Perfection and Morality:
A Commentary on Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* and its Relevance to Kantian Ethics

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Abstract

Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* (first ed. 1740) exerted significant influence on the development of Kant's moral philosophy. However, the extent of this influence often remains unnoticed, since this book has never been translated into a modern language. This thesis seeks to explore this influence. The first part reconstructs the historical and philosophical framework within which Baumgarten's ethics developed, with chapters on the historical background, Leibniz, and Wolff. The last chapter of this first part closes the framework by sketching Kant's transformation of the relation between faith and reason, philosophy and natural theology, a relation central in Baumgarten's ethics. The second part provides a thorough commentary of *Ethica*, showing the ways in which Kant continued to depend on the metaphysical apparatuses and indeed many of the central ethical concepts inherited from his predecessor, at the same as he altered them radically.

Statement of Candidate

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled "Perfection and Morality: A Commentary on Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* and its Relevance to Kantian Ethics" has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Signed:

Toshiro Osawa

Date:

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Abbreviations[1]

Baumgarten

A *Aesthetica*

E *Ethica Philosophica* (^{3}1763)

Initia *Initia Philosophiae Practicae Primae Acroamatice*

L *Acroasis Logica*

M *Metaphysica* (^{7}1761)

Kant

Anth. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*

CPR *Critique of Pure Reason*

CPrR *Critique of Practical Reason*

LE *Lectures on Ethics*

MM *The Metaphysics of Morals*

R *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*

Refl Notes/Fragments (*Reflexionen*)

Leibniz

DM *Discourse on Metaphysics*

NE *New Essays on Human Understanding*

T *Theodicy*

Wolff

GM *German Metaphysics*

TN *Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*

PD *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*

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[1] For detailed bibliographic information, see Bibliography at the end of the present thesis.

1. To the concepts indicated by the signs (a), (b), (c), etc. in the citations from *Ethica Philosophica*, Baumgarten provides German annotations in the original. I do not present them, however, since they are, if translated, mostly identical with English translations of the original Latin concepts. Nevertheless, I keep those signs for the convenience of readers' reference. In cases where German annotations are crucial, however, I emphasised them in the argument.
2. For the English translation of *Metaphysica*, I owed the translation by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (see Bibliography for the detail). For maintaining the coherence of Baumgarten's ethical arguments, however, I occasionally changed some of the words and phrases.
3. All Kant's writings are cited by volume and page number(s) of the standard German edition of Kant's Works known as the "Academy Edition" (*Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900 ff.).
4. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, are indicted by A (first edition) and B (second edition), following the generally accepted convention.

Introduction

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62) is a German philosopher who exerted significant influence on the development of Kant's philosophy. However, this positive evaluation of Baumgarten has long remained unacknowledged, despite the fact that Kant used Baumgarten's major works, *Metaphysica* (first ed. 1739) and *Ethica Philosophica* (first ed. 1740), as textbooks in his lectures for more than four decades, ranging over both his pre-critical and critical period.[2] Instead, many of Kant commentators have disregarded Baumgarten as only a "copy" of his direct predecessor, Christian Wolff, and dismissed him as insignificant, considering him to have no originality worthy of attention in the history of philosophy.

There is another obstacle to Baumgarten's proper assessment. Because Baumgarten famously coined the word "aesthetics (*aesthetica*)" in his *Aesthetica* (1750/58) and thereby established aesthetics as a philosophical discipline in the modern sense, the discussion of his work has been largely restricted to this discipline, which, arguably, has separated itself from mainstream of philosophy in the course of its development.

Despite all these obstacles, however, in the Kant scholarship of recent years, Baumgarten has finally come to be re-evaluated for what he actually wrote. This

[2] J. B. Schneewind, introduction to Kant, Immanuel, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. and ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xiii; Translators' introduction to Kant, Immanuel, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xx; Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: the History and Significance of its Deferral", in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17. Frederick Beiser, for example, laments the dire situation that average Kant scholars never read the works of Kant's direct predecessors, in "Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship since the 1960s", in *German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Espen Hammer (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 86.

trend culminated in the modern translations of *Metaphysica* in German (2011)[3] and English (2013).[4]

Ethica Philosophica, in contrast to *Metaphysica*, often remains unnoticed in terms of the extent of its influence on the development of Kant's moral philosophy, notably because it has never been translated into a modern language.[5] In this work, Baumgarten grounds ethics in metaphysics, articulating it around the principle of "perfection" which, following Leibniz, he defines in ontological terms, as quantitative and qualitative completeness of being, a completeness underpinned by God's power and goodness. This basic concept plays the central role throughout the *Ethica*, and leads to Baumgarten's own version of a categorical imperative: "perfect yourself (*perfice te*)". Kant of course totally rejected such an approach to ethics. At the same time, however, as this thesis aims to show, he remained deeply indebted to several aspects of Baumgarten's way of presenting and developing an ethical theory, from the breakdown of topics to many of the central ethical concepts that need to be included in the discussion. Beyond his wholesale departure from Baumgarten in relation to the foundation of ethics, Kant also departed from Baumgarten in the detail of his ethical theory, through the careful and thorough alteration of a number of Baumgarten's arguments and concepts. In a number of passages in the *Doctrine of Virtue* and the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant does seem as though he is directly targeting Baumgarten's ways of establishing morality without ever missing the mark.

This thesis seeks to explore this complexity by exploring in detail the content of *Ethica Philosophica*, with the aim of clarifying the extent to which Kant owed to this work of Baumgarten in the development of the content of his ethical theory,

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[3] Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysica = Metaphysik: historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, trans. and ed. Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011). Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-77), Baumgarten's direct disciple, already translated it into German with quite a few modifications in 1766 (a revised second edition was published posthumously in 1783).

[4] Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials*, trans. and ed. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

[5] Dagmar Mirbach, the German translator of *Aesthetica*, provides a partial German translation of *Ethica* in *Ästhetik*. 2 vols., trans. and ed. Dagmar Mirbach (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2007), vol. 2, 1106-16.

notably as it culminated in the *Doctrine of Virtue* in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.[6] The thesis is divided into two parts: a reconstruction of the historical and philosophical framework within which Baumgarten's ethics developed; followed by a thorough commentary of *Ethica*, which seeks to spell out the ways in which Kant remained indebted, in different, sometimes indirect ways, to Baumgarten.

An appropriate place to set out for our exploration is by visiting the historical context out of which Baumgarten emerged as an influential philosopher. Chapter one, the first chapter of Part I, is devoted to this task. The philosophy of the most influential of Baumgarten's predecessors, Leibniz and Christian Wolff, must be understood against the backdrop of the political and academic milieu of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Germany, where the philosophers had to reconcile their own philosophical systems with the dominant theological doctrines of the time. Kant himself must be situated against this backdrop as well, as it explains the importance of the concept of "piety", which he received from his philosophical predecessors, and which also nourished his upbringing as a practical dogma, and which he would then have to oppose in his mature thinking in order to establish his own version of rationalism, in opposition to Baumgarten's metaphysical one.

In order to understand Baumgarten's ethics, we must first scrutinise Leibniz, since it is he who set the scene in which ethics is primarily grounded in metaphysics. Chapter two is dedicated to this task. The concept of "perfection", quintessential to the understanding of Baumgarten's ethics, already plays a crucial role in Leibniz's philosophical system and already forms the heart of his ethics. Leibniz is the philosopher from whom derives the full presentation of the central idea that there are different degrees of perfection from God's to that of the simplest substance.

Chapter three turns to Christian Wolff, Leibniz's direct successor, who further developed the concept of perfection for practical philosophy. Based on this concept, Wolff elaborated a notion of obligation that was taken up by Baumgarten. With the help of this concept, the link between ontological perfection and moral

[6] See Allen W. Wood, "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy", in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-21. Originally published in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36, Supplement (1997): 1-20.

duties is made more explicit, and it can be shown how the subject of human action is "obligated to perfection", as it were. The concept determines the order of what is good and bad, or what Wolff calls "the law of nature". Wolff sees this law as an intrinsic force working in the world, which drives the human being towards acting for the good, exactly in the same way as the other beings are made to follow it in "the course of nature".

Chapter four, the last chapter of Part I, closes the framework to situate the philosophical position of Baumgarten's ethics, by sketching Kant's transformation of the relation between faith and reason, philosophy and natural theology, a relation central in Baumgarten's ethics. Contrary to common perception, Kant retained a considerable place for theological and metaphysical arguments in the development of his ethics, despite his well-known prohibition regarding any kind of knowledge in this realm. Even though the content of their doctrines is opposed in many respects, and indeed Kant seems to have Baumgarten as an explicit target in many of his criticisms (even if it is only in negative form, in a way), it can also be said that it is upon the thorough consideration of the metaphysical apparatuses Baumgarten initially prepared that Kant built his original ethics.

The following four chapters constitute Part II. In Chapter five, I will discuss how Baumgarten defines his version of ethics, and show what he means by "philosophical ethics". Disconcerting as it might be to post-Kantian ears, philosophical ethics is more like an applied practical ethics, which contains detailed moral exhortations and prescriptions, as a result of Baumgarten's application of his own definition of "perfection" to ethics. This is because Baumgarten assumes there are grades of perfection, according to which an object becomes "more" perfect if the number of its predicates (together with its truth, clarity, certainty, and liveliness) becomes greater. As a direct consequence of this ontological insight, an exhaustive treatment of the many ways in which the human person can be made "more perfect" is a requisite of the theory. This explains the paradox that Baumgarten's definition of ethics is itself significantly short, whilst so much space is devoted to practical matters. The need for a foundation of ethical theory is in fact devoted to the treatment of religion, as the mode of access to the ultimate guarantor of perfection. Baumgarten devotes an extensive part (one third of *Ethica*) to the

description of religion, for the sole purpose of grounding the discussion of morality.

Baumgarten's *Ethica* is classically divided in three different kinds of "duties (*officia*)". Chapter five, which studies the definition of ethics and its grounding in religion, is dedicated to "duties towards God". We will see how Kant strongly and explicitly rejects this notion. Chapter six then focuses on "duties towards oneself". Under the heading of the duties towards oneself, Baumgarten ascribes our duties, internally, to different modes of self-relation or self-introspection as exercise of our self-knowledge enabling different processes of self-improvement, for the aim of a perfecting of the self. All the derivative ways of knowing ourselves (self-judgement, conscience, and self-love) must be based primarily on self-knowledge, i.e. the understanding of the existing "perfections (*perfectiones*)" and "imperfections (*imperfectiones*)", in comparison with the conception of the highest state of perfection that equates with God. Based on the internal knowledge of ourselves, Baumgarten thinks no dimension of human existence can escape from the perfectibility of the human being as formulated in his moral imperative "perfect yourself". The description of the duties towards oneself then proceeds to include, in a significantly detailed extent, all the external dimensions of human existence such as the body and the "external state". Although such a detail is not to be encountered to such a degree in Kant's ethics, he does mention these aspects as appended to his conception of "pure ethics", as if he feels obliged to tackle all the points of discussion presented by Baumgarten.

Chapter seven addresses the third type of duties, namely the "duties towards others". Baumgarten's conception of this type of duties is based on the picture of the metaphysical construction of the world, which includes both ourselves and the beings other than us as its constituents. With the recognition that other beings in general are all participants in the perfection of the world in the same way as we are, we have a duty to contribute to this perfection to the best of our abilities. We can do this by extending our concern from self-relation to interaction with all the other beings. For this purpose, however, a person has to have developed her self-relation in advance, before proceeding to interact with others, since it is on the basis of self-knowledge that she can "theoretically" assume

what needs to be done for the perfection of others, knowing that it eventually contributes to the perfection of the world. This cosmological view of the type of duties is in stark contrast to Kant, who argues that the duties towards others (exclusively taken as rational beings) have primacy over the duties towards oneself for the reason that "others" as participants to the kingdom of ends are the proper expression of an impersonal legislator of the moral law who gives it to herself.

Chapter eight, the final chapter of the thesis, closes our exploration of Baumgarten's ethics with the discussion of the theme of "special ethics", or the "specialised", "applied" dimension of ethics, for which Baumgarten sets an independent part in his *Ethica*. This part is based on the special considerations that arise from the fact that a human person can be "universal" and "special" at the same time without contradiction, that is, share in the universal essence of what constitutes humanity, whilst having specific qualities as an individual being. The most notable aspect in this part is Baumgarten's discussion of "a more special form of friendship". The concept of friendship is central in Baumgarten's ethics, as the affective underpinning of our concern for all the beings partaking in the perfection of the world. Friendship is thus universal at first, since it concerns in theory all the other creatures, and yet in reality the number of people with whom we can establish such friendship is limited and in any case universal friendship even seems to be unattainable. Aiming for "a more special form of friendship" is a preeminent task of the human being, whereas God cannot be special "by definition". Kant, by contrast, reduces such Baumgartenian connotations of being special to a significantly trivial confinement, yet again he persistently retains the discussion of these matters, as if he feels obliged, in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (as appended to his "pure ethics").

The thesis includes the translation of a number of sections (numbered with an §) contained in *Ethica*, which I translated based on the third edition (1763). I comment on those passages and contrast them with how Kant handles the same concepts, topics, and questions in his version of ethics. This method is justified not only by the fact that *Ethica* was for so many years the source of Kant's ideas for developing his ethics, but also, as we will amply witness, by Kant's remarkable persistence in the alterations and inversions of the ethical concepts, topics, and

questions that Baumgarten discussed. Kant's consistent alterations and inversions ultimately derive from his overall approach to the concept of duty, which is the complete opposite of Baumgarten's approach.

One of the most notable of Kant's alterations of Baumgarten's concepts is the concept of perfection. Kant does not straightforwardly deny Baumgarten's duty of the perfection of the self, but modifies it in such a way that he submits what he calls "inner morally practical perfection" (MM 6:387) to the governance of the moral law, which works as the incentive to all rational beings independently of "the law of nature". Baumgarten, by contrast, argues that all occurrences in the world are under the single sway of the law of nature, which dictates that we ought to perfect ourselves in our moral actions and behaviour as participants in the perfection of the world. Moreover, as we will also see, Baumgarten's definition of "philosophical ethics" as "the ethics, which can be known [...] *without faith*" (E §2; italics mine) is the direct antipode of Kant's famous declaration of the rejection of speculative knowledge. In the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues for the need to "deny knowledge in order to *make room for faith*" (CPR Bxxx; italics mine). These instances indicate the difference between the two philosophers in terms of the most crucial concepts, but this is not the end of the matter. The extent of the detail of Kant's alterations and inversions (from major to minor) of Baumgarten's ethical concepts, topics, and questions is much more far-reaching than was previously estimated. I will now set out to explore the relationship between Kant and Baumgarten.

Part I: Baumgarten's Intellectual Background

Chapter one: General historical background

In this chapter I will contextualise Baumgarten's historical background for better understanding of his position in relation to Leibniz and Christian Wolff, who exerted great influence on him. I will also describe how Baumgarten had a significant impact on the development of Kant's philosophy from a historical perspective.

1. Life and work

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten was born in 1714 in Berlin, the son of a Lutheran, a pietistically-oriented garrison-preacher, and died in 1762 in Frankfurt an der Oder. One of the most important events in his earlier years was his stay at the orphanage in Halle founded by August Hermann Francke (1663-1727). This theologian is regarded as one of the three most influential figures in Halle, along with the jurist Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), and the philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Baumgarten lectured in Halle between 1735 and 1740. It was during this time that he published two of his main works: *Metaphysica* in 1739 and *Ethica Philosophica* (hereafter often indicated as *Ethica*) in 1740. After Halle he was appointed to the chair of philosophy in Frankfurt an der Oder and published his *Aesthetica* there (1750 and 1758, two vols.).[7] It is this book that is generally perceived as his most important work, as the research on Baumgarten thus far has focused almost exclusively on the novelty of aesthetics as an independent discipline – a tendency strengthened by the fact that Baumgarten coined the term "aesthetics (*aesthetica*)".[8]

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[7] Johann Eduard Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1880 (1924)), vol. 2, 237-38.

[8] For a typical discussion on the use of Baumgarten's aesthetics in an applied context, which positions Baumgarten exclusively as the revolutionary founder of the new discipline, see Luc Ferry, *Homo Aestheticus: The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), esp. 18-19.

Below, I briefly present a selective list of Baumgarten's works as a first attempt to contextualise his *Ethica*.[9]

1. *Dissertatio chorographica, Notiones superi et inferi, indeque adscensus et descensus, in chorographis sacris occurrentes, evolvens. Disp. chorograph. Präs. Christian Benedict Michaelis*. Halle: Meyh [26. Feb.] 1735.

In order to be awarded a master's degree (*Magistertitel*), Baumgarten gave an inaugural disputation titled as above.[10] Note that it was the highest degree achievable in those days, since philosophy was regarded as a propaedeutic to law, theology, and medicine.

2. *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*. Halle: Grunert 1735.

It was because of this master's thesis (*Magisterarbeit*) that Baumgarten was promoted to professor.[11]

3. *Metaphysica*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1739 (2nd ed., 1743; 3rd ed., 1750; 4th ed., 1757; 5th ed., 1763; 6th ed., 1768; 7th ed., 1779).

At first, when lecturing in all areas of philosophy, Baumgarten followed Wolff and Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750),[12] who was commended by Wolff himself for having comprehended Wolffian philosophy thoroughly. It was Bilfinger who introduced "Leibniz-Wolffian" philosophy.[13] Wolff himself rejected this labelling,[14]

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[9] This list is taken from the bibliography contained in the German translation of *Aesthetica*. The selection is mine, however. See Dagmar Mirbach, "Bibliographie", in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, vol. 2, 1253-1261.

[10] Dagmar Mirbach, who published a complete German translation of *Aesthetica*, provides a concise description of Baumgarten's life, based on the biography written by Georg Friedrich Meier (Baumgarten's disciple), on her website (http://www.baumgarten-alexander-gottlieb.de/leben/index.html).

[11] Dagmar Mirbach, "Einführung zur fragmentarishcen Ganzheit von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica* (1750/58)", in Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, vol. 1, XVII.

[12] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 238.

[13] Ibid., 236.

[14] Charles A. Corr, "Christian Wolff and Leibniz", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975): 242.

for it invalidates the difference between Leibniz and Wolff, and can therefore be misleading. Nevertheless, Bilfinger was influential in the development of Baumgarten's metaphysics. In later years, Baumgarten lectured in all areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, based on his own notes. But since all these disciplines converge in metaphysics in his method, his *Metaphysica* (published in 1739)[15] grounds them. He refers to it systematically in all his other works.

4. *Ethica philosophica*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1740 (2nd ed., 1751; 3rd ed., 1763).

This text also stems from the notes Baumgarten prepared for his lectures.[16] Although it has three editions, showing that it attracted the attention of intellectuals, and despite the fact that Kant actually used it as a textbook in his lectures, it has never been translated into any modern language. With regard, however, to the crucial influence it had on the development of Kant's ethics, which recent Kant scholarship is now beginning to notice,[17] this work requires special treatment and it is the main focus of this thesis.

5. *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus*. Frankfurt/Leipzig 1741.

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[15] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 238.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Clemens Schwaiger, "The Theory of Obligation in Wolff, Baumgarten, and the Early Kant", in *Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy*, ed. Karl Ameriks et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 58-74, esp. 70. In this article, Schwaiger particularly emphasises Kant's indebtedness to Baumgarten in the development of his ethics, arguing that the distinction between "necessity" and "necessitation" in Baumgarten's conception of the notion of obligation leads to Kant's transformation of the term "imperative" from a merely grammatical term to a specifically ethical term. According to Schwaiger, the now seemingly self-evident Kantian deontological thought that human beings are compelled or necessitated to act in accordance with the moral law is originally conceptualised by Baumgarten. See also Clemens Schwaiger, "Baumgartens Ansatz einer philosophischen Ethikbegründung", in *Sinnliche Erkenntnis in der Philosophie der Rationalismus* (Aufklärung 20), ed. Alexander Aichele and Dagmar Mirbach (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), 219-237; Clemens Schwaiger, "Ein 'Missing Link' auf dem Weg der Ethik von Wolff zu Kant: Zur Quellen- und Wirkungsgeschichte der praktischen Philosophie von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten", *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik* 8 (2000): 247-261; Gerhard Lehmann, *Kants Tugenden: neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).

Alethophili philosophische Briefe. Halle: Hemmerde, 1741.[18]

This is the philosophical weekly that Baumgarten published throughout 1741. These "letters" are the only texts he wrote and published in German. In these letters, their fictive author Aletheophilus laments the reductive equation of philosophy with logic.[19]

6. *Aesthetica*. Frankfurt: Kleyb 1750/ 58.

This book, the most famous of Baumgarten's, also stems from his lecture notes.[20]

7. *Initia philosophiae practicae primae acroamatice*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1760.

The title translates as, *Introduction to Practical First Philosophy*. This is a book on practical philosophy and is also based on his lecture notes.[21] Many references to this work (hereafter indicated as *Initia*) were added to *Ethica Philosophica* after its third edition appeared in 1763. It must be emphasised, however, that *Initia* was published after the first edition of *Ethica* (1740), and that it continues the discussion of general practical philosophy with special focus on its juridical (external) aspects in contrast with its moral (internal) aspects handled in *Ethica*. There are, therefore, little thematic overlaps between *Ethica* and *Initia*. I will, however, occasionally refer to some passages from *Initia*, especially when I discuss the key concepts of

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[18] "Philosophischer Briefe Zweites Schreiben" is included in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, trans. and ed. Hans-Rudolf Schweizer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 67-72.
[19] Birgit M. Kaiser, "On Aisthetics and Sensation – Reading Baumgarten with Leibniz with Deleuze", *Tijdschrift voor Kunst en Filisiofie*, accessed 28 December 2011, http://www.estheticatijdschrift.nl/magazine/2011/artikelen/aesthetics-aisthetics-and-sensation-–-reading-baumgarten-leibniz-deleuze.
[20] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 238. On the reception of Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*, see Hans Reiss, "Die Einbürgerung der Ästhetik in der deutschen Sprache des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts oder Baumgarten und seine Wirkung", *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 37 (1993): 109-138. The following article suggests a recurrence to Baumgarten's aesthetics as the original form of the discipline, commemorating the 250th anniversary of the publication of *Aesthetica*: Eberhard Ortland, "Ästhetik als Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis: Ansätze zur Wiedergewinnung von Baumgartens uneingelöstem Projekt", *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49(2) (2001): 257-274, esp. 258-261.
[21] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 238.

"obligation", "perfection", and "the law of nature" as handled in *Ethica*, as these concepts are also defined in *Initia*. This is especially important because Kant left his hand-written remarks ("Elucidations (*Erläuterungen*)") on his copy of *Initia*, as an invaluable source for us to track the development of his practical philosophy. These remarks are, however, extremely sketchy and often significantly cryptic, since they are only short remarks made for his own use.

8. *Acroasis logica. In Christianum L. B. de Wolff*. Halle: Hemmerde 1761 (2nd ed., 1773).
Acroasis logica. In Christianum Wolffium dictabat A. G. Baumgartenio. Halle: Hemmerde 1762.
Acroasis logica, aucta, et in systema redacta a J. G. TOELLNERO, Halle: Hemmerde 1765 (2nd ed. by J. G. Toellner, 1773).

This work is about Wolff's logic and is based on his notes for academic lectures. Likewise, the following three works were based on his lecture notes, but were published posthumously.[22]

9. *Ius naturae [Dictata iuris naturae ad Koeleri exercitationes iuris naturalis]*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1763.

This is Baumgarten's book on "natural law".

10. *Sciagraphia encyclopedia philosophicae. Ed. et praefatus est Ioh. Christian Förster*. Halle: Hemmerde 1769.

In this work, he presented the outlines of his programme of philosophy.

11. *Philosophia generalis. Edidit cum dissertatione prooemiali de Dubitatione et certitudine Ioh. Christian Foerster*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1770.

[22] Ibid.

As the title suggests, in this work Baumgarten presented general philosophy, outlining his programme of philosophy as well. According to Dagmar Mirbach, the German translator of *Aesthetica*, in both *Sciagraphia encyclopedia philosophicae* (1769) and *Philosophia generalis* (1770), Baumgarten discussed the lower, sensory faculties at much greater length compared with the higher intellectual faculties, more than was the case in his *Metaphysica*.[23]

12. *Alex. Gottl. Baumgartenii Praelectiones theologiae dogmaticae. Praef. adiecit Ioh. Salomo Semler*. Halle: Hemmerde, 1773.

The title refers to "dogmatic theology".

13. *Gedanken über die Reden Jesu nach dem Inhalt der evangelischen Geschichten*. Hg. von Friedrich Gottlob Schelz und Anton Bernhard Thiele. Abt. 1, 2, Pförten: Brückner, 1796f.

The title reads, "Thoughts on the orations of Jesus according to the content of evangelical histories".

2. Political and academic context

It is important to remind ourselves of the geopolitical context in which Baumgarten's ethics emerged. Most of Prussia was in the Roman Holy Empire, and included present-day Northern Germany, Poland, and part of Russia. Although Leibniz was cosmopolitan in terms of his various activities, both Wolff and Baumgarten were active only inside Prussia. Prussia was in many ways unique among eighteenth-century European states. Mainly because of its well-organised and strong military force, it developed high standards of honesty and efficiency. In this milieu, Prussia could exercise a policy of far-reaching religious toleration as well as improve the material lives of its subjects. As a result, many German

[23] Dagmar Mirbach, "Magnitudo Aesthetica, Aesthetic Greatness. Ethical Aspects of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Fragmentary Aesthetica", *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics* 36-37 (2008/2009): 108.

intellectuals came to regard it as the prototypical place for "Enlightened Despotism". Even revolutionary France regarded the Prussian polity as "progressive" to the extent that it had no need for revolution. This image arose partly because of the reputation of Frederick II (1712-86, known as Frederick the Great after 1740) and his connections with leading French *philosophes*.[24] The "King in Prussia" (from 1740), later titled "King of Prussia" (from 1772), was the sovereign under whom Baumgarten served as a philosopher and theologian throughout his life. Frederick II actively showed his commitment to the arts and philosophy. He was also influential in the life of both Wolff and Kant.

Though controversial among historians, the Prussian state-service ideology that developed can be interpreted in the context of the Lutheran Pietist movement.[25] In this movement, August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), one of the leaders of the Pietists and probably the most prominent among them with regard to the institutional role they played, built up a mini-society in the city of Halle. In this setting, Pietism developed into an ideological and pedagogical force, to the extent that it represented mainstream Prussian ideology.[26] Among other cities in Prussia, Halle functioned as the centre of this ideology, and therefore attracted the most innovative German thinkers of the time.

Wolff and Baumgarten spent much of their career in Halle. This was a city that had significant influence on the development of their philosophy because it offered a cultural milieu that was then one of the centres, and probably the most significant one, of the educated classes in Prussia. The importance of the city at that time made even Voltaire report that, "he who wishes to see the jewel in the crown of German scholarship must travel to Halle".[27] In fact, this statement was made with regard to Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-57), Baumgarten's elder brother, and another representative of "theological Wolffianism".[28] Siegmund Jacob's Halle

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[24] Richard L. Gawthrop, *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-2.
[25] Ibid., 7.
[26] Ibid., 11.
[27] Cited in Martin Schloemann, *Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten: System und Geschichte in der Theologie des Überganges zum Neuprotestantismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1974), 22 n. 38.
[28] David Jan Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 115.

was the home of the early German Enlightenment, characterised by the introduction of the new sciences and philosophy to the German intellectual milieu from the 1680s onwards. This opening of German thought to the "New Wave" of the time occurred as a result of contact with the Dutch universities and travels to England and France by a number of influential thinkers.[29] Wolff is the one who gave definitive shape to the early German Enlightenment, with a rationalist approach marrying the new scientific attitude to Leibnizian scholasticism in an attempt to ground all aspects of philosophy in reason.[30]

Halle was also the centre of Pietism, the main religious currency of eighteenth-century Germany. From a sociocultural perspective, historians describe Pietism (and Enlightenment with it) as northern middle-class movements.[31] Until the emergence of Pietism, Lutheran Orthodoxy was the dominant religious milieu that put emphasis on confession. The Pietism of Halle shifted the emphasis to spirituality, toleration and freedom of conscience.[32] Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten was a symbolical figure marking this transition. Drawing upon Lutheran heritage, Pietism and the early Enlightenment, he advocated natural law and natural religion, toleration, and freedom of conscience, while stubbornly defending revelation and scripture at the same time.[33] This attempt to reconcile the values of Orthodoxy and those of Pietism is typical of Wolff's and Baumgarten's own thought. Pietism replaced Orthodoxy's doctrinal rigidity with the promotion of every individual's relationship with God.[34] It introduced multifaceted nuances of religious subjectivity experienced inwardly by an individual through the process of conversion. This experience was known as "faith", emphasising its inner activism as opposed to the dogmatic passivism of Orthodoxy. Since its stress was often placed on personal experience of conversion too emphatically, it sometimes escalated to occultist self-devotion. In this context, those who were not completely

[29] Ibid., 123.
[30] Ibid., 124-125.
[31] William John Bossenbrook, *The German Mind* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), 192.
[32] Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 119.
[33] Ibid., 115.
[34] Ibid., 120.

absorbed in Christ were regarded as atheists.[35] Accordingly, Pietism in some of its forms also led to irrationality.

The University of Halle was founded at the close of the seventeenth century (1694). This marked the start of the modern university in Germany, along with the foundation of the University of Göttingen in 1737.[36] In the case of Halle, the three influential figures mentioned above, Francke, Thomasius and Wolff, were especially important in making the university a pivot in the reform of German education, as Philipp Melanchton (1497-1560), the leader of Lutheran Reformation, had intended.[37] The University of Halle was decisively marked by Frederick William I of Prussia's decision to offset the existing two centres of Lutheran Orthodoxy, Wittenberg and Leipzig.[38] Indeed, Thomasius and Francke were refugees from the persecution of orthodox Lutherans in Leipzig.[39]

In the eighteenth century, students matriculated in one of the three faculties of law, theology or medicine. Their course in arts was regarded merely as preparation for their studies in these disciplines.[40] Moreover, the highest degree one could acquire from the philosophical faculty was the "Magister" (master), whereas in the other three faculties one could proceed to a doctorate.[41] Baumgarten's dissertation "Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus" was only a *Magisterarbeit* (master's thesis).

Wolff contributed greatly to the rise of philosophy's status in eighteenth-century Germany. This change was only possible with the preservation of the theological faculties as living parts of the Protestant universities. The education of the clergy continued to be a central service provided by the universities. The enduring popularity of theological faculties throughout the sixteenth and

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[35] Bossenbrook, *The German Mind*, 193-195.
[36] Friedrich Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study* (London: Longmans Green, 1907), 44.
[37] Walter Horace Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 238.
[38] Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 120.
[39] Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study*, 44; Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 124.
[40] Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, 236.
[41] Thomas P. Saine, "Who's Afraid of Christian Wolff?" in *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*, ed. Alan Charles Korsand and Paul J. Korshin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 104.

seventeenth centuries kept the philosophical faculties alive as a necessary part of scientific theological education, even if they were only regarded as preparatory. By contrast, in France at about the same time, the theological faculties lost their students and virtually ceased to function as educational establishments. As if to correspond with the decline of theological faculties, the philosophical faculties were transformed into independent lower schools and no longer had an essential connection with the higher faculties. As a result, they became detached from the cultural movements, philosophy, and science of the day.[42]

The widespread popularity of the new philosophy and sciences, to which Wolff contributed significantly, had significant impact on German universities. It initiated a tradition whereby the most influential intellectual figures of the country remained inside the universities, a tradition maintained by later figures such as Kant. By contrast, in France and England intellectuals were active outside the universities, e.g. the "Encyclopédistes" (encyclopedists).[43] Furthermore, according to Peter Hans Reill, the "Aufklärers" (enlighteners) were not excluded from participation of the political life, unlike the majority of the French *philosophes*. They could take part in activities which had a direct influence on administrative procedures and ideas. The catch, however, was that the desire to maintain their influence on education meant that they had a tendency towards conservatism: they were essentially part of the establishment, in stark contrast to their French counterparts, who were excluded by a powerful "noble reaction". The educated classes in Germany were also conservative because they had a better chance of finding a position than those in France and therefore could participate in the process of decision-making at the bureaucratic level.[44]

3. Leibniz, Wolff, and the early Kant

3.1. Leibniz – the rationalist mould

[42] Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study*, 48-49.
[43] Ibid., 45-46.
[44] Peter Hanns Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 73.

Given his tremendous impact on all the philosophers in Germany who followed him, it is worth locating Baumgarten in relation to Leibniz biographically. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646 of Lutheran parents and died in Hanover in 1716, when Baumgarten was two years old. Unlike Wolff and Baumgarten, he was not a university teacher but was mostly active in the service of princes. Working in such a position, he had many opportunities to do research as well as to engage in diplomatic missions overseas. His journeys to Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome were especially important in putting him in touch with many rulers, statesmen, and scholars all over Europe. He declined many attractive invitations from the Pope and other Roman Catholic rulers, however, because he thought they might restrict his freedom of thought.

It is fair to say that Leibniz's fame rested mainly on his work as a polymath. It was difficult for him to publish a comprehensive presentation of his thoughts because firstly, his interests were so varied, and secondly, his position as an official who devoted himself to studying international policy, planning important reforms, and studying the genealogy of the ruling dynasty as well as the history of the country, kept him busy. As a result, it was largely dispersed in the form of secret memoranda, anonymous pamphlets, and a vast amount of correspondence,[45] to such an extent that Leibniz himself stated that "he who knows only what I have published does not know me".[46] Accordingly, his reception in eighteenth-century Germany was mixed. He was not considered to be a great philosopher during his lifetime and for long afterwards. Furthermore, the famous dispute with Newton concerning the discovery of calculus, followed by an argument with Newton's representative Samuel Clarke, prevented Leibniz's contemporaries and successors from lauding his achievements in appropriate ways. In particular, the fact that this dispute took place during the last two years of his life discouraged such recognition. The way in which his philosophy was received and the kind of

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[45] Frederick Hertz, *The Development of the German Public Mind: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. Vol.2, The Age of Enlightenment* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 113-14.

[46] Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz and Louis Dutens, *G. G. Leibnitii Opera omnia ... nunc primum collecta, in classes distributa, præfationibus et indicibus exornata, studio L. Dutens. (Eloge de ... Leibnitz par ... De Fontenelle. -G. G. Leibnitii vita J. Bruckero scripta, etc.) L.P*, 6 tom. (Genevæ, 1768), VI, i, 65 [Cited in Martin Schloemann, *Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten*, 22 n. 38].

controversies it evoked was largely determined by the order in which his works were collected, edited, and released. [47]

Nevertheless, I can name a few works that can be regarded as representing Leibniz's general thought and were possibly read by Wolff and Baumgarten: the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686); the *New Essays on Human Understanding* (1704);[48] the *Theodicy* (1710), which generated many editions thereafter; and the *Monadology* (1714).

Leibniz exerted considerable influence on Wolff and Baumgarten in many ways, in terms of his question-setting and his approach.[49] To name a few of these: his hyper-rationalism; the metaphysical grounding of things in general; the strong role played by logic; his rationalistic approach to ethics. Both philosophers also had difficulties with religion or religious authorities of the time.

3.2. Christian Wolff – Baumgarten's direct predecessor

Baumgarten's direct predecessor in Halle was Christian Wolff (1679-1754)[50], a man 35 years older than Baumgarten. Being familiar both with the scholastic doctrines of the Roman Catholics and with the reformed scholasticism of the

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[47] Catherine Wilson, "The Reception of Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century", in *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 442-43.

[48] The *Essay* was completed in 1704, but in fact was not published until 1765. Given this, it is not certain whether Wolff and Baumgarten could possibly access this book in some way. There is, however, an important work by Leibniz that was certainly known and widely discussed by Wolff and his circle, namely *Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaque Jurisprudentiae*, which was reissued posthumously under Wolff's editorship. This work covers the same terrain that Baumgarten will later explore, of duties towards God or the whole, oneself, and others, which I will discuss extensively in Part II. See Hans-Peter Schneider, *Justitia universalis. Zur Geschichte des "christlichen Naturrechts" bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967); Albert Heinekamp, ed., *Beiträge zur Wirkungs- und Rezepzionsgeschichte von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Wiesbaden, 1986).

[49] See Stuart Brown, "The Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background", in *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 43-66. On the scholastic tradition, see especially pp.51-52. Among traditions as Leibnizian legacies, the scholastic tradition exerted the greatest influence on both Wolff and Baumgarten.

[50] For a representative overview of the current state of research on Wolff, see Jürgen Stolzenberg, ed., *Christian Wolff und die Europäische Aufklärung*. Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff Kongresses in Halle (Saale) 4. – 8. April 2004. (5 vols.), Olms 2007.

Orthodox Protestants,[51] it is typical of Wolff to try to reconcile religious differences through rational debate. This particular method exerted great influence on Baumgarten in his attempt to reconcile religion with philosophy. I will explicate this later in the present thesis.

Wolff took his degree in 1703 in Leipzig and his presentation of the dissertation interested Leibniz particularly. After lecturing on mathematical and philosophical subjects in Leipzig, in 1706 he was appointed to a professorship in mathematics in Halle.[52] His mode of thinking was foreign to the Pietistic one, as it combined scholastic logic with encyclopaedism, each of which is a legacy of orthodox Lutheran theology. He applied them, however, in the construction of a comprehensive rational and logical system, by transforming the ideas of Descartes and particularly those of Leibniz.[53]

His philosophy was so influential that during the eighteenth century Wolffian philosophy prevailed at all the Protestant universities.[54] Up until Wolff's time, as mentioned earlier, philosophy was merely regarded as preparatory knowledge necessary for later study in the higher faculties of law, theology, and medicine. According to Friedrich Paulsen, however, who wrote the standard work on the history of German universities, generally speaking, the German universities owed their rise in the eighteenth century to the rise of the philosophical faculty from servitude to leadership.[55] The most significant contribution to this shift is attributed to Wolff alone, who treated philosophy as an independent system of knowledge by freeing it from the bondage of its propaedeutic position, as well as by creating German philosophical language.[56] As will be discussed in the third chapter, Wolff's philosophy was based on absolute reliance on reason and relied on

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[51] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 219-220. For Wolff's background and a particular focus on the city of Bleslau where he spent his earliest years, see Thomas P. Saine, *The Problem of Being Modern, or, The German Pursuit of Enlightenment from Leibniz to the French Revolution* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997), 321.

[52] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 220; Hertz, *The Development of the German Public Mind*, 225. For the importance of Wolff in Halle from the perspective that he was on a par with the other great leaders, namely, Francke and Thomasius, see Eda Sagarra, *A Social History of Germany, 1648-1914* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), 86-87.

[53] Bossenbrook, *The German Mind*, 198.

[54] Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study*, 45.

[55] Ibid., 48.

[56] Saine, *The Problem of Being Modern*, 123.

a strictly scientific method whereby he denied the dependence of philosophy on religion. Also noteworthy is the fact that Wolff wrote many of his works in German. This greatly helped to disseminate his ideas on rationality amongst the middle classes, who were engaged in a process of rationalisation and secularisation.[57] To better understand the significance of this change in language,[58] one should also note that until nearly the beginning of the eighteenth century more Latin books were published every year than German ones and Latin was commonly used for university lectures as late as the second half of the century.[59] Standing between Leibniz and Kant, Wolff was the real inventor of the German philosophical language.[60]

In the context of Pietism, as mentioned earlier, those who did not show complete faith in God were regarded as atheists. Against this backdrop we should see what was alleged by some to be the extreme rationalism of Wolff, which eventually resulted in his expulsion from Halle. He was suspected of being an atheist although he actually rejected atheism and instead tried to reconcile faith with reason. Wolff evidently agreed with Thomasius, the founder of German Enlightenment, regarding what he saw as a common element in Enlightenment and Pietism, namely, the concern to free the mind from dogma and superstition. In this respect, one should not use the reason God gave us in matters that pertain to religion. Accordingly, Wolff argued that theology should confine itself to purely religious matters, and should not engage with philosophy, since he thought that one should use reason for matters outside religion. From a broader perspective, the distinction between religion and philosophy was a result of the Pietistic emphasis on purely internal religion.[61] It is in this context that an academic oration he gave in 1721 in which he praised the morality and the politics of the Chinese is to be understood. This was so provocative that his theological colleagues denounced him

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[57] Bossenbrook, *The German Mind*, 198-199.

[58] On the delay of the establishment of German as a linguistic form of academic communication in comparison with England and France, see Felix Mayer, *Language for Special Purposes: Perspectives for the New Millennium* (Tübingen: Narr, 2001), 444.

[59] Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, 239.

[60] Saine, *The Problem of Being Modern*, 121, 322 n. 5.

[61] Bossenbrook, *The German Mind*, 197.

to Frederick William I of Prussia.[62] The King ordered him to be expelled on pain of death.

In the oration, Wolff insisted that the Chinese had achieved a high level of morality without a Christian context, so that the Chinese could also succeed to express "the highest good of men" in their own way. He argued as follows:

> I proved [...] that the highest good of man lies in unimpeded progress towards perfections that become greater day by day. Since the Chinese so industriously realised that one must progress constantly on the way of morality and is not allowed to stand still at any grade of perfection, if one has not succeeded in reaching its highest grade, which, however, is impossible for anyone to achieve, in my opinion their philosophy as well is animated by the conviction that man cannot be happier than when he progresses day by day towards greater perfections.[63]

Moreover, he claimed that Confucius had been able to discover correct moral principles without the aid of either revealed theology or natural theology. He stated:

> Since the ancient Chinese [...] did not know the creator of the world, they had no natural religion; still less did they know any witness of the divine revelation. That is why they could only count on the force of nature—and indeed such as was free from all religion—in order to practice virtue.[64]

On this ground, Wolff even proceeded to say that an atheist could be a moral person.[65]

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[62] Hertz, *The Development of the German Public Mind*, 225-226.
[63] Christian Wolff, *Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica. Rede über die praktische Philosophie der Chinesen*, ed. Michael Albrecht (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985), 56-57 [translation mine].
[64] Ibid., 26-27. Also refer to Robert B. Louden, "'What Does Heaven Say?': Christian Wolff and Western Interpretations of Confucian Ethics", in *Confucius and the Analects: New Essays*, ed. Bryan W. van Norden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 73-74.
[65] Saine, "Who's Afraid of Christian Wolff?" 117-19.

The consequent persecution of Wolff, however, only served to publicise his views.[66] Wolff's expulsion caused a stir all over Europe and was condemned as an act of despotism. As a result, Frederick William I changed his mind about the expulsion, putting forward an offer to have Wolff back,[67] which Wolff declined.[68] In 1741, Wolff finally accepted an invitation by Frederick II to return to Halle and he was welcomed there in triumph.[69] Note that this almost coincides with the publication of Baumgarten's *Ethica* in 1740. During Wolff's professorship in Marburg, however, before his return to Halle after his expulsion, Wolff developed his philosophy more extensively. The series of Latin works in which his philosophy was systematised more intensively than in his previous German works made him famous throughout Europe.[70]

Wolff's thought had a significant impact on the development of Baumgarten's philosophy. Although Baumgarten was initially prejudiced against Wolff because of his connection with the professor of theology at the University of Halle, Joachim Justus Breithaupt (1658-1732), and his successor to the chair of theology, Joachim Lange (1670-1744), the latter of whom had a particularly hostile relationship with Wolff, he was gradually attracted to Wolff's thought.[71] Around 1728, his brother, Siegmund Jacob, lectured on Wolff's philosophy, a philosophy forbidden at that time because its rationalism and determinism were regarded as hostile to religion. Baumgarten not only attended the lectures but even went so far as to organise a Wolffian study circle around the year 1730.[72] Ten years later, Baumgarten applied his knowledge of Wolffian principles in his two major works: *Metaphysica* and *Ethica Philosophica*.

3.3. The early Kant as Baumgarten's successor

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[66] Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, 243.
[67] Hertz, *The Development of the German Public Mind*, 226.
[68] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 220.
[69] Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study*, 45.
[70] Saine, *The Problem of Being Modern*, 121.
[71] Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 237.
[72] Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 125-126; Mirbach, "Einführung zur fragmentarishcen Ganzheit von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica* (1750/58)", XVI.

It is useful to remind ourselves of some key dates around the time of the publication of Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* in 1740, when Kant matriculated as a student at Albertina University in Königsberg at the age of 16.[73] It was in 1755 that Kant began teaching at the same university, that is, when he was 31 years old. Although he also taught logic, metaphysics, physical geography, anthropology, and many other subjects for more than four decades, ethics was one of the most common courses he offered, and he taught it nearly thirty times. In his lectures on ethics, Kant used both *Initia Philosophiae Practicae Primae Acroamatice* and *Ethica Philosophica* as textbooks, according to the instruction by the Prussian government that professors should use Baumgarten's books.[74] Although the exact date when Kant began lecturing on ethics is not clear, according to Werner Stark (who researched Kant's letters and hand scripts), it may have been as early as 1760 when the third edition of *Initia* was published and he used this edition in his lectures.[75] Moreover, it is established that Kant made his first announcement of a series of lectures on ethics in 1756-57 and, he clearly announced that he would use Baumgarten's texts for his 1765-66 lectures.[76] In any case, Kant only followed the order in which authors had arranged the materials in their lecture books, whilst adding his own observations and theories under the headings those authors provided.[77]

Also of particular importance is that Kant followed Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* in his lectures on metaphysics, which he offered in twenty-five of his thirty semesters as a docent.[78] This book is the basis for all of Baumgarten's other

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[73] Translator's introduction to *Lectures on Metaphysics*, xix.

[74] Schneewind, introduction to *Lectures on Ethics*, xiii, xix, xxi.

[75] Werner Stark, *Nachforschungen zu Briefen und Handschriften Immanuel Kants* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 326-27.

[76] Schneewind, introduction to *Lectures on Ethics*, xxvii.

[77] Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 106. Kuehn repeats this view in Kuehn, "The History and Significance of its Deferral", 17.

[78] Translator's introduction to *Lectures on Metaphysics*, xx. On the particular point that Kant's lectures on anthropology were based on "empirical psychology section" of *Metaphysica*, see Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, introduction to *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2-3. Kant, however, consciously broke with Baumgarten's position to this subject as well as with the tradition of German anthropology dating back to the sixteenth century. Furthermore, Werner Stark points to an interesting fact that after Kant began lecturing on anthropology, he never taught ethics without giving a parallel course on anthropology. See Werner Stark, "Historical Notes and Imperative Questions about Kant's Lectures

works, including *Ethica*. In fact, in these works, Baumgarten often requires the reader to refer to *Metaphysica*.

As will be discussed in detail throughout this thesis, Kant disagreed with Baumgarten on many fundamental philosophical matters. Views on morality were no exception. One might well wonder, then, why Kant used these two books for so many years. According to Schneewind, in his introduction to Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, there are two reasons why Kant found Baumgarten's books useful.[79]

First, the theoretical issues discussed both in *Initia* and in *Ethica* covered almost the whole range of Kant's questions about morality: the nature of obligation and its relation to self-interest; moral law; moral motivation; and the relations between religion and morality. Kant criticised Baumgarten's thoughts just as often as he summarised them, but he was also capable of using them to present his own views. As might be conjectured from Kant's evaluation of Baumgarten as an "excellent analyst" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR A21/B35),[80] Kant thought that the relevant issues concerning morality were already well analysed by Baumgarten, though not adequately argued or articulated. Therefore, he knew what to reject and what to accept.

Second, Kant thought a large number of practical topics of "commonsense" morality which Baumgarten provided particularly in *Ethica* were also thorough enough to enhance his own views on these practical issues. Schneewind argues that Baumgarten dealt with "commonsense" morality in his ethics since his basic framework for the study of morality – duties towards God, duties towards oneself and duties towards others – was discussed in the same way by contemporary teachers of practical morality.[81] As we will see, however, Kant rejected Baumgarten's view, which is typical of Wolffians, that duties towards ourselves and others rest ultimately on pursuing increased perfection and that this pursuit is morally necessary. Instead, Kant argued that the common virtues and vices relate not to perfection and consequent happiness (or imperfection and consequent

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on Anthropology", trans. Patrick Kain, in Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, ed., *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 23.

[79] Schneewind, introduction to *Lectures on Ethics*, xxii-xxiii.

[80] See Birgit Mara Kaiser, *Figures of Simplicity: Sensation and Thinking in Kleist and Melville* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 7.

[81] See Kuehn, "The History and Significance of its Deferral", 17-18.

unhappiness), but relate to our unique status as free rational agents.[82] These are all issues that I will study at length in the body of the present thesis.

[82] J. B. Schneewind, introduction to *Lectures on Ethics*, xxii-xxiii, xxvii.

Chapter two: Leibniz

1. Leibniz's metaphysics

1.1. General characteristics

Since Baumgarten developed his own system, and in particular his ethics, in the framework of Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, it is necessary to begin with a brief reminder of the key features of Leibniz's thought that determined the shape of the German scene after him. It was not just Leibniz's own arguments in ethics that proved influential but also the way in which he defined the task, the objects, and the method of philosophical inquiry. I shall explore some of Leibniz's key general principles before briefly considering their implications for ethics.

Like most other philosophers in the history of Western philosophy, Leibniz defined the core problem as the problem of substance. As the rational knowledge of reality, philosophy's primary task is threefold: to define what the basic constituents of reality are, in other words, what it means for something to be a substance; second, how substances interrelate to make up the world as a whole; and thirdly, how the world can be viewed from the point of view of its creation. The world can be described as a plurality of substances and one of the philosopher's key tasks is to describe how each substance fits in the world. Concerning the third task, the world can be conceived as a whole from the point of view of its creation, and from that perspective we must assume a creator of the world, and describe the relationship between this creator, the world, and each individual substance.[83]

To articulate these three dimensions around the concept of substance, Leibniz famously employs the Greek term "monad". A monad is a substance that is indivisible and has no interaction with other monads, but can be identified as unique because it has a unique perspective on the world in which it participates. In a well-known analogy of the cosmos with a town, Leibniz expresses in non-

[83] Kant appropriates a method similar to Leibniz's threefold explanation of substance in order to prove the intelligibility of the world, according to Jeffrey Edwards, *Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge: on Kant's Philosophy of Material Nature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 85-86. Contrary to my view, Edwards describes the procedure as containing five stages.

technical terms his conception of how each individual substance (monad) relates to the world as a multiplicity of substances:

> And just as the same town when seen from different sides will seem quite different, and is as it were multiplied *perspectivally*, the same thing happens here: because of the infinite multitude of simple substances it is as if there were as many different universes; but they are all perspectives on the same one, according to the different *point of view* of each monad. (*Monadology* §57)

This analogy explains first of all how each substance relates to the world as a whole: the perspective or "point of view" in question is just an analogy. In fact it designates a set of reasons why each substance differs from the others in the world in which it is contained.

The analogy also points to Leibniz's understanding of how the substances relate to each other. Although a monad has no direct interaction with other monads, they are in harmony simply because, in Leibniz's phraseology, they mirror the same universe.

Conversely, the mirroring of the same universe by all the monads also accounts for the relationship of the entire multiplicity of monads with the world as a whole:

> [T]his *interconnection* [between created things], this adapting of all created things to each one, and of each one to all the others, means that it is therefore a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (*Monadology* §56)

All substances are connected to one another by mirroring the same universe, but each substance is different from the others in the ways in which it mirrors the universe differently from the others.

This theory applies most particularly to the connection between two special substances, the body and the mind:

> The soul follows out its own laws, just as the body too follows its own. They are in agreement in virtue of the fact that since they are all representations of the same universe, there is a *pre-established harmony* between all substances. (*Monadology* §78)

One of the most surprising aspects of Leibniz's conception was that monads have "no door and no window", and so no real interaction between them. As noted above, they are interrelated because they each represent a different perspective on the same universe. The harmony that thus reigns between the substances is almost a "pre-established" one, since it derives from the fact that they were all made to fit together as part of a consistent world in the first place. Leibniz famously insisted that there is a pre-established harmony among all substances, in particular between individual bodies and minds. What, then, ensures this harmony? According to Leibniz, it lies in the fact that we must assume the creator of the world that each of the substances equally mirrors. As Leibniz puts it:

> Moreover, each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion—rather as the same town is differently represented according to the different representations of his work. (DM §9)

The world for Leibniz is a *plenum* filled with monads or simple substances lying in pre-established harmony by being representations of the same universe. Irrespective of their being immaterial or material, and no matter how different the laws which each of them follows, all substances are compatible with each other, mirroring the same universe. The difference between substances is, however, that each has its own point of view to represent it.

1.2. Leibniz's basic metaphysical principles

The analogy of each substance as a mirror of the world needs to be understood in ontological terms as well: that is to say, each "point of view"

regarding the world, if it is a consistent point of view, also defines a full monad or substance; in other words, a real being, endowed with identity and self-sufficiency. As Leibniz writes:

> We could give the name *entelechy* to all simple substances or created monads, because they have within them a certain perfection; there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them sources of their own internal actions, or incorporeal automata, as it were. (*Monadology* §18)

This is the basis for his claim that monads have "no doors or windows". Leibniz thinks that the principle of identity equates to a principle of self-sufficiency. For him, a substance is self-sufficient if the complete reason for its properties can be discovered in the nature of the substance itself. Also, a substance is said to be self-sufficient because of the principle of activity that subsists within its own nature. In other words, if a thing is a substance at all, the complete reason not only for its existing properties but also for the actions it is expected to perform, can also be found in the nature of the thing itself. As he puts it in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (DM):

> [E]very substance bears in some way the character of God's infinite wisdom and omnipotence and imitates him as much as it is capable. For it expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens in the universe, whether past, present, or future—this has some resemblance to an infinite perception or knowledge. (DM §9)

Each subject involves in itself all of its predicates, and at the same time, contains in itself the ground for all these predicates, bearing and imitating a single ground for the existence of all substances, i.e., God.[84] Similarly, he writes:

[84] Cf. ibid., 85.

> [W]hat happens to each one is only a consequence of its idea or complete notion and nothing else, because that idea already involves all predicates or events, and expresses the whole universe. (DM §14)

The cause of the predicates or external events that fall into the subject that is a substance is already included in the substance itself.

If we now suggest that this series of predicates is underpinned by a specific rationality (the reasons for acting and for having specific properties as entailed in the substance-subject), we can see how Leibniz's rationalism brings together in one coherent whole all the different dimensions entailed in a metaphysical system. "For everything there is a complete reason" is his basic rationalistic motto. It entails a number of ways of thinking about the world rationally, all of which come together as a kind of circle to sustain the overall picture of a world ruled by and accessible to reason:

(1) *Ontological* or *metaphysical* level. A complete reason for some state of affairs *s* constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for *s*. A substance or a monad is the ultimate reality in the sense that it contains in itself a complete reason why it is as it is and not otherwise.

(2) *Logical* level. For *s*, the logically necessary and sufficient conditions of *s* exist and in principle can be articulated and intelligible. In other words, a complete reason for *s* exists and can be deduced in truth from a preceding chain of reasons; this demonstration is precisely what it means to deduce the truth of *s*.

(3) *Physical* level. A complete reason for *s* is explicitly perceptible to human nature in that, in those cases where one can understand it, one sees exactly why *s* as opposed to some other state of affairs came about. This type of rational thinking explains the so-called laws of nature.

(4) *Epistemological* level. In those cases when a full account of it can be given, that account constitutes a complete explanation of *s*.[85] In principle this account is

[85] For an organised view of Leibniz's basic metaphysical presumptions with special focus on his earlier period, see Cristia Mercer and Robert C. Sleigh Jr., "Metaphysics: The Early Period to the *Discourse on Metaphysics*", in *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 72-73.

accessible to human reason, if not now, at least through the progress of the sciences and philosophy.

(5) *Theological* level. God is the ultimate reason for some state of affairs *s* in that *s* is explained as privation. This explanation presupposes the concept of perfection.

To sum up, there is a reason for everything; reasons unfold as the ground for the predicates of those subjects called substances; those reasons have been materialised by God when He created this world and so under His eye a substance already contains all of its predicates as the necessary unfolding of all its reasons for being and for acting as contained in it as logical/ontological subject; but the human mind is equipped to access this order of reason through its rational powers. Substances which unfold according to the law of their nature mirror the grand substance that is the world, which is itself structured rationally. But human minds that discover the reasons why things are the way they are also uncover the rational structure of the universe and thereby also mirror it in its true, rational essence. Leibniz's hyper-rationalism, which determined the shape of much of the German philosophy that followed until Kant, is contained in this perfectly rational order that is both accessible to rational intelligence and constrains even the (rational) creator.

