CHANGES IN POLICY AND PRACTICES IN THE ANGLICAN DIOCESE OF SYDNEY 1966-2013: THE POLITICAL FACTOR

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A thesis presented to Macquarie University in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

FACULTY OF ARTS

2013

ABSTRACT

The Anglican Diocese of Sydney comprises around 80,000 adherents, operating in a network of 270 parishes, 37 schools and a number of service organisations, each functioning independently within guidelines established by Synod or the Archbishop. Predominantly conservative evangelical in theology, it sees its mission as evangelising residents within its borders and people outside through likeminded missionary societies. These characteristics are closely related to its active political culture, expressed through organised political parties operating within the Diocese.

Since the mid-1960s, the Diocese experienced massive cultural and structural change which influenced how it expressed its mission and related to its Anglican heritage. These changes were largely determined by theological considerations, its unique ecclesiology (derived from Broughton Knox), and the inclination to place evangelistic enterprise ahead of traditional Anglicanism.

However the Diocese experienced difficulties marshalling its abundant resources to achieve its aspirations. This was largely due to its essentially bottom up power structures (involving autonomous operational entities), an independently minded Synod and Archbishop, and the complex network of inefficient central committees.

This thesis will examine major events and policy matters to see the interaction of politics, structure and governance. For example, the ordination of women, lay and diaconal administration, and how it managed its vast financial resources. Other major subjects (but peculiar to each episcopate) will be addressed within their particular periods as part of the unfolding picture of struggle and change in its highly distinctive and competitive political environment.

It will be argued that the Diocese failed to utilise its many material and cultural advantages to achieve many of its aspirations and in fact ended the period up to 2013 less secure and confident than it was at the beginning. It will be further argued that a less, rather than a more interventionist approach may have been preferable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AAPB	*An Australian Prayer Book*
ACA	Anglican Church of Australia
ACC	Anglican Consultative Council
ACL	Anglican Church League
ACPT	Anglican Church Property trust
APBA	*A Prayer Book for Australia*
ARV	Anglican Retirement Villages
AYW	Anglican Youthworks
ALCO	Asset and Liability Committee
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ASC	Archbishop's Strategic Commission
BCP	*Book of Common Prayer*
CESA	Church of England in South Africa
CMS	Church Missionary Society
DE	Diocesan Endowment
DEB	Diocesan Executive Board
DET	NSW Department of Education and Training
DM	Diocesan Mission
ECUSA	Episcopal Church of the United States
EOS	Endowment of the See
EOSC	Endowment of the See Committee
ESL	English as a Second Language
EM	Evangelism Ministries
FPC	Financial Priorities Committee
GAFCON	Global Anglican Future Conference
HMS	Home Mission Society (renamed Anglicare)
I&I Ordinance	Inefficiency and Incapacity Ordinance
MADCOM	Marrickville Area Deanery Committee
MOW	Movement for the Ordination of Women

MT&D	Ministry Training and Development
MB	Mission Board
MBSC	Mission Board Strategy Committee
MTC	Moore Theological College
NCLS	National Church Life Survey
PARC	Parramatta Anglican Regional Council
REPA	Reformed Evangelical Protestant Association
SACIT	Sydney Anglican Investment Trust
SACS	Sydney Anglican Clerical Society
SAH	Saint Andrew's House
SAHC	Saint Andrew's House Corporation
SASC	Sydney Anglican Schools Corporation
SC	Senior Counsel
SCC	Sydney County Council
SDS	Sydney Diocesan Secretariat
SPIC	Structures and Priorities Investigation Committee
SMH	*Sydney Morning Herald*
TEC	The Episcopal Church
VFG	Vision for Growth
WARC	Wollongong Anglican Regional Council

CANDIDATE'S STATEMENT

I certify that this thesis entitled,

Changes in Policy and Practices in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney 1966-2013: The Political Factor

and submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy is the result of my own research, except as otherwise acknowledged, and that this thesis (or any part of the same) has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other institution.

Ethics Committee approval has been granted for this research project, Reference number HE02MAY2008-D05845.

No of words 91,000

Signed...

31 October 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

This is an inquiry about changes of policy and practice in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney from the time of the election of Marcus Loane as Archbishop of Sydney[1] in 1966 to the retirement of Peter Jensen in July 2013.[2] In addition, it is about the part politics played in those matters. Others have written about politics in the Diocese, but few have done so with inside knowledge. This has meant that attitudes to the Diocese have tended to be shaped by outsiders, often from a hostile position.

The exceptions to this are the doctoral thesis by Stephen Judd, *Politics and Power in the Diocese of Sydney*,[3] covering events up to the late 1930s. The other was when Judd combined with Professor Ken Cable in 1987 to write *Sydney Anglicans*, *A History of the Diocese*[4] where elements of the political life of the Diocese were also covered. In 2005, Chris McGillion wrote *The Chosen Ones*[5], which covered the political battles during the Goodhew episcopate[6] and the election of Peter Jensen. McGillion's book depended to a large degree on interviews with many participants in diocesan affairs, including myself, and while it is a significant and serious study, in my view it suffered from the unavoidable limitation that any outsider would experience when examining such a complex and values-laden entity. Some might say that this was its strength, but detachment is not the same as objectivity, and though McGillion strove to be fair, he brought to his study his own presuppositions about the Diocese and the issues that were in play at the time. Others have written about the Diocese and its politics, and where relevant, they will be commented at points in the thesis where matters they deal with are first covered or where they fit into the narrative under consideration.

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[1] Archbishop Sir Marcus Lawrence Loane KBE 1911-2009, Archbishop of Sydney 1966-1982 and Primate 1978-1982.
[2] Peter Frederick Jensen, born 1943, Archbishop of Sydney 2001-2013.
[3] Stephen Judd, "Defenders of their Faith": Power and Party in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney 1909-1938 (PhD thesis University of Sydney, 1984).
[4] Judd Stephen and Kenneth John Cable, *Sydney Anglicans*, (Anglican Information Office, Sydney, 1987).
[5] Chris McGillion, *The Chosen Ones,* (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005).
[6] Richard Henry 'Harry' Goodhew AO, born 1931, Archbishop of Sydney 1993-2001.

This thesis is written from the perspective of an insider who witnessed and in some cases participated in the major events that shaped the changes in the nominated period. In summary, these changes involved adding to Sydney's unchanging commitment to the theology and liturgy of the English Reformation a more congregationalist ecclesiology and a willingness to redefine Anglicanism in terms of the mission to a post-Christian secular society. This thesis is written in the hope that it will contribute to the understanding of the history of the Diocese from the point of view of those who held the reins of power and who shaped it into the entity it became. The purpose is to give my perspective on those changes as honestly and as fully as I can, bearing in mind the controversial and contested nature of many of the events described. This is an unusual exercise. To put it in a broader context, the question could be asked: could *anyone* who was personally involved in an institution ever write a proper thesis on that institution? Supposing, for example, a former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia decided to write a thesis on the impact of central banking in Australia, would he be excluded, *a priori*, because at some points he was part of the topic he was inquiring into? This is the obvious issue in relation to my embarking on this study.

I was a member of the Sydney Synod from 1963 (with a short break from 1970 to 1975), an elected member of its Standing Committee from 1979 to 2005 with a break of six years from 1993. I was a member of the Cathedral Chapter from 1995 to 2002; a member of the General Synod from 1983 and continuing; a member and council member of the Anglican Church League (ACL) from 1970 to the present, and its President from 1994 to 2001. I was editor of the *Australian Church Record* from 1974 to 1977, a member of the Glebe Administration Board and the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat from 1993, and Chairman from 2009 to 2012. I was also a member of numerous committees and commissions in the Diocese across the period. Throughout most of this period, I was a parish minister, first at St Phillip's Caringbah from 1971 to 1975, Rector of St Mary's Concord North from 1975 to 1978 and then Rector of St Clement's Jannali from 1978 to 2006. All of this adds up to a significant involvement in the Diocese and at times a controversial one. This diverse range of activities brought me into contact with archbishops and senior figures in Sydney, as well as many of the major events that occurred in the period. This raises the obvious

question: can such a person be trusted to give a fair and objective assessment of the Diocese, and in particular, the role church politics played in those changes in policy and practices? No other issue has been of more concern to me in undertaking this exercise than this. In response to this special problem, I have adopted a number of working practices:

1. The question I have been asked is to examine and offer (as best I can) an objective account of the thinking and actions of those who exercised significant influence in the Diocese of Sydney with respect to changes in policy and practices since 1966 and the part politics played in them. When I began this research, I thought the challenge was to describe and analyse major events that impinged on this general theme (not simply to recycle opinions and facts already known). I suspect that many participants and observers hoped that I might arrive at different conclusions than those I held at the beginning. There is inevitably some of that in this thesis, but a much bigger surprise was in store for me than that. I found myself wondering if I (or anyone else) had truly understood how the Diocese (when viewed as a centralised body) actually worked. As a result, the thesis evolved from being simply a consideration of political machinations to a fresh look at the structural and policy context in which those manoeuvrings took place. My principle concern was no longer just to give an account of the political role played by conservative leaders over the last half century. It became as well to answer the question: what is the nature of this complex entity, why has it consistently struggled to achieve its goals and what role did politics play in that struggle? I hope this will be more useful to historians than merely an account of one side of political struggles.

The thesis is divided into four parts: Part One is an introduction to the Diocese itself, a description of the major changes that occurred in the set period and the nature of politics as it relates to a body such as Sydney Diocese. Part Two takes two major proposals for change, women's ordination and lay and diaconal administration, and traces the political struggles, the constitutional implications they generated, and the wider ramifications of these important proposals. Part Three examines the major political, ministry and administrative changes across the period, but following them *within* the periods delineated by each of the Archbishops in turn. Part Four concentrates on the broader structural and administrative elements of the central

administration with a view to understanding why the Diocese found it so difficult to run major programmes from the centre and to suggest that a more decentralized approach would have been preferable.

2. There are times when the narrative will involve activities which I either participated in or personally witnessed. Without attempting to obscure this involvement, it is intended to write in the third person all the way through, with my own involvement described as one participant among many. I take as a model for this approach the practice adopted by Julius Caesar in his commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars. In them, though he was the dominant figure, he wrote in the third person and that allowed him to distance himself from the narrative. There are dangers here, as was noted in S A Handford's translation of *Caesar: The Conquest of Gaul.* He said:

> It is clear that Caesar wrote not only for the information of posterity. The book was also a piece of personal propaganda intended to impress his contemporaries. He knew that, as well as many admirers, he had powerful enemies and detractors. And before standing for a second consulship it was natural that he should wish to justify himself before public opinion ... The reliability of Caesar's narrative has been impugned by certain critics ancient and modern ... Practically all good judges are agreed that these accusations are groundless. Such independent evidence as other ancient writers provide generally confirms the accuracy of Caesar's statements...[7]

Unlike Caesar, I am not running for any office, nor am I concerned what others might think of me, but I am approaching this exercise with a view to providing an informed and (where appropriate) personal perspective for posterity.

3. When it comes to questions of assessing the merits of this or that action or development there are two obvious problems: first (as mentioned) is the question of objectivity. I submit that my opinions should be treated in the same way as those of other participants. If a certain event took place, *because* of what I thought or wanted at the time, *that* in itself is part of the narrative in the same way that the motivations and actions of other participants are. However, to the extent that I can refer to

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[7] Caesar*: the Conquest of Gaul*, S A Handford, (Penquin Classics, Middlesex, 1965), 24-25.

contemporaneous expressions of my motivations I will endeavour to do so, even though sometimes it will be necessary to say *now* what I was thinking *then* and trust that the reader will not accuse me of rewriting events to suit my current purposes. It is my hope that there is enough evidence given to permit the reader to make an informed judgement based on this insider account, which now supplements the accounts of critics. Second, as with any history on near contemporary events, I readily acknowledge that there is the difficulty of arriving at a balanced and realistic assessment of the significance of those events. To give such an assessment is not the main purpose of this thesis, but rather to explain the thinking and actions of those who exercised political and policy leadership on behalf of the conservative evangelical cause in the Diocese. At the very least, this will be something future students might need to take into account when making their judgements.

I write these disclaimers, not in any way to apologise for anything in this study, but so the reader will understand that in attempting to address (from an insider's perspective) how church politics operated in the Diocese I am aware of the problems inherent in my proximity to the events described. I ask only that the reader judge this study on the basis that as far as possible I endeavoured to give a truthful account and not to use this study as some kind of apologetic for myself. Rather, my purpose is to leave for future generations an account of what I believe to be one of the most significant ecclesiastical communities in Australia, the Anglican Diocese of Sydney.

As I neared the end of this exercise, it occurred to me that a reader might gain the impression that my life revolved around diocesan affairs. Nothing could be further from the truth. For most of the period covered in this thesis, I was the Rector of Jannali Anglican Church. That was the main focus of my life. In 1978, when I began there, Jannali Anglican had an average weekly Sunday attendance of 75 (not counting children). Shortly before I retired in 2006, it was over 500. There was a full-time ministry team of six, plus two full-time trainees. There was a youth ministry of around 250 regulars, a large children's ministry, 70 weekly Bible fellowships involving 500 members and numerous other organisations. Nearly 40 young people

had left Jannali for full-time ministry study and service.[8] Growing that church was the full-time passion of my life. As I said in an interview in *Southern Cross* as I approached retirement in 2006, parish work was the main event, diocesan involvement was 'the icing on the cake'.[9] Being a rector with tenure gave me the freedom and independence to pursue diocesan interests without fear or favour. As I often said, 'I have worked *with* but never *for* any of the administrations of the period covered in this study'.

Bruce Ballantine-Jones

31 October 2013

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[8] The details of Jannali where set out in a book published in 2008, *A Brief History of the Anglican Church in Jannali and Como*, by Tracy Kirkland.
[9] *Southern Cross*, September 2006.

PART ONE

THE DIOCESE - CHANGE AND POLITICS

CHAPTER ONE

THEOLOGICAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE DIOCESE OF SYDNEY

1.1 Introduction

The title set for this thesis is: *Changes in Policy and Practices in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney 1966-2013: the Political Factor.* This title could conjure up many different ideas on what such a topic might mean. What matters is that there is a common understanding of its meaning. It is proposed here to give an exegesis of what the title, and by extension, the question arising from it means.

The Diocese of Sydney can be viewed as a community of Anglicans with certain identifying characteristics or it can be viewed as a voluntary association operating under a constitution and following policies and practices that reflect those characteristics. The Diocese as it will dealt with in this thesis can be divided into three categories: the parishes and what takes place in them, the diocesan organisations established to fulfil specific purposes, such as social services, evangelism and Christian education through schools; and thirdly, what is often referred to as 'the centre', in other words, the central administration. Included in this category are the Archbishop and his staff, the Synod, Standing Committee and its network of sub-committees and organisations.

The term *Policy* is taken to mean the values and policies that guide diocesan entities in their operations. *Practices* is taken to mean what the parishes, organisations and the centre *do* to implement those values and policies. The timeframe, *1966-2013*, spans the period from the election of Marcus Loane in 1966 to the end of the Jensen administration in 2013. The term C*hanges* is taken to mean developments (or proposed developments) in ministry, policies or administrative practices of parishes, organisations and the centre. The *Political Factor* is taken to include the whole

spectrum of activity usually included in the term *politics*: the constitutional framework and processes of diocesan government, the policies that political activists sought to be adopted, and the actions they took to advance those objectives. Some may prefer other definitions and doubtless good reasons could be advanced for them, but for the purposes of this thesis, these are the definitions that will be followed. At one level, this is essentially a descriptive assignment; how did certain things happen and what part did one factor (politics) play in them? However it is suggested that to come to grips with that question one has to ask what *other* elements operated to produce the changes described and *why* they (along with politics) played the part they did?

More fundamentally, if one is going to address the *what*, *how* and *why* of the changes, one needs to understand the *inner nature* of the Diocese as a mixture of theological, administrative, financial and political forces.

1.2 A Working Hypothesis

Before embarking on a description of the Diocese, a general observation is offered to the effect that over the relevant period, there was significant confusion and frustration over the capacity (or incapacity) of the central authorities to manage change and manage its resources to bring about those changes. Examples include problems over financial appropriations, major initiatives such as Archbishop Robinson's Vision for Growth programme (VFG) and Archbishop Jensen's Diocesan Mission (DM). These difficulties were so pervasive that in addressing the set question, a working hypothesis is proposed that seeks to account for those difficulties. This hypothesis will be used as a kind of measuring rod to see whether it provides guidance on how central authorities might to do things better. It is:

1. That the operational independence of virtually all its entities (the parishes and major organisations) is such that it is difficult for the centre to initiate and carry through major programmes without their cooperation, which often is not given.

2. The distribution of power between the Synod and the Archbishop means that when they disagree over policy (and even when they do agree and have the resources to implement them), little of lasting consequence follows. This is because neither side is able to exercise sufficient authority and management skill to break through the first element, namely powerful independent entities and a weak centre.

3. The public service like culture of the centre, with its committee run structures, made up of volunteers (with their conflicts of interest and inherent inefficiencies), actually works against accomplishing what it sets out to do, even when there is popular support.

Taking the first element, Sydney has about 400 churches in around 270 parishes. Within general theological and policy boundaries, their rectors and parish councils have absolute control over their operations. This means they cannot be forced to do anything, and instead have to be persuaded to act. The same is true of diocesan organisations such as Moore Theological College (MTC), Anglican Youthworks (AYW), Anglican Retirement Villages (ARV), Anglicare and diocesan schools, which also cannot easily be controlled from the centre. The only way is to woo, persuade, inspire, encourage or offer financial inducements. But if these independent parishes and organisations will not cooperate, the centre will find it extremely difficult to have its way.

The competition for power between the Synod and the Archbishop tends to limit their capacity to create a management and leadership structure that can both *formulate* and *implement* effective strategies over time. Consider the question: who is in charge? Donald Robinson thought he was, but discovered that without a cooperative Synod his powers were limited. Archbishops who cannot persuade Synod or Standing Committee cannot make headway with their agendas. The Synod is the same. For example, Synod wanted lay administration but no archbishop would support it. Goodhew wanted *ABPA*, but Synod threw it out.[1] In general terms, if an

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[1] Stephen Judd, in his PhD Thesis, 'The Defenders of Their Faith: Power and Party in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney', (University of Sydney, Sydney, 1984) traces the impact of synodical government on episcopal power in Sydney in comparison to the Church in England where in the 19th century 'the

archbishop wants to do something but lacks the political skills to take Synod with him, it is doomed to fail. If the Synod takes the lead but the Archbishop does not agree, that too is doomed to fail. If both sides agree on something, but an appropriate structure cannot be found, that also is doomed to fail. This is not unlike the paralysis that occurs in the US when the two houses of Congress and the President do not agree.

But, if it *were* to happen that for a nominated project the right people were to be put in charge, Synod, the Archbishop, the organisations and parishes were all on side, and funding was available, could that succeed? No one knows because such an alignment of circumstances rarely occurs. This leads to the third element of the working hypothesis. Central committees are largely made up of volunteers used to exercising power or leadership in their own professions or organisations. When they come together in the maze of diocesan committees and boards, it tends to be more like a gathering of chiefs not indians, with strong personalities often cancelling each other out. Diocesan committees have secretarial support, but little executive capacity to ensure decisions are implemented. Add to this the turnover of committee membership (leading to a loss of corporate memory and experience), the political skills of many when it comes to blocking, delaying or defeating proposals and the result is a recipe for inefficiency and failure.[2] As will be seen in this study, these factors tend to apply even without the added factor of medium or high level political action.

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established nature of the Church meant that the Crown, not churchmen, appointed bishops and other church leaders'. Of Australia, and particularly Sydney, he said these constraints were absent: 'There was no outside, intrusive decision-making forum like Parliament. Although the legal nexus with the Church in England was an inhibiting factor, the affairs of the Church were nevertheless determined by churchmen. Initially, the bishop was the sole decision-maker but, with the advent of synodical government, the locus of power shifted to the clergy and laity and decision-making was increasingly shared. With this development, church parties were not only able to influence and lobby, but to participate actively in the processes of power'. 161-162. Judd's thesis is one of the most important studies into the Diocese of Sydney. The son of a leading Anglican clergyman, he was a member of the Sydney Standing Committee and a leader of what became known as the Blue Ticket party. He skilfully outlined the origins of Sydney's unique political culture and especially the triumph of the conservative evangelical party in the 1930s.

[2] In 1992 *The Archbishop's Commission of Inquiry*, set up by Archbishop Robinson, described them 'as inefficient, meeting for too long and lacking direction'. See pages 323-325.

This working hypothesis will have greater relevance to matters involving financial or managerial practices than those involving ideological or theological principles such as women's ordination or liturgical reform.

The structure of this thesis will be in four parts. Part One describes Sydney's theological, constitutional and operational nature, and the major changes that occurred in the relevant period (Chapters One and Two). The nature and scope of diocesan politics will be examined in Chapter Three. Part Two will look at two major proposals for change in the nature of the Church's ministry - women's ordination and lay and diaconal administration at the Holy Communion (Chapters Four to Eight). Part Three will examine major elements of change involving politics within the terms of each Archbishop (Chapters Nine to Thirteen). Part Four will examine major questions relating to the corporate side of the Diocese (Chapters Fourteen to Seventeen). The concluding chapter will attempt to draw this material together to address the major question on change and politics (Chapter Eighteen).

1.3 What is a Diocese?

First, what exactly *is* a diocese? Originally the word 'diocese' referred to an area of internal administration in the Roman Empire. The term came to be applied to an area over which a bishop ruled churches. In NSW, the government of a diocese is shared between the Bishop and the Synod. Synods have rights and powers over the ownership and use of property. These powers are laid out in the *Anglican Church of Australia Act, 1902*. The role of a diocesan bishop is laid out in the *Ordinal* attached to the *Book of Common Prayer (BCP)* and supplemented by whatever other functions are given to him by constitutions or synod legislation.[3] Exactly what a diocese should try to do beyond the minimal functions required to maintain itself is a question that occupied Sydney from the time when its financial capacity increased in the 1970s and questions about what to do with the money became increasingly prominent. Questions of purpose and practice will be examined in detail in Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen.

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[3] *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations,* (Diocese of Sydney: Sydney 2005), 40.

It is the contention of this study that a diocese is properly understood to be a resource of financial, physical, social and human assets for the purposes of the Anglican Church. Its culture is shaped by its history, its theology and by those who exercise special influence. Sydney Diocese has its distinctive core values and its own self-image. They are very different from most other dioceses. It is because of these differences, and the way it engages in political activity to preserve them, that it has attracted so much interest and criticism.

Aside from the particular factors outlined in the working hypothesis, three foundational elements must be understood. First is its particular brand of conservative evangelicalism, second, its complex constitutional and administrative structure, and third, the particular theology of church and denomination that emerged in the 1960s under the influence of D B Knox and Donald Robinson of MTC.

1.4 Sydney's Brand of Evangelicalism

In its distinctive conservative evangelicalism, the Diocese of Sydney is different from other parts of the Anglican Communion. Sydney traces its roots to the Reformation, through the evangelical revival of the eighteenth century via such groups as the Clapham Sect, which was instrumental in recruiting the early chaplains to NSW.[4] The rise of the Anglo-Catholic movement and the evangelical reaction in England in the nineteenth century had its echoes in Sydney, only in that case, the response was reinforced by determined political action related to the opportunities synodical government afforded.[5] The fiercely protestant character of Sydney stands in contrast to the sacramental and ritualist approach of Anglo-Catholicism and the more social gospel orientation of liberalism. In recent years, as noted later in this chapter, the more congregationalist emphasis of D B Knox led to an even greater distinction from Anglicanism as experienced in Britain and North America. However, with respect to Anglicans in the Third World (greatly influenced by evangelical missionaries),

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[4] See M L Loane, *Hewn From the Rock: Origins and Traditions of the Church in Sydney*, (Anglican Information Office, Sydney), and Stephen Judd and Kenneth Cable, *Sydney Anglicans*, (Anglican Information Office, Sydney).
[5] See pages 68-69 on the origins of the ACL and Stephen Judd, Defenders of their Faith: Power and Party in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney, 1909-1938, (PhD thesis, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1984).

Sydney has in recent decades found common cause on issues related to sexual morality, leading to strong co-operation such as the GAFCON conferences of 2008 and 2013.[6]

As for what place Sydney occupies in the range of evangelical varieties, Richard Turnbull's summation captures some of the issues:

> What conclusions can be drawn about Evangelicalism? First, that it too [with Anglicanism] is grounded in the Reformation, but also has been influenced by more Pietistic and Holiness Traditions. Second, that it possesses key marks in the areas of authority (the Bible), doctrine (substitutionary atonement), spirituality (the personal relationship with Jesus) and transformation (evangelicalism). Third, that the Evangelical tradition is a spectrum, with differing weight attached to various antecedents explaining either more Reformed or more Charismatic emphasis.[7]

From a Sydney perspective, at the heart is the question of how a sinner can be restored to relationship with God and thus be saved from the 'wrath to come'. How this was accomplished is explained by the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. This is the view that when Jesus died on the cross he took the place of sinners at the bar of God's judgement.

This doctrine is fundamental to evangelicals. For example, Archdeacon T C Hammond, former Principal of MTC, said:

> The significance of the atonement is a paramount feature of evangelical thought. It separates the evangelical from the liberal or modernist theologian on the one hand, who tends to move away from the idea of propitiation to the lower notion of an example of sacrificial endurance. It also separates the evangelical from the Roman Catholic, or even the Anglo-Catholic opinion, that in some remote way the individual can be a partner in the completed sacrifice of our Lord and offer some compensation to God for the sins he has committed.[8]

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[6] See page 280.

[7] Richard Turnbull, *Anglican and Evangelical?* (Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 2007), 165.

[8] T.C. Hammond, *What is an Evangelical?* (Evangelical Tracts and Publications, Beecroft, 1959), 15.

That *this* doctrine separates evangelicals from liberals is seen in the attack on it by Peter Carnley, former Archbishop of Perth and Primate of the Anglican Church of Australia (ACA). He calls the penal substitutionary theory the 'offensive view of an uncompromisingly cruel punishing God with an inadequate, rough and ready kind of justice, in that the innocent Christ suffers the required punishment to satisfy God instead of the guilty'.[9] He says that it survives amongst some 'local pockets' of Christians. 'It is certainly clear that some Sydney Anglicans still think of the gospel message predominantly in terms of this particular understanding of the Atonement'.[10] It is not intended to argue with Carnley's opinion, or even to debate the doubtful observation that the doctrine survives in 'local pockets', it is to show the enormous gap within the ACA about the nature of reconciliation with God.

Another important element of Sydney evangelicalism is the place of evangelism. An example of this was the 1959 Billy Graham Crusade. Stuart Piggin, in *Evangelical Christianity in Australia* observed, 'at the last meeting of the [1959] Sydney Crusade, Graham waxed lyrical on the Sydney clergy. Seldom had he seen, "a city before, where one man was so loved by so many from all walks of life as the late Archbishop

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[9] Peter Carnley, *Reflections in Glass*, (Harper Collins *Publishers*: Sydney, 2004), 4. It is not every day that a sitting primate of the ACA writes a book attacking the largest diocese in his Church. That is what Archbishop Peter Carnley did in *Reflections in Glass.* Whilst the book deals with his views on a number of major theological issues, it is his attacks on the Diocese of Sydney that mark it out for special attention. He was particularly aggrieved by Sydney responses to his *Bulletin* article in 2000 in which he was interpreted as casting doubt on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus. (This was not the first time that questions on this subject were levelled at him, nor that he made vigorous reactions to them, even to the point of raising the possibility of legal action). So strong was reaction to the *Bulletin* article that a boycott of his installation as Primate at St Andrew's Cathedral was organised, which itself attracted wide publicity and not a little embarrassment to him.

At the heart of his differences with Sydney is the clash between his theological liberalism (he prefers to describe himself as 'progressive or dynamic orthodox', 278) and what he calls Sydney's 'rationalistic' approach to theological discussion. For example at 15 he says:

> Within Australian Anglicanism it is fairly clear, for example, that 'Sydney Anglicans' think of revelation in terms of a body of information of a propositional kind that is found within the pages of scripture. This presupposes that there can be a single reading of the scriptural texts of a very clear and distinct kind and that the revelation of God can be understood to be communicated in matter-of-fact, black and white terms. Others of us appreciate the Word of God not so much as a body of information, but as an invitation to relate to God, who ultimately remains essentially an unfathomable mystery to us, and as a Word of promise to be with us always as we wrestle to discern his truth for the living of our lives.

The Sydney rejoinder would be to say that even though we do not know *everything* about God from the Scripture, that does not mean that we do not know *anything* about him and that knowledge is discoverable by the application of reason and scholarly research. As with so much external criticism of Sydney, this book exemplifies the limitations of distance from firsthand knowledge and the polemical environment out of which it was written.

[10] Ibid, 4.

Mowll", nor a city where the calibre of the clergy has been so high, so devout, so spiritual, so evangelical as in the City of Sydney'.[11] There were two subsequent Billy Graham crusades in Sydney, both initiated by Marcus Loane. It was the passion to be more effective in evangelism that precipitated many of the changes that will be examined in this study. This desire also manifested itself in the determination of many to make Anglicanism fit *around* the evangelistic imperative, rather than let evangelism fit *into* Anglicanism.

Sydney Anglicans believe their distinctive brand of Anglicanism comes from the English Reformation, expressed in the phrases, *Scripture Alone, Grace Alone, Christ Alone and Faith Alone.* Sydney evangelicals see any weakening of these principles as striking at the heart of what it means to be Christian and truly Anglican. This explains why they fight so hard to preserve this understanding in the Diocese and will use political means to achieve that preservation. Early in the twentieth century, Sydney evangelicals saw how evangelicals in England had to compete for their place in the English Church against Anglo-Catholicism. Stephen Judd notes:

> At the beginning of the twentieth century, evangelicals appeared to be a significant force in the Church of England. Evangelical clergymen occupied the pulpits of 4,000 churches and the evangelical flagship of the CMS was experiencing an unprecedented level of support ... In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the fight against ritualism ... had been ostensibly successful in the law courts, where ritualists had been consistently defeated ...[12]

Yet this dominant position evaporated. Judd attributes this decline to the liberal evangelicals, who he says, 'acted ... [up to the mid 1920s] as a fifth column in the evangelical ranks augmenting their own influence at the expense of the conservative evangelicals, whose position they had consistently undermined'.[13] He says,

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[11] Stuart Piggin, *Evangelical Christianity in Australia, Spirit, Word and World*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 1996) 163.
[12] Judd, Defenders of Their Faith, 207. G.R. Balleine in, *A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England*, (Church Book Room Press Ltd: London, 1951), records how Archbishop Tait determined that if the ritualists 'resolved to set the law at defiance, they must sooner or later feel the power of its arm'. Balleine continues, 'Before long several clergy found themselves in prison for contempt of court, and by consenting to suffer imprisonment they won the battle'. 184.
[13] Defenders of their Faith, 237.

'conservative evangelicals in Sydney were determined that the same enervating developments should not occur [in Sydney]'.[14]

In fact, evangelicalism in Sydney not only survived but flourished. Anglicanism, having arrived with the first fleet through evangelical chaplains, became firmly evangelical under the influence of Frederic Barker, Bishop of Sydney (1855 to 1882). During Barker's term many key institutions were created, and synodical government was inaugurated in 1866. Of his influence, Donald Robinson (in the 1976 Moore College Library Lecture, The Origins of the Anglican Church League), said:

> Without doubt we owe to Bishop Barker the foundation of much that is still characteristic of the Diocese of Sydney: the foundation of a group of strong and effective parishes, of a band of vigorous and evangelistically minded clergy and laity, and of institutions like the Church Society, Moore College, and the Lay Reader's Association. Under his guidance the diocesan synod was formed, as well as the Chapter of St. Andrew's Cathedral, both of which became important instruments of representative opinion and government in church matters. Baker's evangelical influence was exerted through the men whom he attracted into the ministry and through his style of leadership.[15]

During the terms of Archbishops William Saumarez Smith and John Charles Wright (both liberal evangelicals), evangelicalism continued as the majority faction. But it was the Anglican Church League (ACL), founded in 1909 to oppose tractarian influence, which made the difference. It successfully promoted the election of Howard Mowll as Archbishop in 1933, and then the appointment of T C Hammond as Principal of MTC in 1934. The ACL of that period fostered a more conservative brand of evangelicalism, which in turn came to dominate theological and political forces in the Diocese. This dominance has continued ever since so that by 2013, the proportion of non-evangelical parishes, (if one takes the place of training of clergy as a guide), numbered only about eight percent.[16] By the 1960s, the battles against

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[14] Ibid, 319.
[15] Donald Robinson, The Origins of the Anglican Church League, The Second Moore College Lecture, 9 April 1976, published without date by the Anglican Church League.
[16] Sydney *Year Books* list the place of training of clergy and show that over 90 percent were trained at Moore Theological College. Not all graduates of MTC are conservative evangelicals and many non-Moore College clergy are, but the numbers of both are relatively small and tend to cancel each other

Anglo-Catholicism were over, leaving conservative evangelicals in almost total control.[17]

1.5 Structures of the Diocese of Sydney

Sydney Diocese is a legal, administrative and political entity. Up until 1835, the Church of England in Australia was part of the Diocese of Calcutta. Thereafter it became a separate diocese with Archdeacon Broughton its first Bishop. Over time,

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out, leaving the criterion of the place of training a reasonable basis of judging the shift in the balance in the Diocese.

[17] There are a number of books about the Sydney Diocese which form a useful introduction. Foremost among them is *Sydney Anglicans: A History of the Diocese,* Stephen Judd and Kenneth Cable, (Anglican Information Office, Sydney, 1987). In preparation for Australia's bi-centenary, Sydney Standing Committee commissioned this short history from its beginnings to 1987. It was fortunate to have Kenneth Cable, the doyen of church historians of his time and Stephen Judd, who studied under Cable and gained his PhD with his landmark thesis on the politics of the Diocese up to 1938. It is more a handbook than a heavily critical analysis of the Diocese. It summarises major eras and important episodes in an accessible and easily digestible form. It is essential reading to anyone wanting to gain an insight into an institution which for many is 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'. With respect to the politics of Sydney after the formation of the ACL in 1909, Judd's description, and his own perspective on the issues is most valuable. He clearly favoured a more comprehensive ACL and is unsympathetic with its becoming a more conservative force emphasising its links with the English Reformation and latterly its more overtly reformed ecclesiology. After the publication of *Sydney Anglicans* Judd became an active participants in the battles described under the heading of the *Holy Wars* during the Goodhew years and was, along with Ballantine-Jones, a member of the GAB/SDS in the years leading up to the crisis of the GFC.

The nearest equivalent to *Sydney Anglicans* as it applies to its sister diocese of Melbourne is *People of the Past?-The Culture of Melbourne Anglicans and Anglicanism in Melbourne's Culture.* This is a collection of papers to mark the 150th anniversary of the Diocese of Melbourne 1847-1997, edited by Colin Holden and published in 2000 by the History Department of Melbourne University. Part 1 contains a series of articles concerning Melbourne's very different approach to matters such as women's ordination, homosexuality and church music. Part 2 deals with episcopal elections from 1947 to 1990, tensions between centralism and regionalisation. The Introduction by Holden examines Melbourne's distinctive culture in comparison to Sydney's which impacted on the different styles of Anglicanism. Though this work covers matters mostly outside the scope of this study, it casts valuable light on a number of factors that became prominent in the Australian Church in the late 20th century and which points to the need of a more detailed examination of the divergences in culture and theology between the two great Australian dioceses.

Another example of the perception of a Melbourne/Sydney divide is seen in Stuart Piggin's paper 'Not a Little Holy Club' – Lay and Clerical leadership in Australian Anglican Evangelicals 1788-1988', *The Ministry, Clerical and Lay: Studies in Church History, Vol 26,* ed. W J Sheils, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1989). See also *Evangelical Christianity in Australia: Spirit, Word and World,* Stuart Piggin, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996). This book contains a broad survey of the range of evangelical schools of thought in Australia under the theme of spirit (pietism), word, (dogmatic and reformed) and world (supportive of social engagement). It covers a number of events that appear in this thesis, albeit in outline form. Along the same lines but with a decidedly international focus are *Anglican and Evangelical?* by Richard Turnbull, (Continuum International Publishing Group, London 2007) and *Gospel People? Evangelicals and the Future of Anglicanism* by John Martin, a Sydney raised writer now living in the UK, (SPCK, London, 1997). Both look at the fragmentation of evangelicalism, Martin doing so with a clearer understanding of Sydney evangelicalism, though a little dated now.

the original Diocese was subdivided so that by the end of the nineteenth century the Diocese of Sydney was defined by its present boundaries, reaching from Ulladulla in the south, Lithgow in the west and Broken Bay in the north. As at 2013, the Diocese had 270 separate parishes with some 400 churches and a weekly attendance of around 80,000 people.[18]

Sydney Diocese operates under the *Anglican Church of Australia Constitution Act, 1961,* and *the Australian Church of Australia Act, 1902*. It holds its property under the *Anglican Church of Australia Church Trust Property Act, 1917*. The management of its institutions is governed by the *Anglican Church of Australia, Bodies Corporate Act, 1938*.[19] The *1902 Constitution Act* divides the government of the Diocese between the Archbishop, responsible for the training and licensing of clergy, and the Synod, responsible for finances, property and the making of ordinances or laws. Included in its powers is the right to vary the trusts on which church property is held. This is a very significant power, rivalling that of the NSW Supreme Court in that respect.

Lay members of Synod are elected by parishioners. Rectors are automatically members. Other clergy and lay persons are appointed by the Archbishop and the Standing Committee respectively. Synod elects the committees that manage its organisations, with the Archbishop making some appointments as well. There are about 50 such bodies, including the Standing Committee of the Synod, the Property Trust (ACPT), regional councils, church schools, university colleges, disciplinary tribunals and ministry organisations such as MTC, Anglicare and Youthworks. Standing Committee elects members to other boards such as the Glebe Administration Board (GAB), the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat (SDS) and the Endowment of the See Committee (EOSC). The total membership of all these bodies is well over 600 people. Elections in most cases take place at the beginning of the Synod's triennial cycle. It has been the practice over many years for political groups to circulate how to vote tickets. The ACL is the largest of these groups and for the

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[18] These figures were quoted by Peter Jensen in his final Synod address in 2012. See *Proceeding of Synod 2012, www.sydneyanglicans.org,*follow links to Sydney Diocesan Secretariat under *Past Synods.*
[19] See *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations, Anglican Church of Australia Diocese of Sydney*, (Diocese of Sydney: Sydney,) 2005.

most part tends to have its recommendations supported by the overwhelming majority of the Synod. This process is the main source of its political power.

Under the Delegation of Powers Ordinance 1998, Standing Committee has power to vary trusts, pass ordinances and fill casual vacancies to committees. The ACL, through its members on Standing Committee, is active in nominating people to fill those vacancies. Once elected in this way it is usual that the new members are confirmed at the next meeting of the Synod. This procedure is another source of power for the ACL. The Standing Committee also operates as a kind of executive committee for Synod, preparing legislation, budgets and policy proposals for consideration at its annual meeting.

Control of the Diocesan Endowment (DE) is in the hands of the Glebe Administration Board (GAB). The Sydney Diocesan Secretariat (SDS) provides administrative services to central diocesan bodies on a fee for service basis. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, the amount of funds under the control of GAB for investment purposes was $775 million.[20] Surpluses from investments are distributed by the Synod to finance diocesan activities.

Parishes function under the Church Administration Ordinance 1990, which gives them a very wide degree of independence. Under the *1917 Trust Property Act*, local parish property cannot be sold or mortgaged without the consent of the parish council, but neither can the parish sell or mortgage its property without the consent of the Synod or the Standing Committee acting on its behalf.

Many diocesan organisations are very large. For example, MTC in 2008 had 322 full-time undergraduate students, a faculty and staff of 75 and an annual budget of $10.7 million. Anglicare in 2008 employed 1,345 persons, with an additional 1,400 volunteers, and had an annual budget of $74.5 million. Anglican Retirement Villages (ARV) in 2008 provided accommodation for 3611 residents, employed 1982 persons, and had an annual turnover of $120 million with total assets of $693 million. In 2008 the Sydney Anglican Schools Corporation (SASC) ran 15 schools with 10,600 pupils

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[20] *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 703.

and a total staff of 1,400. In addition there are 17 other diocesan schools operating under their own ordinances. AYW operates a wide range of children's and youth ministries. In 2008 it catered for approximately 40,000 young people in its camps. It also runs a college to train full-time youth workers. In 2008, it had an annual budget of $11.3 million, and employed 319 people.[21] The actual details of these organisations change from year to year, but the information above is offered to illustrate their size and range of activity.

1.6 Theology of Church and Denomination

Questions related to biblical authority and soteriology were not matters of contention in the period under review, but one important theological element was. That was the theology of the church and denomination, essentially due to the impact of the views of Broughton Knox and Donald Robinson. An early expression of this was the article on the Church by Donald Robinson in the IVF *New Bible Dictionary*:

> While there might be as many churches as there are cities or even households, yet the New Testament recognizes only one ecclesia [church] without finding it necessary to explain the relationship between the one and the many. The one was not an amalgamation or federation of the many. It was a 'heavenly' reality belonging not to the form of this world but to the realm of the resurrection glory where Christ is exalted at the right hand of God. Yet since the local ecclesia was gathered together in Christ's name and had him in its midst, it tasted the powers of the age to come and was the first fruits of that eschatological ecclesia. So the individual local church was called the church of God, which was purchased with his own blood.[22]

Broughton Knox took up this idea and published his developed theology of church and denomination in *Thirty Nine Articles* in 1967. He pointed out that when the New Testament uses the word 'church', it always means a gathering or assembly. 'Since Christ is now in heaven that is where the New Testament thinks of him as building

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[21] The Sources for these statistics are published reports from the CEOs of the relevant organisation, obtained in April 2009. They change from year to year and are included here to illustrate the proposition that 'many diocesan organisations are very large'.
[22] *The New Bible Dictionary*, Ed, J D Douglas (Inter Varsity Fellowship London, 1964), 228.

his church. Because the church of Christ is the assembly which he calls into being around himself, this church is a present –and not merely a future – reality, and Christians are to think of themselves as members of this assembly with him in heaven'. The principle of unity of this church, Knox says, is the fact that Christ has assembled it around *himself*; 'it is logically impossible for him to assemble two churches, for Christ is to be thought of as in one place only, that is, in heaven'. Local churches come into being as their members are joined to Christ by faith but, according to Knox, these local churches will never be visibly 'one' assembly until the Second Coming.

On the question of the relationship *between* the various local manifestations of the church, Knox said; 'The basic and only essential bond between local visible churches is the mutual love, interest and prayer that members of one assembly have for members of another'. Knox argues that denominations develop when the various local assemblies of Christians are grouped together in patterns of fellowship:

> These groupings, or denominations, arose in the course of history for various reasons; but what delineates a denomination at the present time, and is its basic principle of continuity, is the restriction of fellowship to within that particular denomination. Nowadays denominationalism is greatly strengthened and perpetuated by the centralised structure that has been built up to serve denominationally linked churches.[23]

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[23] D B Knox, *The Thirty Nine Articles*, (Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1967). Summary and quotations have been taken from 41 to 50, and from *The Reformed Theological Review*, 23 (1964), 48-55. In the publication *Interchange,* Number 12 1972, Paul Barnett wrote an article, 'Church and Denomination' which was an exposition of the Knox/Robinson doctrine. He said: By 'denomination' we understand a union or association of churches which are rooted in history. ... This association of churches submits to a specific form of ecclesiastic government and it fulfils a particular method of law-making for its constituents. It conducts on behalf of its churches certain evangelistic agencies as well as various forms of Christian compassion. Thus a 'denominational' polity can accomplish much that an 'independent' polity is incapable of fulfilling. However, there are certain dangers with which most of us are familiar. The "churches" of God can be swamped by the very instrument which should be its servant. The concrete effects and achievements of the service organisation (property, institutions, etc.), can become an end in themselves, an object of pride, even to the point of idolatry'.

Knox said such denominational organisations are essentially human structures in contrast to the divine character of the 'Church of God'. That is to say, these 'structures are essentially secular, using the term in the good sense'.[24]

Knox was not against denominations. He recognised that as service organisations they provide many benefits, such as expert advice, training colleges and a pool of ministers to draw on. They provide financial facilities for buildings, superannuation and cheaper insurance. These are all good, but Knox pointed out the problems: '... centralisation, worldliness in the form of high sounding titles, invoking influence that does not arise out of the power of the gospel'.[25] He made the further point that denominations frequently use their control over church trust property to apply sanctions against congregations and ministers. He said that if property was not owned by a trust for the use of the denominational 'church', denominational edges would become blurred. Knox argued that because denominations are in their very essence secular man-made bodies (often the accident of history) and use their power over property as a means of enforcing doctrinal or behavioural discipline, they are a long way removed from the New Testament picture of the heavenly church or the local assembly meeting in the presence of Christ for love, fellowship and to hear the word of God and to 'rightly and duly administer the sacraments'.

It is precisely because of the considerable benefits denominations provide (and the considerable risks) that evangelicals in Sydney try to ensure that people who share their opinion on theology and mission are put in charge of denominational structures. The method by which this is achieved in Sydney (as in other secular bodies) is *politics*.

Once denominationalism was demystified and its secular nature recognised, many in Sydney had a new and liberating framework for political action and this shaped many policies for reform. This characteristic was noted by Prof Michael Horsburgh in his 2001 *Bulletin* article 'High Politics'. He said, '... this group [ACL and its supporters]

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[24] Ibid. Judd and Cable said of Archbishop Gough's Commission of Inquiry in 1959, 'there is little in the Commission's findings that a secular corporation would have queried; indeed they represent the application of modern financial and managerial methods to the Church's business,' *Sydney Anglicans*, 268.
[25] Knox, *Thirty Nine Articles*, 41-50.

may appear to be socially conservative in its rejection of the ordination of women and attitudes towards homosexuality, but it seeks radical change in the Australian Church and Anglicanism in general'. The abandonment of robes, prayer book services and support for lay administration were described by Horsburgh as attempts to 'break down the traditional identifiable culture of Anglicanism and merge it with a generalised modern protestant culture'.[26] It was the generation trained by Knox and Robinson, having attained leadership positions in the Diocese by the 1990s, which led attempts to reshape the Diocese to conform better to the Knox understanding of church.[27]

1.7 Other Important Elements of the Diocese of Sydney

There are five additional elements that are important when considering how Sydney functions. They are, MTC, political parties, the office of the Archbishop, the nature of the Synod, and Sydney's attitude to law.

