



Future of the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership

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ABSTRACT

India and Russia have enjoyed cordial relations for over half a century. The friendly relationship was made official in 1971 with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the Soviet Union and India. With the fall of the Soviet Union the dynamics of this relationship changed as both countries' standings on the international fora also changed. On one side, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and Russia took its place without the status of superpower. On the other side, India became an essential part of global trade, attracting the once estranged United States. This research analysed both the Indo-Russian and the Indo-American relationship in order to understand the future of the former. The analysis of these relationships were made employing Balance of Power and Balance of Threat theories in order to better understand how these relations were formed. The findings indicate that a crucial part of the Indo-Soviet relations, arms import, is witnessing progressive reduction in participation by Russia as India pushes towards diversifying by importing arms from the West. The significance of this finding lays on understanding the impacts on Russia by the recent American rapprochement with India.

I declare this thesis to be my own original work

Leonardo de Souza Mendes

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Indo-Russian relationship established its deep roots during the Cold War years. During those years, countries were expected to align either with the Western block led by the United States (US) or the Communist block led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). The newly independent India spearheaded a movement which provided a third stance in foreign policy vastly followed in developing countries, the Non-Alignment Movement. Putting it clearly, the Non-Alignment Movement was the stance in international affairs in which countries retained a certain degree of strategic autonomy by not aligning with any of the competing sides of the Cold War. In other words, committing neither with the US nor the USSR.

India's non-alignment meant that India was able to benefit, to a limited extent, from both sides of the ideological rivalry, receiving limited aid from both the US and the USSR. In spite of not demonstrating preferences, the assistance provided by the USSR seemed to outweigh that of its rival, the US (Rajan 1972, p. 209). In fact, several studies highlight the assistance dispensed by the Soviet Union in scientific and technological fields, such as space and nuclear energy, as fundamental for the current Indian technological accomplishments (Stobdan 2010, p. vii).

In recent years, the relationship between India and Russia has not only matured but also changed in its nature. The current relationship between both countries has developed into mutual cooperation, substituting the relationship based on USSR assistance to India. Both countries' interests and cooperation also converge in several matters related to global governance. For instance, it is not rare for both countries to share the same political incline when it comes to taking decisions in the United Nations (Trubnikov 2010, p. 5). One well known fact identified by Indian Studies scholars is that if there was an Indian bid for a permanent seat in the United

Nations Security Council, India would certainly enjoy the support from Russian President Vladimir Putin (Stobdan 2010, p. 143), indicating how both countries' foreign policy is closely aligned.

Indian and Russian stances on international matters seem to converge in the same direction. However, most recently the US has started to intensify its efforts to improve its relationship with India, affecting the Indo-Russian relations. The focus of this thesis is to identify the impacts this recent round of American flirtations could pose to the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership.

Research Questions

The current policy shift by both the US and Russia towards Asia raise several questions on the future balance of power in Asia. As both US and Russia divert their attentions from the Middle-East in the case of the US, and Europe in the case of Russia, the balance of power in Asia starts to become more dynamic.

The uncertainties in this changing environment help to fuel several important questions on the future of the region. However, the key questions identified as essential to be answered are those relating to the effects which an increased American presence in the Indo-Pacific region will have. Therefore, this research proposes to address the following questions. First, what are the main underlying reasons for the recent Indian diplomatic drift towards the US? It is not difficult to ponder reasons behind the US' recent round of pleasantries towards India, however, the reasons India might encourage such actions are less obvious. A second question this research will answer is, taking a Russian perspective, what is the major implication to arise from the increased Indo-American cooperation and how Russia might act in order to maintain such a time proven strategic partner.

Significance of this research

The significance of this research is based on the importance of the evolving strategic dynamics that will shape the global security and strategic affairs. In addition, the Asian region also shows significant importance posed by the renewed US interest in India and the newfound Russian interest towards the Asian region as a whole. After years of special attention given to the Middle-East, US's foreign policy is now starting to shift focus to Asia, and India can play a central role in this equation.

India's geographical location, positioned between the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait, two of the most valuable sea-lanes world-wide, make India a central player in the safety of sea commerce as well as an important player in any attempt by the US to contain China in the Indian Ocean. On the Russian side, its interest in the region is primarily economic. Russia has the ambition of becoming Asia's go-to supplier of energy and other raw minerals.

Allied with the previously stated reasons, both the US and Russia are on opposing sides of an undeclared dispute over the future format of the world order. On one side of the scale, the US is trying to maintain the unipolar *status quo*, having itself as the hegemon. On the other side of the scale, Russia and other revisionist states are pushing forward the idea of a multipolar world. In Russia's envisioned multipolar world, Russia itself, India and China are powers along with the US and other regional powers.

The importance of this research also bases on the overall economic figures of the countries involved in this research. For instance the Indian and Russian economies combined generate in excess of 5 per cent of the global GDP (World Bank 2015). Adding the US' GDP to the equation, the three countries are responsible for producing over one quarter of the global GDP (World Bank 2015). The consequences of any major diplomatic altercations between these countries could become the linchpin to the next global financial crisis or even a global scale

war. With the US focusing its attention on the Asian region, China's steady increase in defence budget and capabilities, Russian defence decline and India's continuous acquisition of first grade military hardware, the regional power balance becomes unsteady as countries juggle to balance each other.

Methodology

The vast majority of sources for this research are peer-reviewed academic articles complemented by published books, governmental reports as well as intergovernmental organizations. Some presidential speech transcripts and ambassadors' interviews are also used as sources. These listed sources are most fitting into Mauch and Park's description of data used in qualitative methodologies. According to these authors, these sources of data "do not accommodate readily to quantification, specification, objectification, of classification. Because of that, common statistical procedures cannot be used for data display or analysis" (Mauch & Park 2003, p.18). The nature of the sources being used for this research calls for, as is the case with a vast number of research in fields of International Relations, a qualitative approach to the methodology.

Theoretical Framework

Two theories that are complementary to each other will be used to analyse the complex relationship between India and Russia as well as India and the US. The first theory is the Balance of Power theory put forth by Kenneth Waltz. The central argument of the Balance of Power theory is that states will either balance against or bandwagon with the most powerful states. Balancing in terms of Balance of Power means that other countries will group against a more powerful country (Waltz 1979, p. 117). Balance of Power also anticipates that countries can bandwagon, although this is seen as the exception rather than the rule. The second theory is the Balance of Threat theory developed by Stephen Walt. Walt argues that countries still

balance and bandwagon, however, against threats instead of the power of other countries (Walt 1985; Walt 2009). Still according to Walt, countries can generate threat through four different means, as discussed in details in Chapter 4.

It is important to observe that, unlike many dichotomies present in the theories of International Relations, both Balance of Power and Balance of Threat are not mutually exclusive to each other. The aim of this research is to apply these theories in order to analyse the relationship between India and Russia as well as India and US.

To substantiate the bilateral relations, recent literature has indicated that India's historical relations with Russia are approved by both the Indian people and the Indian political sphere as long as the Indo-Russian relations do not prove counterproductive to the evolving Indo-American relations (Chenoy 2010). The idea that Russia might be relegated to a second tier partner in India's foreign policy is subject to speculation based on various high-level diplomatic visits but the relations with Russia appear to have deeper roots.

The Russian-US relationship will not be covered in this research as there is plethora of literature on this topic. Other relationships, such as India and Pakistan or India and China will be briefly mentioned as both these countries are considered as sources of threat to India.

Literature Review

In order to conduct research for this thesis, two different approaches will be considered. Firstly, the focus will be on the theoretical framework, based on the Balance of Power and Balance of Threat theories espoused by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt respectively. The relation between Waltz's book and Walt's article becomes clear when Stephen Walt proposes to remedy a well-known shortcoming in Kenneth Waltz's interpretation of Balance of Power. The shortcoming in question is that Waltz identifies that countries have a tendency to choose, whenever they have the option to do so, to balance against major powers instead of band

wagoning (Waltz 1979). However, the Cold War scenario appears to contradict Waltz's findings. This contradiction is exemplified by Walt's argument that "the United States was far more powerful than the Soviet Union during the early cold war" (Walt 1988, 331), yet Western European countries allied themselves with the US. If Waltz's was to be proven correct, Western European countries would have chosen to align themselves with the USSR.

In yet another of Walt's article arguing for Balance of Threat, his first article in 1985 arguing in favour of this theory – Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, – Walt does indicate that there are those who might "suggest[...] that the opposite response is more likely, that states will prefer to ally with the strongest power (Walt 1985, p. 6). However, Walt proceeds to disprove that such action is norm, instead arguing that bandwagon is the exception to the rule. This view is also shared by Waltz as he clearly states that "balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced by the system" (1979, p. 126). However, while Waltz puts great emphasis on power as the motivating variable into a country's decision to balance, Walt argues that "power is an important factor in their calculations, [however] it is not the only one" (1985, p. 8). Throughout his articles, Walt argues that there are four main factors that countries calculate in order to position themselves. These include: Power, Proximity, Offensive Capability and Offensive Intentions (Walt 1985, Walt 1988, Walt 2009). By adding these variables, Walt creates an efficient framework to analyse and predict possible outcomes of the interaction between countries.

Secondly, in order to research India's relations with Russia, a complementarity exists in the bilateral relations that is supported by discussion in the book: *India-Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenges and Prospects*. This books sheds light that if India is dependent on the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership including defence cooperation, arms and technology transfer and space cooperation, Russia requires ongoing trade relationship with India "to

continue with its space agenda because of economic constraints” (Lele 2010, p. 42). Therefore Russia considers India as “a natural choice” for collaboration in these fields.

Most of the literature indicates upswing in the Indo-Russia relations. However, concerns are being expressed regarding India’s neighbours, such as Sandy Gordon (2014) in a pioneering work: *India’s Rise as an Asian Power* preponderantly identifies the regional instability caused by the historic Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese relationships as one of India’s main challenges to success of the country in the future. Regarding the Pakistani challenge, Gordon states that “it will be necessary for India to find ways effectively to go around Pakistan and invigorate South Asia [...]” (p. 209). Gordon also adds that India must tread carefully in order not to “destabilize an already fragile Pakistan”. With regards to the Chinese challenge, Gordon portrays a catch 22 scenario. In sum, Gordon explains that “India’s vital water supplies could be profoundly threatened, just as China’s vital energy flows could be threatened by India in the context of the Indian Ocean” (2014, p. 137).

Overview

The current research will be divided into 6 distinct chapters, where the first chapter comprises this introduction to the research.

Chapter 2

The second chapter of this thesis is dedicated to providing an insight into the Indo-Russian relationship. The chapter is divided into two parts characterised by distinct time periods. The first part gives insight into the Indo-Soviet relations ranging from the Indian independence in 1947 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to analysing the Indo-Russian relationship from early 1992 until 2014.

Chapter 3

The third chapter is dedicated to understanding the Indo-American relationship. This chapter portrays the Indo-American relationship from Indian independence until current days. Also mentioned in this chapter is one of India's most noticeable security threat, Pakistan. The reason why the India-Pakistan relationship is briefly explored in this chapter is Pakistan's diplomatic proximity to the US.

Chapter 4

The fourth chapter applies the theoretical framework into the analysis of the Indian relationship with China and Pakistan. This chapter is used to further elucidate both fundamental concepts used in this research, Balance of Power and Balance of Threat.

Chapter 5

Chapter five uses the current trends in the Indo-Russian and Indo-American relationship in order to provide an outlook into the most likely future of the Indo-Russian relationship.

Chapter 6

This final chapter is conclusion to the research. This chapter reinforces the main arguments already exposed in this research.

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Chapter 2

Indo-Russian Relations

The antecedents of the Indo-Russian relationship can be traced to the super-power rivalry during the Cold War and strategic convergence of the interests of the two in the 1970s. In the post-Cold War era, Russia, as the inheritor of the USSR, was privileged to also inherit its time tested relationship with India. However, the Indo-Russian relationship did not become as robust as it is today without efforts. During the Cold War period, it was normal for the USSR to attempt to woo as many allies possible to counter the US influence, in a textbook example of workings of Waltz's Balance of Power, meanwhile India attempted to distance itself from taking a side in the conflict. This scenario seems to create an unnatural environment for any kind of cooperation between the two countries. Yet, today this relationship is described by the Indian Prime Minister as "a friendship of unmatched mutual confidence, trust and goodwill" (Modi 2014a; Modi 2014b). The build up to such a relationship had two distinct periods. The Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, this chapter analyses the intricacies of both periods separately.

Indio-Soviet relations 1971 - 1991

Ever since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, India has sought to position itself in ways to act autonomously in international affairs. In spite of this clear non-alignment stance, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union was not ready to understand India's predilection for not committing to any side and in the words of one Kremlin official "Nonalignment [...] was just another imperialist device, the purpose of which was to slander the U.S.S.R. by placing it on the same level with American imperialism" (McMahon 1994, p. 46). In turn, Stalin government's position delayed the start of what came to be a fruitful relation between the two countries. However, with the death of Stalin in 1953 and in the wake of increased pressure

exerted by the West, and the US' growing diplomatic proximity towards China, and military ties with Pakistan, India was pushed hard to have better relations with the USSR in order to safeguard its own non-alignment stance (Rajan 1972).

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation

The second half of the 1960s witnessed years of building-up ties for the Indo-Soviet relationship, with several lesser important protocols and agreements, culminating in August of 1971 with the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (See Appendix A for full treaty). The treaty underlined the clear message from the Indian foreign policy makers that India would not be pressured into a *de facto* alliance with any of the great powers; and this was ensured in the treaty's text. Embedded in the text of the treaty was the assurance from the USSR that it would respect India's non-aligned stance. Article IV of the treaty stipulates that "[t]he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world" (Ministry of External Affairs 1971). This was not the only article of major importance for India to retain its non-alignment credentials.

Article IX asserted that:

In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of the countries.

Article IX provided India a direct safeguard against the Pakistani threat without having to take the next step in aligning India with the USSR. On Indian policy-makers' mind, this provision would balance the power in the region in case of a direct India-Pakistan confrontation, where the US would stand on the Pakistani side of the conflict and India could have avenues to receive support from the USSR. However, Rajan identified that this same article also provided "controversial provision" (1972, p. 207) to critics to challenge India's commitment to non-

alignment. This controversy was promptly refuted by Rajan by making specific reference to the text present in Article IV, where the USSR respects India's non-alignment stance.

