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Governments Imagining Their Citizens

Figures of Exclusion From Hawke to Howard

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Summary

The aim of this thesis is to suggest that citizenship's role in defining inclusion within a national space can be understood not only in terms of formal juridico-political rights but also in terms of cultural technologies of power. This particular focus is adopted in order to make sense of the ways in which the formally inclusive institution of Australian citizenship has long served to exclude migrant subjects and bodies from the physical and symbolic space of the nation. Using Foucault's notion of governmentality together with Butler's concept of performativity, this thesis seeks to trace the ways in which the liberal political rationality underlying constructions of 'inclusive' citizenship reproduces the discourse of Whiteness. More than this, the thesis suggests that such state articulations of citizenship, in deploying this liberal governmentality, work as tools to regulate the population through the resignification of bodies in terms of the self-regulating, invisible White subject and its regulated, conspicuous Other. Focusing particularly on the Hawke and Howard governments, this thesis will consider three key moments that are cited in histories of Australian migrant policy, examining the official position adopted by government in the context of these moments through speeches and policy papers, with a view to understanding how the citizen is discursively positioned in these texts.

Statement of Originality

I hereby declare that this thesis is wholly my own work unless otherwise acknowledged and has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other academic institution.

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Emma Sarian

October 2014

Acknowledgements

This thesis was borne of a happy circumstance in which, as an English literature student, I made an off-the-cuff remark about neoliberalism in a Gender Studies class and it led me somehow to this cultural history of liberalism in Australia. A sincere thank you goes to Dr Leigh Boucher for making this foray into the discipline of history as painless as possible.

Introduction

The years spanning the Hawke and Howard governments have often been identified as a transformative period in Australian political culture with the advent of neoliberalism and the subsequent delegitimisation of social liberalist logics.[1] It was in this period that neoliberalism gained both a political and cultural foothold, acquiring rapid legitimacy as an economic project while also reconfiguring the role of government in its rearticulation of both market, and therefore individual, behaviour. This period also saw an increasingly public debate regarding national identity and the 'problem' of difference within Australian society, driven by the conflict between the economic imperative for immigration and the challenge this posed to the imagining of a racially and culturally homogeneous nation.[2] This conflict played out most explicitly in the engagement with Australian citizenship which, in accordance with modern understandings of the institution, was by this time formally non-discriminatory, or 'inclusive'. The migrant policy of the period was thus intimately concerned with reconciling this commitment to inclusive citizenship with particular conceptions of cultural difference and national cohesion. It is the contention of this thesis that these conceptions form part of the political rationalities of liberalism and neoliberalism and that citizenship comes to be considered as inclusive or exclusive according to these logics. It is thus important to acknowledge the ways in which these political rationalities have been deployed during this period to reconfigure inclusive citizenship and thereby accommodate the contradictory imperatives for increased immigration and national cohesion. To this end, the thesis will consider three key moments in migrant history – the end of bipartisan support for multiculturalism, the rise of the One Nation Party and the proposal of a citizenship test –

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[1] Michael Pusey, *Economic Rationalism in Canberra : A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind* (New York: New York : Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen Bell, *Ungoverning the Economy : The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy* (Melbourne: Melbourne : Oxford University Press, 1997); Carol Johnson, *Governing Change: From Keating to Howard* (St. Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 2000); Paul Kelly, *The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1992).
[2] James Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (Sydney, NSW: Pluto Press, 1998); Gwenda Tavan, *The Long Slow Death of the White Australia Policy* (Carlton North, VIC: Scribe, 2005); Russell McGregor, "The Necessity of Britishness: Ethno-Cultural Roots of Australian Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 3; Alastair Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jock Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land: Australia's Post-War Immigration* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988); James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen and Emma Dawson, eds., *Social Cohesion in Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

analysing the migrant policy produced in response to these moments and the discourses at play within them in order to interpret the ways they intersect with a formally inclusive citizenship to produce *exclusion*.

It is commonplace in histories of modern citizenship to begin with an account of T. H. Marshall and the ways in which his notion of social rights transformed understandings of the state-citizen relationship, as well as the meaning of 'inclusion' within a political community. This thesis will not do so, for the simple fact that it does not consider citizenship in terms of rights, nor does it consider inclusion in terms of access to these rights. This thesis is primarily concerned with exclusion and the particular constructions of citizenship that have enabled it, which may involve the question of rights but is certainly not restricted to it. More than this, the thesis wishes to scrutinise the norms or logics by which the concept of citizenship 'rights' comes to make sense. This distinction is necessary from the outset because the term 'citizenship' is decidedly slippery, variously encompassing legal rights, public obligations, communal belonging and individual identity. More specifically, then, this thesis is concerned with *cultural* citizenship, which defines inclusion as "the capacity to participate effectively, creatively and successfully within a national culture",[3] and suggests that exclusion is enacted, not only through the denial of rights which inhibit this capacity, but also through the very grounds on which participation is itself defined, namely in terms of a liberal political rationality. It is within this rationality that states articulate, or imagine, their citizens and following Michel Foucault I suggest that these articulations, by operationalising certain discourses, contribute to the production of particular citizen-subjects. Citizenship is thus capable of defining membership in a nation not only through the designation of formal rights but through its production of subjects in whom the right to inclusion within the imagined national space is made natural (and therefore invisible and uncontested) or provisional (and therefore open to regulation). Exclusion is thus conceived as an effect of discursive *limits*, or the ways in which political rationalities determine the grounds on which subjects can be imagined; subject formation in these terms "is neither simply the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction *in* production".[4] In extending this understanding of Foucauldian discourse, I use Judith Butler's notion of performativity to

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[3] Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a General Theory of Cultural Citizenship," in *Culture and Citizenship*, ed. Nick Stevenson (London: Sage, 2000), 12.
[4] Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 84. Original emphasis.

further suggest that such discursive production has a particularly *embodied* effect and that racial exclusion is not simply the legacy of historically racist discourse but is also actively reproduced by 'inclusive' liberal rationalities in their racialisation of the citizen-subject.

Due to the complexity of citizenship as an object of analysis, the scholarship is diverse both in terms of interests and approach. In the Australian context, there are two broad movements that are relevant to this study. The first engages with political theory in order to evaluate historical formations of Australian citizenship in terms of a normative conception of citizenship.[5] This work proceeds from a particular model of citizenship that is theoretically inclusive (generally a democratic one) and assesses the extent to which these inclusions have been realised in different historical moments. This scholarship, in its focus on determining 'good' and 'bad' enactments of citizenship, tends to decontextualise the constitution of such complex processes as multiculturalism, nationalism and community. This ahistorical treatment in turn produces a reductive understanding of how citizenship has been articulated by these processes and the ways in which its capacity for exclusion has been produced through them. The second approach is more strictly historical and is concerned with tracing the development of Australian citizenship as an institution.[6] While there is more attention to the contingencies

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[5] See e.g., Geoffrey Brahm Levey, "The Political Theories of Australian Multiculturalism," *UNSW Law Journal* 24, no. 3 (2001). "Multicultural Political Thought in Australian Perspective," in *Political Theory and Australian Multiculturalism*, ed. Geoffrey Brahm Levey (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008); Christian Joppke, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *The British journal of sociology* 55, no. 2 (2004); Brian Galligan and Winsome Roberts, *Australian Citizenship* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004); Wayne Hudson and John Kane, eds., *Rethinking Australian Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Joseph H. Carens, "Nationalism and the Exclusion of Immigrants: Lessons from Australian Immigration Policy," in *Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues*, ed. Matthew J. Gibney (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Anthony Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building in Australia: Inclusive National Identity and the Embrace of Diversity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 12 (2011); Gregory Melleuish, *The Packaging of Australia: Politics and Culture Wars* (Sydney: Moller, 1998); John Kane, "Racialism and Democracy: The Legacy of White Australia," in *The Politics of Identity in Australia*, ed. Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[6] See, e.g., Stephen Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia*, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1992); Andrew Markus, James Jupp and Peter McDonald, *Australia's Immigration Revolution* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2009); Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001); Kelly, *The End of Certainty*; Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia* (Sydney: Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999); Ann-Mari Jordens, *Redefining Australians: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1995); David Dutton, *One of Us: A Century of Australian Citizenship* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002); Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Tavan, *The Long Slow Death*. Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*; Andrew Jakubowicz, "'Normalising Aliens': The Australian Welfare State and the Control of Immigrant Settlement," in *Australian Welfare: Historical Sociology*, ed. Richard Kennedy (South Melbourne, VIC: Macmillan, 1989); Andrew C. Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity* (Carlton South: Elikia Books, 1995); Jon Stratton, *Uncertain Lives: Culture, Race and Neoliberalism in Australia* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011).

involved in the production of citizenship, there is little to no engagement with more complex theorisations of governmental power and events are analysed in the realist style of political science, where political action is reduced to actors who make decisions according to particular ideological positions. This approach obscures the continuities in logic that might exist even between ideologically opposed actors, as well as assuming an easy confluence between personal agendas and social outcomes. For instance, the dismantling of multiculturalism is often attributed to John Howard's nationalist agenda, without an acknowledgement of the extent to which the Hawke government's multicultural policy relied on similar constructions of a British-derived, uniquely liberal Australian national identity.[7]

Ultimately, then, neither of these accounts are able to conceive of the state as it relates to the exclusivity of citizenship beyond the notion of rights. It is for this reason that I have turned to Foucault's theory of governmentality in an attempt to mediate between the twin impulses of historicising political theory and theorising political history. The theory of governmentality is able to accommodate these moves because it is concerned with both the context and specificity of historical moments, and it also conceptualises power as diffuse and culturally enacted. More specifically, it complicates the reductive equations of power as state domination and freedom as state minimisation in its suggestion that a liberal governmentality operates *through* individual freedom. Furthermore – and in contrast to much of the other historical work being done on Australian citizenship – work in this field takes discursive analysis seriously, in the sense that it believes power is constituted by cultural products in their enactment of discourses, and these products are thereby capable of generating material effects. For this thesis, it presents an opportunity to move beyond accounts of political action that present historical processes as either static or the result of 'people with power', instead assuming a contingent relationality between state and citizen. This is critical for an analysis which seeks to understand the operation of cultural citizenship in terms of state power *beyond* the determination of formal rights.

Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess, writing on what such a Foucauldian approach to government might look like, suggest that,

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[7] Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*. Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test: Process and Rhetoric," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 55, no. 4 (2009). Markus, *Race*. Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism*.

> [r]ather than deriving its view of government from the normative principles of political thought, such a study would start from particular occasions on which authorities... call into question the activity of governing and the attributes of those who govern and are governed.[8]

They add that these problematisations of government "do not exist in themselves. They become known through grids of evaluations and judgement about objects that are far from self-evident. The study of government thus entails the study of modes of reasoning".[9] Building on these two injunctions, this thesis will consider three key moments cited in histories of Australian citizenship in which government becomes problematised, examining the official position adopted by government in the context of these moments through speeches and policy papers, with a view to understanding the particular rationalities that determine how the citizen is discursively positioned in these texts. To narrow the scope of the thesis, and in keeping with its interest in the exclusivity of citizenship, these moments have been selected with a focus on migrant policy, because it deals most explicitly with the question of who is and is not included as an Australian citizen and is thus central to the normative construction of this citizen. The scope has also been confined to the years of the Hawke and Howard governments in order to trace the particular implications of the shifting political rationalities during this period, as well as any continuities that may have been elided in more realist accounts. These moments will thus constitute three case studies: the first considers the release of the 1988 FitzGerald Report and the government's response in the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*, the second the rise of the One Nation Party and the government's release of *A New Agenda For Multicultural Australia,* and the final, the implementation of the 2007 Citizenship Test.

These particular historical moments were selected for analysis because they contributed to two interrelated aims: the first, to interrogate instances in which the 'activity of governing' was problematised, and the second to understand how such problematisations differed – or remained the same – according to the political party in power. In the first instance, these moments are significant for the ways in which the state's role was publically debated and the government compelled to respond by articulating its own vision of 'good' governance. The release of the FitzGerald Report stands as the first publicised debate regarding the effect of

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[8] Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess, "Introduction: Government, Liberalism, Society," in *Governing Australia: Studies on Contemporary Rationalities of Government*, ed. Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9.
[9] Ibid.

multiculturalism on national identity, thereby calling into question the role and limits of the government in implementing policies that affected this identity. The *National Agenda* can thus be read as a claim by the Hawke government for assuming this role. Likewise, the ascent of the One Nation Party was founded on a very pointed and public criticism of the Howard government's rationale of governance, and the release of the *New Agenda* contributed to the wider defence made by the Howard government for legitimacy. In a similar vein, the introduction and implementation of a Citizenship Test in 2007 constituted another decisive claim by the government for its particular vision of good governance, a highly contentious move which once more publicised and problematised the 'art of government'.

In selecting these moments, furthermore, there has been a deliberate attempt to juxtapose two governments who are often characterised as widely dissimilar in terms of ideology and policy strategy, but who are also both identified as belonging to the same general movement in Australian politics away from social liberal ideas of governance towards neoliberalism. In particular, while the Hawke government remained largely committed to issues of social justice, it was also concerned with producing a strong economic position spurred by an economy in decline after the post-war boom and an increasingly globalised world. While neoliberal economic policy took some time to gain legitimacy in the Australian political sphere, it was in the government's restructuring of the public service, and particularly the rise of 'managerialism', which constituted the Hawke government's most significant reproduction of neoliberal political rationality. Thus, while the Hawke government maintained the traditional Labor strategy of state intervention to address social inequality, it introduced a new vocabulary of calculable performance and measurable results as a means by which to legitimise state action.[10] By the same token, while the Howard government continued the Liberal tradition of linking private virtue with public responsibility, it did so through the contemporary language of neoliberalism, thereby rearticulating the relationship between citizens and the state. Both these governments, then, were responding to the transformations produced by neoliberal discourse even as they were complicit in its reproduction, and it is for this reason that they have been selected for analysis, in order to better understand how such discourse is reiterated across differing political positions.

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[10] Bell, *Ungoverning the Economy : The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy*; Pusey, *Economic Rationalism in Canberra : A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind*.

The first chapter of the thesis will provide an overview of the literature on Australian citizenship. The second will consider the case studies and offer an analysis of the discourses therein, while the third chapter will discuss the implications of these discourses for the state-citizen relationship.

I. Literature Review

This chapter provides an overview of the existing literature on Australian citizenship and the various ways in which scholars have characterised its particular relationship to exclusion, both historically and in the contemporary period. A detailed review is especially necessary for this thesis because the chosen approach is a response to the overwhelmingly normative character of these accounts. These works employ theoretical assumptions that are rarely explicated and, as a result, often treat the wide-ranging aspects of citizenship with which they are variously interested as discrete concerns. For this reason, they fail to acknowledge the shared terms from which they proceed and thereby produce a disparate body of work. This chapter is an attempt to clarify these terms in order to synthesise this diverse literature.

The wide-ranging scope of citizenship studies attests to the complexity of citizenship as a concept, with its relevance to disciplines as varied as sociology, legal theory and international relations. This is no less true of histories of Australian citizenship, which trace the development of citizenship as a legal construct,[1] as a cultural articulation of national identity,[2] as a political institution defining membership in a state,[3] as a marker of personal identity,[4] and

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[1] Kim Rubenstein, "Citizenship in Australia: Unscrambling Its Meaning," *Melbourne University Law Review* 20 (1995); *Australian Citizenship Law in Context* (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2002); Helen Irving, *To Constitute a Nation* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Mary Crock and Ben Saul, *Future Seekers: Refugees and the Law in Australia* (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2002); John Chesterman and Brian Galligan, eds., *Defining Australian Citizenship: Selected Documents* (Carlton South, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1999).

[2] Jordens, *Redefining Australians*. Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*. Melleuish, *The Packaging of Australia*. Dutton, *One of Us*. James Walter and Margaret MacLeod, eds., *The Citizens' Bargain: A Documentary History of Australian Views since 1890* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002). Nick Dyrenfurth, "The Language of Australian Citizenship," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (2005). "Battlers, Refugees and the Republic: John Howard's Language of Citizenship," *Journal of Australian Studies* 28, no. 84 (2005). John Hirst, "The Pioneer Legend," in *Intruders in the Bush: The Australian Quest for Identity, 2nd Ed.*, ed. John Carroll (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992); John William Tate, "John Howard's "Nation": Multiculturalism, Citizenship, and Identity," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 55, no. 1 (2009); Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Hage, *White Nation*.