Stephen Judd observed that Sydney evangelicalism has always been about the political leadership of the clergy:

> While other evangelical parties in Australia were almost exclusively lay in character, the predominance of clergy in the ACL provided the League with the stability and depth of leadership for its political success.[28]

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[26] Michael Horsburgh, "High Politics', *The Bulletin* (Australian Consolidated Press: Sydney, May 20 2001), 39.
[27] Broughton Knox is widely regarded as the most influential Sydney leader in the period under review. He not only reshaped MTC, but the Diocese itself through his influence on two generations of Sydney clergy. Marcia Cameron has written a monumental biography of Knox, *An Enigmatic Life - David Broughton Knox – Father of Contemporary Sydney Anglicanism,* (Acorn Press Ltd, Brunswick East, 2006). Peter Jensen said in his Foreward, 'Naturally, her judgements will not always command universal agreement, and there is more work to be done on Broughton's theological legacy, but without doubt she gives us a fresh and deeper understanding of the reality of Broughton's life, with its strengths and weaknesses'. One point of difference that Ballantine-Jones found with Cameron's presentation of Knox was the use of the word 'enigma'. Many who knew him well may have commented on his friendliness, his steely determination to defend the reformed, protestant and evangelical character of the Diocese, his wiliness in debate, committee and synod work, but few would say they did not know where he was coming from so that he was an enigma to them. Others may try again to write about DBK, but if they do, they will owe a great debt to the work Marcia Cameron who describes her subject as the true 'father of contemporary Sydney Anglicanism'.
[28] Judd, Defenders of their Faith*, 450.

The key to this kind of leadership has been their theological formation at MTC. When graduates become rectors, they shape their parishes according to the training they received at MTC. New students coming from such parishes reproduce the attitude they learn at College and so on. To appreciate the critical influence of MTC, one need only recall the names of its leaders who became Archbishops of Sydney; Loane, Robinson, Jensen.

Another characteristic element of Sydney is the existence of political parties. Competing claims of Anglo-Catholics and evangelicals in England in the late nineteenth century saw the emergence of organised political parties there, and in Sydney.[29] The major difference in Sydney was that it had a synodical form of government which gave such groups a platform and a means of productive political action not open to their counterparts in England. As noted, ACL has always been the most influential of Sydney's political groups. Through its concentration on elections and its watching brief on policy it continues to be the major element in Sydney Diocese's political life.

Another political institution of Sydney (as in Anglicanism generally) is the office of the Archbishop. In Sydney, the Archbishop has three functions: he is the public face of the Diocese and by his preaching exercises a prophet-like ministry to his people, not unlike a Zechariah in post-exilic times. He has responsibility for guiding ministry standards and keeping them aligned to Anglican polity, not unlike Ezra in post-exilic Israel. And he has a political function as he oversees the corporate life of the Diocese, not unlike Nehemiah in his political roles in Jerusalem. In the ACA outside Sydney, political power tends to be concentrated in the hands of diocesan bishops. In Sydney, he has to share his power with a democratic and often independent Synod. Nevertheless within this system there are elements of the model of the philosopher king. The Archbishop is granted very significant powers and is always accorded a high level of respect and deference. In Sydney's case, even though there are occasional contests for power between the Synod and the Archbishop, he still retains much of these powers and most Anglicans are happy for that to be the case. Limiting factors to his power are the security of tenure of the clergy, and the

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[29] Donald Robinson, Origins of the Anglican Church League, 15-25.

presence of strong minded and theologically astute lay leaders. Notwithstanding these, the office of the Archbishop (like the queen piece on a chessboard) is the single most powerful political element in the Diocese. He makes clerical appointments and has control over regulations relating to worship centres and variations to statutory services and he can veto legislation of the Synod. He exercises significant influence over central committees and diocesan organisations and his opinions on theology and policy are influential. Because he is elected directly by the Synod, he enjoys a vast reservoir of loyalty, trust and goodwill. This is not to say his policies can never be opposed; this study will examine many examples of archbishops *not* getting their way, but such opposition has to be expressed with great care and within conventions of respect for the office and the office holder.

It is generally true to say that if MTC, ACL and the Archbishop are in alignment, it is very difficult for any other force to have its way. But if they are divided, it usually means the Diocese is divided and likely to experience a period of considerable turmoil or tension.

The next important element is the Synod itself. It meets annually, with the Archbishop in the chair. It functions according to Westminster rules. Apart from elections and legislation, the Synod also debates motions on policy.[30] Underneath the public appearance of procedural order there is often a whirlpool of manoeuvrings and intrigue as participants seek to position debates to maximise their chances of success. These manoeuvres can involve caucusing, the use of points of order and organising speakers to cover anticipated contrary arguments. Sometimes tactics involve circulating material beforehand or holding pre-synod meetings to promote a desired outcome. At a practical level, to exercise political influence in the Sydney Synod requires a detailed knowledge of its standing orders and an appreciation of certain unwritten rules of conduct and respect. Similar points can be made about the Standing Committee.

Another feature of Sydney Diocese is the place that 'law' occupies in its psyche. Unlike the Church of England which is the established state church, the ACA is a

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[30] The scope of legislation includes financial appropriations, the creation of ministry organisations, regulations governing parish administration and the variation of trusts over Church property.

voluntary association. In the nineteenth century, evangelicals in England believed that this nexus with the State protected the protestant character of their Church. This was reinforced by a number of important legal cases which upheld their views on liturgical practice. In Sydney, this legalistic mindset has exercised a very strong influence on the way it believes 'Church life' should be run. For example, the main reason why Sydney evangelicals participated in the *Scandrett v Dowling* case was the belief that what was being proposed was against the *law* of the Church and the land. It offended their sense of propriety that a major change such as women's ordination should be introduced in the way they thought was unconstitutional.[31] Sydney Anglicans tend to be reluctant to break rules. Instead they work hard at *changing* them by lawful and political means.

1.8 Conclusion

This brief survey of the religious, administrative and political nature of the Diocese is aimed at giving an introduction to its complexities and culture. It provides the necessary backdrop to the argument that the Diocese *did* change considerably after 1966 and that politics played a significant part in those changes.

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[31] Another example of this attitude was the involvement of Sydney leaders such as T.C. Hammond and D.B. Knox in the *Red Book Case*. See *Sydney Anglicans*, 253-255.

CHAPTER TWO

HOW THE DIOCESE CHANGED

2.1 Introduction

In February 1981 Archbishop Sir Marcus Loane was officially farewelled at an open air reception in Sydney Square between the Cathedral and St Andrew's House. It was a warm evening and a warm gathering. Hundreds of admirers and well wishes assembled to express their affection and respect for the man who had led them for sixteen years and who, to many, epitomised the very essence of Sydney Anglicanism. The speeches were full of praise and his response, as one would expect, was restrained and humble.

Fast forward to 2001, and the official welcome for the newly elected Peter Jensen; the State Sports Centre at Homebush was filled with thousands of cheering well wishers, mostly young people. Instead of hymns there was a rock band. Jensen was dressed in a collar and tie, a business suit, dark glasses and hat, looking more like one of the Blues Brothers than an archbishop. His speech essentially was a call to follow him on a mighty crusade to win hundreds of thousands of Sydneysiders to Christ.

What happened between those two events for Sydney to become so different at one level, yet so much the same at another? Being part of the ACA, Sydney has always taken its *Anglican* identity seriously. That identity for them is defined in terms of the formularies of the *BCP* and the *39 Articles*, expressing as they do the reformed, protestant character of true Anglicanism (in contrast to Anglo-Catholicism and liberal-Catholicism). For Sydney evangelicals this view of Anglicanism was one element that did *not* change, even though the ways they expressed it did. But as mentioned in Chapter One, the theological focus shifted to doctrines related to the nature of the church and ministry. At the political level, the focus was more on what

kind of evangelicalism Sydney should follow rather than the challenge of Anglo-Catholicism, which had evaporated as an internal threat.[1]

In 1972, the Parochial Ministry and Organisation Commission published *Looking into the Parish*.[2] It is reasonable to see this document as signalling the arrival of *change* as a major diocesan pre-occupation. It focused on two areas: changes that could be made to parish life and ministry, and changes that could be made to central administration. Whilst it is true that few of its specific proposals were adopted, they legitimised and set in train a chain of events which over the years *did* bring about significant changes in policy and practices in both those areas. The categories of that report, structure and ministry, will be followed below in describing the many changes that form the landscape of this thesis. By *structure* is meant governance, central organisations and central policy. By 'ministry' is meant how churches and ministry institutions operated to promote Christian faith and practice. The following survey is grouped under those headings and according to the terms of each archbishop, noting that some covered more than one administration. It is intended to give an overview of the changes to establish the premise that significant changes *did* take place and need to be accounted for.

2.2 A Bird's Eye View of Change

Starting with structural changes under Loane, his attempt to sub-divide the Diocese into three (beginning with Wollongong) was his first major structural proposal.[3] This failed, but eventually led to the development of full-blown regionalisation under Harry Goodhew. Problems in the burgeoning new housing areas, and in the declining parishes of the inner city, led to the formation of two specialist organisations, which were eventually subsumed, into the work of regional councils.[4]

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[1] See page 112.
[2] *Looking into the Parish*, (The Parochial Ministry and Organisation Commission, Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 1973). Generally referred to in this thesis as the Reid Commission.
[3] See Loane's Address to Synod, *1967 Sydney Year Book*, 268-270.
[4] The Inner City Committee was established in 1969 following a commission of inquiry established on the suggestion of Archbishop Loane in 1967. The first director was the Rev Paul Barnett, later Bishop of North Sydney. Its functions were to advise the Archbishop on matters relating to parishes in the inner city which had fallen into difficulties related to population changes and the strain of maintaining

The redevelopment of the St Andrew's Cathedral site in the 1970s and the construction of St Andrew's House (SAH) was a major project involving complex financial and managerial processes. Major difficulties led to the creation of the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat (SDS), a reconstituted Glebe Administration Board (GAB) to manage the Diocesan Endowment (DE), the Sydney Anglican Investment Trust (SACIT), St Andrew's House Corporation (SAHC) and a revamped Endowment of the See Committee (EOSC) to manage the assets of the EOS. Growth in investment income led to the centre becoming financially independent of the parishes, leading to growing concerns over so-called 'centralism'. Another significant structural development in Loane's time involved the removal of all barriers to women participating in parish and diocesan administration.

On the ministry front, Loane's episcopate saw the beginning of many reforms to local church practices and new approaches to evangelism. *Looking into the Parish* was the beginning of these.[5] Other initiatives included the formation of the College of Preachers and the introduction of post-ordination training programmes.[6] Liturgical reform was enthusiastically embraced under Loane, especially *An Australian Prayer Book* (*AAPB*) in 1978 which Donald Robinson played a central part in producing. This was a massive change, bringing to an end over 300 years of exclusive use of *The Book of Common Prayer* (*BCP),* and eventually leading to its almost complete demise. (By Jensen's time, formal liturgical services were the exception rather than the rule and two Sydney prayer books had been published to redress the imbalance and to try and lift the theological content of Sunday services).[7] Attempts to get rid of

old and costly buildings, and to take action in assisting the parishes with their problems. See *1970 Sydney Year Book*, 344.

The New Housing Committee was established in 1968 to meet the pastoral needs of the rapidly developing areas in the west and south west of Sydney. This involved the committee purchasing sites for new churches and helping new parishes to raise funds. The first director was Canon Charles Sherlock, followed by the Rev Peter Watson, later Bishop of Parramatta and Archbishop of Melbourne. See *1969 Sydney Year Book*, 260. The functions of these committees were eventually taken over by regional councils.

[5] It was this report that set in train a sequence of events which over the whole period led to major changes affecting the way parishes conducted their worship and ministry operations.

[6] The first programme was called Post Ordination Training, run be Bishop John Reid in 1971. Over time it expanded so that under Peter Jensen it became known as Ministry Training and Development, under Phillip Jensen as Director with a back up staff of two clergy.

[7] *Sunday Services – A Contemporary Liturgical Resource*, (Anglican Press Australia, Sydney, 2001). *Common Prayer* (Anglican Press Australia, Sydney, 2013). The controlling principle of the Sydney prayer books was that they should conform to Anglican doctrine as found in the *Articles of Religion*

the compulsory use of the surplice began in Loane's time (though with little enthusiasm on his part), and completed in Goodhew's term.

In the 1970s, the charismatic movement was becoming a significant presence across most denominations. The Diocese was impacted by this, but on a relatively small scale. Conservative evangelicals saw the movement as flawed by an erroneous interpretation of Scripture. A number of Synod based inquiries were held, as well as scholarly articles published to expose what they saw as its theological shortcomings.[8] The growth of the movement outside Anglican circles offered an alternative to those interested in it and the loosening of the formal liturgical culture inside meant that its impact had subsided by the 1980s. (Other related movements such as Cursillo and Alpha in the 1990s attracted some interest but never challenged the mainstream conservative evangelical influence in the Diocese).

The Diocese developed a number of policies in social welfare and in the area of personal morality in response to the social changes of the 'swinging sixties' and the relentless march of secularism. These found expression in the Social Issues Committee of Standing Committee and an active diocesan involvement in the NSW Council of Churches, which represented the Diocese and most protestant denominations to government and media.

Putting these structural and ministry initiatives together, and despite Loane's natural conservatism, the Loane period actually saw the greatest push for reform of any administration of the period. This point will need later development, but it is important to note from the outset that Loane's chief interest was in more effective evangelistic proclamation. He took pride in calling himself an evangelical first and an Anglican

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and *BCP*. It was the complaint in Sydney that at certain points, *APBA* did not do this. To that extent, they were both conservative revisions, following the principles on worship outlined in *BCP*. The other concern of the Sydney books was that they should support the continued use of set liturgies in forms that were appropriate for contemporary use.

[8] See *Interchange* Number 13, 1973, 'Baptism in the Holy Spirit', P W Barnett, 'Tongues in the New Testament', B L Smith. See also *Both Sides of the Question,* Sydney Diocesan Standing Committee, (Anglican Information Office, Sydney, 1973). Paul Egan in his PhD thesis on the healing ministry at St Andrew's Cathedral gives details of the penetration of the charismatic movement in the Diocese and reactions to it. He shows how scholars such as Barnett and Peter Jensen, along with other leading Sydney identities such as Canon John Chapman reflected the prevailing approach of conservative evangelical leaders in the 1970s. Paul Egan, The Development of, and Opposition to, Healing Ministries in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney, with special reference to the Healing Ministry at St Andrew's Cathedral 1960-2010, PhD Thesis (Macquarie University, Sydney, 2012) 73-91.

second. He quietly unleashed (or passively allowed) a spirit of inquiry and reform, though always within a framework of orderliness and caution.

Robinson was a conservative in the Loane mould. At the structural level, he also attempted to persuade the Synod to divide the Diocese into three, but without success. In line with that were a number of inquiries on how to extend regionalisation. The growth in the DE led to increases in Synod grants to diocesan organisations and parishes, which in turn led to problems in determining the strategic use of those funds and how to co-ordinate the operations of the various ministry organisations. In response, Robinson appointed a commission to examine these problems. Nothing came of this. The most important initiative in Robinson's term was his 'Vision for Growth' (VFG) campaign, which raised money for parish expansion in the new housing areas. HMS and other central organisations expanded to handle the work generated by VFG.

In ministry terms, the dominant feature of Robinson's period was the battle over the ordination of women. Sydney accepted women as deacons but not as presbyters or bishops. One important by-product of the issue of women's ordination was a change in Sydney's attitude to the ACA, including an unwillingness (in the Goodhew and Jensen terms) to host meetings of General Synod or pay all the assessments of General Synod. Problems over the re-marriage of divorced persons dogged Robinson's term, ending in a stalemate which was later resolved by the non-interventionist policies of Goodhew and Jensen. The clerical vesture issue, that is the prolonged campaign to relax the regulations so that those leading in Sunday services need not wear the surplice, ambled through Robinson's term, with him resisting at every stage. It was finally resolved in Goodhew's term by the passage of the relevant ordinances. Robinson struggled with attempts to modernise services and changes to church architecture and furnishings. He tried to hold back these changes and the pent up pressure for change resulted in many of the battles of the Goodhew era.

One surprising element to Robinson's leadership was his claim that *he* (as the diocesan bishop) was the centre of all ministerial authority and diocesan government. This was perceived as going against his own earlier teachings on

church and ministry which he developed with D B Knox while at MTC. At a time when the Knox view was gaining traction, this put him at odds with his former students, and created tensions in a diocese increasingly impatient for change. By the time Robinson retired, the Diocese was in many ways a powder keg, resulting in the arrival on the diocesan scene of Phillip Jensen, the Reformed Evangelical Protestant Association (REPA), and the parallel growth in organised political parties to challenge the entrenched power of the ACL.

The election of Robinson's successor, Harry Goodhew, was the most keenly fought and politically intense since that of Howard Mowll. The Synod was divided between the 'change now' forces of Phillip Jensen and the traditionalists, supporting John Reid, with Harry Goodhew and Bishop Paul Barnett in the middle. When Jensen and Reid were eliminated, Goodhew narrowly prevailed. The main structural changes under Goodhew were the establishment of the Diocesan Executive Board (DEB), effectively an executive of Standing Committee, and the full regionalisation of the Diocese. He also continued with his version of Robinson's Vision for Growth, known as Vision 2001.

On the ministry front, children were admitted to the Lord's Supper. Following Synod's rejection of *A Prayer Book for Australia (APBA)* in 1996, Goodhew's Liturgical Panel prepared *Sunday Services*, effectively a Sydney Prayer Book and a significant symbolic statement of a new mood of independence from the ACA.[9] During Goodhew's term, church planting outside the Diocese began with Christ Church, Gladesville (supported by a committee of leading Sydney evangelicals) planting the Central Coast Evangelical Church at Erina. This was strongly opposed by the Anglican Diocese of Newcastle and not endorsed by Goodhew. After ten years, it had grown to a membership of over 1000. Other 'unofficial' churches were planted during this period, notably under the influence of Phillip Jensen.[10] The Diocesan Youth Department set up a separate youth ministry training college at Loftus to meet demands for expanding youth programmes. Agitation for lay administration at the Lord's Supper continued, but vetoed by Goodhew. Controversial counselling

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[9] *Sunday Services* was developed by Goodhew's Liturgical Panel but was published early in Jensen's term.

[10] The *2012 Sydney Year Book* at 147 lists 8 such churches under the Affiliated Churches Ordinance 2005.

techniques of the Anglican Counselling Centre (ACC) resulted in a highly contested inquiry, leading to the ACC being absorbed into HMS and the Standing Committee being censured by the Synod. Goodhew's term was marked by division and intense political conflict as Goodhew supporters and the ACL fought a no-holds barred battle for control of diocesan committees.

In Jensen's term, sloppy governance and poor risk management by GAB left the Diocese unprepared for the GFC. It not only lost about half its wealth, but more than half its income. Worse was in store for the EOS. Years of overspending and poor management cost that endowment most of its income and led to a massive reduction in the size of the Archbishop's staff. In response to these disasters, Jensen established a commission to address the perceived governance and structural implications. Its outcomes were inconsequential as the needed reforms were put in place before it finished its work.

On ministry matters, the primary focus was the Diocesan Mission (DM), which will be examined in detail in Chapters Thirteen and Seventeen. Other ministry related changes included extending formal links with non-Anglican churches outside the Diocese, and a new category of local churches called Parishes without Property, and permission to plant churches across parish boundaries.[11] Early in his term, Jensen strongly supported lay administration, but quietly let it drop in the face of legal opinion that it could be contrary to the ACA Constitution. Diaconal administration, that is the practice of deacons officiating at the Holy Communion, became widespread in the Diocese despite an adverse opinion of the Appellate Tribunal and lukewarm support from Jensen himself. In Anglican terms, this was a very significant change and highly contested in the wider Anglican community. Post ordination training programmes grew under Phillip Jensen as Director of a new organisation called Ministry Training and Development. Long time moves towards a permanent diaconate were formalised, though, as ever, resting on the consent of the Archbishop of the day, meaning it could go at the stroke of a future episcopal pen. Under Jensen, the Diocese carved out a strong identity internationally, linked to opposition to practising homosexuals being ordained or becoming bishops. Sydney (along with

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[11] Recognised Churches Ordinance 2000, *2001 Sydney Year Book*, 624-642. Affiliated Churches Ordinance 2005, *2006 Sydney Year Book*, 615-620.

the representatives of the majority of worldwide Anglicans) boycotted the 2008 Lambeth Conference and participated in an alternative conference at Jerusalem under the banner of the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON), with Jensen playing the key role as General Secretary.

2.3 More General Observations about Change

Having described some of the changes under the headings of structure and ministry, the broader changes in the overall ethos in the Diocese will now be examined. For example, new church buildings tended to be multipurpose in nature and less ornate and with design features more attuned to contemporary services.[12] The 'Sydney Church Ordinance' was amended to allow parish councils a say in the 'spiritual life' of the parish, home bible studies proliferated (numbering in the thousands), led mostly by the laity. Team ministries became common, with specialist youth and children's workers in most large parishes. Many more women found full-time employment in parishes. In Jensen's time there were significant changes relating to the operation of the ordained ministry, including large numbers of women being ordained to the diaconate.[13] Trained lay assistants and lay youth workers were also ordained deacons, creating at last a 'permanent diaconate' with would-be rectors put into a special training stream when their appointment as rectors became imminent. Following a number of Synod resolutions, the term 'presbyter' replaced the word 'priest'.

Ethnic based ministries proliferated over the period. In the mid 1970s, under the leadership of Bishop John Reid, a pastor to minister to Turks was appointed. There were also ministries to Aborigines in the Redfern area. By the end of the period there

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[12] In a major statement on church buildings in 2012, Jensen said, 'With the proper emphasis on the local congregation which developed strongly in the 20th century, modern churches also explicitly cater for the task of strengthening relationships between Christians. This has sometimes meant quite radical changes to the interior and use of our buildings, as too has the revolution in what may be called the technology of music and sound'. *Southern Cross*, August 2012.

[13] In 2004, on a motion from Glenn Davies, Synod requested the Archbishop to create a permanent diaconate and thereby break the nexus between being made a deacon and being ordained a priest, *2005 Sydney Year Book*, 403. In the *2012 Sydney Year Book*, 162-270, 33 women deacons are listed under the category of clergy holding a clerical appointment in the Diocese.

were 61 language specific congregations, including 36 Chinese, three Vietnamese, and 6 Sudanese.[14]

Peter Jensen summarised these changes in his address to the 2006 Synod:

> Most of our churches have altered beyond recognition in the last twenty-five years – altered fundamentally in what we do when we meet. Dress has changed; architecture has changed; preaching has changed; music has changed; the content of services has changed. I have hesitations about some of these alterations, but taken as a whole, I applaud them. Failure to make these changes would have shown a preference for church-culture rather than the gospel, for the outward rather than the inward, for elitism rather than universalism.[15]

Processes outside the parish began to change as well. The size of Synod expanded to about 800 members to reflect the larger number of parishes.[16] It changed in style as well. In 1966, all clergy wore clerical collar and academic gown to Synod, but by 2013, most members, including clergy, wore casual clothes, with few clerical collars in sight. The standing orders were simplified to help members better understand procedures. The traditional cathedral communion service and the daily liturgical opening gave way to a daily bible study and a hymn. In 1972 women were permitted to join Synod and their numbers steadily increased, as did their participation in debates and Synod committees.[17] Loane was a very formal president of Synod, rarely intervening in debate, as was Robinson. Goodhew and Jensen allowed more informality, albeit with more intervention from the chair in the form of procedural suggestions. As business became more complex, more was delegated to the Standing Committee. This contributed to a feeling of remoteness as Synod members struggled to make a meaningful contribution on major policies. The venue changed from the cramped Chapter House to the more comfortable, but less cosy, Wesley Centre in Pitt St. As a debating chamber the Chapter House was superb as everyone was close together. The Wesley Centre was large and lacked the atmosphere of the other place. It is necessarily a subjective judgment, but one that is

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[14] *2012 Sydney Year Book*, 153-156.
[15] *2007 Sydney Year Book,* 370.
[16] In 1966, there were 222 parochial units, *1967 Sydney Year Book*, 245-253. In 2012 there were 268 parochial units, *2012 Sydney Year Book*, 377-403.
[17] Synod Representation Amendment Ordinance 1972, *1973 Sydney Year Book*, 280.

widely held, that the standard of debates itself declined over the period in much the same way that people note how the standard of debates in Parliament also declined.

During the period, the size and influence of the hierarchy changed. In 1966 there were two assistant bishops, two full time archdeacons and three part time archdeacons. By 1993 this number had grown to five full time assistant bishops, six full time archdeacons or equivalent, and other senior positions.[18] The size of the hierarchy shrank dramatically in 2009 as a result of the collapse of the EOS, and in 2013 was the subject of review with the outcome deferred until the appointment of a new archbishop.

The Anglican Youth Department went through a number of makeovers during the period. The growing number of youth ministers employed in parishes led MTC in 1976 to provide a youth workers training course. As mentioned, in 1999 the Anglican Youth Department (renamed Youthworks) established its own training college at Loftus, with a full time student body in 2009 of 74, and excluding the Year 13 Gap Year programme, the number involved in the full Diploma/Advanced Diploma courses growing to 56.

On the churchmanship front, it would be reasonable to say that Sydney became even more mono-chromed after 1966. Many of the previously influential high church parishes declined under the pressure of demographic changes in their localities. With fewer non-evangelical clergy in the Diocese, coupled with the drying up of home-grown candidates from non-evangelical parishes, evangelicals increasingly were appointed to them, changing the character of those parishes. This is not to say that non-evangelical clergy played no role in diocesan affairs. There were many who did, but proportionately their number grew smaller and arguably of lesser calibre than

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[18] In 1967, Bob Fillingham was full time Archdeacon of Parramatta and Eric Pitt was full time Archdeacon of Cumberland and Wollongong. Gordon Begbie was an archdeacon and Diocesan Registrar, Graham Delbridge was an archdeacon and part time General Secretary of the General Synod and Clive Goodwin was an archdeacon and Rector of St Phillip's Church Hill. See *1967 Year Book*. See *2008 Year Book*, 37 for details of the five full time assistant bishops and the six full time archdeacons and other senior staff.

some of their illustrious predecessors. Though possibly a subjective judgment, by 2010 more than 92% of the parishes had conservative evangelical rectors.[19]

Many of the changes described in this chapter represent a continuation of the developments noted in 1987 by Cable and Judd.[20] Many were the result of changes in society itself. For example, the decline of formal worship services was occurring across many protestant denominations. Musical tastes and less formal patterns in secular society generally impacted church life, leading to new forms of music.[21] Growing egalitarianism, characteristic of the Australian way, had its impact on church culture, leading to pressure for greater lay involvement in public ministry. From around the 1970s onwards, the American Church Growth movement began to make an impression on Sydney Anglicans. D James Kennedy and the 'Evangelism Explosion' method attracted a following.[22] Other notable American contributors to this influence were the Fuller Theological Seminary, leaders of mega churches such as Bill Hybels of Willow Creek Community Church, Illinois, Rick Warren of Saddleback Community Church in California and Bill Yeager of First Baptist Church in Modesto, California. All of these led pastors' conferences in Sydney.

Demographic changes forced the redistribution of churches, leading to closures in the inner suburbs and the spread of churches to new areas, they tending to follow new ministry formats. A generally increasing demand for higher educational qualifications and specialisation of services in the workplace impacted the Diocese's approach to theological and professional training.[23] Changing roles for women in the home and the work place had their effect, reflected in their greater involvement in the local parish and the Diocese. Other Anglican dioceses were affected by these

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[19] Judge Chris Armitage in a lecture to the Anglican Historical Society on 4 December 2010, on the central and high church group of the 1930s known as the Memorialists, listed the parishes of the ministers who signed that document and their parishes. Of them, most are now strong evangelical parishes. Armitage says, 'It is an interesting list! It is a snap shot of perhaps a quarter of the parishes in the Diocese which were in various ways, and to greater and lesser degrees, not typical of it in teaching and practice. Many places on it maintained their tradition, but the majority have not'.

[20] For a review of the changes up to 1987 see *Sydney Anglicans*, 267-311.

[21] Along with the wave of contemporary music from the US and the Sydney Charismatic Church, Hillsong, many Sydney Anglicans started to produce contemporary music for use in Sydney churches. These were published by Emu Music.

[22] Harry Goodhew was for many years a board member and chairman of that organisation.

[23] In 1982 Archbishop Robinson established a commission to inquire into and advise him on matters relating to ministry formation, *1983 Sydney Year Book,* 241.

outside forces, yet they did not experience the same degree of cultural change as occurred in Sydney.

2.4 Reasons behind the Changes

Accepting that many changes here described followed trends in the wider community, many of the other changes were due to the influence of MTC and its Principal, Broughton Knox. Other significant change agents were Bishop Dudley Foord and Canon John Chapman, especially during the Loane and Robinson administrations. Chapman was Director of the Department of Evangelism from 1969 to 1993. Foord was Rector at Kingsgrove from 1960 to 1965, Dean of Students and senior lecturer at MTC from 1965 to 1973, Director of Post Ordination Training from 1970 to 1978 and Rector at St Ives' from 1972 to 1978.[24] Chapman said of Foord, 'Dudley was the first person who didn't need permission from anybody to do it [make changes]. He just did it, whereas we'd have to go and ask Marcus [Loane] if it was alright. Dudley took leadership ... when Dudley saw a need he hopped in and filled it'.[25] As an example of this, Chapman cites Foord's contribution to changing the preaching style of Sydney clergy:

> ... Back to the question of change, do you remember when John Stott came to the CMS Summer School in 1965 and did that brilliant series on 2 Corinthians? When we came out of one of those sessions I said to Dudley, 'that is what parish preaching ought to be like'. He said, 'correct, and we're going to teach people how to do it Chappo'. We started the College of Preachers where we took people away to Gilbulla in groups of twenty. Dudley sold them the idea of expository preaching in series. We did that for ten years. Years later a clergyman said to me, 'what's all this whoha about expository preaching? Who doesn't do it?' I rang Dudley and said, "we've won the day mate'".[26]

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[24] Dudley Foord was Presiding Bishop of the Church of England in South Africa and Zimbabwe from 1984 to 1987.

[25] Interview with John Chapman, 10 March 2010.

[26] Ibid. At the 1970 Synod, Foord moved that Synod appoint a committee to investigate establishing a College of Preachers. The committee included Foord, Chapman, the Revs Harry Goodhew, David Hewetson, Bruce Smith and Peter Watson, *1971 Sydney Year Book*, 30.

The other significant change agent was the Rev Phillip Jensen, Chaplain at the University of NSW and Rector of St Matthias Centennial Park. Apart from his capacities as an evangelist and minister, he had a unique ability to articulate his vision for the Diocese and the wider mission of the church. He inspired two generations of students to become actively involved in full-time ministry and missionary work. When he decided to become involved in diocesan life in 1992, he did so through a body he created called REPA, the purpose of which, in his terms, was to launch a 'revolution' in the Diocese. This revolution was hotly contested up to the election of Goodhew in 1993. On the election of his brother as Archbishop in 2001, he became Dean of St Andrew's Cathedral and Director of Ministry Training and Development. Apart from D B Knox, no other person played a greater part in the changes in Sydney Diocese than Phillip Jensen, especially as Rector at Centennial Park. Of him, Chapman said:

> I think I am too close to them [Peter and Phillip Jensen]. I think Phillip is the great visionary. He wasn't always right and I am not sure he could have pulled off what he wanted to do if he had become Archbishop. I think we did well not to elect him as Archbishop. I am not sure he could have persuaded the Sydney Synod to follow him. He was too far out.[27]

Another element at work in the Diocese which contributed to its changing face was the ACL. When it was challenged by the Blue Ticket, it added evangelism to its long established objective of preserving Sydney's evangelical character. Through radical reform of its administrative practices it rose to the greatest level of influence in its 100 years of existence. That provided the electoral basis for changes, as it attempted to ensure that candidates sympathetic to change were elected to important diocesan positions.

2.5 Opposition to the Changes

Opposition to the changes described above came from across the theological and churchmanship divide. On the conservative evangelical side, much of the

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[27] Chapman Interview, 10 March 2010.

unhappiness came from clergy who were trained in the 1950s under TC Hammond and Marcus Loane. An example of this was the Rev Silas Horton, a conservative evangelical of impeccable credentials and a former President of the ACL.[28] He was very critical of the influence of the Jensens. He thought Phillip was 'ruffling the system more than it needed to be'. On the changing role of the clergyman he said, 'we have got to the point where there is no point in being a clergyman because the whole show [the parish] can be run without a clergyman. It is going to end up in a mess'. He said, 'you [the clergyman] have an authority, not a dominant authority, but an authority, recognition and a focus point. [Speaking personally], I think the old ways were better because I [as the clergyman] was a Christian, an Anglican, and an evangelical. The number of people I have seen hurt by these changes is quite remarkable'.[29]

Other opposition was institutionalised. For example, in response to *Looking into the Parish* in 1972 a group called the Sydney Anglican Clerical Society (SACS) published a response called, *Another Look into the Parish* which attempted to defend traditional Anglicanism against what it saw as an attack on it in the report. Others, in opposition to what they saw as a hardening of conservative influence, expressed their views through new political parties. The first of these was Open Synod, led by liberal evangelicals such as the Rev Don Meadows and the Rev Bruce Wilson. The other and more substantial group was Anglicans Together. Among this group were, Associate Professor Michael Horsburgh of St James' King Street, the Rector of St Alban's Epping, the Rev John Cornish, the Rev Clive Harcourt-Norton and Canon James McPherson of Granville. In Goodhew's term, the group called the 'Blue Ticket' challenged the ACL, calling for a broader representation on diocesan committees.

The changes described in this chapter did not go unnoticed by outsiders. In her polemic against the Diocese of Sydney called *The New Puritans,* Muriel Porter of Melbourne, commenting on how she remembers church life in Sydney in the 1950s said:

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[28] Silas Horton had been the rector of many parishes, the Director of the Parish Support and development Division of HMS, for many years a Synod appointed representative on the Presentation Board and long time member of the ACL Council, including a term as its President.
[29] These comments were made in a taped interview held under the procedures laid down for this thesis. He died before he could sign off on these quoted extracts.

Archbishop Jensen's very different perception of the Sydney Anglicanism of half a century ago is a striking indicator of the enormous changes that have occurred in Australia's largest Anglican diocese over that time. In short, Sydney Diocese no longer reflects mainstream Anglicanism in terms of parish life, worship or leadership because it now wears the (modern) face of sixteenth century English Puritanism.[30]

2.6 Conclusion

This is a study about change. How and why it happened is the central question. Sometimes it just happened; a mood takes hold, someone gets an idea that catches on. Change like this can be unplanned, take off in different directions until a consensus emerges and rules are eventually introduced to regularise them. Alternatively, someone gets an idea and decides to do something about it. Plans are laid, support is gathered, action initiated and out of the resulting conflict, a new norm emerges. The difference between unplanned, culturally conditioned change and other change is the element of intentionality. As far as Sydney Diocese is concerned, the key is in its attitude to evangelism. This was strikingly illustrated in an article in *The Briefing* in March 2013 by the Rev Tony Payne in tribute to Canon John Chapman. He noted that a book by Michael Jensen, *Sydney Anglicanism: An*

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[30] Muriel Porter, *The New Puritans*: *The Rise of Fundamentalism in the Anglican Church*, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2006), 150. Porter is a strong critic and a political opponent of the Diocese of Sydney in the General Synod. Along with *The New Puritans*, in 2011 she published a follow up, *Sydney Anglicans and the Threat to World Anglicanism,* (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2011). Both these books are essentially polemics against Sydney. The first book focuses on the changes in Sydney compared to what Porter (who now lives in Melbourne) remembers from her childhood. She attributes these to the influence of D B Knox, who ushered in the new wave of old fashioned Puritanism.

The second book is an update of the first, with an eye on Sydney's growing international influence relating to widespread opposition to the consecration of practising homosexuals and the blessing of same sex unions. Both books are political in purpose (to undermine Sydney's influence), and polemical in tone (seeing what she considers its flaws and ignoring its comparative successes). This lack of balance and the absence of inside or firsthand knowledge of the Diocese itself result in books that fall short of what could have been achieved, given the massive effort involved in their production. Their chief value lies in showing how Sydney is viewed by someone from outside who is an unashamed opponent of Sydney's theological and political agenda and its influence within the ACA and beyond.

Apology, made only passing reference to Chapman's contribution to the Diocese and that seemed to him to miss the essential element that makes Sydney what it is. He said:

> However, it is not the absence of Chappo [Chapman's nickname] himself that is the gap in the presentation so much as what Chappo embodied, perhaps more than anyone else in our recent history – which is the *theological and practical centrality of the gospel* within Sydney Anglicanism. The gospel and its growth is what animates Sydney Anglicans. As Peter Jensen reminded us at Chappo's service, we are evangelicals first and Anglicans second.

> The gospel is our passion, our song, our motive force. The gospel explains us. It's the reason why we stopped wearing robes and running formal liturgies in the 1980s and 90s (because we wanted to reach a lost Australian community with the gospel); it's why our 'face to the world' has been less about whether we say 'no' or 'yes' to it, and more about how we preach the gospel clearly and compellingly to our neighbours and communities; it's why we have been active in planting new churches, even (the horror!) across diocesan boundaries; it's why our numbers have grown through conversion at the same time as other Anglican dioceses around Australia precipitously declined; it's why Phillip Jensen and others were able to persuade thousands of young men and women to enter Moore College and SMBC [Sydney Missionary and Bible College], and pursue full-time ministry in Sydney and around the world ... it's why our biblical theology is the way it is (it reads the whole Bible through the lens of the gospel); it's why our doctrine of church emphasises the prayerful speaking of the gospel word as the essence of what gathers and unites and edifies us; it's even why we oppose the normalization of homosexuality and the ordination of women (because gospel obedience to Jesus as he speaks to us in his word is far more important than keeping pace with the trends of worldly thought). And in the end it is why we are glad to be Anglicans, because Reformation Anglicanism was a gospel movement...[31]

Understanding Sydney's passion for the gospel is the key to understanding the changes in policy and practice since 1966. How it went about securing change (and

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[31] *The Briefing*, (Matthias Media, Kingsford NSW), March 2013.

where necessary, resisting change thought to be detrimental to the gospel) is what this thesis sets out to examine and analyse.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WAY OF POLITICS

3.1 Introduction

On the evening of June 5 2001, the Synod of the Diocese of Sydney erupted in applause at the election of Peter Jensen as its Archbishop. Not everyone that night was happy. A significant but small minority saw the election of Peter Jensen as the culmination of a struggle for the heart and soul of the Diocese, and they had lost. Many were simply stunned at the swiftness of the election and the devastating magnitude of the defeat of their candidate (and Jensen's fellow evangelical), Robert Forsyth. Only the night before, the voting to place names on the select list of candidates appeared to signal strong support for Forsyth and insufficient support for Jensen. Twenty-four hours later it was all over. On what was anticipated to be only the second of a three night procedure, Jensen had won, and won with an overwhelming vote. How could this have happened? Politics! Admittedly, it was more than politics, it could be argued (and Forsyth himself has said), that Jensen was the better candidate, but the intense political campaign for Jensen was another factor and this illustrates as much as anything the way of politics, Sydney style.

3.2 The Way of Politics

What is politics? Labor politician Kevin Rudd in his maiden speech in Parliament said: 'Politics is about power. It is about the power of the state as applied to individuals, the society in which they live and the economy in which they work'.[1] He might also have said that it involves *how* one gains, uses and keeps that power. Many, going back to Plato, have reflected on the question of politics. The Bible also addresses this question in the context of the role of the judges and kings of Israel as

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[1] *Hansard,* (Australian Parliament, ACT, November 1, 1998), 140.

administrators of the Mosaic Covenant. Jesus and Paul addressed it peripherally. They did so in the context of a worldview that saw life as being within the sphere of God's sovereign activity, with leaders as 'God's servant to do you good'.[2]

When tribes, countries or voluntary associations combine to form a united entity, the question arises, for what purpose? It may be to promote sport, for defence or the administration of justice. It may be to advance social and economic interests. It may be to spread characteristics it believes to be of value to others. Decisions about purpose will tend to determine what kind of governmental structure is adopted and the scope of its activities. If an entity had a minimalist ideology with respect to purpose, say to provide for defence and underlying infrastructure, a small government policy might be pursued. If it wanted its collective resources to be used for something like a welfare state, a big government policy might be pursued. The nature of the constitutional framework and the complexity of the administrative structure will tend be develop to facilitate those purposes. Control of those structures is what politics is about.

For the study of politics in the Diocese of Sydney, the following working definitions are proposed: the first is in two parts, 'political philosophy' is taken to deal with principles on how societies ought to organise themselves (constitutions and governance) *and* what leaders should do to benefit those they lead (policy). The term 'political science' is taken to deal with *how* practitioners function to bring about their objectives. For example, they may organise themselves into political groups, they may pursue media strategies to persuade others to support them. For the purposes of this study, 'political science' is coterminous with political action.[3]

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[2] Romans 12:4.
[3] Definitions of politics are somewhat fluid and arbitrary. By way of illustration, R G Menzies, in an article in the *New York Times,* 28 November 1948, entitled 'Politics as an Art', commenced with these words: 'Here is my thesis. The business of politics is of supreme importance. Politics is both a fine art and an inexact science. We have concentrated upon its scientific aspects – the measurement and estimation of economic trends, the organisation of finance, the devising of plans for social security, the discovery of *what* to do [what are called in this study, 'political philosophy']. We have neglected it as an art, the delineating and practice of *how* and *when* to do these things and above all, how to persuade a self-governing people to accept and loyally observe them [what is called here, 'political science' and political action].' www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au

The distinctions between politics as dealing with constitutional principles, politics as dealing with policy and politics as dealing with organised action are relevant to this study, because *all* elements will be considered in this review of Sydney Diocese. The overriding purpose of the Diocese of Sydney is to promote the Christian faith according to its view of what that faith requires. But it operates under a constitution, with laws, property rights and power structures which can be used and changed to advance those purposes. It also creates organisations to serve what it thinks are the interests of its members. On the policy front, different ideas are hammered out in Synod, committees and boards. Political activists employ a range of common political tools to advance their policies.

Plato wrestled with the question of what is the best way regimes (in his case the city state) should be run. Against the prevailing mood for democracy in Athens, he postulated the idea of the 'philosopher king', that is, someone trained in the necessary skills of government to rule with virtually absolute powers. This top down model found expression in many different political systems, including Imperial Rome and its stepchild the Roman Catholic Church (with the Pope at the top, served by a curia, with local bishops and priests ruling over the faithful, under his authority). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), following Plato, advocated monarchy as the best model to advance the interests of the state and therefore the interests of its members. The alternative view was put by John Locke (1632-1704), who started with the individual who had rights over against the state. He saw constitutions as a kind of contract between citizens and rulers, operating under conditions decided by the members. He recognised the problems of competing opinions and the tendency for the strong to dominate the weak, so he postulated a system that enshrined a balance between the rulers and the ruled. This ideal found expression in the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and generally in liberal democracies ever since. It involved the formal separation of powers between the legislature (elected by the citizens), the executive (being the enforcement arm of government), and the judiciary (sitting in judgement over everyone).

Interestingly, Sydney operates very much like a state within a state. Constitutionally it is like the USA. Just as the US President has control over the day to day operations of the central government, so the Archbishop has extensive powers over

clergy and parishes. Power to raise money and make laws in both cases belongs to the legislature, Congress in the US, Synod in Sydney. Sydney Synod, though it meets as a single body is actually two houses, clergy and laity, and sometimes they vote separately, requiring a majority in both houses for a matter to pass. Both the President and the Archbishop have the right to veto legislation passed by their respective legislatures. The President appoints his cabinet to assist him to implement his policies and the Archbishop appoints his bishops and archdeacons to assist him. In both systems these appointments require some form of consent from their respective legislatures.[4] Just as the US has its judicial arm, so the Diocese has its disciplinary tribunals.[5] Just as control of the White House and Congress is at the heart of politics in the United States, so the election of an archbishop and control of diocesan organisations set up by Synod, is at the heart of politics in Sydney. Whoever controls the Standing Committee, the Nominations Board (to select rectors) and the other key Synod committees, to a large extent, controls the central functions of the Diocese.[6]

Questions about politics do not end with the formulation of constitutions and the creation of organisations. There are questions of what to *do* with the power that membership of committees delivers. For example, what are the objectives of 'government' policy? Who is best equipped to make decisions? Is a 'big government' model (where the central authorities decide) better than a 'small government model' (where decisions are made down the line)? In Sydney terms, these issues revolve around questions of regulations over local parishes, the independence of organisations, and who should be in charge.

When it comes to the 'praxis' of politics, Sydney operates in a similar way to other secular political bodies. There are political parties, lobbying of leaders, the use of parliamentary tactics, propaganda, networks of coalitions, the influence of elites, and

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[4] This power is generally delegated to the Synod's Standing Committee, though it can be referred back to Synod, as in the case of Bishop Robert Forsyth's nomination as an assistant bishop in 2000. See page 232.
[5] In the case of General Synod related legislation, its validity can be determined by the Appellate Tribunal. In the case of clergy discipline, there are diocesan tribunals and other quasi-judicial procedures in place.
[6] The Nomination Board is composed of four Synod elected members and five elected from the parish seeking to find a new rector. For a nomination to go to the Archbishop for approval, two of the Synod members and three of the parish members have to agree on a name.

'how to vote' tickets. In Sydney, if somebody (in Synod or on Standing Committee) wants to do something new (or to stop something), typically they will move for an inquiry, preferably with suggested members and helpful terms of reference. After that, the debate allows others to shape the outcome by moving amendments. If the proposer is a respected figure, success of the initial stage is mostly guaranteed. The more controversial the proposal, the greater level of political action (lobbying, organising speakers and negotiating with interested parties) is needed. To oppose an inquiry, other steps can be taken, such as nominating allies onto the inquiry, changing the terms of reference, prolonging the process or diverting attention to problems and so dampen support. In a body like Sydney Diocese, where there is a strong sense of participatory democracy and many skilled in the arts of politics, change can sometimes take years to come to fruition or be defeated.