In spite of US' criticism towards non-alignment, as US' policy-makers only saw two distinct ways of positioning in the global sphere, us or them (Tahir-Kheli 1997), Washington recognised the geopolitical importance of India. Considering India as a vital strategic asset, President Richard Nixon publicly supported, to a certain degree, India's policies on foreign affairs. Days prior to his historic visit to China in 1972, Nixon stated that "[i]f India has an interest in maintaining *balanced relationships* with all major powers, we are prepared to respond constructively" (Rajan 1972, p. 209). Yet, the controversy was still present in the Western media and public opinion. To these critics, the mutual consultation provision referenced in Article IX resembled that of some defensive pacts and treaties, therefore, challenged India's non-alignment stance. Summarizing the treaty, appears to be closest to an alliance without the commitment of being in an alliance.

Other than room for criticism by third parties, the treaty assisted in building mutual trust between India and the Soviet Union. Resultantly, this proved instrumental in boosting the trade relations between the two countries.

Economic Relations

Figures from the Indian Ministry of Finance regarding the trade between the two countries in the 1960-61 financial year demonstrate a menial participation from Indian exports to the USSR and even lesser in Indian imports from the USSR (Sachdeva 2010). The decades following the signing of the treaty witnessed an increase in the Indian exports to the USSR close to 600 per cent while imports increased over 950 per cent.

Table 1 India-USSR Trade Relations (Sachdeva 2010, p. 108)

Year	Exports (Rs. Crore)	% Share in Total Exports	Imports (Rs. Crore)	% Share in Total Imports
1960-61	29	4.5	16	1.4
1970-71	210	13.7	106	6.5
1981-81	1226	18.3	1014	8.1
1990-91	5255	16.1	2528	5.9

The growth in trade value between India and the Soviet Union indicates how converging their diplomatic and economic relations became. The main factor behind such growth in trade was the Soviet's centrally planned economy. The positive implications of having the state managed economy were that the trade was used as a tool for foreign aid. In contrast to capitalist economies, the export prices were subject to be more flexibly negotiated with the USSR. In addition, both countries held mutually reinforcing negotiations over the conversion rate to be used in the Rupee to Rouble conversion, a sort of barter system (Achuthan 2010; Sahgal 2010). All these factors were seen by scholars in India as the "Soviet version of bilateral aid" (Sachdeva 2010, p. 108). Furthermore, there is no literary suggestion that the USSR was concerned about how skewed the balance of trade was in favour of India.

However, in spite of the significant benefits delivered by the Indo-Soviet treaty in relation to bilateral trade, the greatest benefit from the treaty was explored in the military cooperation between the two countries. The military cooperation between India and the USSR was the mean found by Indian policy makers to counter the threats posed by its neighbours. As previously indicated, throughout its independent history, India has faced several conventional security challenges posed by its regional neighbours. India is beleaguered by border disputes with Pakistan and China that still exist and appear volatile in nature.

These territorial disputes have been the source for four wars and several minor conflicts against Pakistan alone. The first of these wars was being fought in a matter of weeks after the partition of India. Following decades witnessed three additional wars in 1965, 1971, only months prior to the Indo-Soviet treaty being signed, and 1999. The decades prior to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation witnessed India's shift in approach to its defence policy. At first, Indian policy-makers took an "idealist and moralist approach" to India's defence, failing to identify the realist nature of the international order. This approach relied on the assumption that countries would not behave "aggressive[ly] towards a peace-loving country like India" (Ahlawat 2013, p. 2). As a result of this defence policy, India was caught off-guard twice, in 1962 against China and, to a lesser extent, in 1965 against Pakistan.

In order to modernize its military without compromising its non-alignment policy postures, India saw itself having to rely on the Soviet side in the Cold War power struggle. Considering the predicament in which India was placed, it had three options before it. Firstly, to follow idealist and moralist path without relying on any external power. In this scenario, Pakistan would have out-powered the Indian military strength, given US' active engagement in favour of Pakistan by supplying the latest in military hardware and technologies.

Another avenue would have been to seek closer ties with the US. Although from Indian perspective, this could complicate India's modest ambition of pursuing a non-aligned stance. The reason why US military aid to India could have impacted India's non-alignment stance was that the US expected the recipient of its aid to increase cooperation with the US (Sullivan, Tessman & Li 2011). In this case, during the Cold War, India would have been expected to side with the US in matters opposing the USSR and India's own views. One such example of this expectance of a retribution by the US was the use of US' law of Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act – commonly known as Public Law 480 or PL 480. This law regulated and administered the aid provided by the US in the form of food. The Lyndon Johnson

administration used the PL 480 as a mean to leverage against the Indian government in order to “temper criticism of U.S. policy regarding [US’ actions in] Vietnam” (U.S. Department of State 2013). Relying on such scenario would have maligned India’s non-alignment goals. The third option, the option taken by India, was to build closer relations with the Soviet Union.

USSR’s Diplomatic power as a commodity

Prior to becoming so closely ‘aligned’, the USSR had already proved to be a reliable diplomatic partner on global governance issues raised in the United Nations. In contrast to India, during the Cold War the Soviet Union was a diplomatic heavy weight, counting as one of the five countries wielding the power of veto in the United Nations Security Council. This power was used in several instances by the Soviet Union, with results positively in favour of India.

For instance, in 1961 the USSR vetoed a draft resolution put forth by several countries – France, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US – (see Appendix B for the joint draft resolution) calling for India to withdraw from Goa, Daman and Diu, territories previously controlled by Portugal (United Nations 2015). Soviet veto favouring India repeated months later in 1962, when an Irish attempt to a draft resolution to “The India-Pakistan Question” was rejected (see Appendix C for the draft resolution). In the same methods as preceding vetoes, in 1971 the USSR prevented three resolutions, in a time frame of ten days, calling for a cease-fire between India and Pakistan (United Nations 2015; See Appendix D, E and F for the vetoed draft resolutions).

Diplomatically, the USSR proved to be an outstanding partner to India, without India having to adapt or trade influence with the Soviet government, as both countries had the same stance on several issues including: “colonialism, racialism and the economic development of under-developed countries” (Rajan 1972, p. 205). Furthermore, the role taken by the USSR in the military modernisation of the Indian armed forces proved to be the utmost important factor in the building blocks of the Indo-Soviet relations.

Building up Indian defence

Following India's independence, the equipment acquired to arm the Indian military had its origin mostly from the United Kingdom. This distribution changed in the mid-1960s when the Soviet Union took the place of the main provider of military hardware to the Indian defence forces (Sahgal 2010; Singh 2015; Singh 1984). During this period, diversification of suppliers was second in importance to Indian policy makers, their primary concern was to develop the local arms industry. However, the task of finding a patron country accepting to transfer technology to India was not easy. As Singh (1984) indicated, only three countries were self-sufficient in the arms industry: France, US and the USSR.

As a middle power, France was subject to a lesser bargaining power fronting both super-powers. For this reason and its smaller scale production, France's costs tended to be higher than the USSR and the US. Having the US as a major provider of arms meant India's non-alignment could be jeopardized so the natural course was to have the USSR providing these hardware and technologies.

An outside observer, without all relevant facts, analysing the composition of the Indian military hardware would have no difficulty in reaching a premature conclusion that India was a Soviet ally during the 1970s to 1990s. However, the composition of Indian's military hardware was mostly the reflection of Western rejection to India's requests for hardware acquisition. India's position during the Cold War was adamantly that of non-alignment, which meant India did not favour any party when purchasing arms, aiming instead for the hardware which would better increase India's military capability.

Nonetheless, India's choice for arms acquisition was limited by the West. One example of such Western rejection was prior to India's acquisition of four F-class submarines from the Soviet Union in 1967. By then, India had probed the West to acquire comparable hardware with no

avail (Singh 1984). In addition, the US' arming of Pakistan was seen, to some extent, as a way to encircle and contain India's natural ascendance in the sub-continent (Pant 2013). India was practically forced into accepting the support from anyone willing.

The China factor

Other than the constant threat emanating from Pakistan, India also had to pay close attention to China. Often referred to, in the past, as India's major source of threat (Pant 2014), China to this day has unresolved border disputes with India. China and India had clashed in 1962, with China being the undisputed victor in the conflict. During the conflict, the US decided to provide military assistance to India, summing up to US\$92 million in military equipment by the end of 1965. Meanwhile, during the same period, the USSR provided assistance adding up to US\$130 million (Singh 1984). However, a couple of years later, during the 1965 second Indo-Pakistani war over the Kashmir region, the US embargoed the sub-continent. Resulting in withdrawal of all military assistance to both India and Pakistan (Shaumyan 2010; Singh 1984; Trubnikov 2010; U.S. Department of State n.d), a positive outcome for India considering the US' much closer ties with Pakistan. During this war, the USSR did not interrupt its arms supplies to India and even agreed on providing India with "submarines, destroyer escorts, and patrol craft" (Singh 1984, p. 713). In the other camp, Pakistan would receive "from Beijing 200 medium tanks, several squadrons of MiG-19s, and some IL-28 bombers" (Singh 1984, p. 713). Interesting to observe that all these donations from China to Pakistan were of Soviet origin. In addition, Singh indicates a covert trade, pushed by the US, which used West Germany and Iran as proxies to sell 90 F-86 Sabre fix wing aircrafts to Pakistan.

During the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union drifted apart diplomatically. This detachment, on the other hand, allowed for the US and Pakistan to create closer ties with China. On Indian policy-makers' mindset, a close link between China, Pakistan and US meant India was subjected to being encircled (Scott 2008). Alternatively Soviet decision makers saw India

as an important “potential counterweight to China and Pakistan, America’s key ally in South Asia” (Lee 2014, pp. 62-63). Therefore, the American influential presence in the region was not the only factor which helped to cement India and USSR; China factor also played important role in this relationship.

Post-Cold War

The abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 came with extreme consequences not only to Russia but the whole Indo-Russian relationship. As the world order shifted from bipolar – having the USSR and the US as poles, to unipolar with the US being the sole hegemon, Russia required a thorough revaluation of its priorities and positioning in world affairs. Russian institutions went through a process of pivoting towards Europe and the West in what is referred to as “Atlanticism – that is, liberal democratic, trade, and market reforms, and formation of closer political and economic relations with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” (Lee 2014, p. 63). At the same time, it did not make sense for Russia to maintain the level of military spending, specially facing the collapse of the Rouble, collapse caused by the “mounting inflation” (Achuthan 2010, p. 126) in the Russian economy.

With the reprioritization of Russian spending, the defence industry “lost nearly 80 per cent of their funding from the Russian government” (Sahgal 2010, p. 27). Parallel to the loss in funding, countries of the former Soviet bloc were now free to find arms suppliers other than Russia, helping to create an unsustainable economic scenario for the Russian defence industry.

The impact of disintegration of the Soviet Union on India was similarly woeful. As Russia tried to identify its position in the new unipolar world order, India became a secondary actor in Russian interests. India’s position as a counterweight against China and the US was no longer one of the priorities for Russian policy-makers (Hall 2014). On the other side of the scale, India was still heavily dependent on the Russian defence industry. Figures suggest that approximately

70 to 80 per cent of Indian defence hardware had its origin in countries of the former USSR (Sahgal 2010; Tahir-Kheli 1997). Out of those figures, the Indian air force alone was reliant on Soviet origin spare parts for 75~80 per cent of its aircrafts (Lee 2014; Khripunov & Srivastava 1999), for 80 per cent for naval hardware and 60 per cent army hardware (Khripunov & Srivastava 1999). This conjuncture led to the assumption that the efficient maintenance of the Indian defence was directly related to the survival of the Russian defence industry.

Adding to this chaotic scenario, the Russian defence industry, once centrally integrated by the Soviet government, was “scattered all over countries of the former Soviet Union” (Sahgal 2010, p. 27), creating a real treasure hunt for India in the pursuit of spare parts. The early post-Soviet Union years led to a catch 22 dilemma, where India relied on the Soviet/Russian defence industry for spare parts, however, India could not risk acquiring further weapons from Russia as there was little guarantee of a long term commitment to their maintenance. For this reason, there was no major defence trade agreement signed between India and Russia in the months following the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Sahgal 2010, p. 27). However, India still had to address the issue of finding a new supplier for defence equipment. Knowing India’s compulsion to find a new supplier, in late 1992 “Russia put forward a proposal for the setting up of joint manufacturing and transfer of technology in relation to spare parts” (Lee 2014, p. 64). This proposal was intended to keeping the Russian defence industry alive.

Russia’s attempt in re-claiming the position as the go-to supplier for India’s defence needs was short lived. In 1993, under pressure from the US, Russia backed from delivering on an agreement signed in 1990 with India. The agreement was to provide India “two cryogenic rocket-engines with the corresponding technology for India’s Geo-Stationary Launching Vehicle (GSLV) project” (Lee 2014, p 64). This resulted in doubts being raised on Russia’s reliability as a defence supplier (Lee 2014; Lele 2010; Sahgal 2010).

However, supplying India with cryogenic rocket-engines was not the only issue that affected their relationship. As previously stated, the Russian currency experienced a great collapse caused by the sky-rocketing inflation, figures reported by the International Monetary Fund point to inflation rates of over 800 per cent in the 1993 financial year (nd.). The depreciation of the Rouble created further headache for Russian and Indian officials when renegotiating deals signed with the former USSR. Those deals, previously calculated using a makeshift barter system and direct conversion from Rouble to Rupee, were now deprecated as Russia had the need to accumulate hard currency to face its new challenges in the open-market economy (Achuthan 2010). In addition, India lost its role in the eyes of Russian policy-makers as a geo-strategic counter-weight against the US and China (Hall 2014). As a result, Russia expected India to pay for the full market value of their imports. Values which were previously set over mutually acceptable terms by both countries.

