Post-Cronulla:

Narratives of inclusion and exclusion in the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television 2005-2015

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Abstract

In December 2005, thousands of 'white' Australians gathered at Cronulla Beach in Sydney, to 'cleanse' the beach of 'ethnics'. Australian media suggested these riots were a reflection of developing racial tensions in Australia over decades, that they represented a failure in multiculturalism, and that they reinforced divisions between 'us' and 'them'. More importantly, the Cronulla Riots (re)presented Australia as a contested space of belonging, where non-white, Middle Eastern and/ or Muslim Australians are constructed primarily through exclusion and 'otherness'. Assessing the ongoing effects of such exclusionary practices, this thesis addresses the representations of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the Cronulla Riots. The role of 'otherness' is explored in the media's attempt to represent a multicultural nation through the production of narratives of *inclusiveness* and *belonging* (rather than exclusion and marginalisation) for Muslims in Australia.

This thesis engages with discursive and televisual, textual formations that shape belonging and 'otherness', which impact the representation of Muslims on Australian television through binaristic relations of inclusion/exclusion and us/them. Discourse analysis is deployed to place critical understandings of 'otherness' in a relationship with representations of Muslim belonging. Conceptually, Edward Said's (1978) *Orientalism* and Ghassan Hage's (1998) 'White Nation Fantasy' are used to explore the significance of Muslim representations, and question their relationship to hegemonic determinations of 'whiteness' and 'otherness' in Australia. This thesis argues that, while narratives of inclusiveness and belonging *do* represent Muslims within the national realm, they also exploit 'otherness' in ways where belonging is always *conditional* and *limited*, reproducing contested ideas (of belonging) that the Cronulla Riots exemplified.

Author Declaration

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled "Post-Cronulla: Narratives of inclusion and exclusion in the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television 2005-2015" has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of the requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written by me. Any assistance that I have received in my research work and preparation of the thesis itself has been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all information, sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Branka Prodanovic
March 2017

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Introduction

> Race riots aren't a common feature of Australian life. That is one reason why we still look back at what happened on the streets of Cronulla in 2005 with dismay and disbelief…Ten years on, there remain troubling echoes of Cronulla. Now, as then, our harmony as a society is being tested. In our public debate, there are voices intent on promoting fear, hatred and division.
>
> (Soutphommasane 2015)

Considering contemporary socio-political debates regarding terrorism, immigration, and the multicultural state of Australia, new challenges have arisen that shift constructed formations of national sovereignty and belonging (in the nation). These shifts have nurtured the development of in-groups and out-groups within the nation, intensifying concepts of inclusion and exclusion. Increased focus on 'terrorism' over the last two decades has heightened 'insecurity' within Australia, where Muslims have consistently been markers of divisions within the nation (Kabir 2005; 2006, Aly 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Dunn 2014, Chopra 2015). This is reflected in mediated constructions that position Muslims as unable to 'fit in' in the nation because they exist as a continual 'threat' to Australian culture and identity (Dunn 2014). Notions of 'threat' have intensified and been preserved within media and political discourses through the dissemination of messages that promote fear and panic within the Australian community. The purpose of these messages has been to instigate fear of Muslims in the nation. This serves as the catalyst for events such as the 'race riots' that occurred at Cronulla beach (in Sydney) in December 2005, where thousands of 'white' Anglo-Australians engaged in violent protests to 'cleanse the beach' of those people presumed to be 'Middle Eastern' and/or 'Muslim' (Poynting 2006, Evers 2009, Noble 2009).

The 'cleansing' at Cronulla escalated into violence between white Australians and Muslims, and reflected contested parameters of who can and cannot belong in the imaginary space of the Australian nation (Garbutt 2009, Antonsich 2010). These contested notions were embodied in chants and slogans (created by the 'white' Australians) such as 'we grew here, you flew here', 'fuck off Lebs', and 'Aussie Pride', during the riots which emphasised claims to belonging at Cronulla. However, these claims stem from the fear and panic that circulated throughout

socio-political discourse about Muslims as 'threats' within the Australian community. The Cronulla Riots are therefore a product of their context, reflecting heightened fear of the Muslim 'other', recognised as an enemy of the West in the 'age of terror' (Aly 2007; 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015).

The Cronulla Riots represented an intensified fear of the Muslim 'other' in Australia, but also evidenced dysfunctional multicultural contexts at work in the nation itself. The 'white' Australians that gathered at Cronulla targeted a specific ethnic, religious, and racial group as a means of metaphorically exterminating them (Poynting 2006). These racial discourses at the heart of the Cronulla Riots normalise 'white' domination in Australia and undermine multicultural notions of ethnic diversity, national unity and harmony (Stratton & Ang 1994, Ang 2003). Then Prime Minister, John Howard (2005, p.13), stressed: 'I do not accept there is an underlying racism in this country', even though the events that took place at Cronulla were clearly racially motivated. For this reason, the Australian government collaborated with the media in leading national campaigns that focused on reconciliation between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians in the aftermath of the Cronulla Riots, in an attempt to preserve libertarian perceptions of multiculturalism (Johanson & Glow 2007).

December 2015 marked the tenth anniversary of the Cronulla Riots. In the post-Cronulla socio-political climate, tensions that shaped the riots remain, foregrounding issues of racism, sovereignty and belonging within the multicultural nation. The Cronulla Riots suggest that claims of belonging in Australia are harnessed by racial ideologies that enforce sovereignty through states of inclusion and exclusion, or the construction of in-groups and out-groups (Hage 1998; 2003, Antonsich 2010). Australia is consistently attempting to re-define its multicultural status in contexts where racial diversity is feared, and Muslims remain objects of that fear, ultimately shaping associated constructions of exclusion.

This thesis explores the extent to which representational narratives of inclusion and exclusion developed in the Australian media following the 2005 Cronulla Riots. It examines the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade between 2005-2015, and provides a discursive analysis of

contested notions of belonging in reference to the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural society. While this thesis acknowledges the complexity of using 'Muslims' and 'Islam' as catch-all categories to describe diverse communities, it highlights that the diversity of Muslim populations in Australia and even broadcasters' careful selection of who is considered worthy Muslims, who gets to speak, who is granted a platform, and on what basis, is not a given or natural process, but socially determined.

Television is the most accessible form of media in Australia, as much of its content reproduces public knowledge about Muslims and Islam (Hall 1982, Flew & Gilmour 2006, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010). Television as a medium is inextricably linked to power relations in society and thus produces narratives of inclusion and exclusion that determine the status of Muslims in Australia (Hall 1982). This thesis investigates the development of inclusion and exclusion on television, by deploying 'otherness' as an umbrella term that shapes the way media representations perform and visualise power relations in multicultural societies. Specifically, this thesis assesses how Muslims representations are rendered televisually through inclusive or exclusive national discourses of multiculturalism and belonging.

This thesis draws on discourses that centre 'whiteness' as the preliminary or norm in Australian society. The analysis concerns the homogenising perceptions that polarise Australia as a contested space between 'us' ('white' Australians) and 'them' (Muslims), especially in media representations that construct Muslims through inclusive and exclusive measures (Kabir 2008). Muslim representations in this thesis are analysed primarily through the theoretical frameworks of Said's (1978) *Orientalism* and Hage's (1998) *White Nation,* exploring how each navigates discourses that position Muslims as 'other' and as the objects of Western or 'white' fear/desire in multicultural contexts. More importantly, this thesis analyses Muslim representations in terms of how 'they' function as 'other' in a normalised 'white' (but multicultural) Australian society.

This thesis problematises the liberal perceptions of Australia's multiculturalism by indicating the limits placed on Muslim belonging. Five specific themes of 'speaking out', 'domestication', 'in-betweenness', 'cosmo-multiculturalism', and

‘nation’ are considered throughout the analysis. These themes illustrate the ways that narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are framed on Australian television, and how these narratives feed ideologies that normalise the construction of ‘whiteness’ in Australia. It is hypothesised that these themes illustrate shifts in the way Muslims are represented on Australian television, particularly given the focus on reconciliation in the post-Cronulla years, where narratives of inclusiveness and belonging develop and moderate ideas of Muslim ‘otherness’. This thesis argues that while these narratives account for modes of inclusion, they do not hide perceptions of Muslims as ‘other’, meaning that inclusion and belonging are repeatedly made conditional or limited (Hage 1998; 2003, Yasmeen 2007; 2010, Humphrey 2010; 2014, D’Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). In developing these arguments, this thesis addresses three research questions:

1. How have Muslims been represented on Australian free-to-air television in the period between 2005 and 2015?

2. How have these representations been framed through narratives of inclusiveness and discourses of belonging?

3. Are these narratives of inclusiveness and belonging problematised by racial discourses that consequently limit or make conditional the ‘place’ of Muslims in Australia’s multicultural society?

This thesis examines narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on Australian free-to-air television, by analysing the representations of Muslims as ‘other’ in the nation. By investigating television productions, this thesis analyses discursive formations that attempt to humanise the Muslim ‘other’ by ‘bringing to light alternative Australian narratives’ (Krayem 2014, p.6). However, this occurs only at the point where narratives that highlight inclusion and belonging do not impede on ideological constructions of Australia as a ‘white’ (but multicultural) nation (Hage 1996; 1998).

Theoretical Framework

To analyse the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the Cronulla Riots, this thesis draws on theoretical understandings of ‘otherness’. These theories deal with racial discourses

regarding polarised structures that repeatedly position 'us' in contrast to 'them', noting that Muslims exist as an 'other' in Western, 'white', and multicultural contexts. These theories of 'otherness' explore the ideological compositions of 'whiteness' in Western societies such as Australia, shaped by a fear of the 'non-white' 'other'. These constructions shape extant power relations that enable the Muslim to not only be represented, but also subjugated and dominated as an 'other' in nations that are imagined as 'white' (Hall 1993). The theoretical framework in this thesis is presented through scholarship that recognises the socio-political discourses prevalent in Australia which fashion notions of Muslim 'otherness', multiculturalism, inclusion/exclusion, and belonging (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Mansouri & Lobo 2012, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015)[1].

'Orientalism'

Said's theory of Orientalism argues that Muslims have historically been an object of a Western or 'white' gaze, represented as mysterious, backwards, and different from their Western counterparts (Said 1978: 1981, Zine 2002). Chapter One of this thesis argues that these representations reflect power relations between the East and West that are historically fostered by political and military interest (Said 1978, Huntington 1993). Orientalism establishes a premise from which studies of the 'other' can take place, critically highlighting economic, social, cultural and political doctrines that frame socio-political understandings of East and West. As Said (1978, p.7) argues, Orientalism depends on 'flexible positional superiority', which puts the Westerner in a series of possible relationships with the Orient ('other') without ever losing the 'upper hand'.

For Said language and symbolism used historically throughout literature and art are crucial in productions of narratives concerning the contemporary 'Orient'. These illustrate how Westerners have romanticised and mystified that 'Orient' by representing it as irrational, depraved, and different (Said 1978, p.40). Orientalism is thus crucial in the analysis of contemporary media texts because it brings

[1] See also Stratton & Ang 1994, Humphrey 2001; 2014, Manning 2003; 2006, Aly & Walker 2007, Noble 2007; 2009, Yasmeen 2007; 2010, Chalmers & Dreher 2009, Aly 2010, Pardy & Lee 2011.

together the origins of representation and the socio-political ideologies that frame them. Orientalism assists in understanding the constructed oppositional nature between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially in societies such as Australia where this oppositional relationship is built on a foundational 'us' versus 'them' (Manning 2006, Woodlock 2011).

'White Nation Fantasy'

In his book, *White Nation*, Ghassan Hage (1998) argues that race relations in Australia are constructed by a 'white nation fantasy', where issues of race, ethnicity, and migration shape the aspirations of 'white' Australians (see also Pugliese 2002; 2007, Elder et al. 2004, Moreton-Robinson 2004, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008). Put simply, 'it is a fantasy of a nation governed by White people, a fantasy of White supremacy' (Hage 1998, p.18). 'Whiteness' is the epitome or core of Australian society, neglecting narratives of occupation and colonisation, perceiving 'white nationalists' to have authority with respect to who may and may not enter (or belong in/to) the national space (Hage 1998, p. 17-18). Consequently, those classified as 'non-white' or 'not 'white' enough' can be excluded from this imagined Australian nation.

Hage suggests that 'whiteness' is classified as a form of capital that may be accumulated, recognised, even legitimised, and reinforces positions of power within the nation. This deployment of 'whiteness' shapes discursive practices of national belonging through particular inclusive/exclusive binaries. As Hage (1998, p.47) explains:

> A nationalist practice of exclusion is a practice emanating from agents imagining themselves to occupy a privileged position within national space such as they perceive themselves to be the enactors of the national will within the nation…the nationalists perceived themselves as spatial managers and that which is standing between them and their imaginary nation is constructed as an undesirable national object to be removed from national space.

'Whiteness' becomes an authority to delegate which citizens may enter the field of national belonging and which cannot (D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). 'Whiteness' does not strictly refer to skin-colour but a larger range of socio-political and cultural criteria that are considered as 'being Australian' (Hage 1998, p.57-58). Hage proposes that the delegation of 'whiteness' presents a struggle to

determine what is 'really Australian' or what is 'more Australian'. Hage's theories are thus critical in examining the circumstances (or contexts) under which Muslims (as 'other') can accumulate a sense of belonging in reference to 'whiteness'. This ultimately determines how Muslims are represented through narratives of inclusiveness and belonging.

Discourse Analysis

The theoretical frameworks outlined above guide the discourse analysis in this thesis and the critical assessment of relationships between media representations, contexts, and ideologies. The analysis acknowledges that media representations cannot exist outside of context; that media messages are produced and interpreted from a particular place and time, and from a history and culture that is specific. Hall (1990, p.222) argues that what we see and read in media texts is always 'in context' or 'positioned'. The analysis in this thesis is framed through contexts that have racialised fear and anxiety concerning debates about 'invasion', 'terrorism', 'immigration', and 'multiculturalism' (Ang 2003, Aly & Walker 2007, Chalmers & Dreher 2009). Aly and Walker (2007) emphasise that Australia has historically been a racially anxious nation, given its intricate focus on border security and protection. This illustrates that racial divisions have repeatedly been framed through states of inclusion/exclusion (see also Perera 2009, Lems et al. 2016). The discourses of multiculturalism and belonging that guide this thesis rely on these binaries of inclusion/exclusion that shape Muslim representations of 'otherness'.

Multiculturalism

Installed as a government policy in 1973, multiculturalism holds discursive focus within contemporary socio-political debates. While multiculturalism has been associated with the celebration of ethnic diversity in Australia, it is also recognised as a racial discourse which both authenticates and supresses constructed formations of ethnicity and race (Mansouri & Wood 2008, Johanson & Glow 2007, Tufail & Poynting 2013). Pardy and Lee (2011) argue that multiculturalism possesses a 'prescriptive dimension' that has controversially generated ethnic and racial separatism in Australia whilst at the same time encouraging 'cultural maintenance'. Multiculturalism is primarily responsible for 'a fragmented national identity and division between ethnic groups' (Pardy & Lee

2011, p.298). It is therefore a problematic concept that highlights divisive and discursive race relations in Australia.

The discourse of multiculturalism guides the analysis in this thesis with reference to Muslim 'otherness' and inclusion/exclusion. The focus on 'ethnic diversity' romanticises Muslim 'otherness' in ways that fabricate narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. These multicultural promotions of 'ethnic diversity' are also contradictory because they glamorise 'otherness' by positioning it as authentically 'different' to the dominant 'white' culture (Hage 1997, Johanson & Glow 2007). This services the development of polarised racial structures within the nation, as 'otherness' is frequently contrasted to, and made incompatible with, Australian cultural values (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). For this reason, multiculturalism is understood as a 'public fantasy' that does not necessarily account for the diverse character of Australia (Stratton & Ang 1994). This thesis recognises that multiculturalism fosters expressions of difference and shapes contested notions of belonging enlivened by the Cronulla Riots in 2005 (Johanson & Glow 2007).

Belonging

This thesis expands notions of belonging that emphasise 'imaginary memberships' and a 'sense of connection to others' in any given context (Probyn 1996, Garbutt 2009). It follows Antonsich's (2010, pp.646-647) understanding of belonging as multidimensional and encompassing diverse aspects of nationhood, citizenship, gender, ethnicity, status, and emotion. This thesis explores how Muslims are represented as belonging through various categories, professions, networks, and discourses. However, this thesis also acknowledges that belonging is a factor that doesn't exist outside parameters of power relations (Yuval-Davis et al. 2006, Garbutt 2009). As Garbutt (2009, p.88) argues, 'a sense of belonging develops and is continually sought through finding and making one's place and through one's own positioning according to social structures and practices'. Belonging is not an essential feature that people innately possess, but something that is socially constructed (Antonsich 2010). This discursive understanding of belonging is especially significant to the context of the Cronulla Riots, as racial tensions were wrought through competing claims as to who belongs and who

doesn't. Such modes of belonging have reflected notions of inclusiveness to, and within, the Australian nation more generally (Lems et al. 2016).

Methodology

This thesis applies three methodological approaches in the analysis of literature, theory, discourse, and media texts. The first two approaches, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, are utilised in discussions regarding the relationship between media representations, socio-political contexts, and ideologies. Both discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis provide a way of exploring how ideologies are constructed, reproduced, and reinforced through discourse that challenges political, social, and cultural principals which underlie each text (Hall 1980; 1997, van Dijk 1998). Genealogical analysis is the third approach utilised in the thesis, in tracking the conditional production of discourse that frames more commonly circulated Orientalist representations of Muslims.

The 'gap' in current research

This thesis follows extensive literature that investigates the representations of Muslims and Islam through discourses of 'otherness'. It shows how perceptions of Muslims rarely exist outside dominant representations, influenced by socio-political momentum in Australia that produces cyclic patterns of media-feeding-politics-feeding-media (Chopra 2015, Roose 2016). Hall (1997b, p.247) argues that meaning and representation are transfixed through culture and therefore, 'we understand the world by referring individual objects, people or events in our heads to the general classificatory schemes into which – according to our culture – they fit'. This means that Muslims rarely exist outside the dominant context of 'otherness' despite representations that stress inclusion and belonging. This thesis argues that representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging have developed in the decade following the Cronulla Riots, but advance through discourses of 'otherness' that reinforce racial and discursive formations of Australia as a naturalised 'white nation'.

This thesis addresses a 'gap' in current research by examining how Muslim representations have shifted since the Cronulla Riots, in reference to the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on Australian free-to-air

television. It does this by mapping the misconceptions already prevalent in socio-political and media discourses about Muslims and Islam, and arguing that these misconceptions have become the frameworks through which narratives of inclusiveness and belonging develop. More importantly, this thesis hypothesises that Muslim belonging is dependent on the ways that the nation perceives itself as multicultural, and thus inclusive or accepting of 'otherness'. Consequently, as Hall (1997b) argues, while positive representations may account for progressive racial relations in any given society, they do not necessarily eliminate older misconceptions, which have become ingrained in public discourse. For this reason, Muslim representations are limited and made conditional by particular discourses that stress (either) inclusion or exclusion in the production of narratives of belonging.

Issues with terminology

Primary terms applied throughout this thesis reflect the ways racial discourses concerning 'otherness', such as Orientalism, 'whiteness', multiculturalism, and belonging are harnessed by racial terms (Wetherell and Potter 1992). This section addresses the complexity of six specific racial terms used throughout this thesis.

'Muslim' and 'Muslim-Australian'

'Muslim' and 'Muslim-Australian' are the two identity-based terms most frequently used throughout this thesis. The term 'Muslim' has been applied across media, political, and scholarly discourse as an 'all encompassing' category which homogenises both the Islamic religion and Muslim communities in Australia (Zaal et al. 2007). However, Muslims are a diverse group of people and are not restricted to ethnic, cultural, or regional differences, but include generational and sexual differences too. This thesis acknowledges that Muslims are a diverse and complex community of people in Australia and the deployment of 'Muslims' as a catch-all category is thus problematic. 'Muslim' has become a complex and conflated term, that is used to omit diversity throughout socio-political and media discourse. The term denotes a racial category that does not necessarily reflect the *actual* identities and realities of Muslims (or Islam) in Australia, instead relying on stereotypes of what Muslims are 'presumed to be' (Due 2010).

The term 'Muslim-Australian' is a descriptive term used in particular socio-political contexts to refer to those Muslims believed to have integrated into mainstream Australian culture (D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). 'Muslim-Australian' reflects a hybrid identity, where the hyphen stresses the fusion of an exclusive relationship between two separate identities, Muslim and Australian (Woodlock 2011). Similarly to the term 'Muslim', 'Muslim-Australian' references an all-encompassing category that does not necessarily reflect the scope of how Muslims identify themselves in Australia. In media discourse, the term has been ascribed to people who originate from Middle Eastern regions and follow the Islamic faith (Zaal et al. 2007, p.165). The issue, as Hopkins (2011, p.111) argues, is that such an umbrella term 'lumps all Australian followers of Islam into a single subset of all Australians and ignores the complex diversity of Muslims in Australia'. The term constructs identities that determine the ways (ethnic) individuals fit into the broader scope of 'being Australian' (Elder 2007).

Both constructions of the terms 'Muslim' or 'Muslim-Australian' are used in the media to develop certain ideas and perceptions about Muslims and Islam. For example, where the term 'Muslim' is used, it is as shorthand for problematic integration and alien values that are somehow 'un-Australian' and a 'threat' to the 'Australian way of life' (Hopkins 2011, p.123, Morgan & Poynting 2012). Hopkins (2011, p.123) argues that Muslim identity is frequently conflated (by the media) with terrorism, violence, extremism, political instability, denigration of women, and general backwardness. The term 'Muslim-Australian' differs however, because it is used in broadly popular televisual media to represent 'moderate Muslims' or Muslims who have assimilated into the mainstream culture, and those who do not pose much of a 'threat' to Australia (Aly & Green 2008, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015).

'White'

Loo (1998, p.221) argues that the terms 'white' or 'Anglo' are used in socio-political discourse to refer to an imagined Australian mainstream from an English-speaking background, mostly blue-eyed, and fair-skinned. The term 'white' is used in this thesis over the term 'Anglo' when referring to this constructed Australian mainstream. As Hage (1998, p.19) argues, '"Anglo" or "Anglo-Celtic"

are far from being a dominant mode of self-categorisation by White people' and that '"White" is a far more dominant mode of self-perception, although largely an unconscious one'. According to Dyer (1997), 'white' or 'whiteness' is framed through racial discourses that derive from Euro-centric Imperialism. The term 'white' can account for non-Britishness or non-Anglo people who relate or define themselves through Hage's (1998) 'white nation fantasy'. It is therefore deployed as an extensive but exclusive identity, as well as an aspiration, linked directly to national belonging and inclusiveness.

'Ethnicity'

The term 'ethnicity' is used in this thesis to refer to those who have been branded as 'different' (from the 'white' mainstream) and are consequently marginalised/outcast/excluded because of that presumed difference. Ethnic difference strictly refers to foreign, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious dissimilarities that separate 'white' Australians from 'non-whites' or what Hage (1998) terms 'third-world-looking-migrants'. 'Ethnicity' is thus a generalised term that homogenises and pigeonholes racial differences in Australia. Throughout media, political, and scholarly discourses, 'ethnicity' or 'ethnic' have been conflated with terms such as 'Muslim', to refer to the presumed 'otherness' of Muslims in Australia more broadly (Poynting et al. 2000). The term 'ethnicity' is used throughout this thesis to underscore 'otherness' and foreground the ostensible mediated and acculturated polarisation between Muslims and 'white' Australians.

'Muslim women' and 'veiling'

As with the category of 'Muslim', 'Muslim women' is a racial term laden with negative stereotypes that are not so much about 'women', but about Islamic practices rendered as foreign to the West. Pham (2011) argues that Muslim women have become convenient signifiers and metaphors for a number of issues. In particular, gender inequality in (presumably) patriarchal Islam, female oppression through Islamic dress practices, and national security risks in an 'age of terrorism' (see also Aly 2007, Aly & Walker 2007, Lentin 2008, Ho 2010). For this reason, the term 'Muslim women' does not necessarily refer to women who follow the Islamic faith, but acts as a descriptor that reinforces Orientalist

knowledge, thinking, and perceptions of Muslims as 'other'. It mostly foregrounds complex Orientalist positioning of Muslim women as 'oppressed' in Islam and in need of Western aid (Abu-Lughodd 2002, Zine 2002, Hussein 2007, Ho 2010).

Similarly, the term 'veiling' is laden with negative stereotypes and is used to simplify the diverse dress codes that exist within Islam. The term 'veil' homogenises Islamic dress practices, 'as if there is only one kind of "veil" that Muslim women have ever worn' (Bullock 2002, p.x). As Amer (2014, p.12) explains:

> The use of the singular word (veil) instead of plural (veils) fosters the false sense of a uniform dress code, of one unique way of thinking about and donning the veil. The truth…is that Muslim veiling practices range widely, as do other types of dress and fashion customs. The English word "veil" is therefore, best thought of as an umbrella term that refers to all kinds of Muslim women's veiling practices.

The term 'veiling' is acknowledged in this thesis as one that incorporates the diverse practices of female dress within Islam. At the same time, it is used to draw on Orientalist (mis)conceptions of veiled Muslim women that homogenise and subjugate them as 'other' in the West.

Thesis overview

This introductory chapter has mapped out the aim and scope of this thesis, by briefly summarising the theoretical, conceptual and discursive frameworks that shape this thesis. 'Otherness' is explored throughout this thesis by analysing the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the Cronulla Riots. This chapter has also acknowledged the pivotal discourses under consideration including ideological constructions of Australian multiculturalism and contested notions of belonging. This thesis is concerned with the ways that representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are discursively constructed, in contexts where Muslims are commonly perceived as 'other' and excluded from an imagined 'white nation' (Humphrey 2007, Yasmeen 2007, Ho 2010, Chopra 2015).

The next chapter, Chapter One, filters these theoretical frameworks by canvassing and reviewing relevant literature. The chapter discusses Said's (1978) *Orientalism*

and Hage's (1998) *White Nation*, in their productive capacities as foundations for the exploration of mediated Muslim 'otherness' in Australia's multicultural society. These notions of 'Orientalism' and the 'white nation' are necessarily placed in a relationship with the discourses of multiculturalism and belonging that shape narratives promoting inclusiveness and belonging on Australian television. From this basis, Chapter One further engages with critical scholarship regarding the ways Muslims have been represented as 'other' in the Australian media prior to the Cronulla Riots (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, Kabir 2006; 2007, Noble 2008, Aly 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013; 2016).

Chapter Two explores discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and genealogical analysis as the methodological approaches that underpin analytic chapters in this thesis. Chapter Two is concerned with the ways that these methodological approaches expose relationships between media representations, contexts, and ideology (Hall 1980; 1997b, Burr 1995, Fairclough 1995, Whetherell & Potter 1992, Saukko 2003, Wodak & Meyer 2009). The latter half of the chapter explores the content and textual analyses that are undertaken in this thesis, as a means of examining media texts with their corresponding representations regarding Muslim 'otherness'.

Chapter Three is concerned with evaluating the ways in which Muslims have been represented in the Australian media prior to the Cronulla Riots. It exhibits how these representations shape the constructed 'state' of Muslim exclusion in Australia. The chapter presents a genealogical review of mediated events that have fashioned Orientalist representations and (mis)conceptions of Muslims in Australia prior to 2005. Chapter Three explores the role of the media in constructing and preserving binaries of us/them and inclusion/exclusion, which enforce marked differences and oppositions between Muslims and 'white' Australians, in a context where Muslims are rendered 'other' and 'un-Australian' (Poynting et al. 2000 Kabir 2006; 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013).

Chapters Four to Eight analyse media texts by exploring five themes that frame discursive productions of Muslim inclusiveness and belonging on Australian free-

to-air television. The analysis in Chapter Four examines the representation of Muslims on the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) in relation to the theme of 'speaking out', where Muslims are encouraged to contribute to national conversations despite their marginal status as 'other' (Dreher 2003; 2009). Doing so produces narratives of inclusiveness and belonging because Muslims counter Orientalist perceptions through actively contributing to national debates concerning 'otherness' (Dreher 2009, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). The chapter examines two programs on SBS, *Insight* and *Salam Café*, and discusses the value of SBS as a multicultural broadcaster that encourages Muslims to voice their opinions by 'speaking out' and countering negative Orientalist perceptions.

Chapter Five examines the ways that Muslims are represented on network Seven in relation to the theme of 'domestication'. This chapter focuses on how Muslim women and the practice of veiling are represented on two separate current affairs programs, *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night*. It explores the ways sensationalised narratives of Muslim women develop through 'domestication' on network Seven; where the aim is to produce 'national Muslims' that are Australianised and unlike Orientalist stereotypes that circulate in media (Humphrey 2001; 2009; 2014, Bowen 2004, Busbridge 2013). Domestication ensures that Muslims are placed in a space of familiarity where 'otherness' becomes an object of multicultural desire, deemed less of a 'threat' in/to the nation (Ahmed 2000, Zine 2002).

Analysis in Chapter Six builds on these ideas of 'domestication', by exploring notions of hybridisation that promote belonging for Muslims in the national space. The chapter examines representations of Muslims on network Nine in relation to the theme of 'in-betweenness', where some Muslims (such as 'white' Muslim converts and secular Muslims) are able to mitigate 'otherness', to promote fusion and co-existence between Muslims and 'white' Australians (Jensen 2008, Brown 2010, Alam 2012, Moosavi 2015). The chapter analyses the effects of in-betweenness through two programs on network Nine, *A Current Affair* and *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*. It argues that the alleviation of 'otherness' presents spaces where Muslims (as 'other') can be valued within the multicultural constructions of the 'white nation' (Hage 1998, Moosavi 2015).

The valuing of 'otherness' is further examined in Chapter Seven, where the representation of Muslims on network Ten is explored through the theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism'. The chapter highlights the significance of multicultural contexts in the nation that recognise Muslim 'otherness' to be a valuable source of 'cultural enrichment' for the 'white nation' (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997; 1998). These conceptions render the Muslim 'other' as inclusive at the point where it is perceived to improve or enhance the value of the multicultural nation through pleasurable signifiers of ethnicity, such as 'foreign' food. However, to be valued, Muslims must first be made 'moderate' and thus less threatening to/within the nation. The role of two Muslim-Australians on two programs on network Ten, Waleed Aly on *The Project* and Amina El Shafei on *MasterChef Australia,* are analysed in terms of how Muslim 'otherness' presents a form of value in contexts that focus on both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997; 1998, Lentin 2005, Nguyen 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Flowers & Swan 2012, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015).

Chapter Eight is the final analytic chapter in this thesis and explores the relationship between Muslims and the Australian nation in contexts of multiculturalism. The chapter particularly analyses the representation of Muslims on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) with respect to the theme of 'nation', where Muslims accumulate a sense of belonging through affiliation with national cultural values (Hage 1996; 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Peucker et al. 2014). The two programs, *Compass* and *Australian Story,* reference the significance of cultural values in deploying narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. Chapter Eight brings together the previous analytic chapters by exploring the critical role of the nation in authorising belonging for Muslims at the point where it constructs itself as multicultural and thus inclusive of 'otherness'. These conceptions of multiculturalism also reinforce the discursive formations that exploit Muslims as 'other', to benefit the construction and progression of the 'white nation'.

The concluding chapter of this thesis summarises the key points raised in the analytic chapters and draws specific conclusions with respect to the ways Muslims have been represented on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the Cronulla Riots. Narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are reviewed in relation to how they are limited or made conditional, and develop in

contexts of multiculturalism, where normative belonging is frequently linked to conceptions of 'whiteness' (Hage 1998). The chapter considers the implications that these narratives pose for the construction of 'otherness' and states of inclusion/exclusion in Australia. In particular, concerning the contested 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural society.

Chapter One: Theoretical Framework and Review of Literature

> The West celebrates its ability to recognise other religions and cultures at the very moment that it is obliterating them, burying them under the weight of its influence and philosophy.
>
> (Hodge & O'Carroll 2006, p.48)

1.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the theoretical concepts, discourses, and literature that underpin this thesis to situate it within a larger field of scholarship that focuses on the representation of Muslims in the Australian media. Said's (1978) *Orientalism* and Hage's (1998) *White Nation* are considered in this chapter as forming a powerful theoretical framework for the analysis of Muslim 'otherness' on Australian free-to-air television, when filtered through discourses of multiculturalism and belonging. This chapter investigates the ways that Orientalism influences discursive formations that centralise 'whiteness' in Australia's multicultural setting, and ultimately determines the included or excluded status of Muslims within the nation (Hage 1998, Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007, Humphrey 2007; 2009; 2014, Aly 2010, Chopra 2015). The latter half of this chapter engages with critical literature focussing on Muslim representations in the Australian media, to better understand the role of Orientalism in preserving particular perceptions of Muslims as 'other' in the nation (Kabir 2006, Manning 2006, Humphrey 2007, Aslan 2009).

1.2 Section One: Orientalism

In much racial theory, 'otherness' is used to describe the singling out of particular racial, cultural, or religious groups from a wider community. According to Kearney (2003, p.3), the 'other' is a stranger or foreigner that, within the dominant societal context, is frequently distinguished from the majority, or the 'norm'. In his book *Orientalism* (1978) Edward Said explains how theories of 'otherness' can be applied to the study of Orientalism to track the objectification of marginalised groups such as Muslims. This section introduces Said's (1978) study as a theoretical framework that supports the analysis of representations of Muslim 'otherness'. Orientalism is influenced by Western (often 'white' and

Euro-centric) ideologies understood as central to the ways Muslims have historically been positioned as an inferior 'other' in power relations between East and West. More importantly, Orientalism is understood as a tool for interpretation in the way written, spoken, or visual texts construct particular ideas about the 'other' as a means to reinforce the superiority of the West.

1.2.1 Orientalism and the West

According to Said (1978, pp.1-2) Orientalism is 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"' - where the 'Orient' represents the East (primarily Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East) and the 'Occident' denotes the West. Bound by a historic context, Said's *Orientalism* maps the critical role of the 'Orient' in helping to define Europe (or the West) and underscores how the 'Orient' has been an integral part of European material civilisation and culture. Said explores how the 'Orient' derived as a European invention and has been since antiquity, believed to live in a space of romance and exoticism. The defining factor in *Orientalism* is the relationship shared between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' in socio-political structures where one dictates the existence of the other.

For Said (1978, p.120) modern Orientalism is less concerned with religious prepositions that categorised difference, specifically those between the Christian West and Islamic East. Instead, Said proposes that modern Orientalism derives from 'secularising elements' that speak to constructed ideologies and cultures in the West, mainly those informed by Europe and America. He argues that:

> It is always the West, and not Christianity, that seems pitted against Islam. Why? Because the assumption is that whereas "the West" is greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, its principal religion, the World of Islam- its varied societies, histories, and languages notwithstanding- is still mired in religion, primitivity, and backwardness. Therefore, the West is modern, greater than the sum of its parts, full of enriching contradictions and yet always "Western" in its cultural identity; the world of Islam, on the other hand, is no more than "Islam," reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics despite the appearance of contradictions and experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West (Said 1981, p.10).

Orientalism is less a study of religious difference, than it is about the ideologies that enforce socio-political structures of power. Orientalism is applied to the study of 'otherness' where the Orient denotes any 'other' that has threatened the superior power of Europe and the West. Esposito (1999) argues that Islam has historically posed a political and military threat to the West, and in particular, Europe. In the 18th and 19th centuries, a presumption existed that Islam would overtake Christianity, as the rapid rise, expansion, and flourishing of Islamic civilisation posed direct danger to Christendom (Esposito 1999, p.35). During those times, Islam was recognised as a 'threat' in and to the West, one that ultimately led to developments of specific knowledge, which aimed to situate Muslims and Islam in inferior positions of 'otherness'.

Dirlik (1996, p.99) argues that Orientalism is considered as a relationship between Eastern and Western political relations over monolithic or uncontested notions. It is the relationship between East and West that demonstrates how Muslims have become an 'other' in contemporary Western society, especially given the context of terrorism and religious extremism (Poynting et al. 2004, Dunn et al. 2007, Humphrey 2007; 2010; 2014, Noble 2008, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Aly 2010; 2014, Dunn 2014, Chopra 2015). According to Said (1978, p.1), the 'Orient' is frequently recognised as 'adjacent to Europe', and one of Europe's deepest and more reoccurring images of the 'other'. *Orientalism* proposes that Islam (as part of the 'Orient') could be contained through the domination of knowledge by a Western race that knew them and knew 'what was good for them' better than 'they could possibly know themselves' (Said 1978, p.35). It is the power to dominate the Muslim 'other' through the productions of knowledge that has constituted Western cultural, social, and political discourses:

> …Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, setting it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient (Said 1978, p3).

This authority reflects the power and agency attained by Europe and later North America through colonialist discourses. Historically, Europe has been perceived as the ultimate power structure by always assuming the role of the dominant when it came to the colonisation of other nations (Hall 1990, p.232). Said's *Orientalism*

explores the transference of this power between Europe and North America as the socio-political climates of the West continued to shift throughout history. Said's studies were published during a significant period where European Greats[2] began to crumble and Americanisation started to overtake world culture and politics (Huntington 1993, pp.25-28). For Huntington (1993, pp.25-28), this has shaped a 'clash of civilisations' thesis, based on perceptions of Islam as oppositional to not only Europe, but North America and the rest of the Western world. According to Frosch (2002, p.389), North America has remained influential in developing discourses of Muslim and Islamic 'otherness' since the Cold War, and this has been the consequence of an 'upswelling of patriotism', which has resulted in the need to remain superior to 'less fortunate' nations. Contemporary Western understandings of the Islamic East or the 'Orient', are therefore inspired by political climates that position North America as in constant conflict with Islam (Said 1978, Huntington 1993).

Given the current political climates, Orientalism remains as a concept that informs dualities between East and West. According to Samiei (2010), Orientalism is a discourse less concerned with the religious or cultural differences between Islam and the Americanised West, and more with the ideological constructions that enforce these differences. Specifically:

> In the social and political realms the main intention behind promoting dualistic thought is usually to justify the way 'we' treat 'them', even if we, as human beings, do not want to be treated in a similar way. The core of a dualistic arguments thus, is that 'they' are essentially different, totally dismissing their commonalities with us as members of the human race (Samiei 2010, p. 1146).

Dualism enables the West to represent the Muslim 'other' in any way that is believed to be 'unlike us'. However, the study of Orientalism establishes how it is only 'their' representation that is 'unlike us' and, given periods of colonialism and post-colonialism, 'their' realities mimic those of the Americanised/Westernised world. Contemporary lifestyles of many Muslims living in 'the East' (specifically, the Middle East and Asia) mirror those lifestyles of 'white' non-Muslims living in the West. Hage (2002, pp.243-244) argues that, 'at the level of everyday culture

[2] According to Huntington (1993) the European Greats consisted of those nations with high economic, military and political power. These included Russia, Germany, Italy and France.

like clothing, cars, video-games, music, etc. …. the great majority of the Arab world is sadly non-exotic and as heavily Americanised as the rest of the world, if not more'. However, the continuous representation of Muslims as 'other' through Orientalist discourses preserves the politically constructed polarisation of East and West that enable the continued construction of Muslims as barbaric 'others' within/in relation to the West.

1.2.2 Orientalism and representation

Said's study tracks the development of Western art and literature in the 18th and 19th centuries that produced images, narratives, and ideas of the 'Orient'. Said recounts how European scholars, writers, artists, and explorers visited the Oriental or 'Arab lands' and produced works of art and literature that depicted them through frameworks of 'otherness'. Said (1978, p.117) draws on specific works that presented 'innumerable speculations' about 'savages' and 'monsters' in the East. Orientals were linked to identities commonly associated with 'otherness' in that they were described as undesirable, alien, and foreign to the West. Orientals mostly appeared in Western work as 'under-humanised, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth' (Said 1978, p.150). They became understood less as 'citizens' or 'people' but 'as problems to be solved…' (Said 1978, p.207).

Orientalism is influenced by representations of undesirability just as much as desirability. It is the 'Orient's' exotic and mysterious nature that has fostered and preserved Western interest throughout the 18th and 19th centuries (Said 1978, p.51). Rather than establishing Muslims as a fixed 'other' and enemy (to the West) in the context of Orientalism, they became objectified by the very power structure that has dominated them and therefore, 'a swing of the pendulum in one direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued' (Said 1978, p.150). For Zine (2002), nowhere are Orientalist depictions more prominent than in the representation of veiled women.

According to Zine (2002, p.4), medieval representations of Muslim women are intricately linked to the socio-political conditions, which foster the East/West divide. Zine demonstrates how images and narratives of Muslim queens and noblewomen were explicitly romanticised and characterised through bold personalities that were seductive to the Western observer. As with later colonial

depictions, there was repeatedly a necessity to save or liberate these women 'from the shackles of their "heathen" and barbaric societies'. As Zine (2002, p.5) explains, 'the Muslim queen or princess eventually converts her country, religion, and qualities as a transgressive female behind as she enters Christian society with a newly tamed consciousness'. Similarly, in colonial depictions Muslim women have frequently been depicted with veils as symbols of an oppressive, backward, misogynist society. Whilst remaining enticing and seductive, they are hidden behind the veil, and in need of saving or liberation by the 'white' Western observer (Zine 2002, Amer 2014).

Orientalism signifies the ways Muslim women become recognised as objects to be conquered by the 'white' Western observer, as a matter related to her (Muslim woman) or their (Orientals) subordination and inferiority. In this context, Muslim women become an 'other', both over- and under-valued, as the 'Orient' is, in Said's discussion (Said 1978, p.150). Ultimately, Orientalism represents 'otherness' in terms of desirability that feeds greater discourses of Western superiority. As Hall (1992, p.166) argues, representations can never exist outside ideology or discourse, where both are identifiable as a set of statements or beliefs that produce specific knowledge, and serve the interest of a superior group or class. Said (1978, p.3) argues that:

> …without examining Orientalism as a discourse, one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage –and even produce- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlighten period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In short, because of Orientalism, the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought and action.

The study of Orientalist discourse does not only analyse the political powers of the West, but seeks to understand the expansion of those powers as a consequence of Orientalist objectification. As Said (1978, p.129) argues, Orientalist texts embody naturalised ideas of 'typical inevitability' where the observer acts as an interpreter for the reader. The reader therefore forgets the Orientalist's efforts of subjectively restructuring the Orient as an object for admiration and analysis. The representation of the 'Orient' becomes interchangeable with the designation or

reality of the 'Orient'. It is through this process (of Orientalism) that the Orient assumes a position of inferiority in the eyes of the 'white', European or Western observer and reader.

The analysis of Orientalism has become a critical tool for the interpretation and understanding of the Muslim's long-standing position as 'other' in the West. It assists in the investigation of media representations that foster derogatory stereotypes about Muslims and Islam. According to Said (1978, p.26) contemporary television, film and 'all the media's resources' have forced information about Muslims into 'more and more standardised moulds'. Said describes specific images from Islamic regions that are used in Western reporting and focus on the 'barbaric conditions' of these regions such as poverty, war, and political unrest. He observes that Muslims are frequently shown in large numbers with 'no individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences' (p.287). These depictions suggest that Muslims cannot exist outside their cultural, racial, or religious selves, reflecting that Muslims are (and have been) defined by their racial or cultural identity (Hage 2003, p.112). Singular representations of Muslims therefore become hegemonic, presumably reflecting and representing the realities of *all* Muslims.

Orientalist representations define Muslims in the West, and specifically in contemporary Australia. As Rane, Ewart and Abdalla (2010) point out; the media's role in stereotyping, homogenising, victimising, and demonising Muslims has become intricate in the context of terrorism. A large number of (non-Muslim) Australians rely on media representations as a source of information for understanding Muslims and Islam (Rane, Ewart and Abdalla 2010, p.3). Fused with a lack of engagement between mainstream and Muslim communities, such representation is taken as 'reality' (Shaheen 2001, Rane, Ewart and Abdalla 2010, Krayem 2014). It is shaped by Orientalist perceptions, as Said (1978, p.129) argues, because observations made by the media about the Muslim 'other' become taken-for-granted justification for the Western reader (or media consumer). Ultimately, 'the Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist's rationality; its principles become his (sic)' (Said 1978, p.122).

Many ambiguities exist within the discursive formations of Orientalism that make possible multiple readings of Orientalist texts, which in turn enable scholars to determine how and why Muslims have been positioned as an 'other' in Western thinking (Mani & Frankenberg 1985, p.176). Orientalism is contextual and acts as a conceptual and theoretical umbrella covering a wide and varied socio-political scope of Muslim 'otherness'. In this thesis, Orientalist texts are seen as open to interpretation, and their Orientalist nature suggests that they are consistently presented from the perspective and for the benefit of, a 'white' Westernised audience. Orientalism reflects the socio-political power structures of East and West, where the West cannot exist without the 'other', naturalising Muslims as 'other' in Australian society. It is through Orientalism then that Muslims can be explored as objects of Western ('white') observation and desire.

1.3 Section two: Theories of 'whiteness'

While the critique of Orientalism assists in understanding *why* Muslims have been represented as 'other' in Western contexts, it is important to draw on alternative studies that express the significance of these representations, particularly in multicultural societies such as Australia. This section considers 'whiteness' studies in formulating discursive constructions of belonging, as presented by anthropologist, Ghassan Hage (1997; 1998; 2003). Hage (1998) argues that 'otherness' exists in Australia's multicultural nexus due to normalisations of 'whiteness'. Hage's work explores how the Australian nation is constructed around a 'white core' or 'centre' that sets grounds for national inclusion and exclusion from which Muslims as 'other' are consistently excluded. Hage's work also demonstrates how 'otherness' can be ostensibly 'reduced', even revoked in 'white' societies through specific fields that 'permit' the *accumulation* of national affiliation and belonging.

1.3.1 'Whiteness' and aspiration

According to Moreton-Robinson (2004, p.75), 'whiteness' is 'constitutive of the epistemology of the West' and an 'invisible regime of power that secures hegemony through discourse'. 'Whiteness' plays a critical role in the way racial structures exist in Western societies such as Australia. It is recognised as a norm in the sense that 'whites' are 'non-raced', meaning that 'whiteness' is racially

unmarked and acts as the point to which everything else is compared to (Dyer 1997, p.2, Lentin 2005). In the context of Australia, Elder (2007, p.12) argues that:

> Being white was understood by the Australian state as the norm and all peoples in Australia and around Australia were measured in relation to this norm. The closer a citizen or potential citizen was to this norm the more likely they were to have access to the privileges of the state.

Therefore, 'whiteness' has been constructed as a universal attribute and ideal that citizens strive for. As Pugliese (2002, p.165) suggests, 'one is not necessarily born 'white' (because of one's ethnicity), but that 'whiteness' becomes an attribute that is literally conferred and assigned…' In this way, 'whiteness' offers a sense of 'privilege' in the Australian state, which Tascon (2008, p.267) argues, exists by virtue of its invisibility.

There are obvious historical and political factors to consider in this respect, especially given Australia's history of British settlement and colonisation (Hage 1998, Elder 2003, Elder et al. 2004, Kabir 2007, Tascon 2008, Aslan 2009). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901,* more commonly known as the 'White Australia Policy', legislated the superiority of 'whiteness' in Australia during and beyond federation. It was created to encourage new migrants to assimilate into 'white' British-Australian culture and ensured that a 'white' race remained dominant within Australia meaning that migrants would not perturb or change Australia's Anglo-Celtic culture (Hage 2003, p.55).

This process of 'whitening' Australia normalised 'whiteness' despite the nation's growing 'non-white' population. Australia has therefore emerged as a 'white nation-space' where 'white people assume they are at the centre or core of the nation' (Elder et al. 2004, pp.208-209). Consequently, race relations in Australia are built on what Hage (1998) calls a 'white nation fantasy', that foregrounds race, migration, and ethnicity, and structures them around the imagined aspirations of 'white' Australians (Elder et al. 2004, p.208). Similarly to Said's (1978) arguments in *Orientalism*, Hage (1998, p.20) considers 'whiteness' to be a fantasy position of cultural dominance born out of the history of European

expansion that is governed by 'white people' and therefore a'fantasy of white supremacy' (Hage 1998, p. 18).

In his book, *White Nation*, Hage (1998, p.58) stresses that 'white' domination in Australia is exercised through specific fields. Using Bourdieu's (1986) theory of 'economy of being' and his notion of 'capital', Hage deconstructs the role of 'whiteness' in Australia's multicultural context:

> It is not an essence that one has or does not have, even if some Whites think of it and experience it this way. Whiteness is an aspiration. One of my key arguments in the text is that Whiteness and Australianness - of which Whiteness remains a crucial component - are not governed by an either/or logic, even if some people experience them this way. Rather, I argue Whiteness and Australianness can be accumulated (up to a certain point) and people can be said to be more or less White and Australian. How White they can be depends on the social attributes they possess (p.19).

Following Bourdieu's capital, Hage demonstrates the ways individuals can accumulate recognition within race relations in Australia:

> While practical nationality does erect a boundary between nationals and non-nationals, it is more important to recognise that it has a cumulative nature and is unequally distributed within the nation. In the daily life of the nation, there are nationals who, on the basis of their class or gender or ethnicity, for example, practically feel and are made to feel to be more or less nationals than others, without having to be denied, or feel they are denied, the right to be nationals as such...People strive to accumulate nationality. They recognise themselves as more national than some people and less national than others. They are also recognised by others in a similar fashion (p. 52).

Hage stages his discussion through Bourdieu's concept of fields, where a field is a political construct that encompasses a space of potential and active forces (Bourdieu 1991, p.171). Fields are connected to relations of power, as it is struggled for and unequally distributed among those within a given field. According to Roose (2016, p.19), a field is an autonomous social space within which individuals and groups compete or struggle for resources (capital) that allow them to better their respective positions in a society. Accordingly, Tabar et al. (2003, p.268) argue that capital is 'a metaphor used to describe the varied and valued resources which occupants accumulate to succeed within this field, and over which they struggle for control of the field'. In his discussion of Australia, Hage (1998, pp.55-70) stresses that 'whiteness' is the dominant resource or

capital in Australian multicultural society that may be accumulated and permit entry into a 'national aristocracy'. Ultimately, 'whiteness' becomes a mechanism that determines belonging within the Australian nation.

1.3.2 'Whiteness', accumulation, and tolerance

The ways in which people experience and deploy their claims to, and affiliations with, the nation in everyday life is dependent on varied factors that facilitate modes of belonging in the constructed 'white nation' (Hage 1998, p.50). These modes of belonging are attained and embodied through 'whiteness', and not necessarily through formal indicators such as citizenship. 'Whiteness' allows members within the nation to claim dominant status in the field of national belonging, where attributes such as looks, accents, cosmopolitanism or Christianity can be *accumulated* and *converted* into 'whiteness' (Hage 1998, p.232). However, definitions of 'whiteness' are not fixed or restricted to skin colour or British-ness because the 'field of whiteness' is not homogenous, as there are different kinds of 'whiteness' (Elder 2007, p.116).

Firstly, Christianity has historically been a signifier of 'whiteness' and therefore could be accumulated in the field (Randell-Moon 2006, p.1). Similarly a sense of European-ness also acts as a symbol of 'whiteness', especially given the historical link of European colonialism in Australia. Therefore a 'natural' element of 'white' possession exists for those from Christian European states and migrants from those parts have been more welcomed as Australians (Mason 2004, Colic-Peisker 2005, Randell-Moon 2006, Lattas 2009). As Hage (2003, p.50) explains, 'some White Europeans were capable of living up to the "civilised ideals" of White European-ness with greater success than others…' This view constitutes a racial hierarchy that categorises and ranks ethnics and migrants based on their racial and cultural affinity with British, European, and/or Christian Australians (Lopez 2000, p.43, Lentin & Titley 2008). Where a migrant is situated within this hierarchy ultimately determines the possession of capital and their position within the field of the nation.

In order to maintain the power of 'whiteness', the European migrant is recognised as sufficiently like, while remaining suitably unlike, the dominant 'white' Australian (Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 2004, p.45). Specifically:

> The foreigner who is poisoned to give recognition must also remain distinguishable from the dominant white Australian. This is because the white anxiety that derives from criminality harboured in the national imaginary needs the migrant to remain forever dependent on the dominant white Australians who grant us permission to stay on (Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 2004, p.46).

The accumulation of 'whiteness' as capital for belonging therefore is exercised through a binary of tolerance where 'whiteness' is negotiated and selectively delegated. In other words, 'non-whites' who accumulate 'whiteness' are not just 'accepted' as part of an imagined benign mainstream, but 'tolerated' within that construct (Hage 1998, Elder et al. 2004, p.210).

For Hage (1998), questions of tolerance present Australian multiculturalism as less about the cultural diversity in the nation and more about the 'acceptance' and 'tolerance' of an ethnic 'other'. Hage explains that multiculturalism, as it is understood in Australia, is an imagined rhetoric based on a tolerant/intolerant binary. It encourages the Australian mainstream to tolerate the minority ethnic community or group. In particular, 'to tolerate is not just to accept, it is to accept and position the other within specific limits or boundaries' (Hage 1998, p.89). Furthermore, 'it is this discourse of limits that makes clear that those who tolerate imagine themselves to be in a position of spatial power. Likewise, the tolerated others….are part of "our" nation, but only in so far as "we" accept them' (Hage 1998, p88).

Hodge and O'Carroll (2006, pp.3-4) argue that tolerance is about 'enduring pain and hardship' rather than distinguishing who is or isn't Australian; a paradox given its role in tolerating the intolerable as 'something intolerable cannot, by definition, be tolerated. And yet it is' (Hodge & O'Carroll 2006, p.43). Similarly, Burchell (2001, p.240) argues that tolerance does not propose a power conferred by individuals upon themselves, but a responsibility imposed upon them. In this view, tolerance becomes a discursive construct whereby the nation requires the citizens to endure the practices and behaviours of fellow citizens, regardless of their personal moral views (Burchell 2001, p.241). These constructions of tolerance compliment the liberal context of Australian multiculturalism, conceptualised as a way of dealing with 'otherness' in the nation. In particular, multiculturalism promotes a sense of symbolic co-existence between ethnic and

non-ethnic citizens in nation states, similarly to the relationship created between the 'Orient' and 'Occident' in Said's *Orientalism*.

In these notions of tolerance, multiculturalism is a power struggle between 'us' and 'them', as 'power to tolerate is then the same imagined power we are now familiar with: the power to position the other as an object within a space that one considers one's own, within limits one feels legitimately capable of setting' (Hage 1998, p.90). These limits shape the tolerance of the 'other':

> It allows the White Australians who engage in this form of acceptance to live in a fantasy where the Australianness of the ethnic other appears as if it is under their control at a time when the migrant is becoming inexorably Australian independently of their will (Hage 1998, p.103).

The 'other' can be accepted by the 'white' mainstream where that mainstream remains superior and in control. The 'tolerated other', much like the 'Orient' in Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, is positioned in a space of inferiority where 'they never exist, they are *allowed* to exist' (emphasis added, Hage 1998, p.90).

This position distributes power through cultural rather than political domination, in hegemonic terms as posed by Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci (1971), the concept of hegemony is about the relationship between power and culture, and the function of these in defining the boundaries of 'who has power' in modern societies (Lears 1985). Sullivan (1984) argues that hegemony refers to a form of ideological control in which the social practices, beliefs, and values of a ruling class are normalised as 'common-sense knowledge' that serve the interests of the ruling class at the expense of subordinate or marginalised groups (see also Hall 1986). The normalisation of these practices is essential to forms of cultural domination; understood and accepted by the masses not in terms of manipulation or coercion, but consensual participation in a system that disguises inequality (Lears 1985, Hall 1986, Smith 2007). It is through the guise of hegemony that 'white' Australians are able to pose as a dominating class in the multicultural nation, and promote their power in tolerating 'non-white others'. For Hage (1998) this contention is the epitome of the 'white nation fantasy'.

Examining 'whiteness', as Hage does, by understanding how it is normalised in Australian society, illuminates racial and hegemonic constructions that construct and present Muslims as 'other'. Hall (1982) argues that the media is a mechanism

responsible for the dissemination of these particular socio-political views in society. The media produce discourses of Muslims in Australia by positioning them as ideologically oppositional to what is considered as 'white' in Australia (Hage 1998; 2002; 2003, Poynting et al. 2004, Dreher 2009, Humphrey 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Chopra 2015). As in Said's *Orientalism*, Muslims become 'monsters', who in Hage's view, threaten 'whiteness' in Australia and are therefore excluded from imagined conceptualisations of national belonging.

1.4 Section three: Discourses of multiculturalism and belonging

The previous sections have explored the theoretical frameworks that foster analysis and discussion in this thesis concerning the mediated 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural nation. Orientalism and 'whiteness' are seen to shape socio-political discourses regarding the understanding, deconstruction, and re-inscription of 'otherness' as a form of ideological subordination through national media representations. Because this thesis investigates media produced narratives of inclusiveness and belonging since 2005 (where Muslims are perceived as a valuable rather than a 'threatening other' within the nation), this next section brings together the theoretical framework that guides examination of multiculturalism and belonging. It explores the relationship and interconnectedness of both, addressing the role of these discourses in constructing Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Hage 1997; 1998, Lentin 2005; 2014, Mansouri 2005, Kabir 2006; 2007, Elder 2007, Johanson & Glow 2007, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Moran 2011, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Morgan & Poynting 2012).

1.4.1 Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism developed as a national policy in response to the high influx of migrants, mainly from Asian and Middle Eastern regions, throughout the 1970s (Collins 2006, Burchell 2001). It accommodated newly arrived migrants and attempted to foster harmonious interactions between ethnic and non-ethnic Australians, by promoting the value of ethnic and cultural diversity (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002, Lentin 2005, Johanson & Glow 2007, Lentin & Titley 2008, Tufail & Poynting 2013). According to Johanson and Glow (2007, p.39),

multiculturalism involved recognising the different needs of immigrant groups and applying policies in accordance to make them 'more appropriate to an ethnically diverse constituency'.

For right-wing critics, multiculturalism represented a 'handmaiden of immigration policies', which threatened aspects of 'Australian life' such as jobs, education, and public space[3] (Burchell 2001, Johanson & Glow 2007, Lobo & Mansouri 2012). This sentiment reflected a long-standing 'mistrust of foreigners' and the associated calls for assimilation into a 'white' Australian society (Hage 1998, Northcote & Casimoro 2010, p.145-151). Multiculturalism has been perceived as an extension of previous integration policies, and what Moran (2011) calls a 'homogenising force', that has threatened cultural diversity. As a policy, it has maintained that 'not all cultures were equal' because, 'Australia had an "Anglo-Saxon" core culture and set of distinctive values, which also bore distinctive Australian traits that migrants, and all other cultures, had to fit themselves into' (Moran 2011, p.2166).

For Burchell (2001) and Batrouney (2002), multiculturalism is a libertarian approach to nation building processes that has attempted to account for a high and uncontrollable influx of non-English speaking migrants (see also Collins 2006, Moran 2011). It saw the expansion of Australia's cultural identity by allowing 'all Australians' to express cultural differences in a free environment that promotes equality through the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, and religion (Batrouney 2002, p.52). In this view, multiculturalism is centralised in promoting national unity and harmony through the expression of difference (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002). However, the policy of multiculturalism is also tied to the economic values of ethnic diversity that recognise multiculturalism as essential to the production of national economic efficiency. According to Burchell (2001, p.242):

[3] Pauline Hanson's One Nation party campaigned against the policy of Multiculturalism, arguing that it promoted 'invasion' and would place Australia at risk of getting 'swamped by Asians' (see Northcote & Casimiro 2010).

> …it became increasingly important as a matter of statecraft in Australia to present multiculturalism not as a cultural good in its own right, but rather as a producer of "external" economic goods. Multiculturalism, on this argument, was a good thing in large part because it lifted Australia's sociocultural prestige on the world stage and enhanced confidence in its friendliness and stability among its trading partners in the region.

Multiculturalism has thus served the enhancement of 'international appeal' over the 'maintenance of ethnics or foreigners' in Australia (Hage 1998). The material benefit of equity in the guise of ethnic diversity distinguishes the policies from the discourses of multiculturalism, as Elder (2007, p.131) argues:

> In thinking about multiculturalism in Australia it is necessary to distinguish between governmental policies and popular imaginings. Multiculturalism as a government policy emphasised equity; Multiculturalism in popular imaginings emphasised cultural diversity. Diversity rather than equity is the most prominent understanding of multiculturalism in Australia.

As a discourse, multiculturalism complements imagined national mythologies about ethnic diversity as a core Australian value. It is imagined through conceptualised notions of national diversity, but does not necessarily account for the realities of multiculturalism or ethnic practices in Australia (Wise & Velayutham 2009). Mostly, multiculturalism is situated within politics that divide 'white' and 'non-white' (ethnic) Australians, as argued by Hage (1998). It highlights polarising cultures and ethnicities, focusing on essential racial differences over similarities. For many, those elements of multiculturalism that focus on ethnic and cultural diversity reproduce essentialist views of cultural difference in Australia (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997, Stratton 1998, Burchell 2001, McKnight 2006, Johanson & Glow 2007, Hodge & O'Carroll 2006).

Multiculturalism celebrates 'a picture of cultural diversity', but does not need to account for the ways 'everyday Australians' live their lives (Burchell 2001, Wise & Velayutham 2009). Wise and Velayutham (2009, p.2) argue that literature on the discourse of multiculturalism and its expression of difference, does not deal adequately with the 'everyday lived reality of cultural difference' in diverse spaces. The authors take an 'everyday multiculturalism' perspective that explores 'how cultural diversity is experienced and negotiated on the ground in everyday situations' (Wise & Velayutham 2009, p.2). The ways people manage ethnic

relations in daily life through the integration and engagement with diverse people, food, and music, intricately link multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism.

Yuval-Davis et al. (2006, p.4) argue that cosmopolitanism defines aspects of universalism, tolerance, world citizenship, and a global community of human culture (see also Lentin & Titley 2008). However, cosmopolitanism has been used as an instrument in political struggle – 'the unconditional inclusiveness of its abstract formulation can also be used to pursue the exclusionary interests of a particular social group' (Yuval-Davis et al. 2006, p.4). While cosmopolitanism promotes a boundary-less global culture, where citizens are able to migrate freely from nation to nation, the threat of invasion from external sources remains. This is particularly significant with reference to terrorism, and in nations where Muslims have been recognised and excluded as 'other' (Dunn 2001, Mason 2004, Kabir 2005; 2006; 2007, Aly 2007; 2010, Lentin 2008, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013; 2016, Chopra 2015).

Hage (1997) argues that cosmopolitanism is situated in the 'white nation' because its appeal works to benefit the 'white subject' in a multicultural society. Cultural factors such as food and music brought to Australia by migrants are ethnicised, where they are then regarded as benefiting the cosmopolitan subject. Hage incorporates the term 'cosmo-multiculturalism' to explain how such cultural factors are represented as enriching a 'white' Australian culture, given its focus on ethnic diversity (or the celebration of cultural difference). Hage stresses that the value of cultural enrichment has been produced by and for the 'white nationalists'. It is a narcissistic project of self-development for the imagined 'white' mainstream (hooks 1992, Burchell 2001, Flowers & Swan 2012). As argued in Chapter Seven of this thesis, the cosmo-multicultural discourse is used for 'white' mainstream immersion in an imaginary idea of multicultural engagement by listening to ethnic music or eating ethnic food, without engaging with ethnics. Hage (1997) argues that it is 'multiculturalism without ethnics' because cultural factors are abstracted from any notion of cultural history, colonialism, and inequalities (see also Flowers & Sawn 2012, p.2).

Elements of multiculturalism construct ethnic diversity as a 'culture for commodification and consumption' (Johanson & Glow 2007, p.39, Lentin 2005,

Lentin & Titley 2008). Diversity recognises the enjoyment of superficial cultural benefits amidst a range of ethnic groups, including the exploration into cuisine, music and fashion. This is what Johanson & Glow (2007) term 'boutique multiculturalism'. While it supports the sharing and engagement of cultural diversity, its purpose is to serve the mainstream or dominant group – 'white' Australians (Hage 1997). In this way, multiculturalism enforces a discourse strictly *for ethnics*. Mansouri and Lobo (2012, p.116) suggest that multiculturalism promotes openness for minorities such as Muslims (who have been excluded from national belonging) and develops a capacity to produce a civic space that may quell fear and anxiety to promote mutual respect. Where right-wing critics see multiculturalism as a 'utopian fantasy', Mansouri and Lobo (2012, p.127) argue that it nevertheless focuses on producing a 'more inclusive society' and encourages public debate on 'cultural pluralism'.

These imagined notions of a culturally diverse society have led to the rejection of 'multiculturalism' as a social concept, with some seeking to instead embrace 'cultural diversity' (Mansouri & Wood 2008), or focus on 'multiculture' (Hodge and O'Carroll 2006). Hodge and O'Carroll (2006) argue that 'multiculture' is a more accurate description than 'multiculturalism' as it focuses on what happens in a multicultural society over what is represented. It 'refers to a shifting, dynamic interweaving of cultures and diversities such as that which exists in Australian society' (Hodge and O'Carroll 2006 p.4). Focusing on 'multiculture' and/or 'cultural diversity', however, does not necessarily account for the marginalisation and exclusion of specific ethnic minorities such as Muslims. These have been framed through discourses of Orientalism where Muslim 'otherness' is repeatedly represented and perceived in terms of 'threat', and not necessarily through conceptualised forms of cosmopolitanism or cultural enrichment (Dreher 2003; 2009, Aly 2010; 2014, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Humphrey 2014, Chopra 2015).