3.3 Why Politics in a 'Christian' Organisation?

All this raises the question, why should Christian people, who believe in the providence of God, who are committed to the Christian duty of love and who in many ways eschew the competitive culture of secular affairs, be so willing and even eager to engage in raw political action in the Church? There is a theological dimension to this question. Conservative evangelicals believe that the culture and values of the denomination should reflect the purposes of God as set out in the Scriptures and therefore they will promote and defend those principles. Their world view takes into account belief in a sovereign and good God who controls all things, and the duty to preserve what they see as core Christian values within their denomination. In a theological sense, they see *all* of life as a combination of trust in a sovereign God *and* purposeful human activity. Why should denominational affairs be any different? The question of how far one should just *trust* God to look after the denomination and how far one should *act* to achieve desired outcomes is always an issue. Sydney evangelicals have not found this insoluble in the personal sphere, in mission work or in politics.[7] Right or wrong, this is the attitude that has motivated and guided many political activists in Sydney.

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[7] McGillion, *The Chosen Ones*, 55.

Others have a different view. For example, Archbishop Keith Rayner of Melbourne said:

> I don't believe the Kingdom of God is a political programme to be ushered in by political methods. In Melbourne, I publicly deplored party tickets in Melbourne Synod elections. I had the same view of the political methods of the Anglican Church League and REPA in Sydney. It is my conviction that this kind of politicking puts human manipulation in place of trusting in the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the life and decision-making of the church.[8]

Notwithstanding these comments, bishops of every hue use political means to achieve their purposes. They do it through the exercise of influence, patronage, control of committees and the selection of 'agenda items' for discussion in the halls of power, sometimes even bullying those who disagree with them.[9]

Other views are more pragmatic. Stephen Judd attributes political action in Sydney to the nature of the system: 'the democratic polity necessitated the existence of political elites in, around and within which the effective organisation of opinion can take place'.[10] John Chapman, a political activist in Sydney, said, 'that [political action] is simply life. That is the way dioceses are run. There is nothing wrong with that'.[11] The Rev Zac Veron, former President of ACL, said, 'If you are a member of a denomination you should get involved in the structures of the denomination that have provided you with the platform from which you can preach the gospel'.[12]

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[8] Ibid, 55.

[9] On the idea of parishes in Perth planting churches outside of his jurisdiction, Canley told *4 Corners*, 'If a parish in my Diocese tried to do that, I would be jumping on them like a ton of bricks'. ABC Transcript of *4 Corners* programme, *An Unholy War,* broadcast 19 June 2000, Abc.net.au/4Corners/ s141770.htm. Archbishops of Perth have power to dismiss rectors, archbishops in Sydney do not. Canley's accusation about 'bullies' in Sydney is open to assessment against his own implied threat on *4 Corners.*

[10] S Judd, *Defenders of Their Faith: Power and Politics in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney*, 159.

[11] Interview with Chapman, 10 March 2010.

[12] Zachary Veron, *Leadership on the Front Foot*, (Anglican Press Australia, Sydney, 2009), 117. Another view about politics was expressed in the Anglicans Together *Newsletter* of March 1993 by Dr Bruce Kaye. He is quoted as saying, 'Power politics has been a feature of Christianity from the very beginning. ... A predilection to power politics reflects something about our human condition. This evil comes from within us. ... When Jesus speaks to his disciples about the way in which authority in the nations is exercised by coercive force, by the application of power politics, he offers them his own example of service and death. ... Power politics is the underside of our human condition. The real Christian vocation is in service and in fellowship beyond our immediate group'. Another view was put by C S Lewis in *Present Concerns* (Mariner Books, 2002)17, as quoted by Justin Taylor in a blog in

The German philosopher Carl von Clausewitz said that 'war is politics by other means,'[13] meaning that politics sometimes includes the use of military power. Whatever the *means*, it is all politics, according to von Clausewitz. Within the political culture of the Diocese of Sydney, many operated on the view that politics (to adapt von Clausewitz) is *ministry* by other means. If political action has the ultimate purpose of enhancing what many call *gospel imperatives* (good political policy), and is conducted honourably and within the rules, it is not only proper but a *necessary* part of ministry. Sydney conservatives believe that to reject any or all political activism in organisations set up for religious purposes because sometimes people may get hurt or because sometimes it is divisive, is not required by an orthodox theological understanding of how God works in his world or sound ethical principles.

There is another question for participants in the political process in religious organisations: how far is it possible to participate in such activities and not become tainted or corrupted? Reference is made to Lord Acton's famous dictum when commenting on the promulgation of Papal Infallibility: 'Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely'.[14] Political action *is* a dangerous and delicate business. It is because of this that many Christians will not get involved in 'Church' politics at all. However most Sydney participants believe that if the *end* is good, the *means* are ethical and the motives are right, then political activism within the rules is as legitimate in denominations as in any other secular organisation. Indeed given what they think is at stake, many believe it is both a Christian ministry *and* a Christian duty.

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http:thegospel.org/blogs/justintaylor/2010/07/19/c-s-lewis-on-democracy/. Lewis said, 'I am a democrat because I believe in the Fall of Man. I think most people are democrats for the opposite reason. A great deal of democratic enthusiasm descends from the ideas of people like Rousseau, who believed in democracy because they thought mankind so wise and good that every one deserved a share in government. The danger of defending democracy on those grounds is that they're not true ... I find that they're not true without looking further than myself. I don't deserve a share in governing a hen-roost. Much less a nation ... The real reason for democracy is just the reverse. Mankind is so fallen that no man can be trusted with unchecked power over his fellows. Aristotle said that some people were only fit to be slaves. I do not contradict him. But I reject slavery because I see no men fit to be masters'.

[13] Carl von Clauswitz, *On War,* first published in 1832. www.gutenburg.org/file/1946-h/1946-h.htm#linkeH_4_007

[14] Written to Bishop Mandell Creighton, see *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy,* (Third Edition, edited by E.D. Hirsh and others, (Haughton Mifflin Company, 2002).

This attitude found a very early expression in an editorial in the *Record,* the precursor to the *Australian Church Record*, of May 9, 1891, which said in response to speeches in Synod deploring party spirit:

> In the first place, can any man be said to belong to no party, and was the Church ever free from divergence of opinion? If men honestly believe, and are open and above board in their action, what right has the Synod to be troubled with appeals to [such] prejudice [against parties]?[15]

Nevertheless, the discomfort many feel at what they sometimes see as the ruthless exercise of political power has to be acknowledged.

When an office holder uses authority granted under the rules, that is undoubtedly the use of political 'power'. It is morally neutral in itself unless exercised in a capricious way and for bad purposes. It is perhaps apt to recognise that in voluntary organisations such as the Diocese of Sydney, 'influence' and 'authority' are used in ways that may fall short of the naked political power plays so characteristic in secular bodies. Nonetheless they often influence outcomes in similar ways.

3.4 Politics in Sydney: What were the Issues?

Judd described how Sydney evangelicals reacted to Anglo-Catholicism and liberalism in the early 20th by forming the ACL in 1909.[16] If they were the political issues then, what were they in the period covered in this study? Ballantine-Jones recalls that in 1963 when he first joined the Synod, the *ACR*, ACL, and the annual Reformation Rally were still focused on those matters.[17] The Reformation was still celebrated as the time of theological purification. Ritualism and liberalism were still seen as the main threat. ACL selected candidates on the basis of their alignment with protestant orthodoxy against such tendencies.

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[15] Quoted by Robinson in The Origins of the Anglican Church League*,* 7.
[16] Judd, 449.
[17] Ballantine-Jones attended most Reformation Rallies from 1959, he was editor of the *ACR* from 1974 to 1977 and he has been a member of ACL since 1970.

By the 1970s a change was taking place, not to set those matters aside, but to add to them other considerations. These related to a more critical approach to traditional Anglican forms of worship and power structures and the need to make the parishes more adaptive to reach the new unchurched masses. The influence of Broughton Knox meant that many of the younger clergy were not willing merely to follow the old ways.

By the 1990s, disaffection with the ACA over women's ordination and *APBA*, support for lay and diaconal administration and the influence of organisations such as REPA combined to produce a more hard line form of evangelicalism and a narrower political agenda. The emergence of Anglicans Together and the Blue Ticket was in part a reaction to this development. Archbishop Goodhew referred to this in 1995 when commenting on the growing gap between Sydney and the ACA. He mentioned '... the isolation of those within the Diocese not thought to be really evangelical, the division between 'soft' and 'hard' evangelicals, between Prayer Book evangelicals and non-Prayer book evangelicals, divisions between evangelicals who assert this or assert that.'[18]

This fragmentation expressed itself politically when the ACL began to favour candidates who supported more congregationally oriented governance, and who were less acquiescent to central authority and more focussed on making the Diocese more evangelistically effective. Throughout this period there were always those who opposed this trend; supporters of the Blue ticket, liberals associated with Anglicans Together, and older ACL identities such as Silas Horton.

3.5 How Politics Works in Sydney

What is actually meant by 'politics' in Sydney Diocese? By definition, it must mean *what* people want to do with the authority elected office gives them. It must also include *how* they operate to achieve those purposes. For example, Peter Jensen's 'Mission' expressed a philosophical view about what the Diocese should do with its resources. How he went about gathering support for that enterprise involved him

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[18] *1996 Sydney Year Book*, 311.

taking what can be called appropriate political action. Once it was launched, how the DM was run involved decisions about its structure and management, its goals and how it went about achieving them. All had political dimensions.

Synod (and Standing Committee) is the centre stage of political action in Sydney.[19] As with other parliamentary arenas, knowledge of constitutions, ordinances and Synod procedures is essential. Good debating technique also helps. Others outside Sydney take a similar approach. For example, Sarah Macneil, former Dean of St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide (and the first female diocesan bishop in Australia), in her doctoral thesis exploring the nexus between identity and institutionality in the ACA, quoted political activist and strident critic of Sydney, Muriel Porter, as saying, '... our polity is not just modelled on Westminster, it began in Westminster. So we have this sort of polity of debate and confrontation.'[20] Heather Thompson, another leader of MOW told Macneil, 'Our strategies had to suit the Anglican Church, so we had to go through synods, for example ... It had to take account of structures of the Anglican Church to ask: how can these structures change?'[21] That was how opposing forces at General Synod do it, and that is how Sydney political activists do it as well.

Politics in Sydney is almost always conducted in a culture of courtesy and rarely characterised by personal vilification. Public debate is generally restrained and criticism is nuanced. In Synod, for example, anyone who strays into personal denigration incurs the wrath of Synod and is quickly picked up by the President. Expressions of strong disagreements are restrained, discussed privately and often hidden in procedural manoeuvres and behind the scenes machinations. In common with other political arenas, Sydney politics is a function of personal friendships and networks. Trust and an almost intangible sense of common identity are very much

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[19] A short history of the development of synodical government going back to apostolic times was given in an unpublished address at an ACL regional meeting in March 1996 by E A Judge. Of the Sydney Synod he said, 'Our Synod surely remains structurally the most systematically representative body in this metropolis, drawing elected members from the parishes in every major suburb and town. ... In two fundamental respects the Synod remains one of the few authentically democratic parliaments in the country. (a) There is no party based pre-commitment of members in any debate. The arguments are not ceremonial, but are necessary to establish the majority opinion – the silent members can be sensed changing their minds. (b) Endorsement for election to "Cabinet" (Standing Committee) carries no guarantee of success, since voting is by secret ballot'.
[20] Sarah Macneil, Anglican Identity and Institutional Form: an historical and theological inquiry with special reference to the Anglican Church of Australia,(PhD thesis, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, 2002), 181. In 2014, Macneil was elected the Bishop of Grafton.
[21] Ibid, 181.

the mark of Sydney politics on all sides. Maintenance of cordial relations is highly valued and the danger of public bickering is recognised and avoided as much as possible, or pursued at great peril to one's cause. For example, though often criticised by opponents, ACL rarely responds, and even less frequently, openly attacks people who might be considered opponents. They tend to follow a 'play the ball not the man' approach.

3.6 The Origins of the Anglican Church League

Though on occasions other parties emerge, politics in Sydney is synonymous with the ACL.[22] The distinctive culture of political activism which led to this came about in Sydney under Bishop Frederic Barker (1854-1882). The key to that was the arrival of synodical government in 1866. During the later decades of the nineteenth century, many political groups sprang up in England to promote or oppose ritualism and prayer book reform. This found an echo in Sydney. Donald Robinson noted a number of groups in Sydney which in effect mirrored those in England at around the same time.[23] A columnist in the *Church of England Record* classified the groups according to what he saw was their place in the political spectrum of those times: 'The Church Union, extreme right [Anglo-Catholic]; The Church Association, extreme left [protestant]; the Churchman's Institute, right central; and the Churchman's Alliance, left centre.'[24] Robinson said, 'One cannot overlook either, that the situation in England was tending to reproduce itself in Sydney ... That is clearly the case with the Church Union and the Church Association'.[25] He said, 'I am unable to say what happened to either the Church Association or the Churchmen's Alliance in Sydney, but when a new organisation was formed in 1898, it adopted the name Protestant Church of England Union (PCEU), which again suggests an awareness of the position in England'.[26] He admits to uncertainty as to exactly when the ACL began, but says it is generally accepted that it was in operation in 1909, and he believed it

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[22] Because of its central role in Sydney politics, it will be treated in detail here. Other political parties will be examined in later chapters.
[23] Donald Robinson, The Origins of the Anglican Church League, 11.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

followed the election of Archbishop Wright in that year.[27] Following the election of Howard Mowll in 1933, the ACL became more closely aligned to the conservative wing of evangelicalism and set about making the Diocese conform much more to that brand of evangelicalism.[28]

There is no question that ACL acts like a political party. Everybody knows that and expects it to. Its practice of distributing how to vote tickets and using its influence both publicly and privately follows the pattern normally associated with political parties in the secular sphere.

3.7 Measuring Political Action

Politics involves questions of policy and actions to implement that policy. How is one to assess the merits of political policy and effectiveness of political actions? As for the merits of policy, that is always a matter of subjective judgement; what one person approves of, another does not. Many of the major events in Sydney which had a policy dimension will be examined in this thesis. What participants *did* to further those objectives is the other element that will be examined in this study.

Within these definitions, a graduated scale to measure low level, medium level and high level political action has been constructed**.** In Sydney terms, when a Synod member moves a motion, writes to the Archbishop, stands for election, or participates in the business of a diocesan organisation, that is classified here as low level political activity. When someone seeks to enlist the support of others to run a motion, organise a petition to the Synod, take an ongoing and informed interest in a particular organisation, or *promotes* someone for elected office, that is classified as a medium level activity. When someone joins an organisation (such as the ACL, the Blue Ticket or Anglicans Together), gets involved in their leadership structures and uses its resources to influence appointments or policies, those activities would represent high level political activity within the terms of the questions this thesis is seeking to address. Similarly, when members of the hierarchy attempt to influence

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[27] Ibid, 22.
[28] Judd and Cable, *Sydney Anglicans*, 232-240.

debates, organise appointments to important positions or advocate specific policies, they also engage in high level political activity. There is an element of subjectivity in determining how one can classify political actions, but these distinctions will be taken as broad guidelines in assessing the level of political engagement relative to particular events to be covered in this study.

Then there is the question of how to measure the *success* or *effectiveness* of political policies or political actions. For the purpose of this study, this will be determined by the extent to which they achieved their *stated purpose*, noting that an action can have short term or long term outcomes, the so called 'winning the battle but losing the war' factor. Another consideration in measuring success is the theatre in which a battle takes place. For example, in the multiple forums and the high level political actions associated with the ordination of women campaigns, Sydney's political action had short term successes in delaying change, but long term failure in the context of the ACA. Within Sydney (up to the present) it has been successful in preventing that particular change; failure in one theatre, success in the other. However sometimes an activity can be totally successful in relation to its *immediate purpose*, say the election of an archbishop, but unsuccessful in relation to the *ultimate purpose* which his election was meant to achieve. For example, if someone was elected with the expectation he would lead in a certain way, but he actually led in a different way, that could be classified as successful in a process or tactical sense, but unsuccessful in a strategic or policy sense.

The key point to be made about measuring political action is the importance of 'intentionality'. Sometimes change happens spontaneously or with little planning. That would be associated with *low level* activity. But when someone has a clear purpose and assembles forces to achieve that purpose, that level of intentionality would tend to make it a *high level* political activity.

3.8 Conclusion of Part One

Chapter One attempted to describe what the Diocese actually is, in terms of its theological, administrative and political character. Chapter Two attempted, in broad

terms to describe and account for many of the changes that occurred from 1966 to 2013. Chapter Three attempted to outline what this thesis sees the nature of politics to be as it applies in the Diocese of Sydney. It is proposed to take these introductory chapters as a tool to analyse and understand the many examples of change, and politics involved in them, examined in the study. It is suggested that the key to determining an answer to the set question of how the Diocese changed and what part politics played in them, is as much related to understanding the details of the story as it is in pursuing the more general perceptions that time and distance so often obscure. That is why this study will be looking at major events and developments in detail, from the perspective of insiders who participated or had first-hand knowledge of them.

PART TWO

TWO GREAT MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN: THE EARLY ROUNDS

4.1 Introduction

Part Two of this thesis is about two of the most contentious policy issues that confronted the Diocese in the period under review, the ordination of women and lay and diaconal administration at the Lord's Supper. They involved questions of theological interpretation on matters affecting the liturgical and pastoral life of the Church, not questions of finance, structure and the deployment of resources. They did raise questions of constitutional and legal powers in the Church and the relationship of Sydney to the rest of the ACA and the Anglican Communion. In terms of change, the ordination matter was one that Sydney resisted, whereas lay and diaconal administration was one Sydney espoused. In both cases, the political factor was central to how they played out and to the outcome.

The questions of policy and practice around the women's ordination issue were whether gender differences should constitute a barrier to women filling every role of a minister within the ACA. This translated into the political proposition that the rules should be changed so that a woman could be made a deacon, ordained to the presbyterate (priesthood) and consecrated an Anglican bishop. To change the relevant rules required decisions by synods. This brought the matter within the category of political action. This coverage of the women's ordination issue will concentrate on constitutional and political elements associated with successive meetings of the General Synod up to the 1992 decision to allow the ordination of women to the presbyterate. The course of the battle within Sydney, and the last milestone, namely women being able to become Anglican bishops will also be examined. It will be argued that Sydney's opposition to this became the defining issue with regard to relations between Sydney and the ACA, leading Sydney to drift apart from it like tectonic plates.

Advocates of women's ordination had a passion *and* determination which the opponents (at least in Sydney) did not have. Supporters of women's ordination fell into three categories: those motivated by prevailing feminist ideology, which opposed any gender distinctions, those who saw the prohibition of women's ordination as a denial of their fundamental rights as equal members of Christ's church, and those who were deeply impressed by the positive work women had done in churches and on the mission field and could not see why they could not serve in the ordained ministry as well. These various motivations gave them the *passion* to pursue their cause, no matter the cost to themselves or the unity of the Church. Sydney opponents saw the issue as one of scriptural teaching, which represented to them the 'commands of Christ', which they felt bound to uphold.[1]

The essential elements of Sydney's position were set out as early as 1968 by Marcus Loane in an address to the Sydney Synod on discussions at that year's Lambeth Conference:

> The most controversial item arose from a declaration that there is no valid reason why the priesthood and the episcopate should not be as open to women as to men. The ordination of women is not something to be resolved one way or the other on grounds either of sentiment or prejudice; still less is it merely a question of being modern, or daring, or avant garde. It is a theological issue, and it must be resolved on theological grounds; it is a plain question of what is right or what is wrong in the light of the New Testament deposit of truth. I can see no New Testament precedent for the ordination of women; nothing even to hint at such a development. On the contrary, the ordination of women seems to me to be in conflict with the doctrines of Headship and Authority which are rooted in the Godhead. [Concerning male and female roles] Man can do some things which women cannot do; woman can do some things which man cannot do. That is a fact which has nothing whatsoever to do with false ideas of male superiority; it is a law of nature which we cannot obliterate. The distinction between male and female as well as the partnership between man and woman was inherent in their creation: 'God created MAN in His own image ... MALE and FEMALE created He them' (Gen. 1:27). Equality in status as persons is not inconsistent with

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[1] This is the phrase in the Fundamental Declarations of the ACA Constitution, Section 3. See *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations 2005 Edition.* (Anglican Church Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 2005), 3.

distinctions in ministry even in the Triune Godhead. The Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are equal in status and glory: yet there is a sense in which the Son is subordinate to the Father and the Holy Ghost is subordinate to the Father and the Son. If the Godhead is the fountain of authority and the pattern of relationship for the Church of God on earth, there is no encouragement for the view that equality of status implies identity in function. These are the grounds I thought I ought to oppose the ordination of women.[2]

This exposition encapsulates the essence of Sydney's opposition throughout the whole period.

There were massive sociological forces at work in society from the 1970s onwards to remove all forms of discrimination against women. It was inevitable that these would impact the life of the Church. The chief obstacle was 2,000 years of unbroken church tradition. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church with its top down authority structure, advocates in the ACA could campaign to change these traditions by political means and opponents could try to stop them by the same means. This is the struggle these chapters will examine.

4.2 Survey of Early Development of the Campaign Overseas

The first woman to be ordained in an Anglican Church was Li Tim Oi in Hong Kong in 1944. The 1948 Lambeth Conference condemned Bishop Hall for taking that action. In 1971 two more women were ordained in Hong Kong. By then the feminist movement was making inroads into popular culture, which found expression in accelerating demands for women to be ordained in the provinces of the Anglican Communion. For example in 1971 the Anglican Consultative Council (ACC) advised Bishop Hall and others that action to ordain women *was* now acceptable *if* they acted with local diocesan authority. The ACC further encouraged provinces in the Anglican Communion to consider introducing women's ordination by 1973. In 1973, more women were ordained in Hong Kong and the ACC stated that this should *not* cause a split in the Communion. In 1974, eleven women were ordained in Philadelphia

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[2] *1969 Sydney Year Book*, 206-207.

without legal authorisation from the national body of the Episcopal Church of the United States (ECUSA), and in 1975, a further five were ordained in Washington. In 1976, the General Convention of ECUSA legalised the practice and regularised the earlier ordinations.

In 1976,, the English General Synod resolved that there were no fundamental objections to the ordination of women, and established procedures to introduce legislation in the Church of England. Also that year, six women were ordained in Canada, and in 1977, five women were ordained in New Zealand. In 1978, the Lambeth Conference resolved to encourage other provinces to consider following suit. All through this period the ACC was urging member provinces not to leave over the issue. In 1982, Women deacons was legislated for in England, and the following year Kenya and Uganda ordained women as presbyters. In 1987, the first woman in England was ordained deacon and the first ordination of women as presbyters took place in 1994. In 1989, the first consecration of a woman took place in the USA, followed next year by the consecration of a woman in New Zealand. In 1998 the first female bishop attended the Lambeth Conference. In 2008, the first woman was consecrated a bishop in the ACA.[3]

4.3 The Beginning in Australia

If the monopoly of male presbyters was biblically based, *that* could have constituted an insuperable barrier, because the Constitution of the ACA requires the Church to 'ever obey the commands of Christ'.[4] Accordingly, the first major move was on the

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[3] Most of the material in this section is based on facts widely known in the public domain. Special acknowledgement is given to an undated publication by MOW, 'Moves Towards the Ordination of Women in the Anglican Communion, ending with the first ordinations of women as deacons in 1986.

[4] This is an opportune point to refer to the most important work on the ACA Constitution, John Davis, *Australian Anglicans and their Constitution*, (Acorn Press, Canberra, 1993). Based on a PhD thesis, this book sets out the background and history of the ACA Constitution. Marcus Loane described it as 'the first full and detailed account of the long process culminating in its adoption in 1962'. In documenting the divisions in the ACA leading up to and following 1962, Davis acknowledges that 'almost all of them had to do with accommodating the Diocese of Sydney, which for decades held out for fear that the reformation principles behind the *BCP* and the *39 Articles* would be lost. He skilfully records the debates, horse trading and the process right up to the dramatic change of heart by TC Hammond and Howard Mowll which resulted to the breakthrough that led Sydney to support the proposed Constitution. Davis shows how Hammond came to realise that the Church of England itself was slipping away from its reformation roots and therefore offered no security for Sydney. Sydney insisted on safeguards being written in the new Constitution itself as the price for Sydney support.

theological front. In 1973 the General Synod Doctrine Commission concluded that it saw no theological objection to women becoming deacons.[5] In 1977 the Commissioners reported that in their view there were no theological objections to women being ordained to *any* of the orders.[6] There was a dissenting report by D B Knox who argued that the Commission's attitude to Holy Scripture impugned its divine character and incorrectly dismissed its teaching on women's roles in the church as culturally conditioned. He accused the Commission of being conditioned by the 'spirit of this present age'.[7] Notwithstanding this, the Commission concluded that 'the theological objections which have been raised do not constitute a barrier to the ordination of women to the priesthood, or the consecration of women to the episcopate'.

These two opinions expressed the main arguments running right through the controversy. The majority view reflected the growing feeling that it was a question of equal rights and justice for all. Knox reflected the conservative view that the matter was to be determined by a rigorous exegesis of the New Testament. The Anglo-Catholics, by now a movement in numerical decline, tended to oppose women's ordination on grounds similar to those of the Roman Catholic Church, namely that the priesthood of the church stems from the apostles who were all men. The General Synod, by resolution, endorsed the majority view of the Commission in 1977.[8]

4.4 Constitutional Objections

Once supporters had secured the opinion that there were no valid theological objections to women's ordination, everyone assumed an amendment to the

Davis examines Sydney's fears about the dangers of the proposed Appellate Tribunal and how they were 'resolved'. He also discusses the problems with the Tribunal and the Constitution since 1962, many of which are examined in this thesis. This is a thorough, fair and generous treatment of difficult times and determined individuals locked in hard but principled battles for their respective visions of what an Australian Anglican Church should look like.

[5] Report of the Doctrine Commission of General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia, *The Ministry of Women*, *Proceedings of the Fourth General Synod: Official Report, 1973* (Sydney: General Synod Office), 1973.

[6] *The Ministry of Women*, *Proceedings of the Fifth General Synod, 1977* (General Synod Office, Sydney, 1977), 315.

[7] D B Knox, *an Addendum*, *Proceedings of Fifth General Synod 1977*, 315. See also 1993 *Sydney Year Book,* 329.

[8] Resolution 23/77, *Proceedings of Fifth General Synod 1977,* 35.

Constitution would be required. The General Synod passed a canon in 1981 to alter the Constitution to allow each diocese to ordain women to all three orders.[9] This did not work because under the Constitution any metropolitan diocese could veto the Canon, and Sydney did.[10] This was a critical moment because it meant *another* way had to be found or the matter would die. To test the assumption that a constitutional change *was* necessary, the Primate, Archbishop John Grindrod of Brisbane, in May 1985, asked the ACA's Appellate Tribunal for its opinion. This reference brought the Tribunal to centre stage as never before. Hitherto it had been a relatively non-partisan, non-political body. Its members tended to be elected essentially on their standing as lawyers and eminence as bishops irrespective of their known views on particular subjects. That began to change under pressure to find a constitutional way to ordain women. From the Sydney point of view it turned the Tribunal into a political instrument of change, not an impartial umpire.

The Tribunal's opinion, released just before the 1985 General Synod, in effect said there was nothing in the Constitution, in *BCP*, the *Ordinal* or the *39 Articles*, that would prevent women from being ordained to *any* of the three orders. This shifted the focus back to the General Synod to find a political solution. Some supporters took the Tribunal's opinion as implying that admitting women to the diaconate, *ipso facto*, allowed them to progress to the other orders without further legislative action, the so called 'progression theory'.

The timing of the Tribunal's report gave supporters the opportunity to test their strength on the floor of Synod. Strictly speaking the matter should not have come before that General Synod at all because the Opinion came out *after* the time allowed for notices of legislation to be given. However Archbishop Peter Carnley of Perth moved the suspension of standing orders to introduce a bill to authorise women's ordination forthwith.[11] This could have been blocked by ten members, but out of a sense of fair play (as well as a touch of political naivety) the procedural motion was supported by those who actually opposed what it was wanting to achieve. The bill was defeated, but a bill approving women deacons was passed as

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[9] *Proceedings of the Sixth General Synod Report 1981* (Sydney: General Synod Office, 1981), 101.
[10] Clause 67. (1), (a), (iii).
[11] Resolution 34/85, *Proceedings Seventh General Synod* 1985 (Sydney: General Synod Office, 1985), 37.

an 'ordinary bill', meaning it could come into effect as soon as any diocese adopted it by ordinance.[12] The passing of the Deacon's Canon meant that supporters had secured their first legislative victory. This encouraged them to seek a special session of General Synod in 1987 to try again.[13] It was between 1985 and 1987 that the opposing sides began to organise political support for their views on a more formalised basis. In particular, Sydney opened up collaborative arrangements with Anglo-Catholics around the country. For both parties this was a purely pragmatic arrangement. It didn't matter that they had different reasons for opposing women's ordination, the political nature of process required all parties to try to maximize their numbers on the floor of Synod.

Once the 1985 General Synod passed the women deacons canon, the progression theory became the chief driver for the next reference to the Tribunal, this time by opponents who feared some dioceses would move to ordain women as presbyters immediately. Sydney was divided. Some supported women to the diaconate on the grounds that deacons could not be rectors and therefore it did not threaten the *headship* principle.[14] Others opposed it because they feared it was the thin edge of the wedge allowing for their automatic progression. Still others opposed it because they thought some functions of deacons in the *Ordinal* appeared to infringe Paul's prohibitions on women preaching in church and thereby giving them 'authority over men'.

To test the issue, 30 members of the General Synod, under Section 63 (1) of the Constitution, referred the Canon to the Appellate Tribunal for determination.[15] This was a political action bringing together evangelicals in Sydney and Anglo-Catholics

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[12] Under Sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution a bill for a canon affecting the order and good government of the Church in a diocese shall be treated as a special bill and will require special majorities and normally have to go to all dioceses for consideration as a provisional bill and then come back to General Synod for reconsideration. In the case of the Women Deacons Canon, it received more than three quarters of the vote in all houses and therefore came into effect immediately.

[13] Under Clause 23, (b) a special session of the General Synod shall be convened on the written petition of not less than one-third of the members of the house of clergy or the house of laity. Clause 23 stipulates that only matters mentioned in the mandate calling the special session may be dealt with.

[14] The 'headship' principle is derived from an exegesis of 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 and Ephesians 5:22-33.

[15] Ballantine-Jones was responsible for obtaining the Sydney signatories and sending the request to the Primate.

such as the Rev John Fleming in Adelaide and the Rev David Farrar in Melbourne.[16] It also became the decisive hearing of the Tribunal on the question of the ordination of women itself because under the Constitution, a determination (as distinct from an advisory opinion) would be binding. The importance of this case can be gauged by the fact that for the first time the Tribunal held an open hearing, with counsel for the parties making and responding to each other's submissions, much as in a secular court. The hearing took place on 6 December 1986.The case against was led by James Merralls QC of Melbourne, with additional submissions on behalf of the Sydney petitioners by Geoffrey Lindsay, a barrister from Sydney. The case for was led by David Bleby QC of Adelaide on behalf of the Standing Committee of General Synod and by Keith Mason QC on behalf of a number of women deacons. Mason was at that time Solicitor General of NSW, but in these matters acted in a private capacity.

Essentially the case against was that the ordination of women was contrary to the provisions of the Fundamental Declarations of the Constitution and a departure from the 'Ruling Principles' of the Church as set out in Section 4, which restricted the ACA to the principles of doctrine and worship found in *BCP*, the *39 Articles* and the *Ordinal.* The Sydney submission also argued that the ACA was bound to maintain and uphold the law of the Church of England as it was in 1962, as *judicially interpreted* in England, that being the law that dioceses signed up to when the Constitution came into force in 1962. Lindsay argued that a constitutional amendment was needed to affect changes that would permit women becoming deacons since it was not lawful in England in 1961. In addition, the Sydney submission contained detailed scholarly argument to the effect that it was common ground among New Testament experts on both sides of the debate that the New Testament *did* in fact teach gender distinctions between men and women. The difference between them was whether such teaching was *binding* on the Church today.

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[16] Before the General Synod met in 1987, John Fleming resigned his parish and membership of the ACA and was received into the Roman Catholic Church, later to be ordained as a priest in that Church. David Farrar became Bishop of Wangaratta. In preparation for the Appellate Tribunal hearings into the Women's Deacon Canon, Fleming, Farrar, Robert Tong and Ballantine-Jones met with Mr J. Merralls QC in Melbourne.

On the other side, Bleby relied on previous Tribunal opinions in favour of women's ordination and argued that Section 4, properly read, permitted General Synod to alter a principle of doctrine or worship of the Church. He said, '... a statement as to faith, ritual, ceremonial or discipline of the Church and the ordering of the Church's forms of worship and rules of discipline need not necessarily be consistent with the doctrine or principles embodied in the *Book of Common Prayer* etc. referred to in Part 1 of Section 4.'[17] Keith Mason adopted Bleby's submission and added further arguments to the effect that the Canon did not contravene Section 4 or Holy Scripture, as the petitioners claimed.[18]

The Tribunal delivered its determination on 4 March 1987, finding by majority in favour of the Canon, Archbishop Robinson being the dissentient vote. This decision, namely that General Synod *can* legislate on the matter, became the definitive position of the ACA. This put the spotlight back on the General Synod, and therefore the political campaigns of advocates and opponents. That aside, another question to emerge in the lead up to the 1992 General Synod was whether a diocesan synod could legislate *without* a General Synod canon. The question of automatic progression was left hanging.

4.5 The Role of General Synod

Following the Tribunal's decision, supporters petitioned the Primate to hold a special session of General Synod in 1987, two years ahead of schedule. It was called under a specific mandate which included some minor administrative matters, but the primary purpose was to have a re-run of the 1985 debates. It met in Sydney over four days commencing on Sunday 23 August. It met in a blaze of media coverage, mostly sympathetic to the women's ordination.

With respect to the Tribunal's determination, and as a political tactic to undermine the standing of the Tribunal, there was an early attempt by Sydney representatives,

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[17] *Church Scene,* December 12, 1986.
[18] All the submissions made at the hearing were produced in full by *Church Scene,* 12 December, 1986, and pre-hearing submissions may be viewed at the General Synod Office, Sydney. All Opinions and Reasons are accessible on www.anglican.org.au/ under links to 'Appellate Tribunal.

through Robert Tong, to highlight what many in Sydney saw as the inherent limitations of the Tribunal process itself. On the motion to receive their report, Tong argued that there was a problem with lawyers being called to decide theological matters for which they were not qualified, and bishops deciding legal matters for which *they* were not qualified. He also pointed out that because most of the Tribunal members were members of the General Synod which passed the Canon, and some actually spoke in the debates, there was a conflict of interest in them sitting in judgment on a canon some of them voted on. His attempt to amend the motion to receive the report incorporating these points failed, but the point had been made. This was the beginning of a number of attempts to cast doubt on the Tribunal's impartiality, and more importantly, to employ political tactics to influence the appointments of the Tribunal.

There were two other bills for canons from Sydney on the business paper, one to empower General Synod to overrule the Tribunal, the other to open the way for a diocese to secede from the General Synod.[19] This was the first attempt from Sydney to try to modify the Constitution and strengthen diocesan rights over and against General Synod. Both were ruled out of order as being outside the mandate governing the business for that special session. They were however an early indication of the growing concern in Sydney at developments towards the ordination of women. The debate followed the same lines as 1985 but it was always going to be about the numbers, not the arguments. In recognition of this, the ACL in Sydney had begun to strengthen Sydney's anti-women's ordination representation at the General Synod by nominating people sympathetic to Sydney Synod's position as Sydney representatives.

When it comes to passing legislation in General Synod, the critical vote is the third reading, which must be by houses (bishops, clergy and lay members), and with a two thirds majority in each, unless by a 75% vote the Synod declares the bill to be an 'ordinary bill', requiring a simple majority only. Given its strong support the bill easily passed the second reading stage and into committee, where a number of amendments were moved. Most notable was Archbishop Keith Rayner's bid to insert

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[19] *Church Scene*, 28 August, 1987.

conscience clauses requiring parishes to agree to women presbyters *before* they could be appointed to a parish. In the end it was defeated, but another amendment allowing diocesan synods to make their own conscience rules got through.[20]

When a bill reaches the third reading stage, it normally goes straight to the vote without debate, but not so in this case. What followed was another full scale debate, going over all the arguments again. When the secret ballot was taken, it was lost in the house of clergy, 60-32, the required 'yes' vote being 65.[21] This was the second failed attempt to pass legislation. The special session accomplished nothing. Contestants regrouped for a third attempt at the 1989 General Synod, but this too met the brick wall of opposition in the house of clergy, led by Sydney clergy, at the final stage.

4.6 Conclusion: The Gathering Storm

From the time the Appellate Tribunal gave its original opinion that there were no theological objections to prevent the ordination of women, the pressure built up to make that the dominating issue for the whole national church. By 1991, it was clear that things were coming to a head and supporters were not going to accept any more delays.

Because of the growing instability, in August and September 1991, Rayner, as Primate, referred certain questions to the Tribunal to test a claim by Bishop Owen Dowling of Canberra-Goulburn that there was no legal barrier to his ordaining women in his own diocese, without General Synod legislation. The Tribunal was not able to answer those questions with the majorities of bishops and lawyers required by the Constitution.[22] Other dioceses claimed the same right and were thinking of doing the same. For example, in early 1992, Archbishop Ian George of Adelaide

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[20] *Proceedings Of The Special Session Of General Synod, Official Report 1987,* (General Synod Office, Sydney, 1987), 54-56.
[21] Ibid, 58.
[22] Clause 59 (1) of the Constitution requires, in the case of a reference involving any question of faith, ritual, ceremonial or discipline, the concurrence of at least two bishops and two laymen. In this reference only one layman concurred with two bishops and so the Tribunal was not able to give an answer.

released a statement saying the 'issue of the ordination of women has precipitated a clear sense that the legal structures of the church are not working. We must restructure both our Constitution, especially our General Synod's procedures, and our Appellate Tribunal. ... If General Synod is not able to find a way through this morass, I will certainly ordain women in this Diocese before the end of 1992'.[23] The *Church Scene* quoted him as saying that he was of the clear opinion that the Tribunal's opinion had not affected the right of a diocesan bishop to ordain women when having the support of his synod. He said 'he found it difficult to understand how the wish of the majority in the church can be so easily frustrated through legal stratagems by the minority'.[24] George's difficulty is hard to see. Constitutionally the ACA is a federation of dioceses and as part of that agreement, special majorities on important questions are required, so that they could only proceed if they enjoyed widespread support. Rayner, on January 10 1992 said, 'There is no question that we have now reached a critical point of decision. If the General Synod meeting in July is not able to find a way forward, which can be accepted in good conscience by most people on either side of the divide of this question, then we shall face an extremely serious threat to the order and unity of our church'.[25]

On 23 December 1991, Dowling announced he would ordain some women deacons to the Presbyterate in February 1992 because the Tribunal had failed to give an opinion saying he could *not* proceed. Bishop Alf Holland of Newcastle (a member of the Tribunal himself) said that he wholeheartedly supported Dowling's decision. He said he would, 'move very quickly to ensure the necessary passage of legislation [in his diocese]'. Robinson pointed out that the Tribunal by a majority of 6 to 1 expressed the view that a diocesan bishop had *no* authority under the law of the ACA to ordain women, merely in virtue of his office as bishop.[26] He went on, 'the second point clarified (by the same majority) is that adoption by a diocese of the Ordination of Women of the Office of Deacon Canon, 1985, does *not* carry with it any automatic authorisation for women deacons to advance to the priesthood'.[27] This dealt with the confusion arising from the Tribunal's earlier opinion that admission of

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[23] *Church Scene*, 14 February, 1992.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] *Southern Cross,* February, 1992.
[27] Ibid.

women to the diaconate might give them the automatic right to progress to the higher orders. Even though the Tribunal was not able to give a formal opinion on the Canberra-Goulburn and Adelaide ordinances, Robinson pointed out that 'three of the four Supreme Court judges on the Tribunal said they, [the dioceses in question] could not proceed'. He said, 'it is fair to presume that on the strictly legal issue, the ordinances of the two dioceses are not valid to affect what they purport'.[28]

There was an impasse; either supporters would wait for the 1992 General Synod or they would act unilaterally, regardless of the consequences. Dowling's announcement to go ahead on 22 February 1992 precipitated a series of crises which meant that 1992 could rightly be described as 'A Year to Remember'.

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[28] Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

WOMEN'S ORDINATION: 1992 - A YEAR TO REMEMBER

5.1 Introduction

The title of this chapter stems from the 1950s film on the sinking of the Titanic, *A Night to Remember,* which saw something uniquely significant about the moments before and after the iceberg hit the ship. As will become clear, 1992 was also a momentous point in the history of the ACA. It involved litigation, high level political action, ongoing divisions, and most of all, a fundamental change in the nature of the ACA, with some dioceses ordaining and others not.

5.2 Action in the Courts: How it Began

1992 opened with the action in the NSW Supreme Court to prevent Dowling from proceeding with his proposed ordinations of women until its legality had been established. The essential nature in this action was the ecclesiastical equivalent of a state's rights dispute in Australia: was the General Synod *alone* able to authorise women's ordination or could a diocesan synod do it as well? This was the specific question the Appellate Tribunal was not able to answer in 1991, leading Dowling to say he would proceed anyway.[1] Put simply, does Section 71 (1) of the ACA Constitution limit alterations in ritual and ceremonial to *only* those made by General

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[1] The argument revolved around the interpretation of three key sections of the ACA Constitution. Section 71 (1) says; 'Nothing in this Constitution shall authorise the synod of a diocese or a province to make any alteration in ritual or ceremonial of this Church except in conformity with an alteration made by General Synod'. Section 51 says: 'Subject to this Constitution a diocesan synod may make ordinances for the order and good government of this church within the diocese, in accordance with the powers in that behalf conferred upon it by the constitution of such diocese'. Section 26 says: 'Subject to the terms of this Constitution Synod may make canons rules and resolutions relating to order and good government of the Church, including canons in respect of ritual, ceremonial and discipline and make statements as to faith...' 'Order and good government' includes ritual, ceremonial and discipline according to this definition. The question then is whether there is any other section that might be relevant.

Synod or are there other grounds for alterations not mentioned in the Constitution such as a diocesan constitution or the fact that the proposed change was in accord with doctrines and principles of the Church as found in Sections 1 to 4 of the Constitution? Dowling believed there were other grounds. The initiators of the court action and four members of the Tribunal who answered 'no' believed not. That was the question the plaintiffs wanted the courts to decide.

The court action was taken by three members of the ACA. According to Laurie Scandrett of Sydney (one of the plaintiffs), he saw an interview with Dowling by Peter Luck on his *Summertime* current affairs programme on *Channel 7* in which Dowling stated, 'the only way the conservatives can stop me is by an injunction of the Supreme Court'. Scandrett interpreted this comment as an invitation for someone to try and stop him.[2] On hearing of Dowling's intention on 23 December 1991, Robinson called on him not to act and invoked his consecration oath of obedience to his Metropolitan.[3] Dowling said that the oath did not apply since the Archbishop had no power to prevent him from doing what was, according to his advice, a lawful act.[4]

After Christmas, there were discussions between Ian Spry QC, a prominent opponent of women's ordination of Melbourne, and Robinson, who consulted his Chancellor, Justice Ken Handley (a member of the Appellate Tribunal) and his assistant bishops. Spry had indicated to Geoff Lindsay (the barrister who represented Sydney in earlier Tribunal hearings) that he had two clergymen prepared to be plaintiffs. There were serious discussions as to whether Robinson himself should take action, but Handley and the bishops were against this, though Robinson did not immediately rule it out. Preparation continued into early January but it was not yet certain if a Sydney plaintiff could be found.

Ballantine-Jones was drawn into the matter during the CMS Summer School at Katoomba in early January when Robinson told him that *he* was not in a position to take legal action. Apart from the advice of his own bishops and Chancellor, he also felt constrained because he was considering taking Dowling to the Special Tribunal

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[2] Interview with Dr Scandrett.
[3] Letter from Robinson to Dowling, 3 January 1992.
[4] Letter from Dowling to Robinson, 10 January 1992. Dowling says in part, 'There is no answer from the Tribunal, and I am advised that we can move ahead on the presumption of validity'.

of the Church for proposing an action without proper authority from the General Synod.[5] He said that Spry had indicated to him that his supporters were ready to seek an injunction against Dowling.[6] It was Ballantine-Jones' impression at the time that Robinson was hoping he would talk to Spry and explore the possibilities of private individuals from Sydney and Melbourne taking joint action. A major problem from the Sydney end was that the key legal people in Sydney were all away on holidays and not accessible.[7]

On Saturday 11 January, Spry told Ballantine-Jones that two clergymen were prepared to be plaintiffs. One was the former Dean of Perth and a leading Anglo-Catholic from Melbourne, the Rev David Robarts.[8] The other was the Rector of Bega in Dowling's own diocese, the Rev Dalba Primmer, an evangelical. Spry said that it was essential that Sydney people join them by way of an additional plaintiff as the action had to take place in NSW. He said that without a Sydney plaintiff no case could proceed. With Robert Tong and Neil Cameron away,[9] and Spry pressing him to act *immediately*, it came to the point that either Ballantine-Jones secured a plaintiff from Sydney (that Saturday), or no action would be taken in the courts. Robinson was out of contact, so Ballantine-Jones spoke with Bishop Peter Watson, then Bishop of Parramatta (later Archbishop of Melbourne), being the only bishop in Sydney at the time. Watson urged caution. In particular he said that at all costs, he (Ballantine-Jones) should not be the plaintiff. He predicted that whoever was the plaintiff was likely to suffer considerable damage. Ballantine-Jones said that if he could not get anyone else he would feel duty bound to do it himself. He asked Scandrett if he would be prepared to be the plaintiff. Without hesitation he said he would. This proved to be a fateful and expensive decision on his part. His name is forever linked with the case - *Scandrett v Dowling*. He took on this case out of a

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[5] The Special Tribunal is the body established by the Constitution to try diocesan bishops for offences under the Constitution.

[6] In evidence on 23 January 1992 Dowling said Spry had made an announcement on *ABC Radio* that he would take legal action. 1170/*92, Laurence Alan Scandrett and Two Others v Right Reverend Owen Dowling,* (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Sydney, 23 January, 1992) 64.

[7] These included Ken Handley, Chancellor, Neil Cameron, Advocate of the Diocese and Robert Tong, a member of the Sydney Legal Committee.

[8] Robarts had been the Dean of Perth under Carnley and had clashed with him over the ordination of women. In 2006 Robarts, left the Anglican Church of Australia to be consecrated a bishop in the breakaway denomination called The Traditional Anglican Church of Australia.