The consequence of such an uncertain environment caused the Indo-Russian bilateral trade to drop over the years following the fall of the USSR. Bilateral trade gradually decreased in the early post-Cold War years. Figures suggest a drop of close to 50 per cent in trade value during the first five years, from US\$4.2 billion down to US\$2.2 billion, bottoming at US\$1.2 billion by the end of the decade (Ivanovich 2010; Lee 2014). Furthermore, India had taken several loans from the Soviet Union, without the use of hard currency.

The repayment of these loans would also have to be renegotiated. Prolonged negotiations were held to address this issue and an outcome was reached. The “Rouble credit was denominated in Rupees and a repayment schedule was drawn up” (Sachdeva 2010, p 109). Binding the debit to the Rupee gave Russia the advantage of linking the value to a more stable currency. In 1993, the Rupee was facing inflation value of little over 7 per cent, contrasting the Rouble which was facing in excess of 800 per cent (International Monetary Fund n.d.). This meant the debit would not depreciate following the downward trends in the Rouble. For India, the negotiation also had

a positive outcome. Repayments were scheduled over a period of 33 years and these were to be made by giving Russia import credit (Sachdeva 2010). This meant India would repay its debit providing goods and services, instead of currency. In spite of all the above mentioned drawbacks, in 1993 both countries reassured their commitment to the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a continuation to the 1971 treaty – See Appendix G for the full treaty signed in 1993.

Putin Era

The inauguration of Vladimir Putin in 2000 as the second president of Russia was a step forward towards renewal and strengthening of the Indo-Russian relationship. As previously outlined, by the end of the 1990s the Indo-Russian relationship had picked up a negative momentum and both countries seemed to be drifting apart. However, with the advent of new Russian government in 2000 came renewed efforts towards rebuilding the relationship with India. These efforts came after Russia's testing of waters that the previous policy of pivoting towards the West, *Atlanticism*, was of limited advantage to pursue Russian interests (Achuthan 2010; Khudoley 2010; Lee 2014; Larson and Shevchenko 2010). This conclusion was reached after Russia witnessed two distinct events in which its concerns and propositions were dismissed by the West.

Western disregard towards Russia came in response to Russia's attempt to reposition itself as a Western friendly nation. This disregard was exemplified by NATO's push to include among its members, countries of the former Warsaw Pact. This decision led Russia to propose the creation of "a new collective-security organization containing all European states" (Lee 2014, p. 65), however, this proposal was rejected by the West. Russia started to understand it would never be trusted enough to join the West (Lee 2014). This perception was further proven when the West failed to give appropriate consideration to the Russian interests in the Balkan region. Without due consultation with Russia, in 1994, NATO conducted bombing strikes against

Serbian positions, “an area of historic Russian interest” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). Further military operations were conducted in Kosovo in 1999, “in spite of Russian objections, [this] confirmed to Russian eyes that its security concerns were being disregarded by the West” (Lee 2010, p 65). Following these events, Russia shifted its focus from an attempt to fit into the Western standards into creating its own identity. This new Russian identity would embrace Russian uniqueness in cultural, ethnical, political and historical past. This new identity shift was termed *Eurasianist*, in opposition to the *Atlanticism*.

Whilst *Atlanticism* relied on the assumption that the success of Russia relied on its integration into the Western countries, the *Eurasianist* approach saw Russia in a unique position to serve as a bridge between the Europe and Asia (Bakshi 2001, Lee 2014). In this newfound identity, Russian policy makers prioritised the fastest growing economic region in the world, Asia. This identity shift led Russia, once again, to consider India as an integral part to the advance of Russian interests.

One of the ideas inferred from the *Eurasianist* identity assumed by Russian policy-makers, was the idea that the international order should not be unipolar, as put forth by US policy-makers. Alternatively, Russian foreign policy is determined to push forward an agenda which reorganises the international system into a multi-polar system, where several regional actors serve as reference point to smaller actors on global matters. Among other countries sharing this view, Russia reinvented India (Ivanovich 2010). Although, an India different from that of the Cold War era, a matured India, ready to ascend as a global leader.

The convergence of both countries’ goals were cemented in 2000 with the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation. This declaration came from a “desire to further consolidate their traditionally close and friendly ties to mutual benefit” (Ministry of External Affairs 2000, p. 1) and is directly linked to both the

1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and the 1993 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. One of the most interesting provisions present in this Declaration is the provision directly challenging the unipolar international system – See Appendix H for the complete declaration. The provision states that “PROCEEDING from the conviction that it is necessary to build a multipolar global structure based on sovereign equality of all states and peoples, democratic values and Justice” (Appendix H, p 1). This provision directly challenged the US interpretation of the international scenario by declaring that both countries see as necessary a multipolar international system.

The Declaration also took further steps to guarantee that their relationship would continue to improve over the years. For instance, where both the 1971 and the 1993 treaties were somewhat vague on how both countries would cooperate with each other, the Declaration of Strategic Partnership of 2000 actually stated some of the measures taken by both countries to enhance their mutual cooperation. One such example in the political field is that both countries agreed to high level annual meetings as well as to improve their cooperation on international matters. On the economy side, the Declaration sets target, among others, on gradually reducing tariff barriers and simplifying the rules for individuals traveling for business matters. Defence wise, both countries agree on increasing cooperation between armed forces. In general, the treaty was a step forward towards straightening ties between both the countries on several matters.

Figure 1 GDP growth chart of China, India, Pakistan, United States and Russia from 1965 to 2015. (World Bank 2015)



India's remarkable development during the Cold War, in GDP growth terms, outshining countries with noticeable regional influence such as the US and Pakistan, although being surpassed by Chinese figures in the majority of the years – as seen in Figure 1 – created the solid foundation from which to build India's influence in the 21st Century. By 2000, when Putin ascended to power, the Indian economy had already overtaken the Russian economy, sitting as the 14th largest economy, two places above Russia (World Bank 2015). This development suggested that the relationship between both countries would also have to change. From Russia's historical superiority, embodied by the USSR's might, to a position of, at least, equality with India.

Under Putin's leadership, Russia was able to straighten the loose ties with India. This was possible as Russia recognised that momentum in both countries had shifted. However, it was not an easy task, at least in the field of supplying arms to India. The reason for this is the

historical track-record of Soviet/Russian originated equipment failing to function properly. This thorn in the relationship has affected different hardware, from naval to aerial without discriminating ground equipment as well. To mention a few of the examples of this widespread quality issue of Russian arms provided to India: the delivery of T-90 tanks with missing parts, rusty air defence system, imprecise precision-guided munition, substandard quality of anti-submarine warfare equipment on IL-38 maritime patrol aircrafts and faulty Kilo and Nerpa class submarines – which led to death of several Indian sailors (Bhonsle 2010; Sahgal 2010). In addition to these issues of quality, Russia has been unable to maintain the schedules of deliveries as well as regularly increasing the asking price for contracts already agreed upon (Bhonsle 2010).

However negative the quality of the equipment supplied to India, delayed or over budgeted, India's main long-time long-term goal has been to develop its indigenous defence industry, and for this goal Russia seems to be indispensable for India to catch up with other countries, as technology transfer and joint development of new technologies constitute important characteristics of the Indo-Russian defence cooperation. At the same time, Russia faces a complex issue related to work force which directly affects its defence industry. Since the early 1990s Russia has been facing severe decline in skilled and technical work force (Chamie & Mirkin 2014; Emelyanova & Rautio 2013; Federal State Statistics Service 2015; Lukin 2012) ranging from P. Stobdan's (2010) 800,000 people every year to Rogoza's (2014) 1.3 million a year.

Ageing population is not an issue suffered only by Russia. In fact, Russia is accompanied by several other European countries also facing this issue (Coleman & Rowthorn 2011). One of the simplest way found by countries to address depopulation is to increase skilled immigration allied with maintaining a relative high fertility rate. Countries such as France, United Kingdom, Australia and the US are expected to generate considerable population growth using the above

strategy to compensate the effects of depopulation (Coleman & Rowthorn 2011). However, this solution is far from being adequate in the Russian context.

The Russian population is well-known for its nationalist stance. Rogoza (2014, p. 81) explained that Russian nationalism:

bases national identity on what it takes to be Orthodox Christian values, Russian national culture and traditions, and the Russian language, all of which are perceived as jeopardised by an influx of non-Russian/non-Slavic populations with their 'alien' influences, 'defiant' behaviour and unwillingness to adapt.

This view is not secluded only to the demographics, political parties also have aligned themselves to this popular view, although in a moderate manner (Rogoza 2014). The anti-immigrant sentiment has led to several protests, the latest carried out at the end of 2013 in several cities around Russia (Grove & Bush 2013). A poll undertaken by the Center for Security Studies two years prior to the 2013 protests indicated that over 55 per cent of the interviewed believed in the possibility of "bloodshed on large scale in Russia due to ethnic reasons" (Russian Analytical Digest 2011). A similar interview was carried out in 2013 which indicated that "irritation/anger" towards migrants had grown from 35 per cent in 2011 to 55 per cent in 2013 (Russian Analytical Digest 2013). These figures lead to the simple conclusion that Russian population decline cannot be solved by increasing migration.

When contrasting Russian demographics against Indian figures, it becomes clear how both countries can work towards complementing each other. India currently sits high on top of the list of countries by their population, surpassed only by China. Both Russia and India have the attributes necessary to solve one another's problems. Russia can take advantage of India's vast and highly educated population, by producing in India the military hardware it requires, maintaining Russian defence industry research and development alive. On the other hand, India can advance its indigenous defence industry by collaborating with Russian high technology

defence production in its own borders. In other words, the two countries can explore each other's strengths to solve their own weaknesses.

Other sector emerging since the 1990s, in which both countries can help each other is the energy sector. Both countries can complement each other energy wise. India's growing economy is increasing its demand for energy, demand with "little prospect" (Sharma 2010, p. 68) of finding an internal source. For this reason, India is expected to increase its dependency on imported energy "across all major fuel types" (Sharma 2010, p. 68). On the other side of the equation, Russia is an energy powerhouse. When considering the Russian figures for the four major sources of energy – oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear/uranium – Russia is estimated to have over 6 per cent of global oil reserves, over 25 per cent of global natural gas reserves, in excess of 18 per cent of global coal reserves and the third largest uranium reserves, with 10 per cent of the global total (Sharma 2010). In spite of these apparent adjoining puzzle pieces, India's consuming needs and Russian export availability, Indo-Russian hydrocarbon trade is still far from its full potential. The reason for the lack of deep engagement between the two countries is given to geographic distance. For instance, during years Russian hydrocarbon exports have prioritised its neighbouring region, Europe (Gazprom 2015). Currently, in spite of Russian overall pivot to Asia, Russia is still prioritizing its supply to Europe. This is exemplified by Gazprom's – Russian state owned energy company – efforts to diversify its delivery of energy to European countries by listing several European pipeline projects as priority projects for the company (Gazprom 2015). However, there have been some Russian efforts to diversify its energy export market towards Asia. For instance, crude oil is currently exported to China using railroads which traverses Mongolia. In order to improve the delivery of crude oil to China and the Asia Pacific region, Russia is extending its existing pipelines towards the port city of Kozminos, in the Russian Far East (Transneft n.d.). This project will permit for Russian, as well

as Central Asian States already connected to Russian pipelines, oil and gas to be loaded into tankers and exported to the Asia-Pacific region.

On India's side of energy logistics, the proximity to the Middle East makes energy import from the region extremely attractive. This attractiveness is reflected by India's petroleum import figures, figures which in 2008 indicated that over 73 per cent of India's total petroleum imports had its origin in the Middle East (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015). In spite of the Middle East's energy sector attractiveness, heavily relying on energy import from one region is extremely risky. In special when regarding a conflict prone region, such as is the case with the Middle East. India is aware of such perils and has actively tried to diversify its energy imports from other regions. This becomes quite clear when analysing Indian energy import figures – see figure 2, figure 3 and figure 4 to compare Indian sources of crude oil by countries. As previously stated, in 2008 India relied on the Middle East for over 73 per cent of its crude oil imports. This figure has shrank to under 60 per cent in 2014 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015).

Figure 2 India petroleum imports by source 2008. Import total = US\$ 64 Billion (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015)




Figure 3 India petroleum imports by source 2011. Import total = US\$ 92.6 Billion (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015)





Figure 4 India petroleum imports by source 2015. Import total = US\$ 116.4 Billion (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015)



India seems to have chosen the Latin America's energy export market in order to help achieve the goals of this policy. For instance, in 2008-9 years, India massively increased its crude oil import from Venezuela. The trade value leaped from mere US\$ 382 million in 2007-8 to US\$ 4.2 billion in 2008-9, a growth of over 1000 per cent. At the same period, crude oil imports from Russia grew a significant 90 per cent, from US\$ 129 million to US\$ 248 million, yet still outshined by Venezuela's growth in the Indian market. Crude oil imports from other Latin American countries also grew from US\$ 2.6 billion to US\$ 19.9 billion in the same period (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015).

As India diversifies its energy imports, Russian-origin energy appears to be on secondary thoughts for Indian imports. In fact, Prime Minister Modi described that "despite our close friendship, our collaboration in this sector has been disappointing" (Modi 2014a; Modi 2014b). In order to make Russian energy exports become more commercially attractive, Moscow has plans to link its energy rich Siberian region to the sub-continent. In order to accomplish this, there have been feasibility discussions between Russia, India and China on a pipeline traversing China's westernmost province, Xinjian, as well as talks on the possibility of creating a pipeline across Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (Daly 2014; Mahapatra 2014). For the time being, it seems as if the key word in the hydrocarbon cooperation between both countries is mutual investment, as former Russian ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov (2010, p. 6), stated:

India has already invested 1.8 billion dollars in the development and production of the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas deposits. This is a mutually beneficial area of cooperation that is developing very successfully. There is also a prospect of India's participation in the Sakhalin-3 project as well.

In spite of Russia's minor role in India's mineral energy imports, Russia plays a key role in India's nuclear power strategy. This role in Indian nuclear power came as a consequence to the US' withdrawal from cooperation after India carried out its first nuclear test in 1974

(Balachandran 2010). By 1974, India depended on two American supplied power stations in Maharashtra as well as two other Canadian supplied power plants in Rajasthan. On the face of Western withdrawal from their commitments with these plants in 1974, after India's first nuclear tests, Russia stepped in to provide the "needed assistance for the running of both the two US supplied Tarapur Atomic Power Stations (TAPS) reactors and the two Canadian supplied Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant (RAPP) reactors" (Balachandran 2010, p. 87). This assistance came as a know-how to run the plants, fuel for the reactors and heavy water used in the reactors' cooling systems.

