit substance trafficking.

The pledges remained on paper and are far from practice. The MPS was waiting for a modern police academy, even though the Indian government had committed to fund an academy in 2011. The new Police Bill submitted to the *People's Majlis* in 2012 was not mentioned in President Yameen's Legislative Agenda from 2014 to 2018 (Attorney General's Office, 2014).

4.5 MPS Strategic Directions

In the Maldives, framing a strategic plan on policing is not a legal requirement as in the UK, South Africa, and other countries. In the UK, the Police Reform Act 2002 burdens the home secretary to develop a yearly national policing plan, while strategic planning is a constitutional responsibility in South Africa. Hence, there are no directions for the MPS leadership on how to develop a strategic plan. This gap, present in the Maldives policing environment, enables

the police leadership to develop long-term policing plans without consulting the public and stakeholders or political leadership.

Immediately after its inception, the MPS aspired to be "recognised as the leading law enforcement agency within the region" (Brown & Brown, 2006, p. 4). To realise this vision, it sourced international expertise in various areas of policing. Commissioned by the MPS, in February 2006, two officers from Western Australia Police (WAPol) assessed the MPS training programmes and future training needs (Brown & Brown, 2006). In the same year, it hired a retired senior Scottish Police officer to review the Capital Police Department, renamed as Malé City Police (Robertson, 2006). The next year, Derek G. Ingram, a retired officer from Scotland, submitted his review report on the Criminal Investigation Department (now elevated to Crime Investigation Command) on 31 January 2007 (Ingram, 2007; MPS, 2007a).

Based on the findings of the WAPol assessment, when the Commissioner of WAPol met the MPS Commissioner on 27 March 2006, WAPol committed to assist the MPS in transforming it into a "community based policing authority" (MPS & WAPol, 2006). Under a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 31 March 2006, two WAPol police officers—a superintendent and a senior sergeant—were assigned to work at the MPS. The Senior Sergeant worked at the training sector to develop the basic training programme, while the Superintendent worked with the executives in formulating the first strategic plan of the agency (MPS, 2007a). For managing the strategic planning function, the Strategic Focus Unit was created on 4 April 2007 (MPS, 2008a).[16] The WAPol Superintendent and four commissioned officers were assigned to the unit to devise and implement measures necessary for efficiency and responsive service delivery (MPS, 2008a).

4.5.1 Strategic Plan 2007–2011 (SP1)

SP1 was ingrained on COP as its policing philosophy. Hence, of its five priority areas, one area was 'community leadership' through which police-community relationships would be enhanced (MPS, 2007c, p. 9). Goals and desired outcomes of SP1 are shown in Table 4.2. To achieve the first goal, SP1 proposed to utilise problem-solving techniques and develop information and intelligence systems to facilitate ILP (MPS, 2007b, p. 5). Though SP1 did not

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[16] The name of this unit was changed a few times. When the SP2 was launched, the unit's name was Strategic Planning Unit (SPU).

describe the ILP framework or necessary setups to be adopted, it mandated the MPS to develop yearly 'business plans' throughout the life of it.

Table 4.2: **Goals and desired outcomes of SP1**

Goals	Desired Outcome
Reduce incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour and pursue effective crime prevention and community safety outcomes.	Lawful behaviour and community safety
Improve capacity in investigations and evidence gathering.	Offenders apprehended and dealt with in accordance with the law
Improve confidence in, and respect within and for, the police.	Professional and responsive services provided
Building organisational effectiveness and developing good governance within the police.	Good governance

Source: MPS (2007c, pp. 8–15)

In 2007, the MPS entered into an agreement with Global Justice Solutions, an Australian company specialising in criminal justice reform, to convert SP1 to an actionable plan (Srivastava & Kotwal, 2011, p. 19) as WAPol support was to end on 29 May 2007 (MPS, 2007c, p. 3). Global Justice Solutions worked with the Strategic Focus Unit and developed a collection of integrated projects, each project scoped on a primary policing function. Fifty-two projects were scoped in the Project Catalogue, and among these, Project Number 18 was *Intelligence Systems* (MPS, 2007c, p. 16). ILP was not listed in the Project Catalogue. Despite this, the participants of a 2011 study on the implementation of SP1 identified "opportunities to train police in an intelligence-led model" as one of the three most common responses when they were asked about the strengths of SP1 (Srivastava & Kotwal, 2011, p. 50). From the documents made available by the MPS, it was not clear whether any practical measures were taken to execute Project 18. The only document that mentioned it was the Progress Report of SP1 compiled in June 2008, and according to it, the project's execution had not commenced by then (MPS, 2008d, p. 14).

The Project Catalogue and SP1 were merged and published as the *Way Forward* of the MPS. In this new document, the yearly development of business plans was retracted and the timelines of the projects in the catalogue were extended up to 2011.

Following the change of government in 2008, a new assessment was commissioned in 2009 by the government to evaluate issues of management and corruption in the MPS. The study was conducted by experts from Britain, Sir Dan Crompton and Superintendent Gareth Wynne between 19 and 24 May 2009 (MPS, 2010a, p. 54). They realised that the MPS was a "very inexperienced Police Service" due to intensive recruitment to expand the work force to 3,000

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officers, and due to training limitations (Crompton & Wynne, 2009, p. 3). They also found that the agency lacked a mechanism to measure its performance despite overstress on service standards in its Service Charter published in 2009. Hence, they urged the MPS to urgently implement the draft *operational performance review* placed before the Management Board, and advised the leadership to set informed measurable targets for the agency to meet as the MPS had never set measurable targets against its agreed objectives. They expressed concern over the non-existence of a police authority or board (as in the UK) with representatives from the judiciary and independent elected members, to hold the Commissioner of Police accountable for the financial and operational performance of the agency. Another recommendation of theirs was to have an interlinked intelligence system upon learning that the Drug Intelligence Unit sits outside the (main) Intelligence Department, as the demarcation line between drug associated crimes and other crimes is blurred. Their report confirmed that ILP was not the policing model in practice in the Maldives, but COP. They proposed nine major recommendations and a number of additional suggestions. The report was deliberated at a cabinet session chaired by President Nasheed and a decision to adopt the recommendations proposed in it were taken on 13 November 2009 (President's Office, 2009b, p. 35).

In January 2010, the MPS developed its first yearly *Business Plan* in line with the (new) government's manifesto. It consisted of 14 goals and a series of strategies and performance targets. It had a special focus on gang crimes, violent crimes, and drug crimes. In the Home Minister's 'message' of the Plan, it was confirmed that SP1 was followed by the new police leadership and COP was the policing style in practice (MPS, 2010b, p. 1). Due to the type of crimes it focused on, utilising intelligence to prevent and investigate crimes was emphasised. To achieve each goal, strategies were offered. It associated ILP with the its fourth goal ("improve liveability"), and due to this association, the strategies of this goal are listed below (MPS, 2010b, pp. 13–18):

- Strategy 1: Increase police visibility;
- Strategy 2: Strengthen the functioning of existing crime prevention committees and establish new crime prevention committees;
- Strategy 3: Devise awareness programmes to targeted groups;
- Strategy 4: Enhance crime detection systems (crime mapping and hotspot policing);
- Strategy 5: Study effective and efficient crime prevention strategies; and
- Strategy 6: Reduce crimes committed by convicts under house-arrest.

As an 'activity' to achieve Strategy 4, implementing ILP by 1 June 2010, within a span of six months, was planned (MPS, 2010b, p. 16). Likewise, another 'activity' adopted to achieve Strategy 4 was establishing crime mapping and hotspot policing, confirming that crime maps were not used before 2010. An intent to increase intelligence-led operations was also stated under this Plan. Increasing the number of intelligence-led raids by 80% in counter narcotics was also among the activities of this strategy (MPS, 2010b, p. 7).

4.5.2 Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (SP2)

With the conclusion of SP1, the MPS adopted its second strategic plan. Unlike SP1, this plan was drawn for three years from 2011 to 2013. Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (SP2), developed with the technical assistance of Scottish Police, was launched on 30 December 2010 (Faseeh, 2010). The development and implementation of the plan is discussed in the next chapter. This approach was adopted because the first research question required a thorough analysis of the implementation of SP2, it being the cornerstone of ILP in the Maldives. SP2 intended to achieve four goals, which are elaborated below, in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: **Key features of SP2**

Strategic goal	Priority	Problems
Tackling crime	Very High	Violence, drugs and alcohol, and financial crime
	High	Extremism, human trafficking, and crimes against women and children
	Medium	Cybercrime and theft
	Low	Environmental crimes
Improve community safety and partnerships	Very High	Anti-social behaviour, Improve community confidence in police through partnership and prevention
	High	Road safety, and increased victim support
	Medium	Public order policing and maritime security
	Low	Delivery of policing to all islands
Achieve governance and management of highest standard	Very High	Enhance organisational learning and leadership capacity, Build high performance and ethical workforce
	High	Effective use and efficient management of resources
	Medium	Develop and implement health and safety policy / protocols
	Low	Review and implement strategies to retain qualified staff

Source: MPS (2010e)

To monitor and evaluate the implementation of the goals, it absorbed a quarterly assessment process and an 'end of year conference' (MPS, 2010b, p. 54), which is shown in figure 4.2. In March 2012, the MPS adopted a new set of *operational priorities*, implying that the first goal of SP2 (i.e., tackling crime) was amended to address the prevailing situation. The Operational Priorities for 2012 were: organised crimes, drug trafficking, violent crimes, counter-terrorism, and road safety (MPS, 2013p, p. 5). Similar to this, in 2013 also, a new set of *operational priorities* were adopted, which included drugs and alcohol, serious and violent crimes, theft and robbery, (security of) Presidential Election 2013, and terrorism (MPS, 2013m). The process of adopting these priorities will be discussed in Chapter Six. The MPS had not taken a structured exercise to achieve the activities listed in the evaluation process (Figure 4.2) of SP2. Consequently, the SP2 remained unaligned to its activities, and its Strategic Assessment remained unchanged since its publication till the development of a new strategic action plan in 2014.

Figure 4.2: **Monitoring & Evaluation Cycle of SP2.**
Source: MPS (2010e, p. 54)

4.5.3 Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (SP3)

The MPS is currently following Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (hereafter referred to as SP3). The 'Strategic Assessment' for the new plan was done through the contributions of 85 police

personnel in a three-day workshop (MPS, 2014o, p. 15). All the tiers of the management took part in the workshop. The concepts and ideas developed from the workshop were discussed at a special session of the Management Board for finalising the priority areas (MPS, 2014e, 2014o). In none of these discussions, intelligence forecasts were used, and reliance was more on subjective opinion and crime statistics (MPS, 2014o).

The SP3 assured the commitment of the MPS "for service excellence through new values and principles stressing on accountability, compassion, respect for rights, community engagement and fostering partnerships" (MPS, 2014o, p. 15). The five-year plan comprised short-term objectives set for a year, intermediate objectives for two to three years, and long-term objectives planned for the final two years. The plan identified four strategic priorities for policing: (i) strengthening internal governance, (ii) improved operational readiness and efficiency, (iii) effectively combatting crime, and (iv) active community engagement and partnerships. It confirmed the agency's commitment to practise ILP and required the MPS to publish a business plan every year.

Under the second Strategic Priority ('improved operational readiness and efficiency') of SP3, the intent to "develop intelligence systems and process" was stated (MPS, 2014o, p. 26). This intent was for practising proactive policing against organised crimes and national security threats. Through the 'intelligence systems and process', the MPS desired to generate intelligence for the tasking and coordination (T&C) process. The outcomes expected from this endeavour were (MPS, 2014o, p. 29):

- Increase rate of prevented, reduced and detected crime;
- Implementation of ILP;
- Predict crime and implement predictive policing models;
- Production of strategic intelligence assessments and other intelligence products;
- Analysis of *modus operandi* of groups and enterprises;
- Developing an assessment on the introduction of crime-stoppers;
- Establishment of an intelligence fusion centre;
- Expansion of lawful interception;
- Improved understanding of criminality and criminal behaviour;
- Increased seizures of illicit materials;
- Development of systems and procedures to facilitate intelligence;
- Blending ILP with POP;

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- Blending strategic intelligence with decision-making.

Following the requirement of SP3 (to develop yearly business plans), *Business Plan 2014* was published on 24 January 2014. The priorities for the year were: combat crime, secure Parliamentary Elections 2014, ensure organisational sustainability and development, and attain youth engagement and mobilisation (MPS, 2014g, p. 25). For achieving the first priority, one of the strategies adopted was continuing with the implementation of ILP. The various activities listed under this strategy are (MPS, 2014g, pp. 33–34):

1. Predict crime through predictive policing methods, blending ILP with POP;
2. Continue to generate periodic assessments, issue-based assessments and other intelligence products to blend strategic intelligence in decision-making;
3. Expand lawful interception capability;
4. Establish crime-stoppers; and
5. Strengthen the intelligence function through additional resources and technology.

It required the Executive Board to assess the implementation of the strategies bi-monthly, and guide and assist the project handlers to achieve the goals. From the agendas of the Board received from the MPS during data collection, it was clear that the MPS (or Executive Board) did not assess the implementation of SP3.

4.6 Summary

The MPS was established on 1 September 2004 by separating a 400-member law enforcement unit that operated within the military. This change was a product of a broader national reform programme initiated by President Gayyoom in response to public uprisings and international concerns. The MPS took drastic measures to enhance policing services despite a daunting challenge due to limited resources to cater to the needs of a geographically dispersed island population. By 2007, it developed its first long-term plan with the technical assistance of WAPol to enhance community responsiveness, ensure safer communities, provide equitable access to services, and contribute to national stability (MPS, 2007c). Despite its long paramilitary history, the MPS was quick to change from old traditions to a community focused approach. To overcome its skills shortage in formulating a developmental framework, it took the services of an Australian company, and a *Way Foreword* was created with more than 52

projects, each focusing on a key policing aspect. This document mixed COP and ILP to an extent that affected the MPS from adopting COP tenets, as policing philosophies were not well-known throughout the agency.

With the ratification of a new Constitution on 7 August 2008, the Maldives entered into a democratic transition. The previous framework of governance allowed the president unlimited powers, including the use of state machinery to control political opponents. In the Maldives, undercover officers were used for the first time in 1999 to identify dissidents, collect information about them, and establish that crime. In preparation for the 2003 Presidential Election, a semi-formal intelligence apparatus was established in the police to collect information on political activists and assess the support for President Gayyoom. After the election, due to growing political activism and religious extremism, the intelligence structure was formalised as the PID. As the sole intelligence apparatus in the country, the PID was responsible for national security intelligence as well as criminal intelligence. Nevertheless, its primary objective remained in monitoring dissidents and political figures. Though the intelligence function was formally established in 2003, it was in 2012 that a competency framework for its staff was applied. Under this framework, it could recruit civilians for support functions, including analysis. Since then, the intelligence function has been largely a political tool, without standard procedures and transparency. Due these practices, an 'intelligence culture', defined on principles, processes, and accountability, never existed in the Maldives. The gaps in legislations in streamlining the intelligence process further make it a grey area.

When the MPS was created on 1 September 2004, military and defence leadership pressured the government to allocate the intelligence function in the police (MPS) to the military (NSS). Consequently, police leadership had to convince the political leadership on the need to maintain an intelligence apparatus within the police. Police leadership found ILP as a suitable tool for this purpose. By linking intelligence with policing, through ILP, the MPS managed to keep its intelligence apparatus and special funds. Following the marketing of ILP as a strategy for legitimising police intelligence, NDP7 also recognised ILP as a 'policing strategy' (MPND, 2007, p. 190).

Following the adoption of a new national development framework in 2009 (by the new government), drug intelligence was moved from the intelligence department to the DED, and the unit responsible for drug investigations was elevated to a department (DED). This proved to be problematic as the demarcation line between drug offences and other crimes is thin

(Crompton & Wynne, 2009). Hence, the change failed to produce the expected result. Consequently, the unit was relocated back to the intelligence department in December 2011, eleven months after the MPS adopted ILP. The intelligence department was elevated to the command-level in 2012, with three departments, namely, Criminal Intelligence Department (responsible for criminal intelligence), Counter Terrorism Department (responsible for collecting and analysing information related to religious extremism and national security), and Intelligence Support Department (providing technical support to other sectors within the Directorate). The new command was entrusted with the additional responsibility of conducting covert policing to reduce recidivism and organised criminal activities.

The Police Act was enacted on 5 August 2008, two days before the ratification of the Constitution, to fill a legal vacuum that would be created following its ratification, authorises the minister to devise regulatory frameworks required for policing, while the commissioner is mandated to formulate and implement service standards, policies, and procedures. Despite the legal mandate, and more than fourteen years after inception, essential policies and operational procedures have not been formulated. Policies specific to ILP practice are absent, manuals on investigation and responding to crimes are still in the developing stage, and most of the departments and divisions operate without standard operational procedures. Owing to absence of external oversight, the MPS has not been directed to implement these manuals even after the issue was raised in the courts. Among the thirty-two departments and seven divisions, only seven departments had an approved operational procedure. Hence, formalisation within the MPS was weak, which provided leniency to leaders to change the protocols or procedures any time based on convenience and advantage.

All the departments and command elements, including divisional policing, are controlled and managed by senior officers based in Malé. It is not clear whether this setup "slows decision-making and removes discretion from lower level employees" as argued by Maguire (2003, p. 17). The advisory boards such as the Executive Board and the Management Board, established to support the commissioner in the decision-making process, are also based in Malé. The Executive Board, with its membership of executives or 'command heads', advise the commissioner in policy decisions, while the Management Board, comprising managers (Heads of Departments and Division Commanders), play a vital role in streamlining the internal processes of the MPS to enhance service delivery. Despite the authority contained in these two boards, none of the boards can influence a specific departmental or command entity to achieve specific objectives. In the next chapters, the extent to which they influence the T&C process

will be assessed. Soon after the implementation of ILP, the Police Command Centre was renamed as the *Operational Tasking and Coordination Centre*. This could be an effort to institutionalise the T&C process within an operational unit, as the unit has to some extent superseding powers to influence operational policing. Since the authority of the Centre was limited to reactive response, to matters reported to the Centre, it was not clear whether the Centre can have a positive impact on proactive policing and crime prevention. The absence of its operational procedures further casts doubts on the effectiveness of this name change. Clarity on these issues can be acquired in the analytical chapters, especially Chapter Seven.

The decision-making power in the MPS has always been concentrated in a small group. Centralisation of power was considered as a "popular method for achieving organizational control and internal accountability" (E. R. Maguire, 2003, p. 17). It is not clear how far internal accountability has been achieved in the MPS and the authority held by the senior officers due to certain practices within the agency, such as lack of procedures and protocols on *operational performance review*. The draft operational performance review submitted to the Management Board in 2009 has not been implemented.

There exists no board or authority to hold the police leadership accountable to financial and operational performance of the MPS. The loose governance structure has also enabled the president to appoint any number of deputy commissioners, and this provision has been exploited (to influence policing). When the number of political appointees (deputy commissioners) is increased or decreased, the organigram undergoes massive changes to share power and authority among them. No efforts were taken at any level to have a responsible leadership in the police. The draft Police Bill (2012), developed to address the numerous gaps in the current law, is left out of the government's legislative agenda.

The MPS used the term ILP for the first time in its first long-term plan, SP1. ILP was considered as an activity to achieve a specific strategy, listed under a strategic goal, even though the Plan aspired to mould the MPS towards COP. This creates a doubt whether the architects of SP1 were thorough with the basic tenets of ILP and fundamentals of intelligence work. The NDP7 also promoted ILP in that same context as in SP1, without realising the intent of the MPS in using ILP in SP1 was to obtain political and legal authorisation for its intelligence function by associating 'intelligence' with 'policing'. Hence, no effort was made to instil ILP in the MPS till the end of SP1. However, an effort was seen to inject proactive measures (such as crime mapping and hotspot identification) in 2010 in the pretext of ILP (MPS, 2010b). The second

strategic plan, SP2, developed in consultation with Scottish Police, recognised ILP as a business model or policing philosophy for the first time in the MPS. Since then, the MPS contends that it is practising ILP. *Business Plan 2014* addressed the need of generating intelligence for the T&C process, and the extent to which the T&C process takes place in the MPS needs to be examined. This could also mean that the MPS had no T&C process until 2014. Another important aspect seen in *Business Plan 2014* and SP3 was the emphasis on developing crime-stoppers. However, this goal of establishing crime-stoppers was limited to paper, as such a mechanism is not yet in place.

CHAPTER 5:
PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

This chapter addresses the first research question of this thesis: *How do members of the Maldives Police Service (MPS) perceive intelligence-led policing (ILP), and why do they perceive ILP in that form?* In the process of finding answers for this research question, the chapter also aims to validate the first hypothesis (H1): The adoption of ILP in the MPS was either coercive (figurative) or mimetic, but not due to a normative isomorphic approach towards the professionalisation of the force. As the intent here is not merely to test this hypothesis (which was grounded on neo-institutionalism), but also to examine the reason (the 'why factor') for their perception of ILP, both inductive and deductive reasoning were applied to deduce the perception within the MPS and explore the reason(s) for perceiving ILP in that form. Themes one to four (viz. misinterpretation of ILP, definition of intelligence, familiarity with ILP, and ILP in training curricula) are a result of inductive analysis to logically reach a conclusion, while Theme 5 (actual ILP implementation) is a product of deductive reasoning, based on hypothesis H1. However, common patterns observed from the data, relevant to Theme 5, are also presented in Theme 5.

Theme 1: (Mis)interpretation of ILP

As the research aimed to assess how members of the MPS perceived ILP, the first question of the Interview Guide (see Appendix D) served as the foundation for this purpose. Participants of this research were asked about the model or philosophy practised in the MPS, without narrowing to a particular model. While answering this question, some of the participants discussed their understanding of ILP, and where it was not described, a probe question was asked.

In defining ILP, some of the participants linked *intelligence* or *information* with policing. This loose interpretation did not confirm their familiarity with ILP theory or practice. Below are such loose definitions offered by an executive, a division commander, and a manager.

- Plan operations according to intelligence assessments, rather than depending on the information we get from the operations sector. R018.

- Collecting the information [held] at the ground level on a timely basis, and forwarding those information to the concerned departments on a daily basis or timely basis. R026.
- Introduce an intel-led process into the police. R017.

Many participants identified ILP as a process through which the intelligence sector operates the entire MPS. In their approach, they focused on operational policing, and quite surprisingly many of them were serving at managerial or command level positions. Their conceptual understanding of ILP focused on the intelligence sector, and not on the role of intelligence generated by that sector, as many of them did not recognise processing of data or information in abstracting intelligence. This gap will be examined in detail in the next theme. The quote below, by R016 encapsulates their view to some extent:

> Intelligence-led policing is primarily based on intelligence. If we want to implement intelligence-led policing, then we must recruit sources from outside. For example, we must infiltrate into groups or gang groups. We must be able to recruit [sources] from those groups. We must recruit from other areas too.

Another issue noticed in their effort to define ILP was their limited exposure to ILP. Many of them understood ILP as a mere support process to investigations, making it a reactive model, as seen in the below quoted text:

> Actually, when a crime is committed, the intelligence sector must operate alongside the investigations, at the same level. If that function is not taking place in such a manner, then how can we say this is intelligence-led policing? When the investigation officer is trying to solve the crime, the intelligence sector must be at par or one step ahead of the investigations. What is happening is, when something happens, the intelligence sector is trying to follow it up. They can never outreach through such an approach! So, that cannot be called intelligence-led policing. R030

The question that arises from this perception is how the intelligence function can meet the expectation, where intelligence personnel has to provide pre-crime reports or a post-crime reports with all the information required to establish the occurred offence. Intelligence work is primarily conceptualised around the intelligence process (Innes et al., 2005, p. 43; James, 2016) and tasking and coordination (T&C) processes (NCPE, 2005c, 2006b, 2007; OSCE, 2017). Furthermore, practising ILP does not permit blanket surveillance of the whole society (BJA, 2009; Bruce, 2018; Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013; OSCE, 2017). None of

the analytic techniques could yield the expected kind of pre-crime or post-crime report from the analytic profession (for description of the various analytic techniques, see Innes et al., 2005; NCIS, 2000; NPIA, 2008). The surveillance measures permitted in laws for preventive use allow passive information gathering, while active collection is warranted only against threats that may harm the state's security and independence (Bruce, 2018).

A majority of participants, predominantly from the first category (comprising commissioned officers), attempted to define ILP though they had no knowledge of it. Among them, only three admitted that they did not know the meaning of ILP. According to R031, "Everyone will know the name of the model. Nobody will know how the construct of intelligence-led policing functions." R034, R035, and R057 expressed a similar opinion. A number of participants were reluctant to define ILP due to unfamiliarity or fear of giving a wrong answer. In explaining the reason for the limited knowledge of the model, R011 said:

> I don't know its meaning. Because nobody taught us, and it's not even implemented here. I think it's finding offenders through intelligence and solving crimes with intelligence.

Since police culture limits the desire for organisational change, training and professional development programmes have been considered vital for the success of organisational transformations (Harrison et al., 2018). The MPS should have given a heed to this need. Without a first-hand exposure to the new policing model, the staff cannot contribute to its practise (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015, p. 344).

Only a few participants identified the proactive crime fighting aspect of ILP. Among them, two participants believed that ILP was not the model practised in the MPS, while the rest believed some elements of ILP were followed in the MPS. R029 had the impression that ILP involved using police statistics and figures in making decisions, while an executive was convinced that ILP was "a mechanism through which information at the frontline, from the investigation officers at the ground level, can be absorbed into the system" (R019). Based on the responses (to other questions) that illustrated the participants' familiarity to key concepts and elements of ILP, the probe question (regarding ILP) was not posed to four participants. Two of them were familiar with ILP through a diploma programme they had attended, conducted by the Scottish Police College (SPC) through a memorandum of understanding with the MPS signed in 2007 to provide career education to police officers (MPS, 2008a, p. 28). The remaining two participants had attended training sessions abroad that focused on ILP.

Based on these interpretations, it was clear that a vast majority of respondents were neither familiar with the theory nor practice of ILP. Their definitions and responses implied that they lacked an adequate understanding of ILP, at least to the extent required for them to perform their responsibilities according to ILP or the National Intelligence Model (NIM). However, interpreting the nuances behind their responses was not easy because a vast majority (from all categories) believed that the MPS was not practising ILP (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: **Participants' perception of the policing model in the MPS, in percentage.**

As shown above in Figure 5.1, 53.33% of the participants admitted that the policing philosophy in the MPS had not changed over the years and it was reactively responding to matters reported. In spite of the confirmations in MPS policy documents on ILP as its policing model (MPS, 2010e, 2014g, 2014o), only 8.89% of the participants were convinced that the policing model in place in the MPS was ILP. Among the participants from the second category (comprising intelligence personnel and investigating officers), it was the senior intelligence personnel who believed that the MPS was following ILP. Among the participants of category one, except for one participant, all the remaining viewed ILP as an intelligence-based form of policing that is distinct from other forms of knowledge-based policing such as community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP). This is a common issue found in ILP literature (for details, see Chapter Two).

Even though the majority were certain that ILP was not the policing model in the MPS, 56.52% from the first category were convinced that some components of ILP were practised in the MPS, though along with other forms of policing. From the second category, 41.67% expressed a similar viewpoint, while 20% from category three held the same opinion. A cumulative figure of 44.44% believed that the MPS was either practising ILP or some components of ILP with other forms of policing, including reactive policing.

Among all the responses, the most surprising disclosure was from an intelligence manager saying that the MPS was practising a mix of ILP and NIM, and according to this manager, ILP and NIM are different policing models underpinned on different theoretical frameworks. Though some theorists, including the architects of NIM, Roger Gaspar and Brian Flood (2009, pp. 53–54) argue NIM to be broader than ILP, as a "generalised police management framework" (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 29), the participant's interpretation cannot be considered accurate due to two reasons: (1) he referred to ILP as hotspot policing, and (2) he described NIM as a policing model based on the information provided by undercover police officers. R017 was the only participant who believed MPS was practising a mix of COP, POP, and ILP. R017 admitted that none of the elementary processes of any of those models were in place. A noteworthy explanation on the prevailing situation was offered by R024:

> I believe that in the Maldives Police Service what we have is a mixture. Sometimes, based on the circumstance, we focus on community policing. We say that, and work according to that model. Then, at other instances, upon the occurrence of incidents at the national scale or grave offences, we exploit intelligence and base our work on intelligence, saying that we are following the philosophy of intelligence-led policing. So, I would say, we follow different… For instance, when crimes, the so-called petty crimes, increase, we begin to practise the philosophy of community policing. Similarly, when planned, organised crimes are being committed, we begin to practise intelligence-led policing.

R056 and R023 opined that policing in the MPS was modelled on ILP, COP, and the traditional reactive style. While providing further insights into the policing model in the MPS, R023 told that MPS got diverted from its strategic direction shortly after embracing ILP. R023's view was given much attention as he belonged to the executive tier of the MPS. Their responses illustrate the unfamiliarity of the staff not only with ILP, but also COP, which was the previously practised policing philosophy. This must have had a restraining effect on policing in the Maldives.

Three participants from the first category were under the impression that proactively combatting crime was a different style of policing that has no role in ILP, though ILP literature stressed on this interlink (Bullock, 2013; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Clarke, 2006; NCPE, 2005c; Ratcliffe, 2008a; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012; Stockdale et al., 1999). This was an early misunderstanding identified in three British police agencies shortly after their migration to

NIM (M. Maguire & John, 2004). From the participants of this research, an executive felt the MPS was unable to practise ILP due to lack of other sector's confidence in the intelligence sector. Another executive, R018 noticed that though there was no specific model in practice in the MPS, in Malé, there was an effort to practise COP, and at the same time officers preferred to adopt ILP when they undertook tactical operations. R018's opinion was based on the emphasis on intelligence by the operational units in planning and executing tactical operations, instead of depending on information known to various operational officers through their experience. For R018, proactive policing was entirely different to ILP and, according to him, the MPS was practising ILP and proactive policing. R014 and R034 also held similar views as R018. Contradicting to some extent R018's views, R025 believed that ILP was practised in the divisions, though not in Malé. R025 was the only participant from the first category who said that ILP was the policing model in the MPS.

Hence, the staff of the MPS mistook intelligence-based operations to ILP, which had also been documented in earlier studies (New Zealand Police, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2005; Stockdale et al., 1999). Other aspects and details uncovered with respect to the policing model practised in the MPS will be discussed in themes three and four.

Theme 2: What intelligence is!

The difference between intelligence and information was included in the Interview Guide as a control question to assess the participants' familiarity with the role of intelligence in police work. While developing the data collection tool (at Stage 2 of the research plan), considering the findings of earlier studies elsewhere, conducted shortly after those agencies implemented ILP (such as M. Maguire & John, 2004; M. Maguire & John, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008a; Stockdale et al., 1999), similar issues were expected to be unearthed through this research. To serve that need and get the nuances in the participants' responses on ILP elements or definition, this control question was introduced. This question was typically asked at the end of the interview as the second-last question. While many participants understood the term intelligence, there were surprising definitions, especially from the command level officers who were expected to be familiar with the term. An executive defined intelligence as "information from a reliable source, such as a database" (R013), while another executive (R014), who clearly lacked the required knowledge, tried to define intelligence as:

Information can be considered as intelligence, in one sense. But I believe that information is transformed to intelligence when there are rings around it. That is how it changes to intelligence. When it is transformed, there will be a boundary around it, there will be limitations around it, and it will be slowly moulded in a distinct group of people. Information could come on public television. When we interact with each other, even in seminars, that cannot be called intelligence. That is information.

Many other executives provided similar or other inaccurate responses. R019 had the understanding that information originates from human sources, while R018 considered the specific information picked out of the information gathered from numerous sources as intelligence. Despite singling out undercover agents as the source of information, R019 was among the few who highlighted the need to analyse information to transform it to intelligence. R028 explained intelligence as the "information collected through hard labour". Among the executives only R023 was able to define the term, even though it also lacked the terms normally to be expected in a definition provided by an executive of a police force that practises ILP:

Information is data that we can understand. Intelligence, I would put as a picture drawn with information we wouldn't otherwise see.

Among the participants of Category One, few knew the difference between intelligence and information. Only six participants recognised the need to evaluate information or data to convert it to intelligence, while three participants from this category believed that information about an event or incident that had not yet taken place would amount to information. Surprisingly, R031 graded intelligence weaker than information as far as value was concerned, and for R031, information amounted to anything any person has said, that was recorded (with a device).

From the second category, most of the participants working in the intelligence sector were not adequately familiar with intelligence work. Below is the interpretation offered by an intelligence manager.

Information can be any kind of information. It changes to intelligence when the information has weight. For example, someone is arriving in the Maldives from abroad —this is information. But, when he arrives, if there are policing related things, or issues of our concern, then it is intelligence.

The definition could be considered accurate in one sense,[1] but given the responsibility of an intelligence manager to perform the role of a senior analyst and intelligence supervisor, the manager ought to have associated the evaluation of information in the interpretation. Here, the importance of analysis was altogether ignored, despite analysis being pivotal to ILP (C. Atkinson, 2017; Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2016).

Contrary to the responses of the senior intelligence personnel, the junior intelligence personnel recognised the importance of processing or analysing information in order to generate intelligence. The same cannot be said about the investigating officers who formed the rest of category two. All the investigation officers were not able to differentiate between information and intelligence, except one officer. Below is a response provided by an investigating officer, R061, to illustrate their limited knowledge on the subject.

> Those are entirely two different things. I knew information as something distributed by the intelligence sector. This is because we are not aware. Actually, information is something the investigation officer has to get. Intelligence is what must be gathered based on that information. It must corroborate the information we get. Intelligence explains the way an offence is committed based on the information collected by the investigation officer.

