NOT EVERY GERMAN IS A NAZI BUT A JAP IS A JAP

Differentiation in USAAF bombings of Germany and Japan

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SYNOPSIS

The Second World War saw aerial warfare on an unprecedented scale. The United States Army Air Force (USAAF) had an extensive bombing campaign in both Europe and the Pacific, however, the campaign in Japan was substantially more aggressive than the campaign in Europe. In Europe the USAAF seemed determined to follow their official policy of precision bombing, yet extensive firebombing campaigns against Japan prove this policy was not adhered to in the Pacific. Why was the USAAF's campaign against the Japanese more aggressive than their campaign against the Germans? In Europe the enemy was a political entity, Nazism and fascism. Victory would be achieved when these parties were removed from power. In the Pacific the enemy was not a political system, the enemy was Japan. Not the Japanese government. Not Japanese Imperialism. Japan. In the Pacific the enemy was a people, in Europe the enemy was an ideology. There existed 'good Germans' who were victims of Nazism. While as far as the USAAF was concerned, 'There are no civilians in Japan."[1]

[1] [1] Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 696.

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DECLARATION

I, Dominic Caron, hereby declare that this thesis has not been issued to for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

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INTRODUCTION

A New Kind of War

"I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds"

- Dr Robert J. Oppenheimer, July 1945

The bombing campaigns of the Second World War were unprecedented in their ferocity; the most infamous being the dropping of the atomic bombs, "Little Boy" and "Fat Man", on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimates that the initial blasts killed over 100,000 people, not taking into account those who later died of radiation poisoning, exposure and starvation.[2] The atomic bomb was unlike anything ever seen before; unrivalled in its destructive potential. Looking out on the Trinity Test Site New Mexico, 16 July 1945, Dr Robert J. Oppenheimer was reminded of a line from the Hindu *Bhagavad-Gita*, "I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." [3]

Despite the awful and devastating power of the atomic bombs, they account for only one quarter of the casualties of the bombings of Japan. The firebombing of Tokyo 9 March 1945 (Operation Meetinghouse) killed more people than either of the atomic bombs, with

[2] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946), 15.
[3] James A. Hiya, "The Gita of J. Robert Oppenheimer," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 144 (2) (2000) : 123.

an estimated death toll of 100,000 people.[4] This catastrophic figure can largely be attributed to the widespread use of incendiary bombs. The United States Army Air Force (USAAF) had made extensive research into the use of incendiary bombs against Japan in an effort to maximise the destructive impact on their cities.[5] This research, coupled with the lessons USAAF had learned in their joint attacks with the British Royal Air Force (RAF) on German cities meant that these fire-bombings were both efficient and devastating.[6] To put this scale of destruction in context, Operation Meetinghouse killed many people as the two deadliest Allied fire-bombings in the European theatre, Hamburg (Operation Gomorrah) and Dresden, combined.[7]

The USAAF's official policy during the Second World War was precision bombing; the targeted bombing of selected military targets in an effort to maximise disruption to the enemy while minimizing collateral damage. The USAAF made no changes to this policy during the Second World War, yet more civilian died in one year of bombing Japan than in three years of USAAF bombings in Germany. Despite taking place over a notably shorter period of time the bombings in Japan had more casualties as a result of the adoption of area bombing techniques, specifically the use of incendiary bombs on civilian neighbourhoods.

This paper will explore USAAF differentiation between Japanese and German targets in their bombing campaigns. The notable shift from the USAAF policy of precision bombing to a model that more closely resembled the RAF's practice of terror bombing is

[4] Conrad C. Crane, *American Airpower in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians and Oil* (USA, University Press of Kansas, 2016), 174-175.
[5] Michael Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 109-110.
[6] *USSBS Summary Report (Pacific War)*, 92-93.
[7] Max Hastings, *Inferno: The World at War 1939-1945* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 616.

arguably the most notable difference. During the Second World War there were no official changes made to the USAAF bombing policy, yet there is a notable difference in the bombings of German and Japanese cities. In Europe the Americans eschewed the British strategy of terror bombing focusing on precision bombing of military targets. While the RAF largely used incendiary bombs in joint operations like Operation Gomorrah, the USAAF largely kept to high explosives, better suited to precision bombing.

While precision bombing was far from accurate, the difference between precision and terror bombing lies in whether civilian casualties are collateral damage or whether civilians are deliberately targeted as a means of weakening morale. The USAAF blurred the lines between terror and precision bombing in the bombing of Dresden in February 1945, using both incendiary and explosive ordinances. However, less than a month later in Tokyo the USAAF openly employed firebombing techniques intended to create untameable conflagrations, in defiance of their precision bombing policy.[8] Similarly, the use of not one but two atomic bombs, weapons of unparalleled and indiscriminate annihilation, reveal the USAAF's lack of regard for the policy of precision bombing in the war against Japan.

The widespread use of incendiary bombs in Japan, and the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the most significant acts of USAAF differentiation. There has been extensive research exploring the use of the atomic bomb, giving the atomic bomb a deep and rich a historiography. While the bomb had not been completed by the time Germany had surrendered, there has been much debate about whether or not America would have been willing to drop an atomic bomb on Germany. There are the questions as to

[8] A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?* (Great Britian: Bloomsbury, 2006), 17.

why the United States used the atomic bomb on Japan. There are also questions of whether or not the United States should have given the Japanese a longer period of time to respond to the bombing of Hiroshima before the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. These questions and many more have been debated relentlessly since the end of the war. Historians will continue to debate the use of the atomic bomb, but the bomb will not be the focus of this thesis. While it would do a disservice to completely ignore the use of the atomic bomb, the focus of this paper is the identifiable differentiation in USAAF bombings of Japan and Germany, not to raise counterfactuals about if the United States would have used an atomic bomb on Germany. This essay will focus on the USAAF's shift from precision to area bombing and the use of firebombing in Japan and Germany.

The American people's understanding of their enemies and the wars they were fighting identify a clear cultural differentiation. The war in Europe was one that was fought to stop the spread of Nazism, a conflict against a political ideology, the conflict was not personal but was their duty. The war in the Pacific was not against a political party, it was not to stop imperialism; the war was fought against Japan and her people. The war in the Pacific was a personal vendetta for the American people as a result of long standing tensions between the two nations, compounded by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. While the enemy in Europe was an ideology the enemy in the Pacific was a people. It is likely that race was a factor in this understanding, but this is very difficult to prove as most military documents are written in such a way that motivations are hard to discern. However, the policies and strategies of the USAAF coupled with American social and cultural views on the enemy can help identify this differentiation.

This thesis will identify differentiation in the USAAF bombings of Germany and Japan and the reasons for these differences. While historians of the bombing campaigns of the Second World War often acknowledge that the bombing war in Japan was more violent than in Germany, there has been little comparative analysis to determine reasons for this differentiation. Historians such as Michael Sherry, Ronald Schaffer and Conrad Crane have all written extensively about both bombing campaigns, and have acknowledged the differences between the two, but there has not yet been an extensive comparison of the differentiation in the two campaigns. Other historians, including Yuki Tanaka and Robert Moeller, have written extensively about one side of the bombing campaign but have not examined why one was different from the other. In recent years historians like Young and A.C. Grayling have placed the bombing campaign in a moral and/or legal context. This paper will attempt to eschew any questions of morality and instead seek to find the reasons for differentiation without passing judgement.

John Dower's seminal *War Without Mercy* (1986) provides an in-depth analysis of the treatment of and cultural attitudes towards the Japanese in the Second World War. Dower identifies cultural attitudes towards the Japanese and correlates this with military strategy and actions on the warfront. This thesis will employ Dower's methodological approach of using cultural evidence to understand military actions and apply it to a comparative study of the differentiation of Japanese and Germans by the USAAF in their bombing campaigns of the Second World War. This research will use both military and social elements in order to identify causes of differentiation. While military evidence can provide information about the outcomes of this differentiation, social and cultural factors can identify elements which influenced this outcome, such as perceptions of the conflict and racial attitudes.

This thesis will draw from the Strategic Bombing Survey reports in order to make quantitative analysis of USAAF differentiation between Japan and Germany. The Survey provides an enormous wealth of statistics on both theatres of the conflict and are thus an irreplaceable source in this research. Very few USAAF Generals have written about their experience in the Second World War, however, General Curtis LeMay did write a biography titles *Mission With LeMay* in which he reflects on and justifies his actions during the war. Similarly 'Hap' Arnold's War Diaries provide an insight into his perspective on events as they were unfolding. USAAF Mission Reports provide more raw figures but offer little qualitative information, thus they have been included in this research but not to a great extent. Using Dower's methodology, this paper will make use of films, magazines and other cultural artefacts to identify social attitudes held by the American people which will then be used to place the military documents in a larger context.

This thesis will assess differentiation in USAAF bombings of Germany and Japan and identify how and why these differentiations occurred:

- Chapter one of this thesis will examine the history and culture of the USAAF, including the interwar period, training and the presence of Douhetian and Clausewitzian ideas of total war, observe the role of the USAAF in Europe and the Pacific and identify changes to bombing policy and the key figures who shaped these policies.

- Chapter two will identify the social and cultural attitudes of the American people towards Japanese and Germans during the Second World War. These cultural attitudes will then be examined in the context of military strategy and actions on the warfront.

- Chapter three will identify quantitative differences between the bombing campaigns in Japan and Germany. This chapter will compare numbers of casualties, tons of ordinance dropped and length of the campaigns to identify differentiation between the two campaigns.

- The final chapter will explain how USAAF policy changed over the course of the war and identify technological and cultural influences affecting this change. This chapter will also look at overarching issues and influences which shaped USAAF policies throughout the war.

CHAPTER 1

The USAAF and the Evolution of Strategic Bombing in the 20th Century

> "There won't be any hesitation about bombing civilians"
>
> - USAF Chief of Staff George Marshall, November 1941

Arguably the most significant technological development of the 20th century was the invention of the airplane. Taking to the skies, man was no longer bound to the tedious vehicles of land and sea; the airplane revolutionised transport, providing a faster, more efficient way to travel. The introduction of the airplane also revolutionised mankind's ability to wage war. The First World War saw the tentative introduction of planes into warfare with both sides employing aerial bombing by wars end. However, at this time planes were largely ineffective as people struggled to find ways to use this new and evolving technology. It is not until the interwar period that we see the development a more efficient and devastating style of warfare that would dominate the Second World War.[9] The British 'humane bombings' in Iraq in the 1920s established the precedent for aerial bombing as a means of subduing enemy civilians and crippling morale.[10] The British Royal Air Force (RAF) proceeded to make use of bombing as a means of subduing resistance

[9] Eric Dorn Brose, *A History of Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5.
[10] Y. Tanaka, "British 'Humane Bombing' in Iraq during the Interwar Years" in *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History*, eds. Yuki Tananka and Marilyn B. Young (New York: The New Press, 2009), 13.

across the Empire.[11] Despite the RAF's preparedness to use bombs on British subjects, their actions created little controversy among the Allied nations. It was not until the Italian bombing of Addis Ababa in 1936, and the Luftwaffe's bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War in 1937, that controversy regarding the morality of bombing civilians emerged.[12]

The introduction of planes and the development of aerial warfare was a catalyst for rethinking of modern warfare. With the introduction of aerial warfare, militaries were presented with a new way of waging war, one that could reach deep into enemy territory and strike them at their very heart. In the past, causing large scale disruptions to an enemy's military or industry required an invasion or at the very least the employment of saboteurs. With the advent of aerial warfare, planes were able to fly into enemy territory, bomb military or industrial targets and return home all within the space of a single night. Planes were also able to provide better reconnaissance than traditional forms of scouting; their ability to survey areas from high altitudes coupled with their speed made them invaluable.[13] Attacks from the sky came with little warning and were difficult to avoid, allowing for surprising and devastating attacks. Planes were able to cover large distances in a relatively short period of time, were much harder to detect than an approaching army and able to ignore difficult terrain as well as other obstacles that would impede a land army. Aerial attacks did have their shortcomings, most notably their indiscriminate nature; even so called precision bombing was largely inaccurate and had a high chance of collateral damage. A bomb dropped from a moving plane at 30,000 feet is hardly an accurate weapon.