In recent years, under the Putin government, the atomic cooperation between both countries has prospered. Russia has supplied nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear reactors, including reactor built by India as well as assisted in the construction of several joint Indo-Russian projects. One example of such projects is the Kudankulam Atomic Power Project (Modi 2014a; Modi 2014b; Trubnikov 2010). The construction of this project initialized in 2001 and the first of the two initially planned reactors is already operational. The second reactor is currently 98.32 per cent complete and is expected to be operational by October 2015 (Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited 2015). Trubnikov (2010) also mentions the prospect of adding two other reactors to the same project after the completion of the initial two. In addition to these reactors already mentioned, in Putin's 2014 visit to India, Prime Minister Modi also announced that both countries have "outlined an ambitious vision for nuclear energy of at least ten more reactors" (Modi 2014a; Modi 2014b).

Final Considerations on the Chapter

The Indo-Russian relationship has maintained itself sturdy throughout the challenges faced over time. The relationship has had its highs and lows, nevertheless, through commonalities in goals and challenges, both countries have been able to enhance their diplomatic, economic and security ties. The maturing of this relationship was a direct result of the 1971 Treaty of Peace,

Friendship and Cooperation. Treaty which was then renewed during one of the most uncertain periods in recent history, the end of the Cold War, and further enhanced in 2000 when both countries declared the relationship as a strategic partnership.

Since 1971, the goals and challenges faced by both countries have changed in nature. In its early years, India and Russia sought for friendly relations to help balance external powers threatening their own security. Russia sought India to balance the US-led Western alliance, while India sought Russia to balance US' backed Pakistan and China nexus. Security challenges in the international system led India and Russia to rely on each other. In current circumstances, challenges faced by both countries have, at a bare minimum, changed in intensity. India's military strength outshines Pakistan's strength, although, Pakistan is currently a nuclear country, changing the nature of the threat posed by Pakistan. On the other hand, China's military might has increased in proportion to India's strength, however, confidence building measures have kept the threat from escalating.

The cooperation between India and Russia over the mentioned traditional security challenges paved the way for both countries to enhance in areas other than security. Trade and economic relations increased, engagements in the defence sector improved to the point of Russia leasing nuclear submarines, retrofitting and selling to India its aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, and most importantly, the joint development of new military technologies and hardware. In addition, Russia is actively seeking to improve its energy distribution towards Asia, efforts which will directly influence India's energy diversification strategy.

Both countries also play major roles in each other's nuclear energy policy. India faces the challenge of battling increasing energy consumption, directly affecting its energy security. The ripple effects of poor energy policy have the potential to be felt throughout all sectors of the Indian society. Having this in mind, several joint nuclear projects have been agreed upon in

order to guarantee India's energy future. In addition, India's regional influence can be jointly used in order to further expand the Russian regional presence on matters of nuclear energy.

Regional influence is also one of the pillars of this relationship. Both India and Russia have the common goal of installing a multipolar international system. India and Russia have been clear on their pursuit of being seen as major international actors representing their regional interests, consequentially challenging US' led unipolar approach to the international system.

However fruitful this relationship has been, setbacks had to be overcome in several instances. Through a combination of skilful diplomacy and mutual necessity India and Russia are today partners of utmost strategic importance to one another. Importance vocalized by policy-makers both on Indian side, partially attributing India's technological development to Russia, as well as Russia recognizing that the only reason its defence industry is still alive is due to India.

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Chapter 3

India US Relations

The relationship between India and the US can be traced prior to the British withdrawal from the Subcontinent and declaration of India as an independent nation. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the US was one of the main inciters for exit of the Great Britain from its colonial territories in the Subcontinent (Tahir-Kheli 1997). These initial US policy postures seemed to indicate as to what shape the relationship between India and the US would take in the future.

These initial overtures were further strengthened by the commonalities such as the US being the strongest democracy and India being the largest democracy in the world, rules based governance and multicultural societies. These constants indicated that their relation would be close and cooperative in diplomatic engagements in bilateral relations as well as in the international fora. Notwithstanding the above prognosis, the two countries started to drift apart even in the formative stage of their relationship mainly because of divergence in global affairs.

There were two main correlating reasons for these two countries to follow different paths, even prior to the Soviet diplomatic engagement towards India. The first reason was India's non-alignment policy. India regarded its own non-alignment stance as a model for other developing countries to follow (Tahir-Kheli 1997). This, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, fell outside the purview of the US contours of the international system as "the United States was unwilling to accept that there could be a middle way" (Tahir-Kheli 1997, p. 2). The US remained adamant on its dichotomous view of countries, regarding them as being either being democratic free world countries or the communist countries. This percept became clear when the US ambassador to India, Henry F Grady, remarked "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately" (McMahon 1994, p. 40). Even


as the pressure built up on India to indicate its side on the balance of power struggle, India chose to ignore the two pre-set avenues and preferred the avenue of pioneering its own path. India's choice and US' adamant dichotomous view of the world resulted in an ideological barrier of trust between the two countries.

The second reason which led these two democratic nations to drift apart was the near evangelist effect the non-alignment movement had on developing countries. This alluring effect went against American plans for developing countries. In Washington's eyes "[t]he Third World was a key arena for East-West competition" (Tahir-Kheli 1997, p. 2) and India's influence on such countries led the US to see India as an ideological adversary. India's non-alignment movement, unintentionally, opposed American foreign policy strategy.

Heartland, Rimland and US policy for containment of the communist threat

Washington's policy to deal with the threat posed by the communist ideology and the USSR had its genesis in the Spykman's Rimland Theory (Cohen 1991). In order to better understand the American strategy, it is necessary to understand both the Heartland and the Rimland theories.

Figure 5 The world according to Spykman (Gray 2015, p. 15)



Spykman's Rimland theory was a direct response to Mackinder's Heartland theory and both theories placed emphasis on two key regions of the globe, the Heartland and the Rimland – both terms also used in Mackinder's Heartland theory. According to these theories, the Heartland is roughly the geographical location currently occupied by the Western half of Russia and the Central Asian States. The Rimland is the geographical location surrounding the Heartland, spreading from Scandinavia through the Middle East, the Asian Subcontinent and ending at the Russian Far East. In spite of agreeing on the geographical demarcations in both theories, they diverge on the importance of each region.

According to Mackinder's Heartland theory, the Heartland is the region with the greatest potential to develop the next world empire, mainly due to its self-sustaining potential, disposing of vast fertile fields – requisite for sustaining a large population – and rich underground resources. In addition, Mackinder also pointed to the defensive advantages of limited access to seas, preventing the Heartland from being easily invaded by sea power nations (Knutsen 2014). On the other hand, Spykman claimed the Rimland to be the most important region as, although the Heartland is full of potential, it can be contained by the Rimland (Gray 2015). Boxed in and without access to the sea, avenue for power projection, the Heartland cannot exert its power on rest of the globe.

India's geographical position on the Rimland portrays a clear picture to the understanding of the important role envisioned for India in the American strategy to contain communism and Soviet influence globally. However, India's non-aligned stance frustrated this strategy. Furthermore, the Non-Alignment Movement attracted other countries of the Rimland, as was the case with Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, further undermining US' containment strategy towards the USSR. This allure by the Non-Alignment Movement was perceived by the US as competition from India. Competition which, in addition to the communist victory in China and the Korean War, helped to create a favourable environment for the US to take

Pakistan as its ally (Tahir-Kheli 1997). However, there was another regional event which expedited the alliance, the Iranian nationalization of oil.

In spite of this alliance's reputation of being created with the sole purpose of countering and containing the Soviet influence in the region, Alavi (1998) argues that the alliance originated from the need to address a different issue, the lack of Western influence in the Middle East and Subcontinent region. According to Alavi, this alliance was the direct result of the Iranian nationalization of its oil assets in March 1951. Further he explains that after the Iranian decision to nationalize its oil industry, the UK and the West found themselves helpless without means to intervene militarily as their regional influence did not have the required reach for such intervention. This led the US to cautiously consider the Pakistani option.

In the views of Pakistani officials, alliance with Washington was a matter of national survival, as the Indian military stood stronger from the start (McMahon 1994). Self-preservation and build-up in military capabilities were the reasons which since its independence Pakistan had been knocking on Washington's door to purchase military equipment, and repeatedly being denied (Alavi 1998). However, this predicament reduced in 1954 with the signing along with the US of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. The agreement gave Pakistan access to the much needed military hardware to defend itself against the Indian threat. In return, among other perks, the US gained the access necessary to station a listening post in Pakistan, with the intention of spying on the USSR (Khan 1985; Alavi 1998). As expected, this raised concerns in India against the US signing of the agreement.

The US-Pakistan alliance met harsh criticism from Indian leadership, who openly pointed to the less than flattering track record of American policy makers to befriend and actively assist non-democratic regimes around the world (Tahir-Kheli 1997). For American policy makers, the decision to take Pakistan as an ally was not straight forward. In spite of India's demonstrated

neutral stance during the Cold War, Washington was aware of the important role India could potentially play in the regional balance of power (Alavi 1998). For this reason, US' alliance with Pakistan was guardedly tailored to try to minimise negative effects on India and the overall regional balance of power.

One such example of US sensitivities regarding the impact of this alliance would have on India was the safeguard in Article I, (Khan & Emmerson 1954, p. 339) that stated:

[t]he Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nations. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

Article I carefully limited and dictated the reach of US provided equipment to be used by the Pakistani military, and in spite of Pakistani attempts to “define aggression in wider terms, to cover Indian contingency” (Khan 1985, p. 89), the US further limited the scope of the alliance, by making it applicable only against the communist threat. By imposing restrictions on US originated equipment to only be used for self-defence, among other more restricting uses, the US ensured India that the regional balance of power would not skew in favour of Pakistan. A move which in Washington's view, would allow for the maintenance of cordial relations with New Delhi. In spite of these safeguards, US equipment sold to Pakistan to bolster its defence against the Communist expansion were put to use against India in 1965 as a last resort to attempt to change the balance in the Kashmir conflict (Ayooob 1982).

Nevertheless, the sum of Washington's efforts in not upsetting the regional balance had limited success. Addressing its internal audience, Pakistani policy makers overly exaggerated by claiming the agreement would raise Pakistan to equal grounds fronting India. On the other side of the border, Indian nationalists concurred with the Pakistani view on the agreement (Alavi 1998), concluding that the American proximity to Pakistan was contrary to Indian interests

(Tahir-Kheli 1997). As a result, Washington created a difficult diplomatic ground to navigate in South Asia.

To a certain degree, the US relationship with India was shaped by the US-Pakistani alliance. Washington's approach to the two Subcontinent rivals was to balance any and all assistance provided, with a similar assistance to the other country. For instance, to balance off against its alliance with Pakistan, the US aimed to become a "major supporter of Indian economic development plans, granting it more than US\$10 billion in assistance" (Tahir-Kheli 1997, p. 3). However this was not enough to appease Indian policy-makers and criticisms of Washington's foreign policy were often externalised. In contrast, when it came to US' Cold War rival, India was less than willing to criticise the approach taken by the USSR on foreign policy matters (Tahir-Kheli 1997; Pant 2013). Indian criticism, vocalised by its highest political authority and holder of the office for external affairs portfolio, Prime Minister Nehru bemused US officials to the point that the US Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee, raised the question (McMahon 1994, p. 87) as to:

why Nehru himself, should, as it appears he does, go out of his way to be critical of the United States. [...] It is regretted if Nehru has such feelings towards the United States [...] However, it would not appear that he, as chief of state, would not criticize us publicly, but would tell us privately in a constructive way. It would not appear that he is forced by public opinion or by his officials to make such statements, since they are in many cases more extreme than those held by either.

One example of this *quasi* anti-American stance was India's tendency to position itself against the US in the United Nations. By doing this, India became an active thorn in US diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. This was especially clear on matters relating to the Korean War and by India's vocal criticism to the US' participation in the Vietnam War. On the other hand, Soviet aggressive actions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan were overlooked by India (Tahir-Kheli 1997; Pant 2013).

The US military assistance to Pakistan, as previously explained, never had the intention of shifting the balance of power against India. Washington's aim was strictly to shift the balance of power against the Soviet Union. However, as explained in depth in Chapter 2, American assistance to Pakistan was a compelling factor in further pushing India towards the Soviet Union.

The first couple of decades of an independent India served as a slow souring environment for the relationship between the US and India. The peak low in this relation can be pointed to two main events in 1971. Firstly, American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China. Second, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, which, overtly, resulted on the independence of Bangladesh, but had deep background implications to the overall India-US relationship.

Kissinger's visit to China, once it became public, had a disturbing impact on Indian policy maker's mindset. By 1971, India was trying to settle itself amid both the Pakistan-US and the Pakistan-China environment. This was a challenging environment for India as during peace times, the US provided military hardware to Pakistan, but during India-Pakistan war demonstrated limited support to Pakistan. During the 1971 war, China was feared to stepping in and providing Pakistan with the necessary material to continue fighting against India (Singh 1984). Kissinger's visit to China, visit facilitated by Pakistani officials (Tahir-Kheli 1997), meant the perilous regional diplomatic neighbourhood India faced and exponentially turning more complicated security dynamics. As per an Indian policy maker, the possibility of a tri-state cooperation arrangement between Pakistan, China and the US posed catastrophic challenge to India's national security (Chakma 2005), bearing in mind that by the time of Kissinger's visit to China in June, India and the USSR were yet to sign the treaty of friendship between the two countries. Therefore, Kissinger's clandestine visit to China had a negative impact on the relationship between India and the US.