Human intelligence, however, is also limited, both in scope and in clarity. This epistemic limitation reflects an ontological limitation; in other words, it points to degrees of "perfection". More broadly in Leibniz's world view, there is a continuum with degrading density in perfection from God, angels, and human beings through animals to stones and the dull monads which underlie the muck and grime of the world, yet we can never reach the knowledge of perfect God nor ever perceive each substance as distinctly as God can do.

On the other hand, however, when seen macrocosmically, God created the world so perfectly that although each substance acts according to its own law of unfolding, each is in perfect harmony with all other substances. Further, even if there is a continuum from God to the simplest existence with decreasing degrees of perfection, each substance, from the most perfect to the least perfect, mirrors the same world that contains all the substances.

As is evident then, a fundamental metaphysical concept which captures this fusion of rationality and ontology is that of "perfection".[86] Perfection is the key concept for understanding this, and again it has two dimensions, an individual and a holistic one. First, everything has perfection in itself inasmuch as it has a complete reason why it is as it is and is different from anything other than itself. In other words, each substance has its own "reality" and that reality defines its own "perfection". Second, the world itself has perfection in the sense that in it all the substances fit together. The reality is that each substance unfolds itself in the world following the reasoned order of the predicates as entailed in the subject, and each of them thus claims its own perfection. On the other hand, however, the world within which they reside is the ultimate reality in which they all fit. Perfection applies most of all to the being who created this world and the substances in it. This then leads, paradoxically enough, to a differentiated concept of perfection. God is the most perfect being, having no lack or default or imperfection by definition. An individual substance is less perfect than He, of course, and yet is perfect if considered solely from the perspective of the reality that is present in it, and how it reflects the perfection of God and the created universe.

What, then, is the relationship between the perfect God and the world? Is the world also perfect to the same degree as God is, or imperfect because it contains imperfect substances? Leibniz's answer to these questions is that God created the best of all possible worlds. To understand this, we need to presume that God always acts for the best. As Leibniz writes:

> God is an absolutely perfect being.

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[86] Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz retraced the history of the concept of perfection. Its metaphysical concept can be reasonably traced back to Aristotle who divined three meanings: (1) a thing is perfect if it contains all the requisite parts; (2) a thing is perfect if it is so good that nothing of the same kind could be better; (3) a thing is perfect if it has attained its purpose. According to Tatarkiewicz, in ancient philosophy the concept was applied mainly to individuals' skills and productions, and it did not contain any theological or even any moral meanings, and the moral dimension took shape only in the seventeenth century. In the perfectionist tradition based on Leibniz, the "technical" or ontological and the ethical sides of perfection became joined. See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, "Perfection: The Term and the Concept", *Dialectics and Humanism* 6 (1979): 7, 10.

> [P]ower and knowledge are perfections, and, insofar as they belong to God, they do not have limits.
>
> Whence it follows that God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking [...].[87]

That God is most perfect does not mean, however, that He can do anything He wants. Rather, since even God cannot exert the impossibility, He is also constrained by reason. This means that according to the definition of the concept of perfection it is impossible for Him not to create the best world possible. This consequence, which exerted a powerful influence on him, shows the radical rationalism of Leibniz's philosophy.

2. Leibniz's ethics

2.1. Metaphysical grounding of ethics

Leibniz's metaphysical view has direct ethical implications.[88] Just as things happen for a reason in the world, human beings can act in the strong sense only if we see a reason for performing this or that action. About the link between metaphysics and ethics, he writes:

> [W]e must connect morality to metaphysics. In other words, we must consider God not only as the principle and the cause of all substances, but also as the leader of all persons or intelligent substances, or as absolute monarch of the most perfect city or republic, such as is the universe composed of all minds… And since the whole nature, end, virtue or function

[87] Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, trans. and ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 35.

[88] Paul Redding explicates Leibniz's own application of his theocentric metaphysics to the human realm. For this purpose, Leibniz makes an association between physical laws describing the physical universe with the "best" laws (most just, most orderly and harmonious) describing the mind of God. See Paul Redding, *Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche* (London: Routledge, 2009), 26.

> of substances is only to express God and the universe…there is no room to doubt that substances which express it with knowledge of what they do, and which are capable of understanding great truths about God and the universe, express it incomparably better than those natures which are either animal and incapable of knowing any truths, or which are completely lacking in feeling and knowledge. (DM §35)

According to Leibniz, since only human beings are capable of seeing the reasons behind things and the reasons to act, only human beings are entitled to be called moral. What is at stake in being moral is perfectibility, both theoretical and practical: acting in ways that enhance personal and overall perfection on the basis of an understanding of the reasons for things. Beings that cannot see reasons for action, which ultimately are connected with the rationality of the overall order, have no room to increase their degrees of perfection. Human beings, when they see the reasons behind things, also have reasons to act in relation to these things. When they act in this way, they further the perfection both of the universe (since they go along with its rational underpinning) and of themselves (as rational agents). This intellectualist view of morality resonates with Stoic formulations according to which there is a direct connection between understanding the world and acting morally in it.

That we are less perfect than God, however, means in particular that we are less good than the absolute good God represents. The world is constituted in such a way that in comparison with the absolute good, human actions are divided into the lesser degrees of good and evil. The explanation of evil is metaphysical. As Leibniz puts it:

> [T]he formal character of evil has no *efficient* cause, for it consists in privation…namely, in that which the efficient cause does not bring about. (T §20)

By "privation" Leibniz does not mean that this world is constituted partly by the good and partly by the evil, but that everything (except God of course) can be

described as evil if regarded as lacking the sufficient amount of goodness according to variable criteria:[89]

> [E]vil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends to the positive. (T §29)

To fully understand how creatures can be both good and evil at the same time, depending on the point of view, and how a perfect God could create a world in which there was evil, we need a further distinction between the material element of evil (the reality of the substance itself) and its formal element (the lack in the reality of the substance, which is inherent in a finite creature in relation to the perfect reality (or the reality of God)):

> God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defects there are in its action. Thus [...] God is the cause of the material element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the formal element, which lies in privation. (T §30)

> There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such an action of God, and such and such a passion of the creature, which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to its 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that the creature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts…this is true in that God gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is positive, good and perfect… The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects in operations spring from the original limitation that the creature could not but receive with the first beginning of its being, though the ideal reasons which restrict it…there must needs be different degrees in the perfection of things, and limitations also of every kind. (T §31)

[89] Franklin Perkins, *Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2007), 44. On the point that every possible creature is evil to some degree, see Michael Latzer, "Leibniz's Conception of Metaphysical Evil", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55(1) (1994): 14.

Beings other than God are more or less predestined towards evil in the sense that they necessarily entail a privation of being as finite creatures. This "metaphysical" source of evil grounds the other kinds of evil, notably the evil resulting from their actions. Some of these creatures, however, have the potential for turning towards the good through their insights into the universe's and God's higher perfection (and lack of evil). Herein lies the transition from metaphysics to ethics. What is at stake in the latter is the definition of the good peculiarly applicable to human beings; that is, what matters to them is how to achieve the good God perfectly exhibits, which, however, they can only approximately arrive at because of their human limitations.

On the basis of this metaphysical definition of evil, Leibniz develops a tripartite division of the good. These three types of the good are: the metaphysical, the moral, and the physical. All of these are in opposing relation to the three sorts of evil; namely, the metaphysical, the moral, and the physical.[90]

As we have seen, according to Leibniz, the metaphysical good is equivalent to reality, being not only relevant to humans but also to "creatures devoid of reason" (T §209). If we refer to his definition (in an appendix to *Theodicy*) of a "perfection" as "any purely positive or absolute reality",[91] we can understand that he almost equates "reality" with perfection. It is the concept of perfection in relation to which he more precisely explicates the metaphysical good:[92]

> Metaphysical good or evil, in general, consists in the perfection or imperfection of all creatures, even those not endowed with intelligence. (*Causa Dei* §30)

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[90] John Hostler, *Leibniz's Moral Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 98. See also Latzer, "Leibniz's Conception of Metaphysical Evil", 1-2.

[91] Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, *Theodicy*, trans. and ed. Austin Farrer (La Salle: Open Court, 1988), 384.

[92] Lloyd Strickland argues that Leibniz's tripartite division of both good and evil, the latter being the logically necessary counterpart of the former, can simply be seen as the threefold division of perfection: namely, metaphysical, physical, and moral perfection. In particular, he claims that Leibniz almost always means metaphysical perfection when he speaks of perfection without further specification. See Lloyd Strickland, *Leibniz Reinterpreted* (London: Continuum, 2006), 13.

Given that the metaphysical basis of the particular world God chose is good and perfect in the highest possible sense, it applies to all creatures including simple ones that lack the sense of good.

The moral good, by contrast, is synonymous with virtue and is relevant only to humans (T §209). This concept derives from the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent substances, as we saw above. Insofar as a substance is intelligent, it is also virtuous to the extent that it has knowledge of what it does as good and in particular to the extent that it sees how its actions fit with the larger rational order. A limited intelligent substance such as a human also inevitably does evil because he lacks the complete knowledge of the good that is only accessible to God Himself. How perfectly a monad understands what is good depends on its degree of perfection. As a result, something that appears to be good to one monad may appear to be bad to another. In particular, what humans pursue as good is only the "apparent" good. This may have the consequence that an apparent good can sometimes be a sin. By contrast, the "real" good can only be understood by God, and the apparent good and the real good can be mutually exclusive.[93] Consequently, although God knows perfectly what is good, each monad is determined to aim at what appears to it as good. What is most important, however, is that although the most intelligent substance, God, is perfectly virtuous, a human is also virtuous to the extent that he can be said to be intelligent. Though conditioned by this limitation, human beings ought to seek perfection on the basis of their knowledge of the metaphysical good. With good of this kind human beings can participate in or contribute to the rationality of the world.

The last of the three types of the good, the physical good, is equivalent to "pleasure" (T §209). Leibniz defines pleasure as the perception of perfection, and pain as the perception of imperfection (NE 194). He further divides pleasure into two types. A sensual pleasure, on the one hand, is a confused perception of perfection. On the other hand, an intellectual pleasure is a distinct perception of perfection. The physical good, therefore, functions as bridging the moral good with

[93] Hostler, *Leibniz's Moral Philosophy*, 22.

the metaphysical good,[94] since with the aid of pleasure that successively ascends from the sensual to the intellectual when put against its metaphysical basis we can keep ourselves on the right track to become more virtuous.

Given the tripartite division of the good thus far described, we can understand evil as the privative equivalence of the former. As Leibniz puts it:

> Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be not necessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they are possible. (T §21)

His insistence that both physical and moral evil are not necessary but possible, however, evokes the problem of evil.

2.2. The problem of evil

The problem of evil emerges when we pose the question of why God wills the evil to exist if this particular world is the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz justifies the evil either by regarding it as part of good for the sake of a greater perfection or by admitting it in order to prevent another evil that would otherwise be expected to follow from our non-commitment to evil. Both justifications are made first of all from the metaphysical point of view. He explains the metaphysical evil[95] as follows:

> [O]ne must believe that even…monstrosities are part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better to admit…these monstrosities than to violate general laws…but also that these very monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of will, though we be not

[94] Andrew Youpa, "Leibniz's Ethics", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2011 Edition), accessed 30 October 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/leibniz-ethics/.

[95] Michael Latzer focuses in particular on the metaphysical evil in his argument based on the tripartite division of evil into metaphysical, physical, and moral. See Latzer, "Leibniz's Conception of Metaphysical Evil", 1-16.

> capable of discerning this conformity. It is just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics which issue finally in great order when one has finally got to the bottom of them [...]. (T §241)

In the case of the metaphysical evil, Leibniz even thinks that God wills it. To grasp this more precisely, however, we must understand that the conformity of evil to God's grand design of the world is unintelligible to human beings with limited degrees of perfection.

By contrast, when it comes to the other types of evil, namely, the moral evil and the physical evil, Leibniz considers that God does not will them. As he puts it:

> God wills moral evil not at all, and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. (T §23)

As regards physical evil, Leibniz justifies it as follows:

> [O]ne may say of physical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, and often also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or to obtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment and example. Evil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes too it contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the seed that one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate [...]. (T §23)

The physical evil is justified for the sake of preventing greater evils or of obtaining greater good. However likely it appears to be that God wills the physical evil, in fact it is not the evil God wills but its consequence, which is the prevention of further evils and the acquisition of the greater good, although it seems unreasonable to human beings endowed with limited degrees of perfection that they need to suffer.

In the case of the moral evil, Leibniz states more clearly that God does not will it. He writes:

> Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that it may serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, it is not this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or a legitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or *permitted* in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of an indispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was determined not to permit another's sin were to leave it, especially in time of danger, in order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of the garrison who wanted to kill each other. (T §24)

To be sure, from the perspective of human beings, it seems odd to say that it is permitted to let others commit sin. Nonetheless, it is God's providence that He admits this kind of moral evil, which, however, human beings cannot intelligibly know. God even makes some sorts of the moral evil an "indispensable duty" for us, again for the purpose of preventing another evil or of obtaining greater good.

It is important to remember that, however, with all these kinds of evil, be they metaphysical, moral, or physical, the present world God created that allows them to be contained in it is the most perfect world among all possible worlds.

These moral issues underpinned by metaphysical principles are important in relation to Baumgarten, who also asserts the relationship between metaphysics as knowledge of being and morality. Like Leibniz, he also presumes the spectrum constituted by the different degrees of perfection. In moral discussion in particular, it is the perfectibility of finite and therefore imperfect human beings that he considers to be the object of ethics. He argues that human beings are "morally" obliged to imitate God's perfection because they are "metaphysically" less perfect.

Chapter three: Christian Wolff

1. The place of ethics in Wolff's architectonics of knowledge

1.1. Wolff's architectonics of knowledge

As noted in the first chapter, Wolff was the main author in German philosophy at the time when Kant underwent his own philosophical education. He was a synthetic philosopher who drew upon a number of references in classical and particularly modern philosophy, not just Leibniz, even though he did have a privileged communication with the latter, and his first lecture courses were dedicated to the latter's philosophy. As a result, the usual label of a "Leibniz-Wolffian" system is not fully appropriate. It obscures some important differences between the two philosophers.[96] In this chapter I will extract some of the features from Wolff's influential system that would later play a key part in Baumgarten's approach to ethics.

I begin with a sketch of Wolff's architectonics of knowledge. This is a useful and easy way to see how practical philosophy was conceived in the rationalist school to which Baumgarten belonged, and how the relationship of ethics with the other branches of philosophical inquiry was conceptualised. It provides key indications about the fundamental method and key concepts used to develop a theoretical account of moral action and moral judgement.

In the first chapter of his *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General* (PD), Wolff divides human knowledge into three types: namely, history, philosophy, and mathematics. His definitions for each are as follows:

> Knowledge of those things which are and occur either in the material world or in immaterial substances is called history. (PD 3)

[96] Regarding Wolff's dependence on and departure from Leibniz, see Martin Schönfeld, "Christian Wolff and Leibnizian Monads", *The Leibniz Review* 12 (2002): 131-35, esp. 133-34. According to Schönfeld, Wolff's intention to depart from Leibniz was rather political. Wolff hoped to avoid the accusation of adhering to Leibnizian doctrines that were already the target of Pietist condemnation.

> The knowledge of the reason of things which are or occur is called philosophy. (PD 6)

> Knowledge of the quantity of things is called mathematics. (PD 14)

Even though he was himself an excellent mathematician, Wolff's main concern for the purpose of establishing certain, true knowledge is philosophy. He defines it elsewhere as "the science of the possibles insofar as they can be" (PD 29), thus maintaining the rationalist focus on philosophy as the inquiry that provides the reasons (metaphysical, physical, and logical) for how things are constituted and how they interact, following Descartes and Leibniz. The role of philosophy amongst all the sciences is privileged because philosophy is seen as the discipline that is able to give the reasons why things are or occur. This is because philosophy can combine the rigorous (rational) knowledge of all the elements required for achieving epistemic certainty: knowledge of the first principles (metaphysics and natural theology); knowledge of the rules of demonstration and the capacity of the mind to know with certainty (logic); knowledge of the principles at play in the world as studied by the sciences (theoretical and practical philosophy). This distinguishes the philosopher from the historian, who merely reports the facts, or the mathematician, who only deals with the quantity of facts.

On this basis, the divisions of philosophy have more than just organisational importance; they reveal the whole rationalist conception of the relationship of human knowledge with metaphysical, physical, and human realities. This remains true of philosophy all the way to Kant, who famously spent so much effort, following his great teachers, in making sure the topics discussed were systematically treated and the different branches of philosophical inquiry were properly articulated.

Wolff's philosophical goal is to attain complete certitude, which, in rationalistic perspective (borrowed from Descartes and Leibniz), means that the reasons that are supposed to be elucidated by philosophy must follow the method of scientific demonstration. This, in turn, means that the process must advance "solely by the light of nature", in contrast to theology that relies on the resources of

sacred scripture and divine revelation.[97] This is a very important point that will be discussed at length when we consider the relationship between religion and philosophy,[98] a major aspect of Baumgarten's approach to ethics.

Wolff divides philosophy into three main areas according to the objects they study:

> [T]here are three parts of philosophy. One part treats of God, another part treats of human souls, and the third part treats of bodies or material things. (PD 56)

The definitions of each of the three parts of philosophy, starting with natural philosophy, are as follows:[99]

> That part of philosophy which treats of God is called natural theology. Hence, natural theology can be defined as the science of those things which are known to be possible through God. (PD 57)

This part of philosophy is especially important because it relates to God as the ground of reality and provides the knowledge of reality. Through the rational knowledge of God and His attributes, natural theology provides the ultimate reference point from which a theory of certain knowledge can develop. It goes back to the metaphysical foundation of knowledge, on the basis of which not just theoretical but also practical philosophy can unfold.[100]

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[97] Charles. A. Corr, "The Existence of God, Natural Theology, and Christian Wolff", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 4 (1973): 107.

[98] For a rudimentary explanation of the relationship between religion and philosophy for Kant, see Frederick C. Copleston, "Kant (5): Morality and Religion", in *Wolff to Kant*, vol. 6 of *A History of Philosophy* (Burns & Oates, 1960), 308-48.

[99] For a brief description of the three parts of philosophy in Wolff, see Richard. J. Blackwell, "The Structure of Wolffian Philosophy", *Modern Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy* 38 (1961): 211.

[100] Corr, "The Existence of God", 108.

> That part of philosophy which treats of the souls I call psychology. Thus, psychology is the science of those things which are possible through human souls. (PD 58)

This part of philosophy describes the essential nature of the human soul and human cognitive and appetitive powers. These aspects play a direct role in the treatment of practical philosophy. Less interesting for my purposes is the definition of the knowledge of material things:

> Finally, that part of philosophy which treats of bodies is called physics. Hence, physics is defined as the science of those things which are possible through bodies. (PD 59)

The disciplines of physics, natural theology, psychology, together with ontology and general cosmology, constitute the general discipline of metaphysics, defined as "the science of being, of the world in general, and of spirits" (PD 79). Ontology in particular is defined as follows:

> That part of philosophy which treats of being in general and of the general affections of being is called ontology, or first philosophy. Thus, ontology, or first philosophy, is defined as the science of being in general, or insofar as it is being. (PD 73)

Ontology is particularly significant because it deals with the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, fundamental to Wolff's metaphysics.[101] In contrast to Leibniz, Wolff subordinates the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the Principle of Contradiction. Although their definitions of each principle are not very different, the meaning of this reversal is significant. It makes remarkable the systematic character of Wolff's philosophy, in which metaphysics is the first order, or the solid foundation, rather than the capstone of his philosophical

[101] Ibid.

system as was the case with Leibniz's philosophy.[102] Leibniz located the relation between the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in his effort to posit the realm of the rational with his distinction between necessary and contingent truths.[103] According to him, although we can reduce necessary truths in a finite process by way of the Principle of Contradiction, we cannot reduce contingent truths in the same way. In the latter case, the process of reduction will be infinite, although the Principle of Sufficient Reason can be said to be suitable for identifying contingent truths. The world that includes these contingent truths is only intelligible to God, however.[104] By contrast, the way in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is preceded by the Principle of Contradiction is based on Wolff's conviction that judging something to be and not to be at the same time precedes judging "why something is as it is".[105] This inversion shows clearly the way in which post-Leibnizian rationalism hoped to achieve the programme of a full unification of necessary knowledge on the basis of a metaphysics explicitly guided and inspired by the necessary *a priori* laws of logic.

1.2. The position of Wolff's ethics

Of particular importance for my investigation is the way in which Wolff develops his psychology. He does this by considering the two faculties of the soul: namely, the cognitive and the appetitive (PD 60). The cognitive is concerned with logic which, according to Wolff, is "[t]hat part of philosophy which treats of the use of the cognitive faculty in knowing truth and avoiding error… Hence, logic is defined as the science of directing the cognitive faculty in the knowing of truth" (PD 61).

On the other hand, the appetitive concerns practical philosophy along with its subdivisions, ethics, politics, and economics. The definitions for each are as follows:

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[102] Corr, "Christian Wolff and Leibniz", 254.
[103] John Edwin Gurr, *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), 37.
[104] Ibid., 28.
[105] Ibid., 35-38.

> That part of philosophy which treats the use of the appetitive faculty in choosing good and avoiding evil is called practical philosophy. Therefore, practical philosophy is the science of directing the appetitive faculty in choosing good and avoiding evil. (PD 62)

When practical philosophy specifically relates to the individual, it is called ethics.

> That part of philosophy in which man is considered as living in his natural state or in the society of the human race is called ethics. Hence, we define ethics as the science of directing man's free actions in the natural state, or insofar as man acts on his own and not subject to the power of another. (PD 64)

What needs to be emphasised is that Wolff thinks staking out the state of nature leads to the primacy of ethics. In this sense, Wolff grounded ethics on the so-called natural theology that assumes that the concept of perfection unfolds in the state of nature. Yet ethics also has its own rigour as a result of the fact that Wolff's practical philosophy extends from a psychology that has its foundation in metaphysics. As a result, ethics itself follows the order of argumentation based on logic; that is, it qualifies as a mathematical, or demonstrative, method. He defines ethics as a science primarily in the latter sense, and in this respect it articulates moral behaviour in a scientific mode without being dependent on theology. Nevertheless ethics retains natural theology as the basis of metaphysical rigour, assuming that things in general and human moral behaviour in particular "naturally" unfold through the concept of perfection.

In this context, ethics has a form of relative autonomy, wavering between metaphysical rigour and theological "taking for granted", so to speak.[106] This ambiguity between metaphysics (philosophy) and religion is repeated in Baumgarten's ethics.

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[106] Anton Bissinger, "Zur metaphysischen Begründung der Wolffschen Ethik", in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754: Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung,* ed. Werner Schneiders (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 148-60, esp. 148-50.

The practical philosophy bears on the social. It has two realms, politics and economics:

> That part of philosophy in which man is considered as living in a state or civil society is called politics. Thus, politics is the science of directing free actions in a civil society or state. (PD 65)

> That part of philosophy in which man is considered as a member of some smaller society is called economics. Hence, economics is the science of directing free actions in the smaller societies which are distinct from the state. (PD 67)

In addition, apart from the division as to whether the inquiry relates to the individual or the social, there are other areas of practical philosophy at a level penetrating the realms of both the individual and the social. These are: the law of nature (*ius naturae*) and universal practical philosophy. To begin with the law of nature:[107]

> Man cannot seek a good or avoid an evil which he does not know. Hence, there is a part of philosophy, called the law of nature [*Jus naturae*], which teaches which actions are good and which are evil. Therefore, the law of nature is defined as the science of good and evil actions. (PD 68)

And to describe the position of the law of nature in or through practical philosophy, Wolff states:

> The law of nature can be separated from ethics, economics, and politics, for it contains the theory of these disciplines (PD 68). Now no one would deny

[107] For a detailed account of Wolff's conception of the law of nature, see Hanns-Martin Bachmann, "Zur Wolffischen Naturrechtslehre", in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754: Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung,* ed. Werner Schneiders (Hamburg: Meiner 1983), 161-70. See also James Daniel Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 133-43.

> that theory, which is the foundation of practice, should come first. Hence, the law of nature should precede ethics, economics, and politics. (PD 104)

Here Wolff indicates the link between the law of nature and ethics, the relation through which the former regulates the latter. Then, describing how the law of nature, in its task of regulating all sub-disciplines, takes its place in philosophical system, he claims:

> The law of nature, which is a part of practical philosophy (PD 68), explains man's duties in relation to God. And ethics teaches how man can satisfy these duties without any external obligation being imposed by civil authority. But without a knowledge of God, it is impossible to prove and to observe man's duties in relation to God, which are treated in ethics and the law of nature. Now a philosophical knowledge of God is derived from natural theology. Therefore, if ethics and the law of nature are to be established demonstratively, they must borrow principles from natural theology. (PD 92)

In this statement, Wolff defines the role of the law of nature as explaining man's duties in relation to God. The reference to God here should be understood in terms of what it excludes: the natural law defines duties for the human being when the latter is treated merely as a creature of God, on a strictly metaphysical plane so to speak; that is, before the individual's belonging to different social groups is considered. In this respect, the natural law translates in practical moral terms, in terms of duties. Consequently, the metaphysical principle of the best of all possible worlds, which is captured in the concept of perfection, must also be understood in moral terms. In other words, the natural law is simply the law deriving from metaphysics, underpinning all the sub-fields of practical philosophy, according to which we have a duty to further our perfection and the perfection of others, in line with God's intentions.[108] God, as it were, imprints the knowledge of good and bad

[108] See Knud Haakonssen, "Early Modern Natural Law", in *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*, ed. John Skorupski (London: Routledge, 2010), 76-87, esp. 83-84.

antecedently in us as the law of nature. Ethics then, is an individual part of this programme, as opposed to economics and politics, as it teaches man how the duties guided by the imperative of perfection can be satisfied irrespective of those imposed by a civil authority such as a state or smaller communities. Evidently, both the law of nature and ethics require knowledge of God to be fully articulated, and knowing God philosophically requires a natural theology that follows a demonstrative i.e. mathematical method, in contrast to the theology that is based on sacred scripture and divine revelation. Ethics is a discipline we can abide with in our original state before entering into any social groups, simply by following the understanding of the law of nature. Though conditioned by the law of nature, through the capacity of our own reason, which leaves us room for determination of our actions on our part, we can apply the law of nature to all three fields of practical philosophy: ethics, economics, and politics. Ethics precedes the other fields in terms of affinity with the law of nature, since it requires the least amount of effort to transfer the knowledge of the law to our concrete actions.

Finally, to present the full picture of Wolff's practical philosophy, we need to mention his notion of a "universal practical philosophy":

> That part of philosophy which treats of the general theory and practice of practical philosophy I call universal practical philosophy. I have defined it as the affective practical science of directing free actions by the most general rules. (PD 70)

Similarly to the law of nature, Wolff defines the position of universal practical philosophy as follows:

> Universal practical philosophy must precede ethics, economics, and politics. Universal practical philosophy explains the general theory and practice of practical philosophy (PD 70). Therefore ethics, economics, and politics, which are special parts of practical philosophy (PD 62, 64, 65, 67), use its principles. Now the parts of philosophy are to be so ordered that those parts come first which provide principles for the other parts (PD 87). Therefore,

> universal practical philosophy must precede ethics, economics, and politics. (PD 103)

This is a relatively simple logical explanation of how universal practical philosophy precedes other parts of practical philosophy. In addition, there is a clear description of how fundamental it is to his larger philosophical system, showing its metaphysical foundation in a demonstrative way:

> Universal practical philosophy explains the general theory and practice of all the parts of practical philosophy (PD 70). In establishing such general notions, it should appeal in many ways to natural theology and psychology. He who is familiar with these two disciplines will understand why. Therefore, universal practical philosophy borrows principles from natural theology and psychology. Finally, practical philosophy, as well as the rest of philosophy, must use in its demonstrations the universal notions which are developed in ontology. This is quite apparent in the formulation of practical philosophy. Thus practical philosophy also borrows principles from ontology. From what we have proven, it is clear that practical philosophy borrows principles from ontology, psychology, and natural theology, which are the parts of metaphysics (PD 79). Therefore, if everything in universal practical philosophy is to be demonstrated, then principles must be borrowed from metaphysics. (PD 92)

The scope of universal practical philosophy is larger than that of the natural law. It moves through natural theology to psychology, ontology, and finally to metaphysics. When it comes to its application to all the parts of practical philosophy, however, Wolff does not seem to say anything. He seems to speak only of how the corollary goes back to its metaphysical foundation. In any case, some kind of law without content permeates his practical philosophy, which he terms universal practical philosophy, whereas the other law, the law of nature, works as a law with content that categorically teaches humans what is good and what is evil.

2. Wolff's ethics

2.1. Natural theology

As will be discussed in detail when we turn to the first part of Baumgarten's ethics, it is striking that the first 149 sections of his *Ethica* are dedicated to the relationship between rational knowledge and knowledge through faith. This was a crucial issue for the German rationalists. The issue remains a central one all the way to Kant, who famously writes in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith".[109] On this basis, it is important to investigate, however, briefly, the relationship between rational knowledge and faith as seen by Wolff.

For Wolff, God, human souls, and material bodies are the three main objects of philosophy. We cannot doubt their existence even if we cannot demonstrate them initially through philosophical procedures:

> We do not deny that other beings besides bodies, souls, and God exist. Nor do we doubt what Sacred Scripture teaches regarding the existence of angels. We are only saying that before we philosophize we know of no genera of beings which are proper objects of philosophy except souls, bodies, God, their Author. Indeed, we cannot now demonstrate God's existence since philosophy has not yet been developed. But we admit this here for probable reasons, just as we admit the difference between souls and bodies. For we philosophize in order to acquire certain knowledge of the

[109] For an account of this expression in relation to Kant's adaptation to social order, see Terry P. Pinkard, "The Revolution in Philosophy (I): Autonomy and the Moral Order", in Pinkard, Terry P. *German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 58.

> things which we know confusedly by the senses and by reflection on ourselves. (PD 56)

God, souls, and bodies are objects whose existence we cannot doubt even if this knowledge is initially derived from our confused senses. The task of philosophy consists precisely in articulating clear definitions of these entities, and through the laws of rigorous demonstration establishing the necessity for their existence and on that basis, their fundamental attributes. But to begin with their existence must be presumed in order to define the parts of philosophy. Among these objects of inquiry and their corresponding philosophical disciplines, God, as studied by "natural theology", is the most important since it grounds all the rest (via the founding role of metaphysics). But of course the problem that this raises immediately, given the specificity of this object of inquiry, is that rational knowledge has to justify its position in relation to knowledge through faith.

Wolff proceeds to describe the tasks of natural theology as follows:

> He who can demonstrate what is possible through God knows what is present in God. The things which are present in God are called his attributes. And the things which are known to be able to occur through God by the power of these attributes are his operations, for example, the creation and conservation of the universe. Hence, it is clear that natural theology must treat of the attributes and operations of God… [W]e conceived natural theology in the general terms by which it is deduced as a special definition from the general definition of philosophy. (PD 57)

Wolff argues that unlike Christian theologians, philosophers are able to "demonstrate": in other words, they can follow the rigorous procedure of seeing the necessary chain that takes us from "knowing" what is possible through God, to what is present in Him, and to His operations. Even if philosophers begin with confused intuitions, thanks to the definition of what it is to philosophise, that is, "demonstrating" and "knowing" the object, once the existence of God is proven, they can proceed to analyse those intuitions. Once the definition of God as the

object of scientific investigation has been secured, they can logically extract His attributes as well. Natural theology, in this connection, is a philosophical doctrine in the same manner as other philosophical doctrines are in their common capacity to deduce scientifically from what is possible through the object to its actual attributes, and from this to its operations. This is exactly what Kant criticises later, since he thinks that the science of God is impossible compared with other possible objects of scientific treatment.

Wolff's scientific demonstration of God begins with a twofold proof of His existence, *a posteriori* and *a priori*. The *a posteriori* proof of God's existence provided in *Theologia Naturalis* (TN) is as follows:

> The human soul exists or we exist. Since nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is rather than is not, a sufficient reason must be given why our soul exists, or why we exist. Now this reason is contained in ourselves or in some other being diverse from us. But if you maintain that we have the reason of our existence in a being which, in turn, has the reason of its existence in another, you will not arrive at the sufficient reason unless you come to a halt at some being which does have the sufficient reason of its own existence in itself. Therefore, either we ourselves are the necessary being, or there is given a necessary being other and diverse from us. Consequently, a necessary being exists. (TN I, §24)[110]

In this proof, Wolff starts from the Cartesian fact that the human soul undoubtedly exists (since it can make this assumption) and from it derives the existence of God with the help of the principle of sufficient reason. The use of this principle in proving the existence of God is a very good example of what Wolff saw as the productive, demonstrative force of this seemingly abstract principle.

On the other hand, his *a priori* proof of God's existence is as follows:

[110] As cited in Corr, "The Existence of God", 109-10.

> God contains all compossible[111] realities in the absolutely highest degree. But He is possible. Wherefore, since the possible can exist, existence can belong to it. Consequently, since existence is a reality, and since realities are compossible which can belong to a being, existence is in the class of compossible realities. Moreover, necessary existence belongs to God or, what is the same, God necessarily exists. (TN II, §21)[112]

How, then, can we demonstrate God's attributes? According to Wolff, the principle of philosophy common to all its parts is: those things should come first through which subsequent things are understood or demonstrated. Once the existence of God is established as having sufficient reason for the contingently existing universe, then we can demonstrate the divine attributes (PD 131). They derive from the image of Him as a necessary being. They are: necessary existence, *ens a se* (being in and from itself), eternity, simplicity, as well as understanding and will.[113] According to Wolff, these attributes derive from the very existence of God as the idea of a perfect being.

2.2. The relationship between faith and reason

How then does Wolff mediate between natural theology and "revealed" theology based on sacred scripture? He states:

> He who philosophizes according to the philosophical method cannot defend what is contrary to revealed truth. For he who philosophizes according to the philosophical method accepts only what has been sufficiently demonstrated (PD 117, 118)… Now it cannot be demonstrated here that philosophical or natural truth cannot contradict revealed truth, but we will prove this in its proper place. Therefore, he who philosophizes according to

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[111] Compossibles are matters that are possible in themselves and in relation to each other. See ibid, 113.

[112] As cited ibid., 115.

[113] Anton Bissinger, *Die Struktur der Gotteserkenntnis. Studien zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs* (Bonn: H. Bouvier & Co. Verlag, 1970), 275-76.

the philosophical method should not defend what is contrary to revealed truth. (PD 163)

According to Wolff in *German Metaphysics* (GM), there is a sharp division between theology and philosophy concerning their object. Whereas the former treats of supernatural truths, the latter accounts for natural truths (GM §381).[114] Accordingly, when he says that these two types of truths do not contradict each other, it is because their object is actually different.

In this context, how Wolff deals with the relationship between faith and reason is the focal point because he makes an effort to preserve faith in God while trying at the same time to maintain the possibility of knowing the truths of God through demonstration by reason alone. Wolff found it necessary to establish natural theology as a special part of his philosophy, defining it as adhering strictly to the rules of philosophy. His specific intention was to distinguish this special realm from the revealed theology that deals with faith exclusively from the perspective of Biblical revelation.[115]

It is misleading, however, to stress overly the difference between these two types of theology. According to Jean Ecole, as regards Wolff's rationalism, scholars mostly focus on the relationship between reason and experience, and the link between reason and faith has not been sufficiently acknowledged. There is an assumption that Wolff was an intransigent rationalist who operated an *a priori* "transcendent" concept of reason (to echo Kant) that does not require any reference to experience and revealed truth.[116] To counter this prejudice, Ecole provides a list of passages in *Theologia Naturalis* which clarify the argument Wolff put forward. First, it is true that Wolff asserts that revealed truths cannot be known by reason alone, and rely upon the illumination of the Holy Spirit. This does amount to a claim about the lack of rationality of revealed truths. More precisely, however, the claim is that reason must be illuminated first to reach certainty. Revealed theology

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[114] Mario Casula, "Die Theologia naturalis von Christian Wolff: Vernunft und Offenbarung", in *Christian Wolff 1679-1754: Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung,* ed. Werner Schneiders (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 133.

[115] Thomas P. Saine, "Who's afraid of Christian Wolff?", 104.

[116] See Charles. A. Corr, "The Existence of God", 105-18. This article devotes itself to a detailed investigation into natural theology, but it does not even mention revealed theology.

is still a form of rational knowledge: it is the rational knowledge provided by God that calls for the illumination of reason, and is not a religious realm differentiated completely from natural theology based solely on the use of reason alone.

Ecole thus shows that we should not believe that the method would differ between the two types of theology. In fact it should be the same, following the model of mathematics. Both types of theology follow the scientific method, offering initial definitions, articulating propositions, and giving demonstrations. For Wolff, it is definitely the case that we can apply this method to revealed theology itself, contrary to the common prejudice. For him, the Scriptures are logically and necessarily consistent, and provide the subject matter for a systematically coherent theology called "dogmatic theology". Contrary to common prejudice, Wolff therefore does not reject the idea of revealed truths and even considers them to be rationally presented. He aims at a rational translation of revealed truths, which explains why he stresses the transition from exegetical to dogmatic theology.[117]

Concerning natural theology and its relation to revelation, Mario Casula introduces other important distinctions, showing how Wolff attempted to accommodate the teaching from Revelation within his strong rationalism. Casula shows that we should distinguish between two types of revealed truths: namely, *articuli puri* and *articuli mixti*. The former are the truths that are known only through revelation and cannot be known by reason. The latter are the truths that are known both from revelation and reason. In order to be such truths they must have a logical relationship with each other, as is the case with natural truths.[118] Interpretations of some revealed truths in certain texts in scripture can be false, however. This means that *articuli mixti* include false interpretations. Whereas true revealed truths have a logical relationship with each other, false ones are logically in contradiction. This falsity comes about, for example, when what one interprets as the content of a certain text in scripture contradicts a scientifically demonstrable fact. Wolff gives an example of the fact that the earth is round and not a hemisphere, which contradicts what is written in scripture (PD 163). What philosophers can do is either to confirm theology when it teaches us true *articuli*

[117] Jean Ecole, "Les rapports de la raison et de la foi selon Christian Wolff", *Studia Leibnitiana: Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Philosophie und der Wissenschaften* 15 (1983): 205-14, esp. 205-8.
[118] Casula, "Die Theologia naturalis von Christian Wolff", 135-36.

mixti, or to correct it if they are false. Accordingly, philosophers cannot be against scripture itself, but only against its interpretation by certain theologians. On the other hand, however, there is no chance for philosophers to oppose *articuli puri* because they are absolutely true, even though they cannot be known by reason. Whereas Ecole thinks revealed truths do not contradict reason because they can be translated into the words of reason, Casula assumes a realm that is unknowable by reason and constitutes an independent part of revealed truths. Revealed truths and reason do not contradict each other in either case, however, and rational demonstration extends as far as revealed truths.

2.3. The concepts of perfection and obligation

The key concept in Wolff's moral philosophy is that of perfection. It directly influenced the way in which Baumgarten approached his ethics. The notion first appears in Wolff's correspondence with Leibniz.[119] Leibniz responds to a question posed by the young mathematics lecturer, giving a very clear description of his concept of perfection:

> The perfection about which you ask is the degree of positive reality, or what comes to the same thing, the degree of affirmative intelligibility, so that something more perfect is something in which more things worthy of observation [*notatu digna*] are found.[120]

As described in the previous chapter, Leibniz distinguishes between three aspects of the concept of perfection: (1) positive reality (what a thing is as opposed to the lack of it); (2) affirmative intelligibility (the positive reasons which explain how the thing is as it is and why it is and why it behaves in this or that way, and the way in which all things are brought together by the order of reason); (3) observability (the contemplation or knowledge of these two aspects of perfection). In this connection,

[119] In his youth, Wolff actively engaged in correspondence with Leibniz from 1704 to the latter's death in 1716. See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 230.
[120] Ibid.

to speak like Kant, Leibniz conceives of no distinction between reasons for things and things in themselves, since he thinks that all reasons for things are observable to the extent that we can thoroughly anatomise the entire constitution of things including their attributes and operations.

In another definition of perfection from an "aesthetic" perspective, Leibniz stressed harmony in variety as the ground of observability:

> Perfection is the harmony of things, or the state where everything is worthy of being observed, that is, the state of agreement [*consensus*] or identity in variety; you can even say that it is the degree of contemplatibility [*considerabilitas*].[121]

Wolff's concept of obligation derives directly from this Leibnizian concept of perfection:

> I need the notion of perfection for dealing with morals. For, when I see that some actions tend toward our perfection and that of others, while others tend toward our imperfection and that of others, the sensation of perfection excites a certain pleasure [*voluptas*] and the sensation of imperfection a displeasure [*nausea*]. And the emotions [*affectus*], by virtue of which the mind is, in the end, inclined or disinclined, are modifications of this pleasure and displeasure; I explain the origin of natural obligation in this way. [122] As soon as the perfection toward which the action tends, and which it indicates, is represented in the intellect, pleasure arises, which causes us to cling more closely to the action that we should contemplate. And so, once circumstances overflowing with good for us others have been noticed, the pleasure is

[121] Ibid., 233-34.

[122] Similarly to Wolff, Baumgarten defines the concept of obligation in *Initia*, in relation to what they both commonly conceive as "nature": "[O]bligation can sufficiently be known through nature, powers of reason, and the analogue of reason, E §15; M §640. It can also sufficiently be known from the nature of good and bad things freely committed or avoided, and from the nature of the human being and of the human soul, M §758" (Initia § 39). As a comment on this section, Kant defines the concept of obligation in relation to God's absolute freedom: "For God the morally good is subjectively necessary and [therefore] He is free. Human beings, in this regard, are bound. *obligatio*" (Refl 19:23, Reflexion 6482).

> modified and is transformed into an emotion by virtue of which the mind is, at last, inclined toward appetition. And from this inborn disposition toward obligation, I deduce all practical morals, properly enough. From this also comes the general rule or law of nature that our actions ought to be directed toward the highest perfection of ourselves and others.[123]

The concept of obligation has two different levels. On the one hand, the ultimate goal of human action is simply to approximate the highest degree of perfection as far as is possible in us and in the world around us, including and especially in others. Thus the general definition of the concept of obligation is that it represents the practical force of motivation arising from an intellectual understanding (contemplation or observation) of an action's aim of perfection. On the other hand, the account of obligation is also based on a sensualist element in Wolff's moral philosophy. According to this account, we are by "the law of nature (*ius naturae*)" inclined towards good and disinclined towards bad. In other words, we perceive a sensation of the rational order, presupposing the idea of natural inclination towards perfection. The key assumption here is again Leibnizian, since Leibniz defines pleasure as the perception of perfection. Human beings feel pleasure if they see harmony in things. Leibniz does not positively include any sensualist connotation in the definition of pleasure, however. In this connection, Wolff has a different angle on the concept of pleasure from Leibniz's, assuming that the inclination towards the highest degree of perfection originates in moral worth and goodness in the objective essence of humankind. In any case, both Leibniz and Wolff agree that the enhancement of pleasure is, either intellectually or sensually, the origin of obligation. It is through the law of nature that a person is obliged to seek perfection (formulated as duties towards ourselves and others).[124]

Regarding types of duties, Wolff simply follows the traditional categorisation, for instance, of Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), who divides all duties into three groups: duties towards God, duties towards oneself, and duties towards

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[123] Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 231-32.

[124] Matt Hettche, "Christian Wolff", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2006 Edition), accessed 30 October 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wolff-christian/.

others. Following this categorisation, in *Philosophia moralis sive ethica methodo scientifica pertractata* (4 vols; Halle, 1750), Wolff devotes three of the five parts to describing these three kinds of duties.[125] Nonetheless, by asserting the independence of natural theology from revealed theology, and by declaring natural philosophy to be a part of philosophy that follows the scientific method, Wolff succeeded in separating the duties towards God from the other two kinds of duties concerning humans. By so doing, he defined the latter two sorts of duties as independent of the existence of God on the basis of the metaphysical groundings of his natural theology, even though the duties concerning humans cannot be defined without reference to natural theology. Despite the major rupture he introduced to moral philosophy, Kant remained tied to this, since he also distinguished the duties towards God from the other two kinds of duties, but not by reference to natural theology.

It is interesting here to take a small detour and briefly consider an essay by Kant written in 1763, in which the young philosopher considered the relationship between ethical principles and natural theology. Towards the end of the essay entitled "Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality, being an answer to the question proposed for consideration by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences for the year 1763 (1764)", Kant directly addresses the issue of the certainty of the principles of natural theology as ground for the principles of morality. The argument made by the early Kant is particularly interesting as it directly (if critically) discusses the Wolffian grounding of ethics. However critical the early Kant might have been, the discussion shows how influential the Wolffian grounding of ethics continued to be at that time, as will also be shown when we focus on Baumgarten's treatment of the subject. Kant's aim in this text is a sceptical one: he seeks to map out the terrain of theoretical and practical philosophy, and identify the as yet undemonstrated principles upon which the different theoretical inquiries are founded, from mathematics to metaphysics, natural theology, and ethics. When he goes on to talk about ethics (in

[125] Etienne Gilson, "Christian Wolff", in *Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant*, ed. Etienne Gilson and Thomas Langan (New York: Random House, 1963), 496 n. 18.

the very last section), he points out how abstract the main concept, the concept of obligation, remains:

> I shall merely show how little even the fundamental concept of *obligation* is yet known, and how far practical philosophy must still be from furnishing the distinctness and the certainty of the fundamental concepts and the fundamental principles which are necessary for certainty in these matters. The formula by means of which every obligation is expressed is this: one *ought* to do this or that and abstain from doing the other.[126]

The problem, according to Kant at that time, is that the abstract formula of obligation requires a material principle to lead to specific obligations, but such a principle cannot be demonstrated. It is simply given to us through the feeling of the good:

> The rule: perform the most perfect action in your power, is the first *formal ground* of all obligation *to act*. Likewise, the proposition: abstain from doing that which will hinder the realisation of the greatest possible perfection, is the first *formal ground* of the duty to *abstain from acting*. And just as, in the absence of any material first principles, nothing flowed from the first formal principles of our judgements of the truth, so here no specifically determinate obligation flows from these two rules of the good, unless they are combined with indemonstrable material principles of practical cognition.[127]

Similarly, earlier in the section, Kant stated his main point in relation to the indemonstrability of the principles of moral action:

> I ought to advance the total greatest perfection; or: I ought to act in accordance with the will of God. To whichever of these two principles the

[126] Immanuel Kant, "Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764)", in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 272.
[127] Ibid., 273.

> whole practical philosophy is to be subordinated, the principle chosen must, if it is to be a rule and ground of obligation, command the action as being immediately necessary and not conditional upon some end. And here we find that such an immediate supreme rule of all obligation must be absolutely indemonstrable.[128]

The argument, and indeed the expressions chosen by Kant to discuss the problem of the knowledge of the principles of moral action, refer directly to Wolff. It rejects Wolff's rationalistic optimism which assumes that all forms of knowledge are demonstrable scientifically; that is, according to the method of philosophy, including the knowledge of the principles of practice. By contrast, Kant holds that some forms of knowledge are undemonstrable, considering them to be postulates containing the indispensable foundations of all the other practical principles. Although these postulates cannot be proven, they open up some sorts of knowledge reflectively and morality is one of them. In this context, Kant also refers to "moral feeling" and its advocate Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746).[129] Though at this time Kant considered the postulates to be something similar to moral feeling, he later developed them as "the fact[s] of reason" that shows more clearly their indemonstrability. By 1763, Kant had already moved away from a metaphysical grounding of ethics via the concept of perfection, as advocated by his great predecessors, from Leibniz to Wolff and Baumgarten.

2.4. The problem of freedom

When it comes to the relationship between Leibniz and Wolff, we should focus on the problem of freedom. For although basically following the framework of Leibniz's *Theodicy* in discussing the problem of freedom, Wolff's notion of it shows some originality, for he claims that God can bring into simultaneous and actual existence other possible worlds in addition to the best one. Leibniz, on the

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[128] Ibid., 272-73.

[129] Ibid., p.272. For an account of the special importance to Kant of Hutcheson, among British empiricists, see Dieter Henrich, "Hutcheson and Kant", in *Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy*, ed. Karl Ameriks et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29-57.

other hand, asserted that this present world is the only actual one God chose as the best of all possible worlds. This argument comes from Wolff's conception of philosophy as a whole, being "the science of the possibles insofar as they can be" (PD 29). For him, as possibilities God can will all that are possible as long as they are compossible. Wolff completely agrees with Leibniz in this regard. The claim that there are numerous other possible worlds which God can realise is Wolff's original idea, however. As a result, Wolff cannot base obligation, virtue, and the highest moral good upon the will of God because it is possible that God can will all as long as they are compossible, and in this sense God's will cannot be a direction of human moral activities. God rather gave obligations, virtues, and the good a totally immanent basis in human nature and its self-perfection, regardless of God's will, even though moral activities make humans refer to the existence of God.[130]

As a consequence of separation from the realm of God in a sense, the problem of human freedom (and evil) is unambiguous for Wolff, in contrast to Leibniz. Wolff states in *German Ethics*:

> Whatever makes our inner as well as our external condition more perfect is good; whereas whatever makes both more imperfect is evil. For this reason the free acts of men are either good or evil.[131]

Evidently, Wolff's moral principles are quite simple, and can, together, be formulated as an imperative: "aim at perfections and avoid imperfections". Moreover, his conviction that human actions are not determined by God's will is clear from the following:

> Because the free acts of men become good or evil by virtue of their consequences, and because whatever follows from them is a necessary

[130] Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy*, 142.
[131] Cited in Fritz Brüggemann ed., *Deutsche Literatur: Sammlung literarischer Kunst- und Kulturdenkmaler in Entwicklungsreihen, Reihe Aufklärung Band 2: Das Weltbild der Deutschen Aufklärung: philosophische Grundlagen und literarische Auswirkung: Leibniz, Wolff, Gottsched, Brockes, Haller*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966), 142.

> consequence and cannot fail to come about, they are good or evil in themselves and are not simply made to be so by God's will.[132]

Furthermore, not only irrespective of God's will but also regardless of His existence, human free actions can be good or evil, showing absolute autonomous human morality. However, this is under the condition that autonomous human morality cannot be rationalised to the extent that humans appeal to atheism. He says, on the one hand:

> Therefore even if it were possible that there were no God, and the present state of things could exist without him, the free actions of men would still remain good or evil.[133]

And on the other hand, he claims:

> Therefore it is not atheism which leads him [an atheist] into evil ways, but his lack of knowledge and his error with regard to good and evil.[134]

Accordingly, what matters to Wolff is the knowledge of the moral principles. Wolff's emphasis is on the fact that human beings cannot necessarily possess the full knowledge of these principles. This derives from Wolff's grounding of all things including human actions in metaphysics, i.e., the knowledge of God. He also insists, however, on the autonomy of reason, in the sense that he distinguishes human actions from "natural" occurrences. Here, the oscillation in the relationship between metaphysics and human reason, which was already present in Leibniz, is more emphatically repeated in Wolff. This point is especially important because Kant also wavers between reason and faith. As famously presented in the second preface to the *Critique of Reason*, Kant had to "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (CPR Bxxix-xxx). Although Kant excluded religion from his "pure ethics" (MM 6:488) in the *Doctrine of Virtue* in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), he

[132] Cited ibid., 142.
[133] Cited ibid., 143.
[134] Cited ibid., 147.

had to postulate God as an idea for the purpose of establishing practical reason distinguishable from theoretical reason. I will discuss this point in the next chapter.

Chapter four: Kant's grounding of ethics in religion

1. Theoretical theology

Before launching into the commentary on Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica*, it is important to assess the extent to which Kant differs from Leibniz and Wolff regarding the grounding of morality. This examination will show that although Kant in fact constructed his moral philosophy on the elaboration of the metaphysical apparatuses these rationalists prepared, he altered the basic premises they held concerning the relationship between metaphysics and ethics, philosophy and religion, and reason and faith.

As I will discuss later, Baumgarten began to discuss morality only after he had finished a lengthy discussion of religion and its foundational role in the theory of morality. He devoted 149 of the 500 sections for this sole purpose; the two main objects of ethics, "duties towards oneself" and "duties towards others", are preceded by a detailed analysis of "duties towards God". This contrasts starkly with Kant, who rejected the grounding of ethics in metaphysics and theology, and with it, the very notion of "duties towards God" in the *Doctrine of Virtue*.[135]

Nevertheless, Kant was influenced to a considerable extent by Baumgarten's framework, which established an essential link between morality and religion. In his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793) published just four years before the *Doctrine of Virtue*, it is clear that Kant continued to struggle with the detailed topics of religion that were discussed by Baumgarten in his *Ethica*. Of course, even if he wished to restrict reference to religion to the "boundaries of mere reason", that is, in defiance of the earlier grounding of morality in metaphysical and theological knowledge, Kant's conception of the highest good retained a substantive link with the notion of God as the monarch of a kingdom of ends, and to other religious notions like the immortality of the soul (R 6:5, 6:157). In other

[135] "[I]t is clear that in ethics, as pure practical philosophy of internal lawgiving, only the moral relations of *human beings to human beings* are comprehensible by us. The question of what sort of moral relation holds between God and human beings goes completely beyond the bounds of ethics and is altogether incomprehensible for us. This, then, confirms [...] that ethics cannot extend beyond the limits of human beings' duties to one another". (MM 6:491)

words, contrary to common perception, Kant retained considerable reliance on metaphysical arguments in the development of his ethics.

I will now look briefly at the place taken by theology and metaphysical knowledge in Kant's ethics. By considering how Kant maintained some reference to theological and metaphysical arguments in his ethics, despite his well-known ban on any kind of metaphysical and theological knowledge, I aim to complete the presentation of the frame in which Baumgarten's ethics developed. The chapters on Leibniz and Wolff sought to reveal the ground upon which Baumgarten's *Ethica* grew, and to highlight the key concepts and methodological assumptions he inherited from his immediate predecessors. It is equally important to bear in mind the Kantian way of linking ethics to theology and metaphysics, as Kant's departure from the *Ethica* makes the latter's originality stand out.

Kant's thinking about theology has two distinct aspects, the moral and the metaphysical, which gives rise to the distinction between a "moral theology" and a "rational theology". Kant criticises the latter, and yet the contents of moral faith, for which, as the *Critique of Pure Reason* famously declared, "room was made" by establishing the ground devoid of metaphysical knowledge (Bxxx), in fact still depends on the rational aspect of theology. As Allen Wood has argued, rational theology, for all the criticism Kant levels at it, does in fact retain positive and constructive aspects, in terms of how the concept of a supreme being in a theoretical sense is transferred to the practical realm of a philosophy in which the concept takes on practical connotations.[136]

The key aspect justifying retention of a reference to the discipline of rational theology is that, even though there can be no knowledge of God in the strong sense, the concept of God is natural to human reason.[137] An affinity can be discovered in

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[136] Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009; first issued in 1978), 9-10.

[137] "[H]uman reason contains not only ideas but also ideals, which do not, to be sure, have a creative power like the **Platonic** idea, but still have **practical** power (as regulative principles) grounding the possibility of the perfection of certain **actions**. Moral concepts are not entirely pure concepts of reason, because they are grounded on something empirical (pleasure or displeasure). But in regard to the principle through which reason places limits on a freedom which is in itself lawless, they can nevertheless serve quite well (if one attends merely to their form) as examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue, and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are ideas. But the sage (of the Stoics) is an ideal, i.e., a human being who exists merely in thoughts, but who is fully congruent with the

particular by rationally reflecting on the concept of an individual thing in general.[138] In making this claim, Kant shows his continuing indebtedness to Baumgarten, since the argument typically derives a metaphysical object from an analysis of the structures of reason.