[11] Y. Tanaka, "Introduction" in *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History*, eds. Yuki Tananka and Marilyn B. Young (New York: The New Press, 2009), 2.
[12] A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?* (Great Britian: Bloomsbury, 2006), 134.
[13]Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945,Volume I: Preparations* (East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press Lt, 2006), 221.

The indiscriminate nature of bombing raised a series of questions for military strategists. Were civilian losses acceptable and if so, how many civilian losses were acceptable? In a state of war, could civilian workers be considered military targets? The United States Army Air Force's (USAAF) understanding of the changing nature of warfare and the role of air power came primarily from the battlefields of the First World War.[14] Military strategists saw that across the Western Front hundreds of thousands of men died squabbling over insignificant amounts of land, making petty gains, only to lose that same land the next week. The glacial pace of trench warfare, coupled with the enormous losses suffered, pushed military strategists to search for ways to avoid recreating the stalemate of the Western Front. Several strategists saw the introduction of aerial warfare as one successful way to avoid future stalemates, notably an Italian General named Giulio Douhet. Douhet had been formulating doctrines of air strategy even before the First World War, drawing heavily from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz's iconic text *On War*.[15]

Clausewitz believed that war, at its most basic nature, was one nation projecting its power over another to achieve its own ends; "War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."[16] Clausewitz sought to view war stripped bare of all its grandeur and horror, to see not only for what it was, but ultimately, what war could be in its purest form. Clausewitz also created the idea of "total war", the mobilisation of an entire nation behind a singular war effort. He divided the nation's war effort into two fronts; the battle front where the military wages war against the enemy, and the home front where the

[14] Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 18.
[15] *Ibid*, 20.
[16] General Carl von Clausewitz, transl. Colonel J.J. Graham, *On War: The Complete Edition* (Maryland: Wildside Press, 2009), 13.

civilians of the nation produce resources which support and supply the military.[17] Each front is dependent on the other to ensure the nation's ability to wage war. If the battle front fails then the home front will surely be invaded, while if the home front collapses or is unable to adequately supply the battle front then the military will be unable to continue.

Giulio Douhet incorporated Clausewitzian ideas of total war into his own theories and concluded that in a state of total war, civilians were part of the war effort and thus were legitimate targets of strategic bombing. With the rise of air power, warring nations could now reach into their enemies' heartland and attack the home front directly. Douhet argued that while airpower had been supplementary to the army and navy, aircraft would play a significant military role in the future. For this reason he advocated the creation of an independent air force, which would co-operate with the army and navy while answering to neither.[18] This idea resonated with high ranking USAAF staff including Generals Arthur and LeMay, who believed the USAAF should not answer to army staffers who did not understand the full potential of aerial warfare.[19] Douhet, like Clausewitz, disregarded questions of morality in an effort to determine the true potential of aerial warfare. Douhet believed that the ultimate potential of aerial warfare would be the crippling of enemy cities through the use of high explosives and biological weapons. These methods would cause extensive disruption to the production of wartime materiel and result in the collapse of the home front; allowing a nation to claim victory without the heavy battlefield losses seen in the First World War. Douhet saw bombing as a means of weakening enemy morale and crippling their industries.[20] He believed that with the evolution of total war, the loss of

[17] *Ibid*, 14.
[18] Giulio Douhet, eds. Joseph Patrick Harahan & Richard H. Kohn, *The Command of the Air* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 10.
[19] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinlay Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 328.
[20] Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 7-10.

civilian lives would be viewed the same as the loss of soldiers' lives. Douhet argued that the loss of a soldier's life was of greater significance than a civilian's, questioning the "peculiar traditional notion" whereby people will "weep to hear of a few women and children killed" while "unmoved to hear of thousands of soldiers killed in action."[21] As soldiers are well-trained and capable, Douhet believed that the lives of soldiers "should be considered to have the maximum individual value in the general economy of humanity." [22]

Almost all of the high ranking members of the USAAF had been exposed to Douhetian strategy at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) which made continued use of Douhet's writings over the course of the interwar period.[23] Part 1 of Douhet's *The Command of the Air* was used by the ACTS from 1923, having been translated into English only months after its publication in Italian. As Douhet continued his writings into the 1930's the ACTS continued to acquire translations and even made their own translations of Douhet's work which had previously only been translated into French.[24] General Carl 'Toohey' Spaatz, who attended the college in 1925, recalled that most if not all of his contemporaries had read Douhet's work. The behaviour of the USAAF during the Second World War, most notably the XX and XXI air forces under General Curtis LeMay, suggests the influence of Douhetian strategy. The presence of Douhetian military thinking as well as adherence to theories of total war is further implied by the ACTS extensive use of Clausewitz's *On War*.[25] In the interwar period, Clausewitzian ideology was held in high esteem by many military schools including the ACTS and the USAAF. The presence of both Clausewitzian and Douhetian ideologies in the education of senior USAAF staff reinforced the ideology of total war and importance of an air force in such a conflict. The

[21] Ibid, 195.
[22] Ibid. 193.
[23] Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement*, 23.
[24] Ibid, 24.
[25] Ibid, 24.

ideology of total war as represented in Douhet's writings can be seen in USAAF strategies involving the use of bombers to disrupt and cripple enemy manufacturing. We can further see the influence of Douhetian ideology in the inherently offensive nature of USAAF's strategies. Though Douhet truly believed in the offensive potential of an air force, he saw an air force a powerful weapon and not a tool for defense. How can one drop bombs in a defensive manner?[26]

It is this culture of total war and Douhetian military ideologies that forged the men who would lead the USAAF into a new age of air power dominance during the Second World War. These men were not typical military leaders, most of them hailed from middle class families, not from the political and military elite. Aerial warfare was a new concept, requiring fundamentally different thinking to traditional strategies of the Army and Navy. Far from the lustre of familial dynasties, General James 'Jimmy' Doolittle, was the son of a carpenter, while General Curtis E. LeMay grew up in suburbia in Ohio and 'Toohey' Spaatz' family published a weekly rural newspaper.[27] These men were not like the Generals found in the other arms of the military, with a few exceptions, most of them had not seen active service. Instead, the generals of the USAAF were young, keen pilots who were willing to push their planes to the limits. While they had not seen active service, this by no means meant that they were incapable pilots; the generals of the USAAF were experienced airmen, many of whom had broken flight records and pushed people's understanding of planes.[28] It could be said that these men had more in common with daredevils and stuntmen than other generals. This difference, coupled with Douhetian teachings that an air force should operate independently of the army and navy, meant that the Generals of the USAAF

[26] Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 11.
[27] Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement*, 8.
[28] *Ibid*, 8-10

often did not integrate much with other Generals during the war and instead chased their own agendas. While the USAAF was technically a subset of the US Army, even before the war the USAAF and its commanders stood apart from traditional military culture.

During the interwar period, the USAAF suffered the greatest rate of losses of any of the American armed forces. Flying was dangerous business and the combination of poor technology, lack of experience and human error resulted in a high number of accidents among the newer recruits of the USAAF, many of which proved fatal. General Ira C. Eaker said it was hard to recall a month, sometimes even a week when the USAAF did not lose someone to a training accident.[29] Being a small and specialised organisation, many of the army flyers were close, and it was not uncommon to have friends join up together. These losses began taking their toll on both the men and their commanders. Eaker believed that the constant presence of death, even during peace time, meant that the commanders of the USAAF were more prepared for the losses of wartime than their civilian leaders. In one incident General Doolittle was serving as a flying instructor when one of his men's plane crashed, killing the pilot. Seemingly unperturbed by the burning wreckage Doolittle turned to his students and called for the next man to step up. When asked by his fellow instructor how he could be so indifferent to the death of one of their own, Doolittle replied that while he would grieve for the boy's death later that night his first job was to make flyers out of those who were still alive.[30] This looming presence of death almost certainly affected not only how the men saw the loss of lives among their own, but also the way they viewed the value of the enemy's lives and the lives of enemy civilians. If men like Doolittle were able to overlook the loss of lives of their own men ("boys", in their own words), then how would they feel about the loss of enemy lives? These men had been educated in

[29] *Ibid*, 16.
[30] *Ibid*, 16-18.

Clausewitzian and Douhetian military ideologies of total war, taught that enemy civilians were a part of the war effort and are justifiable targets. These men had seen the repeated loss of their own men during peace-time and would see even greater losses come wartime. It is easy to see how these factors could contribute to the USAAF's preparedness to view civilian losses as acceptable collateral.

Having been dragged into the war in the Pacific by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and into Europe by Hitler's declaration of war, the United States found itself fighting a war on opposite sides of the globe. The United States had to choose carefully where they would allocate their troops. Initially a significant portion of the USAAF's resources were sent to fight in Europe. While this best suited Allied strategy, the military knew the American people wanted revenge for Pearl Harbor, wanted retribution. President Roosevelt himself had expressed on several occasions his desire to bomb Japan.[31] Thus, the Doolittle Raid was born, America's retaliation against the Japanese to pacify the American people before the long march across the Pacific could begin and the bombers were turned towards Europe. On April 18 1942 the USAAF launched sixteen planes from the *USS Hornet* targeting military and industrial sites in Tokyo and Osaka. The raid itself did very little damage to the Japanese war industry. Hundreds of people were injured, though the attack killed less than fifty people as the Doolittle Raid largely followed the USAAF's policy of precision bombing, with the planes flying low and attacking military and industrial targets. [32] Despite its negligible impact on the Japanese war effort, the Doolittle Raid did have a significant impact on Japanese morale. The Japanese were afraid, their nation was threatened and was vulnerable to attack from the enemy. Not only did the raid

[31] Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against The Sun: The American War With Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 153.
[32] *Ibid*, 154.

lower the Japanese morale, but it successfully bolstered the morale of the American people. Justice had prevailed and the American Armed forces were taking the fight to the Japanese.[33]

After the Doolittle Raid, the USAAF turned its attention away from the Pacific, towards Europe. With the war in the Pacific being spearheaded by the Army and Navy, the USAAF turned its attention to the VIII Air Force in Europe. There the VIII worked alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF), however, this partnership was not without its problems. The USAAF and the RAF had very different positions on the use of precision bombing as opposed to area bombing. The RAF was quite prepared to bomb German cities and civilians to weaken the German war effort, both by disrupting the nation and by weakening the morale of the people. However, this style of terror bombing was at odds with the USAAF's policy of precision bombing. That is not to say that the USAAF were unwilling to accept civilian casualties or refused to accept collateral damage, precision bombing was far from precise, but the USAAF was not prepared to accept the razing a whole German neighbourhood to destroy one factory. As was the case with the Doolittle Raid, the USAAF were aware that there would be civilian losses as a result of their attacks, but were loath to plan an operation where civilians would be the primary target. It should be noted that this policy of precision bombing was defended not on moral grounds, but on its strategic value.[34] 'Toohey' Spaatz, the first Commander of the VIII Air Force, had said that it was for neither moral nor religious reasons that he did not pursue the use of terror bombing, but rather because he truly believed that targeted strikes against sites of military or industrial significance would more effective at disrupting the war effort than wanton

[33] Sherry, *Air Power*, 122.
[34] Ronald Schaffer, "American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians," *The Journal of American History* 67 (2) (1980) : 319.

destruction. This does not mean the USAAF was unaware of the importance of their perceived morality on the home front. 'Hap' Arnold told Eaker in June 1943 that it was important that the American people had faith in their way of waging war and that the people felt that the USAAF was not conflicting with the morals of the American public.[35] This conversation took place one month before Operation Gomorrah, when the RAF and USAAF bombed the city of Hamburg, razing the city and killing upwards of 45,000 people. The USAAF, in an attempt to adhere to their policy and keep the American people happy largely targeted military and industrial sites. Meanwhile the RAF made extensive use of incendiary bombs, the resulting firestorm crippling the city in a way American precision bombing did not.[36] The USAAF held the support of the American people through most of the bombing campaign in Europe, with one notable exception, Dresden.

