

RADICALIZATION AND DERADICALIZATION: THE TAMIL TIGER CASE STUDY

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

By

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Declaration of Originality

I declare that this thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy does not contain any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma to any university. To the best of my knowledge this thesis does not contain any material previously published or written by any other person except where due reference is made within the text. The interviews conducted for the purpose of this study are in compliance with the requirements of the Macquarie University Ethics Committee (approval granted on 26 May 2014).

Signed: Malkanthi Hettiarachchi

Date: 09 October 2017

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List of Acronyms

BCGR	Bureau for the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation
C.I.	Confidence Interval
CBR	Community Resilience Building
CEP	Community Engagement Program
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CRS	Congressional Report Service
DGI	Department of Government Information
DJ	Distributive Justice
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarieas de Colombi
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FQDM	Formal Quality of Decision Making
FQT	Formal Quality of Treatment
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GA	Government Agent
GSA	Global Securities Asia
GSE	General Self Efficacy scale
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
HAMAS	Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
ICPVTR	International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

IQDM	Informal Quality of Decision Making
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
n	Statistical sample size indicating a sub set of the total sample
N	Statistical sample size indicating total sample
NFI	Normed Fit Index
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGSE	New Generalized Self Efficacy scale
NTU	Nanyang Technological University
OF	Outcome Favorability
ORGJ	Organizational Justice scale
p	Statistical symbol of significance level
PARC	Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Center
PSIG	Personal Significance scale
r	Statistical symbol of correlation
RMSEA	Root mean square error of approximation
SATP	South Asian Terrorism Portal
SGOT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist group
SGSE	Sherer et al. General Self Efficacy scale
Sic	sic erat scriptum or written as it is
SSE	Specific Self Efficacy scale
SWLS	Satisfaction With Life Scale
TESOC	Tamil Eelam Society of Canada
UNICRI	United Nations Inter Regional Crime and Justice Research Institute

Abstract

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) radicalized and mobilized its members to conduct some of the most lethal attacks on civilian, political, economic, religious, cultural and security targets to achieve a separate state. This study explores the LTTE's method of radicalizing civilians into violence, so that counter radicalization efforts can focus on reversing this process of radicalization. While terrorism research has focused on identifying causative factors that contribute to radicalization, this study aims to identify the components actively manipulated by the LTTE in the process of grooming civilians into violence.

The review of literature identified seven such essential components: a grievance narrative, loss of significance, an organization to network, an ideology, shift in roles and images, moral justification of violence, and self-efficacy. Seven hypotheses were formulated to assess these components, using psychometric tools and an interview schedule with ninety participants. Surveys and interviews were conducted with rehabilitated former members of the LTTE (suicide and other units), their family and the Tamil diaspora, to obtain their unique insights into the radicalization process.

The findings support the hypotheses that each identified component contributed to the process of radicalization into violence. No single component was sufficient, but a combination of these facilitated the individual to develop the skill to conduct attacks with confidence. The LTTE was pivotal in driving this process by manipulating the narratives of grievance, providing the opportunity to restore significance, establishing a morally justified ideology of violence, and projecting an image of being the victim as well as the rescuer. Concurrently, the LTTE was driving fear into the Sinhala and Muslim communities, while training its members to mobilize with confidence, in the belief that they were working for a

fair and just organization that was helping to redress their grievances through the only morally justifiable means available, viz. violence.

'Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred'.¹

Martin Luther King Jr.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Terrorism

The definition of terrorism remains a much contested and debated term amongst researchers and academics.² There is no single, universal definition of the term. This study, however, will refer to a terrorist act as one which is 'meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians' with the aim of creating an atmosphere of fear to achieve political or ideological gains.³ The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s modus operandi involved the use of a particularly lethal brand of terrorism, with suicide terrorism as the preferred method. The LTTE made the most use of suicide terrorism amongst all the terrorist groups in the world.⁴ Therefore, the LTTE is referred to as a terrorist group based on nearly three decades of politically motivated violence directed primarily at civilians.⁵

¹ Martin Luther King Jr., 'I have a dream', on 28 August 1963, p. 3,

<https://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

² A.P. Schmid, 'The Definition of Terrorism, The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2012,

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-terrorism-definition/html>, (accessed 18 February 2017). For a list of 260 definitions see: J.J. Easson and A.P. Schmid, '250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions of Terrorism', in A.P. Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, London and New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 99-157. See: J. Sinai, 'How to Define Terrorism', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 2, no. 4, February 2008, p. 9. See: J. Khalil, 'Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Taylor and Francis Group, vol. 37, no. 2, 2014, p.198.

³ The Jane's Information Group makes reference to over 100 definitions of terrorism. See: R. Gunaratna and P. Chalk (eds.), *Jane's Counter Terrorism*, 2nd edn. Surrey, Jane's Information Group, 2002, p. 12.

⁴ R. Ramasubramanian, *Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka*, New Delhi, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2004, p. 4.

⁵ List of 'LTTE attacks,' *South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP)*, [online database], n.d.,

www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/shrilanka/database/, (accessed 18 February 2017). Also see: Stanford University, 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam', [database], 2010,

<https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/225#attacks>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

With the laying down of its foundation on 5 May 1976, the LTTE commenced its campaign for a separate state in Sri Lanka.⁶ The murder of the Tamil Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappa, in 1975, was the LTTE's first assassination conducted personally by Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE. Successive Sri Lankan governments deemed the LTTE a terrorist group, while India declared it as a terrorist group in 1992 following the LTTE suicide attack that killed Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India.⁷ The United States designated the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997, and later, in 2000, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SGOT).⁸ The LTTE was banned by 37 countries as a terrorist organization.⁹ By 2006, Canada and 27 EU countries designated the LTTE a terrorist organization.

The EU lifted the ban on the LTTE in October 2014 after intense lobbying by the Tamil Tigers' support network overseas though the assets remain frozen. Conversely, also in 2014, India, Canada, and the United States renewed the ban on the LTTE. In March 2014, Sri Lanka also reintroduced the ban on the LTTE, including 15 LTTE fronts operating internationally, and on 424 individuals. This came in the light of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.¹⁰ In January 2015, ban on eight terrorist groups and 157 individuals remain in place following a change in the Sri Lankan government.¹¹

The LTTE was a well-developed terrorist group that operated an *overt/semi covert political wing* and a *clandestine military wing*. Over time, the LTTE developed capabilities

⁶ The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) was founded in 1972, and the name was changed to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 1976. See: Stanford University, 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam: Mapping Militant Organizations', p. 5.

⁷ Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a LTTE suicide bomber on 21 May 1991.

⁸ The United States declared the LTTE a terrorist group, when the LTTE rammed a truck laden with explosives into the Central Bank in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 31 January 1991, killing 86 people and causing serious injury to 1338.

⁹ Gunaratna and Chalk, (eds.), *Jane's Counter Terrorism*, p. 8.

¹⁰ Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka – Extraordinary, 'Government Notification 1854_41', Friday March 21, 2014, http://colombogazette.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1854_41-E.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017). List of Designated persons, groups and entities under paragraph 4(2) of the United Nations Regulations No. 1 of 2012.

¹¹ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015*, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, United States Department of State, Released June 2016, p. 260.

in guerrilla and mobile warfare but continued to employ terrorism till the very end.¹² It even developed affiliations with organizations, both within and beyond the theatre of conflict, to establish a support base and ensure a steady stream of funding.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) describes the Tamil Tigers as one of the few non-religious groups that have used suicide bombings to achieve their political aims. The *terrorist tactics* used by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have contributed to some of the highest fatalities in the region. The GTI refers to ‘high profile, long lasting groups such as al-Qaeda, the Tamil Tigers or the Irish Republican Army’ as groups with a long life span. The LTTE was one of ‘the top ten most active terrorist groups of the modern era ... the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), the FMLN (Farabundo marti National Liberation Front), the IRA (Irish Republican Army), FARC (Fuerzas Armada Revolucionaries de Colombi), Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah), and the LTTE’.¹³

The LTTE also featured on the ‘worst 100 attacks’ list and in the category of ‘lethal groups’ with the capability of killing over 100 civilians in any single attack in the period 2002-2011.¹⁴ The LTTE was listed under the ‘deadliest attacks’ category that places the group in the high lethality bracket: ‘some organizations are more active, some are more lethal’.¹⁵ GTI noted a drop in the LTTE’s ranking among global terrorist groups by 2011, as there were ‘no incidences’ and ‘fatalities’ recorded due to its military defeat.¹⁶ From 2006

¹² M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas*, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, 1994, p. 26.

¹³ Global Terrorism Index (GTI), ‘Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002-2011’, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2012, p. 30 and p. 40, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017), refers to: ‘India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal are amongst the Asian countries with the highest number of fatalities’. See List of Acronyms, p. xi, in this study, for complete group names

¹⁴ GTI, ‘Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002-2011’, p. 50.

¹⁵ GTI, p. 32, refers to Terrorist Groups and Ideology.

¹⁶ GTI, p. 48. Statistics extracted from: Table A1 Global Terrorism Index, 2002-2011.

to 2009, prior to the military defeat of the LTTE, the number of terrorist attacks averaged 11.48 per month.¹⁷

1.2 Background of Ethnic Tension

The history of the Sinhalese ethnicity and civilization on the island of Sri Lanka begins in the 6th century B.C.E. The intermarriage between the Indo-Aryans from north eastern regions of India and the indigenous *Vedda* tribes on the island, then known as *Lanka*, gave birth to the Sinhalese ethnicity. The history of the Dravidian Tamil ethnicity on the island is traced back to the 2nd century B.C.E. with the invasions from south Indian kingdoms.¹⁸

Povlock traces the history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to the usurpation of the Sinhala kingdom in 237 B.C.E. by Tamil invasions, which was followed by 22 years of fighting to re-establish Sinhala control over the island. By the 7th century, the invasions established Tamil enclaves in the northern regions of Sri Lanka under the political control of the Sinhala kingdom.¹⁹

More recent history places the ‘colonization and decolonization’ of Sri Lanka as the cause of the conflict.²⁰ The British occupied the island from 1796 until independence in 1948, overcoming the resistance of the Sinhalese and Buddhist monks to colonization.²¹ The British discriminated against the majority Sinhalese and suppressed them, while the Tamil

¹⁷ S. de Silva, ‘Change and Continuity in Terrorism: An examination of the lifecycle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, Australia, 2013, p.112, refers to 379 attacks conducted by the LTTE in 33 months, prior to the end of its military defeat.

¹⁸ I. Dharmawardhane, ‘Sri Lanka’, in R. Gunaratna and S. Kam (eds.), *Handbook of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific*, Imperial College Press Insurgency and Terrorism Series, vol. 1, London, Imperial College Press, 2016, pp. 298-305, refers to the background of the conflict; separate state and map, p. 303; and threats, p. 306.

¹⁹ P.A. Povlock, ‘A Guerrilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War’, *Small Wars Journal*, Small Wars Foundation, 2011, pp. 3-6.

²⁰ C.C. Fair, ‘Urban Battlefields of South Asia: Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan’, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2004, pp. 16-18.

²¹ S. Hettiarachchi, *Faithing the Native Soil*, Sri Lanka, CSR, 2012, pp. 13-19.

minority was elevated to privileged positions. The British adhered to a policy of divide and rule, which divided Sri Lanka into five provinces.

The British brought bonded Tamil laborers from south India to work in the coffee and tea plantations.²² An English education system was set up, accessible only to the elite Tamils and Sinhalese. The British also established the Anglican Church in Sri Lanka and tied the education system to these religious institutions, while Sinhala language and its use in education and Buddhism were sidelined.²³ By the time the British relinquished its colonies in South Asia, Sri Lanka's demography, geography, politics, education, religion and social landscape had changed significantly.

The British exit allowed the Sinhalese politicians to rise into power and re-establish the position of the majority Sinhalese by instituting Buddhism as the state religion and the Sinhala language as the national language. The policy and constitutional reforms that followed were perceived as discriminatory by the Tamil politicians and therein ushered in a new wave of political conflict between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. The Tamil politicians campaigned for a separate state, based on the British demarcation of the provinces, and demanded two of these provinces for 12 percent of the population.

Several failed attempts to negotiate the majority-minority status define the history of political tensions in Sri Lanka. The negotiations have involved domestic and foreign actors but with little progress. This created the space for a number of Tamil militant factions to emerge. There are several debates and papers written on the history and the origins of the

²² C.C. Fair, 'Urban Battlefields of South Asia', pp. 16-18.

²³ The post-colonial era strengthened the establishment of schools with a background in Buddhism such as *Ananda Maha Vidyalaya* (High School), *Nalanda Vidyalaya* (School), *Isipathana Vidyalaya*, *Visakha Vidyalaya*, *Bauddha Balika* (College), etc. These schools arose to fill the gap in educational institutions but equally in competition to the Christian Missionary Schools (CMS) such as Ladies College and Royal College, as well as the Catholic Schools such as Holy Family Convent, St. Bridget's Convent, St. Thomas' College, St. Peter's College, and St Joseph's College.

conflict but this study will not delve into this discussion.²⁴ The focus of this study is the LTTE, which is one of the many factions that emerged during the period of conflict. The LTTE managed to sustain itself while decimating other Tamil militant groups that subsequently relinquished violence and entered the mainstream political process.²⁵

1.3 Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka

The LTTE was considered as one of the most ruthless and violent organizations in the world. The tradecraft later adopted by al-Qaeda and its associated groups was, for the most part, developed by the Tamil Tigers.²⁶ The Tamil Tigers has also worked with other terrorist groups overseas during and after its military defeat in Sri Lanka.²⁷

The LTTE was perceived as invincible and its longevity was due to several factors.²⁸ Some of these factors include the LTTE's ability to control territory and community, and indoctrinate, train and groom its members into a culture of terror. Another factor was the

²⁴ A. Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 29. See: C.R. De Silva, 'Sri Lanka: A History', *New York, Advent*, 1988. See: K. Bush, 'Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka', *Conflict Quarterly*, Spring 1990, p. 43.

²⁵ E. Chenoweth, N. Miller, E. McClellan, and H. Frisch, 'What Makes Terrorists Tick', *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 4, Spring 2009, p. 194. See: T.S. Saley, 'Suicide Terrorism: Development, Identification, Modus Operandi, Potential Threat and Response: Sri Lankan Perspective', *The Journal of Defence and Security*, Malaysia, MIDAS, vol. 1, no. 2, 2010, p. 215. See: Fair, 'Urban Battlefields of South Asia', p. 36. See: S. de Silva, 'Change and Continuity in Terrorism', p. 202.

²⁶ FBI, 'Taming of the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the US', The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008, [website], http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: M. Crenshaw, 'Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay', *Security Studies*, Taylor and Francis Group, vol. 16, no. 1, January–March 2007, p.137. See: P.A. Povlock, 'A Guerrilla War at Sea', p. 17 and p. 33. See: A. Waldman, 'Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka' 14 January 2003, pp. 1-5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/world/masters-of-suicide-bombing-tamil-guerrillas-of-sri-lanka.html?pagewanted=all>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

²⁷ The LTTE relationships with al-Qaeda in Eritrea, the PKK, Harakat-al-mujahideen, Taliban, Abu Sayyef Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, cited in Stanford University, 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam: Mapping Militant Organizations', p. 5. See: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014*, Bureau of Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, United States Department of State, Released June 2015, p. 70, cites the arrest of 13 LTTE members in Malaysia planning an attack on US and Israeli embassies in India, along with a Somali al-Shabaab member in 2014.

²⁸ S.I. Keethaponcalan, 'North–South Relations and Human Rights', *Journal of the Global South*, vol. 2, no.1, 2015, p. 11. See: R. Kalansooriya, 'The Military Defeat of Terrorism in Sri Lanka', in D.-R. Voica (ed.), *Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism*, Netherlands, IOS Press BV, 2012, p. 5. See: A. Ethiranjana on 'How Sri Lanka's Military Won', 22 May 2009, [television], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8063409.stm, (accessed 18 February 2017).

LTTE's ability to secure a steady source of funding from its supporters and members overseas. It had the ability to spread terror through lethal suicide attacks, and by striking vulnerable targets and manipulating foreign negotiators. Successive Sri Lankan governments attempted to negotiate with the LTTE, with or without foreign mediators. Either way, Sri Lankan governments had little success.²⁹ Harmon's in-depth analysis on how terrorist groups decline or end assert that it is harder to defeat an insurgency if the conflict is protracted.³⁰ Connable and Libicki report similar findings and discuss the LTTE's unwillingness and refusal to negotiate.³¹ Jones and Libicki analysed 268 groups that ended terrorist activities as a result of policing and intelligence or because of their inclusion into a peaceful political process.³² These authors and Cronin suggest that negotiation alone is not sufficient but should be part of the overall strategy.³³ Successive Sri Lankan governments failed to launch an effective and holistic campaign to contain the LTTE, which led to its longevity and sense of invincibility.³⁴

The LTTE actively recruited men, women and children (Appendix 7) into its membership and abandoned the restrictive cultural and religious norms and practices prevalent in the Tamil community. For instance, the LTTE abandoned the caste system,

²⁹ *Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis, July 2006-May 2009*, Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka, MOD, pp. 28-37, refers to dates, locations and number of sessions on 'Peace Talks' between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. See: S. de Silva, pp. 116-138, for an in depth analysis of the ceasefire periods during 'Peace Talks'. See: Povlock, pp. 26-28, on the ceasefire from 2001-2006.

³⁰ C. C. Harmon, 'How Terrorist Groups End: Studies of the Twentieth Century', *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2010, pp. 74-77.

³¹ B. Connable and M. Libicki, 'How insurgencies end', National Defense Research Institute, Arlington, VA, RAND corporation, 2010, p. 19 and p. 27. See: K. Høglund, 'Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka', *Civil Wars*, Taylor and Francis, vol.7, no.2, 2005, pp. 156-170.

³² S.G. Jones and M.C. Libicki, 'How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida', RAND Corporation Research Brief Series, California, RAND Corporation, Jul 15, 2008, pp. 1-2.

³³ A.K. Cronin, 'How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 3. See: Connable and Libicki, 'How insurgencies end', p. 213. See: Jones and Libicki, 'How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida', p. 1. See: Harmon, 'How Terrorist Groups End: Studies of the Twentieth Century', pp. 75-77.

³⁴ A campaign that addressed the safety, security, socio-economic, cultural, familial, religious, and mental wellbeing of the people; protect civilians vulnerable to retaliatory attacks by the terrorists; and to train, look after and mobilize fighting troops effectively. See analysis on the Manwaring Paradigm on successful counterinsurgency strategies: F.L. Tozzi, 'How to Kill a Tiger: Measuring Manwaring's Paradigm Against Sri Lanka's Counterinsurgency Strategy', Washington DC, MA Thesis, George Town University, 2010, pp. 50-55.

some cultural norms of marriage, dowry, conservative behavior and dress imposed on women. Non-adherence to these norms and restrictions allowed the LTTE members to find traction amongst segments of the Tamil community. The LTTE utilized the support to push for a separate state from Sri Lanka, which would provide ethnic independence to the Tamils. To achieve this separatist agenda, the LTTE carried out attacks against the Sinhala and Muslim civilian population. Attacks were also carried out against rival Tamil separatist factions and those Tamils who did not support the LTTE ideology.³⁵

After eliminating its rivals, the LTTE emerged as the only group fighting for separatism in Sri Lanka.³⁶ It conducted 1,188 terror attacks across three decades and killed thousands of individuals.³⁷ The LTTE assassinated academics, politicians, entrepreneurs, and anyone opposed to the group. It massacred vulnerable civilians and unarmed security forces personnel, attacked iconic religious, historical, cultural, economic, political and security targets. In an attempt to cripple the economy, the LTTE bombed Sri Lanka's Katunayaka International Airport, cargo ships, trains, railway lines, oil installations, and water tanks, disrupted the water supply to kill the crops and conducted a chlorine gas attack on the Colombo Air Force Base.³⁸

The LTTE maintained international support bases primarily through its separatist diaspora community in Canada, North America, Europe and Australia.³⁹ The LTTE

³⁵ PLOTE and EPRLF were Tamil rebel factions that were attacked by the LTTE seeking to emerge as the sole representative of the Tamil people. See: R. Ramasubramanian, *Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka*, p. 21-25. See: S. de Silva, p. 202. See: Saley, 'Suicide Terrorism', pp. 204-219.

³⁶ C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, 'Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Towards Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge, vol. 20, no. 3, July 2008, p. 424. See: *Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis*, p.5, (Item 17).

³⁷ S. de Silva, pp. 303-439, refers to LTTE Terrorist Attack Database from 27 July 1975- 9 May 2009 and pp. 448-449, refers to Target Selection. See: *Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis*, pp. 88-159.

³⁸ B. Hoffman, 'The Debate Over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons,' p. 74, in B. Roberts (ed.), *Hype or Reality? The 'New Terrorism' and Mass Casualty Attacks*, Alexandria VA, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000. Details of chemical gas equipment also listed in the *Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis*, pp. 136-137.

³⁹ The Tamil diaspora support was both voluntary and enforced. The support extended was monetary, in the form of technical expertise, operating business fronts, and lobbying Western governments, churches, institutions and NGO's. See: Human Rights Watch, 'Funding the "Final War" LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora: UK/Canada', HRW, New York, vol. 18, no. 1c, 2006, p. 25-34. See: C.C.

established its overseas network in 2003 and launched active training for its next generation of members living in North America, Canada, Europe and Australia.⁴⁰ A few charismatic LTTE leaders overseas engaged Western nations and displayed an overt willingness to negotiate, while covertly exploiting the peace process to consolidate the organization and maintain its clandestine operations of conducting suicide attacks, recruiting, amassing weapons, building the Tamil Tigers air capability, and expanding its reach to attack throughout the country.⁴¹ As a result, the LTTE's military capability increased significantly with the breakdown of successive ceasefire agreements and resumption of hostilities.⁴²

The ban on the LTTE as a terrorist organization imposed financial restrictions on the group's collection of funds. Yet, it continued to covertly engage in building its financial network and amassing funds through business fronts, money laundering, arms and human smuggling and drug trafficking.⁴³ The Tamil Tigers operated both in the global East and West and studied the strengths and weaknesses of those who came into contact with them:

In addition to engaging in illegal activities to facilitate weapons procurement, safe travel, and funds, terrorists may attempt to reduce the scrutiny they receive from law enforcement and intelligence communities. Several individuals were known to be involved in multiple counts of criminal activity in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Sri Lankan group designated by the U.S. State Department as a FTO...[several individuals were known to have] provided material support for the LTTE, but also to have conspired to bribe U.S. government officials

Fair, 'Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 11, no. 11, Spring 2005, pp. 140-142, refer to pressure groups and NGO's, forming cells in several countries to secure support and exert diplomatic pressure on Sri Lanka.

⁴⁰ S.M. Anthony, P. Wijesinghe and C. Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', interview series, unpublished, December 2015. Interview conducted with NP, on 15 July 2014, a reintegrated former member of the LTTE that worked with Castro, describes military training of foreign Tamils in 2003-2004-2005 in the Vanni region in Sri Lanka.

⁴¹ Tamilchelvam and Anton Balasingham were two of the LTTE leaders that lobbied diplomats, politicians and NGO's in the West. See: *Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis*, pp. 41-42, on the violations during the peace process. See: Hoglund, 'Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka', p. 166, on LTTE's continuing to strengthen its military capability and child recruitment. See: Fair, 'Urban Battlefields of South Asia', pp. 66-67, on the LTTE 'gaining substantially' by establishing 'cells throughout the country' by using their 'standard method' which was to 'exploit the peace process'.

⁴² S. de Silva, p. 12 and p. 449.

⁴³ S. O'Neil, 'Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress', *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, 24 May 2007, p. 4, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34014.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

in an effort to have the LTTE removed from the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.⁴⁴

The LTTE also coerced the Tamil community into paying a 'tax' to support its activities.⁴⁵ Those who resisted were harassed or socially marginalized.⁴⁶ The LTTE mobilized the Tamil community to engage NGO's (non-governmental organizations) and charities, both inside and outside of Sri Lanka, and set up business fronts to finance the activities of the LTTE.

The Tamil Tigers projected an image of victimhood, mistreatment and discrimination to secure support from vulnerable Tamil diaspora and sympathetic Western audience.⁴⁷ However, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the LTTE realized that the Global War on Terror would further criminalize their terror tactics and clamp down on its funding. The LTTE strengthened its international wing to engage and infiltrate the Western corridors of power. Parallel to its political outreach, the LTTE commenced the military training of Tamil expatriates living in Western countries. These expatriates or members of the Tamil diaspora of foreign citizenry travelled to Sri

⁴⁴ O'Neil, 'Terrorist Precursor Crimes', p. 14.

⁴⁵ Radio-Canada, 'Tamil gangs back in the spotlight', [radio], 2000, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tamil-gangs-back-in-the-spotlight-1.231276>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: BBC, *Tamils preying on Tamils*, [television], 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2007199.stm, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: BBC, *Police unit tackles Tamil gangs*, 2003, [television], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/3201465.stm, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: A. Balasunderam, 'Gang-related violence among young people of the Tamil refugee diaspora in London', *Safer Communities*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2009, pp. 34–41. See: DiasporaNews, *Tamil tiger activities in UK*, 2009, [youtube], <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9qaFfSI9nI>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: Administrator, getwestlondon, *Tamil gang jailed*, [news portal], 2013, <http://www.getwestlondon.co.uk/news/local-news/tamil-gang-jailed-6018162>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, 'Funding the "Final War" LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora: UK/Canada', HRW, New York, vol. 18, no. 1c, 2006, p. 33.

⁴⁷ The LTTE targeted the earnings of the Tamil community living overseas using guilt and intimidation. Some obliged through fear, and others to compensate the guilt. See: Human Rights Watch, 'Funding the "Final War" LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora: UK/Canada', p. 25-34. See: R. Ramasubramanian, IPCS, New Delhi, August 2004, p. 8, refers to the Tamil Tigers as 'infused with a sense of victimhood and martyrdom' in Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka. See: R. Alonso, Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Counter- Narratives against ETA's Terrorism in Spain, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), January 2010, p. 28, refers to terrorist groups such as ETA also benefiting from narratives based on victimhood. See: M. Mendelson, A systems understanding of terrorism with implications for policy, University of Akron, 2008, p. 391 refers to Palestinians being 'socialized and conditioned to adopt a culture of drama and victimhood', and p. 10 refers to terrorists as 'justifying actions based on rationalizing victimhood and mistreatment'.

Lanka during the peace agreement in 2003.⁴⁸ These foreign fighters received weapons training and indoctrination before returning to their host countries to form the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO).⁴⁹

Terrorism in Sri Lanka ended on 18 May 2009 with the death of the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and the demise of the LTTE's military capability. However, the LTTE's international support base was untouched by this transformation at home.⁵⁰ Post 2009, the LTTE support groups overseas splintered into more than 14 groups.⁵¹ These groups competed for funds, position and legitimacy within the Tamil community, while campaigning for separatism in Sri Lanka. The groups continued to function as part of their 'political strategy' to keep themselves relevant in the absence of military capability.⁵²

Narayan Swamy is one of the few people who provided an in-depth analysis of Prabhakaran's thoughts and actions based on direct interviews with him, the leadership, and members of the LTTE. He describes the strength of the LTTE being in its ability to simultaneously use 'diplomatic, political and military maneuvers' while remaining focused on achieving its goal of separatism. The ease with which the LTTE chief seized opportunities, used deception and schemed to accomplish his goals was remarkable. Prabhakaran 'hailed Palestinian guerillas killed by Mossad but accessed Israeli specialist training'; he 'publicly spoke highly of India' while scheming to destroy those 'close to New Delhi'; he 'sent greetings to Rajiv Gandhi', the then-Prime Minister of India, while plotting

⁴⁸ The Norwegian government brokered the peace accord in 2003 in an attempt to get the LTTE and Sri Lankan government to negotiate a peace settlement. The period of the peace accord was accompanied by a ceasefire and freedom of mobility for the LTTE.

⁴⁹ Periodically the LTTE agreed to ceasefires and used these periods to replenish their supplies, fortify the bases, build runways, network with the underworld, travel without restrictions, establish links with overseas support groups, engage professionals for technical support, import containers of supplies unchecked and establish suicide cells in the non LTTE controlled regions and assassinating high value targets.

⁵⁰ Stanford University, p. 3. See: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014*, p. 365. See: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015*, p. 386. See: *National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment*, Department of the Treasury, 6 December 2015, p. 37-38, refers to LTTE exploitation of charities and charitable giving, raising millions of dollars for the LTTE and laundering the funds through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO).

⁵¹ Research and Monitoring Division, 'Geneva's Human Rights Chameleons: Who are they? How do they operate?' Sri Lanka, DGI, 21 March 2014, pp. 24-29.

⁵² Gunaratna and Chalk, p. 8, on terrorist groups engaging in a military strategy and a political strategy – to achieve their objectives.

his death by a ‘human bomb’; he used Sri Lanka’s President Premadasa to ‘evict’ Indian troops and had him ‘blown to bits’ at a May Day rally; he ‘condemned’ the Tamils that emigrated to the West in search of ‘greener pastures’ and used them to fund the LTTE; and he ‘claimed that he nursed no animosity towards the ordinary Sinhalese, [while] his group committed the bloodiest carnages, targeting innocent Sinhalese men, women and children. At no point did he express the slightest remorse’. Prabhakaran’s personal ideology is reflected in his thinking: ‘For our growth we can use anyone. But those who help us should not benefit from us’.⁵³

1.4 Radicalization into Violence

The literature on radicalization identifies several definitions of radicalization with little agreement among scholars, except that radicalization is a process.⁵⁴ Radicalization into violence is a process that involves a shift in thoughts and beliefs, which could be a leap or a slow and gradual progression, into violence.⁵⁵ Several scholars have shed light on the internal shifts that move people towards violence. James Khalil, for instance, explores the shift between attitudes to violence and violent behavior⁵⁶; Peter Neumann distinguishes between cognitive and behavioral radicalization⁵⁷; and McCauley and Moskaleiko provides insights into the shift in beliefs, thinking and behaviors in the direction of violence.⁵⁸ The

⁵³ M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran*, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004, p. 214, p. 240 and p. 268.

⁵⁴ J. Horgan, ‘Deradicalization or Disengagement? A process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation’, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 2, no. 4, February 2008, p. 3. See: McCauley and Moskaleiko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways towards Terrorism’, p. 416. See: J. Khalil, ‘Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Taylor and Francis Group, vol. 37, no. 2, 2014, p. 199.

⁵⁵ McCauley and Moskaleiko, pp. 419-420.

⁵⁶ Khalil, ‘Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous’, p.199-204.

⁵⁷ P.R. Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalisation’, *International Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 4, July 2013, p. 873.

⁵⁸ McCauley and Moskaleiko, pp. 419-420.

crucial question, however, remains as to why some act on their violent thoughts, beliefs and attitudes, while others do not.

Scholars such as Scot Atran and Arie Kruglanski explore aspects that contribute to the process of radicalization into violence. Atran looks into group identity fusion, values considered sacred and the decision making process that propel individuals towards violence, while Kruglanski inspects the degrees of radicalization that determine the progression into violence.⁵⁹

This study will use the definition of a violent radical ideology, as a 'belief system that supports violence', and involves a 'personal commitment to violence' and the 'single minded pursuit' to achieve a 'focal goal'.⁶⁰ The transformation into violent radicalization involves a cognitive shift, which requires the suppression of accepted norms in pursuit of an alternative violence justifying belief system provided by the terrorist group. The terrorist group propagates a grievance narrative that is powerful and resonates with the community. A charismatic leadership is required to motivate individuals on the need to redress grievances urgently. An organization or network, driven by a powerful ideology, is then needed to legitimize the cause and justify the use of violence as the only way forward.

To transform the thinking of ordinary people into highly motivated violent extremists, and to groom these individuals into violent radicals and mobilize them to engage in terrorist activity is a complex and a highly debated process. Randy Borum explores several models and theories among which the Social Movement Theory and Conversion Theory expands our understanding of how terrorist ideology gathers momentum as a social

⁵⁹ S. Atran, 'The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 57, no. 13, June 2016, pp. 193 -197. See: A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, J.J. Belanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hettiarachchi, and R., Gunaratna, 'The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism', in H. Lavine (ed.), *Advances in Political Psychology*, New York, Wiley-Blackwell, vol. 35, no. 1, 2014, pp. 71-73.

⁶⁰ Kruglanski, et al., 'The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization', p. 75 and p. 77.

movement and the power of minority in converting or transforming the thinking of individuals and groups.⁶¹

Some of the models used to understand pathways to radicalization are explored by Christmann. This includes the four tiered 'Prevent Pyramid' model; the New York Police Department's four-stage radicalization process; Marc Sageman's four-stage radicalization process; Taarnby's eight-stage recruitment process; Gill's four-stage pathway model; Wiktorowicz's al-Muhajiroun four process model; Moghaddam's staircase of terrorism; and McCauley and Moskaleiko's 12 mechanisms of political radicalization.⁶² Christmann goes on to conclude that '[d]espite the identification of differing stages in the radicalization process, all studies agree that there is a stage of individual change'.⁶³

This study acknowledges that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence or indeed terrorism. Additionally, radicalization is not only a process of brainwashing but recognize that those who have joined terrorist groups have done so in accordance with their free will.⁶⁴ However, the degree to which individuals are influenced is mediated by their personal and social context. The focus of this study is on how terrorist groups market their

⁶¹ R. Borum, 'Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, 2011, pp. 18-19 and pp. 20-25. On Social Movement Theory see: A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 'Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory', Copenhagen, DIIS Working Paper, no 2008/2, 2008, pp. 6-8. On Conversion Theory see: S. Moscovici, 'Towards a Theory of Conversion Behaviour', in L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, New York, Academic Press, vol. 13, 1980, pp. 215-217.

⁶² K. Christmann, 'Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence', UK, Youth Justice Board, 2012, pp. 10-20.

⁶³ Christmann, 'Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism', p. 21.

⁶⁴ See: J. Baghini, 'Radicalisation is not Brainwashing. We need to rethink how we tackle it', Opinion: UK Security and Counter Terrorism, 13 July 2014, [online], <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/13/radicalisation-brainwashing-british-men-syria-julian-baghini>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: S. Atran and H. Sheikh, 'Dangerous Terrorists as Devoted Actors' in V. Zeigler-Hill, L.L.M. Welling and T.K. Shackelford (eds.), *Evolutionary Perspectives on Social Psychology*, Series on Evolutionary Psychology, Switzerland, Springer International, 2015, p. 406. See: C. Baker-Beall, C. Heath-Kelly and L. Jarvis (eds.), *Counter-Radicalisation Critical Perspectives*, Oxon, Routledge, 2015, p. 5. See: A. Kundnani, 'A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism', London, Claystone, 2015, p. 22. See: M. Sageman, 'Hofstad Case Study and the Blob Theory', in ARTIS, 'Theoretical Frameworks on Pathways to Violent Radicalization', ARTIS Research, August 2009, p. 15. See: Horgan, 'Deradicalization or Disengagement', p. 3.

ideologies to steer ordinary people along the path to join terrorist groups, and the strategies used by terrorist groups to influence the ordinary person to become a violent radical.

In spite of these differences in social characterization, the disparate groups they belonged to and the various structural situations within which all these individuals evolved, the fact is that all convicted terrorists entered a path towards violent radicalisation and became involved in terrorist activities. This empirical evidence underscores the apparent heterogeneity across the spectrum of violent actors.⁶⁵

The survival of terrorist groups depends on the strength of its numbers, popularity and ability to garner public support within its communities. It is essential to recognize that while social, personal and situational factors create a cognitive opening or vulnerability to engage with a violent radical group, the socialization or radicalization into violence involves an active component aided by terrorist groups. These groups do not wait for individuals to join their ranks but play an active role in influencing the decision making process to engage in supporting, joining, and/or conducting terrorist acts.

This case study aims to identify the techniques used specifically by the LTTE in the creation of a terrorist from recruitment to mobilization. The aspects explored are indoctrination and mentoring, maintaining the quest for significance, morally justifying the need for violence, and training to build skills and self-efficacy. This case study also explores the strategies that help with counter radicalization, de-radicalization and preventing re-radicalization.

⁶⁵ F. Reinares, et al., 'Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism', Brussels, 15 May 2008, p. 11. Panel members of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation: Fernando Reinares (Chairman), Rogelio Alonso, Tore Bjorgo, Donatella Della Porta, Rik Coolsaet, Farhad Khosrokhavar, Rudiger Lohler, Magnus Ranstorp, Alex P. Schmid, Andrew Silke, Michael Taarnby, and Gijs De Vries.

1.5 Focus of the Study

Several authors have discussed the causes of terrorism and factors that contribute to terrorism such as social, political, religious, economic, ethnic and historical factors.⁶⁶ This study, however, will examine the process used by the LTTE to radicalize civilians towards violence.⁶⁷ As such, it will identify the strategies used by the LTTE to indoctrinate, recruit, sustain and mobilize individuals for attack.

The shift from an ordinary civilian into a terrorist involves a multifactorial process, whereby violent extremist thinking is nurtured to support violence and violent action. The study will examine several factors, within the literature review, that are used by terrorist groups to actively radicalize civilians into violence. These factors are: the grievance narrative, the quest for significance, the ideology, organizational justice, image projected by the terrorist group, moral justification and self-efficacy.

⁶⁶ Scholars refer to ideological, social and personal causative factors of terrorism: Bruce Hoffman (1985) refers to alienation and boredom; Mark Sageman (2004) cites alienation and disenfranchisement; Robert Pape (2006) refers to liberation from occupation; Riaz Hassan (2008), Christopher Harmon (2010) and Rohan Gunaratna (2012) refer to political motivations; Nasra Hassan (2001) cites religious motivations; Arie Kruglanski (2009) refers to loss of significance; Mia Bloom (2005) cites personal loss and humiliation; Jessica Stern (2004) refers to personal and group based humiliation, frustration, poverty, lack of education; while Anne Speckhard (2006) and Khapta Akhmedova (2006) cites personal trauma.

⁶⁷ The LTTE was a terrorist group that conducted acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka, in pursuit of a separate state from 1975-2009. LTTE members were known as Tamil Tigers. The children recruited belonged to the Leopard Brigade also known as the *Baby Brigade*. The women recruited belonged to the Sodiya Regiment also known as *Birds of Freedom*.




Figure 1. Potential radicalizing components.

There is no universally agreed upon definition of radicalization.⁶⁸ However, this study will use a simple definition of radicalization that refers to the process of an individual becoming extreme.⁶⁹ The focus of this study is to understand the process by which civilians were actively groomed into violent radicals and violent extremists.

The case study of the Tamil Tigers was selected because the LTTE systematically recruited, trained, sustained and mobilized its membership to conduct acts of terrorism and earned the reputation of being a ‘terrorist group ... that perfected the use of suicide bombers,

⁶⁸ D.R. Mandel, ‘Radicalization: What Does It Mean?’ in T.M. Pick, A. Speckhard, B. Jacuch (eds.), *Home-Grown Terrorism*, Netherlands, IOS Press, 2009, pp. 101-113. See: Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, pp. 873–893. See: Schmid, ‘Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalisation’, p. 6 and p. 17.

⁶⁹ A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand and R. Gunaratna, ‘Aspects of Radicalization’, in R. Gunaratna, J. Jerard., and L. Rubin, (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 135.

invented the suicide belt and pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks'.⁷⁰ Interviews were conducted with former Tamil Tigers, their family members and members of the Tamil diaspora to determine their perception of the factors involved in radicalization of the members of their community into terrorism. Obtaining an internal perspective from within the LTTE and the Tamil community was to better understand and address the issues of radicalization, de-radicalization and re-radicalization. A perspective from within will help design more effective counter radicalization and de-radicalization programs that target the strategies used by terrorist groups to recruit, sustain and mobilize its members.

1.6 Justification for the Study

The LTTE mastered the art of radicalization, and in turn mobilized its members to conduct some of the most lethal suicide attacks. Its capacity to recruit and transform the thinking of ordinary civilians was remarkable. The only people who know this process of transformation are the former Tamil Tigers who lived through the grooming process to create what Narayan Swamy describes as 'unique human beings' that were 'groomed' into human bombs. The study aims to provide insights into the process of radicalization and how to reverse it by utilizing the perspective of the former LTTE members, their family members and members of the Tamil diaspora.

⁷⁰ FBI, 'Taming of the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the US', p. 1.

1.7 Aims and Objectives of the Study

The study aims to identify the strategies used by the LTTE to radicalize civilians into violence, and:

- Develop strategies to counter the radicalization of individuals into violence.
- Prevent the radicalization of communities.
- Support the existing de-radicalization initiatives and prevent re-radicalization.

The objectives of the study are to gain an understanding of the:

1. Strategies used to recruit, sustain, and mobilize individuals into violence.
2. Strategies used to project the grievance narrative to the masses.
3. Strategies used to project an ideology as morally just.
4. Strategies used to manipulate the quest for significance.
5. Strategies used to project the organization as just and fair.
6. Strategies used to morally justify violence.
7. Strategies used to build skills and self-efficacy to mobilize members into violence.
8. Strategies that will help with de-radicalization and prevent radicalization in the community.

1.8 Structure of the Study

The Introduction chapter explores the LTTE as a terrorist organization, the role of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the debate on the radicalization process. Chapter 2 examines the literature on the seven components hypothesized to contribute to the process of radicalization. It will explore the narrative and significance of quest components used in the recruitment of civilians into terrorism. Chapter 2 will further look at ideology, the

organization and the image projected by terrorist groups in order to sustain its membership. Finally, it will examine the moral justification and self-efficacy components used by terrorist groups to justify violence and mobilize members.

Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to test seven components discussed in the literature review. Interviews were conducted with a sample of 90 individuals, consisting of 60 former LTTE members that belonged to the suicide units and other units and those who joined the LTTE as child combatants. The sample also included 15 family members of former LTTE members and 15 members of the Tamil diaspora. Seven primary hypotheses were formulated to test the evidence for the presence of these components in the sample used.

The analysis of the data acquired from the survey and interviews are presented in chapters 4 and 5. The quantitative data is presented in Chapter 4 and the statistical findings are based on the several hypotheses being tested. Chapter 5 presents the qualitative data, which includes participant views of the LTTE and the process of radicalization.

The focus of Chapter 6 is on discussing the findings of the previous two chapters related to the hypotheses. This chapter also includes the limitations of the study and ethical considerations. Finally, Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the study and provides recommendations. The benefits of the study and future research are also included in this chapter.

1.9 Conclusion

Given the evolutionary and adaptive nature of terrorist groups, it is vital to understand the psychology of these entities.⁷¹ The LTTE learned from its successes and failures and adapted according to the changing environment and conditions to achieve its goal of separatism. Successive Sri Lankan governments failed adapt to this highly versatile terrorist group. The focus of this case study is to identify strategies used by the LTTE in radicalizing individuals into violence and recruit, sustain and mobilize its membership. The Tamil Tiger case study is, therefore, used to identify factors involved in recruitment, sustenance and mobilization of individuals groomed into terrorism. An understanding of this will help design counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies.

The study will test seven hypotheses related to the role of the narrative, the quest for significance, the ideology, the organization, the images projected, moral justifications for violence and self-efficacy. Identifying and exploring the presence and function of these components will contribute to the formulation of effective counter radicalization and de-radicalization strategies that will ensure safer communities.

⁷¹ H.R. Trujillo and B.A. Jackson, 'Organizational Learning as a Four-Component Process', in B.A. Jackson, J.C. Baker, K. Cragin, J. Parachini, H.R. Trujillo and P. Chalk (eds.), *Aptitude for Destruction: Case Studies of Organizational Learning*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Infrastructure Safety and Transportation, vol. 2, 2005, p. 182.

'I have groomed my weak brethren into a strong weapon called the Black Tigers'.¹

Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter will explore seven themes. First, it observes the importance of narratives within communities. The discussion will be on the formation of narratives, sequencing and manipulation of narratives to evoke emotions, reframing the narrative in accordance with the ideology, expanding the narrative to include a greater number of grievances and promoting the narrative through the media. Second, the chapter examines the concept of personal significance. The focus will be on grievances resulting in the loss of significance, which subsequently gives rise to the quest for significance, and its manipulation.

Third, the chapter will discuss the literature on the role of ideology in the radicalization process of recruits. The emphasis is on the basic components of ideology and the manipulation of grievances within the ideology that provide the ideological justifications for the use of violence. Fourth, the chapter will observe the function of terrorist organizations that project an image of being just and fair. The focus will be on trust-building in terrorist organizations while targeting the credibility of legitimate governments to secure loyalty to the leadership, manipulates the trust to suspend independent critical thinking, and becomes the vehicle to operationalize the ideology. Fifth, the chapter will explain the different images and roles that allow members to play an active role within the terrorist group. The discussion here will center on how terrorist groups project different images to different groups to secure a local and international support base.

¹ Prabhakaran's speech at the commemoration of the sixth Black tiger Day on 5 July 1993, quoted in M.R. Narayan Swami, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran*, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004, p.249.

Sixth, the chapter will study the moral justification of violent acts. In this regard, terrorist organizations reframing violence to normalize the use of violence, morally justifying actions to legitimize the use of violence, eliminating the moral conflict by rationalizing violence, disengaging from social norms that regulate social behavior, and establishing a new moral code that justifies the use of violence will be discussed. Lastly, the chapter will detail the process involved in developing self-efficacy through skill building. The information here will highlight how developing skill and confidence helps to mobilize the terrorist to conduct attacks, thereby facilitating the leap from ideological motivation into action.

2.1 The Narrative

The main narrative of the community is based on the history of victories, failures and grievances that give legitimacy to the community. The narrative is a powerful tool that binds people together to form a shared identity and mobilizes them into action. According to Arun Kundnani ‘...narratives are necessarily selective, reflecting choices about what is relevant and irrelevant...with a disturbance or conflict which needs to be resolved through some course of action’.²

The selective focus on narratives of injustice, discrimination, subjugation, occupation and suffering keep the community in a state of suspense and distress. Terrorists utilize the narrative of grievance to garner sympathy and support by evoking a sense of injustice that propels individuals to unite and act against the perpetrators. Terrorist groups

² A. Kundnani, ‘Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe’, Netherlands, ICCT-The Hague, 2012, p. 8.

require ‘a coherent and appealing foundational’ narrative that is woven with facts, myths and emotionality, which is more appealing to its audience than rational arguments.³

The narratives generated define the enemy and justify killing those who oppose the terrorist group, including members of its own faith and ethnic group. These narratives of injustice and persecution also legitimize the use of violence and suppress norms against killing civilians, and justify taking their own life using the myth of martyrdom.⁴ Moreover, grievance narratives are framed to appeal to different audiences and personalities at different levels, creating an active and passive support base. As such, many are also likely to ‘agree with the narrative but will not engage in the violence’.⁵

Terrorist groups manipulate narratives to shape the thinking and behavior of the target community. Casebeer and Russell highlight the critical and multifaceted role that the narrative plays throughout the lifecycle of a terrorist group in recruitment, formation of identity, role, ideology, foundational myths and in framing the legitimacy of the organization.⁶

2.1.1 Framing the Narrative

Terrorist groups incorporate actual and perceived grievances in their narrative to resonate with the target audience and manipulate the perceptions of the message recipient. The recruiter uses culturally familiar words, symbols or narratives that generate an emotional

³ W.D. Casebeer and J.A. Russel, ‘Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive “Counter-Narrative Strategy”’, *Strategic Insights*, California, Center for Contemporary Conflict, vol. 4, no. 3, March 2005, p. 8.

⁴ I.S. Sheehan, ‘Are Suicide Terrorists Suicidal? A Critical Assessment of the Evidence’, *Innovations in Clinical Neuroscience*, vol. 11, no. 9, p. 85, 2014. See: T.K. Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Pepushtakaan Negara Malaysia, SEARCCT, 2012, pp. 40-53.

⁵ R. Gunaratna and O. Hennessy, ‘Through the Militant Lens: The Power of Ideology and Narratives’, *ICCT Research Paper*, The Hague, ICCT, 2012, p. 2.

⁶ W.D. Casebeer and J.A. Russel, ‘Storytelling and Terrorism’, pp. 6-7.

reaction within the individual.⁷ These strategies used by terrorist groups open the door for a future relationship based on common opinions, ideologies and eventually trust in the group.⁸

Snow and Benford discuss three types of framing necessary for successful recruitment. First, 'diagnostic framing' convinces the recruit that a problem exists and needs to be addressed. Second, 'prognostic framing' shows the strategies, tactics and targets that will be used. Third, 'motivational framing' convinces the recruit to take action.⁹ Thus, the narratives identify the problem, show how to fix it and push the community into action.

The LTTE strategy capitalized on the losses and gains by framing and reframing the narrative. If a terrorist died while conducting an attack, it was framed as a 'sacrifice', thereby creating an impression of veneration and martyrdom.¹⁰ Deaths were framed as 'killings' to spur anger and desire to seek revenge, and entrench members in deeper commitment to the group. Death was used to project guilt onto civilians: 'they are dying for you'. The narrative was framed using the terminology to generate adequate emotion for continued commitment of its members.

If the attack was a success, the attackers who died were celebrated as martyrs, and the family elevated to the status of a *maveera* (martyr) family.¹¹ Martyrdom, honor to the family and special treatment to the attackers further motivated the members and the group.

⁷ K.M. Fahoum and J. Width, 'Marketing Terror: Effects of Anti-Messaging on GSPC Recruitment', *Strategic Insights*, vol. 5, no. 8, November 2006, p. 3.

⁸ W.A. Gamson, 'The Social Psychology of Collective Action', 1992, cited in Fahoum and Width, 'Marketing Terror', p. 3.

⁹ D.A. Snow and R.D. Benford, 'Ideology, frame resonance and participant mobilization', 1988, cited in Fahoum and Width, 'Marketing Terror', p. 3.

¹⁰ Tamil Tigers used the term 'sacrificed' to refer to a member who died in an attack when the purpose was to venerate the demise. The term 'killed' when the purpose was to generate anger and hatred. Names of terrorists who died in suicide missions and attacks were given to the new recruits, to buildings, suicide boats and crafts.

¹¹ LTTE members who died or were killed when conducting attacks were celebrated on 27 November and this day was referred to as the Hero's Day or *Maveera* Day.

The attackers were also given higher positions, gifts, extra bodyguards and larger units to manage.¹² The successful attacks motivated the supporters to fund further attacks.¹³

The narrative evolves with the progression of the conflict with ever-increasing injustices that bind the group together. As the narrative is framed to resonate with the public, it helps set the context for the audience. Those who identify with the grievance narrative become sympathetic to the group and act as its support base.

2.1.2 Sequencing the Grievance Narrative

The grievance narrative is a significant part of the terrorist ideology. Terrorist groups piece together separate events in sequence to form a powerful narrative that demonizes the enemy and justifies violence. The narrative is packaged ‘to suggest a crisis, a causal explanation of the crisis, and the solution to alleviate the suffering’.¹⁴

Video clips are designed to narrate a story and arouse emotion. These clips are sequenced to show an attack by the enemy with massive damage to property, with women and children as the predominant victims. The video would conclude with a show of arrogance by the state security forces and politicians. The video would induce shock amongst an audience that identifies with the victim and this leads to anger and hatred towards the enemy state.

Video clips designed for indoctrination reflect the ideology of the terrorist group. They portray victimization of the people, which provides moral justification of violence by

¹² Interview conducted by researcher with a former LTTE suicide member (S030), on 15 September 2014, revealed that the LTTE rewarded its members with gifts (a radio or Swiss knife), positions and resources, besides compliments for successful attacks.

¹³ S.M. Anthony, P. Wijesinghe and C. Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, interview series, unpublished, December 2015. Interview conducted on 22 May 2011 with a former Tamil Tiger (NP) that the LTTE supporting diaspora funded major attacks: ‘Canadian and London money came for the attacks in Colombo. Kadirgamar’s assassination there was 200,000 pounds from London. Advance is given and balance given after the mission is completed’.

¹⁴ M.M. Hafez, ‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 19, no. 1, 2007, p. 99.

terrorists. Any counter attacks by the terrorist group are depicted as a show of strength with a message of destruction to come. Similarly, Prabhakaran delivered a message of destruction: '[b]y carrying out suicide assaults, we can terrorize the enemy, and demonstrate that though small, we have the potential to inflict heavy damage on them'.¹⁵

The narrative is a success when the audience can relate to the grievances, identify with the pain within the story and understand the justification of the terrorist group for the use of violence to redress the grievances.

2.1.3 Identification with the Narrative

The powerful narratives of injustice, discrimination, occupation and repression at the hands of the enemy arouse emotions in those far removed from the ground realities of the conflict. This phenomenon is known as 'vicarious emotional arousal'.¹⁶ Krueger and Maleckova state that '[a]lthough no single factor has been determined to have a direct causal relationship with terrorism, many of these conditions provide extremists with direct or vicarious grievances justifying their violent acts on behalf of populations and communities with whom they feel an emotive, psychological, or social bond'.¹⁷

Thus, the narrative is effective when individuals vicariously identify with it and experience a similar set of emotions.¹⁸ Fink and Barclay describe how '[t]raumatic events or tragedies, experienced directly by an individual, family, or friends or indirectly by a community with which they share an emotive bond, can also create powerful cognitive

¹⁵ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 268.

¹⁶ Vicarious emotional suffering: Emotions aroused not having directly experienced suffering, but by listening to the experience of such suffering indirectly on television or through another party.

¹⁷ A.B. Krueger, and J. Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?', 2003, cited in N.C. Fink and J. Barclay, 'Mastering the Narrative: Counter terrorism, strategic communication and the United Nations', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, CGCC. 2013, p. 6.

¹⁸ A. Bandura, 'Self-efficacy', in V. S. Ramachaudran (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, New York, Academic Press, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 71-81.

openings to prompt participation in violent activities'.¹⁹ Terrorist groups depend heavily on generating support for their cause by evoking anger, sadness, and indignation within the wider public.

