



POLITICAL ATTITUDES, POLICIES AND THE RADICAL RIGHT

*Has the emergence of a radical right party mainstreamed radical right discourse
and attitudes in Australia?*

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Thesis summary

Populist radical right parties continue to establish themselves as credible options within the party systems of liberal democracies across the globe. Whilst a radical right party has not penetrated the Australian political system as successfully or as consistently as has been seen in Western Europe, we are also not immune to their appeal. The emergence of Pauline Hanson in 1996 is indicative of this and her rhetoric and policies were seen as prototypical of the radical right. Despite the rapid disintegration of the One Nation Party, the underlying grievances and insecurities that Hanson tapped into continued to fester beneath the surface. Her successful re-emergence and election as a senator in 2016 have once again sparked debate surrounding race and identity within Australian society. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate the role that the emergence and re-emergence of a radical right party such as Pauline Hanson's One Nation has had on the Australian mainstream. Has the presence of a radical right party resulted in a lunge to the right? Or, as suggested by some scholars, has it had little impact at all? An examination of change and continuity in the policies of political parties as well as in the political attitudes of voters will underpin the analysis of this phenomenon.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

Signed:



Date: 8th November 2018

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The radical right¹ are one of the most studied political phenomena of the last thirty years. For most of this time, pre-occupation with the negative impacts of the radical right have remained the pre-eminent concern (Mudde 2013: 2). The alleged *verrechtsing* (right turn) in European politics and the potential mainstreaming of the radical right has preoccupied the media and politicians alike (Mudde 2013). While the history and impact of the radical right varies greatly across liberal democracies, Mudde (2007), Immerfall (1998: 250) and Williams (2006: 63) suggest that the perceived threat posed by these parties outweighs the empirical evidence. Despite this, the radical right is - and will continue to be - politically relevant, even if their influence is overstated (Merkel 1997: 17,18; Mudde 2007: 22).

In this thesis, I investigate the effect of the radical right in Australia. The literature dedicated to explaining the emergence of the radical right in Australia is significant. However, recent developments suggest the underlying assumptions about the relationship between the radical right and the Australian mainstream need to be reconsidered. The 'supply side' of the radical right in Australia, is most clearly exemplified by Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON) party. While the party achieved moderate success in the late 1990s and early 2000s, their re-emergence raises questions about policy areas often seen as central to their success. While these debates are multi-faceted, the effect that a radical right party such as PHON has had on the Australian mainstream

¹ The term radical right will be used to define the party family that is also referred to as populist radical right, and radical right populists.

has been inadequately answered. Has PHON forced the Australian mainstream further to the right- particularly on salient issues such as immigration and asylum seekers? This thesis will investigate this topic with the following research question: *Has the emergence of a radical right party mainstreamed radical right discourse and attitudes in Australia?*

Defining the Radical Right

The radical right has been defined in the literature in a number of ways.² This thesis will adopt the definition of Mudde (2007:26) who conceptualises the ideology of the radical right to consist of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism is an exclusive form of nationalism that highlights the antagonism between the ‘good’ nation and the ‘evil’ outsiders (Rooduijn 2014: 82). Nativism is therefore an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation state (Mudde 2007: 19). According to Mudde (2007:23), authoritarianism is the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. Lastly, (Mudde 2004: 543) defines populism as a thin centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people’ versus “the corrupt elites”, and which argues that politics should be the result of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. These

² The finer nuances of defining the populist radical right will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2 in the literature review.

three features of the radical right ideology will be central to the investigation that will unfold in the proceeding chapters.

Methodology and Methods

The overarching methodological approach of this thesis will be drawn from Interpretivism. In particular, this analysis will draw upon interpretive theories of politics and policy to determine the overall impact of a radical right party on mainstream Australia. Hall states:

People behave as they do because of their beliefs and theories about how the world works, about their place within that world, and about the opportunities and restrictions they face. To explain that behaviour, we cannot just rely on analysing or manipulating social facts...but rather we must understand those beliefs and theories that underpin agents' interpretations of the meanings of their actions and others' in their social world that shape their behaviour (2014: 108).

Interpretivism is an appropriate methodology for this thesis as it attempts to understand actions, practices and institutions in order to grasp the real meaning for the people involved (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 1). Thus, according to Hay, (2011:172) for interpretivists, understanding is the key to explanation of social and political phenomena. In utilising an interpretivist lens in this thesis, I will explore the social and political context surrounding the construction of key policy areas frequently associated with the radical right. This includes policies related to, for example, immigration, multiculturalism, Indigenous Australians, asylum seekers and refugees. It is through the interpretivist lens, that the social and political environment that surrounded the emergence of a radical right party can be analysed and explored.

Complementing the interpretivist lens is a mixed-methods approach. This will include descriptive statistics and thick description. I will utilise quantitative data from the Australian Electoral Study (AES) to explore political attitudes of Australian voters. In doing so, my aim is to investigate to what degree populist, nativist and authoritarian attitudes are evident within the Australian population and to explore whether a correlation exists between the emergence and re-emergence of a radical right party – PHON - and a shift in these attitudes. The AES provides the most consistent set of longitudinal data on a range of topics between 1987-2016 and has thus been chosen as the data source.

Thick description will be employed as a means of determining what impact PHON has had on the Australian mainstream. According to Geertz, to thickly describe something is to establish “our own construction of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to” (1973 cited in Marsh et al 2018: 191). While Denzin (1989: 83) suggests that:

It goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances. It presents detail, context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join persons to one another... It inserts history into experience. It establishes the significance of an experience, or the sequence of events, for the person or persons in question (in Ponterotto 2006: 540).

It therefore not only deals with the meaning and interpretation behind events, but the intention behind those actions (Holloway 1997: 154 in Ponterotto 2006: 541). By establishing patterns and identifying ideological predispositions in policy behaviour over a long period of time, the impact of the arrival of a new political contender, such as a radical right party, is able to be more accurately assessed.

The exploration of the underlying political attitudes of voters in this thesis is consistent with a shift in how scholars are studying the radical right (Akkerman et al 2014:5). Recently comprehensive studies by Akkerman et al (2015), Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018), Stanley (2011) and Rooduijn et al (2014) have considered the relationship between voters and the radical right. While this thesis will not be using an original dataset or survey instrument to explore this in Australia, questions which try to 'tap' voter attitudes to nativism, authoritarianism and populism have been selected for analyses.

The Radical Right in Australia

While not as successful as in some Western European liberal democracies, Australia has had experience with the parliamentary radical right for around twenty years. Prior to the emergence of PHON in 1997, Australia had experienced almost a century of ethno-exclusivism (Mondon 2011: 364). The successful electoral breakthrough of PHON resulted in Manne (1998: 87) postulating over an explanation for such an occurrence and the potential impact it would have on Australian democracy. According to Ward, Leach and Stokes (2000:1), the emergence of PHON illuminated a darker side of Australian politics and raised issues which remain unresolved.

Pauline Hanson first achieved political notoriety in 1996 following inflammatory comments published in the *Queensland Times* regarding Indigenous Australians. These comments resulted in her subsequent dis-endorsement from the party, (Kefford 2016: 340) but she still remained as

the Liberal candidate on the voting card. Hanson won the safe Labor seat of Oxley in 1996 (Mondon 2012: 364) and in her maiden parliamentary speech built upon nativist policies identifying Indigenous Australians and Asian immigrants as threats to the ordinary hardworking Australian; positioning herself as their defender (Moffitt 2015: 300). Buoyed by the support she received, (Stokes 2000) Hanson formed PHON to contest the 1998 Queensland State election. In the June 1998 election PHON received 22.7 per cent of the vote and 11 of the 89 seats in parliament (Mondon 2013: 4). According to Ward et al (2000:7), One Nation was an angry response by Australians feeling powerless in the face of rapid social and economic change. The explosive and divisive nature of PHON's views led some scholars to contend that her policies set the tone for the decade that was to follow (Moffitt 2015: 295; Jupp 2002: 124-126).

When the policies, rhetoric and ideology of PHON are examined, it is evident that they are a proto-typical of the radial right. The policies demonstrate an overriding lack of faith in the liberal democratic process and promote ethno-exclusivism (Mondon 2012: 364). Hanson's maiden parliamentary speech rallied against multiculturalism, Indigenous Australians and immigration claiming that a type of "reverse racism was being applied to mainstream Australians" (Hanson 1996 cited in Moffitt 2015: 297). The 'people' Hanson claims to defend have two central characteristics; they are Anglo-Saxon and are perceived to be increasingly powerless as a result of powerful elites (Moffitt 2015: 300). Furthermore, Hanson claims that the Australian mainstream are being attacked from above and below (Stokes 2000). The elites attack from above with their policies of free trade, globalisation and protection of minority groups whereas

immigration, multiculturalism and Indigenous claims serve as cultural threats to Anglo-Saxons from below (Moffitt 2015: 300).

In investigating the central research question of this thesis, one of the key elements of the analysis requires further consideration. This is how the 'mainstream' are defined. The Oxford dictionary defines the mainstream as the ideas, attitudes, or activities that are shared by most people and regarded as normal or conventional. Thus, I have interpreted the meaning of the mainstream in this light; as representing the views of the majority of voters. More specifically, this means those voters who indicated support for one of the established political parties. This includes the major parties, the Liberal Party and the ALP, and two minor parties, the Australian Greens and the Nationals. Where possible, I have separated these voters out by their specific party affiliation, but this was not always possible. Where it has not been possible, I have aggregated them together, often again, 'other' voters. These 'other' voters would include PHON voters at times, but this is not always possible to distinguish. Nonetheless, the point of this thesis is not to analyse whether these voters for 'other' are becoming more radical, instead it is to see what impact a radical right party has had on the mainstream voters and parties.

The proceeding chapters will unfold as follows. In chapter two, I explore the literature on the radical right, discussing the key themes and debates which shape how scholars understand the phenomena. This chapter also considers the impact of PHON on Australian politics. Following on from this, in chapter three, I examine the underlying attitudes of voters on some of the relevant

issues for the radical right. This is done to determine whether a correlation is evident between the emergence – and re-emergence - of PHON and changes in voter attitudes. Chapter four address the key policy areas commonly associated with the radical right to establish whether the presence of PHON has affected the policy choices of the major parties. Finally, Chapter 5 provides key insights into the overall impact of PHON on the Australian mainstream based on the findings of chapters 3 and 4, with Chapter 6 providing an overall determination on the key findings of this thesis.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter does two things. First, it contextualises the literature on the radical right in advanced liberal democracies. Second, it discusses the literature on the radical right in Australia, with particular reference to PHON and their impact on Australian politics, the party system and voter attitudes. By considering the domestic and international literature on the radical right, I will discuss the key themes and debates in this field, including why the focus in studies of the radical right – and populism more broadly - has evolved in recent years. This will highlight why the core research question of this thesis is both timely and will make an important contribution to the field.

Despite its varied political and electoral significance, no other party family has been studied as intensely as the radical right (Mudde 2007; 2). Initially believed to be ‘flash parties’ who would not be able to consolidate themselves within party systems, the radical right has proven itself to be far more resilient and adaptable than scholars first believed (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015). This has had far reaching consequences for the study of the radical right. The emergence - and subsequent re-emergence - of a radical right party in Australia, raises questions about not only the drivers of support for the radical right in Australia, but also how widespread these drivers are. For example, has PHON contributed to a mainstreaming of radical right attitudes, or, were these attitudes already present within the Australian electorate? This question will be explored in due course but it is to the international scholarship that we now turn.

The Study of the Radical Right

Mudde (1996: 225) argues that there has been a wave of radical right parties in Western Europe since the mid-1980s and this has contributed to an explosion in the literature. The political breakthrough of Front National in France in 1984, is seen as a pivotal moment for the surge in interest (Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2005). However, much of the literature even up to the late 1990s and early 2000s suggested that populist parties – including those of the radical right - were destined for success in opposition but failure in government (Mudde 2013, Heinisch 2003; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015). Since the turn of the century, however, populist radical right parties have either served in or provided consistent parliamentary support in governments in Austria and Italy, demonstrating that they are no longer peripheral parties and moreover should not be viewed as such (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 1-2; Roth et al 2018).

The Emergence of the Radical Right

According to Mudde (2016), the study of the radical right can be placed into four distinct waves. Occurring between 1945-1980, the first wave was dominated by historians who tended to study the radical right through the lens of 'extreme right' and 'neo-fascism' (Mudde 2016; Ignazi 1992; Eley 1990). This work was largely descriptive, with radical right parties referred to as 'pariahs' and 'deviant cases' who embodied racist communities (Seiler 1980; Eley 1990:52 in Williams 2006). Scholarly work on the radical right during this period therefore lacked the sophistication

of later eras and was primarily focussed on classification; who was and who was not part of the radical right party family (Eatwell 2000; Art 2007; Mudde 1996).

