THE PERCEPTION OF ISLAM BY POLITICAL PARTIES

A Comparative Analysis of the Rhetorical and Perceptive Schemes Used in Australia and France.

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- Table of Contents

ABSTRACT

The perception of Islam in France and Australia revolves around two very different socio-historical contexts, which produced differentiated systems of constraints and resources for political parties. The structuring dynamics of these contexts are both endogenous and exogenous. The endogenous ones include the migratory history and the specific conditions of settlement of Muslim populations in both countries. The exogenous dynamics ensue from the public authorities' management and, more generally, from an idiosyncratic and historically constructed relationship between the state and religions, citizenship and the integration of minorities. The combining of these processes has fostered the emergence of two modalities of visibility of Islam at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, with a strong religious component in France and a noteworthy ethnic component in Australia. Their expression may be found in the respective debates on *laïcité* and multiculturalism. The placing on the agenda of the "question of Islam" and the issue ownership competitions by political parties are inseparable from these systems of constraints which mark out the boundaries of the thinkable and the possible of discourses as well as logics of action.

In analysing Islam under this multidimensional prism, this thesis serves three purposes: an epistemological one, a methodological one and a heuristic one. From a theoretical point of view, it shows that the perception of Islam by political parties epitomises the necessity of articulating structural overdetermination processes and modalities of objectivation in the sociological approach. In practical terms, this involves exploring new ways to triangulate qualitative and quantitative tools for combining microsociological, mesosociological and macrosociological dimensions, as well as the diachronicity and synchronicity of empirical observations. In doing so, the comparison examines how two "types" of legal-political traditions have shaped different answers to the same question of integrating Muslims within the axiological and cognitive frameworks of the country, and further enables putting into perspective party discourses and representations on the period 2001-2015. It shows the limited relevance of traditional dualisms like the Left/Right opposition on this issue and suggests alternative analytical stances to overcome their biases.

Statement on Academic Integrity

I hereby certify that this doctoral dissertation constitutes my own product and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions or writings of another.

I also guarantee that I have respected the maximum length of 100 000 words and that the dissertation describes original work that has not previously been presented for the award of any other degree. I declare that Ethics Committee approval has been obtained (n°5201401170).

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AD	Australian Democrats
AFP	Agence France Presse
AG	Australian Greens
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AOS	Analysis of Similarities
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
CFCM	Conseil Français du Culte Musulman
CORIF	Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Islam de France
CRIF	Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France
CRMF	Conseil Représentatif des Musulmans de France
DRMC	Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (French: DDHC)
DHA	Descending Hierarchical Analysis
EELV	Europe Écologie Les Verts
FAC	Factorial Analysis of Correspondences
FN	Front National
FNMF	Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armé
JORF	Journal Officiel de la République Française
LP	Liberal Party
MP	Member of Parliament
NP	National Party
NPA	Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste
PS	Parti Socialiste
TS	Text Segment
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
UOIF	Union des Organisations Islamiques de France
WAP	White Australia Policy

La politique porte sur ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on peut en dire, sur qui a la compétence pour voir et la qualité pour dire, sur les propriétés des espaces et les possibles du temps[1].

Jacques Rancière, *Le partage du sensible. Esthétique et politique*, La Fabrique Éditions, 2000, p.12.

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[1] "Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the authority to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of times". Free translation.

Introduction

I - To Solve a Paradox

> I raised the issue of how to deal with the religious when I wrote a book on the Edict of Nantes, it is necessarily a history book and it is also a book on Laïcité because in France the Protestants were all the more laïque as they were the first to suffer from the Catholic Church as a state religion. (...) So the issue of the status of Islam as a religion did not emerge with me. It was somehow refused in colonial times and ignored in post-colonial times[2].

> Interview with Minister of the Interior Pierre Joxe (Socialist Party), Paris, September 2015.

> As with previous generations of ethnic migrants, there is a lot of burden of thought. You see, my father came to Australia in the 1920s. He was coming from Greece. (...) The public debate at the time, the same as now, maintained that we should not let Greeks in, they will take our jobs. Same concern we express with every generation of migrants. (...) Now, we also had some decisions to make, some concerns about security issues. We had to be careful in the assessment of who was coming to Australia. But I am confident about Australian multiculturalism.

> Interview with Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Nick Bolkus (Australian Labor Party), Adelaide, May 2016.

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[2] "Le problème du rapport au religieux, je l'ai posé quand j'ai fait un livre sur l'édit de Nantes, c'est forcément un livre d'histoire et c'est aussi un livre sur la laïcité puisqu'en France les protestants français étaient d'autant plus laïques qu'ils étaient les principaux à souffrir du statut de religion presque d'Etat qu'a eu l'Eglise catholique (...) Donc le problème du statut de l'Islam en tant que religion n'est pas né de moi. Il a été en quelque sorte refusé par la France coloniale et ignoré par la France post-coloniale".

This thesis starts with a paradox. The contrast between these two extracts of interviews is compelling for three reasons. First, because the two interviewees are prominent politicians who occupied comparable positions in government in two "Western" countries and were actively involved in the reconfiguration of a public question of Islam at the turn of the 1990s. Second, because they come from comparable positions in the political spectrum: both identify themselves as belonging to the Left wing within respectively the French Socialist Party and the Australian Labor Party. Third, because they were answering the exact same question: "How do you explain that Islam has been brought on the forefront of public consciousness?"

In spite of all these similarities, the answers of the two politicians appear as incomparable because of the radically different perspectives they raise. Pierre Joxe's argument focuses on the role of the religious and France's specific history while Nick Bolkus answers about ethnic migrants and border issues. The former identifies an issue of religious institutionalisation while the latter identifies an issue of integration of ethnic groups. The French minister frames the issue within the question of Laïcité[3] and the Australian minister within the question of Multiculturalism. In other words, they seem to travel a similar question using different political roadmaps. The same incomparability was systematically observed in the answers to such large questions asked at the beginning of interviews to obtain a general reflexive perspective without influencing the definition of the object of research[4]. The consistency of this religious prism for French politicians and ethnic prism for Australian politicians (expressed in more or less euphemistic forms) made it impossible to assimilate to the mere product of individual trajectories, or personal leitmotifs. These two categories not only refer to different dimensions but also to different epistemes: if both may or may not overlap identity claims, religion has implications in

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[3] On account of the idiosyncratic dimension of the concept and of its specific semantic depth – which will be developed in the present thesis – *laïcité* (referring to French secularism) and all associated terms (e.g. *laïque, laïciste*) will remain in French and will be used as English words to avoid translation issues (Willaime 2008; Baubérot 2013; Greenhouse 2006; Horvilleur 2014).

[4] In the same vein, when describing immigrants, they systematically described them under religious characteristics in France and interchangeably as Muslims or as ethnic groups in Australia ("Asians", "Lebanese", "Arabs", etc...)

terms of beliefs, practices, clergy and dogma when ethnicity is more multidimensional and thus complex to objectify for social sciences.

Hence before the question of the perception of Islam, it became immediately apparent that a main divergence is to be dealt with concerning "what speaking of Islam means"[5], to paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu (1982), and why. The overarching goal of this thesis is to provide elements of answer to these basic questions, also simply reformulated as "what is Islam the name of?", behind which lie three concerns: an epistemological one, a methodological one and a heuristic one. The first two offer the opportunity to address (respectively in theoretical and practical terms) issues as fundamental to political science and the sociology of religion as the integration of microsociological, mesosociological and macrosociological levels of analysis, the multipositionality of actors and the temporality of empirical observations. The heuristic potentiality of this question, on the other hand, is indisputable because what is at stake is nothing less than the capacity to rise in generality and to assess the feasibility of a comparison. All the more so since these idiosyncrasies presented two characteristics that were even more compelling for a political scientist and a sociologist. First, they constituted in many respects a challenge for the existing concepts and literature on Islam in social sciences. Second, they were only visible under the prism of an international comparison.

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[5] For this reason, in this thesis the "perception of Islam" will not be separated from the "perception of Muslims". This distinction may be relevant in a national study but becomes reifying in this international study, in particular because of the different "political grammars" (Thévenot & Lamont 2000). The analyses of discourses in this thesis, however, specify the use of terms and allow a grasp of when politicians choose to focus on Muslims as individual believers or Islam as a religion.

1) A challenge for the existing literature

a) Disciplinary challenges

The approach of social sciences to Islam in the West[6] is a growing field whose bones of contention have been recently redefined in post-migratory perspectives (Amiraux 2012; Maussen 2007; Tottoli 2014) and in a context of revision of the secularisation paradigm (Beckford & Luckman 1989; Milot, Portier & Willaime 2010; Asad 1999; Bruce 2013; Malik 2001; Hervieu-Léger 1993; Turner 2011). Two fields of study, which may be combined, predominate: studies on the regulation and accommodation of Islam and studies on religiosity, practices and beliefs of Muslims (Peter 2006a). In this respect, the perception of Islam has been dealt with through questions including integration (Laurence & Vaïsse 2007; Akbarzadeh & Saeed (eds.) 2001; Kabir 2013; Dassetto 1996; Kepel 1987), security (Inbar & Frisch 2007; Brown 2008), organisation of religions (Asad 2003; Beaumont & Cloke 2012; Portier 2003), international relations (Hurd 2015; Haynes 2007; Berger 2010; Feldman 2012), systems of citizenship (Turner 2006; Triandafyllidou 2010; March 2009; Birnbaum 2011), or public visibility (Göle 2011; Geaves, Gabriel, Haddad & Smith 2004). The challenges involved make it an object of societal controversies around notions as diverse as shari'a (Possamai, Richardson &Turner 2015), gender (Roald 2001; Moors & Salih 2010), public freedoms (Shadid & Koningsveld 1995; Liogier 2012), clergy (Frégosi 2004; Birt 2006; Husson 2007), places of worship (Mayeur-Jaouen 2000; Dunn 2001), culture (Lewis 1993; Zolberg & Woon 1999; Hunter 2002), radicalisation (Joffé (ed) 2013; Khosrokhavar 2014), terrorism (Esposito 2003, Jackson 2007), ritual practices (Rath 2001, pp.58-61) and articulate no less diverse spheres of activity, from education (Hefner & Zaman 2007; Maddox 2011) to food

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[6] The notion of the West is only used in this thesis for practical purposes, as it does not take into account the self-identification as Westerner or non-Westerner, overshadowing the fact that collective identities are shaped by a dialectic interplay of self-representations and external representations (Turner 1985; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Giddens 1991; Jenkins 1996; Brubaker & Cooper 2000). It is in this respect noteworthy that many authors who have explicitly referred to "the West" or "the Occident" have done so in order to point out discourses of domination rather than an actual socio-cultural, economic or political context (see for instance Saïd 1978 and Ong 1996). This study thus has no ambition to come to any conclusion regarding the perception of Islam "in the West", no more than it aims at inferring universal rules from the analysed cases.

(Bergeaud-Blackler 2005; Riaz & Chaudry 2003) or dressing (Scott 2009; Bilge 2010; Joppke 2009).

The rich diversity[7] of these research works brings many grounds for reflection to the subject of this thesis. However a major difficulty is that the various fields of study insufficiently communicate with each other in particular because of disciplinary insularity (Beckford 1985; Davie 2013; Altglas 2005; Turina 2011). Hence there is a difficulty in grasping the national/international dimension of political-religious controversies or processes involving at the same time ethnic and religious identities. Renewing the approach of issues like the introductory paradox of this thesis requires in-depth studies using interdisciplinary perspectives to understand which kind of "religious" is used, and how. In this regard, the classical sociology of religion tends to reify such hybrid objects (Lassave 2014; Milot 1998; Galembert & Koenig 2014; Lamine 2013). On the other hand, political scientists tend to use back channels to deal with Islam, focusing on specific categories of public action (Jouanneau 2009; Sèze 2013; Fournier 2009; Pingaud 2013). Drawing on these contributions, a complementary approach is needed to specify what lies on their margins, that is to say the discourses on Islam and their relation to the categories of understanding. The notion of "perceptive and rhetorical schemes" has therefore been chosen to refer to publicly produced ideas, images and representations which may serve as sources of legitimation or patterns of reasoning for politicians, policy makers, but also citizens including Muslims themselves.

b) The necessity of integrating national specificities

The interest in shedding light on symbolic and discursive aspects has been increasingly taken into account, opening new fields for investigation (Cinalli & Giugni 2013). In particular, two schemes of representation have been identified: on the one hand

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[7] For instance, a comparison with Jocelyne Cesari's state of the art report (1994), or Frank Buijs and Jan Rath's report (2002) shows the growing influence of non-specialists of the Muslim world, coming from a wide range of disciplines.

the opposition between an "integrated" Islam and a "fundamentalist" Islam, and on the other hand the emphasis put on the inequity of treatment (De Galembert 2001; Maddox 2004; Esposito 1999; Hipler, Lueg & Friese 1995; Lawrence 1998; Liogier 2012; Baker, Gabrielatos & MacEnery 2013; Shadid & Koningsfeld 2002; Flood, Stephen, Miazhevich & Nickels 2012). More specifically, political scientists have noticed the overwhelming predominance in political discourses of the first aforementioned scheme, reflected by the statement of a dichotomy within the religious space, according to the alleged degree of compatibility with national values (Etienne 2003; Manço 2004; Motilla 2004; Pauly 2004).

A major difficulty in this undertaking lies in the process of conceptualisation since the subject has a strong potential for politicisation[8]. Many researchers have linked the analysis of the political perception of Islam to the identification of specific categories of racism in almost all Western countries including Australia (Dunn, Klocker & Salabay 2007; Saeed 2007; Mansouri & Kamp 2007), France (Babès 1995; Wieviorka 1996; Balibar 1991), the United States (Kerri 2006; Bonilla-Silva 2017; Haddad 2004), the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al. 2010; Velasco González et al. 2008; Vasta 2007), Britain (Saeed 2007; Dimmock 2017), and Germany (Nordbruch 2016; Ramm 2010). The conceptualisation of Islamophobia has also constitued an extensive body of research (Poynting & Mason 2007; Halliday 1999; Gottschalk & Greenberg 2008; Allen 2010; Mohammed 2016; Yemelianova 2012). The heuristic interest of such engaged analyses in the vein of postcolonial studies must, however, be completed by integrating the influence of different state-church models, different polity patterns and different integration policies of minorities[9]. In the introduction to her book *The Politics of Secularism in International*

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[8] The academic literature is in this respect also completed by what Valérie Amiraux (2012) refers to as "testimony literature" in which social actors – Muslims or not – express a strong position in favour or against specific arguments.

[9] As an illustration, during a discussion of this thesis's subject, an Australian academic advocated that "there is no such thing as a French or Australian perception of Islam because of the existence of a similar Islamophobia in all Western countries", which he described as "Western racism against an ethnic community". This scholar later honourably recognised that his very words showed an Australian-centred perception of the issue, since identifying Muslims in France as an "ethnic community" would prove inappropriate both for political reasons and for academic purposes (Schnapper 1998; Poutignat & Streiff-Fenart 1995; Martiniello 1995; Boubeker 2003; Kastoryano 2004; Hargreaves 1995). This definition illustrated that categories of understanding

Relations (2009), Elizabeth Shakman Hurd notices that "the politics of secularism has gone virtually unacknowledged in political science" (p.4), which has lead to sideline important political outcomes regarding Islam. Besides the identification of convergent trends in the perception of Islam in the West, namely a polarisation between Islam and the national identity, the question largely remains as to how to take into account the substantial divergences in the modalities of management of Muslim religious minorities (Fetzer & Soper 2005; Peter 2006). Acknowledging a common identification of a "Muslim problem" by authorities in most Western countries, Joan Wallach Scott mentions that "still, the specific ways in which these ideas are expressed and implemented as policy differ according to national political histories" (Scott 2007, p.9). The circulation of the categories of analysis must allow for their confrontation to different democratic traditions determining debates, public norms and axiological systems. Failing that, the risk is high of falling into two pitfalls identified by Giovanni Sartori (1970, 1991). The first one is degreeism, that is to say replacing differences in kind by differences in degree and a subsequent will to establish a continuum instead of a dichotomy between categories. Sartori's second warning is that the analysis may be impaired by the researcher's propensity to extend the conceptual construction of reality, what he refers to as "conceptual stretching". In this respect, after a thorough state of the art report on the academic production regarding Islam, Marcel Maussen concludes that

> studies often lack a comparative and/or explanatory focus and run the risk of remaining singular "one-case narratives" (...) It is important to further develop theories and models to systematically describe relevant institutional differences between countries (for example in terms of different state-church regimes, Political Opportunity Structures, and models of political organisation) and to develop instruments to measure and systematically describe the relevant dependent variables (Maussen 2007, p.60).

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formulated in a national context may not be transferable to another context without a diachronic and comparative perspective.

France and Australia are intrinsically interesting to analyse since in both countries political scientists have underlined crucial stakes lying at the intersection of religion and politics[10]. However, the comparative approach offers the possibility to explore hitherto unseen modalities of perception of Islam.

2) Choice of a binary comparison

Comparison has been identified as a primary tool for analysing complex causal relationships very early in the history of sociology[11]. Durkheim (1894) argued that because the chains of causality cannot possess a universal dimension in social sciences, it is technically impossible to immediately interpret the correlations between the explicandum (the influenced variables) and the explicantia (the influencing variables). In many cases, the comparison alone can consequently indicate causal relationships. The corollary of this observation is that comparative analysis is helpful to avoid the pitfall of ethnocentrism (Tarrow 2010) and therefore to draw the study closer to the Weberian principle of axiological neutrality. Indeed, in order to be able to evidence the relative and contextual dimension of the analyses, it is necessary to question the research tools themselves. More basically, it appears unavoidable to challenge the way we "think, feel or act" (Dupré,

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[10] For instance, in 2007, René Rémond observed a "return in force in the public debate and the political concerns of the religious questions[10]" (Rémond 2007, p.144), underlining the renewed necessity to dedicate a detailed investigation to the subject. This observation can be made with the same acuteness for the Australian case, as there are numerous gaps when it comes to the studies on the intersection between religion and politics. As Neil Andrew and Margaret Reid mention in the preface of her monograph *For God and Country*, "the work of Dr Marion Maddox, the 1999 Fellow, has been the first to assess and set in context the religious influences felt by current and past Senators and Members as they pursue their parliamentary duties" (Reid & Andrew, in Maddox 2001).

[11] In *Rules of Sociological Method*, Emile Durkheim showed that comparison is a necessary substitute for the experimental method which is used in other sciences but inoperative in social sciences. He therefore insisted on the fact that, as a consequence, "we have only one way to demonstrate that a phenomenon is the cause for another, which is to compare the cases where they are simultaneously present or absent so as to discover whether the variations they display in these different combinations of circumstances provide evidence that one depends upon the other" (Durkheim 1894, chapter VI).

Jacob, Lallement, Lefèbvre & Spurk 2003). Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy note that "although comparison may initially appear to be a quest for information, it also represents a quest for enlightenment, and thus it is one of the most fruitful ways of thinking. It helps to rid us of inherited fossilised notions, obliges us to reconsider the validity of undiscussed interpretations, and enlarges our visual field" (Dogan & Pelassy 1984, p.9). Setting aside its capacity to shed light on the relativity of the object, the comparison reveals subsequently what is a social construction in the analysed system.

Given these potentialities, Patrick Hassenteufel concisely sums up four advantages of comparison in social sciences: it would help to take distance with the researcher's own national reality, to try theoretical hypotheses on different cases, to create new explicative schemes and to study phenomena of inter-state policy convergence (Hassenteufel 2000, p.117). All these elements meet the requirements posed by the question of what speaking about Islam means in France and in Australia. A thorough comparison between France and Australia, as well as between parties, offers an opportunity to evaluate the relevance and autonomy of traditional dualisms like the "Left-Right" opposition, but also of categories of understanding like "religious" or "ethnic" and to specify under which patterns of public reasoning Muslims can be apprehended.

I have chosen in that regard a binary comparison[12] notably because of both the descriptive reach and the analytical depth it allows (Badie & Hermet 1990; Scott 1976). If

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[12] The question of how to build comparisons has been largely tackled in Comparative Politics, and many typologies have been suggested. Some of them have become classic: Charles Tilly has suggested four categories, respectively individualising comparisons, universalising comparisons, generalising comparisons and encompassing comparisons, according to their combination of two dimensions: scope and number (Tilly 1984, p.59). Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune have distinguished four models according to slightly different dimensions: "most similar systems" design, "most different systems" design, univariate comparisons and relationships (multivariate) comparisons (Przeworski & Teune 1970). Ira Katznelson has renewed this typology by identifying, namely, the global or large-process, case-comparative, variable-comparative and relational strategies (Katznelson 1997, p.87). Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy's typology might be the most useful for our purpose, since it is a very detailed one as it triangulates research objectives and methodology. They identify five strategies[12], namely case study, binary comparison, comparison between analogous cases, comparison between contrasted cases, and conceptual homogenisation of an heterogeneous domain (Dogan & Pelassy 1981). The type of comparison we have chosen to use would be closely related to Dogan and Pelassy's binary comparison.

such a comparison is certainly less appropriate to making generalisations, it is helpful for grasping acutely the subtlety of social processes (Brockett 2005; Gazibo & Jenson 2004). It is therefore well suited to the approach on perceptions I am dealing with in this thesis. Masamichi Sasaki (2002) shows in this respect, through the examples of Marion J. Levy's comparative work on Japan and China and Reinhard Bendix's comparative work on Junkers and Samuraïs, that no other choice of analysis would have allowed such detailed and efficient confrontations of cases. He evidences that binary comparisons consequently allow obtaining contrasted illustrations of theoretical frames and therefore do not prevent the identification of general processes[13]. As a matter of fact, the choice of a binary comparison does not endanger the theoretical objective of this thesis, provided we ensure that the contextual similarities in the two countries make the comparison possible (Dogan & Pelassy 1981).

II - *Questioning the Question*

1) **Implementation of the comparison.**

a) **France and Australia: two different contexts**

The choice of France and Australia may indeed appear surprising at first sight. They present the distinctive feature of being two countries whose conceptions of the articulation between religion and politics are highly different (terminologically noticeable through the opposition secularism/laïcité), and oppose two systems of socio-cultural cohesion. Institutional differences are legion: France's public life has been long dominated by a Catholic establishment (Labrousse 1985; Champion 1993; Mayeur 1991) and Australia's

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[13] In this respect, the compared socio-historical analyses in this thesis will be presented with a quasi-monographic approach in order to give account of the complexity and specificity of the cases.

by an informal Protestant establishment (Mayrl 2011; Hogan 1987), France is a unified State and Australia is a federal system, France is a Republic and Australia is a constitutional monarchy, France has a codified law and Australia is a common law country. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the situation of Muslims is not in the least similar. Although it is difficult to evaluate the number of Muslims in France for legal reasons[14] the Pew Research Centre report of 27 January 2011 offers the interest of having measured these populations with a common evaluation process. According to this study, Muslims in Australia represented 379 000 people (1.7% of the population)[15], while they represented 4 710 000 people in France (7.2% of the population)[16]. The Muslim population in Australia has increased since then to reach 604 200 people in 2016 (2.6% of the population) according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2016), yet the number is still much bigger in absolute terms and in proportion in France. Even if contestable, these estimates are of much interest for social sciences analysts who want to deal with both countries. Further demographic data of these populations in both countries also show important prosopographic differences.

In Australia, the Muslim community includes ethnically diverse religious groupings, and according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics over 60 different ethnic and racial backgrounds are represented (ABS 2011). Though migrations from Lebanon and Turkey have been the most significant (respectively about 10% and 8.5% of the Australian Muslims originate from these countries) the same report gives account of the fact that "in the 1990s, refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Indonesia and Malaysia have all also migrated to Australia. The recent migratory waves of Muslims to Australia include the nations in the Middle East, North Africa, South East Asia, India and most recently Sub-Saharan Africa" (ABS

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[14] This evaluation is particularly complex in France since the 1872 law has forbidden religious census. Moreover, the law of 1978 on "Information Technology and Freedoms" forbids collecting data that reveals racial or ethnic origins, as well as political, philosophical and religious opinions.

[15] The Australian Bureau of Statistics gave the number of 476 300 Muslims in Australia in its 2011 report (2.2% of the population).

[16] Claude Dargent shows that estimations vary between 3.5 to 5 millions, the most common estimations being more than 4 millions (Dargent 2010). We can nonetheless observe that, even in its lowest estimation, the proportion is still higher than in Australia.

2011). In France, statistics concerning immigration are informative[17]. The Muslim population is ethnically speaking essentially composed by people from Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), Central and Sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey (INED-INSEE 2008). Those characterised as "Muslims" therefore present different sociological profiles. While they are more numerous in France, they come from more diverse backgrounds in Australia.

These differences, nonetheless, do not call into question the academic relevance of a comparative study. On the contrary, as I will show below, they tend to reinforce the analysis by safeguarding it against the temptation to consider the comparative writing as an act of translation instead of an exercise of construction.

b) Constructing the comparability of the cases

In 2012, the *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* proposed a special edition on the writing of comparative works, which exemplifies adequately how to deal with such challenges. One of the most striking conclusions of the dossier due to its consensual feature is the necessity of overcoming the methodological principle of an *a priori* comparability of the research issues. As Emilie Courtin, Bleuwenn Lechaux, Elise Roullaud and Marianne Woolven underline in the introductory chapter, the contributions of the dossier reveal that the writing process itself reveals what is comparable (Courtin et al. 2012). In particular, Marie-Hélène Sa Vila Boas shows that the asymmetry of information is an inherent element in any comparison which allows (re)constructing a research project (Sa Vila Boas 2012), and Benjamin Ferron highlights how these difficulties lead to mobilising operative concepts that will eventually give a new intelligibility to the study cases (Ferron 2012). Natacha Gally deduces the necessity of overcoming "the question of the success or the failure of transfers" in order to "bring up to

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[17] Although this would be reductive to estimate that all migrants from Muslim countries are actual Muslims, it gives an important information: for instance, 87% of Algerian migrants identify themselves as Muslim (INED-INSEE 2008, p.115).

date the processes of limited convergence and the resistances" in the comparative approach (Gally 2012). The dissimilarity of the contexts is therefore not a pitfall, but rather a challenge for the comparativist, who is compelled to "construct the comparables", according to Detienne's words (Detienne 2000, 2002). In this regard, Giovanni Sartori showed in his classic article *Comparing and Miscomparing* that the question "what is comparable?" can and must be reformulated in these words: "comparable in which respect?" (Sartori 1991). That is as much as to say that the differences between two entities do not involve the impossibility of a comparison (in case of similarity, a comparison would even be useless) insofar as the properties or characteristics that we are studying are comparable.

As a matter of fact, this thesis is not comparing incomparable entities as it is not focused on the actual Muslims but on how perceptive and rhetorical schemes structure Islam's frame of reference. Therefore quantitative differences as well as prosopographic differences in the Muslim populations prove interesting elements to enrich the analysis for two reasons. First because they give the opportunity to assess a potential gap between the objective reality of Islam and the subjective reality presented in discourses. Second, because they indicate different migratory histories to which may be confronted the respective integration policies of the two countries. This deepens the initial question about what speaking of Islam means with underlying questionings like whether dimensions endogenous to the Muslim population (including the migratory and ethnic background as well as the size of the population) are influential in the perception of Islam by political parties. To answer such questions, it is however necessary to further specify what is meant by "perception of Islam" and what is meant by "political parties".

2) Which perception for which parties?
a) (Re)defining perception

The meaning of perception in this thesis has been progressively refined according to the increasing awareness of the epistemological and methodological stakes involved. The

term has been chosen because of its multidimensional and reflexive characteristics which were not matched by other concepts like identification (Manski 1995; Kagan 1958; Meloy et al. 2015), representation (Moscovici 1982; Duveen & Lloyd 1990) or labelling (Petrunik 1980; Becker 1963; Hagan 1973; Scheff 1974). It allowed encompassing both the mesosociological level of the discursive practices and the macrosociological level of institutional and social contexts. Moreover, this term was suggested by the politicians themselves as they often refer to their "perception" of Islam, as if it was emanating from their own individual cognition. The sociological tradition warned in this respect against the risk of overlapping the social use and the scientific use of such protean concepts (Weber 1965; Goertz 2006), as well as the risk of separating theoretical schemes from the empirical reality (Blumer 1954). As a consequence, I am not using the term as a scientific category but rather as an inclusive concept inherited from the logic of practice (Bourdieu 1976).

In that regard the question of the perception of Islam is closely linked to the conceptualisation of a collective identity, which can be empirically grounded or subjectively constructed (Pizzorno in Badie & Déloye 2007). An operative conceptualisation for my approach may be found in the critique of the notion of "construction of identities" by Martina Avanza and Gilles Laferté (2005). The authors classify the inderterminacies of the construction of identity by developing three concepts: identification, social image (*image sociale*) and belonging (*appartenance*). The concept of identification, borrowed from Gérard Noiriel (1991), refers to the process of categorisation and identification made by the state and is grasped thanks to a socio-history of the state. The concept of social image, borrowed from Jean-Claude Chamboredon (1985) refers to the production of discourses and representations which are developed within the governing frames of understanding: typically, analysing the aggregation of stereotyped discourses on a minority shows the construction of a social image. The concept of belonging refers to the individual socialisation and the appropriation or refusal of the identification by the concerned actors.

The understanding of perception in this thesis focuses on the social image of Islam constructed by political parties as producers of meaning, and its articulation with the

identification produced by the state. I correlate the diverging or converging discursive positions within French and Australian parties to the categories of state understanding by emphasising what may provide a public admissibility (or not) to the arguments. For instance, the admissibility of the religious prism is stronger in France than in Australia, and therefore the admissibility of discourses condemning the veil at school is highly different in France and in Australia, independently from the party positions.

b) Consequences for the relevance of parties

This brings immediate consequences on how to deal analytically with political parties. A first issue must be addressed as to the relevance of political parties for grasping the perception of Islam. In particular, many authors have underlined the decreasing relevance of party cleavages (Sitter 2002; Karvonen & Kuhnle 2003; Kitschelt 1997; Mair 1997), increasingly replaced by new cultural cleavages and political identities including populism (Curran, Van Acker & Hollander 2002; Bornschier 2010, 2012; Haeg 2006; Nicolas 2005) but also post-materialist and antipolitical claims (Wilson 2002; Harmsen 2005). Moreover, parties are not homogeneous organisations but also constructed by interactions and deliberations (Sawicki 1988; Lefebvre 2009). To these analyses must be added the contingency of party organisations, in particular in France where the continuity of a bipartisanship cannot be observed. In France, the implosion of the Socialist Party following the 2017 presidential election to the benefit of an emerging party is the most revealing example of this structural fragility. These elements are taken into account both in the epistemology and the methodology of this thesis[18]. The aim being not a sociology of parties but a sociology of the social image of Islam and of its identification by the state, political parties work as an arbitrary division to grasp these elements. Their contingency is in this respect an asset, because it avoids the assimilation between identified perceptive schemes and party dynamics. This being said, a political party is "an entrepreneurship of

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[18] Further epistemological concerns are dealt with in detail in the first chapter of this thesis, and the practical concerns are dealt with in Chapter 2.

representation participating in the political competition (...) and pretending, with its opponents, to the right to speak in the name of lay people and to represent them" (Offerlé 2012, p.13). As such, it is a collective involved in the production of social images and although parties "cannot have minds of their own", they can "think" (Douglas 1986, p.9) insofar as they are still relevant to understanding how political elites construct and make visible elements of a social reality[19]. Major parties are therefore favoured in the analysis. Further studies of individual cases and interactions may reveal their specificities against the backdrop of these more general patterns.

In this respect, I have abandoned the question "What do politicians personally think about Islam?" for the question "How do they present themselves to others on this subject, and for which purposes?". For the same reason, this thesis focuses on the state categories of understanding and the social image of Islam as they appear in the public debate and does not aspire to bring direct answers to normative questions such as racism, Islamophobia or to general issues like integration[20]. This does not eclipse the fact that designations may be performative as the processes of identification are made in relation to the norms they call into existence. For instance, as Tali Mendelberg (2001) shows, both implicit and explicit racial appeals rely on falsifications but they have a strong impact on the actual emotions and classifications in the civil society.

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[19] These systems of ideas also influence de facto the members of a party insofar as they need to be integrated to maintain the cohesion of the party (Gaxie 1977; Matonti & Poupeau 2004; Briquet 1998). I will develop in chapter 2 some specific methodological issues linked with this element in the analysis of the perception of Islam.

[20] Abdelmalek Sayad shows for instance that the discourse on integration is "a discourse based on beliefs (...) to produce a effect of truth" (Sayad 1999, p.308) because this very notion is indeed structured by the categories of state understanding.

III - *General Organisation of the Thesis*

This thesis is divided into three parts, to give account of the three aspects of reflection that were triggered by the enquiry process. The first part (ch1 and ch2) encompasses the background of this thesis, including the theoretical and epistemological challenges met and how they lead to the deployment of a specific metholodogy of research and relatively new tools for the sociology of religion. The second part (ch3 to ch5) links the state identification of Islam to the social image constructed by parties, analysing the influence of historically-built structural dynamics on the perception of Islam by political parties. It identifies the causes of the initial "paradox" and the political implications of treating Islam either as a religion or as an ethnicity. The third part (ch6 and ch7) goes beyond the paradox and focuses on the political parties strictly speaking, exploring how they deal with the different repertoires of political legitimation, and comparing inter-party and intra-party convergences and divergences.

Chapter 1 aims at two goals. The first one is to assess the relevance of dominant theoretical frameworks for the analysis of a hybrid object like the perception of Islam by political parties. It shows the contributions and limits of approaches focusing on interactions to grasp the categories of perception and the challenges posed by the integration of structural overdeterminations in the analysis. The second goal is to establish epistemological milestones. It does so by suggesting a pragmatic perspective allowing a "middle path" taking into account both the macrosociological structures to objectivate and the modes of objectivation (in particular discourses).

The objective of Chapter 2 is to make operational the epistemological requirements of Chapter 1. It develops an *ad hoc* methodology to integrate the different levels of analysis, the question of the actors' positioning and the synchronicity and diachronicity of the objects of analysis. Concretely, the study of these dimensions has three main domains of application in my thesis: in discourse analysis, in the integration of socio-historical

analyses and in the taking into account of individual cases. The specificity of this thesis methodology is that it uses a triangulation of methods, coupling qualitative and quantitative results (especially computer-assisted content analysis) which corroborate and complete each other. The chapter presents the construction of a corpus of heterogeneous empirical data and the heuristic capacities of the tools used for the analysis.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show the two aspects of influence of the cultural code/State variable (Birnbaum 2011) on the identification of Islam, respectively on the perception of Islam as a religion and of Muslims as a minority. Chapter 3 compares the relations between the state and religions in France and in Australia and refines the opposition secularism /laïcité. It provides socio-historical groundings to understand the political instrumentalisation of religious issues and the admissibility of religious notions as arguments in official discourses. The analysis serves to specify the link between the resonance of "religious public issues" and their political opportunity, and to show why French laïcité has specific links with Islam because of its predisposition to politicisation.

Chapter 4 goes further by identifying, as other side of the same coin, structural differences between the two countries regarding the governance of minorities in general. It draws on analyses of large corpuses of discourses to show that the historical construction of the link between the state and civil society profoundly impacts the perception of Muslim minorities. Questioning the relevance of a "French model" and an "Australian model", it reveals margins of appropriation for political parties and interplays between the political tradition and individual strategies.

Chapter 5 is central to the thesis as it shows how these macrostructural overdeterminations can be put into the socio-historical context of the emergence of Islam to grasp why Islam has progressively emerged and become visible as a religious issue in France and as an ethnic issue in Australia. It does so with a twofold approach. First, it identifies a background of historical endogenous factors (in particular the conditions of

settlement) and exogenous factors (the underlying policy issues as well as the normative frames subtending the discourses). This enables elaborating, in a second part, the differentiated constructions of the "question of Islam" by key politicians since the 1990's, using the insight of in-depth interviews.

In Chapter 6, I put into perspective the macrosociological findings of the thesis by confronting them with party dynamics. I explore two major fields of axiological reconfiguration in which Islam is debated by political parties. The first one is the question of how to integrate Islam as a newcomer in the respective traditions of Left-wing and Right-wing parties regarding religion. The second field, in which the convergence is even stronger, is a revival of the religious in politics, bringing new challenges to the question of the recognition of religions by the state. To give a better account of the heterogeneity of inter-party and intra-party positions regarding Islam I present a dozen contrasted case studies in Australia and in France.

Chapter 7 proposes triangulating the analysis with quantitative semantics in order to reach a higher level of generality by offering cartographies of the discursive patterns used by parties. It exploits the heuristic potential of computer-assisted content analyses to identify thematic regularities in the main parties' discourses, their distribution and their inter-relations. The combination of this perspective and the case studies allows further clarification of the extent to which the individual cases may be marginal or typical and reciprocally enables specification of the reach of the models offered by the synchronic aggregative analyses.

Part I: Theoretical and Methodological Groundings

- **Chapter 1: Theoretical Groundings**

Responding to the question of this thesis entails finding a theoretical stance enabling ilumination of the multiple dimensions in the "perception of Islam" as I have defined it, at the intersection of the state identification and the social image. This chapter argues that this requires taking into account both the institutionalised state as an explicative variable and the processes of objectivation -in particular discourses of politicians. It does so by exploring the contributions and limits of dominant theoretical frameworks. However, as Bryan S. Turner notices in his introduction to *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (2009), "in considering social theory within a broad international framework, we need to recognize that sociology is inevitably colored by different local, national or civilizational circumstances" (p.1). This observation is all the more significant since the present thesis must meet the requirements of two academic traditions whose divisions cannot be ignored: French sociology and Australian political science. This chapter has therefore no ambition to compare all the theoretical frameworks suitable to our object of study, but aims at assessing the relevance of perspectives inherited from these traditions which have proved influential in the analysis of the perception of political parties. I suggest adopting a "mediate path" between the historical sociology of the state and the sociology of concrete systems of action, using a pragmatic focus. I will elaborate on the consequences of this choice for the categories of analysis, showing in particular that semantically charged notions like Islam, laïcité or multiculturalism need a conceptual requalification.

I - Contributions and Limits of Dominant Theoretical Frameworks

1) From the limits of the actor-centred perspective...

a) The problem of structural overdetermination

A number of elements for the political analysis of religions cannot be comprehended without focusing on positions and relations. It is especially the case when the research aims at identifying power strategies at a micro or mesosociological level (Dupuy & Thoenig 1983). Many authors have taken this approach, in particular on the question of places of worship (Allievi 2010; Cesari 2005), religious practices (Bergeaud-Blackler & Bernard 2010), or religious authority (Sèze 2013; Jouanneau 2013; Van Bruinessen & Allievi 2010). One of the interests of such works is that they are able to show both sides of the public policies' production chain. For instance, Solenne Jouanneau's analysis of imams demonstrates that on the one hand the positioning of the state's agents regarding Islam is indebted to the positioning toward immigration; on the other hand, the symbolic recognition of norms is performatively created by the identification of social actors playing with these norms (Jouanneau 2009, 2011, 2013). The references to the interactionnist – and especially goffmanian – tradition (Goffman 1974, 1975, 1988, 1995) may in such works be coupled to an attention toward power resources, in line with the demands formulated by the sociology of organisations (Crozier & Friedberg 1977). Yet, however fruitful this praxeological type of approach might be when it comes to grasping the construction of public policies' narrative space-time, it presents many faults for this specific object of study.

First, a focus on the actors' personal experience as well as a decisive importance given to the interviews are a prerequisite of its methodology (Jobert & Leca 1980). For many practical reasons that I will develop in the methodological chapter, analysing the perception of Islam by political parties from a macrosociological perspective precludes the systematic use of such methods.

Second, many epistemological biases are involved when the researcher tries to grasp party dynamics, and *a fortiori* national idiosyncrasies. A good example might be the interviews with John Howard and Philip Ruddock. Although cross-checking them helped me understand the emergence of the notion of "multiculturalism" at the turn of the 1990s in the light of these specific actors' interest, I could not infer any consequence for the Coalition's ideological posture. Because seizing religion "in the making", to paraphrase Albert Piette (1999, 2003), entails seizing a social activity in its individual, dynamic dimension, the analysis is very sensitive to temporal and situational contingencies. Any modification of the frame recodifies the systems of constraints, specifies new interpretative inferences, shuffles the cards of a new symbolic economy (Denzin & Lincoln 1995; Marshall & Rossman 1989; Payne & Williams 2005). It is therefore impossible to increase the generalisation from the perception of political actors to the perception of political parties without hypostatising forms. In the same way, this perspective prevents us identifying the extent to which the relational power may be the emerging face of a more complex macrosociological system. In political sociology[21], a main risk with the postulate that everything ensues from interactions is therefore to deny the specific constraints of political affiliations and to assert that ideological orientations are irrelevant (Dubois 2010). An illustration of this limitation may be found in the early critique of Robert Dahl's works by Peter Baratz and Morton Bachrach (1962), in which they reproach him for not taking into account the influence or power limiting the actors' spectrum of initiation (p.952). In the classic of sociology *Power: A Radical View* (1974, reed.

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[21] Let us notice that a similar assessment can be made for the sociology of religion. James Beckford's critique of Piette's work, where he characterises it as a "minimalist sociology of religion" (Beckford & Wallis 2006, p.182) is in this respect an enriching illustration of the aforementioned considerations. Although aligning himself with the empirical and descriptive approach of Piette, he makes two important points for our analysis. First, the incompleteness of Piette's perspective arising from the necessary elusion of the context that seizing pratices in the making involves. Second, the complementarity – acknowledged by Piette himself in his commentary on Danièle Hervieu Léger's *La religion pour mémoire* (1993) – between close-up focus and macrosociological perspectives.

2005), Steven Lukes further warns against the naturalisation of categories of structural overdetermination:

> Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (p.28).

This naturalisation process is particularly important in the case of the perception of Islam, because of the polysemy of the term. In this respect, when asked about why they described Muslims using the term "ethnic" in Australia or "religious" in France, most actors emphasised the neutrality and naturalness of it. For instance, when asked about why they called Muslims an "ethnic group", Australian politicians expressed their surprise at the question itself:

> Nick Bolkus: "It was just the natural way of saying it"[22]
>
> John Howard: " I don't quite understand what you are getting at, I am sorry..."[23]

Even if Lukes's perspective does not escape from the difficulty to make explicit the duality between power and structure (Bradshaw 1976; Chazel 1982; Hayward & Lukes 2008), the point of his argument relevant to the question of this thesis remains intact. Social actors' capabilities and opportunities are also structured possibilities which cannot be fully comprehended through the goggles of voluntarism.

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[22] Interview with Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Nick Bolkus, Adelaide, Australia, 5 May 2016.

[23] Interview with Prime Minister John Howard, Sydney, Australia, 24 May 2016.

b) Thinking both the interaction and the structure

Power relations indeed meet supra-individual projects because the actors' actions take place and are constructed within a *vivre ensemble* (living together). This observation does not contradict the findings of interactionist works, but rather completes them. Anthony Giddens (1976) has shown in this respect that power, communication and morality are always inscribed within interactional dynamics, but through the mediation of modalities (facility, interpretive scheme, norm), which ensue from structures of domination, signification and legitimation. The following schema extracted from his book (p.122) represents how structure can be integrated within social interactions:

Figure 1. Structure and Interaction in A. Giddens' theory

INTERACTION		Communication	Power	Morality
(MODALITY)	↕	Interpretative scheme	Facility	Norm
STRUCTURE		Signification	Domination	Legitimation

The interest of this schema is that it helps us think of structure as dual in its nature, which means that the interactions themselves contribute to its existence[24]. Political actors indeed use the modalities of structuration when they reproduce the systems of interaction, and, in the same process, perpetuate the structural properties that gave birth to (or at least were the medium of) these systems. The resources of signification, domination and legitimation are mobilised – consciously or not – within consistent practices that, in return, intensify these structural elements. In the following

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[24] Interestingly, Gidden's theory proves useful for grasping the perception of parties but may have limitations in the study of religion. In particular, Beckford (1992,1996), McCloud (2007) or Davies (1999) have shown that authors like Giddens or Bauman face difficulties in trying to integrate the specificity of religion within their analytical frameworks because they are not specialists of religions (for instance by focusing on unrepresentative aspects). In order to avoid such issues, this thesis therefore suggests a conceptual requalification of notions like Islam or laïcité by refusing to define their "substance" and by focusing instead on their existence as categories of identification and registers for parties (cf. section 2 and chapters 3-7).

chapters, I will show in this respect that if the notion of secularism has a strong legitimising value in France, it is not the case in Australia[25]. The situation, however, is the opposite for the notion of multiculturalism[26]. The use of the notions by social actors for political gain, in return, performatively contributes to increasing their semantic strength and their existence as a wedge issue in political debates[27].

Now, this bridge between structure and interaction brings the question of which analytical perspective to adopt. This question is at the centre of the criticism that Pierre Bourdieu[28] addresses to Max Weber's sociology of religion. Reformulating the Weberian analysis in the language of symbolic interactionism (whose principles were already theoretically formulated by Weber, according to him), Bourdieu observes that it is blind to objective relations because they are brought down to the intersubjective level. He then shows that a way to overcome this bias is not to deny the existence of interactions, but to subordinate their analysis to the analysis of the structure which "determines the form that interactions may take and the representation that (the individuals) may have of them" (Bourdieu 1971, p.5). The combination of the two levels of analysis is made possible because the interactions may act as a medium to

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[25] See especially Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.

[26] See especially Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

[27] See especially Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

[28] In Bourdieu' terminology, structures are referred to as the network of "objective relations" when interactions are linked with "intersubjective relations" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp.113-114). Let us notice that his criticism is explicitly formulated at the same time against structuralism, interactionism and subjectivism, because of their respective propensity to deny the practice of agents out of objectivism, the conditions of possibility for interactions and the history and conditioning of subjects. Social phenomenology is also criticised for being incomplete because of its descriptive dimension, which makes it only a step in the research process. Bourdieu's definition of his posture as "structuralist constructivism" or "constructivist structuralism" is therefore at the juncture of the structure and the interaction: "By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that in the social world itself exists (...) objective structures which are independent from the consciousness and the will of the agents, and capable of orientating or constraining their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a social genesis on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought and action which constitute what I call the habitus, and on the other hand of the social structures, and in particular what I call fields" (translated from Bourdieu 1987, p.147).

reconfigure the field's structure. The categories of perception (just like objective power relations) are therefore both influencing and influenced by interindividual actions, but the analytical precedence must be given to the former. The reason for this ensues from a logical observation. Focusing on the social actors first forbids the access to the systems of objective constraints because the relations between macrosociological elements are reduced to interpersonal and intersubjective relations. On the contrary, an analysis focusing on macrosociological aspects[29] does not preclude a further analysis of their practical accomplishments, and even helps to prevent the risk of "psychological abstraction" (ibid, p.7). Such epistemological choices also involve specific conceptual and methodological tools. Because of their structural nature indeed, the categories of perception I am dealing with are not directly observable. Extracting them requires both taking into account long-term historical dynamics and objectifying the products of interactions with aggregated data[30].

2) ... To the challenging integration of the historical sociology of the state

a) Integrating the contributions of this field of research

Complementary elements of answers to these questions may be found in the historical sociology of the state. The latter is largely indebted to the experience of "the genesis of the European Modern State" (Genêt 1997). Its multiple productions on intermediary bodies, the welfare State or bureaucracy have shown the importance of the state on the structuration of differentiated types of societies and subsequently the integration of religions (Badie & Birnbaum 1979; Braud 1997; Déloye 2010; Jobert &

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[29] In the case in point, the author speaks of the system of objective relations between positions but the argument is also valid for the categories of perception I am dealing with in this thesis.

[30] As Wouter De Nooy shows, Bourdieu's preference for correspondence analysis in comparison to network analysis directly ensues from this choice to turn away from an actor-centred perspective to a sociology of objective relations (De Nooy 2003). This method which enables focusing on structural dimensions (Weller & Romney 1990; Greenacre & Blasius 1994) is in many respects close to the ones that will be developed and used in this thesis.

Muller 1987; Lefebvre 1977; Truman 1951). In the case of France, the existence of a frontal relationship between the state and religions cannot be understood independently from the political culture of generality and its project of organic recomposition of the society. Pierre Rosanvallon (1990) has shown in this respect that the latter may be distilled within three configurations which are of the utmost importance for the subject of this thesis: a social form (the celebration of a "national whole"), a political quality (the belief in the virtues of immediacy), and a procedure (the obsession for the law). Symmetrically, the absence of these configurations in Australia produces, as I will try to show, a completely different frame for the perception of religions by political parties. The absence of historical perspective brings to ignore the effects of these long term structurations, which are specific to each national context because they involve different collusive transactions between different political sectors[31] (Dobry 1986).

Therefore, the modalities for the management of the citizen community cannot be comprehended solely within the framework of the strategies brought about by the actors, in relation to an horizon of interactions and interlocutions. The internalisation of the very vocabulary cannot be completely independent from the symbolic order constructed by the state model, what Pierre Birnbaum and Bertrand Badie refer to as a "cultural code" (Badie & Birnbaum 1979). Let us notice here that no cultural determinism is involved, but rather a cultural factor that proves relevant to grasp the conceptualisation of political issues and solutions within a given context. In France, it is neither laïcité nor the law of 1905 that gave birth to the veil debate in 1989, as well

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[31] Several theorists have brought different and complementary perspectives to the one of Michel Dobry on the postulate of a differentiation of political societies, and refer to a different term than *sectors* (which is inseparable from the notion of "collusive transaction"). In particular, Niklas Luhmann, Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias respectively chose the notions of *systems*, *fields* and *configurations*. Each time, the emphasis is put on different elements: for instance, Luhmann underlines their autoreferential dimension, Bourdieu specifies their homologies through the concept of habitus and Elias brings forward the chains of interdependence when Dobry insists on their modalities of objectivation. However, the common point between all theories is that they acknowledge the existence of a diversity of social spheres with a relative autonomy, a specific logic and coherence. It is this point which allows us to understand the idiosyncrasy of national contexts and the necessity to include the institutionalisation process of the state in our analysis.

as the Obin, Baroin, Stasi, Rossinot and Gerin reports (Lorcerie 2005, 2008). In Australia, symmetrically, multiculturalism did not become a political issue in the 1980s and the 1990s because of a legal or institutional problem (Foster & Stockley 1988). In both cases, as this thesis aims at showing, the public resonance of the debate happens in a context when laïcité or multiculturalism can work as an instrument of political legitimation. This is as much as to say that, instead of being determined by it, party positions and political discourses draw on the society's cultural code to find the elements which are relevant in relation to a specific concern. This link between a society and its cultural code is not static but dynamic because the social change reciprocally restructures the cultural system. In France, laïcité specialists like Philippe Portier and Jean-Paul Willaime acknowledge in this respect the emergence of a new "laïcité de reconnaissance", and in Australia multiculturalism has been increasingly re-defined by public authorities as exemplified by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' *New agenda for multicultural Australia* (1999)[32].

b) Avoiding essentialisation of State and Culture

The arising difficulty is the question of the definition of the two involved variables – namely, culture and State – in the use of this Weberian legacy. As a matter of fact, any research using the "cultural code" as an explicative factor may be biased when it tries to give a concrete, empirical definition of these entities. Bertrand Badie in particular directs this criticism at Stein Rokkan's work, to whom he reproaches with "limiting the cultural variable to the linguistic structures and the ecclesiastical organisations, therefore retaining from the religious only what belongs to the structuration of the churches" (Badie 1981, p.327). The pitfall of an attempt at an empirical definition may, however, be overcome by a semiotic definition of culture. Authors like Mark Bevir and Roderick A. W. Rhodes (2010) have tried to overcome this neo-institutionalist bias using the tools inherited from Clifford Geertz's culturalist

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[32] See especially Chapter 4.

approach as developed in his famous book *The Interpretation of Cultures* (Geertz 1973). Proposing to approach the state as "cultural practice", they defend "a historical approach to meaning as situated agency, explicitly opposing structural concepts of signifiers and regimes" (Bevir & Rhodes 2010, pp.19-20). Far from denying any heuristic value to institutionalism, this leads them to show that a constructivist institutionalism has a promising potential insofar as it allows the integration of actors' logics and as it terminates with ahistorical forms of empirical explanations.

II - Establishing a Mediate Path

1) The choice of a pragmatic approach

a) A consequence-oriented perspective

Taking into account the risks of decontextualisation posed by the interactionist approach and the risks of essentialisation posed by the sociology of the state in dealing with the question of the perception of Islam by political parties, my theoretical posture opts for a middle path. The aim is both to tackle questions of general scope and to avoid categories of description and analysis that would be deprived of heuristic relevance. The crucial epistemological concern is the following: the identification of perceptive schemes, or the categories of designation, must not be a starting assumption. In doing so, my analysis borrows from the pragmatist legacy[33], which has

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[33] Pragmatism is originally a philosophical movement which was mostly initiated by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, and later William James, John Dewey and George H. Mead. Without entering the theoretical differences between these authors, a fundamental point of convergence between them is that the meaning of concepts is only accessible through their practical consequences. The idea of a "legacy" is, however, metaphorical in many respects. As Joan Stavo-Debauge has shown (2012), pragmatic sociology has only recognised lately the contributions of pragmatist philosophy, and authors like Laurent Thévenot (2011) and Luc Boltanski (2009) do not acknowledge an influence of this philosophical background on their early pragmatic works.

influenced pioneers of public policy analysis like Herbert Simon (1959), Harold Lasswell (1971) or James Anderson (1975) (Zittoun 2013) and political sociology (Lafaye & Thévenot 1993; Boltanski 1993 ; Linhardt 2001; Cardon & Heurtin 1996; Trom 1999; Didier 2009; Doidy 2005; Lemoine 2011; Stavo-Debauge 1997). As John Dewey pointed out, "the object of knowledge is eventual; that is, it is the outcome of directed experimental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing" (Dewey 1990 (1929), p.136). This observation, however purely epistemological, has strong consequences for how to tackle the perception of Islam by political parties because it makes us look at the issue on the "reverse side" and avoids some biases. I have underlined in the introduction the difficulty of manipulating slippery analytical objects like "islamophobia", "racism", "integration", "public issue" or "controversy"[34]. Considering the object of knowledge as only accessible through the mediation of concrete observations, which is as much as to say focusing on its consequences rather than its causes, shades off this difficulty.

First, because it allows us not to presuppose arbitrarily the existence of categories of perception or issues (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991). Second, when the notion of causality involves looking at the will and decisions of actors, the notion of consequence allows us to include unexpected effects. Many consequences are indeed epiphenomena that were not consciously decided by social actors (Callon, Lascoumes & Barthe 2001). If my analytical approach does not use the aforementioned categories, I am not denying their existence. However, my inquiry will be directed toward the contexts which may, or may not, provide them with a pragmatic relevance[35]. The empirical, historical and comparative processes will be used to grasp the systems of constraints and resources limiting or making possible, and subsequently visible, the emergence of the "question of Islam". In particular, I will focus on how Muslims have been perceived as an ethnic or religious category, and how what belongs to these designations has evolved through time. In the same way, the state laws are not to be

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[34] In particular in the developments on degreeism and conceptual stretching.

[35] Following the same logic, the definition that Dewey gives of the state tries to avoid both its characterisation as an abstract entity and its reduction to private individual interests.

comprehended as causes, but as structures channelling the action and accompanying patterns of interaction (Dewey 2012 (1927); Cerny 1990).

b) Adapting the epistemological choices

The aforementioned considerations bring a substantial number of consequences for the analysis of the perception of Islam by political parties. The first element involves the levels of analysis. What is at stake is to move away from a logic of binary opposition between the macrosociological structures to objectivate and the modes of objectivation. Methodologically speaking, the implementation of this demand can be achieved by putting the structures to the test of social reality. In other words, the analysis must look at the accomplishment of structural overdeterminations within stabilised practices, without falling into the objectivist trap described by Bernard Lahire as a "naturalisation of the product of (one's) measures" (Lahire 1992, p.116).

This research commitment also impacts the integration of the historical temporality of phenomena within the analysis. I have shown the necessity of taking into account historical dynamics, but the modalities of this research position must be in accordance with the aforementioned pragmatist postulate. A way to reconcile these two requirements is to follow a "methodological presentism" in the analysis of long-term dynamics. Using the terms of Yannick Barthe et al. (2013), the aim is "not only to contemplate in which respect "the dead seizes the living" but to examine as well, and in some way as a priority, in which respect the living seizes the dead" (p.182). In this thesis, I try to shed light on competing modalities of objectivation of history and memory, putting aside the attempt to look for a continuity. Authors like Elisabeth Claverie have indeed shown the etiological illusion lying beneath the surface of such an ambition, especially when it comes to the sociology of religion (Claverie 2003). However, I also needed a conceptual and methodological machinery that would fit the macrosociological nature of the subject I am dealing with. Tools like quantitative

semantics on parliamentary discourses fit such requirements and allow the observation on a large scale of sociolinguistic specificities like indexicality in discourses.

Another consequence of this research choice is that substantives should never be amalgamated with substances. The risk with any substantive definition is indeed its inability to take into account the diversification, complexity and the evolutions of the objects by setting them once and for all.

This postulate is all the more important when dealing with semantically charged notions such as Islam, religious, laïcité, multiculturalism. For the last two, in particular, a conceptual requalification is needed to focus on practical and discursive constructions without being absorbed by the ideological dimension of the debates they raise (Ollion 2010; Altglas 2010).

This is not, however, yielding to a purely nominalist approach of such notions[36]. The research position adopted here is closer to the one of authors like James Beckford (2003), acknowledging both the existence of social constructs and a social reality autonomous to discourses. The analysis aims both at giving an account of their objective and subjective dimensions. In the case of laïcité and multiculturalism, the objective dimension is the legal frame which stipulates the capacity of intervention of public authorities in the religious sphere or toward minorities. The subjective dimension, on the other hand, provides a meaning to the balance of power between the political-administrative arena and the religious or civil arena. This second dimension is analysed in this thesis as a register of legitimation[37]. In the same process, the

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[36] For instance, social scientists like Barr Barnes (1974) and David Bloor (1976) have tried to overcome the limits of a positivist posture by focusing exclusively on the effects of social constructions and the definition processes.

[37] The notion of "repertoire", inherited from Charles Tilly's conceptualisation (1979, 1984, 1995, 2005, 2006) has been largely developed since the 1990s (Traugott 1995), and has been used by sociologists of religions like Solenne Jouanneau and Yann Raison du Cleuziou (2012) because of its heuristic value when it comes to analysing the concrete exercise of authority within religious institutions. The works on discursive repertoires (Steinberg 1995,1998; Yi 2007) and national cultural repertoires (Lamont 1995; Lamont & Thévenot 2000), as well as the notion's compatibility with approaches like the frame analysis (see for example Snow 1986, 2001) show its potentialities. However, due to the many criticisms the notion has brought – especially on account of its reifying and absorbant dimension (Offerlé 2008; Mathieu 2004; Goodwin & Jasper

category of "Muslims" is grasped under the prism of their emerging visibility, whether religious or ethnic -which, symmetrically, allows questioning of the relevance of such categories of designation. This choice is consistent with a will to de-essentialise the objects of research in order to control the logical status of my approach, on both its descriptive and evidentiary aspects. It also requires challenging the existence of an *epistémè* that would be specific to religious dimensions[38].

2) Refining the categories of analysis to fit the object

a) Visibility as a category of understanding for perception

A socio-historical perspective is essential to grasp the modalities of construction of the object "Islam" by the French and Australian political parties. The different terms in which the issue of Islam is raised in both countries ensue from the differentiated problematisation processes, linked to their respective histories and political traditions. In the language of symbolic interactionism, this approach aims at grasping the evolution of a "career of problematisation", insofar as the events are considered as the results of a succession of sequences reorientating the general trajectory (Agrikoliansky 2001).

Now, the evolution of this problematisation process is analytically inseparable from the concrete modalities by which the actors are brought in the public debate. As Jean-Louis Quéré shows, social actors constitute themselves as groups and direct their actions in public space in relation to their public representation. Thus, these actors "do not pre-exist their configuration of a scene of apparition; they take shape incorporating symbolic mediations which are, by definition, public, that is to say shared, transcending the individuals, accessible to all and observable-descriptible" (Quéré 1992, p.88). In this respect, the notion of visibility – constructed as a sociological category – appears as one of the most relevant to grasp the problematisation process of the "question of Islam".

2005) – I am using it here interchangeably with the notion of "register" and without reference to the theoretical tradition it is associated with.

[38] See the introduction for the explicitation of the debates in the sociology of religion.

Brighenti (2007, p.324) highlights that the notion of visibility indeed ensues from a twofold genealogy, as it lies "at the intersection of the two domains of aesthetics (relations of *perception*) and politics (relations of *power*)". As such, it gives account of the semiotic relevance of Islam in social relations[39]. More precisely, I aim at evidencing what Olivier Voirol calls the "operations of constitution of the visible"[40], which prove heuristic in grasping the political perception because they are "necessarily part of a normative universe of visibility and are supported by requirements of visibility purporting to act on the hierarchies defining what deserves to be seen" (Voirol 2005, p.36).

Michel Foucault has extensively shown how becoming visible is linked to power processes and that their observation requires to focus on how social groups are made to be seen more than what is actually visible (Foucault 1966, 1969, 1980). This observation has been acknowledged in France by the postcritical sociological tradition[41], but it is also an essential discovery of the *Cultural Turn*, moving away from cultural legitimism as well as the critical theory inherited from the Frankfurt school[42]. Authors like Stuart Hall (1997), Phil Cohen (1972), Angela McRobbie (1991), Raymond Williams (1982), David Morley (2002) or Charlotte Brunsdon (2000) have in their respective fields of research tried to

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[39] Introducing the notion of visibility requires, however, to use specific theoretical and methodological tools, as well as semantic clarifications. In particular, it is necessary to make a distinction between the notion of visibility and the notion of recognition. I build on the work of Axel Honneth (2000, 2005) who shows that visibility is included within the process of recognition, which entails an expressive act by which knowledge is provided as an affirmation (Honneth 2005, p.45). In other words, the becoming visible cannot be assimilated to the recognition of social actors because it shares the dimension of cognitive identification but not the dimension of expression. This difference is particularly important in the case of Islam, as I will show how different modalities of identification of the object (religious and ethnic, for instance) involve different modalities of expression and of social "value".

[40] In this thesis, I refer to such processes using "emerging visibility" as a synonymous for "operations of constitution of the visible". The goal is to overcome the concept of visibility to focus on the processes that engender it and give it a specific form (see in particular Macé 2006).

[41] In France, this perspective is in particular taken into account by the heirs of the postcritique sociological tradition, with references to authors like Edgard Morin, Alain Touraine or Bruno Latour. See for instance the works of Eric Macé, Jean-Yves Trépos, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot.

[42] The theory of the Frankfurt school is largely based on the critique of the "cultural industry", according to Adorno and Horkheimer's words. Many of its works present an anthropology of mass culture where the individuals are manipulated by ideological bodies and deprived of means of resistance (see for instance Jay 1977; Wiggershaus 1993).

show "how" the subjects are made visible in order to shed light on the observation of "who" is made visible. Through this prism the modalities of construction of a collective imaginary and the normative processes creating the stigmatisation of labelled groups appear. Their deviance is identified in relation to such norms (Rajchman 1988; Macé 2006). In the emerging visibility of Islam in Australia and in France, the most revealing elements are the designation and identification processes by which this visibility is produced. In regard to minorities, Martín shows that two kinds of components influence the social visibility: endogenous components and exogenous components (Martín 2009). The endogenous factors are determined by the migratory trajectory of a group, the modalities of its settlement in the country. The exogenous factors refer to the intervention of external actors, in particular political parties, the media, academics and the public opinion.

b) Including the analysis of discourses

Taking into account all these epistemological considerations leads to search for a mediate path, and an adapted methodology. The perception of Islam is to be grasped as a dynamic activity through its concrete actualisation and context, but at the same time inscribed within structural patterns. Discursive practices of politicians – written or oral – are the most revealing clues.

As Francis Chateauraynaud puts it, "the text is the most widespread form of objectivation of behaviours, positions, argumentative and normative operations made by the actors" (Chateauraynaud 2003, p.120). In order to respect the aforementioned pragmatic requirements, the approach should start from the text itself in order to go back up to the structuring dynamics of meaning instead of looking for the subjective meaning that actors would give to their discourses. Following this Peircean epistemology involves a discontinuity between the social actors and their discursive production, as well as to "take seriously" the justifications given by the actors (Smyth 1997; Chauviré 1979). In this regard, quantitative semantics tools have not only been

chosen because of the macrosociological dimension of the subject but also because they assist us to understand discourse as an activity where regularities and stabilisations are observable, rather than perceive it as the result of a representation. In particular, in line with the works inspired by J.P. Benzécri, I have chosen quantitative analytical tools derived from the work of C. Flament on social representations (Clemence, Doise & Lorenzi-Cioldi 2014; Jodelet 2002; Flament 1981; Flament & Rouquette 2003) and tools for the analysis of lexemes derived from M. Reinert's work (Reinert 1999, 2001; Kalampalikis 2003). The question of how to implement a solid scientific methodology using qualitative as well as quantitative data, and responding to the aforementioned epistemological requirements, will be dealt with in the next chapter.

- Chapter 2: Methodological Groundings

Constructing a specific methodology responding to these epistemological issues in a comparative perspective is one of the goals this thesis aims to achieve. In particular, problems arise as to how to take into account micro-sociological, meso-sociological and macro-sociological dimensions, the multipositioning of social actors and the synchronicity and diachronicity of the object of study. To these challenges must be added the complexity of dealing with perception insofar as it is only accessible through the discourses of politicians which involve substantial biases. One of the most efficient ways to overcome these pitfalls is the triangulation of approaches, that is to say the use of complementary methodologies, including historical, political, sociological, linguistic dimensions in order to exploit their respective assets whilst reducing their potential for bias (Bryman 2004; Erzerberger & Prein 1997; Wodak 2007; Olsen 2004; Hussein 2015).

The methodological thought process that has been followed in this thesis corresponds to the aforementioned pragmatic requirements, because the findings of the fieldwork themselves have guided the choice of the appropriate tools. The identification of the perceptive schemes and more fundamentally of the relevant questions has been made thanks to a two-way process between qualitative analyses and quantitative analyses[43]. I started using qualitative methods (especially interviews) but the limits they raised brought me to use tools that can overcome specific issues like problems of sampling or contextual contingencies. Quantitative and computer-assisted content analyses have revealed a very significant influence of structural dimensions in the perception of Islam, ensuing from the democratic traditions of the two countries. These

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[43] In this respect, the distinction between qualitative work and quantitative work appears as unsatisfying to describe the chosen approach. As Francis Chateauraynaud (2003) shows by using a distinction which was formerly made by Carl Roberts (1997), choosing between the two categories either means that the "qualitative" is what resists to quantification, or to consider quantities as qualities. In both cases, this means denying essential dimensions in the construction and interpretation of the objects of study.

observations have brought me to conduct further socio-historical research in order to re-establish the diachronic dimension (for instance by showing historical continuities and discontinuities). It also allowed me to bring a new perspective to discourses on Islam by paying more attention to crucial explicative variables linked to the differentiated states[44]. In the light of these new findings, I could return to much more fruitful interviews targeting politicians to elaborate on specific issues related to the construction of a "question of Islam".

I - Adapting the Methodology to the Epistemological Requirements

1) The challenge of interviews

Working on the perception of political parties requires circumspection toward the object of study, in particular because analysts of political language have long identified its coded nature (Wodak 1989; Däubler et al. 2012; Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Laver, Benoit & Garry 2003; Carver & Pikalo 2008). This coding may take different forms, including implicit racial appeals which authors have identified under the concepts of "race card" (Mendelberg 2001; Hubert & Lapinski 2006; Nelson, Sanbonmatsu & McClerking 2007; Lee & Morin 2009) or "dog-whistle politics" (Poynting & Noble 2003; López 2015; Every & Agoustinos 2007). It is also necessary to take into account the temporal variations of discourses, like in periods of electoral campaigns (Jahn & Henn 2000).

My fieldwork research initially used semi-structured interviews with prominent politicians still in office (Ministers or Members of Parliament), modifying progressively the interview grid according to the answers and suggestions. This first stage of the analysis was paradoxically quite unproductive heuristically speaking but very useful to think afresh and refine the methodological and epistemological objectives of this thesis.

[44] Two major consequences are directly involved in the perception of Islam, respectively the links between the state and religious dimensions (analysed in chapter 3) and the management of minorities (analysed in chapter 4).

I have indeed very quickly observed that Islam is a "sensitive topic" in interviews (Leech 2002; Corbin & Morse 2003; Renzetti & Lee 1993) and politicians in office use recurring language elements in order to skirt the issue or in some cases refuse to answer when the question presents a risk. All the politicians in office interviewed have for instance claimed that the question of Islam was not a dividing issue within their own party. An explicit illustration is a UMP member of Parliament and former Minister who was interviewed in a context of sharp debates just after the failure of her party to organise a convention on laïcité:

> There is no specific debate (on Islam), I don't think so.
> We do not have any divergences, as you say, within the
> UMP on the question of Islam. Splits are on other
> points, and we have plenty of them, but not on Islam...[45]

Moreover, I noticed that the answers given to my questions often corresponded to the answers given to very different questions in various media[46]. Two consequences can be drawn from these observations. First, in the case of the thesis subject the context of the discourse is much less relevant. The second consequence, which corroborates the theoretical groundings in terms of feasibility, is that studying the post-2001 perception of Islam by political parties thus remained largely inaccessible to qualitative tools traditionally used by the sociology of parties[47] like interviews and participant observation.

I therefore decided to use semi-structured interviews only for a limited number of politicians fulfilling three requirements. The first criterion is that these politicians' role has been significant enough to make them essential for the problematisation process of Islam.

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[45] "Il n'y a pas de débat particulier là dessus, je ne crois pas. Nous n'avons pas de divergences, comme vous dites, au sein de l'UMP sur la question de l'Islam. Les fractures, elles sont sur d'autres points, et on en a pas mal, mais pas sur l'Islam...".

[46] For instance, a member of Parliament gave the exact same answer (including the necessity to gather around common values) to my question "Do you think the approach of your party is different from the approach of other parties regarding Islam?" and in a radio interview to the question "How should we deal with Jihadists?".

[47] In particular in the contributions of the sociology of organisations (Panebianco, Schlesinger, Crozier) and sociology of collective action (Gaxie 1977; Hirschman 1970; Fillieule 2005; Matonti 2005).

The second criterion is that they are no longer involved in politics or that the actions discussed during the interview belong to the past (in particular the turn of the 1990s and the turn of the 2000s). This enables a much more objective and reflexive insight because it is retrospective. To make this possible, the last criterion was to conduct in-depth interviews in order to grasp the perception in detail: as a matter of fact, the interviews lasted from 50 minutes up to 4 hours. To obtain better results, I chose a method of interview described by Jean-Claude Kaufmann (1996) as "comprehensive interview", which requires considering the interviewee not only as an object of study but also as an informer expressing the reasons for his or her representations. I chose to provoke the commitment of the interviewees by not following strictly the interview grid (which served as starting point) but building on the ideas developed by them. This avoided impersonal answers while capturing the axiological rationality of the politicians, as well as the categories of understanding underlying the justifications.

2) The concern for objectivity and the question of relativism

The question remained as to how to grasp the perception without naivety nor misrepresenting the politicians' discourses with preconceptions. As Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002) wrote,

> For the discourse analyst, the purpose of research is not to get "behind" the discourse, to find out what people really mean when they say this or that, or to discover the reality behind the discourse. The starting point is that reality can never be reached outside discourses and so it is discourse itself that has become the object of analysis (p.21).

Grasping the degree of veracity in discourses is therefore less important than identifying the representations which are conveyed and create a "legitimate designation" of Muslims. In other words, in the analysis of perception I aim at grasping the "motives" to use the expression of Isaac Joseph (2002) following Charles Wright Mills, that is to say

not the subjective source of action but an act of language which is inscribed within an available vocabulary and justifies a behaviour *a posteriori*. In this process, all perceptive schemes must be studied in a balanced way, focusing on the modalities of adducing of evidence and justifications. This is also consistent with my theoretical postulates since it ensues from the fact that "reality" is also a "representation" (Bourdieu 1980), that is to say an emerging visibility.

The concern for objectivity in my analyses may be confronted to the question of how to escape relativism. The principle which has been followed is indeed the symmetry in the analysis of discourses, without presupposing an inferior or superior rationality of politicians according to the calibre of their discourses, however radical they may be. In this respect, my approach uses methods which may be in accordance with Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak & Fairclough 2004; Weiss & Wodak 2007; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000) but differs from its normative goals insofar as my objective is not to give evidence of processes of production/reproduction of political inequalities, power abuses or domination. However, the triangulation of methods like computer-assisted content analyses, socio-historical analyses and interviews reveals to what extent the politicians' choices are rational and/or normative in their management of the political constraints and resources (Chateauraynaud 1991; Doidy 2005). In this respect, the choice of axiological neutrality toward politicians does not amount to naivety but enables revelation of their axiological priorities. Even within a same national tradition or a same party, "taking seriously" the discourses reveals crucial differentiations in the processes of definition/redefinition of notions linked to the question of Islam (including public order, public sphere, multiculturalism, laïcité, and so on).

II - *Contribution of Lexicometric Tools*

1) **Potentialities of computer-assisted content analyses**

To grasp these legitimate modes of presentation of Islam, all media can and must be taken into account, whether they be interviews conducted for the thesis, interviews on TV or radio, speeches in parliament, debates, open letters, manifestos or posts on offical websites and social networks. The challenge for the analysis was to find methodological tools which would be able to stabilise the modalities of designation of Islam responding to three requirements to guarantee its scholarly qualities and compatibility with the pragmatic approach: the absence of pre-set hypotheses, the reliability of the procedure and the capacity to handle representative samples. The automated analysis of discourses, or computer-assisted content analysis, can respond to such requirements.

First, the computer-assisted content analyses used in this thesis can be achieved without pre-set hypotheses about the perception of Islam. The categories of understanding are therefore not influenced *a priori* by the researcher, whose actions serve more to highlight observed regularities.

Second, since the researcher's biases do not influence the coding, the replicability of the procedure guarantees its reliability.

The third major asset is that it allows analysis of very large corpuses in a short amount of time. This enabled working simultaneously with discourses from a hundred different politicians simultaneously, thereby solving the problem of sampling.

These tools help in underlining semantic regularities. The latter do not aim at revealing hidden dimensions to the researcher but to highlight events showing consistency in the distribution and association of terms (Harris 1952; Pêcheux 1969; Achard 1993). What appears may be discursive strategies but also the influence of systems of constraints which actors might not be aware of, precisely because of their high degree of apparent naturalness.

Choosing the Appropriate Packages

Many software packages allow similar or slightly different quantitative analyses to those selected. The choice was made after several trainings in quantitative analysis (including completion of the Quantilille diploma in 2015) to evaluate the relevance of about 20 different packages for computer-assisted content analysis on the corpus of discourses on Islam. This list has helped advance the question of this thesis and includes analysis softwares like TXM, R (with Statnet or iGraph), TextQuest, Atlas, Pajek, Ucinet, NodeXL, Lexico 3 and tools for visualisation like Netdraw, Visone, Gephi. These courses, as well as discussions with prominent specialists like Pierre Ratinaud, Pascal Marchand, Pierre Mercklé, Baptiste Coulmont, Claire Bidard, François Denord, Etienne Ollion and Mathieu Hauchecorne have led to the choice of three main software packages: Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) to help for the manual selection of the passages directly related to Islam in the speeches, and Iramuteq and Alceste for the analysis of similarities and the Reinert method. The choice of the softwares came from their potentialities but also their ergonomy and the fact that they are freewares in order to allow a better replicability of the results of this thesis, and their possible use by researchers in different fieldwork settings. Although Alceste is not technically a freeware, it is available in many universities and the same Reinert method can also be achieved thanks to freewares like Iramuteq. Iramuteq is an interface of R (which is a freeware), works on all systems, and inherits R's potentialities of calculation and development.