The LTTE was also able to secure support of non-Sri Lankans through vicarious identification and grievances. For instance, the LTTE operative V. Sriharan alias Murugan inspired an Indian civilian, S. Nalini, to join the team that killed the Indian Prime Minister, by using narratives of injustice and generating sympathy for a cause that was beyond the borders of India.²⁰ The LTTE actively recruited and trained Tamils of foreign citizenry sympathetic to its ideology of a separate state through the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO).²¹ Vicarious grievance narratives were also used to bind the Tamil diaspora to the group at home: 'They're our terrorists, and you all must support this struggle'.²² The narrative framed within the diaspora was strategic.²³

Tamil diaspora members who did not identify with the grievance narratives were disinclined to fund terrorism. They were then terrorized into donating to the LTTE coffers. A Tamil community activist articulates his fear of the LTTE: 'The killing doesn't just happen back home in Sri Lanka. It happens in Paris, in Canada It's everywhere, all over the world'.²⁴ The fear ensured that the members remained aligned to the LTTE and its cause.

¹⁹ N.C. Fink and J. Barclay, 'Mastering the Narrative: Counter terrorism, strategic communication and the United Nations', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, CGCC. 2013, p. 6.

²⁰ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, pp. 225-229. Nalini, a native of India, accompanied the LTTE suicide squad whenever they went out, as she spoke Tamil with a south Indian accent. This was to prevent the group from being identified as Sri Lankan Tamil from their accent.

²¹ Tamil Youth Organization (TYO), consists of foreign citizens of Tamil heritage, indoctrinated and trained by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, during the ceasefire negotiated by Norway in 2002-2005. These foreign fighters of Canadian, British, Australian and continental European citizenry returned to their countries of citizenship to continue to fight for separatism from overseas.

²² Words of Raj Rajaratnam recorded by an FBI agent at the LTTE fundraising Gala at the Doubletree Somerset Hotel, New Jersey. See: 'Crouching Tiger, Hidden Raj', Vanity Fair [online news magazine], 2011, <http://www.slbol.lk/fullstory.php?id=1370040060>, (accessed 18 February 2017). Raj Rajaratnam, currently imprisoned in New York on 14 counts of conspiracy and securities fraud in May 2011, is alleged to have given US\$1million to the LTTE for winning the battle and securing Elephant Pass in 2000.

²³ Fahoum and Width, p. 6.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, 'Funding the "Final War" LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora: UK/Canada', HRW, New York, vol. 18, no. 1c, 2006, p. 1, refers to the words of a Tamil community activist, Toronto, January 2006.

The LTTE extended its definition of the enemy to those who challenged the authority of the LTTE chief and his organization. Prabhakaran emerged as the sole leader of the Tamil cause with the assassination of the deputy leader, Mahattaya, and the destruction of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), a rival Tamil group that was labelled as ‘traitors and enemy agents’.²⁵ Both, Mahattaya and TELO, were framed as threats to the Tamil cause. The parameters of the narrative were redefined: loyalty to the group and its leader was synonymous with loyalty to the cause.

Murphy and colleagues emphasize that the narrative, rather than the individuals or emotions, has the greatest impact on influencing knowledge, attitudes and behavior of the individual.²⁶ A former suicide member articulates how the LTTE hijacked the narrative and manipulated perceptions: ‘we were told our story, how we should think and feel, what our story should be’. The narrative provided a model to follow, ‘I identified with that story and thought – this is how I should be’. The narrative was compelling: ‘it was powerful and attractive’, ‘if we embrace it, we are fine’ but ‘if we reject it, we are looked down upon’.²⁷

2.1.4 Types of Narratives

A variety of narratives are used by terrorist groups in the process of violent radicalization. Grievance narratives were accompanied by narratives of success, victory, and martyrdom to provide meaning and purpose to the members. These narratives were made emotive and colorful using communication strategies that helped to recruit, sustain and mobilize members to support and conduct violence.

²⁵ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, pp. 268-269, refers to Mahattaya and TELO.

²⁶ S.T. Murphy, L.B. Frank, M.B. Moran and P. Patnoe-Woodley, ‘Involved, Transported, or Emotional? Exploring the Determinants of Change in Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior in Entertainment-Education’, *Journal of Communication*, vol. 61, no. 3, 2011, p. 407.

²⁷ S.M. Anthony, P. Wijesinghe and C. Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PDP, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 11 June 2011.

Prabhakaran too justified the need to create a 'battlefield where blood has necessarily to be shed'. Through the justification of this self-sacrificial narrative, he 'pushed his men to the jaws of death by increasingly resorting to suicide attacks'. He accomplished this with pride and reverence: 'I can proudly say that none can equal our martyrs...[s]uch magnificent qualities have enabled them to create an unparalleled legend of heroism'.²⁸

Martyrdom narratives are critical to radicalize, recruit and mobilize the community. Hafez speaks about the 'myth of martyrdom' and its appeal to the potential recruit. He asserts that sacrificing their life will make them a hero and alleviate the humiliation of 'suffering and indignity' as well as 'collective deprivations and grievances'.²⁹ As such, the martyrdom narrative was designed to create a human bomb as it elevated ordinary people into extraordinary moral beings who found glamour in suicide bombing.

In addition, the narratives of success were important to sustain and mobilize the membership. These include powerful images of successful attacks, strength in numbers and large weapons caches. This helped to motivate fighters, secure the confidence of supporters, attract funding and strike fear into the heart of the enemy.

Narratives of victimhood and threat were also important to justify the role of the terrorist group. Narratives of victory to the group and loss to the enemy motivates vulnerable communities to continue to invest in the struggle. As such, it has been argued that, '[t]errorist propagandists have typically spun glamorous success narratives for their audiences that spelled the effectiveness of violent struggle and of the inevitability of the adversary's demise'.³⁰

²⁸ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 234, p. 236, p. 237 and p. 240, refers to quotes from Prabhakaran's annual 'Hero's Day' speech.

²⁹ Hafez, 'Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq', p. 95.

³⁰ A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, J.J. Belanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hettiarachchi, and R., Gunaratna, 'The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism', in H. Lavine (ed.), *Advances in Political Psychology*, New York, Wiley-Blackwell, vol. 35, no. 1, 2014, p.77.

Finally, emotive grievance narratives have the potential to push people to seek revenge or pull people to become a savior or martyr. These push and pull factors focus on range of emotions, inviting the audience to take action and become part of the narrative.

2.1.5 Techniques to Promote the Narrative

Terrorist groups use multipronged communication strategies to reach out to their audiences. Casebeer and Russel discuss three components that impact the target audience. First, the ‘Ethos of the speaker that establishes credibility in the eyes of the message recipient.’ The second component is ‘Pathos or the appeals made to the audience’s emotions.’ Third, the ‘logos or the appeal made to consider the facts and why this is the best way’.³¹ The narrative alone needs to be powerful and emotive to resonate with the community in order to radicalize them.

The LTTE used street theatre, drama, songs, testimonies, documentaries and film clips to circulate grievance narratives within the community. Even though the message resonated with many, most individuals were still restricted to a supportive role rather than being involved in violence. As such, when an individual would join the LTTE, their friends and family could possibly become passive supporters of the group.

Symbolic communication is used as a powerful tool to engage the community. Bandura articulates that ‘through symbols, people give meaning, form, and continuity to their experiences’.³² The LTTE used a range of symbolic communication tools to build a narrative of conflict. The message of separatism was articulated through themes of injustice and discrimination, as well as martyrdom, using song, music, dance and drama. In the back drop, the LTTE flag, logo and the map of a divided Sri Lanka would be used. Women and

³¹ Casebeer and Russel, p. 11.

³² A. Bandura, ‘Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication’, *Media Psychology*, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, p. 95.

children were used to convey emotive themes of suffering and victimization. According to the Change Institute, it is often the ‘emotional’ bonds ‘rather than transactional bonds that bind movements together’.³³

2.1.6 Media and the Power of the Narrative

According to Strom ‘the media is the most powerful tool of the terrorist’.³⁴ The social media, internet and news channels help to carry the message of terrorist groups to the wider public. The importance of the media in broadcasting the narrative is articulated by Scanlan as she argues that, ‘terrorists succeed when they seize headlines’.³⁵ The terrorists’ message is effective when it is dramatic and emotive, reaches the wider public, and impacts public life, policy and the government.

Hafez describes how terrorist groups carefully tailor messages with ‘emotive elements’ and would ‘avoid overwhelming their audiences with information’. They use ‘emotional narratives’ to attract the audience to ‘the image of the *heroic martyr*’ in order to ‘galvanize support for their cause’. Biographies of suicide bombers and online material with themes of ‘humiliation, collusion, and redemption’ appear to push people to make ‘heroic sacrifices’. Moreover, narratives of ‘exaggerated mistreatment of women appeal to the masculinity of men’ and ‘shame them into protecting the cause’.³⁶

The campaigns driven by terrorists and states involved in counter-terrorism are fighting a battle of perceptions. The formation of perceptions of individuals, groups and

³³ The Change Institute, ‘Studies into Violent Radicalization; Lot 2. The Beliefs Ideologies and Narratives’, a study conducted for the European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, 2008, p. 31, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_narrative_en.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017).

³⁴ K.M. Strom, *Terrorism, Democracy and the Apocalyptic Narrative*, Norwegian Police University College, Oslo, 2011, p. 42.

³⁵ M. Scanlan, *Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction*, 2001, cited in S.A. Suver, ‘Exploding Narratives: The Literature of Terrorism in Contemporary America’, PhD Thesis, University of Florida, USA, 2008, p. 2. Available from: Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations, The Graduate School of DigiNole Commons, Paper 1491.

³⁶ Hafez, p. 96.

nations largely depend on how events are presented and the messages are delivered. Communities become polarized when the conflict persists, giving rise to grievances on all sides. Although grievances and polarization does not necessarily give rise to violent radicalization, terrorist groups capitalize on portraying grievance narratives to evoke sadness, anger and hatred towards the enemy state and community. The terrorist group then goes on to recruit emotionally charged individuals, and secure moral and material support from them, while morally justifying the use of violence.³⁷

2.1.7 De-radicalization and Narratives

De-radicalization and counter radicalization programs have much to learn from the radical and violence oriented narratives used by terrorist groups. Exposing the manipulation of grievances, techniques used by terrorist groups to evoke anger and emotion, reframing the narratives, and engaging passionate and charismatic individuals to target the different audiences with counter narratives are likely to help potential recruits think again, prior to engaging with recruiters. The power of the narrative to convert is based on the audience's perception of the truth and credibility of the message.³⁸ Providing an alternative narrative involves studying the content of the narratives, and identifying the motives, target audience, the message, method of dissemination and the messenger.

³⁷ F. Reinares, et al., 'Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism', Brussels, 15 May 2008, pp. 15-17. Panel members of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation: Fernando Reinares (Chairman), Rogelio Alonso, Tore Bjorgo, Donatella Della Porta, Rik Coolsaet, Farhad Khosrokhavar, Rudiger Lohker, Magnus Ranstorp, Alex P. Schmid, Andrew Silke, Michael Taarnby, and Gijs De Vries.

³⁸ S. Moscovici, 'Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior', in L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, New York, Academic Press, vol. 13, 1980, p. 215, refers to the validation process that occurs when trying to see the minority perspective. See: A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 'Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory', Copenhagen, Denmark, DIIS Working Paper, no 2008/2, 2008, pp. 6-8, on framing problems as injustices and moral justification for violence against civilians to correct injustices. See: C.J. Nemeth, 'Minority Influence Theory', IRLE Working Paper No. 218-10, 2010, Berkeley University, <http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/218-10.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017), on minority influence on majority due to actively processing the minority argument due to the need to understand.

2.1.8 Hypothesis to Test

The study observes the role of the narrative in helping to radicalize, recruit, sustain and mobilize the Tamil Tigers for attacks.

Hypothesis 1: A powerful emotional grievance narrative is an essential foundational component in recruitment of terrorists; this narrative continues to evolve and is reframed throughout the lifespan of the terrorist within the movement.

2.2 The Significance Quest

Individual and collective grievances give rise to the arousal of the significance quest. Kruglanski and Fishman identify ‘the quest for personal meaning and significance’ as a ‘pervasive motivational force in human behavior’ that drives people to redress grievances and restore significance.³⁹ Sympathizers and supporters seek a leadership that is willing to respond to grievances.⁴⁰ Charismatic leaders and groups emerge to restore lost significance by reframing the grievance in a social context.⁴¹ These leaders promote violent action as the only possible way forward to redress grievances, and transform helplessness and resentment into action within identifying communities.

Grievances are about losses, inequalities and unfair treatment, which gives rise to a sense of injustice, powerlessness, helplessness and insignificance. Grievances generate a loss of significance at the individual level (I don’t matter), at the group level (we are of no

³⁹ A.W. Kruglanski and S. Fishman, ‘Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis’, *Social Issues and Policy Review*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2009, p. 10.

⁴⁰ R. Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories’, *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, 2011, pp. 7-18, on seeking to find meaning and being open to other world views.

⁴¹ A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I’, pp. 6-8, on framing the grievance. See: Reinares, et al., ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism’, p. 15, on charismatic leadership.

consequence) and at the public level (we are of no importance to them). This loss of significance leads to the quest for significance.

The quest for significance is an attempt to *restore* lost significance related to personal failures and helplessness, discrimination and powerlessness, group suffering and humiliation, and personal stigma related to relationship difficulties such as divorce and infertility or illness and disfigurement.⁴² The quest for significance can *arise* when presented with the opportunity to *gain* significance through acts of bravery, heroism, and martyrdom. It could also arise when people feel their values and territories are threatened and they intend to *protect* and maintain their relevance and significance.

Scot Atran describes a devoted actor's willingness to die as an act of protecting sacred values.⁴³ The threat to or loss of sacred values is at the center of overt moral justifications for violence employed by terrorist groups. Individuals, communities and groups define what is sacred and determine who destroys and threatens these sacred values. The loss of sacred values, such as freedom, equality, territory, religious practice, culture, safety, community, family and individuality have the potential to generate a sense of insignificance. This loss of significance also gives rise to the need to restore significance. Terrorist groups define what is sacred based on their ideology and engage the community to protect these values.

⁴² A.P. Schmid, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review', *ICCT Research Paper*, Netherlands, ICCT, March 2013, p. 4, refers to individual level issues, social and government related issues. See: A.W. Kruglanski, 'Joining Islamic State is about "sex and aggression" not religion', October 16, 2014, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/16joining-islamic-state-is-about-sex-and-aggression-no-religion/>, (accessed 18 February 2017), on issues of divorce, disfigurement, as well as social factors.

⁴³ S. Atran, 'The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures' *Current Anthropology*, vol. 57, no. 13, June 2016, pp. 197-198, refers to fighting for what is held sacred. See: H. Sheikh, A. Gomez and S. Atran, 'Empirical Evidence for the Devoted Actor Model', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 57, no. 13, June 2016, p. 204, on willingness to protect what is held sacred. See: The Executive Summary by S. Atran and R. Davis, in ARTIS, 'Theoretical Frameworks on Pathways to Violent Radicalization', ARTIS Research, August 2009, p. 8, on willingness to die for values held sacred.

While terrorist groups project their mission a 'virtuous calling' or a noble duty to protect that which is sacred, what is not highlighted are the emotions.⁴⁴ The fear, anxiety, helplessness and anger that drive the decision making related to losing or the threat of losing significance (being relevant, mattering and being of value).

In this regard, Reinares and colleagues articulate the importance of maintaining legitimacy, relevance or significance of the ideology to arouse the quest for significance. This influences the decision-making process to join the group.⁴⁵ Manipulation of grievances is central to the quest for significance. Actual and perceived grievances are 'skillfully exploited by terrorist propagandists' and developed into narratives of loss.⁴⁶ A former LTTE member describes how the narrative is transformed to focus on the loss of significance through the death of a friend, which generated the quest for significance through killing to avenge the death, and regaining significance by feeling like a hero:

If I had a friend and if he dies in an attack or fighting for that reason they made it into a worse murderer (sic). They would brainwash us saying 'your friend sacrificed his life and the Sinhalese killed him'. But a Sinhalese youth has been killed by your friend. If your friend died when attempting to kill someone, I have never heard them use word man/person to refer to the one who stands against your friend or opposes him. I did not understand it at that time. Besides they made me think that I was a hero.⁴⁷

The text further refers to dehumanizing the enemy by not referring to them as a *man* or *person*, thereby suppressing any moral qualms in avenging the loss. In hindsight, the interviewee reflects on the fact that his friend died when he tried to kill someone. However, instead the terrorist group diverts attention to the death of the friend, arousing the

⁴⁴ J. Baggini, 'Radicalisation is not Brainwashing: We need to rethink how we tackle it', Opinion: UK Security and Counter Terrorism, 13 July 2014, [online], <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/13/radicalisation-brainwashing-british-men-syria-julian-baggini>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

⁴⁵ Reinares, et al., 'Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism', p. 16.

⁴⁶ Kruglanski et al., 'The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization', p. 75.

⁴⁷ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', cites interview conducted with PDP, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 11 June 2011.

significance quest by avenging the death. The terrorist becomes the martyr and vengeance becomes heroic, thereby gaining and restoring significance.

Prabhakaran claimed that '[w]e have people prepared to give up their lives. We make up a list of these people and train them'.⁴⁸ But it is the promise of martyrdom within these narratives, to restore the lost significance, even in death that attracts the recruits: 'our martyrs are the pillars...whose blood enriches the history...whose memories make our determination stronger'. These narratives of restoration of significance shift the significance quest in the direction of terrorism.⁴⁹

A former LTTE child soldier provides a counter narrative to the significance of martyrdom by stating: 'they trapped us by giving false hopes saying even death can become life, the tombstone an epic'.⁵⁰ The LTTE used the dead by marketing them as martyrs so as to recruit civilians and sustain its members. The former child soldier challenges the narrative of hope and significance attributed to martyrdom.

2.2.1 Suppressing Alternative Goals

Shah and colleagues note that when commitment to a particular goal is intense, alternative goals are inhibited or suppressed.⁵¹ The more committed the person becomes to the terrorist group, the more willing he or she is to take risks and disregard personal safety. Self-preservation is then sacrificed in the interest of the group.

⁴⁸ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 234 and p. 238, refers to a quotation from Prabhakaran's 'Hero's Day' speech in November 1990.

⁴⁹ A.W. Kruglanski, J.J. Bélanger, M. Gelfand, R. Gunaratna, M. Hettiarachchi, F. Reinares, E. Orehek, J. Sasota, and K. Sharvit, 'Terrorism: A (Self) Love Story', Re-directing the Significance Quest Can End Violence', *American Psychologist*, vol., 68, no. 7, 2013, p. 561.

⁵⁰ P. Selvaraja, 'New Life in a Rehabilitation Center: Testimony of a Child Combatant', Sri Lanka, unpublished, 24 October 2009, p. 21.

⁵¹ J.Y. Shah, R.S. Friedman and A.W. Kruglanski, 'Forgetting all else: On the antecedents and consequences of goal shielding', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 83, no. 6, 2002, pp. 1261-1280.

A former Tamil Tiger describes this phenomenon: '[t]hen I came to a stage where I had no love for myself. I had no value for my life. At that time I didn't know anything but this. I was ready to give myself fully, even to destroy myself, in order to destroy another person, to create trouble in another person's life, and to hurt another person'.⁵² He refers to being consumed by a goal that was greater than his life, which allowed him to suppress the 'love of self' according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and self-preservation instincts.⁵³

The former Tamil Tiger then goes on to describe a transformation into a new life with new goals: 'There is a time that we would be changed even without our own knowledge. So I too changed and I liked it very much. They also won. The films they showed was only about fighting and killing. There was no place for love affairs'.⁵⁴ He describes a context that is gradually constructed without his knowledge.

2.2.2 Enhancing Collective Goals

Robert Pape suggests that suicide bombers are 'motivated' and 'committed to a collective goal'. He goes on to stress that terrorist organizations are 'not socially isolated groups with socially unacceptable goals, but go to great lengths to embed themselves in their surrounding communities and to pursue socially acceptable political objectives'.⁵⁵ Terrorist groups seek to recruit members from the same communities that bind them together with shared grievances and a collective identity. Atran and Davis discuss how strong bonds that are nurtured within these groups 'may facilitate a desire to sacrifice self for the collective'.⁵⁶

⁵² Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', cites interview conducted with PDP, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 11 June 2011.

⁵³ J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, 1968/1762, cited in Kruglanski, et al., 'Terrorism: A (Self) Love Story', p. 561.

⁵⁴ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', cites interview conducted with PDP, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 11 June 2011.

⁵⁵ R.A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York, Random House, 2006, p. 125.

⁵⁶ See the Executive Summary by Atran and Davis in, ARTIS, 'Theoretical Frameworks on Pathways to Violent Radicalization', p. 12.

A former member of the LTTE describes the feeling of empowerment by being part of a large group and the readiness to take risks and sacrifice personal safety for the group: ‘[s]o I was changed and without any kind of links with the outside world I was prepared for the next stage of my life. That means a passion and loyalty to that group, to those in charge, to those who sacrificed their lives for the group was built in me. We knew and saw only this, nothing else can come in’.⁵⁷

Kruglanski and colleagues discuss several studies that point to individuals shifting towards the collective-will in an effort to gain significance and meaning through the collectivistic shift.⁵⁸ Feeling empowered, and gaining significance and meaning by aligning themselves with the group were reflected in all studies.

The collective shift enabled the group to channel the anger and guilt into social action. It provided confidence to the aggrieved to take risks and sacrifice the self. Significance quest became a collective effort. Restoring significance, generated a sense of collective success, empowerment, confidence and a feeling of being avenged.

2.2.3 Manipulating the Significance Quest

The quest for significance is a human motivational tendency, aroused in the face of loss of significance. Terrorist groups channel the significance quest in the direction of death and destruction. Anthony et al., cites a former LTTE suicide member as he reflects on the transformation of his thinking and behavior:

Then I was deceived. I couldn’t control my mind, nor my intelligence. I did not know that I had lost control of everything. I wasn’t aware that I was like a puppet, and listening to all what they said. This was the only world I knew. I felt like doing something for them. The life [before I

⁵⁷ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PDP, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 11 June 2011.

⁵⁸ Kruglanski et al., ‘Terrorism: A (Self) Love Story’, pp. 566-569. See: Atran and Davis, p. 12.

joined] was forgotten. There was a craving for life with the LTTE. Then came a change in my life.⁵⁹

The craving was the awakening of the significance quest. When provided with the option of joining the LTTE, he describes it as an opportunity to belong to the collective: ‘I also accepted the offer happily. Even at that time I didn’t realize that I had a life for myself, and the thought that I had to decide for my life never occurred to me. I agreed to this kind of life for somebody else’.

When the quest for personal significance is manipulated by the LTTE, he begins to suppress social norms and activates destructive tendencies:

With enmity, without the fear of murder, without any interest in my own life, not even realizing that I was cheating my parents, believing this evil state of mind as a good state of mind, taking pride that I was going to do something good to someone and feeling like a hero, I stepped into this society. But I never thought that it will affect my life completely, or affect the mind of others.⁶⁰

The individual is trapped in the subculture of the terrorist group that carefully articulates the narrative to direct its members to achieve the goals of the collective, through the moral justification of a violent method.

The Boston bomber, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, reflects the arousal of significance quest that enabled him to morally justify his actions and the actions of his brother: ‘I do not mourn because his soul is very much alive. God has a plan for each person. Mine was to hide in this

⁵⁹ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PKPD, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 5 July 2011.

⁶⁰ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PKPD, a former member of the LTTE suicide team on 5 July 2011.

boat and shed some light on our actions’.⁶¹ Tsarnaev alleviates his actions to a spiritual level to restore collective significance.

Pape discusses the use of suicide bombings by Hamas, Hezbollah and the LTTE as a weapon that helps terrorist groups compensate for its lack of numbers. He cites a speech by Prabhakaran in 1998 that highlights his need to demonstrate LTTE’s superiority over the enemy state: ‘In terms of manpower, firepower and resources, the enemy was strong and the balance of military power was in his favor. Yet we had an extraordinary weapon, which was not in the arsenal of the enemy. The courage and commitment of our fighters was our most powerful weapon in the battle’.⁶² Suicide bombing became a significance restoring method, allowing terrorist groups to become significant in their capacity to damage the enemy state.

Dalgaard-Nielson explains that ‘grievances are framed by recruiters to ring true and help to connect with the narrative and align with the organization’.⁶³ The message needs to be credible and resonate with the target audience that identifies with the narrative that Scott Atran alludes to. They align themselves with the ideology or point of view of the group as referred to by Baggini, and finally align with the organization as explained in Wiktorowicz’s framing theory discussed by Borum. The study explores the framing and reframing of grievances that keep the grievance narrative alive, and legitimize the need for the terrorist group to commit violence and morally justify its actions.

2.2.4 De-radicalization and Channelling the Significance Quest

The significance quest can be channeled in a positive or negative direction. Significance quest is positive if channeled ‘in a positive direction paving the way to peaceful conflict

⁶¹ ‘Boston Marathon Bombing: Dzhokar Tsarnaev’s Note’, *Huffington Post*, [website], 22 May 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/22/boston-bomber-note-boat-dzhokhar-tsarnaev_n_5374524.html, (accessed 18 February 2017). Court documents produced for the case of Dzhokar Tsarnaev on the Boston Marathon bombing of 15 April 2013.

⁶² Pape, ‘Dying to Win’, p. 25.

⁶³ Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 6.

resolution, and harmony in intergroup relations'. It is negative if it is 'misguided' and 'plunge[s] people into mutual destruction, savagery, and mayhem' as seen with terrorist groups.⁶⁴ The bi-directionality of the significance quest can be used within counter terrorism initiatives to prevent terrorism. Redirecting the quest for significance within de-radicalization programs can help the beneficiaries of these programs to find alternative means of significance.

Personal significance of the former LTTE members, undergoing rehabilitation with the Bureau for the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation (BCGR), was assessed throughout their period of rehabilitation.⁶⁵ The success of the program was largely attributed to the various ways in which the significance of the beneficiaries was restored.⁶⁶ An understanding of the strategies used by the LTTE to manipulate significance loss and quest is useful, to help identify ways in which to guide and redirect the quest for significance in pro-social ways.

2.2.5 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of significance in helping to radicalize, recruit, sustain and mobilize the Tamil Tigers for attacks.

Hypothesis 2: Framing and reframing the grievance narrative across the years maintains the community in a state of significance loss, which arouses the quest for significance.

⁶⁴ Kruglanski et al., 'Terrorism: A (Self) Love Story' p. 560.

⁶⁵ 'Motivational, Ideological and Social Processes in Political Violence' is a longitudinal research project conducted by the University of Maryland (USA), in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines. This project commenced in 2009 and is currently ongoing.

⁶⁶ A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, J.J. Bélanger, R. Gunaratna, and M. Hettiararchchi, 'Deradicalizing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Some Preliminary Findings', in A. Silke (ed.), *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, London, Routledge. 2014, p. 184.

2.3 Ideology

Terrorist groups function based on a particular ideology, which is geared to achieve a political objective.⁶⁷ The ideological framework contains the guiding principles for the organization to achieve its political ends, and contains the grand plan of the group's leadership. Chenoweth emphasizes that 'elites often have political goals distinct from foot soldiers...elites use organizational mechanisms to bring cadre behaviour in line with leadership aims'.⁶⁸

However, the ideology needs to be simplified for the rest of the membership. Ginges argues that 'a sophisticated ideological basis is not a precursor to radical action'.⁶⁹ And Abrahams states that those who join terrorist groups have 'little understanding of ideology'. Still, ideology is 'a constant feature in the radicalisation process related to various forms of terrorism'.⁷⁰ Bartlett and Miller refer to an 'overt ideological message and belief system' declared by terrorist groups.⁷¹

In this regard, the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, articulates the nature of the ideology: 'Our ideology is clearly intended to bring about our liberation as individuals and as a people. There is no need to follow any other alien system of thought. We have our own values. Our history and *bani* [scripture] inspires us'.⁷² The overt ideological position cites the goal of the organization, which is liberation and self-

⁶⁷ T. Veldhuis and J. Staun, 'Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model', The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October 2009, p. 4. See: A.L. Wright, 'Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection', New Jersey, Princeton University, 2013, pp. 4-5, http://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/Wright_on_Terrorism.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: J. Bartlett, and C. Miller, 'The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, p. 1 and p. 11. See: C.C. Harmon, 'How Terrorist Groups End: Studies of the Twentieth Century', *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2010, p. 56 and p. 74. See: M. Sageman, 'Hofstad Case Study and the Blob Theory', in ARTIS, 'Theoretical Frameworks on Pathways to Violent Radicalization', ARTIS Research, August 2009, p. 13-29. See: Pape, *Dying to Win*, p. 131.

⁶⁸ M. Abrahams, 'What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counter Terrorism Strategy', *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4, Spring 2008, p. 100.

⁶⁹ J. Ginges, 'Toward a Social-Cognitive Theory of Radicalization', in ARTIS, 'Theoretical Frameworks on Pathways to Violent Radicalization', ARTIS Research, August 2009, p. 75.

⁷⁰ Reinares, et al., 'Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism', p. 14 and p. 18.

⁷¹ Bartlett and Miller, 'The Edge of Violence', p. 17.

⁷² Pape, p. 109.

determination. However, the ‘emotional pull’ required to motivate and mobilize members is rarely highlighted. This added component is articulated by Dalgaard-Nielson: ‘emotive appeals are underpinned by ideological teachings, prompting the joiner to reach the conclusion, that the movement does not only represent the truth, but that he or she has a personal obligation and responsibility to join and become active’.⁷³

Wright explains that a terrorist group’s ideological framework determines the targets they attack, and goes on to cite Hoffman who emphasizes that terrorists tailor their mode of attack and target selection, based on their ideological framework.⁷⁴ For the LTTE, the ideological goal was to achieve a separate state using suicide bombing as its preferred method.

Indeed, violent extremist ideologues use complex theological, ethnic, social, economic and historical arguments to justify terrorism. Yet, most of the members that join the group to restore and gain significance follow a simple model to justify their actions. Individuals may gravitate towards terrorist groups with competing needs, interests and motivations. However, they must align with the ideology of the organization, which is necessary for the sustenance and mobilization of members. Therefore, the ideology needs to be simple, emotive and unsophisticated for public consumption.

⁷³ Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 7.

⁷⁴ Wright. ‘Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection’, p. 3.

2.3.1 The Three Components of Ideology

Kruglanski and colleagues describe three ideological components that terrorist groups use as a framework to mobilize individuals into violence.

A terrorism justifying ideology may constitute a relatively simple belief system, including a few bare-bone ingredients: a grievance of some sort, that is a sense that an injustice or a wrong was perpetrated against one's group; a culprit, that is, an actor assumed responsible for the grievance; and a method, in this case terrorism, assumed to constitute both an effective and a morally warranted means of redressing the injustice and removing the grievance.⁷⁵




Figure 2. The belief system that underlies a terrorism-justifying ideology

The three ideological components, which include a grievance, a target and a method, are reflected in the words of Umar Patek, accused of making explosives in the Bali bombing: When they kill Muslims, surely my heart is sad as to why they do it [Grievance]. I like to make self-defense to protect them. We have to explain to the enemies...NATO, US or Israel

⁷⁵ A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand and R. Gunaratna, 'Aspects of Radicalization', in R. Gunaratna, J. Jerard., and L. Rubin, (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 135.

[Culprit/Target] to go out of Muslim country. Without fighting, they better leave, otherwise by force [Method], we will kick them out.⁷⁶

The organization frames its ideology to the aggrieved masses by defining the actual or perceived ‘grievances’. It also identifies the ‘culprit’ or perpetrators of injustices to be targeted. Finally, it provides a morally justifiable ‘method’ to use against the enemy to redress the grievances.⁷⁷ These components are the core of a terrorist ideology and appeal to the aggrieved masses whether their stand point is political, social, ethnic, religious or separatist. When narratives are packaged and reframed along these lines, it provides a direction and an outlet to channel the anger and frustration to feel vindicated. Sympathizers and supporters decide which groups to join based on the method proposed by the organization to redress the grievances. Groups that deploy violence, indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and inflicting terror to achieve their objectives, evolve into terrorist groups.⁷⁸

Mohammed Hafez describes three dominant themes that emerge from ‘insurgent videos, audio recordings, online magazines, and biographies’. These themes are presented in sequence: ‘Act one depicts the unmerciful humiliation and suffering inflicted on Muslims in Iraq and throughout the world...The second act shows the impotence of existing Muslim regimes and their collusion with the West...The final act insists on the inevitability of Muslim victory...to redeem the suffering and humiliation...on the battlefield’.⁷⁹ These themes or components are ‘woven together to suggest a problem, a cause of the problem and a solution to the problem’.

Samuel discusses a three-step progression into terrorism: ‘[t]here are injustices occurring in many parts of the world. There is a need to act; and Violence is the only possible

⁷⁶ Gunaratna and Hennessy, ‘Through the Militant Lens: The Power of Ideology and Narratives’, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Kruglanski et al., ‘Aspects of Radicalization’, p. 135.

⁷⁸ The IRA, al-Qaeda and the LTTE are three examples of terrorist groups.

⁷⁹ Hafez, p.96.

response’.⁸⁰ Samuel cites Roy Anthony Rogers: ‘terrorists are very adept at exploiting and manipulating such grievances, legitimate or otherwise. Reports, images and life-witness accounts are all skillfully deployed to bear witness to this worldwide suffering’.⁸¹

The three basic components of an ideology are embedded within statements made by terrorists. Terrorists define grievances as injustices, the need to take action against the enemy, and justification for a violent method as being the only way to restore significance. The sequencing of the narrative is manipulated to justify attacks, while blaming the enemy for pushing them to conduct the inevitable acts of violence.

The LTTE rationalized the use of violence against the enemy state and representatives of the state. The suffering of the civilians targeted by the terrorists was also blamed upon the enemy state. LTTE attacks on civilians, in response to heavy losses in battle, were justified as necessary diversion techniques. Violent acts were projected as morally justified, thereby eliminating any potential distress or dissonance when civilians were slaughtered as symbols of the enemy.

The LTTE chief cleverly protected his fighters by equating them to civilians: ‘if thousands of our fighters have to be killed, many thousands of ordinary people will also have to be slaughtered...The Tigers are people; the people are Tigers’. The LTTE believed that it was necessary to shed blood of the civilians it claimed to protect. Civilians were sacrificed to make them understand the LTTE’s tribulations.⁸²

Abrahams describes terrorist groups as committing fratricide and annihilating their enemies when necessary.⁸³ Prabhakaran was relentless in the pursuit of his enemies: ‘[i]n LTTE, the traitors have never been forgotten and will never be forgiven’. He was brutal in

⁸⁰ Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, p. 38.

⁸¹ Samuel, p. 38, refers to the interview with Roy Anthony Rogers, 26 January 2010.

⁸² Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 187, p. 220 and p. 235.

⁸³ Abrahams, ‘What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counter Terrorism Strategy’, p. 90 and p. 97, on fratricide and annihilation by terrorist groups.

dealing with any threat to him.⁸⁴ Prabhakaran even ordered the brutal torture and subsequent execution of his closest friend, Mahattaya, and 200 of his men. The execution of a man (act of violence), perceived as a traitor (enemy), and suspected of undermining his leadership (grievance) was ideologically justified.

The rhetoric suggests that terrorists project themselves as noble by engaging in their crusade for justice. There is a grievance and an enemy responsible for this grievance that becomes the recipient of the violent method.⁸⁵ This simple logic within the ideological narrative was powerful and understood by most people, even the poorly educated. It transports the audience into a 'narrative world where disbelief is suspended and counter arguing circumvented'.⁸⁶

Terrorist groups have to maintain their ideology until their long-term objectives are secured. The LTTE chief articulated the ideology: 'We have sown a seed of an ideal. We have watered it with the blood of our martyrs. The seed, one day, shall grow into a huge tree, fulfilling the dreams of our dead comrades'.⁸⁷

2.3.2 Freedom Fighter and the Terrorist

The distinction between a rights group and a terrorist group depends on the modus operandi. Within terrorist groups, the end justifies the means.⁸⁸ This principal separates the freedom fighter from the terrorist who justifies using violence against civilians to achieve its ends. Indeed, for some 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' but the end rarely justifies the means when the boundaries of right and wrong begin to blur.

⁸⁴ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 241 and p. 268.

⁸⁵ Kruglanski, et al., 'Aspects of Radicalization', p. 135.

⁸⁶ Murphy, et al., 'Involved, transported, or emotional', p. 408.

⁸⁷ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 220.

⁸⁸ His Holiness the Dalai Lama's message of peace: A human approach to world peace, [website], <http://www.dalailama.com/messages/world-peace/a-human-approach-to-peace>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

2.3.3 Deradicalization and Ideology

The three-component model of radicalization identifies three aspects that can be targeted within de-radicalization and counter radicalization programs: the manipulation of the grievance narrative, identifying an enemy to blame for the grievances and the method of violence promoted to redress the grievances. Promoting counter narratives targeting the terrorist group's motives, emotive strategies and propaganda techniques may facilitate individuals to rethink their decision to join terrorist groups. Exposing the techniques used by terrorists, will provide facts and counter arguments that friends and families can use to counter the recruitment drive.

Information on the manipulative techniques used by various terrorists groups to promote and justify their violent ideological perspectives in an effort to push people to engage in violence is likely to generate a debate and expand critical thinking. Providing alternatives to the single narrative can also expand thinking. Highlighting the fratricide and violence expected from members will deter individuals in the initial stages of recruitment. In addition, exposing the myths that justify a violent method, breaking down the glorified image of the terrorist as a freedom fighter, delegitimizing the need to attack states and reframing the martyrdom narrative will dissipate the glorification surrounding terrorist groups. The three-component model of terrorist ideology provides counter terrorism specialists with a three-pronged approach to dismantling a terrorist group's ideological basis to violent radicalization.

2.3.4 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of ideology in helping to radicalize and sustain the terrorist group's membership.

Hypothesis 3: The organization provides its recruits and members with a simple ideology they can identify with and work towards. This includes a grievance, an enemy responsible for the grievance and a violent method to redress the grievance.

2.4 Organizational Justice

Terrorist groups secure trust and build loyalty by projecting an image of being organizationally fair and just. The study explores how the concepts of organizational justice help understand the strategies used by terrorist groups to secure trust, loyalty and willingness to sacrifice the self on behalf of the group. The study applies organizational justice theory measurement to terrorism research for the first time. The study also looks at how these concepts are reversed by terrorist groups to project states as unjust and unfair, hence, morally justifying the use of violence. Examples of the LTTE and the al-Qaeda will be used to explore how they use organizational justice to further their goals and build an image of being more credible than the state, thereby attracting those disillusioned by the system.

2.4.1 Organizational Justice Theory

Colquitt, Tyler, Blader and colleagues explore how organizational justice theory shapes group behavior.⁸⁹ Distributive justice is associated with fairness of resource distribution. The

⁸⁹ J.A. Colquitt, D.E. Conlon, M.J. Wesson, C.O.L.H. Porter and K.Y. Ng, 'Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 86, no. 3, 2001, p. 430. Also see T.R. Tyler and S.L. Blader, 'The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 7, no. 4, 2003, p. 360.

perception of inequality of resources, land and education was propagated by the LTTE as injustice against the Tamils, which became the basis to fight for a separate state. Procedural justice relates to consistency, accuracy, ethics, and a lack of bias. It involves the individual's voice being heard and fairness in the decision-making process. The LTTE projected an image of the state violating procedural justice and the quest for a separate state as the only solution. Interactional justice reflects the quality of treatment received by the other.⁹⁰ The LTTE motivated its members by highlighting the unfair treatment of the minority community by the majority community.

The LTTE projected itself as being just and fair. While inequality of resources was present within the LTTE too, it was justified using informational justice methods. Members accepted inequality within the group, by rationalizing the hierarchical distribution of resources. Resources and facilities were distributed based on performance and seniority and it was accepted that leaders would have greater resources than members. The rewards were contingent on successful attacks.

2.4.2 The Organization Becomes the Vehicle

An organization's ideology determines the modus operandi to respond to actual and perceived injustices. Hizb ut Tahrir group does not use violence but condemns non-Islamic leaders.⁹¹ The LTTE and al-Qaeda related groups use violence indiscriminately, targeting any individual or group that opposes their ideology. It is the organization's ability to communicate its message effectively that helps secure the support for the methods it will use.⁹²

⁹⁰ Y. Cohen-Charash and P.E. Spector, 'Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis', *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process*, vol. 86, no. 2, 2001, p. 282.

⁹¹ V. Asal and R.K. Rethemeyer, 'Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak: Terrorists Who Don't Kill', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, vol. 25, 2008, p. 247.

⁹² Fahoum and Width, p. 5.

The organization becomes the vehicle to radicalize the community and groom its members to carry out violence with confidence. The organization evolves into a credible and trusted vehicle where upper and middle level leaders mentor and groom its members for specific tasks. The organization projects an image of being just and fair and demonizes the enemy (the state) for its injustices and unfairness. The leadership secures the trust and allegiance of its recruits to execute the will and goals of the organization and its leadership. The trusting recruits become willing risk takers, convinced of the purity of intent of its leadership and the organization's goals.⁹³

A large number of youth gravitate towards terrorist groups, spurred by the grievance narratives. Lacking self-efficacy and confidence to act on their own, they ally themselves with organizations that have taken proxy control of being their representatives for restoring or gaining significance. The organization has to present itself as efficacious, upholding values important to its members through its ideology. To sustain its membership, the organization projects itself as sincerer in their commitment to the community than the state. It is the organization that has the responsibility to keep its members together, implement a moral code, motivate its members and work towards a single goal.⁹⁴

The ideology alone, however, cannot sustain a member in the long-term. The organization has to prove itself as capable enough to redress the grievances and restore significance of the community. The flow of recruits and funding, therefore, is contingent upon the success of the organization to deliver.

Organizations define their actions within the ideology. Some organizations do not kill because it contradicts their ideology, while others don't because they are not competent enough, lack the required resources to conduct attacks or do not survive long enough.⁹⁵ To

⁹³ Reinares, et al., p. 15, refers to leaders ensuring the passage from low-risk to high-risk activism. See: Casebeer and Russel, p. 6, on growth maturity and transformation of the organization.

⁹⁴ Bartlett and Miller, p. 15 and p. 17, on moral code in terrorist groups.

⁹⁵ Asal and Rethemeyer, 'Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak', p. 245.

counter terrorism, there is a need to study the organizational factors that help these groups function, as well as factors that hinder their longevity.

2.4.3 Justice and Trust

Colquitt and Rodell explore the relationship between Justice and Trust. Their findings indicate that even after establishing trust–justice perception, organizations must continue to provide honest justifications and explanations and that informational justice continues to matter. Benevolence and integrity are important components that nurture and maintain trustworthiness.⁹⁶

Terrorist groups depend heavily on being able to trust their members. The LTTE members are groomed with care to ensure that their trust is secured. The brutal manner in which members who break trust are disposed of is well known within the LTTE. Members were ‘simply shot dead and families were not informed of the circumstances, but known only to the members’.⁹⁷ The LTTE also minimized the opportunity for members to break the trust by enforcing several checks and balances that ensure members do not deviate from the cause when mobilized for operations outside LTTE controlled regions. Those that failed to adhere to the norms of the organization were recalled or abducted and brought back to the LTTE controlled areas. These individuals were either incarcerated or shot dead.⁹⁸ In some cases, to demonstrate their loyalty to the group, these individuals were then expected to conduct a major attack.

⁹⁶ J.A. Colquitt and J.B. Rodell, ‘Justice, Trust, and Trustworthiness: A longitudinal analysis integrating three theoretical perspectives’, *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 54, no.6, 2011, pp. 1183-1184, defines benevolence as the notion of being caring open and doing good.

⁹⁷ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PK, a former LTTE intelligence wing member on 10 Aug 2014: ‘Parents [were] not told if [their] son is shot and killed by LTTE. [They] only inform if the son was killed doing a heroic deed. Also [parents were] not [informed of] the clandestine high profile [operations]’.

⁹⁸ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PK, a former LTTE intelligence wing member on 10 August 2014.

Several authors view trust as the ‘willingness to be vulnerable’.⁹⁹ This concept views trustworthiness and justice as reciprocal in predicting trust or the willingness to be vulnerable. The LTTE projected the qualities of being just and fair towards its members and community. It projected the qualities of trustworthiness by operationally proving its competence, by being loyal to the cause and ferociously adhering to its principles. The level of trust and commitment generated by the organization, suspended independent and critical thinking of the members. They followed orders without question. As such, they allowed themselves to be used as human bombs.

⁹⁹ R.C. Mayer and H.J. Davis, ‘The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment’, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1999, p. 124. See: J.A. Colquitt, A.B. Scott and J.A. LePine, ‘Trust, Trustworthiness, and Trust Propensity: A Meta-Analytic Test of Their Unique Relationships With Risk Taking and Job Performance’, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, American Psychological Association, vol. 92, no. 4, 2007, pp. 911-914. See: R.C. Mayer, H.J. Davis and F.D. Schoorman, ‘An integrative model of organizational trust’, *The Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 3, July 1995, pp. 724-726.




Figure 3. A nuanced model that predicts the willingness to be vulnerable.¹⁰⁰

A former LTTE member shared his experience of losing faith in the LTTE and stated that when the LTTE attacked the Muslims because they ‘use our resources’ in the region, he was not able to accept these ideological justifications provided by the LTTE. He had believed that he was fighting against discrimination, and did not agree with ethnically cleansing the region to form a mono-ethnic state. Then on, he doubted the procedural, distributive, interactional and informational justice of the LTTE, and decided to leave the organization.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Colquitt and Rodell, ‘Justice, Trust, and Trustworthiness’, p. 1186.

¹⁰¹ Interview conducted by the researcher with a former member of the LTTE (BCO-R003) on 21 October 2014, on the reasons for exiting the LTTE.

2.4.4 Identifying with Prototypical Leaders

The procedurally fair leader is a prototypical leader that leads by example. Marius van Dijke and David De Cremer found that group members identified strongly with leaders portrayed as procedurally fair. Such leaders were trusted more, and they were able to influence how followers should perceive their own position or status in the group. Being treated fairly is an indication of being valued and respected, while unfair treatment is an indication of not being valued or respected. The authors also found that those who are strongly committed to an organization react more negatively to perceived unfairness. The better leaders were the prototypical leaders, with whom the members identified more closely.¹⁰²

Interviews conducted by the researcher revealed LTTE members' admiration for senior leaders with different qualities. The junior level cadres admired and trusted those leaders who were kind, honest, quieter in demeanor, consistent and predictable. They were also attracted to the personalities that conducted successful operations, and identified with those who were perceived as brave and popular. Senior leaders who were strict and implemented the rules severely were feared but also respected. However, the members gravitated towards leaders they could trust. They disliked leaders who were perceived as selfish, unfair and unjust in the treatment of their team members, even if they excelled in their operational skills.¹⁰³

Terrorist groups portray their leaders as moral and spiritual beings, and their organization as procedurally, distributively, informationally and interactionally just in its principles and goal attainment. Simultaneously, they invest time and funds in portraying

¹⁰² M. Van Dijke and D. De Cremer, 'How Leader Prototypicality Affects Followers' Status: The Role of Procedural Fairness', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, vol. 17, no. 2, 2008, p. 227.

¹⁰³ Interviews conducted by researcher with several members of the LTTE (S030) on 15 September 2014, (JFN-R002), 7 July 2014, and (MLT-R017) 4 August 2014.

their enemy as evil, and the state as unjust. This leads members to admire their leaders and trust the terrorist organization.

The LTTE portrayed the state as unjust in terms of resource distribution, claiming that areas occupied predominantly by Tamils were less developed. The LTTE portrayed itself as fair through distribution of resources, while projecting the state as unfair by highlighting the pockets of poverty within the regions they controlled and affluence within the government regions. It also projected procedural justice by prosecuting any member who violated the LTTE code of conduct. Conversely, the state was shown as procedurally unjust when the punishments were based on the skill of the lawyer instead of the crime.

When the identification with the prototypical leader is heightened, and commitment to the organization is elevated, perception of right and wrong is suspended. A case in point is when Shankar, Prabhakaran's Military Advisor, obeyed the LTTE chief's order to poison his brother Haran with cyanide: '[a]t that meeting Prabhakaran said 'I am the person who told Shankar to give cyanide to his brother [Haran] ... They put it on (sic) the food packet'.¹⁰⁴ LTTE Chief's decision to execute his most senior members was framed as a noble and spiritual act and it did not shake Shankar's faith in the leadership or the organization.¹⁰⁵

Tyler and Blader identified four components of procedural justice that define 'fair' process. They discussed two aspects that influence people in evaluating the fairness of the organization: how decisions are made and how people are treated.¹⁰⁶ Terrorist groups are sensitive to how they project themselves, both formally and informally, since grievances take root from such violations. The LTTE pinned its ideological narrative of a separate state based on the inability of Tamils to live with the majority Sinhala community due to

¹⁰⁴ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', cites interview conducted with KTPN, a former LTTE intelligence team member on 11 August 2014.

¹⁰⁵ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 233.

¹⁰⁶ T.R. Tyler and S.L. Blader, 'A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a "Fair" Process', *The Society for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 29, no. 6, June 2003, p. 747.

discrimination. With time the newer generation was indoctrinated with the idea of a separate state arguing that Sri Lanka originally belonged to the Tamils, and they were fighting to reclaim it. Casebeer and Russell highlight how the narratives change to give legitimacy to the organization, and how the organization adapts to new goals.¹⁰⁷

2.4.5 Targeting Credibility

Terrorist groups invest in breaking down the credibility of the state while projecting themselves as a credible alternative. They highlight the injustices of the state that should be opposed with a violent response. When the state is discredited in the eyes of the community, vulnerable youth distance themselves from the evil and corrupt state, and identify with the group that offers comradeship, membership and a promise to redress grievances.¹⁰⁸ Terrorist groups are then able to legitimize their actions as long as they project the state as evil and unjust.

Tyler and Blader discuss the impact of procedural justice in shaping member identification with the group, thereby creating cooperation within the group. The authors suggest that procedural justice provides identity security. When the person identifies with the group it promotes feelings of self-worth and self-esteem. The individual receives respect from the group, and goes on to develop pride in being a member.¹⁰⁹

The Tamil Tigers that served in Prabhakaran's bodyguard team received respect from other members and enjoyed their position of power. The suicide squads developed their own personal identity of being lethal, and were admired and respected by other cadres. The leaders of every unit were perceived as procedurally just and distributively fair. The

¹⁰⁷ Casebeer and Russel, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ N. Oden, *The way out: A handbook for understanding and responding to extreme movements*, Sweden, EXIT Fryshuset, 2009, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁹ Tyler and Blader, 'The Group Engagement Model', p. 358.

confidence and trust in the organization helped to form close-knit teams with a unique identity built around a range of violent activities.¹¹⁰

David De Cremer discusses the interactive effect of procedural justice and leadership styles that influence self-esteem and emotional reactions.¹¹¹ Procedural fairness and a just leader influence member behavior positively within the organization. These groups use the same factors to discredit states and their leaders. Counter terrorism strategies need to highlight the flaws in leadership and procedural injustices of terrorist organizations in order to reduce their power in recruiting and sustaining its membership.

2.4.6 De-radicalization and Organizational Justice

Publicizing the injustices of the LTTE can expose the flawed narratives and faulty logic of its ideology. Seeds of doubt will erode the trust individuals have in them, which will make these vulnerable individuals resilient to manipulation. The protest by LTTE sympathizers in the Tamil community against launching the book *Oru Koorvaalin Nizhalil* (In the Shadow of a Sharp Sword) by the former LTTE female political wing leader Thamilini is a case in hand.¹¹² The book exposed the atrocities and injustices by the LTTE. The publication of this book was opposed by those who continued to see the LTTE as just. Similarly, the LTTE diaspora objected to screening the film *Madras Café* that exposed the detailed clandestine

¹¹⁰ The LTTE did not only engage in suicide terrorism, but engaged in destroying water tanks, power and oil installations, attacking villages, destroying property, etc. The LTTE structure was built to support successful operations from units that built boats, canned food for suicide cadres, intelligence gathering, bomb making, garages to accounts divisions and store keeping.

¹¹¹ D. De Cremer, 'When Authorities Influence Followers' Affect: The Interactive Effect of Procedural Justice and Transformational Leadership', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, vol. 15, no. 3, 2006, pp. 323-324.

¹¹² Memoirs of Subramaniam Sivagami (alias Thamilini) published in June 2016. See: S. Fernando, 'Thamilini's Revelations Reverberate', 7 June 2016, [newspaper], http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=146516, (accessed 18 February 2017).

activities of the group. The Tamil diaspora was successful in getting it banned in Canada and Tamil Nadu, but not in Sri Lanka.

Youth gravitate towards the aura of justice and fairness surrounding terrorist organizations. Highlighting the failures in distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational fairness within these organizations will erode their trustworthiness and legitimacy. It is, therefore, imperative that researchers and practitioners identify and counter the organizational justice strategies used by terrorist groups to neutralize their capacity to manipulate grievances and promote violence.

2.4.7 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of the organization in helping to radicalize and sustain its membership.

Hypothesis 4 – The organization becomes a trusted vehicle that mentors and mobilizes the members to redress grievances and restore significance. The members must believe that the organization is procedurally just and distributively fair.

