

## **Chapter Four**

### **PALESTINIAN DIASPORA ATTITUDES TO THE HOMELAND:**

#### **THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION**

Palestinians in Australia, it has been argued in Chapter Three, have encountered both misunderstanding and discrimination regarding their relationship to their homeland, including their aspirations to statehood. This experience has been paralleled by that of Palestinians elsewhere in the Western Diaspora, for example in the United States. Much of this misunderstanding stems from the fact that information on Palestinian attitudes towards Middle East issues is not generally available, or indeed sought. As Suleiman (10,23, 1993) has pointed out, Americans are biased against Arabs (including Palestinians), but are often unaware of their bias.

On the most basic level, then, Chapter Four seeks to fill some of those information gaps, by way of describing Palestinian attitudes to their homeland as revealed by the survey data. As well as presenting the data on what the sample thought, however, this chapter will also begin to analyse what may have made them think it. Thus, while it will be instructive to learn whether this group was characterised - for example - by political moderation or by extremism, it will be even more useful to find out whether the sample's political stance was associated with any particular socio-demographic factor such as religious affiliation. The latter variable is regarded as of particular interest in the light of current developments in Islamic

politics in the region, and in the light of fears in the West that Middle East migrants are likely to bring with them an Islamic variant of terrorism.

Following on from what was said in the previous chapter about negative stereotyping of Palestinians, it is broadly hypothesised that the data to be presented in this chapter will confound those stereotypes. In other words, it is expected that - in line with findings from other studies - the sample will be found to be politically moderate rather than extremist or irredentist; ethnically tolerant rather than anti-semitic; and secularist rather than Islamicist.

Given the global nature of the Palestinian problem, and in line with the broader aims of this thesis, the findings will be compared and contrasted with those from other studies of Palestinians both in their homeland and abroad. Data from studies done in the United States will be introduced to test a broad assumption of attitudinal homogeneity among Palestinian exile communities world-wide. Shain (1989, 55) has maintained that:

By and large, the greater its scope and the more complex its demographic makeup, the less likely it is that a diaspora pool will consist of a homogeneous population holding similar political opinions.

It will be argued - as it was argued earlier in this thesis when the reasons for undertaking the study were given - that, contrary to Shain's suggestion, Palestinians around the world do hold similar opinions. No study of attitudes within a particular Palestinian community has yet, to the writer's knowledge, been scientifically replicated in a different context. The arguments for a homogeneity of Palestinian attitudes around the world are thereby reduced, although there is an

informal consensus among scholars that such homogeneity probably does exist.

Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989, 98) state that: "Despite their dispersal, Palestinians appear to have preserved a high level of consensus." If this is so, and if that consensus can be shown to have a cross-national aspect, then the findings from surveys of individual communities such as the Sydney Palestinians can legitimately be seen as part of a wider diaspora picture, rather than an isolated phenomenon.<sup>84</sup> It should be emphasised, however, that the introduction of such comparative data will be selective, rather than comprehensive in scope.

It will also be recalled that this thesis has always had a two-fold aim. On one level it can be categorised along with studies such as those by Christison (1989) and Cankar (1988) who have focused on diaspora Palestinians as an ethnic minority whose discriminatory treatment has implications for pluralist democracies. The discussion in Chapter Three followed this line of argument. On another plane, however, this study can be classed with those by Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989), Reiser (1987) and Tuma (1980), each of whom tended to view their respective Diaspora communities as "a microcosm of the Palestinians at large" (Tuma, 1981, 1) - and their data on Diaspora attitudes as a kind of window onto attitudes in the region. Clearly, a necessary pre-requisite for the "microcosm" argument to work, is that diaspora and homeland populations must be seen to share the same, or similar attitudes. This is where the lack of properly comparable data becomes a problem. Nevertheless, where applicable, data from studies done in the Middle

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<sup>84</sup> The phrase "cross-national aspect" has been used by Ghabra in his study of Palestinian families in the diaspora (Ghabra, 1987, 2).

East will be brought into the discussion - again selectively. It is anticipated that the findings from the Sydney research will have at least some parallels in the research done in the Middle East region.

In Chapter Three it was argued that host countries will be better equipped to deal with displaced minority groups if they understand the importance to such groups of ties to the homeland. This chapter, and the next, will look instead at the nature of attitudes to the homeland on the part of one such group. It will be argued that our understanding of conflict situations in regions such as the Middle East can only be enhanced by systematically examining what groups from those regions think, and by attempting to discover why they think it.

### **DIASPORA ATTITUDES TO HOMELAND ISSUES**

Diaspora attitudes to the host country were examined in Chapter Three, and were found to be remarkably uniform across the sample. The data to be presented below, on how the sample viewed the politics of their homeland, exhibited slightly more variation. The variation was possibly due to the more emotive nature of the issues raised, but also due - it is suggested - to the widely varying pre-emigration experiences of the individuals concerned. That those experiences may prove to be the crucial factor in determining attitudinal differences within the sample is a proposition recurring throughout this thesis. Before examining relationships

between dependent and independent variables, however, the survey results on opinions regarding homeland issues will be presented in summary, tabular form.<sup>85</sup>

## EXTERNAL FORCES AND ARMED STRUGGLE

Given that the survey took place at the time of the Gulf Crisis, the first item to be looked at - how the sample viewed the Arab states' contribution to their struggle - provided some subtle and timely insights. It will be recalled that 56% of the sample had identified themselves in some way as Arab (see Table 3-10). Popular reactions to the Gulf Crisis had also appeared to be evidence of a pan-Arab dimension to Palestinian attitudes. At the time of the survey an Arab leader, Saddam Hussein, was not only vowing to liberate Palestine, but was showing every sign of being willing to use military force to do so. As the results given in Table 3-8 have already shown, however, this politically sophisticated group appeared to foresee that the consequences of Saddam's actions would probably be of little benefit to them or to their cause. The results in Table 4-1 provided no evidence to support claims that Palestinians in general supported Saddam Hussein.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> In the tables, the five-point scale has been reduced to three, generally along the lines of "Positive", "Negative" or "Neutral" responses. Percentages are given to one decimal place, and rounded up where necessary. For more detailed frequency tables, see Appendix IV. The actual wording of the relevant questionnaire item is given in each table, but for the full range of categories in each item, the reader is referred to the English and Arabic texts of the questionnaire in Appendices I and II respectively.

<sup>86</sup> A July 1993 opinion poll of Palestinian-Jordanians found that only 2% believed Iraq or Saddam Hussein represented the Palestinian people. The authors of the study saw the decline in Saddam's popularity among Palestinians as being partly due to the aftermath of the Gulf War (*Political Perspective*, July 1993, 13).

**TABLE 4-1 SAMPLE’S PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE OF ARAB STATES**

(Item 58. In general, how would you describe the role of the Arab states in the Palestine-Israel conflict?)

	n	%
	-----	
Very/Quite positive	3	1.8
Sometimes positive,sometimes negative	45	26.0
Very/Quite negative	125	72.2
	-----	
	173	100.0

*Note:* Due to rounding errors, the percentages in the tables do not always add up to exactly 100%.

Despite Palestinian insistence on an Arab dimension to their identity, then, the results in Table 4-1 show the extent of Palestinian disillusion with the Arab states, one respondent making the important distinction that: "The (Arab) people intend to help us, but not the governments." Kuwait’s mass expulsion of Palestinians after the Gulf War can only have reinforced the sample’s negative perceptions on this issue.

Further corroboration of this stance was provided by the sample’s rejection of a role for "external forces" (Table 4-2). The item did not specify Arab forces in particular, but it can probably assumed that the sample had very few expectations of help from the super-powers, whose interests have long interlocked in the Middle East (Said, 1980, 234).

**TABLE 4-2 SAMPLE'S PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES**

(Item 59. How much, do you think, should the Palestinians rely on external forces in order to achieve an independent State of Palestine?)

	n	%
Rely totally/Rely considerably	34	19.9
Rely in some ways	47	27.5
Rely partly/Rely not at all	90	52.6
	171	100.0

The item relating to armed struggle (Table 4-3) was expected to produce controversial results; for this reason it was later selected as a key variable. Two-thirds expressed support for what one respondent called "the legitimate right to fight", although there was a considerable range of opinion as to the circumstances in which it would be desirable. Of that 66%, those who expressed strong support for the proposition amounted to 42%.

**TABLE 4-3 SAMPLE'S ATTITUDES TO ARMED STRUGGLE**

(Item 60. To what extent do you support the idea of armed struggle in order to achieve an independent State of Palestine?)

	n	%
Support strongly/Support with reservations	114	66.0
Support in some circumstances,not in others	39	22.5
Do not really support/Do not support at all	20	11.5
	173	100.0

While the PLO has renounced terrorism in both theory and practice, the continuation of occupation has historically made it difficult for the organisation to abandon armed struggle - at least in principle - as potentially instrumental in both rallying support and in achieving liberation. A senior PLO official, outlining a possible system of political parties in a Palestinian entity, has felt it necessary to state that:

As long as the Israeli occupation continues, such a system need not entail, for example, renouncing the military struggle or underground forms of organization (Hilal, 1993, 60).

On the ground in the Occupied Territories, however, one seasoned West Bank observer has described the organization's stance as "an explicit PLO opposition to the use of arms" (Kuttab, 1993, 81). The fact that the PLO was not in control of a territorial base has made the task of implementing this policy difficult at times, and groups within the PLO such as the Fatah Hawks now use weapons routinely, if sporadically.

One respondent qualified his "strong support" for armed struggle by adding: "If negotiations fail or if Israel's stand stays as it is now". The level of support for armed struggle may be inversely proportional to the individual's level of hope that non-violent means will be successful in resolving the conflict, and Shadid and Seltzer (1988, 31) have pointed out that Palestinian support for violence "is rooted in 40 years of disillusionment with peaceful proposals". It may also be significant that the item in question did not suggest any course of action other than armed struggle, since other surveys have found high levels of support for non-violent alternatives. Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989, 99), for example, found that 51% of



their respondents put political negotiations as their first preference, with civil disobedience and armed struggle each attracting 39%. More recently, a 1993 poll in the Occupied Territories found that 80% believed in democratic dialogue as a means of resolving political differences, while only 14% favoured violence "if necessary" (CPRS, 1993, 1).

INTIFADA

The sample had an unambiguous view of rights seen as legitimate, such as the right to take up arms. Yet, when their views on the Intifada were canvassed, they expressed almost unanimous support for what was then a generally unarmed uprising (Table 4-4). Currently, despite progress in negotiations for autonomy, Palestinians still appear unwilling to call off the Intifada (CPRS, 1993, 1).

**TABLE 4-4 SAMPLE’S FEELINGS ABOUT INTIFADA**  
(Item 48. In terms of how you feel about being Palestinian, how has the Intifada made you feel?)

	n	%
Very/Quite proud	162	93.6
Proud in some ways ..	8	4.6
Not very/Not at all proud	3	1.8
	173	100.0

Demonstrable independence from external means of support was one reason for Palestinian feelings of pride, and may partly account for the sample’s earlier

rejection of outside sources of help (Table 4-2). Another source of pride was their perception that Israeli credibility had been eroded in inverse proportion to a growth in public, including international, sympathy for the Palestinians. In the previous chapter (see Table 3-8) it was seen how a perceived improvement in Palestinians' public image was seen by an 84% majority as being due to the Intifada.

The origins of the Intifada are still being debated by scholars and others. The next item (Table 4-5) explored the sample's perceptions as to whether the Islamic movement had played a central role in the way that both the movement itself and some Israeli elements have claimed. The secular nationalist view easily dominated, although 29% saw the Intifada as wholly or partly a religion-inspired phenomenon.

**TABLE 4-5 SAMPLE'S DESCRIPTION OF INTIFADA**  
(Item 55. How would you describe the Intifada?)

	n	%
Wholly/Mainly a religious movement	15	8.8
Partly a religious movement,partly a national one	35	20.3
Wholly/Mainly a national movement	122	70.9
	172	100.0

SECULARISM

While some members of the sample acknowledged a religious dimension to the Intifada, the majority's personal preferences as to the future ideology of their state were unambiguously secular. It must be remembered that the Christians in the

sample were expected to have secularist inclinations; as a member of that faith put it: "Christians don't like to see religion and politics mixed - otherwise the Muslims will dominate." However, the results in Table 4-6 suggested that many of the 43% of Muslims in the sample had similarly secularist inclinations.

Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989) did not address this particular issue in their study, the omission being possibly a testimony to the relatively recent nature of the Islamicist phenomenon. Over a quarter of Shadid and Seltzer's Occupied Territories respondents (1988) preferred a state based on Islamic law. It is possible that, among Muslims in the Sydney community, the proportion of those rejecting secularism would now have increased. What the data in Table 4-6 appeared to suggest, however, was that Palestinian willingness to acknowledge a role for the Islamic movement in their struggle did not automatically signify a desire for their future state to be an Islamic one. This issue will be dealt with more fully in the next section of this chapter. The issue was selected as a key variable.

**TABLE 4-6 SAMPLE'S ATTITUDES TO SECULARISM**  
(Item 54. Do you think the future State of Palestine should be a secular one?)

	n	%
	-----	-----
Definitely/Probably	137	81.0
Maybe yes, maybe no	6	3.6
Definitely not/Probably not	26	15.4
	-----	-----
	169	100.0

## TWO-STATE SOLUTION

The next item (Table 4-7) was a pivotal item of the survey, exploring as it did the fundamental issue of whether Palestinians accept the existence of the State of Israel. Also, while the previous item had examined their preferences regarding the nature of their future state, this item ascertained their views as to its supposed boundaries. Israel's boundaries have not been defined in international law since the 1947 UN Partition Plan. As far as many Palestinians are concerned, the 1947 borders of what was to be the Arab state in Palestine remain valid in principle (although never implemented on the ground). Pragmatically speaking, however, they acknowledge that the territories likely to be made available to them will be considerably less in area than the 1947 allocation.<sup>87</sup>

This item clarified whether the sample members fully accepted the PLO's 1988 recognition of Israel's statehood, its abandoning of claims to the territory on which Israel had been established in 1948, and its declaration as a national goal the setting up of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>88</sup> In what was to become a characteristic pattern of response distribution, the large majority in favour of an accommodationist view was offset by a small but strongly rejectionist minority. For this important item, the categories are given in full.

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<sup>87</sup> The 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO allowed for initial military withdrawal from only the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The Declaration of Principles in the Accord stated that: "The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit", but did not define the exact areas in question. The issue of Jerusalem was not to be discussed until the permanent status negotiations, scheduled to begin after two years (*Middle East International*, 24 September 1993, 26-7).

<sup>88</sup> For the text of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which was issued in Algiers on 15 November 1988, see *Journal of Palestine Studies* XVIII, 2 (Winter, 1989), 213-216.

**TABLE 4-7 SAMPLE'S ACCEPTANCE OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION**  
 (Item 52. To what extent do you accept the two-state solution, namely a State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel?)

	n	%
Accept completely	56	32.4
Accept with some reservations	75	43.4
Neither accept nor reject	5	2.9
Inclined to reject	9	5.2
Reject completely	28	16.2
	173	100.1

The polarisation of views on this emotive issue means that the dissenting minority comes into some prominence. Whether a rejectionist stance on this issue was being adopted by the same individuals who also rejected secularism, is a question to be dealt with later in this survey. The large majority adopting a moderate stance, however, is not without significance. Since 41% of the sample were born in what is now Israel, many were in a sense signing away their 'Right of Return' to their actual birthplace. One respondent felt that only those from 'inside', in other words from inside Israel, should even be asked this particular question.<sup>89</sup>

Interestingly, the data shows that the majority's insistence on their right to use arms (Table 4-3) cannot automatically be seen as antithetical to their acceptance of

<sup>89</sup> There is also a school of thought which feels that only those in exile have truly known what it is to be Palestinian. Fouad Moughrabi, writing from USA, has accused the West Bank intellectual Sari Nusseibeh of ignoring "the *cri de coeur* of a Palestinian who has suffered first dislocation and exile, then denial of his right to exist, then occupation and near total dehumanization" (*Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXII (Spring 1993), 123-4).

the two-state solution. Support for the latter showed quite a strong *negative* correlation (-.47) with support for armed struggle. The 1988 Declaration, regarded by many Palestinians as an enormously important renunciation of claims they still regarded as legitimate, was largely ignored in the West and distrusted in Israel. The irritation caused by this situation was expressed by one respondent who wrote in: "Everyone accepts that, why ask again and again?"

The data above confirmed the group's commitment to a "solution" which many found extremely painful. Palestinian attitudes on this crucial issue are complex, and in a 1991 survey in Jordan, 57% still saw the goal of a state in all of Palestine as a "realistic political objective", with only 22% seeing such a state as limited to the West Bank and Gaza (Pollock, 1992, Table 10). With this in mind, the sample's emotional attachment to the historic land of Palestine was examined in the next item (Table 4-8). The question sought to ascertain whether cognitive acceptance of an option was necessarily accompanied by a sense of emotional well-being about it. The results were as expected, for while 76% had earlier accepted the two-state solution (completely or with reservations), far fewer felt that Palestinians were "very" or "quite" happy about it. In Christison's informal survey of Palestinians in six American cities, she found that "all but a few accept Israel as an enduring reality", although she noted that many made a distinction between recognition of Israel's existence and recognition of its legitimacy (*Christian Science Monitor*, 28 October 1988).

**TABLE 4-8 SAMPLE’S FEELINGS ABOUT TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

(Item 53. How do you think most Palestinians feel about the idea of a State of Palestine consisting of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem?)

	n	%
	-----	-----
Very/Quite happy	108	63.1
Half happy, half unhappy	32	18.7
Very/Quite unhappy	31	18.2
	-----	-----
	171	100.0

One of the Sydney informants, discussing the responses, said: "They believe something is better than nothing. They are desperate." These sentiments have been expressed on many occasions since 1988. After the signing of the 1993 Accord, for example, the response of a Palestinian in Gaza was:

I feel like a man who has lost a million dollars and been given ten .. (But) we cannot go on the way we are.  
.. After so many rejections, I accept. But, please, don't ask me how I feel  
(*Middle East International*, 24 September 1993).

A willingness to compromise, then, may occur not so much in spite of the pain of renunciation, as because of the greater pain caused by decades of deprivation.

**JERUSALEM**

A pragmatic acceptance of reality, rather than the pursuit of an unattainable ideal, was again apparent in the next two items - on the controversial issue of Jerusalem (Table 4-9). This was so despite the undoubted intensity of emotional involvement on the issue for both Muslims and Christians, as of course there also is for Jews.

**TABLE 4-9 SAMPLE'S PREFERRED/EXPECTED SOLUTION FOR JERUSALEM**

(Items 61, 62. If there is a peace agreement on the Palestine issue, which of the following would you **prefer/expect** to see happen to Jerusalem?)

	<b>Preference</b>		<b>Expectation</b>	
	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and some other city becomes the capital of Israel	113	66.5	47	28.8
E.Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and W.Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel	24	14.1	33	20.2
Jerusalem remains united as the joint capital of both Palestine and Israel	10	5.9	31	19.0
Jerusalem is placed under international control, and is no-one's capital	14	8.2	34	20.9
Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel, and some other city becomes the capital of Palestine	2	1.2	14	8.6
(Respondent refused to acknowledge the existence of the State of Israel)	7	4.1	4	2.5
	170	100.0	163	100.0

*Notes:*i) Respondents in the last category refused to answer these two questions at all, on the grounds that the question wording assumed the continued existence of the State of Israel.

ii) The number of respondents answering the second question - on actual expectations - was slightly less than for the first. The decline in response rate may have been due to confusion about the almost identical wording used in the two items.



Respondents were first asked their preferences, and then their actual expectations. Because of the emotive nature of the issue, the categories are given in full. Some of the results in the Table 4-9 are remarkably similar to those in Moughrabi and El-Nazer's study (1989, 100), although only preferences were elicited in that survey. In that study, 61% preferred to see Jerusalem completely under Palestinian control, while 24% thought it should be internationalised, and 15% felt it should be a joint capital.

Contemporary opinion in the Occupied Territories appears to be more or less in line with the Sydney sample's views. If preferences for the maximalist ideal are ignored, the above results show that the sample was more than twice as likely to prefer the city to be divided, rather than remain united as a joint capital. A July 1993 poll in the Occupied Territories (*Mideast Mirror*, 4 August 1993) similarly found that 33% would accept the division of Jerusalem into two capitals, with only 12% favouring a joint capital.

The question on preferences elicited a large number of strongly-worded write-in comments, many originating with the "rejectionist" minority. Some respondents felt that there was "No place for a state of Israel in Palestine". Others were pessimistic about the basic assumption behind the question - that of an eventual peace agreement - saying: "There will never be peace between the strong and the weak". Responses regarding expectations showed maximalist preferences for ideal solutions being replaced by much greater realism when it came to what was actually expected to eventuate. The proportion favouring the first, all-or-nothing

alternative dropped, while the next three compromise scenarios in the list attracted correspondingly greater support (60%).<sup>90</sup>

The fact that two-thirds of the sample aspired to an undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine did not indicate whether it was the religious, or other aspects of the issue which were uppermost. For this reason, the next item, where respondents were allowed more than one choice, examined exactly why Jerusalem mattered to this group (Table 4-10). The intensity of feeling associated with the city was eloquently expressed by one Jerusalemite: "Jerusalem is the city I was brought up in; it was the cradle of my human contacts, and the source of my relationship with God."

**TABLE 4-10 IMPORTANCE FOR SAMPLE OF ASPECTS OF JERUSALEM**  
(Item 63. How important to you are the following aspects of Jerusalem?)

	n	%
It contains holy places of all 3 great religions	111	64.2
It is the centre of the Palestinian nation	93	53.8
It contains holy places of Islam	44	25.4
It contains holy places of Christianity	29	16.8
It has family and personal associations	23	13.3

*Note:* A total of 173 respondents answered this item.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup> There were many difficulties in designing and administering these items. Respondents were critical about both the wording of, and the assumptions behind the questions. Given the emotive nature of the issue, an open-ended format may in retrospect have been preferable.

<sup>91</sup> Footnote In Multiple Dichotomy items such as Item 63, respondents gave a "yes" or "no" to each category. In Multiple Response items such as Item 64, more than one answer could be given. For both types of item, the figures given for each category relate to the numbers, and proportion, of all the persons answering the item who chose that category. For this reason the

The 54% seeing the city as the centre of their nation seems a rather low figure, given that 67% had earlier insisted on it being the capital of Palestine (see Table 4-9). Disagreements with, or confusion about the definition and translation of the term "nation"- which has no exact Arabic equivalent - may have been a factor affecting the rate of response.<sup>92</sup>

Some respondents felt that the choices should have included one relating to the Arab nation as a whole, seeing Jerusalem as: "Not only for the Palestinian nation, but for the whole Arab nation." More than half the respondents saw Jerusalem primarily as the capital of Palestine, but almost two-thirds selected the response which recognised the religious claims of Judaism as well as of Islam and Christianity. This important majority response meant that both Muslims and Christians in the sample shunned a religiously exclusivist view of the city's significance. Despite this declared tolerance, the members of the sample were well aware of the thorny nature of the religion issue. One wrote: "Both parties will refuse to allow the other side to have Jerusalem as its capital, because of the religious sites." Another, a Muslim, was more uncompromising: "In Jerusalem are the first of the two *kibla*, and the third of the Holy Places, and giving away Jerusalem will be considered as treason."

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figures under "n" add up to more than the sample figure of 176, and the percentage figures total more than 100. In the tables for these items, categories have mostly been arranged in order of frequency.

<sup>92</sup> The Arabic word *'umma*, which can be combined with the adjective "Arab" in Arab nationalist contexts, but which is also used to denote the Islamic community of believers, was used in the Arabic version of the questionnaire to denote the Palestinian "nation". This was objected to by those who saw it as somehow setting the Palestinian nation apart from the Arab nation as a whole. Some respondents indicated a preference for the more general term *shaab* (people) in this particular context.

While the sample had firmly espoused principles of secularism, they agreed that Jewish religious claims over Jerusalem were legitimate. However, Israel's unilateral annexation of East (Arab) Jerusalem has always been regarded as illegal by Palestinians and has not, so far, been recognised by the world community. Recognition of Jewish religious claims, therefore, was not accompanied by any willingness to recognise Israeli territorial sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

## ISRAELIS AND JEWS

Attitudes towards negotiating on territorial issues do not always indicate how the inhabitants of that territory are viewed. Since Palestinians are sometimes thought to hold anti-semitic views, a number of items tested their attitudes towards Jews, both in Australia (see previous chapter) and in the Middle East.

An item on the Israeli peace movement (Table 4-11) found that the majority had a positive view of the 'peaceniks', although twenty-eight per cent were either non-committal, or ignorant of the movement's activities. Positive opinions may have been reinforced by Yasser Arafat's well-publicised relations with some of the peace movement's leading figures.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> For an Israeli peace activist's account of some of these contacts, see Uri Avnery's *My Friend, the Enemy*, 1986.

**TABLE 4-11 SAMPLE’S PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE OF ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT**

(Item 65. What kind of role do you expect the Israeli peace movement to play in the search for a just peace?)

	n	%
Very/Quite positive	101	58.4
Neither positive nor negative	24	13.9
Very/Quite negative	23	13.3
Don’t know	25	14.5
	173	100.1

The disparity between what a disempowered group might hope for, and what it can realistically expect to get, was highlighted in the next item (Table 4-12).

Palestinians in the sample, having earlier stated their own acceptance of the idea of renouncing claims to 80% of their homeland, did not expect the same level of flexibility on the part of their opponents in the conflict. Almost three-quarters of them had a pessimistic view of Israeli willingness to compromise territorially.

**TABLE 4-12 SAMPLE’S EXPECTATIONS OF ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO GIVE BACK LAND**

(Item 66. To what extent, do you think, are most Israelis willing to give back the Occupied Territories in exchange for peace?)

	n	%
Very/Quite willing	19	10.9
Neither willing nor unwilling	27	15.5
Very/Quite unwilling	128	73.6
	174	100.0

The sample’s pessimism regarding Israeli flexibility was echoed in the results of a 1991 poll in Jordan, where 64% of Palestinians thought the Israelis were "very" or "fairly" unlikely to make significant concessions for peace (Pollock, 1992, Table 7). A 1993 poll of Israeli Jews found that 20% were willing to cede all or most of "Judea and Samaria" in a peace agreement, but that 48% thought only a small part of it, or none, should be given back (*Mideast Mirror*, 13 September 1993).

To clarify whether pessimism regarding Israeli political aims was accompanied by ethnocentric attitudes to Jews, the next item asked the sample to envisage a Palestinian state which would be shared with Jews (Table 4-13). A majority was willing to envisage such a scenario. The presence of a sizeable minority which did not envisage such co-existence, however, influenced the choice of the item as a key item in further analysis.

**TABLE 4-13 SAMPLE’S WILLINGNESS TO SEE JEWS AS CITIZENS OF PALESTINE**  
(Item 67. To what extent would you be willing to see Jews become citizens of the State of Palestine?)

	n	%
Very/Quite willing	102	59.3
Neither willing nor unwilling	22	12.8
Very/Quite unwilling	48	27.9
	172	100.0

The PLO’s stated commitment to a secular state was echoed by most Palestinians in this Diaspora study, although a distinction was made by one respondent in this

study who wrote in: "No objection to Jews, but 'No' to Zionists". A Muslim respondent explained that Jews who were "originally" from Palestine would be just as welcome as Christian Palestinians. One respondent wrote: "I hope that the Palestinian government will be a mixture of Jews and Arabs, so our people can live in peace." The writer was often reminded by respondents that adherents of all three religions had co-existed for centuries in pre-1948 Palestine. In Moughrabi and El-Nazer's survey (1989, 98), only 6% of respondents viewed the struggle for Palestine as a conflict between Jews and non-Jews.

It could well be argued that ethnic tolerance of one's adversaries is easier to preach in the diaspora than to practise in the conflict-ridden homeland. The sample's views on co-existence with Jews may - or may not - be shared by the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories, but there is still very little reliable data available on this important subject.<sup>94</sup> It is certainly a central hypothesis of this thesis that the experience of continuing occupation is likely to be an important factor affecting - and inevitably hardening - attitudes, as some researchers have already suggested (Roy, 1991; Reiser, 1987). There is so far little evidence, however, that such attitude shifts regarding political issues would inevitably take on an anti-Jewish aspect. In the Australian context, it will be recalled that nearly 50% of the sample had favoured political contacts with Jews, and that 21% had actual political contact with Jewish groups in Australia (see tables for Items 35 and 50 in Appendix IV).

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<sup>94</sup> While polls within Israel itself regularly canvas Jewish opinion regarding Arabs, the reverse is rarely the case in the Occupied Territories, where survey research is in any case still in its infancy.

## LEADERSHIP

The description of the sample's attitudes concludes with the issue of leadership and representation. Again, because of the disparity between survey research showing historically high levels of support for the PLO, and claims made elsewhere - particularly in recent years - that the PLO has little support from its constituency, the topic was regarded as a key issue.<sup>95</sup>

Four separate questions were devoted to the leadership issue; in the first of these (Item 56a), respondents were asked their views as to the correctness of the PLO's current approach. This item was selected as a key variable for subsequent analysis. They were then asked if they thought the PLO was democratic. The results for these two items - which cover two of the sharpest current controversies within Palestinian circles - are combined in Table 4-14.

As expected, given the sample's strong support for the PLO's two-state solution, just over three-quarters agreed with the first proposition. Although the minority opposition group was smaller here than for some other items, demonstrating perhaps a closing of the ranks behind the leadership, almost a quarter were either non-committal or in disagreement.