2) Principles of the Analysis of Similarities (AOS)

The Analysis of Similarities is a data analysis method of general scope. However, its characteristics make it a particularly useful tool to study social representations (Clemence, Doise & Lorenzi-Cioldi 2014; Flament 1981; Flament & Rouquette 2003). As Rateau, Moliner et al. (2011, p.478) put it:

The first characteristic of (a social representation) is that of *organisation*. This is well and truly a structure, and not just a collection of cognitive elements. This means that the elements that constitute a social representation interact with each other. More exactly, this means that people cooperate in establishing relationships between these diverse elements. Particular opinions are considered equivalent to others, particular beliefs are deemed incompatible with particular information, and so on.

The underlying idea is that two objects will be closer in the representation as "a high number of subjects deal with it in the same way" (Flament 1986, p.141), and it is therefore possible to identify central and peripheral elements in a social representation. Although these relations are often symmetrical, they do not necessarily share transitivity. For instance, bringing together the cognitive elements "Islam" and "laïcité" on the one hand, and "Islam" and "ethnicity" on the other hand need not entail a confluence of laïcité and ethnicity. One could define these relations as proximity relations, locally defined, and whose values can fluctuate (Bouriche 2005). The theory of graphs (Berge 1958) may be used to match these organised systems of relations – translated into matrixes – in graphic form, as valued, connexes and cycleless ("valués"[48], "connexes"[49], "sans cycle"[50]) (Degenne & Vergès 1973, p.473). Concretely, it begins with a matrix of similarities (a table gathering all the similarity values for all dyads of elements) and to use the graphic properties of polarisation in order to highlight strong relations within a system of discourses[51]. The resulting graph, called "maximum tree", is simultaneously the simplest and the heaviest in terms of information as it only retains similarities representing local

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[48] A graph is called "valued" when it shows the strength of connectivity of the links between the summits.

[49] A graph is called "connexe" when there is always at least one way between two summits.

[50] A graph is called "cycleless" when the first summit, in a chain, is different from the the last one.

[51] The software Interface de R pour l'Analyse Multidimensionnelle de Textes et de Questionnaires (IRaMuTeQ), created by Pierre Ratinaud, enables integration of text matrixes, thereby allowing descriptions of internal general schemes of large corpuses.

maxima (Degenne & Vergès 1973). It allows us to identify, within discourses on Islam taken as a set of relations, inequalities of density among similarity relations (Degenne 1985). The Analysis of Similarities empowered by stabilised computer programs offers substantial interests for the analysis of discourses. I have chosen Iramuteq developed by researcher Pierre Ratinaud following his PhD research (2003). First, it involves the researcher in the process and allows a better understanding of the origins of the data[52]. It is therefore not a purely automated process delivering results but a tool for the researcher. A second element is that, because of this manual dimension, it enables adaption of the statistical choices to the phenomena, erasing for instance insignificant or non-relevant variables for grasping structural dimensions. It is useful to identify articulating axes in the sets of occurrences and therefore the existence of models.

3) Principles of the Alceste (Reinert) method

The Alceste method was theorised in Jean Paul Benzécri's research centre by Max Reinert in his PhD research (Reinert 1979).

It has been increasingly used by social scientists in the analysis of political discourses (Stavrou 2013; Marty 2015; Ratinaud & Marchand 2015; Ratinaud & Déjean 2009; De Galembert, Rozenberg & Vigour 2013; Abassi 2001; Brugidou 1998; Schonhardt-Bailey 2005). Kronberger and Wagner (2000, p.306) sum up in a concise manner the main principles of this analysis:

> Taken together, the program realizes a complex descending hierarchical classification combining elements of different statistical methods like segmentation (Bertier & Bouroche 1975), hierarchical classification and dichotomisation based on reciprocal averaging or correspondence analysis (Hayashi 1950;

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[52] For instance, the researcher chooses whether or not he wants lemmatisation, the threshold for the summits, the choice of a maximum tree, or the indice (cooccurrences, percentages of cooccurrences, simple matching, binomial, etc...).

Benzecri 1981; Greenacre 1993) and the theory of dynamic clouds (Diday, Lemaire et al. 1982)

The Alceste analysis is particularly interesting for this thesis because its goal is, in the continuity of Achard (1991, 1993) and Foucault[53] (1971), to grasp the discourse as an effective linguistic act in relation with a context (Reinert 1983, 1986, 1987, 2007). With this method, the meaning of the discourse is not apprehended through the representations that are made of it, but through the actual processes involved in its composition. In other words, Alceste focuses on the discursive activity itself, and does so by identifying the themes of the discourses, their distribution and their inter-relations in the corpus.

In this pragmatic approach consistent with the aforementioned epistemological issues, the basic concept is that the way discourses engender a representation is through the stabilisation of the discursive activity. In political discourses on Islam, just like on any other object, the analyst can observe recursive patterns. What makes this observation especially relevant for understanding the perception of Islam is that these repetitions reveal the three sign modes identified by Charles Sanders Peirce in his triadic model of the sign: *Symbolic*, *Iconic*, and *Indexical* Signs[54] (Peirce 1902). The matrixes used in the Alceste method allow the researcher to take into account these three dimensions[55]. As Max Reinert wrote,

> Just like a relief map gives the opportunity to conjure up
> a mental picture of the rivers, the communications, the
> more complex social activities, the study of repetitions

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[53] In particular, in *The Order of Discourse* (1971), Foucault points out a paradox which is fundamental for the analysis of discourses on Islam and fully justifies the use of programs focusing on co-occurrences: every discourse is saying for the first time something which had already been said.

[54] An iconic sign points to a physical resonance, whether by alliteration (phonetic resonance) or the reference to the same semantic field (isotopic resonance): religious, sacred, God, for instance share a common reference to transcendance. The indexical dimension is the proximity between a sign and an object: a beard, or a veil, may be a metaphor of a Muslim, a burka a metaphor of fundamentalism. The symbolic dimension refers to the impact and significance of a sign: for instance, in France and in Australia, the impact of the veil is different although they refer to the same religious practice.

[55] This technical point is central in Max Reinert's PhD, but is also summed up in Reinert 2003.

within a discourse brings the possibility of conjuring up a mental picture of the ideological trends, the fields of conflict, of splits, comparing the overlappings or oppositions between what we call the lexical worlds (1993)[56]" (2003, p.402).

To achieve this goal, the Alceste method requires that the categories be generated independently of the researcher. The software partitions the corpus in Text Segments (or Contextual Units) and generates classes based on the frequency of word pairs in between these segments[57], using a descending hierarchical classification analysis[58]. It uses different methods (maximum chi-squared criterion and optimal scaling) to classify the segments of texts on the basis of their similarity/ dissimilarity and to gather the most similar ones in a common class. Simultaneously, the different classes correspond to the most separate patterns of co-occurrences. A class presents therefore both the maximum possible internal semantic coherence and the maximum possible difference from other classes. The classes correspond to the "lexical worlds" and can be visualised thanks to a tree diagram (or dendrogram). This offers an immediate visibility of the positioning of classes in relation to one another, and just like for Iramuteq's Analysis of Similarities, all words and sentences can be traced back to the original text to ensure the coherence with the context. The interest is twofold for the analysis of political discourses on Islam: first, it reveals shared semantical universes that can be related to perceptive schemes, second it enables work on the relations between these different modalities of apprehension of Islam. To

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[56] "De même qu'une cartographie des reliefs ouvre à la possibilité de se représenter les rivières, les voies de communication, les activités sociales plus complexes, de même l'étude des répétitions dans un discours ouvre à la possibilité de se représenter les courants idéologiques, les zones de conflits, de ruptures, à partir de recouvrements, d'enveloppements ou d'oppositions entre ce que nous appelons des mondes lexicaux".

[57] Their number may vary according to the threshold specified by the researcher.

[58] The traditional method is the ascending classification (or cluster) analysis. The matrix relates relevant occurrences in column and contextual units in rows: the entry in the cell is "1" if the occurrence is present in the contextual unit, "0" if not. The researcher determines a number of iterations that will be aimed at by the program. The descending hierarchical classification method divides the classes in the most differentiated classes possible, until this number of iterations proves no longer relevant to identify statistical regularities.

ensure the feasibility of the analysis, the conditions are the topical coherence of the corpus and a minimum size of roughly 10 000 words. In this study, all the discourses are directly related to Islam (the use of Discourse Network Analyzer has been helpful for this purpose) and the size is much above the lowest limit.

One may object that this approach separates the contents from the situation of expressing it. Because of its objectifying methodology, this kind of analysis indeed puts an abstraction between the social world of political actors and their discourses. However, this is precisely this automated dimension which allows the researcher to get rid of the preconceptions which induce an interpretative bias, *a fortiori* when dealing with such a highly politicised and ideologically invested subject (Pêcheux & Fuchs 1975). These tools' faults may act in this case as qualities: their elision of the context is also their guarantee to limit the subjectivity and partiality of the analysis (Lebart & Salem 1988).

These lexical "tracks" of the perception of Islam show intentions and construction processes of meaning, but reconstructing the actual meaning involves taking into account the contextual and historical frame of discourses. The characteristics of these tools invite, in this respect, to complete the analysis with more diachronic analyses: this is the role of the socio-historical approach, the case studies and the critical analyses of discourses proposed in this thesis.

III - *Triangulation Between Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*

1) Integration of the historical temporality into the analysis

These analyses of numerous discourses have uncovered the structural importance of national traditions, which is revealed in subjective terms by the categories of understanding of the parties and in objective terms by the way Muslims are made visible in the society.

In order to observe the emerging visibility of Islam in the light of the migratory context and of the legal-political traditions of the two countries, this work's unifying thread is a socio-historical approach. Its reach goes as far as necessary to grasp the issues raised by politicians in the construction of a question of Islam in the 1990s and the 2000s. These analyses are above all important because politicians make references to the past – consciously or not – and the struggles for the interpretation of historical phenomena are structuring. For instance, the confrontations on the "original meaning" of French laïcité or on the historical role of a party toward religions divide the perceptions of Islam.

Grasping such elements requires a specific focus on the historical development of national configurations and on the processes of institutionalisation, in particular for what is related to the state-church relations and the link between citizenship and the integration of minorities. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use the socio-historical approach to include the historically differentiated State as an explicative variable in the analysis. Chapter 6 includes the historical ties between religions and political parties. The analysis draws on various sources to give account of the diverse expressions of the perception of Islam. This work is also based on many archives (archives of the parliament, newspapers, speeches...) to show the influence of political traditions on the perception of Islam as a religion and of Muslims as a minority. The parallel use of legal sources (court decisions, constitutions, international treaties, etc...) enables illumination of links between the legal tradition and the political tradition, as well as the processes of reciprocal influence between the legal sphere and the political sphere.

I have also used databases like INA and FACTIVA to make an inventory of all the press articles and documents, especially TV shows, which have dealt with Islam in France and in Australia. The goal was to observe the emerging visibility of Islam in order to grasp the evolution of the way in which Muslims and their religious practices were "made to be seen". Indirectly, this work helped in showing the overlappings between the media perception and the political perception of Islam. I used these data all along the thesis, but more intensively in Chapter 5. The analysis has been completed with in-depth interviews and more interpretative methods like the comparative analysis of books and internet websites.

It is noteworthy that the comparative perspective is central in these analyses, because it is what gives meaning to the findings. Many socio-historical elements in this thesis have already been observed by researchers but the aim of this work is to show the more or less idiosyncratic nature of such characteristics. For instance, the church-state relations in Australia and in France, or the management of minorities have been dealt with by legal studies, historical studies and political science. However, presenting these findings in a comparative manner and on the question of Islam enables pointing out marginalised or ignored aspects. A national obviousness may be an international singularity, with hitherto unseen effects.

2) Integration of individual cases

Case studies may help to understand the relations between independent variables and dependent variables, by explicating the interplay between individual interests and institutional dimensions. However, taking into account individual cases is complex when dealing with such a macrosociological topic. I have shown that, in the case of this thesis, dispositions and the context of the discourses are not relevant for our demonstration. For all that, the perceptive schemes identified by the analysis are not generalisations and do not refute the necessity to integrate in individual perception the positions and dispositions of politicians. I use individual cases in chapters 4 and 5 in order to refine and weigh against the structural overdeterminations mentioned. I also elaborate on a dozen of contrasted case studies in Australia and in France before the Alceste analysis whose conclusions use idealtypes and which are illustrated by typical discourses. The objective is to confine the reach of these results and to refine the conditions in which they "function", showing that the individual trajectory may influence the perception of Islam without invalidating the existence of macrostructural regularities. The case studies are therefore not examples but possibilities, some of them being representative of common trends and some being unusual. As R. Emigh (1997) shows, working on limit or extreme cases may be the best way to reveal that it is not necessary that all the preconditions of the case be

filled to make the result happen and that, conversely, the result is never inevitable when all the preconditions are matched.

3) Operating a triangulation of methods

My methodological approach is therefore characterised by a triangulation of approaches in order to improve both the sharpness and the fecundity of the analyses.

Three understandings of the triangulation metaphor may be considered: mutual validation, integration of different perspectives on the investigated phenomenon and the trigonometrical meaning (Kelle 2005). In this thesis, qualitative and quantitative results corroborate and complete each other. Socio-historical data allow a cross-checking with the automated analyses but also contextualise their contribution. Since the methods I use yield comparable data, convergences help to validate or deepen the results of qualitative methods by showing that they are not produced by a method artifact (Maxwell 1998; Flick 1998; Fielding & Fielding 1986; Erzberger & Prein 1997). The trigonometrical metaphor of "triangulation" – derived from navigation – is also operational in this thesis since I have tried to localise the object of research using multiple reference points (Smith 1975; Denzin 1978). As Todd D. Jick (1979, p.603) writes,

> triangulation, however, can be something other than scaling, reliability, and convergent validation. It can also capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study. That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures may also uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected by single methods.

Divergences[59], in this respect, have been useful in helping me understand more complex structuring dimensions in the perception of Islam. The most explicit illustration may be found in the construction of this thesis' central question. Interviews and socio-historical research had clearly shown that in France and in Australia the "question of Islam" had been constructed under two different prisms, namely religious in France and ethnic in Australia with two associated governing frames – laïcité and multiculturalism. After having built a representative sample of discourses in Australia and in France, I expected to observe these elements clearly stand out on the analyses of similarities designed to identify such central notions. However, the maximum trees did not make this ethnic/religious divide appear directly. What appeared, however, was a divide between two models of state-citizen relationship (subsuming the ethnic/religious divide). By means of this triangulation process, I found that the emerging visibility of Islam could not be understood independently from the moral architecture of the two countries whose expressions could be observed in the perception of both religion and minorities. Both prisms – the religious and the ethnic alike – were actually derived from a specific role of the state in relation to the society. Therefore the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in a comparative perspective enabled the thesis to reap the benefits of both approaches and at the same time to minimise their respective biases.

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[59] In the cross-checking of my methods, I did not come across contradictions but results relating to different phenomena which I coined as divergences.

Part 2. The "Question of Islam" in Australia and France

- Chapter 3: Islam and the Governance of Religions

One of the most dangerous pitfalls met by social scientists in comparative studies regards the challenges of labelling and categorising.

Marion Maddox recalls that modern Australia has been designated as "the world's most secular society" (Maddox 2001, p.1). Nonetheless, the term secular is problematic, and especially when the study is a comparison with France. Stephen Chavura notices in this respect two harmful tendencies resulting from a prism of analysis using France as a frame of reference. The first tendency would be to interpret words such as "religion" or "establishment" in the light of the laïque rhetorical tradition, forgetting that they take a specific meaning in the Australian legacy[60], the second to observe the absence of a laïque rhetoric and to infer from it the non-existence of an Australian secularism or a church-state separation (in Barbalet, Possamai & Turner 2011, pp.78-79). This analysis is all the more relevant since the immediate comparison of empirical data poses a risk of generating a "synchronic cut" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron 1968) which would omit that the resemblance between two elements of discourses or practices does not necessarily mean a collusion of two temporal systems. As a consequence, it can dissimulate two very different realities, and vice versa. As Natacha Gally explains, "without a historical step backward, the temptation is strong to stabilise, or even to essentialise some institutional configurations"[61] (Gally 2012, p.22).

This is why the regulation of issues related to Islam, and to "the religious" in general, cannot be analytically separated from the evolution of the political structures it relies on. This chapter therefore has two goals. The first is to explore the emergence and stabilisation of different patterns of relations between the state and religions: this will be

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[60] In particular, according to the authors, this would lead the commentators to see violations of the secularism or the church-state separation when there is not.

[61] "en l'absence de recul historique, la tentation est forte de stabiliser artificiellement, voire d'essentialiser certains arrangements institutionnels".

done by comparing laïcité and the Australian secularism in the light of their historical depth. The second goal is to make these models suitable for descriptive purposes: in this respect, I will show that they provide clues to contextualising the current perception of Islam by political parties.

I - Socio-Historical Comparison

1) The origins of the two secularisms

a) Origins of the Australian secularism

The British settlement in New South Wales, officially promulgated on 7 February 1788, followed the necessity to find an alternative to Georgia for sending prisoners (Davison, Hirst & Macintyre 1998). In this context, religion could not play the same role that it had played for the emigrants of the *Mayflower*. Hans Mol underlines in this respect the difference between the purely military ceremony which followed the arrival in Botany Bay and the strongly religious one that had marked the Pilgrim Fathers' disembarking in New Plymouth 68 years earlier (Mol 1971). The respective roles of religion in these events were indeed a sign of the roles it was to play in these new lands. Mol insists that in spite of its development, religion in Australia "did not become central to the life of the nation" (Mol 1971, p.1). This observation is a crucial element to grasp the relatively peaceful context in which the Australian secularism emerged as opposed to its American and – as shown herein below – its French counterparts[62]. It is noteworthy that the Anglican Church had first functioned on the model of an established church (Galligan &

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[62] In America, the most famous episode of this violent context is probably the Philadelphia Nativist Riots of May and July 1844 where 32 people died over a rumour that Catholics (whose population was growing) wanted to remove the Bible from public schools.

Roberts 2007). During the first decades of the settlement, it was the only one to receive aid for education, clergy, and the construction of religious buildings (Thompson 1994).

Two main reasons explain this situation. First, the Doctrine of Discovery and the legally constraining premise that Australia was *terra nullius* installed the British Sovereignty and subsequently the imposition of the Church of England as official State religion (Randell-Moon 2013; Hogan 1981). Second, there was a pragmatic consideration from the authorities seeking to control a potentially dangerous population which was looked upon as morally impaired. In this regard, the church appeared as a social institution able to fulfil this role (Fletcher 2002). Justice Dixon wrote in *Wylde v. Attorney-General (N.S.W.)* (1948) that

> (...) although in the beginning and for a not inconsiderable period the position of the Church of England in New South Wales appears to have been that of the Church established by law, time changed its relation to the law. It is not easy to trace the steps by which the result was reached but eventually it came to be considered as a body like other Churches established upon a consensual basis (...) " (*Wylde v. Attorney-General* 1948).

The ethnic consideration undeniably played a role in the disestablishment of the Anglican Church. In this respect, it is noteworthy that *grosso modo* one third of the colonial population at the beginning of the nineteenth century was Irish, and therefore mostly Catholic. The official discourse regarding this denomination could not but evolve towards an accommodating posture[63].

The context of religious pluralism therefore predated de facto its legal recognition by means of the Church Act in 1836. Implemented by Sir Richard Bourke in New South Wales, the Church Act allowed aids for the construction of churches but also for

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[63] While Neil K. Macintosh notices in his biography of Richard Johnson (the first Australian chaplain) that the authorities had denied the offer made by the Roman Catholic Church to send two priests with the first fleet (Macintosh 1978), Tom Frame highlights that in 1830 all the main denominations had sent representatives (Frame 2006).

recruiting and remunerating clergymen independently of their denomination[64]. If the Baptists turned down the offer to avoid any control by the authorities, it helped not only the Anglicans but also the Catholics, the Presbyterians, and even the Jews (Rutland 2002).

By this initiative, Australia clearly differentiated itself from Great Britain where the state aid was the Church of England's prerogative[65]. In many respects, Australia reconciles both the British tradition considering religion as a social good and the American tradition which refuses any kind of denominational domination (Barbalet, Possamai & Turner 2011, e.g. p.79).

S. Monsma and C. Soper conclude that the *Church Act* installed two precedents which keep influencing Australian religious politics: a rule of non-discrimination among denominations for state aid and a principle of pragmatism in the church-state relationship regulation (Monsma & Soper 2008). As I have mentioned, the motives that underpinned the elaboration of the *Church Act* were mostly practical: the great diversity of the Australian religious landscape made the British model increasingly untenable. Taking into account this diversity quickly became compulsory for the new Australian state. However, the question of the status of the Church in Australia seems to have been scarcely approached at the theoretical level. Practical justifications have again led to a change of posture: in a more stable Australia, where the installation of a political legitimacy was no longer a priority, the Church Act had become a costly and difficult to implement administrative millstone (Hogan 1981). "State aid" therefore changed its meaning over the course of the nineteenth century, and ended by meaning aid to religious schools only. Eventually, each colony implemented new legislations to abolish the state aid: South Australia in 1851, Queensland in 1860, New South Wales in 1862 (subsidies to religious schools were only abolished in 1880), Tasmania in 1869, Victoria in 1870 and Western Australia in 1890.

It is symptomatic to notice that, just as the political class had not shown any

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[64] In particular, 1000£ grants for the construction of religious buildings were allocated to congregations which had already gathered this amount. The *Church Act* was therefore offering aids to already important congregations.

[65] It is nonetheless noteworthy that many Anglicans, amongst them William Grant Broughton, contested this legislation because of its effects which disestablished the Church of England.

particular devotion to the British model of establishment, it did not show an outstanding fervour to defend the promotion of religious pluralism by the state (comparatively, the violence of the debates preceding the disestablishment measures in France after the 1880s is striking). The philosophical question of the status of the Church in Australian society was never asked as strongly as it was in France, or at least never in such a bellicose way. This allowed a more peaceful management of the church-state relationship regulation. The debate only opened explicitly with the process of Constitution writing, but only in a tempered way as shown in the official report of the 1898 Melbourne Australasian convention[66].

b) Origins of the French laïcité

The French history is fundamentally different from the Australian history. First, because of its length which makes it a palimpsest, second because of the role that the Catholic Church has played. The French case offers in this regard a startling example of a case where the political, long subordinate to the religious, granted itself a legitimacy until then reserved to the numinous law. This history is made of countless vicissitudes[67], and could be dated at least to the eighteenth century[68] (Fauchois 1988; Lalouette 2005).

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[66] See, in particular the preliminary debates of 7 February and 8 February 1898 when Higgins only met minor objections from the other Members of Parliament. Symon, for instance, mentioned that the word observance "seems to go a little too far" and Barton argued that his claim was "far-fetched" because " a preamble does not give power to anybody". The contrast is striking when compared with the violence of the debates predating the 1905 law in France.

[67] To give a better account of this complexity, a selective chronology since the Revolution is suggested in Appendix 1.

[68] Some authors go as far as considering the Saint Barthélémy slaughters (24 August 1572) and the end of the religious wars thanks to the Edict of Nantes (13 April 1598). This period has indeed generated the idea that religion and civil violence may be intrinsically linked, and that the state had the duty to protect the civil society. The revocation of the Edict placed again the state under the supervision of the Church, until the Revolution (Hervieu Léger in Martin 2013; Bouineau 2012).

Article 3 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* had stated since 1789 the sovereignty of the nation[69] yet the latter was to be de facto established only after a century of struggles. It would be therefore reifying to sum up this history on account of its non-linearity (Bruley 2004; Weill 2004; Amson 2004) but it is possible to emphasise trends to shed light on our analysis. Despite the chaotic, if not contradictory, chronology of laïcité[70] (Cholvy 1994), Jean Baubérot suggests a clarifying reading through the notion of "thresholds of laïcisation", that is to say transition periods where new relationships between institutions were structured[71] (Baubérot 1998).

The first threshold was according to Baubérot built between 1789 and the beginning of the First Empire. During this period when a first swing was noticeable, important reforms were implemented. A turning point is the civil constitution of the clergy implemented by the laws of 12 July and 24 August 1790 because it accomplished in a secular form the sacralisation of the political (Gauchet 1988). The post-revolution period also brought some important milestones such as the establishment of the system of recognised religions (Concordat), the enforcement of the civil code, the creation of the university. A second threshold would have started with the laïcisation measures of the 1880s, following the 1869 programme of Belleville. To name a few, measures establishing the end of public prayers in Parliament[72], the laïcisation of education[73], the

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[69] In particular, article 3 states that "the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation."

[70] As exposed in Appendix 1, the dynamics and processes at work are therefore complex to comprehend because the history seems to effect many flashbacks, in particular with the Restoration period and the Third Empire, and yet the relationships between the Church and the society changed progressively and structurally all along the century (Rémond 2005).

[71] These thresholds cannot be reduced to the institutional mutations which are their first element. They subsequently involve "the recognition and the questioning of the religions' social legitimacy (...) as well as the issue of pluralism" (Baubérot 2001, p.22).

[72] Cf. the law of 18 August 1884.

[73] Ferry conferred to the state the monopoly for issuing diplomas in 1879. The laws of 16 June 1881 and 28 March 1882 furthered this process by making the public primary school free and compulsory. The latter measures were intrinsically linked in the republican ideology: indeed, being free of charges allowed the education to be compulsory, and this obligation was the solution to impose laïcité in a country with so intense religious divisions.

laïcisation of the school teachers[74] and the banning of catechism from public schools[75] consecrated a new shift towards the imposition of the state as the new transcendent unifying force for the society, until the separation law of 1905.

The large majority of Republicans have considered this law as, according to Ferdinand Buisson's words, "the last term of the laïcisation of the state" (Buisson 1918). However, the definition of the meaning of this breaking point remains an important historical issue (Mayeur 1997). Two activist memories, one Catholic and one Laïque have long split the country over the perception of the period, the former recounting a time of religious persecution and the latter a victory over obscurantism[76].

The reason is that, if the old Church had in many respects a monarchical dimension, the Republican state was not only built against but on the model of its enemy (Coq 1995). The words of Renouvier, a Kantian philosopher and a great inspiration for the Republicans, are here evocative: "the state is the source of the nation's moral unity. It is responsible for souls, like the Churches, but in a more universal manner"[77] (Renouvier 1876, p.100). Hence in the conflicts that shook the nineteenth century, two forms of sacrality were opposed, recalling in some regards the religion wars of the Middle Ages[78].

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[74] For primary schools, the Goblet law of 30 October 1886 aimed at banning religious congregations from public schools. For secondary education, the decision Abbé Bouteyre of 10 May 1912 installed a tradition of laïcité for the teaching personnel.

[75] Cf. article 2 of the law of 28 March 1882.

[76] The memory constitutes a frame to this narration, influencing axiologically a great number of studies on the period. Some historians like Antonin Debidour show a laïque activism in their work, while others like Adrien Dansette or Joseph Brugerette show a much more Catholic point of view.

[77] " L'Etat est le foyer de l'unité morale de la nation. Il a charge d'âmes comme les Eglises, mais à un titre plus universel".

[78] Victor Hugo gave in this respect a famous literary account of the situation: "two schools condense and summarise in themselves the two contrary currents that carry the civilisation in opposing directions, the first towards the future, the second towards the past; the first of these schools is called Paris, the other is called Rome. The book of Paris is the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The book of Rome is the Syllabus" (free translation, in *Œuvres complètes*, Impr. nat., Actes et Paroles, Volume III, p.21).

The Nation on the one hand and the Church on the other hand confronted their rites[79], their temples, their spiritualties, their saints, sharing the space[80] and the time and creating a dichotomy between "two Frances" (Poulat 1987). The law of 1905, in spite of its very liberal and calming objectives, cannot be understood but through the prism of this context where the political modernity took a revolutionary configuration.

From these two brief glimpses of the origins of the two secularisms, some immediate observations can be made that will prove helpful for our contemporary analysis of Islam in political discourses.

2) Two different ties to History

a) Ties to conflictuality

The first element is that the relation to churches do not carry, in both countries, the same conflictuality. Adam Possamai (2008) notices that although Australia is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the world, "this has happened largely peacefully and without clashes between religious groups" (p.30). This social peacefulness may also be observed in the legal-political history of the country. In the Australian constitution, section 116 was not enacted to remove their official position to the religious institutions but rather to avoid giving too much reach to the mention of God in the Preamble. Holly Randell-Moon highlights that: "(the Australian) colonial and religious history is implicated in the ways that section 116 can be interpreted and applied by the Australian High Court to an ostensibly secular and neutral Australian law whilst at other times, the section is viewed as compatible with the institutional privileging of Christianity" (Randell-Moon 2014, p.357). In this respect, Marion Maddox recalls that the biblical quiz at which Julia Gillard challenged Tony Abbott was a nostalgic, although fantasised,

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[79] The celebrations for the anniversary of Clovis' coronation in 1896 give a good example of the opposition between a France that considered itself the heir of the millenary Catholic Church and a France that claimed to be reborn in 1789.

[80] In the end of the nineteenth century the municipalities were covered with signs, memorial stones, and street names, showing the willingness of the state to control the space.

reminder of "the models of politico-religious equilibrium existing at the beginning of the twentieth century" (Maddox 2012, p.62). In France, on the other hand, laïcité was built with an explicit objective of destroying the privileges of the dominant Catholic Church[81], that is to say in a necessarily more conflictual posture towards the religious. This allows us to draw a line between the notion of secularisation and the laïcisation process. The Secretariat Office to the Religious Affairs of Québec mentions that "if secularisation appears as a progressive socio-cultural process, laïcisation rarely unfolds without struggles for power and political debates, because it modifies the functioning of the institutions, whether religious or political"[82] (Comité sur les affaires religieuses 2003, p.19). The popular collective imagination has largely retained the idea of a Third Republic which put down the revolt of the inventories in 1906, virulently anticlerical (Cabanel 2005), derived from a memory of confrontation (Baczko 1982, Lebrun 1985). In this regard, one may recall De Mun's words summarising the spirit of the uncompromising Catholics on the law of 1905 and the Constitution of 1791: "the latter was schism, the former is apostasy" (Boutry 2006). In addition to a social project, which was to free the spirits from any religious dogmatism[83], was the political project to abolish the rivalry of the Vatican to the state sovereignty, which led to the recalling of the ambassador at the Holy See on 21 May 1904[84] (Fietcher 1965, p.99). The Australian case corroborates the comparison made by Jean Baubérot and Séverine Mathieu (2002) between France and the United Kingdom in showing that the French laïcité is an international idiosyncrasy insofar as it refers to a modality of state intervention which is external to the religious with a potential conflictuality.

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[81] Cf. article 2 of the law of 9 December 1905, according to which "The Republic does not recognise, remunerate, or subsidize any religious denomination".

[82] "Si la sécularisation apparaît comme un processus socioculturel progressif, la laïcisation se déroule rarement sans engendrer des rapports de force et susciter des débats politiques, puisqu'elle modifie le fonctionnement des institutions, tant religieuses que politiques".

[83] This feeling is expressed by the naturalist writer Emile Zola, acute observer of the end of the nineteenth century: "C'était du noir pessimisme de la Bible qu'il fallait enfin délivrer le monde, épouvanté, écrasé depuis deux mille ans, ne vivant que pour la mort, et rien n'était plus caduc ni plus mortellement dangereux que le vieil évangile sémite appliqué encore comme seul code moral et social" (Zola, Les quatre évangiles, Vérité, 1901).

[84] A *chargé d'affaires* only was maintained in the Vatican.

b) Ties to ideology

This first observation suggests a fundamental issue which cannot be avoided here on account of its structural dimension. The history of the two secularisms offers the picture of an opposition between very ideology-based church-state relations in France, and a much more pragmatic approach in Australia[85]. In France, clearly expressed principles like neutrality and separation are indissociable from the historical construction of laïcité. The religious neutrality is indeed the contrary of the political neutrality, as evidenced by Jules Ferry's famous letter to the primary school teachers of 27 November 1883[86]. Béatrice Mabilon-Bonfils (2008) evokes in this respect a "very politically engaged ideology" where the school was the spearhead for the inculcation of Republican values[87]. From its origins, the idea of laïcité is therefore ideologically opposed to the Catholic orthodoxy, whether under the form of a bourgeois liberalism or socialist doctrines[88] (Poulat 1977). Conversely, the theoretical considerations seem to have come in second place in the establishing process of the Australian secularism. As shown by Clifford L. Pannam in his classic 1946 article *Travelling section 116 with a US road map*, this consideration enables

[85] Graham Maddox rightly warns against a utilitarian, or Benthamite interpretation of Australian politics which would omit that it is not totally deprived of any ideological substrate. The risk would be indeed to consider as common sense decisions emanating from dominant ideologies (Maddox 2000). The dichotomy we are evoking here emphasises a salient difference allowing a better intelligibility in the context of a France-Australia comparison on the church-state issue. We will be led to nuance this perception of an ideology-free Australian politics when tackling with the question of the party logics (on this subject, see also Stokes 1994 and Edwards 2012).

[86] Ferry urges the primary school teachers to become what Péguy would call later the "black hussars of the Republic" by charging them of the moral and civic teaching: " En vous dispensant de l'enseignement religieux, on n'a pas songé à vous enlever ce qui fait la dignité de votre profession. Au contraire, il a paru tout naturel que l'instituteur, en même temps qu'il apprend aux enfants à lire et à écrire, leur enseigne aussi ces règles élémentaires de la vie morale qui ne sont pas moins universellement acceptées que celle du langage ou du calcul".

[87] To give an evocative example, the battle of the Republicans against the teaching congregations shows this ideological crusade. Jules Ferry obtained in the 1880s the termination of the Company of Jesus and submitted all the other congregations to State authorisations. The Combes' government closed more than 3000 schools in 1902, over an absence of authorisation. In Spring 1903, all authorisations were refused and in July 1904 all congregations were given ten years to end their teaching activities.

[88] It is noteworthy that social Catholicism, whose existence is not to be underestimated, was not considered at its beginning as a march towards social democracy.

grasping the specific relationship between Australian political parties and religion, as opposed not only to France but also to the United States where the Human Right doctrine inherited from Rousseau and Locke was adapted by Jefferson and Paine. According to Pannam, in Australia "(the) lethargic movement of the Australian Colonies towards federation was completely uninfluenced by such philosophical speculation" (Pannam 1946, p.44). Hogan notices likewise about section 116 that "whereas the American formulation enshrines a principle that was close to the heart of the circumstances in which some American colonies had been founded and developed, the Australian measure was a constitutional innovation which was introduced and adopted with only the minimum of consideration and debate" (Hogan 1981, p.219).

II - From the Legacy to Today's Governance of the Religious

1) Two legal and political traditions

a) French laïcité as a project, Australian secularism as a limit?

These two approaches are also legally and politically expressed by two different logics of regulation for the church-state relationship. France is defined as a "laïque Republic" in the constitutions of 27 October 1946 and 4 October 1958[89]. The latter states in its first article[90] that:

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[89] Historically, many French Constitutions have refused to recognise a laïque dimension of the state. However, it remains true that the idea of laïcité, though not explicitly mentioned, has often subtended constitutional texts. To give but one example, the first French Constitution of 3 September 1791 makes strong references to laïque principles.

[90] Laïcité can also be found in the preamble of the Constitution of 27 October 1946 to which refers the preamble of the 1958 Constitution: " l'organisation de l'enseignement public gratuit et laïque à tous les degrés est un devoir de l'État ".

> France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic and social Republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs.[91] (...)

Laïcité is positively defined and associated with the terms indivisible, democratic and social. It must therefore be noted that laïcité is a modality of administration of the French society and, as Jean Boussinesq underlines, a project of which the 1905 law is the expression (Boussinesq 1994). By contrast, the Australian secularism is essentially ruled constitutionally with a negative sentence involving only the Commonwealth:

> The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth (section 116 of the Australian Constitution of 1 January 1901).

Contrary to laïcité, Australian secularism only defines what the Commonwealth cannot legally do. This is as much as to say that, as Justice Stephen puts it, "(it) cannot readily be viewed as the repository of some broad statement of principle concerning the separation of church and state" (Attorney—General (Vic) (Ex rel Black) v Commonwealth 1981). Justice Wilson writes in the same case the sentence – often referred to – which states that "the provision (...) cannot answer the description of a law which guarantees within Australia, the separation of church and state".

This fundamental difference between the two secularisms, with on the one hand a founding law bearing the title of "Separation Law" and on the other hand a mere restriction which does not even apply to the states[92] can only be understood under the light

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[91] "La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances (...)".

[92] The referenda of 1944 and 1988 aiming at extending its power to the states have failed. Now, the states have almost all de facto adopted legislations in order to fill this legal gap. Marion

of a comparative history of the two countries[93]. In France, the intention of the authors of the Separation Law was to put an end to the situation of confrontation by autonomising the political relatively to the religious. Opposing Edouard Vaillant who called the Church an "instrument of error and moral domination" (JORF, ordinary session 10 April 1905, p.1302), and Maurice Allard, who wanted to "keep fighting the Church, which is a political and social danger" (ibid., p.1294), Briand stated loud and clear that he "hated the religious war" and that "legally speaking this regime is the only one which, in France, a country where the beliefs are diverse, protects and safeguards the rights of everyone"[94] (Briand Report, JORF Annexe n°2302, 2nd session 4 March, 1905, p.3). This is far from the reasons that brought the integration of section 116 into the Australian Constitution. As noted, the history of this section is indeed indissociable from the introduction of God in the Preamble. It is here interesting to understand why. The constitutional convention held

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Maddox notes that "of the states, only Tasmania protects religious freedom and prohibits religious discrimination in its Constitution. Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, as well as the Northern Territory and ACT, have specific laws prohibiting religious discrimination. New South Wales lacks specific religious freedom protection, but achieves some coverage (for instances where religious identity is closely tied to ethnicity) via its Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.5 South Australians are the least protected, their Supreme Court having found in 1984 that 'there is no legal remedy available to any person who believes that his or her right to freedom of religion or belief has been violated by that State's Parliament or Government'" (Maddox 2001, p.106).

[93] It is also notable that the opposition between common law and civil law played an important role. If in Australia the jurisprudence has always preceded the administrative practice, the case is different in France. In Australia, the jurisprudence has created precedents that have regulated practices. Harris mentions in this respect that the doctrine of precedent is "woven into the essential fabric of each common-law country's constitutional ethos" (Harris 2002, p.412). To name a few, we will recall herein below the cases Krygger v Williams, Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v the Commonwealth, Attorney-General (Vic) Ex rel Black v Commonwealth. In France, on the other hand, the jurisprudence follows from the administrative procedures and practices. The "veil affair" is a prominent example of this situation: after the events leading to the suspension of three students in Gabriel Havez high school in 1989, the country had to wait the Jospin circular of 12 December 1989 and the law of 15 March 2004 in order to establish a jurisprudence. I will not engage in a legal discussion over the qualities of the two systems relative to religious freedom. My objective is to grasp the differences in the philosophies permeating both secularisms, in order to understand how Islam-related issues can be integrated into these frames.

[94] "Juridiquement que ce régime est le seul qui, en France, pays où les croyances sont diverses, réserve et sauvegarde les droits de chacun". Aristide Briand summarises in these words the spirit of the 1905 law in his report on the law project: "Toutes les fois que l'intérêt de l'ordre public ne pourra être légitimement invoqué, dans le silence des textes ou le doute sur leur exacte interprétation, c'est la solution libérale qui sera la plus conforme à la pensée du législateur" (ibid., open cit.).

in Melbourne in 1898 decided that the mention of God in the Preamble of the Constitution was necessary in order not to lose the support of the masses to the federation project[95], and therefore adopted the words suggested by Patrick Glynn "humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God". The appearance of section 116 aimed, according to many analysts, at counterbalancing this reference (Quick & Garran 1901; McLeish 1992; Irving 1999; Winckel 2000). According to Luke Beck, Higgins, who was the father of its introduction in the constitutional text, would have understood that the legislative powers of the Commonwealth were "wide enough to authorise legislation dealing with religion and the provision he proposed was intended to limit the scope of those powers" (Beck 2013, p.415).

b) The question of separation

Does that mean therefore that only France guarantees a strict separation of the state and the Churches, with Australia confining itself to limitating an overly vaste legislative power granted to the Commonwealth? Such a conclusion would be too hasty and needs to be much nuanced.

First, the case of France cannot be summed up so easily. "We are all, in France, the children of Separation", Émile Poulat wrote in *Liberté, Laïcité* (1987). The central contentions arise as to the nature of this separation. The law of 9 December 1905 bears the title of "Law on the Separation of the churches and the state" but the word separation in itself never appears in the text of law. Raphaël Liogier remarks that this is significant since the latter only is applicable and opposable (Liogier 2006, p.35). The term is probably the only one that can – legally speaking – be the object of a substantial

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[95] Higgins declared in a very pragmatic way that "in order to gain for the Federal Constitution the votes of a vast number of good people, I am willing to support a proposal for the insertion of appropriate words in the preamble." (debate of 7 February 1898). Richard Ely mentioned in this regard that the New South Wales Council of Churches led in 1897 a strong campaign for a petition stating "that in the preamble of the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth it be recognised that God is the Supreme Ruler of the world, and the ultimate source of all law and authority in nations." (Ely 1976, p.21).

misunderstanding. For instance, in 1936 Henri Capitant suggested one of the first definitions of laïcité in the following terms: "a political conception entailing the separation of the civil society and the religious society, the state exercising no religious power and the churches exercising no political power" (Capitant 1936, p.305). If the idea of separation between temporal affairs and spiritual affairs is undeniably at the centre of the notion, the terms "civil society" and "religious society" lead to a noticeable confusion. First, because they present these two entities as unified fields, second because it is a separation between the state and the churches (Barbier 1995). In other words, separation only means the relegation in the private sphere in a strictly legal sense[96]: religion leaves the area of the state, *ie.* the domain of public authority to join the area of the civil society. Thus the "privatisation" of religion is not the denegation of its social dimension, or exterior expressions (cf. article 25 of the 1905 separation law).

A second element is that the law of 1905 – in spite of its title – is not strictly speaking a law of separation for at least two reasons. The first reason is that it is not enough to affirm the non-recognition and the non-salarisation of the religions to fully achieve the separation process. The legislator can still intervene in the organisation of the churches, as it is the case through religious associations (associations cultuelles). The state can also enjoy relations with representatives of religions or act in order to guarantee the free exercise of religions: that is as much as to say that the Republic does not recognise any religion, but is not unaware of them. In particular, during the last years the state has tried to develop the dialogue with Muslims, with the setting up of the French Council of the Muslim Religion – CFCM (Fregosi 2008). Danièle Loschak evokes an "institutionalisation" of religious activities, and Jean-Claude Maestre a "taking into account" (prise en compte) instead of a recognition *stricto sensu*. The second reason is that the taking into account of the religions ("cultes") elides significant dimensions of the religious landscape, like the congregations (still controlled by the state).

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[96] We must here make a clarification regarding the terminology. The opposition between public and private does not cover the same realities depending on whether one is speaking in legal terms or in ordinary language. From a legal point of view, public refers to the domain of the state when private refers to a private natural or legal person. The ordinary language introduces confusion as it separates for example "public schools" (or laïque schools) from "private schools".

The case of Australia, furthermore, merits deeper consideration. The question of separation is closely linked to the interpretation of section 116. As often mentioned, this section borrows explicitly to the First Amendment of the American Constitution, which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". Nonetheless, the terms of section 116 are more detailed[97] and their interpretation are different, as well as their consequences for minorities (Richardson 1995, 2013).

The first amendment was extended to the states through the fourteenth amendment and has been the object of much litigation (Bogen 1997, p.57), while section 116 only applies to the Commonwealth and the High Court has never found it has been violated. There are only three cases in which the interpretation of section 116 was central for the High Court, and the precedents that they have created are likely to dissuade those willing to test the laws of the Commonwealth. In the first case, Krygger v. Williams (1912), the Court concluded that the compulsory military service implemented through the *Defence Act* was not a violation of the free exercise of religions[98]. The second case, Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v. the Commonwealth (1943), directly involved section 116 because it raised the question of whether a law prohibiting dissemination of principles hostile to the Commonwealth would contravene this section. The decision of the High Court was that it was not the case, because freedom of religion in the Commonwealth was subordinate to the existence of the latter[99]. The last case, *Attorney General (Vic.) Ex Rel Black v. Commonwealth* (1981), is more commonly known as the DOGS case (Defense of Government Schools). It posed the challenge of determining if a law granting a financial aid to a denominational school constituted an infringement to the

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[97] The most immediately striking difference is that section 116 expressly prevents the Commonwealth from "compelling any religious observance", expression with no equivalent in the American Constitution. The second difference is the mention of "religious test".

[98] Justice Griffith formulates his argument in these words: "It may be that a law requiring a man to do an act which his religion forbids would be objectionable on moral grounds, but it does not come within the prohibition of sec. 116''.

[99] Justice Rich thus states that "Freedom of religion is not absolute. It is subject to powers and restrictions of government essential to the preservation of the community. Freedom of religion may not be invoked to cloak and dissemble subversive opinions or practices and operations dangerous to the common weal."

non-establishment clause. The decision of the Justices was that it did not insofar as it was not expressly aiming at its recognition as a national institution[100].

The successive interpretations of section 116 have therefore made it much narrower in its reach than the American first amendment. Justice Mason wrote in this respect: "we are dealing, not with a grant of legislative power, but with a prohibition against the exercise of legislative power. In such a context "for" is more limiting than "respecting"; "for" connotes a connection by way of purpose or result with the subject matter which is not satisfied by the mere circumstance that the law is one which touches or relates to the subject matter. In this respect, the first prohibition in s.116 is narrower than its American counterpart" (*Attorney General (Vic.) Ex Rel Black v. Commonwealth*, 1981). Tom Frame evokes an "imaginary wall" (Frame 2006) and Graham Maddox an ambiguous posture, "neither an established church nor a strongly entrenched separation of church and state" (Maddox 2007, p.511).

Thus, the interpretations considering Australia as a country with a well-established separation are really in minority, both in the academic field[101] and in the legal field[102]. The pragmatic picture that the Australian political landscape offers to the observer is an explicative factor, but it cannot exhaust the reasons that bring the church and the state closer to each other. As Marion Maddox demonstrates, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Australian political life is marked by continuing interpenetrations between the political and the religious, which are not only to be found in opportunistic strategies from political parties (Maddox 2009, p.353). Comprehending such structural ties is only possible by taking into account of the country's own history, of the progressive negotiations between religions and public authorities, of long-term institutionalised relations.

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[100] Justice Mason quotes in this respect Quick and Garran whom, in their Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, interpret section 116 in this way: "by the establishment of religion is meant the erection and recognition of a State Church, or the concession of special favours, titles, and advantages to one church which are denied to others."

[101] For a discussion on the notion of separation and its implications in the academic world, see in particular, Marion Maddox, *An Argument for More, Not Less, Religion* (2009), where the author puts in perspective the isolated commentaries of Richard Ely (1976) and Helen Irving (2004).

[102] Notably, Justice Murphy who suggested this interpretation of section 116 was a dissident and isolated voice in the case Attorney General (Vic.) Ex Rel Black v. Commonwealth.

c) Sacralisation of the state vs contractual logic

The point of divergence between France and Australia is therefore not linked to the degree of impermeability of the separation but to the *nature of the ties* uniting, in both countries, the state and the religions. An immediately visible explicative factor is the difference between the legal systems of the two countries. As Olivier Roy notices, "the sacralisation of the state is obvious in civil law countries, but not in common law countries, that is to say Anglo-Saxon countries[103]" (Roy 2005). However, historical perspectives invite a deeper inclusion of the process of national construction (Asad 1999; Baubérot 2007). Alain Touraine wrote in 1994 the following words concerning England which could very well summarise the situation of Australia when compared to France: "the democratic thought affirmed (there) the autonomy of the individual and of the civil society; whilst, in France, the opposite search for a rational order and a complete identification between man and citizen and, consequently, between the society and the state was triumphing[104]" (Touraine 1994, p.60). I previously mentioned that the history of the French laïcité is essentially the history of the construction of the political's autonomy *vis-à-vis* the religious law. Indeed, the conception of a State that would act as guarantor for the religious peace is inseparable from the construction of the transcendence of the political. The law of 1905, created in a context where the state had to impose itself upon the dominant religion, is neither a pact nor a contract. It is in fact a unilateral act from the public authority. In the 1906 encyclic *Vehementer Nos*, Pius X condemned therefore the law of 1905 because it put an end to "a bilateral contract which obliged both sides". The non-acceptance of the law by the Holy See did not put a stop to the implementation of the law, because the reciprocity was not required. In the Australian case, the situation is very different because the challenge was not to put an end to the ascendancy of a religion but to unify in a context where the denominational pluralism is considerable. According to Hans

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[103] "la sacralisation de l'Etat est évidente dans les pays de droit romain, mais nullement dans les pays de common law, c'est à dire anglo-saxons"...

[104] "la pensée démocratique (y) a affirmé l'autonomie de l'individu et de la société civile, tandis qu'en France triomphait la recherche inverse d'un ordre rationnel et d'une identification complète de l'homme au citoyen et, par conséquent, de la société à l'Etat".

Mol, at the end of the nineteenth century the Anglicans represented 40% of the Australian population, the Catholics 23%, the Methodists and Presbyterians 12% (Mol 1985). The objective was therefore to create what Al Stepan calls a "coming-together-federalism" (Stepan 2001, p.320). As a matter of fact, the federal Constitution as a whole "has a character of its own as a pact" (Moore 1933, p.474).

d) The question of neutrality

These two relationships to religions, on the one hand unilateral and on the other hand much more contractual, result in two different conceptions of the notion of "neutrality".

In France, it is an intangible principle of the state[105], associated with the principle of separation[106]. Besides favouring no religion, neutrality entails that the state shall not decide on religious issues and necessitates the absence of financial support to religions or religious associations for acquiring religious goods. I noted that the Constitution of 4 October 1958 hardly defined the notion of laïcité, but a precious indication is given as soon as we compare its text to the Constitution of 1946. It is indeed noteworthy that the new Constitution has kept the first article but added two sentences which refer directly to laïcité: "(The Republic) shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs." The three sentences are, furthermore, joined in the same paragraph. Pierre Langeron (1986) comes to the conclusion that these two specifications constitutionally link the principle of laïcité with the principle of equal respect of all faiths and beliefs. The laïque state is therefore, as defined a century ago by Aristide Briand, neither religious nor anti-religious, but "a-

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[105] In a classic article, Jean Rivero underlines that from a legal point of view, "the legislative texts, the parliamentary reports commenting them, the circulars accompanying their enforcement have always understood Laïcité in one sense: the religious neutrality of the state" (Rivero 1949). The notion of neutrality is thus a central one in the definition of laïcité.

[106] The Separation of the state and the Churches and the neutrality of the state are the two sides of a single coin, referring respectively to the legislative laïcité and the constitutional laïcité.

religious".

In Australia, neutrality reflects less an intangible principle of the state than a modality of regulation for inter-religious relations. As McLeish puts it, "rather than a strict insistence on the state as a secular entity, the emphasis was on the state avoiding involvement with religion which would encourage sectarian divisions in the community, especially in the political sphere" (McLeish 1992). The words of Henry Bourne Higgins (whose father was a Methodist minister) during the debates of the convention display this intellectual posture. He evoked in this way the internecine strife threatening to divide Australia over issues like the Sunday observance:

> Mr Higgins: (...) a lifting of banners of those who wish to impose, for instance, a compulsory Sabbath all through, in, and upon every state, and a lifting of the banner of those who oppose that movement.
>
> Mr. Fraser: Which side are you on?
>
> Mr. Higgins: I think the honorable member's interjection is beside the question, and wholly unfair. This matter may be put upon broad grounds, and not upon the matter of differences between us (Hansard, 7 February 1898).

The injunction to gather behind a depoliticisation of religious issues is thus very clearly stated by Higgins. It echoes the tradition of neutrality followed by the colonial administration during the nineteenth century (McKenna, Simpson & Williams 2001; Randell-Moon 2014). Instead of being a factor of division, religion could therefore play a rallying role in the process which was to lead the colonies towards the federation.

2) Islam in the governing frames of religions

a) Laïcité and secularism as objects of politicisation

If the current discourses on Islam cannot be simply deduced from the historical legacy, they draw on systems of constraints and resources inherited from the aforementioned considerations. In this regard, the French laïcité and the Australian secularism present radically different potentialities. The use of the notions in parliamentary questions offers an explicit illustration of their differentiated political impacts.

Figure 2. Occurrences of secularism in parliamentary questions (Australia)

Figure 3. Occurrences of laïcité in parliamentary questions (France)

It is noteworthy that secularism was completely absent from Australian political debates until the 1990s and has started to make sporadic and rare appearances since then, it is out of all proportion to French laïcité whose presence has been strong since the 1990s and exploded since the 2000s. In order to give a better account of the social image and identification of these issues, I turned the enquiry toward the global media coverage of the laïque and secular questions. In Australia, there is no denying the pointlessness of the attempt. For instance, during the decade 2001-2011, the archives of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC news) give only 479 occurrences of "secular" or "secularism", almost all of them referring to foreign countries (including France)[107]. By comparison, in France, a manual counting of the archives of the AFP[108] gives indications on the setting up of a framing speech on public issues involving laïcité.

Figure 4. *Occurrences of laïcité in the AFP*

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
[107] The archives of the Australian Associated Press were available on the period 1 January 2006 to 1 January 2011 and showed 267 occurrences, also predominantly linked to international affairs.

[108] The Agence France Presse (AFP), besides being the largest French news agency, has a council charged with ensuring that neutrality and independence are respected in the treatment of the news, accordingly to the institution's statutes. It is also revealing of the resonance of the public debate as most declarations from political and social actors are relayed (encompassing diverse elements such as newspaper reports, political statements and speeches, online posts, protest slogans...), and the AFP is a source for all editorial boards. The full archives of the AFP news are available on the website: http://afp.pressedd.com/

Taking a closer look at this graph, it is noteworthy that the emergence of the public controversy corresponds to a short period of time which occurs against a particular political backdrop. It happened indeed at a moment when the strong nationalist trend, which had emerged at the right of the exchequer ten years earlier, was conquering public opinion and extending its influence on the Left of the political spectrum (Mayer & Perrineau 1989). In this context, the Socialist Party's monopoly of power after the presidential election of 1988 had become a structuring element for the political struggle. The opposition had a twofold stake in invoking laïcité in a fight whose byproduct could be the implosion of the power-holding block. The bringing of laïcité into the public arena at that specific moment did not arise *ex nihilo* but obviously went towards favouring a political destabilisation giving room for a change-over of power.

The interest in laïcité seems to fade away during the next years, and with the exception of a modestly sized peak in January 1994 (corresponding to the protest against the Bayrou law) the debate especially reappeared during the legislative elections in 1997, before it sprang up again in a spectacular way in 2003. The minister of the Interior raised the controversy during a meeting at Le Bourget with the Muslim community on 19 April. The Levy affair in October, the Stasi commission to reflect on the application of the laïcité principle set up by president Jacques Chirac, and the declarations of the latter in favour of a new law regarding laïcité, all predated the French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools. The law project was launched in December 2003, voted on 10 February, and enforced on 2 September. It is therefore a very short episode yet a really strong one in term of mediatisation and public debate. Political decisions and contingent facts (including the Islamic Army of Iraq's kidnapping of two journalists and their demand that France renege on the law in August) were intertwined. Yet the political context was, once again, not negligible. A widely known "media war" opposing the president and the minister of the Interior (at that time working on the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith -CFCM) is the backdrop of this picture and offers an obvious clue to grasp the extreme rapidity of this string of events. Although perfectly relevant from a political point of view (since the regulatory vacuum that had emerged with the Creil affair needed to be filled) this law had waited fifteen years to be proposed, yet could be brought to existence within a couple of months. This

suggests that the proactive approach dictated by the political balance of powers at that time was the necessary, decisive element in the process. The following peaks correspond respectively to the presidential elections (April-May 2007) the municipal elections (February-March 2008), and the visit of the pope at the Elysée palace (September 2008). The renewal of the debate came in 2010, with the Act prohibiting concealment of the face in public space. Here our observations are consistent with the conclusions of political scientists who have shown that the government's strategy was the constitution of a wide electoral block unifying at the same time the moderate right wing and the extreme right -a strategy in which laïcité could play a decisive role (Gougou & Labouret 2012).

With a couple of rare exceptions, it appears that the political opportunity always predates public debates. Three elements can be brought into light, which prove interdependent: the debate on laïcité arises when political circumstances are favourable to the deployment of central values of cohesion (noticeable during the election periods and the change overs of power), when politicians have a personal interest in its mobilisation (as in the media war), or when the political lines brought by a government or a party can come as solutions for social problems through this specific prism (in particular in 2009). In this respect, an observation practically begs for commentary: almost all of the moments of public debate are linked with a set of issues directly referring to Islam. In order to specify this relationship, I have operated the same manual counting linking laïcité semantically with Islam.

Figure 5. *Occurrences of laïcité linked with Islam in the AFP*

The comparison of the two graphs is conclusive: with the exception of the protest against the Bayrou law in February 1994 and the visit of the Pope in September 2008, the two charts follow the same pattern. Two observations can be made. First, the semantics of laïcité's political value has been closely tied to Islam during the last two decades. Second, this link has been made much more explicit since the 2000s, meaning that politicians are increasingly disposed to make the connection transparent. In many respects, the political meaning of laïcité is in the *indexicality* of the term, which is to say a modality of meaning where the context (what is actually pointed out by the people using it) matters more than the text (the definition strictly speaking). The first laïque activists were overtly against the Catholic Church, the laïque activists during the post-war period were in favour of public school against private school. Today, if we look at the context of the debates, we observe that the referential is monopolised by another religious actor, namely Islam. The debate on laïcité therefore presents all the distinguishing features of what Françoise Lorcerie calls a "political entrepreneurship", that is to say a "coordination of social and political actors mobilised in order to make the political decision-making power act against a given

problem, in their own words" (Lorcerie 2005, p.11). The latter clause may be the most important, since the success of a political entrepreneurship heavily relies on the capacity of actors to weigh on the designation process, that is to say to impose the legitimate frames of interpretation of the social world (Muller 1995). This representation becomes the frame of reference for the considered action, circumscribing the spectrum of perception for both the problem and the political solutions to be brought[109].

Secularism in Australia has not worked, in this regard, as a theme of political entrepreneurship. None of the main parties have produced discourses explicitly and systematically linking a conception of Australian secularism and Islam. In December 2016, on the website of the Liberal Party of Australia, the search "secular" yielded no results. The same observation could be made for the websites of the National Party of Australia and the ALP. Secularism is the political niche of the Secular Party of Australia, whose political reach is tiny and whose electoral weight corresponds to roughly 0.1% of the votes[110]. The lack of electoral potential of the question of secularism banishes its putting on the agenda by government parties. However, the term "secular" is one of the indexical terms which may be used to refer negatively to Islam. A good illustration may be found in an interview of Treasurer Peter Costello on 23 August 2005 (*Lateline* television news program):

> Interviewer: Now, over the past 24 hours you've been repeating the notion that migrants, evidently Islamic migrants, who don't like Australia, or Australian values,

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[109] Numerous authors have shown that the capacity of a problem to be set on the political agenda is to a certain extent independent of its intrinsic qualities, but relies on the potentiality it offers to integrate within the political discourse concrete situations transformed into a public problem (Jones 1970; Lasswell 1971; Fischer 2003; Baumgartner 2005; Bacchi 2009). Here is not, however, yielding to a strictly instrumental reading of public policies. Such a reading indeed would tend towards the pitfalls of the utilitarian approach, as it would only perceive the use of laïcité within the framework of a strategic use of symbolic resources. In this respect, our argument may be linked to what Boris Gobille (2005) calls the "work of signification" (travail de la signification), that is to say a twofold perspective involving at the same time the symbolic framing of action by socio-political actors and the seizing of the latter by significations which they do not control.

[110] In the 2013 federal election the Secular Party received 4834 votes in the lower house, or 0.04%, and 12698 first preference votes in the senate, or 0.09%.

should think of packing up and moving to another country. Is that a fair assessment?

Peter Costello: What I have said is that this is a country, which is founded on a democracy. According to our Constitution, we have a secular state. Our laws are made by the Australian Parliament. If those are not your values, if you want a country which has Sharia law or a theocratic state, then Australia is not for you. This is not the kind of country where you would feel comfortable if you were opposed to democracy, parliamentary law, independent courts and so I would say to people who don't feel comfortable with those values there might be other countries where they'd feel more comfortable with their own values or beliefs.

Rather than making a claim for secularism, Costello's use of "secular" enables the creation of a dichotomy with "theocratic state" or "Sharia law". The term is used with an extrinsic value in order to signify a more general cognitive and axiological frame to which Islam may be exogenous. In this respect, it is almost used as a synonymous for "democracy" or "parliamentary", as an illustration of Australianness. A fundamental difference with France is therefore that the perception of Islam does not ensue from a defined perception of the secular, but conversely Islam may serve to negatively define the "un-secular". On the other hand, in France the debate concerns the reach and limits of laïcité itself. If the very notion of laïcité has become today absolutely consensual[111], there is an intense competition to define it as a system of organisation and perception of the political (Subileau 2001; Barthelemy & Michelat 2007). This observation is noticeable in interparty but also intraparty dynamics. In an interview with the newspaper *Libération* on 17 March 2011, Jean-François Copé (then general secretary of the UMP) evoked the necessity of a debate within his party on account of the difficulty to find a collective definition:

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[111] This consensus is especially noticeable since 1946 with the constitutional consecration of the principle of laïcité and the process of "laïcisation of laïcité" (Willaime 1988). In the postwar period, the Christian-Democrat Party (MRP) was governing in coalition with the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Communist Party (PC), and they jointly and severally agreed on the term.

> In my eyes, laïcité is not the negation of religions but the freedom to practice one's religion in the respect of the freedom of others and in ther respect of the laws of the Republic. Some do not have this definition, this is why I would like us to have a fundamental debate on the question[112].

The divergences are even stronger within Left parties, a notorious example being the two candidates for the Socialist nomination in the 2017 presidential elections accusing each other of having a "perverted" (dévoyée) version of laïcité[113]. All these definitions carry an instructional meaning, *id est* aim at guiding the interpretation of the addressees rather than expressing a representation. At the same time, they all strive to appear as objective and universal. For instance, during a seminar of the National Front in 2005, Marine Le Pen used a dictionary in order to legitimate her interpretation of the law of 1905:

> The *Petit Robert* dictionary defines laïcité as the political conception entailing the separation between the civil society and the religious society, the state having no religious power and the churches no political power (...) No one could have imagined a few years ago that the law of 1905 which was a law of religious hatred against catholicism and has become the frame of appeased relations between the state and religions could be questioned (...) Mr Chirac named it the column of the temple but only defended it politically to better destroy its foundations. The first indications appeared under the pressure of immigration[114].

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[112] "À mes yeux, la laïcité n'est pas la négation des religions, c'est la liberté pour chacun d'exercer son culte, s'il le souhaite, dans le respect de celui des autres et dans le respect des lois de la République. Certains n'ont pas cette définition, c'est pour cette raison que je voudrais qu'on ait un débat de fond".

[113] See for instance the interview of Benoît Hamon responding to Manuel Valls on RFI, 24 January 2017.

[114] "Le petit robert définit la laïcité comme la conception politique impliquant la séparation de la société civile et la société religieuse, l'Etat n'exerçant aucun pouvoir religieux et les Eglises aucun pouvoir politique. " (...) Personne n'aurait pu imaginer il y a quelques années que la loi de 1905 qui était en son temps une loi de haine religieuse à l'égard du catholicisme et qui est devenue le

The objective definition of the dictionary is paired up with the designation of the law of 1905 as "a law of religious hatred", which – as shown above – is a partial interpretation of a much more complex reality. A significant element is the intertextuality and mutual references between the politicians' discourses in order to impose an interpretation as legitimate within a competitive field. However, such debates reveal, beyond party strategies, a political environment where the governing frame includes a dimension of defiance toward religions. In France, as in Australia, the modalities of management of the religious dimension by parties may present hitherto unseen aspects but they are always constructed in relation to the countries' socio-historical backgrounds. The latter are not cultural determinisms but living repertoires enabling parties to (re)produce history and to historicise the present.

b) The differentiated perception of Islam as a religion

Taking into account these different systems of constraints and resources, the interrogations provoked by Islam in both countries today acquire a new meaning. In Australia, none of the interviewed politicians thought about Islam when I asked the question "Have you ever come across religious issues in your political life?". Significantly, relatively few surveys have been conducted in Australia on the general perception of Islam as a religion. An evocative one was however commissioned by the Australia-Indonesia Institute in June 2003 and clearly showed no objection by principle to the wearing of the Islamic veil in public space (Dunn 2009, pp.31-52).

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cadre apaisé des relations entre l'Etat et les religions puisse être remise en cause (...) M. Chirac la qualifiait de colonne du temple mais il ne l'a politiquement défendue que pour mieux en saper conscienscieusement les fondations. Les premiers indices sont apparus sous la pression de l'immigration (...)".

Table 1: *Appropriateness of Muslim Women in Australia wearing headscarves.*

Appropriateness of Muslim Women in Australia wearing headscarves	%
It does not bother me when Muslim women wear headscarves in Australia	81.16
I think it is inappropriate for Muslim women to wear headscarves in Australia	12.97
I don't think Muslim women should be allowed to wear headscarves in Australia	4.20
None of these	0.53
Can't say	1.14
Total	100

Source: Roy Morgan Research, Commissioned by the Australia-Indonesia Institute, June 2003, quoted by Dunn in Dreher, Ho 2009, p.38.

These results reveal that Australians were overwhelmingly unconcerned about this religious performance. This is all the more evocative since the majority perception of Islam as being exogenous to the historical identity of the country is not very different from other Western countries, including France (Dunn et. al 2004; Bouma 1997; Hamilton 1990; Rizvi 1996). The dissociation between the perception of the religious dimension in Islam and the perception of Muslims as an "otherised" ethnic group (Islam being in this respect seen a cultural-religious identity binder) has become increasingly strong with the growing fear of terrorism. An Essential poll of 11 October 2016 showed that 53% of Australians were "very/somewhat concerned" about the number of Muslim people in Australia. The concern is higher among Liberal/National voters (61%) and lower among Labor voters (49%) and Green voters (32%)[115]. In the same vein, an Essential poll of 21 September 2016 showed that 49% of the population would support a ban on Muslim

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[115] These numbers do not vary much when interviewees are given figures showing that only 2.2% of the population identify as Muslim.

immigration[116], on account of "problems of integration" (41%), "terrorist threat" (27%) and "values" (22%). In France, more detailed surveys are available and deserve attention because they reveal a much more complex relation to Islam as a religion. The two following charts combine different surveys from the same source (IFOP) to show on a diachronic basis the perception of the Islamic veil in the street and in public schools.

Table 2: *Appropriateness of Muslim women in France wearing headscarves.*

In the street	Favourable opinion (%)	Opposed (%)	Indifferent (%)	No answer (%)	Total (%)
October 2012	7	63	28	2	100
December 2010	9	59	32	-	100
April 2003	13	32	55	-	100
1994	12	34	54	-	100
1989	12	31	55	2	100

In public schools	Favourable opinion (%)	Opposed (%)	Indifferent (%)	No answer (%)	Total (%)
October 2012	3	89	6	2	100
December 2010	3	90	7	-	100
April 2003	5	74	21	-	100
1994	4	78	18	-	100
1989	6	75	17	2	100

Source: IFOP 1989, 1994, April 2003, December 2010, October 2012.

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[116] Including 40% for Labor voters, 60% for Liberal/National voters, 34% for Green voters.

In both cases and regardless of the period, the proportion of favourable opinions is dramatically low in comparison with Australia. However, the diachronic perspective gives further specifications. The majority opinion regarding the Islamic veil in the street (that is to say in public space) was predominantly indifferent in the 1990s and the opposition has only become strong after 2003 in the aforementioned context of a growing debate. Conversely, the perception of the veil in public schools has always been overwhelmingly negative, and only strenghtened in the 2000s. This observation is all the more significant given the historical role public schools have played in the construction of the Republican identity. Thus beyond an apparent change in the perception of the veil, these charts suggest a shift in the perception of what belongs to the domain of the state and public authority. A further 2013 survey shows both the reach of this deduction and also its interparty dimension. The interviewees were asked the question "are you personnally in favour, opposed or indifferent to the wearing of the islamic veil for women working in private places with a public use? (including shops, supermarkets, doctors' offices, crèches and private schools, etc...)"[117].

Table 3: *Appropriateness of the Islamic veil for French women working in private places with a public use*

(%)	Full population	Left voters	UMP voters	FN voters
In favour	4	7	2	-
Opposed	84	77	92	98
Indifferent	12	16	6	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: IFOP survey for Dimanche Ouest France, March 2013.

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[117] "Personnellement êtes -vous favorable, opposé ou indifférent au port du voile ou du foulard islamique par des femmes travaillant dans des lieux privés accueillant du public (commerces, supermarchés, cabinets médicaux, crèches et écoles privées, etc...) ?"

Even though the issue is not as consensual for Left voters as it is for UMP and FN voters, these results clearly confirm the general perception of a "religious problem" in the public manifestation of Islamic signs which corresponds to a structural dynamics regarding the religious itself[118]. After having evidenced stereotypes on Islam (natural ties with the political, hostility to democracy, violence, etc...) Franck Frégosi (2008) acknowledges that one of the main issues regards the perception of Islam in a country where the state itself assumes a religious dimension. This point is illuminated by Talal Asad who shows that from a symbolic point of view, Islam in France is perceived as problematic by political parties because as the country's second religion it comes up against the sacrality of the state. Therefore, he explains that "the headscarf worn by Muslim women was held to be a religious sign conflicting with the secular identity of the French Republic" (Asad 2006, p.500). In this respect, Muslim signs do not only appear as the conspicuous elements of a religion targeted by the public authorities, but also as a calling into question of "the state's inviolable personality" (ibid.). Certainly, Akgönul wrote, "in France the hostility towards the cassock and the fear of the veil are inscribed in very different contexts, but, at the end of the day, both phenomenons express a vision of the society where the religious must be invisible in the public space[119]" (Akgönul 2008, p.293). The symbolic violence brought up by the laws against religious conspicuous symbols at school (25 March 2004) and against the full veil (11 October 2010) and most of all their acceptance by the great majority of French politicians as well as among the general population[120] cannot be comprehended but in relation to this context of laïcisation of the public space. This process, which was first implemented in schools (law of 28

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[118] In the same vein, the population is overwhelmingly opposed to political parties or unions using islamic references, and this observation is constant over time: 68% of the population opposed this idea in 1989, and the same proportion in 2012 (IFOP, October 2012).

[119] "En France l'hostilité envers la soutane et la crainte du foulard s'inscrivent dans des contextes très différents, mais, en dernière analyse, les deux phénomènes renvoient à une vision de la société où le religieux doit être invisible dans l'espace public".

[120] The law of 15 March 2004 banning conspicuous religious symbols in schools was voted on 10 February 2004 by a large majority (494 for, 36 against, 31 abstentions). The law of 11 October 2010 banning full covering of the face in public obtained 335 votes for, and one against. To give but one explicit example, a survey LH2-NouvelObs.com revealed in April 2010 that 70% of the French population was in favour of the law.

March 1882), has systematised during the wave of the 1880s the denominational neutralisation of the public space, from Parliamentary chambers to tribunals, cemeteries and hospitals (Lalouette 1991). This is why, for Cabanel, "(...) from the draperies of the Corpus Christi to the veil, laïcité pretends to champion the streets, the voices, the public faces (...) If Islam tends to replace Catholicism in the "bad role", the laïque activism hardly needs to move to be recognised"[121] (Cabanel 2005, p.9). Unlike in Australia where secularism is meant to limit the excesses of the state, the French laïcité also rules the exceptions to the secularity of the state (Asad 2006). Conversely, obvious assaults to the church-state separation like the mention of God in the constitutional preamble[122], the right of publicly-funded religious schools to exclude students on religious grounds, require students' involvement in religious instruction, or even require teachers to sign " lifestyle agreements " do not have the same impact on the Australian collective image[123]. In a context where the state did not have to impose the nation, religions appear much more inoffensive indeed. It is not surprising therefore to observe that many Australians see their religious past as relatively homogeneous and peaceful, notwithstanding sometimes the historical facts (Jupp 1998; Dawson, Jupp & Nieuwenhuysen 2007; Mol 1985).

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[121] "des tentures de la fête-dieu au foulard, la laïcité prétend être le champion de la voie, des voix, des visages publics (...) Si l'Islam tend à remplacer le catholicisme dans le "mauvais" rôle, la position laïque, elle, n'a guère à se déplacer pour se reconnaître."

[122] Such a constitutional mention is indeed the opposite of the laïque project, according to which "the law cannot be referred but to the common denominator accessible to everyone, i.e. the Reason" (Agulhon 1990, p.19).

[123] Carolyn Evans and Beth Gaze notice in this respect that: "while the precise legislative regimes differ from state to state, religious schools are generally permitted to give preference in admitting students on the basis of religion, and in some states are permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion, sexual orientation and marital status with respect to staff and students" and that "there (is) some sympathy from principals of religious schools which (do) not themselves discriminate on the basis of religion towards those schools that did wish to do so" (Evans & Gaze 2010).

Chapter Conclusion

As Cady and Hurd (2010) explain, secularism is a "diffuse package of ideas, ideals, politics and strategies", whose contours "shift accross time and place, underscoring the impossiblity of any monolithic or static definition" (p.12). Exploring the different shapes assumed by secularism in France and Australia has illuminated different historical combinations between institutional aspects and cultural aspects. Their legacies strongly influence the perception of Islam in both countries.

I have shown that in France, the birth of the political modernity had a revolutionary dimension, contrasting with Australia where a logic of adaptation and pragmatism (or practical constraints) prevailed. The reason is the historical ties between the political legitimacy and a dominant church in France, absent in Australia. The old situation of monopoly of the Church of France and the relatively peaceful march towards pluralism in Australia have been followed by two logics, a unilateral one and a contractual one. We are here in accordance with the classic demonstration given in 1978 by David Martin in his *General Theory of Secularisation*[124].

Nevertheless, our analysis of these two particular cases allows us to enrich it by taking into account the question of the relationship between religion and the national identity. In France, where religion appeared as a direct enemy to the creation of the nation, the nationalisation process was also de-institutionalisation of the religious. Thus beyond the convergence of political speeches and beyond the expression of a common defiance in all Western countries toward Islam, a specifically French defiance toward religion *per se* is noticeable. In this respect, Islam is also integrated within the general perception of "the religious".