"Rational theology" is the theory explicating how reality or being is metaphysically constituted, starting with the fundamental premise that God is the highest reality or the most perfect being in a primarily logical sense. This premise is exactly that of Wolff and Baumgarten, both of whom presume that reality/realities or beings have different degrees of perfection that can be measured by taking as a standard the being with the maximum of reality, i.e. God. Following directly in their footsteps, Kant equally defines "reality" in relation to "negation" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in terms of degrees of "perfection", that is, degrees of positive reality:

> Reality is the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of the two thus takes place in the distinction of one and the same time as either a filled and an empty time. […] Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, through which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an object, until it ceases in nothingness (= 0 = *negatio*). Hence there is a relation and connection between, or rather a transition from reality and negation,

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idea of wisdom. Thus just as the idea gives the **rule**, so the ideal in such a case serves as the **original image** for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy; and we have in us no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this *divine human being*, with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard. These ideals, even though one may never concede them objective reality (existence), are nevertheless not to be regarded as mere figments of the brain; rather, they provide an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, in order to assess and measure the degree and the defects of what is incomplete. [...] That is how it is with the ideal of reason [...]" (CPR A569-70/B597-98; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original; italics mine).

[138] Allen W. Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 397.

> that makes every reality representable as a quantum [...]. (CPR A143/B182-83)

If every individual thing has its degree of reality, and consequently, as a finite thing, its degree of negation, in turn we are logically, "rationally", led to the idea of a ladder of thoroughness, from beings with the lowest to the highest degree of reality. The concept of God is to be understood as the most perfect form of reality in this logical, transcendental sense.

A key aspect of this logical-metaphysical definition of God relates to the problem of determinability, that is, the question of how the concept of an individual thing is to be determined. This problem was famously answered for German philosophers by the Leibnizian principle that each individual thing differs qualitatively from all others.[139] As Kant put it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> Every **concept**, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of **determinability**: that of **every two** contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it [...]. (CPR A571/B579; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

This initial principle, "based on the law of contradiction", concerns only the form of knowledge and not its content. It is complemented by the "principle of thorough determination", according to which

> [I]t [the principle] represents every thing as deriving its own possibility from the share it has in the whole of all possibilities. (CPR A572/B600)

This logical perspective on determinability draws on and details less articulated definitions of the principle of determinability given by both Wolff and Baumgarten. According to Wolff:

[139] Ibid.

> [W]hatever exists or is actual is thoroughly determined.[140]
>
> The thorough determination inhering in actual being is their principle of individuation or thisness (*haecceitas*).[141]

Similarly, Baumgarten states:

> The complex of all determinations compossible in a being is its *thorough determination*. Hence a being is either determined thoroughly, or determined less than this. The former is a particular (an individual), the latter is a universal. (M §148)

This transcendental principle that Kant articulates to spell out the conditions of determinability relies on the concept of all possible predicates and how they fit together. The very thought of a thing being determined in its predicates thus inevitably leads to the concept of the sum of all realities, or possibility "in its entirety" as the entirety of all possible predicates, in other words, what Kant names, following the classical denomination, the *ens realissimum*.[142]

From this basic determination of the *ens realissimum* as "total possession of reality", a number of other predicates necessarily follow: namely, that this being has to be an individual, "original being" (every other reality is only derivative); it is the "highest being" (CPR A578/B606) (no reality can be above it) or, "the being of all beings " (CPR A579/B607); it is "singular, simple, all-sufficient, eternal" (CPR A580/B608). In brief, the thought that develops on the basis of the determinability of any thing because of the totality of reality is simply that of God, "thought of in a transcendental sense" (CPR A580/B608).

But of course Kant immediately adds that this concept does not "signify the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but only that of an **idea** to **concepts**" (CPR A579/B607; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original). God as

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[140] Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (Halle: Olms, 1962), 2:3:187-9 [cited in Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology*, 38].
[141] Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2:3:187-9 [cited ibid].
[142] Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion", 397-98.

the ideal of reason remains a "transcendent" being in the sense that the ideal lies beyond human experience. This idea is required to be "transcendental" because, without it, it is not possible for us to conceive of the complete determination of an individual thing. The idea of God is the sum of reality in a transcendental sense, the preeminent ground which we should presume for the possibility of any complete determination of an individual thing at all. This concept is not only a universal one, but also the concept of "an individual primordial being" as one single possibility from which all other possibilities of things derive (CPR A581/B609).

This is how Kant developed the concept of God from the perspective of "transcendental idealism". Even though, as we shall see, Kant argues that we cannot demonstrate the existence of God in a strict sense, the *Critique of Pure Reason* nevertheless maintains the possibility and indeed the necessity of such a "transcendental theology". The latter does not demonstrate the existence of God, but shows that the idea of God is a necessary idea for human reason, as it is necessarily implied in the notion of a thing's full determinability.

Kant thus continues to follow Wolff and Baumgarten: from a strictly logical, or as he says "transcendental" perspective, the individual realities that fill the world are grounded on a primordial being that is the absolute condition for their complete determination or, more simply, for their reality. Negation, then, is premised on this idea of a full determination of being.[143] In this sense, Kant considers it to be possible to derive all the predicates of God from the metaphysical consideration of the concept of God as containing all possible predicates, which each individual thing partly shares in this present world.

Since what is at stake in this concept of "the ideal of reason" is the metaphysical foundation of the world, from this perspective the existence of God is merely hypothetical, only a matter of possibility. After drawing the portrait of God

[143] See CPR A 578/B 606. In *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*, Kant refers to this concept when trying to work out the idea of God in relation to negations: "But what are negations? They are nothing but limitations of realities. For no negation can be thought unless the positive has been thought previously. How could I think of a mere deficiency, of darkness without a concept of light, or poverty without a concept of prosperity? Thus if every negative concept is derived in that it always presupposes a reality, then as a consequence every thing in its thorough determination as an *ens partim reale*, *partim negativum* presupposes an *ens realissimum*" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, 28, 2, 2, pp. 1013f; *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*, pp. 44f) [cited in Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology*, 35].

as *ens realissimum* in direct reference to his predecessors, Kant demonstrates in the following sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that this concept in no way allows us to derive from it the proof of the existence of God. Most significantly, amongst the three possible routes one could take to demonstrate the existence of God (the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological),[144] the first one, because it turns out to be an impasse, undermines the other two.[145]

Once the ontological proof is undermined, the proceeding two proofs lose their validity as well. This is, of course, one of the most influential teachings of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Existence is not a real predicate"; "It is not anything that could be added to the concept of a thing" (CPR A599/B626).[146] As a result, even what used to be supposed to be the most basic predicate "is" or "exists", turns out to not be a reality or perfection which might be contained in the concept of a thing.[147]

> Now If we take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say **God is**, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the **object** in relation to my **concept**. Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely (through the expression, "it is"), nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible (CPR A599/B627; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

God's predicates (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) are all merely possible and we cannot prove the existence of these predicates, nor for that matter, the existence of God Himself. The two statements "something is possible" and "something is existent" cannot necessarily be compatible because to

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[144] For a reassessment of Kant's critique of the threefold arguments of natural theology, see Peter Byrne, *Kant on God* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 37-55.
[145] See Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion", 398-99, for a concise explanation of the three possible routes to the proof of God's existence.
[146] Wood's translation cited ibid., 400.
[147] Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion", 399-400.

say something is possible is equivalent to saying that it is totally open as to whether something exists or not. Denying the possibility to prove the existence of God on a metaphysical basis therefore explains why Kant claims that he has to make room for faith, since for him God cannot be known on a metaphysical or theoretical basis.

How, then, can God be posited at all in relation to Kant's overall critical system of reason?[148] As he famously put it in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> Thus I cannot even **assume God, freedom, and immortality** for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, and thus declare all **practical extension** of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny **knowledge** in order to make room for **faith;** and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic. (CPR Bxxix-xxx; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

Taken on its own, and if we emphasise the point about "denying knowledge", this statement seems to confirm the widespread notion that Kant completely breaks with his rationalist predecessors and, as it were, "never looks back".[149] Yet, if the statement is read retrospectively from the perspective of the necessity of a rational theology as depicting the "ideal of reason", things become more complex. In effect, the passage on "faith" means that one must continue to presume a rational

[148] Pamela Sue Anderson and Jordan Bell, *Kant and Theology* (London: T & T Clark, 2010), 12.
[149] For a typical account of Kant's break with the rationalist tradition, see Terry P. Pinkard, "The Revolution in Philosophy (I): Human Spontaneity and the Natural Order", in Pinkard, *German Philosophy, 1760-1860*, 27-28, 37, 43-44.

theology at the very source of one's moral predicament,[150] which derives from the fact that there are things that human beings cannot theoretically know but are forced to assume in order to make sense of the necessity with which some key moral notions impose themselves on reason. This delocalised rational theology in turn looks very much like a legacy from the work of the metaphysicians just dismissed.

But this is not the end of the matter. Kant explicitly acknowledges the achievement of his "great" predecessors, typically evaluating Baumgarten as an "excellent analyst" (CPR B35). But the predecessors, and in particular, Baumgarten, make the mistake of putting too much trust in an uncritical reliance upon the omnipotence of metaphysical knowledge. This mistake is not just a theoretical one. As the Preface makes clear, the consequence of this mistake is that it eventually undermines the very moral realm that it was supposed to secure. For the sake of morality, Kant insists, human beings endowed with limited knowledge must "believe" in the realities securing the other realm of knowledge that is practically required. This belief cannot rely on the assumption that our knowledge can be complete on a metaphysical basis alone. On the contrary, the scrutiny of reason involves practical knowledge that cannot be known but must be believed, no matter how contradictory this may seem. If we take "believe" and "think" as synonyms in the following passage, it is clear that what is at stake for Kant in terms of establishing practical knowledge is the autonomy of rational beings:[151]

> [Though] I cannot **cognize** freedom [...] nevertheless, I can **think** freedom to myself, i.e., the representation of it at least contains no contradiction in itself […]. [F]or *morality* I need nothing more than that freedom should not contradict itself, that it should at least be *thinkable* that it should place no hindrance in the way of the **mechanism of nature** [...]. (CPR Bxxviii-xxix; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original; italics mine)

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[150] Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology*, 10. For a more detailed explanation of this predicament, see, Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009; first issued in 1970), 155-60.

[151] Anderson and Bell, *Kant and Theology*, 20.

Now that we have seen that the freedom and autonomy in the moral action of a rational agent form the backbone of morality, but that the problem of God is crucially important in the exploration of the nature of practical reasoning, that is, moral reasoning, the other aspect of theology, "moral theology", has to be brought to the discussion.[152]

2. Moral faith

Kant does not totally break away from the metaphysical grounding of ethics as presented by Baumgarten, but rather displaces the link between metaphysics, theology, and ethics. According to Kant, one has to gain transcendent, practically grounded rather than theoretically grounded, knowledge of God for the purpose of knowing what to do in action, no matter how contradictory this may seem in relation to his rebuttal of the metaphysical knowledge of God as we have seen above.

Kant first addresses the problem of God, as we have seen, with regard to the metaphysical constitution of the world in the first place and this investigation was called "rational theology". Due to the necessity of setting the moral aspect of theology apart from, but not quite severed from, rational theology, Kant set aside "moral theology". For Kant, what makes religion moral and morality religious is the universality of "reason alone".[153] For Kant, religion can only bind us "within the boundaries of reason alone". But how is this different from what the rationalists, Baumgarten in particular, argued, for they also established a link between morality and religion through what they considered to be a rational route? The difference is

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[152] Ibid., 22-25.

[153] For Kant's claim that the universality of religion is grounded by the universality of reason, see the following passage from the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*: "We have reason to say [...] that 'the Kingdom of God is come into us,' even if only the principle of the gradual transition from ecclesiastical faith to the *universal religion of reason*, and so to a (divine) ethical state on earth, has *put in roots universally* [...]" (R 6:122; italics mine). Also, for Kant's argument that morality leads to religion and not vice versa, which he thinks derives from the concept of the highest good, see another passage from the same book: "if the strictest observance of the moral law is to be thought of as the cause of the ushering in of the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does not suffice to effect happiness in the world proportionate to the worthiness to be happy, an omnipotent moral being must be assumed as ruler of the world, under whose care this would come about i.e., morality leads inevitably to religion" (R 6:7-8).

not so clear since Baumgarten himself, after deducing the existence of God and the necessary predicates from reason alone, immediately went on to add in his *Ethica* that "many things are in God and are posited above your reason" (E 51), thus, in a sense, "making room for faith" and establishing morality's reliance on religion. The difference between Kant and the rationalists, therefore, is not so great, or rather, is far from being straightforward. It lies only in the specific order in which rationality, as inspection of the structures of reason and as possibility of knowledge, morality and religion, is articulated. Kant, as we have just noted, denies the possibility of a contentful theoretical knowledge of God. Theoretically, God is only a necessary ideal, posited by reason, to which no content can be attached, and on which therefore nothing can be built. What comes first are the absolute dictates of human reason to itself, in the form of synthetic a priori propositions. In the theoretical realm, these are the foundations of knowledge in the strong sense (which lead to the ideal of reason). In the practical realm, one such proposition is the imperative to act according to reason, the moral law:

> He judges […] that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him. (CPrR 5:30)

The absoluteness with which morality imposes its commandments on us is one of those absolute "facts of reason" upon which the systems of knowledge can be built. In the practical realm, this fact of reason shows us that we can actually give laws to ourselves and are thus free, self-determining beings.[154] As Kant puts it:

> Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical, although it would be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed; but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required,

[154] Anderson and Bell, *Kant and Theology*, 37.

> which certainly cannot be assumed here. However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding this law *as given*, it must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason which by it announces itself as originally lawgiving (*sic volo, sic jubeo*). (CPrR 5:31)

Practical reason for Kant is not a special realm of reason as opposed to speculative reason.[155] Rather, to use Kant's own expression, the moral law contained in it is a "fact of pure reason".[156] Unlike in the realm of pure theoretical reason, which furnishes pure intuition of space and time and is the condition for empirical intuition, in the realm of practical reason, neither pure nor empirical intuition occurs. Instead, practical reason gives no "material" but only the "form" of the law. In other words, the moral law has no material content but is posited as originally legislative. A moral agent is, as it were, "in fact" free in the exercise of practical reason, whereas theoretical reason can only assume the idea of freedom as possible. Herein lies the *primacy* of practical reason. What comes first is the moral law, which unveils to us the idea of freedom. Upon the absolute command of the moral law, moral agents realise their freedom when they give it to themselves. The very fact that they are self-legislative makes the agents autonomous. In other words, Kant's conception of autonomy is formulated as we act as we ought to, as free, moral and rational agents.[157] By contrast, for Baumgarten, as we will see, an agent has to give up the scrutiny of reason, in the face of the fact that God is the ultimate reality that she can only theoretically know *but not as a fact*. For Baumgarten, there are many

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[155] For an argument that Kant required practical reason where mere speculative reason fails to demonstrate the existence of God, situating it in a historical context, see Maria Rosa Antognazza, "Arguments for the Existence of God: The Continental European Debate", in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, Volume 2*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 742-43. Paul Redding argues that it can be observed in the formulations of the categorical imperative given in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, that the metaphysical themes ejected from the theoretical reason are transposed into the framework of practical reason. See Redding, *Continental Idealism*, 78-79. For a further account of the formulations of the categorical imperative, see Chapter seven, section 1 of the present thesis.

[156] For a detailed analysis of the fact of reason, drawing upon its different interpretations by various commentators, see Christian Onof, "Reconstructing the Grounding of Kant's Ethics: A Critical Assessment", *Kant-Studien* (2009): 496-517, esp. 499-501.

[157] Anderson and Bell, *Kant and Theology*, 43-44.

things in God beyond human reason and therefore he even suggests that we should not "hope to reach them through reasoning" (E §51).

It is on the basis of this self-determination by the agent himself or herself through the use of his or her own rational powers that the "ideal of reason" that is God comes back to play a decisive role. What it means to be a moral agent for Kant gains its full significance only in a wider perspective, when the existence of God is taken into consideration: in other words, in the relationship between religion and philosophy, faith and reason becomes the focal point of moral life. The key concept that reunites knowledge (this time, knowledge of my duty) and faith is "moral faith". Although we cannot demonstrate the existence of God through reason, we need to assume it as a necessary postulate, that is, neither as a principle nor as the result of scientific demonstration but as a necessary complement of our moral destiny.

This is the inverse of Baumgarten's argument, in this respect. Rational theology receives a late confirmation in a sense, in a different field. Its only possible justification is "moral" and therefore it has to be argued in terms of a moral theology.[158] Herein lies the concept of "moral faith" for Kant. The contrast with Baumgarten shows how complex the relationship with the rationalist tradition is. Baumgarten does indeed position religion as a necessary propaedeutic to the study of morality, because God functions already like an "ideal" from which the concept of perfection can be secured. But once this is done, God exits the moral realm and is no longer a postulate that is required to complete the moral picture. Once the metaphysical foundation has been laid, Baumgarten considers that ethics can be demonstrated as a scientific discipline without appealing to "moral faith" at all. This derives from his premise that ethics has to be philosophical, that is, follow the scientific method with no need for a belief in any particular god.

Kant, by contrast, who is supposed to have rid modern philosophy of its metaphysical baggage, is the one who is caught in the paradox of arguing that God cannot be known or His predicates established theoretically but is absolutely required in moral terms, and who for that purpose makes practical reason the

[158] Frederick C. Beiser, "Moral Faith and the Highest Good", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 591.

extension and as it were the culmination of theoretical reason. God is needed as a necessary postulate of our moral life because only this postulate can secure what is ultimately the ground of our moral motivation. We are, Kant thinks, motivated to act as we ought to in the hope that our autonomous and virtuous actions will be rewarded with happiness.[159] Although Kant separates happiness as a natural end from virtue as a moral end, he could not wholly excise it from human life, more particularly as the ultimate source of motivation. Kant acknowledges that we cannot get away from the fact that human beings acting in the world ultimately seek to combine happiness and virtue, the natural end with the moral end, in the course of our life (CPrR 5:110). The "kingdom of ends", which appears in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, secures not just the thought of an ideal moral community in the midst of real existing communities, but also provides the conceptual place for the unavoidable agreement between our moral ends as rational agents who treat each other as ends, and our natural ends as beings with affects and desires. Only the agreement of the latter sort can explain the compatibility of happiness with virtue. God, as ruler of the kingdom of ends, or as the "moral" ideal of reason, is the ultimate point securing the agreement between happiness and virtue. Despite the fact that God is the object of believing, He has a metaphysical substratum in the fact that it secures the concept of the highest good. On the one hand, the highest good is the *supreme* good or the unconditional good under which any conditioned good is subsumed. On the other hand, the highest good is also the *perfect* good and the concept of perfection included in it is logically defined in the first place. In other words, the early rationalist legacy shows up once more in Kant's mature philosophy, this time via his own conceptualisation of the old notion of the highest good. Morality *alone* is the supreme good, whereas happiness in accord with virtue or morality is the perfect good.[160] Although Kant insists that the connection between happiness and virtue is contingent, the highest good presupposes a moral world in which moral ends are ordered, and in which its ultimate source in some "intelligible author" confirms this order in a purely logical

[159] Anderson and Bell, *Kant and Theology*, 31-32. For a detailed account of the relationship between happiness and virtue in Kant, see Eoin O'Connell, "Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good", *Kantian Review* 17, Issue 2 (2012): 257-279.
[160] Beiser, "Moral Faith and the Highest Good", 595.

way. Kant's argument for the postulation of the existence of God is, however, wholly metaphysical. The intelligibility of the connection of happiness and virtue is accessible only to the most perfect being in a logical sense, no matter how contingent this connection "appears" to be to finite beings. Since we cannot know the connection of happiness and virtue with our limited level of understanding, the existence of God is *practically* required as supreme over the moral, not metaphysical, consideration of the highest good. Yet this practical postulate envisions the supreme being who secures and sees through this connection of natural and moral ends. Although the assumption of the supreme being has only a *practical* validity in the sense that we have only *moral* reasons for believing in its existence, ways of addressing and solving the underlying problem remain *metaphysical*.[161]

We could well see in this Kant's deep indebtedness to rationalist metaphysics. Among the rationalists who advocated such metaphysics, it was Baumgarten who exerted the greatest influence on Kant, since the scrutiny of Baumgarten's works constituted the significant part of Kant's philosophical career. For Kant, God is not just possible but necessary if happiness is to be a reward for virtue. In short, Kant himself positions religion as the propaedeutic to the reflection on what morality is.[162] This point is significant, as it clearly denotes the fact that Kant remains deeply indebted to Baumgarten's basic framework of the relationship between faith and reason, religion and philosophy. In its construction, however, Kant also greatly alters Baumgarten's premise. This appears most strikingly in their differing use of the concept of perfection, which Kant rejects as a heteronomous foundation for morality.

In this connection, it is important to consider Kant's critique of perfectionist ethical programmes like that of Baumgarten as versions of rational heteronomy. Kant describes it as the doctrine in which intelligible goods are taken to be

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[161] Ibid., 601-2.

[162] Indeed, Kant even gives a striking remark on Baumgarten's definition of "propaedeutic (*propaedeutica*)" (Initia §87) that it is "theology" (Refl 19:42, *Reflexion* 6510), although Baumgarten himself not only does not mention the term theology in the same section, but also only uses it once (§98) in the entire *Initia*.

independent of moral will itself.[163] As Kant writes in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*:

> Whenever an object of the will must be assumed as the ground for prescribing the rule determining the will, there the rule is nothing but heteronomy; the imperative is conditioned, namely: *if* or *because* one wills this object, one ought to act thus or thus; consequently, it can never command morally, that is, categorically. (G 4:444)

Further, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant repeats this point, making clearer the contrast between "autonomy" and "heteronomy":

> *Autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties in keeping with them; *heteronomy* of choice, on the other hand, not only does not ground any obligation at all but is instead opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will. (CPrR 5:33)

Kant thinks that the object of the moral will must be determined independently of the intelligibility of the object, or put differently, it is determined in terms of the autonomy of the moral will with no prescriptions made beforehand. This claim constitutes, as will be clarified in the course of the discussion of this thesis, the complete opposite of Baumgarten's position in which he thinks intelligible goods such as clarity and certainty must be acquired before one understands the object of the moral will. Kant, however, does not exercise wholesale dismissal of rational heteronomy, as one might imagine, since he ranked the positions of its advocates in terms of their suitability as moral principles. In this ranking, rational moral theories (ranked higher than empirical moral principles) are divided into two schools: the one that is built upon the rational concept of perfection as a possible effect of our will; and the one that is based on an existing perfection (God's will) as the

[163] Douglas Moggach, *Politics, Religion, and Art: Hegelian Debates* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 182.

determining ground of our will.[164] Obviously, as we will see, Baumgarten's position represents the latter. Although Kant preferred the former position and it is ascribed to Wolff,[165] it can be argued that how he derives such a positioning is the result of Kant's wholesale engagement with Baumgarten's *Ethica*. This also constitutes the relevance of Kant's later and full engagement with Baumgarten, as is abundantly testified especially in Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue* in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

At any rate, in order to understand Kant's nuanced dismissal of rational heteronomy, we must identify the concept of perfection as the key concept, as it is commonly central to the two advocates of rational heteronomy. It is to this concept that we now turn to as we begin our reading of Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica*.

[164] Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 266-67.
[165] Ibid., 268.

PART II: Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica*

Chapter five: Baumgarten's definition of ethics and its religious ground

1. Definition of ethics

The larger part of Baumgarten's *Ethics* is dedicated to the theological underpinnings of ethical practice. These are not, however, evident in Baumgarten's definition of the discipline. The definition, which opens his *Ethica*, reads as follows:

> ETHICS (a) (discipline of the pious, honest, seemly man; the science of virtue, moral, practical, ascetic science) is the science of inner human obligations in the natural state. (E §1)[166]

Baumgarten defines ethics on the basis of the type of individual it delineates. In a similar vein to its classical definition (Aristotelian in the first place), in which the virtuous "man" is spelt out, Baumgarten's ethics is construed as a science of virtue, by way of which the "pious, honest" man is depicted. We can observe in the notes on Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, taken by Georg Ludwig Collins in the Winter Semester of 1784-5 that Kant agrees with this point as he argues that ethics is defined in terms of the science of "inner obligations":

> Ethics treats of the *inner goodness* of actions [...]. Ethics [...] refers solely to dispositions. It [...] demands that even those actions to which one can be compelled should be done from *inner goodness* of the dispositions, and not from coercion. [...] [S]o ethics is not a science that should include no coercive laws and actions; on the contrary, it [ethics as a *science*] also extends to coercive actions, though the motivating ground is not coercion, but *inner quality*. Ethics is thus a philosophy of dispositions, and hence a practical

[166] "ETHICA (a) (disciplina pii, honesti, decori, scientia virtutis, moralis, practica, ascetica) est scientia obligationum hominis internarum in statu naturali".

philosophy, for dispositions are basic principles of our actions and serve to couple actions with their motivating ground. (LE 27:299; italics mine)

What is particularly striking about Baumgarten's definition of ethics, however, is that it is significantly short, given that he devotes a full 500 sections to describing this "pious, honest" man. This suggests Baumgarten has no doubt what it means to be ethical or moral. Witness, in particular, his belief that from "the law of nature", every single matter (including non-physical reality of "man") can be extracted since it is underwritten by God, the absolute metaphysical reference point in terms of the concept of perfection. This reference point includes a metaphysically grounded "moral" prescription for finite beings which demands of them that they pursue God's absolute perfection, despite that the fact that because they are finite, they are incapable of completely achieving it.

The second section of Baumgarten's text reiterates the link between ethics and natural law:

> PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS (a) (moral philosophy, the inner law of nature) is the ethics, which can be known, to an extent, without faith. Therefore, philosophical ethics is best demonstrated through scientific method, but not through evidence. (E §2)[167]

The concept of a "law of nature"[168] can be traced back to the Stoics. It informs, for example, Cicero's famous definition: "Law is the highest reason,

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[167] "ETHICA PHILOSOPHICA (a) (philosophia moralis, ius naturae internum) est ethica, quatenus sine fide cognosci potest. Ergo ethica philosophica aptissime methodo scientifica, sed non ex testimoniis, demonstrantur. P. P. p. §. 1, 2".

[168] Baumgarten defines this concept in *Initia* as follows: "The law of nature in the widest sense comprises all natural laws that are sufficiently known from nature and through nature […]" (Initia §65). As a comment on §85 of *Initia* where Baumgarten discusses the antinomy of the moral laws and stakes out what he thinks is the "apparent" (and not true) antinomy of the moral laws, Kant draws our attention to the distinction between the positive law and the law of nature: "Insofar as the duty of a well pleasing person is [given] through the positive law, the duty of an owed person is [given] through the law of nature" (Refl 19:41, *Reflexion* 6508). Although this Kant's statement is ambiguous due to the cryptic nature of his "*Erläuterungen*", it may well be interpreted that Kant distinguishes between the duty as a member of the state of promoting happiness of other members

implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite" (*De Legibus*, I. 18).[169] Later, as we recalled in the previous chapters, eighteenth-century thinkers in the Leibnizian tradition conceived "law" in relation to the perfectibility of human nature as reflection of and striving for God's own perfection.[170] This shift is ambiguous because, on the one hand, it makes the capacity for increased perfection ultimately dependent upon God, and on the other, it delivers a concept of the law that is itself independent of God's will. For Wolff, in particular, the command to pursue the perfectibility of humanity, or what was understood as *summum bonum*, is in fact not subject to God's will, but is merely implanted in human "nature" itself. It is against this background that we should understand Wolff's statement that even "God cannot prescribe for humans any law contrary to the natural".[171] According to this view, the freedom necessary to fulfil the "natural law" and thus to be moral consists in the procedural realisation of our moral objective or potential in this scheme.[172] In this specific sense, "nature" does not oppose "freedom", in answer to Kant's fundamental worry. It is this general rationalist approach to morality that Baumgarten also adopts.

When Baumgarten defines ethics as "the science of inner human obligations in the natural state", he echoes Wolff's idea directly that in the natural state as the state of the soul, truth is to be found in its manifold, and is to be maximised as much as possible so that one can find the truth in its best possible form, and on that basis find the criteria allowing one to distinguish between the good and the bad.[173] Baumgarten adheres to the concept of the law of nature as a principle, grounded in and connected to the overall structure of the universe (as created by God), which

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(anthropocentrically conceived duty) and the duty of an individual person insofar as she is created by God (duty for God's sake).

[169] Cited in *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, s.v., "Natural Law", accessed 13 September, 2012, http://www.credoreference.com/entry/routethics/natural_law

[170] Knud Haakonssen, "German Natural Law", in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 260.

[171] Christian Wolff, *Philosophia Practica Universalis*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: 1738-9), I, §282 [cited ibid., 270]. Cf. Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedancken von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen* (Frankfurt: 1736), §29 [mentioned ibid.].

[172] Haakonssen, "German Natural Law", 260.

[173] To recall, Wolff defines the law of nature as follows: "[T]he law of nature [*ius naturae*] [...] teaches which actions are good and which are evil. [...] [T]he law of nature is defined as the science of good and evil actions" (PD 68).

accounts for the sources of moral judgement and explains moral action: since all occurrences in the world must be regarded as completely explicable scientifically by law in general in the metaphysical scheme, morals are no exception and therefore are the object of the law of nature in the sub-scheme of metaphysics, that is, ethics.[174]

Metaphysics, defined in the Mrongovius manuscript of Kant's *Lectures on Ethics* (1785) as "[t]heoretical philosophy on *a priori* principles" (LE 29:597), functions as the basis of the whole system of Baumgarten's philosophy. In this system, ethics, as a practical philosophy, is subsumed under the former. Indeed, Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* is a recurrent point of reference and the *Ethica* constantly requires us to refer to sections of *Metaphysica*. This gives the book its particular shape, which is fairly disconcerting for those reading it after Kant. Since the metaphysical-logical background is taken as fully explicated in a previous work, and since ethics is defined as realisation through subjective capacities of perfection known through metaphysics and logic, Baumgarten's deduction in *Ethica* sounds dogmatic, as though the book was more a set of moral exhortations and prescriptions than what we understand today by a book of philosophy. It is clear, however, that Baumgarten was able to make all these concrete practical prescriptions and exhortations "scientific", as application of a scheme logically established elsewhere to the subjective capacities, from the intellect to the affective capacities and even behaviour. In this very specific sense, ethics in Baumgarten is only an applied science which takes all its underlying metaphysical principles as established.

2. Practical significance of philosophical ethics

[174] In the Herder manuscript of Kant's *Lectures on Ethics* (1762-64) Kant strongly rejects this terminology, suggesting the need to distinguish between the law of nature and ethics: "The *jus naturae* and ethics are [...] quite different, since the one demands liabilities, the other, obligations" (LE 27:13). Kant makes the distinction after consideration of Baumgarten's *Ethica*, which later in the critical period, results in the establishment of practical reason. According to Kant, in the moral world we need to distinguish between two types of reciprocity held by human beings, one concerning the maxims we adopt and the other regarding the actions we perform. This distinction represents the division Kant makes between the doctrine of virtue and that of right, which corresponds to ethics and law respectively. See Haakonssen, "German Natural Law", 285.

After the basic definition of ethics, and philosophical ethics in particular, Baumgarten proceeds in §3 to the specification of ethics in relation to Christian ethics as well as to the other disciplines that are subsumed under practical philosophy.

> Philosophical ethics, since it will define obligations both external and internal and provide more perfect principles for economics and politics both public and private, but not principles of Christian ethics itself, will be extremely useful. Since its purpose should be the certain knowledge of our internal obligations in the natural state, the more truthfully, clearly, certainly, ardently it will teach us, the more motives and the greater the variety of internal obligations in the natural state it will teach us, the more perfect it will be. (E §3)[175]

Baumgarten introduces a distinction between internal and external obligations. To understand this, we must take as given that he developed the distinction as follows: "Internal obligation is moral necessitation by one's own choice"; "external obligation is moral necessitation by another's choice" (LE 27:270).[176] We can trace this distinction back to Thomasius, for whom external obligation is a concern when behaviour is subject to sanctions in our external actions, whereas internal obligation arises if sanctions are placed on our inner life. Being true to our obligation, we "naturally" strive after peace or quietness of life, and as a result, our sanctions are described either externally as security of action or internally as our peace of mind.[177]

It is surprising to see Baumgarten discuss external obligations here and as part of his philosophical ethics, since the very first definition of ethics was

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[175] "Ethica philosophica quum obligations, tam externas, quam internas, facilitet, principia oeconomicae, politicaeque tam publicae, quam privatae perfectiora suppeditet, immo ipsi ethicae christianae, erit admodum vtilis P. P. p. §. 3. Quumque finis ipsius sit certitudo obligationum nostrarum internarum in statu naturali, §. 1. quo verius, quo clarius, quo certius, quo ardentius, quo plura motiua, quo plurium obligationum internarum in statu naturali docebit, hoc erit perfectior. P. P. p. §. 4, 5".

[176] The distinction summarised in the notes made by Georg Ludwig Collins on the lectures of the winter semester in 1784-85.

[177] Haakonssen, "German Natural Law", 265-266.

restricted to internal obligations. This is because Baumgarten furnishes two different levels of the distinction between internal and external obligation. On the one hand, ethics is divided into internal and the external sorts, depending on whether it relates solely to an individual in the state of nature (following the Wolffian definition) or to the conduct of an individual under the power of something external to her, such as societies or states. On the other hand, internal ethics in the sense given above can itself be divided into internal and external subdivisions. "Internal" internal obligations, as it were, concern the articulation of basic qualities necessary for their later development, through acquisition of the knowledge of God as the ultimate model of perfection to be emulated. "External" internal obligations, by contrast, if we can call them that, relate to all the external aids one needs to cultivate one's qualities so that those qualities that one has identified in the exercise of knowing God can flourish. Though external, these aids to internal perfection are necessary, since, according to Baumgarten's definition of the concept of perfection, everything becomes "more" perfect if the number of the object becomes greater and is further articulated in its variety. As we will see, philosophical ethics therefore takes into account all the elements of the human person without exception, from inner knowledge and affect, to physical well-being, social standing and how one should behave towards others (human and non-human) or be treated in relation to them. These elements include what appear to be very trivial aspects, like occupation and leisure, and theurgy. Kant's radical distinction between a pure realm of morality and all the other dimensions of human life makes Baumgarten's inclusion of all aspects as aspects that can be perfected, whether internal and external, make his ethics, appear odd to us post-Kantian readers. Furthermore, this "quantitative" pursuit of perfection has no end in that one has to aim ceaselessly for God's highest perfection towards the end of one's life, which can never be achieved due to the limits inherent in human finitude. One has to remember, however, that it is only internal obligations constituted by their necessary components, both internal and external, that Baumgarten defines as the object of ethics.

Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue* covers almost all of the aspects of ethics Baumgarten initially proposed as relevant, yet he brings it to a form of strictness, excluding

external behaviour from ethics as a purely philosophical system. By so doing, Kant argues that pure ethics must take the concept of morality in its strict sense, that is, one's internal motivation for action. The examination of this internal motivation, he considers, derives from what he calls "the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue" (MM 6:468). Nevertheless, Kant still retains his wavering position on the handling of external behaviour. He does not completely ignore the issue of external behaviour, but rather regards it as appended (albeit unintegrated) to the system of ethics (MM 6:468-69).

Since ethics on Baumgarten's understanding defines the duties[178] we have to fulfil in terms of how we behave both externally and internally, it provides us with principles for both economics and politics. Even though Kant rejects this view of ethics, he remains influenced by the links between economics and politics. In one of Kant's "Erläuterungen", in which he tries to explain Baumgarten's *Initia*, we see that "economy" is defined as "prior obligations" in contrast to "politics", which he defined as "private obligations" (Refl 19:10, *Reflexion* 6457).[179] By "prior", Kant means that its object is smaller than the "private" one.[180] If we refer to Wolff's definition of the disciplines, the distinction between them is clearer. It reads: "politics is the science of directing free actions in a civil society or state" (PD 65), whereas "economics is the science of directing free actions in the smaller societies which are distinct from the state" (PD 67).[181]

Baumgarten shares Wolff's definition of the law of nature, i.e. that general practical philosophy comprises of ethics, politics, and economics. However, Baumgarten differs from Wolff in that he considers that ethics precedes the other two disciplines, for the reason that the former provides principles for the latter two.

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[178] "[Any] action that is conform to the law is duty (*officium*)" (Initia §83).

[179] See also Christian Ritter, *Der Rechtsgedanke Kants nach den frühen Quellen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971), 72.

[180] We can trace this distinction in Kant's popular 1784 essay, "An Answer to the Question, What is Enlightenment?".

[181] Recall that Wolff's definition of the law of nature includes the consideration of ethics in relation to politics and economics: "The law of nature obviously is the theory of practical philosophy, i.e., of ethics, of politics, and of economics. However, since it is not our purpose here to distinguish between theory and practice, the law of nature can be treated in ethics, economics, and politics" (PD68).

Also, because the central purpose of *Ethica* takes ethics as the primary discipline of general practical philosophy, neither politics nor economics are discussed in *Ethica* any further.

Viewing ethics as the commanding discipline which provides the content for the other normative disciplines, we can see that Baumgarten's thinking is based on a progressive extension of the application of obligations, beginning with a person's role in the household economy, her official role in a society, and finally the more volitional role that she can play in the service of the human race, particularly as a philosopher.

This section also provides the standards for judging the "philosophical" significance of a work in ethics: "The more motives and the greater the variety of internal obligations, it [philosophical ethics] will teach us, the more perfect it will be" (E §3). Baumgarten's Leibnizian view of philosophy as systematic development and articulation of logically connected claims means that philosophical ethics will be philosophically more perfect if it is shown to be practically more useful. Baumgarten doubtless thinks that the next 500 sections are a response to this criterion that he set up himself. All the sections, following his very short definition of ethics, provide a significantly detailed analysis of what to do and what to avoid in order for a person to be a virtuous "man".

Baumgarten tells us that he does not need to repeat the important definitions of the metaphysical key terms in the description of *Ethica*, as they had been defined and were available to the reader for reference in his *Metaphysica*. In spite of this, it still seems quite sudden when Baumgarten proceeds to the discussion of religion soon after the basic definition of ethics, as we will see below. Nevertheless, this seeming leap in the argument has a "metaphysical" justification of its own, if we look at how the concept of God is positioned in Baumgarten's whole system of philosophy. Indeed, in this system, God is a purely metaphysical concept separate from the "religious" God, so to speak, and accordingly has nothing to do with the scriptures. Nonetheless, Baumgarten adheres to the term "religion", which exclusively relates to internal obligations, in order to explain how to become a virtuous "man", both internally and externally. On the one hand, a human being is internally obliged to seek perfection, by presuming the possibility of becoming the

most perfect being on a metaphysical basis. On the other hand, s/he is also internally obligated to perform actions in certain externally institutionalised sanctions. With respect to this twofold dimension of religion, Baumgarten describes it as the internal subjective motivation directed by objective formal knowledge about our relationship with God. It should be emphasised that in addition to the metaphysically grounded necessity of religion, religion as external practice is also necessary since it helps us secure our knowledge of God through a variety of actions, which is the condition for the enhancement of perfection of any object. As I will discuss later, it is this latter external, practical aspect of religion that makes it possible for us to initiate the argument for morality.

3. The concept of perfection

Baumgarten's typical method of argument in *Ethica* is to begin with the basic definition of the concept, and then to show the positive duties that flow from it by constant reference to the logical-metaphysical underpinning presented in the *Metaphysica*. Usually, these positive sections are followed by consideration of negative or faulty aspects of the duties and commandments. Baumgarten employed this method previously, in *Metaphysica*, in terms of basic metaphysical concepts, exemplified, for example, in the contrasts between "perfection" and "imperfection", "the necessary" and "the contingent", "the alterable" and "the inalterable", "the real" and "the negative", "the singular" and "the universal", and "the whole" and "the part" (see M §94-164). On the positive side, ethics is defined as a science that guides us to the conception of what it is to be a "pious, honest man", as we have just seen. In order to clarify what it means to be pious and honest with the effect of contrast, in the negative so to speak, Baumgarten lists examples of flawed forms of ethics, which are either too lax or too strict: "lax ethics (*ethica laxa*)" (E §4), "flattering ethics (*ethica blandiens*)" (E §5), "stringent ethics (*ethica morosa*)" (E §6), and "deceptive ethics (*ethica deceptrix*)" (E §7).[182]

[182] For an argument with particular focus on the "deceptive (chimerical) ethics" in terms of its significance for Kant's moral philosophy, see Corey W. Dick, "Chimerical Ethics and Flattering Moralists: Baumgarten's Influence on Kant's Moral Theory in the Observations and Remarks", in *Kant's Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide*, ed. Susan Meld Shell and Richard L. Velkley

After discussing types of ethics that provide a counter-model to the correct philosophical ethics, in §10 of *Ethica* Baumgarten presents his own version of the imperative of perfection that is, as we saw in the previous chapters, the key principle of ethics in the German, pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. Baumgarten formulates it in the following way:

> PERFECT YOURSELF.[183] Let us say, perfect yourself AS MUCH AS YOU CAN in the state of nature. In other words, in this state of nature do things which perfect you either as an end where you yourself are the determining ground of perfection, or as a means by which, those things make you accord with others, to the determining ground of perfection that is placed outside yourself. DO GOOD THINGS and cease to do bad things AS MUCH AS YOU CAN in the state of nature. In that state, DO WHAT IS BEST FOR YOU THROUGH YOUR OWN DEEDS. In the state of nature, live in accordance with nature,[184] as much as you can, and love what is best as much as you can. Also, follow your best conscience in every circumstance as far as you can. (E §10)[185]

"Perfection" is the key concept determining the entire argument of *Ethica*. Indeed, Baumgarten indicates the identification between good and perfection more clearly

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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 38-56; Oliver Thorndike, "Ethica Deceptrix: The Significance of Baumgarten's Notion of a Chimerical Ethics for the Development of Kant's Moral Philosophy", in *Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, ed. Valério Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido Antonio de Almeida, and Margit Ruffing. 5 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), vol. III, 451-62 (Vol. III, Proceedings of Law and Peace in Kant's Philosophy).

[183] As a comment made specifically on the imperative "seek perfection" that Baumgarten proposes in §43 of *Initia*, Kant states that "[perfection] is the obligation of an imperfect being", making clear the point that finite beings have obligation to perfection because they are imperfect.

[184] This Stoic principle is repeated in §43 of *Initia*: "One who lives in accordance with nature aims at those things which are prescribed to nature".

[185] "PERFICE TE. Ergo *perfice te in statu naturali*, QUANTUM POTES, i. e. fac in eodem, quae te perficiunt, vel ut finem, quorum tu ipse es ratio perfectionis determinans, vel vt medium, quae te cum aliis consentire faciunt ad rationem perfectionis determinantem extra te positam. P. P. p. §. 43. FAC BONA, *omitte mala*, QUANTUM POTES, *in statu naturali*: P. P. p. §. 39. FAC *in eodem, quod* TIBI FACTU OPTIMUM. P. P. p. §. 44. In statu naturali viue conuenienter naturae, quantum potes, P. P. p. §. 46, ama optimum, quantum potes, P. P. p. §. 48, optimamque, quam potes, tuam vbique conscientiam sequere. P. P. p. §. 200".

in §43 of *Initia* than is presented here.[186] Yet it is striking that he does not bother to define the concept either in *Ethica* or in *Initia*. The reader is inevitably required to refer to the definition provided in *Metaphysica*:

> If several things taken together constitute the sufficient ground of a single thing, they AGREE. The agreement is the DETERMINING GROUND OF PERFECTION (the focus of the perfection). (M §94)[187]

This ontological definition of the concept of perfection[188] is enriched with moral aspects in *Ethica*. This bridging between the ontological definition and the moral definition is necessitated by the fact that the human being is a participant in God's creation of the perfect world, endowed with the powers of knowing and willing. Given that the absolute reality for Baumgarten is God as the most perfect being (M §803), each of his predicates being "as great as it can be in any one being" (M §804), these powers are primarily directed to God. This is particularly because the human being partly shares this absolute reality in the sense that it is a reality and shares the same predicates albeit with lesser degrees of perfection. From this, Baumgarten derives the moral imperative, "perfect yourself". He thinks that for the human being, knowing and willing God's perfection can only be formulated as an incessant "duty" to enhance his own perfection as well as to develop predicates with lesser degrees of perfection, as long as he lives in the present world. It is, however, determined from the premise that beings other than God cannot reach the absolute state of perfection. In other words, in Baumgarten's terminology, the

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[186] "A person commits good things because they are good, and commits those things for the reason that, if they are posited, perfection is [accordingly] posited" (Initia §43).

[187] See Wolff's definition of perfection, which is almost identical with Baumgarten's: The concordance [*Zusammenstimmung*] of the manifold constitutes the perfection of things" (GM §152) [Cited in Paul Guyer, "Kantian Perfectionism", in *Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics*, ed. Lawrence J. Jost and Julian Wuerth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 198.

[188] For a historical account of the concept of perfection in its ontological dimension, see Mark Owen Webb, "Perfect Being Theology", in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition*, ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing, 2010) [Blackwell Reference Online, Accessed 23 October, 2012. http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405163576_chunk_g978140516357627].

human being has a duty to cultivate existing "perfections" both inside and outside himself. These predicates of finite beings are named "perfections", even if they are of lesser degree compared with God's predicates of the highest perfection. This is because Baumgarten stresses unity in diversity in the perception of perfection, defining perfection as the "agreement" of predicates of a being, which is sufficient to make the being as such a being. In this sense, even God cannot retain mutually contradictory predicates. According to this definition at any rate, God possessing predicates of the highest degree of perfection and the human being endowed with predicates of lesser degrees of perfection are likewise "perfect" beings at their own "level", so to speak. Of course, from the perspective of the *ens perfectissimum*, all human beings are also described as "imperfect" without contradicting the definition. Therefore, Baumgarten thinks that imperfect human beings necessarily hold an internal reality of ceaselessly seeking to be "more perfect", through their exercise of the power of knowing and willing the highest perfection. Indeed, this striving for perfection straddles the boundary between inner and outer, since it applies to perfection in general, and so to us in all of our dimensions (as we will see), to others in equally as many dimensions, and indeed to any other reality considered in terms of its perfectibility.

As we know, for Leibniz, perfection can only be understood through the old Scholastic view, in which it is presumed that metaphysical evil is a privation of being and perfection designates the fullness of being, positive reality.[189] This metaphysical evil can be understood as moral evil at the same time, and the metaphysical concept of perfection is immediately paired with its ethical meaning. This is precisely because the gap between our metaphysical imperfection and the ideal of perfection makes us compare our state of imperfection with the latter, and commands to us to "perfect ourselves" and aim for greater perfection everywhere (also in relation to others). Wolff followed this mode of deduction by further radicalising the notion of "nature". According to him, "nature" provides the standard of morality, namely perfection,[190] since the author of nature is God, who is the highest possible perfection. Therefore, moral perfection for Wolff can be

[189] David C. Blumenfeld, "Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World", in *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 398-399.
[190] Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, "Moral Perfection", *Dialectics and Humanism* 7 (1980): 122.

defined as the moral necessity of human action to aim at perfection,[191] which is based upon our understanding of the law of nature. Whereas for Wolff a person is morally necessitated, as a consequence of metaphysical necessitation, to duties towards oneself and others, in a similar way, Baumgarten requires that the metaphysical God serve as the reference point so we know how to behave morally. In other words, we need to know God in order to be good in terms of our actions, our being and our conduct. This explains why "religion" has to be considered in the first place before he argues for duties towards ourselves and others, and why "duties towards God" precede other duties. It also explains why the description of religion required in philosophical ethics can be done without the help of the notion of morality: precisely because it serves as a foundation of the latter. Perfection is derived from the necessary consideration of the most perfect being in such a way that this consideration, which is on the one hand purely metaphysical, on the other hand also expresses a direct moral command. The vision of absolute perfection, as a direct counter-effect, makes us realise our capacity for greater perfection in us and around us, and thereby directly expresses a command. So at the stage of religion, it suffices for us to listen piously to the "voice" of our inner nature so we can be moral in the very conduct of religion. The imperative of self-perfection and perfection around us derives directly from the vision of God and our fulfilment of duties towards Him. These, in turn, can also be specified directly as moral implications of the ontological gap between His absolute perfection and our deficient ones. This is, of course, completely antithetical to the Kantian approach, which first deducts the pure principle of morality from the consideration of reason alone, and on the basis of that derives the content of the "doctrine of virtue" as well as the kind of relationship we should have with God and faith. For Baumgarten, the question of foundation in the argument's order is already resolved by the rationalistic optimism in the possibility of laying out the full metaphysical context within which all human understanding and action take place.

Since human beings are less perfect than God, they can aim towards perfection only approximately in their unending effort to reach the knowledge of

[191] J. B Schneewind shows that it is precisely this Wolffian view of the morally necessitated pursuit of increased perfection that Kant rejected, and so by extension Baumgarten's also. See Schneewind, introduction to *Lectures on Ethics*, xxii-xxiii.

the most perfect being or God. From the perspective of moral perfection, however, it is a moral imperative that a person must be determined to approximate this state of perfection as a moral agent. Baumgarten describes the contribution of "philosophical ethics" in §7:

> We can be obligated to do things which cannot be reached by the powers of corrupt nature. (E §7)[192]

Baumgarten thus formulates our obligation towards moral perfection upon the presupposition of our limitedness in terms of understanding metaphysical perfection. Another important point is that, as he states in §8, even if philosophical ethics appears to contradict Christian ethics, this contradiction does not violate the law of nature in that the contradiction is only apparent to the eyes of corrupt beings.

In conclusion, to paraphrase what Baumgarten discusses in §10, as a moral agent pursuing its moral perfection, he or she must be in the state of nature in which, as we have seen, the truth is to be found. In particular, in that state of nature, a person is obliged to be either an end (*finis*) in which she herself is the determining ground of perfection or a means (*medium*) that contributes to the perfection of others in sharing the determining ground of perfection that is placed outside herself. This distinction that Baumgarten makes between ends and means in the pursuit of perfection, each of which equally comes into the purview of the moral imperative since it is perfection overall that matters, is striking in contrast to Kant's own famous definition of the categorical imperative in terms of this very distinction (G 4:429; cf. MM 6:462). Baumgarten's moral imperative "perfect yourself", in contrast to Kant, functions both intrinsically and extrinsically, as he argues that we should not only perfect ourselves by regarding ourselves as an end, but also serve as a means for others' perfection; Baumgarten's moral imperative is based on his perspective on the total perfection of the world and involves the contribution of both ourselves and others. As we have just seen, this whole perfection of the world of course presupposes God as the model of perfection. In a practical sense, in turn,

[192] "Possumus tamen obligari ad ea, ad quae vires naturae corruptae non sufficiunt."

our deeds need to be pleasing to God as we love what we can recognise as good as much as our own capacity, called "conscience", allows, as I will discuss later.

4. Proofs for the obligation to religion

For Baumgarten, as for his immediate predecessors, the central moral imperative is to seek perfection in all dimensions of one's life. In order that the individual can pursue this for the whole of her life, she needs a subjective internal motivation that continuously drives her to act in this way. The complex of this sort of action is religion since religion provides the sense and the knowledge of the "ideal of reason", to use Kant's concept loosely, the contrasting ground on which individual action can rest as the ground of the natural law and against which it can rate itself in moral terms. Since, for Baumgarten, ethics is defined as a philosophical investigation grounded in metaphysics, a metaphysical justification is needed to show why a person is obliged to adopt religion in the first place. In this context, it is no contradiction that, despite the strong distinction just made between philosophical and revealed (Christian) ethics (see Chapter five, section 2), Baumgarten moves on to the discussion of religion in the first *Caput* (Chapter) of the book, beginning at §11 and continuing until §149.

In particular, from §11 to §21 he provides us with a lengthy list of proofs of why we are "obligated to religion". The proofs he gives are purely logical (which for Baumgarten is synonymous with being "philosophical"), appealing to syllogism. The apparent paradox but ultimate consistency of Baumgarten, given his premises, is well illustrated in these sections: on the one hand, the method of demonstration is supposed to be purely "scientific" (logical), and in that sense defines a methodology "opposed" to revelation. In this way, it posits philosophical ethics in opposition to Christian ethics. On the other hand, the metaphysical grounding of ethics, expressed in the imperative of perfection, makes religion an obligation. Baumgarten believes that there is a purely philosophical demonstration of the need for faith. This might well sound paradoxical but we reminded ourselves in Chapter four that, in different ways, Kant made the same move in his own moral philosophy.

The proof given in §11 can be called the "perfection" proof. It is first in order and in importance. Applying the Leibnizian point made in §36 of *Metaphysica* that "a positive and affirmative determination is, if it is true, REALITY", Baumgarten draws the conclusion that "reality consists in knowing the most perfect being more richly, dignifiedly, clearly, certainly, and ardently". This enables him to reiterate the direct link between the metaphysical and moral dimensions of perfection. The "glory of God"[193] posits reality in a person, since it confirms for her what is the basis of any truth, ontological and logical. From the individual's perspective, acknowledgement of the glory of God (which is how Baumgarten defines religion) also "posits reality", since it is the acknowledgement of the ground of truth. In a sense, God is the cause of its own affirmation through the person's "celebration of God".[194] But as stated in §94 of *Metaphysica*, "if several things taken together constitute the sufficient reason of a single thing, they AGREE. This agreement itself is PERFECTION". Inasmuch as the finite human being through religion becomes the ground for the unity of the glory of God and its celebration, he becomes the "determining ground for perfection". Since this agreement occurs "in you [a person]", an act that makes this agreement happen contributes to her perfection. In other words, the combination of the "glory of God" and its "celebration"[195] creates the subjective ground on which the unity of the metaphysical and the moral can be realised. This act of celebration sets the person as an end, as a result of her being put on the way to perfection through the celebration of God and the recognition of His glory. Since the person is necessarily obliged to commit an act that makes her perfect, she is obligated to religion. As we will see below, this proof provides the model for all the other proofs in that they are all based on the premise that a person

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[193] This is the subjective acknowledgement of perfection. The definition reads: "the glory of God is the greater knowledge of his supreme perfection" (M §942). Wolff's definition, on the other hand, states as follows: "The collection of divine attributes, insofar as they are recognized by rational creatures, is called the *Glory of God*" (Christian Wolff, *Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*, first part, new edition (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1739), 610 [cited in Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials*, trans. and ed. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 313]).

[194] Baumgarten explains the relationship between the "glory" and the "celebration" of God as follows: "All creatures, whether viewed as means or ends, are useful for the glory of God, which is useful for the celebration of divine glory" (M §949).

[195] Indeed, this is the definition of religion provided in M §947. It reads: "The glory of God and its celebration is RELIGION".

is obligated to whatever makes her perfect, and religion, by giving access to perfection, in the objective and the subjective sense, is a necessary path for the realisation of this imperative.

The proof given in §12 can be called "cosmological". It is based on a similar type of argument as the previous one: "Religion makes you agree with the whole City of God and also with the whole of the most perfect universe": religion, which is defined by Baumgarten as "the glory of God and its celebration" (M §947), is the subjective acknowledgement of God's perfection, and that in turn means acknowledgement of the perfection of His creation. But as the crucial argument about "agreement" showed, this subjective acknowledgment of perfect absolute reality itself makes the acknowledging subject perfect. Since there is an obligation to perfection, there is an obligation to religion in that cosmological sense. Note that here it is religion, not philosophy, which provides the insight into God's perfect creation and, as a consequence, is the channel for the individual's perfection. In this scheme, the individual person is thus a means for the end of perfection, but being a means for this end retroacts on the person to allow her to be more perfect.