The second wave of scholarship lasted from 1980-2000, with scholars shifting their focus to explain the circumstances that had precipitated the radical right's emergence (Mudde 2016: 3-4). This period was dominated by the earlier developed theory of Scheuch and Klingeman (1967) who asserted that populist radical right values are alien to western democratic values but emerge under 'extreme conditions'; this was described as the normal pathology thesis. The so called, 'politics of resentment' or 'losers of modernisation' thesis was also developed to understand the emergence of the radical right (Betz 1994). The thesis hypothesised that during times of great social upheaval or 'crisis', the so called 'losers of modernisation' will vote for radical right parties due to their policies of welfare chauvinism and their tough anti-immigration stance (Betz 1994; Minkenberg 2001; Carter 2005; Kitschelt 2007). According to Mudde, (2010: 1168) however, this theory was unsubstantiated by empirical evidence, and erroneously focused attention on why people hold radical right views. In contrast, Mudde (2010: 1168) claims that the radical right should be viewed as a pathological normalcy whereby, ideologically and attitudinally, the populist radical right constitutes a radicalisation of mainstream views (see also Betz 2003; Minkenberg 2001).

The turn of the century sparked the third and most extensive wave of scholarship, with increased focus on alternative determinants for the radical right's emergence (Mudde 2016). The works of

Art (2011) and Norris (2005) are typical of this era. This resulted in an increased focus on the impact of the radical right on democracy and the party system (Williams 2006). Furthermore, the literature extended its focus beyond Western Europe, moving further into Central and Eastern Europe (Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016; Minkenberg 2015). Finally, the fourth wave of scholarship, according to Mudde, focuses on the future considerations of studies of the radical right (Mudde 2016: 14). These waves of scholarship highlight not only how the focus of the radical right has shifted from the finer nuances of party classification but also developing an increased understanding of the wider implications for democracy and the party system.

Defining the Radical Right

Part of the historical scholarly problem in dealing with the radical right has been that attempts to define it have been contentious and problematic (Williams 2006; Mudde 1996; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2005; Minkenberg 2000; Zaslove 2009). Mudde (1996: 229) identified 26 definitions and 58 features associated with the radical right. They have been labelled as either fascist, neo-fascist, radical, extreme or populist leading many to argue that they do not possess uniform interests or common ground upon which to conclusively categorise them (Zaslove 2009; Hainsworth 2004, 2008; von Beyme 1988). Norris (2005) points out that radical right parties are highly diverse in their ideological appeals, organisational structures, and leadership rhetoric. Macridis (1989) identifies xenophobia, racism and nationalism as essential. Whereas Falter and Schumann (1988: 101) argue that: “extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anticommunism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law and order thinking, a demand for a strong

political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism” are all equally fundamental attributes. While debate will continue as to the core attributes, Mudde (1996: 226) has argued that despite the difficulty in comparing radical right parties, it is no reason to ignore a ‘collective hunch’ that there is a common thread binding them together.

Theorising the Radical Right

In explaining the rise of the radical right, scholars have tended to focus on either demand or supply theories, treating them initially as mutually exclusive factors (Kitschelt 2007). Beyond Betz’s aforementioned losers of modernisation thesis, other reasons provided to explain the rise of the radical right includes: disenchantment with and changes to political institutions (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995); economic hardship (Rydgren 2005, 2009); declining social values and a post-materialist ‘silent revolution’ (Inglehart 1977; Ignazi 1992). Kitschelt’s (1995) influential work suggests the role of the party system is important in contributing to radical right success. Kitschelt (1995) argues that a convergence between the major moderate left-wing and major moderate right-wing parties often creates the possibility for a radical party to position itself successfully on the extreme at either side. Abedi (2002) has found evidence to support such a conclusion - contesting earlier party polarisation theories as developed by Ignazi (1992). This suggests that radical right success is rarely of their own making and often associated with the mainstream parties.

While the impact of radical right parties in the parliamentary and executive arenas (Minkenberg 2001; de Lange 2012; Rydgren 2005; Norris 2005; Williams 2006), has been given significant attention, analysing the 'supply side' is a relatively new area of the scholarship. This also has been built upon a diverse set of analyses in the literature. For example, fluctuation in support for radical right-wing parties has been measured in individual countries (Lubbers and Scheepers 2001), and at a multinational level (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers 2002). Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2002), for example, focussed on why certain social categories are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties (Ignazi 1992; Mudde 1999; Lubbers & Scheepers 2000). What these theories showed, was that while radical right parties have experienced varied success across Europe, there remained an inability to account for these differences in a systematic or consistent way. This thesis is unable to solve this dilemma, but it will contribute to the ongoing and important debate about how the radical right is mainstreamed.

Impact on the Mainstream

The insatiable appetite for the radical right by scholars and the media is suggested to be a product of the view that radical right success will lead to a '*verrechtsing*' (or right turn), effectively radicalising the mainstream (Westin 2003; Bale 2012; Van Spanje 2010; Mudde 2013). Consequently, the intricacies of the interplay between the radical right and mainstream parties has been given substantial consideration. This includes scholars considering the extent to which the radical right has been able to shake their 'pariah' complex and form workable alliances with mainstream parties (Van Spanje and Van Der Brug 2007; de Lange 2012). For example, at the

beginning of the century, Heinisch (2003) argued that the that the populist character of populist radical right parties had the potential to see them labelled as 'flash parties'. Indeed, Meny and Saurel, (2002: 18), suggested that all populist parties were neither durable nor sustainable parties of government. Their fate was to: be integrated into the mainstream, disappear altogether or remain permanently in opposition (Meny and Saurel 2002: 18; Heinisch 2003). Moreover, Heinisch (2003:125) suggested that "it is unclear how they are to achieve long-term success without a means of transcending their chief weaknesses, which is being wedded to a single individual and lacking mechanisms for effectively managing internal disputes over political direction and policy priorities".

Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015), however, demonstrated the erroneous nature of such a claim. Using three examples - the *Popolo della Libertà*³ (PDL – People of Freedom), the *Lega Nord* (LN – Northern League) and the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP – Swiss People's Party), they sought to address, among other things,: (1) how sustainable these parties are in government; (2) what the three parties have done as members of executives; (3) their electoral performances before and after incumbency. They found that despite suffering setbacks, these parties demonstrated resilience (2015:10). Furthermore, populist parties who were not new to government fared better in subsequent periods of incumbency (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015:10). What this showed was that populist parties, including those of the radical right, were not destined to fail

³ Although not a radical right party they formed a significant part of the study and hence are mentioned here.

and could become part of the mainstream themselves, rather than having their policies and approaches copied by other parties in the party system.

Mainstreaming the Radical Right?

Despite the aforementioned analyses which suggest that radical right parties could become mainstream consolidated players within their party systems, the primary focus of the literature remains on the way that these parties affect and shape the mainstream. This includes analyses of whether radical right parties are induced to move closer to the mainstream (Akkerman, de Lange, Rooduijn 2016). Applying the Downsian (1957) inclusion-moderation thesis to nine case studies, Akkerman et al (2016) concluded that there is little evidence to suggest a mainstreaming effect on the radical right. These conclusions are also supported by Albertazzi (2009) and Minkenberg (2013).

Scholars such as Art (2011), Givens (2005) and Ignazi (2003) argue that the presence of radical right parties create pressure for mainstream parties to accommodate their views. Odmalm and Hepburn (2017) tested this theory through an empirical analysis addressing the significance of mainstream party positioning. Their findings challenged the proposition that radical right parties are the only alternative available to voters; especially on issues of immigration. By expanding on the works of Meguid (2005), Odmalm and Hepburn (2018) argue that the lack of choice thesis is exaggerated and that the relationship between the mainstream and the radical right is more complex than previously thought.

What this suggests is that whilst demand side theories are able to account for the pre-existing conditions that give rise to radical right parties, they are unable to provide reasons for why people choose to vote for the radical right (Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005). Furthermore, these theories are unable to explain the variation between success rates of radical right parties who share similar sociocultural and economic experiences (Rydgren 2005). Therefore, recent scholarship on the radical right has shifted its focus to the distribution of populist attitudes amongst the public and whether there is evidence of a mainstreaming of radical right attitudes (Hawkins et al 2012; Akkerman et al 2014; Stanley 2011; Rooduijn 2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Spruyt et al 2016).

Rooduijn (2014: 80, 89) established that the combined ideology of nativism, authoritarianism and populism are consistent attitudes amongst the Dutch population and that people who harbour these attitudes are more inclined to vote for a populist radical right party. Building on the work of Hawkins et al (2012), Akkerman et al (2014: 1324), measured populist attitudes amongst the people and linked those attitudes to party preferences. Spruyt et al (2016) demonstrated the ability to apply the work of Akkerman et al (2014) to other case studies; the Flanders. In this work, Spruyt et al (2016: 335) demonstrated that populism can be distinguished from feelings of a lack of political efficacy and additionally identified the type of people attracted to populism. In a cross-national approach, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) measured populist attitudes and found that they are prominent amongst populist left and right-wing voters and that populist attitudes serve as an important predictor of populist party support. They also demonstrated that populist

attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support of right-wing populist parties. While each of these studies didn't consider the question of the mainstreaming of radical right attitudes explicitly, what they show is that this is increasingly viewed as an appropriate approach to exploring the relationship between mainstream and radical right actors.

Australia and the Radical Right

In contrast to Western Europe, the Australian experience with the radical right has been 'episodic' (Taggart 2000). The fear of the "other", however, dates back to Australia's days as a colonial outpost of Britain (Burke 2008). The introduction of multiculturalism in the 1970s, challenged the hegemonic place of the white Anglo-Saxon and raised questions about what it meant to be 'Australian'. Ang and Stratton (1996) argue that Australians were confused by the new discourse, as their place had not been satisfactorily defined in this 'new Australia'. They also suggest that this assisted the radical right in gaining a prominent voice amongst the mainstream in Australia. As Archer (1997) has poignantly articulated, Hanson presented a nostalgic ideology which longed for a past when racial superiority was unquestioned.

The academic literature on Australia's encounter with the radical right has primarily focussed on the reasons for the rise and fall of Pauline Hanson and PHON (Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000; Mondon 2012, 2013; Johnson 1998, Manne 1998). Similar to the experience in Western Europe, varying grievance-based causes and explanations have been provided for Hanson's rise: high unemployment and politics of economic rationalism (Johnson 2000a; Moore 1997); rising voter

disenchantment and the convergence of mainstream parties (Fletcher and Whip 2000; Deutchman 2000); and the increasing political salience of race-based issues such as native title, reconciliation and border protection (Jupp 1993, 2000; Brunton 2000; Wear 2000; Mondon 2012, 2013; Marcus 2001). Others, however, see that essential to the rise of PHON was Hanson herself, with her drive, charismatic appeal (Ghazarian 2015; Gibson, McAllister and Swenson 2002), and the role of the media in generating interest and airing her sensationalised views (Dodd 1997; Goot 2000; Deutchman and Ellison 1999).

The unexpected emergence of PHON also led scholars to question the role of radical right views in Australian political culture (Goot & Watson 2001; Jackman 1998; Mondon 2012). Goot (1998) analysed individual data from Morgan polls suggesting that voters were likely to be predominantly working-class males, from outside the metropolitan, over fifty and educated to around a school certificate level. Many of these studies have focussed on creating a profile of potential PHON voters (Goot 1998). Davis and Stimson (1998) for example, completed a geographical analysis of Queensland voting of PHON, isolating the differences between the fringes and urban areas.

Other multivariate assessments have been conducted on PHON's support at various elections (Mughan 1999; Charnock 1999; Denmark and Bowler 1999). Reynolds (2000), as one example, compared the 1998 state and federal elections in Queensland, demonstrating the popularity of PHONs message amongst rural and regional Queenslanders. His findings illustrated two key

things. Firstly, PHON voters attributed blame for their perceived social and economic hardship on the Nationals; secondly, the PHON vote is highly volatile (Reynolds 2000). Delineating slightly, Wear (2000) examined the tradition of far-right parties in Queensland after their initial collapse. He posed the question of how the Coalition should best deal with right-wing threats given Queensland's radical propensities (Wear 2000). In perhaps the most extensive quantitative study to date, Goot and Watson (2001) analysed Hanson's support base and concluded that it does not reside in economic issues but is based on new class values underpinned by race. While these analyses do help to provide a comprehensive explanation for PHON's emergence and the defining characteristics ascribed to PHON voters, they provide limited insights into the real drivers of why people vote for PHON and what link there is with mainstream voters.

There have been studies which have examined the issues which differentiate radical right voters from the rest of the electorate, namely issues of race and immigration. Bean (2000) examined the foundations for PHON support at the 1998 federal election, demonstrating the variance in state attitudes. In line with Goot, Bean's analysis points to an overwhelming disparity between the attitudes of PHON voters and those of the broader electorate on matters relating to race and immigration:

Whether the question is to do with equal opportunities for migrants, the number of migrants allowed into Australia, links with Asia or Aboriginal issues, time and again the gulf between ONP supporters and the rest of the electorate is huge ... There can be no doubt of the extent to which the ONP has tapped into a well of resentment over racial and ethnic issues harboured deeply by a small minority of Australians (Bean 2000)

Jackman, (1998) investigated Hanson's claim that there is a gulf between 'mainstream Australia' and political elites on questions to do with race. His findings demonstrated that on many issues, Australian political elites and the Australian electorate are in rough agreement. But on questions to do with government assistance to Aboriginal Australians, land rights, levels of immigration, or the contribution of immigrants to Australian society, there is a critical divergence of candidate and mass opinion (Jackman 1998). This is complemented by Goot and Watson's (2010) study establishing a correlation between individuals who harbour strong feelings of nativism and voting for PHON and anti-immigration sentiments.⁴ Nonetheless, while each of these studies is extremely useful, a gap remains in our understanding of the relationship between the mainstream and the radical right. This is not to contend that the question has not been considered, but that which has considered the question has not done so systematically.