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[124]The historical perspective leads us to express reserves on the distinction made by Martin between Protestant countries and Catholic countries, articulated to the dichotomy between pluralist countries and countries with a religious monopoly. As we have shown, Australia is historically a more pluralistic country than Great Britain, for instance. Also, the nineteenth century France was mostly Catholic, but the Protestants and the Jews benefited from a recognition in the Concordate system.

It is however necessary to specify the influence of these hysteretic institutional and cultural aspects in discourses on Islam involving not only religious dimensions, but also how Muslims are perceived as a minority. Drawing on the above socio-historical analyses, the next chapter tackles this issue by providing further empirical groundings.

- Chapter 4: Islam and the Governance of Minorities

Chapter 3 has shown that the question of Islam cannot be apprehended in a comparative perspective without taking into account the specific contexts of development of secularism. I have underlined that the specificity of the French laïcité, and reciprocally of the Australian secularism, is closely linked with a political culture which involves both the representation of society as a whole and differentiated perceptions and roles of the law. These factors influence the perception of Islam in its religious dimension, but also shape the link between the state and minorities. Therefore appears a second structural facet of the question of Islam, related to the governance of minorities in general. In other words, this leads to analysis of the perception of Muslims taken not as members of a specific religion (Islam) but as a group to integrate. This chapter identifies the structuring impact of the state management of minorities in the perception of Islam by political parties. Using an Analysis of Similarities on large corpuses of political discourses in France and Australia, it shows that the state variable has been a determining one in the definition of the "question of Islam", but allows important margins of appropriation for political parties. These synchronic analyses are put in light of diachronic analyses, using discourses, to further grasp the underlying mechanisms and processes of political appropriations. Crossing these methodologies reveals the numerous interplays between national referentials and party or individual strategies.

I - *The Governance of Minorities as a Comparative Variable*

1) Visualising the discourses on Islam

a) Assembling the corpus

The first step was the assembling of a large corpus of discourses on questions simultaneously involving religion and politics, following a principle of non-discrimination of sources as exposed in the aforementioned methodology of research. I first used the software Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) in order to select only elements of discourses explicitly referring to Islam, before preparing the corpus for Iramuteq. In this process the political weight of parties does not need to be scrupulously respected as the aim is to identify the specific structure of the representation in each country independently from political parties. However, I have taken this dimension into account in order to avoid any synthesis effect. It is difficult to evaluate the "weight" of political parties because of the volatility of the electorate and because the number of adherents may not be a reliable indicator. For instance, in France in 2013 the Communist party had more than double the adherents of the National Front (approximately 168 000 and 65 000).

In this regard, I have followed the following estimations. In France, the yardstick was the average result in the 2002, 2007 and 2012 presidential elections, which gave *grosso modo* the same weight for the Socialist Party (PS) and the UMP: each 30% of the total of occurrences. The National Front (FN) represents slightly less than 20% of occurrences. The other parties share approximately 20% of occurrences. In Australia the Liberal-National Party (LNP) Coalition has been given approximately 50% of the total of occurrences because of its constitution as a group of smaller parties; the ALP approximately 40%; the other small parties sharing the remaining 10% occurrences. This first analysis resulted in the assembling of a lemmatised corpus[125] of 78 967 occurrences

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[125] Lemmatisation is the linguistic process by which occurrences are brought to their root form (for instance, "positioning" becomes "position"). This process, which simplifies the reading of the corpus, does not modify the analysis in our case (Brunet 2006).

in France, and a corpus of 31235 occurrences in Australia, both including roughly a hundred politicians[126].

Each corpus contains approximately 350 different discourses (a "discourse" being considered here as a "speaking slot") in which the most visible politicians (party leaders and members of government) have a predominant position. The smaller size of the Australian corpus is not fortuitous, but reflects the unequal importance of political debate on the question of Islam, a matter that will be studied more thoroughly in the next chapters.

This corpus's size and composition allow us to have a global, representative perspective on party discourses on Islam in France and Australia on the period 2001-2016, which would be impossible to assess by studying individual cases. The Analysis of Similarities whose process is described in the methodological chapter[127] has been chosen to display the general structure of discourses because of its mathematical and descriptive capacities, but also because of the possibility it offers of integrating its results within a theory of social representations (Flament 1981; Vergès & Bouriche 2001). As a matter of fact, its capacity to unravel discursive associations and identify differentiated groups of variables provides a solid framework against which a qualitative analysis may look for causal dimensions whilst avoiding biases in the construction of the object (Bénatouïl 1999; Inghilleri 2014). As the aim here is to give visibility to the points of articulation in the discourses without *a priori* judgement, the analysis is rendered by Fruchterman–Reingold graphs (or Force-directed graphs) which position the nodes (here, the occurrences) in a two-dimensional space by assigning forces based on the articulating value of the terms in the discourses. The treatment of these corpuses with the software Iramuteq revealed the following graphs which show the articulation in terms of associations in the discourses on Islam in Australia and France.

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[126] In France the number of hapaxes (forms or occurrences appearing only once in a corpus) represents 50.98% of the forms and 5.01% of all occurrences, and in Australia 47.55% of the forms and 6.23% of all occurrences.

[127] Please refer to Chapter 2, especially the section "Principles of an Analysis of Similarities".

Figure 6. *Analysis of Similarities Graph - Australia*

Figure 7. *Analysis of Similarities Graph -France*

b) Structural differences between France and Australia

Analysis of the graphs[128] first requires clarification of some methodological points. Changing the weight of parties in the corpus does not entail a substantial modification of the trees, thereby strengthening our hypothesis of a relational structure overcoming the party positions. The same consideration applies to the size of the corpuses, since a reduction of 50% does not alter the structure of the graphs. It is necessary to keep in mind that elements with a mathematical property of centrality are the "points of articulation" of the graph, that is to say the points that ensure its connectivity (without which the graph would be disjointed[129]).

The two graphs display immediately visible structural differences. In Australia, two terms possess an important centrality: "person" and "community". Because of lemmatisation, "person" also refers to the term "people" in the actual speeches. I have deliberately kept the lemmatisation process for "people" taken as the plural of "person" in order to make it visible and separate it from "the people" taken as an entity[130]. Person is the most important term in the structural hierarchy, and the graphic polarisation clearly indicates that it works as the main articulation point of the discourses. It articulates, in particular, a subset linked with individual subjectivity (where "think" has a strong degree of centrality), a subset related to Australia (and its position in the world), to the notion of "country" (as a system taken within a history), to the "law" and to the political stances of politicians. In front of it, and with an equal weight, appears the semantic field of the

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[128] In order to ensure there is no word distribution issue, the Zipf diagrams on the top right present the word frequency in the corpus on a graph with a "X rang" frequency distribution.

[129] A graph is connected ("connexe") if and only if there is a chain in from any point of the graph to any other point of it. Even if it is possible to suppose a correspondence between the centrality and what Abric calls the "central kernel" of a social representation, the visualisation of the graph does not necessarily give evidence of a fusion between these two properties (Bouriche, 2005). For our argument however, it is only needed to show the role of articulation played by key notions within the corpus.

[130] In this respect, Iramuteq's table of concordances shows that the aforementioned term "people" is in the vast majority of cases the plural of "person" and only in a small minority of cases a singular.

community to which are articulated two major subsets: "Muslim" and "Australian".

It is noteworthy that neither of the two central terms ("person" and "community") has a religious connotation. The religious dimension does not appear as a semantic binder between the two subsets of discourses. The link with Islam is only made clear in two other subsets: one related to individual subjectivity – just like Christianity – and one related to the community, where it is associated with notions referring to the social debate, such as "racist", "condemn", "terrorist" or "violence".

The French graph, on the other hand, reveals a quite different structure of discourses on Islam. The two notions with the strongest centrality are "Republic" and "Muslim". The semantic fields of Human Rights, women, laïcité, law, principles, and public space are clearly linked with the notion of Republic, as well as with "France" and "religious". The second graphic polarisation reveals "Muslim" as an articulation point. The latter is strongly linked with two semantic fields: French identity and religion. Conversely to the Australian case, in France Islam appears to compete with the Republic on these two notions.

Thus, comparing these two graphs results in several important observations.

First, the intermediate position occupied by the term "person" in Australia is largely replaced by "Republic" in France, and especially so in the semantic fields of religion, values, national belonging and the law. This description confirms what the socio-historical approach had shown about the construction of relations between the state and the religious in the two countries. This legacy is clearly reflected in the structure of contemporary discourses on Islam. It also implies that the words used by politicians when they speak about Islam do not have the same meaning, because they have to be looked at against the systems of constraints and resources (registers of justification, modalities of action) available – or not – depending on the context. The "religious" linked to the Republic is not the one linked with the "person" in the Australian frame. It is precisely this observation that causes anthropologist Carol Greenhouse to issue a warning when comparing the systems of separation in France and the United States: "the church-state divide (in the States) is a warrant for both individual liberty and a moral economy only partially vested

in state power. It is this structural implication of the church-state divide, not the implication of liberty, that makes laïcité difficult to translate" (Greenhouse 2006, p.502).

Second, the French case reveals an element that is specifically conflictual, at least in the discursive field. Two particularly sensitive semantic fields, respectively the one of national identity and the one of religion, are being fought over by two forms of concurrent transcendence, the Republic and Islam. In the Australian case the notion of national identity (Australia) is torn between the semantic field of the person and the one of the community, but Islam is not directly involved and the religious dimension does not appear to be relevant in this process. The potential conflict in Australia appears on another dimension. Indeed, Islam can be at the same time an element of subjective identity or an element of communitarian, and possibly secessionist, belonging.

2) From the reflexivity of actors to the performativity of the models.
a) Two different approaches to the question of minorities.

The AOS have shown that, beyond the question of religion, a fundamental element of differentiation between French and Australian speeches on Islam directly reflects the moral architecture of the two countries. However specific the political management of Muslims may be, it is also inscribed within the broader framework of the governance of minorities. This governance is hardly comparable in France and Australia because of the different natures of the ties between the state and civil society. Thus imparting how the question of Muslims taken as specifically targeted religious/ethnic actors joins the question of Muslims taken as a minority requires specifying the differentiated roles of the two states in the regulation of social harmony and citizenship.

A concrete, revealing example of such differences in the link between the state and civil society is the comparative history of the identity card. In France, its existence was largely accepted and the card was progressively adopted by the majority of the

population[131]. In Australia, Bob Hawke's Labor government tried to introduce an "Australia Card" but was defeated twice in the Senate and the attempt was eventually abandoned in 1987 after major protests had emerged from civil society[132]. The main concern expressed by the Opposition[133] and the Australian citizens was that this change was making, to paraphrase Frank Bongiorno (2015), "the state (a) master, rather than (a) servant".

As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the French modern thought inherited from the Revolution, the statement of equality of Rights ensues from equality before the Law[134]. The consequences of this conception are determining elements for the construction of France's management of minorities: the notions of pluralism, multiculturalism, communities, are obstacles to the founding legal myth of the Republic (Pierré-Caps 1990; Fenet & Soulier 1989; Rouland 1994; Abalain 2000; Michalon 1982). The words of the French representative[135] at the Council of Europe in 2001 give an interesting account of a fundamental French specificity in the myths and the moral architecture upon which social cohesion is thought of:

> There are in Europe two different approaches: the one
> of France and other members on the one hand, and the
> one of Anglo-Saxon countries on the other hand. The

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[131] The card is only compulsory for foreigners since 1917, but has been popularised among the whole population since September 1921.

[132] According to Jackson and Ligertwood (2006), by 1987 90% of Australians were opposed to the scheme. On 23 September a protest in Perth rallied between 20 000 and 40 000 people from diverse political backgrounds, displaying for instance pictures of Bob Hawke wearing a Hitler moustache to criticise what was perceived as a totalitarian change (Bongiorno 2015). It is however noteworthy that the question of the identity card was reconsidered in July 2005 by John Howard (a strong opponent in 1987) in the new context of international terrorism and associated security issues (Davey 2006).

[133] For instance, Liberal Senator Fred Chaney mentioned in 2005 that "the predominant view in the Opposition at that time was that it was a threat to civil liberties" (*ABC* 18 July 2005).

[134] In one of its earliest reports, on January 1992, the High Council for Integration writes in this respect that "the logic of equality opposes any long-term settlement on our soil by foreigners, or people of foreign origin, trying to live in community groupings, negotiating their own spaces and specific rights on an ethnic or religious basis" (HCI 1992, p.25).

[135] This intervention is all the more revealing as he underlines that there were "no divergences on this point within the delegation" composed of Left and Right politicians.

first approach is based on citizenship and integration. The second approach is based, on the contrary, on the definition of groups, minorities, which are recognised with specific rights, and that do not integrate but coexist. These two conceptions are respectable and correspond to the respective histories of our nations. (Council of Europe 2001, p.120).

This perception has been structuring the French position toward international institutions for half a century. France joined the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980, but with the condition of a declarative interpretation anticipating the non-applicability of Article 27 on minorities[136], on account of its incompatibility with Article 2 of the French Constitution[137]. France has also expressed a reservation about Article 30 of the Convention on Children's Rights, which envisages a specific treatment for children belonging to ethnic minorities. The Republic has not signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities either [138]. The French UN delegation within the work group in charge of the rights of people belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities declared in this respect:

France does not recognise, on its territory, the existence of groups whose particularism would be based on racial, linguistic and religious criteria. France's perception is

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[136] Article 27 of the Covenant states that: " in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. "

[137] Article 2 of the French Constitution states that "The language of the Republic shall be French. The national emblem shall be the blue, white and red tricolour flag. The national anthem shall be La Marseillaise". The maxim of the Republic shall be "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity". The principle of the Republic shall be: government of the people, by the people and for the people".

[138] For instance, Article 5 of the Convention states that "The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage". Andorra, Monaco and Turkey have also refused to sign the Convention, Greece, Belgium, Iceland and Luxembourg have signed but not ratified this Convention.

based on an universal principle: all human beings are
born free and equal, in dignity as in rights[139].

UN, Report C/CN.4/1991/53, 5 March 1991.

This political and legal tradition entails a specific perception of public rights. Francesco Capotorti, representing France in the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities wrote in 1979 that religious, ethnic and linguistic differences fall within the scope of the free exercise of public freedoms, and not public rights. In other words, citizens may expect from the government that it guarantee the free exercise of such freedoms in the legal frame, but not a legal recognition as an ethnic or religious group. This expression of universalism does not oppose, however, the recognition of minorities' rights in other states. Capotorti shows in this respect that, conversely, "in many countries minority groups have constituted, often with the financial support of the state, associations contributing actively to the protection and the showcase of their culture", explicitly mentioning Australia as one of them (Capotorti 1979, p.70). For instance, the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA) enforced under the Whitlam Government in 1975[140] instituted a "Race Discrimination Commissioner" as well as a Commission whose role is not only to address racial discrimination but also to "promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among racial and ethnic groups", which amounts to recognising that they can evolve independently, constituting distinct parts of what it is to be Australian[141]. The multicultural agenda has been developed through the institutionalisation of multiculturalism. Key Australian Government multicultural institutions have been established, including the Australian Institute for Multicultural

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[139] "La France ne reconnaît pas, sur son territoire, l'existence de groupes dont le particularisme serait fondé sur des critères raciaux, linguistiques et religieux. Les conceptions de la France se fondent sur un principe universel: tous les êtres humains naissent libres et égaux en dignité et en droit." (ONU 1991, p.7)

[140] The recent debates about the Racial Discrimination Act in the light of the terrorist attacks show the close ties between the management of minorities and the public visibility of Islam. For instance, the *Australian Conservative* titled after the attacks: "The murderous attack on the office of French magazine *Charlie Hebdo* has renewed the debate in Australia about Section 18C of the federal Racial Discrimination Act 1975."

[141] Racial Discrimination Act, Section 20.

Affairs (AIMA) in 1979, the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in 1987, the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) in 1994, the Council for Multicultural Australia (CMA) in 2000 and the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC) in 2008. Furthermore, in 1975 a Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs with the goal to preserve and value ethnic cultures was created. This department has since known many reconfigurations following the political changes[142] but it shows that multiculturalism could be thought of and developed in Australia as the expression of ethnic and cultural differences within a society which was perceived as fundamentally diverse. Gough Whitlam stated in this respect that:

> The Racial Discrimination Act wrote it firmly into the legislation that Australia is in reality a multicultural nation, in which the linguistic and cultural heritage of the Aboriginal people and of peoples from all parts of the world can find an honoured place.
>
> Gough Whitlam (foreword, Al Grassby 1979).

In this founding perspective of the Australian multiculturalism, rather than emphasising on an homogenised universal citizenship, the aim of the government is therefore to favour harmonious relations between communities recognised as such and to avoid the domination of the strongest ones[143]. This process of establishment of a multicultural society was partly inspired by American sociologists working on cultural pluralism[144], and the notion of ethnicity played a fundamental role in its conception. However, the integration of "ethnic affairs" and immigration within a "multicultural"

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[142] See below and Chapter 5 for an analysis of the political stakes of these semantic differences.

[143] Gough Whitlam himself wrote that multiculuralism offers "the best guarantee that Australia has ever had that the dark forces of bigotry and prejudice which have prevailed so often in the past will never again be able to exercise influences far greater than their numbers in the community"(Whitlam 1979, p.19).

[144] For instance, the works on nationalism in Québec and the Black movements (La Belle 1996; Scott 1992). The term "multiculturalism" was in particular used by the Trudeau Governement in a context of strong frictions between the French-speaking Canadians and the English-speaking Canadians in order to appease cultural tensions. Academics like Jean Martin (who was involved in the 1977 report writing) and Jerzy Zubrzycki were strong advocates for the importation of the doctrine.

scheme minimises the risks of a society that would be recognised as multiracial (Martin 1981; Jakubowicz et al. 1984; Milne & Shergold 1984). It is therefore important to note that if the Australian multiculturalism relies on a model of ethnic differentialism which derives from a specific link between the state and civil society, both notions do not conflate with each other. Multiculturalism, as an historically-constructed model of society, is therefore to be considered independently from ethno-differentialism, which is a postulate recognising the ontological specificity of each ethnic group. This element explains, as I will show below, how the criticism of multiculturalism may be compatible with the differentialist referential.

b) "Deviant cases" as illustration

The consequences of these modalities in the governance of minorities are both legal and political, and produce a framework in which the question of Islam is understood by public authorities. A good indicator to highlight these dimensions is the way France and Australia deal with Islamic customs identified by both as deviant, that is to say those that are the most challenging for the country's traditional normative and axiological systems (Kazancigil 1994; Kendall & Wolf 1955; Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991). The cases of polygamy and female genital mutilation[145] offer an opportunity to observe, behind the legal framework, differentiated modalities of management of Muslims as a minority.

On the question of polygamy, the French position has been made very clear. In an answer of the Ministry of Justice to a question asked in the Senate, the interdiction of polygamy was described as a "principle of public order". Polygamy constituted an offense punished by law[146] (JO Senate, 5 April 1990, p.726). Since the Pasqua law of 24 August

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[145] Even though they are often perceived as typically Muslim (Family Law Council 1994), these practices are considered deviant by a large proportion of Muslims (for instance the leading Sunni Al-Azhar University of Cairo re-stated in 1986 that FGM was not an Islamic practice) and are also followed by small numbers of non-Muslims. Their marginal dimension makes them, however, all the more relevant for the purpose of this chapter.

[146] As stated by the Civil Code: " L'interdiction de la polygamie en France est un principe d'ordre public dont la violation est sanctionnée par l'annulation du mariage irrégulier et constitue un délit

1993, foreigners in situation of polygamy cannot obtain the 10 year residence card. The Australian stance, on the other hand, is more complex. The Australian law recognises both marriages and de facto relationships. If polygamy strictly speaking is a criminal offence (section 94 of Marriage Act 1961), multiple relationships may be legally recognised as de facto relationships with all the rights attached for example when it comes to welfare policies[147]. Moreover, according to the Family Law Act, s.6, polygamous marriages lawfully contracted overseas are legally recognised in processes for divorce and dispute resolution[148].

On the question of female circumcision, even if both legislations are close for practical purposes, the approaches are different. The French State condemns unilaterally such practices in the Penal Code (Art 222-8, 222-9, 222-10) or even the incitement to it (Art 227-24-1). In Australia, the Commonwealth does not pronounce on the subject, female genital mutilation being criminalised exclusively by State and Territory laws, under heterogeneous legal forms[149].

It is therefore noteworthy that even on such matters considered in the two countries as deviant to the traditional social norms, the legal-political management is not identical. In fact, two levels of management are superimposed. The first level, on which both

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prévu et réprimé par l'article 340 du code pénal". The case of Mayotte is the only exception to this rule for historical reasons, yet new polygamous marriages are forbidden.

[147] An online statement of the Parliament of Australia posted on 14 December 2016 mentions in this respect that "In recognising multiple relationships, social security law recognises the existence of legal de facto relationships involving more than two people at the same time" (http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2016/December/Polygamy_and_welfare).

[148] The contention of the issue may be found in the judgment delivered by the Full Court of the Family court of Australia on 4 March 2016 (Ghazel & Ghazel and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 31).

[149] Let us notice that it also more broadly reflects the role of the state in Australian law: most criminal law is at the level of State jurisdiction (and therefore variable between States), with only a small number of areas covered by the Commonwealth code. In 1995, New South Wales was the first Australian jurisdiction to consider performing genital mutilation an offence. The differentiated legislations include: in New South Wales the Crimes Act 1900 s45; in the Australian Capital Territory, the Crimes Act 1900, s73-77; in the Northern Territory the Criminal Code Act s186A -186D; in South Australia the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s33-33B; in Queensland the Criminal Code 1899 s323A-323B; in Victoria the Crimes Act 1958 s32-34A; in Western Australia the Criminal Code s306 and in Tasmania the Criminal Code Act 1924 s178A, 178B, s389.

countries meet, is the identification of an incompatibility between the customs and the applicable law. The second level, however, clearly shows the specificity of the French case. It is the identification of an incompatibility of a community representation of minorities with the national law. This position has been reaffirmed in several occasions by public authorities, in particular by the High Council for Integration (HCI), whose last report submitted in April 2011 mentioned female genital mutilation, polygamy and forced marriages as "cultural behaviours irreconcilable with the Republic" (p.70) focusing on "two obstacles to integration which seemed to have a proven cultural origin: the unequal status of women and the practices of radical Islam" (ibid).

c) Using the models as arguments

Now, these differences in the democratic traditions between France and Australia have not only structured public speeches on Islam but are themselves used as arguments by political parties. An analysis of the French debates on the veil in 2004 shows that a substantial number of speeches from Left, Right and Centre politicians bring the decision back to the choice of a model of society.

> Those who, within French Islam, defend the right to wear the veil at school precisely share this conception in which the society must answer systematically for the individual against the collectivity. This "liberal-libertarian" model brings us straightforwardly, if it triumphs, toward a communalist Anglo-Saxon-like society, in which each ethno-religious group lives next to, but not with the other, in a kind of informal apartheid reducing the individual to what he was by birth. It is what Pierre-André Taguieff called ethno-diffentialism and, for me, I cannot accept this evolution which would mean the disappearance of the Republic[150].

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[150] "Ceux qui, au sein de l'Islam français, défendent le droit au port du voile à l'école, adhèrent précisément à cette conception dans laquelle la société doit répondre systématiquement en faveur de l'individu contre la collectivité. Ce modèle " libéral-libertaire " nous mène droit, s'il triomphe, vers une société communautariste de type anglo-saxon, dans laquelle chaque groupe ethnico-religieux vit à côté, mais non avec l'autre, dans une sorte d'apartheid informel qui réduit l'individu

Georges Sarre (PS), November 2003, Stasi Commission.

It is also a result of History. Anglo-Saxon societies, for instance, are less sensitive to these matters than we are. This because they have integrated from the origin communalism in the representation of themselves. France, on the contrary, has been built throughout centuries as unitary, and each breach of this unity is deeply painful[151].

François Bayrou (UDF), November 2003, Stasi Commission.

Laïcité appears as a stable and somehow mythical reference. This is why it has become an element of reference for the French identity. Its calling into question by multiculturalism and communalism may be perceived as a threat for the national identity[152].

François Baroin (UMP), May 2003, Introduction to the "Rapport pour une nouvelle laïcité".

A noteworthy element is that the arguments used may be very different. Georges Sarre reproaches multiculturalism with being too individualistic and implicitly too incompatible with the Left egalitarian ideal. François Bayrou and François Baroin, on the other hand, refer to the century-long construction of an unitary nation, which produced a traditional identity. The common point between the discourses, however, is the idea that the abstract universal provided by the state enables a transcendence of the particularisms

à ce qu'il est par la naissance. C'est ce que Pierre-André Taguieff a appelé l'ethno-différentialisme et pour ma part, je ne me résigne pas à cette évolution qui signifierait la disparition de la République."

[151] "C'est aussi un fruit de l'Histoire. Les sociétés anglo-saxonnes, par exemple, sont moins sensibles à ces sujets que nous ne le sommes. C'est qu'elles ont dès l'origine intégré le communautarisme pluriel dans leur représentation d'elles-mêmes. La France, au contraire, s'est construite au travers des siècles comme unitaire, et toute atteinte à cette unité lui est profondément douloureuse".

[152] "La laïcité apparaît comme une référence stable et un peu mythique. C'est pourquoi elle est devenue un élément de référence de l'identité française. Sa remise en cause par le multiculturalisme et le communautarisme peut donc être perçue comme une menace pour l'identité nationale".

of civil society[153]. The rejection of the "communalist risk", in all cases, comes from an ontological perspective on society itself, that is to say a perception of how the society represents itself. This perspective escapes the Left/Right divide because the referential it relies on is a transpartisan one.

In Australia, the question of hijab-wearing has never been politically influential partly because of the pacified perception of religions I have explored in Chapter 3. The question of burqa-wearing, however, did emerge[154]. Interestingly, two elements may be observed in this respect. First, the debate was inscribed within the broader framework of the redefinition of Multiculturalism. An evocative element is that, of the 513 submissions received during the 2012 Parliament Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism, 212 raised concerns about or discussed the question of Islam in Australia (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2012). The question of burqa-wearing was raised in several submissions (for instance, submission 21 p.2). Because the debate was brought through the prism of multiculturalism, this argument acquired a transpartisan dimension. One of the advocates of the burqa ban among the MPs, Senator Jacqui Lambie (Palmer United Party) focused her argument on security and migratory issues, and restated her attachment to Australian multiculturalism[155].

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[153] Marine Le Pen has also increasingly used this argument. For instance, in her book *Pour que vive la France* (Ed. Grancher, 2012), she reproaches the anglo-Saxon models with neglecting the state on account of a neoliberal deregulation and insists on the idea of nation: "(Anglo-Saxon) countries are happy with a minimal state, who is summoned to avoid disturbing the free play of markets. (...) France, I think, does not belong to this model. The French nation succeeded the state" (p.186).

[154] The debate on burqa-wearing has more recently gained a new visibility when Senator Pauline Hanson wore this garment during Senate question time at Parliament House on 17 August 2017 to advocate a ban out of "security concerns". In his response, Attorney-General George Brandis warned against community stigmatisation, mentioning that "to ridicule that community, to drive it into a corner, to mock its religious garments, is an appalling thing to do". His response received a standing ovation from opposition members of the Parliament. Senators across the political divide, including Labor, Coalition, Greens, Nick Xenophon and Jacqui Lambie, have deplored Pauline Hanson's "stunt".

[155] For instance, she expressed her indignation at an editorial reproaching her not supporting multiculturalism: "The article continues in a highbrow, academic, condescending tone, implying that I do not understand that Australia's greatness has come because successive waves of migrants have made Australia home and some have taken the time to adapt." Senate Hansard, 16 February 2017.

Our nation is a beacon to the world of a successful and harmonious multicultural society based on the Australian principles of equality, mateship and a fair go. It is a model we should be proud of and we should work hard to defend and to spread.

Jacqui Lambie, Senate Hansard, 16 February 2017.

To defend the opposite view, Liberal Attorney-General George Brandis links his perception of multiculturalism as a modality of social cohesion and a liberal view about the burqa:

From my point of view multicultural means... multiculturalism means that all the different cultures in our society should live peacefully and mutually respectfully together. (...) A few weeks ago the debate about the burqa reached a new pitch of intensity in this country. Now, my position on the burqa I've made very clear. I think if people want to wear a burqa, that's nobody's business but theirs.

George Brandis, 3 November 2014, *ABC*.

It is also in the name of the Australian multiculturalism as a breeding-ground for social cohesion that Bill Shorten and Michelle Rowland, speaking for the Labor Party, criticised the Coalition members' behaviour toward Islam:

The Islamic story in Australia has a rich history and grows stronger each year. Australia's Muslim community continues to do our nation a great service by fostering enduring cultural and religious harmony, and making a substantial contribution to our national prosperity. This reflects modern Australian multiculturalism: a story of cultural enrichment, social cohesion and economic growth and it is a story that the Labor Party is committed to and will always defend.

Bill Shorten, Michelle Rowland, June 2014, Open Letter.

In this respect, the Australian model plays a similar transpartisan role which enables political actors to situate their discourses. This semantic openness of the term, in a similar way to the French laïcité, opens a breach for political reappropriations. Now, a second, fundamental element to be noticed is that the models are not hermetically sealed but interdependent. The societal debate behind the question of burqa-wearing has been very much influenced by the transnationalisation process which fostered reflexivity toward democratic traditions. Just like French politicians refer to the Anglo-Saxon differentialism, the French handling of the question of Islam is referred to by Australian politicians in a process coined by Samina Yasmeen (2013) as "transnational intertextuality". As she puts it, "the debate on wearing the burqa and niqab in Australia (and elsewhere) needs to be understood with reference to the dynamic relationship between ideas and global debates within Muslim and non-Muslim communities" (2013, p.255). For instance, the Christian Democratic Party politician Fred Nile who presented a Bill to the NSW Parliament for burqa prohibition heavily referred to the French model, defined as a promoter of freedom, in his argument[156].

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[156] On 11 September 2014, he defended the Bill in the Legislative Council with the following words: "Earlier I quoted from the French Parliament's resolution and their legislation. As we know, the French Revolution is the source of liberty and freedom, and we expect France to promote liberty and freedom in its legislation" (Extract from NSW Legislative Council Hansard and Papers, 11 September 2014, p.4).

II - *Integrating Party Dynamics Into the Frame*

1) The parties' political appropriation of the models

a) Visualising the party positions

Thus, there is a constant interplay between the historical traditions of assimilation or multiculturalism and the existence of simultaneous party dynamics. The moral architecture is not a structure imposed upon the actors but a repertoire which allows them to formulate both the issues and the solutions with a rise in generality. In this process, party positions are defined by their interpretation of the "French" and "Australian" models within the margins allowed by the respective democratic traditions. A synchronic analysis of these differences using the same AOS technique can make visibly patent the party tendencies to emphasise different elements within a similar general scheme of representation.

Figure 8. *Analysis of Similarities Graph -ALP*

Figure 9. *Analysis of Similarities Graph - Coalition*

Figure 10. *Analysis of Similarities Graph -Socialist Party*

Figure 11. *Analysis of Similarities Graph -UMP*

Figure 12. *Analysis of Similarities Graph -National Front*

b) Structural Party Divergences

The Analysis of Similarities on party sub-corpuses is complementary to the one provided by the AOS on the full corpuses. In the Australian case, the AOS of the Labor Party and the Coalition shows differences not of kind but of degree in the centrality of terms. The Labor Party tends to give a greater centrality to the notion of "community" whilst the Coalition uses the term "person" as the major articulation point. These divergences express a fundamental difference on the parties' postulate concerning the origin of social cohesion in the Australian society, as well as the perception of minorities. In other words, if both parties consider that the question of Islam should be raised in terms of management of the civil society, they do not put the emphasis on the same elements. It suggests that the ALP tends to highlight the collective, community dimension first when the Coalition discourses focus more on individual dimensions. In both cases, however, "Muslim" is always linked with the semantic field of "community", as well as "Islamic", which shows that both parties link religious identity with the belonging to an ethnic group. One may also notice the articulatory strength of the term "Australia" in the Coalition discourses, as well as "country", which are much more marginal in the Labor Party's AOS. An explicative element is the presence of the National Party within the Coalition, reinforcing the emphasis put on the national dimension. The specificity is that it reveals a dichotomy and a potential conflict between two communities of belonging for the individual: the "national" community and the "ethnic" community.

In France, the AOS of the UMP reveals three instantly noticeable major points of articulation: "Republic", "France" and "Muslim" (musulman). The AOS of the Socialist Party, on the other hand, shows a bigger fragmentation of the points of articulation, including "Islam", "Muslim", "France", "laïcité", "religion" and "Republic". In the discourses of the National Front, the terms "France" and "French" (français) constitute the two main articulation points, to which are linked the semantic fields of "Islam" and "Muslim". These analyses suggest therefore that Islam is at the centre of interparty "issue ownership" strategies, in particular between the UMP and the PS on the issue of "Republic" and between the National Front, the UMP and the Socialist Party on the notion

of "France". What is noteworthy, however, is that in all cases "Islam" and "Muslim" are linked with the semantic fields of "France" and "religion" -which is a specificity when compared to the Australian party discourses.

These complementary analyses show that the existence of national models and their political relevance do not transform parties into mere transmission belts for a homogeneous conception of sovereignty or public interest. The political tradition may act as a cultural code but its contours are strongly disputed within the political field. Rather than positively defining the meaning of discourses, the political culture sets the terms for the debate and their domain of legitimate application.

2) Multiple stances, one reference?

a) Islam as a developing bath for the debate on the French model

An insightful example deserves to be analysed thoroughly because it provides an edifying glimpse both on interparty and intraparty dynamics. It is an extract from a debate which I obtained thanks to the archives of the Socialist Party and which opposed in the context of the discussions on the veil at school two of the most influential leaders of the UMP and the PS: Nicolas Sarkozy (then Minister of the Interior and Religions) and François Hollande (then First Secretary of the PS).

> F. Hollande: (Sarkozy's) affirmative action consists in considering everyone not as member of the working class or an underpriviledged environment, but according to his religion or community and to give a place related to this ethnic or social background. And here we are not in the conception of what I believe is the Republic. Indeed the Left has been late in representing the society at the administrative, political, economic and social levels. But when you spoke about naming a Muslim prefect, this was a very bad illustration of your principle. One must not name a prefect for his religion,

but for his competences or merit. Affirmative action is not a communalisation of the Republic (...)[157].

N. Sarkozy: I totally disagree with F. Hollande on this question. A deep, total and complete disagreement. It is strange to accuse me of communalism. Ladies and gentlemen, if people turn toward their community, it is because they have the feeling that the state abandoned them and does not defend them. It is not with pleasure that you turn toward your community, it is because the state has let you down. Because the state does not defend me, I only have my community to defend me (...) The truth is that France is multiple. The country does not know that. They reproach me with saying "the Muslims". Why do I pronounce the word "Muslims"? Because in the street I have never been called a "dirty catholic" when one may say "dirty Jew" or "dirty Muslim". (...) It is strange that it should be a representative of the republican and moderate Right who fights on this point. (...) It is necessary that someone who is not Muslim speak in their name. How do you believe that the fear existing in our national community is going to decrease? I wanted to accelerate the process, this is why I conduct this policy[158].

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[157] F. Hollande - (avec Sarkozy) La discrimination positive consiste à considérer chacune, chacun, non en tant que membres d'une catégorie populaire ou d'un territoire difficile, en fonction de sa religion ou de sa communauté et de donner une place en fonction de cette origine ethnique ou sociale. Alors là, nous ne sommes pas dans la conception, de ce que je crois être, la République. En effet, la gauche a tardé du point de vue de la représentation de la société au niveau administratif, politique, économique et social. Mais lorsque vous avez parlé de nommer un préfet musulman, c'était une très mauvaise illustration de votre principe. On ne doit pas nommer un préfet au titre de sa religion, mais au titre de ses compétences, voire de son mérite. La discrimination positive n'est pas de faire une communautarisation de la République. (...)

[158] N. Sarkozy - Je suis en total désaccord avec F. Hollande sur cette question. Un désaccord profond, total et complet. Il est curieux d'accuser le communautarisme. Mesdames, messieurs, si des personnes se tournent vers leur communauté, c'est parce qu'ils ont le sentiment que l'Etat les a abandonnés et ne les défend pas. Ce n'est pas par plaisir que l'on se replie sur sa communauté, c'est parce que l'Etat vous a laissés tomber. Comme l'Etat ne me défend pas, je n'ai plus que ma communauté pour me défendre. (...) La vérité, c'est que la France est multiple. Elle ne le sait pas. On me reproche de dire les musulmans. Pourquoi je prononce le mot "musulmans". Car dans la rue, on ne m'a jamais dit " sale catholique ", alors que l'on peut dire "sale juif" ou "sale musulman". (...) C'est peut-être un peu curieux que ce soit un représentant de la droite

E. Plenel: N. Sarkozy can be a man of the Left!

F. Hollande: Don't be misled! He is not. I want to reassure him if he was worried about it. The conception that he has just presented, and which has its advantages, its meaning, its dignity, is the liberal Anglo-Saxon conception which is not the conception of the French republican model. N. Sarkozy presents himself as the representative of the French Muslims, this is unbelievable! (...) Manifestly, even if these citizens must be better represented on the basis of their religious background, you are going the wrong way. From this, there is a communalisation of the Republic[159].

The first noticeable element is that Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande seem to strongly oppose each other, the former going as far as to evoke a "deep, total and complete disagreement". In fact, if there is an actual political divergence on the modalities of management of the minorities, the disagreement is less structural than it seems. As shown on a large scale with the AOS, the difference is more a question of degree than kind. If the religious identification is supported by N. Sarkozy and contested by his opponent, the model of reference for the management of minorities remains basically state-centric. The observation made by N. Sarkozy is not the necessity to recognise the minorities as such, but the failure of the state to fill its role and to "defend" the

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républicaine et modérée qui se batte sur ce plan-là. (...) Il faut bien que quelqu'un qui ne soit pas musulman parle en leur nom. Comment croyez-vous que la peur qui existe dans notre communauté nationale va-t-elle se réduire ? J'ai voulu accélérer ce processus. C'est pour cette raison que je conduis cette politique.

[159] E. Plenel - N. Sarkozy peut faire l'homme de gauche !

F. Hollande - Ne vous trompez pas ! Il ne l'a pas fait. Je veux le rassurer s'il était inquiet. La conception qu'il vient de présenter, et qui a ses avantages, son sens, sa dignité, est la conception libérale anglo-saxonne qui n'est pas la conception du modèle républicain français. N. Sarkozy se présente comme le porte-parole des musulmans de France, c'est invraisemblable ! (...) A l'évidence, même si ces citoyens doivent être mieux représentés en fonction de leur origine religieuse, vous faites fausse route. À partir de là, c'est une communautarisation de la République.

individuals, which requires a temporary alleviation. Both politicians acknowledge a preeminence of the state – seen as the guarantor of universal values – over the civil society – marked by particularisms. The designation of an "Anglo-Saxon model" identified as the preeminence of civil society, acts as a foil to F. Hollande and is not assumed by N. Sarkozy[160].

The second element is that this debate structures an opposition over the notions of "Left" and "Right" as both politicians claim their belonging to one or the other political tradition and argue over their respective attributions. When N. Sarkozy evokes his surprise at having to defend a perspective closer to multiculturalism as a representative of the "Moderate and Republican Right", he refers to a major division within the Left which has been exacerbated by the question of Islam. Both the Right RPR and UDF had officially condemned multiculturalism[161] but the Socialist Party has been torn between a Republican orientation and a multiculturalist orientation[162]. The former, which has historically been linked to a militant anticlericalism (Mellor 1966; Rémond 1999; Boutry 2005) merges the notions of citizenship and national community, considering the nation as "one and indivisible"[163]. The latter is in minority within the Socialist Party[164] but

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[160] The position of Nicolas Sarkozy has evolved toward a more assimilationist and republican rhetoric. On 10 February 2011, he declared on TF1 that "multiculturalism is a failure" and "We do not want a society in which commuities coexist one next to the other. If one comes to France, he has to accept to merge within one community, the national community" ("le multiculturalisme est un échec", "Nous ne voulons pas d'une société dans laquelle les communautés coexistent les unes à côtés des autres. Si on vient en France, on accepte de se fondre dans une seule communauté, la communauté nationale.").

[161] For instance, in their common manifesto for the legislative elections in 1993, the two parties claimed that they were "attached to a conception of school that favour the transmission of common morale, culture and values, and not "multiculturalism" " (*Le Monde*, 11 February 1993).

[162] The question of interparty crossings will be dealt with more specifically in Chapter 7, as the Alceste methodology and a Factorial Analysis of Correspondences on the three main parties will allow a systematic grasp of the thematic convergences.

[163] The Creil affair of 1989 had already shown an friction within the Left between these two positions. Prominent Left intellectuals like Régis Debray, Catherine Kintzler, Elisabeth Badinter or Elisabeth de Fontenay have shown a strong opposition to the veil in schools in the name of the defense of the unitary Republic.

[164] As an evocative example, the Tuot report of 1 February, 2013 which has inspired the Hollande Socialist government's integration policies clearly states that multiculturalism is not amongst the values of the Republic and identifies it as an impasse (p.66).

important in small parties like the NPA or EELV[165]. Its aim is on the contrary to integrate ethnic and religious particularisms in the definition of citizenship. For instance, Corinne Narassiguin, appointed spokesperson for the Socialist Party on 15 April 2014, praised the American model of integration[166], and Razzi Hammadi, national Secretary of the PS, defended in Parliament the "plural" dimension of the Republic (JORF 1 July 2016). This is not new: in the 1980s discourses had emerged within the Left on "the right to difference", but public opinion led the Socialist Party to abandon this direction. In this respect, the semantic debate about what being "a man of the Left" means is revealing of an intraparty division which has become decisive, on a point which is precisely beyond party positions.

Reciprocally, this structural dimension is precisely what makes its mobilisation an opportunity for politicians seeking a rise in generalisation. On the question of Islam, Jean-Luc Mélenchon reproaches Marine Le Pen for preaching an "ethnic communalism" masked behind a discourse of assimilation[167]. An apparent paradox is indeed that the National Front puts forward simultaneously the notion of assimilation and the idea of ethnic and religious difference as a central notion in its discourses. As an illustration, Marine Le Pen has described multiculturalism as "the germ of multiconflict" (interview on BFMTV on 26 September 2016), and simultaneously ethno-differentialism has been largely theorised by intellectuals and movements which are influential within the FN. In particular, the "Nouvelle Droite" (New Right) movement has strongly opposed the

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[165] For instance, Eva Joly (former leader of EELV) declared on France24, on 21 February 2011 that "it seems that we forget for France that we are a multcultural country. We have been constituted by successive waves of immigration" ("il me semble qu'on oublie pour la France que nous sommes un pays multiculturel. Nous nous sommes constitués par des vagues successives d'immigration").

[166] In an article for *Le Figaro* published on 3 November, 2014 and titled "We, Socialists, must assume our multiculturalism", she declared that "having been an immigrant for a long time in an great immigration country, the U.S., my perception of a successful integration has changed. In this country, the affirmation of belonging to a community goes with a strong patriotism " ("Ayant été longtemps immigrée dans un grand pays d'immigration, les Etats-Unis, ma perception d'une intégration réussie a changé. Dans ce pays, l'affirmation d'une appartenance à une communauté va de pair avec un patriotisme très fort").

[167] See for instance the Lyon speech, on 5 February 2017.

"egalitarian ideology" permeating the republican universalism[168]. This differentialism has been central in the FN's perception of minorities since the 1990s, as it allowed the party to move from the politically non-operational notion of race to the notions of ethnicity and culture (Camus 2015, Crépon 2006). Historical leaders have praised differentialism as the recognition of each community's right to choose its own modalities of development: Gilbert Sincyr (former vice president of the FN) developed the notion in an article entitled "let us be differentialists" (1996) and Jean-Marie Le Pen in a discourse on the Iraq invasion on 2 February 2003 proclaimed his attachment to the respect of cultural specificities. The rejection of multiculturalism and the praising of ethno-differentialism are, however, far from being incompatible. On the contrary, in the National Front discourses, the claim for differentialism is precisely what allows advocating, on a given territory, the preservation of an exclusive community identity. It is therefore from the recognition of each culture's right to develop separately that ensues the axiological injunction of assimilation. When Marine Le Pen declared in Evian on 14 September 2008 that "(the FN's) fight is not only a political fight. It is more than that. It is a fight of civilisation, it is a fight for our values", she expresses the logical articulation between the will to defend a differentiated community identity and the will to homogenise it on the territory of the Republic.

b) Islam as the new entrant in the debate on Australian multiculturalism

In comparison, Australian politicians situate their discourses in relation to the differentialist model of recognition. The paradox here lies in the fact that on the question of Islam multiculturalism is at the same time a common argument for both the Coalition and the ALP and an element of differentiation between them. An extract of an interview with John Howard makes this apparent contradiction explicit. As I asked him about his

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[168] This point is central in the writings of the prominent intellectual Alain de Benoist (see for instance De Benoist 1977). The New Right also criticised Christianity because of the "ideology of the Same".

difference on the question of Islam with the following governments, the former Prime Minister gave the following answer:

> I think the line of the government that has followed me is more in favour of multiculturalism; and I'm not quite sure on where the present government stands on that, you will have to ask it. I can't answer for the present government but I think I am more in favour of integration than the Labor Party of Mr Rudd and Mrs Gillard, much more in favour of integration and less in favour of multiculturalism.
>
> Interview with John Howard, May 2016.

A first element of the answer is that the perception of the question of Islam is closely linked to the perception of multiculturalism. His clarification, moreover, provides information on party specificities. J. Howard does not mention any opposition to multiculturalism, but establishes a hierarchy between multiculturalism and integration, presenting them as two opposite poles. In this dichotomous configuration, apprehending Muslims through the prism of multiculturalism in priority would characterise the position of the ALP. This perception of party stances as a matter of "degrees", which amounts to distancing without condemning multiculturalism may appear ambiguous at first sight. In fact, it becomes understandable in the light of the previous part: within a differentialist cultural code where multiculturalism has progressively become the reference, politicians[169] must deal with the margins of manoeuvre allowed by the governing frame.

Since multiculturalism's implementation as Australia's official policy, politicians have been very conscious of the semantic power of the term, and especially in the ALP. Ernest Healy (1993) has shown for instance that within the Labor Party multiculturalism

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[169] A very similar response was made by Leader of the Opposition Tony Abbott when questioned as to the absence of an Opposition spokesperson for multiculturalism: "I think that it's important that we recognise the diversity of Australian society but these days on both sides of politics we tend to talk more in terms of citizenship and I'm happy to keep doing that. I think that it's important that we acknowledge the diversity of Australia but I think it's also important to focus on the unity of Australia and that's what I want to do" (*Transcript of joint press conference: Sydney: 14 September 2010: Announcement of Coalition Shadow Ministry; parliamentary reforms; speaker's role*, media release, Sydney, 14 September 2010).

has been useful both for Left and Right branches to enlarge their electoral base through the mobilisation of an ethnic rhetoric[170]. During an interview focusing on the question of Islam, a former Liberal MP deplored the lack of strategic positioning of his party on multicultural issues:

> Among the Liberals, the only one who does a reasonable job on that front now is a fellow called Kelly who has strived to link communities of his constituencies and beyond it. Unfortunately, most Liberal MPs don't do enough on this subject. (...) I think the Labor Party represents (the minorities) because they have more of those whom you might regard as minorities living in their constituencies. So they purport to represent them. My view is that they do it because they have to, not necessarily because they are naturally meant to. Chris Bowen knows he's got one of the biggest Assyrian churches, Jason Clare in Blaxland has to be very focused on the Vietnamese and around Blaxland they also have got a big Lebanese population, and so on...
>
> Interview with a former Coalition MP[171], June 2016.

On a question like Islam, it is meaningful to note that a former Coalition member himself considers that his party has a deficit of legitimacy because the multiculturalist agenda has been historically more invested by the ALP. This interview, among many others, shows the political importance of multiculturalism, and further that ethno-differentialism works as a transpartisan referent which is also performative: the necessity for politicians to take into account the existence of ethnic groups for electoral purposes entails their recognition as such. Within this differentialist pattern where ethnicity may appear as a relevant dimension for the identification of groups, multiculturalism imposed

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[170] Healy notices the existence of various branches, including Greek, Italian, Arabic, Macedonian, Turkish and Timorese. He underlines the strategic revitalisation of dying branches by specific ethnic groups, in particular "Maronite-Christian Lebanese and Filipinos into the Coburg East branch by the Labor Unity faction, and of Muslim-Lebanese into the hitherto Greek Westgarth branch by the socialist Left faction" (Healy 1993, p.39).

[171] Because of the interviewee's preference for anonymity, his name has not been mentioned.

itself as the legitimate prism for their apprehension by the public actors. Politicians who may be unfavourable toward multiculturalism therefore find more political gain in contesting the acceptations of the term rather than its use, in redefining its contours rather than in fighting against its principles. Since its appearance in the 1970s, the political meaning of the term has therefore evolved. A manual search of the mentions of "multiculturalism" in Australian Hansard offers an overview of how the debate on the term has evolved.

Figure 13. Mentions of "multiculturalism" in the Australian Hansard

The graph clearly shows that the questioning and redefinition process of the notion dates back to the 1980s, had a revival in the middle of the 1990s and after 2010. This last period, contrarily to the earlier ones, is closely linked with Islam. The "question of Islam" has not created a debate on multiculturalism but integrated this already existing field of political struggle[172]. It is in this respect important to emphasise that if the social-democrat and neo-conservative agendas have integrated the notion, its criticism has become increasingly systematic from the 1980s. Some politicians have indeed followed the path lead by the work of intellectuals like Geoffrey Blainey (1984), Robert and Tanya Birrell

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[172] This is, in particular, a major difference with the inscription of Islam in the cultural code of the French laïcité since the debate had dried up a long time ago and surfaced again as the result of the emergence of Islam in the public debate.

(1978, 1981), Raymond Sestito (1982), Lachlan Chipman (1980) or Frank Knopfelmacher (1982). However, in contrast to the French case, these criticisms almost never questioned the principle of the preeminence of civil society, focusing for instance on the instrumental use of cultural heterogeneity by interest groups[173]. The paradox is that the questioning of multiculturalism since the 1980s has borrowed from the vocabulary of assimilation, but in a different meaning than the French politicians because it did not put forward a unified citizenship legitimised by the state.

A good indicator of the performativity of the Australian model, and how its contours were reshaped by different governments, is to follow the semantic evolution in government institutions. The functions of the DIEA have been modified since 1987, showing the evolution of the Coalition and Labor Government perspectives on the management of immigration and ethnicity. The following chart presents the evolution of the denominations.

Table 4: *Evolution of the denominations of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA)*

- Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA): 1987-1993,

- Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (II): 1993-1996

- Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA): 1996-2001

- Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA): 2001-2006

- Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (II): 2006-2007

- Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC): 2007-2013

- Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP): 2013-present.

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[173] It encapsulates authors coming from different intellectual traditions, from social conservatism to the libertarian tradition. However, they all agree on underlining the risk posed by multiculturalism to social harmony. It is also noteworthy that there was a criticism from the Australian Left and influenced by Marxism, for which multiculturalism's focus on ethnicity "prioritises ethnicity over class difference" (Lepervanche 1992, p.83).

The semantic change from the notion of Ethnicity toward Multiculturalism, then Citizenship and eventually Border Protection shows that the Government priorities have shifted toward identity and security considerations. Immigration is therefore not only a matter of social cohesion but has also become (again) a question closely tied to economic growth[174] (Miller 1999; Betts 2003; Spinks 2010). It is noteworthy that the Howard Government was responsible for reintroducing the term "Multicultural" in 1996 with Philip Ruddock as Minister. This choice may appear surprising at first glance since John Howard's *One Australia* policy launched on 22 August 1988 had sought to deconstruct multicultural policies, integrating some of Blainey's recommandations[175]. It is in fact these events which led him to amend his position in order to get back into the political arena. His public position on multiculturalism had done him, according to his own words, "considerable damage"[176] and contributed to the loss of his leadership to Andrew Peacock who had shown more support toward the notion. Even in the Coalition, the critique of multiculturalism proved to be a politically unviable initiative because of the importance of the pregnancy of the multiculturalist referential. Philip Ruddock explains in the following terms the reappearance of multiculturalism in the 1996 Coalition's agenda:

[174] Since the Howard Government in 1996, the Governments have sharpened focus on skilled migration. The planned migration intake even increased under the Rudd Government, reaching 190 300 for the years 2008-2009. These changes have had an impact on the ethnic composition of migration waves.

[175] In an interview with Gerard Henderson, John Howard explained: " The objection I have to multiculturalism is that multiculturalism is in effect saying that it is impossible to have an Australian ethos, that it is impossible to have a common Australian culture. So we have to pretend that we are a federation of cultures and that we've got a bit from every part of the world. I think that is hopeless" (in Markus 2001).

[176] In his autobiography *Lazarus Rising,* Howard recounts: "The whole issue had done me considerable damage. It had divided the Liberal Party and diverted attention from the original issue of substance I had introduced during my speech in Western Australia, namely the real doubts I had about multiculturalism. It was a case of having antagonised everybody. Those who supported multiculturalism disagreed strongly with me. Those who may have agreed with my views on multiculturalism lost track of the debate as the Asian-immigration issue intruded, and those who might have agreed, on careful analysis, with what I had said about the pace of Asian immigration, felt that having raised the issue I had then gone quiet on it. I had been wrong to make the original statements on the pace of Asian immigration" (Howard 2010, p.155). Following this situation, the Labor Party decided to propose a motion against Racial Discrimination as a disavowal of Howard's statements. Exceptionally, some Liberal MPs (including Philip Ruddock) crossed the floor and voted against their own party.

Look, when we came in, it was in 1996. Howard had to reposition himself on the issues of ethnicity and multiculturalism. He had run these issues in opposition, but he now was in government. And in my view he decided what is the best way of operating an inclusive immigration program. You put into that role Ruddock who crossed the floor in 1988 and people find it very difficult to say "oh, this is Howard who is still discriminating against people on the basis of their race". And I suspect, even now, I know, Howard has had reservations about the term multiculturalism but he had to repair the wounds.

Interview with Philip Ruddock, June 2016.

On 3 December 1996 John Howard issued a "Statement on Multiculturalism" and on 11 December 1997 he gave an address at the Launch of the National Multicultural Advisory Council's Issues paper. In both, he reaffirmed the Coalition's commitment to maintain and further enhance "Australia's unique cultural diversity". In the same process, he mentioned Australian multiculturalism as being specific, thus redefining the acceptance of the term. Only microparties can afford a frontal, direct opposition to multiculturalism. In particular, Rise Up Australia (launched by Daniel Nalliah on 22 June 2011) condemns multiculturalism held responsible for favouring "Dual Legal Systems (ie. Sharia Law)", praising on the contrary "a multi-ethnic nation with one culture"[177]. Two points must be noted: first, the direct link between the rejection of multiculturalism and the fear of an Islamic invasion; second, the inscription of this very criticism within the differentialist cultural code.

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[177] Rise Up Australia's perception of multiculturalism is widely developed on their official website: http://riseupaustraliaparty.com/our-policies/multi-cultures/ (last checked on 7 March 2017). The party gives the following definition: "A 'multi-ethnic nation with one culture' means that we have a melting pot that draws its richness from a blend of many ethnic groups".

c) "Deviant cases" as an illustration of interparty dynamics

Using deviant cases may, again, be helpful to illustrate and shed light on the differentiated positions of French and Australian parties on Islam-related questions. In particular, two cases involving Muslims had a strong political impact and prove revealing because they happened during the same period (respectively July and October 2006) and raised questions linked with other societal issues (in the case in point, gender roles). The reactions of political parties help in grasping the priority angles of approach.

In France, on 26 July 2006, a Muslim man asked for the annulment of his marriage to the Lille Regional Court, arguing that his wife lacked the "essential quality"[178] of being a virgin and lied about it. The Court decided to annul the marriage but the decision was eventually reversed by the Appeal chamber. The choice to appeal against the original sentence came from the political parties' universal condemnation of the first decision. However, the reasons given by the parties are not similar. The UMP politicians mainly used two kinds of arguments. First, the undermining of the equality between men and women: Valérie Létard (State secretary for equality) spoke of a "regression", Dominique Paillé (spokesperson for the party) evoked a "calling into question of equality", Fadela Amara (State secretary for urban policies) evoked a "fatwa against women's emancipation". Second, a lack of compatibility with Republican law: Frédéric Lefebvre (spokesperson for the party) made an appeal "in the interest of the Law" and Dominique Paillé condemned a problem of law. The Socialist Party joined the UMP in condemning a problem in the principle of equality between men and women: Laurence Rossignol (National secretary for women's rights) in a communiqué (Appendix 2.1) criticised a decision violating the "constitutional principle of equality" and René Rouquet (MP) raised this issue in Parliament. Now, the PS argument was slightly different since the subject was linked to the question of laïcité and communalism. Using the exact same words as L. Rossignol, R. Rouquet linked the situation with bigotry and mentioned that the decision

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[178] The French civil code (Art 180) mentions that a marriage can be annulled if a spouse lied about an "essential quality" which may impact the relationship.

not only flouted women's right to control their own body but also "the principles of laïcité" by "submitting the laws of the Republic to customary law" (JORF, question n°25817, 24 June 2008, p.5328). The communiqués of the Greens and the Communist Party reflect a divergence between the far Left toward the question of minorities. In the Communist Party communiqué (Appendix 2.2), Marie-George Buffet condemned simultaneously a "step backward of more than two centuries, when the women were men's property" and a "communalist logic". The Greens (Appendix 2.3) did not make any mention of communalism, focusing exclusively on "women's fundamental freedoms, their dignity and their integrity". The National Front (Appendix 2.4), in contrast, is the only party making a direct mention of Islam. Its communiqué was titled "French Justice at the Time of Sharia" and focused on the fact that the decision illustrated "the rise and influence of communalist claims in (the) country", as well as the mistakes of "the multiculturalist Left".

The Australian affair is quite different in form and consequences but its political treatment reveals similar party divergences. In October 2006, the Grand Mufti of Australia Sheik Taj Aldin al-Hilaly made controversial statements blaming women who "sway suggestively" as the original cause of gang rapes and comparing them to "uncovered meat"[179]. These statements were largely condemned by the Australian Muslim community[180] but triggered many political reactions. If all parties condemned the statements, their reaction to the retention of Hilaly as Mufti did not emphasise the same aspects. The ALP focused on Hilaly's damage to the equality between men and women. For instance, Kevin Rudd declared that "Australia's Muslim leadership should not be taking any decision that allows someone like Hilaly, who's defended pack rapists, to remain as mufti of Australia" (*SMH* 26 March 2007). The Coalition discourses, however, included axiological comments and reflections on multiculturalism and the integration of the Muslim community within the country. John Howard called the remarks "quite out of touch with contemporary values in Australia", adding later that "the failure of the

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[179] See for instance: "Read Sheik Hilaly's comments", Special Broadcasting Service, 28 October 2006; "Ethnic leaders condemn Muslim cleric", *AAP*, 26 October 2006.

[180] For instance, the Islamic Council of Victoria issued a statement calling for his resignation, and the Islamic Council of NSW officially condemned his remarks.

community to do something more decisive about this is damaging the image of Islamic Australians as part of (the Australian) community" (*ABC News* 26 March 2007). Treasurer Peter Costello expressed his hope that "the moderate Muslim leaders will speak out today and condemn these comments" (*SBS News*, 26 October 2006). The Socialist Alliance addressed the issue in Green Left Weekly (#703, 21 March 2007), in which they condemned the sexism of the statements but also the Coalition's response, mentioning that "the government and right-wing shock jocks turned the issue into one about "Islam", not the sexist remarks". They refused, however, to link the issue with religion or the Muslim community, establishing a parallel between "Muslim and Arab", "South Asian" and "Aboriginal" communities.

Chapter Conclusion

Analysing the interplay between party specificities and the national cultural code proves very informative for theoretical purposes, as well as heuristically fecund. The differentiated democratic traditions for the governance of minorities remain an indispensable factor for grasping how the "question of Islam" is constructed in France and Australia. Although facing comparable challenges, the two political systems react using different symbolic grammars reflected in the party universes of discourse. Synchronic automated analyses of discourses and diachronic socio-historical comparisons have shown that the historical construction of the link between the state and civil society profoundly impacts the management of Muslim minorities. In France, where multiculturalism remains foreign to the cultural code, Left and Right discourses may join in fighting communalism. In Australia, both conservative and social-democrat discourses praise cultural diversity yet the debate occurs on the (re)definition of multiculturalism. A striking element is that in both countries, political parties may praise practical consequences of the other democratic tradition without integrating the cultural code attached to them. In Australia, the

conservative assimilationist discourse does not rely on the existence of a French-like unitary State and in France, the National Front's defense of ethno-differentialism does not involve multiculturalism.

The references to the cultural code made by politicians may be further seen through the twofold prism of "objective" and "subjective" dimensions identified by Howard Becker[181] in his analysis of the concept of "career" borrowed from Hughes (Becker 1963). First, elements linked with the individual trajectory of politicians and their previous choices bring objective constraints in which they have to inscribe their actions. Second, politicians need to be conscious of the symbolic and subjective value of their actions in this context. N. Sarkozy could not support a law against the veil in 2003 because of his personal involvement in the CFCM process and because he could not oppose an important Muslim electorate[182]. Retrospectively, he had to revise a conception which could appear in opposition with the French universalist model. J. Howard, symmetrically, found himself in a position where the criticism of multiculturalism was politically counter-productive. Recapturing the notion by modifying its acceptance in order to create an "Australian specificity" could address the electoral issue whilst furthering the project of reconfiguration of multiculturalism. Such career considerations act as "causal mediations" (Dobry 1986) between the national frame of reference and the politicians' discourses. This shows that the perception of Islam has to be grasped at the intersection of structural and situational dimensions, macrosociological variables and interactions. The theoretical ambition expressed in Chapter 1 shows its relevance, as interactions, like party positions, reveal their hermeneutic subtlety when confronted with the democratic tradition in relation to which they are constructed.

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[181] The use by Becker of these two dimensions to analyse deviance allows by extension a theoretical opening which may prove fruitful for other domains of interest like activist engagement (Fillieule 2001) or political perception with a long-term focus.

[182] In November 2004, N. Sarkozy created within the UMP the "Cercle de la Diversité Républicaine" for electoral purposes, with representatives of the "French diversity" like Rama Yade, Dogad Dogoui and Lucien Pambou. Abderrahmane Dahmane, founder of the Council of the Muslim Democrats, actively contributed to the 2007 campaign for N. Sarkozy as well as many Muslim support committees.

- Chapter 5: The Emergence of the "Question of Islam" in Australia and France

Chapter 3 and 4 have shown governing frames involved in the perception of Islam as a religion and Muslims as a minority. However, blind spots remain regarding how the "question of Islam" *per se* has emerged in both contexts as a major political issue – albeit in different terms – and how this correlates to the specific situation of Muslims in France and Australia. This chapter aims at responding to this question by focusing on the visibility of Islam with a diachronic perspective.

In order to grasp the differentiated modalities of designation for Muslim populations, it is necessary to take into account simultaneously endogenous and exogenous dynamics. This is why I will proceed by coupling an account of the Muslim settlement in both countries and a socio-historical analysis of how their presence came within the scope of the public authorities' management of minorities. A common element is that the visibility of Muslims has been socially and demographically linked with the question of immigration. Differences are noticeable in the nature and social impact of Muslim migrations, as well as the political and state "categories of understanding" (Sayad 1999a) of these processes. The consequences of such specificities have been crucial during the last decades both for the treatment of Muslim minorities and for the framing of the situation by political parties. Drawing on these elements, I will analyse how key politicians in France and Australia have favoured and promoted different modalities of regulation for Islam in the 1990s and in the 2000s. In particular, I will show that whilst in Australia debates arose on the "ethnic management" of Muslims, in France the central contentions focused on the institutionalisation of Islam as a religion.

I - The Grounds of Visibility: the Influence of the Conditions of Settlement

1) The weight of the migratory context on French and Australian Muslims

a) The "Unthought Religion"

A reference publication directed by Mohamed Arkoun, *Histoire de l'Islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Age à nos jours* (2006) shows that the Muslim presence in France is old but a major turn occurred with the colonial undertaking of the 19th century. Henry Laurens writes in this respect that "the fear of Islam reappeared but under the fear of the dominated natives' revolt (...) Republican France can only define its action through a rightful despotism" (Laurens in Arkoun 2006, p.499). France's religious policy, during this colonisation period, was globally respectful toward Islam, as well as its religious leaders (Sehimi 1989), famous examples being Lyautey's interdiction to non-Muslims to penetrate into mosques or the refusal to flypost the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (DDHC) in Morocco because it contradicted some principles of the sharifian kingdom. However, Jocelyne Dakhlia shows that this deference also corresponds with a strict separation between mainland France and the Muslim provinces of the colonial empire, thus creating an "unthinkable" of the recognition of Islam on the hexagonal territory (Dakhlia 2006). It is only in 1911 that the country adopted an institutional tool with the *Commission Interministérielle des Affaires Musulmanes* (CIAM) in order to help the officers and administrators interacting with the indigeneous populations in the colonies. It is also noteworthy that before World War I, the Muslim presence was quite weak in mainland France, an official enquiry mentioning "4000 to 5000 Algerians" only, especially in Marseille, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the Paris region (Sayad 1977; Stora 1992). Out of gratitude for the 400000 indigenous North Africans (approximately 170000 Algerians and 135000

Morrocans) mobilised during the conflict[183], the Republic deployed a handful of symbolic measures (Sbaï 2006). Among them, some started to make Islam visible in France as a religion, like the Avicenne hospital, the Great Mosque of Paris inaugurated on 15 July 1926[184], and the Muslim cemetery of Bobigny[185] created by presidential decree on 4 January 1934. The working immigration increased notably after the war, encouraged by the public authorities before the return of unemployment forced them to change their approach [186] (Le Pautremat 2003; Rosenberg & Jacquet 2013).

World War II marked another major turn for the Muslim presence in France, as immigration became a "national imperative" for which the order of 2 November 1945 (n°45-2658) created the National Office of Immigration (ONI). Patrick Weil shows the emergence of "rules of the game" that pitted two principles in competition. An "egalitarian" principle, on the one hand, consisted in making immigration laws more flexible independently from the countries of origin. An "ethnic" principle, on the other hand, simultaneously encouraged immigration from countries labelled as "culturally close" in order to favour a sustainable settlement. Immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Tukey were only thought about as temporary "travellers" despite their numerous arrivals in the country (from less than 250 000 after the war, their number rose to 1 100 000 in 1975). In order to grasp the importance of this political perception, one

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[183] One also has to acknowledge the 130 000 Muslim who worked as replacement for the French people mobilised on the front.

[184] The Great Mosque of Paris is not the first mosque in France. The oldest was built in 1538 in Tsingoni, Mayotte, and in 1905 a mosque had been built in Saint-Denis (Réunion). The Great Mosque of Paris constituted, however, a major step in the emerging visibility of Islam. Its inauguration gathered the bey of Tunis, the Sultan of Morocco as well as the French institutional elite, including Edouard Herriot and Gaston Doumergue – both hostile to the publicisation of the religious. This will to express the state's Islamophilia is to be understood in a context of afterwar thankfulness and was also meant to counter Abd el-Krim's Islamist rhetoric during the Rif War. Nationalist intellectuals like Charles Maurras were very critical of what they perceived as a religious intrusion.

[185] There are also cemeteries with Muslim sections for soldiers killed during the two World Wars, including Suippes (Marne), Douaumont (Meuse), Notre Dame de Laurette (Pas de Calais), Condé-Folie (Somme), Rougemont (Doubs), Sigolsheim (Haut-Rhin), Rétaud (Charentes Maritimes) and Besançon (Doubs).

[186] For instance, the suppression of the travel permit for Algerians. Even if the immigration policy changed in 1924 because of unemployement, the immigration process continued.

has to take into account the fact that it was not only caused by the French public authorities but was part of a more general framework. As Jocelyne Cesari (1994a, p.109) puts it, "the North African immigration has a specific symbolic status distinguishing it from other migrations because of its colonial and post-colonial origin". In other words, this immigration has taken place within the frame of a project built with the countries of origin. Before the independence of these countries it was a direct consequence of colonisation (for instance the law of 20 September 1947 on freedom of movement for Algerian Muslims[187]), and after independence it became linked to the necessity of development in the former colonies (Cesari 1994b; Tribalat 1996; Rahaoui 2006). The migratory model is often referred to as the "noria" because migrants allegedly came for a limited amount of time and were replaced by subsequent migrants when leaving. The "return to the home country" was therefore constantly present in the mind of the immigrants, which also explains why Islam did not structure the community life in a country of provisional exile where the religious obligations could be suspended (Kepel & Leveau 1988; Hifi 1985). Solenne Jouanneau (2013) shows in this respect that the material and symbolic appropriation of places of worship did not occur before the 1980s[188] and that, in parallel, the religious dimension of the migrations was not taken into account by public authorities.

b) The heterogeneous origins of Australian Muslims

The origin of the social and political visibility of Muslims in Australia involves different dynamics, even though their presence in the country is old (Ganter 2008). The first known contacts between Muslims and the Australian continent date back to the 17th century, when Macassan trepangers visited the Northern coast (Russell 2004; Macknight

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[187] This law is indeed the continuation of the orders of 7 March 1944 and 17 August 1945, as well as the Lamine Guèye law promulgated on 7 May 1946 and recognising the French citizenship "for all oversea citizens (Algeria included)".

[188] In particular, the professionalisation of imams only occurred in the 1980s with the development of associations providing a social base for the structuration of Islam.

1976; Jones 1993). Commercial exchanges with China contributed to the development of South Sulawesi and fostered various contacts, the fishermen moving with the availability of resources (Schwerdtner Máñez & Ferse 2010). Ian McIntosh evokes in this respect the adaptation by Aboriginal peoples from the North East Arnhem Land of some traditions inherited from Islam, as well as elements of language (McIntosh 1996). The Muslim presence is also noticeable – although weak – among the convicts. Nahid Kabir quotes Donohoe to show that about 5% of the 160000 prisoners sent to Australia came from the British empire, including India, Barbados and Tunisia (Kabir 2013). The official settlement of Muslims dates back to the mid-nineteenth century[189], with the arrival of Afghan cameleers (Jones & Kenny 2010; Saeed 2001). Estimates report roughly 3000 cameleers having worked in Australia. They played an important role in transportation until the advent of the automobile in the 1920s (Jupp 2001). During this period, Australia saw the arrival of European Muslims with the Albanian immigrants. They settled mainly in farms and in the sugar industry around Mareeba and Cairns in Queensland, in Victoria near Shepparton, and in Western Australia around Fremantle, York and Morana (Carne 1984; Price 1963). Malaysian pearl fishers were also employed in Western Australia as were Javanese ploughmen in the sugar industry. They represented a small but coveted workforce (Kabir 2006). This initial Muslim presence remained relatively discreet, even though stigmatising behaviours from local populations were occasionally reported toward Afghans, especially in the context of the economic crisis (Fazal 2004; Drewery 2008). The only event which showed a political impact was the "battle of Broken Hill", during which religious and political motives were used by two criminals, Gool Mohammed and Mullah Abdullah, in the context of the war against the Ottoman empire[190]. Significantly, it

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[189] According to the Australian Government's information, in 1860 the government of Victoria imported 24 camels and 3 cameleers, and in 1865 South Australia imported 124 camels and 31 cameleers (source: http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/afghan-cameleers).

[190] On 1 January 1915 two Muslims living in the West Cameleers Camp, Badsha Mohammed Gool and Mullah Abdullah, killed 4 people and wounded 7 people shooting on a family train. Their motivations are suggested by letters found on their corpses, including frustration (Abdullah was "convicted by Chief Sanitary Inspector Brosnan for not having a licence to operate an abattoir") and political protestations (Gool Mohamed claimed his allegiance to the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid stating "I will fight and kill your people because your people are fighting my country"). This isolated event marked the community and generated defiance toward cameleers as

was their ethnicity, rather than their religion, which interested the commentators talking about their "Afghan" or "Turkish" look[191] (Stevens 1989; Commonwealth War Graves Commission 2013). The Muslim population remained quite small until the 1970s, and mostly masculine. From this period on however, its growth became sustained and uninterrupted. In 1971, the Census of Population and Housing of the Australian Bureau of Statistics mentioned 8711 Muslim women and 22311 Muslim men, representing 0.2% of the Australian population (ABS 1971). In 1981, the Muslims represented 0.3% of the population (41 329 men, 35 435 women) (ABS 1981), 0.9% in 1991 with 147 487 individuals (ABS 1991), 1.5% in 2001 with 281 600 individuals (ABS 2001) and 2.2% in 2011 with 476 291 individuals (ABS 2011). This sustained immigration is not only a Muslim phenomenon but is also observable for Buddhists and Hindus (ABS 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011). The ethnic composition of the Australian population has therefore noticeably changed during the last half-century, and even more than in France. However the socio-cultural context of this mutation was totally different, instigating a different visibility of ethnic minorities. Post World War II Australia has, like many other Western countries, tried to attract a massive immigration (Kuo 2010; Foster & Stockley 1984). In sharp contrast to France, the declared aim was to get populations moving into the country permanently (Haebich 2008; Crotty & Roberts 2009). This immigration was not only wanted to supply manpower, but also intended to swell the population in general. A first immigration program had been planned in the 1920s but had to be given up because of the world depression as well as its obsolete focus on rural areas (Jupp 2007). To these processes must also be added Australia's humanitarian commitments to admit refugees fleeing the Lebanese civil war since the 1970s and the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

From this history ensues a specificity of Australian Islam, which is its ethnic diversity[192]. This is why the definition of an "Australian Muslim community" only has a

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well as the German community acccused of being manipulative of Muslims (see for instance Stevens 1989).

[191] The two men, first considered as Turkish, were in reality from Afghanistan and Pakistan (then India), showing the confusion in ethnic identifications.

[192] The countries of origin of the Muslims are as diverse as Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Eritrea, Etiopia, Fidji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Irak, Lebanon, Malaya, Pakistan, Palestine,

very limited empirical relevance, making it complex for Muslims to set up an organisation (Spalek & Imtoual 2007; Wafia & Allen 1997; Humphrey 1987). The first Islamic societies were established in the 1950s in New South Wales and Victoria. They were relatively unstructured but maintained a high level of inter-ethnicity (Mansouri 2006). In 1976, following the presence of a Saudi delegation with Abdullah Al-Zayed and Ali Kettani – one of King Faisal's advisors – the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) appeared. Its aim is to represent all the Muslim populations and to specify the modalities of integration of the Islamic norms within the Australian society[193]. The Australian Muslims are, however, a very heterogeneous group. As Bilal Cleland points out, "ethnic pride still divides the community despite the existence of a second and third generation of Australian-born Muslims" (Cleland in Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2001, p.28). The question of the ethnic origin is therefore very important to grasp the processes of self-identification, and reciprocally the social designation of Muslims. The relevance of this observation was furthered during the 1990s (Collins, Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2000).

2) Two founding myths as basis for the state understanding

a) The French myth of temporary immigration

This overview of the historical conditions of settlement for the Muslim populations in France and in Australia reveals totally different modalities of visibility groundings for Islam. In the French social and political sphere, I have shown that the Muslim immigration was perceived as temporary both by the authorities and the populations

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Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Turkey. In total, about 80 countries and not less than 50 ethnicities are represented on the Australian territory.

