

Australian Frames in Indonesian Minds

The Contested Australian Image Among Indonesian Muslims on Salient Australian Issues in Indonesia

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
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Declaration of Originality

I certify that the research described in this dissertation has not already been submitted for any other degree.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge all sources used and any help received in the preparation of this dissertation have been acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink on a light blue background. The signature is stylized, starting with a large 'T' and 'B' that are connected, followed by 'Hapsari' in a cursive script. There are two long horizontal strokes at the end of the signature.

Twediana Budi Hapsari

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Abstract

The relations between the neighbors Indonesia and Australia have become interesting over the last several decades. The 'up and down' tension between these countries, is influenced not only by their governments, but also by their citizens' perceptions, about the other country. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world; with 87% of Indonesian (around 202 millions) being Muslims. As the largest religious group in Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims play significant roles in shaping public opinion within society. Since the Bali Bombing in 2002, there has been intense attention devoted to Australia and Indonesian Muslim issues. The cattle slaughter in 2010, the clemency given by Indonesian President to Corby (Australian prisoner in Indonesia) in 2012, and the tapping of the Indonesian First Lady's phone in 2013 are a few examples of issues that have raised the attention of Indonesian Muslim audiences to Australia.

Taufik Abdullah (2013) categorises Indonesian Muslims based on their attitudes and behavior related to the degree of tolerance to others. His three types are militant, moderate and liberal Muslims. This study investigates how members of groups within these three Indonesian Muslim types framed Australian issues. It further explores whether there are any distinctively different frames among them. This research applies second-level agenda setting theory by McCombs (2005) that examined both media and audience frames related to Australian issues. To obtain detailed attribution of media content, this research gathered data from all news within 2011 to 2013 from four Muslim group's websites (Arrahmah, Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia, NU online, Dakwatuna) and one general Muslim media online (Republika) that mentioned Australia. Meanwhile, audience frames were gathered from in-depth interviews with 28 leaders and followers drawn from militant, moderate and liberal Muslim backgrounds.

This research found that there are general frames of Australia that are mentioned by informants: Australia's generosity with scholarships and its outstanding educational system, its multiculturalism, its interference in Indonesia's internal matters, its alliance with the US and its imbalanced relationship with Indonesia. The general frames have developed over a long time period (for example the scholarship awards started with the Colombo Plan initiatives in 1963) and from the assumption of several conflicting events between Australia and Indonesia (for example, the Australian interventionist frame was shaped from the time of the East Timorese independence struggle, the Bali Bombing 1 and 2, and West Papua issues).

Generally, there is no broad dissimilarity of Australian frames in the minds of members of different Muslim group backgrounds. However, when it comes to specific

issues, interviews from each Muslim background showed different concerns about issues. Militant Muslim informants focused on anti-terrorism issue, while moderate Muslims were interested in the existence of Islamic values in Australia, and liberal Muslims concentrate on pluralism, human rights, as well as gender equality standards.

The significant factor that influences the audience-framing process is the informants' prior experience of Australia. General frames, media driven frames as well as peer group frames greatly influence 'inexperienced informants'. 'Mediated-experience informants' tend to have more opinions and assumptions than facts when they evaluate Australia. Meanwhile, 'direct-experience informants' constructed their frames on facts based on their direct experiences. Other factors like relevance, prior knowledge of the issue, group leader opinion and media frames also bore influence on a variety of issues.

Finally, by linking the informants' ideological backgrounds and experiences with Australia, this study found seven different models of Indonesian Muslim audiences and how they perceive Australia. These models are: 1) militant Muslims with no experience and 2) militant Muslims with mediated experience, 3) moderate Muslims with no experience, 4) moderate Muslims with mediated experience, 5) moderate Muslims with direct experience, 6) liberal Muslims with mediated experience, and 7) liberal Muslims with direct experience. Each of these has generated a variety of frames for Australia, especially when linked to relevant and important issues.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

In 2013, Edward Snowden's revelation of documentation of Australia's intelligence activities with regard to tapping the phones of the Indonesian president, his wife, and his inner circle caused the collapse of the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. The Indonesian Foreign Affairs minister, Mr Natalegawa, stated that this allegation had deteriorated Indonesian trust of and bilateral relations with Australia (Republika, November 4th, 2013). Even Mr Yudhoyono, the former Indonesian president, tweeted his disappointment in Mr Abbot response to the scandal, which reflected on this important matter and showed no regret (Antara News, November 19th, 2013). Subsequently, the Indonesian president demanded a new intelligence accord between Australia and Indonesia. Before that, the Indonesian government was withdrawing its ambassador from Canberra and cutting off the military and maritime cooperation related to the sea border and asylum control (Republika, November 30th, 2013).

Ball and Wilson (1991) portray the relationship between Australia and Indonesia as 'strange neighbours'. Even though both countries are geographically close, they face different circumstances that frequently lead to misunderstandings. Dr Kusumohadimidjojo (1986) explains the contrasting facts between both countries as follows: Australia is a wealthy country with a European civilization, while Indonesia is a relatively poor and overpopulated

country. Furthermore, Australia and Indonesia have different strategic cultures that make it even more difficult for both countries to agree. Australia has powerful allies, while Indonesia initiates non-alignment in international relations (Leece, 2015). These cultural differences also generated the problem of mutual trust, which Peter Leahy¹ (2015) states was what caused Australians to ignore Indonesia.

The contrast condition above leads to misinterpretation between Australia and Indonesia since both countries are on conflicting sides in approaching problems. Sulistiyanto (2010) explains that this misunderstanding is rooted in a fear perspective as a result of not 'knowing' each other well. For example, Indonesia perceives that Australia has interfered in Indonesia's domestic affairs, such as the East Timor and Papua issues, which placed both countries in opposite stances. On the other hand, Australia also fears that Indonesia will 'break up', thus involving it in a crisis if thousands of Indonesians cross over to Australia.

Yet, both governments should already be aware of each other's strategic roles for their own advantages as well as for international relations. Jeffry Babb, a Melbourne-based journalist, explains four factors that can be considered to portray the significance of Indonesia's role for Australia (News Weekly, March 4th, 2015). Those factors are as follows. First, Indonesia's large population is the fourth largest in the world and is 10 times greater than that of Australia. Second, Indonesia is also the world's largest Muslim majority nation even though it is not an Islamic nation. The third factor is that Indonesia's stable economic improvement is important as a market for Australia's goods and services. Finally, the new Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, has no connection to the New Order regime, which brings new hope for a better relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

Relating Indonesia and Islamic issues is easy since this archipelago nation is the world's largest Muslim population. Compared to the Middle East, as the Islam place of birth, which has around 20% of the world's Muslim population, 62% of the world's Muslim population inhabits Asia-Pacific, and 30% of that population lives in Indonesia (PEW Forum, 2011). However, Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular country. Indonesia has Pancasila (five pillars), the nation's ideology that places 'believe in one supreme God' as its first pillar. This first principle does not refer to a specific religion's God, which means that all Indonesians are religious; they can become Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus.

¹ Peter Leahy is the Director of the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra. He spoke in the Third International Defense and Security Dialogue on May 27th, 2015 in Jakarta

Mr Yudhoyono, the sixth Indonesian president, introduced Indonesia's international identity as a country in which Islam, democracy, and modernity walk side by side for the very first time (Anwar, 2010). Mr Yudhoyono valued this identity from two of Indonesia's main attributes: its status as the world's largest Muslim population, and as the third largest democratic country in the world. He assertively announced this new identity in the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) in Jakarta on May 20th, 2005. He based this statement on the country experiencing a peaceful power shift without bloodshed to a New Order regime – which was lead by Suharto, the second Indonesian president - that had ruling power for more than 30 years. Since then, Indonesia has been through a huge and tranquil transformation, holding elections not only for parliament members,² but also for the president, governor, and local regent or mayor, none of which was done in Suharto's era.

During Suharto's presidency, the New Order era, Islam was not an important factor that influenced the Indonesian policy, and especially foreign policy (Azra, 2000). According to Hasjim Djalal³ and Jusuf Wanadi⁴, as cited by Azra (2000), there were at least four factors that influenced Indonesia's foreign policy that did not include Islam as a significant component. Those factors were the national development, especially in social and economic fields; the national unity issue, which considers Indonesia as a plural state consisting of various ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religions; the justice and law enforcement, which affected the government's credibility; and the issues of democracy and human rights.

Although Suharto visited and opened collaboration with Middle Eastern countries from 1975 to 1996, Azra (2000) highlights these events as having economic and trade motives, rather than religious ones. However, Suharto's activities started to demonstrate more 'Islamic' motives from 1990, by visiting Samarkand in Central Asia and performing prayer in the Bukhara mosque, the birthplace of Bukhari, the most important hadith scholar in history, and performing hajj in 1991. Those activities invited speculation among international observers, who perceived them as fully political movements with the aim of gathering sympathy from Suharto's Muslim constituents (Azra, 2000).

Unlike his predecessor, Mr Yudhoyono has clearly named Islam as a part of Indonesia's identity to help reduce negative stereotypes of Islam. He is aware of the potential strategic role of Indonesia in international relations, especially after the 9/11 tragedy, which

² Previously in the New Order era, the general election was only for choosing parliament members by voting for certain political party. The president, governor, and regent or mayor was chosen by the parliament members who were elected in the general election.

³ Hasjim Djalal was a former diplomat and leading scholar on Indonesian foreign policy.

⁴ Jusuf Wanadi is a senior fellow and cofounder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), one of the most influential institutions during Suharto's era.

spread the fear of terrorism and led to an extended gap between Islam and the West (Anwar, 2010). Indonesia could play the role as a model for Muslim societies who succeed in forming a democracy, and as a bridge that connects Western countries and the Islamic world.

According to Anwar (2010), Indonesia's new international identity, which includes Islam, is directly related to the constellation of domestic politics after Suharto resigned. Suharto was well known to have constrained Islamic movements and forced all of the Islamic institutions to accept Pancasila as their fundamental values. Suharto also fused all Islamic parties into one party and restricted Muslim activists from their affairs. Yet the fall of Suharto's regime has created opportunities for Islamic parties to re-enter Indonesian politics (Perwita, 2007).

The rise of Islamic political interest in foreign affairs, for example, has spread from Palestinian issues to the number of demonstrations held, such as protesting the United States (US) military action in Afghanistan (BBC News, October 9th, 2001), protesting the publication of a cartoon of the prophet Muhammad in Denmark's newspapers in 2005, and protesting the film 'Innocent Muslim', which also harassed the Prophet Muhammad. Furthermore, the issue of the Iranian nuclear program that faced sanction from the US also led a large number of legislative members to raise this issue as 'unfairly targeting a Muslim country', since the US did not take any action regarding Israel's nuclear weapon development (Anwar, 2010). The allegation that Australia spied by tapping Mr Yudhoyono's and his inner circle's phones also invited a myriad of demonstrations from Muslim activists in Indonesia, such as Hizbut at Tahrir Indonesia, and the Islamist group Islamic Defender Front (The Guardians, November 22nd, 2013).

The growth in interest of political Islam after the Suharto era was marked by the emergence of Islamic political parties and militia Muslim groups (Perwita, 2007). Through both forms of movements, the Islamic thought has become closely involve in response to certain issues that have been perceived to be against Islamic values. For example, the cases of the Lady Gaga concert in 2012 and the Miss World festival in 2013 both provoked controversies among Indonesian society. Both issues generated enormous demonstrations held by a variety of Muslim groups and university students in Jakarta and several big cities in Indonesia. The result was the cancellation of Lady Gaga's concert (Kompas, May 27th, 2012) and the ban of the bikini session in the Miss World contest as a form of respecting Indonesian local culture and in response to the Muslim hardliner protest (Reuters, June 7th, 2013).

The level of participation among Indonesian Muslims in local issues as well as international issues has increased significantly, which can be seen from the amount of participation in each demonstration held by Muslim groups or organisations. Perwita (2007) explains this phenomenon as ‘symbolic politics’ or ‘collective construction’ by Indonesian Muslims. ‘Symbolic politics’ is connected to the circumstances of cultural politics that attracted political Muslim elites to propose a larger impact by their followers as well as wider Muslim society. The Muslim elites play not only an instrumental role for decision-makers, but also a significant interpretative role. The instrumental role related to gaining political support for certain proposed actions by drawing the attention of wider society in the determining of issue, filtering the conflicting issues, and supporting government legitimacy. On the other hand, the interpretative role includes issue judgment and social adjustment; the Muslim community can depend on the political symbol to overcome disappointment caused by the changing circumstances domestically and socio-politically (Perwita, 2007).

This collective construction has spread quickly and exponentially to wider Muslim society with the support of the media. Another achievement after Suharto resigned was the emergence of freedom of the press, which was restricted during his regime (Sulistiyanto, 2010). The appearance of new media companies is growing rapidly: within nine months after Suharto resigned, there were over 800 newspapers and magazines launched (Hamayotsu, 2013). The media nowadays not only disseminate news; they also interpret issues in accordance with the opinion leader and the journalist point of view. When it comes to bilateral relations and relating conflicting issues between Indonesia and Australia, a sharp difference is revealed.

There are some issues that become headlines in some Indonesian and Australian newspapers that could shape images of both countries’ relationship in the minds of both populations. An example of such an issue is the news about the death sentence of two Australians from the so-called ‘Bali Nine’, which was covered in different ways in both countries’ media. Australian media highlighted the issue by citing the Lowy Poll, which showed that 69% of the Australian population does not support the death penalty for drug criminals⁵; that the judges of the Bali Nine took bribes;⁶ and that the grandmother of one Bali Nine defendant begged for a chance for the defendants to live.⁷ Meanwhile, several

⁵ *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 16th, 2015. ‘Bali Nine’s Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran to be moved to Nusakambangan Island This week, Authorities Say’.

⁶ *Herald Sun*, February 16th, 2015. ‘Doomed Bali Nine duo to be transferred to Nusa Kambangan island this week ahead of their executions’.

⁷ *ABC News*, February 16th, 2015. ‘Bali Nine: Australian diplomats to meet authorities, Myuran Sukumaran’s grandmother begs Indonesian president to give death row pair a ‘chance to live’.

Indonesian media highlighted that the death sentence is not against International Law;⁸ the Bali boycott campaign in social media in response to the Bali Nine death sentence;⁹ the significant role of Indonesia in the battle against drug dealers;¹⁰ and the critics of the Indonesian government who wanted to delay the death sentence of the two Australians in January 2015.¹¹

The headlines regarding the Bali Nine demonstrate the different frames through which Australia and Indonesia portrayed in media. Australian media tended to be against the execution of the Australian defendants, while the Indonesian media supported the decision made by the Indonesian government to sentence the drug criminals to death. The different focuses on such an issue are understandable, since both countries have totally different backgrounds and objectives with regard to the issue. However, if this dissimilarity is not addressed, the huge gap and misunderstanding between two countries will be uncontrollable.

The following two examples will show the difference between the perspectives of Australian and Indonesian media. The first concerns the Australian teenager who was arrested in Bali because he purchased marijuana in October 2011. This issue became headline news in some Australian newspapers, but not in Indonesia. Indonesian newspapers simply relegated the story to their international pages, instead of placing it on their front page.

The reaction was different in relation to the abattoir issue that dominated Australian news in June 2011. Indonesian newspapers treated this as a headline issue for a week. Many Indonesians reacted emotionally to what they felt was a misinterpretation of halal practices in Australia. According to them, the decision to stop cattle exportation from Australia to Indonesia on the grounds that cattle were being tortured prior to being killed was not a fair one, because the video that showed this malpractice illustrated an isolated case. In addition, torturing animals is also against Islamic values¹² (Republika, June 2011). This issue was of considerable interest because it affected major industries in Australia (cattle production and export) and Indonesia (meat processing), as well as consumers in Indonesia. The issue was

⁸ *Republika Online*, February 16th, 2015. 'Indonesia Respons Statement PBB Soal Hukuman Mati' (Indonesia response the UN statement about Death Sentence)

⁹ *Kompas.com*, February 16th, 2015. 'Seruan Boikot Bali Muncul di Medsos Australia' (Australia's social media calls for Bali Boycott).

¹⁰ *Detik.com*, February 14th, 2015. 'Eksekusi Mati dan Peran Besar Indonesia Lawan Narkoba' (Death row and Indonesia's significant role against Drug dealers).

¹¹ On January 18th, 2015, an Indonesian attorney shot six drug dealer defendants dead, none of whom were Australians. *Arrahmah* questioned whether the Indonesian government hesitated to shoot them dead, compared to what happened to the Bali Bombing sentenced death in 2008. Therefore, *Arrahmah* published the article on January 19th, 2015. 'Kapan giliran WN Australia gembong narkotik Bali nine ditembak mati?' (When will it be the Australian drug criminals' turn to be shot dead?)

¹² *Republika Online*, June 15th, 2011. MUI: Sikap Pemerintah Australia Berlebihan. (Indonesian Ulama Council : Australian Government attitude was exaggerated)

connected with the lives of a number of people who conduct business in exporting meat to Indonesia.

Different Australian issues are not treated in Indonesian newspapers or perceived in the same way by Indonesian society. Treatment and perception depend on the importance of the story to Indonesians, meaning whether it has implications for the lives of a large number of Indonesians. The two Australian issues briefly described above illustrate that distinction. Within Indonesian media, the Australian teenager's drug charge was simply a criminal story, while the abattoir story had commercial, consumer, and religious connotations. Muslim beliefs and values about killing cattle were challenged.

As part of the religious culture of the Muslim majority (87.3% of all Indonesians), Muslim beliefs and values are carefully taken into account by news editors. In some cases, when the news pertains to Islamic values or beliefs, the news editor is expected (under the prescription of Pancasila Press)¹³ to frame the story in a sympathetic structure, so that it will not discomfort Muslim readers. For example, Kompas, the national newspaper with the highest circulation, reported on three church vandalisations in Temanggung, central Java on February 8th, 2011. Instead of reporting the incident in detail, Kompas portrayed the perpetrators' actions as 'being attacked by masses' without detailed information about suspected groups.¹⁴ Kompas also chose the headline 'the government failed to protect their people', instead of blaming the event on a certain group. It was a pragmatic decision that the Kompas editor made in not revealing everything to the population.

In line with advanced information technology, the online media are also growing; this is true not only of commercial media, but also of media owned by certain communities and Muslim organisations. Furthermore, technological advancement has led to equal access to media for promoting ideas and interest in Islam teaching, and to frame certain issues. Eickman and Anderson (2003) projected that this phenomenon would facilitate religious mobilisation, which can cause religious pluralism and disintegration.

For instance, the news that Australia's government granted AUD\$ 500 million to support Madrasa or Islamic schools in 2012 was framed in contradictory ways by two online Islamic media: Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). NU appreciated this grant and considered that Australia 'supported madrasas to complete their accredited

¹³ *Pancasila* is the five pillars, that become the Indonesian fundamental values. There are (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilised humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, and (5) social justice for all Indonesian citizens.

¹⁴ *Kompas*, February 8th, 2011. Tiga Gereja di Rusak Massa.

status as a requirement for quality schools'.¹⁵ In contrast, HTI online framed Australia as utilizing this grant to spread a 'liberal and secular' virus among Indonesian children.¹⁶

NU is known as one of the biggest Muslim organisations in Indonesia with a moderate view. NU's has around 30 million followers, and is rooted in traditional pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) that spread all around Indonesia's rural areas (Pringle, 2010). Each pesantren has Kyai as a charismatic leader, who is highly influential on his students (Noor, 1990). Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth Indonesian president, was one of the NU leaders. NU has a large number of followers and exists since 1926 within Indonesian society. As a result, NU's moderate perspective of Islam influences Indonesian Muslims themselves.

HTI is a transnational organisation that was found in Jerusalem in 1953 by Palestinian ulama, Taqiyyudin Al Nabhani. Its mission is Pan-Islamism and proposes the existence of Khilafah Islamiyah, the Islamic leaderships, and to establish Islamic Syariah (Islamic law) in all nations in the world (Nashir, 2013). Eliraz (2004) categorises HTI as radical Islamic movement that shares the indisputable fundamentalist declaration that legitimate authority belongs to God, and that therefore all political movements should consider Islamic law.

As previously mentioned, since the fall of Suharto in 1997 Muslim groups have emerged in wider varieties (Bruinessen, 2002). Taufik Abdullah (2013) classified Indonesian Muslims into militant, liberal, and moderate groups. Militant Muslims are those who are 'intolerant to the plurality of opinions' while liberal Muslims are those who 'possess an objective perspective that tends to detach them from Islamic symbols, and accept the existence of other religions as equals with Islam' (Abdullah T, 2013). Within this classification, NU is categorised as moderate Muslim, and HTI is militant Muslim.

Each Muslim categorisation above has its root of thought that shapes the group's way of thinking and that influences the way it perceives text in the media. Gamson (1992) identifies three ideal types of frame formation: cultural, personal, and integrated approaches. A cultural approach is developed from common individual frames, which is defined as a group discussion, Islamic groups included. Muslims within a certain Islamic group shape their opinion according to the way of thought in which they believe. A personal approach relies on experiential knowledge and popular wisdom. Both are influenced by their own experience with their groups. The integrated approach uses media discourse, popular knowledge, and experiential knowledge. Prince, Tewksbury, and Powers (1997) found that individuals'

¹⁵ *NU Online*, February 2nd, 2012. LP Ma'arif Peroleh Hibah Akreditasi 100 Madrasah

¹⁶ *HTI Online*, October 6th, 2012. 500 Juta Bantuan Madrasah Indonesia untuk Kepentingan Australia

frames do not exclusively depend on media coverage of an issue, but instead they demonstrated a capacity to introduce their own thoughts, feelings, and values, going beyond the information provided and drawing out basic implications on their own. Muslim audiences individually process the information from the media based on their experiences and previous references.

The present study examines how Indonesian Muslim media and Muslim group members frame Australian issues. The proliferation of Islamic interest in Indonesian foreign affairs in the post-Suharto era may either directly or indirectly affect the future of bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia. Furthermore, this study also investigates whether the Indonesian Muslim audience can be classified similarly to Indonesian Muslim society.

Research Questions and the Significance of the Study

Rizal Sukma, the CSIS Indonesian Political analyst, argues that it is an obligation for Australia and Indonesia to initiate deeper and closer bilateral relationship (Jakarta Post, October 2011). The importance of Australia-Indonesia relations rests in the shared mutual economic, political, security, and strategic interests between these neighbouring countries. Therefore, to build an improved relationship, a mutual understanding between the two countries is important.

The 2014 Lowy Institute Poll showed that 40% of Australians perceived Australia-Indonesia relations to be worsening; this answer was 24% higher than it was in the same poll in 2008 (Lowy Institute, 2014). This poll also revealed Australians' choice of China (31%) and Japan (28%) as their best friends in Asia, instead of Indonesia (9%). This result is in line with an Australia National University poll (ANU poll) about foreign policy, in which 55% of respondents viewed Indonesia as friendly but not as an ally (ANU, 2014).

The above polling results show that mutual understanding between both countries does not yet exist. Margaret Coffey commented that many Australians are embarrassingly unaware about Indonesia, as seen in the Newspoll report titled 'Australian attitudes toward Indonesia' (Coffey, 2013). According to the Newspoll report, released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 30% of Australians think that Bali is an independent country, and the majority believe that Islamic law is the basis of Indonesian law (Newspoll, 2013).

Conversely, Melissa Crouch, cited by Coffey in her article, stated that the most fascinating thing to happen in Indonesia – compared to other Muslim majority countries – is the dynamic debate about religion and the regulation of religion (Coffey, 2013).

Unfortunately, similar polling of Indonesians' attitudes about Australia is difficult to find. Two polls about how Indonesians perceived Australia were conducted by the Lowy Institute, which is the Australian independent institution located in Sydney, Australia. The polling was held in 2006 and 2012. The polling concerned Indonesians' viewpoints on Australia, their opinion of Australia-Indonesia relations, democracy, economic enthusiasm, terrorism, and other countries such as the US and China (Lowy Institute, 2012). However, this polling did not particularly explore the opinion of Indonesian Muslims about Australia since the respondents of this poll were not particularly Muslims.

To remedy the need for Indonesian Muslims' opinion about Australia, this study poses two research questions. The first concerns the image of Australia in the minds of Indonesian Muslims within both media and Muslim group members. Investigating the frames from both media and group members will provide a comprehensive picture of how Australia is framed. This research investigates the context of Australia is being framed by both media and group members rather than compares the frame of both subjects. Furthermore, to explore the reason behind certain frames, this study also aims to discover the moderating factors in the audience framing process.

As previously mentioned, Indonesia hosts a variety of Islamic thoughts, which can be classified based on their ideological backgrounds. The diversity of Islamic thoughts and Australia's images raises the second question of this study: do militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims have different images of Australia?

With regard to the Indonesian Muslim categorisation based on their ideological backgrounds that spread from militant to liberal Muslims, this study also investigates whether this categorisation is relevant to dividing Indonesian Muslims in terms of how they frame other nations, and especially Australia.

The aim of this research is to describe Australian issues in the minds of Indonesian Muslim audiences. To do so, this research examines the audience framing process as well as the moderating factors that influence the process within different Muslim group members from militant, moderate, and liberal ideological backgrounds. In addition, this study aims to discover a new classification of Indonesian Muslims in terms of the way in which other nations particularly Australia are framed depending on audience.

The significance of this research is in discovering the different images of Australia held by Indonesian Muslims; this can be considered beneficial from two perspectives. The first perspective is that of the Indonesian government; this study will increase its knowledge about the majority of its citizens in interpreting other nations, especially Australia. The knowledge is not only about the process of how Indonesian Muslims interpret Australia, but also relates to identifying the needs for collaboration and relations with Australia within this society. The other benefit is for the Australian government: this study will contribute a greater understanding of Australia itself when the government is aware of how other citizens interpret its nation. This study is also projected to contribute to communication science, especially in terms of audience classification that relates the audience's religious views and the framing process with regard to other nations.

Overview of Previous Research

Previous studies have investigated how Australia is perceived by other nations. One example is the longstanding research conducted by Jones and Jones (1965) into the perceptions of Malaysian students of the 'white Australia policy'. The other study is related to Australia's image as a tourism destination in the perception of mainland Chinese travellers (Hung & Gross, 2010) and backpacker visitors (Murphy, 2008). Both studies illustrate Australia's image as having unique natural attractions, such as the Great Barrier Reef, kangaroos, and koalas; comfortable living conditions (Huang & Gross, 2010); and friendly people (Murphy, 2008); but a lack of cultural atmosphere and historical heritage (Huang & Gross, 2010).

Smyth, Plange and Burdess (1997) initiated research into the image of Australia in the minds of South Pacific University students. The most common positive images found within this study were of Australia as a 'Big Brother'. The positive images perceived by South Pacific students were of Australia as sophisticated and technologically advanced, a good international citizen, a good neighbour in the South Pacific, and the most important is the future economy with Japan (Smyth, Plange & Burdess, 1997).

The other study concerning other nations' images of Australia's in the media was conducted by McArthur (2006); he investigated the cultural relationship between Australia and Japan in the media. McArthur found in his research that Australia was portrayed as a large and prosperous country in the Japanese media. All of the previous research about

Australia's image above generally shows the image of Australia as prosperous and advanced in technology and economics.

A comparative study of Australian and Indonesian media with regard to terrorism portrayal and Indonesian Muslim groups was conducted by Inez Mahony (2010). Mahony examined the news of Bali bombings that happened in 2002 and 2005, as well as the bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004. She chose *The Australian*, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, and the tabloid *Daily Telegraph* as examples of Australian media; and for comparison she chose *Media Indonesia*, *Suara Pembaharuan*, *Kompas*, *Jawa Pos*, *Republika* – all of which are nationally circulated newspapers – and *Antara*, the Indonesian official press bureau. Her study found different media portrayals of events in Australia and Indonesia. Some dissimilar descriptions were found, such as for example the terrorist label of 'Muslim extremists' by Australian media, version the name of 'other' in Indonesian media instead of attaching the label of Islam. Australian media also highlighted the reluctance of the Indonesian government to take decisive action against Muslim hardliners, as well as the role of Islamic schools as places for nurturing terrorists (Mahony, 2010). On the other hand, Indonesian media avoided linking Islam to terrorism and were careful not to misrepresent Islam within their reports. Mahony concluded that Australian media presented a collective stereotype of Muslim terrorism and reflected Australia's racist past.

What Mahony concluded about the collective stereotype of Muslims among Australians (which was shown in media frames) is also evidenced by the study about the Australian majority's perception of Muslims initiated by Lantini, Halafoff and Ogru (2011). Some focus groups' participants conveyed that Islam and Muslims are potential risks to Australia and Australian security. In addition, they believed that Islamist terrorists are deeply rooted within the faith and cultures where Islam is a majority (Lantini, Halafoff & Ogru, 2011). Furthermore, this stereotype was also projected in the latest polling of Australians' opinions about the priority of the collaboration that should be done by Australian and Indonesian governments. Their opinion was that the priorities should be security in the region and terrorism,¹⁷ besides people smuggling and asylum seekers (Lowy Institute, 2014). This polling result indirectly suggested that most Australians felt threatened by Muslims in Indonesia because Australians related Islam as the root of terrorist teaching.

¹⁷ The result of this poll indicated that 75% of respondents prioritised security in the region and terrorism as the most important collaboration that should be initiated by the Australian and Indonesian governments (Lowy, 2014).

Meanwhile, the polling result of Indonesian opinion was that the priority of the collaboration between the Australian and Indonesian governments should be in the fields of education (95%), health (92%), and trade (87%). Collaboration in counter-terrorism and stability in the region were fourth and eighth, respectively (Lowy, 2012). Comparing the Australian and Indonesian poll result above illustrates the difference in focus and interest in the issues of security and terrorism. On the one hand, Australians were concerned about the threat of terrorism and security issues that might relate to Islam; on the other hand, Indonesians did not see Islam as an issue, and instead perceived education, health, and trade issues as being more important.

From the 2012 Indonesian poll by the Lowy Institute, Indonesian respondents' images of Australia are that the country is advanced in economy (91%), a good place to study and to gain educational qualifications (89%) and a good place to visit (83%). This polling result strengthens Australia's image from previous research that concluded that Australia was portrayed as a prosperous country in Japanese media (McArthur, 2006), sophisticated and advanced in technology according to South Pacific students (Smyth, Plange & Burdess, 1997), and a comfortable place to live according to Chinese mainland travellers (Hung & Gross, 2010).

All of the research and polling results above have demonstrated the images of Australia perceived by other nations' people and media, including Indonesia. However, none of this research directly relates to Australia's image according to Indonesian Muslims, both media personnel and individuals. What interests Indonesian Muslims about Australia? Is there any different focus among militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims with regard to Australian issues? This study aims to find the answers related to Australia's images in the minds of groups with various ideological Muslim backgrounds, as well as their interest in Australia.

Assumptions and Limitations

This study uses qualitative methods to gather survey data about Australia's image in the minds of Indonesian Muslims from a variety of ideological backgrounds. Only a few leaders of Muslim groups from various ideologies and organisations were chosen for this study. To participate, individuals needed to meet the following criteria: he or she had to have been a member of an Islamic group for at least five years and had an important position within that

group. Militant, moderate, and liberal Muslim ideological backgrounds were the main reason for choosing an informant. The selected media were used to identify ideological groups from the literature from which participants were selected for interview. The frames in these sites in relation to salient Australian issues were compared with frames in the minds of the three ideological types. The data showed that one could conceive of seven types of observers of Australian events.

Moreover, there are also various types of Muslim organisations in Indonesia; therefore some informants were chosen based not only on their ideological backgrounds, but also on the type of organisations to which they belonged, such as pesantren, modern pesantren, Islamic political parties, and social and mass organisations.

Besides gathering data on audience frames from in-depth interviews with informants with various ideological backgrounds, this study also investigated the media framing of Australia from Indonesian Muslim websites. Gathering the framing of Australia from Indonesian Muslim media is important for two reasons: first, to obtain an overview of how Australia is portrayed in Muslim media; and second, to investigate whether the informants' image is influenced by the media frames.

However, since this research only considered a few informants and Muslim websites, the results of this research cannot be generalised. The results of this research will contribute a brief preview of how Australia is portrayed by Muslim media and Muslim audiences based on the chosen websites and informants. Further research should be conducted to examine broader Muslim media and various Muslim organisations, as well as those who are not part of any Muslim organisation.

Summary and Thesis Outline

Overall, a mutual understanding between the governments and people of both countries should be developed by encouraging a deeper and closer bilateral relationship.

Acknowledging how Indonesians, and especially Muslims as the majority, perceive Australia is important in order to understand the aspects in which Indonesian Muslims are interested. In addition, the Indonesian government also needs to understand how individuals of various

ideological Muslim backgrounds perceive other nations, and the moderating factors that may influence their framing process.

To obtain comprehensive knowledge about the image of Australia in Indonesian Muslim minds, this study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, discussing the background of Australia-Indonesia relations existing in the media, the influence of the Muslim majority in Indonesia in foreign affairs, and the importance of conducting this research. Chapter 1 also explains the aim of this research, its significance, and its assumption and limitation.

Chapter 2 explains the historical backgrounds of the establishment of Muslim groups and Muslim media in Indonesia from the early 20th century until the first decade of the 21st century. The establishment of Muslim groups in Indonesia has been in accordance with the dynamics of Indonesian political changes. Therefore, this chapter divides the time-line of history into four phases: the beginning of the twentieth century, which is marked by the fight for freedom from Dutch colonialism; followed by the first president, Sukarno; the second president, Suharto; and the latest era after the fall of Suharto, from 1998 until 2010. A brief history of Muslim media is also discussed within this chapter.

Chapter 3 discusses the audience frames and national image literature reviews. This chapter reviews some previous studies related to several terms, including frames and audience frames. This chapter also explains the framing effects process, which includes explaining the audience framing process and the moderating factors that influence the process. In addition, some studies about national image are also discussed in the last part of this chapter.

Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this research. The first part of this chapter discusses the research framework and research paradigm as the fundamental base of the study. The research method that was applied was qualitative, which is also explained in detail in the next sub-chapter. The data gathering of media frames and audience frames, and also how to analyse them, are discussed within the research method sub-chapter. Therefore a meticulous research method was created to obtain the complete data and analysis.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the findings and their discussion. Chapter 5 presents media frames, which are provided in various ways: first, via an overview of Australian news from 2011 to 2013 in five selected media, followed by the news tones, news frames, and the different frames of Australia among militant, moderate, and general Muslim media.

Chapter 6 discusses the framing of Australia in the minds of informants from various ideological backgrounds. Within this chapter, the religious memberships and their framing processes, especially in framing Australia, are further discussed. This chapter also explains the informants' frames of Australia, including their perceptions of Australia-Indonesia relations. The last part of this chapter identifies the different focuses of militant, moderate, and liberal informants in framing Australia's issues.

Chapter 7 is mostly a discussion chapter. It relates the media frames and audience frames and investigates the moderating factors that influence the audience framing process; this includes the influence of media frames in shaping audience frames. This chapter aims to explain the internal and external factors of the informants in their framing of Australia. The audience classification for Indonesian Muslims relating Australian issues is projected to be the outcome of analysing moderating factors in the framing process.

Chapter 8 summarises the previous chapters and concludes by determining whether all research questions have been answered. This last chapter discusses the significance of the research and the recommended steps for further research to explore in depth the various ideological Muslim backgrounds, their media behaviour, and the way in which they frame Australia.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN MUSLIM GROUPS AND MUSLIM MEDIA

Introduction

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim society. According to the 2010 PEW Research Report, 60% of the Muslim world's population is from the Asia-Pacific, of which 20.37% lives in Indonesia (PEW Forum, 2011). According to the census data released by *Biro Pusat Statistik Indonesia* (Indonesian Statistics Bureau) in 2010, the number of Muslim inhabitants of Indonesia is 207,176,162, which is 87.2% of all Indonesian citizens. This chapter will provide a historical overview of Indonesian Muslim groups and media.

The earliest evidence of Islam was found on a gravestone with a Muslim date of 1082 in Leran, East Java (Pringle, 2010). Further proof came from Marco Polo's report about his travels in Sumatra (one of the largest islands in Indonesia) around 1292. He stated that there was a Muslim community founded by 'Moorish' traders at Perlak. He also found Muslim influence in tombstone names, such as 'Malik Al Shalih' from nearby 'Samudra Pasai' port (Laffan, 2011). 'Samudra Pasai' is now known as Aceh (Pringle, 2010).

The spread of Islam in Indonesia grew with the increasing European demand for Indonesian herbs and spices from the 13th century onwards. Muslim traders from Egypt, Yemen, and Gujarat played important roles in spreading Islamic values through international

trading routes from Indonesia to Europe at that time (Pringle, 2010). Some areas in Indonesia, including northern Java, the Mollucas, and Srivijaya, became centres of spice trading.

There were three steps in the spreading of Islam in Indonesia, according to Hasan Muarif Ambary (Maemunah, 2006). The first step was taken when Muslim traders arrived from Arabic regions around the first to the fourth centuries. The second step was when the Islamic kingdoms in some areas of Indonesia were established between the 13th and 16th centuries. For example, the Pasai Kingdom in Aceh (North Sumatra) was established in 1297; the Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo kingdoms in the Mollucas were established between 1257 and 1583; the Makasar and Buton kingdoms on Celebes Island were established around 1590 to 1911; and some kingdoms on Java island, such as Demak, Gresik, Cirebon, and Banten, were established between the late 1500s and 1882 (Yusuf, 2006). The third step consisted of the institutionalisation of Islamic values into society's systems, including in the bureaucratic monarchy system, the building of new mosques as centres of Islamic preaching in society, the adaptation of local cultures to Islamic values, the conversion of kings in these regions to Islam, and other social activities.

Azumardi Azra (2002) explains three patterns of Islamisation in Indonesia. The first pattern was that certain cities became centres of trading and of Islamic communities. In such centres, the sovereigns converted to Islam. Subsequently the monarchy played an important role in Islamisation in their regions. The second pattern was that the elite from those kingdoms studied Islam at centres of Islamic education, such as Giri and Gresik in East Java. The third pattern was that Islamic kingdoms supported other non-Islamic kingdoms that wanted to take over other territory, provided that the non-Islamic kings converted to Islam. For example, support was given by the Demak monarchy to the Banjar kingdom that wanted to dominate the Daha kingdom after the king of the former converted to Islam.

Some factors helped Islam become the majority religion in Indonesia. According to Nurcholis Madjid, Indonesia is one of the countries that did not employ its military force for the purposes of spreading Islam (Madjid, 1996). *Penetration Pacifique* (peaceful penetration) is known as the approach of Islamisation in this country, brought by Muslim traders from Arabia and India. Islam became a new trend and offered new political and economic opportunities (Pringle, 2010). Furthermore, intermarriages between the traders and local residents facilitated mutual acculturation, including that of Islamic values.

Another factor that helped Islam spread easily in Indonesia was the simplicity of its teaching, which could easily be understood by local residents (Maemunah, 2006). The form

of Islam at that time was syncretic and mystical, which was close to Hinduism and Buddhism, the predominant beliefs of the country. For this reason, it was easily possible to convert people to Islam in Indonesia (Madjid, 1996; Maemunah, 2006; Pringle, 2010). Also for this reason, Islamic values can be seen in Indonesian culture today. For instance, the names of months in Javanese were adapted from the Islamic calendar (Madjid, 1996), the Islamic features of the Hindu Tenggerese community¹ were described by Robert Hefner (Madjid, 1996), and the true story of two Javanese Islamic *Kyais* in *Serat Cebolek* was written by Kanjeng Raden Adipati Suryakusuma in 1892, in the form of 32 poems in *Macapat* (one of the famous forms of Javanese poems) (Kuntowijoyo, 2008).

The influence of Islam can be seen in the content of *Pancasila* (the five principles)², the official ideology in Indonesia, even though the term itself is of Sanskrit origin (Madjid, 1996). The first *sila*, 'believe in One God', resonates with 'Monotheism', which is in line with Islamic teaching that only believes in one God. Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, was such a worshipper. He was the inventor of *Pancasila*. Originally, Sukarno put the 'believe in One God' precept as the fourth *sila*, but this idea was rejected by politicians with an Islamic orientation. Another negotiation that took place between politicians with an Islamic orientation and Sukarno regarded the idea of 'nationalism', which was the original idea of the third principle, 'The Unity of Indonesia'. Muslims objected to 'nationalism' because it was against the concept of Islamic universalism and cosmopolitanism, and because it reminded them of the chauvinist nationalism of Germany and Japan (Madjid, 1996).

When discussing Indonesia, one cannot exclude Islam as the major religion in this country. Some phases of Islamic movements have affected the history of this nation. This chapter will explain the phases of Muslim groups, from the rise of freedom pressure groups as a reaction to Dutch colonialism in Indonesia from the beginning of the 20th century, to its freedom declaration in 1945; the Sukarno era from 1945 to 1965; the New Order's era from 1966 to 1998; and the era of reformation since the fall of Suharto and through the first 10 years of the 21st century. This chapter also presents a brief history of Islamic media in each phase within Indonesian history from the beginning of the 20th century. The authoritative power of each era seemed to influence the changing life of the majority of religious society in Indonesia.

¹ Tenggerese are the traditional communities that live on the slopes of Bromo mountain in East Java.

²*Pancasila* (five principles) : (1) belief in the One Supreme God or monotheism; (2) just and civilised humanism; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy; and (5) social justice. The term itself is of Sanskrit origin.

Indonesian Muslim Groups in the Early 20th Century

Modern Islamic movements in Indonesia first appeared in the early 20th century, when a lot of Muslim leaders realised that it was impossible to compete with Dutch colonialism, Christian penetration, and other attempts to step forward while they still employed traditional efforts to establish Islamic influences (Noer, 1990). According to Deliar Noer, the root of modern Islamic movements has come from two substantial advances within Muslim societies: education and social movements on the one hand, and political movements on the other.

Syaikh Ahmad Khatib pioneered the modern education and social movements in Indonesia. He was born in Bukittinggi, Minangkabau, Sumatera in 1855. He continued his studies in Mecca in 1876, and became an *Imam*³ of *Syafii mahzab* in *Masjid al Haram*⁴. Although he taught Syafii's mahzab, he never forbade his students to learn about Muhammad Abduh's concept of modernisation in Islam.⁵ Some of his students from Indonesia were Syaikh Muhammad Djamil Djambek, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, and Haji Abdullah Ahmad from Minangkabau, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan from Java (the founder of *Muhammadiyah*), and some traditionalist leaders, such as Syaikh Sulaimanar-Rasuli from Bukittinggi, and Kyai Haji Hasjim Asj'ari, the founder of Tebu Ireng pesantren in East Java. Later, Kyai Asj'ari became the leader of NU (Noer, 1990).

Syaikh Ahmad Khatib's students disseminated Islamic teaching when they returned from Mecca. They inspired other local Islamic leaders to establish new Islamic movements. They taught Islam in local traditional communities in Minangkabau, such as Syaikh Djambek and Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah. They published Islamic magazines, similarly to what Haji Abdullah Ahmad did with *Al Munir* (1911-1916), *Al-Akhbar* (1913), and *Al-Islam* (1916).

Kyai haji Ahmad Dahlan founded *Muhammadiyah* in 1912 as a social Islamic organisation that still exists today. Some other new Islamic organisations launched included *Al-Jam'iyat al-Khairiyah* in Jakarta (1905), *Persyarikatan Ulama* in Majalengka, West Java (1912), *Al-Irsyad* in Jakarta (1913), *Persatuan Islam* (Persis) in Bandung (1920), and

³ Imam is the highest position for teaching Islamic thought.

⁴ Masjid al Haram is one of the holy places for Muslims, and also became the centre of Islamic teaching in Mekkah (Mecca).

⁵ Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was an Islamic thought reformist from Egypt. Together with Jamal ad-Din Al Afgani (1839-1897), the Islamic Politics reformist, he published the *Al'Urwat al-Wustqa* magazine from Paris in 1884. This publication shocked the Islamic world as well as the Western world. British, Egyptian, and Indian administration destroyed and banned this magazine at that time.

Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Association) in Padang (1929) (Noer, 1990).

The political movements stemmed from the Ethical Policy applied under Dutch colonialism in Indonesia in 1901. This policy was suggested by Snouck Hurgronje,⁶ the consultant for local residents' issues, to limit Islamic values for the middle class (Pringle, 2010). Hurgronje recommended distinguishing between Islam as a religion and Islamists as anti-Dutch colonialists. As a religion, Islam was a set of moral guidelines that should be tolerated, similarly to the situation between Protestants and Catholics in the Netherlands itself. Related to this issue, he argued that Islam was not an enemy. The rebellion of Islam extremists in some areas might be caused by inappropriate Dutch policy, such as the restriction on the Pilgrimage to Mecca, and the oppression dealing with the 'fanatic' Islamist leaders (Pringle, 2010).

On the other hand, Hurgronje acknowledged that the involvement of Javanese aristocracy and traditional leaders in the outer Javanese islands could possibly be an effective counterweight to the increase in Islam. He cited the case of the Balinese, who still upheld the caste system that was successful in keeping the Balinese as devout Hindus, delegating the political roles to the higher caste. He did not, however, call for a separate nation. Based on that view, Hurgronje advocated the Ethical Policy that included two main issues: sending young Javanese aristocrats to the Netherlands for their studies, and giving colonial civil service jobs to the educated upper classes (Karim, 2006; Pringle, 2010).

The effect of more education among people of the upper classes was the increase in awareness of nationalism. Although they were becoming secular nationalist groups, they were able to cooperate with Islamic nationalist groups to fight for Indonesian freedom against Dutch colonialism. The earliest awakening movement was led by Mas Ngabehi Wahidin Sudirohusodo, a doctor from Yogyakarta who spread awareness and collected money to offer scholarships to local citizens in 1906. He promoted the idea of education for gifted children to achieve a better future. His ideas were supported by his colleagues from the Medical Faculty in Jakarta, and he established the first modern organisation named '*Budi Utomo*' on May 20th, 1908 (Karim, 2006).

Inspired by *Budi Utomo*, other local Islamic traders, RM Tirtoadisoerjo and Haji Samanhudi, started a new Islamic organisation called '*Sarekat Dagang Islam*', then better

⁶Snouck Hurgronje was a bureaucrat and scholar of Islam. He had visited Mecca and met Indonesians there. He spoke and read Arabic and had completed an Islamic education in a *Pesantren* (traditional Islamic school in rural Indonesia).

known as *Sarekat Islam* (SI), in 1911 (Noer, 1990; Karim, 2006). The competition with Chinese traders and their arrogance towards local merchants were the reasons for the launch of this institution. SI was the first mass Islamic movement in Indonesia, having more than two million members by 1919 (Pringle, 2010). From 1918, SI had representatives in the *Volksraad*, the parliament during the Dutch colonial period. This opportunity opened channels for the Islamic voice to be heard by Dutch administrators (Noer, 1990). In 1923, SI changed its orientation from a traders' association to an Islamic political party. This party was first named *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII). PSII was followed by other Islamic parties, such as *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Permi) in 1930, and *Partai Islam Indonesia* (PII) in 1938 (Noer, 1990).

During this period, Deliar Noer (1990) classified Muslim activists into two groups: secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists. Secular nationalists were those who believed in Islam but tended to be neutral and tolerant to other values, and some of them ignored their religion's assertions. In contrast, Muslim nationalists were those who took Islamic thought as the reference for their movement.

Moreover, the rising number of educated Muslims also influenced the comprehension and practice of this religion. Deliar Noer (1990) differentiated between two main streams among Muslim groups: traditionalists and modernists. Traditionalists were those whose application of Islam was limited to that of the teaching of the *Ulama*, who lived from the seventh to the 13th century (Dhofier, 1982). The traditionalists were those who focused on religious teaching and worship practices. For them, Islam was about *fiqh* (the rules of Islam), and they accepted *taqlid* (following the leader without criticising him) and refused *ijtihad* (decisions about solving contemporary problems that were not anticipated in the *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, and *Ijma'* – the *Ulama's* interpretations) (Noer, 1990).

The traditionalists tended to follow their *Kyais* (Islamic leaders) and totally devoted themselves to their leaders. For these groups, their *Kyais* had no sins, and the *Kyai's* statement was final: nobody may question it (Kuntowijoyo, 2008). This situation created an education system that focused more on memorising than understanding Islamic teachings. The followers did not have the courage to entertain different opinions than those of *Kyais*, and knowledge transfer tend to be a one-way communication process, without any discussion. Because they focused on religious matters, these groups generally did not become involved in politics. They were not anti-politics, but they were likely to limit themselves to their *pesantrens*, and spend their whole lives in them.

On the other hand, the modernists had a more open attitude to the application of Islamic thought (Noer, 1990). Islamic teaching was not only deals with *fiqh* and practical worship, but it also had relevance to daily life. Islam was a universal teaching that could be applied to any time, any place, and under any condition. Islam was a reformed religion. It would not obstruct the exploration of knowledge, the development of science, or the position of women in society. Thus, Islam could be understood through a ‘modern’ lens.

The modernists, inspired by Muhammad Abduh’s notion of a reform of Islam, only follow al *Qur’an* and *Sunnah* as the resources that inform their thinking. They believed that the *ijtihad* can still be opened wider, and they refused *taqlid*.⁷ The modernists believed that Islam offered freedom of thinking that could enhance the quality of a life led by Islamic values. This notion was contradictory to that of the traditionalists.

Ijtihad has led the modernists to pay attention to the argument, rather than to the one who has the argument (Noer, 1990). This is why the modernist teacher did not monopolise Islamic teaching, unlike in the case of the *Kyai* in traditionalists’ view. The modernists agreed that Islamic discussion could be held outside of the *pesantrons* and mosques, and that Islamic teaching could be discussed, too. This view is contradictory to that of the traditionalists, who completely trust the man (the *Kyai*) who has the argument. Modernist Muslim leaders at that time were not only from *Ulama*, like Haji Rasul and KH Ahmad Dahlan, but were also businessmen, like Haji Abdullah Ahmad, Samanhoeddhi, and Ahmad Hasan. They were also aristocrats and cultural leaders, like Tjokroaminoto, Salim, Moeis, Natsir, as well as government administrators, like Gunawan and Djajadiningrat (Noer, 1990).

Ahmad Dahlan pioneered the modernist Islamic movement. He established *Muhammadiyah* in 1912. His preaching about Islam attracted a wide range of people, from businessmen to educated people. His tolerance, kindness, and helpfulness made him easily accepted within the community. However, his initiative to revise *kiblah*, the direction of praying, generated a strong reaction from his seniors. Later on, *Muhammadiyah* focused its movement on establishing education and health centres in marginal societies.

Besides *Muhammadiyah*, modernists supported other Islamic organisations and political parties as well. The other modernist Islamic organisations were *Syarekat Islam*, *Al-*

⁷Taqlid means following someone’s statement about a matter about which one does not have enough knowledge (Utsaimin, A. S. (2007). *Prinsip Ilmu Ushul Fiqh*. (A. S. Shilah, Trans.) Jakarta: Tholib). Qur’an sura An Nahl ayah 43 stated “..so ask the followers of the Reminder if you do not know”. This ayah explains that people have to ask to someone that knows and has knowledge about the matter of the question being asked.

Irsyad, and *Persatuan Islam* (Persis). Some political parties that held Islam as their foundation were *Partai Muslim Indonesia* and *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Noer, 1990).

NU, founded by Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari⁸, KH Abdul Wahab, and KH Bisri in 1926, was primarily established as a response to the growth of modernist Islam, and particularly *Muhammadiyah*. The fast-growing modern schools run by *Muhammadiyah* threatened the traditional *pesantrens*' existence at that time. *Muhammadiyah* had also loosened the *Kyai-Santri* relations, which was the main issue in NU traditions. The rivalry between both organisations prompted the dynamics of Islamic movements in Indonesia until the late 1900s.