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<sup>95</sup> In a 1982 *Time* magazine survey on the West Bank, 86% of respondents wanted the PLO to run a State of Palestine; and in Shadid and Seltzer's 1986 survey in the Occupied Territories, 95% of respondents saw the PLO as their representative (Shadid and Seltzer, 1988, 22). Later, assertions that the PLO had become marginal, a "hostage to extreme elements", and that the Intifada had generated an alternative, indigenous West Bank and Gaza leadership, were made (Mylroie, 1990, 153). At the time of writing the PLO is generally thought to retain majority loyalty, though suffering considerable erosion in prestige.



**TABLE 4-14 SAMPLE'S ATTITUDES TO THE PLO**

(Item 56. What is your reaction to the following statement(s) relating to the PLO?

a) "The PLO leadership's current approach to the struggle is correct" b) "The PLO is a democratic organisation.")

	a)PLO is correct		b)PLO is democratic	
	n	%	n	%
Strongly agree/Agree	129	75.9	121	72.4
Neither agree nor disagree	18	10.6	22	13.2
Strongly disagree/Disagree	23	13.5	24	14.4
	170	100.0	167	100.0

Among the objections raised by the opposition group were assertions that only those living in the Occupied Territories could really judge the PLO's performance; and the stated belief that "the PLO shouldn't have played all its cards at once and got nothing back". The last statement is a reference to the fact that many Palestinians perceived the 1988 Declaration as a major concession to Israel, for which they got little credit and no reciprocal gesture. Similar sentiments are still being expressed, and increasingly so, as current developments unfold.

Considerable publicity has been given to recent gains in popular support made by the Islamic movement at the expense of the PLO (particularly Fatah), in the Occupied Territories. A 1993 poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) found that "nationalist forces" were supported by 52% of an Occupied Territories sample, while 24% favoured the "Islamic forces". In January 1994, when hopes raised by the 1993 Declaration of Principles had still

not been realised, another JMCC poll found that 30% had become less supportive of the PLO (*Mideast Mirror*, 4 August 1993, 14 January 1994).

Given that Diaspora opinion tends to reflect trends in the homeland (not the reverse), support for the PLO will almost certainly suffer further erosion in both Diaspora and homeland, if Palestinian concessions on paper fail to be matched by gains on the ground. Informal contacts with Sydney Palestinians have reinforced this supposition. In the West Bank, Palestinian researchers have noted that the population's initial enthusiasm for the 1993 Accord had come about "primarily because the PLO itself had entered the negotiations with Israel" - testimony that the organisation's historically strong support base was not limited to the Diaspora. The same researchers, however, also noted the necessity for the leadership's decisions to be accompanied by "concrete positive results", if public opinion is to remain favourable (Electronic mail received from CPRS on Palestine News Network, 5 October 1993). Loyalty to the organisation may therefore be strong and deep - but, among this politically aware population, it is neither unthinking nor unconditional.

Strong support was expressed for the notion that the PLO was democratic, although over a quarter had neutral or negative opinions. In Moughrabi and El-Nazer's study (1989, 94), an even higher 85% expressed satisfaction with the democratic nature of the PLO. The community in Australia is too small and, according to the PLO representative, not well enough organised, to warrant formal representation in the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, the Palestine National Council (PNC). Other PLO institutions (with the exception of the General Union of Palestinian Workers)

have historically not been represented in Australia, so that this item tested general, rather than Australia-specific, perceptions of how the PLO operated. As on most items relating to their opinion of the PLO, respondents in Sydney tended to present a united front to the outside observer, so that the data on such items may not have been truly indicative of actual feelings on the subject.

Recently, the need for democratising the organisation has become an extremely controversial issue, and a recent poll in the Occupied Territories (mentioned above) revealed that 88% of inhabitants saw a need for "democratic reform" of the PLO (*Mideast Mirror*, 4 August 1993). Dissatisfaction has increasingly been focused on the person of the PLO leader, which leads on to the next issue. Regarding the personal performance of Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO (Table 4-15), the members of the sample were supportive, although slightly less so than for the PLO as a whole.

**TABLE 4-15 SAMPLE'S ATTITUDES TO ARAFAT**  
(Item 57. How would you rate Yasser Arafat's performance as leader so far?)

	n	%
Very good/Good	104	60.1
Sometimes good, sometimes not	49	28.3
Not very/Not at all good	20	11.5
	173	99.9

Arafat's political demise has been forecast many a time, but at the time of the survey only a few respondents were willing to express criticism of his leadership.

Moughrabi and El-Nazer's survey (1989, 96) had come up with a figure of 63% support for Arafat - a result which once again almost mirrors the Sydney findings. Pollock reports that, in a poll conducted in Jordan at almost the same time as the Sydney survey, 51% of Palestinians were satisfied with Arafat (Pollock, 1992, Table 11).

On the other hand, considering the undoubted salience of the leadership issue for the majority of respondents, and given that the opinions of this sample tended to be very polarised on important issues, the number of uncommitted responses was unusual for this sample. It is possible that respondents felt that the issue was too sensitive to be discussed openly; certainly, some of Moughrabi and El-Nazer's respondents (1989, 96) had objected to a similar item as being divisive. At interviews in Sydney, few had been ready to criticise the PLO leader as forthrightly as the anti-Fatah activist whose reaction to the two-state scenario was: "Arafat has done a striptease, and has got nothing for it, not even a tip!"

Approval rates for Arafat are currently being affected by several factors, including the need (mentioned above) for democratising the PLO, and the feeling that Palestinian statehood is not likely to be realised as a result of his current policies. Pollock (1992, 50) saw a decline in Arafat's popularity in Jordan as due to his being seen as "too accommodating, even defeatist, vis a vis Israel". It is therefore quite possible that, if Arafat's policies do not bring Palestinians the results they desire, approval rates for the PLO leader will continue to fall. The reverse is probably also true; if statehood eventuates, support for the PLO leader will rise

again. The fact that pro-Arafat feeling ebbs and flows according to *Israeli* actions is not always recognised outside the region, but at least one West Bank research institution has made the connection:

People are frustrated with Israeli attempts to hinder implementation of the (1993) political agreements. This has influenced popular views of the PLO (*Mideast Mirror*, 26 January 1994).

In addition to perceptions of political ineptness, there has also been dissatisfaction with Arafat's authoritarian - some would say autocratic - tendencies.<sup>96</sup> While the January 1994 JMCC poll found that a fifth of the Occupied Territories sample thought Arafat was democratic, another fifth saw him as undemocratic, and nearly a half felt he was "individualistic" (*Mideast Mirror*, 14 January 1994). In Sydney, a veteran of Black September told the writer after the 1993 Declaration: "I am not against peace. I am against the way it was done. I believe in democracy, and Arafat should have consulted the PNC." The PNC did approve the 1988 Declaration, but not - up to the time of writing - the 1993 Declaration of Principles.

Ascertaining the sample's opinion of the structure, leadership and effectiveness of the PLO did not necessarily reveal whether they felt they were represented by it. For this reason, and because the whole question of representation is so central to

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<sup>96</sup> Serious commentators such as David Hirst have linked these tendencies to the after-effects of his 1992 plane crash. Hirst cites a PLO official who said afterwards: "We hoped it had made him think of those he might have left behind, of delegating authority, of reviving the democracy he always boasted about, but which, in truth, he was emptying of its content. The opposite happened; more than ever he thinks only of himself." Another factor which did little to enhance Arafat's popularity was his marriage to a woman described by Hirst as "a public relations calamity". (*Guardian Weekly*, 19 December, 1993).

the Palestine-Israel conflict, the next item was left as an open-ended one, to avoid suggesting any particular answer (Table 4-16).<sup>97</sup>

**TABLE 4-16 SAMPLE'S PREFERRED REPRESENTATIVES IN NEGOTIATIONS**

(Item 64. Who do you think should represent the Palestinians in any future negotiations with Israel?)

	<b>n</b>	<b>% of cases</b>
PLO/Arafat	136	82.4
Diaspora/Palestinian people	23	13.9
Occupied Territories/Intifada	19	11.5
HAMAS/Islamic	6	3.6
Other	27	16.4

*Note:* A total of 165 respondents answered this item.

In Table 4-16, categories of similar responses have been grouped (for the original responses, see Appendix IV). Of the 82% in the first category, 77% referred to the PLO. Moughrabi and El-Nazer's figure (1989, 94), for the percentage of the sample who agreed that the PLO represented their views, was 87%. Feedback from respondents had shown up differences of opinion as to what the "the Palestinian people" signified, but it was decided to treat it as a term embracing all Palestinians world-wide. Despite strong feelings of identification with the Intifada (see Table 4-4), the group did not generally see the Intifada leadership as

<sup>97</sup> This choice of question design had certain drawbacks. Firstly, the variable could not be utilised as a key variable for further analysis in the same way that the other, five-category attitude variables could. Secondly, there were the usual problems of coding sometimes lengthy answers. Responses referring to both the PLO and the Intifada leadership, for example, had to be entered under both categories. Finally, a few respondents seemed confused by the change in question format and failed to answer.

supplanting the PLO. Nor were those in favour of an Islamic alternative more than a tiny minority.

Perhaps the two clearest messages from these results were the reiteration of support for the PLO, and an insistence on the Palestinian-ness of their representatives. The latter point, in particular, was emphasised in comments such as: "The PLO only without the participation of others". One young West Banker opted for: "The PLO plus representatives of the fighters, the wounded, the prisoners, the children, the old and the women of the blessed Intifada."

Although the "Jordanian option" was having one of its periodic resurgences at the time of the survey, and although the idea of a confederation between Palestine and Jordan has also been current for some time, not one respondent referred to either Jordan or to King Hussein in the context of Palestinian representation. Ninety-three per cent of Moughrabi and El-Nazer's respondents (1989, 98) likewise strongly rejected any leadership role for Jordan.<sup>98</sup>

The picture of the sample's attitudes which emerges from this profile is a complex, and at times contradictory one. While the views of the majority were clear-cut on most issues, tending to be clustered at one end of the attitude scale, a persistent dissenting minority recurred. The sample's deep attachment to the homeland did

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<sup>98</sup> A 1993 survey of Palestinian-Jordanians found - apparently to the authors' surprise - that King Hussein was preferred over Yasser Arafat. While Arafat's position has undoubtedly been eroded, it is also possible that respondents in the survey - many of whom were refugees and/or stateless - felt it expedient to affirm their loyalty to the King. This possibility was not raised by the authors of the study (*Political Perspective*, July 1993, 13).

not dictate extremist or irredentist attitudes. Nevertheless, a willingness to co-exist with, and to recognise the religious rights of their adversaries, was not synonymous with readiness to cede sovereignty over occupied lands, including their putative capital city. In ideological terms, pan-Arab sentiments existed, but were not expressed in terms of attachment to the Arab states; and while Islamic influences were acknowledged to have a role in resistance to occupation, those same influences were not expected to dominate the future state. Adherence to the principle of armed struggle existed alongside deep-rooted identification with a mainly unarmed uprising which had greatly boosted national pride. The PLO and its leadership enjoyed very strong support, despite the fact that the majority's acceptance of the PLO's two-state approach was admitted by many to be a painful renunciation.

A tension was apparent between the majority's willingness to compromise in territorial terms, and their simultaneous perception that such willingness did not exist on the other side. Another significant feature of the findings was the distinction respondents made between solutions thought to be desirable or preferable, on the one hand; and compromises which were deemed as acceptable (if painful), on the other hand.

No comparative data exists in Australia on Palestinian attitudes, or indeed on Arab attitudes to homeland issues. Studies of Palestinian diaspora communities in USA have not been numerous, but have tended to show the same broad patterns as the Sydney data, despite certain demographic and political differences in the respective



communities. Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989, 101), whose findings have been cited throughout, concluded their study by describing the sample in the following terms:

A highly educated and politically active community which hovers around the middle of the political spectrum and supports the PLO and Arafat as its leader .. Palestinians in this survey tend to be secular and political moderates..

Most of them want to see a secular, democratic and pluralistic future Palestinian state which is willing to give persons of the Jewish faith full political rights.

The attitudes of the Sydney sample, as profiled above, were generally in line with these findings for Palestinians in the United States. As hypothesised at the outset, this sample exhibited the moderation, secularism and ethnic tolerance which have been found to be characteristic of other Palestinian groups, and which should prove an antidote to negative stereotyping of those groups. At the time of the survey, the Sydney results also seemed to be fairly similar to what was then known of Palestinian attitudes in the Middle East. The argument for a global homogeneity of Palestinian attitudes appeared to hold.

A closer look at the distributions, however, revealed that a minority within the sample expressed strong differences of opinion from the majority. Arrestingly, those minority views - particularly on subjects such as support for Arafat and the PLO, and for secularism - represent what are becoming significant trends within Palestine itself. The trends, at the time of writing, are accelerating, so that the Diaspora-as-microcosm perspective onto the homeland begins to appear an increasingly valid one. Returning to the data, the next logical step was to isolate

the factors associated with - and possibly causing - those differences within the sample, in an attempt to explain them.

## **THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ON ATTITUDES TO THE HOMELAND**

Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989) have been among the few researchers of Palestinian Diaspora attitudes who have investigated the effect of independent variables on the attitudes held by members of their sample, rather than simply describing those attitudes. Reiser (1987) was another, although his work pre-dates the other study by a decade.<sup>99</sup> Christison's work (1989) was based on qualitative data from informal interviews. Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989, 96) tested for the effects of variables such as education, length of residence, religion and political ideology. Unusually, for Diaspora studies, a variable was also included which covered the homeland experience - whether the respondent was a refugee, had lived under Occupation, and so on. However, possibly because of the uniformity of the data, the authors did not make many definitive statements about the effect of such variables on attitudes.

Given the lack of comparable Diaspora studies, surveys done in Israel and the Occupied Territories were looked at with regard to the selection of variables for the purposes of analysis. It was the survey carried out by Shadid and Seltzer (1988)

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<sup>99</sup> Although Reiser's work was published in Farah's *Pan-Arabism* in 1987, the actual data he used were collected in 1979, 1980 and 1981.

which suggested the selection of key variables for this analysis. In addition to "standard" variables, the authors included variables relating to place of residence (refugee camp, village or town; West Bank or Gaza), and - importantly - variables relating to experiences such as confiscation of land or arrest. They found that, while factors such as sex and income could not predict attitudes, those who had experienced confiscation, arrest and so on were more likely to support political violence, even if they were well educated. Such support, they found, was "strongly linked with people's levels of bitterness".<sup>100</sup> Reiser's earlier study (1987, 94) had likewise noted the effect of occupation on Palestinian attitudes, postulating that it was likely to be greater than the effect of other factors which were, for example, "culturally derived". Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar (1989, 61) found that socio-demographic attributes in general had a "limited power" to explain political variables among the Palestinians of both Israel and the West Bank.

In the light of what was suggested by the research cited above, it was decided to first match key attitude variables against standard socio-demographic variables. The "null" hypothesis adopted was that the latter would *not* be found to have a statistical effect on political attitudes. The possible exception to this hypothesis would be religion, at least where some variables - such as attitudes to secularism - were concerned. On the basis of what had been suggested by studies such as Shadid and Seltzer's, and also on the basis of what had been observed of the

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<sup>100</sup> Although the Shadid and Seltzer study has been criticised by Moughrabi (1987, 128) for its lack of "methodological caution", it still remains an extremely useful source of data. That the Israeli authorities took it seriously was indicated by their revoking of Professor Shadid's permit at his West Bank university, after the survey was published (Moughrabi, 1987, 128,131).

Sydney community, the second phase of the analysis (see Chapter Five) would examine the effect on attitudes of variables related to the homeland experience. Since 97% of the Sydney sample were Middle-East born, and 69% were born in Palestine, it was expected that homeland experiences would provide the data for some important correlations with political attitudes. And if this were so, it would not only assist our understanding of diaspora communities - an understanding shown, in Chapter Three, to be lacking - but would also make a contribution to our knowledge of Palestine and its politics.

## SELECTION OF VARIABLES

Out of the 20-odd questionnaire items covering respondents' views of Palestine-related issues, five attitude variables were chosen for the purposes of cross-tabulation. The variables were selected because of their centrality to Palestinian national aspirations, as well as for their controversial nature. The fact that similar questions had been asked in other such surveys helped ensure comparability.<sup>101</sup>

The five key attitude variables were as follows:

- Acceptance of the two-state solution;
- Support for the PLO leadership's approach;
- Commitment to a secular Palestinian state;
- Support for armed struggle;
- Willingness to see Jews as citizens of a future State of Palestine.

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<sup>101</sup> Ease of manipulation was assured by the fact that all the items had an identical (five-point category) design, and dealt with a relatively straightforward issue. Response categories typically ranged from Strongly Agree and Agree, followed by a neutral category, through to Disagree and Strongly Disagree.

To some, the omission of items on Jerusalem, or on the leadership of Yasser Arafat, may seem surprising. These issues are important, and considerable emphasis was therefore given to them in the section above on frequency distributions. The Jerusalem issue was excluded from the bivariate tabulations mainly on the grounds of its complex, emotive, and difficult-to-categorise nature. The Arafat item was passed over in favour of the item on support for the PLO, which - given Arafat's longstanding domination of the organisation - was thought likely to cover the same attitudinal ground.

Acceptance of Israel's existence as a state, together with support for the PLO, were included as two of the key issues in the analysis. Secularism, it was felt, could not be omitted from the analysis at a time when anti-secularist tendencies in the Middle East were being given so much attention. The variables relating to armed struggle and to acceptance of Jews as citizens of Palestine were bound to yield some controversial results, but this in itself was not considered a reason for their exclusion from the analysis; if anything, their controversial nature dictated their inclusion.

The five key attitude variables were first cross-tabulated against the following six "standard" variables:

- Age
- Sex
- Occupation
- Income
- Education
- Religion.

Other socio-demographic variables, such as the respondent's length of residence in the host country, were considered for inclusion, but rejected on various grounds.<sup>102</sup>

## RECODING

The problems inherent in a small sample size (176) came to the fore, as soon as cross-tabulations were begun. Recoding became a priority, and categories were collapsed accordingly. The distributions in the initial set of frequencies guided decisions as to the categories requiring collapsing.<sup>103</sup> The variables for Age, Income and Education could be recoded without undue difficulty. Sex and Religion were binary variables and did not require recoding. The variable relating to Occupation was difficult to recode, because of the looseness of the categories. A further problem was that Palestinian migrants often report a low degree of correspondence between their skills and their field of work (Abu Duhou and Teese, 1992, 159). Particularly in times of economic recession, occupation - in such groups - does not necessarily act as a useful indicator of socio-economic status. In retrospect, ascertaining father's occupation may have been more useful, although in some other studies of Palestinians where the father's socio-economic status was

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<sup>102</sup> Lengthy residence in the host country is often associated with more moderate political attitudes among migrant groups, but utilising years of residence as a variable would have risked confusing those born in Australia with those who had emigrated. In some procedures, the Australia-born were excluded, for precisely this reason.

<sup>103</sup> This approach was made on statistical grounds, and to avoid undue influence by a small number of extreme cases. A different approach was adopted in the previous section, where the categories were collapsed into Positive, Neutral and Negative categories, irrespective of the distribution of responses.

taken into account (Farah, 1983; Reiser, 1987), no correlation was found with attitudes.

In the case of the attitude variables, some of the recoding was affected by an unusual characteristic of the response pattern in the sample as a whole - a tendency to avoid neutral categories and to express firmly-held opinions at either end of the attitude scale. The fact that the issues raised in the questionnaire appear to have been of great salience for the respondents has already been mentioned. So-called "non-attitudes" were rare.

The implications of this for recoding were, typically, that those who "Totally rejected" a given option were numerous enough to form a category on their own, while the less numerous "Inclined to Reject" were swallowed up in a neutral category. While some nuances were thereby lost, it was decided to follow what was dictated by the number of cases per category; in each case, this meant that the 5-point scale was reduced to 4.<sup>104</sup>

## CROSS-TABULATIONS

Broadly speaking, it was found that when Age, Sex, Occupation, Income and Education were cross-tabulated with the five attitude variables mentioned earlier, almost no significant statistical relationships between variables occurred. In the

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<sup>104</sup> See Appendix IV for the frequency distributions for all five categories.

discussion which follows, tables will only be included where such relationships did occur.<sup>105</sup>

There were only two findings which challenged the null hypothesis. Firstly, there was a statistical relationship between sex and attitudes to armed struggle, with women more likely to oppose the use of arms than men (Chi-sq.=7.94, df=3,  $p=.047$ ). Twenty-two per cent of women in the sample disagreed with the use of arms, compared to only 7% of men. This was the only instance where sex had an effect on attitudes. The Israeli social scientist Galia Golan, who did a study of gender-related issues in Israel in 1989, found that: "Women tend to seek resolutions of conflict through negotiations rather than force". Golan rejected the notion that women's views might shift in a direction more supportive of violence if they themselves lived in an physically threatened environment (Agron, 1989, 31). Sara Roy's research in Gaza refugee camps, often the scene of violent conflict between residents and the occupation forces, likewise quoted a number of camp women as calling for political compromise rather than further confrontation (Roy, 1989, *passim*).

The only other instance of a valid relationship between a socio-demographic variable and an attitude variable occurred when occupation was matched against support for the current approach of the PLO. Support for the PLO was more likely to occur among those in business than in other occupations (Chi-sq.=29, df=15,  $p=.016$ ). Sixty-four per cent of business people "Strongly agreed" with the PLO's

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<sup>105</sup> The statistic utilised for the purposes of the analysis was chi-square.



approach, while none of them expressed disagreement. Those in other occupational categories, such as students and professionals, expressed lower levels of strong agreement and higher levels of disagreement.

This finding may be partly explained by the fact that, among Christians in the sample, a higher percentage were to be found in business than in any other occupation (24%, compared to 12% of Muslims); and by the related fact that Christians supported the PLO more strongly than Muslims did (see Table 4-17 below). Another relevant fact may be that - as in the United States - Christians tend to have been longer in Australia than Muslims. At the time of the survey (as well as currently) there tended to be proportionately more Muslims arriving from the volatile and dangerous environment of the Occupied Territories, where support for Arafat and the PLO was being eroded. The data suggested that reduced support for the PLO may be associated less with occupation than with religious affiliation, and less with religious affiliation than with recent political experiences prior to emigration. This possibility will be more closely examined in the next chapter.

The results of cross-tabulating age, sex, occupation, income and education by attitudes had left the null hypothesis all but unscathed. With two exceptions, attitudes on the part of this group of Palestinians were held, irrespective of whether a respondent was old or young, male or female, socio-economically advantaged or disadvantaged, educated or not. However, results for the religion variable were less uniform, as will now be seen.

The first issue investigated was that of acceptance of the two-state solution. There was no statistically significant relationship between religion and degrees of acceptance, although there was a tendency for Muslims to be somewhat more polarised in their views, including attitudes of complete rejection - 22%. Christians appeared to prefer a more middle-of-the-road approach, with only 11% totally rejecting the two-state concept. Suleiman has suggested that it is psychologically easier for a Christian Arab than for a Muslim Arab to accept the Israeli reality, since Islam enjoyed dominant-culture status in the Middle East from the 7th century onwards (Suleiman, 1973,488) - a dominance only challenged, in Palestine, after 1947-8.

Amongst Palestinian secularists of both religions there undoubtedly lingers a preference for the old ideal of a unitary, democratic state of Palestine in place of the state of Israel. In Christison's study, she came across many Palestinian-Americans who adhered to this view, although it was co-existence with Jews (not the use of force to expel them) that they had in mind (*Christian Science Monitor*, 28 October 1988). In Sydney interviews, a yearning expressed by many of the older respondents (in particular) was for a return to the situation in Palestine before 1948, when Muslims, Christians and Jews had co-existed in a single political entity. References were made, for example, to the fact that they had all gone to the same schools together. But the sample's response to this item shows that a sentimental yearning may co-exist with an altogether more realistic attitude.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> See Muhammad Muslih's chapter in Yossi Shain's *Governments-in-Exile* (New York and London, 1991) for an account of the evolution of Palestinian political thought on the secular democratic ideal and other key concepts relating to Palestinian statehood.

The secularist ideology of many Palestinians implies a rejection of what they see as the religiously exclusive nature of the State of Israel. A similar - and often stronger - rejection is also to be found among those actively committed to Islamicist ideologies. Yet, in this sample, 78% of Christians and 73% of Muslims accepted the reality of Israel's actual existence, and one's religious affiliation was not associated with either acceptance or rejection of that reality.

The next task was to ascertain whether the respondent's religious affiliation affected his or her attitude to the PLO.<sup>107</sup> Here a statistically significant relationship emerged. As the results in Table 4-17 show, being Muslim was associated with minority attitudes of rejection towards the PLO's approach. This was despite the fact that the proportion of those generally agreeing with the PLO was almost as high among Muslims as it was among Christians. In other words, the difference between the groups occurred mainly because of the strength of Muslim disagreement, not because of any real differences in the proportions who agreed with the statement.

The data in Table 4-17 suggest, *inter alia*, that Palestinian attitudes to their leadership were not determined solely by sectarian or religious considerations. This characteristic of Palestinian politics stands in contrast to that of some other Middle Eastern groups, notably the Lebanese.

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<sup>107</sup> It should be noted that, although the item in question is referred to hereunder as relating "to the PLO", the wording actually refers to "the PLO leadership's current approach to the struggle". The question of whether respondents felt that they were properly represented by the PLO was discussed in the previous section.

TABLE 4-17 RELIGION BY AGREEMENT WITH PLO APPROACH

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly disagree	Row Total
Muslim	26 35.1	26 35.1	5 6.8	17 23.0	74 44.0
Christian	40 42.6	35 37.2	13 13.8	6 6.4	94 56.0
Column Total	66 39.3	61 36.3	18 10.7	23 13.7	168 100.0

(Chi-sq.=10.89, df=3, p=.012)

Although Fatah, the dominant faction in the PLO, is often labelled as a Muslim stronghold, the Christians in this sample were more likely to support the Fatah-controlled organisation than were the Muslims. In their study of Palestinians living in the USA, Moughrabi and El-Nazer similarly found that Muslims were more critical of the PLO than Christians were. They also found that a larger percentage of Muslims than Christians supported the Christian PFLP leader, George Habash; and that Christians in the sample were more supportive of Arafat, a Muslim, than were Muslims themselves (Moughrabi and El-Nazer, 1989, 94, 97).

On one level, such findings would be surprising only to those who view all Middle Eastern politics through a sectarian prism. Christians, in fact, might well be expected to favour PLO secularism. At the same time, the intensity with which the Muslim minority in the sample expressed their rejection of the PLO approach suggests that the Islamic movement may now be providing some of them with an appealing ideological alternative. Ultimately, however, there remain strong

indications that Palestinian pragmatism will prevail over more ideological inclinations. In the Occupied Territories, for example, tactical alliances between secular Leftist groups and elements of the Islamic movement have become a regular occurrence.<sup>108</sup> Asked in January 1994 what they saw as the most important criterion in the selection of officials for new institutions in a Palestinian entity, only 17% of those surveyed in the Occupied Territories felt religiosity was important. The largest group, 58%, insisted on the officials' professional competence (*Mideast Mirror*, 26 January 1994).

The sample's overall approval of the PLO may have been eroded by an awareness that the PLO's current approach, while conceding much in the way of territory, was failing to put an end to occupation and oppression. Anwar Nashashibi (a former Jordanian minister) has suggested that every setback at peace negotiations supplies more fuel for the Islamic opposition (*Guardian Weekly*, 7 February 1993). Similar sentiments were expressed to the writer by a former Fatah fighter who said in late 1993: "If there is no peace in the West Bank and Gaza, HAMAS will control the streets." On the basis of the findings for this sample, it is suggested that, despite strong majority support for the PLO on the part of both Christians and Muslims, a sizeable Muslim minority will continue to reject the PLO approach unless occupation is brought to an end. In that sense, support for the PLO

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<sup>108</sup> In November 1993 a coalition of HAMAS, PFLP and DFLP contested the student council elections at Bir Zeit and defeated the nationalists (mainly Fatah). The Palestinian academic Salim Tamari pointed out at the time, however, that: "One should not draw too many conclusions from the results. The weight of Hamas and the PFLP at Birzeit is much higher than their representation in society." Tamari's observation was confirmed by the results of a November 1993 survey conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus which found 42% support for Fatah, 11% for the Leftist factions, and 15% for HAMAS and Islamic Jihad (Electronic mail messages from Salim Tamari on Palestine News Network, 1 December 1993).

becomes dependent upon Israeli actions as much as on anything the organisation itself is able or willing to achieve.<sup>109</sup>

Cross-tabulating respondents' religion by the level of their support for armed struggle yielded further results of statistical significance (Table 4-18). Although a majority in both groups favoured the use of arms to achieve national goals, Muslims in the sample were much more likely to favour armed struggle than Christians, who were much more likely to reject it.