2.5 Images Projected

This study applies the theory proposed by Stephen Karpman, for the first time in terrorism research, to understand the three faces of terrorism, the images projected and roles enacted in order to keep the momentum of terrorist groups. Karpman refers to a psychological and social model of human interaction, the Drama Triangle.¹¹³ The victim continues to enact the role of the victim, blaming others and feeling victimized. The rescuer continues to indulge

¹¹³ The Drama Triangle is a psychological and social model of human interaction used in psychology and psychotherapy, described by Stephen B. Karpman, in *Fairy Tales and Script Drama Analysis*, 1968, [website], <http://karpmandramatriangle.com/pdf/DramaTriangle.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

in the role of the savior, reinforcing the victim's sense of helplessness while enjoying being a martyr. The aggressor continues to persecute those labeled as the enemy while blaming the enemy for the need to persecute. This study explores the three faces of terrorism operationalized within the role of victim, savior and aggressor.¹¹⁴

Each of the three roles represents a common and ineffective response to a conflict, which prolongs disharmony rather than ending it, hence, creating misery for themselves and others. According to Karpman, each player in this particular mind game begins by assuming one of the three aforementioned roles. Players sometimes alternate or 'switch' roles during the course of the game.¹¹⁵ The person in the role of the victim of injustice may enter into the role of the rescuer or go on to persecute those who are a threat to the terrorist organization.




Figure 4. The Drama Triangle.

¹¹⁴ M. Hettiarachchi, 'Unlocking the Terrorist Mindset: A Psychological Approach', in Countering Violent Extremism: Dialogue, Training and Research, UAE, The Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, (INEGMA), 2012, p. 27.

¹¹⁵ S.B. Karpman, 'Breaking the Drama Triangle', 2008, [website], <http://karpmandramatriangle.com/pdf/DramaTriangle.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

Karpman describes that while a healthy person will perform in each of these roles occasionally pathological role-players avoid leaving the role and will often create one to continue the drama. In each case, the drama triangle is an instrument of destruction. The only way to leave the drama is by acknowledging the manipulation of the roles and not engaging in this game.¹¹⁶

A clear victim is identified within social movements. The social group comes together as rescuers and saviors to become the voice of the victims and target the perpetrators. Such groups will know the boundaries within which to function under their clearly defined roles. Non-terrorist groups are unlikely to keep victims within their role but instead become aggressors and persecutors for change. However, too often groups that start-off with legitimate grievances spiral into dysfunctional means of resolving their grievances. Groups that shift from campaigning and agitating to using violence against civilians are often those that cross the boundary to become terrorist groups. The LTTE is one such group that started off with campaigning for the rights of the Tamil community and then became a terrorist group with the use of violence against civilians.

The lifeline of a terrorist group is the community. Terrorist groups function in and around communities for several reasons.¹¹⁷ The community provides the group protection: ‘Prabhakaran also used the civilian population in Sri Lanka to good effect ... instructed his cadres to mix with the people to evade detection’.¹¹⁸ The community also provided the group its *raison d’etre*. The terrorists have nothing to market without the image of the aggrieved

¹¹⁶ Karpman, ‘Breaking the Drama Triangle’, p. 1. See: M. Orissa, ‘The Karpman drama triangle’, Coaching Supervision Academy (CSA), 2004, <http://coachingsupervisionacademy.com/the-karpman-drama-triangle/>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹¹⁷ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with KTPN, a former LTTE intelligence team member on 11 August 2014: The strategy of the LTTE chief was to be based in proximity to a village, jungle and water. The LTTE dominated these three escape routes. During the final phase of the battle, the LTTE used all three methods to escape. They blended with the villages. When the army advanced, they took the village with them as a shield. The LTTE members also attempted to escape by mingling with the villages, and finally to escape through water, and then into the jungles, where the LTTE chief was killed.

¹¹⁸ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 196.

community that is a support base and source of recruits. Therefore, the image and the role that the group projected, maintained its popularity. The LTTE projected itself as the victim to the world, as rescuer to its communities and as the aggressor to be feared by the enemy to justify its existence.

2.5.1 Image of the Victim

The image of the victim is projected to the local and international community to secure sympathy and concern. The group becomes the proxy victim helping to carry the message far and wide, securing direct and indirect support. The wider the ambit of the victim's message the greater the pressure exerted on the perceived enemy.

The image of the victim is powerful and is magnified through media coverage. Terrorist groups are highly skilled in using the internet and the media strategically and invest in their marketing capabilities.¹¹⁹ The LTTE, through its media campaign, attempted to secure the support of the West to intervene in military action against the Tamil Tigers in 2009.

Terrorist groups need a 'victim' to justify the group's actions. The 'victim' image keeps the conflict alive and is maintained until the political objectives are achieved. Portraying a victim makes it is easier to justify the need for the group's actions and paves the way for more individuals to join as they identify with the argued injustice. The power of the image projected facilitates fighters, supporters and funders to come together as a formidable block to lobby governments and NGO's for its sustenance. For instance, the LTTE proxy groups continue to project an image of victimhood, which enables them to

¹¹⁹ N.C. Fink and J. Barclay, 'Mastering the Narrative: Counter terrorism, strategic communication and the United Nations', p. 1.

campaign for separatism in Sri Lanka even six years after the LTTE was militarily neutralized.

2.5.2 Victim Turns Savior

Following the Boston marathon bombing, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev attempts to project a sense of invariable victory: ‘...we Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all...know you are fighting men who look into the barrel of your gun and see heaven, now how can you compete with that’.¹²⁰ He identifies with the collective grievances of the victims and projects an image of the victims rising to become the saviours and aggressors. .

The victim, persecuted and helpless, needs a savior or rescuer to rectify the injustices. The terrorist group organizes itself to fulfill this need and steps into the role of the savior. The community gives proxy control to the group and develops efficacy by proxy, and builds confidence: ‘for many Tamils, Prabhakaran remains their only savior’.¹²¹ The terrorist group then begins to market the image of the victim and develops the narrative of the need for a rescuer-savior. Long after original grievances may resolve, the rescuer-savior will continue to seek and project new grievances to keep the aggrieved community in a victim mode. The role of the rescuer-savior or organization has meaning as long as a grievance and a victim exist.

The victim is the emotive face of the grievance as the terrorist group becomes the official guardian and begins to command respect and support of the community. The community begins to depend on the group for protection and regains lost significance. This

¹²⁰ Note written by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston marathon bomber about his brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev who died on his way to the hospital following the bombings in April 2013. The incident resulted in the deaths of one child and three adults. The note was released at the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 22 May 2014, [webnews], http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/22/boston-bomber-note-boat-dzhokhar-tsarnaev_n_5374524.html, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹²¹ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 276.

responsibility provides the terrorist group the leverage to harness community support and loyalty: ‘they suddenly saw Prabhakaran as their lord protector who only could safeguard Tamil rights and began swearing by him’. The group becomes powerful and indispensable: ‘The Tamil Tigers cannot be vanquished in armed combat’. The group also builds an image that the community and terrorists are one: ‘The Tigers are people; the people are Tigers’.¹²² The terrorist group becomes embedded in the community and is perceived as freedom fighters within that community.

2.5.3 The Aggressor and Persecutor

The group projects the image of the aggressor or persecutor of the enemy. The organization inflicts fear and terror into the heart of the targeted enemy and its representatives. These acts of aggression also build an image of power and confidence within the group and the community that it represents.

The LTTE political wing projected an image of being the victim in order to secure support from the international community while its fighting units relentlessly attacked the state and its civilians. The LTTE overseas persecuted those who did not support them and coerced the Tamil community into paying a ‘tax’ to support its activities.¹²³ Those who resisted were harassed or socially marginalized, thereby minimizing resistance.¹²⁴ With the role of the aggressor being legitimized, Prabhakaran was relentless in the pursuit of his

¹²² Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 274 and p. 187.

¹²³ Radio-Canada, ‘Tamil gangs back in the spotlight’, 2000, [radio], <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tamil-gangs-back-in-the-spotlight-1.231276>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: BBC, *Tamils preying on Tamils*, 2002, [television], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2007199.stm, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: BBC, *Police unit tackles Tamil gangs*, 2003, [television], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/3201465.stm, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: DiasporaNews, *Tamil tiger activities in UK*, 2009, [youtube], <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9qaFfSI9nI>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: Administrator, getwestlondon, *Tamil gang jailed*, 2013, [website], <http://www.getwestlondon.co.uk/news/local-news/tamil-gang-jailed-6018162>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: A. Balasunderam, ‘Gang-related violence among young people of the Tamil refugee diaspora in London’, *Safer Communities*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2009, pp. 34–41.

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch, ‘Funding the “Final War” LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora: UK/Canada’, p. 33.

enemies: '[i]n LTTE, the traitors have never been forgotten and will never be forgiven'. He was brutal in dealing with any form of threat to him: 'very brazenly and with scarcely any thoughts about the human cost, he went about annihilating anyone that he felt could come in his way'.¹²⁵

The LTTE acting as the aggressor against the enemy state helped to boost the morale of its members and motivate its fighters. The suicide cadres were described as 'the balls of fire smashing the military prowess of the enemy'.¹²⁶ Terrorist groups project the face of the victim to its sympathizers and supporters, the face of the aggressor to the perceived enemy, and the face of the rescuer to the vulnerable community.¹²⁷

2.5.4 Deradicalization and Images Projected

The shifting roles within the drama triangle characterize a dysfunctional pattern of interaction. The justifications provided by the LTTE for being the victim, as well as the rescuer/savior and the aggressor/persecutor towards the enemy and traitors, maintains an active cycle of violence. Therefore, there is a need to expose the LTTE's notion of projecting itself as a victim, a savior and an aggressor in order to keep its supporters and members aligned to the group. Exposing these aspects makes the community aware of being used as a victim to justify violence until the group achieves its ideological aims as opposed to the community needs. Genuine grievances are hijacked by groups that continue to escalate the use of violence to achieve their ideological aims, and manipulate the perceptions of the very community it claims to rescue. A former member of the LTTE explains the inner process

¹²⁵ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 241 and p. 268.

¹²⁶ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 249-250.

¹²⁷ Hettiarachchi, 'Unlocking the Terrorist Mindset', p. 27.

where perceptions are manipulated: ‘There they taught us to turn love into a passion for killing’.¹²⁸

2.5.5 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of images projected to different audiences in helping to radicalize and sustain its membership.

Hypothesis 5 – The organization projects the image of the Victim, the Rescuer and the Aggressor to different audiences. The former LTTE members identify with all three aspects and switch between these roles, thereby maintaining the conflict.

2.6 Moral Justifications

Individuals emotionally aroused by grievance narratives, and experiencing loss of significance, do not necessarily commit violence. When convinced by an ideological narrative and provided a role by a terrorist organization, the person is likely to move further along the pathway to committing violence. However, the thinking process has to shift in order to enable an individual to engage in violent acts. The LTTE reframed what is right and wrong and cognitively restructured its members’ and supporters’ thinking to allow the use of violence against civilians. Violence was justified by reframing what is right and wrong within a new context. Similarly, rationalizations or moral justifications portray ‘jihadists’ as ‘moral agents’ even when they are engaged in ‘immoral’ activities. Their ‘violent deeds’ are framed as ‘moral acts in the service of their people, nation, or God’. Therefore

¹²⁸ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PDIP, a former suicide team members on 11 August 2014.

‘[u]nderstanding how violent militants are able to deactivate self-detering norms against killing and injuring civilians is an important step to combating terrorism’.¹²⁹

Emotive narratives, moral and religious justifications are strands closely intertwined within the ideology used for recruitment, grooming and sustaining a terrorist within the group. Narratives are also tailored to different audiences and levels of intellect. For instance, jihadists in Iraq give their ideological justifications by inducing shock to the moral conscience of Muslims, demonizing the Shiites and Iraqi security forces, and elevating the threat facing Islam globally.¹³⁰ This helped in recruitment because it gave potential jihadists a meaningful and significant role to play. A former LTTE member explained that he thought he was doing ‘something good...and feeling like a hero’ when facilitating attacks. He goes onto reflect that he ‘did not understand it at the time. Besides they made me think that I was a hero’.¹³¹

A former member of the LTTE explained that ‘now there is no war, because there is no terrorism. So if there is terrorism there is war. We did not see it that way’.¹³² Escalating attacks and counter attacks lead members to experience the suffering of the community and demise of their own members: ‘If a friend died conducting an attack we were made to believe that our friend is killed and to hate the enemy more. We did not think that our friend died killing many civilians. We focused only on our losses’.¹³³

¹²⁹ Hafez, p. 112.

¹³⁰ Hafez, p. 99.

¹³¹ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, interview conducted with PDP, a former suicide team member on 11 June 2011.

¹³² Interview conducted by the researcher with a former Suicide Member of the LTTE (S031) on 16 September 2014.

¹³³ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, interview conducted with PDP, a former suicide team member on 11 June 2011.

2.6.1 Reframing to Reduce Cognitive Dissonance

The moral justification of violence and the rationalization of violence reduces self-doubt and cognitive dissonance.¹³⁴ Festinger discusses the theory of cognitive dissonance as the tension created due to the inconsistency between two attitudes, or an attitude and a behavior.¹³⁵ The human tendency is to reduce this moral tension or dissonance by rejecting the violence in keeping with social norms or justifying the violence by engaging in the moral code of the terrorist group. This theory sheds light on how terrorists are able to conduct attacks and not experience dissonance or distress, due to moral justifications of the attack.

The ideology dictates the method of redressing grievances as a result of perceived or real injustices. This method is rationalized by enabling the group to conduct the most horrific attacks and morally justify the need for the attacks. These actions, supported by an organization and backed by an ideology, do not give rise to an inner conflict. The individual, instead of a mass murderer, becomes a hero, a martyr, and an icon.

The annual speech of Prabhakaran in 1999 was a colorful story of the LTTE's amazing power that brought down a colossal enemy and shocked the world. We have 'amazed our enemy', 'astonished supporters', and 'astounded world military experts'; through our 'spectacular military victories', 'extraordinary growth', and 'tremendous courage'; by damaging the might of a 'colossal military', with 'fortified bases'; we have caused the 'collapse' of the enemy. Large scale attacks were articulated as 'historical achievements' that bring them closer to the goal of a separate state.¹³⁶ The Tamil Tigers listened in awe to the narrative of their own achievements. These were the moral

¹³⁴ L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, New York, Harper and Row, 1957, p. 113.

¹³⁵ L. Festinger and J.M. Carlsmith, 'Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance', *Attitudes*, Article 11, 1959, pp. 113-121, <http://faculty.washington.edu/jdb/345/345%20Articles/Festinger%20&%20Carlsmith.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹³⁶ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, pp. 260-262.

justifications crafted by the leadership, backed historically, religiously and politically, that allowed members to carry out gruesome attacks without any moral qualms.

2.6.2 Desensitization and Normalization

Terrorist groups suppress the norms and values of their culture to be able to engage in violence. They create a subculture that morally justifies violence such as assassinations, beheadings, massacres and suicide attacks. The value placed on these activities is reflected in the ritualized actions that follow such attacks. Celebrations are backed with words of encouragement by the leadership making this the new norm.

Such violence was normalized in the electronic, print and social media, and at events organized by the LTTE and its supporters. This normalization led women to donate their gold and jewelry to the LTTE, while others publicly defended acts of terror. The examples include a mother speaking proudly of her daughter who conducted a suicide bombing.¹³⁷ Similarly Hamas families watch their children perform themes of violence at musical shows.¹³⁸ And Pakistani children in conflict areas act out scenes of suicide bombings during their play time.¹³⁹ The presence normalization of violence gradually desensitizes civilians to violence. The new subculture of violence allows disengaging from established societal norms.

¹³⁷ A mother from the Tamil community venerates suicide bombing by her daughter, a black tiger, [youtube], <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ydYiYISGVY>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹³⁸ Hamas children perform at a musical event, [youtube], <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4zgURMOZ6k>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹³⁹ Pakistani children play act suicide bomber scenarios, [youtube], <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISLNKXD7tJU>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

2.6.3 Rationalizing Actions and Justifying New Rules

Greenberg and colleagues describe ‘humans as having a need to perceive themselves as good, and their actions as moral and justified’.¹⁴⁰ People need to generally believe that they are living according to the expected norms of society, which reduces any moral conflict or discrepancy between thoughts, feelings and actions.

The LTTE groomed its members to accept a new set of values contrary to the Hindu culture. They justified eating beef and burying their dead, and they moved away from praying to the Hindu Gods. A former LTTE bodyguard said that the ‘LTTE destroyed God’. The former bodyguard went on to state that ‘Tamils believed [in] Thalaivar ‘Sun God’ only. My Mother, brothers, sisters, they worship Gods. I don’t’.¹⁴¹ He aligned himself with Prabhakaran’s notion of self-reliance and considered the worship of the Gods as weakness.

A former LTTE bodyguard narrates how the LTTE chief had stopped to worship God Krishna at the Ponnalei Kovil on his way to assassinate Alfred Duraiappa, the Tamil Mayor of Jaffna: ‘I told “God Krisha, [you] had (sic) done a Bharatha war. Like you, I am starting a war. Duraiappa should come. I must shoot [him] and return without a problem”. After I shot him then I came back without any problem. That is how I came up in life. That is how you must come up in life’. The LTTE chief had narrated this story, as an example to follow, to the 13 to 14 year-old children he was grooming in an orphanage.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski and S. Solomon, ‘The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory’, in R.F. Baumeister (ed.), *Public self and private self*, New York, Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 1986, p. 189.

¹⁴¹ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with NJRB, a former LTTE bodyguard on 23 January 2012. The LTTE chief, Prabhakaran was referred to as *Thalaivar*.

¹⁴² Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with MAN, a former LTTE bodyguard, 22 July 2012.

2.6.4 Community Adjustment

With the morally justified and spiritually blessed assassination, Prabhakaran commenced a campaign of bloodshed ‘that virtually destroyed Sri Lanka’. The community and the country suffered: ‘More than 90,000 people lay dead... simply because one man claimed he knew how to chart their destiny’.¹⁴³ The LTTE held the community in an iron grip by destroying all communication, interaction and mobility between the areas it controlled and the rest of the country. The group de-rooted the community by manipulating religion, culture and family values. The group created fictive kinships and familial units to substitute family.¹⁴⁴ A subculture of violence was established in an attempt to give birth to a new nation.

Prabhakaran projected himself as the sole savior of the community, a demi god to be worshipped. He managed an effective organization with an iron fist. People were made to rationalize and morally justify the need to create a separate state and work for a pittance, while suffering was justified as being honorable.¹⁴⁵

The community reduced its dissonance by accepting and justifying the need for LTTE control, or by maintaining silence and marking time.¹⁴⁶ The adoration of leaders was not an alien concept to the culturally religious Tamil community. Neither was the ‘devotional commitment indexed by the suicide act’.¹⁴⁷ Festinger explains how people pushed to accept a bad deal, begin to morally justify having to go through the process, and become more tenacious in defending the bad situation. To reduce dissonance, a gradual adjustment in

¹⁴³ M.R. Narayan Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's story*, New Delhi, Sage Publications Pvt Ltd., 2010, p. 174-175.

¹⁴⁴ T. Herath, *Women in terrorism: Case of the LTTE*, New Delhi, Sage Publications Pvt Ltd., 2012, p.119

¹⁴⁵ D.N. Jones and E. Ince, ‘The Effects of Cognitive Dissonance on Interpersonal Perception and Reassertion’, *Academia* [online journal], December 2001, http://www.academia.edu/1188753/The_effects_of_cognitive_dissonance_on_interpersonal_perception_and_reassertion, (accessed 18 February 2017). The concept of adjusting attitude to fit the situation, closing the gap on moral conflict.

¹⁴⁶ A. Karunaratna, 2011: During a visit to a rural village in Killinochchi, an elderly Tamil man had pulled out a parcel, wrapped in an old discoloured newspaper. Delicately opening it he had shown the Sri Lankan national flag, stating that he hid this flag for 30 years under his mattress – during the period of LTTE control.

¹⁴⁷ M. Roberts, ‘Confrontations in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, LTTE and Others’, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, August 2009, p. 222.

thinking, belief and attitude takes shape.¹⁴⁸ The human tendency is to make the best of a degenerative system to avoid being in constant distress.¹⁴⁹

Terrorist groups effectively manipulate thoughts, feelings and behavior of their communities. These groups reach out to their own community for moral support, the media to promote their messages, and politicians and diplomats to support their campaign. Manipulating the quest for significance and creating a sense of collective narcissism within the community stands counter to the integration of communities. The LTTE chief, for instance, single mindedly pursued his aim of creating a separate state by attempting to create a separate history for what he believed was a unique race.

In the absence of the LTTE's aura of terror, however, members of the Tamil community voice their opinion:

We don't have a separate book, a history, or a culture. We are part of the history and culture of both India and Sri Lanka. Our people were misled to believe that we are a separate entity. That we must fight to have a separate land and have a separate story. But we don't. We are an ethnic group within Sri Lanka. Our story is part of Sri Lanka's story. Not a separate story. Our people have to resolve this. We must learn to live together without trying to make factual what is not real.¹⁵⁰

The appeal to the community is not to be trapped into making the Prabhakaran's myth a reality but to rethink living together harmoniously as an ethnic group how to live together.¹⁵¹ Today Daesh is forging an 'Islamic State' - declaring *wilayats* and claiming territories believed to be historic. Numerous small wars and sustained urban terrorism

¹⁴⁸ L. Festinger, 'Cognitive Dissonance', [website],

<https://web.mst.edu/~psyworld/general/dissonance/dissonance.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2017). Experiments on: Lying for a dollar, Forbidden Toy, Sour Grapes and Buyer's Remorse,

¹⁴⁹ People that remain within a moral dilemma and experience distress for an extended period of time could develop anxiety and depression.

¹⁵⁰ Interview conducted by researcher with a member of the Tamil diaspora community (DP007), on 5th June 2015.

¹⁵¹ R. Gazali, 'The myth of a traditional homeland unmasked', [news portal], <http://infolanka.asia/opinion/politics/the-myth-of-a-traditional-tamil-homeland-unmasked/all-pages>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

campaigns are being fought around the globe, with terrorists who are strategically uncompromising and states unwilling to surrender control over territories.¹⁵² The unending claim for territories results in polarizing communities.

2.6.5 Self-Sanctions to Regulate Conduct

According to Bandura, ‘self-sanctions play a central role in the regulation of inhumane conduct’. Communities have within them ‘moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct’ and people regulate their behavior to align themselves with their standards.¹⁵³ Terrorist groups provide a new moral code, to regulate the behavior of its members, supporters and sympathizers.

Given that ‘moral standards are not fixed internal regulators of conduct’, the ‘self-regulatory mechanism’ can be activated and deactivated by people to either engage in or disengage from inhumane conduct.¹⁵⁴ When violence is justified, ‘[H]armful acts’ are converted to ‘moral ones through linkage to worthy purposes, displacement of responsibility, misrepresenting or disregarding the injurious effects inflicted on others and vilifying the recipients of maltreatment by blaming and dehumanizing them’.¹⁵⁵

The study explores the moral justifications provided by terrorist groups that sanction atrocities against civilians in order to punish the enemy. Moral justifications help to suppress social norms and liberate terrorists to seek vengeance.

¹⁵² C.C. Fair, ‘Urban Battlefields of South Asia: Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan’, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, RAND, 2004, p. 106. See: E. Chenoweth, N. Miller, E. McClellan, and H. Frisch, ‘What Makes Terrorists Tick’, *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 4, Spring 2009, p. 183.

¹⁵³ A. Bandura, ‘The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism’, in F.M. Moghaddam and A.J. Marsella (eds.), *Understanding terrorism: Psychological roots, consequences and interventions*, Washington, DC, American Psychological Association Press, 2004, pp. 121-150.

¹⁵⁴ Bandura, ‘The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 123.

¹⁵⁵ A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. Vittorio Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1996, p. 364.

2.6.6 Deradicalization and Moral Justifications

To engage in an act of violence, an individual needs to rationalize or morally justify the need for the violence. Exposing the futility of violence, delegitimizing the need for violence, generating alternative pathways to violence, are likely to create doubt in the mind of the individual on the need for violence. Demonizing the other helps to emotionally distance the enemy and morally justify attacking the enemy state and its citizens. Portraying the demonized other in personalized terms, as a mother, brother or sister is likely to create dissonance within, as the individual is reminded of his or her own family member. Highlighting the emotive impact of violence and the suffering is likely to sensitize the families and communities of the terrorist group to reframe a violent course of action as unjust and immoral. Publishing testimonies of terrorists who have transformed, and propagating victim accounts, victim family accounts and narratives of family members of terrorists can help to create dissonance and prevent others from joining.

2.6.7 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of moral justifications in helping to mobilize its membership.

Hypothesis 6 – Moral Justification of violence is essential to suppress norms of violence in order to engage in it. Morally justifying attacks on civilians reduces the cognitive dissonance and frees the member to celebrate the attack.

2.7 Self-Efficacy

Bandura describes self-efficacy as an ‘individual’s belief in his or her capacity’ to perform a particular task.¹⁵⁶ Self-efficacy has also been found to predict performance of ‘tasks of varying difficulty with different threats’.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the greater the belief in one’s competence, the better the person is able to overcome challenges.

A person’s confidence to perform a task is identified as being ‘situation specific’. This means an individual could possess generalized self-efficacy, which is confidence in performing a range of tasks, or specific self-efficacy, which is the confidence to perform in a specific task.¹⁵⁸ The question remains as to whether terrorist groups groom their members to develop task specific efficacy or generalized efficacy.

Individuals that join a terrorist group are likely to come from a variety of backgrounds. Developing the motivation to conduct an attack is insufficient to carry out an attack, as it requires confidence that develops with skills training. Therefore, some may be dilettantes, demonstrating a high interest but unlikely to become sufficiently committed to conduct attacks.¹⁵⁹ The link between training and developing self-efficacy is well established.¹⁶⁰ The LTTE actively trained their members and fighters to be target oriented, merging ‘diverse self-interest in support of common goals’.¹⁶¹ The training provided by the LTTE helped to develop and sustain a sense of collective efficacy to help mobilize their members into action.

¹⁵⁶ A. Bandura, *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control*, 1997, cited in C.A. Scherbaum, Y. Cohen-Charash and M.J. Kern, ‘Measuring General Self-Efficacy: A Comparison of Three Measures Using Item Response Theory’, *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, New York, Sage Publications, vol. 66, no. 6, 2006, p. 1047.

¹⁵⁷ A. Bandura, N.E. Adams and J. Beyer, ‘Cognitive processes mediating behavioural change’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 35, no. 3, March 1977, pp. 125-139.

¹⁵⁸ Scherbaum, Cohen-Charash and Kern, ‘Measuring General Self-Efficacy’, pp. 1047-1048.

¹⁵⁹ Asal and Rethemeyer, pp. 244-263.

¹⁶⁰ C.M. Axtell and S.K. Parker, ‘Promoting role breadth self-efficacy through involvement, work redesign and training, *Human Relations*’, vol. 56, no. 1, 2003, p.118. See: Bandura, ‘Self-Efficacy’, in Ramachaudran (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, pp. 71-81.

¹⁶¹ A. Bandura, ‘Self-efficacy mechanisms in human agency’, *American Psychologist*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1982, p. 133.

Several studies provide evidence that links self-efficacy with actual behavior.¹⁶² Self-efficacy and confidence are strongly correlated with increased effort and persistence in both taking on and in completing challenging tasks.¹⁶³ The LTTE focused heavily on training to develop confidence and competence in carrying out attacks with precision.

2.7.1 Task Specific Training

Terrorist groups provide task specific training to individuals recruited into the organization. It is with intense and precise training that the LTTE mobilized its members to conduct attacks.¹⁶⁴ Grooming to develop competence and self-efficacy was a key component in their task specific training. Interviews conducted with bomb makers, body guards, IT cadres, communications cadres, intelligence cadres, drivers, artillery cadres, suicide bombers, suicide handlers and agents indicate that they possess task specific confidence.¹⁶⁵

Additionally, interviews conducted by the researcher in the course of this research and during the rehabilitation of the LTTE, indicated a remarkable lack in social interaction skills. The focus of the LTTE appeared not to build well rounded personalities but to build specialist skills to ensure the individual excelled in their specific roles.

The LTTE had several levels of training. Basic training was first provided for a period of three to six months, during which ‘strengths and skills were identified’, and recruits allocated to ‘different training divisions for specialized training’. The training masters were, however, careful in ‘selecting members’ for suicide training. It involved a process of

¹⁶² Axtell and Parker, ‘Promoting role breadth self-efficacy’, p. 114, refers to 114 meta-analyses that link self-efficacy with actual behavior.

¹⁶³ J. Barling and R. Beattie, ‘Self Efficacy Beliefs and Sales Performance’, 1983, cited in Axtell and Parker, ‘Promoting role breadth self-efficacy’, p. 114.

¹⁶⁴ Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, p. 246. Cites how ‘Prabhakaran ordered a meticulously planned surgical strike’ on 2 August 1992.

¹⁶⁵ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PKPD, a former suicide team member on 5 July 2011.

application, interviews and written submission where the leaders looked for grievances, motivation, endurance, confidence and factors that indicate task completion, determination and loyalty.¹⁶⁶

2.7.2 Vicarious Learning

Bandura proposed that ‘much learning takes place through observing and modelling the actions of others’.¹⁶⁷ Individuals are attracted by terrorist groups based on this principle of observational learning, where the ideology is heard, behavior is observed, which then becomes a guide for a new set of behaviors that the person adopts.

The LTTE’s culture of veneration and martyrdom gave emphasis to learning from personalities that conducted decisive operations. The names of those martyred were given to new recruits, training bases, buildings and boats in order to keep the memory of the martyr alive and motivate fighters to model these personalities. Surviving LTTE suicide members speak proudly of being mentored, for example by ‘Charles’, a suicide mission planner that conducted several successful suicide attacks in Colombo.¹⁶⁸

The spread of terrorism is testimony to the power of vicarious learning. Much of the Tamil Tiger formation was influenced vicariously by studying key personalities and their operations. The LTTE studied operational successes and failures and they continued to build on their successes while eliminating the factors for failure.¹⁶⁹ Suicide members watched video clips and were motivated by the final words of those who had gone before them.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interview conducted with PK, a former LTTE intelligence team member on 6 October 2010.

¹⁶⁷ Bandura, ‘Self-Efficacy’, in R.S. Sharf, *Theories of Psychotherapy and Counselling: Concepts and Cases*, New York, Brooks/Cole, 2012, p. 287.

¹⁶⁸ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interviews with PKPD on 5 July 2011 and MO on 22 May 2012.

¹⁶⁹ The LTTE was creative, innovative, yet simple, in their methods of conducting attacks and operations.

¹⁷⁰ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, cites interviews conducted with VWRB on 21 January 2012, and PDIP on 11 June 2011.

These members were vicariously gaining confidence and building self-efficacy.¹⁷¹ The opportunity to be martyred by virtue of being a suicide bomber, was at the apex of the suicide mission. This task required self-efficacy or conviction as an individual about performing successfully at diverse levels of difficulty.¹⁷²

The effect of vicarious learning and motivation was evident when successful operations were celebrated, which attracted more recruits. Observing someone similar to them succeed was a powerful motivator to join the group. The opportunity to dine with the LTTE chief prior to suicide missions, the veneration of the *maveera* or ‘martyr’ families, facilities, gifts and admiration were symbolic acts that were reinforcing.

2.7.3 Spike in Attacks to Restore Collective Efficacy

The LTTE was careful not to criticise operational failures, which prevented the self-efficacy and confidence of its members from ebbing. This strategy helped to remove the fear of failure and punishment, and instead increased their commitment to succeed the next time. The LTTE instead, focused on celebrating successful attacks, creating an impression that it was indomitable. It compensated for heavy losses in the battlefield by conducting suicide attacks in the city, to prevent the loss of collective efficacy. Interviews indicate how the LTTE leadership mounted pressure on suicide handlers and agents to conduct the attacks in the city to ‘improve the morale of the cadres who had faced defeat’.¹⁷³

The LTTE units competed with each other to conduct the best operations. One such operation involved the LTTE overseas network competing to secure surface-to-air-missiles

¹⁷¹ J.J. Van der Bijl and L.M. Shortridge-Baggett, ‘The Theory and Measurement of the Self-Efficacy Construct’, 2002, cited in B.F. Redmond, ‘Self-Efficacy and Social Cognitive Theories’, [website], Updated 10 October 2016, p. 4, <https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/psych484/7.+self-efficacy+and+social+cognitive+theories>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹⁷² Van der Bijl and Shortridge-Baggett, cited in B.F. Redmond, ‘Self-Efficacy and Social Cognitive Theories’, p. 6.

¹⁷³ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, ‘Prabhakaran Unmasked’, unpublished, 2015. Interviews with PKPD on 5 July 2011 and PDP on 11 June 2011.

to attack Sri Lankan security force aircrafts, following the LTTE's operational failure to attack the Sri Lankan Air Force Base in Palaley in August 2004.¹⁷⁴ The FBI arrested Sahil Sabaratnam of the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), when he was in the process of purchasing the surface-to-air-missiles in the US for this purpose.¹⁷⁵

2.7.4 Proxy Control and Collective Efficacy

Another concept discussed in the literature is proxy control, where the individual or group draws strength and legitimacy by aligning with a stronger individual or group. Some 'believe they possess superior coping ability to handle potential threats themselves' but 'those who perceive themselves as less skilled readily yield control to others' and function under the protection of the more powerful.¹⁷⁶ Similarly the LTTE members functioned by drawing their confidence and efficacy from the collective and collective action. The study examines the self-efficacy levels of the former members of the LTTE.

At an organizational level, when the LTTE expanded its network overseas, satellite groups aligned to the LTTE came into being, and these groups acted semi-independently on behalf of the LTTE.¹⁷⁷ They acquired legitimacy to function by aligning with the group or by supporting it. Following the demise of the LTTE these groups evolved into distinct entities, and the LTTE supporters aligned themselves to the different groups.

¹⁷⁴ Anthony, Wijesinghe and Nathaniel, 'Prabhakaran Unmasked', unpublished, 2015. Interviews with KEN on 21 August 2012 and NAN on 05 April 2014.

¹⁷⁵ Sabaratnam, S., 'Letter written from prison in the United States: To my dear beloved Tamil people', August 2011, [blogsite], http://lttewatch.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/letter3_sabaratnam.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017).

¹⁷⁶ A. Bandura, 'Self-Efficacy Mechanisms in Human Agency', pp. 141-142.

¹⁷⁷ Research and Monitoring Division, 'Geneva's Human Rights Chameleons: Who are they? How do they operate?' pp. 24-29. See: Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka – Extraordinary, 'Government Notification 1854_41', Friday March 21, 2014, http://colombogazette.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1854_41-E.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017). List of Designated persons, groups and entities under paragraph 4(2) of the United Nations Regulations No. 1 of 2012, refers to the banning of LTTE fronts.

Bandura disputes the view that ‘hopelessness breeds militant social action’. Instead, he claims that militant social action is pursued, not by ‘those who have lost hope,’ but by the ‘more able members whose efforts at social and economic betterment have met with at least some success.’ Bandura goes on to explain that those who protest ‘are generally better educated, have greater self-pride, have a stronger belief in their ability to influence events in their lives and favor coercive measures’.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, those who have spearheaded some of the most effective terrorist campaigns in the recent years, Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri and Prabhakaran, were not from deprived backgrounds.

Self-efficacy is a vital building block in the radicalization and mobilization of terrorists. Developing self-efficacy through training, learning and by proxy influences individual and group behavior and motivates others to act on behalf of the group.

2.7.5 Hypothesis to Test

The study looks at the role of self-efficacy in mobilizing its membership.

Hypothesis 7 – The organization grooms its members (cadre population) to develop task specific self-efficacy through training. The training involves both direct learning and vicarious learning.

¹⁷⁸ Bandura, ‘Self-Efficacy Mechanisms in Human Agency’, p. 143.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined the literature on key components considered essential in grooming a terrorist: the emotional grievance narrative, quest for significance, ideology, organization, roles and projected images, moral justification and self-efficacy.

In summary, terrorist groups are dependent on its membership for survival. Its members are recruited from the body of sympathizers and supporters from the community. The politics of terrorism invests heavily in the community and its membership, to be able to recruit, sustain and mobilize. Long term grievances give rise to loss of significance and the birth of grievance narratives. These narratives are manipulated by terrorist groups to secure recruits. Organizations emerge to redress the grievances armed with a simple yet appealing ideology of violence that resonates with the aggrieved community. The group projects itself to the world as being victimized by the state, to the community as its rescuer, and to the enemy state as an aggressor to be feared. Having consolidated its role through these images the group goes on to prepare its members for mobilization. Rigorous training helps to build confidence and self-efficacy while moral justifications ease the conscience of the terrorist. The radicalized recruit is then groomed and mobilized to conduct violence.

'He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster'.¹

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The radicalization of a civilian into violence is multifactorial. Seven components were identified as contributing to the process of radicalization within the literature review. This chapter outlines the methodology to explore the function of these seven variables in grooming a civilian from radicalization to mobilization. The seven components explored include, 1) the grievance narrative, 2) the loss of significance and arousal of the quest for significance, 3) the ideology, 4) the terrorist organization and concept of organizational justice, 5) the shifting roles and images projected to the community, 6) the moral justification of violence, and 7) training to build self-efficacy. While this may not be an exhaustive list of factors involved in the process of grooming a terrorist, the scope of the study is limited to testing these seven variables, using a sample of ninety participants. A semi structured interview schedule and four psychometric scales were used to gather data from the sample on the seven variables. Qualitative and quantitative data is used to discuss the contribution of the seven variables to the radicalization process.

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, [website], 1886, www.nietzsche-quotes.com/beyond-good-and-evil/, (accessed 18 February 2017).

3.1 Research Questions

The primary research question:

- What are the factors involved in the process of radicalization into violence?

The benefit of this primary research question:

- To identify potential points of intervention to prevent radicalization, disrupt radicalization and minimize re-radicalization.

The research questions to gather information on the process of radicalization and deradicalization were focused on:

1. Methods used to indoctrinate and radicalise the community
2. Techniques used to recruit, sustain and mobilise individuals to use violence
3. Approaches used to obtain direct, indirect and passive support for terrorist activity
4. The push and pull factors that lead people to join terrorist groups.

Psychometric scales and interview questions were used to test each component hypothesized as contributing to the process of radicalizing a civilian into violence.

3.2 Hypotheses

Seven hypotheses were formulated to identify potential components in radicalizing civilians into violence.

Hypothesis 1 – The emotive narrative: A powerful emotive grievance narrative is an essential foundational component in recruitment of members; this narrative continues to evolve and is reframed throughout the lifespan of the terrorist within the movement.

Hypothesis 2 – Significance arousal and quest for significance: Framing and reframing the grievance narrative across the years maintains the community in a state of significance loss, which arouses the quest for significance. The terrorist group guides its members to restore significance.

Hypothesis 3 – The ideology of a grievance, a target and a violent method: The organization provides its recruits and members with a simple ideology they can identify with and work towards. The ideology contains a grievance, a target responsible for the grievance, and a violent method to redress the grievance.

Hypothesis 4 – An organization that is procedurally just and distributively fair: The organization becomes a trusted vehicle that mentors and mobilizes its members to redress grievances and restore significance. The members believe that the organization is procedurally just and distributively fair.

Hypothesis 5 – Image and role of the victim, rescuer and aggressor: The organization projects the image of being the Victim, the Rescuer and the Aggressor to different audiences. The members identify with all three aspects and switch between these roles.

Hypothesis 6 – Moral justification to reduce dissonance: Moral Justification of violence suppresses social norms against violence. Morally justifying attacks on civilians

reduces the cognitive dissonance and allows the members to take pride in and celebrate the attack.

Hypothesis 7 – Training to develop self-efficacy: The terrorist organization grooms its members to develop task specific self-efficacy through training. The training involves both direct learning and vicarious learning.

The seven primary hypotheses identified, aim to test if these are essential building blocks in the process of radicalization into violence.

3.3 Design

The study involved interviewing members of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The case study focused on former members of the LTTE as well as individuals from the Tamil community. As the research involved interviewing human subjects, ethics approval was requested from the Macquarie University Human Ethics Committee, Human Sciences and Humanities (Appendix 1). Final ethics approval was granted on 26 May 2014 (Reference No: 5201400114). The initial twelve-month period of ethics approval was extended until 6 July 2015 upon written request. Permission to conduct the study was sought by letter (Appendix 2) from the Government Agents (GA's) in Sri Lanka, responsible for administrative duties in the region.

Participants were not offered incentives, to prevent social desirability.² Instead, each participant was provided travel costs of Sri Lankan rupees five hundred, which is a value close to three hours of a daily wage, which was the approximate amount of time spent to travel and participate in the study.³ All participants and accompanying individuals were

² Social desirability is a phenomenon within research, when participants tend to provide responses they believe may be expected by the researcher, to be viewed in a favorable manner. This could arise due to a need to please or coercion.

³ The travel cost was equivalent \$ 5.00 (Australian dollars).

provided refreshments irrespective of their participation.⁴ Serving refreshments is in keeping with the norms of hospitality in the Sri Lankan culture.

Five groups of participants were included in the study to access a broad range of views. The first group of participants were former members of the LTTE suicide units.⁵ The second group were former members of the LTTE working in various other units.⁶ The third group of participants were former child combatants.⁷ The fourth group were family members of former members of the LTTE.⁸ The fifth group of participants were members of the Tamil diaspora community. The first three participant groups included former members of the LTTE who were rehabilitated and reintegrated into society and not considered vulnerable as they had effectively *spent* their crime or granted an *amnesty*. The latter two participant groups were members of the Tamil community and were not members of the LTTE.

A mixed method survey design involving a semi structured interview was utilized to access quantitative and qualitative data. The interview and survey on average lasted one and a half to two hours. The entire interview process, involving greeting the participant, introducing each other, explaining the study, taking consent of the participant, instructions, as well as the termination phase, and providing the travel allowance and guiding the person out took approximately three hours.

⁴ Refreshments included fruit juice packets, flavored milk, bottled water, biscuits and cookies. Lunch packets were provided if the interview was during a meal time.

⁵ Black Tigers were the members of the LTTE suicide units. The LTTE had several suicide units (Intelligence, Radha Bodyguard, Sea Tigers, Air Tigers). The people interviewed in this study were former Black Tigers from the LTTE intelligence unit and the LTTE body guard unit.

⁶ Various units refer to the Intelligence units, Political unit, Foreign unit, Communication unit, Media unit, Fighting units, and Sea Tiger unit.

⁷ At the time of interviewing, the former child combatants had reached adulthood.

⁸ Interviews included members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, working in Sri Lanka.

3.3.1 Participants

The study involved a total of 90 participants ($N = 90$). All participants completed the questionnaires but only 85 remained to complete the interview. The completion rate of the entire survey was, therefore, 94 percent. The study was designed to access an equal number of participants ($n = 15$) in each category. Difficulties were experienced with accessing equal proportions of rehabilitated and reintegrated former suicide members. The snowball technique⁹ was used to access this group through former beneficiaries of the rehabilitation program. The knowledge to identify this particular group was with Sri Lanka's security services and not divulged to civilians.¹⁰ Difficulties were also experienced with achieving a gender balance within each category. A greater number of reintegrated males volunteered for the study while females were less willing to do so.

The rehabilitated former suicide member sample ($N = 12$) was all male. This group was referred to as 'Suicide Rehab'. The study aimed to understand the thought processes involved in the radicalization and grooming of former members of the Black Tiger units that volunteered for suicide missions. The members of these units were highly motivated and received the most intense training provided in the grooming of a terrorist.

The rehabilitated former members of the LTTE ($N = 33$) included male ($n = 23$) and female ($n = 10$) participants from a variety of units. The study aimed to identify gender differences in the process of radicalization and also differences between this group and Suicide Rehab group. This sample is referred to as 'Other Rehab'.

The rehabilitated young adults ($N = 15$) included former male ($n = 6$) and female ($n = 9$) child combatants of the LTTE. This sample consisted of young adults at the time of the

⁹ The snowball technique involves accessing larger number of participants through those existing participants, when existing participants may have the best access to a specific group rather than through a random sample as the representation is few and far between.

¹⁰ The practice of the government on rehabilitation and reintegration was to support individuals to enter mainstream and move on with their lives as citizens.

interview, and is referred to as 'Youth Rehab'. The study aimed to identify differences in the process of radicalization between this group and the other two groups.

The family members of reintegrated former members of the LTTE ($N = 15$) included both male ($n = 7$) and female ($n = 8$) participants. The family of former members were referred to as 'Family FM'. This group was interviewed to obtain the perspective of an involved civilian on the methods used to radicalize the community. Of particular interest were their views on what could deter their family member from joining a group in the future.

Diaspora members ($N = 15$) included both male ($n = 12$) and female ($n = 3$) participants. This sample is referred to as the 'Diaspora'. Some of these individuals had walked away from recruitment while others had supported the LTTE from overseas. This group was involved in supporting the reconciliation and peace building efforts in Sri Lanka at the time of interview.¹¹ The group was interviewed to determine the methods used to radicalize the community at the local and international level.

¹¹ Sri Lanka Unites, [website], <http://srilankaunites.org/>, (accessed 18 February 2017). Sri Lanka Reconciliation Youth Forum, [website], <http://reconciliationyouthforum.org/>, (accessed 18 February 2017). Peace Direct, [website], <http://www.peacedirect.org/peacebuilders/sri-lanka>, (accessed 18 February 2017). Lakshaman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies, [website], <http://www.ft.lk/article/150394/LKIIRSS-presents-%E2%80%98Role-of-Arts-and-Culture-in-Reconciliation> and <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lanka-realizing-peace-reconciliation-and-ending-violence/>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

Table 1: *Distribution of the Participant Sample*

Participant groups	Sample size	Description
Suicide Rehab	12	Former members of the LTTE suicide units. ¹²
Other Rehab	33	Former members of other units of the LTTE. ¹³
Youth Rehab	15	Former members recruited as child combatants and worked in other units. ¹⁴
Family FM	15	Family members of former members of the LTTE. Non-LTTE living in Sri Lanka.
Diaspora	15	Diaspora Tamil community. Non-LTTE that have lived overseas. ¹⁵

¹² The LTTE Intelligence units, *Radha* bodyguard unit, Sea Tigers, Air Tigers, each had their own suicide units. Those who worked within the suicide units were referred to at the Black Tigers (BTs)

¹³ For the purpose of the study ‘other units’ mean all units (Intelligence unit, Political unit, Foreign unit, Communication unit, Media unit, Fighting units, and Sea Tiger unit) excluding the suicide units.

¹⁴ At the time of interview all individuals were adults.

¹⁵ Interviewed while in Sri Lanka.

3.3.2 Material

The participant information sheets, consent forms and scales were translated from English to Tamil and translated back to English, to ensure the accuracy of the translation.

Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 3) outlined the nature and the purpose of the study, the type of questions that would be included, the time required to complete the survey and interview, confidentiality of information and the participants' right to withdraw from the study. Each sheet contained a time and a date for participants to attend the interview, and a phone number was provided for participants to reschedule the appointment, if required. The participation of family members was not restricted to the families of the former LTTE members that participated in the study but open to any family member of a former LTTE member. The Diaspora Information Sheets were distributed to those currently working in the field using the snowball technique.

Informed Consent Form

Each participant was provided with the Macquarie University's Human Research Ethics Committee approved Informed Consent Form. This document outlined the purpose of the study, the procedure, risks, benefits and participant rights. The information was to help participants make an informed decision to accept or decline participation in the study. After the individuals agreed to participate they were invited to sign the document. One copy was given to the participant and the other was retained by the researcher. A number of participants declined to sign the information sheet but verbal consent was taken and the researcher noted this on the Consent Form.

General Information Sheet

The General Information Sheet gathered demographic details of the participants. Questions common to all five groups were: age, gender, marital status, number of dependents, ethnicity, education, occupation and socio-economic status. Questions specific to the three 'Rehab' groups were on years in rehabilitation. Questions specific to the 'Diaspora' group were on years lived outside of Sri Lanka.

Interview schedule

The semi structured Interview Schedule contained 28 questions that sought the opinion of participants on a range of aspects. The questions were common to all participants. The Interview Schedule was designed to explore the following themes:

- Strategies used to recruit, sustain and mobilize individuals.
- Methods of indoctrination to groom the membership.
- Factors that attract or prevent people from joining violent groups.
- The ideology, the narrative, the grievances, the organization, sense of efficacy, significance and the future.

Psychometric Scales

The study involved the use of four psychometric scales to test the role of personal significance, organizational justice, self-efficacy and satisfaction with life. The application, reliability and validity of these scales will be explored in this section.

Personal Significance Measure

The Personal Significance measure is a five item scale that measures an individual's level of personal significance by assessing the strength of the meaning and purpose in their life.¹⁶ The five items that make up the Personal Significance Measure have been selectively chosen by Kruglanski and colleagues from the Meaning in Life Questionnaire developed by Steger and colleagues.¹⁷ These five items were found to be most pertinent to measuring the aspect of personal significance tested by Kruglanski and colleagues in the realm of significance quest. The Personal Significance measure has been translated into Arabic, Tagalo, and Tamil, and used in Indonesia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka respectively, to assess terrorist populations by Kruglanski and colleagues.¹⁸

For each item, there is a choice of seven responses ranging from 'Absolutely untrue' scored at 1 to 'Absolutely true' scored at 7. The scores for each of the five items are summed up to give a total score. Higher scores indicate high personal significance and lower scores indicate lower personal significance. Psychometrics on reliability and validity are limited. However, the scale indicates good reliability with cronbach's alpha = .92, and when used in longitudinal studies the reliabilities are as follows: Time 1 alpha = .65, Time 2 alpha = .71 and Time 3 alpha = .84.

The scale was administered by asking the participants to initially respond to the questions by (1) thinking of themselves in the 'Present' as a civilian living in the community, and then by (2) reflecting on the 'Past' during the time the LTTE was in control.¹⁹

¹⁶ A.W. Kruglanski, X. Chen, M. Dechesne, S. Fishman, and E. Orehek, 'Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers' Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance', *Political Psychology*, vol. 30, no. 3, 2009, p. 335, p. 340 and p. 349.

¹⁷ M.F. Steger, P. Frazier, S. Oishi and M. Kaler, 'The Meaning in Life Questionnaire: Assessing the Presence of and Search for Meaning in Life', *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, APA, vol. 53, no. 1, 2006, p. 86.

¹⁸ A.W. Kruglanski, J.J. Bélanger, M. Gelfand, R. Gunaratna, M. Hettiarachchi, F. Reinares, E. Orehek, J. Sasota, and K. Sharvit, 'Terrorism: A (Self) Love Story', Re-directing the Significance Quest Can End Violence', *American Psychologist*, vol., 68, no. 7, 2013, p. 560.

¹⁹ The LTTE was operational from 1976-2009.

New General Self Efficacy (NGSE)

The NGSE designed by Chen, Gully and Eden is used to assess competence across a range of situations.²⁰ The NGSE is a development of the Generalized Self Efficacy scale (GSE), Sherer et al. General Self Efficacy scale (SGSE) and the Specific Self Efficacy scale (SSE).²¹ Development on the three scales has resulted in the NGSE capturing both trait and state aspects. Psychometric properties of the NGSE, '[a]lthough shorter than the SGSE scale, [it] demonstrated high reliability, predicted specific self-efficacy (SSE) for a variety of tasks in various contexts'.²²

Sherbaum and colleagues describe the NGSE as having an advantage over the other scales and the psychometric evidence as being positive.²³ The internal consistency of responses to these items range from .85 to .90, stability coefficients range from $r = .62$ to $r = .65$, and test-retest reliability coefficients are reported to be reasonably high ranging from $r = .62$ to $r = .66$.²⁴

The scale was administered by asking all participants to initially respond to the questions by (1) thinking of themselves in the 'Present' or current context as a civilian in the community, and then by (2) reflecting on the 'Past' during the time of the LTTE.

²⁰ G. Chen, S.M. Gully, and D. Eden, 'Validation of a new General Self-Efficacy Scale', *Organizational Research Methods*, vol. 4, 2001, p. 77.

²¹ GSE (Generalized Self Efficacy) scale: R. Schwarzer, and M. Jerusalem, 'Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale', in J. Weinman, S. Wright, and M. Johnston (eds.), *Measures in health psychology: A user's portfolio. Causal and control beliefs*, Windsor, UK, NFER-Nelson, 1995, pp. 35-37. See: The SGSE (Sherer et al.'s General Perceived Self Efficacy) scale: M. Sherer, J.E. Maddux, R. Mercandante, S. Prentice-Dunn, B. Jacobs, and R.W. Rogers, 'The Self-Efficacy Scale: Construction and validation', *Psychological Reports*, vol. 51, no. 2, 1982, pp. 663-671. See the SSE (Specific Self Efficacy) scale: Chen et al., 2001, p. 63.

²² Chen et al., 'Validation of a new General Self-Efficacy Scale', p.65.

²³ C.A. Sherbaum, Y. Cohen-Charash and M.J. Kern, 'Measuring General Self-Efficacy: A Comparison of Three Measures Using Item Response Theory', *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, SAGE publications, vol.66, no.6, 2006, p. 1047.

²⁴ Sherbaum, Cohen-Charash and Kern, 'Measuring General Self-Efficacy', p. 1051.

Procedural Justice Scale

The Procedural Justice Scale designed by Tyler and Blader is based on four types of processes involved when judging fairness:²⁵ All four components influence the assessment of procedural justice:

1. Formal decision making (rules and policies involved);
2. Formal quality of treatment (how people are treated based on the rules and policies);
3. Informal decision making (how particular group authorities make decisions);
4. Informal quality of treatment (how particular group authorities treat group members).

The Procedural Justice Scale is scored differently in each section. Each of the subscale items are scored on a six point Likert scale (1-6). Procedural Justice fairness is assessed using five items; Formal Quality of Decision Making (FQDM) has four items; Formal Quality of Treatment (FQT) is a three-item subscale; Informal Quality of Decision Making (IQDM) consists of thirteen items; Distributive Justice (DJ) has three items; and Outcome Favorability (OF) consists of three items.

The Means (standard deviations) and Coefficient Alphas for each component are provided below.²⁶

1. Procedural justice fairness 3.33 (1.17) .95
2. Formal quality of decision making 3.30 (1.15) .87
3. Formal quality of treatment 3.06 (1.04) .95
4. Informal quality of decision making 3.71 (1.42) .96

²⁵ T.R. Tyler and S.L. Blader, 'The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 7, no. 4, 2003, p. 354.

