

**The Self-Critical Politics of Play:
Politics as Autotelic**

by

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Abstract:

This thesis builds upon Ulrich Beck's theory of world risk society, in particular his conceptualisation of cosmopolitan society and his theory of self-criticism. This thesis contends that the concept of play external to culture and a self-critical concept. Through the legitimisation of a relationship between play and politics, the excessive risk production that characterises contemporary society can be undermined. Using a genealogical approach, this thesis explores concepts of politics and play across three epochs, emblematic of prominent social and political archetypes. Such an approach gives emphasis to conception of the 'sport' term as a discursive means of acknowledging the legitimate politics of play. This leads to a case study in which contemporary relationships between play and politics are examined, and the implications of this for the emergence of a second modernity are assessed. The subject of this case study is eSport, and the reliance of eSport politics upon risk productive institutions can be read to imply the continuation of modern technocracy. Despite this, powerful examples of self-critical political logics can be seen as central to eSport communities and their legitimisation of play. This thesis concludes by suggesting that politics of contemporary society are unlike those politics of both cosmopolitan and modern societies. Contemporary politics bear striking resemblance to the politics of ancient Greece; a politics of institutionalised self-criticism.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Methodology.....	4
A Genealogy of Play:	7
The Behavioural Modernity, Ancient Greece and the First Modernity.....	7
The Behavioural Modernity.....	8
Ancient Greece	16
The First Modernity	23
A Case Study of Play:	29
eSport and the Second Modernity.....	29
The Second Modernity.....	30
EA FIFA	38
League of Legends.....	43
Speed Running; The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time.....	46
Conclusion.....	53
Reference List.....	56

Introduction

Human history has resulted in the widespread devaluation of *play*; the autotelic. That which is *autotelic* is driven by intrinsic purpose, resulting in autotelicism's inherent criticism of institutions used to define the self, and of logic broadly. Thus play can also be described as self-critical and as unreliable on meta-structures. Play is widely devalued by its perceived irreconcilability with modern institutional logics of science, economics and democracy. This irreconcilability emphasises an important quality of the play concept; play is widely conceived of as external to logics on which modern politics depend, due to play's denial of belief. This is because of play's autotelicism; its intrinsic value. Belief and logic are not considered a prerequisite of play politics. Belief is the reciprocal of intrinsicism. The irreconcilability of institutional logics and play emphasises the vitality of play to the establishment of self-critical politics.

The importance of self-critical politics is emphasised by society's contemporary risk dynamic, which is the result of an institutionalised lack of criticism based upon belief.

Acknowledgement of a contemporary lack of criticism provides an opportunity; This thesis argues that by framing politics through play, that is, by the framing of politics as autotelic, the accelerated production of risk can be undermined.

Through an exploration of the concepts of play and sport across human history, I challenge prevalent modern notions of sport that are responsible for the contemporary prominence of risk, and emphasise the relationship between play and politics. We can only understand this relationship by avoiding institutional logics that history has used to define concepts of politics and sport. The result is a new conceptualisation of sport as the legitimate politics of play. This conceptualisation functions to illustrate the politics of play as self-critical, politics I explore within contemporary society through the play communities of eSport.

eSports are an effective subject for this exploration due to their communities challenging popular definitions of play and sport. Through analyses of these communities, the extent to which the emergent logics of contemporary society conform to logics of technocracy and self-criticism will be assessed, and possibilities for the future of world risk society will be proposed.

Ulrich Beck's theory of world risk society (1999) is central to the framing of this work, and is responsible for theorisation of self-critical politics. Beck's core argument is that knowledge produces unawareness. Beck asserts that resigning oneself to logic discourages acknowledgement of the unknown, thus producing organised irresponsibility (the legitimated ignorance) of risk. In order to locate responsibilities, Beck proposes a politics of knowledge production can be undertaken in accordance with '*cosmopolitan society*'; a society based on self-critical politics relying on global and individual concepts, concerned with the subversion and management of risk. This thesis understands cosmopolitan society to be reliant upon autotelic politics; the politics of play.

Cosmopolitan societies contrast to societies of the *first modernity*. Societies of this period witnessed the rapid expansion of institutionalised knowledge production, and Beck believes the first modernity to be most responsible for our contemporary risk dynamic. This epoch emerged alongside the Age of Enlightenment, during the late 1600s. During this time, knowledge was founded on assumptions of controllability, security and certainty, and was based primarily on conceptions of the nation-state; “where social relations, networks and communities are essentially understood in a territorial sense” (Beck, p. 1-2 1999). The *second modernity* follows the first modernity and is marked by meta-social change. This meta-change heralds a challenge to modern institutions as a result of an inherent problem with which their logics are faced: they undermine their power by manufacturing risk that their logics prevent them from recognising. The extent to which a transition from a first to second modernity has occurred is open to challenge.

Politics regard the influence of power mechanisms. The manufacture of risk is largely dependent on the legitimisation of belief via *meta-politics*. The terms meta and *sub-politics* are used throughout this thesis as a shorthand for distinguishing the politics of institutional structures (the former) and those politics outside of these structures (the latter). Meta-political structures are more likely to be considered discursively legitimate as 'politics' than those logics of sub-politics due to institutional restriction of the 'politic' term. *Legitimacy* implies social approval, and the second modernity marks potential for the legitimisation of both meta and sub-politics. While Beck believes cosmopolitan legitimacy to be dependent on sub-political consensus, an analysis of the relationship between competition and risk will emphasise the importance of political ubiquity to cosmopolitan politics.

This thesis contends the concepts of consensus and competition are institutional logics that produce risk, and that the responsibility for the legitimation of these concepts lies with *institutions*. Institutions are inflexible logics that take shape as belief-based communities. They are powerfully symbolic of ways of thinking in the first modernity and encourage technocracy, a form of political regulation in which decisions are made in accordance with the logics of technological experts. Institutions are understood in reciprocal to autotelic. *Reflexive modernisation* drives the transition from a first to second modernity, being a process of acknowledgement that “the unforeseen consequences of functional differentiation can no longer be controlled by further functional differentiation” (Beck, 2000 p. 2). Reflexive modernisation is a process of *self-criticism*, spurned by logics that uphold their uncritical interpretation as accurate. Beck understands reflexive modernisation to potentiate cosmopolitan society as a theory of self-criticism. To Beck, self-criticism means socio-political criticism, in the sense that realisation of the prominence of risk results in self-critical politics. The concept of self-criticism can be broadly applied to knowledge and will be explained through the concept of play, in an attempt to counteract the risk production of beliefs. Politics of self-criticism are autotelic politics, they purport no value other than the intrinsic value of politics themselves.

Beck understands the realisation of self-critical politics to be key to the emergence of a cosmopolitan politics in the second modernity, and as vital to the subversion of risk productive tendencies of modern technocracy. Self-critical politics can be described as the political criticism of criticism and is the purpose of cosmopolitan politics. Cosmopolitan politics pursues the destabilisation of meta-politics through self-critical sub-politics- sub-political criticism outside of the logics of institutions. Thus self-critical politics pursue the management of risk through politics based on sub-politics, outside of and without reliance upon meta-politics. This is important due to meta-politics contemporary prominence, and the relationship between meta-politics and the exponential production of risk through their propagation of ignorance.

Play is vital to the framework of this thesis due to its self-critical nature- play logics allow the critique of play to be conceived outside of the logic of institutions, logics upon which play is not reliant. This is the reason for the continued incompatibility of play and logics, it is autotelic because it does not rely upon institutions in order to be understood. Logic is not a prerequisite of play. Play is unique in its conceptualisation as a logic in that it can be positioned outside of cultural logics (the key source of modern meta-politics), and thus

pursues the criticism of culture from outside of culture. This is not to say the play observable in contemporary society is not the product of cultural interpretations of play, but the fact that play's understanding is not reliant on culture enables it as an autotelic, intrinsic and self contained logic. Play existed prior to the behavioural modernity, it is pre-cultural. It is this external nature of play that implies its relationship with a politics of self-criticism, and thus with a cosmopolitan politics of the second modernity. This thesis contends that play logics can be used as a yardstick for the self-critical politics of society.

Technocracy is responsible for the accelerated production of risk that characterises contemporary society. It involves the governance of society in accordance with logics of technology, and its risk productive tendencies result from the uncritical application of these logics. In terms of the theory of world risk society, institutionalised technocracy is the major threat with which humanity is currently faced and is the result of belief. Technocratic politics characterise modern institutions and are the product of an institutionalised learning culture. While forms of technocracy existed prior to the modern era, modernity marks the uncritical internalisation of technocratic logics by its subjects. To reflexively undermine the organised irresponsibility produced by technocracy, this thesis contends that sub-political logics can counteract risk production through their self-critical framing of belief through play.

Methodology

To explore the emergence of self-criticism and its relationship with the politics of play, this thesis will employ a genealogical method. This method is drawn from the work of Michel Foucault. A genealogy aims to record history outside of concepts – as “they (*concepts*) stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they (*concepts*) must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process” (1977, p. 152, my italics). Thus the genealogy pursues a self-critical history, outside of the history of institutions on which a majority of contemporary history is reliant.

To explain Beck in terms relevant to Foucault; increased risk is the product of institutionalised power mechanisms. The primary difference between these two thinkers is the pessimism seen in Foucault's understanding of knowledge (as 'malicious' [1977, p. 164]), and the optimism implied by Beck's advocacy of cosmopolitan society. That being said, it could be argued that Foucault was not inherently pessimistic- as a genealogist of the first modernity, his characterisation as such could be the product of Foucault's intimate observation of

internalised institutional logics. Beck's optimistic characterisation is the result of his observation of reflexive modernisation, a process which, by comparison, was extensively repressed in Foucault's context.

This thesis comprises of two parts. The first, '*A Genealogy of Play*', situates self-criticism, politics, play and sport within a history of humanity, considering three epochs prior to that of the second modernity; the behavioural modernity, ancient Greece and the first modernity. Each epoch represents an archetype in the culture of human politics- from play politics of self-criticism, to play politics of institutionalised self-criticism, to institutional politics opposed to play.

A Genealogy of Play explores the history of play and its relationship with autotelic politics, illuminating play's independent logic, its influence upon self-critical politics and its relationship with the production of risk. From the prominence of legitimate play and self-critical politics in societies of the first modernity, to the meta-politicisation of self-criticism within ancient Greece, to the internalisation of meta-politics in the first modernity; this genealogy shows that human history has marked the progressive elimination of self-critical politics in favour of meta-politics and the progressive elimination of play from these politics. Human history corresponds to the exponential production of risk.

The second chapter of this thesis, '*A Case Study of Play*', aims to assess the extent to which a transition from the first to second modernity has occurred through an analysis of politics and their relationship with both institutional meta-politics and self-critical politics. Thus this case study aims to assess the implications of eSport politics for cosmopolitan society and/or technocracy in the second modernity. eSport has been chosen for this case study due to its affiliation with play logics, and its exemplification a process of reflexive modernity having occurred, supporting claims regarding the emergence of a second modernity. Association between eSport and play suggests a greater potential for the logics of play to influence politics. Furthermore, there is no established eSport meta-politics conceived of as broadly sub-politically legitimate by communities associated with the eSport concept. The lack of internalised eSport meta-politics thus enhances potential for a self-critical politics of play, and a cosmopolitan second modernity.

Genealogy is a necessary means by which to recognise the institutionalisation of the play concept that has resulted in its exemption from modern political beliefs. It is through

genealogy that a politics of technocracy can be identified, and challenged. Thus it is in the genealogical method that potential exists for the creation of self-critical histories, challenging the role of history as an instrument of technocracy through its autotelic pursuit.

A Genealogy of Play:

The Behavioural Modernity, Ancient Greece and the First Modernity

The epochs of the behavioural modernity, ancient Greece and the first modernity each represent a contrasting archetype of legitimate politics and a contrast in their relationship between politics and play. These three archetypes exemplify the variations in conceptions of legitimate politics over time; as self-criticism, as institutionalised self-criticism, and as technocracy. Indeed, institutionalised self-criticism can be conceived of as technocracy, but this genealogy will make distinctions between the two as a means of illustrating the history of institutions and their affiliation with the restriction of autotelic politics.

This genealogy explores the history of politics, play and sport outside of their institutional definitions. In doing so, I will emphasise the self-critical politics of play as a means of undermining technocracy. Pursuit of self-critical politics is of the utmost importance, as it is only through their legitimation that the exponential production of risk characterising contemporary society can be undermined. This genealogy will illustrate that throughout human history, the legitimation of the politics of play has been key to the realisation of autotelic politics and the egalitarian management of risk.

This genealogy of play emphasises an affiliation between play and the politics of societies of the behavioural modernity (Gray, 2012), suggesting potential for self-critical, autotelic politics during this period. The relationship between politics and play was also conceived of as legitimate in ancient Greece. However, this ancient Greek conception of legitimacy was in an institutionalised sense, particularly in contrast to the fiercely egalitarian legitimacy of societies of the behavioural modernity. Comprehensive institutionalisation of legitimacy can be seen to have emerged during the first modernity, and the result was conception of a clear division between play and politics. Cue institutionalised technocracy.