[193]The description of the AFIC's mission is made in the folloing terms on the official website of the organisation: " The mission of AFIC is to provide service to the community in a manner that is in accordance with the teachings of Islam and within the framework of Australian law. To advocate on behalf of the Muslim community on all such matters that will affect the community's relevance, settlement and integration within Australian society. The main role of AFIC is to represent Islam and Muslims of Australia as one "Ummah" to the government and other bodies nationally and internationally. AFIC coordinates and provides resources for activities of its State Islamic Councils and member Islamic societies."

themselves. In Australia, on the contrary, the rhetoric of permanent settlement predominated. In both countries, the postwar migratory policy reflected these specific links. Their respective implications have been highly structuring on party politics from this period onward.

In France, the postwar period broke with the national tradition of immigration policy, since it was considered exclusively in demographic and economic terms. Before immigration was brought to a standstill in 1974, the perception of Islam was relatively benevolent, precisely on account of the short-term perspective of its settlement. For this reason, the administrative regulation of Muslim populations was very weak. Significantly, the intelligence agency investigations and the prefectoral documents totally avoided the question of Islam, merging it with indigenity (Jouanneau 2013). A striking observation in this respect is the political transversality of the perception that Muslim immigration was only to be thought of in economic terms. Famous speeches of the postwar period are revealing of this perception. For instance, G. Pompidou declared in 1962 that "immigration is a mean to relieve the work market and to resist social pressure"[194], M. Massenet (Director of Population and Migrations) asserted in 1966 that "a massive foreign immigration is an incomparable instrument to fight against the heating of the economic climate"[195] and J.M. Jeanneney (Minister of Social Affairs) stated that "clandestine immigration is not useless, because if we relied on international rules and agreements, we may lack workforce"[196]. Examining the Parliament archives of this period further reveals this consensus. For instance, on 28 January 1958, Jean-Marie Le Pen gave the following speech:

> Let us offer to the Algerian Muslims (...) the entrance
> and the integration in a dynamic, in a conquering

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[194] "L'immigration est un moyen de créer une certaine détente sur le marché du travail et de résister à la pression sociale", sentence pronounced during the General Assembly of the French Founders, in 1962.

[195] "Une immigration étrangère importante constitue un instrument incomparable de lutte contre l'échauffement conjoncturel".

[196] "L'immigration clandestine n'est pas inutile, car si l'on s'en tenait à l'application des règlements et des accords internationaux, nous manquerions peut-être de main d'oeuvre".

France. Instead of telling them, as we do now: "you cost too much, you are a burden", let us tell them: "We need you. You are the youth of the Nation. (...) How may a country which regretted so long not having enough young people undervalue the possibility to have 5 or 6 millions of them?[197]

Jean-Marie Le Pen, Discourse in Parliament, JORF 28 January 1958, 2nd session, p.310.

This extract deserves to be highlighted because it emanates from the founder of the National Front, which has extensively claimed the constitution of an anti-immigration political niche[198]. Such a declaration is to be inscribed within this specific context, with the aim to defend French Algeria (and therefore the assimilability of the Muslim Algerian population) and the perspective of a short-term immigration posing no risk of socio-cultural issue[199]. The paradox is important: although immigration was commonly accepted by all parties, almost no observers contemplated the possibility of long-term integration. As Abdelmalek Sayad puts it, "an immigrant is essentially a working force, and a temporary working force, provisional, in transit" (Sayad 1997, p.61). A revealing element which appeared through the comparative reading of the Parliament archives is the complete interchangeability of the words "migrant" and "workers" (travailleurs). As an example among many others, during a debate in 1964, Minister of Health and Population Raymond Marcellin mentioned a developing

(...) policy of welcoming and social action toward the immigrants, and in particular those originating from

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[197] "Offrons aux Musulmans d'Algérie (...) l'entrée et l'intégration dans une France dynamique, dans une France conquérante. Au lieu de leur dire, comme nous le faisons maintenant: " Vous nous coûtez très cher; vous êtes un fardeau ", disons-leur: " Nous avons besoin de vous. Vous êtes la jeunesse de la Nation. (...) Comment un pays qui a déploré longtemps de n'avoir pas assez de jeunes pourrait-il dévaluer le fait d'en avoir cinq ou six millions ?"

[198] For instance, Jean-Marie Le Pen's program in the 2002 presidential election expressed the objective of "reversing the immigration stream" establishing four points, including "expelling immediately all immigrants in illegal situation", "supressing the automatic acquisition of the French nationality", "ending family reunification".

[199] In the same speech, Le Pen also mentions a "particular social psychology" in the Muslim countries of origin which would not be integrable.

Algeria and the African States, in order to improve the
conditions of life and adaptation of these workers in
France[200].

The consequence of the social use and the institutional contents given to these
categories became performative, because the very justification of the immigrants' presence
became inseparably linked to what they were employed for (Blanc-Chaléard 2001). Since
the fundamental social purpose of immigrants is consubstantial to the economic situation,
they lost this very legitimacy in a context of unemployment – which has been the case
since the 1970s. Moreover, because of their provisory status, the political imaginary
cannot grasp them other than beings wihout history and without past, or to recall Pierre
Bourdieu in the preface of *La double absence,* "atopos, without place, moved away,
unclassifiable" (Sayad 1999, p.13). From this ensues the incapacity of public authorities to
grasp the immigrant as also an "emigrant", that is to say an individual with a pre-existing
social, cultural and religious capital. In this respect, Gérard Noiriel (2001) evokes a
"memory denial" and Dominique Schnapper characterises France as "an immigration
country in self-ignorance" (Schnapper 1991, p.13).

b) The myth of White Australia

Australia was, in contrast, a very conscious country when it came to the permanent
immigration process. In this respect, public authorities have tended to control and regulate
who could come in (Brett, Gillepsie & Goot 1994; Stratton & Ang 1994). James Jupp
synthesises the immigration policy project in three pillars: the maintenance of British
hegemony and subsequently "white" predominance through selection, the strengthening of

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[200] "Le Gouvernement se préoccupe actuellement de promouvoir les structures et les moyens
nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre d 'une politique d'accueil et d'action sociale en faveur des
immigrants, et notamment de ceux originaires d'Algérie et des Etats africains, en vue d'améliorer
dans tous les domaines les conditions de vie et d 'adaptation de ces travailleurs en France." (JORF
2nd Session, 8 April 1964, p.687).

Australia economically and militarily by mass migrations, and the state control of such processes (Jupp 2007, p.6). The phenotypical and cultural framing of populations is noticeable in the programs and discourses of the two major Australian parties.

The slogan "populate or perish", used for the first time in 1937 by Billy Hughes, became famous on account of its reutilisation by Arthur Augustus Calwell in the immediate afterwar. The observation made by the post-1945 Australian governments was that the Australian population was too small to survive in a context where the Asian nations were seen as particularly oppressive (Kunz 1988; West 2010). The Australian authorities first tried to attract populations culturally and phenotypically close to the traditional figure of the Christian White Australian by focusing on the British islands, Northern and Eastern Europe, then Southern Europe, especially Italy and Greece[201] (Markus 1984; Martin 1978). The immigration program then turned to South America, Turkey, Lebanon and other extra-European countries like Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

The most prominent Labor defender of the postwar White Australia policy is certainly Calwell, who after having been Minister of Immigration in the Chifley's government (1945-1949) led the Labor Party from 1960 to 1967. In his essay 'I Stand by White Australia' published on October 24th, 1949, he sought to respond to Prof. W. Macmahon Ball's 'Case for a Quota of Asian Migrants'. It sheds light on his doctrine and his perception of foreign religions like Islam:

> Underlying the White Australia policy is no suggestion of racial superiority. It began as a positive aspiration, and from it has resulted a positive achievement. (...) We will avoid the evils that plague America, that distress South Africa, that embitter Malaya, and that worry Fiji. Ingredients of an explosive character are inherent in the conditions existing in all those countries, and when the explosion occurs, as it did in Durban recently, there is civil war. The evils of miscegenation always result in rioting and bloodshed. We have avoided them in this

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[201] In particular, the country committed to welcome annually a minimum of 12 000 refugees from the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), the second highest number after the United States.

country, thanks to the foresight of our forebears and our
own innate common sense.

The simultaneous evocation of South Africa, Malaya and Fiji is meaningful. Islam is not directly evoked, but through the mentioning of problems met by multi-denominational countries, it appears in the same way as Buddhism or Hinduism as a potential threat for the cultural unity of the nation. The White Australia policy therefore shows a consistent philosophical postulate: the perceived necessity to create a social and religious homogeneity by merging race and culture[202]. This goal may only be achieved by making explicit the racialisation of Australianness. Interestingly, Robert Menzies, then in the Liberal opposition, declared on 10 November 1949 that "though we naturally want as many migrants as we can get of British stock, we denounce all attempts to create hostilities against any migrant or group of migrants". This shows that, even though the Liberal/Country Coalition was more cautious than the Labor Party when it came to interdictions[203], the core postulate of the White Australia policy remained untouched by political divergences.

Paradoxically enough, it is for very pragmatic reasons that a breach opened in the WAP, allowing Islam to become a visible part of the Australian socio-cultural landscape. Anna Haebich shows that, although the government tried to keep its promise to ensure that 50% of all migrants were British, the average level was 37% between 1945 and 1961 (Haebich 2008, p.165). The Menzies and Holt governments therefore unraveled the "White Australian Policy" which was officially abolished by the Whitlam government in December 1972. The assimilation policy became a multicultural policy. It is important to note that if the multicultural polity has imported a Canadian-inspired model, it also needs to be understood as the continuity of this post-White Australia policy in which assimilation was unsustainable (Lopez 2000; Cope & Kalantzis 2000). Indeed, this enables illumination of how ethnic management of the population and acknowledgement

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[202] A copy of A. Calwell's original article is included in Appendix 3.

[203] More than a hundred Asian immigrants were deported before 1949, including 49 Malaysians, which provoked diplomatic tensions with the governments of Malaya (Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2001, p.25).

of its diversity could emerge simultaneously[204]. In this context the emerging visibility of Islam was renewed. The situation was reinforced by the war against Israel in the Middle East. Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason (2001) show that the first Lebanese immigrants were mostly Christian but since 1975 they have been replaced by Muslim "chain migrations". By 1971, 16000 Lebanese-born residents were Muslim (about one in seven) and in 2001 almost half were Muslim (29300).

II - The Emergence of Current Debates

1) The turn of the 1980s and the renewed visibility of Islam

a) The emergence of a religious framing

In France, the 1980s initiated a switch in the emerging visibility of Muslims, following the Iranian revolution which Gilles Kepel and Remy Leveau (1988) call a "blast wave" in the context of the Cold War. The "second generation" was indeed a very different population from the first immigrants: it was mainly composed of young people who had always lived in France, where they attended school, and their presence could not be seen as provisional anymore (Withol de Wenden 2005). Without rejecting a culture of origin in which Islam was influential, members of this generation briefly tried to develop a civic movement that did not have religion as a central referent, but rather, ethnicity: the "beur" movement. The latter was revealed by the march occurring between 15 October

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[204] Please refer to Chapter 4 on the governance of minorities for an analysis of the semantic link between the political management of ethnic issues and cultural diversity.

and 1 December 1983[205] (Le Breton 2009; Boubeker & Abdallah 1993; Cérède 2008). This movement is important for two reasons related to our argument. First, marches provided this second generation with the recognition of a positive force and ability to protest. Before that, it was caught in a vice between the discourse of social workers seeing them as victims of the cultural multipositioning and the discourse of public authorities seeing them as potential troublemakers. Second, it allows for an understanding of how the Socialist Party took over the issue of "diversity" during the 1980s. François Mitterrand's government strategically orientated its policies toward multiculturalism. On the one hand, the aim was to seize upon the Communist municipalities thanks to the "suburb votes" and the PS control over the union of the Left (Jarreau & Kergoat 1995). On the other hand, the party sought to exploit a then popular media-friendly multiculturalism against the Right coalition UDF-RPR. "Beuritude" worked in this respect as a "political loss leader", to use Geisser and Soum's metaphor (2008, p.25), allowing for an electoral legitimation which was not accessible to the Right. It is noticeable that under the Fourth Republic, and the beginning of the Fifth, the Republican Right had played a pioneer role of integration by promoting Muslim elites from French Algeria[206]. However, it totally turned away from the issue of integration in the 1970s and 1980s by refusing to take into account the second generation, opening a political niche for the Socialist Party, which seized this opportunity. As a matter of fact, the political discourses that, up to the 1980s, merged the immigrant

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[205] The "beur" movement, which retrospectively gave its name to the second generation, took as a public birth certificate the "rodeos of the Minguettes" during the summer 1981, when young people of immigrant background stole cars and confronted the police. The year 1983 showed an explosion of violence from the "suburb youth" and in parallel with xenophobic acts committed toward the people of North African background. Inspired by the Amercian civil rights marchs, parish priest Christian Delorme and pastor Jean Costil initiated with the Minguettes' young people a long march which gathered about 100 000 people in Paris and whose delegation was received by the President of the Republic. A major victory was the creation of a ten-year residence permit. This march was followed by another one in 1984, organised by the collective movement "Convergence 1984" which gathered about 60 000 people, and two others in 1985 from Bordeaux to Paris.

[206] Nafissa Sid Cara promoted a republican Islam adapted to the metropolitan context. She became Secretary of State of De Gaulle from 23 January 1959 to 14 April 1962. She signed with Michel Debré an order on 4 February 1959 related to the condition of Muslim women and mutual consent for marriage. The text was at the origin of a debate involving laïcité and Islam because the Algerian FLN opposed this order, stating that the French laïcité was in contradiction with the Muslim personal status (Lalami 2015; Arkoun 2010, p.181).

populations in urban policies directed toward the "jeunes des banlieues" (suburb youth) or the "*jeunes de quartiers difficiles*" (sensitive urban zones) now made apparent the ethnic dimension of this generation (Laurence & Vaïsse 2007). Sylvie Durmelat goes as far as evoking a "political invention of the Beur culture" (Durmelat 1995). In this perspective, two movements became the associative batons of the Socialist Party: SOS Racisme claiming a "right to difference" and France Plus claiming a "right to indifference"[207]. In a configuration of promotion of militant initiatives, the reconversion of this symbolic capital within the PS has been a structuring element for the Left (Juhem 1999; Juhem 2001; Sawicki 1997). However, this political handling of the Beur movement may be partly responsible for its failure, as it led to divisions between those who wanted to make political activism the spearhead of integration and those who condemned the appropriation of the Beur movement by the antiracists. The right-wing discourses, symmetrically, opposed strong discourses against communalism to the claim for a "right to difference" (Berhil 2009). The movement's loss of impetus was to the benefit of the Muslim associative networks, giving more weight to religious claims, which grew exponentially from the 1990s. This observation points to two major consequences: the emerging visibility of Islam in the public space and the emergence of a religion-oriented prism for the perception of Muslims by parties, reactivating the long French tradition of political debate about the place of the religious in the public sphere.

The appearance of the religious prism as a modality of understanding for political parties may be observed at least since 1983. On 26 January, Minister of the Interior Gaston Defferre spoke about the strikes in the automobile industry of Flins (Parisian region). He qualified the movement as "holy strikes of fundamentalists, of Muslims, of Shia"[208] (*Europe 1*, 26 January 1983). The existence of an external context of apprehension incited by the Iranian revolution offered the government an opportunity to

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[207] SOS Racisme is an anti-racist association founded in 1984, shortly after the electoral successes of the National Front. The association's links with the Socialist Party are strong. Harlem Desir, who was its president for eight years, has been elected as European deputy on the Socialist Party's list in 1999. François Mitterrand also offered the vice-president Julien Dray to be candidate for the Socialist Party in the Essonne 10th constituency.

[208] "grèves saintes d'intégristes, de musulmans, de chiites"

(re-)discover the potential of conflict in Islam despite the largely non-religious dimension of the claims (Withol De Wenden, Diop, Barou et al. 1986; Hajjat & Mohammed 2016; Tripier 1990). Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy followed Defferre in mentioning the agitation of "political and religious groups" different from the "French social facts" (*Nord-Eclair*, 28 January 1983). Minister of Labour Jean Auroux played a decisive role in orientating the process of characterising the movement in religious terms. He made several declarations mentioning fundamentalists (from *Paris Match* to *France Inter*), the most explicit of which may be the following in the newspaper *L'Alsace* on 10 February 1983 :

> There is, undoubtedly, a religious and fundamentalist aspect in the conflicts that we have met (...) I oppose the institutionalisation of a religion, whichever it be, within the workplace (...) Immigrants are the guests of France and as such they have a twofold duty: playing the game of the firms and of the nation. [209]

The fear of any kind of religious institutionalisation brings back to the French imaginary of the conflictuality inherent to religions. Moreover, as Vincent Gay (2015) shows, depicting the strike as "Muslim" allows the Government to diagnose a triple disloyalty, toward the country, the firms and the tradition of freedom and pluralism. Generating publicity around this religious dimension which could appeal both to the Left and the Right also proved politically convenient just a month before risky municipal elections (in March 1983). This moment is noteworthy because it shows the premises of a "question of Islam" and above all the predisposition of the French political sphere to apprehend in religious terms the new entrants (Withol de Wenden 1988; Blanchard, Bancel & Thomas 2016).

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[209] "Il y a, à l'évidence une donnée religieuse et intégriste dans les conflits que nous avons rencontrés, ce qui leur donne une tournure qui n'est pas exclusivement syndicale. […] Je m'oppose à l'institutionnalisation d'une religion quelle qu'elle soit à l'intérieur du lieu de travail. […] les immigrés sont les hôtes de la France et à ce titre ont un double devoir : jouer le jeu de l'entreprise et celui de la nation".

It was not, however, until the end of the 1980s that the political visibility of Islam was to take a new scope with the Veil[210] affair. The emergence of the debate is still well anchored in the French collective memory (Massignon 2000; Baubérot 1996; Rochefort 2002). On 19 October 1989, Ernest Chenière, headmaster of Gabriel Havez Middle School in Creil, suspended three female students for having refused to remove their hijab whilst attending classes. Though apparently insignificant (yet not without any political background) this controversy produced a debate with a high public resonance as similar incidents involving Muslim schoolgirls occurred throughout the country. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin chose to leave the ideological dimension of the debate binding himself to the legal field and soliciting an opinion from the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), delivered on 27 November. The string of events resulted in a circular on 12 December stating that the refusal of admission could be decided, where required, on a case by case basis within the framework of normal remits of the relevant authorities. This statement devolving the appraisal to the academic authorities was nonetheless too vague not to raise complaints from headmasters associations during the following decade, and the debate has not withered since then.

Retrospectively, what appears also striking is that although the veil affair concerned only a small number of girls, the inscription of the debate within the broader scope of a religious framework imbued this piece of apparel with an inherent conflictuality. As one example among many, on *Antenne 2* (State Channel) on 5 October 1989, the main news presenter introduced the theme with the words: "Must we fear the believers? (...) Between religious faith and fanaticism, there is but a narrow border"[211]. A manual counting of the

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[210] The semantic debate on the term is in itself revealing of the difficulty to categorise this garment referring to a religious and cultural practice which is not even linguistically identified yet. Newspapers have often chosen "Islamic veil" (*foulard Islamique*, *voile Islamique*) or "Coranic veil" instead of "hijab" or "tchador", without any consensus on the question (Siblot 1992; Petiot 1995).

[211] "Faut-il avoir peur des croyants? (...) Entre croyance religieuse et fanatisme, il n'y a qu'une étroite frontière". This speech appears all the more revealing since these words are explicitly linked with the hijab (see the screenshot in Appendix 5) and during the following comments it is mentioned as a "Moroccan zif" (zif marocain), showing the mix between the cultural alterity and the religious issue.

occurrences of "Muslim" (musulman) in the French National Assembly since the 1980s shows the sustained increase of their political visibility :

Figure 14. Occurrences of "Muslim" in the French National Assembly

This graph completes the Figure 5 suggested in Chapter 3 linking Islam and laïcité, as it shows that Muslims as social actors have also had an increasingly significant role in the public debate. Franck Frégosi and Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet wrote that "[the 1990s decade] was even more marked by a process of growing visibility of Islam, which for the young people sometimes took the shape of a re-Islamisation" (Potz, Wieshaider et al. 2004, p.145). The reapparition of the veil at the turn of the 1990s is symptomatic in this respect. If there is a plurality of motivations for wearing the hijab, many researchers have shown that from this period on, it has increasingly been used in France as a tool for identity-based statements (Sanna & Bouyahia 2013; Ikhène 2003; Amiraux 2004; Zouari 2002). The importance taken by the expulsion of three hijab-wearing girls in Gabriel Havez high school (known as the Creil affair) shows the intensity of this identity feeling which aimed at being expressed collectively, and was interpreted as a symbolic rupture with society. The fact that the Islamic faith acquired an increasing public visibility also reveals an abandonment of the myth of temporary presence: since going back to the country of origin was not an option anymore, the recognition as believers became a clearly expressed claim.

This more visible Islam has been structured through the setting up of a dense associative network, supported by the countries of the Gulf (Bastian & Messner 2007; Césari 1994; Frégosi 2006). An important step was the creation in March 1983 of the "Union des Organisations Islamiques en France" (UOIF)[212] in Meurthe et Moselle, initially directed by Tunisians like Ahmed Jaballah and Abdallah Benmansour and close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Supported by the Muslim World League and more related to Morocco, the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF) appeared in December 1985. In 1990, Moustapha Diop and Riva Kastoryano (1991, p.93) counted between 1000 and 1100 Muslim associations in France, competing with the non-religious associations. The Creil affair acquires real meaning in the continuity of this claim-making framework, as the FNMF played an important role in broadcasting the affair, raising protests and writing to the Council of State. This new visibility of Islam emerged in a context when, simultaneously, international events negatively impacted on the collective consciousness and were associated with Islam[213]: the murder of five French people in Algiers in August 1994, the hostage-taking of December 1994, the eight bomb attacks between July and October 1995 imputed to the GIA jihadists making 8 deaths and 200 casualties, the murder of the Tibhirine monks and the Rushdie affair, well before 9/11 and the attacks in the 2000s. To these events must be added the fight against delinquency and anti-semitism in predominantly Muslim suburbs (Guénif Souilamas 2006; CNCDH 2007). In addition, different movements – however deprived of organisational synergy they may be – like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tabligh and from the 2000s, salafism, have been the pilllars of the re-Islamisation process and contributed to make Islam visible in the public space (Amghar 2006; Adraoui 2013; Khosrokhavar 1997; Roy 2005). Because of the lack of republican integration, Islam became a relevant symbolic matrix in some working-class areas where it organised the collective living (Geisser 2009; Lejeune 2000; Timera 1996; Vieillard-Baron 2004).

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[212] The UOIF has since become Union des Organisations Islamiques de France.

[213] It is noteworthy that this period is marked by a new visibility of the religious in general (e.g. the Scorcese affair, the RU 486 pill) but Islam plays an incomparable role in this process.

b) Ethnicity as a category of understanding

If the Australian Muslims have not known the same visibility process as in France, they have also been increasingly important in the public debate since the 1990s. The Muslim-Arab community first experienced a wave of suspicion during the Gulf War. The conflict was indeed an occasion for some nationalist media to make a symbolic dichotomy between Australians with an Arab-immigrant background and the others (Poynting & Mason 2007). The fear of the emergence of a "fifth column" is visible in the press, leading to a conflation between Iraqi, Muslim, Arab and terrorist (Goot & Tiffen 1992; Hage 1991). Although such stigmatisations and racist acts were nothing new[214], a recrudescence could be observed in the period (Parliamentary Paper n°100, 1991). As Cunneen, Fraser and Tomsen put it, "there were undoubtedly Arab Australians who were opposed to Australian involvement in the Gulf War, and even some Arab Australians who were supporters of Iraq. However, such expressions of lack of support for the Australian war effort could not have warranted the hysteria about the possibility of Arab Australian treachery displayed in media reporting and evidenced by street attacks, property damage, and threats of violence, as well as surveillance by ASIO phone tapping and questioning of Arab and Muslim Australians" (Cunneen, Fraser & Tomsen 1997, p.82). Such attitudes were so widespread that they led Prime Minister Bob Hawke to condemn on 14 January 1991 "any attacks made by racist elements in the Australian society against any group on the basis of their ethnic or religious or cultural adherence". This declaration is interesting as it mixes the ethnic, religious and cultural components of stigmatisation. In the process of otherisation the religious part was just an element of "Muslimness", in the same way as the "Arabness" – whether real or presumed. This is why, for instance, Christians of Arab-speaking background have known similar treatments (Poynting et al. 2004).

The configuration of the public debates has been quite different in this respect from the veil affair in France where the religious dimension has become crucial. The common

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[214] Muslims are described by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission as one of the four "most vilified groups in Australia" (on this subject, see also Hage & Jureidini 2002).

point is, however, the discursive dichotomy between the Muslim community and the national community. The end of the Gulf War had a paradoxical effect: the emergence of a wave of media benevolence towards the Australian Muslims. In Wakim's (1992) terms, they moved from being the "villains" to "victims" and eventually "victors". Their public visiblity increased, giving a new reach to their voice. A manual counting of the occurrences of "Muslim" in the Australian Hansard shows that the political visibility of Muslims had started even before 9/11, especially in the second part of the 1990s.

Figure 15. *Occurences of Muslim in the Australian Hansard*

The Muslim population again received a lot of negative media coverage in the late 1990s, following crimes imputed to "ethnic youth gangs"[215] in Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney (Aumair & Warren 1994; Lyons 1994; Guerra & White 1995; Healey 1996; Sheehan 1998; Perrone & White 2000). This process intensified after the murder of young

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[215] The notion of "ethnic gang" is ambiguous in the Australian case because it relates to groups which do not have the organisational structure attributed to American gangs (Klein 1995). It is also noteworty that the political and mediatic question of the "ethnic gangs" is not only linked with the Muslim community (in particular Lebanese and Turkish) but involves all Asian communities, as well as other backgrounds. White, Perrone, Guerra and Lampugnani (1999) have for instance identified and studied six different ethnic categories: Vietnamese Young People, Turkish Young People, Pacific Islander Young People, Somalian Young People, Latin American Young People, Anglo Young People.

Edward Lee by the member of a Lebanese group[216], then the shootings at Lakemba police station in October and November 1998[217]. Beyond the origin of the aggressors, two elements contributed to the emergence of an "ethnic problem" in the public space (Ethnic Communities Council of NSW 1999). First, the observation made by the police of a reluctance of Muslim neighbours to divulge information and *a fortiori* the name of the aggressors. Many commentators spoke in this respect of a "wall of silence", giving credence in the public opinion to the idea of a connivance between members of an ethnic community (Dixon & Maher 1998). The newspaper titles are evocative of a growing climate of defiance toward what was perceived as a lack of cooperation in these sensitive areas: the *Sydney Morning Herald* titled "They all know Edward's killer, but won't talk" (Kennedy 1998), *The Australian*: "Call to Community on Shooting" (Jackson et al. 1998), and the Daily Telegraph spoke of a "Street where no one talks" (Trute & Stevenson 1998). The second element is the use by the authorities of the term "Lebanese gangs": the New South Wales Premier Bob Carr and the Police Commissioner Peter Ryan largely contributed to broadcasting the expression (Poynting 1999). "Ethnic gangs", "Middle Eastern gangs", "Lebanese gangs", "immigrant gangs" soon became synonymous in media headlines and political discourses (Collins & Reid 2009, p.4). Between August 2000 and August 2001, eight gang rapes and sexual assaults were committed by young Australians of Lebanese-Muslim background. The specificity of these attacks, and the negative repercussions they had on the collective representation of Australian Muslims, came from the explicit racism of the aggressors who chose victims with alleged Anglo-Australian phenotypes and used racial insults[218]. The racist dimension of these aggressions has,

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[216] On 17 October 1998, 14 year old Edward Lee was stabbed to death in Telopa Street, Sydney by Mustapha Dib -a member of a group of young people of Lebanese background.

[217] On 1 November 1998, the Lakemba police station in Sydney was attacked in a drive-by shooting. Among the offenders, three were identified as people of Lebanese background: Michael Kanaan, Wassim El-Assaad and Saleh Mahmoud Jamal.

[218] Among the insults reported by the press, some were clearly ethnic (from "Aussie pig", "you deserve it because you're Australian" to the evocation of a "Leb-style" rape) and some religion-oriented ("When you are feeling down ...bash a Christian or Catholic and lift up"). The paradox, as shown by Poynting and Mason, is that both the aggressors and the commentators were misled in the ethnic framing because two victims were of Italian background, one Greek and one aboriginal Australian (Poynting & Mason 2007). This also shows the performativity of ethnic categories of designation.

however, almost eclipsed the gender violence of the attacks themselves in many political and media discourses which tended to comment them under this specifically ethnic prism (Aslan 2009). An example is an interview of Labor NSW Premier Bob Carr on ABC on 16 September 2002:

> Reporter: But do we acknowledge that white Anglo gangs are also ethnic gangs?
>
> Bob Carr: Well, I've just said – I've just said a moment ago –.
>
> Reporter: But do we name them as such?
>
> Bob Carr: I've just said a moment ago that we've all agreed that there is gang behaviour, based on ethnic groupings. There is at least one gang – the Police Commissioner has said this – based on the Lebanese community, as there are based on other communities.

In the case of these attacks, the choice of the authorities was therefore to link the "gang behaviour" with a "Lebanese ethnic grouping"[219]. From a comparative perspective with France, it is also noteworthy that the absence of reference to religion is revealing of a specific ethnic framing of a "public problem". Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar (2000) speak of a *racialisation* of criminal and gang activity, that is to say the assumption that culture and ethnicity are inseparable from the causes of social incivilities and crime. The leaders of several ethnic communities in Sydney gathered for a special forum on 24 August, in which they strongly criticised "the use of ethnic terms to describe alleged offenders – a practice endorsed by Mr Carr" (quoted in Wilson 2001, p.222). This ethnic designation was used by government agencies, but also for different purposes by diverse media and political actors like the anti-immigration party One Nation whose leader Pauline Hanson explicitly linked the rapes to "their race, their cultural background" (*Insight,* 23 August 2001).

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[219] A similar ethnic pattern could be observed several years later in the political framing of the Cronulla riots of December 2005, in which tensions developed between people identified by their ethnicity. In particular, the police referred to them respectively as "Middle Eastern males" and "males of Caucasian appearance" (NSW Police 2006, p.16).

These events have been all the more prejudicial for the public perception of Muslims as they coincided with the 11 September attacks and the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002. During the Joint Standing Committee on Migration on 28 July 2011, Roger Lean, Acting Director of Multicultural South Australia (Attorney-General's Department) pointed out that the public visibility of Muslims in Australia was closely tied to the World Trade Centre attacks:

> Chair (Ms Vamvakinou): Do you have any ideas as to why it is that at this point in time the Muslim community is being singled out for debate or discussion and then used an indicator of the divisiveness or the failures of multiculturalism when, as you very correctly point out, the Muslim community has been in Australia as long as any other faith community?

> Mr Lean : It is part of a global concern that goes back to, in most people's minds, the attack on the Twin Towers. (...) Together with the disasters associated with terrorism, terrorism is now being attached to Muslims and any time terrorism is mentioned it seems to be associated with Muslim issues, even though I understand in a practical sense that is not the case.

The corollary of this visibility associated with terror is that the appearance of Muslims in the Australian public has been conflated with security concerns. In the aftermath of 11 September, about 30 households and workplaces in Sydney area were raided by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Federal Police and the New South Wales Police. These security raids were highly publicised and contributed to the racialisation process of Islamic terrorism (McCulloch & Joo-Cheong 2005).

The same security concern has brought the successive governments to focus on the border protection issue, in particular with the aim to further control the Muslim immigration. As a matter of fact, Muslim asylum seekers were given a stronger and specific visibility (Maddox 2004; Every & Augoustinos 2007; Pedersen, Watt & Hansen

2006; McKay, Thomas & Kneebone 2012). Two days after the 9/11 events, the Defence Minister Peter Reith established a direct link between security risks and the arrival of Muslim asylum seekers, evoking a "pipeline for terrorists" (Kabir 2013, p.303; Mares 2002, p.134). Some days later, in another declaration, he went further in linking the security risk and ethnic identity: "If you've got people with – I think the words (Jim Kelly) used were "with strange identities" – walking around, that enhances your security concerns." (Petrilli 2007, p.403; *Telegraph* 24 September 2001). The apparent emergency to connect border control and the terrorist threat was made all the more meaningful since, at the turn of the millenium, the illegal immigration of Muslims had largely replaced the traditionally Asian[220] illegal immigration (Phillips & Spinks 2010; Koleth 2010). The internal political success of the government's handling of unauthorised arrivals like the "Tampa affair"[221] or the "Children Overboard Affair"[222] is to be understood against the backdrop of this political dynamic of border protection legitimated by ethnic-oriented speeches involving especially migrants of Muslim background.

The novelty in the political and media discourses is that the terrorist issue has

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[220] Elsa Koleth (2010, p.30) mentions in this respect that "unlike previous waves of asylum seekers arriving by boat who were largely from the Asian region, the majority of asylum seekers arriving in this period were primarily Muslims from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran". These new predominant countries of origin for asylum seekers after 2000 have therefore changed the public perception of Asian immigration, and immigration in general since the ideal-typical illegal immigrant has become in this process the young man of "Middle Eastern appearance" (Klocker & Dunn 2003).

[221] On 26 August 2001, 438 people (mostly Afghan asylum seekers) were rescued from a distressed Indonesian fishing boat by the Norwegian cargo ship MV Tampa. The latter was refused entry **to** Australian territory, and an Australian warship ferried the boat people to the Pacific state of Nauru and New Zealand, which agreed to accept them. This incited strong international criticism. Domestically, however, opinion polls have shown large support for the government's reaction. For instance the Morgan poll publish**ed** by the *Bulletin* news magazine, showed that 67% of respondents approved of Howard's performance as PM and 68% opposed illegal asylum seeker arrivals.

[222] On 6 October 2001, a "Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel" (SIEV 4) was intercepted to the North of Christmas Island and sunk. Authorities reported that the passengers had threatened to throw children overboard, a claim which was repeated by the Immigration Minister, the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. The claim later proved to be inaccurate. These events happened in the context of a federal election (the declarations of the Minister of Immigration were made the day before the issue of writs) and echoed the campaign speeches of the Coalition (Howard 2010; Marr & Wilkinson 2003).

developed a new, religious framing for people of Muslim background and/or "Middle Eastern" appearance. Now, this does not call into question the aforementioned ethnic prism, but rather shows a more complex phenomenon: the integration of a religious perception within an ethnic framework. In an analysis of Great Britain, Modood (2005) evokes the move from a "colour racism" toward a "cultural racism". Numerous authors like Bonilla-Silva (2003), Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock and Kendrick (1991), Barker (1981), Ansell (2016), Jayasuriya (2002) have noticed and coined this variation "new racism". Despite the complexity of the diachronic and comparative use of such concepts in our study (please refer to Chapters 1 and 2) they help, in a practical sense, to think the renewal of the modalities of designation of a minority from the biological to the cultural. This does not imply, however, that the "old" modalities of racialisation have disappeared to make way for the "new" ones. Dunn, Klocker and Salabay (2007) highlight that, in the case of post-11 September Australia, both logics co-exist and that "they are both reproduced through a similar racialisation process" (p.567). In particular, they both rely upon the identification of inherent differences from which ensues an "otherisation". Moreover, this identification is still grounded on phenotypical features or "visual markers" (Mansouri & Kamp 2007). In this respect, analysing current debates about Muslims against the socio-historical backdrop helps to comprehend the racialisation of Muslims' cultural and religious identity at the turn of the 2000s.

2) The differentiated construction of a "question of Islam"

a) Dealing with a new religious actor

These divergences between France and Australia may be observed in the construction of public policy discourses. To understand this process, the most revealing prism is to focus on the emergence of a public question at the turn of the 1990s, a period of major reconfiguration of Muslim visibility, as previously shown. In order to grasp the modalities of these discourses, the actors have to be integrated into the frame. This is why I have interviewed and followed the political trajectory of key actors whose actions

embodied the country's perception of and behaviour towards Islam.

In France, the project of fostering the emergence of an "Islam of France" (Islam de France) has been a *leitmotiv* of public debate since the 1990s. The initiator of this project is Minister of the Interior Pierre Joxe who was the first politician to set up elements of institutionalisation for Islam in France. In 1988, Joxe created a Council for Reflection on Islam of France (CORIF) in order to give the French Muslim community a political visibility. His approach to the emerging Muslim question was inscribed in a larger reflection on the place of religions in France. The author of a book named *The Edict of Nantes: a Story for Today*, Joxe made a clear rapprochement between the historical situation of Protestants in France and the situation of Muslims. He strongly reaffirmed this vision during our interview:

> My idea was that the model to follow was the Protestant model. The Muslims are so divided, as much as the French protestants. Because in the French Protestants you do not have only the philosophical division, as we might say: I am Reformed, I have little in common with the Lutherans who believe in the real presence, transubstantiation, etc... However, I have some things in common with some evangelical protestants. There is no dogma in French Protestants. So the French Protestant Federation is rather an organisation of influence (...) So when I received members of the CORIF at the Protestant Federation, I told them: "Listen, let us not worry about this, it will take thirty years or maybe fifty, it cannot take any less time. And the model already exists, it is the Protestant Federation of France. There are Morrocans, Sunni, Shia, Ibadis, people coming from the M'zab, all of this will get structured little by little".[223]
> Interview with Pierre Joxe, September 2015.

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[223] "Moi mon idée c'est que le modèle qu'il fallait suivre, c'est le modèle protestant. Ils sont tellement dispersés, autant que les protestants français. Parce que les protestants français vous avez non seulement la division philosophique on peut dire -moi je suis réformé, j'ai peu de choses en commun avec les luthériens qui croient à la présence réelle, à la transubstantiation, etc... En revanche, j'ai certaines choses de commun avec certains évangéliques. Il n'y a pas de dogme chez les protestants français. Et donc la Fédération protestante de France, elle est plutôt une

The question of the form given to this new modality of visibility was of crucial importance. If the CORIF has become an institutional prelude to Charles Pasqua's CRMF, Jean-Pierre Chevènement's Al Istîchara and Nicolas Sarkozy's CFCM, its functioning was fundamentally different insofar as it did not aim at representing the Muslim community. Joxe expressed concerns for the impossibility to do so:

> (...) I spoke about this with (Islamologist Jacques Berque) who said "no, you cannot represent the Islam of France but you can symbolize it. By gathering people who are recognised and who recognise each other. So that is what we did, we empirically spotted nine people, and we made several consultations.[224]

> It was gauged in a way... There were not only Algerians and Moroccans, there was a Comorian, a Senegalese, a man of Turkish background, and there were different traditions. But it did not aim at being representative. And that is the tragic mistake I made: when I created the Council of Reflection on Islam of France, it gave the initials CORIF, which had a guilty alliteration with CRIF. The CRIF is the representative council of Jewish Insitutions of France, and there was in the mind of people "then that is the CRIF of the Muslims"[225] (*ibid*.).

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organisation d'influence (...). Et quand j'ai reçu des membres du CORIF à la fédération protestante, je leur avais dit "écoutez, ne vous cassez pas la tête, ça mettra trente ans ou peut-être cinquante, ça ne peut pas prendre moins. Et le modèle il existe, c'est la fédération protestante de France". Il y a les marocains, les sunnites, les chiites, des ibadites, des gens originaires du M'zab, et bien tout ça va se structurer petit à petit."

[224] "De mon côté, j'en ai parlé avec Berque, qui m'a dit "non, on ne peut pas représenter l'Islam de France mais on peut le symboliser. En réunissant des gens qui sont reconnus et qui se reconnaissent entre eux". Alors c'est ce qu'on a fait, on en a repéré de façon empirique neuf, on a fait plusieurs consultations..."

[225] "C'était dosé de façon... Il n'y avait pas seulement des Algériens et des Marocains il y avait un Comorien, un Sénégalais, un originaire de Turquie, et puis il y avait des tendances différentes. Mais ce n'était pas une représentation. Et c'est là l'erreur tragique que j'ai faite: c'est que quand on a créé le Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Islam de France, ça donnait les initiales CORIF, qui avait une allitération coupable avec CRIF, et le CRIF est le conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France, et il y a eu dans l'esprit des gens "alors mais c'est le CRIF des musulmans"."

This framing of Muslims as a religious heterogeneous group also takes place in a context where the influence of foreign countries was strengthening on the associative networks, as aforementioned with the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Muslim World League. Making the observation that this influence was not deprived of religious implications, the government also wanted to stay one step ahead of any attempt at religious communalism. As reported by Joxe and advisors who were interviewed, the Minister of the Interior therefore controlled the quality of the personalities suggested by the first nine for enlargement, and refused one. The idea was that the visibility should favour religious leaders compatible both with a "republican" and "laïque" axiology. In this respect, one challenge was to avoid struggles for influence between the Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan associations. Raoul Weexteen, current General Secretary of the French-Algerian Association, was Joxe's main advisor on the question of Islam. His insights help to grasp the context of this attempt to create a government-backed political visibility for Islam:

> Two or three things allowed us to contemplate the CORIF, that is to say to start a reflection process on Islam. The first one was that in 1981 Gaston Deferre had allowed the creation of all foreign associations. Immediately, this gave free rein to all these Muslim projects. The second element is that the Mosque of Paris was already there before – because the CORIF dates back to 1988, so it was his second term as Minister of the Interior and his predecessor, Pasqua, had already advertised the Mosque of Paris. When Pierre Joxe arrived, a few months later, the rector of the Mosque died. So Joxe said "maybe we can take advantage of the temporary vacuum to try and discuss with the Algerians in a more constructive manner". [226]

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[226] "Deux ou trois choses qui permettaient d'envisager le CORIF, c'est à dire d'entamer un processus de réflexion sur l'Islam. Le premier c'est qu'en 1981 Gaston Deferre avait autorisé la création de toutes les associations étrangères. Immédiatement cela a donné du champ à tous ces projets de musulmans. Le second élément est que la Moosquée de Paris était déjà avant -parce que ça date de 88, donc c'était son deuxième mandat comme ministre de l'intérieur et son prédécesseur Pasqua avait déjà mis en scène la Mosquée de PAris. Donc c'était un élément important. Quand Pierre Joxe est arrivé, quelques mois plus tard, le recteur de la mosquée de Paris est mort. Donc Joxe a dit "peut-être qu'on peut profiter de la vacance momentanée à la tête de la Mosquée de

(...) The weight of history in France gives everyone a sort of comfort on religious questions, these are not new questions. France has a sort of exception on the management of religion that one may follow: we are not in the case of Ireland or England. We are not in a permanent conflict, and with Muslims either. Things have evolved because the number of Muslims has increased in France, because many foreign associations have developed, because the Muslims themselves are of different origins so there are nuances: sunni, shia, ibadi, hanafi Turkish, wahhabi, etc... (...) In the case of Joxe's approach, electoral considerations did not come into play. One has to distinguish that, because otherwise the whole intention of the CORIF collapses and it becomes again a political stake between left and right parties.... To give you a precise example, (...) Pasqua had to deal with the attacks of 1986 in Paris behind which Islamists were suspected. So there was already this security-oriented approach which made of Islam a political powder keg in a France that was well. So when Joxe took the minister back, it was out of the question to keep going this way. It was necessary to appease, to understand, to give a chance to speak to Muslims.

Interview with Raoul Weexteen, September 2015.

Several elements are worth noting. First, it appears that notwithstanding the

Paris pour essayer de discuter avec les Algériens d'une manière un peu plus constructive (...) Le poids de l'histoire en France donne à chacun une sorte de confort sur les questions religieuses, ce ne sont pas des questions pointues. La France a une espèce d'exception de la gestion de la religion que l'on peut suivre: on n'est pas dans le cas de l'Irlande ou de l'Angleterre. On n'est pas dans un conflit permanent, et avec les musulmans non plus. Les choses ont évolué parce que le nombre des musulmans a augmenté en France, le fait que beaucoup d'associations étrangères se sont développées, que les musulmans sont eux-mêmes de différentes origines, donc il y a des nuances: chiites, ibadites, turcs hanafites, wahhabites, etc... Dans le cas de la démarche de Joxe, les considérations électorales n'entraient pas du tout en jeu. Il faut le distinguer, sinon toute la problématique du corif s'effondre et elle redevient un enjeu entre les partis de gauche de droite etc... Pour vous donner un exemple précis, (...) Pasqua a dû prendre en charge les attentats de 86 à Paris derrière lesquels on soupçonnait des Islamistes. Donc déjà on avait cette approche purement sécuritaire qui fait de l'Islam un brûlot politique dans une France qui se portait très bien. Donc quand Joxe a repris le ministère, il n'était pas question de continuer sur cette voie. Il fallait apaiser, comprendre, donner la parole à des musulmans".

differences in the chosen modalities of management the Muslims have become for Right and Left governments alike, an "issue for public debate and State intervention", to paraphrase Eric Neveu (1999, p.42). As such an administrative category, they have acquired a public recognition and been the object of increasing demands from the government to adapt to the French society. In this respect, as soon as 1995 the *Charte du Culte Musulman en France*, which was signed by Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua, aimed at reconciling the Muslim faith with the French Republican tradition[227]. Second, since the beginning of Islam's visibilisation in the 1980s, two perceptions have co-existed: a perception inscribed in a tradition of dialogue between the state and the religions and a perception identifying Islam as a "new problem", based on a twofold observation coupling practical dimensions (security issues) and axiological dimensions (values). If the first discourse is characteristic to the French history of religious minorities' management, the second discourse is not idiosyncratic to France. Hence a bipolarisation of the "question of Islam", which makes it at the same time the continuation of an old debate and a hitherto unseen issue.

These two perceptions are not, however, exclusive. An anecdote narrated by a former member of the Minister of the Interior[228], is very revealing of how Islam could be perceived simultaneously as a religion to integrate in the republican pattern and the expression of a specificity in front of which the public authorities seemed unprepared:

> I accompanied Joxe during a visit in Alsace-Moselle
> where, as Minister of Religious Affairs, he received the
> representative of the Catholic church, the representative
> of the Protestants, of the Jews and he told me "I cannot
> receive the Muslims but you gather them in Strasbourg's
> city hall and I will come and greet them". (...) So I
> introduced him to a Turkish imam who was running a

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[227] For instance, article 4 states that: **"La cohésion sociale et l'unité nationale de la France ne sont pas fondées sur une ethnie ou une religion, mais sur une volonté, celle de vivre ensemble et de partager les principes de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, et les valeurs républicaines. Les Musulmans vivant en France, qu'ils soient français ou étrangers, y vivent par choix et sont conscients que leur participation à la communauté nationale leur donne des droits et leur impose des devoirs."**

[228] Because of the interviewee's preference for anonymity, his name has not been mentioned.

mosque without any fuss... But in the small delegation, who was there? A young veiled woman. That is interesting, I leave it to you to judge: at that time, there was none. I was surprised! It was the first time that, with all this existing Muslim population in France, the veiled women appeared. Please do not misunderstand me (...): that was maybe in 1990, that was a sign.[229]

Interview with a former member of the Ministry of the Interior, September 2015.

This anecdote is all the more interesting since it happened in Alsace-Moselle, which is a concordatory region where the law of 1905 does not apply and therefore the government is only supposed to recognise the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religions. However, even in this legal context the authorities have tried to show the state's recognition of Islam. This recognition was considered within the frame of an existing equilibrium where the field of application of the religious was implicitly defined. The presence of a veiled woman was unexpected in 1990 because it referred to a cultural and axiological referent belonging to what had been considered as "countries of origin" (Noiriel 2001; Sayad 1992). Its appearance without any link to a culturally exogenous context appeared as an alarm bell for the model of integration (Schnapper 1991). It was as such perceived as a "sign" of a repositioning of Islam as an identity category.

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[229] "J'ai accompagné Joxe dans une visite en Alsace Moselle, où il a reçu en tant que ministre des cultes le représentant de l'église catholique, des protestants, des juifs et il m'a dit: "je ne peux pas recevoir les musulmans mais tu les réunis à la mairie de Strasbourg et je viendrai les saluer". (...) Donc je lui ai présenté un imam turc qui menait ses affaires de mosquée sans histoire.... Mais dans la petite délégation, qu'est-ce qu'il y avait? Une jeune fille voilée. C'est intéressant, je vous laisse juger. A l'époque, il n'y en avait pas. J'étais surpris! C'était la première fois que derrière toute l'existence d'une population de culte musulman en France, la première fois qu'on avait la femme voilée. Comprenez-moi (...) C'était un signe."

b) The attempt at an ethnic management of the Muslim minority

In Australia however, the problematisation of the question of Islam in the 1990s and therefore the construction of a public issue has not taken the form of favouring the dialogue between the state and a religion. The question of minorities was brought **to** the forefront of political consciousness but under almost excusively ethnic terms. At the turn of the 1990s, the Labor governments fostered an agenda of reforms on the question of minorities, a major legal achievement being in this respect the introduction encouraged by Minister Nick Bolkus of provisions dealing with racial hatred in the 1975 *Racial Discrimination Act*. The Act specifically states that:

> It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if: (a) the act is reasonably likely in all the circumstances to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or group of people, and (b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or some or all of the people in the group.
>
> Racial Discrimination Act 1975, s.18C(1).

A noteworthy element, when compared to France, is that the legislation does not cover religion. As a matter of fact, Nick Bolkus linked the question of Muslims with the question of immigration, and its practical consequences, stating that the case was not comparable with France because of the very "nature of the country's borders".

> My strong political commitment was to provide a safety net for people who migrated. Ethnic affairs is for me the issue of providing services, the safety net and to recognise services to assist people. It is another word for social justice, support. The ethnic affairs agenda had a focus on recognition of a need for social justice. When I spoke about racial vilification our language was inclusive. It is right that it seemed natural to speak about race, in France it might be different.

(...) Now, for Muslims.... Just because Fox News and Murdoch wanted the ideologues to write stories about terrorists and gangs in Sydney, that does not mean it was an issue.

(...) We had some decisions to make, some concerns about security issues. Iranian students was one, whether we should take refugees from one refugee camp or another... Also, we had to be very careful in the assessment of who was coming to Australia. So we spent a lot of resources to introduce new technologies, new systems, new firewalls, new networks all over the world. So... check people before they are coming to the country to make sure they medically are ok, they don't have criminal records...

Interview with Nick Bolkus, April 2016.

One may notice first the encompassing definition of "ethnic affairs", which shows the extreme flexibility of the term "ethnic" and its capacity to be either linked with strong axiological dimensions or, like in the case in point, a merely practical term. The concerns expressed by Nick Bolkus are linked with the question of "who was coming" and exterior security issues. Interestingly, interviews have shown that political actors involved in ethnic affairs during this period are reluctant to identify the Muslim minority under their religious dimension. A revealing element is that his successor Philip Ruddock, who politically defined himself as a strong opponent to Bolkus, also defines the actions undertaken toward Muslims during the 1990s without a religious framing. As Shadow Minister for Immigration in 1989 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs from 1996 to 2003, Philip Ruddock has also been a central figure in the process of political management of minorities in the 1990s. When asked whether he remembered political or social debates involving Muslims in the 1990s, his answer was explicit:

Question: As a MP and then Minister of Immigration, do you remember any political or social debate involving Muslims as a religious group in the 1990s?

No, you are characterising it that way, I would say there was very little debate about it, (at that time) I never

heard about it in Parliament. In public life, we have groupings who very openly show our cultural diversity. And you know, you cannot look at the policies of the Coalition or the Labor Party and suggest that among the government or the opposition there is any crack with hostile views toward religion. That does not mean you cannot find somebody, somewhere, sometime who have a question or two or make a statement.

(...) For instance, we had the Cronulla riots. (...) Some people took the view that they would not accept any more Lebanese coming to the beach, so there were some hostilities and the local member and the Lebanese community involved themselves in working these issues through. And I think the Lebanese did it very well. Often, these things happen. You need to have some community leadership, and policing becomes quite important in relation to those issues as well. We haven't seen any reccurrence of the Cronulla riots. I don't think as a nation that we would have been able to manage the recent events as well as we have if we did not have very good relationships with the Islamic community and its leadership. There are times in which the Australians think the leadership should be more vocal, you know the imam should be standing up at the mosque every Friday and say "behave yourself", but if you look at how our intelligence organisations have worked these issues through, I don't think that you would argue that the communities have not settled well.

Interview with Philip Ruddock, May 2016.

Three elements appear as striking when compared to the French case. First, the refusal to characterise the political visibilisation of the Muslim community in the 1990s with religious terms. The "religious" dimension is only understood as possibly emanating from isolated politicians, or linked with "public life". Second, the example chosen for illustration (the Cronulla riots) is typically what has been defined by the police and media as a "race riot", stemming from tensions between ethnic communities (NSW Police 2006). Third, the resolution of the conflict is associated with two elements: "policing" and the

work of "community leadership". Hence the prism of interpretation joins security issues and ethnic issues. For Ruddock the case expresses an example of a good relationship with leaders from the "Islamic community". In this respect, the "imam" mentioned and the non-religious "community leaders" are identified as even "Muslim" interlocutors. Tabar, Noble and Poynting (2003) have shown that such "ethnic leader" management has characterised Australian multiculturalism since about 1978. It generates specific modalities of political apprehension of the minorities. In this perceptive scheme, ethnic communities are assimilated with moral communities. The religious is not banned from the picture, but merged within the frame of ethnicity. A structuring scheme of perception is linked with the nature of the Muslim community itself and the role of the state, beyond party positions on the question of Islam.

A shift has been noticeable, following the 9/11 attacks and the Bali bombings but also, more substantially, a global rise of religious rhetoric in Australian politics (Maddox 2005; Stanley 2015). In this context, another discourse emerged in which Muslims are not only apprehended under this ethnic dimension but also under the prism of a religious specificity. This discourse, however, has been built on and in relation to this ethnic background. This matrix is indispensable to understand the modalities by which the secular and religious have had a "revival" after 2000 in the same way as the debates on multiculturalism, as I will develop in the next chapter.

3) The 2000s: Change in continuity?

a) The institutionalisation of religion as a modality of social regulation

The process of institutional construction initiated by Pierre Joxe had to wait almost ten years before being brought to fruition. The Debré and Pasqua ministries were unable to integrate the diverse movements within French Islam, all the more since they had already

been locally structured. The recognition and public visibility of Islam took a new step in the dawn of the 2000s under the aegis of Jean-Pierre Chevènement. On 29 October 1999, he officially wrote to well-known Muslim personalities, six mosques and the leaders of six federations. The addressees included the UOIF, which was politically feared for its links with the Muslim Brotherhood and fundamentalism but whose integration was an indispensable requisite. The religious dimension was thought of as a key element in the integration policies of citizens with an immigrant background, on which Chevènement insisted during our interview:

> It seemed desirable to me that it would not be only the Catholics, the Jews and the Protestants that would be represented for New Year's wishes for instance, so I united all the tendencies of French Islam in 1999 and it lead to a call, or more exactly a declaration of principles defining the links between the public authorities and the Muslim faith (...)
>
> It is a fundamental aspect of a policy of integration because I think that one can be a French citizen and a Muslim. So the goal is to create the conditions for the establishment in France of an Islam compatible with the values of the Republic. So for me it is an aspect of an integration policy. It is not a project of disintegration but a project of integration. Only, integration means that there can be the contribution of a religion which is not a traditional religion in France. We remain here in conformity with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in its Article 10[230].
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> Interview with Jean-Pierre Chevènement, March 2017.

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[230] " Il me paraissait souhaitable que ce ne soient pas seulement les catholiques, les Juifs et les protestants qui soient représentés par exemple aux voeux de nouvel an donc j'ai réuni toutes les sensibilités de l'Islam de France en 1999 cela a abouti à un appel – ou plus exactement à une déclaration des principes qui régissent les rapports entre les pouvoirs publics et le culte musulman (...) C'est un volet fondamental d'une politique d'intégration parce que je pense qu'on peut être un citoyen français et être musulman. Donc le but est de faire que puisse s'établir en France un Islam compatible avec les valeurs de la République. Donc pour moi c'est une partie d'un volet d'intégration. Ce n'est pas un projet de désintégration mais un projet d'intégration. Simplement, l'intégration accepte qu'il puisse y avoir l'apport d'une religion qui n'est pas une religion traditionnelle de la France. Nous restons en conformité avec la DDHC dans son article 10".

A striking element is the continuity established between the origins of the Republican project (e.g. the DRMC) and the integration policy of a new religion. In this pattern, extremism is seen as the consequence of a bad social and political integration to which the symbolic recognition can bring an efficient answer. Chevènement's project takes into account the efforts of his predecessors and acknowledges their weaknesses. In his Paris speech on 28 January 2000, he mentioned the transpartisan dimension of the project by crediting Pierre Joxe and Charles Pasqua. He concluded that the attempts at imposing an organisation of Islam "from the top" would be doomed from the outset. Using the same formulation as for his Eid al-Kabir wishes, he evoked "an initiative that belongs only to the Muslims themselves". This process renamed "Istichâra" (consultation) aimed at the emergence of an "Islam of France", recognised by the state but whose organisation is driven by the Muslims themselves. After discussions a text entitled "Principles and legal foundings on the links between the public authorities and the Muslim faith in France"[231] was adopted by all the movements. This text is the result of negotiations and concessions from the state, in particular for its title[232] and the withdrawal of the "right to change one's religion" at the UOIF request. Alain Billon, former Islam advisor of Chevènement, sees in this text a direct continuity with the institutionalisation of the other faiths:

> The state was not desireless, that is obvious. It is the role of the state to have desires, but there was a discussion. Second, on the argument according to which the text did not engage Muslims: the text has put the Muslim faith in the same frame as the other faiths, eighty years after these other faiths[233] (Laurence, Billon et al. 2005, p.120).

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[231] " Principes et fondements juridiques régissant les rapports entre les pouvoirs publics et le culte musulman en France ".

[232] The first title was " Déclaration d'intention relative aux droits et devoirs des fidèles du culte musulman en France ", but was considered too suspicious toward Muslim citizens.

[233] "L'État n'a pas été sans désir, c'est évident. C'est le rôle de l'Etat que d'avoir des désirs, mais il y eu discussion. Deuxièmement, sur l'argument selon lequel le texte n'engageait pas les musulmans: le texte a fait que la religion musulmane passe par le même cadre que les autres religions, quatre-vingt ans après ces autres religions".

The paradox is that the process of recognition of Islam without any imposition of the state's will is conflated with the desire to integrate Islam within the national, republican frame. When I asked Chevènement to evaluate the usefulness of his actions and his successor's (Nicolas Sarkozy), his answer again evoked the role of the state:

> The ideal would be that Muslims get organised by themselves, without intervention of the state. But I think that there is a *primum movens,* an initial impetus which has to be given in order to allow the emergence of an Islam of France, that is to say a republican Islam, a gallican Islam.
>
> *Question: Do you consider that the constitution of the CFCM by Nicolas Sarkozy represents a continuity or a rupture with the project of Istichâra?*
>
> Both, because I did not envisage chosing myself the candidate for the CFCM. Actually, Mr Sarkozy convinced the others to accept the transitional solution which was the choice of Dalil Boubekeur. But I did not disapprove it because I think that the initial impetus is probably necessary.[234]
>
> Interview with Jean-Pierre Chevènement, March 2017.

His answer expresses the difficult challenge for the state to conciliate between integration and the refusal of a top-down approach. In the case of Chevènement, it also shows the ridge line on which the Republican Left position is situated. The process of self-

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[234] "L'idéal voudrait que les musulmans s'organisent par eux-mêmes, sans intervention de l'Etat. Mais je pense qu'il y a un primum movens en quelque sorte, un coup de pouce initial qui doit être donné pour permettre l'émergence d'un Islam de France, c'est à dire d'un Islam républicain, d'un Islam gallican.

question: Considérez-vous à cet égard que le constitution du CFCM par Nicolas Sarkozy constitue une continuité ou une rupture par rapport au projet d'Istichâra?

Les deux parce que je n'envisageais pas de choisir moi-même le candidat au CFCM. En fait, Monsieur Sarkozy a convaincu les autres d'accepter la solution provisoire qui était le choix de Dalil Boubekeur. Mais je ne l'ai pas désapprouvé parce que je pense que le coup de pouce initial est probablement nécessaire".

organisation referring to Article 10 of the DRMC is confronted with a pragmatic exigency in order to be initiated. This is how, *nolens volens*, the public authorities have upheld the tradition of a state-centred perspective. Right and Left politicians alike have come to acknowledge that Islam cannot "sit at the table of the Republic"[235] without a close interaction with public authorities. In this process, the state gives advantage to the dialogue with the "moderate" forms of the Muslim faith, that is to say those that are the more able to integrate its rational framework of understanding. This explains why, retrospectively, Chevènement does not disaprove of Sarkozy's choice to nominate Dalil Boubekeur as president of the CFCM. Sarkozy's approach to the integration of the Muslim faith has been highly proactive (Amiraux 2003; Zeghal 2005; Alaoui 2005). He undertook to draw the Paris Mosque (supported by Algeria), the UOIF (close to the countries of the Gulf and the Muslim Brotherhood[236]) and the FNMF (close to Morocco) closer to one another. In December 2002, after consultation with the ambassadors of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, he supported the internal composition of the future French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). The Paris Mosque received the presidency, the UOIF and the FNMF each received a vice-president. This process culminated on 19-20 December 2002, in a seminar in the ministerial castle of Nainville les Roches where the main tendencies and personalities of French Islam gathered and approved the contours of the new organisation[237]. Eventually, during the elections of April 2003, the UOIF obtained the most important representation[238]. The involvement of the state in the sphere of the religious was therefore clearly accepted, at the same time as Islam obtained the political representation it had long lacked. Symbolically speaking, the establishment of the CFCM had the consequence of installing the religion *de facto* in the political landscape and dissolving its

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[235] The formulation is interesting since it was used by Jean-Pierre Chevènement as early as 23 November 1997 for the ordination ceremony of Joseph Doré, and reused by Nicolas Sarkozy (e.g. *Le Monde*, 18 September 2002, p.11).

[236] In particular, Ahmed Djabballah (founder and president of the UOIF from 1985 to 1992) has been a member of the Islamist "Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique" (MTI).

[237] The seminar in Nainville les Roches is in particular narrated in details by Nicolas Sarkozy himself in his book *La République, les religions, l'espérance* (2004, p.66ff).

[238] 4032 representatives of about 900 mosques have voted to elect the 200 members of the General Assembly and the 41 members of the Administrative Council. The UOIF obtained 14 seats in the Administrative Council.

status of exogeneity. The result is a process of "indigenisation of Islam" (Dakhlia 2005; Göle 2015) alleviating the reciprocal suspicion between the public authorities and federations like the UOIF. Religion as a modality of social regulation found a concrete achievement in the CFCM:

> If fundamentalism or extremism have progressed so much, it is because we have been tolerating an Islam of the cellars and of the garages. Islam must live in plain sight like the other religions in France, for an Islam of France and not an Islam in France (...) It is precisely because we recognise for Islam the right to sit at the table of the Republic that we do not accept any drift. It is precisely (for this reason) that we want to train French-speaking imams[239].
>
> Nicolas Sarkozy, interview with *Europe 1* on 15 April 2003.

Exclusion and social deviance are thought of jointly and severally with the marginalisation of religious identity. The participation of Muslims in the national community is therefore associated with the political recognition and visibility: in this process, the organisation of the Muslim faith appears as the basis for the regulation in the suburbs. The overarching aims of this enterprise are to cut the link between French Muslims and foreign powers (in particular the Gulf and wahhabism) and the destruction of communalisation through an integration into the Republic. This approach "through the religious" may be observed in the way public authorities have tackled many questions involving citizens of immigrant background, from the riots of 2005[240] to the question of

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[239] "Si le fondamentalisme ou l'extrémisme a tant progressé, c'est parce qu'on a toléré un Islam des caves et des garages. L'Islam doit vivre au grand jour comme les autres religions de France, pour un Islam de France et non pas un Islam en France. (...) C'est justement parce que nous reconnaissons à l'Islam le droit de s'asseoir à la table de la République que nous n'accepterons aucune dérive. C'est justement (pour cela) que nous voulons former des imams qui parlent Français".

[240] As an example, on 6 November 2005, the UOIF Dar el Fatwa (office of fatwas) emitted a fatwa condemning the troublemakers. This decision, anticipating any declaration from the Minister of the Interior, shows that the Muslim federations themselves have integrated the

radicalisation[241] in the suburbs. The management of the "question of Islam" in France has therefore rested on two pillars, on which all government parties jointly agree. On the one hand, as I have shown, the identity of citizens of immigrant background has been "confessionalised" (Turner 2010) by endogenous and exogenous dynamics. On the other hand, this religious prism has been paired with a desire of "gallicanisation" or "republicanisation" of the Muslim faith through the emergence of an institutionalised "Islam of France".

b) The integrationist turn of the Australian multiculturalism

11 September 2001 was a turning point in Australian policies toward Muslims. An explicit example is the Howard government's redefinition of the 1999 multicultural agenda with a new program titled *Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity: Updating the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: Strategic directions for 2003-2006*. In his foreword, the Prime Minister (p.1 cf. Appendix 4.1) directly linked the consequences of Islamist terrorism with the necessity to recalibrate the conditions of mutual existence:

> This new statement reaffirms the government's commitment to promoting diversity, understanding and tolerance in all areas of endeavour. These actions are especially important given the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America and 12 October 2002 in Bali and the changed global environment in which we live.

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religious prism in social regulation and also that the institutionalisation process has contributed, to use Chevènement's words, to the "republicanisation" of the federations.

[241] The approach is not unidimensional but the question of radicalisation is often presented in the first place as a religious aberration. In a kit for the prevention of radicalisation made by the Government, it is for instance mentioned that "the public answer for the prevention of violent radicalisation is at the junction of different approaches: fight against the sectarian aberrations, the protection of childhood, the prevention of delinquency" (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance, prévention de la Radicalisation, September 2015, p.117) .

An element which appears in stark contrast with the French case is the geopolitical and international dimension of the Muslim question, linked in many discourses to a "global environment". In France, the international context has largely acted as a secondary catalyst of a strong internal (and post-colonial) dynamic (Amiraux 2008). In Australia, the internal dynamics of multiculturalism have been modelled on the government's external considerations. In the new geopolitical agenda, Islam had become a central actor (Humphrey 2005). From this ensues the difficulty for the Howard government to show a consistency over the long term in the multicultural policies. The aim of this report is therefore to show the continuity with the traditional ethnic policies of the 1990s and at the same time to put forward a pragmatic necessity to reconsider them in light of the new context. Gary Hardgrave (p.3 cf. Appendix 4.3) clearly expressed this twofold objective:

> While we remain committed to this ongoing goal, and the fundamentals of the policy remain valid, it is appropriate, particularly in light of international and domestic events of the last three years, to refocus and renew our strategic directions.

The modifications brought by this renewed agenda especially target relations between the Muslim community and other communities. Contrary to the French case, the institutionalisation of religion is not considered as a modality of access to integration. As the report states, "National security begins with domestic community harmony" (p.7). From a practical point of view, this means condemnation of all "actions and statements" threatening social cohesion, and close work with "individuals and community" (ibid.).

Behind these differences in the implementation process, the overarching goal is quite close to the French one: the integration of Muslims within the national community as a shield against radicalism, with the idea that the sharing of common values can halt the propagation of the latter. The stakes of the fight against extremism mentioned by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in its Annual Report 2005-2006 (p.223) echo the French Minister of the Interior:

Supporting Australian Muslims to become more integrated and connected with the rest of the community, particularly in terms of jobs, educational attainment, and participation in community activities, is an important aspect of preventing extremism and violent ideologies gaining influence in Australia.

Compared with the French perspective of integration through an institutionalisation of the religious, Australia has attempted a community-based integration. Both countries thereby used their respective cultural codes (the unified Nation for France, community coexistence for Australia) to answer the same question: integrating Muslims within the axiological and cognitive frameworks of the country.

In the Australian case, perhaps even more than in the French because of the diversity of Muslim backgrounds, the difficulty is to know which community representatives and other individuals to turn to in order to implement the integration policies. Prime Minister Howard and several ministers[242] met with community leaders on 23 August 2005, leading to the setting up of an advisory board renamed Muslim Community Reference Group. In his introductory letter, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Andrew Robb, mentioned the choice to rely on "Imams and religious leaders" but also "Representatives of Muslim women and youth"[243]. This choice of

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[242] Especially the Hon John Cobb MP, the Hon Andrew Robb AO MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[243] The Reference Group members as mentioned on the Australian Government website are Dr Ameer Ali (MCRG Chairman), President of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils, Mrs Aziza Abdel-Halim, President of the Muslim Women's National Network Australia, Sheikh Taj Aldin Alhilali, Mufti of Australia, imam of Ali Bin Abi Taleb Mosque, Dr Mohammed Taha Al Salami, President of the Iraqi Islamic Council of Australia, Sheikh Fehmi Naji El-Imam, General Secretary of the Board of Imams Victoria, Imam of the Islamic Society of Victoria, Presidentof the Australian Islamic Foundation, Ms Nadia Gani, Youth representative, Dr Amin Hady, Chairman of the Foundation of Islamic Studies and Information, Mr Harry Hage, Director of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council Australia, Ms Iktimal Hage-Ali , member of the Alaway Muslim Association, Mr Kemal Ismen, President of the Islamic Council of NSW, Mr Abdul Jalal, President of the Islamic Council of Queensland, Mr Mustapha Kara-Ali , Youth representative, Mr Yasser Soliman, Member of the Council for Multicultural Australia, Mr Malcolm Thomas, President of the Islamic Council of Victoria.

personalities has however not represented the Turkish Muslims even though they are the second-largest group of foreign-born Muslims. This was widely perceived as a sign that only communities with a potential for radicalisation were of interest to the public authorities. Following the same logic, the "cultural" Muslims, that is to say those who do not necessarily consider Islam as a primary source of identity, did not get a representation (Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011). These two examples are important because they show how the religious dimension could be integrated into the "ethnic prism". By choosing religious leaders as community representatives, the public authorities created *ipso facto* a presumption of confessionality (or religious affiliation) on all Australians with a Muslim background. However, unlike in France, the religious designation was made invisible because it was merged within the definition of "ethnic difference" or "cultural difference" (Dunn 2003; Jacubowicz 2005). Moreover, since this identification was made by public authorities for security purposes, it implicitly linked this specific religion with suspicion.

This shows an inherent difficulty to the integrationist will of the Australian state as it has been redeployed since the middle of the 1990s and, even more, since the 11 September events. The country simultaneously pursues an integrationist policy and a security policy, the logics of which may be contradictory (Awan 2012; Hage 2002, 2003). The work of the first focuses on community involvement to encourage integration but this task is precisely what may be undermined by the security approach. During the debate in Parliament on the ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2006, Senator Natasha Stott Despoja clearly expressed this concern:

> The Australian Muslim community needs to feel protected and involved within the fabric of Australian society. The current ASIO laws and any proposed increase in powers will only act to reinforce anti-Muslim sentiments that are not in the best interests of a harmonious society. If we are to encourage the existence of a harmonious multi-cultural society it is crucial that legislation promotes this as much as possible and reduces the potential for vilification on the grounds of race. Not only are these actions creating anti-Muslim sentiment but it is also creating distrust of

ASIO and other government agencies within the Islamic community.[244]

Two elements are worth emphasising. First, Senator Despoja evokes a vilification "on the grounds of race" but does not mention religion (in her whole intervention). This does not mean, however, that she is ignoring such a dimension: for the aforementioned reasons, in the Australian context the notion of "race" also encapsulates cultural and religious aspects. The fact that Australian anti-discrimination speeches also use the ethnic prism shows the structural and interparty dimension of the latter. Second, her position is far from isolated (especially among the Left) and expresses a growing concern that the integration of a preventive-security logic into the "ethnic leader multiculturalism" may actually have an adverse impact. An extensive literature on the subject has shown that an excess of policing contributes to negatively publicise a community and to deteriorate the quality of the links this community has with public authorities – in other words the quality of their citizenship (Spalek & McDonald 2010; Jones & Newburn 2001; Bowling & Phillips 2007; Spalek 2010; Sharp & Atherton 2007; Waddington, Stenson & Don 2004; Virta 2008). In this regard, a side effect of security policies is to have made the Muslim community increasingly visible through policing (like the aforementioned security raids), legal measures like the "Terrorist Bill" of 2002[245] and symbolic measures (like the LOFA prevention kits[246]). James Richardson underlines in this respect that the anti-terrorism laws "have particularly impacted members of the Muslim communities in Australia" (2013, p.588) because of their symbolic effect on social cohesion.

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[244]Senator Natasha Stott Despoja (Australian Democrats), Speech in Parliament, 13 June 2006.

[245] For instance, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 strengthened the authorities' powers in particular by " enabling the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to seek a warrant to detain and question persons over 14 years of age for the purposes of investigating terrorism offences" (http://www.aph.gov.au/ Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r1539)

[246] The anti-terrorist package Let's Look Out For Australia: protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat (or LOFA) was sent to Australian homes in February 2003. It aims at depicting Australian values, measures taken by the Government and ways to recognise the threats on an everyday basis (cf. Appendix 6).

In spite of a strong focus on social and political aspects[247] as well as concrete achievements from involved community leaders[248], the suspicion of state intrusion within communities was highly controversial and the Reference Group was not renewed (Poynting & Mason 2008). Being conscious of the caveats, Andrew Robb mentioned that "many Muslims have expressed concern the Muslim Community Reference Group only serves to highlight Muslim communities as separate, rather than part of our broader community" (*News.com*, 26 November 2006). This integration/security dilemma is not restricted to Coalition governments. It was also faced by the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments. The Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils (FECCA) heavily criticised[249] the Gillard government for having removed the word multicultural from the title of Kate Lundy, her parliamentary secretary assisting the immigration minister (Levey 2013; Karvelas 2010).

Chapter Conclusion

The emergence of the "question of Islam" in France and Australia has brought both the media and the institutional actors to perceive different relevant dimensions in the social issues involving Muslims. The religious prism became evident in the French political field in the 1990s, and developed in the 2000s. As Amel Boubekeur writes, "the

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[247] To implement the National Action Plan (NAP) for the integration of Muslims, the Australian Government has committed $35 million over four years. The report of the Reference Group's work focuses on five elements: Employment, Education and training, Mainstream community activities, Leadership and Addressing marginalisation and radicalism.

[248] For instance, Mustapha Kara-Ali, who joined the Prime Minister's Muslim Community Reference Group, has written a guidebook entitled "*The Way Forward for Australian Muslims: a Good Practice Guide for Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation*".

[249] The council spokespesron, Pino Migliorino, mentioned in this respect that there was "a great deal of community concern" about the removal of the term.

political responses were elaborated for the first time under the ethnic angle especially in France with the "beur" politics. From the 1990s, these political responses have turned to another register. It is not through the question of ethnicity anymore but through the question of Islam that the social problems met by European Muslims are reconceptualised" (Boubekeur 2006, p.10). In fact, the failure of ethnic policies had become patent even before the 1990s, and reveals the lack of relevance of this prism of designation in the French context. The consequence is that the debate on Islam has come to compete with and in some cases replace the debate on immigration. In Australia, on the contrary, the religious prism was almost never used in the conceptualisation of social issues before the 2000s. This does not mean, however, that religion was not present in the political mind but that the framing has operated different inclusion, exclusion and emphasis processes.