In his book, Kuntowijoyo stated that the NU movement was based on the agricultural Islamic traditions and on communal solidarity (Kuntowijoyo, 2008). This organisation attracted numerous participants mostly from rural areas because the *Kyais* joined it as their Islamic leaders. The NU had traditional institution networks that needed to avoid the influence of not only *Muhammadiyah* as the modernising movement, but also SI (which became PSII in 1923) as the political movement that had great influence on Indonesian Muslims at that time.

Indonesian Muslim Groups in the Sukarno Era (1945-1965)

The dominant issue in this era was the debate about the ideological foundation of this state after the Declaration of Independence on August 17th, 1945, when Sukarno became the first president of Indonesia. The contention took place between Muslims, Communists, and Nationalists (Abdurrahman, 2006; Pringle, 2010; Bolland, 1971). The conflict arose from debates about the constitution among politicians, and progressed to the Communist rebellion in 1948 and *Darul Islam* (DI/TII) from 1948 to 1962; Sukarno's presidency had to be ended in 1965 when the biggest revolt by the Indonesian Communist Party occurred.

The debate about 'seven words' in the Jakarta Charter, which became the preamble of the Indonesian constitution, took more than 14 years to resolve through debate (Pringle, 2010; Boland, 1971). The seven words were the added phrase after 'Belief in God'. The phrase was '*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluknya*' (with the obligation for

⁸Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari and Ahmad Dahlan were students of Syaikh Ahmad Khatib when they studied Islam in Mecca from 1893 to 1905 (Noer, 1990).

adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law). The non-Islamic politicians rejected these words because they did not agree with the notion of an Islamic state, but the Muslim politicians argued that these words were only for Muslims, and could be the foundation of law in Indonesia since Muslims constituted the majority religion in Indonesia. The debate was ended by President Sukarno when he launched the ‘Decree of the President of Indonesia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with regard to the Return to the Constitution of 1945’ on July 5th, 1959 (Boland, 1971, p. 100). By this decree, Sukarno dissolved the Constitutional assembly, the place where the debate on the Indonesian constitution took place.

Moreover, the unity of all Islamic groups, such as *Muhammadiyah*, NU, and PSII, occurred through a change in the form of the *Masyumi* party in 1945. The establishment of *Masyumi* was based on the agreement of *Kongres Umat Islam* (the Congress of Muslims) on November 7th, 1945 in Yogyakarta (Abdurrahman, 2006; Boland, 1971). The basic objective of this party was to ensure that Islamic values were the foundation of Indonesia. Initially, this party was supported by all elements of Islamic groups that existed at the time; but the discordance within those cohorts could not be resisted, and internal disunity happened through the discharge of PSII and NU in 1947 and 1952, respectively (Abdurrahman, 2006). Finally, Sukarno dismissed *Masyumi* in August 1960 after he released his decree in July 1959 (Boland, 1971).

When Sukarno launched the Decree in July 5th, 1959, he started the new era of his presidency called ‘*Demokrasi Terpimpin*’ (Guided Democracy) until his fall in 1965. During this era, he dismissed the assembly and built a new ‘parliament’ with no ex-*Masyumi* activists there and eliminated most of the Islamic leaders who opposed him (Boland, 1971). He succeeded in marginalising Islamic leaders during his regime. However, NU was still allowed to join parliament and had the opportunity to support Sukarno in his cabinet. Wahid Hasjim, one of NU’s leaders, was appointed as Minister of Religion in 1950 (Boland, 1971).⁹ By his hand, Islam had the opportunity to spread more widely by establishing Islamic subjects in schools’ curricula (including *pesantrens*, the traditional schools), from elementary schools to State Islamic Institutes.

Previously, while *Masyumi* and other Islamic leaders were active before they were dismissed by Sukarno, they succeeded in 1950 in introducing the Education by Law no. 4 of April 4th, 1950 article 20, which determined that religious knowledge had to be taught in all state schools. Furthermore, the religious subjects must be delivered over two hours each

⁹At first the name was Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was initiated on March 12th, 1946, with H Rasjidi as the first Minister of Religion.

week, beginning in the fourth year of elementary school (Boland, 1971). Since then, Islamic teaching has been boosted extensively all over Indonesia via state schools, not only inside the *pesantrens*, which were previously the only place in Indonesia to study Islam.

Indonesian Muslim Groups in the New Order Era (1966 – 1998)

According to Haedar Nashir (2013) in his book '*Islam Syari'at*', the power of Muslim activists in Sukarno era was raised against the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), which had close relations with Sukarno in the last years of his presidency. The PKI was believed to have a mission to arrange a communism revolution to apply the world's communism dictatorship, which would turn Indonesia into an unreligious nation by reducing *Pancasila* (five pillars) into *Ekasila* (one pillar), that is *gotong royong* (mutual assistance) (Suryanegara, 2010). The PKI movement was terminated after its coup on Sukarno's presidency, which was known as G30S/PKI.¹⁰ After the bloody military response to the coup, and after the PKI was banned, Sukarno instructed Suharto to restore national security and Suharto took the role of the second Indonesian president.

Suharto's well-known objective was forging massive development in Indonesia under his '*orde baru*' (New Order), especially in the economic sphere. In the beginning, Suharto brought a new hope for many Islamic leaders who had been repressed during Sukarno's era. However, such hopes were not fulfilled, given Suharto's political performance. In 1973, all four Islamic political parties that existed at that time were merged into one political party named *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, the Development Unity Party), which had no 'Islam' label in its name (Arifin, 2006).¹¹ Suharto also restricted the activities of all political parties (including PPP) under the *Kabupaten* or *Kotamadya*¹². This meant that there were no activities by political parties in rural areas that had direct contact with people in the lowest level of society. It could clearly be seen that Suharto wanted to limit the influence of political parties, and use '*Golongan Karya*' as the only political tool to support his regime.

¹⁰ G30S/PKI is stand for Gerakan 30 September (September 30th, 1965), the time when PKI coup Indonesian authority by kidnapping several general who were the leaders of Indonesian army.

¹¹ The other Nationalist and Christian-based parties also merged into *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*.

¹² Undang-Undang No 3 tahun 1975 (Government regulation number 3, 1975) about Political Parties and Golongan Karya.

The other step that drew objections from most Islamic organisations in Indonesia was Suharto's decision about *Pancasila* as the only fundamental ideology (*asas tunggal*) for all Indonesian institutions, including political parties and other Muslim organisations. This policy was legislated in the Government's regulation number 8 in 1985 about Social Organisations (Arifin, 2006). There were numerous social organisations that continued to deny *Pancasila* as the only fundamental ideology of the nation, and this could cause serious social disintegration. As a consequence of this regulation, PPP had to change Islam to *Pancasila* as its fundamental ideology. This regulation also attracted other Islamic-based organisations that disagreed with it.

During the New Order era, some Islamic groups were established that originated from a transformation of previous Muslim activists or as a part of transnational Islamic movement networks. Muhammad Natsir was one of the examples of the movement of the existing Muslim activist. Natsir was the leader of Masyumi; he shifted his focus from politics to *dakwah*¹³ (Bruinessen, 2002) or an intensive program of religious predication (Hefner, 2000), following the limitations on the activities of Islamic parties. In May 1967, Natsir commenced *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Mission Council), an organisation that supports Islamic revitalisation and prohibits conversion of Muslims to other religions. Natsir also supported the establishment of *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA – the Islamic and Arabic Studies Institution), a branch of Muhammad bin Saud University from Saudi Arabia in 1990. This institution became the source of *Islamic Wahabbi Salafism*, which includes among its alumni some who became Salafi leaders (Bruinessen, 2002; Pringle, 2010). Later, Natsir and Abu Bakar Ba'asir were two important figures who supported the fundamentalist movement (Bruinessen, 2002). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the heir to the *Darul Islam* movement that had been banned in 1962, and was alleged linked to *Komando Jihad's* activists who were behind 'terrorist' actions by bombing several churches, cinemas, clubs, and the Borobudur temple in the 1970s and 1980s (Bruinessen, 2002). After his release from jail and his return from Malaysia, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir found Pesantren Al Mukmin, the *salafi* school that was widely known as the 'radical' *salafi*. This pesantren is located at Ngruki, Solo (in central Java) and was founded in 1972 (Pringle, 2010). The founders of this school, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, were involved with Negara Islam Indonesia (NII),¹⁴ which has a commitment to the establishing of an Islamic

¹³ Dakwah = preaching.

¹⁴ NII is an Islamic community that has connections to its predecessor Kartosuwiryo, who moved the revolt of Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) from 1948 to 1962. NII believes that turning Indonesia into an Islamic state is important to ban un-Islamic values that spread globally in this modern world.

state in Indonesia. In post-Suharto era, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was accused of being the leader of 'Jama'ah Islamiyah', which was responsible for several bombings in the early 2000s.

On the other hand, some new Islamic activists also emerged as a branch of international Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and HTI from Jerusalem (Noorhaidi, 2012; Bruinessen, 2002). In the future, in the post-Suharto era, these transnational movements existed in political¹⁵ and non-political movements.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Nurcholis Madjid was one of the most important figures promoting Liberal Islam in Indonesia. His speech entitled 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the *Umma*', which was delivered on January 2nd, 1970, became the mark of the renewal movement (*gerakan pembaharuan*) in Islam (Pringle, 2010). One of his controversial ideas was the 'Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!', which invited debates and protests from other Islamic activists. His way of confronting the 'mainstream' Islamic thought was criticised as 'impolite' according to senior Islamic leaders. A lot of Islamic leaders attacked his notions of 'secularism' and 'pluralism'.

Nurcholis Madjid is known as the 'bourgeois pluralist' for his belief that all religions in Indonesia should be considered as 'equal'. Madjid stated that the problem of pluralism in Islam was the problem of Muslim adaptation in this modern age, because Muslims could not assimilate to rapid changes in global society (Madjid, 1996). This statement drew the criticism from conservative Muslims that it could be used by Christians in their efforts to evangelise Christianity.

Madjid became the father of tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia, and a number of modern Muslim scholars follow his concepts. His followers are mostly intellectual Muslims who have completed tertiary education. Madjid's notion seems to make sense when he tries to see Islamic teaching through a liberal interpretive lens. Most Islamic leaders (including the modernists) reject this approach because there are prescribed methods to interpret the *Qur'an*, one of which is incompatible with the liberal interpretive approach. Thirty years later, in 2001, Ulil Absar Abdala continued to promote his way of thinking through the *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL, the network of Islamic liberation), which allows ordinary people to interpret Islam and offers ideas of a reform movement in Islamic teaching in Indonesia. This

¹⁵ Islamic brotherhood in Indonesia formed the Justice Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) (Noorhaidi, 2012).

¹⁶ Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Salafy argued that democracy does not exist in Islamic teaching, and therefore joining political practices in Indonesia that apply a democratic system is against Islamic thought (Noorhaidi, 2012).

movement has provoked criticism from other Islamic leaders. These leaders state that this movement deviates from the original way of understanding Islam.

The growth of liberal followers, as well as followers of other Islamic thought, was caused by the growth of the economy, society, and policy under the New Order – an outstanding achievement of Suharto's. The New Order resulted in the growth of a powerful new middle class that was more educated and wealthier than before. William Liddle correlates this situation with the growth of 'creative' Islamic thinkers, whom Liddle labelled *substantialists*¹⁷ and the growth of 'reformist' *scriptualists*¹⁸ (Liddle, 1996).

Fachri Ali and Bachtiar Effendy classify four Islamic patterns in the New Order: Neo-Modernism, Socialist-Democracy, Internationalism or Islamic Universalism, and Modernism (Ali and Effendy, 1996). Neo-Modernism is the viewpoint that marries Islamic values with modern conditions and processes without diluting basic Islamic values. The figures who support this view are Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. The Socialist-Democracy standpoint calls for Islam to be the transforming power for all aspects of national life. Based on this notion, Islam should be considered in every socio-political process of change. Its innovators are Adi Sasono, M Dawam Raharjo, and Kutowijoyo.

The third pattern is Internationalism or Islamic Universalism. The Universalism group believes that Islam has universal values, including nationalism as long as this does not contradict fundamental Islamic teaching. Amin Rais, Jalaludin Rahmad, and Endang Saepuddin Anshari are the proponents of this view. The last pattern is Modernism, which emphasises the rationality of Islamic thought within the modern context. Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif advocates this stance.

Following the fall of the Indonesian rupiah by up to 70% relative to the US dollar over the course of six months in late 1997, a financial crisis was generated in Indonesia. This economic frustration became one of the reasons for political reformation instituted by Suharto's opponents, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of Sukarno) and Amien Rais, the leader of *Muhammadiyah*. Suharto faced massive demonstrations against him by

¹⁷*Substantialists* view Islam as the content or basic belief, and view the practice as more important than the form. Substantialists believe that Muslims must be more tolerant of each other, and even of non-Muslims. They accept the current structure of government as the final form of the Indonesian state (Liddle, 1996). The Islamic leaders who hold this view are Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.

¹⁸*Scriptualists* view Islam as a set of Islamic law (*syariah*) that should be obeyed. Scriptualists always try to implement Islam as is done in the Qur'an and Sunnah (the two fundamental Islamic resources). Natsir is one Islamic leader who follows this view.

metropolitan university students and finally resigned his presidency, allowing Habibie, his vice-president, to take office in May 1998.

Indonesian Muslims in the Early 21st Century (1999 – 2010)

The collapse of Suharto's 'New Order' regime of almost 32 years ushered in a new period of Indonesian history called '*orde reformasi*' (Reformation Order). Indonesia became a prime example of a democratic shift in Muslim societies (Hefner, 2001). Everybody, including Islamic groups, may express feelings and thought freely after the constraints imposed by Suharto had been dissolved. The most striking issues emerging in this era are the discourse about radical Islam and the discussion about *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL), which had been spearheaded by Nurcholis Madjid in the previous period.

The emergence of radical Islam in Indonesia is considered to be a response to Suharto's repressive handling of Muslim activists during his period, which resulted in the revolutionary idea to fight against the tyrant sovereignty (Hasan, 2012). For example, the appearance of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) is closely linked to the underground movement Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), which was banned in Sukarno's era. MMI held its first congress in 2000 as the mark of its establishment and chose Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as its leader (Bruinessen, 2002). Yet, because Ba'asyir considered that MMI did not apply the Islamic norms in terms of leadership within the organisation, he quit MMI in October 2008 and formed a new organisation, Jama'ah Ashorut Tauhid (JAT) (*Kompas*, September 17th, 2008).

The other reason for the rise of Indonesian radical movements was rooted was the disappointment relating to the government's policy (Hasan, 2012; Bruinessen, 2002). An example is the militias formed by some Muslim leaders as a response to the slow reaction of government in handling conflicts in several places in Indonesia (Pringle, 2010). Local conflicts involving religious issues took place in west and central Kalimantan from 1996 to 2001, Maluku and north Maluku from 1999 to 2004, and in Central Sulawesi from 1998 to 2007 (Pringle, 2010). *Laskar Jihad*¹⁹ and *Jemaah Islamiyah*²⁰ were the militia formed to

¹⁹*Laskar Jihad* was formed by Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of Salafi Pesantren in Yogyakarta, in April 2000. *Laskar Jihad* sent 7,000 troops to Maluku to help Muslims in that area (Bruinessen, 2002) (Pringle, 2010).

defend the Muslims in affected areas (Pringle, 2010; Hasan, 2012). Some members of these brigades had been former volunteers in Afghanistan's war to end Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989 (Pringle, 2010).

The presence of *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front) found by Habib Rizieq Syihab in 1998 was also a response to the disappointment in government policy in handling the acts against Islamic values within the society. FPI's movement seeks to transform Muslim life from ignorance of living within Islam into a pure Islamic society (Eliraz, 2004). FPI pursues its aims in controversial ways, such as closing bars, casinos, hotels, and other places that are viewed as offensive to the values of Islam.

Kuntowijoyo (2008) describes radicalism as being espoused by new fragment groups within Indonesian Muslim societies that emerge as an effect of globalisation. He mentions two kinds of fragment groups: religious fragment groups and political fragment groups. The religious fragment groups appear as a reaction to marginalisation processes and the style of modern life. Psychologically, they feel loss of control in dealing with new social processes. Sharpening social polarisation can cause these groups to mushroom in society. In the rural areas, polarisation removes them from the folds of communal solidarity, while in urban areas it tends to make people coalesce in groups bearing on rigid beliefs and characteristics. Both contexts push people to forge new social identities, which can be done through the making of new Islamic groups. Examples of this kind of group are *Darul Hadits* and *Islam Jama'ah* (Kuntowijoyo, 2008).

The second kind of fragmenting groups, according Kuntowijoyo (2008), is more political in character. These groups are usually still in the mainstream, but they try to isolate themselves or to be exclusive. They become radical because they are disappointed with their leaders' response to social and political change. On the other hand, those who are frustrated because of religious issues tend to be radical in actualising their goals. This radicalisation appears because they tend to be close-minded. Thus, their ability to analyse social facts is low. According to Kuntowijoyo (2008), radicalism is an emotional movement, without a thorough understanding of macro-social analysis.

By contrast, as a reaction to these radical movements, JIL or Liberalist Islam became more popular in the early 21st century. Liberalism offered a new way of understanding Islam and was spread by Ulil Absar Abdala, a young Indonesian Islamic scholar and the founder of

²⁰ *Jema'ah Islamiyah* was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1993 (Pringle, 2010). Bruinessen does not mention *Jama'ah islamiyah* in his article, but he mentions *Majelis Mujahidin*, founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu BakarBa'asir.

JIL. Abdala also introduced a new methodology in interpreting Islam. Normally it is only certain *Ulama* with certain qualifications who may interpret the content of the *Qur'an*. The qualifications are to guarantee that the *mufasssirin* (the interpreter of the *Qur'an*) is a knowledgeable person and has credibility in applying Islamic values, so that his or her interpretation of the *Qur'an* will not deviate from the origin of Islamic teaching. In addition, the qualifications of the *mufasssirin* have the purpose of ensuring the purity of Islamic teaching.

Abdala suggests a new methodology in interpreting the *Qur'an*. In early 2000, Abdalla recommended a controversial *ijtihad* methodology in assessing the *Qur'an* (Assyaukanie, 2008). According to him, everybody can interpret the *Qur'an* drawing on his or her own knowledge; there are no special requirements needed for interpretation. He also says that all religions are the same and that no religion is better than another. This means that every human being needs a religion, but that he or she does not have to be a Muslim, because Islam is the same as other religions. Abdala's other controversial notion is that *syari'ah* (Islamic Law) is a product of human history (Assyaukanie, 2008).

Abdala's controversial notion has drawn a striking reaction from most Islamic leaders. *Media Dakwah* magazine (2004) accused JIL of being part of a Jewish-Zionist plot, because this network was sponsored by USAID. This fact was then used repeatedly to frame JIL as a member of 'a conspiracy' aimed at undermining Islam in Indonesia. MUI, the official Islamic leaders' assembly, finally released MUI Fatwa no. 7, 2005, which banned pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in Indonesian Islam.²¹

All in all, a variety of Muslim groups have been in existence in the post-Suharto era. These groups range from militant to liberal Muslims (Abdullah, 2013; Hasan, 2012). Taufik Abdullah (2013) defines militant Muslims as 'those who are intolerant to the variation of opinion about Islam'. Included in militant Muslim groups are FPI, Laskar Jihad, MMI, and HTI (Bruinessen, 2002). On the other hand, liberal Muslims are those who have objective perspectives and admit that other religions are equal with Islam (Abdullah, 2013). The well-known Liberal Islam Network figures are Ulil Abshar Abdala and Lutfie Assyaukanie. On the other hand, moderate Muslim groups, which represent the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, are in the middle; they tend to tolerate various opinions but do not accept the notion that all

²¹ Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia no. 7/Munas VII/MUI/11/2005

religions are similar to Islam. NU and Muhammadiyah, two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, refer to themselves as moderate.

An example of the differences between militant and moderate Muslims is in the way they accept democracy applied in Indonesia. Militant Muslims perceived democracy as a system that does not exist in the two main references for Muslims: *Al Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (Hasan, 2012). Democracy is interpreted as a *thogut* system, which produces leaders who are unfaithful to Islamic law (*Arrahmah*, February 23rd, 2013). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a militant Muslim leader, stated that the Indonesian government since the Sukarno era until now has been *thogut*, because it applied non-Islamic law, and led Indonesian Muslims to become detached from Islamic values and unfaithful to them (Ba'asyir²² in Abdurrahman, 2012). Upholding an Islamic state is an ideal goal for all Muslims to actualise *Islamic Chaliph* into reality (Victoria, 2012). Since the Muslim activists reject democracy, they also refuse to participate in any elections held in Indonesia (Hasan, 2012).

Conversely, moderate Muslims tend to accept the idea of democracy and believe that it is a strategic system to promote good governance (Hasan, 2012). Some moderate Muslim groups formed political parties after Suharto resigned, and the Reformation Order was begun. Haedar Nashir (2013) categorises Islamic political parties that were born at that time into two groups: the party with Islam as the official fundamental principle and the party with the support of Muslim society. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Development Unity Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Moon-Stars Party), and Justice Party (PK, which then became Prosperous Justice Party, PKS) are examples of the first category. All of those parties have overtly declared to have Islam as their fundamental reference.

The second category comprises political parties with the support of the Muslim community. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Resurrection Party) is formed with

²² Ba'asyir wrote an introduction to Abdurrahman's book titled '*Ya... Mereka Memang Thoghut*' (Yes... They Are Thogut). Ba'asyir wrote it behind bars in Nusakambangan jail.

the support of the NU community, while the Partai Amanat Nasioanal (PAN, National Mandate Party) is supported by the Muhammadiyah community. Both parties do not openly declare themselves to be Islamic parties, and they are more inclusive. Both parties allow non-Muslims to join (Nashir, 2013).

Different views also exist among militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims in perceiving other nations, and especially Australia. Some militant Muslims perceive Australia as one of the democratic countries²³ where Muslims are treated like enemies, and Islam is positioned as a social problem, rather than as a solution (Awwas, 2010). The spying scandal issues proved that Australia treated Indonesia as an enemy (HTI, November 25th, 2013), and FPI called Australia a '*negara kafir*' (infidel country) (*Merdeka.com*, November 22nd, 2013).

In contrast, liberal Muslims perceive Australia as a multicultural place that respects all humans, including Muslims. Lutfi Assyaukanie, an important figure in JIL, completed his degree in Australia and perceives Australia as an alternative place for Islamic studies. He also argues that Australia guarantees the freedom of exploring Islam without the pressure of certain ideologies, such as what he experienced when he studied in Jordania (Islamlib, March 8th, 2004). In another case, Ulil Abdala, the leader of JIL, supported the freedom of Papua via Twitter, which was in line with several Australian politicians' support (*Arrahmah*, June 17th, 2012).

Meanwhile, moderate Muslims tend to perceived Australia as a good partner. Dahlan Rais, one of the leaders of the central board of Muhammadiyah, stated that Muhammadiyah always welcomes the mutual collaboration in education, health, and economic empowerment

²³ Irfan S Awwas mentioned Australia, the US, the United Kingdom, and France as examples of these democratic countries (in Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin dalam Bingkai Kebhinekaan, *Majelis Mujahidin.com*, December 13th, 2010).

with Australia (*Muhammadiyah.or.id*, February 9th, 2011). NU also has several collaborations with Australia in the fields of disaster mitigation²⁴ and education.²⁵

The examples of democracy and of Indonesian Muslims' images of Australia above have shown the variety of images provided by militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims. Militant Muslims tend to approach all the matters with two main references, *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, and relate each issue to Islamic thought in every discussion. Moderate Muslims, on the other hand, consider not only the Islamic values but also the certain circumstances that might bring benefits for Muslims. Finally, liberal Muslims tend to be in line with Australia's policy.

A further question arises in this study, concerning whether Muslim ideology will prove to be the main reason behind the variety of different pictures of Australia among Indonesian Muslims. Is there any existing reason behind their different pictures of Australia? Could Muslim audience be classified as militant, moderate, and liberal as well?

A Brief History of Indonesian Muslim Media

This sub-chapter aims to provide a brief history of Indonesian Muslim media, which followed the development of Muslim movements from the early 20th century. Like the growth of Muslim groups affected by the social politics at that time, the dynamics of Muslim media also relate to the recent situation faced by Muslim organisations and their environment.

Unfortunately, references about the history of Muslim media in Indonesia are limited

²⁴ Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Iklim NU (LPBI NU, the Institution of Disaster and Climate Mitigation of NU) has engaged in some collaboration with the Australia Indonesia Facility of Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) (LPBI NU *bahas penguatan penanggulangan bencana*, NU Online, June 25th, 2012).

²⁵ NU received grants from the Australian government via the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) for accreditation process of 100 madrasah under NU (LP Ma'arif terima hibah untuk 100 madrasah, NU Online, March 2nd, 2012).

compared to references about mainstream media. Therefore, this sub-chapter describes the Muslim media that existed from early 20th century and relate them to the situational political dynamics and the role of Muslim groups during that time.

The Emergence of Islamic Media in the Early 20th Century

As already mentioned above, the modern Islamic movements of the early 20th century developed from educational and social movements (Noer, 1990). As more Muslim scholars returned from their studies in the Middle East and Europe, there was more awareness among them of being occupied by the Dutch government, and they pioneered the nationalism and freedom movements among their societies.

The first Indonesian Muslim media outlet was initiated by Haji Abdullah Ahmad, the Padangnese *ulama*, who became the leader of *Jamaah Adabiah* in Padang, West Sumatra in 1908 (Noer, 1990). *Al Munir*, the name of the magazine that emerged in 1911, was inspired by *Al-Imam* magazine, the fortnightly magazine published in Singapore. *Al-Imam* was the first Islamic reform magazine in Southeast Asia from 1906 to 1909, and this magazine inspired Haji Abdullah Ahmad to create a similar medium in his hometown. The *Al Munir* content included Islamic teachings, the story of the prophet Muhammad, and translated articles about the international Islamic world – an particularly the Middle East – from *Al-Manar* magazine Cairo (Noer, 1990). Haji Abdullah Ahmad also initiated the news magazine *Al Akbar* (1913), and became editor of the religious desk at *Sarekat Islam* media, *Al Islam*, in 1916 (Noer, 1990).

Sarekat Islam (SI) played an important role in expanding Islamic media during the 1900s until Indonesia's independence in 1945. HOS Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, both important figures in *Sarekat Islam*, gave their full support in promoting Islamic media outlets during that time (Noer, 1990). Some media were officially administered by SI, such as

Neraca (1916-1924), *Hindia Baru* (1924-1926), *Laskar* (1930-1932), and *Fajar Asia*²⁶ (1927-1930). Other Islamic media were not part of SI but were supported by Agus Salim and Tjokroaminoto, including *Bendera Islam* (1924-1927), *Bintang Islam* (1923-1926), *Mustika* (1931-1932), and *Utusan Hindia* (1914-1923) (Noer, 1990). Both individuals were known as respected figures in the struggle for Indonesia's independence.

Muhammadiyah and NU, as modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups that emerged during that time, also had internal media outlets. *Muhammadiyah*, the modern Muslim group, initiated several media outlets, such as *Soeara Muhammadiyah* (1912), *Adil* (1932-1942), and *Pancaran Amal* (1936-1939), as well as some media collaborations between Muhammadiyah and SI figures, such as *Bendera Islam* (1924-1927) and *Bintang Islam* (1923-1926). NU also had its own internal media outlets, such as *Utusan Nahdlatul Ulama* (1928-1930), *Swara Nahdhatul Ulama* (1937-1941), and *Berita Nahdlatul Ulama* (1935-1940).

Beside *Muhammadiyah* and NU, some other Muslim organisations also had their own media outlets, such as *Al-Lisan* (1935) and *Pembela Islam* (1929-1933), owned by *Persatuan Islam* (Persis, Islamic Unity). *Jong Islamieten Bond*, the Muslim organisation whose members were those who had Dutch educational backgrounds, had *Het Licht (The Light)* (1925-1940).

The content of Islamic media from 1900 until 1945 was varied. The content was not only about Islamic teachings; it also discussed other nations' circumstances. This fact is interesting, since at that time Indonesian audiences had limited access to information about other nations. *Bintang Islam*, *Al Munir*, and *Suara Muslimin* were three Islamic media outlets that discussed other nations' conditions, inspiring the audience to fight for independence against Dutch colonialism in Indonesia (Noer, 1990).

During World War II, there were political changes in Indonesia when Japan occupied Indonesia and took over *Hindia Belanda* authority. The Japanese occupation lasted from 1942

²⁶ *Fajar Asia* was the official medium for *Partai Sarekat Islam* (Sarekat Islam Party), the transformation of SI to become a political party on February 20th, 1923 (Noer, 1990).

to 1945. During that time, the Japanese government strictly oversaw the Indonesian papers by taking over all Dutch and Chinese media, and maintaining Japanese newspapers and magazines in the Melayu language, which carried Japanese propaganda in Indonesia (Smith, 1986). Unfortunately, there is insufficient reference available to explain what happened to Islamic media during the Japanese occupation.

Islamic Media during Sukarno's Era (1945 – 1965)

Sukarno's era lasted from Indonesia's Independence Day on August 17th, 1945 until he resigned as the first president in 1965. During that time, the shift in power in Indonesia was not only against the allied forces of the Netherlands and the UK, which wanted to return to Indonesia after the Japanese occupation; the power also spread among Indonesian nationalists, Islamists, and Communists to build power bases in forming a new independent Indonesia.

The Islamic media were also influenced by the situation at that time. Almost all Muslim activists were involved in politics, forming political parties like the PSII (*Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* from SI), which *Muhammadiyah* and NU activists later agreed to merge into one Islamic political party called *Masyumi*. To extend their political influence to broader Indonesian society, *Masyumi* published newspapers and magazines. *Abadi* is *Masyumi*'s official newspaper that expresses the party's position to society. *Abadi* was founded in 1947 and has had a striking influence as Islamic media in the general society ever since. This influence can be seen from the re-birth of this newspaper in 1968, after it was banned in 1959, in line with the dismissal of *Masyumi* in the implementation of the 'Presidential decree' on July 5th, 1959. *Abadi* was banned for the second time in 1974, when it was accused of supporting the *Malari* tragedy.²⁷ Hefner (1997) summarises that Suharto used

²⁷ Malari was the first protest movement during Suharto's presidency, and was sponsored by university students in Jakarta. They protested against Suharto's ignorance of public policy, on January 14th to 15th, 1974. Unfortunately, the demonstration led to the vandalism of hundreds of building, cars, and motorcycles, which were burned and ruined in the middle of Jakarta (Aliansyah, January 2014). Hariman

this tragedy to rid himself of *Abadi*, the biggest Islamic newspaper at that time. Besides newspapers, *Masyumi*'s supporters also launched magazines that promoted *Masyumi*'s aims. The two well-known magazines were *Hikmah* (1948-1958) and *Pandji Masyarakat* (1959-1961) (Noer, 1990).

Masyumi significantly influenced the rise of Islamic media in Sukarno's era via its media outlets, which had become the main reference for Muslims on current issues. Smith (1986) recorded that the circulation of the *Abadi* newspaper was up to 17,000 per day. The momentous role that *Masyumi* had from 1945 until 1957 was not only in Islamic media, but also in Indonesian politics. *Masyumi* earned second place in the Indonesian general election in 1955, after Sukarno's party, PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Party) (Arifin, 2006). *Masyumi* activists were also chosen to be involved in the cabinets. Therefore, even though this party had been dismissed by Sukarno in 1960, the ex-activists of *Masyumi* continued their struggles in different forms, such as via the DDII in Suharto's era.

Islamic Media in the New Order Era (1966 – 1998)

The Islamic movements in Suharto's era, also known as the New Order Era, were limited. Suharto not only merged all Islamic parties into one party named '*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*', but he also removed the symbol of Islam in both the name and logo of the party. Suharto also forced all organisations – including Islamic organisations – to acknowledge *Pancasila* as the only fundamental ideology (*asas tunggal*) within their organisations.

In terms of media, Suharto enforced control systems that required all media to gather two kinds of licences, a printing permit and a publishing permit, for which in 1982 the

Siregar, the leader of the protest, denied that students were responsible for all of the vandalism. The effects of the vandalism were too broad to have been caused solely by the student protest participants. Hariman believed that there must be a stronger agent who could have committed the vandalism.

Ministry of Information issued a new media permit called the Press Publication Enterprise Permit or SIUPP (Kakiailat, 2007)²⁸. All media had to possess a SIUPP in order to circulate their media to the general public. Since the large payment required for a SIUPP was up to \$140,000, only limited Islamic media outlets had a SIUPP at that time. According to Hefner's investigations, only *Muhammadiyah* owned a SIUPP (Hefner, 1997). Therefore, the other Islamic media could not be displayed in general bookstores, and were only circulated among limited Muslim groups and societies.

Despite the strict censorship and limited publication access during the New Order Era, this era was also marked by the widened spectrum of Islamic movements, from fundamentalism to liberalism (Pringle, 2010). This spectrum was also projected in Islamic media. Hefner (1997) mentions in his article that there were *Media Dakwah* launched by DDII with a militant background, *Suara Muhammadiyah* managed by *Muhammadiyah*, with a moderate background, and *Ulumul Qur'an*, administered by *Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat* (LSAF), which consists of liberal Muslim activists. In addition, *Republika*²⁹ was born under the initiative of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI).³⁰

Republika published its first newspaper on January 4th, 1993. The online version was launched on August 17th, 1995 and it became the first online newspaper in Indonesia (Utomo, 2010). *Republika* is the first national newspaper that is acknowledged as an Islamic newspaper, because it was founded by ICMI and its initial investment was raised through shares being personally offered to Indonesian Muslims (Utomo, 2010). Despite the ownership change to PT Mahaka Media, the newspaper's positioning as Islamic remains today.

²⁸ Based on Government Law no. 21/1980, that regulated the media should have permission to publish by owning a SIUPP (*Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers*)

²⁹ The general Muslim newspaper whose stock was offered and owned by the Muslim public.

³⁰ ICMI was the new Muslim organisation supported by Suharto, founded in 1990. Suharto chose BJ Habibie to be the first Leader of ICMI. BJ Habibie was the Research and Technology Minister at the time, and became Indonesia's vice-president in January 1998, and the third president, replacing Suharto, in May 1998.

Islamic Media in the Early 20th Century (1999 – 2010)

The fall of Suharto became the momentum for media freedom, since the SIUPP regulation that limited media circulation was dropped during Habibie's era. Press regulation was changed to reflect a liberal press³¹ that limited the government's intervention in press freedom (Saptohadji, 2011). Due to the new regulation, a myriad of new media emerged at that time.³² Islam media also followed this upward trend. Large numbers of Islamic magazines appeared; even though some of them might have existed in the Suharto era, at that time they could only be circulated to internal members. For example, there are some militant magazines from *salafi* backgrounds such as *As Sunnah*, *Assyariah*, *An Nashihah*, *Fatwa*, *Qiblati*, *Nikah*, and *Elfata*.

During this era, the internet as the new medium also began to spread among Indonesians. This new technology has also brought some changes in the landscape of Indonesian media. Muslim activists use the internet to spread more ideas about Islam and their concerns about their surroundings, which are related to their ideological backgrounds. Griffith et al. (2013) find that the violent ideological group websites use a variety of media to spread their ideological beliefs and may create a larger community of shared values than they presently have. These groups also highlight certain pictures and issues to create the affective process for indoctrination and maintenance of their group members (Griffith et.al, 2013). Sageman (2008) – as cited by Bergin et al. (2009) – highlights the growth of community interest via internet initiated by the nature of anonymity among internet users, which leads them to disclose themselves easily via the internet, and to develop greater feelings of closeness among them. Therefore, to spread the ideological interests and to gather a wider society, many new websites with Islamic names and symbols have arisen since 2005. Some of those websites are *salafy.or.id* (2005), *alsofwah.or.id*, *eramuslim.com* (2005), *arrahmah.com* (2006), and *Muslim.or.id* (2008).

Some scholars have investigated the use of websites for spreading radical messages in Indonesia. Bergin et al. (2009), in a special report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute published in March 2009, reported the number of internet users in Indonesia skyrocketed by 900% between 2000 and 2008. Bergin et al. also discovered that the number of websites with radical content increased drastically, from 15 in 2007 to 117 within a year. Within this report,

³¹ The previous regulation (law no 21/1980) had been dismissed and replaced with the new law no. 40/1999.

³² Based on Serikat Penerbit Surat Kabar (the Newspaper Publishers Association) data, up to 1997 there were 289 registered media, and this number skyrocketed to 1,687 in 1999 (Saptohadji, 2011).

Bergin identifies a variety of administrators of these radical websites: they are radical Muslim groups', pesantren's, and sympathetic groups' websites.³³ In addition, Hui (2010) examines the radical websites description that frequently published the injustice concerned with the live threaten received by other Muslim jihadist and the compliment for martyrdoms.

The present study examines five online Muslim media outlets that range from militant to moderate and general. Bergin (2009) and Hui (2010) suggest *HTI* (hizbut-tahrir.or.id) and *Arrahmah* (Arrahmah.com) as two militant media outlets. Bergin et al. (2009) categorises *hizbut-tahrir.or.id* and *Arrahmah.com* as the media outlets that are administered by fundamentalist radical groups. *HTI* criticises the Indonesian government for not applying Islamic law; in addition, it promotes the importance of the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia as well as in all other countries in the world. One typical feature that exists at the end of every news article on *HTI*'s website is the editor's note that explains his or her view related to the issue (Hui, 2010).

Arrahmah media was found by Muhammad Jibril, son of Abu Jibril, the most important figure of the militant Muslim group Jama'ah Islamiyah (Hui, 2010; Muzakki, 2014). Muhammad Jibril initiated *Arrahmah* media network as the publishing house that produced a variety of media, such as CDs, magazines (*Jihadmagz*),³⁴ books, and videos, about the jihad (Muzakki, 2014). In March 2015, the Indonesian government banned *Arrahmah.com* with 21 other Islamic websites for the allegation that they served as Islamic State for Iraq and Syria (ISIS)³⁵ propaganda for Indonesians (*Republika*, March 31st, 2015). After a rigorous investigation of all 22 banned Islamic websites, the allegation that the outlets served as tools for ISIS promotion was not proven, and the prohibition was cancelled. Therefore *Arrahmah.com* continues to exist today.

The moderate Muslim websites chosen for this study are *NU online* (nu.org.id) and *dakwatuna* (dakwatuna.com). *NU online* is the official website of NU, the largest moderate

³³ Some websites are run by groups of individuals with no links to any radical or extremist groups (Bergin et.al, 2009)

³⁴ *Jihadmagz* is the magazine that claimed to be 'the first jihad magazine in the world' (Muzakki, 2014).

³⁵ ISIS is the jihadist group that spreads threat to non-Muslims countries.

Muslim organisation. As the official website, *NU online* conveys the organisation's activities and NU's perspectives on updated issues. It further provides teaching materials like *khotbah*³⁶ material, *du'a*³⁷, and articles written by NU's leaders.

The content of *Dakwatuna* is administered and updated by *Lembaga Kajian Dakwatuna* (LKD, the Preaching Studies Institute) in cooperation with *Lembaga Kajian Manhaj Tarbiyah* (LKMT, *Tarbiyah* method institute). LKMT has an indirect connection to the *tarbiyah* movement, according to Bruinessen (2002). This movement was formed by a group discussion about rudimentary Islam in Salman mosque at the Institute of Technology Bandung³⁸ in the early 1980s. Unlike other radical Islamic websites that highlight *jihād* and the hatred of western countries, *Dakwatuna*'s tag line is 'toward the unity of *ummah*' (*Menuju kesatuan umat*)³⁹, thereby focusing on constructed positive behaviour in accordance with the Islamic teaching '*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*' (Mursyidah & Salim, 2012). Therefore *Dakwatuna* has a moderate Muslim ideology that accepts the idea of democracy.⁴⁰

The fifth media outlet to be examined in this study is *Republika*, because it targets a general Muslim audience and is owned by a profiting media corporation. Therefore, unlike the previously discussed media outlets, which are owned either by Muslim groups or by individuals, *Republika* has a different approach and considerations in publishing its news: to generate a profit and maintain a wider audience of Muslim readers.

³⁶ *Khotbah* is a form of preaching by delivering speech in front of groups of people on a certain occasion.

³⁷ *Du'a* is a prayer, usually delivered in Arabic.

³⁸ Institute Teknologi Bandung (ITB) is one of the outstanding universities in Indonesia.

³⁹ Taken from the editor page of *Dakwatuna* accessed on February 27th, 2016 at 11.31 am <http://www.dakwatuna.com/redaksi/#axzz41L69PQkD>

⁴⁰ The Tarbiyah movement, which became the background of *Dakwatuna*, sponsored the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) to join the general election in 1999. The party later became the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in 2004 (Hasan, 2012; Bruinessen, 2002).

Summary

In conclusion, the development of Muslim groups in Indonesia was closely related to political changes and the struggle to of Muslims to earn recognition from the Indonesian authorities. Indonesian Muslim activists also played significant roles in the process of spreading awareness of nationalism during Dutch colonialism, as well as the struggle to achieve Indonesia's independence. Furthermore, they were actively involved in Sukarno's cabinet, until Sukarno took a stance against certain Muslim activists from *Masyumi* because of the allegations that they were involved in the *Darul Islam* rebellion that aimed to create an Islamic nation within Indonesia. After that, Indonesian Muslims became marginalised, even in Suharto's era. Muslim movements have existed since the fall of Suharto until and continue to exist today.

Islamic media emerged as one of the tools to spread Muslim organisations' ideas from the very beginning of the movements. Some of those media took the form of the official outlets of the organisations, seeking to create a commonality of views through the way in which news and issues were framed, while others were general media outlets with Islamic values embedded within news content. The form of the media also varied following the communication technology developments of the era. Chapter 5 will examine framing in the various Islamic media that were selected for this study as being affiliated with militant, moderate, and liberal Muslim ideological groups; first, however, the next chapter will explore the framing process itself.

CHAPTER 3

AUDIENCE FRAMING AND NATIONAL IMAGE

Framing Theory

The study of framing in media and communication studies has grown in popularity among scholars in recent years. According to the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) index under the category of ‘communication science,’ the number of articles that mention the word ‘frame’ or ‘framing’ has grown steeply from less than 10 articles in 1977-1991 to more than 20 articles in 1995, and to a peak in 2009 of around 90 articles (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011). The framing concept has been used in sociology since the mid-1950s, when Bateson first developed it, and was introduced to communication studies by Goffman in 1974 (Kitzinger, 2007). After Entman’s article about ‘framing as a fractured paradigm’ was published in 1993, the use of these terms has developed even further (Kitzinger, 2007).

The word ‘framing’ refers to the process of giving some issue salience in people’s minds. This term has been used in various fields of study, including sociology, politics, linguistics, psychology, and fine arts (Kitzinger, 2007). In the field of sociology, Erving Goffman (1974), cited by Pan and Kosicki (1993), defines frames as ‘the schemata of interpretation’, which entitle individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify and label’ circumstances

or information. In the field of psychology, framing is related to an individual cognitive process that guides information processing. In the field of politics, Entman specifies framing as 'public opinion' that, in the democratic processes, is controlled by the political elites. The shaping of frames allows elites to drive the major emergence of 'true' public opinion that is convenient to the government (Entman, 1993).

Entman (1993) explains four steps in the framing processes: defining problems, diagnosing causes, making a moral judgment, and recommending solutions. Defining problems is choosing the causal agent that deals with cost and benefit in the context of common cultural values. After the causal agent is found, the second step of the framing process is diagnosing causes, by identifying the pressure that caused the problems. The third step is making a moral judgment by evaluating the causal agents and their effects. The last step is offering alternative solutions to solve problems and predicting their effects.

Entman (1993) also defines the processes of framing that occur in four parts of the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. The framing process at the communicator level happens when the communicators make a decision about what to say, guided by frames or schemata that organise their belief systems. The framing process occurs in text when the representation is raised in the text by the presence or absence of certain keywords, phrases, stereotype images, and sources of information that lead to certain judgments. The receivers may or may not perceive the same frames in the media. The framing process in culture is shaped by empirical common frames through the discourse and thoughts of most people in social groups (Entman, 1993).

Furthermore, Scheufele describes the framing process as a cycle process involving frame-building, frame-setting, the individual-level effects of framing, and journalistic audiences as the links between individual frames and media frames (Scheufele, 1999). Scheufele defines the frame-building process as involving the formation of media frames that

require influential sources in shaping media frames, such as the journalists' professional values, the organisational pressures, and other external sources of influence, such as political actors, interest groups, and other elites. The results of frame-building are seen in media frames.

Once the media frames are created, the next step is frame-setting. The process of using audience perception and salience of the media frames to construct the audience frames is called frame-setting. The individual-level effects of framing occur once the individual frames (in this case, audience frames) have been constructed. The effects can be manifested in behavioural, attitudinal, or cognitive outcomes. The last step of the framing process affects journalists as audience members. In this step, journalists are similar to 'ordinary' audience members who are affected by media text as well (Scheufele, 1999).

In the context of the framing process, Scheufele explains the process comprehensively, in comparison with Entman's explanation about framing. Scheufele considers the individual, organisational, cultural, political, and other macro levels in the process of media framing. However, it seems that Scheufele pays more attention to the media framing process than the audience framing process. Scheufele does not explain the factors that moderate audience framing, but he does explain the manifestation effect in the individual's knowledge and behaviour.

Van Gorp (2007) concludes that frame analysis is the dynamic process of constructing social reality, and therefore framing studies should be approached using a constructionist paradigm. Furthermore, Van Gorp argues that in the process of discovering the frames in either media or the audience, the subjective interpretation of the researcher is unavoidable. Reporters only perceive a part of reality; then, by selecting and constructing certain facts, they highlight certain evidence in the news, and subsequently the audience takes notice of that evidence (Entman, 1991). The process of selecting and constructing the issue is also the basic

procedure in the framing of messages. In terms of media frames, researchers should find possibilities of frames embedded in the media by examining a number of elements in the text. Conversely, within the audience frame, researchers should examine the interpretive view of the audience related to certain issues (Van Gorp, 2007).

The constructionist approach suggests that media deliberately select the frame before reporting the news (Van Gorp, 2007). In this case, the situation that is reported does not determine the frame; instead, the reporters follow the ‘appropriate’ frame that corresponds with the event. Consequently, the news report is constructed to fit in the pre-selected frame.

Media Frames

News frames can be examined and identified using certain keywords, phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide facts and judgments (Entman, 1993). Frames applied to the media content are consumed by audiences and influence their conversation in daily life. Frame analyses can be used to examine the media production process, how journalists convey the information in the media, and how the issue is represented in newspapers, and on television and websites. However, frames in the media can influence audiences, and different audiences might entertain different frames about an issue in their minds compared to those represented by the media.

Because frames are determined from what is encoded in news and decoded in interpreting news, framing analysis can be divided into two concepts: media frames and individual frames. Analysing media frames includes analysing media production and media content. The media production analysis examines how media representations are produced. The researchers in this area examine the origin of the frames embedded in the news; this includes examining the influence of social institutions, power structures, professional

practices, and values on the selection and shaping of the frames in the media (Kitzinger, 2007). On the other hand, the media analysis of content examines the media representation of certain events or issues, such as poverty, Muslim radicalism, and the war on terrorism (Kitzinger, 2007).

There are two possible approaches to analysing media frames: the deductive and inductive approaches (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The deductive approach starts by predefining certain frames to analyse the content of news. This approach seems easier to apply; however, some news may not match any definite frame. The deductive approach may not accommodate any 'other' frames beside the predefined one, and it might thus exclude some important issues that do not match any frames that have already been outlined.

On the other hand, the inductive approach involves analysing frames with an open view to identify all of the possible frames existing in the news. To start with a loose definition of frames can help to detect many possible ways to frame certain issues. Within the inductive approach, Ghanem (in Chyi & McCombs, 2004) identifies four dimensions of media frames in his research: the topic of a news item, its presentation, cognitive attributes, and affective attributes. The first dimension is the topic of a news item, identifying the frame content of the news. The presentation dimension regards the size and placement of the news. In the context of online media text, news placement does not matter, since there is no first and last page, compared to in newspapers. However, the frequency of news published on the websites can be considered as the presentation dimension. Cognitive attributes explain the detail in the frames. Finally, the last dimension is affective attributes, which relate to the tone of the frame and whether it is positive, negative, or neutral.

Kiousis (2004) reiterates the external and internal characteristics of media salience. The external characteristic is visibility, which consists of attention and prominence. Attention refers to the number of media issues published in the media, while prominence is the

placement of news, its size, pictures, graphs, and other illustrative devices to attract the audience's attention. On the other hand, the internal characteristic is issue valence, which classifies the news as positive, negative, or neutral.

Iyengar (1991) also identifies two kinds of framing based on the content of the issues: thematic frames and episodic frames. Thematic frames occur within the broader and general contexts of public issues, whereas episodic frames arise from a certain event and particular issues (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Chyi & McComb, 2004; Aaroe, 2011). Previously, episodic frames were considered to be more detailed in issue attributions and salience, which could lead to them having a stronger influence than thematic frames. However, Aaroe (2011) found that the intensity of the audience members' emotional reaction played a significant role in influencing the form of frames in the audience's mind.

The inductive approach was chosen for the present study because its aim is to explore as many frames as possible to achieve a comprehensive view of the images of Australia presented by selected Indonesian Muslim media outlets. In addition, an inductive method also employs a thorough media frame analysis of all news with regard to four dimensions: topic, presentation, cognitive attributes, and affective attributes (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). The topic element distinguishes between thematic and episodic frames of the issues, while the presentation element refers to the frequency of the same topic appearing in the media outlet. The cognitive dimension explores the keywords, phrases, stereotypes, and attributes, while the affective dimension refers to the tones of news stories. Therefore, using this approach will reveal a comprehensive image of Australia as it is depicted in five Muslim media, as well as the distinctive images that they present.

Audience Frames

Kersey (1969 [1708]) explains the brief concept of audiences in *Dictionarium Anglo-Britanicum*, stating that an audience is ‘the hearing of one that speaks, or the Assembly of Hearers’ (Mosco & Kaye, 2000). This definition emerged in the context of face-to-face communication, such as attending the theatre, a concert, or a political campaign. Since the invention of communication technology and of printed media in the mid-1800s, however, the audience concept has evolved. Audiences do not have to ‘meet’ the actors themselves, but they can instead read their stories in books, watch the drama on television, or listen to the radio to hear their favourite singers. The term of audience includes its engagement with the media. The study of audiences has developed in accordance with the development of media and technology.

Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) distinguish between three stages of audience history: ‘simple audience’, ‘mass audience’, and ‘diffused audience’. The simple audience is a face-to-face audience who has direct communication, such as the audience at an opera performance or a music concert. The ‘mass audience’ is the one who reads the newspapers or listens to the radio, and the ‘diffused audience’ is scattered and fragmented, which means that the audience usually accesses the media during its daily activities, such as browsing the internet for news, online shopping, and doing office work at the same time.

McQuail categorises an audience into two contexts: audience in society and audience in media (McQuail, 1997). In the first context, the audience is seen as a group of the public that has collective values and cultures that influence media content. In this context, the audience’s interest becomes the main concern of the media administrators. A community that has its own media is an example of this sort of audience. The community usually generates its

own funds for the media operations; therefore, the community's cultural values greatly influence the media content as well. Another example is the internal media set up by organisations such as political parties or religious institutions that are concerned about disseminating their internal values to their members, to facilitate their own cohesiveness and identity-building.