The third category also lacked the knowledge. There was only one participant in this category who could differentiate the two terms. Like the investigation officers, some of the participants of the third category had the view that intelligence work involved the use of covert means only. Below is a description to illustrate their limited exposure to intelligence work:

> Information is received on a daily basis. But intelligence must be collected through intrusive means. R076.

Figure 5.2 depicts the responses of all the categories in defining the term intelligence. While generating this figure, leniency was taken to accommodate any interpretation that identified a need to process the available information or subject information to an assessment process as an acceptable description of the term. This approach was taken as NIM defines intelligence as "information that has been subject to a defined evaluation and risk assessment process in order to assist with police decision making" (NCPE, 2005c, pp. 13, 196). Despite that leniency, the

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[1] This view is based on *Definition and Types of Crime Analysis* [White Paper 2014-02] (IACA, 2014).

percentage of participants who understood the term intelligence was as low as 31%.

Figure 5.2: **Participants' interpretation of intelligence.**

Similar to the findings of this research, a 2006 study in Western Australia Police (WAPol) found confusion in relation to intelligence and evidence at all levels of WAPol (Management Audit Unit, 2006, p. 48). It found the misunderstanding of intelligence was exacerbated by inadequate training and absence of force protocols for targeted collection and intelligence direction. Hence, for an intelligence function to be effective, "its component parts need to be trained to a professional level", the study deduced (Management Audit Unit, 2006, p. 42), so that all staff can contribute to effective and efficient policing services. Decision-makers need to have knowledge of how to apply intelligence in planning and decision-making, while tactical commanders need to have an understanding of what they can do to improve the effectiveness of their strategies and activities (Management Audit Unit, 2006).

In the literature on intelligence, disagreement on what intelligence is, is often raised by academics (Alach, 2011; Dintino & Martens, 1983; Harfield & Harfield, 2008b; Marrin, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008a, pp. 92–93). Police agencies, on the other hand, have adopted definitions based on their need and context. For example, NIM guidance material explains the processes through which intelligence is produced so that the British police forces have a clear understanding of it along with a definition of the term (NCPE, 2005c, p. 13), while the US Department of Justice defined it for American agencies (see BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2004, 2009; Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013, p. 46; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003, p. 6). The *US Code of Federal Regulations: 28 CFR 23.3(b)(3)* describes intelligence (IACP, 2002, p. 13). Likewise, Australian law enforcement agencies have defined the term within their respective agencies (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, 2013).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2006, 2010, 2011a) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2017) have defined intelligence for national police agencies.

Based on this observation and due to the variations and narrowness in the participants' definitions, an effort was made to determine whether ILP or intelligence was defined in any of the MPS policies, plans, laws and regulations, commissioner's orders, manuals, and training curricula. The *Way Forward*, which comprised the MPS Strategic Plan 2007–2011 (SP1) and Project Catalogue (of 52 developmental projects proposed till 2011) identified ILP as the central approach of the MPS (MPS, 2007c), without defining the term. It aimed to "implement various proactive programs to address existing crime and anti-social behaviour issues and trends" by utilising "problem-solving techniques, including the development of information and intelligence systems that will support effective intelligence led policing" (MPS, 2007c, p. 8). In the Project Catalogue, 'Intelligence Systems' was scoped as a project for capacity building. SP1 (included in the *Way Forward* and published as a separate document) did not define it. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (SP2), Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (SP3), and Business Plan 2014 confirmed the policing philosophy in the MPS as ILP. Nonetheless, no document or manual described the ILP processes or defined key terms such as intelligence, Intelligence Cycle (IC), and ILP. The *Policy on Surveillance and Interception* defined Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS), direct surveillance, and intrusive surveillance, but not intelligence and information (MPS, 2013q). The findings of training curricula are discussed in the fourth theme.

As seen in the response of R076 (above), some of the participants pointed to collection of information for the intelligence function through covert approaches either in their interpretation of ILP, intelligence, or in describing the intelligence process. The participants provided a glimpse into the circumstances for such interpretations. Being one of the two Security Services recognised in the Constitution has resulted in the MPS working closely with foreign security and intelligence agencies to counter the growing threat of Islamic extremism (R001; R002; R012; R032; R052). These counterparts are foreign intelligence agencies or national security agencies (R002; R032; R052). According to R052, their approaches are "totally different" to law enforcement intelligence processes. In police, "the intelligence sector is the body that collects information for the entire police force, analyses those information, and provides interpretation to the entire force. Law enforcement intelligence is not just involved in managing undercover agents or collecting information through them by intrusive methods and undercover

operations." The police intelligence function must analyse hotspots and identify crime trends by filtering the information existing in the police such as reported crimes and incidents. R052 believed that the MPS had not adopted those kinds of practices because almost all the training opportunities, except two, that the MPS received from its foreign network did not explain to the participants such approaches. As a result, the MPS has "mostly learned the functions of national security intelligence". R052's response was based on his experience at the intelligence sector of the MPS and the training received overseas, especially in NIM. In the efforts taken to cross-verify this, it was found that no police officer had attended an intelligence training in 2010, when ILP was initiated. However, in 2011, the MPS got few opportunities from other countries and all the programmes were facilitated by the national security agencies of those countries (MPS, 2011e). The MPS annual reports listed no training programme on intelligence analysis offered by friendly countries, in any of the years from 2010 to 2015, albeit a handful tradecraft courses (on surveillance and monitoring) were listed in those reports.

Theme 3: Education and Awareness – Inadequate

This theme is a continuation of the first theme. As identified in that theme, a lack of awareness of ILP was expected to slow down the efforts to sustain the practice of ILP in the Maldives. Considering this challenge and the need to point to the 'why' aspect of the research question explored in this chapter, it was decided to explore this factor as a distinct theme. This examination is also related to the third research question of the thesis: 'What are the factors that facilitate or impede the development and effectiveness of ILP in policing in the Maldives?'

A vast majority (75.56%) of the participants admitted that they lacked sufficient knowledge of ILP or the intelligence processes for them to perform their responsibilities. The majority of them were working in sectors other than the intelligence sector. From the second category, 41.67% said they knew as much as they were required to know about ILP, while 86.96% of the participants from Category One agreed that they lacked that knowledge. For a breakdown of the figures, see Figure 5.3.

Except for one participant, everyone else revealed that ILP was not communicated agency-wide. However, 35.56% believed that a few sessions were organised to make officers aware of ILP theory and practice. They had heard about such sessions, though most of them (82.22%) did not attend a session on ILP or intelligence work as they were not invited. Among

the participants of Category One, 78.26% did not attend an information session on ILP or NIM, and 75% from category two said the same. None from the third category attended a session where ILP, NIM, or intelligence work was explained. Consequently, they not only lacked the necessary knowledge about ILP to perform their responsibilities, but also about ILP and the intelligence process.

Figure 5.3: **Extent of participants' knowledge of ILP to perform their responsibilities.**

The participants said that the rest of the staff of the MPS would be like them, unexposed to the concepts of ILP. To put in figures, over 91% of the participants believed that other police officers would not have knowledge of ILP, and over 77% were convinced that MPS executives would also lack the required knowledge of ILP (see Table 5.1 for a breakdown of the figures).

Table 5.1: **Knowledge of ILP within staff, in percentages**

	Category 1			Category 2			Category 3			All Categories		
	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA
Most officers are familiar with ILP	86.96	8.7	4.35	100	0.00	0	90	10	0	91.11	6.67	2.22
Executives are familiar with ILP	91.3	0	8.7	66.67	16.67	16.67	60	20	20	77.78	8.89	13.33

Note: NA = Not aware and no answer.

Though 22.22% of the participants felt they were familiar with ILP to a sufficient extent for them to apply the model in their job roles, the actual situation appears to be worse than depicted through this figure. One of the participants, an intelligence manager, who was under the impression that he had sufficient knowledge about ILP, was not able to differentiate between ILP and NIM. R030, who felt he knew ILP as much he must know, was also not able to define ILP. Likewise R060, despite believing in having adequate knowledge of ILP, could not point out the difference between information and intelligence. A division commander, who believed

that the MPS was practising ILP, though not in its entirety, said that he learnt ILP through self-learning. This division commander's description of the policing style in the MPS was:

> Even though the model is not followed in its entirety, a large portion of the philosophy is in practice. Earlier I worked at the investigations, for a long time, and worked very closely with the intelligence sector as the investigations and intelligence sectors keep a close working relationship. But now, when I am working at the atolls, I feel that the accuracy of the information and the dependency on it for conducting operations is much more in the atolls. These operations are mostly successful and considering this outcome, I believe that intelligence-led policing is the model in practice.

The response of R027 encapsulates the majority of the participants who admitted about their lack of knowledge of ILP or NIM:

> I do not believe that I know the important aspects of intelligence-led policing. Because, to inform that, from the junior-most level to the senior level, no effort had been taken. I did not participate in such a programme. But, when it was introduced, during that time, information about it was shared with some of the staff. As a result, I have no knowledge about the main components of it. Similarly, I don't think our leaders also know much about it.

According to the leading officers involved in imparting ILP knowledge to the agency, it did not reach all the officers as none from the executive leadership took responsibility for the process (this issue will be elucidated in Chapter Seven), and the lead member of the team that developed SP2 was transferred to a division soon after the publication of the Plan (R017; R032), affecting ILP and SP2 implementation. R035 described the information session he attended:

> In 2011, one day, I took part in a meeting. It was a meeting to inform us about the functions of the intelligence department. In that, while explaining the functions of that department, we were told that the intelligence department follows intelligence-led policing. I haven't heard of that at any other forum.

Participant R033, who was involved in the awareness programmes, described the extent of the process:

> We just failed to make it aware down the line. Though we took sessions for three to four departments in Malé, we could not take sessions for the whole organisation.

Initially, we planned to visit the islands, and educate them as the operational results of the regional police were low. We could not do that.

It is apparent that ILP and the newly adopted business process were not communicated throughout the agency. Expecting revision of the training curriculum based on the change in the policing doctrine, force training materials were analysed. This examination was important as an audit of the Institute for Security and Law Enforcement Studies (ISLES), the training sector of the MPS, conducted by the University of Western Sydney in 2014 stated that the MPS was practising COP (UWS, 2014). The findings are provided in the theme below.

Theme 4: Training shortcomings

The training syllabus was among the materials the MPS gave access to for this research. The Police Basic Course (which must be completed to become a police officer) was revised in 2006 to include COP tenets with the guidance of Western Australia Police (WAPol), when the MPS decided to change from traditional reactive policing to COP (MPS, 2007a, p. 17; 2008b, pp. 29, 45).[2] The training syllabus was not altered to include ILP tenets in 2010 or 2011 following the decision to adopt ILP. However, training syllabus was amended in October 2012 for attaining national accreditation from 'Certificate Level II' to 'Certificate Level IV' (ISLES, 2012).[3] With this change, ILP was included in the curriculum for the first time (ISLES, 2012, p. 81). ILP was included under the subject of 'community-oriented policing'. The trainees were expected to "make a crime profile on the type of crimes that occur" in a specific zone as the learning outcome (ISLES, 2012, p. 84). Hence, the MPS did not recognise ILP as a policing model, but rather as a COP tactic or strategy against crime. When the course was revised again in 2014 (to reduce the duration of the course from four to three months), ILP was included under the subject of 'Community Policing Theories'. One indoor period was allocated to the unit, and unlike other subjects or units, the learning outcomes for this subject was not specified (ISLES, 2014). According to R022, working at the ISLES, COP was the underlying philosophy on which all MPS training materials were structured. As expected, intelligence work was taught

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[2] The first training batch trained under the revised curriculum, based on COP, and graduated in 2007. Until then, ten batches of trainees were trained under the previous curriculum, based on traditional reactive policing (MPS, 2008b, p. 45).

[3] Prior to this, from 2007 onwards, the Police Basic Course was recognised in the national accreditation scheme as a *Certificate Level II* course (Police Academy, 2007).

at "a very basic level" to the participants of the Police Basic Course, confirmed a managerial level officer of ISLES.

The detective course, originally designed in 2007 in an effort to move from confession-based investigation to evidence-based investigation (MPS, 2008a, 2008b),[4] emphasised the use of proactive methods, by using intelligence in criminal investigations (Ingram, 2007). It identified sources of "instigation in proactive investigations" as crime pattern analysis, crime incident analysis, target profile analysis, operational intelligence assessment, problem profiles, and tactical profiles (Ingram, 2007, p. 32). The training manual not only lacked a definition of intelligence but also the 'sources for proactive investigation', and often used the term intelligence as a synonym for information. The extent to which 'intelligence' was explained to the participants of various courses was a grey area in the training materials as descriptions were lacking. ISLES would officially request the intelligence sector to take classes on intelligence work in the in-house training courses that had such a component/module (R016; R022; R052; R053).

R052 revealed that when he asked the participants of the courses he lectured for a definition of intelligence, most of the participants would say "spying". Like R052, R053 had been actively involved in imparting knowledge on intelligence work, and his interpretation of intelligence deserves attention:

> As far as I understand, intelligence is what we get before the occurrence of an incident, to make a decision about it. But information is what we learn after an incident. For example, the information we get about a drug shipment before it gets trafficked in is intelligence. But after it has been trafficked in, after it has been sold out, how it was sold, is information.

From this definition, it is apparent that R053 lacked familiarity with the fundamentals of intelligence, due to which he had been imparting erroneous information to new recruits and investigation officers. Since the MPS lacks a structured component on intelligence work in any of its training curricula for police officers,[5] the educator imparts what s/he *thinks* is an appropriate description. Even in intelligence curriculum design, Walsh (2017, p. 1007, original emphasis) argues that "what educators *think* at that time is the appropriate learning content,

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[4] The first detective course (called Initial Detective Course) was conducted from June to July 2007 with twenty-one police officers (MPS, 2008a, pp. 140–141).
[5] The only exception is the Intelligence Foundation Course, designed for (new) intelligence personnel.

rather than based on empirical reasoning about what the work place may really require".

Executive R014 believed ILP was not included in the training curricula (for any training programme). An Intelligence Manager believed that the "instructors do not have that much knowledge about ILP" to impart the knowledge to the participants of various training programmes. As a result, it was not taught to police officers in the Police Basic Course (R051). R053 also expressed a similar opinion, saying that ILP was not explained to the participants of any training programmes though the role of intelligence was, to some extent, taught in some training programmes.

From the interactions with the draftsmen of SP2, it was confirmed that an intention to educate all the MPS personnel in ILP and SP2 was there, but which failed for various reasons. Among these, the reasons relevant to this theme are: lack of a plan to conduct awareness, lack of executive support to the awareness programme (R001; R012; R017; R032; R033), and exclusion of the two senior-most draftsmen of SP2 in the team constituted to create awareness (R017; R032; R033). According to R017, the task of informing SP2 and ILP throughout the MPS was assigned to the four to five officers working in the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU). The sectors, in which these officers had no acquaintances could not be influenced, and education sessions did not take place in departments such as the Human Resource Department and ISLES. As a result, ILP could not be incorporated into the training curricula. The SPU hence failed to add ILP and the intelligence process in "the refresher courses such as supervisory level management, Atoll Commanders [Course], and courses that were conducted for the head of department level" (R017). As a consequence of this failure on the part of the SPU, all personnel could not be educated on ILP, due to which they also failed to comprehend the objectives of SP2.

A common theme that emerged from a study of the intelligence frameworks in the 'Five Eyes' (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and US) was the importance attached with personnel training requirements and how their implementation would assist in improving results (Walsh, 2015). Recognising the importance of training and professional development, the New Zealand Police's intelligence framework specifically mentioned about providing professional development pathways to officers (Walsh, 2015, p. 133).

MPS Annual Reports 2010 and 2011 provide no details on any efforts taken to educate on ILP or NIM. Annual Report 2010 mentioned the unveiling of SP2 on 30 December 2010 (MPS, 2011e, p. 2), but beyond that there was no other description, including the change of policing

philosophy. The Foreword of Annual Report 2011 stated that efforts were made to achieve the objectives of SP2, and for that purpose, the MPS had changed its organigram to arrange all the departments and divisions under nine Directorates (MPS, 2012g, p. 2). The report briefly mentioned a visit of two officers, a Chief Inspector and a Principal Analyst, from Scottish Police Service to familiarise MPS officers with NIM, who met with the MPS Commissioner on 20 June 2011 (MPS, 2012g, pp. 105–106). The report provided no additional information about the activities they conducted to make officers aware of NIM. R017 recalled a one-day workshop organised for the senior officers (including the executives) to inform them about SP2 and the intelligence process, taught by foreign experts. As some other participants had such a vague recollection (R012; R016; R019; R023; R024; R025; R028; R029; R051; R052; R055), it seems only one educational session was convened for the management level on NIM or ILP, which was conducted by these two experts in June 2011 (MPS, 2012g). A copy of the presentation delivered by the Scottish experts was obtained by the researcher. The business process explained in it is shown in Figure 5.4, and the learning outcomes expected through it were:

- How and why policing priorities are established;
- The contribution of the senior officers in setting operational policing priorities;
- To inform the impact of operational priorities on daily workload;
- Explain the delivery mechanisms established to drive operational priorities and its impact on resource allocation;
- Importance of prioritising finite resources;
- Role of budgets on the delivery of operational priorities and the role of business assessments and horizon scanning in that process; and
- Different performance regimes for monitoring policing performance and how these link with the priority setting process.

The Scottish experts emphasised the importance of finding senior officers responsible for each 'strategic goal' of SP2, both at the organisational level as well as in the divisions. From their presentation, it appears that they assisted the attendees in identifying the specific officer responsible for each strategic goal, through syndicate exercises. Guidance was also given to produce a 'tactical assessment' fortnightly or monthly and 'problem profiles' as commissioned by the chair of the Tasking and Coordination Group (T&CG) or intelligence manager in response to 'hot intelligence'. They suggested to nominate the senior-most officer as the chair

of the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG) and explained how an assistant commissioner handles that responsibility in Scottish Police Service. The National Briefing Model of the UK was also described to the attendees as an effective method to deliver briefing and debriefing.

Figure 5.4: **The Overall Business Process of NIM.**
Note: PIE = Prevention, Intelligence and Enforcement (options of the Tactical Menu)

Following the change of commissionership on 8 February 2012, the new commissioner did not give any importance to educate officers on ILP or NIM as he believed that the officers would have the required knowledge by then (R002). The new commissioner believed that executives and most of the managerial level officers would be familiar with modern policing, including ILP, as most of them had attended training programmes conducted by reputed foreign law enforcement agencies (R002). When he assumed office, both investigations and intelligence sectors were lagging far behind the crime environment. Hence, he assigned an executive who was exposed to the field of intelligence to the Intelligence Department, elevated that department to the level of a command (now known as the Directorate of Intelligence), assigned resources to it (R002; MPS, 2014f, pp. 1149–1151), and instructed the newly appointed Head of Directorate of Intelligence to develop the command and design the intelligence system as prescribed in NIM (MPS, 2013o, p. 14), so he could focus on developing the investigations sector (R002). He wanted serious and organised criminal networks to be tackled through a proactive approach, and that purpose was served by a newly formed Covert Policing Unit in

the Directorate of Intelligence, which reported directly to the Head of Directorate (R002; MPS, 2013p, p. 21).

Theme 5: ILP Implementation

Owing to the facts that came to light during the problem identification stage of the thesis, it is imperative to explore the actual implementation of ILP. Furthermore, such an account will provide empirical knowledge for other agencies aspiring to practise ILP. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this was the primary reason to interview retired officers directly involved in the process. The majority of this section is developed on the insights provided by them and the three draftsmen of SP2. This section is considered vital to verify hypothesis H1.

Over 13% of the participants believed that the MPS had adopted ILP due to the efforts of a handful of officers from the managerial or supervisory level at the Intelligence Department in 2010. Some of the participants believed that the initiators for this change did not get the support of the executives in the actual implementation, though they got a *go-ahead* approval. Other reasons given by the participants include: imitating other police agencies (R001; R020), close relations with the UK (R017; R033), as an alternative to overcome the failure to practise COP (R016; R058), combatting increasing organised and sophisticated crimes (R013; R018; R019; R024), and effectiveness of ILP in policing (R021; R023; R028). Sophistication of crimes was witnessed in the Maldives in 2010 and 2011 (MPS, 2011g). The reason behind adopting ILP was not a question initially planned to ask all participants. As a result, it was not put to all the participants, as the intention was to depict the transformation of the MPS from COP to an ILP practising agency by consulting the architects who were involved in the change. Their description is summarised below.

With SP1 approaching its end (by March 2011), the MPS had to develop a new strategic vision. For this endeavour, a three-member team comprising a Chief Inspector, Inspector and Sergeant were sent to Scottish Police College (SPC) (R001; R017; R032; R033). Since none of the members of the team had the operational experience (required for such a task), a member of the team requested the police leadership to include a fourth member to fill that knowledge gap and to make the document agreeable to all the staff. This proposal was rejected, as the leadership did not find it meaningful (R001; R033). The leadership expected the team to study the processes in Scotland and "develop something appropriate for the Maldivian context",

which did not require senior officers or operational officers to be sent to the UK (R001). Through the new plan, the leadership wanted to tackle the growing gang crimes and violence (R001; R032). The criminal environment worsened in 2009 and 2010 (HRCM, 2009; MPS, 2011f; People's Majlis, 2011, pp. 4–6). The tipping point for the leadership was when criminal gangs began to target tourist resorts (R001), which is the main driver of the Maldives' economy (MED, 2013). When the team departed to Scotland to formulate the future direction of the agency, except for this message, no other direction was given to them (R001; R032; R033).

The team left for Scotland in June 2010 to develop a new strategic plan, and worked with SPC for about 10 days in developing a new plan (R033). The SPC officers described to the team the concepts of NIM and provided them with copies of the teaching aids used at SPC. The 'pre-read' pack given to them included a background of the virtual town Brookbank, Association of Chief Police Officers of Scotland's (ACPOS) Strategic Assessment 2010/2011, ACPOS Business Assessment 2010/2011, Brookbank Divisional Strategic Assessment, Brookbank Divisional Tactical Assessment, Problem Profile (Anti-social Behaviour), Target Profile (of John Smith), Brookbank Divisional Control Strategy, and Brookbank Intelligence Requirement (for the current reporting period), and materials for T&C Meetings. A presentation on NIM was delivered to them by SPC.[6]

Based on the suggestions of the Scottish police officers, the team recognised the benefits of applying NIM as the business model in the MPS and proposed it to the leadership (R017; R032; R033). Until then, except for one member, none in the team knew anything about ILP, and whatever he learnt was through his undergraduate studies (R033). When the team proposed the adoption of NIM, the MPS leadership instantly approved it because the UK was considered to have the world's "number one" police force (R001). This decision to adopt ILP was not discussed at any level, including the political leadership, Executive Board, and Management Board, because the police leadership did not find it relevant to discuss the change of policing philosophy (R001).

The team, with the assistance of the Scottish facilitators, drafted a new plan without any executive inputs (R017; R032; R033). As the only source they referred to was crime statistics, the outcome of that process was crime-related matters (R017). Though NIM was explained by SPC, the draftsmen said that theoretical aspects such as control strategy were not explained to

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[6] With the pre-read file pack, a copy of the presentation's slides was also received by the researcher from one of the participants.

them in detail. However, from the 'pre-read' materials the only inference that can be drawn is that all relevant concepts about NIM were explained to them, but they could not grasp all of it in the short time they spent at the College. Following the directions of the Scottish facilitators, the team initially assessed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats through a SWOT analysis and scanned the MPS through a PESTELO (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal and Organisational) analysis (R017; R032; R033). They emailed a copy of the draft to the police leadership, to which they received no feedback (R017; R033). They returned to the Maldives with a draft of the new plan on 29 June 2010.[7] The draft was discussed by the Executive Board and endorsed, with a few minor changes made to the order in which crimes were prioritised (R017; R033). From a set of mission and vision statements provided by the team, the Executive Board adopted one after chiselling it to fit the agency. R017 detailed this process and the problems that occurred due to this approach:

> I must say that it was actually a team of managerial level, too junior to formulate an executive vision. To be specific: a vision and mission. That was the most impractical thing for us. We developed the plan of action, derived the activities under the plan of action, and created the timeline for the activities. Based on this document, the Executive Board decided the mission and vision [statements]. I consider this inappropriate because it was in the reverse direction. For instance, we develop a plan of action to achieve a vision and mission. But, what happened was, because we were such a junior team, and low-ranking team to draw such a plan, we had to formulate a plan of action for the issues identified at the consultation process. We also formulated the timeline and strategies to deliver the plan and sent that to Malé. Despite all these, a vision and mission could not be decided. After our arrival, we offered several vision and mission [statements] to the executives for them to decide, and they chose from those. As a result, there are strategies in the plan of action that are unrelated to the vision and mission [statement]. If it is scanned in-depth, those strategies can be noticed. Therefore, when the plan was developed by a junior team that cannot make the decisions of the executive level's vision and mission, there are unaligned things in it.

It is difficult to categorise the approach taken to develop SP2 in any specific type of strategic planning. In a literature review conducted by Allaire and Firsirotu (1990), five strategic

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[7] R033 was able to recall the date as it was the day the entire cabinet of President Nasheed resigned *en masse* citing Parliament's obstruction to performing the executive branch's responsibilities.

planning modes were identified: leader-driven, culture-driven, line-driven, staff-driven, and numbers-driven. They concluded that the first three modes are "appropriate and functional", while the staff-driven and line-driven planning proved to be "unstable and inefficient under any circumstances", resulting in "disappointment and frustration with strategic planning" (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1990, p. 104). Of these modes, the approach taken by the MPS is closer to staff-driven, as the team did not receive any comments or feedback for the drafts they emailed to the executives. Furthermore, the champions of the change and the transformers of that change did not understand it aptly to manoeuvre that change. As mentioned earlier, only 8.89% of the participants felt the executives had any know-how of ILP.

All the draftsmen believed they had performed a PESTELO and SWOT analysis and described those in the final edition of SP2. When they were asked about the reason for the absence of the 'organisational' dimension in the description of the PESTELO analysis in SP2, two of them assumed it to be a mistake on their part while copying write-ups through the various drafts, while the third member said the executive leadership had asked the team to drop it, and therefore, it was deliberately omitted. NIM requires using a PESTELO analysis to assess risks for the Strategic Assessment, and PESTELO issues for each crime and disorder problem to be examined at the planning phase (NCPE, 2005c). Though the strategic plan and Strategic Assessment are distinct documents, the emphasis of a PESTELO analysis by the Scottish facilitators must have been due to the significance attached to it in NIM in developing Strategic Assessments,[8] which must also be developed along with the strategic plan. The control strategy on prevention, intelligence, and enforcement priorities must be based on the two documents (NCPE, 2005c, 2007). The SP2 was situated on this theoretical requirement as its 'Strategic Assessment' was undertaken through a PESTELO analysis of the policing environment (MPS, 2010e, p. 6). Despite using a PESTELO analysis in SP2 in explaining the approach taken to develop the plan, the 'organisational' element was amiss in the plan. The plan mentioned nothing about a SWOT analysis in any of its sections.

From the planning stage to the implementation of SP2, the executive leadership failed to understand the enormousness and complexity of changing to a totally new policing philosophy, as it had happened earlier with the COP implementation (for details, see Chapter Four), due to

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[8] In the Presentation delivered by SPC to the team, two slides were devoted to 'business planning', and in these the developing a 'strategic assessment' and control strategy were emphasised. In developing the Strategic Assessment, five key 'issues' that must be addressed were: (1) accurate picture of the business, (2) what is actually happening on the ground, (3) the nature and extent of the problems, (4) the trends, and (5) where the main threat lies.

their unfamiliarity with ILP. As a result, the adoption of ILP was considered as a strategy to strengthen its intelligence department. Hence, the responsibility of implementing ILP was delegated to the Intelligence Department, and none of the departments that had overall responsibility for the entire agency was tasked with a role in the implementation of ILP (R001). While describing the implementation of SP2, a draftsman said:

> Implementation of the plan was carried out not by referring to the exact activities proposed in the plan. Though we said, we were practising an intelligence-led model, but… I think it was limited to official activities. […] People got really stuck with the intelligence word of it, and they didn't know led. That includes the senior leadership too. If we talk in textbook terms, it is policing led intelligence. Isn't it? It wasn't intelligence-led policing. It was understood in such a context. Because of that, community engagement [goals] weren't understood. This is not a complete departure of community engagement and bringing a very covert form of policing. They did not understand that intelligence-led policing is actually a very community context policing. That could be one part. The second part is, maybe intelligence-led policing was piecemeal to the Maldives at that time. Intelligence-led policing as a model was very new, as was being developed. So, there wasn't anything for us to look also to implement it in a transition country like ours.

Hence, the import of ILP from the UK to the Maldives took place without sufficient understanding of organisational issues prevailing in the MPS or the Maldives. Such circumstances have been noticed earlier (for a discussion on the export of policing strategies, see McCulloch & Martin, 2013). Pino and Wiatrowski (2006, p. 8) argued that such 'export' of policing strategies and "forms of police training offered by the developed world are currently not appropriate to export to other countries", as it usually fails to adequately address key issues faced by transitional or developing countries such as the provision of security, trust of the citizenry, community engagement, development of the agency, agency's integrity, and similar issues. The developed world often does not take into account the local context existing in such countries and attempts to introduce "one-size-fits-all strategies" (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006, p. 8). Brogden (2004) discovered the challenges in practising COP in the Global South when it was imported from the Global North with the same foci without translating it to the local structures and needs. McCulloch and Martin (2013, p. 111) assert that "Export policing programs are often found to be culturally inappropriate and unworkable when transplanted to their destination societies".

Though most of the participants were aware that ILP was embedded in some of the strategic plans, there were a handful, serving at key positions, who had a direct bearing with the intelligence function but did not realise that ILP was incorporated in any policy documents. Among them were a manager, an executive, and an intelligence supervisor.

According to R017 and R023, ILP was introduced in the Maldives at a time when there were more pressing issues for the MPS and the nation to resolve. R023 referred to these problems as "problems on the streets" and provided no elaboration. Based on the response provided by R023 and other participants, it appears that those 'problems' were crime problems created by criminal gangs. R019 believed that "NIM was a tool" adopted by the intelligence department to counter gang crime. The enactment of laws specific to gangs in 2010 and 2011 also point towards this direction.[9] However, R017 provided new insights, and labelled the problem as issues related to "political polarisation" due to hard-line approaches taken by the new government. No other participant raised this issue. R017 further explained:

> Some of the officers had to leave the place, some were asked to wait at home, and some were transferred. Amidst this, there took place incidents that would make a public official, or public security official, or police officer lose job security. When I said, 'staff related' or 'welfare related', I meant deductions in salary or reduction of salary, and the disentitlement of a certain group of officers to medical expenses, and the ineligibility of certain medical expenses based on circumstances. Some of the officers who had been living here [in police accommodation] as their home lost that support, and a loss of belongingness was seen on their faces. These problems demoralised and demotivated the staff. […] These problems did not occur all of a sudden. These were due to the changes introduced by the administration, governing the Maldives at that time, and the failure of the police leadership to resist or filter those changes. Thus, many people who were loyal to the agency left it. Owing to such problems, the ground was not ready, people were not ready, context was not ready. The agency was not ready for such a change. There was no foundation to implement this change process.

The documentary materials received from the MPS provided no support for the views of R017. It is widely known that a reduction of salary for public servants, including police personnel,

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[9] On 3 August 2010, the Maldives enacted *Anti-Social Behaviour Act* (Law Number 11/2010), while two other laws were enacted on 5 September 2010, namely *Act on Prohibiting Threatening and Possession of Dangerous Weapons and Sharp Objects* (Law Number 17/2010) and *Law on Prohibition of Gang Related Crimes* (Law Number 18/2010).

was implemented in 2009 by the government (MoF&T, 2009). Another matter noticed was the deployment of a large number of troops (more than 700 police officers) from various departments to Addu City for the security of the 17th SAARC Summit held in November 2011 (MPS, 2012g). The only support for R017's assertion, though indirect, was the withholding of 257 police officers' salary in 2010 (MPS, 2011e, p. 452) and 480 police officers' salary in 2011 (MPS, 2012g, pp. 1095-1096). The Annual Reports of the MPS provided no details for this action.

Summary

The aim of this chapter was to examine how members of the MPS perceived ILP and evaluate the first hypothesis of the thesis (H1). It was found that most of the officers did not understand ILP to an extent they can practise and apply the concepts of the model in their work. Their perception of ILP was ingrained in collecting information through covert activities to support investigations and tactical operations. Hence, for them, ILP was all about supporting the investigation (of crimes that have been committed) or conducting intelligence-led operations. The failure of the agency to communicate the intelligence process and elements of ILP agency-wide in a planned manner affected their perception of the model.

The officers of the MPS regarded ILP as an operational policing strategy. Even with this narrow understanding, 53.33% of the participants of this research felt that the MPS was responding to crimes and incidents reported to it by following the traditional reactive style of policing. The remaining were under the impression that the MPS was practising certain components of COP, POP, and NIM along with ILP. Though it was only one participant who said that the MPS was practising ILP and NIM, and explained the two as two different models of policing, the participant being an intelligence manager illustrates the extent to which the terms are nebulous within the MPS. Four main factors appear to have contributed to such an understanding of the theory of ILP in the MPS. First, an agency-wide effort was not initiated to make all the officers aware of the intelligence process, ILP, and information uptake before or after the implementation of ILP. A handful number of sessions, motivated by junior officers assigned to the strategic planning sector, were conducted for the officers assigned to the departments based in Malé. Other than these sessions, two Scottish experts convened a session for the management level to make them understand the business process in NIM. Considering the limited

knowledge of the participants of that session on ILP theory, and there being over 135 different standards of NIM for the implementing agency to comply with (NCPE, 2005c), it proved inadequate for the purpose of ingraining NIM in the MPS management framework. The sessions could not make everyone appreciate the proactive response to crime in ILP, or understand the emphasis laid on using problem-solving strategies in crime prevention in NIM (NCPE, 2005c). A vast majority of the officers were, therefore, unschooled in NIM or ILP, making them unequipped to perform their roles to sustain ILP in the MPS. Over three-quarters of the participants admitted to this weakness inherent in them due to unfamiliarity with ILP, and over 91% of them were convinced that other staff also lacked the necessary knowledge in ILP and the intelligence process. Over 77% felt that the executives of the MPS lacked practical knowledge of ILP, impeding its application.