**TABLE 4-18 RELIGION BY SUPPORT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE**

	Support strongly	Support with reserv- ations	Support in some circum- stances	Not really/ Not at all	Row Total
Muslim	34 45.9	21 28.4	18 24.3	1 1.4	74 43.3
Christian	37 38.1	21 21.6	20 20.6	19 19.6	97 56.7
Column Total	71 41.5	42 24.6	38 22.2	20 11.7	171 100.0

(Chi-sq.=13.58, df=3, p=.004)

In the results reported by Moughrabi and El-Nazer (1989, 95), Muslims viewed "operations" slightly more positively than Christians. The authors also pointed out,

<sup>109</sup> One of the few respondents willing to criticise the PLO, in interviews with the writer, was a young Muslim activist recently arrived from the Occupied Territories. In addition to expressing his disillusion with the PLO's failure to regain Palestinian territory, including the holy mosque of Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem, he accused the organisation of using its funds for patronage: "Only the bourgeoisie in Palestine get support from the PLO; the poor people get nothing. This is why the people are moving to Islam .. The PLO is interested in getting money only" (Interview, 8 November 1989).

however, that similar percentages in both religious categories thought such operations had a "mixed impact". This last finding finds corroboration in the data in Table 4-18, which show that Muslims and Christians in the Sydney sample were equally likely to express reservations about the use of arms, or to feel they should be resorted to only in some circumstances (these being the two middle categories in Table 4-18).

The results for this item do not suggest any single-factor explanation. It is probably over-simplistic to fasten upon the Islamic concept of *jihad*, regarded by Muslims as a legitimate means of confronting their enemies, as the key to analysing the significance of these findings. The feeling certainly existed among some members of the sample that - in the words of a Muslim student - "Islam is a religion of peace, but it still teaches us to fight if our land is taken." Moreover, at the time of the survey, Saddam Hussein was making references to the need for a *jihad* to liberate Palestine. There were few indications at the time, however, that believing Muslims took seriously such statements on the part of a Baathist leader. The overall strength of secularist inclinations among Muslims in this sample indicated that few saw the struggle to regain their land in solely religious terms.

Equally limited would be an approach that focused on Christians being socialised to "turn the other cheek" when injured. One church activist, a West Bank woman, admitted she had felt hatred for the Israeli soldiers during the Intifada, "even though as a Christian this is hard for me to say". In terms of its religiosity, the sample did not rate itself particularly highly. Only 13% described themselves as

"Very religious", with just over a fifth saying their religiosity had increased in recent years. These findings would seem to militate against the idea that respondents were merely expressing doctrinal precepts which they had internalised. The sample's lack of religiosity was further indicated by the large majority among Muslims, as well as among Christians, which insisted that a Palestinian state should be secular (see Table 4-19 below). That degrees of religiosity may be more relevant than actual religious affiliations in determining political attitudes was suggested by Reiser's 1984 study of Arab, including Palestinian, residents of the United States. Reiser found that, among both Christian and Muslim Arabs, it was the non-religious who were more in favour of arms than were the self-declared religious respondents. Religiosity, rather than religion, was one of the operative variables he isolated as having an effect on attitudes. Importantly, one of Reiser's major findings was that non-religious Christians were more militant than both religious and non-religious Muslims (Reiser, 1984, 93-5).

In Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar's 1989 study they found that, for Israeli Jews and for Israeli Palestinians: "The more religious the respondent, the more extreme the response." While on the one hand this finding appears to validate Reiser's conclusions regarding the link between religiosity and political extremism, the Israeli study produced a positive association between the two variables, while the USA research came up with a negative association between the two. Moreover, Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar went on to reveal that, for West Bank Palestinians as a group viewed separately from those in Israel, "...the political choices of the Palestinians cannot be predicted from their religiosity" (Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar,



1989, 51). What these somewhat contradictory findings seem to indicate is that, whatever the effect of either religion or religiosity on Palestinian political attitudes - including their attitudes to the use of arms - there are almost certainly other variables at work in influencing those attitudes.

When religious affiliation was matched with willingness to co-exist with Jews in a future State of Palestine, there were no statistically significant differences between the two groups. Muslim views tended to be more polarised than those of Christians, who were grouped more in the central categories, but well over half in each group were willing to accept Jews in a State of Palestine.<sup>110</sup> Contrary to some current speculation that Muslims are less ethnically tolerant, especially towards Jews, than Christians, both groups in this sample were equally likely to accept Jews. While in one sense this is a non-finding, it is not without relevance in terms of the sample's overall support for the idea of a Jewish and an Arab state existing side by side.

The final procedure in this section was the cross-tabulating of religious affiliations by attitudes to secularism. On one level, the results were highly predictable. As expected, the data (Table 4-19) revealed that respondents' attitudes were significantly affected by the religion they adhered to, with Christians (87%) more

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<sup>110</sup> Jewish opinion, whether inside or outside Israel, provides a useful counterpoint to the Palestinian data, on the subject of racial tolerance between the two conflicting groups. In a study published recently, between 60% and 70% of Israeli Jews were found to favour the view that "Israeli Arabs should be encouraged to emigrate from Israel" (Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1992, 49). There does not seem to be much evidence that Israelis differentiate greatly between Muslim and Christian Arabs in this respect. According to another observer, the general Israeli view is that: "The Arabs are still seen as an unchanging entity, whose 'genetic code' determines their development - leading, inevitably, to Saddam Hussein" (Steinberg, 1990, 23).

likely to strongly favour a secular state, and Muslims more likely to strongly oppose it (22%, compared to only 2% of Christians).

Less anticipated, however, was the finding that fully 73% of Muslims in the sample supported secularism to some extent. The likely occurrence of a minority of Muslims strongly opposing secularism was therefore matched by the likelihood that a majority of them would generally favour it. This finding is important in several respects.

**TABLE 4-19 RELIGION BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Muslim	42 57.5	11 15.1	4 5.5	16 21.9	73 43.7
Christian	75 79.8	7 7.4	10 10.6	2 2.1	94 56.3
Column Total	117 70.1	18 10.8	14 8.4	18 10.8	167 100.0

(Chi-sq.=21.35, df=3, p<.001)

The data suggest, firstly, that this group of recently arrived migrants from the Middle East were far more likely to oppose the Islamicising of Palestinian politics than they were to support it. Secondly, the data indicate that such attitudes spanned the religious divide within the sample. Thirdly, the fact that a minority of Muslims was likely to strongly reject a secular state is not without significance, particularly if viewed in the context of what was said earlier about trends in

Muslim disaffection from mainstream PLO policies. It should be noted, however, that there is so far little evidence that the Muslim rejectionists form more than a minority, whether in the Diaspora or in the homeland.

Outside the region, there has been speculation that the headquarters of some Palestinian Islamic organisations are situated in the Western Diaspora (*Middle East International*, 5 February 1993). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Arab Muslims in Australia, including those of Palestinian origin, have been reported as importing Islamic terrorism. Yet the results for this sample generally confirm the secularist tendencies which have long characterised Palestinian politics. This brings to an end the analysis of whether Palestinian attitudes in this sample were affected by socio-demographic factors. On the whole it has been seen that, as initially hypothesised in the light of findings from other studies, such factors did not correlate with Palestinian attitudes. The exception was religious affiliation.

There was no difference between the two religious groups in their willingness to accept the State of Israel, and in their readiness to co-exist with Jews in a State of Palestine. These are crucial findings, but they are at least partly offset by a minority Muslim propensity to reject the PLO's approach, and to reject secularism, accompanied by a greater willingness to use arms. Admittedly, these findings only apply to a small minority in a non-random sample from a distant corner of the Diaspora. Nevertheless, all three rejectionist tendencies are strikingly - and increasingly - apparent within the Occupied Territories, so that the findings do

seem to provide some kind of insight into the political conflict within the homeland.

## CONCLUSION

One of the aims of this chapter was to test whether the negative stereotyping described in Chapter Three had any foundation in fact, when applied to the Palestinians surveyed in Sydney. On the evidence presented so far - and with the usual caveat that the sample may not have been truly representative - the stereotypes did not hold. Assumptions that Arab and Muslim migrants in general, and Palestinian migrants in particular, are likely to "bring their conflicts with them" were not borne out by the findings for this group.

For both the multicultural society receiving them, and for the conflict-ridden homeland from whence they so recently came, the implications of Palestinian moderation are encouraging. This is so despite the sample's intensely-felt emotional attachment to the whole of their homeland, and despite their insistence on bringing to an end - by force if necessary - the Israeli military occupation of that part of Mandate Palestine on which they hope to establish their own state.

The majority were found to adhere to principles of territorial compromise; of ethnic and religious coexistence; of secularism; and of support for political pragmatism - as practised by the PLO - rather than the dictates of more uncompromising ideologies. Minority views were another matter, as will be seen below.

A second aim of this chapter was to build on the attitudinal profile revealed by the frequencies, and examine what factors might be affecting those attitudes. In line with other research on the subject - and confirming a general assumption that Palestinian attitudes worldwide tend to be homogeneous - standard socio-demographic variables were found to exert very little effect on the attitudes of the sample. The partial - if partially anticipated - exception to this was religious affiliation, since minority attitudes of rejectionism were more likely to occur among Muslims. Clearly this was a subject area where further analysis was needed.

If attitudes within Palestinian communities in the Diaspora are broadly similar, do the similarities recur in Palestine itself? The tentative conclusion, based on the findings presented in this chapter, was that a Diaspora community may indeed be seen as an attitudinal microcosm of the nation as a whole, or as a window onto attitudes in the homeland. Minority rejectionist tendencies within the Palestinian-Australian community, for example, have turned out to be paralleled by contemporary - if still minority - trends in the Middle East homeland.

The task of analysing the effect of homeland experiences upon Palestinian attitudes - always part of the original plan for this thesis - is given added urgency by what has been suggested above. The discussion in this chapter has made it clear that, firstly, an explanation for Palestinian attitudes cannot be based on the effect of standard variables such as age, education or income; and that, secondly, the effect of religious affiliation needs further clarification. Whether Palestinian deviation

from the politics of moderation is associated solely with that religion factor, or with some other aspect of the individual's background, is one of the challenging questions to be tackled in Chapter Five. It is in the Palestinian homeland that the answer to that, and other questions will be sought.

## Chapter Five

### **THE MIDDLE EAST EXPERIENCE** **AND ITS EFFECT ON PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES**

Studies of the Palestinians are often grounded in an assumption that the Palestinian experience is *sui generis* - unique in its history of dispossession, occupation and statelessness. The corollary to this is another assumption, namely that any attempt to understand Palestinian attitudes must take such factors into account. The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus recently called for more attention to be given to the "urgent need to understand the attitudinal frameworks to which Palestinians refer", going on to insist that any study of Palestinian attitudes "must place attitudes and opinions in their proper socio-historical context, especially in relation to a prolonged foreign occupation" (CPRS, 1993, 1,4).

In the Diaspora, Christison has described the Palestinians' "political distinctness" among migrants in the United States:

While first-generation Palestinian immigrants tend to make a rapid adjustment to American society, they remain, to an unusual degree among immigrant communities, highly conscious of and deeply involved in the politics of their native land. Even more unusual, the American-born second generation of Palestinians also exhibits a high and growing degree of political consciousness and ethnic pride .. Other refugees seem in general not to harbour a lingering attachment to their homelands to the extent Palestinians do.

The "lingering attachment" to which Christison refers is in no sense a romantic one. She maintains that the overriding factor which continues to bind Palestinians to their homeland is that of "foreign occupation and alienation of land" (Christison,

1989, 18-19). The effects of dispossession and Occupation, it is argued by Christison and others, may be seen as integral to, and possibly explanatory of, Palestinian attitudes in both Diaspora and homeland.

Chapter Four has dealt with the question of whether Palestinians' social and demographic characteristics could explain the kind of attitudes they were likely to hold, finding that - on the whole - they could not. This chapter, in contrast, will focus on the sample's Middle East experiences, for it is argued that herein lies the key to an understanding of Palestinian attitudes. One school of thought, for example, has it that Palestinian suffering helps propel them toward the negotiating table (Abu-Amr, 1992, 27). Opposed to this view is that of many other observers, who see support for rejectionist ideologies growing as a result of "worsening socio-economic conditions .. coupled with intensifying Israeli repression" (Hilal, 1993, 57).<sup>111</sup>

An assumption basic to this thesis as a whole is that Palestinian attitudes are largely a product of their political situations, rather than an expression of primordial tendencies such as religious fanaticism or entrenched anti-semitism. The data presented in Chapter Four indicated that the majority of Palestinians accept the reality of Israel's existence. Acceptance of the continued military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, however, is another matter. The experience of Occupation, together with other negative personal experiences - in

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<sup>111</sup> Hilal's main argument in this article, however, is concerned with showing how political discontent is also a reflection of PLO inadequacies.



Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and the Arab world - will be the main foci of attention in this chapter.

In the Western Diaspora, few other surveys of Palestinian communities have used the individual's homeland experience as an independent variable in the analysis of attitudes. This lacuna in the research seems strange, in the light of the general consensus as to the emotional intensity with which Palestinian attitudes towards homeland issues are held. In other words, it is rarely suggested that the homeland is *irrelevant* to the recently-exiled Palestinians.

It might be argued that the politics of the homeland will always form part of the "attitudinal baggage" of first-generation migrant communities, and that there is nothing exceptional in this. The argument is partly valid, but stands in contrast to the fact that very little empirical data is available on the subject, generally speaking. For, while survey researchers have sometimes carried out studies examining the effect on diaspora communities of events such as wars in the Middle East homeland (Taft, 1973; Zaghel, 1976; Beirman, 1990), the pre-emigration experience of the individual has rarely been isolated as a variable affecting attitudes. In this sense, the data from this study may help illuminate the migration experience of other displaced groups.

There is a feeling among the Australian population at large, and among some elements of the bureaucracy and government, that the relevance of the homeland ends (or should end) with the decision to emigrate. As one official concerned with

Arab community matters in Sydney sighed: "They do bring their animosities with them" (Interview, May 1991). It is hoped that, at least as far as the Palestinian community is concerned, the data already presented in Chapter Four will have helped modify some of those perceptions. It is also hoped that the material contained in this chapter will make a further contribution to our understanding of this displaced ethnic group.

## **HOMELAND EXPERIENCES AND DIASPORA ATTITUDES**

### **SELECTION OF VARIABLES**

The first step in the analysis was to select the independent variables connected with the Middle East experience of respondents, henceforward referred to as the "Middle East variables". These variables would then be cross-tabulated with dependent variables relating to respondents' attitudes on key political issues. As in the previous chapter, the five dependent variables were:

- Acceptance of the two-state solution
- Support for the PLO leadership's approach
- Commitment to a secular Palestinian state
- Support for armed struggle
- Willingness to see Jews as citizens of a future State of Palestine.

The reasons for selecting the seven "Middle East" variables are set out below.

Because of the lack of comparable Diaspora studies, surveys carried out in the Middle East have influenced the choice of some variables used. Even so, many contemporary survey researchers - particularly in the Occupied Territories - have

limited themselves to reporting univariate results, so that slightly older data has had to be used for the purposes of comparison with the writer's own bivariate findings.

Birthplace data is often utilised in studies of migrant communities, if only to distinguish the overseas-born from the others. In the Palestinian case there were added reasons for its inclusion as a variable. Since respondents were first asked whether or not they had been born in Palestine, and were then asked to give their town of origin, the data helped pinpoint how respondents defined the geographical entity of Palestine. The item became, in effect, an attitude question. Also, since the two-state solution would leave four-fifths of pre-1948 Palestine as part of Israel, rejection of that solution was expected to be associated with a birthplace in pre-1948 Palestine.<sup>112</sup>

The Palestinian history of displacement from their homeland meant that many respondents - and/or their parents - were likely to have spent formative years in places other than Palestine. A Palestinian member of the pre-testing panel had therefore felt that place of residence should be included in the analysis, alongside birthplace. The wisdom of this suggestion was confirmed when the data showed that, while well over two-thirds had been born within the borders of pre-1948 Palestine, only about a quarter had been living there prior to emigrating.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> References to Palestine in this chapter generally reflect the way in which respondents defined it in a historical sense. The results for questionnaire items regarding, for example, economic loss in Palestine may be taken as applying to the whole area now covered by Israel and the Occupied Territories, unless otherwise specified. Neither the writer, nor most respondents, would define the boundaries of a future State of Palestine in the same way.

<sup>113</sup> As shown in Chapter Three, the Palestinian case is clearly one where neither birthplace, nor country of last residence can be used as measures of ethnicity or nationality.

However, the fact that respondents reported a large number of different pre-emigration residences, plus the fact that so few had remained in the Palestinian homeland, meant that there would inevitably be certain difficulties in carrying out statistical procedures involving the less numerous sub-groups.

Asked in Item 7 about their reasons for emigrating, the category chosen by most respondents (46%) was: "To escape political harassment and/or discrimination" (Table 5-1).

**TABLE 5-1 SAMPLE'S REASONS FOR EMIGRATION**

	Pct of Count	Pct of Responses	Cases
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To escape harassment, discrimination etc	75	28.1	45.5
To join/accompany family	68	25.5	41.2
For employment	59	22.1	35.8
To educate self/children	56	21.0	33.9
For citizenship and its benefits	9	3.4	5.5

*Note:* In Multiple Dichotomy items, respondents answered "yes" or "no" to each category (see also Table 5-2). The total number of responses involved is therefore larger than the sample (176), and the percentages of cases add up to more than 100 (if totalled). The respondents answering this item totalled 165.

Because of the sample's strong views on this issue, and although the exact location of such harassment was not specified, the variable relating to whether emigration was due to harassment and/or discrimination (the first category in Table 5-1) was selected for further analysis. Four other similar variables were also selected, covering the issues of whether economic loss and personal harassment had

occurred; and whether it had taken place in Palestine or in other parts of the Middle East. The inclusion of these four (Table 5-2) was partly suggested by Shadid and Seltzer's (1988) research in the Occupied Territories, and partly by Smootha's 1989 study of attitudes in Israel.<sup>114</sup>

**TABLE 5-2 SAMPLE'S EXPERIENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND PERSONAL HARASSMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

	No. answering in affirmative	% of cases
Economic loss in Middle East?	52	32
Harassment in Middle East?	90	56
Economic loss in Palestine?	116	72
Harassment in Palestine?	75	46

The four-part item (Item 8) on loss and harassment (Table 5-2) had asked the respondent about what "you or your family" had experienced. Researchers such as Ghabra (1987, 2) have highlighted the durability, tenacity and cross-national aspect of Palestinian family ties, and it was felt that the experiences of any one member, of a family as close-knit as the average Palestinian family, would inevitably affect the other members. Shadid and Seltzer (1988, 16-17) adopted a similar perspective in their study. A student informant in Sydney told the writer of his reaction to the fact that his friends and his nephews in the West Bank were in gaol: "I would join

<sup>114</sup> In Smootha's survey (1989, 254), Israeli Palestinian respondents were asked if they had endured "harassment by the authorities or economic suffering". In his later study, a similar question asked respondents about "political harassment and economic suffering" (Smootha, 1992, 138).

in demonstrations if I was there, and even use guns if forced to. And if, for example, my brother was shot, I would feel the need to do something in reaction."

The seven Middle East variables chosen for cross-tabulating against the five key attitude variables were, then, as follows:

- Birthplace;
- Main Place of Residence prior to emigration;
- Whether political harassment and/or discrimination had been a reason for emigrating;
- Whether economic loss had been suffered in Palestine;
- Whether economic loss had been suffered elsewhere in the Middle East;
- Whether personal harassment had been suffered in Palestine;
- Whether personal harassment had been suffered elsewhere in the Middle East.

Broadly speaking, it was hypothesised that - as suggested by Shadid and Seltzer (1988) - an individual's negative experiences would be found to be correlated with his/her adherence to more extreme political positions. In his 1989 study, Smootha too had noted the explanatory power of deprivation, in relation to the attitudes of Palestinians in Israel, concluding that:

Orientation is to a large extent a product of the treatment afforded to Arabs in Israeli society. Militancy is a reaction to the unfavorable treatment certain communities receive (Smootha, 1989, 178).

Smootha's follow-up study lent further weight to this finding:

The orientation of Israeli Arabs toward Jews and the state is shaped largely by how the Arabs are treated. Those who are less discriminated against .. are more likely to be moderate (Smootha, 1992, 183).

In the context of the Sydney study, it was anticipated that experiences such as discrimination, harassment, economic loss - or simply having been born into or lived through a conflict situation - might lead people to favour the PLO and the

two-state solution less, and to favour armed struggle and possibly the exclusion of Jews more.<sup>115</sup>

Finally, while Christian views on secularism were not expected to alter under economic or political pressure, the hypothesis was that such pressures might have led Muslims towards a more strongly Islamicist viewpoint. Some Muslim respondents saw the realities of Occupation as directly linked to the rise of Islamicism: "The people found they could not depend on the PLO to get back Al-Aqsa, and this started the Islamic movement."

The "Middle East" variables will be discussed in the order in which they are listed above. The first of these variables is Birthplace.

## BIRTHPLACE

For most people, writing down one's birthplace is rarely an act which challenges the status quo. Yet, as seen in Chapter Three, Palestinians have often incurred official wrath for writing "Palestine" on forms. Respondents therefore took full advantage of Item 4 in the survey which asked: "Were you born in Palestine?", with 69% answering in the affirmative, and many naming a town or village as

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<sup>115</sup> Smootha (1992, 183), who has documented ethnocentric tendencies on the part of both Jews and Palestinians in Israel, has found that "Arab willingness to have contact with Jews has intensified over the years despite the Jews' reluctance to open up". In an earlier study he had described Jewish ethnic intolerance as institutionalised and justified by the very nature of the Zionist state. In contrast, he saw Palestinians' ethnocentrism as partly rooted in traditionalism, but in much greater part as a reactive phenomenon brought on by the way in which they were treated by the Jewish majority (Smootha, 1989, 146-150).

well. The group made no distinction between pre- and post-1948 borders, using the term "Palestine" to refer to the whole area now covered by Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Responses such as "Haifa, Palestine" and "Jaffa, Palestine" made the sample's attitudes on this point even clearer. The reiteration of the word "Palestine" alongside the name of the town was twice as likely to occur among those from *inside* Israel. The exile's insistence on affirming his/her national origins has been articulated by Fawaz Turki, an eloquent chronicler of the Palestinian Diaspora, in these words: "If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am one now" (Turki, 1972, 8).

Since many of the places mentioned by respondents have been destroyed, built over or re-named by the Israelis, their location necessitated some detailed research with a Mandate-period map and an older Palestinian informant.<sup>116</sup> No one referred to the West Bank as Jordan, and not one respondent wrote "Israel" as his or her birthplace. The nature of responses by those born in what is now Israel might be seen as suggesting an unwillingness on the part of the "1948 generation" and their descendants to recognise the reality of Israel, and the cross-tabulations of birthplace by attitudes were done in order to test this possibility.

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<sup>116</sup> Dr Shukri Arraf of the University of Sydney was an invaluable informant on these matters. He explained, for example, that one respondent's reference to 'Om Khalid, Natanya', referred to the fact that the Arab village of Om Khalid had been destroyed by the Israelis and built over by the Jewish settlement of Natanya, now in Israel. Dr Arraf also noted that Palestinians still preferred to use the British (or even Biblical) terms for the names of districts, rather than the current Israeli terms (Interview, 26 February 1991).



Before the data could be tabulated, the 11 different birthplaces named by the sample had to be recoded into manageable groups.<sup>117</sup> Those declaring Palestine as their birthplace were grouped according to whether they were born in Israel or in the Occupied Territories, including Jerusalem. A third category grouped Jordan and Lebanon together, while a fourth category contained the Australia-born and others. The birthplace data were now distributed as in Table 5-3.

**TABLE 5-3 BIRTHPLACE GROUPS OF SAMPLE**

	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Israel	71	41
Occupied Territories	50	29
Jordan or Lebanon	37	21
Other	15	9
	173	100

*Note:* While the term "Israel" was not used either in the Birthplace item, or in the responses given by the sample, it will be used in the tabulations and discussion relating to birthplace.

Somewhat unexpectedly, when the recoded birthplace variable was cross-tabulated against the key attitude variables, no results of statistical significance emerged.

Apart from a slight tendency for the groups from Israel and the Occupied Territories to contain larger rejectionist minorities than the other groups, attitudes were largely unaffected by where the respondent had been born.

<sup>117</sup> For a complete set of data on birthplace responses, see Appendix IV.

Regarding the Israel-born, these results were surprising. The Israelis have made it clear that, should there be a negotiated settlement, only a small percentage of the 1948 refugees will be allowed to settle in their birthplace again. In that sense, the Israel-born group had - and still have - most to lose from the two-state solution, which makes their willingness to compromise the more striking. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 1948 group have had longer to get used to the idea that their land is under Israeli control and will inevitably remain so. The accommodationist stance adopted by the PLO on this issue is both a reflection, and a reinforcement of the softening of Palestinian views on this issue.<sup>118</sup>

Finally, the relative youthfulness of the sample - 28% of whom were under thirty - may also have influenced results. An older respondent, born in Palestine before 1948, pointed out to the writer that he and other, older Palestinians remember, believe in and still hope for one state of Palestine in which Jews, Muslims and Christians would co-exist. But, he said, the majority of the community is under forty, and thinks differently.

There were no statistically valid attitudinal differences between the Occupied Territories sub-group and other groups. Merely having been born in an area which

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<sup>118</sup> Senior PLO official Nabil Shaath, during a meeting with Palestinians in Sydney in 1989, was confronted by a former resident of Haifa, embittered at the PLO's "sell-out" on the two-state solution. Shaath admitted that it would probably not be possible for his interlocutor to return to Haifa, but commented that if he was able to settle on the West Bank instead (in a Palestinian state) he would be a lot closer to his birthplace than he was in Sydney (Personal observation, 23 September 1989). In Washington for the 1993 negotiations, Shaath again stated in an interview that "many 1948 refugees will be allowed to return to the West Bank and Gaza" (emphasis added) (*Journal of Palestine Studies* XXIII, 1 (Autumn, 1993), 12).

came under military occupation (in 1967) was not enough to affect an individual's political stance, at least within this sample.

The data on birthplace showed that, firstly, questionnaire items eliciting ostensibly simple facts can actually be both highly sensitive and highly informative.

Secondly, the unanimous affirmation by the Palestine-born of the historical boundaries of their country of birth must be seen in contrast to their willingness - as described in Chapter Four - to abandon claim to 80% of that territory. For the Sydney group, the data suggested that the Palestine of the past, while not forgotten, was not necessarily to be equated with the Palestine of the future. There undoubtedly exist Israeli fears that a "rump state" of Palestine will only be a first step towards total reconquest later on. While the data in this study provide little evidence of such irredentist tendencies on the part of the sample, it is acknowledged that such fears are likely to remain in some quarters.<sup>119</sup>

Overall, while the birthplace data had afforded some useful insights into certain attitudes on the part of the sample, it had not helped to explain them. Given the extent of Palestinian dispossession, displacement and dispersal, the country of respondents' birth was often not the country of their upbringing and formative life-experiences. The next step was, therefore, to look at the location of the pre-emigration experience.

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<sup>119</sup> The writer met a middle-aged couple from Acre just before the survey was administered. They introduced themselves in a social gathering as coming from Israel, and (ironically) referred to themselves as "nus Yehudi" - half Jewish. When filling out the questionnaire at a later date, however, their responses to the birthplace question were "Palestine (Occupied)" and "Palestine" respectively.

## PRE-EMIGRATION PLACE OF RESIDENCE

If having been born within the borders of pre-1948 Palestine was one characteristic of the Sydney sample, then having experienced displacement into exile was another. Palestinians who had been forced to leave their homeland in 1948, 1967, or at other crisis points, had typically gone to either Jordan or Lebanon, with many subsequently re-locating to the Gulf. To the refugees were later added those forced by economic or political pressures to leave their homes in the Occupied Territories to live and work elsewhere. Cainkar (1987, 31) describes such people as "highly politicized because of their forced exile" - a proposition which, while plausible, is difficult to prove empirically. The 1991 Gulf War, which led to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians being expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf states, was only one of a string of events in the region which had resulted in Palestinian displacement. The data relating to the Sydney sample reflected these broad patterns.

In many ways the sample appeared almost as embittered by persecution in the Arab states as by what they had endured under Israeli Occupation or in Israel itself. For, if one respondent had angrily described his tertiary qualifications as: "Qualified from the Academy of Ansar III, and from the prisons of the Occupation", another was no less bitter about what he had encountered in Lebanon - "a life of humiliation, dispossession and insults". Again, asked about reasons for emigrating, one had written "Because my country was occupied and I had no place to go", while another said he had been "treated as a third-class citizen in Arab countries".

Responses such as those just cited had suggested to the writer that data on conditions in the migrants' former place of residence might help us to understand better the way displaced stateless groups such as the Palestinians relate to their new host country. The alienation and discrimination discussed in Chapter Three appear in many cases to have followed on from similar - but often much worse - experiences in the Middle East. A considerable number of respondents had explicitly stated that they came to Australia in pursuit not only of a recognised nationality and passport, but also to live in "a democratic country where a human being has value and where democracy has real meaning". The implication is that those deprived of democratic rights, in the way that Palestinians historically have been in most of the Middle East, may see the achievement of those rights as central to their decision on where to live. It could thus be argued that, rather than threatening democracy in the pluralist societies to which they emigrate, migrants with a background similar to that of the Palestinians may be more likely to bring with them an enhanced respect for those values.<sup>120</sup>

This issue is a controversial one. In their study of trends in Israeli democracy, Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar (1992, *passim*) maintain that the influx of Soviet immigrants with their "thirst to live a free and Western life-style" would "strengthen democratic consciousness in Israel". Elsewhere, however, the same authors state that [Arabic-speaking] Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa, "who

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<sup>120</sup> One student informant, who intended to return to the West Bank upon completing his studies, told the writer: "In future, if there is a Palestinian government, and if it turns out to be non-democratic, I will leave and fight from the outside".

have less of a commitment to democratic values" constitute a "risk category" as far as democracy is concerned.<sup>121</sup>

While living in an Arab milieu, then, is associated by some with ethnocentric and anti-democratic tendencies, the effect on the individual of living under Israeli rule is rarely viewed in the same way. The first task in this section of the analysis, therefore, was to work out the exact location of the respondents' pre-emigration experiences, before examining the effect on attitudes of those experiences.