The next proof given in §13 is the proof through "blessedness and happiness". The sorts of obligation Baumgarten names in §10, such imperatives as "DO GOOD THINGS" and "DO WHAT IS BEST FOR YOU THROUGH YOUR OWN DEEDS", are restated in §13 because, according to his view, we have an obligation towards blessedness. This is based on the definition of "blessedness" given in §787 of *Metaphysica*, which establishes a direct connection between "moral goods" and "blessedness".[196] Since religion is posited as part of blessedness, logically it follows that a person is obligated to religion because she has an obligation towards blessedness. The same proof is reaffirmed in relation to happiness: one sort of obligation, defined as the imperative "love what is best as much as you can" in §10, is restated as that "[y]ou have an obligation towards your happiness" in §13. "Happiness" is defined in §787 of *Metaphysica* as "the collection of perfections that belong to spirit". As can be seen in §787 of *Metaphysica* from the whole description of the hierarchy regarding moral values, "happiness" is

[196] The definition reads: "the perfection that is posited when such things [moral goods] are posited is BLESSEDNESS".

positioned as the highest good integrating many perfections, among which "blessedness" is counted as one, and is complemented by both the "prosperity" of the spiritual side and "those goods [that...] are PROSPEROUS (the physical good in the strict sense)". Since blessedness constitutes part of happiness, it follows that a person is obligated to religion, which is part of blessedness, which, in turn, contributes to happiness. The way in which Baumgarten makes "happiness" an aspect of his metaphysics of perfection, with direct moral implications, is well worth highlighting. As the concept of perfection does all the foundational normative work, there is no need for him to distinguish between natural and moral ends, the "pathological" (as Kant would say), and the rational sides of the subject. Perfection of the subject in all of her dimensions, including the organic and the material, is the basic law of morality. For Kant, as we reminded ourselves, the link between happiness and morality or virtue is merely contingent. Their combination is to be pursued in consideration of the highest good only in the form of a necessary postulate, a kind of necessary hypothesis that cannot be anything more than a hypothesis from an epistemic or metaphysical point of view. For Baumgarten, on the contrary, happiness is entailed in the pursuit of perfection as one of its inherent constituents. Once again, however, this raises the question of whether Kant's sharp departure from Baumgarten is not somehow influenced by Baumgarten in a negative sense, since Kant's argument retains the main concepts just as he inverts them. In other words, the strength with which Kant denies that happiness is not part of the foundation of morality might well be a sign that he considers his immediate predecessor one of the main theorists to oppose in developing his own ethics. This, however, is generally not acknowledged in the literature.

The proof given in §14 can be called the "anthropological" proof. The claim in this section, that "[y]our own nature accords with religion", can be understood by combining the statement in §949 of *Metaphysica*, that "all co-ends of religion in creation are subordinated to religion" with the inference that human nature is subordinated to creation as well, as derived from the cosmological view. Therefore, human nature accords with religion in God's creation. Accordingly, since religion also affirms human nature (as part of creation), and since Baumgarten states that "the MORALLY NECESSARY is that whose opposite is morally impossible" (M

§723), it is a necessary conclusion that religion makes the human moral state accord with human nature. Following the definition of "perfection" given in §94 of *Metaphysica*,[197] Baumgarten draws the conclusion that religion, by making our different statuses agree in us as creatures of God (our nature agrees with our moral destiny), is itself a ground of perfection.

The next proof given in §15 can be called the "pleasure" proof. Baumgarten, directly following Leibniz, starts from the premise provided in §655 of *Metaphysica*, that true pleasure is the perception of perfection.[198] Since, on the other hand, "the knowledge of truth is perfection", it follows that true pleasure, as a means to know perfection (per definition), is also a means to perfect oneself. In addition, the next premise is that the liveliest knowledge of God also increases pleasure, since (by definition) it leads to an enhanced perception of perfection. It thus follows that the liveliest knowledge of God, namely religion, also perfects us to the extent that it augments true pleasure. Again, Baumgarten establishes a circle of proof by connecting core concepts, in this case, the concepts of knowledge, perfection, and pleasure, around the central notion of perfection, in which metaphysical reality attains its maximum and from there dictates the series of moral imperatives.

§16 can be said to derive from the "pleasure" proof. Here Baumgarten focuses on religion in terms of it being pursued by finite beings. He defines the religion of finite beings in particular as the pursuit of "the purest, the most truthful, the clearest, and the most certain pleasure through demonstration". Just before this definition, he states that "The more agreeable something is […], the more you are obligated to it" on the basis of the "pleasure" proof given in the previous section. In order to understand these two statements, we need to understand the link between "pleasure" and the adjective "agreeable". As he puts it in §658 of *Metaphysica*: "Whatever increases pleasure is AGREEABLE". At this point, it is already proven that a person is obligated to religion because a person is obligated to whatever is agreeable (that is, necessarily pleasant) and the most certain form of pleasure is

[197] As we have just seen, the definition reads: "If several things taken together constitute the sufficient ground of a single thing, they AGREE. This agreement itself is PERFECTION".
[198] More precisely, relevant statements read: "The state of the soul that originates from the intuition of perfection is PLEASURE [...]", and "Pleasure [...] originating from a true intuition is called TRUE [...]" (M §655).

defined as religion. The form taken by this proof shows how far the principle of perfection is taken by Baumgarten, as it includes all the aspects of the human life, including the merely pleasant. Of course, he is thinking in a rationalistic fashion about the "truly" pleasant, as he was talking about "true pleasure" above. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a more anti-Kantian argument than this one: we have a moral duty to engage in religion because religion provides us with what is truly pleasant! Every logical connection in the argument contradicts an essential aspect of Kantian morality.

In §17, Baumgarten gives a proof via the concept of "wisdom". Presupposed here is the general definition in §882 of *Metaphysica* that it is "the insight in the relationship between an end and a means".[199] If a person follows the wisest will, that is, God's will, she follows the ultimate purpose of creation as well because God wills that purpose. In pursuit of the wisest will, a finite being is also able to live as wisely as possible for a finite being, since the person attends to the ultimate purpose of creation by being a means to that end. This is made possible by love of religion and since, as already proven in §12, religion serves the best end of God's creation by making a person perfect. As a result, there is an obligation to engage in religion because it is the optimal way to develop one's wisdom. Once again, the cognitive insight into the metaphysically perfect has a direct moral counterpart.

The proof given in §18 can be called the "rationality" proof. This proof follows the same format as the one used in the "wisdom" proof. Here the highest reason simply replaces both God's will and the ultimate purpose of creation, and the rest of the logic employed in this section is exactly the same as in the previous one. In either case, God remains the reference point for humans aiming at perfection. The reference point in this section in particular is the premise that "God has the highest reason" and it is drawn from the description of God's ability in §872 of *Metaphysica* that "God represents every nexus most distinctly to Himself".

[199] This is Meier's translation of Baumgarten's definition that originally reads: "WISDOM IN GENERAL is the perspicuous perception of final nexus". Given Baumgarten's definitions of "wisdom in particular" and "prudence" following the above definition of wisdom in general, and given how Meier interpreted these terms, it is most likely that what Baumgarten means by the "final nexus" is the relationship between an end and a means.

The next proof, in §19, can be called the proof via the "image of God". Baumgarten defined images as "signs of the figure of something else" in §852 of *Metaphysica*. What matters in this proof is approximating our image of God to God Himself. At this point, theology is called upon for support. According to Baumgarten's definition in §866 of *Metaphysica*, "Knowledge concerning God is THEOLOGY IN THE BROADER SENSE". On the other hand, "The theology in which God understands himself is EXEMPLARY [...] THEOLOGY". What Baumgarten suggests here is approximating the theology that we have to the Exemplary Theology. In so doing, we can share the purpose with God to illustrate His glory. As a result, we strive to illustrate the glory of God accompanied by its celebration. It is religion that makes it possible to illustrate the glory of God and the celebration of God. Since a person is obligated to whatever makes the person perfect, and since religion facilitates perfection by helping us to approximate our theology to the Exemplary Theology, we are obligated to religion.

The "reward" proof is given in §20. Baumgarten assumes there is a proportional relationship between "certain rewards" and "religion" when he says that "certain rewards are connected to religion", in the sense that rewards accrue with certainty. This is derived from the presumption in §907 of *Metaphysica* that "A REWARD is a contingent good conferred on a person on account of a moral good". It is presumed that religion is a moral good because it will eventually help us to know how to be moral. Moreover, since religion is best and highest in terms of its effectiveness for our aim of understanding morality, as proven in §16, and since there is a proportional relationship between rewards and religion, rewards attached to it are also best and highest. Hence, it is the perfection of the rewards that should steer us towards the pursuit of religion. Again, the concept reappears in Kant, when he discusses the possibility of happiness as reward for a life of virtue. Note, however, that Baumgarten insists that "A REWARD is a contingent good". Indeed, as we have seen, Kant maintained that what motivates us to act morally is the hope that in the kingdom of ends, our autonomous actions will be rewarded with happiness, which turns out to be compatible with virtue.[200] In this particular case, then, the Kantian opposition to Baumgarten's logic is far more diffuse.

[200] Pamela Sue Anderson and Jordan Bell, *Kant and Theology* (London: T & T Clark, 2010), 31-32.

The final proof given in §21 is the proof through "reasons for action" and thus addresses the issue of moral motivation albeit via an odd detour. The major premise is that if a person has a greater number of and higher motives for action, her obligation in general is fulfilled more easily. The minor premise is that religion increases insights into duties to be performed, and thereby enhances motivation significantly. There is an obligation to religion, Baumgarten concludes, because of the instrumental value of religion in enhancing motivation, or in "facilitating all of one's duties", and because of the added obligation to facilitate the fulfilment of duty.

5. The definition of internal religion

The proofs for the obligation to the religion were needed as the pathway to morality. As we have seen, the subject is obligated to religion as it shapes her towards perfection. The subject needs a link that bridges the perspective of the whole world, which the vision of God provides, to the microcosmical perspective with which to know what her subjective life should be like. For this link, religion is also necessary. More particularly, the subject has to internalise cognitively and affectively logical terms employed to prove the logical necessity of the obligation to religion, in order to apply them to concrete actions. This is what being moral means for Baumgarten. In this sense, religion has to be internal in the first place. Baumgarten's approach to religion therefore focuses especially on the inner life of the subject as the locus where the cognitive and the emotive aspects of religion's impact on the subject's life are at stake. In order to serve this purpose, Baumgarten proceeds to characterise internal religion further from §22 to §29. Since, as we have seen, ethics is philosophical, religion (internal in the first place) as its ground must likewise be philosophical. Baumgarten identifies God as the ultimate source of religion within the philosophical investigation. What matters to us in this investigation is our internal relationship with God, in which the metaphysical aspect has priority above the moral one. Our innate sense of the good is secured by taking our place in a world governed by the perfect being that gave us the standard of morality. The concept of "piety" is therefore central. It is a philosophical concept

that is employed, firstly, to prove metaphysically the internal character of religion (E §22), and secondly, to endorse religion so that we can achieve the concept of "morality" through our internal exercise of religion.

Before seeing the way in which Baumgarten introduces the concept of "piety", we will make a short detour to see how Kant handles this concept, in order to show that it is precisely this concept that Kant regards as an "enemy". In typical fashion, Kant, in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, retains the concept but completely inverts meaning of piety. He writes:

> [W]hile he [the human being who Kant thinks misunderstands the role of religion] busies himself with *piety* (which is a passive respect of the divine law) rather than with *virtue* (which is the deployment of one's forces in the observance of the duty which he respects), though in fact it is virtue, *combined with piety*, which alone can constitute the idea we understand by the word *divine blessedness* (true *religious disposition*). (R 6:201)

Kant completely overturns Baumgarten's foundation of virtue on piety, instead making piety not the observance of duties towards God *per se* but the observance of duties based on virtue, that is, ultimately, the moral law. This can be seen as an attack by Kant on Baumgarten's brand of Pietism.[201] Instead of basing knowledge of the moral law on a broader relationship with the creation and its creator, Kant makes the moral law the core of religion and insists that this core has to be rational, not affective. Kant contends that, if morality is to be grounded on religion and its affective aspects are stressed, rationality is denied and the realm of morality is therefore undermined. Recall the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant warns against dogmatic metaphysics because it "conflicts with morality" (CPR Bxxix-xxx).

Ethica, as a whole, is the theory and the practice of the subjective life involving cognitive, affective, and external aspects (the last one concerns external

[201] Note, however, that Baumgarten was also the target of religious objections of Pietists (and even of Wolffians) in terms of his defence of sensible knowledge, which he advocates most notably in his *Aesthetica*. See Howard Caygill, "Kant's Apology for Sensibility", in Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, ed., *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 182.

practices such as institutionalised rituals). Religion in particular is for Baumgarten the theory and the practice of how its threefold aspects impact on the subjective life. As we have seen, the key concept is perfection, and God works as a model that moulds us towards perfection. This is similar to how Kant's "ideal of reason" functions for knowledge. In sections 22 to 29, Baumgarten places particular emphasis on the cognitive aspect of religion. These cognitive aspects are articulated as "amplitude and majesty", "truth", "clarity", "certainty", and "liveliness" (or ardency). §21 functions as a transition to the discussion of the cognitive side of religion, and the argument that religion makes it "easier (*facilius*)" to reach these cognitive qualities.

It is in §22 that Baumgarten provides an explicit definition of "internal religion": "RELIGION is INTERNAL inasmuch as the act of the mind is immanent". It is important to note that it is in this context that Baumgarten gives a definition of religion for the first time in *Ethica* as "the duties towards God": "You are obligated to fulfil duties towards God". In particular, Baumgarten describes such duties as an obligation to develop the "habit (*habitus*)" of exercising these duties. It is in this context, drawing upon this kind of "habit" that has a strong connection with religion, that Baumgarten introduces the concept of "piety (*pietas*)", the central concept of his ethics: "The habit of exercising pious action is PIETY". By being pious, which is the very basis on which to build up one's moral behaviour, and which one should begin cultivating by focusing primarily on one's immanent state, one is now allowed to set out on a journey towards being moral.

In §23 Baumgarten provides the first translation of the principle of perfection or his categorical imperative "perfect yourself". It reads: "be pious (*pius esto*)". It "expresses the determination that is conform to your ultimate end and therefore to ulterior reason". The imperative discloses the ultimate determination of how we are supposed to be in the world on the metaphysical ground. But at the same time, since we are to live our subjective life in that world, the determining ground of ourselves ("Each determination has a ground" (M §80)) involves how we are to behave as moral agents, that is, as beings motivated in our action by what Baumgarten calls the "ulterior reason". As Baumgarten's definition of "determination" suggests, the determination of an object not only involves

"metaphysical" pre-determination of the object by God, but also our "moral" participation in that determination through our action.[202] In this sense, although the ulterior reason possessed by creatures is subordinated to the ultimate reason that is the final end equating to the glory of God (M §949), the ulterior reason still has its own principle of operation. In *Ethica*, the distinction between mediate (ulterior) and immediate reason is not just logical (as given in M §27). A person can decide what action to take in following a principle only under the condition that this principle is in conformity with the ulterior reason. Although the ulterior reason is under the logical constraint of the ultimate reason, a person has freedom to act, considering whether the ulterior reason allows her to act in such a way, that is, morally. Baumgarten considers such principles to be a "law"[203] of a specific kind. The proposition "be pious" is not just a law governing the course of general matters, but is a law of a specific kind, determining human action exercised for the purpose of being moral. Therefore this proposition is called "the moral law (*lex moralis*)".[204] According to Baumgarten, the moral law is categorised as "one of the superior laws".[205] The moral law is "self-legislated" so to speak, regulated by human reason as the ulterior reason. Although human reason is not the ultimate reason, it nevertheless determines the moral law as superior to the extent that it is strong (*fortis*) enough to coordinate human action as a commitment to the creation of the perfect world. Although Kant would definitely object to the idea of calling the urge to "be pious" the moral law, it is in fact not so far from Kant's version of it as one might suppose, since Baumgarten's moral law of piety is also "self-legislated".

In §27 Baumgarten argues for the obligation to religion in relation to the concept of "the highest good (*summum bonum*)". As he puts it:

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[202] "Those things (notes and predicates) that are posited in something by determining [it] are DETERMINATIONS" (M §36).

[203] The general definition reads: "A proposition that expresses a determination in conformity with a reason is a NORM (rule, *law*) and indeed a NORM IN THE WIDER SENSE is the representation of a determination in conformity with a reason" (M §83; italics mine).

[204] "FREE DETERMINATIONS are MORAL DETERMINATIONS [...] and the LAWS of moral determinations are MORAL LAWS [...] and the supreme law is the strongest" (M §723).

[205] "A law expressing determination conforming to the sufficient and more distant ground is called a SUPERIOR LAW" (M §183).

> The highest number of realities of the human being and their greatest form accord, in the highest possible way, with the most perfect knowledge of divine perfections. Hence, such knowledge is the highest perfection of the human being. Therefore, the highest religion, which befalls a person, is his highest good. The better something is, the more you are obligated to choose it. It follows that you are most obligated to the highest religion that befalls you. (E §27)[206]

The highest good for Baumgarten is the highest form of religion. Through the knowledge of the highest forms of God's predicates, human beings can calculate the best possible predicates that they can acquire. Religion furnishes us with the knowledge of God. Baumgarten draws the conclusion that we should therefore seek the best possible form of philosophical (not Biblical) religion, as the latter teaches us on a scientific basis the best possible forms of predicates a human being can achieve. In this philosophical deduction, Baumgarten presumes a kind of circle between knowledge, the good, and God, and on this basis he argues that one can move up to the point where the highest good on a human scale can be reached with the help of the highest form of religion. From the cosmological perspective, however, it turns out that all the actions a person performs to augment her perfection, even if she does them for her own good or for the good of others, are done for the sake of the glory of God, i.e., the knowledge of God. As Baumgarten puts in *Metaphysica*: "All creatures, whether viewed as a means or as an end, are useful for the glory of God, which is useful for the celebration of God" (M §949). This shows the agreement between the good and God, with the medium being the knowledge that bridges them. Since it is obvious that God's good is the highest good, the knowledge of both the good and God merges into the knowledge of God that includes both kinds of knowledge. This is exactly what we should aim at in our moral life, and it is religion that equips us for it.

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[206] "Ad cognitionem perfectionum diuinarum perfectissimam consentiunt maxime plurimae maximae hominis realitates, M. §. 949. Hinc talis cognitio est summa hominis perfectio, M. §. 185. Ergo religio, quae in hominem cadit, maxima est summum eius bonum. M. §. 187. Quo quid melius, hoc magis ad illud eligendum obligaris. §. 10. Ergo ad summam, quae in te cadit, religionem maxime obligaris".

As regards the highest religion that "befalls" (See E §26 for its particular connotation) a person, she must enhance the material side of her intelligence in addition to its formal dimension by gathering what Baumgarten calls "the spirit and the intellectual substance". This explains why Baumgarten provides such a detailed prescription of what to do and what to avoid in our actions, and is not satisfied with the explication of just the formal side of ethics as one might expect from philosophy. As we have seen, this is also because he wishes to make his own philosophical ethics most perfect, by applying the principle of perfection to his own work. And as we have also seen, the fulfilment of the material side of perfection (its quantitative dimension, so to speak) is the condition for the achievement of the higher perfection.

6. The content of religion

We have seen that in Baumgarten's theory of religion, we require God as the ultimate reference point so we can know how to be good in our action. Knowing God is at the same time entailed in the imperative "perfect yourself (*perfice te*)" (E §10), since we need to pursue perfection because as we are created by God and yet we are imperfect in relation to the most perfect being. Herein lies the link between the knowledge of God and that of morality, but it is also implied that we need a subjective internal motivation that drives us to aim at knowing God for the purpose of conducting a moral life. It is religion that helps us to find this motivation. As we will see, in the description of religion as a whole, the emphasis is put strongly on the cognitive aspect that religion helps us to gain, as religion can be said to be an orientation towards the knowledge of God in the first place. Baumgarten, however, also requires an independent description for this purpose, separate from the discussion of ethics itself,[207] since without the knowledge of God we cannot proceed to the knowledge of morality.

According to Baumgarten, religion has two aspects, one "internal religion (*religio interna*)" and the other the "external cult of God (*cultus dei externus*)"

[207] Ernest Feil, *Religio, Volume 4: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert*, vol. 91 of *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte*, ed. Volker Henning Drecoll and Volker Leppin (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 2007), 84-86.

(although he gives no reason why he does not use the term "external religion" for the latter).[208] "Internal religion" concerns the inner life of the subject. "External religion", on the other, concerns the external, social life of the subject. It is clear from §947 of *Metaphysica* that the combination of our cognitive and emotional relation to God, namely the "glory (*gloria*) of God" (for the definition of "glory" alone see M §942) and the "cult of God", constitutes the whole of internal religion.[209] If we focus particularly on cult, however, we see that it is further divided into its "internal" and "external" aspects and thus cult belongs at the same time to both internal and external religion.

6.1. Glory of God

Inside the framework of "internal religion", the "glory of God" refers to the intellectual aspect, whereas the "internal cult of God (*cultus dei internus*)" is the name given to the emotional aspect, which I will discuss later. The glory of God has six sub-elements. The first two of these are "amplitude (*amplitudo*)" and "majesty (*maiestas*)". The former refers to knowing as many of God's perfections as possible, and the latter means appreciating each of God's perfections as highly as possible in terms of their sanctity. A person is obligated to the glory of God, because as already shown, a person is obligated to religion and the glory of God is a part of religion. The obligation to the glory of God (as part of the obligation to religion) has a direct relation to the knowledge of God and "amplitude and majesty" represent the scope of that knowledge (E §31).

Once the scope of the knowledge of God is determined, Baumgarten moves the focus of the glory of God to its qualitative aspects. All these aspects of the glory of God develop what could be termed, in a specific sense, "epistemic" virtues linked to moral virtues. Cognition in this specific sense is required as a means to an end (morality) and the object of this cognition has to be the precise aspects of the

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[208] Ibid., 84.

[209] "The good determination of a spirit based on the motives of divine glory is the CELEBRATION OF DIVINE GLORY (the cult of God). The glory of God and its celebration is RELIGION. Now the glory of God is useful for His cult (M §336, 712), and both glory and cult are useful for religion (M §336). Therefore, the ends of creation were the cult of God and religion (M §942, 946)" (M §947).

supreme form of knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of God. Since God is also the supreme good, this knowledge has a direct moral implication for the subject of the pursuit of the knowledge, although the knowledge has to be sought primarily in its epistemic origin.

The first of these epistemic virtues is "truth (*veritas*)". Baumgarten writes as follows:

> Look for the truest knowledge of the most and highest divine perfections in you and others, which is possible for you and through you for others, E §31; A §423, 555. Now knowledge of all truth is a means to increase true divine knowledge, M §943. Therefore, motives can be taken from divine glory, leading to knowledge and representation of whatever truth, and to that extent the knowledge and representation of whatever truth can be an illustration of divine glory, M §947. Therefore, learn and teach all the truth that you learn and teach, for the purpose of the glory of God, E §29. (E §32)[210]

Baumgarten first defines "truth (*veritas*)" among other qualitative elements because he emphasises the direct continuity between truth about human knowledge and that of God. Anything true about ourselves is also true of God, implying that the motivation to know the truth about ourselves is to be taken from the glory of God, which is defined as "the greater knowledge of his [God's] highest perfection" (M §942).[211] Baumgarten maintains, however, that since we cannot directly attain God's predicates, we need to seek the knowledge of God by searching for "divine" perfections inside us, both greatest in number and highest in terms of scope. We can find these perfections primarily by seeking the truth that resides inside ourselves. With this knowledge of our own truth, we can infer the truth of God,

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[210] "Quaere in te et aliis verissimam, quae tibi, quae per te aliis possibilis, plurimarum maximarum perfectionum diuinarum cognitionem, §. 31. A. §. 423, 555. Iam omnis veritatis cognitio est medium augendae verae cognitionis diuinae. M. §. 943. Ergo ad cuiuscumque veritatis cognitionem propositionemque possunt motiua desumi ex gloria diuina, atque adeo cuiuscunque veritatis cognition et propositio potest esse illustratio gloriae diuinae. M. §. 947. Omne hinc verum, quod discis, quod doces, disce, doce ad dei gloriam §. 29".

[211] Feil, *Religio*, 84.

since we thereby identify a "ladder" on which to find whatever truth is a degraded version of the highest truth of God. In this sense, the glory of God is the cognitive motivation for us to seek our divine epistemic virtues, since, as is now shown in the case of "truth", it increases our knowledge of the epistemic virtues. Epistemic virtues represented primarily by the truth of God are not revealed to us by themselves. There are two ways of actively committing to the pursuit of these virtues: learning them for oneself and teaching others through oneself. As we will see, these two aspects will be articulated as the distinction between the "internal" and the "external" cult of God. Then, as is always Baumgarten's method, from §33 to §39 he describes various forms of falsity as the stumbling blocks that prevent us from approaching the truth. In the search for truth, God has a practical epistemological function, so to speak, as the place of application of the theory of knowledge to ethics.

The second of the four epistemic virtues comprised in the glory of God is "clarity (*claritas*)". This aspect specifically focuses on the enhancement of true knowledge. Baumgarten thinks we have an obligation to have clear ideas of the object of truth. For this purpose he distinguishes between "intensive" and "extensive" clarity (M §531), a distinction he made in terms of the articulation between logical and aesthetic sorts of knowledge (A §423, 424). The former type of knowledge is enhanced when the perception of its components is more distinct. By contrast, the latter type of knowledge is elevated when its components are perceived as livelier,[212] though confusedly because of the nature of aesthetic perception. Therefore, in the context of ethics, in which the concept of morality must be sought through the pursuit of the knowledge of God, its logical approach allows us to seek to perceive God's perfections more distinctly, whereas its aesthetic approach means we ought to look for the liveliest representation of those perfections. Both approaches to "clarity" as the epistemic virtue contribute to the enhancement of true knowledge.

The next epistemic virtue in the glory of God is "certainty (*certitudo*)". For Baumgarten there is a logical reason why "certainty" follows truth and clarity. As

[212] "Greater clarity due to the clarity of notes can be called INTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY, while the greater clarity due to the multitude of notes can be said to be called EXTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY. An extensively clearer perception is LIVELY" (M §531).

he puts it in §54: "certainty […] is a consequence without which truth and clarity of theological knowledge […] cannot exist". Certainty of the knowledge of God can only be acquired after we arrive at its truth and clarity to the best of our abilities. This echoes the Cartesian presumption of the order of knowledge, in which we must first "clearly" represent truth to acquire certainty. Baumgarten's focus is on the quality of certainty specific to humans, however. According to Baumgarten, the certainty achievable for finite beings is "moral". As he puts it in §56: "In divine matters, in which the higher form of certainty is impossible for you [a person], L §164, seek moral certainty, Initia §143 [...].". "Moral certainty (*certitudo moralis*)" can be defined as the best possible certainty a human being can achieve about phenomena such as revelation and miracles, since s/he cannot be totally certain that God's goodness is behind those phenomena. In this sense, moral certainty is the second best option for the human being, with the first best certainty being the "theoretical" one accessible only to God.

After defining certainty of a special sort as epistemic condition necessary for one's religiosity to sharpen the definition thus derived, Baumgarten typically offers a dialectic of sorts. He does this by providing us with negative forms of certainty, proceeding from the least malicious to the worst. The gradation is described in the following order: "obsession to prove theological matters (*pruritus demonstrandi theologicus*)" (E §59), "theological scepticism (*scepticismus theologicus*)" (E §61), "pseudo-sacred fairy tales (*legendae*)" (E §64), "incredulity (*incredulitas*)" (E §65), and "naturalism (*naturalismus*)" (E §65). This is typical of Baumgarten's "dialectics" throughout *Ethica*: the gradation of negation from the least to the most extreme, with the aim of contrasting the positive concept he intends to demonstrate. In this spectrum of "negative" dialectics we can see that the extent to which God is negated becomes gradually stronger. This is an expression of logical differentiation between the negative positions that one could adopt towards God, and this expression involves moral connotations as a consequence. For instance, in the definition of "naturalism" as the worst form of certainty, it is highly likely that Baumgarten alludes to Spinoza. In fact, in §38 Baumgarten defined "Spinozism (*Spinozismus*)" as one of the negative principles of "truth" to be avoided.

The last of the four epistemic virtues in the glory of God is "liveliness (*vita*)": "liveliness of sacred knowledge is a consequence without which the highest delegation in God,[213] to which you are obligated, cannot exist" (E §66). Baumgarten claims that "liveliness" necessarily accompanies "truth", "clarity", and "certainty", and these three elements he summarises as "the highest delegation in God (*delegatio in deo summa*)" (E §66). As we have seen, these three elements are understood to include moral imperatives that direct us to approximate God's perfection by trying to cognise and imitate it. As the last of the four epistemic virtues, however, "liveliness" is construed as emotional, not just rationalistic, motive, and therefore provides the necessary fuel, for approximating the knowledge of God.

In turn, in order to understand the metaphysical grounding of these motives, we must assume the presence of a being that ensures the preservation and animation of the world. This preservation and animation is made possible by a pure and direct application and determination of the willpower of that being. This being cannot be any but God because His presence must be understood as omnipresent as the source of liveliness that vitalises all other beings. According to Wolff's succinct definition of "liveliness": "We say that a thing is living if it possesses an active principle in itself"; "Hence, life [liveliness] consists in the uninterrupted activity of a particular being".[214] Baumgarten directly reproduces this definition,[215] and views liveliness as uninterrupted activity that has causal effects. The moral dimension of this activity is that we give ourselves an active principle which, by deriving its source of activity from God's omnipresent liveliness, causally exerts some emotional effect on us. Through this principle, we are led to seek the highest good ardently (E §66), i.e., in a lively way, and therefore we are led to leading a moral life, since, as Baumgarten argues in §70, in such a life we are to gain "practical knowledge (*practica cognitio*)" of God that includes more plentiful and higher reasons for good action.

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[213] By "delegation *in* God" (italics mine) Baumgarten means the qualities, which originate *in* God and are conferrable *to* humans.

[214] Cited in Miklós Vassányi, *Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 69-70.

[215] See Feil, *Religio*, 68-83 for the argument that, for the most part, Wolff's discussion of religion is identifiable with Baumgarten's.

6.2. Internal cult of God

Whereas "the glory of God" denotes the intellectual aspect of internal religion by describing key epistemic virtues, "internal cult" designates the emotional aspect of this knowledge. In the framework of internal religion, an individual is viewed both intellectually and emotionally, that is, she is internally depicted as a whole being equipped with the necessary elements to know God, both intellectual and emotional. The entirety of the person, in all of these dimensions, is implicated in the knowledge of God. Just as the whole person is involved in moral life, the whole person is involved in knowing/feeling the source of that life.

With respect to the emotional aspect of internal religion in particular, eleven elements are subsumed under this heading. These elements are described in the following order: "delight in God (*gaudium ex deo*)" (E §72-74), "acquiescence to His decrees (*acquiscentia in eius decretis*)" (E §75), "trust in God (*fiducia in deum*)" (E §76-78), "grateful mind (*gratus animus*)" (E §79), "self-surrendering love of convictions on guard against the opposite matters (*amor cauens suasorum opposita*)" (E §80-86), "adoration (*adoratio*)" (E §87), "fear (*timor*)" (E §88-89), "obedience (*obedientia*)" (E §90-91), "imitation (*imitatio*)" (E §92), "inner prayers (*preces internae*)" (E §93-99), and "pious habits (*pii habitus*)" (E §100-9). In order to understand the principle guiding this order, we need to refer to some of the definitions given in §684 to 686 of *Metaphysica*.

> An agreeable affect is DELIGHT. [...] Delight based on the past (on account of future consequences) is SATISFACTION. The satisfaction based on what the delightful person has done is ACQUIESCENCE IN ONESELF. (M §682)

> [T]he delight based on a more certain future is TRUST [...]. (M §683)

> Delight based on the perfection of another being is LOVE. The love for a benefactor is GRATITUDE [...]. (M §684)[216]
>
> A burdensome affect is SADNESS. (M §685)
>
> [S]adness based on something imminent is FEAR. (M §686)

In *Ethica*, all these elements are redefined in relation to God. Baumgarten's distinction between the "cognitive faculties (*facultates cognitivae*)" and the "appetitive faculties (*facultates appetitivae*)" is one of the most fundamental in his philosophical system.[217] The following statement reveals the particular stress he puts on our appetite for the knowledge of God: "have the strongest appetite for the delegation gained out of divine perfections" (E §71). The internal cult of God described in *Ethica* represents, to a large extent, the application of the basic appetitive faculties, as they are initially defined in *Metaphysica*, to the search of the knowledge of God, for the final purpose of answering the question of what it means to be moral. This application proceeds as follows: (1) in aiming for the cultivation of our state of mind, we begin with "delight in God", which is tantamount to "love of God" (as love is defined as the delight in perfection). Without the delight in God, we cannot gain the delight in ourselves, since the criteria for judging what is good and bad are primarily based on the concept of the highest good. Thus the concept of delight already has moral connotations, because it can be redefined as "an agreeable affect" brought about by a person's consciousness that she is doing good; (2) we acquiesce with God's decrees because we are satisfied with what God has done in creating the world (also because we are satisfied with it as we hope for the future consequences that God's creation is supposed to bring us following the definition of satisfaction). Satisfaction with God is straightforwardly derived from the delight in God; (3) since we have satisfaction with and delight in what God will do for us in the future, we can acquire trust in

[216] Compare with Kant's definition of "gratitude", in which Kant directly opposes Baumgarten: "Gratitude is not, strictly speaking, love toward a benefactor on the part of someone he has put under obligation, but rather *respect* for him" (MM 6:458).
[217] Dagmar Mirbach, "Magnitudo Aesthetica", 107-8.

God, following the definition of "trust" as "the delight based on a more certain future"; (4) since God is a benefactor, the love of God equates with showing gratitude or a "grateful mind" to God. The love of God even precedes self-love, as a consequence of the precedence of delight in God over that in ourselves.[218]

The first four elements of the "internal cult of God" fit easily in Baumgarten's metaphysical framework. The remaining elements require modifications to their previous definitions or are introduced for the first time.

"Self-surrendering love of convictions on guard against the opposite matters" (E §80-86) is one sort of the "love of God". Standing in the same line as the former elements beginning from "delight", "acquiescence", "trust", and proceeding to "grateful mind", all of which are passive in terms of one's submissive state of mind involved under the power of God, "self-surrendering love" is also described as a passive form of love of God. This time, however, Baumgarten brings the extent of passivity to such an extreme that he insists that one should totally resign oneself to God's will (E §80) rather than follow one's own will (E §86). As for the next element, "adoration", §87 is the only place where the term is defined in Baumgarten's work. He defines it as " honouring someone most highly". It has to be understood in relation to the definition of "honour" given in §942 of *Metaphysica* as "the acknowledgement of a greater perfection in someone". Baumgarten thinks that the introduction of the term "adoration" is necessary, not only because he thinks that a special form of honour is required for God, but also because he intends to warn us against a special form of adoration, that is, "idolatry (*idololatria*)", defined as adoration of a non-God being. By distinguishing between "adoration" and "idolatry", he can make clear the legitimate form of adoration.

In the following sections, Baumgarten further describes the quality of the kind of love particularly applicable to God. He identifies one of the quality elements as "fear". This name, however, is a little confusing because fear's general definition in §686 of *Metaphysica* as sadness about the anticipation of the future cannot necessarily be applied to the definition of "fear of God" in particular. Instead, what Baumgarten gives as the definition of "fear" in *Ethica* is the statement, in §88, that "[f]ear of another being is aversion of that being derived

[218] "[L]ove God above all things, hence more than yourself" (E §72).

from that being's aversion against us and our affairs". The connection between these two seemingly different definitions can be understood, however, if we consider the possibility that the object of fear can arise from our sense that it is distanced from us either temporarily or spatially, and is therefore less determined. That is to say, if the object is placed in the future, it is temporarily less determined than the object of the past, and if it is, to use Baumgarten's terms, *naturaliter* (naturally or physically) distanced from us, it is spatially less determined than non-God beings. In particular, Baumgarten describes the fear of God, the highest form of fear of the latter sort, as "reverence (*reverentia*)",[219] since it concerns God as the object that is *naturaliter* most distanced from finite beings.

"Obedience",[220] the second of the quality elements of love of God, is important in connection with the definition of religion as "duties towards God". This connection is established because God is defined as the legislator in §973 of *Metaphysica* and therefore our relation to Him is at stake. Baumgarten suggests that if a person acknowledges some being as her legislator, she determines with her will her own free actions (E §90), that is, recognise her free will to be compatible with obeying the legislator of the law of that will. Baumgarten describes this person's relation to the legislator as "duties towards God". These kinds of "duties towards God" allow finite beings to carefully observe "the complex of divine laws constituted by the entire law of nature, the entire ethics, and the entire practical philosophy" (E §91). Indeed, Baumgarten defines "duties towards God" as this sort of observation.

Obedience is a good departure point from which to discuss the complex relation of Kant's own theory of internal religion to that of his predecessor. To

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[219] See the following passage in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* for Kant's criticism of the concept: "on the basis of revelation alone, without that concept being *previously* laid down in its purity as its foundation as touchstone, there can be no religion, and all **reverence** for God would be *idolatry*" (R 6:169; bold mine).

[220] From Kant's standpoint Baumgarten's definition of obedience must be criticised as being degraded to a mere passive service to God without any active commitment to the good of morality. Kant maintains that this passive form of obedience is "downgrading his [the human being's] **obedience** to the [divine] command to the status of the merely conditional **obedience** as a means (under the principle of self-love), until, finally, the preponderance of the sensory inducements over the incentive of the law was incorporated into the maxim of action, and sin came to be" (R 6:42; bold mine). On Kant's criticism of Baumgarten's concept of "self-love", see Chapter six, section 2.4 (see also Chapter seven, section 2.1. in this connection).

begin with, one needs to emphasise the fact that Kant takes up most of the key concepts constitutive of the internal cult of God. In a gesture we have encountered many times now, at the same time as he inherits them he also inverts their meaning and use. He does this with especially sharp language in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. One remarkable passage eloquently conveys this inversion. It directly alludes to the kind of religion Baumgarten advocates by showing what consequences it may have:

> Conscious of their impotence in cognition of supersensible things, and though they allow every honor to be paid to faith in these things (as the faith which must carry conviction for them universally), human beings are yet not easily persuaded that steadfast zeal in the conduct of a morally good life is all that God requires of them to be his well-pleasing subjects in his Kingdom. They cannot indeed conceive their obligation except as directed to some service or other which they must perform for God – wherein what matters is not the intrinsic worth of their actions as much as, rather, that they are performed for God to please him through passive **obedience**, however morally indifferent the actions might be in themselves. [...] [S]o we treat duty, to the extent that it is equally God' command, as the transaction of an affair of God, not of humans; and thus arises the concept of religion of divine service instead of the concept of a purely moral religion. (R 6:103; bold mine)

Kant clearly rejects any form of passive reference to religion. In particular, he rejects any role of religion that is not directly nurtured by reason. In terms of how Baumgarten, as the advocate of a passive adaptation of religion, defines the elements of the internal cult of God, it is especially the definitions of "adoration", "fear" (together with the associated term "reverence"), and "obedience" which Kant argues against. Alluding directly to Baumgarten's conception of the cult of God, Kant offers what he calls "the true (moral) service of God (*Dienst Gottes*)":

> The true (moral) service of God, which the faithful must render as subjects belonging to his kingdom but no less also as its citizens (under laws of

> freedom), is itself just as invisible as the kingdom, i.e. it is a *service of the heart* (in spirit and truth), and can consist only in the disposition of **obedience** to all the duties as divine commands, not in actions determined exclusively for God. Yet for the human being the invisible needs to be represented through something visible (sensible) [...], it must be accompanied by the visible for the sake of praxis and, though intellectual, made as it were an object of intuition (according to a certain analogy) [...]. (R 6:192; bold mine)

Here, Kant seems to accept the importance of the cult of God as a visible analogy of the invisible (intellectual) obedience to God's commands *inasmuch* as the latter are just a different term for the dictates of practical reason. But the criticism of a purely passive deference to God that is independent of any rational, moral consideration remains strongly in place. The cult of God, as he redefines it, is a stepping-stone to establish what he calls the "true religion" (Kant employs this term throughout the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*). Under the name of the "true (moral) service of God", he can attack each of the elements Baumgarten initially subsumed under the internal cult of God, by offering inverted "true (moral)" versions of them. The following passage is an eloquent example, in which Kant criticises Baumgarten's use of "adoration", "fear", and "reverence" in particular:

> [T]he doctrine of virtue stands on its own (even without the concept of God); the doctrine of divine blessedness contains the concept of an object which we represent to ourselves, with reference to our morality, as a cause supplementing our incapacity with respect to the final moral end. Hence divine blessedness cannot of itself constitute the final end of moral striving but can only serve as a means of strengthening what in itself makes for a better human being, [i.e.] virtuous disposition; and this it does by holding out to this striving and guaranteeing for it (as striving after goodness, even after holiness) the expectation of the final end for which it is itself powerless. The concept of virtue, by contrast, is derived from the soul of the human being. It is already within him in full [...] and, unlike the concept of religion, is not in need of ratiocination through inferences. In the purity of this

> concept; [...]; in the dignity of the humanity which the human being must respect in his own person and personal vocation, and which he strives to achieve – there is in this something that so uplifts the soul, and so leads it to the very Deity, which is worthy of **adoration** *only in virtue of his holiness and as the legislator of virtue*, that the human being [...] is yet not unwilling to be supported by it. [...] [W]ere he [the human being] to begin with it [the concept of a world ruler, who makes of the duty of adoration a commandment for us], he would run the risk of [...] *transforming divine blessedness into a fawning slavish subjection to the commands of a despotic might*. [...] [W]hen the doctrine [of atonement which Kant thinks should follow "courage", an essential component of virtue] is made to come first, the futile endeavor to render undone what has been done (expiation), the **fear** concerning the imputation of expiation, the representation of our total incapacity for the good, and the anxiety lest we slip back into evil, must take the courage away from the human being, and must reduce him to a state of groaning moral passivity where nothing great and good is undertaken but instead everything is expected from wishing for it. – As regards moral disposition, everything depends upon the highest concept to which the human being subordinates his duties. If **reverence** for God comes first, and the human being therefore subordinates virtue to it, then this object [of reverence] is an *idol*, i.e. it is thought as a being whom we may hope to please not through morally upright conduct in this world but through **adoration** and ingratiation; religion is then idolatry. This divine blessedness is not a surrogate for virtue, a way of avoiding it, but its completion, for the sake of crowning it with the hope of the final success of all our good ends. (R 6:183-85; bold and italics mine)

Strikingly, Kant explicitly takes up almost all of the emotional elements constituting the internal cult of God that Baumgarten discusses/defines, in order to eventually clarify what he thinks comprises the "true" internal religion. He outlines what is detrimental in each case about the ways in which Baumgarten defines those elements, thus warning against these elements. Kant reiterates that these elements

form the emotional side of the scientific investigation, a perspective he shares with Baumgarten. But such investigation is for Baumgarten that of "piety", whereas for Kant it is that of "reason". On the basis of rationalistic grounding of morality, in which reason is considered as internal to the human being, and in which piety is something external to reason, Kant thinks it is dangerous immediately to equate religiosity with morality. He regards religiosity as an attitude of the rationalistic optimism that confuses what "truly (morally)" is internal and external to the human being.[221] Religiosity can in fact be false in many cases, in Kant's view.

Initially Baumgarten defines "self-surrendering love", "adoration", "fear", and "obedience" as the quality elements of our love of God. The remaining three elements, "imitation", "internal prayer", and "pious habits" are categorised as the "quantitative" elements of the love of God. That is to say, what is implied in the application of these elements to the life of the human being is a kind of a law of moral obligation, suggesting that the more quantitatively s/he exercises religious practices indicated in these elements to augment his/her perfection, the more moral s/he will be.

"Imitation"[222] can be understood as an internal exercise to enhance the quality of the glory of God, that is, our knowledge of God. According to Baumgarten, this can be achieved if we "seek all possible perfections and avoid all contingent perfections" (E §92). Since we perceive that God's perfections are necessary whereas human perfections are contingent, the practical way to approximate our perfections to God's is to imitate God, which can be done by

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[221] Recall that Kant warns us against the danger of being overly rationalistically optimistic in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as I discussed in Chapter four.

[222] Again, Kant criticises Baumgarten's conception of the term with strikingly sharp language. From his point of view, imitation in Baumgarten's sense pits religiosity against morality: "There is no need [...] of any example from experience to make the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as model already in our reason. – If anyone, in order to accept for **imitation** a human being as such an example of conformity to that idea, asks for more than what he sees [...]; and if, in addition, he also asks for miracles as credentials [...] he who asks for this thereby confesses to his own moral *unbelief*, to a lack of faith in virtue which no faith based on miracles [...] can remedy, for only faith in the practical validity of the idea that lies in our reason has moral worth" (R 6:62-63; bold mine); "[T]he elevation of such a Holy One above every frailty of human nature would rather [...] stand in the way of the practical adoption of the idea of such a being for our **imitation**" (R 6:64; bold mine).

seeking an "image of God" inside ourselves. In this process of internal exercise, we can enhance our understanding of possible perfections.

The next two elements concern forms of internal action. "Internal prayers" is the first of them. Baumgarten writes: "As long as invoking God is an act of mind, the name of INNER PRAYERS (of the heart) is given to it" (E §94). This is based on the belief that God will listen to such an internal act and no scientific proof is involved therein. Internal prayers, however, also include reasons for action, which are scientifically demonstrable in that God rewards us for the moral goods included in our prayers, and the rewards are better rewards in proportion to our moral deeds being better (E §95). Herein lies the unique position of religion for Baumgarten, which oscillates between faith and science. On the one hand, religion is the basis for philosophical ethics as a scientific discipline. On the other hand, it also must presume faith in God in that we can only believe in Him without any scientific ground that God will listen to our internal prayers. In contrast to Kant, who conceives God as an idea we must postulate even though we know that that we cannot know God intellectually, Baumgarten expresses rationalistic optimism, arguing that we can hope to gain (at least approximately) the intellectual knowledge of God if only we resort to aids that endorse emotional motives to serve this purpose.

After providing us with a lengthy list of different types of prayers, and stressing that we should pray "continuously", Baumgarten sets out a new *Sectio* entitled "pious habit". In order to understand why this element comes after internal prayers, we need to refer to Baumgarten's definition of "habit". According to him, it is "a greater hypothetical faculty" (M §219), presuming that "since the higher degrees of the soul's faculties are habits (M §219), and since the frequent repetition of homogeneous actions – is EXERCISE, the habits of the soul are augmented by exercise (M §162)" (M §577). The point is that the habit results from the repetition of certain actions. In the case of "pious habit", it results from the continuous exercise of "internal prayers". Establishing a pious habit requires "purity (*puritas*)", "constancy (*constantia*)", and "fervour (*feruor*)", all of which are said to constitute the "threefold perfection of religion". These three attitudes are particularly important since they are named as components of "piety (*pietas*)". In this respect

too, Kant continues to critically take up Baumgarten's discussion, focusing on the role of prayers in moral life (R: 6:192-93). He explicitly defines the action of "church-going" as a collective affirmation of morality (R 6:193) instead of regarding it merely as a ritualised passive service to God. But again, after introducing the kinds of prayers he thinks constitute the "true" service of God (which must be founded on moral good, but not on God), Kant uses strong language to reject a relationship between faith and morality that could easily be construed as the kind of Pietistic obedience characteristic of Baumgarten's foundation of ethics: "Every beginning in religious matters, when not undertaken in a purely moral spirit but as a means in itself capable of propitiating God and thus, through him, of satisfying all our wishes, is a *fetish-faith*" (R 6:193).

As a transition to Baumgarten's explanation of the "external cult of God", we must remind ourselves of the position of the internal cult of God in the whole system of Baumgarten's ethics. In §22, within the framework of the "internal cult of God", the relationship between an internal state of mind and internal actions is clearly formulated. Baumgarten writes: "RELIGION is INTERNAL inasmuch as the act of the mind is immanent. [...] PIOUS ACTIONS are a part of religion (religion taken in a broader sense, cf. E §149, that is, obligations towards God)". Whereas the first sentence denotes the internal state of mind, the second one relates to internal actions. As we have just seen, both of these constitute the elements of the glory of God. With particular regard to the internal cult of God, the subject of religious exercise is specifically seen in the emotional aspect of finite beings. On the other hand, we must remember that the intellectual aspects of finite beings were described under the heading of the glory of God. As we will see in the next section, "liveliness" is the key concept, which, as the last of the elements of the glory of God, plays an important role in bridging the glory of God and the internal cult of God, implying that an emotional moment emerges from inside the intellectual quality of knowing God.

6.3. External cult of God

Baumgarten begins the treatment of the "external cult of God" with a simple definition of external actions, to parallel the concept of internal action that was used for the theory of prayer: "Our free determinations as demonstrated by harmonious movements of our body are EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS" (E §110). As was the case with internal actions that include free determinations, external actions are also free in that human beings freely determine "the complex of movements and positions of our body" (E §110). On this presumption Baumgarten defines the "external cult of God" as "the use of your [one's] body towards religion" (E §111). One's bodily representation of God as the model of religiosity counts for an agent to be moral and even more it constitutes a requisite part of religiosity, along with the internal cult of God (where internal representation of God is discussed in terms of "imitation of God (*imitatio dei*)" (E §92)). On the one hand, the internal cult of God is the expression of the internal state of mind in internal behaviour. The external cult of God, on the other, is the expression of the same internal state in external behaviour. As we will see, the external cult of God is not only part of internal religion but also defines "religiosity in the stricter sense" (E §149), meaning that the external cult of God precedes its internal counterpart in terms of religiosity.

The external cult of God subsumes four components. The first is "confession of God (*confessio dei*)". Baumgarten defines it as follows: "The signification of our internal religion before the eyes of humans in the glory of God is CONFESSION of God" (E §119). The purpose of the confession of God is to show explicitly to our fellow humans the fact that our internal religion is enhanced with respect to both its intellectual and its emotional aspects.

The second element of the external cult of God is "pursuit of promoting religion (*studium promouendae religionis*)". In order for a person to be able to teach the glory of God, as Baumgarten claims, she needs to "be a teacher (*doctor*) of piety" (E §126). In particular, pursuit of promoting religion is an act of expressing the "threefold perfection of religion" by way of teaching it to others, and the components of this act constitute one's internal state of "piety". More specifically, according to Baumgarten, the things a person should focus on in teaching others with her internal state of piety are exactly parallel to the elements of the glory of God. They are: "amplification of both subject and object" (E §127), "dignity and

majesty" (E §127), "truth" (E §127), "clarity" (E §128), "certainty and solidity" (E §131), and "liveliness of sacred knowledge" (E §132). Baumgarten argues that these elements need to be signified for a person to be able to teach them to other fellow human beings. Once a person sets out to teach others her own internal state of mind by externally expressing the elements' configuration, in order to support this activity she needs to show concrete examples to others. This can be done by a person being an example herself. In particular, the actions that one can take for this purpose, according to Baumgarten, are: "action of gratitude (*gratiarum actio*)" (E §137), "praise (*laus*)" (E §137), and "doing a return favour (*gratias referre*)" (E §137). He subsumes these actions under the heading of "external prayers" and defines them as "[s]ymbolic orations of internal prayers" (E §136). By this, he means that "external prayers" must be read out in order that they can signify "internal prayers", which as a result serves the purpose of teaching the glory of God, or the knowledge of God, to others.

Furthermore, just as "external prayers" are the external counterpart of "internal prayers", "pious ceremonies (*piae ceremoniae*)", which is the last element in the external cult of God, are the external counterpart of the "pious habit". Pious ceremonies must be understood in relation to the concept of "custom (*mos*)" (E §140), which is defined as an external expression of "habit". Baumgarten's idea of deriving pious ceremonies from the concept of custom proceeds as follows: (1) "custom" is defined as "[o]bservable identity in many actions" (E §140); (2) there are both "natural and arbitrary" customs; (3) after focusing on "arbitrary custom", he defines "rituals (*ritus*)" as "[e]xternal customs of many people [...], which are to be observed in certain (*certa*) matters" (E §140); (4) finally "ceremonies" are defined as "[s]ignified rituals of duties" (E §140). What strikes the modern reader with Kantian assumptions is the extent to which external behaviour only partly related to moral intentionality is given room in philosophical ethics. The care with which Baumgarten ensures that religious conduct is made part of the overall picture of moral life seems to be, once more, one of the key opposition points taken up by Kant in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*.

To sum up, for Baumgarten religion is divided into its internal and external aspects, corresponding to the division between "internal" and "external religion",

the latter of which is named the "external cult of God" in his taxonomy. In addition, religion has not only a cognitive and affective but also a behavioural dimension. What we finite beings can do to fulfil our "duties towards God" is primarily sought by aiming at the increase of the knowledge of God or the most perfect being, inasmuch as we finite beings are created by God and are therefore imperfect. Furthermore, these duties have both internal and external aspects as well, the one being called the "internal cult of God" and the other the "external cult of God". However confusing its structure is, there are two overlapping pairs of concepts in Baumgarten's description of religion, the one concerning the division between "internal religion" and the "external cult of God" (virtually external religion), the other concerning that between the "internal cult of God" and the "external cult of God". In this connection, the "external cult of God" is not only divided in terms of whether it is internal or external, but is also divided into its cognitive and behavioural aspects. However complicated this structure is, on the whole there is complete logical correspondence between all those elements together with their sub-elements. This is a good example of how carefully Baumgarten sought to include all aspects of personhood in his ethics textbook, thereby fulfilling his own normative criterion of "perfection", at least in a quantitative sense.

In §149, the final section on religion, Baumgarten gives a transitional description in order to finally introduce the concept of "morality". This shows us that morality is based on religion and not vice versa, marking a stark contrast to Kant and most of the ethicists thereafter. In this section, Baumgarten introduces the concept of "moral truth (*veritas moralis*)" and defines it as the "agreement of the signs of one's soul with itself (E §149)". It is implied in this statement that the external cult of God is a prerequisite as the signification of the model of religiosity. Baumgarten argues that our bodily movements are indispensable for being religious, and from this point we can become moral. This might sound odd to us post-Kantians. As we have just seen, the agreement between the signs and the soul is achieved as the correspondence between the "internal" and "external" cult of God, the latter being expressed as the signs of the former. This further means that we can begin pondering what it means to be moral only after the representation of our internal religious state of mind is completed both internally and externally. In

concluding his description of religion, Baumgarten tells us that the "truth of morality lies in religiosity" (E §149). "Religiosity (*religiositas*)" is defined in its positive sense as fidelity expressed in external actions (and sanctimoniousness expressed in external actions in its negative sense). In this connection, the external cult of God in fact precedes its internal counterpart. As Baumgarten puts it: "ACTIONS of the external cult as parts, whose connection with the internal religion is more manifest, are RELIGIOSITY IN THE STRICTER SENSE [...]" (E §149). It is now clear that Baumgarten had to complete the whole description of religion before proceeding to the discussion of morality, since religiosity as the quintessence of religion can only be derived from its connection to the external aspect of religion in particular. Although morality is the focal point of ethics in the post-Kantian tradition, Baumgarten's ethics, thus far discussed in relation to religion in particular, sheds light on the important fact that the pre-Kantian paradigm of ethics was still heavily determined by religiosity. It cannot be overemphasised that religion, for Baumgarten, constitutes the necessary component in the argument about ethics.[223]

[223] Feil, *Religio*, 84, 86.

Chapter six: Duties towards oneself

1. Duties towards oneself in general

For Baumgarten the moral imperative "perfect yourself (*perfice te*)" (E §10) constitutes the quintessential formula of morality. What we should seek in the first place in order to be moral is our perfection. Behind this formula is an assumption that we finite beings are not completely perfect and yet are open to perfectibility, because we are able to refer to the most perfect being as the model of the highest perfection. The right way to for us to seek perfection therefore begins with the knowledge of God, which explains why ethics, even as a philosophical discipline, must begin with religion. This is a necessary propaedeutic to secure our relation to the knowledge of being through a psychological, phenomenological description of the knowledge of God that stands at the top of the hierarchy of being. In a sense, therefore, moral life requires of us that we somehow adopt the position of the philosopher or metaphysician, placing ourselves in the position of God as creator of the best of all possible worlds and as guarantor of perfection. The "natural law" is indeed innate in us, but the development of moral life requires of us that we develop it cognitively and affectively in all of its implications. The question of how to be moral can then be restated as a question of how we fit in the world that God created and how we become beings we are supposed to be in it.

Although we can counterfactually develop, in principle, an understanding of what the world is like (as containing perfection), we are at the same time finite beings. As a result, our factual presence in the world that is underpinned by perfection, a presence testified to us through the law of nature, simultaneously expresses a duty, on the basis of the gap between the perfection we can countenance and our own imperfection. In order to participate in God's project of creating the best world, we need to perfect ourselves in a real practical sense. The human self therefore has a double position, as it were, sharing in God's perfection whilst striving to better participate in it at the same time on the basis of his own limitations.