Multicultural discourses therefore present a paradox based on the promotion of ethnic difference or 'otherness', only in instances where that 'otherness' is recognised as different from the dominant 'white' culture in Australia. This thesis recognises that multiculturalism fixates on 'otherness', which predominantly allows Orientalist representations to filter through society. While multiculturalism

is contested as a space of exclusion, it remains the context within which narratives of inclusion and belonging are constructed and developed on Australian television (Pardy & Lee 2011, Mansouri & Lobo 2012).

1.4.2 Belonging

Discourses of multiculturalism influence notions of nationalism, nation-ness, and belonging (Hage 1998, Moran 2011). Antonsich (2010, pp.650-652) argues that belonging is a concept mostly associated with emotional connotations that presume an imaginary 'sense of connectedness to others'. Garbutt (2009, p.84) conceptualises a sense of belonging in terms of membership that reflects, 'being included in a group or excluded from it', denoting why belonging has commonly been associated with aspects of national identity and citizenship. Northcote and Casimiro (2010, p.142) define citizenship as the recognition of a citizen by the State where it is a formal indicator allowing full membership in a nation 'with all its rights and obligations' (Hage 1998, p.49, Yuval-Davis et al. 2006, p.2). However, citizenship does not account for figurative modes of belonging or inclusion. On the contrary, as Yuval-Davis et al. (2006) argue, belonging is an imaginary aspiration, linked to emotionality of connection. Marginalised groups such as Muslims can in this context be citizens of the nation but not belong due to Orientalist factors, which shape perceptions of 'otherness' and alienations from the dominant ('white') society (Humphrey 2009, Aly 2010, Yasmeen 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Chopra 2015).

However, belonging is only politicised through inclusion/exclusion once it has been threatened in some way. As was the case during the 2005 Cronulla Riots, belonging has been recognised as augmenting occupation and domination in the nation, by contesting who belongs ('white' Australians) and who doesn't belong (Muslims) (see Chapter Three, Evers 2008; 2009, Johanson & Glow 2007, Noble 2009, Garbutt 2009). The riots illustrate that belonging is associated with a 'desire for membership' that is constructed through social practices of exclusion and (imaginary) boundary maintenance (Garbutt 2009, p.98, Noble 2009). These boundaries concern rules of 'being Australian' and ground belonging to a particular place (Cronulla/Australia) that excludes Muslims due to their mediated 'un-Australian-ness', and roles as 'other' in multicultural Australia (Poynting et

al. 2000; 2004, Humphrey 2007; 2009, Garbutt 2009, Aly 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Yasmeen 2010, Pardy & Lee 2011, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Chopra 2015).

Hage argues that much like 'whiteness', belonging is fluid and can be delegated. It is restricted by a specific politics that never exists outside the realms of power (Yuval-Davis 2006). For those perceived as dominant ('white' Australians) belonging is naturalised as a taken-for-granted value that simply exists. For others, positioned external to, or as 'other' within the nation (such as Muslims), belonging is something to be accumulated or attributed and can only be recognised by those in power. It is therefore important to distinguish between those who *embody* a naturalised sense of belonging, those who *grant* belonging, and those who *aspire* to belong.

Antonsich (2010) suggests a sense of belonging in social settings (such as a nation) is effectively fostered through language. Distinguishing 'us' from 'them' linguistically evokes a sense of community situated in the material conditions of exclusion. 'We' are recognised as harbouring a naturalised sense of belonging, where 'they' represent those people who are in search of, or aspire to, belong but are denied. Herein lies the politics of belonging, where belonging is integrated within discourses of boundary maintenance, which separate 'us' from 'them' (Probyn 1996, Antonsich 2010). Specifically:

> …every politics of belonging involves two opposite sides: the side which claims belonging and the side which has the power of "granting" belonging. This means, that a process of negotiation -as well as rejection, violation, and transgression- is always in place, either at the individual or at the collective scale or both (Antonsich 2010, p.650).

At the collective level, 'white' Australians, especially those that imagine themselves as 'nationalists' in Hage's (1998) 'white nation', possess the power to grant belonging to those positioned as 'other'. Belonging is accumulated as a form of capital one acquires within the nation. For Muslims, this may include adopting particular values to integrate into a mainstream society and belong to a particular neighbourhood, community, workforce, setting, or discourse (Northcote & Casimiro 2010). As this thesis illustrates, there are various themes, categories,

environments, and settings through which Muslims can accumulate a sense of inclusiveness and belonging.

Hage (1998) argues that belonging can be accumulated through multiculturalism. As argued above, multiculturalism opens a realm where 'ethnicity' or 'otherness', as a forms of social capital, rightly link to aspects of social cohesion. Belonging can exist where 'allegedly undesirable characteristics' of groups such as Muslims can be recast as 'acceptable' (Pardy & Lee 2011, p.312). Pardy and Lee (2011, p.300) suggest that multiculturalism is produced as a space of, and for, those 'migrants' that do not necessarily belong to the dominant or mainstream 'white' group in Australia. As a result, marginalised migrant groups such as Muslims claim multiculturalism as 'their space' in that it ostensibly guarantees notions of belonging.

The Australian media is recognised as a mechanism that enforces discursive notions of belonging and inclusion/exclusion as addressed above (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, Kabir 2006; 2007, Aly 2007; 2010, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013)[4]. Aly (2010) argues that it is the emphasis on Muslim 'otherness' in media discourses which creates obstacles in the process of belonging for Muslims. In particular:

> Although media do not determine identities, they do contribute in creating symbolic communicative spaces that either include or exclude, thereby affecting audiences' media experiences and discourses about their identities…The media often create boundaries for inclusion and exclusion, and eventually for participation in a "common culture" (Madianou 2005, quoted in Hopkins 2011, p.122).

The media in Australia represents Muslims in ways that account for exclusion (see next section). Terminological and social distinctions of 'us' and 'them', used throughout socio-political and media discourses, foster imaginings of who belongs and who doesn't in the nation (Manning 2006, Humphrey 2007; 2009, Yasmeen 2010). Contested discursive notions of belonging in Australia therefore require the critical exploration of multiculturalism. The analysis in this thesis is less concerned with the construction of identities per se, and more with the

[4] See also Dunn 2001, Poynting & Mason 2007, Noble 2008, Aslan 2009, Dreher 2009, Rane, Ewart and Abdalla 2010, Chopra 2015.

ideological and discursive implications of multiculturalism and belonging, as sites for inclusionary or exclusionary practices, in the representations of Muslim 'otherness' on Australian television.

1.5 Section Four: The representation of Muslims in the Australian media

Prior to the Cronulla Riots in 2005, publicly circulated understandings of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia were noticeably shaped by manifestly Orientalist media depictions. The media continuously redefines and disseminates ideas about Muslims and Islam. Many of these ideas are constructed through representations that engage 'feelings, attitudes and emotions' and mobilise fears and other anxieties within society (Hall 1997b, p.216). Haldrup et al. (2008, p.118) note that media representations embody prevailing social tensions and are capable of reproducing dynamics already in existence. As a result, the Muslim 'other' has often been represented through oppositional binaries that reflect those Orientalist constructions of inferiority and superiority in multicultural societies (Said 1978, Hall 1997b, p.219).

Media representations post-Cronulla continue to circulate powerful representations and tropes of Muslims as 'other' in Australia (Mason 2004, Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, Manning 2006, Posetti 2006; 2010, Grewal 2007; 2012, Dunn et al. 2007, Rane, Ewart and Abdalla 2010)[5]. The following section maps research and literature investigating Muslim representations in the Australian media prior to the Cronulla Riots.

1.5.1 Muslims, moral panics, and difference

The construction of a group of people as 'other' in negative, even 'threatening', terms, as is the case with Muslims, can be further understood through moral panic theory (Poynting et al. 2000, Gleeson 2004, Warner 2004, Grewal 2007, Humphrey 2007, Poynting and Morgan 2007, Aslan 2009). Cohen (1972, p.1) defines a moral panic as a 'condition, episode, person or group of persons' which 'become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented

[5] See also Aly 2005, Humphrey 2007; 2009, Kabir 2006, Poynting & Mason 2007, Mansouri & Wood 2008, Baird 2009, Aslan 2009, Aly 2007; 2009; 2010, Yasmeen 2010, Chopra 2015.

in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media'. Moral panics are 'social threats' that have been amplified by media coverage and socio-political debate, but do not necessarily account for the actual extent of that threat (Poynting et al. 2004, p.11, Aly 2010, p.89).

Moral panic theory helps identify the 'othered' status of Muslims in Australia considering 'no minority religious community has captured media headlines as Muslims have…' (Rane, Ewart and Abdalla 2010, p.ix). Rane, Ewart and Abdalla (2010, p. p.xiii) argue that in Australia, 'the media have become the primary source of information about Islam and Muslims for an overwhelming majority of the public' and 'there is a general perception that the media play a crucial role in influencing perceptions of Islam and having a negative impact on relations between Muslims and the wider society'. Not only is the media the cultural and social arbiter of information about Muslims, but key in encouraging engagements between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians (Aly 2007, Krayem 2014). Alongside promoting harmonious discourses, the media have utilised moral panic theories to instigate fear that has ultimately resulted in Islamophobia in Australia (Dunn 2001, Aly 2007; 2010, Aly & Walker 2007, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Poynting & Mason 2007, Aslan 2009, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Rane & Hersi 2012)[6].

Northcote and Casimiro (2010) argue that the construction of Muslim 'otherness' has been amplified through emphasis on ethnic, cultural, and religious differences that are framed around values. The authors suggest that Australian ideals such as a 'fair go', 'freedom of speech' and 'peaceful expression of difference', have been constructed as in opposition to values considered foreign, especially those associated with Islam, 'which become demonised as the antithesis of liberal [Australian] values and constructed as fundamentally alien to the "Australian way of life"' (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, p.150, Morgan & Poynting 2012, p.2). Similarly, Aly and Walker (2009, p.204) argue that representations of 'otherness' have developed through discourses of fear and anxiety. Particularly, it is the fear that Australian cultural values might collapse from the 'threat' of 'external invaders' such as Muslims. In this respect, Australia is perceived as in opposition

[6] See also Mason 2004, Poynting et al. 2004, Mansouri & Wood 2008, Noble 2008, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Rane, Ewart and Abdalla. 2010.

to and incompatible with Islam, which reflects Orientalist 'othering' (Hall 1997b). As Northcote & Casimiro (2010, pp. 147) suggest:

> The Western tradition of Muslim "Othering", which fails to recognise the diversity of Islamic practices, and overlooks some of the ways in which Muslim "values" accord with those of the West, resulted in the positioning of Muslim Australians as suspect residents in some quarters and unwelcome guests in others.

'Othering' promotes Muslim exclusion based on dissimilarity, framed through difference. While the media play the larger part in this process, there are a multitude of factors to consider that are already entrenched in socio-political settings. According to Chopra (2015, p.326):

> How we see difference is framed in schemas or patterns of understanding "the other" is informed by our family, education, media, and life experiences. The combined effect of these factors contribute to how we shape and perceive the "Muslim other". These elements feed bias and misconceptions which give legitimacy to a swathe of rhetoric upon which Islamophobia relies.

Fearon and Laitin (2000, p.848) argue that misconceptions produce social categories that develop when people are clustered together and labelled as 'other' as with Muslims in Australia. Social categories establish 'rules of membership that decide who is and is not a member of the category' as well as 'sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral commitments, physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviours expected or obliged of members in certain situations (roles)'. Diverse features of ethnic groups are compressed into a single social category and marked as 'un-Australian'. In the case of Muslims this includes descriptors such as 'Islamic veiling' or 'Middle Eastern appearance'. The media reportage creates an assumption that these broad features and social categories are natural, inevitable and unchanging facts about the social world, solidifying Orientalist perceptions and fuelling hysteria surrounding Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Fearon and Laitin, 2000, p.848, Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Dunn 2001, Kabir 2006, Humphrey 2007, Lentin 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Phillips 2011, Chopra 2015).

1.5.2 Muslims, terrorists, and criminals

While moral panics foster social categories that homogenise Muslim cultures, they also produce stereotypes that result from specific socio-political contexts. Humphrey (2010) suggests that several Muslim-centred mediated events involving Muslims have been combined with a political (and the actual) 'war on terror', both of which have produced Muslims as 'other' in Australia. Discourses of terrorism are influencing the negative representations and (mis)conceptions of Muslims in the West (Mason 2004, Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006, White 2007, Lentin 2008, Aly 2010, Humphrey 2009; 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015, Tufail & Poynting 2016). According to Dunn (2001), the most common representations of Muslim 'otherness' in the contemporary West relate to fundamentalism, terrorism, violence, sexism, misogyny, and religious extremism, coherently representing Muslims as 'terrorists', 'suicide bombers' and 'hijackers' (see also Akbarzadeh and Smith 2005, p.4).

For Kabir (2006) the context of terrorism has served two purposes. The first presents Muslims as 'other' through Orientalist frameworks that place terrorism at the centre, while the second enables the objectification of Muslims as a way to entice audiences. As Kabir (2006, p.313) suggests:

> A stereotype of hysteria, inherent violence and barbaric practices often seems to be deliberately permutated, either to marginalise Muslim people as the uncivilised "Other" in the dichotomy between Eastern and Western culture, or for purely commercial reasons- sensational stories guarantee higher newspaper sales.

In this framework, the representations of Muslims are not only negative or Orientalist, but also ready to be consumed by Western audiences and made profitable by media institutions. As argued earlier in this chapter, discourses of Orientalism make it clear that stories about Muslim 'otherness' are readily available. In this respect, there is a separation between subject and object, where Muslims become objects of Western interest and desire in much the same way that the 'Orient' has been for the 'Occident' (Said 1978).

The objectification of Muslims reproduces dominant stereotypes mostly from popular culture and Hollywood (Shaheen 2001). While films such as *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962) and Disney's *Aladdin* (1992) romanticise Said's (1978) 'Orientals'

in their portrayals of deviant Arabs and Muslims, more contemporary portrayals focus on the 'threat' of the 'Orient' in Western lands. Alsultany (2012, p.2) draws on American dramas such as *24* (2001-2010), which 'cashed in on the salacious possibilities of Arab or Muslim terrorist threats'. For programs such as these, representing Muslim men as terrorists supports a homogenising effect of 'demonising the enemy' in the political 'war on terror' (Alsultany 2012). Such depictions of Muslims have circulated in the Australian media, contributing to the limiting perceptions of Muslim experience and practice in Australia.

Shaheen (2008, p.11) argues that circulation of such Americanised, Orientalist imagery has created a 'stereotype virus' that infects nation after nation through Orientalist thinking. This is problematic because Orientalist imagery assumes that Muslims are defined by a homogenous rather than diverse religion. The portrayal of Muslims in the Australian media shows signs of this 'stereotype virus' where knowledge of Muslims derives not only from Hollywood caricatures, but also from globally mediated events that position a single Muslim *perpetrator* as the model of *all* Muslims (Lentin 2008, Noble 2008).

At the local level, a series of moral panics arose between the years of 1998 and 2002, which targeted Muslim men in Australia. Given events surrounding gang crime and rape, Muslim men have been represented as 'criminals' and at other times 'potential terrorists' (as no actual terror attack has yet occurred on Australian soil) (Poynting et al. 2004, Aslan 2009, Aly 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2016). Concern over Muslim gangs, rape, asylum seekers, and terrorism has labelled Muslim men as a contemporary 'folk devil' in Australia (Poynting et al. 2004, p.12, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Morgan & Poynting 2012). Noble (2008, p.20) argues that media generally displays the Muslim male as the 'face of evil'. Noble illustrates how images of infamous Muslim men have been accompanied by headlines such as 'evil speaks'. It is these faces that have become a 'metonym for the cultural pathology of evil' and 'evil' has become the pathology of a 'Muslim culture' (Noble 2008, p.25). Similarly to Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, single Muslim perpetrators are repeatedly portrayed to represent the appearances and behaviours of entire Muslim communities in Australia.

In national newspapers, Muslim male 'otherness' has mostly been represented through use of 'othering' language. In a study of how *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Daily Telegraph* have identified Muslim men as 'naturally evil', Manning (2003, pp. 13-37) concludes that terms such as 'violence', 'rape', 'illegal', 'asylum', and 'crime' are mostly associated with 'Muslims'. Furthermore, common perceptions of Muslims denote that sexual crimes such as rape are typical among Muslim men and that 'it's the fault not just of the rapists but of the Muslim community that nurtures them' (Manning 2003, p.36).

It is clear that the use of pronouns ('our', 'we', 'they') are strategic in positioning Muslim men as unlike other Australians, to exclude them from the constructed understandings of 'being Australian' (Humphrey 2007). Muslim men 'are widely represented existing outside any moral zone, one implication of the view that their behaviour is caused by their racial or cultural background' (Baird 2009, p. 385). These stereotypes frame localised Orientalist perceptions that focus on Muslim men's behaviour as the antithesis of what it means to be Australian because their relation to crime and terrorism has presented them as 'un-Australian' (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Humphrey 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). White (2007) argues that specific crimes are deemed as ethnic in nature and constitute part of a Muslim 'problem' in Australia. Such crimes have been depicted as products of immigration, 'an import to our shores', rather than a social phenomenon created and sustained by rampant media vilification and social and economic disenfranchisement (White 2007, p.51). Exclusion is promoted through Orientalist depictions, at the expense of including and/or understanding those affected by socio-political and economic disadvantage.

Representations of Muslims have not always been, and are not always, negative. Studies conducted by Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005, p.20) demonstrate that while negative stereotypes continue to be reproduced and reinvented, 'there is also a counter construction process at play which reflects the desire to know more about Islam and Muslims'. Terms such as 'moderate' and 'mainstream' are juxtaposed against news articles about 'extremists' and 'terrorists' (Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, p.22). At the same time, there has been an increase in fear about 'them' living in 'our' communities:

> Although "They" remain the "Other," there is a new sense of fear of "Them" because they are now near "Us" in "Our" society. Therefore, the way in which the public understand "Us" and "Them" has been recreated to adapt to the new climate of fear (Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, p.23).

This 'new climate of fear' derives from the localisation of global events such as terrorism (Osuri and Banerjee 2004, p.152, Morgan & Poynting 2012). It encourages the homogenisation of events such as the 2001 terror attacks that occurred in America (known as 9/11), which have been reported locally in Australia and tied to 'white' or Western or Australian values (Osuri and Banerjee 2004, Ho 2007, Northcote & Casimiro 2010). More importantly, Akbarzadeh and Smith's (2005) findings illustrate that positive stories about Muslims and Islam in Australia tend to be linked to negative stories and thus carry negative undertones.

1.5.3 Muslim women and Islamic veiling

Misrepresentations of Muslims have also resulted in the stereotyping of Muslim women and the practice of veiling in particular. In much socio-political and media discourse, the veil is a visible signifier of the supposed strict and mysterious practices of Islam, and the fear of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Aly & Walker 2007, Murphy 2009, Hussein 2009; 2016, Aly 2009, Posetti 2010, Carland 2012, Amer 2014).

According to Wagner et al. (2012, p.522) 'a vast array of discursive tropes and metaphorical figures are employed by the Occident to construct the Muslim "Other" and many of these relate to the veil' (see also Zine 2002). Historically, the veil has represented an oppressed female population in a rigidly patriarchal and anti-feminist Islam. According to Aly and Walker (2007, pp.203-204):

> The Muslim woman is routinely represented as subordinate and passive, an enigma shrouded in the black veil of religious oppression. In contrast to their Western counterparts, Muslim women are portrayed as inferior or backward. To many Western women, the veil stands as a single, most powerful symbol of the gender oppression that women in non-Western countries suffer.

Similarly, Posetti (2010, pp.69-70) argues:

> Muslim women are both highly visible members of one of the most marginalised groups in Western society and the most vulnerable to vilification and media stereotyping, suffering the "triple-Whammy" effect of sexism, racism and religious bigotry. Ubiquitously portrayed as veiled,

> they are concurrently represented as oppressed and radical non-conformists, as threatened and threatening, as passive sex-slaves and exotic, erotic beings. Symbolised generically by the distinctive religious clothing some choose to wear, Muslim women of all cultures have become the most recognisable, visible targets of racism on the streets, yet at the same time they are almost invisible and voiceless in news coverage.

These representations of 'oppression' have created generalised images and narratives of Muslim women and the practices of veiling (Amer 2014). In contemporary discourses regarding Muslims and terrorism, representations of the veil have shifted from oppression to the threat of terrorism (Aly & Walker 2007, p.212). Kabir (2006) explains how newspapers have presented images of terrorists (such as Osama bin Laden) alongside veiled Muslim women to create a connection between them. Kabir (2006, p.316) finds that, 'while the press reported sympathetically on the women, the images inappropriately associated with other news to give readers the impression that the nature of "Muslimness" is violence'. Drawing on media stories involving Muslims, Kabir observes the ways that negative representations are created through visual imagery. Accordingly, as is discussed in Chapter Five, the veil has gained a certain salience within news and current affairs media.

Chalmers and Dreher (2009, p.138) also find that representations of Islamic veiling are changing, as they argue:

> Muslim women are constructed as emblematic of everything that is supposed to be "wrong" with patriarchal Islam, which is assumed to be threatening, foreign, oppressive, backward and uncivilised. Muslim women are both innocent and guilty at the same time. Portrayed as innocent, they are caricatured as at the behest of "their" men who all subscribe to brutish patriarchal norms who demand they cover themselves so as not to appear sexually attractive to other men, particularly Western men.

Chalmers and Dreher (2009) suggest that these representations define the cultural and racial divisions between Muslims and Australians. Muslim women (who veil) have become the markers of difference as they represent those people who 'refuse to be like us' (Aly 2009, p.21). Veiling is thus represented as being in contrast with Australian values. It is simply 'un-Australian' – emblematic of an alien and unwelcome identity (Johns & Lobo 2013, Hussein 2016, p.75).

Studies of veiling also draw on the effects of representations in establishing particular discourses that present Muslim women as 'spoken for' rather than 'spoken about' (Hussein 2007; 2009, Aly 2009, Ho 2007; 2010, Posetti 2010, Carland 2012, Pham 2011, Amer 2014). Ho (2010, p.434) argues that problematically these studies represent the overwhelming tendency of educated, 'white' women to speak up against Islamic oppression. Ho defines this as 'Orientalist feminism' that, 'sees women only as passive victims in need of salvation, rather than as active political agents'. Orientalist feminism suggests that the West and Western imperatives must protect these women from oppression, arguing that the solution to the problem must derive from outside Islam (see Chapter Five, Said 1978; 1981, Zine 2002, Ho 2010, Amer 2014).

Although Ho's (2010) account of Orientalist feminism does provide evidence of Muslim women being spoken for, scholarship has also demonstrated that Muslim women speak out for themselves (Dreher 2010b, Posetti 2010, Carland 2012, Aly 2014). In particular, Muslim women are publicly engaging in debates concerning Muslims in politics and media. Studies conducted by Posetti (2010) and Carland (2012) address how Muslim women choose to appear in media to discuss issues about veiling, Islam, gender inequality, and terrorism. However, Carland (2012) concludes that a large number of Muslim women endure criticism after making appearances in media. These criticisms rarely involve what the Muslim women said, and are mostly about how they conducted themselves and their appearance (Carland 2012, Aly 2014).

In Posetti's (2010, p.76) study Muslim women concluded that representations of veiling have mostly been clichéd in media reportage, especially those that focus on misogyny, oppression, polygamy, foreignness and 'un-Australianness'. When asked about 'speaking up' in media, these women have argued that it becomes pointless when framed in a way that reiterates the negative connotations about Muslims. Positive stories about Muslims are linked to Orientalist and negative perceptions that cloud the overall representation of Muslims in Australia. This is troublesome given that media is the common source of information about Muslims and Islam for a majority of Australians beyond their own immediate experiences (Humphrey 2010, p.67, Rane 2010, pp.104-123). It is the primary vehicle for the circulation of Orientalist ideas and political endeavours, which

reduce Muslims to a handful of clichés that are polarised as 'un-Australian', consequently leading to social exclusion (Aly 2007; 2010, Humphrey 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2016).

1.5.4 Muslims and Australian television

The literature stresses the overwhelmingly negative aspect of Muslim representations in Australia. Much of the literature investigates Muslim representations with a specific medium, mainly Australian newspapers, radio, and cinema (Poynting et al. 2000, Manning 2003; 2006, Kabir 2006, Posetti 2006; 2010, Dunn et al. 2007, Humphrey 2007, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Rane & Hersi 2012). This thesis annexes the literature reviewed above with regard to the Orientalist portrayal of Muslims as 'other', and grasps a 'fuller picture' of the way Muslims have been represented on television since 2005. This thesis questions how the representations of Muslim 'otherness' become frameworks within which narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed and produced. It therefore follows studies that focus on televisual representations, but that also reflect the negative depictions of Muslim 'otherness' (Phillips 2011, Dreher 2009, Pearce 2010, Nicholls 2011, Ewart & Rane 2011; 2013, Busbridge 2013).

Phillips (2011) analyses the ways that Muslims have been represented on commercial current affairs programs, and concludes that repetitive Orientalist imagery of veils and Mosques consistently reflect ideas of 'threat', 'danger', and 'otherness'. For Ewart and Rane (2011, p.58) 'these images are deployed in the media and communicate a vast amount of information without the need for words'. It is the Orientalist nature of such representations that allows particular connotations, associated with Muslims and Islam, to develop and resonate in public discourse.

For Dreher (2009), Pearce (2010), Nicholls (2011), and Busbridge (2013), Australian television has enabled the production of content, which has challenged Orientalist conceptions and common (mis)representations of Muslims. Local productions on public broadcasting and news segments on commercial networks have supported Muslims in Australia to 'speak out' about issues such as Islamobhopia and terrorism (Aslan 2009, Dreher 2003; 2009, Busbridge 2013,

Schottmann 2013, Chopra 2015, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). Nicholls (2011) and McClean (2011) argue that local television productions, particularly on public broadcasting in the last decade, have introduced audiences to Muslim characters. Both authors analyse the police drama *EastWest 101* (2007-2009), where the protagonist is a Muslim-Australian detective, allowing the program to deal with themes that address difficulties and issues of living in racial and multicultural societies such as Australia. Nicholls (2011) argues that while *EastWest 101* is promoted as constructive in presenting inclusive narratives of Muslim-Australians, it reiterates the status quo presented by Hage's 'white nation fantasy', and leaves ethnic relations in Australia unchallenged (see also Krayem 2014).

While these scholars demonstrate how local television productions encourage constructive representations of Muslims in Australia, such instances are still rare. According to Kalina (2012) Australian television screens have been 'white-washed', reflecting 'white' characters, narratives, and norms (see also Krayem 2014). For critics of Australian television such as Chopra (2015), there is a lack of the ethnically diverse Australian population in mass media generally. Chopra (2015, p.327) argues, 'for the almost 400 000 Muslims in Australia, the depiction of them are negative and based on stereotypical perceptions of the Muslim "bogeyman"'.

Australian television has mostly been criticised for the role it plays in circulating such Orientalist representations and depictions (Phillips 2011). However, this thesis is also interested in the potential that television has in creating fresh, productive perspectives, which focus on discursive developments of belonging and inclusiveness with respect to Muslim representations. Moreover, and as the literature suggests, television has greater opportunity to produce such narratives of inclusiveness, especially given its influence as a communicative medium. Flew and Gilmour (2006, p.175) argue, 'television is the most widely used mass media form in Australia…' Similarly Aslan (2009) claims that visual strategies as appropriated by television are far more comprehensible and believable than written texts in print media. More importantly:

> Television's power and influence can be assessed via a number of indicators. The sheer volume of time that TV viewing occupies in people's lives points to its importance, and it has increasingly displaced the

> newspaper as the principal source of news and information for the majority of the population (Flew and Gilmour 2006, p.175).

Television is an important focus for critical media analysis given its role and impact in producing socio-political discourse of Muslims in Australia (Hall 1982, Flew & Gilmour 2006). Hall (1982, p.142) suggests that much of television's power to represent rests on the visual and documentary character of its production – 'its inscription of itself as merely a "window on the world", showing things as they really are'. It has the power to promote specific ideologies and push particular agendas, representing 'naturalised' truths of social structures in society.

Contemporary socio-political contexts that frame the position of Muslims in Australia's multicultural framework facilitate a necessity to reconsider constructions and representations of Muslim 'otherness' through alternative contexts that take into account the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Yasmeen 2010). This is the case following the 2005 Cronulla Riots, which exposed contested notions of belonging in Australia that this thesis draws on, to analyse the ways they account for or reinforce both inclusionary and exclusionary practices in Australia's multicultural context. For Northcote and Casimiro (2010, p.153) Muslim exclusion has been framed by a 'cycle of isolation', which operates in a subtle manner and infects those institutions (media) that hold power in disseminating ideas about Muslim integration. In this 'cycle of isolation' it is also important to understand the 'system of opportunities' that exists simultaneously, 'made possible by a multicultural discourse that encourages cultural expression and a two-edged discourse of inclusion/exclusion that can swing in favour of social groups as quickly as it can swing against' (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, p.155).

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined and reviewed the theoretical framework that informs the discourse and media analysis in this thesis. The theoretical concerns of Said's (1978) *Orientalism* and Hage's (1998) *White Nation* guide analysis in this thesis, particularly in regards to ideological constructions that frame media representations of Muslim 'otherness' in multicultural spaces. While Orientalism allows for the identification of historical roots of common Muslim

representations, Hage's theorisation of the 'white nation' exposes social structures in multicultural Australia where Muslims are predominantly represented and excluded as 'other'. However, this chapter has also argued that the 'white nation' is constructed as a field, where belonging can be figuratively accumulated by 'non-whites', ultimately permitting Muslim 'otherness' to be placed within the realm of, but dominated by, 'whiteness'.

Studies of 'otherness' reveal the discursive implications that influence Orientalist media representations of Muslims in Australia. In particular, and prior to the Cronulla Riots in 2005, Muslims have been represented and perceived through a socio-political lens that has foregrounded terrorism as an aspect of threatening 'otherness' within the nation (Dunn 2001, Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006, Grewal 2007, Poynting & Morgan 2007, Lentin 2008, Humphrey 2010). These perceptions also frame narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on Australian television because they are influenced by discourses of multiculturalism and belonging. Discursive understandings of multiculturalism and belonging are significant cultural formations that complement the ways Orientalist perceptions filter through society at large. This thesis therefore explores how multiculturalism and belonging remain productions of ideological and discursive technologies that shape, preserve, and amplify the contested 'place' of Muslim 'otherness' in the ('white') Australian multicultural nation.

The next chapter elucidates the methodological approaches used in this thesis. Three methodological approaches are addressed: discourse analysis, critical discourses analysis, and genealogical analysis. These methodological approaches are discussed in the chapter with reference to the ways that each is utilised as a tool for media analysis in this thesis, and the particular deployment of each in examining representations of Muslim 'otherness' on Australian free-to-air television.

Chapter Two: Methodology

> …the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.
>
> (Said 1978, p.272)

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has addressed the significance of studying media representations of Muslim 'otherness' on Australian free-to-air television. It particularised discourses of Orientalism, 'whiteness', and multiculturalism, and highlighted their significance in exploring the racialised ethos of the Australian multicultural nation, by illustrating how notions of belonging are contested in constructed representations of 'whiteness' and 'otherness' (Hage 1998, Mansouri 2005, Kabir 2006, Hodge & O'Carroll 2006, White 2007, Pardy & Lee 2011). Discourses of multiculturalism and belonging have been drawn on, to identify the ideological constructions that position Muslims as 'other' in Australia. These are consistently framed through socio-political contexts that have produced dominant media representations of Muslims and Islam in the nation. This chapter explores the relationship between ideological and textual formations and their contexts, by addressing three factors – discourse, representation, and context – and mapping the methodological approaches deployed in this thesis.

The three methodological approaches explored in this chapter are discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and genealogical analysis. This chapter navigates the way these methodological approaches problematise media texts as part of analysis and help to explore the relationship between text formation, meaning making, discourse, representation, ideology, and context. While media texts are usefully understood as polysemic and ambiguous, texts nonetheless constitute important 'forms of cultural conventions' that are produced through socio-political contexts and discourses (Hall 1980, Gray 2003). Addressing the three methodological approaches of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and genealogical analysis, the first half of this chapter identifies the significance of each in the analysis of racial representations in media texts. The latter half

explains the ways each is applied to selected media texts taken from contemporary free-to-air Australian television network programs.

2.1.1 Research focus and approaches

This thesis analyses the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade after the Cronulla Riots (2005-2015). It is concerned with identifying trends in the way Muslims have been represented as 'other', and argues that the contested nature of the Cronulla Riots has resulted in the development of narratives that stress inclusiveness and belonging, simultaneously with those of exclusion and marginalisation. Chapter One advanced an understanding of Muslim 'otherness' by drawing on common, lingering Orientalist representations, constructed through 'threat', 'danger', and 'un-Australian-ness' (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Aly 2007; 2010, Kabir 2006; 2007, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Chalmers & Dreher 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015, Tufail 2015). The naturalising of these media representations has fed the eruption of racial tensions between Muslims and 'white' Australians at Cronulla beach in 2005 (Poynting 2006). Taking these riots as a starting point, this thesis investigates how media texts develop narratives and perceptions of an inclusive multicultural Australia, that Hage (1998) argues can never exist outside the boundary of tolerance, consistently positioning Muslims as 'other'.

This thesis addresses three research questions:

1. How have Muslims been represented on Australian free-to-air television in the period between 2005 and 2015?

2. How have these representations been framed through narratives of inclusiveness and discourses of belonging?

3. Are these narratives of inclusiveness and belonging problematised by racial discourses that consequently limit or make conditional the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural society?

This thesis utilises qualitative strategies to address the research questions and analyse media texts. Specifically, discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and genealogical analysis are deployed to allow for critical engagement with media texts and discourse in assessing *how* Muslims are represented on Australian free-to-air television (Saukko 2003, Tonkiss 2012, Anais 2013). These approaches provide insights into the way texts shape and reproduce socio-political meanings and other forms of knowledge that enable media researchers to understand how facts about the social world are formed and framed (Tonkiss 2012, p.405-406).

Hall (1980; 1997) argues that there is no single way of reading or interpreting texts and so there is also no 'right' way of analysing them. On the contrary, 'we should always bear in mind that how we approach our analysis totally depends on what we want texts to reveal' (Gray 2003, p.164). Theory and discourse of Muslim 'otherness' require methodological approaches to deal with constructed socio-political ideologies that are inherent within and surrounding media texts (van Dijk 1998). The methodological approaches addressed in the following sections identify discursive conditions that frame text production and reception, and examine how these have been historically produced (Whetherell & Potter 1992).

2.2 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a form of ideological analysis that concerns language and discourse (van Dijk 1995, Wodak & Meyer 2009, Tonkiss 2012). It examines patterns of language across texts and studies their relation to social and cultural contexts in which language is used. Paltridge (2012) explains that discourse analysis considers how 'views of the world' and 'identities' are constructed through language, text and context, and how language and text relate to 'discourse'. Hall (1997a, p.6) argues:

> Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society.

There are multiple ways of understanding what constitutes discourse. This thesis advances discourse in a Foucauldian sense, where the production of 'knowledge' and not necessarily 'meaning', is key to perceiving how human beings understand themselves in 'our culture' (Foucault 1982, p.208). The rules and practices that produce meaning have regulated discourse in various historical periods. In this sense 'discourse' can be defined as 'a group of statements which provide a language of talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment…' (Hall 1997a, p.44). This thesis deploys the term 'discourse' in relation to Westernised ideological structures that position Muslims as 'other' and normalise such positions through media representations. It deals with the power relations that are essential in racial social structures that Hage (1998) draws on in his account of the 'white nation' (see Chapter One).

Discourses shape the production and interpretation of specific 'knowledge' that develops at particular points in time. However, discourse does not operate discreetly outside of socio-political contexts. Hall (1990, p.222) explains that, 'we all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific…what we say is always "in context", *positioned*' (emphasis in original). Discourses perform a relationship between meaning, representation and the material. Hall (1997a) argues that meaning and representation share a relationship formed and framed in and through discourse. Representation in media texts is thus understood through 'meaning' that is constituted within discourse (Hall 1997a, p.44).

2.2.1 Meaning and representation in media texts

Discourse analysis recognises that texts are embedded with ideological meanings decoded by those who read them. As Hall (1997b, p.218) suggests, '…there is no one, true meaning…meaning "floats"'. Thus, texts are polysemic in that they can be read and interpreted in different ways depending on the interpreter's socio-political or ideological position in a given society.

Any analysis of discourse teaches us that social, economic and political motives influence any text production and reception (Wodak & Meyer 2009). The 'preferred readings' of texts can be said to emerge precisely *because of* discourse

(Hall 1980). For de Certeau (1984, p.xxiv), 'the question bears on more than the procedure of production: in a different form, it concerns as well the *status of the individual* in technical systems, since the involvement of the subject diminishes in proportion to the technocratic expansion of these systems' (emphasis in original). The production of discourse sees the reading of text 'politically' embedded in a particular social context as any text written or produced (Saukko 2003, p.112). As Pan and Kosicki (1993, p.64) argue, 'meanings result from active interpretations by audiences in relation to their knowledge and their life experiences', suggesting that both 'knowledge' and 'life experiences' are framed through discourse.

To put it in another way, certain cultural codes have been so widely distributed in specific socio-political cultures that they appear not to be constructed but naturally given (Hall 1980, p.167). 'Whiteness', as argued in Chapter One, is perceived as determining social hierarchy and can be 'accumulated' by those seen to be inferior in the 'white nation' (Hage 1998). 'Whiteness' thus *naturally* exists as an aspiration against which everything is measured. These views have derived from colonial histories, which ultimately have encouraged 'white' hegemony that normalises the superiority of 'whiteness' in Western/Australian contexts (Dyer 1997).

Texts are moulded in ways as to produce dominant meanings both in production and reception. Hall (1982, p.142) explains that discourses not only reference themselves in the structure of already 'objectivated social knowledge' but establish the 'viewer' in a complicated relationship of pragmatic knowledge to the 'reality of the discourse', producing 'point of view'. The production of meaning works through a framework of representation, where representation comes from a shared knowledge or culture (Hall 1997a). Representation is not only key to portraying something in a particular way, but is embedded in and through social, cultural and political discourse as 'real', 'true' and 'natural' (Hall 1980, Burr 1995, Whetherell & Potter 1992).

As demonstrated in Chapter One, the representation of Muslims as 'other' is naturalised through media narratives. Specific stereotypes depict Muslims through derogatory categories such as 'criminal', 'terrorist', and 'un-Australian' (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Dunn 2001, Aslan 2009, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Rane, Ewart and

Abdalla 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Chopra 2015, Tufail & Poynting 2016). These shape the ways Muslims are perceived, understood, talked about, and related to by the non-Muslim majority in Australia. The perceptions create a specific 'knowledge' as Foucault would argue, where the discourses about/relating to Muslims are framed through a 'system of representation' (Said 1978, p.273, Hall 1997a, p.44).

Analysis of discourse thus questions the role of discourse in annexing socio-political ideologies in Western societies. It presents the question: *who* produces media texts and for the benefit of *whom*? According to Fairclough (1995, p.2) the (mass) media has significant power to shape and influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, and identities. For Hall (1990, p.226) the media plays a decisive role in preserving specific knowledge about the 'other'. The question then becomes one of who produces media texts, who interprets them and how they do so. For this reason, discourse analysis unpacks constructed representations in media texts, simultaneously advancing an understanding of the intended or 'imagined audience'.

2.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Fairclough (1995) argues that any examination of media texts should be in relation to critical analysis of discourse (see also van Dijk 1995, Wodak & Meyer 2009). Discourse analysis requires intimate examinations of texts and is concerned with studying the effect of language, text, and 'meaning making' processes in shaping the social world (Tonkiss 2012). However, critical discourse analysis pays closer attention to critical issues by engaging with discourse to observe how social power, abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by texts in social and political settings (van Dijk 1995, Martin & Rose 2003, Brennen 2013, Wodak & Meyer 2009, O'Keeffe 2011, Tonkiss 2012).

Critical discourse analysis examines the role of language, text, and discourse in shaping society by focusing on the relations between power, hegemony, and constructed ideologies. Threadgold (2003) argues that critical discourse analysis is not interested in the workings of individual texts but the way they are traversed by traces of, and enter into networks of, other texts and discourses to form a part

of the hegemonic discursive structures that create social realities. As Gramsci (1971) argues, hegemony reflects the class and ideological struggles of one social group attempting to win the consent of another in socio-cultural contexts.

Lears (1985, p.567) argues that Gramscian social thought contains some 'remarkably suggestive insights' into questions of dominance and subordination in modern, capitalist societies. As outlined in Chapter One, Gramsci's (1971) hegemony explores the relationships between culture, power, and domination. It provides insights into the cultural channels through which politics are expressed in the space of civil society (Smith 2007). Arguably, hegemony works in and through discourse and is pervasive, relating to all spheres of social existence including the economic, political, and cultural (Sullivan 1984, p.89). Hall (1986) argues that the mass media is a central institution in the cultural realm of hegemony. Hall draws on Gramsci's views to suggest that hegemony produces and sustains specific ideas that have a 'centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion…' (Hall 1986, p.22). Moreover, these ideas are 'sustained and transformed in their materiality within the institutions of civil society and the state' (Hall 1986, p.22). Hegemony therefore deals with the ideological structures of society, which both produce and use discourse as a means of exercising power.

By referencing hegemony, critical discourse analysis can connect ideas of knowledge and discourse to the naturalisation and exercise of power (Martin & Rose 2003, p.264, Wodak & Meyer 2009, p.7). In a Foucauldian sense, power is exercised in and through discourse. This thesis suggests that power is not necessarily a 'possession', but functions through knowledge, as 'there is no meaning outside power' (Burr 1995, Martin & Rose 2003, p. 264).

2.3.1 Power

The analysis of media texts within socio-political contexts promotes critical understandings of power relations that circulate within society (Threadgold 2003). Both 'power' and 'ideology' are significant in discourse and are understood in reference to social reality. This thesis underscores Foucauldian understandings of power, where knowledge is recognised as a power over others and a power to define others (Burr 1995, p.64). Foucault (1972, pp.88-89) argues:

> …power is conceived primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance simultaneously of the relations of production and of class domination which the development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered possible.

One of the primary ways power relations are understood in any given society is through critical engagements with discourse. Critical discourse analysis is significant because it allows discourses relating to Muslims to be analysed and critiqued based on how they frame representations of 'otherness'. Power is central to the discourse of Orientalism. Said (1978) argues that Orientalism survives through unequal power relations that have historically, politically, and socially defined exchanges between East (Orient) and West (Occident). It produces Muslim 'otherness' as a discourse in itself, threaded through ideology, as an effect of the exercise of cultural power and normalisation (Hall 1990, p.225).

In Australia's multicultural society, Muslims are positioned as inferior to the 'dominant' Australian mainstream. Power can thus be understood through the construction of Hage's (1998) 'white nation', where power is integral in establishing a multicultural and/or tolerant society. It questions who is 'included', who is 'excluded', and who has the 'power' to make those decisions? If power is central in producing representations of Muslim 'otherness', then it is also central in the development of inclusive narratives in discourses of belonging. This thesis is concerned not only with how Muslims are represented through narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, but also the conditions under which these are determined. The analytic chapters of this thesis demonstrate that, consequently, some Muslims can 'accumulate' a higher degree of belonging than others, and are therefore in a position to be more 'tolerated' than others (Hage 1998). Understanding power necessitates an analysis of the conditions and effects of inclusion and exclusion, with regard to the conceptual 'place' of Muslims in multicultural Australia's representational structures.

Further to this, power works as a symbolic term that links media texts to constructed, hegemonic ideologies. As mentioned previously, this thesis questions how the production of mediated narratives and representations benefits one group of people over, and at the expense of, another. Hage (1998) and others (Pugliese 2002, Moreton-Robinson 2004, Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 2006, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008) argue that Australia is imagined as 'naturally white' and therefore

much of the discourse produced through media works to preserve that norm. This thesis investigates how such normalised 'whiteness' is masked under the guise of an idealistic multiculturalism, which promotes aspects of diversity and difference as part of an imaginary, national Australian culture. This has been the case in the aftermath of the 2005 Cronulla Riots, where racial reconciliation (rather than separatism) was stressed by governmental and media initiatives. Yet the focus on reconciliation emphasises 'otherness' as prescribed difference. While it promotes positive representations of Muslims, it does not displace Orientalist representations, perceptions, or thoughts about Muslims that normalise 'otherness' and exclusion within contemporary Australian multiculturalism (Hall 1997b, Hage 1998).

2.3.2 Ideology

There are a number of ways in which ideology is approached in critical discourse analysis. Some researchers identify multiple ideological positions in texts, while others focus on understanding how dominant ideological power relations within race, class, age, gender and ethnicity are encoded in texts (Brennen 2013, p.202). This thesis examines the socio-political and ideological perspectives that shape media texts by 'maintaining that texts help to construct our knowledge, values and beliefs, and reinforce our common sense understandings' (Brennen 2013, p.202). Ideology is thus understood as:

> …the dominant ideas of an individual, group, class or society, the way meanings are socially produced, or even as the false ideas upon which a social, political or economic system is based (Brennen 2013, p.201).

Ideology is a discursive construct that (re)produces specific aspects of society as natural, and frames them as part of 'normal' social experience. Ideology in this sense has been framed as a 'socially shared schema' or 'mould', which patterns the thoughts of its 'bearers' (Billig et al. 1988, p.29). Hall (1982, pp.142-143) argues that ideologies construct naturalised 'points-of-view' and repress 'any recognition of the contingency, of the historical conditions on which all social relations depend. It represents them, instead as outside of history: unchangeable, inevitable and natural'. The meanings embedded in media texts are not determined by the structure of 'reality', but dependant conditionally on the work

of representations that are successfully characterised by social practices (Hall 1982, p.145).

Ideology therefore underscores dominant ideas, disseminated and normalised within society, but should not be conflated with discourse. Analysis of ideology identifies the way 'forms of consciousness' condition the manner in which social subjects become 'conscious' of their conflicting interests and struggles (Purvis & Hunt 1993). It is associated with attempts to understand how power relations concerning domination and subordination are produced and reproduced in society. Ideological power, unlike discourse, is therefore understood as something external to, rather than inscribed within, the knowledge constituted by social practices (Foucault 1972, Purvis & Hunt 1993, Hall 1997a). This shift from earlier understandings of ideology, where the exercise of power works within a top-down Marxist model, marks the movement to Foucauldian thinking, that focuses on subjectivity, disciplinarity and most importantly the social conditions within which discourses are formed and framed.

Ideology and discourse nonetheless share relations concerning aspects of social life (Purvis & Hunt 1993, p.474). For Purvis and Hunt (1993), ideology represents specific forms of discourse that reference the normalisations of subjugation or domination of social subjects in particular contexts, through media and communications (see also Hall 1997a). Both ideology and discourse are central to understanding how society participates in the comprehension or 'consciousness' of social relations and engagement in cultural, social and political activities. As Purvis and Hunt (1993, p.474) argue:

> This consciousness is borne through language and other systems of signs, it is transmitted between people and institutions and, perhaps most important of all, it makes a difference; that is, the way in which people comprehend and make sense of the social world has consequences for the direction and character of their action and interaction.

This thesis addresses ideology in similar terms to discourse, in the way it mobilises meaning within media texts so as to represent and normalise Muslim 'otherness' as something external to Australia, but that must be 'tolerated'. Hage's (1998) 'white nation' is discussed as an ideology in this sense, that attempts to preserve 'whiteness' in Australian society, by subjugating the Muslim 'other'.

Ideology suggests 'truth' (or reality) may be distorted or manipulated in pursuit of particular 'white interests' (Fairclough 1995, p.46). According to van Dijk (1995) ideology produces in-groups and out-groups where the in-group is the dominant group, positively presented, and sets the perimeters of who is included and excluded. This thesis follows van Dijk's (1995, p.139) account of ideology, attending to polarities of 'us' and 'them'. Ideology is considered through racial discourses that not only uphold hegemonic ideals but also determine how/why 'difference' is produced within a society. It is thus impossible to read and analyse texts without considering the ideological principles, much as it is difficult to read texts without considering contexts (Gray 2003).

2.3.3 Context

The interplay between 'discourse', 'meaning', 'power', and 'ideology' foregrounds 'context' as significant in both the production and interpretation (reception) of media texts. This is critical in studying the representation of Muslims, because representations and stereotypes are often taken-for-granted constructs that are normalised through discourse (Hall 1980). In the relationship between 'text' and 'context', contexts influence social variables such as, race, ethnicity and religion, and allow for the understandings of the ways that dominance is executed in any given setting (Wodak & Meyer 2009, p. 14). Context offers insights into how/why Muslims and Islam are represented in a particular way on Australian television, through the socio-political environments at the time of production and reception. As Gray (2003, pp.144-145) argues, it is impossible to deal with texts in isolation, as separable from their context because texts are produced and interpreted through social and historical relations and discourses.

The media texts analysed in this thesis are simultaneously discussed against socio-political contexts that have been highlighted in Chapter One. These texts are recognised as products of an 'age of terrorism', and thus read against a post-9/11and post-Cronulla context. The relationship between these contexts sees multiple discourses shape the production and reception of these media texts. It is context that ultimately reflects the way Muslims and Islam are reported on and represented in the Australian media (Aly 2007; 2010).

2.4 Genealogy

Where discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis focus on 'discourse' as the framework for analysis, genealogical analysis is more concerned with the historical principles in which discursive normalisations develop. It allows discourse to be understood as discontinuously marked by historical breaks in understanding, which ultimately change the way objects (Muslims) are conceptualised and understood. Genealogy investigates the 'historic origins of meaning', as Saukko (2003, p.115) argues:

> Genealogy is a method that investigates how certain taken-for-granted, such as scientific, truths are historical constructs that have their own roots in specific social and political agendas.

As a methodological approach, genealogical analysis is not concerned with studying the history of 'origins', but maps out epochal shifts and is designed to question established practices and beliefs (Saukko 2003, p.131). It doesn't explain where things came from; it explains *how* they have been discursively constituted, and how their meaning has come about. As Guttig (1990, p.340) suggests, genealogy deals with the processes whereby 'systems of discourse' are formed rather than given. The goal of genealogical analysis in cultural studies is to explore how some ways of being are not 'timeless truths' but socio-historical constructs (Saukko 2003, p.116).

Foucault understands genealogy as a productive methodology, which explores the historicity of a particular phenomenon. As Foucault (1972, p.78) explains:

> …it [Genealogy] is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession. This search is directed to "that which was already there," the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity…there is "something altogether different" behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.

Genealogy reveals the political underpinnings that frame discourse in any given time. As Foucault argues, 'social subjects' can only be 'produced' and developed through certain discourses (Hall 1997a, p.46). Knowledge about Muslims has

developed within socio-political contexts that render particular representations as naturally given. Genealogy helps track the discourses and representations to better understand ideological or discursive formations. Foucault (1972, p.86) argues that genealogical analysis records:

> …the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical processes.

Saukko (2003) explains that there are two main approaches to genealogy. The first is a historical approach, and the second an investigation into the historicity of phenomena that are forming in the present (Saukko 2003, p.133). This thesis utilises genealogical analysis as a tool for the mapping of Muslim representations to apprehend the ways these have developed into contemporary social understandings of Muslims and Islam. Such analysis allows us to understand that any knowledge, including historical knowledge, is constituted through discursive formations (Whetherell and Potter, p.80).

Similar to critical discourse analysis, genealogy links contemporary discourses to historical events that have influenced structures of the social world. Genealogical analysis is deployed to track how socio-political contexts impact and influence the development of certain discourses, representations, and stigmas surrounding Muslims and Islam. Chapter Three provides a genealogical analysis of the political climates that have influenced and produced media representations of Muslims in the years leading up to the Cronulla Riots. This type of analysis assists framing moments of discursive production of common representations of Muslim 'otherness' that have developed in Australia. Ultimately, genealogical analysis is a method and process that unpacks ideologies from a historical perspective, but not in order to construct explicitly chronological or nominal accounts. Genealogical analysis facilitates the exploration of representations of Muslims in terms of how they develop, how they are framed, and reproduced through Orientalist discourses presented and maintained on Australian television.

2.5 Analysing media texts

Studying the relationship between discourse, ideology, context and representation assists in questioning why common representations of Muslims are framed through 'otherness'. These questions promote analysis that concerns the function of these representations in the preservation and circulation of dominant trajectories (Hall 1982, van Dijk 1995, Gray 2003, Brennen 2013). The application of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and genealogical analysis presents understanding of these complex relationships (between discourse, ideology and media texts), and facilitates ways of making sense of Muslim representations, particularly those regarding discourses of belonging on Australian free-to-air television. While the above sections introduced and discussed these methodological approaches, this section explores how they are utilised as a means of analysis for this study of television representations.

2.5.1 Television

Television is a dynamic and complex medium that requires analysis, which moves beyond the basic scope of semiology, where images have primacy over words. For Fairclough (1995), television invokes a more complex consideration of factors such as 'text', 'sound', and 'image'. The combination of these factors enables 'messages' or 'texts' to be more articulate and influential, making television the 'dominant medium of social discourse and representation in our society' (Hall 1982, p.142). Hall argues that the 'system of recognition' on which television relies, is especially important because it is widely available in any culture and so *appears* to involve no invention of coding, selection, or arrangement. The texts produced by television are thus perceived as *naturalisti*c and taken-for-granted, denoting that audiences are assumed to 'passively consume them [media texts]' (Hall 1982, Ang 1996, Gerbner et al. 2002).

Critical debates regarding the notion of the passive television audience have featured strongly in the development of media studies as a discipline. For Gerbner et al. (2002, p.44) television informs and impacts social reality because it has become the primary source of 'socialisation and everyday information' for an otherwise heterogeneous population. Television plays a significant role in the way people receive and understand information, ultimately describing and prescribing

the way people might act and behave in certain social environments. This view renders television consumption or 'television watching' as a 'natural practice' firmly set in the routines of everyday life (Ang 1996, p.21). However, these observations position television as a 'naturalistic medium' that also renders its audience 'submissive' to the messages produced (Hall 1982). Television, in this way of thinking, is a 'persuasive medium' that works as a one-way, monolithic, 'push' process (Hall 1980; 1982, Brown 1992, Gerbner et al. 2002, pp.48-49). In the context of Muslim representations, this view suggests that Muslim 'otherness' is naturalised as a universal truth, *simply accepted by the audience* as an unchanging fact about the social world. As Said (1981) argues, Orientalist depictions become normalised, and in this view of television, the primary, unchallenged source of information about Muslims and Islam among television viewers.

Other studies position television as 'pro-social', as opposed to 'persuasive', because it engages audiences through entertainment and information (Brown & Singhal 1990, Brown 1992). Brown (1992, p.254) acknowledges the social role of television and the impact it has on its audience, by arguing that television should be studied as an educational tool, which promotes messages and disseminates valuable knowledge that denotes positivity and social acceptance. Television, as a tool for change, allows consumers to invest in the meaning making process, particularly in reference to race relations in multicultural societies such as Australia. In this view, television can disseminate messages of positivity and inclusiveness for Muslims in Australia, allowing an audience to interpret narratives of inclusiveness and belonging despite recurring representations of 'otherness'.

Television is a medium that sustains both 'persuasive' and 'pro-social' qualities. Whilst television does produce representations of 'otherness' through latent and manifest Orientalist discourse, it also produces narratives of inclusiveness and belonging concerned with recognising the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural social context. Subsequently, this thesis is less concerned with analysing the impact of media texts, than with the representations inherent in these texts in concert with the socio-political discourses, and contexts that bind their production. Media texts are analysed based on *how* they represent Muslims

in the context of Australian multiculturalism, through the discursive formation of televisual narratives that signify inclusion and exclusion.

The commercial and public value of Australian free-to-air television is also acknowledged throughout analysis. The aims and purposes of each of the free-to-air networks and broadcasters differ greatly. While there are five free-to-air channels, three are commercial networks (Seven, Nine, Ten) structured around profit, loss and the market economy, while the other two are public broadcasters (SBS, ABC) that seek to inform and educate public audiences. Understanding both the commercial and public imperatives of Australian television helps to determine the discursive context of media texts, through entertainment, information, education, profit or news-making (Brown & Singhal 1990, Brown 1992, Macdonald 2000, Flew & Gilmour 2006, Ang et al. 2008, Phillips 2011). Emphasising the purposeful construction of media texts on these television channels places framing and production in a direct relationship with 'otherness', via discourses of inclusion or exclusion of Muslims in Australia.

2.5.2 Gathering and analysing media texts

The processes of data collection, case study and analysis in this thesis, works through distinct but interrelated methodological stages. Firstly, media texts produced and broadcast between March 2013 and November 2015 are gathered from across the five free-to-air television networks. Texts are chosen for analysis based on *how* they represent Muslims in Australia; in particular, the focus is on television images and stories that seemingly reduce or place Orientalised Muslim 'otherness' in the background, to produce ostensibly positive depictions of Muslims and Islam. According to Fairclough (1995), flexible ways of analysing media texts better considers the themes embedded in and through textual content (see also Tonkiss 2012). This thesis analyses media texts by identifying and addressing five themes within which positive depictions or narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims are constructed and develop on Australian television: 'speaking out', 'domestication', 'in-betweenness', 'cosmo-multiculturalism' and 'nation'. These themes are further divided and addressed by the five analytic chapters (Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight) of this thesis, and are listed in the table below (Table 1) along with the media texts chosen for analysis.

Table 1: Analytic Chapters and Themes

Segment	Program	Network/broadcaster	Theme	Chapter
True Colours	*Insight*	Special Broadcasting Service	'Speaking out'	Four
-	*Salam Cafe*	Special Broadcasting Service	'Speaking Out'	Four
Behind the Veil	*Today Tonight*	Network Seven	'Domestication'	Five
Behind the Veil	*Sunday Night*	Network Seven	'Domestication'	Five
Crossing Over	*A Current Affair*	Network Nine	'In-betweenness'	Six
-	*Underbelly: The Golden Mile*	Network Nine	'In-betweenness'	Six
-	*The Project*	Network Ten	'Cosmo-multiculturalism'	Seven
-	*MasterChef Australia*	Network Ten	'Cosmo-multiculturalism'	Seven
Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style	*Compass*	Australian Broadcasting Corporation	'Nation'	Eight
A Winger and a Prayer	*Australian Story*	Australian Broadcasting Corporation	'Nation'	Eight

Chapter Four examines the theme of 'speaking out', which encourages practices that present Muslims with incentives to counter Orientalist representations (Dreher 2003; 2009; 2010a). Chapter Five addresses the theme of 'domestication' that positions Muslims internally, as opposed to externally, in narratives of the nation (Humphrey 2001; 2009; 2014). Chapter Six investigates the theme of 'in-betweenness' by exploring hybrid constructions where Muslim 'otherness' is mitigated and fused with 'whiteness' to foster inclusive narratives (Brown 2010). Chapter Seven assesses the theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism' (Hage 1997; 1998) that promotes discourses which represent 'otherness' as a form of enrichment, rather than 'threat', in the nation. Chapter Eight examines the theme of 'nation' in terms of how Muslims can accumulate a sense belonging in the 'white nation', based on how they affiliate with Australian over Islamic values (Hage 1998, Humphrey 2001, Northcote & Casimiro 2010).

2.5.3 Textual and content Analysis

The five themes addressed in this thesis are discussed in conjunction with textual and content analysis of media texts. Textual analysis deconstructs media texts and highlights the representational structures, styles, and messages found in each text. Content analysis establishes the frequency of key messages, and phrases that produce a specific 'knowledge' about Muslims and Islam. Both analyses allow for the examination of media texts against their socio-cultural and socio-political contexts that shape ideologically charged constructions of Muslim 'otherness' (Fairclough 1995, van Dijk 1995, Hall 1997b, Tonkiss 2012). As Tonkiss (2012, p.413) argues, 'the repetition or emphasis of keywords, phrases and images reveals most clearly what the speaker or writer is trying to put across in the text'.

Van Dijk's (1995) 'discursive strategies' are used to sift through, compare, and contrast media texts in reference to relevant discourses and ideologies. Van Dijk (1995) outlines discursive strategies, considered here, that can be used to analyse descriptions of Muslims and Islam by applying the following 'discursive strategies':

- *Negative lexicalisation:* Selecting words deemed negative in descriptions of Muslims and Islam.

- *Hyperbole:* If/how Muslims and events involving Muslims are described in exaggerated terms.
- *Negative/positive comparisons:* Outlining 'bad' or 'good' qualities of Muslims and Islam and how these are situated opposite 'qualities' of Australia and Australians.
- *Generalisations:* The use of conflation in generalising Muslims as a uniform community.
- *Warning*: Whether Muslims and Islam are described in threatening terms or through racial prejudice.
- *Norm and value violation:* If/how descriptions of Muslims and Islam are structured through us/them narratives presenting 'whiteness' or Australia as the norm and Muslims as 'other'.

This combination of textual and content analysis facilitates the discursive interpretation of media texts in this thesis. Texts are not taken in isolation, but questioned in reference to their position within the wider production and dissemination of discourse about Muslims and Islam in Australia. The analysis questions how inclusiveness and belonging, or exclusion and marginalisation, are imagined, in reference to the ideological understandings produced within media texts. These frame Muslim representations through inclusion or exclusion, and depict the Australian nation through discourses of multiculturalism and belonging (Hall 1982, Fairclough 1995, Hage 1998).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed three methodological approaches utilised within this thesis: discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and genealogical analysis. These approaches allow for textual and content based analysis that simultaneously navigates socio-political contexts and discourses that bind their production (Gutting 1990, Fairclough 1995, van Dijk 1995, Saukko 2003, Gray 2003, O'Keeffe 2011, Wodak & Meyer 2009, Tonkiss 2012). Such analysis shapes critical discussions of the roles of discourse and ideology in framing Muslims as 'other' in Australia's multicultural society (Said 1978, Hall 1997a, Hage 1998).

Following Chapter One, this chapter has argued that both discourse and ideology are central to the production of narratives concerning Muslim 'otherness' in Australia.

The next chapter is a genealogical analysis of Muslim representations produced and developed prior to the 2005 Cronulla Riots. The chapter highlights and explores specific mediated events that have shaped televisual and cultural stories of the marginalisation and exclusion of Muslims in Australia since that time.

Chapter Three: Muslim representations in the Australian media prior to the Cronulla Riots

> While stereotypes have been found to assist us in making sense of groups of people in society, there is a tendency towards unconscious bias in which seemingly innocuous perceptions are underlined by discrimination. These perceptions become prejudices when left unchallenged with a counter view.
>
> (Chopra 2015, p.326)

> The recipients of the hate-crime message are not targeted for anything they might have done; they are targeted for being who they are, or, rather, being who they are, where they are – where they do not belong. They transgress by being there. From the point of view of hate criminals, they must be expelled from "our" space, or forced to keep such a low profile that they are not identifiable in it.
>
> (Asquith & Poynting 2011, p.99)

3.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the 2005 Cronulla Riots. It highlights the Cronulla Riots as a significant event, in underscoring contested notions of belonging, with reference to who can and cannot exist/belong within the national space (Hage 1998, Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Dunn 2009, Garbutt 2009, Antonsich 2010, Asquith & Poynting 2011). Such contested notions of belonging repeatedly position Muslims as in contrast to 'white' Australians. This chapter reviews media representations (prior to 2005) that have centralised on these contestations, and constructed states of exclusion where Muslims have been ostracised as an 'other' in the national space. This chapter explores particular mediated events concerning Muslims and argues that these have developed discursive narratives, which depict Muslims as a 'threat' to/within the Australian nation (Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006, Poynting 2006, Aly & Walker 2007, Noble 2008, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Chopra 2015, Tufail & Poynting 2016,).

This chapter offers a genealogical analysis of the mediated 'place' of Muslims in Australia prior to the 2005 Cronulla Riots. To recap from the previous chapter: genealogy is a method that assists in dismantling authoritative forms of knowledge and tracks the origins of particular discourses (Saukko 2003). It analyses previous media representations to challenge the normalised perceptions of Muslims in the 'present' context (Foucault 1972, Saukko 2003). The role of the Cronulla Riots is of particular significance in this chapter, considered as a turning

point from where narratives of inclusiveness and belonging have developed on Australian television. These narratives are necessary in a post-Cronulla context to counter common derogatory representations of Muslims as 'threats' in/to the nation. Orientalist depictions have particularly framed and normalised perceptions of 'otherness', and constructed states of exclusion for Muslims in multicultural spaces.