The Behavioural Modernity

This genealogy will emphasise the emergence of a flourishing learning culture, reductions to social criticism and the de-legitimation of the autotelic politics of play following birth of the anatomically modern human. Societies of this time will be explained in reference to shamanism, a logic further implying these societies' reliance on autotelic politics. The politics of the behavioural modernity will be explored through analysis of hunter-gatherer societies, who imply the potential for societies of the behavioural modernity to have de-legitimated institutionalised criticism in pursuit of self-criticality, through the legitimation of play. The self-criticality of hunter-gatherer societies will be used to problematise modern conceptions of sport, and their legitimation of play as politics will be seen to imply the self-critical politics of play. The legitimation of play by hunter-gatherer societies will be argued to have contributed to their potential for cosmopolitan politics, and this is in keeping with conceptualisation of play as external to institutions. While perceptions of play (or indeed any concept) as external to institutions is likely to be challenged by post-structuralist theory, there exists evidence of reflexive understandings of play in the second modernity that promote such an understanding. A self-critical politics of play was prominent in politics of the behavioural modernity, and this genealogy contends that these early societies can be conceived of as cosmopolitan. This encourages perceptions of play and politics as synonymous in the autotelic management of risk in contemporary society.

The evolution of humanity has been accompanied by reductions in social self-criticism and the expansion of risk. The anatomically modern human came into existence during the Upper-Palaeolithic time period and was marked by the emergence of a “distinctively human learning niche” (Sterelny, 2008, p. 2) that is believed to be the product of interactions between cognitive adaptations and human engineered environments approximately 50 000 years ago. This 'learning niche' refers to the capacity of the anatomically modern human to replicate beliefs, and it is this capacity for learning that is often believed to differentiate humans from other animal species. The self-critical politics of play encourages recognition of similarities between humans and other creatures. The time in which the anatomically modern human emerged is generally termed by sociologists as 'the behavioural modernity.' During the behavioural modernity there occurred “rapid technological changes, emergence of self-awareness and group identity, increased social diversification, formation of long-distance alliances, and the ability to symbolically record information” (Bar-Yosef, 2002, p. 369). The responsibility for these developments lies with pursuit and evolution of human learning

culture (belief culture), as does responsibility for the broad de-legitimation of play. The products of the learning and education concepts with which belief culture is accompanied are responsible for the increased production of risk that has accompanied the anatomically modern human since his conception, and have resulted in the pursuit of technocracy through belief and the de-legitimation of autotelic politics and play.

The evolution of learning culture characterises human evolution since the behavioural modernity, and the evolution of learning culture is responsible for ongoing reductions to the prominence of self-criticism and play that has accompanied development of the anatomically modern human. This would suggest that early *Homo sapiens sapiens* (the anatomically modern human; a sub-species of the archaic *Homo sapien*) and animal species have greater potential for legitimated self-critical politics of play than do the *Homo sapiens sapiens* of contemporary societies, due to their lack of technocratised learning cultures. Modern humans' frequent attempts to distinguish themselves from animals has resulted in belief in distinct arenas of nature and culture. It is in perception of these arenas as separate that cultural institutions (such as those of education) become established, the autotelic, self-critical politics of play required to acknowledge interdependent culture and nature concepts become undermined, and government as technocracy becomes legitimated and institutionalised.

Evidence from the period of behavioural modernity is conspicuously lacking. Archaeological interpretation of human life during the behavioural modernity is varied, and the limited data sets available have received a range of readings. Studies of fossils and DNA evidence are primarily concerned with the evolution of human anatomy (Brose and Wolpoff, 1971), and analyses of Upper Palaeolithic tools focus upon technological expansion. A particularly large quantity of conflicting theorisations exist in regards to Upper Palaeolithic art, and this is one of the primary sources of evidence from this era. Existing primarily in the form of cave paintings, interpretations have ranged from *l'art pour l'art* (art for the sake of art), totemism and sympathetic magic, to name but a few of the most creative interpretations.

The prevailing contemporary interpretation of this art is that of the shamanic hypothesis (Steif, 2010). The shamanic hypothesis suggests the potential such pre-historical shamanism held for the self-critical politics, which contrasts to technocratic interpretations of shamanism implied by religious institutions. Thus it can be contended that religion does not necessarily imply belief, or the restriction of autotelic politics. The shamanic hypothesis contends that Upper Palaeolithic cave art is the work of shamans. Shamans of the behavioural modernity

were individuals who intentionally altered their state of consciousness “in order to achieve some socially-mandated end, such as healing the sick, changing the weather, predicting the future, or conversing with spirits” (Steif, 2010, p. 15). The fact that the purpose of shamanism was dependent on social decisions illustrates that shamanism was a self-critical religion in the behavioural modernity, dependent on sub-politics. Shamanism's existence was reliant on a social mandate for which an egalitarianistic concept was responsible. Conceiving of shamanic religion of the behavioural modernity through modern religious politics would produce a technocratic analysis. Shamanism of the behavioural modernity was not technocratic- its politics were defined through processes of social self-criticism, enabled by a lack of meta-politics. Meta-politics are the key barrier to perceptions of synonymy between autotelicism and politics in contemporary society.

As has been noted, it is difficult to understand the characteristics of pre-historical politics due to a lack of associated evidence. In order to explore the autotelic politics of societies of the behavioural modernity, this thesis will consider hunter-gatherer societies as their analogy. Pre-historic societies took shape as hunter-gatherer communities, and the imaginative approach of genealogy encourages the drawing of such parallels. While there must exist differences between hunter-gatherer societies of pre-history and those subjected to modern analysis, hunter-gatherer societies appear to offer a unique potential for legitimisation of the self-critical politics of play. As social self-criticism can be understood to have characterised societies prior to the emergence of the anatomically modern human, the validity of a comparison between hunter-gatherer societies and those societies of the behavioural modernity is enhanced. The self-criticality of hunter-gatherers emphasises autotelic politics, bearing striking resemblance to the self-critical politics of play.

Hunter-gatherer societies and societies of the behavioural modernity can both be seen as distinct from modern technocratic societies due to their legitimisation of the self-critical politics of play. Such politics are emphasised through concepts of egalitarianism and competition within a hunter-gatherer context. Hunter-gatherer egalitarianism has been described as “fierce” (Lee, 1988). In this sense, egalitarianism implies the equality of members, and it is considered the core principle upon which hunter-gatherer society is regulated. While modern conceptualisations of egalitarianism emphasise equality of opportunity, within hunter-gatherer societies; “nobody has more material goods than anyone else... everyone’s needs are equally important, and nobody considers himself or herself superior to others” (Gray, 2012). In this respect, hunter-gatherer egalitarianism emphasises the importance of equality of outcomes. In

regards to their conception of competition, extensive efforts are applied to mediate conflicting politics, and the occurrence of such conflict is ritually undermined. Hunter-gatherer societies are thus one of the only known cultures without any form of competitive game (Sutton-Smith; Roberts, 1970). In such a context competition is de-legitimated- should conflict be unable to be resolved, the incident legitimates a band member's choice to leave the band. The de-legitimation of competition can be understood as the de-legitimation of institutionalised criticism and meta-politics, and as cosmopolitan. The meta-political legitimation of competition observable throughout modernity denies the potential for legitimation of a self-critical politics of play, institutionalising technocracy.

Legitimation of the relationship between play, politics and autotelicism is reliant on the de-legitimation of competition. Such de-legitimation contrasts to the legitimation of institutionalised criticism caused by the legitimation of the competition concept in technocratic societies. In modernity, competition is perceived as one of three major biological forces influencing the establishment of living communities (Keddy, 1989). In modern society people can engage in criticism to the extent permitted by the institutionalised competition concept, and the institutional sphere of democracy is likely responsible for the paradoxical affiliation of competition with egalitarianism. The hunter-gatherer enactment of egalitarianism shows their resistance to institutional political logics and their perceived affiliation of play and politics. The de-legitimation of competition is a product of self-criticism relying on the de-legitimation of institutions and meta-politics, and recognition of politics as autotelic. The equality of outcome experienced by members of hunter-gather society is evidence of the reduced risk that the de-legitimation of competition poses for contemporary society. This is in keeping with a perception of the self-critical politics of play as a challenge to technocracy-competition occurs organically in play politics, but should not be considered the primary purpose of play, which is autotelic. Competition is the institutionalised purpose of play. Neither should the legitimation of competition be considered the primary purpose of politics, despite the assertions of political logics of institutionalised democracy to the contrary.

Potential for hunter-gatherer societies to legitimate the self-critical politics of play is also emphasised by their sociality. Tim Ingold, in his discussion of the social relations of hunter-gatherer societies, notes; “ the significance of three terms which appear together in the ethnography (*of hunter-gather societies*) with such regularity and consistency as to suggest a distinctive form of sociality” (1999, my italics) – immediacy, autonomy, and sharing. The latter regarded an obligation to share all goods equally in accordance with the critical

interpretation of value by the hunter-gather band. Ingold explains autonomy in hunter-gather societies- “it is through their relationships that persons are constituted as autonomous agents” (Ingold, 1999, p. 65). Thus hunter-gatherer autonomy refers to the freedom enabled by participation in politics, not freedoms provided by liberation from them. Immediacy refers to focus of hunter-gatherer societies upon issues of the present moment, and can be “defined in terms of its present membership rather than in terms of relations of filiation or descent linking past and future generations” (Ingold p. 405, quoting Meillassoux, 1981). In contrast to contemporary society, hunter-gatherer bands are unconcerned with the impacts of decisions upon the long term, which encourages perceptions of logic and politics as autotelic. Thus these societies can be understood to pursue self-criticism through the undermining of institutional/external political logics as a result of perceptions of principles of interdependent freedom (autonomy), mutual benefit (sharing) and recognition that knowledge is only relevant to the moment in which it is conceived (immediacy). These principles are akin to the self-critical politics of play.

The scope for social self-criticism permitted by hunter-gatherer societies has interesting implications for a conceptualisation of sport as legitimate play. However, modern analysis has declared a lack of sport outside of modern times (Guttman, 1978), and in terms of modern definitions of sport, such an analysis can be conceived of as correct- there are certainly no competitive games in hunter-gatherer societies. While we have discussed hunter-gatherer processes of legitimation as dependent on self-criticism, in order to conceive of sport in such a context we must consider the relationship between their politics and the play concept. Modern sport thus represents a technocratic institution, restricting players' capacity to engage in the autotelic play politics, by promoting play and politics as independent.

Modern analysis has noted a particular prominence of play within hunter-gatherer societies, and recognition of this suggests the relationship between play and political self-criticism. Gray's (2012) recognition of the integration of play and the politics of hunter-gatherers marks a key difference in the politics of hunter-gatherer societies and those meta-politics of modernity. Gray provides an analogy of hunter-gatherer social governance as a “well functioning group of people playing a social game” (2012). Should we consider the technocratic governance of modern societies in these same terms, we would likely be lead to conclude that modern societies symbolise a play group that is far less well functioning, due to institutionalised conceptions of the egalitarian concept and its perceived affiliation with competition, resulting in the de-legitimation of autotelic politics. In modern times,

institutionalised politics are legitimate, and play for the most part is illegitimate, being understood as purposeless activity in reciprocal to work. In a hunter-gatherer context, institutionalised politics are illegitimate and play becomes politics. According to Gray, band-structured hunter-gatherer societies ubiquitously “combated the tendency toward dominance by maximizing the tendency to play” (2012). As we understand legitimation in hunter-gatherer society to be dependent on self-criticism, we can also understand this self-criticism to be dependent on the broad political legitimation of play. As Beck conceives self-criticism to be central to the reduction of risk, the relationship between self-criticism and play cannot afford to be ignored.

As sport is legitimate play, sports within a hunter-gatherer context can be understood through processes of self-criticism, as it is self-criticism that is responsible for their legitimacy of play as politics. Indeed, identifying where sport ends and non-sport begins within such a context becomes difficult because, as sports are legitimate play, and play is legitimate politics, all politics in hunter-gatherer societies are inherently legitimate. The prominence of play in such politics makes it difficult to distinguish instances of 'games' from other social processes, and such conceptions are central to definitions of sport in the first modernity. Indeed, hunter-gatherer and cosmopolitan societies begin to appear as play societies; societies based on autotelic politics. The de-legitimation of play by political logics is likely to herald the technocratic tendencies of these same politics. The lack of self-criticism of modern meta-politics means that the enduring legitimation of these meta-politics is not the product of sub-political egalitarianism, but of institutionalised political beliefs that are illegitimate in cosmopolitan society. Meta-politics are technocracy.

Modern meta-politics are responsible for problematisation of the relationship between culture and play. Johan Huizinga's (1955) famous proclamation that play precedes culture is widely considered to have been debunked by modern theory. Modern understandings tend to assert that play is a product of culture (Guttman, 1978); of institutionalised conceptualisation. Such a belief implies that self-criticism/autotelicism is the product of technocracy, and reductive modern political logics used to conceive of the play concept show that this is impossible, for conceptualisations of play consistently challenge technocracy. Play is clearly not technocracy's product. For the self-critical politics of play to be legitimated, play must be considered pre-cultural, as this is the means by which play can be used to challenge problematic institutional politics.