This ambivalence of the human subject is at the heart of the next section of the *Ethica*, dedicated to "duties towards oneself". Baumgarten makes duties towards oneself the first set of duties after duties towards God, because they are the easiest to articulate for the subject of ethics. This is because, as the addressee of philosophical ethics, the ethical subject is simultaneously the subject and the object of ethical prescriptions, an agent acting upon herself to increase her own perfection in direct response to the general imperative of perfectibility. Furthermore, the previous *Caput* has consistently reinforced the idea that ontological perfection directly expresses moral commands, namely to strive to know and contribute to perfection through one's capacity for it or one's perfectibility. Consequently, Baumgarten does not feel he needs to justify further the transition from "duties towards God" to "duties towards oneself" (*officia erga te ipsum*), or justify the way in which the moral command is immediately couched in terms of "augmenting one's realities":

> DUTIES TOWARDS ONESELF (a) are those duties whose determining ground of perfection is a reality to be posited in oneself, to be more precise, in order to increase realities (*realitates*) either of the soul, or the body, or the external state. (E §150)[224]

We have duties towards God because the knowledge of God and His grand design for the world are the basis of any further knowledge, including the moral one. When it comes to having duties towards ourselves, we have specific duties because we need to know where to improve by knowing ourselves to take part in God's project for the world's perfection.

Moreover, I can add that in this section, 150, the concept of duty towards ourselves is not just metaphysically but also logically defined. The "determining ground of perfection" is an ontological translation of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. As we recalled in the previous chapters, for the post-Leibnizians like Baumgarten there is a direct translatability between reasons and reality. Since

[224] "OFFICIA ERGA TE IPSUM (a) sunt, quorum ratio perfectionis determinans est in te ipso ponenda realitas, siue propius animae, siue corporis, siue status externi realitates augeat".

God is the ultimate reality of perfection, when Baumgarten says duties towards ourselves are those that have the determining ground for them to be duties in relation to ourselves, this is on the presumption that such determining ground directly points to the guarantor of the world's rational order. Since we are participators in God's reality and therefore can find elements of perfection in us, which as a whole are expressed as our perfectibility, duties towards ourselves are those that make us enter and indeed cooperate in this rational order. In a very indirect sense, therefore, Baumgarten's moral imperative of self-perfection is already pointing to the idea of a kingdom of ends, as the ideal or counterfactual realm in which creatures come to be integrated in the rational order of the world as guaranteed by God.

As noted, however, the primary sense of duties towards ourselves is to be ontologically explained. They relate to our capacity to increase realities, i.e., our capacity for making each component constituting us more perfect against the grand reality that is God's perfection. Since we have this kind of capacity, we have the duties to exercise it fully in order to participate in God's project of creating the perfect world. Since we can expect, as a result of exercising this capacity with particular focus on the soul, the body, and the external state, that we can be ontologically more perfect as part of God's perfection of the world, there is an ontological basis of our duties towards ourselves.

If we consider the duties towards oneself as the first, proper set of moral prescriptions, we might say that Baumgarten's conception of duty is one that turns on the notion of a maximisation of reality for the self,[225] and so in this sense, we might call it a metaphysically positive doctrine of duty. This maximisation is directly "quantitative" in that it means to simply "increase" the degree of reality of all of our ontological dimensions, but also includes a qualitative aspect, since Baumgarten retains the Leibnizian definition of perfection as "agreement" or unity

[225] See the following passage in the *Doctrine of Virtue* in which Kant seems to repeat Baumgarten's definition and articulation of the concept of perfection: "Perfection is sometimes understood as a concept belonging to transcendental philosophy, the concept of the *totality* of the manifold which, taken together, constitutes a thing. – Then again, as a concept belonging to *teleology*, it is taken to mean the harmony of a thing's properties with an *end*. Perfection in the first sense could be called *quantitative* (material) perfection, and in the second *qualitative* (formal) perfection. The quantitative perfection of a thing can be only one (for the totality of what belongs to a thing is one)" (MM 6:386).

between the different parts. So the perfection of the self consists of the different ways in which the self can enhance itself in terms of being, both simply in terms of degree of reality and in terms of overall consistency. Indeed, this "quantitative" approach to perfection includes the negative side, that is, the consideration of "imperfections" to be avoided or rectified (E §151). The positive duty to enhance our subjective reality translates into a negative duty to avoid all forms of negation or lack of perfection.

This is in stark contrast with Kant, for whom the fundamental relationship of the moral law with our entire being is a negative one, resistance of what reason dictates we ought to do against all the subjective motivations behind our actions.

> [T]he moral law is for them an *imperative* that commands categorically because the law is unconditional; the relation of such a will to this law is *dependence* under the name obligation, which signifies a *necessitation*, though only by reason and its objective law, to an action which is called *duty* because a choice that is pathologically affected (though not thereby determined, hence still free) brings with it a wish arising from *subjective* causes, because of which it can often be opposed to the pure objective determining ground and thus needs a resistance of practical reason which, as moral necessitation, may be called an internal but intellectual constraint. (CPrR 5:32)

For Kant, the concept of duty is the necessity to act as determined by rationality, and we can gain insight into the pure form of rationality in ourselves. We could have pathological motivations for our actions, which is why our motives need to be subject to the higher or the intellectual instance of practical reason. In this sense, the concept of duty expresses the tension between our rational destiny on the one hand, and all the positivity (perfectibility) of our being on the other, the potential subjective reason for our choices and actions.

Kant's moral philosophy thus seems to be the exact opposite of his immediate predecessor's. To put it in terms of simple opposition, whereas Baumgarten's ethics expresses direct, positive, "quantitative" duties towards the

self, as the duty to "augment one's realities", Kant's ethics is strictly negative and formal in relation to the self. We may wonder that the same cultural-religious context, eighteenth-century Pietism, could produce such diverging philosophical outlooks on the ethical subject.

And yet, for all this opposition, once again the radical departure of Kant from his predecessor hides a more covert continuity. For Kant does not deny, in the detail of his doctrine of virtue, that there is also something like a series of duties towards oneself, and when he considers them, he does articulate them in terms of an increase in perfection. As he puts it:

> A human being has a duty to himself to cultivate (*cultura*) his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and the body), as means to all sorts of possible ends. (MM 6:444)

This passage succinctly summarises the way in which Kant includes the concept of self-perfection in his doctrine of virtue, despite his stark criticism of any foundation of practical philosophy on theoretical-metaphysical assumptions. Kant does acknowledge that perfecting oneself in one's capacities expresses a duty in the strict moral sense of the term (not just as "pragmatic" rules relating to one's natural side) (MM 6:386-87). But if perfecting oneself is to be moral in the strict sense, that is, based on the radical opposition between what pure reason dictates *a priori* and what our nature commands, then this duty of self-perfection itself remains entirely subordinated to being a means to the end of being able to fulfil our moral destiny. The duty to cultivate ourselves is there "as a means to all sorts of possible ends" (MM 6:444). The duty to perfect ourselves is so that we can set our ends with sufficient intellectual clarity (spirit), affective fortitude (mind), and physical force (body). Despite the strong qualification (as opposed to Baumgarten's "quantification"), however, it is striking that Kant retains Baumgarten's phrase: "to increase realities (*realitates*) either of the soul, or the body, or the external state" (E §150).

2. Four forms of self-relation

Duties towards oneself consist in the duty to "increase", both in a "quantitative" and "qualitative" sense, the multiple dimensions of the self. In order to systematically cover all those dimensions, Baumgarten divides these duties more specifically into four forms of self-relation: namely, "self-knowledge (*cognitio tui ipsius*)", "self-judgement (*diiudicatio tui ipsius*)", "duties towards one's conscience (*officia erga conscientiam*)", and "love of oneself (*amor tui ipsius*)". Since our moral faculty is grounded in metaphysical reality, what is necessary for us to do next is to introspect in detail how we relate to ourselves for the purpose of knowing more precisely how to become moral, based on the metaphysical (or ontological, from the perspective of humans) definition of the concept of duty. Since we are finite and therefore can err, however, a necessary part of philosophical ethics consists in considering the many deficient ways in which those forms of self-relation can be established. In this sense, *Ethica* also takes the appearance of a practical book, not just a theoretical one, as one might imagine from Baumgarten's definition of ethics as a science. It anticipates Kant's moral writings, which similarly descend into concrete moral admonition, despite Kant's claim to "pure ethics" (MM 6:488).

2.1. Self-knowledge

There is a long tradition in Western moral thinking of grounding morality in self-knowledge. It originated with Socrates, and was then reinterpreted in a religious sense by Augustine.[226] At the beginning of Augustine's *Soliloquies*, for instance, we see a conversation between the personified "Reason" and Augustine himself:

[226] For the argument that the modern political thought developed in the persisting tension between Stoicism and the tradition of Augustinian anti-Stoic criticism, see Christopher Brooke, *Philosophical Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Reason: What then do you want to know?

Augustine: All these things I prayed for.

Reason: Summarize them briefly.

Augustine: I wish to know God and the soul.

Reason: Nothing more?

Augustine: Nothing at all.[227]

The knowledge that Augustine thinks is relevant to the soul's salvation is the knowledge of God and the self-knowledge attained through introspection. These two types of knowledge are interconnected in such a way that the admonition "know thyself", which can be said to be the moral imperative for Augustine, is to be understood as the imperative to live in accordance with one's nature under God.[228] For Augustine, however, the knowledge of God is further away from self-knowledge, exceeding not only our powers of comprehension but also our powers of description.[229] In the *Confessions*, the term "confess" means "confession of sins", which is the free acknowledgement, before God, of the truth one knows about oneself.[230]

This marks a stark contrast to Baumgarten, who premised the possibility of self-knowledge and the insight into one's perfections and imperfections on the partaking in the general metaphysical reality secured by God.[231] This contrast helps to further identify Baumgarten's position. Baumgarten's God, in his philosophical ethics at least, is one that secures the ontological foundation for any further consideration of perfection and imperfection, the basis for moral action. What is thus crucially missing in Baumgarten from the Augustinian perspective is the

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[227] As cited in Gereth B. Matthews, "Knowledge and Illumination", in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 176.

[228] Ibid., 176-77.

[229] Ibid., 182.

[230] Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *Augustine: Confessions and Enchiridion*, trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler (London: SCM Press, 1955), 19.

[231] For the argument that shows that in his youth Augustine struggled with the puzzle of human existence while adopting a "rationalistic" viewpoint, in which he relied on mathematical certitude, see Stephen J. Duffy, "Anthropology", in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan Fitzgerald, and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 1999), 24-25.

thought of original sin,[232] which continues to exert a conceptual, philosophical influence all the way to Kant through the notion of radical evil.[233] Self-knowledge in Baumgarten is completely alien to this thematic. It consists simply in the consideration by the finite human individual of the degree of metaphysical reality present in him or her. This leads to a very specific kind of relation to the supreme being. Whereas for Augustine the moral imperative to "know thyself" and know God is a matter of contemplation,[234] Baumgarten's moral imperative, "perfect yourself", which is premised on a positive ontological continuity between the creator and His creatures, rejects a submissive attitude towards God. The definition of philosophical ethics as being both a demonstrative science and reliant on religion, or the knowledge of God, is testament to this metaphysical and epistemological optimism.

Baumgarten's definition of "self-knowledge" in *Ethica* is thus simply knowing the existing perfections and imperfections inside us as a basis for further perfecting ourselves. As he puts it in *Ethica*:

> You have an obligation to seek all your perfections, and to avoid imperfections as much as you can [...]. Therefore, know well your perfections and imperfections as much as it can be done [...]. (E §152)[235]

More specifically, he writes:

> Now that the determining ground of perfections to be sought via duties towards oneself is [found] in oneself, E §150, one's task is to remove those imperfections which are to be avoided, through [clarifying] duties towards oneself. Therefore, in order to be able to know one's own perfections and

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[232] For an account of original sin as a hindrance to the perfectibility of "man", see Henry Chadwick, *Augustine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 2.

[233] Anne Margaret Baxley points to the etymological sense of the concept of "radical evil" deriving from *radic*- that means "root" in Latin. This concept thus refers to the root or ground of the possibility of moral evil. See Anne Margaret Baxley, "Kantian Virtue", *Philosophy Compass* 2, no.3 (2007): 408 n. 1. 396-410.

[234] Matthews, "Knowledge and Illumination", 182.

[235] "Obligaris ad perfectiones tuas omnes appetendas, imperfections auersandas, quantum potes […]. Ergo perfections imperfectionesque tuas nosce, quam fieri potest […]".

imperfections for the sake of duty, know yourself as much as you can. (E §153)[236]

As we know from the crucial section 94 of *Metaphysica*, "the one thing in which there is agreement is the determining ground of perfection (the focus of perfection)". For the subject of ethics, it is primarily the self that is this ground, the reality to be perfected. Self-knowledge thus contributes to morality by indicating the areas of the self that need to be enhanced as already containing perfection, and those to be corrected or avoided as they contain gaps and faults, imperfections. Knowledge of oneself provides insight into the determining ground of one's own perfection. It is also by knowing oneself that one can detect one's own imperfections and thus be in a position to avoid them. As a whole, self-knowledge, thus defined as the knowledge of one's own perfections and imperfections, is necessary for the later purpose of finding possibilities of self-improvement.

After giving a general definition of self-knowledge in terms of our metaphysical moral faculty to discern our perfections and imperfections, Baumgarten provides positive and negative indications as to how we can achieve self-knowledge as well as avoid errors in knowing ourselves. This advice takes on the character of concrete admonition. For example, in §156 he warns against "prejudice towards yourself", which can take shape either as "excessive confidence" or "excessive lack of confidence" (self-doubt). In §157, he even suggests to his readers and listeners that they should follow a programme of psychological self-introspection by following a certain template, using it as a tool for self-reflection. According to this template, one should not just focus on one's obvious qualities, but also on the "depth" of these qualities, and should pay attention not only to phenomena but also to the "reasons" behind them. His rationalistic optimism leads him to think that the self can, in principle, uncover the structure of the reason underpinning reality even when that reality is the self itself. This kind of metaphysically-based optimism in relation to self-knowledge is, of course, something that Kant rejects totally. The radical distinction between the

[236] "Iam vero perfectionum per officia erga te ipsum quaerendarum est in te ipso ratio determinans, §. 150: tuum est, quod imperfectionibus per officia erga te ipsum fugiendis demitur, §. 151. Ergo vt possis pro debito perfectiones imperfectionesque tuas nosse, nosce te ipsum, quantum potes, §. 152".

transcendental and empirical self[237] is the first rejection on pure theoretical grounds. When applied to the field of morality, this distinction means that the absolute clarity with which the law of practical reason imposes itself on the self, contrasts with the self-clarity the self has regarding itself. Whereas in Baumgarten the moral imperative of self-perfection relies upon a clear and distinct knowledge of self, in Kant the moral imperative owes its force precisely to the fact that it is initially independent of a very uncertain self-knowledge.

Baumgarten subsumes all these activities of self-introspection, such as pursuing the depth of one's obvious qualities, under the category of "exploration of oneself (*tui exploratio*)". This exploration is meant to be fully metaphysically grounded and thus programmable. Of course, he allows for inadequate or insufficient forms of self-knowledge, which finite beings are destined to have, but this is integrated into a larger picture of metaphysics that human beings can theoretically acquire. Interestingly, this self-exploration must be done purely for the sake of being moral and not for the purpose of being happy.

Baumgarten's template is so detailed and thorough that it even prescribes how we should spend our time. He argues that we should ceaselessly introspect by reflecting on our past, present, and future, just for the purpose of being more perfect, that is, being moral. As he puts it:

> Beware lest you create for yourself a state, whether of your past, present or future, which is anything other than true, especially when it is moral, E §156; M §590. (E §161)[238]

He even recommends that we should write diaries as tools for reflecting on our long-term state,[239] in order to reflect on our underlying reality over time. As he writes:

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[237] "[W]e will understand by *a priori* cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur *absolutely* independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only *a posteriori*, i.e., through experience. Among *a priori* cognitions, however, those are called **pure** with which nothing empirical is intermixed" (CPR B2-3; italics and bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original, excepting *a priori* and *a posteriori*).

[238] "Caue, ne vel praeteritum, vel praesentem, vel futurum tuum statum, praesertim moralem, alium tibi fingas, quam verum, §. 156, M. §. 590".

> Clearly display your past states of being that are especially moral, E §158, as much as you can, E §157, because if it is to become an exploration of yourself, it will be (a) A RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR PRECEDING LIFE. (b) DIARIES, which are supporting material for reminiscing, should not be scorned, and the same goes for day-to-day notes of things pertaining to you. Nor should you forget your pristine states, M §549. (E §160)[240]

This marks a stark contrast to Kant who considered, as we have just recalled, that the subject unproblematically knows what the moral command is since practical reason exerts its pull on the rational being in direct, unmediated form. There is no need for any lengthy process of self-introspection. But Kant does acknowledge that there is a duty of self-cognition:

> This command [the first command of all duties towards oneself] is "*know* (scrutinize, fathom) *yourself*," not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or unfitness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. (MM 6:441)

It is tempting to see in Kant's adoption of this duty of self-cognition a remnant of his strong acquaintance with Baumgarten's ethics. Indeed, the next section in this part of the *Doctrine of Virtue*, which signals the right path between "fanatical contempt for oneself" and "egotistical self-esteem", has a strong Baumgartenian air to it. But once again, the way in which Kant elaborates on a theme that he (probably) picked up from Baumgarten is to completely twist and turn around its explicit conceptual content. Kant carefully distinguishes between natural perfection

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[239] On the point that Pietism typically regards keeping diaries as part of the teachings of self-reflection, see Terry P. Pinkard, "Introduction: 'Germany' and German Philosophy", in Pinkard, *German Philosophy, 1760-1860*, 8.

[240] "Status tuos praeteritos, praesertim morales, §. 158, clare tibi repraesenta, quantum potes, §. 157, quod si fiat in exploratione tui erit VITAE ANTEACTAE REPUTATIO (a). Nec contemnenda sunt iuuandae reminiscentiae adminicula DIARIA (b), s. rerum ad te pertinentium chronologiae adnotationes: ne obliuiscaris status tui pristini, M. §. 549".

and moral perfection. Natural perfection, the perfection of our ontologically-given predicates, seems to fit well with the perfection that Baumgarten has in mind as the basis of ethical life. Kant, by contrast, advocates self-cognition as a means to the end of moral perfection, which is only obedience to the dictates of practical reason. In Baumgarten, self-cognition aims to identify areas of improvement for the self on a simple ontological level, in terms of "realities" of the self: to increase understanding, strengthen the will, fortify the body, work on one's "external state", so as to better participate in the City of God.[241] In Kant, by contrast, self-cognition is wholly at the service of the moral law. Its purpose is to "remove the obstacles within" that prevent us from heeding its dictates. The possibility of radical evil, which is the philosophical translation of the theological doctrine of original sin, has to be confronted by each subject as they face the radical choice between what reason commands and the possibility of freely discounting this command. In Kant's view of the duty, self-cognition is therefore a tragic one, whereas Baumgarten's view is an optimistic one. For Baumgarten, self-cognition serves increase in being. For Kant, it is a "descent into hell".

2.2. Self-judgement

Whereas "self-knowledge" relates only to the description of the self, the second type of self-relation, the "judgement of oneself", concerns the normative evaluation of the self by itself.

Section 606 of *Metaphysica* directly links the capacity of judgement with the representation of perfections and imperfections.[242] In *Ethica*, Baumgarten simply applies the definition to the self, and defines "self-judgement" as the "representation of one's own perfections and imperfections". He writes in §164:

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[241] Paul Guyer emphasises the point that one's bodily and external condition constitutes the integral part of Wolff's ethics, contrasting this point with Kant's concept of perfection situated in his ethics. Perfection, for Kant, is limited to that of one's *will* alone. See Guyer, "Kantian Perfectionism", 194-214, esp. 199-207. This does not, of course, contradicts the fact that Kant endorses perfection as self-cultivation of the will, as it is internal capacity of human beings. See Gary Banham, "Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics", in Gary Banham, *Kant's Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 32.

[242] "I perceive the perfection and imperfection of things, i.e. I JUDGE. Therefore I have a faculty of judging (M §216)" (M §606).

> So that any judgement of yourself be satisfactorily abundant and complete, E §155, discern, to the best of your abilities, not only your perfections, but also imperfections, as well as not only imperfections, but also perfections, and furthermore, not only their existence, but also their grounds/reasons (*rationes*) and their grades (*gradus*), M §185; L §409. (E §164)[243]

Baumgarten defines reason (*ratio*) as "that from which it is knowable why something is [such as it is]" (M §14), and grades (*gradus*) as the "depth (*quantitas*) of quality (*qualitas*)" (M §246). Self-judgement, therefore, is again the articulation of one's own perfections and imperfections from a descriptive perspective, in ontological or even logical terms, in the Leibnizian sense. His self-elucidation becomes normative, however, when he comes to terms with the difficulty involved in judging one's own perfections and imperfections. The difficulty is that we finite beings cannot discern our perfections very well. In the practical sense, therefore, Baumgarten even advises us to prioritise the knowledge of our imperfections over that of perfections, since the former type of knowledge still remains intuitive, that is, easy to discern for finite beings. To use Baumgarten's expression, the intuition of imperfections is more "ardent". He writes:

> In your moral perfections and imperfections both present and past, clearer intuition of imperfections will help you more than that of perfections because it is more ardent, M §669. Therefore, since less is sufficient for imperfections that are to be vividly known equally on both sides, attend to your moral imperfections as much as you can, E §166. (E §167)[244]

To understand what he means by "intuitive knowledge (*cognitio intuitiva*)", it helps to refer to its definition in §620 of *Metaphysica*, that "if the perception of the

[243] "Quae diiudicatio tui ipsius vt sit satis plena et completa, §. 155. non perfectiones tuas solum, sed et imperfectiones, non imperfectiones solum, sed et perfectiones, non qua solam existentiam, sed et qua rationes et gradus earum, pro virili, diiudica. M. §. 185. L. §. 409".

[244] "In praesentibus et praeteritis tuis perfectionibus et imperfectionibus moralibus, harum tibi magis prodest clarior intuitus, quam illarum, quia ardentior est, M. §. 669. Ergo minus sufficiens ad vtrasque aeque viuide cognoscendas, imperfections tuas morales potissimum attende, §. 166".

signified is greater than the perception of the sign, the KNOWLEDGE will be INTUITIVE (intuited)". As can be seen, the prioritisation of the knowledge of imperfections is justified metaphysically. The position of perfections and imperfections is "morally" reversed because Baumgarten thought it practically more effective to prioritise imperfections over perfections in order that we can use those imperfections to induce the identification of one's own perfections, thereby facilitating our stepping up on the ladder to perfection, i.e., being moral.

Such a rationalistic, metaphysically grounded conception of "self-judgement" seems at odds with other religiously based conceptions in which self-judgement concerns the consciousness of one's sinful state. It is also at odds with the long tradition in Western thought of critical self-introspection and self-evaluation, of ethical self-assessment, which stretches from the Greek philosophers to Montaigne.[245] Indeed, in Kant's own philosophical translation of theological teachings into different aspects of moral obligation, the discussion of guilt and the judging of oneself according to the standards set by pure practical reason continue to play a big role. Being a judge of oneself, in Kant's philosophy, directly entails a critical appraisal of one's failure to abide by the commands of practical reason.[246] In Baumgarten, by contrast, the judging is simply an appraisal of ontologically-defined imperfections, which are ultimately measured against the standard of the supreme perfection of the supreme being. Despite the major difference in their conception of self-judgement, it is also striking that Kant retains some of Baumgarten's very terminology. As Baumgarten writes:

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[245] For an account of the concept of self-introspection with particular focus on Montaigne, see Glyn P. Norton, *Montaigne and the Introspective Mind* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), esp. 185-187.

[246] "[W]hen represented in his Divinity (the Holy Spirit), i.e. as he speaks to our conscience with the voice of the holy law which we ourselves recognize and in terms of our own reckoning, the judge of human beings can be thought of only as passing judgment according to the rigor of the law, for we ourselves know absolutely nothing of how much can be credited in our behalf to the account of our frailty but have only our trespasses before our eyes, together with the consciousness of our freedom and of the violation of our duty for which we are wholly to be blamed, and hence have no ground for assuming generosity in the judgment passed on us"; "It is hard to give a reason why so many ancient peoples hit upon this idea [that a human community is comprised of three different subjects: the lawgiver, the guardian, and the judge, in accordance with the threefold superior power in God], unless it is that the idea lies in human reason universally whenever we want to think of the governance of a people and (on the analogy of this) of world governance" (R 6:141).

> The capacity to judge one's own perfections properly is (a) JUST APPRAISAL OF ONESELF. The capacity to judge one's own imperfections properly is (b) HUMILITY. (E §168)[247]

This is reproduced almost verbatim by Kant in the section on "Servility" in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (MM 6:434-37, esp. 6:435-36). This literal paraphrase shows the extent to which the text of Baumgarten's *Ethica* continues to be mobilised in the background of Kant's ethical reflection, despite the radical shift that he introduces.

To recap, what is at stake for our perfectibility depends on the question of how we make the transition from the sphere of the theoretical to that of the practical, that is, how we transfer the knowledge of God to that of ourselves. In order for us to find perfection in general, we should first seek it by knowing God. Once we theoretically identify the model of perfection, the first step in knowing ourselves for practical purposes is to identify our imperfections as the clues to perfections, because we can intuit our imperfections more "ardently". As we have seen, "liveliness", which is tantamount to "ardency", is the fourth intellectual element of the glory of God. Therefore, "liveliness" or "ardency" is the concept that bridges God's knowledge to morality, that is, the theoretical to the practical. The fact that we can know our own imperfections "most ardently" when focusing on the knowledge of ourselves derives from the ardency that we have already acquired, as one element of God's knowledge, through the lengthy practice of religiosity. Despite what we might have thought, at the stage of self-judgement, Baumgarten's terminology remains tied to religiosity, but purely in an ontological sense, in terms of the comparison between realities.

2.3. Conscience[248]

[247] "Habitus de perfectionibus suis recte iudicandi est IUSTUM AESTIMIUM (a). Habitus de imperfectionibus suis recte iudicandi est HUMILITAS (b)".

[248] For a substantive account of this topic as treated by Kant, see Pierre Keller, *Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

We therefore need to know our existing perfections and imperfections at the stage of self-knowledge, and make a judgement of perfections and imperfections by discerning their "reasons and grades" at the stage of self-judgement. The third stage of self-relation, "conscience (*conscientia*)", opens up a new dimension of self-introspection, namely, one's capacity to judge between good and bad.

In the tradition of Western moral thinking, the term "conscience (*conscientia*)" had a wide range of meanings, of which its usage in modern English is just a small part. The term is originally a translation of a Greek word "*synderesis*", which has a number of meanings stemming from the verb "*synoida*" that means "I know in common with".[249] Although for many years, both of these Greek and Latin words were treated almost as synonyms, it was scholastic philosophers who began to take special care in distinguishing between "*synderesis*" and "*conscientia*". Thomas Aquinas tidied up the distinction. Applying the Aristotelian classification of potentialities, dispositions, and actualisations, Aquinas defines "*conscientia*" as an actualisation, which is understood as the application of knowledge to particular cases. Aquinas maintains that when our practical reason as potentiality becomes disposition it takes the shape of basic deontic propositions, and we should call this disposition *synderesis*. On the other hand, if these propositions are applied to particular cases, the actualisation of our knowledge of these propositions can be called "*conscientia*". In the light of this distinction, Aquinas insists that "*synderesis*" is never mistaken whereas "*conscientia*" may be. Conscience, in the scholastic sense, can thus be defined as the application of the knowledge of deontic propositions that one's disposition requires, derived originally from our practical reason as potentiality. To put it in ordinary language, if we are by nature a good person and if we will to be a good person, we have conscience if we apply our knowledge of what is right and what is wrong to the action that we are thinking of committing or have committed. According to Aquinas, whereas we cannot be mistaken in knowing what is right and wrong, we can err in applying that knowledge to concrete action, since rules employed in the action can always be misapplied.[250]

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[249] Timothy C. Potts, *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2.
[250] Ibid., 50, 52.

Baumgarten agrees with Aquinas that our conscience can be mistaken, but attributes the source of error in the process of application to the sheer fact that we are finite, unlike Aquinas. As is always his method, he begins by describing firstly, our metaphysical finitude, and secondly, the moral solutions to overcome these metaphysical limitations however approximately. In §176, Baumgarten begins the description of conscience with the definition of "the minimum amount of conscience":

> The minimum amount of conscience would be as much as the recognition for your benefit of the sole minimum amount of your deed, and the recognition and subsumption for your benefit of your deed under the sole minimum amount of law and in the minimum amount of truth, clarity certainty, and the grade of liveliness, E §175. (E §176)[251]

Here Baumgarten claims that we are made to have the minimum amount of conscience when recognising the connection between our deed and the benefit that we gain from it, with the help of the slightest hints. That is to say, when we aim at good action, we have to be able to judge if the things we are doing (or have done) are good, and so we must have certain criteria to know what makes an action good or bad. Thus Baumgarten's definition of "conscience" in general is that it is the knowledge of the moral law that, if we follow it, will let us commit a good action. Once we detect the minimum amount of law that includes the most basic qualities ("the least amount of truth, clarity, and certainty") necessary for our benefit, after we know that we are on the right track of morality, our continuous moral effort is to increase the quality of our conscience. As Baumgarten writes in the passage following the one just cited:

> Therefore, the greater in number and the greater our deeds are, and the more truthfully, clearly, certainly and ardently they are recognised for matters that concern us, and the more truthfully, clearly, certainly and ardently we

[251] "Minima conscientia esset vnici tantum minimi facti tui agnitio pro tuo, et sub vnica lege minima in minimo veritatis, claritatis, certitudinis et vitae gradu facta agnitio pro tuo et subsumtio, §. 175".

> subsume them under laws which are more plentiful and greater and stronger, the higher conscience is, M §160. You are obligated to the highest conscience that is possible for you, E §175. Hence, to the best of your abilities, see to it that you apply yourself to deeds that are greatest in number and are highly important, make sure that you apply laws that are the greatest in number and most supreme to the most blessed life in the highest grade of truth, clarity, certainty, and liveliness as much as you can and most truthfully, e.c., E §154, for recognised matters that concern you. (E §176)[252]

Baumgarten's advice for us to commit a good action is, at this point, purely metaphysical. He directs us to pursue the best quality in all aspects of the knowledge of our deeds as well as of the laws that govern them. Note that the number of both our deeds and the laws is expounded as one of the qualitative elements, alongside truth, clarity, certainty, and ardency. To better understand this, recall Baumgarten's definition of grade (*gradus*) as the "depth (*quantitas*) of quality (*qualitas*)" (M §246). Furthermore, that the number is qualitative can also be explained by the fact that it corresponds to "amplitude and majesty", which has been explicated as one of the qualitative elements of the knowledge of God, alongside "truth", "clarity", "certainty", and "liveliness".

Nevertheless, Baumgarten thinks that it is not enough to define conscience only metaphysically. Since we can err as finite beings, he also deems it necessary to adjust conscience to a proper state by describing different modes of conscience, as well as possible errors, so we can concretely instruct ourselves in the course of our conduct. For example, he writes in §183:

> [Y]ou have an obligation to a conscience which is vigilant and watchful, and which flees from a sleeping conscience, E §182, 181. Whenever a vigilant

[252] "Quo plura ergo, quo maiora facta nostra, quo verius, quo clarius, quo certius, quo ardentius pro nostris agnita, quo pluribus quo maioribus fortioribusque sub legibus, quo verius, quo clarius, quo certius, quo ardentius subsumimus, hoc maior est conscientia, M. §. 160. Ad maximam tibi possibilem conscientiam obligaris. §. 175. Ergo pro virili, ad plurima facta tua, grauissima maxime, pro tuis agnita, quantum potes, verissime, e. c. plurimas, supremas maxime vitae beatae, leges in summo tibi possibili veritatis, claritatis, certudinis et vitae gradu §. 154. fac applices".

> conscience concludes that a deed is either legitimate or illegitimate, E § 175, in the former case it will be (a) AN APPROVING CONSCIENCE and in the latter case it will be (b) A DISAPPROVING CONSCIENCE. While CONSCIENCE that approves illegitimacy is (c) TOO LAX, CONSCIENCE that disapproves legitimacy is (d) TOO STRICT. [...]. Straightforward conscience, which is to be sought, is neither too lax nor too strict, E §177. (E §183)[253]

Here Baumgarten warns us against a possible error in judging a legitimate action as illegitimate and vice versa. Although both lax and strict conscience are ideally to be avoided, however, we cannot reach the state of metaphysical completeness to the extent that we can prevent ourselves from having either a good or bad conscience. In other words, because we are finite, we cannot avoid having a good or bad conscience in some cases. After maintaining that "good conscience" is approving whereas "bad conscience" is disapproving in §184, Baumgarten provides us with advice to prioritise bad over good conscience in cases where we cannot help having these kinds of conscience. As he writes in §190:

> When you cannot be equally certain in all (a) CASES OF CONSCIENCE, that is, when events are to be judged through conscience, you should work to be more certain of conscience for bad than conscience for good [...]. (E §190)[254]

Baumgarten provides this advice for the practical purpose of keeping us on the shortest track to morality, that is, to let us become more perfect more easily. Prioritisation of a bad over a good conscience is advised because he thinks that the

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[253] "[O]bligaris ad conscientiam vigilantem, et vigilem, fugiendamque dormientem, §. 182, 181. Quumque vigilans conscientia concludat factum vel legitimum esse vel illegitimum, §. 175, in priori casu erit CONSCIENTIA APPROBANS (a), in posteriori IMPROBANS (b). CONSCIENTIA illegitimum approbans NIMIS LAXA (c), legitimum improbans NIMIS ANGUSTA (d) est. [...]. Conscientia recta quaerenda nec nimis laxa, nec nimis angusta est. §. 177".

[254] "Vbi aeque certus in omnibus CONSCIENTIAE CASIBUS (a), i. e. euentibus per conscientiam diiudicandis, fieri nequeas, magis certus esse labora, qua conscientiam mali, quam qua conscientiam boni [...]".

former is more "vivid" (E §184). This is another example of his practical advice he persistently appeals to, considering it specifically fitting for us finite beings.

As can be observed here as well as in other discussions throughout *Ethica*, Baumgarten's prescription for moral choice in competing values is always "ascetic". The term has some Stoic connotations, since it implies a self-forming activity that introduces the changes that a person makes to herself in order to be moral.[255]

For his part, Kant defines conscience in the *Metaphysics of Morals* as one of the moral feelings on the presupposition that we human beings are susceptible to duty.[256] He does not, however, regard conscience itself as a duty. In this respect, Baumgarten's insistence that we have duties towards our conscience is an absurdity. As Kant puts in the *Metaphysics of Morals* in a passage which can be read as directly targeting Baumgarten again:

> [C]onscience is not something that can be acquired, and we have no duty to provide ourselves with one; rather, every human being, as a moral being, has a conscience within him originally. To be under obligation to have a conscience would be tantamount to having a duty to recognize duties. (MM 6:400)[257]

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[255] See Baumgarten's employment of the term in §47 of *Aesthetica*: "the *askēsis* [...] requires that the repetition of actions of the same sort be exercised in order that the agreement of the spirit (*ingenium*) and the disposition (*indoles*) is brought about"(my translation). For a historical explanation of the concept, see Richard Valantasis, *The Making of the Self: Ancient and Modern Asceticism* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2008), 5. See also Foucault's concise elucidation of the term cited ibid., 5-6: "No technique, no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; neither can one learn the art of living the *technē tou biou* without an *askēsis* which must be taken as a training of oneself by oneself: this was one of the traditional principles to which the Pythagoreans, the Socratics, the Cynics had for a long time attributed great importance" (Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress", in Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 364.

[256] Allen W. Wood, "Kant on Conscience" (Stanford: Stanford University, 2009; appeared in *Kantovski Sbornik*), accessed 4 November 2013, http://www.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/KantOnConscience.pdf, the third paragraph.

[257] See also this definition of conscience: "Every concept of duty involves objective constraint through a law (a moral imperative limiting our freedom) and belongs to practical understanding, which provides a rule. But the internal *imputation* of a *deed*, as a case falling under a law (*in meritum aut demeritum*), belongs to the *faculty of judgment* (*iudicium*), which, as the subjective principle of imputing an action, judges with rightful force whether the action as a deed (an action coming under

Kant understands conscience in the modern sense, as a faculty intrinsic to rational beings and at the source of our moral feelings, determining how we stand morally in relation to our actions. For Baumgarten, however, conscience is the knowledge of the logical connection between our deed and our benefit in the first place. The fact that we are regulated by some kind of moral feeling in our conscience is even explained metaphysically. For Baumgarten, there is room for the improvement of our conscience as it is to be understood as one of the elements to be devoted to our moral perfection along with the other components of self-relation. Kant admits that we have *duties* towards ourselves in which forms of self-relation are intrinsically encompassed, but we have no duties towards these self-relations themselves, as they are just given to the extent that we are rational. Baumgarten thinks that we have *duties* towards ourselves *and* therefore these duties can be further articulated as duties towards the forms of self-relation.

2.4. Self-love

As the fourth form of self-relation, Baumgarten discusses "self-love (*amor tui ipsius*)".

In Augustine's thought, self-love is regarded as the natural consequence of the development of self-knowledge. For Augustine, self-love is tied to our God-given nature and therefore is in no need of being commanded. This can be understood when it is put into the Christian, especially Augustinian, context, in which "inwardness" is not just about the self as we usually take it in the modern sense. Augustine maintains that God is "more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me".[258] In other words, if we reflect on our self-relation, or introspect within ourselves, it necessarily leads to the most

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a law) has occurred or not. Upon it follows the conclusion of *reason* (the verdict), that is, the connecting of the rightful result with the action (condemnation or acquittal). All of this takes place before a *tribunal* (*coram iudicio*), which, as a moral person giving effect to the law, is called a *court* (*forum*). – Consciousness of an *internal court* in man ("before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is **conscience**" (MM 6:437-38).

[258] Cited in Darlene Fozard Weaver, *Self Love and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 82.

profound introspection of ourselves, that is, our relation to God. Therefore, when it comes to the question of moral value of our self-knowledge, Augustine sees no difficulty in identifying that which makes us good and happy, with God Himself. This amounts to saying that Augustine sees no serious conflict between declaring happiness our supreme good and declaring God our supreme good.[259] Consequently, Augustine thought that once we were commanded by Christ to love God, there was no need to further expect Christ's command to love ourselves.[260] In a similar way, Thomas Aquinas argues that a person loves herself if she loves God, because God is the principle of good and the person is a partaker of this good.[261]

Baumgarten follows in this grand tradition but his rationalistic presuppositions make him take a slightly different stance on the notion of self-love. He sees no difficulty in regarding love as a duty. That this is so is evidenced in the definition of love given in §684 of *Metaphysica* that it is "[d]elight in any perfection". This is not only because God is the highest perfection, but also because we owe to God our understanding of perfection. In other words, since He is the benefactor behind our perfectibility, we cannot escape from having delight in God and for that delight, we must be grateful to Him. Therefore, a human being has an obligation to love God. It is neither by feeling nor willing but due to a duty derived from the sheer metaphysical reality that God is our benefactor. At the same time, we have an obligation to love ourselves as a logical consequence deriving from the love for God, since we can also regard ourselves as perfection (albeit less perfect than God). Since we are the secondary benefactor to ourselves (next to God), we are able to represent our own perfections for the purpose of becoming a more perfect being. It is self-love as the final stage of self-relation that boosts our ardent self-introspection, with the benefit of a more accurate identification of our own perfections. Setting aside our love towards others, which is discussed later, it can be said at this point that in Baumgarten's theory, we can speak of love in general as a duty on the presumption that the object is our benefactor.

At the very outset of the *Sectio* on self-love, Baumgarten writes in §191:

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[259] Bonnie Kent, "Augustine's Ethics", in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 215-16.
[260] Ibid., 216.
[261] Weaver, *Self Love and Christian Ethics*, 133.

> Since you will know yourself most ardently to the best of your abilities, E §154, be pleased with your perfections after having declined your imperfections, M §669, with sensory and rational (a) SELF-LOVE (*philautia*), [that is,] love of yourself. Love yourself, M §684, just as God loves you, E §92, inferior to Him, E §81, 72 [...]. (E §191)[262]

As we have seen, a key element in the knowledge of God is "ardency" with respect to bridging the gap between knowledge and morality. When this element is put into self-knowledge (particularly self-judgement), it works to clarify our self-relation by pointing out our imperfections more specifically. Here, given Baumgarten's emphasis on the "ardent" exercise of our ability to be pleased with our perfections (something that concerned only our imperfections at the stage of self-judgement) suggests that at the stage of self-love, we can finally acquire the most ardent representation of our perfections. As a result, self-love is simultaneously the most emotional and most rational aspect of our self-relation and self-introspection (self-love as both sensory and rational), because it leads to the highest awareness of our perfections, both "quantitatively" and "qualitatively" as it were. At the stage of self-love, we can finally come to love ourselves for all that is good in us, because we know already that what we are doing (or have done) is most perfect on a human scale. This state of self-love can be acquired only after our journey has been undertaken, a journey that takes us through the knowledge of our existing perfections and imperfections (self-knowledge), discerning reasons and grades for both our perfections and our imperfections (self-judgement), and being vigilant about what we are doing or have done, based on our judgement of our perfections and imperfections (conscience).

By contrast, for Kant, the presupposition that we have a duty to love (whatever the object is) is a contradiction in terms. As he puts it in the *Metaphysics of Morals*:

[262] "Ardentissime pro virili cogniturus te ipsum, §. 154, gaude perfectionibus tuis auersatus imperfectiones tuas, M. §. 669. sensitiua et rationali HEAUTOPHILIA (a) (philautia) amore tui ipsius, ama te ipsum, M. §. 684, sicut deus te amat, §. 92, infra eundem, § 81, 72 [...]".

> *Love* is a matter of *feeling*, not of willing, and I cannot love because I *will* to, still less because I *ought* to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a *duty to love* is an absurdity. (MM 6:401)

Kant rejects the concept of duty to love by ascribing it as a feeling rather than a willing,[263] the latter being the only human faculty to which a rational constraint can be applied. Indeed, since he also regards self-love as a mere feeling, Kant insists that practical principles of self-love cannot provide universal laws because feelings can change subjectively, and therefore those principles can be merely contingent and cannot be objective as is required for law. Kant rejects the attempt to base the concept of duty on practical prescriptions as Baumgarten does, since human emotions, which Baumgarten thinks direct our rationality by eventually bringing about precise understanding of our own perfections, cannot claim any universality. The contrast between Baumgarten and Kant on this point can be seen just as clearly in the first chapter of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where principles of "self-love" are again rejected as grounds for morality:[264]

> [P]ractical precepts based on [principles of self-love] can never be universal because the determining ground of the faculty of desire is based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which can never be assumed to be universally directed to the same objects. (CPrR 5:26)

As we have seen (Chapter five, section 4) and as we will see below, Baumgarten had no compunction in grounding the concept of duty on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

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[263] As I will discuss later in Chapter seven, 2.1., Kant's position to "duty to love" is more nuanced than I present it here, as he also claims that "love is not to be understood as feeling" (MM 6:449). Kant's twofold (seemingly contradictory) approach to the concept of love (defining love as a feeling at one time, denying it to be a feeling at another) unveils how he conceives the notion of "respect", a central concept in his ethics.

[264] Jeffrey Edwards, "Anthropology, and Universal Benevolence in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals", *The Review of Metaphysics* 53, no. 4 (2000): 898.

3. Special duties towards oneself

Under the heading of the special duties towards oneself, Baumgarten subsumes "duties towards the soul", "duties towards the body", and "duties towards the external state".

3.1. Duties towards the soul

When Baumgarten argues that we have obligations towards the soul, and that this sort of obligation constitutes a special part of the duties towards oneself, along with the general part made up of the four forms of self-relation (as we have seen), the argument focuses on the perfection of each of the faculties constituting the soul. Note that these faculties are applicable to any sort of self-relation, and are not just restricted to self-knowledge. In particular, Baumgarten classically considers the soul to be constituted of two kinds of faculties, namely, the "cognitive" and "appetitive", in line with both Leibniz and Wolff.[265]

Since Baumgarten's thorough ethical programme involves developing a whole moral person under the name of ethics, it thereby also includes the development of both cognitive and appetitive faculties in that moral person. This ethical project is therefore substantially more detailed than that limited to the mere use of the appetitive faculty in Wolff's architectonic of philosophy. In introducing his fuller ethical program, Baumgarten introduces a further division, namely between the inferior and superior degrees of the faculties. This division is made according to the view that the human soul has both cognitive and appetitive components and each can be known from a material (in terms of content) or a formal point of view (in terms of the quality of the knowledge). Although only the

[265] According to Leibniz, the distinction reads: "This triad [of God's **power**, **knowledge**, and will] correspond in created **monads** to the subject or basis, the **perceptive** faculty and **appetitive** faculty" (*Monadology* §48 [cited in Stuart C. Brown and N. J. Fox, *Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 246], bold by the authors of the book). Wolff describes this distinction as follows: "The soul has two faculties, the cognitive and the appetitive. [...] That part of philosophy which treats of the use of the cognitive faculty in knowing truth and avoiding error is called logic. [...] That part of philosophy which treats of the use of the appetitive faculty in choosing good and avoiding evil is called practical philosophy" (PD 61-62).

cognitive side of this further division is usually discussed (in terms of the known Leibnizian distinction between confused (inferior) and distinct (superior) cognition), Baumgarten extended the application of this division to the appetitive faculty.[266] According to Baumgarten, in order to be moral, one therefore has to perfect one's faculties in all dimensions: all of the faculties; the inferior and superior degrees of all those faculties; and formally as well as materially.

Furthermore, the idea that one should take care of one's faculties in order to be moral is directly connected to the concept of self-love, the last element of the forms of self-relation. Typical of Baumgarten's method, the concept of self-love is given a transitional function, mediating between the "general" and the "special" duties towards oneself (just as was the case with the concept of "ardency" that functioned as the transition from the knowledge of God to self-knowledge). This mediating function of self-love can be understood if we refer to Baumgarten's definition of the concept of "caring" (*cura*), given in the context of self-love, as the general relation to oneself in the aim of perfecting oneself. As he puts in one of the sections on self-love:

> He who pursues knowing and actuating matters of some kind of an average/moderate goal of perfection (a) TAKES CARE of it. (E §197)[267]

The concept of "caring" appears here in *Ethica* for the first time in his works. It subsequently features as a central concept in the sections concerning the special part of the duties towards oneself, starting from *Sectio* VI entitled, "The care of the intellect", all the way through to *Sectio* XVII named, "The care of external delights". As a result, it can be said that "caring" is the key concept of the duties towards oneself, covering all aspects constituting ourselves, our faculties, our soul, our body, and external state, all of which presuppose "self-love" as the basis of self-relation. If the argument concerns our faculties with special focus on their cultivation for the

[266] We can see an example of the division of the appetitive faculty in Christian Freiherr von Wolff, *The Real Happiness of a People under a Philosophical King Demonstrated; Not only from the Nature of Things, but from the Undoubted Experience of the Chinese under their first Fohi, and his Illustrious Successors, Hoam Ti, and Xin Num* (London, M. Cooper, 1750), 95.
[267] "Cognoscendis et actuandis mediis perficiendi alicuius finis studens, eum CURAT (a)".

purpose of being moral, self-love, previously defined as a form of self-relation, is now applied to caring for ourselves through care for each of our faculties.[268]

Baumgarten does not shy away from the implications of his thorough application of the principle of perfection to all aspects of the human person, and therefore pays great attention, within the special duties towards oneself, to the inferior cognitive faculty particularly. He describes his philosophical psychology in *Metaphysica*, as the process from the inferior to the superior cognitive faculty. Since human cognition of anything at all begins with recognising it obscurely or confusedly by relying on the senses, when Baumgarten says that a person has an obligation towards the inferior cognitive faculty, he implies the obligation to the perfection of the sensitive aspect of the human cognitive faculty:

> Perfect your cognitive faculty, and hence the inferior one, that is, the analogue of reason (*analogon rationis*), M §640, in such a way that the materially best knowledge – that is, that of the best matters that you can know – is at the same time formally the best, the richest, the most important, the most truthful, the clearest, the most certain, and the most ardent knowledge that you can provide, M §669. (E §202)[269]

Based on his definition of "reason" as discerning the relation of things "distinctly", the "analogue of reason (*analogon rationis*)", is the generic category comprising of all the inferior cognitive faculties that discern the relation of things "confusedly": (1) the sensitive faculty of seeing the agreement of things; (2) the sensitive faculty of discerning differences between things; (3) sensitive memory; (4) the poetic faculty (the capacity to invent); (5) the sensitive faculty of judgement; (6) the expectation of similar cases; and (7) the sensitive faculty of signifying things (M §640).

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[268] For an account of the development of one's character through the care of one's faculties in Kant, see Holly L. Wilson, *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 33-34. The book, however, ignores Kant's indebtedness to Baumgarten on this point.

[269] "Perfice facultatem tuam cognoscitiuam, hinc et inferiorem, analogon rationis, M. §. 640. ita, vt cognitio materialiter optima, i. e. optimorum, quae potes cognoscere, sit simul formaliter optima, quam praestare potes, vberissima, grauissima, verissima, clarissima, certissima, ardentissima, M. §669".

Baumgarten's categorical imperative commands us to "perfect yourself", which means to develop all aspects of our human faculties. Particularly in terms of the human cognitive faculty, however, the superior dimension of each faculty cannot be developed before we have developed the inferior side of that faculty. So in order to be moral we have to develop our inferior cognitive faculty first, for all seven cognitive faculties. This is basically what the twenty sections of this sub-part delineate one by one. The imperative of perfection thus requires both exhaustive self-knowledge in terms of our capacities ("know your soul"), and extensive enhancement of their powers, both quantitatively ("materially") and qualitatively ("formally"). Baumgarten thus reinterprets the classical Socratic imperative, "know yourself", in terms of a quantitative and qualitative enhancement of being.

As usual, the delineation of the key imperative according to all its dimensions is accompanied by a series of concrete, practical instructions. For example, Baumgarten prescribes the following to his audience:

> Get to know, experience, and measure your senses both external and internal (M §535). Pay attention to senses to be sharpened, conserved, intensified, and extended, as well as avoid their blunting, M §540. (E §203)[270]

Cultivating our inferior cognitive faculty entails developing one's senses, memory, and imagination in their multiple facets in relation to their corresponding formal qualities, such as magnitude, truth, clarity, certainty, and ardency, and their potential objects. For example, such a development can be achieved if we deepen our sensitive perception by being more attentive to how large, hard, bright, and so on, the object is; how we can memorise that object; how it relates to other objects (how far they stand from each other, how strongly they are attracted to each other, etc.); and the like. Baumgarten sees a straightforward connection between having more sophisticated senses, as well as a more sophisticated faculty of memory (E §212) or imagination (E §216), and being more moral. There is no need to emphasise how odd such an ethics sounds to our post-Kantian ears, but it also makes it so

[270] "Nosce, experire et metire sensus tuos tam externos, quam internum, M. §. 535. Da acuendis, conseruandis, intendendis extendendisque sensibus operam, fuge eos hebetantia, M. §. 540".

interesting: Baumgarten does not shy away from the ultimate consequences of his systematic application of the perfectionist rule. To be good is to know the perfection of the world so that we can perfect ourselves in accordance with it; this demands perfecting our soul; our soul is composed of "inferior" faculties of knowledge; therefore morality demands that we also enhance our senses and imaginative powers in terms of their cognitive reach. The rationalistic basis of Baumgarten's ethics leads directly to a philosophy of embodied cognitive enhancement. Indeed, he spends much more time providing prescriptions about how to enhance our "inferior" cognitive faculties (twenty sections), than he does the "superior" ones (five sections).

Once a person has cultivated the sensitive knowledge of the objects that she perceives by being attentive to their multiple facets, she has to proceed to understand them intellectually, that is, formally articulate them, since those objects were only obscurely or confusedly represented at the stage of their inferior cognition. At the stage of the superior cognition, we can represent the objects "distinctly", which constitutes the other side of human perception of a thing along with the "confused" perception. Indeed, the confused, inferior knowledge is still necessary for a person, since this kind of knowledge satisfies the material condition for that knowledge to be "clear" ("clarity" is one of the substantial cognitive elements of the knowledge of God, as we have seen). In order for us to be able to qualify that knowledge as scientific, however, we need to satisfy the other, formal condition for the knowledge to be clear. Since knowledge is clearest if we adopt the superior cognitive faculty, Baumgarten, at this point, states that with the description of the superior cognitive faculty we have reached "science tested subjectively" (E §224), or as the German annotation says, "science seen as the feature of reason". On the way to unfolding his full theory of ethics, Baumgarten has reached the stage here where he is describing moral reasoning that is fully equipped with the scientific treatment of our moral investigation, regarding what kind of existing features we already have and what room for improvement the features potentially possess.

Although religion serves as pure theoretical science for the sake of the knowledge of God, our effort to know the objects God has created in this world can

be exercised like a practical applied science. On the one hand, the "analogue of reason (*analogon rationis*)" has to be excluded from the realm of scientific activities lest we confuse reason with it (E §224). Nevertheless, the analogue of reason plays an essential role in Baumgarten's ethics as well, as the propaedeutic to moral reasoning, since he considers our inferior cognitive faculty to be indispensable in our journey towards becoming moral because it is tailored for finite beings in its function to facilitate our material and sense-based association of things, before allowing us to reason the formal connection of those things.

What, then, is entailed in the need to develop our superior cognitive faculty? Baumgarten writes in §221 as follows:

> The special obligation accords with the general obligation of attention to that which must be cared for, of abstraction, of reflection, of comparison, M §626, and of foreknowing, E §202; M §589, agrees with special obligation because without exercising them neither can understanding be cultivated, M §631, nor can freedom in general be exercised, nor can the faculty of attending to at will, M §719, be acquired in the appropriate dominion of yourself, E §220, with all its consequences, E §204, 220. Therefore attend as much as you can, but attend to those matters that you should attend to, matters that deserve elucidation, matters that are obscure with good reason, M §529, matters that deserve reflection and comparison, and many more. (E §221)[271]

The superior cognitive faculty allows us, first and foremost, to clearly and distinctly perceive the relation of things as they are or as they will be, with the exclusion of material or emotional content. Baumgarten maintains that our superior cognitive faculty is the precondition not just for our understanding, but for our freedom as well. This is because without exercising our higher cognitive capacities, we can never truly understand which object to aim at, or indeed what the object we

[271] "Ad generalem obligationem curandae attentionis, abstractionis, M. §. 625, praescissionis, §. 202. M. §589, accredit specialis, quia sine earum exercitiis nec intellectus coli, M. §. 631, nec exerceri generatim libertas potest, facultas attendendi pro lubitu, M. §. 719. Nec acquiri potest debitum in te ipsum dominium, §. 200, cum omnibus huius consectariis, §. 204 – 220. Hinc attende, quantum potes, sed attende quibus attendas, quae illustrationem mereantur, quae digna tenebris, M. §. 529, quae reflexionem, et comparationem mereantur, et quantum".

aim for is like, which results in our inability to desire or will the object properly. Practically speaking, the only way he thinks we can acquire this faculty is to choose things that deserve attention in our aim of being moral, and to pay attention to those things without interference from material or emotional concerns.

Now that we have cultivated our cognitive faculty both materially and formally, we will focus on how we are affected in certain ways by the objects that we cognise because we need to be guided towards the things we aim at. In particular, what we need to work out first are the affections lying at the very elementary level of human existence. A person is emotionally affected by what is pleasant and unpleasant, even if the object that causes this pleasantness (and unpleasantness) is not well articulated yet. Baumgarten thinks that it possible to explain this kind of pre-configuration of human emotion metaphysically, employing the logical classification of the terms. According to him, "pleasure (*voluptas*)" is defined as "the state of the soul emerging out of the intuition of perfection" (M §655). "Displeasure (*taedium*)", on the other hand, he defines as the state of the soul emerging out of "the intuition of imperfection" (M §655). When Baumgarten claims that a person has an obligation towards pleasure and displeasure, what he implies is that now the person has cultivated her cognitive faculty to represent a thing in general both materially and formally, the next task is to focus on her judgement of what makes a thing pleasant or unpleasant. This is because we need to know how to relate ourselves to pleasure and displeasure in order to be moral. Since the judgement of what is pleasant or unpleasant is intuitive in the first place, however, we have to unite this intuitive judgement with the formal judgement of perfections and imperfections, because their formal aspect clarifies the metaphysical criteria of pleasantness and unpleasantness. The enhancement of this formal judgement goes hand in hand with exercising our cognitive faculty, especially our superior one: it is much better if perfections and imperfections are represented "more truthfully, more clearly, more certainly, and more ardently" (E §234) in this process.