One study which has considered the mainstreaming question comes from Mondon (2012). In it, Mondon asserts that Australia is immune to what they call the extreme right. He argues that it was the racist prerequisites of the White Australia Policy that kept the radical elements of the right appeased. In essence, the radical right was able to be suffocated because the government had a satisfactory alternative; racism was already part of everyday politics. Mondon (2012: 366) argues that the rise of Hanson precipitated a rightward shift by Howard, allowing him to implement his 'cultural revolution' and 'lift the pall of censorship' of the Keating years. By speaking out against the 'politically correct' elite he could reclaim the voters who fled the

⁴ See also Goot (2006) applying the cartel thesis and considering its implications for understudying PHON.

coalition in response to their economic policies (Mondon 2012: 366). According to Mondon (2012: 366): a causality of Howard's rise, the extreme right was withdrawn from the space it had previously been given to thrive.

The re-emergence of PHON however, not only reflects the complexity of the relationship between the mainstream and the radical right, it problematizes Mondon's emphasis of Howard and the coalition in suffocating the extreme right. This thesis improves upon this argument through its systematic assessment of not only the policies of the major parties but an examination of the change and continuity of the attitudes of the mainstream also. This is important because it demonstrates that Australians already had a predisposition to support the ideas of Hanson and this links to the arguments purported by Mudde (2013:7) that there was not a great deal of difference between the ideas of the radical right and the mainstream.

Conclusion

This literature review has considered the key debates and evolution of the literature on the radical right in Western Europe and Australia. Once viewed as 'flash' parties who were ill suited to the task of governing, radical right parties have evolved into legitimate political options for voters. Thus, political scientists have developed a more sophisticated set of analytical tools in which to study these parties. This literature review has also shown that while scholars are improving their understanding of radical right representation and engagement with the mainstream in Europe, the Australian scholarship has not kept pace. Australian scholars have focussed on accounting for the rise of a radical right party and building a profile of those voters

who are attracted to PHON. The re-emergence of PHON to the political stage, however, has demonstrated that the literature fails to account of the relationship between PHON voters and mainstream voters, but also PHON and the mainstream parties. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by exploring whether there are correlations between the emergence and re-emergence of PHON with changes in the policies of these parties, as well as the attitudes of mainstream voters.

Chapter Three: Australian Political Attitudes and the Radical Right

Political attitudes are long-term stable predispositions towards a question of public policy or social concern (Pietsch et al 2012: 166). They are “not merely ascribed characteristics or socioeconomic status but have their own independent effects on political behaviour” (Campbell et al in Pietsch et al 2012: 165). Attitudes are an important determinant in predicting patterns of behaviour as contemporary politics relies upon harnessing political attitudes as a means of mobilising mass support (Pietsch et al 2010: 165). Tuning in to the political attitudes of a nation is seen to be increasingly important given the diminished importance of political cleavages such as class in determining political partisanship and therefore voting behaviour. According to Pietsch (2010: 165), this has contributed to a phenomenon of ‘issue voting’ whereby responding to public opinion is key to electoral success (McAllister 1992: 75). To understand whether a radical right party has contributed to a mainstreaming of attitudes associated with the radical right, this chapter will explore change and continuity in the political attitudes of Australian voters.

Populist Radical Right Attitudes

Examining the political attitudes of voters to better understand the radical right, has become an increasingly important component in the scholarly literature (Stanley 2011; Akkerman et al 2014; Rooduijn 2014; Spruyt et al 2016 and Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the relationship between underlying attitudes and voting behaviour, this chapter will examine the underlying attitudes of voters on some of the relevant

issues for the radical right. By doing this, I will be able to determine whether the evidence suggests that there is a correlation between the emergence of a radical right party, PHON, and a change in the attitudes of mainstream voters on the issues most relevant to the radical right.

In order to explore the political attitudes of Australians, the raw data from the Australian Election Study (AES) will be analysed. The AES was chosen as the major data source due to its consistency of questions over time allowing for longitudinal analysis. Of course, some caveats are required when utilising survey data and it is important not to over-extrapolate. For example, it has been found that the type and style of question has a direct impact on the quality, nature and accuracy of answers provided by respondents (Goot 1991; Goot and Watson 2011). Nonetheless, evidence from the AES will be used just as that, as one piece of evidence rather than definitive ‘proof’ that demonstrates a connection between the emergence of PHON and any changes in voter attitudes. It should also be noted that due to low response rates for minor parties, ‘other’ is used to group voters from these parties together. Due to PHON’s extended decline, they are also not present in each of the AES surveys that have been conducted. Hence, it is not always possible to compare mainstream voters with PHON voters. Nonetheless, changes in the attitudes of mainstream voters – which consists of voters from the ALP, Liberal Party, Nationals and Greens – that correlate with the presence of PHON, can be used as a proxy for an effect on the mainstream.

In identifying relevant questions in the AES to use, advice has been taken from studies such as Akkerman et al (2014), Van Hauweert and Van Kessel (2018), Stanley (2011), Rooduijn et al (2016) and Spruyt et al (2016). The items selected for analysis are outlined in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Items measuring Populist, Authoritarian and Nativist Attitudes

POP1	Satisfaction with democracy
POP2	political efficacy and who is in power
POP3	makes a difference who is in power
POP4	Who the government is run for – big business or the people
POP5	Trust in government
POP6	Politicians know what ordinary people think
POP7	Big business has too much power
AUTH1	attitudes towards jail sentences and capital punishment
NTV1	Attitudes towards policies on Indigenous Australians
NTV2	Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration
NTV3	Attitudes towards the level of immigration into Australia
NTV4	Consequences of immigration into Australia

Source: AES (2016)


Discussion and Findings

Populism

In exploring the items associated with populism, the attitudes that Australians hold towards their democratic institutions have been explored. Items in relation to political efficacy and the importance of who you vote for have been included in order to establish how voters feel about the importance of casting a vote. Furthermore, whilst the data is unable to provide an indication of pluralist attitudes within the mainstream, populism's mirror image, elitism (Mudde 2004: 543-544), can be explored. Hence, items POP4 and POP7 centre around who government is run for and the amount of power wielded by big business. Hence the items utilised to investigate the prevalence of populism within the Australian population, are used to identify anomalies or shifts in attitudinal positions specific to populism which correlate with PHON's rise.

In 2016, 60 per cent of voters indicated that they were satisfied with democracy. This is compared with its peak of 86 per cent in 2007. Since that time, a steady decline in respondent's satisfaction levels with democracy can be observed. Paralleling the decrease in satisfaction with democracy is the rise in dissatisfaction. In 1996 those who expressed that they were not satisfied with democracy was 22 per cent, this has risen to 40 per cent in 2016.

Figure 3.1 Comparison: Satisfaction with democracy mainstream and 'other' voter



When compared with the 'other' voter, there is a marked difference. There are two distinct periods whereby sharp rises in dissatisfaction with democracy occurred. The first was between 1996-1998, where levels moved from 29-49 per cent. The second and more extreme period occurred between 2013-2016 whereby levels of dissatisfaction all but doubled, increasing from 40 to 79 per cent. The period from 1996-1998 coincided with PHON's emergence. The same is true for the period 2013-2016.

Another measure that can be used to explore dissatisfaction is that of political efficacy. Scholars such as Kitschelt (1995) argue that the radical right are enjoying success because of the convergence of the major political parties. The increased similarities between the major parties leads voters to opt for radical parties because of a lack of choice. The data suggests that

Australians think that party choice does make a big difference- particularly amongst the tertiary educated. However, this is not consistent with all voter groups. A third of 'other' voters in 2016 indicate that it does not make any difference who you vote for. These results can also be compared with Australians views about the importance of the party who are in power, with at least 58 per cent of respondents supporting the idea that it makes a big difference who is in power. Again, the 'other' voter is different, with 38 per cent of respondents saying that this does make a difference.

Figure 3.2 Comparison: political efficacy and the use of the vote mainstream and 'other'






Figure 3.3 Comparison: Makes a difference who is in power mainstream and 'other'




An important aspect of populism is the argument that politics is ran by and for elites at the expense of the 'people'. One way this can be investigated is via questions about who the country is run for. Higher anti-elitist attitudes are indicative of distrust towards authority, reinforcing notions that the government have sold out the interests of the people in favour of the elites. As per figure 3.4, the question asked who voters thought the country was run for; (1) all the people or (2) a few big interests. The majority of voters thought a few big interests was who the country was run for. This view was on the decline until 2007, but has been on the rise since, with over half the population thinking the government is run for a few big interests.

Figure 3.4 Comparison: Who is the government run for mainstream and 'other'




Another item which explores the 'elite' v 'people' divide, is about trust in government. This has been on the decline since 2007, and interestingly was also on the decline in the lead up to PHON's first period of electoral success. Australians have consistently demonstrated and has been on the rise since 2007.

Figure 3.5 Comparison: Trust in government mainstream and 'other'



Another key element of populism is the idea of 'monism'. Monism implies that the 'elites' and the 'people' are completely different and this difference is moral. One question which can tap this difference is whether politicians know what ordinary people think. As Figure 3.6 shows, the data indicates that Australians do not think that politicians know what they think with the highest result peaking at a meagre 17 per cent in 2013. Moreover, the second period of success for PHON correlates with a change in these attitudes.

Figure 3.6 Comparison: Politicians know what ordinary people think mainstream and 'other'



Analysis of populist attitudes

The data suggests that some of the attitudes which are related to populism are salient in Australia. Whereas Figure 3.1 indicates that attitudes towards democracy in Australia remain positive, two of the starkest examples of dissatisfaction occur during periods of PHON's popularity. It is important to note that it has been suggested that the fluctuations in levels of government trust reflect election cycles and the political context (Bean 2001; McAllister 2011; Wilson 2018). People are more hopeful when a new party is elected but this quickly changes. The fluctuations between 1993-1998, however, were more pronounced. This period coincided with PHON's rapid emergence and decline which may also serve as an explanation for the anomaly in attitudes.

Authoritarianism


By exploring items associated with authoritarianism, the longitudinal predispositions of Australians towards authority can be explored. A core feature of radical right ideology, authoritarianism, places high value on the maintenance of law and order and infringements of authority should be punished. According to Altmeyer:

The right-wing authoritarian believes authorities should be trusted to a relatively great extent, and that they are owed obedience and respect . . . Criticism of authority is viewed as divisive and destructive, motivated by sinister goals and a desire to cause trouble. (Altmeyer 1981: 151 in Mudde 2007: 22).

Therefore, the items selected to examine authoritarian attitudes in Australia were ideas that the death penalty should be reintroduced and that harsher sentences for criminals were needed. Both of these items tap into the trust people place in authority to deal with various infringements. In seeking to determine the impact of the emergence of PHON on the mainstream, the longitudinal predispositions of Australians towards crime assists us to understand whether these attitudes have become stronger as a result of the emergence of PHON.

On the questions of the death penalty and harsher sentences, the attitudes of Australians has softened. Decreasing numbers of the electorate seek the reintroduction of the death penalty and harsher sentences. It is worth noting however that despite a fall in the numbers, in 2016, 65 per cent of people desired stiffer sentencing for criminals and 40 per cent would still like to see the death penalty reintroduced.

Figure 3.7 Comparison: Attitudes towards jail sentences and capital punishment mainstream and 'other'



Analysis of Authoritarian Attitudes


The available data on authoritarianism is very limited. Whilst other datasets and polls provide more items for analysis on this issue, they were not utilised in this study to ensure that comparability was maintained. What we can draw from the small number of questions examined is that, in general, Australians have relatively tough attitudes towards criminals and these attitudes have been consistent over a long-time period. Whilst there are correlations to be made between spikes in support with PHON, on matters in regard to punishment, spikes also occurred during times where PHON were not a dominant feature of the political landscape.

Nativism

Mudde (2007: 22) argues that nativism is the key ideological feature of the radical right and to explore this feature of the radical right, five items have been selected for examination. These include attitudes towards immigrants, immigration, asylum seekers, and Indigenous Australians. The latter is important as nativism taps into more than anti-immigrant sentiment, illustrated by PHON's framing of the danger posed by Indigenous Australians to the wider Australian nation state. Therefore, the nativist items under investigation focus on examining Australians long-term attitudes and whether there is any correlation with the success of PHON.


Voters were asked to respond to two issues on Indigenous Australians: (1) Government help has gone too far; and (2) the transfer of land rights has gone too far. When considering both statements, the trend suggests that Australians increasingly harbour more positive attitudes towards Indigenous Australians. The one exception is the period 1993-1996, where over half of respondents believed that help had gone too far.

Figure 3.8 Comparison: Attitudes towards policies on Indigenous Australians mainstream and 'other'



It is noteworthy to consider the attitudes of the 'other' voters. Whereas the trend for mainstream voters shows increased support for policies aimed to assist Indigenous peoples, this is not the case for these 'other' voters. A noticeable shift occurs in 2010, and by 2016, over half of respondents in this category think that Government assistance has gone too far, with 46 per cent suggesting the transfer of land rights has gone too far. The latter part of this period coincides with the re-emergence of PHON, which is an interesting correlation to note.

