

IDENTITY AND SENTIENT EMOTIONS AT WORK

Amanda Mead

BSc (Hons), London; MCom, UNSW

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Macquarie Graduate School of Management
Macquarie University
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ABSTRACT

Work is central to human experience, influencing individual's lives, value systems and identities and organizing and shaping societies. Globalization, increasing economic interdependencies and technological change have destabilized the experience of work, causing organizational rationalizing, downsizing, mergers and offshore employment, and making the individual's experience of work increasingly uncertain and anxious. The pace of change is set to continue, even increase.

Using an interpretivist research paradigm and drawing on sociology, social psychology, moral philosophy and related disciplines, this research considers three 'moral' emotions – embarrassment, guilt and shame – and their relationships with personal identity-making. It draws on *practice* in a natural group setting during major organizational change to investigate the interpersonal emotional bridges between people and their experience of damage to these bridges.

I contend that the interactional ongoing development of self-identity is intrinsically linked to the awareness of *Other* and can be analyzed through the Goffmanesque perspectives of the dialogues of face and frame. I consider the *ethics of identity* and further contend that the ethical orientation of *communality*, a social construct of particular importance in African/Akan philosophy, can provide a significant third perspective to face and frame to help understand the role of these sentient *Other*-oriented emotions in personal identity-making.

My thesis makes five contributions. For scholars of identity, organizational change and sociologists of emotion, it proposes the addition of cognitively complex negative-affect valenced self-conscious emotions to the discussions of emotions in change. It proposes that Face and Frame are complementary analytical perspectives. It introduces the lens of the *ethic of communality* as a complement to individualism and extends Goffman by creating the Trilogy of Dialogues, *Face*, *Frame* and *Self-ethic*, to enable a more complete understanding of people's coactions with their self-identities. For practising managers, it will increase their ability to adapt and reinvent their organizations in times of major change, by providing a better understanding into the experience of change and the dilemmas and impact of sentient emotions.

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This work has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the thesis itself. I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Amanda Mead." The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Amanda Mead

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My motivation for embarking on this long, arduous and satisfying journey was a desire to widen my horizons beyond that afforded me by an academic background in the sciences.

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Ethics Committee Approval

Ethics Committee approval, Protocol number 5201001144, was granted for the interviews undertaken in this thesis. The research was conducted in accordance with the approved protocol.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Work is central to human existence and in Western society it has become a source of self-respect and identity particularly associated with achievement and status. Workplace roles and identities are dependent on cultural workplace orientations around gender, hierarchy, education level and geographic location. They shift in time and context and through managerial discourses and local dynamics, but work remains a defining characteristic of human identity. As Budd (2011) noted “identity cannot be separated from what others think of us and our work, nor from how we see our work fitting into the broader, social world” (p. 149).

The nature of the workplace is changing. Globalization, the results of innovation and technological progress, the advent of world-wide communication through the Internet, changes to manufacturing technologies, and increases in international travel and education have all been an influence in the latter part of the 20th century. Structural market changes, including privatization, deregulation and removal of market protections such as tariffs and subsidies resulted from the increasing international integration of local economies through movement of goods, services, capital, labour and intellectual capital across borders. These effects, combined with stable and long-term growth, created access to increasing work opportunities and a flourishing of markets worldwide. This in turn has led to structural organizational change through rationalization, downsizing, mergers and acquisition, and shifting employment offshore. The very nature of work, and models of organization, have been directly affected and have been changing at an increasing rate in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund described the pace of globalization as “like a snowball rolling down a steep mountain, globalization seems to be gathering more and more momentum” (IMF, 2008 p. 7).

In 2008–09 the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) accelerated the changes, further increasing uncertainty in the workplace internationally: “Today, the world’s societies face severe

economic and social challenges. The 2008–09 economic downturn has led to reduced potential output growth, rising unemployment and soaring public debt. To recover, countries need to find new and sustainable sources of growth” (OECD, 2010). The challenges are considerable: “The search for new sources of growth comes, however, at a time when many countries have stagnating or declining populations and face diminishing returns from labour inputs and investment in physical capital” (OECD, 2010). Globalization, increasing economic interdependencies and technological change have destabilized the experience of work, making the individual’s experience of work increasingly uncertain and anxious. As noted by the IMF, the pace of change is set to continue and even increase.

In this turbulent environment, more and more people will experience major workplace change at least once in their careers. As work is central to human identity and workplace identities are in flux, the uncertainty and anxiety that this change brings is already causing mental health issues in the workplace. Work-related stress compensation claims now rank as second in the list of most common claims in Australia, and 14% of adults experience anxiety disorders annually (Australian Social Trends 4102.0, 2009). The social and financial costs are high. In Australia, the median time lost at work for mental stress reasons has increased faster than any other cause, and is now more than three times the overall median (Compendium of Workers’ Compensation Statistics Australia 2010–11, 2013). The wider societal effects are unfolding as individuals try to find ways of reducing their discomfort and these will continue to reverberate.

The increasing momentum of globalization, combined with the ongoing effects of the GFC, is creating structural and social changes in the workplace. Changes to models of organization have affected the nature of work and human interactions at work and the anxiety this is causing is starting to have significant social and financial costs. The micro dynamics of interaction in change meetings and their effect on emotions and identity is a largely unexplored area of change management practice. The argument that meetings should be centre stage as a topic of research in sociology, anthropology and sociolinguistics has been developing since the 1970s. Johnson et. al. (2006) raised the idea of whether there should be a multi-perspective theoretical response to examining meetings in organizations. The argument for such an approach is the breadth of insight that this can provide.

This research focuses on sentient emotion and identity construction in formal meetings, in an organization during major structural change. It is an in depth analysis of a single case study to illustrate the phenomena. This emic approach, seeking a contextually-grounded view of meeting practices, identity and emotion in organizational change, was used in order to obtain a “real, rather than an idealised, view of what takes place” (Clegg, Pitsis and Veenswijk, 2008 p. 599) in those moments at social site of change.

The research is significant at such a time of turbulence and change as it contributes to the understanding of self and identity in the workplace.

1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH

My own experience illustrates the changes noted above and provided the impetus for this thesis. Prior to becoming an academic, I had a successful commercial career as a strategic marketer working at a regional level in two large organizations in the food industry, one Australian and the other French owned. At the time when I was employed, both organizations were negatively affected by changes to government subsidies and tariffs and positively affected by the globalizing marketplace. They were growing fast through regional development of markets, technological product and process innovations, and acquisitions and mergers. Each of the organizations that I worked for was the dominant partner in merger activities.

My management team was responsible for merging with our own the organizational culture of the acquired organization. The employees of the smaller organizations were the worst affected. They had to make the larger adjustment to their work roles and behaviours, and were the people most likely to lose their employment through cost cutting or a lack of ‘fit’ with my organization. To me, it felt like an almost brutal process. I witnessed anxiety, distress, anger, mis-steps in meetings, loss of face, great sadness and significant changes in people’s behaviours a number of times during my time with the organization as we ‘merged’ with many other smaller ones. At the time it seemed a little counter-intuitive that employees would stay on in the face of this anxiety and distress. However, they did and it appears they still do.

Organizations are open ecologies, not Goffmanesque total institutions (Goffman, 2007) in the traditional sense, and employees are tied economically, socially, sometimes

geographically and through specialization to their workplace. While they could be said to have the ‘choice’ to deselect themselves in unwelcomed times of change and increased emotional anxiety, they often felt they could not and they did not. Instead, they chose to stay and tried to manage their emotions and themselves in the unwelcoming situation in which they found themselves.

I learned to expect extreme emotional responses to the news of change that I brought. The interactions that immediately followed the news held great meaning for all the people involved. I became concerned about the wider effects for the people, since central to their sense of identity was how people felt about their work and their alienation from it. I also became concerned about the future of the organization. As a consequence of these concerns and the sense of responsibility that I felt for the others, I tried to understand what was behind the intensity of the emotional response, what was unrevealed, and how people were being changed by the impact. I believed that improved understanding would enable insight and practical wisdom in the workplace and in wider social contexts and perhaps lead to more positive experiences and outcomes. It was this belief and hope that led to my leaving the commercial sector and ultimately embarking on this research.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research considers the experience and impact of sentient moral emotions on identity during organizational change. Sentient moral emotions are the cognitively complex other-oriented emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame – the result of damage to the interpersonal emotional bridges between people. The full descriptive name for the emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment is ‘moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, negative-affect valenced’ emotions (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).

Sentient is an adjective defined as (a person or animal) having the power of perception by the senses. It is characterized by sensation and consciousness. The etymology is from the Latin ‘sentire’, to feel; and early English definitions of sentient included ‘capable of feeling’ (Brown, 1993). Sentient is used here as a shorthand for moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, negative-affect valenced emotions in order to help capture the combination of ‘knowingness’, feeling, awareness of self and others and its often tacit character.

The objectives of this research are to reveal how people experience the emotions that arise from awareness of others in social interactions during the transition ritual of major organizational change and to develop a depth of understanding of the effects on personal identity. To achieve these objectives, the research focused on the group setting of meetings during an organizational takeover and subsequent redundancy. It used semi-structured interviews to explore the social anxiety, emotions and identity of a group of employees of the smaller organization in a takeover/merger process during two meetings. The interviews had a heuristic aspect with the research method using projective techniques and the Goffmanesque constructs of Face and Frame. Dialogues were used to analyse narratives of sentient emotion and identity.

The intention is to bring together practice insights from different theoretical disciplines and develop a cross-disciplinary theory that accepts the “necessary loss of conceptual refinement this requires when seen from any single disciplinary perspective” (Schultz & Hatch, 2005 p. 341). Integrating insights from different theoretical disciplines will be of benefit in practice to develop “theoretical constructs that reflect everyday managerial concerns” (p. 341) and help managers develop insights and reflective practice around sentient emotions and identity in change management.

Using a philosophical interpretivist research approach, this thesis demonstrates that self-identity is influenced by Self-ethic and that interactional ongoing identity construction is intrinsically linked to sentient emotions.

This thesis makes five contributions to the literature and practice of identity coactions and change in organizations.

This research extends the discussions of:

- 1) self-oriented negatively valenced emotions, such as loss and associated grief, which are widely discussed in the literature on change, to the sentient emotions that are an intrinsic part of self-identity. This allows for a more complete, complex understanding of identity in change
- 2) identity in organizations to include the ethical dimensions of self-identity, the moral base of the individual’s perspective
- 3) culture in organizations by balancing the individualism prevalent in Western cultures with importance of community, rather than suggesting that one or the other is more important. This sense of community, solidarity and mutual social

responsibility in African philosophy is in harmony with the contemporary cultural ethos in Western societies.

This research extends the work of Goffman in two ways:

- 4) It extends the current Goffmanesque practice of explaining how people coact their identities through the dialogues of either *Face* or *Frame* independently to one of complementarity.
- 5) It further extends Goffman by adding the complementary dialogue of *Self-ethic* to *Face* and *Frame*, creating the Trilogy of Dialogues.

Both these extensions enable a more complete understanding of identity and sentient emotions at work.

1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS

The subject of emotions in the workplace is an important and emergent one. Many of the ‘change gurus’ have proposed managing emotional responses to change and giving attention to emotion as the key to effecting management learning in organizational change (Bolton, 2009; Fineman, 1997). In organizational research on emotion, attention has focused on daily workplace practices. These scholars’ primary focus has been on understanding the stress of self-oriented negative-affect valenced emotions such as loss and associated grief, and the pain of learning (Bridges, 2003; Kanter, 1983a; Schein, 2007), but not the role of the moral emotions, the cognitively complex moral negative-valenced self-conscious emotions that are an intrinsic part of self-identity.

Based on transition ritual theory, the three-stage process theory of change developed by Kurt Lewin (1952) became a major feature of management of organizational change in the second half of the 20th century. In the transition ritual perspective on change, work is characterized as central to human existence and workplace change as a transition ritual between two ways of being. People whose employment is at risk in a workplace during a major structural change, such as downsizing, can be characterized as being in the liminal phase of a transition ritual. Turner (1977) described liminality as a context where participants are in transition: “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the

positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony” (p. 95). This is a useful period for investigation because, in liminality, social anxiety is increased along with participants’ uncertainty and self-conscious awareness of the judgements of others (Miller, 1996). The experience of sentient emotions in identity construction during liminality is potentially more explicit and therefore more open to investigation.

Organizations are social entities, and meetings are a basic and pervasive part of organizational life (Schwartzman, 1987). Meetings are also the main social context within which change interactions occur in organizations. Increasing attention is being paid to the ‘improvisational’ nature of change management practice in social interactions (Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997). These social interactions are usually in multi-personal meetings (Laeven, 2002). What happens in meetings during change – and how the management issues are addressed and the other interactions are enacted – has received relatively little close investigation.

Thus the research problem addressed in this study is:

How can we better understand how people coact their identities in meetings during organizational change?

The research problem gives rise to three research questions; each is addressed, in turn, in chapters 2–5.

Research Question 1:

How can perspectives of self/other and identity be integrated and analysed in order to understand the role of sentient emotions in identity construction?

Research Question 2:

How can social interactions in meetings during organizational change be characterized and analysed in order to consider the effects of sentient emotions?

Research Question 3:

How can sentient emotions in meetings during organizational change be revealed through a research process of narrative analysis?

1.5 DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

In developing an understanding of the lineage of thought and the bodies of literature that bear on this research, I made use of the hermeneutic framework for literature reviews described by Boell and Cecz-Kecmanovic (2010), which can “help academics in advancing the quality of their literature reviews” (p. 142). I was drawn to this research topic through my own experiences, described in sections 1.2 and 1.6(3), and the sociological writings of Erving Goffman. I therefore already had a bond to my subject matter, which Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall (2004) noted is highly important in research.

1.5.1 THE INTERVIEWS

The analysis of the in-depth interviews was a heuristic exploration of emotions and identity during an organizational takeover and subsequent redundancy. This empirical work was based in the phenomenological research technique of heuristic “methods and processes aimed at discovery; a way of self-inquiry and dialogue with others” (Moustakas, 1994). These methods drew on Polanyi’s (1966) concepts of tacit knowing. They emphasize the process of discovery of an inner knowing. In conversations, the researcher enters into the participant’s perspective and experience, through the participant “telling and retelling their stories with increasing understanding and insight” (Moustakas, 1994 p. 19). This second-order enquiry provided a reflection on first-order forms of knowledge from experience, making explicit the principles which are implicit in the practices (Collingwood, Connelly, & D’Oro, 2005).

The selection of participants was purposive (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p27). The criteria for selection were that they had worked at the organization for 10 or more years and had developed a career through promotion and continuing education; they were actively engaged with their professional associations; they had completed or were close to completing their transition to their new life; and they had attended at least one of two half-day-long meetings at which a major change in organizational direction had occurred.

During the period of investigation, the participants could be considered to be in a liminal state, between what had been a relatively stable state of employment with a familiar peer group, transitioning to a new phase of life, which may or may not include similar employment. In this empirical investigation, the participants played an active role, widely and deeply exploring the phenomena within heuristic conversations with the researcher.

1.5.2 THE NARRATIVE APPROACH

A narrative approach was determined as the most appropriate to offer methodological coherence and give the credibility, transferability and completeness required. Narrative analysis is widely held to be useful in uncovering meaning and revealing identity, as Polkinghorne (1988) noted: “narrative meaning functions to give form to the understanding of a purpose to life and to join everyday actions and events into episodic units” (p. 11). The research used emplotted narratives, a powerful means of capturing the heart or the essence of the story of an individual or a group of participants. This process unifies and connects the individual narratives of each study participant with the reflexive understandings of the researcher in a complex retelling.

1.6 RESEARCHER’S INFLUENCE

With the research focus on sentient emotions and identity, the position adopted here drew on literature from philosophy, social psychology and sociology. Three important starting points influenced the approach taken.

1. I was influenced by interaction, relationships and the generalized human goals of connection in an open interpretive approach and the concept that the relationships between the elements of any social order to be variables rather than known quantities. I took the social constructionist and interactionist view that self and identity are constructed dialogically over time through interaction between self-definition and the social context (Watson, 2008a; Ybema et al., 2009). I acknowledge the paradox at the heart of my approach, noting that concepts of identity presuppose at least a partially stable self. However, if self is constructed only through dialogic coaction in a context, then how are the entities in dialogue existing in the first place? And if the ongoing

nature of dialogic coaction dictates that self and identity are co-created and continually changing over time, how can the instability be analyzed? These are key concepts and questions in European and North American sociology.

I drew heavily here on Erving Goffman's work on micro interaction and the individual's emotional-relational world to build my perspective on self and identity.

2. I was influenced by concepts of identity and the identity roles of emotions, relationships and social influence. My interests were the moral emotions, specifically the negative-affect, negative-affect valenced, other-oriented – that is, the sentient emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame. English-speaking cultures have historical taboos around discussing and displaying emotion, particularly in the language around shame and guilt, which makes navigating a clear research path more complex.

In chapters 2 and 3, I drew on key scholars of identity, organization, social and cultural psychology and descriptive phenomenology to build my perspective on identity at work.

3. I was influenced by my childhood in West Africa which allowed me to be *part of* two cultures, rather than *between* two cultures. My early life was in the Akan region of Ghana and the Hausa region of Nigeria. My expatriate English family lived in large houses on university campuses and my mother had the help of many local servants in running the family household. These servants and their families lived in smaller houses in our compounds, in close proximity, and my brother, sister and I spent much of our time with them until we went to boarding school and then during school holidays. Despite the obvious status difference between my parents and their servants that had been bestowed by geography, culture, education and financial resources, these same servants and their families were like an extended family, in warm and supportive daily relationships, providing key social and ethical influences in our early lives.

As a curious consequence of these relationships, I grew up with primarily African, specifically Akan and Hausa, philosophies of personhood and communality. These informed my approach to the research. However, conscious of my presence as an expatriate 'other' being the primary source of my knowledge of African philosophies, I make a limited claim to knowledge. My knowledge and experience are of oral and aesthetic traditions in visible practice to an outsider child engaged with and in the

presence of the community; as a member of a family whose shared African history and ongoing connection to aesthetic and symbolic African artefacts, myths and narratives forms part of our collective identity; and finally as an outsider adult engaged with and identifying with the community and the philosophy from a distance.

I drew on a range of African philosophical thought, focusing particularly on oral and aesthetic Akan traditions and the writings of contemporary cosmopolitan philosophers of Akan origin, Kwase Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye and Anthony Appiah.

My research was thus influenced by these three extensive and diverse bodies of scholarship and a rich oral and aesthetic tradition, all of which are based in long legacies of philosophical thought. As Kenneth Gergen (2009) so beautifully describes it, these are my ‘Textual Companions’.

1.7 DELIMITATIONS OF SCOPE

The emotions studied in this research are shame, guilt and embarrassment. These are moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, negative-affect valenced emotions. The family of moral emotions includes Pride. Pride is a moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, positive-affect valenced emotion. Pride is not included in this research. Pride is excluded from this research as, while the development of pride is considered to influence moral life, pride is a positive self-oriented emotion which is associated with confidence and perception of reduced social risk. This focus of this research considered the effects of the moral self-oriented negative-affect valenced emotions on the self-identity of participants in change meetings, a time of time of increased personal anxiety and social risk.

Only meetings during a major organizational change are included in this study.

People of retirement age or who had taken redundancy and returned as contractors are excluded from the study.

1.8 THESIS OUTLINE

Chapter 1 – Introduction introduces the research topic, the motivations for this research, the objectives and contributions to knowledge, and the significance of this research. It

presents the research problem, the corresponding research questions and the research approach.

Chapter 2 – In Relationship: Emotional Duality of Self/Other addresses the question: How can perspectives of self/other and identity be integrated and analysed in order to understand the role of sentient emotions in identity construction? This chapter develops the Goffmanesque concept of Face and begins with introducing the emotional duality of self and other. This is followed by a description of the sentient emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame, first in relation to social anxiety and then in relation to Goffman and the sociological traditions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of identity and self in the emotional-relational world, and Face-dialogue.

Chapter 3 – Change Encounters: Where Emotions Meet addresses the question: How can social interactions in meetings during organizational change be characterized and analysed in order to consider the effects of sentient emotions? This chapter develops the Goffmanesque concept of Frame. It describes sentient emotions at work, strategizing and organizational change, and transitions, rituals and liminality. Meetings are discussed comprehensively as is the concept of Goffman's Frames. The chapter then presents self-identity and emotional relational bridges, and concludes with a discussion of Frame-dialogue.

Chapter 4 – The Meetings and the Moments addresses the question: How can sentient emotions in meetings during organizational change be revealed through a research process of narrative analysis? The chapter describes and justifies the adopted methodologies, outlines the research context, and describes the interview process and how the narratives were created from the interview data. Finally, the emerging analytical perspectives of Face, Frame and moral dialogues are discussed in the context of marketing and engineering strategy meetings.

Chapter 5 – Sentient Emotions at Work: Face, Frame and Self-Ethic Dialogues considers the findings of the previous three chapters and relates them to the research problem and questions. It discusses self-identity and dialogues with Self-ethic and further explores the African ethic of communality. The chapter concludes by examining the implications of these research findings.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion summarizes the research, presents the contributions to the body of knowledge and the implications for theory and practice. It discusses the limitations of this research and offers directions for future research.

1.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced the research problem and the research questions, justified the significance and contribution of the thesis on theoretical and practical grounds, and described the research orientation and the research process. Starting from these foundations, the next chapter develops a detailed view of the literature on concepts associated with self-identity, self-other, sentient emotions, Face and identity.

CHAPTER 2

IN RELATIONSHIP WITH IDENTITY: EMOTIONAL DUALITY OF SELF/OTHER

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the proposition that cognitively complex, sentient, negative-affect valenced emotions, which act to facilitate attainment of complex social goals such as identity construction, can be partially examined through the Goffmanesque concept of Face-dialogues. It reflects on concepts associated with self, other, emotions, face and identity and addresses the question: How can perspectives of self/other and identity be integrated and analysed in order to understand the role of sentient emotions in identity construction?

The chapter begins with an examination of the moral basis of identity. This is followed by a historical overview of the importance of emotions in social life and development of a sociological view of self and otherness that will allow investigation of emotions. It then analyzes how the work of Erving Goffman can inform the investigation, and builds the case for examining emotions in organizations and within the context of organizational practices. It examines sentient behaviour in micro interaction and the role other-oriented emotions play in the ongoing development of individual identities. The final section introduces Face-dialogue, a Goffmanesque concept, as a partial lens to investigate the phenomenon of sentient emotions and identity.

2.2 MORAL VIEWS OF IDENTITY

James (1890a) first discussed the concept of personal identity in the psychological literature, drawing it from philosophy. Weigert (1983) traced the recent emergence of the concept of identity in sociology and social psychology to Erikson (1946) describing ego identity as a psychological achievement and a function of the socio-historical moment in which that individual lives (Weigert, 1983 p. 186).

There are number of definitions of personal and moral self-identity currently available in the literature. The simplest is from Aquino and Reed (2002) who defined moral identity as “a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits” (p. 1424). In a related discussion, Hitlin (2003) described the “core of personal identity as being composed of particular value structures” (p. 132). Carr (2001) separated moral identity from personal identity arguing that saying that moral identity is voluntary and “more a significant feature of personal identity that actually synonymous with it” (p. 79). Blasi (1993) described “an inner quasi-substance made up of immediately experienced feelings, intuitions and beliefs. This inner self is contrasted with the external superficial self and is considered one’s true self” (p. 105). Similarly, Goffman (1974a) described ego or felt identity as “subjective sense of his own situation and as the sense of existential continuity coming from social experiences” (p. 105).

Morality can be considered as part of a group of related concepts about how humans ‘should’ act. The word ‘moral’ is defined as of or pertaining to human character or behaviour considered as good or bad; of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the actions, volitions or character of responsible beings. ‘Mores’ are the acquired customs and moral assumptions which give cohesion to a community or social group; and ‘morality’ is defined as knowledge of moral science or ethical wisdom (Brown, 1993). What individuals owe to others is guided by moral understandings of right and wrong, and these moral understandings and principles are grouped into and interpreted through ethics. These are all base the idea of what can be seen as general identity values. Goffman (1974a) described theses as: “fully entrenched nowhere, and yet they can cast some kind of shadow on the encounters encountered everywhere in daily living” (p. 128).

Discussions around the concept of an ethic or ethics have been developing since Ancient Greece. Related to the above, the term ‘ethic’ or ‘ethics’ is defined as set of moral principles that are held by and guide the behaviour of individuals (Brown, 1993). Originally from the Greek term ‘ethike philosophia’ or moral philosophy and ‘ethikos’ or moral character, the term in the sense of the study of morals was used as early as the late 14th century, while ‘ethic’ meaning a person’s moral principles or moral stance, stems from the mid-17th century (Harper, 2001).

Three types of ethical theories exist, teleological, deontological and virtue-based. Teleological ethical theories, such as Mill’s (2007) ‘Utilitarianism’, are about maximizing

goods, valuable outcomes or the good life and minimizing harm. Deontological ethical theories, such as Kant's (2002) 'Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals', concern the rights and duties of individuals and relationships between people being mediated by constraining rules or principles of behaviour. Teleological and Deontological ethics, therefore, are about the values and principles of action of people in groups and societies, the duties and benefits, and the contexts in which they take place. These guiding principles have practical value in everyday life, guiding practices or what we do in new and varying circumstances and allowing support for each kind of decision-making. Tensions can arise from the different ways the principles are interpreted.

In contrast, Virtue ethics are about how to develop virtue and ethical character in individuals and communities so that they behave virtuously as adults and achieve a good life. Virtue ethics has a long history in moral philosophy, dating back to Plato and Aristotle. It focuses on educating individuals to have virtuous dispositions, character traits that are seen as good, and practical wisdom to make good decisions. Virtue ethics cannot be directly contrasted with Teleological and Deontological ethics as they do not directly relate to decisions made and actions taken. Instead, Virtue ethics have to do with what the society seeks as enabling one to lead a good life, and how to be a good person, which relates more to concepts of personhood. Haidt and Joseph (2007) noted that "where the Greeks focussed on character and asked what kind of person we should become, modern ethics focusses on actions, trying to determine what we should do" (p. 370). From a moral psychology perspective, Virtue ethics are intrinsically related to the idea of 'other'. They can be seen as how humans develop moral understanding, learn to make moral decisions and how those ethics inform an individual's sense of identity. The next section considers the role of the other in the development of moral understanding.

Blasi et al's (1999) discussion of emotions and moral motivation noted: "it would seem that, rather than explaining moral motivation, emotion pre-requires moral motivation in order to be explained in moral term" (p. 13) and considered that moral emotions "seem to be based on, and reflect pre-existing concerns" (p. 16). This suggests that ethical base that each individual holds most strongly, be it individualism, family oriented or community oriented, will influence what they experience moral emotions about. In the perspective of the research in this thesis, these 'pre-existing concerns' appear to be the underlying moral ethics, the traits or values structures that are at the core of moral identity.

In traditional Akan philosophy, the ethical base is one community. There is no direct translation of the word ‘moral’ in the Akan language, instead the concept of character, ‘suban’, is used. Gyekye (1995) notes that this concept is “so crucial and is given such a central place in Akan moral language and thought, that it may be considered as summing up the whole of morality” (p. 147). This notion of character is related to the concept of an ethic, in the same way that *ethikos* meant moral character in ancient Greece, and it is completely related to the welfare of the community. “In Akan moral thought, the sole criterion of goodness is the welfare or well-being of the community ... the good is identical the welfare of the society, which is expected to include the welfare of the individual” (Gyekye, 1995 p. 132).

Understanding of the need for an ethical base has led to attempts to unite the values and principles of people’s actions in groups and societies, how to help individuals to have a virtuous character and the practical wisdom to make good decisions has led to calls for a Global Ethic: “We speak here not of ethics in the plural, which implies rather great detail, but of ethic in the singular, i.e., the fundamental attitude toward good and evil, and the basic and middle principles needed to put it into action” (Swidler, 2006 p. 159). Okeja’s (2012) ‘Normative Justification of a Global Ethic’, a consideration of ‘The Golden Rule’ based on African philosophies, discussed the challenges of oversimplification and how no single version of the Golden Rule could fulfil the demands of a global Ethic. In his conclusion, Okeja noted the important role of the social aspect in any discussion of ethics: “The moral ought of the principle of reciprocity, which defines the basic idea of a global ethic, should be justified in a way that address all of humanity and not some who belong to a particular group” (p. 142).

To address the challenges of oversimplification, another way of approaching a ‘global ethic’ is to consider the similarities that exist between people at a more personal level. Shweder, Much, Mahpatra and Park (1997), in their ‘Big Three of Morality’, defined autonomy, community and divinity as widespread moral ethics that inform moral identity. They argued that autonomy, community and divinity are universal moral concepts present in every society. However, the relative importance of each varies between societies. Their analysis of moral discourse in India and the United States developed the argument that morality and moral identity is a communal concept as much as an individual one.

Shweder et al. (1997) described the ethic of ‘autonomy’ as relying on regulative concepts relating to harm, rights and justice. This ethic focuses on the ideal of individualism and is

designed to “protect the zone of discretionary choice of ‘individuals’ and to promote the exercise of individual will in the pursuit of personal preferences” (p. 138). They described the ethic of ‘community’ as relying on regulative concepts relating to duty, hierarchy and interdependency. This ethic focuses on the ideal of community or society and is designed to “protect the moral integrity of the various stations or roles that constitute a ‘society’ or a ‘community’ where a ‘society’ or ‘community’ is conceived of as a corporate entity with an identity, standing, history, and reputation of its own” (p. 138). The ethic of ‘divinity’ relies on regulative concepts relating to sacred order, natural order, tradition and purity. Its theist ontology presupposes the existence of higher being(s). It “aims to protect the soul, the spirit, the spiritual aspects of the human agent and ‘nature’ from degradation” (p. 138).

This ‘Big Three’ concept of moral order has been further investigated by a number of scholars. Directly influenced by the work of Shweder et al., Haidt and Joseph (2007) developed a sophisticated cross-cultural view of the social functions of intuitions and emotions and the psychological mechanisms underlying moral judgement and discourse. Haidt and Joseph concluded that there are five underlying emotional ethical systems, foundations they characterized as kind of ‘taste buds’ that give rise to moral intuitions across cultures. The ‘Five Foundations’ are evolved capacities involved in detecting and producing affective reactions to issues related to harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity. The Five Foundations theory is a cultural-psychological theory, which extends the ‘Big Three’ of Shweder et al., proposing that each of the five foundations has an evolutionary basis. The foundations are cross cultural, varying in their importance in a particular culture.

The first of the foundations, harm-care, is based in the sensitivity to and dislike of signs of cruelty and/or suffering in others, and the compassionate responses that primate species, particularly humans, show to others. Fairness-reciprocity is related to concepts of fairness and justice based in reciprocal altruism and the sense of responsibility and gratitude needed for co-operation and the formation of alliances. These two foundations of harm-care and fairness-reciprocity form the psychological base of Shweder’s ethic of autonomy (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Ingroup-loyalty is based in the social emotions related to concepts of loyalty, patriotism and heroism and comes from the need for humans to live in collective or family groups. This foundation involves recognizing, trusting and co-operating with ingroup members through rituals that strengthen group solidarity, and distrusting others. Authority-respect

was originally based on living in hierarchically structured ingroups where the dominant individual has protective powers for the others, but is now based more on social hierarchies and voluntary deference. There are virtues relating to the positions of power: magnanimity, fatherliness, and wisdom and subordination: respect, duty, and obedience. These two foundations of ingroup-loyalty and authority-respect form the psychological base of Shweder's ethic of community (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

The final foundation, purity-sanctity, relates to disgust, an emotion specific to humans that acts as a guardian of the body. Disgust originally protected against disease transmission, but in more recent human societies it has also become a social emotion. Purity-sanctity is concerned with bodily and religious activities, seeing vices in 'debased, impure' preoccupations such as lust and gluttony, and elevating and sanctifying virtues such as chastity and piety. This foundation, purity-sanctity forms the psychological base of Shweder's ethic of divinity (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Gigerenzer's (2007) perspective on the five foundations theory takes the individual, family and community as his ethical base, and looks at the activation of these higher-evolved capacities in a way that relates to levels of identity through society. Gigerenzer regards the capacities around harm-care and fairness-reciprocity as relevant to all humans, but the focus is at different levels.

Like Shweder et al. (1997) and Haidt and Joseph (2007), Gigerenzer suggested that a person in a society with an ethic of individualism, like some Western societies, focuses on autonomy and is connected primarily to the higher-evolved capacities around harm-care and fairness-reciprocity for the individual. Gigerenzer developed a more identity-based theory when he suggested that societies with a family-oriented ethic are connected to the higher-evolved capacities around harm-care and fairness-reciprocity, but at the family, not the individual, level and that an ethic of family also activates the capacities around ingroup-loyalty and authority-respect. Rather than the ethic of divinity standing alone, Gigerenzer suggested that all five foundations are activated in those societies with an ethic of community. He argued that, once a group reaches a certain size, societal rules and codes around concepts of purity-sanctity become important and concepts of divinity emerge to help people make sense of their roles in the society (Gigerenzer, 2007 pp. 185–189).

Emotions and their moral base are now seen as integral to work. Chester Barnard, in his classic book 'The Functions of the Executive' (1938), noted the importance of morality in

managerial identity, explaining that “morals arise from forces external to the individual as a person” (p. 262) and that “executive positions imply a complex morality” (p. 272). Barnard’s analysis was influential, because it was one of the first examinations of morality in modern organization structures.

The moral base of individuals and organizations was seen as an important and challenging issue facing organizations as they became larger and more complex as: “an increasing degree of corporation implies an increasing moral complexity” (Barnard, 1938 p. 288). This challenge is still true today, as evidenced by Flanagan and Clarke’s (2007) comment on ethical decision making for accountants that “Most accountants do not realize—until it is perhaps too late—that virtually all aspects of their work have an ethical dimension” (p. 488).

This acknowledgement of the importance of a moral base has led to the development of professional ethical codes internationally. The International Federation of Accountants is one such example and its ‘2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants’ (IFAC, 2013) assists accountants to maintain a moral dimension to their decisions. Yet as Flanagan and Clarke also noted: “Focusing on yet another set of rules (ethical codes) is unlikely, by itself, to solve the problem” (p. 493), as such rules can be applied only to known problems and conditions and not all of these problems and conditions are known. They noted that codes of ethics need to allow the context to be considered: “ethical rules need to be contingent on the settings, intentions or consequences with which the practitioners are faced” (p. 499). In their book ‘Practical Wisdom’ (2010), Schwartz and Sharp agreed, noting that “from ethics textbooks to professional association codes, to our everyday life, any discussion of moral choices is dominated by rules talk” (p. 43), but it is a “grey world, not a black and white one. It is context dependent” (p. 44). This context dependency is acknowledged by Flanagan, Little and Watts (2005), whose governance model further highlighted the importance of moral base: “At the level of responsibility, we need to assess any likely action against the good we intend by that action. This will result in decisions that the decision-maker knows are ethical” (p. 280).

A further complication is different types of morality and their increasingly overlapping applications. Hendry’s (2004) ‘bimoral society’ noted that two distinct types of morality coexist and that they have become increasingly blurred in the past 40 years. He observed a decline in traditional morality, with norms of obligation to others, and a rise in self-interest based ‘market morality’ exploiting outsiders. He postulated the reason for this was that

“business and financial institutions grew massively in power and influence, while the traditional moral authorities of church, state, family, community and education were all seriously weakened.” (p252). This combination has allowed increased social legitimacy of the market morality of self-interest (p. 253). Managers must navigate a course which allows the business imperatives and competitive advantage of self-interest and individuality and their own moral beliefs to coexist.

2.2.1 EMOTIONAL DUALITY OF THE SELF/OTHER

Emotions are so fundamental to the human experience that they are studied in and across academic disciplines. The intertwining philosophical, psychological and sociological scholarly perspectives give a rich basis for exploring how other-oriented emotions play a role in identity construction.

Major debates in philosophy and psychology historically concerned the positive and negative effects of emotions in social life. The negative view, described as early as the time of Plato, is associated with emotional responses being antagonistic to reason and therefore negative to the smooth operation of social life. This view was echoed strongly during the Enlightenment period, which valued reason as a route to higher levels of existence. In contrast, Aristotle viewed emotions as learned phenomena which enable group interaction and are therefore positive for the dynamics of social life, a view which has gained momentum during the 20th century developments in humanistic psychology. These opposing views have finally been abandoned in scholarly enquiry and replaced by much broader and ‘optimistic’ perspectives (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). Current emotion research perspectives eschew the earlier divisions and include, but are not limited to, neural, behavioural, structural, peripheral, expressive, social engagement-estrangement, cognitive, linguistic, social, cultural, societal and therapeutic. The field of study is so large and complex and the varied perspectives differ so much in orientation and aims that “there will never be an integrative theory of emotion, and no current theory can account for all emotional phenomena” (p. 275).

In the 20th century, however, a consensus has emerged around key characteristics of emotions in philosophy, which also informs scholarly work on emotions in psychology and sociology. The consensus is that emotions are typically conscious phenomena which involve more pervasive bodily manifestations than do other conscious states. They vary along a number of dimensions, intensity, valence, type and range of intentional objects;

they are reputed to be antagonists of rationality, but contribute crucially to defining our ends and priorities. In shaping identity, they have a central place in moral education and moral life, protect us from an excessively slavish devotion to narrow conceptions of rationality, and play a crucial role in the regulation of social life and an indispensable role in determining the quality of life (de Sousa, 2010).

While there is evidence that other animals are able to experience emotions (Kohlberg, 1969; Morell, 2013), the capacity to self-reflect is a distinguishing feature of emotion in humans, as noted by Crook (1980): “the development of a capacity for objective self-awareness and description marks the boundary between the animal and the human” (p. 267). Self-reflection, in which one’s own self is the object, inevitably involves the self’s relationship with otherness, which has a long history of scholarship. Until the early 19th century, folk or social psychology, which studied the influence of real or imagined ‘others’ on individuals’ thoughts, feelings and behaviour, dominated scholarly thinking. Around the mid-19th century, however, it became clear that empirical methods were needed to examine individual psychological phenomena. Comprehensive empirical disciplines were developed by Wilhelm Wundt and William James (James, 1890; Wundt, 1906). As a result, 20th century scholars of scholarly emotion predominantly used these experimental research methods to focus on abnormal behaviours, the role of emotions in decision-making and human interaction, and categorizations of the types of emotions that humans can express and understand. The consequent outpouring of research in the psychological literature has created multiple and overlapping typologies, representing both richness and a challenge in determining a useful starting point for discussing emotions and identity in organizational change.

This outpouring has been intra and intercultural, investigating emic or culturally specific experiences, behaviours and beliefs, and those considered etic, culturally universal or neutral (Pike, 1954). This emic and etic distinction is important, especially in the social sciences, as researchers investigate locally and attempt to generalize from local findings. This can lead to misunderstandings and scholarly argument at one level, and misrepresentations and negative cultural responses at another. The empirical work for this research was done in Australia and takes an emic view in its analysis. This follows Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis and Veenswijk (2008) argument that an emic, or “internally-focused, contextually-grounded view of actual practice”, can be used in order to obtain a “real, rather than an idealised, view of what takes place” (p. 599).

Ortony and Turner's (1990) review of the scholarly English language around emotion challenged the view that all emotions are either basic emotions or built from basic emotions, arguing that concepts and numbers of emotions remain in dispute. Categorizations varied from six basic emotions (Eckman, 1992), to seven (Plutchik, 1980), to ten (Izard, 1971), and 18 emotions language groups (Storm & Storm, 1987), 92 definitions and 11 dimensions of emotion (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). These categorizations continue to grow in number (Ortony & Turner, 1990), and do not reflect differences in languages other than English and cross-cultural definitional biases, thereby potentially increasing the complexity (Thompson, 2007). Such investigations are trying to identify and label complex experiences which are highly contextual and contested. As a consequence of this complexity, the language around emotion is unlikely to ever be completely agreed. Harré (1986) referred to this problem when he discussed psychologists' 'persistent illusion' that emotions are 'there' when the word 'emotion' itself is only a representation of experience. From this subjective perspective, where emotions exist only as experiences which contribute to concepts of self and identity, the starting point for any discussion of emotions, identity and change has to be concepts of self and other.

Like investigations of emotion, and intrinsically linked to those investigations, concepts of self have been of interest to humanity since written records or oral histories were first kept. Priests, philosophers and playwrights were the acknowledged experts in soul, psyche and humanist mind until the late 18th century, developing models of folk or social psychology, particularly around a tradition of care. The tradition of care of the soul, by which religious thought was largely promulgated, included case-based moral reasoning, consolation for suffering and soul sustenance for the hereafter (Reich, 1995), and so was based primarily around an ethic of divinity. Increasing secularization in European and North American cultures in the 20th century occurred concurrently with the development of scientific experimental methods which became a major method of psychological exploration. This experimental focus resulted in a lessening of the role of context in psychological work on self and identity. However, humans do not live in laboratories with binary responses to separate stimuli. We are engaged in context, with others, and have life histories, interests, social worlds and propensities that mean that our response to every situation and relationship is particular. While the early psychologists were focusing on specific binary responses in laboratory situations, the sociologists, philosophers, postmodernists and, more recently, social psychologists engaged in and dominated the major debates around self as wholeness and in relationship with others.

2.2.2 A SOCIAL SELF

'Self' is a polysemic concept, lexically ambiguous, which can be used to describe different aspects of personhood in different contexts. While all meanings of the concept are related and overlap, the term can be applied in various ways. In a social sense it may refer to an individual, or all or some aspects of a human personality. In psychology, social psychology, philosophy and sociology, the word 'self' may be used to describe the cognitive processes that mediate self-awareness and reflexive thinking, thought and feelings about oneself, and the executive process underlying agency and self-control (Kohlberg, 1969). Most conceptualizations involving the executive control functions assume that the ability to self-reflect includes some kind of core or stable construct of self that is mediated over time.

Garrety (2008) argued that concepts of core or stable self are disputed and problematic, particularly in postmodern research but, in practice, organizations support the idea of a core concept of self which is reflexive. The multiplicity and reflexivity of the individual was characterized by Elliott (2001) as "a self-defining process that depends upon monitoring of, and reflecting upon, psychological and social information about possible trajectories of life" (p. 37). This multiplicity and reflexivity plays an important role in the self-management of uncomfortable emotions and the production of identity. Elliott's definition implies the existence of a core self which is mediated by a multiplicity of selves in dialogic relationship, a recurrent theme in the literature. The following discussion draws specifically on Harré's (1998) concept of three-phase self, a concept with a strong lineage through William James, Charles Cooley, George Herbert Mead and Erving Goffman.

William James (1890) theorized multiple selfhood and human ability to reflect, describing the consciousness of a unified self observing the world and reacting to it. He named three 'discriminated aspects' of self: (1) a 'social me'; a multiple self reacting to others; (2) a self having "as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups": the 'I', or self-as-knower; and (3) the 'me', or self-as-known (p. 179).

Cooley's (1902) 'looking-glass self' argued that each individual's identity and self-knowledge are created through understanding how others see them; and the 'self' arises dialectically through communication with the surrounding society. This understanding is gained

through monitoring the other's reactions and perceiving and imagining the other's thoughts about "our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends" during social interactions and relationships (p. 185). Cooley acknowledged that the looking-glass self is not a complete explanation as "self-feeling is affected by the general course of history, by the particular development of nations, classes, and professions, and other conditions of this sort" (p. 185), but it has formed a basis for a conception of self, enacted in part through an individual's consciousness of the reactions of others.