In our journey towards becoming moral, once we are able to judge what is pleasant or unpleasant by exercising our cognitive faculties, both inferior and superior, with the help of which we can represent our perfections and

imperfections, we have to be able to pursue pleasure (the enhancement of perfections) as well as to avoid displeasure (the reduction of imperfections) to be able to make an active commitment to being moral. In Baumgarten's scheme, the next faculty we must develop is our "appetitive faculty (*facultas appetitiva*)". As he puts it in *Metaphysica*:

> If I endeavor or make an effort to produce some perception, i.e. if I determine the power of my soul, or myself, to produce some perception, I DESIRE. [...] Therefore I have a faculty of desiring [...], that is, THE APPETITIVE FACULTY. (M §663)

As this statement suggests, since it is not enough for us to be moral to remain at the stage of representing our perfections and imperfections using our cognitive faculty, we also have to desire that their representation works in us so that it facilitates our pursuit of morality.

Baumgarten splits the appetitive faculty into its two constituents, the inferior and the superior. In relation to our representation of things in general, the inferior appetitive faculty is connected to our inferior cognitive faculty with which we represent things sensitively, whereas the superior appetitive faculty relates to our superior cognitive faculty that enables our intellectual representation of things. In the moral cultivation of ourselves, our focus is on our perfections and imperfections, and at the cognitive level, we acquire the knowledge of the object materially before proceeding to the formal cognition of it. This material knowledge of the object relates to our inferior appetitive faculty. Given this, we find that at the appetitive level of pursuing perfections and avoiding imperfections, we begin our journey with our inferior appetitive faculty that is affiliated with the sensitive or material representation of our perfections and imperfections, a representation that is enabled by our inferior cognitive faculty.

On this journey, what we will is positioned higher than what we merely desire. Baumgarten clearly distinguishes between "desire (*appetitio*)" and "will (*animus*)", by relating the former to the mere or inferior "appetitive faculty" and the latter to the "superior appetitive faculty". Once again, we find that the rationalistic

philosopher explicitly and substantially establishes his theory of the moral will upon a large sensory base. For instance, Baumgarten gives a strong role to affects, defined as follows: "The (stronger) desires and aversions originating from confused knowledge are AFFECTS (sufferings, affections, perturbations of the mind)" (M §678). If a person is affected by a thing, she will come to desire it by the operation of her (inferior) appetitive faculty. What, then, can we do to our intuition and affection for the purpose of perfecting them, if the moral categorical imperative "perfect yourself" is also specifically applied to the cultivation of these sensitive qualities as well? Baumgarten recommends we should aim at "the right degree of passions (*metriopathia*)" (E §244) as a person standing between an "apathetic man (*aphathian*)" (E §244) and an "empathic man (*emphathian*)" (E §244) would, the latter of which is explained in his German annotation as "a man full of passions". Typically, there is an explicit Aristotelian strand in his ethics, identifying our duties by letting us choose between two extremes, requiring of us a kind of a balancing act, defined as "averageness" or "mediocrity", between the extremes. As Baumgarten puts it in §244:

> Moral mediocrity that unfolds [its effect] in those who are affected is the right degree of passions, which is to be sought, E §170. (E §244)[272]

If a person is passionate about things to an average ("mediocre") extent, she is on the way to being moral.

Volition or will, in contrast to intuition and affection (which makes us desire the object), is exercised with the help of our superior appetitive faculty. Therefore, in terms of the order in which we cultivate our appetitive faculty, Baumgarten thinks that we should proceed from the cultivation of the inferior to that of the superior appetitive faculty, as is shown by his claim that "volitions (*volitiones*)" arise after one experiences "intuition and affection (*intuitus et affectus*)" (E §246). Moreover, since at the stage of cultivating our superior cognitive faculty, he identifies the object of our volition as "maxims (*maximas*)", and since they are defined in Baumgarten's German annotation as "the rules of the free action that

[272] "Mediocritas moralis in affectibus se exserens est METRIOPATHIA (c), quaerenda, §. 170".

man has adopted" (E §246), we finally see that what is at stake at this point is the question of the morality of our free actions. This time, the moral imperative, "perfect yourself", is applied at the highest level, namely the identification of the rules that we need to adopt in our free actions (for we cannot merely desire these rules as the object of intuition and affection). This makes us agents, all the more morally responsible for the actions we commit because we are truly free to choose what we will. In brief, we have reached the level from which Kant's practical philosophy departs. The contrast with Baumgarten is clear, given all that has had to be discussed in advance of this point as a necessary foundation. Kant begins directly with pure practical reason; the affective, sensitive, and intuitive side of the human being is discussed only as a hindrance and obstacle to the realisation of our moral duties.

It is this stark contrast that also explains the difference in the applied aspects of ethical theory. In Baumgarten, because the higher cognitive aspects of morality are seamlessly grounded in the affective-intuitive dimensions, the applied aspects are directly connected to the theoretical aspects; indeed, the distinction makes little sense in his ethics. So he can advise us that in order to be morally free in the higher way that he has described, we need to overcome ourselves, that is, regulate our will for things so that it becomes neither excessive nor too servile, and centres on the concern for mediocrity (E §248). This leads to the advice to take a moderate course in choosing "maxims (*maximas*)"(E §246) to adopt among the extremes with reference to "temperance (*temperantia*)" (E §249), the recommended mediocre quality of appetition. As regards this quality, Baumgarten instructs us to seek out "abstinence (*abstinentia*)" (E §249), "temerity (*temeritas*)" (E §249), "patience (*patientia*)" (E §249), and "moral humour indicating goodness (*phlegma morale bono significatu*)" (E §249). On the other hand, the following sub-qualities are to be avoided: "intemperance (*intemperantia*)" (E §249), "weakness of mind (*mollities animi*)" (E §249), "timidity (*timiditas*)" (E §249), "insensitivity (*indolentia*)" (E §249), and "moral humour indicating evil (*phlegma morale significatu malo*)" (E §249). As in Aristotle, and Greek moral theories more generally, moral philosophy must be able to describe who the moral person is precisely, the virtues to be developed, and the weaknesses and defaults to be avoided. Kant, of course, also develops a doctrine of

virtue to flesh out the implications of the moral imperative. But the fact that, for him, it is an egregious mistake to pretend to arrive at a formulation of the imperative by constructing it on the basis of the full gamut of human faculties shows that the relation between higher practical faculty and "lower" faculties is totally contrary to the relation developed in Baumgarten's approach.

Although Baumgarten also thinks that each of our maxims has to be lawful, that does not mean that they do not need any content. Rather, they are to be as fully equipped as possible with concrete instructions, so that they can facilitate our moral perfection by instructing us how to act lawfully, on the presupposition that our understanding of lawfulness can be increased as part of the perfection of ourselves as morally cultivable persons.

3.2. Duties towards the body

In line with all that we have seen regarding the gradual way in which we can learn to rationally choose the principles of free action, for Baumgarten it does not suffice to focus on the perfection of one's soul for the purpose of becoming moral. In addition, in order to be moral in general and to perfect one's soul in particular, one needs to perfect one's body at the same time. Baumgarten gives equal importance to the discussion of the duties towards the body as to the duties towards the soul. The background explanation of human body in relation to human soul is given in §741 of *Metaphysica* as follows:

> It can be known from the position of the human body in the universe why the human soul represents this, and not something else, obscurely, clearly, or distinctly (M §740, 736). Therefore, THE HUMAN SOUL is the power for representing the world according to the position of the human body in it[273] (M §513, 155). (M §741)

The human soul, constituted by both inferior and superior cognitive faculties (accompanied by both inferior and superior appetitive faculties, respectively), can

[273] "I REPRESENT ACCORDING TO THE POSITION OF MY BODY in the universe" (M §512).

represent the world only in reference to the position of the human body. Morally speaking, therefore, in terms of the perfectibility of self, there is a proportional relationship between the perfection of the soul and how perfect the body is. By the position of the body Baumgarten means the state of one's life, one's health, one's food and clothing, one's occupation and leisure, and one's chastity, each of which will be discussed separately under the heading of the duties towards the body.[274]

Life is the most fundamental element among all constituents of the human body, since without it, there is no possibility for a person to become more perfect at all. Baumgarten's first suggestion in this respect is therefore that we preserve our life as a necessary condition for any further striving towards perfection. Kant keeps this duty, but restricts it drastically by talking of it in terms of a "duty to oneself as an animal being", and as a duty that makes sense only negatively, as a prohibition to suicide (MM 6:421-22).

After the preservation of one's life is determined as the primary obligation towards the body, Baumgarten has to establish that we should take care of the body so that it lasts longer, to allow the greatest possibility of achieving perfection. Although it might sound like mere common sense to say that we should take care of our health for a longer life, Baumgarten's justification for it is terminologically defined. As he puts it:

> In this life, generally seek for yourself the highest possible habit of harmonious actions in the whole of your body. [...] This habit, so long as it depends on the unhindered nature, is called HEALTH. (E §253)[275]

Baumgarten regards health as a habit, which is, as we have seen, defined as "a greater hypothetical faculty" (M §219). Health is such that it contributes to the possibility of living longer, and thus underpins the possibility of more and greater perfection of ourselves on condition that we make it our habit to do things that nurture our body. The seamless shift from the theoretical to the applied that we

[274] Refer also to the following passage: "My body has a determinate position (M §85), place, age (M §281), and situation (M §284) in this world" (M §509).

[275] "In hac vita quaere summum tibi possibilem habitum actionum harmonicarum generatim in toto corpore tuo. […] Hic habitus, quatenus a natura non impedita pendet, SANITAS (c) vocatur".

previously highlighted,[276] appears in its most striking form in this passage: Baumgarten recommends the practice of "dietetics (*ars diaetetica*)", while advising not to "indulge in excessive physical strength (*passio athletica* or *exessus in appetendo corporis robore*)" and the "dangers (*pericula*)" that could result in death or harm life. Baumgarten agrees with Aristotle, in that one should pursue happiness in order to be virtuous, and that virtue has pleasure in itself (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1099a), which suggests that one's health matters for one's virtue. As we will see in the next section on the duties towards the external state, they also agree upon the point that happiness also needs external goods (*Nichomachean Ethics* 1099a-b).[277]

The argument thus far, in terms of our duties towards the body, is that we are given the moral imperative to "perfect your body", which, when combined with the other imperative to "perfect your soul", constitutes the broader fundamental moral imperative, "perfect yourself". In order to perfect our body, Baumgarten thinks it necessary that in addition to our "natural" body, we need "external" bodies, such as "food (*victus*)" and "clothing (*amictus*)". His argument and advice at this point sounds highly peculiar to our modern ears. The most trivial aspects of bodily existence are included in the theoretical discussion, leading to a definition of food and clothing in the very same language that is used for the most abstract metaphysical entities:

> Food (a) or nourishment is the complex of bodies, from which healing through digestion is expressed. (E §259)[278]

Predictably, in line with his concrete advice for becoming a better person, he admonishes against "drunkenness (*temulentia*)" (E §260), and this admonishment falls in this category too. Baumgarten then defines clothing in the following way:

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[276] Guyer describes a "seamless web" woven by human reason, human agency, nature, and God, as characteristic to Wolff's moral philosophy. See Guyer, "Kantian Perfectionism", 210. This, of course, is the same as with the case of Baumgarten's ethics, as we have already amply seen.
[277] On Aristotle's theory of happiness, see R. J. Hutchinson, "Ethics", in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 195-232, esp. 199-204.
[278] "VICTUS (a) s. alimentum est complexus corporum, ex quibus chilus per concoctionem explimitur".

> Clothing (a) is the complex of bodies, with which we are accustomed to nearly enclose our body. (E §266)[279]

However odd these sections might sound, they are extremely revealing. The justification for including such trivial matters is that the body is just as much an aspect of the imperative of perfectibility as all the other aspects of human existence. Our body, however, requires "external bodies" and so these are also included in the general perfectionist imperative. These odd-sounding passages illuminate most clearly Baumgarten's moral vision: the vision of a world suffused with God's rationality in which every single parcel of this world can be made to participate in His Glory. We cannot be further from Kant's radical ontological and moral dualism, and indeed Baumgarten's radical rationalism seems to lead directly to the kind of pantheistic view he had officially rejected in the name of Spinozism. Logically then, not only do the external bodies helping one's own body, need to be included in Baumgarten's account, but the "shape" of the body too, since no dimension can escape the imperative of perfectibility. Thus, Baumgarten is even concerned with the beauty of the body, defined as the "shape of the body (*forma corporis*)" (E §264). Even things with which we decorate ourselves make us *morally* better persons.

"Life", "health", and "food and clothing", the components of the body so far discussed, are subsumed in the same *Sectio* named "The care of the body". The rest of the topics are handled in independent *Sectio*s. The first of them is "occupation and leisure (*occupationum et otii*)" (E §267-71), in which Baumgarten considers the ways in which the body is "externally occupied" as it were, that is, the ways in which one's time is occupied. Once again, the "quantitative" and "qualitative" criteria of the resultant obligation apply: perfection in this regard consists in maximising one's "occupation", i.e. the number and quality of actions one makes one's body perform. The qualitative criterion matters as much as the quantitative one, however, and so the obligation also concerns spending one's time well, and sharing that time between moral reflection and other occupations. Baumgarten here retrieves a classical strand of moral writing, namely the condemnation of idleness and discussion of the proper occupations of mind and body. His perfectionist

[279] "AMICTUS (a) est complexus corporum, quibus corpus nostrum propius circumdare solemus".

stance, once again, makes him address the classical question in a highly original form. Rather than a negative approach focusing on idleness as the source of sin, with possible reference, in the Christian context, to original sin, here the approach is positive, focusing on the maximisation of one's bodily and mental faculties in how they are occupied.

Under the heading of "Chastity" (E §272-75), the *Sectio* after the one on "occupation and leisure", sexual intercourse as the relationship of one's body with another's is discussed. Here Baumgarten goes candidly through the different ways in which sexual pleasure might be licit or not, morally acceptable or not. The principle of maximisation of perfection on the one hand speaks against any puritanical condemnation of sex in general. The quest for maximum perfection includes the body and its pleasures. On the other hand, the very same principle demands "prudence" and "temperance", since indulging in sexual pleasure can easily bring with it physical and social problems. In the end, however, Baumgarten's prescriptions are the same as Kant's, even though they operate from such different premises: an obligation to marry, in order to enjoy another sexually and to be mutually enjoyed (MM 6:277-78). For Baumgarten, this obligation stems from the necessity of keeping the urgent force of sexual desire under control (*dominium*).

3.3. Duties towards the external state

In the journey towards becoming moral, we need to perfect both the soul and the body in order that the perfection becomes complete. The perfection of ourselves is not complete, however, unless our body is further connected to the external state facilitating the ends we set for ourselves. Baumgarten therefore considers the different components of the human life that constitute the "external state" of the person: "necessities and conveniences of life (*necessitates commoditatesque vitae*)" (E §276-80), "work (*labor*)" (E §281-84), "money (*facultatum*)" (E §285-89), "external delights (*deliciae externae*)" (E §290-92), and "reputation (*existimatio*)" (E §293-300).

In order to narrow down what an "external state" is, in §276 he defines "external matters (*res externas*)" as "actions by means of which things are posited outside of you". The consideration of these external things as an essential part of the moral person means that the "inwardly directed mind (*mens introrsum versa*)", however morally superior it might look, is in fact very far from the introspection discussed as one of the components of general duties towards oneself, because if the mind is only inwardly oriented and has no interest in external matters, such a mind leads us to the type of "chimerical ethics" that obligates us to things that we are actually not obligated to (E §7).

Under the heading of "The care of necessities and convenience of life", Baumgarten defines "necessities" as "the sorts of external matters without whose use life cannot be naturally conserved" (E §277), and the "convenience of life" as "the sorts of external matters whose use can be performed with greater pleasure or which gives rise to a more pleasant life" (E §278). Especially in terms of the convenience of life, he recommends a "masculine disposition (*animus masculus*)" (E §279) in one's attitude in willing convenience of life, while disapproving "judgemental (*distinctus*)" (E §279) and "self-indulgent (*delicatulus*)" (E §279) dispositions categorised as "feminine (*effoeminatus*)" (E §279).

Regarding all the other components subsumed under the heading of the duties towards the external state, the arguments flow in almost the same way: definitions of the key terms are first, followed by the list of things to be recommended and otherwise. In every context, it is a matter of maximising the material aspects of one's life, ensuring that one secures the "necessities" of life (E §277) and achieves as many "commodities" and avoids as many "incommodities" as is possible (E §278). The rule of quantitative and qualitative maximisation, however, immediately restricts the search for these goods, and leads to an Aristotelian golden mean. Most classical ethical theories prescribe the virtues of temperance and fortitude, but Baumgarten's maximising maxim offers an original angle to justify them from.

"Work (*labor*)" is defined as "the complex of unpleasant occupations to which necessities and convenience of life are subservient" (E §281). In relation to work, Baumgarten's Pietism is far from advocating a puritanical work ethic. He

insists that rest from work is also *morally* necessary (E §281), since work is an unpleasant activity and moral reflection can be a "more noble occupation" once the necessities of life have been secured. The virtue of the "hard-working (*laboriositas*)" person (E §282) is indeed a virtue, and "laziness (*pigritia*)" (E §282) a fault, but hard work is only a negatively defined virtue, something that needs to be done conscientiously but in a way that alleviates its "tediousness" as much as possible. Furthermore, since Baumgarten regards work as unpleasant albeit necessary, he permits a person to spend time idly, so long as it is done eagerly and is pleasant (E §282). Again, since he considers work to be inherently unpleasant and to be restricted to serving our necessity, whereas he deems it to be important for us to seek pleasure in order for us to become a better person, he thinks that both of the following cases must be avoided as much as possible: a case in which a person cannot continue a job for long enough (E §283), and a case in which a person does work only for the sake of gaining bread (E §284).

Regarding "money (*facultas*)", the next element of the external state, it is justifiable to take care of it for similar common-sense reasons to the other elements of the external state. In order to gain necessities and convenience of life, we must have something valuable to redeem them, which we can possess as an ability that is external to ourselves. This external ability Baumgarten calls "money". If a person does not have enough money to obtain the necessities of life, she is called "needy (*egenus*)" (E §285). If someone does not have sufficient money to spend on the commodities of life, that person is called "poor (*pauper*)" (E §285). On the other hand, if a person has sufficient money for gaining convenience of life, she is "prosperous (*locuples*)" (E §285), whereas if the money she has for that purpose is abundant, she is "rich (*diues*)" (E §285). Baumgarten's standpoint in terms of money lies in his recommendation for us to be rich, coupled with his insistence that we should be neither needy nor poor. Again, this standpoint can be explained by the principle of the pursuit of pleasure. Following an Aristotelian line, however, he does not endorse such an activity as "economics (*chremastica*)" (E §286), since, he thinks, its focus is not on gaining necessities and convenience of life and it does not serve the good as a result. Since external goods are good only to the extent that they support the quest for perfection of the soul and the body, once they have been

secured any increase in them is no longer useful and therefore the search for them becomes morally reprehensible. From here on, all the other concepts regarding money are evaluated according to "temperance" and "intemperance", both of which are defined as recommendable and not, respectively, in relation to the ability of one's soul (E §249). In this framework, Baumgarten disapproves of "avarice (*avaritia*)" (E §287), "miserliness (*tenacitas*)" (E §288) and its stronger form, "meanness (*sordities*)" (E §288), because all of these belong to intemperance. On the other hand, in terms of maintaining one's fortune, he endorses "thrift (*parsimonia*)" (E §289) as well as "frugality (*frugalitas*)" (E §289), both of which belong to temperance. He further disapproves of such forms of intemperance as "prodigality (*progalitas*)" (E §289) and "luxury (*luxuria*)" (E §289), the latter of which is specifically defined as prodigality in food and clothing.

In terms of "external delights", the next element of the external state, Baumgarten allows us to seek them as long as they are "innocent (*innocens*)" (E §290) and not "crass (*crassus*)" (E §290), since they are primarily useful because of their proximity to sensuous delight. In particular, Baumgarten advises us to be cautious lest our external delights adhere to false perceptions and lead us to "crass pleasure (*crassa voluptas*)" (E §290).

What Baumgarten tries to suggest regarding taking care of our "reputation", the last element of the external state, is that if we seek "love of reputation" (*philotimia*) (E §293) and come to acquire it, it can protect us from various forms of "disgrace (*contemtus*)" (E §293). Disgrace is divided into its internal and external components, depending on whether it remains in our soul or is signified in external ways. Furthermore, since the way in which others judge us well or badly depends on our fortune, it is especially advisable for us to take care of our reputation as externally recognisable to others in order to defend ourselves from external contempt. Baumgarten names two forms of such external contempt, one being "censure (*vituperium*)" (E §293), defined as "verbal disgrace", the other a "malicious remark (*caluminia*)" (E §293) if the statement included in the former is false. Baumgarten further distinguishes between "deserved (*meritus*)" (E §294) and "baseless (*vanus*)" (E §294) reputation, and he thinks that the latter sort occurs when it appears to be true even if it is actually not. When it comes to the ways in

which we can gain a (deserved) reputation, he advises us to focus on the following three points: (1) possessing higher perfection so as to be praised; (2) making that perfection explicit so that the praiser can recognise it; (3) verbally expressing it. In pursuing reputation, however, we again need to take care of keeping temperance. In this regard we must not only avoid "vanity (*vanitas*)" (E §296) because with it we try to pursue false or quasi-true reputation, but also abstain from "ambition (*ambitio*)" (E §296) as it is counted as intemperance. For this reason Baumgarten recommends us to keep "modesty (*modestia*)" (E §296) in enhancing our reputation, and this is supported by his argument that we must imitate God "modestly (*modeste*)" (E §296) in promoting His glory (E §92). Both pursuing our reputation and seeking the glory of God serve the common goal of searching for perfection. Baumgarten's direction concerning the pursuit of reputation goes into even more detail. He insists that "expenditure (*sumtuositas*)" (E §297) in terms of food and clothing is permissible as long as it contributes to the honour of our external state, since they do not contradict modesty. In particular, it is called "magnificence (*magnificentia*)" (E §297) if it contributes to the higher form of honour. He argues, however, that two other forms of expenditure, "pomp (*pompa*)" (E §298) and "fury (*ferocia*)" (E §298), should be avoided, as ambition and vanity are ascribed to them, respectively. This level of detail is no longer to be encountered in Kant and subsequent moral theories. The model is clearly the moral treatises of the Epicureans and the Stoics, and the moral literature of the Middle Ages, where every aspect of a person's conduct, in particular their demeanour in public, is a topic worthy of address by a moral philosopher. What matters is not securing pure access to the voice of conscience, as in Kant, but prescribing the right code of conduct given the standard of God's perfection.

Sections 299 and 300 mark the very last part of the discussion on the duties towards oneself. They reveal the special role that Baumgarten ascribes to the consideration of the care of reputation or honour in relation to what is important about the principle of maximisation that we are supposed to pursue in order to become a better person. He maintains that honour accorded to us by others does not necessarily coincide with whether we are pleased, so we need to study how to conduct ourselves in such a way as to give honour to ourselves rather than being

trapped by the consideration that others may give to us (E §299). For this reason, Baumgarten insists, we need to develop our "virtue (*virtus*)" (E §300) that is named "honesty (*honestas*)" (E §300) if we can earn honour by it. The corollary to this is that Baumgarten approaches the redefinition of the concept of ethics itself. First, he defines "internal honesty in a wider sense (*honestas interna latius*)" (E §300) as "the complex of all virtues to which we are internally obligated" (E §300). Second, when he specifies the condition in which "internal honesty" is "in the natural state (*in statu naturali*)" (E §300), he finally calls this specific sort of internal honesty, "ethical (*ethica*)" (E §300). Whereas the former includes all the different kinds of duties, those towards God, oneself, and others, the latter is focused on our pursuit of our own natural perfection, independent of the consideration of others, and done for the sake of virtue (expressed as the complex of the duties towards oneself alongside their habituation). Baumgarten's redefinition of ethics in this way is in stark contrast to Kant's conception of ethics, when we recall that he distinguished between natural and moral perfection and, in principle, excluded the handling of the question of morality from the consideration of the former. After the redefinition of ethics, Baumgarten characteristically names two forms of ethics to be avoided, one being "moral egoism (*egoismo morali*)" (E §300) and the other being "neglect of oneself (*negligentia tui ipsius*)" (E §300). Whereas the former is excessive focus on ourselves coupled with neglect of God or others, the latter consists in the lack of any focus.

Chapter seven: Duties towards others

1. Duties towards other beings in general

In our journey towards morality, which Baumgarten sees as tantamount to being more perfect, we need the model of perfection as a starting point. We can then apply this knowledge of perfection in pursuit of our own perfection. Baumgarten thinks that God's project of creation requires us to be more perfect, and so we are bound to have a definite relationship with God as the model of perfection, and with ourselves as the object to which to apply the knowledge of perfection. Consequently, we can make ourselves moral, to fit in God's grand design of perfection. If, however, we recognise that there are beings other than us and that they are to be more perfect in their own right just as we are, we can appreciate others as beings that share the common purpose of perfection. Although we cannot seek others' perfection on their behalf, we can still help them to achieve perfection by applying the theoretical understanding of the fact that God is the model of perfection for them too, to our attitude towards them in assisting their perfection. Although we cannot experience as duty the urge to attain perfection as they experience it, we can still theoretically understand that this urge and duty are exactly the same as what we experience in terms of our own perfection. As a result, in addition to our duties towards God and to ourselves, there emerges a third kind of duties, namely, those towards others. Baumgarten defines this kind of duties as follows in §301:

> DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS (a) are those duties whose determining ground of perfection is the reality that is to be posited outside of yourself. Just as all the duties towards God posit in yourself the highest reality, E §16, they also posit many duties in others. Therefore just like duties towards oneself could be examined, E §150, so could the duties towards others; thus also duties towards others should not only be understood in such a way that as if they posit no reality in yourself. But inasmuch as this or that determining ground of perfection is more closely observable in any

> particular duty, it is referred to this or that sort of duties on the basis of its primary features, thereby certainly not by means of denying the greater number of determining grounds of perfection, since wisdom more powerfully advises you to examine them all together, E §225, M §986. (E §301)[280]

Baumgarten's definition of duties towards others is, as always, metaphysical. God exhibits the highest reality in each of us and we can theoretically assume that He does exactly the same to others, although we cannot experience how God establishes the highest reality in others as they do. In particular, just as the determining grounds of perfection were defined as the subsumed perfections of the mind (both formal and material), of the body, and of the external state, as we have seen in the discussion of the duties towards oneself, just so can other human beings claim their own determining grounds of perfection in terms of their mind, body, and the external state, since they are also creatures that participate in God's creation of the perfect world. Moreover, even non-human beings can also claim their determining grounds of perfection, although those beings are limited in terms of their active commitment to their perfection in comparison with human beings, because they lack the mental capacity that humans have. Nevertheless, we have duties towards all other beings, both human and non-human,[281] in that we are advised to observe and enhance, as far as we can as many determining grounds of perfection as possible even if they are external to us. This advice to observe those determining grounds of perfection outside oneself, is given to us by wisdom. The metaphysical definition of "wisdom", in the wider sense, is "the insight into the

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[280] "OFFICIA ERGA ALIA (a) sunt, quorum ratio perfectionis determinans est extra te ponenda realitas. Sicut officia erga deum omnia etiam in te summam ponebant realitatem, §. 16. multa etiam in aliis, §. 118. hinc poterant etiam, vt officia erga te ipsum, §. 150. et alia spectari: sic etiam officia erga alia non sunt exclusiue intelligenda, quasi in te nullam ponerent realitatem, sed prout haec, vel illa ratio perfectionis determinans in aliquo officio propius obseruabilis est, ad hoc vel illud officiorum genus a potiori facta denominatione refertur, neutiquam negatis pluribus perfectionis rationibus determinantibus, quum sapientia potius suadeat, eas omnes cointendere, §. 225. M. §. 986".

[281] For an argument that Kant admits of no duties towards non-human beings, see Allen W. Wood, "Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others", in *The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics*, *Blackwell Guides to Great Works*, ed. Thomas E Hill (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 244.

relationship between an end and a means" (M §882).[282] In this sense, observing more determining grounds of perfection not only inside but also outside ourselves gives us more insights into the relationship between means and ends in general, and specifically between causes of perfection and effects as the perfection itself. The duties to recognise and enhance perfection in others translate into the duty of "love" of others. This "love" is a metaphysical one, based on the definition in §684 of *Metaphysica* as "delight in the perfection of someone". We can at least take "metaphysical" pleasure in others' perfection even if we can only rarely share "empirical" pleasure with them. Since there is, in principle, no limit to the imperative of perfectibility, the duty to love others apart from oneself is in fact "universal love (*pamphilia*)", which Baumgarten deduces in the following way:

> All the actions that make you agree with the realities in greater number and of higher quality, which you posit outside yourself, those actions are to be performed, E §10. Now all these actions posit both your and others' perfection, if other conditions are positive, M §660. Therefore, take pleasure in as many perfections of others as possible, as much you can, M §682. Hence, love anything lovable in things posited outside yourself as much as you can, M §684. This, together with you, constitutes the purpose of the world, M §354, which is the best world, M §936. Therefore, study the best world inasmuch as it is found inside yourself. Outside of the world there is nothing actual except God, who must be loved in the same way, E §72. Hence, you are truly obligated to love the universality of all good things, that is, to UNIVERSAL LOVE (a). (E §302)[283]

[282] This is Meier's translation. See Chapter five, section 4.

[283] "Quot et quantae actiones ad quo plures, quo maiores realitates extra te consentire faciunt: tot ac tantae praestandae sunt, §. 10. Hae autem omnes cum perfectione tua simul perfectionem aliorum ponent, aliis bonae, M. §. 660. Ergo gaude tot tantisque perfectionibus tot aliorum, quot potes, quantum potes, M. §. 682. Ergo ama, quantum potes, tibi quicquid amabile in positis extra te, M. §. 684. Haec tecum constituunt finita mundum, M. §. 354, optimum, M. §. 936. Ergo stude, quantum in te est, mundo optimo. Extra hinc nihil actuale praeter deum, itidem amandum, §. 72. Hinc obligaris ad amorem vere vniuersalem bonorum omnium, PAMPHILIAN (a)".

The metaphysically grounded concept of love inherently entails an active and a passive side. Firstly, it is about "positing" realities in oneself and in others. If we take more "actions" towards our perfection, that is, if we take better care of each component (the mind, the body, and the external state) of our overall perfection, we can accordingly accrue more "realities" with higher qualities in ourselves. Equally, if we take more actions for others' perfection, this in turn gives others more realities with higher qualities. But this active, practical side is also linked to a passive, contemplative side. Love is "delight in the perfection of someone" (M §684). In addition to the pleasure that we can take in our own perfection, we can also take delight in others' perfection. This is insofar as we can at least theoretically see the constituents of others' perfection as such, even if we cannot experience them as our own. At this point, we find that the perfection of others contributes to the perfection of the world that God created. As a consequence, it becomes clear to us that others may be in positions to assist our perfection as well. From the universal perspective, we can theoretically understand that helping others' perfection has the practical benefit of contributing to our perfection, although empirically the connection might not be evident to us. Taking part in others' perfection has a cosmological meaning in that, on the presupposition Baumgarten inherited from Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds, the human species, and in fact, all things, are destined to perfect themselves to fit in with God's projection of the best possible world. Although the view of the best possible world can be actual only to ourselves once we have established the knowledge of God who is the model of ultimate perfection, how it is also actual to others remains merely theoretical. This is because we cannot share the experience of others who, we may theoretically assume, pass through the same process towards perfection as we do. Therefore, Baumgarten thought it necessary that we set up "universal love", in order to observe and promote other beings' perfection as if it were our own from the perspective of the universal picture of the best of all possible worlds. By so doing, we are led to love any good thing, that is, anything that presents some good (defined simply as positive reality), and even more, anything aiming at its own perfection and thereby contributing to the ultimate perfection of the best world that God designed. For Baumgarten, the reference point of understanding how others

might actually experience perfection always comes back to the self, whereby the perfection of others is understood by theoretically applying what one experiences to what others could experience. Nevertheless, it is because of our knowledge that God created the best of all possible worlds that we can assume that others are also beings that, firstly, somehow reflect God's goodness, and secondly, are aiming at their perfection to fit the grand design of God's perfection of the world just as we are. We can help others achieve their perfection by loving them because of our understanding that they are "metaphysically" lovable. In this sense, our journey towards becoming moral takes us at this point from the personal to the universal aspect of morality.

This shift to "*pamphilia*" ("universal love") is especially interesting in the context of Baumgarten's influence on Kantian ethics since it establishes a different notion of "universalisability", and yet, as we will see, continues to operate in the background of Kant's reconceptualisation of it. This can best be seen if we focus on the different formulations of the categorical imperative in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (G). Universalisability, in Kant's work, is restricted to other human beings, whereas in Baumgarten, we have a duty to "love" (to positively contemplate and to sustain) all "other beings" (including non-human beings), even though the most eminent "*alia*" in ethical terms are other beings like us.

If we now restrict the consideration of "alia" to other human beings, we can see how Kant's diverse formulations of the categorical imperative[284] show interesting features in terms of how universalisability of the imperative is justifiable, in comparison with Baumgarten's conception of the "universality" at the heart of ethics. The first of these formulations is the Formula of Universal Law:

> *Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*. (G 4:421; italics for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

[284] For the following argument on how to interpret the formulas of the categorical imperative, I draw on the discussion by Allen Wood. See Allen W. Wood, "The Supreme Principle of Morality", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 342-80, esp. 348-58.

With this formulation, Kant provides us with the criteria for deciding which maxims can be universal. The universality of our maxim is guaranteed in the case that we could will that everyone else in the same circumstance should be permitted to act upon that maxim. As he puts it in the preceding chapter of the *Groundwork*: "Would I be able to say that anyone may make an untruthful promise when he finds himself in embarrassment which he cannot get out of in any other way?" (G 4:403).[285] In the name of universality, we restrict ourselves to acting upon the maxims that would be permissible to others as well. The categorical imperative declares duties towards others in this formulation of the categorical imperative, for it forces us to control our behaviour according to the consideration of whether the action would be permissible for others to do as well. This is a duty towards others in a specific sense: the duty to take the others' intentions and points of view into consideration in our practical deliberations.

In Baumgarten's terms, by contrast, whether a maxim can be universal depends on whether or not it fits in with God's design of the perfect world. Therefore, we will our maxim to become a universal law by directly referring to God without any consideration of others in the first instance. We must assume, however, in the second instance, that for the sake of the total perfection of the world under which beings other than ourselves are also deployed, others also have the same relation to God as we do, and are beings equally under the gaze of God. In other words, we can decide what to employ as our maxim in a pure relation to God without envisioning any connection to others. Indeed, since perfection relates to all kinds of realities, not just human rationality, "in the second instance" we are not just connected to other beings like us, but to all beings somehow implicated in our actions. Since being moral is tantamount to being more perfect, the criterion for us is our ability to place ourselves in a personal yet universal perspective, for the purpose of acquiring the ultimate perspective. This ultimate perspective is that from which we can at least theoretically view the perfection that only God in the strictest sense substantiates, in order to be able to apply that model of perfection to the enhancement of our own perfection. In particular, we metaphysically know God as the model of perfection from the universal perspective, and empirically

[285] Wood's translation cited ibid., 350.

from the personal perspective we prioritise our own perfection over that of others because of the physical and psychological closeness to our own existence.

This sense of universality in our moral obligation is radically at odds with Kant, since it relies upon a maximalist metaphysical view (seeing the world from the perspective of God) as opposed to a radically anthropocentric one. Yet it is possible to see an underlying impact of Baumgarten's model of moral universality in the first formulation of the categorical imperative. The impact is in the way in which the very first formulation articulates a perspective that is personal-universal, asking the subject to embody, from her own personal perspective, the "universal law" that is to apply to all other beings. The content of the law is completely different, but the scheme, as it were, is comparable. This parallel comes out even more strongly in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of the Law of Nature:

> *So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a* **universal law of nature**. (G 4:421; italics and bold for line-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)[286]

Here, the "cosmological" turn in justifying the maxim of the action as one that needs to be universalisable is explicit. Even though the ways in which the two philosophers think about moral justification are poles apart, they each retain the element of "jumping" to the universal point of view and then viewing one's own particular position from that point of view. For Baumgarten, the duties towards others are those duties that we are "recommended" to have towards those who are outside us, for the sake of the perfection of the world and the subsequent perfection of ourselves. This is very different from a justification based on the common rationality of human beings. Yet, formally speaking, the argument of the "law of nature" is similar: we have duties to others because we are all under the sway of the one normative rule (a perfect world or rules of reason).

[286] Wood's translation cited ibid., 351.

In the third formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, the link between morality and a certain kind of interaction with others emerges explicitly:

> *Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*. (G 4:429; italics for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)[287]

This is the formulation where the restriction of morality to "humanity" is most explicit. As the *Doctrine of Virtue* makes clear, the core of the moral imperative is respect for the human species in its specific difference from all other beings, as the rational species:

> Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is *in turn* bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all *things*. (MM 6:462)

It is through dignity, as based on the rationality which grounds our capacity for freedom, which raises humans above non-human beings (except God), that we owe duties to other fellow human beings. In this regard, respect is due only to those human beings upon the recognition of their dignity. We value our own existence not merely because we are rational beings individually seen, distinguished from ends that could possibly serve other higher ends as means, but through the thorough exercise of rationality that includes valuing the existence of other rational beings in precisely the same way as we value ourselves. In other words, the condition for valuing ourselves lies in the possibility of valuing the existence of others in the same way as we do ourselves. A third way of saying is that we cannot

[287] Wood's translation cited ibid., 354.

be rational merely in terms of our self-relation, but only through our relation to others. Since Kant thinks that as long as we are rational we are immediately moral, it can be said that the basis for morality rests on our rational relation to others.[288]

This initially marks a stark contrast to Baumgarten, who puts the basis for morality first of all in our self-relation, which then grounds our duties towards others, because of his premise that the way in which others are physically and psychologically distant from us yields to the immediacy of how we relate to ourselves. This is why Baumgarten gives no positive definition of "respect", defining it only as "being attentive" to things in general, in §529 of *Metaphysica*. In this section, he endorses no particular application of the concept to our relationship with other human beings. By contrast, Kant clearly distinguishes between "love" and "respect" in terms of the relationship between "attraction" and "repulsion" in the physical world, stating that "[t]he principle of mutual love admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another; that of respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another" (MM 6:449). Baumgarten thinks that the concept of "love" suffices for us to consider our duties towards others if we develop the right way to exercise our "universal love". With the exercise of universal love, the physical and psychological distance between ourselves and others is bridged, as it allows us to put ourselves in the position of God.

Baumgarten also recognises the special relationship of "spirits" (rational beings) with each other in the grand scheme of things. So even though the imperative of perfection applies to all "other things", it applies specifically to other human beings like us. It is not rationality that demands a special duty of love

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[288] Lara Denis, in contrast, argues for the primacy of the duties towards oneself in Kant's ethics, based on the reading of the *Doctrine of Virtue* and the ethics lecture notes of Collins and Vigilantius. Admitting that this primacy may be argued for, however, she does not take into consideration the important fact that those lecture notes are based on Baumgarten's *Ethica* (and *Initia*), and that this may explain Kant's oscillation between the primacy of the duties towards others and that of the duties towards others, the latter of which is explicit in the *Groundwork* in terms of the notion of "universalisability", as I discuss in the present section. See Lara Denis, "Freedom, Primacy, and Perfect Duties to Oneself", in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 170-91. But, as if to testify to the "formal" comparability in terms of the concept of duty between Baumgarten and Kant, Denis mentions the view that the duties towards oneself are the "formal" reference point of all the other duties; ibid., 183 n. 13.

towards same-species individuals, but simply likeness. But again, in strictly formal terms, in Baumgarten already, the cosmological perspective is narrowed down to a more "(anthropo)centric" form of ethical foundation.

> Make your universal love, as much as you can, be most proportionate to both the knowledge and the object of love, E §235. Therefore the more perfect something is, the better it can be known by you and the more it must be loved. The more imperfect something is among things that are posited outside yourself, the less well it can be known by you and also the less it must be loved. Perfection of finite spiritual beings is both greater, M §185, 949, and can better be known by you and is more similar to your spirit, M §754, than other finite beings that are not spiritual. Therefore love of spiritual beings in general is postulated by you as greater than love of those beings that are not spiritual. The more useful your love can be to faithful, lovable beings as well as to yourself, the stronger you are obligated to love them, E §302, 150. Now in the whole of the pneumatic world, perfections of no species of spiritual beings can be better known to you than the perfection of the human species. There is nothing, the love of which may be more useful to both the loved ones and yourself than the perfection of the human species. Hence with respect to the human species it will not contradict the most proportionate love to love less not only more imperfect but also more perfect spiritual beings than human beings. (E §303)[289]

The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends continues to articulate the personal-universal shift:

[289] "Pamphilia tua sit, quae potest, proportionalissima et cognitioni et obiectis amandis, §. 235. Ergo quo quid perfectius, quo melius a te cognosci potest, hoc magis amandum: quo quid imperfectius extra te positorum, quo minus bene cognosci a te potest, hoc etiam minus amandum est. Perfectio spirituum finitorum et maior est, M. §. 185, 949, et melius a te cognosci potest, tuae similior, M. §. 754, quam finitorum aliorum, quae non sunt spiritus. Ergo amor spirituum in genere maior a te postulatur amore eorum, quae non sunt spiritus. Quo vtilior amor tuus certis amabilibus et ipsi tibi esse potest, hoc fortiorem ad eorum amorem obligaris, §. 203, 150. Iam in toto mundo pneumatico nullius spirituum generis perfectiones tibi notiores esse possunt, nullum est, cuius amor et amatis et tibi possit vtilior esse, ac generis humani: hinc non imperfectiores solum humano genere spiritus, sed et perfectiores minus amare, quam homines, non erit contra amorem proportionalissimum".

> Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible kingdom of ends. (G 4:439)[290]

If we are to establish a rational maxim to act upon, we need to consider ourselves counterfactually as impersonal members of the kingdom of ends in which every rational being is an end in itself, an impersonal legislator who advocates rationality. In order to formulate how each rational being is equally qualified to be such an impersonal legislator in the kingdom of ends, however, we need to show further that we are bound by reason in some unitary form. For this purpose Kant has to set up a single overarching end (that is purely rational) that precedes each individual end (that is both rational and empirical). In this sense we can understand what Kant means when he says that the kingdom of ends is "merely possible". The kingdom demanded, as a single overarching end that integrates the collection of individual ends, is of a purely rational character and can never be experienced.

Furthermore, since all individual ends are united in the kingdom of ends, it becomes clear that the way in which we are obligated to others is grounded in the fact that each rational legislator, by caring for the overarching end, also cares for all individual ends equally. That is to say, the kingdom of ends comprising individual rational beings must be constructed in such a way that all rational beings are to be fully developed under the guidance of an overarching end, the end of rationality, for the sake of the progress of the human species, without excluding any single rational being. At the end of the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant expresses this concretely when he writes that we need a single overarching end of humanity for "the progressive organisation of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united" (Anth. 7:333). In order to actualise the full destiny (*Bestimmung*) of the human species,[291] Kant gave priority to the establishment of a minimum level of prosperity agreed by all individuals

[290] Wood's translation cited in Wood, "The Supreme Principle of Morality", 356.
[291] Regarding Kant's usage of the term *Bestimmung* in terms of the human species, see Robert B. Louden, *Kant's Human Being: Essays on his Theory of Human Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 90.

who may empirically claim different, at times conflicting, volitions, over maximising the happiness of all, by minimising conflicting volitions among individuals. As we have seen, the absence of conflicting volitions is also metaphysically grounded in the Formula of Universal Law and the Law of Nature. This time the sacrifice of the maximisation of happiness of all, or human welfare, is morally justified in favour of the maximisation of the common good, coupled with the minimisation of conflicting volitions, which can only be realised by some communal entity that pursues the "progress" of the whole of the human species. In this communal entity, which Kant calls the kingdom of ends, each member is identified as an impersonal legislator of rationality. In this sense, the duties towards oneself cannot be thought of without presupposing the duties towards others, since we have duties towards ourselves *qua* rational beings in the same way as we are under obligation to others.

Therefore in the kingdom of ends all ends are also horizontally related. We have duties towards others in the sense that we are under obligation to all rational beings, which thereby inevitably gives rise to our duties towards ourselves. The scheme is once again formally comparable in Baumgarten. At first, all human beings are vertically obligated to God under the imperative to "perfect yourself", which demands of us that we aim for our own perfection by using the knowledge of God as a model. Although we know metaphysically that other human beings are also under obligation to God in their own right, exactly as we are, as finite beings we cannot share their experience of perfecting themselves. In this sense, our volitions are intrinsically separate, and so potentially conflicting. Nevertheless, we are obligated to others because by helping others aim at their perfection, we can contribute to the perfection of the world God created in which He designed all beings to be more perfect in the course of their life. In helping others, we thereby eventually contribute to our own perfection as well. In this connection, we see that endorsing others' perfection in turn entails that others are also in a position to help pursue our perfection. As a result, we can mutually contribute to the perfection of the world. In this sense, our "ends" then communicate and are reunited in the grand scheme of things underpinned by God's ends.

Finally, one key aspect in which Baumgarten's and Kant's universalistic approaches differ markedly relates to the issue of universal happiness. Kant denies that the realisation of the happiness of all is a legitimate dimension in the counterfactual assumption of a kingdom of ends. This is in stark contrast to Baumgarten who grounds the pursuit of the happiness of others on its eventual effect on the happiness of the self, and takes a cosmological view that is concerned with the maximisation of the happiness of the whole of the human species. Since the moral imperative for Baumgarten is "perfect yourself" and perfection also includes the perfection of happiness that is coupled with the perfection of pleasure, the pursuit of happiness of the whole of the human species does not contradict but rather endorses the maximisation of virtue of the human species. Kant thought this was incompatible with the proper structure of the kingdom of ends. For him, we are at times constrained to sacrifice the maximisation of happiness for the sake of the maximisation of the virtue of the human species, since respect for persons as ends in themselves cannot be relinquished even if we thereby have to give up the maximisation of happiness.[292] Baumgarten thought that even though we may not "naturally" achieve the maximisation of the happiness of the human species because beings other than us are both physically and psychologically distant from us, we do have to make a "moral" effort to maximise it. What he proposes is that we overcome this physical/psychological limit by submitting ourselves to the exercise of "universal love", which is metaphysically defined in the first place, as we have seen, but which, however, leaves room for our "moral" effort to contribute to the enhancement of morality by its employment.

2. Friendship

2.1. General friendship

[292] David Cummiskey, *Kantian Consequentialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4. In this respect, Guyer's description of Kantian perfectionism as the rejection of Wolffian consequentialism is too simplistic. See Guyer, "Kantian Perfectionism", 200-201. As is shown in the fact that Kant cares for the maximisation of happiness (even though in a negative way), Kant's morality in fact depends on the *immediate* consideration of whether nature itself will attach desirable consequences to our lawful actions, in contrast to Guyer's view that this is what rationality *ultimately* demands.

When Baumgarten insists that we have a duty of "universal love (*pamphilia*)", he means that we ought to love other beings "equally", both human and non-human. From another perspective, however, he thinks that it is justifiable for us to love them "unequally", according to what each of them means to us in a practical sense. Although universal love is to be exercised towards all kinds of beings without exception (including non-human beings, as well as God) for the sake of the total perfection of the world, the strength of love we exercise towards human beings is justifiably different. In order to justify this difference, Baumgarten uses a more specific concept of love when it is applied to members of our own species, namely the term of "friendship".

In the tradition of Western moral philosophy, the central question for any philosophical theory of "friendship" is the definition of what it means for a person to love another individual.[293] Although there can be a generic, "metaphysical" meaning to love, notably in the Christian tradition (the love of God for His creation, see E §308), friendship has been used as a specification of love, notably in the sense that it cannot occur between oneself and non-human others, including God. Moreover, there are two general approaches to the definition of inter-human "love", or friendship, both of which originated in Greek philosophy: an egocentric approach and an altruistic approach. In a very formal sense, it can be said that most later developments in the theory of friendship depart from these alternative approaches.

On the one hand, Aristotle advocates the "egocentric" approach by defining friendship as the mutually affectionate relationship voluntarily established between adult men of comparable social status, for the common purpose of enhancing the life of the *polis*. We must, of course, take into consideration the limitations of the Aristotelian concept of friendship, which excludes women and "non-citizens" and therefore is at odds with the one we have today, in order to understand the seemingly narrow definition of friendship. Aristotle's crude understanding of what is most important in terms of entering into friendship with someone is whether or not we can find each other useful. In particular, he puts special emphasis on the reciprocity of affection rather than the intensity of that affection. What matters to

[293] A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 103.

him most is not the possibility of how much one can love the other, but rather how much they can enhance each other's goodness as a result of their friendship. It is true that he distinguishes between different kinds of friendship according to whether they are based on either mutual utility, or the mutual expectation of pleasure in their relationship, or the mutual respect for each other's characters. He regards the last kind of friendship as the most important (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1156a6-57b5, 1158b1-11), however, since it can be established only between the best men. Nevertheless, consistently with his doctrine of the mean, he considers mutual utility the most prevalent element of friendship.[294] Aristotle's concept of friendship is egocentric in the sense that the central question of friendship is what it means to love the other person "for oneself" (the lover).

Epicurus represents the alternative, altruistic approach by posing the question of what it means to love the other person "for the sake of friendship itself". As he puts it: "friendship [or love] had its beginning as a result of utility, but is to be chosen [or is a virtue, if we follow the manuscript reading] for its own sake" (Vatican Saying 23).[295] Epicurus explicitly opposes Aristotle in locating the primary source of friendship in utility. What Epicurus meant by "friendship for its own sake", however, is not clear and this lack of clarity is magnified by the difference in opinion about friendship among later Epicureans. What characterises Epicurean friendship, at any rate, is its notorious style of communal living. In particular, rather than focusing on political action or arguing with each other about what should be undertaken by the members of the *polis*, whom Aristotle exclusively considered as friends, Epicurean friendship stresses communal activities in honour of the founders of the Epicurean school, Epicurus himself among them.[296] Epicurean friendship is thus a sort of religious fellowship among those who regard themselves as chosen to be virtuous. It is a mutually affectionate relationship, with the affection intensified by sharing the worship of the foundation of that relationship, for the purpose of being virtuous for its own sake.

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[294] Hutchinson, "Ethics", 228-229.

[295] Cited in David Konstan, "Epicurus", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed 31 October 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/epicurus/.

[296] David K. O'Connor, "The Invulnerable Pleasures of Epicurean Friendship", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 30, no. 2 (1989): 165, 168.

Baumgarten's definition of friendship is basically in line with Aristotelian friendship in the sense that it stresses utility as its major determination. He draws this conclusion, however, by means of his architectonic of the metaphysical principle of perfection.

To understand Baumgarten's definition of friendship, we need to note beforehand that what comes under the title of "general friendship" in the outline of *Ethica*, in fact begins with sections dedicated to the "love of human beings". In the actual text,[297] friendship then is a subspecies of love in the metaphysical sense of "universal love", and its specific difference lies in its reciprocity, which in turn explains why friendship can occur only among humans. At this level of the species as a whole, he defines a general concept of friendship as follows:

> GENERAL or universal FRIENDSHIP (a) is brought to all human beings only if it is mutual, E §312. (E §313)[298]

This statement shows the transition from the concept of "universal love (*pamphilia*)", whose definition we have already seen, to that of "philanthropy", which from its etymological origin means "love of human beings".[299] In this context, "general friendship" must be understood as a synonym for "philanthropy". The concept of friendship must be understood in relation to philanthropy. This way of conceptualising friendship seems, at first, to be at odds with the tradition of friendship theory, which usually reserves the term "friendship" for close relationships, however. As noted above, this is typically the case in the Aristotelian and Epicurean traditions. It is tempting to see in this concept of "general friendship", as based on shared species characteristics (being a "spirit", see E §303), an anticipation of the concept of "species-being" developed by Feuerbach and Marx in the wake of Hegel.

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[297] General friendship is discussed in E §304-14, and special friendship in E §315-99.

[298] "AMICITIA GENERALIS (a) s. vniuersalis, est in omnes homines lata, vtinam mutua". See Kant's direct opposition to this statement: "friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but must rather be a purely moral one" (MM 6:470).

[299] Baumgarten does not provide any separate definition of "philanthropy" anywhere in his work.

Once it is established that friendship is only applicable to human beings, the next question is how we justify the strength of friendship differing from person to person as objects of our love. Beyond the generic concept of friendship, Baumgarten also considers the more common conception, which sees friendship as singling out individuals through their modes of intimate relations. As he writes in §304:

> [I]n mankind there is a uniform equality, an unequal inequality, so the more perfect someone is, the more familiar to you that person is, the more useful are both your active love [of others] and the love of yourself, the more ardent your love ought to be, E §303. Therefore, you are not obligated to love yourself and other human beings totally equally, M §272. Indeed, to love one person more than another, those who are more perfect than those who are rather more imperfect, those whom you know than those whom you do not know, to prefer those who are more useful to you than those who are less useful to you, to look after those whom you are better able to look after than those to whom you cannot be useful very much, does not contradict universal philanthropy, E §303. (E §304)[300]

Baumgarten thinks that just as we can justify loving humans more than non-human beings on the ground that the former are more perfect than the latter, within the category of human beings we can also distinguish how much we ought to love each object of love as a human being according to what he or she means to us in the practical sense. It is a logical consequence of putting ourselves in the position of God, i.e., viewing the issue from the "metaphysical" perspective, that we ought to love God more than ourselves, since God is the ultimate form of perfection and therefore more perfect than us. But when it comes to loving other human beings it is "morally" justifiable to put that love second to loving ourselves, since from the

[300] "[A]equalium aequalem, inaequalem inaequalium in hominibus ita, vt quo quis perfectior, quo tibi notior, quo amor tuus actiuus vtrique vestrum vtilior est, hoc esse debeat ardentior, §. 303. Hinc non obligaris ad amorem tui et aliorum hominum totaliter aequalem, M. §. 272. Vnum hominem magis amare, quam alterum, perfectiores imperfectioribus, notos incognitis, tibi vtiliores minus vtilibus tibi praeferre, eos etiam, quibus plus inseruire poteris, illis, quibus tantum prodesse non potes, non est contra philantropian vniuersalem, §. 303".

"moral" perspective, we are the ultimate source of moral motivation because of the outstanding "ardency" we can perceive about ourselves. This sort of perception about ourselves in turn becomes the criterion for how much we ought to love other human beings. In particular, it is permissible to love some people more than others because of the special benefits that they can offer to us: i.e. how perfect they are, how much we know them, how useful they are to us, and to what extent we can help them. On the one hand, we are justified in loving God the most, human beings less, and non-human beings the least, according to their grades of perfection lying in the same order. The difference in the strength of love of those three categories of beings is determined by the significant metaphysical difference of perfection among them.[301] On the other hand, from the metaphysical perspective, there is no difference among individuals categorised as equally human, and so there must be different criteria for deciding the strength of love to be exercised towards each of them. This distinction is made "morally", meaning that we differentiate how we love each of the other human beings from a pragmatic point of view:

> In loving others, it is not only allowed but also postulated among the determining grounds, to quantify the grade of perfections in others who must be loved, the grade of familiarity that lies between us, and indeed [one's own] usefulness as well, E §304. This should simply be done without moral solipsism, E §195. Therefore, one's active usefulness should not be neglected, insofar as we are able to be helpful to the beloved one, E §303. Hence, since greater people recognise less great people as well as what is better, and are able to be useful for those inferior people than the latter are able to be useful for greater people, the order of love descends rather than ascends, E §194, 166. From the same principles love of neighbours can be deduced to be legitimately greater, because of [the closeness of] place and time than love of people who are more remote, because of the mutual

[301] It is noteworthy that Leibniz is said to be a "genuine humanist" in the sense that he equates the love of others with the love of God, as a result of valuing the public good, that is, pursuing the happiness or enduring pleasure of spirits as widely as possible in the social context. See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 48.