Realisation of the paradoxes of institutional political logics are characteristic of reflexive modernisation, the process by which society enters the second modernity. While I contend that play and politics are symbiotic within hunter-gatherer societies, societies of the behavioural modernity and cosmopolitan societies, modern meta-politics believe play to be legitimately excluded from politics. Even within the discipline of game studies itself, which is intimately concerned with the subject of play, institutionalised definitions of the play concept are often upheld, and this further institutionalises technocracy. Fortunately, a shift in this discipline and understandings of play appears to be under way, and this is exemplified by evolving conceptualisations of rules. Tulloch (2014) is helping drive such a change by challenging a popular paradigm of rules as devices of freedom and constraint. Salen and Zimmerman's design text *Rules of Play* (2004) is emblematic of the conceptualisation of rules purported by most of game studies, which rely upon two irreconcilable discourses for rules' definition; "One constructs play as a space of control and mastery, a space for player empowerment, choice and agency. The other views play as a process of submission and of voluntary obedience to the rules of the game... paradoxically, play is understood as being contingent upon both agency and compliance" (Tulloch, 2014, p. 2). Tulloch asserts that agency and obedience are not oppositional concepts- they are components of the same power mechanism. This model of rules proposed by Tulloch challenges institutionalised definitions by emphasising the role players have in the conception, interpretation and operation of rules. Tulloch understands the recognition of player involvement in defining rules to be a necessary means of challenging "the stereotype of gamers (particularly video gamers) as mindless automations... they are active agents in the construction of play" (Tulloch, 2014, p. 14). Here, Tulloch is referring to the ability of gamers to be critical of institutional definitions of rules, despite the tendency of these same definitions to encourage the restriction of criticism. Citizens of a theory of world risk society must hope such evolving conceptualisations mark re-emergence of social values of the behavioural modernity and the growing legitimisation of the relationship between play and politics as a means of enabling self-criticism. It is an understanding of subjects as active agents in the construction of politics upon which the de-legitimation of technocracy and the legitimate distribution of risk depends.

Throughout history, there has been no society so equal as those societies of the behavioural modernity. This is due their legitimisation of a relationship between play and politics, and in contrast to modern societies, this legitimisation was enhanced due to a lack of institutions and their associated meta-politics. The formation of a relationship between politics and play is dependent on a lack of belief in meta-politics. Such belief denies the legitimacy of play, as

play logic is external to belief and knowledge. Thus play is vital to self-critical politics, the challenge of belief and the perception of a relationship between politics and play. The self-critical politics of play enables politics to be dependent on neither belief or knowledge, and permit political criticism of politics in accordance with sub-politics. Play is vital to a cosmopolitan second modernity due to its inherent challenge to meta-politics.

Ancient Greece

The politics of ancient Greece are comparable to those politics of the behavioural modernity in regard to their legitimation of play. The politics of both these epochs were conceived of as autotelic; politics were for the sake of politics, not for the sake of institutional logics as is the case for modern politics. However, the politics of ancient Greece were meta-politicised in accordance with a logic of citizenship, which resulted in the repression of non-citizen sub-politics, but not the sub-politics of citizens. The relationship between play and politics in ancient Greece permitted self-critical politics, but the logic of citizenship enabled the meta-politicisation of these politics. Thus, while the politics of societies of the behavioural modernity can be conceived of as legitimate from the perspective of cosmopolitan society, this is not the case for ancient Greece.

This thesis will show that the primary source of ancient Greek legitimacy was the meta-politics of citizenship. Play and politics were considered mutually dependent in ancient Greece, although unlike societies of the behavioural modernity, access to ancient Greek politics was restricted in a process of meta-politicised self-criticism. Ancient Greek citizenship can be described in terms of democracy, but not in accordance with modern political logics of democratic institutions. The citizenship concept provided foundations for the meta-politics of ancient Greece, distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate sub-politics. In contrast to modern society, these meta-politics will be shown to have de-legitimated the work concept, resulting in the relationship between play and politics being perceived as meta-politically legitimate. The contrast between ancient Greece and modern societies implies that is the work concept that de-legitimizes politics as autotelic. Thus the meta-politics of ancient Greece existed as meta-politicised self-criticism, a technocracy distinct from those technocracies of modernity- where self-criticism is broadly illegitimate. Legitimated play in ancient Greece will be used to exemplify this- while participation was restricted, legitimate play enabled the legitimate self-criticism of that which was legitimated. Thus the legitimate play politics of ancient Greece occurred as meta-politicised self-criticism- a self-critical technocracy. This politicisation restricts our capability to understand ancient Greek sub-politics, thus undermining the extent to which this genealogy can be self-critical. This meta-politicisation of sub-politics will be shown to support the paradox of legitimate competition and equality. Such understandings lend to conception of the importance of social ubiquity to autotelic politics/the self-critical politics of play. Ancient Greek legitimate play can be seen to have permitted participants to engage in self-criticism through the subversion

of rules. Player agency in the interpretation of rules was legitimated. Further illegitimacy of ancient Greek self-criticism can be seen to have been potentiated by their colonisation by the Roman empire.

The historical situation of ancient Greek civilisation resides between ~800 BC and 600 AD, incorporating the Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic, Roman Greek and Antiquity periods. The culture and theory of ancient Greece were highly influential upon the Roman Empire, and in turn upon contemporary western culture. Unlike societies of the first modernity, the societies of ancient Greece did not legitimate a work concept. Nor did ancient Greek citizens find legitimacy solely in religion, as was the case for many pre-modern societies. Despite these differences, ancient Greece and the first and second modernities can be conceived of as similar in regards to their legitimation of a democracy concept. A primary difference between conceptualisations of such a concept in ancient Greece and its theorisation in modern periods is the fact that the ancient Greeks did not legitimate all members of their community as social participants deserving of equal rights. This privilege was reserved for native Greek men, their rights legitimated by a conception of democracy inaccessible to slaves, women and non-land owners. Thus ancient Greek democracy was reliant on a technocratic concept of citizenship. While the political logic of citizenship was open to challenge by citizens through play, as play was understood to be a legitimate influence upon politics, other subjects of these meta-politics had their own critical sub-politics and participation in play de-legitimated.

The subjects of ancient Greek citizenship were structured as independent states, and in contrast to the political logics accompanying the modern nation state, the ancient Greek political logic of citizenship upheld drastically different conceptions of work and freedom concepts. The area we now call Greece was known as Hellas, which, rather than existing as a collective political entity, was considered a group of independent states, or poleis (Sweet, 1987). Politically, these states were structured as aristocratic oligarchies, although such political organisation often came about democratically (Larsen, 1962), much as is the case for modern technocracy. In ancient Greece, slavery was legitimated and the accumulation of wealth by the political elite was common. While work was legitimated in the first modernity due to its conception as a means of attaining freedom, freedom from (the absence of) work was legitimated in ancient Greece due to perceptions that “anyone that had to work was not only unfree; he did not count as a member of society” (Beck, 2000, p. 11). The ancient Greek value of freedom has been tied to promotion of the concept by tyrannical oligarchic

governments, which were the strange by-product of the democratic efforts of Greek citizens to empower the 'best' government possible. Yet they were not the product of inherently technocratic meta-politics. Indeed, while religion is understood to have been a key component of ancient Greek society, flexible understandings of this religion throughout the poleis can be compared to changing needs of government (Larsen, 1962), and this flexibility exemplifies the legitimacy of relationships between religious politics and conceptions of autotelicism. This de-emphasises the importance of religion as an institution within ancient Greek society- religion was conceived of self-critically in accordance with the meta-politicised logic of Greek citizenship. Legitimate politics in ancient Greece was meta-politicised self-critical technocracy. Legitimate self-criticism could only be undertaken by citizens, but divisions of expert/layman knowledge within citizenship logic were largely unapparent.

The scope for self-criticism permitted in ancient Greece can be explored through legitimate play in this context. Four prominent gaming ceremonies of ancient Greece (The Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean games), collectively referred to as the 'sacred games' (Sweet, 1987), are the most accessible example of legitimate play in ancient Greece. The significance of these games lies not in religion, as the 'sacred' term may suggest, but in their legitimization of play as criticism. While legitimate play in the first modernity is legitimated through perceptions of associated work, legitimate play in ancient Greece was legitimated through perceptions of its abstraction from work. Thus the ability to participate in legitimate play symbolised the ability to participate in legitimate politics. It is for this reason non-citizens were excluded from participation in ancient Greek legitimate games. The meta-political criticism permitted by legitimate play enabled participants to challenge meta-politicised political logics, including the de-legitimation of work, due to the legitimacy of a relationship between politics and play. In this regard, play allowed criticism of the work concept, finding legitimacy in its contribution to class distinction- contrasting “the athletic muscularity achieved through gymnastic *ponos* from the servile muscularity that results from intensive manual labor” (Reid, 2012, p. 286). While legitimate play within ancient Greece permitted the criticism of core social principles, this criticism was meta-politicised in accordance with the political logic of citizenship and thus represents an example of meta-politicised self-criticism that contrasts to technocracy's modern forms.

Meta-politicisation of ancient Greek politics restricted the conception of illegitimate sub-politics and their contribution to politics, excluding them from processes of self-criticism. A

cosmopolitan political logic of citizenship considers this problematic. Unlike modern societies, the politics of ancient Greece could be legitimately explored through play. Yet there were likely a far greater number of human bodies living within ancient Greece than those implied by their concept of citizenship. While democratic institutions of the first modernity and ancient Greece both have conceived of democracy as a means of resolving legitimate conflict between human bodies on a political logic of their equality, those human bodies central to ancient Greek democracy were conceived of in a more restrictive manner than human bodies central to modern democracy concepts. The legitimization of ancient Greek bodily inequality and meta-politicised criticism was purported by their associated meta-political structures (particularly the slave trade), and at first glance, seemingly by ancient Greek sub-politics (scholarly documentation of the period upholds value of the free/unfree political structure). Such documentation is the primary source of historical evidence regarding the politics of ancient Greece, and thus we remain ignorant of the sub-politics of the unfree. The extent to which the democratic exclusion of those which the ancient Greeks did not consider part of society was perceived as legitimate is open to debate due to the fact that the unfree and their critique of meta-politics was ignored by the meta-political logics of ancient Greek society. For the free, however, it appears that this form of meta-politicised equality was considered legitimate- much as is meta-politicised inequality of the first modernity in accordance with political logics of science, economics and democracy. The meta-politicisation of ancient Greek restricts conception of illegitimate sub-politics which are necessitated by a concept of self-criticism, despite their legitimization of the relationship between play and politics.

Competition between free ancient Greeks was legitimated, and this was the product of meta-politicised democracy as it is in modernity. The relationship between meta-political democracy and the continued legitimization of competitive games across modern models of sport is worthy of note. Considering hunter-gatherer societies as symbolic of societies of the behavioural modernity, and that these societies are the only known societies to have de-legitimated the competition concept, it appears that the de-legitimation of competition and meta-politics contributed to what can be conceived as one the most powerful examples of egalitarianism in human history. Democratic meta-politics undermine egalitarianism due to their legitimization of competition and lack of self-criticism. Within the self-critical politics of play, competitive logics are not inherently legitimate, yet remain emergent. It is through the politics of play that the meta-politics of democratic technocracy can be challenged, but such a

challenge did not arise in ancient Greece.

The driving ideology behind meta-political democracy is an understanding that members of society will inherently come into conflict with one another, leading to the misconception that self-criticism must be regulated in order to reduce the risks produced by such conflict. However, the opposite is true; by regulating self-criticism, risk is manufactured at an exponential pace. Yet even Beck believes in the social vitality of competition, perceiving the legitimization of competition as a necessary means of legitimating self-criticism. The cosmopolitan legitimacy Beck perceives in the competition concept is the result of the institutionalisation of Beck's own political logics, and it is for this reason that cosmopolitan legitimacy does not necessarily rest upon consensus, but upon ubiquity. It is through the legitimization of social ubiquity alone (and perhaps even a more comprehensive ubiquity than this- 'social' interpretation of ubiquity being institutionalised) in which potential for the legitimization of a self-critical politics of play resides. While social ubiquity is rare within histories of institutional politics, and starkly unapparent in ancient Greece politics, it is not uncommon within histories of play politics.

The importance of social ubiquity to self-critical democracy is further emphasised by ancient Greek conceptions of politics and their relationship with the self-critical politics of play. Legitimation of autotelic politics has not existed in modern history. In ancient Greece, the prominent political structure was varying forms of oligarchy, which could be misinterpreted to contradict prominent sub-political values of democracy. However, as ancient Greek democracy was understood in terms of citizen sub-politics (although access to these sub-politics was restricted by the meta-politics of citizenship logic), conceptions of democracy and the legitimization of competition enabled the continued criticism of ancient Greek meta-political structures, producing meta-politicised, self-critical technocracy. The self-fulfilling purpose of political autotelicism of early human societies was replaced by purposes of the citizen concept: a stepping stone to the internalisation of institutional politics as belief in modern times.