[3] Hudson and Kane, *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*. Nicolas Peterson and William Sanders, eds., *Citizenship and Indigenous Australians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*. Jennifer Curtin, "The Gendering of 'Citizenship' in Australia," in *Citizenship and Democracy in a Global Era*, ed. Andrew Vandenberg (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000); Bettina Cass and Paul Smyth, eds., *Contesting the Australian Way: States, Markets, and Civil Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Laksiri Jayasuriya, "Citizenship and Republicanism in a Multicultural Nation" (Perth, 1993); Judith Brett, "Retrieving the Partisan History of Australian Citizenship," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 3 (2001); Alison Holland, "Australian Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century : Historical Perspectives," in *From Migrant to Citizen : Testing Language, Testing Culture*, ed. Christina Slade and Martina Mollering (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Tim Soutphommasane, "Grounding Multicultural Citizenship: From Minority Rights to Civic Pluralism," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 26, no. 4 (2005); Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell,

usually a mix of all of these. While such diversity exists, these histories all express – whether explicitly or not – normative conceptions of the relationship between states and their members which turn upon varying theories of the inclusive potentialities of liberal democratic citizenship. In particular, such theories seek to work through the operation of citizenship as legal status - or access to membership in a state - and as a normative container of rights which are guaranteed by the state. They are thus interested in how, under a liberal democratic framework, these two dimensions are able to produce inclusion within the boundaries of the modern nation-state.[5] The nation-state is integral to citizenship theory because it remains the pre-eminent form of political community. Indeed, some attribute the growth of citizenship studies to the reconfiguration of the nation-state and its implications for citizenship in the

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"Making Australian Citizenship Mean More," *People and Place* 15, no. 1 (2007); Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles, "Patriotic Vs. Proceduralist Citizenship: Australian Representations," *Nations and Nationalism* 16, no. 1 (2010); Suvendrini Perera and Jon Stratton, "Introduction: Heterochronotopes of Exception and the Frontiers and Faultlines of Citizenship," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 23, no. 5 (2009).

[4] Jan Pakulski and Bruce Tranter, "Civic, National and Denizen Identity in Australia," *Journal of Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2000); James Forrest and Kevin Dunn, "'Core' Culture Hegemony and Multiculturalism: Perceptions of the Privileged Position of Australians with British Backgrounds," *Ethnicities* 6, no. 2 (2006); Nola Purdie and Lynn Wilss, "Australian National Identity: Young Peoples' Conceptions of What It Means to Be Australian," *National Identities* 9, no. 1 (2007); Murray Goot and Ian Watson, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity," in *Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report*, ed. Shaun Wilson et al. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005); Judith Brett and Anthony Moran, *Ordinary People's Politics: Australians Talk About Life, Politics and the Future of Their Country* (South Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia, 2006).

[5] Most theorisations of democratic citizenship proceed from Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy, emphasising active public participation and dialogue: Jurgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). Early feminist critiques of liberal democratic citizenship include Pateman's gendered citizenship and Young's group-differentiated citizenship: Carole Pateman, *The Disorder of Women* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Theories of group-differentiated multicultural citizenship also include Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Anna Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Tariq Modood, *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). For criticisms of this multicultural citizenship as reproducing inequalities, see, e.g., Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Rita Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics: How Difference Is Produced, and Why It Matters* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009); Uday S. Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," *Politics and Society* 18, no. 4 (1990); Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). For feminist re-readings of this position that critique the essentialisation of identities and instead emphasise respect for political contestation, see, e.g, Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Jodi Dean, *Solidarity of Strangers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Anna Yeatman, *Post-Modern Revisionings of the Political* (London: Routledge, 1994); Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Anne Phillips, *Democracy and Difference* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993). See also radical democratic citizenship, which rejects the notion of a unified public: Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993); *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London ; New York: Verso, 2001); William E. Connolly, *Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 1991).

wake of globalisation and an increasingly mobile world.[6] This concern is evident in the preoccupation of Australian scholarship with the tensions between citizen rights and national cohesion, as well as with immigration and migrant settlement, both for the theoretical questions they raise regarding the inclusive capacities of liberal democracies and their particularly prominent role in the historical development of the Australian nation-state.

This interest in inclusion as a normative or substantive feature of liberal democracies naturally raises the spectre of exclusion, and it is here that the histories of citizenship most diverge. In general, scholars offer a consistent narrative of Australian citizenship as a progression from racial and gender-based exclusivity during Federation to an increasingly inclusive institution in the years following the dismantling of the White Australia policy,[7] with some suggesting a return to greater exclusivity over the last two decades.[8] It is with regard to this last point that both the assumptions of scholars and therefore their conclusions become divided. First, there are those who claim that, while Australian citizenship has become more inclusive, it has nevertheless remained grounded in conceptions of a core Australian culture which is fundamentally exclusive, thereby limiting its capacity for full inclusion. The result is a reinforcement of cultural homogeneity, which is identified as an obstacle both in terms of recognition and redistribution. The reasons for the persistence of this core culture are variously characterised by a sociological approach as a result of either the historical construction of the institution which has yet to be adequately reconfigured, the continuing

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[6] Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Christian Joppke, "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity," *Citizenship Studies* 11, no. 1 (2007); Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, "Citizenship Studies: An Introduction," in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, ed. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London ; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002).

[7] Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Dutton, *One of Us*; Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*; Chesterman and Galligan, *Defining Australian Citizenship*; Jordens, *Redefining Australians*; Tavan, *The Long Slow Death*; Miriam Dixson, *The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity – 1788 to the Present* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999); Rubenstein, *Australian Citizenship Law in Context*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Anthony Moran, *Australia : Nation, Belonging, and Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Walter and MacLeod, *The Citizens' Bargain*.

[8] Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Jon Stratton, *Race Daze: Australia in Identity Crisis* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1998); *Uncertain Lives*; Ien Ang and Jon Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis: The New Politics of Race and National Identity in Australia," *Topia* 2 (1996); Ellie Vasta, "Dialectics of Domination: Racism and Multiculturalism," in *The Teeth Are Smiling: The Persistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia*, ed. Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996); Crock and Saul, *Future Seekers*; Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Laksiri Jayasuriya, "Fine De Siècle Musings," in *Legacies of White Australia. Race Culture and Nation.*, ed. Laksiri Jayasuriya, David Walker, and Jan Gothard (Perth, WA: University of WA Press, 2003); Markus, *Race*; Stephen Castles and Ellie Vasta, "New Conflicts around Old Dilemmas," in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, ed. W.A. Cornelius (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Gianni Zappalà and Stephen Castles, "Citizenship and Immigration in Australia," *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 13, no. 273 (1998).

racist or racialised thinking of individuals, or the deliberate actions of those who might profit from it (the latter two often co-mingling in accounts of political actors specifically). Conversely, more theoretical approaches identify the enactment of this exclusion within the political logics underpinning the institution of citizenship itself; they therefore seek to offer alternative ways of theorising citizenship to achieve a more inclusive configuration. Finally, there are several scholars who contest the position that retaining a core culture in Australian citizenship is problematic, arguing from an understanding of citizenship as necessarily exclusive in its demarcation of the national community, where the formation of this community is both a natural and necessary process for the viability of the nation.

In assessing the limits of Australian citizenship, most scholars turn to the historical legacies of colonialism and assimilationism to account for the particular exclusions being enacted by the institution in the modern day. In doing so, they specifically identify the historical effects of racism or racialised thinking as the cause of inequalities produced by the current configuration of citizenship. The divergence in scholarship regarding the form that these effects take is largely determined by differing conceptions of state power and political action. Some accounts demonstrate a realist understanding of political action in their focus on political actors, relating exclusionary citizenship to the decisions of individuals and political groups.[9] Andrew Markus provides the most extended of these accounts in examining what he characterises as a resurgence of racial politics in the late 1980s, which turned against the increasingly inclusive notion of Australian citizenship that had arisen in the preceding decades. Markus suggests that racial exclusion under the terms of nationalism was reignited by public figures and political collectives such as the New Right, and was deliberately perpetuated by John Howard as a matter of political expediency. While he is careful to note the complexity of the racial politics under examination, and specifically repudiates the notion that any individual alone was responsible for its resurgence, he nevertheless offers an uncomplicated account of state action that ultimately reduces the process of exclusion to the confluence of political wills.[10] The exclusive operation of Australian citizenship is in this instance attributed specifically to political agendas.

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[9] See also Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism*; Chesterman and Galligan, *Defining Australian Citizenship*; Betts, *The Great Divide*; Kelly, *The End of Certainty*; John Hirst, *Sense and Nonsense in Australian History* (Melbourne: Black Incorporated, 2009); Jordens, *Redefining Australians*; Markus, *Race*.

[10] These political wills are also decontextualised in Markus' attempt to avoid explanations of personal motive, which tend to feature in agentic conceptions of individual action.

A more sociological approach suggests that such agendas must be considered in terms of the structural conditions that produce and perpetuate them. For this reason, scholarship which takes this approach considers historical effects in terms of structural conditions and their social impacts in shaping the exclusive nature of Australian citizenship.[11] For instance, Ellie Vasta contends that the legacy of assimilation is a persisting racist ideology which is located in individual subjects and is thus perpetuated by them:

> [D]uring the period of assimilationism, Anglo-Australian ethnic/national identity was structured *in dominance* over other group identities... [T]he loss of dominance can mean a sense of loss of identity... This sense of loss is not in itself racist, but it can often be expressed through racist discourse and practises.[12]

Australian citizenship is exclusive in these terms because of its historical relationship to colonial racist ideology, which placed race (and later culture) at the heart of national identity and which has yet to be supplanted by a more inclusive understanding of this identity. For this reason, the common solution to the problem of exclusion proposed by these scholars is to replace the cultural character of Australian citizenship – where citizenship is conflated with a national cultural identity – with a civic citizenship that locates the conditions of state membership in terms of a political identity alone.[13]

A number of scholars stress that the necessity of this civic citizenship is in fact a consequence of an inherent tension in liberal democracies between liberalism, which insists upon certain

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[11] Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles, eds., *The Teeth Are Smiling: The Persistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996); Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Andrew Jakubowicz, "White Noise : Australia's Struggle with Multiculturalism," in *Working through Whiteness: International Perspectives*, ed. Cynthia Levine-Rasky (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2012); Laksiri Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism in Australia* (Nedlands, WA: School of Social Work and Social Administration, University of WA Press, 1997); Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Walter and MacLeod, *The Citizens' Bargain*; Hage, *White Nation*; Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis, *A Place in the Sun: Re-Creating the Australian Way of Life* (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2000); Holland, "Australian Citizenship."; Susan Schech and Jane Haggis, "Migrancy, Multiculturalism and Whiteness: Re-Charting Core Identities in Australia," *Communal/Plural* 9, no. 2 (2001); Kane, "Racialism and Democracy."
[12] Vasta, "The Teeth Are Smiling," 56. Original emphasis.
[13] Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*; Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Cope and Kalantzis, *A Place in the Sun*; Mary Kalantzis, "Multicultural Citizenship," in *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, ed. Wayne Hudson and John Kane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Donald Horne, *Public Culture: An Argument with the Future* (London: Pluto Press, 1994); Wayne Hudson, "Differential Citizenship," in *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, ed. Wayne Hudson and John Kane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kane, "Racialism and Democracy."

universal values, and pluralism, which affirms the diversity of values as a political good.[14] Laksiri Jayasuriya is the most prominent exponent of this in his critique of Australian citizenship as politically exclusionary. He contends that this exclusion is enacted through what he terms 'cultural pluralism', which restricts plurality to the privatised domain of culture, thereby inhibiting its political potential:

> The social accommodation afforded through cultural pluralism within liberal political philosophy avoided the potential of social conflict and disharmony by channelling the social and economic strivings of migrants into the private domain of their cultural needs.[15]

Jayasuriya claims that this particularisation of other cultures has served to undermine the social cohesion which cultural pluralism seeks to preserve. Instead, he suggests that social cohesion can be achieved not through a shared cultural identity but through an inclusive citizenship derived by a common *political* identity: "It is essentially the civic virtues in the public and political culture – linked to a post-modernist liberal view of citizenship – that serves [*sic*] to integrate and contribute to nation building".[16] Thus, Jayasuriya too advocates for a civic form of citizenship in order to ameliorate the exclusive effects of a national identity based on cultural homogeneity; however, he attributes this configuration of national identity to the political institution of citizenship itself.

While Jayasuriya contends that inclusive citizenship and national cohesion are compatible objects, several scholars argue against this position in asserting that exclusion is an inevitable consequence of the current configuration of the nation-state. The valorisation of cultural homogeneity is in this case an expression of the nationalism required for maintaining the viability of the nation-state formation.[17] Stephen Castles *et al.* characterise Australia as having a 'weak' nationalism due to its longstanding subordinate relationship to Britain; they suggest instead that "the assimilation of the post-1945 decades... is the first historically significant nationalism in Australian history", arising from a need to maintain social solidarity in the wake of the large-scale immigration program pursued to satisfy national development

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[14] Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*; Stephen Castles, "Multicultural Citizenship: A Response to the Dilemma of Globalisation and National Identity?," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 18, no. 1 (1997); Tim Soutphommasane, "Grounding Multicultural Citizenship: From Minority Rights to Civic Pluralism," ibid.26, no. 4 (2005).

[15] Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*, 23.

[16] Ibid., 93.

[17] Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*.

projects.[18] They thus make an explicit connection between the imposition of cultural homogeneity and the economic imperatives of nation-building, articulating nationalism as an ideological state tool for social control and identifying race as just one of a number of possible ways that the state deploys this tool. Alastair Davidson likewise suggests that the exclusivity of Australian citizenship is a result of its function to secure national identity:

> [T]he requirement that citizenship depends on *belonging* beforehand to an existing, structured *national family* has effectively functioned to exclude great numbers of people from citizenship here throughout Australian history.[19]

He goes on to define the migrant policies of the Hawke-Keating government as "a Celtic re-reading of the past" in their retrograde attempt to inscribe a single national identity.[20] David Dutton similarly notes that

> the Australian citizenry was intended to be cohesive, free of internal divisions, bound by common identity and tied to the state. These are the attributes which facilitated effective governance in the modern nation-state system.[21]

Dutton concludes, therefore, that "[r]ace was an effective means of constituting a citizenry distinguished by the qualities just mentioned",[22] suggesting, like Davidson, that the erasure of race from later government policy was a continuation of state exclusion which simply re-articulated the terms of difference. For these scholars, then, the limits of Australian citizenship to facilitating inclusion lie in its relationship to the nation-state and, while the form that this exclusion takes is historically determined, the fact of exclusivity itself is institutionally inscribed.

The theorisations outlined so far assume that national identities are, to a greater or lesser extent, shaped by state institutions and therefore approach the issue of exclusion in terms of the state's involvement in both the redistribution of resources as well as the recognition of minoritised, and thus excluded, identities. They also assume as a corollary that the cultural homogeneity identified within constructions of Australian citizenship is a result of exclusive state practises or logics. There are several scholars who disagree on both points due to a

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[18] Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*, 110-14.
[19] Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, 146. Original emphasis.
[20] Ibid., 145.
[21] Dutton, *One of Us*, 157.
[22] Ibid.

fundamentally opposing view of both the formation and operation of national identity.[23] These scholars proceed from an understanding of national identity as an organic product of individual interpersonal experience, as well as from a normative conception of state action as illegitimate where it seeks to intervene in this organic process. These scholars criticise the notion of civic citizenship since – according to their schema – it is neither possible, because it does not reflect the way that people (naturally) experience national belonging, nor desirable, because it does not account for the ways that such experience is necessary to national cohesion and thus the viability of the nation itself. Brian Galligan and Winsome Roberts suggest, for instance, that

> political institutions are important for citizenship, but they cannot be made to do all the work
> because they are hollow, lacking in cultural richness and human content... Australian citizenship is
> better understood as Australians themselves understand it: as a commitment to preserving,
> enriching and defending a particular country and a way of life that they have in common.[24]

While the authors suggest that no political national identity can fail to contain a cultural dimension within it, they do not follow the implications of this for a potentially exclusive citizenship, but offer it instead as a legitimation of their construction of national identity as both organic and necessary. There is a tendency in these theorisations of Australian citizenship to dehistoricise *current* configurations of national identity.[25] It is telling, for instance, that although Galligan and Roberts suggest Australian citizenship is "membership in a political community of people with a particular history... [B]ecoming an Australian citizen means sharing in that history",[26] they fail to note the ways in which this history is both racialised and gendered as a history of white male experience, and what such a construction of citizenship might mean for those who have been excluded from it in this way.[27]

The diverging assumptions underlining these characterisations of Australian citizenship are most clearly evident in the treatment of multiculturalism, which is universally acknowledged

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[23] Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*; Betts, *The Great Divide*; Betts and Birrell, "Making Australian Citizenship Mean More."; Melleuish, *The Packaging of Australia*; Dixson, *The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity – 1788 to the Present*; Hirst, *Sense and Nonsense*.

[24] Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*, 8.

[25] Johnson, *Governing Change*, 63.

[26] Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*, 96.

[27] They do not explain, for instance, how those excluded from this history would be able to 'share' in it. By the authors' own account, Australian citizenship did not commence until colonial settlement - what does this mean for Indigenous Australians? And how are newly arrived migrants positioned by this insistence on a shared history?

in the literature as a significant moment in conceptualisations of Australian national identity. Those scholars just mentioned who assert the need for a core cultural identity consider the policy of multiculturalism to have been divisive, and particularly emphasise its unpopularity with the general Australian public in justifying this claim.[28] For these scholars, multiculturalism was a top-down policy which was bound to fail because of its inherent incompatibility with a cohesive nation-state. Its gradual rollback in recent years is thus understood not as a return to the racial exclusion of the past but as a necessary response to its shortcomings for the maintenance of Australian society.[29] A large number of scholars argue, however, that multicultural policy indicated an increasingly inclusive understanding of Australian citizenship and that its diminution, particularly under the purview of the Howard government, signalled precisely a return to historical exclusivity.[30] In particular, the advent of official multicultural policy is highlighted as a first step in the recognition of cultural difference, rejecting cultural homogeneity as a requisite feature of Australian citizenship and thus affirming the compatibility of cultural differences within a national framework. Several scholars articulate reservations about this inclusive capacity of multiculturalism, however, noting its implicit privileging of a core culture within which the accommodation of difference is delimited.[31] Jon Stratton claims, for instance, that "[b]oth the policies of assimilation and multiculturalism are founded on the same assumption of the fundamental unity of Australian national culture being expressed in homogeneity",[32] while Ghassan Hage suggests that multiculturalism "is a form of domination disguised as egalitarianism".[33] Multiculturalism in

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[28] Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*; Betts, *The Great Divide*.