When the USAAF and RAF bombed the city of Dresden in February 1945, the USAAF played a significant role in the firebombing and destruction of the city. The USAAF as well as employing precision bombing techniques also made use of firebombs in a blurring of precision and area bombing strategies. There was massive public outcry in both the United States and Britain condemning the bombings as violent and excessive. The bombing of Dresden was the last major bombing undertaken by the USAAF in the European theatre. While the attack did take place only months before the German surrender, the public backlash against the bombing discouraged the USAAF from any other major actions in Europe.[37] Just as Arnold had feared, the USAAF's actions in Europe had come into conflict with the American people's morality. Despite the American people's disenchantment with the USAAF, Arnold still though of he and his men as a force for good

[35] Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement*, 36-37.
[36] Conrad C. Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians and Oil* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 142-143.
[37] Sherry, *Air Power*, 262-263.

in Germany. Less than two months after the bombing of Dresden Arnold wrote an account of American transports carrying German and American wounded, commenting that "No nation in the world probably would have done such a thing; [others would] leave the Huns there to die".[38] Arnold viewed the USAAF as the clear protagonists of this conflict, taking the fight to the enemy and shouldering the clean-up. In his mind America was saving Germany from itself.

Arnold fervently believed bombing could bring about an end to the war in the Pacific, just as bombing had played a major role in Germany's defeat. Holding true to Douhetian ideas of total war Arnold believed that the most efficient way to win the war with the least amount of American casualties would be to bomb Japan until its industry collapsed. Arnold also believed that both the Army and Navy underestimated the importance of strategic bombing, admitting that cooperation with the Navy in the Pacific was important, but that this cooperation would hinder the effectiveness of the USAAF.[39] Arnold's belief that the USAAF could cripple Japan was coupled with an unwillingness to fully cooperate with men he believed did not understand the nuances of aerial warfare. This self-confidence and independence may have been as much a result of the brash culture of the USAAF as it was other failing to understand the potential of air power. By 1944 Arnold had grown restless with the USAAF's lack of progress in the Pacific. In August 1944 Arnold replaced the commander of the XX Air Force in China with General LeMay, who had proven himself an innovative strategist in Europe, helping devise new bombing strategies and techniques for the VIII. LeMay and Arnold both reflected the culture of the USAAF, with no military lineage, a daring attitude and a passion for developing new ways

[38]John W. Huston, ed., *American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's World War II Diaries Volume II* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 232.
[39] *Ibid*, 329-330.

to wage war from the air.[40] LeMay, true to the culture of the USAAF, insisted that he flew on missions with his men, unwilling to order a soldier to do something he was no prepared to do himself.[41] Both Arnold and LeMay had keen interests in the potential use of incendiary bombs on the cities of Japan. In 1923 much of Tokyo burned down as a result of the Great Kanto Earthquake, revealing Japan's vulnerability to fire. This did not go unnoticed by military strategists, including Arnold, who sought to take full advantage of this weakness.

As early as 1942 the USAAF had prepared information on Japanese targets, including a ranking of areas of Tokyo most vulnerable to incendiary attack. By 1944 Arnold was constructing "little Tokios [sic]" to test firebombing techniques to identify those which would yield maximum impact.[42] Both Arnold and LeMay were inspired by the successes of the Allied firebombings of Hamburg and Dresden and sought to learn all they could from their success. This meant that when the USAAF firebombed Tokyo in March 1945 (Operation Meetinghouse), the destruction was without parallel; steel melted, rivers boiled and the stench of burning flesh filled the air. With an initial death toll of approximately 100,000 and hundreds of thousands more left homeless, the firebombing of Tokyo was a scale of destruction never seen before and nor again from any bombing raid.[43] The USAAF continued a campaign of fire-bombing which, over the next six months, reached all but five Japanese cities. The old capital of Kyoto was spared at the personal request of War Secretary Henry L. Stimson, citing the city's rich history and lack of military importance, Stimson requested that the USAAF spare the city he had become

[40] Crane, *Airpower Strategy*, 169.
[41] *Ibid*, 167.
[42] Crane, *Airpower Strategy*, 168-169.
[43] M. Selden, "A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, The Destruction of Japanese Cities and the American Way of War From the Pacific to Iraq" in *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History*, eds. Yuki Tananka and Marilyn B. Young (New York: The New Press, 2009), 85.

enamoured with during his travels in Japan. The remaining four cities were spared for a much less noble purpose.[44] The cities of Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki and Niigata were left untouched by the firebombing and kept as potential test sites for an atomic bomb. The USAAF wished for these cities to remain unmolested so as to show off the bomb's full destructive power.

LeMay, like Arnold, embraced the firebombing of Japan and in his memoirs differentiated America's reasons for fighting in Europe and Japan. When explaining why a young American would sign up for the war LeMay believed he would sign up because "he doesn't agree with Hitler's ideology" or "what the Germans were trying to do to the world." But the motivation for fighting the Japanese was "what the "Japs" did to us at Pearl Harbor."[45] To LeMay the conflict in Europe was either an ideological conflict with the tenants of Nazism or an act of duty to protect the world from the spread of Nazism. LeMay did not see the conflict in Europe as personal, it was an ideological conflict. This was in stark contrast to the war with Japan which was entirely personal. This hypothetical all-American boy joined the war with Japan because of what the Japanese did in Pearl Harbor, for him it's personal. This may also be a factor in the differentiation in the bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific. While bombing Germany was a noble cause to stop the Nazis, in the Pacific the bombing campaign was not for a noble cause, it was personal. While Hitler may have declared war on the United States, Japan brought the war; for that reason the Japanese and the Germans were two fundamentally different enemies.

[44] Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 295.
[45] LeMay, *Mission*, 359.

This targeting of nearly every city, extensive use of firebombs and planning for the eventual use of an atomic bomb is a notable difference from the more targeted, restrained bombing campaign the USAAF had run in Europe. Much of the impetus for this shift came from LeMay, who believed that the Japanese war industry was spread out throughout the civilian workforce, with people working out of their own homes. His response was to destroy these civilian's homes to cripple Japan's industry, irrespective of whether there were civilians inside them. In justifying his actions LeMay said:

> We were going after military targets. No point in slaughtering civilians for the mere sake of slaughter. Of course there is a pretty thin veneer in Japan, but the veneer was there. It was their system of dispersal of industry. All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we'd roasted it, and see the ruins of a multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the act and worked to make those airplanes or munitions of war… men, women, children. We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and kids when we burned that town. Had to be done.[46]

While this belief that the Japanese people were working together with a singular purpose like a hive was not unique to LeMay, LeMay chose to act on it in with widespread use of area bombing.[47] The culture of the USAAF plays a significant factor in LeMay's ability to act on this belief in the way he did. Both General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz were opposed to the idea of area bombing and felt, like General Spaatz, that bombing civilians would not assist in the completion of military goals.[48] While these two headed the Army and Navy operations in the Pacific, the USAAF did not answer to either of these men, being USAAF LeMay only had to answer to Arnold, who shared his

[46] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinley Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 384.
[47] John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 55-56.
[48] Crane, *Airpower Strategy*, 163-166.

interest in the potential of Douhetian warfare and the potential of incendiary bombs. Arnold had also appointed LeMay to oversee the XX and later the XXI Air Force, which answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not the Army.[49] Hence while LeMay may have interacted with those who may have opposed his methods such as MacArthur and Nimitz, he was free to pursue the destruction of Japanese cities in an attempt to cripple their morale and war industry.[50] LeMay argued that while there was some dispersal of industry among the German population it was not on the same scale as Japan, hence precision bombing would be less effective than it had been in Europe. LeMay argued that by burning these cities and neighbourhoods the USAAF was able to "destroy the enemy's potential to make war" which he argues is "the whole purpose of strategic warfare".[51] In its six months LeMay's firebombing campaign killed more than 300,000 Japanese.[52]

[49] LeMay, *Mission*, 328.
[50] *Ibid*, 166.
[51] LeMay, *Mission*, 384.
[52] Selden, *A Forgotten Holocaust*, 86.

CHAPTER 2

Race and Culture in American Society

"There are no civilians in Japan"

-USAAF V Airforce Intelligence Report, July 1945

A poll of American citizens, December 20 1944, asked "What do you think we should do with Japan as a country after the war?" 13% believed the United States should "kill all Japanese," 33% wished to destroy Japan as a political entity while only 8% chose to re-educate and rehabilitate. When the same question asked how the Germans should be treated 34% of people called for the destruction of the German government. Notably absent from this question was the option to "kill all Germans." Instead the most severe option was to disband the German government.[53] This poll took place four months before the USAAF bombing of Japan began in earnest, when Operation Meetinghouse razed Tokyo and killed 100,000 people. Three months before Dresden was put to the torch and American citizens denounced their government's heavy-handed use of bombing. These polls reflect a clear difference in the way the Japanese and Germans were viewed by the American public. The Japanese were a different kind of enemy to the Germans; not every German was a Nazi, but a "Jap" was a "Jap".

[53] Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinions 1935-1946* ed. Hadley Cantril (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 1114-1118.

The lack of respect for the lives of the Japanese can be seen in actions by American soldiers in the Pacific, where there are clear and public records of soldiers collecting 'trophies' from Japanese soldiers, removing ears, noses and even skulls; an action that was unheard of among American soldiers Europe. These actions were so commonplace that they were published in the Marine Corps magazine *Leatherneck.*[54] Why were Japanese dead considered less sacred than German dead? Why was the death of every Japanese man, woman and child deemed an appropriate response to the war, but was not the case for the Germans? The reason is an intersection of racial ideals regarding Japanese, cultural differences between Japanese and Western culture and differentiation between the perceived political conflict in Europe as opposed to the perceived racial conflict in the Pacific.

With the signing of Executive Order 9066 in 1942, President Roosevelt incarcerated 120,000 of persons of Japanese descent in concentration camps across the United States. The document itself never mentions any nationalities or races as its target only that its purpose is to take "every possible protection against espionage."[55] Despite this seemingly broad implication, the order was intended for and used almost exclusively for incarcerating persons of Japanese descent. People were interned irrespective of whether or not they were American citizens, for fear that they may secretly be agents of the Emperor. Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor there had been distrust for the Japanese, American society had a low regard for 'Orientals,' and non-whites in General. The Imperial Army's actions in

[54] Anonymous, "Old Young Men," *Leatherneck*, June, 1943, 29.
[55] "Transcript of Executive Order 9066," OurDocuments, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/print_friendly.php?flash=true&page=transcript&doc=74&title=Transcript+of+Executive+Order+9066:++Resulting+in+the+Relocation+of+Japanese+(1942)

China were further proof of the barbaric nature of the Japanese.[56] Even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American government had been involved in failing diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, with the Army Chief of Staff expressing his preparedness to raze the cities of Japan in November 1941.[57] This animosity towards the Japanese was amplified a month later after the attack on Pearl Harbor, proof the dishonourable nature of the Jap.[58]

Looking back on the war in 1946, Allan Nevins wrote that "probably in all our history no foe has been so detested as were the Japanese", arguing that while "hatred of the enemy" was immortalised by attack on Pearl Harbor, it was continually fed throughout the war with controlled revelations of the Imperial Army's atrocities in East Asia.[59] It is as a result of this hatred that President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 to incarcerate the Japanese in an attempt to contain the enemy. Executive Order 9066 is just as significant for those it did not incarcerate as those it did. Executive Order 9066 was signed in February 1942, when the United States was at war with Japan, Germany and Italy, yet the order was only used for the mass incarceration of the Japanese, not Germans or Italians. This reflects a notable distinction in the discourse in the United States; in Europe the enemies were the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy, while in the Pacific the enemy was the Jap. This distinction may seem minor at first, but reflects a social understanding of the war and what American's felt they were fighting for. In Europe the enemies were fascism and Nazism; political ideologies adopted by the people of Italy and Germany. The enemies were Hitler and Mussolini, men who espoused these ideologies and who represented them. In the

[56] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), 213.
[57] *Robert L. Sherrod Memorandum for David W. Hulburd, Jr,* November 15, 1941, Hanson W. Baldwin Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
[58] Max Hastings, *Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (Great Britian: Willian Collons, 2007), 6.
[59] A. Nevins, "How We Felt About the War" in *While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life in the United States*, ed. Jack Goodman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 13.