George Herbert Mead acknowledged Cooley's contribution, in particular "his successful establishment of the self and others up on the same plane of reality in experience, and his impressive study of society as the outgrowth of association and co-operation of the primary group in its face-to-face organization" (Mead, 1930 p. 706). Mead contributed an original theory of self developed through communication with the generalized other, where the self is a summation of the social norms and shared meanings in a given community or environment. In his theory, self is innately tied to the development of language and is intersubjectively constructed in interaction with generalized other(s). Suggesting the importance of the role of the other in the developing selfhood, Mead argued that the interaction, rather than action or consciousness, should be the starting point for sociological theorizing of self (Aboulafia, 2009; Mead, 1913; Mead & Morris, 1934).

Mead's 'unified self' describes a self that is enacted through a continuous and ongoing internal dialogue between the 'I' and the 'me' as two 'phases' of the self. In his scheme, the 'I' is the site of a spontaneous and creative ongoing consciousness, which responds contextually to others. The 'me' is an object of consciousness, which is in relationship to a specific generalized other, internalizing the attitudes and norms of the social group, and directly related to Cooley's 'looking-glass self' (Mead & Morris, 1934). Multiplicity, in Mead's theory, is enacted through performing the 'I' as "we divide ourselves up in all sorts of different selves with reference to our acquaintances" (Mead & Morris, 1934 p. 142). Mead's work on the intersubjective relationship with the 'generalized other' influenced other major scholars of the day. These include John Dewey's work on choice and pragmatism (Cohen, 2007), Habermas's work on communication (Bergo, 2008; Festenstein, 2009) and Goffman's (1959, 1974b, 1983b) work on interaction, stigma and performance. The theory remains influential today.

Goffman's work on self and an interaction schema for the self was most explicitly described in 'The Insanity of Place' (1969), but parts were elaborated elsewhere. Goffman

(1959) affirmed Mead's description of self as a performance, a "dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented" (p. 243). The performance requires roles, which he viewed as being enacted within 'situated activity systems', specific contexts that involve presenting multiple different selves to different 'audiences'. The social control inherent in the interaction of these roles acts as a "special kind of institutional arrangement [that] does not so much support the self as constitute it" (Goffman, 2007 p. 168). In 'The Insanity of Place', he discusses the importance of an individual's 'assumptions about himself' in the same language that scholars now use about identity, describing the 'person' or 'virtual definition of the person' and 'self' as outer and inner portraits of the same individual, with the self being defined through self-assumptions. These self-assumptions or aspects "constitute the individual's 'self'" (Goffman, 1969 p. 360) and inform the individual's enacted performance. The self-assumptions are challenged and supported recursively in interaction: "The individual stakes out a self, comments on his having done so, and comments on his commenting, even while others are taking the whole process into consideration in coming to their assessment of him, which consideration he then takes into consideration in revisiting his view of himself" (p. 361). In this way, self cannot exist without the 'other'.

Goffman's focus was on presentation and interaction and the dramatic techniques by which the self displays agency to others. He suggested the possibility of a core, reactive and expressive self, where "the initial perspective is that of a kind of holding company for a set of not relevantly connected roles; it is the concern of the second perspective to find out how the individual runs this holding company" (Goffman, 1961 p. 90). This perspective raises fundamental questions about how the multiple selves postulated in role analysis are related. Goffman (1959) hinted further at a human capacity for reflexive imagination and self-management to assist in maintaining expressive coherence in an interaction, saying "a certain bureaucratization of the spirit is expected so that we can give a perfectly homogenous performance" (p. 56). Goffman's agentic self, heavily influenced by Cooley's 'looking-glass' self (Verhoeven, 1993a), therefore, is a reflexive and reactive self that is managed, performed and produced jointly from whole 'scene of action', the context and the participating agents.

Concepts of human agency have been debated for centuries and remain disputed (Thalberg, 1972). Over time, the polysemic concept of human agency has been conceptualized in three main theoretical streams: autonomous, mechanical and emergent

interactive agency (Bandura, 1989). Goffman's sociological concepts of human agency, the 'emotional relational world' described by Scheff (2006), and the implicit notions of causality, intentionality and effect on free will, are agentic concepts that relate to Albert Bandura's (1986, 1989) psychological model of emergent interactive agency in social cognitive theory. Bandura's work on self-efficacy relates to one part of the emotional experience of change, that "people's beliefs about their capabilities to exercise control over events that affect their lives" (1989 p. 1175), but does not directly address the other-oriented or 'self-conscious' emotions. Emergent interactive agency is a useful concept, however, in a wider sense relevant to this argument. Bandura described it as inherently relational, having no one aspect of self or other, context or structure taking primacy over another, with a model incorporating "reciprocal causation, action, cognitive, affective, and other personal factors, and environmental events all operate as interacting determinants" (1989 p. 1175).

Rom Harré, a psychologist building on the work of James, Cooley, Mead and Goffman, described the distinction between personhood or identity and self (Harré, 1984). Harré's three interacting aspects of the self are characterized as fluid and interconnected discursive devices through which we create, manipulate and sustain the complex phenomena grouped into the concept of 'singular self' (Harré, 1998). Harré described the closely intertwined relationship between the embodied self of Self 1, Self 2 and Selves 3. Self 1 denotes the "the necessary singularity of he or she who sees, hears, feels, acts, manages, and remembers" (Harré, 1991 p. 52). This idea is similar to Mead's 'I', the standpoint from which we experience and act upon the world and Goffman's 'holding company'. Self 1 interacts with the identity boundaries of Self 2, a person's reactive self-concept or self-identity, a 'loose-knit cluster' of beliefs about what their more or less 'real' or 'core' selves are (p. 70) and "expressed, however inaccurately, in the content of confessions, self-descriptions, autobiographies and other reflexive (sic)discourses"(p. 76). Self 2 is in turn mediated by the rules and reactions of others through Selves 3, expressive clusters of coordinated presentations and public displays to which others react. Self 2 and Selves 3 both reflect aspects of Mead's 'me', as an object of consciousness that internalizes the attitudes and norms of the social group. Harré's person or identity, as seen in the community, consists of the discursive narratives and performances encompassing the cluster of identity beliefs of Self 2 interacting with the 'other' through Selves 3. This conception of identity relates to Goffman's inner portrait of 'self' and outer portrait or 'virtual definition of the person', as the outer portrait's self-assumptions interact in the

context to co-create and mediate identity. Identity as a personal and relational concept is commonly used in communication theory and pragmatics – for example in Domenici and Littlejohn's (2006) 'Facework', Spencer-Oatey's (2007) work on identity and face, and Arundale's (2010a, 2010b) and Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini's (2010) work on face in conversation – and it allows social psychological exploration of the emotional relational world described by Goffman and an individual's discursive self-production.

Brewer and Gardner (1996) echoed this. They argued that self is threefold: personal, relational and collective. These three conceptually distinct construals represent self at three different levels of connection to others. The individual or 'personal self' level represents the differentiated, individuated concept of self; the interpersonal or 'relational self' level represents the self-concept derived from connections and relationships with others; and the 'collective self' represents the self-concept derived from significant group memberships.

Concepts of personal and social self are also supported in African philosophy, where the concept of personhood is the taking of a particular form of moral self-identity which is acceptable to the greater group, and key to the communalistic structure of many African societies. In West African Akan society, for example, a newborn child is not fully a person, but the potential of a person (Wiredu, 2005). Personhood, or personal self, is something each individual is brought up to work for. With a sense of relational belonging and solidarity with an extensive circle of kith and kin, the collective rights and obligations that personhood entails are a self-ethic, taught to be tacitly understood as the child grows into adulthood. In this way, they are given the greatest chance to fulfil their potential and achieve personhood at whatever level they are able. The degree of personhood achieved by an individual at one end can be seen as nonexistence and, at the other, the individual is fully realized as an important part of the community, so personhood includes the role of the 'other'. This realization does not preclude individuality and a sense of personal identity, more that each member of a society is part of a whole and sees themselves as such.

Community is a concept so widely used in Western cultures that it has become ubiquitous. The words 'community' and 'communalism' both have origins in the Latin word 'communitas' meaning 'common' (Brown, 1993). 'Community' originally meant a body of individuals or an organized political, municipal or social body of people, for example a profession, a town, a country. In the English-speaking world the word 'community' has come to mean something shared, of life in association with others with common characteristics understood as distinct the larger society it exists as part of (Brown, 1993).

This discrete idea of a group with shared properties is the basis of social identity as categorization (Jenkins, 2000).

This notion of community is extended in traditional Akan philosophy and extends to a way of thinking commonly referred to as communality “a society-oriented morality ... necessarily grounded in human experiences in living together” (Gyekye, 1995 p. 145). The traditional Akan or African ethic of communality is a concept that is challenging for Western societies. Gyekye noted that the moral base of behaviour in traditional Akan philosophy incorporates Shweder et al.’s (1997) ethic of divinity, saying: “African religion is moral; that, it is founded on morality” (Gyekye, 1995 p. 138). This forms the basis of the Akan ethic of communality. It comes out of a morality that does not have a theist religious base, more a spiritual one where there is no external god revealing moral rules to the society, but where spiritual beliefs are strong. It is an ethic, rather than a group:

To exhibit solidarity with one another is for people to care about each other’s quality of life, in two senses. First, it means that they engage in mutual aid, acting in ways that are expected to benefit each other (ideally, repeatedly over time). Second, caring is a matter of people’s attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say, by sympathizing with them and helping them for their sake (Metz, 2012).

This absolute reliance on the other in ethic of communality is illustrated in the Akan proverb: “the left arm washes the right arm and the right arm washes the left arm” (Gyekye, 1995 p. 156).

Neisser (1988) proposed that, rather than using constructs of core self, self-knowledge or sense of self at any given time is a process based on actors’ self-abilities to work with five distinct forms of information. Ecological self-ability which processes information regarding the immediate physical environment; interpersonal self-ability which processes information regarding unreflective interactions with others; extended self-ability which transcends the present and allows reflection on past events and imagination of future ones; private self-ability allows secondary mental representations of first-order representations of context, self-aspects and others, which are not available to those others; and, finally, conceptual self-ability which constructs abstract and symbolic self-representations, self-concepts and identity. In a similar way to the Akan notion of personhood developing over time, Neisser’s (1988) self-abilities are part of the executive function, developing over the person’s lifetime. And, like the fully realized notion of Akan personhood, all involve a level of ability to reflect on the context in which the actor finds him/her-self and the identity they find themselves performing.

Neisser's notion of extended self-ability starts to describe how imagination of future may play a role in an individual's sense of self-identity and identity construction. In a related discussion, Carlsen and Pitsis (2009) proposed that hope is associated with identity construction as part of a selective process relating to imagination of the future, a "future oriented quality of experiencing" (p. 79). They related hope to the perspectives of self, group and other orientation. They distinguished three forms of hope: attainment hope relating to sense of purpose, opening up hope relating to openness and unforeseen possibilities, and away-from hope relating to distancing, countering and escaping from something.

Goffman (1961) also highlighted the executive function in the relational and social nature of self, describing actors as 'holding company selves', with multiple commitments and obligations (p. 90). He noted the complexity of people's multiple relations in a community; while being present in one encounter and performing to those present, participants are also performing more or less directly in their own minds to themselves and other participants, which can involve conflict with their other identity roles. These performances are far more complex than merely demonstrating commitment and attachment to a focus, and the required effort varies, depending on the participant's level of involvement in his or her role in the interaction.

The executive function, described by Goffman as 'holding company self' and Harré as 'Self 1' can be seen as a function of an individual's moral understanding. Moral understanding is thought to develop in stages over time. Expanding on Piaget's (1932) developmental stages of children, Kohlberg and Hersch's (1977) schema of moral stages of development is considered the foundation of modern moral psychology and is widely understood in practice in Western societies today. The pre-conventional level of moral development is characterized by the need for concrete rules and consequences to guide thinking. This develops to the conventional level of thinking where one unthinkingly behaves according to the expectations of others. Finally, the post conventional, autonomous or principled level is characterized by the individual making their own definition of moral values and principles guided by, but separate from, the social worlds of that individual.

2.2.3 A DIALOGIC OTHER

This research draws on the work of two major 20th century theorists, Bakhtin and Lévinas, who contributed to the discussions of relational self and the concept of otherness. Bakhtin's 'otherness' is similar to the African 'self-otherness' described by Nobles (1973), an interpersonal and intersubjective self which "makes no real distinction between self and others" (pp. 23–24), and Lévinas's (1998) phenomenological description and hermeneutics of lived experience refers to a world where the role of the other has increased importance.

Bakhtin (1986) suggested that all human activity and all human discourse engage with the tension of centripetal forces which seek to impose order on the apparent chaos of life, and centrifugal forces which disrupt that order. They occur simultaneously (Holquist, 1990 p. 18), are brought to bear in 'every concrete utterance' and do not exist apart, as "The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance" (Bakhtin, 1981 p. 272).

Bakhtin (1986) elaborated the view that dialogue is the concept that brings coherence to the whole. Holquist (1990) labelled this view 'dialogism', noting that "in dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness" (p. 17). Extending this view, Gergen, Gergen and Barrett (2004) interpreted these centrifugal and centripetal forces as organizing and integrating and disrupting, and organizing dialogues in tension, which people confront to gain a type of consensus. We test our own and others' ideas through expression, juxtaposition and negotiation of our individual and cultural differences, all of which determine what we should think and how we should live (Zappen, 2000). Our engagement with an 'other' is an attempt to construct an integrated wholeness, an individual ethic. However, it can never be fully achieved because our worlds are open ecologies, not complete and static but 'unfinalizable', messy and chaotic. Baxter (2004) discussed conceptions of dialogues in Bakhtin's work, highlighting an important asymmetric aspect of the nature of the other in relation to self: "Other's unique excess of seeing provides self with a more complete and whole view, and in this sense is central to one's capacity to know. An individual knows self only from the outside, as he or she conceives others see him or her. The self, then, is invisible to itself and dependent for its existence on the other" (p. 3). Ahmad's (2009) discussion of dialogical working knowledge supports this saying it is "necessarily negotiated, and interplayed between participants, born out of a re-contextualised effort with dialogic space and time" (p. 41).

Lévinas's conception of self, or 'I', places an increased importance on the role of the other in the context, describing an asymmetric responsibility to another to whom the 'I' must account in 'relational beingness' (Wainer, 2010). This increased importance accounts for the demand placed by another, saying "I am recalled to a responsibility, never contracted, inscribed in the face of an Other" (Lévinas, 1998 p. 58). Lévinas's view of asymmetric responsibility to the 'other' places focus on the relational aspects, similar to the African view of personhood and personal identity that has influenced me. This view is based on a communalistic system of reciprocity to others, where one is not subordinated to the other, and where there are 'symmetrical' obligations and rights between individuals (Wiredu, 2008). Nobles (1973) drew a distinction between the African self and the Western concept of individuated, distinct and separate self, saying for a person of African origin, "One's being is the group's being; one's self is the 'self of one's people'; one's being is the 'we' instead of the 'I'", or perhaps more simply as "One's self-identity is therefore always a people identity, or what could be called an extended identity or extended self" (p. 24). Nobles was making one of the early arguments for an African view of African personhood. This was in a critical response to the historical anthropological outsider views which, by their very nature, were limited by cross-cultural misunderstandings and limitations of language (Nobles, 1973; Wiredu, 2009). The Akan communalistic approach can be described as an ethical orientation or a self-ethic of communality.

The concept of a 'holding company self' can be related to the Akan concept of personhood. An individual who has personhood is considered to have achieved a degree of moral maturity and social responsibility and consequently has a certain moral and social standing in the community (Wiredu, 2005). This concept has great importance, and describing someone as 'Onipa' or 'person' is considered praise. In Wiredu's conception of African personhood, as a person "one sees oneself as necessarily part of an ordered whole whose principle of order is the ethic of community. Accordingly, that ethic becomes a criterion of self-identity" (Wiredu, 2009 p. 17). Wiredu appears to be using the term 'ethic' as distinct from morality or principle here, in agreement with Appiah (2005), and as used in this argument. In this view, 'morality' is what we as individuals owe to others, similar to Lévinas's asymmetry, whereas the related concept 'ethic' has to do with a good life to lead, what kind of person we seek to be. Wiredu's (2005, 2009) 'African philosophy of the person' places importance on the ethic of communality, a societal context where the others in the situation and the wellbeing of the community are more important than the individual. While some consider that Wiredu overstates the role of communality, or others,

in his conception of 'African' personhood (Gyekye, 1987), the role of communality and reciprocity in African communities is well supported in the literature. Additionally, as Harré (1984) suggested and Goffman (1961) implied, the concept of personhood is useful in examining the role of others in the development of identity.

Gergen's (2009) 'relational self' agrees with this view, and Gergen further proposed that the relational process itself takes primacy over the concept of the individual. He contended that thinking, feeling, believing, meaning-making and the idea of self grow from 'coaction', or coordinated action in community with others. Hence, the wellbeing of relationships with others is key to our conceptions of reality, rationality and value in life. Gergen's view of the primacy of the relational process relates to Mead's (1913) view that interaction should be the starting point for sociological theorizing of the self; and Goffman's (2005) widely cited view is that interaction is about "Not then, men and their moments. Rather, moments and their men" (p. 3).

Goffman's frequent use of the word 'recursive' to describe the exchange of information between the self and the other could be seen as limiting. 'Recursive' is defined as "the holding or designated designating the repeated procedure such that the required result at each step except the last is given in terms of the results of the next up, until after the finite number of steps a terminus is reached with an outright evaluation of the result" (Brown, 1993). This suggests that, through an iteration of exchanges, an interaction reaches a stable end point. However, the end point lasts only for a fragment in time before the interaction moves on. Therefore it may well be more appropriate to use Goffman's conception of self, but to use Bakhtin's (1986) expression of 'dialogue' instead of Goffman's term 'recursive', in order to more completely describe the temporal instability of ongoing interaction.

The next section looks at social anxiety, the related sentient emotions of embarrassment and shame, and their role in identity. The discussion draws heavily on Erving Goffman's work on micro interaction and the individual's emotional-relational world to build a perspective on self and identity.

2.3 EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL ANXIETY: KNOWING, UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING

2.3.1 HEIGHTENED AWARENESS

Social anxiety involves heightened interpersonal awareness, with actors detecting and responding to events that have implications for the degree to which they are valued and accepted by others. It is “unambiguously interpersonal in nature” (Leary & Kowalski, 1995 p. 200). Social anxiety varies, depending on people’s concerns with how they are being perceived and evaluated by others. It arises particularly when people are motivated to make a specific impression on others but doubt that they will be able to do so (Leary, 2007; Leary & Kowalski, 1995), and it increases the potential of other-oriented emotions arising.

Leary (2007) discussed how the experience of social anxiety gives rise to a number of protective behaviours. People experiencing social anxiety withdraw emotionally from the encounter and endeavour to present a satisfactory face to others while maintaining minimal involvement in the encounter. In other words, they appear engaged, but they are in practice reducing their social contact with the others. This is to limit the possibility of their doing or saying something about which they could be self-conscious and embarrassed or ashamed of later. They engage in other socially anxious behaviours such as self-enhancement, believing only reinforcing interaction responses; self-verification, seeking information that confirms rather than disconfirms their self-concept; and self-expansion, seeking experiences that broaden their resources, perspectives and identities (Leary, 2007). They also compare and contrast their self-identities positively and negatively with others.

Shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride are members of a family of self-conscious or other-oriented negative-affect valenced emotions that are evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation prompted by awareness of the real or imagined judgement of another (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). It may be implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious, but as the self reflects upon the self, other-oriented emotions provide immediate positive or negative judgement of behaviour. They always involve the imagination of an ‘other’. The relationship of this imagination to emotion is well articulated in the literature. From Cooley’s ‘looking-glass self’ in the sociological literature, where we “always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgements of the other mind” (Cooley, 1902 p. 185), to Lazarus (1991) noting in the psychological literature, “although emotions can seem to arise privately

and without others being around ... they always involve other persons” (p. 241). As social anxiety involves heightened awareness of real or imagined others, increased social anxiety is intrinsically linked to increased opportunities to experience other-oriented emotions, and for the experience of those emotions to be more intense. This research focuses on the increased social anxiety in workplace meetings during organizational change. How the meeting context increases social anxiety is discussed in Chapter 3.

2.3.2 SENTIENT EMOTION

There is some discussion in the literature about the correct descriptor for these emotions. Self-conscious emotions sit in a group of emotions known as moral emotions (Tangney et al., 2007). Moral emotions are considered to have a moral or societal dimension, influencing moral behaviour in both anticipatory and consequential ways. They provide critical feedback in the form of anticipatory shame, guilt, embarrassment or pride regarding both anticipated behavioural alternatives and, consequently, for actual behaviour. People’s anticipatory emotional reactions are typically inferred, based on their experience and their ability to imagine that experience from their history and their past consequential emotions in tacit reaction to similar events. Thus, these emotions can exert a strong influence on moral choice, actions and self-identity, and can act to facilitate attainment of complex social goals (Tangney et al., 2007).

One of the issues in researching these emotions is the difficulty people have in acknowledging and articulating their awareness of these emotions. ‘Self-conscious’ implies active consciousness, while each actor may perceive only a mild sense of discomfort that sits just under consciousness. In this case awareness is limited to a feeling which seems to act in a similar way to Gendlin’s (1978) concept of felt sense, or Polanyi’s (1966) tacit knowledge. The descriptor ‘other-oriented’ is also problematic as it places a significant focus on a single ‘other’, and the other may be the actor themselves, an ‘other’, multiple others or some combination of those. From this point in the discussion, the adjective ‘sentient’ is used to describe the emotions of which we are aware. Sentient is an adjective defined as (a person or animal) having the power of perception by the senses. It is characterized by sensation and consciousness. The etymology is from the Latin ‘sentire’, to feel; and early English definitions of sentient included ‘capable of feeling’ (Brown, 1993). It is a useful adjective to describe these emotions: first, it does not necessarily relate to active

consciousness or a particular other and, second, it relates to both the ‘knowingness’ that is agreed in the literature to be characteristic of experiencing an emotion and the external awareness that is necessary for these emotions to be experienced.

One of the core questions in researching sentient emotions is understanding how we know what an emotional experience is – for example, what is embarrassing or shameful – and what is the nature, meaning and value of that knowledge and experience. While this topic has received attention from scholars at least as far back as Aristotle, the discussion here draws on the work of more recent scholars who have developed an understanding of ‘knowing’ based on practice theory and decision-making.

From Gilbert Ryle’s (1945) oft-cited analysis ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, a large body of practice theory has attempted to explain aspects of knowledge in practice in daily life. There is some convergence of exploration between practice scholars, hermeneutic philosophers, sociologists and humanistic psychologists in this endeavour.

Actors can participate more or less productively in group interactions, depending on their level of knowledge of the rules governing their interaction, their knowledge of each other and the context. Simon (1957) introduced the concept of judgemental heuristics as mechanisms people use in order to know and understand the world and their experience of it, deal with complexity, limited time and inadequate mental resources, and to ease the psychological burden of decision-making. These heuristics form part of everyday imaginative practices of human social life. They apply subjective values to the peculiar properties of the context to help manage knowledge, understand meaning and participate in the daily practice of living in an emotional relational world. Kahneman and Tversky (2000) focused on how boundedly rational people use heuristics to make decisions and the cognitive biases and errors that can arise. ‘Fast and frugal heuristics’, simple alternatives to elaborate optimizing models developed by behavioural economists, have recently been proposed as mechanisms that can lead to better decisions than the theoretically optimal procedures (Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999). In the complexities of daily work and life, heuristics and ‘heuristic device’ can describe a model, a story or a metaphor which enables understanding of another entity. A recent expression of this view of heuristics comes from Schön’s (1983, 1987) reflection-on-action, in which a repertoire of images, metaphors and theories, drawing on experiences and understandings generated through reflection on previous actions, are used to frame situations in different ways to facilitate knowledge and understanding. The labels people use for these images, metaphors and theories are also

heuristic devices. Heuristics enable knowledge, understanding and quick responses in an interaction; however, the ability to improvise and respond differently is also necessary. In any practice, however, context has primacy where “the application of rules can never be done by rules” (Gadamer, 1979 p. 83), and requires practical knowing of how to apply a rule in a particular context. The need for this knowledge of ‘how to’ in different contexts gives rise to a ‘phronetic gap’ or lack of practical reasoning (Taylor, 1993 p. 57) “that almost inevitably exists between a formula and its enactment” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997 p. 668). Practical knowing is often tacit, and requires an understanding and acceptance of the unconscious complexity of practice (Polanyi, 1966). Bourdieu (1990) has also highlighted the need for a focus on practical knowing, saying that to truly understand practice we need to “return to practice, the site of the dialectic of the *opus operatum* and the *modus operandi* ... the incorporated products of historical practice” (Bourdieu, 1990 p. 52). These products produce *habitus*, systems of durable transposable dispositions where understanding occurs from the context and history, in a similar manner to Gendlin’s (1997) concept of relevance being understanding the context through recalling past experiences. Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘*habitus*’ and ‘*predispositions*’ underlie his explanation of the tacit, practical knowing that unreflectively shapes our everyday responses (Bourdieu, 1990). Similarly, Dreyfus (1991) regards practices as unconscious and conscious patterns of ‘saying and doing’ that are “shared know-how and discriminations” and are “passed on by society through individuals without necessarily passing through consciousness” (p. 22). This view of knowledge transfer between people, and the importance of individual’s experience and history, are echoed in African thought, as exemplified in the statement “In Africa when an elder person dies, it is a whole library that burns” (Ba, 1972).

Marsh (2002) contended that extending the concept of judgemental heuristics to social domains could be useful. The emotions generated in social interaction, and the subsequent construction of meaning and behaviours in social groups, may also be better understood through frameworks, heuristics or heuristic devices. Human interaction practices operate in complex and emotional contexts. In order to manage the flow of experiences and decisions, we make decisions and interact with others daily using heuristics and heuristic devices. However, the uses of heuristics thus far have focused on the cognitive, not the emotional, worlds that people inhabit, although the use of metaphor and narrative does bring in elements of symbolism and ritual which are more frequently associated with emotion and group cohesion.

This lack of attention to emotion in judgemental heuristics has already been noted by scholars. Simon (1957) noted that an explanatory account of human rationality must identify the significance of emotions for choice behaviour, but he did not explore this line of research. More recently, research has focused on the role of emotion in interaction and decision-making. The Affect Heuristic acknowledges emotion has a role in 'System 1 thinking', where intuitive, fast, automatic, effortless, implicit and emotional evaluation takes place before any cognitive reasoning can take place. Behavioural economists prefer to focus on the cognitive aspects of 'System 2 thinking', which uses slower conscious, effortful, explicit and logical responses and can lead to cognitive biases and errors, particularly when individuals are unaware they are using these heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Kahneman and Tversky's work focused on the biases of heuristics, where Gigerenzer (2007) has argued that heuristics, as rules of thumb, along with the evolved capacities of the human brain are the basis of the phenomenon of 'Gut Feelings'. In a related argument to Polanyi's knowledge and knowing, Gigerenzer defined a 'gut feeling' as a judgement appearing quickly in consciousness, whose underlying reason we are not fully aware of and which is strong enough to act upon (Gigerenzer, 2007). The word 'judgement' here could be synonymous with knowledge.

Relatively few researchers since have explored the functional role of emotions within decision-making, instead emphasizing the cognitive dimensions (Muramatsu & Hanoch, 2005). This is changing as emotions in social life become more central in decision theory and sociology, and the limitations of the rational choice models become more apparent.

While interaction concepts include symbolic and structural properties, the importance of language in creating understanding and meaning for human action is fundamental. For Wittgenstein (2009), language, and therefore dialogue, arises from context: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer" (p. 25e). He refers to the difficulties in even knowing the connection between understanding and response as "Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all – for that is the expression that confuses you. But ask yourself: In what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances do we say, 'Now I know how to go on?'" (p. 66e). For Wittgenstein the dialogic is intrinsic, but it can arise either from others in the context or from the context alone. Wittgenstein's focus on language in generating meaning includes intentionality: "When one considers what is going on in us when we mean (and don't merely say) words, it seems to us as if there were something coupled to these words, which

otherwise would run idle ... As if they, so to speak, engaged with something in us” (p. 147e).

Baxter (2004) noted the “self of dialogism is a relation between self and other, a simultaneity of sameness and difference out of which knowing becomes possible. At once, self and other are similar yet different” (p. 3). Bakhtin (1981) coined the term ‘dialogized heteroglossia’ for the challenging and sometime emotional process of dialogic communication in the wider world. This starts with acts of active listening to the utterances of each voice from the others’ perspectives. Dialogues are the utterances exchanged between individuals in a specific type of interaction. Utterances must have several components: a referentially semantic element, an expressive element, and an element of responsiveness or addressivity in relation to other utterances. The second component, the expressive element, is the communicator’s attitude toward the theme, a “subjective emotional evaluation of the referentially semantic content” (Bakhtin, 1986 p. 84); it captures the specific sense of the utterance and is discernable only in the context of “a particular actual reality and particular real conditions” (p. 84), which are extralinguistic or metalinguistic. Participants actively listen to utterances, respond, and use their imagination to evaluate and initiate utterances in return, developing new shared meanings. Bakhtin (1984) summarized this as “means to communicate dialogically” (p. 252). These acts of active listening also relate closely to Goffman’s (2007) moral agentic self, which “dwells in the pattern of social control that is exerted in connection with a person by himself and those around him” (p. 168). This moral purpose and addressivity are reflected in Goffman’s work in sociolinguistics, where “we find ourselves with one central obligation: to render our behaviour understandably relevant to what the other can come to perceive is going on” (Goffman, 1983a p. 51).

Bakhtin’s world of ‘heteroglossia’ has a multiplicity and diversity of voices initiating and exchanging utterances which contribute to constant change and flux. Bakhtin did not explicitly account for the context in the same way as Wittgenstein did; rather, it is a background to, and is influenced by, heteroglossia. In the process of interacting with the world in dialogically, actors are constructing or imagining events and contexts that influence the future in an emergent way (Bakhtin, 1981).

One heuristic around knowing and knowership that may be able to incorporate emotion is derived from Polanyi’s view of ‘tacit knowing’, with its classic and oft cited “we can know more than we can tell” (Polanyi & Sen, 2009 p. 4). Tacit knowing is a type of heuristic

knowing and a basis for action with useful functional and ontological aspects. In the often-unconscious logic sequence which forms an act of tacit knowing, we apprehend the relation between two events, both of which we know, but only one of which we can tell (Polanyi & Sen, 2009 p. 7). The functional relation between the two terms of tacit knowing is “we know the first (proximal) term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second (distal) term” (p. 10). Since tacit knowing establishes a meaningful relationship between two terms, we comprehend the entity by relying on our awareness of its particular joint meaning. In this way, we can know we are experiencing an emotion which arises as a consequent of the events.

Gendlin (1997) takes this a step further towards emotion with his concept of ‘felt meaning’. In his psychological conception of felt meaning, things or situations are symbolic and, rather than having a direct meaning, they mean something to us because they call forth in us the felt meaning. This links the symbol directly to the felt meaning, so the symbol has a heuristic function. We recognize what the entity or the situation means as “we see, hear, or think them, and in that act feel their meaning” (p. 101). Like Davis and Harré’s (1990) discussion of context in positioning theory, Gendlin discussed how the relevance of an experience is fundamental to the felt meaning, defining relevance as understanding the context through past experience, and pointing out that relevance is necessary for a complete and in-depth understanding of symbolizations.

Knowing and tacit aspects of knowing such as felt meaning are linked to the inner emotional world, in part, through imagination. The concept of imagination is complex, context dependent and contested. Early philosophical discussions of imagination concerned ‘phantasma’, mental imagery or representations in the psyche (Thomas, 2005). More recent philosophical, psychological and educational discussions have regarded possibilities engendered through imagination (Gergen, 2009; Gouwens, 1982; Greene, 1995; Rorty, 1988) and the constructive role of the imagination (Ricoeur, 1978). Thomas (2013) noted that “imagination makes possible all our thinking about what is, what has been, and, perhaps most important, what might be”. Imagination, in this view, enables interpretation and sensemaking of an experience. It produces mental imagery, with which to envisage past memories and emotions and future possibilities and to evaluate alternatives. In doing so it makes experience meaningful outside the confines of our present perceptual reality. The ability to feel emotion is key to this process of meaning making, as Damasio (1994) found with the brain-damaged patients whose basic

intelligence, memory and capacity for logical thought were intact but who were unable to feel emotion due to injuries to the ventromedial frontal cortices. These patients displayed “flawed reason and impaired feelings stood out together as the consequences of a specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason” (p. XII).

Jenkins (2000) described themes of identity research in the late 20th century as including the malleability and flux of identity, difference as a key to understanding identity and self-identity (p. 22). In his analysis of difference, he noted that the basic constituent is a world of embodied individuals, experiencing and interacting with the set and setting, or context, and the other embodied individuals.

Gendlin's (1978) concept of 'felt sense' starts to explain how the body experiences emotion. However, experience of emotion, both positive and negative, also involves greater physical effects on the body that contribute to the 'knowing'. In Damasio's (1994) view, emotions involve 'somatic markers' of recognition, where the association between bodily states with past and imagined experiences and responses allows the individual to recognize the context and the emotion. The strength of these 'somatic markers' depends on valence of the emotion. Hanna (1976) coined the term 'somatic', etymologically derived from the Greek 'soma' meaning 'living body'. He defined soma as the 'body experienced from within', which neatly makes the connection between mind, body and emotion. This 'experience from within', in Damasio's sense, is learnt and present as both positive and negative somatic markers. Positive markers indicate recognition of a bodily expectation of benefits, an incentive to proceed, while negative somatic markers indicate recognition of a bodily expectation of risk and harm of some sort. These markers may be experienced either consciously or as a felt sense. Damasio's work on brain-damaged patients has generated a number of important lines of research on neural systems of emotions and decision making. This research, still at an early stage, focuses primarily on the central nervous system, particularly the frontal lobes of the brain. The frontal lobes have been associated with knowledge of the social world, the ability to interpret others' reactions, empathy and the self-conscious emotions (Baron-Cohen, 2011; Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999). Saxe and Kanwisher (2005) investigated how humans interpret others' behaviour in an isolated region in the human temporo-parietal junction of the brain, which involves reasoning about the other person's thinking. Damasio (2010) further developed an evolutionary distinction between emotion and emotional feeling. He noted that “the world of emotion is

largely one of action carried out in our bodies, from facial expressions and posture to changes in viscera and internal milieu” (p. 116). He distinguished emotions from emotional feelings, a kind of knowing “perceptions of what our bodies do during the emoting, along with perceptions of our state of mind during that same period of time” (p. 117).

Another way of looking at ‘knowing’ emotion linked to the autonomic nervous system is Karl Weick’s (1995) notion of ‘sensemaking’. Sensemaking uses the actor’s experience or familiarity with the context to register something that is ‘different’ about it, an expectation of continuity being breached. This may be experienced as situation of discrepancy, breakdown, surprise, disconfirmation, opportunity or interruption. Emotion in sensemaking is largely characterized as being linked to social interaction. For example, people working in close relationship generate increased expectations of each other. These higher expectations then increase the opportunities for breaching. Any breach intensifies autonomic nervous system arousal and the subsequent experience of emotion. Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) commented that expectations “hold people hostage to their relationships in the sense that each expectancy can be violated, and generates a discrepancy, an emotion, and a valenced interpretation” (p. 418). In response to the breach and emotional aspects, sensemaking actors then draft and redraft plausible retrospective interpretations of the event. Reciprocal exchanges between interdependent actors and their environments continue until such point that the interpretations are meaningful to them and can be preserved as a resilient defensible interpretation (Weick et al., 2005).

Todres (2007) noted that acts of human understanding are made meaningful by the body: “We find a living body that inhabits situations intimately; it interweaves the realms as a matter of being, and is often lost out there in the textures, the senses, the flesh, the histories, and the meanings that come from the flowing excesses of the lifeworld. Yet it also carries personal history and prereflective sediments of historical meanings that shape its openness. One could say that embodying is where being and knowing meet” (p. 20).

Building on the work of Gendlin (1997) and Weick (2005), Todres (2008) ‘embodied relational understanding’, described as ‘being with that’ brings a further degree of richness around the embodied nature of interaction and emotion. ‘Being with that’ is a view that brings the resources of the self to the interaction, This “gives an openness to the alive otherness of what is being addressed, so that existing knowledge opens to the thickness and complexity, gives to understanding the resources for transforming ‘thin’ patterns or

summarized themes of knowing into sensitizing frameworks that can enter into productive play with living situations of ‘that’” (p. 1570).

The many studies in this area, and the developing conversations between neuroscientists and psychologists and philosophers, are extending the understanding of ‘knowing’ and embodied emotion and its physical and interactive and interpersonal nature.

2.3.3 FELT MEANING

This research reviews sentient emotion, the moral, self-conscious negative-affect valenced emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame, and the experience and consequences of them for personal identity construction. This section briefly examines the concept of valence in the psychology of emotions, which is evolving and disputed (Colombetti, 2005) partly from the way that it was adopted by psychologists in the 20th century. The etymology of the word valence is from the Latin ‘valentia’, meaning power or competence (Brown, 1993), a meaning that did not include polarity. It entered the English language in the early 1900s, adopted by scholars in physical chemistry, and was used to denote electrical charge, particularly the positive and negative electrical charges attached to atomic components. From this it entered psychology, usually to denote the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ character of an emotion. From there its use became multiple and disputed, but all the definitions of valence in the psychology of emotion relate to dual aspects of power and charge. One limitation with the use of the word ‘valence’ in emotion is that, from this, it is used in the context of polarity, either positive or negative. This binary aspect does not allow description of the complexity or intensity of the experience of emotions. This limitation is an area of rich debate, with which this discussion engages only briefly for the purpose of this argument.

Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2002) argued that decision-making and understanding of meaning always rely on individuals’ feeling responses to a stimulus and can therefore constitute the Affect Heuristic, which can help explain a variety of complex problem solving. Affect is defined as “the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus” (Slovic et al., 2002 p. 397). Kahneman’s (2003) review of

bounded rationality additionally noted that affective valuation is the emotional core of responses and is therefore of primary importance.

According to Lazarus (1991), valence gives rise to the experience of emotion and its associated feelings. In an argument related to that of Slovic et al. (2002), Charland (2005) developed this idea, separating ‘emotion valence’ (negative or positive character of an emotion) from ‘affect valence’ (negative or positive character, or felt meaning, called forth by the emotion experience). Using these definitions, this research focuses on negative-affect valence.

The negative character of the emotion experience includes harmful social consequences and increasing uncertainty. This has been widely documented in the literature. Lazarus (1991) noted negative-affect valenced emotions are elicited by individuals who appraise a situation as having harmful social consequences to them. Izard (1991) defined negative-affect valenced emotions as having undesirable consequences. Bickhard (2000) characterized uncertainty as being augmented by negative-affect valenced emotions in a runaway feedback which creates further uncertainty.

The physiological responses to the negative-affect valenced emotions noted by Damasio (1993) reflect the negative affect valence, the strength or power of the negative power of the emotion experience in the context. This physical aspect and the strength of these responses are an important part of experiencing felt meaning. The recognition and relevance of felt meaning help explain how emotions that are experienced through seeing self through the eye of another are called forth in practice; the physical responses start to describe the experience of them in practice.

2.3.4 EMBARRASSMENT, SHAME AND GUILT

Embarrassment, the first of the emotions under discussion, is usually considered a normative emotion which follows unexpected events, involves a sense of exposure, and has negative affect valence for the person. The literature contains a number of useful definitions, such as that of Miller (1996), who defines embarrassment as “an aversive state of mortification, abashment, and chagrin that follows public social predicaments” (p. 554).

Sociology, social psychology and communications scholars have studied embarrassment from a number of perspectives, including its antecedents and display (Keltner, 1996; Keltner & Brenda, 1997), embarrassment proneness (Singelis & Sharkey, 1995), intentional use (Cupach & Metts, 1992), cultural dimensions (Edelmann et al., 1989), sources of embarrassment, self-construal and embarrassability (Singelis & Sharkey, 1995), affective reactions (Grace, 2007), the role of public exposure (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002) and remedies (Cupach & Metts, 1992).

Embarrassment is considered a cultural universal, though the causes vary across cultures. It ensues from the kind of occurrence when an actor does not yet know what the new behavioural response 'rules' are and they experience role discrepancy. Common causes of embarrassment are normative public deficiencies, or situations in which a person behaves in a clumsy, absent-minded, awkward way, or where a person feels conspicuous, perhaps due to a loss of script or a real personal transgression involving corrective action. An individual's tendency to feel embarrassment is associated with self-consciousness and a fear of the role discrepancy creating a negative evaluation from others (Leary, 2007; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Miller, 1996). Events causing embarrassment seem to signal that some aspect of the self or behaviour needs to be monitored, hidden or changed. Embarrassment alters the trajectory of any interaction in one of two ways. It either involves conciliatory behaviour in order to win back approval and acceptance from others, or it ends the interaction (Cupach & Metts, 1994; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Miller, 1996; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995). As Goffman (1956a, 1959) described, when individuals cannot sustain expressive control and they violate the cultural script, they lose face and if they wish to be re-included in the group they must make ritual apologies that reduce their prestige and power. Therefore, depending on the local norms of the immediate social environment, embarrassment may prompt the individual to adopt either broadly accepted moral standards or locally endorsed deviant acts in order to regain acceptance. Embarrassment-prone individuals experiencing higher than normal social anxiety tend to be highly aware of and concerned with social rules and standards, and so they may be especially vulnerable to the influence of others and the breaking of social bonds.

Embarrassment is a learned emotion associated with the concern one has for his or her social image (Miller, 1996) that occurs only after a child has become aware of separateness and connection. Participants sense the inappropriate conduct as their expectations are not met and they feel uncomfortable. This awareness is fundamental to an understanding of

otherness and can be seen in some children at just 18 months old (Lewis, 1995). Goffman (1956b) argued that embarrassment occurs when a participant “is felt to have projected incompatible definitions of himself before those present” (p. 264), including his or her own self as an observer (Goffman, 2005). This reaction, fundamental to human development, is quite a complex reaction. The definitions of embarrassment try to incorporate this emerging self-awareness and concern (Leary, 2007). Sharkey’s (1992) definition that embarrassment is “short lived emotional/psychological response of social chagrin (i.e., anxiety or fear that is due to negative sanctioning of lower evaluations from others) that occurs as a result of discrepancy between one’s idealized role identity and one’s presented role identity and the uncertainty that follows an incident” (p. 258) elaborates Goffman’s view.

Embarrassment is in itself embarrassing, so the participants respond by trying to suppress signs of embarrassment. Any of the participants in an encounter may feel the embarrassment. It may be the participant himself directly, or the observers empathically. As a result, “the combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself during an Encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants” (Goffman, 2005 p. 11). In adversarial situations of embarrassment, however, the participants’ self-interest diminishes mutual considerateness and focuses a greater degree of attention to making personal gains. In this case, in order to sustain the social group, participants may assume that the necessary protective co-operative face-work will be done by others, “like traditional plays in a game or traditional steps in a dance” (Goffman, 2005 p. 13), while not being required of oneself.