Second, the training curriculum misinterpreted ILP as a COP strategy, when the MPS revised Police Basic Course in 2012 for the first time since 2007. Hence, the agency understood ILP as an operational policing strategy to tackle organised crime. With this revision, the importance of recognising the difference between information and intelligence was not realised, unlike in many other police agencies. ILP was neither defined in the new curriculum, nor were its elements identified. Even in the latest revision of the training curriculum of the Police Basic Course, emended in 2014, the interpretation of ILP was not changed. In the revised curriculum, ILP was included within the 'subject' of 'Community Policing Theories'. Unlike the other modules and subjects, the curriculum did not specify the learning outcomes for ILP. Hence, this misinterpretation of ILP is promoted in the MPS, contradicting the theory underpinned in its strategic plans SP2 and SP3. The detective course recognises the need to use intelligence in proactive criminal investigations, albeit the training manual did not differentiate between information and intelligence, and both the terms were used interchangeably. Matters are getting worse in the MPS as some of the training instructors impart erroneous information on intelligence or ILP because they are unfamiliar with the fundamentals of intelligence (products, process, function, and systems). The lack of an interpretation of intelligence in any formal documents of the MPS further added to the confusion throughout the agency on what intelligence is. Consequently, more than half the participants failed to recognise evaluation or processing of information in abstracting intelligence.

Third, the MPS leadership lacked the required knowledge of ILP or NIM when they decided to implement NIM in the MPS in 2010. The approval to adopt NIM was based on the fact that NIM was the policing model in the UK. The leadership considered UK as the world's number

one in policing. As a result, they failed not only to analyse their nation's as well as the agency's readiness to adopt such an enormous change, but also to plan and prepare the agency for the change. For them, ILP adoption appeared to be introducing certain changes into the Intelligence Department. As a result, all their emphasis was on the Intelligence Department. Due to the misjudgement regarding the complexity of the implementation process, ILP implementation was not a priority for them compared to other impending problems, such as planning for the security of the 17th SAARC Summit, for which over one quarter of the force was deployed to the southern-most of region of the country. Hence, the lead member of the team that developed SP2 (who was at the SPU then) was transferred to a division.

Fourth, the team that developed SP2, which is the bedrock of ILP in the MPS, was uninformed about the features of ILP and standards of NIM. Though the SPC tried to inform them all about the essential components of NIM, the draftsmen were not able to assimilate all the information within the ten days they spent at SPC. As a result, they did not realise the importance of thoroughly analysing the organisational dimension in their Strategic Assessment. Though they were certain that a PESTELO analysis was conducted for the Strategic Assessment, the 'organisational dimension' was missing. Had the organisational dimension been accurately analysed, they would have been able to appreciate the readiness of the agency and the nation to such a change, and advise the police leadership accordingly. It is possible they could not perceive the full breadth and length of all the issues in the operational environment due to their junior ranks and limited experience in operational policing.

The above findings confirm that the MPS leadership interpreted ILP as operating the MPS by its intelligence sector by collecting information covertly and disseminating those for tactical operations or supporting investigations (evidence gathering). The hypothesis (H1) has been established: in a mimetic adoption of ILP, the MPS copied a model it considered successful in the UK in response to the uncertainties in its operational environment. This type of neo-institutionalism has been witnessed in other agencies, especially in the adoption of COP in the Global South (for a discussion, see Brogden, 2004; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005).

CHAPTER 6:
SIMILARITIES IN PRACTICE AND RHETORIC

This chapter analyses the second research question: *To what extent are the existing crime control practices within the Maldives Police Service (MPS) consistent with intelligence-led policing (ILP)*? It will also address the second (H2), third (H3) and fifth (H5) hypotheses of the thesis (reiterated below), which are relevant to this research question. Owing to the relevance of H5 to the previous chapter too, the hypothesis is partially assessed in this chapter. Aspects related to H2 have also been assessed to some extent in the previous chapter.

- H2: Owing to a lack of understanding of intelligence and ILP within the MPS, adequate attention was not given to the elements of ILP, impeding the development of ILP and the intelligence function of the MPS.
- H3: A majority in the command level were unaware of the control strategy and intelligence requirements, resulting in misuse or non-use of the ILP framework or resources to achieve the organisational goals of the MPS.
- H5: Field officers did not realise that they must contribute to the intelligence function of the agency, and they perceived intelligence collection as a responsibility of the intelligence units—because of this, the MPS lacked an integrated approach to data collection.

In the previous chapter, through the first hypothesis (H1), it is established that the MPS underwent a mimetic isomorphic change, a type of neo-institutionalism. Through the research question under evaluation in this chapter, it can be confirmed whether any other institutional isomorphism occurred within the MPS for it to embrace ILP. The first five themes are discussed in the previous chapter in explicating the first research question of the thesis. This chapter, therefore, begins with Theme 6 and runs up to Theme 15, discussing themes related to ILP theory and practice.

Theme 6: Dependence on covert collection – Excessive

The quality of analytical products depends on the collection of appropriate data or information (BJA, 2009; Harris, 1976; NPIA, 2008, 2010b; Schulz & Norton, 1968). Information enters into police agencies in one of three ways: deliberate collection (also known as tasked collection), another policing activity (called routine collection), and information voluntarily

shared by the community (NCPE, 2005c).

The different sources utilised by the MPS for the collection of information are human sources (undercover police officers as well as registered informants), who were referred to by most participants as 'CHIS' (the abbreviation for covert human intelligence sources),[1] statements recorded at investigations, case documents (excluding police statements), volunteered information shared by the community and staff, communication interception, information passed through the *Operations Module*, social media, government portals that the MPS can access, and crime statistics. The Operations Module, also called the Frontline Module, implemented on 29 July 2013, is a platform for managing frontline policing units (except investigations) on Police Information Management System (PIMS),[2] a custom-built information system (MPS, 2013f).

Table 6.1: **Sources of information identified by participants, according to categories**

Source	Participants of Category 1	Participants of Category 2	Participants of Category 3	All Participants
CHIS	95.65%	100%	70%	91.11%
Police information (excl. statements recorded by police)	0	25%	0	6.67%
Statements recorded at investigation	8.7%	16.67%	0	8.89%
Members of the community	4.35%	8.33%	0	4.44%
Regular police officers	4.35%	8.33%	0	4.44%
Communication interception	17.39%	66.67%	0	26.67%

Note: The total percentage for categories one and two exceeds 100 as some of the respondents identified more than one source.

Table 6.1 lists the sources of information identified by more than one participant. As shown in the table, CHIS dominated with the assertions of 91.11% of the participants, though some of them named other sources too. With the exception of one, all participants from the first category admitted to reliance on CHIS for information, whereas all participants from Category Two affirmed to the use of CHIS. The different view of one participant from Category One was due to the contents of the intelligence received by the participant. The assessments received had no information except 'cut and paste' portions from statements recorded by investigating officers and crime statistics accessible to all investigating officers and senior personnel.

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[1] CHIS is a standard term used in National Intelligence Model (NIM) guidance materials.
[2] PIMS comprises modules for each core policing function, such as human resources, detainees, in-coming correspondences, case management, traffic violations, etc.

Communication or telephone interception was the second-most named source, identified by a total of 26.67% of the participants. The third-most named source was statements recorded by investigation officers, by 8.89% of the participants. Contradicting this view was a larger group of participants (44.44%) who believed that police statements were not being used to produce intelligence. Likewise, whereas 6.67% of the participants talked about the exploitation of case documents (including forensic reports), over 51% expressed an opposite view. The different opinions were mainly within Category One, with over 78% admitting that police information (including case documents) was not being used to produce intelligence. Like them, most of the intelligence personnel confirmed that case materials and police information were not used in analysis, though the reasons given by senior and junior intelligence personnel were different. Senior intelligence personnel gave the reason for non-use of police information as access restrictions, while junior intelligence personnel said analysts can access information held in police databases, but the challenge for them was in utilising that effectively. R058, who was involved in the intelligence process, described this problem:

> Since there are no analytical tools to extract the information stored in police databases, 90% of it is useless. There is no mechanism to extract intelligence from that information. A lot of information is available. Being available does not mean those data can be converted to information [and intelligence] and it can be used. Access is given. But the problem is that there are no tools to manipulate that data.

This is a negative impact of police culture—maintaining information silos that are of no value to the agency's overall strategic direction. This problem, however, is not limited to the MPS, but widespread globally, including those in Global North (for details, see Walsh, 2015). The MPS must seek solutions to overcome these technological barriers for efficient production and dissemination of intelligence.

A small percentage (4.44%) felt the Directorate of Intelligence used the information shared by the MPS general staff (other than those assigned to the Directorate), while an opposing view was expressed by 28.89% of the participants. When the question was altered to find the *main* source of information for analysis, the participants named CHIS, intercepted communications, and open sources as the main sources. CHIS was identified as the main source of information by 60% of the participants, while 11.11% believed the main source was communication interceptions. Adding to those figures, another 8.89% of participants revealed the dependence on both CHIS and communication interception for information, whereas 4.44% believed that

the intelligence function of the MPS depended on CHIS and open sources (social media and news media) for information. For a breakdown of the responses from the three categories, see Figure 6.1. In spite of the overdependence on CHIS, some senior officers emphasised building more covert agents within communities (R012; R015; R016; R017; R020; R051; R053).

Among the participants in the second category, who knew the actual practice in the MPS, everyone mentioned the dependence on CHIS and communication interceptions as the main sources of information, except an investigation officer who felt intelligence was generated from information collected over social media. This opinion was based on the intelligence the participant received, which presented information accessible on social media platforms such as Facebook, and was already known to the participant. Issues related to intelligence will be discussed later in this chapter, in Theme 11.

Figure 6.1: **Main sources of information for the intelligence function.**

Such dependence on CHIS would drain much of the MPS intelligence budget on informants. Reliance on CHIS for information is more similar to national security intelligence collection as a very small proportion of the intelligence is expected to originate from covert sources in police agencies (MacVean, 2008). This problem has been observed by Innes et al. (2005) in three police forces in England. They reported that intelligence personnel tend to rely on established informants as sources of information. Contrary to the assertions and projections of state institutions on the cost effectiveness of running informants as CHIS (Audit Commission, 1993; HMIC, 1997a), research contends that such figures were based on inadequately conceptualised costs (Dunnighan & Norris, 1999).

Theme 7: Use of personal information – Unregulated

All the stages of the intelligence process pose serious implications for individuals' rights and liberties, particularly the right to privacy (D. L. Carter, 2009; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003; NPIA, 2010b; OSCE, 2017). Owing to the requirements pressed on nations through international conventions, and legal protections provided to individuals in national laws and regulations, ILP literature dictates regulating the use of information at various stages of the Intelligence Cycle (IC) and in sharing information across agencies (BJA, 2009; Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council, 2013; Fuentes, 2006; NPIA, 2010b; OSCE, 2017).

In spite of the dependence on human sources and covert methods for information collection, only 6.67% of the participants believed the MPS had a privacy policy for regulating the use of personal information of individuals, and all of them belonged to the first category. R013, an executive, who believed a policy on privacy was in place, he was not aware of its contents because, according to him, it had not been promoted within the MPS. Executive R014 said a policy on privacy had been adopted a couple months before the interview (with the researcher), and the participant was not "thorough" with its contents. Like the previous two participants, R022 was also not familiar with the policy though R022 was convinced that the MPS had a privacy policy.

Though most participants were certain the MPS had no privacy policy or procedure at the organisational level, many of them felt such a procedure could be in use in the intelligence sector (Directorate of Intelligence), about which they lacked any knowledge. This doubt was cleared by all the intelligence personnel who participated in this research as they confirmed that there was no procedure on privacy they were required to follow or base their decisions upon when collecting information or disseminating intelligence. Some of the participants raised the absence of a procedure or policy on privacy as a concern to their superiors, who were not able to answer.

The MPS has an internal document called *Policy on Interception and Surveillance*, issued by the Minister of Home Affairs on 7 February 2013 (MPS, 2013q). It was created to provide necessary powers to the intelligence personnel to perform their responsibilities as intelligence was a grey area, unelaborated, in the Police Act. The policy authorises intelligence personnel to: intercept communications between individuals, use that information, conduct surveillances, and use CHIS for information collection (MPS, 2012j, 2013q). It does not cater to the

requirements of a privacy policy as it does not address issues in the *proportionality* of the method chosen, *legitimacy* of the covert technique, *authority* to undertake the course of action opted, and *necessity* of the covert technique, abbreviated as PLAN (for details of the PLAN mnemonic, see Harfield & Harfield, 2008a; James, 2016, p. 59). The policy has not been circulated agency-wide, limiting it to a few intelligence personnel (R011; R012; R015; R021; R030; R032; R051; R052; R058; R059).

Theme 8: Mechanism for accepting information from staff – Lacking

Among the participants, 73.33% admitted to having shared information with the intelligence sector (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2: **Participants who passed information to the intelligence function.**

The various methods by which they opted to share information are listed in Table 6.2. Even though a majority had passed information to the intelligence sector, their responses and police documents (to which access was given to this research) confirmed that there existed no dedicated mechanism in the MPS for its officers to pass information to the intelligence function. Hence, it was due to this obstacle that staff had to select the methods listed in Table 6.2 for passing information. R024 described this challenge:

> I must say there's no mechanism for the staff to pass information. I'm able to share information because I know some of the officers who work there. But officers who are junior to me, such as corporals, lance corporals, constables, they cannot pass information they know of, because they will not know how to get in touch with

intelligence personnel. They will not know whom to pass the information and how to pass that.

The investigation officers passed information to the intelligence function through the focal points assigned to their departments, while few junior commissioned officers (from Category One) also used this method to pass information. R079 explained the inherent weakness in this unchecked and unofficial mechanism:

Usually, I make a call to the focal point assigned by the intelligence department to my department and share the information with him or her. But, in situations where I believed the assailant would hurt the person who shared that information, instead of me sharing the information directly, I have passed information through other persons. I do that because I don't have confidence that the intelligence sector will protect my identity. In the past, there were instances where offenders found out that I was the person who passed leads on them. When I pass information to the intelligence sector through a third person, I organise for him to meet with an intelligence personnel. Due to my job role, I knew some of the officers working at the intelligence sector.

Table 6.2: **Methods used to pass information to the MPS**

	Category 1	**Category 2**	**Category 3**	**All Categories**
Through a colleague on phone	30.43%	16.67%	10%	22.22%
Through a colleague in a face to face meeting	34.78%	16.67%	50%	33.33%
Through phone (Police Communication Centre)	-	8.33%	40%	11.11%
Through designated focal points	13.04%	41.67%	-	17.78%
Reports/letters	8.70%	-	-	4.44%
Sent text message to Police Emergency No. (119)	4.35%	-	-	2.22%
Through superior officers	-	8.33%	10%	4.44%
Other means	13.04%	8.33%	-	8.89%

Note: The total percentage for Categories One of Two exceeds 100 as some of the participants used more than one method in passing information to the MPS.

Regarding the nature of the information passed by police staff, the connection between the participant and victim or offence was not revealed by a large majority. R013 admitted to reaching the intelligence sector to inform about a crime committed by his family members, while R024 approached the intelligence sector to get help when a known person was victimised. R082 confessed to seeking help when R082 became the victim of a crime. From the descriptions of crime managers and investigators, it was evident that most of them passed information about the cases they handled to get help in building their cases or shared information about another crime that had been committed earlier which they discovered in their

investigations. A senior analyst felt that officers approach the intelligence sector when their family or private life gets affected:

> Except the police officers on duty, we don't get any information on crime from other police officers. But, if there is something going on with somebody's personal life, we get that information to some extent. But, they don't connect with us the criminal activities that occur in the society.

Despite these flaws in the system, 40% of the participants believed there is a system in the MPS for the staff to pass information to the intelligence sector. Over half of them admitted to never using that system. More than 13% felt the Operations Module was effective for that purpose, while 8.89% of the participants considered sending an SMS to the Police Emergency Number (119) was a seamless mechanism for sharing information.

When ILP was initially adopted in 2011, the 5x5x5 Report of NIM was translated to Dhivehi and uploaded on the MPS intranet site as 'Intelligence Collection Form' (R052; R059; R080). Access was given to all the personnel so they could pass information to the intelligence function (R012; R013; R016; R017; R052; R053; R059). Information about the form was provided to the members of the Management Board on 21 June 2011, explaining to them how to fill it and where (on the website) to access it (MPS, 2011d). No further action has been taken to institutionalise the use of the form in the MPS. In 2013, sessions were conducted for officers of the Maafannu Police Station[3] and the Specialist Operations Department (SOD)[4] to inform them on how to fill the form. When no information came through the form, a meeting was held among the supervisory level officers of the intelligence sector and SOD (R052). The meetings proved fruitless as no filled-in forms had been received by the intelligence function, and the form was taken down from the website in March 2013 (R052; R053; R059). Staff maybe reluctant to accept new systems. Appropriate measures must therefore be taken to convince them of the advantages of a system, for them to adopt it wholeheartedly (den Oord & Vallet, 2012, p. 14). According to chief of West-Coast Police Zone of Belgium, "it takes at least three years to change routines, and success is necessary to convince people" (cited in den Oord & Vallet, 2012, p. 14).

Since the launch of the Intelligence Collection Form in 2011 until it was disabled in 2013, it

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[3] One of the two police stations in Malé.
[4] SOD is one of the largest departments of the MPS, with public order units and elite tactical teams to provide operational support to all the other departments and all divisions.

was filled only four times (R052). Yet, the manager responsible for the process was unaware of these changes, and was under the impression that the form was still available on the MPS websites (internet and intranet sites) for the staff and the public to fill if they want to pass any information to the MPS.

Force policies, procedures, regulations, and commissioner's orders were studied to find whether any official directive on providing information to the MPS (or intelligence function) about incidents or events officers come across during their official working and off-duty hours. Such a policy or procedure was not in place not only at the organisational level, but also within the intelligence sector (R053; R057; R058). However, the operational officers working in frontline departments based in Malé can enter their observations on unlawful activities through the Operations Module at the end of their shift (R029; MPS, 2013f).

Since ILP is distinctive in its focus on intelligence and information, channelling information from the frontline to analysts remain vital in achieving results. To improve information gathering and intelligence sharing, and integrate operational policing, Phoenix Police Department (US) began a special project in 2014 (Telep et al., 2017). The participating patrol officers received special training and tools to collect information and report their activities. This project, implemented in phases, made the agency "more intelligence-led" as intelligence was used to guide resource allocation and crime control efforts (Telep et al., 2017, p. 333). It also facilitated in discovering recurring problems by the intelligence function without diverting additional resources, and provided actionable intelligence to the frontline to develop responses (Telep et al., 2017). This illustrates the importance of utilising frontline officers in the ILP framework.

Theme 9: Community information – Undervalued

Information from the community is vital not only to the intelligence function, but also in solving crimes. Unfortunately, the MPS has not established a standard mechanism for the public to pass information to it, except reporting incidents to the Police Communication Centre (PCC). Yet, 42.22% of the participants believed there was a mechanism to obtain information or tip-offs from the community. Over 24% of them were under the impression that the PCC was suitably developed to record such information, while 6.67% considered email communication as an effective mechanism that was in place in the MPS. About 6% believed

that people can pass information to the MPS through its website, despite there being no provision in it for the community to pass information, either anonymously or with personal details.[5] Another 20% considered sending an SMS to the police emergency number as an appropriate mechanism for submitting information.[6] Among all participants, only one was convinced that the public knew the various ways through which they can share information about criminal or suspicious acts with the police. It was surprising to find that only two participants felt that the public trusts the MPS for them to share information with the agency, and both of them belonged to the first category.

The PCC receives all incoming telephone calls from the public seeking assistance and reporting disturbances or breaches of law.[7] As there are no community-supported crime-fighting organisations, such as crime-stoppers, in the Maldives, all calls, including calls to pass useful information about crimes or suspicious activities, are made to the PCC. When the PCC receives a lead or a tip-off, the Duty Officer (DO), who is the senior-most officer at the PCC, relays that information to the intelligence sector over the phone, if s/he thinks their attention is required (R016; R026; R035). There existed no other mechanism at the PCC to pass information to the intelligence sector (R016; R026; R035; R053). A junior officer working at the PCC explained the difficulties in recording the information they receive:

> To pass information too, people have to call the Command Centre [PCC's previous name]. Sufficient attention cannot be given to those calls. Because the staff do not get the time to attentively listen and ask all the relevant questions as they are always engaged in incidents of different levels that have just occurred. Furthermore, there is no way to feed such information, if at all received, into the [information] system. For example, when someone calls to pass information about drugs, we have to give them the DED [Drug Enforcement Department] operation [unit's phone] number. That's all

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[5] Following these responses, the MPS website (www.police.gov.mv) was browsed and a screen copy of the website was saved. At that time, the website allowed people to lodge complaints through a form, and for that, their personal details must be provided. Hence, the form was not designed to collect information or tip-offs from the public or regular police officers.

[6] Some of the participants identified more than one method of sharing information with the MPS.

[7] The PCC can be contacted through police assistance lines 3322112, 3322111 or police emergency number 119. When a person makes a call to 119, it will be received at the PCC. However, text messages sent to 119 will be received by the intelligence sector and the PCC has no access to those messages. Depending on the type of assistance needed, the PCC dispatches teams to the scenes. It is manned by call handlers, civil staff to monitor police security cameras, dispatch officers, and a commissioned officer as the team leader (DO), to make decisions and enforce those.

we can do at the Command Centre. Nobody knows whether the DED follows up on that information or whether anyone values that information.

According to R053, a number of people call the DED to pass information about drug crimes, some of which routed by the PCC. The duty shift makes a note of the information if they feel they must attend the scene. As the duty phone is answered by different shifts and there is no mechanism for them to feed the information into a police information system, the information received on that phone does not go for analysis. A similar experience was shared by R078:

> From what I have witnessed at the FCPD [Family and Child Protection Department], the messages passed by the public are not noted as information received. If the officers are required to attend the scene [of crime], or if they find something there, they might use that information to register an offence. […] There is no procedure on how to note the information received on that [phone] number. The officer there [at the FCPD] does not feed that information into the system. What I mean is, there is no way to enter that information into the system for retrieval. If he or she passes that information to a superior officer, then the superior officer might know about it. Usually what happens is, the information will be lost in the process. Because officers are not required to officially log that. There is no logbook for recording that. Hence, the officer might make a note of it on a piece of paper. If the information was not considered useful, then it will be lost. The other thing about family related crimes is, usually the same people are involved. So, when information about a known person is received, the call will be labelled and disregarded.

Overlooking volunteered information, as expressed by R078, has been documented earlier. Cope (2004, p. 199) found that police officers preferred "experiential knowledge" and it "framed how crime problems were perceived and the prolific protagonists of crime that needed to be targeted". The experiential knowledge was held in the officers' brains and seldom recorded or systematically documented (Cope, 2004, 2008). The absence of an intelligence culture in the MPS (for details, see Chapter Four) as in other police agencies (especially those in the Global north) could be the reason for not valuing volunteered collection or community intelligence. A similar scenario was witnessed in Britain 1997, and to alleviate the issue, community intelligence was defined, and valuing community intelligence was emphasised as much as criminal intelligence (HMIC, 1997b). Despite the support of Her Majesty's

Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC),[8] a 2003 thematic study found that not all police forces in Britain promoted community intelligence, and proper utilisation of community intelligence was re-emphasised in 2003 (HMIC, 2003). In the thematic study, HMIC recommended that the Association of Chief Police Officers (renamed in 2015 as the National Police Chiefs Council) develop a national strategy to collect community intelligence for use in police training (HMIC, 2003).

The findings of this research are also consistent with the findings of Kleiven (2007). The role of community intelligence from regular police officers and the general public were not promoted in the MPS. An apprehension in taking such an approach could be the perception of public confidence in the MPS. A mere 4.44% were confident that the public trusts the MPS. John Grieve, a key architect of NIM, said a primary challenge to the collection of community intelligence was the community's mistrust of the police (Kleiven, 2007, p. 269).

Theme 10: Information collection – Unplanned

In spite of the emphasis on developing intelligence collection plans in the literature for producing actionable intelligence (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009; Dintino & Martens, 1983; Harris, 1976; McDowell, 2009; NCPE, 2005c; NPIA, 2008; OSCE, 2017; Phillips, 2008; UNODC, 2011a), none of the MPS manuals, procedures, or commissioner's orders identify a need to develop collection plans. Consequently, there were no standards on pre-collection and collection of information in the MPS. As a result, there was no "systematic collection effort", leaving the officers to their own imagination, "picking and choosing the data that they believe are relevant to the goal(s) and objectives" of the agency, as prophesied by Dintino and Martens (1983, pp. 76–77). Developing a collection plan was an individual choice, left to the officers, unsupervised at any stage (R021; R032; R051; R052; R057; R058; R059).

In the MPS, intelligence personnel understand collection planning as listing of all possible sources from where they can get information for a specific problem or target. They have no knowledge about the other areas in it, such as the task's definition, objective, scope, timeline, and legal requirements such as sources and means (OSCE, 2017, p. 34). An intelligence manager described the prevailing practice as:

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[8] HMIC has now been replaced by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.

There isn't a need to develop a collection plan before beginning to collect intelligence. Because, mostly we have to gather information available on social media, and refer the information provided by covert agents. When we check these two sources, usually there will be the information we were looking for. If it is not there, then we intercept their phones. As we do not get much information from other sources, there is no need to develop a [collection] plan and get the approval of the supervisor.

Consistent with the findings of Theme 6, a junior intelligence officer described the stages from collection of information to dissemination of intelligence in these words:

When a task is given to analysts or the intelligence officers, we don't develop any kind of working plan to collect information. She or he would write a report by collecting all the information from the sources s/he can reach. The most commonly used source now is lawful interception. A report will be generated based on the information gathered through the interception system, human sources, government portals, and social media. Most of the time, all these sources will not be looked at. Instead, most of the time, they would depend on the interception system.

As a result of this practice, frontline officers are not involved in intelligence collection. Only 6.67% of the participants said the intelligence sector had tasked them or their teams to collect information.[9] From the first category, none of the participants or their subordinates were tasked by the intelligence sector, while an intelligence manager from Category Two said they rarely tasked other departments with collecting information. From the third category, R084 found that the Counter Terrorism Department rarely reached out to the SWAT Team asking for assistance in getting access to places they could not reach. R084 asserted that the Criminal Intelligence Department never approached for such assistance. The other participant (R081) received requests for assistance at an individual level.

Theme 11: Intelligence – Unactionable

The intelligence generated must be actionable and the receiving units or departments must be able to use those products to prevent and/or mitigate the threat (D. L. Carter, 2004; HMIC,

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[9] These figures include the intelligence personnel, who said they tasked operational teams in other departments or divisions to collection information for them.

1997a). ILP draws heavily on analysis to provide intelligence for tactical use in police agencies' targeted approach to tackle specific crimes, and to provide insights on future and impending threats for the decision-makers to make informed decisions (D. L. Carter, 2009; NCPE, 2005c, 2007; Peterson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).

The Directorate of Intelligence generates Daily Assessments for operational departments, Weekly Assessments for Division Commanders and command level officers, Profiles (of offenders for investigations), Situational Assessments on special events or incidents (generated rarely according to intelligence managers), and weekly briefs for the president of the republic, called Presidential Briefs, summarising events and incidents that occurred in the past week with a forecast for the coming week (R012; R015; R020; R021; R032; R051; R052; R054; R056; R057; R061). Other than these, the intelligence sector also provides 'lists of gang members' to the frontline and 'hot intelligence' (raw information collected through covert means) verbally or as text messages to operational departments and divisions (R035; R052; R083; R084). Except for half of the participants from Category Three and one participant from Category One, all the other participants had seen intelligence products.

As expected, 80% of the participants considered the intelligence contained unusable material, thereby making those unactionable. From the participants of the first category, this view was expressed by 86.96%, while 83.33% from the second category expressed a similar opinion. Hence, the majority of the intelligence personnel also affirmed the weakness in the finished products. From the third category, 60% believed the assessments were poor in quality. The mismatch in the number of participants who saw intelligence products with that percentage was due to the opinion of one participant who had not seen an assessment. This conviction on inaccurate assessments was based on the intelligence received by the participant's (R083) 'shift in-charge'. R083 noticed discrepancies in the intelligence they received with the information known to patrol officers. R083 specifically pointed to the inaccuracy in the gang-member lists disseminated by the intelligence sector. R084, another junior officer, detailed the issues found in the list of gang members:

> When we get information on a particular gang, it might have information of individuals who have left gangs so many years back. I can give an example. When we were given information about gangs, in our last tour to Addu […] All the teenagers or youth who lived in a particular neighbourhood were included in the list as gang members. Just because he belonged to that area, he is a member of that gang [operating in that locality].

Just because somebody lives in a particular area does not make him a gang member. But, just for the reason his mother gave birth to him [in that area], he becomes a gang member, because he is a boy.

Such intelligence products infer that proper collation was lacking in the MPS, and analysts followed an unstructured process in collation and analysis, divorced from a rationalised approach. Innes et al. (2005, p. 41) argued that even in the Global North, the move "to a more ordered, rationalized approach, based upon specific methodologies, on the basis that [it] provides a more 'objective' perspective on patterns of crime and offending" was a recent phenomenon.

Efforts to find any guidelines on information collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the MPS yielded no result. Though there were no approved organisational standards, an intelligence supervisor said that the Directorate of Intelligence follows an internal procedure, which was protectively marked, while the rest of the participants (including intelligence personnel) were certain there were no such standards for the intelligence process and function. At the agency level, there existed no guidelines, including a procedure on criminal intelligence file,[10] which is essential to maintain checks and balances against inappropriate activities (Harris, 1976; LEIU, 2011). The discrepancies or inaccuracies in the gang lists could be due to the lack of such guidelines or procedures. The inaccuracies and mismanagement of police information due to a lack of standards is not only a problem prevalent in the MPS, as such discrepancies have been established by the Bichard Inquiry (2004) on the effectiveness of intelligence-based record keeping and information sharing in Humberside Police (UK).

In spite of the range of problems identified, 24.44% of the participants were under the impression that the analytical capacity of the MPS was developed to meet its strategic priorities, while 66.67% held an opposite view (see Figure 6.3). Over 28% of the participants believed that intelligence was poorly developed as the analytic capability of the agency was underutilised. This view was most dominant in the third category, even though half of them did not have access to intelligence products, except the occasionally passed list of gang members.

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[10] A criminal intelligence file consists of stored information on the activities and associations of individuals and entities involved in crime or suspected to be involved in committing crime. Information about an individual or group merely on the basis of non-criminal personal habits must not be stored in the criminal intelligence file (LEIU, 2011).

R080 succinctly described the reason for weak intelligence assessments:

> I don't think they [analysts] have given any effort to crime analysis. […] We analyse intelligence. In the crime sector, we do not analyse the trends or profile even the crimes that are happening in the country. The statistics we get in the crime statistics report, [contain] very, very basic level of information. It does not evaluate the trends of crime or why it is happening or the underlining factors that lead to this kind increase or decrease of crime.

Figure 6.3: **Perception on the MPS analytical capacity.**

From the analysts' point of view, a major drawback in their working style is the extensive support they must provide to investigations for ongoing cases. They believe they were overstretched in supporting investigations. R058 explained the work allocation in the Directorate of Intelligence:

> I notice that we work in a reactive method. So, 90% of my work would involve getting information for an incident or event that has taken place and support its investigation. What we have is such a concept. I don't see us doing much on deterrence or preventing crimes so as to protect the community.

In spite of the attention given to investigations, the investigating officers and many other participants felt that the support given to investigations was insufficient. Contributing to R058's viewpoint, R057 said:

> I believe that the intelligence sector is not focused on crime prevention. It doesn't do much to collect information about crimes. Instead of that, the sector performs

investigation officers' duties. What I mean is, the information the investigation officers require will be collected through the intelligence sector and analysed. That is the primary responsibility now. The intelligence sector is not focused on collecting information for proactive efforts against crime, before the commission of crimes, to prevent those crimes. The duties of the analysts and intelligence officers include transcribing the intercepted calls, finding video footages for crime scenes, and obtaining and passing those footages to investigating officers. When a crime is committed, the intelligence officers work with the investigation officers. That's the process in place.

A similar problem was diagnosed in a UK study conducted among analysts by Sissens (2008) in which 65% of the participants felt their skills were not fully utilised, and 22% felt they spent more time in administrative or support work. As a result, she proposed to allot more time for analysts to conduct 'analysis' and reduce the time of analysts in administrative or support work. The intelligence personnel's views also echo the findings of Cope (2004) when she surveyed intelligence analysts in the UK. She noted that some of the analysts felt that intelligence was side-lined, labelling it as "window dressing", making the analysts feel the intelligence they generated was like "wallpaper" (Cope, 2004, p. 192). Consequently intelligence was ignored in operational planning (Cope, 2004). This aspect is also discussed below and in Theme 18 (Chapter Seven).