The second context is the audience composed of readers, listeners, and viewers of certain books and radio or television programmes. This kind of audience is suitable for the concept of marketing, which views audiences as a commodity for advertisers, expressed as 'ratings'. The other side of audience in this context consists of fans: audience members who interact with their favourite artists, sport teams, or book authors. Allor (1998) classifies this kind of audience in a political-economic study, which also looks at the audience as a commodity for advertisers. As commodities, Nightingale (2004) uses the term 'cultivate like the crop' as the metaphor for audiences, which are harvested, bundled, and sold in the media marketplace. Audiences consist of consumers of both media and advertisements. The audiences' exposure to the media is measured by ratings. Ratings provide information to advertisers, who negotiate the airtime price with broadcasters.

The focus of audience research has changed in line with the invention of print media, electronic media, and the latest communication technology. Marie Gillespie (2005) classifies media audience research into two broad traditions: media effects, and media uses and interpretations. Moreover, Jensen and Rosengren (1990) categorise audience research into five traditions: effect research, uses and gratifications research, literary criticism, cultural studies, and reception analysis.

Audience framing is 'the cognitive schemata or collective consciousness that assists in the construction of media text' (Wu, 2006). According to Stuart Hall's encoding/decoding model, the meaning of media text can be perceived differently in the audience's mind (Hall,

2003). The media 'encode' reality in the form of 'preferred reading' from the text. However, the meaning perceived by the audiences could be different if they do not share the same 'code' as the producer has, or if they refuse to decode the text into the meaning that is proposed by the communicator. According to Hall, media text can be interpreted to have several different meanings, meaning that it is 'polysemic' (Hall, 2003).

Hall distinguishes between three kinds of audiences in their decoding of the media text: they employ preferred reading, negotiated reading, and oppositional reading. Audiences who can accept all the meaning presented in the media are said to engage in 'preferred reading'. On the other hand, those who reject all the presented text are engaging in 'oppositional reading'. Finally, those who can accept only parts of the text are called 'negotiated'. The existence of the internet, however, may affect Hall's audience categorisations. Since boundless alternative information is available on the internet, as well as interpersonal communication, audiences always have a chance to 'negotiate' their own frames rather than be fully influenced by the media text. Therefore, 'preferred reading' would only exist with regard to an issue that has limited sources of information and is only published by certain media.

The study that relates the media text and its effect to the audience has been explored using a variety of terms: agenda-setting, priming, and framing. McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that there was a strong influence of the media agenda in shaping public opinion, named agenda-setting theory. This theory is a causal theory that relates the amount of news coverage to the form of the public agenda. Since this theory was first used to investigate the US presidential campaign in 1968, the traditional media still had a powerful influence in shaping public opinion.

Iyengar and Kinder (1987) amplify the concept of priming as the influence of the prominence of an issue in media in forming audience opinion. The authors propose that the

changing media landscape also influences the application of the priming concept in the study of media effects. Within the priming concept, the media coverage produces standards in evaluating a political actor or an issue; therefore, an individual judges political figures or issues based on the media that he or she consumes. Yet, this theory does not consider the possibility of peer groups' or opinion leaders' influence on the evaluation process.

The agenda-setting and priming theories were both developed while traditional media were the public's main points of reference for an issue. Consequently, media issues had a significant role in shaping public issues. However, the existence of the internet nowadays provides more information and references about issues, and the public is more independent – or has the potential to be more independent – in gathering and constructing issues. Therefore, McCombs (2005) revised the previous agenda-setting theory into a second-level agenda-setting theory, which considers the internet and the changing landscape of media and audience behaviour.

McCombs (2005) identifies two developments as the mark of agenda-setting evolution. The first development was the large number of people who accessed various different websites concerning a myriad of issues. In previous agenda-setting, people were only concerned about a small number of issues in newspapers, on television, or on the radio. Therefore, it is assumed that the agenda-setting theory is not applicable in the internet era. The second development was the changing of the audience's habit in accessing media. Before the internet existed, traditional media such as television and radio shaped the audience's habit in consuming media. For example, every morning people watched the news on television before they went to the office, or listened to the radio news reports at a certain time every day. However, since the internet can be accessed anytime and anywhere, the audience's media behaviour has changed. This has affected the measure of the quality of media engagement and the influence of the quality of media on audiences (McCombs, 2005).


The main concepts of agenda-setting and priming theories are the transfer of issue salience from the media to the public. Both theories propose that the media inform the public about an object or issue. The presence of the internet offers more detailed information and characteristics about the object or issues, which drives the public to not only know 'what' to think, but also 'how' to think of an object or issue. McCombs calls it 'second-level agenda setting' theory, which is close to the concept of framing theory. Both theories discuss the form of issue salience in the media and the public (McCombs, 2005).

Van Gorp (2007) distinguishes the concepts of priming and agenda-setting in one hand, and the frame analysis in the other within the context of the cultural and construction approaches in two substances. First, the frame analysis is the interactive process in which social reality is constructed, while both agenda-setting and priming are causal processes. Agenda-setting is the study of whether people's interest in an issue is to some extent influenced by the media agenda, while priming demonstrates the influence of prominent issues of political actors that might influence the electoral behaviour of the audience. Second, agenda-setting and priming are concerned with the issue itself, whereas the framing analysis makes a clear distinction between 'issue' and 'frame'. One issue can cover different frames, and similarly the same frame can be applicable to several issues (Gorp, 2007).

McQuail's concept of audience in media context, discussed above, is not applicable to audience framing concepts, because he only explains the audience's interpretation process in the context of consumers or target markets, rather than more general issues. However, the audience framing process can occur in broader areas, including politics, economics, and other social issues. Nightingale's audience classification is therefore more appropriate in the study of audience framing, since the framing process could happen in the context of the audience as the public, the market, and the community.

The audience framing process occurs in the frame-setting stage of the framing process described by Scheufele (1999).¹ In frame-setting, audiences determine the salience of frames that they perceive in media text. Scheufele and Huang argue that this process is similar to McCombs's second-level agenda-setting effect (Scheufele, 1999; Huang, 2009). Unlike the first agenda-setting theory, McCombs (2005) differentiates between the concept of 'object' that is used in the media's agenda in previous agenda-setting, and the 'attributed object', which describes the variation of its features and traits. McCombs states that this attributed agenda-setting connects the framing theory in some instances. The audience frame is shaped by the transfer of attribute salience from the media text to the audience, and becomes the prominent issue for the audience. The essential frame from the media can help the audience to construct meaning (McCombs, 2005).

Figure 3.1. A Process Model of Framing Research (Scheufele, 1999)



This figure is taken from Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of communication*, 49(1), 103-122.

¹ See Figure 3.1.

Likewise, Scheufele differentiates between the concept of ‘salience of frames’, which is used by McCombs, and the concept of ‘perceived importance’, which was popularised by Nelson and Kinder (1996) (Scheufele, 1999). Salience of frames refers to the extent to which people’s thinking is influenced by the accessibility of frames. The frames that are accessible are those that are most easily available and retrievable from memory. On the other hand, the perceived importance of frames is the outcome of a more conscious process of information gathering and processing (Scheufele, 1999). The process of information gathering involves values, facts, and other considerations that provide more information about the issues. Therefore, shaping audience frames involves not only media frames, but also other considerations that come from the internal and external audience-self.

The Moderators in Audience Framing

The factors that influence audience framing come not only from media frames, but also from other sources, including popular wisdom, experiential knowledge (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011), the elites’ opinion in their group-centrism (Kinder, 1996), and other individual-level moderators (Sen, 2004). Entman uses the term ‘audience autonomy’ to refer to the part of the framing process in which the process of creating the dominant meaning is centralised in audience independency to create polysemic meanings and to decode the media text (Entman, 1993). The dominant meaning from the audience’s standpoint includes the interpretation of problems, causes, and evaluations with the highest possibility of being noticed, processed, and accepted.

Chong and Druckman (2007) propose three steps in an audience’s psychological mechanism while processing the framing effect. First, audiences store their sets of prior beliefs or knowledge in their memories; in other words, they already have previous memories.

Second, some of those beliefs can be accessed at the moment when the audience perceives the issues to be framed. The last step is evaluation, which leads the audience to consider whether the issue is framed or not. This evaluation of the issues depends on personal motivation and the competitive context (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lecheler & Vreese, 2009). Personal motivation is related to the issues that are important to the person. The competitive context is the existence of opposite frame contexts that may stimulate the audience to create frames that are more strongly against the mainstream, or to exchange their frames for new ones.

Related to personal motivation in processing the framing effect, McCombs defines the concept of need for orientation (NFO), which explains the individual's natural curiosity about the world around him or her (McCombs, 2005). The need for orientation is described by two concepts: relevance and uncertainty. Relevance is personal involvement in the issue, and uncertainty is knowledge of the issue. A low need for orientation is caused by low relevance of the issue to the individual. A moderate need for orientation is prompted by high relevance to the individual's need but low uncertainty. Finally, a high need for orientation is generated by high relevance and uncertainty. Moreover, Gunho Lee (2005) – cited by McCombs – adds the degree of effort as one of the aspects in personal motivation, especially with the widening spread of information technology. For example, exploring websites to gather more information requires more effort (McCombs, 2005).

Several scholars elaborate on influencing factors such as values, knowledge, contextual moderators such as elite group frames, daily conversations, and competitive framing for limiting or enhancing framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lecheler & Vreese, 2009). People who have strong values are less affected by frames that contradict their values. The frame made by elite groups also influences the group's sentiment about the issues, and whether the audience would support or oppose those issues (Kinder, 1996). Competitive frames occur when two opposing frames are present in the media, inviting debate

among audiences. Individuals with strong prior values will relatively strengthen their frames when faced with contradictory frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

People tend to be limitedly affected by framing when they have previous beliefs about certain issues, and frame the issue in accordance to their prior beliefs. On the other hand, when someone does not have available prior knowledge about those issues, he or she will be more affected by media framing. Besides accessibility, Lecheler and Vreese (2012) explain belief importance and belief content as the possible mediators of framing effects. Belief importance is ‘altering the weight of particular consideration’ in the individual’s mind. It means that the media frame becomes salient for audiences when it increases the weight of the belief that they already hold. Moreover, belief content is the additional news that intensifies the belief in the individual’s mind, and creates the persuasive effect of the media text (Lecheler & Vreese, 2012). Belief content will have a significant effect when people do not have prior knowledge of certain issues.

Rune Slothuus (2008) conducted another study of the mediators of framing effects; he proposes the dual-process model of framing effects. This model suggests that the issues framed in the media can influence the audience framing effect in two ways: by changing the importance of considerations, and by changing the content of considerations. The first process focuses on particular values, facts, and other considerations framed in the issue that seem more important than other factors. Thus, this model enables the audience to deliberate about the issue and be able to integrate the issue frames with opinion formation (Slothuus, 2008). Therefore, audiences who apply this model should hold such beliefs and values in their long-term memory and have moderate or high political awareness of an issue frame (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997).

The second process is changing the content of considerations that were not previously in the audience’s mind. This second model is applied to the audience with moderate

awareness of the issue and belief considerations about the issue (Zaller 1992, cited by (Slothuus, 2008)). This audience is likely to accept the changing content of the issue, compared to an audience with high awareness of the issue. People with moderate awareness and weak values regarding issues tend to approve of new content concerning the issue without criticising it. In other words, the stronger the values in individuals' minds are, the clearer the information is that they received. The information cannot be changed easily with the new content regarding the issue without analysing and criticising it first.

Furthermore, some researchers claim that individual-level factors, such as demographic and social environment factors, can influence news framing. The demographic factors such as gender, age, education, and income have been proven to influence the framing process within media and audiences (Iyengar, 1991; Huang, 1996; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; cited by Huang, 2009). Huang found that education is the significant predictor of differentiating frames created by audiences, because education shapes values and beliefs within their cognitive map, both of which are needed in the process of audience framing (Huang, 2009). Different social environments also lead to different audience frames, because different places to live deliver different life experiences. For example, higher socioeconomic status is associated with more nominal media frames (Huang, 2009).

Besides the individual-level factors, Kinder and Nelson (1996) found that group-centrism also influences the audience framing process. They found evidence that group sentiments become the primary element in public opinion, and the importance of group sentiment depends on how the issue is framed. When issues are framed to attract the attention of intended groups, the power of group sentiment rises; however, when the issue is excluded from frames, the sentiment reaction is lessened. The power of group sentiment is considered important by elites to define public issues (Nelson & Kinder, 1996).

When the issue relates to the group's sentiment, it seems that group members will rely on their prior knowledge and beliefs, rather than consider it and change their belief content. Previous studies about audiences' belief importance and belief content illustrate the influence of prior knowledge and belief of certain issues in media on the audience frame. When the issue conflicts with the group's sentiment, the group members will perceive the issue negatively.

Religious Membership and the Audience-Framing Process

Some research has related religious issues in the media and the social group's influence on audience framing. Lindlof (1996) investigated how the community perceived the meaning of the movie *The Last Temptation of Christ*. The author found that there were two perceptions of the meaning within the community: for and against the meaning in the movie. The opponents of this movie believed that it undermined the scripture about Christ, while the supporters saw it as a possible truth (Lindlof, 1996).

Buddenbaum (1996) also attempted to relate religious affiliations to newspaper use for political issues. She found that some followers of Pentecostal groups and other fundamentalists who were less tightly tied to their church were more likely to use newspapers to gain political information. Meanwhile, those who were conservative Christians used fewer newspapers for political information than main line Protestants and Catholics did, while only one third of mainline Protestants and Catholics were heavy users of newspapers (Buddenbaum, 1996).

Another interesting study, conducted by Valenti and Stout (1996), concerns different perceptions about television programs among Mormon women in the US in 1992. The authors

found that although Mormon women share membership of conservative religious groups, they have different patterns of media usage, and reflect different opinions about media issues and media attitudes. The authors also found that media promote individual diversity within a strong conservative culture, and the women realised that the media had power and danger embedded in their mediated messages (Valenti & Stout, 1996). The authors conclude that religious audiences are aware of the diversity that media offer.

Some of the research above provides evidence of the influence of religious values on the audience framing process. As a belief system, religious values give guidance to followers in terms of perceiving, reacting, and behaving with regard to certain issues. Such audiences normally follow their religious leaders as a reference for their reactions to an issue. Meanwhile, those who have less of a bond with their religious groups tend to be more influenced by media frames (Buddenbaum, 1996).

Indonesia as the world's largest Muslim community has a variety of Islamic groups within its society. Religion is the belief system that provides guidance to its followers on how to perceive, react, and behave with regard to particular issues. Nightingale explains that a member of a group or community will think and act like others in the group (Nightingale, 2004). Group leaders' opinions play important roles in influencing the framing process in their followers' minds.

Recent research into Indonesian Muslim society illustrates the behaviour revolution of religiosity among the Indonesian Muslim middle class (Yuswohadi, Madyani et al., 2014). Yuswohadi et al. (2014) conclude that within the last five years, there has been a significant change in the Muslim middle class as consumers, who places more concern on spiritual values than functional and emotional values. A few examples of the changes taking place are the growth in numbers of sharia banks and other financial institutes, of Muslim women wearing the hijab, and of food products labelled as '*halal*'.

Yuswohadi et al. (2014) classify Indonesia's Muslim middle class into four categories based on their consideration of product benefits and spiritual values while purchasing. The categories are *universalist*, *rationalist*, *conformist*, and *apathist*. *Universalists* are those who highly consider both product benefits and spiritual values. *Universalists* value not only the advantages of the product, but also its compliance to the Islamic values. The second category consists of *conformists*, who place more importance on spiritual values and give less consideration to a product's value. *Muslim conformists* are highly pious in applying religious teaching, and tend to be less open-minded and more exclusive. They are highly sensitive to western values, which are believed to be opposed to Islamic values. Therefore, in their purchasing behaviour they tend to choose products with Islamic labels, or those endorsed by their group leaders (Yuswohadi et.al, 2014).

On the other hand, there are also Indonesian Muslims who do not care much about spiritual values. People who pay more attention to product knowledge and function and less attention to spiritual compliance are categorised as *rationalists*. The last category that Yuswohadi proposes consists of *apathists*, who do not care about either product value or spiritual values. Yuswohadi et al. (2014) define *apathists* generally as those Muslims with minimal income. They struggle to fulfil their basic needs. Therefore, instead of thinking about the emotional values of a product, an affordable price is their main consideration. *Apathist Muslims* do not have Islamic issues embedded in their consumer behaviour either.

The research on middle class Muslims above demonstrates the significant role of religious values in consumer behaviour among Indonesian Muslims. Even though the categories are meant to be used for marketing strategies, they can also be projected onto the wider field of understanding Indonesian Muslim society. In terms of the audience framing process, the different weighting of Islamic values in consuming news can also be analogised.

As a belief system, religion provides guidance to its followers concerning how to perceive, react, and behave with regard to particular issues. Unlike other social group memberships, religious group members share a sacred world view and everlasting group membership, which guides the cognitive and emotional values of the group (Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman, 2010). Group members normally follow their religious leaders as references for their reaction to an issue.

A prime example of how group members follow their religious leader occurred in the latest Indonesian presidential election in 2014. The election was between two candidates, one of whom (Prabowo) was supported by four out of five Islamic parties² that joined the general election in 2014, as well as by other Muslim groups (Fealy, 2014). All of the Islamic parties in Indonesia have a moderate perspective, since these political parties accept the democracy notion as the official Indonesian system (Hasan, 2012). The overt political alignments polarised Indonesian society into two blocks: Islam and secular. The election resulted in a slight gap,³ with only a 6.3% majority for Jokowi that saw him elected as president of Indonesia (*Bloomberg*, July 2014).⁴ Within this election, Muslim group members were mobilised by their leaders to vote for Prabowo, and some of them may have simply followed directions without digging for further information about their preferred presidential candidate.

Amin Abdullah (2013) explains three religious perspectives in understanding Islamic teaching. They are subjective, objective, and inter-subjective. The subjective perspective understands religion as dogmatic-theological, which tends to treat religious teaching as a certain, absolute truth with no dialogue. Someone who understands religion subjectively sees

² Five Islamic parties (PAN, PKS, PBB, PPP and PKB) passed the electoral threshold during the previous general election in 2009. With the exception of PKB (Islamic party under NU), the parties made a coalition to support Prabowo as the presidential candidate for the presidential election in 2014 (Fealy, 2014).

³ Compared to the result of Indonesia's presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, the difference between Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and his opponent Megawati in 2004 resulted in a 21.24% gap. Moreover, the presidential election in 2009 resulted in a large gap between SBY and his opponents of 21.6%. (Detik, July 23rd, 2014)

⁴ The 2014 Indonesian Presidential election result was as follows: Jokowi had 53.15% of the votes, and Prabowo had 46.85% of the votes.

him- or herself as an insider and as fully involved in all religious issues. Conversely, those who perceive religion as empirical fact, understand religion through scientific methods⁵ and see themselves as detached from religious doctrine are said to have an objective perspective. Someone with an objective perspective positions him- or herself as an outsider and a spectator of religious practices. Meanwhile, someone with an inter-subjective perspective understands religion in the middle between the subjective and objective perspectives. Individuals with an inter-subjective point of view tend to carefully separate phenomena surrounding them, which allows for dialogue between religious values and reality. Therefore, inter-subjective individuals tend to be inclusive and empathetic, and thus have sympathy for those who differ from themselves (Abdullah A, 2013).

The religious perspectives above serve as elements in understanding different Muslim ideological backgrounds within Indonesian Muslim society. A militant ideology tends to have a subjective perspective, believing that there is only one absolute truth of religious values, and no dialogue in practice with recent phenomenon. Taufik Abdullah (2013) defines militant Muslims as ‘intolerant to the plurality of opinions’. Other scholars identify those Muslims with militant ideological backgrounds as radical Islamic groups, which is highlighted by the Bali Bombing, the increasing demand for sharia’s application (Assyaukanie, 2008), and the emergence of jihadist discourse, as well as by the mobilisation of local jihadists (Bruinessen, 2002).

Amin Abdullah (2013) does not support the idea that everyone with a militant ideological background will always behave radically. Abdullah admits that within a society with subjective perspectives, community egoism can be formed, including not only radicalists⁶ but also gradualists, who choose a gradual process for their purposes. Noorhaidi

⁵M A Abdullah explains that scientific methods include research, statistical data, and other knowledge inquiries.

⁶ Those who use a radical method to achieve their goals.

Hasan (2012) defines some Islamic groups⁷ as ‘militant’, whereas Assyaukunie (2008) had previously classified them as being ‘radical’. To gain a broader understanding of the subjective perspectives of Muslims, the term ‘militant’ is preferable.

On the other hand, liberal Muslims possess an objective perspective that tends to detach them from Islamic symbols, and they tend to accept other religions as being equal to Islam (Abdullah, T, 2013). The effort of making ‘space’ between Islamic symbols and Muslims has created the ‘secularisation from within’ process, supported by liberal Muslims. This secularisation process promotes the inclusive and pluralist point of view in religious and political issues (Assyaukanie, 2008). Moreover, liberal Muslims also try to oppose the intolerant thoughts and attitudes promoted by militant Muslims. Liberal Muslims believe that in the context of politics, a genuine democracy cannot be applied in a non-pluralist society (Assyaukunie, 2008).

Moderate Muslims adopt the inter-subjective perspective, and they try to synchronise both religious values and recent facts into mutual dialogues. Moderate Muslims are aware of dynamic of social interactions and try to adapt Islamic values to the lively world. Overall, the different religious perspectives possessed by audiences will also influence their framing of an issue.

According to Taufik Abdullah and Amin Abdullah, when comparing Indonesian Muslim consumers with ideological Islamic backgrounds, it seems that both Muslim consumers and their ideological backgrounds are related. Conformist Muslims, who are pious and fully consider the spiritual values of the products they choose, are connected to militant Muslims with subjective perspectives. Although all conformist Muslims cannot be defined as militant Muslims, both classifications show their obedience to Islamic values in their daily lives. Meanwhile, liberal backgrounds relate to rationalist and apathist Muslims. Both

⁷ Some Islamic groups that are considered to be ‘radical’ by Assyaukanie (2008) and ‘militant’ by Hasan (2012) are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Jihad Troopers (*Laskar Jihad*), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI*), and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI).

rationalist and apathist Muslims pay less attention to the Islamic values of the products that they purchase. Muslims who are categorised as rationalists and apathists tend to be more secular, compared to universalist and compromist groups.

Finally, the classification of moderate Muslims is close to that of universalist Muslims. Muslims within these categories are substantively religious, accept universal values, and tolerate diverse values within society. Therefore moderate and universalist Muslims tend to be inclusive and open-minded like rationalists are, but at the same time they also worship and are aware of the importance of applying Islamic teaching in their daily lives, the way conformists are.

This study follows Amin Abdullah's classification in determining whether such Muslim groups' perspectives can be categorised as being subjective, objective, and inter-subjective. These distinctive points of view form a fundamental background for perceiving news and drawing certain frames of the news. A further question arises: Do all members of militant, moderate, and liberal groups have subjective, inter-subjective, and objective perspectives?

The interpretation of the news by Indonesian Muslims is mediated by several variables, such as knowledge, values, and beliefs, including the values and beliefs of referenced groups (Lecheler, Vreese & Slothuust, 2009). Based on Hofstede's (1986) cultural variability concept, Indonesia is categorised as a collectivist culture that considers group values and interests as precious in interpreting an issue. As a collectivist culture, Indonesian Muslims are likely to frame an issue in line with their Muslim group references rather than by following the media frame itself. This study seeks to identify the audience frames of different Muslim groups with a variety of ideological backgrounds. This step is important because these group references will influence the members' framing process with regard to their images of Australia.

There are certain factors that influence audiences' picture or framing process, such as the two resource strategies suggested by Gamson (1992) that explain thinking strategies applied by audiences. The first strategy is the substantial strategy, which uses popular wisdom, common sense and universal values. The other strategy is the personal strategy, which reflects personal experience, including group references, and somewhat rejects media framing.

Another factor that predetermines the framing process is the source of information and the pattern of media use. Lin (2009) concludes in her research that different news sources about the Iraq war generated different public opinions. Lin compared the Iraq war reports in Fox's news talk program, which strongly supported the US military invasion of Iraq, with the reports of CNBC news, which offered less support for the war. However, the audiences who selected the news sources already had personal preferences that matched the way in which news sources conveyed the Iraq war reports; therefore, the audience decisions to choose certain information sources were based on their disposition and need (Lin, 2009). In addition, Sotirovic (2000) found in her research that the pattern of media use related to demographic characteristics, like education, age, and income, influences individuals' pattern of accessing the media, including the kinds of media being used.

Framing Other Nations

The news about other nations in the media contributes to people's understanding of foreign countries. This role is important since most people in society have no direct experience with other countries; consequently, the only information they have about such issues mostly comes from media content. The media portrayal of a country can influence the general public's views and, in a wider field, can influence cross-national personal interactions, public opinion about foreign policy, and the practice of public diplomacy (Li & Chitty, 2009). Zhang and

Meadows III (2012) found in their research that the issue salience of other nations in US media influenced audience awareness as much as presidential public papers did, even though the media only exposed news related to both public opinion and presidential public papers in negative tones (Zhang & Meadows III, 2012). This finding supports previous research conducted by Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004), which concluded that the more negative the news coverage of a nation is, the more respondents can be expected to perceive it negatively, while positive coverage of a nation has no effect on public opinion.

Boulding (1969) explains factors that influence national image construction in the international system, besides historical images that already exist based on the shared experience between two nations in the past. However, Boulding states that both history and geography of other nation that are taught in schools are devices to provide ‘perspectives’ rather than truths (Boulding, 1959). Meanwhile, a nation’s image can be seen as the representation of a country in positive or negative tones in media in terms of historical, political, economic, military, diplomatic, and religious contexts (Hyunjin, Johnson & Stein, 2009).

Boulding (1959) mentions two dimensions of national image: the territorial aspects, and the hostility and friendliness in relation to other nations. The territorial aspect includes the symbolised nation on the map, which creates the boundary of the nation in the minds of people via formal teaching in schools and repetition in media content including news, advertisements, etc. On the other hand, the dimension of hostility and friendliness relates to the relations between the other country and the country of origin. There are two sub-dimensions of hostility-friendliness: the stability of assurance of the connections, and the strength or weakness of the relationship (Boulding, 1959).

Some studies examine audience frames of the national image. Shanto Iyengar (1989) verifies two dimensions of the responsibility issue: the causal responsibility and the treatment

responsibility. The causal responsibility focuses on the issues of origin, and the treatment responsibility focuses on an issue of subtractions. These two dimensions are divided into four frames of responsibility attributions: poverty, racial inequality, crime, and terrorism (Iyengar, 1989). Hyujin, Johnson and Stein (2009) examine enemy frames and dialogue frames to describe US audience frames of North Korean and Iranian leaders. With regard to considering another nation as an enemy, Forgas and O'Driscoll (1984) conclude that people tend to make a distinction between their nation and others and to see their own nation as better than others.

Besides the historical and territorial aspects, the quality of the relationship between two countries, and the local media frames about other nations, some individual factors also influence the audience framing process. Forgass and O'Driscoll (1984) try to correlate demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, political preference, religious affiliation, and social economic status, with nation perception. Their results suggest that some individual variables, such as age, voting preferences, and social economic status (SES), were significant predictors for other nation's frames. This finding is in line with the results of Sherman (1973) and Warr et al. (1969) in their investigations of the correlation between political attitudes and nation perceptions (Forgass & O'Driscoll 1984). Iyengar (1987) also notes the influence of political activity and religions in national affairs framing. Moreover, the more educated people are, the more comprehensive their learning skills are; thus, they are more likely to consider dissimilar aspects of controversial issues in their framing process (Huang, 2009).

In the context of Indonesia, understanding the audience framing process of other nations' issues in Muslim groups is challenging, since there are various factors affecting the process: not only the media frames and individual factors, but also their religious group affiliation and their opinion leaders might have a significant role. The individual factors include prior knowledge and experience with a nation. The religious group affiliation involves the values and belief system of individuals, which are influenced by the opinion of their group leaders on such issues.

Summary

Audience framing is the process of forming issue salience in the mind of an audience member. The issue source is obtained not only from the media content, but also from other references, such as experience, daily conversation, and opinion leaders, because the member of that particular media's audience can also pay attention to other media and be part of other forums and discourses. In addition, the need for orientation (NFO), which contains issue relevance and uncertainty, also influences the audience member to further frame a particular issue.

The construction approach is applied in frame analysis because both media and audience frames are interpretive activities that lead to social construction of meaning through frames that have been formed. The media can construct reality from 'appropriate' frames of their choosing, while the audience frame is the interplay between the audience's culture, belief, and experience.

In terms of framing for other nations, audience frames may play significant roles in shaping positive or negative images. The relations between Australia and Indonesia do not only depend on the collaboration between the two countries. Relations between these neighbouring countries are also influenced by the image of the nation in the media, as well as the image of the nation in the citizens' minds.

The present study adopted an inductive approach in analysing media frames. Within this approach, every news article from five Indonesian Muslim online media outlet was examined, with a focus on the dimensions of topics, presentation, and cognitive and affective attributes. Applying this inductive approach uncovered comprehensive frames that shape

broader messages that the media want to deliver to their audiences. This study also employed the constructivism paradigm that applies individual subjective meaning in picturing Australia within the framing process among informants from a variety of Muslim groups.

Muslims, as the majority population in Indonesia, play a significant role in forming the image of Australia in Indonesian society. However, Indonesian Muslims cannot be treated as an entity monolithic formation; Indonesian Muslims include a variety of Muslim groups across a spectrum of militant, moderate, and liberal ideological backgrounds. Each background evinces a different point a view, which results in different focuses of interest when framing certain issues. Therefore, exploring the framing process within each ideological background is important to determine the kinds of frames and influencing factors at work during the framing process.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology of this study's audience framing research within Indonesian Muslim society. The aim of this study is to explore Australia's image as Indonesian Muslim audiences perceive it through news media resources. How different groups perceive Australia is perceived depends on audience frames created from personal values, group references, media frames, and viewers' past experiences with Australia.

Understanding how Australia is viewed from other countries' perspective may help to promote mutual appreciation and understanding between Australia and Indonesia in the future. To achieve this aim, this study applied a qualitative research method, which involved three kinds of analysis: a media frame analysis, an audience frame analysis, and a mixed analysis of both frames to define distinct frames among different ideological backgrounds.

Indonesia has complex reactions to certain issues in the news, especially when the news is related to Islamic values. For example, the reaction to the Lady Gaga concert in May 2012 was so strong that the concert was banned by Indonesian police following mass

demonstrations by several Indonesian Muslim groups. However, not all Indonesian Muslim groups agreed with this concert prohibition. Ulil Abshar Abdala, the leader of the Islamic Liberal Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*), argued that Indonesian Police should give permission for the concert independently, without pressure from any organisation (Rahmat, 2012).

The Lady Gaga case illustrates the diversity of ideas and reactions of Indonesian Muslim society. Taufik Abdullah (2013) argues that reactions can be classified into a continuum ranges, from extreme impatience and intolerance to extreme open-mindedness towards religious pluralism in Indonesia (p. 75). Militant Muslims tend to be watchful of others' behaviour that might be considered sinful, and they act swiftly if Islamic laws appear to be broken. For example, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front) would consider it to be against Islamic rules for a restaurant to be open at noon during the month of Ramadhan, because at that time all Muslims are supposed to be fasting. Therefore, they conducted 'restaurant sweeping' at several restaurants in Makassar and other cities in Indonesia that were still open during day time in Ramadhan, and forced them to close (Amri, 2011).

However, the Indonesian Minister of Religion and one of the leaders of *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI, Indonesian *Ulama* Association) were against the restaurant sweeping actions during *Ramadhan*, because Muslims should tolerate those who cannot fast for certain reasons¹, and should also tolerate non-Muslims (Wahyuni, June 16th, 2015). The Minister of Religion (Lukman Hakim Saifuddin) and the MUI representative (Din Syamsuddin) are from NU and Muhammadiyah, respectively, which are the two largest moderate Muslim organisations in Indonesia. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, liberal Muslims agree with the idea of pluralism, and believe that a religion should liberate and enlighten all human beings (Abdullah, T, 2013).

¹ There are circumstances that may lead Muslims to stop fasting, such as sickness and pregnancy, as well as work that requires physical strength, which must be obtained by eating.

The interpretation of news by Indonesian Muslims is mediated by several variables, such as knowledge, values, and beliefs, including the values and beliefs from reference groups (Lecheler, Vreese & Slothuust, 2009). This study seeks to identify the audience frames from different Muslim groups with a variety of ideological backgrounds, which is important because these group references will influence the members' framing process with regard to Australia.

The number of internet users in Indonesia grew to 71.19 million in 2013, comprising 28% of the total Indonesian population.² Even though the number increased by 13% from 2012, this achievement did not meet the target of internet users representing 50% of the population. Based on Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), the expected number of internet users in Indonesia was 107 million in 2014, increasing to 139 million in 2015 (*Jakarta Post*, January 2014).

In 2012, the Association of Indonesian Internet Providers (APJII) reported that 65% of internet users had access to it from their mobiles, with 60% of them between the ages of 15 and 35 (APJII, 2012). This number illustrates that internet users are mostly from a certain generation in Indonesia. This phenomenon might affect the framing process of young people, since they can browse unlimited information about an issue on the internet, compared to those who consume only traditional media with their limited time and space.

Based on the previous background, the research questions (RQs) are : (RQ 1) How is Australia being portrayed by Indonesian Muslim websites and Muslim group members? To explore comprehensive process of framing within different Muslim groups; further questions are (RQ 2) What is the framing process among different Indonesian Muslim group members? What are the internal and external moderating factors the framing process? Regarding the Indonesian Muslim's classification made by Abdullah (2013) another question arises as to

² Based on The Association of Indonesian Internet Providers (APJII) (*Jakarta Post*, January 2014).

whether Indonesian Muslim audience may be classified as militant, moderate and liberal Muslim? (RQ 3)

The first aim of this research is to describe Australian issues as Indonesian Muslims perceive them. The picture of Australia would be defined within Indonesian Muslim websites (media frames) and Indonesian Muslim group's members (audience frames). To do so, the second goal of this study is to explore the moderating factors from the audience members' internal and external selves with regard to Australian issues and within different Muslim groups from militant, moderate, and liberal ideological backgrounds; to obtain a comprehensive description of the Indonesian Muslim audience regarding the framing process of Australia, the third aim of this research is to investigate whether Indonesian Muslim audience can also be classified as militant, moderate and liberal audience.

A contribution of this research is discovering different Australian images seen by Indonesian Muslims; this can be beneficial from two perspectives. The first perspective is that of the Indonesian government. The research results will increase the Indonesian government's knowledge of the majority of its citizens in interpreting other nations, and especially Australia. The knowledge does not only relate to the process Indonesian Muslims' perception of Australia; it also identifies the needs for collaboration and relations with Australia within Indonesian society. The other side of the perspective is for the Australian government, which will gain a greater understanding of Australia itself when it becomes aware of how other nations perceive it.

Research Framework

Several studies into audience framing have been conducted using a variety of terms, such as viewers' reception (Hooijer, 1990), viewers' interpretation (Schaap, Konig, Renckstorf & Wester, 2005), audience attribution of national image (Iyengar, 1989), audience evaluation

(Lim & Seo, 2009), and audience framing (Sotirovic, 2000). Furthermore, some researchers have tried to differentiate audiences in terms of framing effects, such as sex differences (Huang & Wang, 2010), cross-cultural and demographic differences (Forgas & O'Driscoll, 1984), and the black identity classification of African Americans (Davis et.al, 2010).

The term 'framing' can be used in both theory and methodology to analyse the prominence of issues framed by the media and perceived by audiences (Li & Chitty, 2009). Vreese (2012) illuminates three considerations in conducting framing effects research; they are the types of frames, the framing effects' dynamics, and, most importantly, the research design. The dynamics of framing effects consist of repetitive and competitive framing (Vreese, 2012). The more news frames are repeated in the media, the more constant and the higher the level of accessibility of the frames by the audiences will be, which will increase the influence of framing effects. On the other hand, when an issue is reported with from two perspectives, this helps the audience to reinforce its own beliefs and to support one side of the issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

To obtain a comprehensive picture of the framing process, an integrated approach that analyses the framing process taking place in media and audience frames should be applied (Schemer, Wirth, & Matthes, 2012). The process of frame-building in media is influenced by pressure from internal and external media organisations, the journalists, and the ideology and attitudes of organisations and people in the organisation, including the political elite (Scheufele, 1999). The frames can be determined using two approaches: the inductive and deductive approaches. The inductive approach applies when the frames are analysed with an open view to discover as many frames as possible (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In a deductive approach, on the other hand, the frame topics are defined before classifying the frames. The present research applied an inductive approach in order to obtain a wider range of frames in the media text without any predetermined frame classification.

Audience framing is a mental representation or schemata of interpretations that results or result from contact with the news frames, the individual's experience and cognitive structure of knowledge, opinion leaders in the group, and their peer groups. Entman (1993) proposes four steps in the framing process: defining the problem, diagnosing causes, accomplishing moral judgment, and recommending solutions. First, audiences define an issue in the media as a problem based on their existing beliefs, values, and experiences. Once they consider that there is a problem, they start to diagnose the causes of that problem. The cause diagnosed predicates moral judgment with their own beliefs and values as the standards. Last, they propose several recommended solutions to the problems.

Several factors moderate the framing process. They come from internal and external audiences. Factors from internal audiences include the audience's personal motivation in accessing information about and personal experiences with Australia. On the other hand, group affiliation, daily conversation, and media frames of Australia are factors from the external audience. All factors were considered important in this research and were profoundly investigated.

Information beyond people's normal scope, such as Australian news, is only obtained from media frames and other people's experiences. However, not all Australian issues in the media are considered important by Indonesian Muslims, depending on their need orientation, which includes degree of relevance and uncertainty about the issue (McCombs, 2005). A high degree of relevance occurs when an issue is related to personal interest and values, and a low degree of relevance arises when the issue has no relation to personal interests and values. Moreover, high uncertainty happens when someone has no proper knowledge of an issue; therefore, he or she tends to believe all information from the media. Low uncertainty occurs when people already have real knowledge about an issue, which minimises the influence of media frames. Not all Australian issues have a high degree of relevance and uncertainty. Some Australian issues that entered social discourse in the last two years are the cattle

slaughter and Australian meat import issues. The first issue was discussed since the treatment of cows before slaughter relates to Islamic values. The second issue was related to meat consumption and the Indonesian government's meat import policy, which caused a rise in meat prices in Indonesia.

The present study investigated media frames from Indonesian Muslim websites belonging to militant and moderate Muslim organisations, as well as frames from general Muslim commercial media online. Having media frames of Australia will elucidate the influence of media frames in the audience framing process. McCombs argues in his theory of '*second level agenda-setting*' that media attributions or media frames may contribute to shaping audience frames (McCombs, 2005). The media attributions of certain images or issues still have important roles since new communication technologies, such as smart phones and computer tablets, have become part of modern life. These new communication technologies enable people to access the internet from their mobiles, and this technology has changed people's lifestyles, as well as their behaviour towards media. Previously, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) outlined the media's role in linking the individual's social interaction and public affairs. People need to update their knowledge about issues being discussed when interacting socially with their friends, and they obtain their information from the media.

The result of this research was expected to reveal the different framing of Australian issues in both media and audience frames of Indonesian Muslim groups. However, both media and audience frames are not linked for portraying an effect model of media frames toward audience frames. Both media and audience frames are gathered for the additional aim of this study; to explore the factors that shape audience frames, including personal knowledge about and experience with Australia, and the discussion of a group's opinion leaders and other group members.

Research Paradigm

A paradigm is a point of view, the position that the researcher takes in relation to the material being researched. The paradigm should be determined at the beginning of the research design, because it determines the way in which the research will be conducted and reported. This research applied a social constructivism paradigm, the paradigm that develops an individual's subjective meaning in understanding the world (Creswell, 2007). The aim of this study is to discover different subjective perceptions of Australia among Indonesian Muslims from militant, moderate, and liberal ideological backgrounds. This study also aimed to investigate how subjective meaning is negotiated with group references when they are involved. Within the negotiation process, the interaction process between individuals and group members as well as the cultural context of the interaction were taken into account.

A constructivist paradigm, also known as an interpretive paradigm, was applied in this research because the purpose was to obtain an overview of audience framing processes in Islamic society. This paradigm was chosen because this research examines social realities, which are unique, plural, simultaneous, and localised. In addition, this research sought to obtain a deep understanding of human behaviour in the nation framing process, which is influenced by cultural norms and individual experiences (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011).

As a paradigm, constructivism brings social and communication activities in social construction reality (Foster & Bochner, 2008). This research's aim was to find the meanings constructed by the audience within their social environment, and especially as members of religious groups. Referring to McQuail's four stages of media effects research³, framing effects belong to the fourth, which focuses on social constructivism (McQuail, 1994).

³There are four stages of media effects research in history. In the first stage, from the early 20th century until the late 1930s, the fear of media messages' impact on attitudes grew because of strategic propaganda during World War I. Strong media effects dominated this stage. The second stage was contrary to the previous stage, considering personal influence as the main effect on attitude change. This stage lasted until the late 1960s. The third stage began in the 1970s, when the focus shifted from attitude changes to

Since subjective perceptions of Australia are the main focus of this study, the ontological substance assumes that the nature of reality is the subjective reality perceived by the participants in this study (Littlejohn & Foss, 2011). Within the shaping process of subjective meaning in the participants' mind, the negotiation process between individual personal reference and social values occurs. This negotiation is important in weighing whether individual or group references play substantial roles in shaping the subjective meaning of individuals as group members. The set of members' subjective meanings illustrates the guidance of the group's ideology on the framing process. In the case of Australia's image and Indonesian Muslim group members, the result will be interesting because it will indicate whether group references have a substantial role in shaping the image of Australia.

In terms of epistemological issues, the relationship between the researcher and the participants was close in this study (Creswell, 2007). The process of obtaining knowledge involved the researcher's own empirical experience and perceptions. The researcher's insight became a tool of data collection by observing as well as being an 'insider' as an Indonesian Muslim. The observation focused on the process of picturing Australia and considering factors that govern the process, such as media sources, an organisation's values, and the patterns of media use.

Since the researcher's position is close to the subject being researched, it is obvious that this study is not completely objective, which could influence the data analysis and discussion. Moreover, this study investigates the influence of an organisation's ideology, spread across militant, moderate, and liberal Islam. It may be difficult for the researcher to put

cognitive effects on mass media. Finally, the fourth stage began in the early 1980s. This stage is characterised by the combination of the strongly limited effects of media and the strong impact of social construction reality (McQuail, 1994).

herself in a neutral position, since she is not objective either. Therefore the ethical issues involved in conducting in-depth interviews with participants should be seriously considered.

Research Method

A qualitative method was applied in this research. It was chosen because the object of this study is to investigate what Australia means to Indonesian Muslims from different ideological backgrounds. The investigation included the process of forming subjective meanings in participants' ordinary settings, and trying to understand the process of providing and interpreting Australian news in the participants' mind. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) argue that qualitative research is the practice of transforming the world into a series of representations, which helps to make the world observable.

Some characteristics are applied in a qualitative methodology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The first is data collection, which draws on media text and participants' experience with the issue being studied. In this research, participants were interviewed in their homes or offices and asked about their opinions of Australia and the process of picturing Australian issues. Besides the participant's opinion, this study also investigated the frames of Australia generated from the media frames of several Indonesian Muslim websites. The subjective perspectives of Australia in participants' minds, and media frames constitute the main study focus of this research.

The researcher was the key instrument in collecting data; however, the researcher's subjective perspective of Australia should not be brought into the reports. To minimise the influence of the researcher's subjective perspective, a theoretical framework was applied. This theoretical structure guided the researcher in obtaining the data needed and in omitting

unnecessary facts. In addition, it also led the researcher in making interpretations from the data collected and observable facts, such as the participants' expression during interviews and Australian images in the media. However, the researcher's prior knowledge, thought, Islamic background, and context while interpreting the data cannot be ignored.

The other characteristic of qualitative research is using various sources of data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Unlike quantitative research, which uses one form of data source, such as questions, qualitative research gathers various forms of data, such as interviews, observations, documents, films, and news archives. This researcher reviewed all data, classified it into categories, and excluded unnecessary information. The process of creating categories could not all be completed at once. The researcher related data and themes back and forth to establish the result and discussion, as well as the theme, into one complete report. The back-and-forth process of relating data and themes occurs because the research design of qualitative method cannot follow a restricted plan. This situation occurs because once the researcher starts collecting data, questions and forms of data may change, adapting to the situation of the participant being interviewed. This condition may lead the researcher to modify the concept that has already been set, because the main focus is to learn about the participant's problems and situation. In doing so, adapting the research approach makes it possible to obtain valuable information from the participants.

The last characteristic of the qualitative method is forming a holistic picture of certain situations and problems (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The holistic picture includes multiple-perspective reporting, the various factors influencing a situation, and creating a detailed picture of the situation. This holistic picture is provided by an inductive process, which describes and analyses various facets of the situation and compiles them into a bigger, detailed picture. Collaborative interaction with participants also contributes significantly to a research report because rich description is the goal of a qualitative methodology.

Data Gathering

Two main data gathering methods were applied in this research: in-depth interviews and media text analysis. In-depth interviewing is the correct way to understand a participant's perspective and experience (Lindlof & Taylor, 2010). Participants' perspectives of Australia and their experience with interpreting Australian news were the main data that needed to be collected in this study. The interviews were voice-recorded and transcribed verbatim for data analysis. The media text analysis was used to collect media frames of Australian news data.

Discussing solid data gathered in this research is somewhat debatable in qualitative research, since it raises the basic issue of the reality and the researcher's perception of reality. Therefore, this study needed to consider data validity and reliability when gathering such data (Richard, 2009). *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, cited by Richard (2009), defines validity as 'the quality of being well-founded and applicable to the case or circumstances' (p. 148). Regarding this definition, to achieve data validation this research applied a triangulation methodology by constructing the interview guides to include two different questions about a single issue. Validated data were achieved when both answers supported each other. However, if informants gave different answers, the data validation could be traced from other secondary data, such as literature, organisations' backgrounds, and the answers of other informants from the same organisation or similar ideological backgrounds.

Moreover, data reliability is associated with trustworthy data, on which the reader can rely in the research results (Richards, 2009). To achieve trustworthy data, this study should include a responsible interview process and a consistent data classification that enabled it to transparently explain the data, and it should also be well documented. To achieve a degree of consistency in coding the data, two coders performed the coding process to confirm that the

coding interpretation was appropriate. Therefore, data reliability could be assured due to the confirmation of the co-coder in the data-coding process.

As previously mentioned, this study investigated frames of Australia in both media and audiences. Therefore, it needed two kinds of primary data: media text and audience opinions regarding Australia. Each set of data was coded, classified, and analysed according to the kind of frames and interrelations between two sets of data in forming frames of Australia in the minds of Muslim participants. The following section provides further explanations of how the two kinds of data were gathered, coded, classified, and analysed.

Gathering Media Frame Data

Media frame data were gathered from Indonesian Muslim media websites. The media websites were chosen based on the following considerations: the variety of ideological backgrounds, the media outlet's owner and management, and daily accessibility. Five Muslim media websites were chosen and expected to provide a diversity of frames of Australia from different ideological backgrounds. These were two militant Muslim websites (*Arrahmah* and *HTI*), two moderate Muslim media outlets (*Dakwatuna* and *NU*), and one general Muslim outlet (*Republika*).

Arrahmah is a news portal for Islamic issues, and especially news about the Islamic world and *Jihad*. The aim of this media outlet is to publish balanced information about Islam and the Islamic world, which has been marginalised through globalisation and the modern communication era. *Arrahmah* is categorised as militant media because its content is more subjective, with arguments strongly based on the absolute truth of *Al Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. *HTI* has similarities to *Arrahmah*, being categorised as militant media, with one ultimate goal: to establish a Caliphate with one Muslim leader for all Muslims in the world. *HTI* is a Muslim group in Indonesia. To execute its goal, *HTI* argues that there will be no suitable governing system in the world unless Islamic systems are applied in all respects. *HTI* rejects the idea of

democracy, capitalism, and liberalism, as these are not referred to in *Al Qur'an* or *Sunnah*.

Dakwatuna is a news portal similar to *Arrahmah*, with a moderate Muslim ideology. *Dakwatuna's* news content is more empathetic and respects differences among individuals within societies. Even though *Dakwatuna* also bases its arguments on *Al Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, this site prefers to tolerate differences and is open to having discussions. NU also has a moderate Muslim ideology. NU is one of the larger Muslim organisations. NU members are spread all over Indonesia, especially in rural areas, in the form of *pesantren* or traditional Islamic boarding schools, which continue to exist today.

The last media outlet is *Republika*. Unlike the four previous outlets, *Republika* is commercial, with a Muslim target market, and is owned by *PT Mahaka Media Tbk*. *Republika* has been in print since 1995. Since this media outlet is owned by a private company, *Republika* has no affiliation to any Muslim group, and tries to stay 'neutral,' representing the Muslim population more generally.

The media text gathered in this research comprised all news articles mentioning 'Australia' from 2011 to 2013 on the five selected websites. This timeframe was chosen because at the time of study it had been 10 years since the first Bali Bombing in 2002; therefore, this research tried to document the recent frames about Australia a decade after the catastrophic event that saw Australia lose so many victims. In addition, other Australian issues became headlines between 2011 and 2013, such as the WikiLeaks scandal in 2011; the limitation of cattle imports from Australia as an effect of slaughtering controversies in 2011; and the latest event, which was the spying scandal in Australia's embassy in Jakarta in late 2013.

To collect media frame data relating to each news item about Australia, this study applied the external and internal characteristics of media salience defined by Kiousis (2004). The external characteristic is visibility, including the number of media issues published in the media, while the internal characteristic includes issue valence that classifies news tones into

positive, negative, or neutral. In addition, each news item selected was classified based on the content's issues, whether it contained thematic issues with broader and more general context, and episodic issues that arose from certain events and particular issues (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; McCombs, 2004; Aaroe, 2011).

Not all news mentioning Australia within the time period was used for this study. Only news articles that discussed Australia as their subject were gathered as data. Certain news items only mentioned Australia as a participant in a conference, or as part of an international group, without further explanation of Australia's role in the issue. This kind of news, in which Australia was mentioned without further discussion, was not collected as a data. Only news about Australian issues was counted as data.

Having gathered all the selected news articles, the next step was coding the text based on three classifications: news themes, news tones, and news sources. News themes were coded based on the event⁴, issues⁵, or broader themes that they encompassed.⁶ Sometimes a news article could be classified into two categories; when this happened, the article was only classified based on its strongest theme. The reason behind categorising only one news theme code for each article was to obtain the visibility aspect of the external characteristic of media salience (Kiousis, 2004). Therefore, each article needed to be classified into one code theme to obtain the visibility themes that frequently appeared on each Islamic website. Determining the frequent news themes that appear on each website may lead to uncovering the media salience of each media outlet.

Another news article classification was evaluating the whole article and determining whether the news tone was positive, negative, or neutral. Evaluating the news is challenging,

⁴ The news event classification is based on a certain event happening at certain times, like the 'Innocent Muslim' film demonstration in September 2012, and Tony Abbott as the new Australian Prime Minister in 2013.

⁵ The news issue classification is based on the issue that has been discussed several times over a long time period of time. It is not limited to certain times and certain events. Examples include the terrorism/anti-terrorism issue, the West Papua freedom issue, and Corby's parole issue.