[29] Galligan and Roberts, *Australian Citizenship*; Betts, *The Great Divide*; Melleuish, *The Packaging of Australia*; Betts and Birrell, "Making Australian Citizenship Mean More."; Hirst, *Sense and Nonsense*.

[30] Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Cope and Kalantzis, *A Place in the Sun*; Kalantzis, "Multicultural Citizenship."; Ang and Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis."; Stratton, *Race Daze*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Castles and Vasta, "New Conflicts around Old Dilemmas."; Holland, "Australian Citizenship."; Christina Ho, "From Social Justice to Social Cohesion: A History of Australian Multicultural Policy," in *'For Those Who've Come across the Seas...': Australian Multicultural Theory, Policy and Practice*, ed. Andrew Jakubowicz and Christina Ho (London: Anthem Press, 2014).

[31] Stratton, *Race Daze*; Ang and Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis."; Dutton, *One of Us*; Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*; Hage, *White Nation*; Andrew Jakubowicz, "State and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as Ideology," *Journal of Sociology* 17, no. 3 (1981); Ellie Vasta, "Multiculturalism and Ethnic Identity: The Relationship between Racism and Resistance," ibid.29, no. 2 (1993); Schech and Haggis, "Migrancy, Multiculturalism and Whiteness."; Emma Kowal, "The Politics of the Gap: Indigenous Australians, Liberal Multiculturalism, and the End of the Self-Determination Era," *American Anthropologist* 110, no. 3 (2008); Amanda Keddie, "Australian Multicultural Policy: Social Cohesion through a Political Conception of Autonomy," *Journal of Sociology* (2012); Sneja Gunew, *Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalisms* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013); Tom O'Regan, "Introducing Critical Multiculturalism," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 8, no. 2 (1994).

[32] Stratton, *Race Daze*, 70-71.

[33] Hage, *White Nation*, 87.

these terms simply perpetuates the exclusionary operation of antecedent forms of Australian citizenship.

These conflicting accounts of multiculturalism and of citizenship's inclusive capacity more generally are not simply a matter of disagreement but of scholars at cross-purposes due to their often divergent assumptions regarding the process of national inclusion and its relationship to formations of citizenship, nationalism and race. These are *historical* formations and inclusion too is thus a historical, as well as normative, object. It is imperative, therefore, that accounts of Australian citizenship historicise the terms upon which inclusion has come to be defined as a normative construct. More specifically, it is important to note that, despite the variety of approaches to the theorisation of Australian citizenship, all of these histories acknowledge its relationship to the political tradition of liberalism without, for the most part, theorising liberalism itself. Those scholars who, as already mentioned, *have* sought to engage with liberalism as a political theory are more concerned with its normative dimension rather than its operation. Barry Hindess makes this point of political theory generally, noting that studies of liberalism within the discipline fail to question the techniques by which it is enacted. Hindess' critique is based on a particular understanding of liberalism in terms of what Michel Foucault defined as a form of governmentality; that is, a political rationality that seeks to legitimate its own authority through the construction of 'regimes of truth'.[34] According to Foucault, liberalism as a political rationality assumes the natural operation of markets and societies (as distinct but related spheres) and that these processes are best secured by the guaranteed freedom of individuals. As a corollary, however, liberalism "also requires that those individuals do not freely choose to behave in such a way as to undermine the 'natural' processes on which their security depends".[35] Hindess thus suggests that, in Foucault's terms,

> while liberalism is certainly concerned to free the actions of individuals from police regulation and
> other forms of state control, it nevertheless ensures that they behave according to the standards of

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[34] Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 26-27. See also, Thomas Lemke, "'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège De France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001); Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, eds., *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government* (London: UCL Press, 1996); Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: SAGE Press, 1999); Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

[35] Barry Hindess, "Politics and Governmentality," *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 26, no. 2 (1997): 268.

civility, orderliness and reason required for the proper functioning of state agencies, markets, households and other aspects of social life.[36]

This tension inherent to liberalism between freedom and its limits is implicitly addressed by the histories of Australian citizenship in their persistent concern with reconciling individual rights and national cohesion, but their characterisations of liberalism as an ideology or normative theory foreclose an analysis of the ways in which liberalism itself constructs this problem and offers a particular means by which to resolve it.

Australian citizenship histories have thus almost entirely eschewed conceptualisations of neo/liberalism as a form of governmentality. While neoliberalism particularly has an increasingly central role in accounts of Australian citizenship, it is characterised as an ideology or policy doctrine which has enacted exclusion through the defunding of migrant support services, more restrictive and economically-driven immigration programs and the exacerbation of economic marginalisation which disproportionately affects migrants.[37] Jon Stratton goes so far as to argue that neoliberalism has brought about a state of exception, in Giorgio Agamben's terms, which justifies the state's aggressive policing of its borders in order to ensure the economic functioning of the state in the interests of capital.[38] These theorisations fail to engage with citizenship as a cultural institution in their focus on neoliberalism as state ideology and their subsequent circumscription of its effects to juridico-political rights. This chimes oddly with the attentiveness otherwise shown to citizenship's cultural dimensions.[39] Furthermore, as with the scholarship's treatment of liberalism, this approach does not account for how the exclusivity of citizenship is reconfigured or made intelligible by neoliberalism, but simply assumes it is an unchanging process which is compatible with and therefore perpetuated by neoliberalism. Viewed in terms of

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism*; James P. Walsh, "The Marketization of Multiculturalism: Neoliberal Restructuring and Cultural Difference in Australia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no. 2 (2014); Anne McNevin, "The Liberal Paradox and the Politics of Asylum in Australia," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (2007).

[38] Stratton, *Uncertain Lives*. See also Perera and Stratton, "Heterochronotopes of Exception."

[39] This is most evident in the scholarship concerned with state discourses of citizenship. These works acknowledge the role that state articulations of citizenship play in constructing normative citizens, but in reducing these articulations to examples of state ideology, do not theorise how they might produce exclusive effects beyond determining policy agendas. See, e.g., Dyrenfurth, "The Language of Australian Citizenship."; "Battlers, Refugees and the Republic."; Cathy Greenfield and Peter Williams, "Limiting Politics: Howardism, Media Rhetoric and National Cultural Commemorations," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (2003); Anne McNevin, "The Liberal Paradox and the Politics of Asylum in Australia," ibid.42, no. 4 (2007). Carol Johnson mediates between these positions in acknowledging governmental power but suggesting that it does not take adequate account of institutional action: Johnson, *Governing Change*.

governmentality, however, it becomes possible to articulate certain "technologies of citizenship" which produce citizen subjectivities in accordance with particular (exclusionary) logics of neo/liberalism.[40] Acknowledging these logics complicates the aforementioned claim of much Australian scholarship that citizenship is necessarily more inclusive because it supports equal political participation. As Barbara Cruickshank notes, the notion of the active citizen itself relies upon a particular construction of subjectivities that "invest[s] the citizen with a set of goals and self-understandings, and gives the citizen-subject an investment in participating voluntarily in programs, projects, and institutions set up to 'help' them".[41] It is thus imperative to question how such terms as democratic participation are defined by a liberal rationality and what this means for understandings of 'inclusive' citizenship.

In accordance with Foucault's notion of governmentality, this thesis is concerned with both discerning the political rationalities at work in particular historical moments, as well as the effects of these rationalities in their construction of particular subjectivities.[42] It is for this reason that the analysis of the policy documents being undertaken in the case studies will consist of both a discursive analysis of the evidence and a critical analysis of the implications of this discourse. This is driven by an understanding of discursive effects as historically contingent; political rationalities are not assumed to produce uniform effects in all contexts

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[40] See also Lauren Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Michael Sparke, "A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border," *Political Geography* 25, no. 2 (2006); Wendy Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization," *Political Theory* 34, no. 6 (2006); Katharyne Mitchell, "Educating the National Citizen in Neoliberal Times: From the Multicultural Self to the Strategic Cosmopolitan," *Transactions of the institute of British geographers* 28, no. 4 (2003).

[41] Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 41.

[42] Foucault's conception of governmentality is concerned with *both* the particular 'mentalities' or rationalities underlying state strategies of governing, as well as the modern rearticulation of the 'art of government' as the knowledge of subjects in order for their proper regulation. By deploying knowledge in particular ways, these political rationalities form discursive formations that are evident "whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)" (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 38.) Discourses structure what is sayable or knowable about a subject, and discursive analysis in Foucauldian terms is thus not concerned with how a statement communicates meaning but with "determining what position can and must be occupied by an individual if he is to be the subject of it" (ibid., 95-96.) Discourses are therefore complicit in the circulation of power, by authorising particular truths and knowledges that position subjects in certain ways. In seeking to regulate their citizens, governments too operate within and reproduce discourses and thereby contribute to this production of subjects. It is important to stress that these contributions are only partial and are not deterministic; the circulation of discourses and their effects are always contingent operations and are open to rupture. The focus of this thesis on state discourse does not wish to suggest that this circulation is a one-way process.

and it is thus necessary for a discourse analysis to account for the particular ways in which these rationalities are enacted. The case studies will comprise the second chapter, analysing these historical moments through a focus on three particular questions: what were the historical conditions surrounding this moment? What discourses were mobilised in the government's response to this moment? And ultimately, what were the rationalities of government underlying this response? The third chapter will consider the implications of these discourses in terms of their constitution as a particular technology of government. In this way, I will consider not just the logics at play in these policy discourses but also offer a theoretical framework for interpreting their effects.

II. Case Study Analysis

1. Multiculturalism Under Fire

i.

Since its official inception as policy by the Fraser government, multiculturalism had received bipartisan support under its terms of social justice and equal opportunity as defined in the 1978 Galbally Report.[1] However, the question of immigration was brought to the fore in the 1980s and with it, questions regarding Australian national identity and what, if any, place multiculturalism had within it. In 1984, historian Geoffrey Blainey launched an attack on what he characterised as elite social engineering which preferenced Asian immigration and encouraged immigrants to remain apart from mainstream Australian culture; multiculturalism thus threatened the social cohesion of the nation by "turning Australia into a nation of tribes".[2] The Hawke government's response to this debate was to tighten selection criteria for family visas and increase the skills component, but the overall character of immigration policy was largely unchanged, with family and humanitarian visas still accounting for two-thirds of the intake at the end of the decade.[3] Then, in 1988, Opposition leader John Howard effectively ended bipartisan support for the policy, stating: "I think it is a rather aimless, divisive policy and I think it ought to be changed".[4] Coinciding with this statement was the release of the FitzGerald Report, a government-commissioned inquiry into immigration which was highly critical of multiculturalism, identifying it as harmful to immigration policy due to its confusing and divisive nature. The Report was primarily concerned with immigration's role in increasing Australia's economic competitiveness and, to that end, it made recommendations both to change selection criteria in favour of economic utility and to ameliorate the damaging effect of multiculturalism by reinforcing the value of citizenship.[5] According to the Report, the kind of racially-charged objections being raised against immigration were a result of

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[1] Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Ang and Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis."; Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building in Australia: Inclusive National Identity and the Embrace of Diversity."; Elsa Koleth, "Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas," no. 6 (2010).

[2] Geoffrey Blainey, *The Australian* 3 December 1988.

[3] Robert Birrell, *The Chains That Bind: Family Reunion Migration to Australia in the 1980s* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990), 3.

[4] Quoted in Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 106-7.

[5] Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies (CAAIP), *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988), 90.

public perceptions of multiculturalism as a separatist, sectionally-driven policy. It tacitly agreed with this position, noting that multiculturalism "did not seem to have enhanced the two-way commitment which is so essential to immigration's success".[6] The Report identified this lack of commitment as a threat to national solidarity since it devalued citizenship; it thus made an explicit connection between cultural difference, national cohesion and the obligations of citizens to the nation. The Report's concern with national commitment echoed Howard, who a few months earlier had outlined his preference for

> an Australian society that respects our cultural diversity and acknowledges that we are drawn from many parts of the world, but requires of all of us a loyalty to Australia at all times and to her institutions and her values and her traditions which transcends loyalty to any other set of values anywhere in the world.[7]

ii.

In response to the FitzGerald Report, the government produced the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: Sharing Our Future*, a policy paper which attempted to reconcile the concern for national cohesion with the maintenance of individual liberal freedoms. The most apparent aim of the *Agenda* – and the one most directly tied to the criticisms made by the FitzGerald Report – was the reframing of multiculturalism as a policy for 'everyone'. The *Agenda* sought to counter claims that multiculturalism was both divisive as well as driven by special interest groups through an emphasis on multiculturalism as the management of diversity in the interests of the nation as a whole. These interests were expressed in terms of three dimensions of multiculturalism: economic efficiency, social justice and cultural identity. In articulating the benefits for each of these dimensions, a constant tension was apparent between an insistence on the individual's right to difference and the circumscription of this difference within an unassailable framework that defined the fundamental national identity.

As per the FitzGerald Report's suggestion that immigration policy strategies "need a sharper economic focus, for the public to be convinced that the program is in Australia's interests",[8] the *Agenda* emphasised the economic benefits of multiculturalism for the entire nation, claiming for instance that, "[b]y seeking to improve the management and use of our human

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[6] Ibid., 11.
[7] Quoted in James Jupp, "Multicultural Public Policy," in *Australian National Identity*, ed. Charles A. Price (Canberra: Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 1991), 146.
[8] CAAIP, *Immigration*, xi.

resources, and thereby to contribute to a sustained improvement in our standard of living, multicultural policies serve the interests of us all".[9] It also addressed the criticism of divisiveness through an emphasis on 'sharing', signalled most overtly by the subtitle, 'Sharing Our Future'. According to the *Agenda*, "[m]ulticulturalism is concerned to encourage all Australians, including those from non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds, to share their diversity of cultures, rather than excluding one another or being forced into separate enclaves".[10] However, this conception of shared cultures was qualified as one which had to be subsumed under the broader umbrella of 'Australian' culture, as implied by the statement that "there is overwhelming support for the maintenance of cultural traditions providing they are shared with the rest of the community and that they become part of Australian life".[11] Thus, difference was framed as acceptable for the role it played in constructing a collective and unifying Australian identity: "[T]he richness of our diverse origins can contribute – as indeed they are already – to an evolving, but distinctive Australian culture".[12] Diversity was thereby figured in neoliberal terms as a resource, both economically and socially, and the government positioned as the manager of this resource 'for everyone'. This was explicitly signalled by the head of the Office of Multicultural Affairs, Peter Shergold, speaking of the *Agenda* after its launch: "[F]or us to make the best use of the human resources that we have, for us to maintain our social cohesion we need multicultural policies, policies to manage our ethnic diversity in the best interests of us all".[13]

As well as the economic aspects, then, the *Agenda* engaged with the social dimensions of multiculturalism, most significantly in its acknowledgement of structural inequality. It noted, for instance, that "[t]he ethnic, racial and religious diversity of contemporary Australia means that there exist barriers of language, culture or prejudice which continue to prevent some Australians from gaining a fair go or a fair share".[14] Furthermore, the *Agenda* specifically characterised these barriers as structurally embedded:

> In the past Australia failed to anticipate and plan for the changes and challenges presented by a
> rapidly diversifying population. The attitudinal environment was unprepared and the institutional

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[9] Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), 26.
[10] Ibid., 52.
[11] Ibid., 46.
[12] Ibid., 52.
[13] Peter R Shergold and Andrew McCutcheon, "Multiculturalism: Celebrating the Past, Planning the Future," 1989, Working Papers on Migrant and Intercultural Studies (Clayton, VIC: Monash University), 12.
[14] OMA, *National Agenda*, 19.

structures unresponsive. This resulted in inequities and inefficiencies – individuals were denied their rights and potential resources were wasted.[15]

Social justice was thus framed as protection of the 'fair go', where the failure to access opportunities was considered an institutional failing rather than an individual one. While the economic cost of this inequality was also mentioned, the paper presented limitations in the extent to which government could become involved where barriers existed in non-government sectors:

> The ability – and right – of government to intervene directly in many of these areas is extremely limited. Its contribution must often be confined to attempting to ensure that individuals are equipped with the necessary skills – education, information, and English language proficiency – to exercise their rights.[16]

Instead, it was under the terms of *social* (redistributive) justice that the *Agenda* made its most explicit claims for government intervention:

> Multicultural policies… are premised on the belief that all Australians, whatever their ethnic origin, are entitled to genuine equality of treatment and equality of opportunity in all spheres of community life, including equal access to and an equitable share of the resources which governments manage on behalf of the community. In this way, multiculturalism expresses and complements the Government's broader social justice strategy which is designed to ensure that the benefits flowing from its economic policies are fairly distributed throughout the community.[17]

The inclusion of social justice as a fundamental dimension of multiculturalism reiterated the way in which the social was positioned in the *Agenda* as a distinct sphere of government, a sphere that – unlike the economy – was dependent upon and benefited from government action. The recognition of structural inequality made this case for the government's role in its suggestion of individual rights under threat, invoking state intervention in their defence.