Figure 3.9 Comparison: Number of migrants allowed into Australia gone too far mainstream and 'other'




One measure which can be used to explore nativist attitudes is about the level of migrants entering Australia. An indication that migrant levels are too high indicates nativist proclivities within the population. Australians were asked to respond to the following statement: 'the number of migrants allowed into Australia has gone too far'. In 1993, 70 per cent of Australians agreed that that the number of migrants allowed into the country had gone too far. Over the next decade, attitudes appeared to soften with numbers falling to 31 per cent. Six years later, however, in 2010, public attitudes to migrants had risen again, with just over half of respondents suggesting that numbers had gone too far. In 2016 the number decreased again to 40 per cent. What is important to note about these attitudes is that negative attitudes towards immigration rates were high irrespective of PHON's presence. For the 'other' voter, there is only one period

where their belief was that migrant numbers were not too high, this occurred in 2001 with numbers hitting a low of 36 per cent. This still means that over a third of voters in this category believed that migrant numbers had gone too far. Since 2004, there has increased even more, rising to 61 per cent in 2016. There is a strong correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and PHON, however, interestingly, the evidence suggests that rather than PHON activating these attitudes, they are activated by them.

Another measure used to explore nativism tries to tap attitudes to whether the government should; (1) Increase immigration, (2) keep immigration levels the same or (3) reduce immigration. Australian attitudes have fluctuated between wanting to reduce immigration and keeping levels the same. Increasing immigration levels has consistently polled poorly.


Figure 3.10 Comparison: Attitudes towards the level of immigration into Australia mainstream and 'other'



The desire to maintain immigration levels has remained stable among the population. It is the notion of reducing immigration which is the most volatile of the three statements. In 1996, 63 per cent of respondents wanted to reduce immigration. By 2004 that figure had dropped to 35 per cent. In 2010, the desire to reduce immigrants was on the rise again with the number rising to just over half at 52 per cent. This number has reduced to 42 per cent in 2013 and 41 per cent in 2016. The 'other' category also exhibits some anomalies. In 1996-1998 the view that Australia needed to reduce immigrants increased from 59 per cent to 64 per cent. Numbers decreased sharply from 1998 – 2001, but the most notable delineation from the 'other' voters is that since 2013, the desire to reduce immigration numbers has sharply increased. In 2016, 61 per cent of voters in this category expressed the attitude that immigration needed to be reduced. Again, this period coincides with the emergence of PHON in 2016.

Moreover, attitudes towards the consequences of migrants into Australia is another useful way of assessing nativist attitudes within the electorate. The nomination of positive factors associated with immigrants suggests lower levels of threat perception and therefore a lower level of nativism. When respondents were asked to consider the consequences of immigration, they were required to rank the following four statements: (1) Immigrants are good for economy; (2) Immigrants increase crime rate; (3) Immigrants make Australia more open to ideas and cultures; and (4) Immigrants take jobs away from Australian born. Statements 2 and 4, in particular, tap into arguments espoused by radical right parties such as PHON that immigrants have a negative impact on society.

Figure 3.11 Comparison: The Consequences of Immigration mainstream and 'other'




What is evident from this data is that mainstream Australian voters think that immigrants are good for the economy and immigrants make Australia more open to ideas and cultures. Moreover, these attitudes have remained consistent throughout the twenty-year period in which they have been measured. The belief that immigrants increase the crime rate has reduced slightly and so has the belief that immigrants take jobs away from Australians.

In terms of assessing the contribution of immigrants to society, it is the 'other' voter who is less supportive of the positive contribution that migrants have made. The belief in the link between crime and immigration has risen recently from 35 per cent in 2010, to 62 per cent in 2016. Furthermore, the view that immigrants take jobs away from the Australian born has also increased significantly moving from 25 per cent in 2007 to 54 per cent in 2016. This presents a very different view from that of mainstream voters. What should also be noted is the correlation between PHON and the spike in support for negative statements about immigrants.

Another item worth evaluating are attitudes towards asylum seekers. This is because asylum seekers arriving by boat have been framed as a threat to national security and it also raises broader questions which challenge conceptions of national identity. In 2001 a new question was introduced asking Australians whether: (1) Boats should be turned back; or whether (2) Boats should not be turned back. What is evident is that there has been a decrease in support for this policy, declining from 62 per cent in 2001 to 48 per cent in 2016. Of note, again, is the 'other' vote. It has gone in a different direction to most mainstream voters.

Figure 3.12 Comparison: Boats should be turned back mainstream and 'other'



In 2001, 54 per cent of 'other' respondents indicated that they wanted the boats turned back. Whilst this declined in the period immediately following, since 2004 the numbers wanting the boats turned back has steadily increased, sitting at 57 per cent in 2016, higher than what it was in 2001. Whilst the desire to turn the boats back has seen a peak in 2016, correlating with PHON's arrival, the data indicates that support for turning the boats back had been increasing steadily since 2004. Again, this suggests that PHON has been activated by rather than activating these attitudes.

Analysis of Nativist Attitudes

Overall the data suggests that whilst mainstream attitudes towards Indigenous Australians and immigrants have improved, there are small pockets of voters who harbour strong nativist attitudes. The early 1990s resulted in a surge of anti-Indigenous attitudes in regard to land rights with a peak in 1996. This surge coincided with the rise of Pauline Hanson's maiden speech which described examples of reverse racism and special privileges for Indigenous Australians. According to Jackman (1998:168), Hanson reignited the resilient strand of racism that had resurfaced under the guise of Indigenous land rights. The anti-Indigenous sentiment expressed in the nineties can be attributed, in part, to the mainstream's ignorance of Indigenous Australians due to a lack of authentic debate surrounding the issue of race (Jupp 1993; Marcus 2001; Money 1999, Ang and Stratton 1996). In regard to attitudes towards immigration, there is a surge in anti-immigrant attitudes that have occurred since 2010, however, this occurred before the re-emergence of PHON.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated whether any changes in Australian political attitudes correlate with the rise and fall and rise again of PHON. It has been found that there is some evidence of a correlation between voter attitudes and PHON's electoral success. But this is not consistent and does not appear to be unidirectional. This chapter has also shown that Australian voters with nativist tendencies predate Hanson and Howard (Goot and Watson 2005; 200). These nativist attitudes are not just associated with the radical right, they exist amongst the mainstream (Goot and Watson 2005, Pakulski and Tranter 2000: 218; Kefford and Ratcliff 2018).

Chapter 4 Party Policy and the Impact of the Radical Right

Policies are an important reflection of a party's ideological stance and serve as a source of differentiation from their political competitors. While voters may support a party for a variety of reasons, theoretically at least, policies lie at the heart of democratic politics as voters are persuaded to vote for their preferred party based on the strength and credibility of their policy positions (Bean 1994: 134). The role of policy is therefore crucial in identifying what voters are attracted to and changes can be seen as indicative of parties recognising that other parties may have policy positions which are strongly favoured by the voting public. By examining the policy platforms the major parties have taken to federal elections, we can explore the influence of PHON in the party system. Hence this chapter will focus on the policy positions of the Labor and Liberal parties in order to establish if the emergence of a radical right party altered the major platforms of these parties.

Scholars such as Mudde (2007) argue that the influence of the radical right on policy such as immigration has been overstated. Instead, the drive for more restrictive immigration policies originates with European centre right parties long before the emergence of the radical right (Bale 2008). Furthermore restrictive policies have been enacted by governments not containing a radical right party and indeed by governments faced by no significant radical right competitor (Duncan 2010: 340). Therefore, this chapter will address the key policy areas specific to the radical right in order to see what effect they have had on the major parties. Has the emergence

of PHON resulted in a dramatic shift in policy decisions towards the right or have they exercised minimal influence? Have the policies of the mainstream political parties adopted more nativist, authoritarian or populist tendencies in order to combat the threat posed by PHON? These are the key questions this chapter will investigate. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide a summary of the major policy platforms introduced by the major political parties from the period 1990-2016. These tables are a compilation of both primary and secondary data including key party policy documents, speeches, and relevant campaign materials. In order to make a comparison with PHON, the major elections contested by PHON and the election prior are included; 1996, 1998 and 2016. Three key policy areas of the radical right have been identified as key areas for investigation. These include; immigration and multiculturalism; refugees and asylum seekers; and Indigenous Australians⁵.

Immigration and Multiculturalism

Across Western Europe, it has been found that the mainstream right has adopted an increasingly hard line on immigration during the past 15 years (Akkerman 2015; Carter, 2005; Norris, 2005; Schain, 2006; Van Spanje, 2010; Williams, 2006). It has also been found that the radical right has had an impact on mainstream party positioning, causing a rightward shift but this has been modest and at times a temporary (Akkerman 2015). In cases where parties have adopted harsher policies in relation to immigration, it has been suggested that this is not always a direct impact

⁵ While the policies of the radical right encompass numerous other areas, for the purposes of this thesis, given the timeframes, these issues have been used as a proxy for the impact of the radical right on the policies of the mainstream parties.

of the presence of a radical right party; rather it is symptomatic of other underlying causes (Akkerman 2015: 63). According to van Heerden et al (2014), in some cases the mainstream parties were already making the shift to the right independent of the rise of radical right parties. Moreover, radical right parties are often seen as accelerating the process already taking place amongst mainstream political parties.

Similar to most advanced democracies, immigration has remained a controversial and divisive issue in Australia (Kukathas 1997: 167; Kolet 2010). The size and composition of migrant intake has dominated key areas of policy debate and rhetoric since the invocation of the White Australia Policy in 1901. According to Cronin, (1993: 84 as cited in Pietsch 2013: 143) since Australia was settled, the colonial and federal governments have stated their sovereign right and duty to control immigration. The *Migration Act 1958* remains the main instrument by which immigration is controlled. Australia's initial reticence to embrace immigration is reflected in the conservative policies of assimilation and integration which remained in place until the official introduction of the multicultural policy in 1973. Despite these debates being prone to significant 'politicking', the major parties have largely maintained bipartisan support for a non-discriminatory immigration policy at election time and in their policy programs. Instead, they have largely chosen to campaign on economic issues such as the state of the economy, employment, education and health (Jupp 1991; Jupp and Kabala 1993; Gibson et al 2002). As shown in Table 4.1, there are very few examples of the major parties adopting policies on immigration which resemble anything like that of the radical right. Nonetheless, a brief discussion of the period from 1990 to 2016 is required to better understand the underlying dynamics.

Immigration and Multiculturalism: 1990-2016

The period 1990 to 2016 can be seen as three distinct eras. The first is from 1990 to 1996, when the ALP remained in power. The second is the Howard years, from 1996 to 2007. The third is the period after the ALP returned to government in 2007 and up to the present day. The dynamics in each era were different and the way that the major parties responded to immigration and multiculturalism in each was also different.

The early 1990s were dominated by high levels of unemployment and an economic recession. The sweeping economic reform of the Hawke and then Keating led ALP governments had created clear 'winners' and 'losers' and, according to Wear, (2008: 625), the 'losers' of this new era of economic rationalism, held very negative views on immigration. While the debate over the link between economic globalisation and the radical right goes on and on, it was during this era that a discussion of the environmental and economic implications of immigration – as opposed to the cultural implications – became common (Gardiner-Garden 1993). The Liberal Party, then led by John Hewson, proposed cuts to immigration numbers, directly linking the high rate of unemployment to immigration and proposed an overhaul of the immigration system (Markus 2000:92). Moreover, In the lead up to the 1993 election, the Keating Government, decided to cut immigration numbers but made no new announcements during the election campaign.

In the lead up to the 1996 election, the relatively new opposition leader, John Howard, presented Keating and the ALP as being out of touch with 'ordinary' Australians and argued they were captive to minority or special interests (Johnson b 2000: 18). Howard claimed that the Coalition would govern in the interests of all Australians and not just the cosmopolitan elites (Johnson 2000b: 18). Nonetheless, what is important to note here is that before the emergence of PHON, a significant debate surrounding the nature of immigration was already occurring and this included serious consideration being given to immigration cuts. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, once the Howard led Coalition was elected, it immediately changed the focus of the immigration programme. Planned immigration was cut from 96,000 in 1995-1996 to 86,000 in 1996-1997 (Goot and Watson 2005: 182). The proportion of the family reunion intake was also reduced, falling from two thirds in 1995-1996 to less than half in 1997-1998 (Betts 2002). The government also changed the mix of the migrant intake shifting the emphasis away from family reunions to skilled migration. The focus on skilled migrants has remained a consistent element of Coalition policy since.

In late 1996, only months after the election, the Office of Multicultural Affairs was disbanded. As was the Bureau of Immigration, and the Multicultural and Population Research centre. Structural multiculturalism was not supported by the Howard government, and it has been suggested that Howard viewed multiculturalism to be divisive and avoided use of the term as much as possible (Galligan and Roberts 2003). Indeed, Howard had said:

The objection I have to multiculturalism is that multiculturalism is in effect saying that it is impossible to have an Australian ethos, that it is impossible to have a common

Australian culture. So we have to pretend that we are a federation of cultures and that we've got a bit from every part of the world (Curran 2004: 254; see also Holland 2010: 50).

While there was bipartisan consensus on Australia's need to increase the intake of highly skilled migrants, and Asian immigration in particular, debate remained as how best to manage increasing cultural and ethnic diversity (Pietsch 2013: 149). This conflict had also been exacerbated with the emergence of Pauline Hanson.