⁶ Broader theme issues consist of several events that have similar themes, such as Islam's existence in Australia, Australia funding Indonesian projects, and outstanding findings and achievements of Australia.

since there is no clear indicator of it being positive or negative. A further question can be raised: positive/negative according to whom? To minimise the risk of a biased evaluation, the news was judged as being positive/negative by examining the adjectives used to describe Australia within the text, and the connection with Indonesia and Islamic issues. A positive news tone can be identified by the use of 'positive' words, such as 'Australia supports Indonesia' and 'Australia is welcoming Muslim immigrants'.

On the contrary, a negative news tone can be identified from the negative words or critics that are attached to Australia. Some examples are phrases such as, 'Australia's interference in Indonesia' and 'Australia discriminates against Muslims'. A neutral news tone can be found in an article that has no positive or negative words and descriptions related to Islam or Indonesia. An example is the news article published in *Republika* about the number of Indian immigrants catching up to the number of Chinese immigrants in Australia in 2012 (Pitakasari, July 2012). This article presented updated data about immigrants coming to Australia, without evaluating Australia itself as either positive or negative in relation to these data. Therefore this kind of article can be evaluated as having a neutral news tone.

Also challenging in defining news tone is that there might be more than one news tone within an article. This 'double' news tone is possible when the media tries to balance information by presenting it from both perspectives. Therefore, for this case, one news article could be coded into two news tones since the aim for this classification was to find the major feeling of each medium towards Australia.

The last news article classification was news sources. The news sources identified within the article included citations of opinion leaders, and quoting other media outlets. The aim of this classification was to explore the media policy in citing the news sources, since news sources have a strong connection to certain ideological backgrounds. Therefore, choosing the news sources for the article is a sensitive issue. Some media only quote the

internal opinion leader as the news source, while other general media would avoid quoting opinion leaders from only one or two Muslim groups.

News frames in an article can be found in stereotyped images and in sentences that provide facts and judgments (Entman, 1993). The news themes, news tones, and news sources classifications made significant contributions to analysing news frames and media salience on Australian matters within the selected media outlets. Accordingly, the focus of militant, moderate, and general ideology media could also be determined.

Media frame analysis can make significant contributions when it comes to analysing the audience framing process.

Media frames are known as one of external moderating factors in forming audience frames. Media frames might assist the audience in adding references regarding the framed issues. However, media frames might not be the only resource that is taken notice of in constructing of frames by audience members. This process also depends on other moderating factors, such as experience and personal motivation in gathering the issues.

Gathering Audience Frame Data

To obtain a variety of perceptions of Australia among Indonesian Muslims, this study considered the spectrums of Islamic thought and kinds of Islamic organisations to which participants belonged. The Islamic spectrum includes militant, moderate, and liberal Islam. The participants of this study were chosen based on their membership to a Muslim organisation, their ideological background, and their position within the organisation, either as leaders or members.

The variety of organisations was also considered in order to obtain a wider overview of audience frames of Australia. Unlike militant and liberal Muslim organisations, moderate Muslim organisations are more diverse, ranging from traditional Islamic schools such as *pesantren*, to modern Islamic schools; and from two large Muslim organisations such as

Muhammadiyah and NU, to political parties such as *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Justice Prosperous Party) and *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party).

Twenty-eight participants were interviewed in three big cities in Indonesia:

Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Jakarta. Yogyakarta and Surakarta are two cities with a history of Indonesian Muslim revival. *Muhammadiyah*, *Syarikat Islam* (SI), and *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) are organisations that started their activities in these cities. Muslims from Yogyakarta and Surakarta are experienced with debate and other contended issues among different ideologies. Besides the place of origin, Yogyakarta and Surakarta have branch offices of some organisations, such as NU, PKS, PPP, and *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI)⁷. The sizes and ages of organisations were two factors that made it possible to find participants in both cities. In other words, it was not difficult to find participants from NU, PKS, PPP, and FPI who met the criteria for this study.

Jakarta was chosen because it is the capital city of Indonesia and houses most Muslim organisations' head offices. Participants from *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL) were interviewed in this city. Furthermore, interviews with participants from other listed organisations were also conducted in this city.

The audience frame data in this study was gathered by in-depth interviews. Informants chosen for this research were mostly the leaders of their organisations. To begin, a consent letter with regard to the interview was offered to all informants. Once the informant agreed to be interviewed based on the interview guide, the interview began. On the other hand, if the informants did not feel disposed, the interview was cancelled.

Semi-structured interviewing was suitable in this study because, besides specific topics about new framing processes experienced by interviewees, the researcher also wanted to explore other ideas that might make significant contributions to the study (Weerakkody, 2008). An open-ended interview guide was prepared that offered flexibility to the researcher

⁷ FPI, Islamic Defender Front, a militant Muslim organisation.

in asking additional questions when participants provided interesting answers that needed to be explored further.

The interview guide could be divided into three sections: how informants pictured Australia; how they obtained information; and what experience they had with Australia. The first section included the picture of Australia in informants' minds, the vision of organisational values, and their impression of Australia-Indonesia relations. The picture of Australia included positive and negative images of Australia, interesting Australian issues to follow, and how an organisation's opinion leaders as well as other members persuaded their perspective in framing Australia. The aim of the first interview guide was to obtain an overview of audience frames of Australia and the influence of the informants' ideological backgrounds on their frame.

The second section concerned sources of information about Australia. The sources were not limited to local traditional media, but also extended to the internet and broadcasts by local and international media. Within this section, informants were also questioned about media habits, and time and duration of consuming media, especially when they wanted to gather information about Australia. Furthermore, informants were also asked whether they had discussions about Australia in their daily conversation. This section's goal was to explore the media habits of informants and their sources of information about Australia. Therefore, this section related to media frame data, and to whether the interviewees were noticed by media frames.

The last section of the interview guide covered experience with Australia. The informants were asked whether they had already been to Australia, had any friends or relatives staying in Australia, or if their group's opinion leaders had visited Australia. Understanding the informant's direct or vicarious experience with Australia was important, because it would also determine their framing process. Their experiences were not only personal encounters, but also their organisation's interactions with Australia. Therefore, the

opinion leaders' experience with Australia and the collaboration experience of the Muslim organisations with Australia would guide the group's perception of the nation.

To code the informants' responses, all recorded interviews were transcribed and coded into several groups: frames of Australia, the organisational weight on the framing process, media behaviour, and experience related to Australia. The coded interview data were then ready to analyse.

Unlike exploring media frames that gathered from classified issues of Australian news, discovering an informant's framing could be done while the interview was conducted. The informant's frame of Australia could be detected from his/her first impression of Australia, his/her opinion about Australia, and also his/her experience of Australia. The informant's frame of Australia also could be recognised from his/her word expressions on how picturing Australia as well as his/her evaluation of Australia, whether positive or negative values. The end of interview would confirm the informant's frames of Australia.

Data Analysis

Data analysis started after all media frame and audience frame data were gathered and coded. The analysis started with media frames and audience frames, then compared both frames to elaborate on the moderating factors that establish the audience framing process. Finally, the reasons that people with different ideological backgrounds had different audience frames could be determined. However, this research is not drawing on the influence of media frames toward audience frames.

The media frame analysis started with displaying the number of news articles mentioning Australia between 2011 and 2013 in five selected media outlets. These numbers provided a general indication of how often Australia's issues attracted media administrators. The visibility of external media salience could also be seen by the news theme comparison of five selected media outlets. This comparison showed the different theme focus of each media

outlet. There might be one news theme that was found to exist in one media outlet, but that did not appear in any other media.

Internal media salience could be evaluated by analysing news tones and sources of articles. News tones could be used to analyse the evaluation process of each media source related to an issue. The positive, negative, and neutral tones reflected the media outlet's feelings towards Australia: whether the country was positioned as a friend or an enemy, or whether the outlet was trying to be more objective by balancing the positive/negative news tones. Furthermore, news source analysis explored types of opinion leaders as well as other media articles referenced. In addition, the kind of issue also determines the type of news source. This news sources analysis served to investigate media policy, particularly in framing Australian issues. News visibility, news tones, and news sources made significant contributions in analysing media frames in this study.

Van Gorp (2007) suggests methodological steps for inductive frame analysis by representing each frame package in a matrix.⁸ The matrix presents the frames in the row entries and reasoning devices in the column entries. The first step is to carefully select the framing devices, such as word choices, metaphors, examples, descriptions, and arguments (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). These are then classified into reasoning devices that consist of problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and treatment evaluations (Entman, 1993). The media frames result from linking the framing devices and reasoning devices by understanding the central idea and suggesting the name of each frame (Van Gorp, 2007).

On the other hand, analysing audience frames is different from analysing media frames. Unlike media frames, which can easily be identified based on the issue and event, audience frames are unstructured. Organising audience frame data was more challenging in this study, since there was no time and topic limitation when informants were asked about

⁸ For example see Van Gorp, B. (2005). Where is the frame? Victims and intruders in the Belgian press coverage of the asylum issue. *European Journal of Communication*, 20(4), 484-507.

their thoughts on Australia. Therefore, all transcribed interviews were coded into several matrices that each represented a certain frame. By using these matrices, it was possible to identify similar frames from several informants, contrasting frames on a single issue, and one idiosyncratic matrix expressed by a single interviewee.

The frame matrix provided above was used in several steps of analysis for audience frames. The first step focused on the most frequent frames of Australia, and investigated the original event and motives as the background of the frame. In terms of exploring the background event, investigating related issues in the media was necessary. Investigating the media issue was the second step. Within this second step, it was important to determine whether the audience frames were influenced by the media. The more similarities there were between media frames and audience frames of Australia, the greater the possibility was that the audience frames had been influenced by the media text. The influence of media text on audience frames might occur with regard to an issue that could not be approached in their daily life, such as the WikiLeaks issue, which started from the 'leak' of US electronic wiretaps; this kind of information can only be accessed from the media.

The frame matrix served to explore the pattern of attention and interest within the informants' answers. The pattern might bring up idiosyncratic frames, which did not have to be mentioned by many informants, as one informant was enough as long as the frame explored a different aspect of Australia that might be interesting. Finally, the last step in analysing audience frames was classifying the frame matrix based on the interviewees' ideological background. This step was interesting because it might reveal that each ideological background had particular issues to be framed. If a distinctive picture of Australia in the minds of militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims could be determined, one research question in this study would be answered.

Besides analysing media frames and audience frames, this study also explored the moderating factors in the process of framing Australia. As already mentioned, moderating

frames include the internal and external self of the audience. Need for orientation (NFO) and experience with Australia are both internal factors that moderate audience frames, while group affiliations, daily conversations, and media frames are external factors. The audience's NFO was important to explore since this concept investigates its motive for accessing the media text, whether to increase knowledge to reduce anxiety, or to improve the audience's issue engagement. Besides media frames, other moderating factors were investigated through in-depth interviews.

NFO was traced from the informants' explanations about the importance of Australia for them, or in other words its 'relevance' to them; and the informants' knowledge about Australia reflected their 'uncertainty'. If an interviewee considered Australia to be important to him or her, and found that he or she had a lack of knowledge on the subject, then that informant's motivation to seek information about Australia would be great. When informants did not perceive Australia as an important issue for them, on the other hand, their need for Australian information would be low.

Related to the informants' knowledge about Australia, their experience with Australia became an influential factor as well. Generally, the informants' experiences with Australia were classified into direct experience (ever been to Australia) and mediated experience (mediated by media or friends who have been to Australia). However, the experience classification could spread wider, depending on the causal condition of informants' experiences.

The present study also aimed to explore the interaction among Australian issues within the group's discourse via the group's references and opinion leaders in forming the audience frames. Therefore, interviewees were also questioned about their daily conversations with other members and opinion leaders related to Australian issues. Further questions asked were whether there were any collaborative projects between their Muslim organisations and

Australian institutes. Collaboration experience between the informant's organisation and Australia would contribute to better frames of Australia.

The last analysis served to compare media frames and audience frames, leading to two findings: the impact of media frames and the distinctive frames among militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims. Exploring the similarities and dissimilarities between both media and audience frames would lead to two possibilities. The first possibility was that media text might dominate audience frames when both frames are similar. The other possibility was that informants might have had alternative references that formed their frames of Australia, which were different from media frames.

Comparing media frames and audience frames also contributed to uncovering distinctive frames of Australia among different ideological backgrounds. To do so, media frames and audience frames were first separated based on ideological backgrounds. Then, both types of frames were compared based on ideologies, and similar and dissimilar frames were found. Both commonalities and contrasts might be found when comparing these frames. This comparison, however, was only possible for militant and moderate ideologies, since liberal media do not exist and were therefore not investigated in this study. To find a different focus of liberal informants, the same procedure was applied: finding similar and dissimilar frames, as well as the distinctive factors of liberal audience frames that do not exist among individuals with militant and moderate backgrounds.

Research Limitation and Ethical Issues

The limitation of this research is the number of media and informants that were investigated. There are huge numbers of Indonesian websites today, and some of them label themselves as Islamic websites. The selection of the five Islamic media outlets in this study was based on popularity, and on these outlets being referred to by most Muslim members of the same

ideological background. However, liberal Muslim online media was not covered in this study because at the time of this investigation liberal Muslim organisations do not maintain any particular news portals/websites. Therefore, finding media frames' inspiration on Muslims with liberal backgrounds was challenging.

The other limitation of this research is the spectrum of informants from all ideological Muslim backgrounds. Besides militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims, there are many 'general Muslims' who do not relate to any ideological background. These general Muslims are simply common Muslims who have no interest in engaging with certain Muslim backgrounds. This common Muslim is called 'apathis' based on the middle class Muslim classification (Yuswohadi et.al, 2013) or Islam 'KTP'.⁹ Finding non-affiliated ideological background informants was difficult, since there was no clear definition of them.

An ethical issue also emerged within this study. Some informants felt insecure when asked about their opinion of Australia, since they perceived Australia negatively. The insecure feeling was related to sensitive issues, such as terrorism, that victimised their group's leader and other members. They refused to participate in an interview at first, but some were willing to continue the interview after it was explained that their names and group affiliations would be not be revealed. Therefore, this study does not provide the informants' names or group affiliations, but only their ideological background and the types of institutions to which they belonged, such as a *pesantren* or political parties.

Summary

This research's aim is to determine how Australian issues are framed by militant, moderate, and liberal Indonesian Muslims. To do so, qualitative methods were applied with a

⁹ KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk (= citizen's ID card). There is a religion column on Indonesian ID cards, and the term 'Islam KTP' means his religion (Islam) is stated in his ID, but not applied in daily life.

constructivist paradigm. The data gathered included media text and in-depth interviews with several Indonesian Muslims from militant, moderate, and liberal backgrounds.

An inductive approach was applied in this study to classify both media frames and audience frames. Media text was classified into news themes, tones, and resources. In addition, the media frames were gathered from connecting frame devices and reasoning devices from the text. The interviewees' transcriptions were classified into a frame matrix. The coding of both media text and interview transcriptions was done by two coders to obtain reliable data.

The next step was data analysis to compare the media text and audience frame matrices. Finding similar and dissimilar frames between media and informants contributed to uncovering the difference in interest in Australian issues among militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims. The second-level agenda-setting theory was applied in this research to analyse media frames and audience frames, and to determine linkages between both types of frames.

The results of this research do not only illustrate frames of Australia in the minds of Indonesian Muslims; they also reveal the different focuses of interest with regard to Australia among each ideological background. In addition, this study aimed to explore the internal and external factors that may determine the process of audience framing.

CHAPTER 5

MEDIA FRAMES OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ONLINE MEDIA RELATED TO AUSTRALIAN ISSUES

Introduction

Australia-Indonesia relations are always interesting to track in the media. Media portrayals of Australia-Indonesia relations are not about friendly neighbours. Some of the more controversial aspects of the relationship are exposed: the cattle-slaughter issues (2011), asylum seeker issues (2013), Corby's parole issues (2013), and Australian phone-tapping of the Indonesian President (2013), to name a few.

Several influential factors that place other nations in cooperative, oppositional or stratified stances are dependent on news production (Rivenburgh 1997). This involves the professional roles of journalists, organisational routines, and cultural values.

This chapter will explore Australian images as framed by Indonesian Muslim online media. A variety of online Muslim media has been chosen address this question, ranging from

general commercial media targeting specifically Muslim audiences to Muslim group media outlets that have different Islamic ideologies – from militant to moderate. The aim of this chapter is to comprehensively show how Australia is portrayed in Indonesian Muslim online media. The chapter not only elucidates issues to do with Australia, but also investigates the particular tones and framing mechanisms that these media outlets have taken toward Australia from 2011 to 2013. This chapter also attempts to explain whether there is any variance in the framing of Australia between militant, moderate and general media.

Indonesian Muslim Online Media

The examined online media has been chosen to cover a variety of Muslim ideologies, media owners and management, and the daily rate of accessible content. The five Indonesian Muslim online media programmes selected are: *Arrahmah*, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)*, *Dakwatuna*, *Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)* and *Republika*.

Arrahmah (*Arrahmah.com*) and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (*hizbut-tahrir.or.id*) are categorised as militant media outlets by Bergin (2009) and Hui (2010). The founder of *Arrahmah* is Muhammad Jibril, who was identified by the US Department of The Treasury¹ and the UN Security Council² as the senior member of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) network. Jibril was sentenced to five years in Indonesian jail in June 2010 for his expected participation in the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Hotel bombing in Jakarta. The Indonesian government also banned *Arrahmah* in March 2015 for spreading radical ideologies (*CNN Indonesia*, 31st March, 2015). However, this ban only lasted for a few days and was lifted in mid-April 2015 (*Republika*, 12th April, 2015).

¹ Press release by the US Department of The Treasury, titled “Treasury Sanctions Three Senior Members of the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist Network”, 16th August 2011, retrieved from <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1276.aspx>.

² Press release from the UN Security Council titled “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman to Its Sanctions List”, 12th August 2011 retrieved from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10359.doc.htm>.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) media content promotes the Islamic caliphate across the world, therefore, this group rejects the idea of democracy because it is not compatible with *Al Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, the two central texts for Islam (Hasan, 2012). The HTI media outlet, owned by the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesian Muslim group and linked to the International Hizbut-Tahrir media network operates in five languages: Arabic, Dutch, English, Turkish and Indonesian.³

The third and fourth media channels examined in this study are *dakwatuna* (*dakwatuna.com*) and *NU online* (*nu.org.id*) – these channels both follow moderate ideology. *Dakwatuna*, administered by *Lembaga Kajian Dakwatuna* (LKD, the Preaching Studies Institute) was founded 20th January 2007 and launched by Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Chairman of *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR, People's Consultative Assembly) from 2004 to 2009. Hidayat Nur Wahid is known as the former President of the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Prosperous and Justice Party), an Islamic party in Indonesia where Hasan (2012) categorised Muslim groups that accepted democracy as being moderates. *Dakwatuna.com* is one of three Muslim online media channels that have been accessed by Indonesian Muslim activists from several high schools in Jakarta who want to learn about Islam (Nur, 2015).

The other moderate Muslim website being examined in this study is *NU online* (*nu.org.id*). NU, or Nahdhatul Ulama, is one of the largest Muslim organisations. NU members are spread throughout Indonesia, especially in rural areas, in the form of *pesantren* or traditional Islamic boarding schools. NU online is the official website of Nahdhatul Ulama and publicizes the organisation's activities as well as illustrates their perspectives on current issues, for example, NU positions against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) issues that had become a controversial issue in Indonesia between February and March 2016 (*NU Online*, 4th March 2016).

The last media outlet being studied is *Republika*. Unlike the four previous media channels, *Republika* is commercial, has a Muslim target market and is owned by *PT Mahaka Media Tbk*. *Republika* launched a print version in 1995. As this media outlet is privately

³ Retrieved from <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info>.

owned, *Republika* has no affiliation to any Muslim groups and tries to stay ‘neutral’, representing the general Muslim population.

Overview of News About Australia, 2011 – 2013

This research observes news about Australia in five Indonesian Muslim online media channels from 2011 to 2013. The total number of news items with the ‘Australia’ keyword in all five media during 2011 to 2013 was 795 (Table 5.1). Table 5.1 shows that *Republika*, the general commercial Muslim media channel, had the highest number of news stories about Australia. However, in 2013 *Arrahmah* had almost the same number of news stories about Australia as *Republika*. All online Muslim media outlets show the highest number of news stories about Australia in 2013 because of the Australian spying scandal in early November of that year.

Table 5.1.
Number of News Items Mentioning ‘Australia’
In five Indonesian Muslim online media channels, 2011 to 2013

MEDIA	Year			Total news items
	2011	2012	2013	
<i>Arrahmah</i>	33	37	84	154
<i>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)</i>	11	51	75	182
<i>Dakwatuna</i>	5	8	50	63
<i>Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)</i>	57	51	33	141
<i>Republika</i>	71	67	85	223
Total news items (annual)	221	239	335	795

The news stories about Australia range from general to specific: the former tend to be broad news stories that are expanded on through discussions about topical events, for example, Australia-Indonesia collaboration issues comprise several attempts to collaborate such as military training between Australian and Indonesian armies, the Young Leader exchange program, and the Disaster Reduction program collaboration between Australia and *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU). Specific issues are stand alone issues or events like the Corby parole, asylum seekers, live cattle import issues, the US military base in Darwin, and an ‘innocent Muslim’ film demonstration that caused a riot in several places in Australia in 2012, found in news stories.

However, not all news mentioning Australia actually has issues directly related to Australia itself. Some news stories only mention Australia incidentally – as the participant of a conference – or mention Australia as part of a larger group of other Western countries without attributing any specific Australian issue to it. The number of Australian-only issues in five Indonesian Muslim Online websites is displayed in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2.
Australian Issues from Five Indonesian Muslim Websites, 2011 to 2013

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	2011	2012	2013	Total*
1.	General	Islam in Australia	26	23	52	101
2.	General	Australia-Indonesia collaboration	20	23	14	57
3.	General	Economics & finance	8	14	12	34
4.	General	Daily life in Australia (human interest)	8	3	20	31
5.	General	Australia’s international relations	4	9	11	24
6.	General	Australia funds Indonesian Project	7	6	6	19

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	2011	2012	2013	Total*
7.	General	Australian Muslims support <i>Jihad</i>	1	5	11	17
8.	General	Outstanding findings & achievements of Australia	5	3	7	15
9.	General	Australia-Indonesia relationships	2	8	4	14
10.	General	Sports	2	4	5	11
11.	General	Australian scholars' interest in Indonesia	3	4	3	10
12.	Specific	Australia spying issues (2013)	0	0	59	59
13.	Specific	Terrorism and anti-terrorism issues	15	17	18	50
14.	Specific	Cows imported from Australia	14	6	4	24
15.	Specific	Wikileaks (2011)	20	0	0	20
16.	Specific	West Papua issues	4	9	3	16
17.	Specific	Corby's parole	0	15	4	19
18.	Specific	Asylum seekers	2	4	12	18
19.	Specific	<i>Innocent Muslim</i> film demonstrations	0	10	3	13
20.	Specific	US military base at Darwin	4	2	3	9
21.	Specific	Sponsoring Indonesian members of parliament to visit Israel	0	0	6	6
22.	Specific	Tony Abbott, the new prime minister	0	0	4	4
		Total	145	165	261	571

*Rank by total number of each general and specific issue

'Islam in Australia' was the general issue that appeared with the most frequency, appearing in around 101 news stories from 2011 to 2013. The 'Islam in Australia' issues relate to the various activities of Australian Muslims and the existence of Islamic values in Australia. Examples of these activities are mosque building in several locations, the existence of Islamic schools, Australians converting to Islam, Australian Muslim women's fashion, an Australian cricket player who refused a beer advertisement to be on his team shirt, and many

others like these. Stories highlighting the existence of Islamic values within the Australian economy have had themes such as the following: The *sharia*' stock market; Islamic retirement funding; Islamic banking. However, there is some negativity about this topic, such as stories on discrimination experienced by Australian Muslims at their workplaces, the *burqa* being banned by the NSW Government, and new anti-Islamic party in Australia.

The second group of general stories is about the issue of Australia-Indonesia collaboration. These stories include specific collaboration programs between Australia and Indonesia, some Indonesian figures who have received honours from Australian institutes, and the Indonesian President and Vice President visiting Australia to initiate a bilateral partnership. Some cooperation programs that have been feature are as follows: Joint training between the Australian Defence Force and the Indonesian National Army; the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) program; the defence industry cooperation between Australia-Indonesia; the Muslim Young Leaders exchange program, and other exchange programs from either country. Dr Budiyo, the Indonesian Vice President, also received recognition as *Doctor Honoris Causa* from the University of Western Australia. In addition, Da'i Bachtiar, the former chief of Indonesian Police, received an anti-terrorism acknowledgement from the Edith Cowan University, Australia.

Economic and financial issues include import-export issues between Australia and Indonesia, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Bali, the Australian white paper and the Indonesian Government's plan to be in debt to Australia. Other examples of general stories surround daily life in Australia. The news attracts human interest, and ranges from floods in Queensland to bushfires in NSW and Canberra's court cancelling homosexual marriage, to Australian tourists dominating Bali and a variety of other matters. These stories have no affinity with Islamic values and Muslims.

The Australian international relations issue featured are about the Australian Government's attitude to international relationships, especially relating to Muslim countries other than Indonesia such as Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Iran and Palestine. News stories about Afghanistan focus on the Australian squad that was a part of the United Nation's (UN) peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. This squad withdrew at the end of December 2013. News stories about Iran focus on Australia's support of Europe's embargos on purchasing Iranian oil. News stories about Libya and Syria focus on internal disputes between its government and people. Australia followed the US and Europe in withdrawing their people from those countries in 2013. Another Australian international issue pertains to Australia abstaining from voting for Palestine as a new member of the UN.

Another general news topic about Australia is about the country funding Indonesian projects. The projects funded by Australia cover many fields, from education and health, to the army and anti-terrorism. Regarding education, Australia has funded school building projects, a disaster reduction project, the Indonesian Islamic schools 'Madrasah' standardization project, and scholarships for Indonesians to attend Australian universities. Within the field of health, Australia fund HIV access facilities in Papua and supplied rabies vaccines for the rabies endemic in Bali.

Another news topic that was often discussed was Australia's funding of the special detachment for anti-terrorism squad, Detasment khusus (Densus) 88, believed by some militant Muslims to be a squad that deliberately targets Muslims (Bilal, 2013). Stories about Densus 88 are also connected to a specific issue - terrorism and anti-terrorism. The five examined media outlets convey that Densus 88 is clearly linked to the government of Australia. For example, the former Police Chief of Indonesia, Dai Bachtiar, was awarded the

anti-terrorism professorship from the Edith Cowan University in Australia, which has been taken as proof of Australia's intervention in Indonesian anti-terrorism efforts (Bilal, 2013).⁴

Some militant Muslim websites have also published news about Australian Muslims who became *Mujahideen*⁵ in Syria and Palestine. The story, relating to *Jihad*,⁶ includes information on Australian Muslims who were killed in Syria, the Australian Government's cancellation of 20 passports of Australian citizens suspected of going to Syria and becoming *Mujahideen*, and the Australian Government sentencing citizens supporting that war effort to 20 years in jail.

As a developed country, Australia is recognised for its outstanding achievements in many fields by the Indonesian Muslim online media. Beneficial research findings, such as Dengue fever herbal medication and the negative effects of fast food on asthma, are the topics of some news stories. In addition, some achievements also became benchmarks, like underscoring how to certify foods as halal, how to regulate cigarette packaging without brand logos, and how to allocate a budget for education. Those achievements are highlighted in Muslim media that Australia is a few steps ahead of Indonesia in various fields.

The general focus of news stories about Australia-Indonesia relations relate to the borders between Australia and Indonesia, the role of Indonesia within Asia Pacific geopolitics, and future Indonesian influences on Australia. These news items include the story of an Australian ambassador to Indonesia who was comfortable wearing the *Batik* – a traditional Indonesian sarong, the story of Australia preparing to spend a million dollars on teaching Bahasa Indonesia in Australian schools, and the 2012 Indonesian educational celebration in Melbourne, Victoria.

⁴ 'Da'I Bachtiar dapat gelar professor anti terror dari Australia', Arrahmah.com, Saturday, February 2nd, 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2013/02/02/26449-dai-bachtiar-dapat-gelar-profesor-anti-terror-dari-australia.html>

⁵ *Mujahideen* is someone who does *Jihad* to fight against Muslims' enemies. *Jihad* is explained in footnote 2.
⁶ *Jihad* is normally being framed as a war conducted by Muslim countries against 'Western' enemies, but it also alludes to one's personal struggle to overcome wrong-doing in one's life.

Finally, two general news items relate to sports and Australian scholars' interests in Indonesia. Sports stories largely revolve around the Australian soccer team joining the Asian Football Federation (AFF) in 2013, the Australian soccer team losing to Japan in the final AFF match in 2011, and other news specifically relating to Australian and Indonesian soccer teams. And there has been some interest in covering stories about Australian scholars who conduct research in Indonesia. Some research is on traditional *Pesantren*, interest in Abdurrahman Wahid's thinking,⁷ the participation of some Australian scholars in the NU general meeting, and the 2011 Javanese Language Conference in Surabaya.

Australian News Tones: From Positive to Negative

One important element of media framing is the tone taken to relay the various news stories. McCombs (2005) defines these 'tones' as affective attributes that evaluate media content in positive, negative or neutral ways (McCombs, 2005; Sheafer, 2007). For the purpose of this research, evaluations of 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' specifically focus on perceptions of Australia in the news story. Australia is seen variously as a nation, government, institution or people in these news stories. The tone of each article is also evaluated by Australia's role in Indonesian and Islamic issues.

Tone is often, if not always, determined by the media that publishes news content. Scheufele (1999) has claimed that organisational routines and media ideologies are some of the influencing factors that shape the media. Dunaway (2013) has argued that media ownership of structures and economic motivations, as well as its engagement with political settings, tend to influence tone in news campaigns. This subjectivity occurs due to the choice of the media rather than the events themselves (Patterson, 1996). Moreover, for media

⁷ Abdurrahman Wahid was the fourth Indonesian President. He is also a former NU leader.

channels that are owned by non-profit organisations, the organisation's ideology is more important than any other factors, such as economic motivations. For non-profit media owners, the main purpose of publishing news is to spread the organisation's own ideology and attitude toward the issue at hand, and thus gain increased support from their members and followers.

Considering the scope of media ideologies in this research, a single issue might be treated positively, negatively and neutrally across the board. Tone is judged by analysing the content and keywords used in portraying Australia. For example, *Arrahmah* portrayed Australia positively for the country's approval of a new mosque to be constructed in Melbourne (Bilal, 2013).⁸ However, the same media channel negatively judged Australia for its invitation of Geerts Wilders, controversial right wing politician from the Netherlands who has widely discredited Muslims and Islamic teaching, into the country (*Arrahmah*, 14th September, 2012). Table 5.3 shows the spread of tones about Australia in news stories from 2011 to 2013.

Table 5.3.

Tone Toward News Stories About Australia, 2011 – 2013

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1.	General	Islam in Australia	52	1	48
2.	General	Australia-Indonesia collaboration	54	1	2
3.	General	Economics & finance	17	1	16
4.	General	Australians in daily life (human interest)	8	9	14
5.	General	Australia's international relations	11	3	11
6.	General	Australia funds Indonesian Project	11	0	8
7.	General	Australian Muslims support <i>Jihad</i>	10	0	6
8.	General	Outstanding findings & achievements of Australia	13	0	2

⁸ 'Otoritas Australia setuju pembangunan masjid baru di Melbourne' (Australian Authority had approved the mosque construction in Melbourne). *Arrahmah*, March 13th, 2013

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	Positive	Neutral	Negative
9.	General	Australia-Indonesia relations	9	0	5
10.	General	Sports	6	2	3
11.	General	Australian scholars' interest in Indonesia	9	0	1
12.	Specific	Terrorism and anti-terrorism	3	5	42
13.	Specific	Australia spying issues 2013	2	2	55
14.	Specific	Imported cows from Australia	10	2	12
15.	Specific	Wikileaks (2011)	1	8	11
16.	Specific	West Papua issues	2	0	14
17.	Specific	Corby's parole	1	0	18
18.	Specific	Asylum seekers	7	3	8
19.	Specific	<i>Innocent Muslim</i> film demonstrations	6	0	7
20.	Specific	US military based at Darwin	0	0	9
21.	Specific	Sponsoring Indonesian parliament members to Israel	0	0	6
22.	Specific	Tony Abbott, the new Prime Minister	1	0	3
		Total	233 (40.80%)	37 (6.48%)	301 (52.71%)

For all Indonesian Muslim websites from 2011 to 2013 (Table 5.3), news stories about Australia are negative 52.71% of the time. The most negative news coverage was of the spying scandal in 2013 that has around 55 articles attributed to it.

However, when counting general and specific issues separately, a different pattern of news emerges. General news stories about Australia tend to be more positive (53%) compared to negative (41.25%) and neutral (5.74%) – see Table 5.3a. Specific news stories about Australia, on the other hand, tend to be much more negative (76.06%) than positive (14.89%) or neutral (9.04%) – see Table 5.3b.

Table 5.3a.
Tone Toward General News Stories About Australia, 2011 – 2013⁹

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1.	General	Islam in Australia	52	1	48
2.	General	Australia-Indonesia collaboration	54	1	2
3.	General	Economics & finance	17	1	16
4.	General	Australians in daily life (human interest)	8	9	14
5.	General	Australia's international relations	11	3	11
6.	General	Australia funds Indonesian Project	11	0	8
7.	General	Australian Muslims support <i>Jihad</i>	10	0	6
8.	General	Outstanding findings & achievements of Australia	13	0	2
9.	General	Australia- Indonesia relations	9	0	5
10.	General	Sports	6	2	3
11.	General	Australian scholars' interest in Indonesia	9	0	1
		Total	200 (60.06%)	17 (5.16%)	116 (34.83%)

News stories about general issues tend to be more positive as there are a number of events discussed, leading to greater insight and a deeper, more positive understanding of Australia. For example, general issues relating to Australia-Indonesia collaborations have the highest number of positive news stories (54 of 57). This includes how the countries collaborated, which are also described positively.

⁹ The percentage obtained from the total general issues articles of each news tone, compared to total general issues articles of all media

Table 5.3b.
Tone Toward Specific News Stories About Australia, 2011 – 2013¹⁰

No.	Type Issues	Issues	Positive	Neutral	Negative
12.	Specific	Australia spying issues, 2013	0	4	55
13.	Specific	Terrorism and anti-terrorism	3	5	42
14.	Specific	Imported cows from Australia	10	2	12
15.	Specific	Wikileaks (2011)	1	8	11
16.	Specific	West Papua issues	2	0	14
17.	Specific	Corby's parole	1	0	18
18.	Specific	Asylum seekers	7	3	8
19.	Specific	<i>Innocent Muslim</i> film demonstrations	6	0	7
20.	Specific	US military based at Darwin	0	0	9
21.	Specific	Sponsoring Indonesian parliament members to Israel	0	0	6
22.	Specific	Tony Abbott, the new Prime Minister	1	0	3
		Total	31 13.03%	22 9.24%	185 77.73%

Negative tones appear very strongly within news stories about specific issues (77.73%), while positive and neutral tones are 13.03% and 9.24% respectively (Table 5.3b). These data show that media outlets tend to evaluate issues negatively when they are restricted to an isolated incident. This finding is in accordance with Wattenberg (1983), cited by Lou Galician and Pasternack (1987), who criticise the media for judging news on three criteria: 'bad news is big news, good news is no news and no news is bad news'. Based on this notion, it seems that bad news – represented negatively – attracts a greater number of visitors to news websites. Thus, the media editors base their decisions to publish these negative, isolated news stories which are often contrary to the given group's ideologies.

¹⁰ Percentage obtained from total specific issues articles of each tone compared to total specific articles across all media channels.

The highest volume of negative news was from the Australian spying scandal, which arose in early November 2013 and continued until the end of the year. This issue was intensively written about on online Indonesian Muslim media in 59 separate news items over two months (November-December 2013). The Australian spying scandal issue focuses on Australia's electronic spy agency intercepting phone calls and Internet data in neighbouring countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, East Timor and Papua New Guinea.¹¹ Edward Snowden, who first published this information stated that interception facilities were installed in Australian embassies within the targeted countries. This spying issue brought about major protests from many Indonesian leaders who insisted on explanations from the Australian government.

The second negative news story regards terrorism and anti-terrorism. Stories about this issue increase in number from 2011 to 2013, after the Bali Bombing in October 2002, and focus on the role of Densus 88 and its sponsorship by the Australian Government. The number 88 embedded in the squad's name is believed to come from the number of Australian victims in the Bali Bombing. In practice, this anti-terrorism squad targets Muslims as terrorist perpetrators – and the squad killed some of the terrorist suspects in a series of 'dramatic event[s]'.¹² This generated scepticism from some Muslim leaders about the role of Densus 88 under Australian sponsorship. The Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) – an Indonesian Muslim group – requested that this anti-terrorism squad be dismissed (Muttaqin, 2013).

The West Papua and Corby's parole issues are another couple of issues that are negatively portrayed, and appear as news stories between 2011 and 2013. However, neither

¹¹ This issue was first published by Germany's Magazine *Der Spiegel* on October 2013 and then by Australian Broadcast Corporation, ABC, on October 31st, 2013. Other Australian media followed by placing this issue in headlines as well.

¹² According to data released by Indonesian Human Right's National Commission (*Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia*), 100 suspected terrorists were killed without trial (*Tempo.co*. 4th January 2014) *Komnas HAM: Sudah 100 Terrorist Mati Ditembak*. (Some terrorists were found and killed in their hiding places).

appeared in the media as expansively as did issues to do with terrorism and anti-terrorism. The Papua issue regards Bob Carr, the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, who urged the Indonesian Government to investigate the death of Mako Tabuni, the separatist figurehead of West Papua (Nasrul, 2012). A flag of West Papua freedom was posted in front of an Australian cosmetic store in Perth. A news item claimed that Australia's concern about West Papua was similar to its concern for East Timor during the conflict that led to East Timor's separation from Indonesia (Prasetyo, 2013).

The Corby parole issue arose in 2012, when Mr Yudhoyono, the Indonesian President, gave Corby five years' parole off her 20-year jail sentence. This parole elicited a strong reaction from a number of leaders, including many Muslim leaders. The granting of parole for a convicted drug trafficker would create a bad image of Indonesian law enforcement among other drug dealers. There was also concern that Corby's parole could be seen as a form of Australian intervention in the Indonesian legal system (Bilal, 2012; Niam, 2012). In 2013, the issue regarded Corby's request for remission on Christmas day. This request received no reply from the authority officers (Baraas, 2013).

News tones are also influenced by media structures and routines, including ideology. Becker (1984), cited by Schoemaker and Reese (1996), defines ideology as an integrated set of frames of reference, through which each individual sees the world and adjusts his or her actions from it. Schoemaker and Reese also believe that ideology is a social-level phenomenon (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Underscoring ideology is unavoidable for Indonesian Muslim online media owned by Muslim groups, giving rise to different news tones. In Table 5.4, a different positive news tone, based on media ideology, can be seen.

The issue of Islam in Australia is a good example of how this issue is portrayed across Muslim media. Islam in Australia is a general issue regarding Muslim activities in Australia (Table 5.4). Overall, this issue is positively written about (52 out of 101 news tones).

Moderate Muslim media channels, *NU* and *Dakwatuna*, were more positive than negative on these issues.¹³ Both media channels displayed the freedom of Muslims to worship in Australia, the co-existence of Islamic values with other religions in Australia, and the presence of a *Sharia* pension fund for retired Muslims in Australia. Other positive issues centred on Islamic banking and *sharia* stock markets existing in Australia, Muslim Australians becoming senators, the activity of Indonesian Muslims in Australia, and more. Positive news tones from militant media focus on the existence of Muslim activities, like the presence of Ulama, in Australia, approval of the mosque project, and the support of Australian Muslims for the presence of *Hizbut Tahrir* in Australia.

Meanwhile, *Arrahmah* and *HTI* – militant Muslim media channels – attributed Islam in Australia more negatively than positively.¹⁴ Some examples are found in covering Australia's largest Islamic school Malek Fahd, the spread of anti-Islam stickers that associated halal food with terrorism, the restriction of *Hizbut Tahrir* in Australia, and more.

The variance in news tones can also be seen in topics about economics and finance. All five media channels are positive about this topic except for *HTI*. None of *HTI*'s news tones about economics and finance are positive. *HTI*'s media content tends to criticise the Australian government, focusing on free trade organisation and other international economic associations, as well as highlighting collaborations that Australia uses to exploit Indonesia as developing country, saying that international trade collaboration will result in disadvantages for Indonesian people who are only treated as a 'target' market and a natural resource.

Another general Australian issue that has a different news tone is the Australian funding of Indonesian projects. There are fewer positive articles than negative on this issue;

¹³ Islam in Australia was positively reported in 12 articles and negatively reported in three articles by *NU*, while *Dakwatuna* positively reported 16 news stories and negatively reported five news stories.

¹⁴ *Arrahmah* attributed Islam in Australia with seven positive tone sand 20 negative tones, and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia(HTI)* attributed 3 positive tones and 6 negative tones.

only *NU* and *Republika* are positive.¹⁵ *NU* directly collaborates with Australian institutions on several projects: they received \$500 million in Australian grant funding for the construction of 1500 *NU* elementary schools and school accreditation programs (Niam, 2011). *Republika* attributed positively to four Hercules aircrafts donated by the Australian military to the Indonesian military (Pitakasari, 2011), and reported that Australia was supporting an anti-rabies vaccine program in Denpasar, Bali (Pitakasari, 2011). *Arrahmah* and *HTI* were negative about Australia's funding of Densus 88, which they said targeted Muslim activists rather than actual terrorists (Bilal, 2013), as well as Australia's 'hidden agenda' behind its grant for constructing Islamic elementary schools (Prasetyo, 2012). Having said this, neither *NU* nor *Republika* stated in forthright terms that there was a link between Australia's funding for Densus 88 activities and its focus on Muslim activists. *Republika* only stated that Densus 88 was *possibly* entangled with the murder of the West Papuan opposition leader in 2012 (Hapsari, 2012).

The various media ideologies not only influence news tone but also how an issue is published in the media. Several media channels tend to focus on one topic, and publish frequently on that issue, ignoring other topics. The issue of *Jihad* and conflict in other Muslim countries always draws the attention of *Arrahmah*, a militant media channel; this is apparent from the 'Australian Muslims support *Jihad*' and 'Australia's international relations' news stories. Both issues are strongly discussed in *Arrahmah*, and there is not a single article about the Australian Muslims supporting *Jihad*, as published by *NU* and *Republika*.

Arrahmah, *Dakwatuna* and *Republika* also variously report news stories on 'Australian international relations'. *Arrahmah* publish the role of Australia in Muslim countries, such as conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the presence of the UN's peacekeeper

¹⁵ The overall Australia funds Indonesian projects news tones are 11 positive tones and seven negative tones

troops in Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of troops in December 2013.¹⁶ *Dakwatuna* focuses on Australia's response to the Palestinian conflict, the Australian passport fabrication by Mossad, Israeli's secret service, and the murder of Hamas leader, Al-Mabhuh. Meanwhile, *Republika* reports news about supporting the European Union (EU) in embargoing Iran, relating to Iran's plan to develop nuclear capability, and Australia's firm reaction to the Libyan crisis under the dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi.

The news tones of these specific issues are mostly negative. Some of these are Australia's spying issues, the US military base at Darwin, and the Australian institution that sponsored Indonesian members of parliament visits to Israel. Except for Australia's spying issues, the media channels only negatively reported specific issues. The spying issue has at least four neutral news stories, and these focus on the meeting between Indonesian and Australian external affairs ministers, giving no specific decision on related issues.

While terrorism and anti-terrorism issues have been negatively regarded across most media channels, *Republika* and *NU* were largely positive. The positively-credited news involved the ten-year commemoration of the Bali Bombing in Bali, the international conference on handling terrorism, and the dangerous potential of online media in spreading terrorism. Instead of only reporting negatively, *Republika* seems to balance its news stories with positive comments about the Wikileaks (2011) issue, Corby's parole, the new Prime Minister Tony Abbott, and issues to do with West Papua.

¹⁶*Republika* also attributed the Australian peacekeeper UN troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Table 5.4.

Positive Tones For Each Issue from Five Indonesian Muslim Websites¹⁷

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>
1.	General	Islam in Australia	7	3	16	12	14
2.	General	Australia-Indonesia collaboration	1	0	0	29	24
3.	General	Economics & finance	1	0	2	3	11
4.	General	Australians in daily life (human interest)	0	0	0	0	8
5.	General	Australia's international relations	7	1	2	0	1
6.	General	Australia funds Indonesian Project	0	0	0	8	4
7.	General	Australian Muslims support <i>Jihad</i>	8	1	1	0	0
8.	General	Outstanding findings & achievements of Australia	6	3	1	3	0
9.	General	Australia- Indonesia relations	0	0	0	1	8
10.	General	Sports	0	0	0	0	6
11.	General	Australian scholars' interest in Indonesia	0	0	0	8	1
12.	Specific	Australian spying issues, 2013	0	0	0	0	0
13.	Specific	Terrorism and anti-terrorism	0	0	0	2	1
14.	Specific	Imported cows from Australia	0	0	1	2	7
15.	Specific	Wikileaks, 2011	0	0	0	0	1
16.	Specific	West Papua issues	0	0	0	0	2
17.	Specific	Corby's parole	0	0	0	0	1
18.	Specific	Asylum seekers	1	0	0	0	6
19.	Specific	<i>Innocent Muslim</i> film demonstrations	5	0	1	0	0
20.	Specific	US military based at Darwin	0	0	0	0	0

¹⁷ The percentage obtained from the positive tones news of each media outlet, compared to total news tones of its media outlet

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>
21.	Specific	Sponsoring Indonesian parliament members to Israel	0	0	0	0	0
22.	Specific	Tony Abbott, the new Prime Minister	0	0	0	0	1
			36 (24.65%)	8 (10.66%)	24 (55.81%)	68 (76.40%)	98 (44.4%)

Table 5.4 shows the distribution of positive news articles across the five selected media outlets. *NU* had the highest positive news stories for Australian issues, followed by *Dakwatuna* and *Republika*. The militant Muslim media, in contrast, had the least positive news tones, with 10.66% for *HTI* and 24.65% for *Arrahman*. *HTI* and *Arrahman*, also show high percentages of negative coverage, 86.67% and 67.12% respectively (Table 5.5). *NU* gives the least negative coverage of Australia, as only 17.98% of all its news on Australia is negative, while *Dakwatuna* (41.86%) and *Republika* (46.76%) are close in their negative coverage of Australia.

Comparing Tables 5.4 and 5.5, it is clear that *Republika* shows the most ‘balanced’ news coverage, somewhat between positive (44.4%) and negative (46.76%). This shows that, as a Muslim-targeted media channel, *Republika* tries to position itself as the largest Muslim newspaper in Indonesia and wants to portray Australia in a ‘neutral’ position, highlighting the good relationships between Australia and Indonesia.

Unlike *Republika*, *NU* tends to have more positive news coverage of Australia than negative, and there is a huge gap between positive (76.40%) and negative (17.98%) news stories. This may be a consequence of *NU* having conducted collaborative projects with Australian institutes themselves, which thus encourages a more positive image in describing Australia. The Realistic Conflict Theory explains that amplified conflict between groups can

only be diminished when both parties cooperate and both resources and reward structures are adjusted to get better outcomes (Sherif, 1966). In contrast, *HTI* shows the greatest gap between negativity (86.67%) and positivity (10.66%). *HTI* critically evaluates Australia about its concerns with Islamic issues and the Australian Government's relations with Indonesia.

Table 5.5.
Negative Tones on Each Issue from Five Indonesian Muslim Websites¹⁸

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>
1.	General	Islam in Australia	20	6	5	3	14
2.	General	Australia-Indonesia collaboration	1	0	0	0	1
3.	General	Economics & finance	0	10	0	0	6
4.	General	Australians in daily life (human interest)	0	0	0	0	14
5.	General	Australia's international relations	5	1	3	0	2
6.	General	Australia funds Indonesian Project	2	2	0	0	3
7.	General	Australian Muslims support <i>Jihad</i>	6	0	0	0	0
8.	General	Outstanding findings & achievements of Australia	1	0	0	0	1
9.	General	Australia- Indonesia relations	0	0	0	3	2
10.	General	Sports	0	0	0	0	3
11.	General	Australian scholars' interest in Indonesia	0	0	0	1	0
12.	Specific	Australia spying issues, 2013	13	15	2	2	23
13.	Specific	Terrorism and anti-terrorism	30	9	0	1	2
14.	Specific	Imported cows from Australia	0	1	5	0	6
15.	Specific	Wikileaks, 2011	4	0	0	2	5
16.	Specific	West Papua issues	0	8	0	0	6
17.	Specific	Corby's parole	2	7	1	4	4
18.	Specific	Asylum seekers	2	0	0	0	6

¹⁸ The percentage obtained from the negative tones news of each media outlet compared to total news from its media outlet.

No	Type Issues	Australian Issues	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>
19.	Specific	<i>Innocent Muslim</i> film demonstrations	6	0	0	0	1
20.	Specific	US military based at Darwin	3	3	0	0	1
21.	Specific	Sponsoring Indonesian parliament members to Israel	3	1	2	0	0
22.	Specific	Tony Abbott, the new Prime Minister	0	2	0	0	1
		Total	98 (67.12%)	65 (86.67%)	18 (41.86%)	16 (17.98 %)	101 (46.76%)

Australian News Sources: Who is Being Cited?

As mentioned before, defining the factors that influence the framing of each medium is a challenge. Scheufele outlines journalistic professional values and organisational pressure as an internal factor, as well as political actors, interest groups and other elites as external factors that influence frame building (Scheufele, 1999).

In the context of frame building in the five media channels being examined in this study, each media outlet has dissimilar circumstance that might result differently in Australia's frames. All media channels owned by Muslim groups, such as *Arrahmah*, *HTI*, *Dakwatuna* and *NU*, have strong internal influencing factors based on Muslim ideologies, and they are less considerate of external factors. However, *Republika*, as a general media organisation, considers both internal and external factors as it is commercial and has a larger audience of general Indonesian Muslims. The influence of these internal factors emerges from the news source that is cited in their news (Table 5.6).

The news source presented in Table 5.6 is divided by two kinds of news sources: statements of opinion leaders and the cited news article from other media. There are three types of opinion leaders whose statements are referred to by all the examined media outlets. They are either leaders of their own group (in-group opinion leaders), leaders from other Muslim groups (other group opinion leaders) and officials with particular responsibilities, for example, governors (official opinion leaders). For other news, sources can be classified into Australian media, other Indonesian Muslim media and other foreign media.

In Table 5.6, *Arrahmah*, *HTI* and *NU* cited internal opinion leaders. Even *NU* has no other group opinion leader cited in its news stories. The more internal leaders opinions that are referred in the news, strengthens group ideologies within the media content as leaders frame issues through their statements. Moreover, in order to lead audience opinion, *HTI* attaches additional paragraph highlighted the notion of the news under news article that has been cited from other news sources.

Unlike *Arrahmah* and *HTI*, *Dakwatuna* and *Republika* have a different pattern of citing news sources. *Dakwatuna* uses both internal and official opinion leaders, as well as refers to other Indonesian Muslim media channels, especially *Republika*. *Republika*, however, in having no official affiliation to any Muslim groups, has no internal opinion leaders. *Republika* mostly cites official opinion leaders and Australian media channels as sources of Australian news.

In terms of other news sources, *Arrahmah* and *Republika* seem to have directly cited from Australian media the most, compared to the other three media channels. This finding is particularly interesting for *Arrahmah*, since this site mostly refers to news about Australian Muslims who support *Jihad* in Afghanistan and Syria, and thoughts about Islam in Australia from Australian media itself. The Australian media outlets referred by *Arrahmah* are: *The*

Herald Sun, The Guardian Australia, ABC News, the Daily Telegraph, 7News, SBS, The Northern Star, The Australian, The Age, and Canberra Times.