Ultimately then, the *Agenda* argued for the necessity of multicultural policy through the liberal discourse of individual rights, which were figured not only in terms of access to resources but also in the recognition of identity:

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[15] Ibid., 7.
[16] Ibid., 12.
[17] Ibid., 19.

> Fundamentally, multiculturalism is about the rights of the individual – the right to equality of treatment; to be able to express one's identity; to be accepted as an Australian without having to assimilate to some stereotyped model of behaviour.[18]

This right to the maintenance of cultural identity came with a proviso at the outset of the *Agenda* where, as one of the dimensions of multiculturalism, it was defined as "the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage".[19] These limits were later defined as "the Constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language and equality of the sexes".[20] Culture was thus figured as *individual* identity and its expression circumscribed within the private sphere; insofar as this culture was privatised, it remained under the purview of individual liberal freedom. Yet this freedom had a limit; there was an implicit suggestion in this construction of culture that cultural difference as a *collective political force* posed a threat to the core tenets of Australian culture – which had at their heart the defence of individual freedom – and it is for this reason that the imposition of a limit to cultural difference was not only justified, but justified under the terms of freedom itself.[21] Thus, despite the *Agenda*'s insistence that Australian identity "evolves and changes over time",[22] it also ultimately reaffirmed the limit to this change in redefining Australian culture, which was articulated as a matter of safeguarding freedom:

> Multiculturalism does not mean that we should dismantle or repudiate our institutions in order to start afresh. Our British heritage is extremely important to us. It helps to define us as Australian. *It has created a society remarkable for the freedom it can give to its individual citizens*.[23]

iii.

The *National Agenda* was a product of the growing conflict between the incumbent political rationality of social liberalism and the newer logic of neoliberalism (which in fact hailed back to certain classical liberal precepts). Although, as many scholars have noted, the discourse of neoliberalism was certainly at play in the *Agenda*, it cannot be said that it ultimately

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[18] Ibid., 15.
[19] Ibid., vii.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Stratton, *Race Daze*, 70; Levey, "The Political Theories of Australian Multiculturalism," 873; Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, 167.
[22] OMA, *National Agenda*, 52.
[23] Ibid., 50. My emphasis.

prevailed.[24] Instead, there was a continual tension between opposing concepts of the national good, in neoliberal terms defined as economic efficiency driven by privatisation and in social liberal terms as state intervention guaranteeing equal access to some broadly conceived notion of 'the good life'. The inclusion of cultural identity as a substantive dimension of this 'good life' has been singled out as a particular innovation of the *Agenda*, signalling the advent of multiculturalism as a distinct political strategy.[25] Yet the paper's articulation of cultural identity was largely indebted to certain liberal conceptions of culture and individual identity as necessarily private, conceptions which were reinforced by neoliberalism and which found expression in the discourse of 'diversity'. Furthermore, while the centrality of substantive equality to the *Agenda* demonstrates that neoliberal logic was still far from dominating political rationale, the paper nevertheless relied heavily on this logic to legitimate its policy, and it is here that the growing influence of neoliberalism becomes most apparent.

While the *Agenda* stressed the limit of state intervention in private enterprise, there was also a very clear claim made for the government's role in the social sphere, which was figured as distinct from the economy. Most particularly, the release of the FitzGerald Report and the official responses to it demonstrate a growing understanding of the nation as a cultural construct.[26] As the *Agenda* itself claimed:

> Television programs and films imported from overseas; increased tourism to and from our shores; the structural transformation of our economy... all these factors, and many others, influence the development of our national culture. The changing face of the Australian population is simply another influence.[27]

The *Agenda* can thus be seen as an acknowledgement by the government that it was vested with a significant role in the shaping of the national identity, which it defined through the institutions of liberal democracy, in contrast to its more neoliberal non-interventionist stance towards the private sector. Furthermore, the benefit of economic liberalisation was presented as an increase in the resources available for state redistribution, not – as neoliberalism would

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[24] Theophanous, *Understanding Multiculturalism*, 135-43; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*, 180-1; Walsh, "The Marketization of Multiculturalism: Neoliberal Restructuring and Cultural Difference in Australia."; Lois Foster and David Stockley, "The Rise and Decline of Australian Multiculturalism: 1973-1988," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 2 (1988); Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Alastair Davidson, "Multiculturalism and Citizenship: Silencing the Migrant Voice," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 18, no. 2 (1997); Walter and MacLeod, *The Citizens' Bargain*.
[25] Levey, "Multicultural Political Thought in Australian Perspective," 9.
[26] Stratton, *Race Daze*, 114-6.
[27] OMA, *National Agenda*, 52.

have it – in the elimination of such statist intervention altogether.[28] State intervention was thus presented as necessary, first, because of an acknowledgment of structural disadvantage and its threat to individual rights, and second, because of the belief that it was the government – and not the market – that had the capacity, and held the responsibility, to correct this disadvantage. Social justice, figured as state intervention to protect the right of equal access to resources and opportunities, contradicted the neoliberal rationality which prescribed this distribution through the competitive market. Together with the right to cultural identity, the prominent affirmation of such rights of recognition and redistribution underscores the extent to which the rights of the individual became the privileged site for state action.

The multiculturalism being espoused by the *Agenda* was thus a particularly *liberal* form of multiculturalism, which is most evident in its persistent elision of group relations. For instance, cultural rights were expressed solely in terms of individual identity, and political rights were concomitantly defined as individual participation in the public sphere; the legitimacy of cultural affiliations adopting a political force was denied. As Geoffrey Levey notes:

> Cultural minorities *qua* groups have no entitlement. This qualification is of the utmost importance. It means that Australian multiculturalism remains committed to the liberal idea that the ultimate unit of moral worth is the individual, and it avoids one of the traditional liberal concerns about group and cultural rights; namely, that the interests and rights of the individual may be jeopardised in the interests of the group.[29]

Culture was thus privatised, and while difference was acknowledged as a systemic issue, the problem and solution was located in individuals.[30] This particular configuration of culture and difference produced the discourse of diversity, which privatised and commodified difference in order to ameliorate its potential political antagonisms and thereby secure national cohesion. Ien Ang suggests this discourse is a particular effect of multiculturalism in its attempt to reconfigure difference as a national benefit, rather than a threat:

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[28] Tim Battin, "Unmaking the Australian Keynesian Way," in *Contesting the Australian Way: States, Markets and Civil Society*, ed. Bettina Cass and Paul Smyth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 96.
[29] "The Political Theories of Australian Multiculturalism." 873-4. See also Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*, 120-8; Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building in Australia: Inclusive National Identity and the Embrace of Diversity."
[30] Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*, 20-23; Gavan Titley and Alana Lentin, *The Politics of Diversity in Europe* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008), 14; Ho, "From Social Justice to Social Cohesion," 38-9.

> A key plank of state-led recognition of difference is the policy of multiculturalism, which officially sanctions and enshrines ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences within the encompassing framework of the state. In this administrative-bureaucratic context, difference becomes the cornerstone of *diversity*: diversity is the managerial view of the field of differences to be harmonized, controlled and made to fit into a coherent (i.e. national) whole by the (nation) state.[31]

This discourse of diversity has two particular implications: it first produces a split between good and bad diversity and, in doing so, both reproduces and regulates difference, as well as legitimating the need for its management.

The differentiation between good and bad diversity is located in the underlying function of the discourse of diversity as "a rationality of integration: it ceases to be a divisive force when it is good, and anchored in shared values".[32] Diversity thus seeks to depoliticise difference, obscuring the power relations that are constituted by it and thereby denying the legitimacy of the political antagonisms that may arise because of it. In this way, it is able to recognise difference while evading its political implications. It is in the privatisation of difference that diversity is both effective and attractive in achieving this depoliticisation. By individualising difference, the discourse of diversity commodifies cultural difference, producing a static, non-contingent view of culture that is presented as freely available for individual consumption. The threat posed by culture as a mark of group affiliation is thus erased in the suggestion that it is not fixed, but can be taken up or discarded according to the desire of the individual.[33] This notion of culture divorces it from its historical formation together with the unequal power relations formed with it. Difference, then, far from signalling these inequalities, becomes an expression of an individual's identity, as well as the position this individual adopts with regard to others. As Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley note, the result is that "the diverse subject cultivates the competencies necessary to live with difference understood as a set of variegated characteristics, but not as relations of power".[34] This notion of cultural competency was famously expressed by David Putnam as a kind of 'capital' which individuals can acquire in

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[31] Ien Ang, "The Predicament of Difference," *Ethnicities* 5, no. 3 (2005): 296. Original emphasis.
[32] *The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 187.
[33] Gunew, *Haunted Nations*, 23; Hage, *White Nation*, 125-30; Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*, 70; Stratton, *Race Daze*, 97; Dutton, *One of Us*, 155.
[34] Lentin and Titley, *The Crises of Multiculturalism*, 186. See also, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics*.

order to achieve belonging in their communities.[35] 'Good' diversity is thus that form of difference which, in being adopted by the individual, contributes to their ability to live with others (and thereby serves national interests); by contrast, then, bad diversity is that which acts to separate or cause division. The implementation of a 'Productive Diversity' strategy after the release of the *Agenda* provides the most obvious example in its linking of a diverse workforce with improved productivity, since the cultural knowledge and language skills of individuals could be harnessed to better understand and thus gain access to global markets.[36] Difference is thus considered a valuable commodity only insofar as its consumption does not threaten some existing national framework, while political conflict arising from difference is reduced to acts of individual transgression.

It is in this articulation of good and bad difference that the discourse of diversity both reproduces difference and constructs the need for its regulation, which is expressed in terms of its management. The government justified the policy of multiculturalism on these terms, as well as its own intervention to direct its implementation. As many scholars have noted, the growing prevalence of managerial rhetoric has often accompanied the spread of neoliberal rationality, a result of neoliberalism's particular relationship to technical knowledge.[37] Increasingly, states seek to locate their legitimacy in their managerial capacity; that is, the ability to apply expert, objective knowledge in order to maximise outcomes for both individuals and the nation, as distinct from a social liberal rationality, which seeks to produce outcomes according to some ethical framework.[38] The *Agenda* claimed, for instance, that

> [d]ifferent perceptions, values and modes of behaviour can contribute to social tension. There is an obligation on both sides to try to understand the other... There is a need for opportunities to develop cross-cultural understanding".[39]

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[35] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

[36] David Stockley and Lois Foster, "The Construction of a New Public Culture: Multiculturalism in an Australian Productive Culture," *Journal of Sociology* 26, no. 3 (1990); Kalantzis, "Multicultural Citizenship," 106-7.

[37] Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, 197-233; John Clarke, "Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-Liberalism," *Journal of Social Policy* 33, no. 1 (2004); Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*.

[38] Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization."; Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality?: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012); Henry A. Giroux, "Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy under the Reign of Neoliberalism," *Communication Education* 52, no. 3 (2003).

[39] OMA, *National Agenda*, 37.

It thus positioned the government as a facilitator of 'opportunities', implicitly suggesting that the proper management of individuals would result in their acquisition of cultural competency and thereby secure social harmony. This articulation of the state as a neutral manager reflects the neoliberal moralisation of efficiency and productivity over and above the defence of particular interests (including ethical ones). This rhetoric of management is profoundly depoliticising in its emphasis on objective knowledge and calculated outcomes and it thus reinforces the reconfiguration of difference as diversity.[40] In particular, it presents the regulation of difference in terms of good and bad diversity as an apolitical process; the cohesive framework against which these terms are defined remains unchallenged. In this way, as Charles Hale suggests in his study of what he terms 'neoliberal multiculturalism', "the emergent regime of governance shapes, delimits, and *produces* cultural difference rather than suppressing it".[41] In doing so, difference as diversity is stripped of its political significance and instead placed in service to the reinforcement of a no-longer-threatened national framework.

The discourse of diversity articulated in this period was thus premised on a construction of cultural difference as individual, private identity. Although structural disadvantage was acknowledged as a site for state intervention, emphasis was also placed on the negotiation of cultural difference in terms of individual acquisition. Difference was thus reconfigured as diversity, a commodified resource which located national cohesion in individual competence and thereby justified state intervention in the management of this resource. This in turn depoliticised political conflict as the failure of individuals to acquire cultural competency and legitimated their regulation for the national benefit.

2. The Arrival of One Nation

i.

Although John Howard was notoriously disapproving of multiculturalism and actively avoided using the term,[42] a year after the Coalition's successful bid for government saw the

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[40] Lentin and Titley, *The Crises of Multiculturalism*, 183.

[41] Charles R. Hale, "Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America," 28, no. 1 (2005): 12-13. See alsoDhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics*, 38.

[42] Ang and Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis," 24.; Judith Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to John Howard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 195.; (Kelly End 243)

establishment of the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC), whose primary task was to recommend a policy framework "aimed at ensuring that cultural diversity is a unifying force for Australia".[43] This new focus on multiculturalism as a source of unity was a reiteration of Howard's longstanding position that multiculturalism could only be tenable if it was underpinned by a common (British-derived) Australian ethos, rather than upholding difference. In 1996, however, this position on migrants – which had proved too controversial in 1988 – was overshadowed by the first parliamentary speech of Pauline Hanson, who claimed:

> Immigration and multiculturalism are issues that this government is trying to address, but for far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate by the major parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished... A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united.[44]

In this speech, Hanson not only warned against the threat to national unity posed by multiculturalism, she specifically targeted the source of the threat as elite interests who were silencing the views of mainstream Australia. Through this populist division of 'elites' against 'the people', Hanson constructed a racially-specific 'people' as the only group vested with a legitimate claim to government representation, and in so doing recast "equality-seeking groups as special interest groups".[45] The success of Hanson's One Nation – and indeed of the populist politics adopted by both parties – has been identified by most critics as a direct result of the economic marginalisation experienced by the middle classes due to the increasing implementation of neoliberal policy. This marginalisation in turn created resentment against those organised interests – such as proponents of multiculturalism – who were perceived to be influencing government in ways that undermined its claim to being a representative body.[46] This 'politics of grievance' was clearly articulated by the One Nation Party, who structured its

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[43] National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC), *Multicultural Australia: The Way Forward* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997), 1.

[44] Pauline Hanson, "First Speech," 10 September 1996, Hansard, House of Representatives 3861.

[45] Marian Sawer and David Laycock, "Down with Elites and up with Inequality: Market Populism in Australia and Canada," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 47, no. 2 (2009): 142.

[46]Judith Brett, "Representing the Unrepresented: One Nation and the Formation of the Labor Party," in *Two Nations : The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia*, ed. Nadine Davidoff (Melbourne: Bookman Press, 1990); Geoff Stokes, "One Nation and Australian Populism," in *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*, ed. Michael Leach, Geoff Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 27.; Sawer and Laycock, "Down with Elites and up with Inequality."; Tod Moore, "Economic Rationalism and Economic Nationalism," in *Pauline Hanson : One Nation and Australian Politics*, ed. Bligh Grant (Armidale, NSW: University of New England Press, 1997), 50.; Michelle Grattan, "Pauline Hanson's Hijack of John Howard," in *Two Nations : The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia*, ed. Nadine Davidoff (Melbourne: Bookman Press, 1990), 75.; Paul Kelly, "Hanson - Symptom of a Deeper Problem," ibid., 96.; Stratton, *Race Daze*, 55.

campaign around the two key pillars of zero net immigration and economic nationalism, both of which it characterised as opposing elite economic interests. For instance, the party's line on immigration in the 1998 election claimed that,

> to economic, political and intellectual elites, immigration has become central to a perspective which holds that inherited Australian institutions, culture and identity are outmoded and expendable obstacles to the establishment of a borderless world.[47]

By the same token, the party claimed that "government level playing fields and 'get big or get out' fantasies... are destroying jobs and sending Australian jobs and companies offshore".[48] A very clear opposition was thus drawn between the interests of mainstream Australia and the special interests illegitimately upheld by government.

ii.

This discourse valorising the mainstream against special interests, with its underlying code of cultural hierarchy, was clearly at play in the reconfiguration of multiculturalism attempted by the three government policy papers produced during this period; *Multiculturalism: The Way Forward* (1997), a discussion paper outlining the NMAC's terms of reference, *Australian multiculturalism for a new century: Towards inclusiveness* (1999), a report of the Council's findings, and the government's response to this in *A New Agenda For Multicultural Australia* (1999). Indeed, the discussion paper clearly noted the changing emphasis of multicultural policy since the '89 *Agenda* from "a somewhat migrant-oriented focus to a more inclusive whole-of-community focus", which it implicitly endorsed as an appropriate response to community concerns that multiculturalism had "given undue emphasis to the maintenance of cultural difference and the interests of individual groups rather than those of the Australian community as a whole".[49] The Council's attempt to construct multiculturalism as a 'unifying force for Australia' involved four distinct moves: defining democracy in its (neo)liberal form, subsuming multiculturalism under the umbrella of democratic citizenship, linking such democratic institutions specifically to British-Australian culture and rebranding this new type of citizenship 'Australian multiculturalism'.

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[47] Quoted in Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 132.

[48] Quoted in Paul Reynolds, "The One Nation Parliamentary Party," in *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*, ed. Michael Leach, Geoff Stokes, and Ian Ward (St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 177.