Numerous issues were cited by the participants in the intelligence they got, including non-use of information collected in routine policing, copying contents of statements recorded by investigating officers and presenting it as 'intelligence', presenting outdated information, presenting the 'chit-chats' the intelligence personnel had with investigating officers after the occurrence of a gang-crime as 'intelligence', and scarcity of information due to less number of CHIS, lack of penetration in crime groups, or inability to predict. Some of these issues imply a lack of understanding among analysts. Most of the intelligence personnel identified training and resource limitations as the main factors for the weakness in assessments. From their category, 25% identified fewer intelligence personnel as the key reason, while the overall figure who held a similar opinion was 11.11%. Below is the description of the business process in the intelligence sector, provided by an intelligence officer:

> We don't analyse to depict the criminal environment. As I told earlier, we would develop products for specific cases, which will be very narrow, for use in investigation. We only generate case-specific reports. We don't develop reports for organisational

level decisions.

NIM requires the information collected in routine policing be collated and analysed to generate intelligence products (Higgins, 2009; NCPE, 2005c; NPIA, 2008). Though the MPS maintains positions for collating data entered into its information system, the intelligence personnel pointed to issues overlooked in the collation, such as repetitions, spelling errors or words spelt in multiple ways, and incomplete information. These issues were similar to the issues identified by Higgins (2009), though his list had additional issues such as using different operational names for the same investigation and preserving documentary evidence separately making the information contained in those documents inaccessible or unknown to the retrievers. Upon assessing the protocols, policies and procedures at the MPS, it was evident there was no code of practice on the storage and use of databases, unlike other countries (D. L. Carter, 2004; LEIU, 2011; NPIA, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). The absence of a law mandating such a requirement could be the reason for the persistent gaps in the MPS.

Theme 12: Approach in prioritising policing problems – Not systematic

A fundamental difference between an efficient intelligence function (in a non-ILP agency) and ILP is the tasking and coordination (T&C) process to effectively manoeuvre the entire agency (BJA, 2009; M. Maguire & John, 2006; NCPE, 2005c, 2006b). Owing to the importance of the T&C and the Tasking & Coordination Group (T&CG) in ILP, the process adopted in NIM is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Effective T&C processes are essential for efficient service delivery as they (NCPE, 2006b, p. 7):

- ensure decisions about priorities and resources are made based on the best available assessment of threats;
- enable managers to weigh competing demands; and
- establish a rational basis for decision-making.

Figure 6.4: **T&C process in NIM.**
Source: NCPE (2006b, p. 13)

In spite of MPS' centralised governance framework and authority vested in the Management Board and the Executive Board (for details, see Chapter Four), there exists no T&C process in the MPS for directing the whole agency to address policing problems. Except for the draftsmen of SP2 and few senior intelligence personnel, other participants did not understand the concept of T&C. Though most of the participants said they had participated in a T&C meeting (for question 3.3 of the Interview Guide), through the control questions (questions 3.4 and 3.5 of the Interview Guide) it was clear the meetings they took part in were not T&CG sessions but coordination sessions organised to tackle increasing violence or organised crimes[11] at various periods of time. These were irregular meetings organised by departments or officers to whom the commissioner had tasked tackling the problem, as a special assignment, as explained by R026:

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[11] Details of the special operations conducted to suppress the gang activities following knife attacks or murder in Malé are usually not recorded in any formal documents of the MPS. When gang activities rise, the MPS leadership creates a temporary committee to tackle the problem. At different times, different departments were made responsible for addressing the issue and mostly the problem swings between the SOD, the Serious and Organised Crime Department (SOCD) and the Criminal Intelligence Department.

I remember attending a tasking and coordination meeting sometime back. There was a set of meetings then. A committee was constituted for gang suppression when gang activities increased. I believe it was organised following the concept of tasking and coordination. Those were more like coordination meetings. [...] Instead of delegating new tasks, the issues in-hand were attempted to solve, based on available information. It was a structure of that type.

Many misunderstood the debriefing sessions and after-action reviews (after tactical operations) as T&CG sessions. One of the executives misunderstood the T&C process to be operational performance reviews (that he experienced overseas) as performance assessments of departments or divisions (with respect to available resources) were not assessed in the MPS. A draftsman of SP2 explained the reason behind the issue:

When we looked to transfer that [T&C] process, we felt the tactical team was… the tactical coordination team was the Management Board. We thought that must be decided at the strategic level, by the Executive Board. We also believed that the tasking and coordination team at the strategic level must be the Executive Board. We brought up this idea. We believed that the two main pillars of NIM or intel-led process was the Tactical Tasking & Coordination Team and tasking and coordination team at the strategic level. These are the two core teams. When decisions are made at the strategic level and tasked to the tactical level, then they must mobilise resources, identify risks… mobilise resources to achieve results or success. This process was unknown throughout the agency. The executive leadership at that time did not want to bring all such issues before the Executive Board and attend those through the Board. Owing to the unwillingness and lack of interest at the organisational level, we were compelled… We had the thinking of formulating a strategic level tasking and coordination team and a tactical tasking coordination team and introduce changes to the organisational structure to facilitate that. We suggested making the departments function under a strategic guidance and to functionalise a tactical level tasking and coordination process. We even worked to make it a reality. [...] There was a strong resistance against the introduction of that entire process. That was due to the executives' lack of knowledge on the subject. As a result, the whole concept was discarded. Even after that, we tried to initiate the process at the tactical level. What happened with that was, those at the managerial level snubbed it due to its failure to produce results owing to the absence of [executive] ownership. […] When policy level decision-making process was excluded, it could not

be practised at the tactical level. When this became certain for us, we decided to remove the entire process from the model. That was what happened.

An intelligence supervisor provided insights on why some participants felt they had attended T&CG sessions even though such a medium did not exist in the MPS:

> If the officers at the executive level have the knowledge that the core feature of intelligence-led policing is the tasking and coordination meeting, then they will practise that. They will arrange those meetings, and delegate tasks and coordinate the entire process through that meeting. I believe they are not organising those meetings because they lack that knowledge. Or even if they have, then they don't realise the importance of it. They don't understand the need. I haven't seen that happening here in a formal way. But, informally, the SOD organised and led some meetings. That was not at the organisational level. That was for the operational officers responsible for the Malé area. During those meetings, after an intelligence briefing, other departments will brief their activities, and tasks will be assigned, and plans will be made to accomplish those tasks. I think it continued for about two to three months. After that it stopped. After that, again we did begin some coordination meetings. In those coordination meetings, we mainly discussed administrative difficulties, technical issues, and ways to solve those issues. Those were not operational tasking and coordination meetings. We did not discuss operational issues and neither did we discuss solutions for those.

In examining the issues discussed in the Management Board and the Executive Board from January 2011 to October 2016, it was found that specific crime problems were not discussed in the sessions of the boards to assess the strategic direction of the agency. However, crime statistics and information pertaining to departmental performances were presented to a few sessions. In April 2013, the DED and SOCD delivered presentations on their work before the Management Board (MPS, 2013d, 2013e), while all the police Divisions also delivered presentations on their performance to the Management Board in 2013.[12] Written instructions or directions did not originate pursuant to these sessions to any department or division. The intelligence sector informed the members of the Management Board on 31 August 2014 of the extent of extremist ideology in the society (MPS, 2013g). Following this, unexpectedly, no directions were given to any of the departments responsible for the problem, to mitigate the

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[12] These were not operational performance reporting sessions as their performances were not assessed based on the control strategy or operational priorities.

threat, despite recognising it as a major security issue. Likewise, on 3 August 2014, the members of the Executive Board deliberated on the threat of gangs to the society (MPS, 2014k). They were concerned about the increase in crimes but the discussion was limited to their subjective knowledge. Following their concerns, the seriousness of the problem was explained in detail to the Board on 14 October 2014 by the Directorate of Intelligence (MPS, 2014a, 2014k). Subsequent to any of these presentations, no specific tasks were assigned to any department, division or command.

The sessions of the boards had no effect on the Strategic Assessment or control strategy as the Strategic Assessment presented in SP2 and SP3 were never altered or modified throughout the life of these plans. Without changing the control strategy or re-evaluating the Strategic Assessment, on 28 February 2012 the operational priorities of the MPS for 2012 were discussed by the Executive Board (MPS, 2012e). An action plan to achieve the operational priorities was submitted to the Board on 6 March 2012 (MPS, 2012b), and on 28 March 2012 the Board endorsed the new operational priorities (MPS, 2012f). As the adoption of SP3 and Business Plan 2014 have already been discussed in Chapter Four, that process will not be repeated in this chapter. On 27 December 2017, the MPS published its *Annual Commitments 2018*, without changing the Strategic Assessment or control strategy. The Operational Priorities listed in this document include: "policing with confidence", community reassurance, Presidential Election 2018, and organisational development (MPS, 2017).

The issues relevant to the Strategic Assessment discussed in the Executive Board meetings in 2012 were establishing a cyber police on 24 July 2012 (MPS, 2012d),[13] and establishing a victim support unit and developing police procedure for cases of domestic violence on 23 October 2012 following the ratification of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (MPS, 2012c, 2013k). On 1 November 2012, crime statistics were presented to the board (MPS, 2012a), based on which no directions were given to influence the operational environment or control strategy as the intention appeared to be to make the executives aware of the criminality in the society.

In 2012 and 2013, different operational priorities were set, without (re)evaluating the Strategic Assessment, after deliberating at sessions of the Executive Board (MPS, 2012b, 2012e, 2012f, 2013a). At the discussion of the Executive Board on the Work Plan for Operational Priorities

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[13] The Executive Board approved the establishment of the Cyber Police Department on 5 August 2012 after going through a detailed paper.

2013 on 4 February 2013, two executives observed the financial constraints ahead in achieving those priorities as the budget of the MPS, which had been approved earlier by the *People's Majlis*, was not forecasted in considering the new priorities (MPS, 2013l). The lack of a relationship with the priorities, and the SWOT analysis used to identify the priorities, was also a point raised in that session (MPS, 2013l). The 2012 and 2013 annual reports of the MPS (sent to the Home Ministry and the President's Office to fulfil a legal obligation) contained no information about these operational priorities.

When the MPS developed SP3 in 2014, a new Strategic Assessment was also developed (MPS, 2014o). Pursuant to SP3, a business plan for 2014 was developed with goals the agency aspired to achieve in 2014 (MPS, 2014g). Surprisingly, before both plans were developed, the budget estimate for 2014 had already been approved by the *People's Majlis*.[14] As with the development of these two plans, documents made available for this research confirmed that SP2 was also not budgeted and its implementation was not financially planned.[15]

The MPS then devised a new Business Plan for 2015 (MPS, 2014d). Though the plan analysed statistics available in police databases, there was no effort to evaluate the Strategic Assessment (MPS, 2015e). It was not clear the extent to which Business Plan 2014 was achieved (due to the absence of a mechanism to review operational performance). The strategic goals of *Business Plan 2015* were similar to the goals of Business Plan 2014. Except for one, none of the executives who participated in this research knew about *Business Plan 2015*, and it appears that the plan was not circulated, though published. Though SP3 requires a business plan to be developed every year, the MPS has not developed a business plan for 2016, 2017, or 2018.[16] Hence, the MPS budged from the guidance of NIM to develop a Strategic Assessment every twelve months (NCPE, 2005c, 2007). Even in the traditional policing style with a robust

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[14] The Executive Board deliberated and approved the Budget Estimate for 2014 on 26 June 2013 (MPS, 2013b), while the Public-Sector Investment Programmes (large-scale projects funded by the government) of the budget were deliberated upon at the Board's session on 28 July 2013 (MPS, 2013c). The strategic priorities of SP3 were decided in 2014 (MPS, 2014o, p. 15).

[15] On 28 April 2011, the budgetary requirements for the Operations Command were discussed at the Executive Board and in this discussion, there was no reference to the strategic goals or SP2 (MPS, 2011b). Likewise, when the operational requirements for the 17th SAARC Summit, to be held in Addu City were discussed at numerous meetings of the Executive Board (28 April 2011, 18 September 2011 and 24 September 2011), there was no effort to align it with SP2. The only connection was that SP2 recognised the need to plan well ahead for the Summit citing political polarisation. In a discussion of the financial challenges expected in 2012 by the Executive Board on 18 October 2011, following the reduction of 1.51% from the MPS Budget for 2012 compared to 2011 (MPS, 2011a), it was evident SP2 was considered neither for forecasting nor finalising the financial projections. This inference was drawn after examining budget-related documents submitted to the Board.

[16] The *Annual Commitments 2018* is a single page document that described the annual priorities and listed the expected outcomes, and due to that it is not considered as a business plan developed according to the requirements of SP3.

intelligence function, a twelve-monthly Strategic Assessment must be generated because it is an essential input to planning major enforcement actions (Harris, 1976).

Theme 13: Tactical resolution (operational intervention) – Erratic

Tactical resolution involves taking tactical actions for specific crime and disorder problems. The Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG) allocates a plan or problem owner, who uses various options in the 'tactical menu' to create a plan to resolve a problem (NCPE, 2005c, p. 86). As demonstrated earlier, the tactical menu was absorbed into SP2's action plan. Though there existed no T&CG at the MPS, efforts were made to assess the way it aligned tactics to strategy (in its various plans) and served the public without a delineated T&C process. This would allow understanding the extent to which Daily Assessments, Weekly Assessments and Situational Briefs served as operational or tactical intelligence, adding to the discussion of Theme 11.

According to 31.11% of the participants, different policing responsibilities and duties were balanced by the DO at the PCC, while 46.67% felt the MPS lacked a coordination mechanism when more than one department was involved in resolving or mitigating a problem. Some of them believed that each department performed its role without any specific officer or department coordinating the whole process. However, the participants were quick to note that good coordination setup springs into action to control political rallies and demonstrations. Only 11.11% of the participants witnessed inter-departmental synchronisation, without an executive intervention, to tackle disorganisation during major issues that required more than one department's operational intervention.[17]

The DO gets *hot intelligence* through instant messaging applications (such as Viber and WhatsApp). According to R035, by the time the DO gets a message or report from the intelligence sector, the frontline must have responded to that incident or event. As a result,

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[17] Due to the mandates of various departments, multiple departments are often required to work together. For example, Malé City Police has no role in managing the traffic of Malé Island as it is a responsibility of the Traffic Management Department. Likewise, the two Police Stations in Malé Island (Maafannu Police Station and Galolhu Police Station) have no authority to investigate crimes as that function is assigned to other departments. All misdemeanours are investigated by the General Investigation Department, while felonies are investigated by specialist investigation departments: DED (drug crimes), Economic Crime Department (frauds and financial crimes), FCPD (crimes committed by under-aged children and domestic violence), and SOCD (serious and organised crimes).

except in political events such as public protests, hot intelligence has little use in operational policing. Other than hot intelligence, the DO rarely gets any intelligence as the intelligence sector does not disseminate assessments directly to the DO. Instead, assessments are sent to the Head of PCC, who attends to the intelligence at his convenience, due to which intelligence is often not received in a timely manner by the DO's (R016; R035), perhaps due to a lack of written directives or procedure.

The Directorate of Intelligence collects and disseminates intelligence to the departments and divisions when the intelligence supervisors and managers or command head is satisfied with the product for operational intervention (tactical resolution) (R012; R015; R032; R053). Based on the gravity of the problem, further discussions might take place between intelligence units and the enforcing operational department or division, though it is a rare practice (R051; R053; R078). In attending major events, such as elections and large-scale public protests, intelligence gets disseminated to the operational element constituted for managing that event/operation. This course of action and the absence of a T&C process both have restricted the evaluation of intelligence gaps and collecting feedback from the end-users of intelligence.[18] Only two participants from the first category were convinced that the MPS assesses its intelligence gaps, while 33.33% from the second category expressed a similar view.[19] Among them, R028, an executive, believed the MPS has not been able to sustain the effort to assess intelligence and investigation gaps due to a failure to organise such sessions.

According to the participants of Category Two, assessing gaps was limited to intelligence units, and it was an occasional endeavour taken to resolve issues, when an issue cropped up. They made no effort to assess the gaps as it was not required. Like this, end-user feedback was also not collected in the MPS. Only 6.67% said end-user feedback was collected, while 86.67% never experienced that process. Among the participants of Category One, who said end-user feedback was taken, one of them had never seen an intelligence assessment, while another thought it was a rare practice. In the second category, the intelligence supervisor who said feedback had been taken noticed that feedback was received only from 'heads of departments' (managers). Nevertheless, even that feedback was not incorporated into the evaluation process because the processes in the intelligence function had not been evaluated (R052).

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[18] For details on the significance of end-user feedback and intelligence gaps in ILP, see the Analytical Framework adopted in Chapter Three.
[19] The question was not asked to the participants of the third category.

Theme 14: Crime prevention – Anomalous

In the MPS, crime prevention at the organisational level is supervised and managed by the Crime Prevention Unit, which is situated in the Public Affairs Department—PAD (MPS, 2016b). Surprisingly, no relationship can be seen between the intelligence sector and PAD, either from the documents obtained for this research or from the participants' experiences at the MPS.

PAD has been an under-resourced department, relegated to support services, to report incidents (on police website) and coordinate media agencies for news briefings (MPS, 2012g, 2013h, 2014f, 2015d, 2016b). In 2011, it had just four staff (MPS, 2012g, p. 121). PAD does not receive intelligence and, consequently, its activities are not based on intelligence (R023; R030; R032; R051). It has its own events calendar, endorsed by the Executive Board, which is dominated by fun-fare events and activities for school children (R025; R030; R034; R060). The common wisdom in the MPS regarding crime prevention is enforcement units attending to crimes that are in motion or before the commission of a crime. Usually, the intelligence sector waits till the offence has been committed to make an arrest (R032; R025; R060; R061). PAD or the Crime Prevention Unit plays no role in proactive policing. R035, while explaining the crime prevention process in the MPS, said:

> I won't say our activities against crime are effective. I am telling this because our approach to crime prevention is through detaining suspects. Even if the evidence against them is insufficient, we keep them in detention so they do not get an opportunity to commit new crimes. In most cases, by presenting an intelligence report or by some other way, suspects are held under detention until judgment for the cases is passed by a court. […] The only responsibility of the crime prevention department is to visit schools, and organise Ready Camps and other such programmes. It is not their responsibility to identify the types of crimes and take efforts to reduce crimes. If I may add, they do nothing proactive against crime or criminals.

This statement confirms that the MPS had not embedded problem-solving and preventative tactics in its operational policing strategies. Considering the myriad criminogenic factors that affect crime in a neighbourhood (for a summary, see Weatherburn, 2001), many of which the police cannot directly influence, a greater focus on problem-solving and preventative tactics ought to have been followed (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 141). Without a scientific approach to problem-solving, the police cannot contribute to reducing the number of people in conflict with

the law (Braga, 2015; D. L. Carter, 2009; Edwards, 2011). R061, a senior detective, adding further insights, explained the crime prevention process as:

> When the gangs get active, SOD officers will be deployed on the streets until gang activities reduce. That's all! We always adhere to a temporary plan. Nowadays we give no attention to crime prevention. Awareness programmes are not organised. […] The only thing we do for crime prevention is arresting people. Through the hard work we did early this year, all notorious criminals are behind bars. Now, the effort is to keep them under detention. That is crime prevention. Even if the suspect is not convicted, or the evidence is insufficient to convict the suspect, police wants to keep them in arbitrary arrest until the judgment of the case. Our efforts are towards that.

Such short-term strategies will be ineffective in the long run. Three operations conducted in Australian Capital Territory (ACT) targeting rising burglary offences validate this assertion. The first operation is Chronicle, that ran from 8 November to 1 December 1999, using 18 police officers. After the operation, the number of burglary offences fell sharply before rising to pre-operation level within a few weeks. The second operation is Dilute, that was conducted from April to June 2000. The impact of Dilute was similar to that of Chronicle (Makkai, Ratcliffe, Veraar, & Collins, 2004). The third operation, codenamed Anchorage, that employed analysts, investigators, and frontline teams over a period of four months in 2001, produced better results unlike the previous two operations. It facilitated in the arrest of 77% of persons who had at least one prior offence recorded, and within 100 days offending rate of recidivists dropped by half (Makkai et al., 2004). Following this endeavour, the crime rate remained low for 45 weeks, until the release of those incarcerated in the operation (Ratcliffe, 2016, pp. 160–162). Based on the success of Anchorage, the ACT commenced Operation Halite, and three aspects of policing were incorporated in it: investigations, intelligence, and crime prevention (Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 163).

Returning back to this research, the participants identified the programmes for school children to be a wasteful undertaking as the programmes are targeted at the disciplined or well-looked after children in the educational system. As a result, the vulnerable and risk groups, who are not in the educational system, are marginalised. Only R016 had noticed a role of the intelligence sector in crime prevention, which was based on the collaborative work between the intelligence sector and the Islamic Ministry, against religious extremism. A senior intelligence personnel explained the relations between crime prevention and the intelligence

sector:

> We are more focused towards disruption. We work very closely on that... While considering preventing activities, I think the people responsible for prevention, who are at the Public Affairs Department are supposed to be doing that. But we don't have a link established with them. So, most of the time, preventive activities are conducted through the operational sector. Those two—disruption and prevention—are kind of mixed. But we have taken some good measures against disruption.

To identify the drivers of specific crimes, analysis is vital (Home Office, 2016b, p. 6), which was not recognised within the MPS leadership. Consequently, the MPS responded to crime issues (such as knife attacks or robberies) after it became a significant problem, without developing a crime prevention strategy.

Theme 15: Information from the right people at the right time – Withheld

In the MPS, there is often the issue of withholding information without delivering it to the right people, including the executives (R012; R015; R018; R030; R053; R057; R061; R075). In explaining this improper behaviour, R053 explained how the intelligence managers and supervisors held information from the operational teams in the capture of the notorious convicts who had escaped from the central prison, Maafushi Jail, in 2014. According to him, the senior intelligence personnel did not share the necessary information with the frontline teams involved in locating and apprehending those convicts for days, until one intelligence supervisor threatened to walk out of the operation if intelligence was not shared with the right people. The intelligence sector was getting first-hand information through phone interceptions, but that information was not shared for four days. When intelligence was shared with the right people (operational commanders), the escapees were located and arrested within hours. From the minutes of the Executive Board, it is clear the intelligence sector did not share intelligence with the executives responsible for operations. The jailbreak was discussed at a session of the Executive Board on 19 October 2014 (MPS, 2014l). As the jailbreak was of national concern, tasks carried out by the operational teams to find the escapees were briefed to the Board by the executive responsible for operations. He told the Board that the intelligence sector had notified his command of the jailbreak on 17 October 2014, and from that moment the operational teams worked ceaselessly to locate and arrest the escaped convicts. In that process, operational teams

had searched 34 guesthouses in Maafushi Island and all the likely places they would visit or make contact with. He informed of the preparations to search nearby tourist resorts (separate islands), and the dispatch of an operational team to Guraidhoo Island. Plans were set to send another response team to Dhiffushi Island on 19 October 2014. He had also mounted security at the residences of the prosecutors and police detectives who had handled the cases. These operational activities bespeak the unnecessary cost and extra-burden of not sharing vital information with the right people at the right time.

According to the participants, the extra control on dissemination of information was a regular practice as intelligence personnel were unfamiliar with the role of intelligence in policing. It was said that intelligence was shared only with officers trusted by the intelligence personnel (involved), but not on a need-to-know or right-to-know basis. The experience shared by a junior officer is relevant in this regard. According to R075, intelligence was often shared not with the right person, but with the person the intelligence officers trusted. R075 narrated an experience as a deputy team leader of a tactical team that was deployed in an atoll (for a short period) to tackle youth violence there, where intelligence was briefed not to R075 but (verbally) to a subordinate. In the operations R075 led, R075 had to get information from the subordinate officer.

Another issue identified was bypassing certain officers, who had an integral part to play, in disseminating intelligence. R024 encountered such problems, where his superior officer (an executive) was not informed about the problems that were shared with him. Likewise, sometimes, R024's subordinates received intelligence that R024 was not informed about, though as the operational manager, all operational and tactical intelligence must be communicated to R024, as it was the manager's responsibility to assign tactical teams to tackle those problems operationally. The same issue was raised in an Executive Board meeting by an Assistant Commissioner for keeping him in the dark when a national-level operation in which a department under him was utilised in early 2015 under the direct command of the commissioner without his knowledge (MPS, 2015i).

Hence, a culture of secrecy was prevalent in the MPS, which affected intelligence and ILP processes pertaining to identifying, prioritising, and intervening to prevent or mitigate threats. The agency must be made aware of the importance of delivering the right information to the right people at the right time to achieve results (Fletcher, 2000, p. 114, cited in Cope, 2004, p. 191). Access to classified materials should be based on the security classification of the

"would-be inquirer, not the individual's membership of an informal power clique or formal organisational grouping" (Management Audit Unit, 2006, p. 56).

In the MPS, there were no standards or protocols on information management or sharing. None of MPS' internal documents or evaluations identified these problems, reducing its efficacy. A possible reason could be the failure of the MPS to review its operational performance. Only 15.56% of the participants assumed that operational reviews were conducted in the MPS (see figure 6.5), and a majority of them believed that operational reviews were not conducted periodically. Even after-action reviews were not a common practice in the MPS. R025 explained the existing practice of performing operational reviews as:

> I don't believe operational reviews are done here. I am not denying the various activities organised at the end of the year to develop a new plan. But, in a planned manner, we do not conduct operational reviews. But when a [major] incident occurs, things might be evaluated. When things get worse, and there is a dire need, then an assessment might be conducted.

Figure 6.5: **Participants believed operational reviews were conducted.**

Though some of the participants of category two claimed that operational reviews were conducted in their departments, based on their description, those activities cannot be considered as operational reviews. For instance, R021 referred to the weekly department meetings as operational reviews, even though R021 attended only three of those meetings, despite being the manager. From R021's description of the meetings, it is clear these were briefing sessions, which is a small segment of an operational review (NCPE, 2005c, p. 94; 2007, p. 15). R056 believed that operational reviews were conducted, though R056 never participated in that process.

Summary

The chapter intended to find answers for the second research question, comparing existing practices and protocols within the MPS with ILP literature to study the features of ILP that the MPS adopted in its efforts to customise and contextualise NIM to its local needs and context. Through this process, it was expected to distil hypotheses H2, H3, and H5.

The Directorate of Intelligence overly relied on deliberate information collected through covert and intrusive methods, and rarely used routine information collected through everyday policing activities. The information collected in everyday policing is preserved in data silos, which the analysts were not able to exploit due to lack of applications to visualise or manipulate that. This unproductive routine is not recognised by the management and it was not attributed to the poor quality of MPS intelligence. Consequently, to overcome this limitation, senior officers long for more CHIS within communities. In spite of its overdependence on covert techniques and means, the MPS has not formulated a privacy policy. The closest to a privacy policy was the *Policy on Interception and Surveillance,* issued by the Minister of Home Affairs in 2013. This policy legitimised intelligence work in the MPS by providing necessary authority and powers to intelligence personnel, which was a grey area in the Police Act and the regulations made deriving powers from the Police Act. This policy does not promote ethical decision-making before interfering with the right to privacy and family life. The Policy is known to few intelligence personnel as it was not circulated agency-wide.

The MPS has also not realised the importance of community information, both from its general staff and the populace. As a result, there are no dedicated mechanisms to obtain and channel useful information from the community and police staff. Despite this limitation, 73.33% of the participants passed information to the intelligence sector, predominantly to circumvent a problem for themselves or close persons. Hence, this figure does not imply that the staff recognised information collection as an agency-wide responsibility. Furthermore, the receipt of four Intelligence Collection Forms from staff, from 2011 to 2013, implies that the majority of police personnel perceived intelligence collection as a responsibility of intelligence personnel and that they have no role in that process. Additionally, the MPS does not task its frontline teams to collect information for analysis. These findings validate hypothesis H5.

The Maldives is yet to have any community-supported crime-fighting organisations. Consequently, all service calls, including calls to pass useful information and calls to report incidents and criminal acts, were received at the PCC. The PCC is not designed and equipped

to handle this pressure as mechanisms have not been installed to channel tip-offs or information to the intelligence function. As a result, the call handlers at the PCC do not get sufficient time to think and ask all the relevant questions to those calling to share information, as call-handlers are always engaged in incidents or events that require prompt attention and action. In instances where members of the community passed information to the MPS through police assistance lines (at the PCC) or other departments, suitable protocols and processes were not in place to record and forward that information for analysis.

As a result of dependence on CHIS and communication interception for information, the intelligence function of the MPS was more similar to a national security apparatus than a police intelligence setup. The reliance on intrusive methods has diminished the role of developing intelligence collection plans as well as the value of 'police information'. These factors reduced the quality of its intelligence, making those unactionable. The underlying factor for this organisational failure was the underdeveloped analytical capability to meet its strategic and environmental requirements. As developing analytical capacity is one of the focus areas in implementing ILP, the failure to focus on analytical needs must have affected ILP practice in the MPS. Owing to this oversight, intelligence disseminated to all levels (supervisory, managerial, and strategic/command) was either tactical or operational, but never strategic.

Another key element of ILP, not adopted by the MPS, was the T&C process. There existed no T&CG at any level, even though it is an essential element of ILP for tackling both strategic and operational problems (BJA, 2009; NCPE, 2005c, 2006b, 2007; OSCE, 2017). The Management Board and the Executive Board rarely discussed departmental performances with respect to crime or crime problems. In the few instances when such discussions took place, it did not affect the strategic directions of the agency. This affected in setting the control strategy as well as decision-making at both the strategic and operational levels. Due to the absence of TT&CG, there was no effort to achieve the organisational goals (or operational priorities) in a collective manner, leaving out significant problems unattended. When the MPS embraced ILP, there was an intent to incorporate the T&C process of NIM in the agency, with the Executive Board as the strategic T&CG and the Management Board as the TT&CG. That process could not be adopted as the executives were reluctant to bring all the issues to a single platform, perhaps for fear of losing control or authority in their respective domains.

The absence of a T&C process has affected not only service delivering but also resource management. Though the Executive Board authorised yearly plans and annual operational

priorities, these were not based on a Strategic Assessment. Furthermore, the plans were not budgeted. Such an approach hindered achieving the goals set in those plans. Owing to the absence of any T&CG, the MPS failed to assess its intelligence gaps, and reactively responded to crimes instead of being proactive. In the absence of a tactical T&C process, the DO was responsible for coordinating different departments and divisions when more than one department or division had to be involved in tackling or mitigating real-time issues or incidents. In such situations, the DO could only be responsible for the 'enforcement option' of the tactical menu. In spite of the important role the DO plays, intelligence was not directly disseminated to the DO. The products were sent to the head of PCC, and it was his or her discretion to share the products with the DO. Consequently, the DO was not always informed.

Proactive crime prevention efforts were very limited in the MPS. Its Crime Prevention Unit did not receive intelligence and there was no link between the Directorate of Intelligence and this unit or its parent department—PAD. PAD was primarily focused on organising fun-fare events and programmes for the public. As a result, PAD had no operational responsibility, and there was no clarity between crime prevention and disruption as both functions were attended by frontline operational units. Another bad practice noticed in the MPS was withholding intelligence from the right people at the wrong time. Owing to this practice, resources have been misused and individuals have faced unwarranted risks. Through the participants' experience and the documents shared by the MPS, this study observed one such incident where notorious convicts broke out of the central prison. In this incident, the live information acquired through phone interceptions was not shared with the concerned operational teams for four days, making operational teams search many islands and places, and wasting resources, officers' time, and public money. The MPS is yet to learn about the misuse of resources due to withholding information in this case, because it still does not conduct operational reviews, which are essential to ensure lessons are learnt and organisational knowledge is retained (NCPE, 2005c).

Based on these findings, it is clear that adequate attention was not being given to the elements of ILP in the MPS, and sufficient efforts were not made to develop ILP and the intelligence function of the MPS. This verifies the second hypothesis (H2) of the thesis. The findings also point to an unawareness of the process involved in developing control strategy among members of the Executive Board. Their unfamiliarity with control strategy affected intelligence requirements, resulting in the misuse or non-use of its intelligence architecture and resources to achieve its organisational goals. The non-use of police information in analysis and restricting

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the intelligence from the 'right people' has impacted the efficacy of the agency. Therefore, the third hypothesis is also verified. The findings also ascertain that the MPS adopted the ILP moniker, but not its philosophy. Based on the findings of the previous chapter and the dissimilarities in the ILP in the MPS and its rhetoric, the only inference that can be drawn is—adopting ILP in the MPS is not shaped by coercive or normative isomorphic modelling, but it is a mimetic neo-institutionalist approach, because the MPS copied a model it considered successful in another police agency.

This chapter intended to assess the extent to which existing crime control practices within the MPS were consistent with ILP, and the conclusion is that the practices in the MPS were not aligned to ILP, even in its most basic form. Even though the MPS says it practises ILP, it was following the traditional reactive form of policing. The intelligence function of the MPS has been neither adequately developed to generate actionable intelligence nor integrated into the organisational structure of the MPS even in the most basic form, hindering its ability to support decision-making and proactive policing.

CHAPTER 7:
FACTORS INFLUENCING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

This chapter examines the third research question of the thesis: *What are the factors that facilitate or impede the development and effectiveness of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in policing in the Maldives?* Through the last two chapters, it has been established that practising ILP has been restricted in the Maldives Police Service (MPS). This chapter explores the underlying factors that influenced this hindrance. All hypotheses of this thesis are related to this research question. Of these, the only hypothesis not evaluated in previous chapters is the fourth one (H4): *Technological innovations within the MPS were not directly linked to its organisational goals or ILP needs*. This hypothesis is examined in this chapter.

In analysing other research questions in the previous chapters, the underlying reasons that affected the practice of ILP in the MPS have already been discussed, to a large extent, under fifteen broad themes. Therefore, this chapter addresses the new and pertinent themes (from sixteen to twenty-one) without reiterating those discussions. Of the six themes discussed in this chapter, Theme 16 is developed predominantly on the responses of the architects of Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (hereafter referred to as SP2), and to maintain source anonymity the alphanumeric codes assigned to the draftsmen are not used in this theme. In instances, other references are used in this theme, they are appropriately cited.