Pacific the enemy was not a political ideology but a people, the enemy was Japan. The enemy was Emperor Hirohito, who spoke for and represented the Japanese people. This was not the case for Italy where "our contempt for the 'jackal' Mussolini was enough." In the case of Germany, despite revelations of the holocaust and other Nazi war crimes "it could not be said that the German people as a whole came to be hated" though "the German system was detested."[60] By detaining Japanese-Americans but not German or Italians, Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 further reinforced the understanding that the Japanese people were the enemy in a way that Germans and Italians were not. After the war Carey McWilliams reflected "German-Americans and Italian-Americans have gone through this war virtually unscathed by prejudice or discrimination."[61]

Japan's appeal for a unified Asia under the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere frightened Western imperialists. Like the Third Reich the Co-Prosperity Sphere was shaped by ideals of race, with the Japanese as rulers of the empire while 'lesser' Asians served below them. Unlike the Third Reich's desire for an Aryan led European empire, the Co-Prosperity Sphere would be an empire of Orientals, an empire of former European subjects. Roosevelt himself felt a unified Asia was a significant threat and expressed his fear of the "1,100,000,000 potential enemies" in Asia.[62] This fear is clearly reflected in Western responses to the release of the apocryphal *Tanaka Memorial*, known as *Japan's Mein Kampf*. This document which supposedly revealed Japan's plans to conquer Asia, was translated into Russian, then English and was held up as proof of the devious nature of the Japanese, who had a methodical plan for domination, all the while engaging in

[60] *Ibid*, 14.
[61] C. McWilliams, "What We Did About Racial Minorities" in *While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life in the United States*, ed. Jack Goodman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 93.
[62] John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Rand and Power in the Pacific War*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 7.

diplomatic relations with the very nations they were planning to attack.[63] Western nations felt threatened by the Co-Prosperity Sphere as Japan was deliberately targeting Western imperialist outposts. Singapore, the Philippines and Burma were among the colonial outposts 'liberated' by the Japanese imperial Army. By targeting imperialist outposts Japan was able to weaken Western influence in Asia by loosening the grip of Western powers. The Japanese then hailed themselves as the liberators of their Asian brothers, before establishing themselves as imperialist overlords. Emphasising the racial difference of the European imperialists, the Japanese further reinforced their similarities to those peoples they 'liberated', reinforcing their position in the American mindset as 'Orientals' and 'jaundiced monkeys.'[64]

Japan and Germany brought differing racial ideologies to the war, both certain in their genetic superiority giving and their right to rule over 'lesser races'. Many Allied nations tried to distance themselves from the Nazis ideals of Aryanism; British and American intellectuals and scientists challenged the pseudoscientific theories of race held by the Nazi party. Yet this challenge reveals an inherent hypocrisy; anti-Semitism was rife in both Great Britain and the United States with both nations having laws favouring white citizens over non-white citizens. While Britain and the United States may have disagreed with the extreme nature of Nazism, there were clear cultural similarities in their racial viewpoints. That is not to say that the British or the Americans would have committed an act as horrendous as the Holocaust, but both held strong beliefs in the superiority of white Christendom, and the Japanese were neither white nor Christian unlike their German counterparts. Unlike Japanese immigrants, German immigrants were culturally similar and

[63] W.J. Thomas, ed., *Japan's Mein Kampf: Full Text of the Tanaka Memorial* (Sydney: NSW Bookstall, 1942), i-iii.
[64] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 213.

were better able to integrate into society as both the United States and Great Britain had large German populations. Germans were not physically identifiable as different to other Anglo-Saxons, while the same could not be said of the Japanese. Physically and culturally identifiable, the Japanese were easily singled out as a cultural 'other,' in turn making it easier to identify them as an enemy.

In 1853 Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy steamed a gunship into Edo Bay with a message for the Emperor, open Japan's borders and be prepared to trade or prepare for war. The isolationist Tokugawa shogunate could not repel such a threat and in 1854 when Perry returned, the Japanese opened their borders. Japan saw what 'trade' with the West had done to China, a nation Japan once respected, and feared she would suffer the same fate. Japan modernised during the Meiji Restoration, determined to become an empire to rival those of Europe.[65] After having defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and expanding her empire, Japan went to war with Russia, in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), surprising everyone by defeating Russia, further expanding her empire.[66] After the First World War, Japan used the Versailles conference to claim German territories in the Pacific. There was some dispute about this as Japan wanted the island of Yap, a small island between Hawaii and the Philippines which America wanted as a cable base. There was further disagreement when Japan and China requested the League of Nations Covenant mention racial equality. Both Britain and America opposed this proposal, as both nations had laws favouring white citizens.[67]

Japan had been given a seat at the table but this rejection cemented the idea that Japan would never be considered an equal by the Western powers. In 1922 Japan signed the

[65] Scott Morton and Kenneth Olenik, *Japan Its History and Culture Fourth Edition* (United States: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 138-143.
[66] John Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe, Volume Two: From the French Revolution to Present, Third Edition* (New York: Norton, 2010), 645-646.
[67] Akira Iriye, *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume III: The Globalising of America 1913-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67-70.

Four Power Treaty with Britain, France and the United States which stated that they would respect each other's interests in the Pacific, giving Japan a significant sphere of influence. That same year the Nine Power Treaty, created an open door policy in China. Using the Manchurian Incident (1931) as onus, Japan invaded China, violating this treaty.[68] By the time Japan invaded China again in 1937 US-Japanese relations were tenuous stretched by Japan's alliance with the fascists Germany and Italy. When the League of Nations called a meeting to discuss the Sino-Japanese War, Japan and Germany boycotted. Uncharacteristically the United States attended and condemned Japanese aggression, marking America's return to the international stage.[69] Later that year the Japanese Navy sank an American gunboat, evacuating US Embassy personnel, killing two; relations between the two nations were strained even further. Japan apologised and offered indemnities, creating a simulacrum of normality. Roosevelt's response was to send a secret envoy to Britain to make plans for war with Japan, reflecting Americas the distrust of the Japanese and fear of war.[70] Relations between the two nations deteriorated, with the United States ignoring the Neutrality Act and selling arms to China from 1938. Public outcry resulted in a moral embargo placed on the selling of airplanes to Japan. While not legally binding it was a clear that America had taken a side in this conflict and would no longer be a neutral party.[71] This open support for China and condemnation of Japan was the beginning of the end of US-Japanese relations. America had spoken; Japan was now an enemy of the people and the state.

To the American public, the Japanese were a fundamentally different enemy than the Germans. In the conflict in Europe, Germany was not the enemy Nazism and its

[68] James L. Huffman, *Japan in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 100.
[69] Iryie, *Globalising America*, 150-158.
[70] Ibid, 159.
[71] Ibid, 162-163.

proponents were the enemy. The war in Europe was fought to defeat Nazism, preventing its expansion across Europe. The enemy was a political entity, which allowed for the creation of what John Dower termed the 'good German.' The idea was that not all Germans were Nazis and that the German people were victims of Nazi oppression.[72] The 'good German' was symbolic of the American people's willingness to understand and sympathise with the German people. American attempts to adhere to a practice of precision bombing during the European Theatre and the American public's outcry at the excessive force used in the bombing of Dresden are indicative of this sympathy felt by the American people towards the Germans. Dower points out that there is no Japanese equivalent of the 'good German,' a result of the fact that the Japanese were considered the enemy in the Pacific in a way that the Germans were not.[73] In the Pacific the enemy was not a political entity like the Nazis but rather the nation and people of Japan. This then may explain that while the bombing of Dresden resulted in much protest and uproar in the United States, but when the USAAF razed Tokyo less than a month later, killing over twice as many people, there was little to no protest.[74]

American acceptance of civilian losses as a means of advancing the war effort is arguably the by-product of a combination of racial fears and hatreds coupled with a military trained in the concepts of total war. While the USAAF did have the same understanding of total war in their bombings of Germany, the bombing were more restrained and largely avoided weapons of indiscriminate destruction such as incendiary bombs. However, in Japan the concept of total war was compounded by societal attitudes towards the Japanese. In February 1945, the Japanese government created the National Resistance Program

[72] Dower, *Without Mercy*, 8.
[73] Dower, *Without Mercy*, 8.
[74] Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 138—143.

drafting all men over 15 and women over 17 into the defense of the Japanese homeland.[75] This was also used as justification for bombing Japanese civilians as now these civilians were technically military personnel. In what could be argued as the ultimate evolution of Douhetian warfare the USAAF's V Air Force's intelligence officer responded to this program by claiming "There are no civilians in Japan."[76]

Curtis LeMay clearly expressed his thoughts regarding the targeting of Japanese civilian neighbourhoods as an acceptable action in order to counter the Japanese dispersal of manufacturing. LeMay was prepared to burn down some of the most densely populated areas of Japan in order to cripple Japan's manufacturing capabilities. While LeMay's targets were technically industrial he also believed strongly in the impact of firebombing on morale claiming that it was "that rain and reign of flame which demoralized Japanese industry, and shattered the military heart, and whipped the populace into a state where they could – and would- accept the idea of surrender."[77] LeMay also expressed his belief that with more incendiary bombs he could have broken the morale of the Japanese people without the use of atomic bombs.[78] This means that while LeMay's primary justification for firebombing Japanese cities was the destruction of industry, he was also motivated by the impact incendiaries had on civilian morale, using firebombing to force surrender, making his campaign one of terror bombing. Several other significant figures such as the Head of the War Manpower Commission Paul McNutt and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall suggested that the United States would not hesitate to bomb Japanese civilians.[79] The military cultures of total war and Douhetian warfare meant that targeting civilians was seen

[75] James L. Huffman, *Japan in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 106.
[76] Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 696.
[77] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinley Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 368.
[78] *Ibid*, 369.
[79] Dower, *Without Mercy*, 55.

as a viable option, while the societal view of the Japanese people as the enemy in the Pacific meant that the deaths of Japanese civilians were considered more acceptable than German civilians.

Japanese casualties as a result of USAAF bombings were higher than German casualties. While this fact was not something that was widely published at the time, the USAAF's firebombing campaign itself was not unknown to the American people. Specific details may not have been disclosed, but the American public seemed content to burn the cities of Japan in a way they had protested in Germany only months before. The American people may not have known the number of deaths resulting from this bombing campaign, but the lack of protest when compared to the bombing of Dresden suggests that the American people were at the very least accepting of the campaign itself. Some of this can be attributed to the betrayal and anger Americans felt towards Pearl Harbor and the later Japanese atrocities in the Pacific, which was slowly released to the public to keep up support for the war.[80] LeMay believed that the average American joined the war effort to avenge Pearl Harbor. However, the attitude of the American people towards the Germans was still much more forgiving even after information regarding the Holocaust and German atrocities in Europe became widely known. While Frank Capra's film *Know Your Enemy – Japan* made several references to Japanese atrocities, his equivalent film *Here Is Germany* made no reference to the holocaust or Nazi death camps.[81] Racial stereotypes, cultural fears of the Japanese as beasts and an absence of a 'good Jap' meant that forgiveness and understanding was not forthcoming for the Japanese.