[49] NMAC, *The Way Forward*, 7-8.

The NMAC's response to concerns that multiculturalism was privileging certain groups belied a notion of democracy that was more classically liberal (and also neoliberal) than that of the '89 *Agenda,* which identified social justice in terms of substantive equality as a key goal of multicultural policy. By contrast, the discussion paper and subsequent report both emphasised the importance of formal equality, but downplayed that of the material, limiting the language of rights by replacing it with that of 'needs'. Thus, the discussion paper noted that earlier multicultural policy

> initially placed most emphasis on the rights of clients who face language and cultural barriers when seeking services. More recently the emphasis has been on practically addressing the needs of clients that arise from cultural and linguistic factors.[50]

By implication, then, the issue of discriminatory barriers was dismissed and the necessity for government intervention negated.[51] While the need for substantive equality was thereby rejected, that of formal equality was stressed, most bluntly in the report's denial of structural inequality when it stated that "our society does not guarantee equal outcomes".[52] The term 'social justice' was eliminated altogether in the government's response, which claimed that "since there is some duplication in the criteria 'need' and 'social justice and equity', the government has decided to merge them into a criterion called 'need and social equity'".[53] The discourse of social justice, which asserted the right of all individuals to an equal standard of living, was thus superseded by that of social equity, which framed equality as the address of individual needs in terms of equitable – that is, equal – treatment.

It was this liberal ideal which underpinned the NMAC's defence of multiculturalism as an evolution of Australian's democratic traditions. This reframing of multiculturalism was made evident by the report:

> The freedom that our democracy guarantees gives space for the cultural diversity in Australian society, so it is our democracy and our expectation that 'citizens' respect and adhere to its

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[50] Ibid., 6.

[51] Jingjing Shen, "A Documentary Analysis of Australian Multicultural Policy under the Howard Government" (2008), 31.

[52] National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC), *Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1999), 12.

[53] Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), *New Agenda for Multicultural Australia* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1999), 22.

principles that are the key ingredients of a unifying Australian tradition which Australian multiculturalism retains.[54]

Diversity here was a *result* of liberal democratic freedoms, but also paradoxically a threat to their continuance (and by extension its own); it was therefore required to concede to the demands of these institutions where there was conflict. Thus – echoing the '89 *Agenda* – the report noted the place of multiculturalism as subsumed under a liberal democratic framework:

> While Australian multiculturalism values and celebrates diversity, it is not an 'anything goes' concept since it is built on core societal values of mutual respect, tolerance and harmony, the rule of law and our democratic principles and institutions. It is also based on an overriding commitment to Australia.[55]

It was for this reason that the report stressed that this multiculturalism "does not seek diversity in our society as an end in itself; rather it welcomes and values diversity as a great cultural, social and economic resource".[56] Diversity was only welcome insofar as it was an outcome of and served to reinforce liberal democratic institutions.[57] This repositioning of multiculturalism as an inevitable (and laudable) result of liberal freedom allowed it to be framed as an inclusive and unifying force, since it was now absorbed into a uniquely Australian citizenship whose universal appeal provided the social 'glue' of the nation:

> As a community we have and support certain core values, principles and institutions which, while shared by many countries, have a special 'Australian' quality. These include a 'fair go', mutual respect, egalitarianism, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, freedom of religion and expression, equality of opportunity... and the rejection of bigotry and prejudice. The Council believes these are strong enough to unite Australians from all backgrounds.[58]

It was this linkage of liberalism, nominally a universal institution, to Australian identity particularly that formed the core attempt of these papers to affirm the unifying capacity of multiculturalism; hence its rebranding as 'Australian multiculturalism'. This tension between the apparent universality of liberal freedoms and the desire for a uniquely Australian identity is evident in the claim that "[t]hese basic principles – freedom and openness – define some

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[54] NMAC, *Towards Inclusiveness*, 52.
[55] Ibid., 42.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Keddie, "Australian Multicultural Policy," 2. ;Laksiri Jayasuriya, "Australian Multiculturalism Past, Present, and Future," 2003, (Perth: School of Social Work and Social Policy, University of Western Australia).
[58] NMAC, *The Way Forward*, 2.

common ground. They are, in one sense, timeless but in practice they derive from Australian experience".[59] The desire to ground liberal democracy in the Australian nation was achieved through an emphasis on the British origins of these institutions, which were thus afforded a central role in constituting the Australian identity. While the '89 *Agenda* also noted the legacy of British institutions to Australia, this was taken much further in the NMAC report, which not only identified this British heritage but suggested that it bestowed a cultural privilege to those of British descent:

> Australians whose origin is wholly or partly from Great Britain and Ireland can take special pride in their heritage, for its substantive contribution to the development and success of Australian society. This is exemplified in the underlying philosophy and principles and the essential components of Australia's democratic system, which is the foundation on which our society has been built, and in our special social values of mateship and a fair go, which contribute so much to community harmony.[60]

A cultural hierarchy was established here in which the cultural identities of the 'non-British', migrants or otherwise, were subordinated to that of the Western-coded native core, who was inherently and exclusively vested with the capacity to unite the Australian nation through its historical relationship to liberalism. The discussion paper exposed this contradiction when it noted that

> not all community standards and values are or can be enshrined in legislation. It is also important to recognise that law is not simply a matter of legislation; ultimately it is a matter of morality of values and standards.[61]

The apparent universality of the liberal framework uniting the nation was here revealed to be culturally specific. This characterisation of the unity of the nation maintained its foundation in a British heritage, in line with the previous policy of assimilation, merely shifting the significance of this heritage from a racial to a political one.[62] Thus, the attempt to particularise multiculturalism as a specifically Australian form of liberal democratic citizenship engaged with a kind of "new nationalism" that was coded in a cultural hierarchy.[63]

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[59] Ibid., 9.
[60] NMAC, *Towards Inclusiveness*, 15.
[61] NMAC, *The Way Forward*, 9.
[62] James Curran, *The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2006), 238.
[63] Jayasuriya, "Australian Multiculturalism Past, Present, and Future," 7.

iii.

Although scholars have variously noted the changing emphases in these documents on civic values, cultural privilege and nationalist sentiment, this shift is most often explained as a result of the nationalist tendencies of Howard himself, who used populism and the strategy of mainstreaming to advance his particular vision.[64] This kind of analysis is incomplete because it fails to articulate the relationship between difference and liberalism which was at play in the discourse of 'new nationalism' espoused by the Howard government. This is particularly important to understanding the operation of *neo*liberalism within this discourse, since it gained much of its legitimacy from its relationship to the liberal tradition. According to Judith Brett, this concern with difference is symptomatic of Howard's staunch liberal individualist politics, and is the reason she calls for Howard's claim that he is not racist to be taken seriously.[65] What Brett wishes to stress here is that Howard's position on such matters as multiculturalism, immigration and Aboriginal affairs was consistent with his broader position on all group claims; namely, that as special interests, they were inherently divisive and posed a political threat to individual negative freedom.[66] Against this threat, Howard cast himself as the defender of the mainstream, posing a populist divide between 'the elites' and 'the people' where he – unaccountably – was positioned amongst the latter: witness his definition of the Liberal tradition as "a political movement owned by no special interests, defending no special privileges and accountable only to the Australian people".[67] It was this contradiction between the government's claim to represent 'the people' and its commitment to neoliberal rationalities in policy-making which was exploited by Hansonism and allowed it to gain such purchase. Howard's discourse of liberalism is thus central to understanding how this contradiction was eventually reconciled.

In particular, the relationship between (neo)liberalism and difference was enacted in the deployment of populism, which takes as its premise "that virtue resides in the ordinary people" and thus legitimates the demands made by 'the people' in terms of the representative principles of democracy.[68] Howard and Hanson both spoke the language of populism, but

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[64] Markus, *Race*.; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*.; Stratton, *Uncertain Lives*.; Holland, "Australian Citizenship."; Fozdar and Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test."; Jakubowicz, "White Noise."

[65] Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*, 194.

[66] A view long held in the Liberal political tradition, but legitimised in this period through a new vocabulary.

[67] John Howard, "The Liberal Tradition: The Beliefs and Values Which Guide the Federal Government," 18 November, 1996, Sir Robert Menzies Lecture.

[68] Rae Wear, "Permanent Populism: The Howard Government 1996–2007," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (2008): 619.

where Hanson staked her claim to being on the side of 'the people' through her anti-establishment credentials, Howard instead tied his liberalist defence of small government to the logic of 'market populism', which holds that "[m]arket activity is the purest form of democratic choice, and the market itself is the only system through which people can make choices without interference from 'social engineers'".[69] In this way, not only was the liberal tradition of limited government tied to the neoliberal rationale of benevolent markets, but this rationale itself, in its championing of the independent individual, became the standard for democratic governance. As Howard claimed: "people want governments not out of their lives but off their backs... the role of modern government is evolving so that it facilitates competitiveness and choice."[70] Going one step further than simply being a voice of the people, Howard presented his government as democratically legitimate in its safeguarding of (a neoliberal conception of) liberal freedom:

> We believe, as we always have, that 'the only real freedom is a brave acceptance of unclouded individual responsibility.' And in making policy since we took office, that encouragement of self-reliance, of giving people choice... has been at the forefront of our efforts.[71]

It was this convergence between populism and neoliberalism that legitimated the government's increased insistence on minimal state intervention. This political position had less clout a decade earlier, when the Liberal Party's policy agenda *Fightback!* proved a failure at election and cost its primary architect, economist John Hewson, party leadership. The proposals in *Fightback!* were exemplary of neoliberal economic policy, advocating for decreased government spending and greater privatisation of services, but without a reconfiguration of limited government as a boon for the people, the agenda was roundly derided as out of touch.[72] The Howard government's 1996 election campaign successfully delegitimised Paul Keating in the same manner. The mobilisation of populism by the Howard government was thus well underway by the time Hansonism emerged. This legitimation of the minimalist state as a defence of the mainstream also accounts for the revival of formal over substantive equality, which had long held a privileged position in Australian conceptions of liberalism; the notion of the 'fair go', for instance, has been linked to the longstanding

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[69] Sawer and Laycock, "Down with Elites and up with Inequality," 135.

[70] John Howard, "Address to the World Economic Forum Dinner," 16 March 1998, Press Office of the Prime Minister.

[71] "A Century of Nationhood," 22 November 2000, Melbourne Press Club Address.

[72] James Walter, *Tunnel Vision: The Failure of Political Imagination* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 70-74; Kelly, *The End of Certainty*, 614; Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*, 180-81.

tradition of state interference for the improvement of social conditions in order to ensure the advancement of the individual.[73] It was reconfigured, however, into an affirmation of equal treatment – what Behrendt terms "difference-blind liberalism" – ostensibly to unshackle the entrepreneurial spirit.[74] As Hanson declared, "I am the voice of mainstream Australia… All they want is to be treated like everybody else".[75] This formal concept of equality, while harking back to classical concepts of liberalism, gained its legitimacy through the new discourse of neoliberalism and its insistence on the neutrality of the market as a positive condition for individual development, the ground on which it staked its claim to populist credentials. By the same token, this conception of equality reconfigured difference as 'special interests' and the minimalisation of state intervention as democratic.

Engaging in populism also necessarily requires the inscription of a homogenous group identity, homogenous because, in Ernesto Laclau's terms, "[i]n order to have the 'people' of populism... we need a *plebs* who claims to be the only legitimate *populus* – that is, a partiality that wants to function as the totality of the community".[76] Laclau's conception of populism is useful for understanding the ways in which it is a particular engagement with difference. In particular, Laclau contends that the institutional failure to meet differing demands results in the coalescing of these demands along the fault lines of already-existing social relations. The absorption of these heterogeneous demands into a unitary, universalised one provides the representational means by which collective political subjectivities are formed. Laclau terms these representations 'empty signifiers', suggesting that particular demands always desire to inhabit a universal position despite the impossibility of this ever being achieved.[77] In the operation of populism, then, (and indeed the political generally, according to Laclau) there is an inherent instability to the claim of universality which legitimates populist demands. In eliding this instability, populist demands are naturalised; that is, they are constructed as arising from organically derived and universally accepted principles, evident in the

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[73] Sawer and Laycock, "Down with Elites and up with Inequality."; Ian Tregenza, "From Virtues to Values: Conceptions of Australian Citizenship," in *From Migrant to Citizen : Testing Language, Testing Culture*, ed. Christina Slade and Martina Mollering (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Nick Dyrenfurth, "John Howard's Hegemony of Values: The Politics of 'Mateship' in the Howard Decade," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 2 (2007).
[74] Larissa Behrendt, *Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia's Future* (Sydney, NSW: Federation Press, 2003); Dyrenfurth, "John Howard's Hegemony of Values: The Politics of 'Mateship' in the Howard Decade." Johnson, *Governing Change*, 105.
[75] Quoted in Stokes, "One Nation and Australian Populism," 32.
[76] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London ; New York: Verso, 2005), 81.
[77] Ibid., 71.

deployment of 'mainstream Australia'.[78] Hanson made this clear in claiming representation for this group: "My view is based on common sense, and my experience as a mother of four children, as a sole parent, and as a businesswoman running a fish-and-chip shop".[79] It is for this reason that populist movements emphasise consensus and are, conversely, incapable of admitting difference; this difference can only ever be a threat to their legitimacy and must therefore be excluded, specifically through a denial of the right to claim political representation. Howard reflected this in his configuration of Keating's national strategy as a "crudely self-serving" politics of division: "National identity is, and must remain, in a realm above the partisan fray because it enshrines the virtues which unite us, and give us cohesion… We can't afford the politics of division and should not tolerate them".[80] It is in this way that political recognition of difference became an illegitimate state action, as touted by the Coalition and One Nation, because such action was unrepresentative of the legitimate body politic.

The discourse of 'the mainstream' and its engendering of a 'new nationalism' was thus ultimately concerned with the regulation of competing political demands and the consequent exclusion of particular voices under the guise of democracy. This exclusion was justified through the reconfiguration of equality in (neo)liberal terms as homogeneous treatment, while the political demands of difference were concomitantly deemed 'special interests'. Together with the discourse of populism, state intervention that recognised difference was reconstructed as undemocratic while the legitimacy of claims for political representation were restricted to those who were inherently identified with a homogenised Australian nation.

3. A Test of Australianness

i.

The later years of the Howard government were marked by several significant events – the 9/11 attacks, the *Tampa* crisis which preceded the Howard government's re-election in 2001, the Bali and London suicide bombings and the Cronulla riots of 2005. Most critics identify these moments as catalysts for the growing preoccupation with national identity and the

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[78] Wear, "Permanent Populism," 620; Carol Johnson, "John Howard's 'Values' and Australian Identity," ibid.42, no. 2 (2007): 196; Schech and Haggis, "Migrancy, Multiculturalism and Whiteness," 146; Dyrenfurth, "Battlers, Refugees and the Republic," 187.
[79] "First Speech."
[80] "A Reflection on the National Identity Debate," 13 December 1995, 1995 Headland Speech.

integrity of Australian borders which characterised the politics of the decade.[81] However, such analysis tends to obscure the continuity in the Howard government's political logic which, if it is acknowledged, is generally attributed to the personal political agenda of Howard himself.[82] John Tate suggests, for instance, that the 2007 Citizenship Test was Howard's "boldest policy attempt to give expression to the ideas and values on Australian nationhood that he had consistently held to since he first expressed them over eighteen years before", while Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles describe it as "Howard's particular nationalist project".[83] It is instead more productive to consider these historical moments as establishing the conditions of possibility whereby certain ideas regarding national identity already in circulation achieved greater significance, as well as legitimacy, in this period. In particular, several critics note the growing preponderance of the discourse of 'values' which, although still emerging in the *New Agenda*, acquired a new weight in the government's later years.[84] The issue of cultural values has always underlined the government's rationality for reconciling difference with national identity; both Hawke and Howard sought to negotiate this in their multicultural policies by appealing to the universality of liberal democratic principles as a uniting, culturally neutral framework. With the advent of the 'war on terror', however, the popular narrative of Islam against the West brought increased visibility to this framework and its particular embeddedness in Western culture. This allowed for a much more explicit assertion of the cultural hierarchy underlying earlier iterations of multiculturalism, which was expressed in terms of Australian values. This discourse of values was first overtly signalled in the 'values debate' of 2004, a response to the government's suggestion that schools were too "values-neutral", which eventually lead to the implementation of *The National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* as well as a new condition of funding requiring

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[81] Ho, "From Social Justice to Social Cohesion."; Jock Collins, "The Landmark of Cronulla," in *Social Cohesion in Australia*, ed. James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen, and Emma Dawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Hurriyet Babacan, "Has Multiculturalism Failed Us? Rethinking Multicultural Policies in Post-Cronulla Australia," 2006, National Symposium 'Responding to Cronulla: Rethinking Multiculturalism' (Nathan, Griffith: Multi-Faith Centre, Griffith University); Koleth, "Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas."; Augie Fleras, *The Politics of Multiculturalism.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[82] Fozdar and Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test."; Markus, *Race*; Tate, "John Howard's "Nation"."; Anthony Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building in Australia : Inclusive National Identity and the Embrace of Diversity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 12 (2011); Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, "The New Integrationism, the State and Islamophobia: Retreat from Multiculturalism in Australia," *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 36, no. 4 (2008).