²⁶ T.R. Tyler and S.L. Blader, 'A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a "Fair" Process', *The Society for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 29, no. 6, June 2003, p. 750.

5. Informal quality of treatment 4.08 (1.26) .98
6. Distributive justice 2.88 (1.20) .83
7. Outcome favorability 3.35 (0.99) .83

Strong associations are cited between factors.²⁷ High correlations between the two formal factors ($r = .92$) and the two informal factors ($r = .91$). All correlations between the seven aspects were found to be significant at $p < .01$. The four-component model demonstrated excellent fit on the Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .96 and on the Normed Fit Index [NFI] = .94, at 90 percent confidence interval of the root mean-square error of approximation [C.I. RMSEA] = .058 to .066.²⁸

The literature survey indicated that when employees perceived their organization to be distributively fair and procedurally just, their trust in the organization increased as well as their willingness to take risks on behalf of the organization.

The Organizational Justice scale was administered by asking (1) the three 'Rehab' groups (suicide units, other units, young adults) to respond to questions by focusing on the time they worked for the LTTE. The scale was administered to (2) family members of beneficiaries and (3) diaspora members by asking them to reflect on their last place of work.

Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS)

The SWLS designed by Diener, Emmons, Larson and Griffins measures global cognitive judgments of one's life satisfaction. Each item on this 5-item scale has a choice of seven

²⁷ A p-value between .01 and .05 is an acceptable level of significance, indicating 95% - 99% possibility of a strong relationship between variables. The r value is always between +1 and -1 indicating that the relationship is either positively or negatively correlated, while a 0 value indicates no relationship between the variables.

²⁸ Tyler and Blader, 'A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice', p.751.

responses that range from ‘Strongly disagree,’ scoring 1, to ‘Strongly agree,’ scoring 7. The authors report that the SWLS was developed to assess satisfaction with life as a whole. The structure of this subjective well-being scale is reported to reflect the judgmental or cognitive component.²⁹

The SWLS is reported to reflect good convergent validity when used with other scales on reliability, predictive validity and temporal stability.³⁰ The scale has also been found to be sufficiently sensitive to reflect changes in life satisfaction as it evaluates the person’s conscious judgment of satisfaction with life based on own subjective criteria.³¹

The scale was administered by asking all participants to initially respond to the questions by (1) thinking of the ‘Present’ or current context as a civilian in the community, and then by (2) reflecting on the ‘Past’ during the time of the LTTE.

3.4 Procedure

The sample of rehabilitated beneficiaries and family members of former rehabilitees were invited to participate in the study from the areas of Vavuniya, Killinochchi and Trincomalee. A written request was submitted to the Government Agent (GA) office to gain access to the list of beneficiaries from each area.³² Permission was also obtained for a meeting room within the GA premises to interview the participants during the working hours of 9am-5pm. The GA was reassured that participants will not be subjected to any distress. However,

²⁹ E. Diener, R.A. Emmons, R.J. Larson, and S. Griffin, 'The Satisfaction with Life Scale', *Journal of Personality Assessment*, vol. 49, no. 1, 1985, pp. 71-75.

³⁰ W.G. Pavot and E. Diener, 'Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale' *Psychological Assessment*, vol. 5, no. 2, June 1993, p. 167-168.

³¹ Satisfaction with Life Scale: Selected Abstracts, Fetzer Institute, <http://www.fetzer.org/sites/default/files/images/stories/pdf/selfmeasures/SATISFACTION-SatisfactionWithLife.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

³² GA=Government Agent, responsible for all state administrative duties in any given region.

measures were in place to provide support to participants should any participant become distressed as a result of the interview.

The surveys were conducted within the GA premises as well as in Community Centers. The GA premises in the country are a familiar setting to people in the community. In particular, members of the rehabilitation program accessed GA services during their reintegration phase.

Participants were selected based on the random sampling method from the GA list. The top three names that appear alphabetically were checked for age and gender. Any name that was familiar to the researcher was excluded due to previous work in the field. The Information Sheet was mailed out to each person and they were invited to join the study on a specific date, time and venue. Participants who attended were provided the Consent Form and requested to read through carefully and sign the document if they were comfortable with participating. One copy was given to the participant and the other retained by the researcher.

Participants who arrived with a family member (Family FM) were offered the Information Sheet. The family members that agreed to participate were then included in the study. Access to the reintegrated former suicide member sample (Suicide Rehab) was based on the snowball technique as the GA did not possess this secure information. This sample was accessed through those who participated in the survey.

Diaspora members were invited to participate in the study using the snowball technique. Those individuals working in the country, who were known to the researcher, were requested to provide the information sheet to others interested in participating in the study. These individuals then contacted the researcher and a mutual date and time was set, to conduct interviews within community centers.

The participants that attended were from a variety of regions: Vavuniya, Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Nuwara Eliya and Colombo. The sample included participants using both the random sampling method and the snowball technique.

A consistent procedure was followed with each participant. Participants were guided into the room allocated for the interview. The researcher and translator built rapport through introductions and general conversation. The participant and any accompanying persons were offered biscuits and a packet of juice or milk. Those that accompanied the participant but were not participating in the study were requested to be seated outside the interview room.

The interview commenced by administering the General Information Sheet through the translator. Next, the participant was requested to fill out the Structured Questionnaires that required crossing the appropriate items on four itemized self-report measures. Upon completion of the questionnaires, participants were requested to engage in an interview through a translator. Questions were paraphrased for those participants that requested clarification. Some participants took longer than others to complete the self-report measures. Of the 90 participants that completed the survey, five did not engage in the interview due to the time factor (when they had other commitments beyond the one and a half hours).

At the end of the session each participant was asked if they had any questions regarding the survey. The researcher and translator ensured that each participant was comfortable with the interview prior to them leaving the premises. Each participant was thanked, provided an envelope containing Rs. 500, and informed that it was for their 'travel expenses'. The participants were free to withdraw from the study at any stage, during or after their participation, without any obligation or reduction in benefits.

All interview sheets and entries carried an anonymous code that allowed participants to express their views freely. None of the participants were identified by name. The

interviews were conducted confidentially through a translator and the responses handwritten as participants were not comfortable with voice recording. The data was encoded and entered electronically. The data files were password protected and paper copies of written consent stored in a locked cabinet in the researchers' office premises for a five-year period. All electronic files and backup files were also stored in a secure locked cabinet and will be destroyed after a period of five years.

The data from the survey forms were entered into SPSS version 12.³³ Statistical analysis included descriptive statistics, means testing, analysis of variance (ANOVA), Games Howell post hoc tests to see which groups differed from each other, and Bonferroni post hoc tests to probe patterns in pairwise comparison of groups. Means, standard deviations, correlations and percentages are presented in tables. Line graphs and bar graphs are used to illustrate the data.

Content analysis was carried out on the qualitative information to identify themes related to the research questions and data categories. Thematic analysis was used to identify relevant themes and issues that arose from the interviews. The data is presented using frequency counts and percentages.

3.5 Ethical Issues and Considerations

The research was designed to fulfil the requirements of a PhD degree. The researcher has previously worked with former LTTE members during her voluntary work on the rehabilitation program design and assessment in Sri Lanka. The researcher's direct contact with the rehabilitation of Tamil Tigers ended in September 2011 when approximately 10,000

³³ Support for the statistical analysis of the study was obtained from Dr. David Webber, University of Maryland, USA. The Personal Significance Scale designed and used in Sri Lanka by Professor Kruglanski since 2009 was also analyzed at the University of Maryland, USA. The researcher has discussed all the data pertaining to the scales in depth with both Dr. David Webber and Professor Arie Kruglanski when writing this study, to ensure the integrity of the data and the accuracy of its interpretation.

beneficiaries of this program were reintegrated. The participants included in this study were living in civil society and not in detention or custody at the time of this study.

It is acknowledged that the researcher has worked in the field of rehabilitation from 2009 to 2013. The researcher has not included any participant she has directly worked with during rehabilitation. The clinical involvement has remained separate to the research.

3.6 Conclusion

The data for this study was collected during the period of ethics approval granted by the Macquarie University of Ethics Committee. Each interview was anticipated to take one and a half hours at the time when the study was designed. However, the waiting times, introductions, hospitality and closing of the interview process resulted in approximately two and a half to three hours being allocated for each interview. The sample under study did not contain a gender balance, as originally anticipated, due to the difficulty with accessing the participation of the female sample. Accessing equal proportions of former suicide members was difficult as this sample was not identifiable on a register, resulting in a smaller sample size ($n = 12$) than originally anticipated. All participants ($N = 90$) that attended engaged in the first part of the study that required completion of structured questionnaires. However, only 85 participants remained to engage in the interview, which was the second part of the study.

'The goal is to turn data into information, and information into insight'.¹

Carly Fiorina.

Chapter 4: Quantitative Data Analysis

The hypotheses were designed to test the factors involved in the process of radicalization into violence. Identifying the radicalizing factors are likely to help target interventions to prevent radicalization, disrupt the process of radicalization and minimize re-radicalization. The quantitative data gathered from the sample of 33 rehabilitated former LTTE members (Other Rehab), 12 former LTTE suicide members (Suicide Rehab), 15 young adults former LTTE child soldiers (Youth Rehab), 15 family members of former LTTE members (Family FM), and 15 members of the Tamil diaspora (Diaspora) will be presented in this chapter. The quantitative data gathered using four psychometric scales that measure personal significance, self-efficacy, organizational justice and satisfaction with life, and a semi-structured interview schedule. The quantitative data is presented at two levels:

- (1) Five secondary hypotheses were tested using four scales: Differences in level of personal significance, self-efficacy, organizational justice and life satisfaction in the present and the past across two broad categories. (i) those who admire the LTTE, reject the LTTE and those who acknowledge the good/bad in the LTTE; and (ii) those who want a separate state, to live separately in one country, live together in one country.
- (2) Analysis using the interview schedule to test seven primary hypotheses: Differences between the five participant categories on their perception of the importance of the

¹ Carly Fiorina, former CED of HP, Analyticshero, [website], <http://www.analyticshero.com/2012/10/25/31-essential-quotes-on-analytics-and-data/>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

grievance narrative, significance, organization and its ideology, organizational justice, images and roles, moral justification and self-efficacy.

4.1 Categorization

Participants were categorised into five groups and used as the independent variables. For statistical analysis purposes, the rehabilitated members of the suicide units were referred to as “Suicide Rehab”. Individuals belonging to a variety of other units were referred to as “Other Rehab”. The rehabilitated young adults recruited as children were referred to as “Youth Rehab”. The family members of former Tamil Tigers were referred to as “Family FM” and Diaspora members were referred to as “Diaspora”.

Table 2: *Five Main Participant Groups*

Category	Number (<i>N</i>)
Suicide Rehab	12
Other Rehab	33
Youth Rehab	15
Family FM	15
Diaspora	15

These five groups were further categorised into “LTTE Rehab” and “Non-LTTE” groups, and were used as independent variables to ascertain if there are differences between members and non-members.

Table 3: *Participants Categorised Based on Membership with the LTTE*

Category	Number (N=90)	Description of participants
LTTE Rehab	60	Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab
Non-LTTE	30	Family FM, Diaspora

Another set of independent variables used for analysis included those who ‘Admire LTTE’, ‘Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE’ and ‘Reject LTTE’. These categories were based on interview question 25. Question 25 assessed participant perspective of the LTTE on regret, anger and sadness, as well as hopefulness that the group was not functioning, the need to restart the group, and if life is better or worse without the LTTE. These three categories captured the level of attachment to the LTTE and were supported by the responses on the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS).

Table 4: *Participants Categorised Based on Level of Admiration for the LTTE*

Category	Number (N = 90)
Admire LTTE	12
Acknowledge good/bad in LTTE	32
Reject LTTE	46

The final set of independent variables used were categorised based on those that wanted a ‘Separate State’, to ‘Live Separately’ in one state and to ‘Live Together’ in one state. These three categories were ascertained through interview question 26 on vision for the future, message to the community and message to the next generation. These responses were also supported by the responses on the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS).

Table 5: *Participants Categorised Based On Preference of a Separate State*

Category	Number (N=90)
Separate State	13
Live Separately	21
Live Together	56

The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) was used to test the consistency of participant responses. For example, elevated scores on the Personal Significance Scale (PSIG) in the ‘past’ were expected to positively correlate with elevated levels of satisfaction in the ‘past’ and negatively correlate with satisfaction scores in the ‘present’ on the SWLS. Therefore, SWLS was used as a scale to help verify satisfaction levels in the past and present, and strengthen the findings of the Personal Significance (PSIG) and the New Generalized Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scales. These three scales included two sections. Section A required participants to respond in reference to the present context and Section B required responses in reference to the ‘Past’ during the time of the LTTE control.

Given that the distribution of age, gender, education and socioeconomic status was varied, the descriptive statistics were not of significance. As such, analysis was not conducted based on the above demographic data. See Appendix 4 for demographic details.

4.2 Analysis

Analysis was carried out to test if there were significant differences between the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora groups, and to probe the pattern of results to determine if the differences were consistent with the hypotheses. The inferential statistics and means from the analysis are provided in the next section.

All participants ($N = 90$) had been exposed to LTTE ideology and activities at different stages during the organization's lifespan.² Preliminary analysis indicated that it was more meaningful to run the analysis based on how much individuals currently admire the LTTE, which is reflective of their appreciation/approval of the LTTE. Analysis was also conducted based on how much individuals currently espoused a separate state, reflecting their commitment to the LTTE aim of a separate state.

Most of the hypotheses pit one group against two groups, predicting that those who support a separate state would differ from those who do not; those who admire the LTTE would differ from those who do not; those who were members of the LTTE Rehab would differ from the non-LTTE; and Suicide Rehab would differ from Other Rehab.

The first set of probes conducted looked at specific comparisons between categories. Three categories were formulated based on the degree of connectedness to separate state, admiration and membership:

² LTTE was formed in 1975 and its activities continued until it was militarily defeated in 2009.

1. Those who support a Separate State (Group 1), Live Separately within the same state (Group 2) and Live Together (Group 3).
2. Those who Admire LTTE (Group 1), Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE (Group 2) and Reject LTTE (Group 3).
3. Those who were members of the LTTE Rehab (Group 1), non-LTTE categories of Family FM (Group 2) and Diaspora (Group 3).

The second set of probes conducted looked at linear trends within categories. This means comparing each group in succession: comparing Group 1 to 2 and then Group 2 to 3. The data from these analyses is presented as either Group 1 vs. Groups 2/3 or as Group 1 vs. Group 2 vs. Group 3.

4.3 Results of the Survey

Several secondary hypotheses related to personal significance, satisfaction with life, organizational justice and self-efficacy are tested in this section. These hypotheses contribute more weight to the seven primary hypotheses discussed in the second section of this chapter.

4.3.1 Personal Significance and Life Satisfaction

The notion of significance is related to differences in the level of personal significance (importance, purpose and meaning in life) within the sample under study. The Personal Significance Scale (PSIG) and the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) were used to assess the level of significance and life satisfaction in the present and in the past (during LTTE control).

Secondary Hypothesis 1

Individuals more attached to the LTTE would express greater personal significance and life satisfaction in the past (during LTTE control).

Statistically significant differences were found in ‘Personal Significance’ ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .44$) and ‘Satisfaction with Life’ ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .43$) between those who Admire LTTE, those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE and those who Reject LTTE.³ See Appendix 4A for detailed statistical analysis.

Secondary Hypothesis 2

Those who admire the LTTE should be higher in ‘Personal Significance’ and ‘Satisfaction with Life’ than the other two groups.

A contrast test compared those in group 1 to the mean of those in groups 2 and 3 and was supported in both cases. The results indicate that those who Admire LTTE were higher in ‘Personal Significance’ and in ‘Satisfaction with Life’ at $p < .001$.⁴

Testing the linear trend as to whether group 1 is higher than group 2, which is higher than group 3, was also supported. Personal Significance between Group 1 and Group 2 was significant ($p = .007$), as well as between Group 2 and Group 3 ($p < .001$).⁵ A similar trend was found in ‘Satisfaction with Life’ between Group 1 and Group 2 ($p < .001$), as well as between Group 2 and Group 3.⁶

³ Admire LTTE: All three groups - PSIG: $F(2, 86) = 33.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .44$; SWLS: $F(2, 86) = 32.36$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .43$.

⁴ Admire LTTE: PSIG (Group 1 vs Groups 1/2): estimate = 2.22, $SE = .43$, $p < .001$; SWLS (Group 1 vs Groups 1/2): estimate = 2.68, $SE = .46$, $p < .001$.

⁵ Admire LTTE: PSIG (Group 1 vs Group 2): estimate = 1.28, $SE = .46$, $p = .007$; PSIG (Group 2 vs Group 3): estimate = 1.86, $SE = .30$, $p < .001$.

⁶ Admire LTTE: SWLS (Group 1 vs Group 2): estimate = 1.84, $SE = .49$, $p < .001$; SWLS (Group 2 vs Group 3): estimate = 1.68, $SE = .32$, $p < .001$.

A Means test found that individuals in Group 1 had higher personal significance and satisfaction with life in the past. The scores of those in Group 2 were about the same in the past and present, and those in Group 3 were doing better in the present.

The results indicate that those who continued to admire the LTTE reported greater personal significance and life satisfaction during the time of the LTTE. Those who acknowledged both the good and the bad in the LTTE reported about the same levels of personal significance and life satisfaction in the past and present. Those who rejected the LTTE reported higher levels of personal significance and life satisfaction in the present.

Secondary Hypothesis 3

Individuals that want a separate state will report higher personal significance and life satisfaction in the past.

Statistically significant differences were found in ‘Personal Significance’ ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$) and ‘Satisfaction with Life’ ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .47$) between those who wanted a Separate State, to Live Separately and to Live Together.⁷ The same probing procedure was used to compare Group 1 to Groups 2/3. This difference was found to be significant for both ‘Personal Significance’ $p < .001$ and ‘Satisfaction with Life’ $p < .001$.⁸

Testing the linear trend as to whether group one is higher than group 2, which is higher than group 3, was found to be significant. ‘Personal Significance’ between Group 1 and Group 2 was significant ($p = .032$), as well as between Group 2 and Group 3 ($p < .001$).⁹ A similar trend was found in ‘Satisfaction with Life’ between Group 1 and Group 2 ($p <$

⁷ Separate State - PSIG between all three groups: $F(2, 86) = 27.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$; SWLS between all three groups: $F(2, 86) = 37.68$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .47$.

⁸ Separate State - PSIG (Group 1 vs Groups 2/3): estimate = 1.98, SE = .44, $p < .001$; SWLS: (Group 1 vs Groups 2/3) estimate = 2.50, SE = .43, $p < .001$.

⁹ Separate State - Linear trend: PSIG (Group 1 vs Group 2): estimate = 1.09, SE = .50, $p = .032$; PSIG (Group 2 vs Group 3): estimate = 1.78, SE = .36, $p < .001$.

.002), as well as between Group 2 and Group 3 ($p < .001$).¹⁰ See Appendix 4A for detailed statistical analysis.

The results indicated that those who continue to aspire for a ‘Separate State’ report greater personal significance and life satisfaction during the time of the LTTE. Those who aspire to ‘Live Separately’ in the same state reported about the same levels of personal significance and life satisfaction in the past and present, while those who want to ‘Live Together’ reported higher levels of personal significance and life satisfaction in the present.

4.3.2 Self-Efficacy

Self-efficacy was considered an essential component in sustaining and mobilizing members. Indoctrination and skills training focused on developing members’ confidence in ability to conduct terrorist activity. The study hypothesized that the LTTE developed self-efficacy of individuals through skills training and indoctrination. The New Generalized Self Efficacy (NGSE) scale was used to test the efficacy with the sample of $N = 90$.

Secondary Hypothesis 4

Individuals that admire the LTTE would have greater self-efficacy in the past.

Statistically significant differences in self-efficacy were found ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .37$) between those who Admire the LTTE, those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE and those who Reject LTTE.¹¹ A contrast test that compared Group 1 to the mean of Groups 2

¹⁰ Separate State - Linear trend: SWLS (Group 1 vs Group 2): estimate = 1.55, SE = .49, $p = .002$; SWLS (Group 2 vs Group 3): estimate = 1.90, SE = .35, $p < .001$.

¹¹ Admire LTTE - NGSE between all three groups: $F(2, 86) = 25.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .37$.

and 3 was significant ($p < .001$). The results indicate that those who admire LTTE were higher in self-efficacy.¹²

A test of the linear trend as to whether group one is higher in self-efficacy than group 2, which is higher than group 3, was also found to be significant. Self-efficacy between Group 1 and Group 2 was significant ($p = .010$), as well as between Group 2 and Group 3 ($p < .001$).¹³

A means test found that those who admired the LTTE (Group 1) had higher efficacy during the LTTE compared to the present. The analysis below indicate that this difference is driven, not due to a difference in the present, but difference in the past. In the past there were significant differences found between groups on efficacy ($p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .36$). However, in the present, the differences between groups on efficacy is not significant, $p = .30$, $\eta^2 = .03$.¹⁴ See Appendix 4B for detailed statistical analysis.

The analysis indicates that those that Admire the LTTE experienced greater efficacy in the past during the LTTE. Of particular interest is that this difference in Group 1 is not caused by feeling lower efficacy in the present, but caused by the higher efficacy generated during the LTTE. Group 2 and 3, on the other hand, feel just as efficacious as those who Admire LTTE at present. However, during the LTTE, they didn't feel so efficacious. These results indicate that the aspect that gave greater efficacy to Group 1 in the past was the LTTE.

¹² Admire LTTE - NGSE (Group 1 vs Groups 2/3): estimate = 1.18, $SE = .25$, $p < .001$.

¹³ Admire LTTE - NGSE (Group 1 vs Group 2): estimate = .72, $SE = .27$, $p = .010$; NGSE (Group 2 vs Group 3): estimate = .92, $SE = .18$, $p < .001$.

¹⁴ Admire LTTE - NGSE in the present: $F(2, 86) = 1.24$, $p = .30$, $\eta^2 = .03$. NGSE in the past: $F(2, 86) = 7.11$, $p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .36$.

4.3.3 Organisational Justice

Projecting an image of being a just and fair organization that will redress grievances is at the center of recruitment, sustenance and mobilization. An organization that is considered procedurally just and distributively fair is trusted. When an organization is trusted, its members become more committed, and willing to take greater risks. Terrorist propaganda attack the enemy state by reversing this very concept, projecting the enemy as deeply unjust and unfair, thereby legitimizing violence against an unfair and unjust state.

Secondary Hypothesis 5

Individuals that admire the LTTE will perceive the LTTE to be organizationally just.

The analyses was restricted to include individuals in the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab categories which were the only groups with direct experience of working for the LTTE organization. The sample size for this analysis is $N = 60$.

Table 6: *LTTE Rehab Participants Categorized Based on Admiration for the LTTE*

Category	Number (60)
Admire LTTE	11
Acknowledge good/bad in LTTE	20
Reject LTTE	29

Significant differences in organizational justice ($p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .54$) were found between those who Admire LTTE, those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE and those who Reject LTTE.¹⁵ A contrast test found significant differences in Organisational Justice ($p < .001$) between those in Group 1 and those in Groups 2 and 3.¹⁶ The results indicated that those who admire the LTTE were higher in Organisational Justice than the other two groups.

Testing the linear trend as to whether Group 1 was higher than Group 2, which was higher than Group 3 on Organizational Justice was also supported. The results indicate that those who 'Admire LTTE' were found to be higher in Organizational Justice than those who 'Acknowledged Good/Bad in LTTE'. Those who 'Acknowledged good and bad in LTTE' were found to be higher in Organizational Justice than those who 'Reject LTTE'.¹⁷

All individuals in the LTTE rehab category ($N = 60$) worked for the LTTE and responses were based on their experience with the LTTE. This sample was categorized into those who Admire LTTE, Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE and Reject LTTE. The results indicate that those who Admire LTTE demonstrated a significantly higher level of Organisational Justice within the LTTE than those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE. The Reject LTTE group demonstrated the lowest level of Organizational Justice within the LTTE.

Exploratory analyses

The analysis conducted looked at the differences in the Organizational Justice aspects of the full sample ($N = 90$). The Family FM and Diaspora categories were grouped together as they

¹⁵ Admire LTTE: ORGJ -between all three groups: $F(2, 56) = 33.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .54$

¹⁶ Admire LTTE: ORGJ - Contrast test: Group 1 vs. Group 2/3, $t(57) = 5.87$, $p < .001$.

¹⁷ Admire LTTE: ORGJ - Group1 vs Group 2: $t(57) = 3.03$, $p < .001$; Group 2 vs Group 3: $t(57) = 5.70$, $p < .001$.

reported on justice and fairness related to civil organizations. The Other Rehab and Youth Rehab categories were grouped together to assess their experience within the regular LTTE units. The Suicide Rehab category was grouped separately to assess their experience within the Suicide units. Those who worked within the Suicide Rehab units were expected to have a different organizational experience from that of the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab. The suicide members were particularly trained for focused attacks and qualitatively different from the regular LTTE members.

Table 7: *Participants Categorized Based on Organizational Setting*

Category	Number (N=90)	Description of participants
Suicide Rehab	12	Worked within LTTE specialist unit
Other Rehab and Youth Rehab	48	Worked within LTTE regular units
Family FM and Diaspora	30	Worked within civilian setting

Significant differences in Organisational Justice were found ($p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$) between the three groups.¹⁸ A series of Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses was conducted to probe the pattern of these results. Pairwise analysis compares each of the groups with the others. The Suicide Rehab group did not differ from Family FM/Diaspora ($p = 1.00$). However, the Suicide Rehab reported higher Organizational Justice than the

¹⁸ ORGJ – between three sample groups: $F(1, 87) = 8.24$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .136$.

Other/Youth Rehab ($p = .032$). The Family FM/Diaspora members reported higher Organizational Justice than Other/Youth Rehab ($p < .001$).

A means test was conducted. The Suicide Rehab (Group 1) demonstrated a level of Organizational Justice within the LTTE that was similar to Family FM and Diaspora (Group 2) groups that worked for civilian organizations. Both of these reflected a higher level of Organizational Justice than the Other/Youth Rehab (Group 3) who worked for the LTTE.

Table 8: *Means Test of Organizational Justice*

Group	Category	Mean	SE*
1	Suicide Rehab	4.93	1.18
2	Other Rehab and Youth Rehab	4.01	1.24
3	Family FM and Diaspora	4.94	.74

*Standard Error

The results on the Organizational Justice scale indicate that those who admired the LTTE had the strongest view that the LTTE was organizationally just and fair, followed by those who acknowledged the good and the bad in LTTE. Those that rejected the LTTE were least likely to view the LTTE as being organizationally just and fair. Indeed, all three categories worked with LTTE. However, it is significant that it is primarily those within the

category that admired the LTTE that perceived the organization as just and fair. It is also significant to note that Suicide Rehab demonstrated the highest level of Organizational Justice compared to the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups, demonstrating the suicide members' admiration of the LTTE and perception of the LTTE as organizationally just and fair.

Of further interest is that the Suicide Rehab group and Civilian group were equal on their perception of Organizational Justice within their places of work. However, the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups were less inclined to see the LTTE as organizationally just and fair. It is likely that those in civil society expect, receive and recognize just and fairness within their work settings, while those highly trained within the Suicide Rehab group perceive the just and fairness within the LTTE as special. The Other Rehab and Youth Rehab did not experience an elevated sense of Organizational Justice and fairness in procedures followed by the organization.

A summary of descriptive statistics on all four scales is contained in Appendix 4D. The findings in this section, based on the secondary hypotheses and the exploratory analysis, will be discussed further in the next chapter. The next section will explore the seven primary hypotheses in the study on the process of radicalization into violence.

4.4 Analysis of Hypotheses

The qualitative data obtained from the interviews was quantified using frequency counts and percentages. The data presented in this section is sequenced according to the themes of each hypothesis.

4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 – Emotive Narrative

[A] Is the foundational narrative a powerful emotive grievance narrative or a long-term grievance narrative?

It was important to establish at the outset as to whether the foundational narrative of the community is one of long-term grievances or if it is a powerful and emotive grievance. All participants ($N = 85$) agreed that the foundational narrative is a ‘grievance narrative’, which means it involves a grievance. However, participants were required to determine whether the narrative was one of long-term grievances or powerful emotive grievances.




Figure 5. Percentage of participants that believed the foundational narrative is a ‘powerful emotive’ or a ‘long-term’ grievance narrative.

Participants differed in their response on the type of narrative. The bar graph indicates that the majority of participants in Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora reported that the foundational narrative was a ‘long-term grievance narrative,’ while most of the participants within the Suicide Rehab group reported that the foundational narrative was a ‘powerful emotive grievance narrative’. It is likely that the Suicide Rehab group was more focused and motivated by the ‘powerful and emotive’ elements of the narrative, while all other categories were likely to recognize the long-term nature of the grievance narrative.

[B] Is a powerful emotive narrative required for ‘recruitment’?

While participants were divided in their opinion on the nature of the foundation narrative, all participants ($N=85$) reported that a ‘powerful emotive narrative’ is required for recruitment. Participants were able to make a distinction between the requirement for ‘recruitment’ and the ‘foundational narrative’. According to the participants, a powerful and emotive grievance narrative is needed to motivate people to join. Therefore, a long-term grievance narrative is not sufficient for recruitment. Instead, the narrative has to be powerful and emotive.

[C] Did the narrative evolve throughout the lifespan of the movement?

With time, more grievances were added on and the narrative had become powerful. This helped to recruit younger and larger numbers to the group. It was, therefore, adaptive for the narrative to evolve. A narrative that is not renewed was likely to lose momentum.




Figure 6. Percentage of participants that believed the narrative ‘evolves’ during the lifespan of the LTTE.

Most of the participant groups believed that the narrative evolves from the original foundational stage. The bar graph indicates that 82-89 percent of participants across the four groups view the narrative as evolving, only 66 percent in the Youth Rehab group acknowledge that the narrative evolves. This is possibly because this category of former child soldiers were born during LTTE control into a narrative of injustice and not had the opportunity to experience the narrative evolving.

4.4.2 Hypothesis 2 – Significance Arousal and Quest for Significance

[A] Did framing/reframing the narrative maintain or keep the community in state of significance loss or quest?

Although participants ($N = 85$) were asked for their opinion on either significance ‘loss’ or ‘quest’, interview responses indicated agreement with ‘loss’ and ‘both’. Most of the participants believed that continuing to frame and reframe the grievance narrative results in the community experiencing a state of loss and quest. Some remain with significance loss whilst others experience loss and quest.




Figure 7. Percentage of participants that believed reframing the narrative results significance ‘loss’ or ‘loss and quest’.

Significance loss was reported by 73 percent of family members, while the majority of the other four groups recognized both ‘loss and quest’. Of interest is that all those in the Suicide Rehab and Other Rehab groups recognized the quest component, while the Family FM group was more aware of the loss component. A likely explanation is that

the family was in a more passive role experiencing loss, while the LTTE Rehab groups were in a more active role in quest of restoring the significance.

[B] Did significance loss arouse significance quest?

Participants ($N = 85$) agreed that significance loss precedes the drive to go in quest of significance. According to some participants, the sense of loss is overwhelming when people constantly live with grievances. People cannot remain in this state for too long as it leads to distress and helplessness. As a consequence, the sense of loss arouses the quest for significance and would motivate people to take action rather than remaining in a state of loss.

[C] Was it significance 'loss' or 'quest' that lead people to redress grievances?

Participants were requested to select either loss or quest but not both in order to narrow down the search. Participants ($N = 85$) were of the opinion that it is significance 'quest' that finally pushes people to redress grievances. Some clarified that loss feels more 'helpless' and quest feels more 'motivating', 'pushing to go after', to 'take action' and redress grievances. Participants ($N = 85$) also believed that it is significance loss that sets them on the path to redress grievances.

[D] Did the group guide its members to restore significance?

Participants ($N = 85$) confirmed that it is the group that guides, mentors and leads its members to regain the status that was lost. They went on to explain that the aim of the group

was to regain the lost importance. It is likely that the group became a uniting factor that steps in to fill a vacuum created by the loss and redirects the aggrieved into collective action.

[E] Did the group try to restore significance through a violent method?

Most of the participants objected to the term ‘violent’. They preferred ‘armed fighting.’ Both options were therefore accepted.




Figure 8. Percentage of participants that believed the group tried to restore significance through a ‘violent’ or ‘armed’ fighting method.

While participants agreed that the fighting method was required to restore significance, a majority objected to the label ‘violent’ and preferred to view the fighting method used by the LTTE as ‘armed’. The group that was less concerned as to whether the fighting method was referred to as ‘violent’ or ‘armed’ was the Youth Rehab group. Those who were most keen to call it an ‘armed’ method were the Suicide Rehab group. It is likely that for the Youth Rehab group fighting is the use of violence and this group may be less

concerned with the image of violence. The label mattered to the Suicide Rehab group as they took pride in their role and saw themselves as warriors and martyrs. The purpose of the question was to establish the opinion of participants on whether this method helped to restore significance. Participants agreed that the fighting method was used to restore significance but it is likely that it was important to sanitize the violent method by using a more acceptable term, viz. ‘armed’.

[F] Personal Significance: Were there changes in ‘meaning in life’ between the past and present?

The Personal Significance Scale (PSIG) captured both ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ in life. Participants were requested to respond to Section A of the scale by focusing on meaning and purpose in life in the *present*. Participants were then asked to respond to Section B of the scale by focusing on the meaning and purpose in life in the *past* during the LTTE control.

When responding to the Personal Significance scale, the LTTE Rehab groups and Family FM group reported changes in life related to the period during and after the LTTE control. The Diaspora responded to general changes in life, which they attributed to loss of spouse due to age and illness, retirement from employment and worries related to marriages of their children. Changes experienced were not influenced by the presence or absence of the LTTE. Therefore, the changes were not comparable to the other four groups.




Figure 9. Percentage of participants that reported changes to ‘meaning in life’ in the past and the present.

Most of the participants in the Suicide Rehab group reported more meaning in the past. It is likely that this particular group, had a clear role and mission within the LTTE, and felt more significant during the time of the LTTE than in its absence. However, most of the participants in the Other Rehab, Youth Rehab and Family FM report meaning in life in the present, in the absence of the LTTE. A possible explanation is that these three groups transitioned more easily from past to the present and found greater meaning in life after the LTTE. Of interest is that Family FM did not report meaning in life in the past during the time of LTTE. These responses may reflect the family members’ experience of the uncertainty and lack of stability in life during the conflict. The smaller percentage within the ‘no difference’ category is likely to be those who did not derive meaning in life from the LTTE even during the time of the LTTE.

[G] Personal Significance: Were there changes in the purpose in life between the past and present?

The response pattern of participants on ‘purpose in life’ in the past and present were similar to those reported on ‘meaning in life’ in the previous analysis.




Figure 10. Percentage of participants that reported changes to ‘purpose in life’ in the past and the present.

The majority in the Suicide Rehab category reported greater ‘purpose in life’ in the past while the other groups reflected greater purpose in life in the present. In comparison to the two analyses, the Family FM group reflected a variation with participants falling into all three categories. A possible explanation is that while family members did not find meaning in life in the past, a minority had a purpose regardless of it being meaningful or not. It is not uncommon that soon after the end of a conflict the people who spent time worrying about their friends and family may feel redundant and lacking in purpose.

[H] Did ‘meaning in life’ increase or decrease the more one worked with the group?

This question was restricted to the three LTTE rehab groups ($N = 60$). Participants were asked if they experienced an increase or decrease in the meaning of life the longer and harder they worked for the LTTE.




Figure 11. The percentage of participants that reported on increase and decrease in ‘meaning in life’ related to work.

The bar graph indicates that the more they worked for the LTTE, meaning in life increased for all three LTTE Rehab groups. Although the Youth Rehab group also reflected a similar trend, 36 percent of participants in this group reported a decrease in meaning in life during the LTTE. A possible explanation is that the former suicide members, and senior members of the LTTE, were more committed compared to the Youth Rehab group. It is also likely that the Suicide Rehab and Other Rehab groups found new meaning with the LTTE. While the Youth Rehab group, born into the LTTE period, felt locked into a task specific role that lacked variation, and experienced a decrease in meaning in life. This may reflect a natural tendency of young people to seek variation and transition to maintain meaning and purpose in life.

[I] Did ‘purpose in life’ increase or decrease the more one worked with the group?

Participant responses ($N = 60$) to whether ‘purpose in life’ increased or decreased the longer and harder they worked with the LTTE, was similar to that reported on ‘meaning in life’ in the previous analysis.



Figure 12. Percentage of participants that reported on increase and decrease in ‘purpose in life’ related to work.

The responses indicated that while all participants in the Suicide Rehab and Other Rehab groups found purpose in life increased, the Youth Rehab group was divided in their response pattern. A possible explanation is that former suicide members and mature members of other units became more committed to the group with time. However, for young people LTTE was the norm, and they may have aspired for a life different to the LTTE. It is also likely that this next generation started questioning the purpose of what they were doing, considering that Tamils of their age group were leading a different lifestyle in the rest of the country and overseas. This may have become more attractive, thereby eroding the meaning and purpose in being with the LTTE.

4.4.3 Hypothesis 3 – The Organization and its Ideology

[A] Is an organization required to redress grievances and to network?

It was important to establish the role of the organization in the process of radicalization. Participants interviewed ($N = 85$) agreed that an organization was needed to redress grievances. The perception was that the community, as a collective, has greater power to make changes. This allows the organization to take control and act on behalf of the community. Participants also agreed that the organization was needed to network and coordinate. The consensus was that the organization had brought together those who possessed the knowledge and capability to redress grievances and had found the funding, garnered support and provided training.

[B] Did the organization provided a simple understandable ideology?

Some participants objected to the word ‘ideology’, which they associated with al-Qaeda. However, they agreed that the set of ‘ideas’ and ‘beliefs’ promoted was easily understood by the community. Some participants viewed ideology as the ‘mission’. The participants ($N=85$) agreed that the ideology included a grievance component, an enemy, and a method to correct the grievance. Participants also agreed that in order to achieve their goal, the armed method was believed necessary to punish the enemy and its allies. While participants agreed that all three components were required, they preferred to use softer terminology. Participants perceived the ideology as their guiding principle, which was simple and easy to understand to which members could relate to comfortably.

4.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Organizational Justice

Terrorist groups project themselves as just and fair organizations while the states they fight are projected as unfair and unjust. The credibility of the organization mattered within the group. Participant views on justice, fair-play and trust were accessed through the Organizational Justice Scale. The Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab responded to questions on Organizational Justice in relation to the LTTE. The Family FM and Diaspora groups responded to questions based on the civilian organizations they had worked with.

[A] Was the LTTE organizationally just and fair?

Organizational Justice (ORGJ) was assessed based on five components: Procedural Fairness (PF), Quality of Decision Making (QDM), Quality of Treatment (QT), Distributive Justice (DJ) and Outcome Favorability (OF). The score on each subscale is presented across the three LTTE Rehab groups based on their perception of the LTTE. Scores are also presented on the Family FM and Diaspora groups based on the civilian organizations they worked with.




Figure 13. Average scores by participant group on the five components of the Organizational Justice scale (ORGJ). Scores range from one (minimum) to six (maximum)

The results indicate that the Suicide Rehab group was elevated on all five components of the scale when compared to Other Rehab and Youth groups. While Procedural Fairness, Distributive Justice and Outcome Favorability were most important to the LTTE Rehab sample, it was the Quality of Treatment and Quality of Decision Making that was most important to the non-LTTE sample.

What appeared most important to the non-LTTE sample mattered the least to the LTTE Rehab sample. The procedures followed by the organization, how resources were distributed and the outcome was more important than how people were treated and decisions were made. The former LTTE members often rationalized and dismissed unfair treatment and decisions within the LTTE as being in the greater interest of the organization. However, the most important aspects for the two civilian groups were how people were treated and how decisions were made by the organization. These differences may also indicate that the civilian sample had a voice within the organization while the LTTE sample was more focused on the overt function of the organization.

[B] *Did trust increase or decrease risk taking?*

The relationship between trust and risk taking was explored with the LTTE Rehab sample. Participants ($N = 55$) agreed that the more they trusted the organization, the harder they worked. They also confirmed that the greater the trust in the organization, the more risk they were willing to take.

[C] Was the organization and supervisor trusted at the same level?

The responses to two questions in the ORGJ scale pertaining to trust were isolated: ‘I trust the organization to do what is best for me’ and ‘I trust my supervisor to do what is best for me’. The LTTE Rehab group reported its perception of Organizational Justice based on the LTTE, while perceptions of the Family FM and the Diaspora were based on their civilian jobs.




Figure 14. Average scores by participant group ‘trust’ components (Organizational Justice scale).

Participants ($N = 90$) responded to both questions. The bar graphs show average scores by group for each of the two categories of trust. The LTTE Rehab groups report slightly higher trust in the organization than in the supervisor. The non-LTTE group was almost equal in trusting the organization and the supervisor. A likely explanation is that the civilian sample expects the supervisors of an organization to be as trustworthy as the organization. However, the LTTE Rehab groups are likely to have greater admiration and trust in the organization than its supervisors. This is also likely to account for the reason that members were willing to endure difficulties on behalf of the organization rather than

its leaders. For these members, perception of the organization appears powerful and important to protect.

[D] *How important was it to trust the organization to be able to mobilize?*

The question was limited to the LTTE Rehab participants ($N = 55$), as this group had direct experience of being mobilized to fight. The average percentage of trust was calculated for each LTTE Rehab group.




Figure 15. Average percentage of trust needed to mobilize members.

Participants agreed that ‘trust’ in the organization was an important aspect to mobilize its members but there were differences in the amount of trust needed for mobilization. The Suicide Rehab group believed they needed to trust the organization 95 percent to be able to mobilize. The Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups did not require such a high level of trust. A possible explanation is that the Suicide members were trained to be highly committed and willing to sacrifice life, and to elicit this level of commitment,

the former suicide members needed to be able to trust the organization and its mission to a very high level.

[E] Did the organization mentor and mobilize its members to redress grievances and regain significance?

The specific questions were directed at the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups ($N = 55$). Participants agreed that the organization mentored its members with a view to mobilizing them to redress grievances. They also believed that the organization mobilized its members to redress grievances and restore or regain their level of importance in the community. The LTTE prepared its members to engage in restoring significance of the community by redressing grievances and provided opportunity for its members to be martyred in the process. This was a powerful attraction to vulnerable and disgruntled youth. The organization projected itself carefully to legitimize its actions.

4.4.5 Hypothesis 5: Projecting the image of Victim, Rescuer, and Aggressor

Terrorist groups need to connect with several audiences to maintain its legitimacy and support base. The organization projects different images in order to connect with different audiences. Participants clarified that these images reflected the different roles played by the organization.

[A] *Did the organization project the image of being the Victim, Rescuer, Aggressor?*

Participants ($N = 85$) agreed that the organization engaged in these three roles. They described the LTTE projecting the role of the victim to the wider public and international community, the role of the rescuer to the vulnerable community and the role of the aggressor to the enemy. These three images were identified as three fundamental roles of the organization.

Participants also agreed that these three images were projected onto different audiences. The image of the victim was carried to the international community by the civilians, diaspora and the media unit. The message of being the rescuers of the community was taken to the community through the political wing. The image of the aggressor was projected to the enemy and the enemy communities through attacks. These descriptions indicate that each role and the image projected had a purpose. This strategy was effective in engaging the aggrieved community, securing international support and driving fear into the enemy.

[B] *Did members identify with and switch between these three roles?*

Participants ($N = 85$) agreed that the members identified with the victim, rescuer and aggressor roles and were able to shift between these three roles. They explained that while different units were allocated to engage in these roles it was a function of one mission. The group projected these images depending on what was required of each audience, but all three roles were part of one mission and one identity.

[C] What was the purpose of the organization in projecting these images?

Participant groups varied in their response to this question. Some believed that the purpose of projecting these images was to keep the community ‘engaged’ in the conflict rather than trying to ‘maintain’ the conflict.




Figure 16. Percentage of participants that believed the underlying motive in projecting different images was to keep the community engaged or to maintain the conflict.

While participants ($N=85$) believed that the LTTE projected different images to different audiences, they varied in their perception of the purpose of this strategy. The Suicide Rehab and Other Rehab groups viewed the intention of the group in positive terms, while the Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora groups were less concerned. A possible explanation is that the Suicide Rehab and Other Rehab groups, comprising of the more senior and committed members, were keen to maintain the image of the LTTE as non-manipulative.

4.4.6 Hypothesis 6 – Moral Justification

It was important to ascertain what helped radicalized recruits from the community engage in conducting attacks. Being radicalized by a violent ideology may not necessarily translate to violent acts as violence may remain at the level of intent only. Was moral justification an essential component in mobilizing the intent into action? What allows a person that previously did not engage in violence, commit a violent act and not experience distress? The section below explores these aspects with the three LTTE Rehab groups.

[A] Is it possible to conduct violence (attacks) without morally justifying them?

Participants ($N = 55$) believed that it was not possible to conduct attacks without morally justifying the ‘need’ for the attack. Participants explained that the reasons for the attack were publicized in the community after the attack. The actions of members were morally justified by celebrating the success of the attack, rewarding those who planned and executed the operation, and venerating those who died conducting the attack. Moral justification of actions before and after attacks enabled members to engage and continue to engage in attacks. Participants within the LTTE Rehab groups preferred the term ‘attack’ instead of ‘violence’.

[B] Moral justification of violence (attacks) is essential to suppress norms (new morality?)

Participants ($N = 55$) agreed that morally justifying actions enabled members to disengage from or suppress social norms. Participants went on to explain that the LTTE had a different moral code within which it was possible to justify attacks. They described disengaging from

societal norms and reengaging with LTTE norms. Participants articulated that social norms were automatically suppressed when they internalized the LTTE norms.

[C] Suppressing norms allowed engagement in violence (attacks)

Participants ($N = 55$) confirmed that disengaging from or suppressing social norms enabled them to engage in attacks. They emphasized that just suppressing societal norms was not sufficient; re-engagement in LTTE norms was essential. The suppression of social norms was restricted to the identified enemy and not with their own community. Participants described that LTTE members had greater difficulty punishing their own community members for acts of ‘betrayal’. The organization therefore portrayed them as weak and contaminated by the enemy. By labelling individuals in own community as the enemy, helped members disengage from the social norm of protecting own community members, and justify attacking them.

[D] Did the moral justification of attacks reduce the distress that is experienced?

Participants ($N = 55$) explained that when engaging in attacks they did not experience distress as it was framed as an attack justified against the enemy. In hindsight, some participants stated that it was distressing, but not at the time of living and working within the group. The rationale provided to morally justify attacks mattered the most. The moral justifications framed by the LTTE suppressed the social, cultural and religious norms of morality that prevent people in civil society engaging in violence. The moral justifications do not give rise to a moral conflict, which means that distress is not experienced. The person is acting in line with a new moral code.

[E] *Reduction in dissonance/distress enables celebration of successful attacks*

While participants ($N = 55$) stated that successful attacks generated confidence and pride, it is only some that acknowledged the celebrations, rewards, promotions and benefits that followed. Distress was not an emotion experienced as a result of a successful attack. Distress was the emotion experienced when an attack was unsuccessful. Morally justifying the need to attack the enemy liberated the person from distress and free to celebrate its success. Some attacks were celebrated with the community, while others were celebrated within the unit. Clandestine attacks were not celebrated but the individual members were rewarded.¹⁹ Generally, the unit was described as taking pride in the attack. The attack was used as a case study and the attacker was used as a role model. Often recruits were baptized with the names of attackers. The purpose of celebrating attacks was to honor the attack team and to motivate others to aspire for similar recognition.

4.4.7 Hypothesis 7: Self Efficacy

Developing self-efficacy was considered an important factor in mobilizing the membership. Moral justification for attacks combined with confidence in the person's own competence to carry them out was considered to be the two essential aspects in mobilizing the membership. How did the organization help its members to develop this efficacy? Did this sense of efficacy generalize to other areas or was it task specific? These are some of the aspects explored in this section.

¹⁹ Attacks that are not publicly acknowledged by the LTTE to prevent international condemnation.

[A] Did the organization develop self-efficacy through skills training?

The opinion of the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups were obtained as they had direct experience of being groomed by the LTTE.




Figure 17. Average percentage of training attributed to developing self-efficacy.

Participants ($N=55$) believed that training contributed to developing self-efficacy. However, there was variation between groups on the importance given to training. The Suicide Rehab group attributed the highest percentage to training while the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups gave less importance to training. A possible explanation is that members of the suicide units depended heavily on skills training to conduct their missions. They derived confidence in their competence to carry out their tasks from the training they received. It is likely that while the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups considered training as important, they derived efficacy from aspects other than training.

[B] Did the organization groom its members to develop confidence in doing their specific duties or general work?

Participants ($N = 85$) were asked if they were more confident in doing ‘specific work’ restricted to allocated tasks or ‘general’ work that reflected confidence in general skills. The LTTE Rehab group responded based on the work they carried out with the LTTE, while the non-LTTE group responded based on their employment with the civilian organizations. The LTTE Rehab participants ($n = 55$) reported confidence in ‘specific’ duties, while the Family FM and Diaspora ($n = 30$) groups were confident in ‘both’ areas of specific and general work. This is likely to reflect the LTTE focus on task specific training of its members, while civilians are trained to develop confidence in a range of skills within their work environment.

This section focused on how training contributed to developing task specific and general work related skills. The next section pertains to confidence between work and living life. The rationale was to ascertain whether the focus of the grooming and mentoring provided by the LTTE was specific to work or living life.

[C] Did the organization groom members to develop confidence in their job or in general living life and socializing?

The Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups ($n = 55$) responded based on the LTTE. The Family FM and Diaspora ($n = 30$) responded based on the civilian institutions they had worked with.




Figure 18. Percentage of participant confidence in work and general life.

The three LTTE Rehab groups ($n = 55$) cluster to demonstrate their high level of confidence in their job. This indicated that the member confidence was heavily tied to their work within the organization. Confidence in living life and socializing were secondary to these groups. In contrast, the non-LTTE sample of Family FM and Diaspora groups demonstrated confidence in living life and socializing as well as in specific work, reflecting a greater balance. The LTTE Rehab sample ratings indicated that the members led an organization centric life with their efficacy tied heavily to their work within the group.

[D] Did the level of confidence to mobilize develop through skills training?

This question was restricted to the LTTE Rehab sample since it was the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab that experienced being mobilized by the LTTE. Participants were asked how confident would they need to be to be mobilized for attacks.




Figure 19. Percentage of confidence in skills to be able to mobilize.

Participants within the LTTE Rehab group ($N = 55$) agreed that the confidence to mobilize was developed by the organization through skills training. The Suicide Rehab group considered skills training as the most important factor to mobilize. Suicide Rehab participants needed to be 97 percent confident, in their competence, to mobilize.

In addition, participants stated that while confidence in skill competence was the most vital component, team and organizational confidence also contributed to the overall confidence to mobilize.

4.5 Conclusion

The data analyzed in this section is limited to quantifiable data gathered from psychometric scales and interviews. The four psychometric scales used to test several secondary hypotheses were related to grooming a terrorist. Three of the scales were used to test significance, organizational justice and self-efficacy. The fourth scale that measured satisfaction with life was used as an adjunct to support the findings of the significance scale. The findings indicate that:

- Greater the level of admiration for the LTTE the higher the level of meaning and purpose in life, self-efficacy and satisfaction with life during the time of the LTTE. The less the level of admiration for the LTTE the greater the level of meaning and purpose in life, self-efficacy and satisfaction with life in the present, in the absence of the LTTE.
- Greater the aspiration for a separate state, the higher the level of meaning and purpose in life, self-efficacy and satisfaction with life during the time of the LTTE.
- Greater the perception of wanting to live together or live separately but within the same country, the higher the level of meaning and purpose in life, self-efficacy and satisfaction with life in the present, in the absence of the LTTE.
- Greater the admiration for the LTTE, the stronger the perception that the LTTE was organizationally just. The less the admiration for the LTTE, greater the perception that the LTTE was unjust and unfair.
- Across the sample categories, the Suicide Rehab group perceived the LTTE as most organizationally just. It is likely that organizational justice is a priority for the highly motivated suicide terrorist.

The Suicide Rehab demonstrated the highest levels of Organizational Justice, trust in the organization and supervisor, and belief in the LTTE's commitment to the community, compared to the Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups. It is likely that the highly committed

Suicide Rehab category needed to trust and believe in the organization deeply enough to sacrifice life and work loyally. Further, the Suicide Rehab group believed that trust was one of the most important factors in mobilizing for attack.

The seven primary hypotheses analyzed in this chapter are related to the function of the narrative, significance, the organization, its ideology, the images projected, moral justification and self-efficacy. These seven components were found to contribute to the process of grooming a terrorist. The findings are discussed in-depth highlighting its contribution to radicalization (section 6.3).

The next chapter will explore the statements made by participants on the process of radicalization which will further strengthen the hypotheses being tested.

'I use emotion for the many and reserve reason for the few'.¹

Adolf Hitler.

Chapter 5: Qualitative Data Analysis

This chapter will explore perceptions of participants on strategies used by the LTTE to groom civilians into terrorism. The strategies used to recruit, sustain and mobilize its members are categorized thematically and presented as quotations within this section. The qualitative data gathered from 85 participants is presented at two levels: (1) participant views of the LTTE's recruitment, sustenance and mobilization strategies, and (2) participant views related to the process of grooming members of the LTTE. Participant statements on the LTTE are thematically listed in Appendix 5A.