[9] Robert Tong and Neil Cameron were members of the Canon Law Commission of General Synod and leading legal figures within the Diocese of Sydney.

genuine concern for the ACA and in the belief that what Dowling proposed was against the Constitution and the law. He and his family accepted the risk and the eventual costs. Later, he and Ballantine-Jones became targets of abuse and political action which led to them losing their seats on the Sydney Standing Committee in 1993.[10]

Because Robinson was out of contact, in effect the whole matter rested on Ballantine-Jones. When he did make contact with Robinson later that Saturday, he said to him that in initiating court action they (Ballantine-Jones and Scandrett) were likely to be the object of significant media and public criticism. They wanted to be sure that he would support them publicly. Robinson said he would, and he did. A number of other questions were put to him by way of a final check as to why Scandrett, the Anglo-Catholic from Melbourne and a lone evangelical from Bega should take action and not *he* as Archbishop. He was asked that if he as Archbishop was prepared to live with a breach of *this* law by not taking action why should anybody else from Sydney take action. He was asked that if he was prepared to live with a breach of *this* law, what would be his position with regard to breaches of *other* laws within the Diocese? It was put to him that if neither the Archbishop of Sydney nor anyone in Sydney was prepared to support Spry then it was unlikely that *he* would take action, in which case Dowling would have won and everything they had fought for over the previous ten years would have been for nothing. He told Robinson that Spry believed that if Dowling won *this* way, there would be a massive leakage of opposition and the pro-ordination forces would certainly have the numbers at General Synod in 1992. Robinson agreed they were significant points. He gave a clear indication that he would publicly support the people applying for an

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[10] On the propriety of going to the civil courts in the light of 1 Corinthians 6, which some see as forbidding Christians *ever* taking other Christians to the secular courts, Ballantine-Jones conferred with Dr Peter O'Brien, Vice-Principal of Moore College and renowned New Testament scholar before approaching Scandrett. His view was that the restrictions in 1 Corinthians had to do with taking *personal grievances* before unbelievers. This matter was a question of interpretation of the Church's Constitution which was a schedule to an Act of Parliament and so, he said, did not fall within the prohibitions of 1 Corinthians. In April 1992 *Southern Cross* O'Brien published his reasons for believing this action fell outside the 1 Corinthians prohibitions. Dr John Woodhouse, later Principal of Moore College, in the April 1992 *ACL News,* also addressed the subject and made the additional point that the ACA is not a 'church' in the New Testament sense of the word, '[The ACA] is a different kind of association from a congregation (which is what 'church' means in 1 Corinthians and elsewhere)'. Keith Mason took a different approach on this question. He believed 1 Corinthians 6:1-8 prohibited Christians from ever going to court against each other. See his comments in the annual Cable lecture, www.anglicanstogether.org/files/Cable-lecture.pdf.

injunction. Spry was informed that the Sydney end was in place and the action could begin. That was how what turned out to be one of the most tumultuous episodes in the life of the ACA began.

The reason Sydney evangelicals acted in this case was the ingrained attitude in Sydney that the Church should be governed by *law* and not be at the mercy of powerful individuals, especially bishops. What the origin of *Scandrett v Dowling* shows, as far as Sydney is concerned, is that it (the court case) was not the result of a concerted or planned political strategy, but of key individuals reacting in an almost ad hoc way to the idea of the Constitution of the ACA being so easily subverted.

5.3 The Case Begins

The first shot was fired on 16 January 1992 in a letter from solicitors for the plaintiffs to Dowling stating the purpose of the action was 'to obtain determination, that upon the proper construction of the Constitution of the Anglican Church of Australia, you [Dowling] have no power or authority to ordain women as priests, as you have publicly announced you proposed to do on 22nd February 1992'. The letter further explained that the plaintiffs, 'are concerned, if you act upon your proposal to ordain women as priests without the authority of General Synod, you will be acting not only unlawfully, but also in a manner destructive of the Church'.[11] Dowling's lawyers replied that the application to the Court will be defended, 'inter alia on the ground that your clients are seeking to invite the jurisdiction of the civil courts to determine a vexed theological dispute'.[12] Here in a nutshell was what the action was thought to be about: on one side, whether Dowling had legal power to ordain without General Synod's authority, on the other, whether the courts should be asked to decide a theological question.

The plaintiffs were represented by Barry O'Keefe QC and Dowling by Keith Mason QC, both acting on a pro bono basis.[13] The case went before Mr. Justice Andrew

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[11] Letter from Jeremy Saxton and Associates, Sydney, to Bishop Dowling, 16 January 1992.
[12] Letter from Gillespie-Jones and Co, Sydney, 16 January 1992.
[13] O'Keefe later became a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW and Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption of NSW.

Rogers on Thursday 23rd January. O'Keefe wanted to interview Robinson, who that morning was travelling to Sydney. O'Keefe consulted Ken Handley, Robinson's Chancellor, and asked whether it was proper to involve the Archbishop.[14] Handley said it was and so frantic efforts were made to contact him before the court sat later that morning. It was also decided to ask John Reid (the senior assistant Bishop in Sydney) to attend and perhaps give evidence as well. The value of Reid appearing for the plaintiffs was that he was a known supporter of women's ordination, but opposed to the way Dowling proposed to do it. He readily agreed and came to O'Keefe's chambers. It was quickly established that he would be a very good witness. Eventually Robinson was contacted and he too came in to be interviewed by O'Keefe.

The first part of the case was taken up with technical argument as to the standing of the plaintiffs and whether it was even proper for the courts to intervene in what seemed to be an internal Church matter. Justice Rogers inclined to the view that it was not and O'Keefe had to work very hard to keep the matter alive. Eventually Rogers agreed to hear the case as a matter of urgency. He said, 'Whatever views one might have about any of these matters, I would hate to be the person who goes down in history as splitting the Anglican Church. There is a serious danger [of that] and you [O'Keefe] are putting it forward as a serious danger. I want to have proper and admissible evidence about it, not just a bit of hearsay.'[15] He said it was important that he hear from Robinson in person, and that counsel for the defendant have the right of cross examination. The court was adjourned till 2.30pm so he could review the affidavits presented by both sides.

On resumption, Robinson told the court that he thought Dowling's proposal was a recipe for short term chaos and long term disintegration. His basic argument was captured in this exchange with O'Keefe:

> My view is that it will create a great deal of division. It will create in the first instance uncertainty as to the status of the women so ordained as to whether

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[14] This conversation took place in the presence of Ballantine-Jones and Robert Tong (later Deputy Chancellor of the Diocese of Sydney).

[15] Supreme Court of NSW Equity Division, 23 January 1992, 1170/92 – *Laurence Alan Scandrett and Two Others v Right Reverend Owen Dowling*, Transcript, 21

they are validly ordained. It will, secondly, at once create a breach in communion between bishops who so ordain and other bishops and therefore the dioceses concerned. Whether I describe that as a breach in communion, I think it has been generally agreed it will create at least an impairment of communion.

Q. What is your view as to the likely outcome of such an action in the circumstances postulated by the Church, that is, the Anglican Church in Australia, as a national church?

A. Inasmuch as it goes against the principle of our Constitution - that is to say our articles of association - it will greatly increase the tendency by the individual dioceses to do their own thing on a diocesan basis without regard to the agreements which we very carefully have come to - as embodied within the national Constitution. It will tend, I believe, to lead us to fall apart as a national body. I don't say we will cease to have a national body or synod but the degree of agreement we have so far had and sustained in our communion I think will be potentially greatly diminished.[16]

Robinson was followed immediately by John Reid. His evidence was that for Dowling to act unilaterally would be destructive of the unity of the Church. He was asked that if such ordinations occurred in the absence of a canon [from General Synod] what effect, if any, would that have on the ACA. He replied:

I think in the short term it will have some immediate difficulties which I suspect would settle down. I think in the long term it sets a precedent for creating change within our denomination without a canon. If I may say so, it took forty years for our Constitution to come into being, our experience as a national church is really very fragile and vulnerable, but we have grown within those forty years and I think it would set a precedent for radical change on a diocesan basis if it was introduced. ... We would, over ten years I think, go back to having dioceses initiating very significant legislation and carrying it through without reference to General Synod. We could cease therefore to be a really national church but become more like a kind of conference of dioceses.[17]

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[16] Ibid, 26-27.
[17] Ibid, 46.

Next day Scandrett, being the only plaintiff in court, gave evidence. At one point Justice Rogers asked 'who was the kind person who suggested you become a plaintiff'? He replied, 'Rev Bruce Ballantine-Jones, Rector of Jannali'.[18]

After Scandrett, it was Bishop Dowling's turn. He stated that Archbishop Carnley of Perth, Archbishop George of Adelaide, and Bishop Bruce Wilson of Bathurst had announced dates to ordain women before the General Synod met in July. He said others were considering taking similar action. He mentioned Bishop Newell of Tasmania, Bishop Holland of Newcastle, and Bishop Hearne of Rockhampton.[19] Ultimately only Carnley actually went ahead with his threat.

Dowling's own position was summed up in his answer to the question: 'Will you tell his Honour why you are not prepared to wait until General Synod?'

> Well, we have this log jam in a way of deacons, whether they were male or female that would be a problem being not able to move through into priest's orders. I think that psychologically it is very damaging for the women involved and in a sense it is like saying we affirm these women up to a certain point but no further. These women are leading and teaching the congregations and there is no evidence to believe they don't do that as well as a man and likewise all the other performance of their ministries so they are to all intents and purposes doing the work of a priest but unable to pronounce absolution or celebrate the Holy Communion. [20]

Rogers said he would reflect on the matter over the weekend and deliver his judgment on the following Tuesday. He signalled that he was unlikely to grant the injunction, citing UN conventions and human rights as reasons why he was unlikely to find for the plaintiffs.[21] Accordingly, the plaintiffs made preparations for an immediate appeal. On the Tuesday, Rogers duly dismissed the application for an injunction. Dowling and his supporters broke out in applause, but their joy soon turned to disappointment when the news of the appeal filtered through.

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[18] Ibid, 52.
[19] Ibid, 59.
[20] Ibid, 63.
[21] Ibid,101.

With the lodgement of the appeal, the second phase before the full bench of the New South Wales Court of Appeal began, this time presided over by the Chief Justice, Murray Gleeson,[22] Justice Gordon Samuels,[23] and Justice Roderick Meagher. Because the proposed ordinations were scheduled for February and people were expected to come from overseas, the court agreed to meet as a matter of urgency. The Chief Justice from the outset saw a decision that may later turn out to be illegal may have *more* serious consequences than one which prevented Dowling proceeding in the first place. The Court granted the injunction pending a resolution of the main issue, namely, whether a diocese could act to ordain women without a General Synod canon. Gleeson went further and offered to hear the main matter expeditiously. The plaintiffs were happy to proceed at once, but Dowling was not, and so the matter lingered in the legal system for several months and was eventually heard by a different bench and on questions formed in a way that shifted the argument away from the Constitution itself to whether the Constitution was a legally enforceable contract at all. It was during this phase that the plaintiffs invited the other side to join them in a 'friendly' approach to the courts, as it were, to cool the temperature.[24] This was declined, which ensured that the matter continued to be portrayed as an acrimonious conflict, which as far as the plaintiffs were concerned, it was not.

What happened next was set out by Archbishop Robinson in his Synod Address in October 1992.

> The matter came before the Court of Appeal on 22 April, and the court then had before it nine questions of law which Mr. Justice Hodgson of the Equity Court had ordered should be decided separately from, and before, the trial of other questions in the proceedings.

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[22] Justice Gleeson later became Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.

[23] Justice Samuel later became Governor of New South Wales.

[24] An example of this approach was the case known as *Gotley & Anor. V Robinson & Ors.,* in March 1989. This was a request to the NSW Supreme Court by Warren Gotley, Sydney Diocesan Secretary and Archbishop Donald Robinson to clarify the meaning of the ACA Trust Property Act 1917 with respect to certain bequests for scholarships through MTC. The court gave a ruling on the meaning of the Act. Nobody objected to the process and the matter passed without controversy. The plaintiffs in the *Scandrett v Dowling* case wanted the court to clarify whether diocesan powers, under the Constitution (which was a schedule to an act of Parliament), permitted Dowling to ordain women; in other words, to give an authoritative interpretation of the law.

Of these nine questions, with another two which the Court might choose to consider, some had to do with the Constitution as such, and others with whether or not it had legal force and effect or was legally binding on the members of the church. The implications of these questions for our Diocese, and for me as Archbishop and Metropolitan, both in relation to my dealings with Bishop Dowling and generally, were plain. It seemed to me of the utmost importance that the questions, having been raised in this form, should be considered fully and by competent counsel on both sides. I therefore again drew the attention of the Standing Committee to the matter and proposed that we offer to meet the reasonable costs of both sides up to an amount of $50,000. At that stage the hearing was expected to occupy two days. I proposed that the Endowment of the See be used in the terms of the trusts of the Seventh Schedule of the Ordinance, which I was advised, were adequate to cover this purpose. The Standing Committee agreed to this without dissent.[25] At a later meeting, when the hearing had been found to occupy four days, I asked the Standing Committee to increase the limit to $100,000 and it agreed to do so, though with less enthusiasm. The plaintiffs accepted the offer; Bishop Dowling declined. I stress that the offer of assistance to both sides related only to the 4 day hearing before the Court of Appeal and its preliminaries during which the questions of law were framed by the Equity Court.[26]

5.4 Perth Breaks Ranks

As part of the fallout of the Tribunal's failure to answer the question on diocesan powers, Archbishop Carnley of Perth announced that he would ordain ten women on 7 March 1992 on the basis of a diocesan ordinance and advice from his Chancellor. The Sydney plaintiffs, plus one other from Perth, sought an injunction in WA on the same grounds as in NSW. However the court there rejected the application, thus allowing (after many years of struggle) the first ordinations of women *and* without the authority of the General Synod. However in rejecting the application, the judge

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[25] Stuart Piggin, a member of Standing Committee at the time, asked him what he would do if Dowling refused to agree to the action, which Piggin said he knew he would. Robinson said he had not thought of that. Statement by Piggin to author.
[26] *1993 Sydney Year Book*, 260.

actually addressed the central issue, namely the division of power between a diocese and the General Synod. He said:

> The Constitution provides in s51 that a diocesan synod may make ordinances for the order of good government of the Church within the diocese, in accordance with the powers in that behalf conferred upon it by the constitution of such diocese. It seems clear from the provision of s26 of the Constitution that matters of ritual, ceremonial and discipline are part of the government of the Church and are, therefore, within the legislative power of a diocese.[27]

He did not refer to Section 71 which says, 'Nothing in this Constitution shall authorise the synod of a diocese or of a province to make any alteration in the ritual or ceremonial of this Church except in conformity with this Constitution'. He accepted that the alternative view (in favour of the General Synod) was an appropriately arguable issue, but the evidence before him, as to the balance of convenience, supported the defendant, Archbishop Carnley.[28]

What an appeals court might have made of this finding is obviously unknown, but in the absence of any other judgement contradicting it, this appears to be the judicial interpretation of the Constitution with respect to diocesan powers on ritual, ceremonial and discipline. It is certainly the one which Perth relied on for their ordinations. In addition, Carnley said that matters such as ritual, ceremonial and discipline 'are not justiciable' before the court: 'The W.A. State Act ... explicitly provides that it is for the purposes of the protection and conveyancing of property only'.[29] This statement should have signalled to the litigants their exposure on this question, but it seems the whole case passed with hardly a ripple in NSW.

It could be argued that the Perth case was as significant as the NSW case: there was the action of Carnley on the basis of his synod's ordinance and the judgement that the ACA Constitution in Section 51 and Section 26 empowers a diocesan synod to act in such matters. Add to this Carnley's reference to the property issue, the case

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[27] *Butterworth's Unreported Judgements: Scandrett v Carnley*, White J, 6 March 1992, 3.
[28] Ibid, 3.
[29] *Church Scene*, 20 March, 1992.

suggested that assumptions about the legal enforceability of the Constitution were very fragile indeed.

5.5 Attempts to Find a Political Solution

Against the background of the court cases, threatened diocesan action, the failure of the Tribunal to provide a solution and with General Synod scheduled to meet in July 1992, a number of groups were established to find a way to break the deadlock. One was the Monitoring Committee set up by Rayner to 'monitor proceedings' and report back to the Standing Committee of General Synod.[30] Another was established by the Sydney Standing Committee in February 1992 to advise on what steps it might take.[31] In addition, the Canon Law Commission of General Synod was also looking at options. Justice Peter Young of the Appellate Tribunal was instrumental in establishing yet another group to seek to find a political solution. That body attracted the name of the St Paul's-Sydney Group and was made up of leaders across the spectrum of the ACA.[32]

Out of these various groups emerged recommendations which it was thought might be acceptable to the General Synod. One was a constitutional amendment devolving power to the dioceses. This originated with Archbishop George of Adelaide and went through the Monitoring Committee and the Canon Law Commission in February 1992. That proposal had in-principle support of all groups. Another was to pass a canon repealing any residual inherited law from England which might constitute a legal barrier to women's ordination. The Sydney committee came up with two other proposals. One was to allow disaffected churches to opt out of their diocese and join another. The other was to amend the Constitution to allow a diocese to secede from the ACA. David Bleby, Chairman of the Canon Law Commission, reported to the Primate on 24 February 1992 that the Commission favoured a repeal canon and

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[30] The members of the Monitoring Committee were Bishop Donald Cameron of Sydney, Muriel Porter, David Bleby, Bishop (later Archbishop) Ian George, Neil Cameron, and Rowena Armstrong.
[31] The Sydney Committee comprised of Archbishop Robinson, Donald Cameron, Boak Jobbins, Neil Cameron, Robert Tong and Bruce Ballantine-Jones.
[32] The St Paul's Sydney Group was made up of Bishops Paul Barnett, Harry Goodhew and Peter Watson of Sydney, Bishops Hearn, Holland and Wilson, being diocesan bishops who had announced their intention to ordain women without a General Synod canon, and also Phillip Jensen, Neil Cameron, Keith Mason, Jim Munro, Peter Young and Bruce Ballantine-Jones.

expressed the view that the devolution amendment had 'the most likely chance of being passed'.[33] As for the St Paul's Sydney Group (which met between April and June), none of their negotiations came to anything, and on 12 June Young wrote to the members saying that 'there was insufficient impetus to agree on any possible solution'.[34] He expressed the view that the consequences would presumably be unilateral action to ordain women priests and further lawsuits.

5.6 To Secede or Not to Secede

Another manifestation of the atmosphere of crisis in 1992 was what came to be known as the secession controversy. When rumours of the three Sydney proposals leaked out to the media, reporters started to make inquiries. Ballantine-Jones was rung by the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* early in Holy Week. He was able to put the *Telegraph* off, but the *Herald* was clearly going to run a story so he decided to brief them on all three Sydney proposals. On Good Friday morning, 17 April, he was rung by almost every major media outlet in Australia about the front page story in the *Sydney Morning Herald* that day which quoted him as calling for the Diocese of Sydney to secede from the ACA. So frenzied was the media response that during the Good Friday service at Ballantine-Jones' church at Jannali, five television crews invaded the church yard, set up their cameras and then stormed into the service taking notes on everything he said. At the end of the service, members of the congregation were interviewed as to whether they agreed with his reported remarks.

The dilemma was that the story was partly true, but the *Herald* gave prominence to the secession option. Ballantine-Jones had said that the proposals had been developed by a 'group' within the Diocese of Sydney. He did not feel at liberty to say *which* group and the reporter incorrectly concluded that it was the Reformed Evangelical Protestant Association (REPA), which had recently been formed by Phillip Jensen. Instead of downplaying the secession proposal or blaming the *Herald* for misrepresenting the situation, he decided to defend the secession proposal as a

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[33] *Report to the Primate of the Canon Law Commission*, 22 February 1992, 3.
[34] Memo to Members of St Paul's-Sydney Group, Peter Young, 12 June 1992.

legitimate option. Later that day, other media leapt onto the issue. Outside St Andrew's Cathedral, Robinson basically stonewalled, saying, correctly, that secession was merely one option on the table. In Melbourne Rayner was also approached. He did not disguise his anger. He took the timing of the statement to be Ballantine-Jones' fault and attacked him for spoiling the most solemn date in the Christian calendar. Other archbishops and bishops took the same line. Ballantine-Jones found himself the lead story in virtually every paper and newscast across the country and being criticised by nearly every spokesperson for the Church. Significantly Donald Robinson did not join in these attacks.

Responding to local reactions, a number of Sydney bishops wrote pastoral letters in the May *Southern Cross*. Only Paul Barnett, Bishop of North Sydney, supported the idea of 'a constitutional disengagement' of Sydney from the ACA.

Rayner put out a statement on the incident:

> What have we done? What have we done to the church of God? What have we done to the gospel of Christ? Good Friday speaks to us of God's purpose for a unity in Christ. But the message being put through the media was the exact opposite of this. It blotted out what was being preached in our churches that day. It harmed not only the Anglican Church, but all Christians who were seeking to preach Christ crucified. This is scandalous. It calls us to deep and searching repentance. The reason I felt so disturbed on Good Friday was that I saw secondary things overshadowing and threatening to swallow up the primary truths of our faith. It is a tragic expression of human sin, seen repeatedly in history, that people who are closest in their basic beliefs fall apart on secondary, (sometimes trivial) matters. To our shame the same is seen in the history of our church... On Good Friday I declined comment on reports of projected schism. In part this was because the reports themselves represented a beat up ... The coming General Synod must make decisions.[35]

By any measure this was a strong statement. Even though he conceded the issue was a beat up he proceeded to treat it as if it wasn't and by implication that Ballantine-Jones, as the one he believed responsible for the report, was guilty. In the

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[35] *Church Scene*, 1 May 1992.

weeks following, Ballantine-Jones made several public statements pointing out the facts. He wrote to Rayner, who accepted that he was not responsible for the matter coming out on Good Friday.

The idea of a diocese seceding from the ACA was shocking to many people at the time. However under the Constitution, two dioceses already had (and still have) the right to secede, namely Adelaide and The Murray. In addition, the Constitution accepted the possibility that some dioceses of the pre-1961 Church might have chosen *not* to join the federation in the first place.[36] If it is possible for two dioceses to secede, and for some of the original dioceses not to have joined and yet still be in communion with the ACA, the idea that other dioceses could secede was not in itself so revolutionary. How that could be accomplished politically (and legally) is another question.

5.7 Action in the Court: The Court Decides

On 3 July 1992 the full bench of the NSW Court of Appeal found against the plaintiffs. All judges agreed that the Constitution of the ACA in NSW was not a legally enforceable instrument, except to the extent that it relates to Church property. This finding allowed Dowling to go ahead with his ordination, which ironically he didn't do until *after* the General Synod passed the enabling legislation in November 1992.

The key exposition of the majority view of the Court was given by Mr Justice Priestly:

> They (the plaintiffs) say there are two reasons why their claimed rights are civil
> rights enforceable at law.
>
> First is that because the Constitution is a schedule to an Act of the New South
> Wales Parliament, Act 16 of 1961, it had legally binding effect on all members of

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[36] Section 68 (3) states: 'If any diocese in Australia does not consent to this Constitution such diocese shall not by reason only of that fact cease to be in fellowship or communion with this Church or with the Church of England in the diocese of Australia and Tasmania, but may have association with this Church on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by ordinance of the diocesan synod of the diocese and by canon of the General Synod'. *The Constitution and Canons of the Anglican Church of Australia 2001*, (The Standing Committee of the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia, Sydney) 2001.

the Church in New South Wales not only in regard to Church property but, also in regard to the organisation of the Church. Therefore the obligations and duties it creates are enforceable in the same way as those created by any statute.

I do not agree with this. Section 2 of Act 16 of 1961 in my opinion makes it as clear as words can make it that the binding legal effect of the Constitution is limited to purposes connected with or in any way relating to the property of the Church. Matters of faith and organisation not connected or related to Church property are not made any more binding at law than they were before the Act was passed.

Secondly, it was said that all members of the Church in New South Wales were parties to a consensual compact embodied in the Constitution and that this compact had contractually binding legal effect on every member. I do not agree with this either …[37]

Neil Cameron, a prominent lawyer and leading Sydney layman, submitted a report to the Sydney Standing Committee in August 1992, entitled *Scandrett v Dowling: Aftermath*. He explained the implications of the judgement, saying there was nothing in the *ACA Constitution Act 1961* which curtailed the powers of the *ACA Trust Property Act 1917* which included power with regard to the management and use of Church trust property and power to vary trusts.

He concluded:

On the foregoing analysis, the General Synod is (and always has been) little more than an expensive and useless debating society so far as the dioceses in New South Wales are concerned. Each diocesan synod in New South Wales is at liberty to organise its affairs in ways that were never believed possible before *Scandrett v Dowling*. The fact that the court declined to even look at the question of the ordinance of the Synod of the Diocese of Canberra Goulburn and dissolved the previous injunction which it had issued, thereby leaving the Bishop

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[37] *Scandrett v Dowling* (1992) 27 NSWLR 483, Mahoney JA, Priestly JA and Hope AJA, 512f.

of Canberra-Goulburn free to act pursuant to the ordinance and ordain women, illustrates how far diocesan synods can now go ...[38]

This interpretation has been disputed, but it represents the view of an influential member of Sydney Diocese and illustrates a shift in opinion away from the ACA and towards diocesanism.[39] The point of the judgement is that whoever is ordained and licensed to conduct services in a church building was determined *not* to be a matter relating to property otherwise the court would have intervened to decide whether Dowling's proposal was in breach of the Constitution. Taking the point further, legal experts, Macfarlane and Fisher said, '... if a dispute or other matter is properly characterised as non-proprietary then there is no corresponding right on the part of the civil courts to intervene and make civil orders governing the rights, duties and affairs of members and churches as voluntary associations'.[40] Robinson, in his final address to the Sydney Synod in October 1992, questioned whether the plaintiffs had pressed their case as to property strongly enough. He was unhappy that the judgment took away the common law rights to a contract when those rights revolve around 'religious, spiritual and mystical ideas as religious dogma'. He argued that such religious bases for the consensual compact, 'does not make the compact itself of a different kind from any other compacts made between people'.[41]

Whether the judgement was correct in limiting the definition of the enforceability of the Constitution to property matters was never tested in the High Court. The decision of the Court must now be taken as settled law with respect to the Constitution of the ACA.

A number of issues arise out of the case. Given that the Constitution (when not relating to property) is binding only as a matter of conscience, it can be asked how far a member of the ACA (or a diocese) should feel morally bound to the Constitution

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[38] Scandrett v Dowling: Aftermath, N M Cameron. Paper prepared for Sydney Standing Committee, 7 August, 1992.

[39] Justice Ken Handley also issued an analysis of the judgement: 'The internal rules of the Anglican Church of Australia are binding in conscience only, unless property rights are involved. It [the judgement] revealed to us that our Constitution and the legislation of General Synod are not legally enforceable. Apart from property we are really only bound by consensus and by conscience' Interview between Handley and Journalist Dominic Steele, 9 July 1992.

[40] MacFarlane, Peter and Simon Fisher, *Churches, Clergy and the Law* (The Federation Press, Sydney: 1996) 78.

[41] *1993 Sydney Year Book,* 260-264.

when changes are made *after* the 1961 Constitution which *alter* the nature of the Church and its doctrine, or might materially change the Church from what it was in 1961? Another issue is that what previously had been assumed (namely that the Constitution was a legally enforceable contract binding the dioceses together and requiring General Synod's approval for major changes), had now been declared by the court to be nothing more than a gentlemen's agreement, with even less power than a common law contract. Well may Robinson have said; 'this situation takes some digesting'.[42]

5.8 General Synod Decides

When General Synod met in July 1992, the stage was set for what was going to be, one way or another, the final showdown. If no political way forward was found there, there would be a proliferation of diocesan action, such as in Perth, and, if an ordination bill *was* passed, there was fear of a constitutional and political crisis, perhaps leading to Sydney in some way splitting from the ACA. The Standing Committee of General Synod, along with the conference of bishops, had agreed there were two possible ways forward: one was the so called *clarification* bill, which would repeal any inherited English Church law that prevented women's ordination, the other was the so-called *devolution* bill to amend the Constitution to devolve power to dioceses with respect to ritual, ceremonial and discipline. This second proposal had the support of Sydney. If the c*larification* canon did not succeed, and many doubted that it would, the *devolution* proposal would permit dioceses to ordain women if they wished and other dioceses to do other things as well, as long as they were all within the Fundamental Declarations and Ruling Principles of the Constitution.

However the judgment in the *Scandrett v Dowling* case changed everything. Proponents did not *need* General Synod legislation to ordain women because the Constitution was not a legally enforceable contract. They could follow Perth if they wanted. Many thought it would still be desirable to pass the *clarification* bill to give certainty to all dioceses *and* to pass the *devolution* bill to show good will. But, from a

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[42] *1993 Sydney Year Book*, 264.

political standpoint the balance had shifted significantly away from Sydney. For Sydney and its allies the question of principle regarding women's ordination forced them to oppose the *clarification* measure and to support the *devolution* measure in the hope that something positive for them might come out of the whole struggle.

5.9 General Synod: Round One

The Clarification Canon was moved by Archbishop Peter Hollingworth and as a bonus, seconded by Bishop Peter Chiswell of Armidale, an opponent of women's ordination. Chiswell said he maintained his own conviction that the ordination of women priests was not desirable for scriptural reasons, but that the main consideration was the unity of the Church, and that was why he was supporting the bill.[43] The debate itself followed the same pattern of previous occasions, but in the end was passed as a special bill, with each house approving by at least a two thirds majority. To facilitate final acceptance, it was agreed to adjourn the session to November 1992 to allow dioceses to debate the Canon. If after that the Synod voted for it again and it passed, *all* dioceses would be free to adopt it and ordain women to the presbyterate, in accordance with a General Synod canon.

As for the Devolution bill, it had a mixed reception. Archbishop Ian George moved it with Peter Chiswell seconding. John Reid of Sydney said there was a need for liberty for different practices. Charles Sherlock of Melbourne cautioned against jumping into something whose complexities had not been fully explored. The Primate said he was 'open minded' but was puzzled because he had not heard what things it would enable that could not be done at present. Bishop Bruce Wilson of Bathurst said he would vote for it, but didn't want the Church to descend into diocesanism and congregationalism. In reply Ian George said the flood gates were already open with regard to diversity. Hollingworth moved that ritual and ceremonial be deleted from the bill, leaving only discipline. That amendment was passed, against opposition from Sydney. Then the bill itself passed. Because this was a constitutional amendment it had to go around the dioceses, where it needed 18 of the 24 dioceses,

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[43] *Church Scene,* 17 July 1992.

including all metropolitan dioceses to support it. That did not happen so the proposal lapsed.

5.10 General Synod: Round Two

By the time the adjourned Synod reconvened in November, tension was very high all round. The supporters were very close to victory, the opponents were looking for a way to vote it down and force the dioceses to take independent action, thus weakening the concept of a united national church, which the courts had already weakened with their judgements.

In the Lead up to the Synod, a tactics meeting of Sydney representatives was held, chaired by Robinson. Two of the Sydney clergy members had not declared their position and it was assumed they would vote for the bill if it was a secret vote. Robinson said not to invite them and he would speak to them privately. Whether he did so is not known, but the tactic of forcing an open vote at the third reading stage was all about the hope that they might not vote against their archbishop on this question. It was the last card in the deck.

When the debate was concluded, the decisive third reading vote was called, the assumption was that there would be a secret ballot as at previous synods. The plan from the tactics meeting was to oppose the suspension of standing orders to permit a secret ballot. Because the other side had not given notice, it only needed ten members to block it. Ballantine-Jones stood up and invited nine others to join him. Many more did. In fact he called for a division, which provides for members to move to each side of the room to be counted. This was a tactical mistake because it was unnecessarily inflammatory. In any case pandemonium broke out. Many objected and some shouted abuse. Rayner conferred with his legal advisors, but they could not see how to avoid the open vote. After 45 minutes of points of order, questions on procedure and all round confusion, Robert Fordham of Melbourne (and one time Deputy Premier of Victoria), moved the adjournment of the debate till the next day. Debate ensued on that idea. Then someone moved that everybody adjourn for afternoon tea while the participants worked out what to do.

During the break, people from all sides approached Ballantine-Jones to relent on the secret ballot. He waved them away, wanting time to think. He formed the view that Fordham's motion was out of order because there was no proper question before the chair seeing that the vote on the third reading had already been called for. However he also thought that if Rayner accepted Fordham's motion there was no way that a dissent motion against his ruling would pass. He also knew that a number of Sydney representatives would be absent next day, so it was imperative for the vote be taken *that* day. Because he was certain there was no way of preventing an open vote, he approached Rayner and said that if he gave him the call he would seek leave to withdraw his veto on the secret ballot. That is what happened. The vote was held and the bill passed, by two votes. The two Sydney clergy who had not hitherto declared their position (but were assumed to be in favour) were probably the votes that made the difference.[44]

5.11 Conclusion

Whichever way it came about, it was inevitable that eventually the General Synod would pass a canon to permit women to be ordained as presbyters. Given the outcome of the court case, Sydney opponents wanted to force the issue back to the dioceses as part of a growing disenchantment with the ACA and a growing mood for disengagement. Notwithstanding the result, there was a sense of relief that this battle was over, even though it meant that the legal standing of the ACA had been diminished and Sydney, theoretically, might be able to pursue its own agenda priorities more easily. For all that happened, and their long-term consequences, 1992 could rigtly be called 'A Year to Remember' in the history of the ACA.

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[44] The vote may have been closer than it was. In the February 1993 *Anglican News* (Bathurst), the Editor, Allan Reeder, when commenting on the close vote said that the Diocese of Perth had discovered in the months between the two meetings of the Synod that they were entitled to an extra clerical and lay delegate. They filled those 'positions'. What nobody seemed to have realised was that the November meeting was an adjourned meeting of the same Synod and that the number of the representatives was set at the time of the *original* mandate for the July meeting and the new members from Perth should not have been allowed. On that basis the majority may well have been different.

The battle for full integration of women into all levels of ordained ministry was not over in 1992.

CHAPTER SIX

WOMEN'S ORDINATION: THE LAST BATTLE- WOMEN BISHOPS

6.1 Introduction

The last major battle of the women's ordination issue was over the consecration of women as bishops. The Appellate Tribunal in 1991 had given an opinion that a diocesan bishop was not empowered to consecrate a woman as a bishop without a canon of General Synod.[45] However the Tribunal issued another opinion in 2007 suggesting that a canon was not actually necessary because *after* the 1991 opinion there had been a constitutional change which altered the definition of canonical fitness of a bishop inherited from England in 1962.[46] This chapter will trace the steps that led to the last bastion of male only leadership being broken down in those parts of the ACA which chose to avail themselves of that opportunity.

6.2 Judge Made Law Trumps the Political Process

The English law which may have constituted a bar to women bishops included the so-called Phillimore rule that women could not be ordained or consecrated because, 'by nature, Holy Scripture and catholic usage meant they are disqualified'.[47] The new constitutional definition of eligibility adopted in 1990 stated that a bishop need only be a *person* who was at least 30 years old, had been baptised, and was in 'priest's' orders, thus by-passing the Phillimore prohibition. This change was contained in a canon to amend the Constitution passed in 1989. However for it to become effective, it had to be adopted by at least three quarters of the dioceses, including *all* metropolitan dioceses. According to Neil Cameron, the significance of the change

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[45] www.anglican.org.au, Report of the Appellate Tribunal 1991, 28 November 1991, 3.
[46] www.anglican.org.au, Appellate Tribunal, Report to Primate, Reference on Bishops, 26 September 2007, 3.
[47] Cripps on *Church and Clergy*, 8th edition, 1937, 25; *Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of England*, second edition, 1985, 22, citing Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity,* Book vii.

was not apparent to the Canon Law Commission which offered it to the General Synod as an 'unsubstantial' change and as part of a raft of amendments intended only to tidy up the Constitution on non-controversial matters.[48]

When the ordinance came before the Sydney Synod in 1990, it was passed without controversy. This in itself is proof that it was not thought to be of great significance. However Donald Robinson saw the potential that it might open up the way for female bishops and refused to give his assent. His reasons were, 'that the canon ... would alter the basic qualification for canonical fitness, namely, that a person should be male'.[49] When Goodhew became Archbishop he advised the Standing Committee that if the Synod passed the ordinance he would be inclined to assent to it.[50] Some in the Synod saw the danger inherent in the amendment and had included in the ordinance a clause stating that the Synod was not intending to legislate in any way on the ordination of women as priests, or the consecration of women as bishops.[51] It was on that basis that the Synod passed the ordinance on the new definition of canonical fitness. Goodhew assented to it.

In 2005, a number of non-Sydney members of the General Synod asked the Appellate Tribunal whether the answers in the 1991 opinion were still applicable given that a new definition of canonical fitness had been inserted into the Constitution in 1995. At the public sitting on 31 March 2007, C E Croft SC appeared for the petitioners, R Refshauge SC, for Canberra-Goulburn and Geoff Lindsay SC for Sydney.

In answer to the primary question, the Tribunal said there *was* no constitutional impediment to a woman being consecrated a bishop where the diocese concerned had adopted the *Clarification Canon*, nor to a woman being elected and installed as a diocesan bishop in such a diocese. The Tribunal split 4-3 on the constitutional question. For the majority, Keith Mason (now a member of the Tribunal) said, 'the amended definition that came into effect on 5 June 1995 swept away the uncertainties of the English position as at 1962 and replaced them with three (and

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[48] *Southern Cross*, December, 2007.
[49] *1992 Sydney Year Book*, 318.
[50] *1995 Sydney Year Book*, 570.
[51] Ibid, 571.

only three) requirements to be addressed at the confirmation stage'.[52] He continued that the constitutional alteration 'as regards canonical fitness ... was gender neutral (as regards a person)'.[53] David Bleby, a member of the Canon Law Commission which originated the amendment agreed, adding 'the only qualification constituting canonical fitness and qualification for consecration ... would be the attainment of the age of 30 years, baptism and being in priest's orders. It is a deliberate process of simplifying and clarifying what had to be certified before admission to episcopal office'.[54] The minority opinion, led by Peter Young, took the view that such a radical and far reaching change should not be made by means of a constitutional amendment intended only to tidy up minor matters in the definition section.

When the opinion came out there was outrage in Sydney. Neil Cameron wrote in the *Southern Cross*, saying 'that the majority opinion went against the submissions of the Canon Law Commission which said the constitutional amendment was a 'non-controversial improvement to the Constitution'.[55] At a political level, the Sydney Standing Committee expressed its strong opposition and disappointment with the opinion. It noted the Tribunal's rejection of the Canon Law Commission's view that this amendment was not to facilitate 'any change of substance'. More importantly, the Standing Committee said it was 'unlikely that it would participate in future references on the Constitution put to the Tribunal' and that in future it would seek advice from other sources.[56] This resolution is evidence of the exasperation in Sydney at the Tribunal, which in relation to the issues surrounding women's ordination and consecration, found against Sydney submissions on almost every occasion.[57]

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[52] www.anglican.org.au Appellate Tribunal Opinion on Bishops, Mason *Opinion*, 17.
[53] Ibid, 18.
[54] Ibid, Bleby *Opinion,* 39.
[55] *Southern Cross*, December 2009.
[56] Sydney Standing Committee Minutes*,* 15 October 2007. The resolution concluded at (d): 'requests that the Diocesan Secretary inform the Primate, the General Secretary of the General Synod and each of the present members of the Appellate Tribunal that – (i) it is unlikely that this Standing Committee will hereafter participate in the consideration of questions on the Constitution put to the Tribunal, and (ii) in the event that the Standing Committee wants advice on the operation of the Constitution (whether already considered by the Tribunal or otherwise), the Standing Committee will have recourse to other sources for that advice'.
[57] The statement that Sydney would not be likely to enter into future references to the Tribunal found expression in its refusal to make a submission on the administration by deacons at the Lord's Supper reference in 2009.

The admission of women to the episcopate is another example of how hitherto unquestioned assumptions were overturned, through what were perceived to be ingenious ways to get around what had been seen as political or legal barriers. While some in Sydney complained that assurances of the Canon Law Commission were ignored by the Tribunal, it is more likely that the Commission itself did not see the implication of what, to them, were innocuous constitutional changes.

Even though opinions of the Tribunal are not binding, this opinion gave the necessary encouragement to those dioceses in favour of women bishops. Acting on that opinion, Roger Herft, consecrated one of his women presbyters, Kay Goldsworthy, a bishop on 8 May 2008. From the Sydney side, authorizing women bishops by this means further weakened its commitment to the ACA. For example, women bishops, when visiting Sydney Diocese, still cannot function liturgically, except as deacons. Both Archbishop Jensen and Archbishop Davies declined to consecrate women as bishops in NSW when they would otherwise have done so had those consecrations involved men.

Sydney ought not to have been surprised about the outcome of this issue, because Donald Robinson's refusal to give his assent should have signaled the potential of the proposed constitutional amendment, which Sydney could have blocked at the time. However, even if the amendment had failed, it is very likely that supporters would have been able to muster the numbers at General Synod for an enabling canon to be passed, as they did in 1992 for women presbyters.

6.3 Long Term Effects of Women's Ordination

The first and most significant effect of women's ordination is that the ACA no longer has a fully interchangeable and universally accepted ministry. This lack of universal recognition has been described as impaired communion, because some clergy cannot function in dioceses that do not accept women presbyters. Inevitably, this has weakened the concept of a national church. The disaffection with the ACA in Sydney and the hardening of anti-Sydney attitudes elsewhere meant that meetings of General Synod from 1995 have been held *outside* Sydney. Even when on rotational

grounds Sydney would have been expected to host the 2010 session, Sydney indicated that there was no enthusiasm for that and it was held in Melbourne instead. The 2014 Synod will be held in Adelaide for the same reason.

Perhaps the biggest casualty of the women's issue was the decline of old style Anglo-Catholicism. In the 1980s, that movement was influential in Adelaide and in many country dioceses, and was a significant minority elsewhere. Over time, Adelaide moved to a liberal Catholic position, as did Wangaratta and Ballarat, leaving only The Murray as the last of the old style 'Catholic' dioceses.

The decline of Anglo-Catholicism was the subject of a lecture by the Rev Peter Corney in 2002.[58] He attributed this decline to its drift 'away from the credal and biblical orthodoxy of its founders and [the gradual embrace of] a reductionist liberal theology'.[59] He noted also the trend to an 'unbalanced incarnational theology, and the idea of "presence" over "proclamation"'.[60] He said, 'So instead of a balance of "the whole gospel for the whole person", confidence in preaching was eroded and the link between word and deed fatally weakened'.[61] He concluded, that 'the inevitable eventuality happened: preaching, evangelism and proclamation were devalued and diminished'.[62] Other factors he noted were the consequent problem of an untaught laity and the concentration of the service of Holy Communion, effectively alienating non-church going Anglicans and damaging the Sunday School movement.[63]

Whatever else one might attribute this decline to, it meant not only that the blocking power of the Sydney/Catholic axis evaporated, but precipitated many defections to the break-away Traditional Anglican Church, including David Robarts, one of the litigants in the *Scandrett v Dowling* case, and to the Roman Catholic Church, such as Bishop David Silk.

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[58] Peter Corney, 'The Future of Anglicanism in Australia in the light of the decline of the Anglo-Catholic Movement', (2002 Institute for Contemporary Christian Leadership Lecture, ICCL, Kew, Victoria, 2002).
[59] Ibid, 9.
[60] Ibid, 10.
[61] Ibid, 10.
[62] Ibid, 10.
[63] Ibid, 14.

The relentless drive towards women's ordination resulted in many other assumptions about the ACA and its Constitution being overturned. Diocesan powers on ritual and ceremonial were upheld by the court in WA and confirmed by the ordinations in Perth. Assumptions about the legal enforceability of the Constitution were demolished by the NSW Supreme Court in the *Scandrett v Dowling* case. It is unlikely the secular courts will be approached again on constitutional matters, and if they are, that they will intervene. Whatever personal views may be held, the ACA will have to come to terms with the reality that the 'binds that tie' are much weaker than they were once thought to be and that over time the dioceses are likely to drift further apart, like the proverbial tectonic plates, unless remedial steps are taken to limit this.

If the authority of the General Synod has been a casualty, so also has the authority of the Appellate Tribunal. It was concern about a suitable internal arbiter that was one of the major blockages to a constitution being agreed to in the first place, but the actions of the Tribunal over the issues related to women has exposed its inherent weaknesses and undermined its moral authority. The structural problem of lawyers deciding theological questions and bishops deciding legal questions has been noted.[64] Perceived partiality of some members (on both sides) also weakened its credibility. The fact that a number of Tribunal members (wearing different hats), help formulate legislation, which they promote, and then sit in judgement on in the Tribunal, leads to the question: what kind of tribunal is that? This concern is further illustrated by the fact that elections to the Tribunal have become politicised, with factions manoeuvring to get nominees elected who are thought to favour particular policies. Contested claims that opinions of the Tribunal were binding didn't help its standing, or the fact that once elected, members hold office till they reach retirement age or resign. To be fair, if they were subject to re-election, that also would undermine their independence. Either way, there is a serious problem with the Tribunal as an impartial dispute resolution mechanism. As noted, such was the loss of confidence in the Tribunal that the Sydney Standing Committee is now unwilling to participate in references and the Synod has voted to reject some of its opinions.[65]

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[64] See page 82.
[65] www.sydneyanglicans.org.au, SDS, Synod in Past Years, 2010, Resolution, 16/10.