Hanson's maiden parliamentary speech clearly articulated her policies on immigration and multiculturalism. She said that Australia was in "danger of being swamped by Asians" and that Australia needed to wake up before it was too late (Hanson 1996). She called for multiculturalism to be abolished and the return to the concept of "one people, one nation, one flag" (Hanson 1996). She attacked the promoters of 'political correctness' as they were funding the multiculturalists at the expense of Australian taxpayers. She also called for an immediate halt to immigration until unemployment was addressed and when immigration was resumed, she argued that Asian immigration should not be permitted.

The Howard government should not be seen as reactive to PHON, instead they should be viewed for what they were: in the vanguard of opposition to immigration. Once they were elected in 1996, they dismantled most of the Labor Party's policy initiatives on multiculturalism (Koleth 2010). The National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) had been established in 1994 to

advise on multicultural issues. In 1997, NMAC recommended that the Howard Government adopt a considered approach in defence of multiculturalism (Koleth 2010). The response, coming in the form of a policy document, *A new agenda for Multicultural Australia*, made clear that the government only recognised 'Australian multiculturalism' and outlined that the principles of 'civic duty', 'cultural respect', 'social equity' and 'productive diversity' were key to their approach (Koleth 2010).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, brought multicultural anxieties to a head. Howard, who had already been a reluctant advocate of multiculturalism, moved even further away instead focussing on the promotion of civic integration (Koleth 2010). The Howard Government's last policy statement on multiculturalism, released in 2003, was framed in the context of prevailing security concerns about the threat of terrorism (Koleth 2010). Entitled, *United in Diversity*, the statement focused on the idea that 'the key to national unity is citizenship' (Koleth 2010). This was followed by proposed new citizenship laws in 2006, which included a requirement for migrants to sit a 'formal citizenship test' that includes a 'common values' test, an English test and 'a knowledge of Australia test' (Pietsch 2013). A further amendment was made in 2007 to the Australian Citizenship Act which involved increasing the residence requirement from two to four years. Multiculturalism was now about developing a set of national values which brought cohesion and integration (Koleth 2010). As part of these changes, in January 2007, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) became known as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Koleth 2010).

The evidence from this era suggests that once the Howard Government was elected, immigration policy underwent a significant shift to more closely align it with the Coalition's long-held position on migrant composition. The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in a further deemphasis of multiculturalism in an attempt to forge a distinctive focus on citizenship values and integration. Moreover, there was little in the policies of the Liberal Party to suggest that PHON had some significant impact on their approach.

After the Rudd led ALP came to power in 2007, Rudd said that he supported the idea of a big Australia, giving his blessing to a predicted population of 36 million by 2050 (Betts 2010b: 33). Immigration was not an issue in the 2007 campaign, with both major parties in agreement on the need for population growth (Betts 2010a: 52). After Gillard replaced Rudd as prime minister, she immediately spoke out against a big Australia, saying the focus should be on a sustainable Australia. Despite the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC) being devised in 2008, very little priority was given to multiculturalism during this time (Koleth 2010). When the Coalition returned to power in 2013, the new government made its position on immigration clear immediately. Then immigration minister, Scott Morrison, said that "the primary purpose of our immigration program is economic, not social, in our view. Immigration is an economic policy, not a welfare policy" (Morrison in Larsen 2013). Beyond this, however, there was very little specific policy details on immigration and multiculturalism during this era.

In general, then, the major parties have demonstrated a consistent ideological position on immigration and multiculturalism. Furthermore, the emergence of PHON appears to have had no effect on the policies of the parties.

Indigenous Policies

Nativism is an important feature of radical right politics which holds that the nation should be inhabited exclusively by the native group (Mudde 2007). This creates a distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘others’ (Stokes 2000: 26). According to Stokes, this created an interesting ‘contortion’ for the place of Indigenous Australians in the discourse of PHON (Stokes 2000:26). PHON defines two types of other; those who are categorised as oppressors or enemies and those who, by their existence are cultural or criminal threats to Australian culture (Stokes 2000: 26). In the discourse of PHON, Indigenous Australians are not ‘ordinary Australians’ because they receive significant government assistance. These ‘privileges’ are un-Australian because they prevent ordinary, hardworking Australians from receiving a fair go. PHON’s dissatisfaction with policies towards Indigenous Australians was evident when Hanson said: “I am fed up with being told, ‘This is our land.’ Well where the hell do I go? I was born here, and so were my parents and children... Like most Australians I worked for my land; no one gave it to me.” (Hanson 1996).

As Table 4.2 and 4.4 illustrate, the policies that were implemented by the major parties did not resemble those of PHON. There are however issues regarding land rights and native title whereby

some similarities between Coalition and PHON policies emerge. A broader discussion of Indigenous policies is therefore necessary to account for some of these similarities.

Indigenous Policies 1990 – 2016

When the Hawke government came to power in 1983, Hawke said that his government would make provision for Aboriginal people ‘to own the land which has for years been set aside for them’ (Pratt 2003: 7). Efforts to grant land rights became a feature of national policy objectives, however, by the end of the decade efforts had been frustrated by mining lobbyists and the West Australian government (Pratt 2003: 8). By the end of the 1980s, policy had increased to acts of symbolism, with the idea of a treaty or *makaratta* revived as a foundation for guiding all future policy (Kuthathas 1997: 170). Reconciliation was a key priority for Hawke, and the establishment of the Aboriginal Council for Reconciliation (CAR) in 1991 was a significant development in this regard (Robbins 2007: 319). The CAR’s functions were to stimulate public interest in a concept of reconciliation and to promote better understanding of the history and culture of Indigenous people, as well as awareness of the extent of their disadvantage in Australian society (Robbins 2007: 319).

Upon assuming the leadership, Keating placed the issue of reconciliation at the heart of his prime ministership and sought to make a significant impact in race relations (Markus 2001: 37). On the eve of the 1993 election he told his staff, “I’m more convinced than ever that we’ve got to make peace with the Aborigines to get the place right” (Keating 1993 in Markus 2001: 37). Keating’s

Government welcomed native title as an important opportunity and challenge for all Australians, and his landmark Redfern address clearly articulated his desire to work on land rights. Keating's vision, however, was not popular and, according to Johnson (2000a) , unnerved many sections of the Australian population.

The election of the Howard government in 1996 resulted in a marked difference in policy. Howard was keen to create a clear distinction between his government and the Hawke/Keating years (Gunstone 2008). The Howard government inherited from its predecessors an established process devoted to exploring the options for reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (Robbins 2010: 320). In stark contrast, however, Howard's vision stressed the paramount importance of social unity and common political processes, ruling out any symbolic gesture of separateness for Indigenous Australians (Robbins 2007: 316; Gunstone 2008:35). Rejecting concepts of self-determination, the potential to formulate a treaty and the idea of native title; Howard called for practical reconciliation (Robbins 2007, Gunstone 2008, Gardiner-Garden 2003: Pratt). As Table 4.2 reflects, policies were focussed on socio-economic disadvantage, housing, education, unemployment and health. This period also marked the rise of PHON and her tough stance on welfare support for Indigenous Australians as reflected in Table 4.4.

In rejecting what was believed to be acts of symbolism, the Howard government opposed an apology to Indigenous Australians and made a stand against the 'black armband' view of history.

Howard argued,

Australians of this generation should not be required to accept guilt and blame for past actions and policies over which they had no control. But we do have an obligation and responsibility to overcome their legacies for our fellow Australians (Howard cited in Robbins 2007: 316).

In stark contrast to the Keating and Hawke governments, the Coalition were opposed to notions of land rights; offering the Ten Point Plan in order to allay the concerns of the pastoralists and miners (Pratt 2003: 131). In his special address to the nation in 1997, Howard talked about 'striking a fair and decent balance' between rural and Indigenous Australians (Robbins 2007:318). Prior to his speech he had likened native title to a swinging pendulum whereby interests had swung too far in the way of Indigenous Australians. He used this to justify his amendments to the Native Title Act which passed in to law in 1998. According to Robbins,

The policy decisions made by the Howard government on this issue were strongly influenced by a concept of national identity that discounts the different history and cultural entitlements of Indigenous people (2010: 319).

As demonstrated in Table 4.4, and drawing on the rhetoric of Hanson from the time, there are some similarities between PHON and the Coalition in their policies about Indigenous land rights. However, these policies were also identifiable from the 1980s, as the successful campaign led by Hugh Morgan to prevent recognition of Indigenous land rights showed (Markus 2001; Robbins 2010; Mondon 2012, 2014). The decision to merge Indigenous Affairs into the portfolio of

Immigration and Multiculturalism has been interpreted by Tavan (2006:7) as further evidence of the government's hostility towards Indigenous self-determination. This is further supported by the fact that Liberal Party polls indicated that Hanson's policies on Indigenous Australians were popular amongst a significant proportion of voters (Curran 2004: 42).

Rising opposition to Indigenous emancipation did not end there. Both Labor and the Coalition expressed their intent to abolish ATSIC in the lead up to the 2004 election. Howard had vehemently opposed the creation of ATSIC, suggesting that it enabled a separate status for Indigenous Australians, serving as a kind of 'black parliament' (Pratt et al 2004). In 2004, ATSIC was abolished with no replacement (Pratt et al 2004: 11). Instead the ATSIC programs were devolved to a range of other Commonwealth government departments and agencies; it was a 'mainstreaming' initiative (Robbins 2007: 322). For the Howard government, ATSIC had represented self-determination for Indigenous Australians and did not adhere to their goals of national cohesion and unity (Robbins 2007: 324). In summary, during the period the Coalition was in power, the government made significant changes to how they allocated their spending on Indigenous Affairs. The budget was cut, Abstudy reformed and a significant cut in spending on Indigenous health was implemented (Gunstone 2008: 38).

The Northern Territory Intervention in June 2007 was a controversial move on the part of the Howard Government. It was a response to the release of the *Little Children are Sacred* report which outlined reports of child sex abuse in the Northern Territory. According to Toohey, (2008:

18) the five-year plan was hastily drafted and with little regard for long term implications. The emergency legislation would in the first year seek to establish order through increased police presence, changes to alcohol and pornography laws, the quarantining of welfare, the gathering of population data, and explaining the intervention to residents of seventy-three communities and forty-five town camps. This would be followed by the longer normalisation stage whereby communities would be provided with the services to implement good health, education and infrastructure (Toohey 2008: 50). It also resulted in removing the permit system governing access to Aboriginal land in the NT and removing customary law as consideration in sentencing or setting bail (Gardiner-Garden 2011: 24). Kevin Rudd, then the Opposition leader, gave his full support to the intervention.

The election of a Labor government in 2007 resulted in a formal apology issued to Indigenous Australians and a shift in the rhetoric. Prime Minister Rudd endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, oversaw legislation which reinstated the full operation of the Racial Discrimination Act (1976) and promised consultation on a range of issues – from the future of the CDEP scheme, to the formation of a new Indigenous representative body. Rudd also came under criticism for continued support for the Northern Territory Intervention. Under Gillard, policy remained largely the same (Gardiner-Garden 2011: 24). The focus was on ‘closing the gap’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Despite the rhetoric, however, it has been noted that the initiatives were not that different to the previous Howard government (Gardiner-Garden 2011:27).

The policies of the major parties from 1990 to 2016, therefore, were focussed on reconciliation with Indigenous Australians (albeit with different approaches) and closing the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians in areas such as health and education. This is compared to that of PHON who did not support the policy of reconciliation, rather, their policy objectives endorsed supporting people on an individual basis regardless of race. As Table 4.4 demonstrates, PHON sought to disband any formal structures and financial assistance to improve the plight of Indigenous Australians. Furthermore, PHON has no Indigenous policies listed on their current official party page, however, Hanson has called for a referendum to amend the race-based section of the Constitution, scrap section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act and continues to fight against constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples. Furthermore, as outlined in Table 4.4, PHON opposed the idea of a national apology and called for the abolition of ATSIC. Again, whilst Howard also refused to deliver an apology, Table 4.2 demonstrates longstanding opposition to the symbolic overtures of reconciliation as reflected in their focus on practical and economic areas for assistance. Hence, there is no evidence to suggest PHON has shaped the coalitions policies on Indigenous peoples.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Public perceptions or concerns over unauthorised maritime arrivals continue to strongly influence government policy and remain an emotive and divisive political issue (Phillips 2014:1). As early as the 1970s, asylum seekers have been accused of 'jumping the immigration queue' or questions raised surrounding the legitimacy of their refugee status. Headlines referred to

‘invasion’, ‘flood’, and ‘yellow peril’ with claims that the government had lost control over migrant selection (Phillips and Spinks 2013). Mandatory detention of unauthorised asylum seekers has been a legacy of the Keating government and received bipartisan support as part of the Migration Amendment Act 1992. The ALP and Coalition have both adopted a hard-line approach to unauthorised asylum seekers and as demonstrated in Table 4.3, this position has maintained largely consistent support from the major parties.

Betts asserts that the desire to turn boat arrivals away is a policy which has been building since the mid-1970s (2001: 44). Boat arrivals came in three distinct waves: the first from 1976 to 1981; the second, from 1989 to 1998; and the third, and largest, from 1999 to the present (Betts 2001b: 34). The arrival of 27 Indochinese asylum seekers in November 1989 heralded the beginning of the second wave of asylum seekers arriving by boat. Over the following nine years, people arrived by boats at the rate of about 300 per annum—mostly from Cambodia, Vietnam and southern China (Phillips 2013). This second wave were treated differently, being held in detention whilst their claims were processed. Betts asserts that it was the context which precipitated such a response. Even though boat people constituted a small minority of refugee intake, there were increased numbers of legal arrivals; those people who had arrived on temporary visas, seeking refugee status (Betts 2001a: 36). They were often held for a duration of two years; some delayed further by lengthy legal appeals. It was this extended period of detainment which garnered considerable criticism. Despite this, the Keating government passed the Migration Amendment Act in 1992. This had the effect of making detention mandatory for people who had arrived

without visas. The new act received bipartisan support and was not repealed by the Coalition government when they came to power.