5.1 Participant Perceptions of the LTTE

5.1.1 Common Reasons for Joining the LTTE

Participants described a variety of personal, social and ideological factors that attracted and persuaded people to join the LTTE. Personal factors disclosed by the participants were related to the loss of a family member or material losses as a result of fighting between the LTTE and Sri Lankan Military. Another factor was protection from within the community, as Tamil civilians connected to the LTTE were believed to be less vulnerable and better protected because 'no one else will trouble the family' and 'others are scared of the family with a member'. Some stated that they felt they would gain 'more social status', 'more

¹ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1935, <http://www.military-quotes.com/Hitler.htm>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

respect', 'belongingness', 'power' and an 'identity'. Impulsivity and emotionality factors that drove people to join the group were anger, revenge, excitement and boredom.

The social factors disclosed were related to failures in love, family problems, financial difficulties at home, reluctance to study, inability to find a job and boredom. They also described friends joining the group which had led to them feeling left behind. Some stated that they joined to 'avoid being insulted in public', being given the 'label of a traitor', 'to prevent being made fun of' and to avoid being 'insulted for not joining'. Others joined to avoid being shamed in public and being told 'you are weak' or asked 'if you are not a man' and 'if [your] mother prostituted herself with Sinhalese', thereby casting doubt on the potential recruit's origins of being a Tamil.

Ideologically driven factors were about being told that 'Sinhalese came and took over our country so we have to fight to get it back'. Additionally, some wanted to fight for a separate state because they 'were taught this history in the school so we want to separate'.

Participants also described the feeling of being compelled to join the LTTE. They commented: we 'feel we have to join LTTE', we 'have problems with government', 'we need to fight for people' and we 'feel our people need help'. Participants talked of forced conscription that involved the compulsory 'rule' of one member per family joining the LTTE. This led to a parent or stronger sibling offering to join in order to protect more vulnerable siblings.

Participants described feeling compelled to remain within the group for a variety of reasons. We 'feel we can't leave the LTTE', 'can't let [LTTE] down', and we 'don't want to be called a traitor'. A sense of entrapment was expressed 'when within you can't leave and go back to community as everyone knows who you are'. A sense of helplessness was also expressed because leaving the LTTE would lead to a period of isolation or punishment, including incarceration by the LTTE political wing.

Many of the factors identified appeared contextually driven. A context that was carefully prepared to capture personal and social grievances. The grievances were reframed to appeal to the public at different levels. Personal resilience factors and the context were likely to determine whether a person will join the group. The decision to join had largely been shaped by one's interpretation of events and ability to cope with events within the context one was living in.

5.1.2 Methods used in Recruitment

The LTTE played a dynamic role in the recruitment process with well thought out strategies that appealed to different audiences. They were aware that the organisation's strength and ability to survive was dependent on recruitment numbers.

The LTTE tailored its recruitment strategies to attract different age groups. This was reflected by the participants when they informed how 'small children get attracted to the uniform, the gun, seeing the LTTE walking around', and 'listening to narratives of heroism'. Young people were described as being 'in search of an identity' and wanting 'to be [as] a hero' while adults were described as being attracted when the 'LTTE [members] speak to them saying *thambi* [brother]'. Some said 'they have power but speak simply', and they 'behave decently in front of others', which impressed them. Families were targeted at social gatherings, 'we attend and they see [us]' at a party, festival or funerals. A participant described how 'they [civilians] like if I do something they admire. Civilians say, see how good they [the LTTE] are – how well behaved – how disciplined'. This approach appealed when reaching out to the community.

Participants commented on the content of the message: 'Recruitment has a message of revenge', and that it is 'better do something and die than to just die'. Another commented 'you will get old and die anyway, so why not do something heroic and die?' They also

believed that if the ‘message reaches 100 percent of people, only 30 percent join’. This trend was accepted and used to the advantage of the organization. Radicalizing the community was framed as a win-win situation because ‘others are needed outside the organization as supporters and sympathizers’ and ‘the moment there is a problem, these others will join’. Participants stated that ‘some join because of possible arrest’ since ‘they are involved with helping and feel they will have a problem’. Others join because ‘they are anyway helping from out [side]’ and can get ‘more benefits when working from inside’.

The LTTE presence was normalized because of inclusion of one person from every family. To this, the participants commented: ‘we grow up with seeing and knowing about them. They become a familiar sight when you know of LTTE from young days’, and people built ‘friendships with members’. Community acceptance of the LTTE was created through familiarity.

Participants talked of recruitment being conducted in meetings in public places, in schools, at festivals and funerals. Several methods were used to capture attention and emotions. The LTTE was described as using DVD clips, movies, songs, street theatre and drama, and books that contained ‘motivational statements on LTTE’. Historical narratives were used to motivate the community: ‘We are told about past stories, incidents and their interpretations, heroic efforts’. Young people were told it was their chance ‘to be a big person’, ‘you can be like a king’, and ‘we can be kings in our area’. People were also attracted to the benefits: ‘they spoke about benefits and position’, and ‘we were shown the benefits they had’.

Additionally, the LTTE also created a climate of fear when people were ‘forced to come to meet [the LTTE] and then kept [back]’. Obedience was elicited when ‘people were made to fear the punishments - so they obeyed’.

Participants described how the LTTE generated resentment amongst the community. They ‘show that others have and we don’t have’, they ‘show that south of the country is developed and we are not’. Inequality and persecution were highlighted to an unquestioning audience and blamed on the state: ‘Overseas everything is equal and we don’t have that because of government’, while in ‘other countries people earn a lot and we can’t because of government’. Although an image of being victimized was promoted, the LTTE presented itself from a position of strength by projecting that ‘the enemy is weak and we are about to win’.

The LTTE strategy was to seize any opportunity to nurture anger. Participants recalled that ‘they take [recruit] quickly if they [civilians] lose family’, ‘show videos of our children dead’, ‘then we feel more and want to kill more’. Gripped by emotion, ‘no one asks if images of [the] dead is from our [LTTE] attack or their [government] attack’.

A former suicide member describes the recruitment process into the suicide units:

Only if the person wants to join they take [recruits]. Have to apply and request to join. Applicants sometimes write about 10 letters. Then there is an interview with Pottu or Muthappan before accepting. They look for words in these letters ‘I give all of myself’, ‘I would be a weapon’, ‘you can use me’, ‘my body will be a weapon’. The letters will show [reflect] 100 percent commitment. The letters need to have a story of motivation. When selected for attack must do the attack. If missed blasting target then blast anything. Cannot take the person back. The method was to quickly attack in Colombo and go to Vanni.²

The process described by the former member highlights a conscious effort made to show that the admission process for suicide units was tough. Applicants must demonstrate an overwhelming commitment to die in order to gain admission. This in itself attracted a

² Participant interview. Pottu and Muthappan were two leaders of the LTTE intelligence unit. Vanni was an LTTE controlled region in the northern part of Sri Lanka.

large number of recruits. The potential to be martyred was the hall-mark of achieving significance.

Maximizing opportunity for recruitment was articulated by a participant:

If someone died the body is kept in their school and civil people get to see. The LTTE puts songs and films. People watch and get attracted. The songs and films say 'he died for you'. This information goes out. What he did, how he fought heroically, how he died, then they say he was 'killed' not died, they modify the story and tell us he is a hero and he fought. The family feels good he was a hero, others feel angry he was 'killed' and want to join'.

Key phrases identified in messages were 'he is a hero', 'he fought', 'see what they did', 'we need more like him', 'he did it for you', 'come join', 'don't let this fight go to next generation', 'you can be the one person that can make this fight a success'. The LTTE made it the responsibility of each community member to join the crusade for a separate state. Those who thought otherwise were made to feel guilty and powerless, which made joining the group attractive.

5.1.3 Religious Justifications used by the LTTE Related to the Hypothesis

Although the LTTE overtly rejected religious practice and focused on self-reliance, religious justifications were used to create an aura of righteousness. Very little is discussed about LTTE's subtle use of religion to buttress its campaign for a separate state. Participants were, however, cognizant of the religious narratives used: 'History and religion have stories about killing. We grow up with this. By telling history they get us currently to fight fight fight'.

Mythico-religious justifications described by participants were: 'We were told that in history God makes war - Vishnu and Shiva fight, Siva and Ganapathi [are] messengers – [they] killed someone [during] school days and [were] told to fight. Hiru God [is] the Sun

God creator. Bahiravar God is about anger. We have Gods for everything'. Religious justification for the use of weapons given was: 'Gods have weapons. Some are old kings [that] we consider [as] gods with weapons. Gods are with weapons. Why weapons if not to fight? Fighting is ok. Fighting with weapons is allowed by the Gods'. Historical justifications given by participants were: 'LTTE says to see Mahabaratha. So we can do this, we can kill, it is morally ok. India to Sri Lanka its weapons it is about our Gods [who] have fought. So we fight and have to fight for our land'.

The LTTE established its credibility by aligning man with God and mythical narratives. The LTTE chief was equated to the 'Sun-God'. 'Like Anton Balasingham gives a story and then for people [what he says] its god and they follow what he says. Like in the Bhagavath Gita [the epic story where Lord Krishna tells Arjuna to fight]'. Themes of war and fighting were described as being part of the religious events, Tamil films, Hindi movies, and at kovil functions. With reference to the films and events, a participant reflected that 'everywhere there is killing'. Some expressed doubt in the LTTE chief who 'likes Lord Murugan' while the organization promoted self-reliance: 'I won't go to kovil. People make temples and tell stories and fight'.

The LTTE, even though it was overtly secular, used religious narratives to create a spiritual dimension to morally justify its campaign of terror. These findings support the hypothesis that moral justification of violence was essential to both suppress social norms and reduce the dissonance or distress that allowed the Tamil Tigers to take pride in their actions.

5.1.4 Sustaining Members for Short and Long Term

Sustaining members long enough to train and mobilize them involved several personal, familial, interpersonal and organizational needs being met. These dynamics were balanced to ensure that the LTTE worked towards achieving its focal goal.

Family support was secured by evoking a parent's sense of protection for their child: 'parents are asked to visit the frontline. Then family feels we came to see our son, they see others and feel we must support our children. Then they tell others to look after my son and they feel grateful to them for looking after'. The responses indicate that the LTTE attempted to secure family support and align the family to the mission by exposing the anxious family to the hardship faced by their courageous child. The family members, by supporting their child, was likely to feel a part of the mission. However, many of the recruits that ran away, or could not be sustained within the LTTE, were emotionally tied to family and arranged for their children to be smuggled out of LTTE held regions.

Sustaining diaspora enabled the LTTE to reach another level of sophistication. The diaspora was a vital financial and diplomatic resource that was pulled in with the use of emotive narratives: 'They see films. They hear songs. They connect from a distance. They only hear stories, listen to songs and cry'. The narratives were manipulated to a level unknown to its members: 'The stories [were] put together to make them sad and angry'. Once emotionally bonded by proxy, the diaspora would provide support to the LTTE financially, diplomatically and by disseminating information in order to secure more support.

Participants described the process: 'They work all the time [and make money] - so they are made to feel guilty. They feel less guilty when they send money and support and protect us. When we [the LTTE media unit] say children affected, women affected, our people affected, they carry the message for us'. The campaign of emotive misinformation had to be on-going in order to sustain the support of the diaspora.

Participants' believed that members will sustain within the organization if they were 'committed to the organization', 'if interested in the work being done' and having the opportunity to 'do interesting activities'. Feeling significant within the organization was another reason mentioned by participants: 'if a significant person in LTTE', 'having important information', 'important achievements', 'power' and when 'trusted, given a good post, and others speak of you highly'. Family entrenchment was also a factor to sustain within the LTTE particularly when the 'husband [and] wife [were] both in LTTE'. A participant described how 'they [the LTTE] created the end goal – we would be in that post if we stay long enough'. It is likely that the LTTE strategy was to hold members within strict guidelines for long enough until they were self-motivated, and started morally justifying and cognitively adjusting to a new way of life.

Participants' perception was that members would 'leave (the LTTE) if there is overseas contacts', 'internal problems' and 'if [the] boss [does] not like [the member]'. Participants stated that 'sometimes if there are problems with [the] immediate boss [we] can get a transfer to another unit, but [the] person should have confidence to write to [the] leader [LTTE chief] and ask for [a] transfer'. Family related issues that led to members leaving the LTTE were if members have 'no leave to go [home] and come', if there were 'home problems', 'if people die in family and need help' and if the 'LTTE had killed their family'.

Sustaining members also involved balancing the leadership sentiments. Excessive reinforcement of individuals may result in unsettling other members. A participant explained how the LTTE chief praised his best fighter, Karuna, who later defected: 'They [other leaders] got jealous' when the LTTE chief said 'Karuna was an example, was his right hand' and for others to 'be like Karuna, be like Karuna, be like Karuna'. This jealousy had led

other leaders to start a campaign to cast doubts about Karuna's overwhelming popularity as a leader in order to undermine the LTTE chief's authority.³

Sustaining members within the LTTE involved managing familial ties to reduce emotionality, enhancing commitment by establishing trustworthiness in the organization, maintaining interest in the type of work offered, ensuring significance by valuing the person and providing meaning through guidance and direction. Members were given time to settle into their roles and mentally adjust to the LTTE culture. Sustaining members within the organization was meticulously planned and executed. The bulk of the work within the LTTE was in sustaining the members long enough to groom them into effective fighters.

5.1.5 Process of Sustaining Members to Train and Mobilize

The members had to be sustained long enough within the LTTE to be trained. Several methods were employed to achieve the required changes.

Punishment was used to deter members from leaving the LTTE. Participants commented that: 'During training some leave, we bring them back, keep them in front of others and hit, then others won't go'. At other times 'they also get the batch to hit him so no one wants to leave'. There was a negative perception of those who wanted to abandon the cause of the LTTE: 'If they leave, they are treated very badly in a low way. Seen as no commitment, no loyalty, selfish and a traitor. Even [those who were] rehabilitated are looked at in a low way, as if they have been influenced'. Members remained in the organisation as they did not want to be perceived as weak or treacherous or contaminated by the enemy, and they feared being insulted or shamed in public.

³ The LTTE chief assassinated his closest and most trusted friend, Mahattaya, fearing that his authority will be challenged. Karuna developed a similar leadership but defected before he was assassinated, and survived many attempts by the LTTE to kill him.

Rewards were used to enhance positive behavior: ‘People are reinforced, praised, put up, given [a] pistol, bike, vehicle, body guards, a four-man team, many things like that’. The participants describe how the LTTE rewarded its members for each attack. The rewards had included: ‘bases and men to run [a team to manage]. The biggest reward had been to meet him [the LTTE chief] and if he gives a gift [for example a pistol] they worship that pistol’.

Training had involved ongoing assessments conducted by the LTTE training ‘masters’ who were also the ‘mentors’. Participants described the initial process: ‘It is in basic training that everyone is assessed and selected for special units’. They stated that trainers ‘know in 3 months who we are and trainers identify the mind through training’. They screen for key words and ‘study the essay about ourselves’. Following this process the ‘master then writes a report he [the trainee] is like this’. The recruits were then placed according to their skill with the different ‘fighting’, ‘bodyguard’, ‘black tiger [suicide]’, ‘political’ and ‘intelligence’ units. The training had involved appropriate allocation of duties. The participants also recalled that, ‘They also do video games to assess. If they identify a good worker they give the job to him’. Some were selected to become double agents: ‘To be a double agent is like walking on a sharp knife. When [a] double agent we can’t trust anyone. It is good training to become a double agent’. Placing the recruits in units that will maximize their skills acted as reinforcing the recruit and, thereby, yielding benefits to the organization.

Participants stated that during the training phase, the training masters provided daily updates and positive feedback on the progress of the recruit to their family members. The purpose of this was twofold. First, it gave families the impression that the LTTE was ‘winning’ with the help of their member. Second, the members were able to focus on their job knowing their families were aware of their progress.

Maintaining morale was important to sustain members. Participants described how attacks were needed to boost the morale of the fighters after losses: during the ‘period of loss in Vanni [a region dominated by the LTTE] we dropped mentally, so we have to hurry and make an attack to win, to increase morale’. Participants also explained how suicide operations required conviction and confidence: there was ‘no doubt when detonation’ was carried out since the target can be missed if there is uncertainty and doubt. The importance of the activity kept members focused and they recalled, ‘we had to do quick suicide attacks [in Colombo] to get security moved to Colombo’. Attacks that were seen as a success increased morale. Therefore, if the planned target was missed ‘we took any target’.

Celebrating successful operations was another method of boosting morale and sustaining those who achieved it. Participants spoke of the importance of the celebrations that reflected the organization’s approval, value and appreciation of the actions taken. The suicide act became a model to follow and the recognition received from the group helped to affirm members: ‘Celebrations make people feel good’ and believe that they are ‘doing the right thing’. The honor, rewards and possibility of promotion became a motivating factor.

To ensure maximum productivity, the training masters and operation leaders did not penalize failure but reinforced success. Participants reflecting on this recalled that if an operation was unsuccessful ‘they did not scold or discard [us]’. This approach had helped members to recover from their failure and work harder: ‘Failed attacks are not celebrated, not punished but we continue with normal work, then those that fail will continue to try to make [a] successful attack. If punished then we will become afraid of failure during [the] operation. In this way we want success because of [the] glory’. The LTTE, therefore, retained its members by motivating them to achieve greater heights to impress the organization.

5.1.6 Coping and Supporting Each Other

Participants varied in their views on needing, seeking and supporting each other within the LTTE. For support, we ‘speak to each other if we trust’, or ‘speak to a leader’ but ‘some would leave’ if they could not access the support. If there were difficulties with the boss, some would try to ‘change [the] boss’ and others felt they ‘can tell master [training master] at any time if there is a problem’.

A distinction was made by participants on general problems and specific problems: ‘They [the LTTE] address problems in general. For instance, 24 worked on the Anuradhapura airbase attack. So, we work towards the bigger aim. There is no time to think of problems. We are not like people [civilians], [we have] morning till night training. They [the LTTE] want to get the maximum work’ from us. The responses indicate that the organization had little space for individual problems. The focus on individuality was de-emphasized, while the collective took precedence. The collective was expected to work towards a single aim, ‘we are not like [or similar to] people’.

The LTTE emphasized the need to be self-reliant as opposed to seeking spiritual support. Participants stated that the attitude within the LTTE was ‘no prayer – no kovil – you believe in you – not others’ and that ‘you can do everything’, hence why seek support from the Gods. Particularly the Suicide Rehab sample believed that the ‘kovil means you don’t trust yourself’, when it is ‘you [that should] give protection to others’. The responses indicated that seeking support was a weakness. The LTTE promoted self-reliance, with the LTTE Chief leading by example in not practising the Hindu faith. The LTTE, however, used the Gods and mythico-religious narratives to justify the need to engage in armed conflict.

5.1.7 Teaching and Training to Maximise Learning within the LTTE

Training was an important part of the LTTE strategy to promote competence and confidence within its members. Participants describe the foundational narrative that was propagated by the LTTE: ‘We learn from the history we are taught. We were the original people. The whole country belongs to us. This is the main foundation’. The narratives were accompanied by emotive films and songs that gradually helped to adjust thinking and arouse the quest for significance: ‘Then we feel we have to fight till we die’. The members learnt how to operationalize the ideology by learning from ‘the case studies of heroes in LTTE, the attacks and the losses to the enemy, then we feel we can achieve this’. The thinking gradually adjusted through narratives and case studies while emotions were aroused through films and songs.

Following on from ideological indoctrination, the LTTE physically prepared its fighters for battle: ‘the skills we get through fitness and exercise and training, maximum training for the body’, ‘everyone gets a lot of training’, ‘KGB type training was provided’ and ‘Indian training was provided’.⁴ The theory was acquired from ‘the Mossad book’ and the ‘SIOT book’ that refer to Israeli and Sri Lankan special operations training.⁵ Participants also shared that the ‘Tamil diaspora engineers from Australia and other countries came to teach and train them.’⁶ Additionally, there was practice and rehearsal:

We practice on convoy targets, stage targets, single person, crowds [and] moving targets, [using bombs as well as] pistol sniper. Once the target is identified then a special training is done. Try for target in less and less time 10mins, 5mins, 2mins. Stand – Fit - Aim. Video games [involved] practice, practice, practice. See movies of blasts. We practice within a model set up to correct measurements.

⁴ KGB type training refers to LTTE receiving training through Russian mercenaries within the LTTE bases in Sri Lanka, and not in any official capacity by Russia. Indian training refers to training received in Tamil Nadu. See: R. Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, Colombo, South Asian Network on Conflict Research (SANCOR), 1993.

⁵ Mossad book and SIOT book had been acquired by the LTTE, but not in any official capacity from Israel or Sri Lanka.

⁶ There is no evidence that personnel from Australia arrived in any official state capacity to work with the LTTE.

A participant shared his views on planning and mobilizing:

[The] attack [is] planned carefully. Trainers identify strengths [of the members]. If 20 people are needed for the attack then more than 20 people are trained. Members are trained for pistol, sniper, shooting...Skill-target method [accessing person with the correct skill to take the target].

The precision training and care with which the skill is matched with the complexity of the target was remarkable. A former suicide member shared his views on suicide attacks:

[We] match the gender and body size and decide if [a] girl is suitable or not for [the planned] blast. We select a girl if the environment [or the context is] easier for a girl to reach [or access the] target. We take a boy if [the] boy is less noticeable to mix with the crowd and place. We select [the] body size to carry it [the bomb] depending on [the] size of [the] crowd we [plan to] target. [If there is a] bigger crowd [we get a] bigger body (sic) girl or boy.⁷

The LTTE continued to refine its methods and teach new techniques to protect its network. The LTTE changed its design of the suicide belt and training for detonation to prevent identification of the bomber. A participant describes how they adopted the forward and upward blasting method ‘for self and crowd’ to disfigure the bomber and kill the people in front: ‘After Dhanu’s head was identified [the suicide bomber of Rajiv Gandhi] everyone got caught. No more blasts to keep face to identify. Pottu said you must bend [the] face down when blasting [and] not to keep face remaining [intact] to identify’.

Participants shared their insights on civilian attacks. The justifications provided for the attacks were: ‘I know they use every incident to say why we have to do this civil attack. They say it is tit for tat, they say they retaliate, but they also continue to attack every day and they use the main attacks to say we did [it] as retaliation’. The moral justifications make the

⁷ Statements in the text related to girl and boy refers to women and men. The LTTE suicide bombers were carefully groomed and mobilized for targeted attacks. Individuals who joined this unit as young as 14 and 17 were carefully indoctrinated, trained and mobilized as adults for suicide attacks or to work within Black Tiger bodyguard team.

attacks righteous: ‘It is rationalized that it is right – so [we] can do it. The mythico-religious-historical justifications: [We feel] we must do retaliation because it is what we had in history and this is why we must get it back’. Justifications help members to accept and transform their thinking: ‘If retaliation then it’s easier to understand and accept why we do this’, ‘the mind is focused - not to think of other things’, ‘even those who are soft, in the face of death fear is reduced’, and they become ‘confident’ and feel they ‘can do it’.

Strategies used to cope with the training and overcome difficulties were shared by participants. Bonding with the group and focusing on the training helped overcome difficulties: ‘If there is interest in the work then we enjoy the training. We do training, study, work, play video games, watch attack films, read Veerakesari paper [and] supervised access to [the] internet’. The LTTE helped recruits to bond and created a pseudo family: ‘We are like a family’.

The ultimate goal in training was to secure loyalty to the LTTE and prepare its members for mobilization. The training helped to build skills and confidence: ‘We learn and we become confident’. The outcome was to build efficacy in own ability to conduct these activities: ‘You feel special. Like an investigator’, ‘like you’re the only person who can do this. And it [what you do] will make a big difference’. Therefore, ‘there is no regret because you do it for the cause, you do it for the friends and organization’. These findings provide evidence as to how the organization grooms its members to develop efficacy through direct and indirect or vicarious methods of learning.

5.1.8 Transformation of Thinking

Participants describe the gradual shift in their perspective of how they see life: ‘After joining [the LTTE] it [life] changes’. The meaning of success is redefined: ‘If the attacks are a success – it is pride. If not, we feel bad but no one tells anything. The aim is to do a successful

attack. It means everything. You work towards it'. Some participants described feeling entrapped: 'When inside [the LTTE we] can't stay and can't leave' and 'we become homesick after joining' but engage in 'games, functions, programs to relax the mind', which helps to cope.

The transformation of parents is carefully engineered by the LTTE: 'They allow meeting of [sic] mother and father. They [parents] cry. The visits are short'. Members were taught how to handle their anxious parents. To engage the parents: 'I say I want food, they are happy to bring [food] and meet [next time]. Then the parents settle. It normalizes, it gives them something to do. They feel good that they are helping me'. This was also a strategy of the organization to secure the loyalty and support of family. The parents supported their child regardless of whether they approved of the LTTE or not. The parents' aim was to protect their child working for the LTTE.

5.1.9 Idolizing the LTTE Chief

Participants talked of the importance of believing 'that the leader is good'. 'We follow the leader [and] even if [the] immediate boss is a problem we continue because we believe the LTTE is good and he [the LTTE chief] is special'. A God-like impression was developed in the minds of people: 'He speaks once a year and then it is very attractive. People wait to hear him speak. They worship him. He is known as the sun-god. We believed that what he tells is right [and] he won't make mistakes. We believed that what he predicts comes true'.

Some participants acknowledged that 'he [Prabhakaran] is good for Tamils, not for others' as the LTTE chief was single-minded in his pursuit of a separate state and would use any means to achieve this. When the international community pressurized the LTTE's foreign representatives, such as Tamilchelvam and Anton Balasingham, to agree to cease

fires and peace talks, Prabhakaran was unhappy.⁸ The LTTE members had focused on civilian life and commitment to the LTTE had started to dissipate: ‘He did not speak to civilians during peace time. He did not face them [the people]’.⁹

The demise of the LTTE chief was incomprehensible to his devotees. His aura of invincibility led people to believe that ‘he committed suicide, shot himself. People don’t want to believe that someone else killed him. It is better to believe that he took his own life because it is he that decided it is time to go. He controlled till the end’. The strong belief in the LTTE chief’s invincibility resulted in his followers denying his demise. The survival of the organization was tied heavily to Prabhakaran.

5.2 Participant Perceptions Related to the Hypotheses

This section explores the participant perceptions on the nature and the function of the emotive narrative, significance loss and quest, the need for an organization, and ideology pertaining to the hypotheses.

5.2.1 The Nature and Function of the Narrative

The importance of the foundational narrative was articulated by participants in the study: ‘Without the story of suffering we have no basis to fight. Every rebel group starts with a story [and] it is how this story is looked at, told and solutions available’.

⁸ Interview conducted by researcher with members of the LTTE’s former political wing (R023 and R025) on 18th and 19th August 2014, indicated that Prabhakaran had reluctantly agreed to ceasefires suggested by Tamilchelvam and Anton Balasingham.

⁹ Interview conducted by researcher with former LTTE bodyguard (S035) on 18 September 2014.

Was a powerful emotive grievance narrative an essential foundational component in recruitment?

Participants emphasized the emotive power of the narrative: ‘The story has to be emotional. People must feel the story. If you hear the story and don’t get angry and want to do something [then] it is not effective’.

The narrative was crafted with the audience in mind: ‘The story has to make you feel sad, angry and revengeful and it has to be powerful. It is powerful because it is emotional and moves people’. The narrative considered human vulnerabilities: ‘Our people are emotional people. They will be moved and get angry and fight and not let go. So we tapped into these human qualities. It is when a story is told many times that people begin to listen, otherwise, it is forgotten’.

The expected outcome of the narrative was ‘for me to give money to someone, I should feel that the person deserves it. So, we had units that worked on the media side’. It was not only the emotionality of the narrative that was important, but the messaging and marketing of the narrative to the people was vital: ‘Our people were dedicated. They worked only on the messages we project to our people, to the world and to the supporters. There are many issues in the world that don’t get publicity. How do some get publicity and not others? We thought about that’.

The views expressed by the participants indicate that the LTTE was cognizant of need for the foundational narrative to be powerful and emotional to create an impact on people. Concurrently, the message needs to be marketed properly in order to recruit its members.

5.2.2 The Emotive Narrative Binds People

Participants believed that the emotions within the narrative bind the people together: ‘It is the way they speak, when we look, we get motivated’. The effect of reaching the public through emotions is: ‘Emotions make people join quickly, films touch people, [and] songs make people feel’. There is variation within the appeal: ‘People get attracted depending on *what* is said and *how* the message is given. [Some] people get attracted by suicide attacks and others get attracted by team attacks’.

The audience is locked into the imagery of the narrative: ‘The BT [Black Tiger] movie is told by a boy: I see a Dora boat. He was with me in school. They say he was hit. Then I want to be like in that photo, or in that film or in that song, or Pooja film and songs. I recall everything in that movie or song. Forget other things. Feel anger, sadness, and think I must do something’.

The member identified with the narrative: ‘You begin to live inside that story. I modify my life when it is told to me. I connect with the boy in the story. You are touched by what they say’. The emotive narrative binds the audience: ‘Our story is told to us, to be like that, to desire to be like that. It is about a boy who does not want to join. Then I think I was also like that. Running from the fight. We identify with that story and with that feeling’.

In hindsight participants felt the story was skewed and said they ‘don’t show both sides, show only one side and hold people. Then people believe and feel and act on this [what is shown]’. They create dissonance to motivate: ‘They show how bad it is now and what we can make it like – the difference – and that difference *you* can make happen’. The careful attention given to grooming the mind is articulated: We ‘kept group together with the attacks videoed. Even if you die it must be videoed. Then the story is projected as he died, I must do something to remember him, to keep memory. Make the memory special, heroic, then others who see this video want to be special like this’.

5.2.3 The Narrative Evolves and it is Reframed

Participants believed that ‘it is the narrative that makes people committed. It is binding and it has to evolve’ because ‘if we don’t keep our story going, how will other generations know?’ The responses indicate that the cause survived around the narrative: ‘Without a story there is no meaning for the existence of our group. It is the story that makes people cry, makes people support, makes people send funds’, and ‘our story is our mission statement. It holds us together’.

Participants acknowledge that the narrative evolves: ‘The reasons we started this changed but we have to keep this going to achieve [a] separate state. We had to learn to project our story. The only way was to set up the international unit to carry our story to people with money’. For the story to live it had to be repackaged: ‘It is like you can’t sell the same product everyday. You have to add and change to keep people interested, involved, supporting, worried, frightened, angry, sad’. The LTTE used the media and participants commented that ‘it is about marketing the story. If we don’t know how to use the media, we are a failure. LTTE got international fame because of diaspora. If no diaspora, we won’t be able to package the story. They know how to deliver to the international mind’.

The story had to be kept alive in order for the cause to be kept alive. Participants described a threat to the narrative during times of peace:

The most dangerous time is peace time because people come and see. Our people go and see that life is different so they are not committed again to fight. People mix with Sinhala in peace time and then [they are] not motivated to fight. During peace times our fighters got soft. There was no story to tell, there was no motivation to fight so we had to restart [the fighting by breaking the peace pact] to get them back.

To retain commitment to the cause the story had to be made increasingly powerful: ‘Our story keeps the commitment. People go overseas and forget our struggle so we have to keep the story alive. To hold the commitment, it has to be more and more serious, more and more powerful, more and more sad and angry’.

The narrative is described by participants as expanding and evolving: ‘When issues are addressed other issues are taken up’ where the basic narrative remains, but new aspects are added on. The manner in which the grievance narrative evolves was articulated as: ‘The more that die the more we are able to say this. It is not the same when this started because the more attacks, the more counter attacks, the more people die. The longer the fighting the more stories to publish. We have to have this’.

As hypothesized, participant perceptions indicate that an emotive grievance narrative is a necessary component in recruitment. This grievance narrative is not static but continues to evolve and is framed and reframed by the LTTE with new grievances added onto this narrative. In addition, participant responses indicated that the narrative helps to bind people to the LTTE.

5.2.4 Significance Loss, Arousal, Quest and Restoration

Did framing and reframing the narrative result in the community continuing to be in a state of significance loss/quest?

Participant perceptions indicate that continuing to expose the community to the grievance narrative was essential to keep the community engaged and motivated. The necessity to project the loss was emphasized: ‘If we constantly don’t project that we are victims then how will they want to fight?’ The loss-quest aspect was articulated as: ‘Only when you are losing something will people want to fight for it and achieve an important state. If we don’t show

what we lose how will they fight to get it back? To make it better for us to keep our community committed we have to have our media that tells them how bad the situation is. Then they want to make it better'. Participants felt that using the community was inevitable to achieve a higher goal: 'We don't intend to keep the community like that [in a state of significance loss] - but it happens'.

One participant stated reflectively that: 'Our story is the central point. We have to keep that story suffering. And the possibility of winning, that is so powerful. While our people feel sad and angry then they are also hopeful and motivated. In this way, we can move people to action'. The words, 'keep that story suffering' indicates that the narrative is dynamic, and needed to manipulate the quest for significance.

Do you think significance loss arouses significance quest?

Participants stated that 'when we feel loss [of status] we want to regain our status. It is about regaining our dignity and if we did not lose we won't go looking for it. We fight for it when we feel we lost it'. The manipulation of the significance quest is articulated: 'With LTTE we are constantly made aware of the loss and, therefore, we go fight to get it back'. People appear driven in pursuit of the significance quest: 'We see ourselves as having to achieve a goal that is taken away, or going after what we have not got. If others have got it we also want to get it'. In some cases the arousal of the significance quest may not originate from an externally imposed loss: 'Some people are self-motivated, they don't need a loss to achieve because it is about achieving more and more'. Significance quest may arise from an internal drive that craves for greater levels of excitement.

Does Significance Loss lead people to redress grievances or does Significance Quest lead people to redress grievances?

Participants agreed that a powerful emotive grievance narrative is needed to create significance loss to drive people to go in quest of significance: ‘We need the narrative if we are to redress grievances. It has to be emotive. It has to be a grievance narrative and we have to say the story with emotion to have an impact’. Participants believed that the loss gave rise to quest: ‘When we feel we lose then we go after it [in quest] to get it back. If we don’t lose something we won’t have a drive [motivation] to get it back. After we lose we push to get it back and it is one of the things, it is the most important thing and without that [loss] people won’t feel’.

Does the LTTE guide its members to ‘restore’ significance?

Participants agreed that restoring significance was ‘the aim and the objective, not only of members but for all our people’. This aspect was taught in training and utilized in recruitment. Significance restoration ‘was the focus of the training. The LTTE guides and trains every member to get back our important place. All our training is to get back what we were taught we should have had. To get back what we were told over and over again that we had lost and every one joins for this reason’.

Did the group try to restore significance through a violent method?

Some participants acknowledged the attempt to restore significance through the use of violence: ‘We tried - no other method will work, and it was [an] effective method’. When asked whether they considered the method to be effective participants commented: ‘It motivated people so it was [an] effective method. We got some things we wanted through

this method, then it is a useful method. We felt victorious that we are doing something and achieving something. We believed in that method and captured territory and held territory, even for a while'. Some participants objected to the term violence and commented: 'It is a fighting method. We do not call it a violent method'. The method used was considered a 'good method' due to the outcomes achieved.

5.2.5 Significance through Meaning and Purpose in Life

The more you worked with the group – did the meaning in your life increase or decrease?

Participants believed that:

[W]e were all working to one aim - so it [life] was meaningful. When people who fought with us died we felt it was the only mission. When the LTTE news carried different stories, our work became more meaningful. There was no other meaning for our life - we lived for LTTE - to achieve our aim. We worked hard and felt all what we do is helping us to achieve our separate country.

Participants interviewed attributed meaningfulness in life to the work they did in the LTTE. Their sense of significance and meaning was tied heavily to their commitment to the LTTE. The confidence they experienced in executing their work was achieved through the training they received: 'With more training and confidence, this work became more meaningful. The work we were doing became our life. Even with little salary, the work was meaningful. We even neglected parents, family and children to serve the organization and we became more and more a part of the group, like a family'. The LTTE focused on missions which provided meaning and created a sense of belongingness: 'The LTTE gave us meaning, so the harder we worked the more we were accepted and it gave meaning'. As such, the sense of being part of the collective was self-reinforcing.

Participants also described reasons for a decrease in meaningfulness in life: ‘Because I did not like the civilian attacks’, ‘because of the way they treated people’ and ‘I did not like my boss’. Meaning in life was lost when the member of the organization had an interpersonal or moral conflict. Meaningfulness in life was derived from the aim, the mission and the cause. For others, meaningfulness in life was derived from the training and confidence that went in to do the work and achieve the mission. Meaningfulness in life therefore was heavily tied to the work the person was doing and the organization they were serving.

Did the purpose in your life increase or decrease with more work you did with the group?

With greater entrenchment in the group, participants felt their purpose in life increased: ‘Yes I felt this is what I am meant to be doing’. With longer service, a stronger and a clear purpose appeared to emerge: The ‘purpose became a commitment’, and ‘that was why we worked without proper pay - it was the aim’.

Was life more meaningful before, during or after the LTTE?

Meaning in life is tied to the perception of personal significance. Participants varied in their perception of whether life was more meaningful before, during or after LTTE control ended.

Those who felt that the LTTE guided them stated that: ‘Life had meaning before the LTTE but the LTTE gave a proper pathway in life. LTTE was a system so it was more meaningful. LTTE was well organized and it was clearer after joining. Life is meaningful now, also during LTTE, but not so much before LTTE’, and ‘there was a lot to do after joining’.

Participants that did not like the LTTE articulated their views: ‘No I did not like, so I wanted to get away. My focus became how to get away’. Some found new meaning for example, ‘now life has meaning again, now we know which direction to take or now life has a different meaning’. There was space for individualism: ‘Now we work for ourselves, before it was for the group. Before, it was working to the aim of LTTE, now it is for us’. A lack of futuristic thinking was expressed:

We did not have a sense of future with LTTE, more about how to end it. Now we have a future but it’s harder as we have to make it for ourselves...Life is more meaningful now...We have a sense of future that we can build. There is less tension with life now. It is about planning and living for future. Earlier it was planning and living for group, not ourselves.

In hindsight, it was felt that ‘meaning in life changed from time to time, and it is meaningful now’. A participant articulated the change in perception between the then and the now: ‘Earlier it was not about sacrificing life for our future, but for a future country. We were made to believe we could not live with Sinhala and Muslim. So it was meaningful then to fight. Now we know we can live together so it is meaningful to progress. What they said looks meaningless now’. The change in context provided a change in meaning.

Reasons for the increase and decrease in meaning and purpose in life.

Meaning and purpose was reported to increase ‘if we were liked’ by the LTTE. For example, ‘when our boss liked us and praised us, when we thought that LTTE was the best and when we thought we were achieving our aim’. Meaning and purpose in life decreased when ‘I did not like the LTTE [and] what it does, when members could not agree to the attacks, when my family did not like [the] LTTE because I am not for fighting [and] I wanted a different life’.

As hypothesized, participant perceptions indicate that framing and reframing of the grievance narrative helps to maintain the community in a state of significance loss. Further, this significance loss was found to give rise to the quest for significance. Participant responses also confirmed that the LTTE guided its members to restore significance through an armed/violent method.

Besides the hypothesized findings, participant perceptions indicated that the purpose and meaning in life increased the longer members worked for the LTTE. This was found particularly among those members who were senior and within suicide units but not as much within the younger members. The reasons for loss of purpose and meaning was attributed to conflict between personal values and group values, and due to personality clashes. Reasons to remain in the long term with the LTTE were attributed to acceptance, belongingness and significance.

5.2.6 The Organization

Is an organization needed to redress grievances?

Participants believed an organization was needed to coordinate the effort to redress grievances: 'To do this in an organized way you need an organization, otherwise you can't redress grievances'. A diaspora member stated that 'the LTTE was seen as the only organization that can correct the situation and it was a very powerful organization whose image was propped up carefully'. The importance of appearing trustworthy was emphasized: 'The credibility of organization is maintained 100 percent in the eyes of the people. People have to believe that the LTTE is fair in what they do and how they treat people'. This trust overflowed to the LTTE chief: 'people then trust him' and the organization was perceived 'as different from other organizations'.

Participants viewed the ceasefire periods in positive and negative terms. Ceasefire periods were also known as ‘peace times’.¹⁰ Participants stated that: ‘Peace time is a *big mistake* because during peace LTTE and civilians mixed’. The focus of the LTTE members were seen to shift from the group to the individual: ‘With peace there are fights inside the group. Members have body guards and cars, women become posh, [and] so others get angry’. Social comparisons were: ‘I watch and see others, compare what we have and what others have. We develop anger’. Material needs were believed to take center stage: ‘If someone gives a radio or TV others think we also must have. I think of my old house and want to make a new house, get foreign things. If I don’t then I think why should I work hard? I then do 80 percent and not 100 percent’. Participants felt that LTTE’s activities were compromised. Some participants felt that due to free movement the ‘secret news gets out’. These periods were viewed as times when the LTTE was dissipated.

Participants also described how the peace times helped the LTTE to expand its reach: ‘Before peace only LTTE inside so people did not like LTTE’ indicating that the LTTE role was tightly controlled and had little social interaction with civilians. This had led to a gap between civilians and the LTTE, therefore, ‘there was little liking for LTTE’. ‘During peace times LTTE mixed with civilians and they get to like the LTTE’. Peace times also provided the LTTE with overseas access: ‘They can reach [or access the] international community more. They send people overseas and bring people from overseas for training to fight’. Financial expansion during peace times was articulated: ‘[the] LTTE start[ed] businesses like civilian businesses in other parts of the country and overseas’. Participants also

¹⁰ The ‘ceasefire agreements’ that were signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE were referred to by the former LTTE members as ‘peace times’. These were periods when military confrontations ceased between the LTTE and Sri Lanka Military, and people were free to travel in and out of LTTE controlled regions. For description of ceasefire periods from 1985-2006 see: S. de Silva, ‘Change and Continuity in Terrorism: An examination of the lifecycle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, 2013, pp. 116-138.

described how the LTTE expanded its capability to attack: ‘We sent *sleepers* to the rest of the country to live and work for us in intelligence and as operatives’.¹¹

Perceptions of the negative influence of the diaspora were shared by participants: ‘People were spoilt by those overseas diaspora people’ and ‘spoilt when they say what life is like overseas and people here want to go overseas’. Participants also believed that while the diaspora helped from overseas, they also influenced the lifestyle of the people. This was seen as diverting the LTTE from its mission. For instance, when diaspora members visited, the quality of their clothes and shoes, hair styles and make up, the mobile phones they used, the level of comfort that was provided to them, the accent and style of speaking created an aura of superiority that the LTTE cadres resented and admired and aspired for.

Participant perceptions of the demise of the LTTE was varied. Some participants found it difficult to believe that the LTTE that had survived for nearly three decades was no more: ‘Now people think, why we lost such an organization?’ Others view the demise of the LTTE as part of the process of change: ‘After LTTE finished the people changed’, ‘if there is a virus – there will be an antivirus’, ‘people will not go back to that because they like the lifestyle now’ and ‘if [the] LTTE comes [returns] it can’t take the same route’. Reflectively a former suicide member stated that ‘to destroy an organization, you need peace time. It can destroy without a war’.

As hypothesized, participant perceptions indicated that when the organization is trusted, it is able to mentor and mobilize its members to redress grievances and restore significance. Participant responses also indicate that the image of the LTTE as just and fair was carefully projected to secure the trust and confidence of its members. It was this trust and confidence in the LTTE and its leader that enabled them to conduct attacks with

¹¹ Sleepers were suicide bombers who were mobilized to other parts of the country to integrate and live as civilians, until they were activated for an attack.

confidence. They believed they were working towards redressing grievances and restoring significance.

Besides the hypothesis, participant perceptions indicated that an organization was required to conduct their activity. In the absence of an organization, the members were dissipated and abandoned commitment to the group to engage in individual and personal goals.

5.2.7 The Ideology

Does the organization provide a simple and understandable ideology to follow?

Participants agreed that a story is needed, a method, a reason, a philosophy, an argument, a clear rationale and an aim. They felt that LTTE was the protector. Although the LTTE tried to provide an ideology, some participants felt that ‘it was all political with international involvement’. Other participants stated that ‘without an ideology it is not possible to get people together to work towards one aim’, and that ‘we always had an ideology and our aim was to get a separate state’. A participant emphasized that ‘our ideology clearly identified who is suffering, who is going to save our people and how we will do that’ and that the ideology was simple enough to be ‘easily understood by the people’.

As hypothesized, participant responses indicated that the ideology provided by the LTTE contained a grievance, an enemy responsible for the grievance and a method of redressing the grievance. Further the ideology was simple and easily understood by the common person.

5.2.8 Recommendations

Recommendations made by participants focused on the need for community engagement and integration. One participant stated that ‘people need love’. Segregation of communities was seen as counterproductive: ‘Do whatever to retain [Tamil] people in South also’. The need for integration was emphasized: ‘We must have the North, South, East, West mix’.

In relation to education and language, participants described how schools must not reflect the ethnic divide: ‘[Do] not have separate schools’, as ‘Tamil Sinhala schools must come together’ and ‘children must mix’. The importance of investing in education and ‘get a qualification’ was mentioned. The language was seen as a bridge to unite communities: ‘learn 3 languages’. Religious harmony was seen as important: ‘If Muslim and Buddhists have problems then the religions will separate. Muslims must mix with all communities’.

The value of speaking out and sharing of experiences to prevent repeating mistakes was articulated: ‘Those of us who were in it must share experiences. I will tell them that I was in it’. Participants also mentioned the importance of focusing on commonalities rather than the differences: ‘Our cultures are similar’ and religious practice of attending the Kovil. A clear message to move on was shared by a participant: ‘Don’t make a big problem, accept the humanity’. The focus was on unity and on what is achievable: ‘All people are meant to live together’, ‘don’t talk about difficulties all the time as everyone has difficulties, so get on with life’.

5.3 Conclusion

Personal, social and ideological reasons contributed to people joining the LTTE. The LTTE prepared the context to transform grievances into a crusade against the state to restore lost significance. Within this context, individuals were actively recruited into the LTTE. Some people were attracted to the narratives, while others felt compelled to join to avoid public

insults and shame. A small segment was forcibly recruited. However, the grievances and ideology were not sufficient to sustain members within the LTTE. Sustaining members depended on several factors, including the skills of the organization in managing its leaders, members, member families and the community.

The role of the organization was central in keeping the members and the community engaged. Projecting the LTTE as a just and fair organization, engaging in different roles, providing meaning, purpose and significance, promoting an ideology that helps to bind people, and a narrative that keeps the community and members active were essential components in recruitment and sustaining its membership. Providing training to build efficacy and moral justifications for attacks, helped to mobilize its members.

Training was an important facet in sustaining the members to build skill and confidence to mobilize. Assessments conducted during training helped to match the recruit's talents with the task. The recruit gradually adjusted to the LTTE culture. A mixed method of punishment and reward was used to keep members aligned with the ideology. Punishments were morally justified, which helped the members to accept the need for punishment. The recognition that accompanies praise and rewards was a central motivating factor for the members to work harder. Moral justifications provided allowed members to engage in violence.

In hindsight, participants recognized the subtle manipulation of the context to entrench the recruits within the group. However, it was interpretation of grievances and personal resilience factors that determined whether an individual would gravitate towards the LTTE.

'The value of a psychological theory is judged not only by its explanatory and predictive power, but also by its operational power to improve human functioning'.¹

Albert Bandura.

Chapter 6: Results and Discussion

The radicalization of a civilian into a terrorist is a multifactorial process. The literature reviewed in this study explored some of the contributory factors such as the narrative, personal significance, meaning and purpose in life, the ideology, the organization, trust and justice, the images and roles projected by the organization, moral justifications and self-efficacy. The methodology adopted in this study was designed to capture evidence of these factors contributing to the process of radicalization. To achieve this, interviews were conducted with former members of the LTTE, their family members and members of the diaspora community. Participant views gathered from the questionnaires and interviews were used to test seven hypotheses. This chapter will discuss the results of the data analysis carried out in the two preceding chapters and explore the evidence for the seven hypotheses, as well as the limitations of the study.

6.1 Recruitment

Recruitment into a terrorist group involves a historical and social context mediated by situational factors and personal vulnerabilities, which are exploited by the recruiters. The LTTE studied these vulnerabilities and nurtured the context to maximize recruitment. From 1976 onwards, the LTTE became a familiar presence in the Tamil dominated northern

¹ A. Bandura, 'Organizational Applications of Social Cognitive Theory, *Australian Journal of Management*, vol.13, no 2, 1988, p. 299.

regions of Sri Lanka. Participants describe how they grew up among the LTTE and developed relationships with its members. The LTTE rule to recruit a member from each family and its presence within the community for almost three decades, ensured the loyalty of almost every family to the LTTE.

Parallel to being a familiar presence within the community, the LTTE also built an image of being an organization to be feared.² The LTTE destroyed competing groups and dominated the region, cutting off mobility of the civilian population to other regions and severed relationships with other ethnic groups, which made the community insular and vulnerable to the narratives of the terrorist group, and its perspectives of right and wrong. The LTTE projected the image of being the sole rescuer and provider for the Tamil community in the region. They provided vocations and exciting opportunities to the youth, and built a powerbase both locally and internationally. Surrounded by thinkers and strategists, the LTTE carefully prepared the context to facilitate recruitment and establish itself as a formidable group.

6.1.1 The Context

Several factors motivate civilians to join terrorist groups. Participant interviews identify personal, social and political factors for joining the LTTE. Some had joined the LTTE in search of an identity, in quest of significance, seeking to belong, in need of a job, wanting to help or protect family, due to boredom, financial difficulties, peer pressure, to prevent a more vulnerable family member being recruited, to prevent being insulted or branded as a traitor and to avenge personal losses. Other factors for joining the group were to fight for a separate state, for excitement, admiration for the uniform, desire to use weapons, to drive a vehicle,

² Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran*, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004, p. 180, p. 249, p. 250 and p. 268.

to ride a motorcycle, or to acquire power, prestige and privileges and due to familiarity with group members. These factors appeared to pull or attract individuals towards the group. Avoidance related factors cited were related to wanting to get away from family problems, avoid going to school and to distract self from failed relationships.

Once civilians were recruited into the LTTE, they felt locked into serving the group. This feeling of entrapment was threefold. Some members of the LTTE had felt compelled to remain with the LTTE out of loyalty to the group. Other members had remained because of fear that the LTTE would hunt them down and punish them if they left. Still others had continued to work with the LTTE as they did not want to face the civilians in the community. Participants gave two reasons as to why the members of the LTTE did not want to face the community. Some civilians had suffered at the hands of the LTTE and were angry at the members, while others who admired the LTTE disapproved of the member abandoning the LTTE.

6.1.2 Strategies used to Attract Civilians

The LTTE recruitment strategy was multi-pronged, flexible and creative. The LTTE had a well-developed media unit that carried its messages to the wider public. The literature review analyzed the speeches of Velupillai Prabhakaran that were pitched to distress, attract and appeal to different audiences. The content of these speeches confirmed the use of emotions and messages of revenge, urging the youth to take action now, and sacrifice one's life for a noble cause.

The LTTE used a range of techniques to attract vulnerable children and youth to the organization. LTTE members paraded uniformed children with weapons; members in uniform befriended children in the villages; mingled among school children; were seen encouraging children to touch and hold weapons; and members' presence at school events

were a source of awe and excitement for children. Children and youth alike were motivated by narratives, movies, dramas and songs. It was appealing to youth in search of an identity, seeing their peers join the group, catering to their desire to become a hero (Appendix 6). The adults were attracted when the Tamil Tigers, a feared group reached out and spoke to them with ease. Children, youth and adults were attracted to the power they received by proxy through their association with the Tamil Tigers. See Appendix 7 for pictures of child recruitment.

6.1.3 Methods used in Recruitment

The LTTE selected public and private venues to maximize their reach into the community. Meetings were held in public places, schools, street corners and in the market places seizing every opportunity to recruit. The group deployed selected members to attend festivals, religious ceremonies, funerals and parties to impress the community with their conduct. The long-term aim in mingling with the community was to develop a support base to ensure a steady flow of recruits.

The LTTE was quick to recruit from the family that had lost a loved one in battle. The living and the dead were used in the recruitment drive. Funerals were used to target emotionally vulnerable people. During the exposure of the body, the LTTE played music and films that communicated strong messages of honor in sacrificing life. The narrative of the dead individual was modified to represent the story of a hero that fought valiantly. The grieving families felt proud of their dead family member while the funeral attendees were angry and motivated to support or join the LTTE.

The LTTE used successful operations to recruit by marketing the glory of winning. Successful operations were also used as case studies to train recruits and evoke a desire to be like the martyr. The martyred terrorists' names were given to new recruits, to be part of

that identity and prestige. Prabhakaran gave his own son the name 'Charles Anthony' in memory of his friend Charles Lucas Anthony.³ To keep the memory of the martyred alive, LTTE camps were named after them. For instance, 'Collins base', 'Kittu Political Training School' and 'Kantharuban Arivucholai' orphanage, were named after martyrs.

As much as the message was important to create maximum emotional impact, the medium was equally important to spread these messages. The LTTE created songs, movies, printed booklets, flyers, prepared DVD clips, documentaries and street drama.⁴ The content of these messages communicated the loss and a method of regaining the loss. The narratives transported the message recipient on an emotive journey through a serene environment to death destruction and humiliation. A method of regaining the lost glory was also highlighted to motivate the listener. The sequencing of the message was stepwise and progressive: 'He is a hero – He fought - See what they did - We need more like him - He did it for you – Come join – Don't let this fight go to the next generation - You can be the one person that can make this fight a success'.⁵

The LTTE used the past, the present and the future in the recruitment drive. The narratives of past glory, the present suffering, and future glory proved attractive to youth living in an environment that had little to offer. The LTTE restricted the mobility of civilians and development of the northern and eastern regions, and projected itself as the only organization to offer meaning and purpose to disaffected youth.

The LTTE manipulated emotions through social comparisons by highlighting 'that others have and we don't have', and that the 'south of the country is developed and we are not', thereby breeding resentment in the minds of civilians. Such downward negative

³ Narayan Swamy, *Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's story*, New Delhi, Sage Publications Pvt Ltd., 2010, p. 173.