Inside Sydney, the most noticeable effect of the women's ordination dispute has been the change of attitude from a sympathetic to a more hostile attitude towards the ACA. In 1992, conservative leaders supported the *Scandrett v Dowling* action because they thought they were defending the ACA Constitution. Having lost on the grounds that a diocese *could* ordain women without General Synod endorsement, Sydney was in a sense liberated from the obligation to play by ACA rules. As a result, Sydney has been far more willing to act unilaterally. Examples are: the refusal to pay the special assessments to General Synod, disputes over the so-called compulsory assessment, seen as attempts to expand the role of the Primate, the publication of its own prayer books and the repeal of many General Synod canons.[66]

Sydney does not need to consider the option of secession any more. Rather, it looks to loosen the Constitution to allow greater liberty with goodwill for all. In fact, General Synod in 2010 overwhelmingly passed a motion moved by Ballantine-Jones asking the Standing Committee to appoint a commission to study how the tensions in the ACA could be addressed. As a result, General Synod Standing Committee appointed the Unity Task Force to explore how the ACA might recover a greater sense of national unity. In 2012, a series of meetings took place in Melbourne and Adelaide to try to ascertain what support there was for this objective. Following those meetings, a meeting of Sydney Standing Committee representatives, the Unity Group and the whole of the General Synod Standing Committee was held in April 2013, signalling a

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[66] Differences within the ACA have sparked a number of books. Of interest are two by Tom Frame, former bishop to the armed forces and now a full time academic. He wrote *Anglicans in Australia*, (University of New South Wales Press Ltd Sydney, 2007), and *A House Divided? The Quest for Unity within Anglicanism* (Acorn Press, Brunswick East Victoria, 2010). These two books are commented on together because they are essentially about the same thing, the ACA. In *Anglicans in Australia*, Frame says his main aim is 'descriptive', and 'prescriptive'. In *A House Divided*, he says it is 'prescriptive'. His methodology is to take recent books or publications as representative of factions within the ACA and offer his own critique of them (mostly negative), and then attempt to lay out his own views on Anglicanism and the ACA and how they might arrest its decline and refresh its mission. The key to his critique of the competing factions in the Church is his own position. He calls it 'Consensus Anglicanism'. This he defines as 'Reformed and Catholic' and in an intellectual sense, 'Liberal'. He says his position is opposed to party politics and is defined by the centre rather than the periphery of Anglican belief.
In *A House Divided,* Frame makes suggestions about structure, diocesan and episcopal, functions that seem to take no account of the real politick. For example, he proposes a highly centralised national structure for the ACA involving the abolition of diocesan, provincial and general synods and their replacement with diocesan councils of 24 members and a national council of not more than 18 members. Given the power of the diocesan veto to ordinary, let alone radical changes such a top down, highly centralised structure, his ideas would be politically impossible, which prompts the question, why float it? Even if implemented, it would lead to a denomination led by a remote, unrepresentative and unaccountable group of careerists.

desire to bring proposals to the 2014 General Synod in Adelaide. What will come of all this is unknown, but it does show that even with all the changes since 1992, Sydney is still willing to engage with the ACA, albeit on a downgraded and more realistic basis.

6.4 Change and Politics and the Ordination Question

After 1985, the politics of the women's ordination issue was demonstrably of a *very high level.* For example, both sides were organised into disciplined interest groups.[67] Both sides organised meetings, and in the case of the Movement for the Ordination of Women (MOW), held demonstrations inside and outside synod meeting halls. Both sides attempted to influence the election of supporters to key positions on synods and committees on the basis of their views on *this* question. Both sides made use of the secular media to explain their positions and to enlist public support.[68] In Sydney, the influence of the ACL was enlisted to secure a strong anti-ordination representation on General Synod.[69] On the national stage, the numerous references to the Appellate Tribunal were highly organised political actions, both in securing the required number of signatories and in the preparation of submissions. Both sides engaged senior counsel. As noted, even the election to the Tribunal itself became the object of intense political action to try to alter the balance of power within it. At the various meetings of the General and Sydney Synods, resolutions, debating tactics and voting procedures were highly organised and disciplined. Notwithstanding their chaotic beginnings, the court proceedings in Sydney and Perth were not just legal manoeuvres, but political actions to force the battle back to the General Synod and away from diocesan synods.

The composition of General Synod and the size of Sydney representation at General were also factors. Even though the proportion of Sydney representation opposed to

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[67] MOW and Equal But Different.

[68] Sydney representatives employed a journalist to handle their media relations during the 1992 General Synod.

[69] ACL as an organisation did not play a public role in the political battles over women's ordination, post 1985. The reason for this was that Robert Tong and Bruce Ballantine-Jones did not want the ACL's interests on *other* matters to be weakened because of any backlash from supporters who happened to favour women's ordination.

women's ordination increased under the influence of ACL, the basis of allocating diocesan representation at General Synod worked against Sydney and favoured dioceses with a higher clergy to people ratio.[70] Also, each diocesan bishop has an equal vote in the House of Bishops whether it has only 20 parishes and a few hundred Anglicans attending (as in the Diocese of the Riverina) or, like Sydney, 270 parishes and 80,000 regularly attending. (Gerrymander is the term Sydneysiders use). Given these factors, it was only going to be a matter of time before supporters of women's ordination reached the numbers required to pass legislation, again raising the ire of Sydney, and leading to ongoing tensions between the two camps.

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[70] The basis of representation on General Synod is a formula that allocates a clerical and lay representative for each twenty full time active clergy in the diocese. Dioceses with smaller parishes tend to have higher per head representation than one such as Sydney where the church attendance per parish is higher. Also the formula allocates representation to small dioceses that is higher than the one to twenty clergy would produce.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LAY AND DIACONAL ADMINISTRATION: BIBLE OR TRADITION

7.1 Introduction

The second subject to be examined in Part Two is lay and diaconal administration at the Lord's Supper. This was a change that the Sydney Synod wanted. It tried to work through established processes but the implacable opposition from outside Sydney drew from its supporters massive investments of political capital, not to mention time and resources, in pursuit of their objective. The outcome was only partially successful in that diaconal administration became widely practised in the Diocese. To the frustration of supporters, up to the end of the Jensen administration, lay administration was yet to be adopted.

Nothing illustrates the issue of change in practice in the Diocese of Sydney as much as the proposition that lay persons and deacons should be permitted to administer the Lord's Supper at authorised Anglican services. For Sydney advocates of this change there was no theological principle in opposition because Scripture is completely silent on the matter. How such a change could come about was a question of whether the rules of the ACA in the Diocese of Sydney could permit it to happen. This translated into the proposition that any rules preventing this should be repealed.

As with the issue of women's ordination, the need for synodical action brought it into the political realm requiring the same armoury of political weapons that was used in that case. This chapter will describe this campaign and address the question of how political action operated to influence its outcome. Behind all this was Sydney's proclivity to want to act within the law of the Church, meaning that it took decades even to reach the point where it was felt proper to move forward if only to permit

diaconal administration. Because the campaign followed an essentially legal path, this chapter will focus mostly on the legal and technical aspects of the campaign.

First a definition: the Lord's Supper (or Holy Communion) is the occasion when Christians in the Anglican Church gather to remember and give thanks for the death of Jesus. The *BCP* rubric requires that the prayer of consecration be said *only* by a presbyter (priest). This restriction was seen by many in Sydney as an anomaly. The anomaly was more pronounced because of changes in the rules about lay preaching. The long-standing Anglican practice of limiting the ministry of word and sacrament to priests is one thing, but to allow lay people to preach but not administer the sacraments appears to have the effect of elevating the sacrament over the word, something Sydney evangelicals dissent from.

7.2 Arguments For and Against

Arguments for and against tend to fall under two headings: principle and process. With respect to principle, the supporters start with New Testament teaching on the nature of the gospel, church, sacraments and ministry. They say that *this* teaching should determine the issue. Opponents tend to skate over the biblical material and claim that post-apostolic developments reserving this function to presbyters are part of the post-apostolic revelatory work of the Holy Spirit.[1] In the case of process, opponents, having argued that it is wrong in principle, then say that in any case it is prohibited by the formularies of the ACA and the Constitution. Supporters say that the formularies have to be read against their Reformation background, and properly interpreted, *do* permit it.

Submissions to the 1996 reference to the Appellate Tribunal illustrate the competing arguments.[2]

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[1] See reference to the House of Bishops submission to the Appellate Tribunal at page 120.
[2] The main question read: 'is it consistent with the Constitution of the [ACA] to permit or authorise, or otherwise make provision for-
(a) deacons to preside at, administer or celebrate the Holy Communion; or
(b) lay persons to preside at, administer or celebrate the Holy Communion?
The second question sought opinion on whether a diocesan synod may, 'permit, authorise or make provision as mentioned above. The Tribunal answers can be found on the General Synod Website: www.anglican.org.au Appellate Tribunal Opinions and follow links.

The case for lay and diaconal administration prepared by Dr John Woodhouse, then Rector of Christ Church, St Ives, stated in part:

12 There is no basis for the proposition that only an ordained priest may administer the Lord's Supper in Section 3 of the Constitution: [Which says] *This Church will ever obey the commands of Christ, teach His doctrine, administer His sacraments of Holy Baptism and Holy Communion, follow and uphold His discipline and preserve the three orders of bishops, priests and deacons in the sacred ministry* [because]:

13. There is no 'command of Christ' on the subject, and nor do the canonical scriptures to which we look for 'doctrine' and 'His discipline' provide any basis for the proposition, [that only an ordained priest may administer the Lord's Supper].

14. The preservation of the three orders of bishops, priests and deacons does not entail the restriction of the administration of the Lord's Supper because:
(a) 'Priest' means 'elder', and the Anglican order of priest corresponds to the elder of the New Testament.
(b) The distinctive role of the priest (elder) in the Anglican Church and the New Testament is oversight of the congregation.
(c) While this oversight is exercised chiefly through preaching and the administration of the Sacraments, the role of oversight is not necessarily compromised if on certain occasions these functions are carried out by someone else.

On process, Woodhouse argued:

15. There is no basis for the proposition that only an ordained priest may administer the Lord's Supper in Section 4 of the Constitution: *This Church... retains and approves the doctrine and principles of the Church of England embodied in the Book of Common Prayer together with the Form and Manner of Making Ordaining and Consecrating of Bishops, Priests and Deacons and in the Articles of Religion sometimes called the Thirty-nine Articles...* [because]:
16. The rubrics of the *Book of Common Prayer* which indicate that 'the priest shall say...', (or the like), are not to be understood as prescriptive and restrictive

rules indicating that the priest AND ONLY THE PRIEST must say/read these sections.

17. *The Form for Ordaining Priests* contains the bishop's authorisation of the priest to preach the word of God and to administer the sacraments. This does not, and has never been understood to mean, that ONLY THE PRIEST may preach the word of God or minister the sacraments.

18. The *Thirty nine Articles* do not address the question directly, but indirectly provide the principle that nothing that cannot be proved by Scripture can be 'thought requisite or necessary to salvation' (Article 6). Therefore unless it can be proved from Scripture that only an ordained priest may administer the Lord's Supper, this cannot be a 'principle of doctrine or worship in this Church'.

18 Furthermore Section 4 of the Constitution provides that, with certain provisos:
... a bishop of a diocese may, at his discretion, permit such deviations from existing order of service, not contravening any principle of doctrine or worship as aforesaid...
If there is no principle of doctrine or worship contravened by lay persons and deacons administering the Lord's Supper, then to permit such a deviation from the existing order appears to be in the competence of the diocesan bishop according to the Constitution.[3]

The case against was made by the House of Bishops. They said on the question of principle:

Although we cannot say from the New Testament exactly who presided at the Lord's Supper, we can discern that the early church did recognise a variety of ministries for which various charisms [gifts] were required and which were acknowledged by the community. While each of these ministries reflected in some way responsibilities to which the whole community was called in baptism, the early ordering of the apostolic church assigned public ministry to selected individuals.

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[3] 'Lay and Diaconal Administration of the Lord's Supper'*:* A Submission to the Appellate Tribunal Prepared by Dr John Woodhouse, Undated. The original is in the possession of the General Synod Office, Suite 2, Level 9, 51 Druitt St, Sydney, NSW, 2000.

Even if the New Testament evidence is unclear, there can be little doubt that the present shape of the ministry became normative in the church during the same period in which the canon of scripture and the historic creeds were also accepted. ... In the case of the canon, it is argued that the church simply recognised the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It did not bestow authority on the canon; it acknowledged an authority the canon was seen to possess. However, a similar process could also be claimed to be at work in the emergence of the apostolic ministry. The same faith which acknowledges the canon was also led in the same period to acknowledge the ministry as a divinely appointed means of serving the church and preserving its unity.

... In requiring the retention of the three orders of bishop, priest and deacon, the Fundamental Declarations... express the determination to retain the historic pattern of ministry which this Church has received as part of the one holy catholic and apostolic church. This requires not only the retention of three orders of ministry bearing these names, but that the orders continue to exercise the same functions as in the past and that the same differentiation of function between them should continue. This rules out permission being given to deacons or lay persons to consecrate the sacrament of the Lord's Supper...

Article 26 of the *Thirty Nine Articles* lays down that the unworthiness of ministers hinders not the effect of the sacraments they administer. This is based on an understanding important in the Western Church from the time of Augustine that it is Christ, not the minister, who acts in the sacrament to make it effectual. Ordination, which involves both the laying on of hands and a prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit to the person being ordained a priest or a bishop, sets a person apart to act in the Christian congregation in the name of Christ. ...Ordination also empowers the person being ordained to act in a representative capacity on behalf of the whole priestly people of God and to speak on their behalf.

On the question of process, they said:

... Furthermore the ruling principles of the Church affirm that the *Book of Common Prayer (1662)* and the *Thirty Nine Articles* are to be regarded as 'the authorised standard of worship and doctrine in this Church, and no alteration in

or permitted variations from the services or Articles therein contained shall contravene any principle of doctrine or worship laid down in such standard.[4]

7.3 Early Chronology

As part of the political campaign for lay administration, the ACL and the *ACR* published *The Lord's Supper in Human Hands: Who should Administer,* which set out the sequence of events leading up to the Sydney Synod of October 2008.[5] Notable among these was the Lay Assistants at Holy Communion Canon 1973, which allowed the bishop of a diocese to authorise laypersons to 'assist the priest in the administration and distribution of the Holy Communion'.[6] In 1977, John Chapman moved that the 'Synod requests the Committee re Meaning, Value and Theology of Ordination to investigate the issue of licensing lay persons for the ministry of Word and Sacrament and to report to the next session of Synod'.[7] The Committee reported in 1978 and requested the report be sent to the General Synod Commission on Ministry and Doctrine. In 1981, General Synod appointed a commission on lay ministry. At the same time, the General Synod Commission on Doctrine issued a report, *Towards a Theology of Ordination,* with a section on lay presidency at the 'Eucharist', rejecting that option and supporting active lay persons being ordained in a part time capacity.[8] Meanwhile, the 1981 Sydney Synod requested the Standing

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[4] This submission was sent to the Appellate Tribunal by Archbishop Keith Rayner on 30 August 1996. The original copy is in the possession of the General Synod Office, Suite 2, level 9, 51 Druitt St Sydney 2000.

[5] *The Lord's Supper in Human Hands: Who Should Administer*? Peter Bolt, Mark Thompson, Robert Tong (Australian Church Record Ltd, Anglican Church League, Sydney, 2008), 36ff. See also *The Lord's Supper:* Epilogue, Peter Bolt, Mark Thompson Robert Tong (Australian Church Record, Anglican Church League, Sydney, 2010). These two books are a collection of essays aimed at explaining the basis of Sydney Diocese's strong support for diaconal and lay administration at the Lord's Supper. Apart from the editors, other contributors are John Woodhouse and Glenn Davies. The first book lays out the theological, historical and legal basis for the proposed practice. The second responds to the 2010 advisory opinion of the Appellate Tribunal and the errors the authors see in the Tribunal's opinion that a canon of General Synod is necessary. The arguments advanced in these books are dealt with in Chapters Seven and Eight.

[6] *Act, Ordinances and* Regulations*, 2005 Edition*, (Standing Committee of Synod, Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 2005), 222.

[7] *1978 Sydney Year Book,* 242. It should be noted here that in the early stages, and generally outside Sydney, the term 'lay presidency' was commonly used. This was eventually discarded in Sydney, because it was thought that it placed too much emphasis on the role of the officiating minister as someone who was *presiding* when it was felt the emphasis should be on the nature of the sacrament itself as a corporate activity, rather than on the minister, who was seen as the facilitator of that activity not the one who legitimises it.

[8] *Towards a Theology of Ordination,* (Standing Committee, General Synod*,* Sydney,1981), 49.

Committee to investigate how to implement the conclusions of its own *Meaning, Value and Theology of Ordination* report.[9] Standing Committee referred that to the Sydney Doctrine Commission, which in 1983 issued a report affirming that lay presidency *is* a proper expression of the gifts of some lay members of the Church.[10] It further stated that on the grounds of history and theology, 'it cannot be affirmed as an Anglican stance to say that episcopal ordination is of the essence of a validly dispensed sacrament'.[11] In 1985, a committee chaired by Bishop Goodhew reported to Synod, with Goodhew moving that the Synod *endorse* the principle of lay presidency, which it did.[12]

At around the time Sydney was becoming engaged on this issue it also surfaced overseas. John Martin's, *Gospel People? Evangelicals and the Future of Anglicanism*[13] referred to early efforts to include laity in the Lord's Supper at St Matthias in Centennial Park Sydney and observed that this was 'part of a worldwide groundswell in support of lay presidency'. He cited Emmanuel Church Wimbledon, where lay administration was first practised in the interregnum before the arrival of the Rev Jonathon Fletcher, who retained it after he arrived.[14]

The matter came up at the 1988 Lambeth Conference:

> During the conference, an additional group of bishops from section 2 was formed to look at the arguments for lay members being licensed to preside at the Eucharist in special circumstances. In their report, they held that where it is not possible to provide a president the bishop is still responsible for making the sacrament... available and they believe that there might be circumstances in which it would be justifiable for him to authorise a lay member to preside in his name... [15]

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[9] *1982 Sydney Year Book,* 251.
[10] *1984 Sydney Year Book*, 366-375.
[11] *The Lord's Supper in Human Hands*, 41.
[12] *1986 Sydney Year Book,* 244.
[13] *Gospel People? Evangelicals and the Future of Anglicanism*, John Martin, (SPCK, London,1997).
[14] Ibid, 183.
[15] *Report of the Lambeth Conference 1978*, (CIO Publishing London 1978), 83.

The official report said, 'When the report [of the study group] was presented to the section it was decided that the subject should not be further discussed'.[16] Martin says it was taken off the agenda by Archbishop Runcie.[17] At the time when Sydney voted for lay administration in 1993, the influential English Roman Catholic weekly *The Tablet* said this issue posed a greater threat to Anglo-Roman Catholic relations than women priests.[18] Evangelicals in England in 1993 were also agitating for lay administration and among their own associations it was garnering widespread support.[19]

Meanwhile in 1992, General Synod passed the Canon Concerning Services.[20] This allowed variations in services, and even gave the right to ministers to produce services for which no other provision had been made.[21]

In December 1994, the General Synod Doctrine Commission convened a theological consultation on lay administration in Sydney. Spokespersons of various positions presented papers and others responded. These were published by the General Synod Standing Committee in May 1995.[22]

It was only a matter of time before the spotlight fell on the Appellate Tribunal, and in 1996, it did. Sydney initially proposed to go to the Tribunal.[23] It then changed its mind, partly due to the perception that the Tribunal had become a politicised body minimising Sydney's chances of getting a favourable opinion.[24]

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[16] Ibid, 83.

[17] Martin, 183.

[18] Ibid, 183.

[19] Ibid, 182.

[20] Under clause 29 (11) of the ACA Constitution, the General Synod can pass a canon, but if it affects the order and good government of the church in a diocese it does not take effect until that diocese adopts it by ordinance. See *Acts, Ordinances & Regulations, 2005 Edition,* 15.

[21] Ibid, 218. It was this canon, which became the subject of considerable debate inside and outside Sydney following an article by Ballantine-Jones in the *ACL News,* June 1999, under the title, 'A Quiet Revolution'.

[22] *Lay Presidency at the Eucharist,* (Standing Committee of General Synod, Sydney, 1995).

[23] *1996 Year Book,* 293. This resolution was proposed by Professor Michael Horsburgh, a strong opponent of lay administration.

[24] *1996 Sydney Year Book,* 342, Resolution 19/95 cited 'cost and other factors...' The politicization of the Tribunal can be seen in the way membership itself became just another political election, with competing factions trying to get people they thought were inclined to their views elected. For example, in the 1995 General Synod in Melbourne, there were two episcopal vacancies, one to be filled by the determination of the clerical members on one day, the other by the determination of the lay members the next day. Sydney representatives did a deal with the Anglo-Catholics to support Bishop Chiswell

Notwithstanding Sydney's wish to withdraw, Keith Rayner as Primate made his own reference in 1996. It is not difficult to see this as a political move bound to have serious political implications, no matter what the outcome. Sydney did not want the reference because an answer that lay administration was contrary to the Constitution (though not binding in itself) would be seen as a significant roadblock. Opponents, expecting such a result, thought that would end the matter once and for all.

7.4 Sydney Asks its Own Questions

Such was the political atmosphere at the time that 25 Sydney members of General Synod referred some *other* questions to the Tribunal relating to the constitutionality of prayers for the dead, reservation of the elements, manual acts at Holy Communion services and lay persons taking other parts of authorised services.[25] The view was that if the Tribunal was going to advise *against* lay administration, they should be required to express a view on those other matters as well, given that they were close to the heart of many 'catholic' oriented Anglicans but which were never authorised in the way Sydney was trying to have lay administration authorised.[26] Rayner was unhappy at this development. Writing to the petitioners, he said, 'They [the new questions] are of a quite different character from any previously put to the Appellate Tribunal. Previous references have directly related to significant change of practice ... which was envisaged by proposed or actual legislation ... The questions in your proposed reference ... relate to practices some of which would seem to be well nigh universally accepted and others of which have for a long time been matters of disagreement among members of the church... I confess I am concerned at the precedent which will be created ...' He said that he would be very fearful of the consequences if this became a common practice.[27]

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from Armidale for the clerical vacancy, and at the election the next day, to support Bishop Waldren from the Murray for the vacancy to be filled by the lay members. The liberals made the mistake of nominating too many for the first election and split their vote, allowing Chiswell to be elected. They learnt their lesson and next day put up only one candidate, Bishop Bruce Wilson of Bathurst, for election by the laity, who was elected.

[25] Ballantine-Jones was one of the organisers of this reference to the Appellate Tribunal.
[26] *Weekend Australian,* 23-24 March 1996.
[27] Letter to Robert Tong from Archbishop Keith Rayner, 21 March 1996.

As it turned out the Tribunal refused to answer the questions. The Tribunal cited the fact that the petitioners did not themselves make submissions. They said that several [of the questions] were vague or imprecise. Sydney petitioners found this a puzzling response given that Section 63 of the Constitution states: 'Whenever any question arises under this Constitution ... the question is referred ... to the Appellate Tribunal ...' The operative words which guided the petitioners were, 'whenever *any* question ...'[28] Why wouldn't a question on liturgical practice which may be in contravention of the Fundamental Declarations or Ruling Principles be such a question? Where else under the Constitution could such a question be asked? Did it mean that if clergy in Sydney just implemented lay administration so that it became an 'accepted' practice, no one else could approach the Tribunal for its opinion on that? The refusal to address those questions was seen in Sydney as reeking of political expediency and became another contributing factor in Sydney's loss of confidence in the Tribunal. Undoubtedly the Tribunal saw the political problem of being forced to declare that, say, prayers for the dead were not in accordance with Anglican formularies when they were so widely offered in Anglican churches across the country. How could opponents of lay administration press their opposition if the Tribunal had declared any of those *other* practices also to be contrary to the Constitution? That was the point behind Sydney's additional questions.

7.5 What the Bishops said to the Tribunal

The leading submission against lay administration was made by the House of Bishops.[29] This submission, according to Rayner, was prepared by the Bishop of Wangaratta and Goodhew. Rayner told the Bishops he intended to forward it to the Tribunal on 30 August 1996 saying, 'Unless I receive advice from any bishop to the contrary by 28 August I shall advise the President of the Tribunal that this submission is made without dissent'.[30] There was one dissenting bishop, who said he did not support the submission as it stood, and dissented from it. 'History is not revelatory and the analogy with the recognition of the Canon [of Scripture] is unsustainable'. This dissenting bishop was not Goodhew but Tony Nichols of North

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[28] *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations 2005 Edition*, 29.
[29] The Bishop's submission may be found on page 120.
[30] Quotation taken from the letter of Primate to members of the House of Bishops, 12 August 1996.

West Australia. Many Sydney evangelicals wondered why Goodhew supported this submission. The question was how could he embrace a proposition which appeared to say that post-apostolic developments are part of the revelatory process? The outcome of his involvement in the submission, along with his later refusal to approve the Lay Administration Ordinance was to seriously weaken his political standing in the Diocese with the conservative majority. For example an editorial in the *Australian Church Record* said:

> Two Statements of Archbishop Harry Goodhew show that the matter of scriptural authority is now in the balance, the advice of the Australian Bishops given to the Appellate Tribunal on the matter of lay administration of the Lord's Supper. ... As reported in the last edition of the *ACR*, the Australian House of Bishops' submission to the Appellate Tribunal on lay and diaconal presidency acknowledges that the threefold order of Bishops, Priests and Deacons as a *normative* order was not revealed to the Church in Holy Scripture. According to the submission, it had been revealed through the theological writings and synods in the centuries following the writing of the New Testament. It (sic) also revealed to the Church that only a bishop or priest could celebrate the Holy Communion.[31]

The editorial said that this was an appeal, not 'to Bible alone', but to 'Bible plus experience of the Church'. Noting that Bishop Tony Nichols dissented from the reasoning of the report, it said that 'until Archbishop Goodhew also dissented from the agreed statement, he has to accept a method of doing theology contrary to the evangelical faith'.[32]

7.6 The Tribunal's Surprising Answers

The Tribunal released its answers in December 1997. To the surprise of many, the Tribunal answered 'yes' to question 1, but 'no' to question 2.[33] The significance of

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[31] *Australian Church Record*, 1 February 1999.
[32] Ibid.
[33] The election of Bishop Bruce Wilson to the Tribunal was crucial on the lay administration reference. References on matters of ritual and ceremonial require a majority of episcopal members to agree, with at least two of the lawyers concurring. On question 1, on lay administration, the affirmative answer was 4-3, with Bishops Chiswell and Wilson agreeing, supported by Young and Handley. Many

the affirmative answer to question 1 (that diaconal and lay administration *was* consistent with the Constitution) was that the Fundamental Declarations of the Constitution set out the doctrinal standards of the ACA. By answering yes to question 1, the Tribunal was stating its opinion that diaconal and lay administration *was* consistent with the commands of Christ, his discipline and the three orders of ministry, and that they were *not* contrary to the Ruling Principles of the Church of England embodied in *BCP* or the *Articles of Religion,* even if they required General Synod authorisation*.*

Rayner (minority member on the Tribunal with respect to this question) was very unhappy with this answer. In a letter to John Woodhouse in November 1999, he said, 'In my opinion the majority were wrong in that opinion'.[34] He went on to make another and curious observation: 'In any case, I doubt whether any of us would want to argue that the church's highest judicial body is the final court of appeal on a theological, as distinct from a legal constitutional question', the very point Robert Tong made years earlier in relation to women's ordination.[35] The irony is that it was he who persisted with the referral in the first place. What higher authority could there be in the ACA? Why was he (and others) so willing to invoke the Tribunal's opinions that there were no theological or constitutional objections to the ordination of women, but not on this matter?[36]

For opponents of lay administration, the affirmative answer to question 1 was a severe blow. The negative answer to question 2, saying a canon of General Synod was required, appeared at first to be a major setback for Sydney because it looked to be a political impossibility that the General Synod would ever approve such a canon.

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believed those four answered in favour because all of them had their origins in Sydney. Chiswell and Wilson were trained at MTC and Handley and Young were prominent evangelical laymen in the Diocese. Whatever their views might be on other matters, their biblical orientation meant that they would have found it difficult to support a sacerdotal view on priesthood and sacraments. On matters of faith, it is hard to see how they could divorce themselves from their own theological orientation.

[34] This letter was dated 1 November 1999, expressing his unhappiness at the 1999 Sydney ordinance to which Archbishop Goodhew declined to assent. This letter is used with the permission of Dr Woodhouse.

[35] See page 82.

[36] Rayner's doubts about the Tribunal's capacity to give opinions on theological matters found an echo in Sydney responses to the Tribunal's opinion in 2010.

7.7 Sydney Reactions

Sydney Synod, taking heart from the affirmative answer to the first question, persisted with its own legislation. In 1995, a bill for such an ordinance had been introduced into the Synod and passed to the third reading stage. It was then deferred to the 1996 Synod pending the outcome of the Appellate Tribunal's deliberations. It was deferred again in 1996 and 1997. In 1998 it was withdrawn, and in 1999, a new ordinance was introduced which passed through all stages.[37] Goodhew refused his assent. He told members of the Synod in November 1999 that he acknowledged the strength of the theological arguments but said that the opinion of the Appellate Tribunal against a diocesan synod passing such ordinance could not be taken lightly.

It was the impact on the Australian Church and the wider Anglican Communion that weighed most heavily on him. He said:

> If I was not aware of it before, correspondence and phone conversations over the last few weeks have certainly convinced me that whatever we do will have a significant impact. I am particularly sensitive to this point, because I have been engaged since Lambeth with other parts of the communion, arguing against unilateral action over crucial moral issues and attended theological norms. To act unilaterally myself, without wide consultation, would undermine my credibility in the ongoing debate.[38]

Goodhew's action was a great disappointment, especially because he had chaired the committee supporting lay administration and actually moved the motion recommending its implementation.[39] It was hardly a surprise, as he had repeatedly told Synod he would not consent. This was not going to be the end of the matter.

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[37] *2000 Sydney Year Book*, Preaching and Administration of Holy Communion of Lay Persons and Deacons Ordinance, 639.
[38] *2000 Sydney Year Book*, 645.
[39] *1986 Sydney Year Book*, 244, Resolution 18/85 stating that Synod endorses the principle of lay presidency and asking Standing Committee to investigate ways the possible legal or other difficulties could be overcome.

7.8 Conclusion

This thesis is about how Sydney initiated or opposed change since 1966. On lay and diaconal administration, supporters had clearly won the political battle internally but the only victory externally was the opinion of the Appellate Tribunal that there was nothing in the ACA Constitution that prohibited them from being adopted other than the lack of a General Synod canon. This was almost impossible politically given the political barriers to such an eventuality. Not to be daunted, supporters looked to other means.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LAY AND DIACONAL ADMINISTRATION: SYDNEY LOOKS AT NEW WAYS FROM OLD LAWS

8.1 Introduction

Given the Appellate Tribunal's negative answer to question 2, meaning that a General Synod canon was required, Sydney turned to consider how this apparent road block could be removed. One way was to revisit the question of what *actual* law of the Church of England, inherited under the 1961 Constitution, prohibited lay administration and therefore required a General Synod canon. Some thought disqualification might rest in the rubrics of *BCP* which stipulate that a 'priest' should read the prayer of consecration. Implicit in this view is the idea that rubrics enshrine a principle of doctrine and worship and are not just 'stage directions'. If there were theological implications, it would be reasonable to expect some explanation as to what they were. Certainly without such propositional interpretation it would be difficult to see how a rubric could be elevated to a 'principle of doctrine and worship', binding on the Church.[1] In the absence of such supporting argument, Sydney argued that the use of the rubrics is not sustainable. The question some Sydney activists asked was whether there were *other* laws that *do* constitute a barrier?

8.2 Inherited English Law

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[1] An example of a rubric which might be thought to convey such an implication is that which requires communicants to receive the elements kneeling. In order to dispel any suggestions that by kneeling, the bread and the wine were being worshipped, another rubric was added to *BCP*, called the *Black Rubric,* which *does* lay down a theological principle of worship. There is no equivalent commentary on the rubrics relating to priests administering the Lord's Supper.

Suspicion fell on the *Act of Uniformity* of 1662. Section 10 states, '... no person ... shall presume to consecrate and administer the holy sacrament of the Lord's Supper before such time as he shall be ordained priest ... by episcopal ordination'. In 2001, Sydney Synod asked Standing Committee to investigate what options '... if any, consistent with law ... [were] available and report back with any appropriate legislation'.[2] The Committee reported in 2003 that the *Act of Uniformity was* part of the law of the Diocese in 1962 when the Constitution came into force. It had been repealed in England in 1974. The Committee concluded that prior to 1976, 'it would not have been competent for a NSW synod to repeal the *Act of Uniformity* as part of the consensual compact', but it became possible after 1976 because of amendments to the *1902 Constitutions Act*, which severed connection between the law of the Church of England and the ACA. For the sake of greater certainty, the Committee recommended that the Synod pass an ordinance repealing Section 10 of the 1662 Act. This was done in 2003.[3]

8.3 Other General Synod Legislation

The other possibility related to any *existing* General Synod legislation, properly read, which might permit lay administration. Sydney had adopted in 1998 the Concerning Services Canon 1992, within which Section 5(2) states:

> Subject to any regulation made from time to time by the Synod of a diocese, a minister of that diocese may on occasions for which no provision is made use forms of service considered suitable by the minister for those occasions.

Section 5(3) states:

> All variations in forms of service and all forms of service used must be reverent and edifying and must not be contrary to or a departure from the doctrine of this Church.[4]

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[2] Resolution 25/01, *2002 Sydney Year Book*, 392.
[3] *2004 Sydney Year Book*, 448-451.
[4] *1999 Sydney Year Book*, 556-557.

Ballantine-Jones published an article in the June 1999 *ACL News* entitled, *A Quiet Revolution,* which argued that 5(2) appeared to give the minister enormously wide powers to use forms of services for occasions for which *no other provision had been made*. He posed the question:

> ... does this mean a minister can now write a service for *any* occasion, since any service can have elements in it for which no other provision is made, including lay administration at the Lord's Supper, which the Tribunal said was not contrary to the Constitution? The Tribunal had said it believed General Synod legislation was necessary. But General Synod can authorise a practice in two ways, either by nominating the *specific* practice it wishes to authorise (say in this case, lay administration) or by passing a canon which gives a blanket approval to *any* form of service as long as it meets certain criteria, such as it being 'reverent and edifying' and not 'contrary' to 'the doctrine of this Church.[5]

The first reaction to the article came from Archbishop Peter Carnley. He said in a personal letter to Ballantine-Jones:

> I think one difficulty you may have with this thesis is that the Appellate Tribunal explicitly said that General Synod legislation would be needed to specifically allow for the possibility of lay presidency, which the Appellate Tribunal majority opinion held was thinkable.

In fact the Tribunal said no such thing. This was Carnley's construction on what they said. He went further to say that the [Tribunal's] opinion may be 'quite seriously flawed'.[6] In response, Ballantine-Jones pointed out that at no point did the Tribunal say that the practice had to be provided for by means of a 'specific instrument.' He said the Tribunal's 'answers had to be interpreted against the questions that were posed to them'. The words 'permit' and 'authorise' do not in their plain meaning

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[5] It should be noted that the ventilation of this argument in this way was a deliberate act to put into the public arena an interpretation which gave supporters hope that what seemed like a road block could be overcome.

[6] Letter from Peter Carnley to the author, 9 June 1999. That the opinion might be 'seriously flawed' shows Carnley aligning himself with Rayner who had also said it was wrong with respect to Question 1. Both were willing to use Tribunal opinions as a basis of action for settling disputes when they favoured their own views, such as women's ordination, but unwilling to accept them when they differed from their own.

include the notion of specificity. In everyday use, words can be used to express the idea of 'blanket' permission or authorisation to any range of activities. But even if they did carry the idea of specificity, he argued that the following words, '... or otherwise make provision for' in question 1 to the Tribunal did not [carry the idea of specificity]. 'Otherwise than what', Ballantine-Jones asked, 'otherwise than *specific* permission or authority'. He said that having been asked when a diocese may authorise lay administration, the Tribunal did not limit the method by which they could do this, other than to say it must be by a canon of General Synod, under Section 71.

Further comments on the *ACL News* article came from John Woodhouse and Neil Cameron in the July 1999 *Southern Cross.* Woodhouse said:

> I suspect these arguments are sound. If so it means that our denomination has relaxed its rules about liturgy somewhat more than we have realised. This may pose some problems, but I suspect that ministers will act responsibly and the positives will outweigh the negatives. With regard to lay administration of the Lord's Supper, the implication of the majority opinion of the Appellate Tribunal (that there is no *essential* obstacle), are still being worked out. However if that opinion is correct, then our Synod may now only have to adopt regulations to ensure that the change is introduced responsibly. Synod may find it easier and less controversial than an ordinance.[7]

Neil Cameron said, 'A great many liturgical activities conducted in Anglican churches have been illegal ... Further, the *Red Book* Case laid down, at least for NSW, that deviations from prescribed services, however trivial, are illegal. The canon clearly is intended to deal with such situations ... without breaking the rules'.[8]

Donald Robinson in the August 1999 *Southern Cross* responded to both Cameron's comments and Ballantine-Jones'. He argued that the *Services Canon* had nothing to do with *who* may administer Holy Communion, nor does it 'open the door' to virtually any kind of service, so long as it is reverent etc. Robinson said Section 5 (2) deals only with *forms* of service, citing *BCP* and the *Uniformity Amendment Act 1872*, adopted by Sydney in 1912, which allows for special services and minor variations.[9]

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[7] *Southern Cross*, July 1999.
[8] Ibid.
[9] *1913 Sydney Year Book,* 153.

He also referred to Section 4 of the Constitution, which allows for other variations to be used when appropriate local and episcopal authority has been obtained.[10] In the same issue Robert Forsyth, under the heading, *I hope Bruce Ballantine-Jones is Right* said, 'As long as he [the Archbishop] does nothing, and the Synod does nothing, the Archbishop will not have to veto lay administration, and so be involved in a damaging conflict'.

The matter generated such wide interest that the September *Southern Cross* had a double page spread devoted to responses to criticism of the original articles. Neil Cameron concentrated on technical matters raised by Robinson. Ballantine-Jones addressed the question of how widely words in Clause 5 could legitimately be interpreted. He pointed out that Justices Handley and Young in their opinions had said, 'that the controlling principle is that the legislative text is paramount and if clear, prevails over extrinsic material which would support a different meaning'. He said that others appear to support this approach: 'For example, DC Pierce and RS Geddes, who say, "The general principle is that words in a statute that are undefined are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary and current meaning"'.[11]

Ballantine-Jones said:

> If this is correct then the words in Clause 5 of the Services Canon can legitimately be interpreted quite widely. In effect the words in Clause 5 mean what they say, namely that if an occasion for a service arises, for which no provision exists, it is now permissible for the minister to use a form of service he considers suitable, provided it is edifying, etc. What constitutes an occasion is to be determined according to the ordinary and current use of the word, not what may be meant in some ancient statute, and you certainly don't need to be a lawyer to know what the ordinary and current meanings of words are.[12]

He then opened up another response to the Tribunal's answer to Question 2:

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[10] *Southern Cross,* July, 1999.
[11] *Southern Cross, September*, 1999.
[12] Ibid.

1. The Authorised Lay Ministry Canon 1992, Clause 3 (1) (d) says that a lay person ... may be authorised by the bishop ... to exercise any lay ministry declared by the bishop ... to be an authorised lay ministry for the purpose of this Canon. In the definitions clause, lay ministry is defined to exclude 'only those functions required by the discipline and doctrine of this church to be exercised and performed only by a deacon, priest or bishop. But the Appellate Tribunal in its 1997 opinion stated that lay administration is not such a ministry. So, what prevents any bishop in the diocese that has adopted that canon from declaring lay administration to be an authorised lay ministry?

2. Lay Assistance at Holy Communion Canon 1973, at Clause 1 states that a layperson may be authorised by the bishop to assist the priest in the ministration and distribution of the Holy Communion. Two questions arise: firstly, what is ministration? Could it refer to parts of the service, such as the prayers? If so, what principle of doctrine would differentiate between prayers, including the prayer of consecration, given that the Appellate Tribunal has said that lay administration is not inconsistent with the Constitution, which contains our Church's doctrinal standard? Secondly, what meaning should be given to the word 'assist'? The ordinary and current meaning would include someone taking part of a service in order to assist the minister, or taking all the service when the minister is absent. For example, if I am on holiday my assistant minister assists me by taking the services, including Holy Communion. If I am preaching, he assists me by taking the rest of the service. This is common practice, why shouldn't this ordinary use of the word be taken to apply to a lay person in the same circumstances? If this is correct, then it is already in the power of the Archbishop of Sydney to authorise a lay person to minister the Holy Communion in an assisting capacity and should our diocese adopt the Lay Ministry Authorisation Canon 1992, it would be within his power to authorise a lay person to minister Holy Communion under that Canon as well.[13]

8.4 What Law is Everybody Talking About?

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[13] Ibid.

All through this debate an underlying question persisted: is there some Church rule which actually shows that lay administration *is* illegal so that a minister who permits it could be guilty of an offence? If so what is it? At the 2004 Sydney Synod, a notice of motion was given, expressing the view that:

> Synod believes and urges that, until such time as any necessary change in the law can be affected by an appropriate process (or can be determined by an appropriate process that no change is needed), no disciplinary or other action should be taken against any person merely because the person authorises or permits [etc] a deacon or lay person to administer the Lord's Supper ... [14]

That notice was withdrawn and instead Standing Committee appointed a committee (comprised of John Woodhouse, Glenn Davies and Ballantine-Jones) 'to seek expressions of opinion on any legal barrier(s) that would make unlawful the practice of a lay person or deacon administering the Lord's Supper in this Diocese ... and prepare a report ... with a view to Standing Committee making a recommendation on this matter to the 2006 session of Synod.'[15] In the event, the Committee took two years to report.[16] It noted that responses varied widely.[17] The Committee concluded that if it is assumed that the Appellate Tribunal opinion is correct, and General Synod legislation *is* required, then the existing canons, as described above, are sufficient for that purpose.[18]

8.5 The Spotlight turns on the Diaconate

There the matter rested until 2007 when a new front was opened up, this time on the question of the diaconate. The argument around the words 'assist' and 'administer', suggested ways of proceeding based on existing General Synod legislation. Glenn Davies argued that the '1985 Ordination of Deacons Service' was instructive in this regard.[19] He said, '... in this service of the 1985 Canon, the bishop

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[14] *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 543.
[15] Ibid, 528.
[16] Ibid, 528-564.
[17] Ibid, 535-537.
[18] Ibid, 539.
[19] Bolt, Thompson, Tong, *The Lord's Supper in Human Hands,* (ACL ACR, Sydney), 2008, 69.

gives the deacon a New Testament and says, "Receive this sign of your authority to proclaim God's Word, and to assist in the administration of the sacraments". These changes have been universally recognised as an authorisation to preach God's Word and to minister baptism to candidates of any age'.[20] He continued:

> What is curious about the wording of the 1985 service is the explicit inclusion of the Holy Communion in the deacon's responsibility. On three occasions the term 'administration' of the sacraments is used whereas the word 'baptism' does not occur at all. ... Clearly, the authority to assist the priest in the administration is an authority to assist in the administration of Holy Communion as well as baptism. There is no differentiation in the *Ordination Service* between the deacon's authorities to administer either sacrament. In both cases the deacon is 'assisting' the priest, whether it is in administering baptism or in administrating Holy Communion.[21]

Concerning the use of the word 'assistance', he pointed out that the new role for the deacon in the 1985 service was to assist the priest by baptising an infant in the presence of a priest and does not preclude the deacon administering the rite of baptism in its entirety:

> Since the canon is undifferentiated in its reference to the deacon's assistance in the administration of the sacraments – Noting that neither Baptism nor Holy Communion are *explicitly* mentioned in the canon, the expanded role of the diaconate may properly be seen in the deacon's assistance to the priest in Holy Communion as well as in baptism.[22]

On the meaning of the verb 'to assist' he quotes Justice Handley's opinion in relation to the 1996 reference to the Appellate Tribunal:

> '... if the priest was sick, on holiday, from the parish on duty, or conducting services elsewhere. In such circumstances the deacon could assist the priest in fulfilling his/her ministry to the parish by conducting communion services that the

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid, 69-70.
[22] Ibid.

priests could not conduct personally ... However, the role of an assistant is not limited to situations in which the rector is absent'.[23]

On the proposition that canons should be interpreted according to the intention not the actual words, Handley quoted Keith Mason, by then a member of the Tribunal:

> The primary source of the presumed "intention" of a legislative body is the language it uses. But talk about a legislator's "will" is largely fictional ... Those who prepare or promote legislation (or any other formal instrument) have the opportunity to form it in their own terms, but they have no additional control over its interpretation. After all they are not the lawmakers.[24]

The significance of Davies' arguments for lay administration is that if diaconal administration is accepted, based on the meaning of words such as 'administration' and 'assistance', it can just as easily be applied to lay persons. If the argument is that it is not the supposed *intention* of legislators, but the plain meaning of the words that should determine how a statute is interpreted in relation to deacons, the same must be true for lay persons. So persuasive was Davies' argument that in 2008 the Sydney Synod passed a resolution which encouraged the practice of diaconal administration and reaffirmed support for lay administration.[25] Since then, assistant bishops routinely allowed deacons to administer the Lord's Supper without interference from Jensen.

8.6 The Appellate Tribunal and the Diaconate

In 2009, 28 non-Sydney members of the General Synod referred a number of questions relating to lay and diaconal administration to the Appellate Tribunal. These concerned whether certain General Synod canons constituted an alteration in ritual or ceremonial so as to make provision for a lay person (or in one case, a deacon) to preside at, administer or celebrate the Holy Communion.[26] There was also a

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[23] Ibid, 73-74.
[24] Ibid, 75.
[25] In 2009 there was not a *Sydney Year Book* published. Resolution 27/08 can be viewed on the SDS summary of the 2008 Sydney Synod on www.sds.asn.au.
[26] Those questions addressed the arguments in the article, *A Quiet Revolution*, referred to earlier.

question on whether Sydney Resolution 27/08 was in accordance with the Constitution and canons of General Synod. This reference was seen in Sydney as an attempt to enlist the supposed moral authority of the Tribunal against Sydney's efforts to enact lay and diaconal administration as outlined earlier. A group called the External Affairs Think Tank (convened by Peter Jensen) had been meeting in Sydney for many years to monitor developments outside the Diocese.[27] It was the view of that group, and subsequently the Sydney Standing Committee, that Sydney as a diocese should *not* make a submission to the Tribunal and so legitimise what they saw as the patently political use of the Tribunal and potentially compromise any Sydney's responses if the answers proved unacceptable. Instead they supported Glenn Davies making a submission in his own name.

On 10 August 20 2009, at a preliminary conference of the Tribunal, it was also agreed by all parties that this reference was not about a doctrinal but a legal question and would therefore not need to be referred to the House of Bishops or the Board of Assessors for submissions, as required when doctrinal questions arise.[28] The Tribunal operated on written submissions only.