Despite the fact that *Arrahmah* frequently refers to news from Australian media, most cited news was about unfortunate or discriminatory experiences of Muslims in Australia. Therefore, a positive image of Australia is rarely formed in this media channel. This also supports Amin Abdullah's argument about community categorisations based on their responses to social change (Abdullah A, 2013). Abdullah categorised *Arrahmah* as radicals in the 'Community Egoism' category, which chooses extreme methods to achieve their goals.

Table 5.6.

News Sources Cited by Five Indonesia Muslim Online Media Channels

No	Media	News Sources					
		Opinion Leaders			Other Media Channels		
		In-group Opinion Leaders	Other Group Opinion Leaders	Official Opinion Leaders	Australian Media	Other Indonesian Muslim Media Channels	Other Foreign Media Channels
1.	<i>Arrahmah</i>	50	18	35	40	7	23
2.	<i>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</i>	63	4	16	12	6	4
3.	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	12	1	13	8	15	3
4.	<i>Nadhatul Ulama</i>	78	0	21	2	4	1
5.	<i>Republika</i>	0	3	151	53	3	8

Australian News Framing: From US-Allies to a Multicultural Country

Another way to examine Australian images within Indonesian Muslim online media is to find the salient issue within the news or the news frame. McCombs defines a frame as 'an attribute

of the object under consideration because it describes the object' (McCombs, 2005). A frame is not about many attributes but rather a single dominant attribute. Entman defines framing as selecting some aspects of reality and making them more salient in communicating a text (Entman, 1993).

This study examines framing by identifying the dominant attributes of the framing device. According to Gamson & Modigliani (1989), framing devices consist of condensed information such as metaphors, examples, catchphrases, depictions and visual images (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

The term 'Australia' can refer to the name of the country, its government or its people. The media channels might frame one issue in different ways, and there might be two or more frames within a single issue. Corby's parole issue is a good example of one issue being framed differently by each media channel. Corby's parole issue began with the five years' remission for Corby's sentence, as given by Mr Yudhoyono on May 2012. This news triggered enormous reactions across society. All five online media channels framed this decision as interference from the Australian Government, and related it to the negotiations for Indonesian prisoners who had been arrested by the Australian Navy in 2012. *HTI* and *Arrahman* framed the issue negatively, suggesting that it would look as if Indonesia was not serious about its handling of convicted drug traffickers.

In addition, an issue can be given more than one frame by a single media outlet. For instance, 'asylum seekers': for this news story, *Republika* focused on the collaboration between Australian and Indonesian governments in handling the problem. Both countries agreed to initiate a bilateral collaboration to overcome this problem. Therefore, the issue was framed as: 'Australia-Indonesia is a good partnership'. However, *Republika* also cited an Indonesian scholar of international law who explained that the agreement proposed by

Australia was disrespectful to Indonesia¹⁹ and ran against the convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR) 1951 which Australia had approved (Mardiani, 2013).

This research determined media framing by examining frame devices such as keywords, stereotyped images or examples and sentences that offer facts and judgements within news articles (Entman, 1993). In addition, Gans (1980) identified the presence of ethnocentrism embedded in news stories that related to foreign nations. This perceived ethnocentrism was influenced by in-group favouritism and included cultural values, belief and ideology (Rivenburgh, 2000). Furthermore, Rivenburgh (2000) argues that even when news stories are about foreign countries, the news is presented in accordance with national perspectives. It is no different for Muslim media: the way news stories about Australia are presented are congruent with the ideologies of the channels' audiences – the group's own members and other Muslims.

Considering in-group favouritism, media ideology and national perspectives, this study determines the interaction between the media and Australia through analysing news stories within five media outlets. All five media outlets have framed Australia within three contexts: Australia in relation with Islamic issues, Australia's position toward Indonesia, and Australia's image as a developed country.

The first context relates the stances that Australia has on Islamic issues. This involves the position of Australia and other Western countries including United States (US). The second context regards Australia's role as a supporter or opponent of Indonesia. As a supporter, Australia is framed positively as a 'good partner' in several collaborative projects. However, Australia is also framed as 'disrespecting Indonesia' with relation to particular conflicts with Indonesia, such as Corby's parole and the spying scandal. The last context frames Australia as a developed country and one that is not linked with Islam or Indonesia's

¹⁹ Framed as: 'Australia disrespects Indonesia'.

issues. Some more detailed descriptions of how media channels frame Australia are shown below.

The Context of Australia's Stance on Islamic Issues

The first context of Australia is framed in relation to Islamic issues. Within this context, the position of Australia in the minds of media editors being examined is positively framed while Australia is seen as being positive in relation to Islamic values. While Australia is framed negatively for conflicted stands of Australia toward Islamic interest.

Table 5.7.

Positive Framing of Australia and Its Relation to Islamic Issues

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Australia supports Islamic values / thoughts / issues	Australia's government launched sharia funds for pensioners (<i>dakwatuna, 2012</i>)	Sharia finance in Australia has growth 15 to 20 per cent per year (<i>dakwatuna, 2012</i>)	'Australia has large Muslim population' said Australia's ministry of Immigration, Chris Bowen (<i>dakwatuna, 2012</i>)
		Australia expelled Syrian ambassador (<i>Arrahmah, 2012</i>)	International society reacted to the massacre in Syria by expelling Syria's ambassador in their countries (including Australia) (<i>HTI, 2012</i>)	International society (including Australia) protested the brutal action of killing hundreds of Muslims in Syria (<i>Arrahmah, 2012</i>)
		Canberra's authority (ACT) cancelled the same sex marriage law (<i>NU, 2013</i>)	27 same sex spouses that had registered their marriages had to be cancelled (<i>NU, 2013</i>)	The federal government sued since it was against the Marriage Law that prevails nationwide (<i>NU, 2013</i>)

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS / METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
2.	Muslim existence in Australia as multicultural country	Australian policewomen are allowed to wear a hijab (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	Youth Muslim women in Sydney founded a football club for Muslimah (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	Indonesia as a Muslim majority should learn from its neighbouring country, Australia, that allows Muslim women to wear the hijab (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)
		The second mosque in Canberra was built. (<i>NU online</i> , 2011)	ACT authority gave permission to build a new mosque in Canberra (<i>NU online</i> , 2011)	The president of Canberra's Muslim Community stated that the Mosque in Yarralumla has limited space for all Muslims to pray together (<i>NU online</i> , 2011)

Table 5.7 above shows some examples of how two positive frames of Australia relating to Islamic issues were formed through word choices, examples and arguments. Those frames are: Australia supports Islamic issues and allows Muslim existence in Australia as multicultural country. The first frame imagined Australia as a country with a positive attitude toward the implementation of Islamic values in many areas such as sharia finance practice, standing up for humanity in the Islamic world, and the cancelation of same sex marriage law (the cancelation being perceived to be in line with Islamic values). The second frame is related to how Australia treats Australian Muslims as equal to other Australian citizens. Therefore, the existence of Australian Muslims in various fields is frequently published across all five media outlets.

On the other hand, there were also some frames that enforce the idea that Australia negatively reacts to some Islamic matters. Some examples of negative framing regarding Islamic issues are explained in Table 5.8 below:

Table 5.8.

Negative Framing of Australia Relating to Islamic Issues

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Country of infidelity (<i>Negara kafir</i>)	Australians have lost their religion (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	Almost 35% of postgraduate students, older than 19 admit to having no religion (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	The census held by ABS (Australia's Bureau of Statistics) revealed the rise of atheism among Australians (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)
2.	Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination in Australia	The prejudice against Islam as a terrorist religion still exists, says Greg Barton (<i>NU Online</i> , 2012)	A Muslim woman in Australia was a victim of discrimination (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	60% of Australian voters are afraid of Muslim immigrants (The Essential Research) (<i>Republika</i> , 2011)
3.	US allies	Australia was under US pressure about Palestinian voting in a UN meeting (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	Australia's government followed the US & Europe's decision to embargo Iran due to Iran's threat of producing nuclear weapons (<i>Republika</i> , 2012)	The US is concerned about Indonesia's natural resources, therefore, the US plans to build a military base in Darwin, Australia (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2011)
4.	Spreading negative values of capitalism and liberalism	Australian & US expertise seculars nourished the anti-God system to make it familiar among the society (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	Australia gives grants to Indonesian Islamic schools. HTI spokesperson: Beware of foreign funding! (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2012)	There is no free lunch, the reason behind the 500 million grants given by Gillard is to spread the western 'virus' (capitalism & liberalism) to Indonesian students (<i>HTI</i> , 2012)
5.	Australia and other western countries are 'enemies'	Expelled Australian ambassador, closed Australian embassy (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)	Australian & US armies in Afghanistan killing children. That is proof that Australia and the US are the real terrorists (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	As a country of infidelity, the US and Australia always consider Indonesia and other Islamic countries as an enemy and as an imperialistic target. (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)

There are five frames that negatively perceive Australia regarding its attitude toward Islamic issues. The first frame is 'Australia as a country of infidelity'. Some militant media channels such as *Arrahmah* and *HTI* label Australia (and also the US and other Western countries) as '*negara kafir*', or a country of infidelity. This frame was also shaped by research from ABS, that showed the increase of atheism in almost a third of the under 30s in Australia (Ameera, 2013).

The second negative frame is Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination in Australia. This frame describes Australia's hesitation towards Muslims and Islam. News about Australia cancelling 20 Muslim passports who were suspected of travelling to Syria to join the war (Ameera, 2013) and the enactment of the Burqa ban in NSW are a couple of examples of Australian hostility toward Islamic symbols.

The third negative frame is Australia as a US ally. Striking evidence for this is the US military base built in Darwin. In addition, Australia's spying scandal issue is believed to have been a joint action between Australia and the US to monitor and intercept Indonesia's important figures to obtain confidential information about the country (Ameera, 2013). Within this frame, unfortunately there was only a slight nuance arising from the case of a US 'target' vessel that sank after being torpedoed by the Australian Navy Submarine *Farncomb* during a joint military exercise (*Republika*, 2012). This news only featured the joint activity between US and Australia and has no connection with Indonesia in any occasion.

The fourth negative frame is Australia's spreading of capitalism and liberalism. *HTI* accused Australia that their grants towards Indonesia's *madrasah* or Islamic schools were only given to spread Western values contradictory to Islamic values. The Miss World Festival in 2013, held in Indonesia, was not only seen as exploiting a woman's body (which should be

covered according to Islamic viewpoint), but also promoted capitalism by overspending on cosmetics and other beauty products.²⁰

The fifth negative frame regarding Australia's role toward Islamic issue is 'Australia and other Western countries are enemies of Islam'. Within this frame, some actions like supporting Zionism and anti-terrorism were perceived as actions of hatred against Muslims. Indonesian Muslims support Palestinians whose land is contested. Due to that, all counterparts portraying collaborative activities involving Zionists would be perceived as incitements to war (Fachry, 2011). Regarding anti-terrorism, some Indonesian Muslim leaders believe that Western countries, especially the US and Australia, confuse the word 'terrorism' with 'jihad' and 'Muslim activism'.²¹

The Context of Australia's Role Either as Supporter or Opponent of Indonesia

The second context of Australia's frames by five Muslim media outlets is its role toward Indonesia, whether Australia is a good neighbour for collaboration or an annoyed neighbour that interferes with Indonesia's internal matters. Some media editors positively frame Australia as a good neighbour. On the other hand, Australia is negatively framed for all of the country's activity that conflicts with Indonesia's interest. Further details of Australia's framing within this context are shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 below

²⁰ Komara, Fika (19th September 2013) commented on part of the news article in "Prancis Larang Kontes Kecantikan Anak" (French-banned beauty contest for kids), *HTI Online*, retrieved from <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2013/09/19/prancis-larang-kontes-kecantikan-anak/>.

²¹ *Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Pimpinan pusat Front Pembela Islam (FPI) tentang Fitnah Terorisme, Densus 88 & BNPT* (Islamic Front Defender Statement about Terrorism, Densus 88 and National Council for Handling Terrorism slander) taken from Arrahmah (29th August 2013), FPI desak DPR bentuk panja Pembubaran Densus 88 & BNPT, retrieved from <http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/08/29/fpi-desak-dpr-bentuk-panja-pembubaran-densus-88-bnpt.html#sthash.Lpwh4KCR.dpuf>.

Table 5.9
Positive Frames of Australia as a Supporter of Indonesia: Some Examples

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Australia and Indonesia are good partners	The scholarship program is a manifestation of a good partnership between Australia and Indonesia and strengthens the relationship between the two countries (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)	Australian government offers 400 scholarships for masters and doctoral degrees for all Indonesians (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)	The aim of the scholarship program is to empower Indonesian human resources for the future (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)
		The governments of Indonesia and Australia have plans to increase cooperation in the field of agriculture to benefit both countries. (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)	During the talks, Indonesia was highlighted as one of the potential markets for agricultural products from Western Australia. (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)	Australia would have the opportunity to invest in the agricultural and animal husbandry sector, especially in Indonesia's eastern regions. (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)
2.	Australia respects and support Indonesia's programs	Bishop highlighted that the Australian government's plan to handle asylum seekers would not violate Indonesian sovereignty. (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	Youth Muslim Exchange Program held by Australia Indonesia Institute (All) has been established for 10 years (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)	Greg Moriarty, Australian ambassador for Indonesia, said that the existence of All has advanced mutual understanding between both countries (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)
		Australian ambassador for Indonesia, Greg Moriarty, visited Gus Dur's (the 4 th Indonesian president) cemetery in Tebuireng Pesantren Jombang (<i>NU online</i> , 2011)	Mr Moriarty promised to support funds for 1500 madrasah to pursue national accreditation (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)	Australia's government has tied collaboration with NU for a long time in a variety of fields, such as disaster mitigation and education (<i>NU Online</i> , 2011)

Two frames above are positive for Australia, because both show the country's support of Indonesia in a variety of fields such as education, human resources development and disaster mitigation. The frame of 'Australia as good partner' is shaped from Australia's success story – collaborations with Indonesia. This frame only appeared in *NU online* and *Republika*. *NU* perceived Australia as a good partner, referring to its own experience in arranging several collaborative programs with several Australian institutions. *Republika* formed this frame about collaborative events involving Australia and Indonesia, such as collaborative training between the Australian Special Army (SAS) and Indonesia's special army (KOPASSUS) in 2011 (Jafkhairi, 2011).

On the other hand, Australia was negatively framed when it was perceived as a 'nosey neighbour' interfering in Indonesia's internal matters, like East Timor 'separation and West Papua's rebellion. The negative framing of Australia regards its role in opposing Indonesia's position to conflicts. Some negative frames of Australia regarding its role to Indonesia are in Table 5.10 below.

Table 5.10
The Negative Frames of Australia as an Opponent of Indonesia: Some Examples

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Australia has economic motives to deal with Indonesia	Indonesia will be the new economic power in the next 20 years (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)	Australia doesn't want Indonesia becoming self-supportive with its own beef cattle (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	Indonesia has giant marketing potential and provides cheap labour (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)
2.	Australia disrespects Indonesia	Abbott never apologised for Australia's spying scandal, as leaked by WikiLeaks (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	The Indonesian parliament members visited Israel, sponsored by the Australian Jewish association, potentially ruined future relations between Indonesia and Palestine (<i>Dakwatuna</i> , 2013)	Australia's spying scandal undermines Indonesia's pride in the international world view (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
3.	Unclear problem/solution between Australia-Indonesia	The anti corruption attorney team from Indonesia questioned the Australian government sincerity for corruption fugitive extradition who has changed his nationality to Australian (<i>Republika</i> , 2011)	The Australian government has not negotiated with Indonesian government regarding the exchange between Indonesian asylum seekers saved by Australian and refugees in Indonesia (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)	Australian law inhibited the repatriation process of the corruption fugitive who was involved in the BLBI case (<i>Republika</i> , 2011)
4.	Australia is a threat to Indonesia	Ex-chief of the Indonesian Intelligence service stated that Indonesia is a target of asymmetric war by foreign intelligents (including Australia) (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2011)	The article in <i>Time</i> (April 2011) titled 'Holidays in Hell: Bali's ongoing Woes' is an example of negative propaganda of Indonesia that has shaped international public opinion (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2011)	The US army based in Darwin Australia is a threat for Indonesia because it might bring conflict in the border areas (<i>NU</i> , 2012)
5.	Australia interferes Indonesia's internal matter	The existence of Densus 88 is a threat, because it proves that Australian lives are more precious than Indonesians (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	Densus 88 sponsored by the US and Australia targets Muslim activists and Islamic movement in Indonesia (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)	The number 88 in Densus 88 is from the number of Australian's victims in the first Bali Bombing in 2002 (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2013)

Table 5.10 shows five different negative frames of Australia due to Australia's role against Indonesian interest. For example, in the live cattle export controversial case in 2011 there were several articles on how Australia monopolised 40% of domestic beef distribution in Indonesia (*Dakwatuna*, 19th February 2011), which caused damage to Indonesian cattle farmers and increased the price of beef (*Republika*, July 10th, 2011). The live cattle import controversy lead to some discussion in Indonesian media about whether Australia had an economic motive.

There are some issues that portray Australia as undermining Indonesian pride. The spying scandal and the Australian Jewish Institute that sponsored Indonesian parliament members to visit Israel were two of the events that framed negative attitudes of Australia. The

word choice ‘Abbott never said sorry’ and ‘undermine Indonesia’s pride’ for the spying scandal produced the frame of disrespect formed by *Arrahmah* and *HTI* media.

Another negative frame of Australia’s role toward Indonesia relates to Australia’s involvement in Indonesia’s internal problem, perceived as ‘intervention’. Several issues that framed Australia’s intrusion of Indonesia’s internal matters focus on the name of Densus 88 (*Arrahmah*, 2013). The Corby parole issue (*Dakwatuna*, 2013) and the settlement of West Papua issue (*HTI*, 2012) are two other cases that show Australia’s interference beyond that of a ‘normal’ neighbouring country.

As neighbouring countries, conflict between Australia and Indonesia is unavoidable. Unfortunately, some of these conflicts remain unsolved which lead to ambiguity. Several cases of conflict, such as the huge number of asylum seekers who tried to sail to Australia but became stranded in Indonesian territory, and the extradition of an Indonesia criminal who hid in Australia and gained Australian citizenship are some examples of unresolved problems that have not resulted in any mutual agreement between the two countries. While Australia was seen to take advantage of these cases, Indonesian media perceived them negatively, as Australia only seemed to focus on its own interests rather than the interests of its neighbour. In addition, Australia was framed as a threat for Indonesia in several news stories, such as the one on the US army base in Darwin, which potentially increased border conflicts; and Indonesia as being one of the biggest debtors to Australia, positioning Australia such that it could potentially apply pressure on the Indonesian government to follow Australia’s will (*HTI*, 2012).

The Context of Australia as a Developed Country

Besides framing Australia in the context of Islamic issues and as a friend or opponent of Indonesia, some Australian frames that are not related to either of the previous contexts also appears in the five media outlet being examined. Rather, that the positive and negative connotations resonate better with the context of Australia as a developed country. Detailed explanations for this is shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 below.

Table 5.11
The Positive Framing of Australia a Developed Country: Some Examples

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Benchmarking in many fields	Australia is the first nation in the world that introduced flat packaging for cigarettes (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2012)	Four Indonesian farmers visited Australia to learn about methods of growing potatoes (<i>Republika</i> , 2012)	Compared to Indonesia, Australia has a much larger crop production rate, with 9.5 million tons/year (<i>HTI</i> , 2013)
2.	Outstanding education	Six <i>madrasah</i> teachers were sent to Australia to increase their insight about what a developed country is (<i>NU online</i> , 2011)	<i>PBNU</i> (head of <i>NU</i>) received 70 quota seats for Australian scholarships, provided by AusAid (<i>NU online</i> , 2012)	The Australian government has allocated 46 per cent of its state budgets for education, compared to Indonesia which puts less than 20 per cent of the total yearly budget towards education (<i>Arrahmah</i> , 2011)

Australia, as a developed country, is positively framed for benchmarking in many fields, such as how Australia regulates cigarette packaging to depict horrible images of smoke-affected illnesses instead of cigarette logos. This packaging regulation inspired Indonesia's government to adopt the same measures in June 2014 (*Jawapos*, 24th June 2014).

Australia is also well known for its half century old program of giving hundreds of scholarships to Indonesians every year.²² This phenomenon has affected the media frames that depict Australia as having ‘outstanding education’, and program-related education, as well as scholarships, strengthen this frame. One example can be found in the exchange program for six *madrasah* teachers to Australia to learn how education is handled in developed countries (*NU Online*, 2011). In addition, four potato farmers from Dieng Mountain were also sent to Australia to learn how to grow good quality potatoes (*Republika*, 2012).

On the other hand, the negative framing of Australia as a developed country is unavoidable and depicts Australia as being in crisis. This is best carried by news stories about Australian criminals. Australia is negatively framed as being in crises related to disasters such as the huge floods in Queensland and New South Wales in 2012 (*Republika*, 2012), the sea pollution in Australia’s territorial waters (*Republika*, 2013), or the possibility of Australia following the US government for ‘shutdown’ as an impact of having no firm plafond for foreign debt (*Republika*, 2013). Interestingly, only the general Muslim media outlet, *Republika*, negatively framed the crisis in Australia. The other four media channels (*Arrahmah*, *HTI*, *Dakwatuna* and *NU Online*) did not publish these issues because they did not directly relate to Islam or Indonesia.

The second negative framing of Australia as developed country is ‘the bad guy from Australia’. Within this frame, some Australians were portrayed as having criminal records, and this frame includes investigation within several Catholic churches in Australia.

²² The first Australian scholarship program for Indonesians began in 1963, since The Colombo Plan.

Table 5.12
The Negative Framing of Australia as A Developed Country: Some Examples

No.	FRAMES	FRAME DEVICES		
		WORD CHOICES / KEYWORDS/ METAPHORS	DESCRIPTIONS / EXAMPLES	ARGUMENTS
1.	Australia in crisis	Australia is threatened to 'shutdown' following the US (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)	The Australian cattle farmers protested the government for the export ban that caused huge losses and resulted in killing thousands of cattle (<i>Republika</i> , 2012)	Australian cattle farmers lost more than A\$200 million due to the cattle export ban to Indonesia (<i>Republika</i> , 2012)
2.	Bad guy from Australia	An Australian woman was jailed for keeping a corpse in her freezer (<i>Republika</i> , 2011) Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, is Australian (<i>HTI</i> , 2012)	Many aboriginal teenagers are in jail (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)	The Archbishop of Perth, Timothy Costelloe, gave a public apology for the church's failure to avoid the sexual harassment of children in the church (<i>Republika</i> , 2013)

Regardless of the variety of the frame building processes, it seems that all media channels agree on at least eight frames for Australia. The first is that 'Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal problems'. Australia's meddling in Indonesia's problems became a common thread throughout the five media channels. This frame crops up in various issues: the scepticism behind the funds given by Australia for Indonesian projects, the collaboration between both countries, the intervention in law suits and security issues such as Corby, and the forming of Densus 88. Moreover, all five media agree that Australia sometimes steps over its own boundaries, as in the West Papua conflict and spying scandal issues.

The second frame apparent to all five media is 'Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination in Australia'. The party responsible for the anti-Islamic or discriminatory could be an individual, group or institution, but it could also be the government. The news about an anti-Islam petition initiated by Gary Humphries, Australian Senator from the Liberal

Party, is an example of an individual's Islamophobia. An example of group Islamophobia can be found in the launch of the 'Rise Up' Australian party, which opposes multiculturalism. Its founder, Daniel Nallilah, is considered as being anti-Muslim in Indonesia. Lastly, there was news about the Australian government discriminating against Muslims by banning the *burqa*²³ in New South Wales in 2012. Even though in reality the *burqa* law was more about giving power to the Australian police to ask Muslim women to unveil their *burqa* and so confirm their identities, it was given very different attributes in several Indonesian Muslim media. Headlines focused on how the *burqa* ban would lead to discrimination against Muslims.

The third frame that frequently appeared in all five media channels is the frame of 'Australia as a US ally'. In the context of playing an international role, Australia is usually framed as a 'follower' or 'supporter' of US strategy. The word 'Australia' frequently follows 'US' in numerous news items. However, the frame of 'Australia as a US ally' is repeatedly mentioned especially regarding the issue of the US military based in Darwin. 'Australia as an US ally' is also embedded in terrorism and anti-terrorism issues, the spying scandal issue, and several international issues like Australia's peace-keeper troops in Afghanistan and following the US in embargoing Iran.

All five Indonesian Muslim online media admitted 'Australia is a multicultural nation' that respects different cultures and religions. Therefore, the co-existence of Muslim and Islamic values in Australia is respected. General news stories about Islam in Australia usually frames 'Australia as a multicultural nation' that respects Muslims and Islamic values. Examples of this frame are: a report about an Australian who converted to Islam, the celebration of *Eid Mubarak* in Australia, Muslim women's fashions, and other news about

²³ The *burqa* is a face covering. Some Muslim women not only cover their hair, but also their whole face except for their eyes.

Muslims in Australia. This frame is a positive attribute about Australia compared to previous frames given above.

Other positive frames attributed by all five media are: ‘Australia as benchmarking’ and ‘Australia supporting Islamic issues’. Australia has become the benchmark in many fields such as education and agriculture through exchange programs with Australian institutions, collaboration programs like the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) and scholarship offers. *NU* also highlighted that gaining a halal certificate in Australia was not monopolised by one institution – which is the case in Indonesia. As for the ‘Australia supports Islamic issues’ frame, reports focus on the application of *sharia* banking and finance in Australia, the existence of *sharia* pension funds, and how some Australian Muslims who went to Syria for *Jihad* were killed.

The final two frames that occurred in all five media channels are ‘Australia disrespects Indonesia’ and ‘Australia had an economic motive to deal with Indonesia’. Almost all news about the spying scandal was given as proof that Indonesia is not respected by Australia. Furthermore, issues about Indonesian parliament members who visit Israel, sponsored by Australian-Jewish Association, were framed as a form of disrespect against Indonesians, as Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. A complete description of framing Australia within the five examined media outlets is shown in Table 5.13 below:

Table 5.13

Frame Distribution For All Five Indonesian Muslim Online Media Channels

No	Frames by context	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>	Total
A.	Australia stands for Islamic issues	116	40	73	23	42	
1.	<i>Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination</i>	48	9	13	2	17	89
2.	<i>US ally</i>	26	2	22	2	4	56

No	Frames by context	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>	Total
3.	Muslim existence in Australia (multiculturalism)	11	16	1	11	15	54
4.	Supports Islamic issues	16	11	11	4	3	35
5	<i>Spreads bad values of liberalism & capitalism</i>	5	0	16	0	0	21
6.	<i>Australia and other Western countries are the 'enemy'</i>	5	2	8	1	2	18
7.	<i>Country of infidelity</i>	5	0	2	3	1	11
B.	Australia's role towards Indonesia	52	9	42	56	121	
8.	<i>Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal matters</i>	23	1	21	4	13	62
9.	Australia and Indonesia are good partners	0	0	0	28	33	61
10.	<i>Australia disrespects Indonesia</i>	16	3	9	4	26	58
11.	Australia respects Indonesia	2	1	0	19	27	49
12.	<i>Australia has economic motives to deal with Indonesia*</i>	1	4	12	1	5	23
13.	<i>Unclear problem/solution between Australia-Indonesia</i>	3	0	0	0	14	17
14.	<i>Australia is a threat to Indonesia</i>	7	0	0	7	3	17
C.	Australia is a developed country	7	5	7	20	33	
15.	Benchmarking in many fields	4	1	5	10	11	31
16.	Australia is in crisis	0	0	0	0	15	15
17.	Australia has outstanding education	0	1	0	10	1	12

No	Frames by context	<i>Arrahmah</i>	<i>Dakwatuna</i>	<i>HTI</i>	<i>NU</i>	<i>Republika</i>	Total
18.	<i>Bad guy from Australia</i>	0	0	2	0	6	8
	Total	172	51	122	99	196	

**Negative frames are in italics*

Regarding Rivenburgh's (1997) statement about the other nation's position toward the country of origin in the media, there are some additional positions that should be noted. The first, that Australia is a cooperative country, and a 'friend' and 'ally' of Indonesia and Islamic issues, can be seen from several frames such as 'Muslim existence in Australia' and 'support Islamic issues'. Another 'ally' position of Australia to Indonesia can be found in the frames 'Australia-Indonesia are good partners' and 'Australia respects to Indonesia'.

The second position of Australia has a stratified posture and shows admiration for Australia's achievements, such as 'Australia has outstanding education' and 'benchmarking in many fields'. Despite Australia's position as being cooperative and having this stratified position in selected media, the third and more popular position framed Australia as 'an enemy' and 'a threat' to Indonesia. The 'enemy' position of Australia in the media can be seen from some affiliated frames, such as 'some Australians are Islamophobic' and 'Australia disrespects Indonesia'. Moreover, 'Australia spreads bad values of liberalism and capitalism' and 'Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal matters' frames are some example of Australian 'threats'.

Beyond the Frames: The Big Picture of Australia

Within Indonesian Muslim Online Media

The function of media frames is to define a set of political substances for the audience/reader to comprehend, interpret and respond to (Sheufele, 1999). Media framing can have powerful impact in influencing audiences on certain issues (Tewksbury, et al., 2000). Likewise, all the

media channels examined in this study also have the ultimate goal of influencing readers about the media's interests in shaping Australia, and this is especially the case for *Arrahmah*, *HTI*, *Dakwatuna* and *NU online*.

With regards to foreign policy issues, Entman (2003) proposes the cascade model. The cascade model offers the intended frame from the administration elites, which is cited and spread by media outlets and then finally consumed by the public. Regarding Entman's model, the elites who create these frames are politicians, experts, and opinion leaders from various groups in society. However, Chong & Druckman (2007) argue that strong frames only surface from public discussion on an issue. For the Muslim group members, on the other hand, group leaders are responsible for determining position on an issue.

Tewksbury et al. (2000) explains the advocate frame that occurs in relation to certain contentious political issues. To enforce its position on a situation of conflict, the media – driven by elites or opinion leaders – actively construct content giving consideration to possible ways that audiences might frame the issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2000). Issues about Australia within five media outlets that can be contested are most of the general issues and all of the specific issues. Therefore, most of the media frames within the five examined media are advocate frames.

Advocate frames embedded in media frames are constructed from persuasive instruments carefully applied within the text (Van Gorp, 2007). An opinion leader directs the hook of the article and the media administrator or journalist selects the most important facts for conveying the event or issue. The advocate frames of a certain political object will lead to the general messages of the media's attention toward the object. Regarding Australia, the advocate frames from each media outlet can be constructed from issue frequencies, the number of frames, the tone of the news story and the news source, and come together to

convey the ‘big’ picture of Australia that can be different from one media channel to another. A more detailed explanation is described below.

Arrahmah & HTI: Is Australia a Distrustful Neighbour?

Differentiation of the Australian frame in militant and moderate media can be examined by looking at the chosen issues and the frames that have been formed by each media organisation. Militant media tends to publish issues related to terrorism and anti-terrorism, Muslim discrimination and Islamophobia. The moderate media tends to publish items about the co-existence of Islam in Australia and collaborations between Australia and Indonesia.²⁴

Arrahmah and *HTI* are considered militant media by Bergin (2009) and Hui (2010). Both media acknowledge Islam in a subjective way, which Taufik Abdullah argues brings about intolerance to societies and cultures with even the slightest differences (Abdullah T, 2013). *Arrahmah* paid great attention to the terrorism and anti-terrorism issues as well as the US military base in Darwin. In addition, *Arrahmah* also has an interest in Islam in Australia, especially regarding the Australian Muslims who become *Mujahideen* and joined the war in Syria. *Arrahmah* reported on two Australian *Mujahedeens* that were believed to have become *syuhada*, and died in Syria in 2012. *Arrahmah* is also the only media outlet that conveyed news about the Australian government’s banned passports of 20 of its citizens who planned to join the *jihad* in Syria.

The highest number of frames in stories in *Arrahmah* are related to ‘Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination’. The 48 frames included the following: the issue of the 20 Australian citizens banned from traveling to Syria (2013), Australian Muslims who have to change their names in order to find a job in Australia (2013), and the rejection of the application for a Mosque to be built in Melbourne by local residents (2011). The second most significant frame is ‘Australia as a US ally’. Related to this frame are issues about the US military base in

²⁴ See table 5.4 and 5.5 in this chapter

Darwin, the role of Australia in and the US's peacekeeper troops in Afghanistan, and their withdrawal at the end 2012, as well as other issues related to anti-terrorism and issues to do with West Papua.

The third highest number of frames in stories in *Arrahmah* are related to 'Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal matters'. Australia's financial support of Densus 88 is proof of the country's intervention. In addition, *Arrahmah* also framed the issue of West Papua as Australia's interference.

Table 5.14

Australia's Frames Within *Arrahmah.com*

NO	Frame Contexts	Australia's Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim existence and Multiculturalism (11)* • Supports Islamic issues (16) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination (48) • US ally (26) • A country of infidelity (5) • Spreads capitalism, liberalism & is a bad influence (5) • Australia and other Western countries are enemies (5)
2.	Australia's position toward Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia respects & supports Indonesia (2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interferes with Indonesia's internal matters (23) • Australia disrespects Indonesia (16) • Australia is a threat to Indonesia (7) • Unclear problem/solution between Australia-Indonesia (3) • Has economic motives for dealing with Indonesia (1)
3.	Australia is a developed country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking in many fields (4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • none

* Bracketed numbers are the number of stories appearing on the *Arrahmah* website.

Arrahmah's frame of Australia as 'supporting Islamic issues' is formed from news stories about Muslim Australians who became *Mujahideen*, and the withdrawal of Australia's UN troops in Afghanistan. The numbers in the brackets in Table 5.14 shows that Australia is mostly negatively framed in the context of Islamic issues. For some frames, Australia is

clearly outlined as '*Negara kafir*' (a country of infidelity) and an 'enemy'. Regarding Australia's position in Indonesia, Australia is also framed in as being 'suspicious' of Indonesia and as being disrespectful and threatening, and interfering in Indonesia's internal matters. However, *Arrahmah* also admits that Australia is a much better than Indonesia in many fields, and is aware of Muslim participating within Australia's multicultural nation.

HTI, another militant media channel being examined in this study, has different interests to *Arrahmah*. Except for the spying scandal issue in late 2013, *HTI* has more interest in economic and financial issues. Compared to *Arrahmah*, *HTI* also affords more attention to the West Papua issue and less attention to the US military base at Darwin.

The frame of 'US Ally' is mostly how Australia is presented by *HTI*. In addition to the US military base issue, the 'US Ally' frame was formed from a spying scandal, terrorism, economic finance, appointment of Tony Abbott as the new Prime Minister, and Islam in Australia. *HTI* frequently links Australia and the US within broader subjects. The second highest occurring frame for *HTI* is Australia's intervention in Indonesian internal matters. The elements contributing to the intervention frame are West Papua, terrorism, Corby's parole and Australia's funding of Indonesian projects.

The third most important frame of Australia in *HTI* is that the country 'spreads bad values such as capitalism and liberalism'. It seems that *HTI* has more interest in this frame than the other channels, *HTI* and *Arrahmah* being the only ones that have this frame at all. *HTI* is responsible for 16 of the 21 total stories from 2011 to 2012. The comprehensive frames of Australia in *HTI* are presented in Table 5.15 below.

Table 5.15
Australia's Frames within HTI

No.	Frame Contexts	Australia's Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supports Islamic issues (11) • Muslim existence in Australia as a multicultural country (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US ally (22) • Spreads bad values of capitalism & liberalism (16) • Islamophobia and Muslim discrimination (13) • Australia and other Western countries are enemies (8) • A country of infidelity (2)
2.	Australia's position toward Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>none</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interferes in Indonesia's internal matters (21) • Australia has economic motives for dealing with Indonesia (12) • Australia disrespects Indonesia (9)
3.	Australia is a developed country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking in many fields (5) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bad guy from Australia (1)

Table 5.15 shows that *HTI* has no positive frame regarding Australia's interest in Indonesia, and only has two positive frames that admit Australia to be a benchmarking country and one that supports Islamic issues. These positive frames are shaped from Australia's international relations, Islam in Australia, and the AusAID report that pointed out that Indonesia has the least fair system of justice for children (HTI, 13th Sept 2011).

In general, as does *Arrahmah*, *HTI* negatively frames Australia, underscoring the country as 'distrustful', and highlighting the conspiracy with the US. Additionally, *HTI* also suspects Australia as having a 'hidden motive' to its financial generosity towards several projects in Indonesia and accuses Australia of interfering in Indonesia's internal matters and spreading secular values like capitalism and liberalism to Indonesian society.

There are some frames in two of the militant media channels – *Arrahmah* and *HTI* – that are similar. Regarding Australia's interest in Indonesia, both militant media argue the weak position of the Indonesian Government vis-à-vis Australia. This kind of framing mostly

emerges from specific issues like Corby's parole, the spying scandal, terrorism and asylum seeker issues. This frame also criticises the Indonesian government, that was not sufficiently assertive in its diplomatic relations with Australia.

The frames from *Arrahmah* and *HTI* show the position of both media as 'insiders', with complete involvement and interest as Muslims. Both media outlets acknowledge Islam in a subjective way, and Amin Abdullah (2013) classifies militant followers of the religion as projecting Islamic teaching as 'absolute truth with no dialogue'. Therefore, both media outlets tend to choose and criticise news from Australian media that show discrepancy between accepting Islam in Australia and the discriminatory attitudes faced by Muslims living there. One example of this news discrepancy is the new rules in NSW that allow police to ask Muslim women to unveil their *burqa* and so confirm their identities.

In conclusion, *Arrahmah* and *HTI* frame Australia in similar ways. The negative frames are the most dominant regarding Australia's position toward Islamic issues. In addition, the number of negative frames for both media outlets is greater than the number of positive frames.

Dakwatuna and NU Online: Australia is a Multicultural Nation but Not a Friendly Neighbour

Moderate media channels use different frames for Australia. *Dakwatuna* and *NU* focus more on 'Muslim existence in Multicultural Australia' and other Australia-Indonesia relations. *Dakwatuna* frames the multicultural environment of Australian society, which enables various Islamic values to thrive. Two distinctive issues that attracted *Dakwatuna* were: the issue of Australia's abstaining during the vote for Palestinian membership in the United Nations, and the cattle-import issues. Both issues featured prominently in *Dakwatuna* as opposed to the other channels under scrutiny.

One issue that was only highlighted by *Dakwatuna* is the issue of cattle imports, connected with the cattle torturing scandal in 2011 and resulted in the restriction of cow imports from Australia by the Indonesian Government in 2013. This issue became interesting because it was directly related to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr Suswono, who is well known as a PKS cadre.²⁵ *Dakwatuna* framed the cattle import issue as ‘Australia has economic motives for dealing with Indonesia’. Overall, *Dakwatuna* framed Australia as a multicultural country, that enabled Muslims and Islamic values to exist in the country. The comprehensive frames of Australia in the lens of *Dakwatuna* can be found in Table 5.16 below.

Table 5.16
The Frames of Australia in *Dakwatuna*

No.	Frame Contexts	Australia's Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim existence in Australia as a multicultural country (16) • Supports Islamic issues (11) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamophobia & Muslim discrimination (9) • US ally (2) • Australia and other Western countries are enemies (2)
2.	Australia's position toward Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia supports Indonesia's programs (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia has economic motives for dealing with Indonesia (4) • Australia disrespects Indonesia (3) • Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal matters (1)
3.	Australia is a developed country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking in many fields (1) • Outstanding education system (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • none

Dakwatuna mostly frames Australia positively in relation to Islamic issues (Table 5.16). The Muslim existence frame was shaped from a variety of news stories, such as the first Muslim Australian member of parliament Ed Husic, appointed in 2013, an Australian

²⁵ *Dakwatuna* is supported by some important PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, The Justice and Prosperous Party) figures such as Hidayat Nur Wahid, the previous leader of this Islamic party.

Muslim policewoman who wears a hijab (2013), and the increase in number of Aboriginal Muslims (2013). Another positive frame of ‘Australia support Islamic issues’ was outlined from news stories about the application of Islamic banking and Islamic pension funds in Australia.

Unlike *Arrahmah* who saw Australia as ‘enemy’ in terms of jihad and the war in Afghanistan and Syria, or *HTI* who perceived Australia as the ‘enemy’ in terms of the spying scandal, *Dakwatuna* defined Australia as the ‘enemy’ when Australia acted as a supporter of Israeli’s issues, and treated Palestinians unfairly (*Dakwatuna*, 2013). Furthermore, *Dakwatuna* also framed Australia negatively as ‘Islamophobic and discriminatory of Muslims’ in some issues, such as Australian Muslims having to change their names in order to get a job, and a Muslim woman being discriminated against at a gas station. Comparing the number of positive and negative frames outlined by *Dakwatuna*, the result is 3:2: 30 positive to 21 negative. This result shows that *Dakwatuna* tried to frame Australia fairly by balancing positive and negative frames against each other.

NU has a different way of portraying Australia. Compared to previous three media outlets, *NU* has more positive frames of Australia than negative, as seen in Table 5.17 (93 out of 116 frames are positive). Though *Dakwatuna* also has more positive than negative tones, the difference between both is not quite as much.

Table 5.17
The Frames of Australia in *NU Online*

No.	Frame Contexts	Australia’s Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim existence in Australia as a multicultural country (11) • Supports Islamic issues (4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia is a country of infidelity (3) • Islamophobia (2) • US ally (2) • Australia and other Western countries are enemies (1)

No.	Frame Contexts	Australia's Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
2.	Australia's position toward Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia respects and supports Indonesia (19) • Australia and Indonesia are good partners (28) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia is a threat to Indonesia (7) • Australia disrespects Indonesia (4) • Australia interferes with Indonesia's internal matters (4) • Has economic motives for dealing with Indonesia (1)
3.	Australia is a developed country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking in many fields (10) • Outstanding education (10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>none</i>

The most frequent frame given by *NU* online is 'Australia and Indonesia are good partners'.

This frame was shaped by collaborative endeavours between *NU* and Australia, for example, a program in disaster management and mitigation, and a youth Muslim exchange program (*NU*, 2011).

The second most frequent frame for *NU Online* is 'Australia respect and support Indonesia'. Some news, framed to show respect, was the Australian ambassador for Indonesia's visit to the graveyard of the late Indonesian fifth president as well the prior leader of *NU*, Gur Dur. The frame of 'Australia supports Indonesia' has been shaped from several news stories, such as Australia's granting of A\$500 million to support *Madrasahs* and become accredited, as well as providing 70 student scholarships for *NU* members.

On the other hand, *NU* also report negative frames, such as Australia as a US ally, Australia as a threat to Indonesia, Australia interfering in internal matters in Indonesia, Australia disrespecting Indonesia, and the media channel has also labelled Australia as an 'enemy' and *kafir*, the number of these negative frames, however, is incomparable to the positive one.

One interesting fact about *NU*'s website is that it never refers to the opinions of other groups' leaders as news sources. This shows that *NU* strictly limits the interference of other

groups' opinions with its news channels. The limitation of citing other opinion leaders might restrict other Muslim ideologies in its news. Yet *NU* cites numerous opinions from official opinion leaders as news sources to convey *NU*'s frames. This proves that *NU* confines other Muslim groups' assumptions by controlling the news on its own website. Though *NU* is a moderate Muslim group, its viewpoint is firmly closed off from other Muslim groups'.

Another interesting fact about *NU* frames is that, unlike the other three media outlets owned by Muslim groups that highlight Australia's support toward Islamic issues, *NU* also portrays Australia in its role towards Indonesia as well as Australia as a developed country. Therefore, it can be concluded that *NU* frames Australia as a good partner but not as a friendly neighbour, since there has been some conflict between Australia and Indonesia.

Republika: Weighing Australia's Role Toward Indonesia

Republika, the general Muslim online media channel, also has a specific pattern of portraying Australia. *Republika* also collaborates with *ABC*, the Australian media channel.²⁶ Therefore, *Republika* has the widest range of issues and frames in its news, with more general issues, rather than specific issues, about Australia. The *ABC* collaboration has enabled *Republika* to gather information that cannot be found in the other four studied media channels. Some issues are: sport and Australian daily life. Some frames only exist in *Republika*: unclear problem/solution between Australia, and Indonesia and Australia in crisis. The number of positive to negative news items in *Republika* is balanced,²⁷ meaning *Republika* portrays Australia in a 'balance' approach. More detail on these frames can be found in Table 5.18 below.

²⁶ *Republika*, (8th February 2015). *ABC Jalin Kerjasama dengan Republika* (ABC initiates collaboration with Republika).

²⁷ *Republika*'s positive tones are 98 while its negative tones are 101, as shown in Table 5.8.

Table 5.18
The Frames of Australia in *Republika*

No.	Frame Contexts	Australia's Frames	
		Positive Frames	Negative Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim existence in a multicultural society (15) • Support Islamic issues (3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia is a country of infidelity (1) • Islamophobia (17) • US ally (4) • Australia and other Western countries are enemies (2)
2.	Australia's position toward Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia respects and supports Indonesia (27) • Australia and Indonesia are good partners (33) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia is a threat to Indonesia (3) • Australia disrespects Indonesia (26) • Australia interferes in Indonesian internal matters (13) • Unclear problem/solution (14) • Australia has economic motives for dealing with Indo (5)
3.	Australia as a developed country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benchmarking in many fields (11) • Outstanding education (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia in crisis (15) • Bad guy from Australia (6)

This table shows that *Republika* as a general commercial medium with Muslim-targeted audiences and tries to stick to a 'balanced' position which does not defer to one particular Muslim group or ideology. This position also can be seen from the most-cited news sources from official opinion leaders rather than individual Muslim group leaders. In representing Australia, *Republika* stresses the country's relations with Indonesia. These relations could be either positive or negative frames. Some examples of positive frames are: 'Australia is a good partner of Indonesia' and 'Australia supports and respects Indonesia'. Meanwhile, *Republika* also balances the portrayal of Australia with some negative frames, such as 'disrespecting Indonesia'; 'unclear problem/solution with Indonesia'; and 'interference in Indonesia's internal matters'.

Unlike other Muslim group media channels examined in this study, *Republika* has complicated considerations in gate keeping select issues and shaping the frames. For

Arrahman, *HTI*, *Dakwatuna* and *NU*, the group's ideology is the ultimate factor of publishing news. For *Republika*, however, demonstrating a certain group's ideology is best avoided. This avoidance is important as *Republika* tries to reach all Muslim groups in Indonesian Muslim society. Once *Republika* is stereotyped as one particular Muslim group's organ, other Muslim groups would no longer want to access it. Fewer people reading *Republika* means a weaker market, since *Republika*'s main income comes from advertisements, and that depends on audience numbers.

Market consideration is not an important matter for other Muslim groups' media for two reasons: first, each Muslim group's media already has segmented audiences – they are either members of the group or readers interested in following the group. This does not mean that Muslim group media administrators are not interested in reaching wider audiences. By sharing their opinion about an issue on a public website, they show the attractiveness of their group's ideology without worrying whether the news framing might affect other Muslim groups or non-Muslim societies.

Another reason is that the owner of the media outlet is a Muslim organisation itself, which does not depend on advertisers and other elites. Its operating funds come instead from the organisations that influence its operation. Therefore, the internal organisational elites have significant influence on the news content rather than advertisers and audiences. However, not considering advertisers does not mean that there is no advertising on Muslim groups' media. There are several advertisements on these media channels, but advertisers are usually members or other advertisers who do not put any ideological pressure on the media's administrators.

In addition to comparing *Republika* as general commercial Muslim targeted media with Muslim groups' owned media this study also tries to compare militant and moderate Muslim media. Table 5.8 shows three differences between *Arrahmah* and *HTI* – as militant

media channels – and *Dakwatuna*, *NU* and *Republika* – as moderate media channels. The first difference is the frequency of general and specific issues. For the militant media channels, specific issues appear more than general issues, while the inverse is true for moderate media. The second fact is that there is a huge gap between negative tones and positive tones for militant media channels, with negative being the most dominant. This does not occur in moderate media – even *NU* and *Dakwatuna* have more positive than negative news tones. The final difference is that militant media channels seem interested in the role of Australia in world politics, especially Australia's role relating to conflicts in Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Syria. While moderate media channels have more interest in the Muslim existence in Australia, include the application of Islamic teaching in this developed country.

Summary

News about Australia as published in Indonesian Muslim online media relates to Australia's relations with Indonesia and Islamic issues. Only *Republika*, the general commercial media channel that partners with *ABC*, has a wider picture of Australia that includes sport and daily activities – neither of these issues relate directly to Indonesia or Islam. Positive news tones about Australia are usually found in general issues, while specific news issues mostly have negative tones. The narrower the issue that is discussed, the more negative the news tone will be. This correlates with Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring's (1979) conclusion that increasingly negative news exposure correlates with an amplified mistrust of the government.

Australia is acknowledged as being a developed country with an outstanding education system and an established society. Therefore, all five Muslim media channels admit that Australia is the benchmark in many fields. However, the frame of Australia as a US ally

cannot be forgotten. The US military base in Darwin is strong evidence of this alliance that bolsters negative opinion.

Thus, there is a different focus for militant and moderate media. Militant media perceive Australia as ‘distrustful’ neighbour and frames Australia as an ‘enemy’, a ‘threat’ and as interrupting Indonesia’s internal matters. On the other hand, the frames of Australia in moderate media focus on Australia’s support of the existence of Muslims in its multicultural society, but also use several negative frames about Australia disrespect and interference in Indonesia’s internal matters. Therefore, *Dakwatuna* and *NU* perceive Australia as ‘a multicultural country but not so friendly neighbour’. In addition, *Republika*, as a general Muslim media channel, highlights Australia as its role toward Indonesia.

In a nutshell, Australian frames in moderate and general Muslim online media channels tend to balance positive against negative frames, while in militant media the narratives about Australia are far more negative than positive.

CHAPTER 6

INDONESIAN MUSLIM AUDIENCE FRAMES OF AUSTRALIAN ISSUES

Introduction

The 2014 Lowy Institute Poll showed that 40% of Australians perceived Australia-Indonesia relations as deteriorating – up 24% from 2008 (Lowy Institute, 2014). This result shows the detrimental effects of the spying scandal. Even though this scandal worsened relations between the two countries, the Lowy Institute also showed that 62% of Australians consider the spying activity of the Australian Government on Indonesia to be acceptable. Another poll conducted in 2014 by Australia National University – the ANU poll about foreign policy - resulted 55% of respondents viewed Indonesia as friendly but not as an ally (ANU 2014).

Conversely, what might we say about Indonesians' attitudes toward Australia? Unfortunately, a similar poll of Indonesians' attitudes toward Australia is difficult to find. This chapter will explain how individual Indonesian Muslim group members frame Australia. Muslim group members were chosen as Muslims are in the majority in Indonesia, and they play significant roles in influencing opinion and attitudes of Indonesian society. The aim of this chapter is to explain how Australia is framed by Indonesian Muslim group members, as

well as to find out whether there were any different frames of Australia among militant, moderate and liberal Muslims in Indonesia.

Religious Membership and the Audience Framing Process

Hall (1980) considers the influence of a belief system and social identity in the decoding process of media content as a preferred meaning. The preferred meaning is the ‘common-sense construct’ and ‘taken for granted’ knowledge of social structures, which lead its members to decode the meaning from the media text (Hall, 2003). The domain of preferred meaning includes a set of meanings, practices and beliefs in daily knowledge about social structure and of how something supposed to be in the cultural context. Based on this notion, religion as the belief system constructs the preferred reading and creates social identity within its followers.