Theme 16: A vision for policing – Absent at the top

When three officers were sent to Scotland in 2010 to develop a new strategic plan for the MPS, the executive leadership (commissioner and three deputy commissioners) did not elucidate to them a vision to achieve, for which they must devise an objective oriented plan. Consequently, they moulded a three-year plan on their subjective knowledge, based on the guidance they received from the Scottish experts. This new plan was unveiled as SP2 on 30 December 2010 (Faseeh, 2010). Since the strategic planning process adopted to develop SP2 has already been discussed in Theme 5 (Chapter Five), that process will not be restated here. The draftsmen of SP2 envisaged the importance of *owning* SP2 by the executive leadership for its successful implementation, particularly due to the emphasis placed on this by the Scottish experts. The draftsmen tried to convince the executive leadership of the devotion of the executives required

to realise the plan. They proposed making at least a deputy commissioner responsible for the entire SP2, which did not happen.

The importance of "ownership of the strategic plan" by the executive leadership was identified as a 'critical success factor' in SP2 (MPS, 2010e, p. 7). One of the draftsmen assumed that a specific senior executive did not take *ownership* of SP2 because ILP was an 'alien subject' to the executive leadership. Though the implementation of SP2 has been discussed in Chapter Five, this aspect requires further detail.

Another architect of SP2 explained the hurdles faced in trying to convince the executive leadership of the importance of the executive ownership of the plan:

> I struggled a lot to find who was the specific person responsible for the plan. I wanted to get the name of the person who must take ownership of the plan. But that commitment was not given—naming the [specific] person responsible. On one end, DC [Deputy Commissioner] Atheef will be responsible as administrative head. But his job role included some investigative responsibilities too. Since most of the issues addressed in the plan were related to crime, I wanted the DC in the crime sector to take ownership. For that, there was disagreement. How can he take responsibility for something that is more or less administrative, or for something for which a person at the strategic side must take ownership?

The draftsmen of SP2 identified the failure of the executive leadership to own SP2 as a leading factor that hampered the practice of ILP in the Maldives. Though they argued that none of the senior executives took responsibility for SP2, in its 'Plan of Action', the deputy commissioners were made responsible for delivering the 'strategic goals', while the commissioner was responsible for the overall plan (MPS, 2010e, p. 53), as shown in Figure 7.1. The heads of departments were tasked with achieving the 'Strategic Actions' listed for each strategic goal of the Plan (MPS, 2010e).

With this framework and organisational structure in place in the MPS, there was no space for any specific officer to take 'ownership' of the entire plan, except the commissioner. On behalf of the commissioner, the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU), situated in the Commissioner's Bureau, was tasked with monitoring SP2's implementation (MPS, 2010e). Owing to the junior rank of the officers in the SPU involved in monitoring SP2's implementation, they failed to exercise the required authority over other departments towards realising SP2, reported the

draftsmen. Consequently, the quarterly evaluation originally proposed to assess the progress of SP2 did not take place, except in the first quarter of 2011, informed a draftsman. The Annual Report 2011 provided no insights regarding the realisation of the 'strategic goals', though it stated that SPU was elevated to a department (called the Strategic Planning Department) on 13 March 2011 and moved out of the Commissioner's Bureau to the Administrative Services Command (MPS, 2012g, p. 13). With this change, the reporting structure in SP2 (see Figure 7.1) could be affected. However, none of the participants interviewed raised this issue. Upon recognising the challenges in realising the 'strategic goals' of SP2, on 14 March 2011, a deputy commissioner proposed to revise SP2 at a Management Board session (MPS, 2011c). The deputy commissioner suggested making a specific deputy commissioner responsible for SP2, similar to its architects' initial recommendation. That suggestion was rejected. Subsequently, the SP2 missed most of the milestones set out in the 'monitoring and evaluation cycle' even in the initial year, such as organising a mid-year and end-of-year conference, conducting a public perception survey and a staff survey, (re)aligning the strategic plan, and others, revealed the architects.

Figure 7.1: **Delivery strategy of SP2.**
Source: MPS (2010e, p. 53)

One of the draftsmen, who was assigned to the SPU at the time, said the command heads (responsible for the strategic goals) and department heads (responsible for strategic actions) "failed to function as required due to a lack of understanding of the concepts" because heads of commands and departments were not only unfamiliar with ILP, but also SP2. Consequently, the implementation of SP2 was hampered. The draftsmen of SP2 believed that the executive leadership of the MPS lacked not only a vision for the future but also the capacity to translate the vision created for them. Aggravating this weakness was also the executive leadership's limited knowledge of the various knowledge-based policing models, said the draftsmen. For the draftsmen, it was due to this limitation that the executive leadership could not provide them with any directions on how they wanted to develop policing in the Maldives in the future.

The failure to take ownership of the change to ILP and a lack of understanding of ILP at the apex level of agencies have been documented in other research. In a study on New Zealand Police in 2003, soon after it implemented ILP, a number of factors were identified that influenced the agency from effectively practising ILP (Ratcliffe, 2005). One of the most significant factors was "a lack of understanding of intelligence-led policing at the leadership levels of the organization" (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 435). John and Maguire (2004, p. 6), in their evaluation of early implementation of National Intelligence Model (NIM) in three British police forces, identified "ownership" of NIM across the agencies as one of the most significant problems that required attention in the future. Hence, ownership of the change, for them, was not limited to the leadership but to the entire agency. To overcome this problem, which was due to ignorance about the purpose of NIM, they proposed to employ "creative efforts" and training (John & Maguire, 2004, p. 5).

Theme 17: Organisational goals for ILP – Lacking

This is a continuation of the previous theme, which focused on the views expressed by the draftsmen of SP2.

Though SP2 and none of the police documents contained specific goals on ILP, 26.67% of the participants interviewed were under the impression that the MPS had devised goals for ILP practice and promotion, while the rest of them expressed an opposite view or preferred not to answer that question. Among the 26.67% participants, 17.78% were not aware of those goals (see Table 7.1). All the participants from Category Three, who felt goals had been created for

ILP practice, admitted that they were not aware of those goals. Participants in Category One, who believed that goals for ILP practice and promotion had been adopted, revealed:

- Executive R013 said that SP2 was grounded on the theory of community-oriented policing (COP), and the change of direction towards NIM was opted much later. R013 felt the MPS was not able to sustain that change due to political demands.

- For Executive R023, the implementation of the 5x5x5 Report (Intelligence Collection Form) was an organisational goal developed and achieved to practise ILP. R023 did not know that form was no more functional.

- Manager R012 also felt the only goal the MPS attempted to achieve for ILP practice was the implementation of the 5x5x5 Report. Unlike R023, R012 was aware that the Report was accessible for a brief period. R012 attributed its failure to the agency's failure to monitor its progress.

Contrary to these viewpoints, Executive R014 was not aware of any specific goals for ILP. R014 believed that even if goals had been developed for ILP, those remained on paper. This was the opinion of the majority of the participants, who held the notion that ILP specific goals had been devised in the MPS. Like the participants of Category One, from the responses provided by the participants of Category Two, it was clear they were also hypothetical when they said the MPS had developed goals specific to ILP practice or promotion within the agency.

Table 7.1: **Participants' opinion of ILP goals, in percentages**

	Category 1			Category 2			Category 3			All Categories		
	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA
Goals were devised for ILP practice.	69.6	21.7	8.7	58.3	25.0	16.7	60	40	0	64.4	26.7	8.89
Though believed goals were developed, unaware of those.		8.7			16.7			40			17.8	

Note: NA = Not aware and no answer.

Among those who assumed that goals for ILP had been devised, many were not able to recall those goals. Some of them considered the implementation of the 5x5x5 Report as a goal, even though it was merely an activity implemented without formalising it in the agency's policies or procedures (for details, see Theme 8). When the 5x5x5 Report was discussed by the Management Board on 21 June 2011, it was not related to any organisational objectives or strategic directions of the agency (MPS, 2011d).

Consistent with the participants' views, goals specific to ILP were not devised in any initial plans on policing, including SP2, which is the cornerstone of ILP in the MPS. SP2 was

developed around three 'strategic goals', but it did not link any of them to ILP practice or promotion. The strategic goals of SP2 included tackling crimes, improving community safety, and achieving governance and management of the highest standard (MPS, 2010e, p. 6). The first two strategic goals addressed problems related to operational policing. The third strategic goal, while appearing to be relevant to the adoption and promotion of ILP, did not address that, as the issues aimed to tackle through that goal were (MPS, 2010e, p. 26):

• Enhance organisational learning and leadership capacity at all levels.	Very High Priority
• Build a high performance and ethical workforce.	
• Effective use and efficient management of resources.	High Priority
• Develop and implement health and safety policy/protocols.	Medium Priority
• Review and implement strategies to retain qualified staff.	Low Priority

In the 'Plan of Action' of SP2 for these objectives, there was no mention of the term ILP or NIM, even though the Action Plan for the first Strategic Goal was developed on NIM's 'tactical options menu' with the components *prevention*, *intelligence*, and *enforcement*. The difference between NIM's tactical menu and the format adopted in SP2 was that timelines were set for each component, and the three components have mandatory activities for the MPS to implement (MPS, 2010e), whereas in NIM these are options that can be elected to tackle a specific police problem (NCPE, 2005c; 2007, p. 110). SP2 identified 'strategic actions' to be taken for *prevention*, the type of *intelligence* to be generated to achieve each strategic objective, and the type of *enforcement* activity to be performed to suppress and prevent that crime.

Owing to this framework of action, the draftsmen of SP2 were asked about the reason for not including goals or activities to promote ILP practice in the plan. Their responses varied. According to one of the draftsmen, a specific goal for ILP practice was developed at the drafting stage, but he did not know how it was missed in the 'final write-up' of the Plan. After going through SP2, he recalled that the drafting team did not include a specific goal for NIM because the team members decided to contextualise NIM to the Maldivian environment. For that purpose, they "borrowed the concept of *prevention*, *investigation* and *education* from that framework".[1]

According to a second draftsman, the drafting team developed a plan to address existing challenges to policing in the Maldives, not for promoting NIM or ILP. The suggestion to adopt NIM was made by the Scottish facilitators, when the draftsmen explained the challenges ahead

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[1] The draftsman might have been referring to the 'tactical menu' options *prevention*, *intelligence* and *enforcement* as that was the framework of action in SP2.

for the MPS. Presentations on NIM were organised by the Scottish Police College (SPC) to make the team understand NIM. With the limited exposure to NIM at the SPC, it appears that the draftsman was unaware of the key elements of NIM. This was particularly noticeable in his responses on the tasking and coordination (T&C) process. He believed that the MPS practises the T&C process during major events such as elections. Tasking of duties and responsibilities to operational teams convened for specific operations is not synonymous to the T&C process in NIM or ILP.

The third draftsman admitted that the team had failed to assess the *organisational* dimension, even though PESTELO analysis had been used, as the leadership barred the team from using previous research, believing those were biased. As a result, the team had to settle on their subjective knowledge and crime statistics to assess the needs of the MPS along with the advice given by the Scottish experts in developing the strategic goals and 'plan of action' to achieve those priorities. This approach narrowed their focus on internal (organisational) challenges, as external challenges dominated their discussions. He further clarified:

> No effort was administratively taken to introduce the core values or core elements of intelligence-led [policing] into the organisational structure so as to apply that process. The only thing done was the introduction of structural changes. But the core elements could not be incorporated within those changes. No amendments were made to police regulations, policies, Commissioner's Orders, and departmental procedures. We could not do that, and the main reason for that lies with the failure to educate many of the officers on intelligence-led policing. Orientation plus training were not included in the plan, for creating awareness.

Hence, the importance of creating specific goals for implementing and sustaining NIM processes was overlooked by the draftsmen as well as the MPS leadership. The annual reports of the MPS, from 2011 to 2015 did not recognise a need to promote ILP in the agency or the country. None of the reports stated any efforts made by the agency for the implementation or promotion of ILP in the MPS. The 2010 Annual Report briefly mentioned that SP2 and departmental action plans had been developed (MPS, 2011e, p. 60), but provided no further information about the plans or future direction of the MPS. A critical factor in successful implementation of ILP within any agency "is goal clarity" (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p. 13).

In none of the sessions of the Management Board or the Executive Board was such an intent or goal deliberated until 2014,[2] three years after embracing NIM. On 17 February 2014, while discussing the strategies for 'reducing crime', the Executive Board accepted the need to focus on strengthening the ILP architecture of the agency to predict and prevent crime (MPS, 2014c), and consequently it was included in Business Plan 2014 (MPS, 2014g, pp. 33–34). However, from 2011 to 2016, this was the only instance where promoting ILP was addressed in any of its policy development processes.

The only endeavour of the MPS that has any association with NIM is the staff competency framework (and pay grades of civilian staff) of the intelligence sector, endorsed by the Executive Board on 5 August 2012 (MPS, 2013p, p. 35). This competency framework was grounded on Britain's *Practice Advice on Resources and the People Assets of the National Intelligence Model* (MPS, 2013p). Though members of the Executive Board were informed of the contextualisation of the roles elaborated in the NIM Practice Advice during the presentation of the new framework to the board, the intent to adopt the framework was not associated with any strategic objectives of the MPS. Rather, it was an effort to professionalise the intelligence sector (profession) and recruit civilian staff to the positions that could be civilianised so that public money spent on human sources could be reduced (MPS, 2012i).

Theme 18: ILP and the decision-making process – Disconnected

Among the participants interviewed, 8.89% thought ILP adoption affected decision-making in the MPS, while 75.56% disregarded any impact on the decision-making process. Confirming the trends established in Theme 11, 60% of the participants said intelligence was not used in operational decision-making, while 26.67% said intelligence was used to inform operational decisions. Intelligence was rarely used in developing future plans (see Table 7.2).

The only participant from category one who believed ILP affected the decision-making process in the MPS was R028, an executive responsible for divisional policing. However, the participant said that impact was short lived. From the second category, R032 and R055 believed that ILP, to a lesser extent, influenced the decision-making process in the MPS. R032 believed

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[2] The only instance where the limitations inherent in SP2 were discussed was on 14 March 2011 by the Management Board (MPS, 2011c). In this discussion, the importance of devising goals for ILP was not the issue under discussion. The issue of concern raised in that meeting is already mentioned in the previous theme.

that "in some situations, intelligence was relied upon, at the operational level". R032 further explained the process of disseminating intelligence for operational use, saying:

> Regarding most issues, we provide information to operational teams, especially in Malé, on a daily basis. For example, if the crime rate in a particular area increases or it increases at a particular time, we inform that [to operational teams], and share the information of the offenders residing in that area, along with their usual whereabouts. Information is shared to this level. But that is again on an operational… If you talk about the larger picture, at the entire organisational level, we attend this level rarely. Dependence is lesser.

Table 7.2: **Effect of ILP on decision-making in the MPS, in percentage**

	Category 1			Category 2			Category 3			All Categories		
	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA
ILP affected the decision-making process.	82.6	4.4	13.0	75	16.7	8.3	60	10	30	75.6	8.9	15.6
Intelligence is used in long-term planning.	73.9	8.7	17.4	50	16.7	33.3	30	0	70	57.8	8.9	33.3
Intelligence is used in operational planning.	60.9	20.1	13.0	50	41.7	8.3	70	0	30	60.0	26.7	13.3

Note: NA = Not aware and no answer.

R055, a senior intelligence personnel, had the impression that the impact on decision-making was based on the ability of the officer who conveyed the intelligence product. According to R055, it depended on the authority and credibility of the individual and it had no relevance to the working style in the MPS. R051 expressed a similar opinion regarding the personality of the individual officer influencing the decisions, but R051 believed that ILP had not affected the decision-making process in the MPS. R051's response is cited below as it provides insights on the impact of intelligence on decision-making in instances where there is a connection:

> A particular individual leading the intelligence sector could influence the entire agency. In other words, the contribution of intelligence-led policing or the contribution of intelligence on operations, strategic plans, and other things depends on the person who delivers that. For instance, when decisions are made at the senior level or at the Executive Board level, if the person representing the intelligence sector is an influential person, then people accept intelligence forecasts. Else, nobody will accept intelligence. Hence, that affects operations, strategic plans, and all such things.

From the first category, two participants said strategic intelligence was used in long-term planning. Executive R013 said intelligence was used in the MPS at strategic, operational, and

tactical levels. Later in the interview, R013 contradicted the previous assertion, saying intelligence was not used in discussions held at the strategic level. An intelligence supervisor, who plays a crucial role in the dissemination of intelligence, concisely detailed the exercise:

> The intelligence sector does not generate assessments for the strategic level. But, to make the strategic level officers or executive level officers aware of the crime situation, we produce a weekly briefing and send it to them. That is not an assessment of strategic level. That is just an intelligence product that summarises the events that occurred in the past week and provides a forecast for the coming week.

Hence, the weekly briefings (or Weekly Intelligence Reports) are not intelligence assessments, as "Describing a past event is not intelligence analysis; it is reciting history" (Clark, 2013, p. 195). R019, an assistant commissioner, revealed the extent to which intelligence was used in decision-making in the MPS, and R019's observation encapsulated succinctly the responses expressed by the majority:

> I don't believe we use intelligence to any extent in decision-making, especially in the plans that we develop for the future. For instance, in any of the programmes we develop for the future or while planning for future events, there were no requests for information collected by the intelligence sector. But in making security plans, information collected by the intelligence sector is sometimes used. But in other plans, intelligence is not used.

As seen in Table 7.2, intelligence was rarely used by the MPS in operational policing, and when it was used, it was for a major event planning. From the managerial level, only a division commander admitted to using intelligence in operational decision-making. Two critical problems were identified in this commander's response. According to the commander, when he was appointed to his division six months before the interview, he had to personally collect information to initially assess the situation in his division as Weekly Intelligence Reports provided no information about crime in the division due to limited coverage. Consequently, he had to use open sources, mostly news reports of daily occurrences, for his initial assessment. The second problem was his dependence on an intelligence coordinator stationed in one of the atolls to cover the entire division. His responses cast doubts on the capacity of the Directorate of Intelligence to generate actionable intelligence for this division. Despite the MPS' and the division commander's own efforts to enhance intelligence coverage in the division, more still needed to be done, which he explained:

There is only one officer [i.e., intelligence coordinator] to manage the *x* atolls. [The number of atolls is retracted for maintaining source anonymity]. So, physically, he can be stationed at one atoll, at a given time. I noticed that the outcome was better in the atoll where he gets physically stationed. Even when he is not there, activities are conducted. But there is a stark difference when he is present on the ground. I have requested to station intelligence coordinators at all the *x* atolls, and I am giving all the support I can. For that, the intelligence sector has asked me to release one of my investigating officers so that he can work as an intelligence coordinator. I am willing to release him as soon as I get a replacement.

Differing from that division commander's opinion, R028, who was responsible for divisional policing, noted that intelligence was not applied in the divisions in the way it was prescribed in NIM, as the accuracy and content of intelligence products depended on intelligence source coverage, and not operational need. R028 named three atolls where there was no source coverage, due to which no intelligence was generated on policing problems in those atolls. According to R028, there exists no support for ongoing investigations. The weekly intelligence reports R028 received were unsupportive in operational policing due to lack of actionable intelligence.

According to R035, "… the operations sector does not entirely rely on intelligence. They would take a casual look at the intelligence reports they get." R053, while explaining the underlying reason for claiming that intelligence was not used in operational decisions, said the number of intelligence personnel assigned to crimes were far less compared to the workload, which restricts efficiency. R053 compared the number of drug networks in the Maldives to the few intelligence personnel assigned to the Drug Intelligence Unit.

Among the participants of the third category, only one participant felt that the adoption of ILP affected decision-making at the MPS. R083, a patrol officer, affirmed the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence received by the frontline on matters related to politics (activities of the opposition political parties). R083 further informed that intelligence on other issues were of less value to the frontline, due to which frontline supervisors would skim those reports as the contents were unreliable. However, R083 attributed the success of many drug operations to ILP. Coincidentally, R053, while explaining how intelligence supported anti-drug operations, admitted that the intelligence sector was responsible for many successful drug operations,

though those operations were not based on intelligence, but rather raiding places when they heard something on the monitored phone lines.

Theme 19: Executive commitment – Nil

None of the participants of this research believed that the existing practices in the MPS promoted ILP. One of the factors they highlighted was the lack of commitment of the executives. Though they attributed several factors that hindered ILP practice in the MPS, lack of commitment of the executives was the factor identified by most participants. From Category One, 43.48% attributed it to hindering ILP practice, while 41.67% and 20% from Categories Two and Three respectively felt the same. The combined view of all participants is 37.78% (see Table 7.3).

Unawareness of ILP at all levels in the MPS was the second-most cited factor for hindering ILP uptake—33.33% of the participants. Unfamiliarity of the executives to ILP was the third-most prominent factor identified by the participants. Another factor was the MPS' unawareness of the benefits of ILP. When these factors are combined, unawareness would be the main factor that hindered ILP practice in the MPS. Table 7.3 shows the distinct reasons the participants linked to the failure to sustain ILP in the MPS.

Table 7.3: **Organisational factors that hinder ILP**

	Organisational factors	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	All Categories
1	MPS leaders' lack of interest or commitment	43.48%	41.67%	20%	37.78%
2	Unawareness at all levels of the MPS	39.13%	25.00%	30%	33.33%
3	Unawareness of executives	17.39%	33.33%	30%	24.44%
4	The political environment in the country	21.70%	8.33%	10%	15.56%
5	Lack of policies and procedures	13.04%	8.33%	0	8.89%
6	Unawareness of the benefits of ILP	17.39%	0	0	8.89%
7	Resistance from senior officers	13.00%	0	0	6.67%
8	Miscommunication within executives	8.70%	0	0	4.44%
9	Other factors	21.74%	41.67%	20%	26.67%

Note: Total percentage of all categories exceeds 100 as some of the participants identified more than one factor that hindered ILP in the MPS.

Except for the fourth and ninth factors, all other factors in Table 7.3 are directly connected to the commitment of the executives. From those who believed that the political situation in the Maldives was responsible for failing to sustain ILP in the MPS, R012 and R013 gave equal

stress to lack of policies and procedures, which amounts to executives' negligence. Likewise, R027 acknowledged miscommunication between executives as an organisational factor that influenced ILP practice, while R053 linked it with unawareness of ILP among the executives. Like R053, R020 questioned the commitment of the executives to the implementation of ILP. R057 felt that the MPS was highly politicised during 2010, and attempting to switch to ILP without studying the operational environment resulted politics in the nation affecting the implementation process. R057 did not attribute any other factor for the demise of ILP. R057's views were in line with the views of R017 and R033. According to R075, the main challenge for policing and ILP was the interest of politicians in the intelligence sector. The impact of national politics on policing will be discussed in Theme 20, so it is not examined in this theme. The issue of not understanding ILP has been discussed at length in Chapter Six. There, it was established that ILP was not understood by the vast majority of police personnel and adequate effort was not made to educate and raise awareness of the elements and processes of ILP.

In a study on the intelligence frameworks in 'Five Eyes', Walsh (2015, p. 133) identified the most important (and common) finding involved "a group of issues related to the leadership".

> Each framework showed the importance of having sustainable leadership across an agency or community to drive its implementation. This leadership cannot merely arise from those in intelligence executive roles who have responsibility for the framework's implementation. It requires leadership from other executives and non-intelligence management as well. Examining all five examples made clear that, while one or two "senior intelligence champions" may have sought to implement the new frameworks, no uniform whole-of-agency/community approaches were available for their implementation. Heads of agencies may be initially engaged in, or see the need for, development of a more coherent intelligence framework, but at that level sustaining this attention among other competing priorities and diminishing funding is difficult.
>
> (Walsh, 2015, p. 133)

The failure of the MPS to enact the required policies, regulations, and procedures appears to be one of the reasons that obstructed ILP diffusion within the MPS. This problem was noticed by only senior officers, who were serving as managers (heads of departments) or executives. Similarly, the resistance of senior officers, including executives, to practise ILP was noticed by those who were involved in the initial start-up process. R026 said most of the staff of the MPS considered the effort taken to introduce ILP as a marketing strategy of the intelligence

department. Echoing R026's response, R028 added clarity to it by stating that the executives who were unfamiliar with knowledge-based policing models were unsupportive of the new initiative, causing a friction within the top echelon.

In the MPS, there has always been a culture of mistrust within the senior officers, which restricts the flow of information within core policing components (R015; R023; R026; R027). Sometimes, the different commands work in isolation as independent institutions (R015; R027; R057). Such problematic working subcultures have been identified by many researchers (see Reiner, 2010). R015 believed that was the reason for failing to implement SP2. Like with SP2, R028 noted that SP3 was also not executed. Potparič (2014, p. 353) has reported such clashes between different professions of the police in Slovenia—competition between the analytic and operational professions.

Other factors that hindered ILP practice, which are clubbed in the ninth point of Table 7.3, are applying intelligence to selective targets to give space to others to commit crimes, appointment process of the commissioner and deputy commissioner(s), ILP being inappropriate to the Maldives, misinterpretation of ILP, individual's personality affecting the acceptability of intelligence, frequent change of police leadership, insufficient organisational capacity to practise ILP, and lack of work ethics in the MPS.

As the participants rightly identified, the MPS did not develop appropriate policies and procedures for practising ILP. The only policy that has any effect on intelligence (or ILP) has been discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

As unawareness or misinterpretation of ILP was the most significant factor that hampered the practice of ILP, this situation parallels that of the situation in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) when it embraced COP. When RCMP planned to practise COP, lack of understanding of COP within the top echelon delayed the publication of COP guidelines by two years (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p. 244). RCMP also faced widespread resistance to COP due to a misunderstanding on the part of its officers. RCMP overcame the situation by revising its COP based strategic plan altogether, defining COP in the new plan, and extending the implementation by two years (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007). The RCMP commissioner led the effort with the Director of Community Policing Services as "team leaders", while members of the management constituted the "team" (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p. 244). Unlike this case, in the MPS, even after six years, the basic processes have not been adopted

and guidelines not formulated. The management (managers and executives) is yet to understand ILP (for details, see Chapter Six).

Theme 20: Organisational changes – Not purposeful

Previously in this chapter, it has been established that specific goals were not devised for practising ILP. Instead of limiting to policing plans, this theme will discuss the organisational changes the MPS introduced following its migration from COP to NIM. The intention is to assess whether the MPS introduced any changes to facilitate ILP practice, even if no goals were formulated on paper and ILP adoption was a mimetic approach of replicating a model seen successful in another agency.

Despite the pitiful scenario in the MPS in sustaining ILP practice, more than one-fourth of the participants interviewed believed that organisational changes were introduced in the MPS to facilitate and absorb ILP. A differing view was shared by nearly double that number. A similar pattern was seen in the responses regarding the efforts by the leadership to create an environment conducive to promoting ILP (see Table 7.4).

From the first category, R013 thought the new posts created in the intelligence sector was the result of the organisational changes introduced to practise ILP, while R017 regarded the relocation of the Drug Intelligence Unit (DIU) from the Drug Enforcement Department (DED) to the main intelligence department as an organisational change to practise ILP. Contrary to the view of R017, DIU was relocated to the main intelligence function in December 2011, eleven months after the adoption of ILP, due to allegations of corruption within it and failure to produce expected results (R001; R012; R015). The introduction of the 5x5x5 Report was viewed by R017, R019, and R028 as an organisational change introduced for ILP practice. Implementation of the 5x5x5 Report is not discussed further in this theme as the matter has been discussed previously.

Table 7.4: **Efforts to promote ILP in the MPS, in percentage**

	Category 1			Category 2			Category 3			All Categories		
	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA
Organisational changes were introduced for ILP practice.	65.2	21.7	13.0	41.7	41.7	16.7	50	30	20	55.6	28.9	15.6
Leadership took effort to promote ILP.	69.6	13.0	17.4	41.7	33.3	16.7	40	20	40	55.6	20.0	22.2

Note: NA = Not aware and no answer.

R022 assumed that the creation of a specific command to manage the different investigating departments and the adoption of an investigation policy (in 2015) was to promote ILP. However, documentary evidence gathered for this research showed that the MPS brought all the specialist investigating departments (DED, Serious and Organised Crime Department—SOCD, Family and Child Protection Department—FCPD, Property and Commercial Crime Department, and Major Crime Investigation Department) under one command element in 2010 following the increase in the number of deputy commissioners from one to three (MPS, 2010d), to share responsibility among the three new deputy commissioners (see Appendix L). Similarly, the investigation policy issued on 17 December 2015 (MPS, 2015h), referred to by R022 and other participants as a product of ILP, is not related to ILP. The policy was introduced on 17 December 2015 by the new commissioner appointed on 3 December 2015 to reduce the time taken to investigate reported crimes (Areef, 2016; MPS, 2015f).

Among the participants of the second category, the most visible change R021 noticed in the MPS following the implementation of ILP was the participation of the community as a group in the daily and routine affairs of policing to contribute to it. From this category, R032 and R052 thought the 5x5x5 Report as the organisational change they witnessed, while R055 believed the changes brought to the MPS organigram were to practise ILP and enhance inter-departmental coordination. R055 was not able to recall any specific changes introduced.

The organigram of the MPS has undergone numerous changes since 2011, most of which were discussed by the Executive Board (MPS, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a), but none of these have ever been associated with ILP (see MPS, 2010a, 2011e, 2012g; MPS, 2013h, 2014f, 2015d, 2016b). These changes were initiated to streamline services or balance authority within the senior leadership (assistant commissioners and above). An unexplained change that has frequently occurred has been to the strategic planning function. When ILP was rolled out, that function was performed by the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU), situated within the Commissioner's Bureau, which was a command element under the direct supervision of the Commissioner (MPS, 2011e). The Unit was abruptly elevated to a department on 13 March 2011, and by 31 March the new department was raised to the level of a command (MPS, 2012g) without discussing the change at any board. The change was mentioned in the Annual Report 2011, but the reason behind it was unexplained. The organigram was again adjusted on 28 November 2011, and arranged under two deputy commissioners following the resignation of one among the three deputy commissioners (MPS, 2012g). With this change, the Crime Prevention Department, which was previously under the operations command was downgraded

to the level of a unit (Crime Prevention Unit) and moved to the Commissioner's Bureau (MPS, 2012g, p. 94). On 4 April 2012, the intelligence department was elevated to the command level, along with the Forensic Department. With this change, the Crime Prevention Unit was again brought to the level of a department (called the Public Affairs Department). These changes were adopted following the change of commissionership in February 2012 and not related to ILP (MPS, 2013h, p. 20). The elevation of the intelligence department was an effort towards specialisation and promoting covert policing to tackle serious organised crimes (R002). Numerous other changes were also seen in the support service sectors, which are not examined here as those changes are not expected to influence operational policing or ILP practice in the MPS. It was noticed that none of these changes were taken up accordance with Commissioner's Order Number 8/2009 and Order Number ORD-08/2015/03/00, which stipulated the processes that must be followed to change any organisational structure. Hence, the underlying reasons for the transformations are not clear, raising doubts that these changes were not effectuated to realise a vision or plan. R013, R018, and R019, who represent their commands at the Executive Board, revealed that the changes brought to the organigram were not research-based or methodical changes, due to which those changes had no impact on the efficiency of the agency.

R012, R017, and R054 said the dissemination of weekly and 'daily intelligence reports' was due to ILP, which was also emphasised by R001. A junior supervisor from the operations sector, R076 (from the third category), also noticed the receipt of "intelligence briefs" following ILP adoption. The documentary materials of the MPS, until 2012, lacked any information on the number or types of reports the agency generated. The figures were stated in a formal document for the first time in 2013, in *Police Performance Review 2012* (MPS, 2013p, p. 35). The Annual Reports of the MPS before 2010 provided no information regarding intelligence, except a few detections made by surveillance officers. The description of the intelligence disseminated to various departments and divisions in the Annual Reports indicates that tactical intelligence generation became semi-regular in the second half of 2010 (MPS, 2011e, pp. 157–165), and operational intelligence began to be disseminated, though rarely, from 2012 onwards (MPS, 2013h, 2014f, 2015d, 2016b). None of these reports provided any description related to a Strategic Assessment or strategic intelligence.

Among the participants who did not notice organisational changes, R061 and R077 stated that the MPS used the title ILP, albeit ILP was never implemented. In this matter, an atoll commander felt it would have been more advantageous if the MPS had not migrated to ILP and instead continued to practise COP. A similar viewpoint was expressed by R057.

Participants R016, R018, and R029 felt COP was more suitable to the Maldivian context than ILP. R016's understanding of ILP was limited to covert methods of information collection, especially recruiting sources within crime groups or infiltrating such groups.

Despite the underwhelming situation in the MPS, 51.11% of the participants held the notion that the MPS benefitted from ILP adoption (see Table 7.5). But 17.78% of them were not aware of those benefits.

Table 7.5: **Participants believed the MPS benefited from ILP adoption, in percentages**

	Category 1			Category 2			Category 3			All Categories		
	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA	No	Yes	NA
MPS benefitted from ILP adoption	21.5	60.9	17.4	50.0	41.7	8.3	30	40	30	31.1	51.1	17.9
Benefited, but not aware of the benefits.		21.7			8.3			20			17.8	

Note: NA = Not aware and no answer.