8.7 The Tribunal Responds

In August 2010, the Tribunal delivered its opinions. It agreed with the petitioners that the Ordination of Deacons Canon 1985 did not support the interpretation placed on it by Davies and also commented on questions relating to lay administration, even though neither Davies nor anyone else had made submissions on that matter.[29] The majority enunciated a guiding principle: 'all its [ACA] members should be able to worship together in accordance with the rules of the Church'.[30] In disagreeing with Davies, the majority said that at most the 1985 *Ordinal* could affect those who were made deacons under this new form of service. (Davies had made the same point in

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[27] This group comprised Archbishop Jensen, Dean Phillip Jensen, Dr John Woodhouse, Neil Cameron, Robert Tong, Bishop Peter Tasker, Dr Philip Selden and Bruce Ballantine-Jones.
[28] The Board of Assessors is a body of presbyters elected by General Synod to give advice on theological matters when questions of a doctrinal nature come before the Tribunal.
[29] It could be asked why they commented on a matter no submissions were made on, when they refused to consider questions on prayers for the dead, reservation of the sacrament and other matters back in 1996, because no submissions were made on them.
[30] The minority opinion in favour of Davies was given by Bishop Peter Brain of Armidale.

his submission). They said this new service is seen as an 'additional' form with 'no express indication that the function of deacon is altered or that there are two classes of deacons'.[31] Invoking the doctrine of 'intention' they said: to make a radical change would be 'the unlikely intention of the General Synod'.[32] They referred to rubrics in *BCP* which they said, 'plainly indicate priestly presidency ...', and argued that there were 'no new words in the 1985 service which expressly authorised a deacon to administer at the service'.

A lengthy section dealt with words such as 'administration' and 'assist' with respect to both sacraments. Davies had submitted that the same meaning should be applied to *both* sacraments. The Tribunal disagreed because they said the Lord's Supper involved the consecration of the elements. No reason is offered for this distinction, so on its own, it is hard to see how it refutes Davies' argument. They further disagreed with Davies that in the Canons of 1604, the words 'assist', 'administration' and 'distribute' meant, 'the whole ceremony of the sacrament'. Davies had argued that 'assist' does not necessarily mean 'to perform in the presence of the person he is assisting or that he is necessarily in a subordinate role'. But the Tribunal accepted a submission based on the meaning of the preposition 'in'. The submission had said, 'whilst it may be that one can assist X by doing Y when X is not present, that cannot be the case where what is required is that Z assists X in what X is doing'. The Tribunal said that this argument is 'logically correct'. It also accepted the example of a child who might assist his father *in* washing the car, but it is a different matter to say the child assists *by* washing the car.

Concerning the Canon, Concerning Services 1992 (which Ballantine-Jones had said might have signalled a 'quiet revolution', but on which neither Davies nor anyone else had made any submissions), the Tribunal interpreted the argument for this to mean the Canon authorised someone to choose *not* to use an authorised service and to devise another service where a deacon or lay person could preside. The

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[31] Reference is made to the Tribunal's ruling on women bishops when the constitutional change with respect to canonical fitness made no express indication that it altered the gender qualification and thereby binding on the Church.

[32] The Tribunal quoted approvingly a submission that said the Council of Nicea in 325 laid down that a deacon could not officiate at the Lord's Supper, saying it would be strange if the General Synod changed this 'inferentially'. However they also admitted that this rule had not always been 'strictly applied'. Further, they did not establish that such an obscure rule had any legal status in the ACA.

Tribunal said this would not in its view constitute 'an occasion for which no provision has been made'. On the Lay Assistants at Holy Communion Canon 1973 (again though Davies made no submission on it), the Tribunal rejected the possibility of this being used for lay administration on the same arguments about 'assist' mentioned in relation to deacons. With respect to Resolution 27/08, the Tribunal said that since it did not refer to a 'relevant canon', it could not be the basis of an action.

In summary, the Tribunal said that in the light of Section 71, 'even an ordinance of a diocesan synod attempting to 'repeal' the *Act of Uniformity* for its diocese could not affect the continued application of the rule restricting the celebration of the Holy Communion to duly ordained bishops and priests. A diocesan synod does not have the power to alter the consensual compact'.[33]

8.8 Bishop Davies answers the Tribunal

Davies responded in *The Lord's Supper in Human Hands: Epilogue.*[34] He reasserted his view that the *1985 Ordinal was* a radical revision of *BCP* and *AAPB,* that the Canon effectively expanded the function of deacons to allow them to 'preach God's word' *and* to assist in the administration of the Lord's Supper in the same way that a deacon assists in baptism, namely to conduct the service 'in its entirety under delegated authority'. He asked why the Tribunal did not apply the same logic about the absence of words expressly authorising diaconal administration to their earlier opinion about canonical fitness of women for the episcopate, which was itself 'completely novel' in the ACA'.[35] On the tortuous argument about 'assist in' and 'assist by', he said the example is materially different when considering baptism, which he said reduces the argument to an absurdity. He said that to rely on a

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[33] www.anglican.org.au, Appellate Tribunal Reports. This at least is an opinion on the question of diocesan powers that previous Tribunals were unable to give and which gave rise to the *Scandrett v Dowling* case and the findings of the Western Australian Supreme Court, which held that the Constitution *did* permit a diocese to make rules regarding ritual, ceremonial and discipline. This was an opinion, not a determination, and contrary to the view which the Diocese of Perth followed with respect to women's ordination.
[34] Peter Bolt, Mark Thompson, Robert Tong Editors, *The Lord's Supper in Human Hand: Epilogue,* (Anglican Church League and Australian Church Record, Sydney, 2010), 20.
[35] On Nicaea, he pointed out that the Tribunal had got it wrong: the prohibition of deacons applied to administering the sacrament 'to priests', with no general prohibition with respect to others. Ibid, 21.

convoluted illustration to govern statutory interpretation is unconvincing, and in the circumstances, forced beyond reasonableness. He further cited two judicial statements on principles of interpretation which undermined the practice of reading words into a statute, as the Tribunal had done. He cited the example of 'local priests' and 'non-stipendiary priests' as examples of dioceses departing from historical practice, and the Tribunal's refusal to look into to them in the 1996 reference. Davies wondered why the double standard? Taking the Tribunal's narrow interpretation of the Canon to reject diaconal administration, he said that deacons taking weddings would also fall foul of the same prohibition since that too was a departure from *BCP*, because the *1985 Ordinal* lacked 'express authorisation' for this change. He suggested the Tribunal was guilty of 'sloppy thinking' in departing from established practice of interpretation, and its own earlier opinions.

The Tribunal's answers were not unexpected in Sydney. Such low expectations were behind the Standing Committee's refusal to make any submissions. Sydney Synod rejected the advisory opinion and passed 16/10 which reaffirmed 27/08, including its declaration that 'the Lord's Supper in this Diocese may be administered by persons other than presbyters'. An attempt in Synod to deflect this motion by referring the matter to the General Synod was overwhelmingly defeated. Effectively there was a standoff. The referral achieved nothing, except to harden Sydney's attitude to the Appellate Tribunal. As for the future, three factors will determine developments: the attitude of future archbishops, the hold that 'law' might continue to have in the Diocese and whether fatigue will exhaust Sydney's desire for this particular change.

8.9 Lay Administration and Peter Jensen

Jensen had been very enthusiastic for lay administration at the beginning of his term, but a legal opinion from the then Chancellor, the late Michael Orpwood QC, casting doubt on the legality question, caused him to quietly drop the matter from his own priorities.

On the question of the Assistants at Holy Communion Canon 1973, a similar implication of General Synod legislation was discovered in the regulations for lay

persons to assist in Holy Communion in force in the Diocese of Sydney for many years prior to Glenn Davies' exposition. The Authority states:

> I Peter Frederick Jensen, Archbishop of Sydney pursuant to Section 3 of the Lay Assistants at Holy Communion Canon 1973 hereby authorise every lay person to assist the priest in the ministering and distribution of the Holy Communion where the following requirements are satisfied ... [36]

Then follows the requirements, which include being 21 years of age, being invited by the priest to do so, being a communicant member of the ACA, satisfying doctrinal and character tests, and not being subject to any request from the Parish Council or a direction from the Archbishop or Assistant Bishop that they *not* provide such assistance. Finally, that they are not the subject of a prohibition from the Archbishop under the Church Discipline Ordinance 1996.

The plain reading of this regulation is that *every* person who satisfies the stated requirements can be authorised to assist the priest in ministering the Holy Communion. Given the interpretation of the words, 'assist' and 'administer', referred to earlier, and noting that they are direct quotations from the Lay Assistants at Holy Communion Canon 1973, it could be argued that *all* the requirements of the Tribunal's opinion have been satisfied. Of course this authority could be revoked by the Archbishop at any time. What is relevant is the possibility that the practice of lay administration in the Diocese can, after all, be implemented without any special Sydney legislation.

8.10 What is Left for all the Trouble?

The major question is why, after forty years of battling for something that is theologically sound (even according to the Appellate Tribunal) and which enjoyed overwhelming support within Sydney, is there so little to show for all that effort? Near the top of any list of reasons must be the iron grip that respect for the law continues to have on the psyche of the Diocese of Sydney. It was this mindset that caused

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[36] The full text of this regulation may be obtained from the office of the Sydney Diocesan Registrar, St Andrew's House, Sydney

supporters to follow the constitutional and synodical route all along. It was this mindset that prevented any widespread breakout of unregulated practice while the matter was being pursued. In the end, it was fear on the part of some, unwillingness on the part of others, and apathy among the rest that prevented supporters crossing the line to 'just do it.' Another view might be that the *real* reason why no Archbishop was prepared to give assent to an ordinance was that it would have denied them influence on the international stage had they done so.

These considerations aside, there are other reasons why the campaign ran out of steam. Early on there was such a sense of affront over the ordination of women that made lay administration a kind of *quid pro quo* issue; 'if they can have that, we want to have this'. Over time that died down. Then there was the fact that there was no practical necessity for it in Sydney because of a sufficiency of presbyters, which meant that it was seen more as a matter of principle than meeting an actual need. In addition, there was the idea that Anglicanism had got along without it so for long, it is not worth fighting for. Archbishops were mostly against it, and that didn't help. When one (Jensen) *was* in favour, he was not willing to pursue it at any price or at any risk. Finally, the generation of leaders who championed this cause was passing from the scene and those following find little reason to pursue denominational reform through the cumbersome and wearing legal and political procedures open to them.

8.11 Conclusion to Part Two

The five chapters of Part Two concerned what are described as 'Two Matters of Principle', women's ordination and lay and diaconal administration. For Sydney conservatives, the matter of principle was the primacy of the New Testament over considerations of gender equality with respect to ordination, and in the case of lay and diaconal administration, unbiblical post-apostolic developments in the ordering of ministry patterns to the detriment of the laity.

Chapter Four dealt with the origins of the movement towards full integration of women in the ordained ministry overseas and then in Australia. Because the matter concerned constitutional and legal considerations, action centred on the various

instruments of power within the ACA, especially the Appellate Tribunal and the General Synod. This inevitably meant that questions would be decided by political means. Accordingly, attention was focussed on the 1985, 1987 and 1989 sessions of General Synod and related sittings of the Appellate Tribunal. The raw voting patterns at the Synods disclosed an overwhelming majority in favour of change, but not enough to actually pass the required legislation. This led to increasing frustration on the part of proponents who saw the (mainly Sydney) opponents denying them, and women, natural justice. This frustration built up to the point where many bishops threatened to proceed without General Synod approval, at whatever cost to the unity of the ACA that might mean.

That atmosphere of crisis led into what was called '1992 - A Year to Remember', as described in Chapter Five. This involved high level political activity and dramatic legal and constitutional actions that re-shaped the nature of the ACA, as to its actual legal identity and to its inter-diocesan relationships. The two court actions examined opened the way for diocesan synods to authorise women presbyters, without General Synod authorisation. They also reshaped the nature of the ACA in ways not anticipated by the participants. Essentially, the NSW case ruled that the ACA Constitution had binding legal force only with respect to property, which did not include matters of ordination. This finding legitimised for many in Sydney a more independent attitude towards the national church and a desire to explore (and where desirable implement) other changes, such as the publication of Sydney prayer books, diaconal administration and formal relations with non-Anglican independent churches.

Chapter Six concentrated on changes to allow women to be made bishops in the ACA. As would be expected, Sydney opposed this all the way. This particular change came about, not by direct legislative decision of the General or diocesan synods, but by the indirect method of a constitutional amendment to re-define the qualifications for consecration which excluded gender altogether. Some in Sydney took exception to this method and in response advocated even more disengagement from the ACA. However the point was made that Sydney could not complain too much because Archbishop Robinson had identified the danger of the proposed constitutional amendment when he refused to assent to the ordinance that would

have permitted it. The state of impaired communion of Sydney from the ACA, which this change created, continues in that both Archbishops Jensen and Davies refused to consecrate women who were nominated to episcopal positions in the Province of NSW.

Chapters Seven and Eight examined the matter of lay and diaconal administration at the Lord's Supper. Even though this question was not directly related to women's ordination, it fed off resentment over the loss on the women's ordination matter and followed a similar political and constitutional path. Sydney was emboldened by the possibilities for independent action which the NSW court case opened up. As in the case of women's ordination, the standing of the Appellate Tribunal and the General Synod, in the eyes of Sydney Diocese, suffered further loss. Sydney has declined to participate in hearings of the Appellate Tribunal, and most significant of all, has acted unilaterally to introduce diaconal administration without any legislation. This has opened up even further the gap between Sydney and the ACA, sometimes described as tectonic plates rubbing against each other and then drifting further apart.

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PART THREE

CHANGE AND POLITICS ACROSS THE YEARS

CHAPTER NINE

THE LOANE YEARS: THE STIRRINGS FOR CHANGE

9.1 Introduction

Part Three of this thesis will move to a consideration of specific developments in the Diocese from 1966 to 2013 within the terms of each archbishop. On the matter of changes in policy and practices it will be argued that it was the Loane era which was the highpoint, not only of the impetus for change, but also for the beginnings of actual change. These changes related not only to the experience of belonging to an Anglican parish in Sydney, but also to the growth of central power and influence as income from newly acquired financial resources began to make itself felt. Surprisingly, overt political activity took a back seat in much of Loane's time as the dominant influence of his personality gave little opportunity for serious dissent. However, with the growing influence of the Knox ecclesiology and the externally driven perception that change had to come, the Robinson and Goodhew administrations felt the force of pent up pressure for change like never before or since.

Marcus Loane was Archbishop between 1966 and 1981. He was ordained in Sydney and apart from war service as an army chaplain spent all his life in the Diocese. He was a lecturer at MTC, Vice-Principal and then Principal. He was an assistant bishop and then Archbishop. At times he was a member of ACL and its council and a board member of the *Australian Church Record (ACR).* His lectures, his writings and his public persona shaped the values and character of the Diocese in his generation. His scholarship, passion for souls, pastoral heart, and unwavering commitment to the principles of the Reformation embodied what it meant to be a *Sydney Evangelical.* His personality, presence and passion for the gospel commanded almost universal respect. He was not an innovator, but a conservator of what he believed was best about Anglicanism, which in his case was its Reformation heritage. To many he was

a remote and austere figure, but in reality he was a warm and kindly pastor, as his tireless visitations (almost to the end of his life) demonstrated.

His term as Archbishop coincided with massive changes throughout western society. The swinging sixties saw the sexual revolution, the *Age of Aquarius*, the anti-war and anti-establishment movements.[1] It also coincided with a prosperity-driven optimism which saw personal fulfilment as *the* goal of life. But it was a time of struggle for the churches. The Second Vatican Council had robbed the Roman Catholic Church of many of its old certainties. Conservative Protestantism was struggling to maintain connection with a population more interested in the pleasures of the 'long weekend', the clubs, weekend sport, rock music and loosening the rules on just about everything. Liberal protestants were chasing the dream of an ecumenical led revival, and the importance of being 'relevant' in an age which had found supernatural religion hard to swallow.[2] Essentially what was taking place was the outworking of secularism which saw *God* and the universe as unnecessary partners in the human journey. Concurrent with this was the shift from sectarianism.[3] Inevitably, the church's privileged status began to disappear and the process of law reform diminished the Judeo-Christian ethical basis in social legislation. Denominational leaders (including Loane) were uncertain how to arrest this decline. Change had to come, and it began in Loane's time with an unprecedented wave of inquiries into how things could change.

Notwithstanding the conservative temper of Loane himself, his time actually saw the beginnings of change on a scale not matched since Barker and not matched by later administrations. A strong case can be made for thinking that his term was possibly the high point of the period under review. In an entity of interconnected institutions, such as Sydney Diocese, to get order, purpose and perhaps outcomes, needs leadership of an extraordinary kind. Arguably, Loane's administration, of the four

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[1] 1968 was the year of massive race riots, anti-war demonstration across the western world.
[2] It was during this period that the Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church and the Congregational Unions were in church union negotiations culminating in the formation of the Uniting Church of Australia in 1977.
[3] For a review of the issues see Benjamin Edwards, *WASPS Tykes and Ecumaniacs,* (Acorn Press Ltd, Brunswick East) 2008.

under review, had those characteristics in abundance and it stands out as the period when Sydney Diocese was at its surest.[4]

9.2 Election of Marcus Loane

The election of Loane was a kind of re-run of 1958, when Hugh Gough won over Loane and Bishop Clive Kerle, only this time the conservatives were determined not to split the vote. Clive Kerle had recently become Bishop of Armidale, and so Loane, more than ever, was the obvious choice. Central churchmen put up Stuart Barton Babbage, a liberal evangelical, but this was more a token gesture since there was no reasonable expectation he could win.[5] Nevertheless, Loane supporters took no chances. Among the tactics used was his multiple nomination by most leading diocesan personalities so that Synod members could see who were supporting him and draw the conclusion that *he* was the man of the hour. Also there was a kind of whispering campaign to encourage people to vote for *only one name*, Loane's, through all stages. This was obviously unsuccessful, mainly because Synod members, even though they have no intention of voting for anyone else in the final vote, like to string out the process. Being the Administrator of the Diocese meant he was also the President of the Election Synod. This meant he could deliver the presidential address, a showcase opportunity, which he took to great effect.[6] The other advantage Loane had over other nominations was that the long list of nominators and seconders enabled his name to be proposed and seconded by different people at each stage; the other names were moved and seconded by the

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[4] Bishop John Reid wrote a biography on Loane, *Marcus L Loane: A Biography,* (Acorn Press, Brunswick East, Victoria), 2004.The first thing to say about this biography of Sir Marcus Loane is that it is too short. Arguably the greatest Australian churchman of his time deserves a more extensive and thorough treatment than this. Nevertheless, Reid, as an assistant bishop, was in an ideal position to observe Loane and the key events and issues of his administration. His observations are of themselves significant contributions to understanding the dynamics at work during Loane's career. The selection of material sometimes gives the impression that matters close to Reid's own interests occupied an undue place in the book and sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between Reid's and Loane's opinions. That aside, this biography gives a useful background to diocesan affairs and shed light on the makeup of one of the greatest Christian leaders this nation has produced.

[5] The other name on the final list was Dr Leon Morris, Principal of Ridley College in Melbourne.

[6] In later election Synods, the rules were changed to prevent a candidate from being the President of the Synod, although in the 1992 Synod, Bishop Cameron invited Bishop Reid, Administrator and a candidate, to give the address. This right was specifically banned in later amendments to the Archbishop's Election ordinance.

same two each time. The debate on the final night was vigorous, but was always going to result in the election of Loane.[7]

9.3 The Beginnings of Change

A strong case can be made that it was during Loane's time that Sydney experienced the strongest impetus for change of any period under review. Judd and Cable have given a comprehensive coverage of his term. In this study, attention will fall on those major elements relevant to the question of change, governance, structure and politics. Judd and Cable rightly refer to the 'plethora of inquiries, commissions and committees appointed to investigate the social developments of the day'.[8] Not including minor administrative matters, the years covered in this thesis saw an avalanche of inquiries. The bulk of these occurred during the administrations of Loane and Robinson. To illustrate, in the five years from 1966 there were 34 Synod resolutions calling for or welcoming such inquiries. In five year groupings the totals were:

1966 – 34
1971 – 35
1977 – 21
1981 – 19
1987 – 26
1991 – 14
1996 – 24
2001 – 20
2006 – 22
2011 - 14[9]

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[7] Ballantine-Jones had been a member of Synod for three years by then, but had never spoken. He did not want this occasion to pass without speaking and so, as the youngest member of Synod at the time, he spoke on why he thought Loane represented what *his* generation were looking for; a very forgettable speech, but at least it launched his public life in the Diocese.
[8] Judd and Cable, *Sydney Anglicans*, 276.
[9] These figures were arrived at by taking the number of resolutions passed as recorded in the Sydney year books or the online record of proceedings of past Synods at sydneyanglicans.net.

On average, and rounded to the nearest five year period, there were 8.6 inquiries a year in Loane's time, 4.5 in Robinson's, 3.9 in Goodhew's and 4.2 in Jensen's time.

Such was the mood for inquiries in Loane's term that in 1970, Stacy Atkin (Chairman of the Finance Committee of Standing Committee) moved a motion in Synod saying that no committee appointed by Synod was entitled to incur any expenditure for reimbursement without prior approval of Standing Committee.[10] Also, and in response to a motion asking the Archbishop and Standing Committee for a review of the *whole* Diocese, the Standing Committee reported in 1988 that there had been more than 74 reviews of various types undertaken by the Archbishop, the Standing Committee and the Synod between 1964 and 1987. Expressing a measure of inquiry fatigue, they pointed out the significant cost of major reviews had been between $70,000 and $100,000 in 1987 dollars. They suggested that reviews by a *person* rather than a *committee* might be considered in the future.[11] As will be seen throughout this study, even with such a mood for change, legal, structural and political factors meant that the process was often frustratingly slow. Given that major issues in Loane's term, such as regionalisation and corporate affairs are covered elsewhere, it is proposed to deal with just two major matters here to give an indication of the forces for change that were active at that time and the fairly low level of political action that prevailed as well.

9.4 Marcus Loane and the Sub-Division of the Diocese

There can be few more fundamental political questions a diocese such as Sydney could address than whether it should continue as a single unit or divide into three separate dioceses. If it were not to go down that path, it had to be decided whether it should control its affairs from the centre or devolve power to sub-regions. These were exactly the questions which occupied the Diocese from the beginning of Marcus Loane's term to the end of Peter Jensen's. How they were addressed offers a valuable insight into the way the Diocese attempted to cope with pressures for change, problems of complexity and how political action was used to resolve such

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[10] *1971 Sydney Year Book,* 300.
[11] *1988 Sydney Year Book,* 298-299.

issues. The working hypothesis set out in Chapter One posited the proposition that the bottom up nature of power, the competition between Synod and Archbishop and the dominant committee culture militated against its capacity to do these things. This chapter sets out to trace the course of the debate about diocesan structures from Loane's initial proposal to create a new diocese for Wollongong through to full regionalisation under Goodhew. This examination will show how the intense political nature of the sub-division proposal, and the way it was resolved, illustrates how political power at the bottom can sometimes thwart the political power of the top.

In 1966, just after becoming Archbishop, Loane proposed the sub-division of the Diocese into three, starting with Wollongong and then Parramatta. Outlining the case to Synod (which he said came from the Wollongong Rural Deanery) he said that Wollongong had experienced significant growth through industrialisation and immigration, the Roman Catholics had established a separate diocese there, and local Anglicans felt 'a certain degree of isolation from the rest of the Diocese'. There were 41 parishes in the area (including Sutherland Deanery), a number of schools and branches of various diocesan organisations. He said that he was 'generally sympathetic to the aspirations of the Wollongong people'. He did not doubt that such a large diocese [as Sydney] would undergo fresh divisions eventually, and that such a new diocese would ultimately be in the best interests of all.[12] The Synod voted in-principle support of an investigation which he then established and which duly reported back in 1968 in support of sub-division. Loane then officially proposed that there be a separate diocese based on Wollongong. The Synod again gave in-principle support.[13] The next step was to appoint a resident bishop in Wollongong and designate St Michael's Wollongong as the Provisional Cathedral. These occurred in 1969 with the appointment of Archdeacon Graham Delbridge as Bishop. In 1968, an ordinance for the elections of the Wollongong Diocesan Committee and the Wollongong Zone Council was passed.[14] The Diocesan Committee was to examine constitutional matters related to the formation of a new diocese, the Zone

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[12] *1967 Sydney Year Book*, 267-271.
[13] *1969 Sydney Year Book, 275.*
[14] *1972 Sydney Year Book,* 290.

Council to handle delegated administrative matters.[15] An endowment fund was established for the proposed new diocese.

Once the Wollongong proposal was on the table, it was only a matter of time before the same arguments were applied to Parramatta and in 1968, Synod agreed to appoint a resident assistant bishop in Parramatta and the designation of St John's Parramatta as the Provisional Cathedral. Archdeacon Gordon Begbie was appointed the first Bishop in Parramatta in 1969. In 1971 a regional council was created with powers to examine proposed ordinances and deal with local administrative functions. It was also given charge of an endowment fund to facilitate a new diocese. Clearly the whole idea of sub-division was gaining momentum.

9.5 Gathering Opposition to Sub-Division

Opposition centred on the Sutherland Shire and was led by the Rev Tony Lamb of Caringbah. It was generally recognised that a Wollongong Diocese without the nine Sutherland parishes would not be viable, but the 'Shire' (as it is commonly described) was part of the Sydney metropolitan area and had no community of interest with Wollongong. In March 1970, Lamb published a detailed critique of the sub-division proposal which argued that the 'best interests of the gospel should determine the case, and, only after alternatives were properly considered'. He said the Wollongong and Parramatta proposals did not pass the viability test when measured against overseas experience and the record of other Australian dioceses. He warned that the new dioceses would go the way of all the other sub-divisions from Sydney, namely that the inherited evangelical traditions would give way to Anglo-Catholic and liberal dominance. He called for a re-examination of the case for the large diocese model, but with more decentralisation, such as 'regional bishoprics, increased power in the archdeaconries and rural deaneries'. He said this would give

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[15] Loane decided that from 1970, curates working in parishes in the Wollongong region would be ordained presbyter in Wollongong by the Bishop of Wollongong. By coincidence, Ballantine-Jones fitted that qualification and turned out to be the first person ever to be ordained there, notwithstanding his attempts to persuade Loane to ordain him in Sydney.

'a degree of local autonomy and retain the present advantages that are almost unique in Sydney'.[16]

Having analysed why he thought that one time evangelical dioceses had moved away from their roots, he offered his reasons why Sydney had held firm. First, was the foundation of the early evangelical chaplains, second, the influence of Bishop Barker, third, the ACL, fourth the influence of Archbishop Mowll, sixth, MTC and finally, the nature of the Synod with its mix of theological, constitutional and legal leadership, combined with its evangelical persuasion.

Lamb's paper is also of interest as an early exposition of the Knox doctrine of church and denomination. He said that on historical and biblical grounds the congregation remains the unit of the church. The manifestation of the church is 'congregational and local, not diocesan'. The Diocese he said is a collective unit for 'administrative purposes and a federation of local congregations for mutual aid'. He said the Diocese 'must remain the servant and handmaid of the parishes' and must never take precedence over the parish, organisationally or financially. He said its [the Diocese] activities and the loyalty it expects should be limited to those areas and undertakings to which its parishes had specifically agreed. 'Ultimately the Church will stand or fall through the strength of its parishes not its central diocesan structures'. Such a clear and early exposition of the Knox view gave a rational and theologically defensible basis for opposing sub-division. Some might argue that Lamb was an unlikely champion for this cause, being of somewhat shy disposition. But he was highly respected as a rector of a large parish. He had served well on senior committees, had played a full role in the ACL (being its secretary for a time) and had the courage, when he thought it was necessary, to stand up to diocesan leadership on matters of principle.

Another response was from a group in the western region called the Evangelical Society. It was led by the Rev John Baxter, Rector of Glenbrook and the Rev Neil Prott, Rector of Kurrajong. Prott had previously been a rector in the Wollongong

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[16] Tony Lamb's paper, 'Factors and Problems in the Formation of a New Diocese', was distributed in March 1970. Long after his retirement, Lamb gave his second last copy to Ballantine-Jones.

Region and campaigned against sub-division there.[17] The Evangelical Society's agenda was to promote strong evangelical ministry in the west. To that end it used to invite D B Knox to address them on doctrine. However the sub-division proposal forced them to take a political stand on that issue as well. Prott didn't see the point in duplicating diocesan administration. Further he said it would only be a matter of time before clergy trained outside Sydney would be brought in and the character of the new diocese would change.[18] The Evangelical Society (as the focal point of opposition) was so successful that by the end of Loane's term the western area opted for a stronger form of regionalisation instead of sub-division.

9.6 The Alternative of Regionalisation

There were always going to be practical difficulties in sub-division, especially those around economies of scale, lack of revenue, as well as the alternative option of regionalisation turning out to be more popular. Nevertheless, local support in the south and west had grown and both Wollongong and Parramatta had endowments created and funds applied to them in the hope that after ten years there would be enough money for the sub-division to take place. However by the time Loane retired in 1982 it could reasonably be said that both proposals had run out of steam. In 1991, the Parramatta Regional Council (PARC) reported that the best way forward for the western area was as a region *within* the Diocese and therefore the question of autonomy did not apply. They did ask for a progressive extension of functions to PARC to promote regional activities of an evangelistic, teaching and pastoral nature. They also wanted a clearer job description for the regional bishop and an upgraded role for PARC as a council of advice to the Bishop.[19]

At the same time the Wollongong Zone Council (WARC) acknowledged that it was not possible to fulfil the original criteria set out in the 1968 commission report and asked that the question of a new diocese be deferred for another ten years. They noted the strong desire for greater powers to be given to a reconstituted WARC.

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[17] For example, on one occasion when Bishop Graham Delbridge organised a rally in favour at the Wollongong Town Hall, Prott was the main speaker against the proposal.

[18] Material on the Evangelical Society came from an interview with Prott. Quoted with permission.

[19] *1983 Sydney Year Book,* 373 and *1982 Sydney Year Book,* 376.

They reported the results of a survey of clergy in the area indicating that 86.6% were for regionalisation without sub-division, and only 11.4% in favour of a new diocese. The opposition led by Tony Lamb, supplemented by similar views in the west, had overcome what seemed at the beginning of Loane's administration to be a proposal with irresistible momentum. This is not only a good example of medium to high level political action, but of the power of local autonomous parishioners exercising their rights over the centre. In the meantime there was the curious situation where two regions had provisional cathedrals and regional councils, but the northern and southern regions had neither. Annual regional Synod grants involved the uncomfortable spectacle of assistant bishops bidding in a kind of tit for tat way for funds and then distributing them according to their own ad hoc processes. This unsatisfactory approach gave way to the whole process being transferred from the assistant ,bishops to the newly created Parish Support and Development Division of HMS.

9.7 Women and Sydney

The push for the ordination of women was in its early stages in Loane's time. An example of a gender related change with no theological overtones and involving little political confrontation was the opening up of *all* administrative positions in the Diocese to women. Before 1966 women could not belong to Synod or its committees. They could not be wardens in local churches, parish councillors or parochial nominators.

Standing Committee noted in 1966 that the question of women to be elected to Synod was before the Provincial Synod which had not yet reported. In 1970, Synod asked Standing Committee to take steps to permit women to be elected as parochial nominators.[20] In 1971, Synod passed the required ordinance with the proviso that a husband and wife could not be elected at the same time.[21] In 1972, women were allowed to be elected to Synod. In 1974, on the motion of the Rev K R Le'Huray, a leading central churchman, Synod requested legislation to be prepared to permit

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[20] Ibid, 302.
[21] *1972 Sydney Year Book,* 270.

women to be eligible for election to *all* diocesan committees.[22] The enabling ordinance was duly passed in 1975.[23] At the same time Synod said that it believed it was just and equitable and in accordance with Christian principles that women should be able to participate *fully* in the affairs and management of parishes and instructed Standing Committee to prepare an ordinance to permit women to be elected as church wardens.[24] The requested ordinance was passed in 1978 and stated that 'in relation to lay persons, words importing the masculine gender included the feminine gender'.[25] The proviso that husbands and wives could not be elected at the same time was also included. In 1978 Synod passed the 'Women's Work in Church Amendment Ordinance' which provided for the Archbishop to authorise a lay woman (nominated by a ministry organisation) to address a congregation on a subject related to the work of that organisation.[26] In 1979 Deaconess Margaret Rodgers, Principal of Deaconess House (having failed to be elected in 1978), became the first female member of the Standing Committee, holding that position until her retirement in 2010. As a result of all these changes many women have served with distinction and to the great benefit of the Diocese.

This description of how women came to share equal rights in diocesan administration illustrates how substantial changes *can* take place in a relatively harmonious way and with minimal political or ideological input. Even so, the legal structures still required a convoluted and protracted process before they could all be enacted. Admission of women to administrative roles illustrates that a proposed change which is not theologically controversial but enjoys widespread support can happen with little real trouble. Opponents may delay, but in the end, if supporters know their way through the procedural maze, and persist, they will win. This could be described as very low level political action, but a significant change in policy and practice.

9.8 Diocesan Politics under Loane

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[22] *1974 Sydney Year Book*, 245.
[23] *1976 Sydney Year Book*, 312.
[24] Ibid, 254.
[25] *1979 Sydney Year Book,* 279
[26] Ibid, 273.

Politics in the sense of organised campaigning was relatively quiet in Loane's time, unlike the partisanship *between* evangelicals that developed later. The 'enemy' was still ritualism and liberalism. It was later that governance and ideology became the defining political issues rather than churchmanship. The monthly meetings of the ACL Council prepared nominations for casual vacancies to be filled by Standing Committee. They were conveyed through Ron Bailey (ACL Treasurer) to the General Purposes Committee of Standing Committee on the afternoons that Standing Committee met.[27] If Loane or the committee did not like a name that ACL was putting up, it would generally be withdrawn for reconsideration. This reflected the fact that there were no major points of difference between the diocesan leadership and ACL at that time.[28] The general sentiment among conservatives was that *their* man was in the 'White House' and the evangelical character of the Diocese was safe with him. This was perhaps unduly optimistic because the winds of change away from traditionalism were beginning to blow by the early 1970s, and disquiet at growing centralism was also building up steam. In addition, some liberal evangelicals were beginning to object to the political monopoly of ACL and that *they* were being excluded from influence in the Diocese. These twin concerns came together in the reaction by older conservative evangelicals to the 1972 report of a Commission, chaired by Bishop John Reid, called *Looking into the Parish* as well as attempts by liberal evangelicals to amend voting procedures at Synod in the hope that ACL dominance might be broken.

The *Looking into the Parish* report proposed that leadership in parish ministry should be widened to include lay leaders as well as the minister. It encouraged the greater use of small groups for fellowship and Bible study and the idea of local membership rolls to include people living outside parish boundaries. The report called for a local system of shared eldership to include Sunday school superintendants and Bible study leaders. It also explored the idea of team ministries and limiting clergy

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[27] The General Purposes Committee used to meet for about two hours on the afternoon of Standing Committee meetings. The purpose was to vet the agenda to ensure items were properly prepared and correct procedures were in place to assist their passage. It was also a sounding post on policy questions and casual vacancy elections. Such was the dominance of Loane and his team that it was difficult for matters to get through to the actual meeting without their approval.

[28] The *Australian Church Record,* of which Ballantine-Jones was editor from 1974 to 1977, gave little critical coverage to politics during most of Loane's term.

tenure.[29] Many of the recommendations were viewed as very radical for their time and faded away but they spawned other inquiries which eventually *did* lead to substantial changes.

One immediate reaction to that report was the formation of a clerically based quasi-political group called the Sydney Anglican Clerical Society (SACS) which published a counter report called *Take Another Look at the Parish,* accusing Reid's report of undermining the traditional role of an Anglican minister.[30] Another reaction to the direction Sydney was heading occurred at the 1975 Synod when the Revs Don Meadows and Bruce Wilson moved a motion asking Standing Committee to 'consider the desirability of providing additional information regarding candidates for election held by Synod and, if thought desirable, to consider ways and means of providing that information'.[31] The ACL ticket circulated information on its nominations, but the absence of an alternative ticket meant that the virtues of other nominations were unstated. In response, Standing Committee in 1976 promoted an ordinance to allow a candidate to submit a précis of up to 35 words stating their occupation, professional, academic or other qualifications, previous experience and positions held in parish, Diocese or other Christian bodies.[32] On the surface, this looked like a sensible and benign proposal, very difficult for anyone to oppose. However, as often is the case, underneath such a move were deep political currents, not visible on the surface, namely concern over the dominance of ACL.

To illustrate, SACS appointed a sub-committee in 1975 to 'examine the principles and practices of Synod elections and to report to a later meeting of the society'.[33] SACS was hitching a ride on the Meadows/Wilson resolution mentioned earlier. Members of the sub-committee were Meadows and Wilson, the Revs Tom Croft, Ralf Fraser and Ray Bomford from SACS and Alan Hamilton and Ballantine-Jones from ACL. This sub-committee represented three distinct political interests: older evangelical clergy, liberal evangelicals (who felt shut out of elected positions by the

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[29] *Looking into the Parish,* (The Parochial Ministry and Organisation Commission, Sydney, Synod papers, 1972), 2-7.
[30] *Take Another Look at the Parish*, (The Sydney Anglican Clerical Society, North Ryde) 1973.
[31] *1976 Sydney Year Book*, 259.
[32] Election Ordinance Amendment Ordinance 1976*, 1977 Sydney Year Book*, 258-259.
[33] Letter from the convenor of the sub-committee, the Rev Tom Croft, to Bruce Ballantine-Jones, 11 November 1975.

ACL ticket), and conservatives linked to ACL. The records of proceedings of this sub-committee contain important primary sources on the way the political landscape was developing in the mid 1970s. For example, Bomford (an older conservative evangelical) circulated a paper describing how he saw the changes in the Standing Committee at that time. In part he said:

Another interesting point is that Standing Committee has changed in its general make up of members over the years. If we [meaning Bomford in this paper] do something which is perhaps objectionable and divide men into five different categories we have the following categories (roughly):

(i) Men of high church or Anglo-Catholic principles or men who would be seen to represent their point of view while themselves being more evangelical. Nominate as *H.*

(ii) Men who are not really in any category and are not seen as representing any point of view but would normally take a centre of the road point of view (typical example, Archdeacon Goodwin) Nominate as *C.*

(iii) Men who were trained in Moore College in TC Hammond's time or just afterwards or before and who generally resist either Anglo-Catholic pressure or pressure in what they might regard as an un-Anglican point of view. [They] might be called 'old fashioned evangelicals' or evangelical churchmen. Nominate as *BC.*

(iv) Men who take a stirry point of view against status quo, perhaps liberal in some points of view. Nominate as *L.*

(v) Evangelicals from the DB Knox School who would take a decidedly less traditional and Anglican point of view and would push for 'the application of biblical principles in the congregation – sorry, local congregation'. Nominate as *R.*

We then look at the make-up of Standing Committee over the years and find as follows:

CLERGY ONLY (NOT COUNTING EX OFFICIO).

1976 2*H* 2*BC* 9*R*
1973 2*H* 1*C*   6 or 7 *BC* 3 or 4 *R*
1970 2*H* 2*C*   8 or 9 *BC* 1 or 2 *R*
1967 2*H* 1*C*   9 or 10 *BC* 1 or 2
1964 2*H* 1*C*   10 *BC*   1 *R*

This development is a natural one. However one distressing point is that the application of tied voting in not only elections but in other matters seems to be creeping into Standing Committee so that more and more the minds of the majority are already determined before the meeting ... This means in effect that there are two structures in the Diocese, the official structure ... and the hidden structure where in fact decisions (though they appear to be made at Synod and Standing Committee ...) are made elsewhere by a body not answerable to Synod and not officially part of the Diocese.[34]

Some of Bomford's observations and conclusions are contestable, but concern at the growing influence of what he called the Knox School was real for him and SACS.[35]

Wilson and Meadows, representing the liberal evangelical and anti-ACL element were asked to outline the reasons behind their motion at Synod. In explanation, Wilson said:

(a) ... change to the present system of Synod elections is necessary on the grounds of the biblical principle of justice. ... The present system gives an unjust advantage to the ACL.

(b) ... the ACL far from being an independent buffer to episcopal and bureaucratic power in the Diocese is in symbiotic relationship with that power and that change is in the direction of an increase in that relationship. Moreover, the ACL, being a private and in many ways secret organisation, poses a greater threat to the ethical concerns of justice.

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[34] These extracts are taken from an undated submission to the sub-committee in the possession of Ballantine-Jones, a member of the sub-committee.
[35] At the time, Bomford was the Clerical Secretary of Synod and Standing Committee.

(c) ... the historical function of the ACL has changed in the course of the last 20-30 years from a group of evangelicals aiming to maintain and extend evangelical thought and practice to an interest group furthering the cause of i) a sectional evangelicalism and ii) a sectional group of people.

(d) ... the sociological studies of bureaucracy have shown that power groups within them lose touch with the realities of the people whom they are meant to serve and that only the introduction of new people and ideas can prevent them more existing unto themselves. It was argued that this is more and more the state of affairs in the Diocese and that, given the present system of synod elections, the introduction of the kind of new blood needed was virtually impossible.

(e) ... the present method of synod elections involved, through the sheer size of Synod and the lack of an information channel as suggested in Don Meadow's synod motion, the effective disenfranchisement of Synod persons. This, it was said, is especially true for lay members of Synod.

(f) ... as an important background to this whole issue of ACL and synod elections was a profound theological difference between a) traditional Anglican evangelicals, b) congregational-type evangelicals and, c) radical evangelicals. ... ACL was largely influenced by the second category of theological opinion and that this is largely a clergy/lawyer based group.[36]

These comments clearly disclose the broader political agenda behind Resolution 34/75 and Wilson and Meadow's frustration at being excluded from access to positions of influence in the Diocese.[37] Wilson's observation that there was a symbiotic relationship between ACL and the diocesan leadership was partially correct. Because of the close affinity of ACL leaders to Loane and bishops such Donald Robinson, it would be surprising if this was not the case.

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[36] SACS sub-committee minutes of 4 August, 1976.
[37] Resolution 34/75 advocated the provision of basic information about candidates for election to be provided to Synod members to assist them in deciding who to vote for.

To complete the inquiry process, the sub-committee asked Ballantine-Jones to explain what he saw was the [then] role of ACL in Synod elections. He said:

1) The membership of the ACL Council covers the whole range of evangelical opinion.

2) In relation to elections, ACL functions at two levels, the annual letter to synod members, and the consideration of casual vacancies. In those cases, nominations are made by members of Standing Committee and are filled by secret ballot. The principle ACL works by is to look for people committed to the gospel as understood by evangelicals, to look for people of ability and to look to support people with a record of responsible participation in church matters. ACL is very aware of the possibility of making an error of judgement through lack of information, but does make an effort to inform itself [about] people. There is no a-priori commitment to ACL members or council members. Many non ACL people who are evangelicals are supported by ACL. The question of ACL membership does not generally arise; the concern is [to find] good people.

3) ACL does not seek to promote people of a particular type of evangelicalism.

4) In the case of casual vacancies, it is generally true that ACL members tend to vote the same way but not without frequent exceptions. No attempt is ever made to bind or coerce any member of Standing Committee. It is the unchallenged right that people should vote according to conscience. The ballots are always secret.

5) ACL does not equal the 'Sydney Establishment' as is claimed by some. Though ACL does enjoy the confidence and support of a large proportion of Synod, it does not exercise the same influence with the 'hierarchy'. Often there are strong points differences of opinion [with them]. It can be argued that with the enormous growth of the diocesan bureaucracy, that ACL is the only effective counter balance to increased hierarchical control, the norm in most other dioceses.

6) The value of the ACL's role is that it provides stability, continuity and the opportunity for new people to gain positions in the Diocese. It is a strong bulwark in favour of retention of evangelical traditions in the Diocese.

7) The main limitations are mostly practical, for example, not knowing enough about sufficient people who might make a worthwhile contribution to the Diocese. This is partly due to the size of the Diocese. ACL is not unmindful of this. Rather than acting against ACL, people who believe they have a contribution, or know others [who might], should take the opportunity to talk to ACL councillors about them. ACL would respond to any approach that was motivated by goodwill and a desire to advance the gospel.

8) At Synod time, ACL acts as an unofficial nominating committee. This involves a great deal of work. When ACL hasn't done it, many positions have remained unfilled.[38]

These various statements represent a snapshot of the political landscape as it was in the mid 1970s. As noted, the Meadows/Wilson initiative was accepted by the Synod in 1976. It made no difference to election outcomes, except if an ACL candidate failed to submit a précis and it was an otherwise close vote. In any case, ACL always submitted details of its own nominations in their letter of recommendation and encouraged candidates to send in a précis as well.

Wilson and Meadows continued to look for ways to open up the processes to non ACL people. Later they were instrumental in the formation of a political party known as Open Synod. Like SACS, Open Synod also faded and its function was taken over by Anglicans Together in 1992. Meadows later moved to the Diocese of Melbourne and Wilson moved to Canberra-Goulbourn, becoming an assistant bishop there and later Bishop of Bathurst.

9.9 More Than One Man

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[38] SACS sub-committee minutes of 16 June 1976.

Apart from the unique qualities of Marcus Loane, another reason for the strength and stability of the Loane era was the leadership team he had around him and the very distinguished laymen in leadership positions in the Synod at the time. Noting where applicable the community awards they received (either during or after the Loane episcopate), some of these leaders were Bishops Frank Hulme Moir AO, and Jack Dain OBE, Graham Delbridge, Ken Short AO, John Reid, Donald Robinson AO and Donald Cameron. As archdeacons, there were Bob Fillingham MBE and Clive Goodwin MBE and [later Bishop] Harry Goodhew AO.[39] On the lay side there were Justices Athol Richardson (former NSW Cabinet Minister and Justice of the NSW Supreme Court), Justice Norman Jenkyn, Sir Harold Knight, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bruce Davies, one time NSW Registrar General and Head of the NSW Premier's Department, Neil Cameron, partner in the law firm, Allen Allen and Hemsley, Stacy Atkin, Justice Ken Handley AO. These are indicative of the calibre of leaders in the Diocese in Loane's term and it is argued that their abilities

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[39] Jack Dain was made an assistant bishop by Gough in 1965. Dain came to Australia to be Federal Secretary of CMS in 1959. In that role, he reshaped its federal structure to be a formidable policy and administrative unit.[39] Previously he had been a missionary in India, a commander in the Indian Navy during the war, and General Secretary of Bible Medical and Missionary Fellowship. He was ordained presbyter specifically for the CMS position. It was his talent as an administrator, strategist and advocate that earned him the respect of the Diocese and the position of Loane's closest advisor. Bishop Frank Hulme-Moir had been a diocesan bishop in NZ before Gough brought him back to Sydney in 1965. He previously held senior positions in the Diocese and on his return he also served as Senior Chaplain to the Police Force, Bishop to the Australian Defence Forces and Dean of St Andrew's Cathedral. Other bishops were former Archdeacons Graham Delbridge and Gordon Begbie. Bishop John Reid had been Rector of Gladesville and Archdeacon under Loane. Donald Robinson had been Vice-Principal of MTC. Bishop Ken Short had been Rector of Vaucluse, a missionary and General Secretary of CMS, NSW, Bishop to the Armed Forces. The last episcopal appointment by Loane was Archdeacon Donald Cameron, a chartered accountant, former faculty member at MTC, Rector at Bellevue Hill and Federal Secretary of CMS. Cameron, like Dain, was an able administrator and advocate. Robinson's academic and intellectual abilities added much to Loane's administration. Archdeacon Clive Goodwin, in addition to many significant parochial appointments, was Director of the Church of England Retirement Villages (ARV) from 1964 and laid the foundations for it to become the largest diocesan organisation. Archdeacon Bob Fillingham was also General Secretary of the Home Mission Society. Loane's team was the last that had a significant representation of men who served in the armed forces or were familiar with the world of corporate affairs.
Loane himself was not backward in acknowledging the merits of his contemporaries, Marcus Loane, *Mark These Men,* (Acorn Press Ltd, Canberra, 1985). This book contains a series of pen portraits of leading Sydney identities from 1909 to 1985. The link between them is that they were personally known to Loane and were all dead before the book was published. The value of this book goes beyond the biographical details they contain to include Loane's own assessment and why he appointed some of them to be leaders in the Diocese. Later he wrote another book on colleagues still alive at time of writing, *These Happy Warriors - Friends and Contemporaries, (New Creation Publications Inc., Blackwood, 1988*). Included in this volume are pen pictures of DB Knox, Stuart Barton Babbage, Robert Fillingham, Lance Shilton and Alan Cole.

went a long way to explaining why that episcopate could be seen as the high point for the Diocese in the period under review.