Much of theory and research on shame and guilt has focused on the events that led up to these emotional experiences, the phenomenology of these emotions or the consequences of these emotions for motivation and behaviour, rather than how people experience and manage aversive feelings of shame and guilt. Both shame and guilt are considered in the psychological literature to be intense, dysphoric emotions characterized by substantial feelings of responsibility and regret, and desires to atone and make amends. They are similar in that both are characterized by negative affect valence, but have different effects on those people experiencing them. Shame involves a focus on the self, whereas guilt relates to a specific behaviour. In shame-inducing situations there is greater concern with others’ evaluations of the self, whereas guilt situations generate more concern with the effect on others (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996).

Shame is considered by emotion scholars to be the more painful emotion because the individual's core self is at stake. Lewis (1971) described a split in self-functioning in which the self is both agent and object of observation and disapproval. The experience of shame is typically accompanied by a sense of worthlessness, powerlessness and exposure, a sense of feeling "fundamentally bad as a person" (Kaufman, 1974 p. 569). Individuals in the throes of shame turn tightly inward, and are thus less able to focus cognitive and emotional resources on others.

Shame-prone individuals are more likely to externalize blame, experience intense anger and express that anger in destructive ways, such as direct physical, verbal and symbolic aggression, or indirect aggression. They also show awareness that their anger typically results in negative long-term consequences for both themselves and their relationships with others (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). Scheff's (2006) discussion of the 'emotional relational world' emphasized the significance and consequences of shame for social bonds with others, whether they are present or not. Although shame does not necessarily involve an actual observing audience, individuals experience mental imagery of how their 'defective' self would appear to others (Tangney et al., 2007), which then disrupts individuals' ability to form empathic connections (Tangney et al., 1996).

Early research on shame and identity formation grew out of therapeutic experiences, and particularly considered the developmental issues for children. Kaufman (1974) described shame generation from parent to child arising from a relationship where the parent, a significant actor, breaks the interpersonal emotion bridge with the child, another significant actor, through a specific action of turning away, but while remaining in the relationship. While one incident is repairable, he describes how repeated experiences of this damage the identity-forming processes of the child, eventually irreparably. He makes the case that the same shame generation processes occur in adulthood. Similarly, important social relationships in the workplace can thus influence an individual's identity management processes through construction of and damage to interpersonal bridges such as these.

While shame is a universal experience, reasons for experiencing this feeling stem from cultural and gender differences. For example, while Brown (2007) determined gender-related differences in reasons for experiencing shame, she developed a common definition of the experience of shame, which agrees with the view of Tangney et al. and Lewis: "Shame is the intensely painful feeling or experience of believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging" (p. 5); and Appiah (2010) suggested that,

while honour can have different meanings cross culturally, the experience of shame engenders the same reactions cross-culturally.

Poulson (2001) considers that, of all the emotional states, shame can be one of the most debilitating, and he investigated the impact on organizations of individuals' anger, rage and violence that arises from shame. He suggested that shame is routinely and normatively used to 'manage' the behaviour of members of the group because it can be induced by others when members break social bonds by contravening norms. He argued that shame-inducing workplace practices are often seen by the shamed person as being directly about them rather than about the workplace situation, and that such practices are triggers for the feeling of shame and the loss of self-worth leading to anger, rage and violence. Ahmed et al. (2001) described this loss of self-worth as a threat to ethical identity, and the rage response as 'shame displacement'. These writings generally agree with Scheff's (1983) theory of the shame rage spiral, with shame leading to feelings of rage and destructive retaliation, which then sets into motion anger and resentment in the perpetrator, as well as expressions of blame and retaliation in kind, which is then likely to further shame the initially shamed partner. However, the connection between shame, rage and threat to ethical identity is much older, as noted by the comment by Ahmed et al. (2001) on similar discussions from the time of the ancient Greeks.

Guilt is considered in the literature to be typically a less devastating, less painful experience because it is a specific behaviour that is being condemned, rather than the entire self (Lewis, 1971). People in the throes of guilt are drawn to consider their behaviour and its consequences leading to tension, remorse and regret (Tangney et al., 2007). This is a less painful experience than needing to defend the exposed core of one's identity, as happens with shame (Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt is focused on the bad behaviour and the negative consequences experienced by others, and it thereby fosters an empathic response and constructive intentions and behaviours in the wake of wrongdoing (Tangney et al., 1996). Guilty feelings lead to reparative actions, including confessing, apologizing and undoing the consequences of the behaviour. Guilt, therefore, appears to be a more adaptive emotion than shame. The breaks in the social bonds lead to reparative actions that benefit individuals and their relationships in a variety of ways (Tangney et al., 2007), including identity building.

One challenge in discussions of these three related emotions is that the word ‘shame’ is itself shaming (Kaufman, 1974), and discussion of shame is considered taboo in many English-speaking societies (Brown, 2007; Scheff, 2003, 2006). Scheff contended that this taboo is in part due to the lack of a word in the English language to describe ‘everyday’ shame, a non-offensive form of shame that is used to understand everyday obligations to others. Other European languages and many African languages have words to describe everyday shame, which allows the experience to be discussed. However, the increasing use of the English language internationally is leading to this cultural taboo becoming more widespread. This lack of a shame vocabulary creates great limitations on self-expression in English-speaking cultures. As we struggle to describe experiences of shame to ourselves and others, expressions about guilt or embarrassment are more easily used. This confusion and shame around shame means expressions that may seem related to guilt, such as ‘I should have..’, ‘They ostracized me because...’, or self-blaming descriptions, such as ‘I’m an idiot/stupid’ or ‘We didn’t deserve...’, are often used as proxies to denote what psychologists, philosophers and sociologists understand to be descriptions of shame. This has been reflected in scholarly works in English-speaking cultures. Goffman’s extensive discussion of embarrassment, for example, was in part a discussion of shame due to this taboo. Goffman’s use of the term ‘embarrassment’ was simply a “softer less offensive member of the same family of emotions” (Scheff, 2006 p. 53), and therefore more accessible to an English-speaking audience.

Social anxiety and the experience of other-oriented emotions generate a range of protective behaviours. These are focused in and on the interaction experience itself and are linked to the individual’s self-concept through their ability to imagine consequences. Like others, Leary (2007) contended that the other-oriented or sentient, negative affect valence emotions motivate adherence to the norms and morals of the group in an interaction. He reinforces the role of the interaction, questioning whether socially anxious behaviours such as self-enhancement, self-verification and self-expansion are motives to maintain particular states of the psychological self; instead, these behaviours may “reflect efforts to obtain material or interpersonal outcomes, such as to establish, maintain, and protect one’s relationships with other people” (p. 334). Leary’s view is similar to Gergen’s (2009) co-constructionist view of ‘relational self’, which contends that thinking, feeling, believing, meaning making and self-idea grow from ‘coaction’, or coordinated action in community with others and, as Goffman contended, these are key to our conceptions of reality, rationality and value in life.

2.4 EMOTIONS, GOFFMAN AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITIONS

While there can be many classifications, five general and interconnected theoretical approaches to understanding the dynamics of human emotions have emerged in sociology: dramaturgical theories, symbolic interactionist theories, interaction ritual theories, power and status theories, and exchange theories (Stets & Turner, 2006; Turner & Stets, 2005a, 2006). Erving Goffman made contributions to all five theoretical approaches. This section examines Goffman's insights on symbolic interactionism, the micro interaction order and how his use of dramaturgical metaphors can inform research on emotion and moral self-identity.

Goffman's work on the micro dynamics of social interaction is widely recognized as one of the major 20th century contributions to sociological theory (Atkinson, 1989; Burns, 1992; Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Collins, 2004; Ditton, 1980; Drew & Wootton, 1988; Freidson, 1983; Manning, 1992, 2008; Scheff, 2006; Schein, 2006; Smith, 1999; Smith, 2006; Tannen, 1993; Turner & Stets, 2005b). Without explicitly elaborating a theory of self, Goffman insightfully described the management of emotion, the relationship of the emotional relational world, the inner and outer world of an individual. These descriptions directly led to a set of insights in microsociology, around performance, context, the comfort of rituals and change through ritualizing. Those insights gave rise to developments in sociolinguistics, politeness theory, identity theory and within the sociological study of emotion, which are discussed in this chapter. Goffman's contributions to ritual theory and theories of the emotional relational world, developing the work of Durkheim, van Gennep and Turner, are discussed in Chapter 3.

A functional structuralist paradigm defines roles as sets of expectations associated with given positions in a social structure (Ebaugh & Merton, 1988) and views roles as functional for the social system in which they are situated. The theories of symbolic interactionism, a subset of functional structuralism, were developed in the early stages by interactionists Herbert Blumer, George Herbert Mead and Max Weber. These early interactionists assumed that the social world is made up of regular and systematic patterns of behaviour and interaction with large-scale external forces determining individual action

(Dewey, 1970; Lewis & Smith, 1980; Weber & Shils, 1949). Blumer (1969), who coined the term 'symbolic interactionism', disagreed with sociological theories that believe that structure or organization takes primacy over agency. Instead, he emphasized the subjective meaning of human behaviour, with culture, social systems, social stratification or social roles, as setting conditions for action but not determining action (p. 88). Interactionists focus on the subjective aspects of social life, rather than on objective macro-structural aspects of social systems. In an interactionist perspective, humans are pragmatic actors who continually must adjust their behaviour to the actions of other actors intersubjectively. Constant interaction and negotiation among members of society creates temporary, socially constructed relations which remain in constant flux, despite relative stability in the basic framework governing those relations. Interactionist theorists see human agents as active, creative participants who construct their social world, rather than as passive, conforming objects of socialization (Blumer, 1969). This research is based primarily in an interactionist perspective.

Symbolic interactionism emphasizes meaning as a social determinant. Individuals and groups interact, based on meanings drawn from prevailing social symbols which are redefined through this interaction, varying by group and evolving over time. 'The actors' roles emphasize the importance of symbols and negotiate and construct the ongoing reality. The interactionist view is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them; that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, social interaction; and that the meanings are modified through an interpretive process by each individual (Blumer, 1969). This key symbolic interactionist premise is based on a presumption of role, a theatrical metaphor with the basic principles being associated with actors' expectations of social identity. The metaphor is sound, but appears to imply a conscious understanding of role, where, in practice, the actor's awareness of role expectations is learned through experience, and the tacit knowledge this engenders and interactions with others will generate new role identities over time (Tannen, 1993). Roles can be improvised or scripted and actors often act as role-making improvisers in ambiguous situations. This had also been identified earlier by Turner (1956), who conceptualized role as "a collection of patterns of behaviour which are thought to constitute a meaningful unit and deemed appropriate to a person occupying a particular status in society, occupying an informally defined position interpersonal relation, or identified with a particular value in society" (p. 316). It refers to an actor's "behaviour rather than position, so that one may enact a role but cannot occupy a role" (p. 317).

Goffman extended Symbolic Interactionism towards performance and emotional responses by outlining a conceptual framework in which a face-to-face interaction can be viewed as a dramaturgical performance, with the actors taking meaning-making roles. Goffman (1959) extended Cooley's 'looking-glass self', seeing social behaviour as more or less scripted with actors taking roles, seeing what our actions might mean to the other actors in the interaction, and taking the perspective of the other. A role identity is understood as the rights, obligations and expected behaviour patterns associated with a particular social position in a group. A performance is all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence any of the other participants. This includes impressions the actors knowingly and unknowingly 'give off' during the interaction. Goffman (1961) extended the concept of role analysis, proposing that the focus of role as the actor carrying out "a bundle of obligatory activity" (p. 86) within a pattern of social action, recognizing the 'constraining obligations' or creative compromise involved in a role for the actor. Role distance, a major concept defined by Goffman (1961), is when the participant has conflict within the role, does not fully embrace the role, and uses behavioural signals to communicate their lack of belonging, dissatisfaction and resistance. Intrapersonal conflict can occur when the individual has multiple roles to play and these are in tension, so that distance from a role because of another role may also reflect a sense of proportion or balance, rather than dissatisfaction. Self and identity are constructed through these messy interactions; the actors make a 'self' by performing roles for people who are at the same time performing for them.

Goffman (1974a) described the action of role acquisition for an actor as "keys, or sets of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned by this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else" (p. 46). Birenbaum (1984) extended this description by asserting that the process takes place in three ways: role discrepancy, where an actor realizes that their own concept of appropriate behaviour does not match others' expectations; role typification, where an actor is placed into a recurrent and often unwanted typification, complete with an explanation of why the fit between the role and the person was made; and role validation, where the institutionalized character of the role is derived from intersubjective meanings shared by the actor and others, and is seen as a continual process.

According to Goffman (1959), participants, or actors, work to develop a common definition of the situation in order to develop ease of interaction. Goffman contended that the greater the actors' ability to control those signals pertaining to identifiable roles, the greater is their ability to present a coherent front which entails effort, or work. They do this by orchestrating a coherent front for their performances at the same time as accepting one another's performances. This involves controlling signals of their status, both outside and inside the interaction, and often also controlling physical space, props and equipment. Actors orchestrate the performance by maintaining control of their expressive gestures, signalling their sincerity, accentuating those signals relevant to the situation and incorporating and exemplifying general cultural values (Turner, 1991). Herman Wouk (2012) described the effort of this as "What one doesn't realize in ordinary mental health is that daily life is a show. You have to put on a right costume, to improvise right speeches, to do right actions, and all this isn't automatic - it takes concentration and work and a simply amazing degree of control".

The role identity that an individual performs is affected by the individual's experiences, position in life, the expectations of themselves and others, external relationships, belief systems, emotional response to a situation and the contingencies faced in interactions with others. Goffman (1961 p. 106) asserted that to "embrace a role is to disappear completely into the virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms of the image and to confirm expressively one's acceptance of it". Three features are involved in an individual's embracement of a role or identity: admitted or expressed attachment to the role, a demonstration of qualifications and capacities for performing it, and an active engagement or spontaneous involvement in the role activity at hand (Goffman, 1961). In this way the embracement and enactment of the role, and the emotions this engenders, contribute to the ongoing development of identity.

Goffman's conceptions of role and role distance have been explored by many scholars. Coser (1966) argued that Goffman's role distance is simply normative behaviour in groups and occurs in situations where the status occupant faces contradictory expectations. The resulting role conflict is then solved by two types of behaviours: the pretence of detachment from some status prerogatives in order better to perform a role, and taking distance from one role in order to prepare for taking another role. Chriss (1999) argued that role distance is the way an actor attempts to downplay something they perceive to be 'faulty' in the interaction. He suggested that role distance can be displayed in two ways –

euphorically that is with positivity and confidence, and disphorically that is with anxiety and negativity – and that mostly actors display the disphoric or negational self. This may be because the negational self is often humorous and potentially disarming to the audience, or because the interaction itself increases social anxiety. Scheff (2006) discussed the emotional relational world of individuals and the impact of anxiety on the roles played. Giddens (1984) argued that agents have a special capacity for reflexivity, which he defined as the ability to monitor one's own behaviour in relation to that of others. This ability does not relate to the ability to distance oneself from a role though; it is merely an awareness of the agent's own role in an interaction (Giddens, 1984). Bolton (2005) investigated role embracement and distance using the Goffman lens. She observed nurses trying to reconcile the expectations in their workplace, embracing their traditional roles as carers in their nursing practice and feeling ambivalence and distance toward their newer managerial roles. This duality of emotional response observed from the same individual suggests a constant internal dialogue about which role identity should be performed at any given time. All these scholars found role a useful concept in analyzing interaction, particularly sentient interaction.

Davis and Harré's (1990) positioning theory, a critique and extension of Goffman's role theory, describes selves as being continuously produced and characterized by "continuous personal identity and by discontinuous personal diversity" (p. 46). Similar to Bakhtin's conception, this continuous production of self is discursively enacted through an internal, often unconscious, dialectic between the self and the other. Their positioning triangle looks at production of self from outside the experience or episode. The theory unites speech act theories of intentional actions; incorporates temporal and contextual qualities of narrative storylines. It combines interpersonal interactive positioning and internal reflective and performed positioning relative to the context. They described a "a realm of positions, realized in current practices, which people can adopt, strive to locate themselves in, be pushed into, be displaced from or be refused access, recess themselves from and so on, in a highly mobile and dynamic way" (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003 pp. 5–6). The context may include indexical meanings developed through past experiences, and culturally embedded attributes affecting the positioning and the other(s) in the interaction. While it is an external view, not experiential, this "fine grain of local moral orders" (p. 5) is an extension of the 'singular self' (Harré, 1998) in that it includes a more engaged relationship with emotion, and provides a useful basis for investigation of self and emotion.

Goffman's view of the self and performance roles is often criticized as being a cold and even heartless view of the actor. Manning (1991) argued that Goffman viewed "the individual as a set of performance masks hiding a manipulative and cynical self" (p. 76). Hochschild (1979) criticized Goffman for excluding emotion from the masks and then built on Goffman's interactionist theory, adding the concept of 'emotion or feeling rules' and contending that the actors work on inducing or inhibiting feelings in an encounter so as to render them 'appropriate' to a situation. Leary and Kowalski (1995) disagreed with this criticism: "There is nothing Machiavellian or manipulative in our pervasive emphasis on influencing other people. On the contrary, social influence is an essential and valuable aspect of social life" (p. 16).

Goffman's forensic approach to the micro world of interaction and discussions of selves as agents who try to exert influence over one another are certainly challenging for the reader. He was also a polarizing character who was known for his abrupt behaviour and rudeness to others, suggesting a lack of personal warmth. However, Goffman's moral outrage about the inhumanity in the US mental health system shouts from the pages of 'Stigma', 'Asylums' and 'The Insanity of Place' (Goffman, 1969, 1974b, 2007) and appears to have an empathic quality and a fundamental belief in the importance of the emotional connections between people in their management of personal self and identity. Two renowned Goffman scholars, Thomas Scheff and Randall Collins, supported this view, elaborating extensively on Goffman's work in their work on the emotional relational world (Collins, 2004; Scheff, 2006), interaction ritual theory (Collins, 2004) and shame (Scheff, 2000).

Tseelon (1992) also supported this position, arguing that, while Goffman's language seems amoral to many readers, and the schools of Impression Management often interpret self-presentation, an extension of dramaturgy, as immoral, neither is true. Tseelon argued that when Goffman used the dramaturgical metaphors of stage and backstage, or private and public, he was not referring to a true private and a false public, and that "an analysis of self presentation as immoral or insincere is only meaningful within a Cartesian conception which assumes private/public dichotomy, and defines sincerity as correspondence between the two. The moral interpretation depends on the ontology of the critic" (p. 125).

Goffman's work, while strongly based in the language and social mores of his time, is still relevant today. The focus on the micro dynamics of interaction makes Goffman's sociology personal and contributes to its timeless aspects. Fine and Manning (2000) took the credible

view that Goffman's analyses "feel very contemporary: [he was] perhaps the first postmodern sociological theorist" (p. 457). Indeed, Goffman's unique perspective, refusing to be constrained by sociological specialization (Verhoeven, 1993b), shifting between enlightenment theories and postmodernism, and trying to find explanations for human behaviour while viewing that project as one which would never be able to be completed (Goffman, 1983b), contributes to his relevance to today's sociological and social psychological research in the workplace.

2.5 IDENTITY AND SELF IN THE EMOTIONAL-RELATIONAL WORLD

While issues of identity have been studied since the earliest records in philosophy, scholars have shown increased interest in a number of aspects of identity since the beginning of the 21st century. The approaches are varied, depending on the phenomena being investigated, and include personal (Pullen, Beech, & Sims, 2007; Simon, 2004), organizational (Albert, 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002), ethnic (Phinney, 1990) and cultural (Hall, 1990) identity. Concepts of identity in organizations and the workplace are discussed further in Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on individual self-identity.

Individual identity is a slippery and fragile concept, a complex paradox where context holds primacy and where subjective individuals use multiple motives, positioning and negotiations to maintain coherence to themselves over time.

The potential for sentient emotion and emotion management to be part of the individual's experience of change and a relationship with ongoing development of identity was documented as early as Helen Merrell Lynd's (1958) classic work 'On shame and the search for identity'. However, it is only in recent times that research into emotions has specifically targeted organizations as the field of study, and researchers have focused primarily on the self-oriented emotions.

Pullen et al. (2007) neatly noted the paradox of individual identity, that our interest is to differentiate ourselves by being associated with a group identity: "Identity thus makes us the same as others, at the same time it makes us different from everyone else" (p. 1). This 'sameness and difference' are in tension and vary, depending on and within the context. We

can choose to shift identities within single encounters, though this depends somewhat on others' willingness to negotiate and accept the new identities being presented.

The interactionist view is that order is negotiated through being created and recreated in multiple interactions each day with each actor. Goffman's (1983b) 'interaction order' describes the consequence of "systems of enabling conventions" enacted between participants whose identification depends on "four critical diffuse statuses of age-grade, gender, class and race" (p. 14) and some uniquely distinguishing identity aspects. These may be embodied such as hair colour, tone of voice or form a social role such as profession. Strauss et al. (1963) built on the work of Mead, Goffman and others, defining 'negotiated order' as a result of actors' processes of defining, interpreting and negotiating during interactions. Strauss et al. argued that all social order is negotiated, and that negotiations are contingent on the structural conditions, follow patterns and have temporal limits. Day and Day's (1977) emergent view of the fluid, continuously emerging qualities of negotiated order focused on responses to changing contexts; where organizational actors "play an active, self-conscious role in the shaping of the social order. Their day to day interactions, agreements, temporary refusals, and changing definitions of the situations at hand are of paramount importance" (p. 132).

Underpinning the concept of negotiated order is the notion of a 'social world', an organization or ecology openly engaging with the wider environment. Originally developed by Strauss et al. (1963), this concept was further defined by Unruh (1980) as "amorphous and diffuse constellations of actors, organizations, events and practices which have coalesced into spheres of interest and involvement for participants" (p. 277). The actors in a social world are characterized as strangers, tourists, regulars and insiders; and their membership is by voluntary identification, partial involvement, multiple identifications and mediated interactions which are bounded by 'universes of discourse'. These extensions of interaction theory implicitly acknowledge the tension of 'sameness and difference' by making the rules and negotiations governing multiple roles in and the social worlds of the actors more transparent; therefore these may be helpful in understanding identity in social environments in the workplace.

Becker et al. (2012) argued that the identity motive for distinctiveness is a 'functional universal', guiding identity construction processes, but that the construction processes themselves are culturally mediated (p. 849). In a major cross-cultural review they agreed with Pullen et al. (2007) and noted that, while the motive for distinctiveness is universal, it

is associated to a greater degree in individualistic cultures and with social position in collectivist cultures (p. 834). Nobles (1973) supported this view by giving primacy to social position in the communalistic group and noting that in African origin societies “One’s self-identity is therefore always a people identity, or what could be called an extended identity or extended self” (p. 24).

Interactionism theories are useful in understanding the relationship aspects of identity and, in combination with the insights of role theory, can allow the interrelationship between self-definition as a unique individual, and that as a member of a social group, to be part of developments in social psychology identity theory. Simon (2004) explicitly follows symbolic interactionist thought, arguing that an individual’s identity is relational, socially constructed and involves multiple identities, with social consequences. While he acknowledged that people have relatively stable and enduring cognitively held representations of who they are, he also proposed that a person’s self-concept depends how they experience and interpret their self-aspects in a situation which is both relational and interactional. Self-aspects involve cognitive representations of oneself, which are also social products whose meanings emerge from social interaction. They are relational and reflect social hierarchical positions. People have access to multiple interrelated self-aspects which provide a cognitive structure for self-interpretation. The salience or role of a particular self-aspect varies with the situational context and is constructed ‘online’ from the current situation and knowledge retrieved from long-term memory (p. 44). Simon’s examples of self-aspects are much broader than Goffman’s (1983b) age-grade, gender, class and race and general reference to social roles. Simon noted that self-aspects include, but are not limited to, such things as personality traits, physical features, abilities, language affiliation(s), religion, behavioural characteristics, work roles, group memberships, family roles and social roles. Simon noted that individuals differ in the degree to which they differentiate and integrate their various self-aspects, which adds to the complexity. Simon’s theory is “fundamentally psychological in the sense that it the individual serves as the basic unit of analysis and that it is his or her identity that is at stake” (Simon, 2004 p. 43); however, it is sociologically based on the individuals’ relationships with others in the context.

Simon (2004) asserted that identity has the functions of providing a relational and collective sense of belonging and a sense of individual distinctiveness; it gives a sense of place, of belonging in the world, defining where individuals belong and do not belong in relation to others; and it contributes through self-evaluation to self-respect and self-esteem (pp. 66–

67). Kaufman (1974) encapsulated this, defining identity as “a sense of self, of who one is and who one is not, and where one belongs. It is a sense of inner centeredness and valuing” (p. 568). While this coherence and stability are important, singular identities are limiting because humans usually live in complex worlds with many identities. The ability to hold multiple identities is individual; in a wider sense it is associated in Western cultures with personal freedom. People can be part of many collective or social identity groups, religious, political, social identities as a parent, child, team member, professional, but they strongly identify with only one. Grayling (2009) noted that “the fewer identities people acknowledge, the less free they are” (p. 36).

Watson (2008a) analytically separated the ‘internal’ self-identity aspects of human identities from the external or ‘discursive’ social-identity aspects. He defined self-identity as the individual’s own notion of who and what they are, and social identities as cultural, discursive or institutional notions of who or what any individual might be. He eschews self-aspects, instead using externally applied group labels to look at the social identity aspects: (i) social-category social identities, which include all of Goffman’s four categories of class, gender, nationality, including ethnicity; (ii) formal-role social identities that are related to work or organizational membership; (iii) local-organizational and local community social-identities; and (iv) local-personal social identities, which relate to how the individual is characterized by others, in the contexts of specific situations or events, including metanarratives of cultural stereotypes and frames. Watson (2008a) views people’s identity work acting as a bridge between self-identities and the external discursive ‘social-identities’ influencing self. This was supported by Ashforth and Mael (1989), who argued that social identification is a perception of oneness with an external group which is distinctive, attractive and able to be categorized, and which leads the individual into activities that are congruent with the identity and that reinforce that identity and membership of that group. These identity-communicating activities form the link between the culture of the external group and behaviour. Singelis and Brown (1995) supported this view: “self is shaped by cultural forces and affects many, if not all, communication behaviors” (p. 354).

Anthony Appiah, an American philosopher with strong roots in Akan and African philosophies, has brought an additional view to the operation of self-aspects in his discussion of the ‘Ethics of Identity’ (2005). He noted that these self-aspects, or labels, both guide and constitute the construction of identity, particularly collective identity. He argued that the structure of collective identity in any society requires the availability of

agreed descriptive labels in the public discourse so that people can be recognized as members of a group; these descriptors are internalized as parts of the identities of those who bear them and others in the society exhibit patterns of behaviour towards these identities (pp. 66–68).

Appiah also noted that individuals and groups have interactive rights in society, and these rights form part of the interactive co-construction of identity. These individual rights come from both ethical and substantive sources. Ethical sources take the view that rights benefit individuals, and substantive sources that rights are intrinsic in society and must always be attached to an individual (p. 72). Appiah's distinctions of the special rights around membership of social groups include the collective rights of the group where their interests can be asserted externally, and the membership rights of the group where members can make internal claims upon the group (p. 72). These are evident across cultures. This discussion will not engage with the argument around how strongly this individualistic view is held in any one society, but this argument does highlight a dilemma between the rights of the individual and the common good which is universal, that of the value of the individual versus the 'common good'. A common art motif in Akan culture depicts a crocodile with one stomach but two heads, and the two heads are fighting over food. The two separate heads can be said to represent the individual rights and interests, and the common stomach and body symbolizes the shared interest of the two heads. This art motif can also be seen as a communalistic African metaphor for the paradox of identity noted by Pullen et al. (2007), where the difference of the crocodile heads is co-constituted by the sameness of the common stomach.

In Harré's work, the person or identity comprises the discursive narratives and performances encompassing the cluster of identity beliefs, relational and collective self-aspects, and the interactive rights and claims of Self 2 interacting with the 'other' through Selves 3. Recent work on relational aspects of identity suggests that there may be a more fine-grained relationship between Brewer and Gardner's (1994) differentiated, individuated concept of a more stable self-identity and Harré's Self 1 – linking the feelings, or sentient emotions of connection experienced in interaction, with concepts of identity. However it is important to note the role of narrative in development of identity. These internal dialogues form part of each individual's narrative of identity. Oliver Sacks (1998) noted the ubiquity of the internal narrative: "we have, each of us, a life-story, an inner narrative—whose

continuity, whose sense, is our lives. It might be said that each of us constructs and lives, a 'narrative', and that this narrative is us, our identities" (p. 57).

2.6 FACE-DIALOGUE: IDENTITY IN RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER

Goffman's concept of Face is the first of the views of the interrelationship between emotions and identity explored in this research. Face is another polysemic concept in the sociological, anthropological, psychological, sociolinguistics, pragmatics and communication studies literature.

Hu (1944) first introduced the Chinese Face concepts in anthropology. The two concepts of Face, 'lien' and 'mien-tzu', have distinctive criteria and are used quite differently. 'Lien', the more serious of the two, involves social and internalized judgements about character and has recourse to sanctions. It is a concept involving a good moral reputation and sense of self-worth that comes from the respect of other. This concept appears similar to the Akan concept of personhood, a deeper view of self with serious sanctions for major moral transgressions such as a murder. By contrast, 'mien' is a dynamic interactional concept of 'face', an older and more fluid concept generally associated with social mores and politeness. According to Ho (1976), the distinctions of these two views of face have not been sufficiently explored, but the basic concept of face unites sociological concepts of behavioural norms and standards, status and authority. He notes that the "Western orientation, with its preoccupation with the individual, and the Chinese orientation, which places the accent on the reciprocity of obligations, dependence, and esteem protection" (p. 883) are complementary.

Taking an interactional stance, Goffman (1955) first discussed face in reference to how people present themselves in social situations, saying a "person's face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter" (p. 214). Goffman argued that reality is constructed through social interactions, in relationship with others, and that the actor participants' appraisals of the events make meaning of the interactions. He sees face as a series of informal rules that govern interactions in a society, a system of practices, conventions, heuristics and procedural rules which participants use to guide and organize the flow of the

interaction, thus providing a mutual understanding as to when and where it will be permissible to initiate talk, among whom, and by means of what topics of conversation (Goffman, 2005). He regarded any co-presence of others as intrinsically including language, verbal or non-verbal, bringing with it “one central obligation: to render our behaviour understandably relevant to what the other can come to perceive is going on” (Goffman, 1983a p. 51). This development of face having a focus on talk was initiated by Goffman in the latter part of his career and led to work on the concept of face by sociolinguists, pragmatists and communications scholars.

Goffman (2005) explained face as a deeply vulnerable phenomenon, associated with emotional reactions: “If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to ‘feel good’; if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will ‘feel bad’ or ‘feel hurt’” (p. 6). His concept of face involves each actor having a range of positively valued social roles and attributes, in relation to which people make face claims: “The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (p. 5). This accent on positive attributes in Goffman’s face work contrasts with identity attributes, which also include those attributes that are negatively and neutrally evaluated.

Goffman’s conception of face was criticized by Hochschild (1979, 2003) in her development of emotion work. Hochschild’s viewed Goffman’s conception of Face as only encompassing ‘surface acting’ not ‘deep acting’. Since Goffman first discussed face, many of the main debates have been associated with Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory, which frames face as positive or negative, a sociolinguistic concept where face can be ‘lost’ or ‘saved’ by recourse to local politeness conventions in language. In this sense, face work in interaction is ritualized behaviour to enable interaction. At its simplest level, it is a matter of ‘turn taking’ – who is allowed to talk and when. Underlying this process, however, are complex perceptions, rights and conditions that legitimate who is allowed to talk, what they are allowed to talk about, and for whom they are able to speak.

Face is the active process of creating and recreating who has the right to talk, under what conditions and on what topics. Participants adhere to a code regarding giving up and taking over the speaker role, allocating positions around the externally realized hierarchy of the group identity. In seeking to unpack the complexities of this process, Goffman noted the

differences that may exist between the voice of the animator, author and principal. There is the actual speaker (animator), the person who determines what was to be said and on what terms (author), and someone whose beliefs, commitment and position are expressed by what is said (principal). As a result, as Goffman, (1981 p. 150) put it, “Often this means that the individual speaks, explicitly or implicitly in the name of we not I, the we including more than the self”. In a linguistic sense, “an understanding will prevail as to when and where it will be permissible to initiate talk, among whom, and by means of what topics of conversation. A set of significant gestures is employed to initiate a spate of communication and as a means for the persons concerned to accredit each other as legitimate participants” (Goffman, 2005 p. 34). Goffman also pointed to the linguistic conditions where the utterance of the right words by the right person in the right situation effectively accomplishes the speech act. Several conditions are necessary for speech acts to appear not strange, but appropriate to the situation at hand: preparatory conditions, the status or authority of a speaker to perform a speech act, the situation of the other parties, the physical situation/occasion of the utterance, execution conditions, required interactions, validating ritual or ceremonial action, and sincerity conditions, revealing that the speaker intends what (s)he says (Goffman, 1983a).

But face can, in fact, be considered a deeper phenomenon associated with personhood, the inner or core self. Discussions of face and face-work usually relate face, the extent to which face is relational, its dependency on context, and concepts of self and social identity. Goffman’s development of face in sociolinguistics and Brown and Levenson’s original conceptions of face in politeness are often criticized for being transmission-based, using pre-established patterns of action, intentional, and being embedded in the individual rather than the relationship (Haugh & Bargiela-Chiappini, 2010). Another criticism is that Goffman’s conception is concerned only with protection of self-image, a particular focus in North American contexts (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003). People from cultures with a more interdependent view of self may be especially heavily invested in making the ‘right’ impression, although people from cultures with an independent view of self also do this. Ekman (1992) concluded that display rules are particular to each culture. The use of face-work activities, such as non-verbal cues, eye contact and gaze, personal space and emblems, and nonverbal gestures of the hands and arms, show wide cultural variations and are well understood within the confines of a given culture, not just in North America, and therefore relate to identity making within that culture.

Face in this sense fits with the argument that face can be considered a relational phenomenon coacted dyadically or as part of a larger group, and identity as being situated within the individual, but bearing upon and coacting with others in relationship. Spencer-Oatey's (2007) critique and extension of Goffman's concept of face supported and elaborated this view. She proposed that, while face and identity both relate to the notion of self-image and both comprise multiple self-aspects or attributes, face is only associated "with positively evaluated attributes that the claimant wants others to acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly), and with negatively evaluated attributes that the claimant wants others NOT to ascribe to him/her" (p. 644). Goffman's claim that face is associated with 'approved social attributes'. Spencer-Oatey suggested that attributes that are affectively sensitive will vary dynamically in interaction, will not always conform to the socially sanctioned or non-sanctioned ones and that which these attributes will be selected and contested is dependent on the context (p. 644).

Kenneth Gergen, in his influential 2009 book 'Relational Being – Beyond Self and Community', also supported Goffman's view, arguing that humans are in interaction all the time through mental discourse, and noting that "to have a mental life is to have a relational life" (p. 75). His view of the internal self is entirely relational, social in nature; its role is to function in the service of the relationship, its action within relationships is a face work type of culturally prescribed performance which is embedded within the traditions of coaction (pp. 70–75). Arundale (2010a, 2010b) supported Gergen's view in his critique and development of Goffman's concept of face. Here Arundale characterized face as a sense of relational connectedness and separateness, and face-work as the work of interpreting the actions of others as threatening or supportive. Other scholars of pragmatics have also begun to focus on face as relational. Haugh (2007, 2010; Haugh & Bargiela-Chiappini, 2010) and Ruhi (2010) have focused particularly on the broader social context of the relationship and the life histories that influence individuals in their interactions.

Goffman noted the role of structure, using a game metaphor. "When a person treats face work not as something to be prepared to perform, but rather as something that others can be counted upon to perform or accept, then the encounter or an undertaking becomes less a scene of mutual considerateness than an area in which a contest or match is held. The purpose of the game is to preserve everyone's line from an inexcusable contradiction, while scoring as many points as possible against one's adversaries and making as many gains as possible for oneself" (Goffman, 1955).

These concepts all touch on, but do not explicitly discuss, face as a deeper conception of personhood. In times of high social anxiety, such as during organizational change, participants' emotional response is fragmented, uncertain, ambiguous and therefore contradictory and ambivalent (McLoughlin, Badham, & Palmer, 2005). They may feel silenced on issues which are discomfiting, complex and difficult to change (Schein, 2006). This coercive aspect can be considered a threat to the social bonds which act as interpersonal emotion bridges (Kaufman, 1974) with the other significant actor. Interpersonal emotion bridges can be threatened, damaged or broken through a specific action of the other actor, impacting on the inner self. This situation is common in the workplace, for example, where the actors must remain in the relationship. The actor whose interpersonal emotion bridges have been damaged feels the greater impact of their internal face dialogue, which consequently can exert greater potential influence on their subsequent interactions.

Goffman (2005) pointed out that the potential for conflict and harmony are intertwined, in that "the person will have two points of view – a defensive orientation toward saving his own face and a protective orientation toward saving the others; ... in general one may expect these two perspectives to be taken at the same time. In trying to save the face of others, the person must choose a tack that will not lead to loss of his own; in trying to save his own face, he must consider the loss of face that his action may entail for others" (p. 14). Face-work responds to the master narratives and power relationships in the organizational context, intrinsically connected to the framing and performance of roles. It is from the tacit understanding of the frame that face-work can be enacted. "Each participant enters a social situation with an already established biography of prior dealings with the other participants – or at least with participants of their kind; and enters also with a vast array of cultural assumptions presumed to be shared" (Goffman, 1983b p. 4). These assumptions help participants allocate positions around the externally realized hierarchy. These cultural assumptions include familiar patterns or heuristics that individuals use to help them, which Goffman refers to as the "unthinking recourse to procedural forms or rituals" (Goffman, 1983b p. 6). For example, standard rituals to bring back intersubjective accord involve a challenge to the participant who displays the deviant behaviour, the offering of compensation by the participant, acceptance of the offer by the other participants and gratitude by the offending participant for being forgiven (2005). In the interaction game metaphor, this plays a key role in determining the winners and losers in the interaction. "Perhaps behind a willingness to accept the way things are ordered is the brutal fact of

one's place in the social structure and the real or imagined cost of allowing oneself to be singled out as a malcontent" (Goffman, 1983b p. 6). In certain situations, however, the emotional balance may swing away from mutual considerateness and towards a more or less open contest or match, with a greater degree of attention to making personal gains and scoring points against adversaries. Humour may also play a role. In this case, assumptions may be made that the necessary protective co-operative face-work will be done by other participants, "like traditional plays in a game or traditional steps in a dance" (Goffman, 2005 p.13).

The importance of the 'other' in self-knowledge and the ongoing development of personal and social identity is widely supported in Western and African philosophies, social psychology and sociology. The African ethic of communality, a communalistic system of reciprocity to others with symmetrical obligations and rights between individuals, becomes a criterion of self-identity (Wiredu, 2009 p. 17). Relating back to Harré's (1998) 'rhetorical convenience' of the singular self, an agent's personhood or identity involves taking a particular form of identity which is acceptable to the wider community so the individual's identity is embedded in the 'other'. The performance of self by Selves 3 reinforces that identity, and consists of the discursive narratives and performances encompassing the cluster of identity beliefs of Self 2 interacting dialogically with the 'other' through Selves 3 (Harré, 1998).

Emotions are understood to shape identity through their central place in moral education and moral life. They play a crucial role in the regulation of social life and an indispensable role in determining the quality of life. As a person's morality develops, they develop an ethic of self that informs their emotional relational world. Self-conscious or sentient emotions are experienced from the interactive relationship and experienced bodily rather than verbalized. Gendlin's (1997) 'felt meaning' is the ability to directly reference something from functional relationships with others and the context. Polanyi's (1966) actors, apprehending the relation between two events, "both of which we know, but only one of which we can tell" (p. 7), describe this as knowing 'something from'. Social bonds are characterized as interpersonal emotion bridges with another significant actor; they can be threatened or broken through a specific action of the other actor turning away, while remaining in the relationship (Kaufman, 1974).

Face, then, can be characterized as a dialogue with self and a dialogue with others, managing social identities in relation with others, and managing self-conception of

personhood. It is co-acted in context, and the success or not of how it is achieved directly impacts on the individual's identity or personhood in the community.

Face is a powerful analytical concept in that it can describe aspects of interactions, making explicit the small changes and the micro rituals. It has been used to explore interactions by a number of scholars, most recently the pragmatics scholars mentioned above. However, Face is limited in scope in that it cannot account for two aspects of influence on how individuals see themselves; the first is the role of the individual's view of the context, a subjective view of how people see their world and themselves on a minute by minute basis. The second is the role of the pre-existing concerns, the underlying moral ethics, and the traits or values structures that are at the core of moral self-identity.

The research in this thesis therefore proposes that cognitively complex, sentient, emotions, which act to facilitate attainment of complex social goals such as identity making, can be partially examined through Face-dialogue.

2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter began with a moral view of identity and historical overview of the importance of emotions in social life, developing a sociological view of self, otherness and identity that allows investigation of emotions and their effect on identity. In looking at interaction, relationships and the generalized human goals of connection in an open interpretive approach, this research takes a social constructionist view that self and identity are constructed dialogically over time through coaction between self and others in the context. Experiencing and knowing emotion arises from the translation into meaning through imagination and language. The coaction is contextual, relational, dialogic and embodied and influencing the future in a messy, never-ending, chaotic and emergent way.

This chapter has reviewed conceptualizations of identity, sociality of self and the relationship between self and other. The literature on emotions, specifically sentient emotions was discussed and importance of Goffman's sociology in describing people's emotional relational world was outlined. The discussion considered how identity is coacted and introduced Face as a lens to reveal the dynamics of micro interactions between people.

‘Sentient’ is the term used to describe moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, negative-affect valenced emotions in this thesis for the following reasons: ‘Moral’ pertains to responsible beings knowing and basing action on the distinction between right and wrong. Sentient relates to the ‘knowingness’ that is necessary for understanding concepts of right and wrong. ‘Other-oriented’, places a significant focus on a single ‘other’, and the other may be the actor themselves, an ‘other’, multiple others or some combination of those. Sentient relates to an awareness of a generalized other, but does not necessarily relate to active consciousness or a particular other. ‘Self-conscious’, implies active consciousness, while each actor may perceive only a mild sense of discomfort that sits just under consciousness. Sentient relates to a tacit consciousness, an awareness, a feeling. ‘Negative-affect valenced’ refers to negative character, or embodied felt meaning, called forth by the emotion experience. Sentient relates to perception, and is necessary for the negative character of these emotions to be experienced.

Sentient, therefore, relates to moral knowingness, awareness of a generalized other, tacit consciousness as perception, and is necessary for the negative character of these emotions to be experienced. Hence it is used in this thesis to describe these emotions.

The discussion of the literatures in this chapter has shown that sentient emotions are inseparable from self and sense of identity. It has shown that these emotions are more likely to be present at times of heightened social anxiety, such as meetings during major organizational change.

The scholarly focus on self and role identities in studies of organization are highlighted and discussed. Drawing from a broad range of literatures to capture the broadest sociological perspective, the role of the other in identity construction is conceptualised as having a mediating action on both social identities and internal self-identity. The chapter concludes by outlining the opportunity to examine sentient emotions from a perspective of moral dialogues and the analytical Goffmanesque concept of Face.