⁴ S. Dyball, 'Indoctrination of children: A critical look at the causes and effects of child combatants in terrorism and political violence', 8 August 2012, p. 3-4.

⁵ Interview conducted by the researcher with a former Suicide Member of the LTTE (S001) on 22 June 2014.

comparisons created cognitive dissonance, which is the psychological distress that arises when a person cannot reconcile between the opposite positions.⁶ The LTTE then went on to blame this inequality on the government by making another comparison. The LTTE projected that ‘overseas everything is equal and we don’t have that because of government’. Further dissonance was created by projecting that in ‘other countries people earn a lot and we can’t because of government’. This argument was reinforced to the community when the LTTE was funded by those living overseas.

The LTTE also used upward comparisons to motivate potential recruits by showing them that ‘the enemy is weak and we are about to win’, inviting the recruit to be part of the imminent and inevitable victory in the face of a weak state. Interestingly, the LTTE used upward and downward comparisons to motivate different types of personalities. Some were motivated to join the LTTE to prevent a potential loss, while others were motivated to join due to a potential gain.

The fear factor was used by the LTTE to recruit people. Some participants stated that when people were asked to attend the LTTE administrative offices they were forced to join the organization. The fear of punishment prompted families to comply with the enforced conscription of children.⁷ People had reached a point of accepting rather than resisting the LTTE’s call to arms.

The LTTE used martyrdom to recruit people into its suicide units. Its members were given the highest respect, and became a ‘weapon’ that motivated the fighters. The martyr

⁶ L. Festinger and J.M. Carlsmith, ‘Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance’, *Attitudes*, Article 11, 1959, pp. 113-121, <http://faculty.washington.edu/jdb/345/345%20Articles/Festinger%20&%20Carlsmith.pdf>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

⁷ P.A. Povlock, ‘A Guerrilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War’, *Small Wars Journal*, Small Wars Foundation, 2011, pp. 26-27. See: South Asian Terrorism Portal, ‘Child Soldiers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, n.d., www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/child_soldiers.htm, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: A. Waldman, ‘Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka’ 14 January 2003, pp. 1-5, [newspaper], <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/world/masters-of-suicide-bombing-tamil-guerrillas-of-sri-lanka.html?pagewanted=all>, (accessed 18 February 2017). See: Gunaratna, R, ‘Tiger Cubs and Childhood Fall as Casualties in Sri Lanka’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 32, 1 July 1998.

status offered to suicide members ensured a steady flow of applicants to this unit. The application process was selective, and the trainers were screened thoroughly to maintain the secrecy, the lethality and elite nature of the Black Tiger suicide units.

The LTTE recruited from the orphanages in which Prabhakaran took a personal interest. The children were groomed in the shadow of the suicide martyrs and progressed on to be trained as Black Tigers. These children were also recruited into Prabhakaran's body guard team and to other units. Prabhakaran was fascinated by the impact of the terror unleashed by the suicide units. He referred to the suicide members as the body-armor and soul of the LTTE, created to do his will.

6.2 Grooming the Members

6.2.1 Teaching and Training to Maximise Potential

The LTTE carefully screened each member's commitment to the organization. The new recruit was then provided three months of basic weapons training and indoctrination. During this time, each member was carefully assessed for interest and skill, and was placed within the relevant units for further training. The training masters were the mentors who examined the trainees' essays for key words that reflected commitment, observed trainees' performance on video games, and identified relevant strengths in fighting, sniping, intelligence, media or administration. Once the training was complete, the training master would write a report and the trainee was allocated to the unit that could make the best use of the skills.

Through teaching and training the LTTE helped to build skills and confidence to mobilize its members. Each LTTE unit had their own training base, to practice various types of attacks that focused on taking convoy targets, stage targets, single person targets, crowds

and moving targets. Based on the type of target, the weapons training would involve pistol, sniper, person borne improvised explosive device (PBIED), vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), roadside IEDs or parcel bombs. To achieve speed and accuracy the training involved video games and ongoing practice to hit the target within the shortest possible time frame. Watching movies of bomb blasts helped to desensitize members and prepare them for the outcome. To ensure familiarity and accuracy when conducting major operations, the LTTE prepared models to correct measurements for the members to practice. The training helped to boost confidence and skill. The LTTE selected its fighters with care to ensure operational success and learnt from its operational failures and successes.

The LTTE provided specialist training to its fighters. The suicide members were highly focused, single minded and all-or-none in their thinking. These individuals were trained to operate on their own, as stand-alone human bombs with the potential to cause maximum destruction. The suicide members had the power to take life, and were made to believe they had 'power like God'. The Black Tigers were therefore considered ultra-special and functioned within the LTTE as a venerated group. Their food rations, the respect and the treatment received was of a higher standard. Their training was considered the most intense training reserved for the most committed members. While the suicide units received intensely focused training, they were mobilized for specific attacks and did not fight in battle on a daily basis. Some members were aware of the benefits, and opted to join the suicide unit in the latter stages of the war to get reprieve from fighting on the frontline.

The LTTE relied heavily on its intelligence units. The training for members of the intelligence units was considered as important as that of the suicide units. These units provided the vital information that was needed to conduct operations both on the battlefield and off the battlefield. The best recruits were allocated to the intelligence units. Mobilizing of sleepers and double agents was the role of the intelligence units. The training of double agents was described as 'walking on a sharp knife', involving deception when 'living and

working with the enemy that I must destroy'. The intelligence units were held in high esteem by the LTTE chief (Appendix 8).

It was through rigorous physical and psychological training coupled with the strategic management of its members that the LTTE groomed the Tamil Tigers into a force that was deeply loyal and committed. However, to sustain its members the LTTE continued to train, indoctrinate and manage the context. A variety of techniques that were used, to bind its members to the LTTE, were central to sustaining the membership.

6.2.2 Binding the Members to the Organization

The LTTE groomed its members into the organization and created an identity connected to the members' role within the group. The training process commenced with being provided a LTTE name or an alias. A civilian leaves behind his or her identity and steps into the terrorist group, its way of life and takes on a new identity. The individual is expected to 'live up to the name', 'not to bring shame to that name', 'not to let down the martyred hero', and to 'imitate [emulate] that individual and do better'. Members were 'prohibited from trying to find' out the original name or personal details of any recruit. The new recruit developed a new identity as a member of the LTTE, thereby reducing the dissonance between their previous life in the community and role within the LTTE. The LTTE attempted to bind recruits to the organization's culture by severing all connections to their past identity and creating an LTTE identity.

The cultural tradition to marry within close circles to secure wealth was used by the LTTE to secure loyalty. The LTTE arranged marriages for its top tier members, ensuring that the family was entrenched within the organization, thereby, securing family support and the support of the community. Securing the support of parents who may have objected to the LTTE was overcome by an exposure technique. When fighting on the frontline, parents were

asked to visit their children in the frontline to witness the hardships and camaraderie. The parents then felt they must support their child to survive and requested those around to look after their child. This exposure secured the family's loyalty to the LTTE in the interest of their child, irrespective of whether in principle they agreed or not with the LTTE actions. The strategizing, which appears sophisticated, was focused on retaining the members within the organization. The LTTE used the members to help bind the family to the organization.

LTTE members were sustained long-term within the organization when members felt that they were trusted, admired and valued. Other factors were power, prestige, and position, which made the LTTE members feel special. Members remained within the organization when allocated important and interesting work, which was a recognition of their skill. The LTTE provided greater privileges when both husband and the wife worked for the LTTE, recognizing family dedication. These factors indicate that feeling significant within the LTTE helped to keep the members bonded to the organization.

LTTE members attempted to leave the organization for several reasons: if there were internal problems, if the immediate boss did not like that particular member, if the member was not given leave to visit his home or if the LTTE had killed or harmed a family member. Other reasons for leaving the organization were due to family problems or the family needed the support of the individual. Some left if they had family overseas who could sponsor them or family in the south of the country who could provide for them. These factors indicated that those having the opportunity to get away would rather not remain within the LTTE. While the LTTE was successful in binding its members to the organization, the members were likely to break the bond with the LTTE when personally aggrieved or affected. They were likely to exit when a safe exit strategy was in place.

The LTTE used both reward and punishment to sustain its members. The members were positively reinforced and made to feel significant when they conducted successful

attacks. The rewards were contingent upon successful attacks. The gifts that were provided gave prestige to the members and also indicated they had earned the trust of the LTTE leadership. Receiving a pistol, a motor bike, a vehicle, body guards or a four-man team were symbols of prestige. The most prestigious reward of all was to meet Prabhakaran and receive his admiration or a gift of a pistol, which was revered. The material rewards given by the LTTE to its members were symbolically tied to their work within the LTTE. This method of rewards used by the LTTE helped to frame the act of violence as an achievement, reinforced the members for their actions and motivated others to achieve a similar feat.

The LTTE used punishment and shame to sustain its members. Those who tried to leave during training were brought back and beaten in public as a deterrent to prevent others from leaving. The LTTE also forced the trainee batch-mates to beat the runaway recruit so that the batch takes responsibility to ensure that the recruit remains within the group. These methods communicated to the trainee batch of recruits that their loyalty should be to the organization, while desensitizing members to attack their own if required.

Punishments meted out to those that challenged Prabhakaran or broke the rules of the LTTE were justified as essential to safeguard the LTTE ideology. Violation of the LTTE rules involved punishing its own members. By labelling that member as an enemy, the rest of the group collectively justified the need to punish this enemy within who was one of their own. If the person was not labelled as an enemy and prepared for punishment, the members were likely to identify with that individual and loyalties would begin to shift. However, naming an individual as an enemy isolated that particular member and any supporters as the enemies worthy of punishment.

The LTTE did not penalize individual members for operational failures. In the absence of punishment, the fear of failure was reduced. This strategy encouraged the failed member to learn from mistakes, try harder next time and take greater risks. New recruits

were groomed through the principle of modelling, which speeded up the learning process. The members were inspired by those who conducted high profile attacks. The LTTE, as a result, generated members that aspired to be like the senior members and leaders that conducted the most lethal attacks. Modelling became a force multiplier.

A variety of strategies were adopted by the LTTE members to mitigate the difficulties they faced within the organization. They attempted to cope with their difficulties by speaking with the leader, sharing the problem with a friend, or by denying personal problems, framing the problems as a general issue or by leaving the organization. Overall, the LTTE focused on addressing general problems while specific problems were ignored. The organization appeared to divert its focus onto operational problems, minimizing the focus on personal problems, leaving hardly any time to think of personal problems. Members felt that they were not like ordinary people as they focused on work and work related problems. The LTTE's focus on larger organizational needs helped to bind its members to the collective and shared goals, instead of focusing on the individual and personal needs.

The LTTE focused on self-reliance as opposed to seeking support from the Gods. Religious practice as a coping mechanism was not promoted. The arguments presented emphasized that members would seek support from the Gods if they were weak or could not trust themselves. LTTE members gradually moved away from the Hindu faith and venerated Prabhakaran instead, which helped to bind its members to the LTTE.

6.2.3 Maintaining the Morale of the Members

Suicide attacks were a potent strategy used by the LTTE to maintain morale of the members and to break the morale of the enemy. In the face of operational losses in the battlefield, the Tamil Tigers dropped in morale. To regain the lost significance, the LTTE mobilized Black Tigers to conduct suicide attacks in the southern part of Sri Lanka. This tactic was adopted

to force the state to divert security resources to the southern regions of the country to protect civilians, and potential economic and iconic targets. The suicide attacks in the south provided a moral boost to the Tamil Tigers in the battlefield and created an aura of winning. When a planned suicide target was missed, the Tamil Tigers took any other target, and the mission was projected as a success to maintain high morale. The LTTE was acutely aware that it was hard to recruit and sustain members if the group was perceived to be losing. This was witnessed when the large number of LTTE members and fighters deserted their posts in May 2009 when the LTTE started to disintegrate.

Celebrating operational victories was yet another morale boost to the LTTE members, their families and supporters. Celebrations were an important part of the LTTE strategy. It reflected approval, value and appreciation for successful attacks. When attacks were celebrated, those involved in the operation felt validated and recognized. Celebrations also confirmed that the fighters were on the right path and were projected as models to follow, thereby erasing any doubts on the morality of their actions.

The LTTE ensured that the morale of the community was on a winning note. Participants described how daily updates were provided to the community on battlefield victories. The LTTE focused on creating an impression of winning to maintain the morale of their supporters and the community.

6.2.4 Religious Justification to Project Actions as Sacred

Although little emphasis was given to religion within the LTTE, the group used religion to justify war and the use of weapons. Mythico-religious narratives of fighting were used to project war and fighting as sacred. The two examples used were the fighting between Gods Vishnu and Shiva, and the fighting between Gods Shiva and Ganapathi. Mythical historical

narratives of wars between India and Sri Lanka were also used to portray the legacy of war and justifications for animosity.

The LTTE portrayed the worship of the Gods as weakness and justifications were provided to embrace self-reliance. History and religion were perceived as stories about killing, which were reflected in Tamil films, Hindi movies, and at Kovil events. The people in the community were seen as growing up with these narratives of killing and fighting. When the LTTE used the mythico-religious epic, the Mahabaratha, to justify resorting to violence, it was seen as a morally sanctioned narrative of vengeance.

The LTTE leader Prabhakaran was venerated by the LTTE cadres. Prabhakaran admired Lord Murugan, the God of War, who carries a spear.⁸ The Tamil Tigers believed that Prabhakaran was all powerful and would conduct the war and secure a separate state. The words of Anton Balasingham, the LTTE ideologue, was perceived to be God-like. What he said was accepted and followed by the LTTE, like in the Bhagavath Gita [the epic], where Lord Krishna tells Arjuna to fight, and he goes to war.⁹

The logic was that if the Gods used weapons, expressed anger and engaged in fighting, then it was morally acceptable for the LTTE leaders to do the same. Another argument shared was that the statues of Gods were made with weapons, and weapons were meant to be used in battle. Therefore, fighting was religiously sanctioned. The Gods were seen as representing every facet of life and reflected the reality of life.

Prabhakaran aimed to re-create the epic Mahabharatha in his fight for a separate state. The LTTE members and fighters felt that they were making history, sanctioned by the Gods. The LTTE was careful to separate the practice of religion from using religion to morally

⁸ Description of Lord Murugan can be accessed from several websites. See: <http://murugan.org/kaliyuga.htm> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kartikeya>, (accessed 18 February 2017). Lord Murugan is worshipped by the Tamil community in India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and other parts of the world.

⁹ Interview conducted by researcher, former LTTE bodyguard, suicide team member (S015), on 1 September 2014.

justify fighting. The practice of the Hindu faith involved respect for the Gods, which was channeled into the veneration of Prabhakaran.

6.2.5 Veneration of Prabhakaran

The God-like veneration bestowed on Prabhakaran contributed to sustaining the members. Many members remained with the LTTE, in spite of difficulties, because they believed the LTTE chief was special. The adoration for Prabhakaran appeared to make life meaningful and bearable. Prabhakaran won the trust of the LTTE members for being focused on getting a separate state for the Tamil community, even though the Tamil community knew that he was not good for other communities.

Members of the LTTE swore allegiance to Prabhakaran and not to the LTTE. This cult-like allegiance of Tamil Tigers to Prabhakaran was similar to the Nazi movement, where soldiers swore allegiance to Hitler.¹⁰ Both movements collapsed with the death of their leaders.

Prabhakaran was known as the Sun-God or *Hiru God*. The LTTE chief was attributed with God-like qualities within a Hindu context that incorporated concepts of being a creator, an avenger, a rescuer, a protector and a leader in battle. The aura of invincibility created around Prabhakaran was that no mortal could kill him. When Prabhakaran was killed in battle, an effort was made to deny his death and later to say that he committed suicide. It was better to believe that he took his own life because he would be in control of even his demise, and only he had the power to take his own life. Narayan Swamy aptly says '[e]ven after his

¹⁰ M. Roberts, Inspirations: Hero Figures and Hitler in Young Pirapaharan's thinking, 10 February 2010, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/inspirations-hero-figures-and-hitler-in-young-pirapaharans-thinking/>, cites Ganeshan Iyer (2012) and Raghavan (2009), colleagues of Prabhakaran since 1974, discuss Prabhakaran's authoritarianism, allegiance to a leader, total suicide commitment, use of cyanide, and eliminating the other who challenged his authority, as being inspired by Hitler and the Mein Kampf which was translated into Tamil. Prabhakaran's interest had been in the rejuvenation of Nazi Germany under Hitler, and the discipline of the German army that led to the victories of Hitler.

death, the LTTE's love for fantasy did not abate. It kept claiming that Prabhakaran was alive and well', yet it was finally proven that 'they too were mortals'.¹¹ Prabhakaran was offered the status of a cult leader, where people will venerate him, die for him and kill to protect his mission.¹² This image was necessary to secure unquestioning loyalty of its members.

6.2.6 Diaspora a Vital Lifeline in Sustaining the Group

The Tamil diaspora, though physically removed from the ground realities of the battle being waged, supported the LTTE financially to compensate for the guilt of being away. The Tamil diaspora was manipulated by the LTTE by exposing the diaspora to the narratives of victimization. The diaspora members that joined the LTTE support network, provided the revenue for the LTTE, lobbied on behalf of the LTTE campaign, and conducted propaganda campaigns that helped sustain the LTTE. Although some LTTE members were cynical of the diaspora involvement, they were also acutely aware that the LTTE could not have survived without Tamil diaspora funding, the funding of NGO's and political campaigns overseas, lobbying of governments and the propaganda campaign to secure the support base. The Tamil diaspora activity was perceived to be as large an operation as was fought in the Vanni¹³.

6.2.7 Suicide Units Groomed were at the Heart of the LTTE

Central to sustaining the LTTE mission were the suicide members also known as the Black Tigers. The LTTE possessed several Black Tiger units, dedicated to the LTTE intelligence division, body guard team, Sea Tigers and Air Tigers. To Prabhakaran, they were his unique

¹¹ Narayan Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished*, p. 176.

¹² B. Connable and M. Libicki, 'How insurgencies end', National Defense Research Institute, Arlington, VA, RAND corporation, 2010, p. 19.

¹³ Vanni was an LTTE controlled region in the northern part of Sri Lanka.

creation that became the body armor of the LTTE. The suicide units were seen as the future of the LTTE to secure an independent state. See Appendix 8. The suicide members were mobilized to target high ranking individuals, to divert security force resources, to avenge losses to the LTTE, and to eliminate long term and short term threats to the LTTE mission. Suicide attacks in cities, the massacre of border villages, destruction of iconic economic, cultural and religious targets, and the destruction of oil refineries and water tanks were meant to terrorize the public, damage the economy and grind the nation to a halt. The LTTE successfully groomed the suicide members to conduct these missions with precision and accuracy while the battle raged in the northern regions of Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran perceived the suicide bombers as compensating in lethality with what it lacked in numbers.

6.2.8 Transformation of the Individual

The LTTE indoctrination was aimed at transforming the individual's core beliefs. The LTTE used the narratives of injustice and discrimination, narratives of being the original people of Sri Lanka, and narratives of mythico-historical battles to create a foundational narrative. The LTTE crafted an ideology leading people to believe that the only solution was to fight till they die.

The LTTE carefully groomed its members by teaching, training and mentoring. Following assessments of skills and commitment, the recruits were placed in units that maximized the potential of each member. Starting with a LTTE name the members were groomed into the LTTE subculture. The members gradually moved away from their lifestyle as a civilian and entered the LTTE family.

The LTTE training units, its media and propaganda units and the culture of the LTTE was geared to groom its members to transform internally. The focus was to make the recruits believe that they wanted to commit to the battle. The LTTE manipulated the context, crafted

the ideology and provided the necessary training. The LTTE gradually radicalized the community, indoctrinated its recruits, and groomed them for quick mobilization.

The transformation had the potential to reverse when the context changed. This process of reversal was seen when the LTTE was vanquished. The former members shed their LTTE names and returned to their original names.¹⁴ Those who accepted that the LTTE was vanquished found it easier to return to their previous identity and role in civil society. However, some of those who had difficulty accepting the demise of the LTTE, left to join other groups overseas or committed suicide on the battlefield.

6.3 Radicalization Components

Seven primary variables were examined: The Emotive Narrative, Personal Significance, the Organization, an Ideology, the Images projected, Moral Justification of violence, and Self-efficacy. Another set of factors hypothesized to be of value in the process of radicalization towards violence were framing and reframing the narrative, significance loss and quest, meaning and purpose in life, training to develop self-efficacy, moral justification of actions and the need to trust the LTTE as an organization that was fair and just.

6.3.1 Emotive Narrative

This section explores the evidence for the hypothesis that a powerful grievance narrative is an essential foundational component used by the LTTE to recruit members. Additionally, participant perceptions are obtained on how the narrative evolves, how the narrative is framed and reframed by the LTTE throughout the lifespan of the movement. The literature

¹⁴ Each LTTE member, when recruited was given an LTTE name. Their birth names were not known or used within the organization. This provided each member with a new identity linked to the organization and also made the individual virtually untraceable by the authorities.

review highlighted the dynamic nature of narratives and the power of the emotive narrative in swaying perception and public opinion. Participant perceptions of the importance of the narrative, the emotionality and grievances embedded within the narrative, how the narrative evolved over time, and the manipulation of the narrative to recruit, sustain and mobilize people into violence are discussed below.

[A] A Powerful Grievance Narrative was an Essential Foundational Component in Recruitment

Participant interviews established that the initial narrative is one of discrimination, inequality and marginalization. It was this story of suffering that was projected as legitimate grounds to fight for a separate state. The grievance narrative was seen as an essential factor in forming the foundational narrative of the LTTE to attract recruits. A frequency count of participant responses established that the *foundational narrative* had to be a *grievance narrative*.

Some participants (58.4%) went on to qualify the nature of the *foundational narrative* as being a *long-term* grievance narrative, while others (41.6%) felt that the foundational narrative was a *powerful emotive* grievance narrative. A comparison between the three Rehab groups (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab groups) indicate that the majority within the Suicide Rehab group described the narrative as powerful and emotive. The difference in response patterns by the group is likely to reflect the intense training of the suicide members where the power of the emotive grievance narrative was a driving force in sustaining their commitment.

Another aspect explored was whether the grievance narrative was sufficient to recruit members or whether this grievance narrative had to be powerful and emotive to attract recruits. Participants distinguished between the role of the *foundational narrative* and the *powerful emotive narrative*. They felt that while the foundational narrative was a grievance

narrative, the narrative had to be powerful and emotive to be able to recruit members. This was confirmed through interviews where participants described the need for the narrative to generate emotions such as sadness, anger and revenge. Further, when the narrative is powerful and emotive, it mobilizes or moves people into action.

The LTTE had a dedicated media unit that carefully crafted the emotive messages. The messages were designed to resonate with the local Tamil community, the diaspora Tamil community and the international community. The LTTE paid careful attention to the message recipients and the message. The strategy adopted was to have a media campaign that was ongoing and sustained. The messages were projected repetitively and consistently in order for them to be believed. The LTTE studied the vulnerabilities of individuals to pitch the message, and tapped into the strengths and vulnerabilities of communities and organizations.

[B] The Function of the Emotive Narrative

The emotive grievance narratives provided the content for the messages. The effectiveness of these messages was based on how well the message was crafted and delivered. The content, delivery and frequency with which the messages were projected determined the impact of the message. Participants described being motivated by the way in which the message was delivered. Emotive narratives were designed as powerful stories to resonate with the anxieties and doubts of the message recipient. The person listening begins to identify with the narrative and is internally transformed. The narrative transports the message recipient to a world of anger, sadness, hatred and distress. The narrative then provides the solution to this distress, and legitimizes the need to redress grievances and avenge the losses. The narrative dictates the path for the message recipient to follow.

The single narrative highlighted by the LTTE, did not project alternative means to redress grievances but showed one solution that pushes the message recipient to act. The narrative lays the burden upon the message recipient ‘to do something’ to make a difference.¹⁵ The power of emotions prevents the individual from thinking critically of the grievances projected and the solutions offered. This message has a greater pull if the message recipient is disaffected, seeking to belong, feels insignificant and lacks opportunity. The desire to seek significance in the face of grievances is powerful. The message was powerful and attractive because it showed how bad the situation is, how this situation can be changed, and who can make the difference and become a hero.

The LTTE generated movie clips to bind and motivate members. They also recorded attacks to keep memory of the martyred alive and motivate others to fight harder. Participants believed that films and songs that generated emotion triggered people to join the LTTE.

Interviews established that the delivery of the message was as important as the content of the message. The LTTE’s media unit produced films, documentaries, songs, street dramas, leaflets, posters, booklets, radio programs, and lectures to promote these narratives.

[C] The Narrative Evolves and It Is Framed-Reframed Throughout Lifespan of the Movement

The emotive grievance narrative promoted a dynamic narrative that evolved over time. Most of the participants (83%) believed that the narrative had to evolve and that the narrative was not the same as when the conflict started. As the number of incidences grew and the deaths increased, the narrative evolved. Participants’ statements also indicated that the conflict contributed to shape the narrative, and without the conflict the narrative would lose its

¹⁵ See Appendix 5A for participant statements.

potency. This was articulated by participants who believed that peace-times were detrimental to the LTTE as there was 'no story' and 'no motivation' to fight. In the context of protracted conflicts, new issues are added on to the basic narrative to maintain the conflict.

The LTTE invested in the narrative to keep the conflict alive and to bind people to achieve its ideological goals. Participant concerns were that if the narrative is not kept alive, the next generation would not be aware of the grievances, and without a narrative, there would be no legitimacy for the group. The narrative was perceived as the factor that helped to bind the people together to fight for a common cause. The grievance narrative was perceived as the ideological narrative.

The value of crafting the narrative and marketing it effectively helped to secure financial resources for the LTTE. Participants described accessing Tamil diaspora support on how to project their narratives effectively to audiences overseas. The LTTE went on to set up an international unit that helped to carry the narratives to those overseas to secure funding for the LTTE. It was felt that the LTTE achieved international fame because the diaspora was aware of how to market these narratives.

The commitment of the members was kept alive through the narrative that continued to generate emotion. The narrative of conflict had to be kept going to achieve the LTTE's aim. The LTTE was in danger of disintegrating during peace times because its members pursued their individual interests and the focus on the collective dissipated. In the absence of tight LTTE control and in the absence of war, it was difficult to keep the Tamil Tigers together. The focus of the members shifted onto civilian life, a life away from war, and away from the emotive grievance narratives.

The grievance narrative was an essential foundational component. Its function was to keep the community locked within a framework of loss and victimization, which gave rise to the arousal of significance and the need to fight to redress grievances. The evolving

narrative generated worry, fear, sadness, anger and hatred. This powerful emotive grievance narrative projected to the masses helped sustain people's interest, involvement, support and secure funding for the LTTE. Within this grievance narrative, the LTTE emerged as the savior of the Tamil community.

The findings support the hypothesis that a powerful emotive grievance narrative is required to recruit members into the LTTE. However, the foundational narrative is generally a long-term grievance narrative that sets people on the path to redress grievances. The findings also support the hypothesis that the narrative evolved during the course of the LTTE, and that the narratives were framed and reframed with new aspects added on to keep the narratives dynamic.

6.3.2 Loss of Significance and the Arousal of the Significance Quest

The emotive grievance narrative was an important motivational factor for the LTTE to recruit and sustain its members. Participant interviews indicate that the grievance narrative evolved over time and helped to entrench individuals within the organization. Chapter two explored the literature on the narrative and personal significance. The literature indicated that grievances led to a loss of significance, which gave rise to the quest for significance. In this section the interface between the grievance narrative and loss of significance will be discussed.

[A] *Maintaining the Significance Loss*

Framing the narrative is about contextualizing the narrative, or putting the narrative together to resonate with the community. Reframing is about updating the narrative by interpreting facts, events and experiences. The study looked at whether framing and reframing the

emotive narrative maintained the community in a state of significance loss that led to the arousal of the quest for significance. The responses of the five participant groups ($N = 85$) are presented in this section. Appendix 4 contains the demographic breakdown of the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora groups.

A frequency count indicated that 77 percent of participants believed that continuing to frame and reframe the grievance narrative resulted in the community being in a state of *loss of significance* that transforms into a *quest for significance*.

A comparison between groups indicated that 73 percent of Family members (Family FM) while they experienced a loss of significance, they did not recognize a resulting quest for significance. It is likely that family members were more acutely aware of the sense of loss rather than an arousal of the significance quest. It is also possible that their sense of loss was tied to the ongoing anxieties related to their family member working with the LTTE, in quest of significance. This phenomenon, however, is likely to be different with families entrenched in the LTTE and caught up in the quest. The Tamil diaspora, physically removed from the ground situation of loss, may have been more aware of how the significance loss gave rise to significance quest. The former LTTE members, however, had shifted from loss to quest (Figure 7) and were aware of this shift.

Participants believed that the narrative of the victim created a sense of loss and kept the community in this state in order to keep the struggle alive. Framing and reframing of the emotive grievance narrative was viewed as important because the threat of loss generated the will to fight. Participants were aware that the LTTE strategy was to project the losses to keep the community committed to the fight. The grievance narratives were publicized through the media, which helped to keep the community in a state of significance loss. This ensured a steady stream of recruits.

The grievance narrative was central to recruitment and mobilization. The narrative of suffering was considered to be the ‘central’ factor in creating a sense of loss. The LTTE focused heavily on projecting the grievance narrative to maintain the community in a state of significance loss and legitimize the need for violence, which ensured a steady stream of recruits.

[B] *Significance: Significance Loss Gives Rise to Significance Quest*

The power of emotion within the narrative was found to motivate people to redress grievances. The emotion was built into the narrative creating a sense of loss. This sense of loss was perceived to be vital in motivating people into action. Participants believed that this sense of loss gave rise to the quest for significance.

Participants believed that the sense of significance loss preceded the drive to go in quest of significance. The LTTE strategy was to constantly project grievances to heighten the sense of loss and generate distress. People were not able to remain in this state, which had pushed people to go in quest of significance to redress grievances. The LTTE’s use of electronic and print media, song and drama, and ‘rumor’, were powerful methods of using the sense of loss to motivate people into action. These strategies heightened the sense of urgency for people to ‘do something’. This strategy ensured a distressed and angry community that was willing to support the LTTE, a diaspora that was willing to fund, and members on the ground motivated to fight.

Participants made a distinction between loss and quest. Significance *quest* was viewed as helping to redress grievances rather than significance *loss*. The loss-quest drive was described by participants as originating from a perception of loss, resulting in a need to regain status and dignity. However, some participants felt that it was not only about losing

but that some were self-motivated. The LTTE approach was to project the loss, generate the quest, and provide the means to operationalize the quest.

[C] *Significance: Redressing Grievances and Restore Significance*

Significance quest was perceived of a motivational state that pushed people to take action and redress grievances. The grievance narrative when coupled with the possibility of winning attracted people to join the LTTE. Individuals are attracted to join and fight for a cause that has the potential to win and restore significance. The grievance narratives were powerful enough to make people feel sad and angry, but included elements of how significance can be restored through fighting which provided motivation and hope. The LTTE used loss and quest within these narratives to secure support and generate recruits.

Participants agreed that it is the group that guides, mentors, and leads its members to redress grievances and restore significance. The aim of the group was to regain the lost significance by fighting for a separate state. This was also the compelling narrative used to recruit members. The opportunity to redress grievances and restore significance through a separate state was the motivational focus of training. The LTTE guided and trained its members to take back or restore the power, prestige and status that was perceived to have been lost.

Participants agreed that an armed/violent method was used to restore significance. However, 72.6 percent of participants preferred to use the term ‘armed method’ instead of a ‘violent method’ (Figure 8). Particularly, the Suicide Rehab group preferred to frame their actions in the context of a battle instead of terrorism, leaning towards justifying the need to restore significance. An armed/violent method was seen as the only method that would work. This method was also believed to be a good, useful and effective method that motivated people to pursue victory. The responses of participants reflected the traditional myths

espoused by terrorist groups to justify the use of violence. The core themes are: violence is the only way, we are doing it for the people, we have no choice, we are representing the oppressed, our recruits are committed to the cause and victory will be ours, our enemy knows only the language of violence. These myths are similar to those highlighted by Samuel (Appendix 5B).¹⁶

Within the context of the LTTE, the armed/violent method was perceived as effective when the LTTE got rid of other ethnic communities from what they defined as their border and held territory. The effectiveness of the armed/violent method was self-reinforcing and the end appeared to justify the means used, which was an armed/violent method.

6.3.3 Meaning and Purpose in Life: Personal Significance

The Personal Significance Measure was used to assess meaning and purpose in life. The analysis (Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.) indicated that the former LTTE sample experienced greater personal significance [importance, meaning and purpose in life] during the time of the LTTE. Personal significance was assessed in the *present*, and retrospectively in the *past* (during LTTE control). The difference between all five groups (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora) was of significance ($p = .004$).¹⁷ The Suicide Rehab group, trained to be highly motivated and focused, had the highest personal significance in the past compared to the other four groups (Figures 9 and 10, Chapter 4, section 4.4.2). It was not that those assessed lacked in personal significance now but they perceived greater personal significance in the past. These findings were further confirmed by participant views on personal significance related to meaning and purpose in life (Chapter 5, section 5.2.5).

¹⁶ T.K. Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Pepushtakaan Negara Malaysia, SEARCCT, 2012, pp. 40-53.

¹⁷ See Appendix 4D for descriptive statistics.

[A] *Personal Significance in Those Who Admire the LTTE*

Significant differences in personal significance were found ($p < .001$) between those who ‘admired’ the LTTE, those who saw ‘good and bad’ in the LTTE, and those who ‘rejected’ the LTTE.¹⁸ A test of the linear trend and contrast tests between groups also strengthened the finding that those who admired and valued the LTTE, and those mostly committed experienced greater personal significance during the time of the LTTE. Although those who admired the LTTE were smaller in number, their strength of relationship to personal significance during the time of the LTTE was high.¹⁹

[B] *Personal Significance in Those Who Aspire for a Separate State*

Significant differences in personal significance were found ($p < .001$) between those who wanted a ‘separate state’, those who wanted to ‘live separately’, and those who wanted to ‘live together’ with other ethnicities.²⁰ A test of the linear trend and contrast tests between groups confirmed the finding that those who were committed to the LTTE ideology of a separate state experienced greater personal significance during the time of the LTTE. Although those who aspired for a separate state were smaller in number, their strength of relationship to personal significance in the past, viz. during the time of the LTTE, was higher compared to the other two groups.²¹ A similar trend was noted in those who admired the LTTE and those who aspired for a separate state.

¹⁸ See Appendix 4A, Secondary Hypothesis 1 and 2 - PSIG.

¹⁹ See Appendix 4A, Table 4A.1.

²⁰ See Appendix 4A, Secondary Hypothesis 3 - PSIG.

²¹ See Appendix 4A, Table 4A.2.

[C] *Meaning in Life and Personal Significance*

Greater meaning in life in the *present* was reported by 57 percent of participants. The Family Rehab group did not acknowledge meaning in life in the past. This response pattern is likely to be a result of having led an uncertain life in the past because of having a family member in the LTTE. The Suicide Rehab group reported greater *meaning in life* in the *past* (75%), which indicates that their training and mission gave them meaning in life (Figure 9). The mission of the suicide members was focused attacks, and the mission of the Black Tigers of Prabhakaran's body guard unit was to protect the LTTE chief. In the absence of such a focused and trusted role, these individuals were required to find new meaning in life.

Participants attributed greater meaning in life in the *past* to having a clear pathway in life, being occupied and used in the LTTE system. Greater meaning in life in the *present* was attributed to having a clear sense of direction, working for themselves and not for a group, building a future instead of trying to end life, having less tension in life, and being able to plan and live for the future. Some participants acknowledged that life was harder now because they had to make it on their own, and earn a living, whereas with the LTTE they were provided salary and benefits.

The change in context (no LTTE and no terrorism) was attributed to the change in perspective. Participants felt it was meaningful to fight then because the focus was on sacrificing life for a future country due to the belief that it was not possible to live with Sinhalese and Muslims. However, in the current context, it was meaningless to fight as it was possible to live together.

[D] Purpose in life and Personal Significance

Greater purpose in life in the *present* was reported by 55 percent of participants. However, 75 percent of participants in the Suicide Rehab group reported greater ‘purpose in life’ in the *past* (Figure 10). This response pattern was similar to the percentages on meaning in life (Figure 9). The Suicide Rehab group’s responses indicate that they were trained to be single minded in their mission. They lived within the training base and were mobilized only once for the purpose of suicide. Other suicide cadres were mobilized as body guards, and still others as agents to live among the civilians in the south. In the absence of such a mission, they had to find a new purpose in life, which is unlikely to be as intense as the sense of purpose enjoyed during the time of the LTTE.

[E] Changes in Meaning in Life: The More People Worked With the Group

Most of the participants that worked for the LTTE, were of the view that the more they worked with the LTTE, the meaning in their lives ‘increased’. Between the three LTTE Rehab groups, 92 percent of the Suicide Rehab and 93 percent of the Other Rehab groups reported an increase. The Youth Rehab group however reported a 36 percent decrease in meaning the more they worked with the LTTE (Figure 11). This decrease is likely to reflect the more reactive nature of youth to endure hardships and sustain commitment to the group.

Meaning in life increased with time, when members felt they belonged to the group and were accepted. Participants attributed a decrease in meaning in life the longer they worked with the LTTE, when they experienced a conflict between personal and group values.

[F] *Changes in Purpose in Life: The More People Worked with the Group*

Participants in the Suicide and Other Rehab groups agreed that the more they worked with the LTTE, the purpose in their lives increased. Conversely, only 50 percent of the Youth Rehab group agreed with the other two groups (Figure 12). It is likely that the Youth Rehab group had a purpose in life other than serving the LTTE. They wanted ‘a different life’. It is likely that the younger LTTE members were looking for a greater variation in work and/or were less committed to the LTTE than the more intensely trained Suicide Rehab group and the more mature Other Rehab group.

Participants’ views indicate that the purpose in life increased with time due to those that died fighting. The longer the conflict continued, the more deaths that occurred which further entrenched the members in the organization, giving them a sense of purpose.

Common reasons attributed to meaning and purpose in life were when members were liked, accepted and admired by the LTTE. A decrease in meaning and purpose in life were attributed when the individual or family disliked the LTTE as they disagreed with the LTTE policies and actions.

6.3.4 Redressing Grievances

[A] *The Need for an Organization to Redress Grievances and Restore Significance*

The LTTE Rehab participants ($N = 60$) agreed that the organization mentored and mobilized individuals to redress grievances. Participants also agreed that the organization mentored and mobilized individuals to restore significance. This indicates the importance of the organization in grooming members and mobilizing them to redress grievances and restore significance.

Participants interviewed believed that an organization was needed to redress grievances in a systematic way. The LTTE was projected as an organization that was just, fair, and different to other organizations. Its image was carefully developed to secure people's trust as a credible organization, capable of redressing grievances. Its credibility was heavily tied to the LTTE chief, who was projected as a demi-God. An example often cited was peace-times, when LTTE operations were restricted and the organization did not function overtly. These periods were viewed as detrimental to the LTTE as the focus of the members shifted away from group activity to the individual. Members had engaged in pursuing personal goals, resulting in competition between members, amassing of wealth, goods and infighting. The belief was that without an active organization it was difficult to maintain the group focus on fighting for grievances.

Participants shared their insights on the demise of the LTTE. The perception was that an organization was required if the fight was to continue, and in the absence of an organization, 'there will be no fight'. Participants felt that when the context changes, the people change, and the same organization cannot then use the same [violent] methods. It was also suggested that enforced ceasefire periods or periods of non-violence, when the terrorist group is inactive, also contributed to its members, relaxing and moving away from group needs to focusing on individual needs.

[B] The Need for an Organisation to Network

Participants stated that an organization was needed to recruit members, supporters and sympathizers. The LTTE needed these three groups to function. Members were required to carry out the duties of the organization. The LTTE also employed civilians to work for the organization in a paid capacity. Another vital group was constituted by supporters in civil society that advocated for the LTTE and provided logistical support. Sympathizers were a

non-active support-base the LTTE tapped into when they needed supporters. The supporters and sympathizers were an important source of intelligence gatherers for the LTTE that functioned under the radar of security forces and law enforcement.

6.3.5 Ideology of Violence

[A] A Simple Understandable Ideology to Follow

Participants interviewed stated that the organization used a simple and understandable ideology for all members to follow. Some participants initially objected to the word *ideology*, which they associated with al-Qaeda. Once the concept of ideology was explained, the participants agreed that ideology was what they felt was the mission of the LTTE.²² Participants described having an ideology that was easily understood by people, which helped to gather people together and work towards a single aim of a separate state. Some participants felt that the LTTE was not ideologically driven, but was influenced politically and internationally. Amidst mixed opinions, participants agreed that the three components of ideology, viz. a grievance, an enemy responsible for the grievance and a method to redress the grievance existed in the LTTE strategy.

[B] Components of the Ideology: Grievance - Target - A Violent Method

Participants interviewed agreed that the *ideology* included a grievance component, they described the *target to blame* as the enemy, and the method used as an armed method required to punish the enemy and achieve the goal of a separate state. While there was agreement on the presence of the three components, participants again preferred to use the

²² The concept of ideology was defined as a 'strong belief that an injustice has occurred by a particular country or group, and a group uses a particular method to redress this grievance'. The ideology could have a religious, ethno-nationalist, separatist, or socio-economic basis.

term *armed method* instead of *violence*, hence leaning towards more acceptable terminology. Participants also confirmed that members, supporters and sympathizers were able to connect with and relate to the *ideology*, which was perceived as the function of their mission.

6.3.5 The Organization

The LTTE projected an image of being a just and fair organization, and that the state was deeply unjust and unfair. Attacking the unfair and unjust state helped to legitimize the need to use violence. Significant differences ($p = .004$) in organizational justice were found between the five participant groups.²³ The responses of the LTTE Rehab sample were related to how important it was for them to believe that the LTTE was a just organization. The Civilian sample responses were related to how important organizational justice was within the civilian institutions they worked with.

[A] Importance of Organizational Justice

The response patterns of the three LTTE Rehab groups ($N = 60$) and two Civilian groups ($N = 30$) on the five components of Organizational Justice (ORGJ) indicated that the two samples valued different factors (Figure 13). Procedural Fairness (PF), Distributive Justice (DJ) and Outcome Favorability (OF) were more important for the LTTE Rehab groups. The Quality of Decision Making (QDM) and Quality of Treatment (QT) were more important for the civilian sample. This indicates that the LTTE Rehab sample placed less value on how they were treated but greater value on being fair in the procedures followed, distributing resources fairly and receiving adequate remuneration (praise, rewards, compensation, stipend) for their service. How well individuals were treated or how well decisions were

²³ See Appendix 4D for descriptive statistics of the Organizational Justice Scale.

made, were matters in the hands of the hierarchy, and not in the members control. Members appeared to accept and justify how they were treated and how decisions were made.

[B] *Organizational Justice within the LTTE Rehab Sample*

A comparison between the LTTE Rehab groups indicated that the Suicide Rehab group reported higher scores across all five components of the Organization Justice scale (Figure 13). It was important for the Suicide Rehab group to believe that they were giving their life to a fair and just organization.

The analysis was restricted to only the LTTE Rehab sample ($N = 60$) that worked with the LTTE. This sample was categorized into those who were more or less attached to the LTTE. Significant differences were found ($p < .001$) between those who were ‘Attached’ to the LTTE, those who ‘Acknowledged good and bad’ in the LTTE, and those who ‘Rejected’ the LTTE. Contrast tests were also found to be significant between those who were ‘Attached’ and less attached ($p < .001$) and the pair wise linear trend was significant ($p < .001$).²⁴ These results indicated that within the LTTE sample, those who were more attached to the LTTE expressed greater organizational justice in the LTTE.

The data was tested to identify relationships between different sample categories ($N = 90$) of Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab/Youth Rehab, and the non-LTTE (Family FM and Diaspora) sample. Significant differences ($p = .001$) were found between the Suicide Rehab group, Other/Youth Rehab group and the non-LTTE groups. Significant differences ($p = .032$) were found between Suicide Rehab group and the Other Rehab/Youth Rehab.

These results demonstrate that the most lethal and committed group of the LTTE, the suicide members, considered to be the ‘heart’ of the LTTE, had the highest belief in

²⁴ See Appendix 4B, Secondary hypothesis 5 – ORGJ.

organizational justice compared to members who served in other units. Further analysis isolated those members most attached to the LTTE. They also demonstrated a high level of belief in organizational justice, indicating that this factor was important for deeper commitment.

[C] *Importance of Procedural and Distributive Justice within the Organization*

Distributive Justice (DJ) is about resource judgments. It includes distribution of resources, and remuneration and rewards for actions. Distributive Justice was found to be slightly more important to the three LTTE Rehab groups ($N = 60$) than Procedural Justice. Procedural Justice (PJ) is about the fairness with which procedures are carried out. It includes the quality of decision making and quality of treatment. Procedural Justice was slightly more important for the Family FM and Diaspora groups. This finding confirms that the LTTE Rehab sample was slightly more focused on resource distribution, which is visible and seen overtly, rather than the fairness in procedures, or the manner in which judgments are made.

[D] *Organizational Trust and Hard Work*

Participants of the three LTTE Rehab groups ($N = 55$) agreed that the more they trusted the organization the harder they worked for the organization. ‘We trusted the organization so we worked hard’. The relationship between increased trust leading to greater commitment and willingness to be vulnerable is theoretically well established by several authors.²⁵ The LTTE Rehab sample felt that the more they trusted the organization, the more committed they were and the harder they worked.

²⁵ R.C. Mayer and H.J. Davis, ‘The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment’, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1999, p. 124. See: R.C. Mayer, H.J. Davis and F.D. Schoorman, ‘An integrative model of organizational trust’, *The Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 3, July 1995, pp. 724-726.

[E] *Organizational Trust and Risk Taking*

Participants of the three LTTE rehab groups ($N = 55$) agreed that the more they trusted the LTTE, the more they were willing to take risks for the organization. ‘We trusted the organization so we were willing to take risk’. This finding is backed by established studies by Jason Colquitt and colleagues, where increased trust leads to the employee willingness to be more vulnerable and take greater risk.²⁶ This factor is demonstrated strongly by the Suicide Rehab group that indicated a greater trust, greater commitment and greater willingness to take risks.

[F] *Level of Trust in the Organization and Supervisor*

The LTTE Rehab category ($N = 60$) reported greater trust in the organization and slightly less trust in their supervisors on the organizational justice scale. The Family and Diaspora groups reported almost equal trust in organization and supervisor within a civil setting (Figure 14). Trusting the LTTE was vital for its members, who were expected to sacrifice life on behalf of the organization. Priority was given to projecting the LTTE chief and the organization as just and fair rather than the supervisors, which was reflected in the LTTE Rehab responses.

[G] *Importance of Trust in Mobilizing Members*

Participants of the three LTTE Rehab groups agreed that it was important for members to trust the LTTE if they are to be mobilized for attack. The Suicide Rehab group required the highest level of trust (95%) in the organization to mobilize followed by the Other Rehab

²⁶ J.A. Colquitt, A.B. Scott and J.A. LePine, 'Trust, Trustworthiness, and Trust Propensity: A Meta-Analytic Test of Their Unique Relationships With Risk Taking and Job Performance', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, American Psychological Association, vol. 92, no. 4, 2007, pp. 911-914. See: J.A. Colquitt and J.B. Rodell, 'Justice, Trust, and Trustworthiness: A longitudinal analysis integrating three theoretical perspectives', *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 54, no.6, 2011, p. 1186.

group (82%) and the Youth Rehab (81%) group (Figure 15). When an organization is trusted, its members become more committed and willing to take greater risks.

6.3.6 Images Projected to Different Audiences

[A] Images of Victim, Rescuer, Aggressor

Participants interviewed agreed that the organization projected the image of the ‘victim’, the image of the ‘rescuer’ and the image of the ‘aggressor’. Participants described that these three images were also functions or roles within the organization.

The LTTE projected these images to different groups in the community. The role of the victim was carried to the international community by sympathetic civilians, Tamil diaspora and the LTTE media unit. The message of being the rescuers of the community was taken to the community through the LTTE political wing. Participants stated that the aggression was projected at the enemy and the enemy communities through attacks that caused widespread damage and fear. The three images were projected to generate sympathy, support and fear from the different target audiences.

[B] Identification with the Three Images and Switching between the Three Images

The LTTE Rehab participants ($N = 55$) interviewed believed that members ‘identified with all three roles’. Participants described that these ‘three roles were part of one mission’. Some participants believed that each individual ‘switched between these functions’ as they were the victim, they were the rescuer as well as the aggressor. Other participants clarified that these three roles were the function of different units, and they engaged in these functions to project the victim to the public, the rescuer to the community and the aggressor to the enemy.

Therefore, the victim, rescuer and aggressor were part of one identity and also operationalized as part of one mission.

[C] Maintaining the Conflict by Projecting These Images

Participants interviewed agreed that by projecting these different images to different audiences helped to keep the conflict going. However, 65 percent of the participants referred to this strategy as helping the community to remain ‘engaged’ in the conflict, while 35 percent agreed that it helped to ‘maintain’ the conflict (Figure 16). For the conflict to continue, the LTTE had to keep the public connected to the victim, the community loyal to being rescued and the enemy provoked.

6.3.7 Moral Justification of Violence

[A] Moral Justifications to Conduct Attacks

The LTTE Rehab participants stated that it was not possible to conduct attacks without morally justifying the ‘need’ for the attack. Participants explained that justification was not only provided to the members but to the community also. The actions of members were morally justified by celebrating the success of the attacks, rewarding those who planned and executed the operations, and venerated those who died conducting the attacks. Participants had no doubts about the attacks as they were celebrated and further reinforced by giving the team members ‘a reward for every attack’.

Moral justification of actions before and after the attacks, and the rewards and celebrations post attacks enabled members to engage and continue to engage in attacks. Participants within the LTTE Rehab groups preferred the term ‘attacks’, instead of ‘engage in violence’, even though both result in violence. The moral justification of attacks were not

only intellectual justifications but emotive. In the aftermath of the attacks, actions were celebrated to reinforce the importance of the attack and conclude the episode on a high note. The LTTE replaced any potential guilt or remorse with jubilation.

[B] Moral Justification of Violence to Suppress Norms and a New Morality to Engage in Violence

The LTTE Rehab participants agreed that morally justifying attacks enabled the members to disengage from or suppress their social norms. Participants explained that suppressing social norms was not sufficient, but there had to be ‘re-engagement in LTTE norms’ to be able to justify their actions. Participants described how within the LTTE there was a different moral code, and within this new moral code, it was possible to morally justify attacks. Participants stated that when engaging in LTTE norms, social norms were automatically suppressed. As such, they were encouraged to engage in attacks.

The LTTE moral code sanctioned violence against the enemy. This moral code surpassed previous social, cultural, family and personal norms, and was selectively applied to the enemy defined by the terrorist group. The suppressing of social norms was, therefore, restricted to the identified enemy. The moral justifications for the attacks had helped to suppress social norms and carry out attacks without remorse. Disengaging from social norms and re-engaging in LTTE norms was essential to engage in attacks. This indicated that the members did not abandon their moral values but the new moral code allowed the LTTE to conduct violence selectively.

[C] Moral Justification of Attacks Minimizes the Experience of Distress

The LTTE rehab participants agreed that morally justifying the need for the attacks did not give rise to distress. Participants reported that ‘taking civilian targets would not be possible if it was not seen as morally acceptable’. Civilian targets were ‘justified as retaliation’ or a ‘counter attack’, essential ‘to recover the morale of the fighters’ and ‘divert’ military resources to the affected regions. When engaging in attacks, the members did not experience distress as the attacks were justified as being against the ‘enemy’. In hindsight, some participants stated that it is distressing now but not when they were working with the LTTE. The context as well as ‘social, moral and religious justification’ was essential component to suppress any distress that could arise from civilian attacks. The LTTE was convinced of the need for violence against civilians which did not create any moral conflict or distress.

[D] Reduction in Dissonance/Distress and Celebration of Attacks

The LTTE Rehab participants stated that the successful attacks made them ‘proud and happy’. These attacks were followed by rewards, promotions and more benefits. Distress was not an emotion experienced as a result of a successful attack. However, distress was experienced if the attack was unsuccessful. Morally justifying the need to attack the enemy appeared to liberate the Tamil Tigers from experiencing any distress, and they were free to celebrate the successful attack.

Some attacks, according to the participants, were celebrated with the community, while others were rejoiced within the unit. Clandestine attacks were ‘not claimed’ or celebrated but members of the operation were rewarded. Generally, the ‘unit takes pride in the attack’, and it is written up as a ‘case study for the trainees’ to study. The attacker is projected as a ‘martyr’, and this name given to those that join in the future. Attacks were

also celebrated to reinforce those that conducted the attack and to motivate others to conduct similar attacks.

6.3.8 Building Self-Efficacy

[A] Self-Efficacy to Sustain and Mobilize Members

The LTTE focused on developing confidence in their members' ability to mobilize for attacks. The New Generalized Self-efficacy scale (NGSE) was used to assess the level of efficacy in the past and present. Significant differences were found between the five participant groups ($p < .05$).²⁷ The Suicide Rehab group, heavily trained to carry out their attacks to perfection, presented the highest level of self-efficacy in the past compared to the other four groups. The differences were not due to low efficacy in the present but due to high efficacy received from the LTTE (Appendix 4C).²⁸

[B] Self-Efficacy in Those Who Admired the LTTE

Significant differences in self-efficacy ($p < .001$) were found between those who 'admired' the LTTE, those who saw 'good and bad' in the LTTE, and those who 'rejected' the LTTE. A test of the linear trend ($p = 0.10$, $p < .001$) and contrast tests ($p < .001$) between groups was found to be significant. These findings confirmed that those who admired and valued the LTTE, experienced greater self-efficacy in the past during the time of the LTTE.