9.10 Conclusion

This is a study of a diocese which underwent radical change in so many areas. The stability of Loane's leadership, the underlying orientation towards evangelism, the growing (but not yet dominant) influence of the Knox view of church and denomination and the birth of the 'age of inquiry' all contributed to what really were the beginnings of a process which resulted in a form of Anglicanism distinctive in Australia.

It is important to see the matters described in this and the following chapters, as part of a continuum. Though politics or political action were not dominant in Loane's time, the feeling that change had to come for the survival of religious adherence in an increasingly secular society meant that opposing interests and advocates, resorted more and more to political action to bring about what they thought was needed to advance gospel interests in the Diocese.

CHAPTER TEN

THE ROBINSON YEARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE

10.1 Introduction

When Loane retired in 1982, the Diocese was poised between the stability of the past and the uncertainty of the future. Robinson was nothing if not a conservative. John Reid, the other possibility to succeed Loane, seemed to many (especially the laity) as the one to lead Sydney into a new era. Yet (ironically) those pushing for change tended to support Robinson and those who liked the traditional ways tended to support Reid. In 1982, the pull of Reformation theology and concern at the inroads of theological liberalism were more dominant than the more open approach to social associated with Reid. Ironically it was the tension between personal loyalty to Robinson and the frustration at the slow pace of change that sowed the seeds for the conflicts that were to build up towards the end of his term and explode in the Goodhew period.

Donald Robinson was the son of Archdeacon Richard Bradley Robinson, he served as lecturer and Vice-Principal of MTC, then Bishop in Parramatta and Archbishop from 1981 to 1993. Like Loane, he had been a long time member of the ACL and a Director and sometime editor of the *ACR*. He was widely recognised as a brilliant New Testament scholar and liturgiologist. He was conservative by nature, though with a radical and inquisitive side which seemed contradictory to many. He was elected with the strong support of the clergy who had studied under him at MTC and trusted his fair-mindedness and personal integrity. They knew he was a traditionalist and unlikely to support radical change, but they also knew he was steadfast in his adherence to the principles of the Reformation, at that time when they were still of paramount concern to conservatives.

Robinson's administration was marked (some might say spoilt) by the women's ordination dispute which distracted attention from any other legacy he might have left.[1] Internally his greatest contribution was the *Archbishop's Vision for Growth* which channelled resources to new and expanding suburbs. Difficulties over how to spend the expanding inflow of funds and difficulties in coordinating the work of diocesan organisations led to his establishing the Nicholson Commission late in his term. Concerns over the capacity of the Archbishop to function properly across the whole Diocese led him to revive Loane's proposal to sub-divide the Diocese. The growth of central funds raised questions about how the central authorities could manage problems associated with financial allocations. Robinson had strong opinions on the re-marriage of divorced persons, and attempts to accommodate different views tracked through most of his term. His conservatism on liturgical reform heightened pressure for change in that area. The tumultuous events of 1992 resulted in a changed and less sympathetic attitude towards the ACA. Put together, all these led to a build up of partisan political activity, intensifying with the arrival on the scene of Phillip Jensen as a diocesan player and the rise of the Reformed Evangelical Protestant Association (REPA). In reaction, the liberal oriented group, Anglicans Together was established, concerned mostly with preserving 'traditional' Anglicanism and unity with the ACA. Apart from the accelerated political climate, a number of these issues directly impacted the question of the capacity of the central authorities to manage major projects. This brings into view the working hypothesis on why the Diocese found that aspect so difficult to handle.[2]

10.2 Election of Donald Robinson

The election of Loane's successor was always going to be between the only two serious contenders, Robinson and John Reid. The level of political manoeuvring was relatively low by later Sydney standards. Robinson was generally supported by conservative evangelicals and MTC trained clergy, and Reid, generally by opponents of ACL, social progressives and the laity. In the laity's case it was because of his

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[1] See Chapter 5 on women's ordination and coverage of the *Scandrett v Dowling* case.
[2] The working hypothesis is set out in detail in Chapter One. In brief, it is that the autonomy of the parishes and diocesan organisations, the two headed nature of diocesan government (Archbishop and Synod) and the inefficient committee culture combine to impede effective central leadership.

high media profile and his early role in developing local church reform proposals such as the *Looking into the Parish* report. Bishops Donald Cameron and Ken Short were also nominated, but neither had sufficient support to mount a serious challenge. Many thought that Reid was Loane's favoured successor. He denied this in a private conversation with Ballantine-Jones not long before his death in 2009.[3] He said that he had never favoured one over the other. In any case, it was obvious that these two represented the best options available at that time.

Against the case for Robinson were his restrictive views on re-marriage of divorced persons, his well known conservatism on liturgical reform and his alleged support for apartheid in South Africa.[4] This particular rumour arose out of his long association with the Church of England in South Africa (CESA). Some of their leaders were said to be sympathetic to the then South African Government. Being a strong Robinson supporter, Ballantine-Jones wanted to defuse this potential threat. He approached him about that and the re-marriage question so he could use his replies in the debate. On the night of nominations, Robinson gave him a two-page letter on the South Africa question, saying that CESA was itself predominantly black, with (until one had recently died), two black bishops. He said his interest in CESA went back 40 years, predating apartheid. He said he had had extensive contact with the other Anglican denomination, the Church of the Province of South Africa. Replying to an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* alleging that CESA was 'sympathetic to apartheid', he said, 'CESA does not have any official political stance, and attitudes of its members to complex social issues would be varied ...'[5] On the re-marriage question, Ballantine-Jones told Synod that Robinson would follow the teachings of the Bible as he saw it. He said, 'He will faithfully administer the law of the Church as the Synod had created it and he will act with compassion and sensitivity'.[6] At that

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[3] Contemporary notes of this conversation were taken but not confirmed by Loane due to his death in 2009, but confirmed in writing by Robert Tong (Loane's son-in-law) as being something Loane told him.

[4] *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 30, 1982.

[5] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 September 1981 and Robinson's letter to Ballantine-Jones of 24 March 1982. On April 3 the *Sydney Morning Herald* carried two letters to the editor on the question, one from the Sydney convener of Community Aid Abroad attacking Robinson, and one from Ballantine-Jones, saying in part that Robinson had made it clear that 'he is against all forms of injustice and oppression wherever they occur ...' Of interest are the comments of John Reid in his short biography of Marcus Loane where he discusses the views of Bishop Stephen Bradley of CESA and Robinson's connections with him and CESA. J R Reid, *Marcus L Loane*, 93-97.

[6] Taken from Ballantines-Jones' speech notes, 1 April, 1982.

time, Ballantine-Jones (who did not agree with Robinson's views on this) did not anticipate the impasse that was later to develop, as described later in this Chapter.

Bishop Jack Dain, as Administrator presided at the election Synod. He was a strong personal supporter of Reid, though impeccably fair in his chairmanship. As an example of this he decided to call speakers by rotation in favour of each candidate and to call them from different parts of the hall in turn. Unfortunately for Reid's chances, one result of this was that at the crucial point on the final night, he called a layman at the back of the dimly lit balcony who turned out to be a gay activist from Enmore Parish who spoke passionately in favour of Reid. That didn't go down well with the conservative Sydney Synod. Dain was mortified.

One tactic carried over from the 1966 Loane election was for the main candidates (Robinson and Reid) to have multiple nominations. This allowed different speakers to nominate and second their nominee on each of the three nights of debate. Three names made it to the final list, Donald Cameron, Robinson and Reid. In the end, Robinson won 243-223 in the laity and 149-76 in the clergy.[7] Reid was bitterly disappointed. It was widely believed that relations between them were strained throughout most of Robinson's term.

Robinson was assisted by a still strong team of assistant bishops and archdeacons, and strong support from the ACL. What was surprising to many was that in an atmosphere of increasing desire for change, Robinson maintained his following among many of those who were calling for change. The reason for this was his unswerving commitment to the conservative theological tradition of the Diocese, especially on social issues, opposition to women's ordination and the constitutional nature of the Church. His congenial personality and trust in his integrity (engendered in the clergy during their time at MTC), also helped. Conversely, there was deep suspicion of Reid's perceived centralist tendencies, fallout from his attempt in 1970 to keep Knox from re-election to the Standing Committee by nominating Ken Short for the vacancy. Also, many believed was there had been a shift towards a more

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[77] *1983 Sydney Year Book*, 204.

'social gospel' following his return from the Billy Graham sponsored Lausanne Congress on world evangelisation in 1974.

10.3 The 'Archbishop's Vision for Growth'

The first major attempt to harness Sydney's growing resources for diocesan outreach was Robinson's Vision for Growth (VFG) programme. This was a campaign to raise money and direct resources to the new population areas where local parishes were unable to meet the costs of establishing Anglican ministry.[8] At the 1983 Synod (and with Standing Committee's endorsement) he proposed it would run for seven to eight years. He wanted it to become one of his major responsibilities in leadership.[9] Synod, as it usually does, supported the proposal in a resolution moved by Bishop Harry Goodhew.[10]

In 1984, Synod allocated $200,000 to initiate the programme and a ministry committee was set up to plan how to foster growth in designated areas.[11] The Rev Stuart Abrahams was appointed full-time director of the appeal. The New Sites Committee was designated to purchase land with funds raised through the appeal. Existing agencies were mobilised for administration. Robinson told Synod that if successful, the VFG would not be restricted to the fulfilment of a particular goal of establishing a certain number of new centres but would 'open up a new impetus for growth and expansion in every part of the Diocese'.[12] He said he had asked the EOS Committee to make a substantial contribution as well.[13] During 1984-5, he addressed nine regional meetings to promote VFG and formally launched the appeal at Synod. Robinson personally visited most parishes in 1985, sent out 25,000

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[8] 'The original 'vision' emanated from a layman, Mr George Wilton, who, with Archdeacon Walter Newmarch, on behalf of the New Areas Committee, approached Robinson in 1982 to see if it would be possible to raise $1 million for church planting in 1983 ... This became the Archbishop's personal "Vision"', *The Archbishop of Sydney's Vision for Growth: Church Planting Expansion 1984-1990 Final Report*, prepared by the Rev Stuart Abrahams, Director of Vision for Growth, (Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 1992), 14.
[9] *1984 Sydney Year Book,* 222.
[10] Ibid, 237.
[11] *1985 Sydney Year Book*, 272.
[12] *1984 Sydney Year Book*, 221.
[13] Ibid, 222.

personalised letters and (with his bishops) addressed face to face 12,000 church members.[14] By any measure this was a massive investment of time and influence.

In response to this effort, he reported that in 1985 $708,000 had been received, but that only 800 people had signed up as regular givers. Three parishes had resolved to sell surplus property for VFG. 'Best of all', he said, 'has been the sense of unity and common purpose which this has given to us all in the Diocese'.[15] Arguably this was an overstatement. In 1986, Robinson expressed some disappointment at the rate of progress. He said that only one new church building had actually been completed.[16] He compared this to Bishop Barry (100 years before), who had opened nine churches in one year. 'I wish I could say the same,' he said. To make the figure worse, in the same period, exactly twice that number of churches had been closed. He called that sensible rationalisation.[17] Nevertheless this was a moment of sobering assessment of a cause which appeared to have strong Diocese wide support. This situation highlights the problem previously noted: why did Robinson (and later Jensen), find it so hard to drive their dreams of expansion through centrally run diocesan initiatives?

Notwithstanding the fact that two well-established parishes decided to adopt and support a new VFG church and three other parishes sold surplus land and gave the proceeds to VFG, the problem for VFG was that it had minimal parish, Synod, or Standing Committee involvement, meaning that the first element required by the working hypothesis (see Chapter 1, section 2 above), namely a strong buy-in by the parishes, did not occur. Another reason was that Robinson saw himself (and his bishops) as having the pivotal role. Diocesan organisations (out of loyalty and respect) fell in behind him and provided good support, but Standing Committee and Synod gave formal endorsement, but little more. It was, as the full title stated, the *Archbishop's* Vision for Growth, run by a committee *he* appointed. In its favour was a competent director, Stuart Abrahams. But to achieve its objectives, arguably, would

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[14] *1986 Sydney Year Book*, 212.
[15] *1986 Sydney Year Book,* 214
[16] *1987 Sydney Year Book*, 211
[17] Ibid, 212

have required *all* diocesan elements to work together, with stronger grass roots support, and an enthusiastic Synod and Standing Committee.[18]

In 1987, Robinson announced that the New Areas Committee (set up under Loane), had been absorbed into the new Parish Support and Development Division of HMS. He hoped the new division would be able to carry forward a diocesan responsibility for planning and development and be at full momentum by the time the appeal came to an end in 1990.[19] He said the co-operation of HMS and VFG had been one of the reasons for the VFG's success and its full integration into the life of the Diocese. This is an overstatement, but correct with respect to the administrative arrangements. At the same Synod, Abrahams moved that parishes be asked to review their own resources and income to see if some could be reallocated to VFG.[20] Little came of this. In 1988, Robinson said that since 1984, 29 out of 46 projects were either completed or had begun and were assisting 22 different communities. Of the $7 million needed, approximately $4.7 million had been given by parishes and individuals. $2.5 million was needed over the following two years.[21] The administrative costs of the appeal were paid from Synod grants and were less than 20 percent of total income. The precise sources of other income were not spelt out. That same year, Stuart Abrahams moved for a major inquiry (called the Parish Property and Ministry Committee) to investigate how local resources and personnel might be better utilised.[22] This is another expression of the search to find a basis for central diocesan action.

By 1990, VFG was coming to an end and Robinson addressed the question of what would happen next. He proposed an ongoing appeal called *Vision 2001*: 'Throughout this year, [1990] my bishops and I had done a great deal of research and planning for parish development that will occur in the next 10 years'. He said, 'we can best do this by working through the existing episcopal leadership, as well as diocesan agencies such as New Sites, HMS, Inner City ...'[23] This is a clear example of

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[18] In correspondence with Ballantine-Jones in 2013, Abrahams indicated that he believed that there was strong grass roots support and unusual co-operation and support from all diocesan operations.
[19] *1988 Sydney Year Book*, 235
[20] Ibid, 235
[21] *1989 Sydney Year Book,* 227
[22] Ibid, 260. Ballantine-Jones was appointed to this committee.
[23] *1991 Sydney Year Book*, 258.

Robinson's fundamental view that it is the Archbishop and his bishops who initiate and lead major ministry enterprises. It overlooked the influence of the Knox view of church and denomination, which saw the local parish as the centre of mission initiative and effectively sidelined Synod and Standing Committee. People listened, but silence was not consent. In Robinson's mind, Vision 2001 would go further than VFG to include other outreach programmes, 'and where necessary re-structure parish ministries so that we can do our job as a diocese more effectively'. This is where the committee proposed by Abrahams was to fit in. He said the opportunities that Vision 2001 would try to address 'must be met irrespective of which [episcopal] administration is in place ...'[24] Synod duly voted to support Vision 2001. In 1991 Stuart Abrahams was appointed to run that appeal, but as if to foreshadow troubles ahead, Robinson said that reduced financial support from Synod would mean this [new] project will not proceed as quickly as hoped, 'but the objectives and structures were in place'.[25]

When VFG ended in 1990, $7.16 million had been raised, though the final report does not say how much of that was from voluntary rationalisation of parish property and how much was from donations. This is a tiny amount compared to what was raised and spent in the Goodhew and Jensen periods. Robinson declared that the goal had been achieved. The final report stated that 47 different projects had been accomplished, including four new church sites.[26] In Appendix 'B' of the final report, there was a suggestion that future projects should be managed by a 'Director ... who would convene all meetings and follow up all decisions made'.[27] Then followed an outline of how such a centrally run organisation should operate. The question of how to structure a centrally run campaign like this was to become a matter of intense debate in relation to how Peter Jensen was to organise his Mission in 2002, as will be seen in Chapter Seventeen.

Stuart Abrahams' comment in the final report was:

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[24] Ibid, 258. The use of the word 'administration' to describe an archbishop's work is of interest. It is the word used here to describe what each archbishop does as a leader in an essentially secular body, apart from his teaching and pastoral roles.
[25] *1991 Sydney Year Book,* 262
[26] *Final Report*, 15.
[27] Ibid, 39.

The Archbishop had no direct involvement in the development of projects. However, his initiative and leadership in getting the support of most Anglicans in the Diocese to assist Vision for Growth must be recorded in the history of the church as a most outstanding achievement. The high profile and intensity of church planting and financial support would not have occurred without this initiative. [28]

Abraham's assessment was understandable given his central role in 'VFG's administration. For its time it was a bold enterprise. Its strengths were the direct involvement of the Archbishop himself, the appropriate use of existing diocesan organisations to provide operational support and the value of an effective executive arm to manage centrally based processes. Though it enjoyed wide support, arguably it was less than might have been had there been greater input from the Synod and Standing Committee. Politically, the cause of church expansion was unobjectionable and the leadership of the Archbishop welcomed and appreciated. Who was going to oppose it? In effect, the project ran its course on its merits and within the limitations of Robinson himself and the structures *he* created

10.4 Robinson and Re-marriage of Divorced Persons

The other major matter that dogged Robinson's term (aside from the women's issue) was his very conservative attitude to the re-marriage of divorced persons in church. This was a matter which had theological, pastoral, legal and political elements. It was opened up in Loane's term with the appointment of a Synod committee of inquiry, but escalated to become a major controversy throughout Robinson's administration.[29] The controversy revolved around the incompatibility of Robinson's restrictive position (which he was determined to enforce) and the Synod's view, which wanted a more liberal approach in response to pressure from local ministers and affected couples. With respect to the working hypothesis (see Chapter One, section 2 above), this is a

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[28] Stuart N Abrahams, *The Archbishop of Sydney's Vision for Growth, Final Report,* (Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 1992), 32.
[29] *1973 Sydney Year Book*, 37/72.

classic example of the dysfunction that follows when the two heads of power (Synod and Archbishop) do not agree.

Starting in 1973, a committee on re-marriage, chaired by the Rev John Darlington, said that where a marriage had ended in divorce and a partner had repented of his or her share in the breakdown, it was acceptable for that person to re-marry [in church].[30] At the 1975 Synod, a Standing Committee report quoted Loane as saying that the recently adopted Family Law Act 'will make a stronger contrast between the Christian concept of marriage and marriage as a civil institution'.[31] At the 1977 Synod, Loane gave an eloquent description of the Christian view of marriage. He attacked the influence which the 'amoral and agnostic political philosophy of the Humanist Society had over the ALP'. He foreshadowed the later struggles over marriage being a union exclusively between a man and a woman.[32]

When Robinson became Archbishop in 1982, he told Synod, '... when it comes to the solemnization of matrimony and the invocation of the divine blessing on the joining together of a man and a woman ... [the Church is required] to "uphold the commands of Christ and his doctrine and discipline"'.[33] Outside Sydney, the ACA had been working towards a national policy on the question, and Robinson said of that, 'my fear regarding the provisional canon [of General Synod] relates not to its theological principles but to the varieties of practice reflecting conflicting views of the nature of matrimony which it may produce throughout the Church in Australia'.[34] He said his task was 'to administer the law' as best he could. He said any regulations he might issue would be based on the Chancellor, Ken Handley's advice, which he had recently asked for. Following Robinson's remarks, Synod passed 21/82 requesting the Diocesan Doctrine Commission to report on the relevant biblical criteria which should be taken into consideration in coming to a decision. So, by 1982 there were

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[30] *1974 Sydney Year Book*, 389.
[31] *1976 Sydney Year Book,* 323.
[32] On this, Loane said, 'The kind of legislation which was mooted would have gone much further and would allow all forms of relationships such as homosexual and lesbian marriage and even incestuous association; and such couples would have been granted full rights at law on such matters as inheritance and adoption'. *1978 Sydney Year Book,* 222.
[33] *1983 Sydney Year Book,* 224.
[34] Ibid*,* 224*.*

two processes in place: the Chancellor's legal inquiry and the Doctrine Commission's theological inquiry.

The following year, Robinson reported the Chancellor's advice (actually drawn up for him by the then Mr Peter Young QC) which he accepted. It said that the law of the Diocese was that a clergyman could not officiate at a marriage of a divorced person except for the adultery of the former partner, and only then with the permission of the Archbishop.[35] Robinson said this advice appeared to conform to the practice in the Diocese since 1873 and was consistent with regulations of successive archbishops since 1892. He outlined to Synod what he thought was the 'heart of our thinking', namely the nature of marriage itself as a sign of the spiritual marriage and unity between the Church and Christ. He said Christians must unite their thinking and God's revelation, focussing on the 'one flesh' character of marriage. He said the Church had to have some rules to be able to distinguish between those marriages it can approve of and those it could not.[36]

The nub of the issue for Robinson was this: if God's word taught a restrictive view, the Church had no liberty to go beyond that. For others, including the Diocesan Doctrine Commission, it was whether the restrictive interpretation was *correct*. This question (plus a dispute over the law and the powers of the Archbishop) shaped the conflict throughout Robinson's term.

The 1983 Synod appointed another committee (under the chairmanship of Bishop Goodhew) to investigate the legal position and consider the desirability of the Diocese declaring its own policy.[37] When that committee reported in 1984, Goodhew moved that re-marriage of divorced persons be permitted 'without necessarily requiring the assent of the diocesan bishop'. Such legislation was to be based on the theological conclusions of his committee's report and the proposal that following advice from the diocesan bishop, the final decision should be made by the officiating clergyman.[38] At the same Synod, the Doctrine Commission delivered its final report,

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[35] *1984 Sydney Year Book*, 203 ff.
[36] Ibid, 208.
[37] Ibid, 237.
[38] *1985 Sydney Year Book,* 421-432.

setting out the different interpretations of the biblical texts.[39] It concluded: 'if the reasoning of the Commission is correct, Anglican rites should not be denied to those who seek re-marriage if they do so on grounds consistent with Scripture'.[40] So, the Darlington Committee, the Goodhew Committee and the Doctrine Commission lined up against the Chancellor's opinion and Robinson's own position.

The 1984 Synod rejected the 1981 General Synod Canon for the Re-marriage of Divorced Persons, calling for it to be amended to allow re-marriage without necessarily requiring the permission of the diocesan bishop. It also requested legislation based on the following principles:

1. The celebrant believes that the proposed marriage is in accordance with the principles of Holy Scripture.

2. To the best of the celebrant's knowledge, all obligations under the prior marriage have been fulfilled so far as possible.

3. The celebrant believes the proposed marriage to be in the best interests of the couple concerned.

4. To the best of the celebrant's knowledge, the proposed marriage would not cause offence in another congregation if the divorced person was a member of a congregation.

5. The celebrant is satisfied there is no possibility of reconciliation of the parties of the prior marriage.[41]

When the ordinance enshrining these principles was passed in 1985, Robinson refused his assent. There was a stalemate. Robinson wrote to Standing Committee in June 1986 about the possibility of his assenting to the ordinance. He said that if

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[39] Ibid, 433-450.
[40] One member, Dr Alan Cole dissented, saying, 'I wish to point out that, while the biblical evidence is clear that in certain cases a separation between two parties to a marriage is permissible for a Christian, it is not equally clear whether remarriage of either party is permissible. Such a conclusion is one possible exegesis of some of the New Testament passages, but not either sole, certain or compelling'. *1985 Sydney Year Book*, 450.
[41] *1986 Sydney Year Book,* 264-265.

Standing Committee thought fit to bring back an amended bill, after a year's reflection, and if passed with a reasonable majority, he would have to think seriously about giving his assent, 'however reluctantly'.[42]

He offered four suggestions. The first was the inclusion of the caveat of Dr Alan Cole's dissenting opinion to balance the majority view of the Doctrine Commission. The second was the inclusion of some machinery to enable the Archbishop to check on the efficiency of the minister's investigation. The third was the removal altogether of the Archbishop's consent, otherwise the practice would be at the mercy of the different viewpoints of different archbishops. The fourth was the removal of the role of surrogates to the Archbishop. Ballantine-Jones saw these suggestions as Robinson holding out an olive branch. On that basis he decided to re-introduce the Goodhew bill with Robinson's suggested amendments. Ballantine-Jones argued that if passed it had a more than reasonable chance of obtaining Robinson's assent. Notwithstanding this, Goodhew successfully moved in Synod that the bill be deferred and members of the Goodhew Committee review the whole matter and try again.

That committee said that the procedures of the Goodhew/Ballantine-Jones bills were too cumbersome and would prove unworkable in practice. Four new draft ordinances were prepared and discussed with Robinson. One was to adopt the General Synod Canon. Another required the celebrant to seek the Archbishop's permission, but assuming the Doctrine's wider theological framework. The third dispensed with the Archbishop's consent altogether, but required the celebrant to notify the Archbishop in writing at least 60 days before the proposed marriage. Robinson indicated that none of these was acceptable to him. The fourth was effectively a restatement of what Robinson saw was the existing law, as advised by the Chancellor. The committee said it could not recommend that because it was too restrictive, and also because they opposed any role for the Archbishop.

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[42] Letter of Donald Robinson, 20 June 1986 to Secretary of Sydney Standing Committee, Warren Gotley: 'If after further debate, and consideration of my objections, as well as of any further amendments, Synod were still disposed to pass the Ordinance with a reasonable majority, I would have to think seriously about assenting to the Ordinance, however reluctantly. This is neither a promise nor a prophecy, but an indication that I have not closed my mind to the possibility'.

The Legal Committee of Standing Committee was then asked for its advice and what reasons, if any, exist that might indicate that the Archbishop should not act on the advice of the Chancellor.[43] They reported in a 16 page paper in 1988, identifying three views:

1. The present law as advised by the Chancellor.

2. The absolute prohibition of re-marriage, except on the grounds of adultery of the former spouse.

3. That a clergyman can officiate provided such action is not contrary to Scripture and that there is no law requiring the Bishop's consent, but nothing to prevent consultation if the clergyman wishes it.[44]

The committee was divided as to which view was correct and noted that the Synod was also polarised. It said, 'It is unfortunate that so much time has been wasted in considering what was the past and present when it is abundantly clear that the Synod in unlikely to formulate a rule for the future without reference to the past.'[45]

Robinson responded to the Legal Committee by saying that he took it that the law in the Diocese did point to an impediment to re-marriage, namely a living spouse who was not guilty of infidelity. He said he was not persuaded to act contrary to the Chancellor's advice. He disagreed with the view that a diocesan synod could act without a General Synod canon. In any case, he said any diocesan legislation would require his assent, which he would not give if it went against Holy Scripture.[46]

So, after many years of trying (and apart from the failed Ballantine-Jones bill), with no prospect of agreement between the Archbishop and the Synod, the whole question lapsed, except that anecdotally clergy more and more began to act on their own initiative without any reference to the Archbishop at all.

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[43] *1987 Sydney Year Book,* 264.
[44] *1989 Sydney Year Book,* 273-274.
[45] Ibid.
[46] *1990 Sydney Year Book,* 287-289.

When Goodhew became Archbishop in 1993, he adopted a very different approach. In a letter to Ballantine-Jones in 2012 he explained it as follows:

> My understanding of what transpired is that two trends emerged. Some clergy began to take personal liberties and to act on their own initiative following roughly the positions expressed in the legislation that Donald Robinson was unwilling to approve [as set out in the Goodhew Committee recommendations].

> The other was that we set up a process by which clergy made application to the regional bishops on a prescribed form for cases that generally fell within the ambit of the failed legislation. Their requests were brought to a Bishop's meeting. A decision was relayed back to the clergyman. The thought was to endeavour to maintain the theological stance of the failed legislation, conscious also that he [the minister] might benefit from the protection of another level of government that powerful people at the local level might seek to exert, as well as some measure of uniformity across the Diocese. I think more and more clergy were beginning to feel that they were the best arbiters of pastoral issues like re-marriage of divorced persons at the local level.

> These trends were not without their problems but by now clergy, for good or ill, were feeling a greater degree of independence from episcopal and central diocesan oversight and direction. This became obvious not only in this matter but in other requirements such as the approval of the Archdeacon's inspection for building works, rearrangements of furniture and the painting of church buildings.[47]

Goodhew's policy of the local minister determining the matter on the basis of his reading of Scripture and what he saw as the pastoral interests of those involved became the defacto policy in the Diocese. Here was a case where change expressing a wide consensus in the Synod and parishes eventually became diocesan practice, notwithstanding the intransigence of an archbishop and the desire of most parties to operate in accordance with Church law. There was little if any organised political activity, the committee structure found it difficult to overcome Robinson's conscientious beliefs, but time (and Goodhew's commonsense) provided

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[47] Personal correspondence with Goodhew, 27 March 2012, quoted with permission.

a solution that most were happy to live with. This policy continued throughout Jensen's term.

10.5 Robinson Revives the Sub-Division Proposal

Between the end of Loane's term and 1991 (when the sub-division question was due to come up again), attention focused more on what *kind* of regionalism was best for the Diocese. In 1982, Synod called for an inquiry into how regional organisation could be developed in *other* parts of the Diocese.[48] In 1986, Robinson referred to this and other synod resolutions, urging consideration of ways to increase regional responsibility.[49] In response, Goodhew moved for a new committee to replace the 1982 committee, to report back on the whole range of options. A high powered group was assembled, led by Sir Harold Knight, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia and including the Bishops of Wollongong and Parramatta, Bishop Donald Cameron, the General Secretary of HMS, Alan Whitham, Neville Malone, CEO of the SDS and Neil Cameron. The committee reported in 1988. It noted the 'disposition to devolve more functions to the regions' to facilitate local ministry. It was equivocal with regard to the need to replicate the Wollongong and Parramatta models in the other regions. On the question of radical change such as sub-division or the creation of a new provincial structure (cutting the proposed three Sydney based dioceses off from the rest of NSW) the committee did not see them 'as clearly providing a substantial increase in effectiveness of outreach or in economy and efficiency of administration'.[50]

This was a very significant report. Arguably the case for sub-division rested on four planks: enhancement of local ministry, greater administrative efficiency, strong local support and delivery of effective episcopal oversight. This report did not support the first two and did not give any support for separation in the short term in relation to the other two. In the absence of any initiative on the sub-division question, regionalisation was the direction the Diocese was heading towards.

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[48] *1983 Sydney Year Book*, 239.
[49] *1987 Sydney Year Book*, 239.
[50] *1988 Sydney Year Book*, 366.

In 1989, Robinson again raised the question of sub-division. Noting the Knight Committee report, he expressed frustration at the difficulty of providing effective episcopal oversight over such a large diocese. This was a different rationale to Loane's which saw it in terms of organisational efficiency and local preference. Robinson believed the role of assistant bishops was different from that of the diocesan bishop. He said that he hoped the 'Synod will take seriously the goal of creating two new dioceses and of gearing any further development of the Wollongong and Parramatta regions to the achieving of independence as soon as may be possible'.[51] In response, Goodhew moved that a report on these matters be brought to the 1991 Synod.[52] Between 1989 and 1991 there was a raft of inquiries and reports that set the stage for the decisive battle on whether Sydney should divide or opt for full blown regionalisation, involving *all* regions.

Robinson himself had privately told his bishops that he strongly desired sub-division. Apart from Peter Watson (then Bishop of Parramatta), they were unenthusiastic. A confidential meeting of opponents of sub-division was held in the office of John Chapman to discuss how to oppose it. The Rev Jim Ramsay of Liverpool was asked to organise a petition in the Parramatta region to the 1991 Synod, opposing sub-division. Other political options were decided on. This was high level political action.

Among the reports of that period was the one from WARC requested ten years earlier. It concluded that it was *not* desirable to pursue the formation of a new diocese at that time. It cited viability issues and the need for the injection of outside resources.[53] PARC (following the lead from Bishop Watson) on the other hand said that separation *was* possible and desirable and wanted the 1991 Synod to initiate steps 'as soon as practicable to establish a new diocese'.[54] Meanwhile another committee, appointed by Standing Committee in 1989 to consider the implications of the Knight Committee, supported the WARC proposals. It said:

> A central theme emerges very strongly from consideration of the previous reports
> on the subject, presidential addresses over a number of years and discussions

[51] *1990 Sydney Year Book*, 240.
[52] *1999 Sydney Year Book*, 260.
[53] *1992 Sydney Year Book,* 411-415.
[54] Ibid, 401-410.

with the regional councils and that is [that] the present system of diocesan administration and episcopal oversight is unsatisfactory and should not be retained. Improvement undoubtedly lies in the direction of giving a greater responsibility and accountability to 'grass roots' organisations. At present, authority and power is centred at 2 poles, the Archbishop and the diocesan organisations at one pole and the parishes at the other pole. With the growth in population and numbers of parishes in the Sydney metropolitan area, the gap between these 2 poles has become too wide to be manageable and it is necessary to provide some episcopal structure and church government at a level between the Archbishop and the parish.[55]

The Committee came down in favour of a 'new regionalism', taking in *all* regions.

Robinson in the meantime was pressing ahead with his proposal for sub-division and at the 1991 Synod he said:

My own views are still the same as I expressed them at the 1989 session of Synod. I said then that I did not think we could much longer hold in tension the principle of the Diocese as the unit of episcopal oversight with the principle of having assistant bishops with regional responsibility. I urged the Synod to take seriously the goal of creating two new dioceses ... as soon as practicable. I believed then, and I believe now, that to become separate dioceses will be in the best interests of effective church life and ministry in those two areas, and, moreover, in the best interests of Sydney itself.[56]

At the heart of Robinson's position was his view about the role of the diocesan bishop as the one who constituted the essence of authority and ministry in Anglican polity. Many found this hard to reconcile with his earlier teaching when at MTC. In any case, most clergy trained by him and Knox did not agree with him and so, notwithstanding the enormous respect they for held him personally, they rejected his arguments. Others who supported sub-division did so more on the grounds of local identity and greater control of their own affairs.

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[55] Ibid, 390.
[56] Ibid, 263-265.

The decisive debate took place at the 1991 Synod, led by Watson. He spoke very effectively. It was a classic Sydney Synod debate, of high quality and strong passion. When the vote was taken, it was close, but not close enough. So it came down to the fact that even though the Archbishop favoured it, with significant support in the west, other local opinion and powerful people in the centre, opposed it. The Synod did not support it either. The working hypothesis (see Chapter One, Section 2) seems to be applying in relation to this case.

10.6 Political Parties under Robinson: Open Synod

During the Robinson administration, other political groups began to emerge, sometimes in sympathy with ACL and sometimes in opposition. For example, in the mid-1980s, remnants of SACS from the 1970s joined with others to form Open Synod. Key leaders were Dr Patricia Brennan, the leader of the Movement for the Ordination of Women (MOW), John Diesendorf, the Rev John McDonald, the Rev Don Meadows and Paul Pryor. Their publicity said:

> One main reason for Open Synod is that the results of Synod elections do not reflect the real life of the Diocese. Sydney Diocese has a rich tradition behind its evangelical character. The aim of Open Synod is not to change this character but to help it realize its full range. This aim can be summarised as: *retain its character, enlarge the scope.*[57]

As a political party in the Synod tradition, it distributed a How to Vote ticket in 1986. It gave advice for vacancies on Standing Committee, Inner-City Committee and the Council of Trinity Grammar School.

Its political philosophy was enunciated by Don Meadows in an address he gave to an Open Synod meeting in July 1985. It covered some of the ground mentioned in the SACS sub-committee referred to in Chapter Eleven.[58] It began with an analysis of the source of political power in the Diocese as he saw it. He noted the importance of

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[57] This extract is taken from the invitation to Synod members from Open Synod to a Dinner on the first night of Synod, 3 October 1985.
[58] See page 163.

MTC, the trustees who appoint the Principal, who then appoints the faculty. Next, he mentioned ACL, which he said 'controls the electoral process'. Emanating from that is ACL's control of the nominating process for the selection of rectors. Next is ACL's control of Standing Committee. He said: '*Control* is the correct term in that the ACL voting ticket effectively decides the composition of the Standing Committee'.

Meadows then went on to give a critique of the emerging influence of the Knox view of church and denomination. He said the upshot was that Anglicanism, which had always been a church – a legacy of its beginnings as a national church – had begun to be defined as a 'sect', as opposed to a more outward looking approach of traditional Anglicanism.

As a solution, Meadows proposed an opening up of greater opportunities for non-MTC trained clergy. The monopoly of the ACL should be challenged. He said that 'the formation of Open Synod is an attempt to do this'. Thirdly he proposed that the role of what is now called the Nomination Board should 'be reduced or eliminated altogether'. In effect he proposed an open market where positions could be advertised and parish nominators could interview and propose someone to the Archbishop. The final step was to revive the middle level structures (regional conferences, and archdeacons who were also rectors). He concluded:

> These and other attempts at forming and maintaining middle-level structures would go far to solving the twin problems of isolated clergy and centralized curial structure of the Diocese. However their efficacy will be limited as long as the personnel of the diocesan curia are tainted with political partisanship.[59]

This address gave a clear account and evaluation of the way political power operated in Sydney. Meadows was an incisive advocate for his own ideology, while at the same time offering an important challenge to conservative evangelicals. The features he described are among those that led to Open Synod itself having so little impact and eventually morphing into what came to be known as Anglicans Together.

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[59] This summary and all quotations are taken from the paper circulated to Synod members by Open Synod with the invitation to an Open Synod Dinner held on 3 October 1986.

10.7 Political Parties under Robinson: The REPA Challenge

It has been noted that desire for change across the spectrum of diocesan activity began to build up during Loane's administration. Frustration at the slow pace increased under Robinson. Opposition to women's ordination and respect for Robinson kept a lid on this for a while, but the 're-marriage' issue and his seeming rigidity toward liturgical reform generated increasing frustration. Towards the end of Robinson's term, this pressure erupted in the emergence of the Reformed Evangelical Protestant Association (REPA). For about two years it was to shake the Diocese to the core, and more importantly, set in train changes which over the next decade were to alter significantly both the culture and direction of the Diocese. These developments were associated with the arrival of Phillip Jensen as a diocesan player in 1992. Before this, he had sought to shape Sydney Anglicanism outside the mechanisms of Synod.

Jensen's direct involvement began in early 1992 when he decided to go to Melbourne to see the Primate, Keith Rayner, to offer his assistance in resolving the developing crisis in the ACA over women's ordination. Jensen's visit to Melbourne achieved nothing. Rayner said he believed Sydney was more 'Anglican' than 'evangelical' and if women were ordained, he believed Sydney would settle down. This visit was followed almost immediately by the formation of the REPA. It started with an invitation from Jensen to Ballantine-Jones to talk about a 'revolution'. Ballantine-Jones signed up, as did 15 other rectors during the following weeks, with the first meeting at Christ Church Gladesville in February. Jensen chose rectors because they were not part of the diocesan leadership, had tenure in their parishes, and were influential through their reputations as effective parish ministers. In keeping with the revolutionary theme, they gave themselves the nick name 'colonels'. The meetings were private at first, but as plans were made, and a broad strategy developed, other clergy and laity were added. In the early stages, each colonel was assigned a list of rectors to recruit. By 20 March, there were 172 members, by 20 May, 551 (183 clergy and 368 lay). By September, more than 50 percent of Sydney clergy had joined. The membership fee was $50 and by year's end, a war chest of $21,797 had been raised. In May 1993, *REPACUSSIONS* announced that two thirds

189

of attending Sydney Anglicans had rectors who where in REPA.[60] This phenomenal growth is clear evidence of the frustration at the slow pace of change and that patience was running out.

The existence of REPA was not widely known until the Good Friday story in the *Sydney Morning Herald,* which falsely attributed calls for Sydney to secede from the ACA to REPA.[61] The alarm from that story forced REPA into the open earlier than intended and initially put it on the defensive. But the publicity gave REPA a chance to say what it really wanted to achieve, namely to change the Diocese from top to bottom and make it more effective for evangelism. To this end, discussion papers were produced, dozens of local think tanks were held across the Diocese and a newsletter, *REPACUSSIONS,* was published. There was widespread alarm across the Diocese, notably among the hierarchy. John Reid wrote in *Southern Cross* to the effect that it appeared to be 'a highly organised entity outside Synod'. He said it was 'very destabilising'. 'A partnership of clergy and laity within Synod is a better way to affect change'.[62] Phillip Jensen replied in the *Southern Cross*, saying:

> REPA was formed under the conviction that the problems facing our denomination spring from its departure from the reformed, evangelical and protestant theology upon which our church is based (as expressed in the 39 Articles and the *Book of Common Prayer*). This is seen in the dominance of liberal Catholicism in the wider Anglican Church of Australia, and in its influence within our own Diocese.
>
> ... By April and May [of 1992] we had clarified our goals when we produced a leaflet entitled The *Reforming Process*, in which we invited people to join our association. In that leaflet we said:
>
> This is not an organisation with a fixed agenda giving a panacea to the ailing church. We cannot know before the process what our common mind will be – this is the process, not the solution. But we do know this much:

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[60] *REPACUSSIONS* was the REPA newspaper.
[61] See page 98.
[62] *Southern Cross*, September, 1992.

190

- we want Jesus glorified by the prayerful preaching of the gospel for the salvation of his people and the nurture and growth of his people and church.

- we want the world to hear of the saving work of Christ.

- we want to work with each other within our congregations and with fellow congregations to bring about evangelism, church planting and growing Christians.

Much of the misrepresentation of REPA has stemmed from a failure to understand *the structure and process of* REPA. We are not a highly organised political party with a fixed, pre-determined agenda or reform. We are not a bureaucratic structure. In fact, we have no constitution and the barest minimum of office-bearers necessary to function.

... Our aim is to be a grass-roots reforming process. It is a dynamic concept involving participatory consultation at every step of the way.[63]

One tactic REPA adopted was to flood the business paper of the October Synod that year with notices of motions on the subjects it believed needed to be discussed as a precursor of policy and legislative change. For example *REPACUSSIONS* in September 1992 carried an article stating that REPA 'saw synodical government as a method of changing some aspects of the way which Sydney Anglicans work together in the proclamation of the gospel'.[64] The article gave the texts of 16 motions to be moved at the October Synod. Topics included seeking alternatives to parish assessments, alternative ways of housing parish clergy, a request for the appointment of a liturgical committee, an examination of the legality of General Synod assessments, opposition to a proposed canon requiring clergy to swear an oath to be bound by General Synod rules, the promotion of church planting across Australia, supporting a Willow Creek conference on reaching the unchurched, and motions in favour of lay and diaconal administration.

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[63] *Southern Cross*, October, 1992.
[64] *REPACUSSIONS,* No 1, September 1992.

With the election for a new archbishop coming up, there was speculation that REPA was a cover for Phillip Jensen running as a candidate. That was not the case. It had not occurred to him to do this when he first approached Ballantine-Jones. In fact he recalls that the first to raise the idea was Raema Ballantine-Jones immediately following the initial meeting between the Jensens and the Ballantine-Jones'. Moreover, leading up to the election there were two occasions that REPA leaders (with Jensen absent and Ballantine-Jones in the chair) discussed the matter and on both occasions it was rejected. In late 1992, a few REPA 'colonels', on their own initiative, decided to nominate him anyway. In those circumstances many decided to support Jensen, but others did not. In response to speculation about REPA's role, three REPA leaders, the Rev John Mason, of St Clement's Mosman, the Rev Vic Cole of Forestville and Robert Tong, wrote to REPA members noting that Jensen was not the only REPA leader to be nominated (Brian King was another), and that other REPA leaders had nominated other candidates. They said, 'It needs to be reiterated that REPA, first and foremost was and still is, a process. It is a process working at the grass roots of parish life, creating forums for discussion, fellowship and prayer, providing suggestions and promoting think tanks'.[65] Once the election process had begun, many REPA members fell in behind the Jensen nomination, but as will be seen, Jensen's candidature failed, mainly because of insufficient support among lay members of Synod who did not know him and who were generally less eager for radical change than were the clergy.

Goodhew's election was welcomed by REPA, even though it signalled to many a slower rate of change than Jensen might have encouraged. *REPACUSSIONS* carried a two page spread entitled 'And What Now?' reviewing Goodhew's pre-election activities, including his support of lay administration, regionalism, church growth and evangelistic strategies. The article concluded:

> He [Goodhew] moves into office with the weight of expectation for change upon
> him. Clearly not all of the proposals will fit comfortably in the climate for change,
> but overall they remain as valid now as when they were made and accepted in
> principle by Synod. Archbishop Goodhew will need all the help and prayer of the

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[65] Letter to REPA Members from John Mason, Vic Cole and Robert Tong, 23 March 1993.

Diocese to pull all these together to bring about the change the Synod and the Diocese have called for. [66]

Goodhew met with the REPA Steering Committee in May 1993. This meeting was reported by Robert Forsyth (another 'colonel') in the REPA publication *Gospel Truth*.[67] He quoted Goodhew as asking what it was REPA wanted to achieve and if the organisation was still needed. Forsyth said the committee replied that 'REPA continued to be a process of discussion, prayer and work for reform so that the Diocese [would] become more evangelical in heart, in practice and in structure'. Goodhew's approach to achieving change as stated at the meeting was explained by his use of a children's story: 'It was about the wind and the sun trying to get a man to take off his coat. When the wind blew in an effort to tear it off, the man held on more strongly. But when the sun shone brightly the man took it off himself'. Goodhew said, 'that is how to bring about change, not by forcing people'. Forsyth concluded, 'REPA Steering Committee is looking forward to seeing the whole REPA movement being part of the process of letting the sun shine'. The way REPA planned to do that was through its think tanks, discussion papers, occasional conferences and through promoting inquiries and resolutions in Synod. As will be seen in the next chapter, other events in Goodhew's administration overtook these early expressions of goodwill and the REPA agenda was pursued by individuals from a position of 'opposition' and not 'government', and over a longer time frame.