The second event in 1971 which helped that year to reach a low dip in the India-US relationship was the escalation of the Bangladeshi Liberation War. This Pakistani internal conflict lasted less than a year, nonetheless started to have external implications, especially in India, as the East Pakistani citizens fled the conflict towards the bordering India (Rajan 1972; Ahmed 1988), provoking grave problems for India (Walt 1988). Challenged by the problems imposed by the overflow of refugees through its borders with Pakistan – as well as the fear of the implications a strong nationalist victory in Bangladesh would provoke in India's internal cohesiveness (Ahmed 1988) –, India decided to intervene in Pakistan, leading to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. The greatest factor to influence negatively the relationship between India and the US during the 1971 war was the US' response to the conflict by dispatching the USS Enterprise Strike Group to the Bay of Bengal, in order to demonstrate its presence to support Pakistan (Tahir-Kheli 1997; Chakma 2005; Ahlawat 2013; Lee 2014; Gopal & Ahlawat 2015). The long-term implication of the American manoeuvre in the Bay of Bengal was the Indian pursuit of the nuclear bomb as a deterrence strategy against coercion from foreign powers.

After reaching a low in the Indo-US relations in the 1970s, the circumstances motivated India and the Soviet Union to straighten their diplomatic ties. After disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of Russia as a successor state, a power vacuum affected the close ties between India and Russia. This was the opportunity for the US to swiftly move in to fill the vacuum created by the Soviet/Russian withdrawal, and shift the balance of power in the region. On the Indian side of the table, the response by policy makers to the near non-existent Russian interest in the region, characterised by indifference towards the region which lasted the whole 1990s, was to “cultivat[e] ties with Singapore, South Korea and, to a lesser extent, Japan” (Ollapally 2009, p. 195). This new Indian attitude, approaching traditionally US oriented countries, provided the necessary platform for the India-US relationship to build upon. Moreover, India's broadening of its foreign policy agenda resulted in the US president “Bill Clinton's historic

visit in 2000, despite India's nuclear tests two years earlier" (Ollapally 2009, p. 195). Frankly speaking, India's 1998 nuclear tests proved catalyst for rapprochement in the US-India diplomatic relations.

Pokhran II Nuclear Tests

The reason why India's five nuclear explosions in May 1998 had a positive outcome to the US-India relations was based on the US perceptions of the explosions. The US was fully committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and India's tests were received with a sense of urgency by the Clinton administration to address this nuclear proliferation problem in the region. Washington's commitment allowed for senior officials from both countries to participate in 14 rounds of negotiations in seven different countries, coaxing both the parties to constructively engage in bilateral engagements (Fair 2009). Alongside the negotiations, in a letter to President Clinton, letter which leaked later, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed the nuclear tests were solely a reaction to the Chinese threat (Ranjan 2010). According to Ranjan (2010), the leaked letter caused China to angrily respond by pushing for resolution 1172. See Appendix I for the full resolution, resolution (United Nations Security Council 2015) which:

[c]alls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons [...].

The resolution was passed with unanimous approval by the Security Council members, including Russia, indicating the extent to which the Indo-Russian relationship had changed.

If on the one hand, the approval of the resolution condemning the nuclear tests ran by both India and Pakistan was undivided, on the other hand, a uniform punitive action against the two countries could not be agreed upon. Countries proceeded to impose unilateral sanctions against the two Subcontinent rivals. These sanctions varied from the absence of any castigating action,

as it was in the case of China and Russia, to a complete confusing response by France and UK, their response was to raise doubts on the efficacy of sanctions as a general punitive measure, to tougher sanctions such as imposed by Denmark, Japan and Sweden. Sanctions which consisted of suspending or restricting assistance programs towards the region. In addition, G8 nations managed to agree on freezing all lending to Pakistan which were of non-humanitarian nature (Brzoska & Lopez 2009).

The global response, although non-uniform, created a sense of diplomatic isolation of India. Isolation which India knew the best way to break would be by engaging the US, thus India approached the talks with a positive attitude. Attitude which included the disclosure by India's Minister for External Affairs to his US counterpart that he "was not there to negotiate, either to give or to ask for anything. [He] was really there much more to engage in dialogue" (Krepon 2008). For the US, there was more than just the non-proliferation matter.

India's nuclear tests were a setback to the US plans for the region. Washington's actions towards the region had already indicated that to American policy makers, India was the future Indian Ocean power, disregarding Pakistan as being such (Gordon 2009). Still according to Gordon (2009), American plans for the region included the empowerment of India in order to share US' regional burden of balancing against the rise of China. Vaughn (2004, p. 447) shares the same view and describes the converging Indian and American regional interests as a "strategic balance in Asia that prevented China from dominating the continent". Therefore, India had a much bigger role planned by Washington than India itself has imagined.

In order for the US to be able to invest in India's empowerment it expected India to comply with Washington's terms on nuclear matters. Indian approach to the negotiations was to let time dilute the American objections to India as a nuclear armed country. As Washington's senior official to the negotiations, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated: (Krepon 2008),

“India’s strategy was to play for the day when the United States would get over its huffing and puffing, and with a sign of exhaustion or a shrug of resignation, accept a nuclear-armed India”. This day came in March 2006 when US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced they reached an agreement on the nuclear deal.

The agreement was a compromise by both the countries. India disclosed its civilian nuclear research sites and accepted the scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency, while the US softened its stance by changing US laws to allow the transfer of technology and nuclear fuel to a country non-signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (Woods 2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, India’s energy safety strategy relies on nuclear power and India is far from being self-sufficient on nuclear fuel. For instance, Scott Woods (2006) calculates that the entire estimated uranium ore reserves available in India are only capable of fuelling India’s intended 20 reactors for 33 years. In addition, India’s uranium enrichment capabilities are far from the required level to fuel the ambitious 20,000 MW total nuclear energy output planned by 2020 for India’s energy security. However, the deal with the US allowed for much more than nuclear cooperation. With this deal, the US could transfer military technology to India, and this is exactly what happened. India could finally start to achieve its long sought goal of diversifying the origin of its military hardware, addressing its issue of relying on a sole supplier for its military hardware.

Military Cooperation

In previous decades the vast majority of military hardware operated by India was of Soviet origin, as discussed in details in Chapter 2. India’s heavy reliance on Soviet hardware was not a matter of choice, but necessity. Although one of the characteristics of the Soviet/Russian equipment is its highly competitive pricing in contrast to Western origin hardware, India’s diversification of military suppliers comes as a priority on India’s military strategy, pricing having little influence on this matter. Along with the necessity to diversify, India also had the

backing of decades of outstanding economic growth to support an increase in military spending associated with the higher price of Western hardware (Dasgupta & Cohen 2011).

The agreement opened the doors to, not only American military equipment, but also to American technology based equipment developed by third countries. One such case is Israel. India has increasingly turned to Israel for high technology items such as electronic warfare equipment and precision-guided munition. As a result, the India-Israel military trade increased to over \$2 billion annually (Dasgupta & Cohen 2011).

When it comes to purchases from the US, it became apparent that India has decided to focus on aircrafts. Heavily reliant on outdated Soviet/Russian equipment for its air force, depending on Russian parts for over 75 per cent of its aircrafts (Khripunov & Srivastava 1999; Lee 2014), India's purchase of American aircrafts would not only assist in raising India's military capabilities but also help in diversifying such an important sector of modern warfare. The purchase in 2009 of eight P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft, a state-of-the-art aircraft capable of mid-air refuelling specially crafted for anti-submarine warfare and an improvement to the P-3 Orion operated by Pakistan, in a deal worth US\$3.9 billion (Sakhuja 2013) enhanced India's area-denial and anti-submarine warfare capability in the Indian Ocean.

India also turned to the US for acquisition of aircrafts to compose the logistical backbone of the Indian armed forces. In a deal summing to US\$1 billion, the Indian air force welcomed the addition of 6 C-130j transport aircrafts also in 2009 (Dasgupta & Cohen 2011). In addition, with the purchase of 10 C-17 Globemaster III aircrafts (Dhindsa 2014), India became the largest international customer of this colossal transport aircraft.

When it comes to India's fighter jets modernisation, it appears there are some uncertainties as to in which direction to move forward. India's initial plan was for the purchase of 126 medium multi-role combat aircrafts, in a tender program which was known by its acronym MMRCAs,

however, this purchase didn't materialise (Panda 2015). Instead, Prime Minister Modi apparently made a captain's call for the purchase of 36 French manufactured Rafale jets. However, this purchase is repeatedly being delayed (Gady 2015). In spite of these uncertainties, India shows cohesiveness towards its clear intent of diversifying its military hardware as both American made F/A-18 and F-16 were offered to India during the tender process and both were deprecated in favour of the French aircraft.

It is likely that there is more towards the decision of rejecting the American fighter planes. As it was stressed out in Chapter 2 of this paper, India is attempting to build up its indigenous research and development of military capabilities, reducing its dependence on foreign hardware. For this, India must rely on technology transferred upon the acquisition of new hardware. Military technology transfer from Washington is seen with a touch of scepticism by countries not traditionally skewed towards the concept of the US as a sole hegemon. One such example is Brazil and its FX-2 program of modernizing its air force and aerospace industry.

Brazil was offered, as with the Indian case, the Boeing F/A-18 as a contender on its FX-2 tender process. Along with the tender offer, the US government and Congress gave verbal and written guarantees to Brazil on fulfilling its part on technology transfer relating to the tender (Majumdar 2012). In spite of these assurances, there were still plenty of unofficial doubts towards these guarantees as Brazil also requested the exclusive rights of selling to South American markets. A deal with Boeing would most certainly restrict Brazilian produced F/A 18 fighters from being sold to leftist South American countries as these would most definitely be vetoed by the US government. India and Brazil share the same goal of developing their own indigenous aerospace industry and these same considerations must have been taken by both countries when deciding against the US option. In India's case, there is another aggravating issue as India is developing, jointly with Russia, a 5th generation fighter which India would, most definitely, not be able to use any technology transferred by an American contract.

Final Considerations on the Chapter

Much to the resemblance of how Indo-Soviet relations were hampered by Stalin's view of India, India-US relations were also hampered by the powerful figure of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. And even after his death in 1964, Nehru's political legacy of constructing the notion of the US as nothing but a menacing presence in the Asian continent continued to negatively impact the establishment of cordial relations between the two nations. At times, Prime Minister Nehru acted with less than the courtesy expected of a diplomat. Such expression of discontentment is today replicated by countries deemed of much lesser diplomatic prestige than India, such as is the case with the Venezuelan and Iranian leaders' demonization of the US President George W. Bush in the United Nations General Assembly. Actions of these natures were not expected from a country of the Indian prestige.

Most often, Nehru had the right to be displeased and concerned by US' policies and actions towards the region, however, Nehru's actions were inconsistent with the seat he occupied. One example of this was the manner in which Nehru expressed his objection to the presence of US observers to the UN mission in Kashmir in 1953. Nehru had made clear his rightful objection to the presence of US nationals in the team conducting the observation mission in the Kashmir region, mission which is still being operational in 2015 due to the still high volatility of the region. His objections were based on the fact that the US cannot be considered a neutral party as it provided military assistance to one of the parties in the conflict. The overall message was transmitted and is easily understandable even today. However, Nehru felt compelled to add a pitch of his lack of diplomatic touch by labelling these individuals as "*persona non grata*" (McMahon 1994, p. 173).

Nehru's negative approach towards the West shifted American opinions on India to the point where American aid, in the form of grains, to the starving Indian population in 1953 was slowly debated in the US Congress on the merits of whether or not to assist the Indian populations

when its leader positions himself in such a negative way towards the US (McMahon 1994). Nehru's response to this was: "The way in which you are handling our request for grain is insulting and outrageous. If we go through centuries of poverty and millions of people die of hunger, we shall never submit to outside pressure" (McMahon 1994, p. 97). In other words, his own personal opinion of the US had more importance than the wellbeing of the average Indian folk.

Nehru set the tone to the Indo-American relationship for the duration of the Cold War. With the demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, India changed its posture on dealing with the US. Not only did the relationship between these two countries changed in a positive manner, but India had also changed in the international fora to an essential player in the world economic stage. India's aperture to other international actors helped to improve Indo-American relations. However, it was the series of nuclear tests conducted by India which pushed these two countries to actively engage each other, which in turn, helped to build their confidence in one another. The improvement in Indo-American relations was the necessary step towards India's long sought goal of diversification of its military hardware.

In sum, India has evolved into an engaging international actor with a strong economy. Its diplomatic prestige can be corroborated by the United Nations General Assembly's acceptance of discussion on reforms in the United Nations institutions. Its relationship with the US, in spite of suffering from lows during the Cold War, is currently in ascension, mainly given their common interests in countering the rise of China.

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Chapter 4

Balance of Power, Balance of Threat and Power Dynamics in the Indian Subcontinent

After independence in August 1947, Indian policy makers failed to take into consideration the power of other countries whilst developing India's own defence strategy. In other words, Indian policy makers did not accept that a third country's increase in military power, China for instance, in relation to India's own power should influence India's defence strategy towards balancing by building-up its own military capability. Based on such equivocated perception, Indian leadership developed an illusion that "no country would be aggressive towards a peace-loving country like India" (Ahlawat 2013, p. 2), argument which led to unilateral adoption of the *panchsheel* policy (Gopal & Ahlawat 2015).

As discussed in Chapter 2, this policy became a near invitation to countries with territorial disputes with India to settle their claims with the use of force. The 1962 war with China demonstrates how utopian it was, and still is, to expect other countries not to take advantage of their relative military superiority to forward their own interests. There are many advocates in the Liberalist camp of International Relations Theory who argue in favour of the role of liberal institutions in the maintenance of peace and stability, denying the role played by balance of power in the international fora. However, in real terms, power play constitutes the essence in the relations between two countries. And thus far, no other theory has been better equipped to underline international actors and their power than Realism and its derivative theories.

Throughout the chapters in this thesis, there are several brief mentions as to how one of Realism's theory's derivative, Balance of Power, is at play in India's relations with Pakistan, Russia/USSR, US and China. This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of balance of power and threat in the relations with the above mentioned countries.

Kenneth Waltz and Balance of Power

Amidst the uncertain grounds laid by the end of the Cold War, Realism and Balance of Power became easy targets for those who criticized the arguments proposed by these theories. The reason for this, in special in the case of Balance of Power, was that within a short timeframe the international system transformed from what seemed to be a balanced bipolar system, into a heavily skewed and unbalanced system where the US held, and still holds, the status of hegemon. Furthermore, critics claimed realism failed to “predict or anticipate” (Pashakhanlou 2014, p. 295) this event and how the following world system should be setup.