[80] Dower, *Without Mercy*, 35.
[81] *Know Your Enemy – Japan*, directed by Frank Capra and Joris Ivens (United States: U.S. Department of War, 1945), film.
Here Is Germany, directed by Frank Capra (United States: U.S. Department of War, 1945), film.

In American propaganda the Japanese were often depicted as savage, barbaric and cunning. Yet at the same time they were also depicted as weak willed, lacking individuality and easily frightened. Depiction of the Japanese as inherently feminine were also common, this distance from typical masculinity suggested inferiority and inability to a Western audience.[82] One of the most common representations of the Japanese was as a faceless mass of enemies who operated as a singular mind, with a singular idea to conquer in the name of the Emperor. This hive mentality associated with the Japanese played a significant part in shaping General Curtis LeMay's rationale for firebombing Japanese cities. He argued that Japanese industry was dispersed throughout the homes of nearby civilians, in "a home-folks assembly line deal."[83] This idea was not unique to LeMay and could be found throughout American representations of the Japanese during the war. *Know Your Enemy – Japan*, went so far as to liken Japanese citizens to "photographic prints off the same negative."[84] Recurring racial stereotypes were used to simultaneously establish the Japanese as an inferior people whilst also inciting fear in the grave threat they posed. The Japanese were considered so fundamentally different to Western man that they were treated as being almost of a different species.[85] The Japanese were often depicted as monkeys or apes with buck teeth, slanted eyes and glasses.[86] These particularly unflattering depictions were used to dehumanise and belittle the Japanese enemy.

In American propaganda Germans were often represented by large, fearsome Aryan soldiers or a caricature of Hitler, while the Japanese were regularly depicted as more primitive and animalistic. In Disney's V*ictory Through Air Power*, Germany is represented

[82] Frances Power Cobbe, "Criminals, Idiots, Women and Minors: Is the Classification Sound?" *Bristol Slected Pamphlets* (1869) : 5-6.
Dower, *Without Mercy*, 10.
[83] LeMay, *Mission*, 384.
[84] *Know Your Enemy*, Capra, film
[85] Time "The God-Emperor," *Time*, May 21, 1945, 33.
[86] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 213.

by a solid iron ring, encircling Europe. Meanwhile the Japanese are represented by a bulbous octopus, spreading its tentacles across Asia, ensnaring all within its grasp.[87] The depiction of Japan as an animal and Nazism as a ring of iron reflects the underlying sentiment that the Japanese were a more vile and loathsome enemy. The Germans were a formidable force, while the Japanese were a pest to be exterminated. Jonathan Daniels recalls a joke in which a young soldier in the Pacific laments that he failed to kill any "Japs", so his commanding officer tells him to go into the wood and shout "to hell with the Emperor." After doing so a "Jap" jumps down from the trees shouting "Ruzvelt a son-a-beetz [sic]." The soldier later confesses he couldn't shoot because, while he is a proud American, he's "also a Republican".[88] While this joke seems inconsequential, this thinking of the Japanese as animals to be hunted for sport is made more concerning when considering the collection of skulls, noses and ears of Japanese soldiers as 'trophies.' People joined the war in the Pacific not to stop the Japanese, but rather as Admiral William 'Bull' Halsey told his men "Kill "Japs", kill "Japs", kill more "Japs!""[89]

Representation of the Japanese were either weak and effeminate or what John Dower termed "Japanese supermen", a formidable Japanese soldier who channelled the ancient martial traditions of Japan and possessed fighting skills and discipline beyond that of a normal man.[90] This was not the only conflicting representations of the Japanese in American media at the time. The Japanese were thought of as being simultaneously cunning and stupid, warlike and cowardly. Dower argues that this dichotomy, and indeed many of the stereotypes applied to the Japanese were in fact a recycling of stereotypes that had been used by European society to classify non-whites throughout history. The fear of

[87] *Victory Through Air Power*, directed by Perce Pearce (Burbank: Walt Disney Productions, 1943), film.
[88] J. Daniels, "The Presidency" in *While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life in the United States*, ed. Jack Goodman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 125-126.
[89] Thomas Evans, *Sea of Thunder* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 1.
[90] Dower, *Without Mercy*, 9.

the Japanese 'yellow peril' was a recycling of rhetoric used for the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion. 'Yellow Peril' had been used to represent the Chinese in the past, but was easily altered to fit the Japanese; especially to an American audience often unsure of the difference. The Japanese were demonised with the same racial 'otherness' that Westerners had used to separate themselves from 'lesser races' for millennia. Just as Persians and Africans had been described thousands of years before, the Japanese were painted with the same imperialist brush; a confusing hybrid of childlike and warlike, simple yet martial and always inherently animalistic.[91] The Japanese were not a new threat in this way, merely the latest 'other' to challenge Western supremacy.

Racist attitudes in the United States could be found throughout the American media. The December 15th 1941 issue of Time Magazine (the issue after Pearl Harbor), claimed that the American people's reaction, upon hearing the news of the attack was to cry "Why, the yellow bastards!"[92] Not only does it claim that the American people's immediate response was to label the Japanese by their skin colour but then goes on to encourage such a response. The article refers to the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor in an act of "premeditated murder masked by a toothy smile," fitting the stereotype of the scheming, buck-toothed Asian.[93] While they may not have been the same enemy of the past, depictions of Japanese were coloured by a long history of discrimination and fear of the orient as well as their complex history with the United States.[94]

[91] Frantz Fanon, transl. Richard Philcox *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 6-8.
[92] Time "The U.S. At War," *Time*, December 15, 1941, 1.
[93] *Ibid*, 2-11.
[94] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 1-2.

CHAPTER 3

Differentiation of Allied Bombings of Japan and Germany

"We'd rather drop bombs than leaflets."

- General Curtis E. LeMay, September 1989

After the perceived success of the bombing war in Europe there were those who believed that the war in the Pacific could be won with bombs alone. Bombing was seen as an effective way to cripple the enemy's war effort while simultaneously weakening the people's morale. By weakening the enemy's morale through a bombing campaign, the USAAF believed that they could force a Japanese surrender; claiming to have done the same in Germany. After Hitler committed suicide, the Nazis were leaderless and with rising dissatisfaction from a populace under threat of Allied bombardment, surrender was the best outcome. The USAAF had faith that they could bring an end to the war with Japan through a similar means.

During the Second World War, the Allies dropped approximately 1,360,000 tons of bombs on Germany. 1,340,000 tons more were dropped on other European nations, making a total of 2,700,000 tons of ordinances dropped on Europe during the Second World War.[95]

[95] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington D.C., 1946), 84.

These millions of tons of bombs, dropped over the course of six years killed an estimated 300,000 people, though some estimate are even greater.[96] The sheer tonnage of ordinance dropped is indicative of the unprecedented scale of the Second World War. The bombing war started early, with Germany bombing the Poles and later the French and British. The German Luftwaffe was better prepared for an air war than the British Royal Air Force and it took the British some time before they were able to successfully retaliate against the German threat. During Germany's invasion of France, the British and French had only 950 aircraft while the total number of German aircraft exceeded 1500. Before becoming the Prime Minister in 1940, Winston Churchill had long bemoaned the growing airpower gap between Britain and Germany and had warned that this would have dire consequences if it came to war with Germany.[97] Churchill was vindicated when war came to Europe and Britain's lack of airpower was made all too apparent. The Luftwaffe's superior technology, coupled with the RAF's shortage of planes, meant Britain had little ability to adequately respond to German bombings and raids. Both Britain's defensive and offensive capabilities were limited as they could ill afford to lose any planes.

While retaliation was certainly a factor in shaping Britain's employment of terror bombing against Germany, A.C Grayling has argued that Britain targeted German civilian infrastructure as it allowed the RAF to cause the maximum amount of disruption with their weaker Air Force. The RAF's planes were older than those used by the Luftwaffe, and were neither as fast nor as accurate. Consequently the Germans had the advantage in the air, which forced the British to think of ways to best employ their limited resources. Older and slower planes meant that the RAF fighters were less than ideal for strategic strikes in

[96] Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 260.
[97] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume I: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 430-431.

German territory. Though the bomber fleet was also older and slower, the bombers were still capable of dealing significant damage to a target; however, due to the inaccuracy of this older bomber fleet, the bombers were unable to effectively carry out precision bombings on German military targets. These older planes were easily targeted and a lack of efficient fighter planes meant that the bombers could not be adequately protected. This meant that German military targets was not ideal as slow planes were easy to spot, giving the Germans plenty of time to scramble fighters and mount a counter offensive. However, if the bombers focused on civilian targets, lacking in anti-aircraft measures, they could damage both the town and the morale of its inhabitants with less risk to their own planes.[98] Intentionally or not, the RAF's strategy mirrored Giulio Douhet's philosophy that an air force is an inherently offensive entity.[99] While RAF bombings began in 1939, the RAF did not embrace area bombings until 1940. For five years the RAF waged an area bombing campaign across Europe, explaining the sheer volume of bombs dropped in the European theatre.

While the bombing campaign in Europe took place over an extended period of time, the bombing campaign in the Pacific was a much shorter campaign. While millions of tons of explosives were dropped in Europe, in the Pacific the Allies dropped only 656,400 tons of explosives, of which only 160,800 tons were dropped on the Japanese home islands.[100] Yet despite this the total number of deaths in the Pacific as a result of the bombing campaign is notably higher than in Europe. This can be attributed to two notable factors; the adoption and refinement of firebombing and the introduction of the atomic bomb. While this thesis has largely avoided including the use of the atomic bomb in discussions

[98] A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?* (Great Britian: Bloomsbury, 2006), 24-27.
[99] Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 11.
[100] Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, 84.

regarding differentiation, it is important to acknowledge that atomic bombs account for the destruction of two cities and deaths of over 100,000 people. However, it is also important to note that estimates place the death toll for all non-nuclear bombs in Japan at over 300,000, which is roughly equivalent to the death toll of the Allied bombing campaign in Europe.[101] Despite this, more than eight times as much ordinance was dropped on Germany as on the Japanese home islands. Not only were the casualties higher in the campaign in Japan, but the number of cities marked as primary targets for bombing in Japan was also greater than in Germany. In Japan 66 cities were marked as primary targets for bombing, while in Germany the number was 50, discounting Hiroshima and Nagasaki the USAAF razed fourteen more cities in Japan than in Germany.[102] How was it that the Allied bombing campaign in Japan was more destructive while dropping fewer bombs?

The answer lies in the widespread use of firebombing in Japan, coupled with LeMay and Arnold's desire to ensure the maximum destructive results from their bombing campaigns. Incendiary ordinance allowed for greater destruction than simple high explosive ordinance; high explosives detonate on impact, creating a singular explosion. An incendiary bomb crashes to earth and after a slight delay, ignites and immolates its surroundings. While high explosives may bring instantaneous destruction, incendiary bombs will continue to burn after they are dropped and consume resources and manpower in battling the flames. The Strategic Bombing Survey calculates that in the bombing of Germany, incendiary bombs were four to five times as destructive as high explosives.[103] The Survey continues:

[101] M. Selden, "A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, The Destruction of Japanese Cities and the American Way of War From the Pacific to Iraq" in *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History*, eds. Yuki Tananka and Marilyn B. Young (New York: The New Press, 2009), 86.
[102] Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War),* 85.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War) (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945), 36.
[103] Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (European War),* 35.