In response to Item 6, which asked respondents to name the country or countries they had lived in before emigrating, members of the sample recorded as many as five places of residence - in addition to their birthplace - outside Australia.<sup>122</sup>

While this data made an interesting contribution to the composite picture of Palestinian displacement, it hardly lent itself to simple bivariate correlations. Also, very little comparative data was available on this aspect of the Palestinian experience, other than personal accounts such as those of the writer Fawaz Turki.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> The authors do point out that levels of education and religiosity are more likely to be associated with anti-democratic values than is the culture of origin. However, a readiness to equate Arab origins in general with anti-democratic tendencies is implicit in this and many other analyses.

<sup>122</sup> One 40 year-old respondent - by no means an exception - had lived in the West Bank, Lebanon, UK, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia before coming to Australia (see Appendix IV for details of responses to this item).

<sup>123</sup> Turki, born in Haifa, had fled to a refugee camp in Beirut, where he grew up. From there he travelled all over the world, taking out citizenship in Australia, a country he described as "the quintessential what-not land"; Paris; and finally settling in the United States (Turki 1972, 1988).

Whereas, as mentioned above, 70% of the sample had been born in what is now Israel or the Occupied Territories, only 20% of the responses to this item mentioned either of those places as a pre-emigration domicile. Only 5% of those responses referred to a place of residence inside Israel. Few of the Sydney Palestinians, it appeared, had been able to go on living in the homeland where the majority had been born. It was nevertheless decided to proceed with the analysis, despite the inevitable limitations imposed by lack of numbers in the sub-groups.

Of the sixteen different places of residence mentioned by the sample, the four most frequently mentioned were: Lebanon, Jordan, the Occupied Territories and Israel. Since only eleven persons reported Israel as a place of residence, they were combined with the thirty-three reporting residence in the Occupied Territories to form a single category. For ease of reference, this group will be referred to in the text as the Palestine group. Because of the Occupied group's numerical superiority in that category, their views would dominate, although the data indicated that both groups were attitudinally similar.<sup>124</sup> The three major sub-groups established as a result of the above procedures are shown in Table 5-4. The resulting variables were then cross-tabulated with the five attitude variables.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> In fact, the percentage distributions of the "Occupied" group were almost identical to those of the Israel/Occupied Territories group, for each of the cross-tabulations with the attitude variables. The views of the Occupied group were very slightly more polarised than those of the Israel group.

<sup>125</sup> Since the Multiple Response format used in Item 6. does not allow chi-square significance to be calculated, the COUNT command was first utilised to distinguish the groups of people who had lived in each of the three places from those in the sample who had not, before cross-tabulations were begun.

**TABLE 5-4 MAJOR PLACES OF RESIDENCE PRIOR TO EMIGRATION**

	n	% of cases
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Lebanon	62	36
Israel/Occupied Territories	44	25
Jordan	42	24

*Note:* Since so many respondents had lived in more than one place, this item attracted a total of 222 responses (excluding the Australia-born and missing cases).

The cross-tabulations involving residence in Lebanon produced one significant relationship (Chi-sq.=8.89, df=3, p=.031), namely on the issue of attitudes to armed struggle. The source of the significance was not clear-cut, but Palestinians who had lived in Lebanon were somewhat more likely to oppose armed struggle (15%) than those who had not lived there (10%). They were also less likely to strongly support armed struggle (34%) and more likely to have reservations about it (36%), than those in the non-Lebanon group (46% and 18% respectively).

Whatever the effect on Palestinians of living in war-torn Lebanon, the results provided no evidence that those effects included an automatic increase in support for political violence - rather, the reverse. Comments by some respondents that they had come to Australia to escape wars and persecution suggested instead that excessive exposure to violence may lead people to eschew it as the only means of



resolving conflict. One such respondent - born and raised in Lebanon - insisted that arms should only be resorted to "along with negotiations and diplomacy".<sup>126</sup>

If living in Lebanon made a difference to the sample's attitudes on only one issue, the experience of living in Jordan made no difference - statistically speaking - to their attitudes at all. In general terms, therefore, it was not possible to arrive at a definitive view regarding how Palestinians reacted to living in the Arab diaspora. In other words, if in qualitative terms respondents had expressed considerable bitterness at how they had been treated by their fellow-Arabs, almost no quantitative findings could be obtained on this issue. What remained was the question of how they might have been affected by living under Israeli control in Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza - or, to use the sample's terminology, in Palestine. More specifically, one of the hypotheses to be tested is that there will be a radicalising effect on Palestinian attitudes of what the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS 1993, 4) sees as the crucial factor in any such study - "prolonged foreign occupation".

Not all scholars and researchers agree on the centrality of the Occupation factor when it comes to analysing Palestinian attitudes today, although its importance has been argued throughout this thesis. Christison, as mentioned earlier, concurs with those who perceive the issue of "foreign occupation and alienation of land" as

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<sup>126</sup> Humphrey (1989, 4) has noted that post-1975 Lebanese immigrants to Australia "brought with them a lot of problems from the war". He argues, however, that such problems are less important to the politics of the Lebanese community than aspects of the immigrants' relocation within Australian class structures.

central to Palestinian attitudes to their homeland (Christison 1989, 18-19). Reiser (1987, 94) has likewise suggested that, for Palestinians in the Diaspora, events in the homeland such as the continuation of Occupation were likely to have a greater explanatory power over attitudes than, for example, "any inherent approach to conflict that is culturally derived".<sup>127</sup>

Opinion polls now being conducted in the Occupied Territories rarely touch upon the Occupation issue directly, possibly because of expected hostility on the part of the military authorities (see Chapter One). Some Israeli studies also tend to minimise the effect of Occupation on attitudes of the inhabitants, while accentuating primordial and other factors. Ben-Rafael and Sharot (1991, 252-3), for example, maintain that the cleavage between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is due to the existence of "large and influential groups" on both sides who wish to dominate a state that covers the whole territory [including Israel].<sup>128</sup>

The assumption that Palestinian resistance to Occupation is accompanied by, or a predictor of, a desire to destroy Israel resurfaced at the time of the Gulf War.

Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar (1992, 52), for example, stated that Palestinians in the

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<sup>127</sup> Some might now question Reiser's conclusion, made on the basis of studies carried out in the early 1980s, that there seemed to be no evidence of a specifically "Muslim" approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Reiser 1987, 84,94-5).

<sup>128</sup> These authors' emphasis on the role of religious cleavages within Israel leads them to adopt terms such as "the Jewish-Palestinian conflict". Mouin Rabbani has commented that: "Israelis routinely refer to themselves (wrongly, in my view) as 'the Jews', and many Palestinians (again wrongly) simply take this claim at face value" (Electronic mail message received on Palestine news network, 20 February 1994).

Occupied Territories were perceived as an enemy by Israeli Jews at the time, whereas Palestinian citizens of Israel were not.<sup>129</sup>

The resolution of controversies regarding how Palestinians view the Occupation - or, indeed, how they view Israel and Israelis - is not helped by the fact that the quality and quantity of research in the region is still severely limited. Most contemporary polling of those living under Occupation concentrates on opinion regarding the peace process, and on levels of support for the PLO, its factions, and its opposition - Islamic or otherwise. In such a situation, the value of more comprehensive data from the Diaspora is enhanced, particularly if that data is obtainable from recent emigrants.<sup>130</sup>

The first finding was a negative, but not unimportant one. Those who had lived in Palestine prior to emigration reported attitudes to the PLO, to armed struggle and to coexistence with Jews which were not statistically different from other members of the sample. Non-findings such as these have their own significance, particularly on the last two issues. In other words, the experience of living under Israeli control was not related either to respondents favouring violence more, or to their rejecting Jews more, than anyone else in the sample. Nor was that experience significantly related to attitudes held regarding the PLO at the time of the survey,

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<sup>129</sup> Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar maintained in their study (1992, 52) that Israeli Jewish ethnocentrism did not increase as a result of the Gulf War, since "only" half of the public would deny Arabs the right to be elected to the Knesset, and only two-thirds thought they should be encouraged to emigrate from Israel. The delegitimation of an out-group categorised as the enemy, as mentioned earlier, can and does lead to that group's being deprived of its rights by the in-group.

<sup>130</sup> Residence in Australia of ten years or less was reported by nearly half the sample.

despite a tendency for the Palestine group to be somewhat more in disagreement with the PLO’s approach to the conflict.

On the acceptance of two states, however, this group exhibited statistically significant levels of rejectionism. Levels of acceptance, although higher in the outside group, were not vastly different. As the data in Table 5-5 shows, thirty per cent of former Palestine residents rejected the two-state solution totally (compared to only 12% in the rest of the sample).

**TABLE 5-5 RESIDENCE IN ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY ACCEPTANCE OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

	Accept completely	Accept with reser- vations	Neutral/ Inclined to reject	Reject totally	Row Total
Lived outside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	41 31.8	61 47.3	12 9.3	15 11.6	129 74.6
Lived inside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	15 34.1	14 31.8	2 4.5	13 29.5	44 25.4
Column Total	56 32.4	75 43.4	14 8.1	28 16.2	173 100.0

(Chi-sq.=9.29, df=3, p=.026)

On secularism (Table 5-6), despite levels of acceptance which were very similar to others in the sample, a fifth of the Palestine group thought the State of Palestine should definitely not be a secular one (compared to 7% of others).

**TABLE 5-6 RESIDENCE IN ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Lived outside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	89 71.2	14 11.2	13 10.4	9 7.2	125 74.0
Lived inside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	30 68.2	4 9.1	1 2.3	9 20.5	44 26.0
Column Total	119 70.4	18 10.7	14 8.3	18 10.7	169 100.0

(Chi-sq.=8.14, df=3, p=.043)

When the results in Table 5-6 were controlled for religion, one of the most striking findings of the analysis emerged. Having lived within the pre-1948 borders of Palestine was strongly associated, among Muslims, with almost complete polarisation of views regarding secularism. Importantly, the fact that a full 45% totally rejected the idea of a secular state meant that this Muslim sub-group was entirely responsible for the overall patterns in the sample as a whole, regarding this issue.

In an attempt to pinpoint the effect of Occupation on attitudes, the analysis was refined further by separating the former inhabitants of the Occupied Territories from the pre-1967 Israel group for the purposes of cross-tabulations.

**TABLE 5-7 RESIDENCE IN ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR (Muslims)**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Lived outside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	33 62.3	9 17.0	4 7.5	7 13.2	53 72.6
Lived inside Israel/ Occ. Terr.	9 45.0	2 10.0		9 45.0	20 27.4
Column Total	42 57.5	11 15.1	4 5.5	16 21.9	73 100.0

(Chi-sq.=9.43, df=3, p=.024)

As expected, because of the reduction in numbers, the chi-square significance found earlier on attitudes to the two-state solution disappeared, although there was still a tendency for the Occupied group to be much more rejectionist (30% were totally against) than the others (13%).

As Table 5-8 shows, however, there did remain a significant relationship between the variables related to living under Occupation and to the holding of anti-secularist views. This was the only tabulation where it was possible to view the Occupied Territories sub-group as distinct from the rest of the sample, and to obtain results of statistical significance.

**TABLE 5-8 RESIDENCE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Lived outside Occ. Terr.	97 71.3	15 11.0	14 10.3	10 7.4	136 80.5
Lived inside Occ. Terr.	22 66.7	3 9.1		8 24.2	33 19.5
Column Total	119 70.4	18 10.7	14 8.3	18 10.7	169 100.0

(Chi-sq.=10.68, df=3, p=.014)

So far, the findings in this section of the chapter have been instructive regarding the rejectionist minority in the sample. The findings suggested that the experience of living under Israeli control - in effect, living under Occupation - was likely to be related to rejection of the two-state solution. For Muslims, that experience was also likely to be associated with vehement denunciation of the secular ideal. More broadly, and perhaps just as importantly, the experience appeared to be associated with a polarisation of political attitudes, so that Muslim anti-secularism was likely to be counterbalanced by equally determined secular tendencies among the sample.

In the procedures just described, there was no way of knowing whether the respondent's attitudes had been affected by experiences in only one place of residence. The Palestine group, for example, was simply being compared with everyone else in the sample who had *not* reported living in Palestine, but who may

also have lived elsewhere in the world. And, among the Palestine group themselves, it was possible that some had lived in places other than Palestine.

In an attempt to provide further corroboration of the conclusions suggested by the findings above, it was decided to isolate those who had only reported a single place of residence in the Middle East prior to emigrating. Ideally, given the centrality of the Occupation factor to the arguments in this thesis, those who had lived under Occupation would be compared with another group, of similar background, who had not done so. This would reduce the chances of results being affected by "confounding" variables.

Once again, the small sample size meant that those from the Occupied Territories were not numerous enough to form a sub-group on their own, and once again they were combined with the group from Israel, for the reasons given earlier. The Jordan and Lebanon groups were also collapsed into one, for the purposes of comparison. The tabulations would now contain two groups, each with a single Middle East residence in common. One of the groups would have lived under Israeli control of some kind - almost certainly Occupation - and one would not. The analysis revealed that, in relation to one important attitude variable, there were statistically significant differences between the two groups (Table 5-9).

As the data show, Palestinians whose pre-emigration residence was in Palestine were much more likely to totally reject the two-state solution than the Jordan-Lebanon group.



**TABLE 5-9 LIVING UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL BY ACCEPTANCE OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

	Accept completely	Accept with reser- vations	Neutral/ Inclined to reject	Reject totally	Row Total
Lived in Israel/ Occ. Terr.	13 36.1	11 30.6	1 2.8	11 30.6	36 32.7
Lived in Jordan/ Lebanon	25 33.8	30 40.5	10 13.5	9 12.2	74 67.3
Column Total	38 34.5	41 37.3	11 10.0	20 18.2	110 100.0

(Chi-sq.=7.98, df=3, p=.046)

On attitudes to secularism, statistical significance was not achieved, but the results were broadly similar in pattern to those in earlier tabulations. For example, more of those living under Israeli control tended to be definitely anti-secular (22%) than those from Jordan/Lebanon (10%).

In contrast to the data on birthplace, the analysis relating to data on the pre-emigration place of residence highlighted some significant attitudinal differences between the various groups. Of those answering this item (169 out of a total sample of 176), important minorities as large as 30% strongly rejected the two-state solution. Among Muslims, the percentage expressing intense anti-secularism was as high as 45%. The crucial factor associated with the holding of such views was - as hypothesised earlier - the experience of living under Occupation, although several mitigating factors were also at work.

Firstly, one must keep sight of the fact that the majority in the sample generally adhered to views of moderation, ethnic tolerance and secularism, no matter where they had lived. The exception to this was the sample's favourable view of the Palestinian right to use arms in their struggle.<sup>131</sup> In this section, however, it was seen that respondents who had lived in one of the most violent environments in the region - Lebanon - were *less* likely to be pro-arms. This fact, together with the fact that acceptance of co-existence with Jews remained unaffected by place of residence, has positive implications for those who fear that Middle Eastern migrants will "bring their conflicts with them".

Secondly, one of the more interesting findings emerging from the procedures in this section was that living under Occupation was associated with a polarisation of views, so that minority tendencies towards extremism were invariably counteracted by equally strong tendencies in the opposite direction. A recent survey in the Occupied Territories found that deteriorating conditions "may have resulted in a 'polarization' of attitudes in Gaza".<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> While Palestinian support for armed struggle may be seen by some as threatening to the State of Israel, the Israeli scholar Smooha argues that: "Since Israeli Arabs regard the PLO as a liberation movement of the Palestinians - though not of Palestine - they would be expected to accede to its right to armed struggle" (Smooha, 1992, 66). Smooha's distinction between Palestinians (a term he reserves for the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories) and Palestine (in which Israel would be included) is an important one. The initials PLO, for example, stand for *Palestinian* - not Palestine - Liberation Organisation.

<sup>132</sup> A CPRS poll published early in 1994 found that 50% of Gazans favoured continuing peace negotiations with Israel, while 46% were against it, and only 5% were undecided (*Mideast Mirror*, 26 January 1994).

It has not been felt necessary in this chapter to describe the conditions under which Palestinians have lived in the Middle East. For, if the Arab diaspora remains under-researched because of structural and political difficulties, the Palestinian condition in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel has now been reasonably well documented. At the time of writing, and despite the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles, there appears to be little change in the policies and practices of Israeli Occupation. If the section above has concentrated on the location of the sample's Middle East experiences, the next two sections will look more closely at the exact nature of those experiences, and how those experiences might relate to attitudes.

#### HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION LEADING TO EMIGRATION

It is probably true to say of the Middle East in general - and certainly true with regard to Palestinians - that adverse political conditions have been a major cause of emigration. Escribano and El-Joubeh (1981, 150,160), for example, have documented the post-1967 population drain from West Bank villages, where they describe the population as "living under constant fear". West Bank emigration, as they see it, is largely due to the political conditions of life under military occupation.

In nearly half the cases in the Sydney study, political harassment and discrimination were cited in Item 7 of the survey instrument as a reason for emigrating - more than any other single reason (see Table 5-1). This characteristic

of the sample sets them apart from most other immigrants to Australia, of whom it has been noted that economic reasons, rather than political dissatisfaction, tend to provide the main motive for emigrating (Mistilis, 1984, 73). While it was recognised that such encounters may well have occurred outside Palestine, owing to the large-scale expulsions and dislocations affecting the Palestinian population after 1948, the experiences were thought likely to have had some kind of general effect on how people thought politically.<sup>133</sup> The results for two of the five cross-tabulations of this variable with attitude variables (Table 5-10 and Table 5-11) revealed that there was indeed a statistical relationship between political harassment and/or discrimination, on the one hand, and attitudes on the other.

**TABLE 5-10 PRE-EMIGRATION EXPERIENCE OF HARASSMENT/DISCRIMINATION BY ACCEPTANCE OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

	Accept completely	Accept with reser- vations	Neutral/ Inclined to reject	Reject totally	Row Total
Harassed/ Discri- minated against	17 23.0	37 50.0	9 12.2	11 14.9	74 44.0
Not harassed/ Discrim. against	37 39.4	36 38.3	4 4.3	17 18.1	94 56.0
Column Total	54 32.1	73 43.5	13 7.7	28 16.7	168 100.0

(Chi-sq.=8.37, df=3, p=.039)

<sup>133</sup> It had been informally observed in the Sydney community, for instance, that Palestinians from the highly politicised and often violent environments of Lebanon or the Occupied Territories were often more openly and intensely committed to the Palestinian "cause" than were those from, say, Jordan.

Persons subjected to harassment and discrimination were significantly less likely to completely accept the two-state solution. They were also more likely to have reservations about it, or feel somewhat negative towards it, than those who had not so suffered. But on the whole the results on the two-state issue (Table 5-10) were somewhat mixed. In contrast, the data in Table 5-11 (on agreement with the PLO approach) fell into much more clear-cut patterns. Here, harassment and discrimination were strongly associated with reduced support for the PLO (24%, as opposed to 6% in the non-harassed group). Those with a background of harassment were also less inclined to adopt a neutral option.

**TABLE 5-11 PRE-EMIGRATION EXPERIENCE OF HARASSMENT/DISCRIMINATION BY AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO APPROACH**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/Strongly disagree	Row Total
Harassed/Discriminated against	34 45.3	20 26.7	3 4.0	18 24.0	75 45.5
Not harassed/Discrim. against	32 35.6	40 44.4	13 14.4	5 5.6	90 54.5
Column Total	66 40.0	60 36.4	16 9.7	23 13.9	165 100.0

(Chi-sq.=19.12, df=3, p<.001)

Interestingly, however, the harassed group were even more likely to express strong agreement with the PLO approach. The latter finding raised, once again, the

possibility that suffering might turn out to be related to the polarisation of attitudes, rather than their radicalisation. For, while the sample's views as a whole were often polarised, that pattern was accentuated in the case of the harassed group.<sup>134</sup>

Perceptions exist among Palestinian Muslims that they are more persecuted than Christians. Massacres which have taken place in or around mosques such as Al-Aqsa in 1991, and Hebron in 1994, reinforce those perceptions. The discrimination variable was therefore cross-tabulated, at this point, with religious affiliation. However, there was no chi-square significance in the results. The fact that Muslims and Christians in the sample were almost equally likely to report pre-emigration discrimination may be related to the fact that many in the sample had lived in Lebanon, where Palestinians were discriminated against on mainly ethnic grounds.

The sample's attitudes to armed struggle, secularism and co-existence with Jews were statistically unaffected by the experience of harassment in the Middle East. On other issues, while large majorities in both the harassed and the non-harassed groups were political moderates, the intensity with which dissenting opinion was expressed by the harassed group was notable. This dissent suggested some kind of relationship between negative experiences prior to emigration, and the adoption of rejectionist views (especially regarding the PLO). The existence of such a

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<sup>134</sup> Smootha has rejected the radicalisation perspective of Israeli Palestinian political attitudes, in favour of a politicisation perspective. In his 1989 study he found "no evidence for growing extremism and rejectionism among Israeli Arabs" (Smootha, 1989, xvi). In a follow-up study he again rejects the Arab radicalisation approach, this time in favour of one involving Arab "militancy" (Smootha, 1992, 270).

relationship, however, could not be definitively said to imply causality, for it was theoretically possible that those views were held *prior* to the respondent's being harassed. Moreover, since this item did not specify the exact location of the respondents' experiences, the findings were suggestive rather than informative. The next step was to look more closely at the geography of Palestinian suffering.

## ECONOMIC LOSS AND PERSONAL HARASSMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Palestinian prisoners in Gaza, asked by the Israeli authorities about their motives for engaging in civil violence during the Intifada, spoke of their "economic despair and motives of getting even with Israel" (Frisch, 1993, 263). Economic conditions alone, however, can probably not fully explain Palestinian political attitudes, nor be used to explain changes in those attitudes. In their Occupied Territories survey, Shadid and Seltzer (1988, 21) had concluded that "improving economic conditions will not necessarily result in decreased violence unless this approach also addresses the issue of self-determination". Shadid and Seltzer's warning remains relevant for international actors who would currently emphasise the need for economic aid to an autonomous Palestinian entity, while shelving indefinitely more political aspects of a settlement.

Turning to that political dimension, it was observed by Frisch that young offenders in Israeli gaols were highly politicised, not at the time of their arrest, but rather by the time they were released - a process he saw as due to "prolonged periods in prison .. spent in [PLO] indoctrination and organizational training" (Frisch, 1993,

257-9). Shadid and Seltzer (1988, 30-1), on the other hand, linked Palestinian extremism directly to personal experiences of suffering at Israeli hands, and Smootha was similarly able to confirm his hypothesis (1989, 175) that deprivation was likely to radicalise Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

While the rejectionists in the Sydney sample numbered only a small minority, it would clearly be useful to analyse exactly what kind of experiences were associated with the holding of such views, especially since Palestinian opposition to the peace process is growing. In line with the overall aims of the thesis, the question of whether such experiences had occurred specifically under Occupation would be investigated, together with the issue of whether Muslims had been affected in a distinctive way. A larger question - but one which would be difficult to answer, given the nature of the data - was whether radicalism caused an individual to be harassed, or was instead the result of such harassment.

Respondents had been asked (Item 8) whether they or their family had suffered, in economic or personal terms, in Palestine or in other parts of the Middle East.

While such suffering may have occurred some time in the past, it was more likely that the sample's relatively recent Middle East origins meant that such experiences were fresh in their minds. Also, anecdotal evidence from respondents testified to the fact that harassment by the authorities - particularly in the West Bank and Gaza - was regularly encountered on visits home.<sup>135</sup> The distributions of responses for

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<sup>135</sup> A reference to the respondent's family was suggested by Shadid and Seltzer's finding (1988, 30) that respondents' attitudes tended to be more extreme if either they *or a member of their family* had been arrested or had had land confiscated (emphasis added).



the original item have already been summarised in Table 5-2, and are given in full in Appendix IV. References to Palestine in the discussion below will generally reflect the respondents' (pre-1948) definition.

Cross-tabulating the "suffering" variables by the attitude variables resulted in, firstly, a negative finding. Suffering economic loss or personal harassment in the Middle East (endured by 32% and 56% of cases, respectively) was found to have no statistically valid relationship to attitudes, if that suffering had occurred *outside Palestine*. This (non-)finding was in line with what had already been suggested by the data in the previous section, namely that living in the Arab world could not, in itself, be shown to have affected the way the sample thought.

Within the Palestine group, it was found that levels of support for armed struggle, and for acceptance of Jews, both remained unaffected by the "suffering" variables. Both sufferers and non-sufferers, in Palestine and beyond, were equally likely to adhere to, or to reject, the use of arms and/or acceptance of Jews in Palestine. In other words, neither economic loss nor personal harassment were related to attitudes on these two issues.

It is important to note that negative interactions between Palestinians and Israelis were *not* automatically associated in this sample with an increased inclination by the former to favour the use of violence - contrary to Shadid and Seltzer's findings - nor with a tendency to reject Jews. There was even a tendency for more of the sufferers (32%) to be "very willing" to accept Jews in Palestine than the non-

sufferers (19%). This kind of willingness is not necessarily reciprocated; Smootha found, for example, that "the Arabs are much more interested in integration [into Israeli society] than the Jews are prepared to permit" (Smootha, 1992, 89).<sup>136</sup>

Moving on to findings related to the Palestine experience which were significant in statistical terms, it was found that economic losses in Palestine affected only one variable. Those suffering losses were more likely to be definitely in favour of secularism (74%), to avoid the neutral options on the issue, and to be definitely anti-secular (13.5%) than those who had not lost economically (Table 5-12).

**TABLE 5-12 ECONOMIC LOSS IN PALESTINE BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Suffered loss	82 73.9	9 8.1	5 4.5	15 13.5	111 70.4
Did not suffer loss	31 67.4	6 13.0	7 15.2	2 4.3	46 29.3
Column Total	113 72.0	15 9.6	12 7.6	28 10.8	157 100.0

(Chi-Sq.=8.43, df=3, p=.038)

<sup>136</sup> If the Sydney study found that negative interactions between Palestinians and Israelis had no effect on the former's attitudes to the latter, some current research in Israel provides an interesting parallel. Psychologists setting up organised encounters between Palestinian and Israeli students found that such positive contacts did *not* enhance inter-ethnic relations between the two groups. They concluded that focusing on micro-level relations, while ignoring the macro-level conflict between the two groups, will not necessarily contribute to resolution of that conflict (Yogev, Ben-Yehoshua and Alper, 1991, 547,560).

Controlling for religion, while not establishing statistical significance, showed up a tendency for the Muslim "loss" group in the sample to be definitely against a secular state, (27%, compared to only 9% of those not suffering loss). There are, however, a number of possible explanations for the results set out in Table 5-13, and it would be unjustifiable to suggest that the relationship established between the variables was a causal one. More important, perhaps, is the possibility that the "economic loss" group contained a large proportion of the 77% in the sample who claimed to still own property in Palestine - a reminder that Diaspora Palestinian claims for compensation remain a thorny issue for future negotiations. Among the Palestine group of sufferers, then, the findings regarding economic loss were not entirely conclusive. In contrast, the cross-tabulations involving personal harassment within Palestine - endured by 47% of the sample - were to yield more striking results.

**TABLE 5-13 HARASSMENT IN PALESTINE BY ACCEPTANCE OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

	Accept two states completely	Accept with reserv- ations	Neutral/ Inclined to reject	Reject totally	Row Total
Harassed	27 36.0	26 34.7	5 6.7	17 22.7	75 46.9
Not harassed	25 29.4	44 51.8	8 9.4	8 9.4	85 53.1
Column Total	52 32.5	70 43.8	13 8.1	25 15.6	160 100.0

(Chi-sq.=8.04, df=3, p=.045)

On the question of whether they accepted Israel alongside Palestine (Table 5-13), the harassed group were more likely to express complete acceptance (36%) and to avoid the neutral categories. Importantly, however, they were also more likely to be totally rejectionist (23%) than those who did not suffer (9%).

Table 5-13 also reveals the now familiar pattern whereby attitudes on the part of the deprived or suffering group are more intensely held - more polarised - than those among the unaffected. The reasons for such polarisation properly belong in the realm of social psychology. As such, they cannot be dealt with here in any detail, although the Group Polarisation hypothesis, which states that the responses of groups tend to be more extreme than individual members' responses (Forsyth, 1990, 314), suggests what may be a fruitful line of approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict situation.<sup>137</sup>

In the sample as a whole, there was a correlation - albeit a very weak one (.169) - between views on the PLO, and attitudes to the two-state solution. It was thus expected that the same kind of polarised distributions apparent in Table 5-13 would recur when attitudes to the PLO were examined in the context of harassment.

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<sup>137</sup> In one study of group polarisation, "dovish" college students became less militaristic, and "hawkish" army officers became more in favour of forceful tactics, following group discussions (Forsyth, 1990, 313). If it is true that, the more an issue is actively discussed within a group, the more the members of the group will move towards extreme attitudes on that issue, there may be implications for our understanding of controversial developments such as apparent trends towards the Islamicising of Palestinian politics. The argument would be that, as supporters of Islamicisation become more fervent in their views, so would opponents of those views be strengthened in their own convictions.