Thus, the state identification of Muslims in France and Australia differ on the elements of framing identified by Entman (1993): respectively, the problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. This is not, however, a purely formal observation since such categories are performative (Austin 1962) and this contextual specificity also induces institutional constraints which, in return, shape the decisional space (Hall & Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000). In France, the century-long debate about religion has contributed to immediately framing Muslims as "religious newcomers" and, simultaneously, inscribing Islam within the frame of a religious debate may enable political parties to "de-ethnicise" the immigration question[250]. In Australia, the relevant identification factor for people of Muslim background has immediately been their ethnic characteristics, and in particular their alleged "Asian" or "Middle Eastern"[251] feature, because of immigration and demographic concerns inherited from history, as well

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[250] A paroxysmal illustration may be found in the discourses of the National Front which explicitly link Islamism in France with immigration. For instance, a leaflet of the party in February 2015 was titled "Islamist threat: the consequence of mass immigration and laxity of the UMPS" (cf. Appendix 7).

[251] Until 1990, arrivals from the Middle East (including Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Iraq) were counted as "Asian" by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (see for instance http://www.aph.gov.au/sitecore/content/Home/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9697/97cib16)

as the secularisation of the political sphere. However it may also enable politicians to dog-whistle a religious alterity behind a religiously neutral vocabulary. In this regard, political parties still have room to manoeuvre within the governing frames of identification. The next chapters of this thesis will therefore focus on inter-party and intra-party dynamics to explore their axiological or cognitive specificities in the perception of Islam.

Part 3: Assessing Interparty and Intraparty Dynamics

- Chapter 6: Religion and Conflicts of Values for Political Parties

Chapter 5 has shown how the "question of Islam" has been constructed in different ways in France and in Australia, foregrounding religious issues in the former and ethnic issues in the latter. This does not imply, however, that religion plays an undisputed role in the French political handling of Islam, nor that religion does not matter in Australian politics. As Marion Maddox remarks in a comparison with the U.S., "religious appeals in Australian politics work more along the lines of the 'implicit' racial appeals described by Mendelberg. In our much more secular political environment, religion is likely to seem suspect in the same way that race is to post-1960s Americans. Not that religious appeals don't work in Australia – they just have to be deniable, so their subliminal appeal is not interrupted by rational dissociation" (Maddox 2004, p.8). This point allows us to impart the link between the differentiated secularisation contexts developed in Chapter 3 and the political perception of Islam during the last decades. The secularisation of the political environment does not necessarily involve a decline in the social importance of religion. What is changed by the process is in fact the repertoire of political legitimation in which the problem can be formulated to become acceptable and audible.

Taking into account these specificities, this chapter aims at specifying the relation between political parties and religion, and the new issues revealed by the question of Islam. In this respect, I will identify two major fields of axiological reconfiguration in which Islam is debated by political parties. The first one is the confrontation between the respective traditions of the parties regarding religion and Muslims appearing as "new entrants". The second field of axiological reconfiguration is a revival of the religious in politics, and can be identified as an international dynamic in which France and Australia alike have been involved. Although all parties are touched in these processes, Left parties are specifically challenged in the first, while the second emphasises trends which are more salient in Right-wing parties. To further specify the interplay between the politicians'

trajectories and these party dynamics, the analysis will contrast a selection of case studies from both countries.

I -   *The Party Traditions and the New Conflicts of Values*

1) **Australian party dynamics**

Australian politics shows an historical specificity which is the traditional association between a confessional identity and the main parties -whether it be their leaders or their followers. In this respect, Judith Brett joins John David Bollen's 1972 observation (Bollen 1972, pp.8–9) in asserting that "the differences both amongst the dissenting sects and between them and the Anglican Church (which was not an established Church) were minor in comparison with those between Protestants and Catholics"[252] (Brett 2002, p.40). If religions in Australia seem to have been relatively uninvolved in the question of workers and subsequently the party position until the 1880s (O'Farrell 1962, p.139) the dawn of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a dichotomy of partisanship linked with belonging to either the Roman Catholic Church or to Protestantism. In broad outline, analysts acknowledge an historical alignment of the clergy and the members of the Catholic church with the positions of the Labor Party and an alignment of their Protestant counterparts with the nonlabour parties (Warhurst 2007).

This does not, however, make such alignments automatic[253]: according to O'Farrell and later Mol, it is rather to be defined as a "drift" of the Catholics toward the Labor Party

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[252] However, both denominations should not be considered homogeneous: historians like David Hilliard (1994), Neil Batt and Michael Roe (1966) have emphasised the diversity of the Protestant sects, which may be greater than today.

[253] In particular, Baptists and Methodists strands were influential in the ALP and High church Anglicans were often socialist (Sawer 2003). For instance, in South Australia, where there were very few Catholics, the ALP was largely Methodist. The same observation applies to Catholics. Hans Mol recalls in this respect that if Cardinal Moran of Sydney and Archbishop Carr of Melbourne had openly supported the Labour Party in the 1890s, it was not the case of the two Catholic newspapers in Sydney and of Bishop Dunn of Brisbane (Mol 1971).

for three reasons: less sectarianism and bigotry of the party, Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* encyclical[254] and above all the proximity of its ideas with the socio-economic conditions of the Catholic workers (Mol 1971; O'Farrell 1968). Conversely, many Protestants joined the non-labour parties out of loyalty toward the Crown and moral issues (Nichols 1992). Two major moments that reveal this differentiation are the referenda of October 1916 and December 1917 on conscription. Jeff Kildea mentions that whilst a near-unity was forming among the Protestant church to preach a moral duty to vote "yes", "the Catholic Church, however, saw the issue as political, so that its official stance was one of neutrality, while the personal opinions of its leaders were divided" (Kildea 2002, p.299). Such divergent positions contributed to create in the collective mind the systematic association between Catholics and the Labor Party (McKernan 1980; Murphy 1974). It is noteworthy that during the forty years following World War I, Catholics and people of Irish background composed half the federal caucus in the Labor Party and dominated in all states, with the exception of South Australia (Jupp 2001, p.336). It is however doubtful that the Catholic Church influenced the Labor Party stance, insofar as the party demanded exclusion of religious considerations from politics to focus on the condition of workers (Brett 2002; O'Farrell 1968). The Australian Labor Party split of 1955 fostered a second emanation of religious sectarianism, since it resulted in the transfer of a substantial number[255] of Catholics toward the Democratic Labor Party (Lyle 1988; Murray 1970).

This historical outline is necessary because this situation is idiosyncratic to the Australian political field, and must be taken into account in the perception of a religion like Islam by political parties. However, the situation is complex to analyse because of the reconfigurations of the differentiation[256]. Many analysts have shown that sectarianism has

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[254] The social encyclicals of the pope are essentially *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 (on the condition of workers), *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931 (updating *Rerum Novarum*) and *Divini Redemptoris* in 1937 (on atheist communism). They had a direct influence on Labor leaders, as well as Catholic intellectuals and influenced the 1955 split (on this subject, see for instance Fitzgerald, Carr and Dealy 2003).

[255] Influential members of the Catholic community, like the Archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel Mannix, encouraged this new party whose intellectual line was very influenced by the anti-communist Catholic Bartholomew Augustine Santamaria (Fitzgerald 2003).

[256] McAllister suggested a new differentiation between "Catholics", "Anglicans" and "other Protestants" but Marion Maddox shows in this respect that it is very difficult to use it for

diminished since the 1960s, as a result of the secularisation process (Aitkin 1982; Jones & McAllister 1989; McCallum 1992; Maddox 2001). Consequently, an analysis that would attempt to explain the religious position of political parties using solely the Catholic-Protestant divide would fall into a methodological impasse (Hogan 1984; Smith 1998).

The first element is that being Catholic does not constitute in itself an obstacle to a political career within the Liberal Party[257], when, conversely, the influence of the Catholic prominence within the Labor Party has diminished[258] (Warhurst 2007). The second element is that new religious dynamics do not only involve Christian denominations. As Judith Brett shows, the differences between the religious and the secular, or between religious conservatism and religious progressivism, appear more crucial than the differences between Protestants and Catholics (Brett 2003).

This analysis is valuable at the same time for intra-party and inter-party dynamics[259]. Outside the main parties, this dissociation is made visible by the recent

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analytical purposes: "it dilutes Lutheran vignerons with Salvation Army teetotallers. It couples Pentecostal male-headship proponents with Uniting Church feminists. It enrols Methodist trade unionists with Presbyterian entrepreneurs, and marches pacifist Quakers and Mennonites to the same drum as defence-conscious fundamentalists. Some of these divergences, such as differing positions on wine excises, would translate into only the most limited electoral effects. Others, such as support for the Office of the Status of Women, affirmative action and equal opportunity legislation, would be more electorally significant." (Maddox 2001, p.5).

[257] Under the Menzies Government, which lasted no less than 18 years, there was only one Liberal Catholic in the House of Representatives. Conversely, the Sydney Morning Herald of 21 September 2013 noticed that 47% of Tony Abbott's Liberal-National coalition cabinet members were Catholic (when Catholics represent 25% of the global population). In this respect, it is possible to make a comparison with the US, where the organisations of the Christian Right have tried to dissolve sectarianism in the 1990s in order to create lasting political coalitions (Bendyna, Green, Rozell & Wilcox 2000). In Australia, an element of explanation is the successful constitution of a Christian base in the Coalition, the reasons for which will be developed further.

[258] Paul Strangio goes as far as showing that being a Catholic may be a disadvantage for a Labor leader. The reason is an anti-Catholic prejudice in the Victorian branch of the party, which is a consequence of the split (Strangio 2005).

[259] This observation is true for the position of leaders within political parties but also for voters. Brett notices that "Regular church-attenders, whatever their denomination, are more likely to support the Liberals. Catholics are still more likely than non-Catholics to support Labor, but if they are regular church-attenders they are more likely than non-attending Catholics to support the Liberals" (Brett 2003, p.132). It may be noted that, further, clergy are much more likely to vote Labor than members of their congregations -except for Pentecostals, where the relationship is reversed.

(re)emergence of the religious dimension in party programs. The Family First Party was co-founded in 2001 by Pastor Endrew Evans, who was known as General Superintendent of the Australian Christian Churches (ACC). If it does not define itself as a Christian party, it openly claims to be founded on a Christian ethics[260]. Conversely, the Secular Party of Australia founded in 2006 explicitly claims to ban the influence of religion[261], like the Freedom from Religion party (both parties merged in 2007).

A crucial element for the analysis of Islam is that the place of minority religions within these interparty and intraparty dynamics acquires a new meaning. Stephen Blyth speaks of a "progression of Australia's society from inter-Christian sectarianism to other-religion wariness" (Blyth 2012). This reconfiguration of sectarianism involves major differences with the traditional division of parties following the Catholic-Protestant divide. When the party position was motivated by denominational affiliations, the quantification was easy (Bean 1999) but the recent focus on religious alterity changes the paradigm. Marion Maddox notices that "Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus, between them a mere 3.09 per cent of the 1996 census population, do not account for a large part of the electorate. However, there is more to political impact than the votes cast by individual adherents" (Maddox 2001, p.5). The distinction is subtle, because it involves taking into account the gap between the symbolic impact of Muslims in the contemporary political field and their relative voting impact. The links between religion and parties have therefore evolved to become much more complex, since the attitude toward minority religions has become a defining element of party positions. In parallel with the aforementioned structural differences influencing the perception of Islam "as a religion" and "as a minority", the question of Islam is also to be inscribed within these party dynamics.

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[260] The Family First Federal Secretary, Matt Burnet, published a communiqué in which he affirmed: "The party is not a church party or an Assembly of God party, nor is it funded by AOG churches. It does see itself as socially conservative, with Family Values based on Christian ethics."

[261] Their official website emphasises on a strong opposition between religion and social progress: "As 21st century citizens, we want to challenge the power and privilege of religious institutions in Australia. As secular humanists, we want an end to religious interference in education, health, civil liberties and taxation. As champions of human rights, we want women, minorities and the LGBTI community to be free of discrimination and the dictates of archaic superstition."

Historically, Muslims have voted for the ALP like most new migrant communities[262] but the younger generation appears to be shifting to having the Greens as its default party. Among the reasons for this suggested in an in-depth study by Al-Momani, Dados, Maddox and Wise (2010) is that the ALP has ceased to respond to Muslims' concerns because their vote is taken for granted, as well as the perceived similarity of the ALP and the Coalition's stances on issues like the treatment of asylum seekers, Palestinian autonomy and social justice. This highlights a conflict of values within the ALP raised by the question of Muslims. Because of its aforementioned history the party has an elective affinity with ethnic minorities, which makes ALP politicians' position more difficult when dealing with the context of terrorism and debates about illegal immigration. Kevin Rudd's address to the nation announcing the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua-New Guinea on 19 July 2013 is a revealing example:

> As Prime Minister, I must address changing circumstances, balancing our humanitarian obligations under international law with the reality on the ground. Australian Governments have never had a policy on asylum seekers that is set in stone. We must always adjust to changing circumstances while remaining true to our values and vigilant concerning our legal obligations. Asylum seeker policy is complex. It is very complex indeed. It is hard.

A striking element in his speech is the abundant use of terms referring to a permanently-evolving environment ("changing circumstances"). Kevin Rudd's central argument to justify the strengthening of border control policies is therefore the necessity to respond to instability by a constant adaptation and pragmatism ("address", "set in stone"), in a context where his party must shoulder its responsibilities ("As Prime Minister"). However the corollary of such a position is the difficulty to arbitrate ("balancing", "adjust") between this goal and axiological principles which are defining for

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[262] For instance in 2015, of the 20 seats in Parliament with the most numerous Muslim voters, only one was not held by the ALP.

the ALP (in particular the protection of minorities). The repetition of terms evoking a troubled issue ("complex", "hard") underlines this contradictory process. Another explicit example of such conflicts of values may be found in the party attitude toward the UN resolution of November 2012 to give a greater recognition to a Palestinian State. This issue prompted heated debate within the ALP. Although Prime Minister Julia Gillard was in favour of the "No" voting[263], major Labor figures like Kevin Rudd, Andrew Leigh, Gareth Evans and Bob Carr opposed this view, which resulted in a decision of abstention (Kirk et al. 27 November 2012). Bob Carr himself, in his autobiography (2014), quotes Phil Coorey's *Sydney Morning Herald* report (28 November 2012) titled "Backbench revolt forces PM to drop Israel support" mentioning that it "says it all": "The Right faction, which would usually support Ms Gillard, backed an abstention, in part due to the views of its members that the Government was too pro-Israel, and also because many MPs in Western Sydney, who are already fearful of losing their seats, are coming under pressure from constituents of Middle East background". Although the ALP's historical legitimacy on the issue of minorities still has some relevance, a major change is that the party can no longer rely on unconditional support of ethnic workers, and in particular Muslims, in a context where ethnicity is increasingly involved in multidimensional dynamics.

2) French party dynamics

In comparison with the Australian case, the historical relations between political parties and religious identities appear even more difficult to establish in France. The more obvious element is that France does not have a bipartite system and that its political field has known many reconfigurations (even within the Fifth Republic). Any attempt at identifying a continuity might therefore prove arbitrary (Offerlé 2012; Lévêque 1997; Huard 1996; Platone 2007). This observation is all the more true when it comes to Right-

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[263] A few ALP politicians supported her stance, including Bill Shorten and Stephen Conroy.

wing parties: as Florence Haegel (2007, 2012) shows, the structuration of the "French Rights" has been quite disruptive to party logics. The numerous political groups which contributed to the formation of the UMP on 17 November 2002[264] are hardly comparable when it comes to their position toward religion. However, the relevance of the religious criterion for grasping political cleavages is real. André Siegfried and André Latreille (1951) already observed this importance in the first half of the century. François Goguel wrote in 1966 that "sixty years ago, the problem of the relations between the state and the Catholic Church dominated French political life almost exclusively. The divergences when it comes to the ways to approach it and the solutions to apply constituted the essential demarcation line between parties and political trends" (Goguel 1966, p.1174). In 1977, a classic book by Guy Michelat and Michel Simon identified the existence of two structuring poles in the political field, namely atheism and Catholicism. This dichotomy was, according to the authors, partially linked to a geography of votes dividing the country between the predominantly Christian-Democrat West and the predominantly Left-oriented East, traditionally more suspicious toward the Church. Left and Right parties were, as a matter of fact, opposing each other in a debate which in many respects prolonged the conflict of the "two Frances" mentioned in Chapter 3 (Poulat 1987; Portier 2005; Déloye 2006). At the beginning of the 1980s, 90% of the (right wing) RPR members were Catholics compared to only a third of socialist militants, the majority of the latter (59%) declaring themselves atheists (Dormagen & Mouchard 2009, p.121). Moreover, if France has known like Australia a decline of Christian religious practice since the second half of the century[265], religion still appears as a key factor in political behaviours[266]. For instance, the IFOP poll following the second round of the 2012 presidential elections shows that 57% of Catholics voted for Nicolas Sarkozy, 48% of the

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[264] Namely, the RPR, Ecologie Bleue, Démocratie Libérale, le Parti Radical, the Forum des Républicains sociaux and the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans.

[265] An IFOP poll of August 2010 establishes that the weight of Catholics in the French population fell from 81% to 64% in the period 1952-2010, and the percentage of people declaring to attend Mass fell from 27% to 4.5% in the period 1952-2006.

[266] This does not exclude that the religious variable may be secondary in comparison with social belonging (Gaxie (dir.) 1989). However, as Claude Dargent shows, the impact of religion is striking -twice bigger than the professional status (Dargent 2007, p.4).

general population and only 33% of people "without religion"[267]. Confirming the results of the study made by Guy Michelat in 1997 (Michelat 2000), Claude Dargent (2007) establishes for 2002 that a practising Catholic is 6.3 times more likely to vote for the Right than a person "without religion". If Protestants have historically voted for the Left, they follow today a similar voting pattern to the Catholics (Cautrès & Mayer 2004). However, a closer look shows that the vote for the Centre Right is more influenced by religious practice than the vote for the extreme Right and even the moderate Right (Perrineau 2007; Haegel & Sauger 2007).

The Left has historical ties with a militant laïcité which has been maintained until recent times by what Frédéric Sawicki calls the "networks of the Socialist Party" including teachers' unions (FEN, FSU) or federations like the Teaching League (Ligue de l'Enseignement) (Sawicki 1997). Conversely, the RPR and the UMP have had many Catholic groups among their supporters, to which the demonstrations against the Taubira law in 2013 gave an important visibility[268]. The case of the National Front is more complex and requires us to distinguish between the line of the party and the voters: although Catholicism is highly used in the party's rhetoric, Catholicism has historically been a barrier to the vote for the National Front[269]. The identification of Catholics with the Republican Right may be an explanatory factor for this rejection (*La Croix*, November 2013).

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[267] This cleavage was even neater in 2007 when Nicolas Sarkozy obtained 64% of the Catholic votes (versus 53% in the general population and 34% of people "without religion"). This was confirmed in local elections. The IFOP poll of 23 March 2014 for Pèlerin Magazine regarding the first round of the municipal elections shows that 35% of Catholics have voted for a Centre/Right list (vs 23% of people "without religion") and 23% have voted for the Left (vs 37% of people "without religion"). This poll was not conclusive for the National Front which united 8% of Catholics and 8% of people "without religion".

[268] For instance, the group France Audace (initially Collectif Audace 2012) gathers according to its website 116 associations (http://www.france-audace.fr/objectifs/). It was inaugurated in October 2010 with three prominent UMP representatives: Christian Vanneste, Jean-Frédéric Poisson and Xavier Lemoine and its president was the UMP member François Billot de Lochner. The nomination of conservative Christian Bruno Retailleau as head of the UMP on 2 October 2014 shows the influence of such groups on the party.

[269] The *paradox'Opinion* poll of November 2013 for *La Croix* shows that only 7% of Catholics feel close to the National Front, versus 13% of the general population.

For the Left, the comparison with Australian intraparty dynamics reveals a specificity of the French case and a convergence point. The specificity is the defiance toward religion *in itself*, that is to say the way to deal with religious value systems, the convergence point is the handling of the question of minorities. The Communist Party is an explicit historical example: although ideologically opposed to religion, the Communist leaders had to take into account the widespread Catholicism in the working class (Tranvouez 2000; Platone & Subileau 1975; Molinari 1991). In the same vein, in his letter to the rector of the Mosque of Paris in 1981 (cf. Appendix 8), Georges Marchais did not hesitate to address the "Muslim members of the proletariat".

The inclusion of Islam within these patterns has emphasised intraparty conflicts of values. The Creil affair in 1989 worked as a first catalyst of such divergences, and especially so for the Left.

It is noteworthy that (with the exception of the National Front) Left and Right parties alike were very slow to express their views on the affair, in particular because of the lack of consensus in their ranks. Many political scientists have shown that in 1989 the Left was put in tension between two logics: defending the father who was a Moroccan worker opposing the institutions, and defending laïcité against the upsurge of communalism, especially since school has always been the core vector of laïque integration[270] (Rochefort 2002; Lamine 2006; Tarnero 1990). The debate in the National Assembly on 25 October 1989 gives a good examplification of irreconcilable positions, even within parties. Minister of Education Lionel Jospin, declaring that "school cannot exclude," was booed but also acclaimed by Right-wing and Left-wing politicians. Jean-Marie Le Guen (PS) declared as he left the lower chamber that "this debate comes from the reaction of a number of friends who do not understand that we are facing a provocation" and Jean-Pierre Balligand (PS) expressed regrets that "the minister handles this contradiction the best he can but without giving satisfaction to any camp" (*France 2 tv news*, 25 October 1989). However, beyond such strong oppositions, a point often

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[270] Jean Baubérot concisely sums up this conception in the following words: "the school must integrate all kids, but to do so it needs to go beyond their differences, not to be flooded by their specificities" (1996, p.11).

missed by media commentators is that most politicians, at the end of the day, share a common cognitive and axiological ideal (Lorcerie 1996; Gaspard & Khosrokhavar 1995). Jean Baubérot (1996) theorises that on the Left both the defenders of a position open to the veil and the defenders of a "firmer" position shared a same rationalist objective. The question in Parliament of Yvette Roudy (PS) and the Minister's answer are evocative in this respect:

> **Yvette Roudy:** Mister Minister, if wearing the veil for young Muslim girls is indeed the symbol of their submission....
>
> **A Socialist deputy:** That is right!
>
> **Yvette Roudy: ...**and therefore an obstacle to their emancipation (applause on several benches of the RPR[271] and the UDF[272]), it is contradictory with the very principle of laïcité, which is an expression – among other things – of the equality between all men and women (applause on the benches of the Socialist group, of the RPR, the UDF and the UDC[273]). Some religious leaders purport to prevent young women from showing their hair, a symbol of seduction. Now, for fifty years girls have been fighting in our schools to express their will for more freedom in showing their feminity.
>
> **Willy Dimeglio (UDF):** Bravo!
>
> **Yvette Roudy:** We do not go to school today as we used to forty years ago! Nobody contemplates however, to solve this issue, by going back to the wearing of the uniform which would certainly be refused by our youth. Although it used to be a symbol of equality, it is very likely that it would not be accepted today. In the case in point, we should maybe ask ourselves a question: why were we unable to transmit our message of laïcité? Maybe we have not been welcoming enough.
>
> **Bernard Pons (RPR):** Indeed!

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[271] Rassemblement pour la République (gaullist Right wing party).

[272] Union pour la Démocratie Française (Centre-Right party, and non-gaullist Right).

[273] Union du Centre (Centre-Left party).

Yvette Roudy: Now, we are having a problem...

Bernard Pons: For sure!

Yvette Roudy: So what should we do? Should we constrain or convince?

Marie-Noëlle Lienemann (PS): Convince!

Yvette Roudy: If we want to succeed, as we wish, in integrating these young girls -and in this moment it looks like the success or failure of integration is resting on their shoulders, that is a little heavy isn't it? – and integrating communities of religious background in the French society, we must convince! We must explain, explain and explain again -as some used to say in other times. We must do it until these young girls give up by themselves this symbol of their own submission -then, we will have won!

(Official Journal of the French Republic, 25 October 1989, p.4118)

In this speech, I have transcribed the multiple interjections because they reveal the passionate dimension of the debate as well as its interparty dimension. This speech is in fact a prelude to the numerous debates on the veil occurring during the following decades, whose central contentions are similar in many respects. It clearly shows that, from the beginning of the "debate on Islam" the basic divergences have not been about the ends to reach but the means to use. Acknowledging the same observation of an axiological divergence, the defenders (like Y. Roudy) of an "open" position seek to "convince", that is to say to create the conditions for the Muslim girls to internalise the system of laïque values[274]. The corollary of such a position is the focus on a long-term perspective. In many respects, the "open" position is therefore even more ambitious in its axiological claim. This internal conflict within a shared universe of discourse (the one of rational emancipation) is still dividing the parliamentary Left. A quarter century after this first

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[274] The position of Lionel Jospin joins Yvette Roudy's. He declared during the same parliamentary session that, just like her, he was willing to "convince" and that school was "the best vector of integration" (le meilleur vecteur d'intégration).

debate, the controversy around the burkini issue has revealed the persistence of these lines.

> Yesterday, we heard Nicolas Sarkozy saying that he was going to forbid religious symbols in the public sphere. Why not? But let us be clear: all religious symbols! This means that the kippa should be banned, as well as sheepskin hats (...) Let us think twice.... The vice squad of clothing, this is complicated! (...) What is wrong today is that it seems that we are always pointing out at Islam[275].
>
> Jean-Luc Mélenchon (PG), interview on France 2, 25 August 2016.
>
> My dream of society is a society in which women are free and proud of their body. Now, if you ask me if I find appropriate the controversy around the burkini the answer is no, clearly no. Blame it on those who saw in it an opportunity for political exploitation[276].
>
> Najat Vallaud Belkacem (PS), interview on Europe 1, 25 August 2016.
>
> These decrees are not a drift (...) This is a bad interpretation of things. These decrees were taken in the name of the public order[277].
>
> Manuel Valls (PS), interview on RMC, 25 August 2016

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[275] " Hier, on a entendu Nicolas Sarkozy dire qu'il va interdire tous les signes religieux dans l'espace public. Pourquoi pas ? Mais c'est clair : tous les signes religieux ! " a-t-il dit. " Ça veut dire que la kippa, on n'a pas à la porter, les chapeaux en peau de mouton non plus [...] Réfléchissons bien... La police des mœurs des vêtements, c'est quelque chose de très compliqué ! (...) Ce qui ne va pas aujourd'hui, c'est qu'on a l'impression qu'on montre du doigt sans cesse l'Islam "

[276] "Mon rêve de société, c'est une société dans laquelle les femmes sont libres et fières de leur corps. Maintenant si vous me demandez si je juge pertinente la place qu'a prise la polémique autour du burkini la réponse est non, clairement non. La faute à ceux qui y ont vu un potentiel d'instrumentalisation politique. (...) La situation est suffisamment grave pour que nous cherchions comment la république française peut conquérir les coeurs, faire en sorte que chacun se retrouve en elle (...)"

[277] "Ces arrêtés ne sont pas une dérive. (...) C'est une mauvaise interprétation des choses. Ces arrêtés ont été pris au nom même de l'ordre public".

Let us mention, first, that the debate on the burkini has not been chosen fortuitously, because the garment was invented in Australia[278] and has never sparked off political debates in the country. This element allows us to situate the national orientation of the analysis in terms of political resources and constraints. In the burkini debate, none of the politicians who expressed their opinion was personally in favour of the burkini: the goal is clearly not the dividing line and politicians' speeches may still be inscribed within a common laïque universe of discourse. A second element is that the position toward this Islamic clothing may strongly vary, especially within the Left since the Right proved relatively much less divided on the subject[279].

Jean-Luc Mélenchon's point of view refers to a rationalist ideal to integrate the Islamic veil debate within a broader analysis of the religious. A fundamental element which appears as a specificity of French Left speeches is the use of rationalist arguments paired up with a questioning of Religion as a whole. Islam only appears, in this process, as the paroxysmal emanation of a broader problem: the difficulty of separating religion from the national being. It is noteworthy that, even in a purely rhetorical manner, J.L. Mélenchon does not oppose the possibility of a complete neutralisation of the public sphere, but the targeting of a specific minority. His speech is at the same time distrustful toward the religious and the stigmatisation of Muslims. Najat Vallaud Belkacem's perspective and Manuel Valls's[280] express different registers than Mélenchon's. N. Vallaud Belkacem refuses the "proliferation of decrees" at the same time that she refutes a system of values opposing her feminism. The rational dimension only shows between the lines through the notion of "freedom". The legitimation given by Manuel Valls is interesting because it uses a notion which shows between the lines an axiological dimension through a security-based argument. Although Manuel Valls belongs to the Socialist Party, this

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[278] The burkini was invented in 2004 and is attributed to Aheda Zanetti, a Lebanese-born Australian designer. It only raised attention in Australia after the Cronulla riots, and with a comparatively small resonance.

[279] Only a few right-wing politicians expressed a different view, like Alain Juppé refusing "situational laws" or Christine Boutin (Christian-Democrat and UMP) who explained that "it is necessary to affirm the Christian values but not by being against the burkini because it is grotesque and ridiculous" (*Le Figaro* 17 August 2016).

[280] It is noteworthy that the statement of M. Valls was a repudiation of N. Vallaud Belkacem's assertion, although both were members of the same government.

argument has been largely used by leaders of the Republican Party like François Baroin, François Fillon, Christian Estrosi[281] or Valérie Pécresse and by the National Front (in particular Florian Philippot and Marine Le Pen). The "public order" has been defined, since the law of 1905, as the limit to the public exercise of religions. Yet, in its original formulation, this meant the violation of other people's security or wellbeing (*sécurité* or *salubrité*)[282]. In the case of the burkini, such dimensions are uneasy to establish[283]. The "public order" has therefore changed its nature in political discourses from the Left and the Right, shifting from security concerns to systems of values. The debate on full-face veils had given a first example of this drift, with the assimilation of public order to the conditions of social cohesion (*vivre ensemble*). For instance, the report of 23 June 2010 (n°2648) handed by Jean-Paul Garraud evoked an "immaterial and societal public order", understood as "minimum grounding of reciprocal requirements and guarantees essential to life in society"[284] (p.7). In the case *S.A.S. vs France* (ECHR, 1 July 2014), the report of the Court mentions three "common values" which are systematically put forward by French governments: the respect of equality between men and women, the respect of people's dignity and the respect of life in society. These values were at the centre of the legislative resolution proposed by the UMP on the "attachment to the respect of Republican values against the development of radical practices affecting them", prelude to the law of 11 October 2010, and adopted unanimously (434 votes).

In France as in Australia, the perception of Islam by political parties appears as a catalyst for complex dynamics involving the question of minorities and the question of religion, confronting the parties' historical traditions. I have shown how, especially for Left parties, these dynamics have produced strong conflicts of values. A striking element

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[281] In particular, his letter to Manuel Valls on 16 August 2016 explicitly shows a convergence in both perceptions.

[282] For instance, in 1917, the Government Commissioner mentioned in the Baldy affair that the religious symbol is not "in itself" a security issue but becomes so when worn by a group in a procession.

[283] On 26 August 2016, the Council of State settled the legal dispute by stating that the decrees infringed the freedom of conscience and the individual rights.

[284] "socle minimal d'exigences réciproques et de garanties essentielles de la vie en société".

is that in many issues involving Muslims, the party variable may no longer be relevant to understanding politicians' positions. On the other hand, an observation which proves much more significant is a growing interparty tendency to subsume the question of individual rights under the question of values in a context where religions acquire a new meaning and importance.

II - *Islam and the "Religious Turn"*

1) Acknowledging an international process

In France as in Australia – with the exception of very minority traditionalist trends – the principle of separation of church and state is not questioned by any political party. However, political projects aim at reorganising the conditions of this separation, by playing on the public-private relation or the designation of what, in religions, is compatible with the national unity. It is on these bases that appears, in a converging manner, a "re-enchantment" of politics, with a new expansion of the religious in public debates. Two elements make this process crucial for our analysis: the international comparison which impels acknowledgement of a French-Australian convergence, and its direct consequences on the question of Islam.

This "religious turn" has been observed by numerous commentators in Australia (Maddox 2001, 2003, 2005; Manning & Warhurst 2005; Marr 1999; Mutch 2004; Crabb 2009; Warhurst 2007; Howe & Nichols 2003; Brennan 2007; Lohrey 2006). The redirection may be observed under the prism of the government appointments and the relations with church leaders[285], the rise of religious parties like the Family First Party[286]

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[285] The most notorious being the appointment of Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane, Peter Hollingworth, as Governor-General in June 2001.

[286] In particular, at the 2004 Federal election, the Family First candidate Steve Fielding was successful in obtaining a senator seat.

(Stewart 2005; Warhurst 2007) but also, what is even more meaningful for our argument, the public presentation of beliefs. As Warhurst puts it, "one has only to compare the outwardly Christian approach of Howard–Anderson–Costello–Abbott, for instance, to the privately Christian, even secular, approach of Fraser–Anthony–Lynch to see that this is true" (2007, p.23). Anna Crabb (2009) has shown with a quantitative analysis that the use of Christian terms by politicians from the Coalition and the ALP alike has known a significant rise during the years 2000-2006. The Coalition government led by John Howard distinguished itself in the religious turn, from the multiple declarations of Howard himself to the politically engaged declarations of Treasurer Peter Costello[287] and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer[288] who both criticised the political role of the clergy. Malcolm Turnbull's first speech as MP evoked prayers that "fly heavenward" in the name of the "new" and "the old testament". The ALP is not to be outdone. In October 2006, Kevin Rudd wrote an essay for *The Monthly* titled "Faith in Politics", in which he established a continuity between his political perception and Christian socialism[289], declaring that "a Christian perspective, informed by a social gospel or Christian socialist tradition, should not be rejected contemptuously by secular politicians as if these views are an unwelcome intrusion into the political sphere" (Rudd 2006). In March 2011 Julia Gillard (coming from the Left wing of the ALP) challenged Tony Abbott to a "biblical quiz" in Parliament. This appears all the more revealing of a transpartisan change in the relation with the religious since analysts like Marion Maddox (2012) estimate that it would have been unthinkable two decades earlier.

In France, this resurgence of the religious in political speeches is also well documented (Portier 2003, 2008, 2010; Willaime 2008a; Massignon 2000; Milot 2013;

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[287] See for instance Peter Costello, 'Is Faith a Lost Cause' Address to Anglicare lunch, WatersEdge, Pier One,WalshBay,Sydney, 27 June 2003.

[288] See for instance Alexander Downer, 'Australian Politics and the Christian Church', Sir Thomas Playford Memorial Lecture, University of Adelaide, 27 August 2003.

[289] In this essay, Kevin Rudd links the history of his party with religion: "Keir Hardie, the founder of the British Labour Party, was a Christian socialist, as was Andrew Fisher, the first majority Labor prime minister of Australia. For his part, Bonhoeffer was a committed social democrat, although he did not use the term "Christian socialist" to describe his own politics. Nonetheless, his writings on "otherness" and "the oppressed" fit well within this perspective."

Liogier 2006; Foret 2007, 2009; Lamine 2004). Its origin is probably slightly older: Philippe Portier and Jean Baudoin (2001) go as far as the 1980s to grasp a renewal of such rhetoric, with examples breaking the French tradition of non-recognition like François Mitterrand's appreciation of the "contribution to the national community" of the "Jewish community". However a tipping point is to be observed at the turn of the 2000s, with salient discursive reconfigurations like the much-commented speech of Nicolas Sarkozy in Latran on 20 December 2007 in which he praised the educative role of the clergy and mentioned that "the laïque ethics always risks running out when it is not backed up by a hope filling the aspiration to infinity"[290] and many similar speeches given to Muslim authorities[291]. As Philippe Portier points out (2008), there is in France a continuity between the concept of "plural laïcité" put forward by the Socialist Party in the 1990s and Nicolas Sarkozy's "positive laïcité", insofar as they both aim at overcoming uncertainty with a reappropriation of faith. The reorientation is also visible in the following Socialist government: for instance François Hollande expressed on 17 August 2016 his "gratitude" to the pope, highlighting that religions "create social ties" following the Islamist attack on the Saint Etienne du Rouvray church. Bernard Cazeneuve himself gave a speech in the Mosque of Paris for Iftar on 7 July 2014 and then in Notre Dame on 13 July, and used a prospective rhetoric in several occasions: on 2 December 2016 in Royaumont, he called for considering religions "not as a threat for citizenship, but a resource" and to "reenchant laïcité".

2) Assessing causal hypotheses

As we see, this religious turn and the accompanying renewal of the rhetoric bring substantial consequences for the way political parties deal with the question of Islam and therefore their origins need to be further investigated.

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[290] "La morale laïque risque toujours de s'épuiser quand elle n'est pas adossée à une espérance qui comble l'aspiration à l'infini".

[291] This speech was followed, on 14 January 2008, by the Riyadh speech using similar patterns.

For the Australian case, researchers have mentioned as potential causes the decline of sectarianism and the emergence of personalities having a strong desire to reinstall religions in the public debate (Mutch 2004; Warhurst 2007; Brennan 2007). However, without denying the influence of such factors, they seem to be unsatisfying to explain the emergence of the religious in speeches since the 2000s. First because sectarianism has been declining since the 1960s in Australia and the totally different configuration in France has not impeded a similar dynamic. Second, because this process is a multipartisan one and may be observed for many politicians, including some who openly refused to use religious-oriented arguments in public debate. An explicit example may be found in Maddox (2001, p.141). The author asked Kevin Rudd, then member for Griffith, if calling on theological positions in public debate was "legitimate" and was answered: "It makes me vomit. Would you like me to be more graphic?". In the same way, Bernard Cazeneuve has long criticised the links between religion and politics. On 2 April 2012, he published an opinion column in *L'Obs* titled "How Nicolas Sarkozy gave away laïcité"[292] in which he reproached the President of the Republic with risking the "dislocation of the Republic" through the "denying of its laïque roots". It would be therefore erroneous to see in the renewal of the rhetoric either a return of pre-secular considerations or long-thought personal projects.

Two dynamics touching both France and Australia – one situational and one structural – may offer an analytical grounding to this resurgence of religions in which the "question of Islam" has been integrated. The first, situational dynamic, has been developed in Chapter 5: it refers to the impact of international events and the emergence of a global fear of radical Islam (Mutch 2004; Warhurst 2006). The second, structural dynamic, is endogenous to the evolution of the political field in the two countries. It is characterised by a need to "re-enchant" politics in a period when the latter seems unable to claim the transcendance of its values. Some authors have theorised the emergence of an "ultramodern" frame (Willaime 2006; Lambert 2000), "hypermodern" trend (Liogier 2015) or late modern age (Giddens 1991). Such notions will not be discussed here because

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[292] "Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a bradé la laïcité".

of the complexity of their heuristic manipulation in my framework[293] but they should be credited for making visible the upsurge of a period of symbolic powerlessness for political projects. To this ontological uncertainty is linked the loss of ideological specificity defining political parties. The observation of the "end of ideologies" which was already mentioned by Daniel Bell in 1960 should be put into perspective with recent works on the plasticity and temporality of resources and party constraints (Adams et al. 2004; Moon 2004; Katz 1990; Lawton 2004) and the differentiation with militant activities (Lipsky 1968; Fillieule 2009; Gaxie 2005). However, it is enough for our argument to notice that many works have shown that the role of party ideologies has a very limited relevance in explaining political competition, whether it be in France (Desage 2005; Offerlé 2012; Bréchon 2011; Mény 1989) or in Australia (Jackman 1998; Mendes 2008; McAllister & Studlar 1995). Religions appear, in contrast, as both an ethical and an identity resource for creating social ties (Dubar 2010). Jürgen Habermas summarises a general trend from which neither France nor Australia –despite their different secular traditions – escape:

> Here, in the European part of the West, the aggressive conflict between anthropocentric and theocentric understandings of self and world is yesterday's battle. Hence the project of *incorporating* central contents of the Bible into a rational faith has become more interesting than combating priestcraft and obscurantism[294] (Habermas 2008 (2005), p.211).

This provides an important clue to the interparty dimension of this process. This perception is neither a mere personal project nor a gesture directed specifically at

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[293] Because of the methodological requirement to avoid concept stretching on such notions for comparative puroposes, I will not elaborate on the theoretical debates and use the terms interchangeably with notions like third modernity (Olivier Bobineau) or post-modernity (Jean-François Lyotard).

[294] In another text, Habermas further specifies this link by mentioning how the rational language may reciprocally provide the religious language with accessibility: "The force of religious traditions to articulate moral intuitions with regard to communal forms of a dignified human life makes religious presentations on relevant political issues a serious candidate for possible truth contents that can then be translated from the vocabulary of a specific religious community into a generally accessible language" (Habermas 2006, p.10).

believers[295]. Basing her analysis on Hans Mol's statistical works (1971, 1985), Marion Maddox (2012) shows that trying to attract the most religious voters in Australia would be politically unproductive because of the solidity of their vote. She directs our attention, however, toward an important stock of voters who are not personally religious but regard Christianity as an important driving force of social cohesion and identity (Mol calls them "modal Australians"). In France, the situation seems more difficult to analyse at first sight because the link between religious practice and voting for the Right is more established (Cautrès & Mayer 2004). Yet in the same way, the country has a large body of voters considering themselves as "cultural Catholics" who represent roughly a third of the electorate (33% according to the NS-Sofrès-TriElec poll in 2012). These electors, whilst not being personally committed with respect to religion, remain sensitive to speeches inspired by religion for similar social or identity reasons (Schlegel 2015; Tiberj 2012; Fourquet 2015).

3) Conflicts of values on the identity issue

In this project, the place of Islam is difficult to deal with for political parties. As a resource for conviction, as well as an ethical resource, Islam is recognised in the same way as other religions. In this respect, Sarkozy's Riyadh speech on 14 January 2008 is fully symmetrical with the Latran speech a month earlier (this symmetry is claimed by N. Sarkozy in his 2004 book *Republic, Religions, Hope*). Likewise, John Howard insisted during our interview on the importance of all forms of faith, his attachment for all believers to the "right to worship and to have buildings in which they carry out their worship". As an identity resource however, the integration of Islam brings more complex issues. At the Bourget Congress on 19 April 2004, Nicolas Sarkozy defended at the same

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[295] In this respect, corroborating the observation made by Marion Maddox during her 2001 interviews in the Australian Parliament, all the Australian and French politicians that I interviewed mentioned that they did not use it to have a direct impact on the electorate: "Look, I have my own religious views", "I am a practicing Christian but I don't trade on my party", "In my view, religion is something that is very personal and should remain so", etc...

time the integration of the UOIF and the Tabligh within the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) and the necessity to withdraw the veil on ID photos, for which he was respectively applauded and booed[296]. This twofold dimension was underlined by John Howard himself during our interview:

> The best way for different religions and different belief systems to exist in the Australian society is for everybody to be tolerant toward other people's point of view. But also you have to accept that the dominant religious tradition of the country is Christian.

This shows a difficulty perceived as inherent to the integration of Islam within the recognition process. The relevance of Islam is recognised from the point of view of its moral and social reach, that is to say what founds its religious universalism. On the other hand, frictions emerge when Islam is apprehended in what constitutes its identity idiosyncrasy: in this case, it may appear contradictory with an ethics identified as "Christian" or "Judeo-Christian". This twofold concern, although not restricted to Right-wing parties, is especially salient in their discourses because of the predominance of the project of assimilation. For instance, mentioning the education of young Muslims, Liberal Federal Education Minister Brendan Nelson mentioned that "we don't mind what their religion is" and added "if people don't want to support and accept and adopt and teach Australian values then, they should clear off" (Aslan 2005, p.80). The conflict of values may occur, in this respect, in the confrontation between liberal principles and the will to create social cohesion behind a common ethos. In this regard this ethos relies on religious grounds but is less religious than axiological because it encompasses indefinitely "national values" (rather than actual theological statements). The French National Front epitomises this paradox[297], because of its focus on the "national identity". In an interview

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[296] The evolution of Nicolas Sarkozy's position on Islam is revealing in this respect. In his book of 2004, he wrote that "everytime the Republic guarantees a freedom, it strenghthens its roots" (op.cit.), which appears in sharp contrast with his book of 2016 where he mentioned the duty for Islam to "merge within the cultural, political and moral context of the country" (op. cit.).

[297] This question is also a key element of debate within the FN. On *Infrarouge* on 14 October 2014, Jean Marie Le Pen reproached his daughter with not being "spiritual" enough: "I think that

to *Al Jazeera* on 17 December 2012[298], when asked about Muslims feeling targeted by the law, Marine Le Pen responded:

> Madame, we are, France is a country of Greco-latin culture and Christian civilisation. This determines our whole way of life.

The mention of the "Greco-latin culture" and the association between "Christian" and "civilisation" is revealing that Christianity in her speech is not the name of a religion but the marker of a profound identity, a strong axiological base. The "way of life" points in this respect to two shared conditions for the constitution of a national community: a shared public culture and a common memory. The semantic power of religion offers a strong identity resource to feed this ethos.

III - Contrasting Case Studies

1) Selective cases

In order to better give account of the diversity of the points of view but also of the personal trajectories which may influence the politicians' perception of Islam, the following part focuses on key individual case studies. These cases do not aim at being representative of the parties, nor of the full spectrum of the studied politicians' views, but at providing a better in-depth visibility of divergent internal party dynamics. In relation to what may be inferred from the parties' history and recent trends, they sometimes refer to what I have described in the methodological chapter as "negative cases" or "limit cases"

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this day (Joan of Arc celebration day) lacked spirituality. Marine needs to show to her Christian wing that she is a little more than laïque."

[298] Although the interview is in French, I have transcripted and translated it in Appendix 9.

(Emigh 1997). The difficulty for the choice of such cases came from the striking asymmetry between the Australian context and the French context. If, in the former, it is rare to find major politicians who have dedicated many long speeches to the question of Islam, the latter reveals the exact opposite observation. In Australia, I have selected three politicians from each of the two major parties who have been in Parliament (to ensure their institutional legitimacy), represent different trends, and have evoked the question of Islam at length in at least one speech or article. In France, as too many political personalities have been influential on the question to avoid choosing arbitrarily, I have selected politicians from divergent political traditions who have written at least one influential book on the question of Islam, on which the analysis will be based.

Peter Costello (Coalition- Liberal Party)

Born in Melbourne in 1957 in a family of practising Christians and a former barrister, Peter Costello was continuously elected to the House of Representatives for Higgins, Victoria, from 1990 to 2007. He was appointed Treasurer from 11 March 1996 to 3 December 2007. His constituency is mostly inner metropolitan (including retail and service industries) and enrolled 89 345 electors in November 2007. Publicly heralded as John Howard's natural successor, he refused to stand after the defeat of the Coalition in 2007 and resigned from his seat in 2009. An advocate of a liberal economy and increased socially conservative policies, he was identified in the 1980s as close to the Australian "New Right" movement (Coleman & Costello 2009).

Close to the conservative religious group "Catch the Fire", he met several times with its leader, Daniel Nalliah, and supported him when he was unsuccessfully prosecuted for religious vilification of Muslims. In an article of the *Herald Sun* in November 2015 titled "We have a duty to ask the tough questions on Islam and terrorism", he extensively developed his conception of Islamist terrorism. Starting from the observation that "all these attacks are coming from people who subscribe to one religion, which is not Catholic or Protestant or Jewish or Buddhist or Yazidi", he infers that "it has something to do with

Islam. And the people who are doing it think it has everything to do with Islam." His discourse articulates two elements in the perception of Islam: the acknowledgement that radicalism is a very minority behaviour ("a tiny, minority one") and at the same time the idea that its origin is linked to a specificity inherent in Islam. Therefore he claims the necessity of differentiating religions in their theological link with violence:

> One great illusion that Western liberals use to console themselves is that all religions are more or less the same. They know little of religion but find this belief to be comforting. It means there is no need to worry that Muslim immigration is bringing unique problems to Western cities. Everyone just believes the same thing anyway.

In his article, he makes multiple theological references, insisting on the necessity to make explicit the Qur'anic texts under the light of Reason, that is to say to make them fit within the axiological patterns of the Western intellectual tradition. It is therefore not paradoxical to notice that, in speeches, he claimed seeing a return to "Judeo-Christian values" as the best way to improve the relations between Christians and Muslims.

George Christensen (Coalition- National Party)

Born in 1978 in a third-generation cane farming family, Christensen describes himself on his official webpage as having "lived in Mackay all his life" and has mentioned being a converted Orthodox Christian in many statements. A firm defender of a low-tax economy and "small government", he joined the Young Nationals in 1993 and was elected to the House of Representatives for Dawson, Queensland, in 2010, 2013 and 2016. He was elected Party Whip for The Nationals from 17 October 2013 to 9 May 2016 and Chief Whip from 30 August 2016 to 28 February 2017. His constituency is mostly rural (including small crops, sugar industry, coal mining and tourism) and enrolled 103 665 electors in July 2016. He resigned as chief whip, claiming that his "outspokenness was

incompatible with the position", and mentioned that he might possibly join the One Nation Party in the future (*SMH*, 28 February 2017).

His approach may be considered as more radical, insofar as he directly challenges the immigration of people of Muslim background and repeatedly mentions the expulsion of Muslim people opposing national values as a key process to re-establish social cohesion. In September 2016, a day after Pauline Hanson advocated a ban on Muslim immigration, he expressed in Parliament his concern that "many immigrants in recent years do not share our "Australian values". He defends the model of a close national community in order to avoid dangerous cultural exogeneities:

> It is not necessary to travel halfway around the world to
> come to Australia and demand that Australians change
> their culture, their society and their laws.

As he faced criticism, in particular from Russell Broadbent, George Christensen defended himself by establishing a distinction between Islam as "a religion" and "radical Islam or Islamism" as "an ideology", arguing that "nowhere in the speech (...) will anyone find any criticism of Islam" (*SMH*, 8 November 2016). His speech nonetheless explicitly links Islamism and "intolerant" cultural forms, highlighting that such forms are dominant in many Muslim-majority countries. Moreover, if the criticism of Islam as such is indeed not present in his speech, the ties between Islamism and Islam are presented as very close. In particular, he gave a speech at the QSA[299] Fundraiser Event in Melbourne on 10 February 2017 in which he strived to make explicit the dangers of "halal certifications" and its presumed links with the funding of terrorism.

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[299] The Q Society of Australia defines itself on its official website as "Australia's Premier Islam-critical organisation".

Russell Broadbent (Coalition- Liberal Party)

Born in Koo Wee Rup in 1950 and a former retailer in family business, he joined the Liberal Party in 1980. First elected to the House of Representatives in 1990 for the seat of Corinella, he was re-elected for McMillan, Victoria, in 1996, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016. His constituency is mostly rural (including dairy farming, fruit, forestry and tourism) and enrolled 116 200 electors in July 2016. His political stance is interesting because he crossed the floor on John Howard's immigration policy of offshore processing for asylum seekers but later gave his "full support" to Prime Minister Tony Abbott (identified as a "Liberal Dry"). To the question "Where do you think you stand in the Liberal Party?" he responded: "I've never put myself in boxes, I've always seen myself to be actually in the centre" (*OCSN* 29 January 2010).

Russell Broadbent also extensively spoke on the question of Islam – or more specifically on the political perception of Islam – in a speech given on 7 November 2016 before the House of Representatives. This speech was intended as a critical response to his Coalition colleague G. Christensen. Establishing a comparison with Hanson's speech, he denounced the "bogus claims that Australia was in danger of being swamped by Muslims – dangerous Muslims who were arriving with their 'violent extremism'; dangerous Muslims who did not share 'Australian values'." In his approach, the aim is both to acknowledge the danger linked with Islamist terrorism and to refuse its systematic discursive association with the Muslim community:

> I do understand the concerns of the Australian people over these issues. I am not immune to the fears expressed to me by the people that I meet. At the same time we cannot condemn the whole of the Muslim community for the actions of a crazy dangerous few.

R. Broadbent aims at dissociating the cultural and religious dimensions from the sharing of a common system of values. Taking over Malcolm Turnbull's words who declared in New York that "we are not defined by race, religion or culture but by shared political values of democracy", he tries to show that the concept of democracy may stand

out from any particular cultural background. In this respect, R. Broadbent's approach is not less value-oriented but focuses on the universality of the values' modalities of acquisition. His specificity is that he does not circumscribe the democratic tradition to the Judeo-Christian or Western tradition. In this respect, his normative comments aim less at Muslims than at Christians: "I do not know what Muslims are asked to do. But I know what Christians are asked to do".

Bill Shorten (ALP)

Born in Melbourne in 1967 and the son of a union leader, Bill Shorten was elected as the Australian Workers Union's national secretary in 2001, before he was elected to the House of Representatives for Maribyrnong, Victoria, in 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016. His constituency is inner metropolitan and enrolled 110 286 electors in July 2016. Several times Minister, he has been Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party from 13 October 2013 and then Leader of the Opposition. A claimed defender of "middle and working class" families, he is considered as belonging to the Right faction of the ALP (Kernell 2014; Marr 2015).

Bill Shorten has spoken on many occasions on Islam, and in particular at length during the Speech to the Islamic Museum of Australia Gala Dinner on 28 February 2015. In this speech, he clearly links the past discriminations suffered by Catholics to the situation of Muslims in contemporary Australia. This perception is very much indebted to his own personal story, as he recounts that his own mother was refused a job because she was a Catholic. Acknowledging "a rise in racism towards Muslim Australians that needs to be called for what it is", he expresses regrets to see the continuity of religiocentric views. His approach to the question of Islam is therefore much less orientated toward Muslims than toward the perception of the public and political opinion.

These are some people who would question the loyalty
of someone to their homeland, to their community

because they have a different faith. People who would seek to use the actions of a tiny violent, criminal, corrupt minority, to underestimate the contribution of hundreds of thousands of Australians.

The articulation point in his speech is therefore the inscription of the question of Islam within the question of how to deal with religious and cultural minorities. Refusing the perspective of "a patchwork country", Bill Shorten explains that social cohesion between Muslims and non-Muslims may only be found in mutual understanding. The strength of the country comes from its diverse construction, "forged from the best of every culture and every tradition". It is therefore cultural diversity itself which is seen as the preferred modality to improve the relations between Christians and Muslims.

Maria Vamvakinou (ALP)

Born in 1959 in Lefkada (Greece), Maria Vamvakinou emigrated to Australia with her working class parents when she was four years old. She worked as a high school teacher before being continuously elected to the House of Representatives for Calwell, Victoria, from 2002 to 2016. She is a member of the Victorian Socialist Left faction within the ALP. Her constituency is outer metropolitan, has the third largest Muslim community in Australia and enrolled 109 405 electors in July 2016. She has been very involved in issues related to multiculturalism and immigration, being in particular Deputy Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Migration, co-convener of the Australian Parliamentary Friendship Groups for Multiculturalism and her official website also mentions her involvement for Palestine.

Maria Vamvakinou's approach may be considered as more radical than Shorten's because she defends not only diversity but also in several speeches the withdrawal into one's own community. In a speech in Parliament on 10 February 2011, she expresses her conviction that the separate development of Muslim communities, like Jewish

communities, is natural and that it may be a necessary condition for equality and social cohesion:

> It is a natural phenomenon for migrants to initially gravitate towards their own communities. In fact, it is this very settlement pattern that has enabled us as a country to repeatedly build on the foundations laid by each wave of new migrants, and we have done it successfully. (...) These so called enclaves are home to first, second and third generation Australians who ultimately have a right to live where they choose.

In this respect, she strongly opposes "Mr Cameron's assertion that this nation's tolerance of segregated communities has weakened its collective identity" and conversely links "the high level of incidents or social unrest" in the United Kingdom, France and Germany to their respective models of integration. She identifies the communalist attitude as the sign of Australian multiculturalism's good vitality, and considers that it could be raised as a model: "the world can start following our example". In an intervention in Parliament on 26 October 2011 (Joint Standing Committee on Migration), she mentions that Islamophobia is one of the "key issues of our time" insofar as it shapes the response of Muslim communities, whether in a "positive or negative" manner. In this respect, she underlines that what is identified as a deficit of integration and the "question of Islam" may be a response toward a more or less hostile attitude of politicians and the majority population.

Ed Husic (ALP)

Born in Paddington in 1970 and the son of Bosnian immigrants, Ed Husic has described himself as a non-practising Muslim. He was elected to the House of Representatives for Chifley, New South Wales, in 2010, 2013 and 2016. His outer metropolitan constiuency enrolled 103 864 electors in July 2016, He held the positions of

Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Parliamentary Secretary for Broadband and is linked to the Labor Right faction. The point of view of Ed Husic is very informative because he is one of the few Muslim members of the Parliament[300] and the first Muslim sworn onto the Australian Federal Government frontbench. This is a significant clue to grasp the line of the ALP. According to a long interview given to *SBS* on 1 February 2017, his personal experience has constituted the "bedrock" of his political attitudes. He often refers to the conflict in the Balkans to evoke the necessity to rethink social cohesion, with a special focus on fighting reciprocal intolerance:

> One of the biggest, most instructive things that came out of that for me is the corrosive impact of hate that would drive people apart. Everything I do in public life is informed by that event.

Following his election, Husic illustrated this position visiting Serbian communities in his electorate. The most interesting point is that his perception of Islam is constructed in inverse order to the Nationals' integrationism insofar as it is thought from the point of view of the entrants themselves. In other words, his personal experience allows him to think integration in terms of "us" rather than "them". It is from this point of view that he makes references to the axiological references of the Australian society, and in particular to "democratic values". He clearly expresses this perception toward negative comments directed at Islam:

> I'm not supportive of things that are said of the faith deliberately, provocatively, for the sake of triggering that type of reaction. But at the same time, too, it's a democracy. This is the deal. If you move to Australia, this is what you value; this is what you need to accept, as uncomfortable and displeasing as it may be [to you].

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[300] Other Muslim members of the Parliament include Sam Dastyari, appointed Senator representing New South Wales on 21 August 2013, or Anne Aly, member for Cowan (Western Australia) who was the first Muslim woman elected to the Australian Parliament in the 2016 federal election.

Such words do not acquire the same meaning when pronounced by a politician like Husic because they refer in a bottom-up perspective to the necessity of thinking cultural dualism[301]. It is also this position that gives him a legitimacy to denounce intolerant attitudes from his own community: "You can't have Muslims asking for more tolerance yet being anti-Semitic". His perception merges both the pride to belonging to a Muslim community with a specific history and the claim for a democratic system of values thought of as a means for reconciliation in a multiethnic society.

Lydia Guirous

Born in 1984 and a former militant of the Radical Party as well as a member of the Centre-Right party UDI[302], she became in January 2015 the UMP's National Secretary in charge of the Values of the Republic and Laïcité, before becoming spokesperson for Les Républicains. Lydia Guirous' point of view is informative because of her life course, which she traces in an evocatively-titled book: *Allah is Great, so is the Republic*[303] (2014). A Muslim herself and a native of Kabylia (Algeria), she came to France in a working-class area. She explains having developed her conception of laïcité before the observation of the development of fundamentalism in the town where she lived. She contrasts the "Islam of the parents, the grand-parents and a silent majority" (p.23) with the "Islam conflating faith and law" (ibid.), and recounts having suffered from the emergence of the latter in the 1990s, which she links to the failure of integration. She relates having found in republican values a shield against the demands and persecutions of proselytes:

> In the classroom, a boy would sit next to me and tell me
> that they had to convert me into "a good Muslim"

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[301] The sociology of immigration has developed concepts to take this dimension into account: Schiller, Basch et Szanton (1995) has proposed the notion of "transmigrant" and Vertovec (2003) coins this as "conceptual cross-fertilisation".

[302] Union des Démocrates et Indépendants.

[303] *Allah est grand, la République aussi*.

because my parents preferred that I didn't do Ramadan to better work at school. I already knew that laïcité was protecting me against him[304] (*Le Figaro*, 18 March 2015).

Laïcité is therefore in her perception linked to the meritocratic model at school, which allowed her to join university. She explains that access to citizenship may only materialise by refusing community isolationism, and identifies the state as the guarantor of universalism before discriminations. Conversely, she considers that "the communalist model is institutionalised racism" (p.64) because it assigns individuals to their culture of origin. The same observation applies to the concept of "dual culture" that she identifies as a "nomadism of identity". She points out that it stigmatises and "plays into the hands of the National Front" because "it underlines that the children of immigrant background will never be able to get integrated" (p.16). In a manner similar to Husic, she articulates the republican system of values from a bottom-up perspective:

> There is no shame in claiming a French identity, in the same way as there is no incoherence to feel a member of it while being "of immigrant background". There is (...) no genotype of "pureblood French", yet there is a DNA of the French political and republican thought[305] (p.96).

She perceives in this respect her own Muslimness as a "synthesis" (p.16) between a family religious legacy she is proud of and a host culture whose axiological and identity references should prevail.

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[304] "Sur les bancs de l'école, un type s'asseyait à côté de moi et me disait qu'il fallait faire de moi "une bonne musulmane" parce que mes parents préféraient que je ne fasse pas le ramadan pour mieux travailler à l'école. Je savais déjà que la laïcité me protégeait contre lui".

[305] "Il n'y a pas de honte à revendiquer une identité française, de même qu'il n'y a pas d'incohérence à se sentir membre de celle-ci en étant "issue de l'immigration". Il n'y a pas de gêne, ni de génotype du "française de souche", en revanche il y a un ADN de la pensée politique et républicaine française".

François Fillon

Born in 1954 in a family of Gaullist militants, François Fillon became in 1976 parliamentary assistant of the prominent Gaullist politician Joël Le Theule. Since then he has been several times minister, and Prime Minister from May 2007 to May 2012. He has been identified by observers as a "social Gaullist" or as a "neo-Gaullist" (Perrineau 2016). He has been an important actor in recent policy debates regarding Muslims as he was Prime Minister during the "burqa debate" and the related legislation. In this respect, he declared to the Croatian newspaper *Jutarnji List* on 9 July 2010 that:

> In its vast majority, Islam in France shows the face of
> an open and well-integrated community in the society
> (...) The real problem is that of communalism, and of its
> most extreme, dangerous version: fundamentalism[306].

Muslim radicalism is therefore seen as a drift of communalism, and the full-face veil as its paroxysmal expression. Six years later, he imparted his perception in a book titled *Defeating Islamic Totalitarianism*[307] (2016) and assumed for the sake of a "clarity of judgement" (p.19) to establish a continuity between Islam and its minority extremist variant[308]. After having highlighted an historical continuity ("tomorrow has been written yesterday", p.19) he refers to analyses according to which "wahhabism is the Saudi exception which has become the norm in the Sunni world" (p.20). He also establishes a parallel between Islamism and totalitarianism focusing on several points: a common worship of death (p.23), the development of conservative revolutions (ibid.), their links with antisemitism (p.24), cognitive and axiological dimensions: role of knowledge, role of women, persecution of minorities, among others. The central element is the idea of a

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[306] "Dans sa très grande majorité, l'Islam de France offre le visage d'une communauté ouverte et bien intégrée dans la société. (...) Le vrai problème, c'est celui du communautarisme, et de sa version la plus extrême et dangereuse, l'intégrisme".

[307] *"Vaincre le totalitarisme Islamique".*

[308] In the book he also refers to "Islamist totalitarianism" (p.19), using both notions interchangeably.

friction between this theological tradition and the Judeo-Christian tradition, the latter being identified with French national identity and democratic values:

> Let us stop pretending. No, there is not a religious problem in France. Yes, there is a problem linked with Islam. Saying the things is recognising that there is an Islamic communalism which has no place in France, which is not compatible with our history, our values and what we are deep inside ourselves [309] (p.46).

In this perspective, the grounding of *vivre ensemble* is inscribed within cultural and religious roots. It is therefore this reference to a long history which allows the integration of different cultural and religious traditions.

Philippe de Villiers

Born in 1949 in Vendée in a family of noble descent and a fervent Catholic, Philippe de Villiers was Secretary of State for Culture in the Chirac Government (March 1986-June 1987). In 1994 he founded the sovereignist Mouvement Pour la France (MPF) party and was a candidate for the presidential elections in 1995 and 2007. A claimed defender of the country's identity and regional heritage, he initiated public policies and projects (like the Puy du Fou theme park) aiming at their promotion. Although the MPF occupied a rather marginal place in the political field[310], Philippe de Villier's influence on the political debate has been important, and all the more so since he has been one of the first politicians to point out what he perceived as a growing influence of Islam in France.

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[309] "Arrêtons de faire semblant. Non, il n'y a pas un problème religieux en France. Oui, il y a un problème lié à l'Islam. Dire les choses, c'est reconnaître qu'il y a un communautarisme Islamique qui n'a pas sa place sur la terre de France, qui est incompatible avec notre histoire, nos valeurs et ce que nous sommes au plus profond de nous-mêmes".

[310] The MPF has never obtained more than two deputies in the legislative elections but obtained good results in the European elections, with for instance 13.06% of votes in 1999.

A prolific writer, he published many books, two of which had a significant impact on the political perception of Islam: *The Mosques of Roissy*[311] (2006) subtitled "New Revelations on Islamism in France" and *Will the Bells Ring Tomorrow?*[312] (2016) subtitled "The Truth on the History of Islamisation in France". De Villier's perception, whose most revealing expression appears in the last of the two books, confronts the question of Islam with an identity based on an historical legacy. The bells are therefore representative of "this small threatened world of the symbolic markers of our identity" (p.10), that is to say signs of an endangered tradition. As such, the bells are the metaphor for the belonging to an historical community to which Islam is exogenous in the same way that Christianity is exogenous to Arab countries:

> It does not seem outrageous to wish that France respect what legal practitioners call "the parallelism of forms", the principle of reciprocity: no bells there. No minaret here. France must remain France. It has no vocation to become the eldest daughter of Islam[313] (p.213).

Philippe de Villiers, more than any other aforementioned politicians, tries to discern the "ontology" of the French culture, analysing that the country is "of multiethnic tradition" (p.79) but "it has never been multicultural. France is a culture" (ibid.). In this respect, the traditional language and religion are seen as the guarantors of this culture, as expressed in the last three chapters titled "Born from an Act of Literature" (p.195), "The Treasure of the French Soul"(p.200) and "A White Coat of Churches"(p.206). He strongly criticises multiculturalism that would promise a "diversity paradise" (p.81) but would result in making two antinomic societies. In this perspective, the abandonment of the

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[311] "Les mosquées de Roissy. Nouvelles Révélations sur l'Islamisme en France".

[312] "Les cloches sonneront-elles encore demain? La vérité sur l'histoire de l'islamisation de la France".

[313] "Il ne paraît pas outrancier d'émettre le souhait que la France respecte ce que les juristes appellent " le parallélisme des formes ", le principe de réciprocité : pas de cloches là-bas. Pas de minarets ici. La France doit rester la France. Elle n'a pas vocation à devenir la fille aînée de l'Islam".

references to the Christian roots explains the country's inability to oppose Islamist radicalism:

> There is where symbolic escheat and uprooting leaves us. We have removed the stumps. In front of the jihadists, there is a lost people, which has become limp, condemned to the moment and doomed to effacement[314] (p.204).

His perception may be considered therefore as more radical than François Fillon's, for instance. If both of them share the same idea that fundamentalism feeds on this cultural vacuum, De Villiers goes further in linking the weakening of the country in front of Islamism to a cultural expropriation at the benefit of Islam.

Bernard Stasi

Born in a family of Italian, Cuban and Spanish migrants, he became a French citizen at 18 years old. Several times Minister and vice-president of the National Assembly, he was mediator of the Republic from 1998 to 2004. Although considered as a figure of the Centre (UDF-CDS[315]), he mentions having often been described as a "leftist" (*La Croix*, 07 January 2005). It is this position that brought him to preside over the commission and the report that bear his name, and which paved the way for the law of 15 March 2004, making him an important actor in the public debate on Islam. Bernard Stasi published in 1984 a book which provoked a strong debate: *Immigration, a Blessing for France*[316] and

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[314] "Voilà où conduit la déshérence, le déracinement. On a arraché les souches. Face aux djihadistes, il y a tout un peuple perdu, avachi, condamné à l'instant et voué à l'effacement".

[315] Union pour la Démocratie Française, Centre des Démocrates Sociaux.

[316] "L'immigration, une chance pour la France".

23 years later its update: *All French. Immigration, the Blessing of France*[317] (2007). The most important element for our argument is that the "blessing" is not only economic or demographic but also cultural and religious.

> The stranger is for us a permanent school teaching us the diversity of the planet, reminding us that the progress of societies always results from a form of interbreeding[318] (1984, p.60).

In a context of globalisation, he perceives in particular the presence of many Muslims in France as an openness to other continents and ways of life, which may help the country to better find its place in the internationalisation processes. Moreover, he esteems that Islam, like all the other religious diversities, "galvanises" (dynamise) the society. The Muslim immigrant is seen simultaneously as a "challenge" (défi) and a "blessing" because "he is the witness of our capacity for tolerance, openness, questioning of ourselves" (p.101). He further highlights that the project is not self-evident and that the problems arise in the "difficult and yet necessary conciliation between the requirements of unity of the social body and the requirements of respect for differences" (p.108-109). This twofold project was put to the test in the Stasi commission delegated to conduct a reflection on the "veil affairs" and the application of the principle of laïcité, in particular at school. As Baubérot (2004) recounts, the Stasi report is in many respects against a strict conception of laïcité, but its most restrictive proposition was the only one which was immediately implemented as a law[319]. Bernard Stasi expressed regrets that the political agenda had not respected the balance advocated in the report, declaring that "laïcité is not a police of religions, it is essentially tolerance and freedom" (*La Croix*, 7 January 2005).

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[317] "Tous Français, l'immigration, la chance de la France".

[318] "L'étranger chez nous est une école permanente qui nous enseigne la diversité de la planète, qui nous rappelle que le progrès des sociétés résulte toujours d'une forme de métissage".

[319] This report is in reality the result of the work of twenty women and men from diverse sensibilities and with divergent views on laïcité. A quarter of the commission was known for defending a "strict laïcité", one quarter an "open laïcité", and the rest had no known opinion. The Stasi report finishes with 26 proposals, with the aim to promote both a unified society and the respect of plurality. The work of this commission was not totally consensual. Two votes took place: the first was on the report as a whole and was voted unanimously, the second was on the proposition of interdiction for conspicuous symbols at school, for which Jean Baubérot abstained.

André Gerin

André Gerin is known in particular for having initiated the parliamentary committee on full-face veil wearing, with the support of 66 fellow deputies. The personal and political career of André Gerin makes him a revealing example of a far-Left militant who has come to consider the question of Muslim integration as a priority. Born in 1946 in a working-class family, he worked as a laborer and union representative and joined early the political fight with the Communist Party. In 1968 he settled in the Minguettes (the area where the riots preceding the *Marche des Beurs* broke out) and was still living there in 2017. In 2007, he published a book titled *The Ghettos of the Republic*, with a foreword by Eric Raoult. In the preface of the 2012 reedition, Malek Boutih qualifies it as "the clash of a reality before the ideal of a man who moved in the brand new suburb before he became its mayor". Describing himself as proud of a "town rich in its diversity" (2012, p.30), A. Gerin explains having been the witness of a "global degradation of these suburbs" (p.32) and of a growing influence of Islam (he uses the term "Islamisation"). The specificity of his discourse is that he sees the development of Islam as a consequence of capitalism:

> Whether we like it or not, Islam has become the religion of the ghettos. Whether we like it or not, the ghettos are the monstruous outgrowths of a predatory capitalism which engendered in the worker districts pauperisation, marginalisation and the corrupting influence of drug trafficking [320] (p.80).

He considers in this respect that Islam has been the victim of capitalism when it got radicalised at the contact of the "mafias" (p.81) which exploited it and prevented it from "taking its full place as France's second religion"[321] (ibid.). He further analyses the

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[320] "Qu'on le veuille ou non, l'Islam est devenu la religion des ghettos. Qu'on le veuille ou non, les ghettos sont les excroissances monstrueuses d'un capitalisme prédateur qui a engendré dans les cités tout à la fois la paupérisation, la marginalisation et la gangrène des trafics de drogue".

[321] "prendre toute sa place comme deuxième religion de France"

incapacity to stop the expansion of fundamentalism as a defeat of the laïque and republican ideal when it should have constituted a federative banner. Therefore, he deems it necessary to go further than the mere condemnation of fundamentalism by "acting concretely for our values"[322] (p.81). His fight against the burqa, the niqab or the burkini responds to this axiological position. In an interview with *Le Point* newspaper (20 January 2015), he mentions such signs as "the emerged part of the iceberg" and explains having come to a stricter position after many testimonies of teachers and "two electroshocks": the presence of two kids from his suburb in Guantánamo and the riots in "800 districts" in 2005 which raised after a grenade was found close to a mosque. He infers from his observations the necessity to re-establish "the very notion of belonging to a social community" (p.80) through a firm policy of integration, theorising that the open policies favour both the upsurge of fundamentalism and the National Front (p.13).

2) Discussion of the cases

As mentioned above, these case studies do not "reflect" party positions. In particular, an element that should be kept in mind is that speaking and – even more – writing a book about Islam is already an act showing that a politician gives a specific importance to the subject. Contrasting these positions proves, however, informative of existing nuances in the perception of Islam.

In Australia, the Coalition is the political grouping where divergences appear most visible because of the coexistence between the Liberal Party and the National Party. George Christensen gives an explicit illustration of a perception of the nation as an identity whose strength lies in its homogeneity, Russell Broadbent focuses on the contrary on a universalist democratic ideal and Peter Costello bases social cohesion on the stability of traditional political and religious balances. The aforementioned ALP politicians reveal

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[322] "agir concrètement pour nos valeurs"

a common commitment to the notion of diversity but their opinions differ on its modalities of development.

In France, as the party system is much more difficult to apprehend, I have focused on politicians who have been influential but often identified as "secant-marginals"[323] to show some complex dynamics involved in the perception of Islam. Although it appears impossible to deduce the perception of Islam from party memberships, the weight of the Left/Right traditions is relatively strong. The historical legacy may be observed in the definition of the nation: whilst recognising Catholicism as consubstantial to the national entity is more typical of Right-party politicians, many Left-wing politicians consider as primordial the dissociation between the nation and the religious. These cases also show that diverse causes (having suffered from discrimination for Lydia Guirous, being a communist activist for André Gerin, etc...) may lead to apparently convergent discourses.

The differences in the perception of Islam do not correspond to clearly identified party lines but rather to broader visions of society as a whole involving an interplay between party traditions and individual trajectories. In this respect, two dynamics must be comprehended separately. On the one hand, although most discourses express tolerant views, nationalist positions tend to be more often linked to explicitly stigmatising discourses on Islam. On the other hand, symbolic dichotomies between Islam and the national identity are transversal to the political spectrum and reflect more complex dynamics than a mere stigmatisation of the "Muslim other". They appear as the symptom of a dialectic between identity and alterity in which the the "instituted Them" cannot be thought of independently from the "instituted We" (Dubet 2014; Guillaumin 2002; Descombes 2011; Wald 1994; Castoriadis 1975). Normative and symbolic considerations involving Islam directly ensue from the perception of what makes the *vivre ensemble* (living together) possible and desirable. In this process, it would be incorrect to establish an arbitrary classification of politicians on the basis of their alleged capacity to defend equality or diversity. Instead, the fundamental divergences must be addressed upstream in

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[323] Crozier and Friedberg (1977) define these actors as being part of different systems of action in relation with each other and can therefore play a role of intermediary between different logics. For this reason, the parties were not exhaustively mentioned as I focused mostly on the diversity of individual positions.

the ontological postulates girding the foundations of social cohesion. In broad terms, it has appeared that politicians include their definitions into three main patterns, respectively a close community, a top-down federative ideal and the confidence in a bottom-up dynamic of solidarity emerging from social progress. These modalities are not, however, exclusive from each other and using them for heuristic purposes requires further examination of the party universes of discourses on a more systematic and synchronic basis.