While Orientalism is used as a key framework throughout this chapter (and thesis) to analyse media content which exhibits ideas of 'otherness', it also limits the ability to understand Muslim representations in Australia outside to the us/them dynamic. While critics of Orientalism (Waraq 2007, Farris 2010, Samiei 2010, Kumar 2012) argue for its inconsistency and irrelevance in today's society, it is nonetheless useful in understanding how relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have been socially constructed in the media, as this chapter illustrates, particularly in regards to ethnic crime, where Orientalism assists in understanding the outcast of Muslims as 'other'. Observations made to this end do not necessarily deem all media coverage of non-white cultures and/or criminality as Orientalist, but point to indications of how non-white/cultured representations can be analysed.

This chapter particularly explores the historical presence of Muslims in Australia and particularly in relation to early Muslim migration in the pre- and post-settlement years. The analysis then investigates specific events that have been framed through Orientalist representations in Australia, such as the Gulf War and 9/11. These events prove to be significant, as their repeated mediation has resulted in states of exclusion for Muslims in the nation, and instigated racial sentiment, which prompted the riots at Cronulla beach in 2005. The latter half of this chapter draws on the impacts of the Cronulla Riots in underscoring discursive notions of national belonging in multicultural settings, which have constructed narratives of inclusion and exclusion.

3.2 Early years of Muslim migration to Australia

Muslims have been significant in historical narratives of pre- and post- settlement periods in Australia, evidencing that Muslim presence dates back centuries. Aslan

(2009) argues that Muslim travellers, such as the Macassan fishermen (discussed below), were among the first 'migrants' to frequently visit the Australian nation. Once the British colonised Australia in 1788, they brought with them Afghan cameleers to assist in the settlement and development of the nation. According to Kabir (2007), these Afghan cameleers were among the first Muslims to migrate to Australia as labourers and assist in 'white' settlement (see also Isakhan 2010). However, these narratives of early Muslim migration have consistently been omitted from Australian mythology, despite their relevance in 'building the nation' (Kabir 2007).

3.2.1 Patterns of Muslim migration

Aslan (2009) argues that contrary to historical belief, the first Muslim travellers to Australia were Muslim Macassan fishermen. These fishermen 'came from the port of Macassar in the south-west corner of the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi, formerly known as Celebes', and made regular voyages to the northern shores of Australia, decades before British settlement (Aslan 2009, p.28-29). Each year the fishermen would sail down to the coast of (what is now) the Northern Territory, and set up beach camps, spending four months catching and processing sea animals. The Macassans established good relations with local Aboriginal tribes in the north, and did not intend to possess or colonise the Australian continent (Aslan 2009, Isakhan 2010).

At the time of British settlement in 1788, English explorers, convicts, and free settlers arrived in Australia. Many of them also transferred Muslim camel drivers from India to assist in the transportation of goods and services. The camel drivers were referred to as Afghan cameleers and have been recognised as one of the first Muslim groups to migrate to Australia (Kabir 2007, p.1278). The cameleers were prominent during the Gold Rush period of the 1850s, a time where the Australian economy boomed. The Afghan cameleers were favoured over horsemen during these periods, given they were able to transport goods across the country as 'the camels could endure lack of food and water; they were hardy, faster and more reliable compared to bullocks and horses; and transport by camel strings was cheaper' (Aslan 2009, p.33). Muslim Malay pearl divers also migrated to Australia in the 1800s, to assist in the development of the pearl industry. Malay

pearl divers were also favoured over Europeans, as they provided a source of cheap labour and were more suited for tough working conditions in the water (Aslan 2009, p.31).

Despite the crucial roles these Muslims played during the period of settlement (by assisting in the exploration and development of the nation), 'record of their efforts and acknowledgment of their achievement are paltry at best' (Isakhan 2010, p.13-14). Recognition of the contributions and achievements made by these early Muslims is scarce in Australian historical narratives. This is because recorded history focuses mostly on 'white' narratives[7] and excludes migrants, such as Afghan cameleers and Malay pearl divers, who were brought to Australia to assist in the development of the labour force (Kabir 2006, p.209). According to Kabir (2006, p.195), the omission of these Muslims from greater Australian narratives served to preserve a 'white Australian ideal' that developed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries where 'politicians and journalists began to articulate a vision of a future Australia inhabited only by "white" people'.

The notion of the 'white Australia ideal' framed the basis of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* (also known as the White Australia Policy[8]) that developed in 1901, restricting the immigration of 'non-white' and non-European people into Australia (Aslan 2009). The purpose of this legislation was to preserve the nation as a 'white' outpost of the British Empire (Day 2000, p.31). According to Isakhan (2010, p.13), the Act, 'not only sought to limit and control the arrival of non-European immigrants, it also sought to further disenfranchise and marginalise those few who had already arrived'. A number of 'European Muslims' were exempt under this policy, such as the Albanians, and were often granted permission into Australia to work as labourers in the 1920s. Between the years of 1967 and 1971, some policies of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* were lifted

[7] According to Bode (2009), popular Australian mythology is dominated by stories of 'white men' who worked as labourers, farmers of Bushman in the early years of settlement. For more details see Bode (2009).

[8] The *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* was replaced in 1972. Much of the policies under this Act limited non-white immigration into Australia and focussed on assimilationism (see Tabar et al. 2003).

allowing Australia to form an assisted migration agreement[9] with Turkey that saw thousands of Muslims migrate to Australia in that period of time.

As the ethnic population grew throughout the 1960s, the so-called White Australia Policy struggled to regulate and control the influx of 'non-white' migration and was officially abandoned in 1972. It was replaced by the policy of Integration[10] (which sought to allow migrants to integrate into Australian society rather than assimilate) and later Multiculturalism. The policy of Multiculturalism saw an increase in Muslim migration from regions that are predominantly Islamic such as Lebanon (due to the Arab-Israeli Conflict in 1967 and the Civil War in 1975), Iran (due to the Islamic Revolution in 1979), Iraq (due to the Gulf Crisis in 1991), and most recently Afghanistan (due to introduction of Taliban rule in 1996) (Aslan 2009, p.39). The influx of migrants from these areas meant that the Muslim population expanded rapidly in Australia throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Ultimately, as Muslims became more visible in public spaces, their 'foreignness' and 'otherness' became an object of media fascination.

3.3 Creating an enemy: Muslims in the Australian media

When Muslim migration from Middle Eastern regions was at its highest in the 1990s, a number of events occurred that saw Muslims and Islam become frequent targets of media interest. These events cast Muslims primarily as 'foreigners' and objects of fear in Australia, rendering Muslim 'otherness' as a 'threat' (Aslan 2009). These events are explored in the sections below by consolidating the ways mediated Muslim 'otherness' has constructed states of exclusion in Australia and presented Muslims as enemies within the nation.

3.3.1 The Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and annexed it under his leadership. Many Western nations, led by America, disapproved of the

[9] The first significant migration wave of Turkish people dates back to 1967, following a bilateral agreement between the Turkish and Australian governments. The agreement was made to facilitate the provisions of assisted migration to Australia for the Turkish.

[10] The policy of Integration replaced the so-called 'White Australia Policy' and allowed 'non-whites' to integrate into Australian society by following Australian 'values' and an Australian way of life. Criticisms of this policy, suggest that integration stood alongside assimilation as the same set of government agencies and community organisations that oversaw policies of Assimilation were used to implement the policies of Integration (see Tabar et al. 2003, p.272).

invasion and called that Iraq immediately withdraw from Kuwait. Australia supported America in declaring war against Iraq to prevent Hussein's expansion into other oil-rich regions of the Gulf (where Kuwait was situated). The United Nations Security Council decided to impose sanctions against Iraq allowing military intervention from America and its allies (Aslan 2009, p.40). The Australian military dispatched warships to the Gulf to assist America in the war. Iraqi troops were quickly defeated, however the war resulted in 'many deaths, great human suffering and escalation of human rights violation in the Middle East' (Powell & Bolt 1992, p.26, Aslan 2009, p.41). This angered Iraqi troops as they released millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf creating a 'Gulf Crisis', which was recorded as the largest oil spill in history (Aslan 2009, p.41).

The Gulf War was extensively covered by the media and became the only source of information about the Gulf region for many people in Australia. It is therefore a significant event in understanding the discursive developments of Muslim representations in contemporary Australia. The Gulf War has been recognised as one of the first *televised* wars since the Vietnam War, with the difference being that a greater number of Australians owned and watched television in the 1990s compared to the 1970s (Tiffen & Gittins 2004). According to Tiffen and Gittins (2004, p.182) the number of television sets per 1000 people in Australian increased from 216 in the 1970s to 522 in the 1990s. As a result, a greater number of Australians had access to television underscoring that reportage of the Gulf War reached a higher number of viewers.

Images of the Gulf War also happened to be more graphic and explicit than those of Vietnam, with real time bombings and other war atrocities directly streaming to news programs, later watched by larger numbers of Australians (Kendrick 1994). Video footage overtly focused on missiles and other American military technology 'successfully' used against the 'Arabs' in the Gulf, adding not only to Western propaganda, but also to the explicit coverage of the War (Kendrick 1994, Mizoeff 2005). While the majority of the Australian television networks did cover the Gulf War, coverage frequently used imported content from American and British news programs. As Fraser et al. (1997, p.78) explain, the Gulf War was 'brought to you by CNN' with live satellite feeds of air strikes and bombings in

Baghdad. These images showcased the success of the war for Western nations against the 'evil' Arabs and Muslims.

The focus on military technology and triumph over the Arabs obscured the suffering of the people situated in the Gulf region at the time. Arabs and Muslims were demonised throughout reporting, often described as followers of Hussein and labelled 'little Saddams', despite many fleeing the region because they opposed Hussein's regimes (Qureshi and Sells 2003, pp.18-19). Aslan (2009, p.41) argues that the reporting of the Gulf War encouraged 'a major Islamophobic attitude toward Muslims' which stemmed from already problematic misconceptions that 'all Arabs were Muslims'. Reportage of the violence was linked to both Arabs and Muslims, and particularly those who were identified as from the Gulf region (Kabir 2005, p.208). Consequently, media reporting conflated people from these regions including Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners and Iraqis, with many Australians assuming 'all Arabs were Muslim, and all Muslims were Arabic; and that everybody from the Middle East was both Arabic and Muslim' (Aslan 2009, p.41).

The extent of coverage of the Gulf War meant that many Australians were presented with visual images of what Arabs and Muslims 'looked' like. This intensified racial vilification against Arabs and Muslims in the nation. Arabs and Muslims were generalised and many people assumed that they were a homogenous group, ultimately resulting in the frequent harassment of both Arabs and Muslims (Poynting & Noble 2004). Some Australian politicians and commentators ridiculed Arabs and Muslims by asserting that if they did not agree with government policies concerning the Gulf, then they should 'leave Australia and go back to their own countries'[11] (Aslan 2009, p.43). In particular, media commentator Bruce Ruxton endorsed violence against Iraqis in Australia and suggested that these Arabs were 'ratbags' who should not have been allowed to migrate to Australia (Aslan 2009, p.44). Popular talkback radio hosts at the time, Alan Jones and John Laws, also insulted Arabs and Muslims in Australia by declaring they should 'rack off' and 'go home' (Fraser et al. 1997, p.81).

[11] Many Arab and Muslim Australians did not agree with Australia's involvement in the Gulf. Aslan (2009, p.43) argues that many Arabs and Muslims believed the Gulf War was an American motif to plunder the oil reserves and establish its own military base in the Gulf.

These mediated vilifications illustrate that Arabs and Muslims were constructed as an enemy of Australia. Some news media reported on Arabs and Muslims who burned the Australian national flag, automatically representing them as enemies of the nation, given the imagined patriotism emblematically attached to the flag as a national symbol (Fraser et al. 1997, p.78). National newspapers also reported that Arabs and Muslims were 'raising money for Saddam Hussein's campaign in the Gulf', constructing Arabs and Muslims as direct threats both externally (through the war in the Gulf) and internally (through claims of terrorism and retaliation within Australia) (Fraser et al. 1997, p.80). Such media reporting not only fuelled detestation towards Arabs and Muslims, but also created a new enemy that 'threatened' Australia. These threats persisted into the 2000s with respect to the moral panics about ethnic gangs that positioned Muslim Australian men as perpetrators of danger.

3.3.2 Ethnic crime and Ethnic gangs

The murder of a young boy named Edward Lee in western Sydney, on October 17, 1998, became the catalyst for increased media hysteria concerning young Muslim males and gang violence. Lee was allegedly bashed and stabbed by a group of young 'Middle Eastern' men who were later identified as 'Lebanese', and then again as 'Muslim', in media reportage (Poynting et al. 2000). According to Aslan (2009, p.64), these perpetrators were also described as 'thugs' and branded as criminalised gangs linked with danger. These links were established only to incite fear and panic in the community, because they did not necessarily reflect the real scale of youth crime in Sydney.

Two weeks after Lee's death, news media reported the drive-by-shooting of a police station in Sydney's south-west. The shooting was immediately linked to an ethnic gang 'crime-wave', where Muslims were identified as the main perpetrators. *The Australian* reported on November 2, 1998 'Australians were witnessing "a new era of crime" growing in a way where "violence is becoming the norm"' (p.3). *The Daily Telegraph* also reported on the shooting of the police station specifying it as a gun attack that 'marked the arrival of a new kind of evil in our society' (p.10). The 'evil' in these reports is the presence of 'gangs', assumed to be Lebanese, Muslim, and/or Middle Eastern. These articles also drew

on racialised depictions to establish 'ethnic gangs' as a palpable threat to the community. The article in *The Daily Telegraph*, for instance, continued to refer to the perpetrators of the shooting as 'terrorists' desperate to bring harm to the 'community' (see also Al-Natour & Morgan 2012).

Such articles reflect Orientalist representations by associating Muslims with crime and danger and constructing narratives where 'Lebanese', 'Middle Easterners', and 'Muslims' are recognised as 'un-Australian' (Poynting et al. 2000, Dunn et al. 2007, p.576, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). On November 3, 1998, an article in *The Illawarra Mercury,* linked 'ethnic groups' with 'Lebanese gangs' who were 'destroying the Australian way of life' (p.3). Another article published (on the same day) by *The Sydney Morning Herald* labelled crimes committed by 'Lebanese gangs', such as drug dealing and car theft, as 'un-Australian' (p.1). These articles have neglected to explain *how* or *why* these people and crimes have been labelled 'un-Australian' as crime is a societal factor present in all types of communities and societies regardless of ethnicity, culture, or religion (White 2007).

White (2007) argues that youth (and not race) have persisted in Australian stories about crime. White describes a specific 'larrikin era' (in the 19th century) where larrikins were groups of young people known for their notorious and deviant public behaviour, including petty crimes such as theft. Similarly, in an analysis conducted by Poynting et al. (2000), such petty crimes were linked to social spaces as a means to produce fear of ethnic 'otherness' in everyday public settings. The 'ethnic youth crime' moral panic meant that young boys 'of Middle Eastern appearance' who loitered in public spaces were labelled as dangerous gangs by media and police (Poynting et al. 2000, pp.120-121). These labels intensified the ways Muslims were perceived and represented in Australia, as media continued to target them as 'other'[12].

[12] Evidence suggests that professional criminal gangs were persistent and systematically involved in organised crime in Sydney at the time of the 'ethnic youth gang' moral panic and therefore the confusion of 'ethnic youth' with professional criminal gangs had dire consequences. As Aslan (2009, p.60) warns, 'these young people might sometimes get involved in criminal and threatening behaviour such as opportunistic and petty adolescent crime, but they are not professional criminals' (see also Poynting et al. 2000, p.75).

Media focus has thus been on constructing a fear of 'otherness' in reference to 'ethnic youth crime'. White (2007) argues that young Muslim men have been targeted as criminal perpetrators, due to their supposedly perceived racial and religious differences. More specifically:

> The "explanations" for such "ethnic crime" tend to pathologise the group, as though there is something intrinsically bad about being Lebanese or more generally Middle Eastern. Such explanation suggest that the origins of the criminality stem from outside Australia and are related to immigration and "foreign" ideas and cultures, rather than being linked to social and economic inequalities within this country (White 2007, p.48).

The connection established between crime and Muslim identities, frames immigrants from the Middle East (as many were referred to 'Lebanese' or 'Middle Eastern' gangs) as associated with crime. They are then accused of bringing a culture of crime and violence from their home countries, where war and conflict has been common[13] (Aslan 2009, p.55). For Poynting et al. (2000), news media have used war narratives to explain 'otherness' in relation to *why* certain crimes are committed by Muslim perpetrators. Talkback radio presenters in Australia particularly saw war and conflict in the Middle East as linked to the violent nature of these 'others' (Poynting et al. 2000, p.10). Such assertions negate that, although many of the young males involved in the crimes had Muslim parents, they were themselves born in Australia and thus were technically *Australians* (Poynting et al. 2000, p.59).

3.3.3 Ethnic Gang Rapes

The 'ethnic crime' and 'ethnic gang' hysteria that presented Muslim men as 'threatening others', continued into the early 2000s. Between September 2001 and October 2002,[14] the Australian news media documented a number of rapes that occurred in the Sydney suburbs surrounding Bankstown. These rapes were initially referred to as the Skaf rapes, as the lead perpetrators were two Muslim

[13] More recently, Immigration Minister, Peter Dutton, made a statement to Parliament in November 2016 suggesting that the earlier Fraser Government 'made a mistake in bringing Muslim Lebanese refugees to Australia in the 1970s'. Dutton blamed the intake of these refugees for the large number terrorist-related offences in Australia, arguing that second and third generation Muslim migrants were the problem (see Burton-Bradley 2016).

[14] The rapes initially occurred in September 2000 however the Sydney Olympic Games dominated media reporting at the time so the story of the rapes was ignored until the trial in 2001.

brothers with the surname Skaf [15]. These rapes were later infamously labelled as 'ethnic gang rapes', 'Muslim gang rapes', and, more widely, 'Lebanese gang rapes' and 'Sydney gang rapes'. According to Aslan (2009, p.82):

> Bilal Skaf was the ringleader, and the perpetrators contacted one another using mobile phones and used text messages to coordinate sexual assaults. They trapped teenage girls at various locations; threatened their victims at gunpoint; beat and sexually assaulted them; and on some occasions they raped the girls in groups of up to fourteen boys at a time. The perpetrators also insulted their victims with racial remarks such as "Aussie pigs", "You deserve it because you're Australian", "I'm going to fuck you Leb style".

The Arab, Muslim, and Lebanese identities of the perpetrators were immediately centralised in media reporting and linked to the criminal acts of sexual harassment (Warner 2004, Humphrey 2007, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). During court proceedings, these linkages were assessed and found to be untrue on multiple counts. According to Warner (2004, p.348), the judge assigned to the rape case ruled that the attacks were motivated by 'opportunism and pack mentality' and not 'racism'. Furthermore, not enough evidence was provided to label such crimes as being racially motivated (Warner 2004, p.347).

As in White's (2007) analysis of 'larrikins', Gleeson (2004, p.185) compares the Skaf rapes to those of Mt Rennie in the 19th century. Gleeson argues:

> Gang rape is particularly susceptible to being understood in terms of "them" and "their" bad behaviour due to its collective structure. Its collectivity has been interpreted as demarcating its participants as external to and outside of the mainstream, not simply in terms of their crimes, but also in terms of their fundamental identities and natures

Gleeson (2004, p.191) suggests that similarities exist in the mediated and political nature of how both rape cases have been reported on. She observes that in the Mt Rennie case, the crimes were framed through fears of the 'white native', meaning that culture and religion were overlooked. The media and political attention paid to ethnicity and religion in the Skaf crimes, however, obscured 'the reality that gang rape is common across cultures' (Gleeson 2004, p.184).

[15] In 2000, Bilal and Mohammad Skaf were involved in the gang rape of several young (on multiple occasions) women in Sydney's southwest. According to court proceedings, the gang took the girls to remote locations and sexually assaulted them sometimes in groups of up to 14 males. The rapes were heard in the NSW District court under three different cases in 2002. Being the ring leader in the rape cases, Bilal Skaf received a minimum 55 year sentence, the highest ever for rape crime in Australia. See case details at http://guides.sl.nsw.gov.au for more information.

The Skaf rapes were followed by another rape trial where 'ethnicity' was centralised. In 2002, four Pakistani (Muslim) brothers referred to as the 'K brothers', and a Muslim student from Nepal, allegedly raped multiple girls as young as 13. Court proceedings note that the brothers invited these girls to their house in the Sydney suburb of Ashfield, where they gang raped them using violence and weapons (Aslan 2009, p.89). The names of the sexual offenders were supressed as some of them were minors at the time.

The 'K brother' rapes also featured in media reporting and mirrored much of the Islamophobic sentiment that was present throughout the Skaf rape trials. Media reporting emphasised the 'evil nature' of the Muslim perpetrators and the threat they posed to the nation. *The Australian* published an article in August 2001 claiming that the rapes were a real issue, 'threatening the safety of young women in a large section of Australia's biggest city'. The article argues rape to be a 'horrific crime', and that society must take notice because these rapes were committed in groups with 'ethnicity', 'race', or 'culture' as motivating factors. The article is an example of the racialised context in which the Skaf and 'K brother' rape cases have been reported.

In both the 'K brother' and Skaf rape cases, sexism and misogyny were increasingly represented as external to Australian culture, even though many 'white' Australian males have committed similar sexual crimes. In an analysis of how gang rape involving Australian football players[16] was mediated, Baird (2009, p.377) argues that less emphasis was placed on race and/or religion when non-Muslims were involved. She suggests that this shapes a 'discourse of diversity', which obscures difference and 'can accommodate men of all creeds and colours as long as they behave like white men'. Baird (2009, p.377) argues that the reporting of the rapes involving football players made no references to racial categories (even in the case where Indigenous men had been accused). Ultimately, rape is only presented as a 'crime' by media when 'white' males are involved and as part

[16] In March 2004, allegations of sexual violence were made against several professional football players in Australia. The first were from a woman who claimed she was raped by players from a Sydney National Rugby League (NRL) team. These were followed by allegations of rape against players in a Melbourne Australian Football League (AFL) club. The rape allegations gained much media attention with the women making the claims and receiving a payout of up to AU$200,000 (see Baird 2009 pp.377-379).

of racial or religious identity when 'others' (Muslims) are involved (Al-Natour & Morgan 2012).

The media thus focused less on the impacts of crimes such as rape and mostly reinforced the perceptions of Muslims as 'un-Australian'. In August 2001, the *Daily Telegraph* published a statement in reference to both rapes that read, 'these boys may be born in Australia, but they consider themselves Muslim enough not to rape other Muslims. Their parents teach them to respect only Muslim women, making these boys believe that Aussie women do not deserve respect' (p.90). This sentiment reflects the multitude of opinions about the rape cases in the years between 2000 and 2002. These opinions also constructed particular assumptions of the rapists and their cultural or religious practices, and vilified *all* Muslim men by linking crimes such as rape to Islamic identities. Consequently, the racial profiling and vilification that intensified because of the rapes, extended to entire Muslim communities (see also Tufail 2015).

To suggest that the Muslim community is at fault for the rapes negates the real causes and effects of rape as a crime. Media reporting in the 2000s thus neglected to accept and challenge the dominant conceptions and experiences of rape outside ethnic boundaries (Grewal 2012, p.516). 'Gang rape' was identified as a problem of the rapists' communities and not the society in which the rapes occurred (Gleeson, p.184). Media reporting has discursively placed greater focus on ethnic over socio-economic factors in coverage of the rapes, subsequently underscoring the prosecution of these men as 'ethnics' and 'criminals'.

The rapes have also been frequently linked to the stabbing of Lee and the shooting of the police station, forming part of the 'ethnic youth gang' moral panic. This moral panic has linked notorious behaviour with Arab and (mostly) Muslim men in Australia. Warner (2004, p.345) refers to this conceptual clumping of events as a 'signification spiral'. It connects particular events to establish common ground between them. Ethnicity has been framed by the media as a mutual factor in the stabbing of Lee and the gang rapes, highlighting its centrality in media hysteria about 'otherness'. Warner (2004) explains that links between Arabs, Middle Easterners, Muslims, immigration, and crime have further intensified after global events that associated Muslims and Islam with terrorism.

3.3.4 September 11 and the Bali Bombings

On the morning of September 11 2001, two planes flew into the World Trade Centre in New York and were reported as 'terrorist attacks' perpetrated by 'Islamic fundamentalists' (Aly 2010). Reports of other planes crashing into the Pentagon in Washington and in a paddock in Pennsylvania surfaced as part of this terrorist attack, now referred to as 9/11.

There was a spike in racial harassment towards Muslims in Australia following these so-called terrorist attacks. Harassments mirrored those of the Gulf War, including the ripping off of veils, vandalism of Mosques and Muslim businesses, and threats made towards Muslims in public spaces such as shopping centres (Aslan 2009, pp.71-72). These attacks illuminated the heightened fear of Muslim presence and visibility in Australia. According to Al-Natour and Morgan (2012) they were a result of the racialised media reporting of Muslims and Islam in the aftermath of 9/11 (Poynting & Noble 20014). Terms such as 'terrorist', 'Islam' and 'Muslim' were routinely used throughout reporting, producing assumptions that Muslims and Islam were intrinsically associated with terrorist activity (Kabir 2006, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). Such associations added to the negative media portrayal of Muslims and Islam, encouraging the racism and abuse that Muslim-Australians experienced in the aftermath of 9/11.

Aslan (2009, p.69) explains that politicians and media commentators questioned the loyalty of Muslims in the nation and depicted them as threatening the democratic, liberal and secular values of Australian society. Muslims were repeatedly described as 'un-Australian' and singled out as 'other' in media reporting. Rumours also circulated on talkback radio that many Muslims 'celebrated' the terror attacks by dancing in streets around Australia (Aslan 2009, pp.69-70). This instilled fear of potential Muslim terrorist supporters in the nation. It resulted in 'terror raids' on houses of Muslims living in Sydney in the months following 9/11. The *Sun-Herald* reported on September 30, 2001, 'ASIO agents investigating "sympathy links" to the US terrorist attacks have conducted a series of home raids in Sydney's south-west' (p.4). The article suggests that some Muslims were plotting terrorist activities within Australia and were subsequently referred to as 'home-grown' terrorists.

The fear of Muslims continued to amplify as a result of two other events following 9/11 - the Tampa affair[17] and the Children Overboard affair[18]. These involved Muslim asylum seekers attempting to migrate to Australia but were refused. The Children Overboard affair involved groups of asylum seekers who were said to have thrown their children overboard to enter the country (Mason 2004, Poynting et al. 2004, Mansouri 2005). These events were later proven to be untrue[19], but were of value to news media in depicting these asylum seekers in demonic ways. During both the Tampa affair and the Children Overboard affair, fictitious narratives focused on the illegal nature of the arrival of these asylum seekers, as opposed to the circumstance from which they were fleeing (Mason 2004, p.235). These mediated attacks on asylum seekers resulted in further alienation and demonization of Muslims in Australia. This combination of 'illegal' asylum seekers and the fear of terrorism fuelled debate regarding the 'place' of Muslims in the Australian social framework (Mason 2004, p.235).

The events concerning asylum seekers were followed by the Bali Bombings, which occurred approximately thirteen months after 9/11 on October 12, 2002. Media reported that a group of Islamic extremists bombed the Indonesian island of Bali, resulting in 202 deaths including 88 (the highest) of Australian deaths. Bali has been an Australian tourist destination for decades and was deemed a 'paradise lost' in media reports after the bombings (Aslan 2009, p.74). The attacks in Bali also heightened insecurities in Australia as political commentators and media reportage emphasised that the bombs were 'on our doorstep' (Aslan 2009, p.75). The media thus began to report that Australia was a direct 'terror target'

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[17] In August 2001 a Norwegian Vessel rescued 433 asylum seekers from a sinking ship in the Indian Ocean. The Australian Government at the time declared the MV Tampa (vessel) could not disembark on Christmas Island and a few days later the ship's captain declared the ship in distress and moved into Australian waters.

[18] In October 2001 HMAS Adelaide intercepted an Indonesian fishing boat off Christmas Island and its passengers were transferred into Australia. The government released photos to the media throwing children allegedly being thrown overboard. Within days the Navy clarified that no children were thrown overboard but were in the water because their boat was sinking. Senate Inquiry into the matter revealed that the government failed to alter the public record when information contravening the initial report surfaced. For more information see Perera 2002, Klocker & Dunn 2003, Mason 2004, Papastergiadis 2004, Poynting et al. 2004).

[19] The Children Overboard affair was used to convince the Australian public into believing the inhumane status of these 'others' (see Mason 2004, Poynting et al. 2004). The affair, however, was believed to be a heated political initiative to help the Howard Government remain in power for another term (Poynting et al. 2004). Several journalists and scholars later proved the Children Overboard affair to have been a false event, one that inevitably entered a large pool of Western propaganda against the Middle East (see also Marr 2011).

and 'the Bali Bombings became Australia's September 11' (Aslan 2009, p.76). On October 16, 2002, *The Australian* suggested that the Bali Bombings were a 'powerful wake up call for Australians' as 'deadly terrorists' are not just a problem for 'people in far-away places' (p.15). The newspaper also reported this on November 2, 2002, suggesting that Australians needed to be aware of 'home-grown terrorists' and stop blaming 'foreigners' for terror attacks (p.28).

The intensified media exposure of Muslims, discussed throughout this chapter, has vilified 'them' as 'other' and spread fear and anger throughout the nation. These vilifications resulted in racial harassments on those deemed 'other' and worked to exclude and isolate Muslims from/in the nation (Aslan 2009). The reportage of particular events added to the xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiment that lingered nation-wide throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Ultimately, the scale of fear and 'threat' established racial tensions between 'us' (Australians) and 'them' (Muslims) that later underscored the 2005 Cronulla Riots (Due & Riggs 2008).

3.4 The Cronulla Riots

In early December 2005, the Australian media reported on a number of violent clashes at Cronulla beach in Sydney's south. Media reports highlighted that these clashes escalated into racial riots that had been prompted by a group of Lebanese men who violently harassed[20] a lifeguard at Cronulla on December 4, 2005. This attack inspired frenzied responses that framed the incident as racial aggression, as opposed to a minor 'beach brawl' (Aslan 2009, p.115). On December 18, 2005, *The Sunday Age* reported that the 'the bashing of a lifeguard gives them [Lebanese men] a sense of fighting back' (p.13). However, the article does not specify exactly what the 'young Lebanese men' are fighting against. Similarly, *The Australian* stated that the bashing was 'risky business' referring to it as 'the Cronulla *attack*' (p.9, emphasis added).

According to Aslan (2009) vilification of Muslims increased after reports surfaced about the incident involving the lifeguard. This was most prominent on talkback

[20] It was reported that a group of four young Lebanese-Australian men had an argument with three lifeguards. According to police reports the lifesavers initiated the conflict by asking 'what are you looking at?' and later taunting the Lebanese men by asserting that 'Lebs' didn't belong on the beach because 'Lebs can't swim' (see Aslan 2009, pp.114-117).

radio program 2GB in Sydney where host, Alan Jones, often referred to perpetrators of violence and crime as 'Middle Eastern grubs' (Aslan 2009, p.115). Jones began campaigning against Muslim-Australians and encouraging his listeners to do the same. This resulted in a high number of angered callers who agreed with Jones and were outraged by the 'horrendous bashings' of the innocent lifeguard by the 'evil Muslims' (Aslan 2009, p.115).

The figure of the lifeguard is recognised as symbolic in mythological constructions of the Australian nation. White (2006, p.5) argues that the lifeguard shares a relationship between masculinity, nation, and 'whiteness' and emblematically possesses an aesthetic of a bronzed idol that saves lives for a living. It is such iconography that has constructed the figure of the lifeguard as a national symbol, illuminating the emotional reaction over the 'bashing' of the lifeguard at Cronulla (Poynting 2006, p.87). Arguably, the mythology surrounding the lifeguard signifies that the 'attack' at Cronulla had indicated an 'attack' on the 'white nation', which needed 'cleansing' and 'redefining' to remain pure and safe (White 2006, p.2).

In the week following this attack, Sydney's Cronulla beach was flooded with 'white' Anglo-Australians (referred to in the media as 'Aussies') on December 11, 2005. News media reported that there were approximately 5000 'intoxicated Aussies' attacking anyone of 'Middle Eastern' and/ or 'Muslim appearance' on Cronulla beach (Poynting 2006 p. 85). In particular, 'images of thousands of drunk white males, many of whom waved or wore the Australian flag, chasing and bashing isolated men and women of "Middle Eastern appearance" were compelling and frightening viewing for media audiences in Sydney, the rest of Australia, and internationally' (Collins 2008, p.30). These attacks were later reported to have angered the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities of Sydney, who engaged in 'revenge attacks' on December 12, 2005, damaging property and harassing local Cronulla residents (Collins 2008, p.30). *The Age* reported:

> It is now a matter of public record that for about 12 hours mobs rampaged through Sydney's southern beach suburbs of Cronulla, Maroubra, Brighton-Le-Sands and Rockdale hounding, harassing and beating those who fitted their Middle Eastern stereotype. Women were not spared. Then came the inevitable revenge raids later in the day when some 60 cars were

> trashed by carloads of youths from the western suburbs, the homeland for some 200, 000 Muslims (p.7).

Collins (2008, p.31) argues that the repeated media vilification of Muslims in Australia has meant that a race riot such as the one at Cronulla had been 'brewing' for decades. Ultimately, 'the Cronulla Riots were born in the post-9/11, anti-Middle Eastern sentiments nurtured by national political opportunism during the "Tampa Affair"'. The inter-link between these events highlights how Muslims have been positioned as 'un-welcome' in the nation (see sections above), and this is how the news media reported on the Cronulla Riots. In December 2005, *The Age* published an article that drew a link between the 'notorious Lebanese rape case', 9/11, the Tampa Affair, and the Bali Bombings (p.7).

An article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* also argued that Cronulla residents have been expecting a racial eruption for many years, as Cronulla beach was an area with high numbers of 'multicultural visitors' (McMahon 2005, p.7). According to Evers (2008, p.412) the Cronulla Riots were instigated by a 'turf war' between local 'surfies' and visiting 'ethnics', which has historically posed an 'issue' at Cronulla dating back to the 1960s[21]. Aslan (2009, p.130) argues that the extent of media attention placed on the riots, has been due to the racialised context in which they occurred, and had the perpetrators of the initial attack on the lifeguard been Anglo-Australians or 'white', the incident would not have gained as much attention (or resulted in riots). Ultimately, a number of complex factors have underscored the Cronulla Riots, but frequently foregrounded have been the ostensible racial tensions between Muslims and ('white') non-Muslims in Australia.

The Cronulla Riots thus illustrated racial sentiment in Australia and accentuated contested notions concerning belonging and multiculturalism (Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008). As Evers (2008) argues, the riots signified a 'turf war' over the domination of multicultural-shared space at Cronulla, and have been

[21] As Cronulla is the only beach that has been directly accessible by train, many white and immigrant Australians from the western suburbs of Sydney (especially those that didn't drive) would catch the train to Cronulla beach. In the 1960s and 1970s these people where referred to as 'westies' or 'banksies' (those who were from Bankstown) and the Cronulla locals were 'surfies' (See Shaw 2009, p.65). The 'surfies' rarely enjoyed the influx of visitors to Cronulla and often saw it as an 'invasion of their beach (Collins 2009, p.34). According to Aslan (2009) fights between 'surfies' and 'westies' were common on the beach, in the streets and at the train station of Cronulla. Both sides usually were white, Anglo-Australians in the 1960s and 1970s.

influenced by media vilifications of Muslims as 'other' in that space (see also Asquith & Poynting 2011). Consequently, 'white-thinking citizens' felt warranted to 'attack' the 'enemy' wherever they may encounter 'it', which in this case was at Cronulla (Poynting 2006, p.88, Asquith & Poynting 2011). The Cronulla Riots therefore revealed a deeper racial sentiment in Australia that illuminated the contestations of, and struggles for, national belonging.

3.4.1 Cronulla and national belonging

According to Due and Riggs (2008), the Cronulla Riots comment greatly on conceptions and discourses of home and belonging in Australia. Claims to 'home' are frequently affiliated with claims of 'national belonging', identifying that both are contested sites within the nation, as 'notions of who is seen to be at home in Australia are constantly being challenged and reworked' (Due & Riggs 2008, p.210). The events addressed in this chapter signal the ways Muslims have frequently been excluded from such discursive notions of 'home', understood to be 'un-Australian', and subsequently labelled as an 'enemy within' the nation (see previous section).

Chapter One has illustrated that racial outcasting is not a novel sentiment in Australia, but is framed through the nation's naturalised constructions of 'whiteness' as central to 'being Australian' and *belonging* in Australia (Hage 1998, Pugliese 2002, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008). This discourse normalises notions of 'home' for 'white' Australians, despite the history of British settlement and colonisation. Yet in this framework, Muslims are viewed as 'immigrants' and thus 'invaders' to 'our' shores (Perera 2009, Lems et al. 2016). Such discursive constructions have underpinned the racial logic at Cronulla, where some 'white Australians' shouted phrases like 'Go home Lebs' and 'No more Lebs'. Due and Riggs (2008, p.211) explain further:

> Such ideas of home as being a contested space in which issues of national belonging are played out in Australia were seen quite clearly in relation to the 2005 Cronulla Riots, in which thousands of white Australians gathered around Cronulla beach, shouting at and threatening those located as "Lebanese Muslim" people. The people involved in the riots made it quite clear that whilst Australia was a home for them, it ought not to be a home to people who were identified as Lebanese Muslim. Such racist opinions exemplified the fact that Australia is seen to be a white country, and

> therefore as a legitimate home to white people rather than to non-white minority groups.

This problematises discourses of 'home' and invokes imaginary feelings of 'ownership', where people feel they have legitimate claims to the nation for reasons primarily linked to 'race' or 'location of birth' (Due & Riggs 2008). Such views are central to the constructions of inclusion and exclusion, as they advance discursive tropes that signify 'whiteness' in the nation (Hage 1998).

The media's portrayal of the behaviours of both parties during the Cronulla Riots particularly exemplifies the ostensible neutrality 'whiteness' holds in the nation. A number of media reports ignored the responsibility of the 'white' Australians involved in the riots, emphasising that the violence was the result of a small handful of 'hooligans' who 'brought shame upon themselves' (Kennedy et al. 2005). Similarly, the then New South Wales Premier stated: 'the Australia that I know, and intend to preserve as Premier does not support the sort of behaviour that we saw today' (Kennedy et al. 2005, p.1). The Cronulla Riots were summarised as the result of a 'fair few', despite the thousands reported to have been at the protests and engaged in violence on December 11.

However, the behaviour of 'Lebanese Muslims' was acknowledged as 'expected' and framed through the preceding moral panics surrounding crime and violence in the lead up to the riots (see Kabir 2007, Noble 2009, Due & Riggs 2008). An article published by the *Sydney Morning Herald* in the aftermath of the riots illustrates this:

> Similar things are said about Middle Eastern youths today. Quite apart from the events of last week, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that indeed some do rove in packs and on the beach their behaviour can be ill-mannered in the extreme. The fact that they may feel excluded by the beach culture, and that their exaggerated aggression springs from a feeling of inferiority, is no excuse. Nor, however, is it a reason to demonise a whole ethnic group. Soon enough the hoons will learn acceptance is gained by behaving as if they are accepted, not by mindless self-assertion. The beach belongs to everyone - in-groups and out-groups alike (p.32).

The events at Cronulla are seen to be at the fault of the 'ethnics' in this article. They are the 'ill-mannered out-group' whose feelings of rejection and failure of assimilation have caused racial tensions to build and erupt in Australia. In this

regard, 'they' are represented as suffering from rejection, which has been caused by their own 'bad behaviour', as opposed to, from the exclusions constituted by the contested notions of national belonging in Australia (Due & Riggs 2008, p.220).

Another factor that underpins these contested notions of belonging relates to discourses of multiculturalism in Australia. Arguably, the riots were less a reflection of the racial relations between Muslims and 'white' Australians, but underscored the 'faultlines' of a 'fractured multiculturalism' (Noble 2009, Foster et al. 2011, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). The protests at Cronulla are thus recognised as a form of resistance against the presumed multicultural state of Australia. For this reason, media and government initiatives attempted to reproduce notions of ethnic diversity by encouraging reconciliation between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the aftermath of the Cronulla Riots. It is through these incentives, as the section below illustrates, that representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging develop in the media, and on Australian free-to-air television in particular.

3.4.2 Cronulla and reconciliation

In the immediate aftermath of the Cronulla Riots a number of government initiatives were implemented, involving local political and Muslim community leaders, aimed at creating peace at Cronulla and across Australia (Knox 2010). The aim of these initiatives was to reassure the nation of its supposed harmonious and multicultural character, by producing national narratives of inclusiveness that emphasised reconciliation between Lebanese, Muslim communities and other (mainly 'white') Australians (Ryan 2012).

Surf Life Saving Australia's On the Same Wave[22] program has been the most popular campaign that sought to reconcile ostensible differences between Muslims and 'white' Australians. Originally developed by Muslim community leader, Dr Jamal Rifi, On the Same Wave launched in 2005 shortly after the Cronulla Riots. The program encouraged engagements between ethnically diverse

[22] On the Same Wave was a federal program, which received funding of $600 000 from the Australian government to increase ethnic membership of surf clubs across the nation, which have predominantly been Ango-Celtic (see Teutsch 2007).

communities in Australia, by appointing 20 young Muslims from Lakemba Sports and Recreational Club to train with surf lifesavers at Cronulla beach (Teutsch 2006, Knox 2010, p.13). Knox (2010, p.13) explains that On the Same Wave saw the integration, interaction, and engagement of 'dark-complexion boys in yellow and red caps' and 'smiling young women in burquinis' being taught by 'white' Australian surf lifesavers. The program allowed young Muslims to engage in beach activities and simultaneously encouraged organisations such as Surf Lifesaving Australia to re-examine their relevance to 'sections of the Australian community' after the Cronulla Riots (Teutsch 2006, Knox 2010). On the Same Wave thus worked to break down two sets of stereotypes, Muslims *and* lifesavers in Australia.

As summarised in the section above, the lifeguard is recognised as a symbolic figure in mythological constructions of Australia and has subsequently played a peculiar role in the Cronulla Riots (Lems et al. 2016, p.39). For this reason, Surf Lifesaving Australia has strategically been incorporated into the On the Same Wave program. As Johns (2008) suggests, lifesaving in Australia has been built on conceptions of dedication, volunteerism, and self-sacrifice, all deployed in the greater interest of the nation. The young Muslims that graduated from the On the Same Wave program and received their lifesaving certificates have thus been represented as adopting particular 'Australian values' that reflect devotion and commitment to the nation (Johanson & Glow 2007).

A number of other campaigns, programs, and creative projects developed in the aftermath of Cronulla. Lems et al. (2016) particularise creative works such as stage plays and local films that have been inspired by the Cronulla Riots. Jayce White's film *Between the Flags* presents a take on the Cronulla Riots and strictly addresses notions of reconciliation. The film was shortlisted as a finalist in the 2007 Tropfest, and produced a comical view of the riots by questioning negotiations of race and racism in multicultural societies such as Australia (Johanson & Glow 2007). *Between the Flags* centralises two characters – one of Middle Eastern and the other of 'white' Australian descent – and follows their shared interests, external to race, as 'it becomes apparent that what they have in common is more important than their differences' (Johanson & Glow 2007, p.42).

A number of events following the Cronulla Riots were also organised, mainly by Muslim communities in Australia, to assist in the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ryan (2012) notes the production of local and national Museum exhibitions that showcased historic and creative contributions made by Muslims, such as Islamic artworks and fashion designs. These were accompanied by a number of public lectures, hosted by Muslims, in conjunction with public tours of local Mosques, as part of the educational endeavour to teach non-Muslims about Islam[23] (Ryan 2012). The focus on reconciliation in a post-Cronulla context thus produces a premise for media narratives that stress inclusiveness and belonging. According to Ryan (2012, p.199), measures that engage diverse communities in 'ordinary spaces' (such as the On the Same Wave program) 'have the potential to became arenas where cross-cultural understanding can occur and more meaningful and permanent bridges can be built across cultures and within communities'.

These narratives of reconciliation inform the analysis in this thesis, which addresses discursive and multicultural conceptions that have been shaped by the pre- and post- Cronulla years in Australia. Ultimately, these narratives produce imagined modes of inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims in the 'white nation'. The televisual texts examined in the following chapters, highlight the ways such representations of inclusiveness are constructively rendered 'positive' in a post-Cronulla context. These representations are mostly framed through discourses of belonging, in similar ways to the practices of reconciliation discussed above. However, these narratives do not necessarily mitigate Orientalist perceptions that reproduce threatening 'otherness' in the nation. As Chapters Four to Eight illustrate, representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed through limited measures that are frequently made conditional. These narratives develop through socio-political discourses that are structured and bound by normalisations of 'whiteness' in the imagined nation (see Chapter One, Said 1978, Hage 1998). Ultimately, notions of inclusion and exclusion are shaped through similar frameworks, underscored by discourses of belonging, and

[23] Other measures taken to foster reconciliation between Muslim and white Australians included invitations to Iftar dinners during the holy month of Ramadan where Muslims and non-Muslims ate together, local Islamic festivals at shopping malls, and, public screenings of local Islamic films usually produced by young Muslim refugees (see Ryan 2012, p.198, Lems et al. 2016).

produced within multicultural contexts that promote Australia as both 'fearful' *and* 'inclusive' of Muslim 'otherness'.

3.5 Conclusion

The dominant media representations of Muslims as 'threats' in/to Australia have been addressed through the genealogical analysis deployed in this chapter. According to Saukko (2003, p.122), the task of genealogy is precisely to unravel the ways discourses weave together social, cultural and political agendas. The representations examined in this chapter, have particularly shaped constructed states of exclusion for Muslims in the nation, and underscored racial tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims (Poynting et al. 2000, Warner 2004, Kabir 2006, Humphrey 2007, White 2007, Aslan 2009, Aly 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). The mediated events reviewed also demonstrate the ways media representations work to ethnicise and Orientalise Muslims in Australia. Ultimately, this has reinforced frictions between Muslims and 'white' Australians, prompting the protests and violence during the 2005 Cronulla Riots (Poynting 2006, Noble 2009, Asquith & Poynting 2011).

The analysis in this chapter has further demonstrated that racial tensions heightened during the Cronulla Riots have complemented contested notions of belonging in Australia. The riots particularly demonstrated a frayed multicultural politic in the nation and enlivened debates surrounding inclusion and excision regarding the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural setting (Due & Riggs 2008, Noble 2009, Yasmeen 2010). The Cronulla Riots have thus made visible polarities in the nation that frequently position Muslims as in contrast to 'white' Australians. These polarisations stem from, and have been determined by, localised moral panics and globalised terror events repeatedly linked with Muslims and Islam. The intensified mediation of these particular events has further strengthened perceptions of Muslims as 'threats' in the nation, and illuminated that the violent clashes at Cronulla reflected an attempt to establish boundaries and reinforce dominant positions of 'whiteness' in the nation (Moreton-Robinson & Nicoll 2006, Perera 2009, Poynting 2006, Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Bliuc et al. 2011).

This chapter has argued that mediated emphasis on Muslims as 'other' prior to the Cronulla Riots has been necessary in shaping racial discourses about multiculturalism, belonging, and inclusion. The following analytic chapters explore five themes that address constructions of representational inclusiveness and belonging on Australian free-to-air television in a post-Cronulla context. The next chapter draws on the theme of 'speaking out' in reference to Muslim representations on the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS). The chapter examines the multicultural dimension of SBS in promoting practices of speaking out, as a means of countering dominant Orientalist perceptions and highlighting similarities (as opposed to differences) between Muslims and 'white Australians'.

Chapter Four: Muslims and 'Speaking Out' on the Special Broadcasting Service

> After years of critique and struggle it is now routine for a wider diversity of voices to be accessed, and there have been plenty of attempts to provide greater context in reporting, to produce "positive stories" and to expand the news agenda around racialised communities during the "war on terror"…
>
> (Dreher 2010a, p.97)

4.1 Introduction

The racial tensions that have been augmented by the Cronulla Riots in 2005 illuminated the constructed 'place of exclusion' for Muslims in Australia. As the previous chapters have argued, this constructed place is based on a 'white nation fantasy', where Muslims are represented as, and hold a position of 'other' (Hage 1998, Poynting et al. 2000, Warner 2004, Kabir 2006, Humphrey 2007; 2010, White 2007, Noble 2008, Aslan 2009, Aly 2010, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Rane & Hersi 2012, Chopra 2015). Hage (1998) argues that this fantasy is framed through discursive constructions of multiculturalism that centralise Muslim 'otherness' and deploy (imagined) heterogeneous over homogenous perceptions of/in the nation. Discourses of multiculturalism are thus significant in constructing particular narratives that foreground inclusiveness and belonging in reference to Muslim representations on Australian television.

This chapter is the first analytic chapter in this thesis, and examines the theme of 'speaking out' by exploring the ways it has been utilised by the Special Broadcasting System (SBS) to produce narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims. According to Dreher (2003), 'speaking out' produces alternative modes for Muslims in Australia to 'talk back' to those Orientalist (mis)conceptions that have circulated in socio-political and media discourses (discussed in Chapters One and Three). This chapter is concerned with the ways Muslims gain a sense of authority in the multicultural environments produced by SBS, in situations where 'they' are able to speak out and form a sense of inclusion and belonging.

‘Speaking out’ is explored in this chapter through the analysis of two programs. The first is an episode of SBS’s *Insight* program called *True Colours* and the second focuses on *Salam Café*, a program dedicated to challenging the negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam in Australia (Busbridge 2013). Both these programs grant Muslims the opportunity to speak out and simultaneously challenge Orientalist misconceptions, by stressing similarities over the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians. This chapter argues that by speaking out, Muslims are able to question the voice of authority and acquire a sense of socio-political power where they are presented as ‘active’, rather than ‘submissive’, in media productions that explore Muslim ‘otherness’ (see also Dreher 2009; 2010). However, practices of speaking out also limit the inclusive possibilities of such narratives, as they seem to foster agency only in ‘multicultural’ spaces such as the one provided by SBS (Hawkins 1996, Hage 1998, Smaill 2002, Dreher 2009; 2010a).

The analysis in this chapter begins by introducing ‘speaking out’ as a practice that encourages narratives of inclusiveness and belonging in the national space. This is followed by a brief summary of SBS’s background as a ‘multicultural broadcaster’ in Australia, emphasising its significance in producing spaces for Muslims to speak out (Ang et al. 2008). The latter half of this chapter explores the role of ‘speaking out’ on SBS through the analysis of two programs, *Insight* and *Salam Café*, and highlights their relevance in producing *limited* representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging.

4.1.1 ‘Speaking Out’ and belonging

‘Speaking out’ is recognised as a crucial exercise in this chapter, where those who have been ‘othered’ (such as Muslims) within the nation are given opportunities to position themselves as ‘subjects’ rather than ‘objects’ in media and socio-political discourses (Dreher 2003, p.125). ‘Speaking out’ presents what West (1990, p.94) identifies as a ‘new politics of difference’ where homogenous constructions of ‘otherness’ are ‘trashed’ in the name of diversity, multiplicity, and heterogeneity. By speaking out, Muslims are actively contributing to media discussion of ‘otherness’, and engaging in national debates where ‘they’ are able to counter misconceptions by setting their own agendas. ‘Speaking out’ promotes

a sense of visibility and permits Muslims to respond to racism in media and socio-political discourse, as a means of re-establishing a sense of inclusivity in Australia's multicultural society (Al-Momani et al. 2010). 'Speaking out' thus becomes a strategy for 'empowering' the Muslim 'other', through the process of 'finding a voice' that foreground 'their' marginalised positions in mainstream society (Dreher 2009, p.446).

'Speaking out' promotes forms of 'inter-cultural' dialogue, which stress loyalty and affiliation with the Australian nation, simultaneously with integration and inclusiveness, positioning Muslim 'otherness' as less 'threatening' (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Rane et al. 2010, Roose 2013, Aly 2014). The programs examined in this chapter demonstrate that Muslims who speak out are perceived as actively participating in a form of 'democracy' by engaging in national debates about those issues concerning 'all Australians' (Dreher 2009; 2010b, Schottmann 2013). The aim of 'speaking out' is therefore to advocate and develop a shared sense of 'sameness' between the mainstream and the Muslim 'other'.

Chapter Three has argued that negative Muslim representations have resulted in a *state of exclusion* for Muslims in Australian society (Turner 2003, Poynting et al. 2004, Humphrey 2007; 2010, Noble 2008, Aly 2010, Yasmeen 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Rane & Hersi 2012, Chopra 2015). This state of exclusion derives from ideological constructions of the Australian nation as 'white', allowing 'white' Australians to place themselves in positions of power and delegate who can and cannot be included in discourses of national belonging (Hage 1998). Practices of speaking out enable Muslims to contest these constructions and challenge the Orientalist conceptions of 'otherness' that instigate states of exclusion in Australia's multicultural society. For Dreher (2010a, p.92), strategies for speaking out are oriented 'not only to telling different stories but aim rather to critique media institutions, make direct political demands and present oppositional counter-narratives'. Muslims can confront those Orientalist notions that have been stabilised through media reporting, and address discourses that polarise Islam and *the rest of* Australia. 'Speaking out' thus aims to facilitate interaction, engagement, interdependence, and inclusion (Dreher 2009, p.450).

Just as much as challenging misconception and fostering engagement is an important part of 'speaking out', so too are the 'spaces' within which Muslims are able to speak out. Part of the process of speaking out entails 'being heard' (Dreher 2009, p.447). It ensures that specific aspects of what has been said by the Muslim 'other' can be comprehended by the broadly perceived, 'white' mainstream society. Two spaces that present Muslims with opportunities to speak out are explored in this chapter. The first analyses the space of 'public forums' on SBS, which allows Muslims to express their concerns by participating in social discussions (Ang et al. 2008). The second is the space of comedy production on SBS, which enables Muslims to challenge misconceptions outside dominant media conventions, by promoting humorous yet familiar narratives that can be sensibly comprehended by 'all Australians' (Busbridge 2013, Luckhurs & Rae 2016).

Both comedy productions and public forums are intrinsically shaped by Muslims who speak out in the Australian media and particularly where these are made and/or broadcast by SBS. A large part of SBS's aim and purpose is to represent a multicultural Australian nation that advances ethnic inclusion as a primary goal of living in Australian society (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002, Ang et al. 2008, Dreher 2009). For this reason, SBS is crucial in allowing Muslims to 'speak out'.

4.2 Background: Special Broadcasting Service

SBS is Australia's second public broadcaster, established some years after the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC – discussed in Chapter Eight), as a response to the high influx of non-English speaking migrants that arrived in Australia between 1970 and 1990. At the time, the media in Australia neglected to cater to these newly arrived migrants and, according to Jacubowicz et al. (1994), much of the media content reflected a 'white', middle-class majority which failed to present multi-cultural content and views of everyday Australia. Those migrants that struggled with the English language were marginalised, without any means of connecting to either their own language or with the values of their newly adopted host nation (Dreher 2003, Ang et al. 2008). SBS became a government initiative that filled a gap in the Australian media, focusing on the production of diverse

content that caters to needs of 'special groups' such as migrants (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002, Ang et al. 2008).

The inception of SBS coincided with the official Australian government policy of Multiculturalism, shaping the broadcaster's focus on multicultural content that has been critical in promoting ethnic diversity and acceptance. According to Smaill (2002, p.395), SBS is the 'most visible product' of 'state-sponsored' multiculturalism. It must abide by a legislative Charter that outlines its purpose and requirements as a multicultural broadcaster. The Charter was initially introduced in 1978 when the government established an Independent and Multicultural Broadcasting Corporation to monitor SBS. This body clearly set out the objectives and aims of SBS, in the production of multicultural and multilingual television and radio services.

According to the SBS Charter, the 'principal function' of the SBS is to 'provide multilingual and multicultural radio, television and digital media services that inform, educate and entertain all Australians and, in doing so, reflecting Australia's multicultural society'. SBS's role is to 'contribute to', 'increase awareness', and 'promote understanding and acceptance' of the ethnic, religious, geographic, Indigenous, sexual, and generational differences of 'all Australians'. SBS therefore holds particular significance for the Australian television landscape, given its production of multicultural and ethnically aware content (Hawkins 1996). Documentaries, discussion forums, and drama programs have been particularly broadcast that feature multiple Australian identities making them relatable to diverse Australian communities, both ethnic and otherwise.

SBS has managed to tackle challenges of media and multiculturalism in Australia to develop a unique, innovative and important media institution (Ang et al. 2008, Dreher 2009, p.456). Most valued has been SBS's use of subtitling over voice-over in foreign films and news programs. Dreher (2009, p.448) argues that this practice has been viewed as 'culturally democratic' because it renders accessible the diversity of language rather than replacements made with English voiceovers. Accordingly, the SBS aims to produce 'high quality, independent, culturally-relevant Australian media' for 'all Australians, regardless of geography, age, cultural background or language skills' (SBS 2015).

SBS's diverse focus has stimulated programs that attempt to remedy the distorted and often non-existent picture of ethnic minority communities, and strive to counter stereotypes already present in media (Jakubowicz 1987, p.26). For this reason, content about Muslims and Islam is especially important. As this chapter argues, through SBS's promotion of multiculturalism, many Orientalist depictions are mitigated and instead counter or challenge such representations by providing spaces where Muslims are able to speak out.

4.3 Case 1: Young Muslim men on *Insight*

The SBS Charter ensures that the broadcaster produces and broadcasts television programs that reflect the changing nature of Australian society and present 'many views' by using innovative forms of expression. SBS has a greater role in the production of television content than simply to appeal to a linguistically diverse audience. According to Smaill (2002, p.107), SBS has become an 'innovative avenue' producing creative content in styles not prevalent among the other television networks. An example of such programing is SBS's *Insight*, which covers socio-political issues in Australian society through audience discussion and engagement.

Originally broadcast in 1995, *Insight* replaced the *Vox Populi* program, which was designed to discuss issues affecting ethnic and Indigenous experience in Australia. *Insight* became more appealing through its 'cosmopolitan feel' and glossier format designed to draw a wider audience to SBS (Field 2001, p.15). *Insight* originally intended to discuss current affairs issues in Australia and was hosted by journalist Gael Jennings between 1999 and 2001. Since then, *Insight* has become a forum-based discussion program, hosted by journalist Jennie Brockie and debates various socio-political issues within Australia each week, including broad-ranging subjects such as crime, politics, racism, corruption, sexualities, and terrorism.

As a mediated public forum, *Insight* is significant in producing a space for Muslims to speak out. Ang et al. (2008, pp.199-200) argue that *Insight*'s format allows contributors to express their concerns about matters being discussed, thus establishing a 'participatory culture' that produces 'active' (as opposed to 'passive') audiences. Part of *Insight*'s innovative appeal is its engagement and

interaction with audience members, ultimately promoting a sense of 'democracy in action' (Ang et al. 2008). Rather than simplifying or interpreting national discussions, *Insight* 'complicates and opens them up' by revealing diverse perspectives on issues (Ang et al. 2008, p.200). It encourages diverse Australians to share their stories and engage in debates that affect the nation as a whole (Roose & Akbarzadeh 2013). *Insight* represents the 'density of public debate and the jostle of opinions that need to be listened to with respect' (Ang et al. 2008, p.200). *Insigh*t is thus a critical platform producing spaces where Muslims can speak out and challenge dominant perceptions of 'otherness'.

Participating in forums such as *Insight* also means that Muslims are actively contributing to socio-political debates in Australia (Schottman 2013). This deems Muslims as actively participating in or contributing to the greater 'national will' of Australian society – a point that is further detailed in Chapter Eight (Hage 1998). Peucker et al. (2014, p.285) argue that through such political engagement and participation, Muslims are perceived as actively seeking to serve the 'whole society and pursuing the common good', whilst simultaneously, 'may also engage in public affairs more specifically to advocate the well-being and recognition of their own religious community and to redress exclusionary stigmatisations'. By participating in forums such as *Insight,* Muslims are not necessarily speaking out to challenge misconceptions, but also to engage in national debates as 'active citizens' (Yasmeen 2007, Peucker et al. 2014).

The episode of *Insight* analysed below, focuses on issues relating to young Muslim men. It is titled *True Colours* and originally aired on August 15, 2006 (eight months after the Cronulla Riots). The episode centres on the events that took place during the Cronulla Riots and addresses the 'threat' of ethnic youth gangs in Australia (see Chapter Three). A substantial amount of time within the episode is dedicated to discussions of young Muslim men and 'their' involvement in crime and gang culture. To counter some of the assumptions made about Muslims and crime, young Muslim men use the *Insight* forum to speak out and share their own experiences. These young Muslim men are represented as 'actively engaging' (Yasmeen 2007, Peucker et al. 2014) in *Insight*'s public forum, producing narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging.

4.3.1 'Speaking out', demystification, and belonging

'Speaking out' is a process by which Muslims are able to address Orientalist and negative media perceptions by challenging them and promoting sites of change (Dreher 2003; 2009). This process allows Muslims to speak from a marginalised position and engage in public discourse, which shapes their sense of belonging in the nation. In *True Colours*, this is achieved through *Insight'*s format as a mediated public forum that enables young Muslim men to challenge dominant perceptions through 'demystification' (West 1990). Much of the debate regarding young Muslim men and crime in this episode, focuses on demystifying assumptions that have been socially constructed by socio-political and media discourses, and that explicitly link Muslim men with crime, violence, or gang culture (see Chapter Three).

Chapter Three has illustrated the ways young Muslim men have synonymously been linked with crime, violence, and gangs throughout news media as a means to differentiate 'them' from the rest of Australian society (see also Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Humphrey 2007, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). This linking has enabled the development of contemporary stereotypes of Muslim men in Australia, frequently representing 'them' as 'evil criminals', 'untrustworthy' and 'un-Australian'[24]. For Chopra (2015, p.331), the media has stereotyped factors such as 'ethnicity', 'race' and 'religion' as particularly 'pertinent' and 'integral' to the motivation or circumstances of the crime. In this way, crime is synonymous with young Muslim men, naturalising the perception that crime or criminal activity is inherent within Islam (Manning 2003, Humphrey 2007, Baird 2009).

In *True Colours*, prevailing perceptions of Muslims and crime are debated and challenged. The debate is shaped by demystifications of the belief that Islam is an extremist religion that promotes dangerous and criminal activities. As many speakers in *True Colours* suggest, crime is the result of social, economic, and political factors within society, and not necessarily characterised by Muslims or Islam. American rapper Napoleon particularly attempts to decouple Islam and crime. He explains that 'as Muslims' many things are unacceptable by religion

[24] See Chapter One and Chapter Three for a detailed analysis of young Muslim men and representations of moral panics, which label 'them' as 'un-Australian'.

and thus 'as Muslims', young men who commit crime are 'turning away' from their religion (*Insight* 2006). For Napoleon, involvement in crime denotes isolation from, and not engagement in, Islamic practices.

Other Muslim speakers in *True Colours* also attempt to demystify assumptions about Muslims, Islam, and crime. For example, Muslim youth worker, Fadi Rahman, argues that Muslims engage in crime for much the same reasons as non-Muslims. He argues that crime among 'Australian youth' is problematic and should be 'solved' beyond the singular context of the Muslim community. Rahman particularly highlights that crime is a 'national issue' and not necessary a 'Muslim or Middle Eastern problem'. He argues that it is explicitly racialised, as 'non-white' criminals are commonly visually and ethnically described (White 2007, Noble 2008). At one stage, when former politician Malcom Kerr explicitly states that 'Middle Eastern crime is a problem', Rahman intercepts by articulating that 'youth crime' and not necessarily 'Middle Eastern crime' or 'Muslim crime' is the problem, because 'Middle Eastern' or 'Muslim' people are not alone in committing crimes in Australia. Here, Rahman attempts to demystify and debunk those assumptions that homogenise and pigeonhole crime as an 'integral' in Islamic practice, by shifting crime's location from one particular group within Australian society (Chopra 2015). While Kerr alludes to the types of crime commonly committed by Middle Eastern or Muslim perpetrators, Rahman argues that it is not 'ethnicity' or 'religion' that motivates criminal behaviour, but the society that nurtures these young men, whether Muslim or non-Muslim (see also Poynting et al. 2000, White 2007, Tufail 2015, Tufail & Poynting 2016).

By voicing these concerns on *True Colours,* Rahman draws on the Orientalist depictions of Muslims and crime and, in this context, is recognised as engaging in a greater debate about youth and crime in Australia. As a public forum, *Insight* is identified as a space where people gather to discuss critical issues concerning particular groups, communities, or societies. Marcotte (2010, p.117) argues that these forums are especially important for marginalised or 'othered' groups such as Muslims because they foster sites where 'multiple and multivocal' discourses develop. Marcotte explains that public forums, advance through media, and generate 'novel means of interaction' by sustaining new forms of public spaces

and new social support networks. They become democratic spaces where Muslims voice their opinions alongside those already prevalent in Australian society.

By speaking out as a Muslim on *True Colours*, Rahman exudes a sense of authority as a marginalised figure that 'shifts some of the focus and responsibility for change…onto the conventions, institutions and privileges which shape who and what can be heard in the media' (Dreher 2009, p.447). As has been illustrated in Chapter One, it is the media that construct and preserve specific Orientalist constructions that favour 'whiteness' in Western societies. It is therefore the media that can intercept these constructions, by enabling Muslims to speak out in similar ways to Rahman on *True Colours* (see also Hall 1992).