The next chapter reviews the literature on concepts of work and the role of meetings in workplace change. It explores a common site of interactions in organizational change, organizational change meetings, and the ritualizing behaviours that occur there, and considers the role of the context of the interaction. It considers characterizations of workplace change and discusses the importance of subjective context and individuals’

construct of Frame, the other Goffmanesque analytical concept used in the research explored in this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

CHANGE ENCOUNTERS: WHERE EMOTIONS MEET

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed the perspectives of the self in emotional relationship with the other and how the relationship impacts on moral self-identity. It overviewed the importance and significance of emotions in social life and developed a sociological view of self and otherness that will allow investigation of emotions. It also examined sentient behaviour in high social anxiety interactions and introduced Face dialogue, a Goffmanesque concept, as a partial lens to investigate the phenomenon of other-oriented emotions and identity in micro interaction.

This chapter suggests that cognitively complex sentient emotions can be partially examined through the Goffmanesque concept of Frame dialogues, and it addresses the question: How can social interactions in meetings during organizational change be characterized and analysed in order to consider the effects of sentient emotions?

The chapter begins by reflecting on concepts associated with the idea of work and the centrality of work to human experience. It discusses conceptualizations of work, strategizing and organizing and considers the role of meetings in workplace change by characterizing change as a transition ritual and how meetings become a liminal site of change. Goffman's construct of Frame is used to examine subjective context and structures of expectations. Finally, Frame dialogue is presented as a lens for addressing an individual's dialogue with the context and how social identities are coacted with micro-ritual behaviours in such social contexts.

3.2 SENTIENT EMOTIONS AND WORK

3.2.1 THE CENTRALITY AND SOCIALITY OF WORK

Work is another polysemic expression with multiple meanings dependent on the context. The etymological origins of the term are from the ancient Indo-European ‘*werg*’, meaning ‘to do’. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1993) entry for ‘work’ has a number of ideas associated with the concept, grouped into three main classes of definitions. The first class of definitions discusses work as action, a “purposive action involving effort or exertion, especially as a means of making one’s living, including sport; an actor’s regular means of employment”. The second class of definitions discusses work as an output, “a thing, structure or results produced by the operation, action or labour of a person or other agent; something achieved or accomplished”. The third class of definitions discusses work as a social place, “that place or premises where work is carried out, especially collective manufacture”. From these definitions, it is clear that, at least in English-speaking societies, work is most widely regarded as a concept in which effort over time becomes a commodity given to an employer in exchange for money.

However, work plays a major role in social life and is much more important than just the simple exchange of time and effort for money. Bolman and Deal (2003) noted that working, as an activity, takes up most of the weekdays and often weekends as well, proportionately more time and energy than given to any other single waking human activity. Work has become a source of self-respect and identity in Western society associated with achievement and status. This perspective is firmly based in Western cultures and there are distinct differences between the development of European and North American concepts of work, influenced by Judaeo-Christian principles and the development of the capitalist society, and those of pre-capitalist societies influenced by other systems of religious belief, in South America, South Asia and Africa.

Budd (2011) noted that all cultures share common characteristics about the development of work and that the development of work has been intertwined with human evolution. Very early forms of work centred around the process of hunting and gathering food. Prehistoric peoples developed simple tools and so began a gradual shift, from work being done by hunter-gatherers who followed the food sources nomadically, to those who stayed in a fixed geographic area and stored food to eat later. Work became seasonally intense around the sowing and reaping of crops, and tools for storage were developed. This transition

from hunter-gatherer to agricultural society led to small family-based societal groups working together and beginning to specialize work around the need for different agricultural tasks and the tools required to perform them. As these small societies grew and started to connect, they began trading with each other. This increased craft specialization, and manufacturing and trading by people with specific craftsmanship expertise began to grow. A greater social differentiation between occupations developed and, around the same time, complex hierarchical societies with complex business organizations and trading systems emerged. However, even with this specialization, most work was agriculturally based until the 18th century, and only a few organizational precursors to the modern factory system existed. The Industrial Revolution in 18th century Europe transformed work. The social division of labour, largely household-based and agrarian, and where individuals were in today's terms self-employed, changed to being a manufacturing division of labour, a full-time activity with an employed industrial workforce, where skilled craftsmanship was supplanted by unskilled, repetitive jobs. This change was the foundation of "modern forms of work and today's employment relationship" (p. 7).

In terms of attitudes to work, hierarchies developed around production of food in the pre-capitalist Western cultures of ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and the early Jewish peoples. Due to the prevalence of available labour, the wealthy who valued leisure and regarded work as unpleasant drudgery and a degrading activity were able to avoid it by allocating work to the lowest level of society. So work was done, but it was not held in esteem. As Judeo-Christian thinking strengthened, the notion of work was recast as a punishment given to humankind as a consequence of original sin. This strengthened the church, by creating a virtue of obedience, but not necessarily something to satisfy any other needs. The emergence and rise of Protestantism and the Reformation began to change the meaning of work from punishment, recasting it again to being a 'calling', similar to that of a religious vocation within Western cultures, described by Weber (1949) as the 'Protestant work ethic'. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries the work ethic has evolved to become "an essential prerequisite of personal and social advancement, of prestige virtue and self-fulfilment" (Watson, 2008b p. 228).

While they overlap considerably, three phases of management of work have been noted since the beginning of the capitalist society. Taylorism or Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911), a philosophy of work developed in the early 1900s by Frederick Winslow Taylor, where workers were seen as extensions of machines, drove the first change. In Taylorism,

the managers, not the factory workers themselves, controlled work through a combination of minute subdivision of tasks, detailed instructions and monetary incentives. The factory workforce was seen as not being able to contribute any intellectual value. This was followed by Fordism, Henry Ford's mass manufacturing method in the automotive industry based around relatively high rates of pay being offered in return for high-speed, high-pressure jobs in the very rule-based environment of an assembly line. Again workers were not seen to contribute any intellectual value to the production process. Most recently, Flexible Production methods, where the traditional hierarchies are flattened and co-operative groups of workers are encouraged to solve issues themselves, value the intellectual input of the workers. However, this does not mean that workers are necessarily more highly valued, or that they are not manipulated. Sennett (1998) noted that discontinuous reinvention of institutions, a characteristic of flexible production, in part leads to corporate culture being treated as a sophisticated science by the management to maximize productivity and economic gain. The workforce is reconfigured as a short-term, expendable resource to be managed in a globalized market (Sennett, 1998). Sennett observed the paradox of flexibility: "in attacking rigid bureaucracy and emphasising risk, it is claimed flexibility gives people more freedom to shape their lives. In fact, the new order substitutes new controls rather than simply abolishing the rules of the past - but these controls are also hard to understand" (p. 10).

Work has been defined by Watson (2008b) as "the carrying out of tasks which enable people to make a living within the social and economic in which they are located" (p. 2). However, if work is purposive effort, and purposive effort is made outside of work in other areas of daily life, then the whole notion of work becomes more complex. Work, home and leisure are usually separate social worlds, but not separate forms of existence, and work is central to them all. For example, domestic management responsibilities involving effort with sometimes limited reward can also be seen as form of work, as can leisure activities are not generally identified as work but may involve effort and reward. This is acknowledged in Budd's (2011) definition of work as "purposeful human activity involving physical or mental exertion that is not undertaken/solely for pleasure and that has economic or symbolic value" (p. 2).

While the centrality of work may currently be 'unfashionable' (Dejours & Deranty, 2010) in some scholarly circles, work has always been a central feature of the human experience and people's lives and human societies are organized and shaped by it. Work's centrality to

humanity has been considered by many scholars, as far back as Plato, by seeing a person performing their function or work well as living well and being happy. Modern Western conceptions of work are based largely on Marx's view of human activity as central to making and transforming life and Weber's 'protestant work ethic' which placed work as central to human experience. In Marxist terms, through work "we establish relation to the natural world and to our own desires that is mediated through work" (Sayers, 2007 p. 434). This importance is even enshrined in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" (United Nations, 1948). This includes the role of work as identity, as Everett Hughes noted: "a man's work is one of the things by which he is judged, and certainly one of the more significant things by which he judges himself" (Hughes, 1984). Hannah Arendt (1998) saw work as the use of the mind and the hands to create durable product, an activity crucial to the human condition. While the Western work ethic is based in Protestantism, Catholic teachings argue that work is a distinguishing feature of humankind where people come to understand their role in an obligation to society, and to humanity as a whole. More recently, Dejours and Deranty (2010) located work's centrality to the human experience psychologically at both individual and social levels; in terms of gender relations where work is seen as 'production of life'; social-politically where "the transmission of social values is not just from society to workplace. It also goes in the other direction" (p. 176); and epistemically, which in part relates to the "strong affective and emotional dimensions of the experience (of work)" (p. 178). Bolton (2007, 2009) also supports this notion, highlighting the centrality of work as tied to a person's value system and self-identity. In a number of cultures, including African Akan, notions of work are based on a mandate to reciprocity. Personhood is constructed from acting as a contributing member of society and earning the respect of self and others, rather than an exchange of labour for money. In this sense, work is purposive effort creating personal meaning and reward, and this contribution to society is intrinsically related to the concept of work and identity.

Work is at one level a social place, a site of interaction. Budd's (2011) typology of work included work as a social relation, which he defined as "human interaction embedded in social norms, institutions, and power structures" and, related to that, work as identity, which he defined as "method for understanding who you are and where you stand in the social structure" (p. 14). The relational aspects of work and its sociality also include an aspect of community. The main exploration of community in the workplace came from the

work of Lave and Wenger (1991) in their discussion of communities of practice. This has generated a wide range of lines of investigation, in sensemaking (Weick, 1995), leadership, knowledge organizations and learning (Brown & Duguid, 1991, 1998, 2001; Chun, 1998; Duguid, 2005).

The centrality of work in people's lives inevitably leads to discussion of commitment to the workplace. The concept of personal commitment to work is an area of rich debate on which this thesis touches only very briefly. Gardner's (2002) and Gardner et al.'s (2008) concept of 'good' work includes not only excellence in knowledge about the work the organization, the environment and the ethical desire to do the right thing; but also, importantly, commitment and engagement with the work, the goals of the work and the others in the workplace. Commitment is intrinsically related to emotion. Becker (1960) discussed commitment as being reinforced by 'side bets', involving attitudes and emotions towards a relationship, organization, goal or occupation, as well as evaluations of whether current circumstances are what one expected or might expect in the future. In other words, the individual recognizes the costs of discontinuing commitment to an organization and ongoing commitment behaviour towards that organization is based on that knowledge.

Meyer and Allen (1991) noted that concepts of organizational commitment fall generally into themes of affective attachment to the organization, perceived costs with leaving the organization and obligation to remain with the organization (pp. 63–64). Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) proposed that organizational commitment includes acceptance and belief in the organization's values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf the organization and a strong desire to remain in the organization. Organizations act to increase personal commitment by influencing employees' socialization processes, with approaches including participation, ownership in the company and job enrichment (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990 p. 192).

One of the areas of tension is feeling alienated from the work, while trying to stay in the work. The Marxian view of alienation is that people cannot derive meaning from their work since it is only a means of meeting other's needs and because it is controlled by other people in the work situation (Blauner, 1964). Hence they are alienated from others and the product of their efforts and experience work as an alien thing which oppresses them. This was developed as a major area of scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing on the power dimensions. Blauner's (1964) dimensions of alienation include feeling powerless, that the work has no meaning or purpose in the overall production process, feeling isolated

and self-estranged, and being unable to achieve personal fulfilment at work. Schacht (1971) argued that underlying the concept of the alienation is one of separation, and others followed. Seeman's (1975) review of the polysemy of the scales used in alienation literature concluded that five of the six key dimensions of alienation – powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, cultural estrangement and social isolation – are relational, and only self-estrangement is intrapersonal. Schacht's (2013) review of the concept of alienation supported the relational aspect and concluded that the idea of alienation is normatively loaded and generally seen as a negative experience: “‘alienation’ – would seem to imply a separation that has been preceded by the existence of a previous relation of actual unity in the lives of those involved, and that is true of its most traditional uses” (p. 8).

Budd's (2011) typology of work acknowledges the centrality of, and commitment to, work and argues that work can be understood and analyzed using ten different frames of orientation: as a curse, freedom, a commodity, occupational citizenship, disutility, personal fulfilment, a social relation, caring for others, identity and service. As work occurs within a social structure of social institutions where individuals do not work in isolation, but interact within networks, this research focuses on work as identity where human interaction is a fundamental source of psychological and social meaning; especially associated with tensions and increased social anxiety at a time of workplace change.

It can therefore be seen in the philosophical and academic literature that work is central to the human experience. Work is strongly related to sense of identity. Budd (2011) noted that “identity cannot be separated from what others think of us and our work, nor from how we see our work fitting into the broader, social world” (p. 149). Self-respect and a positive self-identity therefore relate to work (Budd, 2011). The next section considers how work and emotions experienced in the workplace can be seen as providing the basis for at least part of an individual's ongoing identity-making, helping individuals understand what it means to be human in the workplace.

3.2.2 IDENTITY AT WORK

The increasing complexity in the workplace and 21st century expectations of organizational corporate social responsibility have led to both an organizational focus on employees'

wellbeing and greater scholarly interest. This area has seen a varied outpouring of writings: on identity regulation and identity work (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), organizational identities (Hatch & Schultz, 2002, 2004), Cunliffe's (2001) extension of Shotter's (1993) 'practical authors', entrepreneurial identities (Down & Reveley, 2004; Down & Warren, 2008), managerial and leadership identities (Carroll & Levy, 2008, 2010; Watson, 2008a), dialogic identity (Beech, 2008), identity in liminality and organizational change (Beech, 2011; Beech & Cairns, 2001), identity work and category identities of class, gender, nationality and ethnicity, formal role identities of occupation, rank and citizenship, and local-personal identities through the judgement of others (Watson, 2007), professional identity and resistance (Parker, 2007) and identity construction as a situated communicative practice (Wieland, 2010). The relationship between wellbeing and identity – that identity functions to “provide a particular psychological experience that promotes (her) social adjustment or well-being” (Simon, 2004 p. 66) – has led to an increasingly scholarly focus that has been largely social psychological and sociological (Spencer-Oatey, 2007), as the role of the 'other' is also important; “self-respect and self-esteem do not result simply from independent reflection; the respectful recognition of relevant others also plays a crucial role” (p.642).

Beech, MacIntosh and McInnes (2008) described 'dialogic identity' as providing an explanatory framework exchange on information and development of meaning by developing a “route to meaning construction' of the self” (p.51). Using both Wittgenstein's and Bakhtin's conceptions of dialogue, discussed in Chapter 2, Beech's construct looks at the centripetal and centrifugal responses to the outside “flowing in from contextual discourses that provide discursive resources that can be used and which act on actors” (p. 65). He argued that, as a consequence of the multiplicity of self, “the meaning of the identity construction is the sum of a set of 'meaning giving tensions' which are the spectra along which people can place themselves, and be placed by others” (p. 68). This incorporates the notion of multiplicity within the self and shows how there can be both change and dynamic stability. Watson's (2007) work on category, formal role and personal identities particularly responded to Goffman's call for investigation of the consequences of social situatedness for individuals, which have “traditionally been treated as 'effects', that is, as indicators, expressions or symptoms of social structures such as relationships, informal groups, age grades, gender, ethnic minorities, social classes and the like, with no great concern to treat these effects as data in their own right” (Goffman, 1983b p. 2).

Watson (2007) has described workplace identity as “the mutually constitutive set of processes whereby people strive to shape a relatively coherent and distinctive notion of personal self-identity” (p.136). These coactive processes involve self-engagement with the context through talk and action. Watson (2008b) noted that the “the notion of identity has come to be seen as invaluable as a bridging concept between individual agency, choice and creation of self on the one hand, and history, culture and social roles on the other; however, it is a polysyllabic word and means different things in different contexts” (p. 251). Goffman’s inner and outer portraits of self and person, discussed in Chapter 2, relate to Watson’s (2009) conceptual distinction between internal, personal self-identities and external, discursive social identities.

All the identity factors outside the workplace play a role inside the workplace. Workplace identity is dependent on orientations around gender, hierarchy, education level, geographic location managerial discourses and local dynamics. Recognizing this, Budd (2011) noted “to see work as a post-modern identity to see individuals as employees embedded in organizations full of discourse-meetings, social gatherings, formal and informal feedback, performance appraisal systems promotional ladders, training programs, motivational posters, campaigns to create organizational culture, and the like-that constantly (re)shape their understandings of themselves” (p. 156).

Chapter 2 noted the origins of the development of ‘identity’ in its current form as a psychological achievement and a function of the socio-historical moment. Ybema et al. (2009) described the effects of the dynamic changes brought about by the changes to the workplace in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as: “one symbol of individualism in liquid modernity is the search for ‘identity’” (p. 299).

This section has reviewed the centrality of work, and the research focus on coaction of identity through dialogue. The next section discusses the ubiquity of change in organizations in a globalizing world, and reviews workplace change as a planned and emergent activity and the ritual nature of strategizing and organizing and emotions in liminality.

3.3 STRATEGIZING, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND TRANSITIONS

Change is a constant feature of human social structures, “so pervasive in our lives that it almost defeats description and analysis” (Mortensen, 2008). In addition, the rate of change in the workplace is also increasing. The ‘new’ post-Fordist or Flexible Production economy has produced stable and long-term growth, access to increasing work opportunities and a flourishing of markets worldwide. This, combined with the advent of the Internet, changes to manufacturing technologies, and increases in international travel and education, has led to an increasing pace of knowledge exchange which has affected models of organization. Consequences have included privatization, deregulation and removal of market protections such as tariffs and subsidies. These changes have inevitably flowed on to organizations through rationalization, down(right)sizing and mergers and acquisition. Most recently this was followed by the Global Financial Crisis which, in combination with the rise in technology in developing economies, accelerated these activities by adding the option to move employment offshore, increasing uncertainty in the workplace.

Mid-20th century scholarly work on organizational change focused on resistance to change at the individual, group and organizational levels in an organizational development framework, building on Kurt Lewin’s (1952) work on group dynamic and change stages, Edgar Schein’s (1961b) work on influence in management development, and Lester Coch’s and John French’s (1948, 1968) overcoming resistance to change. In the US, UK and Australia, scholars such as Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1983b), John Kotter (1996), Andrew Pettigrew (1985), Patrick Dawson (1994), Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace (1993), David Buchanan and David Boddy (1992) and David Buchanan and Richard Badham (1999, 2008) have broadened the emphasis to a more processual human resource management perspective, studying the participatory dimension and complex processes and politics of strategic change. More recently, such scholars as Karl Weick (1995), Ralph Stacey (1995), Shona Brown and Kathleen Eisenhardt (1998), Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria (2000), Glen Morgan and Andrew Sturdy (2000), and Julia Balogun and Gerry Johnson (2005) have shifted academic developments on change to include the paradoxical, complex and chaotic nature of change, and improvisatory and sense-making perspectives. Around the same time, scholars such as Gareth Morgan (1993, 2006), and Lee Bolman and Terence Deal (2003) have developed the intellectual and pragmatic challenges involved in

management and the role and importance of metaphors and frames in understanding people's experience.

This research is underpinned by the notion of change over time and there have been many scholars in this field. Early philosophical writings include oft-cited Heraclitus fragment on the relationship of change and time, "no-one can step twice into the same river, nor touch mortal substance twice in the same condition" (Heraclitus, Unknown Date); Aristotle's noting that the rates of change vary but the rate of time does not (Sachs, 1995); and Kant's (2008) noting that change must have a cause and, while it is not a function of time, it occurs in relation to time (Gardner, 1999; Kant, 1999). Change over time received considerable focus from scholars during the late 20th century, a body of work far too large to be comprehensively covered in this chapter. However, that research has produced some important developments. Sociologists reflected on change as a function of the tension and instability in the relationship between structure and agency (Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1976, 1984; Whittington, 1992). Ritual scholars considered change as transition (Bell, 1992; Collins, 2004; Grimes, 1995; Van Gennep, 1960). Psychologists and other scholars of emotion started to consider the relationship between change and emotion (Kemper, 1978; Smolka, 2001; Stets & Turner, 2006). Organizational scholars considered such aspects as power in change (Buchanan & Badham, 2008; Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006), control and commitment (Kunda, 1992), resistance and drama (Kelley & Volkart, 1952), performance in change (Badham & Mead, 2009; Turner & Behrndt, 2008; Turner, 1974, 1980), change as learning (Argyris, 1977; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bandura, 1986; Brown & Duguid, 1991; Clegg, Kornberger, & Rhodes, 2005; Gherardi, 1999, 2000; Schein, 2007; Senge, 1990; Lave & Wenger, 1991) and the 'processual' nature of change (Chia & MacKay, 2007; Czarniawska, 2007; Pettigrew, 1997). They characterized change management as entrepreneurship (Kanter, 1983b, 1989, 1997), dealing with chaos (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998b) or strategy as practice (Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003b; Whittington, 1996; Whittington, Molloy, Mayer, & Smith, 2006), and characterized those experiencing change as 'change riders' (Dawson, 2003), ironic (Badham & McLoughlin, 2006) and ambivalent (McLoughlin, Badham, & Palmer, 2005). Bridges (2003) focused on the experience of grief and loss in change, when something in the environment is altered and it triggers an internal psychological reorientation process in those who are expected to carry out or respond to the change.

The enduring focus of these scholars is the phenomenon of change over time and its many manifestations, and the challenges of informing practice and emotional literacy in social groups, particularly during workplace change. These discussions of change all overlap considerably, and this section examines some of the reasons for organizational change, the practices of change and how people experience change in meetings.

3.3.1 STRATEGIZING AND ORGANIZING

Organizational change management usually comes out of a defensive response to an environmental change driving a firm or industry to do something that is outside the range of existing practice. Schumpeter (1947) described this as a ‘creative response’ which cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules of inference from the pre-existing facts and which shapes the whole course of subsequent events and their long-run outcome; furthermore, the frequency and intensity of its success or failure is related to the individual decisions, actions and patterns of behaviour of the personnel available.

The organizational processes of strategizing and change involve reacting to a range of external and/or internal drivers to gain an advantage in a situation or to proactively meet future competitive demands. The defensive response described by Schumpeter (1947) usually comes from one or more of four related drivers for organizational change. Strategic and structural drivers for change cause adaptation to external changes and forces; changes in technology drive changes in work practices; culture drivers internally address the psychological, behavioural and personal dimensions for the organizational actors; and leadership and agency drivers relate to the internal capacity of the leadership and subsidiary actors to influence the organization (Badham & Langton, 2005).

Changing the organization’s structure or practices is an obvious remedy. Pye and Pettigrew (2006) acknowledged this, noting that the unspoken goal and inevitable outcome is a change in organizational practices, as “the ultimate goal of strategizing and organizing is change” (p. 558).

At this point certain internal processes and resources need to be in place for the change to be enacted effectively. The organization needs strategic techniques or processes for change to allow the people to recognize different ways of approaching the issue. These may include project management tools, quality systems, mergers and alliances. The

organization's employees need to be able to map out the process, knowing where they are going from and the goals they are going towards. Finally, they need to have enough knowledge and practical skills to improvise, use the theory and learn (Badham & Langton, 2005). However, these skills and planning processes are 'necessary master techniques'; change is an inherently qualitative process and a phenomenon of time and perspective. Strategic change, including planned change, usually involves a structural change to staff numbers and physical situation, which can be both incremental and episodic and which necessarily involves a change in the context for individuals.

The strategic future orientation which guides organizational transformations, designing specific actions in pursuit of particular ends, is supposed "to lead an organization through changes and shifts to secure its future growth and sustainable success" (Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2008 p. 83). Strategy was a major focus of scholarly work in the latter half of the 20th century. From Hart's (1967) militaristic view of strategy as a means to 'fulfil ends', Steiner (1979) noted that strategy relates to the organization's purpose and ends and how to realize them. Strategy is adversarial in its construct and is either designed or emerges as a framework from which one can manage adversity or seek advantage over an adversary. Mintzberg's (1978, 1987, 1993, 2007; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998) extensive work on strategy, the Five Ps – plan, ploy, pattern, position and perspective – and strategy as emergent challenged traditional strategy theory, which had 'unthinkingly' relied on the 'rational' managerial model (Franklin, 1998).

Organizations can be characterized as being in a race with increasingly higher stakes as globalization and technology change the context. As a consequence, organizations need to be flexible and responsive to change. The timing and magnitude of the consequent transformation is influenced by a dynamic balance of forces within the organization. Brown and Eisenhardt (1998a) characterized organizations as 'competing on the edge' and noted that currently successful strategies may not be effective in the future. The tension between those seeking to promote change and those attempting to maintain the status quo affects the organization's appetite for change and the ability to initiate it (Lewin & Gold, 1999). The challenge for organizations is to be agile, react quickly, anticipate changes, and lead, plan and implement change in an environment that is itself changing (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998b). The ongoing transformation and social reorganizing of strategy and change remain an important and increasing focus for organizational researchers.

Organizational change involves a difference “in how an organization functions, who its members and leaders are, what form it takes, or how it allocates its resources” (Huber & Glick, 1993 p. 216). An organization may exist in a state of change at all times; however, managed change is not completely emergent, but an attempt to socially engineer an outcome for the organization from the top down. Changing organizations can be seen as systems of political activity, with patterns of conflict and power between subcultures and individuals (Buchanan & Badham, 2008). This type of top-down change in organizational strategy may add or remove a major section of the organization’s structure, mandate a change in practices, or change the nature by which the organization operates, thereby transforming it (Weick & Quinn, 1999).

Planned change in organizations is much faster than situated learning, as described by Lave and Wenger (1991), and requires a generative learning transition process of cognitive redefinition or reframing. Badham, Mead and Antonacopolou (2011) described current practices of planned organizational change as attempting to follow a two-phase medical doctor-patient logic. Ills are diagnosed within the organization and a cure is prescribed and administered, healing the diagnosed sickness and pathology. This two-phase view – bad old way, good new way – draws on utilitarian enlightenment theory, which does not allow for the complex emotional responses that individuals need to change. However, it has become a meta-language pervasive in organizational practice.

Increasing discussions in the literature in the late 20th century concerned the overly prescriptive nature of management theory in general and organizational change management in particular, focusing on its disconnect from organizational practice. The development of strategy as a management discipline has been very successful in meeting the practitioner demand for change toolkits, checklists and guidelines. In this prescriptive view, there is an implicit belief in underlying principles or ‘laws’ that govern management activities and functions. Weick (1985) supported the emergent view of strategy as a non-rational concept stemming from the informal values, traditions and norms of behaviour held by the firm’s managers and employees. Mintzberg and Quinn (1996) noted that strategic change presents in a variety of forms – from the rare deliberate, or planned, to the more frequent emergent, or circumstantial. This more descriptive perspective has been developed by the processual and who have promoted the use of verbs such as ‘changing’ rather than descriptions of ‘change’ in academic language (Dawson, 2003; Pettigrew, 1985). This development is also informed by the practice theorists, who have developed more

descriptive models focusing their research on the ‘doing’, the practical activities related to individuals’ “ongoing involvement with the world” (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Savigny, 2001 p. 3).

The processual approach to organizations focuses only on the fluid processes and events recognizing the messy, nonlinear, irrational, conflictual and political nature of organizations and change (Dawson, 2003; Pettigrew, 1985; Sztompka, 1999). Pettigrew (1985) noted that strategic change processes are contextually located and that it is not clear when they begin and when they end. However, research into planned change practice has focused largely on the episodic, discrete planned change projects at either the micro sense-making or macro organizational level. The experience and emotion of planned change at a micro level that individuals respond to in this context are emergent. Like Pettigrew’s view of process theories, this research assumes that practices are embedded in context and action, and that processes occur across a number of levels of analysis and over time and should be viewed holistically and in relation to the outcomes (Pettigrew, 1997).

The goals of managed organizational change appear to be inherently functionalist and integrative, intending to culturally transform the organization. However, change becomes embedded in an organization over time and this is inherently processual. The practice of managed organizational change can be seen as an overlapping and nested series of threefold temporal transition rituals, which include ritualizing activities and performance of rites. The next section reviews how these ritualizing practices and processes are enacted.

3.3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RITUALIZING AND PRACTICES

Cohen (2007) suggested that new approaches are needed to understand recurring action patterns and the drivers. Several recent scholarly developments have contributed to the ‘practice turn’ in organizational research (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007). These developments include considering practices and routines as encoding organizational knowledge and capabilities, and playing a key role in organizational learning (Feldman & Pentland, 2003); and highlighting the essential role of human action in knowing how to get things done, thereby suggesting that knowing is an ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted as organizational members engage in everyday practices (Orlikowski, 2002). Practices are learned social skills that constitute agency and identity for

individuals and organizations, and enable knowing “what it is to be a person, an object, an institution” (Dreyfus, 1991 p. 17).

Practices form the background of skilled coping capabilities that enable us to act appropriately, but not necessarily consciously, in specific cultural contexts. People understand human action and identity building in terms of historically and culturally shaped internalized propensities and dispositions which shape and direct intentions and actions; as Dreyfus (1991) noted: “We are the practices ... not something that we have a relation to, but something embodied in us” (pp. 27–28).

Becoming skilled in a practice is “incorporated into the *modus operandi* of the developing organism through training and experience in the performance of particular tasks” (Ingold, 2000 p. 5), as through being socialized, often unconsciously, into certain social practices and skills. It is often unconscious, a practical coping where deliberate choice is not visible, and it is when emotional relational bonds break down and the practices are disrupted that the action becomes visible.

A number of major practice theorists in philosophy, anthropology, sociology management and organizational studies have examined a variety of research topics. Common areas of interest include examining the ways in which social order is constituted in social interaction, and the relationship between micro-social interaction, macro-social societal influences and social order. Schatzki et al. (2001) pointed out that, independent of the theoretical areas, practice research has three common issues: practice is conceived of as activities or sets of activities embedded in practice; activities are built on knowledge, skills or competences of those performing the activities or of the community in which the activities are performed; and practice involves humans performing activities, utilizing or using and creating knowledge.

Human beings have been using the recurring action patterns of ritual behaviour from at least the time of the earliest historical records. While ritual is a complex phenomenon with many types of rituals, Bell (1997) described it as a “process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition” (p. 148). She noted that ritualizing is a universal category or feature of human behaviour, with the role of repetitively embedding and transforming memory and giving meaning to society, and it is a complex phenomenon in which meaning is ascribed to routines (Bell, 1997).

Bell (1997) noted three aspects of ritual behaviour – rule-governance, sacral symbolism and elements of performance – but these can vary during ritualizing processes. While rituals are rule governed and have invariant aspects, during ritualizing processes they are also improvisational, negotiated and renegotiated through multiple interactions and practices. Sacral symbolism can vary. The generation of sacred objects or symbols in ritualizing is one in which the ordinary becomes significant or sacred, simply by being there (Smith, 1980). Van Gennep (1960) called this the ‘pivoting of the sacred’, noting that sacredness as an attribute is “not absolute; it is brought into play by the nature [of] particular situations” (p. 12). Finally, the performative elements vary according to the context and the participants.

When characterizing change as a ritual process, ritual scholars have identified several types of ritual and have developed various typologies of ritual. Durkheim and Swain’s (1915) typology of negative rites of restriction and positive rites of communion and Turner’s (1977) broad categories of rites of affliction and rites of passage are useful, but too general for detailed analysis. However, more detailed ritual typologies, such as Grimes’ sixteen types are cumbersome and overlapping (Bell, 1997). Bell’s categorization of ritual actions as calendrical rites, rites of exchange and communion, rites of affliction, feasting/fasting festivals, political rites and rites of passage provides a “balance between completeness and simplicity” (Bell, 1997 p. 94). These six categories provide a useful map of ritual in society and, even with a simplified typology, many rituals can be considered as combining different types of ritual action (Bell, 1997).

Goffman (1983b) contrasted the more formal view of rituals with an everyday view of rituals. He described the majority of human interaction as ‘contact rituals’, “perfunctory brief expressions occurring incidental to everyday action - in passing as it were” (p. 10), which still fulfil the conditions of ritual rites of exchange and communion and which contain micro-ecological metaphors of the participants’ worlds, life narratives and summaries, and iconic symbols of structural arrangements.

‘Interaction ritual chains’, Collins’s (2004) extension of Goffman’s (1983b) contact rituals in social interaction, emphasize the importance of the subjective context and micro dynamics. Collins (2004) contended that participants are continually moving through micro rituals in daily life in a series of ‘natural rituals’, providing a processual model in which emotional relational bonds are formed and reformed, with the shared emotions and intersubjective focus sweeping participants along. It is not a cognitive construction, but a sense of ‘knowing’ where sacred symbols and meanings are constructed, shared and

dissipated processually, charting the participants' emotional energy (Collins, 2004). In successful micro interactions, participants are attracted to the intense ritual 'charges' that they can get from successful rituals and become inherently socially 'magnetic' with a high degree of emotion, motivation and symbolic charge. Where the interaction ritual is unsuccessful, however, participants view the ritual as merely 'formal' and empty, going through the motions, a dead ceremonialism. Participants feel flat and unaffected, and experience a sense of drag and feelings of boredom and constraint.

The 'practice turn' situates the actor practitioner in 'the field of practice', the locus of active engagement with the constituents of his or her surroundings (Schatzki et al., 2001). Social interaction is dialogic, coacted and characterized by micro rituals and emotional energy changes which affect individuals' sense of identity (Beech, 2008). From this, social interaction is integral to identity construction. The next section discusses the ritual nature of organizational change and impact on personal identity.

3.3.3 TRANSITIONS AND RITUALS

Planned change initiatives can be usefully examined as a set of social rituals in a number of ways. Badham, Mead and Antonacopoulou (2011) noted that the theory and practice of planned organizational change is grounded in a three-phase model of change, involving some idea of a past state, a transition state and a future state. While the classic formulation of this view was provided by Lewin in his model of 'unfreezing', 'moving' and 'refreezing', this underlying framework continues to inform both theories of change and the assumptions of many of its critics (Collins, 2004; Dawson, 2003; Hendry, 1996). The three-phase model has been explored at the macro level by a number of scholars. For example, Brown's (1995) transition ritual view of the stages of cultural change involves rituals of questioning, destruction, degradation and conflict, followed by rituals of passage and embracement and the rituals of integration and conflict reduction. Kunda's long exploration of the ritual character of organizational meetings started with his (1986) ethnography where he analyzed rituals of talk. He described management 'talking down', trainers 'talking across' and peers in workgroup meetings 'talking around', and this work on social rituals continues (Kunda, 1995, 2006).

Goffman made a major contribution to ritual theory and the emotional relational world. The absolute definition of a ritual is still disputed in ritual theory, but there is general agreement on what constitutes ritual-like behaviour. Some ritual theories attribute the differences between ritualized recurring action patterns and other recurring action patterns to the sacred and social functions ascribed to ritual in a society. Durkheim and Swain (1915) viewed ritual as a social phenomenon reinforcing group cohesion and holding society together. These social outcomes of development of shared meaning and group cohesion remain a keystone in ritual theory today. Van Gennep (1960) focused on context, noting that a ritual makes sense only when it is looked at in the context of both preceding and post-ritual events. For Turner (1977), rituals are part of an ongoing process of redefinition and renewal of the community. This understanding of context and process view of social outcomes is useful when determining what constitutes a successful ritual. The ritual can be seen as successful if the social outcomes, rather than the manifest goals of the activity, constitute the purpose of the ritual and are achieved.

Transition rituals comprise three phases – separation from the bad old way, transition, and incorporation into the good new way (Turner, 1977; Van Gennep, 1960) – and are characterized as helping define cultural understanding in a society (Bell, 1997). The three-phase transitional view of strategizing organizing and change in organizations fundamentally challenges the current two-phase meta-language of change in organizations. However, while the fundamental nature of change is inherently contested, this view has a sound basis as all characterizations of change in sociology, from Kurt Lewin's unfreezing, moving, refreezing and onwards, to involving some notion of transition rituals using concepts of past, transition and future states (Lewin & Gold, 1999).

Based on transition ritual theory, the three-stage process theory of change developed by Kurt Lewin (1952) became a major feature of organizational change management in the second half of the 20th century. Elrod and Tippet's (2002) review of the models of change and human response to change, 'The "Death Valley" of Change', identified that most models of change in use by the beginning of the 21st century follow the three-stage model and almost all of them identify degradation of capabilities in the intermediate or liminal state.

For all its success, since the 1980s there have been a number of significant criticisms of the three-phase view of change. Critics have sought to show that, as organizational change is continuous and open-ended, the three-phase process theory is too simplistic, mechanistic

and outmoded in the late 20th century organizational environments (Dawson, 1994; Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992; Pettigrew, 1990). Kanter et al. went so far as to call it “wildly inappropriate” a “quaintly linear and static conception - the organization as ‘ice cube’” (p. 10). The model was particularly problematic for the processual scholars who felt it was not able to incorporate the fluidity, pervasiveness, open-endedness and indivisibility of change; and was not suitable for transformational organizational change, such as mergers and takeovers, but relevant only to incremental and isolated change projects (Dawson, 1994; Dunphy & Stace, 1993; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).

Then there is the nature of transition ritual itself. In Lewin’s three-phase model of unfreeze, move, refreeze, the ‘move’ phase is aligned to the liminal phase of a traditional ritual. The critics’ argument that people are always in a state of flux or change suggests that people are in a liminal state all the time, so the concept starts to lose meaning in research. In addition, the concept of liminoid increases the complexity as, according to Turner (1982), being in a liminoid state has a relationship to being in a liminal one, but liminoid relates to activities but are undertaken for leisure and fun, conceptualized as profane in terms of ritual theory; as opposed to work, a more sacred concept in ritual theory. Turner (1982) described the difference as “One *works* at the liminal, one *plays* at the liminoid” (p. 55). As human lives consist of both work and leisure activities intertwined, the terms ‘liminal’ and ‘liminoid’ are used interchangeably. The term ‘liminoid’ has sometimes been used more generally to describe being in a permanently liminal state. This is presumably due to the ending ‘oid’ denoting resembling liminal, but this meaning has not been confirmed.

Despite the validity of these critiques, what they bring into question is a static and simplistic characterization of ‘three stages of change’, not the existence and value of an embedded ‘three-phase’ view of key aspects of change as such. As Badham, Mead and Antonacopoulou (2012) and Badham (2013) argue, in conceptual and cultural terms, some idea of a separation from an ‘old world’, creation of a ‘new world’, and a state of ‘transition’ between the two is embedded in Western ideas of what ‘change’ means. In addition, writers such as Sturdy et al. (2006), Tempest and Starkey (2004), Czarniawska and Mazza (2003) and Beech (2011) have found it useful to explore the experiences of cultural separation from established habits, and the characteristics of ‘transitional’ or ‘liminal’ states or places before the stabilization of new routines and codes of behaviour in varied studies of liminality, identity and change.

Burnes's (2004) reappraisal of Lewin's approach to planned change argued that it continued to be relevant in organizations or society at large. He noted that a narrow interpretation had driven some of the critiques of the three-phase method and this was now being acknowledged by scholars in the field: "the last decade has also seen a renewed interest in understanding and applying his approach to change" (p. 997). Describing an organizational change as a transition ritual, therefore, has some limitations, but it is still a useful concept in investigations of organizational change and this is the reason it is used in this research.

In the work of van Gennep and Turner, rituals of transition involve individuals and groups engaged in a personal or social transformation, a change of status, role and identity. Transition rituals take the form of a three-part structure of separation (Gennep, 1960), transition or liminality, the focus of my research, and incorporation. The separation/divestiture phase consists of rites of stripping the old status and identity. Participants are separated from their identity in traditional space and time with symbolic changes in appearance and homogenization of social status through stripping of status symbols, levelling of authority and activity changes. The transition/liminality phase, a temporal and spatial location between statuses, involves the creation of a sacred space and time, with totems; it is characterized by 'anti-structure' – ambiguity, equality and a sense of 'communitas' of those involved. It is a time of uncertainty and questioning and "may be partly described as a stage of reflection" (Turner, 1967 p. 105). The third stage of adopting the new status involves rituals of incorporation and investiture, and includes symbols representing the return of participants' status system (Turner, 1977) and their engagement with the new status and identity. However, transition rituals do not stand as separate forms; rather, they incorporate many other types of ritual and micro-ritual action, particularly during the more fluid liminal state.

The fundamental concepts in Lewin's three-stage model of change lead to a range of insights that help make the practices, knowledge and skills learned in producing change more understandable (Schein, 2007). Drawing on ritual theories of transition, Lewin's three stages of unfreezing, moving and refreezing, and his own work on coercive persuasion, Schein (2007) developed the concept of change as a profound psychological of painful unlearning and relearning. Schein's (1961a, 1996, 2006) 'managed learning', a continuous active intervention process where employees are subject to cognitive redefinition managed structurally, or coerced, through social interaction, focuses on the pain of learning in change. The theory draws on Schein's work on coercive persuasion and 'brainwashing' in

the total institutions of prison camps. This link is relevant in organizational research as, while members of an organization are not in prison camps, their choices may be limited economically, socially, sometimes geographically and through specialization in their workplace. Given the individual's limited choice, Schein's three-phase theory of coercive persuasion can be applied to planned change in organizations and provide insight into the pain of learning for the actors. Managed learning is characterized as a continuous active intervention process where employees are subject to cognitive redefinition managed structurally, or coerced, through social interaction. This research focuses particularly on the emotional response and learning anxiety during the reframing/cognitive redefinition process.

In Schein's (1996, 2006, 2007) 'managed learning', the primary driving force in 'unfreezing' is the presence of information that disconfirms expectations or hopes about current practices and threatens outcomes the individual cares about. When this threat surfaces with its attendant undiscussables, the individual experiences learning anxiety and fear of failure, the beginnings of survival anxiety. As the risks of shame for the individual are high, learning anxiety can lead to defensive avoidance of the disconfirming information and resistance to the change. The loss of face involved may initially make it seem more desirable to fail. The threat produced by disconfirming data needs to incorporate enough psychological safety to allow the individual to accept the information, feel the survival anxiety and become motivated to change.

'Moving', related to the liminal stage of a transition ritual, involves reframing or cognitive redefinition and occurs through semantically redefining the meaning of words, reinterpreting concepts more broadly than previously assumed, and creating new standards as the anchors individuals use for judgement and comparison are shown to be not absolute. This reinterpretation must be congruent with the existing behaviour, belief systems and personality of each individual, or new rounds of disconfirmation will challenge the new learning. In a situation of limited power and status, individuals are more vulnerable to shame and embarrassment, and so they act to reduce the emotion caused by the loss of face that occurs from them retaining their commitment to the current practices. As with coercive persuasion, a mentor role can support and model behaviour to facilitate cognitive redefinition (Schein, 2007). The cognitive redefinition is complete when the individual recognizes that prior behaviour is from the new perspective, wrong. At that point, they have reframed the concept and taken on the new role that is being demanded.

Schein noted that refreezing, or integrating and stabilizing the change in role, occurs most effectively when the individual is supported in that choice. In a group situation, the group that held the norms that support the old behaviour undergoes the process together, and refreezing occurs as a relational activity, where the group reinforces the change to each other.

Schein's reconceptualization of managed learning in organizations as a transition ritual uses all the elements of a traditional transition ritual, including the involuntary personal commitment to the change. It allows for the complexities of organizations in major change, while using the three phases to change the way individuals and groups interact and work and prevents them from moving back to their old behaviours. Allowing for complexity in the process makes it a useful concept in this research.