[83] Tate, "John Howard's "Nation"," 120; Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test: Process and Rhetoric," ibid., no. 4: 512.

[84] Holland, "Australian Citizenship."; Johnson, "John Howard's 'Values'."; Dyrenfurth, "Battlers, Refugees and the Republic."; Anna Halafoff, "Unaustralian Values," *Cultural Studies Association of Australasia annual ...* (2006); Tregenza, "From Virtues to Values."

schools to more prominently display Australian symbols.[85] Soon after, and in the wake of the London bombings, Howard claimed that immigrants had "an obligation to... unconditionally embrace and imbibe the attitudes of this society" and that failure to do so would legitimate a revocation of their citizenship.[86] The Cronulla riots provided a new opportunity to reinforce this language of values; reflecting on the violence in his Australia Day address, Howard declared:

> Racial intolerance is incompatible with the kind of society we are and want to be. Within limits, all Australians have the right to express their culture and beliefs and to participate freely in our national life. And all Australians have a civic responsibility to support the basic structures and values of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality.[87]

In the same speech he also noted that "people come to this country because they want to be Australians. The irony is that no institution or code lays down a test of Australianness. Such is the nature of our free society".[88] Eight months later, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs would release a discussion paper calling for views on the proposed introduction of a citizenship test.

ii.

The development and implementation of the 2007 Citizenship Test was notoriously sudden and secretive, a fact which is emphasised by the government's refusal to make the test questions publicly available.[89] For this reason, the only official policy documents available for analysis are the discussion paper, *Australian Citizenship: Much more than a ceremony* (2006), and the resource booklet, *Becoming an Australian Citizen* (2007).[90] For a more substantial analysis, several speeches delivered in 2006 around the time of the test's proposal will also be considered, including Howard's Australia Day Address, mentioned above, and two talks delivered by Andrew Robb, Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister of Multicultural Affairs. These speeches were selected because they each contributed directly to the wider justification

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[85] Halafoff, "Unaustralian Values."
[86] John Howard, interview with Barrie Cassidy, *The Insiders*, ABC, 2005
[87] "Address to the National Press Club," 25 January 2006, Parliament House.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Emily Farrell, "'Do I Feel Australian? No You Tell Me': Debating the Itroduction of the Australian Formal Citizenship Test," in *From Migrant to Citizen : Testing Language, Testing Culture*, ed. Christina Slade and Martina Mollering (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 177; Fozdar and Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test," 503.
[90] There is also the *Summary Report on the Outcomes of the Public Consultation on the Merits of Introducing a Formal Citizenship Test*, a response to the discussion paper, but it is not discussed here due to its brevity. For an overview of its findings, see "The Australian Citizenship Test."

offered by the government for the necessity of the test. These documents engaged the discourse of values in framing the test as a means of assisting new citizens to participate, where participation was dependent on the *private* adoption of values as well as the more usual public duties enacted in civil society. This discourse reproduced a cultural hierarchy which located these values inherently in those of British ancestry – echoing the '99 *New Agenda* – and in turn placed the responsibility of national cohesion on the migrant subject. In this way, the guarantee of liberal democratic freedoms was vested not in the state but the virtuous citizenry and their private relationship to the nation, a configuration which particularly implicated the migrant and justified the regulation of their 'commitment' to national values.

The Howard government's defence of a citizenship test was always centred on the claim that it would aid migrants to more fully participate in Australian life; however, the form that this participation might take, and the means by which the test would assist this, was never clearly established, with the exception of the least controversial proposition that English language skills would increase employment prospects. When the Citizenship Test was first proposed, Andrew Robb characterised it as

> providing aspiring citizens with more incentive to learn English, understand our way of life and the commitment they are required to make to become Australian citizens. Encouraging people to obtain these skills will help migrants maximise their ability to get a job and participate in the economy as fully as possible.[91]

In the discussion paper, this understanding was problematised as conditional for *social* participation:

> A key question is whether it is possible for a prospective citizen to make the commitment to Australia contained in the Pledge — and to fully participate in Australian society as a citizen — without first having knowledge of Australia, our democratic beliefs and our way of life?[92]

Finally, the resource booklet articulated the relationship between knowledge and participation through reference to 'social links':

> An understanding of the Australian way of life... will better equip migrant and refugee settlers to build new social links and make a meaningful commitment to Australia. New citizens should be in

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[91] Andrew Robb, "The Importance of a Shared National Identity," November 27 2006, Address to the Transformations Conference (Australian National University, Canberra).
[92] Australian Government, *Australian Citizenship: Much More Than a Ceremony* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2006), 9.

a position to make informed choices and participate as active, empowered members of the Australian community.[93]

It added that this understanding "is also important from a broader perspective as it will support social cohesion and successful integration into the community".[94] These statements made clear use of the notion of cultural capital in their linkage of individual cultural competency, the ability to form cooperative networks and the resulting production of social cohesion. Furthermore, migrants *specifically* were charged with the responsibility for acquiring this capital (since Australian citizens were by definition inherently endowed with it) and were therefore responsible for social cohesion, with the corollary that social divisions too were a result of their failings.

This framing of successful participation as reliant upon the acquisition of cultural capital – whether termed skills, understanding or knowledge – implied neutrality of access through its language of market exchange; this was effectively undercut by the discourse of values, which reinforced a cultural hierarchy legitimated by the linkage of Australian culture with the conditions for social harmony. This was most evident in the continued emphasis on the need for migrants to be integrated; this constructed migrants as cultural Others and, as a corollary, implied that they lacked the kind of values which were inherent to Australians and which were integral to the safeguarding of national cohesion. As Andrew Robb suggested:

> [N]ew and emerging communities, who increasingly come from cultures far different to our Australian culture, are effectively being told that they have no obligation to do their best to become 'Australian'. Advocating the equality of cultures, or a community of separate cultures, fosters a rights mentality, rather than a responsibilities mentality. It is divisive. It works against quick and effective integration.[95]

Here, the maintenance of other cultures was presented as a threat because they were necessarily 'divisive', suggesting that these cultures were incompatible with Australia's own. More visibly than its predecessors, this discourse articulated a private, static notion of culture as the container of essential values – where Western culture was uniquely endowed with the values of liberalism and democracy – and thereby created a necessarily antagonistic relationship to cultural difference. Howard made this oppositional stance clear:

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[93] *Becoming an Australian Citizen* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2007), 11-12.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Robb, "Shared National Identity."

> We know what our enemies think and what they are capable of. They hate our freedoms and our way of life. They despise our democratic values. They have nothing but contempt for a diverse society which practises tolerance and respect.[96]

In this Othering of non-Western cultures and their construction as inherently oppositional to an Australian one, cohesion was possible only through the insistence on a shared identity of 'core values' which, in their close identification with Western culture, necessarily enforced a cultural hierarchy. This is most evident in the framing of the institutions of liberal democracy as the "values of British political culture" and of "British political heritage".[97] In this way, these values became more explicitly than ever a shorthand for Western, and therefore Australian, culture. The discourse of values was thus a more visible expression of the cultural assumptions at play in migrant policy many years earlier.

In the reinforcement of a cultural hierarchy, this discourse created a division between those who were inherently committed to Australian cultural values and those who were not, and whose commitment was therefore always in doubt. The Citizenship Test, along with a proposed Pledge of Commitment, was positioned as a solution to this risk through its restriction of citizenship access to those who successfully demonstrated their attachment to the nation. The resource booklet made this explicit when it contended that "[m]odern citizenship also rests on sentiments of nationhood and enduring attachment to what Australians hold in common".[98] It was on this affective level that liberal freedoms could be secured, and social cohesion consequently became the result of individual emotional compliance.[99] There was thus a conflation between public acts and private values, which is evidenced by the constant slippage between the two; for instance, in the assertion that "all Australians have a civic responsibility to support the basic structures and values of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality". It was for this reason that the rhetoric of the 'national family' was frequently utilised, both to articulate the private nature of the citizen's relation to nation, and the responsibility this relationship entailed to a collective (though united, homogenous and therefore non-conflictual) need. This engagement with affect is evident in Howard's address:

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[96] Howard, "Address to the National Press Club."
[97] Ibid.
[98] *Becoming an Australian Citizen*, 1.
[99] Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City*, 56.

> It would however be a crushing mistake to downplay the hopes and the expectations of our national family. We expect all who come here to make an overriding commitment to Australia, its laws and its democratic values... And we expect each unique individual who joins our national journey to enrich it with their loyalty and their patriotism.[100]

Furthermore, this private dimension had a public function:

> This sense of shared values is the glue that binds our nation together. It involves the maintenance of a shared national identity... A shared identity is not about imposing uniformity. It is about a strong identification with a set of core values.[101]

Once more, values were presented as things to feel 'strong identification' with on a private level, in order to serve a public good, with the implication that failure to do so was a public transgression: "A sense of shared values is our social cement. Without it we risk becoming a society governed by coercion rather than consent".[102] This, ultimately, was the proposition of the discourse of values: liberal freedoms were guaranteed not by an interventionist state but by the affective dimensions of the polity. The Citizenship Test was positioned as a defence of these freedoms through its proposed regulation of this private dimension.

iii.

The notion of virtuous citizens securing the public benefit is not a new one and indeed, according to Brett, has always been a cornerstone of Australian Liberal political thought.[103] However, this earlier form of the virtuous citizen was conceptualised in terms of individual moral duties towards others within a community. Its reappearance during the Howard years constituted a similar moralisation of citizenship seeking to emphasise individual obligations over rights, but it was distinct for its vertical conceptualisation of such obligations as flowing from the individual to the state rather than horizontally between members of a community, reflecting the neoliberal construction of individual virtue in terms of independence from state aid.[104] It is for this reason that in its more recent iteration, individual obligations were directed specifically towards the nation, as defined through private attachment to national 'core values'. This renewed emphasis on private values is generally attributed to a rise in

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[100] Howard, "Address to the National Press Club."
[101] Robb, "Shared National Identity."
[102] Howard, "Address to the National Press Club."; Rose
[103] Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*. See also, Irving, *To Constitute a Nation*; Tregenza, "From Virtues to Values."
[104] Put more plainly, this discourse was only a newer manifestation of an old political tradition. See Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*; Tregenza, "From Virtues to Values."

nationalism during this period, the result of either a top-down enforcement of Howard's personal proclivities, a bottom-up expression of insecurity generated by terrorism and economic instability, or a combination of both.[105] Reversing the order of analysis, I propose instead that examining the rise of this private 'values' discourse might reveal something about the configuration of nationalism in this period. In particular, this values discourse formed part of a liberal governmentality that suggested the capacity for freedom must be learned, and was also implicated in a cultural hierarchy that created a dichotomy between a uniquely liberal Western culture and its illiberal Others. As a result, the call for integration into a 'core' national culture became depoliticised as the only means by which national cohesion could be achieved, and migrants specifically became responsible for ensuring that this cohesion occurred.

The depiction of the Citizenship Test as a tool for familiarising migrants with Australian values and thereby facilitating social cohesion reveals two interrelated tenets of liberal governmentality: firstly, that social cohesion is a result of the *correct* exercising of freedom by individuals and secondly, that this proper exercise of freedom is a learned activity. Social cohesion can in this sense be read as a successful outcome of the government of free individuals. Hindess notes that this is precisely the grounds on which citizenship is based, and accordingly, the grounds on which it can act exclusively:

> [L]iberal thought sees autonomy as involving roughly the capacities of rationality and moral responsibility invoked by citizenship programs in Western societies. Consequently, human sociality is understood as a matter of relations between individuals capable of possessing those capacities. Peoples who live their lives in ways that promote and depend on other capacities are seen not only as different but also, in certain respects, as deficient.[106]

It is only through the adoption of particular values that individuals can be said to be capable of the kind of self-governing that ensures the functioning of a 'free' society in the liberalist terms of minimal state interference. It is this characteristic of liberalism which allows for the legitimation of exclusive practices, not in despite of, but due to, a particular conception of

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[105] Ho, "From Social Justice to Social Cohesion."; Collins, "The Landmark of Cronulla."; Koleth, "Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas."; Fleras, *The Politics of Multiculturalism.* ; Fozdar and Spittles, "The Australian Citizenship Test."; Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building."; Tate, "John Howard's "Nation"."; Jupp, Nieuwenhuysen and Dawson, *Social Cohesion in Australia*; Halafoff, "Unaustralian Values."; Wear, "Permanent Populism."; Castles and Vasta, "New Conflicts around Old Dilemmas."
[106] "Not at Home in the Empire," *Social Identities* 7, no. 3 (2001): 369.

individual and collective freedom. The 'deficiency' of other ways of life is evident, for instance, in Peter Costello's equation of sharia law and rejection of a 'democratic compact' as necessarily illiberal:

> We have a compact to live under a democratic legislature and obey the laws it makes. In doing this the rights and liberties of all are protected. Those who are outside this compact threaten the rights and liberties of others… And the citizenship pledge should be a big flashing warning sign to those who want to live under sharia law. A person who does not acknowledge the supremacy of civil law laid down by democratic processes cannot truthfully take the pledge of allegiance.[107]

This is what Hindess defines as the Janus-faced nature of liberalism, where one face

> expresses the familiar liberal claim that government should rule over, and as far as possible rule through, the activities of free individuals. The other, less benign face reflects the equally liberal view that substantial portions of humanity consist of individuals who are not at present capable of acting in a suitably autonomous fashion.[108]

This discourse was reproduced by the positioning of the Citizenship Test as a tool both for assessing the capacity of potential migrants to become suitably autonomous (that is, self-governing) and for providing them with the knowledge through which this could eventually be achieved.

This construction of freedom as a learned capacity has a particular implication where it intersected with the static conception of culture being espoused in migrant policy, not only in this period, but also within the earlier discourses of diversity and 'Australian multiculturalism'. This notion of culture has been characterised as an anthropological conceptualisation, derived from its early practice, in which

> the study of small societies with relatively well-defined cultural borders and only a small degree of internal differentiation... appear as the very image of cultural homogeneity, cultural coherence and cultural continuity.[109]

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[107] "Worth Promoting, Worth Defending: Australian Citizenship, What It Means and How to Nurture It," 23 February 2006, Address to the Sydney Institute.

[108] Hindess, "Not at Home in the Empire," 365-66. See also Mitchell Dean, "Liberal Government and Authoritarianism," *Economy and Society* 31, no. 1 (2002); Dean and Hindess, "Introduction: Government, Liberalism, Society."

[109] Hans-Rudolf Wicker, "From Complex Culture to Cultural Complexity," in *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*, ed. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (London ; New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), 32; Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*, 6; Stratton, *Race Daze*, 63; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*, 123; Jakubowicz, "State and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as Ideology," 4.

This stands in distinction to understandings of culture as a contingent and negotiated process, in which "communicative interaction operates selectively, filtered through the structures of society" and as a result, "shared emanating systems of signification... are not historical views but are created and sustained by what happens between people".[110] Instead, the static view of culture essentialises difference and, more specifically, *naturalises* it in its implication in what has been termed 'neo-' or 'culturalist' racism. This neo-racism too conceives culture

> along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid, changing, unstable, and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than a relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social, historical relationships. When culture is brought into contact with race it is transformed into a pseudobiological property of communal life.[111]

This new kind of racism resignifies race, which has become discredited in modern times as an acceptable category of difference, from a biological cause of inferiority to a sign of cultural identity, which is itself naturalised as a biologically driven process of communal affinity.[112]

Individual identification with and commitment to a culture is in these terms a natural and inflexible response to living within a particular community and, as a corollary, confrontation with cultural difference necessarily produces conflict. This conceptualisation of difference naturalises political conflict in its implication that such antagonism is an inevitable result of the "insurmountability of cultural differences",[113] a theory most famously articulated in Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis.[114] This view is not a new one in Australia: it was made by Blainey in his critique of Asian immigration, and again by Hanson to the same purpose.[115] Hanson warned, for instance, against "being swamped by Asians", reflecting a reductive understanding of 'Asian' culture which was characterised as utterly incompatible with Australia's own.[116] It is also evident more recently in Howard's response to the 'children

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[110] Jayasuriya, *Immigration and Multiculturalism*, 8-9.

[111] Paul Gilroy, "One Nation under a Groove: The Cultural Politics of 'Race' and Racism in Britain," in *Anatomy of Racism*, ed. Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 266.

[112] Etienne Balibar, "Is There a Neo-Racism?," in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 18; Gilroy, "One Nation under a Groove."; Martin Barker, *The New Racism* (London: Routledge, 1981); Stratton, *Race Daze*, 63.

[113] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Racism, Desire, and the Politics of Immigration," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 28, no. 3 (1999): 588.

[114] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 180; J. Melamed, "The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism," *Social Text* 24, no. 4 89 (2006).

[115] Stratton, *Race Daze*, 32; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*, 135; Ang and Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis."; Moran, "Multiculturalism as Nation-Building."