Kenneth Waltz’s response to such critics is simple and direct, lecturing them on his view as to what is a theory and how Balance of Power should be used. According to Waltz, theories are simplifications of realm. In his words, “a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity” (Waltz 1997, p. 913). Given the limitations of a mentally formed picture, not all angles to the subject can be known. Therefore, theories cannot account for black swans, and if there is a clearer example in history of a black swan event, that is the fall of the Soviet Union. Waltz also claims that if it was that case of knowing all the elements of a realm, such as black swan events, “theory would serve no purpose” (Waltz 1997, p. 913). Furthermore, other criticisms were being directed straight to one of Waltz’s main contribution to Balance of Power theory in which he argues that countries have the tendency to balance against a more powerful country, in contrast to band wagoning with that country (Waltz 1997; Waltz 2000; Waltz 2008). Waltz’s argument has been, or so they think, debunked by those criticizing Balance of Power by pointing out to Italy’s choice of band wagoning with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, instead of balancing against Nazi Germany. Waltz replies by stating that “[t]heory does not direct the policies of states; it does describe their expected consequences” (Waltz 1997, p. 915). In other words, Waltz’s work predicts that a less powerful nation, labelled a junior partner, band wagoning with a stronger side will see his own power diminished, as the stronger

side borrows the junior partner's power, aggregating to its own, while the junior partner gains a temporary sense of security from the senior partner.

In the Italian case during the Second World War, Balance of Power could not have predicted Mussolini's choice, as this would certainly fall in the field of the science of the mind. And Waltz states that "[m]otives from which men act have nothing at all to do with the consequences of their actions" (Waltz 1997, p. 914; Waltz 2000, p. 86). Therefore, Waltz distances Realism and Balance of Power from the prediction debacle, alternatively treating both theories as tools for understanding the consequences of choices taken by leaders.

One such choice which can employ Balance of Power to be analysed is Prime Minister Nehru's choice to ignore Balance of Power as a whole, during the initial years of his tenure. As previously stated in chapter 2 and this chapter, India chose to disregard the seriousness of the gap in power between India and China, leading to the 1962 war with China. This choice can be directly linked to Waltz's argument borrowed from Morgenthau in which he compares "'a statesman not believing in the balance of power to a scientist not believing in the law of gravity.' Laws can be broken, but breaking them risks punishment" (Waltz 1997, p. 915; Waltz 2000, p. 87). India broke this balancing law and was promptly punished by China. Ever since, balancing power has been a key consideration to Indian policy makers.

The power struggle in the Asian Subcontinent during the Cold War cannot be isolated from the balancing acts being played globally. The global balance of power was extended to the Subcontinent after Pakistan allied itself with the US in order to balance and counter the Soviet expansion towards the Indian Ocean. As indicated on Chapter 3, the US sought Pakistan as an alternative to India, who decided to distance itself from alignment by adopting the non-alignment policy.

However, for Pakistan, it was an opportunity it found to close the gap towards India (Dwivedi 2013). This response by Pakistan is one of the options for balancing as argued by Waltz. According to Waltz, countries can balance internally, by increasing their own capabilities without outside influence, or they can balance externally, by joining an alliance against a perceived more powerful state (Waltz 1979). Pakistan chose to balance externally.

In spite of US' attempt not to upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan in favour of the latter, India perceived the US-Pakistan alliance as upsetting to the regional balance. Therefore, during the 1960s until 1980s, India was challenged to balance in two fronts, Pakistan and China. India's response was to become as closely aligned, without having to commit to an alliance, to the other pole of the superpower struggle, the Soviet Union. India's choice didn't consist solely of external balancing, India also sought to improve its internal capability to balance by developing its own capabilities in order to increase its own power, instrumental in balancing against both Pakistan and China.

Balance of Power is straightforward in the analysis of balancing acts such as India balancing against China, however, it becomes complex when it is employed to analyse India's balancing act against Pakistan, as Pakistan's power is far inferior to India's. Leading to the assumption that balancing against Pakistan is not necessary. To remedy this apparent discrepancy, Stephen Walt developed the Balance of Threat theory, a refinement to Balance of Power.

Stephen Walt and Balance of Threat

Balance of Threat is, in most regards, similar to Balance of Power, however the difference lies in the scope of the factors being analysed. While Balance of Power's scope is the power being exerted by countries, Walt argues that "states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone" (Walt 1987, p. 5), although he also ensures, as expected from a Realism scholar, that power plays an exceptionally important role in Balance of Threat. As such, power is one

of the factors taken into consideration for this theory. In this regard, and by simplifying by disregarding nuclear deterrence strategy of different nations, China should be construed as a formidable threat to India. While Pakistan should not pose a threatening challenge against India. However, it appears that the opposite is true, and that a new conflict with Pakistan is always unavoidable. While China must be closely balanced in order to avoid history from repeating itself, India should pay close attention to all Pakistani attempts to raise their own military power.

Walt's theory explains this apparent discrepancy by relying on factors other than power on its own. In Walt's view, countries take into consideration four factors while building up their threat perception of a third country, one of which is power. The remaining factors include their proximity to the other country, the other country's specific offensive capabilities and finally their aggressive intentions (Walt 1985; Walt 1987; Walt 2009).

In the Subcontinent scenario, the same level of threat generated by Pakistani and Chinese proximity should be perceived, as these two countries share border with India. This argument is backed by Walt's justification which points out to the inversely proportional nature of distance and power projection, concluding that "states are most likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant" (Walt 1987, p. 23). Therefore, distance wise both countries should raise the same level of threat to Indian security apparatus. However, as previously indicated, other factors are taken into consideration in Balance of Threat, such as aggressive intentions.

When it comes to aggressive intentions, Pakistan has historically demonstrated to have a revisionist posture towards the Kashmir issue. China on the other hand, in spite of previous clashes with India over territorial claims, has had confidence building actions assisting to appease all major heated exchanges on the disputed territory. In addition, the globalisation of the Chinese economy, the large volume of the two-way bilateral trade with India and their

mutual revisionist ideal towards multi-polarity has added hurdles to settling this matter through the use military force, as such military actions would lead to devastating negative opinion of China in the international fora. Therefore, it is easier to reach an assumption that India's threat perception of Pakistan is more prominent than India's perception of China, at least while considering aggressive intentions.

On the other hand, the capability to project power is also taken into account by Balance of Threat, and comparing to Pakistan, the rise of Chinese military has placed China into a much more threatening position to India on this matter. Such threat is clearly noticeable by considering India's recurrent mention of China in India's yearly defence reports (Garver 2002).

Figure 6 China's "String of Pearls" edited to add the port in Sri Lanka (Spinetta 2006, p. 8)



China's Blue-water navy build-up implies increased reach in its power projection. In addition, China's continuous gain of experience in operating aircraft carriers imposes further challenges to Indian security. If during the 1962 war with India the Chinese front was limited to the zone bordering India, a strong Blue-water navy is capable of opening a front in the Indian Ocean. This should be especially worrisome to Indian subscribers of the String of Pearls theory which

speculates on the underlying reasons for Chinese civilian ports built around the Indian Ocean (Brewster 2014; Khurana 2008; Spinetta 2006).

Balance of Power during the Cold War

The Cold War as a whole was one global scale balancing act between the two great powers. The US and USSR aggressively worked towards skewing the balance in their own side. With some differences, India and Pakistan were used by these great powers in the regional and global balancing act. Most noticeable differences are that, in spite of Pakistan's lesser potential to aggregate power to the US compared to India, its geo-strategic position played an important role in the American containment strategy of Communism, specifically after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India had a much larger potential to provide an impetus to the power of the USSR, however, India was averse to the idea of aligning with the USSR, which in return limited the impact India could have brought to the global balance of power. Overall, Pakistan sought the US assistance in order to balance against India. This balancing act by Pakistan provoked India to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union in order to balance the perceived threat exerted by the US-Pakistan-China block during the Cold War.

Final Considerations on the Chapter

Balance of Power and Balance of Threat have shaped the relations of states and the international system throughout history. From multi-polarity to uni-polarity transiting through the bipolar system, out of those structures, the one argued most stable by the Realist theory is a concert of powers, in other words, a multipolar system (Waltz 1979; Waltz 2008). The current world order, unipolar, is derived from the bipolar system which originated throughout the Cold War. The transition from the bipolar system to unipolar is one of the expected outcomes of the struggle between two competing states, where one fails to check the other's power. Although Realism

accepts the possibility of uni-polarity, Realist theory expects the world system to reconfigure itself into to multi-polarity (Waltz 2008).

In the Asian Subcontinent, the consequences of not observing and balancing against the increase in power by a threatening state, have led to the dire results expected by Balance of Power, as it was the case of the Sino-Indian war in 1962. Ever since, balancing has been an important part of Indian defence strategy.

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Chapter 5

Future Relations

Since its independence in 1947, India has played an important role in the Asian region as a whole and a key role in the Asian subcontinent. Notwithstanding the power politics played by the two super powers, Indian policy makers retained strategic autonomy to play an active role in the international fora to fight against colonialism and apartheid, support equality of nation-states and resistance to Cold War rivalries. However, just transcending its borders, India found its immediate neighbours entwined not only in the Cold War alliance system but also championed hostile policy postures towards India. India's initial response was to reject to support any of the two powers, favouring the non-alignment policy. However, as Cold War events started to unfold, it became clear that India's stance was of friendly neutrality towards the Soviet Union and neutral contempt towards the US. The above assessment is discussed in depth in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.

With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union, India was exposed to uncharted waters in its foreign and security policy. India found itself losing the strong partner it had in the Soviet Union. For this reason, India started opening itself, economically and diplomatically, in especial towards other Asian countries, as discussed in Chapter 3. The post-Cold War openness led to a new dynamics between India and the US by converging its foreign policy contours that included fight against international terrorism, support for democracy and commonality on rise of China. This common platforming also opened new vistas for both the countries to engage vociferously both economically and diplomatically.

Meanwhile, witnessing the downturn in the Indo-Russian relations, the US was quick to not only fill the gap but also engage India constructively, whereas the Soviet Union successor Russia, found itself scrambling diplomatic efforts towards mitigating its loses in the evolving

new global order. As it can be inferred from Chapter 2, one of the main factors which held the Indo-Soviet relations strong during the Cold War was the one-way arms trade from the Soviet Union to India. In the post-Cold War period Russia worked hard to maintain this relationship as a cementing factor between the two countries, however, one of India's major goal in the post-Cold War period was, and still is, to develop its own indigenous weapons industry, strategy to deter a rising China of its own volition.

Indo-Russian Joint Development of Military Projects

Russian leadership was able to identify the changes in the circumstances involving both India and Russia. For instance, the power which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union was not enough to allow Russia to be regarded as a superpower. This gave rise to the unipolar international system as no other country had, or currently has, enough power to compete with the US in overall terms. The Russian decline, along with it the Russian defence industry decline, came at the same time of India's ascension to global spotlight. Therefore, if on the one hand the Russian defence industry could not survive solely on its domestic demand, on the other hand, the rise in Indian economy and its subsequent arms imports from Russia were enough to maintain the Russian defence industry alive. The role played by India in the survival of the Russian defence industry becomes more prominent when isolating the Saint Petersburg naval industry. It is well known fact among Russian officials that without the shipbuilding orders from India, this industry would have collapsed.

One of the inferences that can be drawn from Chapter 2 is that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the cuts in defence funding for military hardware development, resulted in Russian military losing a cutting edge vis-à-vis defence related technology development by the US and other Western countries. Against this backdrop of cash starved Russian defence industry, India's goal of developing its own native defence industry became a perfect fit with Russia's need to share expenses to develop up-to-date technology.

The joint development of military hardware has become one of the foundation stones of the post-Cold War Indo-Russian relationship. Two major projects can be regarded as fundamental to this newfound dynamics between India and Russia. Firstly, the successful case of development of the supersonic *BrahMos* short range cruise missile. Secondly, development of a 5th generation fighter jet. While the *BrahMos* is being already test launched and deployed in Indian military installations. However, further joint research is being conducted to further broadening of its launching platforms from land and ship to include aerial and submarine launched versions, the 5th generation fighter is still at its incipient stage of negotiations between the two countries.

On the other hand, although the Indo-American relationship has vastly improved during the past two decades, but it has still not reached to the same point as the Russian relationship with regards to the joint development of military technology. And it is possible that this might never be the case. As explored in Chapter 3, the US is well known for its imposition of conditions of use and restrictions to foreign aid and technology transfers. The implications of this confining factor could be that India will not be able to employ any technology acquired from the US in India's joint development projects with Russia.

In general, with regards to joint development of military technology, the expectation is that in the next twenty years, India and Russia will continue to increase their cooperation on development of all sorts of military technology. These will range from continuing to assist India in its development of nuclear powered submersed vessels to the joint development of an Indian version of the recently unveiled T14 Armata, main battle tank, although no official intention of the latter has been publicly expressed so far either by India or Russia.

Military Hardware Supplier

The Russian monopoly over the Indian arms market is approaching to its end. Throughout the Cold War, Indian military's goal had always been to develop its indigenous defence industry and diversify its sources for defence equipment. The massive Soviet share over this market was simply the consequence of West's distrust over India's intentions and stance on the superpower clash. End of the Cold War gave rise to India's access to Western hardware, allowing India to finally pursue its diversification strategy with effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter 3, it did not take India long to take advantage of the evolving global system and have access to Western hardware.

For Moscow, the implications of losing its largest arms export market could pose devastating consequences to its ability to effectively balance the West and China, as sale of arms contributes to a large share in research and development funding. In addition to the examples provided in Chapter 3 on India's purchase of Western equipment, New Delhi to further bolster its diversification process has recently expressed its intentions to purchase 22 Apache attack helicopters from the US (Economic Times 2015). To countervail this diversification process, Russia has indicated that it will compensate the reduction of sales to India by opening its market to countries traditionally considered hostile to India, such as Pakistan (Gady 2015). The first indication of this shift was witnessed with Russia's approval of sale of four MI-35 attack helicopters to Pakistan (Sputnik 2015b). This comes amidst recent speculations on Russia and Pakistan engaging in talks over the acquisition by Pakistan of the Su-35, a 4.5 generation jet fighter (Sputnik 2015a).