These findings were further confirmed by looking at self-efficacy in the past and present separately. There were no differences between groups ($p = .30$, $\eta^2 = .03$), but there were differences in the past ($p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .36$). This indicated that the aspect that gave the

²⁷ See Appendix 4C, Secondary Hypothesis 5 - NGSE.

²⁸ See Appendix 4C – Descriptive Statistics - NGSE

members greater efficacy was the LTTE. The category of individuals who admired the LTTE felt greater efficacy by virtue of being connected to the LTTE.

[C] Self-Efficacy Developed Through Training

The LTTE Rehab participants ($N = 55$) stated that skills training helped to develop self-efficacy. The Suicide Rehab group attributed the highest percentage (87.9%) to self-efficacy development through skills training, while the Other Rehab (73.5%) and Youth Rehab (74%) allocate similar percentages (Figure 17).

[D] Confidence in Specific Work versus General Work

The LTTE Rehab participants ($N = 55$) were more confident doing their ‘specific’ allocated duties in relation to the LTTE than the general work. The Family FM and Diaspora groups, however, were almost equally confident with both ‘specific’ and ‘general’ work. The LTTE appeared to groom its members to develop skills in their specific tasks, while the civilian work experience was one of receiving training to develop overall capacity. The skills training appeared to be strictly compartmentalized with individuals trained for specific tasks and developing efficacy within those tasks (see Chapter 4, section 4.4.7).

The LTTE appeared to focus on grooming its members to develop ‘task specific skills’, and lock them into serving the group. It is likely that their lack of confidence in other areas may have kept them within the collective and within their familiar ambit of work within the LTTE.

[E] Confidence in Work versus General Life

The LTTE Rehab groups were most confident in their assigned tasks compared to general living life and socializing. The experience of the Family FM and Diaspora groups that had worked with a range of charities and volunteer programs were somewhat different. Their work experience appeared to promote both work specific confidence as well as interpersonal engagement and socializing skills. The Family FM (60%) and Diaspora (87%) reported most confidence in both ‘Specialized’ work and in ‘Living Life-Socializing’ (Figure 18). The contrast between the two groups may have been contingent on the exposure they received in the community. Civilians focused on a range of activities while the LTTE had its sights set on securing a separate state.

[F] Skills Training and Confidence to Mobilize

The LTTE Rehab participants agreed that the confidence to mobilize was developed by the organization through skills training. Percentage of importance attributed to skills training that developed confidence to mobilize was highest in Suicide Rehab (97%), followed by Other Rehab (89%) and Youth Rehab (87.5%). While confidence in skills training was the most vital component to mobilize, team confidence and organizational confidence also contributed to their confidence to mobilize (Figure 19).

6.4 The Process of Radicalization to Mobilization

Radicalization is a process that involves several dynamic components. The contribution of seven such components was identified and tested in this study. Former members of the LTTE, their family members and diaspora members provided invaluable insights into the process of grooming a civilian into a terrorist. Based on the findings of this study, a flexible model is developed to reflect the components involved in the process of radicalization.

6.4.1 Recruitment Phase

The study attempts to capture the process of radicalization that occurs in the recruitment phase (Figure 20). Emotive grievance narratives contribute to the community experiencing a loss of significance. Loss of significance is an unpleasant state, which arouses the quest for significance, and seeks to redress grievances. People living within such a context are vulnerable to recruitment but not able to mobilize effectively. An organization is needed to recruit and systematically mobilize the people.

When an organization emerges to support the aggrieved community to redress grievances and restore the lost significance, the community is likely to produce recruits. Not all those who are motivated would become members of the organization. The community is likely to generate sympathizers, supporters, lone wolves and members. The study identifies this phase as the recruitment phase.




Figure 20. Radicalization components involved in the recruitment phase.

6.4.2 Sustaining the Membership to Mobilize

To sustain the recruit within the terrorist organization, involves ongoing radicalization (Figure 21). A grievance narrative and the quest for significance alone is insufficient to mobilize. The organization provides its members with an ideology and a role to redress grievances and regain lost significance. The ideology outlines the current grievances, an enemy to target and a method to redress the grievance. Based on the ideology, some groups justify the killing of civilians and graduate into becoming terrorist groups. Other groups that emerge to redress grievances may engage in targeted political killings and destructive and non-destructive activities, which are not the focus of this study.

The organization that promotes an ideology of violence assigns a specific role to its members. The members identify with the image of being the aggrieved victim to the public, of being a savior or rescuer to the community and being an aggressor or persecutor to be feared by the government and the community it represents.

The organization gradually prepares its members for mobilization. The organization continues to frame and reframe the grievance narrative, which begins to evolve and encompass an increasing number of new grievances. The members are kept connected and motivated by the narratives of grievance directly by witnessing the suffering and indirectly by being exposed to stories of injustice. Actual or perceived grievances continue to create a sense of significance loss and arouses the quest for significance. This process helps to motivate the members for mobilization. However, the members must be able to morally justify the attack in order to conduct it.

The organization provides, historical, religious, social, economic and political justifications for attacks. Members are psychologically prepared to morally justify attacks on civilian targets, to punish the perceived enemy, the enemy community and its supporters, to redress grievances. Being morally prepared, however, is insufficient for a member to

conduct an attack. The member has to be trained to develop confidence and self-efficacy in being able to conduct a successful attack. Moral justifications and developing self-efficacy through training are two vital components in mobilizing members for attacks.

A further aspect is that the organization is perceived to be just and fair. Individuals join terrorist groups with the belief that the state is unjust and unfair. Terrorist propaganda focus on projecting the organization as being pure in its mission, whereas the state is portrayed as corrupt and unjust. The organization provides proxy efficacy and social cohesion to the collective. Finally, for members to conduct attacks and sacrifice their lives, they need to believe that the organization is trustworthy. This allows members to take risks and commit themselves to the group.




Figure 21. Radicalization components within the sustaining and mobilizing phase.

6.4.3 Grooming a Civilian into a Terrorist

The model proposed below contains the components found to be essential in grooming a civilian into a terrorist in this study (Figure 22). This model is not exhaustive but contains aspects identified and tested within the scope of this study. While the model appears linear, it contains feedback loops as the process of radicalization is ongoing. The organization plays a pivotal role in maintaining the community in a state of significance loss and arousal, motivates its members to engage in a violent ideology, supports the role of the member, provides moral justification for violence and continues to train its members to develop self-efficacy while projecting the organization as just, fair and trustworthy. The organization was found to perpetuate the conflict in order to achieve its goals. The LTTE conducted 1,188 terrorist attacks from 1975-2009. However, in the absence of the LTTE since May 2009, Sri Lanka has not experienced any terrorist attacks.




Figure 22. Process of radicalization from recruitment to mobilization.

6.5 Conclusion

Over the years, the Tamil community was exposed to radicalization through the LTTE media, indoctrination in schools, on the streets, through video clips, songs, street drama and rumor. The community was also exposed to three decades of hardship during the fighting between the LTTE and government troops. The presence of the LTTE within the community, grievance narratives and the propaganda in the absence of a counter narrative became a reality accepted by the community. Within this context, the recruitment drive flourished. Conflicts within family settings, social pressures, political conflict, and armed fighting prepared the youth to reach out to and follow role models of power and success. The LTTE strategy was to study the vulnerabilities of individuals and the community, study the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, study its allies and funders, and emerge as the only group to actualize its aim of a separate state.

The community was a vital resource base that provided a steady flow of recruits to fight on the ground. Funding was an important life line that was accessed through the diaspora. The most important support bases were the local and international community. In this backdrop, the LTTE invested much effort in radicalizing the community to be able to recruit members, supporters and sympathizers. The recruits were then groomed into terrorism.

The above model incorporates several features identified in this case study of the LTTE as contributing to the process of radicalization towards violence. It is a dynamic model that attempts to demonstrate an ongoing process with feedback loops of radicalization into violence. It is a model that will also allow interventions to be targeted at each level to disrupt the process of radicalization.

6.6 Limitations of the Study

The findings of this study are limited to the LTTE. The context within which the LTTE operated is unique to the Sri Lankan geo-political and ethno-nationalist context. While there are several commonalities between the LTTE and other terrorist groups as identified in Chapter 1, any generalizations of the findings in this study need to be made with caution.

The concepts, theories and models explored in this study (Chapter 2) to test the radicalization process (Chapter 3) used by the LTTE, were found to be valid (Chapters 4 and 5). However, the generalizability of these results to other terrorist groups can only be verified through research carried out with terrorist populations in those countries.

With the exception of the Personal Significance Measure, the Organizational Justice Scale, New Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and the Satisfaction with Life Scale have not been previously used with terrorist populations. These scales were used with the former members of the LTTE and a comparative sample in the local Tamil community and the Tamil diaspora community, within this study for the first time. The results obtained, therefore, can be compared to other terrorist populations in other countries if the same scales are administered.

A noteworthy limitation is that none of the psychometric scales used have been validated for the Sri Lankan population. Some of these scales have been used in clinical contexts within Sri Lanka, however they are not formally validated for the terrorist populations within the country.

Although the study was designed to include a gender balance, fewer females participated in the study. Therefore, gender based differences could not be picked up within the study due to the small sample size. Similarly, when analyses were conducted the sample

sizes within some of the categories were small. As such, caution had to be exercised when interpreting this data to ensure that the study does not overgeneralize the findings.

While being cognizant of the limitations of this study, some of the key findings may be applicable to terrorist groups in other countries, as the study focused on tapping into universal patterns of human thinking and behavior.

*‘In the final analysis...no longer asking why something happened, but asking how we will respond, what we intend to do now that it happened’.*¹

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The LTTE evolved into a formidable terrorist group that developed an expertise in suicide terrorism until the demise of its leader, Prabhakaran on 19 May 2009. The case study of the Tamil Tigers provide unique insights into the methods used by a terrorist group to indoctrinate, recruit, sustain and mobilize its members, supporters and sympathizers. Studying the methods used by the LTTE to groom, sustain and mobilize its members, provide direction on how to prevent, counter and manage violent extremists from preying on vulnerable communities. In addition, details related to the process of radicalization from the perspective of the former LTTE members, their families and the diaspora is likely to help build safer and more resilient communities. These insights also provide information regarding potential intervention to reverse the process of radicalization and prevent terrorism.

Although the LTTE’s capability to use armed violence within Sri Lanka was neutralized in May 2009, its ideological roots and financial networks remain intact overseas. Internationally, 16 LTTE proxy groups that use LTTE related symbols and rhetoric have emerged.² For instance, in the case of al-Qaeda, with the demise of Osama Bin Laden,

¹ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), was a philosopher, theologian, paleontologist and geologist from Orcines, France, Betterworld, [website], n.d., <http://www.betterworld.net/heroes/pages-t/teilhard-quotes.htm>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

² Gazette notification banning the LTTE fronts. See: Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka – Extraordinary, ‘Government Notification 1854_41’, Friday March 21, 2014, http://colombogazette.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1854_41-E.pdf, (accessed 18 February 2017). List of Designated persons, groups and entities under paragraph 4(2) of the United Nations Regulations No. 1 of 2012. See: Research and Monitoring Division, ‘Geneva’s Human Rights Chameleons: Who are they? How do they operate?’, February 2014, pp. 24-29.

emerged Daesh (or the Islamic State). As such, the potential for ideological roots of terrorist groups to spread after the demise of its leaders, warrants closer scrutiny in terms of the multifaceted factors that contribute to the making and sustenance of terrorists.

The LTTE's capability to justify violence, death and destruction in the minds of ordinary people was indeed alarming. In addition, the LTTE depended heavily on its community for recruits, support and funding. The grievance narrative and the ideology was central to sustain the support of the community. Therefore, the community remains a vital target of intervention in the upstream prevention of terrorism.

7.1 Key Findings

The study identified seven components involved in the radicalization of the LTTE (Figure 1). Each of these seven components, which include the narrative, significance, ideology, organization, images projected, moral justifications and self-efficacy, were hypothesized to be involved in the radicalization of civilians into terrorism. The hypotheses were then tested through a survey conducted with 90 participants that comprised of rehabilitated members of the LTTE suicide units, other units, former child combatants, their family members and members of the Tamil diaspora. Participants in the study identified several key aspects that are manipulated (Figure 22), by the terrorist group during the recruitment, sustenance and mobilization phases (Figure 23), when grooming of a terrorist.

7.1.1 Grievance Narrative

A long-term grievance narrative was identified as a foundational component in the formation of the LTTE. This foundational narrative was the launching pad used to justify the need for the LTTE to redress grievances. However, in order to recruit individuals, a powerful emotive

grievance narrative was essential. The emotive grievance narrative was packaged in a way to appeal to people at different levels, generating a passion and desire to join the LTTE. These findings supported the hypothesis, that *a powerful emotional grievance narrative is an essential component in recruitment of terrorists; this narrative continues to evolve and is reframed throughout the lifespan of the terrorist within the movement.*

The findings identified that while the foundational narrative was a long term grievance narrative, for recruitment, the narrative had to be powerful and emotive. Therefore the foundational narrative had to be framed as powerful and emotive in the recruitment drive. The LTTE grievance narratives continued to evolve from the foundational stage, with increased grievances added on as the conflict progressed and became protracted.

7.1.2 Significance Loss and Quest

When the narrative was long-term and grievances projected emotively, people experienced a loss of significance. This significance loss was a negative emotional state within which individuals did not wish to remain, and instead desired change. The LTTE continued to renew the grievances by framing and reframing the narratives. Framing and reframing the narratives helped to maintain the community in a state of significance loss, which subsequently generated the quest for significance. The LTTE became indispensable in perpetuating this cycle of grievances and catering to the evolving and expanding narratives of grievance. When the narrative of loss was constantly framed and reframed, it gave rise to the arousal of the quest for significance, which was intended to restore the lost significance.

In this regard, the potential to alleviate the loss carried a powerful restorative appeal. These findings supported the hypothesis that, *framing and reframing the grievance narrative across the years maintains the community in a state of significance loss, which arouses the*

quest for significance. The terrorist group guides its members to restore significance through the group's method of choice - violence.

The LTTE emerged as the sole representative of the Tamil community to alleviate this negative state, which in turn resonated with the people. The LTTE became the vehicle that helped to channel the loss of significance and the resulting drive to go in quest of significance by engaging in violence. The presence of the LTTE provided the opportunity for civilians to work with a group to redress these grievances, instead of remaining in a state of loss. The LTTE had guided its members to use a violent method to restore significance and the vulnerable community experiencing this aggrieved state became a tool that was manipulated by the group.

7.1.3 Organization and Ideology

A formal organization or a group was needed to network and bring the disheartened, unhappy, angry community together. However, the organization continued to package and promote the grievance narrative and loss of significance, keeping the community in a state of loss and conflict. As such, the LTTE became the machine that nurtured the sense of loss and facilitated the quest for significance. The organization was needed to manage the recruitment drive, and sustain the membership long enough for further radicalization, training and mobilization towards violence.

The group needed an ideology that communicated the grievances, identified the enemy responsible for those grievances and an effective method to punish the enemy, while redressing the grievances, in order to recruit, sustain and mobilize its membership base. A long term emotive grievance narrative was not sufficient to retain members within the terrorist group. An ideology was needed to bind the members together long enough to continue their indoctrination, training and mobilization. This ideology resonated with the

people as it was clear and easily understood. The ideology was perceived as the mission that communicated the problems and means of dealing with them. These findings supported the hypothesis that *the organization provides its recruits and members with a simple ideology they can identify with and work towards. This includes a grievance, an identified target responsible for the grievance, and a violent method to redress the grievance.*

7.1.4 The Image Projected to Sustain Membership

For a terrorist group to survive, it has to expand and reach to a wide audience both locally and globally. The grievance narratives, loss of significance, an organization and an ideology were essential components in the process of radicalization of civilians, but these factors were not sufficient to sustain the terrorist group. The LTTE projected an image of victimization to gain sympathy and support from the wider public. The LTTE also portrayed itself as the rescuer and protector of the community. In addition, the group depicted itself as the aggressor and persecutor of the enemy. These images appealed to different audiences and allowed the LTTE to secure members, supporters, advocates and funders.

These images were also perceived differently depending on the varied roles the different members played within the terrorist group. The LTTE members perceived themselves as victims of an unfair system that justified their engagement in violence. The LTTE members regarded themselves as the rescuers of the community, who were fighting on behalf of the community. The group also considered their efforts as teaching the enemy a lesson by acting as aggressors and persecutors on behalf of its representatives (civilians) and its allies (supporters). The LTTE members had shifted between these three roles depending on their audience. However, when the victim became the persecutor in order to seek revenge, the avenger or persecutor became the rescuer to save the community, and the rescuer or savior projected the image of being the victim to gain sympathy. This

interchangeability managed to keep the conflict alive (maintained) in the absence of a resolution.

Switching between these roles was dysfunctional in resolving the conflict, but benefited the LTTE in two ways: 1) the images projected helped to secure support from the community, created a support base, generated recruits to attack the enemy, and kept community engaged while the enemy remained fearful; 2) the three roles helped to motivate the members, whilst identifying with the aggrieved victims, perceiving the self as a savior of the community, and regarding the self as a fighter to be feared. These findings support the hypothesis that *the organization projects the image of the Victim, the Rescuer and the Aggressor to different audiences. The members identify with all three aspects and switch between these roles, thereby sustaining the conflict.*

7.1.5 Developing Personal Significance through Meaning and Purpose in Life

Personal significance was assessed at the level of meaning and purpose in life and the LTTE provided meaning and purpose to its members. This aspect was seen in those individuals who admired the LTTE and experienced greater meaning and purpose in life in the past [during the LTTE], while those who rejected the LTTE had found greater meaning and purpose in life in the present [after the LTTE was defeated]. The greater the admiration and connectedness to the LTTE, the more meaning and purpose in life was experienced while the LTTE was active. This finding indicates that the former LTTE members did not feel less significant now, but that they felt more significant during the time of the LTTE. Thus, it becomes evident that personal significance of those who admired the LTTE was tied to the organization.

The study found that *greater personal significance was observed in the past in those who admired the LTTE, those more attached to the LTTE and those who aspired for a*

separate state. The study also found that *the more one works with the group that the meaning and purpose in life increased*. These findings are useful when planning rehabilitation and reintegration programs. The beneficiaries of these programs need to be supported in order to ensure that they find meaning and purpose in life within the community, and not from an organization that justifies violence. As such, therapeutic work that includes exposing the organization's manipulation of the community, exploring factors that contributed to personal significance within the organization and supporting beneficiaries to develop personal significance through prosocial activity is vital and likely to be transformative.

7.1.6 Moral Justifications and Social Norms

Individuals who were emotively and ideologically motivated had joined the LTTE. However, to mobilize and carry out attacks, it was vital for the Tamil Tigers to morally justify the need to use violence and suppress social norms to encourage its members to act. Hence, the LTTE groomed its members to accept the norms of the group and sought to preach violence as a morally justified method to redress grievances. This allowed the Tamil Tigers to disengage from acceptable social norms and engage in acts of violence without the accompanying cognitive distress.

In addition, morally justifying attacks helped to further suppress social norms, which liberated the LTTE members from any accompanying distress. This also allowed the LTTE members to experience the attacks as an achievement that should be celebrated. In certain cases, members experienced distress if the attack was not successful, which was then seen as a personal failure. Celebrating attacks, rewarding attacks, and the making of martyrs helped the Tamil Tigers to remove any doubts regarding their actions and to further justify attacks as an accepted *modus operandi* of the LTTE. It was a method that was morally sanctioned by the LTTE, which perceived violence as the sole morally justifiable method to

redress grievances. These findings support the hypothesis that *moral justification of violence is essential to suppress norms of violence in order to engage in violent activities. Morally justifying attacks on civilians reduces the cognitive dissonance and frees the member to celebrate the attacks.*

7.1.7 Training to Develop Self-Efficacy and Confidence

Although the recruits are ideologically motivated and able to morally justify attacks, they require training to develop confidence in their skills to conduct these attacks. The LTTE provided its members with confidence and skills through an elaborate training mechanism. These methods included direct and indirect processes of teaching and training. Direct learning methods comprised attending classes, physical training, practice within model compounds, and direct experience in the battlefield. In addition, indirect or vicarious learning methods included studying past successful attacks, martyrs, watching movies of attacks, modelling seniors, and exposure to videogames to increase response speed and processing.

Moreover, the LTTE provided its members with necessary training to develop skills and confidence in carrying out task specific work rather than general work. The terrorist group helped its members to develop efficacy in task specific activity, instead of focusing on general life and the process of socialization. In comparison, the civilian sample (family and diaspora members) demonstrated self-efficacy in general and specific duties at similar levels. The civilian sample that worked with civil institutions, felt efficacious in their work, as well as with their daily life and socializing. The LTTE was highly focused in grooming its members to develop specific skills that helped to enhance the agenda of the group as opposed to personal development.

Following the end of terrorism in Sri Lanka, the LTTE members undergoing rehabilitation demonstrated a remarkable lack of confidence and efficacy in socializing with other ethnic groups. They also exhibited difficulty with general living, such as engaging in a regular job to earn money and raise the family, visiting friends, relatives, and places of interest. The former LTTE members describe a sense of discomfort in socializing as their entire life was spent with the organization, time was spent with the members, and the places of interest were targets of the group. These findings support the hypothesis that *the organization grooms its members to develop task specific self-efficacy through training. The training involves both direct learning and vicarious learning.*

7.1.8 Perception of Organization as Just and Fair

The LTTE was considered to be procedurally just and distributively fair by those interviewed in this study. It was important for the members and supporters to believe their organization was just and fair, thereby justifying the need to work for and support the organization. The human desire to believe they are right, doing the right thing and feel righteous was exploited by the LTTE. The group crafted the ideology and provided the moral justifications to operationalize the ideology of violence. Within this new moral framework, the LTTE chief and unit leaders and supervisors were projected as just and fair. To sustain the membership, it was paramount that the LTTE was projected as just and fair, while the state was considered unjust and unfair. This was necessary because the LTTE members needed to feel that they were working for a credible and trustworthy organization to achieve a noble mission.

The LTTE members were mostly concerned with procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and outcome favorability. The opposite trend was seen with the diaspora members and their families, with greater emphasis on the quality of treatment and quality of decision making. The LTTE members appeared to be more concerned with overt fairness regarding

how things are done, in a visible and comparable manner to others, rather than how decisions were made within the organization or how individuals were treated. As such, LTTE members appeared to accept poor treatment, and were not as concerned about how decisions were made, as long as the procedure was fair and resources were distributed fairly.

The power of the organization over its members was critical in sustaining their loyalty. The LTTE members trusted the organization more than their supervisors, while the civilian sample trusted the civilian organizations they worked for and their supervisors at the same level. In this case, believing that the organization, leaders, supervisors were just and fair was vital in trusting the organization. The more the LTTE members trusted the organization, the higher was the willingness to take risks. The LTTE groomed its members to a level where they trusted the organization and leaders sufficiently to conduct suicide attacks. These members believed in the LTTE ideology, its leaders and supervisors, and sought their admiration and approval to an extent where the members were willing to sacrifice their lives to kill civilians. Particularly, the Tamil Tigers worked with dedication to actualize the agenda of the LTTE chief, who functioned like a leader of a cult, exercising control over its members. These findings support the hypothesis that the *terrorist organization becomes a trusted vehicle that mentors and mobilizes the members to redress grievances and restore significance. The members must believe that the organization is procedurally just and distributively fair.*

The LTTE had managed to build an image of being powerful and indomitable in the mind of the individual and community. In order to delegitimize this need for violence, powerful and strategic counter messages and counter narratives are required. Counter radicalization strategies assist in creating doubt and buffering the community against believing that violence and terror is the legitimate way forward. In this sense, the strategies used by the LTTE and its leaders to groom civilians into terrorism, can be used to reverse the process.

The diagram below identifies the factors involved in each phase of the radicalization process. There is some overlap that exists in components between the recruitment, sustenance and mobilization phases. Figure 23 below reflects common themes that run through all the stages. Each of these components are necessary during the process of radicalization. However, each component alone is insufficient to mobilize a member for attack. It is a combination of multiple factors that contribute to develop and prepare the members for attacks.




Figure 23. Factors involved in each phase of the radicalization process.

7.2 Recommendations to Prevent Radicalization

7.2.1 Community Aware of the Emotive Methods Used

Grievances are a natural part of any religious or ethnic community and the state must address the actual and perceived grievances to prevent them from being used to justify violence. Moreover, the community also needs to be supported to address their grievances in a non-violent manner. The state media must counter the ‘emotive’ aspect of the grievance narrative, geared to sway feelings, while preventing actual incidences that feed the emotive narrative. In addition, the grievance narrative is central in securing recruits and a support base. Hence, the manner in which terrorist groups manipulate the grievance narrative, frame and reframe these narratives to keep the community in a state of significance loss needs to be exposed to the public.

7.2.2 Expose the Manipulation of Grievances

Long term grievances contribute to the loss of significance and a negative emotional state that gradually transforms into an actionable quest for significance. Powerful personalities and groups emerge to cater to this need, and manipulate the quest for significance. As such, the state should also address the long-term grievances by empowering non-manipulative personalities to take the lead in advocating for the needs of the community.

7.2.3 Address Grievances and Prevent the Misuse of Such Grievances

Individuals experiencing loss of significance and lacking meaning and purpose in life are readily drawn to individuals, groups and ideologies that lead them to redress grievances and restore significance. The state should also work towards addressing these grievances directly by engaging the community and its leaders, and preventing individuals and groups from manipulating vulnerable communities and trapping them into violent radical ideologies.

7.2.4 Expose Flaws in the Radical Ideology

The state should focus on dismantling organizations that propagate and support violent radical ideologies and empower community leaders to identify potential risks. Moreover, it is necessary to build community resilience and to safeguard the community as part of the civil society mechanism. The state and media should relentlessly highlight the myths and cognitive distortions propagated by the terrorist group, and expose its violent radical ideology that is geared towards division of the community.

7.2.5 Highlight Attempts to Mislead Community

The state specifically needs to prevent violent radical organizations from emerging to hijack the grievances of the community and instead, empower community leaders to redress the grievances. Moreover, other steps that are critical include making the community aware of the organization or group's actions in attempting to crusade on behalf of the community, projecting vulnerability and victimhood while exploiting grievances, and misleading the community to secure support for the group. It is also pertinent to engage members of the community to lead in rejecting the violent radical group's actions as a violation of social, cultural and religious norms.

7.2.6 Expose Destruction of Society and Prevent Further Entrenchment

The state needs to expose the manipulative techniques used by the group to recruit and retain individuals. In addition, it is vital to empower community leaders, teachers and parents, to actively engage in countering the recruitment drive, and protecting their children and the youth. Also, the media should continue to expose the manipulation by the terrorist group and the negative outcomes of joining any such groups. It also remains integral to highlight the legal implications of being associated with such groups and the destruction caused by

violence. Moreover, the state should construct narratives that expose the duplicity of such groups and their leaders. It has been established that long-term conflicts and grievances give greater reason for the youth to join such groups and for those who identify with that community to support and fund the terrorist group. Through a comprehensive strategy, the state should also address the grievances of its people, counter the ideology of such groups and prevent an existing conflict from becoming protracted.

7.2.7 Counter the Ideology and Expose Recruitment Methods

The state needs to make the people aware of the various strategies used by the terrorist group to recruit and maintain the conflict. It should also counter the violent radical ideology and propaganda with facts. In this regard, there is a need for a range of creative, emotive and powerful messages to counter the terrorist's propaganda. Carefully crafted counter narratives that appeal to the youth and provide the required vocabulary to counter the recruitment drive should be made available to youth and families. The state should also gear efforts towards preventing young people from joining such groups by providing alternative ways of thinking about the conflict, redressing grievances and alternate meaning and significance. Therefore, it is critical for the state to support and invest in critical thinking skills, problem solving skills, diversity and peace building within schools, and build cognitive and emotional resilience in the next generation.

7.2.8 Erode Group's Power to Give Meaning and Purpose

The state should focus on reducing the attraction and commitment to such groups by consistently and powerfully exposing the duplicity, negativity and harm caused to the community by such individuals and groups that propagate violence. Further, in order to erode the group's power to provide meaning and significance to its members, the state institutions

need to ensure provision of leadership training and gear policies towards strengthening families. In addition, it is imperative to dismantle violent groups speedily to prevent vulnerable individuals from getting attracted to these groups, and to prevent those that have joined the group from becoming further entrenched in such groups.

7.2.9 Skill Development to Advantage of Group

The state should prioritize disrupting and dismantling training bases that generate opportunities for individuals to receive terrorist training. Prevent access to propaganda and curb civilian access to terrorist information and skills training via the internet. There is a need to highlight the fact that the terrorist group is focused on making use of and enhancing specific skills that help to further the terrorist agenda alone and not the future of the person. The state then needs to back this narrative with facts by publishing stories and profiles of individuals who are discarded, punished, killed, or tortured by the terrorist group, when the member was not deemed to be of benefit to the organization.

7.2.10 Suppression of Social Norms

The state should rely on exposing how terrorist groups replace social, cultural, family norms with values that justify violence. To achieve this, the state should publish accounts of the terrorist group manipulating these established norms in order to exploit individuals to conduct and plan attacks. Moreover, the state needs to highlight cases where the terrorist group has required its members to attack their family and friends in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the group.

It is imperative to expose the fact that terrorist groups provide a moral boost to its members by rewarding violence in order make it seem legitimate to the members. As such,

young people may often feel that they make a valuable and conscious choice to join a terrorist group. Thus, it is essential that powerful, reflective and insightful interviews of former terrorists be publicized to communicate that young people are groomed to enter a role and a path that is already defined by the terrorist group. This narrative could be used to make joining such groups unattractive for impulsive young people who dislike being controlled or dominated.

7.2.11 Organizational Injustice and Unfairness

The state needs to make public the incidences of unfairness and injustices within the terrorist group on a daily basis. To capitalize on this narrative, the state should acquire testimonies and provide airtime to charismatic personalities and former members that expose the terrorist group's procedural and distributive injustices.

In addition, it is integral to highlight how the terrorist group helps members to accept poor treatment as long as the organization is projected to be procedurally and distributively fair. This could be done by publicizing the transgressions, wrong doings, injustices and duplicity of the terrorist group, its leaders and members, through the mass media and social media domain. The testimonies of former members are a powerful deterrent for youth attracted to such groups.

7.2.12 Manipulation of Trust

The state should direct its attention towards the terrorist organization's manipulation of its members' trust to mobilize individuals to take maximum risk and sacrifice their lives. In this regard, the state could consider tapping into narratives or case studies on how members were mobilized by boosting their morale as saviors and manipulating their trust in the

organization. In addition, publicizing the misdemeanors and incidences related to the organization, and its leaders and members will allow the state to ensure an erosion of trust towards the group. This is particularly important because trust in the organization is central in recruiting and mobilizing its members. When the credibility and trust in the organization and its leaders are damaged, the terrorist group loses its power to recruit.

Terrorist groups use several push and pull factors to draw recruits to its fold. Counter radicalization methods that carefully study the strategies used by terrorist groups, and reverse them can assist in the prevention of uphill radicalization and recruitment. De-radicalization attempts involve downhill rehabilitation, to help former terrorists reintegrate (Chapter 9, section 9.3).

7.3 Recommendations for Deradicalization

The recommendations in this section are based on strategies used to de-radicalize the former members of the LTTE within Sri Lanka's rehabilitation program. The study involved a sample of 60 former LTTE members that participated in the rehabilitation process. When a detainee enters the rehabilitation program, he or she is referred to as a 'beneficiary' of the program. The individual is not referred to as a detainee or terrorist as the aim of rehabilitation is to reintegrate the individual into a society to eventually become a productive member of the community.

7.3.1 The Approach

Counter terrorism initiatives need to engage in the "battlefield of the mind". Staff working within rehabilitation programs need to use strategies to overcome resistance that will help the beneficiaries of the program open their mind and be willing to explore alternative

thinking. The programs need to use dissonance to highlight what the individual had and could have in the future, and what he or she would need to change in the present. Moreover, it is apt to make use of the Socratic method of questioning that will help the beneficiary question, doubt and then transform from within.

Terrorist organizations maintain that their leaders and their groups are procedurally and distributively fair, whereas the state is not. Such programs should then challenge these perceptions factually in the public domain and at an individual level when appropriate. The authorities should also expose the terrorist group's manipulation of the grievance narratives that kept people in a state of significance loss and facilitated their recruitment. There is also a need to challenge the ideology of using violence to redress grievances. The state should also focus on diversity and peacebuilding to help expand thinking on living in harmony with all ethnic communities and resolving conflicts peacefully while celebrating the differences. The state needs to capitalize on the role and function of such groups in projecting the image of the victim, the rescuer and aggressor to achieve different objectives from different audiences. Moreover, the state should highlight the focus of training being restricted to developing skills only in areas of use to the terrorist group and not the individual. It should also shed light on the lack of care for the individual by the terrorist group as they neglect general life and interactions related training.

The state should expose the manner in which the member's self-efficacy was tied to their skills within the terrorist group and not to living skills in the broader society. It should also explore how the terrorist group facilitated the moral justification of violence, celebrating and rewarding violence that enabled their members to be utilized to destroy another.

Communities exposed to radicalization, need to be inoculated against re-radicalization through active community engagement programs. These programs need to highlight the manipulative strategies used by the terrorist group, and the impact on

community due to terrorism. As terrorist groups are vanquished and dismantled, new groups may tend to emerge. In this case, it is essential not to remove focus on conventional terrorist groups when addressing new and emerging threats.

7.3.2 The State

It is the duty of the state to project terrorism as a criminal activity, while identifying the culprit as a ‘Terrorist Criminal’ to take away the glory of being a ‘martyr’. The state should also reduce the attraction of vulnerable youth to terrorism, by projecting terrorist acts as ‘criminal acts’. In addition, it is necessary to highlight the criminal activities of the terrorist group which involves drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, brewing of illicit alcohol, money laundering, fraud, illegal businesses, intimidation, funding criminal networks and underworld activities. By exposing the ‘martyr’ as a common criminal and the group’s criminal network, it reduces the purity of the terrorist mission that attracts vulnerable youth. Moreover, broadcasting discussions led by the community the terrorists claim to protect can highlight the impact of violence on ordinary men, women and children from an emotive perspective.

7.3.3 The Family

It is pertinent for the state to access and engage with families that are isolated from mainstream communities and vulnerable to recruitment. In addition, the state should involve the families in the rehabilitation process as the beneficiary will return to the family. It remains integral to also strengthen the bonds between beneficiary and the family to prevent the pull by peers when beneficiary returns to the community. Moreover, the state should also highlight the psychosocial impact of terrorism on the spouse, children, and community.

Another step that could be taken relates to strengthening the role of the beneficiary within the family unit. Emphasizing the beneficiary's contribution to the wellbeing of the family and role in preventing family neglect, places responsibility on the beneficiary to remain engaged with the family. Programs that strengthen family bonds ensure that peer pressure and propaganda material will become secondary, while providing the individual and family the tools to counter terrorist propaganda and arguments. The staff should also be alert to family tensions as well as the embedded nature of the family within the terrorist group to effectively counter the phenomenon.

7.3.4 The Community

Terrorist groups carry out their battles on the ground and in the minds of individuals and communities. To effectively counter their efforts, it is important to engage the community to support the rehabilitation process and become a stakeholder. Moreover, it is pertinent to secure community support for the reintegration process in order to reduce the stigma and resentment towards the returning beneficiary. Steps need to be taken to ensure that the community regains and retains its power and will not allow a violent group to wrest power. This allows the returning beneficiary to not be celebrated, but instead return as an ordinary civilian. The community needs to take responsibility to keep the society harmonious and the reintegrated beneficiary safe. Moreover, the community also needs to take responsibility to prevent people from returning to violence.

The state should consider it a duty to provide community leaders and youth in schools with tools to counter the radicalization propaganda and recruitment rhetoric. Moreover, it is necessary to increase cross cultural interaction between schools, communities and regions through sports, drama, music, and art. The existing schools should twine with schools from other regions to promote togetherness and to highlight the impact of terrorism on the

community. In addition, it is pertinent to ensure greater cultural and religious mix in all areas to reduce the suspicion, anger, and rejection of the unknown-other. The state should also work towards securing a reversal of what is considered sacred and valued by the community. There needs to be a renewed focus on projecting education and careers in order to secure prestige and honor, while linking violence and criminality to shame.

An educated vibrant and engaged community is less likely to be vulnerable to exploitation and recruitment. The incidence of recruitment may be a small percentage and undetectable, hence it becomes the responsibility of the community to be alert to their community being misled. The staff of such programs should be aware of vulnerabilities of the community into which the beneficiary returns.

7.3.5 The Media

It is vital that the media acts responsibly by envisaging the impact of the messages it carries to the public. There should be an ongoing evaluation to assess if the media is inadvertently escalating and reinforcing violence or helping to reduce it. The state needs to project multiple narratives to counter the single narrative. Specifically, the narratives of families that have prevented children getting into terrorism can be a model to follow, especially for families at risk of losing a family member to terrorism.

The narratives on the impact of terrorism upon one's own community can provide a powerful perspective shift. However, the narratives that counter the justification for violence discussed by all age groups and people of all socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds should highlight that violence is condemned by a cross section of the community and not restricted to the elite. Similarly, using powerful voices of charismatic youth rejecting acts of terrorism would help vulnerable youth rethink their decision. Counter narratives provide an alternative perspective and those that project losses to the terrorist group are a powerful deterrent. This

is because young people are less likely to join a losing group, but gravitate towards a winning group.

7.3.6 Messaging

The key to de-radicalization is to engage, understand and dismantle the justifications for violence used at the individual, group, and community levels. In this case, it is integral to puncture the arguments and attack justifications used by violent radicals to recruit, radicalize and mobilize recruits into violence. In doing so, it is necessary to use the same mediums of communication used by the terrorist group for counter messaging. Alternative thinking helps to create doubt and reframe the grievance narrative in realistic terms. Moreover, to dismantle the terrorist ideology, the psychological approach must focus on reaching the *hearts and minds* of terrorists and their recruiting communities from within.

The operationalization of counter terrorism initiatives must include understanding the process of radicalization and what works in deradicalization. As such, it becomes critical to use this knowledge to formulate a strategy for ‘messaging’ and ‘counter messaging’. The messages targeted at countering the narratives, justifications for violence, and legitimizing actions of terrorist groups, need to be factual, realistic and delivered using methods that are more powerful, emotive and attractive than those used by the terrorist group.

If the messaging space is not occupied by nation states, non-state actors will occupy and manipulate this space, which remains a powerful opinion maker and opinion changer. This space is in the mind, stationed in the web and operationalized through technology, by the terrorists on the ground. This space cannot be protected or defended with conventional weapons of war, but by adopting a psychological approach to techniques used by terrorist groups and delivered using effective communication strategies. To engage in the

propaganda war of terrorist groups, innovative thinking and creative strategies that resonate with the masses is an imperative.

7.3.7 Rehabilitation

Radicalization, de-radicalization and re-radicalization are processes that happen from within. Several contextual and individual vulnerabilities are exploited in this process as identified in figure 22. Radicalization is an ongoing process that takes place at multiple levels as highlighted in figure 23. Hence, a robust, creative, multi-pronged intervention approach is needed to secure attitudinal change of the beneficiary. Terrorist groups carry out their battles on the ground and in the minds of individuals and communities. The ethos of the center needs to be one which facilitates this change process through education, skill building, re-aligning the former members to their families and community. As such, the staff needs to be well trained and each program should be geared to achieve this change. The beneficiary assessment and categorization is at the core of designing an effective de-radicalization program. In addition, the staff needs to seize every opportunity to win over the beneficiary, the family and the community, as it may well be the only window of opportunity that could set the beneficiary on a path to move away from destructive behavior and engage with civil society.

7.4 Conclusion

The study identified seven distinct components that are essential features in the process of grooming civilians into terrorism (Figure 1). These seven components were developed into a flexible model to capture the dynamic nature of radicalization (Figure 22). Communities that experience long term grievances and lack opportunity, often fall prey to the carefully crafted and powerful recruitment drives of terrorist groups.

Personal resilience and community resilience factors help to inoculate those exposed to terrorist propaganda and recruitment drives. This accounts for the large number of people that do not join terrorist groups in spite of grievances, vulnerabilities, and exposure to indoctrination. A smaller number is likely to fall prey to terrorist groups due to lack of cognitive and behavioral resilience, in the face of long term grievances.

The study identified powerful emotive grievance narratives as essential for recruitment. The terrorist group not only crafted powerful narratives, but also used charismatic individuals to deliver these messages emotively powerfully, attracting and compelling individuals to join an organization that would provide the means to redress their perceived grievances.

The study also looked at the function of significance in the process of radicalization. Long term grievances give rise to the loss of significance, which arouses the quest for significance. These grievance narratives were framed and reframed to include more grievances. This evolving narrative becomes a powerful motivator in recruitment. In this regard, vulnerable youth and adults gravitate towards the terrorist group that creates a sense of belonging and acceptance. The recruit is indoctrinated with an ideology that promotes violent means to redress grievances. The arousal of the quest for significance is channeled in the direction of violence. Further, the organization projects different images to different audiences to secure support and funding. The recruit also learns to play the role of the victim

to the wider public, the role of the rescuer to the community and the role of the aggressor to the enemy. Specifically, members of the terrorist group project these images and switch between these roles, maintaining the conflict.

The recruit is motivated by the grievance narratives, prepared to restore significance, is armed with a violence justifying ideology and has a role within the organization. However, these factors alone are not sufficient to mobilise the recruit to conduct attacks. The recruit needs to be able to morally justify acts of violence. Besides moral justifications, the recruit requires skills training to develop self-efficacy to conduct attacks. The study also found another vital component as being decisive in the process of grooming members towards mobilization. It was imperative that the members believed the organization or group was just and fair. Since the members believed that the organization was procedurally just and distributively fair, it helped them to trust the organization. The LTTE was careful to project an image of being organizationally just, whilst strategically portraying the state as unjust and unfair. The group stepped forward as the sole representative of the people, while crushing anyone that dared to oppose the organization or the LTTE chief.

Radicalization is a process that is multidimensional (Figure 22). Understanding the several components involved within this process would help to design strategies to delegitimize the need for violence. Exposing how terrorist groups manipulate thoughts and beliefs will help to make communities more resilient. Individuals that join these groups believe they engage in a cause that is noble, and that their contribution would make a difference to the organization and the community. The potential to belong to an organization that is feared, the ability to gain power by proxy, receive acceptance, feel valued, and to engage in a cause that is perceived as noble with the potential to be a martyr has a powerful attraction to aggrieved, economically disadvantaged and disaffected individuals.

Human resilience factors mediate the context within which terrorists manipulate these grievances and prepare the ground for recruitment, indoctrination and mobilization. Some individuals are more resilient to recruitment than others, which points to universal human response patterns.

The study revealed that radicalization is a process that is driven by contextual and personal factors. Contextual factors such as long-term grievances, lack of opportunities and the existence of vulnerable youth provide fertile ground for terrorist groups to engage and manipulate the community. The findings of this study was developed into a pathway, which represents the dynamic nature of the process of grooming into terrorism (Figure 22). The components identified in this pathway were actively manipulated by the LTTE to radicalize civilians into violence over a period of nearly three decades. These very components were used to recruit, sustain and mobilize its membership into violence.

Rehabilitation of the LTTE members involved using these very components to shift the beneficiaries within rehabilitation in the direction of peacebuilding through engagement, empowerment, problem solving, meaning and significance is necessary. Beneficiaries were supported to develop skills and build efficacy as individuals, delegitimize the need for violence and develop alternative meaning and significance. In addition, reversing the process of radicalization, counter radicalization, preventing radicalization were attempts made to ensure safer communities.

Research into terrorism is an imperative, as terrorist groups continue to evolve in the face of counter measures. Governments are then left to grapple with safeguarding the community, empowering the vulnerable, protecting the youth, preventing recruitment, and dismantling terrorist networks. Terrorist groups harness their resources to radicalize communities into violence, at multiple levels. Therefore counter terrorism strategies must be multifaceted in approach and interventions should be ongoing, dynamic, creative and

multipronged if they are to create an impact on this uphill battle against terrorism in the 21st Century.

7.5 Benefits of the Study

The study identifies seven components involved in the process of grooming civilians into terrorism. The study outlines how the LTTE manipulated these seven components to radicalize civilians towards engaging in violence. The literature survey on the seven components indicates that terrorist groups globally may be using these same components to recruit, radicalize and mobilize civilians to conduct violent attacks.

The study specifically identified several strategies used to:

- Radicalize individuals into violence
- Recruit, sustain and mobilize the community, diaspora and membership.
- Counter radicalize and de-radicalize

Further, the study highlighted organizational justice and trust issues that have not been previously addressed in terrorism research. The research also used the drama triangle of dysfunctional relationships within terrorism research for the first time, to understand how the terrorist group projects different images to different audiences and maintains the conflict. Moreover, the role of self-efficacy in mobilizing terrorists for attack was also explored in depth. These findings identify points of intervention when formulating counter radicalization strategies.

7.6 Future Research

The seven components identified as contributing to the process of radicalization into violence within the former LTTE sample could be tested with other terrorist populations. They are crucial intervention points to be targeted at the recruitment, sustenance and mobilization phases. The model proposed on grooming a terrorist is not exhaustive, therefore other components could be tested and included to further develop this multidimensional model.

Another important topic that could be explored is the role of identity in those who have joined and resisted joining violent extremist groups. The images projected by the LTTE, explored using the Karpman Drama Triangle, indicates the importance of manipulating the image of the terrorist group with different audiences. This factor is worth testing with other terrorist populations as it is a vital access point to secure recruits, funding and support for the terrorist group.

The procedural and distributive justice assessed using the Organizational Justice Scale was used for the first time within terrorism research. The distinct differences found in the response patterns between the former LTTE sample and the civilian sample is worth testing against other terrorist populations. In addition, the effort made by terrorist groups to develop self-efficacy, measured for the first time in terrorism research, indicates differences between samples, which is worth testing with other terrorist populations.

Lastly, considering the power exercised by terrorist groups over vulnerable communities, it is worth exploring factors that attract and dissuade individuals from joining these organizations.

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Appendix 1 of this thesis has been removed as they may contain sensitive/confidential content

Appendix 2: Sample Letter of Permission

[Printed on University of Macquarie letter head]

The Government Agent
GA Division Vavuniya
Vavuniya

06 May 2014

Research Project - Building Safer Communities: Radicalization and Deradicalization

I am the Principle Supervisor for Ms Mal Hettiarachchi, a student registered with the Macquarie University. This research project is for the sole purpose of her PhdD research. The **aim of** this project is to learn/study how we can build safer communities. As part of this research, she will ask participants about what makes people feel important and recognized; and what people value most in post war Sri Lanka.

Ms Hettiarachchi would need to interview reintegrated members of the community. This group would be the most knowledgeable and experienced in helping us understand what would make communities safer. It would be very helpful if you could support Ms Hettiarachchi to access a random sample of 15 reintegrated beneficiaries from your GA division in Vavuniya. I understand that this contact list is confidential. Therefore, it would be greatly appreciated if the Participant Information Sheet can be mailed out from your office inviting the selected individuals to attend the interview on a pre-arranged date, to help maintain the confidentiality of their address. Ms Hettiarachchi will be able to select the names and provide the required stationary and documents for mailing.

I have been informed that the GA office is a familiar place to participants. Therefore, if a room can be allocated to conduct the interviews within the *kachcheri* premises, on a specific date, it would help the participants to engage in the interview in a safe and familiar setting. The interviews will be conducted within office hours and each interview will take about 1 hour – 1 ½ hours. Ms Hettiarachchi will be asking questions in general and not about the participants' past involvements, contact with any armed groups or any personally identifying information.

Ms Hettiarachchi will provide the participants with refreshments (biscuits and soft drink/milk) during the interview and a travel allowance of Rs. 500 following the interview. There will be no other payments made. Ms Hettiarachchi will personally bear all costs for her research and has not received any funding or grants from the university.

She will ensure the wellbeing of each participant. If any individual is distressed during the interview Ms Hettiarachchi will discuss with the participant and inform the allocated reintegration staff at the Kachcheri or an independent support person, Fazana Ibrahim on 0779737644 (see attached Participant Information Sheet).

Ms Hettiarachchi will be happy to share the outcome of this study once the study is completed, as it will provide knowledge on how communities can be made safer. She can be contacted on 0775497456 or email: deradphase2@gmail.com.

If you have any concerns/worries or complaints contact me on email:
dalbir.ahlawat@mq.edu.au

Dr. Dalbir Ahlawat

.....

Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet

[Printed on University of Macquarie letter head]

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

You are invited to participate in a research project on “*Building safer communities to prevent radicalization into violence*” conducted by Ms Malkanthi Hettiarachchi a PhD student at the Macquarie University. You are specifically invited to participate in this research project as a reintegrated member of society. The purpose of this study is to learn how we can build safer communities. As part of this research, we will be asking about what makes people feel important, recognized and what people value most in post war Sri Lanka.

We will be asking questions on your opinion **in general**, related to several aspects in which you will have experience or knowledge: in general, what made people vulnerable to recruitment by the armed group, to indoctrination, and recruitment? What were the thoughts and feelings of family members in general to recruitment? What is likely to prevent people joining the group? What would attract people to join such groups? How do you think in general the group was successful in keeping people motivated? We will also ask some questions related to the future aspirations of people in general and what people value in post war Sri Lanka. In general, what do people consider as justice and fairness? The Interview will take about 30 minutes and the survey form to be filled out will take about 30 minutes. If you need any support with reading or writing, we will be happy to support you. The survey and interview are available bilingually.

We will be asking for your age, gender, education level, vocation, socioeconomic status, months in rehabilitation and months having been reintegrated, but not personally identifying information. We will not ask you any questions about your past involvements, contact with any armed groups. All your information will be held confidential; except any information, on future illegal activity, that will be required by law.

You will have the opportunity to answer the questionnaires in a private setting/area and return to us in a sealed envelope. Only the researchers will have access to these questionnaires/forms. Your responses to the survey and interview will be coded and stored securely. We will not ask for your name or personally identifying information.

You are free to respond to the survey or decline at any point in time before/during the survey. We will also provide you with feedback on the outcome in general on completion of the study. While this research will not help you personally, its results will help us to build safer communities and to understand the dynamics of people joining armed groups and help the community to prevent its members joining such groups.

If you have any questions, concerns, worries about your rights as a participant of the research, please contact Mal Hettiarachchi on +94775497456 or by email: deradphase2@gmail.com.

Thanking you,
Mal Hettiarachchi

<p>If you wish to participate in the study, please be present at the GA Office in _____ On ____/____/2014 At _____am / pm</p>

Appendix 4: Demographic Details

Table 3.1: *Distribution of Sample by Participant Categories*

Level	Participants	Description
Suicide Rehab	12	Worked within suicide unit
Other Rehab	33	Worked in various units
Youth Rehab	15	Former child combatants
Family FM	15	Family members of former LTTE
Diaspora	15	Tamil civilians that lived overseas

Table 3.2: *Age Distribution across Five Participant Groups*

Age Range	Suicide Rehab	Other Rehab	Youth Rehab	Family FM	Diaspora	Total (N = 90)
20-29	1	7	15	7		30
30-39	8	12		4		24
40-49	2	11		3	3	19
50-59	1	2		1	4	8
60-69		1			5	6
70-79					2	2
80-89					1	1

Table 3.3: *Distribution of Sample by Gender, Ethnicity and Religion*

Gender		Ethnicity		Religion	
Male	Female	Tamil	Indian Tamil	Hindu	Christian
60	30	88	2	80	10

Table 3.4: *Distribution of Sample by Dependents*

Dependents		Children		Type of Dependent	
Yes	No	Yes	No	Child	Relative
69	21	56	34	56	13

Table 3.5: *Distribution of Sample by Marital Status*

Single	Engaged	Married	Divorced	Separated	Widowed
21	8	46	2	9	3

Table 3.6: *Participant Distribution by Education*

Level of Education (Years of Study)							
(1-5)	(6-10)	Ordinary Level (11)	Advanced Level (13)	Diploma (15)	University (15)	Degree (16)	Masters (18)
4	19	24	24	5	5	8	1

* University = within university, Degree = Bachelors, Masters = Masters Degree

Table 3.7: *Participant Distribution by Employment*

Employment Status					
Full Time	Part Time	Self Employed	Student	Unemployed	Retired
46	17	13	5	3	3

Table 3.8: *Participant Distribution of Socio-economic Status*

Level	Participants	Description
Upper – Upper	6	Wealthy/influential
Upper – Lower	5	Doctors/lawyers
Upper –Middle	19	Teachers/social workers
Lower –Middle	30	Small business/cleric/farmer
Upper – Lower	21	Skilled worker/ small farmer
Lower– Lower	9	Unskilled/unemployed

Appendix 4A: Statistical Analysis - Personal Significance and Satisfaction with Life

Results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted using the Personal Significance Measure (PSIG) and the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) are presented below.

Secondary Hypothesis 1: Individuals more attached to the LTTE would express greater personal significance and life satisfaction in the past (during LTTE control).

- Independent variable = A20 (1 = Admire LTTE, 2 = Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE, 3 = Reject LTTE). Those responding with a '1' should be more appreciative/approving of the LTTE.
- Dependent variables = mean scores were calculated for Personal Significance (PSIG) at both past ($\alpha = .94$) and present ($\alpha = .93$), and life satisfaction (SWLS) at past ($\alpha = .90$) and present ($\alpha = .87$). Then difference scores were calculated (past scores – present scores) for each variable; higher (and positive) numbers mean that both PSIG and SWLS were higher in the past than the present.
- Covariate = sampling group (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora); significant differences were found between these groups on the dependent variables. Including it as a covariate allowed controlling these differences in the analyses. Thus, any significant differences based on LTTE admiration cannot be explained by sample type.