3.3.4 MEETINGS AS RITUALS

In recent years, organizational studies researchers have explored the nature of meetings as rituals (Czarniawska & Mazza, 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2003; Sturdy et al., 2006), focusing on the nature and dynamics of meetings themselves as 'transition rituals' involving phases of divestiture, liminality and investiture. The focus on change meetings as transition rituals is seeking to understand the relationship between the meetings practice and the success, in a functional sense, of the planned change meeting process. Transition rituals can occur at a number of different levels in the organization. At the organizational level, there is the planned change itself. Employee participants are taken through a process of change through a chain of meetings. This project meeting chain is a transition ritual, with its own separation, transition and incorporation phases. Within the planned change process, however, incremental changes develop within the meetings in the chain. Each meeting could be considered a mini transition ritual in form, with separation, liminal/transition and incorporation phases. Yet these meetings occur within a context, and there is interplay between the micro interaction within the liminal stages in the transitional meeting rituals, the broader transition ritual of planned change and the overall organization context.

Whittington's (2002b, 2006) and Bourque and Johnson's (2008) investigations of 'awayday' meetings as transition rituals is a managerial culture management view of a transition ritual. Awayday meetings are defined as off-site meetings of one or more days intended to create a

change in work practices. It works with the assumption that the characteristics of separation, liminality and re-integration are similar enough in an awayday meeting to form a real transition ritual. Managers note with dismay that the enthusiasm of the day and commitment to new practices evaporate once the participants are back in their normal working lives (Bourque and Johnson, 2008). This does not mean that the elements of the transition ritual are not there, simply that the individuals lack of commitment to the process as a ritual undermines the process. This observation would indicate that there are key differences between a planned organizational change transition ritual and a traditional one. Traditional transition rituals are associated with rites of passage in life, for example from a child to an adult or from a single person to part of a couple. These transition rituals have a number of characteristics that organizational planned change does not. First, transition rituals involve significant preparation time and commitment from the participants. They may have spent years learning ways of being an adult or watching couples around them interact. At the time they undergo the symbolic ritual process, their preparation is complete and their commitment to the process is absolute. In other words, they actually want to undergo the change. This is contrasted with organizational planned change, where the individuals may or may not be willing to undergo the change and have usually not been given the time needed to prepare and engage with the change.

Therefore, in planned organizational change the participants can be characterized as being involuntarily emotionally committed to the process imposed upon them, often unwanted and unwelcomed. The common aspect of both types of change is liminality, where, in both traditional and planned organizational transitions, participants are separated from their identity and are in a uncertain liminal space, characterized by 'anti-structure' – ambiguity, equality and a sense of communitas. The next section extends the discussion of liminality, or 'moving' in transition, highlighting the personal exposure and vulnerability in liminality, and the anxiety and the heightened awareness of others and emotions in the liminal space.

3.3.5 EXPOSURE AND EMOTION IN LIMINALITY

In Van Gennep's original formulation, liminality is the ambiguous phase where the initiate is outside of society but preparing to re-enter society. There is very little freedom of movement due to the strict nature of the ritual process. There is however, mobility, or freedom of movement to move back and forth between states and areas, in liminality.

Turner (1977) expanded upon the transitional or liminal stage in the three-part structure for transition rituals, defining liminal individuals as “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony” (p. 95).

Liminality, or anti-structure, is characterized by ‘communitas’ with two other cultural manifestations, marginality and inferiority, both of which refer to a level of powerlessness (Turner, 1977). In Turner’s view, the state of liminality has both physical and social properties that contribute to the participant’s powerlessness. However, participants within liminality possess a freedom of movement not available to non-liminal participants because the non-liminal state has no structure. Liminality, being the antithesis of structure, dissolves structure. Freed from the normative constraints associated with the status system, participants’ capacities of cognition, affect, volition and creativity are allowed to work in an unstructured, egalitarian, ambiguous and creative environment with transformational potential (Turner, 1982). It remains connected to both the status system and the source of structure. Just as chaos is the source of order, liminality represents the unlimited possibilities from which social structure emerges. It is a temporary state bounded between a starting point and an ending point, when the participant is reincorporated into the social structure (Turner, 1982).

Liminality in change transition rituals actually exposes the participants in a number of ways. Participants in a liminal state are stripped of anything that might differentiate them from their fellow human beings, they are without status or rank, they are powerless, marginal and inferior, and they must obey totally and accept the pain and suffering that the change brings (Turner, 1977). There are emotional risks for the participants during the powerlessness of the liminal state, particularly of becoming embarrassed or shamed, both powerful emotions (Scheff, 2000). Goffman’s work applies to exactly this kind of context. While his work has sometimes been accused of neglecting power (Gouldner, 1970), and emotion (Hochschild, 1979), Goffman’s work focused on embarrassment and threats to social bonds or emotional relational bridges causing social alienation and shame. Threats to social bonds, no matter how slight, are not accepted passively (Scheff, 2006). This creates tension as the individual locus of identity, even in a ‘total institution’ analogous to liminality, resides in the active, resistant agency of the individual (Clegg et al., 2006; Goffman, 2007).

The sense of exposure in liminality is related to the rate of change in identity. Learning in organizations can generally be considered a slow social process in which individuals change their roles and identity as they move towards full participation in the sociocultural practices of an organization, and their identity changes supported by communities of practitioners situated within it (Lave & Wenger, 1991). This process is slow and creates commitment to the established practices and stable identities. Planned change in organizations is much faster than situated learning. It destabilizes identities and requires a generative learning transition process of cognitive redefinition or reframing. As noted by Schein (1996), planned change in organizations has borrowed many aspects of transition rituals as a functionalist method of cognitive redefinition to move participants from one identity to another, through a vulnerable liminal state at a much faster rate.

Cognitive redefinition involves two different processes managed structurally, or coerced, through social interaction (Schein, 1996). Concepts like good and bad working practices have to be semantically redefined so the participants understand how someone else might define something differently. The process mirrors liminality, putting “most managers and employees into a situation comparable to the prisoner in a political prison” (Schein, 1996). The individuals act to reduce the extreme emotion by participating in the change in a state of openness and vulnerability with limited power and status. Then, the individual has to be structurally supported and begin to feel psychologically safe in this liminal state of openness and vulnerability. These planned change practices necessarily generate higher levels of social anxiety and awareness of others’ roles (Bell, 1997). Planned change also involves the surfacing of issues which are discomfiting, complex and difficult to change (Schein, 2006) and include collusive activities such as norms of silencing, marginalizing, and minimizing intellectual disagreements, creating ‘undiscussable’ (Argyris, 1980) issues and ‘organizational silence’ (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). ‘Undiscussables’ are risky and threatening issues, which often threaten underlying existing organizational assumptions and policies; and ‘organizational silence’ is the withholding of information about potential problems or issues for the future. This silencing of discomfiting complex issues impacts on the planned change process as “sometimes that which is left unsaid is more important than that which is carefully articulated”(Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2007).

Organizational change therefore involves coercively changing individual and group practices, removing the individual’s discretion and placing them in a situation where their tacit knowledge and practical wisdom is low. This surfacing and anxiety raises emotions

and reactions which are typically inferred based on their past consequential emotions in reaction to similar actual behaviours and events (Leary & Kowalski, 1995). As poet T.S. Eliot (1944) eloquently said, for all individuals “time present and time past ... Are both perhaps present in time future, and time future contained in time past”.

Change practices in social groups necessarily generate higher levels of social anxiety and awareness of others’ roles (Bell, 1997). This creates strong emotional responses in the participants and increases the level of work required by the participants. These collusive activities include norms of silencing, marginalizing and minimizing intellectual disagreements. This can take the form of being ‘undiscussable’, whereby participants feel unable to discuss risky and threatening issues which threaten underlying organizational assumptions and policies (Argyris, 1980), or where they create ‘organizational silence’, withholding information about potential problems or issues (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

Chapter 2 discussed the effects of heightened awareness and embodied experience of moral, sentient emotions. Goffman described the social nature of meetings as rituals and the experience of liminality in an objective sense. This research seeks to understand the process from a subjective perspective and uses Gendlin’s (1978, 1997) notion of bodily ‘felt sense’ as its starting point.

The next section discusses the social nature and the importance of meetings in organizations, reviewing how participants in meetings enact identity through the subjective context they experience.

3.4 ENCOUNTERS WITH GOFFMAN – MEETINGS AND FRAMES

3.4.1 MEETINGS AS ENCOUNTERS: THE SOCIAL SITE OF CHANGE

The micro dynamics of interaction in change meetings is a largely unexplored area of change management practice. The argument that meetings should be centre stage as a topic of research in sociology, anthropology and sociolinguistics has been developing since the 1970s. Formal and informal meetings now constitute a major proportion of managers’ time spent at work. Mintzberg (1973) found that 59% of a manager’s time was spent in scheduled meetings and another 10% in unscheduled meetings. McCall, Morrison and Hannan (1978) noted that meetings consume more of the manager’s time than any other

activity, and that time spent in meetings increases as managers move up the organizational hierarchy. They also noted that managers consistently underestimate the time they spend in meetings. Three more recent studies reported that managers spent over 60% of their time in meetings; with over 50% of those meetings being formalized and with more than three other participants from different sections and management levels (Hoeksma, 2003; Laeven, 2002; Nilsson, 2003). These and other studies suggest that a significant proportion of management in practice occurs in and through such meetings, and that larger numbers of participants in meetings brings increased complexity for the manager (Badham & Mead, 2007b).

Johnson et. al. (2006) raised the idea of whether there should be a multi-perspective theoretical response to examining meetings in organizations. The argument for such an approach is the breadth of insight that this can provide. Meetings have, however, been a secondary focus of research on other areas of group interaction at work, with an increasing focus on the micro level. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) 'Prospect Theory' generated a body of work on decision-making and bias by individuals and groups (Bazerman, 2006; Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Janis's (1982) analysis of 'Groupthink' in meetings at NASA generated a large body of work on decision-making and then further aspects of teamwork (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998; Neck & Manz, 1994; Park, 2000; Schafer & Crichlow, 1996). Briskin's (2009) 'Collective Wisdom' looked at positive and negative aspects of sharing power in group interactions and the knowledge and insight gained in those interactions. Gerry Johnson (Johnson et al., 2003a, 2003b) and Richard Whittington's (1996, 2002a, 2006) work on 'Strategy as Practice' focused on the fragmenting micro practices of strategizing and change in groups. Balogun and Johnson's (2004) work on micro practices and sensemaking during top-down organizational change showed it is "essential to tap into, monitor, and understand the multiple interpretations that are developing among recipients" (p. 546). This increasing focus on the micro in organizational scholarship touches on, but only partially examines, the importance of emotions in the interaction.

Mintzberg (1973) noted that meeting functions involve ceremony, strategy making and negotiation. Merton (1968) highlighted the importance of ritual-like activities and their latent social role of reinforcing group identity and producing and reproducing the social structure and cultural values of the group. In terms of the social processes, organizations

use hierarchies of meetings, nested within the broader processes of the organization. From high-level strategy making down to execution planning processes, meeting functions involve ceremony, strategy making and negotiation (Mintzberg, 1973). They are considered to be one of the genres of organizational communication (Yates & Orlikowski, 1992) and explicitly task-oriented and decision-making encounters (Bargiela-Chiappini & Harris, 1997). They are used to manage competing and/or conflicting needs between participants (Vree, 1999) and “facilitate relationship negotiations, struggles, and commentary” (Schwartzman, 1989).

Meetings are commonly defined as an act or process of coming together, a chance or planned encounter, an assembly, congregation, gathering, place, confluence, intersection or other notions of “face to face joining” (Brown, 1993). This is similar to Goffman’s (1983b) view of a meeting as an encounter: “Persons come together into a small physical circle as ratified participants in a consciously shared, clearly independent undertaking, the period of participation itself bracketed by rituals of some kind” (p. 7). The underlying social relationships and values that characterize meetings are generally agreed in the literature. A meeting has a purpose or an underlying reason, someone or some way of calling the participants together at a specified time and place, and formal and/or informal series of rules and conventions for ordering and regulating talk, including a way to start and end the meeting.

Generally, there are two metaphors for the functions of meetings: as a game played within a field of power for stakes or as a genre of communication between people searching for the best decision for the organization. Both these metaphors can often be applied simultaneously, as meetings can usually demonstrate dramatic game-like relationships and expressive emotion can be seen in the individuals’ performances and functional outcomes relative to organizational goals (Fine, 1990).

Goffman’s (1963) primary unit of interaction is characterized as a gathering of two or more individuals, with participants including “all and only those who are at that moment in each other’s presence either through (physical) co-presence or contact” (p. 18). Gatherings may range from two people in co-presence to large formal occasions. They are also to be contrasted to situations in which people may be physically co-located but are unaware of each other (e.g. students working independently in a university library). When in co-presence, the members of the gathering are mutually monitoring and have awareness of others’ responses to their presence. In accordance with symbolic interactionist assumptions

about the 'looking glass' self, gatherings are characterized by cascading levels of reciprocal mind-reading in framing and reframing the meaning or definition of the situation (Scheff, 2006). Co-presence is thus characterized by the members of the gathering being aware of each other, existing as sources of information for each other and being involved with each other in an ongoing fashion (Drew & Wootton, 1988).

Goffman defined involvement as "sustained cognitive and affective engrossment" (Goffman, 1963 p. 36), and included the individual being responsible for certain actions, vesting feelings and identification in something in the interaction. He described the level of engrossment in involvement as a "psychobiological focus in which the subject becomes at least partly unaware of the direction of his feelings and his cognitive attention" (Goffman, 1986 p. 347). Individuals are capable of multiple involvements, but primary involvement in a gathering "absorbs the major part of an individual's interest, visibly forming the principal current determinant of his actions" (Goffman, 1963 p. 43). A Gathering is also temporally bounded, beginning when mutual monitoring occurs and lapsing when the second-last person has left (Goffman, 1963).

Goffman (1963) discussed two types of gathering which fall at either end of an axis of involvement, both of which could be an organizational example of a meeting. At one extreme, a gathering can be unfocused, as shown by the civil inattention which occurs when strangers give visual notice to each other and then withdraw their attention (Goffman, 2005). At the other extreme, focused gatherings or encounters display high levels of involvement characterized by a single focus of thought and attention and dominated by a one main conversation. Schwartzman (1989), in her seminal work on meetings noted, social co-operation does not just happen but must be achieved. Co-operation is the medium and outcome of jointly created events, in which tentative and confused interpretations are solidified and negotiations are undertaken. This all occurs in a manner that both creates and is created by the cultural and structural frame of the encounter. Schwartzman consequently proposed that meetings should be centre stage as a topic of research, noting that "decisions, policies, problem solving, and so forth are not what meetings are about. Instead, we need to reverse this view and examine the possibility that meetings are what decisions, policies, problems, and crises are about" (p. 40).

As defined by Goffman (1961, 1963), encounters develop group-like characteristics and individuals may develop into distinct collective social groups over multiple encounters. Social groups have the interaction work elements of encounters with additional functional

elements of identity, power and socialization. Goffman (1963) developed the trajectory and culture of a multi-person-focused interaction in social groups:

A shared definition of the situation comes to prevail. This includes agreement concerning perceptual relevancies and irrelevancies, and a 'working consensus' involving a degree of mutual considerateness, sympathy and a muting of opinion differences. Often a group atmosphere develops – what Bateson has called *ethos*. At the same time, a heightened sense of moral responsibility for one's acts seems to develop. A 'we-rationale' develops, being a sense of a single thing that we the participants are avowedly doing together at the same time (1963 p. 96).

The group is a distinct collective unit with a capacity for collective action, a social entity with members who belong, symbolic elements and hostility to outgroups. The group fulfils a means of satisfying personal ends and performing latent and manifest social functions in the surrounding society, and it continues to exist apart from when the members are physically together. This definition applies equally to organizations.

Goffman characterized a social encounter as a natural ritual of life with its own rules: "There are clear rules for the initiation and termination of encounters, the entrance and departure of particular participants, the demands that an encounter can make upon its sustainers, and the decorum of space and sound it must observe relative to excluded participants in the situation" (Goffman, 1964 p. 135).

Van Vree's (1999) history of meetings traces the development of meeting rules and behaviour, based on Norbert Elias's (1939/1982a, 1939/1982b) theories of civilizing processes and manners. Van Vree contended that meetings between people developed as an alternative to violence. Their role was to manage expanding and increasingly dense networks of interdependency that formed as societies became more complex. The rituals of the meetings accounted for the distribution of power between and within the groups and formal and informal forms of negotiation developed. This was a function of scarcity of resources as the population grew and mutual dependencies between communities increased, preferences emerged for negotiation and discussion rather than violence (Van Vree, 1999). Van Vree's concept of meetings is that they are a rule- and power-based game, and Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) concept of field could be used to analyze them. In the game metaphor, the external outcomes of the meeting are secondary to the internal rules of conduct (Van Vree, 1999). Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) view of encounters as social fields encompasses the importance of structure and internal rules. Strauss's (1978) 'negotiated order', a power and status theory of emotion, emphasizes the importance of the structural context to emotions in an interaction, rather than the relationships themselves.

Characterizing organizational interaction as negotiation, he argued that emotional outcomes are affected by the stakes, complexity and visibility of the interaction, the experience and size of the group, the sequence and frequency of the negotiations, the relative power of the parties they represent, and the alternatives to avoiding or discontinuing negotiations. In Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) social field view, participants are positioned in a hierarchy and in a struggle for 'social capital' such as power, prestige or financial resources at the expense of others. Like Goffman and Van Vree, Long (1958) characterized the power interaction as a game and suggested that unconscious co-operation within the territorial systems of a community accomplish "unplanned, but largely functional results" (p. 258). Fine (1984, 1990) acknowledged the importance of the game metaphor in group interaction in meetings, but argued that both negotiated order and corporate culture, or sense of belonging, are more complementary approaches to emotions in interaction, as they emphasize employee satisfaction and take into account the constraints of their social and physical environments.

In both the literature and business, meetings are understood to have a business function, being seen as tools for tasks, searching for 'truth' or best outcomes for the organization. Meeting purposes are considered to be as a genre of organizational communication (Yates & Orlikowski, 1992) and as explicitly task-oriented and decision-making encounters (Bargiela-Chiappini & Harris, 1997). In this view of meetings, the expectation that meetings should be seen as a search for truth, analogous to scientific enlightenment, involved with producing the decisions that are best for the organization means that the individual is seen as less important than the organization's structural needs.

Schwartzman (1989) described meetings as communication genres in which social co-operation, sense-making and social and cultural validation does not just happen but must be achieved: "meetings should exemplify our basic values of pragmatism, task orientation, efficiency and rationality. We are frustrated when we find that meetings do not seem to accomplish or display these" (Schwartzman, 1993). A meeting is the medium and outcome of jointly created events, in which tentative confused and ambiguous interpretations are solidified and negotiations are undertaken. This all occurs in a manner that both creates and is created by the cultural and structural frame of the encounter (Schwartzman, 1989). Weick's concept of sensemaking (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005) to resolve ambiguity in meetings is again useful here. Sensemaking is both an individual activity and an interpersonal one. It relates to actions and organizing, testing whether each new situation is

the same as or different from previous experience and leading the actor to action. Interdependent actors communicate to make sense of their ambiguous environment developing post hoc rationalization and creating plausible acceptable explanations that they can act upon, or improvise with, usually through language (Weick et al., 2005).

Goffman (1981) noted that meetings with a primary focus may encompass more than one type of communication. This is particularly notable as a function of larger groups, where there may be enough participants to enable several subordinate or covert communications to occur. These impact the interaction and, even though they are demonstrating alienation of the participants, they may not always be concealed. These covert communications usually occur in the form of ‘byplay’, or subordinated communication of a subset of the group; ‘crossplay’, or communication between participants and bystanders; or ‘sideplay’, hushed words exchanged entirely among bystanders; and they are culturally specific, all managed through “gestural markers that are distinctive and well standardized” (Goffman, 1981 p. 133).

As is seen in the above, Goffman (1957) had earlier noted that the participants may not be completely focused on the subject of the interaction, and this alienation from the interaction may have a number of causes. The participant may be attending to something outside the interaction while still appearing to pay respect to the interaction and the other participants. The participant may be self-conscious, or internally focused in the context, focused on the way the interaction is proceeding rather than the official topic, or be preoccupied by another participant so that they are not attending to the topic or their own role in it. Social anxiety increases consciousness of self and others, so the context of an organizational change meeting is likely to be accompanied by alienation from the interaction.

Goffman (1961) defined rules of irrelevance as blocking out those things that are not part of the interaction and, through this, what shall be accepted as the definition of the situation. Certain issues are deemed irrelevant under these rules, some because they are too risky and threatening, especially if these issues threaten the underlying organizational assumptions and policies. Argyris (1980) characterized the latter as ‘undiscussable’.

Argyris’s (1980) concept of undiscussables incorporates the inability of organizations to discuss risky and threatening issues, especially if these issues threaten the underlying organizational assumptions and policies. Individuals are taught, through acculturation and

socialization, a set of values, action strategies and skills that lead them to respond automatically to threatening issues by “easing in”, “appropriately covering” or “being civilized” (p. 205). Morrison and Milliken (2000) extended the notion of undiscussables to the notion of organizational silence. Organizational silence describes properties of the situation that cause the withholding of information about potential problems or issues for employees of an organization. These issues appear to be tacitly agreed and this withholding is potentially negative for the organization.

Participative cross-functional change meetings in organizations can be analyzed using a Goffmanesque approach as they involve co-presence, size-structure, situation, engagement-involvement and temporal aspects, the five key aspects of Goffman’s social interaction model of a focused interaction within a gathering. All these elements have emotional dimensions and are context dependent. The next section reviews the role of context in emotion.

3.4.2 ANALYSING SUBJECTIVE CONTEXT: GOFFMAN’S FRAMES

In his life’s work of studying encounters and the interaction order, Goffman continually emphasized the importance of relational context. In his (1983b) Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, written to be read on his behalf and published posthumously, he distilled his early work on what actors attend and dis-attend to in an encounter as a “non-exclusive linkage – a loose coupling – between interactional practices and social structures” that constitute “a set of transformation rules, or a membrane selecting how various externally relevant social distinctions will be managed within this interaction” (p. 11). Goffman (1983b) alluded to the way people understand their roles and the roles of others in an interaction: “It is plain that each participant enters a social situation carrying an already established biography of prior dealings with the other participants – or at least with participants of their kind; and enters also with a vast array of cultural assumptions presumed to be shared” (p. 4).

Much earlier, Goffman (1961) had noted that the definition of the situation in an encounter or ‘frame’ is determined in part by ‘rules of irrelevance’ applied for the direction of the encounter. Rules of irrelevance strictly determine which details will be accepted as part the frame of the encounter and blocks out those aspects that are not (Goffman, 1961

pp. 19–21). Framing, from Goffman's (1968) perspective, was first a co-operative exercise in uncovering and keeping a particular narrative or definition of the situation going as a necessary feature of interaction and, second, it involved a recursive, mutual and inter-subjective response to the unstable and shifting meanings and 'moves' in the interaction. In 'Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience' (1974), widely considered his most ambitious work, Goffman fleshed out his view of frame using examples from popular culture. He broadly defined framing as a way to describe what is taking place from the participant's perspective, what it is that they understand they are involved in doing. Goffman contended that it is characteristic of encounters that their order pertains largely to what will be attended and dis-attended and through this, and what will be accepted as the definition of the situation or the frame: "I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify (pp. 10–11). At a core level, Goffman proposed frames as basic cognitive structures which actors use to guide and interpret perception and presentation of reality, unconsciously adopted and tacitly agreed (Goffman, 1974a).

The anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972) had originally proposed the term 'frame' in 'A Theory of Play and Fantasy', his analysis of how animals know what is play and what is real in 'play fights'. He had noted that animals, like humans, not only fight with each other but they also play at fighting. Bateson proposed that an interpretive frame enabled all communicative moves by others to be understood by an individual. The frame, or encapsulated awareness of context, informs the receiver about what is going on; it can explain how, in play fights, actions that mimic acts of aggression are understood not as aggression, but play. Goffman's (1974a) work developed the use of the term 'frame', but acknowledged Bateson strongly, noting his original conception of framing effects on an interaction was influenced by "Bateson's paper [where] the term 'frame' was proposed in roughly the sense in which I want to employ it" (p. 7). Goffman's 'Frame Analysis' (1974a) developed four key aspects of framing – keying, fabrication, footing and anchoring – which Goffman continued to develop until the end of his life, notably in 'Forms of Talk' (Goffman, 1981).

Goffman's concept of 'Footing' mediating the frame is intrinsically connected to his concept of role. In a focused interaction participants are engaged in speaking and listening and may take on a number of different roles. When speaking, the roles include speaker as

principal, author or spokesperson; when listening, the roles include the hearer as addressed, overhearing or eavesdropping: “A change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance. A change in our footing is another way of talking about a change in our frame for events” (Goffman, 1981 p. 128).

Goffman (1961) discussed the multiplicity of roles that actors hold at any time, describing the multiples selves as a kind of “holding company for a set of not relevantly connected selves” (p. 90). Merton (1957) developed the concept of role set as the complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status. The role-set differs from the concept of ‘multiple roles’, the various social statuses people hold in different social worlds (Merton, 1957). Turner (1978) extended the review of this tension, suggesting that actors resolve some dissonance by ‘merging’ with the role. He postulated the notion of a role-person merger with three criteria. First, an actor continues to play a role outside of the relevant situation; second, the actor resists abandoning a role, even when the alternatives are advantageous; finally, the actor manages the new role by acquiring the attitudes and beliefs appropriate to that role (Turner, 1978).

Within the construct of role, there are three important distinctions: role playing, role taking and role making. Coutu (1951) described role playing as a sociological concept referring to an actor’s expected behaviour, conduct and performance, and role taking as a psychological concept where the actor projects himself into the field of the other actor to imaginatively put himself in the other’s place. This concept was first fully described by Mead and Morris (1934) as a process of adapting one’s behaviour to conform with the expectations of others with whom the actor is socially implicated (Stryker, 1957). The concept included a deliberate communication aspect through playing *at* the role of the other (Coutu, 1951).

‘Keying’ relates to the clues that create what the action is intended to achieve and “intendedly leads all the participants to have the same view of what is going on” (Goffman, 1974a p. 84). Noting that it was not an exhaustive list, Goffman (1974a) provided examples of major types of keys, including how participants know when something is make-believe, consisting of playfulness, fantasy and scripted drama; a contest; a ceremonial; a technical redoing, consisting of practising for or demonstrating something, creating a record of that action or repeating the action for some other purpose; or a regrounding, the “performance of an activity more or less openly for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern ordinary actors” in the encounter (p. 76).

Goffman's third aspect of framing, 'anchoring', relates to cues to make a situation more authentic to actors, achieved through a series of layers of information, laminated to underpin the frame. The external or final frame is the 'rim', which reflects the wider context in which the interaction is embedded, into the interaction "the outermost lamination, the rim of the frame, as it were, which tells us just what sort of status in the real world the activity has, whatever the complexity of the inner laminations" (Goffman, 1974a p. 82). The rim is part of the agreed definition of the situation, since "when participants are engaged in the activity, they take the rim for granted" (Gamson, 1985 p. 603).

Actors are more able to accept the frame as real if it is 'anchored' to something already real to those actors. This reality includes memories of past events, evoked through associative symbols, and actions in the structure and interaction. How a frame is anchored can consequently play an important role in decision-making and the outcome of the interaction. As a result, anchoring is most widely elaborated in behavioural economics for its role in decision-making bias, and in communications theories for its role in influence. In behavioural economics, for example, Bazerman (2006) noted that, as a short cut in decision-making, actors anchor their perception of the value of something based on the initial value provided to them, then typically make insufficient adjustments from that anchor when establishing a final value. This is known as the heuristic bias of Anchoring and Adjustment.

In communication theories, using anchoring to influence can lead to 'fabrications' that are designed to mislead, Goffman's fourth aspect of framing. Goffman (1974a) noted that, unlike keying, fabrications require differences in the participant's views of what is happening. Two important aspects of fabrications are that they can be "benign when for the benefit of the audience and exploitative when they are for the benefit of the fabricator" (p. 84) and, once the fabrication is exposed, the exposure becomes the focus for the audience, so that "what was real for him a moment ago is now seen as a deception and is totally destroyed" (pp. 84–85). The use of fabrications, therefore, has some risks for the fabricators.

Goffman's attempts to systematize were thought by some scholars to be overly prescriptive, confusing and unusable. Gamson (1975) considered it insightful but inadequately systematized and impossible to teach. Jameson (1976) called the argument contradictory and Goffman's use of consumer media as data 'trivial'. Sharron (1981) critiqued it as 'Frame Paralysis', considering the scheme too static for development. Denzin

and Keller's (1981) critique noted weaknesses in applicability – "His posited transformations have no cause or process behind them. His frames catch events that are on the periphery of everyday life" – and made the case that he has moved too far from symbolic interactionism: "Goffman's actors are 'monads', with single frames looking out at the world. There is no interaction in Frame Analysis" (p. 59); and there were many more. Goffman was stung by these critiques, even going so far as to make the only formal response to criticism in his entire career. Though, perhaps fortunately for Goffman, one perhaps unintended outcome of the critiques was that behavioural effects of framing in interactions became a major focus of research across a number of scholarly areas, including management and organizational studies, communications studies, behavioural economics and studies of social movements. The bodies of work that resulted from the publication of *Frame Analysis* entrenched Goffman's importance in 20th century sociology.

There is a reasonable case for asserting that Goffman's writing often complicates and is frustrating, and *Frame Analysis* is no exception. While Goffman outlined a number of overlapping concepts in *Frame Analysis*, they could be seen as a "loose collection of abstract ideas with no clue as to how to organize or use them" (Scheff, 2005 p. 369) that are cumbersome and difficult to apply in practice. However, frames are unique as they both act on context externally and structure context internally. They have shown themselves to be powerful and extremely useful in several ways, particularly as opinion shapers or thought manipulators and as structures of expectations. Lakoff (2004) noted that frames are ubiquitous, part of the cognitive unconscious and shape the way we see the world.

In communications theories, the primary role of frame is as an opinion shaper. Gitlin (1980), in his discussion of framing in the media, defined frames as "principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980). Kahneman and Tversky (1986) concluded that "frame invariance cannot be expected to hold and that a sense of confidence in a particular choice does not ensure that the same choice would be made in another frame" (p. 344). They related the idea that frames are selective and call attention only to particular aspects of the reality of using frames to influence decision-making by deliberately changing the frame in which the decision is made. This has developed as a key line of communications, behavioural economics and psychological research.

Building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, the use of frames developed in advertising communications with Entman's (1993) definition of frame: "To frame is to

select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Hertog and McLeod (2001) described frames as “structures of meaning made up of a number of concepts and the relations among those concepts” (p. 140), and Gitlin (1980) saw frames as:

persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize (p7) ... frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters (p. 6).

Entman (1993) suggested that framing activities have four main locations in an interaction, with similar functions. The “empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping” (p. 53) form the overriding cultural frames. Textual frames, what people know about the context, are manifested by the presence or absence of archetypal sources of information, acting to reinforce clusters of facts. The communicators decide what to say guided by frames organizing their belief systems, and the frames organizing the receiver’s belief systems may be independent of the textual frames and the intention of the communicator.

Reese (2001) defined frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). He elaborated on these aspects:

Framing varies in how successfully, comprehensively, or completely it organizes information. The frame is based on an abstract principle and is not the same as the texts through which it manifests itself. The frame must be shared on some level for it to be significant and communicable. The significance of frames lies in their durability, their persistent and routine use over time. The frame is revealed in symbolic forms of expression. Frames organize by providing identifiable patterns or structures, which can vary in their complexity ... a frame is a moment in a chain of signification (Reese, 2001 p. 8).

Reese (2007) subsequently noted that framing is more of a research program than a unified paradigm and that theoretical diversity has been beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of the process, if not a consistent terminology.

These investigations have focused on the inner laminations. The role of the ‘rim’, or outer lamination, has received some focus in social movements. In encounters with authority,

rim talk involves some implicit or explicit questioning of the authorities' conduct (Gamson, 1985).

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) referred to a frame as a 'central organizing idea' and Tannen (1993) related framing to the wider, twofold, concept of structures of expectation. First, interactive frames of interpretation enable understanding of how the speakers mean what they say and refer to a definition of 'what is going on' in the interaction. Second are knowledge schemas, the participant's knowledge prior to the interaction, which set up expectations about people, objects, events and the setting.

Goffman (1974a) defined context and its relationship with framing as "immediately available events which are compatible with one frame understanding and incompatible with others" (p. 441). In 'Forms of Talk' (1981) he developed this definition into a much more complete conception of subjective meaning and relating to utterances:

Commonly, critiques of orthodox linguistic analysis argue that although meaning depends on context, context itself is left as a residual category, something undifferentiated and global that is to be called in whenever, and only whenever, an account is needed for any noticeable deviation between what is said and what is meant. This tack fails to allow that when no such discrepancy is found, the context is still crucial – but in this case the context is one that is usually found when the utterance occurs. (Indeed, to find an utterance with only possible reading is to find an utterance that can occur in only one possible context.) More important, traditionally no analysis was provided of what it is in contexts that makes them determinative of the significance of utterances, or any statement concerning the classes of contexts that would thus emerge – all of which if explicated, would allow us to say something other than merely that the context matters (p. 67).

Scheff (2005) neatly distilled this idea into an unpacking of the "global and undifferentiated" idea of subjective context, proposing that "subjective context can be defined in an orderly way, enabling us to represent, in the simplest way possible, the least numbers of levels of frames and awareness that are needed to make valid interpretations of any particular strip of discourse. This same method could lead the way to showing, in the moment, how the microscopic world of words and gestures is linked to the largest social structures in any society" (pp. 91–92).

Goffman wrote 'Frame Analysis' towards the end of his career and it received a very mixed response. A large, complex book with a very big ambition, it has been taken into a number of other scholarly areas such as behavioural economics and sociolinguistics. While Goffman never really sought to simplify, Thomas Scheff (2005) suggested that it can be read as an "extended attempt to unpack and define the idea of context as it occurs in

subjective experience” (p. 370). In addition, Goffman’s analysis of frame and the ensuing extensions of the concept of frame acknowledge that emotions exist, and may be important in the way people are affected by the frame, but they do not address the emotional underpinning of how and why people frame their subjective context. Addressing these questions completely is beyond the scope of a thesis, so this research focuses on the role and the experience of sentient emotions. The next section explores theories of moral emotions, ethics and identity, and the important connection between moral self-identity and structures of expectations.

3.5 IDENTITY AND SUBJECTIVE CONTEXT IN THE EMOTIONAL-RELATIONAL WORLD

3.5.1 EMOTIONAL RELATIONAL BRIDGES AT WORK

Scheff (2006) described the underlying assumption in English-speaking societies, that emotions are unimportant relative to the material world. His analysis of Goffman’s studies of human interaction highlighted the importance of the Emotional Relational World (ERW). Scheff (2006) argued that Goffman was a trope clearer, clearing the way for wholesale changes in social science, saying Goffman’s “attack on individualism is one example of his deconstruction of basic tropes in our society: mental illness, gender, language and many of the conventions of current social sciences” (p. 16). Goffman’s most influential writings were produced between 1960 and his death in the early 1980s. He described a world where we can experience emotions and actually name and know them, and start to understand and focus on the role sentient emotions play in self and self-identity. These views still inform sociological perspectives of self-identity more than 30 years after his death.

As noted in Chapter 2, emotions and their moral base are now seen as integral to work. This view is now mainstream thinking. Without explicitly relating it to identity, Watson (2008b) noted that it is now recognized that moral emotions and feelings pervade every aspect of working and organizational lives. This acknowledgement is reflected in the writings of other scholars such as Fineman (1997), who commented that emotional responses can no longer be considered ‘optional extra’ but an integral part of management practices and key to managing organizational change.

In the 20th and 21st centuries, developments in emotion research in organizations have brought depth and richness to management theory. Elton Mayo (1949) introduced the idea that negative-affect valenced emotions such as anger, fear and suspicion were part of an individual's experience of factory life. Scholarly research since then has explored many aspects of emotion at work. Arlie Hochschild's (1983) study of American flight crews used a Goffmanesque actor-stage metaphor and broke new ground in organizational studies by discussing the gap between how emotions are felt and how they are presented in a work context. Organizational research on emotion has focused on daily workplace practices, describing concepts of 'emotion work' (Hochschild, 1979), 'emotional labour' (Ashforth, 1993; Hochschild, 2003), emotional work, emotion with work and emotion towards work (Miller, Considine, & Garner, 2007) emotional dissonance (Hochschild, 1983), emotional exhaustion (Goldberg & Grandey, 2007), emotional competency (Barsade & Gibson, 2007), emotion regulation (Gross, 1999), emotional management (Lyons & Schneider, 2005), toxic emotions (Frost, 2003) and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 2006), and models such as the multi-level model of emotions at work (Ashkanasy, 2003) and 'Emotions As Social Information' (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Manstead, & Mark, 2010). These scholars' primary focus has been on understanding the stress of self-oriented, negative-affect valenced emotions such as loss and associated grief, and the pain of learning (Bridges, 2003; Kanter, 1983a; Schein, 2007). The argument in this thesis proposes that sentient emotions, the cognitively complex self-conscious other-oriented, negative-affect valenced moral emotions arise from damage to emotional relational bridges. These emotions act to facilitate attainment of complex social goals (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) and relate to self and identity, and they should therefore receive a similar focus in organization research.

Ashforth (1993) defined emotional labour as "the display of expected emotions by service agents during service encounters. It is performed through surface acting, deep acting, or the expression of genuine emotion. Emotional labour may facilitate task effectiveness and self-expression, but it also may prime customer expectations that cannot be met and may trigger emotive dissonance and self-alienation" (p. 88). This definition focuses on the interface between organization and the external world, but internal interactions between people also play a role in the experience of emotional pain. As Frost (2003) noted, emotional pain, in work as in life, is inevitable and sometimes necessary. Frost developed a typology of sources of toxic emotions that cause emotional pain at work: intention, incompetence, infidelity, insensitivity, intrusion, institutional forces and inevitability.

Anandakumar, Pitsis and Clegg's (2007) analysis of management behaviours in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), looked at the sources of toxic emotions. Anandakumar et al (2007) noted the NICU sources of toxicity included trust-breaking, emotional bullying and selectivity. They concluded that "NICU nurses are remarkable examples of how resilient, patient, caring and generous people can be pushed to their limits by managers lacking strength and abilities in people management from a humanist, positive psychological perspective" (p. 213). These behaviours are endemic in organizations and the emotions that these behaviours engender include shame, guilt and embarrassment.

Bolton in Bolton (2000a, 2000b) Bolton and Boyd (2003) and Bolton and Houlihan (2009) developed a typology containing four categories of emotion management: presentational, where emotions are handled according to general social rules; philanthropic, where emotional management is given as a gift; prescriptive, where emotional management occurs according to organizational or professional rules of conduct; and pecuniary, where emotional management is done for commercial gain. Bolton's typology does not, however, address the ethical basis of emotion, an observation borne out by the emergence of discomfort and social anxiety and an increase in mental health problems in the workplace. Social anxiety is gaining increasing attention from organizations, governments and social psychologists, as one-quarter of all adults are anticipated to suffer social anxiety in their lifetime (Miller et al., 2005).

Issues of emotionality in the workplace and the challenges of change are discussed in a wide range of publications, including a number of popular management publications on emotional issues, anxiety and emotional regulation that span academia and practice, as well as a range of self-help publications. Acknowledging this, Kremer (2011) took for granted that the workplace would be 'challenging emotionally' and advocated developed personal strategies to cope with specific emotionally challenging situations. Concepts such as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 2006), coping strategies such as mindfulness (Williams & Penman, 2011), and group decision strategies such as practical wisdom (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010) are now part of the workplace conversation.

These scholarly works relate to normative structures and actions in the workplace; however, while they touch on issues related to ethics and moral self-identity, they do not directly address them. Normative controls act to mediate interpersonal emotion bridges (Kaufman, 1974) between actors and generate managerial outcomes. The interpersonal relational bridges are important to self-identity. Haidt and Joseph's (2007) evolved

capacities of self and ethics – harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect, and purity-sanctity – which can be threatened, damaged or broken through specific actions of others, demonstrate that for humans “there is no dividing up ethics into compartments: There’s only ethics” (Kidder, 2001). It follows from this that people’s sense of personal self in community is coacted through these fragile bridges between self-identity and an ethic of self.

3.5.2 FRAME DIALOGUE – IDENTITY IN RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTEXT

Work has become a source of self-respect and identity in Western society, taking a higher proportion of time and energy than any other single waking human activity, and being associated with achievement and status. The centrality of work in people’s lives mean that identity is increasingly related to their work experience. Increasing social awareness and discussions of morality and how an individual’s moral self-identity drives behaviour have highlighted the notion of ethic or ethics in business from a consumer perspective. However, the focus in this research is how an organization’s behaviours relate to an individual’s moral stance inside the organizations in the liminal stage of managed change.

Gigerenzer’s (2007) ethics of individuals, family and community regards the evolved capacities around harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect, and purity-sanctity to be most widely used in the ethic of community. This ethic has particular parallels with the Akan-African ethic of communality and can be used to consider the emotional responses of individuals in organizations during change.

Moral intuitions underpin an individual’s experience of subjective context, the essence of how they frame their experience. Frame-dialogues, the concept being considered to analyze subjective context, are the active processes of creating and recreating what Goffman (1986) called the ‘organization of experience’, the definition of the situation that the participants are in and the people they are interacting with:

In all social interaction, we find ourselves with one central obligation: to render our behavior understandably relevant to what the other can come to perceive is going on. Whatever else, our activity must be addressed to the other’s mind, that is, to the other’s capacity to read our words and actions for evidence of our feelings, thoughts, and intent (Goffman, 1983b, p. 53).

Participants use Frame to account for the structural, hierarchical and situational aspects of the wider situation, and they moderate their emotional responses by framing and reframing their subjective view of the context (Scheff, 2006). People enact the frames through 'structures of expectation' (Tannen, 1993) about what is going on, or should be going on, and are involved in an ongoing shuffling of these schemas in response to interaction with others. In a focused interaction, such as a meeting at work, this involves perceptions of what the focus of the gathering is, or should be, how to categorize ratified participants, placing them in social categories and identifying individual participants' characteristics and how the interactions should proceed.

Frame-dialogues have interlinked components. First, frames are basic cognitive structures guiding the perception and representation for the participants, a co-operative exercise in uncovering and keeping a particular narrative or definition of the situation going as a necessary feature of interaction. Second, they involve a dialogic, mutual and inter-subjective process of framing and reframing in response to the unstable and shifting meanings and 'moves' in the interaction (Goffman, 1968).

It is important to note that Goffman did not expect Frame to be used in a singular way, but as part of a range of lenses through which to view interaction. Frame is a powerful concept to be used in understanding the way people influence and are influenced by their subjective context. It also goes some way to accounting for the role of the person's pre-existing concerns, the underlying moral ethics, the traits or values structures that are at the core of moral self-identity, but it does not completely address them. However, on its own, the dialogue of Frame with the context does not account for all of the aspects of the dialogue with others, the actions of managing social identities in relation with others. These are more fully understood using concepts of Face.