Overall, in the mid to long term Russia will be deeply impacted by India's decision to diversify sources of its military equipment acquisition. However, Russian policy makers must not allow for this specific sector of the relationship to tint other sectors, especially joint development of technology. It is quite imperative for Russia to seek to minimise its losses by expanding towards

other markets, however, close consideration must be given to the possibility that even if arms equipment sale to India is reduced, the probability is that India will still have a larger volume in arms trade than Pakistan. Therefore, Russia must balance its sale of weapons to Pakistan by not upsetting the whole spectrum of Indo-Russian relationship.

United Nations and the Multipolar Structure

India and Russia also share similar interest of re-establishing a multipolar world system. On this matter, the major impediment to the re-establishment of a multipolar world order is the US. The warm Indo-American relations has slowly developed over the past two decades, only recently reaching the point of being considered by the US as trustworthy enough to access American arsenal once restricted to allies. More on this issue is explained on Chapter 3, where it is underlined in details as to how the 1998 nuclear tests worked as a catalyst to improve relations between India and the US. If it was the case for India to aggressively work towards diluting American hegemony and influence in world affairs, by pushing towards a multipolar structure, India might face a potential backlash by the US in the long run, impacting India's strategy of diversifying its military supplier, as the US might perceive such actions as competition. However, India plays a major role in American foreign policy for balancing the rise of China, fact which should help to balance the negatives and positives of an Indian attempt to challenge the US in a multipolar system.

American foreign policy does not have another alternative to India to balance the rise of China. The American strategy heavily relies on India's growth and capability of pulling its own weight in order to share the burden of balancing China. The closest analogue to this strategy, would be to employ Pakistan as a balancing actor against China. However US relations with Pakistan are souring (Pande 2015), and Chinese and Russian diplomacy have pushed towards strengthening their own ties with Islamabad (Mitra 2015). In addition, Pakistan's balancing power against China cannot be compared to India's as the latter is incalculably greater.

From Indian perspective, it stand on a complex yet favourable ground in the whole global power play. As a revisionist state, India shares multipolar interest with China and Russia although India must also employ safeguards to prevent China's unchallenged rise and China's use of its muscles against Indian interests specifically on the border as well as in the Indian Ocean. In order to accomplish this, India can rely on Washington and the West, as they also share the Indian perception to contain China (Walt 2015). Therefore, sits in the comfortable position of having the backing of Russia and China in the re-establishment of a multipolar international structure, while still enjoying the American and limited Russian support for countering the rise of China.

Russian support for India and a multipolar world structure reaches the highest arena of international diplomacy, the United Nations and its Security Council (NDTV 2015a). Historically, Russia, embodied by the Soviet Union, has been India's greatest diplomatic ally when it comes to the United Nations and in especial the Security Council. As it has been well noted in Chapter 2, on several instances the Soviet diplomats used veto power to protect India from damaging resolutions being voted in the Security Council. However, with the end of the Cold War, the once near unconditional Soviet support seemed to have faded and the Russian diplomacy, trying to gain points with the West in order to insert itself into the club of Western nations, forwent its influence in the Security Council on matters relating to India. This change in dynamics became clear with Russia's refusal to veto the condemnation of Indian nuclear tests in 1998. However, since President Putin's first term in 2000, Russian diplomacy seems to be back on track towards supporting India in international matters and although Russia does not stand alone on its push for the Indian inclusion as a permanent member of the Security Council, as Washington has also signalled a positive attitude towards this matter, Russia can still be regarded as a time tested and trusted partner of India.

In spite of the support enjoyed by India from the US and Russia, India will still face harsh opposition from China regarding expansion of the Security Council, especially because Chinese current strategy is to avoid, at all costs, to address the matter (NDTV 2015b) and its common sense that it is not in China's national interest to have India as an influential member of the Security Council.

The relationship between India and Russia has substantial potential to benefit from their mutual understanding of restructuring the international institutional framework. This goal puts India in the same camp as Russia and in opposing grounds to the US. Both India and Russia can work towards this restructuring by allying India's notoriety for diplomatic reasonableness with Russia's expected revisionist stance. Adding to this equation, their mutual neighbour China also supports the revisionist approach to the world order. Both India and Russia need China, and the Chinese power that has potential to push for a multipolar structure. They also rely on China as a market for their exports, however, covertly, it is in the interest of both India and Russia to check China's rise beyond a set threshold (Pei 2014). While Western media and scholars debate implications of closeness of the Sino-Russian relations, India and Russia play their own balancing game against China, and the most shouting example of this is the superiority of Russian hardware being exported to India in contrast to the hardware being exported to China (Pei 2014). Indicating that, as is the case with the US, it is in the Russian best interest to maintain India strong in order to balance China.

Energy and Nuclear Cooperation

The energy sector is the mainstay that holds the Russian economy; India is renowned for its rapid growth, which in turn put great strain on the energy sector, resulting in energy shortages. These two countries have the potential to develop an even closer partnership in the energy sector as they have agreed on joint development of the military technology. However, based on the geographical distance, this does not seem to be the case at least in next twenty years or so.

India's geographical location makes the Middle Eastern region extremely attractive for energy imports. As discussed in Chapter 2, with nothing but the Arabian Sea separating India from the energy rich Persian Gulf, it should not take much to convince Indian policy makers of the short-term benefits of relying on the Middle East region for India's energy security. Although, in spite of its geographic closeness to the Middle East, Indian statistics on energy import indicate a push towards diversification of its reliance on energy from the Middle East to other regions such as Africa and Latin America. As seen in Chapter 2, Latin America has been the main winner in this case that remarkably increased its share in the Indian energy import market (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015).

Russia, has conducted serious research on feasibility of delivering, over-the-land, gas and oil derivate to India, however, all assessed alternatives include the construction of large sections of pipeline stretching over either Pakistan or China, increasing the complexity over this matter.

On the other hand, there is feasibility of the two countries enhancing their nuclear cooperation to the point of becoming a new *forte* in the relationship. However, the US also holds stakes in the development of Indian nuclear power program, bringing competition to this area. However competitive this area might become, Russia has the upper hand as it has been, historically, a reliable partner to India also on nuclear matters. While the US, on the other hand, has previously withdrawn itself from civil nuclear cooperation with India in order to express its dissatisfaction towards Indian nuclear tests (Balachandran 2010).

Final Considerations on the Chapter

In general, the outlook for the future of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership points to a positive and less mutually dependent relationship. This relationship is currently going through a minor shift induced by India's rapprochement with the US and the West over India's pursuit for its arms diversification strategy. Meanwhile, Russia must wait on India to assess exactly the

extent to which this shift will affect Russia's position as a defence supplier to India. The reason for Russia to wait is that India, in many ways, has overtaken Russia in the global influence and economy sphere. And in this specific dynamic, it seems like Russia currently depends more on India than the opposite.

India's inclusion in the Western sphere of trustworthy nations should not be a cause for strain on the relationship between India and Russia. The main reason these two countries should actively work towards enhancing their relationship, in spite of any Indian shift towards the West, is that the two countries share the same interests, both on the restructuring of the international institutional framework and on balancing the rise of China. On this matter, it is difficult to conceptualize a multipolar world without the presence of India and Russia as poles, however, the concept of a bipolar world made of US and China as main actors can be easily imagined, making the Indo-Russian relationship key for the rise of a multipolar world order instead of a bipolar. In other words, India needs Russia just as much as Russia needs India in order to shape the next structure of the international system to their interest. In addition, Russian and Indian diplomacy mutually regard each other as equals in the international fora while the US' approach to India is still that of using India as merely a tool for its containment strategy of the Chinese rise.

If on the one hand the volume of arms trade between India and Russia will drop, on the other hand, their engagement over the joint development of new technologies will continuously help to solidify this strategic partnership. Any attempt by American diplomacy to offset this specific factor of the Indo-Russian dynamic will be met with scepticism from the Indian side given American intricacies on technology transfer.

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Chapter 6

Conclusion

The research questions in this thesis was set out with the purpose of increasing the body of knowledge available on the future of the Indo-Russian relationship. The theories chosen to conduct this research relied heavily on the Realist theory, in especial employing Balance of Power and Balance of Threat as lenses to analyse the past, present and short term future of the Indo-Russian relationship.

The two questions which were proposed to be answered by this research are directly related to the addition of the US into the Indo-Russian relationship dynamic. The first question enquires on what are the main underlying reasons for the recent Indian diplomatic drift towards the US. The second question takes the perspective of a Russian policy makers in order to answer what are the major implication of increased Indo-American cooperation. In addition, this research also posed the complementary question of how can Russia act in order to maintain the best level of cooperation with India

This research uncovered several factors which, when put together, help to create a comprehensive answer to the first question. First of all factors, the diplomatic distancing which moved India and the US in opposite directions during the Cold War was the dire consequence of the American inability to deal with non-alignment as a viable alternative to alignment. India's choice of following non-alignment should not have affected the Indo-American relationship in the negative manner it did, and in spite of several events of discourtesy by Indian leadership, the estrangement in the relations between the strongest democracy and the largest democracy should never had reached the negative threshold it did during the Cold War.

Second factor taken into consideration is that the closeness reached in the Indo-Soviet relationship during the Cold War was a direct consequence to the American policy targeting the containment of the Soviet Union. This policy consisted mostly of equipping Pakistan with advanced weapons in order to create a first line of defence against the Soviet threat. Arming Pakistan resulted in pushing India into the Soviet sphere of influence, as India saw the possibility of becoming the weaker side in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

Indian policy maker's found in the Soviet Union the arms supplier it desperately needed to maintain itself ahead of Pakistan in the regional balance of power. Nonetheless, in spite of having its arms requirements being met by Soviet purchased equipment, India's goal on this matter was, and still is, to diversify its arms supplier. Albeit repeated attempts to achieve this goal during the Cold War, India was only able to effectively diversify its military hardware after the end of the Cold War as the US and the West started trusting India.

The third factor taken into consideration is that the end of the Cold War served as a reset button for the Indo-American relationship. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the geography books, the threat posed by communism to the US ceased. As consequence, India's negative status with American policy makers also disappeared. At the same moment, Russia was facing an identity crisis, which led Russia to disengage from its partners of the Soviet era, including India. Feeling isolated, India reached out to countries traditionally oriented towards the US. This measure proved benchmark in the improvement of the Indo-American relationship.

The final factor is the rise of China. In spite of decades of peace and confidence building measures between India and China, these two countries play a major role in each other's defence strategy, especially China on Indian defence strategy. During the Cold War, India's intentions for approaching the Soviet Union were not exclusively to balance against Pakistan, but also to

balance China and the current Indian balancing acts are, in their vast majority, intended at keeping up with China's power. In addition, the US acts as a stakeholder on the balanced rise of China by also closely balancing China, this makes India and the US closely aligned towards the same goal.

By joining these four factors, a clear picture is portrayed over the two main reasons for which India sought the US at the first opportunity. Reaching a simplified answer to the question, by considering the four above mentioned factors, India's reason for recent diplomatic drift towards the US is firstly driven by the necessity to achieve the Indian long sought goal of diversifying its military hardware and secondly to use the American power as a counterbalance to the rising Chinese power.

The Indo-American relationship flourished with the absence of the ideological barriers present during the Cold War years. In addition, the recent trend in American foreign policy of distancing itself from Pakistan, as well as the shared goal of checking the Chinese rise, which in the American strategy requires empowering India, worked positively towards improving the Indo-American relationship.

From a Russian perspective, the improvement in the Indo-American relationship has affected the Indo-Russian relations in an adverse yet limited manner. The major negative implication to the Indo-Russian relationship is the steady reduction of the Russian participation in the Indian defence market. Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, had grown accustomed to monopolising the Indian defence import market, in spite of India's repeated attempts to reduce its dependence from a single supplier. Indian choice to diversify its sources of military hardware should not be construed as a result of a change in the overall dynamics of the Indo-Russian relations as Russia is still expected to hold a place as a major supplier of arms to India.

As stated above, the improvement in the Indo-American relations reduced the Indian dependence on Russian military equipment, however, both countries still share commonalities which heavily work in favour of maintaining the Indo-Russian relationship strong and relevant. One of these commonalities is the mutual interest in restructuring the unipolar international system into a more inclusive and stable multipolar system. This shared goal works against the US, as it's the American interest as the hegemon in maintaining the current unipolar order. Therefore, Russia can work towards improving India's standing in international institutions such as the United Nations by aggressively pushing forward a Security Council reform agenda, a founding step into multi-polarity.

From a Russian perspective, the Russian losses in the Indian defence market can be overcome by increasing other ties in different sectors of the Indo-Russian relationship. Especial consideration should be given to the joint development of military technology, as this field seem to be out of the reach of American diplomacy given the American constraints over technology transfer. India has demonstrated desire and drive to increase its indigenous defence industry, in order to further reduce the reliance on arms imports. Russia can use this desire, allied with the favourable track-record of successfully developing joint projects with India, such as the case with the *BrahMos* cruise missile, to push for an expansion in joint projects. A push towards cementing the joint development of the 5th generation jet fighter could extend Russia's position as the go-to supplier of combat aircraft and parts.

In addition, Russian strategists must find an avenue to link Russian energy exports to India. In spite of several routes being assessed on their feasibility, none seems to be realistic in attempting to connect India to Russian pipelines from a geopolitical point of view. One of the proposed routes stretches over Pakistan in order to reach India. The political instability in Pakistan and widespread disapproval of India, casts off any chance of developing such project over Pakistani territory. Other route proposed links Russia to India through China. However,

the logistical challenges involved in constructing a pipeline through the mountainous bordering Sino-India region allied with the possible implications of relying on China to allow the uninterrupted flow of gas and oil towards India, makes this project's risks greater than the gains.