For Dreher (2003), practices of speaking out present a form of empowerment that position Muslims as 'subjects' and not 'objects' in public debates about 'otherness'. This is reflected in *Insight'*s format that attempts to quell fears and anxieties by promoting mutual respects through 'speaking' and 'listening' (Dreher 2009, Mansouri & Lobo 2012). Rahman's opinions about youth and crime *become valuable*, given that his concerns reflect the nation's, and are not necessarily or strictly limited to Muslims (Schottmann 2013, p.419). This process allows Muslims to practice what Peucker et al. (2014) identify as 'active citizenship' – through immersing and engaging in discourses that affect national interests. 'Speaking out' against the racialised discourses of crime, and expressing its significance in the greater Australian community, supports Rahman's claims to active citizenship and belonging in particular.

Chapter One has expressed that belonging facilitates emotional connections between people in any given field (Garbutt 2009, Antonsich 2010, Roose 2016). This emotional connection reflects the need for both 'speaking' and 'listening' as central to the practice of speaking out. They denote that processes of belonging are harnessed by the ways people feel that they can express themselves through various channels and be recognised as an integral part of the community, as well as 'being valued' and 'listened to' (Antonsich 210, p.650). The context of *Insight* renders this possible given its role as a 'discursive site' established by SBS where the desire for 'multicultural' and 'multivocal' perspectives is essential (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002). This is demonstrated throughout *True Colours,* as diversity is

accounted for aesthetically by the headshots of each speaker that accompany the opinions and comments made, so as to showcase the richness of perspectives and opinions.

Moreover, Brockie draws on a number of Rahman's points in *True Colours* to acknowledge them as significant to the debate. In her role as moderator, Brockie is responsible for fostering and guiding discussion, and she uses Rahman's comments to address issues of Muslims and crime. Brockie poses direct questions to a number of young Muslim men asking them about their experiences with crime. The majority of responses emphasise factors such as the 'need for money', 'no job', and 'boredom', as opposed to religion, as specific reasons for criminal activity. These responses reflect what Poynting et al. (2000) identify as socio-economic factors that motivate criminal behaviour amongst marginalised groups such as Muslims. However, for Rahman, these are 'issues within the community' that include unemployment, low education, and low self-esteem, which are primary issues amongst Australian youth generally and not restrictive to young Muslim men.

Rahman thus utilises the space of *Insight* to exposes particular constructions that frame Muslim 'otherness'. As West (1990, p.105) suggests demystification is an 'illuminative mode' that exposes 'complex dynamics of institutional and other related power structures in order to disclose options and alternatives for transformative praxis'. Rahman suggests that pigeonholing Muslim men as criminals, through the lens of the media, is counter-productive and that attention should shift to the investigation of crime as a 'national problem' and not one distinctively linked to Muslims and Islam.

Other speakers in *True Colours* demystify Orientalist perceptions of young Muslim men in reference to belonging. This is evidenced during discussions about 'ethnic youth gangs'. As explored in Chapter Three, young men of 'Middle Eastern appearance' who 'loitered' in public spaces were immediately labelled as dangerous gangs by news media in the late 1990s (Poynting et al. 2000, p.120-121). This was despite the fact that in many cases, young men did not necessarily engage in illegal or criminal activity but were labelled dangerous *because of* racial profiling (Poynting et al. 1999; 2000, Noble 2007, White 2007). In *True Colours*,

some of the young Muslim men attempt to address this thinking by expressing their attempts to socialise with other Muslims, which are repeatedly read as the desire to form criminal gangs. As Noble (2007, p.332) argues, with reference to the ethnic youth gang moral panic of the 1990s:

> …the formation of peer groups, which were vaguely presented as a "gang", had more to do with negotiating the complex dynamics of friendship, ethnicity and masculinity and the desire for social power through a defined identity than any real connection to the world of criminal gangs.

The socialising processes in which these young Muslim men take part are more about the search for belonging, a factor that has ultimately been framed through derogatory terms within news media. Similarly, scholar Rob White tells the speakers in *True Colours* that the term 'gang' has been racialised and needs to be 'treated carefully' in reference to Muslims. White explains, 'what we're really talking about in most cases is groups of young men who hang around together and who occasionally will engage in street fights and that kind of thing…' White's comments are borne out through an exchange between Brockie and a young Muslim man, Nader Hamden. Brockie introduces Hamden as the 'leader of a gang' in his 'area' while Hamden immediately attempts to correct this statement:

> **Hamden**: No, I wasn't a leader of a gang. There was no gang. We were just a bunch of young guys living in the same area…and the media labelled us a gang and… when you're named a gang you've got to do things that are going to be the toughest and baddest (sic) people in your city.
>
> **Brockie**: Is that what you did when you were young?
>
> **Hamden**: That's basically what I did. I got labelled something and I wanted to live up to that label and we wanted to be the baddest (sic) guys around, that's what it's about.

Hamden stresses that the media 'labelled' his group of friends as a 'gang' and their involvement in criminal activity was a direct response to this labelling (Poynting et al. 1999). For Hamden, the issue is less about gang culture or criminality and more about gaining a sense of recognition amongst those institutions that marginalise him. By speaking out, Hamden is not only demystifying perceptions about young Muslim men and gangs, but exposing the power struggle that positions him as an 'other' in the mainstream multicultural

nation. Hamden's need to 'live up to a label' is ultimately a consequence of the desire for social power and cultural capital in the search for social worth in a society where he is excluded (Noble 2007, p.331, Tufail 2015).

By speaking out both Hamden and Rahman highlight that Muslim 'otherness' is constructed through Orientalising processes and does not equate to a universal truth about struggling Muslims in Western societies (Said 1978). These young Muslim men are therefore able to produce alternative narratives that promote a sense of inclusiveness and belonging. In Rahman's case, it is about stressing social cohesion by targeting a 'common national issue', which in the context of *True Colours* is crime. Pardy and Lee (2011) argue that social cohesion accentuates common aims, shared social objectives, and a sense of 'community solidarity', which ultimately is linked to social capital (see also Lentin & Titley 2008). As addressed in Chapter One, social capital represents characteristics or 'material and symbolic goods', which are valued within the national field and are basic requirements for the accumulation of belonging in the 'white nation' (Hage 1998, p.53). By speaking out in *True Colours*, the young Muslim men are able to accumulate a sense of belonging given their concern for 'the nation' and by increasing 'their' engagement with mainstream Australia through public forums such as *Insight*.

Multicultural notions, as facilitated by SBS, are also relevant to this figurative accumulation of social capital because they produce spaces where 'claims to the nation' through 'active citizenship' are asserted (Pardy & Lee 2011, Peucker et al. 2014). Yasmeen (2007, p.44) argues that feelings of inclusiveness encourage Muslims to actively seek participation in national initiatives, presenting them as 'motivated to opt for pro-active strategies to achieve the desired status of equal citizenship'. Practices of speaking out account for social capital through instigating forms of recognition and acknowledgment for young Muslim men in the nation, as illustrated by *True Colours*. As Dreher (2003; 2009) argues, 'speaking out' aims to produce positivity amongst ethnic communities and inclusivity by countering those perceptions which mostly construct exclusions in the multicultural space.

The accumulation of social capital through 'speaking out' is reinforced by *Insight*, given its mission to debate Australian issues and encourage multiple (and diverse) perspectives (Ang et al. 2008). In line with its Charter, SBS provides spaces where young Muslim men, such as Rahman and Hamden, exist as 'cultural innovators' who make creative contributions to Australia's multicultural society (Dreher 2003, p.128). Smaill (2002, p.393) argues that programming practices of SBS, such as those facilitated by *Insight*, provide a frame through which exploring difference and conflicting perspectives are made possible. Not only then are the young men on *True Colours* recognised as speaking out on behalf of Muslim communities in Australia, but as actively working to better the nation[25] (Hage 1996, see also Peucker et al. 2014). Practices of speaking out therefore illuminate modes of inclusiveness and belonging, and produce multicultural spaces where young Muslim men can engage in public debate and subsequently counter negative perceptions concerning crime and gangs.

4.3.2 'Speaking out' and marginalisation

Dreher (2003; 2009) recognises that 'speaking out' is beneficial in multicultural societies such as Australia; however, it does not necessarily shift the social realities of those who are marginalised. For the young Muslim men on *True Colours,* practices of speaking out grant them a form of national recognition produced through their engagement in debates. These practices also sustain and support the very issues the young Muslim men attempt to rectify. According to West (1990, p.103) efforts made by those in marginalised positions to counter dominant perceptions remain inscribed in the discursive logics that dehumanises 'them' as 'other'. 'Speaking out' therefore victimises Muslims through racist processes that tend to be Orientalist. Practices of speaking out are thus constructed for the purposes of conceptualising a greater multicultural nation, as opposed to assisting those who have been marginalised in society (Hage 1997; 1998).

The multicultural focus presented by *Insight,* preserves a perception of SBS as a 'space for migrants' (Pardy & Lee 2011) that guarantees a sense of inclusiveness and belonging. It is about reflecting multicultural principles that shape national imaginations of ethnic heterogeneity (over 'white' homogeneity). SBS's purpose

[25] This point is further discussed in Chapter Eight.

is to produce niche content for a niche, albeit multicultural, market that is separate from the commercial networks. In this way, SBS forms part of a greater media ideology produced through structures of exclusion and control that characterises the media industry's approach to 'cultural difference' (Smaill 2002. p.397). By speaking out on *True Colours*, young Muslim men recognise that they have been marginalised and therefore 'speak' from a position external from the mainstream. SBS thus does not necessarily bridge an ostensible gap between Muslims and Australians, but maintains the divide between dominant and marginal subjectivities, that determine the status of these young Muslim men as 'other' in Australia.

This logic highlights Orientalist constructions of 'otherness' and reproduces a system that is dedicated to 'making sense' of the essential difference between the 'other' and the 'white subject' (Said 1978, p.204). The point, as Said (1978) argues, is that the 'other' remains an 'object' or 'subject' of Western interests, regardless of how that 'other' is represented or who represents it. By speaking out on forums such as *Insight,* Muslims are obliged to 'explain themselves' and their 'otherness' to the broader Australian community who perceive them as a 'threat' (Aly 2014). It is a binding process where Muslims are trapped in a need to constantly 'prove themselves' within society and 'in light of norms and models set by white elites whose own heritage devalues and dehumanises them' (West 1990, p.106). 'Speaking out' is another form of seeking 'approval' and 'acceptance' in a multicultural society where Muslims have frequently been excluded due to a perceived 'difference' ingrained in discourses of 'otherness' (see Chapter One). Aly (2014) argues that 'speaking out' emphasises a need for the declaration of 'loyalty' and 'commitment' to Australia by participating in debates about an supposed 'Islamic issue' in the nation. This is precisely the case for the young Muslim men on *True Colours*, given their 'speaking out' is bound by the circumstances that marginalise and disenfranchise them: religion, crime, and gangs.

Garbutt (2009) argues that marginalisation complements the notions of belonging as constructed through a discourse of polarisation and clustered around some hegemonic formation of boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. On *True Colours*, factors such as 'crime' and 'gangs' are racialised to the point where fundamental

divides are drawn between the culture of the perpetrators and that of mainstream society (Dagistanli 2007, p.181). As discussed in Chapter Three, it is about polarising Islam and Australia to emphasise the incompatibility between Islamic and ('white') Australian values (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). This framework creates a kind of separatism between Muslims and non-Muslims that has been played out during the Cronulla Riots in 2005 (Poynting 2006). Such us/them polarisations are reflected in *True Colours,* as young Muslim men recount their own experiences and stress their struggles with disenfranchisement and marginalisation. Jimmy Jihad explains that:

> I couldn't mix in with my Australian friends because I didn't fit in with them, so I felt isolated and I think a lot of the youth feel like that too and a lot of my friends still feel like that.

In similar fashion, Rahman states:

> We feel that these youngsters feel that they've been marginalised within Australia. The place that they're supposedly calling home, they can't call home….

The issue highlighted in both statements references a division in identity and belonging between what it means to be outcast as 'Muslim' and how to 'fit in' by 'being Australian'. Belonging is expressed here as a sense of connection through 'sameness' or 'difference' and 'connection to others' (Probyn 1996, Garbutt 2009, Antonsich 2010). Jihad makes a clear distinction between himself and his 'Australian friends' by highlighting that he is unlike them because he is unable to 'mix in' or connect with them. Similarly, Rahman uses a metaphor of 'home' to emphasise the difficulty of fitting in and belonging for young Muslims in Australia. 'Home' stands for a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional attachment in this case, from which these young Muslim men are excluded (Antonsich 2010, p.646). As Antonsich (2010, p.649) explains:

> To be able to feel at home in a place is not just a personal matter, but also a social one… one's personal, intimate feeling of belonging to a place should always come to terms with discourses and practices of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion…

According to Hage (2002), the 'home' metaphor enhances ethnic difference in multicultural societies. This is predominantly because Australia is consistently recognised as a 'host' nation for Muslim migrants – one to which they must adapt

and are recognised as 'guests', rather than 'inhabitants'. Australia can thus never actually be perceived as 'home' for Muslims in this conceptualisation (Hage 1997; 2002, Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Noble 2009).

These reservations concerning the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural society are framed through Orientalist discourses that depict an incompatibility between Islamic and Australian values *because of* Muslim 'otherness'. This is despite discursive and multicultural formations that supposedly accommodate for inclusivity and belonging. 'Speaking out' on *True Colours* means that the young Muslim men acknowledge their marginalisation and recognise their polarised 'otherness'. In *True Colours*, Rahman emphasises this by recounting his own experience of growing up in Australia as a young Muslim:

> I was raised in a place where I was- probably me and my brothers… were the only black-headed kids in the school. It is hard to fit in. We find it very difficult for us to fit in and the politicians and the media aren't helping the problem.

These comments reflect Orientalist constructions that position Muslims as incapable of 'fitting in' or integrating into Australian society given their Muslim 'otherness'. According to Dunn (2014), the circulation of negative media portrayals has significantly heightened perceptions of Muslims as being 'un-Australian'. In *True Colours*, both Jihad and Rahman are presented, as expressing a desire for belonging but feeling limited in their ability to 'be Australian' given their Muslim 'otherness'. According to Dagistanli (2007) this presents a form of 'cultural distancing' experienced by Muslims, where they have been demonised through racial labels such as 'monsters', 'barbarians', or 'criminals' to emphasise 'their' difference from the rest of Australia, ultimately accounting for a sense of exclusion.

Given the struggles to 'fit in', the young Muslim men in *True Colours* are mostly perceived as conflicted. According to Poynting et al. (2004) this perception has established a context where representations of young Muslim men as criminals have been nurtured and maintained. It relies on descriptions of young Muslim men as being 'caught between two cultures'[26], which leaves them in a fragile

[26] Poynting et al. (2004) argue that young (second-generation) Muslim men have been represented as 'caught between two culture' or 'lost' struggling to find a sense of belonging in Australian

position, often depicted as 'lost' and struggling to find a sense of belonging in Australia. These Muslims are presented as 'caught' in the sense that they suffer an identity crisis where they struggle with 'belonging' to two 'opposing' identities: being Muslim *and* Australian (Poynting et al. 2004, Woodlock 2011, Lynch 2013).

This struggle that the young Muslim men in *True Colours* are seen to face also explicitly underpins constructions of criminal activity. Feelings of marginalisation and disenfranchisement are emphasised as supposedly accounting for criminal behaviour. In *True Colours*, Mahmoud's experience clarifies this as he tells Brockie:

> I just left school, looking for work, couldn't get work, hanging around the wrong crowd. If I did get a job, I would get fired not because I was – I know I was a good worker, but it's because of who I was, Lebanese Muslim, and so I just turned to crime. I needed to get money, somehow, help my family….

Similarly to Rahman and Jihad, Mahmoud's Muslim identity is shown as limiting his integration within mainstream society. Mahmoud states emphatically that he is 'a good worker' but feels he has been marginalised because of who he is - 'Lebanese Muslim'. The victimisation of young Muslims is foregrounded through disenfranchisement and exhibits what Garbutt (2009, p.88) recognises as the black and 'white' analogies of belonging: these young Muslim men are placed in positions where aspects of social inclusion are limited because they are recognised as 'the excluded' and constantly identified as 'the problem to be solved' (see also Lentin 2005, p.390).

The struggle to 'fit in' illuminates the limitedness of representational narratives regarding inclusiveness and belonging that are produced on *True Colours* through the theme of 'speaking out'. Rather than 'empowering' these young Muslim men to counter misconceptions, the process of speaking out victimise 'them' as marginalised 'others', unable to integrate into the mainstream. More importantly, 'speaking out' is recognised as a practice whereby individual Muslims are to represent the views and opinions of heterogeneous religious communities (Aly

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culture. The representations often articulate the cultural, social and religious backgrounds of the young men as incompatible with the Australian culture. As a result, the young men are represented as 'acting out' because they are 'caught between two cultures' (see Poynting et al. 2004).

2014). The experiences of marginalisation and disenfranchisement emphasised by the young Muslim men on *True Colours* are to represent the experiences of Muslim youth generally, which consequently offers a misconceived depiction of complex 'social realities' (Poynting et al. 2004, Aly 2009, Collins & Reid 2009).

Insight as a televised public forum has recognised and limited 'national belonging' available to young Muslim men in their search for belonging. Comedy is another televisual space where Muslims speak out and challenge dominant perceptions of 'otherness'. Where *Insight* favours public discussion and debate that simultaneously reinforces commonly held Orientalist perceptions, the space of comedy is more open and suggestive. The next section analyses SBS's *Salam Café* as a comedic space, where Muslims are able to speak out and highlight similarities over differences between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the multicultural nation (Busbridge 2013).

4.4 Case 2: Muslims on *Salam Café*

The SBS's Charter outlines that programming must reflect Australia's multiculturalism by paying close attention to ethnic differences and interpreting these through creative and innovative means (Ang et al. 2008). One of the primary ways SBS has been innovative in its production of multicultural content is through television comedy. Comedy is recognised as a space where Muslims are able to speak out and 'educate' audiences about constructed Orientalist perceptions of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Dreher 2009, Busbridge 2013). Similarly to public forums, speaking out through comedic conventions allows Muslims to become positioned as 'valued' members of Australian society (Luckhurs & Rae 2016). According to Al-Momani (2010) and Busbridge (2013) comedy can be perceived as a form of political participation that aims for better engagements and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims in Australia. A program that demonstrates this is *Salam Café*[27], which originally aired on SBS on May 7, 2008.

[27] *Salam Café* originally broadcast on the free-to-air community Channel 31 in April 2005, produced by RMITV, a local production facility based in RMIT University.

Marketed as a comedy talk show and entertainment program, *Salam Café* integrates comedy conventions with panel discussions in order to produce relevant and effective debates about Muslims and Islam in Australia. *Salam Café* also attempts to demystify dominant assumptions about Muslims and Islam by emphasising similarities over differences between Muslims and non-Muslims (Busbridge 2013). This evidences SBS's aim as a 'multicultural broadcaster', to promote national unity through the recognition of 'sameness' and 'difference' (Smaill 2002, p.393). According to Smaill (2002, p.397), it is a means of promoting cosmopolitanism for the benefit of two groups: Those multi-lingual minorities for whom SBS was originally established, and those recognised as the majority or mainstream community of Australia, who aspire to 'become more worldly' at the expense of the provision of minority services.

Salam Café thus entertains an audience that is open to social, cultural, and ethnic difference. The program is recognised as a platform for speaking out by facilitating a 'better understanding' of the Muslim 'other' and constructing 'better relations' between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Australia (Dreher 2009, p.451). The program mostly consists of comedic sketches that draw on Orientalist assumptions wrought through polarised binaries of 'us' and 'them'. However, *Salam Cafe* constructs a comedic space through which Muslims enact and perform Muslim and Australian identities, and the relations between them, as opposed to, exploring the ways non-Muslims perceive Muslims (Busbridge 2013, p.460).

4.4.1 'Speaking out', sameness, and belonging

'Speaking out' involves a politics of listening, where the challenge for Muslims is not so much 'speaking' but 'being heard' (Dreher 2009, p.447). Producing spaces where Muslims can speak out are just as important to facilitate 'listening', and for the comprehension of what is being said. 'Speaking out' thus promotes new ways for 'the centre' or 'white' mainstream to 'hear', rather than constantly requiring the marginalised to 'speak' (Dreher 2010b). One of the ways to do this is to speak out using conventions, with which the mainstream is familiar, such as those found in television sketch comedy.

Jacubowicz (1994, p.100) argues that comedy offers an 'important site' from which 'mythic forms' of society can be recomposed. Comedy is a genre within which ethnic relations in Australia, particularly those between Muslims and 'white' Australians, can be expressed, challenged, or provoked (Jacubowicz 1994, Busbridge 2013). For Luckhurs and Rae (2016), comedy becomes a form of activism when used by marginalised 'others' because it enables critical issues to be addressed in 'safe spaces'. Accordingly, the conventions of comedy enable ideological expressions around media representations and multiculturalism, to be addressed by those who have been 'excluded' (Busbridge 2013, p.460).

In *Salam Café*, comedy shapes the ways Muslims speak out. Each episode combines panel discussions with comedy sketches and vox populi (or vox pops) as a means for informal political debate about issues of Muslims and Islam in the West. Ahmed Imam[28] hosts the program and is accompanied by Muslim panellists including Waleed Aly, Susan Carland, Ahmed Hassan, Dakhylina Madkhul, and Toltu Tufa. Comedians Aamer Rahman, Nazeem Hussain[29], and Jehad Debab also contribute to discussions by performing in topical sketches. Dreher (2009) describes these panellists as 'media-savvy young Muslims' who push the boundaries of difference and speak directly to an audience who have marginalised them. The program encourages viewers 'to contemplate conflicts and uncomfortable truths and to hear a little of how they might be implicated in the everyday workings of prejudice and racism' (Dreher 2009, p.455).

Many of the comedic sketches in *Salam Café* focus on constructed Orientalist and homogenised stereotypes/representations of Muslims. A number of vox pops are interspersed throughout *Salam Cafe* to demonstrate the effect of Orientalist perceptions in society. In the first episode, the panel share a clip of Hussain in Adelaide sampling 'random' Australians on their perceptions of Muslims and Islam. Hussain asks questions such as 'what do you know about Muslims?', 'What religion do terrorists believe in?', and 'What country do Muslims come from?' The majority of responses illustrate limited understandings of Muslims and Islam, with the most common answers being, 'I have no idea [about

[28] Ahmed Imam was the acting Chief Executive of the Islamic Council of Victoria at the time.
[29] Nazeem Hussain went on to have a successful comedy career winning the Best Newcomer Award at the Melbourne International Comedy Festival in 2008 for his stand-up comedy show *Fear of a Brown Planet*, which toured globally after *Salam Café*.

Muslims]', 'Muslims come from Arabia', 'Terrorists follow the Muslim (sic) religion', and that Muslims are easily identifiable by 'the things they wear on their heads'.

Similarly, the panellists in the second episode share another vox pop of Carland surveying what Australians in Melbourne know about Muslims and Islam. Carland asks questions such as 'Do you know what halal meat is?' and 'have you had a halal meal?' One respondent suggests that halal is for Muslims what Kocher is for Jews, even though he didn't quite understand either. A number of other respondents state that they eat 'kebabs' which they believe are a 'halal meal'.

Both these instances highlight the supposed and limited perspectives 'everyday Australians' have of Muslims. *Salam Cafe* draws on and pokes fun at the negative representations of Muslims and Islam that are already circulating in media and public discourse, demonstrated by the references to terrorism. At the same time, Hussain and Carland ask loaded questions (such as 'what religion do terrorists believe in') in order to receive stereotypical answers ('Muslim'). They highlight not only the misconceptions, but also the ignorant, even racist, depictions that have framed Muslim 'otherness'. These vox pops, both poignant and amusing, reveal the Orientalist thinking that circulates in everyday knowledge about Muslims and Islam in Western multicultural societies, and additionally reflects the ostensible racial sentiment that 'Muslims in Australia encounter regularly' (Dreher 2009, p.452, see also Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). Hence, *Salam Café* exemplifies the ways Orientalist thinking is 'taken-for-granted' in Australia, and produces universal perceptions of 'otherness' that consistently frame Muslim exclusion by positioning them as an 'out-group' in the multicultural nation (Houston 2008, p.37, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, p.131, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012).

According to Hage (1998, p.32), such mediated racial prejudice constructs the imagined 'white nation' as one that recognises 'racism' through 'essentialisation' or 'stereotyping'. This framework allows 'whiteness' to retain a centralised position within the nation by enabling particular groups to enforce ideological racism as a means of discriminating and subjugating others. As Hage (1998, p.33) puts it, while everyone may be capable of 'stereotyping and essentialising others',

only those who dominate a position of power are able to use this racism as a means to include or exclude other groups (see also Chapter One). The vox pops shared on *Salam Café* are not designed to exclude the 'dominant culture', but to emphasise the ways racial constructions of society naturalise Muslim representations of 'otherness' in Australia. In doing so, these Muslims are speaking to and exposing the privileged 'white' power inherent in Australia's multicultural structure (Hage 1998).

The Muslims on *Salam Café* confront such racialised constructions by removing cultural barriers to promote a sense of cohesion and unity. This initiates and sustains narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging through aims of promoting heterogeneity. According to Garbutt (2009, p.89), a sense of belonging develops and is continually sought through finding and making one's positioning according to the social structures and practices in society. The Muslims on *Salam Café* present themselves as both internal and external to these structures as a means of producing a sense of self-inclusion. They flip the modes of representation and shift the hierarchies of media structures, as 'they' set the agenda and therefore dictate 'who poses questions, who answers, and for the benefit of whom' (Dreher 2009, p.453).

For easy comprehension of material, the Muslims on *Salam Café* draw on notions of familiarity through conventions that are clearly identifiable by diverse Australian audiences. Houston (2008, p.37) describes *Salam Café* as a 'mimicry' of the popular commercial program *The Footy Show* (a sports chat-show on network Nine):

> The set-up is 100% familiar, from the opening clips and the comedy sketches to the "special guests" and the guy to the side behind the coffee machine (not a bar- these are Muslims, after all). But part of the fun is precisely that familiarity, and the knowledge that all those elements are used both because they work, and as cheerfully ironic not to all the other desk-chairs-coffee-cups shows that have gone before.

The familiarity in the setting accounts for *Salam Café*'s distinct 'Australian humour'. As Houston (2008) suggests, 'part of the fun' in presenting something familiar is essentially because it 'works' and presents content as 'cheerfully ironic'. The familiar setting is already recognised and popularised by Australian audiences, underscoring the ways these audiences relate to *Salam Café.* This

permits easy comprehension of the jokes inherent in the program and to understand the critical issues foregrounded through the conventions of comedy (Davis 2007, Busbridge 2013)

According to Dreher (2009), speaking out in this way enables a sense of 'comprehending the other' and positioning it within a field of familiarity. By drawing on Muslim and 'white' Australian racial stereotypes, Muslims on *Salam Café* perform a sense of 'togetherness' or 'social cohesion' by laughing at the racial perceptions that construct both 'Muslims' and 'Australians' in the nation's multicultural setting (Pardy & Lee 2011, Busbridge 2013). This accounts for a sense of self-inclusion, where Muslims are able to break down and diminish cultural barriers in an environment where their 'difference' and 'otherness' is mitigated. According to Smaill (2002, p.401), SBS promotes a 'safe environment' that represents and discusses ethnic difference in the interests of promoting 'public harmony'. Programs such as *Salam Café* aim to recognise the significance of Muslims in Australia by promoting narratives that position 'them' as 'Australians' just as much as 'Muslims', and thus inclusive in the national space (Busbridge 2013).

The aim of *Salam Café* is to promote a sense of unity by poking fun at the discursive formations that polarise 'being Muslim' and 'being Australian'. In doing so, these Muslims stress that Muslims and non-Muslims are able to harmoniously co-exist in the multicultural society. This is mostly evidenced through comedic exchanges between the Muslim panel members and their non-Muslim guests. In the first episode, for example, the Muslim panellists interrogate comedian Dave Hughes about his lifestyle choices and emphasise how these mirror their own. Hughes is well known for his Australian larrikin humour, as he draws on issues of 'white' working class men in Australia. The panellists jokingly encourage Hughes to 'come out as a Muslim' because of the similarities he shares with 'them' as Muslims:

> **Aly**: I've just been doing some thinking…you say you don't drink.
>
> **Hughes**: That's right.
>
> **Aly**: I've heard you're a vegetarian, is that right?

Hughes: Yeah, I am. I eat fish, but I am.

Aly: So you wouldn't eat pork then?

Hughes: No I don't eat pork. No.

Aly: I've heard you're a fan of hotted-up[30] cars?

Hughes: Yeah, I like Holdens.

Aly: You worked in an abattoir?

Hughes: I worked in an abattoir, yes.

Aly: You would have met a lot of Muslims there…

Hughes: Yes there was a few there…yes.

Aly: You keep getting fired from every job you've ever had and before that you were on the dole for years… so I'm just joining the dots here, and this is a crazy theory but you're not *Muslim* are you?

This exchange, though stereotyped and exaggerated, explores meanings of 'being Australian' *and* 'being Muslim' (not eating meat or drinking alcohol). In suggesting that Hughes is like 'them' (Muslims), Aly is also suggesting that Muslims are like Hughes ('white' Australians). In this way, the Muslims on *Salam Café* are rejecting the 'abstract, general, and universal' (West 1990, p.93) assumptions that construct polarisations of Muslims and 'white' Australians. Speaking out in this regard neither promotes oppositional positions nor transgresses the 'shocking conventions' posed by 'white' and multicultural constructions. Instead, it is about fostering alternative and creative ways to promote co-existence between those people often polarised in media and socio-political discourses (Kabir 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011).

By referencing 'sameness' over 'difference', the Muslims on *Salam Café* are presenting a form of integration, which accounts for their own sense of inclusiveness and belonging. These Muslims balance Muslim-ness and Australian-ness by expressing fusion, similarity, and interchangeability. As Collins and Reid (2009) argue, they induce inter-connected cosmopolitan lives by creating hybrid identities and not necessarily rejecting Australia as a place where

[30] The phrase 'hotted-up cars' is Australian colloquial language used to refer to ethnic males who revamp their cars to 'look good'. The phrase is usually associated with young Muslim males (see Tabar 2007).

they are marginalised, but actually included (see also Noble & Tabar 2002, Poynting et al. 2004, Woodlock 2011).

These views of hybridity and fusion are discussed further in Chapter Six and Chapter Eight respectively, but demonstrate here that such representations allow young Muslims to promote and represent successful integration. Hage (1998) argues that integration is essential in the process of accumulating belonging because it demonstrates the ability for migrants to merge their niche cultures with that of the mainstream or host nation (where Muslims are migrants). Such integration works within Australia's multicultural context, as it centralises ethnicity and diversity (Hage 1997; 1998, Pardy & Lee 2011, Mansouri & Lobo 2012). According to Hage (1998, p.239) integration accounts for the 'attachments of migrants to Australia and their will to participate in its political, cultural, and social life, each according to their capacity'. This underscores the objective of 'speaking out' for the Muslims on *Salam Café*: to demystify 'otherness' whilst actively engaging in socio-political discourses that heighten national inclusiveness and belonging (Dreher 2009; 2010a). By speaking out through the conventions of comedy, these Muslims are able to expose the dominant racist perceptions that construct 'otherness' and exclusion in Australia, while simultaneously perpetuating narratives of 'sameness' and subsequently inclusion.

4.4.2 'Speaking out' and 'otherness'

As a 'multicultural broadcaster', SBS aligns with the social ideal of promoting innovative spaces on which Muslims are able to speak out. The SBS mandate stresses the promotion of multiculturalism as an all-inclusive national identity, or what Hawkins (1996, p.48) calls 'the happy pluralism of unity in diversity'. However, SBS's obligation to reflect multiculturalism and 'the views of all Australians' can also be understood as counter-productive (Hujanen 2013). Discussions of young Muslim men and crime on *Insight* and of mainstream understandings of Muslims and Islam on *Salam Café* taken together, suggest that SBS presents Muslim 'difference' as 'otherness' and therefore reanimates the exclusive nature of 'being Australian' it aims to redress.

In the case of *Salam Café*, Muslim 'otherness' can be viewed as a source of interest catering only to audiences open to difference and that take particular

pleasure in cultural diversity (Hawkins 1996, p.49). Such audiences represent those that Hage (1998, p.202) categorises as the 'white multiculturalists', who 'allow' and 'welcome' ethnic elements of 'otherness' as long as the ethnic retains its inferior position in the structure of the 'white nation' (see Chapter Seven). In the context of *Salam Café*, Muslim 'otherness' is made more accessible (and less 'threatening') through the conventions of comedy, as jokes are made purposely for the consumption of a 'white' Australian audience, even though the program is described as targeting 'Muslims' (Dreher 2009). In this case, Muslims who speak out on SBS are represented less as searching for a sense of belonging, and more as 'caught in a quest for white approval and acceptance' (West 1990, p.103).

As mentioned, SBS caters to a niche audience (which includes Muslims) and one that is already interested in themes that deal with ethnicity and difference. While the intended audience for *Salam Café* may have been 'non-Muslim Australians', discussions, jokes, and sketches exhibited by the program therefore resided better with a niche viewership of Muslim-Australians (Molitorisz 2008). As observed by Dreher (2009), *Salam Café* was clearly created to influence perceptions of young Muslims living in Australia, and its point was to create content that not only made Muslims more visible in the mainstream media, but also in more positive ways. *Salam Café* can thus be viewed as a resource that attempted to build a bridge between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians, but was not as successful as other programs (such as *Insight*) given its niche Muslim viewership.

By stressing 'sameness' through integration, the Muslims on *Salam Café* are not only reflecting sensationalised perceptions of diversity as put forth by the SBS, but also replicate their position as marginalised 'others'. While 'speaking out' promotes 'positive images' over and against Orientalist stereotypes, they are frequently limited because they proceed in an 'assimilationist manner' (West 1990, p.103). For Antonsich (2010), integration is the guise under which notions of assimilation exist because it promotes notions of 'sameness', but where traces of 'otherness' frequently remain. These include visual identifications that Hage (1998, pp.55-56) suggests limit the accumulation of belonging in the national space. Although notions of integration maintain that Muslims are able to merge two polarised identities, its aim is to uphold the ultimate primacy of the 'white centre' and therefore is a 'product of assimilationist mentality' (Hage 1998, p.83).

‘Speaking out’ is a process by which Muslims can show they are ‘really like white people’, thereby eliminating ostensible difference as a means of gaining recognition from the ‘white mainstream’ (West 1990).

Pardy and Lee (2011) argue that a post-9/11 context has placed emphasis away from diversity toward ‘assimilation’. This shift is seen as crucial to processes of multiculturalism that centralise ‘social cohesion’ as promoting a ‘unified national identity’ (Lentin & Titley 2008, Pardy & Lee 2011, p.298). The establishment of ‘ethnic media’ such as the SBS supports this assertion as it accommodates the mainstream by encouraging a divide between ethnic and non-ethnic viewers, where agitation for change becomes the responsibility of the Muslim ‘other’ (Smaill 2002, p.387, Dreher 2009). Dreher (2009) argues that this frames issues with ‘speaking out’ as the primary responsibility for creating narratives of inclusiveness and belonging is left up to the Muslim ‘other’. ‘Speaking out’ thus suggests that the mainstream have no significant part to play apart from lending a hand by providing Muslims a platform, such as SBS, from where they can *speak out* (see also Garbutt 2009).

Muslim ‘otherness’ on *Salam Café* is thus ‘caged’ in terms of its appeal to those audiences that seek to ‘comprehend’ or ‘metaphorically engage’ with the ‘other’ (Hage 1998, Noble & Poynting 2010). It is also pigeonholed by the socio-political context from which the majority of the jokes and sketches appear. As the program was originally broadcast in 2008, many of the jokes allude to particular discourses that address Muslims as a ‘threat’ in the West. For this reason, a majority of the jokes are self-deprecating and reinvigorate perceptions that position Muslims as the ‘object of fear and terror’ in Australia (Aly 2010, p.83). The Muslims on *Salam Café* purposely use language and imagery associating Muslims with violence and religious extremism. This is exemplified in the first episode when host Imam introduces Carland to the panel:

> **Imam**: To my left, sociologist, lecturer, mother, and *fanatical* tea connoisseur…Susan Carland
>
> **Carland**: I don’t know if you should be using the term *fanatical* on this show Ahmed
>
> **Imam**: You may have a point Susan. You may have a point.

The term 'fanatical' is used in similar fashion to its circulation in media and socio-political discourses, and acknowledged by Imam and Carland as degrading Muslims. However, it becomes a taken-for-granted representation that is left unchallenged, unjustified, and misconceived. According to Chopra (2015, p.326), such derogatory terms promote a tendency toward 'unconscious bias' in which these very innocuous perceptions are underlined by discrimination, and become a form of prejudice when left unchallenged. Ignoring terms such as 'fanatical' as a taken-for-granted representation also ignores its normalisation in Western Orientalist depictions of Islam as an extremist religion (Said 1978, Esposito 2010, Roose 2013).

The Muslims on *Salam Café* thus unavoidably engage in Orientalising processes in their attempt to escape difference and promote 'sameness'. Primarily, as Hall (1981) suggests, it becomes difficult to identify what or who is being satirised and for the benefit of whom. Put simply, 'it is never quite clear whether we are laughing with or at' the Muslim figures on *Salam Café* (Hall 1981, p.22). It is this notion of uncertainty that shapes the complexity of speaking out as a 'two-edged' process. It highlights inclusive and exclusive practices, as constituted within a field that can swing in favour of Muslims as quickly as it can swing against (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, p.155). Hall (1981, p.19) argues that this is because one has to 'speak through' the ideologies active within 'our society' as a means of 'making sense of social relations and our place in them'. Practices of speaking out denote that Muslims on *Salam Café* search for a sense of inclusiveness and belonging by acknowledging their marginalised position as 'other' in Australia's multicultural society. These Muslims seek to expand belonging by incorporating performative practices, which attempt to promote 'sameness' and thus diffuse the us/them polarisation.

One particular sketch in *Salam Café* exemplifies this search for belonging. It is titled 'The Race For Camden' and introduces the character of Uncle Sam (Sameer), played by Hussain. Uncle Sam embarks on a political campaign to be the first mayor of a small town in South Western Sydney called Camden. Camden is well known for its 'white' population, with only a small minority speaking languages other than English (Al-Natour & Morgan 2012). In 2007, a number of Camden residents protested against a proposal to build an Islamic school and

Mosque, arguing that it would cause traffic dilemmas, ruin the rural aesthetic of the town, and that they would be 'swamped' by Muslim 'fundamentalists' (Al-Natour 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Busbridge 2013). Many of Uncle Sam's sketches draw on these arguments to expose dominant stereotypes of Muslims and 'white' Australians in the very context where one is perceived to oppose the other (Woodlock 2011).

However, the character of Uncle Sam reinvigorates notions of 'otherness' that circulate throughout Orientalist discourses and those of 'fundamentalists' in particular. Alsultany (2012) argues that the Muslim 'fundamentalist' is routinely caricaturised in Western popular culture to the point where it is reduced to what Hage (1998) refers to as a 'third world-looking migrant' with brown skin, a long beard, and wearing robes. These stereotypes are projected onto, and played out by, the character of Uncle Sam in *Salam Café*: a Muslim cleric, with a long beard, wearing a thobe (Islamic male robe), speaking with thick accent, and proposing to rename the town of Camden to 'Islamden', to construct it as the first Islamic state in Australia (Busbridge 2013, p.471). The character of Uncle Sam adopts a variant of what Hall (1981) identifies as the ethnic 'clown' or 'entertainer', making it uncertain whether the audience is supposed to laugh with or at him.

Uncle Sam's character is significant because he mostly seeks to promote a sense of belonging through overtly inclusive practices (Garbutt 2009, p.98). The majority of the sketches on *Salam Café* position Uncle Sam as unable to grapple with the rejection he receives from Camden residents in his mission to build 'ten Islamic schools', 'ten halal butchers', and 'ten Mosques'. In one sketch, Uncle Sam approaches local Camden residents and questions why they 'don't want Muslims in Camden' and 'what would be so terrible about the Muslim school?' He receives responses that are explicitly racialised, similarly to those in the vox pops discussed in the previous section.

In lieu of this, Uncle Sam attempts to domesticate 'otherness' and 'perform' his Australian-ness as a means of establishing his sense of entitlement, inclusion, and belonging (Busbridge 2013). Belonging is socially constructed and founded in performativity, reflected by the 'acts of performing or doing belonging' (Antonsich 2010, p.652). This was seen during the Cronulla Riots in 2005, where

‘white’ Australians draped themselves in ‘national symbols’ such as the Australian flag to demonstrate their affiliation with the nation and therefore to be recognised as performing a sense of entitlement and belonging (Dunn 2009). In *Salam Café*, Uncle Sam mimics this behaviour to strengthen his own sense of belonging. In one sketch, Uncle Sam drapes himself in the Australian flag and carries around an ‘Australian passport’ as a means to assert his Australian-ness.

The use of national symbols reflects what West (1990) argues is the cultural politics of difference, where the main goal is for Muslims who speak out to ‘prove’ themselves to the ‘white centre’. The comedy constructed and performed by the Muslims on *Salam Café* presents an alternative in which Muslim ‘otherness’ is, as Ryan (2012) argues, ‘put on display’, for the value and entertainment of non-Muslim Australians. It draws on Orientalist discourses, where focus is consistently placed on the Muslim ‘other’ regardless of the circumstances, and the aim is to objectify the ‘other’ through stimulating narratives of ‘comprehension’ (Said 1981, Zine 2002, Dreher 2009).

As noted in Chapter One, Orientalism concerns the maintenance of power relations between the dominant and the ‘other’, by producing particular representations in which the Muslim remains an ‘other’ and therefore inferior to the dominant centre. Accordingly, Orientalism works to accommodate the ‘Western observer’ by highlighting the visibility of the ‘other’ through various means (Said 1978). As Said (1978, p.67) argues, this visibility is about objectifying Muslim ‘cultures’ by ‘receiving those cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be’. By draping himself in the Australian flag and desperately seeking to ‘fit in’ with the mainstream, Uncle Sam gestures toward these conceptualised notions, and contradictorily, reinforces Orientalist constructions of ‘otherness’, which the theme and practice of speaking out is ostensibly expected to counter.

4.5 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has identified discursive limits in narratives of Muslim inclusiveness and belonging produced on SBS and shaped by the practice of speaking out. This is despite SBS being a ‘multicultural broadcaster’, designed to draw on and accentuate Australia’s multicultural identity, by enhancing ‘multi-

cultural' and 'multi-vocal' points of view (Hawkins 1996, Ang et al. 2008). SBS is recognised as a niche broadcaster with a limited audience reach; when Muslims speak out through SBS, it is valued mostly by those who present openness to ethnic difference or cultural diversity. 'Speaking out' therefore does not necessarily penetrate the constructed ideologies that favour a 'white centre' in the Australian nation, but enhance the very 'otherness' that Muslims attempt to overcome through speaking out (Hage 1998).

The programs analysed in this chapter demonstrate the ways 'speaking out' enables Muslims to voice their opinions and attempt to counter negative Orientalist perceptions, but only in those contexts which enhance, rather than diffuse, their 'otherness' (Dreher 2009). While 'speaking out' enables Muslims to, in Hage's (1998) view, accumulate a sense of belonging, discussing nationally relevant issues on public forums or through conventions of comedy is mostly for the entertainment and benefit of the 'white centre' (Hall 1981, West 1990, Hawkins 1996, Hage 1998, Smaill 2002, Busbridge 2013). Promoting forms of engagement, interdependence, and inclusion as Dreher (2009) suggests, represents Muslims who speak out on SBS as searching for belonging by seeking the approval of an imagined 'white mainstream' (West 1990). This logic shapes the constructed formations of the Australian multicultural nation, which govern assimilative 'sameness' as a form of 'social cohesion and unity', rather than multicultural 'difference'. Consequently, while narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are developed on SBS, they are inherently limited because they are filtered through Orientalist discourses and contexts that rely on discursive formations of Muslim exclusion and 'otherness' in Australia.

The next chapter further explores 'sameness' and 'difference' in Muslim representations on free-to-air television, through analysis of the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on network Seven, with reference to the theme of 'domestication'.

Chapter Five: Muslims and 'Domestication' on Network Seven

> What binds Australia together as a "we" is the fact of our differences: differences that belong to us, and that allow Australia "to be" as a nation.
>
> (Ahmed 2000, p.103)

5.1 Introduction

The analysis of Muslims and the practices of speaking out in the previous chapter have illustrated the ways representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed, when Muslims are presented with particular opportunities to counter Orientalist (mis)conceptions (Dreher 2003; 2009, Busbridge 2013). Such opportunities are instigated through multicultural production contexts, such as the one created by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), where Muslim 'otherness' is recognised as *valuable* in the promotion of ethnic diversity (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002, Ang 2003, Busbridge 2013). These multicultural spaces encourage inclusiveness because they enable Muslims to highlight similarities over differences in the national space, with respect to contested notions of 'being Australian' (Elder 2007). This chapter explores further these same constructions of multicultural inclusiveness in reference to Muslim 'otherness'. This chapter is particularly concerned with the ways 'domesticated' versions of Islam have been constructed by current affairs programs on commercial free-to-air television in Australia.

'Domestication' presents the nation as a field where particular forms of Muslim 'otherness' can exist simultaneously and harmoniously with the 'white' majority (Bowen 2004). These conceptualisations work through themes of multiculturalism, where 'otherness' or ethnic difference is perceived and promoted as an authentic experience of integration within the nation (Lentin 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Busbridge 2013, Humphrey 2014, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). Similarly to 'speaking out', 'domestication' is explored in this chapter as a theme that produces narratives which encourage inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims in Australia. This chapter specifically examines representations of Muslim women on two current affairs programs on network Seven: *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night*. The chapter follows Aly's (2009) argument that Muslim women are a key focus in Orientalist discourses, and have become

primary symbols of the apparent polarisation of Islam and 'white' Australia (see also Aly & Walker 2007, Hussein 2009, Posetti 2010, Carland 2012, Amer 2014). This chapter argues that 'domestication' shapes narratives of inclusiveness and belonging in instances where Muslim women are represented through multicultural notions of 'being Australian'. However, these accounts are also limiting in similar ways to those in Chapter Four, given that they develop within, and are read through discursive formations that are consequently framed by Orientalist discourses.

To begin, this chapter introduces 'domestication' as a theme that enables the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. A brief background of network Seven is then provided, followed by the analysis of two programs, *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night*, by exploring the ways each program represents Muslim women[31] through limited narratives of inclusiveness and belonging.

5.1.1 'Domestication' and belonging

Chapter Four has explored the ways Muslim representations on SBS emphasise 'sameness' as a means to demonstrate the successful integration of Muslims into Australia's multicultural society. West (1990, p.93) argues that the focus on 'sameness' encourages a 'new cultural politics of difference', where those who have been marginalised as 'others' in Western society seek creative means of responding to contemporary 'terrors, anxieties, and fears' of the 'highly commercialised capitalist cultures'. The marginalised 'other' must therefore find ways to affiliate with the 'norms and models' set by the Westernised 'white societies' (West 1990, p.107). For Humphrey (2014), one of the primary ways this can occur is through processes of domesticating 'otherness' in Western societies.

Bowen (2004, p.44) defines domestication as a form of 'cultural assimilation' that refers to the ideological management of 'social and cultural differences' in nation-states with the aim of defining limits to 'national values and culture' (see also Busbridge 2013, p.463). The main purpose is to produce 'nationalised versions' of

[31] Terminology such as 'Islamic Veiling', 'Muslim women', and 'veil' will be strictly used in this chapter in references to the discourses that they denote. The use of 'Muslim women', for instance, strictly refers to women who veil as this is what the phrase denotes throughout media and socio-political discourse. As was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, these terms and phrases pose problems because they are so laden with negative stereotypes and representations (see also Bullock 2002).

Muslims and Islam in Muslim-minority countries such as Australia. Domestication seeks to develop appropriately 'domesticated versions' of Muslims and Islam in Australia, in accordance with local, 'white' norms and values (Hage 1998, Bowen 2004, p.43). For Busbridge (2013, p.463), it is a form of secularising Muslim 'otherness', 'for it is a particular extension of the notion that Muslim difference must be managed and its "inclusion" subjected to conditions'.

Domestication is therefore a process within which inclusion is predetermined. It masks pluralised ideas about Muslim difference that limit Muslims from 'full citizenship' or 'integration', and stresses 'cultural compatibility and political loyalty' to the Australian nation (Humphrey 2001; 2010). For Hage (1998) this illustrates a mode of accumulation or acquiring of 'cultural capital' and a sense of belonging-ness. It demonstrates that the Muslim 'other' is willing to affiliate with the nation by 'proving their loyalty' and adapting to centralised 'white norms' set by the 'white nationalists' (Hage 1998). In this way, domestication promotes a desire to 'be Australian' over the need to 'be Muslim'. As Sunier (2014, p.1141) explains, domestication places greater emphasis on 'national integration' as a cultural and not political trajectory, where Muslims show willingness to comply with the dominant 'white' (Anglo) national culture.

Bowen (2004) argues that domestication is mostly a 'state initiative', where governments of Western nations have sought to create 'national Islams' (see also Busbridge 2013, Humphrey 2014). For Humphrey (2010, p.200), domestication seeks to 'redefine the cultural parameters of citizenship' through 'symbolic inclusion and exclusion'. Thus, domestication is strongly tied to those liberal multicultural logics of social inclusion that have been addressed in Chapter One. It proposes that Muslim 'otherness' can be accounted for in the multicultural nation, where ethnic and cultural differences are perceived as valuable in nation-building and in constructing national unity (Hawkins 1996, Smaill 2002, Lentin & Titley 2008, Moran 2011, Busbridge 2013).

According to Busbridge (2013), domestication produces types of 'moderate Muslims' (see Chapter Seven) that align themselves with the 'white nation' and are perceived as practicing a secularised form of Islam (see also Roose 2013, Aly 2014, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). The cultural, political, and textual function

of 'moderate Muslims' in Australia's multicultural spaces is discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis, but is mentioned here for argumentative purposes. By proposing that some Muslims are 'moderate' suggests that they are 'less extreme' and 'more Westernised' than other Muslims (Aly & Green 2008, Esposito 2010). Domestication produces a space where Muslims can be represented as more 'like us' through contexts of social inclusion. As Humphrey (2009, p.139) argues, social inclusion promotes 'cultural change' through domestication (e.g. creating an Australian Islam), by seeking to bring Islamic values closer (and in opposition) to Western or Australian values.

Since domestication seeks to promote nationalised versions of Islam, Muslims can again be perceived as *similar* to 'white' Australians. It produces a realm where Muslims can claim a sense of 'nationality' or 'being Australian' without the limits, rejections, or exclusions imposed by the 'white' mainstream society. Muslim minorities are thus reshaped through the discourse of 'social inclusion', based on the politico-cultural categorisation of 'our Muslims' (Humphrey 2009, p.139). Domestication shapes perceptions that highlight familiarity and similarity by reducing the trans-national 'threat' of Muslim 'otherness' and localising it to 'our' multicultural context.

Domestication ultimately produces distinct Muslim figures in Australia, differentiated from Muslims elsewhere in the world. These Muslims are 'Muslim-Australian' and their 'fixed exclusivity' is abandoned in a mission for 'togetherness-in-difference' over 'separateness and virtual apartheid' (Ang 2003, Woodlock 2011). According to Ang (2003, p.141), these Muslim-Australian identities foreground 'complicated entanglements' that steer clear of the 'absorption of all difference into a hegemonic plane of sameness and homogeneity'. They promote difference through the assertion that difference is nationalised, therefore producing specific national and 'domesticated' identities for Muslims in Australia. At the same time, domestication acknowledges the already-established presence of Muslims and Islam in Australia, and finds alternative means of maintaining this presence through discourses of social inclusion and multiculturalism. In this way, domestication can be perceived as a 'coping mechanism' that assists in the management of ethnic diversity and 'otherness' in the multicultural nation (Lentin 2005). As Ahmed (2000, p.97)

observes, multiculturalism is a way of 'imagining the nation' through difference that simplifies the togetherness-in-difference thesis as a matter of 'being aware of' and 'accommodating for' ethnic diversity.

In this chapter, 'domestication' is explored through two points. The first recognises that processes of domestication produce notions of familiarity by stressing that Muslims living in Australia are inherently Westernised and thus represented as 'similar' to 'us'. The second point addressed in this chapter strictly relates to domestication and Muslim women. According to Humphrey (2014), Muslim women remain a prominent focus of domestication in its aims to reshape Orientalist perceptions of Muslims as symbolically oppositional to 'us'. As this chapter illustrates, 'domestication' seeks to understand and comprehend Islamic practices associated with 'otherness' such as veiling, to establish its 'compatibility' with Australian lifestyles or what can be conceptualised as 'being Australian'.

Domestication also establishes a domain where Muslim 'otherness' is constantly negotiated and re-negotiated in the national realm (Humphrey 2001). These re-negotiations are interpreted by an imagined mainstream audience through commercial media, and television. According to Hall (1993), the media develops 'modes of representations' where particular messages about 'the nation' and 'being in the nation' are specified and played out. As argued in Chapter One, the Australian media is central to the construction and definition of what it means to 'be Australian' in the contemporary multicultural space (Turner 2003, Humphrey 2007; 2009, Rane et al. 2010). This chapter draws these constructions into an examination of how Muslim women are represented through the theme of 'domestication' on network Seven.

5.2 Background: Network Seven

Network Seven (or Seven) is one of the three major commercial networks on Australian television. The network launched in 1956 through the VHF7 frequency in Melbourne, and was the second television station established in Australia at the time (following the network Nine - see Chapter Six). Seven initially consisted of a small group of independent stations across Australia, with ATN7 in Sydney and HSV7 in Melbourne among the first. In 1959, Seven expanded broadcasting

outside the two-city district and into Perth, Adelaide, and Brisbane (Brown 1989, Flew & Harrington 2010). Between 1957 and 1960, Seven formed a partnership with GTV9 and TCN9 in Melbourne and Sydney by sharing resources. However, the partnership dissolved in 1960, leading the stations under Seven to form a single network titled the Australian Television Network in 1963. This was later changed to the Seven Network Limited in 1991 (Brown 1989, Flew & Harrington 2010).

As one of the major commercial television networks in Australia, Seven's priority is to increase profits through advertising revenue (Brown 1989). Unlike SBS, Seven's primary focus is on producing content that attracts greater audience numbers over reflecting a multicultural or diverse nation (Field 2001). For this reason, Seven has endeavoured to produce quality drama programs that have become popular with Australian audiences over the years[32]. These drama productions have subsequently sustained Seven's ratings advantage over the other two commercial networks on Australian free-to-air commercial television (Bodey 2011).

Despite its success, Seven (and Australian commercial television more broadly) has been criticised for its tendency to reflect a 'white-washed' Australian nation, with minimal representation of ethnic diversity (Bell 1992, Jakubowicz et al. 1994, Phillips 2012, Klocker 2014). Criticisms throughout the 1990s focused on the ways in which commercial content across Australian television reflected and was produced for the benefit of a 'white', middle-class audience (Jacubowicz et al. 1994). This is especially true of Seven's longest running drama program, *Home and Away*, which reinforces 'whiteness', and concomitantly dominant 'white' Euro-centric norms (May 2002, Vickery 2012). Consequently, representations of Muslims and Islam on network Seven have frequently reflected Orientalist conceptions that reinforce us/them polarisations in Australia. News and current affairs broadcasts have routinely constructed Muslims as 'other' as these programs reflect contemporary socio-political contexts that frame Muslims through discourses of fear, terror, and 'threat' (Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007, Aslan 2009, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, Phillips 2011, Morgan &

[32] Some of the more popular programs have included *Homicide* (1964-1977), *A Country Practice* (1981-1994), *Home and Away* (1988-), and *All Saints* (1998-2009).

Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015). According to Said (1978), the Western news media is a primary mechanism that disseminates Orientalist imagery and enforces Orientalist thinking across the Western world. News content produced by Seven thus promotes particular views about Muslims and Islam in Australia, and encourages certain social relations while discouraging, denying, or marginalizing others (Hartley 1992, p.40), as the analysis below illustrates.

5.3 Case 1: Muslim women on *Today Tonight*

Today Tonight was first broadcast on Seven in 1995, and during its run became one of the most popular current affairs programs on Australian free-to-air television (McIver 2009, p.46). Its structure in presenting news items as 'entertainment' reflects a tabloid format that is marketed as providing greater 'insight' into critical issues affecting Australians (McIver 2009). For Bonner and McKay (2007), this is a strategy employed by commercial networks to increase entertainment value, attract audiences, and maximise advertising profits. These formats are less concerned with investigating the 'facts' of a news story and more with producing sensationalised 'narratives' for dramatic effect (Turner 2005). *Today Tonight* is infamous for its salacious reporting, focusing primarily on topics that include 'outrageous themes' of crime, sex and gossip (Ehrlich 1996). The objective of these programs is to 'tell a good story', rather than 'search for truth' behind social ills or institutional wrongdoings (Ehrlich 1996, p.14). For this reason, *Today Tonight* has been popular amongst Australian audiences, presenting dramatised and easy-to-digest content[33].

According to McIver (2009, p.47), *Today Tonight* occupies an 'esteemed position' in the contemporary Australian mediascape, and its format remains influential because of its role in discharging public information and shaping public debates (see also Turner 2005, p.1). *Today Tonight* produces national narratives, or narratives about the nation, that reflect constructed conceptualisations of national identity and culture. McIver (2009, p.49) argues that *Today Tonight* addresses Australians singularly and collectively through the use of pronouns such as 'you', 'we', and 'us':

[33] In January 2014, despite its popularity, *Today Tonight* was axed in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane to make room for an hour long *Seven News* broadcast. Reasons for the cancelation remain unknown however it is speculated that a drop in ratings may have been the cause.

> When the terms "you", "we", "our" and "us" are used by *Today Tonight*, the community being referenced is unquestionably Australian. The language of *Today Tonight* is relaxed and informal, frequently drawing upon what can be termed the "everyday" vernacular of "ordinary Australians"… Using language that is "of the people" is one of the main ways *Today Tonight* seeks to align itself with the interests and concerns of ordinary Australians.

Today Tonight is thus an important program to consider in discussions of domestication because its narrative and visual construction directly address 'the nation' and frame particular conceptualisations of 'being Australian' (Elder 2007). In doing so, *Today Tonight* preserves specific socio-cultural constructions of Muslim 'otherness' in the nation that are repeatedly framed through inclusion and exclusion.

The segment analysed below simultaneously foregrounds these constructions in regards to conceptualised notions of 'being Australian'. It focuses less on dramatising Muslim 'otherness' in traditional Orientalist ways, and more on 'putting it on display' to deploy narratives that stress Islamic inclusion in the Australian multicultural context (Ryan 2012). The segment is titled *Behind the Veil* and follows 'Australian supermodel' Rachael Finch as she spends a day with a Muslim woman named Rebecca Kay[34], to better understand the experiences of Muslim women in Australia. *Behind the Veil* originally aired on *Today Tonight* on March 26, 2012, and underscores particular perceptions regarding the presence of Muslims and Islam in Australia's multicultural nexus. The segment deploys domestication as a means of underlying similarities (and differences) between Muslims and non-Muslims, representing Muslim women as 'like us' in another specific narrative of conditional and paradoxical inclusiveness and belonging.

5.3.1 Familiarity, 'domestication', and belonging

As stated earlier in this chapter, domestication draws on notions of familiarity to make specific claims to 'being Australian', with respect to Muslims in the nation. According to Ahmed (2000), familiarity produces recognisable spaces, which become 'sites of inclusion' where ethnic difference or Muslim 'otherness' can be negotiated in the multicultural space. Such domesticated familiarity seeks to bring 'otherness' into closer proximity with Australian-ness by focusing on the value of

[34] Rebecca Kay also makes appearance on Nine's *A Current Affair* discussed in Chapter Six.

multiculturalism. *Behind the Veil* sensationalises the ethics of multiculturalism and establishes a familiar space where Muslim women are able to exist comfortably within the 'white nation' (Hage 1998). This is achieved by showcasing the social lifestyles of the Muslim women, representing them as similar to 'regular Australians'.

According to Phillips (2011), current affairs programs such as *Today Tonight* use specific Orientalist imagery to denote Islamic 'otherness' as reportage and narrative is usually delivered over 'file shots of men in prayer at a Mosque and women in the streets in robes, veils, and burqas' that shape the threat of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Phillips 2011, p.28). In *Behind the Veil*, these semiotically charged images of 'otherness' are counterbalanced by novel (and more pleasurable) images of Muslim women contributing to *and* participating in activities that reflect a sense of 'everydayness' in Australian society (Bowen 2004, McIver 2009, Humphrey 2014). *Behind the Veil* particularly promotes conceptions of 'being Australian', which can exist externally to, but alongside, the conventional tropes of nationalism. The segment presents processes of integration, whereby the women are engaging in social activities that counter common Orientalist perceptions. For example, reporter Damien Hansen describes Kay as a 'devout Australian Muslim woman', and this description is accompanied by images of a veiled Kay, sitting at a work desk with her children, answering phone calls, and socialising with friends. This sequence counters those common Orientalist perceptions of 'threat', mystery, and even fetishism, described by Phillips (2011) that denotes Muslim 'otherness'. The images in *Behind the Veil* instead reflect conceptions that extend beyond notions of citizenship to aspects of lifestyle that are seemingly separate to nationality (Elder 2007, p.2).

These depictions show non-Muslims that Muslims are not 'threats' within the nation and are instead 'like everyone else, just normal people' (Busbrige 2013, p.470). *Behind the Veil* illuminates this form of normality by presenting the Muslim women as active, as opposed to submissive, in their daily routines. For Yasmeen (2007) this constructs a sense of belonging because it demonstrates that these women are willing to participate in the 'social fabric' of society as engaged and dedicated social citizens (see also Garbutt 2009, Sunier 2014). In *Behind the Veil*, the Muslim women volunteer, go shopping, socialise with friends at cafés,

and throw barbeques and parties for their families and friends. These activities are explicitly social and counter imagery of Muslim women as submissive and unwilling to integrate. These 'ordinary' activities are therefore familiar to audiences of *Today Tonight*, whilst simultaneously symbolising actions or behaviours that are not immediately associated with Islam.

One of the primary functions of domestication is that it seeks to promote a form of social inclusion determined by successful performances of what it means to be Australian. In *Behind the Veil* Hansen reports that 'daily rituals' such as 'drinking coffee' and 'going shopping' are essential to the lifestyles of Muslim women in Australia. The Muslim women also stress that these are activities that make them more 'Aussie' than other Muslims. Muslim women on *Behind the Veil* perform belonging through 'membership' and socio-cultural practices, which arise from 'everyday practices and events' (Garbutt 2009, p.88). For Kay, social activities normalise her own personal sense of 'being Australian'. For instance, whilst at a coffee shop with Finch, Kay speaks directly to the camera and exclaims: 'we are just normal people, living our lives like other Australians in the country!'

The focus on the pronoun 'we' reinforces the sense of 'togetherness' that Ahmed (2000) and Ang (2003) find essential to the process of domesticated multiculturalism. Kay's use of 'we' in this context reflects a purposeful association with a sense of Australian-ness and a commitment to national unity. As a Muslim, she lives out Ang's (2003, p.142) socio-cultural 'formations' that are capable of 'overcoming' the constrictions of national boundaries, which enable people to imagine and align themselves within the nation. While the pronoun 'we' alludes to Muslims being like 'other Australians', it also denotes a sense of nation-hood that McIver (2009, p.49) argues speaks to the mainstream viewers of *Today Tonight*. In this case, Kay aligns herself with the viewers of *Today Tonight* as a means of constructing a sense of unity. This is further stressed when Kay speaks directly to the camera and articulates that, 'we all live together in harmony…most of the time!'

As *Behind the Veil* is a text produced in a post-Cronulla context, it illuminates the ways media narratives draw on social and ideological constructions that promote inclusiveness and belonging in the multicultural space. Chapter Two has

illustrated that ideology is taken as critical to the production of media narratives because it shapes knowledge, values, beliefs, and common sense understandings of social societies concerning the nation (Hage 1998, Hall 1982; 1993, Brennen 2012). Processes of domestication complement these factors, as they enable Muslims in Australia to be regarded as 'nationalists' through the establishment of an 'Australian Islam' (Humphrey 2001; 2014, Busbridge 2013). Domestication particularly emphasises on the Australian dimensions of Muslim 'otherness' in an approach that is marked by statements such as, 'I may go to the Mosque, but I also go to footy' (Busbridge 2013, p.470). In *Behind the Veil*, Kay's friend Frida expresses this notion when she joins Kay and Finch for lunch at a local restaurant and tells the camera: 'On the outside I'm Muslim, but on the inside I'm extremely Aussie. What you see is definitely not what you get!'