The research in this thesis proposes that an interaction is better understood using a combination of both Face and Frame dialogues. It considers Frame as dialogue with context and Face as a dialogue with others in the context. This way a more complete view of the interaction can be revealed.

3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed conceptualizations of work, the workplace, the role of meetings and the socialization and coacted identities in such encounters. Managed change was characterized as a transition ritual, and the chapter reviewed transition rituals, ritual behaviours, liminality and identity work in organizational change. The discussion introduced the concept of framing as a lens to view the subjective experience of emotions in liminality and explored how morality and self-identity structures subjective context. This discussion of framing, liminality and mortal identity was located in the context of the centrality of work to the human experience, and to our sense of identity. In this manner, it was revealed how identity is coacted with others in the workplace, incorporating social, internal and moral aspects.

This analysis was situated, in turn, in a characterization and understanding of planned workplace change as transition rituals, in which employees are involuntarily committed to a process imposed upon them. The liminal experience that they have as a consequence of this transition involves social anxiety and the experience of emotions. In this process, it was argued, traditional studies of emotions in organizational change have tended to focus on self-oriented emotions such as grief and loss with little exploration of the significance of our self-conscious or sentient emotions, emotions that are significant and the central focus of this thesis.

The chapter concluded by outlining a framework for exploring the structures of expectation and often hidden meanings of sentient emotions to employees, a framework based on a Goffmanesque concept of Frame dialogues. It noted that meanings in an interaction are better revealed through an analytical combination of Face and Frame dialogues: Frame as dialogue with context and Face as a dialogue with others in the context. Finally, it suggested that people's sense of personal self in community is coacted through these fragile bridges between self-identity and an ethic of self.

In the next chapter, the Frame dialogue framework is combined with that of Face dialogues to analyze the emotional response of employees in two key meetings in a time of major organizational change, exploring the degree to which these two lenses are able to capture the full range of effects of sentient emotions and their effects on identity.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCHING SENTIENT EMOTION IN LIMINALITY: THE MEETINGS AND THE MOMENTS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Goffman (2005) had noted that interactions themselves could be used to illuminate a ‘minimum model’ of how people coact and behave in community, in his oft-cited line: “not, then, men and their moments. Rather, moments and their men” (p. 3). While noting that psychology is necessarily involved, he sought parsimony in the investigation in order to illuminate rather than complicate.

The research explored in this thesis sought to examine sentient, negative-affect valenced emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame in a parsimonious, elegant and complete way. This chapter addresses the question: How can sentient moral emotions in meetings during organizational change be revealed through a research process of narrative analysis? The chapter describes and justifies the adopted methodologies, outlines the research context, and describes the interview process and how the narratives were created from the interview data. Finally, the emerging analytical perspectives of Face, Frame and moral dialogues are discussed in the context of marketing and engineering strategy meetings.

A significant challenge in shaping the methodology was defining and working with the concepts under consideration. Words denoting meaningful concepts, such as self, other, emotions, work, heuristic, meetings and rituals, are polysemic; that is, they are lexically ambiguous, their meaning dependent on their context. As Miller (1999) noted, “Whatever experience is meaningful, contextualizing is involved. People object to being quoted out of context, but nothing is out of context; the objection is to being quoted in the wrong context” (p. 2). In some cases, such words are reserved words in a particular academic field. While all the meanings of a polysemic word to describe a concept are related and overlap, their applications can vary considerably. Based on knowledge of practice and the underlying philosophies, the discussion in chapters 2 and 3 reflected on the various meanings of terms including self, otherness, moral and sentient emotions, dialogues, identity and face, work, organizations, rituals, meetings and frame. These terms were

defined through a hermeneutic circle of iteratively reading, identifying, refining, searching, sorting, selecting, acquiring and reading the texts. Through this iterative process, which provided a better understanding of the literature (Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2010), the concepts of Face and Frame dialogues were also defined and elaborated.

Chapter 2 proposed that the concept of Face, normally used to reveal the dynamics of micro interactions between people, could also be conceptualized as a deeper dialogue to be used as a lens to reveal the unrevealed emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame. Chapter 3 proposed that the concept of Frame, a structure of expectation, could also be conceptualized as a deeper dialogue, and used as a lens to reveal hidden meanings of emotion. Face and Frame are concepts that lend themselves more completely to interpretive and descriptive qualitative research methods of investigation and illumination. They are complex social interactive concepts which are nuanced, situated in self-identity and in social identities. They relate to the morality and are context dependent. They do not easily suit quantitative methods as they are not measured easily and they are impossible to control for variables; therefore a positivist approach was deemed unsuitable. Positivism was also deemed unsuitable, as Flanagan, Little and Watts (2005) have noted that “positivists steer away from ethical issues as being unsuitable for rational analysis” (p. 288).

This chapter outlines the research approach and the empirical work done in order to explore people’s experience of sentient emotions in a workplace meeting during a major change. The chapter explains the methodological challenges concerning researching emotions in the workplace, and discusses the methodology and particular research methods used to address these challenges. It describes the organizational context of the research, the research subjects and the research process itself. The final part of this chapter describes the interview data and the two stages of analysis: the first stage of creation of the emplotted narratives and composite emplotted narratives, and the second stage of linking these narratives to the experience of emotions through the lenses of Frame, Face and Moral dialogues that were discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

The empirical work described in this chapter serves to illuminate and illustrate the concepts presented in chapters 2 and 3, and provides the basis for the development of contributions outlined in Chapter 5.

4.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

This section begins by defining the particular methodological considerations that must be taken into account when researching emotions and emotional experiences in an organizational setting. It covers the challenges that arise, including such issues as privacy, the difficulty in accessing the meetings, the unsuitability of direct observation techniques and locating appropriate participants. Finally, it presents the research methods used to access descriptions of the experience of these emotions and the quality management of the research process itself.

Qualitative research in general, and descriptive research in particular, involve tensions that influence the quality of the processes being undertaken. Early views on quality and rigour in qualitative methods reflected the attention given to reliability and validity as found in quantitative research (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). ‘Naturalistic Inquiry’ (1985), Lincoln and Guba’s seminal work on qualitative research, responded to the challenges of quantitative concepts of rigour and quality in qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba articulated new guidelines for qualitative researchers. They suggested that research must address the notion of how to be meaningful for others and meet ‘scientific’ standards relating to trustworthiness or the truth of the findings, a concept replacing reliability and validity. Their concept of trustworthiness involved four aspects: credibility or completeness; dependability, the consistency or repeatability of the research; transferability, or applicability outside the specific context; and confirmability, the extent to which the respondents shape the research findings.

Morse et al. (2002) argued that reliability and validity are essential in qualitative research and could be achieved by “implementing verification strategies integral and self-correcting during the conduct of the inquiry itself” (p. 13). Verification strategies include ensuring congruence between the research question and the components of the method to give methodological coherence; ensuring the sample is appropriate; developing a dynamic relationship between sampling data collection and analysis by collecting and analyzing the data concurrently; thinking theoretically, checking and rechecking the ideas emerging from the data; and developing the theory as an outcome of the research process and as a template for comparison with further theory development (pp. 18–19).

A number of practical concerns arose when selecting an appropriate research method for this investigation. The first concerned the challenges of confidentiality. The site of investigation was the workplace, where people usually do not want to expose their emotions. Concerns for privacy were raised about direct observation techniques such as ethnography and shadowing. The confidentiality of future employment decisions meant that direct observation and reflection on the emotions during the meetings was not possible. In addition, potential participants were reluctant to have group discussions as a post-hoc reflection. A practical option was to interview participants individually after the meeting, and therefore the interview method included the time for participants to reflect on the meanings of their experience.

The research developed an in depth analysis of a single case study to illustrate the phenomena. The challenges of accessing organizations to research this controversial topic meant that only one group was willing to participate and had appropriate meetings to analyse. However, this emic, contextually-grounded examination of two change meetings in a single organization provided richness and depth and obtained a “real, rather than an idealised, view of what takes place” (Clegg, Pitsis and Veenswijk, 2008 p. 599) and is therefore considered sufficient to illuminate the emotional phenomena in the meetings.

Most people have difficulty embodying, revealing and discussing their emotions. For this research to be successful, the participants needed to feel able to discuss their emotions openly. The phenomenological method of embodied enquiry using heuristic interviews was selected as the most appropriate way of accessing participants’ emotions. Embodied enquiry is a practice that attends to the relationship between language and the experiencing body and marries thought and feeling (Todres, 2007). Todres described this as: “Within an embodied enquiry perspective, qualitative research in general would try to put experiences into words in such a way as to show a humanized and intersubjective world where people and world are intrinsically connected” (p. 182).

The meetings and events under discussion were emotional and had occurred no more than three months before the interviews. The vividness and recent occurrence of these events led to confidence that the participants’ memories would still be readily accessible (Bazerman, 2006). Therefore it was likely that the participants’ recall of the events could be detailed and rich. To evoke participants’ memories of the meetings as fully as possible, two additional methods were used. **Peak end theory** is a mechanism by which past experiences are remembered and judged almost entirely on their peak, whether the experience was

pleasant or unpleasant (Fredrickson, 2000; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002), and was applied within the interviews. **Photolanguage** (Cooney and Burton, 1986) is a projective technique designed to make it possible for both the conscious and subconscious aspects of the mind to find an expression (Bessell, Deese, & Medina, 2007; White, Sasser, Bogren, & Morgan, 2009). This tool was used in the interview process.

4.2.1 A NARRATIVE APPROACH

A narrative approach was determined as the most appropriate to address the research question, in order to offer methodological coherence and give the credibility, transferability and completeness required for such a study. This approach appreciates that participants act as storytellers, refracting the past rather than mirroring it and interpreting the story rather than reproducing it (Riessman, 2006); and the participants thereby play a powerful role in shaping the findings of the research.

This research used emplotted narratives, specifically a combination of individual emplotted narratives and composite emplotted narratives, to illuminate and illustrate participants' experiences. The next section discusses the narrative approach and describes the development and usefulness of individual and composite storied narratives.

Storied narratives are a powerful means of capturing the heart or the essence of the story of an individual or a group of participants. Its additional value is that in creating the storied narratives the individual's underlying story emerges from the data. This process unifies and connects the individual narratives of each study participant with the reflexive understandings of the researcher in a complex retelling. It becomes accessible to the reader as it has a kind of 'everyman' aspect (Wertz, Nosek, McNiesh & Marlow, 2011); it represents someone who typifies the general experience within a living and situated context. Through the researcher's reflexivity during the process of creating the narrative, the findings can be reconsidered in a way that illuminates the topic by its connection with human qualities, and therefore the reader can personally identify with the themes.

Narrative analysis is widely held to be useful in uncovering meaning and revealing identity. Polkinghorne (1988) noted: "narrative meaning functions to give form to the understanding of a purpose to life and to join everyday actions and events into episodic units" (p. 11). Narrative can be used in a superficial and deep way. Noting this, Watson (2009) made a distinction between narratives as a generic term to describe "accounts of

events in the world which are organized in a time-related sequence” and stories, “temporally sequenced accounts of events which unfold through plots involving the interplay of characters with interests, motives, emotions and moralities” (p. 429).

Polkinghorne (1988, 1995) described two types of narrative inquiry. The more common is paradigmatic analysis of narrative, where stories and artefacts are used to generate themes and categories. The second type, now becoming more widespread in social research, is a narrative analysis where the outcome is a story. In this case the task of the researcher is to display the links among the data elements and configure them “into a story that unties and gives meaning to the data as contributors to a goal or purpose” (p. 15). Richardson (1997) noted that storied narratives such as these are not necessarily about just one individual. They can be also ‘collective stories’ as a method of bringing many voices into a single representative one. She commented that “Telling collective stories is a way in which we can use our ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 1959) to reveal personal problems as public issues, make possible collective identity and collective solutions” (p. 34).

Narrative methods are considered valuable in research for their ability to communicate meaning and achieve a thick description. Moustakas (1994) noted that narrative methods most effectively communicate meaning in phenomenological explorations when balancing the textural, thematic accounts of the experience and the structural, underlying dynamics to achieve thick description. In Geertz’s (1973) conception, thick description is a detailed commentary, encompassing conceptual structures and meanings, which is interpreted and commented on iteratively by the investigator to create knowledge and value for the reader.

Narrative has a rich history from the time of Aristotle, who identified narrative as the imitation or representation of human action (Aristotle). Narrative descriptions and interpretations have been important in historical scholarship to inquire about, understand and explain past events and human actions, with the narrative being integral to ‘historical character’ (Ricoeur, 1984). Narratives played a role in the development of anthropology in the late 18th century. Their use expanded into sociology in the early 20th century and they became a powerful research tool. Watson (2009) noted that, from the 1980s onwards, narrative and the emerging concept of narrative as a form of identity played an increasingly prominent role in sociology and organization studies, and warned this focus “may over-privilege the roles of narratives in human lives” (p. 428). However, the value of narrative analysis in research about identity was highlighted by Riessman (2003): “Narratives are a

particularly significant genre for representing and analyzing identity in its multiple guises in different contexts. The methods allow for systematic study of experience” (p. 24).

Polkinghorne’s (1995) conception of narrative analysis and plot is the basis of the descriptive narrative research process used in this research. The storied accounts, or emplotted narratives, give sense to the behaviour of ourselves and others. An emplotted narrative has several key aspects. The story is temporal, marking the start and finish and ordering the sequence of events so they unfold to a conclusion. Events to be included are selected according to certain criteria that help to unify the events and clarify or reveal the meaning of these selected events to the story: “Narrative cognition gives us explanatory knowledge of why a person acted as he or she did; it makes another's action, as well as our own, understandable. Narrative cognition produces a series of anecdotal descriptions of particular incidents” (Polkinghorne, 1995 p. 7). This method of producing storied accounts may use single-person stories or multiple-person stories entwined in one account. The method of producing these descriptions in research is usually a process of interviews.

Todres (2007) also built on Polkinghorne’s method of emplotted stories to develop the first-person narrative. The researcher interprets the meaning through the lenses of knowledge of the literature, and active listening processes during and engagement with the texts generated post the interviews, in a similar manner to emplotted stories. Todres (2007) made a number of developments that develop Polkinghorne’s method. The main differences for the purposes of this research are Todres’s (2007, 2008) specific use of Gendlin’s ‘felt-sense’ and focusing to explore the participant’s embodied relational understanding; and the use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ to tell the story, which is considered essential to the method. Like an emplotted narrative, a composite emplotted narrative is reflective and is not a simple retelling or presentation of the dialogue. It draws a picture of the phenomenon emerging from the participants through the refracting lens of the researcher, and it is presented as a story from the view of the first person.

Polkinghorne’s emplotted story method of narrative analysis is considered useful in sociology, and a number of organizational scholars have moved towards these more nuanced forms of narrative and storytelling in research. This has developed in a number of scholarly research areas, including meaning construction (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998), organizational identity (Hatch & Schultz, 2002) and sensemaking (Weick, 1995). An example of this is Watson’s (2009) analysis of autobiographical identity work, which situated narrative as ubiquitous and part of the taken-for-granted aspects of socially

constructed reality. Watson used the emplotted narrative to demonstrate how an individual's identity work "simultaneously uses discursively available narratives and creates new narratives" (p. 425). Watson (2009) noted that narratives that are presented to us about others in everyday life through stories, conversations, myths and the media "become presented to us as 'normal' or as 'what we might do in this society/tribe/organization'" (p. 426), helping us to know how to play our roles. In his use of narrative analysis to capture the underlying texture and bringing fullness and richness to the reader, Watson both created coherent support for his argument and, like Richardson (1997), acknowledged the value of narrative analysis in sociology.

The acceptance of narrative analysis in addition to analysis of narratives in sociology is due in part to the meaningfulness for others. At the same time it meets 'scientific' standards in relation to trustworthiness or ensuring the 'truth' of the findings. It is therefore with some confidence that a narrative methodology, and in particular the task of finding the emplotted narratives story, was employed for the sensitive process of understanding the sentient emotions shame, guilt and embarrassment.

4.2.2 THE INTERVIEWS AS CONVERSATION

THE INTERVIEWS

The interviews were approached as a conversation between the researcher and participant. Jankelson (2005), in her investigation of the phenomenon of leadership, followed Van Manen's (1990) notions of the conversational interview, and used heuristic interviews and therapeutic questioning approaches to enhance the richness and validity of the findings. Following Jankelson's approach, this research also used a conversational research practice, where the questions were unprepared and secondary to the central driver, and the researcher relied on the central research question to direct the interview. The interview guide contained questions written as prompts to the conversation, flexible starting points, rather than as a list of items to be methodically worked through. The conversation fluidly moved with the interviewee in the directions of their thoughts on the experience.

Heuristic interviewing techniques were selected to explore the participants' experience of sentient emotion in change management meetings. Heuristic interviewing is a phenomenological process, a form of narrative interviewing (Douglass & Moustakas, 1985;

Moustakas, 1994). According to Moustakas (1990), heuristics is “a way of engaging with scientific research through methods and processes aimed at discovery; a way of self-inquiry and dialogue with others” (p. 15). Heuristic methods draw on Polanyi’s concepts of tacit knowing (Polanyi & Sen, 2009), emphasizing the process of discovery of an inner knowing. They involve entering into the other person’s perspective and experience, through their “telling and retelling their stories with increasing understanding and insight” (Moustakas, 1994 p. 19). It is a second-order enquiry that provides a reflection on first-order forms of knowledge from experience, making explicit the principles which are implicit in the practices (Collingwood, Connelly, & D’Oro, 2005).

The interview was a conversation that used strategic questioning (Peavey, 1994) and therapeutic questioning (McGee, Vento, & Bavelas, 2005). Peak-end theory (Fredrickson, 2000; Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) and projective techniques (Buchanan, 2001; White et al., 2009) were helpful to re-construct the transition ritual of organizational change, and to provide internal coherence and wider applicability.

The strategic questioning method was developed by Fran Peavey (1994) for use in vulnerable communities to synthesize new information from that already known, leaving ownership of the new information with the respondent. A strategic question is open and simple, and addresses only one issue at a time so that answers can be easily formed. Such questions are dynamic, creating movement and energy to help people shift their thinking on an issue. Strategic questions are particularly valuable for several reasons: they address powerful and un-askable taboo-type questions in a non-partisan way; they challenge values and assumptions; they allow participants to create options; and they release blocks to new ideas. In Peavey’s classic conception, a strategic question avoids the use of ‘Why’ questions as they can create a power differential. In contrast, this research has chosen to use ‘why’ questions as they often evoke emotional responses.

Therapeutic questioning methods have been translated into research interview techniques in a number of fields investigating human action, including phenomenology (Todres, 2007, 2008) and cultural psychology (Shweder, 2000, 2008). Therapy is a form of specialized conversation using open-ended questions that are not restrained by definite limits or structure but build on common ground, and active contextualizing work between the therapist and the client (McGee et al., 2005). Question types include ‘what’ and ‘how’ and phrases such as ‘What do you think about ...?’, ‘How is this for you?’ and ‘How do you

experience this?’ These types of questions serve as a starting point for the interview guide. The interview guide is included in Appendix 1.

4.3.2 PEAK END THEORY

The interview guidelines and questions were designed to bring the meetings and events readily to mind for the participants. Peak end theory was used to evoke the strongest memories (Fredrickson, 2000; Gilovich et al., 2002). Fredrickson (2000) described peak end theory as a heuristic rule where “people’s global evaluations of past affective episodes can be well predicted by the affect experienced during just two moments: the moment of peak affect intensity and the ending” (p. 577). Fredrickson (2000) noted that “peaks and ends may be salient precisely because they carry a wealth of self-relevant information. As such, these two moments may in effect become ‘bouillon cubes’ of personal meaning” (p. 593).

Fredrickson’s (2000) evaluations of peak end theory show that by remembering the two privileged moments – the one that contained the most intensely experienced affect, and the one that concluded the experience – peak end theory is capable of helping people efficiently reconstruct the meaning of the entire event. She cautioned that the evidence supporting peak end theory suggests that it more suited to “personal meanings associated with specific moments and with specific emotions” (p. 577). While bias can and will occur in any reconstruction process, the simplicity of the peak end theory creates parsimony, appears robust, and has been documented for a wide range of pleasant and unpleasant affective episodes. Where it is an appropriate method, it is valuable as these moments are rich with self-relevant information, and focusing on them illuminates perceptions of emotions and self (p. 577). Fredrickson (2000) also noted that this method is most effectively used when the episodes under evaluation are clearly bounded, continuous and completed, such as the research undertaken here.

4.2.3 PHOTOLANGUAGE

While the phrase “A picture is worth a thousand words” is a cliché, photographs do have a unique ability to move the viewer emotionally. Symbolic photos can be used to generate

research data as they can make it possible for a person's past experience and subconscious to find an expression (Cooney & Burton, 1986).

Photolanguage, a projective research method, was used in the research interviews. Designed to stimulate verbal expression and facilitate concrete expressions of feelings, values, memories, aspirations and ideas, using rich descriptions and imagery, it is an innovative process enabling participants to verbalize more richly "by speaking through photographs" (Bessell et al., 2007). It uses black-and-white photographs, selected for their aesthetic qualities, strength in stimulating memory, emotions, and the ability to promote imagination and thoughtful reflection within the viewer (White et al., 2009). The photographs can be studied again and again during a research process, allowing a multilayered view of the phenomenon in question that digs closer to the truth of the experience (Bessell et al., 2007). Information produced by this process provides a wealth and depth of data for the evaluator (White et al., 2009).

Photolanguage was originally developed as psychological tool in 1965 in Lyon, France, intended to be used to assist verbalizations in counselling and therapy. The Catholic Communications Centre in Sydney introduced it into Australia in 1976, and developed a commercial set of 130 Australia-centred photographs in 1979 for use in therapy and organizational development training (Bessell et al., 2007; Cooney & Burton, 1986). Cultural, psychological, sociological and photographic criteria were considered in developing this collection which features images of people, landscapes and scenes (White et al., 2009).

The methodology combines the photographs with directive questions that can help the participants focus on the research question. They need to be focused and clear and "should not be too direct, too long, nor too complicated" (Vacheret, 2005). Vacheret (2005) described the use of the photographs and the directive question in combination as two 'guard-rails' of primary and secondary thought processes, between which symbolic meaning can be generated. The photographs generate primary processes, 'mobilization' of thinking in images, stimulating the subconscious memories and causing participants to have associative emotional responses. The question generates the secondary processes, 'mobilization' of thinking in the form of ideas and logical thought. She further suggested that the process of generating symbolic meaning appears to be the result of tertiary processes, the psychic effort to establish links between the primary and secondary processes (Vacheret, 2005).

Psychologists and organizational development practitioners have developed methods for using Photolanguage in small groups over a period of 40 years. This wide experience in practice has recently given rise to its use in academic research, as it allows for rich descriptive data that can be transcribed and analyzed. An example is a systematic five-step application of Photolanguage in groups developed by the Education Evaluation Team at the University of Miami in recognition that it has “the unique ability to give ‘voice’ to the participants (Bessell et al., 2007). Its use is still at an early stage; “although several researchers have included images to enhance their understanding of a particular situation or event, the technique is still considered innovative” (White et al., 2009 p. 1).

The process used in this research was an adaptation of the group process used in psychology and organizational development training to allow the process to be used in one-on-one interviews. The process involved several stages. First, a subset of 30 images from the 130 available in were selected for use in the interviews. The subset was selected to provide a range of images representing different emotions. This process follows the other applications of Photolanguage. The participants were then asked to look at the photos carefully and attentively, directed by the question “Which photo(s) represent what you *felt at that moment?*” They were asked to allow themselves to become aware of which of the photos ‘spoke to them’ the most on this and set these to one side. This step was repeated with the directive question: “Which photo(s) represent what you *felt after the meeting?*” The participants were finally asked to pick up the photographs in turn and explain the reasons they had chosen them, describing their feeling towards and about the images in relation to the events at and after the meeting.

4.3 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT – BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

4.3.1 THE ORGANIZATION(S)

This large Australian company in the food industry has a turnover of more than \$1.2 billion per annum and has been in existence for over 90 years. Its pseudonym in this thesis is LocalCo. Recognizing that the strength of an international partner would allow it to respond more effectively to pace of the global marketplace changes, it had prepared itself

to be sold to a larger multinational organization denoted here by the pseudonym FoodMulti. The preparation and sale process had taken three years.

FoodMulti, a still larger international organization, purchased LocalCo. FoodMulti had been a long-term direct competitor to LocalCo in Australia and had a complete manufacturing, distribution and management infrastructure in place, headquartered in another state.

This meant that future employment prospects of LocalCo staff were directly affected by the sale. FoodMulti had initially stated that LocalCo staff would compete for positions in the new, larger organization. However, it was clear that the incumbents in FoodMulti had an advantage in employment prospects and that many LocalCo would not be offered these positions. FoodMulti had consequently offered the option of redundancy to most LocalCo staff from the moment the takeover was ratified; these were to be staged over a two-year period. FoodMulti provided support for the soon-to-be ex-employees with redundancy packages that were seen as generous, and counselling and outplacement services.

Several other organizations undergoing similar structural change were originally approached, declined to participate. Research conducted in industrial settings is characterized by restrictions to access (Easterbrook, Singer, Storey, & Damian, 2008). However, the combined FoodMulti-LocalCo organization fulfilled all the requirements of this research and the participant group was drawn from employees and ex-employees of the new larger organization. As noted in 4.2, an in depth analysis of a single case study to illustrate the phenomena was considered sufficient to illuminate the emotional phenomena in the meetings.

4.3.2 THE PARTICIPANTS

This research seeks to extend our understanding of how participants manage experiences of self-conscious emotions in the liminal (Turner, 1977; Van Gennep, 1960) phase in group change settings or encounters, (Goffman, 1961), and the participants must therefore be characterized as in a liminal state.

The potential interviewees were current and ex-middle/senior managers in technical and management areas of LocalCo. The entire management group numbered around 80 people and comprised about 60% males and 40% females, aged between 35 and 60 years. These individuals and groups were obviously in a major transition: a change of status, between the old and new organization, and between role and identity as insiders or outsiders to the organization. As such, their situation fits van Gennep's (1960) and Turner's (1977) classic profiles of being in a liminal space of transition.

APPROACHING PARTICIPANTS AND ETHICAL MANAGEMENT

The research explored in this thesis concerns the experience of emotions in workplace meetings during major organizational change. Therefore this was an important aspect of selecting participants. During the early discussions, it became clear that two meetings were considered important during the takeover and that a number of the original 80 potential respondents had attended at least one of the meetings. This smaller group of 22 was identified and only people from that group were approached.

It was anticipated that around four to seven people would be an appropriate number for this research; however, nine people agreed to participate and it was decided to proceed with all nine in case any subsequently pulled out. Great care was taken in the identification of participants within the group to ensure that they were not obviously experiencing any ongoing distress at the time of interviews. Any person that the researcher understood may have been experiencing distress was not approached. Potential interviewees were approached in person by the researcher with a verbal explanation of the project, and the information sheet and consent form advising them that they could withdraw at any time without having to give a reason and without consequences. Anyone who was interested in participating was asked to inform the researcher at the time or was directed to make contact by email or phone after they had had a chance to consider it. All contacts were followed up on email with a soft copy of the Information Form. In this way, the participants were fully advised in advance that they would be asked to their emotional reactions to the change in their lives.

Concerns around privacy were addressed using the ethics agreement. In the first instance, the researcher was not to identify any of the participants to the others. This approach was

to prevent any perceived peer or group pressure on any potential participant to participate. The participants generally preferred to not discuss their involvement in this research with the other participants. Also, this way the actual interview participants (and anyone who expressed interest) would not be individually identifiable.

Before any participant was interviewed they were given a hard copy of the Information Sheet, which included that they would be asked their emotional reactions to the change in their lives. They were given the opportunity to ask questions and then were requested to sign the Consent Form. They were informed that they would not be identified individually, they would have complete confidentiality and they could withdraw their participation at any stage without question. All care was taken to minimize the possibility that participants may experience some discomfort or distress when recalling the events. This risk was minimized by:

Participant wellbeing.

The potential participant group all considered themselves to be well supported by their ex-employer. They were mature, experienced and highly educated senior managers who were financially cushioned by the employer in the takeover process. While they had experienced a major life change, they did not fall into a group identified in the National Health and Medical Research Council's 'National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research' (2007) as 'at risk'.

Interview guidelines, questions and projective techniques.

The interviews were guided by a core question "What sentient emotions were elicited in the peak moment and after the meeting for the participants and how did they impact on the a) interaction and b) its' participants?" The questions were designed as prompts to elicit the structural and textural elements of meeting and the peak affect moment. These open ended questions had the aim of allowing the participant's stories to unfold naturally. Participants could therefore discuss freely their experiences, make meaning of those experiences, and stop or change the direction of the interview at any time.

The interview guide including the prompt questions is shown in Appendix 1.

Counselling.

If the participant had become distressed, the researcher was to stop the interview and provided the name of a designated free counselling service to the participant for follow up. The researcher monitored the participants during the interviews and checked at least twice during each interview that the participant was comfortable and happy to continue.

PARTICIPANT SELECTION

The criteria for selecting interviewees were that they had worked at LocalCo for 10 or more years and had developed a career through promotion and continuing education; they were actively engaged with their professional associations; had the intention of remaining in full time employment; they had completed or were close to completing their transition to their new life; and they had attended one of two half-day-long meetings at which a major change in organizational direction had occurred.

People of retirement age were excluded from the study. The research was seeking to illuminate the experience of participants who had a need for a future career and who considered their working lives to be a key part of their identity. Those who were retiring were not considered to have the same emotional stake in the process. This was confirmed in a test interview with a recent retiree from this group, who otherwise had fitted the criteria.

The nine people selected fulfilled all the selection criteria. They had either recently accepted redundancy from FoodMulti, or were considering redundancy as an option, since the takeover resulted in the Head Office and primary factory sites being moved interstate. As a result of selection criteria and the support methods, all the managers who were approached agreed to participate in the research and none of them dropped out during the research process, thereby verifying that the sample was appropriate.

4.3.3 RESEARCHER ENGAGEMENT

Malterud (2001) acknowledged the perspective that the researcher shapes all research, quantitative and qualitative and ‘even laboratory science’. He stated that contemporary theory of knowledge disputes the belief of a neutral observer, noting that “a researcher’s background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of

investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions” (p. 483).

The researcher’s perspective therefore needs to be acknowledged in the research process. Researcher interests, preconceptions, beliefs, values, assumptions, prior knowledge and position may play a part during the research process. In qualitative research, where the researcher is constructed as a ‘human research instrument’ and interaction between researcher and participants creates the findings, this is particularly important. However, as Malterud (2001) noted “preconceptions are not the same as bias, unless the researcher fails to mention them” (p. 484); while the researcher’s approach might lead to the development of different understandings, these different ways of seeing can be equally valid and provide richness and a more developed understanding of complex phenomena.

The researcher in this case knew the organization and was known to the group under study. The researcher had been part of, but left the LocalCo management group 10 years earlier. The researcher was known to this wider group as she had worked in a role that had contact with all parts of the organization as it then was.

The potential for bias in the selection of this organization for this research and analysis must be acknowledged. However, this is ameliorated by two things. Firstly, the time elapsed since the researcher had left the organization, 10 years, meant that the working relationships between the researcher and the participants were not close. Secondly, the reputation of the researcher with the participants was enough for them to consider engaging in the process. Thirdly, the organization had changed considerably since the researcher had been employed. The researcher’s prior knowledge of the organization was, in fact, crucial to establishing trust with the potential participants which enabled the research to occur. This has prior knowledge has similarities to the research context described by Watson (2009) in his access to, and development of, Leonard Hilton’s autobiography arising from Watson’s long involvement with the organization. Indeed many scholars doing longitudinal research such as Kunda (1986, 2006) have returned to organizations to access them, based on long term connections.

This was also important in establishing common ground between the researcher and participants during the interview process. This prior knowledge allowed ease of movement from the structural aspects of the experience under investigation to the more textural ones, and allowing new knowledge to be co-created. Jankelson (2005) described this type of

situation using the metaphor of a warmed crucible: “my sense of the essence of the organization as a whole was already developed ... Metaphorically, this is like the warming up of a crucible. As researcher, I was readied, alert and receptive to the meanings and intentions of the individual expressions” (p. 64). Watson (2009) considered a researcher’s prior engagement with the organization as beneficial, in gaining increased access to unrevealed knowledge. In Watson’s case this allowed him access to a private autobiography of his research subject. As noted earlier in this chapter, it is accepted practice in research that it should seek objectivity, which implies separateness of researcher from participants. In this research, however, the researcher’s structural knowledge of the organization and industry and shared metaphors and cultural understandings of the organization’s history and some of the organizational processes allowed the researcher and participants to become present to each other quickly and meaningfully in each interview.

The interviews were conducted at mutually agreeable locations and time nominated by each participant. The interviews were recorded electronically using a Sony PCM-D50 recorder, and the researcher took notes. Recording for each participant would only happen after the participant had read the Information Sheet, been given a chance to ask questions, and signed the Consent Form that explicitly stated that the interview was to be digitally voice recorded for the research purposes only, with the recording to be stored in a locked cabinet and deleted at the completion of the research.

4.3.4 THE MEETINGS AND THE MOMENTS

The focus of this research is on the events which took place in two key strategy meetings after LocalCo was purchased, and before the takeover was complete. Each of the meetings lasted over three hours and involved the middle and senior departmental managers from both organizations. The managers had been advised that the purpose of the meeting was to make decisions concerning strategic investment. These decisions and recommendations had to be made with some urgency as the FoodMulti board of directors had requested the recommendations be presented at the forthcoming board meeting.

The first meeting concerned the future marketing strategy of the combined organization. This meeting took place at the FoodMulti headquarters. The purpose of this meeting was ostensibly to make a decision about a major new direction for LocalCo’s main brand. The

sales and profitability of this brand had been undermined by the growth of generic products in the marketplace over the previous five years, and the strategic marketing group at LocalCo had consequently been working for over two years on a differentiation strategy for their main brand. This differentiation strategy involved capital investment and a significant increase in advertising expenditure.

The peak moment that participants in this meeting all described was when it became clear to the LocalCo managers that their project was to be shelved. One member of the LocalCo team voiced an objection in strategic terms and there was a strong reaction from the FoodMulti management, which had emotional consequences for the LocalCo managers. This research, therefore, focused on the reactions of participants to both the loss of the project and their experiences and responses when the objector was responded to by the management of FoodMulti.

The second meeting concerned the future engineering and technical development of the combined organization. This meeting took place at the original LocalCo headquarters. The purpose of this meeting was ostensibly to make a decision about a separate, and very significant, item of capital expenditure concerning safety upgrades and meeting corporate environmental objectives. The legislation on these issues had been changing quickly. In order to prepare for these changes, LocalCo's planning process had intended that their position on both safety and environmental issues would always exceed the immediate legislative requirements.

The peak moment that participants in this meeting all described was when the vote was to be taken about whether to proceed with the capital expenditure project. All of the LocalCo employees were under strong pressure to vote against their own project. At the point of the vote, a public round table process, the LocalCo managers overwhelmingly voted against their own project. Only one LocalCo manager, the last to vote, voted in favour of it, which had emotional consequences for all the LocalCo managers. This research, therefore, focused on the emotional reactions of the managers to feeling coerced to vote against their own project, and the emotional experience that occurred when one of the managers went against the perceived coercion and voted for it.

4.4 THE UNFOLDING CONVERSATION

4.4.1 THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

The researcher met individually with participants for interviews lasting between 90 minutes and 2 hours, twice over a period of three weeks. Only one interview was conducted on any one day in order to give the interviewer time to write up her notes and take the time to reflect on the interview.

The first interview established common ground relating to the mutual history of the researcher and participant. The questioning then led participants to give narrative descriptions and self-dialogues, and stories about their sense of themselves in their peer group and organization in their situation of change. This background importantly established the context in which the meeting took place.

Participants were then asked to describe structural elements of the meeting, the site, how the room was arranged, the other attendees, the purpose and nature of the meeting and their feelings prior to it. Moving towards the more textural aspects, they were then asked to consider the peak experience of the meeting, describe what happened, to whom, their responses and their emotional ‘journey’ through that moment. This led to rich descriptions of the experience and was the main focus of the interview. Towards the end of the interview, the participant was invited to reflect on the end of the meeting and the period just after the meeting, describing the structural movements, their interactions and the emotions they felt.

At the subsequent interview, the researcher referred to discussions in the previous interview. Referring to the peak moments, participants were asked to reflect on their previous narratives, confirming the researcher’s understanding and further illuminating their own understanding of the meanings in their responses. Some of them brought additional handwritten notes, giving themselves prompts for more complex descriptions of how they experienced others’ reactions and their own responses to the self-conscious emotions in that encounter.

The researcher then introduced the projective tool of Photolanguage. The participants were asked to look at the photos carefully and attentively, directed by the question “Which photo(s) represent what you *felt at that moment?*” They were invited to take the time required

to become aware of which of the photos ‘spoke to them’ and to set these to one side. This step was repeated with a further question “Which photo(s) represent what you *felt after the meeting?*” The participants were then asked to pick up the photographs in turn and explain the reasons they had chosen them, describing their feeling about the images in relation to the two moments of time.

The participants took great care in doing this exercise. They were absorbed and interested in the process and it generated a descriptive language that deepened the identification of their emotions during the meeting. At the end of the interview, they commented that this experience had brought the memory alive in such a way that they felt relieved and more resolved about the issue. This was such a powerful response that a particular and additional exploration of their response has been added in Chapter 5.

The participants wanted to continue the conversation; it was hard to limit the interviews to 90 minutes or even two hours. They had engaged fully with the process of reflection and wished to take it further. This enthusiasm was both illuminating and helpful for the researcher, who then had another opportunity to return to determine whether the qualities or constituents that had been derived “embrace the necessary and sufficient meanings” (Moustakas, 1994 p18). The researcher could also ensure that participants’ experiences had been illuminated sufficiently to synthesize new knowledge from the data.

4.4.2 CREATING EMPLOTTED NARRATIVES FROM DATA

Two type of emplotted narrative were created in this research. The first was the narratives of the two individuals whose actions caused the reactions in the others. The second was the composite narratives of the others that witnessed and responded to each event. The creation of both began the same way, working with the individual transcripts.

In narrative analysis of this type, the transcripts compiling the participant’s experiences as told to the researcher are the raw data. The researcher’s initial challenge is to find the thread underlying these experiences and establish a beginning, middle and end of the particular story (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1988).

The researcher’s second challenge is to retain each individual’s expression, a concept foremost in this methodological approach to the data analysis. This sensitivity to what has

been revealed in the transcript is necessary in order to capture the details and flavour of what has been experienced by that individual and the phrases and language that they used.

The participants in the interviews were all highly educated and extremely articulate, but generally formal and professional in their language, with masks of socialization reducing their spontaneous expression. The interviews therefore sought definite and original expressions of that individual's emotional experience of the change meeting. The participants were encouraged by the process to give individual descriptions of their experience, and intentionally discouraged from giving routine responses, which were less emotional, more structural and might also simply reflect the opinions of the group.

In working with the individual transcripts, the researcher worked with the participant's phrases that resonated and provided an intuitive sense of connection with the participant's experience. Working with these phrases is designed to create a story that also resonates with the reader, an important element of storied narratives (Van Manen, 1990). Intuition is considered a key concept, a valid way of knowing within phenomenological methodology (Moustakas, 1994). Moustakas (1994) noted its importance saying that intuition is: "the beginning place in deriving knowledge of human experience, free of everyday sense impressions and the natural attitude" (p. 32); and that "as I come to know this thing before me, I also come to know myself as the being who intuits, reflects, judges, and understands" (p. 32).

The researcher's prior knowledge of the organization, and the fact that the researcher had done all the interviewing, played a role in the approach to the transcripts. The sense of the essence of the organization as a whole was already developed and therefore the intuition the researcher brought to working with the transcripts was informed and cultivated.

Constructing the emplotted narratives of the individuals formed the basis of constructing the composite first-person stories. This construction began with the receptive quality of the researcher's attention to and engagement with the transcripts. It then drew on the expressive statements and the themes that emerged. Working originally to develop the stories of the individual protagonists, from researcher engagement with their transcripts, the details of what was needed for the construction emerged through the creation of the story. This construction became the prototype for the other individual's story and the two composite stories. For the two individuals' emplotted stories, this process was the end point. For the composite first-person stories, the process took into account the expressions

in the whole group. The same method of construction was applied to each new individual and composite narrative.

Textural elements including the plot, themes, protagonist and denouement for each of the individual stories and composite narratives were then developed, supported by the structure of the stories. Goodfellow (2000) described this as scaffolding providing support for the story construction. Jankelson (2005) summed up the process: “First, allow the plot to emerge: find the vein that runs through all the data. Establish the denouement: what is the outcome or the solution of the plot? Establish the background or the cultural context out of which the study or story will emerge. Find the significant others and particular events that affect the actions and goals of the protagonist. Capture all that happens, the situations and events of the drama itself. Generate a story with a beginning, middle and ending and establish its plausibility by asking: how is it that this outcome came about?” (p. 75).

The researcher’s work of engaging with the data requires a very particular frame of mind, a type of immersion. ‘Immersion’ is the term used in phenomenological analysis to describe the quality of engagement with the data. The researcher must be focused, engaged with the data in a way so as to exclude all extraneous influences. They must be open to the data itself, seeking below the surface of the words themselves to see what is trying to be said and what is perhaps not said. The researcher must initially not try to understand or interpret, knowing that selective capture of data based on how it will be used will damage and/or bias the process and the final narrative. The researcher deeply engages with each individual’s transcript, being aware of who they are, their position in the organization and their network of relationships. This awareness of the quality of their being and of their voice and even nuances of expressions and attitudes is crucial to the creation of the story.

In the development of the composite emplotted narratives, the challenge was analyzing and synthesizing data such that individual expression and individual voices remain. It was necessary to engage with each individual transcript with a sense of the whole story and acknowledge the significance of the individual voice and how it reflects or offers some aspect of the collective. “The whole imparts itself through each one of these individuals; this occurs not because the total is the sum of the parts, but rather because each individual reflects an aspect of the whole” (Jankelson, 2005 p. 61).

In this process, the researcher's engagement was fundamental to achieving the sense of each individual through the interviews and into the individual and composite stories. Jankelson (2005) noted that this process "brings a kind of craftsmanship that actually weaves the meaning of the narrative with the lived experience of the characters and links the text, the inquiry and the audience. Here the researcher's knowledge of the context and those interviewed becomes essential" (p. 84).

4.4.3 EMPLOTTED NARRATIVES AND COMPOSITE EMPLOTTED NARRATIVES

This section presents the emplotted narratives, the results of the interview process. They are presented and are paired for each meeting. The emplotted narratives presented below constitute the first stage of the results of the interview process and were created by the researcher in the manner described earlier in this chapter. As described above, key aspects of such stories are temporality, plot with structural and textural properties, and denouement.

- The first narrative presented for each meeting is a singular one, telling the emplotted narrative of the individual protagonist who acted differently from the other LocalCo managers in the meeting.
- The second is a composite of the four others who were at the meeting. The protagonists in all the narratives are given pseudonyms in this thesis in order to protect their identities and for ease of discussion in Chapter 5.

The two meetings are reported in turn.