> In the more serious fire raids, any fire-fighting equipment was found to have been of little avail. Fire storms occurred, the widespread fires generating a violent hurricane-like draft, which fed other fires and made all attempts at control hopeless.[104]

These 'hurricane-like' winds were strong enough to move cars and rip trees from the earth. Violent drafts, coupled with the blistering heat created an ideal environment for the spreading the fire, while simultaneously making it difficult for firefighters and other services to combat. The conflagrations that ravaged these cities were so fierce that there are accounts of street lights melting and twisting in the heat, rivers boiling and civilians in shelters being baked alive.[105]

In 1923 the Kanto region of Japan was ravaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake which, in addition causing significant destruction, started a series of fires in Tokyo which killed tens of thousands of people. These fires alerted both Japan and her enemies to her weakness to fire, which both inspired the Allied use of firebombs and encouraged Japan to prepare herself for future fires. American military strategists, including LeMay and Arnold had long been aware of the devastating potential of firebombing Japan. President Roosevelt had a particularly keen interest in the potential of firebombing Japan, and ordered Admiral Husband Kimmel to explore the potential of firebombs to be used against Japan 10 months before Pearl Harbor in January 1941.[106]

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[104] Ibid, 35.
[105] Conrad C. Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians and Oil* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 175.
[106] Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 109.

While Japanese cities were vulnerable to fire, this alone does not account for the difference in the destruction from the USAAF bombings in Germany as opposed to Japan.[107] While it is easy to think of Germany as a modern, industrial nation more resistant to fire than Japan, Germany also struggled to counter Allied firebombings. Operation Gomorrah (the firebombing of Hamburg) was the first major firebombing of the Second World War and was the most destructive bombing until Meetinghouse in 1945. The infamous bombing of Dresden also did substantial damage with a death toll similar to Gomorrah, despite Dresden's smaller population.[108] The Strategic Bombing Survey argues that "German fire defences lacked adequate static and other water reserves replenished by mains independent of the more vulnerable central water supply" and that "in the more serious fire raids, any fire-fighting equipment was found to have been of little avail."[109] Despite their modernity and preparation, German cities were insufficiently prepared for the fearsome firebombings of the USAAF and RAF.

Realizing the flammable nature of their cities and aware of the USAAF's use of incendiary bombs in Germany, the Japanese built extensive firebreaks by tearing down long lines of houses in an attempt to limit the spread of any potential fires. While this was theoretically sound, the USAAF saturated the target areas and in an attempt to ensure that incendiaries fell on both sides of the breaks.[110] The USAAF had developed a new strategy used in the firebombing of Tokyo and then the rest of Japan. Before dropping incendiary bombs the USAAF would first run a light bombing raid, dropping high explosive ordinance over the target area, later another bombing raid would drop incendiary ordinance on the

[107] Crane, *American Airpower Strategy*, 174-178.
[108] Sherry, *Airpower*, 276.
[109] Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (European War)*, 35
[110] Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, 92-93.

previously bombed area. The high explosive bombs damaged and weakened target structures and these damaged buildings were more susceptible to flame than structurally sound buildings. Additionally, bombing densely populated urban areas like Tokyo with high explosives damaged or blocked roads. Explosions damaged the roads while collapsed buildings and debris made them impossible to traverse. Disruption of roads made it difficult for civilians to escape the fire and limited mobility of potential firefighters, who could have potentially contained the blaze.[111] This strategy, coupled with the sheer intensity of the USAAF bombing of Japan explains how the bombing campaign in Japan did so much damage in such a short time, while dropping substantially fewer bombs than in Europe.

One major difference in the way the Allies conducted the campaign in the Pacific as opposed to Europe was the belief that, in Japan, the Allies could bring the war to a conclusion without an invasion. The war in Europe came to an end after the Allies had successfully invaded and occupied Germany. While bombing and aerial warfare did play a significant part in the war in Europe, Germany did not surrender until she had been occupied. However, this was not the case with the war in the Pacific, where the Japanese surrendered after an extended bombing campaign against the home islands, without having been invaded. This is in part due to the USAAF's role in the Pacific, and notably the influence of Generals Arnold and LeMay. Arnold firmly believed that "bombing did not only hasten the end of the war with Germany but had a most disastrous effect on Germany's production."[112] With this conviction that bombing helped bring an end to the war in Europe, Arnold believed that, using lessons the USAAF had learned in Europe, they could lead an even more effective and devastating campaign against Japan, to ensure a swift

[111] Crane, *American Airpower Strategy*, 174-178.
[112] John W. Huston, ed., *American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's World War II Diaries Volume II* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 327.

victory. LeMay recalled that "with the targets gone we couldn't see much of any war going on."[113] By razing Japan's cities she had no other option but to surrender.

In 1944 the United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established to conduct "an impartial and expert study" on the bombing war in Germany, the result of a directive by President Roosevelt. Bombing was a new phenomenon and was one which was proving to be increasingly useful and effective as the war continued.[114] The Strategic Bombing Survey's purpose was to help understand the potential for bombing in future wars and to help the USAAF identify how make the most effective use of bombing potential in the Pacific. The Survey was made up of military and non-military experts in an attempt to make the Survey more impartial. While the Strategic Bombing Survey was completing its reports "interim reports were rendered and studies and suggestions submitted in connection with the air operations against Japan."[115] The Survey collected data from the different bombings, keeping a record of tons of ordinance dropped, number of planes sortied in any given mission, number of planes lost, impact of bombing on production of good as well as estimates on areas destroyed and numbers of lives lost.[116] The survey also interviewed civilians after the war in order to get information about morale and other, less quantifiable impacts of bombing.[117] The Survey's data shaped American bombing strategy not only during the Second World War, but into the future, reinforcing the significance of air power.

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[113] Curtis E. LeMay in *The World At War, Episode 24: The Bomb*, directed by David Elstein (London: Thames Television, 1974), film.
[114] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all Report (European War)* (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945), IX.
[115] *Ibid*, IX.
[116] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy* (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946).
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Japanese War Production Industries (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946).
[117] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947).

Arnold's desire to end the war in the Pacific using only bombing may have been an attempt to establish the USAAF as an independent arm of the military, not just a subsection of the US Army. USAAF leaders were trained in Douhetian ideology and had been taught that an Air Force should be an independent part of the armed forces. While the USAAF may have wished for this independence, they instead had to answer to the Army. However, there was one exception to this command structure, the XX and later XXI Air Forces did not answer to the Army, but instead answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[118] This gave the USAAF an opportunity to prove themselves over the Army and Navy in the Pacific. In the Pacific the Army was led by General Douglas MacArthur who was known for his hubris and his desire to command attention and has been referred to as the 'American Caesar.'[119] MacArthur had a hand in the peace negotiations and an even larger role in the occupation of Japan post war. MacArthur had held much of the spotlight in the Pacific and was a recognisable face for the American people. The USAAF was keen to prove its worth and justify its independence, but to do so they had to upstage MacArthur who held so much of the attention in the Pacific. The USAAF also had to cooperate with Admiral Chester Nimitz commander of the Navy forces in the Pacific. Nimitz was not the showman that MacArthur was but he also commanded a great deal of respect among the military old guard. The men of the USAAF were not from the ranks of the military elites and had little in common with these men. Indeed, Arnold lamented that neither of these men truly understood the importance of the USAAF in the Pacific.[120] This rivalry and a

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945).

[118] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinley Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 328.

[119] *American Caesar*, directed by John McGreevey, (United States: Cineworld Productions, 1983), film.

[120] Huston, "*Hap" Arnold's Diaries Vol. II*, 327.

desire not to be overlooked may have been a significant motivating factor in Arnold's insistence that the USAAF could bring an end to the war themselves.

While Arnold and the USAAF's desire to end to the war through bombing may have been self-serving, there may also have been a more noble intention. Both Arnold and LeMay truly believed that airpower alone was sufficient to win the war in the Pacific. This meant that the United States could save the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers by not invading Japan. Arnold wrote in his diary that "against Japan bombing can be most effective, will result in minimum cost and American lives only if… given most skilful direction and fullest support."[121] Arnold believed that the USAAF, with the right resources and commanders, could end the war in the Pacific without having to mount an invasion of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff met in May 1945 where they planned the invasion of Japan; MacArthur was placed in charge of the land operation while Nimitz was placed in charge of naval and amphibious operations. The invasion, Downfall, was divided into two parts; Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for autumn 1945 followed by Coronet, the invasion of the main island of Honshu, March 1946.[122] Downfall was allocated 767,000 men for the campaign, with estimated casualties of 268,000, over a third of the men allocated. The bloody island hopping campaign across the Pacific had worn down the American's morale. Despite the fact that America had extensive plans for an invasion, the battle for Okinawa dealt a blow to the American will to fight and people were looking for an option which would prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of American lives.[123] The USAAF provided that option.

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[121] Huston, "*Hap" Arnold's Diaries Vol. II*, 327.
[122] Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against The Sun: The American War With Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 542.

[123] *Ibid*, 543.

This desire to bring the war to an end while minimizing the loss of American lives may well account for the high number of casualties in the USAAF bombing of Japan and explain the swift and ferocious nature of the bombing campaign. In nine months of bombing the Japanese home islands, Allied bombings razed more cities and killed more people than a three year campaign in Europe. In Europe these bombings were coupled with an invading land force, while in Japan the bombing campaign was believed to be enough to bring about Japan's surrender. This desire to avoid the loss of American lives is especially poignant when put into the context of the War in the Pacific, where the Japanese held onto each island with bloody tenacity hoping to make the war so horrific that America would lose the will to fight. As the United States advanced closer to the Japanese home islands the more violent the battles became. The Strategic Bombing Survey argues that "the capture of Okinawa was the most difficult operation undertaken in the Pacific by United States forces." The Japanese were "determined to make an all-out effort to hold this island…the Japanese directed in their plans that enemy losses would be made as heavy as possible."[124] This strategy of maximising casualties pushed the United States towards an aerial bombardment of Japan rather than a land based invasion. After the long war in Europe and the bloody island hopping across the Pacific, the Americans were tired of war and had lost much of their will to fight. While the Japanese had hoped that this fatigue would force America to give up, instead it pushed them towards a bombing campaign that bombed all but three cities in Japan and the eventual use of nuclear weapons.

[124] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Campaigns of the Pacific War* (Washington D.C.: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946), 324.

The Allied land invasion of Germany and subsequent lack of invasion of Japan may be the most obvious differentiation in the war. With no land invasion to back up their bombings it seems the USAAF, despite having dropped notably fewer bombs on Japan than Germany, were determined to lead a swift and fierce campaign to bring an end to the war and force Japan to surrender while minimizing US losses. While Germany was determined to fight till the end, she eventually surrendered once invaded and occupied. Japan too wished to fight to the last, but was not invaded, instead subjected to the most devastating bombing campaign the world had ever seen. Even then, it was only when her armies lay wasted, her people starved and her cities burned that Japan finally surrendered.

CHAPTER 4

Changes to USAAF Bombing in Europe and the Pacific

"We Knew We Were Going to Kill a Lot of Women and Kids When We Burned That Town"

- General Curtis E. LeMay, 1965

Operation Meetinghouse saw the beginning of the United States Army Air Force's terror bombing of Japan. With more than 100,000 people dead and hundreds of thousands more homeless, Operation Meetinghouse is the deadliest bombing in recorded history, killing more people than either of the atomic bombs, and roughly as many people as the firebombings of Dresden and Hamburg combined. The mission report explains that the target area had a population density of 103,000 people per square mile, "an average probably not exceeded in any other modern industrial city in the world" while at the "geographical center of this zone, the population runs as high as 135,000 per square mile."[125] It is important to remember that the USAAF's official policy at the time was still precision bombing, which meant that the aim of USAAF bomber command should have been to attempt selective strikes on military targets; though precision bombing far from accurate, it was still at odds with the burning one of most densely populated cities on earth.

[125] *XXI Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report*, *Mission No. 40*, *Urban Area of Tokyo*, 10 March 1945, prepared 15 April 1945, Box 26, LeMay Papers.