Here, Frida's Muslim-ness is limited to the 'outside' or exterior of her sense of self, given that Frida wears the hijab which happens to be a common, visible signifier of Islam in the West (Aly & Walker 2007, Lentin 2008, Hussein 2007; 2009; 2016, Aly 2009, Chalmers & Dreher 2009, Yasmeen 2013, Amer 2014). Frida suggests that though her appearance may not be recognisable as Australian, it is her 'inside' or identity that is 'extremely Aussie'. For Ahmed (2000), this Australianising practice situate 'otherness' in narratives of domestication as it defines 'otherness' in terms of 'lifestyles' or 'ways of being in the world', and seeks to establish that anybody in Australia can be a 'real' Australian even if they don't appear to be a 'typical Australian'. Domestication thus serves multicultural purposes, because it establishes ways of integrating 'otherness' (difference) into the 'white nation', whilst simultaneously curbing the problems this 'otherness' may lead to (Lentin 2005, p.394).

For Frida, her primary difference as a Muslim concerns dress practices. According to Yasmeen (2013), Muslim women's dress practices have, for the most part of the 'war on terror', been recognised as a symbol of the polarities between 'us' and 'them' (see also Kabir 2006). These polarities have occurred to the point where a number of politicians and media commentators have condemned practices such as 'veiling' as simply 'un-Australian' (Johns & Lobo 2013). Consequently, Muslim women have become symbolic markers of 'otherness' that construct difference, and represent those people who 'refuse' to be like 'us' (Aly 2009, p.21).

In *Behind the Veil,* however, Muslim women's dress is represented as an aspect of Muslim-Australian experience that is less traditional and more a part of the immediate material context. In one sequence, Finch accompanies Kay on a 'shopping trip' to show the variety of Islamic fashion available. Muslim women in the segment explain how factors such as 'styling' and 'colour' are just as important to veiling in Australia as are religious factors. One woman tells Kay, 'we have a lot of dresses and skirts' while another explains, 'it's getting away from the blacks and getting away from the boring colours'. These assertions are accompanied by images of colourful Islamic attire and Kay dresses up in some of these garments to share the fashion experience of the Muslim women.

Sandicki and Ger (2010) argue that this type of exchange is a discursive 'restigmatisation' of Islamic veiling in the West, representing Muslim women through materialism and consumerism over Orientalism[35]. It also foregrounds the specific domestication of these Muslim women, given their choice of veiling aligns with consumer fashion in Australia and is therefore understood as less traditionally Islamic (see Chapter Eight). This form of domestication embodies, in Bowen's (2004, p.44) terms, 'cultural assimilation or integration' demonstrated by factors such as the choice of 'designer headscarves' over the 'Islamic kind', eating the same food as everyone else, or interacting regularly and easily with non-Muslims. These aspects of domestication are further illuminated in *Behind the Veil* through scenes such as the shopping trip with Kay and Finch, drinking coffee at a local café, and the developing relationship between Kay and Finch, symbolic of the potential mutual relationship between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the multicultural nation.

Representing the potential for a mutual relationship, in this way, sensationalises the liberal perspectives of multiculturalism as explored in Chapter One. Multicultural spaces (like the one created on *Today Tonight*) can be better perceived through an understanding of cosmopolitanism, where elements such as 'language, looks, cultural practices, a class-derived capacity to intermix with others from different cultures' are valued[36] (Hage 1998, p.54). The presentation of

[35] Ideas relating to Muslim women's dress practices are further discussed in Chapter Eight.
[36] These ideas relating to the value of 'otherness' in multicultural societies is further explored in Chapter Seven.

such multicultural spaces establish symbolic opportunities where Muslims (Kay) and 'white' Australians (Finch) can forge and develop mutually beneficial relationships by sharing values, and oppose the polarities and binaries that underscored the 2005 Cronulla Riots. For Pardy and Lee (2011, p.311) it is these multicultural spaces that more readily facilitate the experience of inclusiveness, as they enhance social capital, by referencing the patterns and qualities of ethnicised relationships in a community.

In *Behind the Veil*, it is 'demographer and social commentator', Bernard Salt, whose ideas anchor and summarise the importance of this social experiment for the audience of *Today Tonight*. In the concluding section of the segment, Salt determines 'the experiment with Rebecca [Kay] shows that this is very much the way of the future, I think with an open and tolerant mind on both sides that we can actually fuse something that is quite enviable in comparison with the rest of the world'. Salt's commentary is accompanied by images of Finch and Kay as they visit the local charity and socialise with other Muslim women. This form of engagement presents the friendliness of multicultural discourses, which frame such inter-ethnic relationships as valuable to the overall cultural identity of the Australian nation (Hage 1997; 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Klocker 2012). For Hage (1998, p.54), these representations of cosmopolitanism present symbolic capital that may be accumulated within the national field by those positioned as 'other'.

As argued in Chapter Four, the purpose of acquiring 'symbolic capital' for non-'whites' is precisely to transfer it into a form of 'whiteness' and therefore a state of belonging. Whilst the analysis of *Today Tonight* has not examined physical or literal attributes of 'whiteness', it does present an understanding of multicultural conceptions of 'being Australian'. The analysis particularly identifies that, for Muslim women on *Behind the Veil*, 'being Australian' is less associated with Islam per se and more with how national subjects live social, multicultural, and integrated lives.

Furthermore, Muslim 'otherness' becomes familiar for the 'white' Australian subject as it is represented through notions that highlight Muslim differences to be 'our difference': it is a difference that belongs to the inclusive 'we' of the nation

(Ahmed 2000, p.98). This notion cultivates 'richness of diversity', which is ultimately rendered positive and not 'threatening' in the multicultural nation (Lentin & Titley 2008, p.16). The 'white' Australian nation, as perceived by Hage (1998), is no longer a fantasy of 'white supremacy', but reinvented as a familiar space, a space of belonging that incorporates (as opposed to rejects) Muslim 'otherness'. The Muslim women on *Behind the Veil* become an embodiment of Muslim 'otherness' that is accepted because it fits into discursive formations of how the nation perceives itself as multicultural and with reference to 'being Australian'. Ahmed (2000, p.98) argues:

> To accept that which is different from the "standard" is already, in some sense, to accept difference into the standard. Those who do not fit into the standardised pattern must still fit into the nation: They fit, not by being the standard, but by being defined in terms of their difference. The nation still imagines itself as a "we", not by requiring that "they" fit into a standardised pattern, but the very requirement that they "be" culturally different.

According to Hage (1998, p.234), one of the greatest mystifications of the 'white nation fantasy' is that nothing is more worrying in Australian multicultural society than the 'lack of integration of third-world-looking migrants'. In *Behind the Veil*, the Muslim women are actually represented as well integrated which accounts for their sense of belonging. This integration mirrors that of the Muslims on SBS (see Chapter Four), where a sense of authority in claims to 'being Australian' is shaped through 'sameness' *and* difference. This is demonstrated by Kay's final comments in *Behind the Veil*. Kay speaks directly to the camera and proclaims: 'at the end of the day we're all Australian, no matter what colour our skin is or what we believe in or what our backgrounds are…you know…we're all just fair dinkum, dinky die Aussies!' Kay's remarks accompany images of Muslim women and the Anglo-Australian Finch sitting at a café, drinking coffee, and laughing, which stresses the sense of 'togetherness' or mutuality as discussed above.

5.3.2 'Domestication' and containment

The representations of the Muslim women in *Behind the Veil* highlight racialised perceptions of what it means to be Muslim in Australia. This is particularly the case in Australian television and culture, in a post-Cronulla context, where the focus is more on inclusivity over exclusivity (see Chapter Three). Muslim women

played an important symbolic and political role during the Cronulla Riots, as their veils were targeted as representing practices that defy Australian values and what it means to 'be Australian' (Evers 2008). Aly (2009, p.18) argues that in much media and socio-political discourse, the image of the veiled woman is that of a 'mute shrouded figure', reflecting the ideological position Muslim women attain in Islamic and Western doctrines. However, in *Behind the Veil* the Muslim women are represented as neither 'shrouded' nor 'mute', but as active social citizens (Yasmeen 2007). As Kay observes in the latter half of the segment: 'they're [Muslim women] intelligent, they're independent, they want a career and they want a family and to me that's empowering'.

To suggest that these Muslim women are 'empowering', as Kay does, reinvigorates arguments about the authority of marginalised voices in multicultural contexts as discussed in Chapter Four. For Ang (2003, p.142), this sense of authority deconstructs the limiting and homogenising structure of the nation by 'those groups who used to be marginalised within its borders but are now bursting out of them'. It transfers some of the social and cultural power within the multicultural nation to the Muslim 'other' as a means of granting 'them' access to belonging within the national field. However, this transfer of power is conditional, contextual and even somewhat illusory, given these Muslim figures are *domesticated* and therefore purposely made 'national' (Bowen 2004, Humphrey 2014). The 'authority' of the marginalised 'other' is thus recognised or acknowledged only once the 'other' declares a form of loyalty or affiliation with the 'white nation' (or mainstream).

Claims to belonging by appropriating 'whiteness' are not uncommon and can be framed through Pugliese's (2007) understanding of 'prosthetic whiteness'. Pugliese (2007, p.13) argues that this form of 'whiteness' is specific to 'non-white subjects', such as Muslims, suggesting that they can contingently and proximally be positioned as 'whites' because of their 'prosthetic assumptions' and 'reproduction of white supremacist values and practices'. The Muslim women in *Behind the Veil* are open with Kay about their lives and defy those Orientalist stereotypes of Muslim women as 'shrouded figures' (Aly 2009). They are represented as 'being Australian' because they eat what they want, dress how they

want, and do what they want whilst still adhering to a secularised or moderate form of Islam.

The problem, as argued throughout this thesis, is that the premise for 'being Australian' (and therefore being included in the national imaginary) is framed through particular discursive constructs that consistently normalise 'whiteness' in the nation. Elder (2007, pp.10-11) argues that these ideologically charged constructs denote that 'being Australian' is organised around themes of 'whiteness' and exerted in relation to 'groups of people and places that are understood to not be Australian or to be un-Australian'. For the Muslim women on *Behind the Veil*, belonging is acquired only at the stage where 'they' are first recognised as 'un-Australian' or 'other', thus limiting those very claims to belong. It is these limitations, which reinforce and reconstruct 'exclusionary' states for Muslims as 'others' in Australia's multicultural society through preserving perceptions of 'threat' (Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2005; 2006, Noble 2008, Aslan 2009, Aly 2010, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Chopra 2015).

Behind the Veil is shaped noticeably by negative lexicons that are retained in constructions and perceptions of threatening 'otherness'. At the beginning of the segment Kay stresses that she is 'terrified' to enter a 'world' that she 'knows little about', speaking to those perceptions of 'foreignness' that amplify danger and obscurity when it comes to representing Muslims and Islam in Australia (Phillips 2011). These complement the context of *Today Tonight* as a commercial current affairs program on Australian television. As argued by Ehrlich (1996), narratives on current affairs programs are constructed through themes of 'outrageousness' that do not defy the homogenous constructions already in place in western societies, but actually complement them. For Turner (2005, p.59), the genre presents fragmented and fast-paced content that is less information-based and relies on existent social structures in Australia to make sense of specific issues (see also Levine 2009, McIver 2009, Phillips 2011). In this way, *Behind the Veil* is necessarily concerned with enforcing us/them dynamics, with respect to Muslims and 'white' Australians, over the production of narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging in perceptions of the multicultural nation.

The opening section of *Behind the Veil* evidences these ideas by emphasising the isolation of those areas where Muslims congregate in Australia. Hansen's report tells us that the women live in 'Muslim enclaves' across Australia, suggesting they are 'separate spaces' from 'white' mainstream society. Peach (2005, p.32) argues that enclaves denote ethnic residential isolation where social interaction with outsiders is minimal while interaction between those within the ethnic group is encouraged. This conception of ethnic residential isolation has resulted in 'enclaves' becoming synonymous with 'ghettoes', where both are the result of some kind of racial segregation, and consolidate notions that these minorities 'choose' to live in such culturally constructed territories (Lentin 2005, p.389, Peach 2005). However, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, racial segregation is seldom positively received for Muslims in Australia. The grouping of young Muslim men, for example, saw the rise of 'gang' labels, which resulted in these young men being targeted as criminals (Poynting et al. 1999; 2000; 2004). Similarly, by using the term 'enclaves', *Today Tonight* reiterates that the grouping of Muslims in a single area denotes some kind of danger or 'threat'.

The reference to 'enclaves' also draws on notions of containment that are prevalent in the theme of domestication (Humphrey 2014). As stated, domestication works within a context of multiculturalism that distributes a 'togetherness-in-difference' philosophy. However, multiculturalism is also located internally, and not externally, to the 'white nation' and therefore subject to the exercise of power. According to Hage (1998, p.151) multiculturalism is positioned within the 'white' nationalist discourse as an 'exhibition' of cultural diversity that Australia 'has' rather than what Australia 'is' (multicultural). It is produced in a context governed by the 'dominant white subject' and presupposes the proximity of those who are already recognised as 'other' in Australian society, as well as the permanence of their presence (Ahmed 2000). Domestication works in this context as a tool for the control and containment of Muslim 'otherness' by isolating Islamic spaces within the nation, rather than 'nationalising Islam' (Humphrey 2009).

In *Behind the Veil*, Hansen describes Muslim 'enclaves' as 'suburban pockets' that are like 'countries within a country'. These practices of figurative isolation separate the Muslim 'other' from the rest of Australian society through a process

that occurs within the nation and not external to it. The suggestion that Muslims are living in isolated 'pockets' within the 'country', limits the possible construction of inclusiveness and belonging (textual or material) because it reinforces discursive conceptions of boundary maintenance, as expressed by Perera (2009), Antonsich (2010), and Lems et al. (2016). *Behind the Veil* does not emphasise national sovereignty and territory in a traditional sense (shaped by perceptions of the Australian coastline), but an imagined perception that illuminates the ways boundaries move inwards creating borders with the nation itself. Hansen locates these borders, reporting that 'Bankstown in Sydney and Coburg in Melbourne' are 'like countries within a country'.

Hansen's report contains images throughout, of men and women in Islamic attire walking through suburban streets of isolation and 'enclaves'. At one stage, Hansen's reportage pauses and Frida tells Kay, 'this is our turf!' The turf reference is suggestive of ownership and localism, especially when placed in the context of the Cronulla Riots. Evers (2008) argues that the term 'turf' is mostly linked to surfing cultures in Australia and references areas of containment dominated by a group of surfers on the beach. It relates to a process of dominating a small territory and imposing its 'cultural laws on others' through localism. Evers (2008, p. 412) argues that this localism works on paranoia about 'outsiders' on the local level in the same way that nationalism works on the national level. Frida's 'turf' reference thus highlights local territorial occupation but in relation to the Muslim 'other'.

These references of isolated 'otherness' do not necessarily support and develop multicultural narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, but present Muslim 'otherness' in Orientalist discursive contexts. The perceptions constructed emphasise that an overwhelming presence of Muslim 'otherness' exists in Australia and prescribes that this 'otherness' must be managed and contained (Ahmed 2000). Chapter One has argued that Orientalism works through interactions consolidated by the 'white' or Western subject, appropriating the right to observe and comprehend the Muslim 'other' as a measure of containing it (Said 1978). Orientalism is therefore a process of disciplining the 'other', in similar form, as domestication is a means to police Islam within the national space (Humphrey 2014). This need to observe and police the 'other' is implicit in

Behind the Veil when Hansen reports that Kay has been 'granted access' into the Muslim 'enclaves' to 'find out for herself'.

Kay's role as the observer in *Behind the Veil* also reflects *Today Tonight*'s role in serving national interests by reporting on issues that threaten citizens in their local places (Levine 2009, McIver 2009). *Behind the Veil* is a special segment that presents *Today Tonight* as a form of 'monitoring', of those territorial spaces or 'enclaves' of 'otherness' that exist within the nation (Sunier 2014). In this way, monitoring suggests that policing the Muslim 'other' is less about repression and more about rendering the 'risk object' or 'other' visible by mediatising 'them' to be profiled under the gaze of the citizen-spectator (Humphrey 2014, p.85). Kay's role in *Behind the Veil,* when placed in this context, serves less to project integration between Muslims and 'whites' in Australia, and seems more concerned with allowing the 'white nation' to monitor those 'others' who are seen to threaten 'white' ideals.

These discursive frameworks imply that domestication is more or less about the 'containment' and 'tolerance' of Muslims and Islam as 'other' in Australia, as opposed to, determining who is or isn't Australian (Ahmed 2000, Bowen 2004, Humphrey 2010; 2014, Busbridge 2013, Sunier 2014). Domestication ensures that 'otherness' remains a source of 'threat' within the nation, but a 'threat' that can be monitored and contained. Domestication thus positions Muslims as nationals, through a process of containment to ensure that threatening 'otherness' does not impact or effect the already established ideological structures of the Australian ('white') multicultural nation. As Woodlock (2011, p.403) argues, 'they [Muslims] can achieve a measure of Australian-ness as long as they do not rock the boat too hard and attempt to challenge the hegemony of the first ['white'] tier'.

Processes of domestication thus limit narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for Muslim women on *Today Tonight*, by representing them through notions of familiarity and 'being Australian'. Part of the issue concerns that these conceptualisations work to present distinct binaries of 'us' and 'them', which underscore imagined perceptions of Australia as a multicultural and inclusive nation. The following section explores these frameworks further in reference to

the ways 'domestication' recognises Islamic veiling as a practice of 'otherness' that might be permitted within the national space, as addressed by a segment on *Sunday Night*.

5.4 Case 2: Muslim women on *Sunday Night*

The previous section has illustrated that 'domestication' is able to produce inclusive narratives of belonging on *Today Tonight* because it purposely positions Muslims within the national space (Humphrey 2014). This is particularly important for veiled Muslim women in Australia, given that the visibility of the veil has increasingly been identified as 'un-Australian' (Aly 2009). As stated previously, Muslim women have consistently been presented as subjects of 'issue' on current affairs programs across network Seven, including *Sunday Night*.

Sunday Night first aired on Seven in February 2009, offering investigative news and current affairs content. Its weekly Sunday evening timeslot was set to rival that of Nine's *60 Minutes*, meaning that content and format is somewhat similar. According to Ehrlich (1996), these programs can be classified as 'old news' formats that attempt to produce investigative narratives whilst still adhering to tabloid structures. Ehrlich (1996, p.4) explains that each program typically features three segments within a 60-90 minute timeslot, with a mixture of 'hard' and 'soft' stories. The 'hard' stories attempt to investigate critical, social and political issues, while 'soft' stories are more personified and focus on human interest or celebrity stories. *Sunday Night* provides a polished version of tabloid journalism by producing 'investigative stories' with a mix of content including feature stories, investigative reports, forums, and interviews.

The segment discussed in the section below was broadcast on *Sunday Night* on June 24, 2012. Also titled *Behind the Veil*, the segment identifies and explores 'critical issues' concerning Islamic veiling in Australia. Where *Today Tonight* focuses on the lifestyles of Muslim women, *Sunday Night* draws specifically on the practices of veiling in the nation. Reported by Rahni Sadler, the story combines narration and four interviews with veiled Muslim-Australian women. Sadler questions these women about why they choose to veil in Australia, positioning *Sunday Night* as a platform for these women to share their story, and

consequently representing them as 'domesticated' in similar ways to those women on *Today Tonight*.

5.4.1 'Domestication', veiling, and visibility

Exploring the ways narratives of Muslim belonging are constructed on Australian television, means that this thesis necessarily draws on socio-political contexts that frame the production and interpretation of media narratives. As Hall (1980) argues, 'messages' and 'interpretations' of media texts rarely exist outside the ideological constructions of context. This is especially true for current affairs programs such as *Sunday Night*, where content frequently reflects discourses produced within and throughout local, national, and/or international settings. Accordingly, the *Behind the Veil* segment on *Sunday Night* focuses on debates about the meanings and wearing of full-face Islamic veils in Australia. The segment reflects the political climate of 2012, where stricter laws for 'face-coverings' were introduced in New South Wales (NSW) that targeted the wearing of full-face veils in public spaces[37] (Hewitt and Koch 2011).

Full-face veils such as burqas and niqabs ostensibly present concerns regarding visibility and identification in Australia. According to Yasmeen (2013), these garments represent an Islamic 'threat', not necessarily in the act of veiling itself, but as a form of Orientalised difference or 'otherness' in Western societies:

> In the era of increased focus on Islam as the "other", burqa and niqab are attracting attention as the signifier of difference between Muslims and others. In liberal democracies, the focus has engaged state activism as a negotiator and legislator to set parameters of acceptable dress code for Muslim citizens…against the backdrop of varied opinions on Islam and Muslims around the world, the debate on burqa represents the continuation – albeit up-scaling – of the focus on Muslim women as the signifier of Islam and Muslim identities (Yasmeen 2013, pp.251-252).

Yasmeen (2013, p.264) argues that in this more recent focus on Islamic dress practices, the niqab and burqa are regarded as 'extreme' cases of veiling or 'cover', and have replaced 'hijab' as a signifier of difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in Australia. These reservations are reflected in media and

[37] In 2012, the New South Wales Parliament passed a Bill that sought changes to the use of 'face coverings', and those worn by Muslim women in particular, such as burqas and niqabs (see Hewitt and Koch 2011).

socio-political discourse that stress the supposed 'threat' veiling poses to Australian life. This has led some commentators to propose a complete 'ban' of both the burqa and niqab in Australia (Hewitt & Koch 2011, Yasmeen 2013). These reservations of Islamic veiling also highlight the 'hijab' to be less a signifier of difference in Australia's multicultural society, establishing that cases of full-facial veiling in the post-9/11 and post-Cronulla contexts are suggestive of a new set of issues and problems. These issues are identified in *Behind the Veil* by the host of *Sunday Night*, Chris Bath:

> No other item of clothing has divided public opinion in Australia more than the burqa. We've heard plenty from those who believe it has no place in here, but we've heard little from those behind the veil…until now.

Bath alludes to the silence, or 'invisibility' of Muslim women in media and socio-political discourses (touched on in Chapter One), particularly when she says 'we've heard little from those behind the veil'. The segment assumes and presumes the voicelessness of Muslim women in Orientalist depictions where veiled women are often perceived as 'shrouded' and 'mute' 'behind the veil' (Aly & Walker 2007, Hussein 2007, Ho 2010). This is reiterated in Sadler's remark that 'not only do we not see these women but we rarely hear from them'. While these remarks reinforce the invisibility of Muslim women, they also suggest that *Sunday Night* is a space where these women are made visible and are able to share their stories, and demystify negative perceptions.

Common conceptions of the veil denote foreignness and 'otherness' due to its associations with Islam. However, processes of domestication work to position this 'otherness' *within* the national space. According to Busbridge (2013) the contextualisation of 'Australian Muslims' presents the primary function of domestication, where Muslim 'otherness' is purposely made visible to situate it within the national realm. In the case of *Today Tonight*, Muslim women are 'being Australian' by engaging in ordinary activities such as drinking coffee or shopping as a means to secularise or mitigate their 'otherness' (Bowen 2004, Elder 2007). In the *Sunday Night* segment, Muslim women are represented in much the same way, but by placing focus on their full-face veils and rendering them 'visible', as opposed to 'invisible'.

In the opening and closing sequences of the *Sunday Night* segment, images of the veiled Muslim women engaging in 'Western' activities, again construct Muslim women as active social citizens (Yasmeen 2007). The women on *Sunday Night* are pictured as boat paddling, bowling, driving, and skydiving while wearing full-face veils. These images counter those of veiled women referenced by Aly and Walker (2007), Aly (2009), Ho (2010), and Posetti (2010), as 'shrouded figures' perceived as submissive or oppressed. The Muslim women on *Sunday Night* are instead positioned as active and daring, despite their veils. As Sadler comments on *Sunday Night*, these women are 'devout' *and* 'defiant' offering 'no apology to those who dislike them'.

These references reflect particular notions of belonging that concern Muslim women and the practices of veiling outside traditional Orientalist frameworks. They particularly shape processes of domestication that position the veil as a 'visible' form of 'otherness' within the national space, but that is embraced by these Muslim women and invokes a sense of 'being Australian'. According to Ahmed (2000), such embracing can only occur in multicultural spaces that aim to extend the 'static' notions of belonging and establish connections through 'difference' rather than 'sameness' (see also West 1990, Probyn 1996, Garbutt 2009, Mansouri & Lobo 2012). For the Muslim women on *Sunday Night*, their veils are marked as visible symbols of 'otherness', and therefore a form of 'difference' which instigates belonging.

In the *Sunday Night* segment, the Muslim women embrace their veiled 'otherness'. For instance, Sadler introduces one of the women as Anisa[38], a 'fifth generation Australian' whose family 'didn't believe in face coverings'. However, Anisa still decided to veil. Sadler explains that 9/11 became 'a turning point' for Anisa because she 'faced hostility for being a Muslim, but rather than turning her back on her religion, she embraced it [by veiling]'. The narration is interspersed with imagery of Anisa paddling boats on a river with her family, where her veil is contrasted with imagery of other non-veiled women paddling boats on the same river. Such imagery amplifies the visibility of Amina's veil within the national multicultural space as a means of positively emphasising her 'otherness'.

[38] Surnames of the Muslim women interviewed on *Sunday Night* are not provided. As such, they are referred to by their first names in this analysis.

Anisa's decision to veil despite objections made by her family (and society) highlights those aforementioned notions of embracing 'otherness' and difference in the nation. It reproduces views about domestication that Ahmed (2000) and Ang (2003) identify, where difference is central to libertarian perspectives of Australian multiculturalism and serves to put Muslim 'otherness' 'on display' as national and therefore 'ours' (see also Ryan 2012). This shapes processes of domestication in its aims to produce spaces for 'those who might not ordinarily be thought of as "mainstream" locals thereby "unfixing" implicit rules that govern "who belongs in a place"' (Garbutt 2009, p.98). For a veiled woman named Amina on *Sunday Night*, this means positioning her veil as an object that *can*, as opposed to *cannot*, exist within the nation. In one scene, Amina is harassed by a woman on the street because of her veil. The woman yells (at Amina), 'you're in Australia! The lucky country!' referring to mythology about the Australian nation as presenting opportunities for freedom and democracy – values that are perceived as being in opposition to the Islam that Amina's veil supposedly represents (Jensen 2008, Aly 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010). Amina then explains the situation to Sadler:

> It made me feel very upset…Like this is the 21st century, we're in Australia…Like everyone is able to do what they do and wear what they wear so why are you now attacking me?

Amina recognises Australia as a multicultural space, and therefore a space of difference where her veil as a symbol of 'otherness' can exist. However, she struggles to understand the hostility toward veiling. This is suggested by her comment 'we're in Australia', where the focus on the 'we' reflects aims of domestication where the Muslim 'other' is incorporated into the 'we-ness' of the nation (Ahmed 2000). Ahmed (2000) argues that this conception is based on the ways the nation imagines itself as heterogeneous or multicultural, enabling those who are visibly different, such as veiled Muslim women, to 'fit into' this perception of the nation. Multiculturalism therefore allows the veiled Muslim women on *Sunday Night* to imagine that 'they' and white Australians are 'different, with different histories, values, cultures, languages and group associations' but that, 'they still belong to a common community - the nation' (Mansouri 2005, p.153).

Amina stresses that her veil signifies religious, over national difference, and explains (to Sadler) that she is 'like everybody else': 'I pay my taxes, I work, I study…I look after a baby, I have a husband, I have a home, I have a family…same as everybody else…' In this regard, similarity and 'sameness' (to the mainstream society) is both emphasised and negated, through conceptualisations of 'togetherness-in-difference' (Ang 2003). Amina recognises and embraces her veil as a signifier of difference within the nation, but also emphasises it as a multicultural form of 'being Australian'. Muslim 'otherness' is highlighted here to reinforce multicultural perceptions of 'being Australian', as Ahmed (2000, p.108) argues:

> Being Australian – and being committed to Australia – is hence "nothing to do with outward appearance", nothing to do, that is, with the expression of one's cultural identity. As long as one is truly Australian underneath one's dress one can appear as different.

However, when it comes to the discussions of the niqab in Australia's multicultural context, 'one's dress' is considered as 'dangerous' and 'threatening', and therefore 'un-Australian' (Aly & Walker 2007, Hewitt & Koch 2011, Yasmeen 2013). *Sunday Night* may not necessarily be 'othering' Amina in this regard, but generating concern around (current) issues of national security. However, in line with arguments made by Hewitt and Koch (2011) and Yasmeen (2013), the niqab's 'threat' in the nation should always be contextualised (as to not put forth the idea that all veiled women are to be viewed 'threats'). While the concern established by *Sunday Night* may be genuine, it is one integrated through narratives that attempt to create positive and inclusive images of 'otherness'. *Sunday Night* therefore blurs political concerns with various representations of 'otherness' to the point where both become mutually exclusive.

Nonetheless, embracing their veils as symbols of 'otherness', produces multicultural perceptions of the nation as tolerant and inclusive, denoting that the Muslim women on *Sunday Night* are able to accumulate a sense of belonging (Hage 1998). Their claim to difference within the multicultural space of the imagined nation constitutes 'symbolic capital', which Ang (2003, p.141) argues has become a 'powerful and attractive strategy among those who have been marginalised or excluded from structures of white or Western hegemony'. It

enables these veiled Muslim women to exist within the 'white nation' as an 'other', but through a context that exerts 'otherness' and difference as 'valuable' (Hage 1997). These conceptualisations mostly collapse dominant conceptions of 'being Australian' that express 'whiteness', and encourage narratives that imagine the nation as 'multicultural, singular, and inclusive in its very difference' (Ahmed 2000, p.99).

5.4.2 'Domestication' and the 'white observer'

'Domestication' enables veiled Muslim women on *Sunday Night* to embrace their veils as symbols of 'otherness', which ultimately accounts for national inclusion. 'Domestication' thus expands the traditional notions of belonging as separating 'us' from 'them', and engages those perceptions about 'togetherness-in-difference', by promoting difference as national and therefore 'ours' (Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Antonsich 2010). However, Humphrey (2001, p.33) argues that while domestication renders Australia inclusive of Muslims, it does not dispose of perceptions of Islamic values as 'in conflict with the organisation and rhythms of public life' in Australia. This is because Muslim 'otherness' is consistently framed through discursive conceptions of the 'white nation' that functions in conjunction with racialised contexts to limit inclusion, and even promote exclusion for Muslims as 'other' in Australia.

These discursive formations of such inclusive/exclusive binaries return the discussion of Muslim representations to the question: who produces media texts and who benefits from the images and discourses they construct? The *Sunday Night* segment is produced through the conventions of commercial current affairs programs and therefore as Turner (2005) argues, dramatises much of its content for the benefit and entertainment of its imagined audience (see also Ehrlich 1996). The segment attempts to understand the practices of veiling in Australia by addressing them as an 'issue' within society, underscoring the visible/invisible complex that frames depictions of Muslim women in the Australian media. *Sunday Night* is ultimately produced for the benefit of the mainstream Australian audience, which Hage (1998) argues is consistently *imagined* as 'white'.

Processes of domestication thus invoke a 'white gaze' that represents Muslims as 'objects of study' for purposes of comprehension and understanding (Zine 2002,

Dreher 2009). The result is a reproduction of commonly held Orientalist perceptions of Muslims and Islam, and especially veiled Muslim women. Zine (2002, p.4) argues that Western representations of Muslim women from medieval to contemporary times have reflected a complex intermingling between 'desire and disavowal of difference'. It is 'difference' that both entices and repulses Western audiences when it comes to practices of 'otherness' within Islam. This binary is constructed and sustained through a 'white gaze' in which Muslim women are depicted as 'sexually available objects, prostitutes, or witches', as in much Orientalist art and literature, or seen as 'hidden' under a veil, which both supresses and oppresses them (Amer 2014, p.85). Either way, both perspectives present a Euro-centric 'white gaze', which perceives Muslim women as subjugated and in need of some kind of 'liberation' (Zine 2002, p.9).

In Orientalist discourses, the veiled Muslim woman 'never speaks for herself' or 'represents her emotions, presence, or history' (Said 1978, p.6). On the contrary, the Muslim woman is consistently spoken for and represented by the 'white subject' who assigns her a subordinate role. While the veiled Muslim women on *Sunday Night* produce their own narratives about Islamic veiling in Australia, these are consistency reported on and interpreted by Sadler, the non-Muslim, 'white' Australian reporter. According to Hallin (2004, p.15), tabloid current affairs programs such as *Sunday Night* produce packaged narratives through language and imagery that can be understood by a majority Australian audience; presenting the reporters as 'storytellers' and 'interpreters' of content, leaving little room for viewers to form their own opinions or judgments.

For the Muslim women on *Sunday Night*, their 'otherness' can never exist outside those perceptions constructed by what Said (1978, p.230) identifies as 'white observers'. The narratives of the veiled Muslim women on *Sunday Night* are less reflections of how Muslim women live in Australia, but are representational constructions of Muslim 'otherness'. Throughout the segment, Sadler questions the role of veiling not only in the daily lives of the women, but also its place in Australia's multicultural society. At one stage Sadler asks Amina, 'what do you think the benefits are, for you, every day wearing it [veil]?' Here, Sadler attempts to understand the practices of veiling outside dominant perspectives that categorise it as 'un-Australian', by focusing on the 'benefits' (of veiling).

However, given that *Sunday Night* addresses a predominantly non-Muslim audience, the focus on 'benefits' is collective, as opposed to individual, and in this regard, questions whether veiling can 'benefit' the Australian multicultural mainstream generally. In answering Sadler's question about the 'benefits' of veiling, Amina also addresses (and attempts to relieve) heightened national concerns about Islamic veiling and specific connections to threats of terrorism.

Sadler's role as the interpreter touches on contemporary socio-political and feminist discourses expressing the need to grant Muslim women a 'voice' in media and political debates. The provisions of a platform for Muslim women to voice their opinions about misconceptions of veiling and share their own, generally positive, experiences works in a similar fashion to the practice of speaking out, as discussed in Chapter Four. However, these aspects of the 'white gaze', suggest that the 'solution to such problems must come from outside' of Islam (Aly & Walker 2007, Ho 2010, p.434). The invisibility of Muslim women in media discourses about Islam has been taken to reflect the invisibility of Muslim women in Islam more generally. As a result, white/non-Muslim women frequently speak for Muslim women, especially in discourses of 'saving' and 'liberating' them from patriarchal and oppressive Islamic regimes (Abu-Luhod 2002, Aly 2007, Ho 2010).

In the *Sunday Night* segment, Sadler can be viewed as 'liberating' the Muslim women by allowing them to express themselves as veiled women in Australia. Through her line of questioning, Sadler offers these women a space where 'they' can defend their right to veil in a context where veiling is recognised as 'un-Australian'. In an exchange with Amina, Sadler admits that her own views align with the argument that veiling symbolises oppression:

> **Amina**: To you, this is probably oppression, but, no, for me, it's guidance…for me its freedom…for me, it's everything!
>
> **Sadler**: Yeah? To me, it seems like oppression….

Bulllock (2002, p.133) argues that the veil has become a powerful symbol that stands both historically and contemporarily for 'entire cultures of the Muslim world' and encompasses everything ostensibly 'done' to Muslim women. Associations between veiling and oppression have thus become naturalised within

Western society shaping dominantly held assumptions about Muslim women's dress practices (Lentin 2008, Yasmeen 2013). Amina assumes that Sadler perceives her veil as a form of oppression, and Sadler herself admits that to her it *does* 'seem like oppression'. Both acknowledge the ways the veil is synonymous with 'oppression'.

Framing veiling in this way suggests that the Muslim women on *Sunday Night* cannot exist outside the constructs of 'otherness'. The 'liberation' that takes place, even as it claims understanding of Islamic veiling practices, promotes confinement, because it particularises and reinvigorates homogenous and Orientalist perceptions about Muslims and Islam that have been addressed in Chapter One. These Orientalist conceptions also complement the processes of domestication that establish a line between acceptable and unacceptable 'others' (Humphrey 2014). Consequently, only those Muslim women who are not represented through oppression are able to exist within the national space. The imagery of the veiled women on *Sunday Night* driving and bowling already suggest that these Muslim women are not oppressed, as do their testimonies throughout the segment. For instance, during her interview with Sadler, Amina exclaims: 'I'm not oppressed, I do it out of choice, I do it because I believe in it, I do it because I love it…'

While domestication encourages the embracing of 'difference', it only does so in a context where such difference already exists (Ahmed 2000, Lentin 2005). According to Ahmed (2000, p.97), the role of difference in establishing a unified multicultural nation presupposes the proximity of those who are already recognised as 'other' in multicultural society. As these 'others' are incorporated into the 'we' of the nation through domestication, it is, at the same time, the majority 'we' that emerges as the ones who must live with that 'otherness'. Domestication is therefore more concerned with discursive notions of tolerance (as explored in Chapter One) over the promotion of narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging.

Hage (1998) argues that in multicultural societies belonging can be accumulated by cultural subjects, but does not necessarily account for national acceptance. Belonging is instead transformed into a form of tolerance in this framework. As

Hage (1998) suggests, it is about tolerating and not necessarily accepting the 'other' within the national space, as a means of enforcing power relations that allow 'whiteness' to retain its centrality within the Australian multicultural space. While the domestication of Islamic veiling allows the Muslim women on *Sunday Night* to acquire a sense of belonging (through conceptions framed by multicultural understanding of 'being Australian'), it is a belonging that is effectively restricted.

Sadler's role as interpreter enforces this restriction because, while she offers Muslim women a way to express themselves, Sadler's interpretation of their responses can be understood in Orientalist terms. Sadler specifically reiterates an ideological discomfort with Muslim 'otherness' and stresses its incompatibility with Australia. This is exemplified in the opening sequence of the segment where Sadler states that 'two Australias' exist, '…uncovered…and covered'. The focus on 'two Australias' sets up relations of incompatibility between Muslim and 'white' Australians, and reflects sentiment that fuelled the Cronulla Riots in 2005. These relations particularly reference the need to 'protect women' against the objectification, misogyny, and sexual harassment perpetrated by Muslim men (Evers 2009, p.195).

In the *Sunday Night* segment, Sadler also draws on these ideas by highlighting the ways gender is perceived in Western discourses of Islam, evident in an exchange between Sadler and Anisa about veiling:

> **Sadler**: So why shouldn't men have to cover up?
>
> **Anisa**: Because women don't have to cover either, it's just a personal choice.
>
> **Sadler**: By why shouldn't it be the same for both? Why shouldn't both men and women…?

Sadler struggles to understand the practice of veiling as anything other than 'covering' as an oppression of women through patriarchy, and in reference to 'men', in Western discourses of Islam. For Bullock (2002) and Zine (2002), these discourses frame sexualised and gendered perceptions of veiling that present Muslim women through two separate discourses. The first recognises veiling as a symbol of female subordination in patriarchal Islam and reiterates 'their'

supposed voicelessness. The second presents Muslim women as 'enticing objects', within Islam's assumed 'sex-positive' attitude that focuses on preventing the objectification of women through the practice of veiling (Bullock 2002, p.148). Both perspectives position Muslim men (and not necessarily Muslim women) in derogatory terms, either as misogynists or sexual predators (Gleeson 2004, Dagistanli 2007, Grewal 2007, Humphrey 2007, Aslan 2009, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail 2015).

During the 2005 Cronulla Riots, such perceptions polarised Muslims and Lebanese Australians against white/Anglo Australians. For Dagistanli (2007, p.184), the labelling of Muslim men as sex-crazed, 'wild animals' dehumanises 'them and their actions' reinforcing the status of Muslim men 'as threatening not only to young women, but also to Australian society more generally'. The issue of veiling as addressed by *Sunday Night,* not only reinforces Orientalist perceptions concerning the veil as a symbol of oppression, but also of Muslim men as a 'threatening other' (Noble 2008, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). The segment presents difference in a way that limits the construction of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, primarily because it preserves Orientalised Muslim 'otherness'.

As a tabloid current affairs program, *Sunday Night* sustains such Orientalist thinking as it normalises the position of Muslims as an 'other' in Australia. Phillips (2011) argues that to address Muslims and Islam as 'issues' within Australian society is a means of enforcing Islamic inferiority and limiting a sense of place for Muslims in Australia through constructions of the 'white nation'. In the *Sunday Night* segment, Sadler assumes a superior position given her power as a reporter and interpreter of the narratives of the veiled Muslim women for a national, non-Muslim audience. Sadler also constructs Muslim 'otherness' by establishing the differences between herself and the veiled women as reflecting differences between Islam and the West. During the interview with Amina, Sadler points to herself and says: 'you wouldn't be wearing this' referring to the purple blouse that she is wearing and placing it as in opposition to Amina's black burqa.

This predetermined duality between Islam and the West deployed in *Sunday Night*, makes the domestication of Islamic veiling in the segment redundant. Such

perceptions (of duality) reassert the Oriental-ness of the veiled Muslim subject and the Western-ness of the 'white' observer. In doing so, representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging constituted through 'domestication' on *Sunday Night* are restricted and restrictive. This is similar to *Today Tonight* in isolating and containing Islamic practices within the national multicultural space, where Muslims already exist (and are primarily excluded) as an 'other' (Ahmed 2000, Humphrey 2014).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the theme of 'domestication' produces limited narratives of Muslim inclusiveness and belonging on network Seven and its well-known current affairs programs, *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night*. While domestication aims to expand a multicultural logic regarding the inclusion of Muslim 'otherness', it works to monitor or contain Muslims as 'other' in the national space (Ahmed 2000, Humphrey 2014, Sunier 2014). The authority of the 'white nation' is preserved in the context of the multicultural Australian space, while perceptions of Muslim 'otherness' are sensationalised to 'fit into' these preconditioned structures of Australian society (Hage 1997; 1998, Ahmed 2000, Humphrey 2009, Busbridge 2013).

The analysis in this chapter has also illustrated that 'domestication' presents a 'white gaze', where Muslim 'otherness' is purposely placed 'on display' for the entertainment and benefit of the 'white observer' (Said 1978, Hage 1997; 1998). This logic highlights the commercial incentives of Seven's news and current affairs programs analysed in this chapter, where the network's central priority is dramatising, and thus racialising/Orientalising content as a means of increasing profits (Turner 1995, Field 2001, McIver 2009, Phillips 2011). Said (1978) argues that Orientalism ensures that the Orient remains an 'other' and can never exist outside the predetermined oppositional binary between East and West. For the Muslim women on *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night,* representational narratives which highlight inclusiveness and belonging are therefore bound by the same logic of 'otherness' that shapes Muslim exclusion in the Australian multicultural nation. As this chapter suggests, processes of domestication work to isolate Islam

within the national field, as it showcases and publicly illuminates 'their' existence (Ahmed 2000).

The following chapter continues to investigate the ostensible polarisations of Muslim 'otherness' and Australian 'whiteness' that underscore the construction of narratives of inclusion and exclusion for Muslims in Australia. The chapter analyses Muslim representations on network Nine through the theme of 'in-betweenness'. While 'domestication' focuses on producing 'national Muslims' (Bowen 2004, Busbridge 2013, Humphrey 2014), the theme of 'in-betweenness' relies on understandings of hybridity with respect to identity and nation.

Chapter Six: Muslims and 'In-betweenness' on Network Nine

> The discourse of minorities, spoken for and against in multicultural wars, proposes a social subject constituted through cultural hybridization, the overdetermination of communal or group differences, the articulation of baffling alikeness and banal divergence.
>
> (Bhabha 1996, p.54)

> A common device in the conflict positioning rhetoric is the conflation of various types of identity labels. Nationality, citizenship, religion, birthplace, ancestry, ethnicity, race, culture and generation are merged and confused in a jumble of stereotypes, with the resulting trope that one is either truly Australian or truly Muslim but not both at the same time.
>
> (Woodlock 2011, p.392)

6.1 Introduction

The theme of 'domestication' has illustrated the ways in which Muslim figures within the multicultural, televisual Australian space, can *become 'national'* by embracing 'otherness' and aligning it with commonly held conceptions of 'being Australian' (Elder 2007, Busbridge 2013). The previous chapter argued that processes of domestication encourage narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on network Seven, as they highlight the existence of Muslim 'otherness' in the multicultural space through isolation and containment. Doing so suggests that these Muslims become authentically 'Australian Muslims', and are recognised as unlike Muslims in other parts of the world (Bowen 2004, Humphrey 2014). Such processes of domestication or 'nationalising Muslims' emblematise notions of hybridity, where two or more cultures are fused together in a multicultural space (Ang 2003, Hutnyk 2005, Humphrey 2014). These constructions of hybridised identities are explored further in this chapter through the theme of 'in-betweenness'.

'In-betweenness' refers to the merging or 'mixing' of various ethnicities, religions, and cultures in a single, albeit multicultural, place (Hutnyk 2005). These mixings complement the ways ethnic minorities and migrants adopt cultural values from host nations and fuse them together in a process of cultural hybridisation. In turn, these minorities embrace neither one culture, nor another, and are alternatively placed somewhere 'in-between' (Bhabha 1996, Ang 2003, Jensen 2008). 'In-betweenness' thus constructs representational narratives of

inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims in the Australian multicultural space. This chapter explores the significance of 'in-betweenness' in moderating Muslim 'otherness' to fuse it with notions of 'being Australian'. Processes of in-betweenness therefore mirror those of domestication in categorising some Muslims as *more* 'white' or *more* Australian than others (Hage 1998, Alam 2012).

This chapter analyses the ways Muslim 'otherness' is positioned in reference to 'whiteness' in the Australian multicultural space, and how both are represented on network Nine. The chapter addresses the theme of 'in-betweenness' by examining the representations of two 'types' of Muslims in Australia, 'white' Muslim converts on *A Current Affair* and 'secular' or 'cultural' Muslims on Nine's crime drama, *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*. In both programs, Muslim 'otherness' is played down to accommodate and make visible fusion and hybridisation as narrative devices of inclusiveness and belonging. For the 'white' Muslim converts, inherent 'whiteness' preserves a sense of belonging, while secular Muslims are perceived as 'non-practicing', meaning that Muslim 'otherness' does not hinder or obstruct their adaptation of Australian (or 'white') values (Hage 1998, Jensen 2008, Brown 2010, Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011, Alam 2012, Moosavi 2015). This chapter argues that both programs highlight ostensible fusions between 'otherness' and 'whiteness', constructing multicultural spaces where Muslims and 'white' Australians can successfully co-exist. Such fusions also highlight dysfunctional race relations in Australia's multicultural structure, where Muslim 'otherness' is consistently pitted against 'whiteness' (Kabr 2006; 2007, Humphrey 2007, White 2007, Dreher 2009, Evers 2009, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, Busbridge 2013).

The following section introduces the significance of 'in-betweenness' in consolidating forms of belonging for Muslims in the national multicultural space. This chapter then briefly outlines the role of network nine, particularly referencing the network's attempt to incorporate ethnically diverse themes in its programming. The latter half of this chapter analyses two programs, *A Current Affair* and *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* and investigates how each constructs 'in-betweenness' in the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging.

6.1.1 'In-betweenness' and belonging

'In-betweenness' refers to those contested diasporic identities and spaces that exist in Western multicultural nations. Used mostly in post-colonial theories, 'in-betweenness' references migrant groups (such as Muslims – whilst acknowledging generations of Australian born Muslims) that have been marginalised in their adopted host nations (Hutnyk 2005). According to Bhabha (1996, p.58), the 'in-between' is a space of 'negotiation' where diasporic or 'partial cultures' exist and are 'equivocal'. These cultures are neither assimilated nor collaborated with the host nation. 'In-betweenness' thus presents opportunities for the ethnic 'other' to rise from marginal positions in host nations and attain at least some form of authority by fusing one or more cultures, or ethnicities, rendering possible 'the emergence of an interstitial agency that refuses the binary representation of social antagonism' (Bhabha 1996, p.58).

Ang (2003) argues that 'in-betweenness' underscores hybridisation in contexts where ethnic 'otherness' is less about complex 'identities' and more about difference. In contrast to the explicit embracement or the rejection of 'otherness', notions of in-betweenness discover ways to 'live with difference' in circumstances where that difference or 'otherness' presents discomfort within the nation. As Ang (2003, p.147) suggests:

> …even in the most oppressive situations, different "peoples" who are thrown into intercultural confrontation with each other, whether by force or by will, have to negotiate their differences if they are to avoid war. The result, after many centuries of contact history, is a profoundly hybridised world where boundaries have become utterly porous, even though they are artificially maintained.

'In-betweenness' discourages those 'ethnic identities' that concern 'otherness' and focuses on building inter-cultural relationships between the dominant 'white subject' and the ethnic 'other'. It seemingly bridges racial relations between 'us' and 'them'. As a theme, 'in-betweenness' determines inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims in Australia by dealing with the disjunct position that Muslims occupy ambivalently in the multicultural nation space (Bhabha 1996, p.57). According to Hutnyk (2005, p.80), both 'hybridity' and 'in-betweenness' are 'usefully slippery categories' that have come to mean 'all sorts of things to do with mixing and combination in the moment of cultural exchange'. Both

categories reflect notions of homogenisation that marginalise and exclude Muslims as 'other' into relief, by promoting notions of dualism and multiculturalism.

The significance of in-betwenness is thus its role in multicultural nations such as Australia, where ethnic 'otherness' is regarded as incompatible with dominant 'white' culture. For Bhabha (1996, p.55), the multicultural space has become a 'floating signifier' whose enigma determines social processes where 'differentiation' and 'condensation' seem to happen almost synchronically. According to Hutnyk (2005, p.81), in-betweenness conveys a process of cultural mixing in similar fashion to discourses of multiculturalism, where the ethnic or cultural 'other' meets the host nation and adopts aspects of their culture, while the host society accepts the presence of the 'other' as an inevitable part of 'multi-culturalism' (see also Hall 1993, Hage 1997, Ahmed 2000, Lentin 2005). 'In-betweenness' therefore denotes a space where multiple cultures are fused together as a way of co-existing within the nation, but not impinging on the dominant 'white' culture. It becomes what Bhabha (1996) identifies as a 'third space', situated betwixt two or more (often) polarising cultures.

For Hall (1993), 'in-betweenness' is the result of an 'intensified phase of globalisation', that has favoured economic, political, and cultural integration within Western nations. These have opened up 'local and regional economies' to new and alternative 'dislocations and relationships' (Hall 1993a, p.354). 'In-betweenness' represents a fusion or sharing of ethnicities and cultures in spaces where cultural diversity is overt and present. It supports libertarian notions of multiculturalism in which culture or 'otherness' is a resource or value within the 'white nation'[39] (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Lentin & Titley 2008).

'In-betweenness' is addressed in this chapter as a theme within which representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed, with respect to the 'place' of Muslims in the Australian multicultural space. 'In-betweenness' breaks down perceived racial binaries by 'entertaining difference'

[39] This point is examined further in Chapter Seven.

without an 'assumed or imposed hierarchy' (Bhabha 2004, Mishra & Shirazi 2010). Further, 'in-betweenness' enables the Muslim 'other' to adopt certain 'white' values, and engage in 'white' culture, whilst remaining 'other'. It primarily enables the Muslim 'other' to 'accumulate' a sense of inclusion or belonging at the point where 'otherness' is mitigated but not supressed. Hutnyk (2005) argues that 'in-betweenness' reproduces racial hegemonic structures because it focuses too much on 'transgressive elements' and neglects to address issues surrounding alienation, exclusion, violence, or marginalisation (see also Young 1995, Mishra & Shirazi 2010, p.196).

This chapter explores the representation of Muslims who are able to mitigate 'otherness' and figuratively adopt aspects of 'whiteness' to 'accumulate' a sense of belonging within the national field (Hage 1998). While 'in-betweenness' mostly deals with 'migrants' who enter a host society, it can also be applied to those (from the host society) who adopt aspects of migrant religion and culture. This occurs given that 'in-betweenness' engages in 'flattening difference' whilst simultaneously celebrating it and encouraging the creative productivity of new mixings (Hutnyk 2005, p.96).

Processes of in-betweenness are explored in this chapter by addressing two different aspects of Muslim experience. The first concerns 'white' Muslim converts and explores the role of 'whiteness' in predetermining national belonging, particularly in cases where 'white' Australians adopt Islamic identities. 'White' Muslim converts are positioned in contexts of in-betweenness as beneficiaries of 'white privilege' at the point where their 'otherness' is diminished. The latter half of this chapter addresses secular or cultural Muslims for whom religion is a less active marker of identity. According to Akbarzadeh and Roose (2011, p.320), these Muslims have a pragmatic approach to religion where it is celebrated but 'not allowed to interfere and interrupt the daily routine of life which may be called secular for all intents and purposes'. For these Muslims, 'otherness' is already mitigated, accommodating for the adaptation of 'white' values as resources for recognition and acceptance within the national field. As Hage (1998) suggests, such mitigation is a means by which Muslims can 'accumulate' a sense of belonging in the Australian multicultural setting.

Both these 'types' of Muslims ('white' Muslim converts and secular Muslims) exist within the theme of 'in-betweenness' because they gesture toward ostensible hybridity. These are considered fundamental to representations on network Nine in both describing and prescribing the ways that Muslims and 'white' Australians can co-exist in multicultural contexts. As mentioned, 'in-betweenness' ensures that 'otherness' is lessened to enable the visibly identifiable fusion between two supposedly polarising cultures (Ang 2003, Hutnyk 2005, Northcote & Casimiro 2010). In this way, 'in-betweenness' rationalises the presence of Muslim 'otherness' in the national space without enlivening threats of 'invasion' (Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Aly & Walker 2007). For commercial networks such as Nine, this is especially important because it renders Muslim 'otherness' more appealing, and forms the basis of narratives where co-existence between 'us' and 'them' can develop.

6.2 Background: Network Nine

Network Nine (or Nine) first launched in Sydney as TCN-9 in 1956 and became one of the first television stations in Australia to commence official transmission (Moran 1991, Bye 2006). According to Bye (2006, p.163), Australians who owned television sets at the time and tuned into Nine, became members of the first television audience in Australia. On September 19, 1956, Nine launched GTV-9 in Melbourne to coincide with the Summer Olympics and became the first network to broadcast a major international event (Flew & Cunningham 2004). Since then, Nine has remained significant to Australian audiences, preserving the largest audience share across Australian television between the years of 1980 and 2005 (Levine 2009, p.195).

Much of Nine's success has derived from its production of drama programs that enhance and reflect Australia's cultural and historic identities. In the 1970s, Nine produced *The Sullivans,* a local family drama that dominated ratings in the years between 1976 and 1982 (Flew & Cunnigham 2004, p.64). More recently, Nine has produced a number of local tele-movies, mini-series, and other programming that fictionalise popular historic events, which have been exclusive to Australia[40].

[40] Some of these include *Beaconsfield* (2012), *Schapelle* (2014), *Gallipoli* (2015) and the *Underbelly* (2013-2015) series.

However, Nine has faced similar criticisms to network Seven (see Chapter Five) for a failure to explore Australia's ethnic diversity in such programs, relying instead on narratives that support 'white Euro-centric' ideals (Bell 1992, Jakubowicz et al. 1994, Kalina 2012, Phillips 2012, Klocker 2014).

Without specifically addressing issues of ethnicity, Nine has attempted to introduce ethnically diverse characters in a number of programs. In some instances, these characters have been normalised as part of a larger multicultural ethos, as with the *Underbelly* series discussed below. The series recreates true Australian crime stories, with the ethnic characters on the margins of social life and ethnic 'otherness' underplayed (Nowra 2013). Muslim representations in the program naturalise Islamic/non-white presence within the national space without over-emphasising 'otherness' as a 'threat'. Early in 2016, Nine also broadcast a comedy program that specifically targeted the racial prejudice against Muslims in Australia. Titled, *Here Come the Habibs*, the program drew on stereotypes of 'Muslims' and 'white Australians' in a similar fashion to those on *Salam Café* (see Chapter Four), to suggest alternative means of how the two can co-exist.

While these programs indicate progress in representing Muslim characters within Nine's programing, its incentives as a commercial network are however less concerned with reflecting multicultural narratives and more with dramatising and sensationalising content for popular success and financial gain (see Chapter Five, Field 2001). As with Australian commercial television generally, most content concerning Muslims on Nine derives from news and current affairs programs. As has been argued in Chapter Five, news depictions shape Orientalist perceptions because they repeat, reproduce, and preserve those representations of 'otherness' that ostracise Muslims in the West (Said 1978). These Orientalist depictions are also a source of information and entertainment for audiences, capturing attention and advancing particular narratives of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia (Kabir 2006, Poynting & Morgan 2007, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, Phillips 2011). For this reason, depictions of 'in-betweenness' have been deployed on Nine's current affairs programs to produce narratives that highlight co-existence between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the nation, and particularly in a post-Cronulla context, as illustrated by the analysis below.

6.3 Case 1: 'White' Muslim Converts on *A Current Affair*

A Current Affair first broadcast in November 1971 on GTV-9 (Melbourne). Originally in the prized 7pm timeslot, the program was cancelled in 1978 following competitive programing on the other two commercial networks. It was later revived in January 1988 and moved to the 6.30pm timeslot so as not to compete with popular drama program *Home and Away* on network Seven. According to Stone (2007, p.25), *A Current Affair* was set up to devote greater airtime to 'worthier' topics particularly those that better suit the needs of local Australian audiences. It addresses news content in much the same way as network Seven's *Today Tonight* (see Chapter Five), highlighting issues that supposedly frighten 'everyday Australians' in their local spaces (Levine 2009, McIver 2009). *A Current Affair* particularly broadcasts sensationalised reports concerning politics, crime, science, celebrities, and entertainment, presented in a fast-paced, easy-to-digest format (Ehrlich 1996).

Given the format mirrors that of *Today Tonight*, *A Current Affair* presents news content through dramatisation and theatrical appeal (Ehrlich 1996, Turner 2005, McIver 2009, Bonner & McKay 2011, Phillips 2011). For Roberts (2004, p.20), *A Current Affair*'s tabloid influence continues, 'to flog whatever issue garners or stimulates a reaction in the community'. It produces dramatised, scandalous, and fear-inducing accounts of issues, thus complementing us/them analogies to decipher who can and cannot be classified as Australian (McIver 2009).

The following section illustrates that such narratives are developed on *A Current Affair* by drawing on notions of in-betweenness. The segment analysed is titled *Crossing Over* and was broadcast in February 2014 (and reported by Brady Halls). It reports on the 'growing number' of Australians converting to Islam, by following three 'white' Muslim converts – Rebecca, Siobhan, and Malik[41] – and detailing their conversion to Islam. *Crossing Over* attempts to represent these 'white' Muslim converts as successful models for hybridisation or 'in-betweenness', by emphasising a noticeable blend of 'whiteness' and 'otherness'. The segment foregrounds a mutual co-existence between Muslims and 'white'

[41] Surnames not provided in the segment. As such, first names will be used when referring to the converts in this analysis.

Australians in Australia's multicultural setting, which constructs narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging.

6.3.1 'Whiteness', 'in-betweenness', and belonging

As already mentioned, processes of in-betweenness are concerned with fusions between two or more cultures in multicultural spaces. As Hutnyk (2005) argues, it is a creative means of cultural mixing, where both cultures exist within a singular entity, without one seen as dominating the other. However, Hage (1998) argues that Australia's multicultural structure is built on the presence, persistence and power of 'whiteness', meaning that in-betweenness can only exist at the point where 'otherness' is mitigated and presents less of a 'threat' in the 'white nation' (see also Ang 2003). For the 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over*, their inherent 'whiteness' is the foundation upon which hybridity is built and in-betweenness can exist.

As discussed in Chapter One, 'whiteness' operates primarily as the normative understanding of what 'Australia is' and thus performs assertions of dominance in subtle but exclusive ways (Hage 1997; 1998, Pugliese 2002, Colic-Peisker 2005, Elder 2007, Alam 2008, p.127, Tascon 2008). 'Whiteness', therefore, exists as something that is 'unmarked', 'unracialised', and 'invisible' within the multicultural nation, anchored by those conceptualisations that enable 'white Australians' to position themselves as superior to the ethnic 'other' (Dyer 1997, Hage 1998, Colic-Peisker 2005, Lentin 2005 Alam 2008, Tascon 2008). 'White' Muslim converts remain beneficiaries of 'whiteness' despite their conversion and adaptation of values associated with 'otherness' (Moosavi 2015). They are privileged with naturalised notions of belonging that do not necessarily have to be 'accumulated' within the 'white nation'.

As beneficiaries of 'whiteness', these converts possess what Hage (1998, p.56) identifies as specific 'white' qualities that are naturalised within the national realm and cannot be accumulated by an ethnic 'other'. These include physical appearance, skin colour, ancestry, and upbringing that 'non-white' Muslims can never acquire. For the 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over*, these qualities are already possessed, as the converts are recognisably 'white' *after* their conversion to Islam. As argued by Antonsich (2010, p.650), such qualities exhort

notions of belonging regarding the rhetoric 'sameness' in which aspects such as skin colour or place of birth become 'requisites' for belonging within the 'white nation'. This reflects the ways the converts are consistently referred to as 'Aussies', rather than 'Muslims', throughout *Crossing Over*. In narration over the opening scenes, Halls describes the converts as 'blue-eyed, fair skinned Aussies' referencing the physical features that are readily identified with Anglo-Australians (and not Muslims) (Hage 1998, Loo 1998).

Colic-Peisker (2005) argues that such visible racial identifiers promote divisions within Muslim communities in Australia, where some Muslims can be regarded 'white Muslims' while others remain 'ethnic Muslims'. Colic-Peisker (2005) defines 'white Muslims' as European Muslims or 'white' Muslim converts, whose in-betweenness belies an inherent 'whiteness' that surpasses aspects of 'otherness', and maintains a superior position of 'white privilege'. However, the racial experience of 'white Muslims' does not mirror those of 'visibly different' Muslims who may have migrated to Australia, and/ or encountered prejudice, discrimination, or exclusion (Colic-Peisker 2005, p.633, Moosavi 2015, p.1919).

This referencing of 'white Muslims' suggests that Anglo-European Muslim converts are perceived as different Muslims, able to exist comfortably within national space. Differentiating between 'white' and 'ethnic' Muslims means that Muslim experiences of inclusiveness and belonging differ greatly, because some are considered to be more 'assimilative' (to 'whiteness') than others (Yasmeen 2010, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). *Crossing Over* draws on these aspects to foster notions of in-betweenness by mitigating Muslim 'otherness' and supporting dominant conceptions of 'whiteness'. This is evidenced through scenes where Halls interviews parents of the converts, and is shown photos of the converts as children. When shown an image of a young Rebecca (without a hijab) Halls exclaims, 'she has blonde hair', while her parents recount her 'white' upbringing. The audience learns that Rebecca grew up as an 'Anglican' and attended an 'Anglican school'. Similarly, images of a young Siobhan are accompanied by narration describing her catholic schooling and religious instruction prior to her conversion to Islam.

As discussed in Chapter One, discourses of 'whiteness' in Australia have been linked to religion, particularly Christianity and Christian values. Randell-Moon (2006, p.11) argues that 'common Judeo-Christian values' preserve the cultural and political power of those identifiable as 'white Australians'. For the 'white' Muslim converts, notions of belonging have more to do with their Christian upbringing than with their Australian identities. As Edwards (2000, p.28) argues, 'to be born, say, in a particular place does not automatically confer the status of belonging to that place, one also needs to be brought up in a particular way'. The religious references on *Crossing Over* symbolise a sense of 'whiteness' and belonging for Rebecca and Siobhan because it suggests that by being raised as Christians, both of these converts have adopted specific values associated with 'whiteness'. Moreover, the religious references lessen the visibility and the effects of 'otherness' for the converts because their previous religions are perceived not as 'ethnic' but 'white'. As Hage (1998) suggests, in reference to the 'white nation', Christian identities (in historical or present contexts) reflect an alignment with and connection to, the nation that has been ideologically constructed and imagined as 'white'.

These religious references also enhance the notion of in-betweenness because they evoke 'whiteness' at the point where Muslim 'otherness' is diminished. The converts' 'white' upbringing serves as a significant reminder that their 'white' identities merge with their newly acquired Muslim identities, whilst enabling them to remain 'white' at the same time. This is explored in *Crossing Over* through reference to the places where the converts to Islam grew up. Halls explains that Rebecca grew up 'on the beaches of the New South Wales South Coast' and that 'like many other Australians' Rebecca 'loves sport and a sun-tan'. Halls's narration is accompanied by long shots of a beach strip, which, as Baker et al. (2012) argue, visually captures the 'fragmented beauty' of life in Australia. These associations draw on Australian social and cultural mythologies, which link discursive formations of 'the beach' with conceptualisations of 'white' Australian nationalism.

Much of this symbolic nationalism shaped the spectacle of the Cronulla Riots, where racial tensions between Muslims and 'white' Australians were reported as literally erupting *on the beach* at Cronulla (see Chapter Three, Due & Riggs 2008,

Asquith & Poynting 2011). Claims of national belonging were synonymous with claims of belonging to the beach (Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Evers 2009, Noble 2009). Lems et al. (2016, p.34) argue that the Cronulla Riots revealed the Australian beach as a material, imaginary, and social arena that 'looms large in the Australian national imagination'. References to the Australian beach on *Crossing Over* ultimately epitomise key understandings of national belonging within the nation. For convert Rebecca, such belonging is predicated on her own white/Christian upbringing on the Australian beach.