Chapter Conclusion

Coupling the two "fields of axiological reconfiguration" and individual perspectives enabled illumination of the political perception of Islam as a complex aggregate in which party traditions undoubtedly play a role but have no predicting value. The relevance of the Left-Right dualism especially emerges in the specific conflict of values met by politicians. Because of their historical ties with the question of religious minorities in Australia and the question of religion in France, as well as their ties with the condition of workers in both countries, the main Left parties face conflicts of values in their handling of the question of Islam, requiring adjustments. The main Right-wing parties, on the other hand, face issues that are not specific to them but exacerbated by them because of their commitment both to the liberal tradition of freedom of conscience and their attachment to a defined religious ethos of society.

The weight of these inherited cleavages is however hard to evaluate because it is counterbalanced by interparty and international dynamics – in particular a general tendency to redefine the role of the religious. The individual cases have illustrated the leeway in how politicians draw on these diverse elements to compose a perception of Islam. They also confirmed that the most relevant prism to analyse the perception of Islam by political parties is, beyond traditional dualisms, the broader postulates on the origins of social cohesion. The next step in our analysis will be to suggest a comparison of the party

universes of discourse using quantitative semantics and idealtypical categories to rise in generality on how political parties articulate patterns of social cohesion and the question of Islam.

- Chapter 7: An Attempt at Mapping Quantitatively Intraparty and Interparty Dynamics

The findings of this thesis have shown the structural influence of governing frames in the perception of Islam, as well as the room for manoeuvre within these frames at party level and at the individual level. A blind spot still remains in how to enable observation of broad, stabilised categories of party perception for Islam, offering a general backdrop to illuminate specificities in individual positions. An analysis of the perception of parties on the January 2001- December 2015 time frame must take into account the aforementioned issues of sampling and temporality, and in particular the reshuffle of political balances both in France (Haegel 2005; Grunberg & Haegel 2012; Labbé & Monière 2008) and in Australia (Klocker & Dunn 2003; Aly 2007; Pedersen, Clarke, Dudgeon & Griffiths 2005).

This chapter therefore suggests a quantitative approach, complementary to the qualitative analyses, enabling stabilisation of the observations. The use of Iramuteq and Alceste proves especially relevant because of their capacity "to 'map' the main *topoï* or 'commonplaces' on which the universe of discourse is constructed simultaneously with the one of the speakers"[324] (Reinert 1998, p.68). As I have shown in Chapter 2, they make visible the lexical universes used by the speaker, and therefore enable taking into account the networks of meaning beyond discursive forms (Reinert 2007; Marchand & Ratinaud 2012). They also compensate the artificial stabilisation of discourses with the accumulation and the focus on the cognitive architecture, the position underpinning discourses rather than the actual speech[325]. This chapter intends to exploit the heuristic potential of these tools in order to analyse the structuration of discourses on Islam for the

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[324] " 'cartographier' les principaux topoï ou 'lieux communs' sur lesquels (le) monde du discours se construit simultanément avec celui de ses énonciateurs."

[325] Moreover, as I will show, the Hierarchical Descending Classification method erases the artifacts resulting from an opposition between a small number of specific positions and the large majority of positions.

most influential parties in France and Australia. These parties are the Union for a Popular Movement[326] (UMP), the Socialist Party (PS) and the National Front (FN) in France, the Liberal-National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in Australia[327].

I - Toward a Roadmap of French Party Discourses

1) Comparison of the lexical worlds on Islam

In France, the corpus used for the following analyses comprises 75419 occurrences, for a total of 2085 Text Segments (TS) (1135 TS for the UMP, 41032 occurrences, 721 TS for the PS, 26230 occurrences, 422 TS for the FN, 15288 occurrences). The process and interpretation of the results gave three diagrams of coalescence (dendrograms) whose dichotomies reveal the structure of the different perceptive schemes identified as "lexical worlds"[328]. The following dendrogram of the UMP shows this architecture.

a) UMP

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[326] Since the discourses were taken between January 2001 and December 2015, the party will be referred to as the UMP in this chapter, although the name changed for the "Republicains" on 30 May 2015.

[327] The profiles for the analyses of Lexemes from which the dendograms have been drawn, including the information on the strength of the links between forms and classes, can be found in Appendix 10.

[328] In practice, the number of classes is much less meaningful than the form of the diagram and the stability of classes (Guérin-Pace 1997, p.869). Several variations have been tried in the dendrograms to ensure this stability. For more details on the process, please refer to Chapter 2.

Figure 16. Dendrogram 1: UMP[329]

For the UMP, the analysis reveals two categories of lexical universes: on the one hand, the classes 1 and 2 (respectively 17.4% and 15.8% of the TS) and on the other hand the classes 3, 4 and 5 (respectively 24.7%, 16.4% and 25.8% of the TS). The first two classes refer to the two dimensions of what could be called the "question of Islam". Class 2 refers to the concrete aspects, through the identification of a "problematic" situation (the most frequent terms being "question", "problème", "situation", "ville", "quotidien", "urgence", "sécurité", "crise"[330]) and symmetrically the necessity to act ("répondre",

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[329] As Iramuteq creates dendrograms only in French language, a class is called "classe". The numbers serve for identification purposes and do not reflect the size or importance of the classes.

[330] The words are mentioned in French because of the importance of the semantic value which might not be translatable. The following translation, just like for the other classes, is only a close suggestion: question, problem, situation, city, everyday life, emergency, security, crisis.

"mesure", "régler", "réfléchir", "remettre"[331]). Class 1 refers to the legal and political dimension with notions like "parlement", "proposer", "mission", "commission", "résolution", "travail"[332]. The following sentences are examples which may be highlighted as particularly representative of these classes among the selection made by Iramuteq:

> We are facing a new religious fact which is called Islam and which is also a cultural fact, foreign to our cultural traditions. This raises a problem which needs to be settled[333].
>
> Henri Guaino, 6 June 2015, interview with *La Croix*.
>
> (Polygamy, burqa) are questions which raise concerns for our fellow citizens. In absolute terms, a woman walking in the street is not a trouble, including when she wears her veil. She raises concerns today because her behaviour becomes source of questions. Therefore it creates anxiety and I think that the role of a government is to respond to it[334].
>
> Georges Tron, 26 April 2010, interview with *LCI*.

A noteworthy element is that this identification of a question linked with Islam is paralleled with another group of classes, which have in common their reference to a system of values.

Class 5, which is the most important, refers to "central values", which is as much as to say a hegemonic axiological reference basing citizenship on an interiorised culture (Leca 1986). The most determining notion in this lexical universe is "woman" (femme), often linked in discourses with the laws of 2004 and 2010 and gathers notions such as

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[331] answer, measure, settle, ponder, fix up.

[332] parliament, suggest, mission, commission, resolution, work.

[333] "Nous sommes en face d'un fait religieux nouveau qui s'appelle l'Islam et qui est aussi un fait culturel, étranger à nos traditions culturelles. Cela nous pose un problème qu'il faut régler".

[334] "Ce sont des questions qui maintenant interpellent nos concitoyens. En tant que telle, une femme qui se déplace dans la rue ne gêne pas, y compris quand elle a son voile. Elle interpelle aujourd'hui par une attitude qui devient source d'interrogations. Et donc ça suscite de l'inquiétude et je crois que le rôle d'un gouvernement, c'est d'y répondre."

"égalité", "principe", "exclusion", "soumission", "dignité"[335]. The specificity of this semantic field is that it inscribes these principles within a concept of Republic as the guarantor of a universal order where the substantive equality ensues from a legal equality.

Alongside the assertion of these principles, classes 3 and 4 make apparent a symbolic polarity between the semantic universe of the nation and the one of Islam taken as a religious minority. The former is perceived as losing momentum and the latter is linked with the challenge of integration. Class 4 blends the lexical field of national unity (nation, républicain, règle, rester, esprit, identité[336]) with one on the risk of division (communautarismes, affaiblissement, stigmatiser, différence, frontière, équilibre[337]). Class 3, in contrast, combines the lexical field of religion (musulman, religieux, culte, pratiquer, imam, mosquée, fidèle[338]) and that of integration (citoyen, intégrer, français, appartenance, compatible, compatriote, devenir[339]).

> The veil is above all a problem of equality between men and women and in this case, it is really the place of women in the French society which is questioned[340].
>
> Dominique Perben, 25 November 2003, interview on Europe 1.
>
> It is necessary to distinguish between those (Muslim people) who accept our values and our laws, that we are keen to welcome, and who are French for many of them -I mention it, and those who refuse and violate these values and these laws, that we have to fight vigorously and keep away from our land[341].

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[335] equality, principle, exclusion, submission, dignity.

[336] nation, republican, rule, stay, spirit, identity.

[337] communalisms, weakening, stigmatise, difference, border, balance.

[338] muslim, religious, worship, practice, imam, mosque, faithful.

[339] citizen, integrate, French, belonging, compatible, compatriot, become.

[340] "Le voile, c'est d'abord et avant tout un problème d'égalité entre l'homme et la femme et dans cette affaire, c'est vraiment la place de la femme dans la société française qui est en cause".

[341] "(...) il faut distinguer entre ceux qui acceptent nos valeurs et nos lois, que nous sommes prêts à accueillir, et qui, pour beaucoup, sont français, je le rappelle ; puis ceux qui refusent et violent ces valeurs et ces lois, qu'il faut combattre avec énergie et éloigner de notre sol."

Alain Juppé, 29 January 2015, interview with *Le Figaro Magazine.*

However, if some religious practices involve ways of life which are not compatible with the Republic, then one has to condemn them, not in the name of the Christian identity of France, but in the name of the Republic[342].

Lydia Guirous, 5 December 2014, interview with *Le Figaro*.

In this diagram, the criterion pervading the question of integration of Islam is therefore the compatibility with the republican frame constitutive of the national identity. The issue is not whether or not the other parties agree with this observation, but if this paradigm is also neuralgic in their discourses. The identification of the lexical classes within the PS discourses offers a first element of answer.

b) **Socialist Party**

Figure 17. *Dendrogram 2: PS*

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[342] "En revanche, si certaines pratiques religieuses touchent à des modes de vie et que ceux-ci ne sont pas compatibles avec la République, alors il faut les condamner, mais pas au nom de l'identité chrétienne de la France, mais au nom de la République".

The descending hierarchical analysis (DHA) applied to the discourses of the Socialist Party reveals a use of different lexical universes. The graphic representation shows a structuration of the discourses in two major semantic categories. The first category, gathering the classes 3 and 5, represents about 40% of all discourses (29.38% and 11.86%) and gathers the vocabulary linked with the values to defend. Class 3 puts forward laïcité as a legal and moral norm. The first terms to appear are "laïcité", "loi", "principe", "public", "liberté", "juridique", "religieux", "règle", "espace", "laïc"[343], and further words like "respect", "égalité", "garantir", "fondamental", "neutralité", "commun", "philosophique"[344]. Class 5 is close to the class n°5 in the dendrogram of the UMP, putting forward central values of cohesion with notions like "homme", "femme", "droit", "parole", "démocratie", "idéologique", "progrès", "affirmer", "égalité", "dignité"[345].

---

[343] laïcité, law, principle, public, freedom, legal, religious, rule, space, secular.

[344] respect, equality, guarantee, fundamental, neutrality, common, philosophical.

[345] man, woman, right, speech, democracy, ideological, progress, assert, equality, dignity.

These two classes also have in common with the class n°5 in the dendrogram of the UMP what Claire Oger and Caroline Ollivier-Yaniv call the "erasure of the political", which may be identified through two processes: the change in temporality and the alleviation of party politics (Oger & Ollivier-Yaniv 2006). The difference is that these values come first in the Socialist Party discourses and are not necessarily subordinated to the notion of "Republic" or republican-labelled values. Furthermore, when the UMP directly evokes the practical question of the integration of Islam, the general discourse of the PS shows a noticeable increase in generalisation (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991).

> I want to say this very distinctly: there is simply no problem between Islam and the Republic and between the Republic and Islam. Neither political nor cultural. Not more than with any other religion. The Republican laïcité is not hostile to any religion[346].
>
> Claude Bartolone, 22 June 2015, discourse in the National Assembly.
>
> I am Republican, I am laïc, but I do not accept that one raise concerns about Islam, religion, community through a false interpretation of these principles. Because laïcité is tolerance, it is not the exclusion of the other[347].
>
> Christophe Caresche, 15 June 2010, interview on Fr. 5.

In parallel to this narrative repertoire appears the problematisation of a "public question", subdivided in two parts: the identification of a question on religious minorities (classes 1 and 2) and the identification of a question specifically linked with Islam (class 4). Class 2, which represents 10.73% of the TS, units notions like "culte", "ministre du culte", "prière", "éducation", "tolérance", "citoyenneté"[348], and notions which are more

---

[346] "Je veux le dire très clairement: il n'y a tout simplement pas de problème entre l'Islam et la République ni entre la République et l'Islam. Ni politique ni culturel. Pas plus qu'avec une autre religion. La Laïcité républicaine n'est hostile à aucun culte".

[347] "Je suis républicain, je suis laïc mais je n'accepte pas que l'on mette en cause l'Islam, la religion, la communauté à travers une fausse interprétation de ces principes. Parce que la laïcité, c'est la tolérance, ce n'est pas l'exclusion de l'autre".

[348] worship, minister of the church, prayer, education, tolerance, citizenship.

specific to Islam like "CFCM", "mosquée", "imam", "recteur", "construction", but linked with "synagogue" or "église"[349]. Class 1, with 19.77% of the TS, involves the Muslims taken as a historically constituted religious minority: "mosquée", "guerre", "soldat", "reconnaissance", "rassembler", "hommage", "carré", "tolérance", "travail", "inauguration", "verser", "sang", "connaissance"[350]. Class 4 gathers notions linked with the question of Islam (Islam, musulmans, arabe, amalgame, diversité, origine[351]) and its integration within a global and civilisational register (monde, culture, culturel, message, occident, occidental, charlie, universel, civilisation, paix[352]).

> There is in our country an important number of Muslim children or children from a Muslim background who do not feel that they are French, and this is unbearable. We cannot only stigmatise or make this observation. We have to bring them an answer, and this answer is especially education. But feeling French, it is feeling the belonging to a community of values, rights and duties, it is feeling welcome in a community, in this community, ours[353].

> Manuel Valls, 22 June 2015, dicourse in the National Assembly.

> The perception of an equality of treatment when it comes to religions is all the more fundamental for France as the economic crisis period that we are going through highlights social tensions within our society. For the Republic, the issue of the equality of treatment for Islam in France is both societal and symbolic:

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[349] French Council of the Muslim Faith, mosque, imam, rector, construction, synagogue, church.

[350] mosque, war, soldier, recognition, gather, homage, grave, tolerance, work, inauguration, shed, blood, knowledge.

[351] Islam, muslims, arab, conflation, diversity, origin.

[352] world, culture, cultural, message, west, western, charlie, universal, civilisation, peace.

[353] "Il y a dans notre pays un nombre important d'enfants de confession ou de filiation musulmane qui ne se sentent pas Français, et ça c'est insupportable. Nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de les stigmatiser ou de faire ce constat. Il faut leur apporter une réponse, et cette réponse, c'est évidemment celle notamment de l'école. Mais se sentir français, c'est se sentir appartenir à une communauté de valeurs, de droits et de devoirs, c'est aussi se sentir le bienvenu dans une communauté, dans cette communauté, la nôtre".

societal as demonstration of the state's will to guarantee a just frame for all, symbolic for its capacity to aggregate the otherness within a shared foundation[354].

Bariza Khiari, 26 October 2012, discourse at the Congress of the PS.

These two examples have been chosen precisely because they come from two members of the PS who strongly oppose each other on the question of laïcité. This shows, which is important, that the use of similar *topoï* does not involve similar positions but also that the dichotomy between the two semantic universes "Management of religious diversity" and "Islam as a religion/ Islam as a culture" reveals two different perceptions in the PS. In these exemples, it is noteworthy that the first extract highlights a distinction between an "Us" and a "Them" ("We have to bring them an answer") with an assimilationist point of view which is not present in the second extract. The latter apprehends the integration of the "otherness" more abstractly through the prism of both social and symbolic State efforts. This difference between a republican-assimilationist axiology and a laïque-social axiology will be examined more precisely with the Factorial Analysis of Correspondences further in this chapter[355].

Therefore, if the UMP and the PS share similar universes of discourse, they use them slightly diffrently: in particular, the link between the republican "living together" and religious freedom is not exactly similar – a point that I will develop further. The work on the National Front discourses reveals, in contrast, a very different architecture.

---

[354] "La perception d'une égalité de traitement en matière de culte revêt un caractère d'autant plus fondamental pour la France, que la période de crise économique que nous traversons accentue les lignes de tensions sociales à l'intérieur de notre société. Pour la République, l'enjeu de l'égalité de traitement de l'Islam en France revêt un double aspect à la fois sociétal et symbolique : sociétal comme démonstration de la volonté de l'Etat à garantir un cadre juste pour tous, et symbolique par la capacité qu'il a à agréger l'altérité dans un socle commun".

[355] On the FAC diagram which is shown below, Manuel Valls' discourse would obviously appear much higher on the vertical axis than Bariza Khiari's.

c) National Front

Figure 18. Dendrogram 3: FN

The dendrogram of the National Front shows a more dichotomous structure than the two other parties. Two semantic universes are used, in which the oppositional dimension is clearly visible. Contrary to the PS and the UMP, the FN shows a twofold symbolic polarisation. The first one gathers the classes 1 and 4, and confronts the republican identity with Islam. Class 1 (29.21% of the TS) gathers notions like "république", "loi", "religieux", "laïcité", "principe", "liberté", "respecter", "religion", "républicain", "défendre", "gouvernement", "adapter", "intégrer"[356]. Class 4 (19.48%) introduces the lexical field of Islam but on a very concrete mode, contrasting strongly with the increase in generalisation of Class 1. The first term is in this respect "chose" (thing) ("je fais

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[356] republic, law, religious, laïcité, principle, freedom, to respect, religion, republican, defend, government, adapt, integrate.

remarquer une chose", "les Français demandent une chose", "il y a une chose à faire"[357])
followed by elements referring to the everyday life and the feeling of threat: "école",
"halal", "nourriture", "quartier", "manger", "visibilité", "peur", "prière", "rue", "pression",
"voile", "coran", "cantine", "porc", "agresser"[358]. The reciprocal mobilisation of concrete
cases and principles is therefore a noticeable constant of the National Front discourses,
which use this dialectic much more than the other parties.

> So let us take measures of immediate application in
> order to reassert these principles. The users of the public
> service must not show conspicuously their religious
> beliefs, for them as it is already the case for public
> agents, religious conspicuous signs will be forbidden
> (...) And I have to tell you what I think about the veil,
> because I consider it as an unbearable symbol of
> women's submission. In public canteens, religious food
> like halal food will be prohibited[359].
>
> Marine Le Pen, 12 February 2012, meeting in
> Strasbourg.

Classes 2 and 3 (respectively 35.6% of the TS and 15.7%) symmetrically show
another form of opposition. Class 2 underlines a perception of "France" taken as a
"nation" rooted in a "history": these three words are largely dominant[360], and followed by
notions like "occidental", "pays", "civilisation", "identité", "régime" which are confronted
with concepts referring to the opening toward the exterior and the endangerment of these

---

[357] "I call attention on a thing", "the French ask for one thing", "there is a thing to do"...

[358] school, halal, food, suburb, eat, visibility, fear, prayer, street, pressure, veil, qur'an, canteen, pork, assault.

[359] "Alors prenons des mesures d'application immédiate pour remettre au premier plan ces principes. Les usagers du service public ne doivent pas afficher de manière ostentatoire leurs convictions religieuses, pour eux comme c'est déjà le cas pour les agents, les signes religieux ostentatoires seront interdits (...). Et je dois vous dire que je pense au voile, parce que je le considère comme un insupportable symbole de soumission de la femme. Dans les cantines publiques, la nourriture à caractère religieux comme la nourriture halal, sera prohibée".

[360] The influence of the words within the classes may be obtained thanks to the calculation of the Chi2, a tool for inferential textual statistics which is described later in this chapter.

former notions: "européen", "monde", "Europe", "musulmans", "nombreux", "nouvelle", "idéologie", "acclimater", "affaiblir", "menace"[361]. Class 3 shows the rhetoric explaining the reasons for this decline, with in particular "immigration", "islamisme", "clandestin", "solution", "expliquer", "nationalité", "conséquence", "étranger", "tension", "violent", "compatible" or "fondamentalisme"[362].

> The problem is the exponential development of radical Islam in France, a phenomenon that results from immigration policies. Islamism and immigration are obviously linked, but one has to acknowledge also a surrender of the French Republic which, for ten or fifteen years, has renounced some of its cardinal principles, like laïcité[363].
>
> Florian Philippot, November 2012, interview with Causeur.
>
> In a simple manner, I will divide Islam in two. What I call Islam acclimatised to nations, to national cultures, to the States and which makes that Moroccan Islam, Indonesian Islam, Saudi Islam are not the same. And Global Islam, the Islam that remained faithful to its jihadist foundations, to its historical foundations, and who says foundations says fundamentalism (...). Should a 1500 year old Christian nation, the nation of the cathedrals, of the Mount Saint Michel, of the Enlightenment which is part of our recent history, should this nation that mattered so much in world history and which still matters stake its future betting on

---

[361] western, country, civilisation, identity, regime, European, world, Europe, muslims, numerous, new, ideology, acclimatize, threat.

[362] immigration, Islamism, clandestine, solution, explain, nationality, consequence, foreigner, tension, violent, compatible, fundamentalism.

[363] "Le problème est le développement exponentiel de l'Islam radical en France, phénomène qui résulte de la politique d'immigration. Islamisme et immigration sont évidemment liés, mais s'y surajoute une capitulation de la République française qui, depuis dix ou quinze ans, renonce à certains de ses principes cardinaux, comme la laïcité."

the idea that Islam will reform and that the evil genie it produced will come back in his bottle?[364]

Aymeric Chauprade, 15 January 2015, video posted on social media.

In this perspective, the question of Islam is torn between on the one hand the excesses linked with its religious dimension, on the other hand its cultural dissonance with the (re-)construction of territorialised images in a logic of historical rooting.

2) Three semantic universes of the perception of Islam

The results of these three analyses provide a source of information on the existing divides and convergences in the discursive practices on Islam.

The first prism of differentiation is the one on the "question of Islam" itself. Let us notice as a preliminary remark that, contrary to an expected result, the social question does not appear as a relevant demarcation line even if comparatively to the UMP and the FN, the Socialist Party educes a class that is more focused on socio-economic factors (class 1). It is however noteworthy that the perception of the religious dimension is a determining factor. The PS focuses less on Islam than on the religious itself, and looks at the issue in terms of dissociation between the religious body and the national body. Islam appears in this respect as a superlative expression, an intensified form of a problem which is inscribed within the laïcisation process itself: this observation of the DHA is consistent with a historical link between French socialism and laïcité (Subileau 2001; Dereymez

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[364] "De manière simple, je diviserai l'Islam en deux. Ce que j'appelle l'Islam acclimaté par les nations, par les cultures nationales, par les États, et qui fait que les Islams marocain, indonésien, saoudien ne sont pas les mêmes. Et l'Islam global, l'Islam qui est resté fidèle à ses fondements djihadiques, à ses fondements historiques, et qui dit fondements dit fondamentalisme (...)Alors est-ce qu'une vieille nation chrétienne qui a 1500 ans, la nation des cathédrales, du Mont-Saint-Michel, des Lumières aussi qui font partie de notre histoire récente, est-ce que cette nation qui a tant compté dans l'histoire mondiale et qui compte encore, devrait livrer son avenir au pari que l'Islam va se réformer et que le mauvais génie qu'il a produit va finir par rentrer dans sa bouteille ?"

1995; Chanet 2009). The perspective is twofold, combining the management of religious diversity and the specific management of Islam. Conversely, the UMP asks the question of Islam in the first place, and against this backdrop brings forward the definitions of the nation and of the republican central values. The religious does not appear intrinsically as an issue but is estimated in correlation to its compatibility with the national identity. Islam plays in this respect a specific role given its relative exteriority to the genesis of the national and republican history.

The National Front shares with the UMP the observation that the "question of Islam" is not linked with religion *per se* but should be posed in terms of consubstantiality with the national being (notwithstanding some differences that I will develop below). Its specificity is above all to create a systematic symbolic polarity between nation and immigration, combined with a direct link between Muslims and immigration.

The corollary of this analysis is that the increase in generalisation is not used by the parties under the same modalities. The calculation of the Chi2 by class of the term "Muslim" is a revealing example of these differences.

Figure 19. Chi2 by Class -France

Chi2 Graph1: UMP   *Chi2 Graph2: PS*   *Chi2 Graph3: FN*

These graphs show the influence[365] of the term "musulman" (Muslim) in each class, for the three political parties. It is noteworthy that all parties have a class where the term is central. However, what is more meaningful is that the classes 3 and 5 of the Socialist Party linked with the *laïque* values define these principles without referring directly to Muslims. On the contrary, the class 2 of the National Front (defining the Nation) is the one which overuses the term "Muslim". The definition of national identity therefore largely feeds on the definition of these social actors. I have shown, moreover, that the pronouncement of principles pairs up with very concrete considerations. Class 3, which underuses the term, puts forward the semantic field of immigration and radicalism. As for the UMP, the result is consistent with the aforementioned observation. Since the party asks the question of Islam preliminarily, its rhetoric is also voluntarily more direct and assertive than the Socialist Party's (for instance, "il faut nommer les choses"[366] appears a dozen times) but the reflection on values and national identity does not systematically establish a link with Muslims[367] (class 4 related to the Nation in particular mentions a "risque" of "affaiblissement" or "communautarisme"[368], or the question of borders, without a direct focus on Islam).

These observations bring an important consequence: the difference in the perception of Islam directly ensues from the definition of elemental axiological references. All parties use the notions of republic, nation and laïcité, but do not mean the same thing, or do not refer to the same relevant dimensions within the same available axiological repertoire.

I have noted that the UMP and the PS use a very similar discourse on central values of cohesion. However, their definitions of the terms vary noticeably. The fundamental

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[365] The calculation of the Chi2 is made with a double entry table, by putting in the columns the TS of a class in front of the TS of the other classes, and in the lines the characteristic to contain or not to contain the relevant form. The form is called "underused" or "overused" when its scores of representaton are lower or higher in a class comparatively to the other classes.

[366] "One has to call things by their names".

[367] As all the TS refer to Islam, it is also noteworthy that a part of these statements can be assimilated to "dogwhistle rhetoric", the table of concordance clearly confirming the observation.

[368] risk, weakening, communalism.

divergence is on the origin of normativity. In an ideal-typical perspective, the dendrograms suggest that the republican and national identity ensue from the statement of major social-laïque principles in the PS discourse, when the UMP subsumes its statement of laïcité and national values under conformity with a republican axiology[369]. This is complementary to the aforementioned tendency of the UMP to bring the religious in the public sphere (Portier 2012), as noticeable in the concept of "laïcité positive". Nicolas Sarkozy's discourse of Latran pronounced on 20 December 2007 is a notorious example of a will to re-establish links between the state and religions, as well as to introduce religion in the republican morals:

> A man who believes is a man who hopes. And the interest of the Republic is that there be many men and women who hope. (...) I wish to see the advent of a positive laïcité, meaning a laïcité which, while careful about the freedom of thought, about the freedom to believe or not to believe, does not consider that religions are a danger, but rather, an asset [370].

On the other hand, inscribing the question of Islam under the scope of social-laïque principles creates important divergences within the PS as to how to implement them, imparting the observations of Chapter 6. An illustration may be found in the opposition between the *Observatoire de la Laïcité* (under the administrative supervision of the Prime Minister) and the Prime Minister Manuel Valls himself. The latter criticised violently the institution and especially Jean-Louis Bianco and Nicolas Cadène by declaring on 18 January 2016 that "the *Observatoire de la laïcité* (...) must not be something that denatures the reality of this laïcité". In an interview with Nicolas Cadène, I asked him about these divergences within the PS and his answer corroborates the statistical

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[369] The change of name from UMP to "Les Republicains" finds its origin in an electoral strategy but also in the context of this semantic confrontation which had been visible for a decade.

[370] " Un homme qui croit, c'est un homme qui espère. Et l'intérêt de la République, c'est qu'il y ait beaucoup d'hommes et de femmes qui espèrent.(...) J'appelle de tous mes vœux l'avènement d'une laïcité positive, c'est-à-dire une laïcité qui, tout en veillant à la liberté de penser, à celle de croire et de ne pas croire, ne considère pas que les religions sont un danger, mais plutôt un atout."

observation of a polarisation between tackling the question of religious minorities and tackling the issue of Islam as a religion/culture:

> We have the same observation in the PS that there are feelings of relegation and introverted assertions of one's community, and sometimes community pressures. Simply, the answers that we bring to it are not necessarily the same. I consider with Jean Louis Bianco that it would be totally counterproductive to multiply prohibitions under the name of laïcité. Others think that it is with an identity-based definition, firmness and a multiplication of prohibitions that we will make it[371].
>
> Interview with Nicolas Cadène, General Rapporteur of the *Observatoire de la Laïcité*, 4 July 2016.

The National Front dissociates the concepts of nation and republic, opposing both of them to the "question of Islam" but on different elements. The republic, home to laïcité, is confronted by Islam as a religion and by its public practice (mosques, street prayers, halal food, etc...). The nation, as an historical entity linking France and its historical past, faces the exogeneity of Muslims taken as actors from an immigrant background. This bipolarity expresses two major orientations within the FN, emphasising respectively the republican and the national dimensions of the country. An interview of Marion Maréchal Le Pen in the newspaper *Charles*, on June 2015, is a good example of how the question of Islam may be a catalyst of these two perceptions of the national identity:

> I do not understand this obsession for the Republic. For me the Republic does not take precedence over France. And it is not because the first practised religion is Islam

---

[371] "On a le même constat au PS qu'il y a des sentiments de relégation et des replis communautaires, et parfois des pressions communautaires. Simplement, les réponses à y apporter ne sont pas forcément les mêmes. Nous on considère avec Jean Louis Bianco que ce serait totalement contre-productif et même dangereux de multiplier les interdits sous couvert de laïcité. D'autres (à gauche) pensent que c'est par une définition identitaire, une fermeté et une multiplication des interdits qu'on y arrivera".

that one must flout this still living dimension which is French Christendom[372].

When insisting on the Republican frame amounts to condemning the politicisation of Islam, linking the identity to an older history amounts to insisting on the Christian roots of the country as core founding elements, and therefore to define Islam as a religion which is potentially exogenous to the national narrative.

Despite such semantic divisions, it is noteworthy that the axiological repertoire is largely shared by the three parties, the reason being the flexibility given by the processes of definition/redefinition. The use of this uncertainty is to be coupled with the differentiation and the interdependence of the positions resulting from transactions in the social economy of the political's symbolic goods. The most striking point in this respect is the reciprocal structuration of discourses: a common element between the three parties is that the references to other parties are overused in the classes linked to nation, republic and laïcité.

The positioning of the three parties may be summarised thanks to a Factorial Analysis of Correspondences (FAC). This graph is not exhaustive because it works with a lossy compression algorithm, but it has the advantage of presenting a common space of representation for qualitative variables. The visualisation on an orthonormal coordinate system makes it possible to grasp the structuration of discursive components relative to forms acting as gravity centres. The following figure is a simplified version of the FAC[373] uniting all classes of the three parties to illustrate the articulation of the discursive components.

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[372] "Je ne comprends pas cette obsession pour la République. Pour moi, la République ne prime pas sur la France. Et ce n'est pas parce que la première religion pratiquée est l'Islam qu'on doit faire fi de cette dimension encore vivante qu'est la chrétienté française".

[373] As this is only a simplified version out of concern for readability and aiming at illustrating the idealtypical universes of discourses, the figures on the abcissa and on the ordinate do not serve any quantitative purpose but have been kept to give a better account of the proportions in the original FAC.

Figure 20. *Simplified FAC of the UMP, PS and FN discourses*

On this diagram, the vertical axis opposes two connections to transcendence, with on the one side a predominance of republican values (subsuming laïcité) and on the other side a predominance of principles referring to laïcité as a social project. The horizontal axis opposes two models of organisation of the *vivre ensemble*. On the right side appear the words mostly referring to tolerance and integration in a broad sense, and on the left side predominates the rhetoric related to an exclusive identity. If we take into account the distribution of the terms on these two axes for the three parties, the FAC gives an ideal-

typical correspondence between the parties and positions toward the "question of Islam". Two preliminary remarks should be made here. First, the name is arbitrarily mentioned as *Pax* since they all have in common modalities of organisation aiming at social appeasement and cohesion. Second, because of the ideal-typical dimension of these models and in order to avoid the categories of practice, the Latin denomination allows a step backward toward the names used.

The first position, mostly illustrated by the UMP, rests on the model that we may call *Pax Republicana*: the lexical field of integration and appeasement falls within the universe of meaning constituted by the Republic. The expressed belief is that leaning on the principles and values linked to this unifying imaginary ("liberty", "equality", "brotherhood", "dignity", men-women relations) will allow the creation of a peaceful coexistence. The second ideal-typical model is the one of the *Pax Laica*, meaning that the lexical field of conflict resolution is mostly inscribed within the lexical field of social and religious challenges. This pattern is mostly linked with the PS on the FAC and demonstrates a confidence in the idea that religious freedom and the improvement of social conditions will allow rebuilding forms of solidarity. Eventually, I called the third model related to the FN *Pax Communitatis* because the solution to the *vivre ensemble* crisis is semantically linked with the re-establishment of a collective meaning rooted in a national, elective community. The FAC confirms that this community is defined in relation to an alterity and sets as a modality a dynamic of inclusion-exclusion on the basis of the social actors' ability to assimilate, that is to say to espouse irreducible dimensions in the identity of the group.

These three models show that beyond an opposition on programs of measures, the three parties differ on the ontological postulate originating social cohesion. Whether they are forms of secularised transcendance (the Republic, the Community) or a confidence in liberal principles, these projects try to overcome a perceived risk of anomie to re-establish a collective future for the society. These ideal types, which may summarise and simplify the aforementioned analyses, take into account intra-party divergences by showing the variety of conceivable positions within the general postures. They also allow a better understanding of how overlappings are possible between the party positions toward Islam.

For instance, a revealing example of the overlapping between *Pax Laica* and *Pax Communitatis* is the case of the National Front mayor of Hayange, Fabien Engelmann. A regional candidate for the far left New Anticapitalist Party in 2010, he left the party with the majority of his section in October 2010 after its decision to stand a hijab-wearing candidate, Ilham Moussaïd, in the same elections. An illustration of the overlapping between *Pax Laica* and *Pax Republicana* may be found in the position of Jean-Pierre Chevènement. On 24 March 2009, he issued a declaration explaining the incompatibility between his party (Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen-MRC) and the Left Front (Front de Gauche) especially because of their divergent conceptions of the Republic. One of the key points was for instance the Left Front refusal to accept the expression "republican exigence". An overlapping between *Pax Republicana* and *Pax Communitatis* may be found in the position of Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, whose party "Debout la République" was initially a current of the UMP, became "Debout la France" in 2014 and eventually accepted an alliance with the National Front in the 2017 presidential elections.

II - *Toward a Roadmap of Australian Party Discourses*

1) Comparison of the lexical worlds on Islam

For Australia, the corpus comprises 18530 occurrences for the Coalition (511 relevant TS) and 15780 for the ALP (436 TS). Following the same computer-based analysis, I have obtained two coalescence diagrams.

a) Coalition

Figure 21. Dendrogram 4: Coalition

The dendrogram of the Coalition reveals a class 1 gathering almost one third of the TS (31.82%), related to the identification of a "question of Islam", developed through two prisms: the risk of extremist excesses and the necessity for social cohesion.

The first issue – fighting radicalism – is expressed by terms referring to the potential of violence which may be present in religion, like "extremist", "terrorism", "fighter", "violence", "counter", "security", "threat", "Daesh", "combat", "terror", "conflict", "suspect", "ideology". The second concern is highlighted by words like "community", "leader", "moderate", "organisation", "home", "social", "division", "lead", "Middle East", "abroad", "minority", "challenge", emphasising on the necessity to favour the hegemony of a "moderate" discourse.

The point about Islam is that this is a minority of extremists, and you could argue it's even a small minority of extremists but it's a significant minority of extremists and it does pose a challenge to our way of life in Australia. We need to acknowledge the significance of this threat, to acknowledge that religion is part of this problem, and thirdly, because this is the key point, we need to deal with it at a hard edge — with a military response — but we also need to deal with it with a counter narrative.

Josh Frydenberg, 29 November 2015, interview on Sky News.

I welcome the efforts of the Muslim community leaders in tackling the extremist threat and publicly rejecting those extremists who claim to speak for all Muslims.

Julie Bishop, 24 June 2015, discourse in Parliament.

Every Islamic peak body, every mosque and every organisation should make a clear demonstration of their opposition to extremists and make that opposition public.

Luke Simpkins, 24 August 2011, discourse in Parliament.

The second branch of the dendrogram shows two lexical worlds appearing as an answer to the "question of Islam". The first one claims an action of appropriate public policies (class 5) and the second one evokes an axiology that may be called liberal-national because of the simultaneous use of these two dimensions (classes 2, 3 and 4).

Class 5 (16.92% of the TS) is characterised by terms showing the public authorities' will to tackle the Islamic issue, like "policy", "child", "school", "minister", "refugee", "immigration", "Abbott", "unity", "learn", "inclusion", "politics", "party", "majority":

The Labor Party had the view that the only thing that mattered in refugee or asylum seekers coming to Australia was the push factors and that the domestic

> policy in Australia pull factors were irrelevant and we
> said no that's not right.
>
> Malcolm Turnbull, 9 May 2011, interview on *ABC*.

The liberal-national axiology centres around two axes, the first one involving cultural considerations and the second one involving a reciprocal system of norms and values. The former has been called "cultural reference" (class 4) because it presents terms referring to the permanence or the undermining of cultural aspects, like "change", "culture", "view", "way" (of life), "debate", "multiculturalism", "migrant", "mainstream", "pluralism", "society", "ethnic", "australian". Within this frame of reference appears a fundamentally national dimension, because of their Australian-centred perspective. The influence of the Nationals on this orientation of discourses is noticeable, on account of their overrepresentation in the TS of this class. In regard to this semantic field, Islam may be perceived as displaying an irreducible alterity.

Classes 2 and 3, forming the other axis, show respectively the systems of values and norms feeding this cultural reference. Class 2 (13.89% of the TS) shows the central values of cohesion, the interiorised political culture giving birth to the citizenship contract: "citizenship", "oath", "exercise", "citizen", "Australia", "share", "liberty", "democratic", "value", "fair", "belief", "law", "live", "right". This lexical field of values reflects a globally liberal conception of the *vivre ensemble*, where accepting the difference is perceived as fundamental. If Islam is included in the same way as the other religions, its integration is in many discourses conditioned to its solubility within this set of values. Class 3 (21.21% of the TS) is relatively close to class 2 insofar as it highlights constitutive elements of the Australian social cohesion but it focuses more specifically on normative dimensions. It also shows a dichotomy – or at least a normative pluralism – with occurrences like "law", "sharia", "country", "good", "democracy", "civil", "state", "parliamentary", "system", "rule", "legal", "case", "guide", "request", "constitution", "court", "advocate", "ban", "practise":

> Today's multiculturalism means that the world view and
> the beliefs that spawn practices like honour killings,

child brides or sharia law must be accepted, because they are seen as legitimate values within a particular culture. This approach completely disregards the fact that such practices are considered abhorrent and barbaric by all the other cultures that make up Australia.

George Christensen, 27 May 2015, discourse in Parliament.

This is a country, which is founded on a democracy. According to our Constitution, we have a secular state. Our laws are made by the Australian Parliament. If those are not your values, if you want a country which has Sharia law or a theocratic state, then Australia is not for you. This is not the kind of country where you would feel comfortable if you were opposed to democracy, parliamentary law, independent courts and so I would say to people who don't feel comfortable with those values there might be other countries where they'd feel more comfortable with their own values or beliefs.

Peter Costello, 23 August 2005, interview on ABC.

In the diagram of the Coalition, the central question is therefore the compatibility between Islam and a legal, axiological and cognitive frame which is identified as properly "Australian". In this respect, there is a striking similarity with the discourses of the UMP in France, notwithstanding the fact that the concept of Australianness is a substitute for the concept of Republic. The other noticeable feature of the semantic distribution is the observable tension between liberalism and conservatism. The presence of the national ideology, especially visible in Class 4, may be confronted to the liberalism expressed on the questions of religious freedom. This does not constitute a contradiction, but rather the claim that these liberal values are consubstantial to an historically structured Australianness. The subjacent idea is that the Anglo-saxon identity is constitutive of this set of liberal values.

The descending hierarchical analysis applied to the ALP shows, however, different perceptive schemes and a different approach to the question of integration.

b) Australian Labor Party

Figure 22. *Dendrogram 5: ALP*

Protection of minorities

The dendrogram of the ALP presents a different distribution of lexical universes. Class 4, with 14.8% of the TS, shows various elements related to the identification of a question of minorities, in its social, political and legal components. The occurrences include: "attend", "racial", "section 18c" (reference to the Racial Discrimination Act), "vilification", "protection", "police", "senate", "protest", "attorney", "hate", "opposition", "racist", "discrimination", "tension", "extremism", "coalition", "parliament", "legal", "program", "human", "legislation".

> The Islamic community has begun to ask that the human rights and antidiscrimination laws be strengthened to cover religious vilification and discrimination. On the Labor side of the House we released an exposure draft of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012, which strengthened many protections and

extended antidiscrimination laws on the grounds of religion to the workplace. That is a major step forward. However, there were several submissions that echoed the views of my Islamic community and argued for stronger antivilification laws on the grounds of religion. In contrast, on the other side of politics the coalition has indicated that it would throw us into reverse by repealing section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.

Julie Owens, 25 June 2013, dicourse in Parliament.

This question of minorities is specific to the ALP and, as I will show further, constitutes a major dividing line with the Coalition. In parallel, appears the identification of a "question of Islam" that is to say a set of multidimensional issues related to this object. The analysis allows identification of two concerns in this question. The first one is linked to the place of belief in the Australian political frame of reference. Class 1, with 36.75% of all occurrences, contains terms like "know", "country", "problem", "belief", "part", "common", "question", "love", "response", "today", "sharia", "liberty", "religion", "freedom", "discussion", "anthem", "view", "respect", "person", "right", "choose", "point of view".

Those with the most basic understanding of Islamic life in Australia would know that Muslims are told by their imams and other community leaders that Australian law is supreme and that the parts of sharia law that are not compatible with Australian law are not to be practised in this country.

Anne Urquhart, 30 September 2014, discourse in Parliament.

We know that the twisted ideology of ISIL bears no relation to a faith of peace, love and tolerance which is followed by millions around the world – and we will continue to make this point. ISIL has no right to use the name of Islam.

Bill Shorten, 25 September 2015, open letter.

The second concern, represented by classes 2 and 3 with respectively 26.21% and 22.22% of all occurrences, brings up the topic of political integration. If the two classes are very close to each other, class 2 focuses especially on concrete aspects related the community dimension when class 3 highlights the principles and the axiological frames of this integration. As a matter of fact, class 2 puts forward terms like "Muslim", "community", "speak", "electorate", "Jewish", "association", "language", "Ahmadiyya", "leader", "member", "commitment", "population", "harmony", "representative". Class 3, on the other hand, shows words like "citizenship", "government", "protect", "create", "citizen", "threat", "minority", "commit", "ensure", "multiculturalism", "seek", "tolerance", "responsibility", "challenge", "settlement", "nation", "cohesion", "society", "inclusive", "principle", "diversity".

2) One Australia, two multiculturalisms?

The main demarcation line between the Coalition and the ALP recalls the aforementioned difference between the UMP and the French Socialist Party. The Coalition shows a more pragmatism-oriented discourse, confronting the identification of a "problem" and its "treatment" with public policies and an identity-based system of values. The liberal principles (in the philosophical sense) are linked with Australianness, perceived as consequence and condition of belonging to a collective national entity. For instance, in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of 25 February 2006, David Humphries mentioned that John Howard affirmed that "Australia's core set of values flowed from its Anglo-Saxon identity". During an interview with the former Prime Minister, I asked him if he could further explain this connection. His answer shows the multidimensional aspect of the Australian identity as he perceives it, including at the same time social, political, institutional, legal and behavioural elements.

Question: You talked about multiculturalism in your autobiography saying that "My view is that Australia should emphasise the common characteristics of the Australian identity". How could you define these characteristics of the Australian identity?

J. Howard -Well, Australians we are believers in democracy, we are believers in free speech, we are believers in the equality of men and women, we have many characteristics that we have inherited from the British such as our belief in the parliamentary system, our sense of humour is very similar to the British, not the same but similar, we believe in a fair go, we believe in the equal treatment of people, and we are willing to accept people to live in Australia from anywhere in the world provided they over time become Australian. That's my philosophy.

(...) question: Do you think there is a specificity in the question of integration of Muslim minorities, requiring a different approach?

J. Howard -Well the starting point must be that anybody that comes to live in this country has to accept the overwhelming philosophy of this country, the values of this great land, the beliefs in the things that I have talked about. They don't need to have our same sense of humour, I don't mean that! But belief in the equal treatment of people, and they have to accept that the culture of this country has been conditioned by being part of western civilisation, and the dominant ethical influence has been that of the judeo-christian ethics, and that's what Australia is, that's the history.

An interesting point made by John Howard is the mention of an "overwhelming philosophy", which assumes the existence of a cognitive system of references associated with an axiological system: "the values of this great land". The Australian identity is therefore defined at the intersection of both dimensions. This presents an explanation for the heterogeneity of the elements which may constitute it: rather than a close, definite object, it is more widely perceived as a general state of mind, a multireferential and plural

notion with undefined contours -which Claude Lévi-Strauss (1977) refers to as a "virtual centre". Now, among the social and legal attributes defining the correspondence between the individual and the collective identity, a hierarchy is outlined. In this respect, "they don't need to have our same sense of humour" shows that the line is drawn between non-negotiable elements and subjective ones. The core, irreducible elements are both inspired by national and liberal perspectives, at the same time diachronic (the recognition of a historical continuity) and synchronic (the belief in the equal treatment of people). The question of language proficiency, which has been influential in Australian public debates on immigration[374], is a revealing example of the subtle link between the national identity and the expression of liberal values, the English language being presented at the same time as a constraint and a vector of emancipation.

Conversely, the ALP shows a stronger rise in generalisation with a focus on principles. In particular, the existence of a universe of discourse related to the protection of minorities is a specificity of the ALP since it does not appear as semantically relevant in the Coalition's discourses. In the interviews that I could conduct, this theme was systematically mentioned (whether positively or negatively) as a distinctive feature of the ALP. An illustration of these ideal-typical postures may be found quite explicitly in two interviews respectively with former Labor Minister Nick Bolkus and former Coalition Prime Minister John Howard, who were asked the same question, "what is the accomplishment you are the most proud of ?", designed to grasp the crux of their political commitment.

> Nick Bolkus: The achievement I am the most proud of
> was to entrench multiculturalism on the national

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[374] For instance, the linguistic question was raised in the public debate after the declarations of Sharman Stone in an interview on 15 September 2005, which has influenced many discourses in the Coalition (Slade & Möllering 2010, p.80). In 2015, the issue of the linguistic test was raised again by Sharman Stone, who justified it with the following words: "By not requiring basic English-language skills as a requirement of citizenship I think we are missing opportunities to help these new citizens get the skills that will help them get a decent job, or help their children in school and ultimately we are risking that they become alienated and discontented" (Taylor, 1 June 2015).

agenda. We preached the principles of multiculturalism, we put meat on the bones of the multicultural polity, we talked about productive diversity, (...) said that we should recognise the minorities and profit from it.

Question: Do you think the approach of the ALP is different from the approach of the other parties?

Nick Bolkus: What I would have liked to have seen continued on both sides of politics is promotion of multiculturalism. The Liberal Party stopped using the term, the Liberal Party does not celebrate it as much as it should.

John Howard: Maintaining the social harmony of Australia was our big achievement. It is a very stable, united, harmonious country.

Question: Do you think the approach of the Liberal party is different from the approach of the other parties?

John Howard: The Labor Party, the other parties pay attention to minorities to much. They worry about minorities too much.

Question: And what are the consequences of this attitude?

John Howard: Well, it does not produce harmony. Minorities should be respected, but so should the will of the majority.

It clearly appears that the question of Islam does not convey the same meaning for the two parties. For the ALP it is subdivided between the question of beliefs and the question of integration, when for the Coalition it appears more related to a question of national security and an issue of social cohesion. The compared analysis of specificities[375]

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[375] The analysis of specificities illuminates the frequency of words while taking into account the differences in size between the parts; it is therefore a more reliable indicator than the mere frequency of terms (Lafon 1980). A positive score of specificity shows an over-representation of the word and a negative score an under-representation. The number indicates a probability: a

shows for instance that the terms characteristic of the ALP include "discrimination" (score of 5.4974), "community" (4.882), "vilification" (3.4492) while the terms "value" (6.2975), "sharia" (4.4713), "terrorism" (4.2756), "rule" (3.3972) are characteristic of the Coalition. The calculation of the Chi2 by class of the term "Muslim" indicates more precisely how the discourses on Islam are organised within these semantic fields.

Figure 23. Chi2 by Class -Australia

Chi2Graph 4: Coalition   Chi2Graph 5: ALP

The term "Muslim" is relatively more used by the Coalition in class 1, which identifies the "question of Islam". In the case of the ALP, the class that overuses the term is class 2, focusing on the concrete aspects of integration, which is not only a part of the question of Islam but a part of the "question of integration". Muslims, taken as social actors, are therefore subsumed under a broader set of issues. The class related to belief (1) underuses the term, which indicates the existence of a line of thought on belief independent from Islamic issues. The difference between the two parties is therefore less linked to the perception of Muslims as such than to the place occupied by the question of Islam within a broader project for social cohesion. The following simplified FAC identifies universes of discourse to illuminate the moral architecture of these projects.

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score of "+5" means that the word had one chance out of 100 000 (10^5) to have such a high frequency. In other words, with a random (hypergeometric) distribution, the probability of obtaining a smaller frequency would be 99.999%, hence a risk threshold of 0.001%.

Figure 24. *Simplified FAC of the Coalition and ALP discourses*

The Factorial Analysis of Correspondences highlights two axes around which the semantic universes are articulated. The vertical axis brings into opposition the semantic field of the challenges linked with norms and values (democracy, law, country, sharia, etc....) and the semantic field of social challenges (community, security, local, representation, etc...). The horizontal axis represents the change in the "rise in generality"

of the discourses when it comes to claims and framings. The discursive productions in the inferior part show a higher level of abstraction with considerations which are often transhistorical and principle-based (pluralism, tradition, enrichment, history, multicultural...). On the contrary, the superior part shows a stronger rooting in the here and now, with concrete considerations and an action-oriented, pragmatic rhetoric (Victoria, Friday, Melbourne, hijab, police station, condemn, violence, raid, etc...). The crossing of the axes corresponds, as in the first case, to the centre of gravity of all classes' crossing. It is immediately noticeable that, all parties considered, the centre of gravity is relatively high on the vertical axis. In other words, the "pragmatic" considerations have a greater centrality in discourses.

On this orthonormal coordinate system, two communities of discourse are identifiable. Again, I have chosen Latin denominations in order to avoid suggesting that a term would be exclusive to a party and to distance the analysis from the words used. These two communities are called *Concordia* (meaning union, harmony) rather than *Pax* because as I have shown before in the French case the necessity of appeasement was a major stake when Australian discourses focus more on models of social harmony. The first model, coupling a relatively higher level of abstraction and a focus on social challenges, overlaps especially with the discourses of the ALP. It is called *Concordia Minoritatis* because maintaining simultaneously this framing and this aim amounts to apprehending the question of minorities as fundamental for social harmony. The second model suggests on the other hand a more concrete framing and adopts as the priority objective the challenges regarding norms and values. It has been called *Concordia Majoritatis* because social harmony is perceived as conformity to the core codes of the majority group. It is notable that these two universes of discourse have a large overlapping area, showing that many discourses of the Coalition and the ALP rejoin in the claim for pragmatism, but also a common concern in addressing social challenges.

Chapter Conclusion

Approaching the political perception of Islam represents a challenge for social sciences on account of the heterogeneity of discourses and the plasticity of the political field. In order to keep at distance these issues linked to the modalities of expression and temporalities, this chapter used a computer-based content analysis complementary to qualitative studies. Drawing on discourses from the main parties in France and Australia, it suggested a cartography of the lexical worlds that emerged. It aimed at showing that although it is impossible to represent party positions, it is possible to provide idealtypical universes of discourses to put into perspective individual positions. Responding to the identification in former chapters of ontological postulates on social cohesion behind discourses on Islam, the Factorial Analysis of Correspondences enabled systematisation of the observation. I have suggested to call *Pax Laica*, *Pax Republicana*, *Pax Communitatis*, *Concordia Majoritatis* and *Concordia Minoritatis* five main schemes in which discourses on Islam are embedded. These patterns have the merit to clarify the semantical lines defining party positions, but they have no ambition to supersede interactionnist analyses. Instead, they acquire their full interest when combined with an analysis taking into account the multipositionality of social actors, as well as the formal and informal negotiations initiated by the latter. In particular, this means considering the specular dimension of political anticipations (Dobry 1986; Rayner 2005) generating a contingency of the context and the constant emergence of new resources and constraints.

General Conclusion

Most Western societies today face similar challenges linked to the management of socio-cultural heterogeneity. In the case of Islam, the involved issues regard Muslims both as believers of a religion and as an ethnic minority. Each society deals with this twofold social reality using its own political grammar and legal mythologies. France and Australia offer two remarkably instructive examples in this respect. This thesis took shape thanks to a difficulty which *a priori* seemed to make the comparison inoperative, namely differentiated understandings of religion and ethnicity. Paradoxically, this difficulty progressively proved to be the source of the most revealing insight. In the French context where laïcité is a governing frame, the repertoire of political legitimation tends to be oriented toward religion, and in the Australian context, where multiculturalism is a governing frame, ethnicity plays a symmetrical (although not identical) role. The "problem of comparability" has thus triggered the heuristic fecundity of the comparison because it questioned "self-evident" facts and modalities of designation identified as the generalisation of patterns of reasoning inherited from specific political histories. Confronting these two fieldworks therefore encouraged me to develop an analysis of what speaking of Islam means, articulating the state categories of identification and the social images constructed by political parties.

Main contributions

This demonstration has been constructed through three complementary questions enabling a fusion of the different dimensions of the analysis.

The first contribution, explicitly developed in Part 1 but covering the thesis transversally, is both epistemological and methodological. This thesis aimed at further comprehending the reach of some existing theoretical frameworks in political science and sociology, and at refining their domains of relevance and fallibility.

I have shown that Islam is par excellence a hybrid object whose political perception is often reified by the sociology of religion and political sociology. Because of the macrosociological dimension of the subject, it is noteworthy that it would have been both useless and impossible to specify all the politicians' specific trajectories. To obtain meaningful results, my goal was to renew the problematisation process by taking into account the context in a different manner. The objective was to avoid the risks of hypostasising contingent forms and, at the same time, the arbitrary assessment of causality between cultural codes and framings. In the first case, it involved going beyond the temporal and situational contingencies inherent in many praxeological, positional and interactionnist approaches. In the second case, it involved apprehending the "causal mediations" (Dobry 1986) through the relations between discourses on Islam and the recomposition of institutional and political balances. Establishing an alternative path between hardly reconcilable perspectives, such as the sociology of concrete systems of action and the historical sociology of the state, has enabled circumvention of issues related to the situation of enunciation and the analysis of framings. The "state-kind variable" (Badie & Birnbaum 1979) has proved most useful to evidence structural overdetermination processes in the governance of Islam, yet it acquired its full meaning when articulated to modalities of objectivation of positions revealead by politicians' normative and argumentative undertakings. In this process, this doctoral dissertation is also a contribution to the project described by James Beckford (2000, p.482) as "partial re-synchronization" between the sociology of religion and other social sciences. A project whose stake is not only a better conceptualisation of religious issues but, as Bryan Turner (2016, p.20) points out, a better understanding of "the very nature of the social itself".

The methodology of this thesis was developed to fulfill these requirements through a triangulation of approaches. If these methodological choices are largely indebted to the idiosyncrasy of the object of analysis, they aim at showing the heuristic potentialities of

such tools, opening new perspectives for future research in the sociology of religion. In particular, I have shown the usefulness of resorting to different methods of data collection and to combine quantitative and qualitative tools of analysis to build a research strategy. This has allowed exploration of how a productive synergy may be established between methods which are rarely combined, but also the links between theoretical assumptions and empirical findings.

The second question which this thesis aimed at answering is a heuristic one. Its focus was to grasp what "speaking of Islam means" through the identification of macrostructural variables liable to influence the perception of Islam. A major advantage of this thesis's subject is that the analysis of Islam has informed the analysis of the political and *vice versa*.

On the one hand, the semantic depth of Islam allowed a renewed analysis of the moral architecture of the two countries, *i.e.* of the nature of the ties uniting the state and civil society. I have shown that Islam concurrently involves framings of religion, culture, ethnicity, language, identity, North-South and Centre-Periphery dichotomies. As such, it presents a multifaceted challenge for each country and reveals (in the photographic sense of the term) the negative of the political traditions in their handling of these specific issues. Schematically, on a virtual axis identified by Pierre Rosanvallon (2004) going from the requirement of nomocratic abstraction to the management of differences, France and Australia have appeared to occupy two opposite poles. When it comes to the governance of the religious dimension of Islam, it illustrates two types following the general pattern set out by David Martin (1978), and completes seminal works offering comparisons of the politics of secularism (Richardson 2004; Asad 2003; Baubérot & Mathieu 2002; Barbalet, Possamai & Turner 2011; Hurd 2009; Beaman 2008). It exemplifies two modalities of state intervention, one mostly internal to religions (Australia) and one mostly external to religions (France), involving different ties to the public space and to conflict.

On the other hand, I have shown that the state categories of understanding and the social images of Islam purport to establish hierarchies defining what deserves to be seen and in which terms. The emerging visibility of Islam is not only the consequence of endogenous factors but also of the incorporation of symbolic mediations in which political parties, as collectives engaged in the production of meaning, play a substantial role. Choosing ethnicity as a modality of social regulation does not imply that religion is not taken into account by public authorities, nor does choosing religion imply that ethnic considerations are ignored. However the normative, symbolic and regulatory provisions aiming at controlling the public expression of Islam cannot use the same political channels. Both countries thereby used their respective cultural codes to respond to a similar question: integrating Muslims within the axiological and cognitive frameworks of the country. In France, the allocation to a denominational identity referential brought the public authorities to try and institutionalise Islam, whilst in Australia the identification has set up ethnic communities as regulatory bodies and legitimate interlocutors.

Finally, this thesis offered answers to a third question that stems from the second. This examined the relevance of party cleavages and traditional dualisms like the "Left-Right" opposition in the light of the differentiated "questions of Islam". I have shown that Islam has confronted the political parties with contradictory dynamics by identifying several fields of axiological reconfiguration for political parties. From the point of view of the confrontation between the "new entrant" and their respective traditions, the Right-Left cleavage shows a noteworthy relevance as it accounts for historically-constructed positionings on the issues of minorities and of the religious in general. Although all parties use similar notions – from republic, nation and laïcité in France to nation, social cohesion or multiculturalism in Australia – they focus on different relevant dimensions within the same available axiological repertoire. However, other dynamics keep this observation in proportion, and especially a general reorientation of all rhetorics on the meaningfulness of the religious in a secularised society. I have therefore suggested – as a counterbalance of contrasted case studies – large semantic references to locate the axiological priorities of discourses on Islam. Their idealtypical dimension makes them

more operational for scientific analyses and for testing the validity of hypotheses than the traditional dualisms inherited from the logic of practice. Last but not least, while the case studies enabled a grasp of the influence of ontological postulates on social cohesion for the perception of Islam, quantitative semantics enabled systematisation of the findings.

Further research

The contributions of this thesis have also aimed at opening new perspectives for research that could extend its inquiry.

First, regarding the analytical integration of the context, further case studies and comparative analyses of discourses observing different situations of enunciation may build on this thesis by assessing regularities or idiosyncrasies. Analyses focusing on interactions and interlocutions between politicians may also, at a more microsociological level, contribute to showing the concrete functioning of the compared dynamics.

Although this thesis was specifically focused on the perception of Islam, analyses taking into account the effects of "intersectional logics" (Banton 2011; Fassin & Surkis 2010; Sandford-Gaebel 2013) may elucidate the extent to which other elements can act as amplifying or reducing phenomena in the observations. In the same vein, looking at other minority religious communities like Buddhists (Étienne & Liogier 2004; Rocha & Barker 2010) and Jews (Cohen 2000; Rutland 2005) would help in specifying the reach and idiosyncrasy of the perception of Islam.

Likewise, the findings of this thesis have shed light on the state identification and the parties' social image of Islam, which invite a complementary bottom-up perspective on the reception and appropriation of such categories by the concerned social actors. Investigations of Muslims themselves would help to grasp the social conditions necessary for these categories to become "belongings" (Avanza & Laferté 2005), that is to say to be integrated or rejected by them.

Lastly, it would be useful to extend the reach of the analysis through comparative study of other countries. In particular, the "multicultural" models of Britain, Canada and the United States have been touched upon in this thesis. Contrasting their analysis with the Australian case study would help to clarify the specificities of the latter.

Even though many of these further perspectives would require larger groups of researchers to realise them as scholarly output, the data collected and analysed in this thesis have prepared the ground for further investigations to measure the evolution of the political and religious fields in the future.

Generalisation of the results

Some observations should also be made regarding the possibilities of generalisation and of related developments based on this thesis. The present contribution has no predictive ambition, on account of the number and complexity of the dynamics involved. In exploring a first paradox, this thesis has revealed several others. The analyses have highlighted various levels of perception corresponding to contrary but not contradictory processes.

For instance, I have observed concurrently a difference in the institutional matrixes bearing the separation of the political and the religious on the one hand and a rapprochement on the acceptation of secularism as a discourse and regulatory tool for modelling religious behaviours on the other hand. Likewise, the thesis has shown simultaneously a persistence of the national models of citizenship and a shift toward an international convergence in political rhetorics. As a matter of fact, while in Australia the assimilationist rhetoric is increasingly significant in the (re)definition of multiculturalism, in France the rhetoric of identity assignment has become increasingly common. The thesis has shown that such opposite observations are, however, less of a paradox than they seem at first sight. In the case in point, discourses based on a religious axiology insisting on the necessary integration of communities could develop in Australia partly because religions are not perceived as inherently conflictual and because the notion of community is more

acceptable. Conversely, it is because the question of the visibility of religions has emerged in France as problematic (for example through the issues of the veil) that the state differentiation is questioned with the regime of laïcité associated to it. In this respect, these recent evolutions do not fundamentally question the models of integration but rather inflect the definition processes. The French model of integration has not become multicultural but increasingly takes into account cultural and moral specificities, whilst the Australian multiculturalism has not become comparable to the French tradition as it does not give preeminence to the state.

These opposed dynamics are reinforced by the surfacing of a new kind of challenge for both societies emerging from globalisation, namely the rivalry of foreign models. In this regard, I have highlighted processes of transnational intertextuality that question national specificities on the issue of state models. In particular, the integration of France within the European space where its model is highly idiosyncratic and the reciprocal integration of Muslim communities in a global space challenge the historically and locally constructed foundings of social cohesion. The symbolic and normative borders between the individual and the collectivity, between the private and the public spheres, are being increasingly recast.

In order to take into consideration such processes, the perception of Islam has offered a privileged viewpoint because of its protean dimension. Three main elements deserve specific attention. First, Islam questions migratory and colonial history, and therefore allows for the dialectic of identity-alterity. Second, as a religion Islam challenges profound moral intuitions of the countries, and especially so in a context where they are used to build post-national communities based on a shared memory and public culture. Third, it poses the question of putting down roots within communities of belonging, epitomising the issue of the ethics of "recognition" (Baubérot, Milot & Portier 2015) and of the unity of civil society – in other words, founding projects of politics. The synoptic question "what is Islam the name of?" finds its answer much upstream from actual discourses, in the difficulty met by a liberal and secular state to endow the values it puts forward with an intrinsic universality. This metareflection can be read between the lines throughout the present thesis, and opens up on a more normative perspective. It

implies, indeed, that neither French laïcité nor Australian multiculturalism are inherently problematic. The multiple attempts at adjusting the governing frames with various processes of closing, opening, or adaptating may miss a crucial point. For beyond the question of the regulation of Islam lies the much more fundamental issue of the capability that political bodies have to provide the collectivity with means of common identification. The challenges arising from the governance of minorities and religions in both countries can be traced back to the fact that the political sphere proves unable to claim the transcendence of its own norms, therefore lacking a *sui generis* legitimacy.

Appendices

From the Revolution to the Third Republic.

26 August 1789: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen by the Constituent Assembly.

12 July 1790: Adoption by the Constituent Assembly of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, condemned by the Pope Pius VI.

20 September 1792 : Laïcisation of the civil state. Dissociation between religious marriage and civil marriage.

24 June 1793: Constitution of "Year I", claiming freedom of religion (never applied).

1795
21 February: Law on religious freedom, but forbidding the expression of religions in public spaces.
29 September: Decree on the exercise of religions.

1801-1802: Napoleon signed with Pius VII a Concordate recognising that Catholicism was the religion of "the great majority" of French people. Establishment of a system of recognised religions including Catholicism, Protestantism (Lutheran and Reformist) and Judaism in 1808.

1814: The system of recognised religions remained but Catholicism became a "state religion".

1830: The July Revolution abolished the status of "state religion" for Catholicism.

28 June 1833: Guizot law organising primary public school.

15 March 1850: Falloux law, distinguishing public teaching (for which the state is responsible) ad private teaching (with a notable freedom).

8 December 1864: Publication of the Syllabus by Pius X, condemning the French Revolution.

1869 : The Programme of Belleville (government program of the Radical party) aimed at breaking the Concordate.

Third Republic.

1877: The crisis of 16 May shattered the hopes of the Monarchists for a third Restoration, and Catholicism appeared as the tool of this failed attempt.

31 July 1879: Some deputies (including Clemenceau) demanded the abrogation of the Concordate (Charles Boysset used the bill again in 1881).

1879-1886: Laws of Republican laïcisation.
12 July 1880: Removal of the Sunday observance (except for civil servants).
28 March 1882 : Ferry law on compulsory education and laïcité completing the law on free education of 16 June 1881.
27 July 1884 : Naquet law re-establishing divorce.
14 August 1884 : Removal of the public prayers in parliamentary sessions.
30 October 1886 : Goblet law on the laïcisation of the teaching personal in public schools.

1892: Leo XIII suggested that Catholics "rally" the Republic.

1er July 1901: Liberal law on the contract of association.

1902-1905: Anticlerical politics of the Combes government. Submission of the bills of 27 June 1902, 20 October 1902, 7 April 1903, 26 May 1903, 9 June 1903, 25 June 1903, 29 June 1903, 31 January 1905, in order to organise the separation of the state and churches and/or the removal of budgets for religions. .

30 May 1904: Diplomatic Rupture with the Holy See.

10 November 1904: Separation bill from the Combes government.

9 December 1905: Law of Separation of the Churches and the State (much more liberal han the Combes project). The Republic guarantees "the free exercise of religions" (article 1) but "does not recognise, remunerate, or subsidise any religious denomination" (article 2).

11 February 1906: Pius X opposed the law in the encyclical *Vehementer nos*, the application of the law was accompanied by violent incidents.

2 January 1907: Law on the public exercise of religions.

1919: Alsace and Moselle became French again after the war but remained in the Concordate system.

1921: Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See.

18 January 1924: Pius XI authorised the bishops to create diocesan associations in the encyclical *Maximam gravissimamque*.

Fourth Republic until 2015

27 October 1946: Constitution of the Fourth Republic, mentioning the laïque dimension of the Republic.

4 October 1958: The Constitution of the Fifth Republic mentioned in Article 1 that "France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic and social republic that assures equality in front of the law for all citizens, regardless of origins, race or religion. It respects all beliefs".

31 December 1959: Debré law on the relations between the state and private schools, establishing a contract with possibility of state funding.

11 October 1962- 8 December 1965: Vatican II Council, renewing the Roman Catholic Church.

25 November 1977: Guermeur law completing the Debré law.

12 July 1984: The President of the Republic announced the removal of the Savary bill on a unified and laïque public service of national education (SPULEN).

October 1989: Media and political unrest after the "Veil Affair" in Gabriel-Havez high school.

27 November 1989: The Council of State mentioned that religious signs at school were not incompatible with the principle of laïcité but opposed conspicuous signs, pressures, provocation and proselytism.

January 1994: Demonstration in Paris in favour of public school.

20 September 1994: Circular of the Minister of National Education on "conspicuous signs" in public schools, introducing the notion of "discreet signs".

11 December 2003: Report of the Stasi Commission to the President of the Republic, with 26 proposals including the interdiction for conspicuous symbols in public school.

15 March 2004: Act No2004-228 concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools.

11 October 2010: Act No 2010-1192 prohibiting the concealing of the face in public.

Appendix 2.1. Communiqué issued by Laurence Rossignol, PS National Secretary for Women's Rights and Parity, 29 May 2008.

Atteinte au principe constitutionnel d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes.

Selon un jugement du tribunal de grande Instance de Lille, la non virginité d'une femme serait une cause de nullité du mariage. Cette décision jurisprudentielle est atterrante.

Elle porte atteinte au principe constitutionnel d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes et de non-discrimination car elle ne peut être prononcée qu'à l'encontre d'une femme.

Elle bafoue le droit des femmes à disposer de leur corps et à vivre librement, comme les hommes, leur sexualité.

Elle bafoue les principes de laïcité en soumettant les lois de la République au droit coutumier.

Si le Code Civil a pu fonder une telle décision, il est urgent de le changer et un projet ou une proposition de loi doit être très rapidement inscrite à l'ordre du jour du parlement avant qu'elle ne serve de point d'appui pour enfermer encore davantage les jeunes filles et les femmes.

Enfin, comment ne pas noter la coïncidence entre l'obsession de la virginité du tueur de femmes Fourniret et la décision des juges de Lille!

***Appendix 2.2. Communiqué issued by Marie-George Buffet, National
Secretary of the PCF, 30 May 2008.***

Rachida Dati a estimé vendredi que l'annulation par la justice du mariage d'une jeune femme qui avait menti sur sa virginité était " aussi un moyen de protéger la personne ".

Ces propos sont une monstruosité juridique et une indignité de la part de la Garde des sceaux. Déclarer que la virginité peut être la qualité substancielle d'une femme revient à ramener le mariage à un vulgaire contrat. C'est considérer le corps de la femme comme une marchandise, et donc la transformer en propriété de l'homme.

C'est un retour en arrière de plus de deux siècles, où la femme objet est la propriété de l'homme.

En outre, la Garde des sceaux fait preuve d'une indignité extrêmement choquante. La République est là pour protéger ses valeurs en vertu desquelles, le corps ne peut être considéré comme une marchandise. C'est la libre disposition de son corps qui est ainsi remise en cause par une représentante de la République : c'est extrêmement grave.

Toute logique communautariste devrait être étrangère à la justice française, et Mme Dati aurait dû demander au parquet de faire appel de cette décision, plutôt que de justifier l'injustifiable. Il est encore temps pour Mme Dati de se resaisir et de jouer son rôle de Ministre de la République.

Appendix 2.3. Communiqué issued by Les Verts, 3 June 2008.

Une annulation de mariage discriminatoire envers les femmes

Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lille a annulé un mariage, considérant que dissimuler la non virginité constituait une erreur sur "les qualités essentielles du conjoint".

En qualifiant la virginité d'une épouse " de qualité essentielle du conjoint", le TGI de Lille a interprété le Code Civil de façon discriminatoire et de plus erronée.

"En mariage trompe qui peut, le dol (le mensonge provoquant volontairement une erreur) n'est pas une faute", disaient déjà les juristes de l'Ancien Régime, et la seule erreur admise en la matière est celle sur la capacité à mener une vie conjugale normale, ce que n'est évidemment pas le défaut de virginité ou tout autre élément du passé de l'un et l'autre des conjoints.

Plutôt que renforcer le principe d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes le TGI de Lille cautionne et renforce ce symbole de domination patriarcale qu'est la valorisation de la virginité de la femme. Ce faisant, il porte atteinte aux libertés fondamentales des femmes, à leur dignité et à leur intégrité.

Les Verts considèrent que la sexualité des femmes est et doit rester une affaire privée et libre, quelles que soient les coutumes et la religion des époux.

En annulant ce mariage au prétexte " d'erreur sur les qualités essentielles du conjoint", la justice de la République porte atteinte à l'intégrité des femmes et participe aux pressions qui conduisent chaque année des centaines de femmes dans les hôpitaux ou les cliniques privées pour une chirurgie de l' hymen.

Il est donc nécessaire que cette décision soit soumise à la Cour de Cassation.

Les Verts réaffirment la nécessité d'un Ministère des Droits des Femmes et d'une loi contre les violences faites aux femmes afin de faire avancer toute la société française vers l'égalité femmes-hommes !

La justice française à l'heure de la charia ?

La justice française que l'on croyait indépendante, républicaine et laïque, vient d'annuler un mariage entre deux musulmans "pour erreur sur les qualités essentielles du conjoint".

Cette décision consternante et scandaleuse qui érige l'absence de virginité de l'épouse en motif d'annulation de mariage, illustre la montée et l'influence des revendications communautaristes dans notre pays. La justice qui se défend dans cette affaire d'avoir tranché sous la pression de considérations religieuses, aurait-elle pris la même décision dans le cas inverse ?

Marine Le Pen, député européen, vice-présidente du FN dénonce cette agression contre les valeurs de la République française tout comme la compromission d'une gauche multiculturaliste qui semble aujourd'hui découvrir avec effroi les effets dévastateurs de l'immigration de masse.

Can Be No Half-Measures About White Australia

By the Hon. ARTHUR A. CALWELL, Minister for Immigration

PROFESSOR Macmahon Ball in an article in THE ARGUS of October 17 expresses the belief that the introduction of a quota for Asian migrants to Australia would be a wise step. It is a step, the wisdom of which I would strongly challenge; and I am confident that I would have the overwhelming majority of Australians behind me in that challenge.

Introduction of a quota would simply be a form of appeasement and appeasement has never solved any problem. There can be no half-measures in a matter such as the maintenance of the White Australia policy, on which Australians hold such emphatic views.

The ideal that this country, which was settled and developed by Europeans, should remain predominantly European was sponsored by our forefathers and has had the unwavering support of all good Australians ever since. Establishment of a quota system for Asians would be an undermining of that Australian ideal which, I am sure, Australians would not tolerate.