As the 1990s wore on, larger numbers of boat people arrived, and people smugglers became involved. Between 1999 and 2002, large numbers of boat people had been entering Australian waters (Mondon 2013; McAllister 2003). Contextualised within the broader global events, Howard conflated the issues of Tampa with 9/11 to create a national security issue (Koleth 2010: 13). The Defence Minister, Peter Reith, announced on radio shortly after the Tampa crisis “you’ve got to be able to manage the people coming into your country... otherwise it can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post for terrorist activities” (cited in Mondon 2013: 152). Curran (2004:46) argues that Howard’s strong stance had successfully attracted the PHON voters who were looking for somewhere to cast their vote. However, there is ambiguity surrounding the impact of PHON on the Coalition at this time. Whereas Curran (2004) and Wear (2008) argue this to be the case, Jupp (2002) believes the impact is indirect. As Jupp (2002) shows, the temporary protection regime and excising territories from the migration zone were ideas espoused by PHON. McNevin (2007) also indicates that limited access to legal aid was also implemented by Howard, but a PHON initiative. There is evidence to suggest therefore that PHON had some impact on Coalition policy at the time. It is the level to which this occurred which remains a source of conjecture.

When the ALP came to power they deviated from the tough stance taken by the Howard government, ending the Pacific Solution. It was during this period, however, that the number of boat arrivals significantly increased. In 2010, once Gillard became the prime minister, one of the first policy changes was the reintroduction of offshore processing and turning the boats away. The return of the Coalition to government in 2013, resulted in Operation Sovereign Borders and the eventual reintroduction of Temporary Protection Visas. Since then, little has distinguished the major parties on their asylum seeker and refugee policies, as reflected in Table 4.3. Both parties have maintained their harsh policies, they claim, to serve as a deterrent to people smugglers.

Conclusion

Mudde (2013) argues the goal of radical right parties is to mainstream their views. In the case of PHON, they were able to attract significant attention to their policies regarding immigration, refugees and Indigenous Australians. Studies in Western Europe have revealed that the impact of the radical right on mainstream right-wing parties has been modest (Akkerman 2015). More pertinently, however, the question has been raised as to whether or not the mainstream right-wing parties were already implementing hard-line policies, particularly in regard to immigration (van Heerden et al 2014). The policy agenda of the Coalition, in particular, adds weight to these arguments. Before Hanson and PHON emerged, the Coalition exhibited a consistent and conservative approach to issues of Indigenous Australians and immigration. But it should also be noted that there is some evidence of these policies being tweaked in response to the PHON phenomena.

Table 4.1 Key Election Policies: Immigration and Multiculturalism 1990-2016

1990 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to cultural identity 2. social justice 3. economic efficiency • Equal access to community and health services, local government, and education • Develop the National Policy on Languages commitment to English language • Establish a National Bureau of Language Services • Increased opportunities for overseas-trained migrants • Provide Special Broadcasting Service its own legislative base and charter • Maintain the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission as an independent statutory body • Keep the Office of Multicultural Affairs within Prime Ministerial portfolio
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immigration intake attuned to economic interests • Approve younger, skilled, knowledgeable, educated and employable migrants. • Expand the number of migrants with financial resources and entrepreneurial skills. • Will not disband Family Reunion category but adjust the proportions • Decrease budget of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs • emphasise the capacity of the Australian people to accept and absorb change
1993 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrant numbers to not fall below 80,000/year • Significant changes to Family Reunion • The spouse of a permanent resident required to wait two years for permanent residence • Focus on English speaking • Establish a Migration Agents Registration board and develop an agent code of conduct. • Caps on the number of permanent visas
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significantly reduce immigration in the short term- increase numbers as economy improves • English language testing in the Concessional family reunion category • Restriction of welfare benefits in the first two years • Skills focus- 'labour market testing' • extend the current two-year residency requirement to four years

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Familiarity with English, Australian history and national anthem prerequisites • Establish a national council on citizenship • Migrants to be assessed on contribution to the current and future needs of Australia • Encourage new residents to acquire Australian citizenship
1996 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family reunion increased • Support multiculturalism
Coalition	<p>Develop an immigration program that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. has broad community support 2. is suited to Australia's national interests and international responsibilities 3. balances economic, social, environmental and international considerations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • adopt a rolling 3-year planning projection for future immigration intakes. • the immigration intake, in the near term, should remain at around its current levels. • anti-racist campaign
1998 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase spending on English language training • Set up Office of Population and Immigration • Restore Office of Multicultural Affairs • Emphasise multiculturalism • Increase family reunion intake • Reduce skilled migrant intake • Maintain status quo on humanitarian intake • Two-year welfare delay is maintained • Anti-racism campaign • Population Policy
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De-emphasise multiculturalism • Decrease family reunion • Increase skilled migrants • Maintain status quo on humanitarian intake, sponsorship • Two-year welfare delay maintained • Anti-racism campaign
2001 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No new policy statements made
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase migrant intake by 85,000

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled stream will increase to 45,500 • Family stream will increase to 37,900
2004 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No new policy statements made
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No new policy statements
2007 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the policy of multiculturalism • Prefer permanent skilled migration over temporary skilled migration • Move to long term population planning in line with nation building
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in temporary 457 visas • Shift away from multiculturalism to a uniform set of values and behaviours
2010 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage Permanent Residents to become citizens • Emphasise multiculturalism and diversity • Recognise the importance of all aspects of the migration program, including skilled, family and humanitarian streams. • 'Sustainable Australia' – a halt on immigration
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish 'rail guards' for population growth • Review population sustainability on a yearly basis – establish a population growth target • Skills migration; two-thirds of permanent migration programme. • Commit to a white paper on immigration • Cut net migration; 300,000 to 170,000 per year • No cuts to skilled migrant visas
2013 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remain a multicultural society • Retain long term planning approach when setting immigration levels
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled migration is focus • Immigrants contribute to a strong economy • 457 visas a mainstay of immigration programme
2016 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-establish Office for Multicultural Affairs (OMA) • Economic empowerment of new migrants • Invest in the Adult Migration English Program (AMEP), Community Hubs and the 'It Stops With Me' Campaign. • New funding to support social cohesion and economic inclusion
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multicultural policy to be reviewed and updated. • no immigration legislation to be introduced

Table 4.2 Indigenous Policy Election Platform 1990-2016

1990 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal Reconciliation – for contrary of Federation 2001 • Initiate plans to draft a treaty with Indigenous Australians • Self Determination • Grant land rights
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve the health, administration and delivery of services to Indigenous Australians • Maintain the Institute of Aboriginal Studies • Protect and promote Aboriginal culture • Work with the states and territories to achieve greater school attendance by Aboriginal children • Oppose and abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) • No formal treaty negotiations • Oppose National land rights legislation • Support the Royal Commission on Aboriginal deaths in custody
1993 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete process of reconciliation • Expand CDEP • Expand funding for National Aboriginal health strategy • Provide a National Response to the Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody • Ensure all Australians develop a wider appreciation and understanding of Aboriginal heritage and culture • Social Justice Package
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reject notion of a Treaty • Equal access to health, education and housing • Oppose National Land Rights Treaty
1996 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation • Focus on Aboriginal Health and Morale
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Practical reconciliation: focus on key issues of health, housing, education and employment • Amendment of Native Title Legislation • No national apology
1998 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation • increased funding for health – domestic violence, immunisation • increase participants in CDEP

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support Indigenous Arts • support role of ATSIC • Deliver a National Apology • National Framework for Indigenous Heritage Protection • Support new preamble to Constitution
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wik Legislation- Ten Point Plan • Practical reconciliation: focus on key issues of health, housing, education and employment • Response to Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody • Improve access to legal services
2001 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce disadvantage in education, health, housing and employment • Reconciliation • Increase funding to both CDEP and housing and infrastructure • Promote community development and self-reliance • Response to Bringing them Home Report • National Apology • Regional agreements-making initiative in response to Native title • Indigenous Heritage Protection • Health - \$47 million to chronic illnesses and infectious diseases, provide dental health services • \$23 million to support problems associated with alcohol, illicit drugs and domestic violence • Make indigenous workforce development a national priority.
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Practical Reconciliation
2004 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish ATSIC • Radical Intervention in Northern Territory • Reaffirm support for apology to Stolen Generations
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish ATSIC • Practical reconciliation
2007 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Radical Intervention in NT • Apology to Indigenous Australians • \$4.6 billion towards Closing the Gap for projects in health, housing, early childhood development, economic participation and remote service delivery. • Increase retention and participation of Indigenous children in schools • Promote the First Nations status of Indigenous Australians. • Advance reconciliation and social justice
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referendum to recognise Indigenous Australians in the Constitution

2010 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stronger Futures Package Northern Territory- focus on employment, education, community safety and policing, alcohol management and welfare payment management • Closing the Gap – bipartisan support to close the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians • Recognise the first Australians in our Constitution
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closing the Gap – bipartisan support to close the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians • Breaking the cycle of welfare dependency for young indigenous people and others trapped in intergenerational poverty • Renounce welfare dependency for employment
2013 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stronger Futures Package NT- target alcohol abuse and school attendance • Constitutional Recognition for Indigenous Australians • Closing the gap: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - close life expectancy gap within a generation - halve gap on child mortality, literacy and numeracy levels, school retention, employment levels • Three additional targets introduced: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase participation in higher and further education 2. Justice target 3. better access to disability services • Funding through national partnerships for education, health and housing • Cape York Welfare Reform Trial • Funding land and sea ranger programs
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closing the Gap (see ALP policy above) • Bipartisan support of ALP 2008 targets • Constitutional Recognition for Indigenous Australians- draft amendment within 12 months • Indigenous Affairs Portfolio moved to Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet • Not make changes to Land Rights Act • Set up Indigenous Advisory Council • PM to spend a week each year in Aboriginal communities • Create economic opportunities • Larger Indigenous communities have a permanent police presence
2016 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closing the Gap • Call for referendum on Indigenous recognition in the Constitution • Targets to close the justice gap

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>'Your Child, Our Future'</i>: 4/7 targets for education • Maintain bipartisan support of Indigenous Health Plan • Double the number of Indigenous Rangers
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closing the gap • Develop Indigenous business opportunities • Health and education • Continued support for Constitutional recognition

Table 4.3 Asylum Seeker and Refugee Election Policies 1990-2016

1990 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory detention of refugees
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fulfil international obligations to provide for the resettlement of refugees
1993 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory detention of refugees • Improve the efficiency for processing claims for refugee status • Meet mandatory international requirements • Administer a flexible and diverse refugee program in line with UN obligations
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory detention
1996 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory detention of refugees
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory detention of illegal immigrants, with appropriate release provisions in the event of prolonged detention. • Access to the courts for review of tribunal decisions should be restricted in all but exceptional circumstances. • establish a Refugee Resettlement Advisory Council
1998 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a wide range of settlement services for refugees • Including accommodation, employment and access to health • maintain current number intake
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Swift removal of illegal refugees • maintain current number intake
2001 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop the boats • Mandatory detention • Strong Borders; Coastguard to monitor the border
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop the boats • Pacific Solution • Protecting our borders package • Border Protection Bill • Keep refugee intake at current level • Make it tough for asylum seekers to gain PR • Mandatory detention • Tougher laws for people trafficking • Offshore processing on Nauru and Papua New Guinea • Legislation excising Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands and CoCos (Keeling) Islands from the migration zone • Enforcing border laws through quarantine and customs

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extend coast watch capabilities • Issue TPVs
2004 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refuse to sign Border Protection Bill • Stop the boats • Australian Coastguard to permanently guard Australian borders • Go tough on people smuggling rings- greater AFP presence in Indonesia • End Pacific Solution • Mandatory Detention to be maintained but under humane conditions • Close Woomera • Short term TPVs
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop the boats- border control • Pacific Solution • Protect our borders- Border Protection Bill • Keep refugee intake at current level • Make it tough for asylum seekers to gain PR • Mandatory detention
2007 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End the Pacific Solution • Comply with Refugee Convention • Eradicate people smuggling • Take fair share of refugees • Process asylum claims quickly • Conditions in detention centres must be humane • Refugee Determination Tribunal to process claims • Create an Australian Coastline to protect Australia's borders • Continue the excision of Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Ashmore Reef from Australia's migration zone • offshore processing • those found to be refugees not settled in Australia • AFP to pay rewards for information leading to capture of people smugglers
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop the boats • Pacific Solution • Mandatory detention • "Not allow illegal boat arrivals and people smugglers to either determine Australia's programme or undermine the Australian people's confidence in the immigration programme"
2010 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offshore processing to resume • Set up regional processing centre in East Timor • Ruled out re-opening Nauru Detention centre • Increase refugee intake from Indonesia