Overall, the Indo-Russian strategic partnership still plays an important role in both Russian and Indian foreign policy. The partnership has evolved throughout over the four decades of existence, adapting to the changes in the international system. In recent years, both India and Russia enjoy the same diplomatic status in the international fora, contrasting with Soviet dominance during the first signing of the partnership in 1971. The solid foundations created by Indo-Soviet diplomatic efforts remain unshaken even when tested against increased Indo-American cooperation in the fields previously dominated by Russia. The Indo-Russian relations will continue to progress in the following decades and will prove to be one of the main forces in challenging the unipolar world order.

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APPENDIX A

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**TREATY¹ OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS**

New Delhi, 9 August 1971

DESIROUS of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

BELIEVING that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between States with different political and social systems,

CONVINCED that in the world today international problems can only be solved by cooperation and not by conflict,

REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on one side,

AND

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,

1. Came into force on 18 August 1971.

HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed :

On behalf of the Republic of India :

SARDAR SWARAN SINGH,
Minister of External Affairs,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

Mr. A. A. GROMYKO,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,

WHO, having each presented their Credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :

Article I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

Article II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

Article III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all Peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other States

to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article IV

The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

Article V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual cooperation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

Article VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

Article VII

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

Article VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between

the two countries each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each High Contracting Party under-takes to abstain from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

Article IX

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

Article X

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

Article XI

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

Article XII

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the
Republic of India

Sd/-
SARDAR SWARAN SINGH
Minister of External
Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

Sd/-
A. A. GROMYKO
Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/5033
18 December 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

France, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and United States of America: joint draft resolution


The Security Council,

Recalling that in Article 2 of the Charter all members are obligateded to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Deploing the use of force by India in Goa, Damao and Diu,

Recalling that Article 1 (2) of the Charter specifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

1. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities;
2. Calls upon the Government of India to withdraw its forces immediately to positions prevailing before 17 December 1961;
3. Urges the parties to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be appropriate.



61-31323

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/5134
22 June 1962

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION

Ireland: draft resolution

- The Security Council,
Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the India-Pakistan question;
Having considered the Report of the United Nations Representative,
Dr. F. Graham;
Expressing its best thanks to Dr. Graham for his efforts;
Noting with satisfaction the pledges made by the two parties to the effect that their Governments will not resort to force in settling this question;
Conscious of the responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for helping the parties to reach a peaceful solution of this question;
1. Reminds both parties of the principles contained in its resolution of 17 January 1948, and in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
 2. Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on the question at the earliest convenient time with the view to its ultimate settlement in accordance with Article 33 and other relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
 3. Appeals to the two Governments to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of negotiations.
 4. Urges the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to refrain from making any statements, or taking any action, which may aggravate the situation.
 5. Requests the Acting Secretary-General to provide the two Governments with such services as they may request for the purpose of carrying out the terms of this resolution.

62-14043

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL
S/10416
4 December 1971

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United States: draft resolution

- The Security Council,
Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,
Convinced that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;
 2. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders;
 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to report on the implementation of the cease-fire and troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP personnel;
 4. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;
 5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;
 6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary-General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the subcontinent;
 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.

71-26670



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/10423
5 December 1971

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua,
Sierra Leone and Somalia: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add.1 and S/10412)
of 3 and 4 December 1971,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan
which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within
the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have
given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the
restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return
of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular
of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,
particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an
immediate cessation of hostilities and effect a withdrawal of armed forces to
their own side of the India/Pakistan borders,

Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all
measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on
the territory of the other to their own side of the India/Pakistan borders;

71-26719

/...

2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;
3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution;
5. Decides to follow the situation closely and to meet again as soon as necessary.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/10446/Rev.1
13 December 1971

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United States of America: revised draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971^{1/} and Security Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, adopted by a vote of 104-11-10,

Noting further that the Government of Pakistan has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI), and the Government of India's letter in document S/10445,

Regretting that the Government of India has not yet accepted an unconditional and immediate cease-fire and withdrawal as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI),

Gravely concerned that hostilities continue between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the declaration on the strengthening of international security,^{2/} particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

^{1/} S/10410 and Add.1, S/10423.

^{2/} General Assembly resolution 2374 (XXV) of 16 December 1970.

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter,

1. Call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. Urge that efforts be intensified in order to bring about speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. Call for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. Call upon all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet again as circumstances warrant.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Republic of India and the Russian Federation,

Proceeding from the mutual aspirations of the people of both States for strengthening and consolidating the centuries old traditions of friendship and cooperation between them,

Believing that the all round development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interest of both the States as well as the interest of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

Inspired by the common ideals of peace, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, non-violence and secularism,

Convinced that in the modern world international problems can be resolved only on the basis of cooperation, respect for sovereign equality, independence, territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for the principles of justice and international law,

Determined to continue their efforts to promote international peace and security, general and complete disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Reiterating their adherence to the Delhi Declaration on a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World,

Recognising that the present Treaty is a continuation of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of India and the USSR, August 9, 1971,

Resolving to develop actively their relations in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other spheres,

Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that peaceful, friendly and good neighbourly relations shall always prevail between the two countries and their peoples.

Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs.

They undertake to develop cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality, mutual benefit and MFN treatment.

ARTICLE II

The Republic of India respects the policy of the Russian Federation aimed at democratisation and de-ideologisation of international relations, development of equal partnership and cooperation within the international community, strengthening of universal security.

The Russian Federation respects India's policy of non-alignment and its role for maintenance of international peace, security and international cooperation for development.

ARTICLE III

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and security of all peoples and attaching great importance to their mutual

cooperation in world affairs, the High Contracting Parties shall hold regular consultations with each other at various levels on all important issues affecting the interests of both the Parties.

In case of a situation which in the opinion of the High Contracting Parties, constitutes a threat to peace or breach of peace, they would immediately contact each other for coordination of their positions in the interest of eliminating the threat or re-establishing peace,

Neither Party shall take any actions which might pose a threat or impair the security of the other Party.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties keeping in mind the objective of general and complete disarmament, agree that the process of nuclear and conventional disarmament including reduction and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction should be expedited.

They consider that reduction of armed forces and armaments to the level, dictated by the minimum needs of defence, will lead to strengthening security and stability at the regional as well as global level.

ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties would strive for further enhancing the role of the United Nations. They would deepen their interaction within the framework of the UN and other international organisations and institutions.

ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties shall pay special attention to the intensification of inter-parliamentary relations.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties shall assist each other in the development of mutually beneficial, economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation. Further, in accordance with their national laws and international obligations they shall also establish necessary economic, financial and legal conditions for promotion of business and other economic activities, bilateral and multilateral joint ventures and facilitation of foreign investments consistent with the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources.

The High Contracting Parties shall enter into separate agreements, wherever necessary.

ARTICLE VIII

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with each other in the field of environment by exchange of experience in sustainable use of natural resources, introduction of environment-friendly technologies and undertaking measures for the protection and restoration of the environment. They shall also render mutual assistance to each other in preventing and mitigating the consequences of natural calamities and serious accidents. Both sides would contribute to the formulation of an international strategy for protecting the environment taking into account their respective national concerns.

ARTICLE IX

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of cooperation in the field of education, culture, art, tourism and sports. The tradition of cultural contact between the peoples of the two countries would be furthered and academic, scientific and technological exchanges promoted in accordance with their national laws and

international obligations. Both parties would also extend cooperation in respect of protection of historical and cultural monuments. Separate agreements would be entered into in respect of all the above areas of cooperation, if considered necessary.

ARTICLE X

The High Contracting Parties shall promote development of cooperation and exchanges in the field of information by encouraging contact between institutions and representatives of mass media and mass communications.

ARTICLE XI

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to promote interaction in all areas pertaining to social welfare, health, including public health, protection against infectious and other diseases.

ARTICLE XII

The High Contracting Parties shall protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion and worship and rights of minorities, in accordance with their national laws and international obligations.

They shall also cooperate in combating crime, particularly terrorism, hostage-taking, unlawful acts detrimental to the security of maritime shipping and civil aviation, illicit traffic in narcotics and illegal trade in objects of cultural and historical value.

They shall undertake the necessary measures in order to render mutual legal assistance in civil, family and criminal cases and shall proceed to conclude an appropriate agreement.

They also undertake to oppose all forms of religious extremism, hatred and violence.

ARTICLE XIII

The rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty are without prejudice to their rights and obligations under any other existing bilateral and multilateral treaties to which they are parties.

ARTICLE XIV

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and comes into force on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

The present Treaty has been concluded for the period of twenty years. It will automatically be extended by every subsequent periods of 5 years, if one of the High Contracting Parties does not express its will to discontinue the Treaty, notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months prior to the expiry of the period.

Done in New Delhi on 28 January, 1993, in two copies each, in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic.



For the Republic of India



For the Russian Federation

Declaration on Strategic Partnership Between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation

The Republic of India and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Sides,

PROCEEDING from a desire to further consolidate their traditionally close and friendly ties to mutual benefit,

DRAWING upon their rich and fruitful tradition of cooperation in various fields accumulated over half a century since their establishment of diplomatic relations,

EMPHASIZING the fundamental and lasting importance of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation of 28 January 1993 which was a continuation of the bilateral Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 9 August 1971, of the Declaration on the Further Development and Intensification of Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation of 30 June 1994, and of the Moscow Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States of 30 June 1994,

CONVINCED that the further comprehensive development of their bilateral ties would promote progress and prosperity in both states and the consolidation of positive trends in the world as a whole,

SEEKING to impart a qualitatively new character and long term perspective to their multifaceted bilateral relations and to actively develop them in political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields, in the years ahead and into the 21st century,

PROCEEDING from the conviction that it is necessary to build a multipolar global structure based on sovereign equality of all states and peoples, democratic values and justice,

CONFIRMING their adherence to the common ideals of peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, non-violence and secularism,

RECOGNISING their special responsibility by virtue of being among the largest multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious States,

INSPIRED by a desire to jointly contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security, the democratisation of international relations, as well as to the promotion of the establishment of a new, just and stable world order,

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

DECLARE as follows:

1. The Sides hereby proclaim the establishment of relations of strategic partnership between them. Based on mutual understanding and long term confidence in each other, this envisages the elevation of their multifaceted ties to an even higher and qualitatively new level, while imparting them with a specially close and dynamic character, both in the bilateral field and in the international arena.

2. This strategic partnership between the Sides is based upon the principles of sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefit.

3. Such a strategic partnership would include enhanced cooperation in the following fields:

(a) Political

- convening of annual Summit level meetings;
- regular bilateral political and foreign office consultations on issues of mutual concern;
- closer cooperation at the United Nations, including its specialized agencies and institutions, at other international and regional fora;
- further intensifying their efforts aimed at strengthening international peace and security, general and complete disarmament, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- joint initiatives on key international and regional issues;
- informing each other of planned foreign policy initiatives in the international arena;

- non-participation in any military-political or other alliances or associations or armed conflict directed against the other Side, or in any treaties, agreements or understandings infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security interests of the other Side.

(b) Trade and Economy

- strengthening close cooperation within the framework of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation, as well as other joint bodies of business and industry representatives, with a view to expand trade and economic relations.
- deepening and diversifying cooperation in sectors such as metallurgy, fuel and energy, information technology, communications and transport, including merchant shipping and civil aviation;
- further development of cooperation in banking and finance, and improving credit and insurance facilities so as to promote bilateral trade;
- creating a favourable environment for mutual investments and guaranteeing their protection;
- simplifying customs and other procedures and promoting the removal of non-tariff barriers and gradual lowering of tariff barriers;
- establishing effective mechanisms for interaction between Indian and Russian entities with a view to achieve sustained expansion of bilateral trade in a long term perspective;
- encouraging contacts between regions in both countries with a view to promoting trade and economic cooperation.
- simplifying rules and procedures for travel by entrepreneurs and businessmen of both countries;
- further enhancing the quality and international competitiveness of their goods by, inter alia, promoting the joint development and sharing of the latest technologies;
- exploiting to mutual benefit the new opportunities arising out of the integration processes underway in the world economy;

- enhancing cooperation and coordination at international trade, economic and financial bodies;
- jointly exploring the possibilities of regional trading arrangements with third countries;

(c) Defence

- consolidating defence and military-technical cooperation in a long-term perspective;
- deepening service-to-service cooperation.

(d) Science and Technology

- promoting existing and new forms of cooperation in fundamental and applied scientific research, expanding the exchange of scientists and scientific information, establishing direct ties between scientific research/higher educational institutions;
- cooperating in areas such as oceanology, agricultural sciences, medical sciences and biotechnology, environmentally clean technologies, meteorology, standardisation, metrology and certification of each other's products.
- jointly exploring the possibilities of commercial application of the results of scientific and technological research and development.
- cooperating in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the peaceful use of outer space.

(e) Culture

- further promoting cultural cooperation and a wider exposure to each others' cultural heritage and achievements;
- activating contacts between peoples and organisations including in the fields of culture, education, mass media, youth and sports.
- promoting tourist exchanges and cooperation between tourist organisations in both countries.

(f) Other fields

- cooperating in the fight against international terrorism, separatism, organised crime, and illegal trafficking in narcotics;
- cooperating in rendering mutual legal assistance in civil and criminal matters and in matters relating to extradition, as well as in other related areas;

4. The strategic partnership between the Sides is not directed against any other State or group of States, and does not seek to create a military-political alliance.

5. Signed on 3rd October 2000 at New Delhi in two originals, each in Hindi, Russian and English languages.

**Prime Minister
of the Republic of India**

**President
of the Russian Federation**



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1172 (1998)

6 June 1998

RESOLUTION 1172 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3890th meeting, on 6 June 1998

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the statements of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12) and of 29 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/17),

Reiterating the statement of its President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), which stated, inter alia, that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and stability in the region,

Deeply concerned at the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and determined to prevent such a race,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the successful outcome of that Conference,

Affirming the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and welcoming the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty,

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

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/...

1. Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;
2. Endorses the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998 (S/1998/473);
3. Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
4. Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;
5. Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;
6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;
7. Calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;
8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect;
9. Expresses its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;
10. Reaffirms its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;
11. Expresses its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and /...

recalls that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;

12. Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;

13. Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;

14. Urges India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;

16. Expresses its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