The self-critical politics of play permitted by the meta-politics of ancient Greek play suggests that their conceptions of rules may have been closer to that which Tulloch suggests (rules as power mechanisms), as opposed to understandings of rules within the first modernity (rules as agency and obedience). In ancient Greek legitimate play, what constituted legitimate play

itself could be challenged, illustrating the legitimization of the self-critical politics of play, and politics as autotelic. Rules relating to the ancient Olympic Games could be legitimately criticised, permitting the self-critical politics of play despite the de-legitimation of such politics implied by the modern meta-politics of rules. For example, the spending of money by athletes as a means of gaining advantage was discouraged in the ancient Greek Olympics. A punishment for individuals caught having won in such a way was not their disqualification, but the use of their winnings to pay for bronze statues. While such statues are said to have served as a warning against similar illegitimate practices (Forbes, 1952), these 'cheaters' (as thinkers of the first modernity conceive of these economically liberal athletes) and their statues were glorified as symbols of the self-critical politics of play. The subversion of rules did not de-legitimize a 'cheater's' victory. It is the legitimization of rule subversion through conception of play politics as autotelic that is responsible for the lack of "unfair decisions by prejudiced or bribed officials" (1952, p. 170) in the games of ancient Greece, and this can be understood as a result of a lack of meta-political influence upon the self-critical politics of play. Within ancient Greece, legitimate play functioned to permit the self-criticism of legitimacy. Unfortunately, the legitimization of the citizen concept meant that while technocratic criticism was legitimated through acknowledgement of politics' synonymy with play, ancient Greek sub-politics were inherently restricted, and thus the extent to which technocratic self-criticism could occur was limited.

Potential for ancient Greek citizens to self-critically conceive of play through its understanding as politically legitimate autotelicism was reduced as a result of Greece's colonisation by the Roman Empire. "Corruption and foul play were never rampant in Greek athletics until the third century" (Forbes, 1952, p. 171). These risks of corruption and foul play were likely the product of the imposition of institutional Roman politics de-legitimizing autotelic politics through belief systems of religion and economics. The forced union of ancient Greece with Roman ideology was the point at which self-criticism of Greek politics was de-legitimized, allowing the internalisation of meta-politics and the institutionalisation of technocracy. Roman colonisation of ancient Greece safeguarded against self-criticism of political logics, encouraging the 'objective' interpretation of rules in accordance with ideology. As a result unnatural and unproductive qualities were now believed to reside in play's autotelicism, thus institutionalising legitimate play as uncritical. This same institutionalisation can be seen to grow in power and potentiate the emergence of the first modernity, sport, and a growing divide between understandings of play and politics.

Within ancient Greece, a relationship between play and politics was legitimated, but the dependence of this legitimation on the meta-politics of the citizen concept resulted in the restriction of sub-politics. Thus ancient Greece cannot be conceived of as cosmopolitan. Despite this, ancient Greek politics did not exist in accordance with an institutional logic; politics were autotelic and their value was intrinsic, despite their meta-politicisation. Ancient Greek politics can be conceived of as a politics of meta-politicised self-criticism.

The First Modernity

The politics of ancient Greece and the first modernity share similarity in regards to the legitimization of meta-politics. Politics of the first modernity and politics of societies of the behavioural modernity do not share any such similarities. While the autotelic political logics of societies of the behavioural modernity de-legitimated both meta-politics and institutions, meta-politics and institutions are the primary source of political legitimacy in the first modernity. Such legitimacy is also distinct from those the (albeit politicised) self-critical politics of ancient Greece; play, autotelicism and self-criticism are absent from modern politics, and purported as illegitimate by their associated meta-politics.

The first modernity was founded on institutions whose political logics are responsible for the contemporary prominence of risk through their promotion of belief. Modern logics will be explained through reference to a concept of 'freedom through work.' I will argue that legitimate play in the first modernity was defined by institutions, and that their corresponding play logics lack potential to be conceived of as sport within cosmopolitan society due to their restriction of self-criticism that is reliant on the legitimization of play's autotelicism. Play and politics are oppositional concepts in modern society. The institutionalisation of self-criticism is seen to be legitimate within the first modernity, and illegitimate in cosmopolitan society. While modern sport functioned to draw understandings of legitimate play and politics closer together; play and politics are only conceived of as legitimate in the first modernity should they abide by the meta-politics of institutions.

The attempts of modern institutions to define play and sport can be seen to disguise their self-critical politics. Play is external to institutions, and thus its cosmopolitan legitimacy is the product of autotelic sub-politics which modern institutional meta-politics inherently fail to comprehend. While meta-politics are a key source of legitimacy in the first modernity, meta-politics are illegitimate in cosmopolitan society due to their de-legitimation of self-criticism. The meta-political ideology of religion was an early influence on the restriction of the self-critical politics of play, and an early example of technocracy. Political logics of modern institutions are responsible for the criticism of external knowledge through promotion of their own logics, but not vice versa. The political logics of religion and modernity both de-legitimate the relationship between play and politics, and the politics of one another.

Beck believes that the beginning of the first modernity was marked by a shift of human

societies from a primarily agricultural to a primarily industrial economy, and that the first modernity is responsible for the contemporary prominence of risk at the expense of a lack of self-criticism. Legitimation during this epoch was primarily based on conceptualisations of 'work'; the perceived application of effort in pursuit of meta-politically defined goals, and it appears to be this work concept that is responsible for broad perceptions of the illegitimacy of play and thus the illegitimacy of a relationship between play and politics within the first modernity. Work was the “only relevant source and the only valid measure for the evaluation of human beings and their activities” (Beck, 2000, p. 10) in this context. Understandings of work framed within the first modernity can be characterised as 'freedom through work' – here, “democracy presupposed living involvement in paid labour” (Beck, 2000, p. 13). Legitimacy in the first modernity relied upon three institutional spheres; science, economics and democracy. While legitimation of the work concept is common within each of these institutions, that which is perceived as work varies with the meta-politics of each sphere. These institutions are ignorant of their risk producing tendencies due to their restriction of self-criticism- perceptions of distinct divisions between play and politics are iconic of modern technocracy.

Modern conceptualisations of play fail to recognise the value of self-critical politics, and thus of play's autotelic politics, due to the exclusion of play and self-criticism from meta-politics. Institutional spheres of the first modernity understand play in reciprocal to their freedom through work concept; play is paradoxically conceived of as meta-politically inhibitive. While there has existed some dispersed modern legitimacy for play, such as in the context of children and education, for the most part play within the first modernity was illegitimate, and this is due to the challenge play's self-critical politics implies for modern paradigms of logic. Etymologically, the term sport is a product of this period, and was a means of referring to play deemed legitimate by modern institutions. Due to institutionalisation, the modern sport concept comprehends of sport as do modern meta-politics of legitimacy; in accordance with work and competition. Institutional political logics were the only way by which to provide legitimacy to play as sport during the first modernity. Since this time, sport has become a discursive means of referencing professionalised, competitive, physical and 'equal' play. Those core institutions of the first modernity can be related to these perceived qualities of sport and thus to perceived qualities of legitimate play; science legitimating play as sport through reference to physical health, democracy legitimating play as sport through reference to competitive equality, and economics through reference to professionalisation. The

institutions of sport proposed by each of these institutional logics are highly technocratic, restricting the self-critical politics of play and lacking the sub-political legitimation necessitated by sports of cosmopolitan society. Thus, while modern sport related to modern politics, conceptions of play as self-criticism was powerfully illegitimate in accordance with both these institutions, Thus modern sport is technocratic, and illegitimate in cosmopolitan society.

In cosmopolitan society, self-criticism can be conceived of as work, but this is not the case in societies of the first modernity, where self-criticism appears more akin to modern, illegitimate play; self-criticism is autotelic, and the autotelic is illegitimate in the first modernity due to perception of its 'unproductive' nature. The importance of work to conceptions of legitimate play is responsible for the inception of means of quantification and record-keeping that characterise modern sport (Guttman, 1978). These technologies allowed institutions to purport sports as legitimate play due to their furthering of meta-political logics through propagation of perceptions of progress, reliant on an emphasis of a relationship between sport and work. Sport and legitimate play in the first modernity occurred as institutionalised self-criticism of work, through work. The illegitimacy of modern play marks the illegitimacy of self-critical politics in modern technocracy.

Conceptualisation of the modern subject as an 'individual' is based upon uncritical, risk productive political logics, and is perceived through processes of institutionalised self-criticism permitted by meta-politicised play logics of modern sport. While Beck notes individuality as a key political logic of cosmopolitanism, it is important to emphasise that the 'individual' concept is powerfully reminiscent of meta-politics of the first modernity. Indeed, as the Age of Enlightenment is often characterised in reference to Descartes' (n.d.) '*cogito ergo sum*' proposition, philosophical tradition would suggest that the first modernity marked the birth of the modern subject. There exists an apparent disjunction between the individual subject of modern institutions and pre-modern subjects of fierce egalitarian/religion/freedom concepts. This genealogy draws attention to the role history has played in institutionalising 'subjectivity' and 'individual' concepts. The self/other dialectic inherent to theorisation of the modern subject;

“automatically subordinates the other to the self, making it appear to have either too much or too little of something, and therefore to be inadequate or imperfect. Whatever gets chosen somewhat arbitrarily as the norm immediately arrogates to itself the prestige of being natural

and right” (Mansfield, 2000 p. 94).

Open to debate is the question of how modern subjective politics emerged and their implications for conception of an autotelic or self-critical 'other.' Mansfield's perception of automatic subordination of the other is a result of legitimated competition produced by technocratic institutional democracy- perception of the human body in hunter-gatherer societies did not result in subordination of other human bodies. Exploration of hunter-gatherer subjectivity would likely illuminate how the 'other' could be conceptualised in accordance with politics of cosmopolitan society and play. As the individual concept remains a powerful source of legitimacy in the second modernity (Beck, 1999), the self-critical politics of play emphasise the importance of perceiving the individual as an autotelic political subject of cosmopolitan politics. Cosmopolitan individuals are the subject of self-critical politics, for the purpose of self-critical politics.

Modern politics of legitimate play have resulted in the creation of play institutions and the institutionalisation of their autotelic political logics, which operate interdependently alongside core institutions of the first modernity. Despite modern de-legitimation of self-criticism, sport actions' reliance on the sub-politics of human bodies has enabled a degree of autotelicism to continue to take place, as meta-politics have not yet become so internalised as to sub-politically de-legitimate play and autotelicism. The sub-political basis of sport society has meant that the legitimacy of autotelicism is not of immediate concern to a majority of sporting subjects; definitions of the sport concept may effect some legitimate games and their interaction with institutions of the first modernity, but the largely sub-political structure of sports tend to remain unaffected by meta-political conceptions of legitimacy. This offers some hope for perceptions of a legitimate politics of self-critical play as an inherently legitimate component of both sub-politics, and life broadly. However in the technocratic meta-politicisation of specific sports, instances of legitimate play can lose their sub-political legitimacy in their pursuit of the legitimacy of institutionalisation purported by modern meta-politics.

The evolution of cricket shows that institutional legitimacy is the product of meta-politics, and that cricket meta-politics are illegitimate in cosmopolitan society. This is because the legitimacy of modern cricket has no regard for the legitimacy of the sub-politics of play. The meta-politicisation of play logics of the cricket game stretch beyond the beginning of the first modernity, and legitimated variations of the game can be seen to have association with

religious institutions. While speculation regarding the origins of cricket continue, the earliest record of the game dates to 1598, existing in the form of a court transcript that documents the occurrence of 'creckett' being played at the Royal Grammar School, Guildford (De Lisle, 2007). Cricket began as a children's game centuries before this time, but adult participation was not commonplace until the 1600s (Birley, 1999). While locating these origins in 15th century Britain is likely to be problematic, cricket politics in this context can be characterised by reference to the two primary institutions of Britain just prior to the first modernity; the Catholic and Protestant Churches. Indeed, a substantial portion of early documentary evidence regarding cricket takes the form of court transcripts summarising the prosecution of persons whose play of cricket had prevented them from going to church or had resulted in damage to a church or body (McCann, 2004). Thus in pre-modern Britain, play was legitimated (although without explicit use of the 'sport' term) through reference to the authority of the church. In this context was as games that did not interfere with meta-political religious ideology, but were permitted to be self-critical within this religious framework. This restricted the self-critical logics of play differently to modern institutions, but still resulted in their technocratisation.

Within the first modernity, sport appears as the uncritical meta-politics of play, as meta-politics are central to legitimacy in this context. Following the conception of parliament under the English Convention of 1689, there occurred a proliferation of cricket and further restriction of the game's autotelic politics through the meta-political production of rules, and the resulting internalisation of belief of these rules as instruments of agency and obedience. Cricket grew alongside the sport concept itself, and by the coming century, the institutionalised meta-politics of cricket were purported as England's national sport. With production of the English Convention is associated with the emergence of the first modernity, with these politics came justification of the deposition of perceived 'natural laws' of religion. By challenging the nature/culture distinctions of the British monarchy, institutionalised democracy began to assert its own nature/culture distinctions, enabling the establishment, development and criticism of cricket politics in association with emerging modern meta-politics. The many issues of quantification and record keeping that accompanied the meta-politics of modern cricket rules exemplify this; the size of the pitch and field, technical specifications of bats, wickets and balls, the ritualised counting of runs and overs, etc. As have modern institutions, restriction of self-criticism has continued to grow in power throughout history. Upon modernity, self-critical cricket play was no longer considered legitimate provided it abide by the political logics of religious institutions- its legitimacy relied upon

internalisation of the political logics of the first modernity. In this regard, modern sport institutionalised legitimate play through meta-politics, which further illustrates modern sports' restriction of the self-critical politics of play.