While precision bombing was the official policy, the XX and XXI Air Forces existed outside the typical command structure of the USAAF. The XX and XXI were unique in that they answered not to the Army but directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This gave them a great deal of independence, which LeMay claimed was "General Arnold's dream of a strategic air force come true." [126] This gave Arnold and LeMay much more autonomy with the XX and XXI air force, which allowed them to stray from the official policy of precision bombing and shape the bombings according to their own beliefs, bringing the USAAF one step closer to their dream of an independent air force. LeMay firmly believed that the best course of action was the maximum use of force in the bombing of Japan. LeMay argued that "it's more immoral to use *less* force than necessary, than it is to use *more*" believing that "if you use less force, you kill off more of humanity in the long run, because you are merely protracting the struggle."[127] This line of thought directly contradicts the USAAF policy of precision bombing, which utilized a controlled use of force in an attempt to minimize collateral damage. Given that the XX and XXI Air Force did not answer to the same chain of command as the rest of the USAAF, LeMay was given much more autonomy to operate as he saw fit.

While precision bombing was not as accurate as its name would imply, it was still a fundamentally different proposition to area and/or terror bombing. Dropping a bomb out of a moving plane flying tens of thousands of feet above the ground and hitting a specific target was not a simple proposition. The Allied air forces went through several different strategic and technological developments in order to maximise the effectiveness of their bombing in order to overcome these limitations. Both the USAAF and the RAF developed and shared different techniques over the course of the war as many of the bombing operations in Europe were run as joint operations. Hence changes and developments of one nation can often be seen in the other.

[126] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinley Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 328.
[127] *Ibid*, 382.

As these development continued into the war they allowed for more accurate and more effective bombing raids. The first large scale Allied bombing was the RAF's Operation Millennium, May 1942 the first 'thousand bomber raid'. As the name implies a 'thousand bomber raid' involved one thousand bombers dropped their payload over the target over the course of the raid. Hamburg was the initial target for Millennium, when weather made that difficult Cologne was chosen instead. Operation Millennium was the first Allied raid where one city was targeted and relentlessly bombed in order to cripple both industry and morale. Bombing raids such as Operation Millennium were still rare and avoided through the rest of 1942 because of the staggeringly high number of bombers lost. Millennium, as an RAF bombing mission was not bound by the policy of precision bombing and instead employed area bombing tactics. This use of area bombing to break morale became known as terror bombing, and can be seen in RAF bombings throughout Germany and later USAAF bombings of Japan.

Larger bombing raids became more common as technology advanced, making it safer to fly large numbers of planes together. An RAF development known as 'Window' was the first major breakthrough in this area and involved dropping small pieces of metalized paper over the target city before a raid. These pieces of paper were tuned to German radar wavelengths, interfering with the German radar. Bunches of this paper would look like a plane on radar, making it a particularly useful tool for night bombing raids, where German defences were dependant on radar to help them find their target.[128] 'Window' was first used in Operation Gomorrah (1943), which devastated Hamburg, the deadliest Allied bombing raid of the European campaign. While 'Window' was an RAF invention, Operation Gomorrah was a join operation, allowing both RAF and USAAF forces to fly under its protection. It should be noted that while Gomorrah was in itself a terror bombing operation, the USAAF largely adhered to their policy of precision bombing,

[128] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, *Volume V: Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 459-460.

targeting military and industrial targets. After the introduction of 'Window' Allied bomber losses dropped dramatically, allowing for an increase in larger bombing raids like Millennium and Gomorrah. While the Allies had been bombing Germany since 1939, their bombing campaigns did not escalate until Operation Millennium in 1942. In 1943 we see the development of the devastating firebombing strategies that would later ravage Germany and the Pacific. These grand area bombing campaigns are a direct result of the development of 'Window.'[129]

Other technologies were also developed to assist RAF area bombing campaigns in Europe. Early in the war the Allies used a blind bombing device 'Oboe,' which used radio transponders to identify the plane's location relative to its target. With these signals, the station could identify where a plane was and help guide and navigate them towards their target. This was used to help navigate Allied planes especially during night bombing raids, when ability to see targets and landmarks was severely compromised. 'Oboe' assisted with area bombing as it could guide a plane to a location or city, but was ineffective for precision bombing as it could not help locate specific targets. 'Oboe' had several limitations most notably its limited range; The Allies needed a way to locate targets beyond the range of 'Oboe' if they were to take their bombing campaign to the German heartland.[130] Their answer to this dilemma was the British H2S radar scanning system later adapted by the Americans into the H2X. The H2S was a radar system installed on the planes themselves, able to identify targets on the ground allowing bombers to find their target city at night even when outside the range of 'Oboe.'[131] The H2S was very limited and could best identify land targets near bodies of water; as a port city with multiple waterside targets, Hamburg was an ideal city to showcase the potential of the H2S.[132] While the H2S and H2X were both very useful for finding a city or similarly large target they did not allow for identification of smaller, specific

[129] Ibid, 460.
[130] *Ibid*, 458-460.
[131] *Ibid*, 458-460.
[132] *Ibid*, 458-460.

targets which meant that they were fundamentally more attuned to night bombing and area bombing than to precision bombing. While more ideal than Oboe, the H2X was still not designed for precision bombing and yet with this inferior technology the USAAF continued to attempt their campaign of precision bombing.

Bomb sights went through several advances which assisted bombers in their ability to identify and successfully hit targets. Unlike radar technology, bomb sights helped identify specific targets and thus lent themselves to precision bombing more than area bombing. Course-Setting Bomb Sights (CSBS), developed during the First World War, relied on data computed and set into the device before the plane took off and would indicate the point of release as the plane approached its target. However this meant that the plane had to maintain a fairly steady course as even small deviations in the air could lead to missing the target by some distance. In order to overcome this limitation the Mark XIV stabilised vector sight was developed, capable of allowing for evasive action and could even be aimed while the aircraft was turning if correctly banked.[133] While initial data was input as with traditional CSBS the Mark XIV had knobs which allowed for manual input of wind velocity, height, sea-level pressure and terminal velocity, which allowed for more accurate calculations. First operational in mid-1942, by early 1944 the Mark XIV could be found in most Allied aircraft. By allowing for the input and change of data mid-flight the Mark XIV was much more accurate than traditional CSBS. The Mark XIV was well suited to precision bombing as it was capable of making better calculations for hitting specific locations, while still limited it was certainly much more efficient than previous CSBS. Tachometric bomb sights were another, less common, style of sight which observed the movement of the target relative to the aircraft, compared that to azimuth and vertical data and calculated a course to intercept the target. These devices were complex and initially rolled out in limited numbers before being scrapped in favour

[133] Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, Volume IV: Annexes and Appendices* (East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, 2006), 37-39.

of the Mark XIV. While tachometric bombsights were more accurate, their complexity meant that they were difficult to use and took some time to train men to use them effectively. However, tachometric sights did play a notable role in the development of new precision bombing techniques meaning that as the war continued bomb sight technology was allowing for more precise strikes than had been possible earlier in the war.[134]. As a result of these advances, by the time the USAAF commenced their bombing campaign in Japan, technology had advanced to the point where more advanced, accurate bomb sights like the Mark XIV were commonplace. Technology like tachometric sights had also helped the Allies develop new precision bombing techniques, yet despite these advances the USAAF abandoned their adherence to precision bombing and adopted a campaign of area and terror bombing in Japan in 1945.

'Window,' 'Oboe,' and radar scanning systems were all developed in response to a shift away from daytime bombing raids to night bombing. The reasoning behind this shift was that, bombers were more difficult to spot at night and therefore losses would be less than from a daylight raid. Early in the war both the RAF and the USAAF made most of their bombing raids by daylight, because of inferior technology and moral questions about collateral damages from night time bombing raids. Max Hastings suggests this initial aversion to night bombing was a product of naïve optimism about the nature of the Second World War which was eroded over time. The belief was, having learned from the horrors of the First World War, the Second would be more civilised, with a greater value placed on human lives.[135] This optimism was worn down as the war dragged on and civilians were bombed time and time again. Nazi night time raids like the infamous Blitz slowly eroded this optimism in Britain. The embracing of area bombing by the RAF early in the war marks the death of this optimism in Britain. Having been subjected to destructive, night time raids the British had seen first-hand the power of area bombing. To many Britons the area bombing of

[134] *Ibid*, 37-39.
[135] Max Hastings, *Bomber Command* (London: Pan Books, 2010), 227-228.

Germany was simply following the changing nature of war, though there was a distinct note of revenge in the British bombings of Germany.[136] Late to the war, the Americans held onto their optimism until 1943, when they began utilizing night time bombing raids and developed a more flexible strategy, blurring the lines between precision and area bombings.[137]

This death of optimism and desire for revenge may help to explain why the USAAF's bombings of Japan were so violent. In Germany the USAAF started with an attempt to adhere to the policy of precision bombing before slowly blurring the lines between precision and area bombing. While in Japan the USAAF had no such transition and commenced with a full force area bombing campaign. While the United States was not victim to the Blitz or similar bombing campaigns at the hands of the Germans, America was the victim of a surprise attack which rocked the nation and dragged her into the war. It is important to understand just how significant Pearl Harbor was on the American psyche when discussing American differentiation between Germany and Japan. Pearl Harbor took two conflicts, both taking place an ocean away, and brought them to America's shore. Suddenly America was not safe, she was no longer a neutral party; war had come to the United States. The attack on Pearl Harbor held a prominent place in the American mindset throughout the war; John Dower argues that Pearl Harbor became much more than an attack or a declaration of war, but rather a symbol of American innocence, victimization and later a justification for exceptionalism. [138] During the war itself these ideals of innocence and victimization were an unspoken justification for the actions that took place in the war. To the American people, the United States was the victim of an unprovoked attack and had been robbed of its innocence. In reality there had long been threats of war between American and Japan. Only a month before Pearl Harbor, the US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall said he was prepared to "burn the

[136] Andrew Chandler, "The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War," *The English Historical Review* 108 (429) (1993) : 928.
[137] Hastings, *Bomber Command*, 227-228.
[138] John Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq* (New York, W. Norton Press, 2010), 15.

paper cities of Japan… There won't be any hesitation about bombing civilians," reflecting a rising tension and an awareness of the imminence of war.[139] Despite this political environment, the American people saw Pearl Harbor as a surprise attack, unheralded and unjustified. Marshall's quote clearly reflects an existing anti-Japanese sentiment before the war and shows that there was already some thought given to bombing the cities of Japan. However, after Pearl Harbor these actions no longer needed any justification, America was at war and Japan was the aggressor. After Pearl Harbor, any and all actions against the Japanese were justified in the minds of the American people, this exceptionalism justified America's extreme measures in putting an end to the Japanese menace. Just as the British quickly adopted policies of night and area bombing after being bombed by the Germans, America was prepared to use extreme force against the Japanese home islands at the first available chance. 'Remember Pearl Harbor' was a truly ubiquitous phrase popularised both as the title of a song and a film. The song was recorded only 10 days after the event and calls on the American people to "remember Pearl Harbor as we go to meet the foe," that Pearl Harbor will be "an act that lives forever more," challenging Americans to remember Pearl Harbor as they "remember the Alamo."[140] The film (taking the title from the song) was a dramatic retelling of the events of Pearl Harbor, focusing on a soldier who ultimately dies in the attack.[141] Both the song and the film reinforced that the American people should never forget that it was the actions of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor that dragged them, against their will, into this war. Pearl Harbor was more than just an attack; Pearl Harbor was a symbol of all that America had lost and of the wretchedness America was fighting against.

One final factor to take into consideration in regards to USAAF differentiation is the fact that the USAAF bombing of the Japanese home islands didn't commence until 1945, which meant

[139] *Robert L. Sherrod Memorandum for David W. Hulburd, Jr,* November 15, 1941, Hanson W. Baldwin Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.

[140] Sammy Kane. *Remember Pearl Harbor/Dear Mom*, Victor 27738-A, 1942, Vinyl.