The benefits of adopting ILP highlighted by the participants were diverse. R076 believed that the intelligence personnel received training due to ILP. R076 was quick to also outline that those educated officers were transferred out with the change of police leadership in 2013. R011, R012, R078, and R080 attributed ILP to the successful drug operations making news headlines, while R056, R057, and R059 felt ILP enabled the promotion of the intelligence sector agency-wide. R053, R029, and R052 identified developments in analytical capacity and improvements in the information collection process as ILP motivated changes. Before the adoption of ILP, information was stored in stand-alone computers, which were susceptible to software viruses (due to the continuous connection of storage devices used in the field and elsewhere to transfer data/information to each computer separately as it was not networked then). Following the transfer to ILP, a centralised information management system was installed, narrated R053:

> I think we began to systematically operate as an intelligence-based agency from 2012. From then on, this system began to develop. For instance, before that, the information we collect will not be available for later use. I don't think there was any way for us to locate the information that was earlier collected. Later, a database was created—an intelligence management system was developed—and information was entered into that system, in a structured manner. Earlier, whatever information an officer had will be with him, in his brain or computer. If a virus infects the computer, then all the information will be lost.

About 8.89% of the participants felt that the installation of a centralised information management system was actuated by ILP. Though the transformation brought to data management in the MPS is undeniable, there is, however, no documentary evidence to associate this change with ILP. Contrary to the participants' views, the MPS had begun to automate its key functions and standardised data storage before the implementation of ILP (R023). Eventually, in 2010, an Oracle Exadata® platform was installed (MPS, 2011e, p. 409). To exploit the advanced computing and intelligent storage capabilities of the Oracle® Exadata Machine, new services were introduced in the MPS intranet in 2010, and already existing systems such as Police Custodial System, Police Information Management System (PIMS), Police Entry Management System (for managing incoming correspondence), Human Resource Management System, Medical Information System, and Finance and Accounts Management System were upgraded (MPS, 2011e, pp. 404–408).

Other areas relevant to automation and data management attributed to ILP were the development of the 5x5x5 Report (24.44%) and the Operations Module (17.78%). Since technological solutions and automated information management systems are integral to practise ILP (Bell & Congram, 2013; D. L. Carter, 2009; den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012; James, 2017; OSCE, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2002, 2007, 2016), the participants' accounts on technological transformations within the MPS require examination. Such an examination will also provide answers for the fourth hypothesis.

The failure to institutionalise the 5x5x5 Report has already been discussed in this chapter and previous chapters, confirming that it was not an outcome of an organisational goal. The only technological innovation that has not been examined so far is the development of the Operations Module. Among the participants of all categories, only one participant believed that the Operations Module "was developed under a plan" (R026). Nevertheless, he was unimpressed with its usefulness as it was suitable only for the operational needs of the departments based in Malé. Based on the intelligence he saw, R026 had the impression that the information fed to that module was not used in analysis. This was a common view as seen in the previous chapter.

The development of various modules or systems on PIMS was never discussed at any session of the Management Board or the Executive Board. The future plans such as SP2 and SP3 did not foresee a need to develop such modules, though all the plans recognised the influence of technology on organisational behaviour, society, and crime (MPS, 2014o). On 31 December

2014, the executive responsible for the information technology sector informed the members of the Executive Board of the new features of PIMS planned for 2015, while summarising the upgrades it had in 2014 (MPS, 2014m). None of the members commented or enquired about the matter after his explanation. From his description, it was evident that the Operations Module and other modules in PIMS had not been developed under the strategic direction of the leadership or an organisational objective. This was confirmed by the participants with knowledge about the progress of the technological developments in the MPS (R020; R023; R030; R034). Consistent with these findings, R023, who was responsible for the technological innovations, explained the development of the PIMS infrastructure as:

> The information management software was initially developed under the guidance of Former Deputy Commissioner Mohamed Fayaz, who retired from service in 2009. The software development team was instructed to create modules for each core policing function such as detainee management, investigation, human resource management, etc.[3] His direction was also not based on a requirement of the leadership but a vision that he held when he was the Head of Technology Department. After that, these modules were further developed by the development team. There was no input from anyone at the command level. So, the development or the progress made to that software is not due to a strategic direction or vision provided by the leadership. Instead, the software development officers would design and have meetings with the executive leadership to get approval or they would develop the functional module and seek an executive to endorse that so that it can be implemented.

As no official policy on the development of information systems existed in the MPS, the technology department introduced modifications to PIMS based on the requests made to the department by managers and supervisors (R018; R023; R025; R029; R030; R034; R084; MPS, 2013k). These requests were usually made to ease the workload of the frontline and, therefore, were not communicated to other departments before execution (R023; R030).

Other benefits the participants associated with ILP were the expansion and elevation of the intelligence department to a command-level element (4.4%), reduction of crime (4.4%), awareness of ILP among officers (2.2%), increased accountability (2.2%), and easing the

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[3] In Mohamed Fayaz's curriculum vitae (section: major projects completed), sent to the *People's Majlis* with the President's letter of nomination as Ambassador of the Maldives to Malaysia on 21 November 2013 for Parliament's approval, these projects were mentioned as his achievements (President's Office, 2013b).

decision-making process (2.2%). R029, while explaining how ILP made the officers accountable for their actions, had the impression that the Operations Module developed in 2013 was an achievement of ILP. R029 explained how the module on PIMS enhanced officer accountability:

> With the efforts taken to promote it [ILP], the system I mentioned earlier [i.e., Operations Module] was created, and we can securely store information in it. Also, the work of the ground level officers began to be valued. Along with that, their work can now be saved and stored. Earlier what happened was, the duty report will not be written on most days. […] But now, it will be written. The officers on the ground can send a message saying that she/he attended a scene, and that information goes into the module. Their work will not be mislaid. If attended, it will be known. Earlier, we got so many complaints saying I was stopped at this particular place and this was done to me. Then, there was no way to know that a person was stopped.

The participants who believed that ILP facilitated a reduction in crime were mostly hypothetical, as expected, as shown below:

- The MPS benefitted. In the future also, it will benefit the police. If we can collect information beforehand and base our activities on that, then risks will be reduced. (R027)
- The agency has immensely gained from it. I think it has led to a decrease of crimes in certain areas. (R028)
- I believe there will be benefits for the system [agency] due to the adoption of intelligence-led policing. Without accurate intelligence, these days, notorious criminals, such as drug dealers, gang offenders, and offenders involved in terrorism, cannot be recognised. So, with the adoption of intelligence-led policing, it will be easier to reach those kinds of people. (R035)

Many participants opined that ILP was never adopted in the MPS, due to which they could not comment on how the MPS benefitted from ILP. R080 believed that the DIU was relocated to the intelligence department from the DED following the adoption of ILP. R080 believed that this change had a positive impact on the fight against drugs, though R080 was certain that intelligence was used in the MPS as a political tool. R015, who witnessed the relocation of the DIU from the intelligence department to the DED in 2009, and again back to the intelligence department in 2011, gave a different reason for that change. R015's account and the circumstance for this change have already been discussed in Chapter Four. The observations

made by the participants on the exploitation of intelligence for political advantages will be discussed in the next theme.

R012 and R053 believed that the police officers learnt the concept of ILP following its introduction in the MPS. But they were reluctant to admit that MPS practised ILP. They believed that an effort was made to embrace it, which failed at a very early stage.

Theme 21: Political influence – Undue

In the Maldives, police intelligence was established for political interests (for details, see Chapter Five). Even after democratisation and the separation of powers of the state in 2008 through a new Constitution, political influence on police intelligence did not diminish (Yameen, 2015). Though the research did not seek to establish a relationship of intelligence with national politics, 46.67% of the participants identified some form of unwarranted influence or challenge to policing from political entities. The activities related to this aspect, mentioned by the participants, are listed in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6: **Challenges for policing from politics**

	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	All Categories
Police work is defined or affected by unwarranted political influence.	52.17%	33.33%	50%	46.67%
MPS collects and disseminates accurate information on matters of political interest (e.g. protests, opposition activities).	17.39%	16.67%	30%	20%
Public mistrusts the MPS due to political issues or nexus.	21.74%	8.33%	10%	15.56%

R013 had the view that when the political environment gets tense, the focus of police leadership also changes, diverting from developmental goals to the needs of the political party in power. R013 considered the tense political situation as the most significant challenge to policing and the development of the MPS. R080 was convinced that the MPS used the new powers acquired to practise NIM "to focus on the politics of the country rather than criminals". R053 and R029 expressed similar opinions. R029 believed that the reason for recidivism in the society was a close politics-crime nexus, with which criminals get an upper hand over the police through politicians. Consequently, convicted criminals remain loose within the society, committing crimes repeatedly.[4] Crime reports and MPS Annual Reports presented a complementary

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[4] Business Plan 2010 identified this challenge and proposed to limit recidivism of convicts kept in house-arrest by establishing a monitoring mechanism (MPS, 2010b). The gravity of the problem in crime control was explained

scenario on recidivism, which is shown in Table 7.7. It is not clear whether the detainees were released due to political influence or any other reason, but some of existing evidence points to undue influence at least in some cases, if not all.

Table 7.7: **Number of times persons were arrested in a year**

No. of times arrested	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
1	2,860	2,775	3,276	3,679	4,666	4,444	4,118
2	514	411	547	664	1,255	1,275	1,002
3	185	107	179	219	543	594	362
4	90	34	58	89	258	309	157
5	37	8	19	42	124	168	81
6	8	4	5	13	68	85	47
7	4	1	1	3	33	52	26
8	1	-	1	-	15	27	13
9	1	-	-	-	9	18	12
10			-	1	6	8	5
11					2	4	3
12					1	2	1
13					1	-	-

Adapted from: MPS (2011f, 2013i, 2015d, 2016b)

R014, R026, R027, R035, R079, R083, and R060 found that unlike organised criminal groups, the penetration of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) within the political sphere was strong, due to which accurate intelligence was produced on political activities organised by the opposition. Such intelligence was either used by the executive leadership or frontline sectors in operational planning to police protests and activities conducted by political parties (MPS, 2013p).

Many participants believed that the primary focus of the intelligence sector was to monitor the activities of opposition political figures. R075 and R015 expressed that this problem has gone to the extent of sharing intelligence with political appointees who have no role in crime control. This issue was acknowledged in 2015 by President Abdulla Yameen in his national address (Yameen, 2015). R019 blamed the way the commissioner of police and deputy commissioner(s) were appointed for not insulating the police from undue political interference. R019 had the opinion that as long as the top police positions are politically appointed (by the

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to the Executive Board on 14 October 2014 by the Directorate of Intelligence, with figures, and the kind of politician-criminal nexus the Directorate has observed over the years (MPS, 2014l, pp. 3–5).

president), political interference will occur as the leadership's top priorities will then be the issues of political (party in power) interest.

Though this issue is not evaluated in-depth in this thesis, the available information (interviews and documentary materials) points that policing was largely governed by the political interests of the executive branch. The refusal of the MPS to enforce the Order of the Supreme Court, issued on 1 February 2018, commanding the release of nine political prisoners (Supreme Court, 2018), and the recent reports of police behaviour in safeguarding the political regime, especially in suppressing or controlling political opponents following the no-confidence motion filed against the Speaker of *People's Majlis* by the united opposition on 3 July 2017 (Transparency Maldives, 2017), illustrates the extent to which the MPS was used as a political tool by President Yameen to remain in power. The dismissal of the Commissioner of Police, appointed to office by President Yameen in 2015, on 2 February 2018 for allegedly attempting to implement the Supreme Court's Order (of 1 February 2018), and arresting and charging him under terrorism law (Ali, 2018), illustrates the undue political influence on policing.

It was alleged by R053 that the intelligence sector diverts more resources to collect information on political opponents and their activities, compared to fighting organised crime such as drug trafficking, even though the drug menace is considered a national security threat (President's Office, 2009a, 2012). A DO said intelligence on political activities was shared in real-time with frontline departments unlike organised crimes or gang activities. The 'daily intelligence reports' generated for key operational positions has a special section on political activities planned for the next 24 hours. Two investigation officers noticed that the intelligence sector provides excellent support to investigations in investigating cases related to national politics (R054; R060), while R080 believed the focus of the intelligence sector has remained on politics and not criminals. Like R080, R083 and R084 also believed that the MPS collected accurate information on political activities. R026 summarised the prominence of politics in intelligence work:

> Even in the operations sector, intelligence is hardly used in daily or routine activities. For instance, when thefts increase in a particular area, and yet the intelligence sector will take no role to tackle that problem. However, if there is a protest, then the intelligence sector will be very effectively used. The information collected will be disseminated to the ground level to police the protest. For instance, for the local council elections scheduled in the coming days, we are preparing for that. I see that intelligence

is collected for that. But when crimes surge in an island, we don't gather intelligence to give an input to the operational sector to tackle that issue.

As the interviews were not designed to get into the details of this connection between politics and operational policing, probing questions were not asked.

Summary

This chapter explored the factors that restricted the practice of ILP in the Maldives. As some of the problems identified in the previous two chapters had influenced ILP absorption within the MPS, this chapter addressed the new and consequential issues.

The failure of the leadership to *own* the change was considered by the architects of the change as the primary reason that hindered the MPS from practising ILP. The underlying factors for hindering the diffusion of ILP within the MPS was found to be much more convoluted than that. Four main factors can be attributed to the cessation of ILP in the MPS. First, the draftsmen of SP2 were not well-versed in the basic processes and elements of NIM (as the time they got to familiarise with NIM at the SPC was not sufficient for the mammoth task). As a result, they gave no importance to embedding ILP processes and elements within SP2 or any other policy paper of the MPS, and focused on ways to tackle impending threats in the criminal environment. They misinterpreted NIM's *tactical menu* and framed SP2's strategic directions purely on the tactical options: prevention, intelligence, and enforcement. With this framework, there was no need to weigh the various options for tactical resolution as all the activities that must be performed or achieved in the next three years were predetermined in SP2. This framework also removed the need to re-assess the policing environment periodically. They made the commissioner of police responsible for deciding the Strategic Assessment (see Figure 7.1) to bring necessary changes to SP2, while delegating the responsibility of achieving its 'strategic goals' to the (three) deputy commissioners. In this process, the control strategy and its impact on SP2 were not identified, making it impossible to draw a connection between the Strategic Assessment with organisational goals ('strategic goals'), especially those related to crime. Based on the responses of the draftsmen and the structure of SP2, it would be accurate to say that the draftsmen were also not familiar with the fundamentals of intelligence work or intelligence function. With these limitations, the draftsmen could not customise NIM to the

context of the Maldives. Hence, ILP or NIM did not enter into practice and remained on paper, as few participants rightly pointed out.

Eventually, this affected ILP uptake as the required policy and procedural changes were not introduced to the existing processes, and new policies and procedures were not formulated. The work environment, as a result, remained unchanged, perplexing the supervisors and managers about its (new) direction. This is the second factor that inhibited ILP practice in the MPS. This situation arose in the MPS as ILP practice was not a vision of the leadership, but rather an interest of junior officers, supported by foreign experts, and imported from Scotland without assessing its applicability to the prevailing situation in the Maldives. Consequently, ILP implementation suffered.

Though the draftsmen attributed the failure of the top leadership to take ownership of SP2 as the main reason that restricted ILP in the Maldives, the framework of delivery adopted in SP2 is practical and theoretically balanced. According to SP2, the heads of departments (managers) were responsible for achieving the 'strategic activities', while the next tier comprising three deputy commissioner (executives) was assigned to achieve the 'strategic goals'. Since all departments that had a role in implementing the 'strategic activities' operated under a deputy commissioner, this framework created the required checks on the progress. Furthermore, the commissioner was responsible for the overall plan. This monitoring and evaluation mechanism, therefore, cannot be termed as the reason for failing to achieve SP2 or ILP. The weakness identified in this scheme of activities was the failure on the part of anyone at the top echelon to assess the progress in the implementation of the responsibilities delegated to them and the strategic planning sector (as a unit, department or command), except for one deputy commissioner. Hence, it would be apt to say that the leadership of the MPS did not give the commitment required to implement and sustain ILP. This was particularly evident in the way the strategic planning function was raised and moved from one command to another—without an objective, plan, or identification of the impact of the change on the implementation of SP2 and ILP.

Third, the MPS did not devise specific goals for ILP and had no vision on how ILP will affect the overall operation of the MPS. To implement and sustain the practice of ILP, goals specific to ILP must be articulated and adopted (BJA, 2009; D. L. Carter, 2009). The MPS overlooked this need as the leadership was unconversant with the key elements and features of ILP, and this affected its implementation. The leadership's limited knowledge of ILP stopped them from

understanding how the MPS could benefit from ILP. Their gravest error was that they approved a policing model without understanding ILP and without appreciating its applicability in the Maldives with reference to available resources, staff motivation, operating environment, and prevailing politics.

Owing to these problems (and issues identified in the previous chapters), the intelligence function of the MPS was detached from the decision-making process, at both the strategic as well as operational levels. Due to this, the MPS could not appreciate the benefits of ILP in making informed decisions against threats, optimising the use of finite resources available to policing, adapting to the complexities in the operational environment, and meeting public expectations in tackling crime and disorder problems. This is the fourth factor that affected ILP uptake in the MPS, even though it was due to the approach the MPS followed in implementing ILP. An important characteristic of ILP is to position intelligence central to decision-making (Hale et al., 2004, p. 303; Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 63), which did not happen in the Maldives. Though the MPS vouched to customise ILP to its needs (MPS, 2010e, p. 9), that never happened, and possibly the MPS attempted to implement the one-size-fits-all model seen in the UK, which is drastically different to the Maldives in all aspects, including socio-economic, political, geographic, and legal aspects.

Automated information management systems and data manipulation are vital for the success of ILP practice (OSCE, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2002, 2016). The MPS has been automating its processes to optimise resources and enhance efficiency. This effort was not carried out for creating an environment conducive to practising ILP, as it was a separate initiative promoted by the technology sector, and contributed by various departments to ease their work. It was not a strategic direction adopted under a planned process. Hence, the centralisation of databases and automation of functions in the MPS was not related to ILP or organisational goals— validating the fourth hypothesis of this thesis.

Another factor that influenced the professionalisation of intelligence work and the police in the Maldives was the undue political influence on policing. The nation needs to find ways to insulate the police from the executive branch using it as a tool against political opponents to remain in power. As some of the participants identified, a starting point could be changing the way the police chief and deputy chiefs are assigned to office and fired.

To sustain ILP practice within the police force, the executives must resolve all organisational barriers and "continuously lead by example" (BJA, 2009, p. 8). They must continuously

reinforce the ILP approach, and develop policies and procedures to support ILP practice (BJA, 2009). The leadership must give sufficient time to managing the change of the policing model to ILP, and give special attention to communicating the change as "communication is a major issue in implementation" (Amey et al., 1996, p. 2). The only positive change seen in the MPS following the migration to ILP was the dissemination of intelligence to various levels, even though these products mostly contained known information and was of less value to operational policing.

CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis analysed intelligence-led policing (ILP) by examining its interpretation, implementation, and perceived impact on policing and crime control from the ranks and files of the police. Three research questions and five hypotheses were used in the process. The research design adopted was an exploratory and interpretive research paradigm, blended in a case study involving the Maldives Police Service (MPS).

To extricate the prevailing practices in the MPS, a qualitative research study was conducted by involving its staff, both serving and retired. Forty-eight practitioners were interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire—45 were serving while the remaining three had retired from the agency after serving in key positions. The retired officers' narrations enabled mapping the developments within the agency (such as efforts in overcoming the challenges to policing shortly after inception, development of police intelligence, and adoption of ILP). Recounting the retired officers' experience was important for the thesis in order to overcome scarce publications about policing in the Maldives, and almost the non-existent information on the development of its intelligence function. On the other hand, the serving officers' experience elucidated the practices and protocols followed in the agency. A number of internal documents were made accessible to this research, which enabled data triangulation or corroboration of specific responses. A qualitative research was decided upon considering the possibility of overcoming any restricted access to official documents due to sensitivity and privacy (Ratcliffe, 2009a), challenge in quantifying ILP's influence in policing (den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012; Hale et al., 2004; HMIC, 1997a), and the intent to cover deep nuances of ILP practice and implementation through the portrayal of the causes, events, and outcomes relevant to ILP in the MPS. The overall research methodology was underpinned on a neo-institutionalist framework, intending to extrapolate whether the factors responsible for the isomorphism in the MPS (viz. adopting ILP in 2011) were coercive, mimetic, or normative.

This research was motivated by many factors. First, ILP was finding many takers across the world even with its multiple interpretations and models. The latter reason (multiple interpretations of ILP) was the second factor. Third, such diverse interpretations backed by models made it difficult to elucidate ILP's essential components (Alach, 2011; Potparič, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2008a). Fourth, like other knowledge-based policing models, ILP was also

surrounded by many criticisms, including the preference for intelligence over officers' experience and personal judgement (James, 2017), and lack of evidence-based methodology based on evaluated practice (Alach, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2002). Lastly, despite its contextualised implementation in the Global North, such as in the European Union (as the European Criminal Intelligence Model) and UK (as National Intelligence Model—NIM), the literature is overshadowed with one form fit for all agencies.

This chapter provides an overview of the pertinent findings of this research. First, the role of intelligence in policing is summarised, followed by an encapsulation of ILP or 'policing with intelligence'. The focus of the first section is the historical development of police intelligence work, while in the second section, a new ILP model is delineated. In order to address today's crime and disorder problems, intelligence is vital, especially to counter the threats posed by organised crime syndicates and terrorists. Hence, today's policing cannot be divorced from threats, risks, and concerns of the community that is policed. The new ILP model was proposed to cater to these requirements and necessities. The third section presents the findings from within the MPS and provides answers to the research questions. In this section, the ILP practised in the MPS is compared with the critical factors of ILP, as laid out by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) of the US Department of Justice, in order to understand how it contributes to the realisation of the organisational goals of the MPS. Finally, based on the requirements, recommendations for the MPS to improve its services and enhance its efficacy are proposed.

8.1 Intelligence in Policing

Intelligence work is often referred to as the second oldest profession, and undercover practices have been used to solve crimes and apprehend suspects ever since policing attained its modern form. It was a systematic practice in the Global North by the early twentieth century, when it was used as a tool against organised crime and in public order policing. After World War II, former military officers who joined the police preached its importance in policing, ultimately getting attention from academics as well as policymakers. Schulz and Norton (1968) were the first to adopt the concepts and constructs used by the military in policing. They adopted in their book *Police Operational Intelligence* intelligence concepts and the Intelligence Cycle (IC) used by the US military to generate (tactical) intelligence. They listed the various processes of the

IC as "intelligence action phases" (Schulz & Norton, 1968, p. 40). A year before this publication, the US Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) published its report on the country's crime problem and the depth of ignorance about it, and recognised and lauded the use of intelligence operations against organised crime. In 1969, another US government publication recognised the weakness of many agencies as the "absence of a reliable intelligence system" (Campbell et al., 1969, p. 312). It emphasised the importance of anticipating crime to prevent trouble (crime problems) and controlling disorder by understanding neighbourhood problems through monitoring and collecting reliable information. This argument echoes ILP's central tenets—information collection, dissemination of actionable intelligence, and proactivity.

Therefore, ILP as a philosophy is not a recent development, though the term came into use only in the late 1990s. Official documents stressed the use of intelligence in policing much earlier, but it is not clear whether the term 'intelligence' was used to refer to intelligence work, products, unit, officers' intellectual abilities, and many other things.

The US Justice Department recognised the potential and use of intelligence in police work in 1970, and contracted two professionals to develop a manual on police intelligence. The manual, *Basic Elements of Intelligence,* developed in 1971 by Godfrey and Harris, and its revised edition by Harris (1976) were the standard reference materials for police intelligence. When the earliest scholarly works on police intelligence used the military's standard IC, their centre of interest was on operational policing.[1] The military's IC was subsequently institutionalised in police literature without referring to the revisions used in the *Basic Elements of Intelligence*, despite the challenges in the application of military's IC due to its cyclical nature and linear flow. Scholars often criticised the cyclical nature of standard IC, but used it as a good reference. In 2016, a book on intelligence work in policing used the modified version of IC (James, 2016, p. 8), revised in 2011 by the British military in its *Joint Military Doctrine 2-00*.

The *Basic Elements of Intelligence* described the theoretical aspects of intelligence (especially processes and products), the structure of an intelligence setup (function), upskilling and maintaining skilled intelligence personnel, and protecting the intelligence function from unlawful interference (Harris, 1976). That manual could be considered as the foundation of ILP, particularly owing to the theoretical stance seen in some of the scholarship on ILP or

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[1] Though the *Basic Elements of Intelligence* referred to strategic intelligence, the interpretation had an operational focus (see Harris, 1976, p. 4).

'policing with intelligence'. Though the manual did not use the term ILP, it referred to intelligence as a "weapon" to combat organised crime (Godfrey & Harris, 1971, p. 1) inasmuch as today's parlance.

8.2 Policing with Intelligence

The growing literature on ILP is marred with inconsistencies in its conceptual differences. The few agreements are limited to its origin and intelligence focus. Apart from ILP, the term *intelligence* has also been a contested subject, often linking it to information collected covertly, a product, a process, a function, a system, and many other things. It was due to these subjective differences that this thesis adopted the terms *intelligence process* to refer to IC, *intelligence function* to refer to the functional entity responsible for producing intelligence, *intelligence systems* (all aspects and components of it, from collection to dissemination), and *intelligence* to refer to the product (output of the process, generated by the function, using the components in the system). Though scholars are often caught in these definitional aspects, most agencies have adopted their own definitions so that their staff have a common understanding; international actors such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have proposed definitions for those agencies that lack such capacity and require assistance. Yet, intelligence still is defined in three different contexts: in official guidelines, academic perspectives, and frontline practitioners' perspectives (Harfield & Harfield, 2008b, p. 52), leaving a gap for some scholars to continue the debate on its interpretation.

The literature often recognises five ILP models: Ratcliffe's 3-i Model (revised in 2016 as the 4-i Model), the standard IC, Gill's Cybernetic Model, NIM, and the American Model. Though the literature, both scholarly and practitioner guidelines, have referred to the standard IC as ILP, it is not a model of ILP because it is just a small part of the ILP construct through which intelligence is generated. The IC cannot explain strategic resource allocation, operational interventions, and strategic planning to prevent or mitigate police problems and disorders. The IC was initially developed for tactical use (Glass & Davidson, 1948; Rolington, 2013). Those who used the standard IC as a form of ILP did not identify its major weaknesses: (1) its pure cyclical nature causing problems to both analysts and decision-makers (to limit this problem, this thesis has used the new IC adopted by the British military), (2) problems between the

decision-maker and subordinate due to the difference of opinion and bias, (3) inability to generate assessments for long-term planning, especially in the context of national police agencies, and (4) failure to find the right decision-maker to attend to a particular problem.

The Cybernetic Model is an extended version of standard IC as it applies a cybernetic system around the intelligence process (IC). It may be due to this reason the Cybernetic Model is fading away in literature. The 3-i Model has been adopted by some police agencies, such as New Jersey Police Department (Fuentes, 2006), and was widely used in ILP researches. The 3-i Model is a crime-centric model, in line with CompStat, designed to *influence* the decisions of policymakers through the continual *interpretation* of the crime environment, to have an *impact* on the criminal environment. Owing to its focus on the crime environment of a specific geographic area, it cannot forecast all the issues in an operational environment. A major weakness of the 3-i Model was also the requirement to generate intelligence to influence the decision-maker so as to impact the criminal environment, causing the analytic profession to take matters into their own hands ignoring the strategic objectives of the agency or supporting the decision-maker even if the decision-maker diverted from the organisational goals of the agency. Its revised version, called the 4-i Model, also suffers from the same weakness, as the fourth 'i' refers to the *intent* of the decision-maker in allowing two-way communication between analysts and decision-makers. Though this modification was published in 2016, New Zealand police had applied a similar model in 2005 in its operational policing.

Due to these inherent limitations, all these models have less practical application, especially for national or large police forces. Police agencies preferred to customise NIM to their context as it was well documented and described. Despite its detailed framework, practising NIM was found to be problematic in many British police forces, and in police agencies that had customised NIM, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Slovenia. While NIM processes and elements are well-sketched out, it was often considered as broader than ILP (Flood & Gaspar, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2016). It had more than 135 different standards for its 11 elements, making it difficult to understand and implement. Consequently, after extensive consultations in 2012, the standards were reduced to four: (1) establish appropriate governance and command structures, (2) effectively manage knowledge, (3) collect information, use it to generate intelligence, and make use of intelligence in decision-making, and (4) establish tasking and coordination (T&C) processes (James, 2016, pp. 76–78).

Most of the criticisms of ILP are directed towards NIM, perhaps because it was the model

contextualised by most agencies in their effort to practise ILP. This thesis has established that most of the criticism, if not all, can be countered, especially NIM's failure to incorporate the experience and personal judgement of officers in decision-making due to the primacy attached to intelligence. Personal judgement, based on personal experience, comes into play in decision-making through the T&C process; before that stage, analysts' judgement (depending on the technique adopted) is embedded within the intelligence in the analytical phase of IC. To further ingrain tacit knowledge of officers, technology can be used, as proposed by Gottschalk (2009), whose four-stage model (officer-to-technology systems, officer-to-officer systems, officer-to-information systems, and officer-to-application systems) can resolve some of the concerns, if not all.

These ILP models were intelligence-based and totally disconnected from other knowledge-based models except NIM, which incorporated problem-oriented policing (POP) tenets for preventative response (NCPE, 2005c, p. 87). UK policymakers recognised the challenge of practising a police model that was distant from the community and eventually adopted 'neighbourhood policing' and national 'reassurance policing', which are forms of community-oriented policing (COP). Similarly, New Zealand Police also began to practise COP and POP along with ILP principles in its policing framework (New Zealand Police, 2005).

Police agencies in the US were required to follow ILP following the revision of its national security domain after the 9/11 attacks. However, the details of the ILP model were not clear in a way it can be operationalised. Due to this, some of the US police agencies adopted the 3-i Model. By distilling the documents published by or under the auspices of the US Department of Justice, it was discerned that the US version of ILP was an amalgamation of all knowledge-based policing models. To differentiate this model from other versions of ILP, in this thesis it is referred to as the American Model. This model of ILP is still nebulous as it has not been delineated to a level it can be operationalised in policing.

The ILP literature examined for this research pointed to three broad problems. First, the definitional, conceptual, and theoretical ambiguity of ILP has made the ILP philosophy not only nebulous for practitioners but also academics and policymakers. Due to this, many agencies adopted ILP moniker, but not its underlying philosophy. Policymakers were confused within the definitional ambiguity to an extent some of them considered 'zero tolerance policing' (e.g. IACP, 2002) and any intelligence-based approaches as ILP. Second, NIM, the most descriptive and the most adopted version of ILP, was too complex for many agencies,

encumbering implementation and practice. Third, excessive emphasis on technology in ILP literature resulted in many agencies becoming fixated with acquiring technical gadgetry, ignoring other important aspects, such as personnel training and professional development, creating and establishing appropriate channels for information collection and dissemination, and designing an appropriate decision-making process. Consequently, ILP had little positive impact on operational policing in agencies that adopted it.

In order to alleviate these issues, the thesis proposes a new ILP model. Towards this, the thesis adopts the American Model of ILP and intends to consolidate the Model by creating a framework that can be operationalised by any agency based on the agency's context and needs. In this new model, the dimensions of COP as proposed by Cordner (2015) are used as the overall framework, and the tenets of other knowledge-based policing models are added to it. Like ILP, COP is also surrounded by a conceptual fuzziness due to its many and varying interpretations. Since POP is straight-forward, and it has already been incorporated within NIM, POP tenets require less explanation. With these, CompStat's four-step process can also be used within new NIM standards. The intent is to create a model that can be operationalised; identifies community concerns through intelligence-led and community-based approaches; uses information (obtained through volunteered collection, tasked collection, and routine collection) to generate actionable intelligence in developing tactical interventions that are prompt, targeted, and effective against organisational objectives and community concerns; supports resource allocation and optimisation; adopts a problem-solving and partnership approach to improving the safety of the community and reducing harm; and generates strategic intelligence for strategic planning and setting an effective control strategy. Such a model is essential against current crimes and threats. Agencies must be willing to adopt new policing models, not due to coercive laws or policies or as a mimetic approach of replicating a model seen as a successful approach in another agency; instead, it should be for the professionalisation and enhancing the efficacy of the agency.

The four dimensions of Cordner's COP philosophy are: philosophic, strategic, tactical, and organisational dimensions. The *philosophic dimension* includes the underlying "central ideas and beliefs", and its elements are: citizen input, broad function, and personalised service (Cordner, 2015, p. 482). These elements are more important than ever to foster volunteered information into agencies to know concerns and possible threats. Owing to technological progress and the information revolution, agencies can make themselves more accessible to the public to pass information and concerns, and report crimes, all of which adds to the information

bank from which the agency can draw patterns and identify threats. The responsibilities entrusted to police agencies are also increasing, and even in instances where a problem brought to the police by a member of the public is not the direct responsibility of the agency, the agency can install mechanisms to pass on that information to the concerned agency through emails or other appropriate means. The agencies must also devise their intervention strategies against the most concerning problems of neighbourhoods in an effort to provide a service for them. 'Intelligence use' is the new addition to this dimension so that agencies can use today's knowledge to shape tomorrow's policing. The elements of the *strategic dimension* are reoriented operations (increased face-to-face interactions between the police and citizens), geographic focus (dedicated patrol teams), and prevention emphasis (employing proactivity). The *tactical elements* are positive interaction, partnerships, and problem-solving. The last two tactical elements are recognised in NIM, while positive interaction is essential to foster a good relationship with the community and promote volunteered collection. Elements of the *organisational dimension* are structure, management, and information (Cordner, 2015). The leadership must introduce the necessary changes to the organisational structure so that ILP can be practised, including a well-defined and adequately resourced intelligence function, and an effective T&C process. The management must follow its control strategy and design its processes and structure so it can assess its performance and conduct end-user feedback. The management practices—adopting a mission statement that can be used in making decisions; engaging continually in strategic planning to effectively use resources, energy, and stay on track with its mission, values, and control strategy; coaching and guiding subordinates; mentoring new staff; empowering to use creativity; and instilling a selective disciplinary process to identify intentional and unintentional errors made by staff—must be incorporated by agencies wishing to implement this new model. The agencies must also regularly evaluate aspects related to 'information', such as the strategies of the T&C groups or specific teams, the performance of different units and departments, and the information systems to find and rectify 'organisational pathologies'.