"Token Quota"

BUT, apart from its impact on an ideal, let us consider just what a quota would mean in materialistic terms. On Professor Macmahon Ball's own admission "abandonment" of the White Australia policy would not provide any significant relief to the population pressure of East Asia. If "abandonment" of the policy would mean so little, how much less significant would be the effect, merely of modifying the policy to the extent of permitting a token quota?

Establishment of a quota would be an empty gesture which could well be interpreted as an insult by our Asian neighbours. Such a system would create discrimination and, in all likelihood, would actually have the effect of restricting the number of people from certain Asiatic countries—Chinese, for example—who otherwise would come to Australia as tourists, as traders, or as students.

In amplifying that statement I would point out that at present any Asian may come to Australia and live here under permit as a trader, provided he can show that he has a turnover —a turnover as distinct from a profit—of only £10 a week. This turnover must be from overseas trade. Imports from and exports to, say, Malaya, and not from such occupations as market gardening.

An Asian, once established here as a trader, may bring in his wife, and when the value of his overseas trade is boosted to £20 a week he may bring in an Asian assistant. For every additional £500 a year of overseas trade he can have an additional assistant, provided the assistant is engaged solely in that trade and provided the Department of Immigration is satisfied his services in Australia are warranted.

Need Have No Fear

PERMITS of residence are renewed periodically as the years go by, provided the conditions of entry are observed. Asian traders need have no fear that they are unrecognisable or that they will find themselves under orders to leave. Any children born in Australia to these traders and their wives become Australian citizens, whether they are Malay, Chinese, Indian, or any other Asian race. There is no regulation law under which Asian Australians could be deported.

These, then, are the regulations governing the entry of Asians into Australia. They are fair, have never been officially challenged by the government of any country in Asia, and I think they have more real meaning to our Asian neighbours than a quota would have.

As Sir Frederic Eggleston, former Australian Minister to China and the United States, stated in a recent article in a Sydney newspaper, "Notwithstanding the trifling quota given to Orientals by the United States, Australia has always been, and still is, more lenient in her policy than America."

It is that very leniency that has created the cases which are avidly seized on by muddleheaded sentimentalists and the sensation-mongering section of the Australian Press.

Majority Went

WE take no unction unto ourselves for granting during the war sanctuary to thousands of people who normally would have been refused admission to Australia. It is only what any country with any compassion at all would have done. But we have a right to expect these people to honour their undertaking to return to their own countries at the conclusion of hostilities. It is to the credit of the great majority that they did not demur when called upon to return, and accepted repatriation without hesitation.

A minority, however, consistently ignored all warnings given them. These people were given extension after extension —and then had the audacity to assert that the extended time granted them gave them the right to permanent residence.

Australia played fair with them; they did not play fair with Australia.

Eventually, to get rid of these people, it was necessary to bring down special legislation, legislation which was unchallenged in Parliament.

Some newspapers have played up, in spectacular fashion, the stories of deportees. Almost invariably they have seized on cases deserving least sympathy to support their charge against the Government of harsh and insensitive administration of the law. One after another their "sob stories" have been exploded by official denials based on facts contained in the files of the Immigration Department.

On the subject of deportations, a comparison of Australian and American figures is illuminating. During the years 1946 and 1947, which provide the latest figures available, the United States deported 18,628 persons or approximately one deportation for each 4,200 head of population. During the same period Australia deported 143 persons, or approximately one deportation for each 48,050 head of our population.

Grave Damage

TO quote again Sir Frederic Eggleston:—

"America's exclusion of Orientals was always ruthless before the establishment of the quota system and now, outside the quota, it is still ruthless for all migrants. Few exceptions are made, and deportation follows any violation of temporary permits.

"The difference between Australia and America is that American action is taken as a matter of course by the people of that country, and is not ventilated in the Press, whereas in Australia, criticism has a political basis, and is made without a knowledge of the circumstances of each case, in ignorance of Australian policy, and in ignorance of the policy of other countries. In addition, the liaison between Australian Associated Press and Reuter's is used to ventilate cases in Asiatic countries in order to set an additional stick to beat the political system. The result is that grave damage is done to Australian interests without any real cause whatever."

When Professor Macmahon Ball says "It is foolish and provocative to be shrill and strident in telling the world that our immigration policy is rigid and inflexible," he should address his remarks not to the Government, as I assume he is doing, but to those sections of the Australian Press to which I have referred.

The Government has all along shown patience and dignity in dealing with a relatively minority of Asians. Certain sections of the Press, including political maxims and the case of Sydney newspapers which in capitals anything in the speculative writing out for the society, have exhibited the snarkiness and artifices that to those who talk about.

Some newspapers in Australia are so irresponsible that in attain their ends they do not mind distorting their stories and it is they who put out highly coloured and grotesquely distorted stories in the hope that they might inflame some of the Asiatic peoples.

No Affront

IF the desired effect is obtained the position they themselves have created is quoted in an attempt to bully or intimidate the Government into abandoning the anti-fifth-column principle. Such policy of appeasement, does grave harm to Australia and is only temporary.

The conditions I have quoted are those under which so-called Asians at are surely sometimes no affront to what the professor terms the new sensitiveness. On the score of Asian children being nationals of racial discrimination.

If it is necessary to repeat it again—and I would happily, everybody knows it by now—I will repeat. Under the White Australia policy is no question of racial superiority. It begins as a patriotic aspiration and ends as the political achievement. This achievement is a natural urge of freedom-loving Australians who can intermarry and amalgamate without the disadvantages that inevitably result from the fusion of nationalities into a united people who hold to the same loyalties, the same outlook, and the same traditions.

Evils Elsewhere

WE will avoid the evils that plague America, that distract South Africa, that trouble Kenya, and that worry Fiji.

Ingredients of an explosive character are inherent in the conditions existing in all those countries, and when the explosion occurs, as it did in Durban recently, there is riot and bloodshed. This evil of miscegenation always results in rioting and bloodshed. We have avoided them in this country, thanks to the foresight of our forebears and our own innate common sense.

We will continue to avoid them. If we are convinced it is better the affection that people ought to have for their children and their children's children. We are heirs of a glorious past. We are also trustees for what can be an even more glorious future.

- **Appendix 4: Foreword to *Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity: Updating the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: Strategic directions for 2003-2006.***

Appendix 4.1. Foreword of John Howard.

PRIME MINISTER CANBERRA

Foreword

In 1999, I announced the *New Agenda for Multicultural Australia* as a statement of the government's multicultural policy. Over three years on, the government remains committed to nurturing our inclusive society with its proud record of community harmony. This new statement reaffirms the government's commitment to promoting diversity, understanding and tolerance in all areas of endeavour. These actions are especially important given the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America and 12 October 2002 in Bali and the changed global environment in which we live.

All Australians, regardless of their ethnic, cultural or religious background are encouraged to participate fully in the wider Australian community to show a commitment to our nation, its democratic institutions and its laws.

I commend this renewed statement of our multicultural policy and encourage all Australians to join the government in ensuring that our diversity continues to be a unifying force for our nation.

(John Howard)

1

Appendix 4.2. Foreword of Philip Ruddock.

Minister's Message

Australia's multicultural policies and programs signify the Government's strong and enduring commitment to community harmony and a migration program that does not discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin, gender, race or religion.

This non-discriminatory migration program has brought people from across the globe and with them their diverse cultural heritages. About six million migrants have settled in Australia since the Second World War. They have made an enormous contribution to Australia, along with the unique contribution of Australia's Indigenous people, earlier migrants and their descendants. Together, we have built a country that is vibrant, successful and outward looking, a country that provided safe haven for the dispossessed, and a bright future for us all.

Australia today is a culturally and linguistically diverse society and will remain so. Like our sophisticated migration program, our multicultural policy continues our tradition of successful nation building. It will help us to ensure that we meet the challenge of drawing the best from the many histories and cultures of the Australian people, within a framework of a uniting set of Australian values.

Philip Ruddock
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Appendix 4.3. Foreword of Gary Hardgrave.

Minister's Message

Our diversity is our strength and this update of the Government's multicultural policy represents a renewal of the principles and a refocusing of strategic directions to reflect changing circumstances.

Multiculturalism is about respect for and of each person in our society. Each person has a strength through their culture and by harnessing this strength we all contribute to Australia.

Three years ago, communicating the relevance of multiculturalism to all Australians was of particular importance. While we remain committed to this ongoing goal, and the fundamentals of the policy remain valid, it is appropriate, particularly in light of international and domestic events of the last three years, to refocus and renew our strategic directions.

In the next three years we will give increased emphasis to furthering harmonious community relations, ensuring equity in the provision of government services and harnessing the economic benefits of diversity. Through our programs we will seek to ensure that Australians give practical effect to the unifying values of Australian multiculturalism every day, in their workplaces and in society at large.

I look forward to implementing this policy to help secure a future in which our diversity remains a source of economic benefit, cultural enrichment and social stability for all Australians.

Gary Hardgrave
Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

3

- **Appendix 5: Presentation of the Creil Affair on Antenne 2, October 1989 (Screenshot).**

Protecting the Australian way of life from a possible terrorist threat

Be alert, but not alarmed

Terrorism has changed the world, and Australia is not immune.

But the way of life we all value so highly must go on. Australians are friendly, decent, democratic people, and we're going to stay that way.

National security has been significantly upgraded to detect, prevent and respond to terrorism.

Around $1.4 billion is being spent to strengthen Australia's counter-terrorist capabilities. New measures include:

- strengthened domestic and overseas intelligence resources for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS);
- additional Defence resources, including increased numbers and capability for our SAS and other Special Forces;
- creation of specialist police counter-terrorist investigation teams;
- upgraded aviation security, including increased baggage screening and air security officers;
- tightened border security to detect unauthorised arrivals and increased x-raying of cargo; and
- new equipment and training for emergency services to deal with chemical, biological and radiological threats.

All of us can play a part by keeping an eye out for anything suspicious.

Over the coming weeks the Commonwealth Government will be providing you with more information on how we can work together to protect our way of life.

Be alert, but not alarmed. Together, let's look out for Australia.

If you see something unusual or suspicious, use your judgement. If it doesn't add up, ring up.

National Security Hotline 1800 123 400
www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

LET'S LOOK OUT FOR AUSTRALIA

Authorised by the Commonwealth Government, Capital Hill, Canberra

297

PÉRIL ISLAMISTE :
Conséquence de l'immigration massive et du laxisme de l'UMPS

Plusieurs milliers de djihadistes originaires de France combattent aujourd'hui en Irak et en Syrie. Leur retour menace gravement notre sécurité. La récente tragédie ayant frappé Charlie Hebdo et la France rappelle l'urgence de la lutte contre le fondamentalisme islamique.

Voici le résultat de la politique de l'UMPS : Ils ont laissé faire et ne feront rien !

⮕ En favorisant l'immigration, l'UMPS a permis la création de zones de non droit en France.

⮕ En organisant, depuis Sarkozy, un « islam en France » contrôlé par l'étranger, l'UMPS a laissé les islamistes radicaux prendre le contrôle de nombreuses mosquées.

⮕ En démantelant nos services de sécurité et de renseignements, l'UMPS a favorisé les groupes terroristes.

Avec Marine Le Pen
Protégeons les Français

⮕ **En stoppant l'immigration massive. Trop c'est trop !**

⮕ **En interdisant tout financement des activités religieuses par des puissances étrangères**

⮕ **En rompant les liens avec les pays qui aident, financent et arment les djihadistes dans le monde (Qatar)**

⮕ **En procédant au désarmement des banlieues**

⮕ **En supprimant la double nationalité aux djihadistes**

⮕ **En démantelant les filières djihadistes**

⮕ **En renforçant le contrôle des mouvements politico-religieux et de leurs prêches**

⮕ **En reprenant la maîtrise de nos frontières par la sortie de l'espace Schengen**

✂ -

COUPON-RÉPONSE

Nom : .... Prénom :...

Adresse : .... Code Postal : .... Ville : ....

Email : ....@.. Téléphone : ....

❏ Je soutiens le programme de Marine Le Pen pour protéger les français

❏ Je désire prendre contact avec un responsable du Front National

À RENVOYER :
76-78, rue des Suisses - 92000 Nanterre
Tél. : 01.41.20.20.00 - www.frontnational.com

Front National

IMMIGRATION

Georges Marchais répond au recteur de la mosquée de Paris

La politique du pouvoir et du patronat est contraire tant aux intérêts des travailleurs immigrés et de la plupart de leurs nations qu'aux intérêts des travailleurs français

Georges Marchais, candidat du Parti communiste aux élections présidentielles vient d'envoyer une lettre (que nous publions ci-dessous) à M. Si Hamza Boubakeur, recteur de la mosquée de Paris.

« Monsieur le Recteur,

Vous m'avez envoyé un télégramme me demandant de condamner le maire communiste de Vitry et mettant en cause la politique de mon parti sur l'immigration. Ce message a été rendu public avant même que j'aie pu en prendre connaissance. C'est pourquoi je vous adresse cette lettre ouverte.

Tenant compte de la charge que vous occupez, je tiens d'abord à vous confirmer ma position, celle de mon parti, sur la religion. Je respecte, nous respectons la religion musulmane à l'égal de toutes les autres. Je sais que des centaines de milliers de travailleurs de mon pays professent l'Islam, qui est l'une des branches vivantes sur l'arbre millénaire de la civilisation.

Je me fais une règle de ne jamais intervenir dans des questions religieuses qui relèvent de la seule conscience des personnes ou des communautés. C'est donc seulement parce que vous avez adopté une position politique sur une question qui nous concerne que je prends la liberté de vous envoyer, aujourd'hui, cette mise au point.

L'idéal communiste est effectivement opposé, comme vous le voulez bien le reconnaître, à toute discrimination raciale ou religieuse.

Tous les travailleurs sont frères

Nous pensons que tous les travailleurs sont frères, indépendamment du pays où ils sont nés, de la couleur de leur peau, des croyances, de la culture, des valeurs ou des coutumes auxquelles ils sont attachés. Qu'ils s'appellent Mohamed, Kemal ou Jacques, Moussa, Mody ou Pierre, tous ont un droit égal à la vie, à la dignité, à la liberté.

Nous nous appliquons à nous-mêmes cette loi d'égalité. Tous les travailleurs immigrés, musulmans ou non, membres du Parti communiste français, ont dans ce parti les mêmes droits et mêmes devoirs que leurs camarades français.

Nul plus que nous en France n'a combattu le colonialisme. Pour ne parler que du Maghreb, dès la fondation de notre parti, nous luttions contre la guerre du Rif. Et, plus récemment, nous avons milité à la constitution du Maroc et de la Tunisie en Etats indépendants ; nous nous sommes opposés à la guerre menée contre le peuple algérien par les capitalistes français et leurs politiciens, avec la férocité de leurs tortures, de leurs camps, de leurs massacres, de leurs dévastations.

Aujourd'hui, je m'honore d'entretenir de bonnes relations avec les dirigeants du mouvement de libération nationale. Je me suis rendu plusieurs fois en Algérie. J'ai parcouru l'Afrique. Et j'ai l'intention de développer encore cette action. Je me suis particulièrement réjoui d'avoir contribué, l'été dernier, au nom du Comité de défense des libertés et des droits de l'homme, à la libération d'Abderrazak Ghorbal, le dirigeant syndicaliste tunisien. Avec ce comité, j'espère bien finir par obtenir justice pour Moussa Konaté, travailleur malien persécuté par l'arbitraire policier de M. Giscard d'Estaing.

En France même, c'est la CGT et nous qui combattons énergiquement la politique des patrons et du gouver-

Une petite annonce de « Libération »

Nous publions ci-dessous, la « petite annonce » de « Libération », à laquelle Georges Marchais fait allusion dans sa lettre :

« Immigrés sex service.

« Serai profondément reconnaissant à toutes personnes pouvant me faciliter une introduction (sic) dans les foyers de travailleurs immigrés de toutes races et conditions, chantiers, dortoirs... pour satisfaire tous leurs besoins sexuels, avec bouche, mains, cul. Suis un homo passif, très maso, de physique agréable, très salope, prêt à tout, docile, endurant. Conviendrais parfaitement pour abattage, même en très grande quantité, le nombre ne me fait pas peur. Accepterais emploi à temps partiel dans hôtel à forte concentration d'immigrés, noirs ou blancs, pour toutes besognes même les plus basses et évidemment satisfaire la clientèle. Aussi dans bains, douches vapeur ou similaires, pour massages complets et services. Possibilité de me travailler. Enveloppe timbrée pour réponse. »

nement, la surexploitation, les atteintes à la dignité, les brimades et les discriminations odieuses qui frappent les travailleurs immigrés. Nous le ferons toujours. C'est que je l'ai réaffirmé, en juillet 1980, en m'adressant aux travailleurs immigrés de l'usine Renault à Flins.

Au vu de ces réalités, puis-je vous rappeler cette belle parole : « Le feu de l'hospitalité luit pour le voyageur qui distingue la flamme » ?

J'approuve le maire de Vitry

Pour la clarté, sur le sujet dont parle votre télégramme, il me faut en premier lieu rétablir la vérité des événements.

Votre message fait état d'une « décision précipitée et irréfléchie » que le maire communiste de Vitry aurait prise à l'encontre de travailleurs immigrés maliens. Voilà une condamnation bien hâtive. De fait, l'histoire réelle est inverse. C'est un dimanche, avant-veille de fête, au moment même où les communistes étaient réunis au Bourget pour le soixantième anniversaire de leur parti, qu'un autre maire — non pas communiste, mais giscardien celui-là — a déclenché l'affaire en prenant la révoltante décision de chasser les immigrés maliens de sa ville de Saint-Maur et de les refouler clandestinement sur Vitry. Pour parvenir à ses fins, cet individu n'a pas hésité à faire forcer — à l'insu du maire de Vitry et sans accord de la commission de sécurité — les issues murées d'un foyer au sujet duquel des négociations étaient officiellement engagées en vue d'y loger de jeunes travailleurs français.

Permettez-moi de vous le dire : comment se fait-il que vous n'ayez pas pris position contre le maire de Saint-Maur ? Je n'ose croire que c'est parce qu'il est un ami intime du président de la République française, qu'il a reçu deux fois en trois ans dans sa mairie. Il me faut bien constater toutefois, avec étonnement, que vous avez été plus prompt à organiser une manifestation contre un maire communiste qu'à prendre à partie les responsables des souffrances des immigrés en France, MM. Giscard d'Estaing, Stoléru ou le président du CNPF. Aux côtés de la droite et de l'extrême-droite, avec les dirigeants socialistes, la CFDT, la FEN et des groupuscules, vous vous trouvez, je le déplore, au cœur d'une opération politicienne anticommuniste qui prend les immigrés comme prétexte et ne peut en définitive que leur nuire.

Je vous déclare nettement : oui, la vérité des faits me conduit à approuver, sans réserve, la riposte de mon ami Paul Mercieca, maire de Vitry, à l'agression raciste du maire giscardien de Saint-Maur. Plus généralement, j'approuve son refus de laisser s'accroître dans sa commune le nombre, déjà élevé, de travailleurs immigrés.

Cette approbation ne contredit pas l'idéal communiste. Au contraire.

La présence en France de près de quatre millions et demi de travailleurs immigrés et de membres de leurs familles, la poursuite de l'immigration posent aujourd'hui de graves problèmes. Il faut les regarder en face et prendre rapidement les mesures indispensables. Ce qui nous guide, la communauté d'intérêts, la solidarité des travailleurs français et des travailleurs immigrés. Tout le contraire de la haine et de la rupture.

Immigration et capitalisme

Certains — qui défendent par ailleurs le droit de vivre au pays pour les Bretons ou les Occitans — prétendent que l'immigration massive est une nécessité, voire un bienfait du monde contemporain. Non, c'est une conséquence du régime capitaliste, de l'impérialisme.

Des millions d'hommes sont contraints au cruel exil en terre étrangère, loin de leur ciel et de leur peuple, parce qu'ils n'ont pas de travail chez eux. Dans beaucoup de leurs pays la colonisation, le développement inégal propre au capitalisme ont laissé de traces profondes ; même dans ceux d'entre eux qui s'engagent sur la voie d'un développement socialiste peuvent subsister pendant de nombreuses années. Ou bien encore les capitalistes qui dominent certains pays exportateurs de main-d'œuvre ne veulent pas ou ne peuvent pas résoudre les problèmes économiques et sociaux de leur

classe ouvrière : ainsi au Portugal ou en Turquie, malgré la lutte des forces les plus conscientes.

Quant aux patrons et au gouvernement français, ils recourent à l'immigration massive, comme on pratiquait autrefois la traite des Noirs, pour se procurer une main-d'œuvre d'esclaves modernes, surexploitée et sous-payée. Cette main-d'œuvre leur permet de réaliser des profits plus gros et d'exercer une pression plus forte sur les salaires, les conditions de travail et de vie, les droits de l'ensemble des travailleurs de France, immigrés ou non. Cette politique est contraire tant aux intérêts des travailleurs immigrés et de la plupart de leurs nations d'origine qu'aux intérêts des travailleurs français et de la France. Dans la crise actuelle, elle constitue pour les patrons et le gouvernement un moyen d'aggraver le chômage, les bas salaires, les mauvaises conditions de travail, la répression contre tous les travailleurs, aussi bien immigrés que français.

C'est pourquoi nous disons : il faut arrêter l'immigration, sous peine de jeter de nouveaux travailleurs au chômage. A cet égard MM. Giscard d'Estaing et Stoléru font le contraire de ce qu'ils disent : ils contribuent à l'entrée clandestine organisée de travailleurs dépourvus de droits et soumis à une exploitation honteuse et inhumaine. C'est le cas des Turcs ou des Maliens. Je précise bien : il faut stopper l'immigration officielle et clandestine, mais non chasser par la force les travailleurs immigrés présents en France, comme l'a fait le chancelier Helmut Schmidt en Allemagne fédérale.

Nous disons également : il faut donner aux travailleurs immigrés les mêmes droits sociaux qu'à leurs camarades français. Nos propositions en ce sens sont les plus avancées qui soient.

Et nous disons encore : il faut instituer un nouvel ordre économique et politique mondial. Il faut une coopération fondée non sur les exigences de profits des trusts et sur des conceptions colonialistes, mais sur des rapports équitables correspondant en priorité aux besoins de développement de la France et des peuples du tiers monde. Cette question, vous ne pouvez l'ignorer, ne tient particulièrement à cœur.

Dans les villes : résoudre les problèmes

En même temps et dans le même esprit nous disons : il faut résoudre d'importants problèmes posés dans la vie locale française par l'immigration.

En effet, M. Giscard d'Estaing et les patrons refusent les immigrés dans de nombreuses communes ou les en rejettent pour les concentrer dans certaines villes, et surtout dans les villes dirigées par les communistes. Ainsi se trouvent entassés dans ce qu'il faut bien appeler des ghettos, des travailleurs et des familles aux traditions, aux langues, aux façons de vivre différentes. Cela crée des tensions, et parfois des heurts entre immigrés des divers pays. Cela rend difficiles leurs relations avec les Français.

Quand la concentration devient très importante — ce qui n'a rien à voir, soit dit au passage, avec la notion non scientifique et raciste d'un prétendu « seuil de tolérance » dont nous ne parlons jamais — la crise du logement s'aggrave ; les HLM font cruellement défaut et de nombreuses familles françaises ne peuvent y accéder. Les charges d'aide sociale nécessaire pour les familles immigrées plongées dans la misère deviennent insupportables pour les budgets des communes peuplées d'ouvriers et d'employés. L'enseignement est incapable de faire face et les retards scolaires augmentent chez les enfants, tant immigrés que français. Les dépenses de santé s'élèvent.

Les élus communistes, dans le cadre de leurs droits et de leurs moyens, multiplient les efforts pour résoudre ces problèmes difficiles au bénéfice de tous. Mais la cote d'alerte est atteinte : il n'est plus possible de trouver des solutions suffisantes si on ne met pas fin à la situation intolérable que la politique raciste du patronat et du gouvernement a créée.

C'est pourquoi nous exigeons une répartition équitable des travailleurs immigrés entre toutes les communes.

Parler à ce propos d'électoralisme, c'est nous faire injure. Notre position ne date pas d'aujourd'hui. Dès octobre 1969, quand j'étais chargé de l'immigration à la direction du Parti communiste français, les maires communistes de la région parisienne et les élus communistes de Paris ont adopté, sur ma proposition, une déclaration dénonçant la concentration des travailleurs immigrés dans certaines villes et demandant une répartition équili-

auraient permis d'éviter les difficultés actuelles.

Encore un mot sur le racisme. Rien ne nous est plus étranger que ce préjuge antiscientifique, inhumain, immoral. Non, il n'existe pas de races d'élite et de races inférieures.

Ne partagez-vous pas l'indignation qui me soulève quand je considère les activités malfaisantes des passeurs, des trafiquants, des marchands de sommeil qui entassent des immigrés dans des conditions violant toutes les règles d'hygiène, de sécurité, de voisinage et que M. Stoléru laisse agir sans entraves comme les négriers d'autrefois ? Ce sont des délinquants qu'il faut réprimer.

Et n'éprouvez-vous pas le même dégoût que moi à la lecture d'une « petite annonce » comme celle que le journal « Libération » publiait récemment sous le titre : « Immigrés sex service », et que la décence m'interdit de reproduire ? Comme j'aimerais que nous soyons, chacun au nom de notre idéal respectif, du même côté contre des gens capables de bassesses aussi abominables, et, j'ose le dire, d'une telle barbarie !

Tout ce que la morale humaine réprouve avec force, l'inégalité, l'injustice, le mépris, la cruauté, nous le repoussons, nous le combattons. C'est pourquoi, dans les entreprises et les cités, nous invitons les travailleurs immigrés et français non pas à se combattre entre eux, mais à unir leurs forces contre leurs vrais ennemis communs, les exploiteurs et ceux qui les servent. Nous les appelons à tracer ensemble le sillon, à l'élargir sans cesse, pour libérer tous les hommes et toutes les femmes de la servitude et de la haine. C'est le sens de notre lutte pour la justice. De très nombreux prolétaires musulmans la comprennent et la soutiennent.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Recteur, mes salutations.

GEORGES MARCHAIS

299

- Appendix 9. Interview of Marine Le Pen with Al -Jazeera on 17 December 2012 (free transcription and translation in English from the French).

Interviewer (Folly Bah Thibault): I'd like to begin with an issue that you've been very vocal about and that is Islam and its place in French society. Do you consider today Islam to be a threat to the values of the French republic?

- No, it's not Islam that is a threat, it's fundamentalism, it is the most radical aspects, it is the will of a certain number of political religious groups to apply sharia, that is to say to put religious law above the law of the republic. It is those who express in all circumstances claims which go against our culture, our way of life, with, it has to be said, sometimes a lot of aggressiveness. Tha's what is a threat.

-You make a disinction between radical Islam and faithful Muslims but it would seem that not all French people make that distinction. So there seems to be a discourse amalgamating radical Islam and faithful Mulims. A discourse that some people say you supported and you were behind. So aren't you responsible in some way of this lack of differenciation that people tend not to make?

-I can tell you that if there is political responsibility it isn't of my doing. It is because of those who, including those in charge in France, have refused any attack or criticism of fundamentalism under the pretext that any criticism of fundamentalism or radicalism is criticism of Islam. Therefore, one shouldn't be surprised that the French mix the two . There is also another problem which is a real problem ("problème de fait"): massive immigration is taking place. No country in the world, Madame, would accept to go through the fast and sizeable immigration of people who, without a doubt, have a different religion and culture and are pushing around the French (" bousculent les Français").

-But just coming back to the issue of Islam: we heard during the campaign the controversy around halal meat. You can't deny that somehow you initiated that controversy over halal meat at a time when perhaps you were looking for voices during the election.

-Millions of French people eat halal food every day without realising it. Is this tolerable? I mean... would a Muslim country accept that its people were fed....

-But...

-No, but wait, allow me...

-... is is really a concern for the population?

-Of course it's a concern! It breaks our law on secularism. This is because making people who are not religious consume halal food is contributing, due to this consumption which lacks transparency, to financing a cult. That's the first thing. The second thing is that this shocks people. Honestly, listen if in a Muslim country....

-But at the time...

- No... wait... if in a Muslim country Muslims were made to eat consecrated bread, they would scream. Well... and they would be right. If they were made to eat so-called halal products which contained pork without them knowing about it, they would scream about it

and they would be right to do so. There is absolutely no reason that, inversely, French people should be made to eat halal products without knowing it.

-But are the French very concerned about this issue because at the time of the controversy, when you first started it, a majority of the French surveys didn't care about whether they were eating halal meat or not. All they were concerned about was whether they were eating just all together...

-No, it's the exact opposite, Madame. It's an important issue and it's the reason why the president of the republic, Nicolas Sarkozy after having completely dismissed this problem, made a u-turn and said that this was a topic the French where.... it was the foremost topic at the time I spoke of it... that... French people were discussing. This is because, once again, it's extremely shocking. I want you to understand that there is no reason to ask the French to accept things that no other people in the world would accept. I feel no hatred towards anyone but do not want my people to be asked to bear things that no one else would.

-What would you respond to those who accuse you of shifting the attention to secondary issues because you have no solution for the economic crisis, no solution to unemployement, no solution to urban violence, shifting the attention to Islam in order to reinforce your political credibility.

-No but, allow me, who is accusing me of that? Those who have been in power for 30 years? Those who have put France, which was once one of the richest countries in the world, in a situation of bankruptcy? Those who accuse me of that are the world champions of unemployement, the world champions of debt, the world champions of deficits, the world champions of the explosion of insecurity, and these are credible enough to come and tell me that I have no solution? Listen, I think the facts speak for themselves in this case. I do not take Islam to be an enemy in any circumstance. I say that there is a major problem of massive and anarchical immigration in our country which creates the conditions for conflict, for the disintegration of society, which disturbs our indivisibility, our laws, (et notamment) including our law on secularism. I think that a huge majority of French people agree with me on this.

-Alright, coming back to that question of secularism. France, we know is very adamant about secularism. This law on secularism dates back to 1905, at a time when the French state was dealing with a very powerful church, which is not the case anymore. The context today is very different. Should this law on secularism be amended?

-No but listen, we have in our... each nation has its own DNA, its history, its identity. France has been shaken by wars of religion which were terrible. We have this fear in our collective conscience as a people. The law on secularism has been there precisely to avoid the return of religious war. However, I do notice one thing, Madame, that is that the weakening of the law on secularism, that I am fighting against today, leads precisely to the rise of religious conflicts. It is for this reason, that I want the law of 1905 to be applied again in all its rigour, including for prohibiting the financing of places of worship, whatever they may be. I think this is an element of civil peace.

-Yes, but some Muslims feel that this law is being used to target them specifically.

-Madame, we are, France is a country of Greco-latin culture and Christian civilisation. This determines our whole way of life. This determines our calendar. This determines how we behave towards others. This determines the relationships between men an women. Consequently, that there may be reticence, resistance and that this culture finds itself facing

diverging claims ("se voie imposée ou fasse face à des réclamations"), nothing could be more natural than this. It would be the very same thing the other way around. If tomorrow there were systematic claims n the part of the Catholic Church in a given number of Muslims countries to obtain this or that, to not be subjected to this law or that law, of course there would be reticence on the part of Muslim countries.

-France banned the wearing of conspicuous symbols in public schools before full face veil in public we know, but you Marine Le Pen a few months ago said you wanted to go even further and ban Muslim headscarfs and the Jewish kippa in public. Is that what secularism is also, the eradication of all religious expressions?

- I think it's necessay that the law of 1905 should come back in all its force and firmness. It is indisputable that the law of 2004 which bans visible signs at school and thus bans the veil and the kippa and which exists... which hasn't been contested by anyone. I ask for this law... (interruption) I ask, so that everyone understands, that the scope of this law be widened to the whole of the publlic sphere and, according to surveys done, the French people are asking for the same thing.

-But as recently as April (2012) you said that secularism isn't about forbidding religious clothing or religious signs, so you've changed your mind?

- No, of course not. In your mind, a religious person is someone who has a religions. In French a religious person is, for example, the priest the rabbi, the imam. This is what is called "religious personnel". Religious personnel can have religious clothing but all the others should not be able to distinguish themselves, as it were, by presenting their religion before presenting themselves as individuals. This is, in a sens, the spirit of laïcité. It is, when you come across someone in the street, you cannot know what my religion is and I cannot know what yours is, because the individual takes precedence over religion in which he participates in his own private sphere.

-Alright, let's talk about radical Islam. You said that radical Islam is taking over French suburbs. Who is responsible for that, and why do you think that is happening?

-First of all, I consider politicians to be responsible because it's always those who do not prevent something from happening and who nevertheless have the power to stop it who are responsible for it. I think political religious movements rely on social uneasiness, they rely, once again, on generations which haven't been assimilated into France because of the numbers, because assimilation procedures which once allowed whole generations of foreigners to blend into the national community have been abandoned. So, they use this social uneasiness to recruit, in a way.

-Yeah but how widespred, really, is radical Islam in France? Isn't it an overstatement to said you know that it's highly widespread in the suburbs because the salafists who were said to practice a "pure Islam" are what? between ten and fifteen thousands. So isn't it an exageration to say that radical islaam is highly present in French suburbs?

-It's a good question. It's up to them to ask it. What is for certain is that attitudes are being radicalised, Madame. There you have it. We have had, there have been Muslims in France and for... I'll tell you, we have defended them because I'll remind you that during... after the Algerian War, we were the only political party to defend the Harkis and to be scandalised by the way they were received in France. They were French Muslims and they were, undeniably,

our brothers. At the time, there was no question of wearing the veil or any other demands. This was secularism's great era. It wasn't just France, you know this. There was Tunisia, Turkey, etc...

However, today it's true that because of the very high and rapidly growing number, these demands are stronger and stronger. I'll remind you also that I stood against street prayers and this was held against me at the very same time when Algeria itself was banning these street prayers. So, there is a point where one must not be deceitful ("de mauvaise foi") I think those who are sincere know that the demands I'm making are perfectly legitimate. Here's a phrase that makes peace amongst peoples, immigrants included: When in Rome, do as the Romans do. There you have it.

- Appendix 10. Tables of Profiles for the Analysis of Lexemes.

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
	Class1 **		
76.00	61.79	parlementaire	3.816279e-15
100.00	43.30	proposer	4.701215e-11
100.00	43.30	ump	4.701215e-11
76.47	42.26	mission	7.977963e-11
53.66	39.63	vie	3.062636e-10
60.71	37.97	prÉsident	7.180907e-10
90.00	37.22	commission	1.057638e-09
88.89	32.44	groupe	1.231615e-08
100.00	28.76	info	8.205584e-08
87.50	27.69	rÉsolution	1.424999e-07
80.00	27.67	sarkozy	1.436436e-07
69.23	24.76	dÉcision	6.492170e-07
69.23	24.76	expliquer	6.492170e-07
100.00	23.93	stasi	9.968559e-07
100.00	23.93	cours	9.968559e-07
100.00	23.93	lci	9.968559e-07
72.73	23.81	travail	1.062600e-06
85.71	22.98	rÉflexion	1.636416e-06
85.71	22.98	rtl	1.636416e-06
37.50	22.32	public	2.305161e-06
66.67	20.63	position	5.584862e-06
100.00	19.12	enquÊte	1.225284e-05
100.00	19.12	prÉcÉder	1.225284e-05
41.86	18.98	burqa	1.319316e-05
75.00	18.70	difficile	1.531563e-05
75.00	18.70	assemblÉe	1.531563e-05
52.38	18.41	parlement	1.776722e-05
83.33	18.33	crÉation	1.861277e-05
61.54	17.96	juin	2.256127e-05
71.43	14.38	mois	1.495678e-04
71.43	14.38	travailler	1.495678e-04
71.43	14.38	dÉputÉ	1.495678e-04
100.00	14.32	information	1.538293e-04
100.00	14.32	chaÎne	1.538293e-04
100.00	14.32	annoncer	1.538293e-04
44.44	14.27	permettre	1.585541e-04
45.83	13.96	venir	1.864169e-04
80.00	13.75	discuter	2.087988e-04
80.00	13.75	opposition	2.087988e-04
80.00	13.75	copÉ	2.087988e-04
80.00	13.75	ajouter	2.087988e-04
42.86	13.13	sujet	2.907540e-04
60.00	12.82	dernier	3.427282e-04
37.21	12.46	dÉbat	4.164407e-04
45.45	12.43	gouvernement	4.226111e-04
47.37	12.20	vrai	4.777038e-04
62.50	11.47	mot	7.086704e-04
62.50	11.47	initiative	7.086704e-04
43.48	11.24	exemple	7.986626e-04
43.48	11.24	interdiction	7.986626e-04
54.55	10.74	proposition	1.049241e-03
50.00	10.57	attendre	1.149799e-03
66.67	10.24	avril	1.377721e-03
75.00	9.30	union	2.288677e-03
55.56	9.25	occasion	2.359072e-03
55.56	9.25	nouvelle	2.359072e-03
50.00	9.04	rÉponse	2.646275e-03
38.46	8.33	prendre	3.905154e-03
35.29	7.95	politique	4.819148e-03

[376] TS/Tot is the percentage of TS containing the form which are associated to the class.

The chi2 gives the result of the dependence test. A higher chi2 shows that the dependence between the form and the class is more likely. A chi2 of 2.706 is correlated to a margin of mistake of 10%, a chi2 of 3.84 is correlated to a margin of 5%, a chi2 of 10.827 is correlated to a margin of 0.1%.

Form is the form of the occurrence.

p is the probability, *ie* the risk that the chi2 test be incorrect. A lower p means a lower margin of mistake for the test of dependence.

57.14	7.78	jean	5.274714e-03	50.00	4.48	charger	3.420530e-02
57.14	7.78	constitution	5.274714e-03	35.00	4.44	moment	3.507569e-02
35.71	6.80	temps	9.108841e-03	26.98	4.40	aller	3.590771e-02
42.86	6.45	nÉcessaire	1.110473e-02	40.00	3.61	crÉer	5.732921e-02
42.86	6.45	texte	1.110473e-02	35.71	3.34	forme	6.759129e-02
42.86	6.45	dÉcembre	1.110473e-02	35.71	3.34	souhaiter	6.759129e-02
60.00	6.37	soutenir	1.160300e-02	33.33	3.27	notamment	7.060186e-02
60.00	6.37	rÃ´le	1.160300e-02	42.86	3.20	responsable	7.381896e-02
60.00	6.37	polÉmique	1.160300e-02	42.86	3.20	responsabilitÉ	7.381896e-02
45.45	6.13	Évidemment	1.330011e-02	42.86	3.20	franÃ§ois	7.381896e-02
45.45	6.13	europÉen	1.330011e-02	50.00	2.98	Évolution	8.418723e-02
45.45	6.13	exprimer	1.330011e-02	50.00	2.98	violence	8.418723e-02
38.89	5.94	important	1.479948e-02	50.00	2.98	scolaire	8.418723e-02
36.36	5.69	demander	1.710955e-02	50.00	2.98	modÉrÉ	8.418723e-02
66.67	5.10	valls	2.394556e-02	50.00	2.98	assumer	8.418723e-02
66.67	5.10	utiliser	2.394556e-02	50.00	2.98	thÉorique	8.418723e-02
66.67	5.10	consÉquence	2.394556e-02	50.00	2.98	matin	8.418723e-02
66.67	5.10	valÉrie	2.394556e-02	50.00	2.98	collÈge	8.418723e-02
66.67	5.10	rÉunion	2.394556e-02	36.36	2.80	fond	9.407522e-02
66.67	5.10	rÉforme	2.394556e-02	36.36	2.80	application	9.407522e-02
66.67	5.10	prÉciser	2.394556e-02	37.50	2.28	cadre	1.309390e-01
66.67	5.10	prochain	2.394556e-02	37.50	2.28	ouvrir	1.309390e-01
66.67	5.10	pleinement	2.394556e-02	37.50	2.28	considÉrer	1.309390e-01
66.67	5.10	mÉdiateur	2.394556e-02	27.59	2.19	national	1.391194e-01
66.67	5.10	mesurer	2.394556e-02	28.00	2.03	lieu	1.540856e-01
66.67	5.10	membre	2.394556e-02	*	*	*	*
66.67	5.10	mars	2.394556e-02	81.82	32.27	2009	1.338897e-08
66.67	5.10	marque	2.394556e-02	70.00	19.54	aprÈs	9.843047e-06
66.67	5.10	intÉgriste	2.394556e-02	100.00	19.12	22	1.225284e-05
66.67	5.10	heureux	2.394556e-02	100.00	19.12	18	1.225284e-05
66.67	5.10	heure	2.394556e-02	63.64	16.63	2010	4.536077e-05
66.67	5.10	gÉnÉration	2.394556e-02	100.00	14.32	23	1.538293e-04
66.67	5.10	grave	2.394556e-02	80.00	13.75	quel	2.087988e-04
66.67	5.10	fondement	2.394556e-02	27.34	10.55	sur	1.163846e-03
66.67	5.10	dÉbattre	2.394556e-02	35.71	10.39	trÈs	1.267689e-03
66.67	5.10	chef	2.394556e-02	75.00	9.30	six	2.288677e-03
66.67	5.10	bienvenue	2.394556e-02	32.69	9.09	Ã§a	2.566146e-03
66.67	5.10	avÉrer	2.394556e-02	27.62	8.84	par	2.953175e-03
66.67	5.10	auditionner	2.394556e-02	21.24	7.20	avoir	7.301531e-03
66.67	5.10	apporter	2.394556e-02	20.70	7.11	le	7.653843e-03
66.67	5.10	actuellement	2.394556e-02	29.51	6.77	bien	9.244753e-03
66.67	5.10	accueil	2.394556e-02	60.00	6.37	moi_mÊme	1.160300e-02
32.26	4.98	ensemble	2.565458e-02	45.45	6.13	monsieur	1.330011e-02
50.00	4.48	vote	3.420530e-02	33.33	5.53	2003	1.866601e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
28.85	5.10	savoir	2.391320e-02
66.67	5.10	madame	2.394556e-02
41.67	5.01	devant	2.519643e-02
34.78	5.00	pourquoi	2.532368e-02
44.44	4.65	eux	3.108029e-02
44.44	4.65	an	3.108029e-02
50.00	4.48	telle	3.420530e-02
50.00	4.48	eh	3.420530e-02
50.00	4.48	demain	3.420530e-02
23.26	3.71	vous	5.417509e-02
35.71	3.34	peu	6.759129e-02
42.86	3.20	lui	7.381896e-02
42.86	3.20	f	7.381896e-02
42.86	3.20	attention	7.381896e-02
50.00	2.98	b	8.418723e-02
29.63	2.93	votre	8.718908e-02
36.36	2.80	dÉjÃ	9.407522e-02
21.00	2.77	ce	9.616120e-02
33.33	2.71	maintenant	9.948305e-02
20.28	2.55	une	1.100165e-01
29.17	2.40	d_abord	1.214489e-01
37.50	2.28	voilÃ	1.309390e-01
37.50	2.28	e	1.309390e-01
37.50	2.28	5	1.309390e-01
31.25	2.19	dont	1.387967e-01
21.05	2.05	nous	1.520871e-01
28.00	2.03	me	1.540856e-01
*	*	*	*

Class2 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
55.36	71.10	question	3.399602e-17
47.83	37.80	problÈme	7.851466e-10
100.00	37.75	ville	8.028997e-10
75.00	32.21	rÉpondre	1.384913e-08
75.00	32.21	mesure	1.384913e-08
80.00	31.48	personnel	2.012206e-08
72.73	27.27	sÉcuritÉ	1.771002e-07
100.00	26.90	quotidien	2.143530e-07
100.00	26.90	enfermer	2.143530e-07
52.17	23.65	poser	1.152943e-06
36.51	22.17	aller	2.495398e-06
100.00	21.49	Élu	3.552172e-06
100.00	21.49	urgence	3.552172e-06
100.00	21.49	meaux	3.552172e-06
100.00	21.49	burka	3.552172e-06
75.00	21.36	voter	3.797119e-06
83.33	20.80	rÉgler	5.108369e-06
83.33	20.80	etc	5.108369e-06
63.64	19.26	phÉnomÈne	1.140691e-05
66.67	17.77	projet	2.491121e-05
66.67	17.77	terme	2.491121e-05
71.43	16.49	cause	4.897404e-05
71.43	16.49	titre	4.897404e-05
71.43	16.49	besson	4.897404e-05
100.00	16.10	fillon	6.010647e-05
80.00	15.64	rÉflÉchir	7.649071e-05
80.00	15.64	crise	7.649071e-05
45.45	15.03	gouvernement	1.059602e-04
42.31	14.27	prendre	1.585242e-04
62.50	13.30	total	2.653908e-04
34.88	12.52	burqa	4.028658e-04
66.67	11.80	totalement	5.913190e-04
66.67	11.80	remettre	5.913190e-04
66.67	11.80	maire	5.913190e-04
66.67	11.80	favorable	5.913190e-04
66.67	11.80	dÉvelopper	5.913190e-04
55.56	10.86	lÉgifÉrer	9.823125e-04
75.00	10.63	r	1.113257e-03
75.00	10.63	polygamie	1.113257e-03
75.00	10.63	niqab	1.113257e-03
75.00	10.63	effectivement	1.113257e-03
75.00	10.63	discussion	1.113257e-03
42.11	10.18	intÉgral	1.422024e-03
32.56	9.66	penser	1.883578e-03
46.15	9.20	situation	2.423625e-03
46.15	9.20	simplement	2.423625e-03
46.15	9.20	possible	2.423625e-03
46.15	9.20	partir	2.423625e-03
46.15	9.20	ministre	2.423625e-03
57.14	9.11	franÃ§ois	2.540057e-03
57.14	9.11	extrÊmement	2.540057e-03
31.11	8.46	voir	3.620769e-03
60.00	7.42	sortir	6.452866e-03
60.00	7.42	retrouver	6.452866e-03
60.00	7.42	congrÈs	6.452866e-03
60.00	7.42	choquer	6.452866e-03
60.00	7.42	sembler	6.452866e-03
60.00	7.42	juillet	6.452866e-03

60.00	7.42	islamique	6.452866e-03	50.00	3.55	matin	5.950528e-02
60.00	7.42	exigence	6.452866e-03	50.00	3.55	justifier	5.950528e-02
45.45	7.41	laisser	6.487140e-03	50.00	3.55	gÊner	5.950528e-02
34.78	6.46	interdiction	1.105604e-02	50.00	3.55	education	5.950528e-02
41.67	6.16	annÉe	1.306280e-02	50.00	3.55	dÉfinir	5.950528e-02
41.67	6.16	rapport	1.306280e-02	50.00	3.55	drapeau	5.950528e-02
66.67	5.88	secte	1.531812e-02	50.00	3.55	confronter	5.950528e-02
66.67	5.88	propos	1.531812e-02	21.62	3.34	loi	6.779507e-02
66.67	5.88	lapidation	1.531812e-02	37.50	2.88	regarder	8.980713e-02
66.67	5.88	guaino	1.531812e-02	37.50	2.88	voilÉ	8.980713e-02
66.67	5.88	bÂtiment	1.531812e-02	37.50	2.88	prÉsenter	8.980713e-02
66.67	5.88	voie	1.531812e-02	37.50	2.88	initiative	8.980713e-02
66.67	5.88	versailles	1.531812e-02	25.81	2.45	etat	1.173030e-01
66.67	5.88	supposer	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	dÉbut	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	rÉsultat	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	constater	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	rencontrer	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	travers	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	paraÎtre	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	tort	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	logement	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	rÃ´le	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	lapider	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	hortefeux	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	justement	1.531812e-02	40.00	2.23	constitutionnel	1.355594e-01
66.67	5.88	imaginer	1.531812e-02	33.33	2.12	propre	1.455510e-01
66.67	5.88	gerin	1.531812e-02	27.78	2.00	cas	1.568570e-01
66.67	5.88	dÉcider	1.531812e-02	*	*	*	*
66.67	5.88	confier	1.531812e-02	100.00	16.10	vite	6.010647e-05
66.67	5.88	ampleur	1.531812e-02	62.50	13.30	e	2.653908e-04
66.67	5.88	amara	1.531812e-02	23.32	13.28	je	2.682837e-04
35.00	5.72	fois	1.676058e-02	26.40	12.63	dire	3.805885e-04
44.44	5.64	assurer	1.752587e-02	30.30	11.46	si	7.115199e-04
50.00	5.34	ordre	2.084151e-02	75.00	10.63	anti	1.113257e-03
38.46	5.13	absolument	2.349708e-02	30.77	9.44	savoir	2.125747e-03
33.33	5.02	parlement	2.508247e-02	46.15	9.20	loin	2.423625e-03
22.86	4.59	femme	3.224914e-02	57.14	9.11	f	2.540057e-03
40.00	4.48	visage	3.422761e-02	26.09	8.35	se	3.859054e-03
42.86	3.91	mari	4.808838e-02	60.00	7.42	moins	6.452866e-03
28.12	3.84	parler	5.003805e-02	60.00	7.42	longtemps	6.452866e-03
28.57	3.59	conseil	5.817855e-02	50.00	7.14	ensuite	7.547402e-03
36.36	3.57	maniÈre	5.891663e-02	23.44	6.76	sur	9.309037e-03
36.36	3.57	fond	5.891663e-02	41.67	6.16	ma	1.306280e-02
36.36	3.57	commun	5.891663e-02	24.72	6.05	ou	1.387518e-02
50.00	3.55	henri	5.950528e-02	31.25	6.03	moi	1.409748e-02
50.00	3.55	dÉterminer	5.950528e-02	66.67	5.88	g	1.531812e-02
50.00	3.55	Ã¢ge	5.950528e-02	25.71	5.73	j	1.671579e-02
50.00	3.55	secrÉtaire	5.950528e-02	22.48	5.23	vous	2.219130e-02
50.00	3.55	rÉpÉter	5.950528e-02	32.00	5.13	oui	2.354052e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
30.77	4.56	certains	3.269775e-02
33.33	4.28	encore	3.845179e-02
22.02	3.72	au	5.366992e-02
25.53	3.59	croire	5.803146e-02
25.00	3.58	Ã§a	5.855955e-02
36.36	3.57	comment	5.891663e-02
50.00	3.55	envers	5.950528e-02
50.00	3.55	b	5.950528e-02
24.53	3.29	aussi	6.977953e-02
19.90	3.23	qu	7.231193e-02
24.44	2.71	non	9.972415e-02
19.49	2.70	pour	1.005590e-01
18.01	2.64	avoir	1.039400e-01
26.92	2.52	lÃ	1.121523e-01
40.00	2.23	quatre	1.355594e-01
40.00	2.23	pourtant	1.355594e-01
40.00	2.23	celles	1.355594e-01
33.33	2.12	mal	1.455510e-01
27.78	2.00	toute	1.568570e-01
*	*	*	*

Class3 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
64.10	114.34	musulman	1.097027e-26
62.89	86.53	religion	1.379741e-20
52.34	62.58	france	2.554345e-15
69.77	49.64	culte	1.847374e-12
58.82	46.54	islam	8.998175e-12
100.00	43.46	pratiquer	4.330736e-11
100.00	40.30	citoyen	2.174392e-10
65.85	39.37	grand	3.514257e-10
47.44	24.03	franÃ§ais	9.488559e-07
90.00	23.23	seul	1.438864e-06
51.85	22.96	droit	1.649909e-06
75.00	22.22	discours	2.429736e-06
100.00	18.44	pratiquant	1.754518e-05
100.00	18.44	rÉcent	1.754518e-05
100.00	18.44	cfcm	1.754518e-05
71.43	16.74	imam	4.289822e-05
80.00	16.66	peur	4.472722e-05
75.00	16.58	mosquÉe	4.659223e-05
100.00	15.35	considÉration	8.948856e-05
69.23	14.10	foi	1.735437e-04
77.78	13.80	fidÈle	2.038168e-04
60.00	13.75	premier	2.085822e-04

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
100.00	12.26	tÉmoigner	4.623110e-04
100.00	12.26	relation	4.623110e-04
100.00	12.26	ca	4.623110e-04
51.72	11.82	chose	5.846651e-04
70.00	11.18	intÉgrer	8.268384e-04
83.33	11.18	aimer	8.265775e-04
83.33	11.18	appartenir	8.265775e-04
83.33	11.18	radical	8.265775e-04
83.33	11.18	parfaitement	8.265775e-04
83.33	11.18	consÉquent	8.265775e-04
83.33	11.18	amalgame	8.265775e-04
51.85	11.08	communautÉ	8.705485e-04
42.37	10.71	pays	1.068141e-03
55.56	9.43	nombre	2.130828e-03
45.00	9.34	respect	2.245347e-03
100.00	9.18	observer	2.440144e-03
100.00	9.18	transmettre	2.440144e-03
100.00	9.18	rÉciproque	2.440144e-03
100.00	9.18	monothÉiste	2.440144e-03
100.00	9.18	azhar	2.440144e-03
100.00	9.18	al	2.440144e-03
66.67	8.63	montrer	3.315518e-03
71.43	8.30	diffÉrent	3.973251e-03
80.00	8.28	citÉ	4.013443e-03
80.00	8.28	reprÉsenter	4.013443e-03
80.00	8.28	minoritÉ	4.013443e-03
80.00	8.28	dÉsormais	4.013443e-03
80.00	8.28	apaiser	4.013443e-03
58.33	7.42	majoritÉ	6.467282e-03
41.30	7.24	vivre	7.120123e-03
32.89	6.78	rÉpublique	9.206626e-03
50.00	6.34	reconnaÎtre	1.178404e-02
62.50	6.21	revanche	1.268499e-02
62.50	6.21	reprÉsentant	1.268499e-02
47.62	6.10	place	1.354380e-02
53.85	6.04	histoire	1.397843e-02
66.67	5.73	partie	1.669133e-02
66.67	5.73	organisation	1.669133e-02
66.67	5.73	culture	1.669133e-02
66.67	5.73	compatible	1.669133e-02
66.67	5.73	rÉgional	1.669133e-02
66.67	5.73	compatriote	1.669133e-02
75.00	5.47	juif	1.932148e-02
75.00	5.47	pensÉe	1.932148e-02

75.00	5.47	respectueux	1.932148e-02	66.67	2.85	extrÊme	9.117127e-02
75.00	5.47	islamophobe	1.932148e-02	66.67	2.85	dÉsigner	9.117127e-02
75.00	5.47	entier	1.932148e-02	66.67	2.85	dÉclaration	9.117127e-02
75.00	5.47	arrÊter	1.932148e-02	66.67	2.85	domaine	9.117127e-02
75.00	5.47	action	1.932148e-02	66.67	2.85	convention	9.117127e-02
55.56	4.66	devenir	3.081251e-02	66.67	2.85	convaincre	9.117127e-02
55.56	4.66	exercice	3.081251e-02	66.67	2.85	contribuer	9.117127e-02
37.50	4.50	valeur	3.380602e-02	66.67	2.85	cohÉrent	9.117127e-02
50.00	4.20	laÃ¯que	4.050124e-02	66.67	2.85	cacher	9.117127e-02
57.14	4.00	acte	4.550893e-02	66.67	2.85	boubakeur	9.117127e-02
57.14	4.00	Égal	4.550893e-02	66.67	2.85	adhÉrer	9.117127e-02
57.14	4.00	deuxiÈme	4.550893e-02	50.00	2.78	libre	9.522098e-02
50.00	3.49	attacher	6.179601e-02	50.00	2.78	tolÉrance	9.522098e-02
50.00	3.49	message	6.179601e-02	50.00	2.78	garantir	9.522098e-02
60.00	3.37	croyant	6.624667e-02	35.90	2.77	libertÉ	9.613083e-02
60.00	3.37	redire	6.624667e-02	45.45	2.59	connaÎtre	1.078072e-01
60.00	3.37	racisme	6.624667e-02	45.45	2.59	volontÉ	1.078072e-01
60.00	3.37	concitoyen	6.624667e-02	45.45	2.59	protÉger	1.078072e-01
60.00	3.37	campagne	6.624667e-02	45.45	2.59	juridique	1.078072e-01
60.00	3.37	arabo	6.624667e-02	50.00	2.08	Égard	1.489820e-01
32.58	3.35	laÃ¯citÉ	6.706891e-02	50.00	2.08	spirituel	1.489820e-01
46.15	3.27	tradition	7.039326e-02	50.00	2.08	fermer	1.489820e-01
40.00	3.25	monde	7.131615e-02	50.00	2.08	clairement	1.489820e-01
35.56	3.03	voir	8.192570e-02	35.48	2.02	rappeler	1.552199e-01
37.50	2.94	parler	8.636182e-02	*	*	*	*
66.67	2.85	table	9.117127e-02	57.89	36.37	autres	1.630717e-09
66.67	2.85	lancer	9.117127e-02	33.02	19.60	les	9.568444e-06
66.67	2.85	instance	9.117127e-02	77.78	13.80	mÊmes	2.038168e-04
66.67	2.85	Élection	9.117127e-02	45.95	9.42	sa	2.142363e-03
66.67	2.85	porteur	9.117127e-02	80.00	8.28	million	4.013443e-03
66.67	2.85	gros	9.117127e-02	57.14	8.07	celui	4.500264e-03
66.67	2.85	espoir	9.117127e-02	48.00	7.54	toutes	6.036032e-03
66.67	2.85	agresser	9.117127e-02	36.05	6.68	comme	9.762180e-03
66.67	2.85	zone	9.117127e-02	75.00	5.47	telles	1.932148e-02
66.67	2.85	unique	9.117127e-02	75.00	5.47	dÈs	1.932148e-02
66.67	2.85	tenir	9.117127e-02	26.50	5.23	de	2.224578e-02
66.67	2.85	reculer	9.117127e-02	36.54	4.20	tous	4.049716e-02
66.67	2.85	prier	9.117127e-02	50.00	4.20	point	4.050124e-02
66.67	2.85	matiÈre	9.117127e-02	50.00	4.20	certain	4.050124e-02
66.67	2.85	maghreb	9.117127e-02	28.07	4.13	que	4.215095e-02
66.67	2.85	lier	9.117127e-02	57.14	4.00	trois	4.550893e-02
66.67	2.85	instaurer	9.117127e-02	41.67	3.83	chacun	5.021515e-02
66.67	2.85	garantie	9.117127e-02	33.33	3.47	notre	6.249823e-02
66.67	2.85	former	9.117127e-02	27.69	3.34	avoir	6.760402e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
33.85	3.19	aux	7.418644e-02
42.11	3.17	ses	7.481764e-02
31.91	2.99	devoir	8.391422e-02
66.67	2.85	juste	9.117127e-02
27.02	2.73	et	9.822788e-02
40.00	2.59	leurs	1.078518e-01
27.84	2.20	des	1.378648e-01
37.50	2.18	ceux	1.395312e-01
30.48	2.17	pouvoir	1.403668e-01
*	*	*	*

Class4 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
73.33	36.20	nation	1.776222e-09
75.00	30.57	appeler	3.223840e-08
60.00	28.50	rÈgle	9.382071e-08
44.44	27.42	rÉpublicain	1.640922e-07
69.23	26.95	rester	2.085740e-07
77.78	25.06	effort	5.570742e-07
77.78	25.06	moyen	5.570742e-07
57.89	24.49	sentir	7.464157e-07
64.29	23.88	esprit	1.026318e-06
70.00	21.26	exister	4.010700e-06
70.00	21.26	avenir	4.010700e-06
55.56	20.64	identitÉ	5.556237e-06
100.00	20.53	diversitÉ	5.882339e-06
100.00	20.53	juppÉ	5.882339e-06
100.00	20.53	communautarismes	5.882339e-06
100.00	20.53	changer	5.882339e-06
100.00	20.53	alain	5.882339e-06
75.00	20.28	immigration	6.702044e-06
75.00	20.28	cÃ´tÉ	6.702044e-06
83.33	19.79	objectif	8.649993e-06
83.33	19.79	diffÉrence	8.649993e-06
50.00	18.67	intÉgration	1.554012e-05
66.67	16.81	culturel	4.136364e-05
66.67	16.81	nouveau	4.136364e-05
66.67	16.81	chance	4.136364e-05
100.00	15.38	sursaut	8.812770e-05
100.00	15.38	massif	8.812770e-05
100.00	15.38	personnellement	8.812770e-05
100.00	15.38	affaiblissement	8.812770e-05
36.96	15.09	vivre	1.027133e-04
80.00	14.87	continuer	1.151306e-04
80.00	14.87	stigmatiser	1.151306e-04
80.00	14.87	gens	1.151306e-04
80.00	14.87	frontiÈre	1.151306e-04
60.00	14.07	fonder	1.761557e-04
47.37	13.65	donner	2.206261e-04
62.50	12.55	sentiment	3.959212e-04
45.00	12.27	moment	4.605820e-04
54.55	11.86	commun	5.725387e-04
38.71	11.74	ensemble	6.113716e-04
66.67	11.16	Équilibre	8.343772e-04
66.67	11.16	dÉmocratie	8.343772e-04
75.00	10.09	servir	1.492655e-03
75.00	10.09	regard	1.492655e-03
75.00	10.09	pierre	1.492655e-03
75.00	10.09	parvenir	1.492655e-03
50.00	10.06	origine	1.518998e-03
38.46	9.57	respecter	1.980012e-03
31.25	8.24	valeur	4.089013e-03
36.00	7.25	trouver	7.073934e-03
60.00	6.99	chrÉtien	8.192268e-03
60.00	6.99	Économique	8.192268e-03
60.00	6.99	renoncer	8.192268e-03
60.00	6.99	idÉal	8.192268e-03
45.45	6.89	communautarisme	8.691954e-03
50.00	6.67	autoritÉ	9.804829e-03
32.35	6.62	politique	1.011003e-02
40.00	6.23	idÉe	1.257444e-02
23.03	6.05	rÉpublique	1.392679e-02
41.67	5.69	vraiment	1.707458e-02
66.67	5.56	conduire	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	adapter	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	veiller	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	nature	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	consensus	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	apparaÎtre	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	rÉussir	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	rÉformer	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	renforcer	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	reconnaissance	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	rassemblement	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	pacte	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	multiplier	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	issu	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	inscrire	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	dÉtourner	1.836779e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
66.67	5.56	dissimuler	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	coeur	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	civilisation	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	affrontement	1.836779e-02
66.67	5.56	accroÎtre	1.836779e-02
37.50	5.32	dialogue	2.110325e-02
44.44	5.24	nouvelle	2.213079e-02
44.44	5.24	haut	2.213079e-02
50.00	4.99	siÈcle	2.549412e-02
50.00	4.99	assimilation	2.549412e-02
38.46	4.71	tradition	3.006519e-02
38.46	4.71	partir	3.006519e-02
32.00	4.60	monde	3.200717e-02
35.29	4.54	agir	3.315419e-02
33.33	4.53	sociÉtÉ	3.337106e-02
40.00	4.13	hicham	4.223076e-02
35.71	3.89	sÃ"r	4.857238e-02
35.71	3.89	combat	4.857238e-02
42.86	3.62	poursuivre	5.724660e-02
42.86	3.62	engager	5.724660e-02
42.86	3.62	extrÊmement	5.724660e-02
42.86	3.62	dÉriver	5.724660e-02
50.00	3.32	unir	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	pÉriode	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	ur	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	rencontre	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	progrÈs	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	offrir	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	nÉcessitÉ	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	minoritaire	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	lutter	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	incompatible	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	cohÉsion	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	cher	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	antisÉmitisme	6.850953e-02
50.00	3.32	ambiguÃ¯tÉ	6.850953e-02
31.58	3.28	appliquer	6.997896e-02
36.36	3.25	volontÉ	7.129782e-02
36.36	3.25	proposition	7.129782e-02
37.50	2.63	Également	1.046991e-01
37.50	2.63	cadre	1.046991e-01
37.50	2.63	neutralitÉ	1.046991e-01
29.41	2.15	sorte	1.421565e-01
40.00	2.05	organiser	1.521974e-01

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
40.00	2.05	sein	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	rÉunir	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	racisme	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	prÉtexte	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	opposer	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	fraternitÉ	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	communautaire	1.521974e-01
40.00	2.05	campagne	1.521974e-01
*	*	*	*
30.77	13.06	notre	0.0003014891
55.56	10.20	force	0.0014035418
27.17	8.84	s	0.0029471860
24.05	8.45	faire	0.0036512418
38.89	6.81	cet	0.0090499413
33.33	6.54	oÃ¹	0.0105378775
66.67	5.56	elle_mÊme	0.0183677865
37.50	5.32	fort	0.0211032544
44.44	5.24	quoi	0.0221307890
27.27	5.12	donc	0.0236961728
42.86	3.62	aucune	0.0572465996
42.86	3.62	parfois	0.0572465996
50.00	3.32	1905	0.0685095285
28.57	3.15	contre	0.0759438755
25.58	2.81	quand	0.0936846981
20.47	2.65	nous	0.1034165276
31.25	2.64	dont	0.1044239794
33.33	2.56	mon	0.1097836957
24.07	2.50	aujourd_hui	0.1135804475
18.24	2.38	et	0.1226578432
23.08	2.32	aux	0.1279412201
18.23	2.16	l	0.1420921305
40.00	2.05	vers	0.1521973515
40.00	2.05	pourtant	0.1521973515
*	*	*	*

Class5 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
62.86	86.56	femme	1.357355e-20
73.13	85.49	voile	2.331153e-20
74.36	50.46	ÉgalitÉ	1.217179e-12
77.42	44.86	jeune	2.121077e-11
73.53	42.22	homme	8.140469e-11
79.17	36.79	accepter	1.318469e-09
75.00	36.66	port	1.403748e-09
60.78	34.79	principe	3.673166e-09

65.79	33.30	signe	7.907617e-09	52.63	7.31	intÉgral	6.845274e-03
78.95	28.70	porter	8.451624e-08	57.14	7.31	combat	6.868476e-03
85.71	26.71	fille	2.368708e-07	45.16	6.31	etat	1.202061e-02
100.00	26.17	sexe	3.130975e-07	60.00	6.18	doute	1.289661e-02
48.10	22.74	religieux	1.857168e-06	60.00	6.18	conscience	1.289661e-02
68.18	21.21	appartenance	4.112602e-06	62.50	5.68	formation	1.713907e-02
100.00	20.30	exclure	6.615513e-06	50.00	5.63	interdire	1.767161e-02
100.00	20.30	pression	6.615513e-06	53.85	5.43	rendre	1.984223e-02
100.00	17.38	empÊcher	3.061300e-05	66.67	5.27	ÉlÉment	2.168202e-02
80.00	15.53	refuser	8.112752e-05	66.67	5.27	repli	2.168202e-02
100.00	14.46	ÉlÈve	1.428085e-04	66.67	5.27	essayer	2.168202e-02
100.00	14.46	soumission	1.428085e-04	66.67	5.27	engagement	2.168202e-02
100.00	14.46	obligation	1.428085e-04	75.00	5.08	fin	2.419050e-02
100.00	14.46	homme_femme	1.428085e-04	75.00	5.08	oeil	2.419050e-02
100.00	14.46	extÉrieur	1.428085e-04	75.00	5.08	nÉgation	2.419050e-02
57.69	14.27	dignitÉ	1.586691e-04	75.00	5.08	rÉagir	2.419050e-02
66.67	13.33	imposer	2.615078e-04	75.00	5.08	individuel	2.419050e-02
85.71	13.24	croyance	2.746129e-04	75.00	5.08	coran	2.419050e-02
69.23	13.01	arriver	3.093392e-04	75.00	5.08	prÊt	2.419050e-02
69.23	13.01	expression	3.093392e-04	75.00	5.08	profond	2.419050e-02
77.78	12.84	rue	3.393553e-04	75.00	5.08	communautariste	2.419050e-02
61.11	11.99	notamment	5.362024e-04	43.33	5.00	mettre	2.535753e-02
100.00	11.56	Éducation	6.748172e-04	54.55	4.81	protÉger	2.828332e-02
100.00	11.56	tÊte	6.748172e-04	54.55	4.81	fondamental	2.828332e-02
100.00	11.56	retirer	6.748172e-04	50.00	4.36	social	3.688863e-02
100.00	11.56	enlever	6.748172e-04	55.56	4.21	novembre	4.025746e-02
48.72	11.24	libertÉ	8.022022e-04	55.56	4.21	mÉriter	4.025746e-02
45.83	10.69	École	1.076280e-03	42.31	3.82	respecter	5.062053e-02
83.33	10.45	ostentatoire	1.227657e-03	57.14	3.62	oublier	5.703693e-02
75.00	10.21	couvrir	1.394707e-03	57.14	3.62	poursuivre	5.703693e-02
100.00	8.66	promotion	3.257674e-03	57.14	3.62	comportement	5.703693e-02
100.00	8.66	politico_religieux	3.257674e-03	57.14	3.62	choisir	5.703693e-02
63.64	8.34	europe	3.887565e-03	57.14	3.62	mari	5.703693e-02
66.67	7.94	enseignement	4.844888e-03	57.14	3.62	majeur	5.703693e-02
80.00	7.72	compte	5.468989e-03	57.14	3.62	dÉfendre	5.703693e-02
80.00	7.72	sÉparation	5.468989e-03	50.00	3.10	contraire	7.851045e-02
80.00	7.72	soumettre	5.468989e-03	60.00	3.07	construire	7.963575e-02
80.00	7.72	confession	5.468989e-03	60.00	3.07	succÈs	7.963575e-02
80.00	7.72	accord	5.468989e-03	60.00	3.07	proviseur	7.963575e-02
71.43	7.68	sphÈre	5.595579e-03	60.00	3.07	privilÉgier	7.963575e-02
71.43	7.68	atteindre	5.595579e-03	60.00	3.07	facile	7.963575e-02
71.43	7.68	Écouter	5.595579e-03	60.00	3.07	distinguer	7.963575e-02
71.43	7.68	risque	5.595579e-03	60.00	3.07	communautaire	7.963575e-02
71.43	7.68	privÉ	5.595579e-03	60.00	3.07	au_delÃ	7.963575e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P	TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
60.00	3.07	acceptable	7.963575e-02	66.67	2.63	ostentatoires	1.051451e-01
46.15	2.86	conception	9.097028e-02	66.67	2.63	ostensibles	1.051451e-01
40.91	2.69	pratique	1.007050e-01	66.67	2.63	norme	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	relever	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	naturel	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	rÉseau	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	militantisme	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	obliger	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	insister	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	manifestation	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	fondamentalement	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	arabe	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	dÉnoncer	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	affaire	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	dimension	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	ÉlevÉ	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	contrat	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	tribunal	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	contester	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	temporel	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	capacitÉ	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	subir	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	battre	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	solution	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	base	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	signal	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	assister	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	revendication	1.051451e-01	66.67	2.63	amener	1.051451e-01
66.67	2.63	provoquer	1.051451e-01	50.00	2.47	libre	1.160254e-01
66.67	2.63	prosÉlytisme	1.051451e-01	50.00	2.47	symbole	1.160254e-01
66.67	2.63	priÈre	1.051451e-01	50.00	2.47	voilÉ	1.160254e-01
66.67	2.63	politico	1.051451e-01	50.00	2.47	seulement	1.160254e-01
66.67	2.63	payer	1.051451e-01	50.00	2.47	neutralitÉ	1.160254e-01
66.67	2.63	participer	1.051451e-01				

PS

Class1	**			TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
TS/Tot	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**	66.67	17.02	construction	3.702737e-05
77.78	60.33	mosquÉe	8.023269e-15	100.00	16.35	reconnaissance	5.260761e-05
65.62	45.13	grand	1.847103e-11	100.00	16.35	rassembler	5.260761e-05
90.00	31.68	guerre	1.813925e-08	100.00	16.35	hommage	5.260761e-05
61.54	30.06	lieu	4.190145e-08	100.00	16.35	carrÉ	5.260761e-05
100.00	28.78	strasbourg	8.110970e-08	70.00	16.21	tolÉrance	5.678245e-05
68.75	24.94	premier	5.902389e-07	70.00	16.21	maire	5.678245e-05
100.00	24.62	soldat	6.978486e-07	60.00	15.74	pari	7.248340e-05
87.50	23.48	sÃ"r	1.259159e-06	75.00	15.62	imam	7.760974e-05
100.00	20.48	mondial	6.030346e-06	83.33	15.45	Évoquer	8.454704e-05
85.71	19.44	dÉclarer	1.036722e-05	83.33	15.45	travail	8.454704e-05
77.78	19.42	exercer	1.050998e-05	83.33	15.45	minaret	8.454704e-05
77.78	19.42	occasion	1.050998e-05	52.38	14.65	identitÉ	1.291655e-04
77.78	19.42	nouvelle	1.050998e-05	63.64	13.62	formation	2.234870e-04
				43.75	12.34	national	4.435441e-04

100.00	12.24	front	4.676118e-04	66.67	4.18	seconde	4.085601e-02
100.00	12.24	profondÉment	4.676118e-04	66.67	4.18	roland	4.085601e-02
100.00	12.24	inauguration	4.676118e-04	66.67	4.18	espÉrer	4.085601e-02
100.00	12.24	verser	4.676118e-04	66.67	4.18	confessionnel	4.085601e-02
100.00	12.24	sang	4.676118e-04	41.67	3.71	mettre	5.410912e-02
100.00	12.24	inaugurer	4.676118e-04	41.67	3.71	contraire	5.410912e-02
71.43	11.93	apporter	5.521412e-04	41.67	3.71	inscrire	5.410912e-02
71.43	11.93	ouverture	5.521412e-04	50.00	3.49	sujet	6.155726e-02
80.00	11.54	beau	6.808447e-04	50.00	3.49	fidÈle	6.155726e-02
80.00	11.54	priÈre	6.808447e-04	50.00	3.49	modÈle	6.155726e-02
62.50	9.35	connaissance	2.233902e-03	50.00	3.49	lien	6.155726e-02
75.00	7.75	pierre	5.375537e-03	50.00	3.49	juif	6.155726e-02
75.00	7.75	ancien	5.375537e-03	50.00	3.49	territoire	6.155726e-02
75.00	7.75	rencontre	5.375537e-03	50.00	3.49	terre	6.155726e-02
75.00	7.75	cimetiÈre	5.375537e-03	50.00	3.49	mort	6.155726e-02
55.56	7.39	projet	6.563069e-03	50.00	3.49	juin	6.155726e-02
55.56	7.39	citoyennetÉ	6.563069e-03	30.77	3.21	rÉpublicain	7.329303e-02
55.56	7.39	fois	6.563069e-03	40.00	2.63	construire	1.049774e-01
57.14	6.24	Éducation	1.246067e-02	42.86	2.38	partir	1.226976e-01
46.15	5.85	rendre	1.561446e-02	50.00	2.32	objet	1.276292e-01
36.67	5.72	permettre	1.677676e-02	50.00	2.32	fier	1.276292e-01
60.00	5.15	rÃ´le	2.326620e-02	50.00	2.32	joie	1.276292e-01
60.00	5.15	intÉgrer	2.326620e-02	50.00	2.32	fonction	1.276292e-01
60.00	5.15	lier	2.326620e-02	50.00	2.32	revenir	1.276292e-01
60.00	5.15	choisir	2.326620e-02	50.00	2.32	pleinement	1.276292e-01
35.71	4.73	ministre	2.956491e-02	50.00	2.32	Établissement	1.276292e-01
50.00	4.68	annÉe	3.055632e-02	50.00	2.32	incarner	1.276292e-01
50.00	4.68	institution	3.055632e-02	50.00	2.32	extÉrieur	1.276292e-01
50.00	4.68	cas	3.055632e-02	50.00	2.32	envoyer	1.276292e-01
36.00	4.35	question	3.692038e-02	31.82	2.10	rappeler	1.474277e-01
66.67	4.18	haine	4.085601e-02	*	*	*	*
66.67	4.18	poser	4.085601e-02	100.00	16.35	0	5.260761e-05
66.67	4.18	jouer	4.085601e-02	31.58	12.75	pour	3.556151e-04
66.67	4.18	Épreuve	4.085601e-02	54.55	8.56	lors	3.434595e-03
66.67	4.18	tomber	4.085601e-02	75.00	7.75	aprÈs	5.375537e-03
66.67	4.18	sol	4.085601e-02	75.00	7.75	lendemain	5.375537e-03
66.67	4.18	phÉnomÈne	4.085601e-02	57.14	6.24	enfin	1.246067e-02
66.67	4.18	lutter	4.085601e-02	50.00	5.87	point	1.540461e-02
66.67	4.18	fraternel	4.085601e-02	24.43	5.18	avoir	2.281262e-02
66.67	4.18	contribuer	4.085601e-02	32.56	4.82	vouloir	2.812618e-02
66.67	4.18	ancrer	4.085601e-02	66.67	4.18	envers	4.085601e-02
66.67	4.18	absence	4.085601e-02	27.85	3.81	au	5.083132e-02
66.67	4.18	Édifice	4.085601e-02	27.78	3.36	cette	6.665568e-02
66.67	4.18	synagogue	4.085601e-02	32.14	2.85	j	9.134104e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
23.23	2.38	d	1.228730e-01
42.86	2.38	an	1.226976e-01
*	*	*	*
Class2	**		