[141] *Remember Pearl Harbor*, directed by Joseph Stanley (United States: Republic Films, 1942), film.

that America had been at war far longer than it had when it started its bombing campaign in Europe. The Japanese wished to stretch out the conflict as long as they could and make the war as unpleasant for the Americans as possible. This is most clearly evident in the bloody struggles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa. By 1945 the USAAF had begun blurring the lines between area and precision bombing, most notably in the firebombing of Dresden; the USAAF's firebombing of Japan was, in some ways, a natural evolution of this. As the war dragged on the USAAF became less optimistic about precision bombing while warming to the idea of area bombing, much as the RAF had done earlier in the war. While this is certainly a factor, there had been a preparedness to bomb Japanese cities long before 1945, from Arnold's experimenting with his own "little Tokios [sic]" as tests for incendiary bombs going as far back as Marshall's threat to burn the cities of Japan, even before Pearl Harbor.[142] While a desire to end the war and the war's erosion on the optimism and faith of the USAAF in their policies is likely a factor, there seems to be an existing preparedness, or at the very least consideration of the possibility, to use firebombs against Japan even before such tools were used in Germany. While precision bombing was the official policy of the USAAF, it seems that Japan was an exception even before the war had pushed the USAAF towards embracing area bombing.

The unpredictable nature of bombing means that collateral damage is always a reality. The indiscriminate nature of firebombing and other forms of terror bombing embrace the reality of collateral damage. Civilian losses were seldom mentioned in USAAF Mission Reports, likely because estimating civilian losses was difficult for bomber crews flying thousands of feet in the air, and because such thoughts may have been distressing to the airmen. Piloting bombers was a very stressful mission and 'combat fatigue' (as it was known) was a major issue.[143] While little was known about psychology and trauma at the time, air crews already had the stench of burning flesh

[142] Conrad C. Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians and Oil* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 168-169
Robert L. Sherrod Memorandum, November 15, 1941, George C. Marshall Research Library.
[143] LeMay, *Mission*, 359.

lingering in the planes bomb bays, they didn't need another reminder of the lives lost as a result of their actions.[144] Civilians were seldom mentioned in mission reports, perhaps to help assuage these men's consciences. And yet, counted or not, these bombing raids left casualties in their wake.

One notable exception to this silence can be found in the foreword to the USAAF mission report for Operation Meetinghouse. Here the report states in no uncertain terms that "the object of these attacks was *not* to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations."[145] While this is uncharacteristic of a mission report, the report itself later noted that the target bombing area is one of the most densely populated cities on earth, which means that even before the bombing began, there would have been an awareness of the devastating toll this raid would have. Whatever the intent of this statement, this document is a rare acknowledgement of civilian losses in a mission report. Acknowledgements of civilian losses are not found in XXI Bomber Command mission reports in missions before or after Meetinghouse, either in military operations like Iwo Jima or other suburban firebombing missions. [146]This is also significant as Operation Meetinghouse began the firebombing campaign which would touch nearly every Japanese city, taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and leaving even more homeless. This acknowledgement may be a passive nod to the fact that the bombing campaigns to come were not in line with the policy of precision bombing, but rather utilized the full force of the XXI Air Force in order to cripple Japan and force her surrender. Perhaps this acknowledgement of civilian losses was an indication of an

[144] Crane, *Airpower Strategy*, 174
[145] *Foreword to XXI Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report*, *Mission No. 40, Urban Area of Tokyo*, 10 March 1945, prepared 15 April 1945, Box 26, LeMay Papers.
[146]*XX Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report*, *Target: Iwo Jima*, *Mission No. 4*, 5 November 1944, prepared 12 November 1944, Box 17, LeMay Papers.
XXI Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report, *Mission No. 0*, 16 January 1945, prepared 21 January 1945, Box 26, LeMay Papers.
XXI Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report, *Mission No. 251-255*, 6 July 1945, prepared 18 Nov 1945, Box 26, LeMay Papers.

awareness that there would be significant civilian casualties in the following months in the firebombing raids throughout Japan.

By war's end, technology had developed in such a way as to benefit precision bombing strategies. Despite this the USAAF shifted further and further away from precision bombing as the war continued. This can, in part, be explained by a slow erosion of the optimistic belief that precision bombing could win the war, as seen earlier in the war with the RAF. However, the adoption of unrestrained terror bombing in Japan, coupled with existing tensions with Japan suggests that there are other factors at play. The significance of Pearl Harbor in the American mindset cannot be overlooked as a contributing factor; indeed it lends credence to the idea that the Japanese were a different kind of enemy to the Germans. The war in Europe was against a political entity, while in the Pacific the enemy was Japan and the Japanese people. The animosity felt towards the Japanese after Pearl Harbor and the cultural vendetta held over from the attack meant that the Japanese were an enemy that was to suffer the full force of the United States. Not the Japanese military, not the Japanese Government, the whole of Japan was to blame and the whole of Japan was to suffer.

CONCLUSION:

A War of Duty and A War of Honour

"War is the continuation of politics by other means"

- Carl von Clausewitz, 1832

When the United States entered the Second World War in 1941, they entered two very different conflicts as far as the American people were concerned. In Europe the enemy was an ideological and political one, the spread of Nazism and fascism and those who sought to expand their influence through violence. While the war was fought against the Germans and Italians, the real enemy was not a nation but an ideology. However, the war in the Pacific was fought not against a political enemy, but a racial enemy. The enemy in the Pacific was not Nazism or fascism; it was the Japanese, not Japan's government, nor Japanese imperialism but the Japanese themselves. In propaganda the Nazi state was often represented by Hitler or an Aryan looking Nazi soldier; it is the Nazi's, not the German people that were marked as the enemy. This is important because, as John Dower identifies, there was an understanding in the United States that not all Germans were adherents of Nazism and hence not all Germans were the enemy; what Dower terms 'good Germans.'[147] In the case of the Japanese, they were often represented by Emperor Hirohito who was believed to speak for all Japanese. Indeed many Western observers believed that the Japanese existed as a hive, all serving the greater good, the Empire. For this reason, representations of Hirohito in propaganda were understood to represent the will of the

[147] John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Rand and Power in the Pacific War*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 8.

Japanese people.[148] These vastly different perceptions of the enemy shaped the events of the war and are reflected in the strategies used against each nation. In Europe the Allies raged a war of duty against the perils of Nazism; in the Pacific they waged a war of honour, seeking revenge against Japan and her people. It was the "Jap" who was the threat; Japan and her people were the enemy.

This differentiation is apparent in the bombing policies of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) in Japan and Germany. The long, drawn out bombing campaign in Europe relied heavily on the USAAF attempting to make targeted strikes of select targets, focusing their firepower on specific targets with the intent of crippling Germany's military and economic capabilities, in keeping with the official USAAF policy of precision bombing. The bombing war in Japan, however, was an entirely different affair; the total weight of ordinance dropped in Germany was approximately 1,360,000 tons, while in Japan it was a mere 160,800 tons.[149] The bombing campaign in Europe took place over four years, while the bombing campaign in Japan only began in earnest in March 1945 with the firebombing of Tokyo (Operation Meetinghouse). Despite these major differences, the bombing war in Japan had a higher casualty rate than the bombing war in Germany. Even discounting the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the death toll for the Japanese and German bombing wars are roughly equal; both totalling approximately 300,000 people. The high number of Japanese casualties over such a relatively short period of time as well as the significant difference in the amount of ordinance dropped can largely be attributed to the shift from precision bombing (as practiced by the USAAF in Europe) to area bombing and the use of incendiary bombs. By shifting to area bombs the USAAF were

[148] *Know Your Enemy – Japan*, directed by Frank Capra and Joris Ivens (United States: U.S. Department of War, 1945), film.
[149] *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington D.C., 1946), 84.

no longer using large quantities of bombs in an attempt to hit a singular target, but instead could use a smaller quantity of incendiary bombs to start a conflagration which could raze an entire city. While precision bombing was far from an accurate practice, firebombing was a far more indiscriminate type of weapon, once dropped the fires were well beyond the control of the USAAF, burning anything in their paths.

The indiscriminate nature of area bombing is of great significance when taking into account the different attitudes the American people held towards the Germans and the Japanese. The threat in Europe was a political enemy and as such the USAAF wished to target military and economic targets. However, in Japan the enemy was not a political one, but a racial one, the Japanese people were the enemy. LeMay argues that the reasoning behind his use of area bombing in Japan was that the Japanese had dispersed their industry throughout the suburbs surrounding their factories. However, LeMay admits that the Germans also dispersed their industries, yet the USAAF did not practice area bombing in Germany.[150] When the dispersal of industry and the perception of the Japanese people as an enemy are both considered, then the choice to disregard the policy of precision bombing and undertake a campaign of area bombing makes sense. Japanese cities also lent themselves to firebombing because of their density of population and use of flammable materials in traditional Japanese construction. While Japan had made attempts to counter Allied firebombing, many older Japanese buildings were built largely of wood making them ideal targets for incendiary bombing. USAAF bombers were also able to take lessons learned in their joint bombings of Hamburg and Dresden to make their firebombing as effective as possible. The use of firebombs on Japanese cities was also justified by an ideology that Japanese civilians were not in fact civilians, but were legitimate military

[150] Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinley Kantor, *Mission With LeMay* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965), 383-4.

targets. In February 1945, as the war effort worsened and the threat of an American invasion loomed, the Japanese government created the National Resistance Program which drafted all men over the age of 15 and all women over 17 into the defense of the Japanese homeland.[151] This justified the USAAF bombing campaign in Japan as these civilians enlisted into the military were now military targets. This argument is best summed up by the USAAF's V Air Force's intelligence officer who stated: "There are no civilians in Japan."[152]

It is important to remember that these differing cultural and military attitudes towards the Japanese and the Germans did not evolve in a vacuum. The USAAF's bombing policy in Germany had shifted from precision bombing to a hybrid of precision and area bombing over the course of the war. The USAAF bombing of the Japanese home islands did not occur until 1945, after the USAAF's involvement with the firebombing of Dresden, the ultimate example of this shift. Not only did the bombing of Japan take place after much of the bombing of Germany, but the USAAF operated largely independently in the Pacific. In Europe the RAF ran a campaign of area bombing across Germany, which meant that whether the USAAF took part or not, German cities would still be razed. However in the Pacific the USAAF were largely alone and as such were forced to carry the full responsibility of the bombing raids. In this way it was simply more effective to burn the cities of Japan rather than attempt a long, drawn out campaign of precision bombing across multiple cities. The push for bombing Japanese cities also comes as a result of the steadfast belief held by Generals 'Hap' Arnold and Curtis LeMay that a campaign of area bombing would be sufficient to break Japanese morale and force them to surrender. This also

[151] James L. Huffman, *Japan in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 106.
[152] Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 696.

appealed to others in the US Armed Forces as it would avoid a costly American invasion of the Japanese home islands; an effort that was predicted to cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. All of these events took place in the shadow of Pearl Harbor, which shaped the American mindset for the entire war. Pearl Harbor was seen as an unforgettable and unforgivable event which did nothing to help the American people's already low views of the Japanese people. However, the American people's views on Germans and Italians remained largely unaffected by the war. This is because it was the Japanese who attacked America and mistreated American prisoners of war, while atrocities committed in Europe did not have any significant impact on the American people directly. The atrocities in Europe were regarded as the acts of a political party and not a nation, while the acts of the Japanese were seen as proof of the wicked nature of the Jap.

The USAAF bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific were markedly different in how they made use of the resources available to them. The aversion to area bombing in Europe was not found in the Pacific, where the firebombing of Japanese cities was embraced by the USAAF. No two conflicts will ever be the same and no strategy or policy, no matter how perfectly planned will survive contact with the enemy; however, it is still important to ask how and why the USAAF differentiated in their bombings of Germany and Japan. While military, social and cultural factors all play a role in shaping the policies and strategies used in these two conflicts, the single most significant factor in shaping this differentiation would be that, in the minds of the American people, the Nazis were the enemy in Europe while the Japanese people themselves were the enemy in the Pacific. To put it simply, not every German was a Nazi, but a "Jap" was a "Jap".

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