- Results
 - After controlling for differences between the sampling groups, there were significant differences between those who Admire LTTE ($n = 12$), those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE ($n = 32$), and those who Reject LTTE ($n = 46$).
 - PSIG: $F(2, 86) = 33.90, p < .001, \eta^2 = .44$
 - SWLS: $F(2, 86) = 32.36, p < .001, \eta^2 = .43$

Secondary Hypothesis 2: Those who admire the LTTE should be higher than both of the other groups. A contrast test that compares those in group 1 to the mean of groups 2 and 3, was supported in both cases.

- PSIG: estimate = 2.22, $SE = .43, p < .001$
- SWLS: estimate = 2.68, $SE = .46, p < .001$
- Testing the linear trend, whether group one higher than group 2, which is higher than group 3, was also supported.
 - Group 1 vs. Group 2
 - PSIG: estimate = 1.28, $SE = .46, p = .007$
 - SWLS: estimate = 1.84, $SE = .49, p < .001$
 - Group 2 vs. Group 3
 - PSIG: estimate = 1.86, $SE = .30, p < .001$
 - SWLS: estimate = 1.68, $SE = .32, p < .001$
- Means (after covarying out differences between sampling groups), individuals in Group 1 had higher PSIG/SWLS in the past, those in Group 2 are about the same in the past and present, and those in Group 3 are doing better in present.

Table 4A.1: *Means and Standard Error of Personal Significance and Satisfaction with life*

Group	Category	Personal Significance		Satisfaction with Life		Level
		M	SE	M	SE	
1	Admire LTTE	1.02	(.40)	1.48	(.42)	Higher levels in the past
2	Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE	-.26	(.23)	-.36	(.25)	About the same in the past and present
3	Reject LTTE	-2.13	(.20)	-2.04	(.21)	Doing better in the present

Secondary Hypothesis 3: Individuals that want a separate state will report higher

personal significance and life satisfaction in the past.

- Independent variable: A19 (1 = Separate State, 2 = Live Separately, 3 = Live Together).
- Dependent variable: PSIG and SWLS difference scores used in the above analyses.
- Covariate: sampling group (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora); significant differences were found between these groups on the dependent variables. Including it as a covariate allowed to control for these differences

in the analyses. Thus, any significant differences based on commitment to separate state cannot be explained by sample type; higher (and positive) numbers mean that PSIG and SWLS were higher in the past than the present.

- Results

- The ANOVA conducted indicated significant differences between those who wanted a Separate State ($n = 13$), to Live Separately ($n = 21$), and to Live Together ($n = 56$). It was interesting that most want to live together. [Caution on statements made: small numbers in the Separate State group].
 - PSIG: $F(2, 86) = 27.08, p < .001, \eta^2 = .39$
 - SWLS: $F(2, 86) = 37.68, p < .001, \eta^2 = .47$
- The same probing procedure was used to compare group 1 to groups 2/3. This difference was significant for both variables.
 - PSIG: estimate = 1.98, $SE = .44, p < .001$
 - SWLS: estimate = 2.50, $SE = .43, p < .001$
- To test the linear trend, the comparison of group 1 to group 2 was significant.
 - PSIG: estimate = 1.09, $SE = .50, p = .032$
 - SWLS: estimate = 1.55, $SE = .49, p = .002$
- The comparison between group 2 and group 3 was significant.
 - PSIG: estimate = 1.78, $SE = .36, p < .001$
 - SWLS: estimate = 1.90, $SE = .35, p < .001$

Table 4A.2: Means and Standard Error on Living with other Ethnic Communities

Group	1	2	3
Type*	Separate State	Live Separately	Live Together
PSIG	.99 (.40)	-.09 (.30)	-1.87 (.19)
SWLS	1.54 (.39)	-.02 (.30)	-1.92 (.18)
Significance - Satisfaction	Higher significance and satisfaction in the past	About the same in the past and present	Doing better in the present

* Participants selected between wanting to live within a 'separate state', remain within same state but 'live separately', or all communities to 'live together'.

Appendix 4B: Statistical Analysis – Organizational Justice Scale

Results of the ANOVA conducted using the Organizational Justice Scale (ORGJ) are provided below.

Secondary Hypothesis 4: individuals that admire the LTTE will perceive the LTTE to be organizationally just.

- The analyses was restricted to include individuals in the Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab and Youth Rehab categories, which were the only groups with direct experience of working for the LTTE organization. The sample size for this analysis is $N = 60$.
- Independent variable: A20 (1 = Admire LTTE, 2 = Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE, 3 = Reject LTTE). Those responding with a '1' should admire/approve/appreciate the LTTE more.
- Dependent variable: mean scores were calculated for all 7 subscales of the Organizational Justice scale (ORGJ). Each of the subscales were highly correlated (see below). An exploratory factor analysis, suggested that all items formed a single factor structure. Therefore a single variable was created instead of analyzing each subscale individually.
- Results
 - There were significant differences between those who Admire LTTE ($n = 11$), those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE ($n = 20$), and those who Reject LTTE ($n = 29$). [Caution on statements made: small sample sizes].
 - $F(2, 56) = 33.24, p < .001, \eta^2 = .54$
 - Contrast tests to look at Group 1 vs Group2/3 was significant.
 - $t(57) = 5.87, p < .001$

- The linear trend was also significant.
 - 1 vs 2: $t(57) = 3.03, p < .001$
 - 2 vs 3: $t(57) = 5.70, p < .001$

Table 4B.1: Means and Standard Deviations on Participant Admiration for the LTTE

ORGJ	Admire LTTE (1)	Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE(2)	Reject LTTE (3)
Organizational justice	5.67 (.42)	4.69 (.79)	3.28 (1.10)

All individuals in the LTTE Rehab category $N = 60$ have worked for the LTTE and responses are based on their experience with the LTTE. This sample was categorised into those who Admire LTTE, Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE, and Reject LTTE. The results indicate that those who Admire LTTE demonstrated a significantly higher level of organizational justice within the LTTE than those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE. The group that Reject LTTE demonstrated the lowest level of organizational Justice within the LTTE.

Exploratory analyses: Looking at differences reported in organizational justice between groups ($N = 90$). See Appendix 4D.

- Independent variable: The Family FM and Diaspora categories were grouped together as they were reporting on civil organizations. The Other Rehab and Youth Rehab categories were grouped together reporting on the LTTE. The Suicide Rehab category was grouped separately as the training of the suicide unit is different to the rest of the LTTE units. The analyses compared Suicide Rehab ($n = 12$), Other/Youth Rehab ($n = 48$) and Family FM/Diaspora ($n = 30$). [Caution on statements made: small sample sizes].
- Dependent variable; The overall Organizational Justice (ORGJ) score used in previous analyses.
- Results
 - There were significant differences between groups.
 - $F(1, 87) = 8.24, p = .001, \eta^2 = .16$
 - A series of Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses were conducted to probe the pattern of these results. These analyses are pairwise, and compare each of the groups to the others.
 - Suicide Rehab did not differ from Family FM/Diaspora ($p = 1.00$)
 - Suicide Rehab reported higher Organizational Justice than the Other/Youth Rehab ($p = .032$)
 - Family FM/Diaspora members reported higher organizational justice than Other/Youth Rehab ($p < .001$)

Means: The Suicide Rehab (Group 1) demonstrated a level of organizational justice within LTTE that was similar to Family FM and Diaspora (Group 2) that worked for civilian organizations, and both these reflected a higher level of organizational justice than the Other/Youth Rehab (Group 3) that worked for the LTTE.

Table 4B.2: Means and Standard Deviations on Organizational Justice

ORGJ	Suicide Rehab (1)	Other/Youth Rehab (2)	Family FM/Diaspora (3)
Organizational Justice	4.93 (1.18)	4.01 (1.24)	4.94 (.74)

The different categories of the sample however differed on Organizational Justice: $F(1, 89) = 4.11, p = .004, \eta^2 = .16$. A series of Games-Howell post-hocs, controlled for running multiple exploratory tests and violations in homogeneity of variance (non-normal distributions). These are fairly conservative tests, so not many actual differences get picked up. The results were as follows:

- Family FM was higher than Rehab categories ($p = .002$).
- Family FM was marginally higher than Diaspora ($p = .09$).
- Diaspora marginally higher than Rehab categories ($p = .07$).
- No other differences were significant.

Appendix 4C: Statistical Analysis – Self-Efficacy

The results of the ANOVA conducted using the New Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (NGSE) is presented below.

Secondary Hypothesis 5: individuals that admire the LTTE would have greater efficacy in the past.

- Independent variable: 1 = Admire LTTE, 2 = Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE, 3 = Reject LTTE. Those responding with a '1' should be more appreciative and approving of the LTTE.
- Dependent variables: mean scores of general self-efficacy (NGSE) at both past ($\alpha = .94$) and present ($\alpha = .88$). Difference scores (past scores – present scores) for each variable was calculated; higher (and positive) numbers mean that NGSE was higher in the past than the present.
- Covariate: sampling group (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM, and Diaspora); significant differences are found between these groups on the dependent variables. Including it as a covariate allowed controlling for these differences in the analyses. Thus, any significant differences based on LTTE admiration cannot be explained by sample type.

Results: After controlling for differences between the sampling groups, there were significant differences between those who Admire the LTTE ($n = 12$), those who Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE ($n = 32$), and those who Reject LTTE ($n = 46$). [Caution with statements made: small numbers of those who admire the LTTE]

- $F(2, 86) = 25.29, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$
- Contrast tests to examine the pattern of results
 - Group 1 (Admire LTTE) differed from Group 1/2
 - estimate = 1.18, $SE = .25, p < .001$
 - Group 1 differed from Group 2
 - estimate = .72, $SE = .27, p = .010$
 - Group 2 differed from Group 3
 - estimate = .92, $SE = .18, p < .001$

The results indicate that those who admire the LTTE had higher efficacy during the LTTE than in the present. The analyses below, indicates that this difference is driven, not by difference in the present, but by differences in the past. In other words, this difference is not caused by feeling really low efficacy in the present, but caused by the high efficacy they received during the LTTE. The other groups, on the other hand, feel just as efficacious as those who Admire LTTE at present, however during the LTTE they didn't feel so efficacious.

Another way to look at this is to look at the past and present separately. These analyses reveal that there are no differences between groups at present; $F(2, 86) = 1.24, p = .30, \eta^2 = .03$. There are, however, differences in the past; $F(2, 86) = 7.11, p = .009, \eta^2 = .36$. These results indicate that the aspect that gave these individuals greater efficacy was the LTTE.

Table 4C.1: *Means and Standard Error on Level of Admiration for the LTTE*

NGSE	Admire LTTE (1)	Acknowledge Good/Bad in LTTE (2)	Reject LTTE (3)
Difference in self- efficacy between past and present	.55 (.23)	-.17 (.14)	-1.09 (.12)
Self-Efficacy in the past	5.06 (.22)	4.19 (.13)	3.45 (.11)

Appendix 4D: Descriptive Statistics

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted with five groups (Suicide Rehab, Other Rehab, Youth Rehab, Family FM and Diaspora) differed on the following dependent variables: SWLS ($p < .001$), PSIG ($p = .004$), ORGJ ($p = .048$) and NGSE ($p = .048$).

- Satisfaction with Life (SWLS): $F(1, 89) = 5.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$
- Personal Significance (PSIG): $F(1, 89) = 4.15, p = .004, \eta^2 = .16$
- Organizational Justice (ORGJ): $F(1, 89) = 4.11, p = .004, \eta^2 = .16$
- Self-Efficacy (NGSE): $F(1, 89) = 2.51, p = .048, \eta^2 = .11$

These differences were controlled and category membership included as a covariate in all of the analyses on these four variables (PSIG in section 4.1.1, NGSE in section 4.1.2, (ORGJ in section 4.1.3, and SWLS in section 4.1.4).

Table 4D.1: Means and Standard Deviations on the Four Scales

	Category	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
SWLS_diff*	Suicide Rehab	.4667	1.91707	12
	Other Rehab	-1.8606	1.81899	33
	Youth Rehab	-.8800	1.84670	15
	Family FM	-1.2267	1.51349	15
	Diaspora	-.0133	.83995	15
	Total	-.9733	1.84140	90
PSIG_diff*	Suicide Rehab	.4167	1.68945	12
	Other Rehab	-1.5758	1.72319	33
	Youth Rehab	-1.0933	1.89113	15
	Family FM	-1.5600	1.65995	15
	Diaspora	-.4800	.79210	15
	Total	-1.0444	1.73394	90
NGSE_diff*	Suicide Rehab	-.0521	.69384	12
	Other Rehab	-.8864	1.08675	33
	Youth Rehab	-.4083	.99829	15
	Family FM	-.4083	.99829	15
	Diaspora	-.2167	.56194	15
	Total	-.5431	.96828	90
ORGJ_diff*	Suicide Rehab	4.9259	1.18385	12
	Other Rehab	4.0279	1.17419	33
	Youth Rehab	3.9570	1.41435	15
	Family FM	5.0430	.59418	15
	Diaspora	4.8531	.87685	15
	Total	4.4425	1.17654	90

*diff = differences between groups.

Table 4D.2: *Means and Standard Error on Personal Significance and Satisfaction with Life between Categories*

Scales	Admire LTTE (1)	Good/Bad (2)	Reject LTTE (3)
PSIG	1.02 (.40)	-.26 (.23)	-2.13 (.20)
SWLS	1.48 (.42)	-.36 (.25)	-2.04 (.21)
NGSE differences between past and present	.55 (.23)	-.17 (.14)	-1.09 (.12)
NGSE in the past	5.06 (.22)	4.19 (.13)	4.45 (.11)

Table 4D.3: *Means and Standard Deviations of Organizational Justice between Categories*

	Admire LTTE (1)	Good/Bad (2)	Reject LTTE (3)
Organizational Justice	5.67 (.42)	4.69 (.79)	3.28 (1.10)

Table 4D.4: *Means and Standard Deviations of Organizational Justice between Combined Groups*

	Suicide Rehab (1)	Other Rehab/ Youth Rehab (2)	Family FM/ Diaspora (3)
Organizational Justice	4.93 (1.18)	4.01 (1.24)	4.94 (.74)

Table 4D.5: Means and Standard Error Personal Significance and Satisfaction with Life between 3 categories

	Separate State (1)	Live Separate (2)	Live Together (3)
PSIG	.99 (.40)	-.09 (.30)	-1.87 (.19)
SWLS	1.54 (.39)	-.02 (.30)	-1.92 (.18)

A series of Games-Howell post-hocs, controlled for running multiple exploratory tests and violations in homogeneity of variance (non-normal distributions) was conducted to test which conditions differed. These are fairly conservative tests, so not many actual differences were found. The results were as follows:

- SWLS
 - Suicide Rehab differed from Other Rehab ($p = .013$)
 - Other Rehab differed from Diaspora ($p < .001$)
 - Family FM marginally differed from Diaspora ($p = .084$)
- PSIG
 - Suicide Rehab differed from Other Rehab ($p = .018$) and Family FM ($p = .041$)
 - Other Rehab differed from Diaspora ($p = .032$)
- NGSE
 - Suicide Rehab differed from Other Rehab ($p = .037$)
 - Diaspora differed from Other Rehab ($p = .054$)
- ORGJ
 - Family FM was higher than Other Rehab ($p = .002$)
 - Family FM was marginally higher than Youth ($p = .09$)
 - Diaspora marginally higher than Other Rehab ($p = .07$)
- No other significant differences were found.

Appendix 5A: Participant Statements on the LTTE

This section contains the qualitative statements made by participants that engaged in the interview process. The statements are presented thematically and correspond to the sections within Chapter 7. Thematic Index of quotations:

1. Common reasons for joining the LTTE (page 311)
2. Methods used to recruit (page 313)
3. Teaching and training to maximise learning (page 315)
4. Sustaining members long term and short term (page 317)
5. Religious justifications (page 318)
6. Sustaining members during indoctrination, training and mobilization (page 319)
7. Coping and supporting each other (page 321)
8. Transformation in thinking (page 321)
9. Idolizing the LTTE chief (page 322)
10. The narrative (page 323)
11. Significance (page 326)
12. The organization (page 331)
13. The ideology (page 332)
14. Rehabilitation (page 333)
15. Participant recommendations (page 337)

1. Common Reasons for Joining the LTTE

Participants describe a variety of push, pull and avoidance factors as reasons for joining the LTTE. Some of the reasons were:

- Personal loss: ‘if a family member died in war, if suffered losses during fighting’.
- Impulsivity and emotionality: ‘for anger, revenge, excitement, boredom’.

- As a diversion: ‘love failure, family problems, not wanting to study, financial difficulties at home, no job, bored with nothing to do, friends joining and feeling left behind’.
- Social status, self and vulnerability: ‘when one is in LTTE more social status, more respect, no one else will trouble the family, others are scared of the family with a member, belongingness, power, and identity’.
- Feel compelled to join: ‘feel we have to join LTTE. Feel they have problems with government. Feel we need to fight for people. Feel our people need help’.
- Forced conscription: ‘rules of joining one per family. Insulted for not joining. To prevent being made fun of. Asked if mother prostituted herself with Sinhalese casting doubt on the potential candidate’s origins of being Tamil. Asked if you are weak. Asked if you are not a man. Prevent the label of a traitor’.
- Feel compelled to remain: ‘feel we can’t leave the LTTE. Can’t let down. Don’t want to be called a traitor. When within you can’t leave and go back to community as everyone knows who you are’.
- Ideology: ‘we want to fight for separate state. We were taught the history in the school so we want to separate. We were told from small days that Sinhalese came and took over our country so we have to fight to get it back’.

Most of the factors identified appear contextually driven. Factors that attract and appeal to one individual to join a terrorist group may not appeal to another. Personal resilience factors and the context is likely to determine whether a person will join a group or not. Many may believe that it is a personal choice they make to join the group, convinced by the ideology. But the decision-making process involved in making this personal choice is also shaped by one’s interpretation of events within the context.

2. Methods Used to Recruit

The LTTE played an active role in the recruitment process.

- The message: 'Recruitment has a message of "revenge". The message was 'Better do something and die than to just die. You will get old and die anyway, so why not do something heroic and die? This message reaches 100 percent of people but only 30 percent join. Others are needed outside the organization as supporters and sympathisers. But the moment there is a problem these others will join. Some join because of possible arrest because they are involved with helping and feel they will have a problem. Others join because they are anyway helping from out and more benefits when working from inside'.
- Location for recruitment included 'meetings in public places, schools, at festivals, funerals'.
- Music/Movies, Books: 'DVD clips, Movies, Songs, Street theatre, Drama, books were printed, motivational statements on LTTE'
- Promoting narratives: 'we are told about past stories, incidents and their interpretations, heroic efforts'.
- Status: 'to be a big person, you can be like a king, we can be kings in our area'.
- Benefits: 'they spoke about benefits and position, we were shown the benefits they had, if family in LTTE then show the image, pride, and creates a liking'
- Fear factor: 'people were forced to come to meet and then kept, creates fear, people were made to fear the punishments so they obeyed'.
- Dissonance: 'show that others have and we don't have, show that south of the country is developed and we are not, show that overseas everything is equal and we don't have that because of government, show that other countries people earn a lot

and we can't because of government, show that the enemy is weak and we are about to win'.

- Nurture anger: 'they take (recruit) quickly if they lose family, they show videos of our children dead, then we feel more and want to kill more, no one asks if images of dead is from our (LTTE) attack or their (enemy government) attack'.
- Suicide cadres: 'only if the person wants to join they take (the LTTE recruits). Have to apply and request to join. When selected for attack 'must do the attack' if missed blasting target then blast anything. Cannot take the person back. Applicant sometimes writes about 10 letters. Then there is an interview (for example) with Pottu or Muthappan (names of two LTTE leaders) before accepting. They look for words in these letters 'I give all of myself – I would be a weapon – you can use me – my body will be a weapon'. The letters will show 100 percent commitment. The letters need to have a story of motivation. The method was to quickly attack in Colombo and go to Vanni (LTTE controlled region in northern Sri Lanka)'.
- 'If someone died the body is kept in their school and civil people get to see. The LTTE puts songs and films. People watch and get attracted. The songs and films say 'he died for you'. This information goes out. What he did, how he fought heroically, how he died, then they say he was 'killed' not died, they modify the story and tell us he is a hero and he fought. The family feels good he was a hero, others feel angry he was 'killed' and want to join'.
- 'The message is - He is a hero – He fought - See what they did - We need more like him - He did it for you – Come join – Don't let this fight go to next generation. You can be the one person that can make this fight a success.'
- 'Friendship we build with members. LTTE members in the family. When u know of LTTE from young days. We grow up with seeing and knowing about them'

The LTTE tailored its recruitment strategies to attract people of different age groups.

- Children: ‘small children get attracted to the uniform, the gun, seeing the LTTE walking around, listening to narratives of heroism’.
- Youth: ‘young people their feeling aroused for films, in search of identity, want to be as a hero’
- Adults: ‘attracted when LTTE speak to them saying *aiya malli* (brother), because they have power but speak simply. Relationship give dignity and respect, behave decently in front of others so they are impressed’.
- Families: ‘at party, festival or funerals – we attend and they see. They like if I do something they admire and say "see how good they are – how well behaved – how disciplined”’.

3. Teaching and Training to Maximize Learning

Thoughts and feelings: ‘we learn from the history we are taught. That we were the original people. The whole country belongs to us. This is the main foundation. Then we feel we have to fight till we die. Then the case studies of heroes in LTTE. The attacks and the losses to the enemy – then we feel we can achieve this. The thinking is adjusted with the history and the stories. The feelings is created through films and songs. The skills we get through fitness and exercise and training’.

- Theory: ‘the Mosad book was translated and used. KGB type training was provided. SIOT book was translated and used. Indian training was provided. Diaspora engineers from Australia and other countries come to teach and train’.
- Training: ‘maximum training for the body. Everyone gets a lot of training. We learn and we become confident’.

- Practice: ‘we practice on convoy targets, stage targets, single person, crowds, moving targets, pistol sniper. Once the target is identified then a special training is done. Try for target in less and less time 10mins, 5mins, 2mins. Stand – Fit - Aim. Video games practice, practice, practice. See movies of blasts. We practice within a model set up to correct measurements’.
- Focused training for attacks: Model made and trained by Anbu Master’.
- Planning and mobilizing: ‘Attack planned carefully. Trainers identify strengths. If 20 people are needed for the attack then more than 20 people are trained. Members are trained for pistol, sniper, shooting, run, cover. Skill-target method (targeting of those with correct skills needed for the operation).
- Suicide attacks: ‘Match the gender and body size and decide if girl is suitable or not for blast. We select a girl if environment easier for girl to reach target. We take boy if boy is less noticeable to mix with the crowd and place. We select body size to carry it depending on size of crowd we target. Bigger crowd bigger body girl or boy (PBIED)’.
- Then they select front blast earlier. Then both upward blast for self and crowd. After Dhanu’s head was identified (Rajive Gandhi suicide bomber) so everyone got caught. No more blasts to keep face to identify Pottu said you must bend face down when blasting not to keep face remaining to identify’.
- Justification: ‘I know they use every incident to say why we have to do this civil attack. They say it is tit for tat. They say they retaliate. But they also continue to attack every day. But use the main attacks to say we did as retaliation. We must do retaliation because it is what we had in history and this is why we must get it back. If retaliation then it’s easier to understand and accept why we do this. ‘mind is focused - not to think of other things. Even those who are soft, in the face of death fear is reduced. Confident and can do it. It is **justified** that it is right – so can do it’.

- Overcome problems: ‘Stay with the group. Bond with them. If there is interest in the work, then we enjoy the training and the work. We overcome all problems’.
- Spending time: ‘we do training, study, work, play video games, watch Attack films, read Veerakesari paper, some supervised access to internet. We (in the LTTE) are like a family’.
- Mobilization strategies: ‘you feel special. Like an investigator. Like you’re the only person who can do this. And it (what you do) will make a big difference. No regret because you do it for the cause. You do it for the friends and organisation’.

4. Sustaining Members for Long-Term and Short-Term

- Securing family support: ‘when fighting on the frontline, parents are asked to visit the border line. Then family feels we came to see our son. Then see others and they feel we must support our children. Then they tell others to look after my son. Then they feel grateful to them for looking after’.
- Diaspora: ‘connect through the phone because they are not in Sri Lanka. They see films. They hear songs. They connect from a distance. They can’t live like us. They work all the time – so they are made to feel guilty. They feel less guilty when they send money and support and protest for us. They only hear stories, listen to songs and cry. It is still like that - they connect bits and put together and they get emotional. When we (LTTE media unit) say children affected, women affected, our people affected. They carry the message for us. We set the correct time. Give information. Tell the story. The stories put together is to make them sad and angry. For example, the stories that were told by them, what I did not know – these stories – I know now.

- Stay a long time: ‘if committed to the organisation, if interested in the work being done. When members are trusted, given a good post, interesting work, do interesting activities, having important information, power, husband wife both in LTTE, if a significant person in LTTE, important achievements, others speak of you highly. They created the end goal – we would be in that post if we stay (long enough)
- Downside of being praised a lot: for example, ‘of Karuna they got jealous when he (the former LTTE leader) said his Right Hand; when he (the former LTTE leader) said Karuna was an example – be like Karuna, be like Karuna, be like Karuna - overseas they say this.
- ‘They leave if there is overseas contacts, internal problems, if boss not like, no leave to go (home) and come, home problems, if LTTE had killed their family, if people die in family and need help. Sometimes if there are problems with immediate boss can get a transfer to another unit, but person should have confidence to write to leader (Terrorist Leader) and ask for transfer’.

5. Religious Justifications

- ‘By telling history they get us currently to fight fight fight. In history God makes war - Vishnu and Shiva fight’.
- ‘I won’t go to kovil. People make temples and tell stories and fight’.
- ‘History and religion have stories about killing. We grow up with this. Tamil films, Hindu movies, kovil functions, everywhere there is killing. Siva and Ganapathi messengers - killed someone school days and told to fight (in the mythic stories)’.
- ‘LTTE says to see Mahabaratha. So we can do this, we can kill, it is morally ok’.

- ‘India to Sri Lanka its weapons it is about our gods have fought. So we fight and have to fight for our land (belief that Tamils are original people of Sri Lanka)’.
- ‘Like Anton Balasingham gives a story and then for people (what he says) its god and they follow what he says. Like in the Bhagavath Gita (epic story where Lord Krishna tells Arjuna to fight) if I think it’s right’.
- ‘He (the LTTE leader) likes Lord Murugan who carries a staff. I think it is an Indian man so why should I follow him?’
- ‘Gods have weapons. Some are old kings we consider gods with weapons. Gods are with weapons. Why weapons if not to fight? Fighting is ok. Fighting with weapons are allowed by the gods’.
- ‘Hiru God the sun god creator. Bahiravar god is about anger. We have gods for everything’.

6. Sustain Members during Indoctrination, Training and Mobilization

- Punishment: ‘during training some leave - bring them back - keep them in front of others and hit – then others won’t go. They also get the batch to hit him. So no one wants to leave’.
- Rewards: ‘people are reinforced, praised, put up, given pistol, bike, vehicle, body guards, a four-man team, many things like that. Always give everyone a reward for every attack. If we go to live in that area they will give bases and men to run (manage). The biggest reward is to meet him (the LTTE leader). If he gives a gift – they worship that pistol’.
- Approach: ‘if failure, does not scold or discard. But don’t take much notice. If they take a target – they say do like the LTTE. Those who look at the attack – learns – they are taught like this’.

- Careful assessment: ‘It is in basic training that everyone is assessed and selected for special units. The trainers identify the mind through training. Masters are the mentors. They know in 3mths who we are. Screening for interest in the most common words in what we write. They study the essay about ourselves. The master then writes a report he is like this (on the trainee). The best three recruits ‘they send to the different units like intelligence unit, bodyguard team, or different fighting units’.
- Appropriate allocation of duties: ‘they also do video games to assess. If they identify a good worker, they give the job to him’
- Double Agent: ‘to be a double agent is like walking on a sharp knife. Give them some info but can’t use. This side can use. When double agent we can’t trust anyone. It is good training to become a double agent’.
- Feedback: ‘Daily update for relations and friends (of achievements in the field). If they don’t handle to family, friends, community, then it becomes a problem to the member. Can’t focus. So, feedback is important so they know that we are winning’.
- Strategy to maintain morale: ‘Attacks were needed to boost the morale after losses. So, we are quick to make an attack if we have a loss. Period of loss in Vanni (region dominated by the LTTE) we dropped mentally so we have to hurry and make an attack to win to increase morale. Suicide – no doubt when detonation. We had to do quick suicide attacks (in Colombo) to get security moved to Colombo. Also, attacks that were a success and increased morale. The attacks that were planned and targeted if they were missed – we took any target’.
- Celebrate: ‘celebrations are important. It shows approval, value, appreciation of actions. Others too want to achieve the same to be celebrated. Celebrations make people feel good and we are doing the right thing. So there is no doubt in the mind about what we do because it is celebrated. We can do more and more successful

attacks and there is celebrations, rewards, promotions. Failed attacks are not celebrated, not punished but we continue with normal work. Then those that fail will continue to try to make successful attack. If punished then we will become afraid during operation of failure, in this way we want success because of glory’.

7. Coping and Supporting Each Other

- ‘Speak to each other if we trust. Otherwise speak to a leader. Some would leave’.
- ‘Can change (the) boss if there are problems (with the boss). Can tell master (training master) at any time if there is a problem’.
- ‘They address problems in general. For example, 24 worked on the Anuradhapura airbase attack. So we work towards the bigger aim’.
- ‘There is no time to think of problems. We are not like people (in the community), (we have) morning till night training. They (the LTTE) want to get the maximum work’.
- ‘No prayer – no kovil – you believe in you – not others. You can do everything. Kovil means you don’t trust yourself. You give protection to others’.

8. Transformation in Thinking

- ‘After joining (the LTTE) it changes. When inside (the LTTE we) can’t stay and can’t leave’.
- ‘If the attacks are a success – it is pride. If not, we feel bad but no one tells anything. The aim is to do a successful attack. It means everything. You work towards it’.

- ‘Homesick after joining. Manage this with games, functions, programs to relax the mind’.
- ‘They allow meeting of mother and father. They cry. The visits are short. If I say I want food, they are happy to bring and meet, then it normalizes. It gives them something to do. Feel good that they are helping me’.

9. Idolizing the LTTE Chief

- Importance of a leader: ‘It is important for us to believe that the leader is good. Because we follow the leader. Even if immediate boss is a problem we continue because we believe the LTTE is good and he (LTTE chief) is special’.
- Common perceptions of the LTTE chief: ‘he is good for Tamils – not for others. He did not speak to civilians during peace time - He did not face them. He speaks once a year and then it is very attractive. People wait to hear him speak. They worship him. He is known as the sun-god. We believed that what he tells is right. He won’t make mistakes. We believed that what he predicts comes true. People believe he [LTTE chief] suicided – shot himself. People don’t want to believe that someone else killed him. It is better to believe that he took his own life because it is he that decided it is time to go. He controlled till the end’.

10. The Narrative

i. *The Nature and Function of the Narrative*

A powerful emotive narrative is an essential foundational component in recruitment

- ‘Without the story of suffering we have no basis to fight’.
- ‘Every rebel group starts with a story’.
- ‘It is how this story is looked at, told and solutions available’.

A powerful emotive narrative is required for ‘recruitment’

- ‘The story has to be emotional. People must feel the story. If you hear the story and don’t get angry and want to do something - it is not effective.’
- ‘The story has to make you feel sad, angry and revengeful’.
- ‘For me to give money to someone I should feel that the person deserves it. So we had units that worked on the media side’.
- ‘The story has to be powerful. It is powerful because it is emotional and moves people’.
- ‘It is when a story is told many times that people begin to listen. Otherwise it is forgotten’.
- ‘There are many issues in the world that don’t get publicity. How do some get publicity and not others? We thought about that’.
- ‘Our people were dedicated. They worked only on the messages we project to our people, to the world and to the supporters’.
- ‘Our people are emotional people. They will be moved and get angry and fight and not let go. So we tapped into these human qualities’.

ii. *The Emotive Narrative Binds People*

- ‘It is the way they speak, when we look, we get motivated.
- ‘Emotions make people join quickly, films touch people, songs make people feel’
- ‘People get attracted depending on *what* is said and *how* the message is given.
Individuals get attracted by suicide attacks and others get attracted by Team attacks’.
- ‘You begin to live inside that story. I modify my life when it is told to me. I connect with the boy in the story. You are touched by what they say’.
- ‘I recall everything in that movie or song. Forget other things. Feel anger, sadness, and think I must do something’.
- ‘Don’t Show both sides. Show only one side and hold people. Then people believe and feel and act on this’
- ‘They show how bad it is now and what we can make it like – the difference – and that difference you can make it happen’.
- ‘The BT [Black Tiger) movie is told by a boy: I see a Dora boat. He was with me in school. They say he was hit. Then I want to be like in that photo, or in that film or in that song, or Pooja film and songs’.
- ‘Our story is told to us, to be like that, to desire to be like that. It is about a boy who does not want to join. Then I think, I was also like that. Running from the fight. We identify with that story and with that feeling’.
- ‘Kept group together with the attacks videoed. Even if you die it must be videoed. Then the story is projected: he died, I must do something to remember him, to keep memory. Make the memory special, heroic. Others who see this video want to be special like this’.

- ‘If they leave, they are treated very badly in a low way. Seen as, No commitment. No loyalty. Selfish. Traitor. Even Rehabilitated are looked at in a low way, as if they have been influenced’.

iii. The Narrative Evolves and is Reframed

- ‘Yes it (the narrative) has to evolve’
- ‘When issues are addressed other issues are taken up. The basic narrative remains, but new aspects added on’.
- ‘The more that die the more we are able to say this. It is not the same when this started’
- ‘The more attacks, the more counter attacks, the more people die’.
- ‘The longer the fighting the more stories to publish. We have to have this’.
- ‘During peace times our fighters got soft. No story. No motivation. So we had to restart (the fighting) to get them back’.
- ‘If we don’t keep our story going how will other generations know?’
- ‘Without a story there is no meaning for the existence of our group’.
- ‘It is the story that makes people cry. Makes people support. Makes people send funds’.
- ‘It is the narrative that makes people committed. It is binding’.
- ‘Our story is our mission statement. It holds us together’.
- ‘We had to learn to project our story. The only way was to set up the international unit to carry our story to people with money’.
- ‘Our story keeps the commitment. People go overseas and forget our struggle. So we have to keep the story alive’.

- ‘To hold the commitment it has to be more and more serious, more and more powerful, more and more sad and angry’.
- ‘It is about marketing the story’.
- ‘If we don’t know how to use the media we are a failure’.
- ‘LTTE got international fame because of diaspora. If no diaspora - we won’t be able to package the story. They know how to deliver to the international mind’.
- ‘The reasons we started this changed but we have to keep this going to achieve separate state’.
- ‘The most dangerous time is peace time - because people come and see. And our people go and see that life is different. So they are not committed again to fight’.
- ‘People mix with Sinhala in peace time and then not motivated to fight’.
- ‘It is like you can’t sell the same product everyday - you have to add and change to keep people interested, involved, supporting, worried, frightened, angry, sad’

11. Significance: Loss, Arousal, Quest and Resolution

i. Significance Loss and Quest

Did framing and reframing the narrative result in the community continuing to be in a state of significance loss/quest?

- ‘Quest, yes, wanting to be on top increases the motivation drive to achieve an important state’.
- ‘We don’t intend to keep the community like that (in a state of significance loss)- but it happens’.
- ‘If we constantly don’t project that we are victims then how will they want to fight? Only when you are losing something will people want to fight for it’

- ‘For us to keep our community committed we have to have our media that tells them how bad the situation is. Then they want to make it better.
- ‘If we don’t show what we lose - how will they fight to get it back? To make it better?’
- ‘Our story is the central point. We have to keep that story suffering. And the possibility of winning. That is so powerful. While our people feel sad and angry then they are also hopeful and motivated. In this way we can move people to action’.

Do you think significance loss arouses significance quest?

- ‘When we feel loss we want to regain our status. It is about regaining our dignity. Yes if we did not lose we won’t go looking for it. We fight for it when we feel we lost it.
- ‘Some people are self-motivated, they don’t need a loss to achieve, because it is about achieving more and more’.
- ‘With LTTE we are constantly made aware of loss and therefore we go fight to get it back’.
- ‘We see ourselves as having to achieve a goal that is taken away or going after what we have not got. If others have got it we also want to get it’.

ii. Significance to Redress Grievances

Does Significance loss lead people to redress grievances or does Significance quest lead people to redress grievances?

- ‘We need the narrative if we are to redress grievances. Yes it has to be emotive. Yes it has to be a grievance narrative. To redress grievances we have to say the story with emotion. Powerfully to have an impact. When we feel we lose then we go after it (in quest) to get it back. If we don’t lose something we won’t have a drive to get it back. After we lose we push to get it back. Yes, it is one of the things. It is the most important thing and without that (loss) people won’t feel’.

Does the LTTE guide its members to ‘restore’ significance?

- ‘Yes that is the aim. Yes, that is the aim. That was the objective. Not only of members but for all our people. Yes that was the focus of the training. That is what was taught in training. That is what is used to recruit. Yes the group guides and trains every member to get back our important place. All our training is to get back what we were taught we should have had. To get back what we were told over and over again that we had lost. Every one joins for this reason’.

iii. Significance Restoration through a Violent Method

Did the group try to restore significance through a violent method?

- ‘We tried. No other method will work. It was effective method. It is a fighting method – we do not call it a violent method. Yes it motivated people so it was effective method. We got somethings we wanted through this method, then it is a useful method. Yes we felt victorious that we are doing something and achieving

something. It was a good method. We believed in that method and captured territory and held territory, even for a while.’

iv. Significance gain through Meaning and Purpose in Life

The more you worked with the group – did the meaning in your life increase or decrease?

- ‘We were all working to one aim - so it was meaningful’
- ‘Yes when people who fought with us died we felt it was the only mission’
- ‘When the LTTE news carried different stories our work became more meaningful’
- ‘With more training and confidence this work became more meaningful.
- ‘The work we were doing became our life.
- ‘Even with little salary the work was meaningful. We even neglected parents family and children to serve the organization’.
- ‘For me it decreased because I did not like the civilian attacks. It decreased for the way they treated people. It decreased because I did not like my boss
- ‘It increased because we became more and more a part of the group, like a family. There was no other meaning for our life - we lived for LTTE - to achieve our aim. LTTE gave us meaning so the harder we worked the more we were accepted and it gave meaning. We worked hard and felt all what we do is helping for us to achieve our separate country’.

The more you worked with the group, did the purpose in your life increase or decrease?

- ‘Yes I felt this is what I am meant to be doing. A clear purpose and it was stronger. The purpose became a commitment. That was why we worked without proper pay. It was the aim’.

Was life more meaningful before or during the time of the LTTE, or now?

- ‘Life had meaning before the LTTE but the LTTE gave proper pathway in life. LTTE was a system so it was more meaningful. LTTE was well organized and it was clearer after joining. Life had meaning before but with LTTE it was more meaningful. Life is meaningful now, also during LTTE, but not so much before LTTE. There was a lot to do after joining’.
- ‘No I did not like so I wanted to get away - my focus became how to get away. Now life has meaning again. Now we know which direction to take. Now life has a different meaning. We work for ourselves. Before it was for the group. There was not much to do during LTTE. We did not have a sense of future with LTTE. More about how to End it. Now we have a future but it’s harder as we have to make it for ourselves. Life is more meaningful now. We have a sense of future that we can build. Before it was working to the aim of LTTE. Now it is for us. There is less tension with life now. It is about planning and living for future. Earlier it was planning and living for group. Not ourselves’.
- ‘Now no LTTE but there is a different meaning to life. Now life is meaningful - even before, but now there is a sense of future. Before joining not much - during yes clear mission and path - now yes meaningful. Meaning in life changed from time to time, and it is meaningful now’.
- ‘Earlier it was not about sacrificing life for our future - but for a future country. We were made to believe we could not live with Sinhala and Muslim. So it was meaningful then to fight. Now we know we can live together so it is meaningful to progress. What they said looks meaningless now’.

Reasons for the increase and decrease in meaning and purpose in life.

- ‘It increased if we were liked. Increased when our boss liked us and praised.
Increased if we thought that LTTE was the best. Increased because we through we were achieving our aim’.
- ‘It decreased because I did not like the LTTE - what it does. Decreased because I could not agree to the attacks. Decreased because my family did not like LTTE.
Decreased because I am not for fighting - I wanted a different life.

12. The Organization

Is an organization needed to redress grievances?

- ‘To do this in an organized way, you need an organization. Otherwise you can’t redress grievances’.
- ‘If 100 are exposed to propaganda, 30 will join. Others are needed outside the group. When there are incidents or fear of arrest - they also join us’.
- ‘The LTTE was seen as the only organization that can correct the situation (redress grievance). Very powerful organization whose image was propped up carefully.
The credibility of organization is maintained 100 percent in the eyes of the people. People then trust him (the LTTE leader). People have to believe that the LTTE is fair in what they do and how they treat people. Then it is seen as different to other organizations’.
- Absence of an organization: ‘Peace times is a ‘big mistake’. During peace LTTE and civilians mixed’.
- Positives in peace times for LTTE: ‘Before peace only LTTE inside so people did not like LTTE so there was little liking for LTTE. During peace times LTTE mixed

with civilians and they get to like the LTTE. Then can reach international community more. During peacetimes also send people overseas and bring people from overseas for training to fight. We sent ‘sleepers’ to the rest of the country to live and work for us in intelligence and as operatives. LTTE start businesses like civilian businesses in other parts of the country and overseas’.

- Negatives in peace times for LTTE: ‘With peace there are fights inside the group. Members have body guards and cars. Women become posh. So others get angry. When free movement the secret news about gets out. If someone gives a radio or TV others think we also must have. I think of my old house and want to make a new house, get foreign things. If I don’t then I think why should I work hard? I then do 80 percent and not 100 percent. Watch and see others, compare what we have and what others have. We develop anger.
- The diaspora: ‘People were spoilt by those overseas diaspora people. Spoilt when they say what life is like overseas. People here want to go overseas. They are helped from overseas but they also influenced the life style which was not good’
- ‘Now people think, why did we lose such an organization?’
- ‘After LTTE finished the people changed. If there is a virus – there will be an antivirus. Now people will not go back to that because they like the lifestyle now. If LTTE comes it cant take the same route’.
- ‘To destroy an organization, you need peace time. It can destroy without a war’.

13. The Ideology

Does the organization provide a simple and understandable ideology to follow?

- ‘Yes a story is needed, a method, a reason, a philosophy, an argument, a clear rationale, an aim’.

- ‘It was clear and easily understood by the people’
- ‘The smallest person understood the suffering, why we were suffering and the need to do something about it’
- ‘LTTE was the protector. There was no ideology. They tried to provide one but was not so. It was all political with international involvement’.
- ‘Without an ideology it is not possible to get people together to work towards one aim. We always had an ideology. Our aim was to get a separate state and our ideology clearly identified who is suffering, who is going to save our people and how we will do that’.

14. Rehabilitation

- ‘We had to learn how to do a job and earn money for the family. In LTTE we did voluntarily. Yes we got money every month, but that was not like a salary – it was to buy what we need. Everything else the LTTE give us, land, house, soap, sarong and uniforms. But now we have to earn this’.
- ‘Responsibility for providing for the family is ours. We have to do a job and earn for the family. When with LTTE we did not have this responsibility. That was looked after by the LTTE. If the family needs something we get it from LTTE to give’.
- ‘Now we have to work from morning till evening. We are not used to that. It is working to earn for ourselves and our family. This is what civilians do. Now we are like them. Have to earn for family. It is our responsibility. So we get upset sometimes that when LTTE was there we did not have to worry about feeding the family. No we did not see it like a job and earning. It was more like they look after. Yes it was because we work for them. Diaspora send money for everything’.

- ‘Now we work for ourselves and our families. Before we worked for LTTE and they provided for us and families. So our families were also grateful to the LTTE’.
- ‘We are not used to going on trips and visiting places. During LTTE it is working all the time. If we go somewhere it is for an attack. When I visited Colombo and saw some places, I remember. Because these are places we target. Some we planned and some we hit.
- ‘When I met the President at the reintegration ceremony, I thought how much we planned to get him. He was our biggest target. And now he is here, we are in his house. This is a place that we want to get inside but we could not. And now he has invited us for this ceremony. Prabhakaran will never believe this. We never believed this can happen’.
- ‘We have met VIPs that we wanted to get [to target]. They have visited our center [Rehabilitation center] and spoke with us. We did not know them then. After meeting them it is different. When we were with the LTTE we know their name and status (*thathwa*) but we don’t know them. So we can attack. No, now we can’t, we have met them.
- ‘Now no LTTE. So no fight. Only LTTE can get people together. These people can’t do it. They don’t know how to do it. If Prabhakaran knows how we are now, he will die’.
- ‘Without rehabilitation we would have all gone back to our villages, and thought how we can attack again. But with rehabilitation we had to start thinking again what we did and what we want to do with our lives now’.
- ‘When in rehabilitation we are exposed to all communities and how other people think. Without rehabilitation we will go back to thinking in the same way as before. Then all these politicians come and destroy our mind and get us to fight again. They are doing that now. We have no trust in those politicians’.

- ‘Rehabilitation made us think about all people. Not only what we want. Only now we know it is not only us. It is all people who have a right to live and not only us. We did many bad things because we believed the whole country belongs to us’.
- ‘We don’t meet other people and travel to other areas and hear the news. Then we believe what we are told only. You can make anyone believe anything if you continue to tell the same thing and we continue to listen to only that thing. Our mind is closed. In rehabilitation our mind is opened’.
- ‘In rehabilitation we can think for ourselves what we want from what we see. In LTTE we are told what to think. How to think. And also what we must do. We don’t have to think. We only have to do. Now it is more difficult. We have to think for ourselves and be responsible for ourselves. With LTTE - they think for us and we do and they take responsibility. In LTTE if we think on our own we get into trouble so everyone follows LTTE because no one want to get into trouble thinking on their own’.
- ‘Rehabilitation works because we do many different things. They don’t tell us LTTE is bad. They don’t tell we are bad. But we do many things and our anger drops. In LTTE we are always angry. It is not good to always hate others’.
- ‘In rehabilitation we do vocational training. It helped us to focus our mind on creating and learning and doing things to develop ourselves. We think ourselves when we do the training. We are training not to kill someone or planning to kill someone with the training’.
- ‘We do education – many subjects. It helps us to learn different things. We learn and we think. It is not to attack. It is to think more and more about the subject. They don’t teach us to hate. They care for us to develop our subject only’.
- ‘Music and dance help us to be free. We can express our heart in this. We cried when Anoja madam (Anoja Weerasinghe) first started with meditation and to

connect with our spirit. We have not before (during LTTE) had time to think of ourselves. Who we are and what we want’.

- ‘People came to train us in diversity and peace. This is all new for us how to learn to live with others. How we see problems and solve problems. With LTTE we see problem, we blame Sinhala and Muslim and government. We get angry then we want to attack. But problems are for everyone. We think it is only for us. We learn to solve problems calmly and with speaking, we don’t have to fight’.
- ‘We listened to many Tamil people speak who lived with Sinhala all their life. They told us how they become a success and how it is possible to do this. They believe they are Sri Lankan Tamil and want to live together. But we were told before (when with LTTE) that we cannot live with Sinhala and Muslim. We must fight for a separate country. How can they do this to us? We have ruined our lives for this for years and years and years.
- ‘I did emotional development program (Emotional Intelligence in Psychological Rehabilitation). I learn how my emotions are changed and how I can manage my emotions. I learn not to allow other people to control my emotions with their words’.
- ‘When I did meditation my mind became calm. I feel more in control. Past present future – I think calmly. No one is telling me to think. I think on my own and I see how my emotions connect to past things. How those things we were told affect how we feel about people now. We were confused’.
- ‘We did not know difference between what we thought and what LTTE thought. Our thoughts were LTTE thoughts. Their way of thinking became our way of thinking. This is not right to do this to our thinking. Then we do what they want’.
- ‘Our children think the way we teach. We thought the way LTTE teach. In rehabilitation we learn vocation and education subjects. But we think ourselves

about the subjects. It is different teaching. We don't have space to think in LTTE. They think for us and we follow. If we think for ourselves we get into trouble. So it is normal for us to think and do what they say'.

15. Participant Recommendations

- 'People need love'.
- 'Do whatever to retain people in South also'.
- 'We must have to have the North South East West mix'.
- 'Tamil Sinhala schools must come together. Not have separate schools. Children must mix'.
- 'If Muslim and Buddhists have problem then the religions will separate. Muslims must mix with all communities'.
- 'Those of us who were in it must share experiences. I will tell them that I was in it'.
- 'Learn 3 languages. Don't make a big problem. Accept the humanity. Get a qualification. Our cultures are similar. More than us Sinhala people are religious and go to Kovil'.
- 'All people are meant to live together. Don't upset civilians'.
- 'Don't talk about difficulties all the time, everyone has difficulties, so get on with life'.
- 'Get everyone to go for rehabilitation. Some LTTE did not go – they are in the villages – they do not have the chance to see and to learn like we have.'

Appendix 5B: Myths Maintained by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups have to maintain **some myths** to retain the cadres and the support of the community. Samuel (2013, p. 40-53) highlights the myths of terrorism.¹

The **first myth** is that “*violence is the only way*”. This is based on a belief “that the world that they dream of can only be shaped through violence.” The violence viewed as a “cleansing force” which is “permissible and justifiable”, which is a “tactically superior option” that will in due time ensure complete victory (Samuel, 2013).

The **second myth** is “*we are doing it for the people*”. Samuel (2013) cites the late leader of the LTTE using this myth to justify violence: “it is the plight of the Tamil people that compelled me to take up arms”. He explains that “terrorists have been able to shift attention from their insidious use of violence by characterizing it as the justifiable need for self-defense on behalf of a suffering and victimized people-group.”

The **third myth** of “*we have no choice*”. Terrorists frame their arguments to indicate “the choice of violence was not taken by them but was forced upon them” by the enemy. Therefore, when violence is used upon civilians, they are told that the state is making them do this to you, deflecting the blame and attempting to gain sympathy as in the case of Stockholm Syndrome (Samuel, 2013).

The **fourth myth**: “*we are representing the oppressed*”. Samantha Lewthwaite’s Ode to Osama reflects this aspect: “My heart will not find peace until all Muslims do” questions the vested interest of terrorists in keeping a conflict going, as resolution will result in loss

¹ T.K. Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Pepushtakaan Negara Malaysia, SEARCCT, 2012, pp. 40-53.

of power, position and strength. Terrorism is seen as an industry that provides a vocation, security and status.

The **fifth myth**: “our recruits are committed to the cause and victory will be ours.”

Terrorist groups give the impression that success is imminent though the reality is far from this. They showcase exaggerated strength and superiority over the enemy in relation to dedication, skill, courageous leaders, as well as tactical, operational and strategic plans. Projecting the rhetoric on emerging triumphant motivates youth. Though terrorists are the weaker party it helps to deal with a numerically superior enemy. The negotiated ceasefire on 26 August 2014, between Israel and Palestine was framed as a victory to be celebrated by Hamas. The Tamil Tigers displayed their war materials and cadres, strategically for visiting dignitaries of the West to believe that the LTTE was a legitimate group to such an extent that Martin McGuinness returned to the UK to say that it was a big mistake to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organization.²

The **sixth myth**: “our enemy knows only the language of violence”. Terrorists depict the enemy as being able to understand only violence. This statement motivates the cadres to see violence as the only option as nothing else works. The implication again is that the option of violence has been forced upon them, so that the blame for use of violence falls upon the state. The Tamil Tigers, while indicating to the West their keenness to negotiate, as advised by Anton Balasingham who knew the mind of the West, on the ground their leader rejected all negotiations except when it was strategically useful to take respite from battle.³

² L. Pathirana, ‘IRA – Sinn Fein urges Sri Lanka for negotiation’, 10 July 2008, [news portal], <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/12151>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

³ The LTTE rejects the offer to self-govern the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka for a 10year period – an offer made by President Chandrika Banadaranaika on 6 January 1995, <http://lankaweb.com/news/items02/140102-2.html>, (accessed 18 February 2017).

The extracts from the White Widow's Ode to Osama⁴ reflect ideology of terrorists wanting to redress grievances by using violence to target the enemy. The myths are the beliefs that underlie the thinking, motivating individuals to go forward in the face of the odds stacked against them.

⁴ Samantha Lewthwait's, Ode to Osama, [news portal], http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/22/white-widow-ode-to-osama_n_4140438.html, (accessed 18 February 2017).

Appendix 6: The Uniform, Power and Status

LTTE child soldiers walk past a young boy ploughing the field. The children in uniform convey a strong and attractive message of power and status. The child soldiers are fed, clothed and belong to a group, the LTTE. The young boy in the field is bare bodied and muddied, working for a living.



Appendix 7: LTTE use of Children in Terrorism



LTTE child combatants hold a machine gun



LTTE child combatant takes aim



Four young boys in LTTE uniform with rifles



LTTE child combatants and civilians



LTTE female child combatant carries a weapon



Prabhakaran next to a girl taking aim

Appendix 8: The Importance of LTTE Intelligence

The LTTE calendar 2007 cover page depicts the tombs of the LTTE suicide bombers upon which the foundation of the LTTE fight is based. The circular rising design, a ball of fire, each depicts a suicide bomb attack. Each attack is based on intelligence that allowed precision attacks. At the apex is the LTTE map of a divided Sri Lanka.⁵

The words at the bottom of the calendar next to the photo of Prabhakaran reads: ‘If there is no proper intelligence knowledge in a country, the enemy will be victorious over that country’. The statement is attributed to: ‘National leader of Tamil Eelam Honorable V. Prabhakaran’.



⁵ The calendar was recovered by the researcher in 2009 from a former LTTE base in Killinochchi in the north eastern part of Sri Lanka. The meaning of the calendar was interpreted by a former LTTE intelligence member.