[116] Hanson, "First Speech," 3859.

overboard' affair, in which he claimed: "The behaviour of a number of these people, particularly those involved in throwing their children overboard… I certainly don't want people of that type in Australia".[117] This so-called 'culturalisation' of politics necessarily naturalises difference (by suggesting 'types' of people), depoliticises conflict and concomitantly makes a virtue of integration as the only means by which social cohesion can be achieved. It is this imperative for cultural integration that intersected with the liberal imperative for 'teaching' individuals how to be free within the policy documents; the association of liberalism to Western – and thereby Australian – culture suggested a direct relationship between the guarantee of liberal freedoms and those 'core' Australian values with which native-born Australians were naturally endowed. Australian culture was thereby privileged as necessary for the securing of freedom and national cohesion, and the imposition of its values was in turn depoliticised. Integration became an objective necessity for the functioning of the nation and was now a process defined in terms of private values rather than public acts since, in liberalism's terms, the former begets the latter. The implementation of the Citizenship Test both claimed to ensure only those with the capacity to adopt these values were permitted to enter, as well as charging those identified as capable with the responsibility of securing social cohesion by becoming virtuous citizens, which entailed commitment and moral obligation to the *nation* specifically.

The innovation of the Howard government's articulation of nationalism was thus in yoking it to the neoliberal technology of responsibilisation, targeting migrants as responsible for ensuring national cohesion and thereby justifying a citizenship test – exclusive by definition – on the grounds of its capacity to foster inclusion. The hierarchisation of culture became more explicit during this period with the linkage of liberalism and the capacity for self-government to Western culture. This culture was now located in the private domain as a set of values that determined public conduct, thereby reaffirming a neo-racism that essentialised cultural identity and naturalised conflict between the liberal West and its illiberal Others. In this way, migrants were specifically targeted for regulation, as their private values (and thus public affiliations) became the site on which national cohesion could be secured.

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[117] John Howard, interview with Mark Willacy, *PM*, ABC, 9 October 2001

III. Discussion

I have focused thus far on the staging ground first prepared by liberalism and subsequently co-opted by neoliberalism – whose legitimation was largely based on the rationality of its forebear – because it is along the fault lines of liberalism and difference that I believe the policy documents 'go to work'. It would not be surprising to claim that citizenship in Australia has always functioned as a tool of exclusion and indeed, most discussions of Australian citizenship seek to trace *who* has historically been excluded and *why*, that is, on what justificatory grounds.[1] There has, however, been very little exploration into *how* this exclusion is effected, which is only an obvious question when citizenship is understood as a *conferral* – of rights, of status, of membership. In that case, exclusion is simply a matter of denial. It is for this reason that many accounts of Australian citizenship, particularly those engaging with neoliberalism's effects, can only attribute its increasingly exclusionary nature to economic discrimination which is either driven by, or itself drives, racial inequality.[2] Exclusion is largely figured in this scholarship as a refusal of "legislated belonging" and inclusion is also, therefore, defined in the restricted terms of formal or juridical recognition.[3] Engaging with citizenship in this way does not allow for an articulation of the very real exclusionary effects that are still able to be produced within this 'inclusive' rubric. The most telling instance of this is the fact that, since the dismantling of the White Australia Policy and the implementation of the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act almost a decade later, the Australian government has consistently espoused an anti-discriminatory position, a position that is clearly asserted in the policy documents under analysis. Any study of exclusion needs to consider the conditions of its enactment *even within* such formally inclusive frameworks.

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[1] Chesterman and Galligan, *Defining Australian Citizenship*; Stratton, *Uncertain Lives*; Irving, *To Constitute a Nation*; Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Walter and MacLeod, *The Citizens' Bargain*; Dutton, *One of Us*; Castles et al., *Mistaken Identity*; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*; Cope and Kalantzis, *A Place in the Sun*; Crock and Saul, *Future Seekers*; Rubenstein, "Citizenship in Australia."; Jordens, *Redefining Australians*.

[2] Stratton, *Uncertain Lives*; Walsh, "The Marketization of Multiculturalism: Neoliberal Restructuring and Cultural Difference in Australia."; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*; Mike Silvaris, "Political Citizenship," in *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, ed. Wayne Hudson and John Kane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[3] Gunew, *Haunted Nations*, 22.

While other histories of Australian discrimination attend to this contradiction,[4] citizenship histories specifically often fail to do so, I would suggest because of the limitations presented by understandings of citizenship as state-sanctioned inclusion, where state power is constituted solely through political or legal action. What might be revealed about the operation of exclusion in Australia if citizenship policies were instead considered in terms of their cultural effects? Reorienting a conception of state power away from strictly realist notions of domination allows for a different understanding of policy-making, offering a more nuanced conception of citizenship as a state tool of inclusion and exclusion. In this I echo Ong's criticism of the scholarship's focus on citizenship as a juridico-political institution, to the detriment of its cultural dimensions. Ong proposes that citizenship can also be considered "a cultural process of 'subject-ification', in the Foucauldian sense of self-making and being-made by power relations".[5] The aim of this thesis, examining how governments imagine their citizens, is a similar attempt to resignify the state-citizen relationship in its consideration of the cultural implications that follow state articulations of citizenship. This approach allows for an engagement with the question of "how the universalistic criteria of democratic citizenship variously regulate different categories of subjects",[6] a distinction that is elided in strictly formal conceptions of inclusion which merely *assume* the capacity of liberal democratic citizenship to be universally inclusive.

It is precisely this assumption of the universality of liberalism which scholars have objected to, both in their analyses of multiculturalism and political formations more generally; specifically, the universal subject at the heart of liberal theory has been established as gendered, raced, sexualised and, in a word, exclusive.[7] In the veiling of liberalism's

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[4] This is especially true of scholarship regarding Indigenous sovereignty. See, e.g., a Moreton-Robinson, "Towards a New Research Agenda?: Foucault, Whiteness and Indigenous Sovereignty," *Journal of Sociology* 42, no. 4 (2006); Behrendt, *Achieving Social Justice*; Ann Curthoys, "Liberalism and Exclusionism: A Prehistory of the White Australia Policy," in *Legacies of White Australia. Race Culture and Nation.*, ed. Laksiri Jayasuriya, David Walker, and Jan Gothard (Perth, WA: University of WA Press, 2003); Kowal, "The Politics of the Gap."; Elizabeth A Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

[5] Aihwa Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States," *Current Anthropology* 37, no. 5 (1996): 737.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*; Pateman, *The Disorder of Women*; Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*; Phillips, *Democracy and Difference*; Benhabib, *Situating the Self*; Charles W. Mills, "Racial Liberalism," *Modern Language Association of America* 123, no. 5 (2008); David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics*. Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, *Contract and Domination* (Malden: Polity, 2007); Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion."; Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*; Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

particularity can be seen a specific relationship to the institution of democratic citizenship, what is often termed the 'democratic paradox', or the tension between the democratic and liberal traditions within constitutional democracy.[8] This tension stems from the contradictory logic of democracy, which locates political legitimacy in the will of the people and thus substantiates majority rule, and of liberalism, which claims to protect individual rights against collective pressures. Multiculturalism can be seen as a response to the intensification of this tension with the growing diversity of nation-states and the consequent pluralisation of political demands.[9] In Australia, this was driven by the economic imperative for immigration and the gradually broadened definition of acceptable source countries.[10] Yet the kind of multiculturalism being espoused by the policy documents simply offers to unite the political community under the banner of liberalism, reaffirming liberalism's claim to cultural neutrality through the privatisation of difference. This multiculturalism therefore reiterates the hegemony of liberalism, where hegemony "is nothing more than the investment, in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us because it is purely mythical".[11] It is this 'mythical fullness' which liberalism presents as its unique achievement. It is a political rationality which stakes its legitimacy on its apparent universality and by extension its ability to totalise a fragmented body politic. It is within this regime of truth that liberalism comes to be the only viable solution to the 'problem' of difference, or more accurately, that it first *constructs* and then *perpetuates* difference as a problem.[12]

The configuration of cultural identity and cultural difference is thus integral to liberalism's operation. Liberalism has always been premised on the evacuation of the social and cultural

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[8] Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*; David Beetham, "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization," *Political Studies* 40 (1992); Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," ibid.47, no. 1 (1999).

[9] Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging*; Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul, "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (2008); Eleonore Kofman, "Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity," *Citizenship Studies* 9, no. 5 (2005); Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*; Modood, *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea*; Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*; Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition."

[10] In 1947, 9.8% of the Australian population was born overseas, with migrants from the UK and Ireland constituting 72.2% of this group. By 1986 (13 years after the dismantling of the White Australia policy and 9 years after the implementation of a distinct refugee policy), 20.8% of the population was overseas born, with those from the UK and Ireland constituting only 34.7% of this group. In terms of *new* migrants (arriving within the last five years), those from the UK and Ireland comprised 19.3%, while those from South East Asia comprised 21.4% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing, 30 June 1986*, cat. no. 2501.0 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986), 5.)

[11] Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 116.

[12] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 96, 186.

from the political sphere as a condition of its own efficacy. That is, liberalism as a politics has always claimed to guarantee freedom specifically because it is acultural.[13] It is for this reason that both the Hawke and Howard governments were able to insist on the adoption of Western cultural values by migrants while simultaneously asserting this was not an infringement of their individual right to cultural identity; liberalism is capable of 'respecting' cultural difference.[14] In these terms, the 'framework' under which Australian citizens were to live was culturally neutral, since the liberal principles that constituted it were the product of rational – and therefore objective – deliberation, and it was thus universally acceptable. It is in this apparent neutrality to culture and defence of rational choice that liberalism grounds its claim to universality, and the liberal values espoused by Western culture are thus configured not only as a choice but the only *rational* choice. The privileged position of rational deliberation in theories of liberal democracy is staked on this premise that individuals are able to think beyond the constraints of culture and to choose what they may believe, but it is only through a liberal political framework that this can be made possible.[15] (As a corollary, the belief in liberalism will necessarily be the choice made by the rational thinker and the rejection or absence of a liberal framework thus becomes proof of irrationality.[16]) By the same token, non-liberal cultures are necessarily prescriptive because, without liberalism as a safeguard, the traditions and norms of culture deprive individuals of the capacity to become rational thinkers and are therefore liable to corrupt political processes and thus curtail individual freedoms, which is perhaps most evident in Western anxieties over Islam and women's rights, exemplified by the increasing politicisation of the burqa in Australia, as elsewhere:

> Equality of women is one of the key values in our secular society and any culture that believes only women should be covered in such a repressive manner is not consistent with the Australian culture and values. Perhaps some of you will consider that burqa wearing should be a matter of personal choice, consistent with the freedoms our forefathers fought for. I disagree. New arrivals to this country should not come here to recreate the living environment they have just left. They should come here for a better life based on the freedoms and values that have built our great nation.[17]

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[13] Ibid., 21. Linda Alcoff, *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 21-22.

[14] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 172.

[15] Ibid., 152; Hindess, "Not at Home in the Empire."

[16] Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics*, 9; John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, "Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice: The Limits of Liberalism and the Pragmatics of Difference in the New South Africa," *American Ethnologist* 31, no. 2 (2004): 194-96; Alcoff, *Visible Identities*, 53-54.

[17] Cory Bernardi, "For Australia's Sake, We Need to Ban the Burqa," *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 6 2010.

Freedom here is only a particular product of secular Western society; individual choice in any other terms is not considered an act of freedom but remains a reiteration of cultural oppression. Liberalism has thus from the outset legitimised the claim that Western culture is uniquely free. This assumption lies at the heart of the increasingly overt linkage in state articulations of Australian national identity between liberal political principles and Australian culture, which culminated in their reconfiguration as cultural 'values'. Liberal rationality thus perpetuates a particular understanding of culture as static and homogenising and, as a result, demands the privatisation of cultural difference; collective claims on the basis of a shared cultural need cannot be tolerated. In this reductive conception of culture, difference is depoliticised and cultural affiliation in turn naturalised. In particular, it underlines the neo-racist assumption that antagonism towards cultural difference is a biological response and integration is necessary for the maintenance of social cohesion. In the case of Australian migrant policy, with the advent of neoliberalism and its delegitimisation of state intervention, this was manifested in both the populist discourse of 'the mainstream' and the increased targeting of migrants as a threat to social cohesion.

It is in thinking about how liberalism claims to be universal and the effects of this claim that Foucault's notion of governmentality becomes useful in *both* its senses, as a rationality of government and the governmental techniques of the 'conduct of conduct', which are techniques of subjectivation. Accordingly, the policy documents being analysed are not only worth studying because of the political rationalities that may be discerned within them, but also because they form a particular set of technologies which produce and regulate subjects through the construction of what I term an ideal (or normative) citizen. This understanding of the ideal citizen is predicated on Foucault's conception of power and the subject. Foucault's critique of the sovereign notion of power as a possession which is used to prescribe the limits to action – and which in turn presupposes a prior subject – leads to his reconceptualisation of power as a process of 'subjectivation':

> This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to

someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.[18]

Power is not a possession but a configuration of the relation between subjects, which Foucault terms a law or regime of truth. It is this understanding of power which produces the mutually constituted notions of governmentality as a political rationality (a regime of truth) and a process of subjectivation (of subject-making). The ideal citizen is conceived as an effect of the varying discourses being engaged in the policy documents and I offer it as a way of thinking about how these work together to produce particular subjects.

The case studies thus far have been interested in the ways that both the Hawke and Howard governments deal with difference. Whether through the discourses of 'diversity', 'the mainstream' or 'core values', these cases reveal a continuity in political rationality towards the question of difference – despite personal or party ideology – that has often been obscured in historical accounts due largely to the invisibility of liberalism. By rejecting liberalism's implicit claim of neutrality towards cultural difference, it becomes possible to chart its specific relation to difference and how this determines potential political responses. It is through this relation, therefore, that the particular responses of the Hawke and Howard governments, while not exhibiting narrative consistency, can nevertheless be understood as contributions to the same framework in which the ideal citizen comes into effect. This framework is co-constituted by several moves. The first involves the depoliticisation of national identity; to the extent that liberalism is invoked as a limiting framework, and this framework presented as culturally neutral, the 'core' of Australian national identity remains off the table of political contestation. This is supplemented by a concomitant reconstruction of national identity as natural, private and therefore doubly outside the scope of the political sphere. The next is an articulation of political freedoms as inherent to Western culture, while other cultures conversely are a threat to freedoms due to their imposition of collective beliefs onto individuals. Through this the necessity of demanding integration with a homogeneous Australian culture is legitimated, and the exclusion of particular voices justified. This exclusion is not a formal one, however; the state remains formally committed to anti-discrimination and inclusive citizenship. It is within this framework that the ideal citizen is able to differentially regulate the population in spite of these universalistic principles.

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[18] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 781.

The changing perception of the state's role is perhaps one of the starkest differences offered by a comparison of the Hawke and Howard governments. In particular, the place of the state in influencing the national character underwent a substantial upheaval, in large part due to the discourse of neoliberalism, a change that is most evident in the rearticulation of political collectives as 'special interest' groups. These collectives had operated on the premise that structural inequalities existed in society and required state intervention in order to be resolved. The Hawke government took this claim seriously, as apparent in its multicultural agenda.[19] By the time of Howard's election, however, such state intervention was being recast as social engineering, both illiberal and illegitimate, and this position was consistently espoused in the Howard government's migrant policies. Underlying this position was an assumption of cultural identity as something private and natural, an assumption that was at play in the claims to legitimacy made by populist notions of 'mainstream Australia', as well as the assertion of 'core values' necessary for social cohesion. This naturalisation and homogenisation of national identity has generally been characterised as the result of a growing nationalism; it is important to note, however, that Australia's national identity was never fully politicised – that is to say, fully open for contestation – because both governments, despite their differing positions regarding the state's role, insisted on liberalism as its limiting framework. Insofar as this framework was presented as culturally neutral and liberal values a result of rational calculation rather than political contestation, there remained a depoliticised and therefore unquestioned cultural core to the national identity, a circumstance which was only exacerbated by the spread of neoliberal rationality.

It was due to this particular configuration of the 'core' values of Australian national identity that both governments were able to insist on the necessity of their adoption by migrants in order to promote social cohesion, although the Hawke government aimed to facilitate this through redistributive justice, while the Howard government in its more neoliberal approach located this responsibility in the migrants themselves. Nevertheless, both identified the condition of social cohesion and national good in the take up of these liberal values, and this in turn was premised on the assumption that a liberal framework was able to guarantee individual freedom while retaining a respect for cultural difference (hence the lack of irony in prescribing a limit to cultural freedom). This assumption allowed for the characterisation of these values as universal, even as both governments identified them particularly with Western

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[19] This was in line with earlier Labor traditions premised on the benefit of state intervention.

culture. This was borne of a particular understanding of non-Western cultures as inherently illiberal and any resulting collective cultural affiliations as potential threats to liberal freedoms. It was for this reason that cultural difference was repeatedly stressed as a specifically *private* right, first articulated in Hawke's discourse of diversity, while the political mobilisation of cultural collectives was attacked as political corruption, most overtly in Howard's rhetoric of the mainstream. By contrast, Western culture, in its valorisation of the self-governing, autonomous individual, was constructed as inherently liberal and thus uniquely tolerant to difference. The safeguarding of individual freedoms was in this way implicitly tied to the maintenance of this culture and, by extension, the exclusion of those differences that might threaten it. Both governments, in their attempts to address difference, contributed to a framework which constructed a particularly liberal notion of the problem of difference, including the tension inherent to this problem between claims of universal inclusion and the exclusionary effects of privatising difference.