Similarly, Malik is described on *Crossing Over* as a 'former Aussie surfer'. The 'surfer' reference explicitly intersects national character and location with reference to the Australian beach. Lems et al. (2016) argue that 'surfers' and 'lifesavers' are especially imagined to dominate the Australian beach as figurative symbols of Australian national pride and culture. While Malik's case may suggest that his conversion to Islam means he has given up this iconic Australian identity, the fact that it alludes to mythologies of the Australian beach actually facilitates Malik's (newly adopted) Islamic acceptance. This is because the beach is represented on *Crossing Over* as not only a space of 'whiteness', but also a space of in-betweenness, where processes of multicultural hybridisation and social cohesion ostensibly occur.

According to Ang (2003), 'in-betweenness' ensures that 'whiteness' is consistently preserved in formations of multicultural hybridisation. As *hybrid*, Muslim-Australians, are less 'other' and therefore less 'threatening' in multicultural spaces. In *Crossing Over*, the beach becomes a space that exemplifies a form of utopian egalitarianism and a metaphysical space of 'Australianness, where such hybrids are welcome and enhance the overall multicultural aesthetic of that space (Lems et al. 2916, p.32). These conceptions reflect those libertarian multicultural ideals discussed in Chapter One, often represented as a 'communal space of belonging' and 'being-at-home' in a nation that gives 'everyone a fair go' (Lems et al. 2016, p.34). For Malik on *Crossing Over*, the beach is presented as the space where he first started to think about his conversion to Islam. As Halls explains, 'Blue-eyed Mark, now known as Malik, got (sic) interested in the religion because he liked the way his Lebanese mates at the beach talked about their faith…' Here the beach becomes an open and

accepting space where Malik's 'Lebanese friends' are able to discuss their religion without any sense of prejudice or racism.

The conceptions of 'being-at-home', establish the beach as a 'welcoming' and tolerant space, unlike during the Cronulla Riots, where the beach was a depicted as a space of intolerance and racial clashes (Lems et al. 2016). As a key aspect of representations of inclusiveness and belonging, 'home' is often categorised as a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional attachment (Antonsich 2010). For Rebecca on *Crossing Over*, growing up on the Australian beach naturalises and enhances these symbolic understandings of 'home' in the Australian context. She is 'at home' on the beach synonymously as she is 'at home' in the Australian multicultural nation where she can comfortably exist as a 'white Muslim' (Colic-Peisker 2005, Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). Similarly, for Malik, the beach is recognised as a 'homely' space that enhances feelings of attachment and security, despite his newly acquired 'otherness' that is more often associated with exclusion.

The beach is thus characterised as a space where Malik and Rebecca's successful hybridisation through 'in-betweenness' is recognised. According to Mitchell (1997, p.533), 'in-betweenness' reflects 'chiasmatic sites' of 'progressive and liberatory transnational cultures'. These spaces represent liberal notions of multiculturalism and enhance multicultural imagery of the nation, as has been discussed in Chapter Five regarding 'openness to difference' (Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Busbridge 2013). By reporting on the Muslim conversions through references of egalitarianism, *Crossing Over* both accepts and celebrates these 'new cultural mixings', which Hutnyk (2005) argues are the epitome of 'in-betweenness'.

The segment also represents the 'white' Muslim converts as successful models of multicultural hybridity. During many of the interviews with Halls, the converts stress that their conversion to Islam is a religious and not a cultural change. They separate culture and religion by highlighting that their 'true identity' is Australian and thus 'white', while it is their 'religious identity' that is Muslim (see also Jensen 2008). As representations of 'everyday Australians', Malik is shown at work in a retail store and Rebecca socialising at cafés. Like the Muslim women on

Today Tonight, the 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over* stress that conversion to Islam hasn't changed their ability to live as 'average Australians'. At one stage Rebecca tells Halls: 'I still go out to coffee with my girlfriends…I still go to fundraisers…I still have fun…'

Constructions of in-betweenness on *Crossing Over* reference 'whiteness' to stabilise already naturalised ideas that emphasise the 'homely' value of the Australian nation in producing 'inclusive' Australian cultures (Due & Riggs 2008, Lems et al. 2016). These references to 'in-betweenness' foreground dominant discourses discussed by Hage (1998), of Australia as a 'tolerant' nation that provides an environment where conversion to 'otherness' can take place. Muslim belonging is thus developed in this context at the level of the nation, with aims to deploy imagery that allows the nation to imagine itself as multicultural and thus inclusive of 'otherness'. Not only does this strengthen the representational construction of belonging for the 'white' Muslim converts, but it also presents alternative forms of multiculturalism, where co-existence between Muslim 'otherness' and 'white Australian-ness' is fostered through hybridisation (Ang 2003).

6.3.2 'Whiteness', 'otherness', 'in-betweenness'

The representation of 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over* highlights the significance of 'whiteness' in the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. The emphasis on 'whiteness' for 'white' Muslim converts is suggestive of belonging where Muslim 'otherness' is mitigated in spaces of in-betweenness. However, Hutnyk (2005) argues that 'in-betweenness' implies a fusion of two or more ethnic, religious, or cultural identities within multicultural contexts (see also Bhabha 1996). Whilst 'whiteness' is favoured in the construction of 'white' Muslim hybridity on *Crossing Over,* it cannot dominate as a *singular* identity. Instead, 'whiteness' serves as a reminder of the complex racial dynamic between 'whiteness' and 'otherness' in constructions of the multicultural nation (Moosavi 2015).

The conversion process is often characterised as one where people are seen to be embracing 'otherness' that is perceived to be 'dangerous' and fundamentally unlike 'us' (Jensen 2008, p.391). These aspects of conversion on *Crossing Over*

are filtered through the Nine network's commercial imperatives, as the program and genre work to dramatise and sensationalise 'otherness' (Phillips 2011). As Ehrlich (1996) argues, commercial current affairs are designed to invoke fear and panic, even in so-called 'positive' reports. As 'whiteness' on *Crossing Over* cushions a sense of belonging for 'white' Muslim converts, it serves a discourse of 'racial betrayal'. As Alam (2012, p.138) argues:

> … white people's adoption of a religion that is seen as antithetical to Western values and beliefs either diminishes or eradicates their whiteness in others' eyes, or alternatively seen them labelled as race traitors who act against and destabilise the white race.

Whilst belonging is naturalised for 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over,* 'otherness' is necessarily taken on in processes of religious conversion. It is restricted by the fact that 'white' Muslim converts choose to practice a religion associated with 'otherness', and one that has been scrutinised as incompatible with the ostensible 'whiteness' of the Australia nation (Hage 1998, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, p.268, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012).

In *Crossing Over*, race betrayal underscores a narrative of 'white' Muslim converts rejecting 'whiteness' in favour of 'otherness'. This is visible and palpable, despite an emphasis on the converts' 'white' upbringing as discussed in the section above. *Crossing Over* foregrounds how processes of hybridisation must eliminate aspects of 'whiteness' that cannot co-exist with Muslim 'otherness' (Woodlock 2011, Moosavi 2015). For instance, *A Current Affair*'s host, Tracy Grimshaw, introduces the segment as a case where 'white' Muslim converts 'give up' aspects of 'whiteness' to become Muslim:

> But now for the growing numbers of young Australian men and women who are converting to Islam. They are giving up their western lifestyle and choosing to follow the rules and traditions of the Muslim faith.

The phrase 'giving up' stresses the supposed and constructed mutually exclusive relationship between Muslims and Australians in the nation (Woodlock 2011). Grimshaw suggests that the 'white' Muslim converts are 'giving up', even neglecting, a 'western lifestyle' in order to convert to the 'rules' of Islam; the converts are unable to maintain hybrid identities of 'whiteness' and 'otherness', because they can only be one or the other, and not both. As Jensen (2008) argues, the relationship between 'whiteness' and Muslim 'otherness' is characterised as

oppositional in contemporary socio-political discourses, meaning that the 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over* are represented as leaving their 'white' identity behind and embracing 'otherness'.

One of the ways such polarisation is realised on *Crossing Over* is by addressing how conversions to Islam alter the identities of 'white' Australians. Particular emphasis is placed on the changes to 'names and western lifestyles'. For Nieuwkerk (2004, p.237), names and appearances are regarded as central aspects of identity-formation, and any changes made to names or appearances in religious conversions are considered shifts in identities. Ultimately, converts are perceived as 'different' post-conversion. Any change in identities of 'white' Muslim converts also signifies changes in both the experience and condition of the sense of belonging available to them. Nonetheless, a change in name and dress practice is an important part of the Islamic conversion process (Jensen 2008, p.392). The change in name and appearance on *Crossing Over* is emphasised to represent the alteration of important markers of 'white' identity. This is highlighted by Halls, who stresses that Malik has 'changed his name', and that for Rebecca there are 'very different physical and social changes' post-conversion.

These changes also indicate a rejection of 'whiteness' on *Crossing Over*, as Halls consistently states that the converts are 'giving up' a 'western lifestyle' to convert to Islam. Halls explains that pre-conversion, Rebecca was 'like many Aussie teenagers…going out partying and drinking', and she no longer does these things since her conversion. In the same pattern of questioning, Halls asks Malik 'do you miss the Western lifestyle, the nightclubbing, the drinking, and so on…?' The 'Western lifestyle' here, denotes non-Muslim activities, such as 'drinking alcohol' or 'participating in parties'. To deem these activities further as incompatible with Islam, Malik explains, 'there is no benefit from drinking, there is no benefit from clubbing, there is no benefit from gambling…' Stressing 'Westernised' activities as having 'no benefit' explicitly foregrounds the notion of rejection with respect to 'whiteness' and 'Westernness'.

Many of these references highlight the supposed incompatibility between Muslim 'otherness' and Australia by sustaining particular versions of multiculturalism in which the nation is perceived as fragmented and divided by ethnic groups

understood through us/them binaries (Pardy & Lee 2011, p.298). Similarly to the themes discussed in Chapters Four and Five, 'in-betweenness' is framed as a multicultural process that particularly homogenises cultural groups in the nation as 'internally static' and thus inescapable of difference (Lentin 2005, p.388). Throughout *Crossing Over* the Western lifestyle is linked to being 'free-spirited', 'easy-going', 'drinking', and 'partying', in contradiction to Islam as a 'strict' and 'rule-oriented' religion (Jensen 2008). These oppositions reveal the homogenising complexities of in-betweenness. Ang (2003, p.147) argues that the very condition of 'in-betweenness' can rarely be a question of 'simple shaking hands, of happy, harmonious merger and fusion'. It invokes and performs the difficulty of living with difference in multicultural contexts where 'whiteness' and Muslim 'otherness' are reduced to, and constructed as polarised opposites (Mason 2004, Manning 2006, Lentin 2008, Humphrey 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Roose 2013, Tufail & Poynting 2016).

In *Crossing Over,* such polarities are highlighted in descriptions of the conversion process. Halls explains that Rebecca's previous lifestyle of 'partying and drinking' saw her 'getting depressed with the Australian way of life', consequently resulting in her decision to convert to Islam. Partying and drinking are also conflated with the 'Western lifestyle' and the 'Australian way of life', both of which Rebecca is seen to reject as a 'white' Muslim convert. These depictions suggests that the adaptation of 'otherness' through processes of religious conversion on *Crossing Over* positions 'white' Muslim converts as 'un-Australian' in ways that account for exclusion over inclusion (Jensen 2008, Woodlock 2010, Moosavi 2015).

These accounts of exclusion also identify, as argued previously, the mitigation of otherness as a significant conceptual basis for the theme of 'in-betweenness' so that 'successful hybridisation' can take place (Ang 2003). The 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over* assuage the apparent power of 'whiteness' by rejecting the 'Australian way of life', thus confusingly heightening a sense of 'otherness', as opposed to diminishing it. This condition can be understood through processes of in-betweenness that promote an antithetical structure because hybridisations threaten the cultural hegemonic position of the 'white' dominant culture in

multicultural contexts (Mitchell 1997, Hutnyk 2005). 'In-betweenness' allows for 'otherness' to co-exist with 'whiteness', but only at the point where 'whiteness' preserves its centralised and governing position (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Tascon 2008, Humphrey 2014). As the 'white' Muslim converts 'give up' an 'Australian way of life', they are simultaneously regarded and excluded as 'other', alongside and despite, their 'inherent whiteness' (Colic-Peisker 2005, Jensen 2008, Amer 2012).

These insights work within the notion that, in multicultural contexts, a sense of belonging depends on the 'accumulation' of *white value* (Hage 1998, Garbutt 2009). These also complement the position of *A Current Affair* as a commercial current affairs program on Nine, where the dramatisation of Muslim 'otherness' and Australian 'whiteness' serve to Orientalise the 'white' Muslim converts, because the segment is presented for the entertainment and value of an imagined 'white' audience (Hage 1997, Zine 2002, McIver 2009, Klocker 2014). The construction of the 'white' Muslim converts as an 'other' does not automatically occur through racialised codes of cultural belonging created through 'in-betweenness' per se, but in complex conjunction with Orientalism (Kyriakides, Viradee & Modood 2009).

The representations of the converts on *Crossing Over* are thus wrought through Orientalist logic; particularly those aspects of Orientalism that Said (1978, p.300) argues are about absolute and systematic polarisations between the West and the Orient. For Said, the Orient is a member of a 'subject' race and therefore 'must be subjected' (p.207). Within this discourse, the West must remain rational, developed, humane, and superior, and the Orient is represented as aberrant, underdeveloped, and inferior. In *Crossing Over*, 'white' Muslim converts are 'giving up' aspects of 'whiteness' and therefore surrendering to this inferior 'otherness'. The adoption of Islam as a 'backward' religion that contradicts 'Australian values' thus suggests that these 'white' Muslim converts can be devalued as 'whites', and consequently as Australians (Jensen 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2010, Moosavi 2015). As Nieuwkerk (2004, p.236) argues, 'you cannot change race but you can betray race…since Islam is the belief of immigrants, by becoming Muslim one becomes a foreigner too'.

This process of devaluing 'whiteness' means that narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are limited on *Crossing Over*. Because 'white' Muslim converts are perceived as 'beneficiaries' of 'whiteness', their ostensible emigration from 'white' culture suggests a retraction (rather than accumulation) of belonging. For Moosavi (2015, pp.1923-1924), it reflects notions of being 'demoted' over 'promoted' in the national space, and implies 'whiteness' is being revoked. For the 'white' Muslim converts on *Crossing Over*, 'their whiteness' is in some sense 'confiscated', as they reject 'Australian lifestyles' and undergo a process of 're-racialization' and conversion (Moosavi 2015, pp.1921-1922). As Moosavi (2015, p.1922) argues, 'they are no longer considered as 'white', but after converting to Islam are racialised as effectively 'non-white'.

This context follows that of Hage's (1998) 'white nation', as 'white' Muslim converts exist as 'other' only once 'whiteness' is confiscated, and as 'whites' at the moment 'otherness' is mitigated. They are perceived as both 'bafflingly alike' other 'white' Australians whilst remaining 'different' and 'other' as 'Muslims' (Bhabha 1996, Colic-Peikser 2005, Moosavi 2015). Ultimately, they exist in a space of in-betweenness – a dysfunctional space where they cannot successfully fuse their 'white' and Muslim identities, and must choose between one or the other (Jensen 2008, Woodlock 2011, Alam 2012, Moosavi 2015).

The theme of 'in-betweenness' thus preserves dominant conceptions of 'whiteness' in narratives about 'white' Muslim converts. It produces discursive spaces where Muslim 'otherness' must first be mitigated and 'whiteness' enhanced, to facilitate 'successful' multi-cultural hybridity. 'In-betweenness' thus constructs some Muslims as capable of being 'more white' and therefore 'more Australian' than others (see also Colic-Peisker 2005, Alam 2012). This is also possible for secular Muslims, or at least those that distance themselves from the Islamic religion, to adopt values not readily associated with 'otherness' (Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011). The next section examines the ways secular Muslims occupy a space of in-betweenness on Nine's *Underbelly: The Golden Mile.* Similar to *A Current Affair*'s 'white' Muslim converts, Muslim 'otherness' is mitigated but not necessarily eliminated.

6.4 Case 2: Secular Muslims on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*

As stated earlier in this chapter, network Nine has attempted to present ethnically diverse characters in some of its programing without necessarily addressing issues of ethnicity or multiculturalism. Whilst narratives revolve around socio-cultural factors in the production of these programs, the ethnic characters simply 'exist' (Nowra 2013). This representational logic is especially visible in Nine's *Underbelly* series, which re-tells historical Australian crime stories and cases by dramatizing salacious and sensational aspects of them. According to Turnbull (2010), crime dramas have been popular in Australia for decades with the *Underbelly* franchise representing another stylistic and generic development within an extensive archive of local Australian productions. Turnbull (2010) argues that *Underbelly* has changed the way Australian crime and criminals are portrayed on commercial television by glamorising them. *Underbelly* combines highly stylised drama, sex, extreme violence and crime with humour and 'quirky' characters (based on actual people) to attract greater audiences to Nine, packaging crime as effective entertainment.

The first instalment of *Underbelly* broadcast on February 13, 2008, on Nine and became one of the highest rating, locally produced programs on Australian commercial television (Gregg and Wilson 2012). The first series is based on John Silvester and Andre Rule's book, *Leadbelly: Inside Australia's Underworld* that explores events in Melbourne between 1995 and 2004 involving infamous underworld criminals and drug kingpins. The second series, *Underbelly: A Tale of Two Cities* (2009), is a prequel to the first and revisits crimes and events that occurred throughout and between Sydney and Melbourne from 1976 to 1987. First broadcast on April 11, 2010 the third instalment, *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* recounts events from Sydney's Kings Cross[42] nightclubbing and drug scenes between 1988 and 1999. The series focuses on the glamour and excitement of the rise of crime boss John Ibrahim, a secular Muslim who goes from being a 'cheeky western Sydney school boy' to 'King of the Cross'.

[42] *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* is set in Kings Cross, an inner-city suburb located on the Eastern side of Sydney. Kings Cross is well known as a nightly 'hot spot' with an array of bars, clubs, pubs, brothels and food outlets along the main strip (see Nowra 2013).

Underbelly: The Golden Mile disavows Muslim 'otherness' through dramatic effect and the glamorisation of crime, money, and sex (Gregg and Wilson 2012, Turnbull 2010). Much of the series therefore draws on Ibrahim's social and economic ambitions as his Muslim identity is secularised. For Brown (2010), minimal emphasis on religion means that secular Muslims can acquire certain degrees of success within the nation more readily than other, devout Muslims. This is primarily because secular Muslims are assumed to focus more on lifestyle and career over religion, in the accumulation of symbolic capital within the national field (Brown 2010, Peucker et al. 2014, Chopra 2015). This accumulation is nonetheless achieved through 'in-betweenness', based on the mitigation of Muslim 'otherness', for the signifiers of success to be recognised. In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, a focus on success and the process of accumulation (of social, economic and cultural capital) thus promotes representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, as exemplified below.

6.4.1 'In-betweenness', capital, accumulation and belonging

The 'ambiguous and culturally ambivalent' (Mitchell 1997) space that 'in-betweenness' constructs in its exploration of hybridisation inflects inclusiveness and belonging. It facilitates those processes of 'accumulation' that Hage (1998) argues are critical for the Muslim 'other' in the 'white nation'. As Mitchell (1997, p.540) emphasises, the space of in-betweenness is concerned with 'capital accumulation' that does not necessarily have to be fostered on promotions of 'cultural mixings', as Hutnyk (2005) has suggested. On the contrary, it utilises other values associated with social or economic benefits that are shared and valued by the migrant groups *and* the dominant ('white') host nations (Mitchell 1997, Hage 1998). In this view, a sense of belonging thrives less on accumulating 'whiteness' in the space of in-betweenness, and more on finding ways to mitigate 'otherness' through a focus on economic or social success (albeit criminal) in the national field and context (Hage 1998, p.55, Brown 2010).

In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* social and economic success is especially important, because it lessens focus on ethnicity and Muslim 'otherness' whilst normalising secularism. In notions of belonging, secularism presents aspects of 'negotiation' in similar ways as domestication (see Chapter Five) for those

Muslims who wish to succeed in 'white nations' and within the context of associated societal discourses (Hage 1998, Northcote & Casimiro 2010). For *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* this means documenting Ibrahim's 'meteoric rise' in the setting of Kings Cross, and focusing less on his Muslim 'otherness'. The series celebrates Ibrahim's rise from a 'street-wise hustler' to 'successful businessman' who is 'untouchable by the authorities' (Clune 2010, p.5). Ibrahim is represented as a charismatic 'underworld personality' thirsty for power, and in constant conflict with other criminals and with 'white' police authorities.

In the first episode Ibrahim pursues a career in the Kings Cross club and crime scene whilst still a teenager. The episode follows Ibrahim as he is expelled from high school for fighting, and is later stabbed, and hospitalised for several weeks. The stab wound leaves a large scar across Ibrahim's stomach and is referenced throughout the series as a symbol of Ibrahim's determination and ambition, strength and even criminality, as he becomes 'King of the Cross'. When questioned about his success, he shows his scar and stresses its significance as a symbol of experience and hard work in earning money and power.

Brown (2010) argues that discursive constructions of Muslim 'otherness' are moderated when Muslims are represented through aspects of economic determination and success (see also Peucker et al. 2014, Chopra 2015). In particular, economic success positions Muslims as more dedicated to 'bettering and serving the nation', in ways that pious Muslims are unable to be (Hage 1998, Peucker et al. 2014). For secular Muslims, dedication is gauged by the social validation of secularism or separation from religion that does not hinder the desire to work in the nation (Brown 2010, p.179). In the first few episodes Ibrahim approaches well-known underworld figures, such as George Freeman (the original 'King of the Cross') seeking employment. At first, Ibrahim is assigned a role as a 'driver' for Freeman and his partner Lenny McPherson, before becoming a bouncer (door operator) for one of the more successful clubs in Kings Cross, The Tunnel. In episode two, Ibrahim asks the owner of The Tunnel for partnership, and whilst his bid is laughed at, successive scenes show him storing large amounts of money (earned through his jobs) in a meat freezer with resolute determination.

The visual reiteration of entrepreneurial determination in these scenes presents Ibrahim as a hard working teenager, striving for economic success against and unlike the other Muslim characters in the series. Within *Underbelly*'s world of organised crime, Ibrahim's friends Hammer, Charlie, and Buddy, get caught up in drugs, unplanned crime, and gratuitous violence, while Ibrahim does not. On the contrary, Ibrahim is presented as witty, focussed, and charismatic, negotiating his way through the cultural economy of Kings Cross by respecting those in power and learning from them (Nowra 2013). As mentioned above, Ibrahim idolises George Freeman, and in the first episode he tells Freeman and McPherson: 'I want to be like you guys, Mr Freeman…Mr McPherson …I want to be as successful as you, you know, want to have what you've got'. Freeman then invites Ibrahim to his house and fosters a business relationship/mentorship, where Freeman teaches Ibrahim about 'money' and 'respect'. On Freeman's advice, Ibrahim buys a majority of the shares in The Tunnel. Then, at Freeman's funeral in episode three, McPherson acknowledges Ibrahim's rapid rise, exclaiming, 'I'm going to have to keep an eye on you!'

This focus on Ibrahim's success leaves the discursive association between Muslim 'otherness' and crime mostly untroubled, precisely because Ibrahim's 'otherness' is suppressed for much of the series; it is homogenised. Chapter Three has demonstrated how commonplace it has become for young Muslim men, as it was especially in the late 1990s, to be represented through crime and gang culture (Poynting et al. 2000, Manning 2003; 2006, Dagistanli 2007, Humphrey 2007, Grewal 2007, White 2007, Noble 2008, Baird 2009, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). However, in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, Ibrahim resists the homogenous representations that are framed by these associations, particularly because his Muslim identity is secularised.

Akbarzadeh and Roose (2011, p.320) argue that secular Muslims are generally ignored in socio-political discourses concerning 'otherness' because religion is framed less as a marker of identification in Australia. Secular Muslims 'go about their daily lives without making a fuss about religion' (Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011, p.320). These Muslims exist comfortably in the space of in-betweenness, because their apparent devaluing of Muslim 'otherness' presents opportunities for accumulating belonging in the national field (Hage 1998, Brown 2010). For

Ibrahim in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, the enhancement of economic success ultimately supports Hage's (1998) notions of capital accumulation in such discourses of belonging, where belonging can be acquired as a resource that justifies socially inclusive communal and national strictures (see also Mitchell 1997, Antonsich 2010).

As this thesis deals with narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, the process of accumulation is understood as an inclusive measure that works to readdress the 'place' of Muslim figures as 'other' within the multicultural nation. Chapter One has found that capital accumulation, cultural and economic, in Hage's (1998) 'white nation' is premised on discursive 'whiteness', where it is 'white people' who acknowledge and recognise 'non-whites' as national subjects. 'Whiteness' is therefore fluid and can be conditionally transformed and acquired by 'non-whites'. The space of in-betweenness transfers these conditions of 'whiteness' and is open to the accumulation of values seemingly unrelated to race. Achievements in areas of politics, economics, or sport enable some Muslims to accumulate a stronger claim to, and sense of, belonging than other pious Muslims (Hage 1998, p.55). For Ibrahim on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, his economic success is recognised by several 'white' characters. McPherson acknowledges Ibrahim's shares in The Tunnel, just as police officer Constable Wendy begins a sexual relationship with Ibrahim; both are mesmerised by his success. In one scene, Wendy asks Ibrahim, 'how did you manage to buy a club at such a young age' to which Ibrahim replies, 'saved up, you know…work hard, save hard'.

Instances of recognition and acknowledgment mostly consolidate representational narratives that shape inclusiveness and belonging on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*. Ibrahim's Muslim 'otherness' is almost non-existent as part of this narrative, to accommodate for the accretion of economic success. Ultimately, Ibrahim is represented through neo-liberal discourses where his 'wealth' and 'business' assure his 'status' in the space of in-betweenness (see Hage 1998, Brown 2010, p.180). Where the case of 'white' Muslim converts on *A Current Affair* uses 'blonde hair' and 'white skin' to signify belonging, for secular Muslims such as Ibrahim it is 'richness in economic capital' (Hage 1998, p.56). From buying shares in The Tunnel in the early episodes, to living in a 'mansion' in the final episode, Ibrahim's wealth (regardless of its source) is the evidence of and

solidifies his determination to 'work hard' and 'save money' as he tells several characters throughout the series.

Wilkinson (2013, p.426) argues that the mitigation of faith for secular Muslims such as Ibrahim, presents a means to 'fit into' Western host nations (even as one is *already* Australian). This discursive conception facilitates inter-racial relationships sans threatening 'otherness', within processes of in-betweenness. Secularism recognises that social infrastructure can generate higher levels of cohesion in multicultural contexts (Garbutt 2009). According to Mishra and Shirazi (2010, p.195), 'in-betweenness' presents a framework where ethnic and cultural identities are transformed by daily negotiations and interactions of hybridised subjectivities. 'In-betweenness' thus develops and maintains inter-racial relationships between Ibrahim and 'white' characters such as Freeman and Constable Wendy on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile.* This is because Ibrahim's narrative is not racialised or based on race or religion, but on the recognition of social and economic success. These relationships account for narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, where belonging is recognised as a personal intimate feeling of attachment to others in a single field (Hage 1998, Antonsich 2010).

Drawing on Hage's work, Klocker (2014) argues that it is possible for 'non-whites' such as Muslims to accumulate 'whiteness' – and therefore a sense of belonging – through the engagement or interaction with 'white' Australians. The accumulation of symbolic capital, as it is represented on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, is therefore linked to forms of social cohesion fostered by inter-racial relationships – in business or intimacy (Pardy & Lee 2011, p.299, Ang 2003). As a result, the relationships Ibrahim fosters with Freeman and Constable Wendy are crucial in signifying his belonging, especially given Freeman's role as Ibrahim's mentor and Constable Wendy's role as his lover.

These relationships also (re)present openness to inter-racial connections fostered by 'in-betweenness' within the multicultural space. 'Otherness' is diminished or at least appropriated so that processes of 'multi-cultural' hybrid relations can occur (Ang 2003). As Lentin (2005) argues, multicultural spaces are constructed through frameworks that repeatedly establish the dominant 'white' culture as the norm, implying that hybridising processes in multicultural contexts determine

who can and cannot exist in the national space based on affiliation or associations with the dominant host nation (see also Hage 1996; 1998, Lentin & Titley 2008). These discursive constructs are preserved on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* by establishing a multicultural space where cultural mixing is naturalised and therefore *must* occur (Hutnyk 2005). However, as discussed, some processes of in-betweenness are not necessarily related to race, but nonetheless shape a sense of 'cultural belongingness'. Hall (1993, p.357) suggests that 'cultural belongingness' has replaced 'genetic purity' concerning 'whiteness' and functions as the 'coded language' of race and colour, enhancing ideas of 'non-white' success in 'white' nation states. In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* such notions of cultural belongingness are tied up with Ibrahim's economic and social endeavours by measuring and judging his success as a Muslim 'other' through neo-liberal aspects of economic materialism and entrepreneurship (Brown 2010, p.179). Ultimately, the theme of in-betwenness constructs and impacts narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on network Nine, through multiple dimensions where the Muslim 'other' is able to gain a sense of recognition and acceptance both related and unrelated to race (Mitchell 1997).

6.4.2 'In-betweenness' and the search for recognition

While processes of 'in-betweenness' shape narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, they also discursively enhance the secularisation of Muslim 'otherness'. As already argued throughout this chapter, 'in-betweenness' advances at the point where Muslim 'otherness' is mitigated and successful hybridisation can take place (Ang 2003, Hutnyk 2005). For secular Muslims, such as Ibrahim on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* this means that success is acknowledged where Muslim 'otherness' is secularised but not necessarily obliterated. While recognition of success provides a greater sense of belonging for these Muslims, it does not shift positions of 'otherness' in larger social contexts. As Hage (1998, p.55) argues, the accumulation of symbolic capital does secure elements of belonging but it does not necessarily translate into a position of national dominance. Ultimately, as a secular Muslim, Ibrahim remains an 'other' in constant search for recognition, inclusivity, and belonging within the national field.

According to Probyn (1996), belonging is a process actively realised for those in social minorities. 'In-betweenness' augments this process because it recognises hybridisation as an alternative measure for inclusiveness based on the ways the 'other' adopts aspects of 'whiteness' (Hage 1998, Ang 2003). Belonging is thus a resource that represents a cyclic process and cannot be freely acquired outside the bounds of power (Antonsich 2010). Power and belonging are simultaneously explored in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* through tacit micro politics of belonging, but also explicitly through 'turf wars' between criminal gangs vying for domination in Kings Cross. Many scenes depict criminal violence in the streets of Kings Cross, as the characters in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* are pitted against each other in an endless power struggle.

Nowhere is this power struggle more prevalent than in the tense relationship constructed between Ibrahim and Detective Dooley. The relationship reflects the complex dynamics between Muslims and 'white' Australians that have also been enlivened by the Cronulla Riots. In particular, these concern the polarities between Muslims and 'white' Australians, positioning both groups in constant conflict over the recognition of belonging (Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Noble 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Asquith & Poynting 2011). In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* Ibrahim seeks recognition and acceptance from Detective Dooley, while Detective Dooley remains suspicious of him. Throughout the series, Ibrahim attempts to legitimise his rise to success by disassociating himself from crime through earning 'clean money'. However, Dooley doubts Ibrahim's work ethic and the sources of his wealth. This is evidenced in a scene where the police catch a notorious criminal in Kings Cross and Dooley threatens Ibrahim, saying, 'we'll get you one day John…for something'. Similarly, in episode twelve when Detective Dooley is called to Ibrahim's club after reports of a shooting, Dooley remains suspicious, while Ibrahim attempts to prove his innocence.

> **Dooley**: This is part of your war with DK [another drug dealer] for control of the drug trade?
>
> **Ibrahim**: How many times mate? I don't deal drugs, I don't use drugs, I don't have anything to fucking do with drugs. You want to search me? Why don't you search this place, search any of my clubs…I don't care.

> Don't worry about a warrant, just bust right in. Search my house, check my bank statements…I don't care.

This tense relationship that builds between Ibrahim and Dooley demonstrates the contradictions and complexities of 'in-betweenness'. In a space of co-existence between 'whiteness' and 'otherness', where 'otherness' is recognised by 'whiteness', Dooley is ascribed a position of power and authority as a police detective, but also as a 'white' Australian able to grant recognition, and acknowledge Ibrahim's position as a 'successful' and 'secular' Muslim (Hage 1998, Brown 2010). However, Dooley's constant suspicion of Ibrahim represents the constraints and limits of recognition, and thus inclusiveness and belonging of the secular Muslim figure.

Antonsich (2010, p.647) argues that belonging is less a 'personal matter' than a social one, influenced by inter-racial relationships such as the one constructed between Ibrahim and Detective Dooley in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*. The relationship suggests that belonging is not an isolated affair but rather exists in relation to 'ownership' and 'membership', and between those granting belonging and acquiring it (Probyn 1996, Antonsich 2010, p.649). In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* belonging is associated with recognition, as Ibrahim constantly seeks acknowledgement and approval from Dooley. The complicated relationship between Ibrahim and Dooley reflects power relations based on racial competitiveness. It produces a space that Pardy and Lee (2011) suggest is not about the absence of conflict, but the way contests over belonging, the use of space, or the expression of difference are expressed.

Recognition thus serves as a point of significance in discourses of belonging. For Noble (2007, p.231), this is the case for those who seek recognition as a means of accumulating a sense of belonging, in the acknowledgment or validation of 'social worth' that is produced through relations of power. Seeking recognition from 'white' characters such as Detective Dooley is part of Ibrahim's sense of worth as a 'successful Muslim', and thus grants alternative ways of validating his economic success within the theme of 'in-betweenness'. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the 'in-between' produces hybridisation by seeking the recognition or approval of 'otherness' in imagined spaces of 'whiteness'. For Mishra and Shirazi (2010, p.196) 'in-betweenness' privileges the culture of the ('white') host country

through a kind of 'soft, consensual, postmodern social play' that neglects the political and power dimensions of social relations and thus falls into the same essentialist traps as earlier notions of ethnicity (see also Anthias 2001).

In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* Ibrahim's search for recognition is amplified when most 'white' characters question and undermine his success. Some, like Detective Dooley, assume underground criminality, and therefore attempt to expose him. Others are suspicious of his age and ethnicity, such as George Freeman, who initially ignores him and refuses to shake his hand. Constable Wendy questions the legitimacy of his economic success during a sexual encounter and a frustrated Ibrahim replies, 'Oh you think I'm just like them [the drug dealers]…I turned 18… I enrolled to get my liquor license. One conviction, one mistake…I lose everything'

For Yuval-Davis et al. (2006) notions of belonging refer to patterns of trust and confidence; to accumulate a sense of belonging, Ibrahim must first gain the trust of the 'white' characters. Their lack of trust, in turn, represents an absence of recognition. While such lack of recognition has little to do with Ibrahim's Muslim 'otherness' per se, it nonetheless adds to the complex dynamic created by the accumulation of capital in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*. As Hage (1998) argues, the 'aristocratic ideal' contradicts and limits the dynamic of accumulation that constitutes the national field. The 'white' characters thus remain in power in spite of the social or economic success Ibrahim accumulates. As Hage (1998, pp.64-65) explains:

> … no matter how much capital one acquires through active accumulation, the very fact of this acquired capital being an accumulation leads to its devaluing relative to those who posit themselves to have inherited it or to possess it innately without having to accumulate it.

Capital accumulation works to mitigate 'otherness' so that secular Muslims such as Ibrahim are able to exist within the national field. However, it also denotes an Orientalist logic that implies no matter how much capital is accumulated, or 'otherness' mitigated, the Muslim will remain an 'other', and thus cannot be 'successful' or occupy a position of 'success' or dominance in the multicultural nation (Hage 1998, Zine 2002, Humphrey 2009, Roose 2013, Chopra 2015). As Said (1978, p.5) explains with reference to Orientalism, the relationship between

the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' is a relationship of power, of domination, and of varying degrees of complex hegemony. The 'other' is consistently Orientalised in some way, and while Ibrahim is depicted as a secular Muslim in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* aspects of his Muslim 'otherness' nonetheless hover in the background (Zine 2002).

The dramatic structure of *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* relies on Muslim 'otherness' despite the salient focus on secularisation. In Nine's commercial context, as mentioned previously, Muslim 'otherness' is repeatedly presented in sensationalist and theatrical ways for the entertainment of a predominantly imagined 'white' audience (Said 1978, McIver 2009, Phillips 2011). In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, the use of speech and language particular exemplify sensationalised aspects of Muslim 'otherness' that are Orientalised and appropriated. Whilst the majority of characters speak English (some with thick Australian accents), the conversations that Ibrahim has with his Lebanese friends sometimes include popular Arabic terms such as 'yallah' (indicating impatience), 'zub' (referring to male genitals), and 'habib' (meaning 'beloved' and often used to refer to a friend).

According to Tabar (2007, pp.161-163), 'ways of speaking' are commonly associated with men of Arabic and/or Muslim backgrounds, often used as 'slang language' to create a bond between those who share similar ethnic experiences (see also Rieschild 2007). The Arabic terminology used in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* operates as an element of in-betweenness because it blends or merges two separate languages to create a hybrid. For Rieschild (2007) and Tabar (2007), these linguistic practices also limit the ways Muslims can identify with the host nation because it asserts 'difference' through 'language'. In *Underbelly: The Golden Mile,* such language is used in the same way, when Hammer calls Ibrahim a 'zub' after Ibrahim explains that he no longer wants to go back to school. The scene is intertwined with another where Ibrahim punches an Anglo-looking boy at his high school after he was called a 'dirty Leb'.

The correlation between the two scenes formulates what Tabar (2007, p.162) argues is an 'ethnic comradeship' between the ethnic characters that binds them, while at the same time drawing a line between *them* and the 'white' Australians.

In multiple scenes terms such as 'habib' are exchanged between the Muslim characters during social activities, whilst used by the 'white' characters to demean the Muslims. Tabar (2007) argues that the term 'habib' is complex because its meaning is not fixed and may be contextualised depending on the scenario. It is used by the Muslim characters in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* to symbolise friendship, but may also be used as an insult to refer to someone as a 'gangster' or 'try-hard' (Tabar 2007). The 'white' characters in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* deliberately misuse the term 'habib'. In episode three, for instance, when Ibrahim is working as a doorman of a club, a 'white' Australian male attempts to get inside and Ibrahim stops him. The 'white' Australian boy then frustratingly says, 'what is it members only or some shit *habib*?' In this instance, the term is used in a derogatory sense to demean Ibrahim based on his supposedly visible ethnicity/culture/religion.

Many of the references to Muslim 'otherness' in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* are also constructed through stereotypes. According to Hall (1997), stereotyping is one of the dominant ways in which representations racialise and epitomise the 'other'. Stereotypes reduce figures to 'a few, simple, essential characteristics' repeated through discourse and therefore assumed as 'fixed in nature' (Hall 1997b, p.247). As this thesis argues, Orientalist texts create representations of Muslim 'otherness' through essentialist imagery. In the first episode of *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, while Ibrahim is recovering in the hospital from a stabbing, he asks Hammer where the 'boys' are. Hammer replies, 'everyone is at the Mosque praying to Allah for not sending you to paradise'. 'Mosque', 'Allah', and 'paradise' are used here as Orientalist points of difference that frame common (mis)conceptions of, and associations with, Islam or Muslim-ness (Shaheen 2008, Rane, Ewart & Abdalla 2010, Phillips 2011, Alsultany 2012, Chopra 2015).

Orientalist stereotypes serve as a reminder of Ibrahim's 'otherness' in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, despite his status as a secular and successful Muslim (Brown 2010). Incorporating Muslim 'otherness' offers a subtle means of Orientalising the Muslim characters and narratives throughout the series. As Said (1998, p.6) argues, the 'other' is Orientalised not only given the representation as 'Oriental' but also because it 'could be; submitted to 'being Oriental'. The cultural role of the 'other' in the West connects Orientalist ideals with the logic of power.

Lingering 'otherness' in *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* thus undermines Ibrahim's ability to find economic success and accumulate cultural and symbolic capital in spaces of in-betweenness, because he is unable to attain a position of power or dominance (Hage 1998). As Hage (1998) argues, the 'other' can figuratively accumulate symbolic capital, as a means of belonging, where that capital must first be recognised by the imagined 'white centre'. Ibrahim's character on *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* is thus represented as in constant search for recognition and approval from those 'white' characters that are able to acknowledge his success as a Muslim. Consequently, this underscores the limits of constructed narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for secular Muslims.

6.5 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has identified the ways 'in-betweenness' limits the production of narratives of inclusiveness and belonging in representations of Muslims on network Nine. 'In-betweenness' is recognised at the point where Muslim 'otherness' can be mitigated, enabling 'whiteness' to pertain a (discursively formed) centralised position in the multicultural nation (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Lentin & Titley 2008, Mishra & Shirazi 2010). For Hutnyk (2005), processes of in-betweenness denote the fusion of two or more cultures, where both are perceived to be of equal value without one dominating the other. 'In-betweenness' is thus perceived as an ambivalent, albeit multicultural space, which encourages processes of cultural or religious hybridisation as a measure of inclusiveness and belonging (Bhabha 1996, Ang 2003). The analysis in this chapter evidences that these processes of hybridity are subject to dominant racial and Orientalist ideals that enforce polarisations of 'otherness' and 'whiteness in the nation. Subsequently, this implies that Muslims are unable to productively exist as hybrid 'others' in the national space (Jensen 2008, Woodlock 2010; 2011, Alam 2012, Moosavi 2015).

The analysis of *A Current Affair* and *Underbelly: The Golden Mile* has underscored the significance of 'otherness' and 'whiteness' in constructions of in-betweenness. While 'in-betweenness' attempts to preserve a multicultural outlook in processes of hybridisation, it distinguishes between Muslims who are more assimilative, and thus more 'white' or Australian than others (Hage 1998).

Processes of in-betweenness particularly recognise those Muslims who are able to moderate Muslim 'otherness' to make room for qualities of 'whiteness' and accumulate a sense of belonging (Hage 1998, Ang 2003). However, as this chapter has argued, this logic reduces the visibility of Muslim 'otherness' so as to render it less 'threatening' in the Australian multicultural space, while simultaneously allowing the nation to perceive itself as inclusive of that non-threatening 'otherness' (Ang 2003, Brown 2010, Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011, Chopra 2015). These discursive constructions determine the significance of 'in-betweenness' in promoting representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for some Muslims. Yet these narratives are limited through the reproduction of Orientalist discourse that works to polarise 'otherness' and 'whiteness', as a means of constructing exclusion over inclusion in the multicultural nation.

The next chapter extends the critical excavation of 'otherness' and 'whiteness' in multicultural contexts, by addressing the theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism'. The chapter examines the representation of Muslims on network Ten and investigates the ways Muslim 'otherness' produces value in discourses of multiculturalism, where it is perceived to 'enrich' the imagined 'white nation' (Hage 1997; 1998).

Chapter Seven: Muslims and 'Cosmo-multiculturalism' on Network Ten

> As Australia opens its boarders (sic) to an increasingly diverse population, this also requires that Australians themselves open their minds to include new and diverse lifestyles, foods, cultural traditions and values.
>
> (Bastian 2012, p.56)

> It is this recognition that we are a "multicultural community in all our diversity" that is evaded by white multiculturalism, for it is in the opposition between valuing diversity and being diverse that the White nation fantasy operates to reproduce itself.
>
> (Hage 1998, p.139)

7.1 Introduction

The mitigation of Muslim 'otherness' on network Nine has identified the ways in which Muslims accumulate belonging in order to co-exist as an 'other' in dominant 'white' and multicultural spaces (Hage 1998, Brown 2010). The theme of 'in-betweenness' explored in the previous chapter highlighted the importance of mitigation in alleviating Muslim 'otherness' to promote representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. Yet the moderation of 'otherness' problematises discourses of belonging, because it only minimises aspects of Muslim 'otherness' that supposedly 'threaten' normalised 'whiteness' in the nation, and do not necessarily shift ideological positions of the Muslim 'other' in Western contexts (Said 1978, Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015). Nevertheless, practices of in-betweenness encourage the mitigation of Muslim 'otherness' in similar ways to 'cosmo-multiculturalism', where such 'otherness' is enhanced and perceived as a form of cultural enrichment (and not 'threat') in the national multicultural space, as explored in this chapter.

'Cosmo-multiculturalism' emphasises the presence of ethnicity, culture, and 'otherness' in the nation and depicts these as objects of consumption, shaped of discourses of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism (Hage 1997, p.99, see also Lentin & Titley 2008). It suggests that Muslims (as an 'other') are able to exist comfortably within the nation without their presumed 'otherness' serving as a 'threat'. In the cosmo-multicultural framework, the ethnic/Muslim 'other' is rendered as a valuable resource for multicultural experiences in dominant 'white'

societies. It is particularly explored in this chapter as a theme that constructs narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on network Ten, by examining two Muslim-Australian professionals on two programs, Waleed Aly on *The Project* and Amina El Shafei on *MasterChef Australia*.

This chapter argues that 'cosmo-multiculturalism' produces representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, through the recognition of Muslim 'otherness' as a source of multicultural enrichment in the imagined nation (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997, Lentin & Titley 2008). As Chapters Four, Five and Six have argued, some multicultural contexts fixate on and illuminate 'otherness' in moderate ways that allow for the Muslim to comfortably exist as a non-threatening 'other', allowing the nation to imagine itself as multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and heterogeneous (Hage 1997, Ahmed 2000). It is within these imagined constructions that 'otherness' is presented as a valuable resource in the multicultural nation. However, these instances are also limiting, because they subject the Muslim 'other' to Orientalising processes of exoticism (Nguyen 2005). As Lentin and Titley (2008, p.13) argue, 'images and celebrations of "diversity" are congruent with the aesthetic cosmopolitanism of globalised consumerism which sources and refracts images and symbols of diversity with eager promiscuity'. Fixating on Muslim 'otherness' thus reinvigorates 'difference' in Australia's multicultural complex, through discursive measures that highlight Muslim 'foreignness' to construct it as incompatible with, but paramount for, the 'white' Australian nation (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013).

The following section introduces the theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism' and its significance in influencing representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. This chapter then briefly summarises the history and background of network Ten as a commercial television network that advances cosmo-multicultural contexts through programing. The latter half of this chapter addresses practices of cosmo-multiculturalism through the analysis of two Muslim-Australians on two programs, Waleed Aly on *The Project* and Amina El Shafei on *MasterChef Australia*.

7.1.1 'Cosmo-multiculturalism' and belonging

As has been discussed in Chapter One, liberal views of Australian multiculturalism stress the significance of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in framing a heterogeneous Australian identity and culture (Hawkins 1996, Hage 1998, Batrouney 2002, Burchell 2001, Smaill 2002, Johanson & Glow 2007, Pardy & Lee 2011). These views underscore the ways in which the nation supposedly benefits from ethnic, cultural, or religious diversity (such as lifestyle, food, music, cultural traditions) by promoting the 'mixing' of migrant and dominant 'white' cultures (Hage 1997, Ang 2003, Lentin 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Bastian 2012). In this way, multiculturalism centralises cultural fusions by eliminating separatism, and rendering the national space as multicultural and inclusive, less fearful of migrants (or 'others'). For Hage (1997, p.136) this discourages negative perceptions of ethnic diversity regarding fears of 'being swamped' by 'foreigners', and enhances views that conceptualise 'otherness' as a valued or prized possession within the nation.

Stratton and Ang (1994, pp.151-152) argue that such understandings of Australian multiculturalism present a 'public fantasy' that encourages the acceptance of ethnics or 'others' by marketing ethnic diversity (or 'otherness') as enriching and cultivating an Australian identity, rather than annihilating it (see also Lentin & Titley 2008). Similarly Hage (1998, pp.117-118) argues:

> The theme of cultural enrichment is one of the key themes of Australian multiculturalism. Its main emphasis is the recognition of the value of the various cultures present in Australia and the value of the interaction between them.

These discursive abstractions of cultural enrichment signify positive elements of ethnic 'otherness' through the promotion of 'cultural embracement' over 'cultural rejection'. However, such positive acknowledgment of ethnicity occurs precisely at the point where 'otherness' is glamorised and positioned as an object of desire for the dominant white group (Hage 1997, Nguyen 2005). As Chapter Five has argued, desires entice the 'white subject' in a multicultural setting through the appropriation of 'otherness' as a form of 'enrichment' that advances multicultural experiences for both the cultured and the non-cultured subjects (Hage 1997; 1998, Lentin 2005, Morgan et al. 2005, p.101, Lentin & Titley 2008). Framing

‘otherness’ (or the ‘other’) as a resource for ‘enrichment’ follows Hage’s (1997, p.112) understanding of cosmo-multiculturalism as a space for the dominant white culture to develop an appreciation for particular ethnic cultural forms (such as lifestyles, music, food). In particular, this appreciation occurs in a setting where very little recognition has previously been given to ‘ethnic value’. Consequently, the ethnic ‘other’ feels valued and appreciated in figurative terms (within the ‘white nation’), thus shaping notions of inclusiveness and belonging in multicultural contexts.

This chapter explores Hage’s (1997) notion of cosmo-multiculturalism, as a theme that encourages and generates narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. For Hage (1997, p.100), cosmo-multiculturalism promotes inter-ethnic interactions based on power relations, which highlight the availability of ‘otherness’ as an object of appreciation (see also Lentin & Titley 2008). It presents exotic versions of Muslim ‘otherness’, whether in relation to food, dance, music, or religious/cultural traditions. As Ryan (2012) argues, the point is to educate ‘white’ Australians about Muslims and Islam by drawing on cultural themes that counteract Orientalist perceptions of Muslims in Australia. Subsequently, conceptual processes of cosmo-multiculturalism render specific aspects of Muslim ‘otherness’ as valuable to the overall multicultural experience of ‘white’ Australians in the nation (Hage 1997; 1998, Ang 2003, Lentin & Titley 2008).

The central element of cosmo-multiculturalism concerns the desire for ‘otherness’ in multicultural spaces, framed through the symbolic consumption of ethnicity and ‘otherness’. Hage (1997) argues that cosmo-multiculturalism is harnessed by imaginary or virtual (over real-time) ‘inter-ethnic’ engagements that encourage ethnic acceptance by maximising the value of ‘otherness’ in the national space (see also Stratton & Ang 1994, Elder 2007). Specifically:

> Far from putting “migrant cultures”, even in their “soft” sense (i.e. through food, dance, etc.), on an equal footing with the dominant culture, the theme conjures the images of a multicultural fair where the various stalls of neatly positioned migrant cultures are exhibited and where the real Australians, bearers of the White nation and positioned in the central role of the touring subjects, walk around and enrich themselves (Hage 1998, p.118).

Cosmo-multiculturalism thus centralises the dominant ‘white subject’ in the multicultural nation. This chapter follows Hage’s definition, by arguing that

Muslim 'otherness' is appreciated and valued as a form of national and cultural enrichment. It is also perceived (by the mainstream society) as a form of 'otherness' that doesn't impede on the ideological and discursive implications that centralise 'whiteness' in the nation (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997; 1998, Elder 2007, Woodlock 2011). As has already been established in the previous chapters, the perception of such non-threatening 'otherness' occurs at the point of mitigation, where Muslims are first made 'moderate' and thus more likely to be valued as 'other' in Australia's multicultural context (Aly & Green 2008, Roose 2013).

This chapter examines the ways cosmo-multiculturalism promotes narratives of multicultural inclusion through two contingencies. The first concerns the production of 'moderate Muslims' by drawing on network Ten's appointment of Waleed Aly as a permanent co-host on *The Project*. The second addresses how processes of moderation produce perceptions of 'enrichment' in multicultural spaces, particularly concerning the appreciation of ('non-threatening') Muslim 'otherness' through exoticised products such as 'ethnic food' on *MasterChef Australia*. The analysis of both programs illustrates the critical role of cosmo-multiculturalism in representing Muslim 'otherness' as valuable in the nation. In these representations, the 'white nation' also imagines itself as multicultural and thus *open* to difference (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Lentin 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008). This setting of cosmo-multiculturalism is particularly conceptualised by network Ten in presenting a focus on ethnic diversity and promoting cosmopolitanism as an important part of the network's ethos.

7.2 Background: Network Ten

Network Ten (or Ten) originally launched as ATV-0 in 1964, eight years after networks Seven and Nine (Flew & Cunningham 2004, Flew & Gilmour 2006). Ten's purpose was to expand the competitive landscape of Australia's commercial television and diffuse public dissatisfaction with imported material. The network drafted contracts that assured fifty per cent of content produced in the first twelve months of its launch would be Australian-sourced (Flew & Gilmour 2006). Ten differed from the other commercial networks in its attempt to produce content

described as being in 'the best interest' of a diverse Australian audience (Green 2001).

Ten struggled to compete with the other two commercial networks throughout the 1980s. Viewership declined, and the network went into receivership in 1990 (Stockbridge 2000). This prompted Ten to review audience preferences in order to remain competitive, by re-evaluating how audiences were constructed in Australia (Green 2001, p.50). According to Green (2001), Ten particularly sought to differentiate itself within the Australian television environment by actively targeting youth audiences and broadcasting popular imported[43] content with entertainment value (see also Stockbridge 2000). Although such programing was mostly American, it became popular among the younger audiences in Australia ensuring Ten held the largest commercial share of the 16-24 age groups throughout the 1990s (Stockbridge 2000).

Green (2001, p.51) argues that these changes to programing was a tactic adopted by Ten in 'actively seeking' to identify itself as an 'alternative to the other mainstream television entities' (primarily Nine and Seven). The importation of American and British content, and the broadcasting of localised Australian content, was popular among Australian youth, and became a valuable and quantifiable entity for the network (Green 2001, p.51). Much of this imported content included music, drama, and popular culture that younger audiences in Australia had already been exposed and attracted to.

Ten's youth focus also encouraged the network to produce a range of programs that have reflected a diverse Australian nation. In order to avoid a 'white washed' label, as is the case with Seven and Nine, Ten has attempted to represented ethnically diverse Australians across its network. Drama programs such as *The Secret Life of Us* (2001-2005)[44] have developed narratives that engage with ethnic and multicultural themes, while comedic, game shows such as *Good News Week*

[43] Some of this programing included *Baywatch* and *The Simpsons*

[44] *The Secret Life of Us* (2001-2005) is a Logie Award winning drama program, which aired on Ten. It was recognised as a 'landmark program' in the history of ethnic media representations in Australia for its incorporation of the Indigenous Australia character Kelly Lewis, played by Deborah Mailman (see Moses 2002).

(1996-2012)[45], *Thank God You're Here*[46] (2006-2007), and *Have You Been Paying Attention* (2013-current) have regularly included Australian media personalities, writers, and comedians from non-English speaking backgrounds. Furthermore, as explored below, Ten's *MasterChef Australia* stresses the importance of ethnic diversity in the nation through its focus on food and culinary cultures, as a number of contestants across the series have been from diverse cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds (Lewis 2011).

More recently, Ten became the first television network to appoint a Muslim-Australian as a permanent co-host on a primetime commercial news and current affairs program. In December 2014, it was announced that Waleed Aly would co-host *The Project* with Carrie Bickmore and Peter Helliar, replacing both Rove McManus and Charlie Pickering. Following the announcement, viewers took to social media to express opinions regarding Ten's decision, with many commenting that Aly was 'the perfect choice' given his experiences as a professional journalist and academic. Aly's 'moderate views'[47] as a Muslim, were particularly drawn on and divided viewers. Many perceived Aly's appointment as shifting the multicultural landscape of Australian television, while others questioned his 'fit' in the program due to his visible Muslim ('other') identity (Stephens 2014).

7.3 Case 1: Waleed Aly and *The Project*

As mentioned earlier, this chapter is concerned with the way that cosmo-multiculturalism inspires particular perceptions of Muslim 'otherness' on network Ten. *The Project* is a program that embodies particular conceptualised notions of cosmo-multiculturalism by promoting diversity through expression, views, and opinions. *The Project* was first broadcast on July 20, 2009[48], marketed as 'delivering news differently' by producing alternative views in its consideration of news and current affairs content. According to D'Cruz and Weerakkody

[45] *Good News Week* originally ran from 1996-1999 on the ABC, being bought and later axed by Ten in 2000. The program was later picked up again in 2008.
[46] *Thank God You're Here* was picked up by the network Seven in 2009.
[47] Waleed Aly has often been described as a conservative and 'Leftie' (see Stephens 2014).
[48] Originally titled *The 7pm Project,* it had a 30-minute 7pm timeslot and was renamed 'The Project' in 2011 and replaced 'serious' current affairs program *6:30 with George Negus*. This occurred after a boom in ratings for *The 7pm Project*. The name change occurred as the program would no longer be broadcast at 7pm but rather at 6.30pm.

(2015), *The Project* establishes more open and contextual ways of presenting and consuming news, particularly amongst Ten's target audience – Australian youth.

The Project's format is appealing to younger audiences in Australia, as it incorporates comedy production and serious news content within a panel-like setting, similar to that of SBS's *Salam Café* (see Chapter Four). Contrary to traditional commercial current affairs programs, *The Project* aims to 'join conversations in living rooms around the country' and cater to 'everyday Australians' through discussions of contemporary socio-political issues outside dominant tabloid structures (D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). *The Project* negates traditional tabloid formats and replaces them with chat-show style segments, to present news content in a light-hearted and 'easy to digest' manner (D'Cruz and Weerakkody 2015, p.147)

This format enables *The Project* to produce an ideal environment, where notions of 'cultural enrichment' (as deployed through practices of cosmo-multiculturalism) develop and are constructed. Nurturing such a context is significant not only in the exploration of cosmo-multiculturalism, but also in considering Aly's position as a Muslim-Australian on *The Project*. As the analysis below illustrates, Aly's contributions on *The Project* are rendered as valuable for the dissemination of multicultural views in the ethnically diverse nation, and he is modelled as a 'moderate Muslim', whose views and concerns align with that of the 'white nation' (Roose 2013, Schottmann 2013, Peucker et al. 2014). Ultimately, processes of moderation present instances where the Muslim 'other' is perceived as 'non-threatening', and thus appreciated within multicultural Australia, encouraging inclusive modes of belonging, as illustrated below.

7.3.1 'Cosmo-multiculturalism', 'moderate Muslims', and belonging

Cosmo-multiculturalism produces moderate and glamorised perceptions of 'otherness' within the nation, in order to preserve notions of inclusion and belonging. These constructions of 'moderate Muslims' subsequently create 'good citizens' in Australia, who practice a 'preferred' form of Islam, which is deemed different enough to solidify multicultural principles, but remains similar enough to align with dominant cultural and national norms (Aly and Green 2009). As discussed in Chapter Six, the process of moderation ensures that the Muslim

'other' exists within the nation without challenging the hegemonic structures of multicultural society that repeatedly favour 'whiteness' (Peucker et al. 2014, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). These discursive frameworks of moderation suggest that (figuratively speaking) some Muslims are considered *more trustworthy*, particularly those with a prestigious reputation such as Aly on *The Project*.

According to D'Cruz and Weerakkody (2015, p.143), Aly is arguably the 'most visible and vocal Australian public intellectual from a non-Anglo-Australian background'. This is reflected by his 'ubiquitous and telegenic' media presence[49]. Since 2001, Aly has engaged in public discourse through his role as a journalist and columnist in the national newspaper, *The Age.* Much of Aly's commentary has focused on issues such as human rights, multiculturalism, and terrorism, for which he has been recognised, winning the 2005 Walkley Award[50] in the category of Commentary, Analysis, Opinion and Critique (O'Malley 2011). Given this already successful career, Aly was named one of *The Bulletin Magazine's* 'Smart 100' in 2007 and has been a spokesperson for the Islamic Council of Victoria throughout the early 2000s. This saw Aly frequently debate Muslim-related issues on various media platforms in Australia (Domjen et al. 2014).

Such a glorified media presence has been critical in establishing Aly as a suitable candidate for *The Project*, particularly in acquiring a sense of authority as a Muslim 'other', to address socio-political issues relating to both Muslim and non-Muslim Australians (D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015, p.148). However, the glorification of Aly's esteemed media profile concerns less the acts of granting authority, and more the ways his profile has been discursively constructed and enhanced in a post-9/11 context – a time when Muslims in the West have been figuratively excluded from national imaginings and assumed to be security risks and threats in/to the nation (Poynting & Noble 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007, Noble 2008, Aly 2009, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Dunn 2014, Chopra 2015).

[49] Aly's media presence has crossed radio, television, and online platforms.
[50] The Walkley Awards are presented by the Walkey Foundation in Australia, and recognise excellence in journalism. Sir William Gaston Walkley first incepted the Awards in 1956. Please see www.Walkely.com/about for more information.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Aly was one of the few Muslim-Australian media personalities frequently asked to diffuse domestic fears of terrorism and Islamic cultural practices that had generated moral panics and media frenzy. Subsequently, Aly became a 'go-to' Muslim in the Australian media, commonly encouraged to speak and comment on behalf of entire Muslim communities in the nation (and the West) (Roose 2013, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). Like other Muslim spokespeople, Aly condemned much of the violence and attempted to disassociate Islam and terrorism, instead preaching for peace and unity amongst Muslims and non-Muslims in the nation (Jackubowicz 2007, Roose 2013). In doing so, Aly has been recognised as a 'moderate Muslim', where his thoughts, opinions, and behaviours align with those of the dominant ('white') nation (Aly & Green 2008).

For Roose (2013), the label 'moderate Muslim' is a discursive construct that presents particular *types* of Muslims as more acceptable in the multicultural nation. These constructions of moderates create distinctions between trustworthy and non-trustworthy, or 'good' and 'bad' Muslims (Mamdani 2002). On *The Project*, Aly frequently interrogates those Muslims perceived to be un-trustworthy or ill-mannered, in order to warrant his own 'moderate' or 'good' status. In these instances, Aly is positioned as in disagreement with 'bad Muslims', via questioning that draws attention to their 'bad' actions and behaviours as Muslims living in Australia. A segment that was broadcast in June 2015 exemplifies this. The hosts of *The Project* interviewed a young Muslim male named Zaky Mallah[51], who has made frequent controversial appearances in the Australian media discussing the radicalisation of young Muslims. During the interview on *The Project*, Aly questions Mallah and encourages him to 'take responsibility' of his bad mannerisms, whilst simultaneously isolating Mallah as a negative representative of Muslims in Australia (Abusson 2015). Speaking directly to Mallah, Aly says:

[51] Mallah was the first young Muslim-Australian male to be charged under newly established Terrorism laws in Australia in 2005, but later acquitted by a jury. In June 2015, Mallah appeared on ABC's political program, *Q&A,* explicitly blaming the Australian Liberal Government for 'pushing young Muslims' in Australia to join and fight with radical and extremist groups in the Middle East (see Smethurst 2015 for more information).

> …your intervention has made this about *you* and about radicalisation in the Muslim community and about the fact that words such as yours drive people towards that radicalisation…So I wonder if you are aware of the fact that you're actually…it seems…doing a lot more damage here than you are help…(emphasis added).

Aly expresses his concern about Mallah's behaviour by underscoring the 'damage' caused (by Mallah) to the Muslim community. Aly repeatedly disputes Mallah's views by interjecting that they are 'damaging' to the nation and therefore 'bad'. In this way, Aly is explicitly represented as in opposition to Mallah, by aligning his opinions (of Mallah as a 'bad Muslim') with those of the other panellists on *The Project*, who claim that Mallah is an irresponsible and 'concerning' Muslim-Australian.

The rift between Aly and Mallah highlights binaries in which classifications of 'good' and 'bad' Muslims are distinguished. According to Mamdani (2002, p.767), the intensification of Muslim 'otherness' in contemporary public discourse means that 'we are now told to distinguish between good Muslims and bad Muslims…not between criminals and civic citizens, who both happen to be Muslims, but between good Muslims and bad Muslims…' The 'good' Muslim is depicted as liberal or secular, and able to conform to 'our' culture and 'way of life', whereas the 'bad' Muslim retains a motionless position of 'threat' in/to 'our' society (Mamdani 2002, Hodge & O'Carroll 2006, Ali & Sonn 2010, Roose 2013). Ali and Sonn (2010) argue that the 'good' Muslim is defined as 'moderate' and perceived as 'modern', simultaneously positioned as someone who aligns with the dominant 'white' society, therefore living similar lives and sharing the same concerns as other Australians. Hence, 'moderate Muslims', such as Aly on *The Project,* are presented as acceptable *types* of Muslims in Australia.

'Good' Muslims are also identified visually because they conform to an Australian culture, presented as more 'like us' (Elder 2007, Ali & Sonn 2010). During the interview between Aly and Mallah on *The Project*, images of both these men are positioned side by side as to exacerbate the essential and constructed differences between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims. Aly is well groomed, shaved-clean, wearing a suit and tie, while Mallah has a beard, wears a tracksuit and cap by the sports label Nike. According to Tabar (2007, p.166), this is a typical style of dress that has been associated with ethnic youths and particularly

with those young Muslim men discussed in Chapters Three and Four, in reference to crime and gangs. By dressing in this way, Mallah is automatically associated with discursive representations that position him as, not only a 'threatening other', but also as a different *type* of Muslim to Aly.