> distance from one another. The habit and propensity called PARTIALITY (a) is to be avoided, which is to be settled and exercised from perceptible stimuli, M §917, no less than those deceptive acquaintances who are condemning many favourable things, E §404. (E §305)[302]

At the "pragmatic" level, we can see that Baumgarten clearly distinguishes between two levels of criteria as to how much we ought to love other human beings, between the level of perfection and the level of "familiarity". On the one hand, if someone is more perfect than another person, she is "metaphysically more useful" to us in the sense that she has more potential to help us pursue our perfection. On the other hand, however, if someone is better known to us, she is "morally more useful" to us because she is practically closer to us. If she is someone with whom we have a close relationship, such as a family members or a partner, then there is a good reason to ask them for help because they are in the most useful position to support us. The same is true, in turn, for those people we stand in the same close relation to and to whom we are the most useful.

To put it slightly differently, Baumgarten defines "metaphysical usefulness" as the ability of a person to recognise less great people than she in that she is able to discern better than they are able to. On the other hand, independent of "metaphysical usefulness", the "moral usefulness" of a person to other human beings can also be justified and the level of usefulness in this regard is determined by how close a person is to other people. The point to note in this distinction is that we can speak of the moral usefulness only in terms of a relationship between humans that is mutual. It is for the purpose of making ourselves more perfect with the aid of our friends to help us pursue that purpose, that we are to establish a friendship with those to whom we are close. Although from a perfect metaphysical

[302] "In amandis aliis non licet solum, sed et postulatur, inter caussas impulsiuas numerare gradum perfectionis in amandis, gradum notitiae, quae inter nos intercedit, immo propriam etiam vtilitatem, §. 304, modo fiat hoc sine solipsismo morali, §. 195, hinc ne negligatur vtilitas actiua, quam amato praestare possumus, §. 303. Hinc, quia maiores posteros et melius norunt, et plus prodesse possunt illis, quam illi maioribus, amor ordinatus descendit potius, quam adscendit, §. 196, 166. Ex iisdem principiis amor vicinorum et loco et tempore legitime maior, quam remotiorum a se inuicem, potest deduci. Cauenda hic non minus est PARTIALITAS (a) habitus et propensio decidendi agendique ex apparentibus stimulis, M. §. 917, quam notiones huius deceptrices aequa multa condemnantes, §. 404".

position we would be able to review all people and ask those who are most perfect to help us achieve our perfection, this is impossible for us finite beings because we have physical and psychological limitations. These limitations determine whom we should befriend in our actual world. We thus have two separate tasks to fulfil if we are to contribute to the perfection of the world God has designed: first, a duty from a metaphysical point of view, to view the world as philosophers by putting ourselves in the position of God and, if possible, choosing those who are more perfect as our friends so that they can help us to attain perfection; and second, as finite beings, establishing friendships with those whom we are physically and psychologically close to in the actual world, devoting our effort to helping each other in that close friendship as much as we can.

Baumgarten, however, thinks that "partiality" is to be avoided even in a close relationship. Presumably he considers that even such close relationships as those with family members and partners cannot be established on a "natural" basis. These close relationships cannot be justified without the participants' mutual capacity and willingness to help each other in pursuing perfection, which is exactly the same as the general condition for establishing any form of friendship. This means, in turn, that those representative forms of close relationships have no right to claim exclusive status.

This articulation of general and particularistic points of view on love and friendship must have played a part in the development of Kant's thinking because there are strong echoes throughout his moral writings. Kant himself distinguishes between a universal and particular form of love. He calls the latter a feeling and the former "practical love".[303] To begin with, Kant seems to follow Baumgarten fairly closely when he defines a feeling as "the capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation" (MM 6:211). This sounds fairly similar to Baumgarten's definition in *Metaphysica*: "either I intuit the perfection of something

[303] I owe the following argument on how Kant treated the concept of love to Christine Swanton, "Kant's Impartial Virtues of Love", in *Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics*, ed. Lawrence J. Jost and Julian Wuerth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 241-59, esp. 242-50.

and am PLEASED, or I intuit its imperfections, and am DISPLEASED [...]" (M §651). Consequently, Kant claims, as we have seen:

> *Love* is a matter of *feeling*, not of willing, and I cannot love because I *will* to, still less because I *ought* to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a *duty to love* is an absurdity. (MM 6:401)

By contrast, the universal sort of love cannot be a feeling. As he puts it in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, in the context of the "kingdom of ends" (that is, purely as we consider ourselves as moral, rational beings):

> **[L]ove** is not to be understood as *feeling*, that is, as pleasure in the perfection of others; love is not to be understood as *delight* in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of *benevolence* (practical love), which results in beneficence. (MM 6:449; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

The distinction between the sorts of love, applicable to two different contexts, one being particular and the other universal, explains the seeming contradiction between the initial rejection of a "duty to love" and the later explanation of that duty. Indeed, in this definition of the second sort of love that is not a feeling, we can see a direct criticism of Baumgarten, for Baumgarten defined love as "delight in the perfection of someone", whether in a particular or a universal sense.

This twofold approach to the determination of duty, from a subjective or a general point of view, impacts not just on the evaluation of the concept of love in Kant's ethics, but also on the central concept of "respect".

We have seen that Kant revises Baumgarten's concept of love but maintains a key distinction borrowed from him, by distinguishing between particular love and universal or practical love (benevolence). Similarly, the concept of respect has two versions in Kant, depending on whether it is viewed subjectively or universally, and this in turn has a direct impact on whether or not it can be phrased in terms of

duty. To begin with, note the way in which Kant links the two emotions intimately in the *Doctrine of Virtue*:

> In speaking of laws of duty (not laws of nature) and, among these, of laws for human beings' external relations with one another, we consider ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world where, by analogy with the physical world, *attraction* and *repulsion* bind together rational beings (on earth). The principle of **mutual love** admonishes them constantly to *come closer* to one another; that of the **respect** they owe one another, to keep themselves *at a distance* from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, "then nothingness, with gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water" [...]. (MM 6:449; bold for letter-spacing in original)

Contrary to what might be expected, Kant thinks that we cannot dispense with either love or respect, understood as moral emotions. In the kingdom of ends in which all human individuals are conceived as ends in themselves and not as mere means, love and respect have to be in a relationship in which they are intertwined with each other as indispensable objective moral forces.

In the same way that love is distinguished as a feeling and as practical love, we must differentiate between the claim that respect is a mere "feeling" (MM 6: 403) for which there can be no duty (and is rather merely the feeling that accompanies the duty for an object),[304] and the claim in this later section that there

[304] In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant identifies respect as an important moral feeling in a different context: "The negative effect upon feeling (disagreeableness) is *pathological*, as is every influence on feeling and every feeling in general. As the effect of consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation to an intelligible cause, namely the subject of pure practical reason as the supreme lawgiver, this feeling of a rational subject affected by inclinations is indeed called humiliation (intellectual contempt); but in relation to its positive ground, the law, it is at the same time called respect for the law; there is indeed no feeling for this law, but inasmuch as it moves resistance out of the way, in the judgment of reason this removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its causality. Because of this, this feeling can now also be called a feeling of respect for the moral law, which on both grounds together it can be called a *moral feeling* (CPrR 5:75)". Here Kant regards respect not as a simple feeling but as "the negative effect on feeling", which, according to him, "is itself feeling" (CPrR 5:72-73). He further identifies it as "an incentive to make this law [the objective moral law] the maxim" (CPrR 5:76).

is in fact a duty of respect, and that respect therefore is not just the subjective response to an objective command by the moral law.

There is another way in which Baumgarten's discussion of love as moral feeling might well have had an impact on Kant, namely in the discussion of the degree to which a duty applies depending on the distance of the subject to which the duty is owed. As we saw, Baumgarten addresses this question explicitly, and answers it by means of a shift from the metaphysical to the moral point of view. Kant formulates the problem in terms of the "degree" of love that is owed to all human beings from the perspective of a "duty of love":

> [T]he benevolence present in love for all human beings is indeed the greatest in its *extent*, but the smallest in its *degree*; and when I say that I take an interest in this human being's well-being only out of my love for all human beings, the interest I take is as slight as an interest can be. I am only not indifferent with regard to him. (MM 6: 451)

Kant concedes that the strength of the love we exercise is equally balanced when distributed towards all human beings, that is, benevolence as the love of all human beings must be compromised in terms of its strength in order to claim equality among all human beings. This in essence corresponds to the "metaphysical" point of view in Baumgarten's discussion. Kant then translates Baumgarten's shift from the infinite-metaphysical to the finite-moral point of view in terms of a duality between the universal benevolence owed to all and the practical beneficence that can actually be performed for the benefit of the close others and in particular oneself:

> Yet one human being is closer to me than another, and in benevolence I am closest to myself. How does this fit in with the precept "love your *neighbor* (your fellowman) as yourself"? If one is closer to me than another (in the duty of benevolence) and I am therefore under obligation to greater benevolence to one than the other but am admittedly closer to myself (even in accordance with duty) than to any other, then it would seem that I cannot,

> without contradicting myself, say that I ought to love every human being as myself, since the measure of self-love would allow for no difference in degree. – But it is quite obvious that what is meant here is not merely benevolence in *wishes*, which is, strictly speaking, only taking delight in the well-being of every other and does not require me to contribute to it (everyone for himself, God for us all); what is meant is, rather, active, practical benevolence (beneficence), making the well-being and happiness of others my *end*. For wishing I can be *equally* benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another). (MM 6:451-52)

Clearly, the ground for the concept of love as a key ethical concept changed significantly between Baumgarten and Kant, from the imperative to increase perfection to the demands of rationality, but the same scheme remains in place whereby the universal perspective that first grounds the ethical point of view needs to be distilled pragmatically for the finite creatures that we are.

Given the definitions of love and respect as two central, mutually related moral feelings, Kant proceeds to define "friendship" as "the most intimate union of love with respect" (MM 4:469):

> *Friendship* (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect. [...] But it is readily seen that friendship is only an idea (though a practically necessary one) and unattainable in practice, although striving for friendship (as a maxim of good disposition toward each other) is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an honorable one. (MM 4:469)

Kant thinks that friendship is merely an idea because the perfect balance between love as "coming closer" and respect as "keeping at a distance" cannot be realised in our everyday world. Although in the physical world, the balance between attraction and repulsion can be perfectly equal on the theoretical assumption, in the

moral world, the perfectly equal balance between love and respect cannot be attainable in view of the moral practices we actually undertake. The analogy is significant as it betrays the impact of the metaphysically based approach on Kant's thinking. It is arguable that Kant received this metaphysical background directly from Baumgarten, with whom he argued continuously in the development of his ethics until the later years of his career.

Indeed, the shift we have identified between the metaphysical and the moral point of view reappears with the distinction between an ideal concept of friendship and the concept of "moral friendship":[305]

> *Moral friendship* [...] is the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgment and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect. (MM 6:471)

Friendship in general is merely an idea and unattainable, but when considered from the point of view of the two subjects in close proximity in terms of the moral practices in our everyday life, we discover a form of friendship, "moral friendship", which seems to approximate the perfect metaphysical balance between love and respect.

Finally, Baumgarten's discussion of what we might term his amazing "semiology of friendship" might well have had an echo in the *Doctrine of Virtue* as well. Baumgarten considers the signs by which we signify our love to others and reciprocally:

> Since another human being cannot know what is being exercised inside your mind if it is not signified, M §347, often it is of importance not only to you but also to the other person, that the person knows more richly, more truthfully, more clearly, more certainly, and more ardently in what way and how much he is loved by you, E §299. Since philanthropy of the just grade can never or very rarely be bursting into the appealing works of charity from

[305] Silvestro Marcucci pays particular attention to the point that friendship is merely "an idea" that is difficult to realise, as I just argued. See Silvestro Marcucci, "'Moral Friendship' in Kant", *Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft* 90 no. 4 (1999): 434-41, esp. 439.

> its own cause, M §333, you are also obligated to signify your philanthropy, and therefore to build the habit of signifying it, which is called HUMANITY (a), being at one time either express or tacit, and at another either implicit or explicit. (E §309)[306]

Baumgarten regards the work of establishing friendship as the exercise of applying philanthropy to mutual relationship between two persons. According to him, we must denote the reality of another thing by means of a sign in order to know that the signified thing is real (M §347). In terms of signifying philanthropy, since philanthropy cannot be known to be real unless it is signified, we need a means to designate it. In order for us to show that we love human beings, we need a sign as its means, since without that sign we cannot be known to others as loving people. Whatever the sign is, if we keep showing that sign in various ways, it eventually becomes a habit, and Baumgarten calls this habit "humanity". This definition of humanity allows us to define friendship without the concept of respect, since friendship is exclusively grounded on the exercise of love defined as "delight in the perfection of someone". It follows from this that friendship is established as follows: the more one person shows her love of human beings, and the more perfections the second person comes to discover in her partner, the more the latter will love the former, and vice versa. In short, friendship can be defined as a deepening of mutual love between human beings through showing their mutual humanity, which is the habit of exercising philanthropic signification. This then defines the affective, habitual dimensions of friendship as a central moral feeling:

> One who loves another person from one's habit is his INTERNAL FRIEND (a). Therefore you are obligated to have internal friendship towards the whole human species, E §304, that is, you are obligated to love as actively as you love yourself. INTERNAL MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP (b) is the state of

[306] "Quum alter homo, quid intra mentem tuam agatur, nosse non possit, nisi significatum, M. §. 347, saepe tamen non tua solum, sed et illius intersit, eum vberius, verius, clarius, certius, ardentius nosse quomodo quantumque a te ametur, §. 299, nec iusti gradus philanthropia possit esse nunquam aut rarius erumpens in opera charitatis testantia de sua caussa, M. §. 333, obligaris ad tuam etiam philanthropiam significandam, hinc et ad habitum eam significandi s. HUMANITATEM (a), nunc expressam, nunc tacitam, nunc implicitam, nunc explicitam".

> mutually loving people: it should be not prevented from being placed entirely in your control, M §708. However, seek it as much as you can. While you love yourself, in the same way it is proper that you endeavour to please by legitimate modes, E §299, to which you are obligated through general love itself, since to love another human being is the perfection of the loving person, E §304. (E §312)[307]

We find echoes of this in Kant's definition of moral friendship as the readiness to reveal our "secret judgments and feelings to each other" (MM 6:471). In typical fashion, however, Kant distrusts the fickleness of our affective nature. Instead of entrusting us with the capacity to habitually display our love to other human beings, and more specifically to proximate others, he uses respect as a counter-force to mitigate the wavering of feelings:

> [F]riendship is something so delicate (*teneritas amicitiae*) that it is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self-surrender are not subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and mutual love by requirements of respect. (MM 6:471)

For Baumgarten, "tender love *(amor tener*)" as "endeavouring to love the beloved completely" (E §80) is firmly grounded in the perfection that underpins the world. On this basis, all moral imperatives demanding the study and support of perfection can be reformulated in terms of love, starting with self-love and extending to "tenderness" to all kinds of beings to an unlimited extent, using the knowledge of God as the strongest object of love according to the metaphysical principle of perfection. As a result, he does not regard "excessive familiarity and mutual love" as obstacles to establishing proper friendships as Kant understands them. On the

[307] "Qui alterum habitualiter amat AMICUS eius INTERNUS (a) est. Ergo obligaris ad amicitiam internam erga totum genus humanum, §. 304. actiuam illam, qua ipse amas. AMICITIA INTERNA MUTUA (b) est status se muto amantium: haec licet non sit omnino in potestate tua posita, M. §. 708, quantum tamen potes, quaerenda, dum amas ipse, sicut decet, & placere studes modis legitimis, §. 299, ad quod obligaris per ipsam philautian, quia hominem alium amare est amantis perfectio, §. 304".

contrary, he even recommends that we make mutual love as "excessive" as possible, to use Kant's expression. By contrast, when Kant views friendship as "tender" or "delicate", he means fragile and fickle, if it is only based on sentiment. Whereas Kant thinks that we should restrict our excessive mutual love in order to meet the requirements of respect, which primarily presume that we keep at a distance, Baumgarten insists that we should aim at exercising "excessive" love to further friendship. The love God exercises towards every being is perfect and this kind of love is the model of love which we should imitate as much as we can. Kant, by contrast, is concerned that excessive love is unsustainable. This is totally groundless in Baumgarten's view, since it is tantamount to saying that we might possibly "exceed perfection".

2.2. Special friendship

When discussing duties towards others, Baumgarten primarily focuses on the concept of friendship. We have seen that it is generally defined as the love of human beings. Then, as is always his method, he shifts from the general to the "specialised" or applied discussion, what Kant would refer to as "casuistic questions", and so here Baumgarten shifts his focus to the special aspects of friendship. Under the heading of "specialised" friendship, Baumgarten discusses the following points: "pursuit of peace (*pacis studium*)", "vices opposed to philanthropy (*vitanda his opposita vitia*)", "candour (*candor*)", "judgement of others (*diiudicatio aliorum*)", and "the help that is due to others (*auxilium aliis praestandum*)". We have to be reminded that the basic "ethical" relationship between ourselves and other human beings is mutual love, which is generally defined as friendship. As a consequence, the specific points Baumgarten discusses under friendship are those which contribute to establishing or enhancing a friendship, on the one hand, or to avoiding obstacles to the establishment and enhancement of friendship, on the other.

2.2.1. Pursuit of peace

We have seen that Baumgarten emphasises that the universal form of friendship must be mutual, although he concedes that the perfect state of mutual friendship may not be under our control, since we cannot totally take command of the way that others love us. The avoidance of internal mutual hostility (E §313), however, is completely within our control. This hostility is realised by intentional mutual hatred, because this state of mutual hatred is only possible if we take the initiative to hate the other person. Therefore, the point in discussing the special aspects of friendship is that we ought to be actively committed to maintaining peace among human beings, even if others do not positively show their love towards us and, indeed, even when they act against us, as we will see. Baumgarten writes:

> While EXTERNAL ENMITY (a), which is hostility and war, is a state amongst human beings, by way of which the one decides to bring forward a malicious declaration of the other person, EXTERNAL FRIENDS (b) will be those among whom there is no hostility. Love of others avoids inflicting malice on the beloved one, taking pleasure in perfections, M §146. Therefore not only reject the war of all against all (*bellum omnium contra omnes*), but also avoid suspecting hostility towards yourself from anywhere among mortal beings, as much as you can, E §313. Hence strive after, as much as you can, the state devoid of war, or EXTERNAL PEACE (c) that lies 1) between you and all human beings, 2) among other human beings themselves, M §663, thereby attracting the very name of external happiness. Taking pleasure in the habit of actuating peace is [to be] PACIFIC (d). Be pacific as much as you can. One who works to rebuild or conserve peace among enemies or those who are almost enemies through deliberation is called a MEDIATOR (e). You are obligated to play all kinds of mediation roles as are possible for you. (E §315)[308]

[308] "INIMICITIA EXTERNA (a), hostilitas et bellum, quum sit status hominum, quo alter alteri malum inferendi declaratum decretum habet: AMICI EXTERNI (b) erunt, inter quos nulla est hostilitas. Amor alterius perfectionibus gaudens auersatur inferenda amato mala, M. §. 146. Ergo non bellum solum imnium contra omnes, sed et hostilitatem a te cum quoquam mortalium suscipiendam auersare, quantum potes, §. 313. Ergo appete, quantum potes, statum bello vacuum,

Baumgarten thus thinks that becoming "external friends" is the second option for entering into a kind of friendship, next to the best option of entering into an internal mutual friendship with someone. Strictly speaking, becoming external friends with someone should not really be called friendship, since it does not require the love of the other person directed towards us, one of the general conditions of friendship. Given this distinction between becoming friends and becoming external friends, Baumgarten sets the minimum requirement for the latter: that there is no hostility between one another. As was his method when he demonstrated that "the minimum amount of conscience" (E §176) is the condition required at the very least for naming a certain sort of recognition as "conscience", he shows that the minimum condition for establishing "peace" between humans is that they have no hostility to one another. This allows the relationship to be external because it does not require that the other person loves us. Baumgarten considers that we can be actively committed to taking pleasure in others' perfections, that is, loving others, irrespective of how they behave towards us, so long as they are not hostile to us, for the purpose of maintaining peace. Moreover, we can also take the initiative in maintaining peace among other people by playing the role of a mediator. On this basis, the section outlines all the virtues of the peaceful person, which amount either to positively sustaining peaceful relations, or negatively to avoiding what would amount to aggression and injury against others: equity deriving directly from one's philanthropy (E §318); innocence as the "habit to not injure anyone" (E §319); avoiding anger and hyper-sensitivity (E §320); the ability to forgive and the avoidance of revenge (E §322); meekness as opposed to lack of sensitivity (E §323); and patience in the face of injustice (E §325). In other words, Baumgarten's emphasis on friendship as a core ethical virtue leads to a fairly radical form of pacifism, not as a political but as an ethical position.

We find a direct echo of this active pacifism in the so-called Vigilantius notes on Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, started in 1793:

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siue PACEM EXTERNAM (c) 1) inter te et omnes homines, 2) aliorum hominum inter se, M. §. 663. quo ipsum felicitatis externae nomen inuitat. §. 304. Habitus pacis actuandae gaudens PACIFICUS (d) est. Pacificus esto, quantum potes. Qui inter hostes aut paene tales pacem consiliis aut restituere laborat, aut conseruare, MEDIATOR (e) est. Obligaris ad mediationem omnem tibi possibilem".

> The *pacificus* is a peacemaker who seeks to prevent all hostilities, as distinct from a peacelover, who does not indeed engage in hostilities himself, but also does not show himself to be active in preventing them. (VE 27:686-687)

Kant distinguishes between "*pacificus*" and "peacelover" by attributing active commitment to the maintenance of peace to the *pacificus*, that is, to Baumgarten's "mediator", whereas he identifies being merely passive in terms of engagement with the peacelover. The key point to note is that Kant thinks it is inadequate to think loving others is the condition for keeping peace. In opposition to Baumgarten, Kant makes justice an equally important component of a peaceful relation between the members of the kingdom of ends:

> All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with that of another, can be reduced to *love* and *respect*; and, insofar as this principle is practical, in the case of love the basis for determining one's will can be reduced to another's *end*, and in the case of respect, to another's *right*. [...] The divine end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding from *love*, that is, as the *happiness* of human beings. But the principle of God's will with regard to the *respect* (awe) due him, which limits the effects of love, that is, the principle of God's right, can be none other than that of *justice*. (MM 6:488)

We have seen that the perfect balance between love and respect defined as friendship is a mere idea, and that "moral friendship" is the practical form of friendship that rational beings have to pursue, with a special focus on respect, at the expense of limiting the effects of love. These limits concerning the effects of love are, Kant maintains, brought about by the principle of justice, or the principle to take the "right" action towards others.

One might well think that Kant's concept of "right" does not belong in his moral philosophy or even less so in the doctrine of virtue, the part that most closely

corresponds to Baumgarten's ethics. Kant does, however, include the concept in his moral philosophy and situates it positively in this context as well. The principle of justice, inasmuch as it informs the thoughts and behaviours of the ethical person, is identified as "the principle of God's will with regard to the *respect* (awe) due him" (MM 6:488), which means that the origin of the concept of justice rests on what is right in the virtual presence of God. In other words, although Kant distinguishes between the duties of justice and those of virtue and assigns to each of them the independent arguments of the Doctrine of Right and of the Doctrine of Virtue, respectively, when it comes to treating the concept of justice inside the framework of the doctrine of virtue, he positions justice somewhere in the purified human relationship comprised of love and respect. This means that he places justice in relation to the concept of friendship. Since friendship as a mere idea cannot be actualised in the life of humans, Kant thinks it necessary, as does Baumgarten, to offer a second option next to the ideal one, for entering into a friendship. This second option is what Kant defines as justice. In particular, what Kant regards as the condition for justice, i.e. what Baumgarten calls becoming "external friends", is that we do not usurp what others possess as their right. For this purpose, Kant prescribes the minimum amount of respect we owe others. The way in which he establishes this minimum amount is particularly striking, since he suggests we should internalise God's will to create the world to be good.

Baumgarten has already set the scene, as it were, in terms of this kind of minimum condition for being external friends. He writes:

> An action that is opposed to the duty towards another human being is called an INSULT TO A HUMAN BEING (a). Therefore do not insult anybody either internally or externally, E §303. An ultimate proposition states: do not externally insult anybody in the state of nature, E §1, since it is the primary principle of the law of all nature: whatever that principle postulated, philosophical ethics, E §2, also demands, prohibiting INTERNAL INSULTS (b) altogether, which are actions that are opposed to those duties which another person cannot lawfully coerce, E §304. Hence not only distribute to each person WHAT IS OWED TO THEM ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF

> NATURE (c), that is, the complex of goods which cannot be rejected without external insult, but also WHAT IS OWED TO EACH ETHICALLY (d), that is, the complex of goods which cannot be rejected without internal injury to oneself in the state of nature. (E §316)[309]

According to the law of nature, we are assigned certain kinds of possessions, such as food, clothes, and dwellings. If others interfere with our possession of these kinds of things to satisfy our basic needs, the law of nature is violated and Baumgarten calls this violation "external injuries". Baumgarten suggests that even if the basic possession for our minimum existence (what today we might call human rights) is not usurped, our "ethical possession" is transgressed in that the denial of that possession inevitably amounts to an injury to us. For example, if we are told to take actions that are opposed to duties, such as telling a lie or showing ingratitude, we are internally injured because we are conscious of opposing our duties. What is important to note is that Baumgarten considers both external and internal injuries as a violation of the law of nature, meaning that not only our possessions necessary for our existence, but also our ethical possessions, are bestowed on us by the law of nature. It seems as though Baumgarten's distinction between "natural good" and "ethical good" anticipates (without necessarily directly determining) Kant's distinction between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue.

Baumgarten's concept of "justice" relates directly to the question of how to attribute the "natural" and ethical goods that are due to others. We have just seen that Baumgarten considers that the law of nature entails the preservation of both kinds of goods. At the same time, Baumgarten thinks that these kinds of human goods can be transferred to others under the condition that we are neither

[309] "Actio officio erga alium hominem opposite est LAESIO HOMINIS (a). Ergo neminem laedas interne, neminem externe, §. 303. Ultima propositio: neminem laedas externe in statu naturali, §. 1, quum sit principium totius iuris naturae primum: quicquid illud postulauerit, poscit etiam ethica philosophica, §. 2. vetans simul LAESIONES INTERNAS (b), actiones iis officiis oppositas, quae alter non potest iure extorquere, §. 304. Hinc non cuique solum tribue SUUM IURIS NATURAE (c), complexum bonorum ipsius, quae denegari sine laesione externa non possunt, sed et SUUM ETHICUM (d), complexum bonorum ipsius, quae sine laesione interna denegari ipsi non possunt in statu naturali".

externally nor internally aggrieved. When it comes to transferring goods, both natural and ethical, we need to cultivate a certain sort of habit and that habit Baumgarten calls "justice". The concept has a multiplicity of meanings regarding its universal and particular, external and internal dimensions:

> The habit of giving to each what is theirs is called justice (a). It will be either the virtue of observing those duties owed whomever, in which case it will be the UNIVERSAL (b) habit of conforming to the law, which is the complex of statutes that are to be observed by oneself, to which the whole of ethics is obligated, e. c. E §1; or it will be the PARTICULAR (c) habit of bestowing one's possession to someone among the rest of mankind, which is easy to do. [From another perspective,] it will be either EXTERNAL JUSTICE (d), bestowing one's possession such as virtue and honesty of the law of nature, E §300. Or it will be INTERNAL JUSTICE (e), bestowing one's ethical quality, which is the proportional goodness towards human beings, M §906. Be just both externally and internally. [...] Thus ethics is obligated towards all conclusions of the law of nature, yet not out of the same motives for action [as in the law of nature], but out of more noble motives. For the law of nature is not obligated to all the conclusions of ethical matters, E §2. (E §317)[310]

This section, and its ending in particular, make it clear that, as noted earlier, Baumgarten paves the way for Kant's distinction between natural and moral law, right and virtue, through a distinction between external and internal justice.

For Baumgarten, however, the minimum amount of justice is greater than what Kant has in mind. Baumgarten does not regard not infringing others' natural

[310] "Habitus suum cuique tribuendi si dicatur IUSTITIA (a), vel erit virtus erga quemuis obseruandi officia ipsi debita, et erit VNIUERSALIS (b) habitus, se IURI, complexui legum sibi obseruandarum conformandi, ad quam obligat tota ethica e. c. §. 1. vel PARTICULARIS (c) habitus, suum cuique reliquorum hominum tribuendi, et tribuere promta est, vel suum iuris naturae IUSTITIA, virtus, honestas, EXTERNA (d), §. 300. vel suum ethicum, IUSTITIA INTERNA (e), bonitas erga homines proportionalis, M. §. 906. Externe inteneque insutus esto. Fuge iniustitiam externam et internam, §. 216. Sic ethica obligat ad omnes conclusiones iuris naturae, neque tamen ex iisdem caussis impulsiuis, sed ex nobilioribus. Ius vero naturae non obligat ad omnes conclusiones ethicorum. §. 2".

goods as the minimum amount of justice, since preservation of their ethical good is strongly intertwined with that of natural good, as both are "metaphysically" tied to the law of nature. According to Baumgarten, we are obligated to be "noble" by the law of nature. This means that Baumgarten requires us to do more than Kant does, notably requiring us to actively love others even if it is a one-sided love. This may sound alien to the Kantian justice that we are accustomed to, since we think we can only "do justice" when we need to, with respect being the minimal duty we must pay to others. As Baumgarten's imperative "be just" suggests, however, "justice" is the state of nature we must actively pursue in order to match the perfection of the world God designed, and therefore is a virtue for him. Obviously, it is not just about judging and mediating what is "right". Baumgarten's "theory of justice" does not derive simply from a "doctrine of right", that is, a theory of how *natural rights* (however defined) can coexist peacefully, but from a more comprehensive theory of "peace", a theory of how *human beings* can coexist peacefully. This "peace theory" encompasses all aspects, the legal and the moral, the external and the internal, and therefore also crucially entails the "ethical goods", what we might term today "human rights" in their broadest sense – those rights which, if denied, lead to "internal injuries".

2.2.2. Vices opposed to philanthropy

We turn to the next point of the section on "special", or applied friendship, "vices opposed to philanthropy". As we saw, Baumgarten's method consists in alternating positive and negative analysis. His aim is not only to achieve the "golden mean", but also to cover a whole terrain of ethics extensively. The characterisation of virtue as search for perfection must itself be perfect as theory, which means, it must provide completeness both qualitatively and quantitatively. Under the title of "vices opposed to philanthropy", Baumgarten considers the actions and behavioural traits to be avoided for they undermine the promotion of love of others. It is important to remember that even if others do not necessarily show their positive love towards us, we still have to make an effort to love them in "special", "external" forms of friendship, that is, all the applied forms of friendship.

Baumgarten does not provide any positive definition of "vice(s) (*vitium/vitia*)" in any of his works, and Meier's German translation of *Metaphysica* simply testifies that in the context of the *Metaphysica*, the term just means "an error (*Fehler*)" (M §545).[311] Nevertheless, it is important in the context of moral philosophy to heed Kant's distinction between a "transgression (*peccatum*)" and a "vice (*vitium*)", in order to better situate how Baumgarten conceives those actions or behaviour that are opposed to philanthropy. Kant writes:

> Every action contrary to duty is called *transgression* (*peccatum*). It is when an intentional transgression has become a principle that it is properly called a *vice* (*vitium*). (MM 6:390)

Kant thus defines a vice in a strong sense, as a trait of character, whereas a mistaken transgression of certain criteria of morality in our actions or behaviour only denotes our "*deficiency* in moral worth" (MM 6:390). Kant further explains "transgressing certain criteria of morality", as being because of "a mere want of virtue, lack of moral strength (*defectus moralis*)" (MM 6:390). More precisely, "transgressing" denotes "not to be fit for anything", which, as his etymological explication suggests, "comes from '*zu nichts taugen*'" (MM 6:390). Indeed, this German expression is, according to him, the origin of the word virtue (*Tugend*).

The distinction between a "transgression", which is not a sin, and whose opposition is not a virtue, and a "vice", the antidote of which is a virtue, can be taken as an elaboration on Baumgarten's definition of a "sin (*peccatum*)":

> Moral actions that contradict duties towards oneself are SINS AGAINST ONESELF […]. (E §151)[312]

The distinction for Baumgarten is more between the metaphysical and the moral point of view. A sin is a transgression in moral terms and an error (*Fehler*) in metaphysical terms. For Baumgarten, sin and vice are the different expressions of

[311] It corresponds to §406 in Meier's translation.

[312] "Officiis erga te ipsum oppositae actiones morales, sunt PECCATA CONTRA TE IPSUM (a) […]".

the same issue, in the metaphysical and moral world respectively. Kant adds the distinction between transgression (distinguished from sin, as we just have seen) and vice because of his emphasis on the maxim of action as the true locus of morality, whereas Baumgarten's understanding of morality as qualitative and quantitative improvement emphasises the metaphysical/moral double-sidedness of morality.

On the basis of his definition of "vice", Kant then selects particular actions and behaviour under the title of "On the Vices of Hatred for Human Beings, Directly (*contrarie*) Opposed to Love of Them" (MM 6:458):

> They [vices of hatred for human beings] comprise the loathsome family of envy, ingratitude, and malice. – In these vices, however, hatred is not open and violent but secret and veiled, adding meanness to one's neglect of duty to one's neighbor, so that one also violates a duty to oneself. (MM 6:458)

Such a specification of the general issue of "hatred of others" can be seen as being inspired by Baumgarten's discussion from the "general" to the "specialised" issues, arising from the discussion of the right virtues.

The difference is, however, that Baumgarten does not particularly stake out the vices that Kant calls as "the loathsome family", partly because he does not positively distinguish between "transgression" and "vices", only the latter of which Kant regards to be culpable. Baumgarten considers instead, contrary to Kant, that whatever violates our duty is sinful.

Kant specifically marks out the three sorts of vices, namely, "envy (*liuor*)", "ingratitude (*ingratitudo*)", and "malice (*malignitas*)", as the most extreme kinds of hatred against others. We can find in the Collins manuscript of Kant's *Lectures on Ethics* why Kant considers these sorts of vices constitute the extreme. He writes:

> All three, ingratitude (*ingratitudo qualificata*), envy and *Schadenfreude*, are devilish vices, because they evince an immediate inclination to evil. That man should have a mediate inclination to evil is human and natural; the miser, for example, would like to acquire everything; but he takes no

> pleasure in the other having nothing at all. There are vices, therefore, that are evil both directly and indirectly. These three are those that are directly evil. (VE 27:440)

The distinction that Kant makes here highlights the difference of approach in comparison with Baumgarten. Even though there are a great many ways in which human beings can be in moral "error", only some of these errors count as true "vices", inasmuch as they not only attack humanity in the person herself, but also directly in the other. For Baumgarten, in the end, it does not matter "where" the love of perfection is being injured, and what is morally blameworthy is not just restrained to the injury in the person herself or in the other, but to the injury occurring wherever, since all parts of the world are metaphysically interrelated. As a result, the metaphysical outlook makes all vices equally immoral, as it were. This explains why, in addition to these three vices, Baumgarten lists a lengthy catalogue of other vices: "jealous rivalry (*aemulatio*)" (E §329), "mercilessness (*immisericordia*)" (E §332), "cruelty (*crudelitas*)" (E §334), "bloodthirstiness (*sanguinolentia*)" (E §334), "inhumanity (*inhumanitas*)" (E §335), "artificiality (*artificialia*)" (E §335), "pretentious signs (*affectata signa*)" (E §336), and "pretentious habit (*habitus symbolicus affectatus*)" (E §337). It is striking how much we are influenced by the Kantian approach to morality for we may find it strange that "signs of affection" should be listed alongside "inhumanity".

In order to make clear the contrast between Baumgarten and Kant, we focus on Baumgarten's definitions of what Kant regards as "the loathsome family". To begin with, Baumgarten defines "envy" in the following way:

> Since another's property must not be taken away from its possessor, E §317, there must be no appetite to make it ours, E §236. No one is to be pursued with hatred, E §313. Since therefore jealousy has appetite for another's property for itself, and also hates another, M §687, it sins twice. The habit of jealousy (*inuidia*) is called ENVY (a). Do not be an envious person: 1) striving after universal love, E §304; 2) avoid solipsism, E §195; 3) acquiesce to the wisest dispensation; hence 4) avoid the opinion, by way of which others'

properties are rather seen to belong to you, as moral fantasy, E §161; 5) consider that many things are good for others, which might strike you as truly bad; as long as you see them in others they seem to be good. However, when you are more experienced you will perceive those things in other ways, M §660; 6) consider that many things seem to be others' properties, which, however, at the same time that they are useless to you through a hidden connection of this kind, they yet might be useful to another, except not be useful for you. You might be tempted to envy them; 7) respect good things for you, which perhaps fail to support others, e. c. (E §328)[313]

For Baumgarten, envy is a vice in two ways, because it breaks the natural law rule of respect for the other's property, and also contains an element of hatred in it. Envy is sinful in two ways in relation to our duty to love others, which is why it is best counteracted in terms of a "pursuit of universal love". However, Baumgarten admits that we have a propensity to be jealous of others, and presumably that even if we are jealous of others, if we do not transgress others' possession, we do not yet violate our duties towards others. In this connection, we can understand why Baumgarten prohibits us only from making jealousy our habit rather than prohibiting us from being jealous of others. Jealousy as a habit is "a greater hypothetical faculty" (M §219) and is defined as envy. Baumgarten differentiates between three cases in which we need "metaphysical" adjustment in order to be able to exercise our universal love and thereby combat envy. First, some portions of reality work well only for others, even if they appear to be bad for ourselves. In such a case, we need to respect those portions as others' property. Second, we might be able to make use of some portions of reality that are useful for others and do not appear to be useful for us, and yet we might be able to have the

[313] "Alienum possessori non demendum, §. 317, ergo nec appetendum est, vt fiat nostrum, §. 236. Nemo odio prosequendus est, §. 313. Quum ergo et alienum sibi appetat, et oderit inuidia, M. §. 687, bis peccat. Habitus inuidiae LIUOR (a) est. Ne sis homo liuidus 1) amori vniuersali stude, §. 304. 2) solipsismum caue, §. 195. 3) dispensationi sapientissimae acquiesce, §. 75. hinc 4) opinionem, qua aliena tibi potius conuenire videntur, vt somnium morale fuge, §. 161. 5) cogita multa aliis bona esse, quae tibi vere mala forent, multa, quamdiu in aliis vides, bona videri, quae tamen ipse expertus longe alia sensurus esses, M. §. 660. 6) multa aliena videri, quae simul tamen per nexum non ita crypticum tibi prosunt, nec tibi prodessent, nisi alteri essent, quae ipsi inuidere tenteris, 7) bona tibi respice, quae forsan et aliis desunt, e. c.".

insight in the usefulness of them for us without violating others' property. Third, there are portions of reality that are useful only for us and not for others. In such a case, Baumgarten simply suggests that we respect those portions. In every case, the boundary between the instrumental and the moral is blurred, which is a major theoretical mistake from a Kantian point of view, but flows directly from the metaphysical, perfectionist outlook.

By contrast, when considering the loathsome family of vices, Kant defines envy as follows:

> *Envy* (*livor*) is a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even though it does not detract from one's own. When it breaks forth into action (to diminish their well-being) it is called envy *proper*; otherwise it is merely *jealousy* (*invidentia*). Yet envy is only an indirectly malevolent disposition, namely a reluctance to see our own well-being overshadowed by another's because the standard we use to see how well off we are is not the intrinsic worth of our own well-being but how it compares with that of others. – Accordingly one speaks, too, of *enviable* harmony and happiness in a marriage or family and so forth, just as if envying someone were permitted in many cases. Movements of envy are therefore present in human nature, and only when they break out do they constitute the abominable vice of a sullen passion that tortures oneself and aims, at least in terms of one's wishes at destroying others' good fortune. This vice is therefore contrary to one's duty to oneself as well as to others. (MM 6:458-59)[314]

Similar to Baumgarten, Kant also differentiates between jealousy and envy, and indeed characterises envy as a "double" vice, but for a different reason: it contradicts our duties towards both ourselves and others. For Kant, it is not because it is the violation of the metaphysical law of nature that envy is a vice, but

[314] Note that Melanie Klein puts particular focus on envy as "the root of all evil", making this prime passion serve as a model for psychoanalytical investigation. She sets forth this thesis by quoting Chaucer that "envy is the worst sin that is; for all virtue and against all goodness" (Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and other Works 1946-1963* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975), 189). Cf. Priscilla Lenore Roth and Alessandra Lemma, *Envy and Gratitude Revisited* (London: Karnac, 2008), esp. 46.

because it violates the moral law that all rational beings must follow in order for them to be rational at all. Therefore, to have the disposition of jealousy or even the propensity to be envious cannot be blameable as such, since both of them are subsumed under the law of nature in which it is allowed that human beings at times possess them, so long as they do not act on it. It is only when the dispositions develop into violent forces to the extent that they contradict the moral law, that is, violate our duties, that they can be said to be vices and therefore blameworthy. In this respect, it is noteworthy that in first attempting to establish the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, which is to be finalised in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant maintains in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* that "I understand here by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favor of inclination" (G 4:422). He is ready at that point to identify as an imperfect duty that evil where evil intentions are not blameable in the strong sense. This contradicts the general perception of Kant as a rigorous moralist who considers it to be immoral to have even slightly bad intentions in our actions.

Baumgarten defines "ingratitude", the second of those vices that Kant regards as belonging to the loathsome family, as follows:

> Avoid INGRATITUDE (a). Avoid not only EXTERNALLY OFFENSIVE INGRATITUDE (b), E §317, of externally harming the benefactor, and INTERNALLY OFFENSIVE INGRATITUDE (c) of internally harming the benefactor, E §318, but also avoid simple ingratitude, E §306. Do not, however, rashly consider others to be ungrateful to you, E §329. Avoid the following: 1) do not consider those things as benefits to others, which [actually] were not, such as those things that are less important, which either appear to be more good than they are, or do not originate from goodness. Indeed, things that originate from goodness possess some importance/weight, and this weight cannot be balanced/compensated without [having] the grateful mind [for those who provide goodness to you]. 2) Do not confuse an ungrateful person with a person who is not in a position to be able to return gratitude, or with a person who is not in a position to thank many others, E §137. GRACES WILL BE RETURNED (b) if

> benefit is granted to the benefactor because of the gratitude. A person who does not return gratitude, though he can, is ungrateful, E §306, M. §309. Indeed, it is much better not to give trifling gratitude in the past, when one may give the greatest gratitude in the present. Both are possible. (E §331)[315]

Baumgarten explains ingratitude as a negative commitment to the world through the act of harming the benefactor either intentionally (internally) or unintentionally (externally). When seen from the metaphysical perspective, this kind of commitment to the world immediately means the violation of the metaphysical forces working in the world, which must be balanced in order to preserve the goodness of the world. In this sense, ingratitude is an error for him in that it fails to balance forces that become visible as soon as one takes on a metaphysical perspective. This error in balancing the goods becomes a moral fault when it is expressed in terms of the due gratitude to the benefactor of the goodness, but the underpinning is unquestionably the first metaphysical perspective.

Kant writes about ingratitude as follows:

> When *ingratitude* toward one's benefactor extends to hatred of him it is called *ingratitude proper*, but otherwise were *unappreciativeness*. It is, indeed, publicly judged to be one of the most detestable vices; and yet human beings are so notorious for it that it is not thought unlikely that one could even make an enemy by rendering a benefit. – What makes such a vice possible is misunderstanding one's duty to oneself, the duty of not needing and asking for others' beneficence, since this puts one under obligation to them, but rather preferring to bear the hardships of life oneself than to burden others with them and so incur indebtedness (obligation); for we fear that by

[315] "Caue INGRATITUDINEM (a), non illam solum QUALIFICATAM, §. 317, EXTERNE (b), laedentis externe benefactorem, INTERNE (c), laedentis eundem interne, §. 318, sed simplicem etiam, §. 306. Ne tamen alios temere pro ingratis erga te habeas, §. 329, caue 1) ne pro tuis erga eos beneficiis habeas, quae non fuerunt, qualia minora aut apparenter tantum bona, aut non profecta ex bonitate, ex hac enim profecta aliquod pondus habentia, nisi grato animo, compensari non possunt, 2) ne cum potestate positum gratias referre, aut etiam multis agere, §. 137. GRATIAE REFERUNTUR (d) beneficio in benefactorem collato ob gratitudinem. Qui gratias non refert, quum potest, ingratias est, §. 306. M. §. 309. multo magis, ne agens quidem, maxime ne tunc quidem agens, vbi agere iam esset aliquantulum referre gratias, et vtrumque potest".

> showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a dependent in relation to his protector, which is contrary to real self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in one's own person). Hence gratitude is freely shown to those who must *unavoidably* have preceded us in conferring benefits (to the ancestors we commemorate or to our parents); but to contemporaries it is shown only sparingly and indeed the very opposite of it is shown, in order to hide this relation of inequality. – But ingratitude is a vice that shocks humanity, not merely because of the *harm* that such an example must bring on people in general by deterring them from further beneficence (for with a genuine moral disposition they can, just by scorning any such return for their beneficence, put all the more inner moral worth on it), but because ingratitude stands love of humanity on its head, as it were, and degrades absence of love into an authorization to hate the one who loves. (MM 6:459)

Again, Kant justifies the form of ingratitude that he calls mere "unappreciativeness" as a "natural" reaction, not just on the basis that it is prevalent in empirical terms, but also because it is in fact the wrong reaction to a correct feeling, namely the respect we owe to ourselves, since gratitude can be seen to be antithetical with self-respect. Such a misunderstanding is almost excusable and should not be ascribed to moral failure. This failure reminds us of Baumgarten's approach, integrated into God's project of creating the world, in which it is also taken into consideration that we finite beings at times misunderstand the metaphysical structure of the world. The cognitive failure to see the ultimate reasons for why things are as they are (why they belong to the best of all possible worlds) remains a form of cognitive failure in Kant, but no longer one relating to the ultimate causes. It is instead a cognitive failure about what to derive from one's sense of self, which translates into a moral fault (but not a vice).

Finally, we can now see how both philosophers define "malice", the third in Kant's analysis of the vices belonging to the "loathsome family". Baumgarten writes:

> Since malevolence does not exist without hatred, M §684, 687, and further, it is more greatly opposed to commiseration than is mercilessness is, it is to be avoided, E §306, 313. The desire to harm [others] out of malevolence is MALICE (a). Malice through speech is ABUSIVENESS (b). Avoid being malicious or abusive, E §319. Since the minimum amount of malevolence strikes the minimum amount of delight in the minimum amount of imperfections of one person, the greater that the delight in the greater imperfections of more people is, the greater the malevolence is. As malice ascends through these stages, so does abusiveness, M §160, 161. (E §333)[316]

As we can see here, Baumgarten identifies the minimum amount of malice as the positive enjoyment in and contribution to the misfortunes of others, in order to suggest the way to prevent the greater vices ascending from malice. This is the exact opposite pole of love of others. Malice can thereupon be characterised as the origin of the other sorts of vices that Baumgarten describes in the later sections (E §334-337): "cruelty (*crudelitas*)" (E §334), "bloodthirstiness (*sanguinolentia*)" (E §334), and "inhumanity (*inhumanitas*)" (E §335).

By contrast, Kant defines malice in the following way:

> *Malice*, the direct opposite of sympathy, is likewise no stranger to human nature; but when it goes so far as to help bring about ills or evil it makes hatred of human beings visible and appears in all its hideousness as *malice proper*. It is indeed natural that, by the law of imagination (namely, the law of contrast), we feel our own well-being and even our good conduct more strongly when the misfortune of others or their downfall in scandal is put next to our own condition, as a foil to show it in so much the brighter light. But to rejoice immediately in the existence of such *enormities* destroying

[316] "Maleuolentia quum non sit sine odio, M. §. 684, 687. et magis adhuc opposita commiserationi, quam immisericordia, vitanda est. §. 306, 313. Studium nocendi ob maleuolentiam est MALIGNITAS (a). Malignitas per orationem est MALEDICENTIA (b). Ne sis malignus, ne maledicus, §. 319. Maleuolentia minima foret minimum gaudium ex minimis vnius imperfectionibus, hinc quo maius gaudium, quo maioribus ex imperfectionibus, quo plurium hominum, hoc maior est malevolentia, per eosdem gradus adscendente malignitate et maledicentia, M. §. 160, 161".

> what is best in the world as a whole, and so also to wish for them to happen, is secretly to hate human beings; and this is the direct opposite of love of neighbor, which is incumbent on us as a duty. – It is the *haughtiness* of others when their welfare is uninterrupted, and their *self-conceit* in their good conduct (strictly speaking, only in their good fortune in having so far escaped temptations to public vice) – both of which an egoist accounts to his merit – that generate this malevolent joy, which is directly opposed to one's duty in accordance with the principle of sympathy (as expected by Terence's honest Chremes): "I am a human being; whatever befalls a human being concerns me too." (MM 6:459-60)

Here again Kant differentiates between "malice proper", the "vice" properly speaking, and other forms of malice, i.e., "haughtiness" and "self-conceit". The most important point to note with respect of malice is that Kant also presumes some metaphysical background against which to think about moral attitudes. We can see this in the fact that he thinks that malice destroys "what is best in the world as a whole", which reminds us strongly of Leibniz's Principle of the Best.

More generally, it appears that throughout his definitions of representative types of vices, Kant has in mind as a background the metaphysical settings, which Baumgarten has prepared, on which to think about moral questions. Even if, in each case, he carefully inverted each of them with emphasis on individual *rationality*, there are also strong echoes of the general consideration of individual *behaviour* in the world as a whole, and indeed Kant seems to follow Baumgarten's outline of the main vices and the important points to discuss, as found in the *Ethica*. Of course, the reference to explicit metaphysical cognition as a positive foundation of morality is rejected. To recall the famous passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> I had to deny **knowledge** in order to make room for **faith;** and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic. (CPR Bxxx; bold for letter-spacing (*Sperrsatz*) in original)

Contrary to the general perception, this passage is not simply a rejection of a metaphysical grounding of ethics. What Kant refutes is what he identifies as the prejudiced opinion of rationalists that reason does not need thorough examination. Thorough examination, he thinks, is regarded in dogmatic metaphysics as unnecessary, or rather, impossible for finite beings to exercise in the face of the perfect being, God, who determines what reason is in the first place. On this view, actual cognition of God's plans has to be replaced by faith in His goodness, and notably in terms of His perfect construction of the world. Kant thinks, contrary to this view, that metaphysics is still needed as a method, in the sense that it serves as criteria for our correct moral judgment, even if this metaphysics is now mainly critical and in any case cannot make any claim to certain cognition. As he declares in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*:

> A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely because of a motive to speculation – for investigating the source of the practical basic principles that lie a priori in our reason – but also because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we are without that clue and supreme norm by which to appraise them correctly. (G 4:389-90)

In fact, the difference between Baumgarten and Kant is not as great as it would seem. Even if the reference to metaphysics shifts from objective cognition to subjective faith, ultimately the consideration of the whole of humanity in its place in creation remains the deciding criterion of duties and virtues. So much so that Baumgarten's method of defining "morals" through the complete, that is, both positive and negative, analysis of duties and virtues, is replicated in Kant's method, in terms of the "guiding thread" without which it becomes difficult to know what is to be morally avoided.

2.2.3. Candour

"Candour", is the third topic that Baumgarten discusses under the heading of special friendship. We have seen that "humanity" is defined as the habit of *signifying* philanthropy. This explains why Baumgarten thinks it necessary to discuss the violation of humanity under the heading of "Candour" in addition to the section on "The Vices opposed to Philanthropy", where he has already treated the question of how to avoid vices for the sake of securing philanthropy. The section on "Candour" deals not with the actions and behaviour that are adequate to or antithetical to philanthropy, but rather with the forms of communication and their relationship to philanthropy. Philanthropy is called humanity if it is habitualised and it needs to be properly addressed. Next to the direct infringements against love of others, there is also the problem of the sincerity with which love of others is professed, notably in relationship to us. We enter an area here that is getting close to the Kantian realm of adjudicating the maxim of actions by contrast with their actual objective performance. However, Baumgarten's overall strategy of maximising perfection makes him blur the boundary between the strictly moral and the instrumental, which Kant would condemn:

> Since faked humanity is an object of hatred, the more hidden it is, the more pernicious it is, and the more it is to be avoided. You should never make any effort towards these things, E §313. However, whenever you exercise caution against enemies, E §150, be worried about being deprived of human qualities in other masks of pretence. For all the more because of this, the more something approaches a natural state, the more apparent any affectation will be, E §336. However, do not think it insincere, if someone as a truthfully loving person uses signs of love, in as much as it is a custom. Perhaps it is not through reason that the custom could frequently either be its own primary origin or otherwise be supplied to those who are examining the sign, E §310. Or, if someone uses signs of this kind, however insignificant, to her

> external enemy, she can also be obligated to be that enemy's practical (*activus*) internal friend, E §314. (E §338)[317]

In order to protect ourselves from others' hatred, we need to, above all, discern if the attitude of others to us is truly an expression of their love towards us. It might be the case that others hide behind their pretentious humanity their hatred towards us. In such a case, their pretentious humanity that they purport to insist as their expression of love towards us looks "natural" and is therefore difficult to discern from the humanity. Since this could be the case, we need to be cautious of others' attitude towards us to ensure that it is not a fake. At the same time, we must not be too cautious because others might show love towards us, but the way in which they express may be to some extent deceptive due to their signs of love being determined by their particular custom. Baumgarten even advises us to become internal friends with those who are external enemies by showing signs of love towards them. Advising us to become friends with enemies may sound contradictory, but Baumgarten thinks that if there is no hostility between us and others, we can still maintain peace between us and others. This remains the case even if the others do not positively show their love towards us (which is the definition of an external enemy, in opposition to an internal enemy who positively directs his hatred towards us). In this context, we can understand what he means when he speaks of becoming a "practical internal friend" with external enemies. If others do not positively exercise hatred towards us, we can become not only their external friends in the sense that there is no hostility among us, but even internal friends in the practical sense that we can at least, on our part, love those external enemies as human beings to whom humanity is due.

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[317] "Humanitas simulata quum sit odium, quo latentius, hoc perniciosius, hoc magis vitandum, ne illi des vnquam operam, §. 313. Quum tamen tibi debeas cautionem ab inimicis, §. 150, solicitus esto de detrahendis humanitatis in aliis simulatae laruis, idque eo magis, quo magis ad naturalem illa accesserit, quo minus affectati quid in eadem pellucet §. 336. Ne tamen contra candorem putes, si quis vere amans signis amoris vtitur, prout mos est, non qua ratione forsan olim aut in prima sua origine, aut signum aliter considerantibus adhiberi potuit, §. 310, aut si quis signis eiusmodi quantuliscunque vtitur erga inimicum suum externum, potest enim eius et obligatur esse amicus internus actiuus, §. 314".

In order to contrast this point with Kant's definition, we can focus on the way in which Baumgarten defines a "lie" as such a "violation of humanity". He writes:

> A moral untruth hurtful to other human beings is A LIE (a). If it is harmful externally, it is called AN EXTERNAL LIE (b), whereas if internally harmful it is AN INTERNAL LIE (c). Avoid not only the external but also internal lie, that is, all kinds of lie, E §319. Therefore a person flourishing in the habit of lying is A LIAR (d). (E §344)[318]

We can see the conciseness of his description of a lie if we contrast it with the one Kant provides. Baumgarten simply maintains that lying is an untruthful act that hurts either ourselves or others. Baumgarten therefore does not regard lying as such as a vice. Second, as can be seen from his definition of untruth as "false speech" (E §343), Baumgarten thinks that untruthfulness of a person to others is revealed only through a speech act, and the primary form of this untruth, he thinks, is lying.