It is in eliding this tension that the ideal citizen is able to act as a regulator of what Hage has termed 'governmental belonging'. Hage coins this phrase in order to distinguish between the more generally held conception of belonging as feeling included in the national community, which he terms 'homely belonging', and a sense of national belonging as "the belief in one's possession of the right to contribute (even if only by having a *legitimate* opinion with regard to the internal and external politics of the nation) to its management".[20] Hage clarifies further the implications of such governmental belonging: "To inhabit the nation in this way is to inhabit what is often referred to as the *national will*. It is to perceive oneself as the enactor or the agent of this will".[21] In making this distinction between the two kinds of belonging, Hage is interested in the ways that the nation, as a projected space, is conceptualised as in need of *management*. As he contends, nationalist practices are only possible if they are first animated by the fantasy of some ideal nation, against which it becomes conceivable to articulate desirable and undesirable elements. But even more than this, the inscription of the ideal nation produces the dual subject positions of managers of the nation and objects to be managed.[22]

Hage's particular insight is in noting how the very process of articulating a national identity acts as a form of regulation. The ideal citizen, as a state expression of normative citizenship,

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[20] Hage, *White Nation*, 45-46. Original emphasis.
[21] Ibid., 46. Original emphasis.
[22] Ibid., 39,42.

can likewise be understood as part of this broader process of articulating an ideal nation. In particular, the deployment of liberal governmentality and its attendant notions of culture in the construction of the ideal citizen creates a distinction between those who are capable of self-government, and therefore no threat to the nation, and those who are not, and who are thus in need of regulation. Furthermore, it makes this distinction in terms of Western culture and its Others. It is for this reason that the ideal citizen comes to differentially regulate the population, by naturalising governmental belonging in the native-born, Western-coded Australian citizen.[23] For instance, Howard famously declared, "[w]e decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances in which they come" and Hanson likewise asserted that "[i]f I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country". These statements both assert a right to manage the national space derived through a claim of autochthony; migrants in this schema are necessarily managed objects. This claim was made more explicitly during the Cronulla riots in the slogan 'we grew here, you flew here'. These expressions of governmental belonging as inherent to a particular group of citizens are reflected and reproduced by the ideal citizen in its differentiation between those for whom inclusion is naturalised and those for whom it is not, and who must therefore be regulated.

It is here that neoliberal discourse in particular is most clearly operationalised. The ideal citizen, in its differential regulation of the population, creates subject positions that are not only self-regulating but *responsibilised*. That is, in neoliberalism's insistence on the level playing-field, the capacity of subjects to regulate themselves is itself moralised.[24] This is what Wendy Brown characterises as neoliberalism's "signature technique" of governance, in which "[n]eo-liberal subjects are controlled through their freedom… because of neo-liberalism's *moralization* of the consequences of this freedom".[25] By insisting on its universality, the ideal citizen casts inclusion as accessible to all and, as a corollary, figures exclusion as the consequence of individual conduct. In this way, inclusion is cast as a *choice*; the ideal citizen, created through the articulation of the ideal nation and what is considered desirable within it, is posited as a template against which those currently excluded from governmental belonging

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[23] where these two properties have been constructed as equivalent in the conflation of Australian identity with liberalism-as-Western-culture (effectively erasing Indigenous sovereignty)

[24] Wendy Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Nikolas Rose, *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self* (London: Routledge, 1989); Lemke, "'The Birth of Bio-Politics'."; Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*.

[25] Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," 44.

can choose to model themselves and thereby gain access to the privileged position of national managers. As a corollary, this construction of inclusion as a choice, by responsibilising the excluded subject, in turn justifies their exclusion from a managerial position in relation to the national space.[26] More than this, in naturalising the capacity of some citizens to be suitably self-governing, the ideal citizen responsibilises the migrant subject specifically.

It is in this sense that the ideal citizen can be understood as performative, as both constructing and reiterating subjects, or in Judith Butler's terms both naming and making them.[27] I turn to Butler's conceptualisation of performativity here because it is useful for understanding the ultimate implication of the ideal citizen: its embodiment in the discourse of Whiteness. Butler extends Foucault's conception of subjectivation in her notion of discursive power as performative, which is in turn informed by her theorisation of the materiality of the body. This materiality is not an ontological given but a resignification of matter according to regulatory norms: "'Materiality' designates a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its formative or constituting effects".[28] This materialisation is achieved through the performativity of discourse, which "appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent".[29] Following Derrida, Butler contends that the efficacy of such discourse is in its citationality, in the capacity of its norms to be repeated and be repeatedly recognised. Performativity, then, "must be understood not as a singular or deliberate 'act' but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names".[30] Most crucial for this discussion, however, is Butler's contention that this reiterative impulse is borne of the hegemonic desire to naturalise some ideal identity,[31] an ideal that in its

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[26] This act of exclusion by the state can be conceptualised as a manifestation of what Mitchell Dean terms the 'crisis of neoliberalism', which reconsiders sovereign power in terms of Foucault's neoliberal schema but considers instead the response to "not governing enough" ("Power at the Heart of the Present: Exception, Risk and Sovereignty," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 13, no. 4 (2010): 463.) Sovereign power is thus reconceived in terms of the 'state of exception', the normalisation of an exceptional circumstance in order to justify the suspension of civil law and ultimate authority of the sovereign. Dean goes further in suggesting that this justification is centred on a neoliberal discourse of precautionary risk which tolerates zero risk even as it accepts the impossibility of its securement through technologies of risk prevention. This tension produces both the knowable, calculable enemy, *as well as* the enemy that is "undetectable by the rationalities of risk and technologies of security, but imaginable on the basis of them" (ibid., 471.) It is within this 'state of pre-emption' that executive action by states and their delegations comes to be legitimised as a response to the fear of too little government.
[27] Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 157.
[28] Ibid., 9.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., xii.
[31] In Butler's case, the desire of hegemonic heterosexuality to naturalise a gendered identity.

impossibility (its mythic fullness), demands constant repetition and thereby produces a naturalistic effect.[32]

This notion of the tension inherent to the operation of hegemony strikes a familiar chord, echoing as it does the contradiction in liberalism's claim to universality. This claim, in denying liberalism's culturality, obscures its historic racialisation and the ways in which its ontological construction of cultural difference implicates it in the hegemony of Whiteness. I refer to Whiteness here as a discourse that deracialises the White subject while systematically reproducing other raced subjects, as distinct from earlier understandings of whiteness as a biological category of race. More specifically, liberalism has been historically constructed as the particular achievement of Western culture, on which basis the early modern imperial projects of colonialism were legitimated.[33] The capacity for self-government was conceived in early thought as a biological property of race, and the white race identified as uniquely endowed with it; however, neo-racism, in denying race as a category of difference, reconfigures this relationship so that liberalism becomes a property of Western culture, where the still-racialised but now invisible White body signifies this culture. At the same time, liberalism obscures this process of naturalisation to particular bodies since its legitimation is derived from its claims to universality. It is in liberalism's relationship to Whiteness that the tension between particularity and universalism is most fraught, and thus most fiercely elided, because like Butler's hegemonic heterosexuality, Whiteness is a specifically embodied discourse; that is, it is invested in the materialisation of the body and is effected through its resignification. Thus, while Whiteness has long been identified as a normative discourse that seeks to present itself as the universal human condition, the effect of this discourse is a bodily one: only particular bodies are able to be interpellated as White. Most scholars of Whiteness are especially concerned with the apparent invisibility of this interpellation and the ways in which Whiteness is always assumed *a priori* and therefore resists being named.[34] This desire

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[32] Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 125. See also, *Gender Trouble* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

[33] Mills, "Racial Liberalism."; Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion."; Goldberg, *The Racial State*; Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics*; Robyn Wiegman, "Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity," *boundary 2* 26, no. 3 (1999); Kowal, "The Politics of the Gap."; Goldie Osuri and Bobby Banerjee, "White Diasporas: Media Representations of September 11 and the Unbearable Whiteness of Being in Australia," *Social Semiotics* 14, no. 2 (2004).

[34] Richard Dyer, *White* (London Routledge, 1993); Ruth Frankenberg, "The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness," in *The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness*, ed. Birgit Brander Rasmussen, et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Warren Montag, "The Universalization of Whiteness: Racism and Enlightenment," in *Whiteness: A Critical Reader*, ed. Mike Hill (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Aileen Moreton-Robinson,

to inhabit the universal norm is the hegemonic ideal of Whiteness, and its repeated inscriptions of invisibility constitute a performative attempt to naturalise this ideal, thereby producing the invisible White body.

As Ruth Frankenberg cautions, this is something of a truism: Whiteness is not invisible to everyone but is largely so only for those who are marked as White.[35] This is important for understanding the operation of Whiteness: it is vested in maintaining the invisibility of Whiteness *to the White subject*. It is in this way that the White subject, despite being "*coproduced* with other colors",[36] can conceive of itself as universal even as it recognises the particular marked-ness of other bodies. This recognition of difference in other bodies is essential to the construction of Whiteness; as suggested by the term 'co-production', Whiteness is relational, constituted together with a difference against which it is negatively defined.[37] It is the emptiness of this negation which is signified as universal, producing atomistic White subjects that are unaware of their particular constitution with and against others. Frankenberg suggests this in her definition of Whiteness as "a 'standpoint,' a location from which to see selves, others, and national and global orders" which, in the White subject, fails to be seen as a position at all.[38] In this way, the resistance of the White body to being marked produces subject positions that are emptied of the sense of their own relationality, and in so doing legitimates the reinscription of difference that is integral to the operation of Whiteness by obscuring the (unequal) relations that are being reproduced.

I have already suggested that the ideal citizen presents itself as a kind of model to be followed by the excluded subject; it is important to emphasise that it does not function in the same way for the White subject, and this is ultimately because of the embodied nature of Whiteness. One of the consistent features of the policy documents is their attempt to particularise Australian culture by linking the universal tenets of liberalism to a specifically British heritage, thereby reproducing the implicit relationship between liberalism, Western culture and Whiteness. As Raka Shome suggests:

"Whiteness, Epistemology and Indigenous Representation," in *Whitening Race: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism* ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Canberra: Aboriginal Studio Press, 2004).
[35] Frankenberg, "The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness," 81.
[36] Michelle Fine, "Witnessing Whiteness," in *Off White: Readings on Race, Power, and Society*, ed. Michelle Fine, et al. (NewYork: Routledge 1997), 97.
[37] Ibid.; Montag, "The Universalization of Whiteness: Racism and Enlightenment."
[38] Frankenberg, "The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness," 76.

> [I]n historical moments in which whiteness becomes contested, its hitherto normalized practices often become visible. It is in such moments that whiteness begins to mark itself, name itself, come out of its 'hiding place' if you will. Such a naming and marking of itself frequently reveal anxieties about its own slipperiness, and about the very contingent and dependent nature of its practices.[39]

The policy papers similarly attempt to present liberal values as both universally accessible and particularly located, in White subjects and thus in White bodies. The tension apparent here is a result of the resistance of Whiteness to being named in order to remain a universal norm, and the way it seeks to be naturalised in particular bodies. The ideal citizen is implicated in the reiteration of this invisible White body and, far from acting as a template for the White subject, obscures its very constitution. Carol Johnson suggests this in characterising the discourse of 'the mainstream' as "just as much about policing whites and Anglo-Celts... [I]t is about encouraging... members of the 'mainstream' to construct their own identity as unquestioningly central".[40] Suvendrini Perera also notes this performance of Whiteness during the Cronulla riots:

> The Australian flag, with its affirmation of enduring racial kinship with 'British stock,' is inscribed on bodies in multiple forms: blazoned on bikinis and backpacks, tattooed on to arms and torsos, painted on faces like war paint, wrapped around shoulders like a trophy: a performance of native-ised territoriality that echoes other enactments of territorial ownership: We decide who comes on to this beach and the manner in which they come.[41]

The differentiation between manager and managed enacted by the ideal citizen is thus a specifically racial one, normalising their unequal configurations.

It is for this reason that only non-White bodies are made responsible for social inclusion and whose private values are targeted for management: their particular performance of Whiteness is not naturalised to their non-White bodies. This is what Joseph Pugliese defines as 'prosthetic white citizenship':

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[39] Raka Shome, "Outing Whiteness," *Review and Criticism* September 2000 (2000): 368.
[40] Johnson, *Governing Change*, 42.
[41] Suvendrini Perera, "Race Terror," *borderlands* 5, no. 1 (2006): par. 49.

> Prosthetic white citizenship is what is conferred upon non-white subjects of the white nation. As a prosthetic, it is a citizenship that cannot be corporeally owned or nativised – as the prosthetic of white citizenship remains visibly an adjunct to the non-white body.[42]

The ideal citizen, reiterating the discourse of Whiteness, ensures that this body is always experienced as visible and thus always vulnerable to regulation. In Foucault's terms, the awareness of one's own visibility is key to the process of subjectivation: "Visibility is a trap... [A] state of conscious and permanent visibility... assures the automatic functioning of power".[43] For the White body, however, the ideal citizen repeats the norms of Whiteness which maintain its invisibility; the White subject does not experience inclusion as a regulated performance, since this is naturalised to its body.

The state articulations of citizenship that have been analysed by this thesis are thus implicated in forms of exclusion that go beyond access to formal rights. In the very act of articulating citizenship, normative conceptions of the ideal citizen are engaged and, as a result, this ideal citizen becomes a particular technology for regulating the population in its differential production of citizen-subjects and consequent resignification of their bodies. The ideal citizen is constituted by a number of discourses that turn around liberalism and difference, and reproduces the particular configurations of freedom and culture, self-governance and rationality, the West and its Others, that comprised the liberal governmentality being enacted during the years of Hawke and Howard.

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[42] Joseph Pugliese, "Compulsory Visibility and the Infralegality of Racial Phantasmata," *Social Semiotics* 19, no. 1 (2009): 16.
[43] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment* (Penguin, 1977), 200-01.

Conclusion

Articulating this thesis as an examination of 'governments imagining their citizens' was done with two particular aims in mind: first, to suggest that governments act as cultural institutions as well as political ones, and that state power can likewise be considered in terms of cultural effects. The second aim, as a consequence, was to suggest that citizenship's role in defining inclusion within a national body can also be understood in terms of cultural technologies of power. This particular focus was adopted in order to make sense of the ways in which the formally inclusive institution of Australian citizenship has long served to exclude certain subjects and bodies from the physical and symbolic space of the nation. In theorising how the state is implicated in this exclusion, Foucault's notion of governmentality provided a conceptualisation of power which both linked the cultural production of discourse to material effects, but also crucially problematised the understanding of power as state domination and freedom as the absence of this domination; instead, Foucault characterised this as a particular configuration of 'good' government in terms of a liberal political rationality. This understanding of liberalism not as a normative political theory but a set of logics through which norms are established was fundamental to my examination of citizenship, specifically because the construction of citizenship within state policy *as well as* in much of the academic scholarship relied on this discourse of liberalism to articulate notions of inclusion.

This thesis has thus been concerned with both discerning the terms by which a liberal governmentality deals with the problem of difference and interpreting the effects of this discourse for the citizen-subject. In particular, continuity was identified in the constructions of citizenship by both governments, in their privatisation of cultural difference and reaffirmation of the primacy and incontestability of a core Australian identity. Through the discourse of liberalism, this affirmation was naturalised and configured not as an act of cultural imperialism or political domination but as an inclusive articulation of citizenship. This discourse, in its construction of self-government as uniquely fostered by a culturally neutral liberal framework, together with conceptions of collective cultural identity as a political threat, intersected with an emerging culturalist racism that naturalised cultural identity and depoliticised difference. Within this framework, Western culture was uniquely capable of producing liberal subjects and, in this way, migrants became specific targets for regulation in

order to secure national cohesion. These articulations of citizenship, in their production of the ideal citizen, thus acted as a regulatory tool to differentially distribute governmental belonging in the Australian population, reproducing the subject positions of national managers and managed objects and justifying the exclusion of some subjects from a managerial position by responsibilising them. Moreover, in reiterating the relationship between Australian identity and a British heritage, as well as Western culture and liberalism, this differentiation was enacted in racial terms and thereby established the performative conditions for inclusion. Ultimately, then, the ideal citizen re-enacted and strengthened the twin hegemonies of liberalism and Whiteness, reinscribing the unequal power relations between White and non-White, managing and managed subjects.

The liberal governmentality through which the construct of the ideal citizen was produced is thus implicated in the regulation of subjects as well as their bodies; it creates a discursive product with particular material effects. In the very act of delimiting a political (and generally national) body, the institution of citizenship is necessarily engaged in a process of exclusion. In seeking to reconcile this with an increasingly diverse Australian population, both the Hawke and Howard governments deployed the discourses of a liberal political rationality which claimed to be universally inclusive, but which also accommodated the assertion of a core White Australian identity. Exclusion was thus perpetuated despite the development and affirmation of a formally inclusive framework. This contradiction suggests that, in order to theorise the ways in which citizenship and national identity work to produce exclusion, it is critical to first interrogate the norms against which such exclusion is defined. Without this, an artificial distinction is produced between citizenship as a state institution, the distribution of rights and resources, and as individual identity, the formation of subjectivity through culture. Instead, citizenship can also be theorised as a cultural state tool that produces subjects through its deployment of discourses that constitute a political rationality. It is in this way that a formally inclusive Australian citizenship, when considered in terms of a liberal governmentality, can be seen to enact exclusion not *despite* its universality but *because* of it.

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