The institutionalisation of play and self-criticism permitted by modern sport institutions is a paradox- logic cannot meta-politicise autotelic play. Such paradoxical functioning of political logics is characteristic of the first modernity, towards the end of which, institutionalised relations of definition begin to undermine their own authority. It is in the emerging realisation of such paradoxes that a transition to cosmopolitan society can be witnessed. In recognition of growing social inequality, the free market logic of economics is no longer necessarily self justified. As inequality emerges as an institutionally manufactured point of social and political origin, the concepts of democracy and freedom operate as a paradox enabled by meta-politics that undermines the self-criticism necessitated by risks external to these same meta-politics. The creation of paradoxes does not imply their social realisation, it is the product of reflexive modernisation. Realisation of the paradox of logics' opposition to self-criticism is essential to a cosmopolitan second modernity. Should repression of reflexive modernisation continue to be undermined by the internalisation of belief, both the first and second modernities could be effectively characterised by technocracy. Sport in the second modernity thus holds potential to represent either a self-critical politics of play, due to the legitimation of autotelic sub-politics; or institutionalised play, due to the legitimation of meta-political logics. There is an opportunity for play and politics to be conceived as synonymous, much as there is threat of their conception as one another's antithesis.

The first modernity marks the internalisation of meta-political logics by political subjects, and corresponds with the de-legitimation of the autotelic politics of play. Modern politics were explicitly extrinsic, they pursued logics of science, economics and democracy. Politics in the first modernity pursued values external to politics themselves, and this is the reason for the prominence of meta-politics and the excessive production of risk in this context.

A Case Study of Play:

eSport and the Second Modernity

Determining where the first modernity ends and the second begins is dependent on the occurrence of reflexive modernisation. The extent to which political logics produced by this reflexivity are self-critical or institutionalised results in the pursuit of cosmopolitan or technocratic society. Risk, in terms of societies of the second modernity, regards the opportunities and threats associated with these two forms of governance. The extent to which the occurrence of reflexive modernisation is repressed by the internalisation of logics of the first modernity (science, economics, democracy) can be considered the extent to which contemporary society remains a society of the first modernity. The emergence of a second modernity depends upon the extent to which play and politics are conceived of as mutually dependent.

The following eSport case study is an argument in favour of the emergence of a second modernity. The drawing of this parallel is encouraged by Hutchins' (2008) recognition of the relationship between eSport and the second modernity, and his assertion that eSport is “characteristic of a meta-change in social relations, globally” (p. 863). Inception of the eSport term itself is a product of reflexive modernisation- those institutional politics used to define sport deny legitimacy of video game play. Technocratic logics of sport will be shown to undermine the self-critical capacity of play politics, and thus to restrict autotelic politics and cosmopolitanism. This thesis will trace the emergence of the eSport term and its relationship with reflexively conceived sub-political legitimacy, and the corresponding institutional suppression of the self-critical play politics of eSport. Through such an analysis, this thesis will then draw upon specific eSport games as a means of assessing the prominence of complimentary understandings between play and politics in the second modernity, concluding with the implications of this assessment for the internalisation of cosmopolitan and technocratic principles by subjects of the second modernity.

The Second Modernity

This case study will explore the potential for emergence of both cosmopolitan and technocratic society, the primary opportunity and primary threat facing society of the second modernity. The extent to which either of these alternatives is reached is dependent upon the process of reflexive modernisation, and the emergence and repression of this process will be examined. Differentiating between cosmopolitan and technocratic society is not reliant on the identification of specific political logics, but on the identification of the uninhibited self-critique of politics. This differentiation will be explored through the self-critical politics of eSport play, which undermines the significance of those concepts which Beck uses to envision cosmopolitan society, lending emphasis to the way in which these concepts are interpreted. This leads to my challenge of institutional democracy's (technocracy's) value of consensus through the cosmopolitan value of ubiquity. Cosmopolitan society relies heavily on legitimisation of the self-critical politics of play, while technocracy is explicitly exempt from play due to the meta-politicisation of power.

There exists increased potential for the legitimisation of the self-critical sub-politics of play within eSport as a result of reflexive modernisation. These self-critical sub-politics will be used to further emphasise the self-critical politics of play. The meta-politics concerned with sport are shown to be de-legitimated by such sub-politics, and the contribution of self-critical play to the de-emphasis of a sport term will be explored as an influence upon play's political autotelicism. International eSport organisations concerned with politics of the sport concept are discussed as technocratic, and their meta-politicisation of legitimacy is seen as irrelevant to the legitimate politics of play. These legitimate autotelic politics are reliant on the legitimisation of sub-politics, despite such sub-politics often being deemed illegitimate by the meta-politicisation of the sport concept.

Much as is the case for sport, political legitimisation of the eSport concept will be shown to be independent from the sub-political legitimisation of play. Both sport and eSport retain potential to undermine their own legitimacy as a result of reflexive modernisation. Cosmopolitan legitimacy is reliant upon the legitimacy of self-criticism, which is explained as cosmopolitan criticism. By understanding eSport culture through a paradigm of internet culture, this case study implies a lack of self-criticism within the second modernity, and the contemporary prevalence of technocracy. The relationship between dimensions of internet culture and dimensions of hunter-gatherer society are also discussed, alongside their implications for self-

criticism through an emphasis on alternatives to citizenship. In order to consider the relationship between play and politics in the second modernity, this thesis relies upon the politics of three video games to provide an overview of contemporary eSport.

In the second modernity, for the first time, society encounters the opportunity to exert control over life on earth. This is coupled with new opportunities and threats. The second modernity marks potential for the subversion of political logics of the first modernity as a result of the unanticipated consequences of these same politics. Beck notes five processes that have driven this occurrence; globalisation, individualisation, gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (1999, p. 2). Determining where the first modernity ends and the second begins is difficult as institutions on which the first was founded directly inform political logics of the second. As long as society of the second modernity continues to function in accordance with unchallenged institutions of science, economics and democracy (for as long as the internalisation of meta-politics continues to repress reflexive modernisation), the second modernity remains indistinguishable from the first, and can be characterised through technocratic politics. To the extent that subjects of the second modernity challenge meta-political logics through the legitimisation of autotelic politics/the self-critical politics of play, society of the second modernity can be characterised as cosmopolitan.

Reflexive modernisation potentiates self-criticism, and for this reason Beck purports reflexive modernisation as a theory of social self criticism (1999). His theory of reflexive modernisation has two primary components. First, “the automatic transition from industrial to risk society” (p. 80) is characterised by a tendency to 'look away' and ignore the creation of unintended risks. Second, reflexive modernisation signals the realisation of this same tendency. In summary, reflexive modernisation is comprised of both;

“the reflex-like threat to industrial society's own foundations through a successful further modernization which is blind to dangers, and the growth of awareness, the reflection on this situation.” (Beck, 1999, p. 80)

Reflexive modernisation is stimulated by modern distinctions between culture and nature that produce excessive risk. In asserting themselves as natural, institutional logics encourages human bodies to conceive of themselves as meta-political subjects, and to ignore risk that their logics do not make apparent. The production of risk in the second modernity is greater than the risk production of prior societies because throughout the first modernity, meta-politics have become increasingly internalised by subjects, thus repressing the capacity of

human bodies to be self-critical of these problematic politics to which they are subjected. As risk gains increasing prominence, modern institutions politicising society assert that we should not only ignore these risks, but that they do not exist. Beck understands his theory of self-criticism to have been driven by such a process of reflexive modernisation, and his envisioning of cosmopolitan society is an exploration of how society might attempt to reduce the exponential propagation of risk. Conception of the self-critical politics of the play is this thesis' contribution to the destabilisation of technocracy.

In this regard, Beck's exploration suggests that it is through the creation and contextual propagation of alternatives of self-control and self-limitation that cosmopolitan society can be attained. Beck proposes that as a result; “institutions open themselves to the political right down to their foundations, and become malleable, dependent on subjects and coalitions” (1999, p. 80). In Beck's view, the de-legitimation of technocracy is reliant upon realisation of cosmopolitan ideals through the sub-political establishment of self-critical, international institutions based on perceptions of global risk, outside of institutions of modern meta-politics. Beck understands that there exists dangerous potential for the abuse of the cosmopolitan mission, and it is through the promotion of the self-critical politics of play that the institutionalisation of this abuse can be undermined.

By emphasising cosmopolitanism's affiliation with the consensus concept, Beck is faced with the threat of promoting institutionalised self-criticism. This same threat exists for the cosmopolitan concepts of the individual and the global- in a cosmopolitan context all that we can conceive of as broadly legitimate is the self-critical concept itself, and of course play, as autotelic and thus self-critical politics. Much as competition is a concept of institutionalised self-criticism, so is the political significance of the consensus concept. As examination of hunter-gatherer societies indicates, competition between political logics can still occur despite the de-legitimation of the concept. I argue against Beck's assertion that consensus is legitimate in self-critical societies, despite its key contribution to their functioning. In the pursuit of ubiquity, consensus occurs organically- it is not optimum, and thus should not be legitimated. Within the self-critical politics of play, consensus and competition are emergent, but not legitimate. While the legitimacy of these concepts is retained by contemporary society, eSport communities (particularly those speed runners of OoT) can be seen to have utilised play's self-critical politics to produce their challenge.

The ongoing sub-political legitimacy of play outside of institutions of the second modernity

illuminates the self-critical politics of play, as it is only self-critical politics that maintains sub-political legitimacy over time. Unsurprisingly, the legitimisation of the self-critical sub-politics of play is not dependent on competition- competition is the organic result of the pursuit of contrasting political logics, and the institutionalisation of these politics. Competition is not the source sub-political legitimisation. The reliance of play on autotelic political logics of self-criticism has been de-emphasised by the meta-politics implied by the sport concept. Even those sub-politics of games declared meta-politically as sport tend to remain unconcerned with the status of play as sport. The meta-politics associated with the sport concept encourages the misunderstanding of the self-critical politics of play in accordance with institutional logics. The play politics of both legitimate and illegitimate games alike are concerned with sub-political legitimacy, not meta-political legitimacy as the sport term implies. Indeed, international organisations concerned with the politics of a larger 'sport' concept are rarely intimate with games' corresponding sub-politics of play, and within the case of video games and eSport, are rarely considered legitimate by these sub-politics. As a result, the sport concept is largely irrelevant to the sub-politics of play in a cosmopolitan second modernity.

Reflexive modernisation marks realisation that technocratic, meta-political definitions of sport are an ineffective means of comprehending the self-critical politics of play, and a key influence upon play's meta-political repression. As the second modernity is founded upon a political logic of individualism, any game has potential for legitimacy should it conform to subjective conceptions of legitimacy. De-emphasising the relevance of the sport concept in a cosmopolitan second modernity is the fact that the self-critical politics of play are legitimate irrespective of their definition as sport. Any logic purporting otherwise belongs to the politics of technocracy.

Reflexive modernisation problematises the sport concept by recognising that it is ineffective at expressing cosmopolitan sub-politics. Recognition of the legitimacy of these sub-politics is key to play's legitimacy in cosmopolitan politics. While institutions aiming to define sport legitimate games conforming to their meta-political definition, the self-critical politics of play are produced outside of legitimated definitions of sport- the construction of autotelic logic the product of sub-politics concerned with the legitimacy of logic in an immediate sub-political context, rather than within an institutional paradigm. Thus the pursuit of the self-critical politics of play undermines technocracy, challenging institutional meta-politics used to define the 'self.' Indeed, self-criticism should be as understood as the key purpose of politics, should

politics be based on egalitarian principles.

Despite potential for the de-legitimation of the sport term through recognition of its repression of reflexive modernisation, the international politics concerned with legitimate play in the second modernity are a form of institutionalised meta-politics conceived of as a powerful source of legitimacy. Unfortunately, international sports organisations of the second modernity imply the continuation of modern technocracy through the promotion of meta-politics. While Beck asserts that it is the establishment of international institutions in the second modernity that is most likely to potentiate cosmopolitan society, this relies upon these institution's use of self-critical politics and their legitimation of play as a means of enabling these politics. This is not the case for technocratic international sport organisations.

Thus, in order to consider the self-critical politics of play and their relationship with sport in the second modernity outside of meta-political repression, let us consider a form of legitimate play that contradicts modern definitions of sport; eSport. Much as was the case for sport, the term eSport was conceived for the meta-political purpose of denoting legitimate play- its inception occurred during the 1990s as a product of various bids to have video games legitimated as sport by national governments. While eSport thus represents institutionalised conceptions of legitimacy, the usage of the eSport term by play communities remains a challenge to modern meta-politics. A perceived inability of eSport games to conform to modern definitions of sport and their accompaniment by perceptions of sub-political legitimacy is the seeming rationale behind the term's sub-political use. The result is confusion regarding the term's implications, and this is due to paradoxical definitions of the modern term upon which eSport is reliant; sport. In pursuit of a solution to this paradox, it has been argued that the competition concept is the defining quality of eSport (Thiborg, Jonasson, 2010). Should competition be illegitimate in cosmopolitan society as I have proposed, eSport, as emblematic of legitimate play in the second modernity, appears to mark the continued legitimation of modern technocracy through denial of the self-critical politics of play and the repression of reflexive modernisation.