Scenes such as these reflect and augment Aly's ostensible 'moderate', 'trustworthy' or 'good' status on *The Project.* This is in reference to how Muslim men have often been presented in media and socio-political debate – as potential 'threats' and subjects involved in crime and religious violence (Grewal 2007; Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007, Dagistanli 2007, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Roose 2012, p.157, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Chopra 2015, Tufail 2015). As a news presenter on *The Project*, Aly already possesses an esteemed position on Australian television. According to Turner (2005), news presenters hold a sense of prestige by presenting themselves as spokespeople for the 'common citizen', or what McIver (2009) identifies as the 'everyday Australian', expressing concerns and opinions on their behalf.

On *The Project*, Aly figuratively embodies this construction of the trustworthy news presenter. This is exemplified by the 'something we should talk about' segment(s) where Aly speaks directly to the camera about critical issues in 'our' Australian society. Throughout 2015, for example, Aly addressed issues (in these segments) concerning domestic violence, the urgency of preserving iconic Australian reef life, the protection of human rights for asylum seekers and refugees, and threats of terrorism. In the majority of cases, Aly has stressed that these are issues concerning 'all Australians', and particularly uses phrases such as 'we', 'us', and 'our' to shape imaginings of national unification (Ang 2003, McIver 2009). In one segment, where Aly expresses concerns about terrorism, he states that 'we need to come together' to 'fight' the terrorists who mean 'all of us' harm.

Emphasising terrorism as an issue concerning 'us' illuminates the ways in which Aly utilises his 'moderate' status to engage in critical discussions concerning the nation on *The Project*. In this way, Aly seeks to serve the 'whole community' and pursue the 'common good' of the nation (Peucker et al. 2014, p.285). His views become a source of value as they reflect the opinions of both (moderate) Muslim

and non-Muslim Australians. For Roose (2013, p.484) the utilisation of such a moderate status signifies a form of 'capital accretion' that presents Aly with authorisation to speak (as a Muslim 'other') on behalf of the nation on *The Project*. This is mostly the case given Aly's prestigious media profile that ultimately enables him to enter, what Hage (1998) describes as Australia's 'national aristocracy'. This framework deems possible for 'dark-skinned' people like Aly to acquire a sense of national belonging by engaging with and discussing public debates on media platforms such as *The Project,* and this occurs despite their visible 'otherness' (Hage 1998, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015).

As previous chapters have argued, the accumulation of capital means Muslims are ostensibly recognised as an appreciated 'other' in the nation. Hage (1997) argues that such appreciation is the cornerstone of cosmo-multiculturalism, where fixations on 'otherness' are essential for discursive constructions of the multicultural nation. These constructions further allow the nation to depict itself as culturally rich (Lentin 2005). Cosmo-multiculturalism is thus concerned with showcasing the value of ethnic diversity in Australia, by enforcing a state of 'being multicultural' rather than 'having multiculturalism' (Hage 1998, p.140). This conceptualised impression of multicultural Australia, establishes a unified national 'we' that inspires ways in which 'whites' and 'non-whites' are able to fuse a 'consubstantial state of being'.

Aly's engagement with the ('white') co-hosts on *The Project* enables modes of representational inclusivity and belonging. Throughout the program, Aly consistently engages in light-hearted humour and the exchange of jokes with the co-hosts, Carrie Bickmore and Peter Helliar. Cosmo-multiculturalism establishes that friendly interaction such as these reflect critical symbolic engagements between 'whites' and 'non-whites' in the multicultural nation. As Hage (1998, p.55) argues, interaction with the dominant mainstream society presents frameworks within which the Muslim 'other' can accumulate belonging and be granted access to a sense of 'privilege', by aligning with specific mainstream perceptions (see also Klocker 2014). This is more so the case for 'moderate Muslims', as they are able to exist as a Muslim 'other' (albeit a 'good Muslim other') perceived as 'non-threatening' because they are unlike the 'bad Muslims' in the nation (Mamdani 2002, Ali & Sonn 2010, p.29).

Inter-ethnic engagements and interactions on *The Project* thus construct a 'friendly' environment that reflects the cosmo-multicultural context presented on network Ten. As mentioned earlier, *The Project* discusses news content through a panel format, to allow for easy comprehension and greater engagement with younger audiences. According to Turner (2005, p.88) this is an alternative way of delivering news, which is 'less constructed, less self-interested and more socially and politically engaged' for younger audiences. It produces a 'friendly' environment that breaks down, personalises, and demystifies critical societal issues (such as the ones mentioned above), and presents them through conventions of comedy for easy comprehension.

As D'Cruz and Weerakkody (2015, p.149) suggest, '*The Project*'s primary conceit involves maintaining a casual convivial tone; it works hard to create the sense that the viewers are witness to a conversation among friends'. Much like *Salam Café* (see Chapter Four), the hosts on *The Project* play the roles of 'personalities' and exchange jokes between one another as if among friends (Dreher 2009, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). In an episode where the program encountered some technical difficulties, Aly and the other panellists attempted to 'act out' the news and poked fun at each other's 'poor acting abilities'. In another episode, where political commentator Andrew Bolt engaged in a heated debate with Aly, Bolt references the 'friendly' environment constructed by *The Project* by exclaiming, 'we're supposed to be cheery and friendly on this panel!'

This construction of a 'friendly' environment complements and shapes discourses of belonging that enable Aly to exist as a 'non-threatening' Muslim 'other' on *The Project*. This 'friendliness' thus develops representational narratives that stress inclusiveness and belonging, by projecting emblematic inter-ethnic engagement (between the co-hosts and the audience) through a conceptualised safe and comfortable cosmo-multicultural setting. The constructed 'friendliness' on *The Project*, naturalises Aly's sense of belonging as a co-host, as it represents his moderate Muslim 'otherness' as a wholesome part of the nation's ostensible multicultural ethos.

7.3.2 'Moderate Muslims' and conditional belonging

While Aly's role as a 'moderate Muslim' in the cosmo-multicultural setting of *The Project* inspires notions of 'cultural enrichment', it also reinforces Orientalist processes of 'otherness'. Symbolically valuing Muslim 'otherness' through practices of cosmo-multiculturalism produces emblematic relationships between dominant 'white subjects' and the Muslim 'other'. These relationships are further masked by multiculturalism, where the 'white subject' dominates the 'other' in the national space (Hage 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Lentin & Titley 2008). As Hage (1998, p.140) argues, multiculturalism is perceived as a notion that 'simply does not affect the nature of the white we in the nation' but remains 'extrinsic to it'. The section above has illustrated that Muslim 'otherness' must be moderated to be culturally valued in such multicultural constructions, not only limiting representational inclusiveness and belonging for the Muslim 'other', but encouraging divisive practices (between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims) that ensure 'otherness' continues to circulate throughout (and 'threaten') the 'white nation'.

A primary function of 'moderate Muslims' is to promote 'calming points of potential conflict' between 'us' and 'them' (Jakubowicz 2007, p.271). As has been suggested in previous chapters, the moderate Muslim's voice is represented as secular and used to counter perceptions of Muslims as being 'un-Australian' (Aly & Green 2008, Peucker et al. 2014). These moderating processes establish segregations within Muslim communities that deem some Muslims as 'moderate' and therefore 'good', while others remain 'threats' in/to the national space. The interrogation of 'bad Muslims' such as Zaky Mallah on *The Project*, illustrates the ways in which 'moderate Muslims' (such as Aly) enter the national field as an acceptable or preferred *type* of Muslim in Australia.

Aly's moderate status reflects the ways that Muslims can display 'courage and creativity' through active contribution to national debates concerning both Muslim and wider Australian communities (Roose 2012, p.157). For Schottmann (2013, p.420) Aly is a representative of a new generation of Australian Muslims that insert themselves into national conversations and become valued as 'national citizens' who 'simply happen to be Muslim'. While Schottmann (2013) suggests that Aly's Muslim identity can be viewed as an addition to an already prestigious

media career, he neglects to highlight the complexities such constructions establish for Muslims in the multicultural nation. It mostly problematises notions of belonging, as Muslims can never 'simply' exist as an 'other' within the multicultural space. Labels such as 'moderate', 'secular', or 'good' are particularly problematic because they highlight the paradoxical issues that concern Muslim belonging in Australia. As D'Cruz & Weerakkody (2015, p.144) suggest:

> Aly is a paradoxical figure who embodies tensions generated by his religious and cultural background. He is an "insider" as a consequence of having grown up in Australia without a distinguishing "ethnic accent". Further, his interest and participation in Australian sporting and musical culture mark him as a migrant well integrated into mainstream Australian society. Yet he is an "outsider" in Australia as a person of colour and a Muslim post-9/11.

Labelling Muslims as 'moderate' is also problematic, as this identifies that there are 'exceptions' for Muslims to belong in/to the Australian mainstream. The label 'moderate' suggests that Islam is a religion where distinctively 'immoderate and warlike' people exist, as the term 'moderate' is often used to emphasise a peaceful side to the Muslim population and Islamic religion (Smith 2013, p.41). As Smith (2013, p.40) argues, 'you only need moderate and peaceful spokespersons if you think much of the Muslim population is potentially prone or susceptible to having the opposite tendencies'. In this view, Muslims become categorised through binaries that segregate good and evil, or moderates and fundamentalists. As Esposito (2010, pp.168-169) argues:

> Too often, for non-Muslims and Muslims alike, "moderate" Muslims are played off against "fundamentalist" Muslims; fundamentalism is simply equated with religious extremism and terrorism. In an even more restrictive usage, a "moderate" Muslim is defined as someone "just like us". Thus, for many Western secularists, moderate Muslims are those who advocate secular liberalism. Conservative or traditionalist Muslims are regarded as fundamentalists: theologically closed-minded, suspicious, or extreme.

In this view, Muslims are immediately reduced to a one-dimensional fiction, represented as having 'no-essence', and being understood only in reference to particular political and ideological constructions that have framed normalisations of essential 'otherness' in the West. The label 'moderate Muslim' implies that it is

‘socially acceptable’ to be Muslim in the nation, as long as one is not *too* Muslim (Aly 2005, p.1).

Despite efforts to moderate Aly’s Muslim ‘otherness’ on *The Project* (so that it can exist as ‘non-threatening’) it is not made scarce, but consistently referenced in discussions about Muslims and Islam. On multiple occasions, Aly expresses personal feelings about the marginalisation of Muslims and Islam in Western nations. Additionally, the other hosts of *The Project* question Aly ‘as a Muslim’ to comment on issues such as religious radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. Across a number of episodes Aly also refers to those Muslims marginalised in Australia as ‘innocent people like me’. These references made to Muslims and marginalisation shape Aly’s conditional or circumstantial belonging, as exemplified by a segment about hostility and aggression towards Muslims. In this particular segment on *The Project*, Aly stresses his own struggle with belonging and states that he is ‘scared’ and ‘terrified’ about ‘where he belongs’ (as a Muslim) in the nation.

Such statements reflect Aly’s conditional belonging and exhibit reservations of the existence of his Muslim ‘otherness’ in the multicultural nation. Many of these reservations have been exemplified through the hostility faced by *The Project* after the announcement of Aly’s appointment as co-host in December 2014. While many viewers encouraged network Ten to include Aly in its programing, others criticised the network and argued that Aly would only discuss Muslim-related issues. As a small number of viewers commented on Ten’s social media pages, ‘will Waleed [Aly] condemn Sharia law for us live…and the degradation of women and children and animals as follows?’ and ‘Waleed Aly is a man that cannot put the words Muslim and terrorist in the same sentence’. Such comments highlight common derogatory depictions of Muslims, and link them to Aly’s professional career.

The comments contribute further to the ostracised status of Muslims and Islam in Australia that have been framed by particular post-9/11 and post-Cronulla discourses (Chopra 2015). As Chapters One and Three have argued, Muslim representations prior to 2005 have been influenced by Orientalist images that depict a homogenous religious community, considered to be incompatible with

Australian values and culture (Poynting et al. 2004, Aly & Green 2008, Noble 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Poynting & Morgan 2012, Chopra 2015). The comments made by some viewers on Ten's social media pages have been influenced by, and continue to shape these Orientalised conceptions of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia. The comments also reflect the contestations over Aly's position as a 'moderate Muslim' on *The Project*, as his supposed 'otherness' seemingly 'threatens' the hegemonic structure of multicultural Australia as a 'white-favouring' nation.

Fixations on Muslim 'otherness' through cosmo-multiculturalism thus showcase the ways in which Aly is able to exist as a Muslim-Australian on *The Project*. However, this existence relies on Aly's 'moderate' status, as this does not impede on the discursive constructions that frame belonging in the nation. Cosmo-multiculturalism thus produces spaces where Muslims do not 'simply exist' as part of the multicultural ethos of Australia, but are 'allowed to exist' as a resourceful 'other' that enables the nation to perceive itself as culturally diverse (Hage 1997, Ahmed 2000, Lentin 2005).

Narratives constructed by *The Project,* which highlight multicultural inclusiveness and belonging for Aly as a 'moderate Muslim', are consequently made conditional. Cosmo-multicultural notions of inclusiveness and belonging are created in similar ways to those discussed in previous chapters, where 'otherness' must first be mitigated or moderated for belonging (of the 'other) to be recognised by a 'white presence' (West 1990, Hage 1998, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). Accordingly, 'moderate Muslims' find themselves in a 'struggle to belong', as Hage (1997, p.128) argues:

> Even if they do well according to the standards of the dominant, they can only reveal themselves to be "lacking" by the very fact that they are "parvenus", "forever-trying-to-become", as opposed to merely "being" who they are.

In this conception of struggle, Muslims deemed 'moderate' are subject to conditional belonging which reinforces assimilative modes that construct and perceive them as a 'non-threatening other' in the multicultural space. The struggles to belong are therefore shaped by particular mediated polarisations,

perceived to exist between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the multicultural nation (see Chapter Eight).

This conditional belonging instigated by cosmo-multiculturalism is recognised through the construction and promotion of 'moderate Muslims' on network Ten. These constructions also present specific elements of Muslim 'otherness' as resourceful or valuable for the production of 'cultural enrichment' in the multicultural nation. In particular, these elements of 'otherness' entail products of symbolic consumption such as ethnic food, figuratively seen to enhance the multicultural experience of the dominant 'white subject' in the nation (Hage 1997, Lentin 2005, Bastian 2012). The next section explores these aspects of 'otherness' and the ways they are rendered valuable in the nation, by examining Amina El Shafei's role as a contestant on *MasterChef Australia*.

7.4 Case 2: Amina El Shafei on *MasterChef Australia*

MasterChef Australia is a culinary program that was first broadcast in 2009 on network Ten. The program follows a group of amateur cooks as they compete over a period of twelve weeks, to win the title of Australia's *MasterChef*. After its initial release in 2009, *MasterChef Australia* gained much popularity, becoming the third-highest rated program of all time on Australian television (with the other two being televised sporting events) (Lewis 2011, p.104). According to Lewis (2011) this success has derived from the program's ability to appeal to a diverse audience. *MasterChef Australia* is an open adaptation of the British *MasterChef* program, yet differs significantly in presentation and content (narrative). *MasterChef Australia* initially aired six nights a week and has been described as more theatrical and faster-paced than the British version, with a glossier format (Lewis 2011).

Each season of *MasterChef Australia* follows a group of 'ordinary' Australians who are chosen as contestants on the series and compete for their chance to become Australia's leading amateur cook (Lewis 2011, p.104). These 'ordinary' Australians come from a variety of backgrounds. For this reason, *MasterChef Australia* plays a significant role in the production of not only culinary, but also cosmo-multicultural discourses on commercial television. As Bonner (2015, p.110) argues, the ethnic range of contestants on *MasterChef Australia* has been,

and continues to be, 'more diverse' than any other reality show or program that features 'ordinary people' as a selling point. This is predominantly evident in the program's promotional tagline 'ordinary people, extraordinary food', with obvious emphasis on the 'ordinary-ness' and 'everyday-ness' of diverse Australian people and culinary cultures.

On May 6, 2012, Amina (El Shafei)[52] became the first veiled Muslim woman to be a regular contestant[53] on *MasterChef Australia*, remaining for over 11 weeks[54]. The analysis below explores the significance of Amina's 'otherness' on *MasterChef Australia* in producing a cosmo-multicultural context, where she is valued as an 'other'. While the program does not necessarily foreground Amina's Muslim identity, it nonetheless centralises aspects of her 'otherness' through the glorification of 'ethnic food' and 'ethnic cuisine' (Lewis 2011). According to Hage (1997), cosmo-multiculturalism represents 'ethnic food' as a form of 'otherness', perceived to be a resource for multicultural consumption that enriches the cosmopolitan and multicultural experiences of non-cultured subjects in the 'white nation' (see also Nguyen 2005, Lentin 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Lewis 2011, Bastian 2012).

7.4.1 *MasterChef Australia*, 'cosmo-multiculturalism', and 'cultural enrichment'

The analysis in this thesis focuses on reviewing narratives that render the Muslim 'other' inclusive in common depictions of the multicultural nation. The theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism' is particularly significant to the analysis of these depictions, because it denotes that the Muslim 'other' possesses specific 'qualities' that are recognised as 'culturally enriching' to the 'white nation' (Hage 1997; 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Lentin 2005). Hage (1997) argues that these 'qualities' include ethnic food, dance, and dress – all of which are perceived to enhance multicultural experiences of 'white subjects' in ethnically diverse nations. Programs such as *MasterChef Australia* (that celebrate these qualities) complement such cosmo-multicultural purposes, because they position the 'other'

[52] Strictly referred to by her first name in/throughout the series. Amina is therefore referred to by her first name in this analysis.
[53] In 2013 another veiled Muslim woman, Samira El Khafir, appeared as a finalist on *MasterChef Australia*.
[54] Amina was eliminated from the competition on July 5, 2012.

as critical to the multicultural ethos of the Australian nation. *MasterChef* contestants (such as Amina) thus adopt cosmo-multicultural roles and provide opportunities for emblematic consumptions of Muslim 'otherness', through measures deemed to be 'non-threatening' to the national or multicultural space (Hage 1998, Nguyen 2005).

Lewis (2011) and Bonner (2015) argue that *MasterChef Australia* establishes a multicultural premise in the way it presents and deals with ethnic diversity. It is recognised as a commercial program that employs culturally diverse contestants. As previously mentioned, Amina became the first veiled Muslim woman to appear on the program in 2012. *MasterChef Australia* does not necessarily limit its focus on ethnicities, backgrounds, cultures, or religious beliefs of the contestants, but presents these as forms of 'enrichment' in cooking, food, and culinary discourses. Such 'enrichment' shapes the narratives within the program, and is represented as reflecting the 'ordinariness' or 'everydayness' of 'multicultural cultures' within Australia (Lewis 2011). According to Flowers and Swan (2012, p.1):

> There is a long history in Australia of concerted effort to construct food as a medium through which people learn about other cultures and as a sign, when they eat diverse cultural foods, that their cities and regions are more tolerant of differences.

Such exposure to 'difference' is imagined and perceives food and culinary cultures to reflect a sense of multicultural acceptance in the nation. For specific minority groups that have been targets of fear and anxiety in Australia (such as Muslims), such discursive conceptions of food discourses are significant to the sublimation of those anxieties (Nguyen 2005, p.52, Aly & Walker 2007). According to Hage (1997), imagined multicultural experiences through culinary discourses offer figurative valorisations of 'otherness', where it is deemed less of a 'threat' to/in the nation. 'Cosmo-multiculturalism' thus suggests that it is possible for Muslims to utilise 'otherness' in particular ways that enable for the successful accumulation of belonging within the national space.

The cosmo-multicultural focus on food enables Amina to exist as a 'non-threatening other' on *MasterChef Australia.* The program particularly adorns Amina's ethnic culinary skills that are represented as part of an 'imagined

multiculturalism', where 'otherness' is perceived to enrich the multicultural Australian pedagogy (Stratton and Ang 1994). Accordingly, cosmo-multiculturalism emphasises the availability of ethnic food in the nation, 'where ingredients are "fresh" and where dishes are "authentic" in the sense of not being "watered down" to cater for a "western palette"' (Hage 1997, p.119, Morgan et al. 2005, Lewis 2011, Bonner 2015).). On *MasterChef Australia*, 'ethnic ingredients' are represented as 'authentic' or 'cultured'. This is evidenced by Amina's opening statement in the first episode:

> **Amina**: Today I am making kofta using…both beef and lamb, vermicelli rice and fattoush. It's a Lebanese salad…

Here, cultured food such as 'vermicelli rice' or 'fattoush' become qualities of 'otherness'. They are shaped by discourses that centralise 'otherness' as a form of cultural enrichment. Even prior to stating her name and background, for instance, Amina strictly focuses on the food and 'ethnic ingredients', because these are the factors that will make up her multicultural 'food journey' on *MasterChef Australia* (Lewis 2011, Khamis 2013).

These 'ethnic ingredients' are particularly understood as 'other', because of their association with 'ethnicity' and 'foreignness'. For instance, rice has commonly been represented as a stereotypical ingredient used in Asian cooking, denoting the 'Asian-ness' of Amina's 'vermicelli rice' (Ang 2004). Her 'otherness' is also identified throughout the series, as Amina wears the hijab (veil), which has been recognised as a visual signifier of Muslim and Islamic 'otherness' in Australia (see Chapter One, Five, Yasmeen 2013, Amer 2014, Hussein 2016). These factors frame Amina's 'otherness' on *MasterChef Australia,* where she is automatically and discursively understood as 'Asian' and 'Muslim'.

The significance of 'ethnic food' in identifying 'otherness' on *MasterChef Australia* is exemplified in a scene where Amina presents her 'dish' to the three judges, George Calombaris, Gary Mehigan, and Matt Preston. Prior to 'tasting' Amina's culinary creation, the judges question her 'background' and 'heritage'. Amina explains that her father is Egyptian and mother South Korean, making her a 'mish-mash of everything'. The judges are immediately mesmerised by Amina's 'otherness' uttering remarks such as 'wow', and encouraging her to use her ethnic

backgrounds as influences for her cooking on the program. Ethnic influences are particularly valued in practices of cosmo-multiculturalism because they denote the authenticity of 'ethnic food' in the perceived non-cultured 'white nation'. As Morgan et al. (2005, p.97) suggest, the production of 'authentic ethnic food' allows ethnics to reside symbolically in their 'homeland' and their 'new country', by promoting particular multicultural exchange processes with Anglo-Australians.

Scenes that stress such ethnic value on *MasterChef Australia* complement the cosmo-multicultural aims of the nation in producing 'cultural enrichment'. The focus is placed less on the presence of 'otherness' in the nation, and more on the ways that 'otherness' can influence multicultural experiences for dominant national subjects (Hage 1997, Nguyen 2005). As Lentin (2005, p.389) argues, common perceptions of 'ethnic food' in the nation work on the assumption that this only refers to 'what does not originate within the national space', and thus is externally sourced. Cosmo-multiculturalism therefore works to mark 'ethnic food' as enriching a previously monotonous 'white' culture. Such ethnic influences in Australia supposedly imply that the nation is becoming more diverse and open to difference (Hage 1997, pp.121-122).

Edwards et al. (2000, p.297-299) argue that the diversity of ethnic cuisines available is an example of the open and inclusive racial sentiment in Australia. Food is used as a public pedagogy of multiculturalism. It assumes that the consumption of, or engagement with, ethnic food suggests one will learn about and appreciate the different cultures that exist within Australia (Flowers & Swan 2012). For Hage (1997, p. 120) this is the epitome of 'cosmo-multiculturalism' in that it concerns cosmopolitan consumption and has 'more to do with the market of foreign flavours than the market of "foreigners"'. It minimises the attention placed on the 'other' as a foreign or 'threatening' identity in Australia, and focuses on enhancing 'otherness' as a resource of multiculturalism.

These conceptualised ideas reflect the liberal notions of multiculturalism that have been discussed in Chapter One, which fixate on 'otherness' and recognise the multicultural space as constructed for migrants and ethnics (Mansouri 2005, Pardy & Lee 2011, Mansouri & Wood 2012). These notions denote that 'people who are not white' become resources for 'white people' in their 'quest for novelty and

desire for authenticity' (Flowers & Swan 2012, p.6). As hooks (2001) argues, the consumption of racial difference by 'white people' has now become a desire and source of pleasure, imagined as a break from the discursive formations of 'whiteness' in the nation, or what Lentin (2005, p.394) identifies as 'combating ethnocentrism' (see also Nguyen 2005). Cosmo-multiculturalism opens up channels where ethnic diversity, and especially 'otherness', is accommodated for and valued in the 'white nation'.

As with the *MasterChef Australia* example provided above, it is not so much Amina's Muslim 'otherness' that is centralised in the series, but the ways in which that 'otherness' can influence her cooking abilities. These, in turn, advance the multicultural setting constructed by network Ten. However, this means Muslim 'otherness' must first be moderated or mitigated to exist as 'non-threatening' on *MasterChef Australia*, so that 'ethnic food' can be rendered as a valuable quality of 'otherness' that the Muslim 'other' simply possesses. On *MasterChef Australia*, Amina's moderate identity is shaped by the program's focus on 'ordinary Australians', consistently representing ethnically diverse contestants (such as Amina) as part of a naturalised multicultural national character. Amina therefore becomes an 'ordinary' or 'good' Muslim, in similar ways to Aly on *The Project*, through depictions that emphasise the multicultural nation's openness to ethnic difference.

Amina's 'ordinariness' is emphasised on *MasterChef Australia* in the scenes where she first meets with the judges and explains that she has an 'ordinary' job as a paediatric nurse. Amina continues to explain that much like the other contestants, she has a 'food dream':

> Since I've left school I have always had an ambition to go into cooking. But both my parents are academics, they both wanted, you know, both their daughters to achieve some kind of an academic career…I do want to open, hopefully with my sister, almost like a tapas, sort of a bar. She will lock me in the kitchen and she'll deal with management!

Bednarek (2013) argues that part of *MasterChef Australia*'s success is the emotionality exacerbated through emphasis on the personal and private 'stories' of the contestants. *MasterChef Australia* produces humanised stories, such as Amina's, by generating narratives based on 'emotional journeys' and 'food

dreams' (Lewis 2011, Khamis 2013). This technique resonates with the *MasterChef* audience, because it produces narratives of familiarity and engagement, enabling audiences to connect with the private lives of the public figures on the program (Khamis 2013, p.3). This shapes the ways in which *MasterChef* contestants come to represent 'ordinary Australians', because they provide 'stories' of familiarity. After George tastes Amina's dish for the first time, for example, he tells her that she will 'go far' in the competition and that he 'loves' her 'story'.

Representing Amina as 'ordinary' reflects *MasterChef Australia*'s attempt to naturalise perceptions that highlight the significance of 'ethnic food' as an essential part of the multicultural character in Australia. The number of 'multicultural faces' available on the program reflects the supposed 'everyday multiculturalism' that exists within the ethnically diverse nation (Wise & Velayuthum 2009). These conceptualised notions of multiculturalism, complement the theme of 'cosmo-multiculturalism'. They present everyday practices (such as cooking) as part of a lived experience of ethnic diversity at a local level in symbolic situations of encounter, such as watching television (Wise & Velayuthum 2009, p.3). Not only then is *MasterChef Australia* a program about food and culinary cultures, but also about the engagement with ethnic difference by producing cosmo-multicultural environments.

Lewis (2011, p.111) argues that this sense of 'ethnic value and interaction' is shaped by the program's format and composition, promoting a distinct 'foodie' lifestyle by engaging with ideas of multiculturalism and egalitarianism (Lewis 2011, p.111). As Lewis (2011, p.108) suggests:

> [*MasterChef Australia*] is overtly cosmopolitan, embracing and championing Australian multiculturalism…the ethnic backgrounds of the contestants are often foregrounded as part of their personal cooking "journey" and "style"…though race and indigeneity is noticeable absent from [*MasterChef Australia*]'s purview. Ethnicity largely seems to stand in or act as a (relatively safe) site for the negotiations of social diversity more broadly.

Lewis (2011) argues that *MasterChef Australia* presents a 'safe multiculturalism' where 'others' like Amina, are resourceful figures of 'ethnic diversity'. These 'others' exist through culinary discourses that promote ethnic, cultural, even

linguistic differences as 'positive' rather than 'threatening' (Stratton & Ang 1994, Carter 2006, Lentin & Titley 2008, Bastian 2012). 'Otherness' is also seen as an influence in the program that enables contestants such as Amina to maintain an advantage over the other contestants. In episode twenty-five, where Amina cooks with 'herbs and spices' from her 'ethnic origins', another contestant jokingly tells Amina, 'Look at you go! I may as well go home now!' In this way, 'ethnic food' becomes a source of 'capital' that Amina can 'accumulate' in the 'white nation', presented as something that 'enriches' 'white' culture and complements 'white' desires for 'otherness' (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1998).

According to Nguyen (2005, p.52), engaging in these notions of cosmo-multiculturalism shapes Australia's aspirations to be seen as 'non-racist'. This is particularly visible in the post-Cronulla context, where Muslims have been placed 'on display' and engaging with the wider Australian mainstream (Ryan 2012). These visible practices of engagement signify how programs such as *MasterChef Australia* thrive on the emphasis of ethnic inclusiveness (Lewis 2011). It permits the non-cultured audience to engage in inter-ethnic relationships with the 'otherness' represented on screen. Ultimately, this fosters a symbolic and imagined multicultural experience, as evident in instances of cosmo-multiculturalism (Hage 1997, Elder 2007, Bednarek 2013).

The symbolic relationships constructed between Amina (as an 'other') and the audience of *MasterChef Australia*, have mostly augmented Amina's popularity. For instance, viewers frequently shared encouraging comments on the *MasterChef Australia's* Facebook page, such as 'go Amina, you deserve to win the *MasterChef* title 2012' and 'Amina you are the most inspiring person and we are madly cheering you on' (both posted on July 2nd 2012). For Veiszadeh (2012), Amina's presence on *MasterChef Australia* has symbolised a 'refreshing' portrayal and 'different version of Muslim women on Australian television'. Such comments reflect perceptions shaped by cosmo-multiculturalism, which highlight the value of 'otherness' in multicultural contexts. Seemingly, this process of cultural exchange is 'imagined', given there is no actual interaction between Amina as the ethnic 'other' and the mainstream *MasterChef* audience (see also Elder 2007, p.141).

Arguably, Amina's 'otherness' exists on *MasterChef Australia* as a resource for the enrichment of non-cultured audience members. The focus on ethnic food means that 'otherness' becomes an 'object of appreciation', and is made 'exotic' only to be symbolically consumed by the audience (Hage 1997, p.100, Morgan et al. 2005, Nguyen 2005). Valuing 'otherness' in this way is particularly important in racial discourses of belonging, where inclusivity is shaped less by 'membership' or 'connectedness to others' and more on 'being valued' as an 'other' in the 'white nation' (West 1990, Hage 1997, Garbutt 2009, Antonsich 2010). The cosmo-multicultural engagement fostered through *MasterChef Australia* shapes the ways in which audiences can value and appreciate Amina's 'otherness' from a distance without ever needing to step outside the comfort zone of their own culture (Nguyen 2005, p.51). By watching *MasterChef Australia*, the audience can 'keep their border' and enjoy a 'threat-free' environment. In this construct, 'otherness' exists as a form of 'cultural enrichment' that encourages representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, and promotes positive perceptions of Australian multiculturalism (Nguyen 2005, p.51, Flowers & Swan 2012, p.2).

7.4.2 'Cosmo-multiculturalism' and the limits of 'enrichment'

The section above illustrated that 'cosmo-multiculturalism' constructs spaces where 'otherness' is perceived to ostensibly enrich multicultural experiences in the 'white nation' (Hage 1997; 1998, Lentin 2005). Cosmo-multiculturalism thus facilitates multicultural experiences that repeatedly serve the interest of the non-cultured or 'white subject'. As exhibited through the analysis of Amina on *MasterChef Australia*, 'otherness' is represented through notions of exoticism and invokes a sense of cultural desirability to be consumed by the dominant subject in the nation. However, such consumption occurs without physical or 'real-time' interactions between the 'other' and the 'white subject' (Stratton and Ang 1994, Hage 1997, Nguyen 2005). In this imaginary, the 'other' exists in the national space as a symbolic figure of/for multiculturalism. The 'other' does not necessarily belong in this space, but is conditionally *allowed to exist*.

Hage (1998) argues that one of the primary issues constituted by cosmo-multiculturalism is its association with dominant hegemonies that invoke relations

of power and possession in the multicultural nation. This thesis addresses the ways Muslim representations on television reflect these particular power relations in Australia's multicultural structure. Mediated representations of Muslim 'otherness' thus become about the 'power' to define and contain the 'other', as opposed to 'possessing' it, within the nation (Burr 1995). As discussed in Chapter Five, representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are construed through normalisations of 'whiteness' that consistently ensure the preservation of 'white' dominance in (Western) multicultural societies.

Fixations on ethnic qualities such as food on *MasterChef Australia* serve a purpose of being consumed (or appreciated) by the dominant 'white subject' in narratives of multiculturalism. These symbolic consumptions subtly reinforce racial structures in Australian society that retain binary positions of dominance and subservience between the 'white nationalist' and the Muslim 'other' (Hage 1998, Northcote and Casimiro 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). Accordingly, cosmo-multicultural discourses that glorify 'ethnic food' as valued elements of 'otherness' are consistently 'eater-centred', focusing on those who consume (rather than create) the food or culinary experience (Hage 1997, p.118). Amina's function as an 'other' on *MasterChef Australia* is therefore harnessed by what she can actively and positively contribute to the discursively constructed multicultural nation.

These conceptions are understood through Orientalist terms, as Amina's 'otherness' presents a form of desire that works to illuminate the 'white person, to render his or her life more authentic' (Lewis 2011, Flowers & Swan 2012, p.24). As Lewis (2011, p.108) argues, ethnic cooking on *MasterChef Australia* is subject to 'white' multicultural experiences where 'otherness' is celebrated on the program only to the point where it adds a 'degree of cultural colour' to an otherwise 'white nation'. The symbolic relationship shaped by Amina as the on-screen 'other', and the *MasterChef* audience who symbolically consume this 'otherness, become Orientalising processes that exploit 'otherness' to satisfy exotic and multicultural desires of the 'white nation'. For example, in the scenes where Amina cooks and presents her 'Lebanese salad' to the judges, they are mesmerised by the 'authenticity' of the 'ethnic ingredients used' and suggest that this adds 'value' to her cooking.

Stiffler (2014) argues that such mediated embellishments of 'ethnic food', shape Orientalist discourses in Western societies that are consistency framed through common media representations of Muslim 'otherness'. Food is cultured in these constructions, to ostensibly represent 'otherness', even if direct focus is not placed on the 'other'. 'Ethnic food' is therefore categorised as a connotation of 'otherness' that denotes exotic desires and 'non-threatening' scopes of 'foreignness' in the nation (Lentin & Titley 2008).

Such Orientalising processes illustrate how particular features of Muslim 'otherness' (as opposed to 'otherness' itself) can account for 'cultural enrichments' in cosmo-multicultural contexts. This is because particular 'ethnic elements' are easier to market as 'exotic' in the nation, than those frequently associated with Muslims, such as 'danger' and 'terrorism' (Stiffler 2014, p.119). On *MasterChef Australia*, it is Amina's 'ethnic influences' and 'ethnic ingredients' that are enhanced throughout the series, primarily those concerning her Egyptian and South Korean backgrounds. Her Muslim identity, on the other hand, is represented as restricting her ability to cook in the competition. Upon meeting the judges in the first episode, Amina is asked whether she would find cooking in the competition 'difficult'. Amina responds by specifying that her Islamic religion 'does not allow' her to 'eat pork or drink alcohol', meaning she would find it 'difficult' to cook with these ingredients.

Instances such as these accentuate how Amina is limited as a Muslim 'other' on *MasterChef Australia*, by having to cook with ingredients deemed *impermissible* by her religion. As Amina explains during a 'pork cooking challenge':

> The thing I'm struggling with today is cooking the pork. As a Muslim, I don't eat pork or handle any products derived from a pig. I've obviously never cooked it [pork] before but I'm just going to go by the touch and feel factor, so hopefully that will get me through.

Amina identifies the struggles she faces on *MasterChef Australia*, when it comes to preparing food considered incompatible with her supposed 'otherness'. Her comments exemplify the ways in which multicultural inclusiveness is limited or made conditional through cosmo-multiculturalism. This is because cosmo-multiculturalism focuses on notions of 'cultural enrichment' that concern Amina's ability (as an 'other') to serve the needs of the dominant subject in the nation

(Hage 1997). The struggle to cook with ingredients such as 'pork' ultimately restricts this supposed cosmo-multicultural service that the 'other' is to perform, highlighting issues with 'otherness' in the multicultural space. This is illustrated further by a brief exchange between Gary and Amina (during the pork challenge) on *MasterChef Australia*:

> **Gary**: Amina? You're cooking pork!
>
> **Amina**: I'm cooking pork!
>
> **Gary**: But you don't *believe* in eating pork (emphasis added).
>
> **Amina**: No
>
> **Gary**: So why would you cook pork?

The focus on the term 'belief' in this exchange directly references Amina's Islamic religion and suggests that she is restricted in her cosmo-multicultural role as a Muslim 'other'. The exchange assumes that Amina fails to cook with pork and thus neglects to highlight that the consumption, and not the 'cooking' or 'preparation' of pork, is impermissible in Islamic practice. As Amina tells the judges in the first episode: 'I am happy to cook with them [pork and alcohol], it's just tasting them [is the issue]'. Nonetheless, the references made to Amina's restrictions on *MasterChef Australia*, serve as a reminder of the 'backward' and 'barbaric' practices presumably enforced in Islam (Said 1978). These references also underscore the ways in which cosmo-multiculturalism may encourage multicultural engagements in the nation, but do not necessarily eliminate perceived distinctions between the 'other' and the 'white subject' (Hirose & Kei-Ho Pih 2011, p.1496).

On *MasterChef Australia*, the judges consistently emphasise the ways in which Amina is limited in her ability to cook as a Muslim, by reminding her that she must 'cook blind' at certain points of the competition. This is particularly depicted in scenes that emphasise Amina's supposed inability or struggle to cook with 'pork' and 'alcohol'. In these instances, the judges stress Amina's disadvantage as a Muslim 'other' on *MasterChef Australia,* signifying that 'otherness' is no longer valued as a resource for multicultural experiences, but consequently de-valued as a factor that differentiates 'us' from 'them' (Nguyen 2005, Hirose & Kei-Ho Pih

2011). These examples highlight that perceptions of 'cultural enrichment' are highly racialised and represent 'otherness' as a paradoxical construct in national narratives of multiculturalism. As Hage (1998, pp.120-121) argues:

> Valuing requires someone to do the valuing and something to be evaluated. The discourse of enrichment operates by establishing a break between valuing negatively and valuing positively similar to the break which the discourse of tolerance establishes between tolerance and intolerance.

Valuing 'otherness' as a form of 'cultural enrichment' thus denotes the paradoxes of tolerance that were established in Chapter One. As Lentin (2005, p.395) suggests, multicultural principles that value ethnic diversity (and 'otherness') work to break down racial barriers by 'increasing tolerance' in the nation. In this discursive construct, tolerance is less about recognising acceptance of the 'other' in multicultural spaces, than it is about finding ways to tolerate that 'other' based on contested notions of national belonging. As Ahmed (2000) suggests, rendering 'otherness' valuable in multicultural settings is a measure of finding ways to 'live with' the 'other', rather than, appreciating or accepting it in the national space (see also Hage 1997; 1998, Hodge & O'Carroll 2006). The fixation on ethnic qualities such as food on *MasterChef Australia* are thus not necessarily valued as a form of 'cultural enrichment', but 'tolerated' as resources that already exist in multicultural spaces.

Cosmo-multiculturalism, as presented on *MasterChef Australia*, constructs Amina's Muslim 'otherness' through multicultural discourses that fixate on ethnic qualities such as food. These fixations imply that Amina is able to conditionally exist as a Muslim 'other' on *MasterChef Australia*. Amina's cosmo-multicultural role can be read through, and is reflected by, Orientalist notions that position the 'other' as a form of enticement or enrichment for the mainstream 'white culture'. As Hage (1998, p.119) suggests:

> In the context of Australian multiculturalism the point being made is not simply that the discourse of enrichment places the dominant culture in a more important position than other migrant cultures…this discourse also assigns to migrant cultures a different mode of existence to Anglo-Celtic culture. While the dominant white culture merely and unquestionably exists, migrant cultures exist for the latter. Their value or the viability of their preservation as far as white Australians are concerned, lies in their function as enriching cultures.

The presence of 'otherness' in cosmo-multicultural contexts represents 'value for', as opposed to 'value in', the imagined multicultural nation. Suggesting that ethnic food 'enriches' Australian culture reinforces the discursive implications that have been addressed in Chapter One. In particular, they work to normalise 'whiteness' as the dominant non-cultured race in multicultural Australia through practices that repeadlety limit inclusion for the Muslim 'other'.

Part of the issue with cosmo-multiculturalism, concerns its fixations on 'otherness' by centralising those that are 'enriched' by multiculturalism (Bonner 2015, p.111). This group is frequently imagined as 'white' and vaunt their knowledge of ethnic diversity by symbolically 'consuming it' (through food or television) from a 'position of privilege' (Bonner 2015). This considers qualities (such as food) as 'ethnic' or 'other' to the extent that they service 'non-ethnics' or 'whites' in the multicultural space (Hirose & Kei-Ho Pih 2011, p.1485). As Hage (1997, p.136) argues:

> Despite the positive "anti-racist" nature of this discourse, it is deeply Anglo-Celtic in positioning Anglo subjects in the role of the appreciators enriched by what are constructed as ethnic objects with no reason other than to enrich the Anglo-subject.

'Cultural enrichment' is thus an imagined construction that represents ethnic difference as a value used to domesticate and dominate the Muslim 'other' in multicultural spaces. It reflects Orientalising processes that preserve polarised relations between 'us' and 'them', and is delineated in terms of domination and control of the 'other' (Said 1978, p.213). Fixations on 'otherness' as a measure of promoting 'cultural enrichment' in cosmo-multiculturalism are an alternative mode of controlling or containing Muslim 'otherness' in the nation (Hage 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Humphrey 2014). The cosmo-multicultural space produced through culinary culture on *MasterChef Australia* therefore centralises 'white' Australians, enabling them to selectively choose which aspects of 'otherness' can be 'tolerated' (and thus belong) as resources of 'cultural enrichment' in the nation, and which cannot.

7.5 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has highlighted the ways that narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are conditionally constructed and limited through cosmo-multicultural contexts produced on network Ten. Many of these limitations derive from discursive perceptions that fixate on Muslim 'otherness' and work to exoticise it as a form of 'cultural enrichment' in/to the multicultural nation (Hage 1997; 1998, Ang 2000, Lentin 2005, Nguyen 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Tascon 2008, Bonner 2015). Such fixations promote alternative means for the 'other' to inclusively exist as a valuable ethnic resource in the imagined multicultural space of the nation. However, these conceptualised modes of inclusivity and belonging are framed through multicultural discourses that reinforce dominant hegemonic structures, which repeatedly normalise and centralise 'whiteness' in the nation (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Northcote & Casimiro 2010).

The two programs analysed in this chapter have also highlighted the significance of cosmo-multiculturalism in producing 'moderate Muslims', and rendering them a 'non-threatening other' in the multicultural space (Aly & Green 2008, Ali & Sonn 2010). However, processes of moderation present symbolic opportunities for inclusiveness and belonging that are framed through divisive measures which segregate Muslim-Australians into moderate (good) and non-moderate (bad) categories, as the analysis of Waleed Aly on *The Project* has revealed (Mamdani 2002, Hodge & O'Carroll 2006, Aly & Green 2008, Yasmeen 2007, Roose 2013, Peucker et al. 2014). This chapter further argues that the process of moderation enables certain elements of Muslim 'otherness' (such as food) to be recognised in terms of value in the national multicultural space. Food and culinary discourses are particularly represented on *MasterChef Australia*, as advancing cosmo-multicultural perspectives that depict the dominant 'white subject' as being culturally enriched by the presence of Muslim 'otherness' (Hage 1997, Ang 2003, Lentin & Titley 2008, Bastian 2012, Stiffler 2014, Bonner 2015). However, these reinforce Orientalising processes, where the Muslim is allowed to exist in the national space in order to advance the multicultural character of the nation, and thus to serve the 'white subject'.

The next chapter continues to explore these limiting constructions of 'cultural enrichment' by examining the ways Muslims are represented as a valuable resource in advancing Australian culture and identity through the theme of 'nation'. The chapter addresses particular discursive conceptions of multiculturalism, as have been explored throughout this thesis, and investigates the way in which these promote inclusive narratives of belonging on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

Chapter Eight: Muslims and 'Nation' on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation

> Instead of being a citizen in legal or spatial terms only, an individual needs to *feel* that he or she is part of the society that claims its citizenship. This sense of belonging, in turn, may be linked to a person's implicit or explicit assessment of the extent to which his/her conception of rights and duties corresponds to those held to be valid by the dominant majority of the country he/she is part of.
>
> (Emphasis in original, Yasmeen 2007, p.44)

8.1 Introduction

The discourse of multiculturalism has been significant in this thesis in examining the representations of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television. In particular, this thesis has focused on the production of narratives that encourage conceptual notions of inclusiveness and belonging. As the previous chapters have argued, multiculturalism is framed through notions of ethnic acceptance that recognise and appreciate the Muslim 'other' within the national space. Chapter Seven has particularly illustrated how multiculturalism advances contexts within which Muslim 'otherness' is perceived as a resource in the promotion of national 'cultural enrichment' (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1997; 1998, Ang 2003, Klocker 2014, D'Cruz & Weerakkody 2015). Perceptions such as these are constructed through contexts of cosmo-multiculturalism, where cultural elements of Muslim 'otherness' are moderated to comfortably exist within the 'white nation'. Cosmo-multiculturalism also underscores that the acceptance (or tolerance) of Muslim 'otherness' is dependent on what the Muslim 'other' can deliver to benefit the overall construct of the nation. It is these notions of 'benefit' that are addressed further in this chapter, and in relation to the theme of 'nation'.

Discourses that frame the nation (such as multiculturalism), are concerned with complex social, cultural, and political factors in which national belonging is conceptualised and situated. As Hage (1996) argues, the nation produces relations between national subjects and the symbolic national space, by establishing internal and external dynamics. This conceptualised construction of the nation is deployed as a theme in this chapter that aims to understand the ways in which groups of people acquire belonging in physical and symbolic spaces (of the nation) (Elder 2007, p.10). The analytic chapters in this thesis have stressed the significance of such national narratives, in promoting discursive notions of

inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims in Australia. These notions are shaped (or made conditional) by prerequisites where the Muslim 'other' must consistently affiliate with the nation through particular processes. The theme of 'nation' highlights the significance of these processes by illustrating the ways national ('non-white') subjects adhere to certain cultural values, in turn, accounting for national belonging (Hage 1996; 1998, Elder 2007, Moran 2011). This conception is critical in producing narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for Muslims on Australia's national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

This chapter explores the significance of the nation in establishing how Muslims are able to 'belong' in the national space when they affiliate with particular values perceived to benefit and not 'threaten' the nation (Hage 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Fozdar 2011, Peucker et al. 2014). This contention is critical to the ABC, as the national broadcaster, responsible for representing Australia in its 'truest form', as an 'all inclusive' multicultural nation (Hawkins 1997; 1999, Smaill 2002). Chapter Seven has illustrated that such representations are achieved by enhancing the value of Muslims in the multicultural space. This chapter expands on this idea by addressing the ways Muslims adhere to, or affiliate with, particular values perceived to advance the nation in some way.

Two programs on the ABC are analysed in this chapter. The first represents Muslim-Australian fashion designers as innovators on ABC's *Compass*, by emphasising the value of innovation in advancing national prosperity. The analysis of the second program examines the role of Hazem El Masri as a Muslim-Australian sports icon on *Australian Story*, where sport is recognised as an esteemed value in the nation (Rowe et al. 1998, Cashman 2002, Ward 2010). Both programs identify the ways in which Muslims are represented as valuable on the ABC, when they adopt certain values that allows them to connect with the Australian nation (Hage 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Peucker et al. 2014). These representations are crucial for the ABC, particularly given its aims to present national values and reflect notions concerning egalitarianism and multiculturalism in Australia (Hawkins 1996; 1997; 1999).

To begin, this chapter introduces the theme of 'nation' and its significance in establishing discursive modes of belonging for cultured subjects in multicultural

societies. The chapter then provides a background of the ABC as the national broadcaster responsible for enhancing images of multicultural inclusiveness and belonging. The latter half of this chapter analyses two programs, *Compass* and *Australian Story*, by exploring their role in advancing narratives that shape Muslim inclusiveness and belonging in the multicultural nation.

8.1.1 Nation and belonging

According to Hage (1996, p.465), the nation is a complex entity that never simply exists, but is in a constant state of fluctuation or 'continually in the making' (see also Moran 2011). National citizens are presented as 'members', crucial to the development and operation of the nation. It is these members that adopt particular national identities, referencing both personal and political attachments to the nation, and marking it 'off from others' (Moran 2011, p.2155). As Elder (2007) suggests, nations are socio-cultural constructs that are about cultural similarity and nationalism as a feeling of attachment to an imagined culture. Discourses of the nation thus emphasise shared conceptions of cultural inheritance and 'way of life', which all national subjects must adhere to, or affiliate with, if they want to 'belong' as cultural and national subjects (Hage 1996; 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Fozdar 2011, Moran 2011).

These discursive formations of the Australian nation are particularly critical to multicultural philosophies that are repeatedly promoted in/by the nation. As the previous chapters in this thesis have argued, multiculturalism encourages narratives of inclusiveness and belonging by endorsing imaginings of social acceptance and cohesion (Stratton & Ang 1994, Hage 1998, Lentin 2005, Mansouri 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008, Pardy & Lee 2011, Mansouri & Wood 2012, Moran 2011). This chapter emphasises that such views of the nation further present Muslims with opportunities to participate in, or contribute to, particular national objectives (Yasmeen 2007, Fozdar 2011, Rane & Hersi 2012). For Fozdar (2011, p.1691) these include economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions of cohesion, which focus on perceiving Muslims as 'active citizens' and fostering greater interaction amongst Muslims and non-Muslims in Australia (see also Peucker et al. 2014).

As in the previous chapters, 'active citizenship' deploys notions of a 'good citizen', who 'participates in the public sphere working toward the greater good of society' (Peucker et al. 2014, p.284). For Hage (1998), this 'greater good' reflects a 'national will' that is based on the ability and capacity of the national subject to perform in ways that better the nation. Citizens that actively contribute to national projects perceive themselves as essential to the workings of the nation, reflecting perceptions of the 'national will'. This is oriented by the dominant mainstream, in its attempt to build what is imagined to be a 'homely nation', where 'non-whites' such as Muslims can become recognised as 'national objects' once they engage in similar national acts (Hage 1998, p.46). This framework is crucial for Muslims in the national space because it allows them to occupy a position of privilege (over other Muslims) and gain a sense of inclusion and belonging. Similarly to secular Muslims (discussed in Chapter Six), the point is to mitigate Muslim 'otherness', by emphasising the adaptation of Australian cultural values and illustrating (supposed) successful integrations.

Hage (1998) argues that these discursively constructed views of the nation enable minority groups such as Muslims to accumulate a sense of belonging. As Chapter One has argued, the multicultural nation is defined through a field that encourages the accumulation of cultural or symbolic capital, so that some Muslims are recognised as 'more Australian' than others (see also Chapter Five and Six). In the theme of 'nation', these Muslims don't necessarily accumulate capital in a traditional sense, but simply belong, given their dedication and devotion to the nation. As Hage (1998, p.52) argues:

> …people interested in "enhancing their national profile" are constantly converting some cultural achievements they have acquired or a personal characteristic they possess to make claims of being more of a national than, or at least as national as, others.

Such claims to belonging demonstrate how Muslims are recognised as national subjects in discursive formations of the 'white nation'. It promotes notions of 'national duty' and 'national value', where the Muslim 'other' can position itself within the national space by working with other national subjects to build, improve, and enhance the nation (Hage 1996, Moran 2011). Hage (1996, p.470) defines this logic as 'functional belonging', where 'the national subject draws the legitimacy of its belonging by constructing itself literally as "part" of the nation –

a functional part who's practices are useful for the functioning of the nation as a whole'.

'Functional belonging' is mostly associated with minority groups that are dominated by the 'white nation' and seek to integrate or assimilate, making it critical for Muslims in the multicultural space. These Muslims are classified as subjects seeking national recognition and belonging by claiming that 'we are just as Australian as anyone else, we have contributed to the building of this nation and we continue to enrich its culture' (Hage 1996, p.470). Such negotiated and self-established modes of national belonging are thus based on liberal perceptions of multiculturalism that source the Muslim 'other' as a form of value within the national space (see Chapters Five, Six, and Seven). As with (the themes of) 'speaking out', 'domestication', 'in-betweenness', and 'cosmo-multiculturalism', the theme of 'nation' positions Muslims as inclusive, depending on whether they affiliate or associate with specific national qualities that are rendered beneficial for the multicultural nation. In particular, discourses of nation target the Muslim 'other' by favouring the skills and services utilised through engagements and interactions that enhance and expand conceptions of the 'national will' (Hage 1997; 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Noble & Poynting 2010).

Two Australian cultural values are addressed in this chapter through the analysis of two programs on the ABC, *Compass* and *Australian Story*. These programs illustrate the ways Muslims acquire representational national belonging through the workings of value production. Firstly, the presentation of innovation as an Australian value on *Compass* is examined by highlighting its role in enabling Muslim-Australian fashion designers to creatively contribute to the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of Australia (Gans & Stern 2003, Tarlo 2010, Rane & Hersi 2012). This is followed by an exploration of the value of sport, with reference to Hazem El Masri on *Australian Story*, and the ways it is imagined as promoting inclusive, egalitarian, and multicultural engagements in the nation (Rowe et al. 1998, Cashman 2002, Spaaij 2012; 2015). The production of these perceptions are notably important to the ABC, given its duty to generate narratives that reflect an ethnically inclusive and multicultural nation (Hawkins 1997; 1999).

8.2 Background: The Australian Broadcasting Corporation

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) developed as a government initiative in 1923 to highlight the importance of public broadcasting in Australia[55]. Initially called the Australian Broadcasting Commission, the ABC emulated a system set up by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that focused on producing local (including British) over foreign content (Davis 1987, Errington & Miragliotta 2001, Wilson et al. 2010). The ABC was also established as a statutory body, under the *Australian Broadcasting Commission Act 1932,* that would enable 'national content' to be available to 'all Australians' – something that the commercial networks failed to do in Australia at the time (Davis 1987, Errington & Miragliotta 2001, Wilson et al. 2010).

ABC radio began broadcasting in 1923, and in 1956 ABC television began transmission in Australia. Similar to radio, ABC television followed legislative duties to recognise and encourage 'local talent', a requirement extended by the subsequent *Australian Broadcasting Act 1942.* The Act emphasised the responsibility of the ABC to promote nationally-sourced content that would be applicable to diverse audiences across the nation (Wilson et al. 2010). As Hawkins (1999) argues, the ABC has been established to represent the nation in ways that a growing national audience could identify with.

As the broadcaster was modelled on the British BBC system, much of the content broadcast by the ABC (radio and television) reproduced British culture and values for an Australian audience (Davies 1987, p.3). This was frequently the case in the 1970s and 1980s, prompting criticism of the ABC's seemingly biased, white-British views, and a lack of diverse representations. Davies (1987, p.7) argues that Aboriginal and migrant Australians were among many who were dissatisfied with the ABC in the 1980s. This was due to the broadcaster catering mostly to an affluent, complacent, 'white' Australian audience. Such criticisms negatively impacted on the ABC as a 'national broadcaster', which was initially established

[55] According to Wilson et al. (2010), the ABC was initially established as a commercial radio broadcaster in 1923 but was replaced by the government-established Australian Broadcasting System in 1929. The system ensured that radio stations transferred to a state-owned entity in an attempt to create a single national broadcaster in Australia. It wasn't until 1932 that this entity became the Australian Broadcasting Commission.

to reflect the 'true identity and values' of 'all Australian citizens' (Errington & Miragliotta 2001).

These criticisms (along with funding cuts) resulted in an internal restructure for the national broadcaster between 1976 and 1985. The restructure and subsequent implementation of major reforms (established under the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983*) prompted a name change (from the Australian Broadcasting Commission to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation) and established a binding legislative Charter that encouraged greater diversity in content. Similar to the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), the Charter set out the functions of the ABC. These include, 'to provide within Australia innovative and comprehensive broadcasting services of high standard' that 'contribute to a sense of national identity and inform and entertain, and reflect the cultural diversity of, the Australian community', and take into account the 'multicultural character of the Australian community' when producing and broadcasting content. This Charter ensures that the ABC represents an ethnically diverse nation and reflects and promotes a multicultural identity.

Given this legislative duty to promote ethnic inclusiveness, the ABC has produced a multitude of television programs that address multiculturalism and ethnic diversity in Australia (McNair & Swift 2014). The Charter's focus on inclusiveness is especially important when it comes to the representation of Muslims on the ABC. According to Hawkins (1999), since its establishment, the responsibility of the ABC has been for the 'Australian people' and 'the nation'. This is reflected in content (produced and broadcast by the ABC) that mostly promotes a totalised, unified, and wholly inclusive public. Ultimately, the values that the ABC invokes through its programming are often rendered as absolute, autonomous, intrinsic, and universal (Hawkins 1999, p.178). The ABC's aim to 'educate and inform' audiences implies that Muslim representations on the national broadcaster are taken to reflect genuine depictions of Muslims, Islam, and Muslim communities in Australia.

8.3 Case 1: Muslim-Australian fashion designers on *Compass*

The ABC Charter establishes requirements to provide for minority and special interest groups, by offering educational and cultural programming that the commercial sector neglects to supply (McNair & Swift 2014). The ABC produces and broadcasts innovative programs such as *Compass* to serve this purpose. Presented weekly by Geraldine Doogue, *Compass* is a news-documentary program that has a strong focus on religion, values, faith and ethics. First broadcast in 1988, *Compass* explores the interface between religion and life, as experienced by diverse individuals and communities in Australia. Accordingly, '*Compass* analyses social phenomena, current affairs and trends in an easily accessible manner and examines secular community issues from a theological and practical perspective' (ABC 2014). The program thus provides alternative views about religious affiliations in Australia.

Since 2005, *Compass* has broadcast over twenty segments directly discussing Muslims and Islam in Australia. These have included interviews with Imams, explorations of the Quran as a religious text, and historical narratives concerning Muslims in the early years of settlement in Australia (such as those regarding Afghan Cameleers discussed in Chapter Three). These segments reflect the ABC's responsibility to provide informative and educational content about ethnic diversity in Australia. In doing so, the content produced on *Compass* is unlike that on commercial programs (such as those discussed in Chapter Five and Six), which aim to dramatise and sensationalise Muslim 'otherness' for commercial purposes (Ehrlich 1996, McIver 2009, Phillips 2011). Instead, Muslim representations on *Compass* reflect alternative views that stress the significance of Muslims to Australia's multicultural identity.

The episode analysed below focuses on the practice of Islamic veiling in Australia, by discussing it through discourses of 'modest fashion', as opposed to, Orientalised socio-political debates (see Chapter Five). Titled *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style*, the episode addresses the innovative appeal of Islamic fashion design in Australia and highlights the ways these benefit, rather than 'threaten', the nation. The episode explores the innovative output of Muslim-Australian fashion designers and represents them as driving economic prosperity. These

designers become affiliated with the (national) value of innovation, framed through inclusivity and belonging on the ABC.

8.3.1 Nation, innovation, and belonging

According to Hage (1998), the nation is perceived as a space that allows for the accumulation of belonging at the point of affiliation with imagined cultural values that have been discursively composed by the nation itself. As outlined earlier in this chapter, cultural values are significant in allowing some national subjects to be perceived as 'more or less' national (Hage 1996, p.467, Elder 2007). This discursive mode of belonging suggests the Muslim 'other' is obliged to adopt specific national qualities, as part of a process of becoming more 'Australian' (see also Moran 2011, p.2163). In discourses of nation, these qualities are perceived as values seen to advance (and benefit) the nation and, in turn, allow the Muslim 'other' to be considered as *worthy* (and accepted) in the national space. On *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style*, it is the value of innovation[56] that is recognised in this way and presented as significant in/to the nation.

Gans and Stern (2003) argue that innovation is linked to aspects of entrepreneurship because innovative practices are recognised as producing economic and commercial profits for individuals and national communities. Innovative practices are highly valued, as they are perceived to contribute to national prosperity and economic success (Gans & Stern 2003, Purdie & Wilss 2007). Innovation thus presents opportunities for 'non-whites'/non-Christians, and Muslims in particular, to connect with the nation based on achievements through creativity, ambition, and economic prosperity, as these are deemed significant to a 'united national agenda' (Purdie & Wilss 2007, p.69). This is reflected in *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* as innovative practices become essential, not only in representing Muslims as inclusive, but also in promoting specific multicultural ideals.

[56] In 2015, the Australian government focused on innovation as a national value, launching an agenda that supported and assisted young entrepreneurs Accordingly, 1.1 billion dollars has been invested over a period of four years as part of the agenda to encourage business-based research in the field of innovation (see http://www.innovation.gov.au/page/agenda).

Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style first broadcast on June 30, 2013, and was inspired by an exhibition that took place at Sydney's Powerhouse Museum from May 2012-June 2013[57]. The exhibition focused on Islamic fashion design in Australia and was created to educate the Australian community about Muslim women's dress in Australia, and promote Islamic veiling through discourses of fashion and style. The exhibition became an alternative way of emphasising the creativity of Muslims in Australia, through measures that made Muslim 'otherness' publicly visible, accessible, engaging, and 'less threatening' (Ryan 2012). Influenced by this idea, *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* highlights the works of four Muslim-Australian fashion designers by emphasising their work in a growing Islamic fashion market, referred to in the *Compass* episode as 'modest dress'. Doogue particularly refers to Islamic fashion as a 'new' and 'emerging' industry that shifts how Muslim women are able to dress in Australia. In the introduction of the episode, Doogue explains that 'modest dress' presents opportunities for innovation that benefit both the Muslim communities in Australia and the nation as a whole:

> **Doogue**: Fashion is a huge global business these days, and while many of us might spend a little time and thought and maybe even money on clothes, this becomes another matter entirely when what you wear is intrinsic to your religion. In this story we look at a new and emerging fashion industry catering to women wanting edgier designs that suit Australia's unique lifestyle and climate, but which also match the requirements of their faith.

In this introduction, Doogue associates 'religious dress' with the 'global business' of 'fashion'. Since dress is recognised as an intricate part of the Islamic religion (see Chapter One and Five), Islam and veiling are alluded to in Doogue's introduction but not dramatised in the way they have been on commercial programs such as *Today Tonight* as discussed in Chapter Five. On the contrary, Doogue's introduction to *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* renders Islamic dress appealing, by associating it with materialised ideas of fashion and style. The Orientalist representations explored in Chapter Five about Islamic veiling thus remain minimal on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style.* Instead, the episode focuses

[57] Called *Faith, Fashion, Fusion: Muslim Women's Style in Australia*, the exhibition explored the emerging 'modest fashion market' in the West, and focused on the works of Muslim-Australian designers.

on promoting alternative narratives that view Islamic veiling as a form of global innovation in the West (Lewis 2007, Tarlo 2010). As Doogue highlights in her narration:

> A new breed of young fashion designers is turning heads on the Australian catwalk…they're making their mark with cutting edge designs that appeal to the fashion-conscious…their clothes are stylish…versatile…and distinctive…and they're breaking into a booming global market.

Doogue establishes a connection between 'modest fashion', Muslim-Australian designers, and national innovation. She refers to the designers as a 'new breed' that is 'breaking into a booming global market'. In this way, Doogue highlights the ways in which these designers inspire creativity in the 'global' fashion industry (Lewis 2007, Tarlo 2010, Slottje 2015). According to Slottje (2015) Australia thrives on the production and consumption of creative output in growing industries that contribute significantly to the economy. *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* establishes 'modest fashion' as one of these growing industries that advance economic value in Australia. 'Modest fashion' is identified as a cultural significance that generates innovation as a key resource that enhances the national economy, whilst also producing cultural goods that reflect multicultural diversity as part of an Australian identity (Slottje 2015).

This reference to cultural diversity is of value to the ABC given its responsibility to produce and promote content that reflects 'the nation' (Hawkins 1999). The connection created between Islamic fashion and national innovation on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* illustrates the ways *Compass* promotes alternative views of Muslims and Islam. In this way, it also adheres to the broadcaster's legislative duty in promoting 'local talent' and ideas of multiculturalism. The episode thus recognises innovation as a prized national value by highlighting its function in acquiring, not only national, but also international appeal. Gans and Stern (2003, p.3) argue that innovation has become an ability to create and globally commercialise cultural products, constituting it as the 'well-spring' of economic growth in the nation. As evidenced by Doogue's narration on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style*, Islamic fashion signifies 'emerging veiling styles in Australia' at the same time as these are represented to have innovative appeal.

The focus on Islamic fashion thus transforms common conceptualised notions of veiling as a sole marker of modesty, religion, or faith, to an item of fashion that is bought and sold worldwide (Lewis 2007, Tarlo 2010). When introducing Muslim-Australian designers Kath Fry and Eisha Sarlay (and their 'online fashion label' *Baraka*) Doogue emphasises that the women are constantly 'busy dispatching orders across the globe'. Fry and Sarlay also stress that their designs have been sent 'anywhere and everywhere' across the world.