As a belief system, religion gives guidance to its followers on how to perceive, react and behave with regard to particular issues: followers will normally follow religious leaders when reacting to an important issue. For example, not all protesters in the ‘Lady Gaga concert ban’ in May 2012 in Indonesia had watched her video clips, or even listened to her songs. These protesters took part in this rally because their religious leaders had told them to do so. They did not need proof that Lady Gaga’s songs were forms of evil worship; it was only assumed in the protests to be true. Since religious leaders continue to have a significant influence in Indonesian Muslim societies, religious values should be considered as one of the most influential factors in the framing process made by audiences from these communities.

Informants and Australian references

This research attempts to uncover Australian images as perceived by Indonesian Muslims belonging to militant, moderate and liberal groups. Amin Abdullah (2013) classifies Muslims' religiosity into three categories: subjective, objective, and inter-subjective. Subjectively religious Muslims' are those who are only alert about their own group interest, including how they interpret Islamic teaching, and tend to be intolerant of others who take a different approach to understanding Islam (Abdullah, A, 2013). Other Indonesian scholars categorised Muslims with subjective religiosity as being militant, as found in FPI, Laskar Jihad, MMI and HTI (Hasan, 2012; Bruinessen, 2012; Abdullah, T, 2013).

Objectively religious Muslims are those who position themselves as spectators, who see religiosity as an objective reality across a variety of religions involving doctrine, ritual, sacred text, leadership, morality, history and institution (Abdullah, A, 2013). Therefore, Muslims with objective religiosity have a more scientific mentality and are curious about understanding Islamic teachings. Taufik Abdullah (2013) named Muslims with objective religiosity as liberal Muslims who perceived all religions as the same. In Indonesia, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) represents liberal Muslims, however, not all Muslims with objective religiosity are members of the group.

The third classification is inter-subjective religiosity. A person with inter-subjective religiosity embraces Islamic teaching through consideration of global ethics and multiculturalism. Therefore, Muslims with inter-subjective perspectives obey Islamic values and, at the same time, try to adapt to global changes. For inter-subjectively religious Muslims, Islamic values are universal and applicable at any time and anywhere. The universal values of Islam are: empathy, sympathy, respect, non-violence, altruism, benevolence, compassion, inclusivity, partnership, and dialogical (Abdullah, A, 2013). The majority of Indonesian

Muslims are inter-subjectively religious and this includes members of the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia: *Nadhatul Ulama (NU)* and *Muhammadiyah*.

Informants for this research were chosen based on the classification given above. Subjective and inter-subjective informants, respectively militant and moderate Muslims, were chosen based on their membership to Muslim organisations that had previously been mentioned by Indonesian scholars. However, taking the need to protect interviewees under the Human Ethics protocol into consideration, none of the persons or institutions may be identified. For objective religiosity, informants were identified by their liberal affiliations in various ways, and namely from their written ideas about Islam (that portrayed their spectator's position and supported pluralism) spread through Indonesian media, known as JIL member, and some of their names are listed in a book titled '*50 tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia: pengusung ide sekularisme, pluralisme dan liberalisme*' (50 Indonesian Liberal Muslim Figures: Supporters of Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism).¹

Informants from Muslim groups were chosen for their position as opinion leaders in the groups/organisations and therefore have greater influence than other members, except for those with liberal backgrounds.² In addition, some members who have no official position in the group were also chosen to get some ideas from their followers. However, all of the interviewee's answers are treated as their individual opinion, and not as representative of their group affiliations. The reason behind treating the replies as personal – and not as representative – is because every one has their own reference and experience regarding Australia and their individual organisations may not have any interest in Australia.

The total number of informants was 28, consisting of seven militant members³ (including two non-leader members), four with liberal affiliations⁴ and 17 moderate

¹ This book is written by Budi Handrianto and was published in 2007.

² Liberal Muslims are more 'liberal' in that they have opinions independent of others and these opinions are not based on group membership.

³ Militant member informant coded #Mt.

members.⁵ The militant informants (#Mt 1, #Mt 2, #Mt7 and #Mt3) are active members of three different militant groups and they have been a part of militant Muslim organisations for more than 10 years. At the time of the interview, the informant #Mt3 held an important position in his organisation. Informant #Mt6 was an ex-member of a radical group, he was a member for about 15 years, and for the last five years he joined another militant group. Informants number #Mt4 and #Mt5 are followers from different militant groups, and have been group members for more than five years.

Moderate informants were chosen from a variety of Muslim organisational backgrounds; the total number of moderate informants is 17. Four of these are *pesantren*'s leaders, from the traditional *pesantren*⁶ (#Md8 & #Md10) and modern *pesantren*⁷ (#Md11 & #Md20). All *pesantren* leader informants are involved in running their *pesantrens* for more than 20 years – one (#Md8) is the heir of the *pesantren*. Another four informants are members of two Islamic parties, including two parliament members (#Md14 & #Md16) and two official caretakers (#15 & #21). All informants from these Islamic parties have been members of their parties for more than 15 years; one of them was the Mayor candidate for local election.

Another six moderate informants are the members of large Muslim organisations. Two of them (#Md9 & #Md12) have an important position at a national level within their groups, while another four informants (#Md17, #Md18, #Md22 and #Md23) are experienced activists at a local level. The time duration of all six informants joining the organisations varied between 12 to over 25 years. The final three members are non-leader members from a variety of Muslim organisations, in which two of them (#Md12 & #Md13) are *pesantren*'s mentors

⁴ Liberal affiliation informant coded #Lb.

⁵ Moderate member informant coded #Md.

⁶ Traditional *pesantren* conducts its own curricula, focus on the classical Islamic teaching and have been existed in Indonesian society since the beginning of *Islamization* in Java (Pringle, 2010)

⁷ Modern *pesantren* adapts the traditional *pesantren* model (in terms of boarding school and teach Islamic teaching) with the modification in 'secular' curricula like math, language, science and sports. Modern *pesantren* follows Indonesia's official curriculum for schools.

who have been members of the *pesantren* for between 5 to 10 years. The final moderate informant is an ordinary member of a moderate Muslim organisation (#Md24).

Liberal informants were chosen based on their opinion about liberal Islam (#Lb 24, #Lb26, #Lb27 and #Lb28). One of them had his name on the list of the *50 tokoh liberal* book that was mentioned earlier. Another was chosen because of his group affiliation that was believed to be under JIL influence, and another two informants were known for their opinion that supports liberal Islam. Two of them pursued an education in Australia.

All interviews were held between May to December 2013 and were conducted in *bahasa* Indonesian with a length of between 30 to 90 minutes. All of the interviews were conducted in the informants' offices and houses located variously in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surakarta. All interviews were transcribed and classified into themes needed for this research. The Media frames, in the previous chapter and the process of developing informants' frames, were identified from keywords, phrases, stereotypical images, sources of information and facts as well as judgements provided in the interviews (Entman, 1993).

In general, informants were asked about three matters: their point of view about Australia, their source of information about Australia, and their experience regarding Australia. Exploring the informant's view about Australia, further questions were about their positive and negative image of Australia, the news about Australia that they noticed in the media, the influence of the interviewee's group values in perceiving Australia, and what they thought about the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Moreover, regarding their information sources about Australia did not only involve asking about the kind of media that they accessed but also their own experiences about Australia. The final part of the interview inquired about the informant's direct and vicarious experience with Australia.

The average response of all informants when they were first asked about Australia was their confession that they did not know much about the country since there was not much

about it either in the media or in their daily conversation with friends or other group members. However, while the interview was running, some general frames and idiosyncrasies resulted. This could have happened because each informant had different experiences with Australia and Australians; ranging from those who had never been to Australia and have no friends in Australia, to those who have both visited and lived in Australia.

Based on these disparate experiences, informants can be classified into three categories: direct experience, mediated experience and unexperienced. Direct experience informants are those who had been to Australia and/or had interaction with Australians, either through collaborative projects or friends. Mediated experience informants are those who have knowledge of Australia mediated through their relatives or friends who had been to Australia, or they had sought information about Australia through the media. Informants in this category actively seek information about Australia, as they either want to study there or simply learn more about the country. Unexperienced informants are those who have no interest in Australia and do not seek information about it. For this last category, their frames of Australia are very general and follow their fellow group members' opinions.

Boulding (1973), as cited by Botan, explained that every individual has their own 'subjective image structures' of things or processes (Botan, 1993). Related to this definition, informants with different experiences of Australia will have different images of Australia in their minds. Informants with direct experience tend to have images of Australia that are close to reality; while unexperienced informants tend to limit their image of the country based on media information. Within this research, there are nine direct experience informants, fourteen mediated experience informants and five unexperienced informants. These comprise moderate and liberal affiliated direct-experience informants, and mediated-experience informants, all from different ideological backgrounds. There were also three informants who had never been to Australia but had experience of studying elsewhere for more than two

years.⁸ All of these informants were open-minded while picturing Australia, even though one of them was from a militant background. Nevertheless, they were not bundled together in one category, as one of them had completed collaborative projects with Australian organisations⁹ and the other two had friends in Australia.¹⁰

The unexperienced category comprises respondents from militant and moderate backgrounds. There are two reasons behind the lack of interest in Australia for this category: the first is that Australia is not in the Middle East, the birthplace of Islamic teaching. The second is because of the sceptical view of Australia's bona fides – believed to have sponsored an anti-terrorism trap in Indonesia, one of which targeted Islamic activists including the respondents' own militant group leaders and friends. Therefore, they have no interest in any information about Australia.¹¹

This research also tries to trace sources from which informants gathered their information about Australia. These information sources include traditional and modern news media: national and local television stations and newspapers, BBC Indonesia radio; Indonesian news portals like *Detik* and *Arrahmah*; international news portals like *The Guardian* and *The Independent*, and even YouTube for exploring interesting Australian tourism destinations. Most informants do not actively seek information about Australia; they just consume what the local media has said about it. However, informants who do actively search for Australian information look for Australian scholarships and academic journals.¹² An informant with a liberal affiliation indicated a different information source to those identified by others. He reads *Inside Indonesia*¹³ magazine, published by Australians about

⁸ They are #Mt3, #Md17 and #Lb26.

⁹ Direct-experience category.

¹⁰ Mediated-experience category.

¹¹ Personal interview with #Mt2, #Mt5 and #Mt7.

¹² Personal interview with #Mt3 and #Md9.

¹³ *Inside Indonesia* was a quarterly magazine published by the Indonesian Resources and Information Program (IRIP) in 1983. The print version was stopped in 2007 and is now a solely online publication: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/>.

Indonesia. He was curious about how Australians see Indonesia; therefore this quarterly magazine fulfilled his interest.

The different experiences and sources of information about Australia influence the image of Australia in informants' minds. So what is Australia's image according to these different Indonesian Muslim group members? And how do different Muslim ideologies influence this image? Both of these questions will be discussed below.

Indonesian Muslim Members' Frames for Australia

The image of Australia for Muslim members is mostly general, ranging from positive to negative. However, some images were framed in both positive and negative tones. All informants related Australia to the issue of Islam and Muslims, and its relations with Indonesia. Besides that, the Bali Bombing's effects were the main issues to emerge during intense discussion among some informants, which may warrant further interest.

Australia is Generous with Its Scholarships and Has an Outstanding Education System

The first image that came to the mind of the most informants when they were asked about Australia was the scholarships offered by Australian Government to Indonesians each year. This image was recognised by militant, moderate and liberal members. For example, the answer given by militant member below:

Australia is a developed country that gives much aid to Indonesia, including scholarships and other aids for disasters (#Mt4)

The number of scholarships offered by the Australian Government from 1963 via the Colombo Plan¹⁴ has crafted the image of Australia as a country for study. The well-established education system in Australia and the increasing number of Australian alumni in Indonesia have supported this image. Two informants from militant and moderate members had tried to apply for Australian scholarships as well.

I almost went to Australia. I joined the student exchange program in Australia. Unfortunately, I failed in the third-stage selection. I still want to study in Australia. Now I am preparing to fulfil the English requirement to apply for scholarships. (#Md15)

I have seniors who undertook their PhDs in Australia. Therefore, I know that Australia has outstanding education and I wanted to follow them. However, finally I got a scholarship for another country instead of Australia. (#Mt3)

A moderate informant who had lived for five years in the UK while studying for his PhD also acknowledged Australia's image as having a good education system. He assumed that Australia's education system resembled the British one, which he considers to be one of the best in the world (#Md17).

Australia's education also provides advantages for Indonesians who want to study in Western countries, since Australia has an image that is closer to that of other Western nations. One militant member stated this image as follows:

Australia represents Western countries, including education. That is an advantage for Indonesians who want to learn about modernism and the Western world. They do not have to go to Europe or the United States. They only need to study in Australia. It is closer and cheaper (#Mt1).

In addition to all the positive images of the scholarships given by Australia's Government to Indonesia, there are also some critical views. One moderate informant said that even though Australia gave many scholarships and a great deal of aid to Indonesia, they

¹⁴ <http://www.australiaawardsindonesia.org/index.php/en/other/news/315-colombo-plan-gathering-2013>.

were not given sincerely (#Md23). Another moderate informant said that all aid and scholarships given by Australia's Government are just a form of soft diplomacy.

The Australian image perceived by *pesantren*'s community is positive, I believe. This happened because of the grants and aid given by Australian Government, particularly to *pesantrens*¹⁵ which create a good image of Australia – as a generous country (#Md10).

Another liberal informant stated that there is 'no free lunch today' and thus considered that Australia must have a 'hidden agenda' behind all of its generosity to Indonesia (#Lb24). He gave an example of the behaviour of some Australian alumni who exalted Australia in every discussion and hardly criticised it. Moreover, the increase of Australian alumni, as well as alumni from other Western countries in Indonesia, has brought substantial influence to the political sphere:

Australian alumni have brought significant influence to the Indonesian political atmosphere. This influence is not only in academic discussions but also in building the political system. Most political science scholars from famous Indonesian universities are alumni from Australia and the United States. They brought [in] the mainstream of liberal democracy to be applied in Indonesia. The Election Law in Indonesia also shows this political mainstream. This could be happening because the people behind the law were Australian and United States alumni (#Lb24).

All evidence points to a clear image of Australia as a good destination for study.

Professor Ronny Rachman Noor, Indonesia's education and cultural attaché in Australia, stated that up to September 2014 there were 17,131 Indonesian students studying in Australia (*Radio Australia*, September 2014). However, this number might decline due to higher study costs in Australia compared to other countries such as Singapore and the United States. According to HSBC's survey, which interviewed 5,000 parents from fifteen countries, Australia is the most expensive country for annual tuition fees and living costs, priced at around US\$42,000 compared to US\$6,000 in United States and US\$3,000 in Singapore (*Radio Australia*, September 2014).

¹⁵ Australian Government granted AUD\$500 million to support accreditation programs for *Pesantrens* and *Madrasah* (Islamic Indonesian elementary schools) (*The Australian*, October 2012)

Generally, the image of Australia as being generous in giving scholarships is a strong image for informants from all groups'. Australia's scholarship program is considered successful, as evidenced by its alumni influencing the Indonesian academic climate, especially in political studies and in relation to the political atmosphere in Indonesia in the last decade. This finding corresponds with the result of the Indonesian Polls conducted by Lowy Institute in 2012. When polling 1,289 Indonesian adults at the end of 2011, 89% of the respondents agreed that Australia was a good place to study and receive an education (Hanson, 2012). This image was the second highest positive framing after 'Australia has an advanced economy' (91%). Byrne and Hall (2013) suggested empowering Australia's international education as a tool for public diplomacy and to enhance interaction between individuals who study in Australia.

It seems that the frame 'Australia has an outstanding educational system' also resulted in a number of private Indonesian students being sent by their parents to Australia to continue their studies. In future, this trend seems likely to decline due to the massive promotion of the US and other European countries in Indonesia as viable educational destinations.

Australia is a Multicultural Country

The second most common image of Australia in the mind of Informants is that of Australia as a country that welcomes everyone to visit and stay there. Therefore, Australia is also considered a multicultural country. Two sub-images have also emerged from interviews with respondents. The first is that Australians provide a space for Muslims to live and apply Islamic worship in their daily life. The second is that Australia protects minorities, including the Aboriginal population.

Respondents from all groups acknowledged this image of multiculturalism. The informant from a militant group said that Muslims in Australia are not excluded from Australian society (#Mt5). The informant from the moderate group who visited several countries such as the US, China, Europe and Australia, said that Muslims in Australia have more freedom compared to Muslims in other Western countries he has visited.

From my own experience, I can see that Muslims can live peacefully there [in Australia]. I saw many Muslim women wear the hijab or headscarf, ride public transportation freely, anywhere, anytime. Even at night. Besides that, I saw some universities in Sydney provide halal cafeterias for their Muslim students. I think this is a good sign from the Australian Government. They give room for Muslims to exist within Australian society (#Md21).

Another informant, with liberal affiliations, who experienced living in Europe for three years but had never been to Australia, also reinforced the image of Australians being open to Muslims. Even though he had never visited Australia, his younger sister was studying in Melbourne at the time of the interview. He also took an interest in Muslim immigrants who live in Western countries.

I think Australians are more friendly and flexible to Muslims compared to other Western countries like the US and [those in] Europe. The tension between immigrant Muslims in the US and Europe is tougher; I think Australia is less racist compared to other Western countries. For example, the competition for getting a job between immigrant Muslims and native residents has raised conflicts in Europe. But this issue has not happened in Australia (#Lb26).

There is evidence that Australia acknowledges the right to participation by Muslims in its political arena is illustrated in the case of Ed Husic: in 2013, Husic was the first Muslim officially sworn in at Government House in Canberra as Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and for Broadband (*The Australian*, July 2013). This was noted by #Md18, a member of the moderate group who had visited Australia. He was also interested in how Australia managed its multicultural society and minimised ethnic conflict.

The way Australia's Government treats its multicultural society interests me. The Government gives opportunities for Muslims to become parliamentary members to accommodate Muslims' concerns (#Md18).

The concern of the Australian Government for Muslim youth – by means of the Muslim Leadership Program¹⁶, the annual program for the young Muslim community from Australia, Indonesia and other Asia Pacific countries – also drew the attention of one moderate informant:

I see the deep concern of Australia's government for its Muslim youth. The Government facilitates communication between Australian Muslim youths and other Muslims in other countries. I think it is a good sign from Australia. They respect Muslims. (#Md21)

Other evidence that Australia is open to Muslims as well as Islamic thought can be seen from the acceptance of Islamic Banking in Australia. Mr Bernie Ripoll, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, stated that the growth rate of the Islamic finance industry in Australia is 15%-20% per year, and could be worth as much as \$2 trillion within the next three to four years (*Financial Standard*, April 2013). This growth would benefit the whole financial services industry, not just the Muslim community in Australia. This phenomenon was also noted by #Md21.

A particularly interesting image of Australia emerged from the views of one moderate member. According to him, the number of scholars of Islamic studies has started to grow in Australia. He remarked on the appointment of Professor Abdullah Saeed from the University of Melbourne and his book *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a Contemporary Approach* (#Md9).¹⁷

I found it is interesting. In all this time, people think that Islamic Studies is only of interest in the Middle East. But these days a lot of scholars, especially in Islamic Studies, have migrated to Australia and teach in Australian universities. The quality of their publications is equal to other Islamic studies scholars from the Middle East and Canada. (#Md9)

¹⁶ Previously known as the Young Muslim Leadership Program, this annual program was started in 2007. http://www.dfat.gov.au/ami/funded_projects/interfaith.html.

¹⁷ Saeed, Abdullah (2006). *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a Contemporary Approach*. New York: Routledge.

Besides all of the positive frames about Australia's openness to Muslims, there is also criticism from a militant informant. He stated that Australia's attention to Muslims is a must, as the Government needs to monitor all Muslim movements in neighbouring countries.

It is natural for Australia's government to give permission and space for Muslims to practice their worship and express their needs. It will [then] be easier to monitor all Muslims' movements. Otherwise, there will be a lot of hidden Muslim movements in society that are hard to detect (#Mt1)

The second sub-image of Australia as multicultural country is its protection of minorities. Some informants mentioned the existence of the Aboriginal community. This issue was framed in both positive and negative images. The liberal and moderate respondents positively acknowledged Aboriginal protection in Australia.

Australia respects its Aboriginal population, the native inhabitants, in a positive way. (#Lb27)

The positive side of Australia is its protection of the minority native population, the Aborigines. (#Md15)

In terms of Aboriginal issues, two moderate informants criticised Australia. Both agreed that Australia has mistreated the indigenous population of Australia, and had violated their human rights¹⁸ and given them no future.

I think Australia is not consistent. On the one hand, Australia warns how Indonesia has violated [the rights of] Papua's people. On the other hand, they mistreat their own native tribes, the Aborigines. These tribes are spoiled by [being offered] enjoyment – by giving them money and other facilities without having to work. They have never been educated, [in order to be able] to earn money and make [their] civilisation. Since everything is given for free and [there is] no need for struggle, they just spend their days with [getting] drunk and [doing] other unnecessary things. If this happens continually, the Aboriginal civilization will soon vanish. (#Md23)

Australia's image as a multicultural country seems to be well known to most informants. All informants from all groups admitted knowing Australians' tolerance for Muslims to worship. However, some informants framed the mistreatment of Aborigines as one of the weaknesses of Australia within this issue.

¹⁸ According to the interview with #Md9

Australia Interferes in Indonesia's Internal Matters

Another very common image of Australia is that it intervenes in several internal issues in Indonesia. Two informants from the liberal (#Lb27) and moderate (#Md9) groups mentioned the intervention involving East Timor's separation, the West Papua freedom movements, and Corby's parole issues. Moreover, another moderate informant predicted the West Papua issue would contain potential conflicts that might influence the relationship between both countries (#Md16). Other moderate informants stated that the intervention made by Australia in some of the cases mentioned above was understandable.

I believe there is no such thing as neutral and value-free for anything; for instance, cultural exchange, university partnerships, anything. Each counterpart must have its own interest. Based on this, the intervention that Australia does is still tolerable.
(#Md17)

Actually, Australia's interventionist image had created intense discussion among informants from militants and moderate groups in relation to the tragedy of the Bali Bombing in 2002. People from both countries regretted this brutal action; however, this calamity generated a greater misunderstanding between Australia and Indonesian Muslims, which continues to grow. For Australia, helping Indonesia fight against terrorism is part of a global campaign against terrorism. Unfortunately, militant and moderate Indonesian Muslim groups perceive this effort differently. According to them, especially those with militant ideology, the Australian support of anti-terrorist troops is evidence that they used the opportunity to arrest Islamic activists.

There are at least two other major topics that concern some informants in addition to the Bali Bombing catastrophe: the anti-terrorism issue and the *pesantren* curriculum intervention issue. All militant informants and several moderate informants discussed the

anti-terrorism topic, while several moderate informants described the intervention in the *pesantren* curriculum. Some informants had direct experience with both issues; others did not.

Australia is believed to have played a main role in the formation of Densus 88, Indonesia's anti-terrorism force (*Arrahmah*, August 2013). The number 88 used as a postfix in the name is believed to be the number of Australians who died in the tragedy (*Arrahmah*, May 2013). FPI¹⁹ stated that this Special Detachment had received \$314,500 from 2010 to 2012 from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in support of their training and daily operations.²⁰

A militant respondent explained the intervention in terrorism issue in detail:

Australia and the US urged the Indonesian Government to pass legislation about eradicating terrorism to legitimize Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's arrest.²¹ I heard that in fact the legislation had already been prepared but was not for authorization in the short term. However, Megawati, the Indonesian president at that time, seemed afraid of threats from Australia and the US. Therefore, she signed the *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (Perpu)*²² no. 1/2002 about the Terrorism Eradication. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was arrested on the same day that Megawati signed the substitute law on 18th October 2002 (or, six days after the Bali Bombing tragedy). (#Mt2)

Almost all militant informants mentioned the intervention of Australia in anti-terrorism campaigns. However, there is some debate about the intervention of Australia and Densus 88 among respondents. A moderate respondent framed this issue in a different way. According to him, Australia is 'just a victim' of terrorism – especially with relation to Densus 88.

In my opinion, in the context of the terrorism issue, Australia is just a victim. Since Australia suffered the most in the Bali Bombing tragedy, they are afraid and paranoid about terrorism issues. This situation was utilized by Indonesians by making a proposal for special anti-terrorism troops, Densus 88, and asking for funds from Australia. We can see the evidence, when these terrorist suspects were arrested in a large number all

¹⁹ FPI, *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front) is a militant Muslim group.

²⁰ Taken from *Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Front Pembela Islam (DPP FPI) tentang Fitnah Terorisme Densus 88 & BNPT* (official statement from the Central Board of FPI about the slander of terrorism from Densus 88 and BNPT (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Teroris*, National Board for Terrorism Prevention), 22nd August, 2013).

²¹ The leader of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*. He is accused of involvement in the Bali Bombing.

²² PERPU = *Government Regulation as the substitution of Law*. This regulation was finally authorised by Indonesian Parliament named Undang-Undang no 15/2003 about The Terrorism Eradication on 4th April 2003.

at once. It looks like it already had been engineered before the act, not to mention the journalists in attendance at the place where the terrorists seized. (#Md23)

Therefore, public trust related to this issue is fading. The criterion of ‘terrorist’ is not clear. Anyone can be alleged to be a terrorist. For example, someone has been killed as terrorist because he attacked the police station. The reason behind his attack could be something other than terrorism. However he was killed by Densus 88, which surrounds his house without any further investigation.²³ (#Md23)

Other intense discussions related to the Bali Bombing tragedy and Australian intervention in Indonesia concerned intervention in the *pesantren* curriculum. This topic arose among moderate informants, especially those who had direct experience of *pesantren* during the time (after the Bali Bombings). As has already been mentioned, after the first Bali Bombing, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was arrested because he was suspected to be the leader of the terrorists. Ba’asyir had a traditional *pesantren*, and almost all of the Bali Bombing executants had studied in his *pesantren*. These facts became evidence that the *pesantren* was a terrorist cell, which interpreted the *Jihad* as God’s fight against non-believers.

Based on this prejudice, traditional *pesantrens*²⁴ were blamed as places for nurturing potential terrorists. Therefore, *pesantren* curricula needed to be comprehensively reviewed to make sure that there was no misinterpretation of what *Jihad* was. Related to this issue, one moderate informant with a *pesantren* background said:

People sometime misunderstand *pesantren*. They think all *pesantren* are similar. Our *pesantrens* are different to other *pesantren*, even though others also attach the name ‘*salafy*’ within the name. Our *pesantrens* have traditions that have been applied for years, and none of our students have a radical ideology (#Md8).

Regarding #Md8, *pesantren* traditions have resilient mechanisms for inheriting knowledge. This knowledge legacy, named ‘*sanad*’, links *kyai-santri* (teacher-student) knowledge inheritance or inheritance of knowledge through marriage between *pesantren* heirs.

²³ There was a case of a man presumed to be a terrorist because he might attack the police station in Solo, Central Java. He was killed while being arrested, along with a policeman. This event invited suspicion from the public, since some irregular evidence was found at the scene of the crime (*Republika*, September 2012).

²⁴ Traditional *pesantrens* here means the *pesantren* under the NU network. These traditional *pesantrens* were established in the early 1900s and spread across Indonesia. There are now up to 13,400 *pesantrens* (NU, April 2013).

Through both links, traditional *pesantrens* have solid connections and make networks. Therefore, it is hard to constrain their curriculums since they apply exclusive curricula through their connections.²⁵

The misjudging of *pesantrens* was not always down to lack of awareness. Another moderate informant with a *pesantren* background suspected that the Australian government deliberately misjudged it as an excuse to enter the *pesantrens'* schools and examine their curricula.

I don't think they don't know that our *pesantrens* are different from the radical ones. They just use it as an excuse to interfere with our curriculum. As you know, our curriculum is exclusive. Australia and the US haven't succeeded to obstruct it. Australia has many agendas to hinder our curriculum via several programs, such as standardization, accreditation, and whatever. By interfering our curriculum, the *pesantrens* will become easy to control. (#Md10)

According to both informants (#Md8 and #Md10), Australia had been involved in interfering in their curriculums. For example, Australia's government granted \$500 million for an accreditation program of 1500 madrasah (*Hizbut Tahrir*, October 2012). The *pesantren* administrators perceive this programme as a form of intrusion into internal management by standardising the school management, including the curriculum. Each *pesantren* has a unique curriculum, depending on the ancestor's *Kyai* followed by the *pesantren's* leader. Therefore, enforcing uniformity into *pesantren's* curriculum is unthinkable for *pesantren's* insiders.

Even though it seems impossible to standardise the curriculum, the accreditation program was still undertaken. *Pesantren's* administrators have tried to compromise this accreditation program, instead of totally refusing it. They would carry out school accreditation under two conditions: first, involving *pesantren* personnel or those who have *pesantren* backgrounds as the assessors, since the organisation's form of *pesantren* is different to

²⁵ Personal interview with #Md8.

ordinary schools. The second condition was to exclude curriculum standardisation and reject any interference from outsiders.²⁶

On the other hand, the informant with a modern *pesantren* background did not frame Australia in the same way as his colleagues from more traditional *pesantren*. He did not see that Australia had interfered in the *pesantren*'s curriculum. Instead, he considered that Australia has an outstanding educational system that should be adopted (#Md12).

Respondents from modern *pesantren* backgrounds do not negatively frame the curriculum intervention because these *pesantrens* had already modified secular and Islamic knowledge in their curriculums. Therefore, the modification of secular curriculum is something that must be avoided in traditional *pesantrens*.

Australia's intervention frames had been raised after the Bali Bombing catastrophe in 2002, which increased levels of suspicion and prejudice related to terrorism and *pesantren* curriculum issues. This suspicion and prejudice was also acknowledged in Australian media, which associated terrorists with 'Islam extremists' and Islamic schools as the place of nurturing terrorists, as well as criticising the Indonesian Government who were reluctant to close down the schools (Mahony, 2010).

Frames about Australia-Indonesia Relations

Regarding Australia-Indonesia relations, all informants responded with a variety of frames. The response they gave when asked about this relationship – was that the relationship was 'good', and 'positive'. When they were asked further questions about the positive frames, answers included 'good collaborative programs such as military collaborations' (#Mt3), 'economic partnerships' (#Md19), and 'disaster management collaboration' (#Lb27). Two

²⁶ Personal interview with #Md1.

militant informants also mentioned Indonesian language teaching in Australian schools as an evidence of good relationships between both countries (#Mt1,#Mt2). Some informants, however, had no interest in Australia-Indonesia relations as they did not find that Australia plays a significant role in Indonesia (#Mt4), nor did they find significance in terms of Australia's international relations; certainly less influence compared to US (#Lb26).

Unbalanced Relations between Australia and Indonesia

Concerning the relation between Australia and Indonesia, some respondents focused on the unbalanced relationship between Australia and Indonesia. The informants from militant, moderate and liberal groups all agreed that the uneven relationships were caused by the Indonesian Government's weakness in diplomatic relations with the Australian Government. Corrupt bureaucracy has contributed to this weakness, meaning Indonesia has no firm policy regarding foreign investors, but has also opened up opportunities for those who were greedy to take advantage (#Mt1).

The Indonesian Government was believed to lack confidence in its diplomatic dealings with Australia (#Md 23). For many respondents, this lack of confidence framed the Indonesian Government as fearful and submissive to the Australian Government. The liberal informant stated that Australia is too dominant for Indonesia (#Lb24). Another moderate informant also explained Indonesia's debt to Australia was the main reason for the lack of confidence.

One example of the unbalanced relations is the cattle slaughter scandal of 2011, based on Indonesia being seen as an 'object' rather than a 'subject' by developed countries, including Australia. Indonesia has huge foreign debt from the World Bank and Australia as well. This loan has become a 'hostage' for Indonesia that enforced Indonesia to obey their rules. Therefore, the Indonesian Government has no freedom in performing balanced relations with Australia and other developed countries. (#Md22)

After seeing a video showing cattle being tortured before being killed in Indonesian abattoirs, the Australian Government made a unilateral decision to suspend live cattle exports to Indonesia (*The Guardian*, May 2011). This issue drew strong reaction from Indonesian figures, including Muslim leaders. According to *Republika*, the banning of cattle exports to Indonesia showed the arrogance of the Australian Government toward Indonesia (*Republika*, June 2011). This cattle export ban was mentioned by several informants as an example of unbalanced relations between Australia and Indonesia (#Mt1, #Md10, #Md15, #Md18).

Australia is a US Ally

Besides framing Australia-Indonesia relations as unbalanced, some informants from all Muslim groups also focused on Australia's role in international relations. Most informants framed Australia as being an ally for the US for two reasons: Australia needs the US to deal with Indonesia, and Australia's weak role in global politics has made it a US follower. Four informants – from the militant, moderate and liberal groups – framed the weak role of Australia in global politics.

I think Australia still sees Indonesia as a 'hidden enemy' – a threat. They felt powerless toward Indonesia as their population is less than Indonesia, and are very sensitive to Indonesian intervention. The aggressiveness of Indonesia can be seen from West Papua and East Timor cases, which had made them extremely anxious of Indonesia. Therefore, they need to have the US as an ally and backup if they have to encounter Indonesia. The US military base in Darwin is a proof of it. (#Md21)

Related to this issue, a militant informant also mentioned the US and Australia's collaboration in handling the *war on terrorism* in Indonesia (#Mt2).

Another informant from a liberal background explained his reason for not paying much attention to Australia's political change: the US is considered more influential than Australia.

I'm not really paying attention to Australia, since I think Australia doesn't have significant role in global politics, instead, we are neighbours. The change of US politics has significantly influenced the world, especially Indonesia. (#Lb26)

Consequently, according to the other moderate informant, Australia is considered as a US follower rather than as an independent country in international relations.

In context of international mediation in global politics, Australia's role is not as striking as the US and Europe. Therefore, the public cannot identify Australia as a main actor in global politics. The public only sees the US, the UK and other European countries that take action against rebellious *mujahedeen* in several Muslim countries. (#Md10)

Meanwhile, in the context of international relations, Australia is not seen as dominant and has no significant role in global political discourse. Compared to the US, political changes within Australia have had no substantial impact on Indonesia or other countries. Regarding international policy, Australia is regarded as a follower of the US. Therefore, most informants were not curious about Australia's role in global politics.

Australia is a Better Neighbour than Other Neighbouring Countries

Some informants focused on the conflict between Australia and Indonesia. Rivenburgh (1997) discussed the tendency of framing foreign countries as 'friends' or as 'enemies'; several informants discussed the position of Australia within this framework and its support or opposition to issues. In particular, they compared the country's actions with other neighbouring countries and cases of conflict such as East Timor's separation from Indonesia and the 2014 spying scandal.

Compared to other neighbouring countries, Australia is framed a lot more positively than Malaysia. Two informants from the liberal and moderate groups agreed to this framing. One reason is to do with the conflict with Malaysia about the bordering land at West

Kalimantan province and Sarawak, Malaysia (*Kompas*, October 2011) and another is to do with Malaysian claims to Indonesian cultural traditions (#Md18).

As far as I know, Indonesia-Australia relations are much better than Indonesia-Malaysia relations. There are no border issues between the two countries (Indonesia-Australia), compared to the unfinished conflict between Indonesia-Malaysia borderlands, Simpadan and Ligitan islands. Besides that, there is no [common] culture claimed with Australia, as opposed to Malaysia. As we already know, Malaysia has claimed Indonesian ancestral traditions such as *Reog* and *Wayang* as their own cultures (#Lb27).

The spying scandal that implicated Australia in espionage in several neighbouring countries triggered huge reactions in Indonesian media as well as from Muslim leaders and other opinion leaders. An informant from a moderate background highlighted the importance of developing mutual relations rather than exploiting one party in order to advantage the other (#Md10). This spying issue, however, does not always bring about negative perceptions.

Select informants from all groups felt that espionage is common practice among states and has safeguarding national interests as its aim.

It is something 'reasonable' when a country is doing such a thing like intervening and spying, because they need to protect their own interests. Other countries, including Indonesia, I believe, also try the same things. Still, there should be a proper rule applied to such a situation. As an Indonesian, of course I will be mad, but I can understand why Australia doing it [spying activities] (#Md17).

Another militant informant also gave his understanding of Australia's spying and intervention activities:

In term of international politics, there is no absolute independence for a country. A country's authority is only a 'residual power' after it has been reduced by international law ratifications from the United Nations. Therefore, spying and intervention are something in common, since our country has no power to fight against it (#Mt2).

Both statements above show that these respondents consider the latest spying issue not to be anything out of the ordinary. The myriad responses in the media related to this issue were used as a trigger to activate nationalist spirit within the Indonesian people (#Lb26).

Overall, Australia-Indonesia relations are positively framed. All informants notice good collaboration in areas such as disaster management and the good economic partnerships. In terms of conflict, Australia is not seen as an ‘enemy’. Its relations with Indonesia are considered as being better than Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia. Even in the case of the spying scandal, the Indonesian Government only utilised the issue to raise nationalistic morale within Indonesian society(#Lb26). If unbalanced relationships exist, informants tended to blame the Indonesian Government for lacking confidence and being unskilled in diplomatic strategy.

***Militant, Moderate and Liberal Audience Frames:
Is There a Difference?***

The general framing of Australia by all of the informants above shows there are no differences between militant, moderate and liberal informants. By separating each issue above according to informant and positive/negative framing, then differences between the three different ideological backgrounds can clearly be seen (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 shows that militant, moderate and liberal informants frame Australia as generous and as having an outstanding education system, that Australia is a multicultural country, and that Australia interferes in Indonesia’s internal affairs. Relating framing of Australia-Indonesia relations, respondents from all Muslim ideological backgrounds stated that there were good collaborations between Australia and Indonesia. In addition, they said that an unbalanced relationship between both countries existed, and they stated that Australia was a US ally in terms of international relations.

Table 6.1.

Summary Frames of Australia by Informants with Different Islamic Ideological Backgrounds

<div> <div>Australian frames</div> <div>Informant backgrounds</div> </div>	Australia is generous and has an outstanding education system	Australia is a multicultural country		Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal affairs		Frames about Australia-Indonesia relations
		Welcome to Muslims	Protection of minorities	General interference	Bali Bombing	
Militant	<p>Wants to continue studying there</p> <p>Outstanding Australian education is an advantage for Indonesia</p>	<p>Muslims are accepted in Australian society</p> <p><i>It is natural to permit Islam to be practised, otherwise it would be hard to detect Muslims' movements*</i></p>			<p><i>Australia interferes in forming Densus 88, the terrorism troop</i></p> <p><i>Australia and the US forced Indonesia to promulgate an Anti-Terrorism Law soon after the Bali Bombing catastrophe in 2002</i></p>	<p>Good collaboration in a variety of fields</p> <p>Australian schools teach Indonesian language</p> <p><i>Australia is not an interesting issue to follow</i></p> <p>Unbalanced relationships with Australia is caused by a corrupt government</p> <p><i>Australia and the US collaborate in the 'war against terrorism' in Indonesia</i></p>
Moderate	<p>Wants to study there</p> <p><i>Scholarships are just soft diplomacy</i></p>	<p>Muslims in Australia have more freedom</p> <p>Government provides opportunities for Muslims to become public officers (Ed Husic)</p> <p>Muslim scholars start to increase in number in Australia</p>	<p>Australia maintains native cultures (Aboriginal)</p> <p><i>Australia has mistreated Aborigines</i></p>	<p><i>Australia interferes in East Timor, West Papua & Corby cases</i></p> <p>Australian intervention is understandable – for protecting its own interests</p>	<p><i>Australia interfered in Pesantren curriculums</i></p> <p>Debating whether Australia was just a 'victim' in Densus 88 issue</p>	<p>Relations with Australia are better than those with Malaysia</p> <p>Spying is understandable</p> <p>Indonesian government is lacking in confidence in its diplomatic performance with Australia</p> <p><i>Australia needs the US to counter Indonesian threat</i></p>

<div style="text-align: center;"> <div>Australian frames</div> <div>Informant backgrounds</div> </div>	Australia is generous and has an outstanding education system	Australia is a multicultural country		Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal affairs		Frames about Australia-Indonesia relations
		Welcome to Muslims	Protection of minorities	General interference	Bali Bombing	
Liberal	<p><i>There is no free lunch today. There must be a hidden agenda behind the scholarship program</i></p> <p><i>Australian alumni influence political discourse in Indonesia</i></p>	<p>Muslims are welcome in Australia</p> <p>Australians are less racist than people in Europe and the US</p>	Australia respects Aborigines	<p><i>Australia interferes in East Timor, West Papua and Corby cases</i></p> <p>Spying issues are utilised by the Indonesian Government to bolster nationalism among Indonesians.</p>		<p>Good collaboration, such as disaster management</p> <p>Relations with Australia are better than with Malaysia</p> <p><i>Australia is not interesting as it has no significant role in International politics</i></p> <p><i>Australia is too dominant, causing unbalanced relationships</i></p> <p><i>Australia is a US follower in international relations</i></p>

**Words in italics are framed negatively*

Yet there are also some issues that go unmentioned by certain informants from militant and liberal backgrounds. Militant informants did not show evidence of framing 'Australia protecting minority groups' and the general matter of Australia's intervention in Indonesia. Within the 'multicultural country' frame, militant informants focused on acceptance of Muslims in Australia's society, and in 'Australia interferes in Indonesian matters' they focused on Densus 88 targeting Muslim activists. Liberal informants did not mention the Bali Bombing at all, nor did they mention Densus 88.

The informant's ideological backgrounds influence their process of framing evaluation, which resulted in varied frames. Informants evaluate the frame by valuing it either positively or negatively. Through evaluating the frames as either positive or negative, the

informants' focus on Australia can be observed. Robert M Entman stated 'making moral judgments' as being important within the framing process (Entman, 1993).

All three Muslim ideological backgrounds agreed on one frame: the unbalanced relationship between Australia and Indonesia. However, the cause that lay behind it is different for militant, moderate and liberal informants. Both militant and moderate informants tend to blame the Indonesian Government as being the main cause of 'disturbed' relationships. A militant informant identified the corrupt Indonesian Government as being the source of the imbalance (#Mt1), while a moderate informant thought that the main reason was Indonesia's lack of self-confidence (#Md 23). A liberal informant framed Australia negatively by framing the dominance of Australia as the cause for imbalance (#Lb24).

Militant informants tend to focus on the issues of Islam and the existence of Muslims in Australia. They formed negative frameworks when discussing Australia's involvement in creating the anti-terrorism troop, Densus 88. A positive frame, however, emerged when relating to Muslims' existence in Australia, even though some informants said that Australia should give space to Muslim immigrants, otherwise these immigrants would go underground in their activities (#Mt1).

Militant informants positively framed the issue of Australia as being a good place to study as it has an exceptional education system. On this issue, militant informants also recognized that some schools in Australia teach Bahasa Indonesian, an Indonesian language. Even though one informant stated he always wanted to continue his studies in Australia, another informant stated that he never wanted to study there since Australia is not the country of origin for Islamic Studies (#Mt4); for the same reason other *pesantren* alumni – either from traditional or modern *pesantrens* – choose study in the Middle East over Australia, as they have learned Arabic to understand the Al Qur'an, the Islamic Holy Book (#Md12).

Compared to moderate and liberal informants, militant informants tend to have no concern about Aboriginal protection and forms of Australian intervention in West Papua and in relation to the Corby parole case. Another militant informant expressed the view that Australian issues are simply not of interest (#Mt5). In the context of Australia's role in global politics, militant informants also paid less attention to it, except for Australia being a US ally in the war on terrorism campaign; other informants from moderate and liberal backgrounds tended to frame Australia by its international role in global political discourse.

Moderate informants tended to balance their positive and negative frames more than the other ideological backgrounds. The 'intervention' frame of the Densus 88 issue is an interesting example. Though all militant informants accuse Australia of unpleasant intentions in supporting anti-terrorism, one moderate informant did not believe it. He perceived Australia as being a victim in this case because Australians are afraid that terrorism will grow in Indonesia, their closest neighbour.

Moderate informants also tend to have various sub-frames related to certain frames. One example is the frame of Australia as a multicultural country – there are various approaches regarding moderate informants. These are not only about Muslims' freedom to worship and apply the sharia, but also opportunities given by the Australian Government and growing attention given to Muslim scholars in Australia. The variety of frames for moderate informants reflects the variety of references to Australia. The citations to which they refer are from the media, their own experiences in Australia, and textbooks written by Australian scholars. These pieces of evidence also show that even though informants are members of certain groups, they still have freedom in referencing Australia.

Liberal informants tend to frame Australia as treasuring pluralism, gender equality and human rights, while for all militant and some moderate respondents these issues were 'secular' topics that was negatively evaluated. The 'multicultural nation' frame focused on pluralistic

values – equality among human beings without a single religious doctrine. Within this frame, the tone is positive, as Australia has demonstrated gender equality and less racism to Muslim immigrants than has been found in the US and Europe. On the other hand, when it comes to the Australian Government, another liberal informant criticised any regulation promulgated by it. He even thought the generosity of the Australian Government in handing out scholarships was suspicious. In addition, he also negatively framed Australia, from the travel warning to Indonesian to how Australia has followed every the US in its international affairs.

We can see that Australia is a US follower at every stage in its international affairs. For example, when Indonesia successfully held a General Election, the US was the first country that congratulated Indonesia, closely followed by Australia ... (#Lb28)

In essence, it is hard to differentiate frames from liberal and moderate respondents by way of the variety of sub-frames.²⁷ Informants from both ideological backgrounds (liberal and moderate) created a variety of sub-frames, as well as a mixture of positive and negative tones. Moderate and liberal informants also had access to a variety of resources about Australia: Australian media, books, the Internet and direct experience with Australians. If there is any difference in ideological opinion, it is the concern for where Islamic issues fit within the frames. Moderate informants tend to be more concerned with the existence of Muslim and Islamic issues, while liberal informants focus not simply on religious issues but rather on the existence of pluralism and human rights. The statement from one moderate informant explains this interest:

Australia should be aware that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim. It means that Australia must support the establishment of our nation and our Islamic values within its collaboration with Indonesia (#Md19)

Meanwhile, a liberal informant also showed his concern for pluralism when describing Australia:

²⁷ The variety of sub-frame means there are variation frames for a single issue. For example, for Australia's spying scandal issue, unlike militant informants that framed this issue as interfere Indonesia's internal matter, moderate informants varied in framing this issue as 'an unfriendly neighbor' and 'espionage is an understandable action for countries to protect their interests', instead of 'interfering Indonesia'.

We are focusing our activities on promoting human rights, religious freedom, tolerance, pluralism, and gender equality [...] I think of Australia positively. There is less racism [in Australia] than in other countries... (#Lb2)

I have a positive impression about Australia; it has no gender discrimination, it protects the Aboriginal community and it supports anti-terrorism (#Lb27)

Differentiating militant and liberal informant frames is quite easy as ideologies are contradictory. Militant informants tend to be most interested in Muslim issues and evaluate the frames through their 'religious lens'. Liberal informants, on the other hand, tend to focus on human rights, which considers everyone as having has the same rights. Therefore, both informants paid different kinds of attention to Australian issues. The issue of Densus 88 drew much interest from militant informants, but most liberal informants did not mention it at all. In contrast, liberal informants praised Australia for practicing pluralism, human rights and gender equality, but this was not of interest for militant informants.

There is one slight similarity between militant and liberal informants in framing Australia. Both ideologies criticised the two governments on the unbalanced relationship between Australia and Indonesia. There was a difference, however, on which government was being blamed. Militant informants tended to blame the Indonesian Government as being a corrupt bureaucracy – a result of democracy.²⁸ Liberal informants criticised the Australian Government for being arrogant and domineering.

²⁸ Some militant groups (not all) do not support democracy as political system in Indonesia. According to them, there is no democracy in Islamic thought (*Al Wa'ie, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, April 2013)

Table 6.2 Summary Different Frames Among Militant, Moderate and Liberal Informants

No	Predominant frames	Ideological Backgrounds		
		Militant Informants	Moderate Informants	Liberal Informants
1.	Australia's generosity in giving scholarships and Australia having an outstanding education system	Advantage for Indonesians	<i>Scholarships are just soft diplomacy*</i>	Australian alumni influence political discourse in Indonesia
2.	Australia is a multicultural country	Muslims are accepted in Australia	Positive and negative frames of Australia regarding Aboriginal issues	Australians are less racist than people in Europe and the US
3.	Unbalanced relationships between Australia and Indonesia	Indonesia's corrupt government caused an imbalance in relationships	Indonesia's government lacks confidence in diplomatic relations with Australia	Australian is too dominant, causing unbalanced relations with Indonesia

* Words in italics is framed negatively

Summary

Four predominant frames for Australia emerge from the interviewees responses: 1) Australian generosity in giving scholarships and Australia having an outstanding education system, 2) Australia is a multicultural country, 3) Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal matters and 4) unbalanced relationships between both countries in the context of Australia-Indonesia relations.

Differentiating the informant's frames based on their ideological background is hard, as there is no clear diversity in their process of framing. Through further examination of the issues attention and evaluation of the frames, though, differences do start to appear. Militant informants were solely interested in issues relating to Islam and Muslims, like the Densus 88 anti-terrorist troop, and these issues were evaluated negatively. Moderate informants used a variety of sub-frames to cover a wider range of issues – both Islamic and general.

Respondents' evaluations used a balance of positive and negative tones for certain frames.

Meanwhile, the issues of pluralism, human rights and gender equality are more important to

liberal informants than are Islamic issues. Although Australia was framed positively for its pluralism, human rights and gender quality, they tended to criticise the Australian Government in terms of international relations.

In conclusion, the strong frames for Australia created by Indonesian audiences have developed over a long period of time. For instance, Australian generosity in giving scholarships to Indonesian scholars began in 1963 and the Bali Bombing happened in 2002. Two significant frames are developed as a direct cause of these events. The framing of Australia as a multicultural country is interesting, as there is no single event that initiated the frame. The source of this frame may be the media and/or direct or mediated experience of Australia. This means that the number of Indonesians who have had experience of Australia has increased. Therefore, to develop more positive frames about Australia, more opportunity should be created to experience Australia as well as massive media exposure in Indonesia.

CHAPTER 7

FACTORS MODERATING THE AUDIENCE FRAMING PROCESS

Introduction

Previous chapters have discussed Australia as framed by both Indonesian Muslim media and Muslim group members. Five Indonesian Muslim media online channels frame Australia within three contexts: Australia in relation with Islamic issues, Australia's position towards Indonesia, and Australia as a developed country. Informants from militant, moderate and liberal backgrounds shaped four predominant frames of Australia: 1) Australia's generosity and outstanding education system, 2) Australia as a multicultural country, 3) Australia interferes in the internal affairs of Indonesia, and 4) there is an unbalanced relationship between Australia and Indonesia. There are some topic frames that have already been mentioned in both media and member groups. However, not always the same frames apply to sub-frames and frame evaluation.

This chapter compares media frames and audience frames of Indonesia Muslim's media and Muslim group members. It will also discuss the moderating factors that establish

the framing process by Indonesian Muslim informants in this research. These factors may be internal, from the audience themselves, or external from other group members and media frames.

Comparing Indonesian Muslim Media Frames and Audience Frames

Australia's frames within Indonesian Muslim media and Muslim members have already been discussed in the previous chapters. It is important to explore further findings about the frames where both media and audience are similar, and the frames that are different. In addition, this section also explores the frames that only exist in either media or audience frames.