**TABLE 5-14 HARASSMENT IN PALESTINE BY AGREEMENT WITH PLO APPROACH**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly disagree	Row Total
Harassed	36 49.3	21 28.8	3 4.1	13 17.8	73 46.5
Not harassed	30 35.7	33 39.3	12 14.3	9 10.7	84 53.5
Column Total	66 42.0	54 34.4	15 9.6	22 14.0	157 100.0

(Chi-sq.=8.61, df=3, p=.035)

And indeed, having been harassed within Palestine was associated with being either more strongly supportive of the PLO, or with being more likely to disagree with it (Table 5-14).

In the wake of the 1993 Declaration of Principles, when - despite talk of autonomy - Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were still experiencing harassment, polls showed that a decline in support for the PLO was expressed by 30% of those surveyed there (*Mideast Mirror*, 14 January 1994).<sup>138</sup> Ironically, Israeli harassment of Palestinians seems to be accompanied not by increased hostility towards Israelis, but by increased rejection of the Palestinians' own leadership - a phenomenon which might perhaps be termed, in the Palestinian case, "internal rejectionism".

<sup>138</sup> The CPRS, reporting in early 1994 that "the Israeli military continued to roam the streets of Gaza, and violent acts against Palestinians were on the rise", related these developments to an increase in Gazan disillusionment with the peace talks to which the PLO was committed (*Mideast Mirror*, 26 January 1994).

The data in Table 5-15 is concerned with the topical question of secularism.

**TABLE 5-15 HARASSMENT IN PALESTINE BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Harassed	51 70.8	3 4.2	4 5.6	14 19.4	72 45.9
Not harassed	62 72.9	12 14.1	8 9.4	3 3.5	85 54.1
Column Total	113 72.0	15 9.6	12 7.6	17 10.8	157 100.0

(Chi-Sq.=13.94, df=3, p=.003)

People who had encountered personal harassment in Palestine (or whose families had) were statistically much more likely to strongly oppose the idea of a secular state (19%, compared to 3.5% of those not harassed). Correspondingly, freedom from harassment was associated with general support (87%) for secularism. However, the proportion *strongly* in favour of secularism was almost identical in both groups.

Opponents of a secular state, in the sample, were overwhelmingly - if predictably - Muslim (see Table 4-19). Now, on the basis of the data in Table 5-12 and Table 5-15, it could be seen that opponents of secularism were also likely to have undergone economic loss and/or harassment in Palestine. It was clearly possible that the same individuals were involved in both cases, and almost inevitable that those individuals were Muslims. Smootha (1989, 178) had noted, for example, that

Palestinian militancy in Israel was partly due to the reaction by Muslims to their unfavourable treatment by Israel. At around the time of the survey, Israeli police had just killed over twenty Palestinians at Al-Aqsa mosque, Jerusalem (*Middle East International*, 18 October 1990). It therefore seemed appropriate to re-assess Muslim perceptions that they have been historically - and are currently - more persecuted than Christians. It will be seen from the results in Table 5-16 that, in all but one instance of Middle East suffering, Muslims in the Sydney sample appeared to have some basis for their perceptions of discriminatory treatment.

**TABLE 5-16 SUFFERING BY MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE SAMPLE**

	Muslims		Christians	
	n	%	n	%
Harassed/discriminated against in ME	35	48	38	40
Suffered economic loss in ME	27	38	24	27
Suffered harassment in ME	42	58	46	52
Suffered economic loss in Palestine	49	68	65	74
Suffered harassment in Palestine	36	50	37	42

*Note:* The "n" figure for each category refers to the number of Muslims and Christians who answered in the affirmative to each item or sub-item. In the questionnaire, the relevant items were 7 and 8, answered by 165 and 162 respondents respectively.

Yet the inter-group differences were not large, and when the variables listed above were cross-tabulated with religious affiliation, no statistically significant relationships were found. The results for this sample, therefore, suggested but

could not prove that Muslims were more likely to be persecuted than Christians. It is possible that a larger sample would have yielded more significant results.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political spotlight is regularly turned upon the Muslim anti-secularists - at times, with more intensity than upon any other Palestinian sub-group. The spotlighting is often accompanied by what a scholar of North African Islam has called "a simplistic identification of the Islamists with the extremism of the movement's violent fringe" (*Middle East International*, 21 January 1994). It has already been seen (Table 4-18) that Muslims in the sample were more likely to support armed struggle than were Christians. For these reasons it was decided to look more closely at the harassed-in-Palestine group, with a view to learning more about the differences between Muslims within the sample.

It must be remembered that, although Christians formed a slight majority in the sample, and may just outnumber Muslims among Sydney Palestinians as a whole, it is Muslims who constitute the very dominant majority in the homeland. The Canberra office of the PLO states that, of the 3 million Palestinians in the Diaspora, 10-12% are Christians; and that, in the Occupied Territories and Israel, there are about 30,000 and 100,000 Palestinian Christians respectively.<sup>139</sup> When the results given earlier in Table 5-15 were controlled for the effect of the religion variable, the results for Muslims in the sample were as shown in Table 5-17.

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<sup>139</sup> The source of these figures, which were contained in a letter to the writer from the PLO representative on 21 February 1994, was the September/October 1993 issue of *Al-Muntada*, the Arabic-language publication of the Middle East Council of Churches.



**TABLE 5-17 HARASSMENT IN PALESTINE BY VIEWS ON WHETHER A STATE OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE SECULAR (Muslims)**

	Definitely secular	Probably secular	Maybe/ Probably not secular	Definitely not secular	Row Total
Harassed	21 58.3	1 2.8	1 2.8	13 36.1	36 50.7
Not harassed	20 57.1	10 28.6	3 8.6	2 5.7	35 49.3
Column Total	41 57.7	11 15.5	4 5.6	15 21.1	71 100.0

(Chi-sq.=16.44, df=3, p=.001)

A remarkably strong relationship showed up - among Muslims - between having been harassed, and being totally against secularism. Thirty-six per cent of Muslim sufferers were definitely against a secular state, compared to only 6% of non-sufferers. It was this factor, therefore, which accounted for most of the differences between the groups seen above in Table 5-15. For Muslims from Palestine, the experience of personal harassment was even more strongly associated with anti-secularism than economic loss had been. On the other hand, an equally large majority was still definitely in favour of secularism, in both the suffering and non-suffering groups. Polarisation of attitudes among the harassed group of Muslims, in particular, was almost complete. In order to highlight the overall pattern of responses by Muslims who had lived and/or suffered under Israeli rule, Table 5-18 draws together a selection of significant findings from previous tabulations.

It has already been seen in Table 5-13 and Table 5-14 that those who were harassed in Palestine were more ready to reject the two-state solution, and the

PLO's accommodationist approach, respectively. The results in Table 5-18 now showed that, for Muslims, the twin facts of living in a conflict situation, and experiencing harassment within it, were also strongly associated with rejection of secularism.

**TABLE 5-18 NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES IN PALESTINE  
BY ANTI-SECULARISM (Muslims)**

	<b>% definitely against a secular State of Palestine</b>
a) Lived in Palestine*	45
Did not live Palestine	13
b) Suffered personal harassment in Palestine	36
Did not suffer personal harassment " "	6
c) Suffered economic loss in Palestine	27
Did not suffer economic loss " "	9

\* Prior to emigration

*Note:* For details of responses to the items relating to a), b) and c) above, the reader is referred to Tables 5-6, 5-11 and 5-15 respectively. Palestine is here defined, in the sample's terms, as Israel plus the Occupied Territories.

On the basis of the findings so far, it seemed plausible to argue that the experience of harassment - particularly the kind of harassment likely to occur under military occupation - may lead individuals to adopt attitudes of political extremism. This finding is generally in line with what has been suggested in similar studies (Smootha, 1989; Shadid and Seltzer, 1988). One must bear in mind, however, that in the case of the Palestinians in this sample, the experience of suffering was not

related to either increased anti-semitism, or to heightened preferences for the use of arms. Also, extremist tendencies were apparent only among a minority.

A final issue arising from the data in this section is whether political extremism is a cause, or an effect of harassment. Shadid and Seltzer (1988, 21) have suggested that "activists are activists by definition because they usually regard conditions in a more negative light than persons who are more complacent". The implication is that such persons are more likely to get into trouble with the authorities, and consequently to be more likely to report harassment. Yet Frisch (1993, 258,263), as mentioned earlier, had noted that young Palestinians arrested by the Israeli authorities typically had no background of political activity prior to their arrest, but emerged from prison highly politicised.<sup>140</sup>

The question is difficult to answer definitively. For participants in the Sydney survey, experiences in the homeland clearly preceded the act of articulating their political attitudes in the survey, but this cannot be taken as proof that those experiences *caused* them to hold those attitudes. The possibility, too, that the act of emigration may have led to a certain softening of attitudes cannot be ruled out. A female informant described to the writer how her views had moderated after eighteen years in Australia: "Now, I experience peace, and that's why I think

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<sup>140</sup> Frisch, speaking of Palestinians arrested in their late teens or early twenties, says: "Most were apprehended *before* they committed the acts they planned" (author's emphasis). He attributes the arrest - and sentencing - of such individuals to "the efficiency of Israel's general security services" (Frisch, 1993, 258). The Israeli Defence forces figure for the number of Palestinians arrested in the first three years of the Intifada is 75,000; of whom 30,000 were never charged with any offence (Friedman, 1992, xxvi).

peace. When I used to live in Palestine under Israeli Occupation, I wanted to retaliate."

For those who had suffered great deprivation or personal tragedy, it also appears possible that the end result could well be depoliticisation rather than radicalisation. Asked to participate in community political activities by an acquaintance, a newly-arrived West Banker responded tartly: "What has Palestine done for me? My seven brothers have all been killed and my sister was blinded. Now I come here and I can't find a job to support my family. And you want me to get involved in politics!"

Yet in other cases it did appear plausible to suggest that suffering oppression could lead to greater political extremism. In contrast to the individuals just cited, a young Muslim recently arrived from the West Bank was adamant about the effect on him personally of the harassment of his family: "Emotionally, I react to the fact that most of my friends, and also my nephews, are now in gaol. In reaction to this, I would join in demonstrations if I was there, and even use arms if I was forced to. If my brother was shot, I would feel I needed to do something in reaction." Not many respondents were willing to be as forthright in such declarations, and indeed, obtaining the kind of data which would enable the researcher to pinpoint how respondents' radical tendencies might be manifested, remains a perennial difficulty in this kind of research.

While the findings reported above clearly suggest that suffering in the homeland was associated with what can broadly be called rejectionism, it cannot be stated with certainty that the suffering actually caused that rejectionism. Although the data from other studies does suggest such a uni-directional relationship between the variables, and although the existence of such a relationship seems both logical in principle, and borne out by current trends in the region, the limitations of the data available in this study mean that some conclusions remain tentative.

## CONCLUSION

Experiences such as economic deprivation, political discrimination and personal harassment in the homeland were associated, in this group of Diaspora Palestinians, with increased political polarisation and - in the case of a minority - with increased rejectionism. As originally hypothesised, the findings regarding these homeland experiences were far more likely to be associated with Palestinian attitudes than were the results for the socio-demographic factors discussed in Chapter Four. The first broad conclusion emerging from the discussion in this chapter, then, is that the homeland dimension of migrant attitudes - particularly among displaced groups with a history of suffering - needs to be paid more attention than it has been in the past. As mentioned earlier, even though those studying the Palestinians acknowledge the centrality of the homeland *issue* for their politics and their identity, they rarely investigate the homeland *experience* as a separate variable.

The findings set out in this chapter, on how the Palestinian experience of loss and suffering relates to their attitudes, can also be used to bolster the argument that says diaspora communities can usefully be viewed as attitudinal microcosms of the homeland. The results of the Sydney survey, for example, are broadly in line with what other observers of Palestinian politics have already suggested - namely, that the crucial explanatory variables in any analysis of Palestinian attitudes are likely to be those connected with the continuing reality of Occupation (Christison 1989). This is true on two levels - firstly, in the patterns into which the sample's responses were distributed; and, secondly, in the precise nature of the issues which were affected by the "Middle East" variables.

Polarisation of attitudes, on the part of groups who are or who have been in a situation of suffering under Occupation, has been observed in both the Palestinian homeland and within the Sydney sample. Despite the sample's possible unrepresentativeness, the recurrence of patterns such as the polarisation of attitudes among the "suffering" groups in both locations is unlikely to be wholly coincidental. Smootha (1989, 1992) has adopted the perspective that experiences such as deprivation are likely to politicise, rather than radicalise Palestinians. Shadid and Seltzer (1988) have suggested that embittering experiences lead to Palestinian political extremism, including support for political violence. What the data from this survey suggest is that, in contrast to the politicisation or radicalisation perspectives, it is the polarisation of attitudes which is most immediately associated with negative personal experiences. The fact that one end

of that polarised spectrum represents the rejectionist perspective brings us to the next point.

A second feature of the response distribution which appears to parallel developments in the homeland is that relating to the rejectionist minority. Across the sample as a whole, acceptance of secularism, the two-state solution and support for the PLO were all likely to show a negative correlation with variables relating to political discrimination and harassment, particularly under Occupation. This was an important overall finding, suggesting as it did that the response to increased oppression might tend to be a kind of "internal rejectionism". Such an "internal rejectionism" can be defined as rejection of a group's own leadership and its policies - the PLO, secularism and the two-state solution - rather than rejection of those identified with the oppression - in this case, Jews in a future State of Palestine.<sup>141</sup>

It was among the Muslim sub-group, however, that some of the survey's most striking findings were to be located. Here, in fact, the results came closer to the radicalisation model referred to above. Intensely-expressed rejection of secularism can legitimately be seen as the hallmark of an Islamicist ideology. The close association in the survey results between negative experiences under Occupation, on the one hand, and anti-secularism on the other, has implications for the future course of politics in the region. Again, these implications will be dealt with more

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<sup>141</sup> The increasingly widespread disillusion with the PLO's inability to put an end to Occupation has currently led George Habash, the PFLP leader, to claim that most Palestinians now oppose Arafat's policies (*Middle East International*, 18 February 1994).

fully in the concluding chapter. Again, too, it must be acknowledged that, suggestive though the findings may be, it cannot be actually proven on the basis of the Sydney data that those experiences led directly to the extremitisation of attitudes. It nevertheless appears to be possible that today's minority, in the Palestinian case, may well be setting tomorrow's political agenda - a reminder that majority views within a population are not the only ones deserving the attention of researchers.

The question of which attitudinal trends were dominant within the sample leads us to consider in more detail the exact nature of the sample's views. Many Australians, it was shown in Chapter Three, view Middle Eastern migrants as "too fanatical and political" (DIEA 1986 Vol.II, 186-7). Claims have also been made in the press that Palestinian terrorist groups exist in Australia, and that for such groups every Jew who supports Israel is a "legitimate target" (*Daily Mirror*, 24 December 1982). The findings in the present study, however, provided no support for such negative stereotyping.

Those who had suffered in economic or personal terms in Palestine - 72% and 46% of the sample respectively - were, it has been seen, more likely to hold rejectionist views than others. Yet those same individuals were no more likely to prefer armed struggle or to hold anti-Jewish attitudes than anyone else in the group. The Israeli-Palestinian writer Anton Shammas has pointed out that: "An ethnic, non-pluralistic Palestinian state would not appeal to most of the Palestinians living in the western Diaspora" (*The New York Review of Books*, 29 September 1988). The data from



the Sydney survey is corroborative of Shammās' remarks about Palestinian commitment to democratic values, and should be reassuring for those who fear that Middle Eastern migrants will inevitably import anti-democratic tendencies with them.

The overall implications of these findings, for both the host country where the sample now lives, and for the Palestinian homeland from whence they originated, will be incorporated into the next, final chapter.

## Chapter Six

### CONCLUSION

This study has, perhaps ambitiously, striven to construct a conceptual bridge linking diaspora with homeland; displaced migrants with the embattled residents of territories under military occupation; stateless refugees with those for whom liberation and statehood at times appear imminent. The politics of the Palestinian situation is unique, and the pattern of Palestinian responses to that situation is also *sui generis* in its complex and sometimes contradictory nature. Whether this survey of Palestinian attitudes has succeeded in its aim of elucidating such complexities is left to the judgement of the reader. From a broader perspective, the uniqueness of the Palestinian situation does not negate its more general usefulness as a model of how stateless exile groups in general relate to both homeland and host country. What this final chapter sets out to do is, firstly, to summarise the major findings; and, secondly, to interpret those findings and discuss their implications.

Other studies of Palestinian Diaspora communities have chosen to adopt one of two perspectives. The first of these is to view such a community as a microcosm of the Palestinian nation as a whole; the second sees them as a more or less encapsulated ethnic minority co-existing with the dominant culture in the host country. Surveys of the attitudes of such groups - and not only Palestinian groups - have therefore adopted either a homeland- or a host country-centred

approach, according to the researcher's perspective. In few cases, however, have the group's homeland experiences been regarded as a relevant variable affecting attitudes in the host country.

Since an assumption basic to this thesis has been that attitudes of a displaced minority can *only* be understood if homeland factors - and, in particular, the individual's experiences there - are taken into account, the "microcosm" and the "minority" perspectives have been combined. The writer would maintain, on the basis of the results from this study, that the original assumption was justified. In short, what is learnt about the homeland can indeed illuminate what needs to be known about the diaspora and, of course, vice versa.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

Like their compatriots in other parts of the Western Diaspora, this group of mostly Palestine-born migrants was characterised by relatively high levels of education, qualifications and political sophistication. Adherence to values broadly described as democratic - including ethnic and religious tolerance, and secularism - was the norm within the sample. Statelessness had not led them to abandon their intensely emotional ties with the homeland, once settled in the Western Diaspora. If anything, allegiance to the new host country appeared partly - if not largely - dependent upon that country's perceived stance on the Palestine issue. The politics

of the homeland, in other words, continued to be of the highest salience as far as the members of the sample were concerned.

At the same time, full identification with Australia was inhibited. The sample were almost unanimous in their perceptions of media bias, public stereotyping and political discrimination - including official harassment - within Australia.

Reluctance to articulate political attitudes; unwillingness to declare ethnic origins; and lack of public involvement in political activity - were all, to some degree, characteristic of the sample. These attitudes appeared to be related as much to the expectation of discrimination in the Australian context, as to the legacy of the sample's past experiences in the politically volatile Middle East. In short, it was indicated by the data that the sample's attitudes to their diaspora existence were being mediated not only through their experiences in the homeland, and but also through their experiences of how the host country viewed the homeland conflict - and the protagonists associated with it.

In analysing the data it was found that, as hypothesised, standard socio-demographic variables generally had no effect on the attitude variables, except for religious affiliation. In contrast, the sample's recent experiences in the Middle East - or the lack of them - were a significant factor affecting the nature and intensity of their political preferences regarding the homeland. Again, this finding was in line with some earlier hypotheses, although the nature of the data meant that some conclusions remained less than definitive. In contrast to the uniformity of the data

relating to the Australian end of the sample's experience, sharply polarised response distributions were a feature of "homeland" attitudes. Polarisation of views was even more apparent among the group who had lived in Israel or the Occupied Territories.

Negative experiences in the Middle East were associated across the sample with minority tendencies to reject both the PLO's pragmatic approach to the two-state solution. Moreover, Muslims in the sample who reported negative experiences in the homeland were much more likely to reject the idea of a secular State of Palestine than Muslims who had not so suffered. There were statistically valid differences between Muslims and Christians on some other issues as well, with Muslims tending towards greater rejectionism.

On the other hand, the patterns of political polarisation mentioned above meant that tendencies towards any kind of extremism were inevitably counter-balanced by a strengthening of more moderate views at the other end of the attitudinal spectrum. Respondents who reported suffering personal harassment in Palestine, for example, were more likely than others to *either* totally reject the PLO and the two-state solution, *or* to be very supportive of them. This having been said, a noticeable feature of the findings was that statistically valid differences, between the groups reporting homeland suffering and others, were mostly due to the intensity with which the rejectionists - rather than the moderates - expressed their views.

Importantly, very large majorities in the sample supported the PLO's approach; accepted the idea of a State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel (the two-state solution); and insisted on such a state being secular. A majority also favoured co-existence with Jews in a future State of Palestine. The principle of armed struggle was generally supported as a means of achieving independent statehood. Rejection of the PLO approach and/or of the two-state solution, however, was *not* associated with increased anti-semitism or with heightened preferences for armed struggle.

The major findings may be summarised in point form as follows:

- The sample was generally characterised by political moderation, and by secularism.
- Uniform dissatisfaction with Australian treatment of the Palestine issue accompanied a reluctance to fully identify with Australia.
- Standard socio-demographic factors (other than religion) were unrelated to the attitudes held by the sample.
- Situational factors, on the other hand, including experiences in the homeland, were associated with the holding of certain attitudes.
- Attitudes regarding the politics of the Palestinian homeland were generally polarised, especially among those who had lived under Israeli control.
- Negative experiences under Israeli control were associated with increased rejectionism, especially among Muslims.
- Political extremism and anti-secularism were restricted to a minority, but that minority tendency was much stronger among those with a background of loss and suffering in areas under Israeli control.
- Intensely rejectionist attitudes on the part of those who had lived under Israeli control were often responsible for significant differences emerging between groups.

Before moving on to speculate on how the above findings should be interpreted, something needs to be said on methodological aspects of the study, and on the results which were not originally anticipated.

## METHODOLOGY AND UNANTICIPATED RESULTS

The lack of a randomised sample is an almost inevitable feature of survey research projects involving Palestinians, if only because they have been so rarely enumerated as a separate group. The possibility of an unrepresentative sample was admitted, though partly mitigated by the fact that results turned out to be very similar to those obtained in similar studies of Palestinian-Americans (see below). Another disadvantage was the lack of a large sample, since chi-square significance was often lost in cross-tabulations involving the smaller sub-groups. In retrospect, it would also have been preferable to concentrate solely on the Middle-East born, or else to compare such a group with a similar group of the Australia-born. In the absence of pre-existing data on this group, however, it was impossible to estimate what proportion of the sample would turn out to be of Middle East origins. It is suggested that any future study of the Palestinian-Australians will benefit greatly from their systematic location and identification by means of government or academic survey research. To that end it is hoped that, not only will the Ancestry item be restored to future government censuses, but that Palestinians in Australia will feel sufficiently secure to respond to it accordingly.

Two other points need to be made regarding the issue of methodology. Firstly, the writer remains convinced that, in order to ensure the trust and cooperation of respondents within a politically sensitive population, it is sometimes necessary to adopt a flexible approach to standard survey research techniques. With Palestinians, for example, where trust of outsiders is hesitatingly given, the "snowball" method of sampling turned out to be particularly appropriate, since the benefits of using informants known to the community outweighed the disadvantages of the researcher's losing a certain amount of control over the survey process.

The second point is that the political environment surrounding any survey of political attitudes must be taken into account by the researcher, on a number of levels. Thus, while it is readily apparent that Palestinians tend to distrust official (including university-sponsored) researchers, it is less obvious that one of the reasons for their reticence is fear for the well-being of relatives in the homeland. It is only when one takes into account the fact that the sample perceived governments such as Australia's to be in close cooperation with the government of Israel, that a major reason for respondent suspicion becomes clear. Ideally, then, a researcher in such a situation should be reasonably well informed as to the sample's likely reactions to a survey instrument before actually investigating their attitudes empirically.



Another aspect of the political environment which needs to be taken into account in the case of diaspora communities is, of course, the possible effect on attitudes of events taking place in the homeland contemporaneous with the administration of the survey. In the case of the Sydney study, the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 was one such development.

This is an appropriate point at which to introduce the question of unanticipated results. It was known, for example, that the issues raised in the questionnaire were likely to prove highly salient for the respondents. It was not expected, however, that responses relating to Australia would be so very uniform, or that responses on Palestine-related issues would be so polarised, as they turned out to be. In the latter case, the distributions might be explained by the polarising effect of conflict situations, but in both cases the response patterns provide evidence of the ongoing salience of those issues for the sample.

Expectations were also confounded by the fact that being born inside what is now Israel was not associated in the sample with the holding of any particular attitudes. It had been thought that this group would be characterised by irredentist tendencies regarding their birthplace. Extremism, however, was found more often to be associated with where formative years had been spent, and what had been endured there.

The overall findings regarding majority acceptance of Jews were no surprise to this researcher who, despite the prevalence of media cliches regarding "age-old hatreds between Arab and Jew", had often been struck by the absence of Palestinian hate for their adversaries. But, as the analysis began to reveal that suffering endured at Israeli hands was associated with a hardening of (minority) attitudes on a number of fronts, it seemed logical to expect that increased antipathy to Jews might be another of those outcomes. Such was not the case, and in fact the variable relating to co-existence with Jews was quite unrewarding in terms of its data yield, since it remained unaffected by *all* the independent variables.

Finally, it would be claiming wisdom only with hindsight for the writer to say a strongly Islamicist groundswell had been expected to emerge within the sample. Despite current trends in some academic circles towards adopting "theologocentric" analysis of most Middle Eastern political developments, little was being said or written about HAMAS or any other aspect of political Islam among Palestinians, at the time of the survey. Given the fact that Christians were a slight majority within the sample, rejectionism was expected to be largely of the secular variety. Such, of course, was not the case. The Islamic factor will be discussed further below, but the finding appears to generally suggest that careful study of attitudinal patterns within diaspora communities may not only *reflect* homeland trends, but may also help to *predict* them. In this case, it was a sub-group within the community which assumed prominence in the analysis, suggesting that it remains important for researchers to track demographic trends within such communities.

## DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Palestinians, reporting persecution in the homeland, often perceive that persecution to be transferred to their new abode as part of a wider pattern of global discrimination. It was not unusual in the Sydney survey to come across comments such as: "Australia cooperates with Israel to attack the Palestinians". Terms such as "attack" and "persecution" may well be inappropriate as descriptions of the officially pluralistic Australian environment, but the findings from the survey nevertheless supported some of the sample's general perceptions.

In terms of both ethnic (anti-Arab) and religious (anti-Muslim) stereotyping and discrimination, the Palestinian experience in Australia - particularly during the Gulf Crisis - has been more than a little embittering. And, while an activist core may - and did - mobilise politically during crises such as that in the Gulf in 1990-91, this study found evidence that many in the community may have become demotivated regarding their participation in Australian political life, following the trauma of that crisis. The question of whether the long-term effect of the Gulf crisis on the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities was one of alienation or of increased political efficacy is a subject awaiting further research. In that crisis, as in most developments touching the Palestine issue as a whole, the sample's perceptions were that government policy was far from being as "even-handed" as it purports to be.

More resented than ethnic and religious discrimination - and potentially more threatening, since the official security services are often involved - have been instances of what can legitimately be called political discrimination. It appears that statelessness, far from automatically reinforcing loyalty to the host country, can actually exacerbate a sense of marginalisation from it, if the stateless group's perception is that the host country is deliberately obstructing their homeland-related political aspirations. Where the group's identification with the homeland is felt and expressed primarily in political terms (rather than, say, in terms of their linguistic or religious identities), it follows that it is on the political front that marginalisation will be most keenly felt. The following statement by a survey participant articulates some of these tensions:

I feel I am oppressed even in Australia, because the foreign policy of Australia primarily serves American interests and international Zionist interests .. As a Palestinian in Australia, it is my duty to protect and defend this country, because I am one of its people. But what inhibits me and makes me hold back from this is the government's current policy towards Israel.

Statelessness is, also, often associated with the "ethnic invisibility" of a migrant group. Amid current calls for an international census of Palestinians, and debate over their Right of Return to a future State of Palestine, this absence of a pan-Palestinian profile is increasingly at odds with their now acknowledged presence as an actor on the world political stage. While censuses of any kind are relatively infrequent (and politically controversial) in the Arab world, the continued exclusion of Palestinians from official statistics in the Western Diaspora can be seen as a

form of institutionalised marginalisation which is at odds with officially inclusive policies of multiculturalism in places like Australia. Apart from alienating the group in question by treating it as non-existent, the lack of reliable data on this particular group means, *inter alia*, that host country policies are being formulated within an information vacuum. There is also a risk, in such a case, that stereotypes will rule by default. The findings from the Sydney survey can and hopefully will be used to negate a number of anti-Palestinian stereotypes.

Ethnic invisibility has another face. When the Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki landed in Australia, he decided:

I will enjoy anonymity in a social reality that is the complete opposite of mine. I can be invisible .. It feels good to be away from me, to discard those profoundly painful connections I had carried on my back, connections between selfhood and nationhood .. (Turki, 1988, 74-5).

The decision to conceal one's origins is a decision commonly made by Palestinians, so that their invisibility cannot be solely attributed to hostile or indifferent external forces. Even when given the chance to assert their ethnic identity, Palestinians have been conditioned to conceal it. Since such conditioning, in a group of recent immigrants, is likely to have taken place in the country of origin (even if later reinforced in the receiving country), it provides a starting point for the discussion of another theme in this thesis.

In a global situation where the displacement and transfer - voluntary or involuntary - of whole population groups is becoming a commonplace, surprisingly little is

known about the nature of links between such groups and their respective homelands. As suggested above, information on experiences in, and affective ties to the homeland can assist our understanding of attitudes in the diaspora. The results from this survey indicate that academics and governments need to pay more attention to this dimension of ethnic community politics in Australia. The specific effects on diaspora groups of events occurring in their homeland also need greater attention, whether in the form of longitudinal studies which will measure actual attitude shifts over time, or in the form of cross-national comparative studies.