The IC sits at the centre of this model, uses 'police information', and draws inferences from the environment (political, economic, sociological, technological, environmental, legal, and organisational—PESTELO) so that all the three types of intelligence (tactical, operational and strategic) can be generated. The intelligence function must identify the intelligence requirement and continuously collect the information needed for the analytic function through tasking, outreach, or routine operational units. The intelligence function must generate accurate and

timely intelligence (ILP and CompStat precept) based on control strategy, community concerns, crime trends, and emerging threats so that prompt, effective, and targeted action can be taken against those concerns and problems. The T&C processes must be established according to the needs and level of the agency. The T&C group will be responsible for optimised resource utilisation and ensuring the use of effective tactics to address specific problems (ILP and CompStat precepts). Operational managers must conduct relentless follow-up of its tactics and assess strategies (CompStat precept)—and share with the T&C group. Operational managers and problem managers (who are tasked a problem by the T&C group) must adopt a problem-solving and partnership approach in crime prevention measures (POP tenet). A Strategic Assessment must be generated at least once every six months and the control strategy must be revised at least once every twelve months. For each crime problem, a PESTELO analysis must be performed (NIM precept). The agencies may include partner agencies, key members of the community, and other members of the criminal justice system in setting the control strategies based on the Strategic Assessment. In this framework, COP precepts are not only at the periphery in creating an environment trustworthy enough for the public to pass on information, but also in the management setup to gauge community concerns for effective service delivery and addressing community concerns.

Since the ILP construct has been made nebulous over time, referring to many things it is not, this new model will be called the 4-Dimensional Model. It is for future research to assess the practicality and usefulness of this model.

8.3 Findings in the MPS

The findings of the qualitative inquiry into the MPS will be discussed in this section, addressing all the research questions of the thesis and validating the hypotheses.

8.3.1 Research Question 1:

How do members of the MPS perceive ILP and why do they perceive ILP in that form?

Five themes relevant to this question emerged during analysis: misinterpreting ILP, insufficient efforts made to create an awareness of the new policing model when it migrated from COP to ILP, lacking an understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence and its use in policing

throughout the agency, underdeveloped training curricula for new recruits as well as other in-service courses, and implementation of ILP in the agency as a mimetic approach.

The perception of ILP in the MPS was ingrained in collecting information through covert methods to support crime investigations (primarily) and tactical operations. Misinterpretation of ILP or lack of an understanding of ILP across the ranks and files of the MPS was due to the last three factors (mentioned above), while the practitioners' limited knowledge of intelligence work in policing was due to the erroneous interpretation of the term 'intelligence' by some instructors (at training programmes), and the lack of an intelligence culture in the MPS (and possibly in the Maldives). The use of intelligence in crime control is a very recent addition to the country's policing—which itself is very young, having been formed only 14 years ago. The creation of an intelligence setup was initially to monitor dissidents and political opponents, as a political tool, thereby detaching the intelligence function from crime control if the issue in hand or concern was not related directly to political interests and need. Before delving into other aspects, this aspect is discussed to illustrate the resultant fallibility in the MPS, linking chapters four and five.

Covert policing was unknown to policing in the Maldives until 1999, when the leadership decided to dedicate four officers to collect information, to monitor dissidents and political opponents. The four officers assigned to this task were responsible for collecting information and writing their reports based on the information they heard (in chitchats at cafés and other congregating places), and articles in newspapers and other materials. Before disseminating the reports, they were not required to evaluate the information, as analysis was *unknown* to the agency. This 'information collection setup' was strengthened in 2001 due to increased political activities and following a petition to form political parties at a time when dissidence was unlawful. With this change, dedicated undercover officers were assigned to collect information. Additional resources were allocated to collect information before the 2003 Presidential Election to assess President Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom's popularity and track dissidence. The reports produced by undercover officers were used to investigate the crime of dissidence. This project was called *Omega*, and after the elections it was rebranded as the Police Intelligence Division (PID). Using the term 'intelligence' within PID was prohibited by the leadership. Hence, other MPS staff knew the unit only as *Omega*. This was the first formal intelligence setup in the Maldives.

During this time, policing was performed by a unit, called *Police Headquarters*, in the National Security Service (the military). When the policing function was separated from the military in 2004, the military was adamant about absorbing the intelligence function in the police into the military, which was opposed by the police leadership as they began to realise the importance of covert collection against religious extremists and drug traffickers, even though it was not the primary objective of PID. As a political tactic to retain the intelligence function, police leadership introduced ILP into the political sphere to establish a theoretical and practical link between intelligence and policing. Eventually, it was accepted and ILP was recognised in the Seventh National Development Plan 2006–2011 (NDP7) as a strategy against terrorism and organised crime. Even at this time, PID staff were not familiar with the fundamentals of intelligence work.

After the Sultan Park bomb blast on 29 September 2007, intelligence agencies of the Global North began to offer training assistance to the MPS. Owing to the focus of these national security agencies or intelligence agencies (due to their responsibilities), the training programmes the MPS received were mostly on the tradecraft and tactics of covert collection, which lacked analytical facets. The MPS did not have its own training programmes for its intelligence personnel even after it adopted ILP, though the intelligence department had a primitive guideline to brief new staff recruited for surveillance (intrusive collection). The MPS held its first formal training for its intelligence personnel in 2012, which was called Intelligence Foundation Course. The intelligence function (identified in the MPS organigram as the Directorate of Intelligence) is yet to adopt an operational manual or procedure. Based on these findings, it would be apt to say that unlike agencies in the Global North, there was no intelligence culture in the Maldives.

As a result, the fundamentals of intelligence were not known to the staff, including the training and intelligence personnel as well as managerial officers, when it decided to implement ILP as its business model. Owing to this limitation, the training materials remained unchanged, retaining their perception of intelligence as information collected through covert techniques or processes. Some of the training staff passed erroneous descriptions of differences between information and intelligence to new police recruits. The training module on ILP or intelligence in the Police Basic Course did not require an assessment and had no measurable outcomes, unlike its other modules, limiting the possibility of unearthing this error by those leading the training sector or anyone else in the MPS. Furthermore, the leadership failed to recognise a need to make everyone understand their roles, for the agency to be truly ILP based. The only

change they saw through was making the intelligence department more prominent in tackling organised crime, especially gang crimes. They neither understood ILP's core precept of proactivity nor did they consider ILP as a process for the optimisation of resources to deliver efficient and effective services in an environment of increasing demands and limited resources. Maintaining a separate intelligence unit for drugs, detached from the main intelligence department, even after embracing ILP, established their limited knowledge of intelligence work.

The officers involved in drafting Strategic Plan 2011–2013 (SP2) did not contextualise and customise ILP to local needs because they lacked adequate knowledge of ILP. They recognised a need to customise NIM to the local context following the emphasis of the Scottish experts who guided them in developing SP2. However, they could not assimilate the elements of NIM in the short duration they spent at the Scottish Police College (SPC) as ten days was not sufficient to understand all the elements and standards of NIM and also draft a new strategic direction for a police agency.

Consequently, for the practitioners, ILP was an operational strategy against organised crime in which intelligence was used for operational interventions against crimes that were in motion. The training materials referred to ILP as a COP strategy. The underlying reason for adopting ILP was that it was practised in the UK, which the leadership considered as the pioneer in policing. Hence, ILP was adopted by the MPS leadership in a mimetic approach to tackle the criminal environment, validating the first hypothesis—*Adoption of ILP in the MPS was mimetic, but not due to a normative isomorphic approach towards professionalisation of the force.*

8.3.2 *Research Question 2:*

To what extent are the existing crime control practices within the MPS consistent with ILP?

The answer for this question is short and simple. The practices in the MPS were not related to any model of ILP, including the most primitive interpretation of the standard IC, as the MPS did not realistically implement ILP. The MPS adopted the name but not the philosophy. To justify this assertion, elements of ILP proposed by the BJA (2009) are discussed here. The existing practices in the MPS were discussed in great length in Chapter Six.

Commitment and Involvement: As discussed earlier, when ILP was implemented in the MPS, its management was not familiar with ILP. Yet, the leadership made no effort to learn about ILP so as to effectively use it to realise the strategic goals of the MPS. A possible reason could be the undue political influence on policing due to which the leadership were required to focus on the events and activities of political interest. In spite of that, they could have created goals specific to ILP and directed the strategic planning sector to seek those. At the time ILP was launched, the MPS had three deputy commissioners, and at least one of them could have focused on the SP2 and ILP diffusion, as argued by the draftsmen of SP2.

Following the transition to ILP, the leadership of the agency must assess how the new philosophy (or strategy) affects the operations of the agency, and they ought to address how the agency will benefit from those (BJA, 2009). On the part of the MPS leadership, no effort was made to ingrain ILP within the policing functions, processes, and systems. After the first quarterly assessment of 2011, the MPS did not follow any of the activities identified in SP2's monitoring and evaluation framework. Hence, the leadership could not provide any evidence of how practising ILP leads to better results to the managerial and supervisory officers, creating vacillation and doubtfulness within the managerial level regarding the practicality of ILP to address the problems in hand and impending. The decision to empower the intelligence department over other departments for practising ILP added unwanted internal friction at the management level. None of the force policies, procedures, regulations, training materials, and orders were amended to promote and practise ILP. It was surprising to find that the Annual Report 2011 of the MPS did not find it important to highlight the new business model as it was a key document sent to the parent ministry (Ministry of Home Affairs) and the President's Office, and may have had an important role in acquiring funds required for developing ILP architecture, source recruitment, training, and influencing policy development. To realise a change, unrelenting focus of the leadership is vital, which was not seen in the MPS.

Collaboration and Coordination: The approach followed in collaboration and coordination was ad hoc and not structured, based on operational necessity. Since the MPS lacked a strategic approach towards crime prevention, it did not recognise the role other agencies can play in addressing criminogenic factors. Its crime prevention tactic remained operational in nature and application, as preventive efforts were limited to holding suspected individuals in detention as long as it could, even if the evidence was insufficient for obtaining a conviction.

The MPS had no policy on privacy at any level—departmental (in the intelligence sector for the intelligence personnel to follow) or organisational (for all personnel). Hence, it was up to the individual officers to decide the type of information to collect, store, and share. The use of personal information of individuals being unregulated, the MPS overly depended on covert means and techniques to collect information for its intelligence function, resorting to communication interception and intrusive techniques more than any other method. As a result, the use of 'police information' was a choice seldom opted for by analysts. The *Policy on Interception and Surveillance,* issued by the Minister of Home Affairs in 2013, provided intelligence personnel the legal powers on information collection using intrusive methods (human sources and interception of communications). This directive is the closest the MPS has as far as a privacy policy is concerned. It serves as the legal authority for the MPS' information collection activities amid the non-existence of standard operational procedures. This policy does not cater to the requirements of a privacy policy for three main reasons. First, it does not promote ethical reasoning or decision-making regarding the individuals who are targeted (see Figure 8.1 for Britain's National Decision-Making Model, which is used in the ethical decision-making process in the UK). It does not mandate the officers to assess their powers and weigh other methods against opting for intrusive options. It creates no oversight mechanisms to ensure powers are not misused even though it provides protection to covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) and intelligence personnel from legal proceedings against them. Second, it does not ensure that the interception authorised is a justifiable interference subject to an individual's right under Article 24 of the Constitution ('right to respect for family life and private communications'). Though it has some resemblance to Britain's Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Chapter 23), it is not as detailed as that law, and there exist no standard procedures, practice guides, or oversight mechanisms on the interception of communications in the Maldives. Based on the reasons in the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights in *Malone vs. the United Kingdom,* this policy could be legally invalid, especially because it is an unpublished directive.[2] Third, the existing mechanism permits all

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[2] An inference can be drawn for the Maldivian context from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights pronounced in 1984. The Court found that the UK had violated the European Convention on Human Rights by intercepting the telephone conversation of the defendant based on an unpublished directive from the Home Secretary ("Malone vs. the United Kingdom," 1984). The Court found that the directive lacked the powers of a law (as it was a directive). It is a prerequisite of Article 8.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights that such 'interferences' by a public authority into privacy and family life rights be exercised 'in accordance with the law', and the Home Office's directive was not regarded as an 'interference' prescribed by *law*. This outcome led to the enactment of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 in the UK. Until then, the political leadership of the UK considered telephone interception as a secret means to help enforcement agencies combat criminal activities (Diplock, 1981; Home Department, 1980). The Maldivian Constitution (in Article 16) guarantees

information supplied by CHIS to be recorded and disseminated as 'intelligence' or 'hot intelligence' without evaluation or processing. This creates negative labelling of individuals who may have a relationship with an offender, even though they have taken no part in crime or disorder problems.

Figure 8.1: **Britain's National Decision Model.**
Source: College of Policing (2014, p. 18)

T&C: This process is the vehicle through which ILP is practised in any police agency. This process was absent in the MPS. The closest mechanism in the MPS to a T&C process was the Police Communication Centre (PCC), which receives all in-coming calls for services. Hence, its authority was limited to operational problems. The Duty Officer (DO), as the senior-most officer at the PCC, has the authority to command any officer, albeit the decisions of the DO are sometimes overridden by departments as the PCC does not have a standard procedure or manual. Soon after the implementation of ILP, the PCC was renamed as the *Operational Tasking & Coordination Centre*, to be renamed again after a short period. Hence, it would be apt to say the leadership expected the PCC to perform the role of the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG), which was not practical due to the mandate of the PCC and the role required from a TT&CG in NIM.

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people's rights unless subjected to the "limits prescribed by a law enacted by the People's Majlis", and such a law can limit the rights "to any extent only if demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" (Hussain, 2008, p. 3). Article 61 of the Constitution requires "all statutes, regulations, government orders requiring compliance by citizens and government policies" to be "published and made available to the public" (Hussain, 2008, p. 16). Hence, the legal validity of this policy is questionable.

The MPS could have easily established the T&C process in its ILP architecture at the time of ILP implementation. The Executive Board was competent for performing the role of the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG), and this task could be delegated to the board by introducing a minute change to its functions, which were articulated by the commissioner of police in Commissioner's Order Number 1/2012. Hence, by amending that Order, the commissioner could have assigned the responsibilities of the ST&CG to the Board, overnight. This was also the expectation of the draftsmen of SP2. The draftsmen also expected the Management Board to take over the role of the TT&CG, which was not practical, given its huge membership (all heads of departments and divisions). Owing to the absence of T&C groups in the MPS, there was no demand on the intelligence function to generate intelligence on emerging policing problems, especially strategic intelligence. Neglecting strategic intelligence and Strategic Assessments subsequently detached the long-term planning function of the MPS from its intelligence function. Consequently, the generated intelligence was mostly tactical intelligence, either for operational interventions or assisting investigations reactively. The Weekly Intelligence Reports were also tactical reports as these contained events that occurred in the previous week, and the reason for producing those reports was to make the executives aware of the events (that had occurred), thus making it unusable in operational policing. The annual goals or 'operational priorities' set for each year were not based on a Strategic Assessment or control strategy as neither of these were developed in the MPS. Eventually, its long-term goals and annual operational priorities were not interconnected with its daily business processes and budget forecasts.

Collection, Planning, and Operation: The MPS stores the information collected through policing activities (routine collection) in various information systems. Analysts have access but rarely use these data and information because the systems are not set in a way the analysts can glean information from cases (confessions, statements, crime scene reports, forensic reports) and police duty reports (patrol reports, traffic reports, vehicle stops, and other reports). Following the transition to ILP, the MPS adopted the 5x5x5 Report (used in NIM, translated into Dhivehi) in its intranet site for obtaining information from its staff. It was hosted on the website as Intelligence Collection Form, and on 21 June 2011 the members of the Management Board were explained how to fill and access it. However, no effort was made to institutionalise the form, due to which it was filled only four times until its removal from the website in 2013. The senior officers responsible for this process were not aware the form had been taken down from the website and believed it was still available for the staff and public.

Most of the managerial level officers also believed that sufficient mechanisms were in place in the MPS for volunteered collection. Contrary to their belief, there were no effective mechanisms even for enthusiast officers (who were willing to pass on information) and the public to pass on information to the MPS. The only option left for the public was through the PCC, which was not equipped to handle those calls, and record and channel it to analysis. The phone lines at specialist investigation departments (such as the DED and the FCPD) were not required to record the information passed on to them by members of the community.

Apart from these problems, it was noticed that the MPS frequently withheld information from the right people at the wrong time. Based on the materials analysed in this research, it appears that this practice was prevalent agency-wide as it was experienced by field level officers, managers, and executives alike, and it was at least once brought up at a session of the Executive Board by an assistant commissioner.

The findings of these three BJA factors establish the second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses:

- H2: Owing to a lack of understanding of intelligence and ILP within the MPS (agency-wide), adequate attention was not given to the elements of ILP, impeding the development of ILP and the intelligence function of the agency.
- H3: A majority in the command level were unaware of the control strategy and intelligence requirements, resulting in misuse or non-use of the ILP framework or resources to achieve organisational goals.

As mentioned above, there was no mechanism to obtain information from the non-intelligence personnel and the community, as information collection (for the intelligence function) was accepted as a responsibility of the intelligence units and not an agency-wide responsibility. Due to this mindset, non-intelligence personnel often approached the intelligence sector with information if an incident or event affected their personal life. This practice validates the fifth hypothesis (H5): 'Field officers did not realise that they have a role to perform in the intelligence function, and they perceive that intelligence collection as a responsibility of the intelligence units, because of which MPS lacked an integrated approach for data collection'.

Analytic Capabilities: More than 86% of the participants interviewed believed that the analytical capacity of the MPS was not developed to meet its organisational goals and priorities. There was hardly any evidence pointing to analysis of information in the MPS. All narrations and materials implied that information (collected through covert means) were presented as

reports with statistics generated from crimes reported to the MPS. There were few intelligence analysts in the MPS, and tasking them with administrative responsibilities (such as locating security camera footages upon occurrence of a crime, transcribing intercepted phone conversations, and finding witnesses) beyond their primary responsibilities and roles drained their time and energy on non-intelligence work rather than their primary responsibilities. Also, owing to the focus of the leadership on political events and opposition figures, more resources were diverted for meeting that objective than actual policing.

The MPS is yet to adopt standard practices in intelligence work such as setting intelligence requirements, developing intelligence collection plans, evaluating information (to convert to intelligence), generating different types of intelligence based on use and the level of the decision-maker, and reviewing the intelligence processes. For all needs and levels, 'reports' with information on the events that had occurred are disseminated, whether generated daily or weekly. The reports—generated as tactical intelligence—were found to be very poor in quality, making them unusable in even operational policing. The longest duration considered in reporting was a week, and weekly assessments were transmitted usually to the executives. Hence, strategic intelligence was never generated.

An effective analytic capability is a requirement even if a police agency was not practising ILP to effectively challenge the criminal environment (Dintino & Martens, 1983; Harris, 1976). Though the intelligence generated for operational units was largely unactionable, the MPS was not aware of this as it made no effort to assess its intelligence and investigation gaps through a review process. Based on the findings of these two BJA factors (viz. 'collection, planning, and operation', and 'analytic capabilities'), it must be said that from the eleven organisational pathologies identified by Sheptycki (2004), at least six existed in the MPS:

- Digital divide: The information systems are non-interoperable due to which much police information is not used in analysis.
- Linkage blindness: Analysts failed to spot the linkages in crime series due to their focus on tasked collection and ignoring routine collection.
- Noise: Due to the lack of a privacy policy, ease in authorising covert means to collect information, and limited use of police information, the information used in analysis was not of the best quality. The abundance of such information clouded the analysts' interpretation.
- Intelligence overload: The analysts were overloaded with tasks that must be carried out

by investigators, reducing time for actual intelligence work. Due to overload, analysts often sorted data and presented those as reports without analysing.

- Non-reporting and non-recording: Discussions pertaining to filling the Intelligence Collection Report held at the department level imply that non-reporting of information was due to the intensive process that had to be followed to feed information into the form. Instead of solving the issue, the form was removed from the website, leaving no mechanism even for the enthusiast staff to pass on information. Lack of any provisions to record the leads received at specialist investigation departments also pointed to the extra burden officers had to take on to transmit information to the intelligence function or to the person who can enter that into an information system, if they decided to do so.

- Intelligence gaps: The inability of the MPS to exploit all the information available in the analytic process resulted in gaps. Furthermore, the lack of reporting procedures, withholding information from the right people, and absence of a mechanism to collect feedback of end-users—all obscured the intelligence gaps.

Awareness, Education, and Training: This aspect has already been discussed under the first research question, so the same points are not reiterated here.

End-User Feedback: Collecting the feedback of end-users of intelligence is a practice not instilled in the MPS. The MPS was lagging behind not only in assessing the usability of its intelligence but also its general performance (detailed below).

Reassessment of the Process: The MPS was reminded by Crompton and Wynne (2009) of the importance of developing measurable targets and assessing its operational performance in 2009, following their study. The draft *operational performance review*, which was placed before the Management Board in 2009, has not yet been implemented. The responsibility to 'carry out activities required to assess the performance of the MPS and identify issues that requires to be resolved' was delegated to the Management Board (MPS, 2010c). The Board has overlooked this responsibility, perhaps due to the lack of a procedure on operational performance review. Hence, the MPS lacks any systematic approach that can identify its internal problems and practices or policies. Consequently, its various departments and staff perform their roles and responsibilities on an individual basis, without considering a common objective.

Since transitioning to ILP in 2011, the MPS has not conducted or commissioned any study to examine the effectiveness of the change and assess its practices so as to strengthen them. The

closest to such an examination was the workshop the MPS held in 2014 to formulate its Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (SP3), following which it realised that useful intelligence was not often being generated and collection plans were also not being primed. These issues were later identified in its Business Plan 2014 (MPS, 2014g, pp. 33–34), but were left operationally unaddressed.

8.3.3 Research Question 3:

What are the factors that facilitate or impede the development and effectiveness of ILP in policing in the Maldives?

As most of the participants of this research identified, and the internal documents verified, ILP was not properly implemented in the MPS and therefore the question of impeding it does not arise. As a 2009 study found on the practice of COP in the Maldives (Crompton & Wynne, 2009), ILP was also another such endeavour, limited to paper, far from practice. There are various factors responsible of this, which range from the (in)experience of the top echelon due to the agency being so young (less than 14 years since its inception), pressure on police leadership to monitor and acquire information about the activities of opposition politicians, lack of knowledge of modern policing concepts and theories throughout the MPS, frequent change of police leadership based on the interest of the political leadership causing a drain of experience (through dismissed personnel), and lack of oversight mechanism on policing to hold the MPS accountable for its financial and operational decisions.

To implement and sustain ILP, the MPS leadership should have adopted goals specific to ILP, which was not done when the MPS decided to adopt ILP. The leadership took the decision of implementing ILP without a vision for ILP as well as policing. So, when they brought changes to the MPS organigram, ILP or making policing efficient was not on their agenda; instead, it was mostly to distribute responsibilities and authority at the top echelon. The leadership did not consider ILP (promoting and sustaining) when they took decisions to cross-transfer staff—one such important change was the transfer of the lead member of the team that had developed SP2 to a division shortly after launching SP2, despite the exposure he got at the SPC and there being few individuals who were familiar with modern policing theories. The non-inclusion of any officer with sufficient operational policing experience in the team that was sent to Scotland to draft SP2 also falls into this category.

The objectives of Business Plan 2014 imply that the MPS realised its shortfalls in ILP diffusion, and ILP specific goals were articulated in this plan for the first time. However, the quick move away from those goals in 2015 in the next business plan without achieving the goals of Business Plan 2014 implies that the leadership also lacked the capacity to translate the vision or strategic direction created for them into practice. This was also a concern expressed by the architects of SP2, which was considered as the cornerstone of ILP in the Maldives.

The MPS has a well-laid out technological infrastructure, with most of its functions automated. In accepting the emphasis on technological advancements required for ILP in its literature (Cope, 2008; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Gill, 1998; Ratcliffe, 2002, 2016; Sanders et al., 2015), a hypothesis related to technology was adopted in this thesis, asserting that '*technological innovations within the MPS was not directly linked to its organisational goals or ILP needs*'. This was the fourth hypothesis (H4), and it validated that the development of technological systems in the MPS lacked a broader strategic objective or plan.

When the MPS adopted ILP, the leadership intended to adopt an approach to target criminally active individuals to obtain successful prosecution, and not a brand new philosophy that required a complete change of its internal structure and procedure. Three factors were noticed in this regard. First, most of the participants interviewed overly emphasised supporting investigations from the intelligence function in defining ILP. Second, key legislations on organised crime were enacted during 2010, months before the MPS implemented ILP. On 3 August 2010, the Maldives enacted *Anti-Social Behaviour Act* (Law Number 11/2010), while two other laws were enacted on 5 September 2010, namely *Act on Prohibiting Threatening and Possession of Dangerous Weapons and Sharp Objects* (Law Number 17/2010) and *Law on Prohibition of Gang Related Crimes* (Law Number 18/2010). These laws point to a drastic change or sophistication in the operational environment. Third, police had been relying on confessions to establish crimes until the ratification of the new Constitution on 7 August 2008. As the Constitution limited the admissibility of confessions to those made before a judge, the MPS had to move away from getting confessions to evidence-based investigations. There is a resemblance in this situation to the situation in the UK when it adopted ILP:

> A need to develop new forms of investigation and evidence-gathering to avoid problems encountered in the use of more traditional reactive methods, particularly increased difficulties in gaining and using confession material as a result of stricter

regulation of police detention and questioning introduced by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. (M. Maguire & John, 2006, p. 70)

8.3.4 Other Discoveries

During the research, organisational issues related to overall policing that could restrict the MPS in achieving its organisational objectives were uncovered. Pertinent discoveries include:

- People approach the PCC to report crimes, inform incidents, and report suspicious activities. To attend the calls made to the PCC from anywhere in the Maldives, there are only five call handlers. They enter the information in the information system and ask the necessary questions, which can sometimes take a long time to complete, based on the type of crime or injury, situation, threat or fear, among many other factors, and then attend the next call. A mere five desks (handlers) is not sufficient considering the load, due to which they prioritise calls related to ongoing crimes and incidents. Consequently, calls made to pass on information are not taken seriously. Most of the time, they divert calls related to specific crimes to the respective specialist investigation departments, but without recording the information if it was to tip-off or inform about a suspicious activity. The specialist investigation departments listen to these calls, but do not enter the information into any information system. As a result, the information does not go to analysis. In instances where the PCC staff recorded leads and information, it was passed over the phone by the Duty Officer (DO), if the DO felt it would be of use to the intelligence sector.

- Forecasting the budget is a responsibility of the Finance Department of the MPS. That department does not base its financial projections on intelligence; instead, it requests various departments to send figures for each budget code. Finalising the annual budget is usually done after the deliberations of the Executive Board. In such discussions, a Strategic Assessment was not used to justify and understand the figures. Finalising the budget and the annual operational priorities or business plans was done separately. The budget finalisation takes about four to five months before deciding the organisational objectives (or operational priorities), so these were not interlinked. The MPS must articulate its organisational objectives before forecasting the annual budget, and budgeting must be based on the adopted priorities in order to realise those.

- The MPS has amended its organigram very frequently without establishing a reason for those changes. The agency has a written policy that details the processes that must be followed for bringing in such changes, but which has not been followed. As a result, the intent behind those changes is not clear to the staff, creating more confusion for all involved (as most of the departments lack an operational procedure).

8.3.5 Impact on the MPS

The thesis identified several policy and operational issues within the MPS and ineffective practices that do not align with intelligence work, policing, or ILP literature. Amid all these, there were some positive influences of ILP on the MPS. The most striking change was the dissemination of intelligence products for tactical use, even though many of these lacked any analysis, making it unactionable. For an agency that had no intelligence culture, this was a good initiative. Previously, intelligence reports were not disseminated to operational units, as 'intelligence' on dissidents was used as a tool to initiate investigations against them.

Likewise, the transition to ILP made the MPS personnel understand and appreciate the use of intelligence in policing, despite their limited knowledge of intelligence and ILP. They embraced the construct with such enthusiasm (and ignorance) that they identified "opportunities to train police in an intelligence-led model" as one of the three most common responses when asked about the strengths of SP1 in a 2011 study (Srivastava & Kotwal, 2011, p. 50), even though SP1 was grounded on COP.

8.4 Recommendations

Before introducing ILP as a business model or policing philosophy, the desiring agency must be ready to evaluate and revise its management practices, procedures, and policies. The agency must have the legal authority to collect information, and a suitable legislative framework must be in place to limit risks of potential abuse. Based on the experience at the MPS, this thesis cannot sufficiently emphasise the commitment and relentless focus of policymakers and police administrators required to sustain ILP pre and post implementation. Their commitment is directly related to the extent to which they know the precepts of ILP. Hence, if they are not conversant with it, they must learn it (BJA, 2009). For any nation aspiring to implement ILP,

the rules of the OSCE (2017) are a good starting point to reduce risk of abuse, ensure transparency, and earn public trust. The rules are listed below (OSCE, 2017, pp. 42–43):

- A clear legislative framework for ILP, which is in conformity with international human rights and data protection standards, and includes clearly defined powers and processes for agencies to collect, analyse and share relevant intelligence;
- Organizational structures that facilitate clear strategic direction and operational cooperation as well as decision-making processes in a multi-agency environment and appropriate oversight;
- Technology to facilitate information sharing through interoperability of systems;
- Knowledge and skills of all relevant staff; and
- A collaborative culture of intelligence sharing to support decision-making across operating domains.

The MPS can use these rules in practising ILP and protecting the rights of individuals. The pertinent issues uncovered through this research, presented in the previous section, must also be addressed by the MPS for it to become an efficient police agency. The specific recommendations for the MPS in order to enhance its efficacy and ILP architecture are:

1. The intelligence process, function, and system of the MPS are underdeveloped and rudimentary, irrespective of the policing model the MPS chooses to practise. Before using ILP as its business model, the MPS must develop these and introduce the fundamentals of intelligence work into the Directorate of Intelligence, such as setting intelligence requirements (upon receipt of tasks or realising the need to develop assessments to address an emerging problem), priming collection plans, weighing sources (for information) before resorting to intrusive techniques, developing tools to exploit all police information, performing analysis, collecting end-user feedback, and reviewing intelligence processes and procedures. In the effort to professionalise the intelligence profession, administrative tasks and non-analytical work assigned to analysts must be drastically reduced. Analysts must be able to access and manipulate various police databases to generate intelligence. Information sharing must be possible through the interoperability of systems.

2. Introduce mechanisms through which non-intelligence staff and community can pass on information to the intelligence function. In small communities, where almost everyone knows everyone else, such a channel will facilitate in depicting emerging

problems and tackling the problem at the onset. After creating a mechanism for the staff to pass on information to the intelligence function, all MPS personnel must also be sensitised that information collection is not just a responsibility of the intelligence personnel, and that every officer has a role in it. In this regard, education and awareness are vital. Before conducting new training or awareness sessions, the training materials must be reviewed to reflect the policing style in practice. The MPS must define intelligence and use it in all training materials and programmes, irrespective of the policing style it practises. Training programmes must be designed to all the levels (command, managerial, supervisory, and field officer) to educate them on the fundamentals of intelligence work, and the new management practices that are adopted. The knowledge of instructors must be assessed so they do not impart erroneous information.

3. Crime prevention requires an understanding of both the cause and crime (Home Office, 2016b), and for this intelligence is vital. Hence, intelligence must be disseminated to the crime prevention unit and staff as crime prevention is a core police function that cannot be delegated only to patrol units. The Public Affairs Department must actively engage in proactive crime prevention, and its activities calendar should be amended to reflect this function. Like crime prevention staff, the DO, as the senior-most officer responsible for making operational decisions at the PCC, must also receive intelligence (directly and timely) so s/he can make informed decisions.

4. Create an environment in the MPS where organisational changes are first planned, outcome estimated, and changes budgeted. The organigram must not be altered for personal or individual interests, and it must be based on efficacy and efficiency. There must be an understanding on the number of political appointees as well as command heads. For sustaining practices and successfully implementing new strategies, the draft *operational performance review* placed before the Management Board must be implemented and departmental performance should be assessed. As operational procedures of departments and divisions will be crucial for such an assessment, the MPS must formulate operational procedures for all departments and divisions, along with manuals on other essential functions such as investigations and intelligence.

5. The SP3 will come to its conclusion by the end of 2018. Hence, the MPS has to devise its new strategic directions soon. While developing the new strategic plan, the MPS can decide whether to realistically adopt ILP or any other policing model. If the intent is to

practise ILP, then it must devise ILP specific goals along with a timeline. In its ILP plan, the MPS must not only formulate strategies and objectives for ILP diffusion within the MPS, but also the broader legislative changes required for protecting its staff and individuals' rights. To practise ILP, the MPS must create appropriate management structures, especially the T&C process. The Executive Board could act as the ST&CG. The MPS must decide on the composition of the TT&CG. Such a discussion should note the geographical layout and how operational policing is performed in the divisions and in Malé. The new strategic plan must be budgeted.

6. At the national level, a clear legislative instrument to protect the fundamental rights of individuals, which is in conformity with international human rights and data protection standards, must be enacted. It must define powers and processes for enforcement agencies (not only the MPS) to collect, analyse, and share information.