Meeting 1 – Marketing Strategy Meeting

In the first emplotted narrative, the protagonist is David, a senior LocalCo Marketing Strategy Manager. In the second, the composite protagonist is Jill, a synthesis of four LocalCo Managers, three Marketing Strategy Managers and one Engineering Manager who attended both the meetings. The combined organization's new Marketing Director, Russell, who has been employed by FoodMulti for two years, is mentioned in both narratives.

Meeting 2 – Engineering Strategy Meeting

In the third emplotted narrative, the protagonist is Ross, one of the senior LocalCo Engineering Managers. In the fourth, the composite protagonist is Alan, a synthesis of four senior LocalCo Engineering Managers, including the manager who attended both the meetings. The new Operations Director, George, has been employed by FoodMulti for three years and is mentioned in both narratives.

MARKETING STRATEGY MEETING - EMPLOTTED NARRATIVE

The protagonist: David, a senior LocalCo Marketing Strategy Manager

Location: FoodMulti Head Office

A 42-year-old male, intelligent, with a Masters in Marketing. Physically very fit, he is relaxed and confident in his value to the organization. He wears expensive and very high-quality stylish clothes. He lives in the inner city and volunteers at a shelter on the weekends. He is excited about the sale of LocalCo to FoodMulti and sees it as an opportunity for career advancement.

The FoodMulti head office looks pretty impressive, spacious, lots of bustle and everyone seems friendly. I wonder if I would fit in here? We are introduced to the local admin staff and I watch them looking at us – a bit warily. I see a lot of looks and nods towards as though they are saying “do you know those LocalCo managers. They seem a bit uncomfortable too. Is it just me? I haven’t felt this sensitive since my first day at LocalCo! It’s like being at a zoo – we’re watching the animals and they’re watching back!

There’s 6 of us and more than 12 of them. We’re a big group really took up lots of seats on the plane this morning – and it felt a bit like a party coming here, maybe more like going to a sales conference – ready for work but thinking we’re going to enjoy ourselves too. I feel confident that our group is big enough to show the depth of professionalism of LocalCo. There are enough of us after all.

The coffee is good, this seems like a nice place to work.

OK, down to business now – we are in this huge conference room with full conferencing equipment, pretty flash really. I’m sitting next to my local counterpart and I wonder if he’s even bothered to look at the strategy doc for Brand Z. OK, we’re third on the agenda, that’s good; I get a chance to see how it all works.

Their new Marketing Strategy Director (and my new boss) Russell is opening the meeting – this is OK – seems friendly. First presentation seems pretty good, professional - Impressed with what they’re doing with brand T. It’s nice to be with some like-minded people!

And then we have a coffee and I can feel that something’s not quite right. I don’t yet know what it is but somehow it isn’t as lighthearted any more. Maybe we just need a caffeine lift, it was an early start. We’re on next – hope they like our presentation on Brand Z.

Oh dear! This is not going well. Russell ... shakes his head. He MUST have read the plans before and not liked them. Why on earth didn't he say something?? And what could be wrong with the Brand Z plan? Surely it's a well-considered strategy with all the risks mitigated. I'm sure it has the best chance of taking us back to profitability – it's one of best things we've worked on. I shouldn't have said all that out loud. Suddenly I'm the naïve one in the room. Apparently I don't understand the real world, and I'm clearly not part of the group who do. Russell is shouting at me – he's red in the face and his eyes are popping out. He's not just attacking what I said, he's attacking me? I feel as though I've been punched, winded. What happened to that nice friendly colleague?

I feel a bit hot and look around the table. I think I should just shut up. OK - FoodMulti people are all looking very busy with their paperwork and The LocalCo people are all glancing meaningfully at me, but quickly, so it isn't noticed. Are they telling me to shut up or is it sympathy? We're all sitting next to strangers from the other team. I didn't realize why he wanted us to be seated separately before. I don't want to be here. I think I hate him. I wish I hadn't had so much coffee. I'm desperate for a toilet break but daren't leave now in case they think I'm running away.

Lunchtime and the other LocalCo people are being really sympathetic. I don't like it – it's like they pity me. I just need to get home and go to the gym, but I've got a few more hours of awfulness yet, what with the plane journey. I'm exhausted, I didn't know sympathy was so tiring! It's like I have to comfort them – very strange!

You know, I wouldn't mind if they had told us before the meeting what was going to happen. I don't agree with it, and I'm quite sure we had the argument and the numbers to make our case, but they really didn't have to shove it down my throat. I feel so stupid that I couldn't defend myself from Russell and I feel bad, small, whenever he is around now. I need to work with these people, but I don't like him much and I don't trust them, in fact I don't belong any more.

I didn't agree with him and just because he's the boss I think all the FoodMulti people are scared of him. Well perhaps a strategic withdrawal was the right thing – that's how I'll tell it anyway. This place doesn't feel right any more. Perhaps the good thing is it's weeded me out of contention for a stellar career with FoodMulti. I'm glad I found out now. I'll just get my resume ready ..., at least my resume is good to go out to headhunters!

MARKETING STRATEGY MEETING - COMPOSITE EMPLOTTED NARRATIVE

The composite protagonist Jill, a synthesis of four LocalCo Managers, three Marketing Strategy Managers and one Engineering Manager who attended both the meetings. A 45-year-old female, intelligent, with an honours degree, and an early career background in a multinational food marketing company. Physically quite fit, relaxed, confident, wears well-fitting conservative business suits, lives in a suburb close to the LocalCo head office and has a child in a private school. Having had experience in multinational organizations, she is uncertain about the sale of LocalCo to FoodMulti and is considering a career change.

It was a long way here this morning. Up at 4.30 am and on the plane by 6 am. It seems a bit mean to schedule the meeting so early when it's only a half day – perhaps it's their idea of a joke. Obviously they don't have to think about who takes the kids to school or have them picked up when they're away.

The FoodMulti head office is GRAND – I looked on the website but it didn't look this good! They're all being friendly and introducing us around the place. I notice a few interested looks like they are sizing us up – we're the strangers here after all – and for all they know, we're after THEIR jobs. We were told that 'all bets are off' and people will be appointed from both companies. I don't really believe it, if only because most of us don't want to move here. Looks nice enough though.

I'm tired already. The preparation involved in getting to get the X brand strategy ready in time for the presentation today was a huge rush and then checking and rechecking it last night to make sure it was perfect took so long. At least Russell, the Marketing Strategy Director, has seen it and approved the presentation so we can get it to the Board.

I'm glad I slept on the plane. And I'm glad they've got a cappuccino machine – all six of us are getting a coffee. – I didn't realize we were all such caffeine addicts – must be the early start!

The meeting room is pretty big and Russell suggests we alternate seating between the two companies so that we all get a chance to speak to each other. He makes a big point about getting rid of any 'them and us' mentality. Actually the seating is two FoodMulti and one of us! Russell opens the meeting and we all have to stand up and introduce ourselves – it's interesting to put faces to the names I've been seeing on the emails. Their presentation on brand T was OK, not how I would approach it, but the thinking is pretty clear. They could be OK to work with if I felt like being in another multinational.

We're on after the coffee break and I've checked the projector and done the run through. I don't have time to get a coffee but Russell brings me one over. He has even remembered I like two sugars. Funny, I don't have him picked for a person who gets the coffee.

As I start to speak, Russell butts in and asks if LocalCo staff know there are problems with the financials on the proposal – there aren't as far as I know. Ah, I get it, it's not the financials on this proposal, it's the company financials once they have consolidated the merger. There's nothing wrong with the Brand Z plan. We know what real work has gone into it – it's good and they know it too. But it's already hopeless and I know it. No point in arguing. I finish the presentation and go to sit down and NO NO NO Paul, one of the LocalCo managers, starts to argue the case for the Brand Z strategy. You know, all the strategic stuff about risks being mitigated, consumer insights and thorough costings and projections and has the best chance of taking the new company back to profitability – Suddenly it's like we're watching a fur seal attack a penguin, Russell starts yelling at David, the anger in his voice is really scary as he attacks David's professionalism and expertise. This is awful, I want to say stop! but freeze. I've worked for 22 years and I've never seen or heard such outright nastiness from a manager to an employee. Russell mustn't like being argued with – well there's a lesson!

David realizes it's not going to get better so he stops. I am mortified, can't breathe and feel like time has stopped. But I look at David and he is practically flinching. My heart goes out to him and I mouth 'breathe' towards him when no-one is looking but he doesn't see me. I keep looking over for the rest of the meeting trying to show solidarity, and feeling the presence of the FoodMulti people all around watching me for a reaction. I look at the FoodMulti people and realize NO-ONE LOOKS SURPRISED! They must see this all the time then. I'm very worried about David, he looks really upset, and I make sure I check on him the minute the meeting breaks up for lunch and goodbyes.

We stand around awkwardly pretending to eat sandwiches and Russell comes over and is friendly and calm. He makes no mention of what happened and I honestly think I imagined how bad it was. But the other LocalCo managers can't stop talking about it and I realize that it was a significant encounter. Poor David, he was the only one of us who actively wanted a job down here. I bet he's rethinking that, but he obviously doesn't want to talk about it. I'll wait until tomorrow or the next day – give him a chance to give him a chance to 'process it', be himself again.

I think about how many times I've been through this, normally on the side of the organization taking over. There's a pattern to it where everyone gets unhappy for a while until things all settle down again. It's obvious that we're not going to agree with FoodMulti on everything – they're in charge now though – things will be done their way, that's just how it is.

*It's just such a ridiculous waste of time to have gone through this farce - and how **sad** for David. I'm so glad I am thinking of moving on anyway. This is not MY place. I want to go home.*

ENGINEERING STRATEGY MEETING - EMPLOTTED NARRATIVE

The protagonist: Ross, one of the senior LocalCo Engineering Managers

Location: LocalCo Head Office

A 48-year-old male, intelligent, with a First Class Honours in Engineering. He is confident and relaxed. He dresses in the factory management uniform of open-necked shirt, drill trousers and safety boots. He lives on a semi-rural property and goes on long bushwalks with his wife during the weekends and holidays. He is ambivalent about the sale of LocalCo to FoodMulti and is not sure what it means for his future.

You know, I am getting bloody sick and tired of organizing farewell parties. People don't seem to know what to do –they all freeze like rabbits in the headlights in case redundancy is infectious or something. It's simple. Once you know someone has decided to take the golden handshake, you just call into the local RSL and ask to book whatever size room is needed, order some food and drink and then make sure everyone contributes to the gift. At the party you make the speech, tell them how important they are to us all and then people feel satisfied. When I go, there won't be a party cause they won't know what to do – I did it once and now it's like every week I have to do it again. I'm so sick of it! This place will be like a wasteland soon. We could rent out the office for indoor cricket!

I know I'm supposed to tell my story, but it doesn't feel right yet.... It was a really odd day. The new manager, George – he's tough, pretty mean actually and I knew what he wanted us to do.

I used to be really proud of the environmental and safety programs here, we all were! Making sure the product was safe for consumers, well that's obvious, you HAVE to do that. And yes, the environment and safety laws must be met. But we were doing better than that, really responsible state of the art stuff - it was part of who we were. Meant we could sleep straight at night.

About a week before the meeting I knew what was going to happen. It was obvious from the rumblings about how they had overpaid for LocalCo, things had not been disclosed, that kind of thing. I knew those comments were rubbish. Then comments about how, like, times were tough in the export markets, the

supermarkets were putting them under pressure to 'pass on' the cost saving – well those two have a bit of truth. But they were setting this up, making the signs pretty damn clear actually.

As usual the coffee machine wasn't working so it was back to instant and a kettle. They were snooty about that – they must have a café down there! They turned up late as the flight was delayed and we didn't waste time on niceties, just sat down and got on with it. George did most of the talking. All the time he was holding the proposal folder in his hand. Any comments were swiftly cut off with a "I'll be finished briefing you all in a minute". Well, I thought, well that's it, it's not going to happen – when is he going to get around to saying it?

We've been there nearly three hours and no LocalCo manager has managed to say a word yet. We all know where this is going and are looking at each other like it's some kind of joke. But it isn't. It IS an elaborate farce though. The next thing, George says is that the new organization is a democracy (really?) and that he wants a round table vote on whether we should proceed or not with the environmental and safety proposal. Well it is obvious what he wants us to do. Vote against proceeding. I don't think I can do that.

This is bad, he's going round the table one by one and asking for a vote. I'm going to be the one he asks last. I know which way the FoodMulti people will go, they're following instructions but I can't believe it when one by one, all the LocalCo managers vote against their own proposal. One by one he asks, and as he goes round the table my heart starts thudding in my chest, following the rhythm of his hand as he gestures to the next person. It takes a while. There are more than 20 of us here. And then he gets to me. I can't, I can't vote against it. A part of me actually wanted to but I just couldn't do it. As I said 'I vote to proceed' a clanging went off in my head and I just knew "that's it – there goes my job". I knew too, that now I was an outsider in my own department.

I didn't really talk about it with anyone except my wife afterwards. We climbed Mt Kilimanjaro a week later and it was good to be somewhere so beautiful and different for a while – even though I wasn't sure if I had a job to come back to! I didn't want to discuss it with the other managers, so the time away was really good. But much later, over a beer, a couple of them said they wished they had done the same thing as I did.

It's not the same place now. The funny thing is, I'm the only one who hasn't yet taken a redundancy package. FoodMulti seems to want me to stay and I won't have to move. I'm still so uncertain about it. It's been nice to feel proud of where I worked for the past 15 years – I didn't know HOW nice until I didn't have it any more. I'm not sure it will come back.

ENGINEERING STRATEGY MEETING: COMPOSITE EMPLOTTED NARRATIVE

The composite protagonist: Alan, a synthesis of four senior LocalCo Engineering Managers

A 52-year-old male, intelligent, with a Masters in Engineering. Physically fit, relaxed and confident in his value. He dresses in the factory management uniform of open-necked shirt, drill trousers and safety boots. He lives in a suburb some distance from the head office with his wife and daughter who is a medical student. He cycles with a group of other men to keep fit and restores vintage motorbikes during the weekends. He is mostly positive about the sale of LocalCo to FoodMulti and is not sure what it means for his future career.

We all talked about and pretty much knew there would be budget cuts. I just didn't realize it would be so radical. About a week before the meeting we began to notice the signs. It was easy for us to talk about it quietly – they were in another state, and their local guys, well I went to uni with one of them and we know each other through the local branch of Engineers Australia. They're more like us really. Perhaps being away from head office is good for them!

The new manager, George – he's tough, and smart. I wouldn't want to cross him. But he's a toecutter who sees too much cost everywhere. And he seems to be targeting our environmental and safety programs. I'm not too sure about that.

The meeting started late so it wasn't really relaxed or anything. We knew it was going to be about the environmental and safety program from the start. George did all the talking, boy can he talk! And it's not a conversation, we just have to listen quietly like he's handing down the Ten Commandments or something! He's got the proposal folder. Is he ever going to stop talking about how we can't afford the program? We know already! I start making lists of the things I have to do tomorrow. We've been there nearly three hours Come ON! I almost want to laugh, and every time I look around I see the others do too and we can't look at each other. OK apparently we are a democracy and he wants us to vote on the proposal.

I don't want to vote against it. Those programs are the reason I'm here, but I'm going to have to or I'll be out the door so fast. I haven't even updated my CV yet. It's easier to just vote against proceeding. I guess that's what I'll do.

He's going round the table asking us one by one. One by one and, guess what, we all say no. We know what we are supposed to do. And we're following instructions – it's sad to lose it but there is always next

year and we were ahead of the legislation anyway. He's almost at the end and we can get out of here and get some lunch. WHAT! I can't believe Ross said 'I vote to proceed'.

I couldn't look at him from then on. I didn't know he was going to do that or how awful him voting that way would make me feel. I'm not sure what the emotion was though, just that I had done something bad. I felt like a traitor to LocalCo – that's not fair. I was only doing the right thing and my vote wouldn't have made a difference anyway. Damn Ross, why couldn't he just do what the rest of us did – acknowledge reality?

I avoided being near him as we left the room. People commented on it as we are normally thick as thieves.

It took ages for me to stop feeling like I'd made a mistake. We didn't really speak for ages and then not too long ago we had a beer together and I told him he shouldn't have done it. But I also said that I wished I had! Pretty cockeyed isn't it?

It's sad about Ross and me – but it's not the same now. I wish we were mates again.

4.5 EMERGENT THEMES: FACE, FRAME AND MORAL DIALOGUES

Goffman (1983b) noted that “Perhaps behind a willingness to accept the way things are ordered is the brutal fact of one's place in the social structure and the real or imagined cost of allowing oneself to be singled out as a malcontent” (p. 6). The emplotted narratives show the perspectives of both the ‘malcontents’, the individuals at the centre of the moment, and the others in the group.

This section presents the results of the research, a secondary analysis of the four emplotted narratives. As all the narratives under consideration are now emplotted ones, from this point they are referred to as narratives and composite narratives, in order to facilitate the flow of the text. The structural aspect of the moment is restated, then the plot and the denouement of the protagonists' narrative are described. Then it considers their experience of sentient emotions from the perspective of Face dialogues with others in the context, Frame dialogues with the context and the internal Moral dialogue founded in the self-ethic of the protagonist.

4.5.1 THE MARKETING STRATEGY MEETING

The peak moment that participants unanimously described was when it became clear to them that their project was to be shelved. One member of the LocalCo team voiced an objection in strategic terms and there was a strong reaction from the FoodMulti management. This reaction, in turn, had emotional consequences for the LocalCo managers.

DAVID'S NARRATIVE

In David's narrative, the core plot is that the positive feelings and high expectations about the takeover by FoodMulti not only failed to translate into the respect he expected, but resulted in his marginalization from the new organization. The subsequent sympathetic interactions from his peers at LocalCo were unwanted. The predominant quality present is a feeling of marginalization of LocalCo and a culture of coercive control in place at FoodMulti. The denouement of the plot is his realization that there is no place for him in the new organization.

Emergent themes in David's narrative

Frame: David's Frame saw a future for himself in the new organization. His life arrangements were flexible to move interstate. He had a high personal commitment to LocalCo and expected respect for LocalCo's strategy and his contribution. He believed that the new management team shared his values and objectives, not just experience in the same industry.

His framing of the meeting was based on that structure of expectation. He saw the meeting as a genre of communication between people searching for the best decision for the organization. He did not understand that the meeting was a search for a different decision from his own, or that it was really a game played within a field of power for stakes.

The shifting Frame David experienced was, initially, about the nature of the new Marketing Director, Russell, who he had previously thought of with respect. This was swiftly followed by the realization that he, David, would not fit in the new organization. The centrifugal effect of the first shift in Frame led swiftly to the deeper shift which concerned his potential future career at FoodMulti.

Face: Up to the moment of the incident, David's Face dialogue, managing his social identity as a strategic marketer of experience, was effective. David's response to his and LocalCo's work not being valued was an expressive response that would normally have been appropriate in the LocalCo setting. From the moment he was silenced by Russell, however, his Face dialogues with others froze. He withdrew from others in the context, and the encounter itself.

After the meeting, he remained distant and did not engage in the encounter with his LocalCo peers. His embarrassment and desire to be somewhere else did not allow the sympathy being offered to him to be received. The offender, Russell, was behaving as if there had been no incident, so there was no opportunity for a redressive act.

Moral: The internal moral dialogue that David experienced was first about the way Russell was behaving disrespectfully. He was surprised, even shocked by Russell's response. He was rendered uncertain initially by discrepancy between his idealized professional identity and the one being given to him, which was unpleasant, but he did not attempt conciliatory behaviour in order to win back approval and acceptance from Russell. Instead he withdrew and effectively ended the interaction.

Russell continued to make him feel unworthy of acceptance in FoodMulti and David then became affected by being unable to respond. The internal moral dialogue shifted to David feeling a greater concern with the others' evaluations of his inability to respond, and feelings of shame being triggered. This feeling of being flawed led to David feeling isolated, angry and rejecting the organization.

JILL'S NARRATIVE

In Jill's composite narrative, the core plot is that her uncertainty about the takeover is confirmed when the cultural differences between the two organizations are exposed and subsequent interactions with David become tentative. The predominant quality present is a feeling of marginalization and lack of respect for LocalCo and a culture of coercive control in place at FoodMulti. The denouement comes when her 'worst fears' are fulfilled, confirming the decision to leave the organization.

Emergent themes in Jill's narrative

Frame: Jill's family life and social network meant she could not easily move interstate. So Jill's Frame did not see a future for herself in the new organization, but she wanted to behave professionally and participate in the handover to the new owners. Her commitment to LocalCo was balanced by her pragmatic approach to the change. Her professionalism led her to expect respect for LocalCo's strategy and her contribution. She doubted the cultural fit between the two organizations and their employees.

Her framing of the meeting was based on that structure of expectation. Like David, she also saw the meeting as a genre of communication between people searching for the best decision for the organization. Her expectation of the meeting was that it probably was more likely a game played within a field of power for stakes than a search for the best decision for the organization. She was preoccupied, both in and out of the meeting Frame, with concerns about her presentation inside the meeting and her home life outside it.

Like David, the shifting Frame Jill experienced was first about the action of the new Marketing Director, Russell, with whom she had previously dealt and felt comfortable. His rejection of her presentation changed the context of the meeting for her, and her response was that the change was probably inevitable. The anger that Russell directed towards her LocalCo peer led to a second shift in the Frame, this time a judgement on Russell. The centrifugal effect of the first shift in Frame was not directly connected to a deeper shift in Frame, but it did confirm her decision to leave FoodMulti.

Face: Jill's Face dialogue, managing her social identity as a strategic marketer of experience, was effective through the whole meeting. Her reaction to David's predicament meant that she saw the fabrication of the meeting as a decision-making one was exploitative. This was because the LocalCo staff were not forewarned, but the FoodMulti staff appeared to have been as they showed no surprise. Her empathy towards David was shown covertly and done in such a way it was intended to protect her own Face as much as his. David's silencing by Russell led her to become distant from the others in the context, and concerned about the encounter itself.

After the meeting, Jill attempted a redressive act with David, but was rebuffed. She understood this was because she did not have the authority to make the act. As his desire to be somewhere else and inability to accept sympathy at that time was evident, she decided

to defer the conversation until the emotion had lessened. When the offender, Russell, behaved as if there had been no incident, so there was no opportunity for a redressive act, Jill unthinkingly behaved normally in response, allowing Russell to continue despite suspecting his motives were radically different from those he was presenting.

Moral: The internal moral dialogue that Jill experienced was first expressed about her discomfort with the new owners and feeling of uncertainty the FoodMulti culture. Her reaction to Russell's actions was more associated with empathic anguish for David's welfare than for the change to the LocalCo strategy. However, she did not act on her protective orientation toward saving David, but waited on the sidelines. She also did not consider that the naïve and incompetent identity Russell was bestowing on David was real. Her assessment of David was not lessened by his freezing and lack of response to Russell's tirade. She did not consider whether David may consider her sympathy meant that she respected him less. Her moral dialogue was about her own response and that was firmly fixed on working out how to help David, however powerless she felt to do so. After the meeting Jill's moral dialogue moved more toward her need for emotional safety and was expressed as a longing for 'home'.

DAVID AND JILL IN COACTION

The interaction that occurred at the meeting had a profound effect on the way David and Jill saw themselves as individuals and in relation to each other. David's response of shame about his inability to respond to Russell effectively was balanced by Jill's empathic response to his situation. Both of them had seen themselves as part of a team, a group of peers working together. They attempted to act together after Russell attacked David, but it was unsuccessful. In a situation where centripetal forces were shifting their structure of expectations about their organization and the meeting, they both felt very alone and powerless about it. Russell's attack in itself did not challenge them; it was more the challenge to their sense of morality and how they managed the moment and each other.

4.5.2 THE ENGINEERING STRATEGY MEETING

The peak moment that participants in this meeting all described was when the vote was to be taken about whether to proceed with the capital expenditure project. All of the LocalCo employees were under strong pressure to vote against their own project. At the point of the vote, a public round table process, the LocalCo managers overwhelmingly voted against their own project. Only one of them, the last to vote, voted in favour, with emotional consequences for the all the managers.

ROSS'S NARRATIVE

In Ross's narrative, the core plot is that his pessimism and sadness about the takeover are confirmed when ritualized and public decision is coerced and he is unable to agree publicly with it. The predominant quality present is a feeling of marginalization for the LocalCo culture and a coercive culture of control in place at FoodMulti. In the denouement his pessimism is replaced by puzzlement and distancing pessimism over time, and a rueful but resolute spirit of acceptance of uncertainties prevails.

Emergent themes in Ross's narrative

Frame: Ross's initial Frame was one of uncertainty about his future with FoodMulti. He had a high personal commitment to LocalCo and its safety and environmental strategy, and expected others to respect it too. His experience in the same industry led him to have knowledge of the new owners. He believed that the new management team were mean and ruthless.

His framing of the meeting was based on that structure of expectation. He saw the meeting ostensibly as a genre of communication between people searching for the best decision for the organization. He knew the 'best' decision was disputed and understood the meeting was a search for a different decision from his own.

The shifting Frame Ross experienced first was about the way the decision was to be made. After the background work by FoodMulti, he had realized prior to the meeting that the Environmental and Safety project was to be cancelled. His expectations were that they would be told the decision, but the announcement they would have to vote shifted the Frame. This shift paradoxically confirmed his initial Frame that the new management were

‘mean and ruthless’. The second shift in frames was initiated by Ross when he voted for the capital proposal.

Face: Ross’s Face dialogue, managing his social identity as an experienced engineer, was effective through the whole meeting. He noticed the fabrication of the meeting as a natural decision for FoodMulti. His second shift in Frame occurred during the vote. At this point his expectations that there would be a few LocalCo staff voting for the project were not founded and he became aware he was going to be the only one. After the meeting, Ross avoided the other LocalCo engineers and did not attempt any redressive acts. Instead he sought the solace of his family and physical distance.

Moral: The internal moral dialogue that Ross described was first about his awareness that he would be the only one voting for the project. He felt it would be a betrayal of the others if he voted for it and a betrayal of himself if he voted against it. This was even though his one vote for the project against such a large number of votes against it would not influence the decision at all. The importance of his vote was more personal than professional. The drive was so strong that he sincerely believed he had put his job at risk by stating a position that was against the organization’s implied instruction, but he still did it.

Once the vote was taken, Ross’s internal moral dialogue became one of sadness about the loss of his position in his peer group. The dialogue shifted to a greater concern with others’ evaluations of him, but these were not as important, partly because he was able to be physically distant and absorbed in another place and culture in the days following this moment.

ALAN’S COMPOSITE NARRATIVE

In Alan’s composite narrative, the plot concerns his acceptance of the new order is confirmed when a ritualized and public decision is coerced but there is one lone rebel. The predominant quality present is a feeling of marginalization for LocalCo and a culture coercive of control in place at FoodMulti. The denouement is when he experiences discomfort and regret that he followed the strongly implied instruction and initial anger towards Ross. He becomes more pessimistic over time, while maintaining his rueful but resolute spirit of acceptance of uncertainties.

Emergent themes in Alan's narrative

Alan's initial Frame was one of slight uncertainty about his future with FoodMulti. He had a high personal commitment to LocalCo and its engineering strategy. He was a competent engineer, well respected and used to being respected. He believed that the new management team were businesslike and ruthless.

Frame: His framing of the meeting was based on that structure of expectation. He saw the meeting ostensibly as a genre of communication between people searching for the best decision for the organization. He knew the 'best' decision was disputed but expected the meeting to end in some budget cuts, not a complete cancellation of the project.

Alan's first shift in Frame was associated with his frustration about the length of the meeting. He began to question the businesslike expectation he had held. The next and much bigger shift was when the safety and environmental project was to be cancelled. He was highly resistant initially, as his commitment to the environmental and safety strategy was very important to his sense of satisfaction in his job. However, his initial resistance shifted quickly to a pragmatic response at the point it was announced they were all to participate in a vote. He reinterpreted the decision as one a good employee would make, congruent with his existing behaviours and belief systems. He followed the group and voted against it, reinforcing his new pragmatic Frame as he did so.

Alan's next Frame shift occurred when, at the end of the round table vote, Ross voted in favour of the capital proposal. Alan's pragmatic Frame was immediately challenged by Ross's action. Rather than reinforcing the 'rightness' of Alan's decision to vote against, this had the effect of highlighting the 'wrongness' of it. The centrifugal effect of this shift in Frame led swiftly to the deeper shift which concerned his feelings about himself.

Face: Up to the moment of the vote, Alan had managed his face dialogue to others without any real challenges. He had internally indulged in some trim talk about the frame, and was distracted, but this appeared not to be reflected in his management of face. From the moment of the vote, though, his management of face changed. He was unable to behave naturally with his old friend to such an extent it was commented on by the others.

After the meeting, he remained distant from Ross. This was made easier by Ross's absence on holiday. After Ross's return, there was an awkward redressive act, a semi-apology, a sign Alan was starting to try to repair the relationship with Ross.

Moral: The internal moral dialogue that Alan experienced was first about the decision they were being asked to participate in. His sense of the importance of the project was balanced by his desire to remain employed and leave in his own time. He was made uncertain initially by discrepancy between his internal idealized professional identity and the one FoodMulti were asking him to take on. He had adjusted his decision by the time the vote occurred.

Alan's internal moral dialogue became much more challenging when Ross voted for the project. The dialogue involved feelings of regret and guilt that he had not taken the same position. These shifted more towards shame and anger after the meeting when the dialogue shifted to a greater concern with Ross's and others outside the meeting's evaluations of his decision to vote against the project he had been so committed to. This angry feeling isolated Alan from Ross for a few months and changed their relationship.

ROSS AND ALAN IN COACTION

The classic normative control aspects of FoodMulti's management of the meeting led to an emotional distance between Ross and Alan, based on guilt and slight shame that each of them felt over the decisions they took over the vote. Both Ross and Alan regretted the emotional distance between them, but even their longstanding friendship was not strong enough to bridge the distance in the short term.

With the centripetal forces shifting their structure of expectations about themselves and their decisions they both felt isolated. The way the decision was taken was not the main challenge for them, so much as the tension emerged from FoodMulti's coercive control of the context. Ross's and Alan's role identities in their relationship were then challenged by them following their own sense of morality. This had a profound effect on how they managed the moment and the moments following.

4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has outlined the interpretive research approach taken to respond to the research questions of 'How do people experience the sentient emotions that arise from

awareness of others in social interactions during meetings during the transition ritual of organizational change?’

The chapter outlined the methodological considerations, and how a narrative approach using heuristic interviews was determined as the most appropriate method. It described peak end theory and Photolanguage, discussed the research context, including the organization(s), the meetings and the moments of emotional richness, and described the participants and the researcher’s engagement with the process.

This chapter has described how a narrative analysis approach was used to create powerful emplotted narratives describing the experience of sentient emotions at a peak moment during two change meetings. These vivid descriptions enable insight into the individuals’ experience of the emotions and the interaction. A secondary analysis of the emplotted narratives illuminated still more parts of the experience from the perspectives of Face dialogues with others in the context, Frame dialogues with the context and the internal Moral dialogue founded in self ethic of each protagonist.

The interviews in this study were strategically designed to be inquiring and unthreatening; to co-create an engaging relationship between interviewer and interviewee. The semi-structured questioning methods and projective exercises enabled the participants to focus on their own experience of the meetings in question and find an easy narrative flow. The questions were designed to invite the dialogue into deeper reflection in the ensuing conversation. Such an investigation could be described as heuristic. In a heuristic investigation, participants and researchers play active roles as co-researcher, widely and deeply exploring the phenomena as a joint enterprise.

The results were presented in two stages: first, the emplotted narrative and composite emplotted narratives; then a secondary analysis of the emplotted stories that revealed the key Frame, Face and Moral dialogues. The importance of these dialogues and their relationship with self-identity are evaluated and discussed in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

SENTIENT EMOTIONS AT WORK: FACE, FRAME AND SELF–ETHIC DIALOGUES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter revisits the findings of the previous three chapters and relates them to the research problem and questions. It begins with an examination of self-identity and dialogues with Self–ethic. It further explores the African ethic of communality and offers it as a potential source of insight to understanding the sense of self identity which people carry with them. The chapter concludes by examining the implications of these research findings.

The secondary analysis of research outlined in Chapter 4 sought to show the emotional responses in the interactions that occurred in the two meetings, the sentient emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame. These began to emerge as a threat to the interpersonal emotion bridges between the protagonists. This continues the development of the complex notion of self-identity and illustrates its vulnerability to being damaged.

5.2 SELF AND IDENTITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Ybema et al. (2009) highlighted the dialogic and coacted nature of identity construction: “the social processes implicated in identity formation are complex, recursive, reflexive, and constantly ‘under construction’” (p. 301). The idea that identity is coacted is widely accepted in the organization literature, as is evidenced by Watson’s (2008a) definition of identity work. Watson defined it as involving “the mutually constitutive processes whereby people strive to shape a relatively coherent and distinctive notion of personal self-identity and struggle to come to terms with and, within limits, to influence the various social-identities which pertain to them in the various milieux in which they live their lives” (p. 129). Its transient nature is further described by Ybema et al. (2009) as a “momentary achievement or a resilient fiction”. The ‘resilient fiction’ noted by Ybema et al. and the

‘mutually constitutive processes’ noted by Watson are important concepts in social identity construction. As shown in Chapter 2, this conceptualization of a dialogic identity is widely elaborated in the literature.

Jenkins (2000) noted that many conceptualizations of identity in the literature rely on categories such as Goffman’s (1983) four categories and Simon’s (2004) self-aspects. This puts the focus on external labelling or more self-conscious awareness of external labelling to characterize social identities as cultural and discursive. Watson’s (2008a) analytical separation of internal self-identity aspects from external or ‘discursive’ social-identity aspects in organizational research allows a greater focus on self-identity, the individual’s own notion of who and what they are. This view acknowledges that the underlying more stable predispositions, which are part of the personal-self, or self-identity, may potentially influence and be influenced by the interaction and the context.

As noted in Section 2.2, Blasi’s (1999) discussion of emotions and moral motivation considered that moral emotions “seem to be based on, and reflect, pre-existing concerns” (p. 16). These pre-existing concerns suggest that each individual has an ethical basis for action that guides decisions. In other words, a self that is engaged in a dialogue with moral sensibility could start to describe the nature of the moral aspects of identity construction. Taylor (1989) described humans as having an ethical base and also being intrinsically oriented to the good, which is “essential to being a functional moral agent” (p. 42). This supports the view of the existence of relatively stable dispositions to feel and behave morally, an ethical base as a reference when reflecting on and evaluating self and identity.

Haidt and Graham’s (2007) description of the five foundations of morality provides the building blocks of what that ethical base may be. The base will influence what people experience as sentient emotions. It concerns that which each individual holds most strongly, be it individualism, family orientation or community orientation. In the context of this research, these ‘pre-existing concerns’ appear to be the underlying moral ethics. These are the traits or value structures that act to influence the core of self-identity involving a set of meanings that distinguish the person as a unique individual (Blasi, 2005). Henceforth, they will be called Self-ethics.

5.3 DIALOGUES WITH SELF IDENTITY

5.3.1 FACE AND FRAME DIALOGUES

The literatures reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 revealed the centrality of work to human experience and conceptions of identity. It demonstrated how managing the social identities in relation with others in organizations directly impacts on the individual's presented identity and their sense of personal identity.

Chapter 2 discussed self as a moral agent that is in a relationship with others and is continually being disrupted over time by centripetal and centrifugal forces in tension. This view of self was based on Goffman's (1961) inner portrait of self as a 'holding company' with multiple commitments and obligations, and outer portrait of person being performed to self and others in relationship. This was combined with Watson's (2008a) extension of this with analytical separation of internal self-identity aspects from external. The enactment of these performances can be usefully analyzed using Goffman's construct of Face.

Discussions of Face and Face-work consider Face as relational, dependent on context, and involve concepts of self and social identity. Face dialogues are useful analytically as they respond to disruptive forces in an organizational context and the performance of roles in interaction. As noted in Section 2.6, Face can also be considered a deeper phenomenon associated with personhood as it involves social and internalized judgements about character, the inner or self-identity of a person.

Frames are dynamic, both constituting and acting on context externally and structuring context internally. Tannen (1993) noted the interpretive role of Frame which acknowledges that minute changes to the context and/or its interpretation can change the entire meaning in an encounter, like a small movement in a child's kaleidoscope changes everything about the colour and pattern seen through the viewing lens. Tannen also articulated a view of Frame as a structure of expectations, where existing knowledge and predispositions form part of the subjective context for an individual.

As noted in chapters 2 and 3, the analytical concepts of Face and Frame have developed independently. Face has been particularly developed as an analytical tool in the communications and politeness literatures (Cupach & Metts, 1994; Domenici & Littlejohn, 2006; Ruhi & IsIk-Güler, 2007; Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Frame has also been developed in a

number of scholarly areas, particularly its role in social influence in behavioural economics, social movements and advertising communications (Entman, 1993; Gamson, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Reese, 2007).

As bodies of work on Face and Frame have developed independently, it has become common practice to consider Face and Frame largely independently when analyzing people's interactions. However, at a micro interaction level, this results in only partial understanding. An individual is not a static entity, but rather behaves and reacts in different ways in different contexts. These differences can be large or small. When analyzing Face, the researcher creates a picture of the individual based on observing the Face that the individual has deemed appropriate for that particular context. Thus the researcher is creating only a partial picture. Observing the individual in a different Frame will allow one more part of a jigsaw to be created. This will continue until a number of the pieces have been created and can be fitted together as a holistic picture of the individual, thus resulting in a fuller, more complex understanding. The same applies to analyzing Frame. With only one individual, only a part of the Frame can be observed. A full picture of the Frame cannot be created until all Frames in the presence of all of the possible individuals who interact with that context have been analyzed. Analysis of one without the other will result in partial understanding. Thus Face and Frame are complementary in gaining fuller understanding of people's coactions with their identities.

This research takes the view that Face and Frame can be more useful analytically when used in combination. Scholars have historically used these concepts together, but only incidentally. For example Spencer-Oatey's (2007) analysis of Face and identity contained elements of Frame changes, and Scheff's (2005) discussion of Frame as a structure of context related it to Face concepts. However, through an extensive review of the literatures on Frame and Face it is clear that Goffman has not formulated a formal linking of the two in the way proposed here.

In short, the combination of the analytical perspective of Face and Frame is more valuable because, while Face and Frame are both in dialogue in every encounter, the dialogues are distinctively different. The perspective of Face can be characterized as in dialogue with others in the context, whereas Frame can be characterized as in dialogue with the context. It is from the tacit understanding of the changing Frame that allows Face dialogues to be enacted and the influence of those Face dialogues that remake the Frame. This continues in a reciprocal manner through the interaction. The combination extends the applications of

the analytical perspectives of Face and Frame as individual dialogues in the investigation of the emotional-relational world of individuals to one of complementarity.

5.3.2 SELF-ETHIC DIALOGUES

A core concept in this research is the idea of the self as interacting with the context. The context includes mental structures of expectation about the context and pre-existing concerns, in the mind as well as external frames (Tannen, 1993). External Frames acting on the encounter are fleeting and ephemeral, as these schemas are reshuffled in response to interaction with others. Therefore a mismatch in Frames can act as a centripetal force, disrupting the centrifugal interactive Frames.

Chapter 4 considered Frame as a dialogue with context and Face as a dialogue with others in the context. However, while these two important and partial views provide a more complete analysis of the action and interaction, they do not address the morality of individuals' 'pre-existing concerns' that they bring to every encounter. These pre-existing concerns are the underlying moral ethics, the traits or value structures that influence the core of self-identity. Therefore, the narratives were considered from the perspective of moral dialogues with personal-self.

In addition to the Goffmanesque concepts of Face and Frame dialogues described earlier in this chapter, this research drew on Shweder's (1997) theory of autonomy, community and divinity as the 'Big Three' of morality, Haidt and Graham's (2007) five foundations theory of underlying emotional ethical systems and Gigerenzer's (2007) identity-based interpretation of the five foundations theory. The five foundations theory postulates five sets of innate evolved capacities involved in detecting and producing affective reactions to issues related to harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity. These can be grouped to create Shweder's (1997) 'autonomy' (harm-care and fairness-reciprocity), 'community' (ingroup-loyalty and authority-respect) and 'divinity' (purity-sanctity). They can also be grouped to create Gigerenzer's (2007) 'individualism' (harm-care and fairness-reciprocity), 'family' (harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty and authority-respect) and 'community' (harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity).

These concepts are then used analytically to describe the Self-ethic of the protagonists in the emplotted narratives. Self-ethic, conceptualised as a moral dialogue with personal-self is used to build a more complete understanding of the interaction and its meaning for the participants.

Oliver Sacks (1998) described humans' inner dialogue in the following terms: "we have, each of us, a life-story, an inner narrative – whose continuity, whose sense, is our lives. It might be said that each of us constructs and lives a 'narrative', and that this narrative is us, our identities" (p. 57). The inner dialogue Sacks refers to is both an external expression and inner dialogue. While Face and Frame are conceptualized as inner-outer and outer-inner dialogues between the self-identity and social identity, the Self-ethic dialogue is conceptualized as internal. That is, the personal-self both informs and is in dialogue with the Self-ethic.

Self-ethic can be said to have a dual action. The first is as an effect of the five innate evolved capacities involved in detecting and producing affective reactions, to harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity. Self-ethic acts as a structure of expectations about what the person considers good. This concerns the person's spheres of interest, individual, family or community. The second is as a dialogue of self with the Self-ethic. Self-ethic thereby provides a rich dialogic construct to help analyse identity and the effect of sentient emotion. This dialogue is an inner dialogue that is related to Frame and Face and underpins and informs the actions of an individual in all the contexts of their lives. In the next section, Self-ethic is applied to the findings of the earlier research.

5.4 THE MOMENTS IN THE MEETINGS

Chapter 4 showed how a narrative analysis approach was used to create powerful emplotted narratives that usefully described the experience of sentient emotions at a peak moment during two meetings during a transition ritual of major organizational change.

The narratives presented a first part of the picture, vivid descriptions enabling insight into the individuals' experience of the emotions and the interaction. A secondary analysis of the emplotted narratives analyzed emotional responses, reflecting the experience of embarrassment, guilt and shame and the impact on the interactions. This analysis

illuminated additional parts of the experience from the perspectives of Frame dialogues with the context and Face dialogues with others in the context.

The following sections review the narrative and dialogues from the perspective of Self-ethic. This review is intended to be illustrative and demonstrates how a slight mismatch in Self-ethic can disrupt relationships, even between close friends.

5.4.1 DAVID AND JILL REVISITED

At start of the marketing strategy meeting, David and Jill had seen themselves as individuals and part of the LocalCo community. David felt he was on the verge of joining the new community that would emerge as a result of the takeover/merger. The centripetal effect of Russell's attack on David related to David's and Jill's understanding of the context they were in through their past experience of similar contexts. They knew that this behaviour was not part of their past experiences, so their understanding of the significance and symbolizations of Russell's actions was based on that prior knowledge (Gendlin, 1997).

David's intense response, characterized by substantial feelings of responsibility, regret and a great concern with others' evaluations, was a classic experience of shame (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). While his descriptions all pointed to shame, David never actually mentioned the word, reinforcing Kaufman's (1974) view that discussion of shame is considered taboo in many English-speaking societies. David did not have the language to describe his experience, which may also provide support for Scheff's (2003, 2006) contention that the word 'shame' being considered taboo is in part due to the lack of a word in the English language to describe 'everyday' shame.