> **Fry**: …I mean we've even sent to Borneo! We've sent to some of the craziest places. We always laugh like just when we think we've sent it to somewhere funny we go ha ha…No well I got an order from Russia…Like you laugh because you just think…
>
> **Sarlay**: Will Australia Post[58] take this!
>
> **Fry**: Yeah!

This 'global' factor is also significant for another Muslim-Australian designer, Tarik Houchar, on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style.* Similarly to Fry and Sarlay, Houchar stresses that the orders he receives are 'fifty per cent domestic and fifty per cent international' mostly from the 'U.K., France, and England', but also from places 'like Japan' where the 'Muslim community has limited options'. Houchar explains that while his designs are 'uniquely Australian' they are mostly marketed internationally.

References that highlight this global appeal of Islamic fashion are crucial on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* in advancing innovative practices and the ways these benefit the Australian nation. For example, Doogue describes Islamic fashion as a 'highly valuable market' that is 'globally worth over 100 billion dollars'. For Doogue, it is 'big business' that these Muslim-Australian designers are 'taking part in', and subsequently cultivating the economy of fashion in Australia. Through their participation in this 'growing industry', the Muslim-Australian designers are perceived not only as partaking in innovative activities that advance the national economy, but also the international appeal of Australia (Gans & Stern 2003, Purdie & Wilss 2007). This view complements liberal

[58] Australia Post is Australia's national postal service.

notions that reflect perceptions of Australia's socio-cultural prestige and ethnic inclusiveness (Hage 1998, Burchell 2001, Batrouney 2002, Mansouri 2005)

Perceived as actively contributing to developments in the nation, these designers embody notions of Peucker et al's (2014) 'active citizens'. Whilst augmenting national prosperity through innovation, the Muslims also re-define the international multicultural image of Australia. The designers are presented as 'worthy objects' in the national space, promoting opportunities for inclusiveness and belonging. This also allows the ABC to disseminate multicultural narratives as outlined by its Charter, by enabling the nation to imagine itself as inclusive of these 'worthy' Muslim 'others'. The adaptation of national values (such as innovation) thus amplifies belonging within the national field (Hage 1997; 1998, Ahmed 2000, Mansouri 2005). On *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* the Australian nation is conceptualised as a space of opportunity, which permits these Muslim-Australian designers to *be* innovative.

This view is intrinsic to discursive and multicultural formations of the 'white nation' as it fashions environments where 'white nationalists' imagine themselves as 'good national subjects', by producing spaces where the 'other' can be tolerated (Hage 1998). As discussed in Chapter Seven, these 'white nationalists' establish inviting national spaces that welcome 'otherness' (and difference) and render it desirable as a form of 'cultural enrichment' (Hage 1997, Ang 2003, Nguyen 2005, Lentin & Titley 2008). It promotes 'social inclusion' for Muslims, by consolidating views of the Australian nation as a cosmopolitan and multicultural space, where cultural, ethnic, and religious differences are intricate to a greater national project (Hage 1996; 1998, Humphrey 2010). These displays of acceptance encourage what Mansouri and Lobo (2012) call 'intercultural negotiations', which produce pedagogies about mutual respect and inclusivity. Not only are the Muslim-Australian designers on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* represented as innovative, but also as belonging to a 'national project' that promotes the inclusiveness of 'otherness'.

These discursive formations are critical to processes of national engagement and multicultural fusion (Moran 2011, p.2163, see also Chapter Six). In *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* the designers stress that their designs fuse Islamic and

Australian styles. In one scene, Fry and Sarlay, describe how they incorporate 'traditional Islamic patterns' (from Islamic art and history) with Australian attire such as 'maxi dresses'. These fusions reflect novel perceptions of Muslim women as 'fashionable figures' in the West, represented as consistently wearing Islamic dress styles in conjunction with non-Islamic fashion (Lewis 2007, p.436). This permits Muslim women to operate within 'overlapping spatialities' in diasporic spaces such as Australia, where traditional or religious dress conventions are integrated with the 'mainstream fashion systems' (Lewis 2007, Tarlo 2010).

Conceptualised multicultural fusions such as these also reflect processes of hybridisation (discussed in Chapter Six), where Muslims adopt Australian lifestyles and fuse them with traditional Islamic practices in a process of 'Westernisation/Australianisation' (Kabir 2008, Collins et al. 2011, Foster et al. 2011, Woodlock 2011). These hybridising processes establish that Muslims understand the normalised prerequisites of 'being Australian' that include 'dressing in Western styles' and 'enjoying the freedoms to do so' (Kabir 2008, p.229). On *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* these fusions are recognised as inclusive practices that expand notions of belonging for the Muslim 'other' (Garbutt 2009). As Sarlay emphasises:

> About 10 years ago you would have seen women importing their clothes from Saudi or Lebanon or other places like that. And it just didn't fit into the Australian environment. Like it's hot and everyone else is colourful and wearing light clothes. You just felt like you stood out. I think that's where it's slowly changed. Where people went "no that's enough…we don't want to buy it anywhere from overseas". We want to make it ourselves and put our personality into it as well.

The suggestion that Islamic designs 'didn't fit' into an 'Australian environment' reflects the supposed incompatibility of Islam and Australia, facilitated by discourses of Orientalism (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). However, Sarlay clarifies that Muslims in Australia have found ways to mitigate this polarisation, by 'making it ourselves' and personalising the designs to suit Australian lifestyles. In this way, Muslims are perceived as physically and symbolically adapting to the Australian nation, ultimately facilitating a state of self-inclusion and valorisation, which Hage (1996) argues is critical to multicultural narratives in the nation.

These discursive formations of belonging are frequently made conditional to, and appropriated by, the 'white nation'. Chapter One has established that 'whiteness' is naturalised as 'simply existing' in Australia and acquiring a dominant position to which 'everything else' is compared (Hage 1998, Pugliese 2002, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008). While innovation (as presented on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style*) cannot technically be transferred as a form of 'whiteness' in national discourses of belonging, it does reflect an effort to contribute to the 'white national will' (Hage 1998). As 'whiteness' is naturalised in Australia, statements about 'Australian values' only make sense when read as referring to 'white Australian values' (Due & Riggs 2008, p.214). In this way, *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* illustrates that belonging is not necessarily accumulated in the traditional sense, but negotiated through processes of affiliation with the 'white nation'. These processes subsequently allow the 'white nation' to construct and imagine itself as multicultural, and thus inclusive of these 'others'.

8.3.2 Nation, Islamic fashion, and questions of compatibility

The section above has illustrated the ways representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* based on how Muslim-Australian fashion designers (are perceived to) affiliate with, or contribute to, the multicultural nation. The episode also identifies that such affiliations instigate sites of struggle for the Muslim 'other' because Australian national values are consistently perceived as 'in opposition' to Islamic ones (Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012). As the previous chapters of this thesis have argued, fusions between Muslim and Australian identities are frequently limited by a perceived incompatibility that has been heightened by the 2005 Cronulla Riots (see Chapter Three).

These heightened polarisations of Muslims and 'white' Australians ultimately construct conceptions where the Muslim 'other' is seen to struggle in its attempt to affiliate with, participate in, or contribute to, the nation. As Hage (1998) argues, the 'other' becomes 'caged' by virtue of the 'white nation fantasy', repeatedly presented as an 'object' of management of the 'white national space'. While *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* produces educational accounts of Muslims for non-Muslim viewers, in accordance with the ABC Charter, it also reproduces

discursive constructs that stabilise us/them relations in the Australian nation. Part of the issue is the focus on Islamic dress practices on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style*, which have consistently been Orientalised as a form of 'otherness' across Western/Australian media (Zine 2002, Lewis 2007, Ho 2010, Amer 2014, see also Chapter Five).

According to Lewis (2007), traditional Islamic veils have repeatedly been constructed as non-Western and as a type of foreign dress practice that is out-dated and non-modern. These perceptions have consequently situated Islamic fashion in the domains of traditional 'dress' and 'costume', categorised as an unchanging expression of collective cultural identities that are antithetical to the fast-paced turnover of typical Western fashion (Lewis 2007, p. 435). While ultimately recognised as a 'growing industry' on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* Islamic fashion remains a site of contention. Simultaneously with the narratives of inclusiveness and belonging, *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* foregrounds questions of modesty by emphasising the struggles Muslim designers face in creating products associated with 'otherness'. Whilst promoting innovative practices throughout the episode, Doogue also highlights the issues that Muslim-Australian designers are confronted with in relation to modesty. She narrates that:

> Dress is an integral part of Muslim life. It embodies a moral or behavioural code dating back to Islam's earliest days. Today, while dress-codes vary from culture to culture, modesty remains the cornerstone…

Doogue's statement reflects common contemporary discourses that present the commercialised fashion industry as in opposition to the morality of conservative Islam (Lewis 2007, Tarlo 2010, Hussein 2007; 2009). One of the primary issues underscored by this discourse identifies that Western fashion attains a stigma of commercialism, materialism, and consumption, while Islam remains outside these circuits. This is particularly the case where fashion is linked to consumer culture and commodification is perceived as central to 'showing off', as opposed to 'hiding' female bodies (Arthurs 2003, Al-Mutawa 2013). In this framework, innovative ideas of Islamic fashion produced on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* become narratives of struggle, as fashion discourses cannot wholly capture the supposed moralising practices of Islam (Gökariksel & Secor, 2011, p.848).

Narratives of struggle are visible in *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* as the Muslim-Australian designers frequently defend their innovative practices. They argue that modesty is a choice and can be achieved by 'tweaking' designs'. A designer, Aida Zein, explains that producing modest fashion is about altering 'specific styles' to make them 'more modest and appropriate' to wear for Muslim women who practice Islam in Australia. These methods of modification imply that Australian fashion styles are 'tweaked' to accommodate for the needs of Muslim 'otherness'. This contests particular notions established by discourses of the nation that require national subjects to cater to, and benefit the nation (Hage 1996; 1998, Ang 2003). Instead, Zein suggests that the nation plays a role in accommodating for the Muslim 'other', by allowing the 'other' to utilise the nation's resources for its own benefit.

For the Muslim-Australian designers on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* the issue concerns fashion styles in Australia, as these supposedly do not adhere to the Islamic values of modesty. Gökariksel and Secor (2011, p.857) argue that veiling is an act that connects to Islamic moral conduct and is not singularised but expected to be 'a way of life'. This view considers Islamic dress as linked less to 'modest fashion', because it is not recognised in relation to 'dress', but to 'conduct' and 'behaviour' (Lewis 2007, Amer 2014). Al-Mutawa (2013) argues that fashion is a practice associated with beautification in Western societies that emphasises the adorning of bodies for purposes of 'being seen' over 'being hidden', as Orientalist discourses would suggest. *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* thus shifts focus from stressing innovative values to questioning the compatibility between Islamic practices, moral codes, and the business of fashion in Australia.

The designers are represented as struggling in their innovative practices and limited due to the constructed religious norms of modesty. As with Muslims discussed in previous chapters, the Muslim-Australian designers are represented as existing in a contested space between 'being Muslim' and 'being Australian' (Woodlock 2011). This is highlighted in the latter half of *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style,* when Fry explains the struggles of designing and dressing fashionably as a Muslim in Australia:

> There is a certain limit…you cannot have it too tight and too fitted…and I mean as designers we're responsible for this. We're responsible in how tight we fit, how tight we photograph it on the models and how we portray that image [of modesty]…

The emphasis on 'limit' reiterates the restrictions of Muslim 'otherness' in Australian multicultural society. It suggests that while the innovative efforts of the designers are recognised as advancing national prosperity, these efforts are also contained by the 'strict rules' of Muslim 'otherness' that position Islamic fashion as unable to exist without questions of modesty.

Perceptions of modesty reinvigorate polarisations that supposedly appear between Muslims and 'white' Australians in the nation. In Orientalist discourses, these polarisations are shaped by frameworks within which Muslims remain an 'other' through recognition of difference, inferiority, and the power relations that initiate subjugation. As Due and Riggs (2008) argue, this dichotomy presents assumptions that the values held by 'white' Australians are inherently superior to those of Muslims, ultimately denoting that these 'white values' ought to be adopted and Islamic values abandoned. As both sets of values are perceived to be in opposition, processes of adaptation augment the struggles faced by the Muslim-Australian designers on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style.* During a photo-shoot for Houchar's designs, Doogue emphasises how non-Muslim photographers and models are used as a means of bypassing 'strict gender rules' in the Islamic religion. This is followed by comments that stress the presumed challenges of *working with* Muslim designers in Australia.

> **Houchar**: Because I'm a Muslim male I wouldn't obviously be able to dress a Muslim female because our religion does set up parameters between male and female however we tend to use non-Muslim models just because it's easier for me to be able to work and be able to make things be as perfect as they possibly can be.
>
> **Alex Wallace** (model): Tarik [Houchar] is the first Muslim designer that I've worked with and I find it very different working with a Muslim designer than a Western designer. Just the different challenges that you have with poses, the outfits, the make-up, it's all very different…
>
> **Johnny Nicolaidis** (photographer): It's hard because… in fashion editorials that I'm used to doing, it's all about sex and being provocative. Fashion is sometimes very suggestive, especially with women – they're

> allowed to show skin…they're allowed to look at the camera in such a way but with Muslim fashion you suddenly have to take all that religion on board, all these rules and regulations. Suddenly you think this is a great photo but it's not allowed to be published; it's not allowed to be seen. So you really have to take that into account and it creates a difficult barrier...

The focus on 'difference' between Islamic and Western designs in these comments reflects those conceptualised polarisations mentioned above. Nicoladis draws on the obscurity of sexualisation in representational knowledge of Islam, and emphasises how Westernised fashion is presented as 'suggestive' and more open to sexualisation, thus in contrast to Islam. Nicoladis also denotes that part of the challenge includes the 'rules and regulations' ostensibly upheld in Islamic practices (of dress), which ultimately create 'difficult barriers' for non-Muslim photographers like himself. Similarly, Wallace explains that specific (sexualised) 'poses' are prohibited in Islamic fashion, unlike her work with 'Western designers'. Both these comments draw on Orientalist representations that emphasise conservatism and backwardness as an intricate part of Islam (Zine 2002, Lewis 2007, Mossiere 2012), thus perceiving Houchar's designs, less as progressive or innovative, and more as restrictive.

These Orientalised polarisations identify how *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* represents Muslims as 'active citizens' only at the point where imagined values of the dominant Australian culture are adopted. Innovation thus becomes a value that advances national prosperity, but simply to benefit the imagined 'white nation' (Hage 1998, Ang 2003). However, this is a homogenising process that threatens cultural diversity as it emphasises solidarity through binaries of inclusion and exclusion, based on fostering a united national identity (Moran 2011). By contributing to innovative practices, Muslim-Australian fashion designers are feeding discursive constructions that enable the 'white nation' to imagine itself as egalitarian and multicultural at the expense of the 'other' (Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Mansouri 2005, Pardy & Lee 2011). Representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging produced on *Fashion and Faith: Muslim Style* are not necessarily concerned with encouraging points of national inclusion or acceptance, but consider ways that the Muslim 'other' can be utilised as a resource in the multicultural space. Consequently, this produces restrictive and

limited notions of belonging for Muslims represented on ABC's *Compass* program.

Innovation is one example of the ways in which Muslims are able to conditionally affiliate with imagined cultural values in the theme of 'nation'. The value of sport is also significant in conceptualising Muslims as part of an inclusive, egalitarian, and multicultural nation (Spaaij 2015). According to Cashman (2002), sport shares an important relationship with the Australian nation, as it is perceived to reflect core Australian values about unity, solidarity, and acceptance. The next section explores the role of sport with respect to the nation, by analysing its significance in constructing representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging for Hazem El Masri on ABC's *Australian Story*.

8.4 Case 2: Hazem El Masri on *Australian Story*

Australian Story is a weekly documentary series that was first broadcast on the ABC in 1996. The program aims to present varied perceptions of contemporary Australian society, by sharing 'human interest' stories that focus on diverse Australians, including politicians, media personalities, war survivors, and migrants (Bonner & McKay 2007). *Australian Story* adheres to the ABC Charter through appropriating a 'soft approach' in each episode. It predominantly explores 'personal relationships' and 'emotional experiences' as opposed to politicising content (Bonner & McKay 2007, p.642). *Australian Story* does not employ reporters, but allows narratives to be told by profile subjects and others (such as friends and relatives) through testimonial and confessional-style narratives. This enables *Australian Story* to humanise and personalise narratives, by encouraging sensationalised accounts of 'life stories' that ultimately appeal to a national audience (Bonner & McKay 2007, p.644). Through this humanising process, *Australian Story* is recognised as an important platform within which narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging are constructed with respect to Muslims in Australia.

The episode analysed below explores the 'story' of Hazem El Masri[59], a Muslim-Australian (former) rugby league player, famous for his record-breaking point scoring in the National Rugby League (NRL). The episode is titled *A Winger and a Prayer* and was broadcast on September 24, 2007. The narrative focuses on El Masri's experiences and recalls his childhood in Lebanon during the civil war, as well as his migration to Australia in 1988, where he become a professional rugby league player. *A Winger and a Prayer* also enhances El Masri's sporting success as a Muslim in Australia, by highlighting the significance of rugby league as a sport that offers Muslims (like El Masri) opportunities to integrate into mainstream society and engage with dominant national norms (Spaaij 2012; 2015).

8.4.1 Nation, sport, and belonging

Discourses of nation shape the ways national belonging is negotiated on the basis that national subjects are perceived as working toward 'building' and 'bettering' the nation (Hage 1996; 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Moran 2011, Peucker et al. 2014). As suggested earlier, the affiliation with national values is a form of accumulating symbolic capital as a measure of national belonging. Chapter Six has argued that recognition of cultural, economic and social successes may account for belonging. Similarly, the recognition of sporting success may also be regarded as a form of symbolic capital, which is acquired to enhance belonging in the nation. As Hage (1996, p466; 470) argues, athletes and sporting icons are identified as 'national treasures' in discourses of the nation, because they embody 'valued characteristics' that become idolised by national subjects. Such conceptualisations of the nation are critical for Muslims in the national space, particularly those who participate in sport as a means of increasing their sense of acceptance, inclusion, and belonging in multicultural Australia (Spaaij 2015).

[59] El Masri is a former professional rugby league player that played his entire football career with the Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs club in New South Wales. He was born in Tripoli, Lebanon and migrated to Australia with his family in 1988, where he took up the sport of rugby league. In 1996 he was scouted to play with the Bulldogs and become a regular member in the 1998 rugby league season. During the 2004 season, El Masri broke the point scoring record for a single season, which also saw the Bulldogs win the Premiership title that year. El Masri retired from football in 2009 (for more information see Woods 2009).

According to Cashman (2002), sport encourages notions of national unity and 'togetherness', making it intrinsic to the theme of 'nation'. Sport promotes nationalism as a cultural force that plays a crucial role in deploying perceptions of egalitarianism and the acceptance of 'otherness' in the nation (Rowe et al. 1998). Sport is therefore linked to conceptions of 'being Australian' given its promotion of specific values associated with national pride, acceptance, and unity (Cashman 2002, Purdie & Wilss 2007). For this reason, sport is imagined as a crucial cultural value that stresses inclusivity and belonging, naturalised as promoting a form of 'symbolic binding' that encourages active participation at both the physical and the ideological level (Rowe et al. 1998, pp.120-121).

In *A Winger and a Prayer,* sport is recognised as the central component of El Masri's life that presents opportunities for belonging in Australia. The first few scenes present sport as a form of escapism that lessens the hardships of war for El Masri during his childhood in Lebanon. El Masri recalls, 'loud bombs and all that going around', while he 'played soccer' with his friends.

> **El Masri**: Playing soccer there was pretty tough as well. I mean, it was actually a building site that they used to just mark out with chalk and all that and they put up a couple of posts and that was our home ground. I just wanted to go out there and enjoy it, forget about what's happening around me. You forget about it until, sort of the game is over and you're like back to reality again.

Through offering escapism in his early life, El Masri also emphasises the significance of sport in allowing him to associate with others in the nation, following migration to Australia in 1988. Spaaij (2015, p.309) argues that sport is important to migrants who have arrived in Australia from war zones and displacement as it promotes a sense of reconciliation through the rebuilding of social support networks and resettlement. In *A Winger and a Prayer,* El Masri describes how, after his migration to Australia, he continued to 'play soccer' as a form of 'connection' to the other migrants in his 'area'.

Sport is recognised as a value early on in *A Winger and a Prayer* that is utilised by El Masri to gain a sense of belonging. It serves as a significant site for civic participation, enabling migrants to foster social relationships with, and cultural knowledge of, the host community (Spaaij 2015, p.1520). In Australia, sport is

already identified and imagined as a key part of national identity, especially nationally popular sport, such as football (Ward 2010). In *A Winger and a Prayer*, El Masri highlights how participation in local sports introduced him to rugby league. He recalls that 'everyone' was 'taking about it' and that 'everyone just loved rugby league'. According to Ward (2010, p.2), rugby league is a strand of Australian football that gained popularity and momentum after the 1950s and 1960s. Rugby league became recognised as the most popular spectator sport in eastern parts of Australia that promoted a sense of national unity and identity (see also Spaaij 2015, p.312). Engagement in rugby league therefore complements notions of belonging, which centralise dominant national norms as generating cohesion amongst diverse groups in the nation (Garbutt 2009).

Rugby league is represented as a 'social activity' that fosters integration among Muslims and Australia's mainstream in *A Winger and a Prayer*. In particular, Debbie Spillane (former Bulldogs media manager) describes the positivity of El Masri's engagement with rugby league. She recounts the time that El Masri first joined the Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs club by highlighting that 'everyone started talking about the fact that he was a Muslim'. Spillane then continues:

> I think for a whole heap of footballers Hazem would have been their first contact with a Muslim. I mean Hazem didn't date women before he got married. He's never drunk… and I remember players telling me about, for instance, during Ramadan, they'd sort of try and goad him into having a drink of water… "come on Haz, just one little sip of water, no-one will know". And it became a bit of a game with them I guess, to see if they could tempt him to break his fasting vows…but he never did and after a while I think people really accepted him and admired him for it.

Spillane describes the social relationship El Masri developed with his non-Muslim teammates, when he first started playing for the Bulldogs. Spillane's comments are accompanied by images that show El Masri socialising and laughing with the other Bulldogs players during a training session. These images reflect the dominant perceptions of sport as an activity that facilitates social interaction and cohesion in multicultural contexts. As Walseth (2006, p.460) argues, involvement and participation in team sports produces feelings of belonging based on a norm of reciprocity, facilitating discursive notions where sports players are regarded as teammates, supporting each other 'inside and outside the sport context'. In *A Winger and a Prayer,* this is evidenced as Spillane explicitly draws on El Masri's

religious practices (such as the reference to Ramadan), to emphasise perceived difference and 'otherness', and how these were 'accepted and admired' by the other Bulldogs team members.

Such recognition of the 'other' reflects liberal views of multiculturalism that stress the acceptance of Muslim 'otherness' in the nation. As mentioned in the previous section, these views also enable the nation to perceive itself as multicultural. Sport is ultimately recognised as an essential value on *A Winger and a Prayer* that permits humanised representations of the Muslim 'other', which stress national and multicultural inclusiveness. El Masri's sporting reputation subsequently counters Orientalist depictions of Muslims as 'ruffians' or 'uncivilised', and alternatively represents El Masri as an 'other' able to balance 'otherness' as part of his integration into the Australian nation (Foster et al. 2011, p.624).

El Masri's sporting success thus becomes a means of inclusion in a national context. Sporting success throughout *A Winger and a Prayer* presents El Masri as an aspirational Muslim-Australian figure. Sport is therefore a type of social capital linked with social cohesion that emphasises common aims, shared social objectives and a sense of communal solidarity perceived to benefit the multicultural nation (Pardy & Lee 2011, p.299). El Masri's emotional accounts of war, migration, and athletics in *A Winger and a Prayer* are further bookended by his sporting success. At the beginning of the episode, biographer Bill Woods sensationalises El Masri's sporting narrative:

> It's a story that I thought was one of the most remarkable I'd ever come across in the world of sport. There's this young kid on the war ravaged streets of Tripoli in Lebanon who transplants himself to Australia. He then decided to take up a sport that was also completely foreign to him, and a culture within that sport that was completely foreign to, not only the culture he came from but his personal belief in many cases, and goes on to become the greatest goal kicker in rugby league history and plays at the highest level of the sport…

Woods highlights that the culture of rugby league was initially 'foreign', but nonetheless adopted by El Masri as a means of integrating into the mainstream culture (Walseth 2006, Spaaij 2012; 2015). Due and Riggs (2008, p.220) argue that discourses of belonging follow directly from the construction of values,

where belonging in the nation is dependent on affiliations with certain 'norms' of the dominant 'white' culture. In *A Winger and a Prayer,* this norm is presented through the sport of rugby league, which is constructed as the source of success for El Masri as a Muslim 'other' in the nation. Footage of El Masri's sporting success in the episode is fused with Woods's narration of his 'remarkable story', and interspersed by game commentary such as 'this game will be remembered for Hazem El Masri's goal kicking', and 'El Masri scores!'

Woods further describes El Masri as a 'hero' in *A Winger and a Prayer* adorning El Masri's achievements and success in rugby league. Such imagery follows Hage's (1996) own account of sporting heroes, referring to them as 'national aspirations' that possess desired and valued qualities and characteristics preserved by the nation. These concepts of the sporting hero, exemplify the ways El Masri is recognised as an ethnic representative in the nation (through the value of sport). As with the Muslim-Australian designers on *Compass*, El Masri embodies notions of the 'active citizen', perceived to engage with values that advance the multicultural attitude of Australia. These representations also reflect the aims of *Australian Story* as a program that 'portrays the personal qualities that are valued in Australia today', such as egalitarianism and integration (Bonner & McKay 2007, p.652).

Images that augment multiculturalism on *A Winger and a Prayer* are intricate in promoting collective narratives of the 'other', particularly in relation to sport (Walseth 2006, Spaaij 2012; 2015). As Walseth (2006, p.456) suggests:

> If the goal is to create feelings of belonging to the nation, the sport organisations and the media must give more attention to athletes from minority backgrounds so these athletes and other members of the minority group can feel that minorities belong within contexts dominated by the majority…Equally important, the media coverage of athletes with minority backgrounds representing the nation can contribute to a reconstruction and extension of our understanding of what it means to be Australian.

Representing El Masri as an inclusive 'other', through discourses of nation and sport on *Australian Story,* also signifies acceptance of Muslim 'otherness' in the dominant space of the nation. This logic constitutes a generalised sense of belonging that extends to an imagined (moderate) Muslim community in Australia, of which El Masri is supposedly a representative. Multiple scenes in *A*

Winger and a Prayer emphasise El Masri's position as a 'role model' for younger 'troubled' Muslim men. At one stage, Paul Houda argues that there is nobody 'in such a unique position' to be able to 'act as a leader' for the Muslim community.

El Masri is thus recognised as a 'national resource' that benefits the nation, not only given his affiliation with sport, but also the ways that such affiliation influence other Muslims to adopt imagined cultural values and integrate into the nation. Ultimately, sport permits Muslims such as El Masri to become 'more Australian' whilst symbolically remaining 'other'. Sport is recognised as intricate to the theme of 'nation' as it presents notions that relate to multicultural acceptance, egalitarianism, and national unity as valued qualities in the nation (Rowe et al. 1998, Pardie & Wilss 2007, Spaaij 2012; 2015). These qualities, in turn, present the Muslim 'other' through discursive formations that shape national acceptance and belonging.

8.4.2 Nation, 'otherness', and struggles to belong

The analysis of *A Winger and a Prayer* illuminates multicultural perceptions that encourage the Muslim 'other' to engage in sporting activities as a measure of affiliating with the nation and thus shaping inclusiveness and belonging. However, this chapter suggests that national affiliation concerns the adaptation of particular values or 'norms', which have repeatedly been constructed as 'white' (Due & Riggs 2008, Harris 2013). Practices that enhance affiliation therefore do not necessarily supress Muslim 'otherness', given its supposed incompatibility with 'whiteness' in the national realm, but present sites of struggle for the Muslim 'other'. This is because national affiliation is consistently concerned with constructing assimilative modes for the Muslim 'other' to discursively belong in the 'white nation' (West 1990, Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Turner 2003, Due & Riggs 2008, Asquith & Poynting 2011, Moran 2011). However, as the previous chapters in this thesis have argued, Muslim 'otherness' is rarely transferrable as an aspect of national belonging (in the multicultural nation). Instead, it fosters sites of struggle for Muslims, such as El Masri, who attempt to adopt cultural values or affiliate with the ('white') nation in order to enhance their inclusion and belonging (Hage 1996; 1998).

While the value of sport is recognised as a way for El Masri to 'make it' as a Muslim in Australia, it is also a constructed as a contentious space 'used to differentiate and exclude' (Spaaij 2015, pp.303-304). As with (the themes of) 'speaking out', 'domestication', 'in-betweenness', and 'cosmo-multiculturalism', the theme of 'nation' highlights trajectories that enable the Muslim 'other' to become a resource in the national space, exploited to benefit the overall perception of the nation as multicultural. Narratives of nation as presented on *Australian Story* stress the significance of national affiliation as a pretence for the adaptation of 'white values', denoting a shift away from approval of ethnic diversity towards forms of assimilation that erases 'difference' in favour of conformity (Pardy & Lee 2011, p.298). Processes of affiliations thus follow Antonsich's (2010) definitions of belonging, which are harnessed by the rhetoric of sameness and framed through inclusion and exclusion (see also Chapter Four).

Processes of affiliation centralise 'white values' and present challenges for the Muslim 'other' consistently seeking to belong in the national multicultural space. These challenges come through the perceived incompatibilities between Muslims and 'white' Australians (Aslan 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Morgan & Poynting 2012). *A Winger and Prayer* constructs and reflects these conceptualised polarities through multiple scenes that stress notions of difference and foreignness (see previous chapters). As Spillane recounts her first meeting with El Masri, she emphasises his difference as a Muslim:

> …and I just remember thinking, well that's a funny name, Hazem El Masri, I wonder what that story is. He was obviously different…Everyone started talking about the fact that he was a Muslim. He had obviously come from a totally different background….

Describing El Masri as 'obviously different' services representational divisions between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians, which have been shaped through Orientalist discourses. The differences that Muslims supposedly possess are framed in contrast to the presumably 'white' aesthetic of the Australian nation (Hage 1998). More importantly, suggesting that El Masri is 'obviously different', also implies that he is 'obviously' not *the same as* the other ('white') rugby league players and thus ultimately recognised as 'un-Australian'.

According to Mansouri and Lobo (2012, p.122), Muslims are commonly visualised as 'un-Australian' due to their engagement in 'traditional practices' that contest the core cultural values and ways of life associated with 'being Australian'. In *A Winger and a Prayer* this logic is reflected by the comparison made between El Masri's Islamic practices and the lifestyles of the Anglo-Australian rugby league players. Spillane's comments regarding El Masri's 'obvious difference', for example, are accompanied by clips of the Bulldogs players in a training session, which are immediately contrasted with images of El Masri (in prayer) at the Mosque. Such a contrast frames the apparent oppositional nature between rugby league and Islam. El Masri's wife, Awra (El Masri), also emphasises differences between El Masri and the other rugby league players. In one scene of *A Winger and a Prayer* she explains the negative impressions she has of 'football players' and stresses how El Masri is unlike this perception.

> …the image that I had of footballers wasn't a very positive one. I thought, you know, he [El Masri] was going to be rude and obnoxious and perhaps even womanizing to some extent…but he was the exact *opposite* of that (emphasis added).

Similarly, Chris Murphy identifies El Masri's difference as a Muslim on *A Winger and a Prayer* by questioning El Masri's 'fit' with the other 'loud and misbehaving footballers'. Murphy identifies that Australian rugby league players are regularly 'invited to great parties, meet women, earn lots of money, have luxury showered upon them', but El Masri resists this lifestyle due to his religion. Awra and Murphy highlight El Masri's 'obvious difference' as a Muslim 'football player', and also present specific descriptions of the 'lifestyles' of rugby league players. In particular, the perception that these practices are incompatible with the values of Islam, is similar to the framing of modesty in the work of Muslim-Australian fashion designers on *Compass*.

The rugby league lifestyles and cultures identified on *A Winger and a Prayer* symbolically reflect specific 'Australian cultures' that are shaped by Australia's intrinsic association with sport (Cashman 2002, Ward 2010). The rugby league culture is mostly stereotyped to be about alcohol consumption, gendered infamy, and violent behaviour (Palmer 2014, pp.264-265). In *A Winger and a Prayer*, El Masri also identifies that these are 'temptations' for rugby league players that oppose his practices and values as a Muslim:

> There's always temptation out there…the girls, the alcohol, the partying, you name it…it goes on and on. But I've always sort of taken a stance and I've said, you know, okay look I'm not doing this because, you know, it's against my religion pretty much. It's against my morals…it's against what I believe in.

El Masri's comments highlight his struggle to 'fit in' as a Muslim with the culture and lifestyles of the other rugby league players, ultimately reflecting his struggle to affiliate with the nation. Similarly to discussions about 'white' Muslim converts in Chapter Six, El Masri is positioned as unable to adopt specific Australian lifestyles *because of* his Muslim 'otherness'. Chapter Six has examined how 'white' Muslim converts are described as 'giving up' particular 'Australian lifestyles' linked to 'drinking alcohol' and 'participating in parties' on network Nine (Jensen 2008, p.395), the very things that distinguish Australian rugby league players from El Masri as a Muslim 'other'.

These instances of struggle augment both 'being Muslim' and 'being Australian' accentuated in the representational theme of 'nation' on the ABC. As Hage (1998) argues, the point of affiliation in national discourses occurs when the 'other' assimilates into the dominant 'white' culture, but by symbolically remaining an 'other', thus recognised as unlike the dominate 'white subject'. For this reason, the Muslim 'other' struggles to adopt or affiliate with nationally-established cultural values (Northcote & Casimiro 2010). This is particularly evidenced in *A Winger and a Prayer* during discussions about El Masri's wife, Awra. Awra's veil is marked in the episode as a visible symbol of Islam and thus Muslim 'otherness'. For Spillane, Awra's veil visibly differentiates her from the other 'football wives':

> Football wives are normally dressed to the nines and in very sort of alluring, fetching sort of outfits. So when you saw a lady in a long dress and a veil, it was quite obvious that was Hazem's wife.

Awra's veil is distinguished from the attire of the other 'football wives' that are 'dressed to the nines' in 'alluring outfits', reintroducing discussions raised earlier (in this chapter) regarding Islamic dress practices and their incompatibility with Western fashion (Lewis 2007, Mossiere 2012, Al-Mutawa 2013). These distinctions shape Awra's misplacement as a Muslim woman in the culture of Australian rugby league, and reinvigorate Orientalist notions of 'otherness'. As

Phillips (2011) argues, imagery of veils is frequently used in media productions about Muslims to highlight difference between 'us' and 'them' in the nation (see also Chapter Five). However, in this instance, the veil is used less as a reminder of Islamic 'threat', and more to reproduce Orientalist depictions that underscore polarisations of 'us' and 'them' (Zine 2002, Aly & Walker 2007, Ho 2010).

Focusing on these polarisations therefore critically highlights the struggles for El Masri to belong as a Muslim 'other' in the national space, despite his affiliation through engagements with sport. This is evidenced in a scene where El Masri is attacked for 'being Muslim'. Whilst at a restaurant with his friends, a woman yells at El Masri to 'get out' (of the country) and continues to shout phrases such as 'I don't like you guys [Muslims]…I don't like what you do' and 'Get the fuck out of my country!' These phrases reflect racist sentiment (toward Muslims) in the nation and particularly highlighting the struggle for Muslims to 'fit in' and belong. As El Masri narrates on *A Winger and a Prayer:*

> But my kids are born here. I fear for them at times and even other's kids. Are these kids going to be misunderstood as well? Are these kids going to be given a chance in life? Australia is definitely my country, but it's tough to say…times are getting difficult and unless there's a sort of change out there with people's attitude, it's going to make you think it's not home and you need to sort of leave and go somewhere else…

The metaphor of 'home' in El Masri's comments reflects those discussed in Chapter Three, where 'home' is recognised as a synonym for 'national belonging' (Hage 1997; 2002). This construction of 'home' has also been augmented by the 2005 Cronulla Riots, where claims to national belonging were conflated with claims to 'being at home in the nation' (Johanson & Glow 2007, Due & Riggs 2008, Dunn 2009, Noble 2009 Asquith & Poynting 2011).

For Due and Riggs (2008), the parameters through which Australia is constructed as 'home' to 'white' people is constituted through national values that are perceived to be Australian and form part of an imagined nation. In this framework, 'white people' create an image of how they want to perceive the nation by conceptualising the exclusion of groups, such as Muslims, from 'being at home in Australia' unless they too adopt these specific values (Due & Riggs 2008, p.214). This is significant to the theme of 'nation' as it illuminates that specific notions of belonging are based on national affiliation through the

adaptation of 'white values' and abandonment of Islamic ones. In this way, Muslims are symbolically stripped of their Muslim-ness. However, these processes are counter-productive as they negate the normalisations of Orientalist representations that have repeatedly positioned Muslims as 'other', and therefore external to the multicultural nation (Poynting et al. 2004, Noble 2009, Aly 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). El Masri emphasises these concerns on *A Winger and a Prayer* by stressing the struggle for his children, as unlike himself, they were born in Australia and should therefore be recognised as 'national subjects' in dominant conceptions of the nation.

A Winger and a Prayer thus aggravates polarised narratives of Muslims and 'white' Australians in the nation, by placing greater emphasis on El Masri's Muslim 'otherness', and less on his achievements as a Muslim-Australian athlete. While designed to produce humanising accounts of Muslims in the Australian national space, *A Winger and a Prayer* follows other programs, analysed in this thesis, that illustrate the ways representational inclusiveness and belonging are made repeatedly conditional or circumstantial, simultaneously contesting and (re)affirming the 'place' of Muslims in the Australian multicultural context.

8.5 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has illustrated how the theme of 'nation' produces limited narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). While discourses of nation imply that belonging can be negotiated when the Muslim 'other' affiliates with specific national values, it also exploits that 'other' as a 'national resource' utilised to advance multicultural perceptions of the nation (Hage 1996; 1997; 1998, Ang 2003, Yasmeen 2007, Fozdar 2011, Moran 2011). Claims to national belonging are limited or made conditional for the Muslim 'other' in this framework, as belonging works concurrently to (re)invigorate Orientalist positioning of Muslims as 'other' in the multicultural space. Accordingly, 'otherness' is valorised to a certain degree to feed multicultural discourses that allow the nation to recognise itself as egalitarian and multicultural at the same time as being unified and driven by an obsession with boundary maintenance (Hawkins 1999, p.177, Ang 2003).

The two programs analysed in this chapter, *Compass* and *Australian Story*, also establish the significance of national values in processes of affiliation, particularly regarding the ways these account for belonging. The analysis reveals how nationally-established cultural values are presented as resources for Muslims in the national space, in their attempt to enhance national belonging by participating in, and contributing to, the 'national will' (Hage 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Moran 2011, Fozdar 2011, Spaaij 2012; 2015, Peucker et al. 2014). However, processes of affiliation stress the need to adopt Australian values at the point where Islamic ones are abandoned, complementing racial discourses that position 'white' Australians as the dominant national subjects in the nation, against which Muslim 'otherness' is repeatedly contrasted. These ways of thinking highlight the struggle for the Muslim 'other' to integrate, even assimilate, into the Australian nation (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Aly 2010, Noble & Poynting 2010, Rane & Hersi 2012, Roose 2013, Peucker et al. 2014). The next chapter presents a conclusion for this thesis by summarising its key points and arguments.

Conclusion

> Our ability to be comfortable in public settings rests on our ability to be acknowledged as rightfully existing there, that is, to be recognised as belonging.
>
> (Quayle & Sonn 2009, p.12)

> This nation of ours has been able to absorb millions of people from different parts of the world over a period of now some more than 40 years and we have done so with remarkable success and in a way that has brought enormous credit to this country. And it's very important that we keep that in mind.
>
> (Howard 2005, p.13)

> As we continue to see… Australia is often constructed as a 'good nation' that is willing to accept those who come to its shores, and to allow others to make Australia their home.
>
> (Due and Riggs 2008, p.226)

This thesis has analysed the representation of Muslims on Australian free-to-air television in the decade following the 2005 Cronulla Riots. It set out to understand the shifting dynamics of inclusion and exclusion with reference to the contested 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural context. As the first half of this thesis has illustrated, Muslim representations prior to 2005 repeatedly produced Orientalist perceptions that positioned Muslims as a 'threatening other' in the Australian nation (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005, Humphrey 2007, Aly 2008; 2010, Noble 2008, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013, Chopra 2015). These perceptions have shaped discursive states of exclusion, which have been augmented by the events that took place during the Cronulla Riots in 2005 (see Chapter Three). This thesis has identified that the racialised nature of these riots questioned the multicultural formation of the Australian nation, and marked the subsequent televisual production of representational narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging. These narratives primarily stressed the inclusion (over exclusion) of Muslims in the national multicultural space (Ryan 2012).

This thesis has addressed three research questions to understand shifting representations that frame narratives of inclusion/exclusion with reference to Muslims on Australian free-to-air television:

1. How have Muslims been represented on Australian free-to-air television in the period between 2005 and 2015?
2. How have these representations been framed through narratives of inclusiveness and discourses of belonging?
3. Are these narratives of inclusiveness and belonging problematised by racial discourses that consequently limit or make conditional the 'place' of Muslims in Australia's multicultural society?

These research questions have framed analysis in this thesis, through the examination of five themes that have discursively constructed representational modes and narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on Australian television in the years between 2005 and 2015. The analysis of these narratives has evidenced Muslims as represented through discourses of multiculturalism and belonging that are consistently framed through modes of affiliation or relation with the ('white') Australian nation: by 'speaking out' against Orientalist perceptions and demonstrating their compliance with Australia (Chapter Four); through processes of 'domestication' (Chapter Five), where their Muslim 'otherness' is 'made national' and serves less of a 'threat' to the nation; by establishing identities of 'in-betweenness' (Chapter Six), where characteristics of 'being Muslim' and 'being Australian' merge to establish ostensible co-existence between the two; through aspects of 'cosmo-multiculturalism' (Chapter Seven), where Muslim 'otherness' is perceived to be valuable in enriching the multicultural experience of the nation; and finally, through association with the 'nation' (Chapter Eight), by adopting values (of design innovation and sporting prowess) perceived to advance the aims and goals of the nation as multicultural.

The analytic chapters of this thesis argue that each theme represents Muslims as significant to, and part of, the multicultural nexus of the Australian nation. It is these representations that shape and construct narratives of inclusiveness and belonging. The narratives exhibited by the programs considered in this thesis not only produce positive imagery of Muslims and 'otherness' in Australia, but also promote spaces for acceptance and understanding. For instance, the inclusion of

Muslims on programs such as *Insight* (Chapter Four), *Australian Story* (Chapter Eight), and *The Project* (Chapter Seven), allows for non-Muslim audiences to become aware of some of the cultural and religious sensitivities and restrictions of Muslims living in Australia. This is especially true for the Muslim women featured on *Today Tonight*, *Sunday Night* (Chapter Five), and *MasterChef Australia* (Chapter Seven). Through the discursive representations produced, these programs fall into Brown's (1992) category of 'pro-social television', where the content created can be considered educational for non-Muslim audiences.

However, these narratives are also limited and context-specific, as each theme recognises the Australian nation as multicultural, representing Muslim 'otherness' as a 'resource' that does not impact the discursive framing of the multicultural nation as 'naturally white' (Hage 1998, Pugliese 2002, Moreton-Robinson 2004, Lentin 2005, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008). Televisual narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are therefore constructed so as to invite Muslims to 'share' national values imagined as 'already existing' in the multicultural nation, which has established itself as 'white' (Harris 2013, p.33). Any claim to belonging for the Muslim 'other' becomes a claim that must service and advance racial structures in the 'white nation'. It is the stabilisation of these racial structures that allows the nation to simultaneously perceive itself as 'multicultural' and thus accepting of Muslim 'otherness'.

The representations in this thesis produce discursive narratives of inclusiveness and belonging concerned with portraying Australia as 'multicultural' and 'tolerant', rather than, identifying the *place* of Muslims in an inclusive nation. Representations of Muslim inclusiveness and belonging are harnessed by liberal views of multiculturalism, that Foster et al. (2011, p.620) argue present an 'optimistic rhetoric' used to mask the complex reality of ethnic relations in the nation (see also Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Ho 2007). As this thesis demonstrates, these discursive notions of multiculturalism stress the ostensible integration of Muslims (and other minority groups) into the mainstream ('white') society. They are also used to justify racist attitudes toward minority groups, such as those presented by the Cronulla Riots, when these groups are perceived as not trying to 'fit into' the dominant versions of 'being Australian' or adopting Australian values (Due & Riggs 2008, p.216). The preservation of power structures that

persistently normalise 'whiteness' in the nation simultaneously calls for the 'tolerance' over 'acceptance' of Muslim 'otherness'. Ultimately, discursive constructions of inclusion and exclusion continue to shift in the national space, as Muslims can accumulate limited and conditional belonging based on particular circumstances, or conditions that support the 'white nation'.

This thesis has also identified the critical role that Australian free-to-air television plays in feeding the ideologies that construct multiculturalism through racial discourses of belonging, but only to the point where they stabilise, or advance 'white' authority and dominance in the imagined nation. As Hall (1982) argues, television is responsible for the dissemination of visual representations that yield Orientalist thinking and produce taken-for-granted views of the racial world. Television augments our perceptions of society, presenting conceptualised views of 'common sense knowledge' that naturalises 'reality' and the relations of power that structure it (Quayle and Sonn 2009, p.19). Televisual representations thus produce dominant cultural frames that are significant in preserving imagined modes of 'being Australian'. These ultimately determine whether Muslims feel that they belong, and are perceived as belonging in the multicultural nation (Walseth 2006, Humphrey 2007, Chopra 2015). This thesis has illustrated how televisual productions consistently reinforce these discursive narratives of 'being Australian', in relation to 'being Muslim', in a context where one is repeatedly in contrast with the other. Simultaneously, these narratives encourage perceptions where some people (Muslims) in the multicultural nation can be seen as 'less Australian' or 'un-Australian' (Elder 2007, p.10).

The central issue addressed in this thesis therefore concerns the relationship between Orientalised representations, discourses, ideologies, and both representational and material contexts. These are significant factors that connect the production of each televisual text analysed in this thesis through representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on Australian free-to-air television. These factors also highlight how such narratives are limited or conditional when analysed from a post-Cronulla perspective. This is because, as Hall (1990) reminds us, media texts are produced and interpreted through relatable discourses. The texts analysed in this thesis can be understood through their identifiably Orientalist frameworks, and the ways they are produced through

racial-specific contexts that repeatedly position Muslims as 'other' in the Australian multicultural nation.

Summary of analytic chapters

This thesis has highlighted the significance of Australian free-to-air television in deploying specific discourses of Muslim 'otherness' in Australia. It has analysed the construction of media narratives that stress both inclusion and exclusion by underlining the ways in which some Muslims are represented 'as more Australian' than other Muslims, based on their affiliation with the imagined 'white nation'. This thesis has stressed in particular, the critical role of multiculturalism in presenting spaces within which Muslims can accumulate a sense of belonging, and be recognised as valuable 'others' within the nation (Hage 1998). This thesis thus supports a number of other studies that utilise discourses of multiculturalism and belonging to understand the 'place' of Muslims in the Australian multicultural nexus (Poynting et al. 2004, Mansouri 2005, Due & Riggs 2008, Garbutt 2009, Noble 2009, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Yasmeen 2010, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Humphrey 2014, Chopra 2015).

The Cronulla Riots have been presented as a turning point in, and opportunity for, discursive narratives of inclusiveness and belonging to develop on Australian television. Chapter Three identified the significance of the riots by tracking the representations of Muslims in the Australian media prior to 2005. The chapter illustrated that Muslims have been depicted as 'threats' in/to the nation since the early 1990s. These depictions have been framed through media and socio-political discourses that have repeatedly presented Muslims through heightened notions of foreignness, criminalisation, and terrorism, ultimately constructing 'them' as 'un-Australian' (Poynting et al. 2000; 2004, Kabir 2006; 2007; 2008, White 2007, Aslan 2009, Quayle & Sonn 2009, Foster et al. 2011, Al-Natour & Morgan 2012, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Chopra 2015).

According to Poynting (2006), depictions that have constructed Muslims as 'un-Australian' have been recognised as the rationale for violence during the Cronulla Riots in December 2005. In the context of these riots, Muslims are perceived as existing in a space (the Australian nation) where they do not belong (see also Elder 2007, Johanson & Glow 2008, Due & Riggs 2008, Evers 2009, Noble

2009). The Cronulla Riots illustrated how 'localised' images of the nation can be entwined with practices and performances of inclusion and exclusion, with essentially dire consequences for Muslims (Noble & Poynting 2010). These images were underscored by a racialised rhetoric that sought to 'cleanse the nation' of Muslims, foregrounding ambiguities and contradictions in Australian multiculturalism. As Chapter Three has illustrated, the riots reflected discourses of belonging that established 'white' Australians as 'managers' of the national space where Muslims were perceived to be 'un-welcome' and thus could not belong (Due & Riggs 2008). To diffuse and counter these racist views, media and government engaged in initiatives that attempted to reconcile relations between Muslims and the 'rest of Australia'. The purpose of these initiatives was to put Muslim 'otherness' 'on display' and promote inclusive (over exclusive) narratives in the multicultural nation (Ryan 2012). As Tascon (2008, pp.267-268) argues in reference to the Cronulla Riots:

> These had been acts of violence which entered our private spaces through visual images of television; such explicitly-racial acts needed to be re-named so that these spaces could continue to engender feelings of "goodness" and honour, and hence belonging for all across the imagined community.

The Cronulla Riots thus established opportunities where narratives of inclusiveness and belonging could develop and be constructed on Australian free-to-air television. These narratives sought to expand notions of belonging by representing the Muslim 'other' as existing symbolically within, and as part, of the multicultural ethos of the nation. Yet, as the analytic chapters in this thesis have argued, these narratives are more concerned with positioning the nation as *inclusive of* 'otherness', as opposed to, *including* 'otherness' as part of the nation. The five themes addressed in the analytic chapters are taken as discursive formations of inclusiveness and belonging that have developed on Australian free-to-air television. The analysis has foregrounded these themes as they are framed through Orientalist discourses that preserve dominant (and normalised) positions of 'whiteness' in the nation. These themes, and the subsequent narratives they produce, thus work to exclude (rather than include) Muslims as 'other' in Australia.

Chapter Four identified practices of 'speaking out' that have been utilised by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) to present Muslims constructively with opportunities to voice their opinions and counter Orientalist perceptions in Australia (Dreher 2003; 2009, Ang et al. 2008). In the analysis of *Insight* and *Salam Café*, these practices enable Muslims to demystify misconceptions about the supposed incompatibility between Muslims and 'white' Australians that have consequently been framed through a post-Cronulla context. 'Speaking out' provides Muslims with the ability to affiliate with the Australian nation by sharing similarities (with 'white' Australians) over differences, which have been shaped through particular discussions on SBS regarding the ways that Muslim lifestyles, cultures and concerns mirror those of 'white' Australians (Busbridge 2013).

One of the issues identified in Chapter Four concerns the ways in which 'speaking out' reinvigorates Orientalist notions of 'otherness', as it permits Muslims to *speak out* under the condition that they recognise their status as 'other' and discuss matters of 'otherness' prescribed by the 'white mainstream' (West 1990, Hage 1998, Aly & Green 2008, Aly 2014). As West (1990) argues, demystification works to enhance, and not diffuse, the constructed ideologies of 'whiteness', and position the 'other' as attempting to assimilate by 'impressing' the 'dominant white race'. Practices of speaking out on SBS represent Muslims as searching for 'white recognition and approval' in the multicultural nation. At the same time, that nation *remains* multicultural through platforms such as SBS, where Muslims speak out and belong (albeit as marginal 'others') in the culturally diverse space of the 'white nation' (Hage 1998, Dreher 2009).

These discursive constructions of privileged 'whiteness' and subordinate 'otherness' have been expanded in Chapter Five. The chapter has analysed the representation of Muslim women on network Seven within the context of cultural and national 'domestication'. Domestication deploys multicultural logic that stresses the inclusivity of Muslim 'otherness' in the nation with a purpose to monitor or contain it as something that simply already exists in the nation and thus must be managed (Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003, Lentin 2005, Humphrey 2009; 2014, Sunier 2014). Domestication highlights the significance of Muslim 'otherness' in allowing the nation to imagine itself as multicultural and thus ethnically inclusive. In Chapter Five the relevance of Islamic veiling is

understood as a symbolic marker of 'otherness' in Australia, embraced by Muslim women at the point where it can be 'made national' through processes of domestication. Islamic veiling is nationalised in these instances and recognised as part of the larger multicultural ethos. Domestication thus presents Muslim women as 'Australian' under the conceit that any ethnic 'difference' is recognised as 'our difference' and belongs to the 'inclusive we' of the nation (Hage 1998, Ahmed 2000, Ang 2003).

As a framework that nationalises Islam, the process of domestication exploits Muslim 'otherness' as a measure of controlling or managing it within the nation (Ang 2003, Humphrey 2014). Analysis of *Today Tonight* and *Sunday Night* in Chapter Five exemplified that Muslim 'otherness' is intrinsically sensationalised to the point where it can *safely* exist within the the national space and without perturbing the ideological implications of dominant racial structures. Chapter Five has thus argued that this process of domestication is shaped through Orientalist notions as it seeks to mystify the Muslim 'other' and fashion it as more appealing to an imagined 'white audience' (Said 1978). Such Orientalising processes complement the commercial incentive of network Seven, which presents dramatised versions of Muslim 'otherness' in ways that have the potential to attract audiences and increase profits (Ehrlich 1996, McIver 2009). The Muslim 'other' ultimately exists within the national space as an 'object' of multicultural entertainment and value, but also one that must be managed so as not to 'threaten' the already constructed (imagined) 'white nation' (Hage 1998, Noble & Poynting 2010).

These discursive formations of Australian multiculturalism have been examined further in Chapter Six through the theme of 'in-betweenness'. The chapter has specifically explored the ways in which Muslim 'otherness' is frequently imagined to co-exist with 'whiteness' in multicultural spaces of the Australian nation. 'In-betweenness' draws on divisions augmented by the 2005 Cronulla Riots, based on assumptions that Muslim 'otherness' is incompatible with, or in opposition to, Australian 'whiteness' (Turner 2003, Poynting et al. 2004, Due & Riggs 2008, Northcote & Casimiro 2010, Woodlock 2011, Morgan & Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013). In the analysis of *A Current Affair* and *Underbelly: The Golden Mile*, some Muslims are classified as 'more Australian'

or ‘more white’ than others in instances where Muslim ‘otherness’ is mitigated and fused with white/Australian identities (Hage 1998, Ang 2003, Hutnyk 2005, Woodlock 2011). This framework of fusion stresses successful cultural hybridisation in multicultural spaces, framing an Australian nation where ‘otherness’ and ‘whiteness’ can symbolically co-exist.

Closer analysis of the representation of ‘white’ Muslim converts and secular Muslims on network Nine has illustrated that ‘in-betweenness’ constructs limited narratives of multicultural inclusiveness and belonging. While ‘in-betweenness’ attempts to encourage multicultural fusions in the national space, it does so once Muslim ‘otherness’ is mitigated (through secularisation), allowing ‘whiteness’ to retain its dominant position. This discursive process of in-betweenness ultimately presents Muslim ‘otherness’ as less ‘threatening’ in the Australian nation. It also constructs divisions between groups of Muslims by recognising that some Muslims are more assimilative and thus more inclined to fit into the ‘inclusive’ multicultural nation (Hage 1998, Peucker et al. 2014). This process encourages inclusiveness for some Muslims in Australia, but only at the point where it excludes others.

Such frameworks of inclusion and exclusion are also constructed through the theme of ‘cosmo-multiculturalism’, as explored in Chapter Seven. Cosmo-multiculturalism denotes the ways in which Muslim ‘otherness’ is rendered resourceful in discourses of ‘cultural enrichment’, and perceived as vital to particular multicultural experiences in the nation (Hage 1997; 1998, Ang 2003). However, notions of ‘cultural enrichment’ operate at the point of moderation that once again deems the Muslim ‘other’ as less ‘threatening’ in the national space. As in the analysis of Waleed Aly on Ten’s *The Project*, cosmo-multiculturalism moderates the Muslim’s position as ‘other’ through discursive representations of ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ (Aly & Green 2008, Roose 2013, Aly 2014, Peucker et al. 2014). Being labelled as moderate means that some Muslims are able to affiliate with the nation more readily, enhancing their own sense of inclusion and belonging. At the same time, the nation is perceived as inclusive of these Muslims because they are portrayed as aligning with dominant national views and thus do not ‘threaten’ or disturb the normalised constructions of the

nation as 'white'. Instead, these notions advance such constructed and imagined racial formations (Hage 1998).

Representing Muslims as moderate also means that aspects of Muslim 'otherness' such as food, music, and dress, are enhanced as part of the Australian multicultural character (Hage 1997, Lentin 2005, Bastian 2012). As analysis of *MasterChef Australia* in Chapter Seven has illustrated, particular practices of Muslim 'otherness' are represented as enhancing the multicultural experiences of an otherwise 'white Australia' (Hage 1997; 1998, Nguyen 2005). Aspects of Muslim 'otherness' that exist within the nation, such as 'ethnic food', are perceived as valuable resources in constructing multiculturalism in the nation. These discursive constructs also allow for the 'dominant white mainstream' to engage in multicultural practices by consuming 'otherness', but without physically interacting with the Muslim 'other'. Analysis in Chapter Seven has exemplified the ways audiences of *The Project* and *MasterChef Australia* imagine themselves as engaging with Muslims on-screen through the act of watching television (Hage 1997; 1998, Nguyen 2005, Elder 2007, Flowers & Swan 2012). As Hage (1998) argues, these imaginary practices of multicultural engagement allow for the 'white culture' to perceive themselves as 'good nationals' by ostensibly accepting and tolerating Muslim 'otherness' in the multicultural nation.

Chapter Eight has drawn together these discursive conceptions of Australian multiculturalism (that have been raised in the analytic chapters) and addressed them through the theme of 'nation'. The chapter has particularly examined the critical role of the Australian multicultural nation in promoting representational and constructed narratives of inclusiveness and belonging on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). Discourses that underscore national belonging stress the significance of nationally recognised cultural values that allow the Muslim 'other' to affiliate with dominant national norms (Hage 1998, Yasmeen 2007, Fozdar 2011, Peucker et al. 2014). Affiliation with norms represents the Muslim 'other' as ostensibly integrating into Australian society, by supporting and advancing national interests. In *Compass* and *Australian Story*, these representations of integration produce narratives that encourage inclusiveness and belonging.

Chapter Eight has also identified the ways processes of *national* affiliation, further position the Muslim 'other' as a resource in the imagined multicultural structure of the 'white nation'. National affiliations develop through the cultural values that repeatedly service 'white' interest. As Due & Riggs (2008) remind us, Australian values have repeatedly been associated with 'white values' that consistently feed the ideological constructions of the multicultural nation that imagines itself as 'white' (see also Hage 1998, Pugliese 2002, Elder 2007, Tascon 2008). This produces sites of struggle for the Muslim 'other', attempting to affiliate with Australian/white values because 'otherness' is repeatedly contrasted to 'whiteness' in the Australian nation (as the analytic chapters have argued). This suggests that Muslims cannot fully belong as national subjects. Muslim belonging in Australia is thus dependant on whether the imagined 'white nation' constructs and perceives itself as multicultural and thus inclusive of 'otherness' through the deployment of egalitarian and 'all-inclusive' representations (Hawkins 1996; 1999, Hage 1998, Mansouri 2005, Moran 2011). The analytic chapters in this thesis have argued that such multicultural imagery has less to do with Muslim belonging and inclusiveness, and instead showcases the ways in which Muslims as 'other' align with dominant national norms that preserve the ideological formations of a 'white' Australian nation.

The themes that have been addressed in the five analytic chapters stress that the discursive narratives of inclusiveness and belonging are constructed at the point where the Muslim 'other' is perceived to affiliate with established 'white' norms that continuously safeguard racial structures. Muslim representations concerning belonging on Australian television in the decade following the 2005 Cronulla Riots are thus consistently made conditional through metaphoric boundary maintenance of the national space, by a nation which views itself as multicultural at the same time as it retains its essential 'whiteness' (Hage 1998, Pugliese 2002, Ang 2003, Colic-Peisker 2005, Kabir 2005; 2006, Poynting 2006, Perera 2009, Due & Riggs 2008). Each of the themes explored in this thesis present Australia as multicultural and thus a 'good nation' that is open to Muslim 'otherness', only once that 'otherness' can be mitigated or deemed less 'threatening' to the imagined core 'white values' of Australia (Due & Riggs 2008, Tascon 2008).

Each theme has also expanded liberal notions of multiculturalism that underscore the ways Muslim 'otherness' is represented as valuable in the nation. While these liberal notions suggest there are no longer 'real' or 'typical' Australians because Australians are ethnically diverse, it nonetheless promotes conceptions that assume some citizens to be more or less Australian than others (Hage 1998, Elder 2007). As Elder (2007) argues, there are Australians who are represented as 'less Australian' than others, and this is the case for Muslims when they do not affiliate effectively with the (non-Muslim) nation. Multiculturalism thus proposes that the nation has a 'limited capacity' for Muslim 'otherness', constructing representations of the Australian nation which reinforce homogenised and imagined 'white' ideals over notions of 'open boundaries' (Hodge & O'Carroll 2006).

Muslim belonging is also consistently dependent on, and determined by, how the multicultural Australian nation views itself. The analysis in this thesis has illustrated the ways that the multicultural nation expands 'being Australian' to produce a more inclusive national identity, but only where these notions remain associated with 'whiteness'. For Muslims in Australia, this logic is framed through narratives that stress inclusion, yet cannot be constructed without those that also stress exclusion, so that Muslims still live with an ever-present possibility of being 'tagged' as an 'other' (Yasmeen 2010). This is the result of history-old Orientalist knowledge that continues to circulate within the contemporary Australian televisual and cultural contexts. Representational narratives of inclusiveness and belonging thus present positive imagery of Muslims (and especially the nation), but do not necessarily obliterate or supress older representations of Muslims as 'other'. As Hall (1997b) reminds us, these older representations have infiltrated 'our' society and become naturalised by the ideological and racial discourses that continuously retain power relations and divisions between 'us' and 'them'.

Concluding thoughts

This thesis has addressed the patterns of meaning production and exchange within and between discourse, ideology, media, material and cultural contexts, and socio-political knowledge concerning the 'place' of Muslims in Australia. These

relations can be consolidated within three points of conclusion. The first is that studies of media representations of Muslims can rarely move outside of the discourses of 'otherness' where Orientalism is foregrounded. This is because Muslim representations always and already serve particular ideological functions within the context of the non-Muslim West, despite the framing of these representations in positive or negative terms. As this thesis has demonstrated, Muslim representations are repeatedly produced and interpreted through Orientalist thinking, meaning that divisions between 'us' and 'them', Muslims and Australians, or East and West, are unavoidable. To quote Said (1978, p.327):

> No one can escape dealing with, if not East/West divisions, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/coloured one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary, contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent.

Secondly, this thesis argues that contested notions of belonging accentuated by the Cronulla Riots remain ever-present within the nation in regards to Muslims and 'white' Australians. This is because the principles of the imagined 'white nation', as critically interpreted by Hage (1998), continue to linger in the narratives and representations produced and disseminated in/by the Australian media. These formations of the 'white nation' ensure that divisions between 'being Australian' and 'being un-Australian' (by 'being Muslim') remain at the centre of understandings of who can and cannot be classified as 'Australian', and thus exist within the bounds of national inclusion and belonging. Most importantly, these discursive formations of belonging safeguard 'whiteness' in its position of dominance in the nation, with the Muslim existing as an 'other' often exploited for the services and benefits of the 'white' mainstream's perception of the nation as multicultural.

Lastly, this thesis concludes that shifts in representations do not diminish the 'place' of Muslims as 'other' in Australia's multicultural context. This is because states of exclusion can paradoxically include elements of both inclusion and exclusion. Analysis in this thesis has emphasised the ways in which Muslims continue to be Orientalised through media and socio-political discourses in Australia, masked by multicultural inclusiveness and belonging, but actually

reinforcing states of exclusion. This thesis thus follows works produced by other scholars to argue that Muslims in Australia are 'tolerated', but have not yet crossed the threshold of broader, more ethical, social inclusion (Humphrey 2001; 2007; 2009; 2014, Poynting et al. 2004, Kabir 2005; 2006, Aly 2008; 2010, Due and Riggs 2008, Lentin 2008, Noble 2009, Northcote and Casimiro 2010, Morgan and Poynting 2012, Tufail & Poynting 2013; 2016, Chopra 2015).

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