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
63.83	151.70	culte	7.356024e-35
81.25	85.61	conseil	2.194211e-20
53.57	56.61	ministre	5.326557e-14
100.00	41.97	charger	9.248640e-11
70.00	37.36	cfcm	9.825837e-10
100.00	33.52	niveau	7.069362e-09
100.00	33.52	affaire	7.069362e-09
100.00	33.52	rÉgir	7.069362e-09
100.00	33.52	reprÉsentatif	7.069362e-09
83.33	33.38	assurer	7.581235e-09
71.43	27.27	souhaiter	1.769064e-07
60.00	25.82	Étranger	3.756765e-07
80.00	25.27	islamique	4.977427e-07
100.00	25.09	boubakeur	5.474099e-07
62.50	22.71	dialogue	1.879600e-06
54.55	22.50	intÉrieur	2.101246e-06
66.67	19.81	soir	8.540817e-06
66.67	19.81	invitation	8.540817e-06
55.56	19.19	instance	1.180792e-05
55.56	19.19	saluer	1.180792e-05
75.00	17.37	rapport	3.074094e-05
75.00	17.37	recteur	3.074094e-05
75.00	17.37	particuliÈrement	3.074094e-05
75.00	17.37	fixer	3.074094e-05
50.00	16.40	organisation	5.131398e-05
57.14	15.94	adresser	6.525323e-05
50.00	13.07	utiliser	3.002264e-04
60.00	12.79	constituer	3.494079e-04
60.00	12.79	objectif	3.494079e-04
60.00	12.79	rÉjouir	3.494079e-04
30.77	11.45	etat	7.141749e-04
35.29	11.06	discours	8.844601e-04
19.13	10.80	musulman	1.015642e-03
38.46	10.69	gouvernement	1.076097e-03
66.67	9.85	janvier	1.698206e-03
66.67	9.85	sÉnat	1.698206e-03
66.67	9.85	dÉriver	1.698206e-03
66.67	9.85	initier	1.698206e-03
66.67	9.85	confÉrence	1.698206e-03

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
40.00	9.11	tenir	2.542530e-03
36.36	7.70	reprÉsenter	5.522182e-03
42.86	7.64	relation	5.712841e-03
50.00	6.48	possible	1.087951e-02
50.00	6.48	large	1.087951e-02
50.00	6.48	engager	1.087951e-02
22.50	6.25	franÃ§ais	1.242414e-02
37.50	6.07	diffÉrent	1.372992e-02
37.50	6.07	cas	1.372992e-02
27.78	5.65	agir	1.747543e-02
28.57	4.77	cadre	2.888757e-02
40.00	4.51	propos	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	initiative	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	engagement	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	juillet	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	fraternitÉ	3.366634e-02
30.00	3.95	particulier	4.693276e-02
33.33	3.23	sujet	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	texte	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	rÉalitÉ	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	reprÉsentant	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	crÉer	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	laÃ¯que	7.210604e-02
27.27	3.21	responsable	7.335672e-02
20.83	2.68	prÉsident	1.019135e-01
28.57	2.36	dÉvelopper	1.248610e-01
28.57	2.36	traitement	1.248610e-01
28.57	2.36	assemblÉe	1.248610e-01
28.57	2.36	voter	1.248610e-01
28.57	2.36	appliquer	1.248610e-01
23.08	2.12	dernier	1.455202e-01
*	*	*	*
21.19	17.30	du	3.197685e-05
15.30	13.00	le	3.119354e-04
66.67	9.85	tiens	1.698206e-03
15.64	8.79	des	3.025052e-03
50.00	6.48	2014	1.087951e-02
27.78	5.65	ici	1.747543e-02
17.39	5.15	devoir	2.329676e-02
33.33	4.88	votre	2.717740e-02
16.67	4.64	je	3.129584e-02
40.00	4.51	autour	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	dÉjÃ	3.366634e-02
40.00	4.51	parmi	3.366634e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
30.00	3.95	elles	4.693276e-02
30.00	3.95	me	4.693276e-02
33.33	3.23	mon	7.210604e-02
33.33	3.23	ma	7.210604e-02
18.60	3.02	vouloir	8.201714e-02
16.92	2.96	avec	8.532893e-02
16.98	2.40	vous	1.215222e-01
21.05	2.19	croire	1.389661e-01
21.05	2.19	toutes	1.389661e-01
11.56	2.08	de	1.496719e-01
*	*	*	*

Class3 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
64.29	58.60	laÃ¯citÉ	1.928001e-14
77.27	53.04	loi	3.265469e-13
73.17	41.07	principe	1.469850e-10
74.29	36.42	public	1.590233e-09
92.86	27.93	port	1.259973e-07
87.50	26.86	voile	2.186863e-07
87.50	26.86	signe	2.186863e-07
60.00	24.95	religieux	5.895215e-07
100.00	24.50	interdire	7.431553e-07
91.67	22.96	espace	1.654969e-06
66.67	21.31	libertÉ	3.909971e-06
77.78	21.04	École	4.507698e-06
90.91	20.50	rÈgle	5.971231e-06
100.00	19.52	protÉger	9.929530e-06
100.00	17.05	fondamental	3.637560e-05
68.18	16.66	respect	4.480933e-05
81.82	14.89	conscience	1.140859e-04
100.00	14.59	privÉ	1.337699e-04
76.92	14.52	garantir	1.387383e-04
87.50	13.22	juridique	2.762690e-04
87.50	13.22	libre	2.762690e-04
100.00	12.13	groupe	4.952456e-04
100.00	12.13	fondamentaliste	4.952456e-04
100.00	12.13	neutralitÉ	4.952456e-04
100.00	12.13	fonder	4.952456e-04
100.00	12.13	communautarisme	4.952456e-04
85.71	10.85	service	9.875185e-04
85.71	10.85	philosophique	9.875185e-04
85.71	10.85	banc	9.875185e-04
85.71	10.85	applaudissement	9.875185e-04
66.67	10.34	commun	1.298592e-03
77.78	10.34	cause	1.304194e-03
77.78	10.34	passer	1.304194e-03
100.00	9.69	difficultÉ	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	empÊcher	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	burqa	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	sphÈre	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	intÉgral	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	distinction	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	corps	1.854383e-03
100.00	9.69	collectivitÉ	1.854383e-03
61.11	9.04	sociÉtÉ	2.637594e-03
83.33	8.51	attaque	3.522491e-03
83.33	8.51	laÃ¯c	3.522491e-03
75.00	8.15	enjeu	4.310712e-03
75.00	8.15	vie	4.310712e-03
75.00	8.15	conviction	4.310712e-03
53.85	7.89	etat	4.975071e-03
100.00	7.25	bianco	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	ignorance	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	vp	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	rÉclamer	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	minoritaire	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	dÉfier	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	constitution	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	individuel	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	dÉterminer	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	commencer	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	arrÊter	7.080185e-03
100.00	7.25	application	7.080185e-03
80.00	6.23	individu	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	appeler	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	dÉfendre	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	terme	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	pacte	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	fermetÉ	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	communautaire	1.253055e-02
80.00	6.23	cesser	1.253055e-02
66.67	6.14	imposer	1.325035e-02
71.43	6.05	devenir	1.394233e-02
71.43	6.05	rue	1.394233e-02
71.43	6.05	socialiste	1.394233e-02
71.43	6.05	coeur	1.394233e-02
52.38	5.58	ÉgalitÉ	1.820811e-02
40.00	4.75	religion	2.931698e-02

50.00	4.70	politique	3.009165e-02	66.67	2.02	concept	1.550466e-01
60.00	4.61	notamment	3.185670e-02	66.67	2.02	avril	1.550466e-01
60.00	4.61	respecter	3.185670e-02	66.67	2.02	situer	1.550466e-01
62.50	4.29	porter	3.823082e-02	66.67	2.02	rÉduire	1.550466e-01
62.50	4.29	diffÉrence	3.823082e-02	66.67	2.02	intransigeant	1.550466e-01
66.67	4.07	comprendre	4.373207e-02	66.67	2.02	dÉmocratique	1.550466e-01
66.67	4.07	comportement	4.373207e-02	66.67	2.02	clair	1.550466e-01
66.67	4.07	seulement	4.373207e-02	66.67	2.02	vigilance	1.550466e-01
66.67	4.07	croyant	4.373207e-02	66.67	2.02	transiger	1.550466e-01
66.67	4.07	exercice	4.373207e-02	66.67	2.02	tenue	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	symbolique	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	sÉparer	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	expliquer	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	sÉparation	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	idÉal	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	sociÉtal	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	chef	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	simple	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	article	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	revanche	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	prÉcisÉment	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	renvoyer	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	fermer	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	glavany	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	ethnique	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	disposer	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	appel	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	confusion	1.550466e-01
75.00	4.04	appartenance	4.435200e-02	66.67	2.02	athÉe	1.550466e-01
54.55	3.43	raison	6.405787e-02	66.67	2.02	aider	1.550466e-01
43.75	3.39	valeur	6.559924e-02	66.67	2.02	affirmation	1.550466e-01
37.21	3.03	rÉpublique	8.158605e-02	*	*	*	*
55.56	3.02	seul	8.205551e-02	83.33	8.51	1905	0.003522491
55.56	3.02	laisser	8.205551e-02	32.74	8.06	la	0.004524689
57.14	2.64	monter	1.044969e-01	100.00	7.25	diffÉrents	0.007080185
57.14	2.64	idÉe	1.044969e-01	100.00	7.25	concernant	0.007080185
57.14	2.64	traitement	1.044969e-01	80.00	6.23	2003	0.012530546
57.14	2.64	exprimer	1.044969e-01	46.34	6.16	elle	0.013052811
57.14	2.64	assemblÉe	1.044969e-01	55.56	6.15	chacun	0.013115105
57.14	2.64	voter	1.044969e-01	52.63	5.14	dont	0.023443190
57.14	2.64	propre	1.044969e-01	35.63	4.88	ne	0.027195018
57.14	2.64	appliquer	1.044969e-01	53.33	4.27	leurs	0.038807416
41.94	2.50	vivre	1.137016e-01	75.00	4.04	2009	0.044352005
60.00	2.28	proposer	1.309502e-01	35.71	3.68	pas	0.055117039
60.00	2.28	outil	1.309502e-01	57.14	2.64	dÈs	0.104496882
60.00	2.28	faÃ§on	1.309502e-01	38.89	2.62	plus	0.105486130
60.00	2.28	aspect	1.309502e-01	50.00	2.52	or	0.112667076
50.00	2.09	exister	1.483675e-01	38.46	2.29	ou	0.130024464
50.00	2.09	ordre	1.483675e-01	60.00	2.28	aucune	0.130950238
66.67	2.02	rester	1.550466e-01	35.87	2.26	devoir	0.132767287
66.67	2.02	radical	1.550466e-01	66.67	2.02	vis_Ã _vis	0.155046605
66.67	2.02	interroger	1.550466e-01	66.67	2.02	celles	0.155046605
66.67	2.02	retour	1.550466e-01	66.67	2.02	malgrÉ	0.155046605

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
66.67	2.02	presque	0.155046605		100.00	7.66	institut	5.635548e-03
66.67	2.02		14 0.155046605		61.54	7.29	jeune	6.948362e-03
*	*	*	*		61.54	7.29	dernier	6.948362e-03
Class4	**				61.54	7.29	besoin	6.948362e-03
TS/Tot	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**		80.00	6.67	apaiser	9.807440e-03
92.59	58.11	monde	2.484393e-14		80.00	6.67	dÉfi	9.807440e-03
50.43	35.65	musulman	2.363673e-09		71.43	6.53	participer	1.063519e-02
50.00	29.47	islam	5.677903e-08		71.43	6.53	gens	1.063519e-02
91.67	24.36	parler	7.984083e-07		56.25	6.38	origine	1.152995e-02
91.67	24.36	arabe	7.984083e-07		56.25	6.38	venir	1.152995e-02
100.00	23.25	deuxiÈme	1.419447e-06		57.14	5.92	message	1.494605e-02
43.28	19.99	france	7.789438e-06		57.14	5.92	social	1.494605e-02
88.89	16.61	jour	4.591536e-05		57.14	5.92	histoire	1.494605e-02
76.92	15.58	concitoyen	7.921245e-05		52.94	5.28	place	2.153374e-02
80.00	13.47	majoritÉ	2.427835e-04		66.67	4.42	amalgame	3.553947e-02
75.00	13.24	culturel	2.741150e-04		66.67	4.42	au_delÃ	3.553947e-02
100.00	12.82	confiance	3.428013e-04		66.67	4.42	Évidemment	3.553947e-02
100.00	12.82	gÉnÉral	3.428013e-04		66.67	4.42	fond	3.553947e-02
100.00	12.82	effort	3.428013e-04		66.67	4.42	voix	3.553947e-02
45.33	12.58	religion	3.905005e-04		50.00	4.35	problÈme	3.702894e-02
85.71	11.56	collectif	6.748854e-04		75.00	4.35	Élu	3.709239e-02
77.78	11.08	acte	8.723736e-04		75.00	4.35	repli	3.709239e-02
77.78	11.08	culture	8.723736e-04		75.00	4.35	tendre	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	occident	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	capacitÉ	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	richesse	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	aspiration	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	occidental	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	normal	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	haut	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	attentat	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	charlie	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	assimiler	3.709239e-02
100.00	10.24	chance	1.376426e-03		75.00	4.35	appartenir	3.709239e-02
83.33	9.08	compatriote	2.577232e-03		54.55	3.83	immigration	5.027253e-02
83.33	9.08	terroriste	2.577232e-03		47.37	3.55	voir	5.940158e-02
83.33	9.08	diversitÉ	2.577232e-03		42.42	3.49	pays	6.179672e-02
83.33	9.08	chercher	2.577232e-03		55.56	3.37	pratiquer	6.646996e-02
83.33	9.08	immense	2.577232e-03		55.56	3.37	nation	6.646996e-02
66.67	8.94	sentir	2.789456e-03		50.00	3.36	penser	6.694237e-02
66.67	8.94	important	2.789456e-03		45.45	3.35	citoyen	6.711525e-02
75.00	8.76	vrai	3.081100e-03		47.06	3.07	chose	7.995656e-02
75.00	8.76	responsabilitÉ	3.081100e-03		57.14	2.92	donner	8.738777e-02
60.00	7.68	confession	5.590527e-03		57.14	2.92	peur	8.738777e-02
100.00	7.66	civilisation	5.635548e-03		57.14	2.92	semaine	8.738777e-02
100.00	7.66	solidaire	5.635548e-03		57.14	2.92	relation	8.738777e-02
100.00	7.66	sembler	5.635548e-03		57.14	2.92	position	8.738777e-02
100.00	7.66	honte	5.635548e-03		50.00	2.87	ouvrir	9.047690e-02
100.00	7.66	regrettable	5.635548e-03		60.00	2.51	effectivement	1.130828e-01

60.00	2.51	relever	1.130828e-01	58.33	5.48	toute	0.019208426
60.00	2.51	issu	1.130828e-01	52.94	5.28	parce_que	0.021533744
60.00	2.51	titre	1.130828e-01	44.44	5.00	ses	0.025380636
60.00	2.51	ignorer	1.130828e-01	31.78	4.98	et	0.025614365
50.00	2.38	nombre	1.229719e-01	62.50	4.70	demain	0.030140831
50.00	2.38	tenir	1.229719e-01	66.67	4.42	c_est_Ã_dire	0.035539468
41.67	2.23	prendre	1.351081e-01	75.00	4.35	anti	0.037092389
66.67	2.20	mot	1.382815e-01	75.00	4.35	monsieur	0.037092389
66.67	2.20	fondation	1.382815e-01	53.85	4.31	Ã§a	0.037932963
66.67	2.20	antisÉmitisme	1.382815e-01	40.00	4.18	dire	0.040897448
66.67	2.20	universel	1.382815e-01	50.00	3.36	quand	0.066942368
66.67	2.20	extrÉmiste	1.382815e-01	39.53	2.94	ces	0.086384836
66.67	2.20	Émancipation	1.382815e-01	37.74	2.61	vous	0.105887522
66.67	2.20	vÉritable	1.382815e-01	60.00	2.51	peut_Être	0.113082802
66.67	2.20	respectueux	1.382815e-01	60.00	2.51	eux	0.113082802
66.67	2.20	recevoir	1.382815e-01	50.00	2.38	moi	0.122971894
66.67	2.20	prÉsenter	1.382815e-01	37.78	2.20	aussi	0.137769144
66.67	2.20	prouver	1.382815e-01	66.67	2.20	million	0.138281487
66.67	2.20	paysage	1.382815e-01	66.67	2.20	certes	0.138281487
66.67	2.20	moderne	1.382815e-01	66.67	2.20	quelque	0.138281487
66.67	2.20	justifier	1.382815e-01	66.67	2.20	eux_mÊmes	0.138281487
66.67	2.20	gÉnÉration	1.382815e-01	*	*	*	*
66.67	2.20	entier	1.382815e-01	Class5	**		
66.67	2.20	dÉlivrer	1.382815e-01	**TS/Tot**	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**
66.67	2.20	domaine	1.382815e-01	91.67	153.08	homme	3.671438e-35
66.67	2.20	distance	1.382815e-01	70.59	57.92	femme	2.733097e-14
66.67	2.20	commettre	1.382815e-01	47.22	46.17	droit	1.083926e-11
66.67	2.20	ajouter	1.382815e-01	85.71	37.00	parole	1.183268e-09
66.67	2.20	ÉvÉnement	1.382815e-01	100.00	29.94	robert	4.456653e-08
66.67	2.20	peine	1.382815e-01	100.00	29.94	badinter	4.456653e-08
66.67	2.20	jack	1.382815e-01	100.00	29.94	idÉologique	4.456653e-08
66.67	2.20	historique	1.382815e-01	100.00	29.94	cour	4.456653e-08
66.67	2.20	entreprise	1.382815e-01	83.33	29.64	parfaitement	5.193716e-08
66.67	2.20	difficile	1.382815e-01	66.67	26.29	europÉen	2.931113e-07
66.67	2.20	destin	1.382815e-01	58.33	25.35	temps	4.773086e-07
66.67	2.20	convaincre	1.382815e-01	71.43	24.07	concret	9.300889e-07
66.67	2.20	blasphÈme	1.382815e-01	80.00	22.41	Économique	2.202975e-06
*	*	*	*	80.00	22.41	traiter	2.202975e-06
100.00	10.24	quelle	0.001376426	80.00	22.41	convenir	2.202975e-06
39.50	9.57	c	0.001975578	54.55	19.57	compatible	9.705834e-06
100.00	7.66	elle_mÊme	0.005635548	66.67	17.43	nom	2.981554e-05
31.48	6.76	Être	0.009297688	42.11	17.23	dÉbat	3.305870e-05
71.43	6.53	force	0.010635191	75.00	15.36	progrÈs	8.867684e-05
46.88	5.83	ils	0.015766351	46.15	14.98	dÉmocratie	1.084192e-04

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
38.89	13.01	agir	3.093873e-04		37.50	5.10	entendre	2.386079e-02
50.00	11.30	État	7.765055e-04		30.77	4.55	affirmer	3.282927e-02
60.00	11.18	souligner	8.248634e-04		33.33	4.04	laisser	4.455432e-02
60.00	11.18	nicolas	8.248634e-04		33.33	4.04	imposer	4.455432e-02
60.00	11.18	action	8.248634e-04		40.00	3.82	effectivement	5.060963e-02
60.00	11.18	regarder	8.248634e-04		40.00	3.82	bataille	5.060963e-02
60.00	11.18	majeur	8.248634e-04		40.00	3.82	aspect	5.060963e-02
44.44	9.29	exemple	2.299871e-03		30.00	3.21	ordre	7.338207e-02
44.44	9.29	sarkozy	2.299871e-03		33.33	2.67	Éviter	1.019409e-01
66.67	8.67	viande	3.243343e-03		33.33	2.67	ville	1.019409e-01
66.67	8.67	interdiction	3.243343e-03		27.27	2.55	raison	1.102709e-01
66.67	8.67	dÉcision	3.243343e-03		27.27	2.55	face	1.102709e-01
66.67	8.67	cours	3.243343e-03		*	*	*	*
66.67	8.67	contraindre	3.243343e-03		60.00	11.18	sous	0.0008248634
50.00	8.44	montrer	3.670261e-03		35.71	7.82	m	0.0051619603
50.00	8.44	adopter	3.670261e-03		33.33	5.41	deux	0.0200025138
42.86	6.52	condition	1.069058e-02		37.50	5.10	souvent	0.0238607853
42.86	6.52	prÉsence	1.069058e-02		24.14	4.42	aujourd_hui	0.0355395855
36.36	6.45	simplement	1.111086e-02		40.00	3.82	bon	0.0506096275
36.36	6.45	cÃ´tÉ	1.111086e-02		16.43	3.79	pas	0.0516317670
28.57	5.84	ÉgalitÉ	1.569800e-02		15.17	3.65	des	0.0560829395
50.00	5.61	doute	1.790508e-02		25.00	3.43	sans	0.0640491949
50.00	5.61	dignitÉ	1.790508e-02		23.81	2.98	trÈs	0.0841168151
50.00	5.61	violent	1.790508e-02		33.33	2.67	ma	0.1019408548
50.00	5.61	gagner	1.790508e-02		18.37	2.18	on	0.1395367654
50.00	5.61	fÉvrier	1.790508e-02		*	*	*	*
50.00	5.61	attendre	1.790508e-02					

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TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
Class1	**				85.71	11.10	front	8.646067e-04
82.86	56.05	rÉpublique	7.056491e-14		60.00	9.91	national	1.644690e-03
78.95	52.99	loi	3.344947e-13		100.00	9.84	nicolas	1.707836e-03
71.88	32.00	religieux	1.542773e-08		100.00	9.84	critiquer	1.707836e-03
63.64	21.58	laÃ¯citÉ	3.400902e-06		100.00	9.84	maniÈre	1.707836e-03
84.62	20.28	principe	6.678462e-06		100.00	9.84	affaire	1.707836e-03
100.00	17.42	libertÉ	2.999410e-05		100.00	9.84	socialiste	1.707836e-03
88.89	16.04	respecter	6.203454e-05		100.00	9.84	ministre	1.707836e-03
54.05	12.82	religion	3.435489e-04		100.00	9.84	vie	1.707836e-03
100.00	12.35	respect	4.417917e-04		100.00	7.35	signe	6.699432e-03
100.00	12.35	reconnaÎtre	4.417917e-04		100.00	7.35	autoritÉ	6.699432e-03
					100.00	7.35	strict	6.699432e-03

100.00	7.35	mode	6.699432e-03	66.67	2.06	cibler	1.513962e-01
100.00	7.35	libre	6.699432e-03	66.67	2.06	catholicisme	1.513962e-01
100.00	7.35	avril	6.699432e-03	*	*	*	*
100.00	7.35	autoriser	6.699432e-03	37.36	18.36	la	1.829288e-05
100.00	7.35	social	6.699432e-03	100.00	17.42	toutes	2.999410e-05
100.00	7.35	vÊtement	6.699432e-03	100.00	14.87	1905	1.150168e-04
100.00	7.35	extrÉmiste	6.699432e-03	34.29	12.24	de	4.681932e-04
100.00	7.35	essentiel	6.699432e-03	59.09	10.35	devoir	1.295082e-03
80.00	6.36	mettre	1.170245e-02	100.00	9.84	devant	1.707836e-03
80.00	6.36	intÉrieur	1.170245e-02	100.00	7.35	comment	6.699432e-03
80.00	6.36	rÉpublicain	1.170245e-02	71.43	6.19	tant	1.281157e-02
80.00	6.36	nom	1.170245e-02	62.50	4.42	cet	3.554503e-02
80.00	6.36	catholique	1.170245e-02	66.67	4.16	ainsi	4.130233e-02
80.00	6.36	combattre	1.170245e-02	45.45	3.06	mÊme	8.033167e-02
80.00	6.36	revenir	1.170245e-02	33.58	2.48	les	1.151078e-01
80.00	6.36	protestant	1.170245e-02	60.00	2.34	pendant	1.264599e-01
71.43	6.19	valeur	1.281157e-02	60.00	2.34	enfin	1.264599e-01
57.14	5.57	Étranger	1.823705e-02	60.00	2.34	peu	1.264599e-01
62.50	4.42	adapter	3.554503e-02	66.67	2.06	2015	1.513962e-01
75.00	4.12	interdire	4.246002e-02	66.67	2.06	quelle	1.513962e-01
75.00	4.12	fois	4.246002e-02	66.67	2.06	vers	1.513962e-01
75.00	4.12	entendre	4.246002e-02	*	*	*	*
75.00	4.12	saint	4.246002e-02	Class2	**		
75.00	4.12	fermetÉ	4.246002e-02	**TS/Tot**	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**
75.00	4.12	conflit	4.246002e-02	65.08	31.30	france	2.206068e-08
57.14	2.71	premier	9.962148e-02	94.44	29.18	nation	6.602984e-08
57.14	2.71	communautÉ	9.962148e-02	100.00	18.81	histoire	1.444271e-05
60.00	2.34	dÉfendre	1.264599e-01	100.00	16.86	europÉen	4.017385e-05
60.00	2.34	appeler	1.264599e-01	81.25	15.49	monde	8.305467e-05
60.00	2.34	rÉalitÉ	1.264599e-01	59.18	14.59	musulman	1.338460e-04
66.67	2.06	grand	1.513962e-01	88.89	11.55	nombreux	6.783335e-04
66.67	2.06	imam	1.513962e-01	100.00	11.11	compte	8.573000e-04
66.67	2.06	gouvernement	1.513962e-01	100.00	11.11	situation	8.573000e-04
66.67	2.06	apporter	1.513962e-01	100.00	11.11	occidental	8.573000e-04
66.67	2.06	prÉsident	1.513962e-01	62.96	9.83	pays	1.720584e-03
66.67	2.06	laÃ¯que	1.513962e-01	100.00	9.23	phÉnomÈne	2.386816e-03
66.67	2.06	capitulation	1.513962e-01	100.00	9.23	rÉgime	2.386816e-03
66.67	2.06	utiliser	1.513962e-01	68.75	8.17	penser	4.259635e-03
66.67	2.06	substituer	1.513962e-01	85.71	7.88	partir	4.991392e-03
66.67	2.06	protÉger	1.513962e-01	85.71	7.88	civilisation	4.991392e-03
66.67	2.06	personnel	1.513962e-01	100.00	7.35	identitÉ	6.697883e-03
66.67	2.06	intÉgrer	1.513962e-01	100.00	7.35	volontÉ	6.697883e-03
66.67	2.06	gouverner	1.513962e-01	100.00	7.35	propre	6.697883e-03
66.67	2.06	exemple	1.513962e-01	100.00	7.35	israÃ"l	6.697883e-03

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
77.78	7.24	seulement	7.147301e-03
83.33	6.11	nouvelle	1.346878e-02
83.33	6.11	idÉologie	1.346878e-02
83.33	6.11	connaÎtre	1.346878e-02
48.44	6.07	islam	1.374375e-02
100.00	5.49	appliquer	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	service	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	produire	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	travers	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	estimer	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	avenir	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	affaiblir	1.908946e-02
100.00	5.49	acclimater	1.908946e-02
64.29	5.31	culture	2.118616e-02
66.67	5.30	radical	2.135822e-02
80.00	4.39	soutenir	3.622908e-02
80.00	4.39	État	3.622908e-02
80.00	4.39	venir	3.622908e-02
80.00	4.39	siÈcle	3.622908e-02
63.64	3.94	passer	4.715465e-02
54.55	3.76	politique	5.242385e-02
75.00	2.75	partie	9.707158e-02
75.00	2.75	rÉcent	9.707158e-02
75.00	2.75	menace	9.707158e-02
75.00	2.75	assimiler	9.707158e-02
75.00	2.75	accord	9.707158e-02
62.50	2.61	majoritÉ	1.063670e-01
66.67	2.59	europe	1.076917e-01
*	*	*	*
100.00	7.35	trente	0.006697883
46.84	6.20	une	0.012770497
100.00	5.49	extra	0.019089463
45.78	5.47	d	0.019348820
62.50	5.38	son	0.020357467
70.00	5.37	an	0.020488472
43.82	3.95	en	0.046750504
75.00	2.75	point	0.097071579
60.00	2.70	sa	0.100169302
*	*	*	*
Class3	**		

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
69.57	55.03	immigration	1.189494e-13
88.89	37.61	islamisme	8.658607e-10
100.00	27.30	lÉgal	1.744917e-07
100.00	27.30	clandestin	1.744917e-07
75.00	21.86	solution	2.940008e-06
100.00	21.75	expliquer	3.098652e-06
83.33	21.16	lutter	4.221801e-06
66.67	18.23	peuple	1.957993e-05
71.43	16.82	nationalitÉ	4.102787e-05
66.67	12.01	crÉer	5.281779e-04
75.00	10.76	ump	1.036357e-03
46.15	9.54	question	2.008449e-03
57.14	9.30	face	2.291350e-03
57.14	9.30	massif	2.291350e-03
25.00	8.51	franÃ§ais	3.534666e-03
60.00	7.53	Évidemment	6.057011e-03
60.00	7.53	consÉquent	6.057011e-03
50.00	7.31	trouver	6.870403e-03
66.67	5.94	Évident	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	ya	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	tension	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	voie	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	violent	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	minoritÉ	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	masse	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	cÉder	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	arrÊter	1.481387e-02
32.00	5.51	problÈme	1.893108e-02
50.00	5.44	origine	1.970418e-02
50.00	5.44	laisser	1.970418e-02
50.00	5.44	entier	1.970418e-02
40.00	4.62	comprendre	3.166903e-02
35.71	4.45	Étranger	3.487778e-02
42.86	3.99	communautarisme	4.575832e-02
42.86	3.99	vivre	4.575832e-02
36.36	3.68	prendre	5.491667e-02
50.00	3.60	seul	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	compatible	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	population	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	lien	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	condition	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	mouvement	5.785930e-02
50.00	3.60	choisir	5.785930e-02
37.50	2.95	majoritÉ	8.595930e-02
33.33	2.94	radical	8.656693e-02
40.00	2.26	unir	1.324020e-01
40.00	2.26	commencer	1.324020e-01

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
33.33	2.18	exister	1.400692e-01
33.33	2.18	fondamentalisme	1.400692e-01
*	*	*	*
44.44	18.68	falloir	1.543577e-05
27.17	13.87	il	1.962378e-04
55.56	11.14	autre	8.430390e-04
30.95	8.71	y	3.161333e-03
66.67	5.94	t	1.481387e-02
66.67	5.94	hÉ	1.481387e-02
44.44	5.79	voilÃ	1.608866e-02
27.27	5.29	sur	2.139042e-02
33.33	4.51	Ã§a	3.366211e-02
42.86	3.99	aucune	4.575832e-02
50.00	3.60	aucun	5.785930e-02
23.64	3.27	qu	7.072043e-02
23.21	2.99	un	8.356732e-02
37.50	2.95	jamais	8.595930e-02
25.93	2.36	parce_que	1.248436e-01
30.77	2.33	pourquoi	1.267762e-01
18.88	2.31	et	1.288781e-01
40.00	2.26	dÉjÃ	1.324020e-01
40.00	2.26	beaucoup	1.324020e-01
27.78	2.11	quand	1.460225e-01
*	*	*	*

Class4 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
100.00	42.95	chose	5.601489e-11
90.91	37.33	École	9.978339e-10
81.82	28.43	halal	9.702790e-08
100.00	25.38	nourriture	4.712659e-07
100.00	21.07	quartier	4.433614e-06
85.71	20.11	manger	7.306511e-06
100.00	16.79	rappeler	4.175282e-05
100.00	16.79	visibilitÉ	4.175282e-05
100.00	16.79	mot	4.175282e-05
100.00	16.79	place	4.175282e-05
100.00	16.79	peur	4.175282e-05
100.00	16.79	i	4.175282e-05
75.00	16.21	exigence	5.662029e-05
57.14	13.37	demander	2.561232e-04
100.00	12.54	jour	3.973106e-04
100.00	12.54	dÉnoncer	3.973106e-04
100.00	12.54	mÉconnaissance	3.973106e-04
71.43	12.37	priÈre	4.358430e-04
62.50	9.73	sentir	1.808476e-03
66.67	8.72	devenir	3.154152e-03
66.67	8.72	pression	3.154152e-03
66.67	8.72	coran	3.154152e-03
75.00	7.98	voile	4.722008e-03
75.00	7.98	sujet	4.722008e-03
75.00	7.98	cantine	4.722008e-03
75.00	7.98	exercer	4.722008e-03
60.00	5.34	considÉrer	2.089276e-02
50.00	4.90	raison	2.686041e-02
66.67	4.31	fondamentaliste	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	tenir	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	nouveau	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	algÉrie	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	femme	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	simplement	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	porc	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	exercice	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	effectuer	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	cacher	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	agresser	3.792199e-02
41.67	3.95	poser	4.700065e-02
44.44	3.70	nombre	5.432693e-02
50.00	3.65	rue	5.618173e-02
50.00	3.65	responsable	5.618173e-02
50.00	3.65	moment	5.618173e-02
40.00	2.79	gens	9.481877e-02
35.71	2.48	parler	1.149899e-01
50.00	2.41	tendance	1.203608e-01
50.00	2.41	sorte	1.203608e-01
50.00	2.41	oeil	1.203608e-01
*	*	*	*
85.71	20.11	quelque	7.306511e-06
46.67	7.49	tout	6.195253e-03
46.67	7.49	sans	6.195253e-03
57.14	6.50	ceci	1.076658e-02
32.43	4.60	vous	3.201108e-02
22.39	4.40	Être	3.598277e-02
36.36	4.36	mÊme	3.678850e-02
66.67	4.31	dont	3.792199e-02
66.67	4.31	mes	3.792199e-02
27.03	3.72	je	5.368852e-02
38.46	3.14	moi	7.634858e-02
23.81	2.86	avoir	9.094555e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
42.86	2.51	oÃ¹	1.134218e-01		50.00	2.41	selon	1.203608e-01
42.86	2.51	personne	1.134218e-01		25.33	2.28	dans	1.308886e-01
42.86	2.51	aucune	1.134218e-01		28.57	2.12	on	1.449163e-01
50.00	2.41	encore	1.203608e-01		*	*	*	*

Coalition

Class1	**				100.00	10.85	evil	9.872658e-04
TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		100.00	10.85	violent	9.872658e-04
68.85	45.59	community	1.459839e-11		100.00	10.85	role	9.872658e-04
86.36	31.95	leader	1.585006e-08		100.00	10.85	effort	9.872658e-04
92.86	24.92	extremist	5.961329e-07		100.00	10.85	andrew	9.872658e-04
78.26	24.28	terrorism	8.340532e-07		85.71	9.54	engage	2.008829e-03
100.00	24.24	organisation	8.483150e-07		77.78	8.97	few	2.749368e-03
100.00	24.24	act	8.483150e-07		100.00	8.66	suggest	3.254691e-03
100.00	21.98	middle	2.749736e-06		100.00	8.66	social	3.254691e-03
100.00	21.98	east	2.749736e-06		100.00	8.66	past	3.254691e-03
100.00	21.98	fighter	2.749736e-06		100.00	8.66	measure	3.254691e-03
61.36	19.92	muslim	8.084169e-06		100.00	8.66	division	3.254691e-03
70.83	17.93	islam	2.296484e-05		100.00	8.66	barnabas	3.254691e-03
100.00	17.50	violence	2.878646e-05		100.00	8.66	abroad	3.254691e-03
100.00	17.50	counter	2.878646e-05		61.11	7.46	need	6.313394e-03
90.00	16.01	security	6.307362e-05		83.33	7.45	fight	6.334486e-03
100.00	15.27	threat	9.318859e-05		83.33	7.45	join	6.334486e-03
100.00	15.27	daesh	9.318859e-05		83.33	7.45	safe	6.334486e-03
100.00	15.27	home	9.318859e-05		83.33	7.45	response	6.334486e-03
68.18	14.20	terrorist	1.645174e-04		66.67	6.93	deal	8.488591e-03
100.00	13.05	face	3.024847e-04		70.00	6.89	stop	8.648102e-03
100.00	13.05	anti	3.024847e-04		70.00	6.89	extremism	8.648102e-03
100.00	13.05	medium	3.024847e-04		100.00	6.48	lead	1.092397e-02
100.00	13.05	fund	3.024847e-04		100.00	6.48	iraq	1.092397e-02
100.00	13.05	combat	3.024847e-04		100.00	6.48	build	1.092397e-02
81.82	13.04	work	3.051740e-04		100.00	6.48	prevent	1.092397e-02
81.82	13.04	condemn	3.051740e-04		100.00	6.48	terror	1.092397e-02
81.82	13.04	action	3.051740e-04		100.00	6.48	minority	1.092397e-02
87.50	11.67	seek	6.354769e-04		100.00	6.48	elomar	1.092397e-02
100.00	10.85	moderate	9.872658e-04		100.00	6.48	region	1.092397e-02
100.00	10.85	play	9.872658e-04		100.00	6.48	key	1.092397e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
100.00	6.48	incident	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	event	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	determine	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	agency	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	activity	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	suspect	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	summit	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	spread	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	reform	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	queensland	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	officer	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	north	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	melbourne	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	malaysia	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	effective	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	conflict	1.092397e-02
100.00	6.48	carry	1.092397e-02
51.72	5.72	muslims	1.681640e-02
80.00	5.42	protect	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	friend	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	cult	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	identify	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	peace	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	ideology	1.991994e-02
80.00	5.42	force	1.991994e-02
66.67	5.16	challenge	2.317606e-02
71.43	5.15	foreign	2.319709e-02
71.43	5.15	sydney	2.319709e-02
71.43	5.15	police	2.319709e-02
71.43	5.15	week	2.319709e-02
71.43	5.15	government_s	2.319709e-02
52.38	4.32	woman	3.761877e-02
57.14	4.29	message	3.832683e-02
50.00	4.24	religion	3.947498e-02
60.00	3.76	important	5.262474e-02
62.50	3.54	member	5.979706e-02
75.00	3.47	target	6.237138e-02
75.00	3.47	meet	6.237138e-02
66.67	3.41	isis	6.478663e-02
66.67	3.41	continue	6.478663e-02
53.85	3.01	speak	8.293697e-02
42.86	2.64	government	1.042635e-01
55.56	2.39	death	1.219631e-01
57.14	2.11	young	1.466624e-01

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
*	*	*	*
66.67	10.56	against	0.001158110
72.73	8.73	name	0.003133320
100.00	8.66	far	0.003254691
100.00	8.66	often	0.003254691
83.33	7.45	after	0.006334486
100.00	6.48	her	0.010923966
100.00	6.48	40	0.010923966
45.16	6.03	our	0.014043371
54.55	5.55	these	0.018520658
80.00	5.42	doing	0.019919945
80.00	5.42	too	0.019919945
80.00	5.42	does	0.019919945
63.64	5.28	last	0.021571748
71.43	5.15	even	0.023197087
34.38	5.02	the	0.024992063
48.48	4.61	can	0.031794861
43.75	3.58	from	0.058321570
75.00	3.47	known	0.062371379
75.00	3.47	cause	0.062371379
75.00	3.47	use	0.062371379
75.00	3.47	old	0.062371379
75.00	3.47	help	0.062371379
75.00	3.47	2015	0.062371379
66.67	3.41	through	0.064786625
66.67	3.41	themselves	0.064786625
66.67	3.41	cannot	0.064786625
37.88	3.35	we	0.067107882
42.86	3.14	by	0.076344846
50.00	2.87	must	0.090050557
40.00	2.86	with	0.091089861
41.38	2.86	do	0.090616212
54.55	2.69	same	0.100734406
40.68	2.51	who	0.113231362
35.32	2.31	in	0.128400410
57.14	2.11	done	0.146662361
*	*	*	*
Class2	**		
TS/Tot	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**
78.95	70.63	citizenship	4.309372e-17
100.00	44.18	oath	2.993765e-11
100.00	44.18	exercise	2.993765e-11
100.00	44.18	expect	2.993765e-11
68.75	41.96	citizen	9.316621e-11

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
68.75	41.96	respect	9.316621e-11		30.95	11.44	them	0.0007195694
34.12	37.03	australia	1.162658e-09		32.26	9.49	other	0.0020671680
66.67	36.31	ask	1.682207e-09		50.00	8.90	might	0.0028479178
77.78	31.43	share	2.067127e-08		50.00	8.90	whose	0.0028479178
100.00	31.40	liberty	2.103685e-08		41.67	7.98	under	0.0047195919
100.00	31.40	dual	2.103685e-08		30.00	7.04	come	0.0079502198
70.00	27.01	democratic	2.027032e-07		66.67	7.04	anyone	0.0079689746
75.00	25.50	leave	4.433677e-07		26.67	6.93	those	0.0084722890
100.00	25.05	uphold	5.577414e-07		16.85	6.90	to	0.0086014175
44.44	22.62	value	1.974527e-06		22.78	6.53	they	0.0106065478
32.31	22.06	australian	2.644611e-06		26.09	6.48	their	0.0109401784
53.33	20.28	stand	6.683337e-06		21.43	6.19	be	0.0128480631
100.00	18.74	born	1.496510e-05		33.33	5.96	take	0.0146233352
80.00	18.51	fair	1.693775e-05		28.12	5.90	will	0.0151469806
26.21	17.68	person	2.613111e-05		35.71	5.78	may	0.0162059061
66.67	14.19	pledge	1.653183e-04		24.07	5.42	if	0.0198682968
26.79	9.07	law	2.597304e-03		42.86	5.00	become	0.0253487414
60.00	9.00	happy	2.695806e-03		50.00	4.41	still	0.0358170627
40.00	8.89	belief	2.871107e-03		31.25	4.20	another	0.0403754439
44.44	7.19	accept	7.334378e-03		33.33	3.91	could	0.0479397504
66.67	7.04	replace	7.968975e-03		37.50	3.81	they_re	0.0510717265
66.67	7.04	mosque	7.968975e-03		23.26	3.54	would	0.0599487257
66.67	7.04	recognise	7.968975e-03		40.00	2.89	you_re	0.0893097179
66.67	7.04	immigrant	7.968975e-03		19.48	2.50	as	0.1139272623
66.67	7.04	forward	7.968975e-03		*	*	*	*
35.29	6.80	live	9.091108e-03		Class3	**		
31.82	6.26	right	1.234223e-02		**TS/Tot**	**chi2**	**Form**	**P TS/Tot**
36.36	4.78	life	2.881749e-02		60.71	60.90	law	6.011183e-15
50.00	4.41	opposition	3.581706e-02		70.97	49.82	sharia	1.685068e-12
50.00	4.41	god	3.581706e-02		51.56	42.07	country	8.784913e-11
50.00	4.41	observe	3.581706e-02		76.47	32.45	great	1.220906e-08
50.00	4.41	obey	3.581706e-02		76.47	32.45	democracy	1.220906e-08
50.00	4.41	consistent	3.581706e-02		88.89	25.24	good	5.066242e-07
37.50	3.81	loyalty	5.107173e-02		100.00	22.63	civil	1.965400e-06
26.09	3.04	clear	8.134245e-02		66.67	19.27	state	1.132360e-05
23.53	2.89	australians	8.911540e-02		100.00	18.81	parliamentary	1.444902e-05
40.00	2.89	interest	8.930972e-02		85.71	17.74	system	2.532719e-05
28.57	2.62	include	1.057917e-01		54.17	16.60	world	4.611147e-05
22.58	2.12	sharia	1.449621e-01		64.29	16.11	religious	5.971728e-05
*	*	*	*		100.00	15.01	guide	1.070140e-04
46.67	14.01	go	0.0001822918		75.00	14.13	rule	1.701985e-04
35.48	13.11	don_t	0.0002930602		75.00	14.13	equality	1.701985e-04
75.00	12.62	possible	0.0003820959		83.33	14.07	legal	1.763613e-04
43.75	12.43	its	0.0004221963		63.64	12.18	case	4.818527e-04

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
44.12	11.68	thing	6.330375e-04
66.67	11.39	talk	7.403451e-04
100.00	11.23	plurality	8.057602e-04
100.00	11.23	background	8.057602e-04
100.00	11.23	request	8.057602e-04
100.00	11.23	preserve	8.057602e-04
71.43	10.75	practice	1.041627e-03
80.00	10.47	constitution	1.212119e-03
80.00	10.47	court	1.212119e-03
75.00	7.00	finance	8.173277e-03
55.56	6.50	oppose	1.079133e-02
50.00	6.14	happen	1.324189e-02
57.14	5.50	custom	1.896561e-02
57.14	5.50	advocate	1.896561e-02
60.00	4.56	parliament	3.275273e-02
50.00	4.05	ban	4.420204e-02
45.45	3.98	understand	4.608048e-02
66.67	3.74	successful	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	multicultural	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	christian	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	independent	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	explain	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	submission	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	sex	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	recently	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	practise	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	marriage	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	killing	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	inform	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	difficult	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	defender	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	condone	5.321665e-02
66.67	3.74	broadly	5.321665e-02
32.56	3.72	islamic	5.390530e-02
33.33	2.55	value	1.104825e-01
40.00	2.17	find	1.410189e-01
40.00	2.17	turn	1.410189e-01
50.00	2.00	agree	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	punishment	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	process	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	ensure	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	term	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	surely	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	race	1.569099e-01

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
50.00	2.00	focus	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	obey	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	justify	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	inquiry	1.569099e-01
50.00	2.00	honour	1.569099e-01
*	*	*	*
80.00	10.47	asking	0.001212119
27.81	9.22	is	0.002391253
62.50	8.33	actually	0.003903269
36.73	8.06	about	0.004520192
35.85	7.84	there	0.005099162
66.67	7.53	whether	0.006062271
34.48	7.16	make	0.007452424
75.00	7.00	everything	0.008173277
30.00	6.18	you	0.012905727
37.14	5.83	mean	0.015753243
37.50	5.53	will	0.018733377
57.14	5.50	between	0.018965614
43.75	5.07	different	0.024375173
46.15	5.00	i_m	0.025300270
60.00	4.56	someone	0.032752734
50.00	4.05	something	0.044202037
32.00	3.98	which	0.045909758
33.33	3.80	has	0.051157137
66.67	3.74	isn_t	0.053216650
66.67	3.74	each	0.053216650
66.67	3.74	i_d	0.053216650
66.67	3.74	merely	0.053216650
66.67	3.74	happens	0.053216650
29.85	3.60	what	0.057745774
33.33	3.48	one	0.062065263
30.00	3.27	or	0.070659994
36.36	3.20	going	0.073649913
50.00	3.02	seen	0.082190328
26.40	2.94	are	0.086329375
32.35	2.76	when	0.096514962
29.63	2.65	if	0.103494028
38.46	2.39	particular	0.121878499
38.46	2.39	around	0.121878499
25.60	2.10	it	0.146888345
50.00	2.00	still	0.156909923
*	*	*	*
Class4	**		
TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P

80.00	46.89	change	7.501325e-12	30.77	2.12	speak	1.456949e-01
71.43	32.72	culture	1.066430e-08	40.00	2.12	subject	1.450260e-01
57.14	27.49	view	1.581623e-07	40.00	2.12	month	1.450260e-01
100.00	26.27	lot	2.969903e-07	33.33	2.00	attack	1.568710e-01
100.00	26.27	dress	2.969903e-07	*	*	*	*
100.00	20.96	circumstance	4.685490e-06	47.37	14.34	he	0.0001522426
100.00	20.96	abhorrent	4.685490e-06	40.00	11.19	some	0.0008217413
75.00	20.86	allow	4.936980e-06	57.14	8.83	let	0.0029590447
83.33	20.29	defend	6.663692e-06	38.89	7.19	us	0.0073369194
83.33	20.29	debate	6.663692e-06	60.00	7.18	wouldn_t	0.0073622005
66.67	17.34	multiculturalism	3.130670e-05	50.00	6.90	get	0.0086198894
71.43	16.06	express	6.124518e-05	50.00	6.90	did	0.0086198894
71.43	16.06	howard	6.124518e-05	41.67	5.94	see	0.0147914357
80.00	15.23	migrant	9.513586e-05	41.67	5.94	example	0.0147914357
80.00	15.23	bad	9.513586e-05	31.25	5.85	want	0.0155835293
50.00	14.09	question	1.742314e-04	66.67	5.69	towards	0.0170550332
62.50	12.94	freedom	3.217720e-04	66.67	5.69	per	0.0170550332
62.50	12.94	speech	3.217720e-04	66.67	5.69	once	0.0170550332
66.67	11.47	free	7.076855e-04	66.67	5.69	couldn_t	0.0170550332
66.67	11.47	kind	7.076855e-04	24.18	5.60	for	0.0179548935
75.00	10.32	hope	1.312862e-03	44.44	5.44	got	0.0197165675
75.00	10.32	choose	1.312862e-03	38.46	4.93	i_m	0.0263472101
43.75	9.37	believe	2.210415e-03	28.21	4.63	has	0.0314001528
57.14	8.83	principle	2.959045e-03	29.63	3.88	no	0.0488956995
57.14	8.83	mainstream	2.959045e-03	42.86	3.75	again	0.0528725547
60.00	7.18	confront	7.362200e-03	50.00	3.41	won_t	0.0646156659
45.45	7.17	society	7.433363e-03	50.00	3.41		25	0.0646156659
50.00	6.90	kill	8.619889e-03	50.00	3.41	un	0.0646156659
66.67	5.69	pluralism	1.705503e-02	50.00	3.41	three	0.0646156659
66.67	5.69	reflect	1.705503e-02	50.00	3.41	rather	0.0646156659
66.67	5.69	consider	1.705503e-02	27.27	3.28	way	0.0701237810
66.67	5.69	attitude	1.705503e-02	29.17	3.19	into	0.0741335613
29.41	4.82	point	2.814361e-02	29.17	3.19	me	0.0741335613
40.00	4.30	matter	3.805352e-02	37.50	2.74	whose	0.0976337540
35.71	4.09	place	4.301254e-02	33.33	2.69	first	0.1007865078
22.33	3.91	person	4.802099e-02	24.44	2.57	well	0.1088681808
42.86	3.75	tell	5.287255e-02	22.39	2.31	what	0.1287576689
50.00	3.41	position	6.461567e-02	27.27	2.12	were	0.1451559922
50.00	3.41	mr	6.461567e-02	30.77	2.12	am	0.1456949093
50.00	3.41	ethnic	6.461567e-02	40.00	2.12	you_re	0.1450259792
50.00	3.41	commitment	6.461567e-02	40.00	2.12	doesn_t	0.1450259792
26.47	2.92	australians	8.763895e-02	40.00	2.12	let_s	0.1450259792
29.41	2.30	live	1.292457e-01	21.52	2.09	they	0.1482228628
27.27	2.12	right	1.451560e-01	25.00	2.01	said	0.1565677833

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
33.33	2.00	always	0.1568709808
33.33	2.00	saying	0.1568709808
*	*	*	*

Class5 **

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
92.86	59.54	policy	1.199300e-14
90.00	38.98	child	4.283193e-10
76.92	34.43	prime	4.421992e-09
71.43	30.68	minister	3.046550e-08
87.50	28.94	refugee	7.478929e-08
100.00	24.87	immigration	6.145026e-07
100.00	24.87	abbott	6.145026e-07
100.00	24.87	population	6.145026e-07
85.71	23.99	team	9.670413e-07
60.00	20.58	year	5.704420e-06
70.00	20.56	school	5.767760e-06
100.00	19.84	white	8.410445e-06
100.00	19.84	unity	8.410445e-06
100.00	19.84	morning	8.410445e-06
100.00	19.84	learn	8.410445e-06
61.54	19.04	give	1.281910e-05
100.00	14.84	pass	1.167916e-04
100.00	14.84	inclusion	1.167916e-04
100.00	14.84	august	1.167916e-04
100.00	14.84	politics	1.167916e-04
100.00	14.84	overboard	1.167916e-04
80.00	14.34	attorney	1.529806e-04
66.67	10.73	party	1.056324e-03
55.56	9.78	majority	1.764202e-03
75.00	9.70	christians	1.845317e-03
75.00	9.70	increase	1.845317e-03
50.00	9.63	group	1.909841e-03
57.14	8.20	feel	4.184127e-03
57.14	8.20	tell	4.184127e-03
57.14	8.20	general	4.184127e-03
57.14	8.20	racist	4.184127e-03
42.86	6.95	message	8.399479e-03
60.00	6.69	press	9.716510e-03
38.89	6.48	part	1.093987e-02
50.00	6.36	statement	1.169450e-02
50.00	6.36	loyalty	1.169450e-02
41.67	5.39	national	2.023261e-02
66.67	5.32	fear	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	wait	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	labor	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	son	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	relation	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	overwhelm	2.105623e-02
66.67	5.32	cut	2.105623e-02
44.44	4.96	word	2.588417e-02
44.44	4.96	claim	2.588417e-02
50.00	4.74	entitle	2.941762e-02
35.71	3.65	issue	5.616102e-02
42.86	3.41	council	6.477771e-02
50.00	3.15	reason	7.611932e-02
50.00	3.15	senator	7.611932e-02
50.00	3.15	push	7.611932e-02
50.00	3.15	consistent	7.611932e-02
50.00	3.15	address	7.611932e-02
36.36	3.04	society	8.107336e-02
36.36	3.04	bring	8.107336e-02
37.50	2.46	public	1.167523e-01
31.25	2.44	question	1.185718e-01
22.35	2.27	australia	1.316123e-01
*	*	*	*
53.85	13.04	look	0.0003050597
50.00	12.98	had	0.0003146914
45.00	11.82	now	0.0005871897
43.75	8.54	your	0.0034757250
50.00	7.99	we_re	0.0047116292
30.95	6.58	was	0.0103001261
31.43	5.75	mean	0.0164879688
20.59	5.71	of	0.0168427415
34.78	5.54	my	0.0185523067
41.67	5.39	together	0.0202326150
66.67	5.32	others	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	2	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	2011	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	0	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	2001	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	9	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	5	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	2013	0.0210562338
66.67	5.32	2010	0.0210562338
37.50	5.02	more	0.0249939389
32.14	4.97	know	0.0258235732
50.00	4.74	though	0.0294176184
20.62	3.70	a	0.0543242142

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
35.71	3.65	why	0.0561610235		29.17	2.73	me	0.0987067055
42.86	3.41	can_t	0.0647777062		37.50	2.46	did	0.1167523128
50.00	3.15	okay	0.0761193197		33.33	2.37	that_s	0.1235345198
31.58	3.05	he	0.0806740632		28.57	2.14	just	0.1433140178
18.44	2.73	the	0.0982048945		*	*	*	*

ALP

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
Class1	**				47.00	6.32	person	1.195262e-02
77.78	29.05	know	7.069202e-08		69.23	6.13	good	1.331826e-02
65.85	16.91	country	3.912337e-05		100.00	5.21	tradition	2.249227e-02
100.00	14.09	problem	1.744024e-04		100.00	5.21	bligh	2.249227e-02
100.00	14.09	belief	1.744024e-04		100.00	5.21	anna	2.249227e-02
68.00	11.31	part	7.722157e-04		100.00	5.21	level	2.249227e-02
100.00	10.51	common	1.190419e-03		100.00	5.21	refugee	2.249227e-02
87.50	9.07	question	2.598289e-03		100.00	5.21	practice	2.249227e-02
87.50	9.07	love	2.598289e-03		100.00	5.21	choice	2.249227e-02
100.00	8.73	response	3.131889e-03		100.00	5.21	solution	2.249227e-02
100.00	8.73	today	3.131889e-03		100.00	5.21	path	2.249227e-02
100.00	8.73	sharia	3.131889e-03		100.00	5.21	key	2.249227e-02
100.00	8.73	difficult	3.131889e-03		100.00	5.21	free	2.249227e-02
100.00	8.73	liberty	3.131889e-03		100.00	5.21	democratic	2.249227e-02
62.07	8.72	religion	3.153523e-03		54.55	4.96	right	2.592348e-02
85.71	7.37	freedom	6.646393e-03		70.00	4.89	hard	2.693474e-02
85.71	7.37	discussion	6.646393e-03		70.00	4.89	debate	2.693474e-02
100.00	6.96	high	8.320904e-03		61.11	4.84	culture	2.775669e-02
100.00	6.96	provide	8.320904e-03		66.67	4.78	public	2.873756e-02
100.00	6.96	pretty	8.320904e-03		80.00	4.08	equal	4.335948e-02
100.00	6.96	anthem	8.320904e-03		80.00	4.08	imam	4.335948e-02
100.00	6.96	answer	8.320904e-03		80.00	4.08	line	4.335948e-02
100.00	6.96	opportunity	8.320904e-03		80.00	4.08	christian	4.335948e-02
100.00	6.96	mix	8.320904e-03		71.43	3.69	build	5.458338e-02
100.00	6.96	measure	8.320904e-03		71.43	3.69	stand	5.458338e-02
100.00	6.96	incredibly	8.320904e-03		71.43	3.69	choose	5.458338e-02
100.00	6.96	evidence	8.320904e-03		71.43	3.69	kind	5.458338e-02
77.78	6.69	view	9.705603e-03		66.67	3.56	point	5.933123e-02
77.78	6.69	respect	9.705603e-03		66.67	3.56	find	5.933123e-02
					63.64	3.53	issue	6.023446e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
75.00	2.55	decision	1.105472e-01
75.00	2.55	parent	1.105472e-01
75.00	2.55	settle	1.105472e-01
75.00	2.55	politician	1.105472e-01
75.00	2.55	big	1.105472e-01
60.00	2.39	call	1.218591e-01
60.00	2.39	family	1.218591e-01
66.67	2.35	proud	1.252798e-01
*	*	*	*
68.97	14.11	different	0.0001722271
77.78	13.74	it_s	0.0002101798
56.90	12.13	you	0.0004962637
61.76	10.13	what	0.0014568080
68.42	8.67	here	0.0032405336
85.71	7.37	got	0.0066463930
51.67	6.93	be	0.0084971495
83.33	5.70	there_s	0.0169830298
75.00	5.15	through	0.0232175468
61.11	4.84	any	0.0277566862
62.50	4.78	look	0.0287721898
64.29	4.76	how	0.0292037101
64.29	4.76	don_t	0.0292037101
80.00	4.08	overall	0.0433594759
51.35	3.79	one	0.0514869608
43.18	3.76	is	0.0524112010
66.67	3.56	most	0.0593312273
63.64	3.53	something	0.0602344577
50.00	3.22	all	0.0728577740
46.55	2.87	but	0.0902179247
75.00	2.55	whose	0.1105471520
75.00	2.55	does	0.1105471520
75.00	2.55	seem	0.1105471520
75.00	2.55	none	0.1105471520
60.00	2.39	said	0.1218590614
46.81	2.36	about	0.1244068531
66.67	2.35	themselves	0.1252798229
66.67	2.35	without	0.1252798229
62.50	2.33	your	0.1265080782
62.50	2.33	particular	0.1265080782
50.00	2.30	them	0.1295955167
52.94	2.01	many	0.1558235289
*	*	*	*
Class2	**		
TS/Tot	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
77.27	67.82	muslim	1.793471e-16
46.96	38.06	community	6.858122e-10
100.00	38.01	speak	7.054784e-10
80.00	23.44	electorate	1.288062e-06
78.57	20.67	great	5.456331e-06
100.00	17.19	jewish	3.390916e-05
100.00	17.19	weekend	3.390916e-05
100.00	17.19	large	3.390916e-05
100.00	14.28	association	1.575718e-04
100.00	14.28	boy	1.575718e-04
85.71	13.08	condemn	2.991858e-04
100.00	11.39	strength	7.381359e-04
100.00	11.39	increase	7.381359e-04
100.00	11.39	constituent	7.381359e-04
83.33	10.30	abuse	1.331273e-03
70.00	10.20	language	1.400606e-03
70.00	10.20	home	1.400606e-03
75.00	10.08	peace	1.502350e-03
100.00	8.52	week	3.515620e-03
100.00	8.52	ahmadiyya	3.515620e-03
100.00	8.52	friend	3.515620e-03
56.25	7.82	leader	5.163098e-03
66.67	7.82	recent	5.177121e-03
80.00	7.59	violence	5.876374e-03
80.00	7.59	spend	5.876374e-03
80.00	7.59	contribution	5.876374e-03
71.43	7.55	future	5.998448e-03
71.43	7.55	continue	5.998448e-03
50.00	7.54	being	6.041116e-03
48.15	7.28	islamic	6.979921e-03
52.63	7.25	work	7.089993e-03
53.33	5.96	muslims	1.463414e-02
47.83	5.95	member	1.475258e-02
53.85	5.33	feel	2.095217e-02
66.67	5.17	radicalisation	2.303730e-02
66.67	5.17	commitment	2.303730e-02
75.00	4.98	melbourne	2.564507e-02
75.00	4.98	activity	2.564507e-02
75.00	4.98	population	2.564507e-02
75.00	4.98	afraid	2.564507e-02
50.00	4.91	fear	2.677404e-02
55.56	4.11	talk	4.256633e-02
57.14	3.53	long	6.014510e-02
57.14	3.53	incident	6.014510e-02

57.14	3.53	harmony	6.014510e-02	60.00	2.99	able	8.356246e-02
42.86	3.20	need	7.362983e-02	60.00	2.99	i_ve	8.356246e-02
50.00	3.01	hear	8.265622e-02	60.00	2.99	non	8.356246e-02
50.00	3.01	bring	8.265622e-02	66.67	2.56	currently	1.095584e-01
50.00	3.01	strong	8.265622e-02	66.67	2.56	however	1.095584e-01
60.00	2.99	story	8.356246e-02	66.67	2.56	7	1.095584e-01
60.00	2.99	wonderful	8.356246e-02	*	*	*	*
66.67	2.56	value	1.095584e-01	Class3	**		
66.67	2.56	representative	1.095584e-01	**TS/Tot**	**chi2**	**Form**	**P**
66.67	2.56	play	1.095584e-01	100.00	36.03	citizenship	1.946629e-09
66.67	2.56	experience	1.095584e-01	65.22	26.32	government	2.886289e-07
66.67	2.56	report	1.095584e-01	87.50	20.18	protect	7.036709e-06
66.67	2.56	prosperity	1.095584e-01	87.50	20.18	create	7.036709e-06
66.67	2.56	enclave	1.095584e-01	80.00	19.88	citizen	8.242885e-06
66.67	2.56	Ã¤Ã®not	1.095584e-01	72.73	16.76	threat	4.244101e-05
66.67	2.56	service	1.095584e-01	85.71	16.66	minority	4.474328e-05
66.67	2.56	servant	1.095584e-01	77.78	16.49	commit	4.879498e-05
66.67	2.56	prayer	1.095584e-01	77.78	16.49	ensure	4.879498e-05
66.67	2.56	open	1.095584e-01	64.29	14.93	multiculturalism	1.117514e-04
66.67	2.56	moreton	1.095584e-01	66.67	14.20	seek	1.643926e-04
66.67	2.56	graphic	1.095584e-01	100.00	14.16	action	1.677789e-04
66.67	2.56	establish	1.095584e-01	100.00	14.16	strategy	1.677789e-04
66.67	2.56	encourage	1.095584e-01	83.33	13.19	tolerance	2.814842e-04
66.67	2.56	conversation	1.095584e-01	83.33	13.19	responsibility	2.814842e-04
66.67	2.56	calm	1.095584e-01	83.33	13.19	intolerance	2.814842e-04
50.00	2.40	represent	1.216882e-01	83.33	13.19	challenge	2.814842e-04
37.50	2.32	australian	1.277071e-01	100.00	10.59	settlement	1.136692e-03
45.45	2.17	young	1.403306e-01	100.00	10.59	unknown	1.136692e-03
45.45	2.17	mosque	1.403306e-01	100.00	10.59	qaeda	1.136692e-03
*	*	*	*	100.00	10.59	agency	1.136692e-03
35.14	16.11	in	5.982494e-05	57.14	10.29	nation	1.339058e-03
48.84	12.97	my	3.163111e-04	80.00	9.80	million	1.748256e-03
83.33	10.30	seen	1.331273e-03	80.00	9.80	fight	1.748256e-03
61.54	8.71	together	3.162207e-03	53.85	7.81	deal	5.192098e-03
60.00	6.08	am	1.370125e-02	62.50	7.68	give	5.571057e-03
41.46	5.58	been	1.812560e-02	62.50	7.68	case	5.571057e-03
66.67	5.17	both	2.303730e-02	66.67	6.98	wrong	8.259170e-03
66.67	5.17	throughout	2.303730e-02	66.67	6.98	reason	8.259170e-03
75.00	4.98	unfortunately	2.564507e-02	66.67	6.98	hansard	8.259170e-03
75.00	4.98	third	2.564507e-02	66.67	6.98	cohesion	8.259170e-03
35.53	4.35	they	3.695743e-02	75.00	6.52	policy	1.066237e-02
57.14	3.53	example	6.014510e-02	75.00	6.52	isil	1.066237e-02
38.89	3.33	make	6.787245e-02	75.00	6.52	reach	1.066237e-02
33.33	3.17	this	7.478733e-02	75.00	6.52	individual	1.066237e-02

TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
75.00	6.52	whilst	1.066237e-02		75.00	13.19	only	0.0002809120
75.00	6.52	treat	1.066237e-02		83.33	13.19	certain	0.0002814842
75.00	6.52	terrorism	1.066237e-02		32.33	12.66	we	0.0003735157
75.00	6.52	safe	1.066237e-02		45.16	10.35	can	0.0012932932
75.00	6.52	lose	1.066237e-02		58.33	9.37	must	0.0022007851
75.00	6.52	contrast	1.066237e-02		53.33	8.77	its	0.0030538716
50.00	6.51	society	1.072910e-02		75.00	6.52	changes	0.0106623690
43.48	6.43	world	1.119546e-02		38.71	5.35	or	0.0207472747
43.48	6.43	understand	1.119546e-02		57.14	5.04	even	0.0247788747
57.14	5.04	show	2.477887e-02		35.90	4.75	do	0.0293451082
50.00	4.60	group	3.206154e-02		32.31	4.69	from	0.0302565665
43.75	4.50	act	3.399247e-02		50.00	4.60	always	0.0320615424
60.00	4.19	february	4.070551e-02		32.76	4.46	but	0.0346403747
60.00	4.19	organisation	4.070551e-02		60.00	4.19	possible	0.0407055068
60.00	4.19	legislation	4.070551e-02		60.00	4.19	name	0.0407055068
60.00	4.19	propose	4.070551e-02		60.00	4.19	since	0.0407055068
60.00	4.19	division	4.070551e-02		39.13	4.07	us	0.0436224418
50.00	3.65	race	5.591031e-02		50.00	3.65	going	0.0559103106
50.00	3.65	divide	5.591031e-02		66.67	3.46	particularly	0.0629415333
50.00	3.65	behaviour	5.591031e-02		66.67	3.46	10	0.0629415333
42.86	3.59	multicultural	5.804923e-02		24.79	2.82	to	0.0930964219
45.45	3.55	social	5.968200e-02		29.85	2.79	as	0.0949693324
66.67	3.46	white	6.294153e-02		34.48	2.75	when	0.0972958473
66.67	3.46	system	6.294153e-02		41.67	2.72	were	0.0992272216
66.67	3.46	order	6.294153e-02		44.44	2.64	he	0.1042627415
66.67	3.46	inclusive	6.294153e-02		38.46	2.06	get	0.1512294646
66.67	3.46	simply	6.294153e-02		29.63	2.03	with	0.1546297520
66.67	3.46	modern	6.294153e-02		*	*	*	*
66.67	3.46	extremist	6.294153e-02		Class4	**		
66.67	3.46	embrace	6.294153e-02		TS/Tot	chi2	Form	P
66.67	3.46	bad	6.294153e-02		100.00	41.07	attend	1.469456e-10
66.67	3.46	Ã¤Ã®but	6.294153e-02		87.50	34.27	racial	4.793237e-09
66.67	3.46	principle	6.294153e-02		100.00	29.17	general	6.645328e-08
66.67	3.46	incite	6.294153e-02		100.00	29.17	18c	6.645328e-08
66.67	3.46	design	6.294153e-02		85.71	28.45	section	9.618187e-08
66.67	3.46	australia_s	6.294153e-02		75.00	23.50	meet	1.250754e-06
66.67	3.46	assertion	6.294153e-02		75.00	23.50	vilification	1.250754e-06
38.10	3.26	thing	7.116123e-02		100.00	23.27	protection	1.411358e-06
50.00	2.73	diversity	9.877851e-02		100.00	23.27	police	1.411358e-06
50.00	2.73	labor	9.877851e-02		100.00	23.27	king	1.411358e-06
34.62	2.50	australians	1.141884e-01		100.00	23.27	ask	1.411358e-06
37.50	2.26	fear	1.324191e-01		100.00	23.27	senate	1.411358e-06
38.46	2.06	feel	1.512295e-01		100.00	23.27	protest	1.411358e-06
*	*	*	*		100.00	23.27	frankly	1.411358e-06

100.00	23.27	committee	1.411358e-06	66.67	6.45	check	1.111773e-02
100.00	23.27	attorney	1.411358e-06	66.67	6.45	celebrate	1.111773e-02
58.33	18.65	important	1.574094e-05	66.67	6.45	broadly	1.111773e-02
58.33	18.65	area	1.574094e-05	66.67	6.45	anti	1.111773e-02
71.43	18.14	hate	2.052756e-05	50.00	5.99	program	1.440163e-02
100.00	17.40	head	3.030321e-05	50.00	5.99	allow	1.440163e-02
100.00	17.40	opposition	3.030321e-05	40.00	5.17	minister	2.293423e-02
100.00	17.40	catherine	3.030321e-05	42.86	4.45	speech	3.488983e-02
100.00	17.40	unity	3.030321e-05	50.00	3.97	human	4.634128e-02
100.00	17.40	unhelpful	3.030321e-05	50.00	3.97	note	4.634128e-02
100.00	17.40	department	3.030321e-05	50.00	3.97	mr	4.634128e-02
80.00	17.08	racist	3.587436e-05	50.00	3.97	extreme	4.634128e-02
80.00	17.08	Ã¤Ã´re	3.587436e-05	50.00	3.97	balance	4.634128e-02
80.00	17.08	step	3.587436e-05	50.00	3.97	authority	4.634128e-02
80.00	17.08	scrutiny	3.587436e-05	31.25	3.59	leader	5.819282e-02
80.00	17.08	message	3.587436e-05	37.50	3.34	numb	6.768388e-02
80.00	17.08	federal	3.587436e-05	40.00	2.55	tony	1.103390e-01
80.00	17.08	bill	3.587436e-05	40.00	2.55	engage	1.103390e-01
62.50	14.75	statement	1.227086e-04	40.00	2.55	Ã¤	1.103390e-01
66.67	13.00	organise	3.106745e-04	40.00	2.55	born	1.103390e-01
66.67	13.00	friday	3.106745e-04	40.00	2.55	side	1.103390e-01
46.67	12.60	discrimination	3.863601e-04	40.00	2.55	move	1.103390e-01
75.00	11.61	tension	6.548102e-04	40.00	2.55	legislation	1.103390e-01
75.00	11.61	night	6.548102e-04	40.00	2.55	accept	1.103390e-01
75.00	11.61	extremism	6.548102e-04	40.00	2.55	september	1.103390e-01
75.00	11.61	coalition	6.548102e-04	40.00	2.55	forward	1.103390e-01
46.15	10.51	parliament	1.189763e-03	40.00	2.55	division	1.103390e-01
37.50	10.50	place	1.190537e-03	40.00	2.55	discuss	1.103390e-01
57.14	10.14	rise	1.450773e-03	40.00	2.55	counter	1.103390e-01
60.00	8.21	easy	4.175151e-03	25.00	2.50	time	1.137630e-01
50.00	8.03	put	4.598685e-03	*	*	*	*
50.00	8.03	prime	4.598685e-03	61.54	23.35	actually	1.348170e-06
40.00	7.88	Ã¤Ã´s	5.010351e-03	100.00	23.27	before	1.411358e-06
41.67	7.10	include	7.714127e-03	50.00	14.30	last	1.555146e-04
66.67	6.45	moment	1.111773e-02	54.55	14.20	against	1.640185e-04
66.67	6.45	alienate	1.111773e-02	75.00	11.61	getting	6.548102e-04
66.67	6.45	weaken	1.111773e-02	75.00	11.61	further	6.548102e-04
66.67	6.45	urge	1.111773e-02	39.13	11.53	s	6.844076e-04
66.67	6.45	strengthen	1.111773e-02	31.71	10.50	been	1.195814e-03
66.67	6.45	significant	1.111773e-02	60.00	8.21	three	4.175151e-03
66.67	6.45	risk	1.111773e-02	37.50	6.84	would	8.933505e-03
66.67	6.45	legal	1.111773e-02	66.67	6.45	off	1.111773e-02
66.67	6.45	fund	1.111773e-02	44.44	6.43	he	1.124850e-02
66.67	6.45	cut	1.111773e-02	50.00	5.99	try	1.440163e-02

25.49	5.39	think	2.027066e-02
26.83	5.31	an	2.120596e-02
24.53	4.67	has	3.074395e-02
19.72	4.54	i	3.304198e-02
42.86	4.45	first	3.488983e-02
36.36	4.18	why	4.094289e-02
25.00	4.14	at	4.199952e-02
25.00	4.14	by	4.199952e-02
50.00	3.97	wish	4.634128e-02
50.00	3.97	still	4.634128e-02
33.33	3.38	mean	6.614044e-02
33.33	3.38	that_s	6.614044e-02
28.57	3.35	more	6.722692e-02
22.41	3.18	you	7.458132e-02
17.62	2.67	that	1.024539e-01
23.68	2.66	there	1.031416e-01
40.00	2.55	two	1.103390e-01
*	*	*	*

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