Attempts to institutionalise the eSport concept stand as an example of the continued legitimation of technocracy. In 2008, many of the largest nationally based eSport organisations joined forces to found what may have been the first, and what is now surely the most prominent international eSport organisation; the IeSF (International e-Sport Federation). The meta-political structure the IeSF imposes upon eSport attempts to institutionalise the

politics of eSport in accordance with those paradoxical politics legitimated by conceptions of sport in the first modernity. While eSport presents a challenge to conceptions of science within the first modernity (natural as physical), the ideology of democracy remains influential upon political logics of both sport and eSport, as does ideology of economics through professionalisation. Video games, in accordance with the meta-politics of eSport as purported by the IeSF charter, are legitimated as eSport in accordance with “humanitarian, educational, cultural, unifying and peace generating” (Ie-sf.com, 2009) principles. Institutions of the first modernity are clearly the source of perceived legitimacy here; humanitarian unification is in keeping with concepts of democracy, and education relates to the institution of science. The political logics of economic are exempt from this description of eSport qualities, however the relationship between economic logics and video games should not be ignored, and will be discussed later. Furthermore, the IeSF charter fails to recognise a need for the continued self-criticism of the politics on which its definition of eSport relies. Education, for example, cannot occur alongside the global unification of individualised human bodies when it is inevitably grounded in paradoxical national politics driving inequality. In cosmopolitan society, meta-politics are inherently illegitimate. The self-critical politics accompanying cosmopolitanism are not concerned with how political logics can ensure the continued survival of the cosmopolitan system (much as the IeSF cannot expect promote cosmopolitan legitimacy through reliance on meta-politics to define legitimate play), but with how a ubiquity can be generated should the cosmopolitan system become challenged through the self-critical politics of play.

The politics of the communities of eSport and legitimate video game play can be seen as illustrative of institutionalised technocratic politics of the second modernity, and Castell's (2001) paradigm of internet culture is a useful tool for understanding such politics. Castell characterises internet culture in reference to four ideals; techno-meritocratic culture, hacker culture, virtual communitarian culture and entrepreneurial culture. Each of these ideals can be explained through reference to meta-politics of the first modernity. Castell understands techno-meritocracy to value knowledge reliant on the institution of science, and it is upon the reinterpretation of the science institution that the political logic of hacker culture relies. Hacker culture is founded on logics of technology and experts/counter-experts, and entrepreneurial culture exemplifies the prominence of economic logics. Internet culture can thus be understood as reliant on principles of technocracy. Principles of internet culture suggest a meta-politicisation of institutionalised self-criticism comparable to ancient Greece.

Political logics of both the second and the behavioural modernities appear to have potential for self-criticism. The political logic of internet culture that Castell terms virtual communitarianism appears highly comparable to the egalitarian logic of hunter-gatherer societies that has been used to imagine life during the behavioural modernity. Castell describes two major cultural features of virtual communitarian political logics; free communication and 'self-directed networking.' Understandings of a 'free communication' concept in this context is comparable to understandings of egalitarian autonomy within hunter-gatherer society; both attempt to liberate the social subject from politics through political self-criticism. These groups differ in regard to institutionalisation of freedom concepts- within the second modernity freedom to engage in self-criticism is institutionally restricted in terms of meta-politics of education and technology, while freedom in hunter-gatherer societies was restricted by the sub-politics of language and communication systems. It is the self-directed networking principle of internet culture that hints of the potential for a self-critical politics of play following reflexive modernisation, and this is comparable to hunter-gatherer societies in a way more likely to be conceived of as legitimate by cosmopolitan society. Castell describes self-directed networking as “the capacity for anyone to find his or her own destination on the Net, and, if not found, to create and post his or her own information, thus inducing a network” (2001, p. 55). This principle seems comparable to hunter-gatherer sub-politics that legitimated the abandonment of a group by members in the wake irrevocable conflict. It would seem that the right to legitimately cease operating within the framework of self-criticism permitted by society in accordance with the will of subjects enhances the maintenance of self-criticism. Alternatives to citizenship are not encouraged by modern technocratic nationalism, but could be conceived of as a fundamental component of a cosmopolitan society intending to minimise the production of risk through the legitimization of the self-critical politics of play.

The potential for emergence of a cosmopolitan society in the second modernity is dependent on the legitimization of politics as autotelic. It is the pursuit of meta-politics based upon extrinsic values that is responsible the continuation and re-establishment of technocracy. Thus subversion of the modern exponential production of risk is reliant on the legitimization of the self-critical politics of play.

In an attempt to address the diverse qualities of eSport sub-politics and assess their self-critical politics of play as representatives of contemporary technocratic or cosmopolitan society, this genealogy will consider three games that can be understood through reference to

the eSport term; League of Legends (LoL), The EA FIFA series, and the speed running community of *Zelda: Ocarina of Time* (OoT). This selection of video games will provide an introduction to eSport politics, and in doing so will contextualise how eSport is understood within the sub-politics of legitimate video game play and outside of technocracy.

The meta-politics of eSport (such as those imposed by the IeSF) are considered largely irrelevant to the sub-politics of legitimate play. Modern meta-politics of legitimate play are internalised by subjects within both the FIFA series and LoL, restricting the capacity of self-critical play politics in these contexts. While this implies the illegitimacy of play sub-politics in a technocratic second modernity, the politics of speed running OoT emphasises sub-politics as crucial to the legitimation of the self-critical politics of play. The significance an analyses of these games within a future of politics resonates even more strongly when it is recognised that association football (being intimately related to the FIFA video games) is widely conceived to be the world's most popular sport (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014) that LoL has recently become recognised as having the most hours played of any video game (Gaudiosi, 2012), and that OoT is widely purported to be the highest rated video game of all time (Metacritic.com, 2008).

EA FIFA

The institutionalised play politics of Electronic Arts' (EA) FIFA series have sought legitimation through an emphasis on a relationship with the meta-politics of association football play, a game perceived as legitimate through institutionalisation as a modern sport, and intimately associated with the restriction of the self-critical politics of play in favour of the political logics of technocratic institutions. Histories of football can be traced to ancient Greece and a game called 'episkyros.' While descriptions of episkyros are comparable to play logics of modern European hand ball, histories focus on the commonalities between this ancient game and modern football through the use of a spherical ball and real-time team-based competition. Indeed non-competitive games have received minimal recognition by institutions of association football, and this resonates with the modern institutionalisation of egalitarianism. Potential for genealogical histories of football could be promoted and their self-critical play politics enhanced through consideration of non-competitive histories of the spherical ball. Investigations of traditions surrounding the Indigenous Australian game of Woggabaliri, or Mesoamerican Ollamalitzli, would contribute to such histories. These games pre-date modern institutions, yet their apparent lack of competitive elements results in their meta-political exclusion from play logics of football. Potential for self-critical play politics is similarly undermined by the meta-politics of the EA FIFA series, and thus the meta-politicised play logics of football are riskily effective at explaining the politics of these eSport games.

Football politics takes shape as the institutionalisation of the self-critical politics of play. It maintains competitive ideology at the expense of cosmopolitan hypocrisy, which is the case for most of modern sport. Attempts to codify football in response to the geographic spread of game variants and inter-regional competition took place during early modernity, and took hold in the form of 'The Laws of the Game.' This text was published by Ebenezer Cobb Morley in conjunction with the English Football Association in 1863, and the changes that have since occurred to these meta-politics represent attempts to rectify the resulting paradoxes of institutional meta-politics that challenge sub-political legitimacy through restriction of the self-critical politics of play. Changes to the meta-political logics of football attempted to remedy problems caused by the legitimation of competition by repression of reflexive modernity through the creation of rules. An obvious example is the gradual incorporation of referees and the establishment of rules regarding fouls. An acknowledged precursor of football, mob football, involved competitive play with a ball, an unlimited number of players and very few other rules. Football attempted to disguise the risk their legitimation of

competition resulted in through various measures such as the inception of teams, the red card and penalty kicks. Not only do these changes represent meta-political solutions to the risks produced by meta-political legitimization of competition, there are no legitimate means by which subjects of football can embrace the self-critical politics of play, and thus subvert risk. In football, self-critical play is considered illegitimate as a result of the legitimization of meta-politics. Such technocracy is a powerful influence on the legitimate restriction of the self-critical politics of play by the meta-politics of the EA FIFA series.

By purporting that play politics associated with EA FIFA video games are comparable to those play politics of football, EA misrepresents the self-critical sub-politics of EA FIFA play and encourages their further meta-politicisation. Understanding the play politics of the EA FIFA series through their promotion as a simulation of football vastly misconstrues the self-criticism of play sub-politics, but remains common practice. EA has worked hard to emphasise the similarities between EA FIFA and association football. EA FIFA (1993) was the first simulation game to receive licensing from football's governing body; the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Initially, such licensing did not enable the direct usage of teams, players, logos or stadiums- the name of countries and their flags served as identification alone, although more extensive details have been included in recent releases. The use of football play meta-politics legitimate the technocracy that is EA, and can be seen to result in the further institutionalisation of the self-critical politics of play.

EA is responsible for the promotion of comparisons between the play politics of video games and the play politics of modern sport, and thus for the restriction of the self-critical politics of play within video games. EA are a powerful political actor within eSport, particularly in regards to their EA Sports brand. Beginning with the John Madden Football (1988) video game, EA Sports (at that time called 'The EA Sports Network' [EASN]) has worked to emphasise the relationship between the play politics of its products and those play politics belonging to legitimate games of the first modernity. Early examples include golf and ice hockey games, with EA sport having released nineteen separate series (each promoted as a distinct form of simulation) to date. Since the release of EA's FIFA International Soccer in 1993, EA have maintained and developed their relationship with FIFA, continuing to develop exclusive licensing relationships with other legitimated play (sport) groups, incorporating their supposed simulation in new releases. EA's economic strategy is distinctly tied to the legitimization of their games as sport simulations. The use of professional commentary, player endorsements and the attempted creation of a simulation sport television network illustrate

EA's pursuit of the same legitimacy enjoyed by modern sports, and their institutionalisation of the self-critical politics of play within these sport simulation games.

The institutions of football and the institutions of the EA FIFA series are highly technocratic. However, the difference between the technocratisation of these politics signals a difference between the play politics of the first and second modernities. While football represents the legitimisation of modern institutions, EA FIFA represents an increased capacity to critique these political logics due to the occurrence of reflexive modernisation. While the meta-politics of EA FIFA play logics are uncritical due to their reliance on perception of simulation, the sub-politics responsible for emergent play logics within the EA FIFA games have potential to challenge their compatibility with play logics of association football. Despite this potential, such challenges are few and far between. As this is a product of restriction of the self-critical capacity of play politics within the EA FIFA series, this case study represents technocracy in the second modernity.

Bolter and Grusin's (1999) work on remediation theory and their categorisation of sport simulation games exemplifies the institutionalisation of otherwise self-critical play sub-politics as a result of perceptions of play as simulation. Bolter and Grusin understand video game production to pursue representation of 'the real.' Their argument promotes perception of simulated relationships between the politics of play relating to the FIFA franchise and those of football. In regards to video games, Bolter and Grusin's theory is informed by political logics of the first modernity, in which video game media functions to represent human sensory experience, and such an understanding upholds their belief that 'virtual reality' (p. 22) type technologies like those of the Oculus Rift are the pinnacle of video gaming. However, presuming video game play politics are simulations of other video game politics is to result in their misunderstanding. The play politics of video games are independent of the play politics which they are purported to simulate, just as meta-politics are independent of the sub-politics they attempt to simulate. Meta-politics of play technocratise self-critical play politics through propagation of ignorance. Thus perception of play as a simulation is to result in its meta-politicisation.

The sub-politics of play within the FIFA franchise contradict the implied political logics of simulation, and one must consider the extent to which the explicit labelling of play as simulation influences perceptions of a game as such. Players of simulation and association football alike cannot help but note the differences between the politics of these games. This is

not only in regards to the means by which it is played, for even if one could ignore the fact that players are largely immobile outside the movement of fingers, the experience of football as permitted by FIFA results in a change to the focus of play action. For example, the game of football has a greater emphasis on passing as a means of subverting defence than does the FIFA game, which (particularly in regards to FIFA 14) increases the ease with which goals can be scored using a head butt (the functionality of which, in FIFA 14 is a highly unrealistic simulation of the politics of football play), resulting in head butts becoming a significant issue of contention within FIFA 14 competitive play. It is hard to express differences between football and its simulation because of the institutionalised vocabulary with which one is expected to refer to their differences. The importance of the head butt function is drastically different between FIFA 14 and football, and thus stands as an example of the technocratic problems caused by defining video game politics in accordance with meta-politics. A game in which people are trying to achieve head butts appears drastically different to the game of football, in which head butts are permitted but provide no inherent advantage over alternate opportunities for agency. Admittedly, this explanation is an exaggeration of the importance of the head butt in FIFA 14, yet it stands to reason that FIFA 14 should be conceived of as an entirely different apparatus of power than that of football. Thus conceiving of power in accordance with institutional meta-politics results in both the misunderstanding and technocratisation of the power mechanism. The self-critical politics of play acknowledge that power is dependent on sub-politics, but the FIFA series represses the legitimacy of sub-political power through meta-politics.