Table 7.1.
Indonesian Muslims' Media Frames and Audience Frames of Australia

No.	Frame Context	Media Frames	Audience Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	Some Australians are Islamophobic	After the 2002 Bali Bombing, some Indonesians in Australia were threatened by some Australians (#Lb24)
		US ally	Australia is a follower of the US in international relations (#Lb24)
			Australia needs the US to prepare for a future Indonesian threat (#Md21)
		Muslim existence in Australia – a multicultural country	Muslims are accepted and welcomed in Australia (#Mt1, #Lb26) Australia's Government gives opportunity to Muslims to become public officers (#Md21)
		Supportive of Islamic issues	Muslims in Australia have more freedom (#Md21)
		Spread bad values of liberalism and capitalism	None

No.	Frame Context	Media Frames	Audience Frames
1.	Australia in relation to Islamic issues	Australia and other western countries are the 'enemy'	Western countries are non-Muslim countries (#Mt4, #Mt7)
		Country of infidelity	<i>None</i>
		None	Muslim scholars start to increase in Australia (#Md9)
2.	Australia's role towards Indonesia	Australia interferes in Indonesia's internal affairs	Australia interferes in East Timor, West Papua and Corby cases (#Md9, #Md 23, #Lb27)
		<i>none</i>	Australia interferes in <i>Pesantren's</i> curriculums (#Md8, #Md10)
		<i>none</i>	In the case of Densus 88, Australia was just a victim (#Md23)
		<i>none</i>	Australia's intervention is understandable for protecting their own interests
		Australia and Indonesia are good partners	Good collaboration in a variety of fields (#Mt1)
			Good collaboration, such as in disaster management projects (#Lb27)
		Australia disrespects Indonesia	Indonesian Government's lack of confidence in diplomatic performance with Australia (#Md23)
		Australia respects Indonesia	<i>none</i>
		Australia has an economic motive to deal with Indonesia	Australia has a hidden agenda behind its scholarships programs (#Lb24)
		Unclear problem/solutions between Australia and Indonesia	<i>None</i>
		Australia is a threat to Indonesia	Unbalanced relationships caused by corrupt government (#Mt1) and domination by Australia (#Lb24)
		<i>none</i>	Scholarships and other aid are just a form of soft power (#Md10, #Md17)

No.	Frame Contexts	Media Frames	Audience Frames
2.	Australia's role toward Indonesia	none	Spying issue is utilised by the Indonesian Government to enhance nationalism among Indonesians (#Lb26) Spying activities by other countries are understood (#Md17)
		<i>none</i>	Relations with Australia are better than they are with Malaysia (#Md18, #Lb27)
		<i>none</i>	Australia alumni influence the political sphere in Indonesia (#Lb24)
		<i>none</i>	Indonesian language is being taught in some Australian schools (#Mt1, #Mt2)
3.	Australia as a developed country	Benchmarking in many fields	Australia is a developed country, has a stable society and politics (#Md15, #Md19)
		Australia is in crisis	<i>none</i>
		Australia has an outstanding education	Outstanding education in Australia is an advantage for Indonesians (#Mt1)
		Bad guy from Australia	<i>none</i>
		<i>none</i>	Australia respects the Aboriginal community (#Md15) Australia mistreated the Aboriginal community (#Md23)
		<i>none</i>	Australia is multicultural in science and religious knowledge (#Lb27)
		<i>None</i>	Australia is not interesting as it has no significant role in international politics (#Lb26)

Table 7.1 shows that there are similar frames for both the media and individuals.

Some positive frames are: 'Muslim existence in Australia', 'Australia supports Islamic issues', 'Australia and Indonesia are good partners' and 'benchmarking in a variety of fields'. There

are also similar negative frames: ‘some Australians are Islamophobic’, ‘Australia interferes in Indonesia’s internal affairs’, ‘Australia disrespects Indonesia’ and ‘Australia is an US ally’.

There is also a frame that is *almost* similar to both media and audience frames. The media frame of ‘economic motives of Australia when dealing with Indonesia’ was slightly different from the framing given by moderate and liberal Muslims. Regarding the motive behind relations between both countries, a liberal informant stated that Australia had a hidden agenda behind its scholarships program (#Lb24) while the other moderate informant cited the use of scholarships as one of Australia’s ‘soft power’ tools (#Md10).

There are also some topics that are framed differently by the media and individual respondents, for example, the frame of ‘Australia has outstanding education’. The media framed Australia as having an outstanding education system, while a militant informant explained the Australian educational system was advantageous for Indonesians who wanted to find quality study abroad without having to travel as far as Europe and the US. Both the media and individual respondents framed this topic positively – but nevertheless differently.

The ‘Australia is Islamophobic’ frame is also related to issues of racism – there were differences in tone between both the media and individual respondents. The media negatively framed the issue of Australia as being racist; however, an informant from a liberal background framed it as ‘Australia is less racist than US and Europe’. Here, compared to the media’s frame, the liberal informant¹ seems to have a deeper knowledge about racism not only in Australia but also in the US and Europe. Therefore, the liberal informant framed this issue positively.

There were several differences between the media and individual respondents’ frames regarding Australia’s intervention in Indonesian affairs. Generally, frames from the media negatively evaluated the intervention, while some informants regarded the intervention as

¹ Personal interview with #Lb26.

‘understandable activities done by such countries’.² Another example of the different framing processes between the media and individual respondents is in the case of Densus 88. Militant Muslim media framed this issue as ‘intervention in anti-terrorism to deliberately target Muslim activists’. A moderate informant, however, framed it differently. According to him, Australia was just a victim being utilised by Indonesians to fund the Densus 88 project.³

In addition to frames both similar and different, there are also some frames that were only mentioned by one group or the other. ‘Spreading of bad values of liberalism and capitalism’ and ‘Australia and other western countries are enemies’, for example, were only mentioned by militant media channels. Some frames, on the other hand, were mentioned by all media channels, regardless of ideological background, but were not considered by any of the respondents: ‘Australia is a country of infidelity’, ‘Australia spread bad values of liberalism and capitalism’, ‘Australia respects Indonesia’, ‘unclear problem solutions between Australia and Indonesia’, ‘Australia is in crisis’ and ‘bad guy from Australia’.

Some frames, however, were only mentioned by the informants and not by the media. Those frames are: ‘the *pesantren*’s curriculum intervention’, ‘the Indonesian language is being taught in some of Australia’s schools’, ‘Australia respect Aboriginal community’, and ‘comparing relations with Malaysia’. In some of these examples, select informants had their own references about Australia, resulting in frames different to those set by the media. There is also the possibility that informants read different articles outside the five media channels being examined, or different time.⁴

There might be diverse reasons behind the frames given above. Further discussion will explore more reasons that stimulate the different frames constructed by individuals. Influencing factors come from internal processes for individuals, such as the need for orientation and embedding of personal experience, as well as external factors such as

²Personal interviews with #Md10, #Md17 and #Lb26.

³Personal interview with #Md23.

⁴Time frame excludes 2011 to 2013 when this research was done.

conversation with other group members and opinion leaders – and even frameworks set by the media itself.

Internal Factors Shaping Audience Frames

Media text can be interpreted differently by different people. Hall (2003), named the different interpretation of media text as ‘polysemic’. Subjective interpretations are influenced by internal and external factors relating to audience members. Internal factors discussed in this chapter are all those coming from the audience member’s self, such as motivation and personal experiences of Australia.

Need For Orientation

According to the earliest utilitarian motivation theorist, Tolman (1932) everybody makes their own efforts to understand their environment in both physical and cognitive terms; therefore, they need the requisite information to fulfil their understanding (cited by Weaver, 1980). McCombs and Weaver (1973) define the concept of the ‘need for orientation’ (NFO) regarding the effort of gathering information through the media (Weaver, 1980). NFO is defined by two main concepts: relevance and uncertainty. Relevance is information that is deemed important for certain subjects, while uncertainty is the degree of information about that subject which is lacking. A high NFO occurs when the importance of the information is high but one has limited knowledge; therefore, the need to access media in order to gather information is also greater.

Regarding Australian issues, there are a variety of combinations of NFO as a result of variable combinations and degrees of relevance and uncertainty among informants. Unlike other research about NFO that measures the ‘highs’ and ‘lows’ of relations between relevance and uncertainty, this research investigates how important Australia is for people in describing the relevance and knowledge about Australia under conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, the result of this research is not to discover the degree of NFO but rather to paint a picture of the interaction between relevance and uncertainty as *components* of NFO that might occur in a variety of connections.⁵

Exploring the relevance and uncertainty of Australian issues among informants is interesting as Australia is a foreign country that is considered geographically distant and difficult to reach by most Indonesians. Paletz and Entman (1981) contend that the public find domestic issues easier than foreign issues. This might be the case because of a lack of education and familiarity with the complexity of foreign institutions (Hamilton, 2010). The issue of distance for Australia in terms of location and problem might result in a lack of interest among informants. The over quarter billion inhabitants of the widely spread Indonesian archipelago are mostly interested in Indonesian issues; international headlines in the media of other countries’ issues (including Australia) are not mainstays of daily conversation. Therefore, identifying the importance of Australian issues, as perceived by informants, is a challenging endeavour.

McCombs and Weaver (1973) conclude that a strong NFO results from a high level of interest in a particular issue and a high uncertainty related to the issue (Weaver, 1980). Therefore the degree of interest (or relevance) will lead to an individual’s motivation in seeking further information on the issue. However, someone who has relevance toward

⁵The determining of need for orientation was finding the levels from the low/high relevance and low/high uncertainty. The levels that might appear were low, moderate and high need for orientation (McCombs & Weaver, 1973)

Australia is no always has less knowledge of related issue, or someone who has knowledge about an issue is not always consider the issue as important.

Some informants from all Muslim groups in the study revealed that Australian issues are important. The relevance of Australia can be considered as either positive or negative. Of positive interest is Australian scholarships (#Mt3, #Md15), development of Islamic Studies (#Md9), Islamic banking (#Md21), and multiculturalism (#Md18, #Lb27). One militant informant negatively considered Australia's anti-terrorism policy, as one of militant's leaders had been arrested for alleged terrorism (#Mt2). All informants with a largely positive view of Australia tend to actively seek information about the country, while those who were negatively invested tended to be passive and limited the issue of Australia's role in fields other than intervention and anti-terrorist action. All informants who found Australia relevant had sufficient information. Therefore, they gave their own weight to how important Australia is for Indonesia – or for themselves.

There were also informants who did not find Australia an interesting topic. Most informants stated that they did not actively follow Australian issues because there were none of special interest to them (#Mt3, #Md19, #Md 14), excepting big case like Corby and the spying scandals (#Md 23). Some informants felt that the United States was more interesting to them than Australia (#Lb26), while others said that Australia is no different to other European countries (#Md10) and that all Australian issues in the media were just about politics which were not of interest to the informant (#Md8). One moderate informant gave an interesting reason as to why he did not think of Australian issues as relevant:

Actually, I don't really care about Australia. I think it happens because we are still focusing on domestic issues rather than other countries' issues. (#Md17)

Based on the above argument, it appears that Australian issues are still not perceived as relevant because Australia is less attractive than the US and other Western countries, and also because some informants place greater emphasis on local issues.

Regarding uninterested respondents and their knowledge about Australia, some variations appear: several from the militant and moderate groups indicated that since they were not interested in Australia, they did not follow any information about the country (#Mt4, #Mt7 and #Md14). Other informants stated that they were not interested in Australia, as they already knew a lot about Australia from direct experience (#Md23, #Lb24 and #Lb26). The latter informants were interesting as it they found Australia uninteresting *because of* their knowledge about the country. One moderate informant, #Md23, had visited Australia three times, and so has direct experience of Australia. However, his experience showed him that Australia was not relevant to his interests:

Apart from it being a neighbouring country, there is nothing of interest about Australia. In my opinion, people will focus on the dynamics of political change in the US, since it will bring greater influence to the world, including Indonesia. (#Lb26)

I rarely follow Australian issues independently. As long as there is no news about Australia in the media, it means that nothing special is happening in that country. (#Md23)

Both statements above show the incongruous relationship between uninteresting Australian issues and knowledge of the issue. Informants who thought of Australia as irrelevant do not necessarily have insufficient knowledge about Australia. Another moderate informant (#Md21), however, who had also visited Australia several times found Australia very relevant to him. At the time of the interview, he was writing a book about the comparative application of sharia banking in several countries, including Australia. He found that the Australian Government was enthusiastic about applying sharia banking:

I am in process of writing a book in which one of the topics is about sharia banking application in several countries. I found the Australian Government to be enthusiastic. They even sent their official finance officer to learn about it, to Abu Dhabi, UAE. It means the Australian Government officially supports sharia banking. (#Md21)

The knowledge #Md21 has about Australia was directly related to his concerns, and he found it relevant to his interests.

Not all respondent showed consistent relevance to Australian issues. Even though some said that they were not interested in Australia, they paid attention to several Australian issues that attracted their interest. For example, a liberal informant (#Lb24) said that nothing about Australia interested him. However, in another part of his interview he talked about the influence of Australian alumni on political discourse in Indonesia. Liberal informant #Lb24 had studied in Australia for two years, and although his frames mostly criticised the Australian Government, he showed an interest in Australian political issues.

Another example is #Md10, the moderate informant who perceived Australia as being no different to any other Western countries. His statement implicitly showed his lack of interest in Australia. However, in another section of his interview he explained that sometimes he followed information about Australian scholarships on the Internet. Following this kind of information demonstrated his specific interest in Australia.

The examples above show that relevance consistency can vary with certain issues and with the interest of the respondents. Those who had sparse information about Australia usually demonstrated negative relevance vis-à-vis Australia. However, informants who were disinterested in Australia did not necessarily have limited knowledge about an issue. The degree of relevance, then, does not necessarily depend on the quality of information they have about Australia but rather their ideological backgrounds. Militant informants are more interested in anti-terrorism issues than they are in the role of Australia in international relations. Moderate and liberal informants demonstrate various degrees of interest to Australian issues. Moderate informants' interest ranges from how to manage multiculturalism, through Australian interest in Islamic banking, to the growing number of Australian Islamic Studies scholars. Liberal informants tend to be interested in pluralism, human rights and gender equality issues.

Experience

Stuart Hall (1980) explained in his encoding/decoding model that individual members of an audience could variously interpret meaning embedded in a text. These different meanings are shaped by the audience members' personal experience and knowledge. Gamson (1992) elaborated on resource strategies used by audiences in interpreting issues: (1) cultural strategy – incorporating popular wisdom, a common sense of truth and of widespread belief, and (2) personal strategy – that which simulates direct and vicarious experience. This suggests that experience plays a significant role in frame forming for individuals.

Personal experience plays a significant role in how audiences frame other nations. As has already been mentioned in Chapter 4, there are three classifications of informants' experiences of Australia. These classifications are: 1) direct experience, 2) mediated experience and 3) unexperienced. A directly experienced informant can refer to informants who have been in Australia and/or have had interaction with Australians through collaborative projects or friends. Mediated experience means the informant's knowledge of Australia has been mediated via relatives or friends who have been to Australia, or they have actively sought information about Australia through the media. Informants in this category actively seek information about Australia as they either want to study in Australia or they want to learn more about the country. Unexperienced informants have no interest in Australia; therefore, they do not seek information about it. For this last category, their frames of Australia are very general and follow popular opinion in their group.

The obvious difference between unexperienced informants and direct and mediated experienced informants is the general image of Australia they hold rather than detailed knowledge held by those in the other two categories. General images from unexperienced informants are: Australia is a developed country (#Mt6); Australia interferes in anti-terrorism (#Mt 7, #Mt2, #Mt4); and Australia has an outstanding education system (#Mt2, #Md14).

These general images have become ‘common knowledge’ in their daily conversations. As has been concluded in the previous chapter (Chapter 6), frames about Australia have been formed over a long time period such as ‘outstanding education’, which is linked to Australia’s generosity in funding scholarships for Indonesians in 1963.

Some reasons behind respondents’ disinterest in Australian issues are that Australia is a non-Muslim country (#Mt4), that it is not the birthplace of Islam (#Mt4), that it interferes by arresting Muslim activists as terrorists (#Mt2, #Mt7), and that it generates no single issue about Australia that excites or interests them (#Mt6, #Md14). Tajfel (1971), cited by Rivenburgh (2000), explains the role of social identity by comparing attributes between in-groups and out-groups. Social identity is formed by cultural values, beliefs and ideologies, and suggests to individuals that their own group has positive attributes, as well as how to act toward out-groups (Tajfel, 1971 cited in Rivenburgh, 2000). Therefore, inexperienced informants attributed Australia as an ‘out group’ in terms of it being a secular nation, and treated Australia as the ‘enemy’ for its anti-terrorist actions toward Muslim activists.

In contrast to unexperienced informants, informants with direct and mediated experience considered varied and detailed frames of Australia. The frames ranged from the general, like giving scholarships and other aid to Indonesia, to specific, like intervention in the *pesantren* curriculum (#Md8, #Md10, #Md23). Furthermore, direct experience informants proposed more detailed frames of Australia, like the influence of Australian scholars in political discourse in Indonesia (#Lb24) and how the Australian Government has given support to sharia banking (#Md21, #Md18).

Informants who had visited Australia or who had undertaken a collaborative project with an Australian institute⁶ tended to have both access to information and access to Australian friends. Therefore, these respondents tended to construct their own frames for

⁶ Including direct experience informants

Australia outside the media, which was dissimilar to responses from other informants, for example, regarding ‘Australia is less racist than other Western countries’ (#Lb26),⁷ the Australian Government supports Muslim youth (#MD21),⁸ and Australia sets a good example in maintaining a multicultural society (#Md18).⁹ Such personally constructed frames correspond to a finding from the Druckman and Nelson (2003) framing experiment – that sufficient knowledge of an issue facilitates individuals to make sense and to connect, framing according to their own opinion. Sufficient knowledge can be formed through direct experience.

Other examples of personally constructed frames from several direct experience informants relate to scepticism about Australia, which have not been framed by other mediated experience and unexperienced informants. The excerpts from the interviews below show the existing sceptical framework from liberal and moderate informants who have visited Australia.

The news about Australia will only appear if there is a sensational issue. It is a fact that Australia is not attractive outside dramatic news stories. (#Lb24)

In my opinion, Australia is ‘a noisy neighbour’. It keeps interfering in Indonesian internal matters. They might have their own reasons, though. (#Md23)

In general, it is difficult to differentiate between direct and mediated experience informants since some of the latter have a sufficient knowledge of Australia. When comparing Australian frames from both experiential backgrounds, it is possible to see a slight difference between their frames, even though the difference does not always occur in both direct and mediated experiential backgrounds. The main difference is the kind of information conveyed in describing Australia and constructing arguments for their frames. Direct experience informants tend to convey detailed descriptions of Australia with supporting facts, while

⁷#Lb26 experienced several collaborative projects with Australian NGOs

⁸#Md21 visited Australia several times.

⁹#Md18 visited Australia once, on November 2012

mediated experience informants are inclined to generalise their descriptions and support their arguments with their own opinions.

The first dissimilarity in direct and mediated experience framing is the amount of information they have at their disposal. Direct experience informants tend to be more detailed in their knowledge than mediated informants. An example is the frame about Australia as being a multicultural country. Mediated experience from a moderate informant stated that, according to his friend who had lived in Australia, Muslims live happily there (#Md12). He did not give further details about the existence of Muslims in Australia. Meanwhile, #Md21, who had visited Australia several times, explained Muslim existence in Australia as:

In my observation while I was in Sydney, the environment was supportive of a Muslim's daily life. I saw women with headscarfs freely ride the bus and train anywhere, anytime. In some universities they provided halal food, and also dormitories for Muslim students. (#Md21)

Another example is the frame about the spying scandal in late October 2013. The mediated informant from a militant background framed this issue as an 'irritant to our nation's pride'.¹⁰ Meanwhile, #Lb26 framed the spying issue as more of a criticism of the new Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, rather than in terms of 'hurting' Indonesian pride:

I think the spying scandal issue is more critical of Tony Abbott, the new Australian Prime Minister, and his diplomacy with Indonesia – rather than hurting Indonesia's pride. In this case, our President, Mr Yudhoyono, took advantage of the issue to boost national morale. (#Lb26)

In addition to general and detailed information, another dissimilarity between direct and mediated informants is the way they build their arguments for their frames. Mediated informants tend to give opinions, while directed informants tend to explore facts. A mediated experience moderate informant, who had never been to Australia but has an interest in political science and Muslims in Indonesia, gave the example of expressing opinion in building an argument:

¹⁰Personal interview with #Mt3.

In my opinion, the negative image of Australia was caused by Indonesian Muslims who dragged Australian issues into building a conflict with Islamic values. For example, there is the news story about Australia's intervention in East Timor. Some Indonesian Muslim media framed this issue as an effort to spread Christianity in East Timor, which did not make sense, as Australia is a secular nation. (#Md22)

#Md10 stated:¹¹

I don't have sufficient data, but in my opinion Australia has a strategic intention towards Indonesia, since we are the closest neighbouring country and related in many aspects. Therefore, Australia needs a friendly regime in Indonesia that will accommodate their interests. (#Md10)

Both interviews above are from mediated experience informants. Informant #Md22 constructed his argument by giving his opinion about the negative image of Australia for Indonesian Muslims. #Md10 on the other hand, who already admitted that he did not have enough data, supports his argument with an opinion about a friendly regime to accommodate Australian interest. Both informants supported their frames with their insights rather than with facts.

Directly informed informants, however, did construct their arguments through factual evidence. For example, #Lb26 argued Australia's contribution to Indonesia's academic environment thusly:¹²

Australia's contribution to the academic atmosphere in Indonesia is enormous. The Australian Government gives at least 300 scholarships to Indonesian students. Besides that, a lot of Indonesian parents send their children to study in Australia. (#Lb26)

#Lb26 based his argument on data of the number of annual scholarships given by Australian Development Scholarships (ADS). He also knew that many parents sent their children to study in Australia as his own sister had recently studied in Melbourne. Therefore, his supporting argument was based on facts.

¹¹ #Md10 has never been to Australia; the reference to Australia is from the media.

¹² #Lb26 had studied in the Netherlands for three years; at the time of the interview, his sister had been studying in Melbourne for two years.

In addition to detailed information and factual evidence, the critical frames of directed and mediated experience informants are also slightly different on several issues. Mediated informants tend to criticise the Indonesian Government, while experienced informants tend to be more sceptical of Australia. For example, those with different experiential background frame Australia-Indonesia relations differently. Both informants agreed that the relations between two countries are imbalanced. However, both informants have different reasons as to why this is:

In my opinion, our government has not yet applied good cultural diplomatic relations with Australia. The result [is that] their [the Australian Government's] reaction is negative as well. (#Md22)¹³

Meanwhile, the direct experience informant had a different argument that was related to the two countries' mutual relations:

Australia is too dominant when it comes to relations with Indonesia. They launch travel warnings easily, [e.g.] right after the Bali Bombing or other terrorism alerts. The Australian Government 'imposes' their concerns on the Indonesian Government. The cattle slaughter issue was one [example] of it. (#Lb24)¹⁴

In addition, elaborating on the internal factors that influence audiences' framing processes, there may be some connection between NFO and informants' experiential backgrounds. The obvious connection is that none of the inexperienced informants have relevant or sufficient knowledge of Australia. In other words, informants with no interest in Australia have no intention to follow the news or access any related information. For mediated and direct experience informants, relevance and uncertainty varies. One potentially direct connection between NFO and experience is uncertainty. The more experience (through direct and mediated contact) that informants have, the more knowledge they will have, which will reduce uncertainty about Australia.

The issue of relevance, however, is not dependent on informants' amount of knowledge and experiential background. The issue of relevance is related to each informant's

¹³ #Md22 is a mediated experience informant and has never been to Australia.

¹⁴ #Lb24 experienced studied in Australia for his Master degree

intention, which can be different. For example, a direct experience informant, #Md23 who had visited Australia several times had rarely followed Australian issues in the media.

I rarely follow Australian issues in the media. If there is no news, it means [there is] no problem. I'd rather follow [the] Egypt[ian] military rebellion and other news from the Middle East. (#Md23)

Meanwhile, a mediated informant, #Lb27, had never been to Australia but was interested in their multicultural, human rights and gender equality news stories. He actively seeks information about these issues and hopes that one day he can visit Australia. Even though he had never been to Australia, he found that his own books were in Australian libraries, which surprised him.

Both informants (#Md23 and #Lb27) show that the issue of relevance has a personal motive, which does not depend on experiential background. Informant #Md23 who had visited Australia showed less interest in the country compared to #Lb27 who had never visited Australia but found it relevant as his books were in the collections of Australian libraries.

External Factors Influencing Audience Frames

In addition to factors from internal audiences, there are also factors that influence the framing process among informants. External influencing factors are those that come from the environment, such as daily conversations, views of opinion leaders, and media texts. This sub-chapter will discuss external factors that influence the process of framing.

Group Affiliation and Daily Conversations

In a collectivist culture like Indonesia, it is a common for an individual to be a member of a group. As the largest Muslim community in the world, Indonesia has a variety of Islamic groups. Religion is a system of belief that gives guidance to followers on how to perceive, react and behave with regard to certain issues. Nightingale explains that, as a member of a group or community, each Indonesian will think and act in the same way as his fellow group members (Nightingale, 2004).

As a member of a Muslim group, group ideology and daily conversation with other group members are viable references to influence the framing process. Chong and Druckman (2007) supply the existence of ‘contextual moderators’, like group elites, daily conversations and competitive framing – the frames opposed form mainstream frames - that all contribute to the individual’s framing process. In another study, Druckman and Nelson (2003) conclude that interpersonal conversations play a significant role in limiting media frames. Therefore, the role of others like group leaders and other important members could contribute to an individual’s framing process.

According to Amin Abdullah, an Indonesian Islamic studies scholar, there are very different worldviews among militant, moderate and liberal Muslims, and this is largely dependent on how they attain their references.¹⁵ Various Muslim ideology backgrounds also influence the way in which each member evaluates issues as well as his or her environment. Militant Muslims tend to be more subjective in evaluating their environment, while liberal and moderate Muslims tend to be more objective and inter-subjective.

In terms of framing other nations, Abdullah stated that there is a choice of two labels for militant Muslims: *dar al Islam* or *dar al harb*.¹⁶ *Dar al Islam* means a nation that applies

¹⁵ Personal interview with Amin Abdullah on July 26th, 2013

¹⁶ Personal interview with Amin Abdullah

Islamic *sharia* in all aspects, including laws and regulations. *Dar al harb* means non-Muslim nations (Arrahman, March 2007). This concept is also in accordance with the views of Hizbut-tahrir, a militant group that wants to establish the *Khilafah* (caliphate), a political system based on Islamic ideology that engulfs all countries in the world (*hizb-australia.org*, March 2012).

Related to this point of view, one militant informant also expressed his framing of Australia as such:

Australia is a country with a majority non-Muslim population. (#Mt4)

Furthermore, when #Mt4 was asked whether he wanted to study in Australia if awarded a scholarship, he replied unenthusiastically:

I don't have any passion to study in Australia because of two reasons: firstly, it is a non-Muslim country. Second, I don't think Australian universities teach the subjects that I'm interested in. (#Mt4)

The responses above show that #Mt4 framed Australia in the context of it being a non-Muslim country (*dar al harb*). Moreover, #Mt4 also perceived Australia in accordance with his own subjective stance. The subjective frame for this respondent only considers Islam and consequently rejects knowledge of or interest in other cultures and religions (Abdullah A, 2013). In giving his reasons for having no passion in continuing his study in Australia, he prejudged Australia as being un-Islamic. Therefore, he did not seek further information about the possibility of his subjects of interest being taught in Australian universities.

When #Mt4 was asked further whether he ever discussed Australia with his leader or as other group members, he explained that the topic was discussed in general.

In this *pesantren*, we rarely discuss violence from other countries to Muslim countries. We only discuss it in general, not mentioning certain countries like the US and Australia. (#Mt4)

Another militant informant also acknowledged that his leaders had never discussed Australia within their preaching:

My leaders never discussed Australia; therefore, I don't know what they think about Australia. (#Mt5)

In addition, related to a non-Muslim country, another militant informant evaluated the Indonesian Government is also secular because it is applied democracy as a secular system. Therefore, since Indonesia does not apply Islamic laws, there is a lot of weakness in the bureaucratic system. One militant informant, #Mt1, tends to throw all fault at feet of the Indonesian Government:

In terms of Indonesia's relations with Australia, we always thought that Australia needs us [Indonesia]. In fact, we are nothing for them. Therefore an unbalanced relationship is occurs. We had been fooled, exploited. For example, Australia's mining in Sulawesi. All of these problems are traced from our weakness in regulation and human resources. Indonesia's bureaucracy is corrupted. [The] 'democracy system' should be changed. (#Mt1)

Another militant informant also blamed Megawati¹⁷ for her weak attitude vis-à-vis the US and Australia's pressure to arrest the militant leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, as the suspected mastermind of the Bali Bombing.

After [the] Bali Bombing 1, Indonesian President Megawati was very scared because of pressure from the US and Australia. At that time, one of Indonesian generals from [the] Armed Forces stated that if the US had attacked Indonesia, we would have collapsed within a week. (#Mt2)

Even though #Mt2 did not explicitly say that the Indonesian system was not bad, the way he framed Megawati as being 'afraid of' US and Australian pressure revealed his critical view of the Indonesian Government. The pressure also resulted in the authorization of new laws of anti-terrorism just six days after the Bali Bombing 1 tragedy.

Not all militant informants, however, always have negative frames for other nations. One militant informant, who had been to visit another country, seems to bring more understanding in framing Australia:

¹⁷Megawati was the 5th Indonesian President and incumbent when the Bali Bombing 1 happened in 2002.

In my opinion, building a good relationship with a neighbouring country like Australia is part of our religious values. In the Qur'an, our God commanded us to travel around the world to get more knowledge from experience. Interaction with people from other countries is reflected in the breadth of our thinking. (#Mt3)

Therefore, he advised other Indonesian Muslims to travel abroad, and to develop understanding of multicultural thought around the world. On the other hand, instead of categorising other nations as either Muslim or non-Muslim countries, moderate and liberal informants seem to understand the dynamics of international relations and its consequences for Indonesia. Some informants who are leaders of moderate groups felt that the relationship with Australia should be developed.

Within this globalised world, it is unavoidable to make friends and [engage in] collaboration with other countries. Collaborations must be made under the condition of them [being] supportive, advantageous for both countries, not exploitative and not [based on] dominance. I think it won't be any problem if collaboration is not only with democratic countries like Australia and the US, but also with communist countries like China and Cuba. We called it *muammalah*,¹⁸ relations between humans, which are strongly advised in Qur'an. (#Md10)

In order to have a beneficial and mutual collaboration between countries, #Md17 suggested having effective and intense communication with no prejudice from either side.

Moderate and liberal informants framed other nations under objective and inter-subjective perspectives. Objective perspectives mean the informant detaches him/herself from the issue and is positioned as a spectator. An inter-subjective perspective happens when the informant detaches him/herself from the issue but adds his/her own values while evaluating the issue.

One informant from a moderate background (#Md10) expressed his opinion about evaluating Western countries that were more flexible in allowing the practice of Islam through the lens of radical (extremely militant)¹⁹ and moderate Muslim viewpoints:

¹⁸*Muammalah* means engaging in good relations with other human beings without differentiating between religion, race, country, and other criteria.

¹⁹Taufik Abdullah called this radical fundamentalism in which followers will be intolerant to the plurality of opinion (Abdullah, 2013).

While evaluating Western countries, there is a difference between radical Muslims and transformative Muslims. Radical Muslims evaluate those [Western] countries because they are non-Muslim countries. They evaluate the US as *kafir*,²⁰ therefore, they perceive the US in [terms of] hostility, while moderate Muslims criticise Western domination and hegemony in world economics and politics. (#Md10)

The statement above supports Amin Abdullah's opinion about how militant Muslims perceive other nations as *dar al-Islam* or *dar al-harb*. In addition, #Md10 also stated that moderate Muslims framed Western countries through political economic approaches.

The other example of a different point of view in audience frames regards the position of Australia as a US ally. Subjective framing from a militant informant defines Australia and the US as 'Muslim enemies', particularly with regard to Australia's accusations of Muslim activists as terrorists (#Mt2, #Mt3, #Mt7). The allegation that the militant leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was a terrorist has led to #Mt3 becoming involved in the issue. Moreover, #Mt3 and #Mt7 who do not come from the same organisation as #Mt2 also believe that the US-Australia alliance is intervening by accusing Muslim activists of being terrorists.

On one occasion I met the ex-investigator of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and he admitted that there was oppression from the US and Australia related to Mr Ba'asyir's arrest. Therefore I believe that there is intervention from the US and Australia to Indonesian Government related to this issue. (#Mt3)

The two liberal informants admitted that the US and Australia were allies, and that the alliance was set up not in order to become an enemy of Muslims but rather in order to properly conduct international relations (#Lb24, #Lb28):

Most US international policy is followed by Australia. Generally, Australia's international policy is part of the US's policy in East Asia. The US military base in Darwin, for example, is a fact of this alliance. However, this military base is not for confronting Indonesia. This military base is the coalition for defying China. Both countries perceive China as a threat. (#Lb28)

#Lb28's view objectively evaluates the US-Australia alliance and does not position Indonesia as an enemy. This interviewer also positioned himself as a spectator by not involving himself

²⁰*Kafir* means infidel; unbeliever.

in the issue being discussed. Compared to the interventionist frame of militant informants, they situated themselves as targeted opponents since one of their leaders was arrested.

Another moderate informant gave a different frame to the US-Australia alliance. He stated that the US and Australia should understand that Muslims are in the majority in Indonesia, therefore, both countries have to consider Indonesian Muslim majority properly.

Australia should be aware that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim. It means that Australia must support the establishment of our nation and Islamic values in its collaboration with Indonesia. (#Md19)

This statement shows that #Md19 tried to position himself both as a member of a Muslim group in Indonesia *and* as a spectator of Australia-US relations with Indonesia. This is called inter-subjective perspective, where the informant detaches himself from the issue but at the same time adds a Muslim perspective to the issue.

Neither inter-subjective nor objective perspectives can be used as a tool to differentiate between moderate and liberal informant frames. Informants from both ideologies tend to use both perspectives randomly, depending on the issue being discussed. Additionally, militant informants do not always have subjective perspectives. When it comes to general frames like, 'Australia gives scholarships' and 'Australia has outstanding education', the frames from all informants were found to be objective since the information has been widespread for a long time.²¹ However, when regarding the more specific issues, militant informants tended to focus on several of these through a subjective perspective.

Differentiating between moderate and liberal informant frames is challenging, as both groups have sufficient knowledge about Australia and tended to have both objective and inter-subjective perspectives. However, while focusing on the issues and frames given by both groups a modicum of difference can be discerned. As has already been mentioned in a previous chapter, moderate informants pay a great deal more attention to the existence of

²¹Australia's scholarships began with the Colombo Plan in 1963.

Muslim and Islamic issues in a given country, while liberal informants focus on pluralism, gender equality and human rights issues in Australia.

For example, within the issue of Australia as a multicultural country, moderate and liberal informants had different focuses. Liberal informants highlighted Australia's consistency in honouring pluralism and anti-racist attitudes that embrace Muslim immigrants:

In my observation, there seem to be a lot of negative news about Muslim immigrants in the US and Europe. But I did not see it in Australia. In my opinion, there is less racist news about Muslim immigrants in Australia, and that is a good sign. (#Lb26)

Another liberal informant (#Lb27) also focused on gender equality in Australia, citing Julia Gillard becoming Prime Minister as a good example of this. In addition, on finding his books on Bahasa Indonesia were being catalogued in Australia's libraries, #Lb27 also framed Australia as multicultural and open to knowledge.

Unlike liberal informants who focused on anti-racism, pluralism and gender equality as multicultural issues of Australia, moderate informants placed importance on the freedom of Muslims in freely practising their religion and other Islamic values in Australia. One direct experience informant from the moderate group teased out some of his experiences during his visit to Australia, such as the freedom of Muslim women wearing headscarves to travel in Sydney, Muslim dormitories in some Sydney universities, and the interest of Australia's Government in sharia banking (#Md21). All of #Md21's responses seem to observe Australia through a 'religious lens' that tends to be inter-subjective.

Media frames

Stuart Hall gave three categories of audiences based on how they decode media text. These three types are: those who engage in 1) dominant reading, 2) negotiated reading and 3) oppositional reading (Hall, 2003). Audiences who can accept all meaning presented in the

media are in the dominant reading category. Those who reject the published texts are in the oppositional reading category. Those who can accept only parts of the text are in the negotiated reading category.

Different types of readings above were influenced by audience tendencies, including preference for accepting authorial meanings, and the distance of the issue itself. The reading process of the audience was influenced through prior knowledge of it, as well as the audience's particular experience of the issue. Issue distance means accessibility of information. A 'close' issue is information that can easily be accessed through daily experience and conversations with friends or family, meaning the audience has alternative resources for acquiring this type of information in addition to the media. A 'distant' issue occurs when the issue is not accessible in daily experience – this applies to international affairs and Australia-Indonesia relations. For these issues, the media is the main resource for audience members and the role of agenda-setting might be applied.

One example of 'distance' can be found in the issue about Australia supporting Indonesian projects. Some informants from militant, moderate and liberal backgrounds acknowledged this issue as following numerous disasters in Indonesia, from the tsunami in Aceh (2004), to the earthquakes in Yogyakarta (2006) and Padang (2008). Within that period, Australia's Government, as well as Australian NGOs, delivered aid to support the Indonesian people and their Government in managing the country post-disaster. These collaborative projects were widely spread across Indonesia, not only at the crucial sites of the disaster but also at other regions that were highlighted as being potential disaster zones. Therefore, the frame of Australia giving aid to Indonesia was widespread both in the media and in daily conversations. In this research, some informants experienced the project directly²² while

²²Informants who experienced the collaborative project with Australia for disaster management are #Md8 and #Lb26.

others did not.²³ Despite #Md8, #Lb26, #Lb27, #Md9 and #Mt4 having different experiences of Australia's aid projects, all informants agreed that, within this issue, Australia supported Indonesia in disaster mitigation and rehabilitation.

Media frames²⁴ also showed similar framing to informants' frames, which showed Australia's assistance to Indonesia. However, informants who have similar frames to the media on this issue cannot be called a dominant reading audience, as media texts are not the only references at informants' disposal. As the collaborative programme was widely spread across various locations in Indonesia, they also had alternative reference points, such as direct experience and mediated experience.²⁵ Therefore, audiences might here be classified into 'negotiated' and 'oppositional' reading groups, since they have sufficient knowledge and experience on the issue.

On the other hand, when alternative information on the issue is limited, audiences tend to depend on media texts as the main source. In this case, 'dominant' reading audiences might emerge because they have no alternative reference to the media's framework. Therefore audience frames were driven by media agenda. For instance, the preferred reading audience appeared in the issues of Australia's intervention in East Timor, West Papua and Corby's parole. All informants from all groups agreed that Australia had interfered in Indonesia's internal affairs in bringing about East Timor's freedom, supporting the West Papua freedom movement, and Corby's parole. No informant disagreed with Australia's intervention from media frame.

The issues of East Timor, West Papua and Corby offer limited access and resources. The resources on the issues involved official figures from both countries – and media also chose certain figures as the news sources. Compared to the 'Australia supports Indonesia'

²³Informants who did not have direct experience of the collaborative project with Australia are #Lb27, #Md9, #Mt4.

²⁴LPBI NU didik 200 Ahli Penanggulangan Bencana, *NU online*, 6th June 2012.

²⁵Jaringan Kerjasama Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre (MDMC collaborative network), retrieved from <http://mdmc.or.id/index.php/kerjasama>.

frame, considered ‘accessible’ by informants, the intervention frame is more limited in alternative source acquisition. Therefore, dominant reading audiences and agenda setting processes were formed on this issue.

Despite limited access to resources on an issue, the media does not always drive audience frames; this is particularly the case when audiences have prior knowledge or other alternative references. This makes them ‘negotiated meaning’. Negotiated meaning occurs when the audience does not follow all the media’s frames, but rather creates their own frames. Audience frames for negotiated readers modify media and non-media frames from prior knowledge, experience, group reference and daily conversations.

One example of negotiated reading is the issue of Australia giving scholarships and funding to support several Indonesian projects. The fact that Australia had awarded hundreds of scholarships to Indonesian students each year is framed as ‘Australia has outstanding education’ and ‘Australia supports Indonesian projects’, in the moderate and general media. Informants from all backgrounds also acknowledged Australia’s generosity. However, some of them ‘negotiate’ this frame of Australia: that it is not always sincere in its generosity (#Md23); that there is a ‘hidden agenda’ behind the scholarships (#Md10, #Md17); and that there is no such thing as a ‘free lunch’ today (#Lb24). The negotiated frame of Australia’s generosity occurred in informants’ critical thinking (#Md10 & #Md17) and direct experience (#Md23 & #Lb24).

The final category of audiences related to media text is opposed reading audiences. Here, the audience’s frame is totally different, even contradictory, to the media’s own frame. An example of this category is the spying scandal in late 2013. All Indonesian media framed this issue as Australia disrespecting Indonesia and intervening in its internal affairs. Some informants agreed with the media, however, two informants from moderate (#Md17) and liberal backgrounds (#Lb26) opposed this frame. The moderate informant framed the event

instead as an ‘understandable’ act by Australia to protect its own interests. According to this respondent (#Md17), there is no country in the world that does not spy on other countries, especially countries in their own neighbourhood. #Lb26 stated that the media blow-up of the issue had been utilised by Indonesia’s government to improve national morale.

Another opposed reading can be found in relation to ‘racist Australia’ in the Islamophobia media frame, published only in general media. No informant brought up this issue except for one liberal informant (#Lb26). According to this respondent, compared to the US and Europe, racist news related to immigrant Muslims is rarely found in Australian media. #Lb26 also supported his frame with his own thoughts that hardly any racism can be found in Australian history. He had had sufficient knowledge from other resources and his research into racism in the US and Europe enabled #Lb26 to construct an oppositional frame about Australia as not being a racist country.

The opposed reading of audience frames is not always contradictory. Sufficient knowledge and experience will help construct an ‘independent’ audience frame rather than an oppositional frame. As knowledge and experience of the audience does not always oppose the media frame, these frames could support a respondent’s knowledge and experience. It also means that the media has attributed similar knowledge and experience to what the audience has.

The issue of Densus 88 also supports the above notion. This issue was supported by sufficient knowledge and experience among informants. However, militant and moderate informants frame the issue differently. The Densus 88 issue is believed to be a result of Australia’s intervention, especially by militantly oriented media channels. Some militant informants (#Mt1, #Mt2 & #Mt7) clearly stated Densus 88 as being part of Australia’s intervention, while other militant informants (#Mt3 & #Mt4) alluded to Australia’s general involvement in counteracting terrorism.

Even though the media and the audience frame the role of Australia in Densus 88, militant informants within this research cannot be called a ‘dominant reading audience’, as media texts are not the only references they use to construct their own opinions on these issues. For example, #Mt2 and #Mt7 had experienced their group leaders and some followers being arrested by Densus 88.²⁶ This direct experience became alternative references to strengthen the frame of Australian (and US) involvement in trapping Muslim activists as terrorist suspects. Here, the militant media frame and the respondents’ frames are similar.

#Md23 framed the Densus 88 issue differently. Instead of framing Australia’s intervention in Densus 88, #Md23 framed Australia as a victim. According to #Md23, Australia suffered most in the Bali Bombing catastrophe, and this situation was utilised by Indonesians to ask for funds from the Australian Government to form Densus 88. He gathered supporting evidence from media coverage of some terrorist-trapping events, including the lack of transparency surrounding the events. According to #Md23, terrorist criteria released by Indonesian police was unclear, which could generate bias towards suspects. He drew his conclusions from several ‘dramatic events’ of terrorist suspects, which were broadcast live on television. These ‘reconstructed events’ had been deliberately engineered for greater exposure to the outside world. Therefore, #Md23 came to his own ‘negotiated meaning’ of the Densus 88 issue, with Australia being a victim.

There are also some respondent frames that were not published in the media. Some of those frames are: the growth of Islamic Studies in Australia (#Md9); Australia’s intervention in *pesantren* curricula (#Md8, #Md10); relations between Indonesia and Australia as better than Indonesia-Malaysia (#Md18); and Australia being multicultural in terms of its openness to knowledge in any field(#Lb27). Informants gathered frames from their own experiences and alternative reference in addition to opinions from the media. Intervention in the *pesantren*’s curricula, for example, had been gathered by #Md8 and #Md10 through personal

²⁶#Mt2 and #Mt7 are members of different militant groups.

experience, when the curricula were administered by the *pesantren* after the Bali Bombing 1 tragedy.

This research has produced three important findings: first, issues from other nations tend to be detached from daily conversations unless there is uproar about another country that is published in national media channels. However, with such a wealth of information on the Internet and elsewhere, it is possible to receive information on topics subsidiary to national media interest. Second, the need to access further information about other nations depends on the relevance of the issue to the audience's interest. Third, related to the relevance of Muslim audiences in Indonesia, militant, moderate and liberal audience members also can be distinguished from their own ideology's relevance to Australian issues.

Muslims Audience Frames for Australia: Types of Perceiving Australia

As has already been discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the ideological backgrounds of informants play a significant role in framing Australia. Ideological background will drive an individual's focus on choosing certain news stories and defining the ways they will evaluate it to support his or her own interests. However, further discussion also shows that ideological backgrounds are not the most essential factor in forming frames for Australia for informants. Another substantial factor is the experience that Australia has played its own significant role for framings from Muslim audiences.

By linking ideological backgrounds and audience experience towards Australia, this research has found seven types of perceiving Australia: 1) militant with no experience, 2) militant with mediated experience, 3) moderate with no experience, 4) moderate with mediated experience, 5) moderate with direct experience, 6) liberal with mediated experience,

and 7) liberal with direct experience. There was no experienced militant informant and no unexperienced liberal informant.

There are two types of militant informants: unexperienced and mediated. The unexperienced militant informants (#Mt2, #Mt4, #Mt6 and #Mt7) framed Australia very generally, such as ‘Australia is a developed country’ and ‘Australia gives scholarships generously’. For unexperienced militant informants (#Mt2 and #Mt7), linked Australia’s image to its intervention in Densus 88. This negative frame constructed Australia as an ‘enemy’, and so neither militant informant had an interest in further following issues to do with Australia. Militant mediated informants (#Mt1, #Mt3 and #Mt5), however, managed to have a variety of frames as they had more information than their unexperienced counterparts. For instance, #Mt1 framed Australia as a multicultural country due to Bahasa Indonesian being thought in several of Australia’s schools.

Another mediated militant informant (#Mt3) perceived Australia as an example of ‘*amanah*’ or ‘mandate’ from God for countries to get to know each other, as stated in the Al Qur’an surah Al Hujurat (49), Verse 13.²⁷ This verse in the Qur’an has inspired the respondent to continue with his studies abroad because he believes that the experience of travelling to many places (including travel to foreign countries) would establish a greater understanding of God’s existence and shape himself as a wiser man.²⁸ This reason supports #Mt3’s knowledge of Australia’s scholarships – he had been actively seeking information about scholarships in Australia regarding his interest in Agrotechnology Studies.

Moderate informants possess all experience types for Australia. Unexperienced moderate informants (#Md14 and #Md16) have a general frame of Australia as ‘a developed

²⁷ Qur’an surah Al Hujurat (49) Verse 13, in English translation: ‘O mankind! Indeed, We created you from a male and a female and We made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, (the) most noble of you near Allah (is the) most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah (is) All-Knower, All-Aware’. (QS 49:13)

²⁸ Interview with #Mt3.

country' and as having 'outstanding education'. Neither unexperienced moderate informants had any interest in Australia; therefore they were not curious about receiving more information about Australia through media channels.

Having direct experience did not necessarily mean that moderate informants (#Md8, #Md13, #Md18, #Md21 and #Md23) had a greater interest in Australia. #Md23, who had visited Australia several times, still found Australia uninteresting because the country was not relevant to his interests (#Md23). Other direct experience informants, however, found Australia very relevant in its application of sharia (Islamic finance) even though it is a secular country (#Md18 and #Md21).

Moderate informants with mediated experience had the largest numbers of informants for this research (10 out of 28 informants). The inter-subjective point of view of moderate informants caused a wide range of issue frames about Australia that linked Islamic values with recent global condition and circumstances. For example, the moderate informant with mediated experience, #Md9, noticed the growth of Islamic Studies in Australia. Unlike another militant (#Mt4) and moderate (#Md14) informants who were not interest to continue their studies in Australia as it was not the origin of Islamic teaching, #Md9 was interested in Australia's recent growth in the number of Islamic Studies programmes. Moderate informant #Md9 found this issue to be very relevant considering his interest in Islamic Studies, therefore, he actively accesses Australian journals online to find new articles in the field of Islamic Studies that had been written by Australian Islamic scholars.

Two mediated moderate informants, who are traditional *pesantren* administrators, give a different frame of Australia. Both informants (#Md8 and #Md10) framed Australia as interfering in Indonesia's internal matters. Both informants related this intervention to the efforts of Indonesian government to standardise the *pesantren* curricula, as Australia's government sponsored this programme. However, the intervention frame was not formed by

the other modern *pesantren* administer informant (#Md12) from a different moderate Muslim group as the modern *pesantren* applied a standardised curriculum from Indonesian government and modified it with additional Islamic subjects.

The final two types for perceiving Australia are attributed to respondents from liberal backgrounds with mediated and direct experience respectively. Liberal informants with mediated experience (#Lb25 and #Lb27) showed their interest in gender equality – specifically highlighting the appointment of Julie Gillard as Prime Minister (#Lb25) – and the openness of Australian scholars to scientific and religious knowledge (#Lb27). One striking phenomenon from the liberal mediated informants is their arguments based on opinion after examining the mediated facts they gathered from the media and other resources. For example, #Lb27 framed Australia as being a better neighbour than Malaysia in terms of conflict.

The liberal informant with direct experience, #Lb26, was interested in racism in Australia. Although some mainstream media frames generated Australian discriminatory sentiment toward the country's Muslim population, #Lb26 had a different opinion. According to #Lb26, Australia is less racist than European countries, and thus opposed the frame from the general media. He concluded with a statement that his interest in following racist issues in Western countries included Europe and Australia.

The ideological background does matter for the selecting the issue and positioned the issue as pro or against the reader. In addition, the issue of relevance drives the audience's personal motivation in noticing the issue to be framed, and experience about Australia provides additional knowledge about Australia.

Summary

Comparing media and audience frames in Australian issues reveals some interesting facts. Before recounting these, I should preface my remarks by recognising that these observations are based on a small number of interviews and cannot be projected onto larger groups. However, this sample is qualitatively interesting and invites further research of a more quantitative nature. The observations are as follows:

Similar frames between the media and audiences might occur when media text is the only information source for the audience and the audience has a similar ideology as the media source. However, dissimilarity in framing between media and audience is usually caused by the existence of alternative information sources alongside media text and the irrelevance of media frames to audience frames.

There are some general similarities between media and audience frames. General frames are mostly down to common sense, which was mentioned by almost all informants. Those general frames are: 'Australia is a developed country', 'Australia has an outstanding education system', 'Australia has given a lot of scholarships and aid to Indonesia', and 'Australia intervenes in Indonesia's internal matters'. These general frames have become developed over a number years; the scholarships programmes, for example, began in 1963, and Australia's intervention in Indonesian matters had been apparent since the East Timor disengagement in 1999. Unexperienced informants also acknowledged these general frames.

The militant audience perspective of other nations is based on two positions: *dar al Islam* and *dar al harb*, or as Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Based on this, militant audiences often but not always incline their perspective on Australia as being a non-Muslim country. Some of them also perceive Indonesia as a secular nation, since it is a democracy (a secular political system). Militant respondents also have a tendency to apply a much more subjective outlook in evaluating events around them.