7. Political control over operational policing must come to an end, and the MPS must be insulated from undue political interference through legislative protections. In this regard, it is important to change the way the commissioner and deputy commissioners are appointed and removed from offices.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Application to the MPS

MACQUARIE
University

ABDULLA PHAIROOSCH <abdulla.phairoosch@students.mq.edu.au>

Permission to conduct research

Abdulla Phairoosch <abdulla.phairoosch@students.mq.edu.au>
To: hrmd@police.gov.mv
Cc: James Martin <james.martin@mq.edu.au>
Bcc: Phairoosch A <phairoosch@gmail.com>

1 June 2016 at 16:52

1 June 2016

Commissioner of Police Ahmed Areef
Maldives Police Service
Male'
Maldives

Dear Sir,

I am a doctoral candidate at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, and I am undertaking a research project to investigate the factors that facilitate or impede the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing in crime control and order maintenance, and to investigate how key elements of intelligence-led policing are perceived and practised by the police. The Project is being conducted to meet the requirements for the degree of "Doctor of Philosophy in Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism" under the supervision of Dr. James Martin (james.martin@mq.edu.au) of the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University. As the Maldives Police Service has been practising intelligence-led policing since 2011, your agency presents an ideal case study for my research.

The purpose of this email to ask for your permission to conduct my doctoral research in the Maldives Police Service. The research seeks to interview staff members, approximately 50 employees to obtain practitioner insights regarding the construct and practise of intelligence-led policing. Additionally, the research requires access to force policies, procedures, training manuals, force reports (annual and special reports), and other documentary sources on the development of the intelligence function of the police that you deem appropriate to disclose for an academic study.

Thank you for your consideration. Looking forward to your favourable response.

Regards,

Abdulla Phairoosch
Doctoral Candidate

Department of Security Studies and Criminology
Level 2, Building Y3A
Macquarie University
NSW 2109, Australia
T: 61(2) 9850 1420
www.mq.edu.au

Appendix B: Consent Letter of the MPS

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Maldives Police Service

Malé

Republic of Maldives

Our Ref.: 171-I1/INDIV/2016/69

Abdulla Phairoosch,

Department of Security Studies and Criminology,

Level 2, Building Y3A,

Macquarie University,

NSW 2109, Australia

16 June 2016,

Dear Mr. Phairoosch,

Sub: Endorsement of research proposal submitted by Mr. Abdulla Phairoosch (Doctoral candidate, Macquarie University, Australia)

I am pleased to inform you that your request to conduct a research (proposal titled: Intelligence-Led Policing: Interpretation, Implementation and Impact) on the intelligence led policing model practiced at the Maldives Police Service (MPS) has been reviewed and favorably endorsed by the organization.

Under this permission, you have been authorized access to employees of the MPS and documents deemed relevant for the conduct of your research project to meet the requirements for the postgraduate degree of "Doctor of Philosophy in Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism" at Macquarie University, Australia. As the proposed research will delve into former and current undertakings and operations of the Maldives Police Service, you are duly informed to consider all materials made available to you by the organization with diligent care. You are further informed that while the organization foresees no direct risk to the organization or for the MPS employees who will participate in providing information for your research, the disclosure of classified information on operations or sensitive material to the organization must be strictly excluded from the research and discarded from the records of interviews. The MPS expects adequate measures to be in place for any residual risks associated with the research.

Tel: (+960) 3322112   Fax: (+960) 3313281   Emergency: 119

Website: www.police.gov.mv   E-Mail: hrmd@police.gov.mv

MPS understands that a doctoral researcher must not commence field work without the approval of the research process and methodology from his/her university's relevant body. Further, the MPS understands that as a researcher, you cannot share the details of the participants of the research with the MPS and neither can identify the responses and opinions provided by any of the participants for reasons of source confidentiality. You are required to solely use the information collected, strictly for academic purposes and to attain prior approval of MPS before disclosing or publishing contents of the research findings that may be deemed sensitive. You are also required to share your final thesis based on the collected data with this organisation at the earliest convenience.

During the process of the research, the Human Resource Department (email: hrmd@police.gov.mv) shall facilitate access to employees while the Commissioner's Bureau (email: admin@police.gov.mv) shall provide relevant documents required for the research. The Human Resource Department can send an email with a flyer or material you provide to all the potential participants of the research prior to the commencement of the research at the MPS informing them of the study and encouraging them to contact you if they have an interest to participate.

I wish you all the best and look forward to hearing about your research findings.

Yours Sincerely,

Assistant Commissioner of Police Ali Shujau
Head of Service Development Directorate

Appendix C: Ethics Approval Letter

Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor
(Research)

Research Office
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**MACQUARIE
University**
SYDNEY·AUSTRALIA

10 August 2016

Dear Dr Martin

Reference No: 5201600538

Title: *Intelligence-Led Policing: Interpretation, Implementation and Impact*

Thank you for submitting the above application for ethical and scientific review. Your application was considered by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC (Human Sciences & Humanities)).

I am pleased to advise that ethical and scientific approval has been granted for this project to be conducted by:

- Macquarie University

This research meets the requirements set out in the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007 – Updated May 2015) (the *National Statement*).

Standard Conditions of Approval:

1. Continuing compliance with the requirements of the *National Statement,* which is available at the following website:

http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/book/national-statement-ethical-conduct-human-research

2. This approval is valid for five (5) years, subject to the submission of annual reports. Please submit your reports on the anniversary of the approval for this protocol.

3. All adverse events, including events which might affect the continued ethical and scientific acceptability of the project, must be reported to the HREC within 72 hours.

4. Proposed changes to the protocol and associated documents must be submitted to the Committee for approval before implementation.

It is the responsibility of the Chief investigator to retain a copy of all documentation related to this project and to forward a copy of this approval letter to all personnel listed on the project.

Should you have any queries regarding your project, please contact the Ethics Secretariat on 9850 4194 or by email ethics.secretariat@mq.edu.au

The HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) Terms of Reference and Standard Operating Procedures are available from the Research Office website at:

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for_researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human _research_ethics

The HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) wishes you every success in your research.

Yours sincerely

Dr Karolyn White
Director, Research Ethics & Integrity,
Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee (Human Sciences and Humanities)

This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council's (NHMRC) *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007) and the *CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice.*

Appendix D: Interview Guide

Participants in this research will be answering questions posed by the researcher in a one-on-one conversation. Follow up questions will be asked based on the answers provided by the participant, so as to maintain the flow of conversation. Probing questions will be introduced if relevant points were missed or to clarify answers. The main questions the interview will focus upon are the numbered questions, while the probe questions will be introduced only when necessary. Depending upon new insights from the participants' new questions may be formulated in order to address all emerging themes relevant to the study.

1. Describe the policing philosophy or model currently practised in the Maldives Police Service (MPS).

    This is the starting point of the conversation. It is expected that officers will have some information about the policing model and that talking about a well understood topic will ease in developing a good conversation. Since one of the objectives of the study is to find how intelligence-led policing (ILP) is perceived and practised in MPS, their response would provide a sense of awareness (created) in MPS on ILP, the understanding of ILP, how vision of MPS is reflected on ILP, how the leadership prepared the agency to implement ILP (through training, education, and awareness) in a broader context. Do they understand ILP; Do they practice ILP; What extent the leadership prepared MPS to implement ILP; and What extent they practise ILP could be known.

    Probe questions are:

    1.1 How did you learn ILP, its elements or key features?

    1.2 How was ILP implementation communicated to all staff?

2. How is your work supporting the intelligence function of the MPS?

    2.1 Do you think you have adequate knowledge to perform your responsibilities about the intelligence function and ILP?

    2.2 Do you think most police officers would be aware of ILP and intelligence?

    2.3 Do you think the MPS leadership and command level are aware of the key elements and factors of ILP?

    2.4 (To Executives): How was intelligence integrated into strategic, operational, and tactical decisions?

3. Think of ways you have contributed to ILP or the intelligence function of the MPS. Can you describe that?

    3.1 Have you ever provided data to the intelligence function?

    3.2 Why, when, and how did you provide data?

    3.3 Have you ever attended a '(strategic) tasking and coordination group meeting'?

    3.4 Can you describe the general issues raised and decisions taken at the meeting?

    3.5 What type of shortcomings were addressed in the follow-up meeting?

    (The purpose of these probe questions is not to know the information or data relayed to the MPS by the officer, but rather to determine whether MPS has adequate systems and procedures required within its ILP infrastructure and sufficient attention has been given to collect information from the police officers and police sources such as interviews, criminal reports, etc.)

4. How is the intelligence function currently supporting policing in preventing, detecting, disrupting, and investigating crimes?
    4.1 What are the assessments conducted?
    4.2 Does the MPS conduct regular operational reviews?
    4.3 If so, how frequently?
    4.4 What are the sources of information available for analysis? (The intent of this question is not to know the covert sources, but what extent it uses the 'police information' available.)

5. How effective are the approaches followed in preventing, detecting, disrupting, and investigating crime, especially organised crime?

6. What are the organisational changes the MPS introduced regarding ILP practise?
    6.1 What are the efforts of the leadership taken to create an environment conducive for promoting ILP?
    6.2 What organisational factors restricts or promotes ILP in the MPS?
    6.3 Is the participant familiar with MPS privacy policy?
    6.4 Was it reviewed after ILP implementation to ensure privacy issues are protected?

7. Do you think MPS benefitted from ILP adoption?
    7.1 What are the specific goals the MPS devised for ILP?
    7.2 How would ILP help MPS to achieve its organisational goals or priorities?
    7.3 Do you think ILP affected in MPS decision-making, if so how?
    7.4 How has ILP or strategic intelligence involved in long-term planning in MPS?

8. What is your opinion on the significance of coordination with other agencies in ILP?
    8.1 Is there an effort in the MPS to collect information from stakeholders and partner agencies?
    8.2 How structured is that effort, or is that ad hoc, or based on necessity to address a particular crime problem?

9. What is the main source of data for the intelligence function? Why?
    (This question was previously mentioned in the probe section. The intention is to find the methods employed to gather data from the public, e.g. Patrol reports, news media and other open sources, covert human sources, investigation reports, investigators summary reports, etc. (It is believed that unlike national security intelligence agencies, police agencies must acquire most of their data from the interactions it has with the community and directly from the community through dedicated channels, and not from covert sources.)
    9.1 What mechanisms are in place to obtain information / tip–offs from the community?
    9.2 If there are, do you think the community is aware of that?
    9.3 Do you think the community trusts police to pass data, or they would prefer anonymity?

10. How does MPS assess its intelligence gaps?
    10.1 How is crime analysis and intelligence analysis promoted in the MPS?

10.2 What extent does the different tiers (units, police stations, departments, directorates and commands) use or obtain intelligence products for decision-making?

10.3 Has the analytic capacity of MPS developed to meet the strategic priorities?

10.4 Is there an intelligence collection plan at MPS?

10.5 Had the participant (if a command level officer) ever identified future threats, potential issues, or developed a proactive plan to counter the threat or problem?

11. How are different duties and responsibilities of police balanced in MPS?
(The intent of this question is to find the resource allocation methods and MPS' 'tasking and coordination' mechanism in prioritising its activities in performing legal responsibilities and those functions expected by the community and political leadership. To some extent, this problem has been previously covered in question number 3.)

11.1 How does the synchronisation take place between different departments, units and police stations?

11.2 How frequently are specific threat assessments developed?

11.3 How are those assessments used (whether used to find command priorities or not)?

11.4 Is there a tasking and coordination group to assist the executive officers?

11.5 How frequently it meets (quarterly or monthly)?

11.6 Does it identify intelligence and investigative gaps (regarding outreach, patrol, enforcement, and investigative initiatives)?

11.7 Does it task personnel on intelligence and investigative initiatives?

12. How does the MPS conduct its end-user feedback?
(The question will be customised based on the position of the participant. For analysts, it would be regarding how they get data from field, for management staff and command level staff it would be regarding how they review the analytical product (as end-users of analytical products), and for frontline/investigation officers it will be regarding the orders they get for data collection.)

12.1 How is the end-user feedback incorporated into the evaluation process to improve ILP process?

13. How has ILP helped to address MPS strategic goals, policing priorities, and crime control?

14. What is the difference between intelligence and information?

15. Is there anything regarding intelligence, ILP, organisational goals, resource allocation, crime control, or anything else that you want to tell, that has not been asked in this interview?

Appendix E: Recruitment Flyer

MACQUARIE University SYDNEY·AUSTRALIA

Research Study

Information for Prospective Participants

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING: INTERPRETATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT

Do you want to contribute to policing studies? If interested, please contact:

Abdulla Phairoosch – Doctoral Candidate	Dr James Martin – Supervisor
Macquarie University	Dept of Security Studies & Criminology
abdulla.phairoosch@students.mq.edu.au	James.Martin@mq.edu.au

What is the purpose of the research?

The purpose of the research to investigate the factors that facilitate or impede the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing in crime control and order maintenance, and to investigate how key elements of intelligence-led policing are perceived and practised by the police.

Who are we looking for to volunteer?

- Any qualified police officer
- Non-uniform staff with over a year's experience in policing who are contributing to the intelligence function of the police.
- Retired senior officers who had contributed to the intelligence function.

What is expected from the participant?

Participants will take part in one-on-one interview of approximately one hour duration. In the interview, the participants will be asked about their understanding of intelligence-led policing, and experiences in the role of intelligence in crime control and order maintenance.

Is there any risks to participants?

The research team foresees no risks to the participants. However, suitable plans are in pace, if required. The participants will not be asked to discuss classified information or operational details. Personally identifying information of the participants will not be provided to the Maldives Police Service, and therefore, the participation will not have any effect on your career.

What are the benefits for the participants?

There are no direct benefits for the participants. However, it is expected to benefit the Maldives Police Service and other police agencies by providing them an understanding on the factors that impede intelligence-led policing and ways to overcome such factors.

Who authorized the research?

The research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee, Macquarie University, Australia. The Maldives Police Service has also given permission to conduct the research.

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Fax: +61 (0) 61 (0) 2 9850 1440
Email: arts.sscy3a@mq.edu.au

Participant Information and Consent Form

Project Title: Intelligence-Led Policing: Interpretation, Implementation and Impact

You are invited to participate in a study on the practise of intelligence-led policing. The purpose of the study is to investigate the factors that facilitate or impede the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing in crime control and order maintenance, and to investigate how key elements of intelligence-led policing are perceived and practised by the police.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and if you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason and without consequence.

Investigators:

Chief Investigator	Co-investigator
Dr James Martin Senior Lecturer, Department of Security Study and Criminology, Macquarie University Phone: +61 (0) 2 9850 1439 Email: James.Martin@mq.edu.au	Abdulla Phairoosch Doctoral Candidate Department of Security Study and Criminology, Macquarie University Phone: +61 (0) 2 9850 1439 Email: abdulla.phairoosch@students.mq.edu.au

Though the co-investigator, Abdulla Phairoosch has a dual role as a researcher and an employee of the MPS, this research is part of his academic undertaking and is not associated with his role at MPS.

Purpose of the Project: The Project is being conducted to meet the requirements for the degree of "Doctor of Philosophy in Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism" under the supervision of Dr. James Martin (james.martin@mq.edu.au) of the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University.

Participant Tasks: If you decide to participate, you are expected to share your understanding of intelligence-led policing and how intelligence-led policing is practised at the Maldives Police Service in an interview conducted by the researcher. The length of the interview is expected to be one hour, usually of one sitting. The number of sittings and the duration of the interview may be changed based on the expected contribution of the participant to the research.

Recording: The interview will be taped with an audio-recording device, unless the participant objects. If the participant does not consent to voice recording, then hand-written notes will be taken.

Risks: The research foresee no risks to the participants. Should you wish to talk to someone or follow-up support such as counselling, you may contact the Society for Health Education (SHE), M.Kulunu Vehi, Malé, phone: 331-8804 / 797-6325, email: counselling@she.org.mv.

Remuneration: The participants will not be receiving any payment or remuneration for participation in the study.

Confidentiality of the Data:

> (a) **Privacy**: Any information or personal details gathered in the course of the research are confidential, except as required by law.

> (b) **Access**: Access to data is limited to those persons directly involved in the research. Access to the data will be strictly monitored by the original investigator, and no information identifying participants will be released without the explicit consent of the participants concerned.

> (c) **Publication**: The results of the study may be published. However, any publication of research will not include any information identifying individual participants.

Withdrawal: The participant has the right to withdraw from further participation in the research at any time during or following the interview process, without having to give a reason and without consequences. The refusal to participate or withdraw from the research will not prejudice the participant's future employment progress in any way.

I ……………………….…. (the participant) have read (or, where appropriate, have had read to me) and understand the information above, and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I can withdraw at any time without consequence. I have been given a copy of this form to keep.

Participant's Name: _____ (block letters)

Participant's Signature: _____ Date:

Investigator's Name: Abdulla Phairoosch

Investigator's Signature: _____ Date:

The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Committee through the Director, Research Ethics, Research Ethics and Integrity (telephone (02) 9850 7854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.

(INVESTIGATOR'S [OR PARTICIPANT'S] COPY)

Appendix G: Interview Analysis Form

Interview Text			Outcome after Condensation
Codes		Categorisation	
Narrative & Interpretive (analysis)			

Appendix H: Summary of Key Findings

This section provides a summary of the key findings of this research. The qualitative statements made by the participants in defining ILP are included in this section owing to the significance of these responses to this thesis.

Question 1: Policing philosophy or model currently practised in the MPS:

- Traditional reactive style – 53.33%
- ILP – 8.89%
- ILP and proactive – 6.67%
- ILP and COP – 20%
- ILP, COP and POP – 2.22%
- ILP and NIM – 2.22%
    - Learnt ILP through a seminar or session attended – 17.78%
    - Learnt ILP in a training programme attended abroad – 20%
    - ILP was (not) communicated to all staff – 2.22%
- ILP descriptions:
    - I don't know its meaning.
    - If we say [we practise] *intelligence-led model*, then there must be an approach for collection of raw data or information.
    - Conducting police work based on the intelligence collected.
    - All policing activities must be based on intelligence. Intelligence sector must operate the police.
    - Carrying out the investigations and other activities based on the information received.
    - Intelligence-led policing is primarily based on *intelligence*. If we want to implement intelligence-led policing, then we must recruit sources from outside [our agency].
    - Introduce an intel-led process into police.
    - Plan operations based on intelligence assessments, rather than depending on the information we get from operations sector.
    - It is a *mechanism* through which information at the frontline, from the investigation officers at the *ground level* can be absorbed in the system.
    - It is following the information you get, following the patterns, following those visible perspectives that are carried by community, and addressing those things, and processing those information, drawing conclusions, and addressing those issues.
    - It is based on information. It is based on multiplying our networks and building capacity of informants. I mean the stakeholders, from the public. It's everywhere. It is a system of well managed information sharing and information gathering, collecting and dissemination, and for all the policing purposes. Using that information for all policing purposes.
    - The core component of intelligence-led policing is information and the data we collect from everyday policing and other aspects of policing.
    - I believe intelligence-led policing is tackling all issues related to policing through systematic collection and utilisation of information. It can be crime fighting, providing operational support, welfare activities of staff, or providing logistic support.
    - Activities are conducted based on the intelligence provided by the intelligence sector.
    - Collecting the information at the ground level on a timely basis, and forwarding that information to the concerned departments in a daily basis.
    - I believe intelligence-led policing is solving crimes and locating criminals and fugitives by using intelligence.

- Statistics from that is generated. We are conducting weekly meetings. *Daily reports* are generated and those reports are used at the command level. So, we are practising intelligence-led policing to a certain extent.
- When a crime is committed, the *intelligence* sector must also work alongside the investigations.
- Everyone will know the name of the model. Nobody will know how ILP functions.
- I have no knowledge of its actual meaning. None of the officers, here, knows the actual meaning of it. Everyone assumes something based on the term itself.
- Intelligence-led policing is arresting offenders by conducting *intelligence*-based operations against offenders by collecting *intelligence* before they could commit the crime.
- It as conducting proactive policing based on the information gathered by the *intelligence* [function].
- Intelligence department must be able to give us directions on conducting our operations. I mean they must be able to tell us the locations in Malé where drug dealings are occurring, or the groups that trafficked the largest drug shipment, or the atoll where the problem is most prevalent.
- Whatever we do, we must coordinate with the intelligence sector, and plan our work according to the information passed by the intelligence sector.
- That is based on the information. [It involves] intelligence-based activities. It also includes targeted activities.
- The intelligence sector operating the police [is ILP].
- I cannot define it. Because it was never explained to us. Even though the term intelligence-led policing is widely used here, I cannot describe it because I was not taught that.
- The intelligence [sector] must provide us information before the occurrence of an event. When they pass the information, we must attend and "neutralise" the threat.
- Intelligence-led policing requires to plan operations based on the information received from the community.
- I don't know much about it to explain it. It is, depending on intelligence for everything.
- *Intelligence-led policing* as operating the police through the *intelligence department*.
- Attending incidents before its occurrence, by collecting information and taking action based on that information.

Question 2: Participants work supporting the intelligence function:

- Knew intelligence process and ILP to perform responsibilities – 22.22%
- Most police officers will be aware of ILP and intelligence – 6.67%
- The MPS leadership and command level are aware of the key elements and factors of ILP – 8.89%

Question 3: Contributed to ILP or the intelligence function of MPS:

- Shared information – 73.33%
  - through a colleague via phone – 22.22%
  - through a colleague via in a face to face meeting – 33.33%
  - through the assigned focal point – 15.56%,
- Attended coordination meetings – 35.56%
- Has a dedicated system to pass information to the intelligence function of the MPS – 40%

- o Never used that system – 22.22%
- o Considered the Frontline Module as that system – 13.33%
- o Considered Police Emergency Number 119 as that system – 8.89%.
- The MPS lacked a dedicated mechanism for the officers to pass on information.

Question 4: Support of the intelligence function to crime prevention, detection, disruption, and investigation:

- Intelligence functioned supported in prevention – 13.33%
- Intelligence function supported in detection – 13.33%
- Intelligence function supported in disruption – 13.33%
- Intelligence function supported in investigation – 24.44%
- Intelligence function supported in the fight against drugs – 17.78%
- Operational reviews are conducted – 15.56%
- Assessments are generated are: Daily, Weekly, Situational, and Presidential Briefs.
- Saw intelligence assessments – 84.44%
- Quality of intelligence assessments are weak – 80%
- Sources of data for the intelligence function: CHIS, investigation statements, forensic and case documents, community tip-offs, phone interception, and regular police officers.
- Market profiles are not generated, instead most reports are on specific crimes (hinting to subject profiles and rarely situational assessments following gang fights).
- Coverage of the whole nation is not achieved. Due to this, crimes on certain regions are not mentioned in the weekly reports.

Question 5: Effectiveness of the approaches followed in preventing, detecting, disrupting, and investigating crime:

- There is no organised effort against crime in the MPS.
- Crimes of public concern are sometimes not a priority for the police (such as RaajjeTV arson case).
- Effective or somewhat effective in prevention – 22.22%
- Effective or somewhat effective in disruption – 22.22%
- Effective or somewhat effective in detection – 22.22%
- Effective or somewhat effective in investigation – 28.89%

Question 6: Organisational changes introduced for ILP practice:

- Organisational changes were introduced – 28.89%, includes:
    - o The 5x5x5 Report (Information Collection Form),
    - o New posts created at the Directorate of Intelligence,
    - o Adopting an intelligence-based process in the Directorate of Intelligence,
    - o Forming a crime command,
    - o Formulating an investigation policy,
    - o Community participation,
    - o Dissemination of intelligence products, and
    - o Changes to the organigram.
- Leadership took efforts to promote ILP – 20%

- o Creating awareness,
- o Developing brochures,
- o Creating Directorate of Intelligence, and
- o Dissemination of intelligence briefs,
- Existing organisational factors hinder ILP – 88.89%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: Unawareness at all levels – 33.33%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: Unawareness of executives – 24.44%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: Unawareness of its benefits – 8.89%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: political environment in the country – 15.56%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: leaders' lack of interest and commitment – 37.78%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: lack of policies and procedures – 8.89%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: resistance from senior officers – 6.67%
  - o Factors hindering ILP: miscommunication within executives – 4.44%
- MPS has a privacy policy – 6.67%
  - o Not aware of the contents of it.
  - o Recently
- Technological systems in the MPS are not developed according to a plan or set long-term objective.

Question 7: MPS benefitted from ILP adoption:

- MPS benefitted from the move to adopt ILP – 51.11%, which are:
  - o Expansion of the intelligence sector,
  - o Awareness of ILP across the agency,
  - o Reduction of crime,
  - o Increasing accountability, and
  - o Staff became aware to intelligence use
- Specific goals were devised for ILP – 26.67%
  - o Unaware of those goals – 17.78%
  - o Goals include: formulation of 5x5x5 Report and goals in the SP2.
- ILP helped the MPS to achieve its organisational goals – 2.22%
- ILP adoption affected the MPS decision-making – 8.89%
- Strategic intelligence is used in long-term planning – 8.89%

Question 8: Coordination with other agencies:

- Coordination with other agencies is important – 62.22%
- There is an effort in the MPS to coordinate with other agencies – 28.89%
  - o That effort is planned – 8.89%

Question 9: Main sources of data for the intelligence function:
- Main source of information:
  - o Phone interceptions – 11.11%
  - o CHIS – 60%
  - o CHIS and interceptions – 8.89%
  - o CHIS and Open source – 4.44%
  - o Crime statistics – 2.22%
- There is a mechanism to receive information from the public – 42.22%, which are:

o   Sent text message to Police Emergency Number, email and through police website.
- Community is aware of those mechanisms – 2.22%
- Public trusts the police for them to share information – 4.44%

Question 10: Assessing intelligence gaps:

- Intelligence gaps are analysed – 13.33%
- Crime analysis and intelligence analysis are promoted – 8.89%
- Intelligence is used by departments and police stations – 51.11%
    o   Intelligence used to obtain court orders – 28.89%
- Analytic capability developed to meet requirements – 24.44%
    o   Intelligence collection plans used – 6.67%
    o   Identified future threats or developed proactive plan – 4.44%

Question 11: Balancing the different duties and responsibilities of the police:

- Synchronisation between departments, units and police stations takes place – 11.11%
- Different duties of the police are balanced by the DO – 31.11%
- Different duties of the police are not balanced in the MPS – 46.67%
    o   Requests attended according to the order it was received – 6.67%
    o   Background of the receiver or pressure gets quicker service – 6.67%
    o   Duties of the police are balanced according to the officers' judgements – 15.56%
- Tasked or got tasked to collect information for the intelligence sector – 6.67%
- Assessments are generated daily and weekly.
- There is no T&C group at any levels.
- Intelligence is withheld from the right people at the wrong time.

Question 12: End-user feedback:

- End-users feedback is collected – 6.67%
- Collected end-user feedback was not incorporated into the evaluation process.

Question 13: ILP's support to address the strategic goals, priorities, and crime control:

- Use of intelligence is limited to operational policing.
- Intelligence generated were tactical and mostly subject profiles to assist reactive investigations.

Question 14: Difference between intelligence and information:

- Acceptable – 31.11%
- Unsuitable – 51.56%
- Undefined – 13.33%

Question 15: Other topics:

- Intelligence function began with just four officers in 1999. Before that, officers were assigned to specific activities to gather information, for specific activities, until the conclusion of that task. There responsibility was to collect information on political figures and dissenters.
- The information collection setup was modified to dedicate it for covert collection to assess popularity of President Gayyoom before 2003 Presidential Elections. This project was called Omega.
- After 2003 Presidential Elections, Omega was formalised as PID in 2003. When the MPS was created as a civil police agency in 2004, the military wanted the intelligence function (PID) to be allocated to the military, which was opposed by the police leadership. To justify intelligence work in policing and obtain political support, they used ILP (to link intelligence with policing). The PID was also renamed as Internal Intelligence Department in 2004.
- In 2006, desks for various functions were established in the intelligence department.
- After 2007 Sultan Park bombing, the intelligence department began to get assistance of foreign national security and intelligence agencies in its efforts against religious extremism. Most of the training programmes offered by these agencies was on the collection aspect of the IC, and not on analysis. Consequently, analytic remained underdeveloped.
- With the directions of the new government, DIU was transferred from the intelligence department to the DED on 2009, and it was relocated back to the intelligence department in November 2011 due to allegations of corruption and failure to achieve results.
- ILP was implemented through SP2, which was drafted by three officers. They were much junior to understand an executive vision and were not briefed about the future directions of the agency when they were sent to SPC to develop the plan with the guidance of Scottish experts. A request to include a fourth officer, with sufficient experience in operational policing, was rejected by the leadership as it was not considered important. The draftsmen made this request as none of them had relevant operational experience for such a task. The decision to adopt NIM was following the directions of the Scottish experts, and approved by the MPS leadership, though the leadership did not provide any feedback to the drafts of the plan sent to them.
- Operational module developed on a strategic direction – 2.22%
- Sufficient intelligence coverage across the country is there – 8.89%
- Reason for adopting NIM:
  - Good UK relations – 4.44%
  - Seizing external funding opportunities – 2.22%
  - Gang crime and sophistication of crimes – 4.44%
- Operational teams get accurate information on events and activities of opposition political parties – 20%
- A challenge to operational policing exists from political interference – 68.89%
- COP is more appropriate for the Maldivian context.
- Information management software was developed under guidance of former Deputy Commissioner Mohamed Fayaz (retired in 2009). He had instructed the software development team to develop modules on core policing functions. The existing system was a product that was developed under this process, not based on a strategic direction or plan, as Fayaz gave this instruction as Head of Technology Department, before he was promoted to the position of the Deputy Commissioner.

Appendix I: Research Timeline

	2016			2017			2018		Milestones
	1 - 6 Months	7 - 12 Months	13 - 18 Months	19 - 24 Months	25 - 30 Months	31 - 34 Months			
	3 4 5 6 7 8	9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	9 10 11 12	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	9 10 11 12			
STAGE 1									
Review Literature									
Proposal approved by Supervisor									16-Mar-16
Consider Research Methodologies									
Consider Resources									
STAGE 2									
Review Literature									
Develop Research Methodology									
Develop data collection guide & tool									
Identify & approach a gate-keeper for consent									MPS approved 16 June 2016
Submit for ethics approval									Submitted on 22 June 2016, & approved on 10 Aug 2016
Draft methodology chapter									
Revise proposal to submit for Candidature Confirmation									Due 1 Sep 2016. Candidature approved on 5 Sep 2016
STAGE 3 (Data Collection)									
Collect data (Interviews & documentary evidence)									
Preliminary analysis of data									
Drafting Sections of thesis									
STAGE 4 (Data Analysis)									
Review literature									
Data Analysis									
Discussion									
Drafting Sections of the thesis									
STAGE 5 (Thesis Writing)									
Final draft: Literature Review									
Final draft: Methodology									
Final draft: Analysis									
Final draft: Introduction									
Final draft: Conclusion									
Final draft: Abstract									
STAGE 6									
Revise based on Superviors feedback									
Proof-read									
Submit thesis									on 22 Sep 2018

Appendix J: MPS Rank Structure

RANK STRUCTURE OF MALDIVES POLICE SERVICE

COMMISSIONED RANKS

Commissioner of Police

Deputy Commissioner of Police

Assistant Commissioner of Police

Chief Superintendent of Police

Superintendent of Police

Chief Inspector of Police

Inspector of Police

Sub Inspector of Police

OTHER RANKS

Police Chief Station Inspector

Police Station Inspector

Police Staff Sergeant

Police Sergeant

Police Corporal

Police Lance Corporal

Police Constable

Appendix K: MPS Organigram in 2016

Appendix L: MPS Organigram in 2010

MALDIVES POLICE SERVICE
Organizational Structure
Updated on: May 01, 2010

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

- PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS DIRECTORATE (PSD)
- COMMISSIONER'S DIRECTORATE (CD)

CRIME MANAGEMENT COMMAND (CMC)

- CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIRECTORATE (CID)
  - DRUG ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT (DED)
  - SERIOUS & ORGANIZED CRIME DEPARTMENT (SOCD)
  - FAMILY & CHILD PROTECTION DEPARTMENT (FCPD)
  - PROPERTY & COMMERCIAL CRIME DEPARTMENT (PCCD)
  - MAJOR CRIME INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT (MCID)
- INVESTIGATION SUPPORT DIRECTORATE (ISD)
  - FORENSIC DEPARTMENT (FSD)
  - POLICE CUSTODIAL DEPARTMENT (PCD)
  - INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (ID)
  - BUREAU OF CRIME RECORDS (BCR)

OPERATIONS & REGIONAL POLICING COMMAND (ORPC)

- OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (OD)
  - CAPITAL POLICE DEPARTMENT (CPD)
  - TRAFFIC POLICE DEPARTMENT (TPD)
  - SPECIALIST OPERATIONS (SO)
  - CRIME PREVENTION DEPARTMENT (CPD)
  - MARINE POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD)
- REGIONAL POLICING DIRECTORATE (RPD)
  - UPPER NORTH POLICE DIVISION (UNPD)
  - NORTH POLICE DIVISION (NPD)
  - NORTH CENTRAL POLICE DIVISION (NCPD)
  - CENTRAL POLICE DIVISION (CPD)
  - SOUTH CENTRAL POLICE DIVISION (SCPD)
  - UPPER SOUTH POLICE DIVISION (USPD)
  - SOUTH POLICE DIVISION (SPD)

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COMMAND (RMC)

- SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTORATE (SSD)
  - INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT (ICTD)
  - LOGISTICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT (LSD)
  - FINANCE DEPARTMENT (FD)
- SERVICE DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE (SDD)
  - HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARTMENT (HRD)
  - POLICE ACADEMY (PA)
  - INTEGRATED SERVICES DEPARTMENT (ISD)