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will not commit to population cap • An architecture of excised offshore places. • The non-statutory processing on Christmas Island of persons who arrive unauthorised at an excised place. • swift processing • mandatory detention- but treated humanely • zero tolerance for people smugglers- harsh penalties
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offshore processing • Re-open Nauru • Reinstate temporary protection visas • Turn back the boats • tougher penalties against people smuggling including mandatory prison sentences • Visa processing Review
2013 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reflect international obligations • Off shore processing • Single protection visa process for asylum seekers who arrive by boat • Increase humanitarian intake • Tough policies on people smugglers • Fair and speedy application process
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop the boats • Clear backlog of asylum seekers • Operation Sovereign Borders • Treat border protection as a national crisis • Restoration of TPVs • Regional policy approach • Regional Deterrence Framework • No support for Malaysia “people swap” • withdrawing taxpayer funded immigration assistance to prepare asylum claims under the Immigration Advice and Application Assistance Scheme (IAAAS) for those who arrive without a visa • denying refugee status for those who are reasonably believed to have deliberately discarded or destroyed their identity documentation • expanding the offshore processing capacity in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru
2016 Election	
ALP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No TPVs • Boat turn backs • Mandatory offshore processing • Humane detention facilities • reinstate access to the Refugee Review Tribunal

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faster processing • Increase the size of Australia's humanitarian and refugee program • reject use of term "illegals" • reintroduce 90-day bill into Migration Act
Coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Three pillars" of border protection: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. boat turn-backs, 2. offshore processing 3. Temporary Protection Visas. • Increase the size of Australia's humanitarian and refugee program • praise the success of OSB in regaining control over Australia's borders

Table 4.4 Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party Election Policies 1996, 1998, 2016

1996 Election	
Immigration and multiculturalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radically review immigration programme- halt in the short term • Abolish multiculturalism
Indigenous Australians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equal treatment- equality for all • Abolish ATSIC
Asylum seekers and refugees	No policy stated
1998 Election	
Immigration and multiculturalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish multiculturalism • Treat all Australians equally • Zero net migration • Continue business migration • Abolish the Office of Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs • Abolish the anti-discrimination Commission • 2-year period for welfare services • Governments must prioritise the training of our homegrown workforce, instead of relying on filling many positions through immigration
Indigenous Australians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish ATSIC • Abolish Office of Indigenous Affairs • Repeal Native Title Act, reverse Wik and Mabo • Remove Aboriginal Industry • No support for reconciliation • Reduce funding for indigenous youth suicide program • Remove the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander portion from the Transport Infrastructure Development scheme • Remove funding for the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Infrastructure program • Abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing Program • Abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education sub-program • Cessation of funding activities to the Indigenous Land Fund • Recognition of Aboriginality as merely being one of desire for cultural recognition with no special benefits attached.

Asylum seekers and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide temporary refuge until the until the danger in the refugees' country is removed. • Mandatory detention
2016 Election	
Immigration and multiculturalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Returning permanent immigration numbers closer to 70,000 until infrastructure can handle a population increase. • A Travel Ban on countries that are known sources of radicalism coming into Australia • Consult Australians at the time of federal elections to see if the intake is too high, too low or about right • set up migration visas in regional locations • A royal commission or inquiry to determine if Islam is a religion or political ideology • ban Muslim immigration • Ban the burqa and niqab in public places
Indigenous Australians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referendum to amend the race-based section of the Constitution to add: <i>'We must rid ourselves of Native Title and just as laws are made by and for the people so can they be amended'</i> • Against constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples • Scrap 18C of Racial Discrimination Act • Restore patriotic curriculum of 1950s & 1960s
Asylum seekers and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable refugee program- priority to Australians in need • 5-year moratorium to clean up infrastructure • Temporary protection visas • No Muslim refugees

Chapter 5: Discussion and Analysis of Findings

This chapter will discuss the major findings of chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 analysed raw data from the Australian Election Study (AES) in order to determine if there was a correlation between the presence of PHON and a change in political attitudes commonly associated with the radical right. The policies of the major parties were the focus of Chapter 4 and the goal was to uncover whether PHONs presence in the party system resulted in significant shifts in policy design or direction. This chapter will bring these separate analyses together so that a richer and more encompassing analysis of the impact of the radical right on the Australian mainstream can be conducted. This chapter is organised into five sections. The first will discuss the populist and authoritarian attitudes prevalent within the mainstream. This will be followed by a discussion of issues commonly associated with the radical right, including immigration, multiculturalism and policies pertaining to Indigenous Australians. An analysis of the policies and attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers will conclude the discussion.

Populist attitudes and policy in Australia

Sawer (2004: 1) argues that that the combination of opposition to elites (them) and a claim to speak for ordinary people (us) has a long and intermittent history in Australia beginning with the rural populism of the nineteenth century, but that this underwent a resurgence in the 1990s. The analysis of the AES data reveals that whilst there are certainly some voters who harbour political attitudes which can be seen as populist, they represent a minority of voters and these attitudes appear to not be consistent. As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, Australians suggest they are satisfied

with democracy, and as illustrated in Figure 3.2, the majority still believe that who you vote for makes a big difference. McAllister (2011:78) argues that high levels of political efficacy are an essential part of ensuring long-term democratic stability by fuelling people's perceptions that they can influence politics. Whilst it appears that the emergence of a radical right party has not impacted on the way that mainstream Australians view their democracy, there are inconsistencies apparent when the category of 'other' voters are taken into account. As reflected in Figure 3.1, those classified as 'other' voters, are more negative in their views about democracy, and these views are more pronounced with the arrival of PHON. A similar pattern emerges when considering political efficacy and the use of the vote, with 'other' voters consistently less inclined to see the importance of their political contribution. This attitude was particularly pronounced in 2016 when PHON returned to the Senate (see Figure 3.1). What this suggests is that despite strong levels of satisfaction with democracy, there are pockets within the electorate who are consistently dissatisfied with democracy. This appears to not be activated by PHON.

Elitism and the mainstream in Australia

As Cahill (2004: 77) argues, one of the identifying characteristics of the Australian right during the 1990s was its unrelenting attack upon 'left-wing elites'. Emerging out of this period was a new class discourse which provided the Coalition with the rhetorical arsenal to demonise the opponents of neo-liberalism - employing the use of 'political correctness', 'special interest', 'the guilt industry' and 'the Aboriginal industry' (Cahill 2004: 77, 80). This enabled the Coalition to position the ALP as 'other' and present themselves as the vanguard of the mainstream (Cahill:

2004: 82), with Howard as the mainstream leader who had adopted anti-elitism (Walter 2004: 214). Wilson and Breusch (2004:166) argue that the tactics of the Coalition were effective: Howard has allied himself with insiders on economic policy and with outsiders - Howards 'battlers', religious conservatives and One Nation supporters – on social and immigration policies. Table 4.1 shows evidence of the way that the Coalition went about constructing their new discourse. The *Future Directions* policy published in 1989 outlined their policy direction for the next decade. Two ideas fundamental to populism are evident in the document. The first of these is that the mainstream has been corrupted by elites and the second is that special interests are threatening the national interest. Furthermore, the jingle, composed by Bryce Courtenay, to accompany the song illustrated the use of populist rhetoric by a mainstream party:

*Never mind the fancy dancers
Plain-thinking men know their right from wrong
don't deal with silver tongues and chancers
keep your vision clear hold it strong.*

*I watched as things began to change around me
the fancy dancers got to have their say
they changed the vision, spurned the wisdom
And made Australia change to suit their way.*

*It's time we cleansed the muddy waters
and do the things we know must be done
so that we teach our sons and daughters
What it means to be a true Australian. (in Sawer 2004: 4)*

These themes were carried over into subsequent policy documents; *Fightback!* (1991) and *The Things That Matter* (1994), which claimed that Labor's favoured 'sectional', 'vested' or 'special' interests (Johnson 2000a: 40). According to Betts (2002), Labor had spent much of the decade courting groups outside of its traditional working-class base: ethnic groups, feminists, Indigenous Australians and environmentalists. This cultivation of non-traditional Labor groups contributed to a growing concern that responsible government was being undermined (Sullivan 1997). According to these claims, policy determination was now in the hands of diverse and unelected interest groups – not the elected representatives of the people (Sullivan 1997). These attitudes are reflected in Figure 3.5 with Howard appearing to tap into such concerns when he commented that:

Australians in the mainstream feel utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who seem to have the ear completely of the government on major issues... Under us the views of all particular interested will be assessed against the national interest and the sentiments of mainstream Australia (cited in Johnson 2000a: 40).

Figure 3.4 demonstrates that there are certainly voters who think that there is an important 'elite' versus people difference. Moreover, studies by Jackman (1998), as well as Wilson and Breusch (2004), suggested that politicians were out of touch with mainstream voters during the 1990s. Wilson and Breusch (2004: 177) argue that it was in the areas of immigration and social policy that there were significant distance between voters and politicians, providing opportunities for anti-elite attacks from PHON and the elite-outsider alliance framed by the Howard government to take hold.

According to populist ideology, a low level of elitism indicates a lack of trust in government (Akkerman et al 2014). Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate high levels of cynicism towards political elites. There is little support for the notion that government is run for all the people (Figure 3.4), instead many Australian voters believe it is run for sectional interests. It is also evident that Australians do not trust their politicians (Figure 3.5) nor do they believe that politicians know what ordinary people think (Figure 3.6). A limitation of the AES data, however is that Figure 3.6, a key item used to measure the claim that politicians are out of touch with the people they represent (Spruyt et al 2016: 340), was not asked until 2001. What we can observe from this, however, is that Australians distrusted their politicians consistently in the period 2001-2013, prior to PHON's re-emergence. Furthermore, a clear distinction between 'other' voters and mainstream voters is maintained throughout this timeframe. There is also a correlation with the emergence of PHON and the feelings of anti-elitism inherent throughout the electorate.

Authoritarianism

According to Bean (1993:74) Australians hold strong authoritarian attitudes. In his study of Australian political culture, Bean (1993) suggested that this authoritarian strain amongst the Australian people implied that at a base level, Australians were a conservative nation politically and socially. Bean's findings assist with constructing a comprehensive picture of the dominant political attitudes held within the mainstream prior to the emergence of PHON. According to Figure 3.7, in 1993, 68 per cent of Australians wanted the death penalty reintroduced for murder and 81 per cent of people called for harsher penalties for criminals. Despite the peak in 1993, the

numbers still remained high throughout the 1990s. In comparison, the 'other' voter at this time recorded a lower figure with 50 per cent (Figure 3.7) of voters supporting the reintroduction of the death penalty and 70 per cent (Figure 3.7) calling for harsher penalties for criminals. This provides some interesting insights into the relationship between authoritarian attitudes in Australia and the emergence of PHON. It demonstrates the strain of authoritarianism was well established in the Australian mainstream prior to the emergence of PHON.

More recently, whilst mainstream voters have been less supportive of the reintroduction of the death penalty (see figure 3.7 for the steady decline), support for harsher penalties for criminals remains very high. In 2016, 65 per cent of Australians indicated that they would like harsher penalties imposed against criminals. Again, these attitudes have remained fairly consistent since the AES has provided data on this item. Whilst Chapter 4 did not identify policies pertaining to crime and punishment specifically, it is worth examining the link between the harsh policies invoked against asylum seekers as shown in Table 4.3. The consistent securitisation of boat arrivals by both ALP and Coalition governments may have contributed to the strong attitudes that Australians have displayed towards boat arrivals. It is to this area that we now turn.

Immigration and Multiculturalism


Mudde (2013:1) has argued that radical right parties should be seen as catalysts, rather than initiators, who are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the introduction of stricter

immigration policies. This argument is particularly pertinent when the policies and attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism in Australia are considered. PHON certainly espoused strong anti-immigrant sentiment, but as the following discussion demonstrates, nativist attitudes are prevalent within the Australian mainstream and, like authoritarian attitudes, have pervaded and shaped political culture well before the emergence of PHON.

McAllister (1993: 176) argues that Australians hold very intense feelings about immigration. The invocation of the White Australia Policy in 1901 allowed Australia to control its population and remain a white outpost of Europe (Ang and Stratton 1996: 32) 'set aside for the white race' (Walkerncited in Ang and Stratton 1996: 30). This policy remained virtually intact until the introduction of the Migration Act in 1966. The emergence of multiculturalism, however, failed to offer white Australians a proper explanation for the loss of their racial monopoly" (Ang and Stratton 1996: 33, 34). Historian Geoffrey Blainey, who predated Hanson in his virulent arguments against Asian immigration (Ang and Stratton 1996: 35), was one of the first to publicly raise questions about immigration levels. He argued that the pace of Asian immigration was well ahead of public opinion (in Markus 2001: 65). The sharp spike in anti-immigration attitudes during the 1980s and 1990s, as revealed in Figure 5.1 (see below), suggest that Blainey may have been correct in his assessment and the release of the Fitzgerald Report in 1988, suggested that Australians felt confused and threatened by multiculturalism (Koleth 2010). Meanwhile, John Howard, then leader of the Opposition, suggested that there might be some wisdom in slowing the rate of Asian immigration (Markus 2001: 89). What this suggests is that policies and attitudes

towards immigration and multiculturalism, were underpinned by deep levels of distrust and resentment towards migrants before the emergence of PHON.