Differentiating between moderate and liberal audience members is a bit more challenging since both groups tend to be more open than the members of the militant group. Variations of issue relevance and experience are also mixed up within both audiences; therefore, it is hard to make a clear distinction between them. However, while comparing attribution frames given by moderate and liberal audiences, a slight difference between the two backgrounds can be seen. Moderate audiences tend to focus on issues relating to the existence of Muslim and Islamic values in Australia, or evaluate Australian issues through a 'religious lens'. Meanwhile, liberal audiences are interested in universal issues such as gender equality, pluralism and human rights.

This study found that relevance and uncertainty in NFO is not reciprocal. It does not always follow that audiences with sufficient knowledge (which means less uncertainty about a topic) will always have an interest in Australia. However, audiences who have no interest in Australia tend not to have any interest in seeking more information about the country.

Finally, by linking the informants' ideological backgrounds and experiences with Australia, this study found seven different types of Indonesian Muslim audiences and how they perceive Australia. These types are: 1) militant Muslims with no experience and 2) militant Muslims with mediated experience, 3) moderate Muslims with no experience, 4) moderate Muslims with mediated experience, 5) moderate Muslims with direct experience, 6) liberal Muslims with mediated experience, and 7) liberal Muslims with direct experience. Each of these has generated a variety of frames for Australia, especially when linked to relevant and important issues.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Answering the research questions

The main aim of this study was to describe Australian frames in the minds of Indonesian Muslims. Considering the wide spread of Islamic ideologies among Indonesian Muslims, this study tried to determine whether there are differences in Australian issue salience among militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims. Therefore, this study also aimed to investigate the moderating factors that influence the framing process within Indonesian Muslim society. Furthermore, this study also tried to define a new type of Indonesian Muslims in their framing of Australia.

This study found that, in the minds of most informants from different ideological backgrounds, Australia was generally framed as generous with regard to granting scholarships, and as having an outstanding education system. The other frames were ‘Australia is a multicultural country’ and ‘Australia interferes in Indonesia’s internal affairs’. These frames exist in both media and audience frames. It seems that this Australian image has been crafted

over a long time, during which it has become a common feeling shared by the majority of Indonesians.

In general, there was no difference in the frames of Australia across a variety of ideological Muslim backgrounds. However, differences could be found in terms of the focus of interest of each ideological background. Militant informants tried to relate Australia to issues of Islam and Muslim existence in Australia. On the other hand, liberal informants valued pluralism, gender equality, and human rights aspects linked to Australian issues, which was hugely different from what the militant background informants did. Meanwhile, moderate informants tended to have a variety of frames on certain issues, and balanced positive and negative news tones. Nevertheless, moderate informants also framed Australia with a 'religious lens'.

This study also tried to relate the informants' ideological backgrounds and experiences with Australia. These relations resulted in seven types that describe the framing process of Australia within Muslim audiences. The seven types are unexperienced militant and mediated experience militant; unexperienced moderate, mediated moderate, and direct experience moderate; and liberal Muslims with mediated and direct experience.

This thesis endeavoured to fulfil the research goal 'to discover Australia's frames in the minds of Muslim members with a variety of ideological backgrounds, to explore the factors influencing the audience framing process, and to define types of framing processes within religious audience.

Key findings/Significance of the study

This research applied Entman's frame theory (1993) and Sheufelle framing effect theory (1999) to investigate the media frames of Indonesian Muslim websites and the audience frames of Muslim group members. This study only identified Australian frames in Muslim group members' minds; nevertheless, identifying the media frames used on Muslim websites over the past three years is essential to determine the kinds of issues being constructed. Furthermore, by comparing media frames and audience members' frames, it will be possible to determine whether the media frames affected audience members' frames.

This study also sought to apply some theories about moderating factors in framing effect theories and to classify those factors into internal and external factors. The internal factors include personal motivation and personal experience with Australia. This study applied 'need for orientation', which includes the personal relevance and anxiety of issues, in order to examine personal motivation. For personal experience, this study grouped experiences with Australia into direct experience, mediated experience, and no experience. On the other hand, external factors include group references, daily conversation, and media frames. This research also investigated the connection between ideological background and experience with Australia, which affected the formation of Australian frames.

The key findings of this study were presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis. Chapter 5 discussed the media frames of Australia, while audience frames among Muslim members and moderating factors in audience frame processes were addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.

There are several interesting key findings from Chapter 5 regarding the media frames of five selected Islamic online media outlets. The first finding concerns news tones in general as well as in specific issues. General issues tend to have a more positive tone, while negative

tones occur mostly regarding specific events and issues. The phenomenon of more positive tones in general issues occurs because there are various events and topics being discussed, which leads to greater insights and results in a deeper, more positive understanding of Australia. On the other hand, for specific issues negative news tones are more dominant than positive and neutral tones are. This happens because of the limited facts about the issue, and to attract audiences to learn more about the issue from the news websites. This finding is supported by Wattenberg (1983), cited by Lou Galician and Pasternack (1987), who reviewed the media's judgment of news based on three criteria: 'bad news is big news, good news is no news, and no news is bad news'.

The second interesting finding from Chapter 5 is the fact that *Republika*, the general Muslim-targeted medium, tends to have more 'balanced' news tones compared to other media outlets. This suggests that, as a general Muslim-targeted outlet, *Republika* tries to position itself as independent and not influenced by any ideological background. In addition, as the largest Muslim newspaper in Indonesia, *Republika* wants to portray Australia in a 'neutral' position, showing good relations between Australia and Indonesia.

The term 'Australia' mentioned in this research can refer to the country, its government, or its people. This study found that Australia was mostly framed in three different contexts: Australia as it stands for or against Islamic values, Australia as it supports or opposes Indonesia, and Australia as a developed country. According to Rivenburgh (1997), there are three possible positions for other nations in media text: cooperative, oppositional, and stratified postures. After further examining the frames formed by all five selected Muslim media in this study, the oppositional position, which frames Australia as an 'enemy and threat', was unfortunately linked to the majority of frames from all chosen media. For example, Australia's 'enemy' position can be seen from the following frames: 'some Australians are islamophobic' and 'Australia disrespects Indonesia'. Furthermore, the example of Australia's position as a 'threat' can be seen from frames such as 'Australia

spreads bad values of liberalism and capitalism’ and ‘Australia interferes in Indonesia’s internal matters’. All of these frames result in Australia being portrayed as ‘least like us’ in media frames, especially in the five examined Muslim websites.

The final important findings regarding media frames were the specific interest and frames of Australia embedded in each examined media. Despite the fact that *Arrahman* and *HTI* are administered by different Muslim organisations, their media frame attributes were almost the same. Both media outlets positioned Australia as ‘least like us’, with a huge gap between positive and negative news, in which the negative tone was greater than the positive.

Even though both *Arrahman* and *HTI* tended to evaluate Australia negatively, concerning issues and frames of Australia, both media showed some similarity and dissimilarity. The similarity was that both media strongly framed Australia as a US ally, in issues where the US was seen as the Islamic world’s ‘enemy’. The other moderate and general media also brought up the ‘US ally’ frame within their news, but this frame did not occur as much as in *Arrahman* and *HTI*.¹

The dissimilarity between both militant media outlets, *Arrahman* and *HTI*, was shown by the chosen issues about which they frequently published. This issue frequency represents proof of the media outlet’s interest in the issue. The more often a certain issue was exposed by a media outlet, the more the focus and interest of the media outlet was seen. Terrorism and anti-terrorism were the issues most frequently published by *Arrahman*. Furthermore, *Arrahman* was the only media outlet that chose the ‘Australian Muslims support *jihad*’ issue, which was not published by any other media examined in this study. These issues show that *Arrahman* concerned itself with issues related to terrorism and *jihad*, as well as the role of Australia in international forums related to the Islamic world.

¹ See Table 5.13, Chapter 5 page 139

Meanwhile, *HTI* was more critical of economic-financial issues and West Papua issues. *HTI* was the only studied media outlet that critically discussed economic issues in both Australia and Indonesia, following liberalist and capitalist values that are against the Islamic values. This kind of criticism was not present in the other explored media. Therefore, *HTI* strongly framed Australia as having economic motives in dealing with Indonesia, which was the most frequent frame found in the outlet, unlike in other media.²

Unlike the militant media outlets, which had a high percentage of negative news tones, *NU* had the highest percentage of positive news tone regarding Australia (76.40%) among the studied media outlets. Another moderate medium, *Dakwatuna*, also had a high percentage of positive news tone (over 55%) of all Australian issues on its website. Both moderate media frequently showed Islam's existence in Australia in a positive manner. Therefore, both moderate media positioned Australia as having 'cooperative' and 'stratified' attitudes towards Indonesia and Islamic issues.

NU is the only organisation (of the other organisations that owned the websites examined in this research) that has collaborative projects with Australian institutes. Therefore, *NU* had the strongest frame of 'Australia supports Indonesian projects'. In addition, *NU* was the website that most frequently mentioned Australia-Indonesia collaboration issues.

The final key finding in Chapter 5 concerns *Republika*, the general Muslim-targeted medium. *Republika* had the widest range of issues and frames in its news stories, with more general issues rather than specific issues concerning Australia. Some issues and frames in this study were only found in *Republika*. Example are the issue about sport and Australian daily life, as well as the frames of 'Australia and Indonesia are good partners' and 'Australian interests in Indonesia'. *Republika* also portrayed Australia in a 'balanced' approach that

² See Table 5.13, in Chapter 5 page 139

appeared in the balancing percentages of positive and negative news tones.³ This demonstrates that *Republika*, as a general commercial medium with a Muslim-targeted audience, tried to maintain a balanced position, which did not lean towards one Muslim group or ideology. This balanced position could also be seen from the fact that the most-cited news sources were from official opinion leaders, rather than from certain Muslim group leaders. In terms of representing Australia, *Republika* stressed the country's relations with Indonesia.

Unlike other Muslim group media in this study, *Republika* has complicated considerations in gate-keeping issues and shaping frames. For other Muslim media, the group's ideology is the ultimate factor in publishing news. For *Republika*, however, demonstrating a certain group's ideology is to be avoided. This avoidance is important since *Republika* tries to reach all Muslim groups in Indonesian Muslim society. If *Republika* were stereotyped as one Muslim group's organ, other Muslim groups would no longer access it. Fewer people reading *Republika* would mean weakening the publication's market, since *Republika*'s main income comes from advertising, which depends on audience numbers.

Comparing the commercially based outlets like *Republika* with other Muslim media generated one distinctive factor that influences media outlets' considerations in exposing certain issues. The distinctive factor is target-market consideration, since *Republika* is commercially based while others are not. For Muslim groups' media outlets, the market consideration is not important for two reasons. Firstly, each Muslim group medium already has a segmented audience; this audience consists of members of the group, or those who are interested in following this group. Secondly, the owner of the media outlet is a Muslim organisation itself, which does not depend on advertisers and other elites outside of the group.

The key findings in Chapter 6 are related to audience frames of Australian issues. There were four general frames of Australia perceived by all different Muslim backgrounds: Australian generosity in giving scholarships and aid; Australia having an outstanding

³ See Table 5.18 in Chapter 5

education system; Australia being a multicultural country; and Australia interfering in Indonesia's internal matters. The first two frames, 'generosity in giving scholarships' and 'having an outstanding education system' were common views among all informants within this study. This indicates that Australia has a stable image of being a generous country with excellent education.

In the context of Australia-Indonesia relations, respondents from all three different ideological backgrounds agreed that there is an unbalanced relationship between the countries. However, all admitted that Australia and Indonesia have had good partnerships in a variety of fields.

Distinctive audience from organisation member frames from the various ideological backgrounds emerged after examining the informants' issue attention and frame evaluation. Militant informants were interested in issues related to Islam and Muslims, and tended to negatively evaluate Australia. Moderate informants had a variety of sub-frames covering a wider range of issues, both Islamic and general; their frame evaluation was also balanced between positive and negative tones in certain frames. Meanwhile, the issues of pluralism, human rights, and gender equality were more important to liberal informants than Islamic issues were. Although Australia was framed positively in pluralism, human rights, and gender quality, liberal informants tended to criticise the Australian Government in the context of international relations.

Another interesting finding in Chapter 6 is that strong Australian frames among Indonesian audiences have developed over a long period of time. For instance, Australian generosity in giving scholarships to Indonesian scholars started in 1963 with the inception of the Colombo Plan. The frame of interfering in internal affairs started in 2002 when the first Bali Bombing happened. The frame of Australia as a multicultural country is interesting since there is no single event that initiated this frame. The source of this frame may be from the

media and/or direct or mediated experience with Australia. This means that the number of Indonesians who have had experience with Australia has increased. Therefore, to develop more positive frames of Australia, more opportunity should be created to experience Australia, through collaborative programs and scholarships, as well as massive media exposure in Indonesia.

The key finding in Chapter 7 is about moderating factors in the audience framing process. These factors emerged from the audience's internal and external selves. The internal factors include need for orientation (NFO) and experience, while external factors are group affiliation, daily conversation, and media frames. An interesting finding regarding NFO was that relevance and uncertainty are not reciprocal. Informants with sufficient knowledge (which means less uncertainty) did not always have any interest (which relates to relevance) in Australia. However, audiences who had no relevance to or interest in Australia usually did not have any interest in seeking more information about Australia.

A substantial finding of this research is that, besides ideological backgrounds, audience members' experience played a significant role in influencing the framing of Australia. Each experience classification showed distinctive Australian frames. Unexperienced informants shared a general image of Australia that was a common view, such as 'Australia as a developed country' and 'Australia has outstanding education'. In contrast, informants with direct experience shared more detailed facts that were closer to reality. Some of these informants also conveyed independent frames rarely found in news articles. Meanwhile, mediated-experience informants shared more general information about Australia. To build their arguments, mediated-experience informants tended to give opinions rather than explore more facts, the way direct-experience informants did.

Moreover, while relating NFO and experience, two interesting findings emerged. Firstly, experience reduced uncertainty in NFO. The more experience informants had with

Australia, the more knowledge they had that caused them to feel certain about Australian issues. However, this does not mean that inexperienced informants experienced uncertainty towards Australia, as this depended on issue relevance for the informants. This leads to the second finding: issue relevance did not depend on the amount of information that informants had about Australia, but instead depended on the interest of each informant regarding Australian issues.

Another finding concerns group affiliation, daily conversations, and media frames as the external factors of the audience framing process. The ideological backgrounds of the audience members played a significant role in projecting Australia in their minds. Militant Muslim informants perceived other nations as *darul Islam* and *darul harb*. Therefore, militant Muslim members subjectively framed Australia as a non-Muslim majority nation.

Moderate and liberal informants had different concerns relating to Australian issues. Moderate audience members paid more attention to the freedom of practising worship and other Islamic values for Muslims in Australia. This attention shows their broader view in perceiving Australia compared to militant respondents. Instead of framing Australia in a 'Muslim/non-Muslim' perspective, moderate informants framed Australia intersubjectively⁴ among the objective facts about Australia, and evaluated it with a 'religious lens', by focusing on the co-existence of Muslims with Australians. Meanwhile, liberal informants tended to frame Australia objectively⁵, using universal values instead of religious values. Therefore, liberal informants were concerned with Australia's anti-racism, pluralism, and gender equality values; they also criticised Australia as a US foreign policy follower in terms of international relations.

⁴ An inter-subjective perspective happens when the informant detaches himself from the issue, but adds his own values while evaluating the issue.

⁵ An objective perspective means that the informant detaches himself from the issue and is positioned as a spectator.

The last external moderating factor in the audience framing process is the media frame. Media frames play a significant role in influencing the process when they meet one or both of two conditions: audience predilection and issue distance. Audience predilection involves the need for orientation, which admits the presence of issue relevance and sufficient knowledge of the audience. Media framing will dominate the audience frame when the audience had high interest in the issue and there is no alternative source of information to the media text. As a result, audiences will follow the media frame regarding the issue.

The second condition is issue distance. Accessibility determines the ‘distance’ of the issue. An issue is ‘close’ when it is easily accessible in daily life and conversation with others. In contrast, an issue is ‘distant’ when it is not accessible in daily life. Regarding Australian issues, examples of distant issues are Australia’s intervention in West Papua and Coby’s parole. These distant issues lead the audience to access media articles as the limited sources of news.

The influence of media frames cannot be separated from the reading process among audiences. The reading process is also influenced by the audience’s prior knowledge and experience. Stuart Hall (1980) classifies the audience according to its reading process into three categories: preferred reading, negotiated reading, and opposed reading. The present study found that preferred reading audiences will be dominated by media frames when the alternative sources of information are limited. Some Australian media frames that dominate audience preference are the news article about Australia as a US ally in the issue of the US military base in Darwin, and about the intervention of Australia in East Timorese.

Another interesting finding related to the reading process is the opposed reading audience. According to Hall’s (1980) definitions, opposed reading audiences have prior knowledge about an issue that is in total contrast to the media frames. Despite following Hall’s definition, the present study found that audience members who engaged in opposed

reading did not always contradict their frames with media frames. Informants who had sufficient knowledge and experience developed independent frames, which did not have to be opposed to the media frames.

Another key finding in Chapter 7 is the development of the types of perceptions of Australia by linking the informants' ideological backgrounds and their experience with Australia. Ideological background directs the audience's point of view in selecting issues and provides key features in evaluating whether the news is in favour of or against the audience's interest. On the other hand, experience backgrounds provide knowledge about Australia that enrich the information available for shaping the frame.

In conclusion, this research produced three important findings related to other nations' issues and the audience framing process. Firstly, other nations' issues are detached from daily conversation, unless there is uproar published in the media about the other country that is published. However, with unlimited information via the internet and other media forms, detached information is accessible. Secondly, the need to access further information about another nation depends on the relevance of the issue to the audience. Lastly, related to the relevance of Muslim audiences in Indonesia, militant, moderate, and liberal audience member groups investigated in this study can also be distinguished by their ideology's relevance to Australian issues.

Recommendation/Policy implications

The contribution of this study is its identification of the different Australian frames perceived by Indonesian Muslims drawn from various ideological backgrounds. In addition, this study also explored the appropriateness of considering Indonesian Muslim audiences as belonging

simply to militant, moderate or liberal Muslim categories, categories used to describe Indonesian Muslim society more generally. The results of this study show that ideological background does influence the framing process, but that it is not the only factor. Regarding the framing process of foreign countries, the audience's experience with another country becomes a differentiator, besides ideological background.

Given the seven types of informants' framing process presented in Chapter 7, further understanding of Indonesian Muslims should be improved. Instead of stereotyping Indonesian Muslims into the three classifications of militant, moderate, and liberal Muslims, a wider categorisation of the audience is possible by taking into account that audience's experience with foreign countries.

The most limited frames of Australia were formed by unexperienced informants from militant and moderate backgrounds. Limited frames of Australia were mentioned by all informants; these frames have become 'common sense' knowledge of Australia in daily conversation. These images have been crafted over years; for example, the terrorist issue was raised after the first Bali Bombing in 2002.

On the other hand, informants with direct experience had more convincing frames, ones that were supported by facts. Even though the framing process is influenced by the issue relevance to the audience, direct experience provides the necessary knowledge for forming audience frames that largely exclude misunderstandings. Moreover, informants with mediated experience tended to modify their frame using media frames and their own opinion regarding certain issues.

The present study developed a deeper understanding of Indonesian Muslims, especially in their role as an audience. Instead of limiting the Muslims categorisation to militant, moderate, and liberal muslims, this study provides other factors that should be considered before making the Muslim classification based on framing process. Those factors are audiences' ideological background, issue relevance, and experiences that affect their

frames. Therefore, even similar militant Muslims might have different frames concerning certain issues. For example, not all informants had negative frames in their perception of Australian interference in Indonesia's internal affairs – in the case of the spying scandal of 2013.

A recommendation based on this study is for interaction to be initiated between Australia's media and Indonesian Muslim groups' media. The interaction between media in both countries would increase mutual understanding, that may contribute to forming unbiased media frames that strengthen the relationship between the two peoples. *Republika* has initiated this collaboration with the ABC network, with the presence of *Australia Plus* as one column in the International section of *Republika* online.⁶

Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research

This study has resulted in defining Australian frames in the minds of informants from militant, moderate, and liberal ideological backgrounds. However, the results cannot represent all of Indonesian Muslim society. This is not only because there are many Muslim groups within each ideological background, but also because there are many online media with religious backgrounds, as well as the broader issues of Australia related to Indonesia itself.

Further research is needed to obtain a comprehensive understanding of audience frames of Australia among Indonesian Muslims. At least, additional exploratory research is needed focusing on the issues of Indonesian Muslims, Muslim media, and Australia within certain time frames.

⁶ Madani, Mohammad Amin (*Republika Online, February 8th 2015*). ABC Jalin Kerjasama dengan Republika (ABC initiates collaboration with Republika) retrieved from <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/14/05/05/n5215h-abc-jalin-kerja-sama-dengan-republika>

In-depth exploration of phenomena regarding Indonesian Muslims and the audience framing process is always interesting. This could be expanded into three topics: exploring Muslim groups within one ideological background; the muslim groups' media behaviour; and their framing process with regard to other nations. The spread of militant Muslims and moderate Muslims covers a wide range. Therefore, additional research is essential to explore the variety of groups within one ideological background and to relate it to their media behaviour and audience framing process. The media behaviour within a Muslim group includes comparing the influence of internal media and external media, as well as the alternative references used by group members. This explorative research could reveal the pattern of audience framing processes within a single ideological background.

The present study investigated Muslim group members and excluded non-affiliated Muslims. Like *Republika*, which positions itself as a general Muslim medium, there are also many Indonesian Muslims who are not part of a particular Muslim group. Therefore, further research is needed to explore this non-member Muslim group's media behaviour and the frames of other nations, in order to achieve a geater understanding of the way in which Australia is perceived by Indonesian Muslims.

Furthermore, the present research did not explore Muslim media's process of producing and selecting the issues that they publish. However, it is important to investigate the process of Muslim media in producing the news. Unlike commercially based media, the media outlets owned by Muslim groups tend to be less concerned with advertisements and more concerned with selecting the issues that are in line with the group's interest and ideology. This media process investigation should cover the reciprocal interactions among the group's ideology, group members, and attracting new audiences to visit the website. The news editors and news administrators of the Muslim online media should be interviewed to obtain a clear description of the media framing process on Muslim group websites.

Besides investigating the media framing process, another interesting topic exists related to Muslim media in Indonesia. There is no appropriate reference that can provide a comprehensive history of Indonesian Muslim media. It would be interesting to compile a history of Indonesian Muslim media. This comprehensive Muslim media history should cover not only the chronological order of the birth of each Indonesian Muslim outlet, but also the media frames and their contribution to the dynamics of Indonesian Muslims over time. The dynamics may include the changing understanding of certain terms used in Islamic teaching, like *hijab* and *jihad* at different times, or society's growing awareness of and fight against Dutch imperialism.

The last topic to extend this research is the further exploration of Australian issues in Indonesia media. To obtain a comprehensive picture of Australian issues, such additional research should focus on either a time period or a chosen issue. Focusing on a time period means investigating the issues that were published in a determined period of time. This kind of research would uncover the issue dynamics within the time period and relate them to the context of that time. Moreover, investigating chosen Australian issues would provide not only detailed information about the production process of media text, as well as the audience framing process, but also the different Indonesian muslim's behaviour toward Australia. The result of this research would acknowledge the interaction between media and audience frames and the moderating factors involved in the stages of both framing processes.

Conclusion

The images of other nations in the media will also influence society's view of those nations. Semetko, Kolmer, and Schatz (2011) explain the role of the media as the main information providers, on which people may greatly rely as the primary resource to compare foreign

countries' issues with domestic issues. This is because people can access alternative information regarding domestic issues from their own experiences and from local media.

News about other nations in the media contributes to people's understanding of foreign countries. This role is important since most people in society have no direct experience with other countries; consequently, the only information they have about such issues comes from media content. The portrayal of a country in the media can influence the general public's views and, more importantly, it can influence cross-national personal interactions, public opinion about foreign policy, and the practice of public diplomacy (Li & Chitty, 2009).

This study demonstrated that it is informants with direct experience that have an image of Australia which is closest to reality. Informants with direct-experience of Australia conveyed more detailed facts about Australia than those with mediated-experience or without experienced. Informants with direct-experience also provided elaborate facts in building their arguments when evaluating Australia; conversely, those with mediated-experience built their arguments on opinion, as a result of examining various references to Australia. Furthermore, unexperienced informants tended to follow the general frames of Australia that exist in society. The unexperienced informants had no interest in gaining further information about Australia. Therefore, they simply did not pay additional attention to searching for information about Australia.

Finally, this thesis provided alternative ways of understanding Indonesian Muslims as an audience in the field of communication studies. The fast growth of online media and social media supports the changing landscape of the audience, especially in terms of religious membership audience and its interest in other countries' issues. The seven types of the framing process identified in this study should lead to further exploration of religious audiences in framing other countries.

List of Abbreviations

ABC	Australian Broadcast Corporation
AFF	Asian Football Federation
AIFDR	Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction
APJII	Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (Indonesian Internet Provider Association)
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CRSR	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
CSIS	Central for Strategic & International Studies
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council)
DI/TII	Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic nation/ Indonesian Islamic troops)
FPI	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
FPIS	Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (Youth Islam Front of Surakarta)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual)
JIL	Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network)
LIPIA	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies)
LSAF	Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (Institute of Religion and Philosophy studies)
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian <i>Mujahideen</i> Assembly)
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama)
NFO	Need For Orientation
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State)
NU	Nahdhatul Ulama
PII	Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party, found in 1938)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperous Party)

PMI / Permi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) also abbreviated to Permi, found in 1932
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
Persis	Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Association Party)
SDI	Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim trade association, found in Solo 1911)
SI	Sarekat Islam (Muslim Association; A transformation of SDI in 1911)
SIUPP	Surat Ijin Untuk Penerbitan Pers (Press Publication Enterprise Permit)
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Aid

Glossary

<i>Abangan</i>	Those who have minimal devotion to Islamic values, blending practical Islamic worship with obedience to other religious and spiritual tradition
<i>Burqa</i>	a face cover. Some Muslim women not only cover their hair, but also their whole face except for their eyes
<i>'close' issue</i>	Issue that can be accessed easily in daily experience and conversation with friends or family
<i>Dakwah</i>	Preaching
<i>Dalil dzani</i>	The text in Qur'an that allow multi interpretation and variety application as long as do not contradict with the main rules
<i>Dalil qathi'</i>	The divine-revealed text in Qur'an that should not be modified. All Muslims obligate to follow
<i>Dar al Harb</i>	Non-Muslim nation
<i>Dar al Islam</i>	A nation that applies Islamic <i>sharia</i> in all aspects – including laws and regulations
<i>'distance' issue</i>	Issue is not accessible in daily life and experience
<i>Fiqh</i>	Islamic law / rules of Islam
<i>Halal</i>	Denoting or relating to meat prepared as prescribed by Muslim law
<i>Hijab</i>	The cloth that should be covered all the Muslim woman's body except face and palms
<i>Ijma'</i>	<i>Ulama</i> interpretation
<i>Ijtihad</i>	Decision about solving contemporary problems that were not anticipated in Qur'an, Sunnah and <i>Ijma'</i>
<i>Jihad</i>	Normally being framed as a war conducted by Muslim countries against 'Western' enemies. But, it also alludes to one's personal struggle to overcome wrong-doing in one's life
<i>Kafir</i>	Infidel, unbeliever
<i>Khalifah (caliphate)</i>	A political system based on the Islamic ideology, that embraces all

countries in the world

<i>Kiblah</i>	The direction of praying toward Mecca (<i>Ka'bah</i>)
<i>Laskar Jihad</i>	A militia formed by Ja'far Umar Thalib in 2000 – 2002 active in the Mollucas conflict
<i>Liberal Muslim</i>	Those who possess an objective perspective that tends to detach themselves from Islamic symbols & accept the existence of other religion as equal with Islam
<i>Mahzab</i>	Particular school of thought to establish the Islamic law (fiqh), referred to the main source of <i>Qur'an</i> and <i>Sunnah</i> by the 4 imams (the well-known Muslim scholars: Imam Hambali, Imam Maliki, Imam Syafii and Imam Hanafi)
<i>Militant</i>	Those who intolerant to the plurality of opinion
<i>Moderate Muslim</i>	Those who try to synchronise both religious values and recent facts into mutual dialogue
<i>Muammalah</i>	Engaging in a good relations with other human beings without differentiating between their religious, races, countries, and other criteria
<i>Mufasssirin</i>	The interpreter of <i>Qur'an</i>
<i>Mujahideen</i>	Someone who does <i>jihad</i> to fight against Muslim enemies
<i>New Order</i>	The order of Suharto, the second Indonesian President
<i>Santri</i>	Student of a <i>pesantren</i> or religious school in Java. Also means devoted Muslim
<i>Sunnah</i>	Normative custom or precedent based on the example of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>Taqlid</i>	Following someone's statement about a matter that she / he has not enough knowledge about it

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Internet Resources

Arrahmah.com retrieved from <http://www.arahmah.com/>

Dakwatuna .com retrieved from <http://www.dakwatuna.com/#axzz3Sf7V7ZAZ>

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia retrieved from <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/>

Nahdhatul Ulama online retrieved from <http://www.nu.or.id/>

Republika online retrieved from <http://www.republika.co.id/>

Appendix



Conditions Met Final Approval - Ref. no. 5201300223

5 messages

Faculty of Arts Research Office <artsro@mq.edu.au>

Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 2:55 PM

To: Prof Naren Chitty <naren.chitty@mq.edu.au>

Cc: Faculty of Arts Research Office <artsro@mq.edu.au>, Mrs Twediana Budi Hapsari <twediana-budi.hapsari@students.mq.edu.au>

Ethics Application Ref: (5201300223) - Final Approval

Dear Prof Chitty,

Re: ('Audience Segmentations in Indonesian Muslim Society Framed Australian Issues')

Thank you for your recent correspondence. Your response has addressed the issues raised by the Faculty of Arts Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval of the above application has been granted, effective 30/04/2013. This email constitutes ethical approval only.

This research meets the requirements of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). The National Statement is available at the following web site:

http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/e72.pdf.

The following personnel are authorised to conduct this research:

Mrs Twediana Budi Hapsari
Prof Naren Chitty

NB. STUDENTS: IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP A COPY OF THIS APPROVAL EMAIL TO SUBMIT WITH YOUR THESIS.

Please note the following standard requirements of approval:

1. The approval of this project is conditional upon your continuing compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007).
2. Approval will be for a period of five (5) years subject to the provision of annual reports.

Progress Report 1 Due: 30/04/14
Progress Report 2 Due: 30/04/15
Progress Report 3 Due: 30/04/16
Progress Report 4 Due: 30/04/17
Final Report Due: 30/04/18

NB: If you complete the work earlier than you had planned you must submit a Final Report as soon as the work is completed. If the project has been discontinued or not commenced for any reason, you are also required to submit a Final Report for the project.

Progress reports and Final Reports are available at the following website:
http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics/forms

3. If the project has run for more than five (5) years you cannot renew approval for the project. You will need to complete and submit a Final Report and submit a new application for the project. (The five year limit on renewal of approvals allows the Committee to fully re-review research in an environment where legislation, guidelines and requirements are continually changing, for example, new child protection and privacy laws).

4. All amendments to the project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee before implementation. Please complete and submit a Request for Amendment Form available at the following website:

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics/forms

5. Please notify the Committee immediately in the event of any adverse effects on participants or of any unforeseen events that affect the continued ethical acceptability of the project.

6. At all times you are responsible for the ethical conduct of your research in accordance with the guidelines established by the University. This information is available at the following websites:

<http://www.mq.edu.au/policy/>

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics/policy

If you will be applying for or have applied for internal or external funding for the above project it is your responsibility to provide the Macquarie University's Research Grants Management Assistant with a copy of this email as soon as possible. Internal and External funding agencies will not be informed that you have approval for your project and funds will not be released until the Research Grants Management Assistant has received a copy of this email.

If you need to provide a hard copy letter of approval to an external organisation as evidence that you have approval, please do not hesitate to contact the Faculty of Arts Research Office at ArtsRO@mq.edu.au

Please retain a copy of this email as this is your official notification of ethics approval.

Yours sincerely

Dr Mianna Lotz

Chair, Faculty of Arts Human Research Ethics Committee



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Twediana Budi Hapsari / Naren Chitty
PhD (Cand)/Prof.

Participant Information and Consent Form

Name of Project: ***Audience Segmentation in Indonesian Muslim Society and the Framing of Australian Issues.***

You are invited to participate in a study of *how members of Indonesian Muslim society picture Australia in their minds.*

The study is being conducted by Twediana Budi Hapsari, Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies Department, +61424997899, twediana-budi.hapsari@students.mq.edu.au to meet the requirements of the Doctorate degree under the supervision of Prof. Naren Chitty, +61(02)98502160, naren.chitty@mq.edu.au of the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies.

If you decide to participate, you will be asked about how you picture Australia in your mind; what issues related to Australia interest you; what is your opinion about the causes of any problems and what might be the solutions; what are your sources of information about Australia (e.g. travel, friends or media). The interview will (*if you agree*) be audio-recorded and later transcribed for data analysis. If you feel uncomfortable during the interview, you may stop the interview and withdraw from participation in the research. After the interview, you will receive a souvenir from Macquarie University as a token of our appreciation.

Any information or personal details gathered in the course of the study are confidential, except as required by law. No individual will be identified in any publication of the results. The data is only accessed by the investigator and her supervisor. A summary of the results of the data can be made available to you on request as a research report.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: You are not obliged to participate and if you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason and without consequence.

I, _____ have read and understand the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at any time without consequence. I have been given a copy of this form to keep.

Participant's Name: _____
(Block letters)

Participant's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Investigator's Name: _____
(Block letters)

Investigator's Signature: _____ Date: _____

The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Committee through the Director, Research Ethics (telephone (02) 9850 7854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Alternatively you may address questions to Dr. Nawari Ismaiel (nwrismaiel@yahoo.com). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.

(INVESTIGATOR'S [OR PARTICIPANT'S] COPY)



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Email: lisa.cuffe@mq.edu.au

Peneliti Utama / Pembimbing :
Twediana Budi Hapsari / Naren Chitty
Kualifikasi :
PhD (Cand)/Prof.

Informasi untuk Partisipan dan Form Kesiediaan

Nama Penelitian : Segmentasi Audiens dalam Masyarakat Muslim Indonesia Membingkai Isu tentang Australia (*Audience Segmentations in Indonesian Muslim Society Framed Australian Issues*)

Anda dimohon untuk bersedia menjadi partisipan dalam penelitian tentang Masyarakat Muslim Indonesia menggambarkan Australia. Tujuan dari studi ini adalah untuk menemukan bagaimana Australia digambarkan dalam benak masyarakat Muslim Indonesia.

Penelitian ini dikerjakan oleh Twediana Budi Hapsari, dari jurusan Media Music Communication and Cultural Studies (MMCCS), +61424997899, twediana-budi.hapsari@students.mq.edu.au yang diselenggarakan sebagai persyaratan untuk meraih gelar Doktor dalam bimbingan Prof. Naren Chitty, +61(02)98502160, naren.chitty@mq.edu.au dari jurusan Media Music Communication and Cultural Studies (MMCCS).

Jika anda memutuskan untuk berpartisipasi, anda akan diberi pertanyaan tentang proses memahami berita tentang isu-isu Australia (isu apakah yang menarik menurut anda, apa opini anda mengenai penyebab dari isu tersebut, dan apa solusinya), darimana sumber informasinya (dari teman atau media, atau keduanya), bagaimana mengakses informasi atau media, dan pengalaman anda seputar Australia. Wawancara ini akan direkam suaranya (jika anda setuju) dan nantinya akan dibuatkan transkrip untuk analisis data. Jika anda merasa tidak nyaman selama wawancara, anda boleh berhenti diwawancarai dan menarik diri dari partisipan di penelitian ini. Setelah wawancara selesai, anda akan menerima kenang-kenangan dari Macquarie University sebagai ucapan tanda terima kasih.

Setiap informasi atau identitas personal yang didapat dalam penelitian ini adalah rahasia, kecuali jika diminta oleh aparat hukum. Tidak ada nama individu yang muncul dalam publikasi hasil penelitian ini. Data hanya bisa diakses oleh ketua peneliti dan pembimbingnya. Ringkasan hasil dari penelitian ini bisa diberikan kepada anda dalam bentuk laporan penelitian.

Partisipasi dalam penelitian ini sifatnya sukarela; anda tidak wajib untuk berpartisipasi dan jika anda memutuskan untuk berpartisipasi, anda bebas untuk mundur kapan saja tanpa memberikan alasan dan tanpa konsekuensi.

Saya, _____ telah mendengar dan memahami informasi diatas dan semua pertanyaan saya telah dijawab secara memuaskan. Saya setuju untuk berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini, mengetahui bahwa saya bisa mundur berpartisipasi lebih jauh dari riset ini kapan saja dan tanpa konsekuensi. Saya telah diberi salinan dari form ini untuk saya simpan.

Nama Partisipan : _____
(Block letters)

Tanda tangan partisipan: _____ tanggal: _____

Nama Pewawancara: _____
(Block letters)

Tanda tangan pewawancara: _____ tanggal : _____

Aspek etik dari penelitian ini telah disetujui oleh Komite Human Research Ethics Macquarie University. Jika anda punya pertanyaan atau pengaduan terkait aspek etik selama anda berpartisipasi dalam riset ini, anda boleh melakukan kontak ke Komite Etik melalui Direktur Research Ethics (telepon +62(02)98507854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Atau sebagai alternative anda bisa menanyakan kepada Dr Nawari Ismail (nwrismaiel@yahoo.com). Setiap pengaduan yang anda lakukan akan diperlakukan secara rahasia dan ditindaklanjuti, dan anda akan diinformasikan hasilnya.

(INVESTIGATOR'S [OR PARTICIPANT'S] COPY)

Audience Segmentations in Indonesia Muslim Society Framed Australian Issues

By Twediana Budi Hapsari

INTERVIEW GUIDE

A. How Indonesian's picture Australia

1. Name the top three positive ideas you have about Australia.
2. Name the top three negative ideas you have about Australia.
3. What is the issue about Australia that you find interesting?
 - a. What issues in the news about Australia / make Australia looks good in your mind? Named top 3.
 - Why do you think news about these issues make Australia look good? (explore the reasons, evaluations and value judgments of the answers)
 - b. What issues in the news about Australia make Australia looks bad in your mind? Named top 3.
 - Why do you think news about these issues make Australia look bad? (explore the reasons, evaluations and value judgments and alternative solutions of the answers)
4. Do you think your organization's values influence your views about Australia?
5. What do other members of your organization think about Australian issues?
6. Whose views about Australia do you respect?
7. What do you think about the Indonesia – Australia relationship?

B. How do you get the information about Australia?

1. What is your source of information about Australia? Among your answers, what is the most important source for you?
 - a. Friend who has experience about Australia?
 - b. News about Australia in Indonesian TV/radio/newspapers/ magazines/films/music?
 - c. News about Australia in western TV/radio/newspapers/ magazines/films/music?
 - d. Websites, social media and other new media
2. How much time in a day do you spend accessing the source information that you mention in (B.1)?
 - a. With friends?
 - b. Indonesian media?
 - c. Western media?
 - d. New media?
3. Do you ever discuss Australian issues/images with your friends in this organization?
4. Which comes first: You find out about an issue by browsing the internet, or you try to find out about an issue after somebody else informs you about it? Why?

C. EXPERIENCE ABOUT AUSTRALIA

1. Have you ever been to Australia?
2. Do you have any relatives or friends living in Australia?
3. Have you ever wanted to study in Australia?
4. Has your organization's leader ever visited Australia?
5. Does your organization have a cooperative project with any Australian institutions?

TRANSLATE IN BAHASA

SEGMENTASI AUDIENS DALAM MASYARAKAT MUSLIM INDONESIA DALAM MEMFRAMING ISU-ISU AUSTRALIA

PEDOMAN WAWANCARA :

A. Bagaimana masyarakat Indonesia menggambarkan Australia

1. Sebutkan tiga ide positif tentang Australia menurut anda.
2. Sebutkan tiga ide negative tentang Australia menurut anda.
3. Isu tentang Australia manakah yang menurut anda menarik?
 - a. Berita tentang Australia apakah yang menurut anda membuat Australia jadi tampak positif?
Sebutkan 3 yang paling positif.
 - Mengapa menurut anda isu-isu ini positif? (jelaskan alasan, evaluasi, pembenaran nilainya dan solusi alternatifnya!)
 - b. Berita tentang Australia apakah yang menurut anda negatif? Sebutkan 3 yang paling negatif!
 - Mengapa menurut anda isu-isu ini negatif? (jelaskan alasan, evaluasi, pembenaran nilainya dan solusi alternatifnya!)
4. Apakah menurut anda, nilai-nilai organisasi (dimana anda menjadi anggotanya) mempengaruhi cara pandang anda terhadap Australia?
5. Apa yang dipikirkan rekan anda sesama anggota organisasi tentang Australia?
6. Siapakah orang lain yang anda hormati pendapatnya tentang Australia?
7. Apa yang anda pikirkan tentang hubungan Indonesia-Australia?

B. Bagaimana caranya anda mendapatkan informasi tentang Australia?

1. Apa sumber informasi anda tentang Australia? Diantara jawaban anda, mana yang menjadi sumber paling penting?
 - a. Teman yang punya pengalaman tentang Australia?
 - b. Berita tentang Australia di TV/radio/surat kabar/majalah/film/musik Indonesia?
 - c. Berita tentang Australia di TV/radio/surat kabar/majalah/film/musik asing?
 - d. Media online seperti website, social media dan lainnya?
2. Berapa lama waktu yang anda habiskan untuk mengakses informasi tersebut no (B.1) 2
 - a. Bersama teman?
 - b. Mengakses media-media di Indonesia?
 - c. Mengakses media-media asing?
 - d. Mengakses internet?

3. Apakah anda pernah mendiskusikan tentang isu/imej tentang Australia dengan teman sesama organisasi?
4. Mana yang datang lebih dulu : anda menemukan issue ketika browsing internet, atau anda baru mencoba mencari issue di internet setelah orang lain memberi tahu ada issue baru? Mengapa?

C. Pengalaman tentang Australia

1. Apakah anda pernah berada di Australia?
2. Apakah anda punya saudara atau teman yang tinggal di Australia?
3. Apakah anda pernah ingin belajar ke Australia?
4. Apakah pemimpin organisasi anda pernah berada di Australia?
5. Apakah organisasi anda memiliki proyek kerjasama dengan institusi di Australia?

Appendix 3. Indonesian Muslim Websites

Arrahmah.com

Senin, 20 Zulqad'ah 1437 H / 22 Agustus 2016

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Bilal Senin, 30 Rabiul Awwal 1434 H / 11 Februari 2013 08:22



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Di Australia, Polwan Muslimahpun Boleh Berjilbab

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dakwatuna.com - Gonjang ganjing boleh tidaknya Polisi Wanita (Polwan) berjilbab di negeri dengan mayoritas penduduk muslim terbesar di jagad raya, Indonesia tercinta, menemukan secercah harapan sejak pernyataan Kapolri yang baru, Jenderal Polisi Sutarmanto, yang mengizinkan para polwan muslimah mengenakan jilbab sesuai dengan syariat agamanya, maka kita lihat berbondong-bondonglah para Polwan muslimah tersebut mengenakan jilbab sebagai bagian dari syariat agama yang diyakininya.

Di tengah euphoria yang dirasakan dan diravakan oleh saudari muslimah kita yang

[Jumlah Telegram](#)



Polisi Wanita (Polwan) Muslimah Australia yang mengenakan hijab (jilbab). (Foto: Mais Zaher)

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Ingin Mengetahui Tuhan?



KANTOR JUBIR

BERITA

MEDIA

MUSLIMAH

SEPUTAR SYARIAH


SEPUTAR KHILAFAH

TENTANG HIZBUT TAHRIR

PUSTAKA DIGITAL

Protes Penyadapan Australia, HTI: "Tutup Kedubes Australia"

25 Nov 2013 in Berita Dalam Negeri Leave a comment



"Usir Diplomat Australia, Tutup Kedubes Australia," seru ratusan massa Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) yang menggelar aksi di depan Kedutaan Besar Australia, Jumat (22/11) Rasuna Said, Jakarta. Ketua DPD Hizbut Tahrir Jakarta, Tisna menuntut Australia yang dianggap musuh haruslah diperlakukan sebagai musuh bukan kawan.

"Australia bukanlah kawan, mereka telah membantai kaum muslim, mereka musuh maka seharusnya dia diperlakukan sebagai musuh," orasinya di hadapan para peserta aksi.

Ia pun sangat menyayangkan sikap lambat Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudiono merespon penyadapan yang dilakukan Australia, berbeda sekali dengan sikap sigap SBY ketika urusan itu menyangkut partainya. "Sangat disayangkan sikap Presiden pun tidak seemosional ketika dirinya disangkutkan dengan Bunda Putri," terangnya.

Dalam aksi tersebut, HTI mengutuk semua tindakan penyadapan yang dilakukan oleh Dinas Intelijen Australia atas sejumlah pejabat tinggi Indonesia.

"Karena tindakan itu jelas merupakan bentuk permusuhan dan pengkhianatan yang nyata," tutur Tisna dalam rilis yang dikeluarkan HTI. (mediaumat.com, 24/11/2013)






Related Posts:


1. **[FOTO] Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Protes Penyadapan Australia: "Tutup Kedubes Australia"**
2. **Inilah Arti Penolakan Australia Menghentikan Penyadapan**
3. **[VIDEO] Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Mengecam Aksi Penyadapan Australia**
4. **Penyadapan oleh Kedubes AS dan Australia: Musuh, Maka Posisikanlah Sebagai Musuh**

22 Agustus 2016 / 19 Dzulkaidah 1437


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Greg Barton Berharap Muktamar Lahirkan Sosok seperti Gus Dur

Jumat, 03 Juli 2015 12:01

Nasional

Bagikan   



Surabaya, *NU Online*

Prof Greg Barton, pengamat NU dari Australia, pengajar di Monash University Australia, dan penulis buku Biografi Gus Dur berharap besar pada Muktamar ke-33 NU di Jombang akan melahirkan sosok tokoh seperti KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). Pernyataan itu disampaikan setelah acara seminar



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


Home > News > Nasional

Friday, 13 December 2013, 18:50 WIB

Remisi Corby Masih Tunggu Pusat

Rep: Ahmad Baraas/ Red: Mansyur Faqih

 Schapelle Leigh Corby

Schapelle Leigh Corby

REPUBLIKA.CO.ID, DENPASAR -- Kepastian remisi Natal bagi terpidana 20 tahun penjara, Schapelle Leigh Corby masih belum jelas. Kadiv Pemasarakatan Kanwilukumham Provinsi Bali, Sunar Agus mengatakan, tidak punya kewenangan untuk menjawab dapat tidaknya Corby remisi pada saat Natal nanti.

"Itu kewenangan Dirjen Pemasarakatan, bukan kewenang kami," kata Sunar pada *Republika*, Jumat (14/12) sore.

Sunar menolak menjawab, apakah hubungan diplomatik Indonesia-Australia yang memburuk menyusul penyadapan terhadap presiden memengaruhi pemberian remisi untuk Corby.

Menurut dia, pihaknya hanya bersifat mengusulkan remisi ke pusat. Sehingga, Jakarta yang memutuskan apakah terpidana dalam kasus penyelundupan ganja ke Indonesia itu dapat atau tidak dapat remisi.

"Kami sudah usulkan pemberian remisinya, nanti kita tunggu saja keputusannya," kata Sunar.

Berdasarkan catatan *Republika*, pada perayaan Hari Kemerdekaan RI 17 Agustus 2013 lalu, Corby juga gagal mendapatkan remisi. Kendala gi Corby itu dikarenakan masalah administrasi.

Iklan



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
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Appendix 4. The example in forming Media frames

Name of Frame : Australia is the US ally			
ISSUES	SOURCES	NEWS TONES	WORD CHOICE, EXAMPLE, PHRASES, ETC
Terrorism & anti-terrorism Issues (15)*	Arrahmah.com (9) Hizbut-tahrir.or.id (5) nu.or.id (1)	Positive (0) Negative (15) Neutral (0)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Densus 88 and BNPT execute the US and Australia's agenda • The US & Australia are controlling separatism in Papua to protect the US assets in Freeport • Australia supports the US in Global Tourtoring program • Densus 88 is a tool of the US and Australia's unbelivers
Australia's spying scandal (10)	Arrahmah (6) Hizbut-tahrir.or.id (4)	Negative (10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is not a new issue of US and Australia intercepted public phones and emails of other countries • Australia's international action is supported by political setting in regards to US interest. • Australia helped the US in intercepted Indonesia
US army in Darwin (9)	Arrahmah (3) Hizbut-Tahrir (5) Republika (1)	Negative (9)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US placed 2000 of its marinirs in Darwin • The US places its crusaders in Darwin • Australia asked the US for help by letting its army based in Darwin
Australia's international relations (6)	Arrahmah (2) Dakwatuna (2) Republika (2)	Negative (6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Like US, Australia covered up the number of dead tropos • Obama had discussed the issue of giving pressure for Libya with Gillard • Australia is under US's pressure about Palestina • Australia is following the US policy in embargoing Iran

* The number in the bracket shows the number of news related in the frame

The example in forming Audience frames

Name of frame : Australia is generous with scholarships and has an outstanding education system

Infor- mants	Informants' Backgrounds	Dictions, examples, Word phrases, etc	Additional information
#Mt1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A member of militant organisation and has been the leader for more than five years Mediated experience (has friends that ever studied in Australia, but #Mt1 never been there) 	<p>Australia represents western countries, including its education.</p> <p>There is an advantage for Indonesians who want to study about modernism and the western world because they don't have to go to Europe and the US</p>	Positive frame
#Mt3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A member of militan organisation for more tan 10 years, and he had important position while the interview was conducted Meditated experience (has a friend who studied in Australia), and ever studied abroad in other Asia's country for around two years 	I have a senior who undertook his PhD in Australia. Therefore I know that Australia's image in education is good	
#Mt4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A member of militant organisation for over 5 years. Never had important position yet. No experience (never try to find any news about Australia, as well as a friend who ever stayed in Australia) 	Australia is a developed country Gives mucha id to Indonesia, including scholarships and other aids for disaster	
#Md15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A member of moderate organisation, he's a student in Islamic boarding school for at least 5 years He wants to go to Australia and almost selected in an Exchange program Mediated experience who actively seeking information about Australia from the internet, since he has a dream to study there. 	I almost went to Australia. I joined the selection of study Exchange program in Australia. Unfortunately I failed during the third stage of selection	
#Md17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A leader of moderate organisation (islamic political party) for more than 10 years Mediated experience, because he never been in Australia, but he ever studied in UK for about 5 years. Therefore he tends to compare Australia with UK's situation 	Australia's education system resemblances British education.	

Infor- mants	Informants' Backgrounds	Dictions, examples, Word phrases, etc	Additional information
#Md10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A leader of moderate organisation and the owner of Islamic boarding school • Mediated experience, because he never been in Australia, but he experienced in several projects with Australia's institutions 	All of Australia's aids and scholarships are just a form of soft diplomacy	Negative frame
#Md23	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A leader of moderate organisation for more than 20 years • Direct experience, several times visited Australia 	Even though Australia's government gave many scholarships, but there were not given sincerely	
#Lb24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A member of liberal Muslim organisation for around 10 years • Direct experience, pursued his study in Australia 	There is no free lunch today Australia's alumni have indirectly influenced Indonesia's political system	