The EA FIFA franchise is responsible for the restriction of the self-critical politics of play through the simulation of meta-politics of modern sport. Players are encouraged to understand play in accordance with football. The restriction of glitch usage in competition stands as another example, such as the banning of the kick off glitch in most FIFA 14 competitions. Alternative play politics, such as those of OoT which this thesis will soon explore, tend to embrace glitch logic, and thus tend to embrace the self-critical politics of play and the resulting challenges to institutional meta-politics. The extent to which the restriction of play politics denies subjects the opportunity to engage in self-criticism can be seen in complaints of the EA FIFA franchise's tendency to limit players agency (Answers.ea.com, 2013). In this sense, EA FIFA players have complained of reductions to player autonomy as a result of EA's pursuit of simulation, which is the product of the meta-politicisation of play politics as simulations of those logics of football. Thus, as is the case for League of Legends, the self-critical politics of play are meta-politically restricted in the EA FIFA series. This restriction

has become internalised as sub-politically legitimate, implying the existence of institutionalised self-criticism and technocracy in the second modernity.

The politics of the EA FIFA series are based upon extrinsic values of simulation, they are not self-critical and do not rely on the autotelic politics of play. The institutionalisation of play logics by EA restrict their potential for criticism external to those play logics legitimated by the game's producer, and these legitimated play logics are reliant on risk productive meta-politics. Thus the sub-politics of play are unable to embrace the play's self-critical autotelicism in a way that legitimately influences the game's politics. EA FIFA symbolises the internalisation of meta-political logics by its subjects and as a result, technocracy in the second modernity.

League of Legends

The politics of League of Legends (LoL) are highly comparable to those politics of the EA FIFA series, particularly in regards to the wide-spread internalisation of institutional meta-politics within sub-political logics. LoL has not achieved this internalisation through promotion of the game as a simulation, as has been the case for the EA FIFA series. However, this internalisation has been comparably reliant on logics of the first modernity. Rather than emphasising similarities between LoL and the meta-politics of a specific play logic, LoL pursues legitimation by drawing on the modern meta-politics associated with broad institutionalised definitions of the sport concept. Despite perceived affiliation of both the EA FIFA series and LoL with logics of play, such autotelic logics are meta-politically de-legitimated within the politics of both these games. Despite LoL's intimate association with play, play logics are blatantly unapparent within LoL politics.

The institutionalised play politics of LoL were founded upon the self-criticism of play politics, and in this sense the history of LoL play implies self-critical politics, despite its current technocratic state. Released in 2009 by American video game publisher Riot Games, the broad genre in which LoL finds itself is termed 'Real Time Strategy', and is characterised by teams of player controlled avatars competing secure areas of a designated 'map.' LoL can also be located within a specific sub-category of real time strategy game, elements of which draw upon play politics of a number of games that have preceded it. The title of this sub-genre has been a surprisingly contentious issue, having been concurrently labelled DotA-clone, action real time strategy, and multi-player online battle arena (MOBA). The origins of this sub-genre can be found in a player-developed custom map for the original StarCraft, titled 'Aeon of Strife.' In this map, players control separate units in a tower defence game, ultimately aiming to reach and destroy the opposition's base. Aeon of Strife is composed of two competing teams, each consisting of three human players and one artificial team mate. This structure was then appropriated by Defence of the Ancients (DotA), which used the design of Aeon of Strife to inform a modification for the game Warcraft III. Since the emergence of DotA, there has been an explosion of other games based on similar concepts. These games include Heroes of Newerth (HoN), DotA 2 and Bloodline Champions, to name a few. League of Legends is not only the most played MOBA, but has recently become known as the most played video game of all time (Gaudiosi, 2012). Through the institutionalised criticism of DotA in particular, LoL has in turn institutionalised its own meta-politics of play and undermined their self-critical history that can be traced through the history of MOBA sub-

politics.

The meta-politics of LoL play are both paradoxical and legitimated. Riot asserts that LoL purports humanitarian ideals, which encourages the creation of risk by ignoring the challenge LoL's economic political logic issues to the humanitarian concept, and this ignorance is powerfully symbolic of the first modernity. Legitimacy is found in the meta-politics of the LoL institution and determined by Riot Games, who purport that that which is legitimate in LoL can be achieved through internalisation of “The Summoner's Code” (Gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com, 2013). This consists of nine articles;

1. Support your team
2. Drive constructive feedback
3. Facilitate civil discussion
4. Enjoy yourself, but not at anyone's expense
5. Build relationships
6. Show humility in victory, and grace in defeat
7. Be resolute, not indignant
8. Leave no newbie behind
9. Lead by example

These are the institutionalised politics of play that Riot claims are legitimate in the play and self-criticism of LoL politics. The Summoner's Code does not explicitly rely on science, economics nor democracy to determine that which constitutes legitimacy. Legitimacy here is that which appears to be humanitarian i.e. support, constructivity, civility, mutual benefit, social and moral ideals. This would seem to signal the prevalence of cosmopolitan values, however in order to be considered as such, 'humanitarian' must be cosmopolitan. This is not the case for Riot. Not for their Summoner's Code, nor for the institution of League of Legends, nor for the producer, Riot Games. As an entity functioning according to economic politics, Riot and the eSport LoL do not evolve as a result of the self-critical play politics, and due to the continued influence of modern institutions, are conceived of as legitimate in their technocratic politicisation.

LoL's economic logic has produced technocracy and the repression of self-critical play sub-politics. LoL represents a continuation of the first modernity- while its categorisation as an eSport suggests the occurrence of reflexive modernisation, aside from its nature as a video game, the politics of LoL play are widely conceived to be synonymous with the meta-politics

modern sport, and thus LoL is often upheld as an eSport exemplar. LoL exemplifies the modern repression of reflexive modernisation. This is a product of a key paradox; legitimate eSports (as parallels to modern sports) must restrict the self-critical capacity of play politics through meta-politicisation in order to be legitimate. Thus Riot is perceived as legitimately technocratic. This has resulted in the restriction of an otherwise highly self-critical history of play politics that have contributed to the evolution of MOBA. Indeed, it is possible that such a history will continue, but this would require the rejection of LoL by the MOBA community as a result of the conceived illegitimacy of the games' associated meta-politics; it is reliant on perceptions of Riot's illegitimacy in their restriction of the self-critical politics of LoL play.

The legitimated, institutionalised play politics of LoL demonstrate technocracy's prominence in the second modernity. While Riot boasts of the democratic principles involved in the LoL's production and management, it cannot be ignored that the perceived rational self-interest of institutions functioning in accordance with economic political logics means that problems arising from their restriction of the self-critical politics of play are not perceived as Riot's responsibility- and this belief is institutionalised within LoL sub-politics. In fact, in recent years Riot has been largely responsible for the promotion of the eSport term in relation to LoL in the hopes of achieving for LoL the same legitimacy enjoyed by modern sports. As a symbol of global culture in the second modernity, Riot and LoL are poised to become historical icons of society and the second modernity. Unfortunately, their legitimated, institutionalisation of meta-politics hints at the continued legitimization of technocracy, despite reflexive modernisation.

Through promotion of an affiliation with the modern sport concept, LoL discourages autotelic play politics. Play politics are meta-politicised in accordance with those values purported by Riot, and the criticism of these politics occurs in relation with extrinsic values of economics and competition, which are emblematic of meta-political values of science and democracy in the first modernity. While this is in keeping with the values of modern sport, in utilising uncritical application of meta-politics of the first modernity to determine legitimacy, the politics of LoL play are prevented from being self-critical. LoL politics are prevented from being autotelic and from being pursued for the intrinsic value of politics alone. Extrinsic politics are conceived of as legitimate by LoL sub-politics, symbolising the continued internalisation of modern risk productive logics, and thus a lack of legitimated cosmopolitan politics in the second modernity.

Speed Running; The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time

The politics of speed running associated with The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (OoT) implies hope for the legitimization of relationships between autotelic logics of play and politics. Thus the politics of speed running OoT also suggest the possibility of an emergence of self-critical politics and a cosmopolitan second modernity. Such possibility is in stark contrast to the technocracy implied by the legitimated meta-political logics associated with the EA FIFA series and LoL.

Speed runners attempt to finish sections of a video game as quickly as possible. Speed-running is based on self-critical play politics that challenge modern institutions through the pursuit of enhanced perceptions of mobility. It is distinct from the play politics associated with casual game play, and is an autotelic logic. Speed running results in the production of mobility techniques, a classic example being those techniques of 'rocket jumping', variations of can be seen in Doom (1993), Quake (1996), Half-Life (1998) and Team Fortress 2 (2007). OoT (1998) also permits a comparable technique known as 'hovering.' Rocket jumping involves using the propulsion from explosion simulations to augment jump functionality. Indeed, suggesting that the individual techniques associated with the rocket jumping term are synonymous with one another is to technocratise the associated play politics as meta and undermine their self-critical sub-politics. Rocket jumping is a means of symbolising speed running's legitimization of the self-critical interpretation of political logics through play. The use of explosives as a means of propulsion is sure to be widely challenged by modern theory, but in speed running such self-critically conceived knowledge is essential. Intentional game-overs as a means of initiating glitches within speed running is another common example. The play politics of speed-running are highly critical of modern political logics, and the lack of speed-running meta-politics portrays cosmopolitan society as a product of reflexive modernisation.

Self-criticism enabled by the play politics of speed-running can be attributed to a lack of centralised political institutions. Speed-running play is understood to be sub-political, and are highly critical of modern play logics purported by meta-politics. The speed-running community of OoT are an excellent example of this. Released as an action-adventure video game by Nintendo Co. Ltd. in 1998 for the Nintendo 64 platform, a number of re-releases of OoT have since occurred for varying Nintendo consoles. While these re-releases have been coupled with minor game changes (such as updated graphics and puzzles), such changes have

been relatively minor. It is the 1998 version of OoT that is most popular for speed runners.

The plurality of speed running play logics can be viewed as the product of self-critical politics. OoT speed running sub-politics challenge modern institutional meta-politics (i.e. the institutionalised logic of OoT's linear narrative) through subjects' cooperative critique and practice of speed running politics. Different criteria and rules are applied to different instances of speed running. Across games the most common forms of speed running are 'any%' and '100%.' In any% speed running, players cooperate to reduce the time taken to reach a game's pre-determined end. Criticism of any% play politics is encouraged by speed running logics, provided it critiques the logic of 'go fast'. Criticism of 100% speed running logics occur in accordance with this same self-critical principle, but the additional logic of 'complete everything' must be critiqued. Any% logic is conceived through self-critical politics, and while this is also the case for 100%, emphasis upon the logic of economics through the empowerment of producer logic somewhat institutionalises criticism. Other genres of speed runs emerge in relation to specific games and are frequently the product of discovery of a new, faster route (a product of the self-critical politics of play) in either any%, 100% or another category. These variant genres of speed running tend to enable players to utilise the skills that faster routes have proved obsolete- the running of these obsolete routes (and their associated political logics) composes a majority of OoT speed running play. While play politics of speed-running have potential to become institutionalised, the ease with which new categories continue to emerge seems comparable to the self-directed networking principle of internet culture and the hunter-gatherer principle of legitimated dispersion following the failure of ubiquity. In this respect, through the legitimation of play sub-politics and a lack of meta-politics, the politicisation of speed running permits the emergence of self-critical politics and appears cosmopolitan despite its emergence from institutions.

Play politics of the OoT speed running community can be further explained in reference to the 'counterplay' term. 'Counterplay' was coined by Greig de Peuter and Nick Dyer-Witheford (2005) in reference to what they understood as emergent video game play. The counterplay concept can also be perceived as the criticism of institutionalised play meta-politics through play sub-politics. Counterplay is a means of referring to forms of play perceived as unintended by a game's producers, and thus represents the criticism of meta-politics. Negative connotations are frequently attributed to the counterplay concept because the concept is self-critical by very definition, and misuse of the term often belies its restrictive nature. The problematic tendency of the counterplay concept itself lies in its reliance upon

institutionalised meta-politics of play for identification, validating technocracy. In a cosmopolitan society the counterplay term can be conceived of as superfluous at best and as risk productive at worst; in such a context play is conceived of as inherently external to institutions. Despite the encouragement of meta-politics by the counter-play concept, understanding the speed-running community of OoT (particularly the portion engaged in any %) through counterplay exemplifies how associated play politics stand as self-critical in relation to traditional, casual play logics implied by producer driven economic logics of OoT. The prominence of counterplay in this community illuminates the prominence of a self-critical politics of play.