David's response of shame was demonstrated by the language he used when describing the photographs he selected when he did the Photolanguage exercise. He selected photographs that embodied feelings of anger, darkness and stigmatization for him and described his sense of the moment as like being physically attacked "*I feel as though I've been punched, winded*". His *felt sense* of the moment was truly embodied and visceral in the way described by Gendlin (1997). This could be described as a toxic emotion, a consequence of emotional bullying as described by Anandakumar et al. (2007).

It can be argued that David's response of shame about his inability to respond to Russell effectively arose not only from the attack itself, but constituted a violation of his Self-ethic. In Gigerenzer's (2007) conception, David's Self-ethic around work suggests that his beliefs were more at the level of an ethic of community. This is because, his approach to physical fitness and pro-social behaviours as a volunteer suggest an evolved capacity around bodily and spiritually based virtuous activities. In Haidt and Graham's (2007) conception, David's Self-ethic sits somewhere between autonomy and community.

The Self-ethic is illustrated by David being very open to the new organization, suggesting his concept of fairness and reciprocity were highly developed. However, his demonstrated loyalty to the ingroup at LocalCo was also clear and he recognized, trusted and co-operated with his LocalCo peers. He also demonstrated respect for authority, giving voluntary deference to the new social hierarchy. David's Self-ethic of community was violated by his experience of what seemed to be an unprovoked attack by a hierarchically more senior FoodMulti staff member.

Jill's response was associated with empathic embarrassment "an aversive state of mortification, abashment, and chagrin that follows public social predicaments" (Miller, 1996 p. 554). She saw the attack as angry and unfair and the naïve and incompetent identity Russell was bestowing on David was not congruent with her experience of David. She sought support from the others in the group and did not find it. Even though she did not act on her protective orientation toward saving David, she did not have sense of lasting guilt.

In Gigerenzer's (2007) conception, Jill's Self-ethic around work suggests that her beliefs were more at the level of an ethic of family. In Haidt and Graham's (2007) conception, Jill's Self-ethic, like David's, sits somewhere between autonomy and community. These responses suggest that Jill's Self-ethic was violated, but in a different way from David's. She was an observer, and therefore one step removed from the interaction and had not integrated the FoodMulti staff into her conception of her LocalCo 'family'. Jill's Self-ethic based on family also influenced her response to the takeover. She saw the overall change in the workplace as a kind of inevitable cycle of uncertainty that she no longer wanted to be part of. She had insight into the ritualized aspect of the meeting from a position of long experience. She had a spontaneous understanding of the change process as a transition ritual. This corroborates the value of the conceptualization of change as a transition ritual that was apparent to the participants. This is in contrast to the earlier view of processual

scholars, described in Section 3.3, who felt that a transition ritual model did not adequately describe the complexity of transformational organizational change, such as mergers and takeovers (Dawson, 1994; Dunphy & Stace, 1993; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).

Whilst Jill saw the organization as going through a transition ritual, she did not appear to see herself going through one. The takeover was potentially causing a significant life change for her and she certainly felt she was 'betwixt and between'. However she did not appear to be expecting to be changed by the process. Her need for emotional safety increased as the anchors she would normally use for judgement and comparison of workplace behaviour were shown to be absent. This was expressed as a longing for 'home', a familiar place.

The comment made at the end of Jill's narrative suggests an awareness that the action by Russell may have been an intentional performance, a regrounding: the "performance of an activity more or less openly for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern ordinary actors" in the encounter (Goffman, 1974 p. 76). She intimated that Russell may have been demonstrating his power and had sought an opportunity in the meeting to reframe the context from a collegiate group of peers to a more hierarchical structure.

Jill's response of empathy was further demonstrated by her language around the photographs she chose in the Photolanguage exercise. She selected photographs that seemed to her to have a strong quality of care for others grounding her view in a humanistic perspective. She described herself as overwhelmed and expressed great sadness and concern about the people in a photograph of refugees trapped behind fences.

The challenge to David's and Jill's Self-ethics emerged in different ways. The slight mismatch in Self-ethic may have contributed to the failed attempt at reparative action, but this was unlikely as they were otherwise closely aligned. The centripetal force of Russell's action affected their Self-ethic and shifted their structure of expectations about their organization and the meeting.

5.4.2 ROSS AND ALAN REVISITED

Ross and Alan were part of cohesive group of engineers who had worked together for some time. Their friendship and shared values over safety and the environment had been a

positive part of their experience at work. The number of engineers had been reduced because several had accepted redundancies.

Ross felt a slight level of guilt when he acted differently from his group in the voting process. Ross considered his action and its consequences with some regret (Tangney et al., 2007). Ross's regret was not about the action, but that he was now in some way separate from his group by his action (Tangney et al., 2007). This follows the consensus in the literature that guilt is focused on the action and the negative consequences experienced by others, and it thereby fosters an empathic response and constructive intentions and behaviours in the wake of wrongdoing (Tangney et al., 1996). The regret Ross felt was mild, not enough to lead to reparative actions, undoing the consequences of his action.

Ross also felt a sense of casting himself adrift, as if showing his view and exposing his ethical stance to the new management made him in some way more vulnerable. This was indeed a risk, though it did not lead to any negative consequences for Ross. In fact, after the interviews, he suggested that maybe he had kept his job in order to demonstrate FoodMulti's capacity of inclusive views. This remark was characteristic of his slight suspicion about the motives of the management of FoodMulti.

It can be argued that Ross's response to the vote was a response to a strong violation of a Self-ethic of community. In Gigerenzer's (2007) conception, Ross's Self-ethic around work suggests that his beliefs were at the level of an ethic of community. This is because, even though there is no mention of religious or spiritual aspects in Ross's narrative, his approach to the environmental issues around food production and the safety of the workforce and the end consumers suggests an evolved capacity around bodily and spiritually based virtuous activities. In Haidt and Graham's (2007) conception, Ross's Self-ethic would still firmly be in community.

Alan's response to the vote was more complex. He experienced both guilt and shame, guilt about his own decision in voting against something in which he believed and shame that he had done so. The shame was made worse by Ross voting in favour of it, and Alan became angry. This relates to Kaufman's (1974) view that shame is generated when one significant actor breaks the interpersonal emotion bridge with another through a specific action of turning away, but while remaining in the relationship. Kaufman noted that one incident such as this is reparable. He made the case that the same shame generation processes occur in adulthood. Similarly, important social relationships in the workplace can thus influence

an individual's identity management processes through construction of and damage to interpersonal bridges such as these.

Alan's Self-ethic around work suggests that his beliefs were more at the level of ethic between family and community. In Haidt and Graham's (2007) conception, Alan's Self-ethic sits somewhere between autonomy and community. The mis-match in Self-ethic between Ross and Alan meant that their decisions were made differently, and this slight difference changed the nature of their friendship and challenged their feelings about themselves.

5.5 COMMUNALITY AS AN ETHIC OF IDENTITY

Unforeseeably, the interviews revealed unsuspected emotions such as loss of place, aloneness and stigmatization. The participants made it clear that they appreciated the opportunity to raise these issues, even though the language was often difficult for them. As Warfield-Coppock (1995) noted in a comparison of Western and African conceptions of self, there is a paradox in this. In the West: "Few things are placed above the importance of understanding one's individual self" (p. 35). However, the vocabulary of understanding that they had for their own emotional reactions was limited, and emotional responses were talked about slightly apologetically, as though they were not supposed to feel them, let alone describe them. It was as though they could not easily use the language of emotion as it was not professional, even in an interview, and when they did, it came as a rush. They were bound in their organizational orientation toward competition, organizational hierarchy, understanding the importance of bottom-line profits and the constrained emotion they described as professionalism. It appeared that, when the release of emotion came, it was almost a destabilising feeling for them.

5.5.1 LOSING PERSONHOOD

A thread running through the interviews was the participants' strong sense of being and feeling alone in the meeting, feeling different, like outsiders and apart from the others, most notably after the 'moment' had occurred. There was a recognition for Jill, Ross, David and Alan that they no longer had their 'place at the table' in the new organization.

This feeling was considered both a judgment, a kind of stigma placed upon them and, at the same time, a kind of acceptance of the situation. There was a sense of loss of hope.

This quality of aloneness and sense of displacement that David, Jill, Ross and Alan felt was difficult for them to describe and they were noticeably awkward in expressing their feelings. However, it particularly manifested itself in their selection of photographs in the Photolanguage exercise. Each of them chose at least one photograph that represented displacement, stigmatization or isolation for them, and most interestingly, out of a selection of 30 photos, they all selected one particular photograph, an image of a face two-thirds in shadow (Photograph 5.1). This photograph represented what was unrevealed to them about their new context and the concomitant discomfort that arose. They had lost their right to their seat at the table. They had lost their sense of place.



Photograph 5.1: Face in Shadow

© CEO, Sydney, 1986

African philosophy, particularly Akan philosophy, emerged as a way of viewing the emotions that participants experienced. Its particular, emphasis on communality and its insight into group situations provides an alternative way of looking at organization. This has proved to be of great value in helping navigate the nature of emotions of organizational culture at a time of crisis. This reference to African philosophy is discussed below as a starting point for engaging with this world view.

5.5.2 AN AFRICAN ETHIC OF COMMUNALITY

Chapter 3 highlighted the interactive and inherently social nature of workplaces. Organizations can be considered sites where human interaction is embedded in the local social norms, cultural norms and power structures (Budd 2011), and where people have methods of understanding their place in social structures at work. They develop knowledge bases and connections with others who share that knowledge base. While Lave and Wenger's (1991) conception of communities of practice dominates discussions of community at work, the relational aspects of work and its sociality also include an aspect of community as a separate construct. Chapter 1 noted that in the English-speaking world 'community' is a concept related to a body of individuals, something shared, of life in association with others and with common characteristics. This section contrasts the Western idea of community as a 'group of individuals' with the traditional African philosophy of an ethic of communality.

Using the term 'African' philosophy in this dissertation could be considered both a postcolonial stance and an oversimplification. Historical views of cultures and philosophies in the African continent have been ignored by colonialists or have been framed or imposed by foreign scholars using their own cultural frameworks. For example, outsider anthropologists' reporting, however well intended, was limited by their own cultural labels of skin colour and their concepts of the self, the physical and the spiritual (Wiredu, 2009). In that sense, my use of the term 'African' is indeed a postcolonial stance which brings with it particular discomforts, especially around my role as an outsider. In addition, the African continent is large, the people many and varied, and philosophies do vary across the continent. This potentially leads to incomplete labelling and generalization. However, following African religious philosopher John Mbiti's (1990) widely cited line describing 'ubuntu', the African view of man as "I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I

am” (p. 106), a number of African scholars have written on the moral aspects of different African philosophies (Gyekye, 1995; Metz, 2012; Nobles, 1991; Wiredu, 2009). They have particularly noted similarities in the ethic around communality and human reciprocity, positioning these as distinct from Western philosophies. Examples of the similarities that have been explored, such as those between the West African Akan and Hausa philosophies and a number of other African philosophies from the other side of the continent such as Bantu, make the idea of an ‘African’ philosophy at least partially viable. This is particularly so around the concepts of personhood, communalistic societies and the mutual obligations of those societies (Wiredu, 2005), and it is in this sense that the term is used here.

5.5.3 A SEAT AT THE TABLE

As noted in Chapter 2, identity in Western cultures has come to be seen as a production of self, an individualist concept. Construction of identity, on the other hand, is seen as a dialogue. In Akan philosophy individualism and communalism are not seen as opposing concepts. The traditional Akan ethic of communality, a core concept in Akan and African philosophy, is a concept which includes individual personhood and interdependency. Like other African conceptions of self-other it focuses on similarities between people. As Schiele (1990) noted: “A fundamental characteristic of Afrocentrism, which is its emphasis on discerning similarities or commonalities of a people and their condition, instead of discerning and emphasising individual differences” (p. 149). One consequence of this is that it does not separate individual and community.

Historically the Akan were a communal group of tribes with a sophisticated and complex network of hierarchies and responsibilities to the other. The underlying ethic is based on the understanding that consensus in a community is asymmetrical and involves compromise in social, political, economic and religious beliefs (Coetzee & Roux, 2003; Davidson & Forman, 1966; Föllmi & Föllmi, 2005; Griffith, 1905; Johnson, 1979; Munslow, 1994; Patton, 1979; Wiredu, 2009). The Akan languages reflect this ethic of the community and social philosophy. ‘Onipa’, the Akan word for a person, means a human individual of a certain moral and social standing in the community, an embodiment of a speck of the divine substance and part of an ordered whole whose principle of order is community (Wiredu, 2009). This moral standing involves a positive sense of future for the person and the community.

The notion of African personhood, an embodiment of the ethic of communality is illustrated by the Ashanti stool (Photograph 5.2) and its function in Akan society. The Ashanti stool is a notable woodcarving art form for the Ashanti people of the Akan nation of Ghana. Originally just for chiefs, known as Asantehene, and kings, the stools are now for all people of note, male and female. Often practical items, they are elaborations of the simple country crafts with sophisticated design and workmanship and embody traditional symbolic and philosophical discourses of the Akan.



Photograph 5.2: Ashanti Stool from Ghana

The individualism-community and the individual-communality can be seen in the Ashanti Stool, an art form which embodies the Onipa concept of personhood and wisdom from the community. The rise of the cultural importance of the stools seems to have come from the most important and symbolic stool, the Golden Stool or throne of the King of Kumasi, with the king being seen as the embodiment of all things wise and the stools being the representation of that.

Each stool is carved out of a single piece of light-weight wood with the grain running horizontally. The stools are transported with the owner to public gatherings and celebrations, so they must be light enough for one person to carry. The basic form is a low, curved seat supported on one to four legs on a flat base. Every Akan stool is unique and personal. It is carved just for the owner and embodies their personhood, or Onipa. This personhood is the soul, wisdom and personal power of the owner. Themes carved or placed in the base reflect the importance of the person and can include brass, gold or silver symbolic embellishments. There are many symbols used to promote wise behaviours.

The use of the stools is important. Each time a stool is sat upon, it is understood to absorb the owner's essence or spirit (Sum-sum) and become imbued with the being of their owner; their history, present and potential future. To maintain the integrity of Onipa, only the owner is supposed to use it and stools are intended to be placed on their side when not in use by the owner. They are associated with rank and position and used as a political symbol to identify and legitimate political, judicial, and social leadership (Patton, 1979).

An important community-based ritualized use of Ashanti stools is their role in community events. The stools are semi-portable and are taken to gatherings where community decisions are made and placed in a circle where the discussions are to occur. This is to symbolically demonstrate that the person is properly present and participating in the interaction. If the person leaves the space for any reason, and their stool remains, it indicates that their perspective is still in the space and should be acknowledged. This ensures the role of the individual as an important element of the community, reinforces the community's importance back to the individual.

Akan communality arises out of a humanist morality, rather than a theist religious base. There is no external god revealing moral rules to the society, but spiritual beliefs are strong and reliance on the other is assumed as part of society, as is illustrated in the Akan proverb: "the left arm washes the right arm and the right arm washes the left arm" (Gyekye, 1995, p. 156).

For the people involved, the emotional outcomes of the meetings analyzed in this thesis were probably not unexpected. These kinds of meetings were held in this organization a number of times and could simply be described as two organizational cultures bumping up against each other, a binary situation that will usually end up with winners and losers. As Anandakumar et al. (2007) noted, "experience of pain and adversity affect workers spirits" (p. 212). The displacement felt by David, Jill, Ross and Alan involved a sense of social anxiety and/or shame, toxic emotions in Frost's (2003) terms. They all withdrew emotionally from the encounter and endeavoured to present a satisfactory Face to others while maintaining minimal involvement in the encounter that followed the moment. David's sense of shame arose from the mental imagery that his 'defective' self would appear to others. Ross's and Alan's were generated from the damage to the interpersonal emotion bridges between the two of them.

Communality offers respect for the individual rather than individualism. It offers the common good as a product of the good of each person and as the goal of society. It expects all members to act to enhance the welfare of the whole. The importance placed on social relationships and respect for the role of each individual maintains a sense of social worthiness and is considered to enhance psychological wellbeing. Ashanti stools act as enduring symbols personhood, the concept that underpins the ethic of communality in Akan society and there are similar symbolic artefacts in other African societies.

Gergen's (2009) 'relational self' and 'coaction', or coordinated action in community discussed in Section 2.2.3, have similarities to the ethic of communality in that the relational process itself takes primacy over the concept of the individual. The idea that thinking, feeling, believing, meaning-making and the idea of self arise only from relationships with others, and that conceptions of reality, rationality and value in life depend on the wellbeing of those relationships has distinct parallels with the ethic of communality. Gergen's 'relational self' is a powerful construct gaining considerable scholarly attention as it suggests that it can transcend traditions of individualism and community. The ethic of communality proposes a similar but distinctly African philosophy balancing the sense of community and individualism in Western culture with the sense of communality, solidarity and mutual social responsibility of African philosophy.

The potential of the Ashanti stool is in its symbolic aspects. In the Western model of organization, the individual's identity is bounded by social identity labels that relate to the hierarchy, areas of specialization and internal competition. As mentioned in the discussion of workplace identity in Section 3.2.2, Budd (2011) noted that individual's organizational identities are constantly being shaped by "discourse-meetings, social gatherings, formal and informal feedback, performance appraisal systems promotional ladders, training programs, motivational posters, campaigns to create organizational culture, and the like" (p. 156). In the Akan world, Ashanti stools are a physical demonstration of how the ethic of communality interrelates in an encounter. The stool embodies the status of the owner. It represents the owner's interests, as their involvement is accounted for when their stool is present, even if they are not. Ashanti stools operate as an enduring symbol of self-identity, unique and distinctive for their owners and allowing rights for them, even when they are not physically there. In terms of ritual theory, the stools would be considered sacred objects.

In the transition ritual of the major structural change that took place when FoodMulti purchased LocalCo, the work identities of David, Jill, Ross and Alan were destabilised. They felt they had lost their place as part of the work community and become stigmatized. This seemed to change their immediate relationships, and to also strike at their self-identity. The individualist nature of organizational culture left them uncertain and displaced. Their titles and achievements appeared to not be valued by the new organization; who they were and their sense of self had no way of being represented.

If their situation is considered from the perspective of an Akan ethic of communality and the Ashanti stool as a metaphor for how their self-identity is sustained through Self-ethic dialogue, the following alternative account could be considered:

Each person had their own 'Ashanti stool', a symbolic sense of personal-self that is part of their workplace identities, carried internally and shaped by their Self-ethic. The 'Ashanti stools' are the image they understand they project and hold in the workplace. The organizational community had always acknowledged their status and importance by inviting them to participate in the meetings at which the decisions are to be made. But the stool is real only in their minds. Actually, the wider organizational world is not aware of it. When they are not invited to participate in the decision making, their sense of place is then lost.

In the more individualist culture of Australia, the role of morality and Self-ethic in their life outside the workplace plays a balancing role to their workplace identity, and this results in the importance of other symbolic elements being increased. Using the metaphor of the Ashanti stool, this would be alternate carvings on the stool, symbols that are not connected to work roles.

For David, the Ashanti stool would then become associated with the importance of his physicality. He responded to the 'moment' with a need to get away and go to the gym, a place where his embodied response to Russell's actions could be placed into some kind of perspective. For Jill, it would become a need to return home, a symbolic place of safety where she could get distance and perspective.

For Ross, the Ashanti stool would remain strongly associated with behaving morally and his connection with the natural world. His trip away was where he became more resigned to a sense of displacement, which allowed him to remain in the organization. For David, it

is less clear. His pragmatic solution at the meeting left him with a dilemma of self that could only be resolved through rapprochement with Ross.

Of course, it did not happen this way, but introducing the Akan tradition does offer a new and refreshing view:

the social, nonindividualistic character of traditional African ethics, the Traditional African conceptions of the value of man and the relationships between people in a society, and the sense of community and solidarity, mutual social responsibility – these are in harmony with the contemporary cultural ethos and can provide an adequate basis for contemporary social and moral philosophy (Gyekye, 1995, p. 41).

The ethic of communality and the metaphor of the Ashanti could be potentially valuable in organizational theory as a means to consider employees from the perspective of how their Self–ethic and self-identity coact with their workplace identities.

5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is not the first to suggest that African philosophy has something to offer the wider world: “there are, particularly in the field of morality, conceptions not based on superstition; the Westerner may well have something to learn from them” (Wiredu, 1997 p. 327). Several scholars have suggested that African philosophy could provide a useful ‘balance’. Cook and Kono (1977) noted “Western traditions have encouraged the development of actualized will — individuality in opposition to social and natural forces. Oriental traditions have fostered the development of a sense of the individual's place in the social and natural orders. Black traditions have resulted in the development of emotional and intellectual sensitivity, responsible for a heightened sense of group cohesiveness and a capacity for collective action” (p. 18). Myers (1985) contrasted the materialism and individualism of Western cultures with the mysticism of Eastern religious philosophies and offered African philosophies as a ‘middle ground’. Finally, Schiele (1990) noted that Afrocentric models have been applied to models of group behaviour but not to organizational theory.

This chapter has described African philosophical and social traditions. It is proposed that even greater understanding would result from considering the traditional African concepts of communality and personhood, Onipa, to complement and counterbalance the

individualism of Western cultures. This thesis proposes the application of the Akan ethic of communality as a lens that could assist in the management of organizational change.

This research has determined that Face and Frame are complementary dialogues and a much greater understanding can be gained when they are applied complementarily. The particular value of shaping the Goffmanesque terms of Face and Frame as complementary dialogues has significantly contributed to a deepening understanding of identity at times of major organisational change.

Yet even this does not provide a complete picture. Self–ethic, a moral dialogue with self-identity, has been shown to offer the additional dimension of a third complementary lens. These three lenses, when used together, offer a new model to enable an in-depth understanding of identity. The three dialogues and the resultant model are given the name of Trilogy of Dialogues. There is the scope to apply this model in a range of situations including other kinds of organisational change.

CHAPTER 6

COACTING IDENTITY – IN CONCLUSION

6.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research focused on sentient emotion and identity construction in the social site of change, meetings, in an organization during major structural change where the model of the organization was changing and this change was creating uncertainty and anxiety.

Morality and ethical bases are a part of the picture of self-identity, which includes such areas as education, social hierarchy, religious affiliations and cultural conditionings. However, morality plays a significant role in social behaviours and the sense of self identity. The research was conducted at a time of turbulence and change and it contributes to the understanding of self and identity as people negotiate the fast-changing workplace. The broad objectives of this research, therefore, were to explore how people experience the sentient emotions that arise from awareness of others in social interactions during the transition ritual of organizational change, and to develop an understanding of the effects on personal identity.

The specific research problem was:

How can we better understand how people coact their identities in meetings during organizational change?

Three separate research questions provided a focus for the ensuing investigations:

- 1) How can perspectives of self/other and identity be integrated and analysed in order to understand the role of sentient emotions in identity construction?
- 2) How can social interactions in meetings during organizational change be characterized and analysed in order to consider the effects of sentient emotions?
- 3) How can sentient emotions in meetings during organizational change be revealed through a research process of narrative analysis?

To answer these questions, emotions and identity in the group setting of meetings during an organizational takeover and subsequent redundancy were explored through semi-structured interviews with those who were involved in the change and were offered redundancy. These interviews and the narratives of sentient emotion and identity were analyzed using the Goffmanesque constructs of Face and Frame dialogues.

The wide range of literature reviewed covered moral self-identity, sociality of self and the relationships among self-identity, social identity and other. The literature on emotions, specifically moral emotions and social anxiety, highlights the importance of Goffman's sociology in describing people's emotional relational world (Goffman 1959, 1961, 1974b; Scheff 2006). Embarrassment, guilt and shame are more likely to be present at times of heightened social anxiety, such as meetings during major organizational change (Tracy, Robins & Tangney, 2007). The scholarly focus on self and role identities in studies of organization, conceptualized as having a mediating action on both social identities and internal self-identity, were incorporated into the argument.

The findings and conclusion to the first research question is that sentient emotions are embodied and inseparable from self-identity and form part of the dialogue between self-identity and the social world. The use of the Goffmanesque concept of Face, a lens to reveal the dynamics of micro interactions between people, is considered appropriate to reveal emotions that people experience at times of heightened social anxiety, such as meetings during major organizational change. In this way the Face concept provides an opportunity for examining the ways self-identity may be mediated by sentient emotion.

To address the second research question, the literature from a number of disciplines was explored to capture the range of ways that change in organizations can be characterized. In keeping with the models of change originally developed by Lewin (1952) and further developed by Schein (1996), organizational change through disruption, such as mergers, was characterized as a transition ritual for employees who are involuntarily committed to a process that is imposed upon them. The liminal experience that they have as a consequence of this transition involves social anxiety and the experience of embarrassment, guilt and shame. This argument stands in contrast with the scholarly focus on emotions in organizational change, which has tended to focus on the self-oriented emotions of grief, loss and anger, rather than the sentient emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame, which are the central focus of this thesis.

This research demonstrated the connection between the centrality of work to human experience and how social identities in organizations cannot be separated from a sense of self identity. It further showed how identity is coacted with others in the workplace (Beech, 2011; Watson, 2008a; Ybema et al., 2009), and has social and internal and moral aspects. In considering the relationship between self-identity and subjective context, Frame, as a dialogue with context, was proposed as a lens through which to view the subjective experience of emotions in liminality.

A narrative approach facilitated addressing the third research question. It used heuristic interviews and narrative analysis based on Polkinghorne's (1995) emplotted stories and Richardson's (1997) collective stories. The semi-structured questioning methods and projective exercises enabled the participants to focus on their own experience of the meetings in question and create an easy narrative flow. Peak End theory (Fredrickson, 2000) was used to bring the critical moment to the fore for participants and Photolanguage (Bessell, Deese & Medina, 2007) was used to evoke the language of emotions and to facilitate deeper reflection in the ensuing conversation.

The narrative analysis created powerful emplotted narratives which captured the experience of sentient emotions at a peak moment during two change meetings. The dialogues of Face and Frame were used to analyse the emotions of participants in two key meetings in a time of major organizational change. The emplotted narratives and composite emplotted narratives provided vivid descriptions and these offered insight into the individual's experience of the emotions and the interaction. A secondary analysis of the emplotted narratives further illuminated the experience from the perspectives of Frame dialogues with the context and Face dialogues with others in the context and enabled greater understanding of the dynamics.

Self-ethic is the third dialogue, provided insight into the role of the internal moral intuitions and their interrelationship with self-identity. Self-ethic further deepened the analysis of how sentient emotions are experienced and their role in self-identity. Self-ethic is used to describe both (a) the moral intuitions, that are the emotional ethical systems, and (b) the dialogue between personal self and the moral intuitions.

Moral intuition arises from the pre-existing concerns, the effects of the five innate evolved capacities involved in detecting and producing affective reactions to harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, ingroup-loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity (Haidt & Joseph,

2007). Self-ethic acts as a structure of expectations about what the person considers good and the sphere of interest of the person, be it individual, family or community (Gigerenzer, 2007).

Self-ethic also provides a dialogic construct to analyse identity and the effect of sentient emotion. This is a dialogue of self-identity with Self-ethic. This dialogue occurs internally and underpins the actions of an individual in all contexts of their lives.

This research was interpretive and open to the participants' needs in its approach. The exploration of the ethic of communality was not the original purpose of this research, but was a consequence of that openness. It arose out of the data and my own awareness of the ethic and knowledge of the Ashanti stools from the myths and stories that formed the background of my childhood. That David, Jill, Ross and Alan sensed they had lost the right to the seat at the table was the driver for this additional investigation into African philosophy. The Akan ethic of communality and its embodiment in the use of the Ashanti stools in Akan communities are aspects of African traditional philosophies that may have something to offer organizations as they continue to respond to the changing demands of globalization.

6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS

Using a philosophical interpretivist research approach, this thesis demonstrates that self-identity is influenced by Self-ethic and that interactional ongoing identity construction is intrinsically linked to sentient emotions.

A review of the literatures has revealed a number of significant gaps in knowledge in the practice of identity construction.

The scholarly focus on emotions in organizational change has tended to focus on the self-oriented emotions and has largely ignored the sentient emotions. This thesis addresses the gap and illuminates aspects of self-identity and sentient emotions that usually do not have a role in organizational literature.

The scholarly focus on identity construction in organizational change is on the dynamic interplay between social and self-definitions, describing the complex, socially negotiated,

temporary aspects of identity construction. However, while the social nature of identity construction is increasingly elaborated in the literature, what is missing are the analytical constructs that allow exploration of self-identity and the role that personal orientations bring to identity construction. Self-identity, with its orientations, forms the internal aspect of this construct and thus plays a significant role in identity construction. This significant gap in the literature is addressed by this thesis with its proposed framework that extends the knowledge of self-definitions.

This thesis has five conclusions.

1. The sentient emotions of embarrassment, guilt and shame are an intrinsic part of self-identity and, contrary to the current practice, should be considered as part of identity-at-work.

This conclusion extends the discussion of self-oriented negatively valenced emotions, such as loss and associated grief, which are widely discussed in the literature on change, to the sentient emotions that are an intrinsic part of self-identity. This allows for a more complete, complex understanding of identity in change.

2. ‘Self-definition’, the internal aspect of identity in theories of identity in organizations, can be conceptualized as a Self–ethic dialogue. A Self–ethic is the moral orientation that individuals bring to all their interactions. It is an internal dialogue framing their expectations. The theoretical base of a Self–ethic is five sets of innate, evolved capacities, the traits or value structures involved in detecting that produce affective reactions to issues related to harm-care, fairness-reciprocity, in-group loyalty, authority-respect and purity-sanctity.

This conclusion extends the discussions of identity in organizations to include the ethical dimensions of self, the moral base of the individual’s perspective.

3. The traditional African ‘ethic of communality’ offers an alternative social and moral philosophy to Western philosophies and can be valuable in organizational research, as it focuses on the whole community level, while concurrently allowing for multiple perspectives within the whole.

This conclusion extends the discussion of culture in organizations. It balances the individualism prevalent in Western cultures with the importance of community, rather than

suggesting one or the other is more important. This sense of communality, solidarity and mutual social responsibility is in harmony with the contemporary cultural ethos in Western societies.

4. The Goffmanesque analytical perspectives of Frame and Face, normally considered separately, can be used in combination to investigate interaction and account for both structural and textural properties of interactions. Frame is considered as a dialogue with context and Face is considered as a dialogue with others in the context.

This conclusion extends the applications of the analytical perspectives of Face and Frame as individual dialogues in the investigation of the emotional-relational world of individuals to one of complementarity. It is an extension of Goffman's work.

5. Conclusion 4 described the extension of application of Face and Frame as individual dialogues to one of complementarity. This can be further extended to include *Self-ethic*, as described in Conclusion 4. This adds the dialogue that takes place between the self and one's ethics to the dialogue between self and content and the dialogue of self with others in the context.

This conclusion extends Goffman's work still further by creating the Trilogy of Dialogues, *Face*, *Frame* and *Self-ethic*, to enable a more complete understanding of people's coactions with their identities.

Four papers were also published during the development of this thesis. Two examine the early developments of Goffmanesque dialogues of Frame and Face in micro interaction (Badham & Mead, 2007a, 2007b), one applies an earlier iteration of the Frame and Face dialogues in critical management education (Badham & Mead, 2009), and one is a book chapter on performance change management (Badham, Mead & Antonacopoulou, 2011).

6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

This research has a number of implications for theory. This thesis contributes to the literature of identity and change in organizations, with relevance for organization change scholars and sociologists of emotion. Traditional studies of emotions in organizational

change have tended to focus on self-oriented emotions such as grief, loss and agony. Few studies have explored our self-conscious or sentient emotions. These emotions are significant and formed the central focus of this thesis.

The analysis was situated in an understanding of major organizational change as a transition ritual, in which employees were involuntarily committed to a process imposed upon them. The liminal experience they had as a consequence of this transition involved social anxiety and the experience of sentient emotions. This thesis places meetings as a social site of change in organizations. Research on the dialogic nature of identity always involves more than one person, so effectively it is taking place in meetings. However, there are many types of meetings in organizations. Large formal meetings during major restructuring in organizations are, by their particular nature and dynamics, a socially anxious and emotionally charged site of change.

This research augmented the findings from the interviews by incorporating two diverse philosophical perspectives – the concepts of communality and social bonds in African philosophy and interactional concepts in Western sociology – to help understand identity construction during structural change management episodes in organizations.

The practical foundations of this research lie in the increasing momentum of globalization, combined with the ongoing effects of the GFC, creating radical structural and social changes in the Australian workplace and internationally. The subsequent changes to models of organization have affected the nature of work, creating uncertainty and anxiety. These tensions affect interactions both socially and in the workplace and people's sense of identity. The tensions have significant social and financial costs to individuals and institutions. This thesis has relevance for managers in organizations undergoing structural change as individuals become more socially anxious and their sentient emotions arise. The role that an individual's Self-ethic may play in the way they respond to being involuntarily committed to a process of change imposed upon them is likely to become more important as individuals try to find ways of reducing their discomfort with their situation.

6.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The sentient emotions studied in this research are shame, guilt and embarrassment. These are moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, negative-affect valenced emotions. In

psychological typologies, the family of moral emotions also includes pride. Pride is a moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, positive-affect valenced emotion. This research is concerned only with negative-affect emotions and so pride is outside the scope of this research.

As this research focused on emotions during major organizational change, only meetings during a major organizational change were included in this study. Other types of change management, such as cultural change programs, were excluded.

Research conducted in industrial settings is characterized by restrictions to access (Easterbrook et al, 2008). Though access was sought from a number of organizations, only employees and ex-employees from one organization matched the selection criteria. Consequently, interviewees were from only one organization, and were all from a single senior management group who had the intention of remaining in full time employment. People of retirement age or those who already had taken redundancy and returned as contractors were excluded from the study. Therefore, the research findings could only be applicable to people with similar and career aspirations and in organizations similar to that studied here.

The interview subjects were all tertiary qualified. Therefore, the research findings could only be applicable to people with similar educational backgrounds

6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Goffman's themes provided an overarching view into the micro interaction in focused interactions or encounters. However, they must be placed into context in order to investigate their value in a modern organizational context. Future research into overlapping concepts and theories, such as structure and agency in organizations, change management, structured creativity, reference groups, learning and decision making, may result in further development of Face, Frame and Self-ethic dialogues to further inform the research on identity.

Organizational research on identity construction has focused on the complex, recursive social nature of identity construction (Ybema et al., 2009). In keeping with a sociological approach exemplified in Berger and Luckman's (1990) 'Social Construction of Reality', that "knowledge is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations" (p. 15), identity

construction research has necessarily largely focused on the sociality. Future research could investigate self-definitions and their effects on the discourse.

In psychological typologies, the family of moral emotions also includes pride. Pride is a moral, other-oriented, self-conscious, positive-affect valenced emotion. Further investigations on sentient emotions could be extended to include pride and the related constructs.

Meetings in other types of change management were not included in this study. Further investigations could include meetings in cultural change programs, change that can also be characterised as a transition ritual. The interviewees were selected from only one organization, were all tertiary qualified and were all from a senior management group. Further investigations could include people from different levels in the hierarchies of the organization.

6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This research has revealed how people experience the sentient emotions that arise from awareness of others in social interactions during the transition ritual of organizational change and has developed a deeper understanding of the effects on personal identity. It has brought insights from African philosophy to the complex notion of self-identity. A cross-disciplinary theory was developed that will help researchers and managers develop insights and reflective practice around identity construction and self-identity in change management.

In particular, this thesis focused on the damage caused to the interpersonal bridges between people. These are the sentient emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment and they are ever-increasingly emerging as consequences of the results of the structural and social changes in the workplace brought about by the growing momentum of globalization, combined with the ongoing effects of the GFC. These social change are characterised by structural organizational change through rationalization, downsizing, mergers and acquisition, and shifting employment offshore. This destabilization of the experience of work increases uncertainty and anxiety in the individual causes mental health issues in the workplace. This research provides much-needed guidance for the researcher and

practitioner alike about how people are affected by and how to deal with identity and sentient emotions at work.

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDES

FIRST INTERVIEW

Guiding question:

What sentient emotions were elicited in the peak moment and after the meeting for the participants and how did they impact on the a) interaction and b) its' participants?

Note:

Topics and timings are approximate

Questions are prompts only. **Prompt questions only if necessary**

This is a conversational interview

The interviewee can stop the interview at any time

1. Purpose

- To create a climate of trust and presence with the interviewees
- To learn about the interviewee's sense of themselves in their peer group and their organization in their situation of change and at the meeting.
- To allow the stories and self-dialogues to emerge naturally in conversation
- To focus on the narratives of the peak experience of the meeting and the end of the meeting.

1.1 Common Ground / Context

- Opportunity to express your own thoughts and story of what happened
- No right or wrong, just what you felt. A confidential conversation
- Exploration of shared history (5m)
- Exploration of what has happened since (10-15m)

1.2 The meeting (30m)

Please think of XXXX meeting that took place shortly after the announcement of the takeover.

Structural elements of the meeting, the site, how the room was arranged, the other attendees, the purpose and nature of the meeting and their feelings prior to it.

- Could you make eye contact and did you? Who with?
- When was it? Where was it?
- Who was there? How was the room arranged?

- What was it intended to achieve? Any other motive?
- Where were you in relation to other LocalCo people. Afterwards did you debrief with the LocalCo staff?
- What was the arc of the meeting, what did you feel before during and after?
- Did the meeting get to the high point at the beginning or the end

Textural aspects of the meeting including the peak experience, what happened, to whom, responses and the emotional 'journey' through that moment.

- How did you feel leading into the meeting? How did it start?
- Can you tell me how you felt about the meeting beforehand
- Did you feel aware of others?
- How were people interacting? Did they behave politely aggressively?

Peak moment

- What was the main thing or event that happened for you in the meeting? How did it start?
- Who was involved?
- What did you notice? How did you feel?
- What was the sense of it for you?
- Can you imagine what the others were feeling? What do you think they felt?

End of meeting

- What happened at the end of the meeting and just afterwards?
- What did you notice?
- How did you feel?
- Can you imagine what the others were feeling?
- What really mattered to you about it all? Why?

1.3 What It Meant – Reflection (1 hour)

- How do you feel about the way the meeting played out?
- How did you experience the moment? Can you tell me what feels like now?
- Why was it significant? What did you think about it?
 - Start with the emotions foremost in your mind, discuss what makes these important.
 - Comfort/discomfort? In what way did you feel it?
 - What did you not care about (why)?
- What mattered most to you? (what they say – the philosophy or attitudes that they capture about the experience).

- What about the others views?
 - What things have they done that make them that way?
 - What emotions did you feel about it, during and after? How was this for you?
- How did you talk about it later? Who with?

1.4 Set Up 2nd Interview (5m)

The next interview will involve

- Reflections on this interview and what came up for you
- More discussion on the meeting we talked about today
- A projective exercise, where you will select some photographs to talk about

Are you ok to continue?

- If yes, set up /confirm time and venue
- If no, check if counselling is appropriate/needed and arrange as necessary.

Thank you and goodbye.

END

SECOND INTERVIEW

Guiding question:

What sentient emotions were elicited in the peak moment and after the meeting for the participants and how did they impact on the a) interaction and b) its' participants?

Note:

Topics and timings are approximate

Questions are prompts only

This is a conversational interview

The interviewee can stop the interview at any time

2. Purpose

- Confirm the researcher's understanding from the first interview
- Enhance the participant's emotional vocabulary around the peak experience
- To further illuminate their understanding of the meanings associated with the peak experience using the projective technique of photolanguage.

2.1 Reflection on first meeting (10-20m)

- Iterative reflection on previous narratives
- Clarify and confirm understanding.
- Some examples we talked about of how other people behaved were XXXXXX and in our discussion you thought that it was because of YYYYYY? Have I understood that correctly?
- This ***** is what I understood were your descriptions and feelings. Do you agree? Have I missed anything? Would you like to add more?

2.2 Photo-Language (1 hour)

Please look at the 30 photographs carefully and attentively.

Select as many as you want to and take as much time as you need.

Peak moment

- Which photo(s) represent what you *felt at the moment of the event*?
- Allow yourself, if you can, to become aware of which of the photos 'speak to you' and to set these to one side.

End moment

- Which photo(s) represent what you *felt after the meeting*?
- Allow yourself, if you can, to become aware of which of the photos 'speak to you' and to set these to one side.

- If any are the same, please just let me know when we discuss them.

Photolanguage / ‘mobilization’ and enhancing emotional language

- Can you describe your feeling about the images in the photographs in relation to the two moments of time?
- Please pick up each photograph in turn, let a word or phrase that comes to mind come up, wait until a word comes to fit the best
 - What is it that gives the photograph this quality for you?
 - What does it mean to you, and if possible, why you chose it
 - Is there anything else that comes to mind? Anybody? Another event?

2.3 Reflection (10-20 m)

- How was this for you?
- Check if counselling is appropriate/needed and arrange as necessary.
- Is there anything you would like to add or change?
- Thank you for participating

END

APPENDIX 2: ETHICS APPROVAL



Research Office
Research Hub, Building C5C East
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY NSW 2109

Phone +61 (0)2 9850 8612
Fax +61 (0)2 9850 4465
Email ro@vc.mq.edu.au

Ethics
Phone +61 (0)2 9850 6848
Email ethics.secretariat@ro.mq.edu.au

14 September 2010

Professor Richard Badham
Macquarie Graduate School of Management
Macquarie University, NSW 2109

Reference: 5201001144(D)

Dear Professor Richard Badham

FINAL APPROVAL

Title of project: **Ethics application: Self-Conscious Emotions in Liminal Change Encounters.**

Thank you for your recent correspondence. Your response has addressed the issues raised by the Human Research Ethics Committee and you may now commence your research. The following personnel are authorised to conduct this research:

Professor Richard Badham - Chief Investigator/Supervisor
Amanda Mead - Co-Investigator

Please note the following standard requirements of approval:

1. The approval of this project is **conditional** upon your continuing compliance with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007)*.
2. Approval will be for a period of five (5 years) subject to the provision of annual reports. **Your first progress report is due on 14 September 2011.**

If you complete the work earlier than you had planned you must submit a Final Report as soon as the work is completed. If the project has been discontinued or not commenced for any reason, you are also required to submit a Final Report on the project.

Progress Reports and Final Reports are available at the following website:
http://www.research.mq.edu.au/researchers/ethics/human_ethics/forms

3. If the project has run for more than five (5) years you cannot renew approval for the project. You will need to complete and submit a Final Report and submit a new application for the project. (The five year limit on renewal of approvals allows the Committee to fully re-review research in an environment where legislation, guidelines and requirements are continually changing, for example, new child protection and privacy laws).
4. Please notify the Committee of any amendment to the project.
5. Please notify the Committee immediately in the event of any adverse effects on participants or of any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project.
6. At all times you are responsible for the ethical conduct of your research in accordance with the guidelines established by the University. This information is available at: <http://www.research.mq.edu.au/policy>

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/researchers/ethics/human_ethics

www.mq.edu.au

- 2 -

If you will be applying for or have applied for internal or external funding for the above project it is your responsibility to provide Macquarie University's Research Grants Officer with a copy of this letter as soon as possible. The Research Grants Officer will not inform external funding agencies that you have final approval for your project and funds will not be released until the Research Grants Officer has received a copy of this final approval letter.

Yours sincerely



Dr Karolyn White
Director of Research Ethics
Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/researchers/ethics/human_ethics

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