In the Palestinian case, for example, experiences of discrimination or persecution in the Middle East context have had a deleterious effect on their willingness to be ethnically identified or to fully participate in Australian life. This reluctance is in contrast to their "suitability", in terms of most objective criteria, for integrating rapidly and smoothly into the host society. For, just because the Palestinians *cause* their host country no problems, does not mean that they *have* no problems. A more sympathetic official approach, for example, to the question of allocating refugee status, or residence on humanitarian grounds, to Palestinians with a history of persecution, would be appropriate. Yet, in the writer's opinion, the implications of studies such as the present one reach beyond concerns focused solely on the well-being of ethnic communities, important though that consideration may be - and should be - for a multicultural society.

The other side of the diaspora coin is the notion that data relating to exile groups can be usefully applied to the informed analysis of developments in the homeland. This is where the diaspora-as-microcosm approach comes into its own. Given that the research environment in most parts of the Middle East is not conducive to obtaining reliable data on political attitudes, diaspora communities represent a readily available and under-utilised alternative source of information. It must be recalled that Palestinian opinions on political topics are likely to be expressed much more readily - and probably more honestly - in the Western Diaspora than in, say, the Occupied Territories or the Arab world. This is notwithstanding what has been said above about Sydney Palestinians' reservations about participating in the survey. There is, after all, a qualitative difference between reluctance and fear.

It is at once apparent, however, that the "microcosm" approach cannot be justified unless some kind of inter-group comparability exists. In the absence of properly replicated cross-national studies of Palestinian attitudes, the question arises as to whether findings relating to the Sydney community really do supply part of an incomplete global jigsaw of Palestinian attitudes. In line with a pre-existing consensus among scholars of the Palestinians and also in line with the assumptions underpinning the work of those studying the international phenomenon of diasporas as actors, the evidence in this study is that a homogeneity of diaspora attitudes among Palestinians is a viable concept. In terms of the socio-demographic characteristics and political views of the respective samples surveyed, the Sydney

findings were remarkably similar to those from studies carried out at around the same period in the USA.

In terms of whether a trans-diaspora uniformity of attitudes necessarily extends to the homeland, the Sydney findings were not very different from those in the admittedly limited number of studies done at around the same time in the Middle East. The relationship between suffering and radicalism, for example, was found to traverse national boundaries, suggesting at least a degree of diaspora/homeland comparability.

Where certain disparities did become apparent was between the findings from the Sydney survey, and the data coming out of the Occupied Territories at the present time. There was a contrast, for example, between the Diaspora's overall moderation as reflected in the survey results, and reports of the increasing intensity of homeland extremism. It might be suggested, on one level, that such a disparity hardly needs explaining, since the Sydney survey was carried out at a different point in time, and at a great spatial distance from the Palestinian homeland. Yet to adopt this approach would be to deny to the Diaspora its organic oneness with the homeland - a oneness which has been argued for throughout this study.

On another level, therefore, and closely linked to the idea that the diaspora represents a political reflection of the homeland, is the suggestion that a follow-up study to the present one would find replicated in Sydney the trends currently



apparent within the Occupied Territories. The argument that the Diaspora can act as a barometer of homeland trends is not negated by the fact that it may be a barometer on slightly delayed timing. The Palestinian case is one where political trends emerging in the homeland today will almost certainly turn up in the Diaspora tomorrow.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, particularly in this era of electronic mail and satellite technology, there is every indication that the Diaspora will have an increasing amount of input into what goes on in the homeland, so that the process will be more and more one of cross-fertilisation, rather than a one-way flow. The dynamic relationship which exists between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora is a case in point. Moreover, the growing size of what might be called an Israeli Diaspora suggests prospects for some interesting comparative studies involving Palestinians and Israelis who have left the Middle East to live elsewhere.

Differences between the demographic composition of the homeland, and that of Diaspora communities are an important factor to consider when comparing any two such populations. Demographic differences, however, should not be allowed to affect, or be an obstacle to the sensitive interpretation of results. The fact that

~~Muslim Palestinians appear to be in a minority within Sydney, whilst constituting a~~

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<sup>142</sup> The writer observed recently, for example, how a local Palestinian journalist confronted a West Bank academic in Sydney with assertions that there was no real peace process; that the Israelis would give up little or no land; that the PLO was giving everything away while gaining nothing in return; and, finally, that HAMAS was right in its rejectionist approach (Public meeting, 14 July 1993). An interesting aspect of his final remark was that the speaker was himself a Christian, suggesting that HAMAS finds supporters not so much because it represent Islam, but rather because it represents resistance. The journalist added that he wanted it known that such sentiments were not confined to the Occupied Territories, but were shared by those in the Diaspora. The academic, while unwilling to respond publicly, later expressed private agreement.

Muslim Palestinians appear to be in a minority within Sydney, whilst constituting a very large majority in the homeland, is actually a reminder that it is often minority attitudes which may hold the key to our wider understanding of the politics of the group in general. For example, Muslims in the sample - like those in the homeland - were mostly secular in their inclinations. However, it was the association which existed - within that Muslim sub-group - between having personally experienced Occupation, and holding strongly Islamicist views, which suggested a major conclusion of this study.

That conclusion is, in the most general terms, that attitudes are affected by one's situation. More specifically, and in the context of dispossessed, persecuted and stateless groups such as the Palestinians, the conclusion is that attitudes are more likely to have been shaped - and radicalised - by the harsh realities of their own experiences in both homeland and exile than by other, more primordial factors.

This distinction is not always made by researchers, let alone by media analysts. For example, the historical lack of rigorously conducted academic studies within the Occupied Territories may appear to now be compensated for by a certain amount of opinion polling, but there remains a danger that the results of such exercises will be manipulated for political ends by various interested groups. Polls purporting to find, for example, that support for the PLO and its policies is declining, can be used to support either the viewpoint of Israelis opposed to a

PLO-led independent entity, or that of the anti-PLO opposition within the homeland.

The findings in this survey support the hypothesis that radicalism among a Palestinian minority is more likely to be associated with the individual's personal encounter with deprivation and oppression than - for example - innate preferences for terrorist activity or religious fanaticism. The corollary to that view is that an end to deprivation and oppression can reasonably be expected to result in a decline in political extremism and rejectionism in the Palestinian homeland. The appropriate response by Western governments to the continuation of that oppression - and to other forms of social and political injustice within the region as a whole - should therefore be clear. To deal with protest - Islamic or otherwise - by supporting increases in the very repression which has led to the protest, seems a short-sighted, if not immoral response.

There are some important distinctions to be made regarding the exact nature of Palestinian rejectionism. It is suggested here that the combined effect of frustration in the political sphere and suffering at a personal level will be an increase in what can be termed "internal rejectionism". "Internal rejectionism" can be defined as a tendency to reject the PLO and its policies, but does not imply a tendency towards more extremist tendencies such as rejection of Jews or increased preference for political violence. For it was found in this survey that the relationship between homeland experiences and diaspora attitudes was not always in the direction some

might have expected. The experience of violence, or even merely harassment, was not related to an increased preference for the use of arms; suffering at Israeli hands was not related to anti-semitism; and being deprived of democratic rights was not related to an observable increase in anti-democratic tendencies. This would not be the first instance where one of the responses by an oppressed group to its continued oppression has been to challenge the authority of the group's own leadership.

Nor should an apparent decline in support for the PLO increase fears concerning the Islamic "threat" of HAMAS and other Islamic groups. The fact that HAMAS itself has expressed interest in the idea of joining the PLO means that it would be simplistic to see the leadership situation in terms of a zero-sum game. A more sophisticated analysis would see attitude shifts among Palestinians everywhere as ultimately a manifestation of their own long-standing tradition of political awareness and pragmatism. Part of that pragmatism has been their ability - as shown in this study - to make a clear-sighted distinction between what is desirable and what is achievable. Currently, Palestinians realise that it is not an achievable goal to seek to replace Israel with a unitary State of Palestine. They refuse, however, to abandon the twin goals of ending Israeli Occupation, and establishing an independent State of Palestine alongside Israel.

For as long as the PLO is seen as able to achieve those goals, it will be supported. If, however, it is unable to achieve them, alternative - and untried - leadership

structures may be preferred. In such a context it would appear to be in the interests of those seeking regional stability - including the government of Australia - to not only work towards realising Palestinian rights in the broadest sense, but also to lend particular support to the Palestinian body which has been for so long a government-in-waiting.

That the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from over was stated at the beginning of this study. The statement remains true to this day, notwithstanding talk of limited Palestinian autonomy in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. If this study has helped to illuminate our understanding of how and why Palestinians relate to the conflict in the way that they do, the study will have been worth while. If any lessons have been learnt regarding the intricacy and intimacy of the nexus binding exiled stateless groups everywhere to their homelands, the study will have been even more worthwhile.

At the time of writing, the signing of the controversial 1993 Declaration of Principles was still the subject of impassioned debate among Palestinians. As the struggle in the Palestinian homeland continued to surge back and forth, a seasoned Sydney activist wearily described how he saw the Declaration: "It is not treason. It is not victory. It is another engagement in the battle."

## **APPENDIX I**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH**

## QUESTIONNAIRE

### STUDY OF THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY IN SYDNEY

As a post-graduate student at Macquarie University, I am writing a thesis on the Palestinian community in Sydney, under the supervision of Dr. Robert Springborg. This is the first such study of the Palestinian community here.

No names or addresses will be asked for, and all the information received will be totally anonymous. I greatly appreciate your cooperation.

Thank you.

Christine Asmar

Sydney, 1990.

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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First I need to ask you for some background information about yourself. I do not want to know your name or address, and all the information you give me will be totally anonymous.

Unless asked to write in your answer, please use one or more ticks [ ] to indicate your answer.

1. **What is your age?** (Please write) \_\_\_\_\_ years
2. **Are you male or female?** M [ ] F [ ]
3. **Do you have any children?** Yes [ ] No [ ]
4. **Were you born in Palestine?** Yes [ ] No [ ]

If 'Yes', please write the town (or nearest town) you were born in:

\_\_\_\_\_

If 'No', please write the country you were born in:

\_\_\_\_\_

5. **Do you or your family still own property in Palestine?**  
Yes [ ] No [ ]
  6. **In which country or countries did you spend most time before coming to Australia?** (Please write)
- \_\_\_\_\_

7. **What was your main reason(s) for coming to Australia?**  
(Tick as many as apply)

To join relatives	[ ]
To join an Australian spouse	[ ]
For employment	[ ]
For education of self	[ ]
For education of children	[ ]
To escape political harassment	[ ]
Other (please write) _____	[ ]

\_\_\_\_\_

8. **As a Palestinian, have you or your family ever suffered any of the following:** (Tick as many as apply)

Economic loss in Palestine?	[ ]
Economic loss in other parts of the Middle East?	[ ]
Personal harassment in Palestine?	[ ]
Personal harassment in other parts of the Middle East?	[ ]



9. Which language do you usually speak at home?

(Tick one)

Sometimes Arabic, sometimes English [ ]  
Arabic [ ]  
English [ ]  
Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]

10. What is your occupation or job? (Tick ONE)

Student [ ]  
Professional [ ]  
Business [ ]  
Employee [ ]  
Skilled or trades [ ]  
Home duties [ ]  
Labouring or unskilled [ ]  
Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]

11. How many years have you lived in Australia? \_\_\_\_\_

12. What kind of accomodation do you live in? (Tick ONE)

A rented flat [ ]  
A rented house [ ]  
Your own flat [ ]  
Your own house [ ]  
Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]

13. Are you working at present? Yes [ ] No [ ]

14. In which of the following ranges is:

a) your personal income per year? (Tick ONE)

b) Your household income per year? (Tick ONE)

	a) <u>Personal</u>	b) <u>Household</u>
Less than \$10,000	[ ]	[ ]
\$10,000 - \$30,000	[ ]	[ ]
\$31,000 - \$50,000	[ ]	[ ]
\$51,000 - \$70,000	[ ]	[ ]
Over \$70,000	[ ]	[ ]

15. What is your highest educational qualification?

(Tick ONE)

University post-graduate degree [ ]  
University degree [ ]  
Technical college [ ]  
Secondary school [ ]  
Primary school [ ]  
No formal education [ ]  
Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]

16. What is your religion? (Tick ONE)

Muslim [ ]  
Christian [ ]  
Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]

17. **How would you describe yourself in religious terms?**  
(Tick ONE)

Very religious	[ ]
Quite religious	[ ]
In some ways religious, in other ways not	[ ]
Not very religious	[ ]
Not religious at all	[ ]

18. **In the last few years, would you say you have:**

Become much more religious?	[ ]
Become somewhat more religious	[ ]
Remained about the same as before?	[ ]
Become somewhat less religious?	[ ]
Become much less religious?	[ ]

19. **Which of the following types of newspaper do you read most often?** (Tick as many as apply)

Local Arabic	[ ]	(Write name(s): _____)
Overseas Arabic	[ ]	(Write name(s): _____)
Local English	[ ]	
Overseas English	[ ]	
Other	[ ]	

20. **How much of your spare time do you spend with other Palestinians?**

All	[ ]
A lot	[ ]
Some	[ ]
A little	[ ]
None	[ ] (If 'None', go to q.22)

21. **Which of the following statements generally apply to the Palestinians you spend your time with?**  
(Tick as many as apply)

They are related to you	[ ]
They come from the same home town as you do	[ ]
They have the same religion as you do	[ ]
They grew up in the same place as you did	[ ]
They live in or near your suburb	[ ]
Other (please write) _____	[ ]

22. **When you first arrived here, did you feel the need to contact a Palestinian community organization?**

Yes [ ] No [ ]

23. Are you a member of a Palestinian community organization at present? Yes [ ] No [ ]

24. How would you describe the effectiveness of the Palestinian community organizations in terms of:

	a) <u>Working for</u> <u>the Palestinian</u> <u>cause</u>	b) <u>Looking after</u> <u>the needs of</u> <u>the community</u>
Very effective	[ ]	[ ]
Quite effective	[ ]	[ ]
In some ways effective, in some ways not	[ ]	[ ]
Not very effective	[ ]	[ ]
Not effective at all	[ ]	[ ]

25. If you had to decide whether certain funds from within the community were to be sent to the Occupied Territories, or used on projects to benefit the community here, how would you divide them? (Tick ONE)

All for the community	[ ]
Most for the community	[ ]
Half for the community, half for the Occupied Territories	[ ]
Most for the Occupied Territories	[ ]
All for the Occupied Territories	[ ]

(Please comment further if you wish: \_\_\_\_\_)

26. If funds were to be sent to the Occupied Territories, what do you think would be the best way to send them? (Tick as many as apply)

Through the PLO	[ ]
Through the community organizations	[ ]
By sending money privately to families and individuals	[ ]
Through international aid organizations	[ ]
Other (please write) _____	[ ]

27. How easy is it for Palestinians here to make their views known to the PLO?

Very easy	[ ]
Quite easy	[ ]
Sometimes easy, sometimes not	[ ]
Not very easy	[ ]
Not easy at all	[ ]

28. **If a State of Palestine was established (and if you were allowed to have more than one passport), would you apply for a Palestinian passport?**

Yes, definitely	[ ]
Yes, probably	[ ]
Maybe yes, maybe no	[ ]
No, probably not	[ ]
No, definitely not	[ ]

29. **If a State of Palestine was established, would you consider moving there permanently?**

Yes, definitely	[ ]
Yes, probably	[ ]
Maybe yes, maybe no	[ ]
No, probably not	[ ]
No, definitely not	[ ]

30. **Have you ever experienced discrimination in Australia?**

Yes, all the time	[ ]
Yes, often	[ ]
Sometimes	[ ]
No, not often	[ ]
No, never	[ ] (If 'Never', go to q.32)

31. **How would you describe the kind(s) of discrimination you have experienced in Australia?**  
(Tick as many as apply)

Anti-migrant	[ ]
Anti-Muslim	[ ]
Anti-Arab	[ ]
Anti-Palestinian	[ ]
Other (please write)	[ ]
<hr/>	
Difficult to specify	[ ]

32. **Do you know any Palestinians who have tried to hide their Palestinian origins while in Australia?**

Yes, many	[ ]
Yes, some	[ ]
Maybe a few	[ ]
No, not many	[ ]
No, none	[ ]

33. **Are you already (or will you soon be) an Australian citizen?** Yes [ ] No [ ]

34. **Are you already (or will you soon be) a member of an Australian political party?** Yes [ ] No [ ]

35. In the last 2-3 years, have the Palestinians close to you done any of the following in connection with the Palestinian cause? (Tick as many as apply)

Contributed donations privately	[ ]
Contacted the Arabic or English press	[ ]
Contacted other media	[ ]
Contacted their State or Federal MP	[ ]
Contacted other Australian politicians	[ ]
Contacted Australian Jewish groups	[ ]
Helped organize a political meeting or seminar	[ ]
Taken part in a rally or demonstration	[ ]
Gone to hear a visiting Palestinian speaker	[ ]
Spoken publicly themselves	[ ]
Other (please write) _____	[ ]

36. To what extent are the Palestinians you know here willing to participate in politics:

	<u>a) in Palestinian community politics?</u>	<u>b) in Australian party politics?</u>
Very willing	[ ]	[ ]
Quite willing	[ ]	[ ]
In some ways willing, in some ways not	[ ]	[ ]
Not very willing	[ ]	[ ]
Not willing at all	[ ]	[ ]

37. Do you think any of the following have affected Palestinians' willingness to participate in the Australian political party system?  
(Tick as many as apply)

Negative experiences with Middle East authorities	[ ]
Negative experiences with authorities here	[ ]
Lack of language ability	[ ]
Fear of discrimination	[ ]
Not understanding the system	[ ]
Lack of time	[ ]
Lack of interest	[ ]
Other (please write) _____	[ ]

38. Which ONE of the following terms describes how you think of yourself ? (Tick ONE)

Palestinian	[ ]
Palestinian Arab	[ ]
Palestinian-Australian	[ ]
Palestinian Arab-Australian	[ ]
Arab	[ ]
Arab-Australian	[ ]
Australian	[ ]

## ATTITUDES

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This part of the questionnaire deals with the various attitudes and opinions held by members of the Palestinian community here. Your views as a member of that community are valuable to me and will, of course, remain totally anonymous.

Again, unless asked to write in your answer, please use one or more ticks [ ] to indicate your answer.

**39. To what extent do you identify with Australian society?**

Completely	[ ]
Very strongly	[ ]
Quite strongly but with reservations	[ ]
Not very strongly	[ ]
Not at all	[ ]

**40. How important to you is the kind of policy the Australian government has on the Palestine issue?**

Very important	[ ]
Quite important	[ ]
Important in some ways but not in others	[ ]
Not very important	[ ]
Not important at all	[ ]

**41. How would you describe current Australian government policy on the Palestine issue?**

Very pro-Palestinian	[ ]
Quite pro-Palestinian	[ ]
Even-handed	[ ]
Quite pro-Israeli	[ ]
Very pro-Israeli	[ ]

**42. How would you feel if the Australian government recognised the State of Palestine?**

Very happy	[ ]
Quite happy	[ ]
Neither happy nor unhappy	[ ]
Quite unhappy	[ ]
Very unhappy	[ ]

**43. How important to you is the kind of treatment the Australian media give to the Palestine issue?**

Very important	[ ]
Quite important	[ ]
Important in some ways but not in others	[ ]
Not very important	[ ]
Not important at all	[ ]

44. **How would you describe current Australian media treatment of the Palestine issue?**

Very pro-Israeli	[ ]
Quite pro-Israeli	[ ]
Sometimes pro-Israeli, sometimes pro-Palestinian	[ ]
Quite pro-Palestinian	[ ]
Very pro-Palestinian	[ ]

45. **How important to you is the kind of public image Palestinians have here?**

Very important	[ ]
Quite important	[ ]
Important in some ways but not in others	[ ]
Not very important	[ ]
Not important at all	[ ]

46. **How would you describe the public image of Palestinians here now, compared to a few years ago?**

Much improved	[ ]
Somewhat improved	[ ]
No change	[ ]
Somewhat worse	[ ]
Much worse	[ ]

47. **Do you think any of the following Middle East events have led to a change in Australian attitudes to the Palestinians?**

	<u>Positive effect</u>	<u>No effect</u>	<u>Negative effect</u>
Israeli actions in Lebanon	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
The Intifada	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
PLO's renunciation of terrorism	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
PLO's recognition of Israel	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
Iraqi actions in Kuwait	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

48. **In terms of how you feel about being Palestinian, how has the Intifada made you feel?**

Very proud	[ ]
Quite proud	[ ]
Proud in some ways, but not in others	[ ]
Not very proud	[ ]
Not proud at all	[ ]

49. Do you think Palestinians in Australia should get involved politically in the struggle for Palestine:

a) through Palestinian  
community politics?

b) through  
Australian  
party politics?

Yes, definitely [ ]  
Yes, probably [ ]  
Maybe yes, maybe no [ ]  
No, probably not [ ]  
No, definitely not [ ]

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

50. Do you think it is a good thing for Palestinians here to make political contact with Jews?

Yes, definitely  
Yes, probably  
Maybe yes, maybe no  
No, probably not  
No, definitely not

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

(Please comment further if you wish: \_\_\_\_\_)

51. Over the last 2-3 years, has there been any change in your own willingness to get involved in the Palestinian cause?

Much less willing now  
Somewhat less willing now  
No change  
Somewhat more willing now  
Much more willing now

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

52. To what extent do you accept the two-state solution, namely a State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel?

Accept completely  
Accept with some reservations  
Neither accept nor reject  
Inclined to reject  
Reject completely

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

53. How do you think most Palestinians feel about the idea of a State of Palestine consisting of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem?

Very happy  
Quite happy  
Half happy, half unhappy  
Quite unhappy  
Very unhappy

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]



54. **Do you think that the future State of Palestine should be a secular one ( علمانية )?**

Yes, definitely	[ ]
Yes, probably	[ ]
Maybe yes, maybe no	[ ]
No, probably not	[ ]
No, definitely not	[ ]

55. **How would you describe the Intifada? (Tick ONE)**

Wholly a religious movement	[ ]
Mainly a religious movement	[ ]
Partly a religious movement, partly a national one	[ ]
Mainly a national movement	[ ]
Wholly a national movement	[ ]

56. **What is your reaction to the following statements relating to the PLO?**

**a) The PLO leadership's current approach to the struggle is correct.**

Strongly agree	[ ]
Agree	[ ]
Neither agree nor disagree	[ ]
Disagree	[ ]
Strongly disagree	[ ]

**b) The PLO is a democratic organization.**

Strongly agree	[ ]
Agree	[ ]
Neither agree nor disagree	[ ]
Disagree	[ ]
Strongly disagree	[ ]

57. **How would you rate Yasser Arafat's performance as leader so far?**

Very good	[ ]
Good	[ ]
Sometimes good, sometimes not	[ ]
Not very good	[ ]
Not good at all	[ ]

58. **In general, how would you describe the role of the Arab states in the Palestine-Israel conflict?**

Very positive	[ ]
Quite positive	[ ]
Sometimes positive, sometimes negative	[ ]
Quite negative	[ ]
Very negative	[ ]

59. **How much, do you think, should the Palestinians rely on external forces in order to achieve an independent State of Palestine?**

Rely totally	[ ]
Rely considerably	[ ]
Rely in some ways, but not in others	[ ]
Rely partly	[ ]
Not rely at all	[ ]

60. **To what extent do you support the idea of armed struggle in order to achieve an independent State of Palestine?**

Support strongly	[ ]
Support, but with a few reservations	[ ]
Support in some circumstances, not in others	[ ]
Do not really support	[ ]
Do not support at all	[ ]

61. **If there is a peace agreement on the Palestine issue, which of the following would you prefer to see happen to Jerusalem?** (Tick ONE only)

- a) Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and some other city becomes the capital of Israel. [ ]
  - b) East Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and West Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel. [ ]
  - c) Jerusalem remains united as the joint capital of both Palestine and Israel. [ ]
  - d) Jerusalem is placed under international control, and is no-one's capital. [ ]
  - e) Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel, and some other city becomes the capital of Palestine. [ ]
  - f) Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [ ]
-

62. **If there is a peace agreement on the Palestine issue, which of the following do you think most likely to happen to Jerusalem?** (Tick ONE only)

- a) Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and some other city becomes the capital of Israel. [    ]
- b) East Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine, and West Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel. [    ]
- c) Jerusalem remains united as the joint capital of both Palestine and Israel. [    ]
- d) Jerusalem is placed under international control, and is no-one's capital. [    ]
- e) Jerusalem becomes the capital of Israel, and some other city becomes the capital of Palestine. [    ]
- f) Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [    ]  
\_\_\_\_\_

(Please comment further if you wish: \_\_\_\_\_ [    ]  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

63. **How important to you are the following aspects of Jerusalem?** (Tick as many as apply)

- It contains holy places of all 3 great religions [    ]
- It contains holy places of Islam [    ]
- It contains holy places of Christianity [    ]
- It is the centre of the Palestinian nation [    ]
- It has family and personal associations [    ]
- Other (please write) \_\_\_\_\_ [    ]  
\_\_\_\_\_

64. **Who do you think should represent the Palestinians in any future negotiations with Israel?** (Please write)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

65. **What kind of role do you expect the Israeli peace movement to play in the search for a just peace?**

Very positive	[ ]
Quite positive	[ ]
Neither positive nor negative	[ ]
Quite negative	[ ]
Very negative	[ ]
Don't know/not sure	[ ]

66. **To what extent, do you think, are most Israelis willing to give back the Occupied Territories in exchange for peace?**

Very willing	[ ]
Quite willing	[ ]
Neither willing nor unwilling	[ ]
Quite unwilling	[ ]
Very unwilling	[ ]

67. **To what extent would you be willing to see Jews become citizens of the State of Palestine?**

Very willing	[ ]
Quite willing	[ ]
Neither willing nor unwilling	[ ]
Quite unwilling	[ ]
Very unwilling	[ ]

**Do you have any other comments you would like to make on the Palestine issue, or on what it means to be a Palestinian in Australia?**

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## **APPENDIX II**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC**

## الاستعلام

### دراسة الجالية الفلسطينية فرع سيدني

انني طالبة جامعية أحضّر لأطروحتي عن الجالية الفلسطينية في سيدني تحت اشراف الدكتور روبرت سبرنجبورج في جامعة ماكوارى.

هذه هي أول دراسة للجالية الفلسطينية هنا والمعلومات التي ستقدمونها لن يعلن عن مصدرها ولن يطلب منكم ذكر اسمائكم او عناوينكم الشخصية.

فعليه لكم جزيل شكري وتقديري لتعاونكم.

كرستين الأسمر

سيدني ١٩٩٠

## معلومات

قبل كل شيء أريد ان اطلب منكم معلومات تتعلق بكم شخصياً ولكن لا أريد منكم ان تذكروا اسمكم او عنوانكم وهذه المعلومات وغيرها لن تنسب اليكم شخصياً بل ستذكر بشكل عام. الرجاء ان تستعمل عند اجابتك علامة الصح ( ✓ ) مرة أو مرات حسب الحاجة الا اذا طُلب منك غير ذلك.

- ١- ما هو عمرك؟  
..... سنة / سنوات
- ٢- ما هو جنسك؟ ذكر ( ) انثى ( )
- ٣- هل عندك أطفال؟ نعم ( ) لا ( )
- ٤- هل انت من مواليد فلسطين؟ نعم ( ) لا ( )  
ان كان الجواب نعم الرجاء كتابة اسم المدينة التي ولدت بها او اقرب مدينة لمكان ولادتك  
.....  
ان كان الجواب لا الرجاء كتابة اسم البلد الذي ولدت به  
.....
- ٥- هل انت او عائلتك لا تزالون تمتلكون املاكاً في فلسطين؟ نعم ( ) لا ( )
- ٦- في اي بلد او بلاد قضيت معظم وقتكم قبل قدومكم الى استراليا؟ (الرجاء الكتابة)  
.....
- ٧- ما هو سبب او اسباب قدومكم الى استراليا؟ (اجب بعلامة ✓ لأي عدد من الأسباب)  
( ) للانضمام الى الأقارب  
( ) للانضمام الى زوج استرالي / زوجة استرالية  
( ) للعمل  
( ) للدراسة الشخصية  
( ) لدراسة الأطفال  
( ) لتجنب ضغوط سياسية  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكر السبب) .....
- ٨- كفلسطيني هل انت او أي من افراد عائلتك تعرض لأي من الأحداث التالية؟ (اجب بعلامة ✓ لأي عدد مناسب)  
( ) لخسارة اقتصادية في فلسطين  
( ) لخسارة اقتصادية في أي جزء من الشرق الأوسط  
( ) لضغوط ومضايقات شخصية في فلسطين  
( ) لضغوط ومضايقات في أي جزء من الشرق الأوسط
- ٩- أي لغة تتكلم عادة في المنزل؟  
( ) أحياناً العربية وأحياناً الانكليزية  
( ) العربية  
( ) الانكليزية  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكرها) .....

١٠- ما هي مهنتك؟

- ( ) تلميذ  
( ) أخصائي / متخصص  
( ) أعمال حرة  
( ) موظف  
( ) مهني او تجاري  
( ) أعمال منزلية  
( ) عامل غير مهني  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء الكتابة) .....

..... سنة / سنوات

١١- كم عدد سنوات اقامتك في استراليا؟

١٢- ما هو نوع مكانك الذي تعيش فيه؟

- ( ) شقة مؤجرة  
( ) منزل مؤجر  
( ) شقة مملوكة  
( ) منزل مملوك  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء الكتابة) .....