Figure 5.1 Public Opinion on the level of immigration into Australia 1950 - 1990



Source: Jupp and Kabala eds (1993: 171)

Pakulski and Tranter (2000), as well as Goot and Watson (2010) argue that nativist beliefs connect people to anti-immigrant sentiment and support for right wing parties. As demonstrated in Figure 5.1, by 1990, 58 per cent of mainstream voters believed that there were too many immigrants in

Australia. This supports what was shown in Figure 3.9, which indicated that there was increasing negativity towards immigration, and by 1993, 70 per cent of Australians thought that migrant numbers had gone too far. Moreover, these attitudes were prevalent prior to the emergence of PHON.

McAllister (1993: 161) asserts that whilst there is debate amongst the scholarly community about the economic consequences of immigration, the mainstream view is clear cut; immigration during periods of low economic growth and high unemployment is bad. The 1950s demonstrated widespread opposition to immigration but this changed in the 1960s. Similarly, periods of high unemployment and economic insecurity in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the period from 2007-2010, correlate to strong anti-immigration levels (McAllister 2011:161, 220). In contrast, the mainstream was strongly in favour of increasing immigration in 2001 and 2004 when the economy was performing well (McAllister 2011: 220). What this helps to demonstrate is that the story about immigration is more complex than we are led to believe.

This supported by the changes in attitudes during the Howard government. Despite the high anti-immigrant sentiment of the early 1990s and vocal opposition to multiculturalism (Goot and Watson 2005: 182), positive attitudinal shifts towards immigration are evident from the Coalition's election victory in 1996. Whilst it may be argued that the change in attitudes may have been driven by the Coalition's initial decrease in migrant numbers, from 1999-2000 numbers increased again without incurring a negative public reaction (Betts 2002). Adding to this, between

2000-2001 the immigration intake was higher than when Howard was elected in 1996 (Goot and Watson 2005: 184). As McAllister (1993:172) argues, this coincides with a decrease in unemployment figures which has been tied to increased anti-immigration sentiment. Again, there is an interesting connection between the economy and social attitudes that requires closer examination.

Asylum seekers

According to Phillips and Spinks (2013), initially Australians demonstrated sympathy to boat people, however, as they continued to arrive (Phillips and Spinks 2013). Furthermore, it was the Labor Government in 1993, that responded to the perceived threat of unauthorised boat arrivals, by adopting a policy of mandatory detention. After receiving bipartisan support, 44 per cent of Australians said they would prefer to see asylum seekers arriving by boat sent straight back without assessing their claims (Betts 2001a: 41). Whilst the AES did not ask questions regarding boat arrivals until 2001, prior polling of the concerns surrounding boats arrivals, suggest that strongly negative attitudes towards arrivals were already present before the arrival of PHON. Indeed Betts (2001a:44) argues that there has been no sudden desire to close the door on boatpeople. This has been a sustained set of attitudes which have endured for a quarter of a century.

Australia's punitive approach to border protection was taken a step further in the aftermath of the Tampa crisis. In particular, the Howard government introduced the concept of third country offshore processing through the Migration Amendment (Excision from the Migration Zone) Bill 2001 (Phillips 2014). This came to be known as the Pacific Solution. Occurring just prior to 9/11, the policy quickly became popular and Betts (2001: 39) suggests that the attacks merged the notions of border control, defence and terrorism for many voters (see Figure 3.12). What should be noted, however, is the high percentage of Coalition voters who wanted the boats turned back; they were 70 and 75 percent respectively. This helps to illustrate that it is not just radical right voters who hold attitudes which are associated with nativism. Whilst it appears that the Australian public have maintained consistent attitudes towards the arrival of unauthorised boat people, Table 4.3 indicates that the Coalition did adopt tougher policies in regard to asylum seeker policies whilst PHON was electorally successful. Hence, it could be argued there is a correlation on this issue.

Indigenous Australians

In 1975, Labor Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, claimed that all Australians were diminished whilst Aborigines were denied their rightful place in the nation (Markus 2001: 21). This was continued on once Bob Hawke became prime minister, with the ALPs 1983 election campaign platform making reference to 'national reconciliation, national recovery and national reconstruction' (Pratt 2003:5). Upon election, however, Hawke was met with resistance. Markus (2001: 57) categorises the years 1983-85 as the successful mobilisation of the conservative

agenda, identifying Hugh Morgan as the chief protagonist in a move to discredit the left and shift the support of public opinion back in favour of miners in the battle over land rights (Markus 2001: 57). The policies of PHON, when they emerged, were consistent with the approach of Morgan, with Table 4.4 highlighting PHON's policies to repeal land rights claims, and their demands for equality for all. By 1986, the Labor government abandoned its commitments to land rights altogether (Pratt 2003:8). The Labor government was met with similar resistance in terms of achieving reconciliation. Despite bipartisan support for the concept of reconciliation, the ALP and Coalition disagreed as to its form (see Table 4.2). Then opposition leader, John Howard, opposed the idea of a treaty with Indigenous Australians, arguing it was a 'recipe for separatism' (Howard cited in Pratt 2006: 13). As table 4.2 demonstrates, the Coalition have had an established and consistent reluctance to support self-determination and land rights initiatives. This is further reflected in Howard's fierce opposition to the formation of ATSIC (Pratt 2006:16).

The issue of land rights was placed under the spotlight with the Mabo decision in 1992 and the Native Title Act passing into legislation in 1993. As an act of compensation, the Keating government had established a land fund to assist groups to buy land; the *Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation Act 1995* allocated the sum of \$121 million each year until 2004. Morgan, again was a central critic, suggesting that the policies had not been fully contemplated and that Keating was jeopardising the nation's future by promoting policies that were motivated by guilt (Markus 2001: 62, 73). Markus (2001: 147) has argued that Hanson had not been able to find herself in the value system which had emerged out of the 1980s and instead created a place for herself by building on the legacy of the likes of Morgan and Blainey and others. However,

mainstream voters held negative attitudes towards Indigenous Australians and suggested land rights had gone too far before the emergence of Hanson (see Figure 3.8; Gibson et al 2010: 828).

McAllister (2011: 223) argues that the emergence of a radical right party such as PHON has forced the government to be more transparent on issues of race. Since 1996 as indicated in Table 3.8, Australians demonstrate that they are less hostile to Indigenous Australians and this continues to diminish. McAllister argues that by transferring the debate to the public realm and therefore generating accountability for policy decisions that impact upon Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations, may in some ways account for such a shift (McAllister 2011:223). Recent policies, as shown in Table 4.2, have included a parliamentary apology and bipartisan support of initiatives such as closing the gap and the controversial Intervention in the Northern Territory. Whilst still a sensitive issue (McAllister 2011: 223), mainstream attitudes are more favourable in regard to Indigenous Australians. 'Other' voters, in contrast, have displayed increasingly negative attitudes towards land rights and government assistance (see Figure 3.8), and this coincides with PHON's re-emergence. PHON have not released any new official policy in relation to Indigenous Australians, however, Hanson has rejected any notion of a treaty with Indigenous Australians, maintaining a stance consistent with her views in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the re-emergence of PHON does not appear to have impacted mainstream voters (see Figure 3.8). But it does appear that, just as Denmark and Bowler (2002) as well as Jackman (1998) suggested, that race is likely to be a critical determinant of voting for PHON. Indeed voters with very negative views about Indigenous Australians appear unlikely to vote for the mainstream parties based on this data.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a discussion and analysis of the major findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The major aim was to establish whether the emergence and subsequent re-emergence of a radical right party had an impact on the Australian mainstream. An exploration of the political attitudes of Australians on core features of radical right ideology; nativism, authoritarianism and populism reveal that many - though not all - of these attitudes were already prevalent within the mainstream before the emergence of PHON. A similar picture emerges when the major party policies are taken into consideration. It is clear that on a number of the issues associated with the radical right such as immigration, multiculturalism, asylum seekers, refugees and Indigenous Australians, the major Australian parties had well developed and consistent ideological positions which predated the arrival of PHON.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

When Pauline Hanson formed her fledgling political organisation in Australia, it was written off as a 'joke', something that would never work. According to Grant (1997:7), the view was that, "She'll be dead in the water in six weeks". But the unexpected emergence of a radical right party, concealed what was really going on beneath the surface in Australia. Voters in Australia had long held views which are commonly associated with the radical right. Adding to this, the mainstream parties had already adopted policies which could be seen as not dissimilar to policies which the radical right would advocate for. Whilst the reasons for the success, decline and re-emergence of PHON remain outside the scope of this thesis, the evidence suggests that some of the issues considered to be important determinants of success for the radical right remain highly salient.

At the time of PHON's initial breakthrough, Stokes (2000) considered the potential of the party to affect the mainstream suggesting that:

Whilst there was no outward impact on the agendas of the two major political parties, it is arguable that the Howard government adopted a more conservative position on issues such as native title, reconciliation, immigration and welfare (Stokes 2000: 12).

The effect of the radical right on mainstream voters and politics is a question which remains at the forefront of European scholarship on the radical right in recent times. In contrast, it has received far less consideration in the Australian context. Hence, whether PHON has affected the Australian mainstream, thereby contributing to a rightward push on issues such as immigration and asylum seekers, is a vitally important question.

In considering what effect the presence of a radical right party has had on Australian politics, it is worth considering what this difference actually consists of. Mudde (2010: 1181) argues that key features of the populist radical right ideology – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – are not unrelated to mainstream ideologies and mass attitudes. In fact, they are best seen as a radicalisation of mainstream values. The radical right is illiberal, nationalistic and favours hierarchy. Are these characteristics vastly different to mainstream Australian voters and parties? Again, what Mudde (2013) says here is important and he has suggested that the ideas of the radical right and the mainstream are not that far apart. In investigating the central research question of this thesis, namely: *Has the emergence of a radical right party mainstreamed radical right discourse and attitudes in Australia*, it appears Mudde might be right.

The major finding of this thesis is that whilst the emergence of PHON was a significant event for Australian politics, the impact on the Australian mainstream was and remains minimal. Instead, attitudes and policies commonly associated with the radical right were already historically embedded within Australian political culture, well before the emergence of PHON. Whilst the policies of PHON tapped into some of those long held attitudes, it did not mainstream the radical right agenda. Before PHON emerged, Australia was already considering a range of punitive policies in dealing with immigration. Before PHON emerged, there was already significant resistance to land rights and the reconciliation process between Indigenous and non-Indigenous

Australians. Hence, there is little to suggest that PHON mainstreamed nativism either, albeit boat arrivals is one difference. The same could be said for authoritarianism.

This finding is consistent with that of Mudde (2013:7) who notes that the attitudes of many Europeans were already in line with the basic tenets of the populist radical right ideology (Mudde 2013:7). This finding also challenges what has become a popular ‘myth’ of Australian politics, that John Howard ‘stole’ the policies of Pauline Hanson and PHON (Jupp 2002, 2006; Archer 1997; Wear 2002, 2008; Curran 2004; Sawer and Laycock 2009), and that is one reason why PHON disappeared from relevance. Indeed, Hanson herself accused Howard of stealing her policies (*Courier Mail*, 15th October, 2001 in Wear 2001). There are nonetheless, a range of caveats that need to be noted with these findings.

It is certainly clear that the attitudes of the majority of Australian voters to ‘boat people’ have been decidedly negative for at least three decades (Betts 2001a). Wear (2008: 628) describes Howard’s government as a form of ‘permanent populism’ that initially started out as a response to PHON but became a permanent feature of his prime ministership. As has been shown, the implementation of a temporary protection regime and the idea of excising territories from the Australian migration zone, were ideas suggested by Hanson (Jupp 2002:195). PHON also advocated limited asylum seeker access to legal aid or appeal. Aspects of these proposals have since been incorporated into government policy (McNevin 2007: 617). Thus, more fine-grained analysis is required here.

Another caveat is around the data used from the AES. The AES has arguably the best set of longitudinal data on Australian political attitudes that deal with these issues, and which is easily accessible to researchers. Other studies such as the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes commenced in 2003. This is a biennial survey focussing on social attitudes and behaviours of Australian citizens. Researchers also have access to the Scanlon Foundation, which supports ongoing longitudinal research into the indicators of social cohesion. A decision was taken early on that it was better to just utilise what was available in the AES, rather than mixing and matching survey data from multiple sources which might mean that this data was not comparable. Nonetheless, the problem with using the AES was twofold. First, questions that the survey asked, although relevant, did not address all aspects of the political attitudes under investigation; for example, pluralism. Second, separation of 'other' voters with PHON was problematic and would have led to more robust and arguably richer findings.

A final caveat to be mentioned is around methods. Deutchman and Ellison (1999), as well as Goot (2000) suggest the role of the media is fundamental to understanding PHON. Analyses of media coverage would add to these analyses. And certainly more original survey data would have taken this a step further. The analysis would have also benefitted from conducting interviews as this would have allowed for more nuanced insights. Time constraints and the scope of the thesis, however, limited what was possible.

If the goal of the radical right is as Mudde (2013) argues about mainstreaming their ideas, in Australia they have failed. That failure, however, is a product of the environment that they are working in. Many of the political attitudes that would commonly be seen as related to the radical right are already part of the mainstream. The policies of the mainstream parties, in particular, on issues such as immigration and Indigenous affairs, also frequently resemble that of the radical right. While this may appear paradoxical when one considers the extremely successful multicultural country that Australia is, a fear of the 'other' has been evident since nationhood, if not earlier (Burke 2008). Whilst Hanson and PHON have been successful in exploiting pre-existing fears in parts of the community, PHON should be understood as opportunist rather than orchestrator.

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