Kant, in contrast, regards lying as the primordial vice opposed to our duties towards ourselves as moral beings:

> The greatest violation of a human being's duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own person) is the contrary of truthfulness, *lying*, [...]. In the doctrine of right an intentional untruth is called a lie if only it violates another's right; but in ethics, where no authorization is derived from harmlessness, it is clear of itself that no intentional expression of one's thoughts can refuse this harsh name. For, the dishonor (being an object of moral contempt) that accompanies a lie also accompanies a liar like his shadow. (MM 6:429)

Kant positions lying as the greatest violation of humanity among other sorts of vices opposed to our duties towards ourselves as moral beings. In relation to

[318] "Falsiloquium morale alios laedens est MENDACIUM (a), EXTERNUM (b), externe, INTERNUM (c) interne laedens. Non mendacium solum externum, sed et internum omne vita, §. 319. Ergo et habitum mentiendi, quo pollens MENDAX (d) est".

others, as we saw, the "loathsome family" entails other vices. The "loathsome family" entails infringements of duties towards ourselves, not just to others. But if we now focus on ourselves exclusively, our first duty is to truth that we have the first duty. In the doctrine of virtue, that is, in ethics, Kant even thinks that an intention of lying suffices by itself to be blameable even if it does not lead to any encroachment of another's freedom in a concrete sense (as the duty of right would demand). Even further, while Baumgarten thinks that a liar is a person that has established a habit of lying, Kant thinks that a person who lies only once, even if she has not yet established a habit of lying, is a liar.

In the passage following the quote above, Kant proceeds to discuss the exact distinction between an external and internal lie that Baumgarten has already prepared:

> A lie can be an external lie (*mendacium externum*) or also an internal lie. – By an external lie a human being makes himself an object of contempt in the eyes of others; by an internal lie he does what is still worse: he makes himself contemptible in his own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person. (MM 6:429)

As can be seen from this quote, lying, for Kant, whether it is external or internal, is the violation of our duties towards ourselves, since the object of contempt is ourselves in either of the cases. In other words, the object of contempt is the subject of lying, and the other as the object of lying is not involved in this condemnation. This directly challenges Baumgarten's "objectivist" attitude to lying, which considers lying as a moral fault because it hurts either ourselves or others.

Kant's challenge against Baumgarten is explicit. He rejects any "casuistic" consideration of lying, which would distinguish between cases of lying depending on their pragmatic usefulness and the specificities of the situation:

> And so, since the harm that can come to others from lying is not what distinguishes this vice (for if it were, the vice would consist only in violating one's duty to others), this harm is not taken into account here. Neither is the

> harm that a liar brings upon himself; for then a lie, as a mere error in prudence, would conflict with the pragmatic maxim, not the moral maxim, and it could not be considered a violation of duty at all. (MM 6:429)

Baumgarten is concerned with lying only from the perspective of whether this or that act of lying happens to infringe on the well-being either of ourselves or of others, in other words, whether or not lying contradicts the ultimate criterion of overall perfection. On this criterion, Baumgarten further distinguishes between different types of lies, according to the object of injury incurred:

> LIES OF NECESSITY (e) are those lies which should be mistrusted because they damage our more serious duties towards ourselves.[319] OFFICIOUS LIES (f) are those lies which damage the duties towards others, E §24. And HUMOROUS LIES (g) should be mistrusted because they bring about unexpected sensuous amusement: each of these lies, however, is a type of untruth, E §343, whether they are not lies or because they forbidden, E §318. (E §344)[320]

Kant, on the other hand, rejects any single sort of lying, irrespective of the object of injury, but even more, regards the intention of lying as impermissible. Following the lengthy explication of lying that we have seen so far, he concludes:

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[319] Stefano Bacin interprets Baumgarten's conception of "lies of necessity" as considered to be necessary to save one's own life (for the self-preservation as a duty to oneself). Since, however, Baumgarten thinks these lies should be "mistrusted", it can be argued that Baumgarten already considers that, even if only in this limited case, lying can be a violation of duties towards oneself (not only as the object of bodily self-preservation but also as mental existence). It is tempting to think that this anticipates Kant's approach to lying, since lies of necessity can typically be discussed in the case of the "murderer at the door", which Kant famously instantiates in his notorious essay, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy" (1797). See Bacin, Stefano, "The Perfect Duty to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being (TL 6:428-437)", in *Kant's "Tugendlehre". A Comprehensive Commentary*, ed. Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 245-55, esp. 248 n. 12.

[320] "MENDACIA NECESSITATIS (e) essent, quae ob collisionem cum officiis erga nos grauioribus suscipienda forent, OEFICIOSA (f), quae ob collisionem cum officiis erga alios, §. 24. et IOCOSA (g) inexspectatae delectationis sensitiuae ergo suscipienda: quae tamen falsiloquia singula, §. 343, vel non sunt mendacia, vel prohibita, §. 318".

> Lying (in the ethical sense of the word), intentional untruth as such, need not be harmful to others in order to be repudiated; for it would then be a violation of the rights of others. It may be done merely out of frivolity or even good nature; the speaker may even intend to achieve a really good end by it. But his way of pursuing this end is, by its mere form, a crime of a human being against his own person and a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in his own eyes. (MM 6:429)

We can clearly see here that Kant opposes Baumgarten in that he thinks lying is not merely an invasion of others' property, as Baumgarten thought it was. Rather, he thinks that even the "mere form" of lying suffices to violate the humanity of the person within ourselves. Despite this difference, however, we might surmise that Kant's own strenuous rejection of a "right to lie"[321] might be an elaboration of Baumgarten's analysis of the types of lies.

2.2.4. Judgement of others

In this last section of "specialised" or "applied" friendship, Baumgarten sets out to determine the way of loving others properly, since it does not suffice to avoid being envious of or lying to others. Baumgarten writes:

> In order that your philanthropy, E §304, is ordered and therefore visible, and in order for you to be able to avoid disordered, blind, foolish, and coarse love of other human beings, E §308, 184, as best can be done by you, know other human beings, not only in order that you may of use to them or protect their known interests, E §305, 195, but also in order that you can investigate by which reason you can be made to become more useful for them, E §301. You should also have a remedy of love against unknown matters which ought not be borne, M §666. Therefore, attend especially to both the perfections and imperfections of others, E §152, and most of all to their

[321] See Wood's account of Kant's rejection of a "right to lie" in the case of the murderer at the door in Wood, "Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others", 239.

> morals, E §158. The art of knowing the moral state of other human beings is MORAL ANTHROPOGNOSY (a), M §747. Therefore take pains to work on this as much as you can. (E §348)[322]

We have already seen that Baumgarten thinks that we need to be watchful for others' signs of love directed towards us, which might be difficult to interpret because their custom might not be familiar to us. However, when it comes to the signs that we use to express our love of others, we can make an effort to make these signs more ordered and conspicuous. What he thinks is best to achieve this is to know others in order to adjust our signs of love to the forms that can be most efficient in caring for others, on the one hand, and in protecting ourselves from them, from their invasion of our property, on the other. In particular, to know others for these purposes, Baumgarten means that we need to attend to others' perfections and imperfections. In this sense, it can be said that the sections subsumed under the heading of "Judgement of Others" corresponds structurally to what he has already discussed under the heading of "Self-knowledge". Moreover, this structural correspondence goes further, to the extent that the recommended ways to know ourselves and others, respectively, are also comparable. In the case of knowing ourselves in terms of self-knowledge, the reference point is God. When it comes to knowing others, it is ourselves that we are supposed to know in advance, to form the point of reference. In short, in our journey towards becoming moral, we begin with the pursuit of the knowledge of God in terms of the ultimate form of perfection, and proceed to knowing ourselves with particular focus on our own perfections and imperfections. To know others, the focus is put on others' perfections and imperfections, but we need to know our own perfections and imperfections in advance in order to be able to judge others.

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[322] "Vt philanthropia tua, §. 304. sit ordinata, hinc aculata, vt cauere queas amorem aliorum hominum inordinatum, coecum, stulum, et stolidum, §. 308. 184. quam optime a te fieri potest, nosce alios homines, non tantum, vt iis vti, vel ab iis cauere cognitis commodius possis, §. 305, 195. sed etiam, vt indages, qua ipsis ratione fieri possis vtilior, §. 301, habeasque fomentum amoris in ignota non ferendi, M. §. 666. Ergo praecipue ad perfectiones imperfectionesque aliorum attende, §. 152, in iisque morales maxime, §. 158. Ars moralem aliorum hominum statum cognoscendi est ANTHROPOGNOSIA MORALIS (a), M. §. 747. hinc ergo, quantum potes, des operam".

More specifically, in the context of establishing a special friendship that requires us to love others even if they do not positively show love towards us, Baumgarten thinks it better to focus on "moral" rather than "natural" perfections and imperfections of others. This is because others' moral states are better known to us than their non-moral states, a conclusion that can be inferred from Baumgarten's statement made earlier in the discussion of self-knowledge that our moral states are better known to ourselves than our non-moral states (E §158) because of our relative freedom to determine our moral states (M §723). Since we have greater room for making efforts to improve our moral perfections and turning moral imperfections into perfections, as opposed to our natural perfections and imperfections that are more strongly determined by nature, we can better detect others' moral perfections and imperfections, for their improvement in the exercise of our love towards them. It is in this context that we must understand why Baumgarten recommends that we should study "moral anthropognosy".

In the Vigilantius manuscript of Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, we see that Kant almost paraphrases and expands what we have just seen as Baumgarten's statements on the judgement of others:

> The judgment of others, i.e. comparison of one's worth with that of others, is not only permitted to everyone, but even a duty, since we cannot judge ourselves in any other way, save by putting ourselves into comparison with other people [...]. Personal self-assessment, or the determination of one's own moral worth, the *justum sui ipsius aestimium*, rests on a comparison of one's action with the law, and to that extent the *humilitas comparationis*, i.e., the maxim of determining one's worth by comparison with others, and of requiring in the process to accord oneself a lesser value, but a higher one to others, is quite contrary to duty, and a monkish virtue, that makes a man a cringing creature, who does not dare to raise his worth by cultivation, so as to obtain the advantages of others, because he obstinately mistrusts his own powers and talents, and resolutely depreciates his own worth. This is not that *humilitas absoluta* which on comparison with the law makes us sink back in face of its holiness and purity, and which consideration of the teaching of

> the Christian religion is meant to evoke in us, though not demanding it in advance. Comparison with others in determining our own worth can thus be aimed only at self-instruction concerning our value; for self-knowledge, *anthropognosia moralis*, or the moral knowledge of men, is likewise of service: the study of men and their actions, in order to get to know them. It is a duty here, to seek out the good that we can discern in their actions, for the use of it really consists in this, that now their actions become motives to prod us into the practice of virtue, in that we thereby become assured that in comparison with the law, and the fulfilment of it achieved by others, our practical virtue is still weak, or in some degree may surpass others. A common error here is that in so doing we compare ourselves more with the faults of other people than with their good points – from self-seeking; the faults of others must certainly be judged and examined, in order not to take what is a failing for something good; but they must have no influence on the determination of our worth. (VE 27:703-4).

Kant resituates what Baumgarten discusses under the heading of duties towards oneself in his discussion of the duties towards others. Baumgarten employs the terms "*justum sui ipsius aestimium*" and "*humilitas*" in his discussion of self-judgment. Kant exploits Baumgarten's argument of self-judgment in the deployment of his own examination of the judgement of others.

One of Kant's objections is to Baumgarten's unjustifiably high evaluation of humility, which Baumgarten recommends, as is his method, as the moderate attitude between two extremes. In contrast, Kant thinks that humility undermines the moral worth of our own value by ascribing higher value to other human. However, at the same time, Kant distinguishes between *humilitas comparationis* and *humilitas absoluta* in order to make room for the absolute evaluation of God. While he does not admit the possibility of degrading humanity in comparison to anything else, he acknowledges the absolute value of God independent from the value of humanity. This is despite his insistence that God is merely an idea that we cannot know.

As we have already discussed, Kant regards our duties towards others as representing our duty in general because he thinks that respect for humanity can be formulated into respect for others. In this formulation, it is properly expressed that this respect entails respecting all rational beings equally (both ourselves and others), but the formulation of the respect for others is chosen as representing the respect for rationality itself. In particular, the precedence of the duties towards others over those towards oneself for Kant is clearly seen in the above quote when Kant equates "self-knowledge" with "the moral knowledge of men", subsumed under the term of "moral anthropognosy (*anthropognosia moralis*)". He claims this despite his clear knowledge of Baumgarten's separation between the judgement of others and self-judgement. Although Kant's advice to discern the good in others' actions by way of knowing them seems to point to what Baumgarten conceives of as the judgement of others, Kant decisively departs from Baumgarten in that he regards "the law" to be the reference point for judging good action. Moreover, although Kant admits that finding good features in others motivates us to do virtuous actions, he thinks that we should categorically distinguish identifying the good in others from evaluating the moral worth of the person in both ourselves and in others.

In the following passage from the Collins notes on Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, taken in the Winter Semester of 1784-5 (so note that this is dated earlier than the previous quote), Kant also provides comments on the judgment of others. This time Kant's description is less straightforward than in the Vigilantius notes. He writes:

> Men are designed for the purpose of passing judgment on others, but nature has also made them judges, for otherwise, in matters outside the scope of external legal authority, we might not stand at the bar of public opinion as we do before a court of law. If somebody, for example, has brought shame upon a person, authority does not punish it, but others judge, and also punish him, although only insofar as it lies in their power to do so, and hence no violence is done to him. People ostracize him, for example, and that is punishment enough. But for this, the actions that authority does not penalize might go altogether unpunished. What does it mean, then, to say

> that we ought not to judge others? We cannot pass any complete moral judgment on another, as to whether he is punishable or not before the divine judgment-seat, since we do not know his disposition. The moral dispositions of others are therefore a matter for God, but in regard to my own, I am fully competent to judge. So as to the core of morality we cannot judge, since no man can know it. But in external matters we do have competence. In the moral sphere, therefore, we are not judges of men; but nature has given us the right to judge them, and determined us to judge ourselves in accordance with their verdict upon us. He who pays no heed to the judgment of others is low and reprehensible. There is nothing that happens in the world, on which we are not allowed to pass judgment, and we are also very subtle in the assessment of actions. The best friends are those who are exact in judging each other's actions, and only between two friends can such open-heartedness occur. (VE 27:450-51)

Kant distinguishes between our "natural" ability to judge others in terms of their actions, and the "moral" inability to judge others in relation to their moral disposition. In particular, the latter means our inability to value ourselves in comparison with others, that is, our incompetence in evaluating humanity itself in comparison with anyone else, which Kant pointed out in the previous quote from the Vigilantius notes.

Finally, in terms of the concept of friendship specifically, one decisive point distinguishes Kant from Baumgarten. On the one hand, for Baumgarten, while friendship in its general i.e. ideal form requires it to be completely mutual, if it is a special friendship, it may be one-sided and does not require the others' positive love towards us. On the other hand, for Kant, friendship cannot be defined generally, that is, any form of friendship cannot be presupposed as ideal and therefore must take concrete forms. Although Kant admits that two persons can be best friends in that they can mutually exercise the most exact judgment of each other, this form of friendship does not cease to be concrete. For him, the best form of friendship still cannot be raised to the realm of generality where we can purely theoretically assume the concept of friendship as such without any empirical

considerations, as Baumgarten asserts. It can be said that friendship is, for Kant, a matter of experience where we are "naturally" allowed to judge others in terms of their actions. By contrast, if the friendship is "moral", Kant thinks that we need to heed to the mutual respect for humanity (MM 6:471), which categorically prohibits us from allowing any empirical comparison and thus in fact gets in the way of the partiality that is defining of friendship. The metaphysical perspective makes Baumgarten develop a "general" concept of friendship that seems fairly counterintuitive, whereas Kant's initially more concrete concept is also severely conditioned by his insistence on moral impartiality.

2.2.5. The help that is due to others

In the process of developing Baumgarten's notion of "special friendship" as specialised or applied dimensions of friendship, we have learned about those elements that contribute to its enhancement. They are: the minimum condition for maintaining peace between us and others; the prescription not to infringe others' property; the precautions to be taken against the invasion of our own property; and the way to love others properly. We have to remember that Baumgarten provided all these specifications for the purpose of describing our duties towards others. The main aim to pursue in our duties towards others is, as we have seen, to help others achieve their perfection, which, in turn, helps us to achieve our own perfection. We have, thus far, staked out how to correctly exercise our love towards others. In addition to positively understanding what our love towards others should be like, we have also scrutinised the negative aspects of this love, by exploring how to avoid obstacles to the pursuit of love, or how not to be deviated from what we are supposed to do in the exercise of the love for others. On this basis, we can now proceed to examine the ways to help others seek their perfection by exploring what Baumgarten calls "the help that is due to others (*auxilium aliis praestandum*)." Baumgarten writes:

> You are obligated to actuate others' perfection and to remove their imperfection as much as you can, E §361, 362. And others are obligated to

> present their own perfection for themselves as well, E §197. However, they might be unable to do this fully for themselves, E §277. Therefore you are obligated to present the complement in order to bring about good effects in others who are lacking in terms of presenting their own happiness, i.e., you are obligated to help others. Help others as much as you can. Therefore you are not obligated to be the only cause of perfecting one person, [but obligated to be the only cause of perfecting that person] as much as helping that person in this way can and ought to be done, either because that person does not seek help, or because others neglect their duties to help a third person, thoughtlessly sustaining his misfortunes, E §321. The less the other person can present something for himself and the more you can present that to him, the more you are obligated to present that to him, E §305. Therefore be a joyful creator of others' fortune as much as you can, E §330; M §912. (E §364)[323]

In discussing "the help that is due to others", Baumgarten distinguishes between general and special parts of the argument, and the above quote can be positioned as the summary of the general part. As a general principle, he defines helping others as a type of action placed against the background of the task of perfecting the whole world that God created, in whose perfection, as God's creatures, we are supposed to take part in. In particular, not only are we obligated to perfect ourselves, but we also have duties to assist others in seeking their perfection (just as others have duties to assist us in perfecting ourselves). The perfection of ourselves is not sufficient for the task of perfecting the world: the help given to others to achieve their perfection is also necessary. We have mutual duties to help each other

[323] "Obligaris ad perfectionem aliorum actuandam, tollendam imperfectionem, quantum potes, §. 361, 362, ad idem sibi praestandum obligantur et alii, §. 197, minus tamen ipsi sibi sufficientes, §. 277. Ergo obligaris ad praestandum complementum ad effectus bonos aliorum felicitati suae praestandae insufficientium, i. e. auxilium. Iuua alios, quamtum potes. Ergo non obligaris solitaria vllius hominis perficiendi caussa esse, vel ipso non concurrente, quantum potest et debet, vel aliis sua officia iuuandi tertium negligentibus eorum vices temere subeundo. M. §. 321. Quo quid alter sibi minus praestare potest, quoque magis tu illud ipsi praestare potes, hoc magis ad illud ipsi praestandum obligaris, §. 305. Ergo gratulabundus esto faber fortunae aliorum, quantum potes, §. 330. M. §. 912".

seek perfections, our own and that of others, for the ultimate perfection of the world as a whole in which both we are all deployed.

There are, however, instances in which others are incapable of helping us or indeed themselves, since others are not necessarily as perfect as we are. In the latter case, the lack of reciprocity does not prevent us from having a duty to help, but not because of a traditional moral principle of self-sacrifice for some higher norm. Rather, it is for a metaphysical reason that we have duties to help others perfect themselves. For Baumgarten, all our duties are cosmologically interrelated whether they are ours or the others'. They are set against a moral economy constituted by the mutual forces of "self-love" and "philanthropy" (E §399).

Kant's position in relation to helping others is complex because, on the one hand, he puts significant importance on our duties towards others, as this kind of duties represents the very essence of morality, while on the other hand, he rejects Baumgarten's duty of direct interference. At the beginning of the *Doctrine of Virtue* where he handles the concept of duty, Kant rejects the possibility that it is our duty to help others achieve their perfection:

> [I]t is a contradiction for me to make another's *perfection* my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this. For the *perfection* of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he *himself* is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do. (MM 6:386)

In contrast to Baumgarten, Kant does not agree with the idea that a person is perfected by herself and others, that in addition to her effort to perfect herself, a person needs the complementation to her perfection through the help of others as well. Rather, the moral point of view consists in taking the person as a being who has an ability to set her own ends, or, to put it differently, is able to perfect herself on her own, according to her own autonomously set ends. Kant considers that if a person is a rational being at all, the law of rationality will guide and constrain the way in which she will set ends to herself, and so by definition this will be done

without the help of others. Since this is the only way in which we should talk about a duty of perfection for ourselves, it implies that there can be no duty of helping others towards their perfection. As we remarked in discussing a "duty of perfection" (see Chapter six, section 1), Kant explicitly argues against Baumgarten. Here we see that the criticism and contrast apply not just to the duty of perfection towards oneself, in terms of what is entailed in it, but also to the alleged duty of helping others towards their perfection. So the goal in our duties towards others has to be restricted to the happiness of others, the other duty discussed in the beginning of §30 in the *Doctrine of Virtue*.[324]

We have seen that Baumgarten distinguishes between general and special friendship. General friendship establishes the ideal state of mutual friendship whilst the forms of special friendship include applied dimensions to the duty of loving and helping others, and thereby includes forms that need not necessarily be mutual and therefore do not require positive love towards us on the part of others. In a similar way, he differentiates between general and special forms of helping others to achieve their perfection. Baumgarten differentiates between the "duties of humanity (*officia humanitatis*)" and the "duties of common humanity (*officia vulgaris humanitatis*)" (E §355). With this distinction, he presents a detailed description of the different ways to help others, since in our everyday life in the moral world, we encounter different types of people and we have to handle them in different ways in order to help them, whereas in the ideal or pure metaphysical world the concept of duty can be deduced from the pure concept of humanity. It is in this context that we have to understand what he means when he says that morally helping others must be done "according to the proportion between your love and the love of others" (E §365). Baumgarten sets out to discuss in significant detail concrete ways of helping others. They are: "working to propagate religion (*studium propagandae religionis*)" (E §367-369), "working to propagate science and virtues (*studium propagandae scientiae et virtutis*)" (E §370-373), "help in passing life pleasantly

[324] "To be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one's means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return, is everyone's duty" (MM 6:453). For the detailed discussion on helping others achieve their happiness as a duty of love in the context of Kant's *Doctrine of Virtue*, see Manfred Baum, "Probleme der Begründung Kantischer Tugendpflichten", *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik* 6 (1998): 41-56, esp. 50-53.

(*auxilium vitae commode transigendae*)" (E §374-377), "duties regarding social practice and social intercourse (*officia consuetudinis et conversationis*)" (E §378-386), "duties in honour of others (*officia in honorem aliorum*)" (E §387-390).

Although Kant does not admit the possibility of claiming that helping others achieve their perfection is our duty, he nevertheless appropriates those topics that Baumgarten discusses under the heading of the special forms of helping others. Kant discussed those topics in a different context, by studying the ways in which we can negatively hamper other people's happiness and perfection. In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, he focuses on the following vices, under the label of "On Vices that Violate the Duty of Respect for Other Human Beings" (MM 6:465): "arrogance", "defamation", and "ridicule". These are exactly the same concepts that Baumgarten handles in the sections of the "duties in honour of others" that are subsumed under the special forms of helping others. The point to stress, however, is that, in defining the three types of vices violating the duty of respect, Kant also attacks Baumgarten's larger picture, in which helping others is considered a necessary component of friendship as based on the exercise of love. As if to testify to this fact, before beginning to discuss the three vices in question, Kant writes:

> Failure to fulfill mere duties of love is *lack of virtue* (*peccatum*). But failure to fulfill the duty arising from the respect owed to every human being as such is a *vice* (*vitium*). For no one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; but a failure in the duty of respect infringes upon one's lawful claim. – The first violation is opposed to duty as its *contrary* (*contrarie oppositum virtutis*). But what not only adds nothing moral but even abolishes the worth of what would otherwise be to the subject's good is *vice*.
>
> For this reason, too, duties to one's fellow human beings arising from the respect due them are expressed only negatively, that is, this duty of virtue will be expressed *only indirectly* (through the prohibition of its opposite). (MM 6:464-465)

We have already seen that Kant distinguishes between "*peccatum*" and "*vitium*" earlier in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (MM 6:390). The point he makes there is that if the

peccatum (the mere "transgression") has become a principle, it is entitled to be called the *vitium* (vice). By contrast, in the quote above, Kant reformulates this distinction in relation to another important differentiation, namely between love and respect. If we focus on the fact that he transforms the translation of both *peccatum* and *vitium* into "lack of virtue (*Untugend*)" and "vice (*Laster*)", respectively, we see he is reformulating the distinction to accord with his distinction between love and respect. This must be understood from the broader perspective, that is, we have to situate this differentiation in relation to the crucial point where Kant departs from Baumgarten with respect to our duties towards others. In contrast to Baumgarten, Kant defines the concept of virtue strictly, through excluding it from the realm of our duty of love towards others. He thinks that we can choose whether or not to love a certain person and even if we determine not to, we cannot be said to be "unvirtuous". By contrast, if we choose to not respect a person, we are immediately condemned as unvirtuous. In other words, Kant considers that insofar as a person is a rational being, she is immediately under the command of being virtuous and the act of respecting others is, as it were, already embedded in her person as imbued with the moral law. Failing to respect others directly connotes a strong meaning that we annihilate the others' good. Kant ascribes only this kind of strong annihilation to the concept of "vice".

In contrast, without positively defining the concept of respect in his moral philosophy, Baumgarten defines "vice" simply as an error in the metaphysical sense. Since, for Baumgarten, ethics is grounded in metaphysics, there is no contradiction in straightforwardly applying this metaphysical definition of vice to our action in the moral world, whereby failure to fulfil our duty, whatever that sort of duty is, is considered immediately as opposing the world's total metaphysical process (or communal effort in the moral sense) of perfecting itself.

In addition to the three types of vices that Kant picked up in order to use it in the construction of his own argument in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, there is another topic that Kant borrows from Baumgarten, although once more it is separated from its original connection. The topic is: "duties regarding social practice and social intercourse". Again, how each of these philosophers approaches this topic differs

significantly, and yet an underlying influence of Baumgarten, if only a negative or contrastive one, can be identified.

Baumgarten, on the one hand, thinks that we are obligated to mutually present pleasant conversation to each other. In other words, he considers that it is a virtue to cultivate social intercourse in the act of conversation. He defines the "notable habits requisite for pleasant conversation" as the "homiletic virtues (*virtutes homileticae*)" (E §378). To put it into the broader perspective, he regards social intercourse as a set of habits to be cultivated in order to help us be moral in fulfilling our duties towards others that contribute to the eventual, indirect perfection of ourselves. Since conversation, the representational form of social intercourse, necessarily involves the participation of others, he thinks that this topic must be discussed in the domain of our duties towards others in the first place. Kant, on the other hand, ascribes social intercourse to both duties towards ourselves and towards others. What is striking in his discussion (again) is the way in which he uses the terms used by Baumgarten, in order to reject the latter's arguments. Kant begins by developing the notion of a duty to have social intercourse, in terms of perfection:

> It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to *isolate* oneself (*separatistam agere*) but to use one's moral perfections in social intercourse (*officium commercii, sociabilitas*). (MM 6:473)

As can be seen, Kant thinks that social intercourse, in addition to being a duty towards ourselves, is also part of the duties towards others in the sense that others are also obligated not to isolate themselves on their part. In the passage that immediately follows, the explanation for such a duty integrates the Kantian perspective, that is, the duty placed on each by the moral law, with a derived Baumgartenian perspective considering the overall effect of intercourse on the world's moral standing. The conclusion is one where Kant seems to explicitly locate his argument in relation to Baumgarten:

> While making oneself a fixed center of one's principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world – not exactly in order to promote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity [...]. (MM 6:473)

"*Not exactly* in order to promote as the end what is best for the world" (emphasis mine): this sounds like a candid acknowledgement of the impact of Baumgarten's ethical approach on Kant's own ethics, despite the radical rupture from his predecessor.

Chapter eight: Special ethics

From §400 of *Ethica*, Baumgarten sets out to discuss what he calls "the special part of ethics". This corresponds to the second part of the division of the book, between "general" and "special" ethics. He defines this part of ethics in the following way:

> The special part of ethics in the state of nature of a human being examines other possible states that are not common to everyone, and [yet] it relates to everyone's obligations, E §9. (E §400)[325]

What distinguishes the special from the general part of ethics is that, unlike the latter, the former covers the discussion of the states of affairs that everyone does not necessarily share, which, however, touch upon the question of what it is to be moral, a question that relates to everyone in principle. Albeit special, since it deals without any contradiction with what is universal, Baumgarten thinks that the special part of ethics constitutes a quintessential component of what he calls "philosophical ethics". As we have seen repeatedly, by "philosophical", he means that, as philosophers, we counterfactually put ourselves in the position of God which allows us to theoretically understand in formal terms at least what the highest state of perfection is. This is what is implied in the term "general". On the other hand, we philosophers are also finite beings, and therefore have to live a life of such beings. This means we need to persistently make an effort to approximate each of the existing constituents of what makes us who we are to what God manifests as the ultimate state of perfection. This moral effort, which is peculiar to human beings, is what Baumgarten denotes in the term "special".

The metaphysical point of view as the defining perspective to establish what it is to be moral also defines the laws governing the state of nature. In other words, if one understands what determines the law of nature, then one can immediately

[325] "Pars ethices specialis in statu hominis naturali possibiles aliquos status considerat, non omnibus communes, eorumque obligationes tangit §. 9".

know how to be moral following the same law. This is true not only in general ethics but also in the special part of ethics.

Baumgarten devotes the last hundred sections of *Ethica* to the special part of ethics. This is a small number compared to an enormous amount of sections comprised in the general part of ethics. But then Kant allocates only one paragraph in the *Doctrine of Virtue* to the summary of what corresponds to that which Baumgarten conceives as the special part of ethics. Kant challenges Baumgarten on whether the special ethics deserves extensive discussion. In fact, Kant's statement on this point is almost merciless to Baumgarten, as is sometimes the case with Kant's criticism of him, although he still does not designate him by name. Kant writes under the heading: "On Ethical Duties Of Human Beings toward One Another with Regard to Their Condition":

> These (duties of virtue) do not really call for a special chapter in the system of pure ethics; since they do not involve principles of obligation for human beings as such toward one another, they cannot properly constitute a *part* of the *metaphysical* first principles of a doctrine of virtue. (MM 6:468-469)

This statement directly challenges Baumgarten's presumption that "special ethics" is a necessary part of ethics. This points to a major disagreement about the nature and scope of a philosophical ethics. For Baumgarten, as we saw, a complete philosophical ethics will involve a deduction of all the duties to oneself and to others that derive from the simple principle of perfection, which is itself grounded elsewhere, namely in a separate part of philosophy, that is, metaphysics. For Baumgarten, therefore, there is no metaphysics of morals, but only moral implications to general metaphysics. Kant, by contrast, develops a specific metaphysics of morals as totally distinct from the metaphysics of nature. His metaphysics of morals explores the structures and implications of the laws of rationality as they apply specifically to human conduct, as practical reason. For him, this study exhausts what philosophers can say about morality, and it is not a criterion of moral philosophy that it should cover all the "special" ways in which we can or cannot be moral. Even so, although Kant rejects the idea of a "special

ethics" in Baumgarten's sense, that is, as an indispensable part of ethics in need of substantive description, he nevertheless in the same paragraph in which the above quote is included states:

> Nevertheless, just as a passage from the metaphysics of nature to physics is needed – a transition having its own special rules – something similar is rightly required from the metaphysics of morals: a transition which, by applying the pure principles of duty to cases of experience, would *schematize* these principles, as it were, and present them as ready for morally practical use. How should one behave, for example, toward human beings who are in a state of moral purity or depravity? toward the cultivated or the crude? toward the learned or the unschooled, and toward the learned in so far as they use their science as members of polite society or outside society, as specialists in their field (scholars)? toward those whose learning is pragmatic or those in whom it proceeds more from spirit and taste? How should people be treated in accordance with their differences in rank, age, health, prosperity or poverty, and so forth? (MM 6:468-469)[326]

It is clear from this extensive list of "cases of experience" to which, as Kant says, we can apply "the principles of duty", that he follows what Baumgarten prepares as a table of components subsumed under the discussion of the special ethics. These are: "the duties of the learned and unlearned (*officia eruditorum et ineruditorum*)" (E §400-425), "duties of the virtuous and the vicious (*officia virtuosi et vitiosi*)" (E §426-450), "duties of those of different ages (*officia aetatum*)" (E §451-460), "duties of the healthy and the sick (*officia sanorum et aegrotorum*)" (E §461-470), "duties regarding the comfortable and the uncomfortable (*officia vitae commodae et incommodae*)" (E §471-480), "duties regarding honour, neglect, and contempt (*officia honorati, neglecti*

[326] See Marcia Baron, "Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the Virtues of Social Intercourse (TL 6: 468-474)", in *Kant's "Tugendlehre". A Comprehensive Commentary*, ed. Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 365-382. We can see the summary in question on pp. 365-366. However, it does not mention any background against which Kant was led to write the paragraph on "special ethics", on which the summary is based.

et contemti)" (E §481-490), and "duties regarding friends and those abandoned by friends (*officia amicorum et amicis destituti*)" (E §491-500).

As each of the titles of these components suggests, for Baumgarten they are to be investigated as different sorts of duties, while Kant considers them to be merely the arbitrary objects of applying "the principles of duty". For example, Baumgarten discusses what the learned people are obligated to:

> Ingenuity is refined either in terms only of the use of things in communal life by way of hearing and reading this and that from dispersed sources, or with the help of the knowledge of disciplines, or else in both ways. Cultivating ingenuity through the knowledge of disciplines is ERUDITION (a). DISCIPLINES are the complex of propositions that are similar among themselves, which are marked by a common name according to the method they propose. (E §404)[327]

According to him, we are obligated to make ourselves learned through whatever ways are available to us. If we have access to certain disciplines that are firmly established for the use of our leaning, we can be "erudite (*eruditus*)". However, being erudite cannot be the common goal for all human beings, since it is the state that only a limited number of people can achieve. In this sense, what he means by the term "special" is clear if we understand that he thinks that although we are obligated to be learned, it cannot necessarily be expected that all of us be excellent in that respect.

In the case of being virtuous, Baumgarten describes it as if it lies in mathematical relation to being vicious. He writes:

> [Theoretically] a human being would either be virtuous to some extent or vicious to some extent, or else virtuous and vicious at the same time. In the last case, the amount of both elements is either equal or unequal. Now [,

[327] "Ingenium vel solo rerum vsu in communi vita, sparsimque nunc hoc, nunc illud audiendo legendoque politur, vel cognitione disciplinarum, vel vtroque modo. Cultura ingenii per cognitionem disciplinarum est ERUDITIO (a). DISCIPLINAE sunt complexus propositionum inter se similium, communi nomine insignitarum et methodice propositarum".

> however, in reality] one is not equally virtuous and vicious, M §790. Hence a sinner is either more virtuous than is vicious, and is called virtuous according to the determination by what is superior, or more vicious than is virtuous, and is said to be vicious according to the same determination, M §789. Repentance, by way of which a vicious person is transformed into a virtuous, is CONVERSION (a). If a vicious person is converted, E §427, it is allowed that he be virtuous. Although a sinner, he repents, E §432. (E §433)[328]

Although it is common sense to say that a person is either virtuous or vicious, what is unique to Baumgarten's argument is that he admits the possibility that a sinner might possibly be virtuous in some respect. This view is granted to him because of the "quantitative" way in which his ontological perspective defines perfection, as amount of being. Once again, the ontological only needs to be translated in moral terms. So even a sinner has a chance to be virtuous by way of "conversion". However religious this may sound, the fundamental justification is purely ontological and metaphysical. More specifically, like everything in general is determined as a perfection or an imperfection in a relative sense, whether a person is virtuous or vicious is decided only relatively, that is, "according to the determination by what is superior". Therefore the conversion is not a religious experience here, but simply the name given to the process of approaching one's perfection.

What, then, does Baumgarten imply when he says that each of the components of the special ethics relates to everyone in principle, in that it touches upon the question of what our duties are, even if all of these components are not necessarily attributed to us all in real life? We have seen, for example, that he considers that not everyone can be erudite, although everyone is obligated to be learned. It is a state of being special that all of us should ultimately aim at. We

[328] "Homo vel esset virtuosus tamtum, vel vitiosus tantum, vel vitiosus et virtuosus simul, idque vel aequaliter, vel inaequaliter. Iam non est aequaliter virtuosus, et vitiosus, M. §. 790. Hinc peccator vel magis virtuosus, quam vitiosus est, et a potiori virtuosus vocatur, vel magis vitiosus, quam virtuosus est, et a potiori vitiosus vocatur. M. §. 789. Resipiscentia, qua vitiosus in virtuosum mutatur, est CONUERSIO (a). Vitiosus conuertatur, §, 427, virtuosus licet, peccator tamen, resipicat. §. 432".

human beings are finite in this world that God created and are constrained to act under this limited condition. This is what Baumgarten means by our being special: to attempt to approach the perfection embodied in the ideal of God from the specific point that our finitude represents. Indeed, not only are we finite beings special by ourselves, we are also "special" in relation to others. In other words, if we are the being determined by others in addition to our self-determination, we are made more special than when we are determined just by ourselves, and also are more likely to be unique and special among other finite beings. In this respect, one thing that we should aim at in particular is a "special" kind of "friendship" that can be gained by the deepening of friendship with someone, with special focus on showing special "favour" to each other. As he puts it:

> SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP (a) is one grade of philanthropy, inasmuch as you are not obligated to exhibit it to all human beings. Hence it is clear that special friendship is also either practical or mutual, E §312. If it is EXTERNAL (b) and it is not greatly simulated, but both truthful and effective, it is allowed that it depends less on favour. If it is INTERNAL (c), it is not only truthful but also depends most powerfully on favour. If this latter kind of friendship were mutual, it is A MORE SPECIAL FORM OF FRIENDSHIP (d). (E §491)[329]

This might sound puzzling since Baumgarten argues in the sections on "duties towards others" that the special kind of friendship is distinguished from general friendship in that it does not necessarily require positive love exercised from others. Rather, it can be realised only if we, on our part, direct love towards them. What he means by special friendship here is articulated through the distinction between "practical (*activus*)" and "mutual (*mutuus*)" friendship. On the one hand, friendship is "practical" if it fulfils its minimum requirement that there is no hostility between

[329] "AMICITIA SPECIALIS (a) philanthropiae gradus, quantum omnibus exhibere hominibus non obligaris. Hinc patet amicitiam specialem etiam esse vel actiuam vel mutuam, §. 312, vel EXTERNAM (b), non simulatam tantum, sed et veram et efficacem, licet minus ex fauore pendentem, vel INTERNAM (c), non veram solum, sed et ex fauore potissimum pendentem. Haec vbi fuerit mutua est AMICITIA SPECIALIOR (d)".

us and others, as we have seen. On the other hand, it is "mutual" if both we and others exercise positive love to each other. Mutual friendship in the general sense is meant to be an ideal state in which it does not matter whether it is actualised or not. By contrast, mutual friendship in the special sense is the one in which both we and others actually proceed to loving each other, or what Baumgarten expresses as showing mutual "favour". Moreover, the more we and others love each other, the more special the mutual friendship is. Baumgarten prescribes to us precisely this, namely, to increase the grade of special friendship, or to put it in our everyday language, to take pains to find better ways to exhibit, on our part, that others are truly special to us.

However, mutual friendship of a special kind is not necessarily advanced equally between us and others. As can be seen from the fact that Baumgarten's focus is persistently set on us and not on others throughout his description of *Ethica* as a whole, we can infer that he thinks that the depth of our special friendship with others depends primarily upon what we do to others and not vice versa. In other words, although others, on their part, are also obligated to show their favour to us in the best possible ways, he regards it as sufficient to describe duties in general from the perspective of the position of ourselves alone. Focusing in this way on what we can do on our part to advance our special friendship with others, Baumgarten states:

> Since philanthropy, that is, favour towards human beings, is postulated by us and is extremely proportional, E §305, 307, we are obliged to exercise practical special friendship towards some others, E §491, in whom the same proportionality demands perfections, in order that we might arrange their natural capacity, which is either present or expected, as well as our favour in the most powerful perfection, that is, the mightiest reason, E §354. Therefore we would be friends of the heart with our special friends, E §492. However, in short, for the same reason the favour in the remaining minor perfections is excluded; rather it is suggested that [this favour] is easy, E §21. (E §495)[330]

[330] "Quia philanthropia fauorque erga homines postulatur a nobis proportionalissimus, qui potest, §. 305, 307, obstringimur ad amicitiam specialem actiuam erga aliquos, §. 491, in horum perfectionibus

We have seen that Baumgarten distinguishes between "practical" and "mutual" friendship by whether others show positive love towards us. Even if they do not, "practical (*activus*)" friendship can be established through the "active" commitment on our part to love them. However, Baumgarten thinks that if we proceed to take up a role of educating others by indicating concretely in what ways others can improve in terms of the love towards us, what used to be merely the "practical" love can be advanced to being "mutual" love. Specifically, what we can do in this respect is to point out others' natural capacity that might not be well developed, in order for them to use it for signifying their love towards us. Moreover, Baumgarten thinks that we need to put special focus on the process of educating others by showing "our favour in the most powerful perfection, that is, the mightiest reason" (E §495). The paramount wisdom we can teach to others is "reason" that we should develop as the primary sort of perfection among other perfections. He even insists that, compared to reason as the primary perfection, the other minor perfections are to be excluded in the development of love. This shows the rationalist strand underpinning his entire ethics, which gives a very specific sense to his discussion of "love". Baumgarten's love is a philosopher's love, the love of being as such, not an affect or passion, but the rational embrace of things inasmuch as the reasons behind them are being seen.

Although the description of *Ethica* begins with knowing God as the elementary step towards becoming moral, at that stage we can only do it generally. We can only theoretically put ourselves in the position of God and we never can fully occupy the place of God as finite beings. However, after going through the stage where we can know ourselves, when it comes to our relation to others, we can reach the point where we can be most "special" in the sense that we can radicalise our specific existence by establishing special friendship with others. At the end of this book we finally find that the persistent thread that we should follow throughout our journey towards becoming moral is in fact nothing but "reason". Of

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eadem proportionalitas poscit, vt indolem eorum vel praesentum, vel sperandam, vt potissimam perfectionem plurimam fauoris nostri rationem constituamus. §. 354. Ergo amicorum nostrorum specialium simus amici cordis, §. 492, nec tamen ideo prorsus excluditur fauor reliquarum etiam perfectionum minorum, qui potius facilitans suadetur. §. 21".

course, Kant will describe an entirely different way for practical reason to determine our rightful actions and behaviour. Yet all the while Baumgarten's detailed handbook of ethics will have provided him with a substantial basis to work with as the most useful of contrasts.

Conclusion

This thesis has explored the way in which Baumgarten developed his ethics on a full set of metaphysical premises established earlier in his *Metaphysica*. The fundamental principle deriving from the *Metaphysica* helping to ground the ethics is the principle of "perfection". However metaphysical, this metaphysical foundation of Baumgarten's ethics has a direct moral significance, for the human being is obligated to participate in the construction of the world inasmuch as the world can be perfected, both in "quantity", by adding and strengthening whatever being there is in it, and in "quality", by improving the being of entities already existing. Human beings act as moral agent to the extent that they participate in this grand enterprise of perfecting the world in all of its possible dimensions.

Herein lies the concept of "duty" for Baumgarten. Each agent has a duty to perfect herself, against the grand design of the perfect world, of which only its creator as the most perfect being has the whole picture. Morality is therefore a concept that peculiarly concerns the human being, who is obligated to thoroughly and ceaselessly perfect himself, to the best of his abilities in his life, no matter how imperfect he is destined to be because of his finitude. In fact, it is an unattainable goal to become the most perfect being, which only one being is logically allowed to be. Nevertheless, the human being is destined to perfect himself, since it is an unescapable metaphysical fact that the world's (and the human being's immediate) "determination (*determinatio*)" and "reason (*ratio*)" govern the occurrences in the world. Under their purview, however, the human being is free to act as participant in the constitution of the world through his efforts to become a better person and to make other beings better around him.

"Determination (*determinatio*)" and "reason (*ratio*)" therefore have metaphysical dimensions that are directly moral. In Baumgarten's philosophical system, metaphysics and ethics are seamlessly intertwined like the two sides of the one medal that is the being created by God. One might insist on the distinction between determination and reason, arguing that determination is simply a metaphysical principle of individuation, whereas reason has to be divided into its theoretical and practical realm, as post-Kantians do. These concepts, however, are

for Baumgarten under the same sway of "the law of nature". This law extends its influence from metaphysics to morality. That is, from how the world is constituted can be directly derived how we have to act and behave in it, and this in turn determines what it takes to become a moral person. Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* proposes a comprehensive practical programme of human exercise to examine all the ways in which oneself and others can be supported and enhanced in their being. On the surface, the book seems to consist only in an endless, disorganised catalogue of concrete exhortations and prescriptions. This contradicts what we post-Kantians imagine a philosophical book should be. But replaced within the frame of Baumgarten's seamless shift from metaphysics to ethics, we can see why a book on "philosophical ethics" would have to look like this. Armed with metaphysical principles which can be demonstrated in full logical rigour, the philosopher is in a position to apply the principle of perfection to all dimensions of human life. Even though, as a finite being, the philosopher cannot penetrate the entire set of reasons behind every single thing, he can hypothetically place himself in the general point of view from which God created the world. This point of view unveils the principle of perfection and how it is linked to the metaphysical principles underpinning individuation, quality, quantity, and so on. This knowledge then allows the philosopher to apply the general principle of perfection to all aspects of our human realities: how we relate to God and how we pray to participate in His majesty, clarity, certainty, and ardency (albeit approximately); how we relate to ourselves both internally and externally (even how we decorate our body); how we relate to other beings in general, both human and non-human. Such an approach to morality which simply seeks to support and enhance being in all of its forms makes for a very different ethics to the rigorist Kantian deontology. Kant's well-known distinction between "one's own perfection" and "happiness of others" as the two representative virtuous ends, for instance, is Kant's refinement of the concept of duty, in direct response to Baumgarten's wholesale application of the concept of perfection to one's duty. For Baumgarten, on the other hand, the principle of perfection has to be applied even reflexively: Baumgarten clearly thinks he manages to apply it to himself through his exhaustive and systematic treatment

of all the dimensions of human action and thought, through which perfection can be achieved in the world, internally and externally.

Many take Kant's ethics regarded as that of a rigorous formalist, to be exhausted by the explication and justification of the categorical imperative. This evaluation of Kant, however, is complicated by the content of the *Doctrine of Virtue* in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. This text especially, but also other writings like the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* or his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* show that Kant himself extended his formal principle into concrete moral questions. His ethical views range over a wide variety of moral topics and questions, and are much more nuanced than can be explained through the single reference to the categorical imperative. In fact, Kant's elaboration of his ethics (most notably the *Doctrine of Virtue* arguably as the "final form" of his ethics) is most likely indebted to Baumgarten, and his relationship to Baumgarten in this respect is far more complicated than was previously believed. I have explored this relationship by thoroughly investigating Baumgarten's *Ethica*, which Kant used as a textbook in his lectures for more than four decades, and which, has been thus far largely ignored by the research in the history of philosophy (even in Kant scholarship, except a few sets of fragmentary or partial research). As a result of my exploration of this book, however, I hope to have been able to show that, to begin with, Kant's ethics can indeed be said to present the exact opposite view to that of Baumgarten's in terms of theoretical foundations. This comforts the widespread perception of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy as premised on a wholesale rejection of rationalist metaphysics, as most famously summarised in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There Kant argued that if the rationalist version of metaphysical knowledge was uncritically extended to morality, it would lead to a "conflict with morality". Despite this radical departure from his immediate predecessors however, and more specifically Baumgarten, as I have tried to show, the extent of the detail of ethical topics and questions which Kant tackled is significant. Almost no single topic or question, which Baumgarten initiated in *Ethica*, escapes Kant's scrutiny. Kant appears to very consciously tackle each of the topics and questions raised by Baumgarten. For instance, Kant's rejection of the definition of love as the delight in the perfection of other human

beings, when discussing "philanthropy", is one of the eloquent examples of what I argue is his direct response to his predecessor. Indeed, there are cases where Kant' objection to Baumgarten is ambiguous. For example, Kant wavers between two versions of the concept of love, defining it as a feeling (that cannot be a duty) at one time, denying it to be a feeling at another (to consider it as a duty). Kant tried to resolve this contradiction, as if to answer Baumgarten, arguing that love is a duty if it is understood as a maxim of benevolence (and not as a feeling). This position of Kant's, regarding love as a duty, implicitly corresponds to what Baumgarten calls "universal" love. Baumgarten distinguished this universal love from "particular" love. Yet the latter also contains a peculiar sense of universality in that it is specific to finite, human beings. This conception of particular love is totally missing in Kant's ethics, and yet his discussion of love as duty does recall Baumgarten's own concept of "universal love".

Even if the influence of Baumgarten's *Ethica* on the development of Kant's ethics is only a negative one, I have tried to show how extensive it had been nonetheless. It is surprising from this historical point of view that pre-Kantian ethics (and metaphysics) has been so extensively disregarded. Kant himself did not view his place in the history of ethical theory in this way. In developing his own model, he purposely sought to make earlier theories obsolete. It is often said that it is particularly the Aristotelian perfectionist ethics against which Kant established his own deontological model.[331] However, it might well be Baumgarten's own perfectionist brand of ethics to which Kant is so vigorously opposed, as might be testified in the fact that Kant obsessively examines almost every single component of the concepts, topics, and questions Baumgarten initially presented in his *Ethica*. Contrary to the Aristotelian version of perfectionism, Baumgarten's version is an ethics which integrates even external matters as intrinsic to a person, that is, as a prerequisite to a person's perfection, and not as accessories, as Aristotle would say. These are matters that Kant thought important to discuss himself. It might well be more accurate to identify the seemingly Aristotelian remnants in Kant's ethics as Baumgartenian instead.

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[331] Jeanine Grenberg, "What is the Enemy of Virtue", in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 152-69, esp. 153, 168-69.

In fact, as I have argued, each of the aspects discussed in Baumgarten's ethics is worthy of further, concentrated scrutiny, for those who are concerned with reflecting on fundamental ethical questions in general. We might well ask, for instance, whether the maximisation of happiness for all should be sacrificed in favour of the prosperity of the society. But the demand for this scrutiny is more pressing for Kantian ethicists who are interested in consistency (or possible inconsistency) of Kant's arguably "mature" ethics, as presented in the *Doctrine of Virtue* especially, with his critical project. This is because it is revealed that in Kant's mature ethics, as I have shown, he returned to Baumgarten's framework of question-setting, which is accomplished near the end of his philosophical career. In addition to this, now that the thoroughness of Kant's examination of Baumgarten's ethics has been made so explicit, Kant scholars might well continue to explore whether Kant's critical project is not more indebted to Baumgarten's philosophical project than was previously believed.

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Appendix

Table 1. The Structure of *Ethica Philosophica*

Prolegomena						
Tractatio	General	Religion	Internal	In General		
				In Particular	Glory of God	His Amplitude and Majesty
						His Truth
						His Clarity
						His Certainty
						His Liveliness
					Internal Cult of God	Delight in God
						Acquiescence to His Decrees
						Trust in God
						Grateful Mind
						Self-Surrendering Love on Guard against the Opposite Matters
						Adoration
						Fear
						Obedience
						Imitation
						Inner Prayer

(*continued*)

Table 1. (*continued*)

						Pious Habits		
			External Cult of God	General				
				Special	Confession of God Pursuit of Promoting Religion Pious Example Pious Ceremonies			
		Duties towards Oneself	General					
			Special	Duties towards the Soul	Duties towards the Cognitive Faculty	Duties towards the Inferior Cognitive Faculty Duties towards the Superior Cognitive Faculty		
					Duties towards the Appetitive Faculty	Duties towards Pleasure and Displeasure		
						Duties towards the Appetitive Faculty	In General	
							In Particular	Duties towards the Inferior Appetitive Faculty Duties towards the Superior Appetitive Faculty
				Duties towards the Body	Regarding Life Regarding Health			

					Regarding Food and Clothing Regarding Occupation and Leisure Regarding Chastity			
				Duties towards the External State	Regarding Necessities and Convenience of Life Regarding Work Regarding Money Regarding External Delights Regarding Reputation			
		Duties towards Others	General					
			Special	Duties towards Other Humans	Universal Love			
					Love of Particular Kinds	Pursuit of Peace Vices Opposed to Philanthropy Candour Judgment of Others		
						The Help that is Due to Others	General	
							Special	Working to Propagate Religion Working to Propagate Science and Virtue Help in Passing Life Pleasantly

(*continued*)

Table 1. (*continued*)

								Regarding Social Practice and Social Intercourse Regarding Honour to Others
				Duties towards Nonhuman Others				
	Special	Duties Regarding the Soul	Duties of the Learned and Unlearned Duties of the Virtuous and the Vicious					
		Duties Regarding the Body	Duties of those of Different Ages Duties of the Healthy and the Sick					
		Duties Regarding One's External Standing	Duties Regarding the Comfortable and the Uncomfortable Duties Regarding Honour, Neglect, and Contempt Duties Regarding Friends and Those Abandoned by Friends					

Table 2. Details of "Duties towards Others"

Duties towards Others	General	Definition of Duties towards Others Universal Love			
	Special	Duties towards Other Human Beings	General Friendship	Generosity Partiality Humanity Candour Politeness Civility Demeanour Cold Mind to Others Internal Friend Internal Mutual Friendship Condition of General Friendship Misanthropy	
			Special Friendship	Pursuit of Peace	External Enmity External Friends External Peace Pacific Mediator

(*continued*)

Table 2. (*continued*)

					Insult to a Human Being Internal Insults What Is Owed to Them according to the Law of Nature What Is Owed to Each Ethically Justice Universal Justice Particular Justice External Justice Internal Justice External Equity Internal Equity External Inequality Internal Inequality Internal Innocence External Innocence in the Strict Sense External Innocence in the Wider Sense Disadvantage Internal Disadvantage External Disadvantage

					Sensible Man Excuse Total Excuse Forgiveness Revenge Lust for Revenge Slanderer A Double-Tongued Person Gentleness Insensibility Calm Mind More Calm Remedies More Calm Remedies to Precede One's Enemy More Calm Remedies to Protect Oneself Calmly Undergoing Injustice Forgiving Readiness to Forgiveness
				Vices Opposed to Philanthropy	Envy Jealous Rivalry Wishing Others Good Ingratitude

(*continued*)

Table 2. (*continued*)

					Externally Insulting Gratitude
					Internally Insulting Gratitude
					Active Gratitude
					Mercilessness
					Malice
					Malicious Speech
					Cruelty
					Bloodthirstiness
					Inhumanity
					Artificiality
					Pretentious Signs
					Natural Signs
					Pretentious Habit
					Natural Habit
					Rusticity
				Candour	A Frank Person
					A Too Frank Person
					A Reserved Person
					Candid

					Secret Concealing Secrecy Deceiving Others A Deceptive Person Untruth A Logical Speech An Ethical Speech An Ethically Wrong Speech Lies Internal Lies External Lies A Liar Lies of Necessity Officious Lies Humorous Lies Simulator Dissimulator Valid Agreement An Externally Valid Agreement An Internally Valid Agreement

(*continued*)

Table 2. (*continued*)

					Faith External Faith Internal Faith	
				Judgement of Others	An Art of Anthropological Knowledge A Loveless Judgement of Others A Hateful Judgment of Others A Loving Judgement of Others A Sarcastic Person Positively and Negatively Influential to Someone A Flatterer Judging Others in a Bad Way Suspicious	
				The Help that is Due to Others	General	Interfering in Others' Business Caustic Spirit Duties of Humanity Duties of Ordinary Humanity Willingness to Provide Service A Person Who is Too Much Willing to Provide Service

					Special	Working to Propagate Religion	Religious Tolerance Religious Hatred Freedom of Religion Syncretism Crasser Persecution More Subtle Persecution
						Working to Propagate Science and Virtue	
						Help in Passing Life Pleasantly	Alms Liberality
						Duties regarding Social Practice and Social Intercourse	Sociable Virtue of Sociability Affability Pleasant Character in the External Behaviour Respectability

(*continued*)

Table 2. (*continued*)

							Being Friendly to Others in the Most Strict Sense An Ingratiating Person Making Oneself Necessary to Others Friendly Practices Flattering Practices Rough Practices Cynical Practices A Genuine Person Ridiculous Matter Carelessness Working [to Understand Others'] Singularity

							Spirit of Contradiction Imitator in the Bad Sense Assentator
						Duties in Honour of Others	Arrogance Pride An Universal Criticiser Sociability One Who Knows How to Live
		Duties towards Nonhuman Others	Theurgical Virtues Cathartic Virtues Divine Virtues Magic White Magic Black Magic Spectator of the World Spirit of Devastation				