The emergent and contextual logics of OoT speed running permits play to occur as self-critical politics. It is for this reason that the speed running community of OoT exemplifies a cosmopolitan second modernity as a result of reflexive modernisation. These self-critical politics are the result of play politics being the product of a navigation between logics, in this case, between the self-critical politics of speed running and the less critical politics of OoT's producers. There is an awareness that conceptions of play are based on a polyphony of logics, and an awareness of logic's concurrent inherent illegitimacy yet integral necessity that enhances the self-critical politics of play in the case of OoT speed running, despite the prominence of institutions. These self-critical politics are also enhanced by the lack of a meta-political competition culture of OoT speed running. If an institution attempted to establish meta-politics as a means of orchestrating such competition culture (and if this institution was sub-politically conceived of as legitimate), the self-critical politics of speed would become institutionalised, preventing cosmopolitan legitimacy via de-legitimation of the self-critical sub-politics of play.

The self-critical politics of play and their relationship with other political logics can both undermine and empower the significance of the eSport term. Play sub-politically conceived as legitimate often struggles to achieve recognition as sport due to conflict between self-critical play politics and legitimation of institutionalised conceptions of play politics. The same is the case for eSport. While OoT's speed running community are useful in exploration of the politics of eSport, it is important to note that this same community's relationship with the eSport concept is not clear cut, and many people understand speed running OoT as a form of play that is explicitly not an eSport, and vice versa. While sport and eSport can be understood as forms of legitimate games, perceptions of video gaming and sporting communities regarding the sport/eSport concept remains heavily influenced by institutions of the first

modernity, and thus OoT speed runners struggle to see themselves as sportsmen due to their self-critical sub-politics of play. Ironically, this upholds OoT as a far better example of cosmopolitan sport than those examples of EA FIFA and LoL. As a result, while eSport players understand that eSport games are legitimate to their associated communities, understanding a game to be an eSport does not necessarily presume a game's legitimacy within broader video game play politics. This is because conceptions of sport and eSport imply the perceived absence of a self-critical politics of play. Conception of sport in accordance with modern political logics implies conception of technocracy.

The extent to which speed running politics are self-critical can be explained through example of the “wrong warp.” Explaining the functionality of this technique to someone who is not a member of this community is incredibly difficult. Mzxrules' (Zeldaspeedruns.com, 2014) summarises the wrong warp;

“...you perform the Ocarina Items glitch as a means to be able to maintain control of Link once you step on blue warp. Then if you open the door on the right frame, you will overwrite the “next entrance” variable with the base value of the entrance back into the Deku Tree (0x0252) rather than the value set by the blue warp, but with the “next cutscene number” set to 0xFFFF1 (cutscene 1). This causes you to end up at 0x0257, which loads the Inside of the Tower Collapse scene.

The Inside the Tower Collapse scene does not have the 0x18 header command, so it instead attempts to play whatever is being pointed to by the cutscene pointer. Depending on what's there, you can end up not playing any cutscene, get stuck in an “infinitely long” cutscene, play the previous cutscene, or crash the game.”

The significance of the discovery of the wrong warp lay in the fact that its discovery reduced the time taken to complete any% runs from several hours to less than twenty minutes. Not only did this render much of the OoT speed running community's hard-won knowledge and skill meaningless in terms of the play politics of any%, this discovery is also acknowledged for its contribution to the increase in the popularity of OoT speed running, but not its institutionalisation. It is widely believed that the reduction in time required to complete a single run increased OoT speed running's ease of access for casual players. In this sense, attempts to institutionalise politics by experts results in the proliferation of political criticism by counter-experts. Thus OoT speed running logic encourages understandings of the self-

critical politics of play.

The OoT speed running community illustrates difficulties accompanying the institutionalisation of a self-critical politics of play, and this implies hope for the self-critical potential of political logics. In the context of OoT speed running, should layman's knowledge prove capable of purporting 'go fast' values in a way that challenges the logics of experts, and if this knowledge results in the sub-political perception of subversion of the threat of 'going slow,' then this knowledge becomes conceived of as both expert and legitimate. When criticism of expert knowledge is restricted by speed running logic, the OoT speed running community diverts the risk of going slow by applying its logics to new contexts, where new knowledge is in turn created. A strong current example of this is the speed runner Cosmo Wright's recent OoT any% time of 18 minutes and 10 seconds (2014). This is the current world record, and upon completion Cosmo remarked that “any% is dead.” This statement is in reference to both the immense ability of Cosmo and the good fortune he experienced during the run. Cosmo not only achieved the run he intended (which to date is the fastest OoT any% route that has been discovered) with near bio-mechanical perfection, he also saved a number of valuable seconds due to his luck with random number generation (RNG). While it is certainly possible that Cosmo could achieve a run of the same or improved quality, the odds of it occurring alongside advantageous RNG are extremely unlikely, and it is for this reason Cosmo proclaimed the death of any%. While this achievement increased the difficulty of initiating self-critical politics, it did not institutionalise them. Player's still hunt for faster routes, and the self-critical politics of OoT play continue.

Following Cosmo's setting of his any% record, experts of the OoT speed running institution appeared to reduce the frequency of participation in any% runs (the author has interpreted the decreased streaming of any% attempts as a symbol of such), and a number of OoT runners instead began to participate in alternative categories such as 'all dungeons,' 'glitchless,' and 'ganonless.' These categories required longer routes that had received far less attention than those routes of any%, and permitted the continued self-criticism of 'go fast' political logics. Participation in these alternative routes allowed the risk of going slow to be avoided while offering increased opportunities to produce expert knowledge, which may impact upon the self-criticism of any% logic. The importance of this is the fact that the fundamental role of OoT speed running politics appears to be a maintained self-critical politics of play.

Cosmopolitan sport begins to appear as the legitimate politics of self-criticism, and with

conceptualisation of play as self-critical, distinctions between play and sport in a cosmopolitan context begins to recede. Understanding sport as legitimate play and play as an inherently legitimate forms of self-criticism, the concept of self-critical politics itself encapsulates the logic of cosmopolitan society. Hence one loses sight of divisions between sport, play, logic and politics.

Attempting to assess the emergence of cosmopolitan sport and politics in the second modernity indicates the difficulty of instigating self-criticism within a society founded upon institutions, even through the perceived legitimacy of play politics. Yet OoT represents potential for establishment of cosmopolitan society. As the community is based on the continued challenge and interpretation of expert knowledge (the means by which 'go fast' is defined), political logics of risk distribution occur primarily in accordance with a sub-politics of self-criticism. However, an important issue this analysis has not yet touched upon is the technologically restrictive nature of the video game communities themselves. In the grand scheme of overpriced information technologies, from a western first world perspective, the speed running community of OoT is quite accessible- the necessary equipment costs less than a computer and does not require an internet connection. However, the casual ease with which Australians spend a Bolivian farmer's annual salary on groceries should cause cosmopolitan readers to be critical of any claims regarding the political accessibility of eSport. Indeed, realisation of the vast social inequality driven by institutions of the first modernity suggests the situation of OoT is more comparable to the institutionalised self-criticism of societies of ancient Greece, than societies of cosmopolitanism. In the second modernity, only global citizens perceived as naturally privileged are able to participate in the self-critical play politics of OoT, and thus only these citizens can participate in these legitimated, self-critical sub-politics. Without first prioritising access to the self-critical sub-politics of play, the sub-politics of self-critical institutions cannot pursue social ubiquity, and thus sow the seeds for cosmopolitan illegitimacy.

The speed running community of OoT relies upon sub-politics for legitimation. This case study implies hope for the emergence of a cosmopolitan second modernity. Responsibility for this hope lies with a lack of meta-politicisation, and this lack is the result of recognition of the direct relationship between politics and play within this context. The politics of speed running OoT depend upon the self-criticism of play logics for their definition, and the logic of speed exemplifies the autotelic nature of these politics; the intrinsic pursuit of speed denies the validity of meta-politics in any%, as this would be to restrict capacity for speed logic to be

self-critical. While the establishment of meta-politics can be witnessed in the case of OoT speed running, these institutions are only conceived of as legitimate within their own context, and subjects are permitted the autonomy required to submit to or ignore these meta-politics in accordance with their will. The legitimation of play as self-critical politics enable OoT speed running to symbolise a cosmopolitan community, and suggest that meta-politics are not necessarily exempt from a cosmopolitan context. It is the recognition that the value of meta-politics exists only within play that implies that institutions are not necessarily exempt from a cosmopolitan context.

Conclusion

While political logics of the first modernity remain a powerful influence on contemporary legitimacy, this genealogy has shown that there has existed an uncritical production of risk via sub-political oppression for as long as there has existed a meta-politics of human learning culture. A history of technocracy spans this same breadth. While Beck contends it is the first modernity that deserves credit for society's contemporary risk dynamic, his recognition of such is a result of the first modernity being the clearest example of exponential risk production as a result of reflexive modernisation. In fact, the institutionalisation of risk production can be traced throughout the history of human education which we have used to distinguish ourselves from other animal species; it can be traced throughout human histories that consider autotelicism the antithesis of politics.

The self-critical politics of play legitimated both within societies of the behavioural modernity and Beck's envisioning of cosmopolitan society implies that human learning culture need not inherently produce risk, should knowledge be conceived as autotelic. It is in the legitimated institutionalisation of learning culture through meta-politics that risk is manufactured, and the citizenship institution of ancient Greece exemplifies the potential for learning culture to reduce risk through legitimation of the self-critical sub-politics of play. Ancient Greece also represents potential of the restriction of self-critical politics to enhance risk through the establishment of technocracy via the repression of sub-politics, and thus represents self-critical technocracy.

It is in the sub-politics of learning culture that the potential for cosmopolitan legitimation of the self-critical politics of play resides, as it is in the sub-politics of learning culture that the potential for the construction of knowledge as autotelic exists. This thesis has shown how societies of the first modernity restricted potential for self-critical logic through the institutionalisation of meta-politics, as is evidenced by the repression of the self-critical politics of play by the modern, technocratic institutions of sport.

It is not difficult to be pessimistic in analyses of the self-critical politics of societies of the second modernity, and this is due to the contemporary prominence of belief in meta-politics of the first modernity. However, concern with these institutional logics is to misinterpret the emergence of self-critical politics in the second modernity. In cosmopolitan society, meta-politics are inherently illegitimate, and basing an analyses of contemporary society upon an

analyses of contemporary meta-politics is simply to encourage their further institutionalisation through technocratisation of their risk productive politics. The sub-politics of eSport in the second modernity suggest the potential for self-critical logic, and while the potential for institutionalisation of this knowledge as meta-politics exists, self-criticality can emerge from meta-politics despite the repression of reflexive modernisation. The solution to meta-politics lies in the legitimisation of both politics and logic as play, and an emphasis of their relationship produces conceptions of autotelicism that are key to cosmopolitan politics.

To declare the reliance of self-critical knowledge upon the extermination of institutions would be to potentiate institutionalisation of this same knowledge, and thus depose its cosmopolitan value. Instead, to reduce risk, self-critical knowledge must be conceived of as autotelic, and this can be effectively achieved by framing the conception of politics and logic through play. There is nothing so broadly challenged by institutional logics than the autotelicism of play, and this is the reason for play's self-critical politics. As cosmopolitan society does not mark the legitimisation of competition, nor does it mark the legitimisation of institutions, meta-politics, belief, or logic. Legitimation of these concepts is the mark of technocracy.

Cosmopolitan society marks the sub-political de-legitimation of the concepts of competition, institutions, meta-politics, belief and logic, but also the acknowledgement that such concepts inevitably form as part of social processes. It is through perception of the illegitimate inevitability of knowledge that risk society can attempt to regulate perceived hazards and opportunities in accordance with self-critical politics through their perception of politics as play. This undermines the legitimacy of the concept of human bodies as meta-political subjects. This illegitimacy of subjection is a key component of cosmopolitan society. As much as self-critical politics are seen in the internet culture principle of self-directed networking and in the legitimisation of hunter-gatherer social dispersion following irrevocable conflict, the legitimisation of human bodies to perceive themselves as external to institutions must be a founding principle of cosmopolitan society.

While the reliance of the politics of the EA FIFA series and LoL upon meta-political logics of the first modernity result in these game's technocratisation, the speed running community of OoT exemplifies the potential for cosmopolitan society to rely upon sub-politics for legitimisation. The direct reliance of OoT sub-politics upon play logics means that their politics occur for the sake of sub-politics alone; they occur for the sake of play; for the sake of the autotelic and intrinsic value of speed. As cosmopolitan society is shown to de-legitimate

competition and consensus while acknowledging potential for their organic emergence, the logics of speed running OoT de-legitimate meta-politics, but acknowledges the inevitable emergence of meta-politics in the form of specific play communities. Players are free to engage or ignore these meta-politics at will, because their value can only be understood from a politics of play- not belief in an extrinsic logic. Thus the relationship between play and politics in cosmopolitan society not only supports the promotion of sub-political, self-critical logic, but is also vital to the management of the inevitable emergence of meta-politics.

For the most part we remain a society of the first modernity regulated by technocracy. Reflexive modernisation can be enhanced and cosmopolitan society pursued through the legitimisation of a relationship between self-criticism, politics, logic and play. In a cosmopolitan society, divisions between these concepts must be eliminated. It is the legitimate exemption of play from politics and logic that is responsible for the contemporary lack of self-criticism producing excessive risk. In short, play is the alternative to a future of inequality.

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