١٣- هل انت تعمل في الوقت الحاضر؟ نعم ( ) لا ( )

١٤- بين حدود دخلك الشخصي؟ (اجب ✓ مرة واحدة)  
ودخل عائلتك الاجمالي؟ (اجب ✓ مرة واحدة)

(1) دخلك الشخصي	(2) دخل العائلة الاجمالي
( )	( )
( )	( )
( )	( )
( )	( )
( )	( )

أقل من ١٠,٠٠٠ دولار  
١٠,٠٠٠ - ٢٠,٠٠٠ دولارا  
٢١,٠٠٠ - ٥٠,٠٠٠ دولارا  
٥١,٠٠٠ - ٧٠,٠٠٠ دولارا  
أكثر من ٧٠,٠٠٠ دولارا

١٥- ما هو أعلى مؤهل علمي حصلت عليه؟ (اجب ✓ مرة واحدة)

- ( ) مؤهل جامعي ماستر او دكتوراه  
( ) مؤهل جامعي  
( ) مؤهل مهني  
( ) دراسة ثانوية  
( ) دراسة ابتدائية  
( ) لا يوجد مؤهل دراسي  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكرها) .....

١٦- ما هي ديانتك؟ (اجب ✓ مرة واحدة)

- ( ) الاسلام  
( ) المسيحية  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكرها) .....



١٧- كيف تصف نفسك من الناحية الدينية؟ (اجب ✓ مرة واحدة)

- ( ) متدين محافظ  
( ) متدين  
( ) متدين من نواحي وغير متدين من نواحي اخرى  
( ) متدين قليلا  
( ) غير متدين

١٨- في السنوات القليلة الماضية هل تعتقد أنك:

- ( ) أصبحت متدينا  
( ) أصبحت أكثر تدينا  
( ) لم تتغير  
( ) أصبحت أقل تدينا  
( ) أصبحت أقل تدينا بكثير

١٩- أي نوع من هذه الصحف تقرأ عادة (اجب حسب الحاجة)

- الصحف العربية المحلية ( ) اذكر اسمائها .....
- الصحف العربية من الخارج ( ) اذكر اسمائها .....
- الصحف الانكليزية المحلية ( )
- الصحف الانكليزية من الخارج ( )
- غيرها ( )

٢٠- كم من وقتك تقضيه مع الفلسطينيين؟

- ( ) كل الوقت  
( ) معظم الوقت  
( ) بعض الوقت  
( ) قليلا من الوقت

لا وقت ( ) (أي هذه الحالة انتقل الى سؤال رقم ٢٢)

٢١- أي من هذه الصفات تنطبق على الفلسطينيين الذين تقضي وقتك معهم؟ (اجب حسب الحاجة)

- ( ) من أقربائك  
( ) من نفس البلدة التي أتيت منها  
( ) من نفس ديارتك  
( ) ترعرعوا في نفس المكان الذي أتيت منه  
( ) يسكنون في أو قرب الضاحية التي تسكن بها  
( ) غيرها (الرجاء الكتابة) .....

٢٢- عند أول وصولك هنا هل شعرت بحاجة للاتصال بمؤسسة اجتماعية فلسطينية؟

- ( ) لا ( ) نعم

٢٣- هل أنت عضو بمؤسسة اجتماعية فلسطينية في الوقت الحاضر؟

- ( ) لا ( ) نعم

٢٤- كيف تصف فعالية المؤسسات الفلسطينية من ناحية:

(١) عملها للقضية الفلسطينية (ب) رعايتها لاحتياجات الجالية

- |     |     |                                 |
|-----|-----|---------------------------------|
| ( ) | ( ) | فعالة جداً                      |
| ( ) | ( ) | فعالة                           |
| ( ) | ( ) | بقدر ما فعالة بقدر ما غير فعالة |
| ( ) | ( ) | غير فعالة                       |
| ( ) | ( ) | غير فعالة أبداً                 |

(Please answer a) and b.)

٢٥- ان كان عليك ان تختار بين ارسال معونات مالية من الجالية الفلسطينية الى الاراضي المحتلة او لاستخدامها لمنفعة الجالية هنا هل تختار: (اختر جوابا واحدا فقط)

- ( ) استخدامهما كلها لمنفعة الجالية هنا
- ( ) استخدام معظمها لمنفعة الجالية هنا
- ( ) استخدام نصفها لمنفعة الجالية وارسال النصف الآخر الى الاراضي المحتلة
- ( ) ارسال معظمها الى الاراضي المحتلة
- ( ) ارسالها كلها الى الاراضي المحتلة
- ..... (اخف اي تعليق ان كان هناك حاجة لذلك) .....

٢٦- لو كان هناك مساعدات مالية ستُرسل الى الأراضي المحتلة كيف تعتقد انه يجب ارسالها؟ (اجب حسب الحاجة)

- ( ) عن طريق منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية
- ( ) عن طريق مؤسسات الجالية
- ( ) عن طريق ارسال النقود شخصيا للعائلات والافراد
- ( ) عن طريق منظمات الاعانة الدولية
- ..... بطرق أخرى (اذكرها) .....

٢٧- ما مدى سهولة التعبير الفلسطينيين في اوستراليا عن رأيهم الشخصي بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية؟

- ( ) بسهولة جداً
- ( ) بسهولة
- ( ) أحيانا بسهولة وأحيانا لا
- ( ) ليس بسهولة
- ( ) ليس بسهولة أبداً

٢٨- اذا تم تأسيس الدولة الفلسطينية (واذا كان لك الاختيار لحوز أكثر من جواز سفر) هل ستقدم بطلب لجواز سفر فلسطيني؟

- ( ) حتماً نعم
- ( ) ربما نعم
- ( ) ربما نعم ربما لا
- ( ) من الممكن لا
- ( ) حتماً لا

٢٩- اذا تم تأسيس الدولة الفلسطينية هل ستفكر بالانتقال الى هناك بصورة دائمة؟

- ( ) حتماً نعم  
( ) ربما نعم  
( ) ربما نعم ربما لا  
( ) من الممكن لا  
( ) حتماً لا

٣٠- هل تعرضت ابدأ الى التمييز في استراليا؟

- ( ) كل الوقت  
( ) معظم الوقت  
( ) احياناً  
( ) بعض الوقت

أبدأ ( ) ان كان جوابك ابدأ انتقل الى سؤال رقم ٣٢

٣١- كيف تصف نوعية التمييز الذي تعرضت له؟ (اجب حسب الحاجة)

- ( ) ضد المهاجرين  
( ) ضد المسلمين  
( ) ضد العرب  
( ) ضد الفلسطينيين  
( ) غيره (الرجاء ذكرها) .....  
.....  
( ) من الصعب وصفها

٣٢- هل تعرف أي فلسطيني يحاول انكار اصله الفلسطيني في استراليا؟

- ( ) نعم الكثير منهم  
( ) نعم بعضهم  
( ) ربما بعضهم  
( ) غير كثيرين  
( ) لا احد

٣٣- هل انت (او ستصبح قريباً) مواطناً أستراليا؟

- ( ) نعم ( ) لا

٣٤- هل انت (او ستصبح قريباً) عضواً في حزب سياسي استرالي؟

- ( ) نعم ( ) لا

٢٥- خلال السنتين أو الثلاث الماضية هل قام الفلسطينيون الذين لهم علاقة بك بعمل أي مما يلي بما يتعلق بالقضية الفلسطينية؟

- ( ) المساهمة بالاعانات المالية شخصياً  
 ( ) الاتصال بالصحافة الانكليزية او العربية  
 ( ) الاتصال بأي من وسائل الاعلام الاخرى  
 ( ) الاتصال بأي من أعضاء البرلمان في الولاية او الحكومة الفدرالية  
 ( ) الاتصال بالسياسيين الاوستراليين  
 ( ) الاتصالات بالجماعات الاسترالية اليهودية  
 ( ) المساعدة على عقد ندوات او محاضرات سياسية  
 ( ) القيام بمسيرة او مظاهرة  
 ( ) الذهاب لسماع خطاب زائر فلسطيني  
 ( ) التكلم لجموع الجماهير بأنفسهم  
 ( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكر ذلك) .....

٢٦- ما مدى مساهمة الفلسطينيون الذين تعرفهم هنا بالسياسة؟

(أ) سياسة الجالية الفلسطينية	(ب) سياسة الأحزاب الاسترالية
( ) مساهمة فعلية	( )
( ) مساهمة معقولة	( )
( ) في بعض الاحيان مساهم وبعض الاحيان لا	( )
( ) غير مساهم فعلي	( )
( ) غير مساهم ابداً	( )

(Please answer a) and b.)

٢٧- هل تعتقد ان أي مما يلي اثر على مساهمة الفلسطينيين في نظام الاحزاب الاسترالية؟ (اجب حسب الحاجة)

- ( ) تجارب سلبية مع جهات السلطة في الشرق الأوسط  
 ( ) تجارب سلبية مع جهات السلطة هنا  
 ( ) عدم وجود سلامة لغوية  
 ( ) الخوف من التمييز  
 ( ) عدم فهم النظام السياسي  
 ( ) عدم وجود الوقت الكافي  
 ( ) فقد الرغبة  
 ( ) غيرها (الرجاء ذكر ذلك) .....

٢٨- أي من التالي تعتقد انها تصفك شخصياً؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)

- ( ) فلسطيني  
 ( ) فلسطيني عربي  
 ( ) فلسطيني استرالي  
 ( ) فلسطيني عربي - استرالي  
 ( ) عربي  
 ( ) عربي - استرالي  
 ( ) استرالي

## وجهات نظر

ان هذا الجزء من الاستعلام يبحث وجهات نظر وارهاء أبناء الجالية الفلسطينية هنا. ان رأيكم كأعضاء في هذه الجالية له قيمة خاصة بالنسبة لي وطبعاً سيراعى عدم ذكر اسمائكم او الانصاح عن مصدر هذه الاراء الرجاء عند اجابثكم استعمال اشارة (✓) الا اذا طلب منكم غير ذلك.

٢٩- الى اي مدى تعتبر نفسك جزءاً من المجتمع الاسترالي؟

- ( ) كلياً
- ( ) الى حد كبير
- ( ) الى حد كبير لكن مع تحفظات
- ( ) ليس الى حد كبير
- ( ) ابدأ

٤٠- ما هي أهمية نوعية سياسة الحكومة الاسترالية تجاه القضية الفلسطينية بالنسبة لك؟

- ( ) مهمة جداً
- ( ) مهمة بقدر ما
- ( ) مهمة من نواحي وغير مهمة من نواحي اخرى
- ( ) غير مهمة جداً
- ( ) غير مهمة ابدأ

٤١- كيف تصف سياسة الحكومة الاسترالية تجاه القضية الفلسطينية؟

- ( ) متحيزة جداً نحو الفلسطينيين
- ( ) متحيزة نوعاً نحو الفلسطينيين
- ( ) متعادلة ومتوازنة
- ( ) متحيزة نوعاً نحو الاسرائيليين
- ( ) متحيزة جداً نحو الاسرائيليين

٤٢- كيف تصف شعورك لو ان الحكومة الاسترالية اعترفت بدولة فلسطين؟

- ( ) سعيداً جداً
- ( ) سعيداً بقدر ما
- ( ) ليس سعيداً وليس غير سعيد
- ( ) غير سعيد
- ( ) غير سعيد جداً

٤٣- ما هي أهمية معالجة القضية الفلسطينية من قِبَل الاعلام الاسترالي بالنسبة لك؟

- ( ) مهمة جداً
- ( ) مهمة بقدر ما
- ( ) مهمة من نواحي وغير مهمة من نواحي اخرى
- ( ) غير مهمة جداً
- ( ) غير مهمة ابدأ

٤٤- كيف تصف المعالجة الحالية للقضية الفلسطينية من قبل الاعلام الاسترالي؟

- ( ) متحيزة جداً للاسرائيليين  
( ) متحيزة بقدر ما للاسرائيليين  
( ) أحياناً متحيزة للاسرائيليين وأحياناً للفلسطينيين  
( ) متحيزة بقدر ما للفلسطينيين  
( ) متحيزة جداً للفلسطينيين

٤٥- بالنسبة لك ما هي أهمية نوعية صورة الفلسطينيين لدى المجتمع هنا؟

- ( ) مهمة جداً  
( ) مهمة بقدر ما  
( ) أحياناً مهمة وأحياناً لا  
( ) غير مهمة بقدر ما  
( ) غير مهمة أبداً

٤٦- كيف تصف صورة الفلسطينيين لدى المجتمع هنا مقارنة بالسنوات السابقة؟

- ( ) تحسن بشكل ملحوظ  
( ) بقدر ما تحسنت  
( ) لم تتغير  
( ) بقدر ما أسوأ  
( ) أسوأ بكثير

٤٧- هل في رأيك ان أي من الاحداث التالية في الشرق الأوسط لها أي تأثير على تغيير وجهة النظر الاسترالية نحو الفلسطينيين؟

- | بشكل إيجابي                     | بدون اثر | بشكل عكسي |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| ( )                             | ( )      | ( )       |
| تدخلات اسرائيل في لبنان؟        |          |           |
| ( )                             | ( )      | ( )       |
| الانتفاضة؟                      |          |           |
| ( )                             | ( )      | ( )       |
| هجر منظمة التحرير لأعمال العنف؟ |          |           |
| ( )                             | ( )      | ( )       |
| اعتراف المنظمة باسرائيل؟        |          |           |
| ( )                             | ( )      | ( )       |
| تدخلات العراق في الكويت؟        |          |           |

٤٨- كفلسطيني كيف جعلتك الانتفاضة تشعر؟

- ( ) مفتخر جداً  
( ) مفتخراً بقدر ما  
( ) مفتخراً من ناحية وغير مفتخر من ناحية أخرى  
( ) غير مفتخر بقدر ما  
( ) غير مفتخر أبداً

٤٩- هل في رأيك ان الفلسطينيين في استراليا يجب أن يفعلوا سياسياً في سبيل النضال الفلسطيني؟

- | (أ) ضمن سياسات   | (ب) ضمن سياسات |
|------------------|----------------|
| ( )              | ( )            |
| نعم بشكل حازم    |                |
| ( )              | ( )            |
| ربما نعم         |                |
| ( )              | ( )            |
| ربما نعم ربما لا |                |
| ( )              | ( )            |
| لا، ربما لا      |                |
| ( )              | ( )            |
| لا بشكل حازم     |                |

(Please answer a) and b).)

٥٠ هل تعتقد أنه من المستحسن للفلسطينيين هنا الاتصال باليهود سياسياً؟

- ( ) نعم بشكل حازم  
( ) ربما نعم  
( ) ربما نعم، ربما لا  
( ) لا، ربما لا  
( ) لا بشكل حازم  
( ) أضيف أي تعليق إن شعرت بحاجة لذلك: .....  
.....

٥١ على مدى السنتين أو الثلاث الماضية هل حدث أي تغيير على مدى رغبتك في للاشتراك في أحداث القضية الفلسطينية؟

- ( ) أقل رغبة الآن  
( ) أقل رغبة بقدر ما  
( ) لا تغيير  
( ) أكثر رغبة الآن  
( ) أكثر رغبة بكثير الآن

٥٢ إلى أي مدى تتقبل حل الدولتين المتجاورتين أي دولة فلسطينية جنباً لجنب للاسرائيلية؟

- ( ) اتقبلها كلياً  
( ) اتقبلها مع تحفظات  
( ) لا اتقبل ولا أرفض  
( ) أميل نحو الرفض  
( ) أرفض كلياً

٥٣ ما هو رأيك بالنسبة لمشاعر أكثرية الفلسطينيين نحو فكرة دولة فلسطينية تتكون من الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة وشرقي القدس؟

- ( ) مسرورين جداً  
( ) مسرورين بقدر ما  
( ) نصفهم مسرور ونصفهم غير مسرور  
( ) غير مسرورين بقدر ما  
( ) جداً غير مسرورين

٥٤ هل في اعتقادك أن دولة فلسطين في المستقبل يجب أن تكون علمانية؟

- ( ) حتماً نعم  
( ) ربما نعم  
( ) ربما نعم ربما لا  
( ) لا، ربما لا  
( ) لا، حتماً لا

٥٥ كيف تصف الانتفاضة؟ (أجب إجابة واحدة فقط)

- ( ) حركة دينية كلياً  
( ) إلى حد كبير حركة دينية  
( ) جزئياً حركة دينية وجزئياً حركة وطنية  
( ) إلى حد كبير حركة وطنية  
( ) حركة وطنية كلياً

٥٦- ما هو رد فمك نحو الملاحظات التالية المتعلقة بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية؟

(أ) ان اتجاه المنظمة الحالي نحو الكفاح هو اتجاه صحيح

- ( ) موافق بقوة  
( ) موافق  
( ) ليس موافق او غير موافق  
( ) غير موافق  
( ) غير موافق بقوة

(ب) ان المنظمة حركة ديمقراطية

- ( ) موافق بقوة  
( ) موافق  
( ) ليس موافق او غير موافق  
( ) غير موافق  
( ) غير موافق بقوة

٥٧- كيف تدرج انجازات ياسر عرفات كقائد حتى الآن؟

- ( ) جيدة جداً  
( ) جيدة  
( ) احياناً جيدة و احياناً لا  
( ) ليست جيدة جداً  
( ) ليست جيدة أبداً

٥٨- كيف تصف بشكل عام دور الدول العربية في الصراع الفلسطيني الاسرائيلي؟

- ( ) ايجابي جداً  
( ) ايجابي بقدر ما  
( ) احياناً ايجابي و احياناً سلبي  
( ) سلبي بقدر ما  
( ) سلبي جداً

٥٩- الى أي مدى في اعتقادك يجب على الفلسطينيين الاعتماد على قوى خارجية لتحقيق استقلال دولة فلسطين؟

- ( ) الاعتماد كلياً  
( ) الاعتماد بشكل كبير  
( ) الاعتماد في بعض النواحي وبعض النواحي لا  
( ) الاعتماد جزئياً  
( ) عدم الاعتماد أبداً

٦٠- الى أي مدى تؤيد فكرة الكفاح المسلح لاجل تحقيق دولة فلسطين مستقلة؟

- ( ) أؤيد ذلك بقوة  
( ) أؤيد ذلك مع بعض التحفظات  
( ) أؤيد ذلك في بعض الحالات والبعض لا  
( ) لا أؤيد ذلك حقاً  
( ) لا أؤيد ذلك أبداً



٦١- ان كان هناك اتفاقية سلام بشأن القضية الفلسطينية أي مما يلي تفضل ان يحدث لمدينة القدس؟

- ( ) (أ) ان تصبح القدس عاصمة لفلسطين ومدينة أخرى غيرها تصبح عاصمة لاسرائيل،  
( ) (ب) أن تبقى القدس موحدة كعاصمة لكل من فلسطين واسرائيل،  
( ) (ج) القدس الشرقية تصبح عاصمة فلسطين والقدس الغربية عاصمة لاسرائيل،  
( ) (د) ان توضع القدس تحت الاشراف الدولي وإن لا تصبح عاصمة لأي دولة،  
( ) (هـ) ان تصبح القدس عاصمة لاسرائيل ومدينة أخرى غيرها تصبح عاصمة لفلسطين.  
( ) (و) غير ذلك (الرجاء ذكر ذلك) .....

٦٢- ان كان هناك اتفاقية سلام بشأن القضية الفلسطينية اي مما يلي في اعتقادك سيحدث لمدينة القدس؟

- ( ) (أ) ان تصبح القدس عاصمة لفلسطين ومدينة أخرى غيرها تصبح عاصمة لاسرائيل،  
( ) (ب) أن تبقى القدس موحدة كعاصمة لكل من فلسطين واسرائيل،  
( ) (ج) القدس الشرقية تصبح عاصمة فلسطين والقدس الغربية عاصمة لاسرائيل،  
( ) (د) ان توضع القدس تحت الاشراف الدولي وإن لا تصبح عاصمة لأي دولة،  
( ) (هـ) ان تصبح القدس عاصمة لاسرائيل ومدينة أخرى غيرها تصبح عاصمة لفلسطين.  
( ) (و) غير ذلك (الرجاء ذكر ذلك) .....
- ان كان هناك ملاحظات أخرى الرجاء ذكرها .....

٦٣- بالنسبة لمدينة القدس ما هي أهمية ما يلي بالنسبة اليك؟ (الرجاء الاجابة حسب الحاجة)

- ( ) انها تتضمن الأماكن المقدسة للديانات الثلاث الكبرى  
( ) انها تتضمن الأماكن الاسلامية المقدسة  
( ) انها تتضمن الأماكن المسيحية المقدسة  
( ) انها مركز الأمة الفلسطينية  
( ) ان بها عائلي وعلاقات شخصية بي  
( ) غيرها من الاسباب (الرجاء ذكرها) .....

٦٤- من في اعتقادك يجب ان يمثل الفلسطينيين في أي مفاوضات مع اسرائيل في المستقبل؟

(الرجاء الكتابة) .....

٦٥- ما هو الدور الذي تتوقعه من حركات السلام في اسرائيل للبحث عن سلام عادل؟

- ( ) دور ايجابي جداً  
( ) دور ايجابي بقدر ما  
( ) دور ليس ايجابي ولا سلبي  
( ) دور سلبي بقدر ما  
( ) دور سلبي جداً  
( ) غير متأكد / لا أعرف

٦٦- الى أي مدى في اعتقادك ان اغلبيّة الاسرائيليين يتقبلون فكرة إعادة الاراضي المحتلة

كمبادلة بالسلام؟

- ( ) متقبلون جداً  
( ) متقبلون بقدر ما  
( ) ليس متقبلون او غير متقبلون  
( ) غير متقبلون  
( ) غير متقبلون جداً

٦٧- الى أي مدى تتقبل ان يصبح اليهود مواطنين في الدولة الفلسطينية؟

- ( ) متقبل جداً  
( ) متقبل بقدر ما  
( ) ليس متقبلاً او غير متقبل  
( ) غير متقبل بقدر ما  
( ) غير متقبل جداً

٦٨- هل لديك أية ملاحظات اخرى تود ان تدرجها حول القضية الفلسطينية او حول كونك

فلسطينياً في استراليا؟

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **LETTER FROM "Y"**

## LETTER FROM 'Y'

Below are translated excerpts from a long letter, in Arabic, received on 13 December 1990, from a person referred to in the text as "Y" (not his real initial). The letter had been passed on by an informant. In it Y gives his reasons for feeling unable to fill out the questionnaire:

-----

I give you my regards and a salute for the victory of the Palestinian cause. I appreciate your choice of thesis in these difficult times in the history of our Arab nation ... but your study does not touch the human side of the sufferings endured by the Palestinian people since their *hijrah* of 1948, 1967, 1982 and of the massacres carried out against our people. By this I mean the history of the Palestinians in the Diaspora. Nor does it touch the social problems of families and how families have disintegrated as a result of the Occupation and emigration. And it does not touch the history of the PLO and its struggle in Jordan, Lebanon and in other Arab countries.

The questions were so detailed that one could easily work out people's names; the way in which the community's political work is carried out; the way the community is structured, even in the religious aspect; ... what the capacity of the leadership is to mobilise the masses; whether the set-up is democratic; whether or not there is social and political integration in the community ... In other words, the study is a questionnaire about our political line, approach and demands.

Because of this emphasis we have to adopt the highest level of awareness and alertness because, as you know, we have suffered a lot from our failings ... Such failings are presented in a twisted, sensational way so as to turn our friends against us, not to mention the effect they have among our enemies.

Do your questions imply the existence of a minority of fanatics among Muslims and Christians? ... Doesn't your study reveal the depth of our strategies? Is it the right time to publish it and give it to the university ( and to its sister institutions, e.g. in London), and to all the other universities who will have access to it? ...

Please remember that we are now in the situation of a Gulf War in which everything damaging to the Arabs and to the Palestinian issue is being exploited, and in which there is a media war between us and them ... (But) we are the highest bidders in the stakes of loyalty to Australia, and we are Australian until death. I know you are seeking the truth in your studies, and this is to our favour. But it could work against us if it falls into the hands of our enemies. I hope I have made clear my reactions upon reading your questionnaire. With my regards, and all due respect.

(Unsigned)

## **APPENDIX IV**

### **FREQUENCY TABLES**

## FREQUENCY TABLES

### NOTES:

- Most variables are un-recoded, except for a few (age, years in Australia). In a few other cases both the unrecoded and the recoded results are given (Items 6, 19, 64). Details of the coding decisions made with respect to Birthplace and Main Place of Residence (including, for example, the definition of Palestine) are given in Chapters One and Two.
- In each table, the number of the relevant questionnaire item is given, followed by the Variable Name(s) in capitals, and by abbreviated forms of the question and of the value labels. For the actual wording of the questions and value labels, see the full English and Arabic texts of the questionnaire in Appendices I and II respectively.
- Categories marked with \* are those which were not included in the original schedule, but had to be created in the light of write-in comments.
- Sources for some items are noted beneath the item.

-----						
Item 1.	AGEGRP	<b>Age groups</b>				
Value Label		Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
18-29 years		0	49	27.8	27.8	27.8
30-45 years		1	78	44.3	44.3	72.2
46-59 years		2	35	19.9	19.9	92.0
60 or more years		3	14	8.0	8.0	100.0
		Total		176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	176	Missing cases		0		

-----						
Item 2.	SEX	<b>Sex?</b>				
Value Label		Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Male		0	122	69.3	69.3	69.3
Female		1	54	30.7	30.7	100.0
		Total		176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	176	Missing cases		0		

Item 3. CHILDREN **Any children?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	120	68.2	68.6	68.6
No	1	55	31.3	31.4	100.0
	.	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	175	Missing cases	1		

Item 4. PALBORN **Born in Palestine?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	121	68.8	68.8	68.8
No	1	55	31.3	31.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

BIRTHPLA **Birthplace**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Israel	0	71	40.3	41.0	41.0
West Bank	1	32	18.2	18.5	59.5
Gaza	2	6	3.4	3.5	63.0
Jerusalem	3	12	6.8	6.9	69.9
Jordan	4	10	5.7	5.8	75.7
Lebanon	5	27	15.3	15.6	91.3
Syria	6	3	1.7	1.7	93.1
Egypt	7	1	.6	.6	93.6
Iraq	8	2	1.1	1.2	94.8
Kuwait	9	4	2.3	2.3	97.1
Australia	98	5	2.8	2.9	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 5. PALPROP **Property in Palestine?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	134	76.1	77.0	77.0
No	1	40	22.7	23.0	100.0
	.	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 6. MAINPLA **Places lived pre-emigration** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Israel	0	11	4.8	6.4
West Bank	1	22	9.6	12.7
Gaza	2	7	3.1	4.0
Jerusalem	3	4	1.7	2.3
Jordan	4	42	18.3	24.3
Lebanon	5	62	27.1	35.8
Syria	6	10	4.4	5.8
Egypt	7	6	2.6	3.5
Iraq	8	3	1.3	1.7
Kuwait	9	19	8.3	11.0
Saudi Arabia	10	6	2.6	3.5
United Arab Emirates	11	14	6.1	8.1
Other Middle East	12	3	1.3	1.7
UK or Europe	14	6	2.6	3.5
USA or Canada	15	5	2.2	2.9
Other world	16	2	.9	1.2
Australia	98	5	2.2	2.9
Unwilling to say	99	2	.9	1.2
Total responses		229	100.0	132.4
3 missing cases; 173 valid cases				

MAINGRP **Places lived pre-emigration, grouped** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Israel	0	11	5.0	6.6
Occupied Territories	1	33	14.9	19.8
Jordan	2	42	18.9	25.1
Lebanon	3	62	27.9	37.1
Syria & Egypt	4	16	7.2	9.6
Iraq, Gulf, other Middle East	5	45	20.3	26.9
Other World	6	13	5.9	7.8
Total responses		222	100.0	132.9
9 missing cases; 167 valid cases				

Item 7. REASEMIG **Reasons for emigration** (Multiple Dichotomy)

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
To join/accompany family	REASFAM	68	25.5	41.2
For employment	REASJOB	59	22.1	35.8
To educate self/children	REASED	56	21.0	33.9
To escape harassment, discrimination etc	REASPOL	75	28.1	45.5
For citizenship and its benefits*	REASCIT	9	3.4	5.5
Total responses		267	100.0	161.8
11 missing cases; 165 valid cases				



Item 8. SUFFER **Suffering in Middle East** (Multiple dichotomy)

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Economic loss in Palestine?	SUFECPAL	116	34.8	71.6
Economic loss in Middle East?	SUFECME	52	15.6	32.1
Harassment in Palestine?	SUFPOLPA	75	22.5	46.3
Harassment in Middle East?	SUFPOLME	90	27.0	55.6
Total responses		333	100.0	205.6

14 missing cases; 162 valid cases

Note: Smootha's items (1989, 254-5), referring to the "economic suffering" and "political harassment" of Palestinians in Israel, provided the stimulus for this item.

-----

Item 9. LANG **Language spoken at home**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Arabic & English	0	83	47.2	47.2	47.2
Arabic	1	82	46.6	46.6	93.8
English	2	9	5.1	5.1	98.9
Combination	4	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

-----

Item 10. JOB **Job**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Student	0	20	11.4	11.4	11.4
Professional	1	37	21.0	21.0	32.4
Business	2	34	19.3	19.3	51.7
Employee	3	29	16.5	16.5	68.2
Skilled	4	32	18.2	18.2	86.4
Home duties	5	17	9.7	9.7	96.0
Unskilled	6	3	1.7	1.7	97.7
Other	7	4	2.3	2.3	100.0
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

-----

Item 11. YEARSOZ2 **Years in Australia, groups**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1-5 yrs	1	58	33.0	33.3	33.3
6-10 yrs	2	28	15.9	16.1	49.4
11-15 yrs	3	18	10.2	10.3	59.8
16-20 yrs	4	38	21.6	21.8	81.6
21-25 yrs	5	23	13.1	13.2	94.8
26-41 yrs	6	9	5.1	5.2	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 12. ACCOM **Accommodation?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Rented flat	0	35	19.9	20.2	20.2
Rented house	1	23	13.1	13.3	33.5
Own flat	2	14	8.0	8.1	41.6
Own house	3	93	52.8	53.8	95.4
With relatives*	4	8	4.5	4.6	100.0
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 13. EMPLOY **Currently employed?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	113	64.2	67.3	67.3
No	1	55	31.3	32.7	100.0
.	.	8	4.5	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	168	Missing cases	8		

Item 14a PERSINC **Personal income range?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Less than \$10,000	0	30	17.0	20.0	20.0
\$10-30,000	1	66	37.5	44.0	64.0
\$31-50,000	2	40	22.7	26.7	90.7
\$51-70,000	3	10	5.7	6.7	97.3
Over \$70,000	4	4	2.3	2.7	100.0
.	.	26	14.8	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	150	Missing cases	26		

Item 14b HOUSEINC **Household income range?**

Value Label	Value	Valid Frequency	Cum Percent	Percent	Percent
Less than \$10,000	0	6	3.4	6.5	6.5
\$10-30,000	1	31	17.6	33.3	39.8
\$31-50,000	2	25	14.2	26.9	66.7
\$51-70,000	3	23	13.1	24.7	91.4
Over \$70,000	4	8	4.5	8.6	100.0
	.	83	47.2	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	93	Missing cases	83		

Item 15. EDUC **Highest educational qualification?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Post-graduate	0	18	10.2	10.2	10.2
Graduate	1	52	29.5	29.5	39.8
Technical	2	50	28.4	28.4	68.2
Secondary	3	39	22.2	22.2	90.3
Primary	4	16	9.1	9.1	99.4
No education	5	1	.6	.6	100.0
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

Item 16. RELIG **Religion?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Muslim	0	75	42.6	43.1	43.1
Christian	1	99	56.3	56.9	100.0
Non-believer*	2	2	1.1	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 17. DESRELIG **Describe own religiosity**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very religious	0	23	13.1	13.2	13.2
Quite religious	1	50	28.4	28.7	42.0
In some ways religious	2	32	18.2	18.4	60.3
Not very religious	3	43	24.4	24.7	85.1
Not at all religious	4	26	14.8	14.9	100.0
	.	1	.6	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 18. INCRELIG **More or less religious now?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much more	0	17	9.7	9.8	9.8
Somewhat more	1	22	12.5	12.7	22.5
About the same	2	111	63.1	64.2	86.7
Somewhat less	3	13	7.4	7.5	94.2
Much less	4	10	5.7	5.8	100.0
Unwilling to say	9	3	1.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 173 Missing cases 3

Item 19. NEWSLE **Local English papers read?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	136	77.3	81.9	81.9
No	1	30	17.0	18.1	100.0
.		10	5.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 166 Missing cases 10

NEWSOE **Overseas English papers read?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	20	11.4	12.0	12.0
No	1	146	83.0	88.0	100.0
.		10	5.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 166 Missing cases 10

NEWSLA **Local Arabic papers read** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Unspecified	0	10	6.5	10.4
An-Nahar	1	71	45.8	74.0
Al-Bairak	2	26	16.8	27.1
Saout el-Moughtareb	3	11	7.1	11.5
El-Telegraph	4	37	23.9	38.5
Total responses		155	100.0	161.5

80 missing cases; 96 valid cases

NEWSOA		Overseas Arabic papers read (Mult Response)			
Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases	
Unspecified	0	6	9.1	14.3	
Felasteen al-Thawra	1	23	34.8	54.8	
Al-Hadf	2	6	9.1	14.3	
Akhbar al-Yom	3	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Ahram	4	3	4.5	7.1	
Al-Akhbar	5	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Arabi	6	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Bayader	7	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Bina	8	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Destour al-Urdani	10	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Hawadeth	11	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Hayat	12	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Ittihad	13	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Nahar	14	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Nahda	15	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Qabas	16	3	4.5	7.1	
Al-Rai	17	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Safir	18	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Sakhra	19	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Saudiya	20	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Sharq al-Awsat	21	2	3.0	4.8	
Al-Yaqtah	22	1	1.5	2.4	
Al-Yom al-Sab'a	23	1	1.5	2.4	
Marrat al-Umma	24	1	1.5	2.4	
Total responses		66	100.0	157.1	
134 missing cases; 42 valid cases					

OANEWS		Overseas Arabic papers read, grouped (Mult Response)			
Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases	
Felasteen al-Thawra	0	23	34.8	54.8	
Al-Hadf	1	6	9.1	14.3	
Other	2	37	56.1	88.1	
Total responses		66	100.0	157.1	
134 missing cases; 42 valid cases					

NEWSOTH		Other papers read?				
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent	
Yes	0	10	5.7	6.0	6.0	
No	1	156	88.6	94.0	100.0	
	.	10	5.7	Missing		
Total		176	100.0	100.0		
Valid cases	166	Missing cases	10			

Item 20. PALTIME **Time spent with Palestinians**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
All	0	13	7.4	7.4	7.4
A lot	1	60	34.1	34.1	41.5
Some	2	75	42.6	42.6	84.1
A little	3	22	12.5	12.5	96.6
None	4	6	3.4	3.4	100.0
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

Item 21. PALPALS **Describe Palestinian contacts** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Related	0	106	32.8	63.1
Same home town	1	44	13.6	26.2
Same religion	2	33	10.2	19.6
Same place of upbringing	3	33	10.2	19.6
Same suburb	4	61	18.9	36.3
Fellow students*	5	5	1.5	3.0
Same politics*	6	3	.9	1.8
Palestinians in general*	7	38	11.8	22.6
		Total responses	323	192.3
8 missing cases; 168 valid cases				

Item 22. ORGCONT **Contacted community organisation on arrival?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	86	48.9	51.2	51.2
No	1	82	46.6	48.8	100.0
.	.	8	4.5	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	168	Missing cases	8		

Item 23. ORGMEMB **Member of community organisation?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	65	36.9	37.6	37.6
No	1	108	61.4	62.4	100.0
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 24a. ORGEFF1 **Organisations effective for cause?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very effective	0	9	5.1	5.4	5.4
Quite effective	1	33	18.8	19.8	25.1
In some ways effective ..	2	46	26.1	27.5	52.7
Not very effective	3	47	26.7	28.1	80.8
Not effective at all	4	32	18.2	19.2	100.0
.	.	6	3.4	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	167	Missing cases	9		

Item 24b. ORGEFF2 **Organisations effective in community?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very effective	0	7	4.0	4.9	4.9
Quite effective	1	18	10.2	12.5	17.4
In some ways effective ..	2	33	18.8	22.9	40.3
Not very effective	3	50	28.4	34.7	75.0
Not effective at all	4	36	20.5	25.0	100.0
.	.	28	15.9	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	4	2.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	144	Missing cases	32		

Item 25. FUNDDIV **How to divide community funds?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
All for community	0	10	5.7	5.8	5.8
Most for community	1	13	7.4	7.6	13.5
Half for community ..	2	43	24.4	25.1	38.6
Most for Occ.Territories	3	51	29.0	29.8	68.4
All for Occ.Territories	4	54	30.7	31.6	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	171	Missing cases	5		

Note: The idea for this item was taken from Taft's study of identity among Melbourne Jews (1973, 279), where he asked respondents to distribute imaginary funds between Israel and the community.

Item 26. FUNDSSEND **Best way to send funds?**

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Through PLO	0	101	46.8	58.7
Through community organisations	1	36	16.7	20.9
Privately	2	45	20.8	26.2
Through international aid bodies	3	30	13.9	17.4
Through Islamic bodies*	4	4	1.9	2.3
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		216	100.0	125.6
4 missing cases; 172 valid cases				

Item 27. PLOVIEWE **How easy to express views to PLO?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very easy	0	23	13.1	25.8	25.8
Quite easy	1	27	15.3	30.3	56.2
Sometimes easy ..	2	10	5.7	11.2	67.4
Not very easy	3	18	10.2	20.2	87.6
Not easy at all	4	11	6.3	12.4	100.0
.	.	87	49.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	-----
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	89	Missing cases	87		

Note: Due to a mistranslation, the English version of Item 27 was significantly different to the Arabic version; the former (PLOVIEWE) elicited opinions on expressing one's views **to** the PLO; the latter (PLOVIEWA) on expressing one's views **about** the PLO. Although the frequencies are reported here, neither variable was included in the data analysis.

PLOVIEWA **How easy to express views about PLO? (see note above)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very easy	0	12	6.8	16.2	16.2
Quite easy	1	21	11.9	28.4	44.6
Sometimes easy ..	2	21	11.9	28.4	73.0
Not very easy	3	13	7.4	17.6	90.5
Not easy at all	4	7	4.0	9.5	100.0
.	.	102	58.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	-----
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	74	Missing cases	102		



Item 28. PALPASS **Would apply for Palestinian passport?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	133	75.6	76.4	76.4
Probably	1	22	12.5	12.6	89.1
Maybe yes ..	2	10	5.7	5.7	94.8
Probably not	3	7	4.0	4.0	98.9
Definitely not	4	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
.	.	1	.6	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 29. PALMOVE **Would move to State of Palestine?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	58	33.0	33.5	33.5
Probably	1	42	23.9	24.3	57.8
Maybe yes ..	2	41	23.3	23.7	81.5
Probably not	3	18	10.2	10.4	91.9
Definitely not	4	14	8.0	8.1	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 30. DISCRIM **Experience of discrimination**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
All the time	0	16	9.1	9.3	9.3
Often	1	26	14.8	15.1	24.4
Sometimes	2	75	42.6	43.6	68.0
Not often	3	25	14.2	14.5	82.6
Never	4	30	17.0	17.4	100.0
.	.	4	2.3	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	172	Missing cases	4		

Item 31. DISCRTYP **Kind of discrimination experienced** (Multiple Dichotomy)

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Anti-migrant	DISCMIG	81	29.8	57.0
Anti-Muslim	DISCMUS	41	15.1	28.9
Anti-Arab	DISCARAB	94	34.6	66.2
Anti-Palestinian	DISCPAL	43	15.8	30.3
Other	DISOTHER	13	4.8	9.2
Total responses		272	100.0	191.5

34 missing cases; 142 valid cases

Item 32. PALORIG **Palestinians known to hide origins?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Many	0	19	10.8	10.9	10.9
Some	1	31	17.6	17.8	28.7
A few	2	28	15.9	16.1	44.8
Not many	3	32	18.2	18.4	63.2
None	4	64	36.4	36.8	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 33. CITIZEN **Australian citizen?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	169	96.0	97.1	97.1
No	1	5	2.8	2.9	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 34. POLPARTY **Member of a political party?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	0	26	14.8	15.0	15.0
No	1	147	83.5	85.0	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 35. ACTIVITY **Palestinian activities known of** (Multiple dichotomy)

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Made private donations?	ACTDON	102	12.8	66.2
Contacted Arabic/English press	ACTPRESS	85	10.7	55.2
Contacted other media?	ACTMEDIA	73	9.1	47.4
Contacted State/Federal MP?	ACTMP	80	10.0	51.9
Contacted other politicians?	ACTPOL	66	8.3	42.9
Contacted Jewish groups?	ACTJEWS	34	4.3	22.1
Organized political meetings?	ACTMEET	72	9.0	46.8
Taken part in demonstrations?	ACTDEMO	105	13.2	68.2
Heard visiting speakers?	ACTVISIT	113	14.2	73.4
Spoken publicly?	ACTSPEAK	68	8.5	44.2
	Total responses	798	100.0	518.2

22 missing cases; 154 valid cases

Item 36a. COMMPOL      **Extent of Palestinian willingness to participate in community politics**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very willing	0	35	19.9	20.8	20.8
Quite willing	1	52	29.5	31.0	51.8
In some ways willing ..	2	46	26.1	27.4	79.2
Not very willing	3	25	14.2	14.9	94.0
Not willing at all	4	10	5.7	6.0	100.0
	.	6	3.4	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	168	Missing cases	8		

Item 36b. PARTYPOL      **Extent of Palestinian willingness to participate in party politics**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very willing	0	11	6.3	7.9	7.9
Quite willing	1	19	10.8	13.7	21.6
In some ways willing ..	2	36	20.5	25.9	47.5
Not very willing	3	41	23.3	29.5	77.0
Not willing at all	4	32	18.2	23.0	100.0
	.	35	19.9	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	139	Missing cases	37		

Item 37. WILLING      **Factors affecting Palestinian participation in parties (Multiple dichotomy)**

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Experiences with M.East authorities?	WILLME	60	15.2	38.0
Experiences with authorities here?	WILLAUTH	49	12.4	31.0
Lack of language ability	WILLLANG	70	17.7	44.3
Fear of discrimination	WILLFEAR	54	13.6	34.2
Not understanding system	WILLSYS	70	17.7	44.3
Lack of time	WILLTIME	56	14.1	35.4
Lack of interest	WILLINT	37	9.3	23.4
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	396	100.0	250.6
18 missing cases; 158 valid cases				

Item 38. SELFDEF **Self-identification**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Palestinian	0	30	17.0	17.2	17.2
Palestinian Arab	1	15	8.5	8.6	25.9
Palestinian-Australian	2	42	23.9	24.1	50.0
Palestinian Arab-Australian	3	68	38.6	39.1	89.1
Arab	4	4	2.3	2.3	91.4
Arab-Australian	5	10	5.7	5.7	97.1
Australian	6	3	1.7	1.7	98.9
Muslim*	7	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 39. AUSIDENT **Extent of identification with Australia**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Completely	0	13	7.4	7.5	7.5
Very strongly	1	39	22.2	22.5	30.1
Quite strongly but reservations	2	68	38.6	39.3	69.4
Not very strongly	3	44	25.0	25.4	94.8
Not at all	4	9	5.1	5.2	100.0
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 40. AUSPOL **Importance of Australian policy on Palestine**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very important	0	101	57.4	58.0	58.0
Quite important	1	36	20.5	20.7	78.7
Important in some ways ..	2	11	6.3	6.3	85.1
Not very important	3	16	9.1	9.2	94.3
Not important at all	4	10	5.7	5.7	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 41. DESCPOP **Describe Australian policy on Palestine**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very pro-Palestinian	0	1	.6	.6	.6
Quite pro-Palestinian	1	-	-	-	-
Even-handed	2	3	1.7	1.7	2.3
Quite pro-Israeli	3	42	23.9	24.0	26.3
Very pro-Israeli	4	129	73.3	73.7	100.0
.	.	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	175	Missing cases	1		

Item 42. FEELREC **Feeling if State of Palestine recognised**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very happy	0	145	82.4	83.8	83.8
Quite happy	1	23	13.1	13.3	97.1
Neither happy nor unhappy	2	5	2.8	2.9	100.0
Quite unhappy	3	-	-	-	-
Very unhappy	4	-	-	-	-
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 43. MEDIAIMP **Importance of media treatment of Palestine issue**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very important	0	131	74.4	75.3	75.3
Quite important	1	29	16.5	16.7	92.0
Important in some ways ..	2	8	4.5	4.6	96.6
Not very important	3	4	2.3	2.3	98.9
Not important at all	4	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 44. DESMEDIA **Describe media treatment of Palestine issue**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very pro-Israeli	0	98	55.7	56.3	56.3
Quite pro-Israeli	1	56	31.8	32.2	88.5
Sometimes pro-Israeli ..	2	16	9.1	9.2	97.7
Quite pro-Palestinian	3	4	2.3	2.3	100.0
Very pro-Palestinian	4	-	-	-	-
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 45. IMAGEIMP **Importance of Palestinian public image**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very important	0	136	77.3	79.1	79.1
Quite important	1	17	9.7	9.9	89.0
Important in some ways ..	2	8	4.5	4.7	93.6
Not very important	3	7	4.0	4.1	97.7
Not important at all	4	4	2.3	2.3	100.0
.	.	4	2.3	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	172	Missing cases	4		

Item 46. DESIMAGE **Describe Palestinian public image now**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much improved	0	47	26.7	27.5	27.5
Somewhat improved	1	79	44.9	46.2	73.7
No change	2	34	19.3	19.9	93.6
Somewhat worse	3	7	4.0	4.1	97.7
Much worse	4	4	2.3	2.3	100.0
.	.	4	2.3	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	171	Missing cases	5		

Item 47. EVENTLEB **Effect of Israeli actions in Lebanon (on Australian attitudes to Palestinians)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Positive effect	0	70	39.8	52.2	52.2
No effect	1	53	30.1	39.6	91.8
Negative effect	2	11	6.3	8.2	100.0
.	.	41	23.3	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	134	Missing cases	42		

EVENTINT **Effect of Intifada (on Australian attitudes to Palestinians)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Positive effect	0	135	76.7	84.4	84.4
No effect	1	21	11.9	13.1	97.5
Negative effect	2	4	2.3	2.5	100.0
.	.	15	8.5	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	160	Missing cases	16		

EVENTTER **Effect of PLO renouncing terrorism (on Australian attitudes to Palestinians)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Positive	0	71	40.3	49.7	49.7
No effect	1	56	31.8	39.2	88.8
Negative	2	16	9.1	11.2	100.0
.	.	32	18.2	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	143	Missing cases	33		

EVENTREC **Effect of PLO's recognition of Israel (on Australian attitudes to Palestinians)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Positive	0	74	42.0	51.0	51.0
No effect	1	60	34.1	41.4	92.4
Negative	2	11	6.3	7.6	100.0
.	.	30	17.0	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	145	Missing cases	31		

EVENTKWT **Effect of Iraqi actions in Kuwait (on Australian attitudes to Palestinians)**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Positive	0	22	12.5	14.9	14.9
No effect	1	42	23.9	28.4	43.2
Negative	2	84	47.7	56.8	100.0
.	.	27	15.3	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	148	Missing cases	28		

Item 48. INTIFADA **Feelings resulting from Intifada**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very proud	0	148	84.1	85.5	85.5
Quite proud	1	14	8.0	8.1	93.6
Proud in some ways ..	2	8	4.5	4.6	98.3
Not very proud	3	2	1.1	1.2	99.4
Not at all proud	4	1	.6	.6	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 49a. INVOLCOM **Should Palestinians be involved in community politics?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	125	71.0	77.2	77.2
Probably	1	23	13.1	14.2	91.4
Maybe yes ..	2	11	6.3	6.8	98.1
Probably not	3	1	.6	.6	98.8
Definitely not	4	2	1.1	1.2	100.0
	.	12	6.8	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	2	1.1	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	162	Missing cases	14		

Item 49b. INVOLPAR **Should Palestinians be involved in party politics?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	105	59.7	73.9	73.9
Probably	1	20	11.4	14.1	88.0
Maybe yes ..	2	10	5.7	7.0	95.1
Probably not	3	2	1.1	1.4	96.5
Definitely not	4	5	2.8	3.5	100.0
	.	32	18.2	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	2	1.1	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	142	Missing cases	34		



Item 50. CONTJEW1 <b>Should Palestinians here make contact with Jews?</b>					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	33	18.8	19.4	19.4
Probably	1	50	28.4	29.4	48.8
Maybe yes ..	2	37	21.0	21.8	70.6
Probably not	3	17	9.7	10.0	80.6
Definitely not	4	33	18.8	19.4	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	170	Missing cases	6		

Item 51. CHANGWIL <b>Change in own willingness to get involved?</b>					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much less willing now	0	2	1.1	1.2	1.2
Somewhat less willing now	1	4	2.3	2.3	3.5
No change	2	63	35.8	36.4	39.9
Somewhat more willing now	3	63	35.8	36.4	76.3
Much more willing now	4	41	23.3	23.7	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 52. ACCEP2ST <b>Extent to which 2-state solution is accepted</b>					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Accept completely	0	56	31.8	32.4	32.4
Accept with reservations	1	75	42.6	43.4	75.7
Neither accept nor reject	2	5	2.8	2.9	78.6
Inclined to reject	3	9	5.1	5.2	83.8
Reject completely	4	28	15.9	16.2	100.0
	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 53. FEEL2ST **Palestinians' feelings about 2-state solution**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very happy	0	44	25.0	25.7	25.7
Quite happy	1	64	36.4	37.4	63.2
Half happy, half unhappy	2	32	18.2	18.7	81.9
Quite unhappy	3	15	8.5	8.8	90.6
Very unhappy	4	16	9.1	9.4	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	2	1.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	171	Missing cases	5		

Item 54. SECULAR **Should a Palestinian state be secular?**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Definitely	0	119	67.6	70.4	70.4
Probably	1	18	10.2	10.7	81.1
Maybe yes, maybe no	2	6	3.4	3.6	84.6
Probably not	3	8	4.5	4.7	89.3
Definitely not	4	18	10.2	10.7	100.0
	.	7	4.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	169	Missing cases	7		

Item 55. DESINTIF **Describe the Intifada**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Wholly religious	0	8	4.5	4.7	4.7
Mainly religious	1	7	4.0	4.1	8.7
Partly religious	2	35	19.9	20.3	29.1
Mainly national	3	52	29.5	30.2	59.3
Wholly national	4	70	39.8	40.7	100.0
	.	4	2.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	172	Missing cases	4		

Item 56a. PLOLEAD **Reaction to statement that PLO's approach is correct**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly agree	0	68	38.6	40.0	40.0
Agree	1	61	34.7	35.9	75.9
Neither agree nor disagree	2	18	10.2	10.6	86.5
Disagree	3	18	10.2	10.6	97.1
Strongly disagree	4	5	2.8	2.9	100.0
	.	6	3.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	170	Missing cases	6		

Item 56b. PLODEMOOC **Reaction to statement that PLO is democratic**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly agree	0	62	35.2	37.1	37.1
Agree	1	59	33.5	35.3	72.5
Neither agree nor disagree	2	22	12.5	13.2	85.6
Disagree	3	21	11.9	12.6	98.2
Strongly disagree	4	3	1.7	1.8	100.0
	.	9	5.1	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	167	Missing cases	9		

Item 57. YASSER **Rating of Arafat's performance**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very good	0	60	34.1	34.7	34.7
Good	1	44	25.0	25.4	60.1
Sometimes good,sometimes not	2	49	27.8	28.3	88.4
Not very good	3	13	7.4	7.5	96.0
Not good at all	4	7	4.0	4.0	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 58. ARABSTAT **Describe role of Arab states**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very positive	0	1	.6	.6	.6
Quite positive	1	2	1.1	1.2	1.7
Sometimes positive ..	2	45	25.6	26.0	27.7
Quite negative	3	44	25.0	25.4	53.2
Very negative	4	81	46.0	46.8	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
		Total	176	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 59. EXTFORCE **Extent to which Palestinians should rely on external forces**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Rely totally	0	16	9.1	9.4	9.4
Rely considerably	1	18	10.2	10.5	19.9
Rely in some ways,not others	2	47	26.7	27.5	47.4
Rely partly	3	38	21.6	22.2	69.6
Not rely at all	4	52	29.5	30.4	100.0
.	.	4	2.3	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	171	Missing cases	5		

Item 60. ARMS **Extent of support for idea of armed struggle**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Support strongly	0	72	40.9	41.6	41.6
Support with reservations	1	42	23.9	24.3	65.9
Support in some circumstances	2	39	22.2	22.5	88.4
Do not really support	3	8	4.5	4.6	93.1
Do not support at all	4	12	6.8	6.9	100.0
.	.	2	1.1	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 61. JERUPREF **Preferred solution for Jerusalem**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Jerusalem the capital of Palestine	0	113	64.2	66.5	66.5
E.Jerusalem for Palestine, W.Jerusalem for Israel	1	24	13.6	14.1	80.6
Joint capital of Palestine and Israel	2	10	5.7	5.9	86.5
International control, not a capital	3	14	8.0	8.2	94.7
Jerusalem the capital of Israel	4	2	1.1	1.2	95.9
(Respondent does not recognise State of Israel)*	5	7	4.0	4.1	100.0
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	3	1.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	170	Missing cases	6		

Item 62. JEREXPEC **Expected solution for Jerusalem**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Jerusalem the capital of Palestine	0	47	26.7	28.8	28.8
E.Jerusalem for Palestine, W.Jerusalem for Israel	1	33	18.8	20.2	49.1
Joint capital of Palestine and Israel	2	31	17.6	19.0	68.1
International control, not a capital	3	34	19.3	20.9	89.0
Jerusalem the capital of Israel	4	14	8.0	8.6	97.5
(Respondent does not recognise State of Israel)*	5	4	2.3	2.5	100.0
	.	5	2.8	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	8	4.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	163	Missing cases	13		

Item 63. JERASPEC **Importance of aspects of Jerusalem** (Multiple dichotomy)

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Contains holy places for 3 religions	JERRELIG	111	37.0	64.2
Contains holy places of Islam	JERISLAM	44	14.7	25.4
Contains holy places of Christianity	JERCHRIS	29	9.7	16.8
Is the centre of the Palestinian nation	JERPALNA	93	31.0	53.8
Has family and personal associations	JERFAMIL	23	7.7	13.3
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	300	100.0	173.4
3 missing cases; 173 valid cases				

Item 64. REPS **Preferred representatives of Palestinians in negotiations** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
PLO	0	127	60.2	77.0
Arafat	1	9	4.3	5.5
Palestinian people	2	18	8.5	10.9
Diaspora Palestinians	3	5	2.4	3.0
Representatives from Occupied Territories	4	8	3.8	4.8
Intifada leaders	5	11	5.2	6.7
Elected representatives	6	4	1.9	2.4
HAMAS/Islamic representatives	7	6	2.8	3.6
Other	8	23	10.9	13.9
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	211	100.0	127.9
11 missing cases; 165 valid cases				

REPREEN **Preferred representatives of Palestinians in negotiations, grouped** (Mult Response)

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
PLO/Arafat	0	136	64.5	82.4
Diaspora/Palestinian people	1	23	10.9	13.9
Occupied Territories/Intifada	2	19	9.0	11.5
HAMAS/Islamic	3	6	2.8	3.6
Other	4	27	12.8	16.4
Total responses		211	100.0	127.9
11 missing cases; 165 valid cases				

Item 65. ISRPEACE **Expected role of Israeli peace movement**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very positive	0	35	19.9	20.2	20.2
Quite positive	1	66	37.5	38.2	58.4
Neither positive nor negative	2	24	13.6	13.9	72.3
Quite negative	3	5	2.8	2.9	75.1
Very negative	4	18	10.2	10.4	85.5
Don't know/Not sure	5	25	14.2	14.5	100.0
.	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	173	Missing cases	3		

Item 66. ISRTERR **Expected extent of Israeli willingness to give back Occupied Territories**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very willing	0	2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Quite willing	1	17	9.7	9.8	10.9
Neither willing nor unwilling	2	27	15.3	15.5	26.4
Quite unwilling	3	60	34.1	34.5	60.9
Very unwilling	4	68	38.6	39.1	100.0
.	.	1	.6	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
Total		176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	174	Missing cases	2		

Item 67. JEWGIT

**Extent of willingness to see Jews become citizens of Palestine**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very willing	0	44	25.0	25.6	25.6
Quite willing	1	58	33.0	33.7	59.3
Neither willing nor unwilling	2	22	12.5	12.8	72.1
Quite unwilling	3	15	8.5	8.7	80.8
Very unwilling	4	33	18.8	19.2	100.0
	.	3	1.7	Missing	
Unwilling to say	9	1	.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	172	Missing cases	4		

Item 68. GENCOMM

**General comments on Palestine issue, or on living as a Palestinian in Australia**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Palestine	0	32	18.2	50.0	50.0
Australia	1	8	4.5	12.5	62.5
Both issues	2	18	10.2	28.1	90.6
Other comment	3	6	3.4	9.4	100.0
	.	112	63.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	64	Missing cases	112		

QLANG

**Language of questionnaire**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
English	0	100	56.8	56.8	56.8
Arabic	1	76	43.2	43.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		

DATE1

**Month and year when questionnaires distributed**

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Oct.1990	0	116	65.9	68.2	68.2
Nov.1990	1	29	16.5	17.1	85.3
Dec.1990	2	13	7.4	7.6	92.9
Jan.1991	3	3	1.7	1.8	94.7
Mar.1991	5	9	5.1	5.3	100.0
	.	6	3.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	170	Missing cases	6		

DATE2	Month and year when questionnaires returned				
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Oct.1990	0	14	8.0	8.0	8.0
Nov.1990	1	54	30.7	30.7	38.6
Dec.1990	2	52	29.5	29.5	68.2
Jan.1991	3	34	19.3	19.3	87.5
Feb.1991	4	12	6.8	6.8	94.3
Mar.1991	5	9	5.1	5.1	99.4
Apr.1991	6	1	.6	.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	176	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	176	Missing cases	0		




## **APPENDIX V**

### **ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOARD STATISTICS**

**(GRAPH)**

# RACIAL VILIFICATION COMPLAINTS IN N.S.W. (JULY 90-APRIL 91)

(GULF CRISIS)



Source: Monthly Reports on Racial  
Vilification, NSW Anti-Discrimination  
Board.

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DILGEA

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