In 1994, developing conflicts in the Diocese and the beginnings of an ACL resurgence meant that REPA as an organisation petered out. A number of the original colonels sided with Goodhew (Brian King and Robert Forsyth were made bishops), others retired shortly after (John Baxter and Neil Prott), some left the ministry altogether (Jack Normand and Vic Cole). The rest worked hard at growing churches and increasing their involvement in diocesan affairs through ACL, to make ready for the day when change (under Goodhew or his successor) might become possible. REPA as an organisation blossomed and faded like the proverbial gourd giving shade to Jonah, but its influence was decisive in accelerating many of the changes in the Goodhew and Jensen administrations.

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[66] *REPACUSSIONS,* No3, May 1993.
[67] *Gospel Truth*, (REPA, Sydney, Winter, 1993).

10.8 Political Parties under Robinson: Anglicans Together

Apart from the formation of REPA, others (representing an amalgam of high church Anglicans, supporters of women's ordination and opponents of ACL) called a meeting at the Chapter House for 10 April 1992 to 'consider the present situation and the possible formation of an organisation ... to express the comprehensive character of the Anglican Tradition'.[68] The letter said that the invitation had been prompted by widespread uneasiness about the dominance of ACL. This, they said, had resulted in 'a failure to acknowledge the diverse views within the Diocese, which are not therefore reflected in Synod processes and elections'. The keynote speaker was Gerald Christmas, a prominent supporter of MOW and a former Chairman of ACL. He also had been the Registrar of the Diocese (1977-1990), but had been replaced by Bishop Donald Cameron.

Out of this meeting, a new political party was created called Anglicans Together. The Executive Committee included Gerald Christmas, the Rev David Davis, Michael Horsburgh, Colleen O'Reilly, the Rev Clive H Norton and the Rev Lance Johnstone. The Board of Reference included Canon Stuart Barton Babbage, Canon Lawrence Bartlett, the Rev Glenn Davies, Bruce Davies, Keith Mason and Rod West.

Over the years since its formation, Anglicans Together published regular newsletters, maintained a website, held occasional public meetings and dinners associated with meetings of Synod. Though they sometimes offered advice on elections, their one notable success was the election to Standing Committee of Associate Professor Michael Horsburgh, who made a significant contribution to debates there and at Synod. His imprint was left when he successfully moved to amend the election rules to no longer require a vote for *all* positions for it to be valid. He objected to having to vote for people he didn't support, just to fill up the numbers. This change may have assisted some candidates if the majority did not complete the

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[68] From the letter of invitation to Anglicans Together meeting toSynod members, 14 March 1992 signed by 26 supporters.

full list. Most Synod members, following ACL's advice, continued to vote for the full list so the change made little difference to the results.

Politically, Anglicans Together never seriously challenged the ACL ascendancy, although their votes assisted the Blue Ticket group which was to emerge in 1993 in opposition to the ACL.[69] From the conservative point of view, the value of Anglicans Together was that it reminded conservatives of the differences between them and the liberal catholic alternative, which generally stiffened support for ACL. They lacked leadership of the calibre of the central churchmen's groups prominent up to and including the Loane era.[70] They continue to the present time, though if ever ACL is seriously challenged, it will be by a liberal evangelical group like the Blue Ticket, with them adding support.

10.9 Robinson's Men

Robinson retained the services of Reid, Cameron and Short for most of his term. He moved Short from Wollongong to Parramatta and made Archdeacon Harry Goodhew Bishop of Wollongong, the last archdeacon to be elevated to the episcopate. He consecrated as Bishop of North Sydney Paul Barnett to replace Donald Cameron, who became Registrar and his assistant. He made Peter Watson Bishop of Parramatta in place of Short, who became Dean of the Cathedral. Barnett was both an academic and an experienced parish man, being a MTC faculty member, Rector of St Barnabas Broadway and the important Holy Trinity Church in Adelaide. He also had served as part-time Director of the Inner City Committee under Loane and was Master of Robert Menzies College at Macquarie University. Watson had served in a number of parishes and had been part-time Director of the New Housing Areas Committee under Loane. He succeeded Donald Cameron as Chairman of GAB and SDS and later became Archbishop of Melbourne. Barnett and Watson would have been high on any list of qualified ministers to be made bishops at that time. Notwithstanding their merits, they did not exercise the same influence in the central

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[69] See page 205.
[70] Notable among these were Canon Bill Siddens, Canon Charles Gilhespy, Archdeacon Clive Goodwin, the Rev Ken Le'Huray, Canon Bill Rook, the Rev Roy Wotton, Canon Charles Sherlock, Mr Stacy Atkin, Justice Norman Jenkyn.

administration as Dain, Reid and Donald Cameron did, nor did they dominate Synod debates as did the bishops in Loane's term. In that sense, the Robinson team did not match the team under Loane. Apart from Goodhew, there was no real leadership towards reform, as the frustration that spawned REPA shows.

10.10 Conclusion

The subject of this thesis is the changes in policy and practices in Sydney Diocese and the role of politics in them. The Robinson years saw the pressures for change build up in the face of Robinson's no change disposition. Leadership was passing to the generation of clergy who were trained by D B Knox. The bruising struggles over women's ordination and the growing influence of Phillip Jensen, combined to ignite the fire that was REPA and the reaction to it that was Anglicans Together. In the middle were Paul Barnett and Harry Goodhew. Reid was a spent force and Jensen too radical and unknown to many of the laity. When Goodhew was elected it seemed that the Diocese would return to a period of relative tranquillity. Such was not to be.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE GOODHEW YEARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

11.1 Introduction

Following the tempestuous events of 1992, Sydney was divided and unsettled. Frustration at the lack of change under Robinson had exploded in the form of REPA. The laity however was suspicious and not yet ready to commit to a radical makeover of Anglicanism. Goodhew's election was a yearning for quieter times. Yet it was during the administration of this widely respected man that possibly the most bitter and divisive political conflicts ever in the Diocese took place. Why was this so? The underlying issues were questions of change and power: what change, what rate of change and how it could be accomplished? Concerning power: where was ultimate authority, the Synod or the Archbishop? For Goodhew, Anglicanism involved acceptance of received polity and processes and he wanted to preserve the best of the past while allowing incremental change within those parameters. The events of this period, and the early part of Jensen's term were well described in *The Chosen Ones*.[1]

11.2 Election of Harry Goodhew

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[1] Chris McGillion, *The Chosen Ones: The Politics of Salvation in the Anglican Church,* (Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005). Ballantine-Jones was interviewed by McGillion, and after Peter Jensen, is the most quoted participant in the book. That aside, *The Chosen Ones* makes one of the most valuable contributions to understanding contemporary events in Sydney Diocese ever written. Ballantine-Jones wrote the major review in the *Southern Cross* in March 2005 and after twelve years sees no need to change his generally favourable assessment. McGillion describes his book as both 'description' and 'interpretation'. On the whole, the descriptive parts are thorough and well researched. There are occasional mistakes such as the claim that Sydney planted churches outside the Diocese. That is not true. Some Sydney Anglicans, acting in a private capacity planted churches, but the Diocese itself never moved in that direction. He fairly represents the views of participants and gives sufficient information to allow the reader to weigh up for themselves what to make of them. One cannot ask more than that of a book written by an outsider dealing with such controversial matters.

When an archbishop's election is in the offing there is always an air of instability not unlike the lead up to the election of the President of the United States. Supporters of prospective candidates meet to plan their campaigns and position their favourite as *the* man of the hour. What was different about Goodhew's election was - the times. The events of 1992 had created widespread concern that the Church was facing a crisis. Many Sydney Anglicans wanted a return to quieter times. Others (impatient with the status quo) looked to Phillip Jensen and REPA.

The issue of rapid and radical change or slower evolutionary change was the sub-set of pre-election publicity and later the debates on the Synod floor. For example, the five Sydney bishops, including three of the candidates, wrote to Synod members expressing concern that the election process and the events leading up it might leave the Diocese divided or damaged. 'We are conscious of the high level of anxiety at present amongst many church people'. They called for prayer, '... so that we will know his [God's] mind and that we remain a united people'.[2] They announced a number of prayer meetings across the Diocese for 6 March. Many saw this letter as a not too subtle message that unity was the main issue and that *they* represented the forces of moderation in contrast to Phillip Jensen. Calling for prayer is always a good thing but sometimes the context can make it a political action as well. In any case, ACL (which played no role in the election campaign, since three of the four main candidates were ACL members) had organised 18 prayer meetings across the Diocese for March 4, to be led by supporters of all four front-runners.

The *SMH* ran a feature article with the heading 'War in the Cloisters', describing Jensen as 'a controversial radical conservative' and the others as the 'establishment or 'old guard' Anglican clergy.[3] It said that without Jensen's involvement, the election would be a choice among men whose views were not radically different. Of greater interest are the comments of the candidates themselves. John Reid said that he strongly opposed breakaway movements. 'If you break away from the rest of the church – I regret to say there is pressure in this Diocese by people to do that - there

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[2] Letter on diocesan letterhead sent to all Synod members, 12 February 1992, signed by J R Reid, P W Watson, R H Goodhew, P W Barnett and E D Cameron in possession of Ballantine-Jones.
[3] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 March 1993.

would be terrible infighting'.[4] No one was advocating that, but the context left no doubt that he was against such a thing, the implication was that a vote for Reid would be a vote for safety and against extremism.

Paul Barnett said it was a matter of regret that the election had been pre-empted 'by the intense repeated lobbying of Synod's representatives for one candidate'. He continued: 'There [is] a great need to restore unity and a sense of security and stability among church people in the wake of last year's events ...'[5] The implication being, a vote for Barnett would be a vote for unity and stability. In addition, he said an archbishop should not step back into the 'labyrinth of administration and become invisible, but should use the mediums like television as often as possible to make himself more accessible to the people'.[6]

Goodhew said he was strongly committed to unity in the church, brought about through tolerance: 'It is beholden on everybody to find reasonable ways to operate together'. He said the church must get on with the job of boosting church numbers and of being relevant to those 'who do not conform to a narrow line'. The implication being, a vote for Goodhew is a vote for tolerance and boosting church numbers.[7] There were no direct comments by Jensen except to deny that REPA was a 'clerical plot'.

Another factor was the ages of the candidates. Reid was 64, Goodhew was 62, Barnett was 58 and Jensen was 48. Was Jensen too young? Were Reid and Goodhew too old? The Jensen supporters put out a paper which showed that the average age on appointment of the nine previous archbishops was 51 years. All had served for more than 15 years except two who had resigned (Barry and Gough).[8] Comparisons were given of recent and current archbishops in the ACA on election.[9] The implication was that Jensen was closest to the average and that some of the other candidates might be too old.

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Information for this was attributed by the authors to *Sydney Anglicans*.
[9] Carnley 44, Rayner 45, Penman 48, Hollingsworth 55, George 57.

As the election drew near, supporters of all major candidates circulated their promotional material. But it was the behind the scenes work that told the real story. This was seen in the way they had worked to garner numbers to nominate and second their nominee. Jensen had 136; Reid 56, Goodhew 48 and Barnett 18. Barnett's number was indicative of the split in the conservative ranks. Among Barnett supporters were John Chapman, Professor Chris Bellenger, Professor Edwin Judge, John Mason and Boak Jobbins (both REPA colonels). Goodhew supporters included Trevor Edwards, Paul Perini, Lindsay Stoddart (all made archdeacons by Goodhew), the Rev Stephen Gabbott, Stuart Piggin, Peter Kell and Stephen Judd (all laymen). Reid supporters included Silas Horton, Warwick Olson, Archdeacons Brian Richardson, Alan Donohoo and Geoff Huard. Jensen's supporters included John Woodhouse, Bruce Hall, Bruce Ballantine-Jones and Jim Ramsay. Some nominated more than one candidate, for example, Neil Cameron nominated both Jensen and Barnett.

When Synod assembled, Bishop Donald Cameron was the President, even though Reid, being the senior bishop, was the Administrator of the Diocese. This was because the rules had been changed to prevent the Administrator (if he was a candidate) from giving the presidential address as Loane had done in 1966. Nevertheless at the point when Cameron was expected to give the address, he called on Reid to speak. Jensen supporters did not want to appear to be interfering in a way that could be prejudicial to his chances, so they did not challenge this. Delivering an address at this point could give a candidate an advantage over his rivals, so it is doubtful that Goodhew or Barnett was happy about it either.[10] Resentment at this manoeuvre probably took away its advantage anyway. Another procedure Cameron adopted was to ask anyone wanting to speak in the debate to write their name on a piece of paper and hand it in and *he* [Cameron] would choose from among those whom he would call to speak. The standing orders provided for speakers to stand in their place to receive the call, allowing Synod members to see who wanted to speak for each candidate. Again, because Jensen supporters had organised more speakers than the others, this was seen to prejudice their man's

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[10] In subsequent amendments to the Ordinance, this action was specifically prohibited.

chances but no objection was made because they did not want to bring the wrath of Synod on them for challenging the Chair.

On the first night of the process, candidates are eliminated if they cannot get a majority in *either* house (clergy or lay). Reid, Barnett, Goodhew and Jensen made it through, but Jensen's vote signalled his problem with the laity, 192-264. Reid's vote among the clergy was also tenuous, 144-122. On the second night, a name has to get a majority in *both* houses to go on to the Final List. Goodhew and Barnett went through comfortably. Jensen failed in both houses, and Reid failed in the House of Clergy.[11]

On the final night (and before the debate on who should be Archbishop began) there was another vote to see if Synod wanted to reconsider Jensen and Reid for the Final List. Neither attracted the required numbers and were eliminated. The final vote for Goodhew was 267 and Barnett 203 among the laity. The clergy vote was 137-122 for Goodhew.

It is speculation (but likely) that had Jensen supporters organised better to transfer their votes to Barnett, he might have won among the clergy but unlikely among the laity. Reid and Jensen were probably preferred by more people as their first choice, but Goodhew's record as a strong supporter of church growth strategies meant he was thought the most likely to lead Sydney into a more tranquil period and with a steady eye on the need for change. Jensen was thought to be too radical for the time, especially among the laity. As events turned out, tranquillity and slow change were not the outcome, as this and the next chapter will show.

11.3 Goodhew Tackles Regionalisation

As already noted, Sydney was not in favour of sub-division. The question then was: what to do next? Reid had moved that Standing Committee bring to the 1992 Synod proposals on how the principle of regionalism could be further extended within the *one* Diocese. Standing Committee appointed a committee which included a mixture

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[11] See *1994 Sydney Year Book*, 267-269 for the complete voting figures.

of stakeholders, technical experts and people of various viewpoints.[12] Goodhew was Chairman. Discussion on its report in 1992 (which was Robinson's last Synod) was deferred so that people could make submissions by 31 March 1993.[13] Goodhew became Archbishop that year, meaning his views became critical to any ultimate outcome. The report focused on having strong viable congregations and strong local area and regional orientation. It affirmed the importance of positive leadership (from the regional bishop), especially with regard for the pastoral care of clergy, their families and the churches. The matter was deferred again in 1993 pending more feedback. At the 1994 Synod, Goodhew said that because he had recently finalised his episcopal and archidiaconal appointments and had created a fifth region, these arrangements needed time to settle in so further consideration of the committee's report and draft ordinances should be deferred pending more feedback.[14] So it was that after 20 years of inquiries, attempts at sub-division, partial regionalisation, massive political power plays and the failure of two archbishops to get their way, the scene was set for the final decision in 1995. In his 1995 address, Goodhew summarised why sub-division had not been supported.[15] He concluded, 'Since we have resolved to remain one diocese, we must do what we can to overcome the difficulties entailed in that decision'.[16]

The regional model agreed to that year involved re-constituting Standing Committee to include four clergy and eight laypeople elected by the whole Synod (known as the 'core') and two clergy and four lay members elected by Synod members from within each of the five regions. Regional bishops and archdeacons were ex-officio members but archdeacons no longer had a vote, except in the absence of their regional bishop. The regional councils were elected on an area deanery basis. Most importantly, Synod grants were to be distributed through the regional councils, meaning that the Inner City Committee, HMS's Parish Support and Development and

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[12] Ballantine-Jones was appointed to this committee.
[13] *1993 Sydney Year Book,* 284.
[14] *1995 Sydney Year Book,* 296-297.
[15] *1996 Sydney Year Book*, 317. He said theological concerns centred on the fear that the new dioceses would inevitably lose their evangelical character. There was a desire for one training college and easy clergy mobility within one diocese rather than three. Financial considerations centred on better management being available in an undivided Sydney. Lack of a large central endowment and other funds was of concern to both outer regions.
[16] Ibid, 317-318.

the other local operation were wound up.[17] Goodhew's new region was called the Georges River Region and was carved out of parts of the South Sydney and the Wollongong Regions. North Sydney lost some of its area to the Parramatta Region and to South Sydney.[18] Regionalism as a contentious issue disappeared, aided by the plentiful supply of funding from the DE. Sub-division never returned as an active question.

Though this process was long and sometimes painful, the outcome owed much to Goodhew's involvement as a regional bishop, his patience as Archbishop, a co-operative Standing Committee following the elections of 1993, and most important, strong local support. Fundamentally, regionalisation was a political necessity given the frustration many felt over the size of the Diocese and the feeling of remoteness. It certainly exemplified the value for co-operation between parishes, organisations, Synod and Archbishop, posited in the working hypothesis (see Chapter One, section 2).

In relation to the question, how did Sydney change and what role did politics play, the proposal to sub-divide was a change that certainly aroused intense political action. Loane, the most influential of all the Archbishops of the period, was not able to pull it off, neither was Robinson. Why? On the face of it, high level political action, the bottom up power base in the parishes, the strength of the large diocesan organisations, and the competition for power between Synod and Archbishop were the key factors. All combined to defeat the views of two archbishops and secure a level of decentralisation that not only altered the power base of Standing Committee but gave local Anglicans an opportunity to participate in diocesan affairs, albeit of a minor kind. This would support the working hypothesis outlined in Chapter One.

11.4 The 'Holy Wars'

Regionalisation aside, other matters in Goodhew's term created massive division. They were about concerns over some of his appointments, deep feelings over what

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[17] This was the Marrickville Area Deanery Committee, MADCOM.
[18] See the relevant report and ordinances in the *1995 Sydney Year Book,* 532-559.

became known as the 'Pymble Matter', Goodhew's support for a rapprochement with the ACA, his apparent about face on lay administration and the fallout from a deal at the 1995 General Synod over *A Prayer Book for Australia (APBA).* Ongoing tensions over an apparent softening of opposition to women's ordination also ran through his term. From the perspective of Goodhew's supporters, the major issues were the unrelenting challenge to Goodhew's authority as Archbishop, especially over some of his appointments, inappropriate interference in the Pymble Matter, and his concern that opposition to women's ordination would deny women legitimate career opportunities and would reduce opportunities for evangelism.

The first real crisis came when Goodhew nominated the Rev Peter Kemp as Bishop of Parramatta. Kemp had been a member of Standing Committee for some years, but without making any significant contribution to its debates.[19] He would turn 65 just before Goodhew retired, which meant he could make another appointment to serve under his successor. Given the normal speculation, there was a suspicion among some on Standing Committee that Kemp *was* likely to be nominated, and so just before the relevant meeting, Neil Cameron raised a question concerning what majorities and quorums were required for a valid nomination to occur. That was a not too subtle signal that if an unacceptable name was offered, it could be blocked. The answer was that three quarters of each house present *and voting* was required, which meant if enough members abstained, the nomination could not pass. That happened and Kemp was not appointed. Understandably, Goodhew was very upset.

Other appointments followed, the Rev Reg Piper of Holy Trinity Adelaide as Bishop of Wollongong, the Rev Ray Smith from Canberra-Goulburn as Bishop of the newly created George's River Region, and the Rev Brian King from Manly as Bishop of Parramatta. All were good parish ministers, but none had any experience in the labyrinthine processes of central diocesan administration. Their nominations were supported, but they were not seen as strong appointments. It was widely believed that the untested character of Goodhew's leadership team, and their reluctance to engage politically, was a major reason why Goodhew's episcopate struggled to gain

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[19] *The Chosen Ones.* 21-22, quoting Robert Tong, 'In the three years [Kemp] was on the Standing Committee, I don't recall one speech [he gave]. So I voted against him. I could not support the name for a regional bishop where I've not heard him make any contribution on policy or any other matter on the Standing Committee'.

confidence. Goodhew seemed to acknowledge this, telling McGillion, 'I may have forfeited some fire power in the Standing Committee with the choices I made'.[20]

11.5 The 'Blue Ticket' Challenge to ACL in 1993

The major reaction to difficulties over appointments was the emergence in late 1993 of a rival political group to ACL called the *Blue Ticket,* so called because of the colour of its how to vote ticket. Essentially, it was made up of Goodhew friends and allies. Rumours that the ACL was planning to drop key Goodhew supporters from its ticket at the 1993 elections was the trigger for this challenge. It is true that some ACL council members did want to do this, but Ballantine-Jones and others persuaded the Council against it as it would be seen as an anti-Goodhew action and likely to incite organised opposition. Word leaked out and understandably, those affected took steps to shore up their positions. The timing of the triennial elections coincided with Goodhew's honeymoon period, the fallout of the events of 1992, the emergence of REPA and inattention to basic political realities by ACL. As a result, pro-Goodhew supporters put out their own ticket, successfully targeting key ACL figures such as the President, Vic Cole, Laurie Scandrett, and Bruce Ballantine-Jones. In the volatile atmosphere of those times the Blue Ticket won enough seats (when combined with other non-ACL and ex-officio members) to control the Standing Committee for the next three years.

At Goodhew's first Synod in 1993, he outlined the agenda for his term. He said the Diocese should set attainable objectives and build on recent research into the nature of the community across geographical and socio-economic categories. He called for experimentation and diocesan wide cooperation. He said the object of the Diocese should be to 'subsidise mission rather than maintenance'. He proposed a broad strategy for growth involving prayer, fresh approaches to ministry and service, based on understanding the community, making the regions work, wide consultation, strategies and planning, working together to implement effective teaching and outreach. He wanted to continue restructuring property and parishes, increase the number of living agents for the gospel and ensure that these new initiatives had the

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[20] Ibid, 22.

full cooperation and financial resources of the central organisations.[21] This looked like the change agenda Sydney had been waiting for.

The problem with this programme was not so much its content, but the political environment following the emergence of other major policy differences and the Blue Ticket challenge. What Goodhew needed for his programme to take hold was the willing cooperation of the diocesan heartland, key leadership blocs, and a clearly worked out organisational structure to turn good intentions into actual outcomes. The developing political conflicts were to deny him those necessary elements.

11.6 The ACL Begins its Recovery

In 1994, there were two significant political issues: the beginning of the ACL fight-back following the reversals of 1993 and the Pymble matter.

The ACL recovery began after Ballantine-Jones returned from overseas in mid 1994. He had come to the conclusion that the key to the revival of conservative influence was the rebuilding of ACL as a disciplined and efficient organisation to represent mainstream Sydney evangelicalism. He told ACL leaders that either he took over the ACL leadership and did it properly or he would withdraw from diocesan affairs completely. They readily agreed and at the ACL Annual Meeting in July he became President, and close ally Robert Tong became Chairman.[22] This was the beginning of an intense programme of reform involving not only new management structures but new ACL policies to better express the aspirations of the mid 1990s. This led to a new motto: 'Defending Gospel Truth, Advancing Gospel Growth'.

Among the initial changes to ACL was the creation of a new category of leadership to provide for senior but busy members to be recognised as Emeritus Vice-Presidents. Included in this category were Goodhew himself, Bishops Barnett, Smith, Piper and long time supporter Dudley Foord. Others were Vic Roberts and Phillip Jensen. On the Council proper were Peter Jensen, John Woodhouse and the

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[21] *1994 Sydney Year Book*, 300-324.
[22] In the ACL Constitution, the position of Chairman is effectively second in command to the President. Ballantine-Jones' nomination was moved by Peter Jensen.

immediate Past President, Vic Cole.[23] Next there was a radical overhaul of the ACL management structure. This included (in addition to the monthly council meetings), an executive to meet between council meetings to implement council decisions and develop new initiatives. The central element of these was the creation of task forces to work on publicity, theological discussion papers, membership recruitment, membership services and finding possible candidates for casual vacancies to be filled by Standing Committee. Over time, other task forces were added, such as regional chapters, women's affairs, central and regional conferences and the annual Synod dinner. These task forces included non-council members to broaden membership involvement.

11.7 The Pymble Matter

New archbishops (like new rectors) come with a store of goodwill which allows a high degree of tolerance in their early period. A three year moratorium on debate about women's ordination meant that that issue was not a major factor. Goodhew's initiatives on regionalisation were generally welcomed. The creation of a Standing Committee executive board (DEB) and its domination by Goodhew supporters was of concern at the Standing Committee level but not beyond. These were positives for Goodhew. The developing issue (and one that was to do him considerable damage) was the Pymble matter. This was a dispute between the newly appointed Rector of St Swithun's Pymble, David Gilmour, and a number of parishioners, over his style of leadership, which they found unacceptable. They wanted him out. Their complaints led to charges under the Tribunal Ordinance 1962 in November 1993.[24] While these were being heard, Goodhew initiated another action under the little used Inefficiency and Incapacity Ordinance 1906 (I & I Ordinance) in December 1993.[25]

The definitions of 'inefficiency' and 'incapacity' were hotly contested. Hitherto, it had been assumed that they applied to ill health or mental deficiency. Legal advice to Goodhew was that it included relationship breakdowns in a parish, rendering the

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[23] The full list of office holders is always published on the ACL letterhead and in letters to Synod members, to counter allegations ACL is a secret society.
[24] *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations,* 2005 Edition, 414.
[25] The full text of this ordinance may be found in the records of the Select Committee in the Sydney Diocesan Archives.

minister *incapable* of functioning effectively. The Tribunal Ordinance procedure (which investigates offences a clergyman might be guilty of) found there was no case to answer and it lapsed. Meanwhile the Inquiry Committee established under the I & I Ordinance found that there *was* a prima facie case according to the wider definition given to Goodhew. This meant that the matter could go to the decisive stage involving Goodhew appointing three commissioners (including a senior serving judge) to hear the case. Gilmour objected to the proceedings on the grounds of contested interpretations and declined to appear. After taking evidence, the Commission in September 1994 recommended that Gilmour should be dismissed and in December 1994, Goodhew revoked Gilmour's licence as Rector of Pymble.[26]

Goodhew explained his position to the Synod in 1994:

> I have a responsibility for all the churches, all the people, all the clergy of the Diocese, for the flock of Christ, all of it. Clergy and laity alike and I did not believe that I could responsibly walk away from a situation and leave it acrimoniously to bleed to a shadow of its former self, in full view of the public eye ... I therefore took what appeared to me to be a gospel directed ordinance sanctioned approach.[27]

On the question of tenure, he said, '[this action] does not threaten clergy tenure. It poses the question of ministerial capacity of a particular clergyman, in a particular situation, at a particular time'. On the process, he said, 'The inquiry into this question [incapacity] must, from any reasonable perspective, be considered to be weighted in favour of the clergyman. At both stages, Committee of Inquiry and Commission there is a 2 to 1 majority of clergy to laity'.

The dispute aroused widespread alarm across the Diocese, including one protest meeting of more than 100 rectors. At the 1994 Synod, Goodhew asked that the matter not be discussed at that session because processes under the ordinance were not yet complete. Notwithstanding this request, over 20 questions were placed

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[26] Under the I & I Ordinance, there was an opportunity for the minister in question to stop the process by calling for the matter to be referred to the Diocesan Tribunal. Gilmour was aware of this, but declined to take advantage of it.

[27] *1995 Sydney Year Book,* 310-316.

on notice, three personal explanations were given (one by Gilmour himself), and most significant of all (and at the instigation of Ballantine-Jones), a Select Committee to investigate the whole question was appointed.[28]

The Select Committee met for three years and as a result of its deliberations new procedures were created, leading eventually to the Ordinance I & I itself being repealed. The cost of the Pymble Matter was revealed to be $266,313 in cash, but with the cost of SDS staff and other resources added, the estimated cost to the Diocese was around $500,000.[29] The cost to Gilmour and his family was devastating, especially because throughout the whole affair, he was nursing his terminally ill wife, who died not long after his dismissal. The cost to Goodhew's personal standing in the Diocese and among the clergy was considerable. Beyond these, the dispute raised major issues of principle: the balance of power between clergy and laity in the parish, the relationship between the Archbishop and his clergy, and the roles of the Archbishop and the Synod in dealing with such disputes and ultimately, the tenure of clergy.

The Select Committee appointed in 1994 was not required to form a judgement on the merits of the original complaints, but its report in 1997 expressed the view that the use of the I & I Ordinance was inappropriate for pastoral problems.[30] It said that it was unfair for two ordinances to have been in operation at the same time. As to the meaning of *inefficiency and incapacity*, the Committee said the Synod should be given the opportunity to decide once and for all which definition it wanted. On the question of the efficiency and suitability of a minister, the Committee said the Diocese should follow the General Synod lead and deal with it under a separate disputes resolution procedure. The report included a draft ordinance to this effect. Further, it proposed a wider inquiry into the general question of clerical tenure and recommended that the I & I Ordinance be repealed and replaced with one that defined *incapacity* to exclude the wider interpretation Goodhew had used. It noted the cost, the breakdown of relationships and the adverse media publicity. It said that

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[28] Ibid, 334. For a summary of questions asked on notice, see 319. For answers and texts of personal explanations by Gilmour, Ken Handley and Davis Lloyd, Pymble Synod Representative, see Synod Minute Book, 1994, Diocesan Archives.

[29] *1998 Sydney Year Book*, 386-398. The figure of $500,000 was given verbally to the Committee by Ken Bowden, officer of the SDS servicing the Committee.

[30] *1998 Sydney Year Book*, 386-398.

mediation would have been preferable. One could not say the Committee in any way endorsed the use of the I & I Ordinance in the Pymble case and was thus a subtle way of saying that it did not approve of its use at all.

Following the tabling of the report, a committee on clerical tenure was established which reported in 1999 with recommendations and draft ordinances.[31] Various other ordinances were introduced from 1998, but were mostly deferred pending the adoption of the General Synod's Bishop (Incapacity) Canon 1995 in 1999. This procedure enshrined the narrow definition of incapacity. The upshot of the whole matter was that the Parish Disputes Ordinance was passed in 1999, and in 2001, the Parish Relationships Ordinance was passed. This ordinance also repealed the I & I Ordinance.[32] Both ordinances had safeguards to protect the rights of affected parties.

Ultimately the action against Gilmour rested on the interpretation of the words *inefficiency and incapacity.* Justices Handley and Young in a written opinion to the Inquiry Committee, and after reviewing the historical material available to them, said, 'There is no need to repeat all the historical material. We would however express the opinion that it does not support a firm conclusion that "the Church" intended the general words of the 20th Constitution [*Anglican Church of Australia Constitutions Act 1902*], to have a restricted meaning'.[33] They later said, 'the natural effect of their omission [the words *by reason of mental or bodily infirmity*] was to bring all cases on incapacity of whatever kind and however caused within the proposed new Constitution'.[34]

The other view was expressed by Peter Jensen (then Principal of MTC), supported by Professor Kenneth Cable. Jensen argued that a detailed examination of the historical data did *not* support the wider interpretation. He said that the omission of *inefficiency and incapacity*, based on the historical data, is better understood as a

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[31] *2000 Sydney Year Book,* 447-461.
[32] Parish Disputes Ordinance1999*, 2000 Sydney Year Book*, 606-617. Parish Relationships Ordinance 2001, *2002 Sydney Year Book,* 546-554.
[33] Copies of advice to the Inquiry Committee by Handley and Young, and Peter Jensen were supplied to the Select Committee and may be found in the Sydney Archives.
[34] Ibid.

non controversial abbreviation. He quoted from a *Sydney Morning Herald* report of the Synod speech on 27 September 1906 where the mover, J A I Perry, described it as 'a mild and inoffensive ordinance'. Jensen says it 'passed without discernible controversy'. Jensen concluded:

> When the Synod in 1906 passed the Incapacity and Inefficiency Ordinance it was aware of the restricted meaning of the words. The title of its Ordinance came from the wording of the 1902 Constitutions and can be traced back to its own concern for the mental or bodily infirmity of some clergy 'in the discharge of ministerial duty' ... Members of Synod were aware through questions raised and answered in that very Synod that the alienation of clergy from people in a parish could not be dealt with in terms of the licence of a clergyman without parliamentary legislation. Nor was it suggested that the new ordinance could be used for that purpose. In the atmosphere of suspicion in some parishes aroused by innovations of ritual and practice, any move to limit tenure under incapacity and inefficiency would have been treated with grave disquiet.[35]

The *Sydney Morning Herald,* in an editorial on 10 December 1994, noted that Gilmour's morals or ethics had never been questioned. Commenting on the changing nature of modern ministry, it said that Gilmour's management style may have exacerbated the dispute. 'It also may have been aggravated by the nature of a congregation of St Swithun's – many of whom are used to wielding influence in wider Church affairs and business and commerce'. On the question of Gilmour going to the secular courts, it said, 'The Anglican Church cannot complain about the intrusion of secular law into church affairs if there is doubt that natural justice has been denied to Mr Gilmour'.[36]

Opposition to Goodhew's action expressed itself in what could reasonably be called *high level* political action. Against the question, 'how did the Diocese change and what part did politics play'*,* the Pymble matter is an example of change in the assumptions about the meaning of inefficiency and incapacity, as it applied in that ordinance, leading to its repeal and its replacement with new procedures which distributed power *away* from the Archbishop and *to* the Synod. Into that situation

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[35] Ibid.
[36] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 1994.

came reactions that were highly political. For example, lobbying the head of an organisation (an archbishop) in favour of one side over the other is as political as lobbying the Prime Minister. Charging someone with what turned out to be unsubstantiated accusations and then attempting to withdraw them when another action was commenced was political. Pressing opinions on a committee to influence their decision was political, as was the production of alternative opinions. Control of the information flow was a form of political action, as were attempts to discourage debate. The use of standing orders (by opponents of the action) to ask questions in Synod was political. So also was the move to set up a select committee. The formulation of proposals by the Select Committee was by definition, political, especially when it involved the re-distribution of power away from the Archbishop back to the Synod. The production of propaganda and the staging of a protest meeting were also political.

These political actions aside, at the heart of the Pymble matter was the right of the Archbishop to remove a rector from his position because of a breakdown in relations with some parishioners who could not work with him. The safeguards of ministerial independence had been overturned by a novel interpretation of a little used ordinance which was assumed to relate to matters of mental or physical incapacity. It was a very unpopular decision among clergy. That the legislation used in this case was rescinded immediately after Goodhew retired and replaced by new procedures under the control of Synod is evidence of Synod's insistence on preserving its right to decide the grounds that rectors might be removed from their office. Sydney was thus re-defining downwards the role of the Archbishop.

11.8 The Blue Ticket Flexes its Muscles

An ongoing concern going back to Loane's time was the sense that the central administration was growing so powerful that Synod and the parishes were losing control. This 'centralism' found expression in the expansion in the size and influence of the hierarchy and the growing power of Standing Committee. In 1995, Ballantine-

Jones published an article entitled 'Centralism: Real or Imagined'.[37] In addition to the trend outlined above, he nominated the recently established DEB and the Pymble matter as examples of growing centralism. On the role of Standing Committee, he said that the volume of business and the need for specialised knowledge had led to greater referrals to sub-committees. He said 'the chain from the parishes to Synod to Standing Committee to sub-committees was getting longer'.[38] The question was posed, 'Is this a good thing?' He called for more power to the regions and for a serious debate on the relative merits of centralism verses decentralisation.

Goodhew invited Ballantine-Jones for a discussion on this whole question. It was a friendly and valuable opportunity for both to re-connect. It was agreed that Ballantine-Jones should put down a summary of their discussion. However within a few days a major rift between ACL and the Blue Ticket broke out over who should fill a casual vacancy on General Synod. Notice had been given of Ballantine-Jones' nomination. Archdeacon Lindsay Stoddart, a close ally of Harry Goodhew's and a key member of the Blue Ticket group, nominated the Rev Glenn Davies. Davies had been told by Stoddart that the Archbishop wanted him to stand, but was not told he would be nominated in opposition to Ballantine-Jones. During the debate [at Standing Committee] members associated with the Blue Ticket spoke against Ballantine-Jones' nomination, some reportedly making personal and derogatory remarks. In the event, Davies was elected, 21-19.

Whether they realised it or not, this was an attack, not only on Ballantine-Jones personally, but on the ACL as well. In effect it was a power play in the complex tangle of Sydney politics with a view to consolidating a new balance of power. It was widely believed in ACL circles that this could not have happened without the support (or at least acquiescence) of Goodhew. That this could be so was particularly surprising to Ballantine-Jones because of the very amicable discussion just days before. When he heard what had been said about him at Standing Committee, he faxed Goodhew saying that in the light of the opinions allowed by Goodhew to be expressed, he did not think it appropriate to write further on the matters they had recently discussed. Goodhew rang him immediately and there was a very frank and

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[37] *ACL NEWS*, March, 2009.
[38] Ibid.

at times painful conversation about this and other contentious matters. In many ways this conversation was a watershed in setting out the simmering issues that were to develop into what McGillion called the *Holy Wars*.[39]

When word of the Stoddart tactic filtered out, there was dismay among conservatives. One letter to Ballantine-Jones came from John Chapman. He said, 'I picnicked with the Jensen brothers and families on ANZAC Day. They told me that the Standing Committee failed to elect you to General Synod. I am writing to say that the judgement is on them [Standing Committee] for this. I am so sorry. Your debating skills are very great and as a champion of evangelical truth you are second to none ...'[40] One does not have to agree with his sentiments about Ballantine-Jones to see how the actions of the Blue Ticket were being received. Glenn Davies himself was embarrassed and appalled. He wrote to the Standing Committee in the following terms:

> I am writing to inform you that I wish to resign my position as a clerical representative on General Synod. I apologise for the inconvenience that this resignation may cause as my election was only confirmed last week. However, as I was under the impression that it was an uncontested election, it was for this reason that I allowed my name to go forward. Had I known that I was standing against the Rev Bruce Ballantine-Jones, I would not have allowed my name to be nominated.[41]

That should have been the end of the matter, given Davies' resignation and the known sense of outrage. Ballantine-Jones supporters expected that he would have been re-nominated, unopposed, at least by the Blue Ticket. Instead Stoddart indicated to Laurie Scandrett on the 12 May that he would be opposed again. This was seen as a sign that the Blue Ticket was determined to press their campaign against the ACL. On 14 May, Ballantine-Jones spoke to Stoddart, who denied that it was an 'anti BBJ move'.[42] Stoddart described his group as the 'Bishop's Party' (understood to mean the Goodhew Party) and said he wanted to meet with him. That meeting took place at Ballantine-Jones' private home at Stanwell Park on 22 May,

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[39] *The Chosen Ones,* McGillion, 3.
[40] Chapman is deceased, but he gave verbal permission for his letter to be quoted shortly before his death.
[41] Standing Committee Agenda Papers, 22 May 1995.
[42] These and following observations were taken from contemporaneous notes.

the day of the next Standing Committee meeting. Ballantine-Jones said that to persist in this would be divisive, given his position on the ACL and with significant support in the Diocese. It also would create an atmosphere of open war which would damage Goodhew's episcopate. He suggested to Stoddart that if he *was* going to nominate someone, he should run himself. He did, but Ballantine-Jones was elected. In a meeting with Ballantine-Jones on 30 May, Goodhew said that he had been asked about Glenn Davies being nominated and said okay, but had not thought through the implications

This incident (petty in itself) highlights the personal dimension of the conflicts of those times and brought into the open frustrations that had been building up since the 1993 Synod. At least Goodhew knew that the ramifications of the Blue Ticket's actions were likely to be significant and it gave him the opportunity to take any action he wanted to in order to hose things down. That a fruitful and friendly discussion about centralism could be so quickly followed by such hostility from Goodhew's close supporters was indicative of prevailing tensions. It seemed to represent a departure from the custom where differences and strong feelings were expressed within conventions of courtesy and moderation. That it was Ballantine-Jones who was at the centre of this particular incident is not as important as that it happened at all. It was a high level political action, a snapshot of what was happening in the Diocese at the time, a manifestation of a power struggle that was to dog the rest of Goddhew's term, and which was destined to end with the disappearance of the Blue Ticket as a political force. The incident was briefly reported in the *Church Scene* and for a while things settled down.[43]

11.9 The Great Prayer Book Debate

The other contentious issue in 1995 concerned a new ACA prayer book. The 1995 General Synod met in Melbourne for the first time in the shadow of the strained relations in the ACA following the women's ordination decision in 1992. The major item of business was *A Prayer Book for Australia* (*APBA*). Those running the programme decided that for any proposed amendments to the book to be debated, a

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[43] *Church Scene,* June 1995.

threshold number of 70 members in favour of them being debated was needed. The Anglo-Catholics and the evangelicals on their own did not have that number, so they agreed to support each other's motions to debate, without prejudice to the vote on the actual amendments.[44]

Most Sydney representatives stayed together in a hotel opposite the Melbourne Grammar School where the Synod was held. They met every night after Synod to discuss tactics for the following day. Goodhew chaired these meetings, though he was staying at Bishopscourt with the Primate. Not all Sydney representatives were equally opposed to *APBA*, but a clear majority were. Debate went over three days. The night before the decisive vote, it was agreed at the tactics meeting that Sydney would press its amendments and vote for the bill to go forward as a *provisional* canon only, meaning it would to be brought back in three years time for reconsideration. When the meeting broke up, there was a clear understanding that this was the strategy. During the debate next day, word filtered through that a small meeting of some Sydney and Melbourne representatives (including Goodhew) had agreed to switch support on the understanding that a sub-title was added describing *APBA* as a *Liturgical Resource authorised by the General Synod.* It was argued this would give *APBA* a lesser status than an alternative prayer book. Goodhew moved the amendment, saying he would support the *immediate* passage of the book as an *ordinary* bill if his amendment was carried. This was greeted with thunderous applause, but stony silence from the majority from Sydney. Anglo-Catholics realised they did not need Sydney's support to get their amendments debated and effectively withdrew from the agreement to allow Sydney's amendments to be debated. *APBA* passed as an ordinary bill, to come into effect immediately in any diocese which adopted it.

This was a humiliating outcome from the point of view of most Sydney representatives and resulted in deep and lasting anger towards Goodhew. The *SMH* coverage reflected this reaction:

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[44] Ballantine-Jones was part of the negotiations that led to this arrangement.

The Right Rev David Silk, [the Anglo-Catholic Bishop of Ballarat] said, 'I should like to echo the words of Adolf Hitler in 1938 and say 'I have no further territorial ambitions'. Funny of course, [said the *Herald* correspondent], but not too far from the truth. Bishop Silk – the unofficial leader of the church's Anglo-Catholic stream – had been instrumental in horse-trading the holy deal which ensured the passage of the church's latest, all-inclusive, prayer book. But what was funny from Bishop Silk, a so-droll English import to Australian Protestantism, proved to be unfortunate for the Archbishop of Sydney, the Most Rev Harry Goodhew. Like Bishop Silk, Archbishop Goodhew emerged from the meeting as a deal–maker – a force for unity against the strains of a potential split. But for some, Goodhew has become Chamberlain to Silk's Hitler. Appeasement, some say, is his middle name.[45]

At the 1995 Sydney Synod, Goodhew gave his reasons for supporting *APBA* as a *liturgical resource*. One was that Lawrence Bartlett of Sydney was Chairman of the Liturgical Commission, the other was that 'a considerable number of changes to the draft had been secured subsequently by evangelicals'.[46] He said that the contents did not compel interpretations that were contrary to evangelicals', and the *BCP* remained the standard of doctrine and practice for the Church. He said there was no guarantee that a newly appointed liturgical commission would be as sympathetic to evangelical concerns as the one which had produced *APBA.* He noted that evangelicals from other parts of Australia had supported this approach. 'In any case', he said '*APBA* would only operate in Sydney if it was accepted subsequently by our Synod'. He then announced his intention to appoint an Archbishop's liturgical panel, among other things, to 'begin work on fresh material as a contribution to future liturgical developments'. These comments were essentially his *political* assessment of the situation in Melbourne but were strongly contested by Sydney conservatives. Many wondered why he did not push these reasons at the tactics meeting the night before the vote, and why he switched position, knowing his fellow Sydney representatives were preparing speeches against *APBA* and its immediate acceptance.

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[45] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 July 1995.
[46] All quotations are taken from the *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 327-332.

11.10 Sydney Fight Back Against *APBA*

Conservatives in Sydney (especially ACL) were not going to take this lying down. ACL organised a pre-Synod conference on *APBA* at MTC. The speakers were former Archbishop Robinson, Professor Edwin Judge, Dr David Peterson of MTC, and the Rev John Mason.[47] ACL's intention was that this conference should alert Synod to the flaws in *APBA* and be the beginning of a political campaign to defeat the book at the 1996 Synod, when it would come up for consideration. Over 500 attended this conference. When Synod met in 1995, it referred *APBA* to the Sydney Doctrine Commission for its advice. When that advice came back in 1996, it was that the book was not satisfactory from a theological perspective.[48] A similar ACL conference was held just before the 1996 Synod with the purpose of defeating the book at Synod. When the Synod debate in 1996 was concluded, *APBA* was overwhelmingly rejected, a major rebuff to Goodhew.

Why did Sydney react so strongly against *APBA*? Basically it was because of the perception that it represented a constitutionally sanctioned departure from the historic protestant and reformed character of the Church. John Mason at one of the ACL conferences said, 'The funeral service [of *APBA*] particularly illustrated this point. This service has introduced the option of a cluster of ceremonies before the service commences. These include the placing of a lighted candle, the sprinkling of water, the placing of a bible and a cross on or near the coffin ...'[49] Beside the sanctioned use of new and decidedly *Catholic* symbolism, a more nuanced critique was offered by Edwin Judge. He suggested that the cumulative effect of changes in language down-played the classic modes of acknowledging and praising God, focussing more on the 'human predicament and aspirations' and evidenced a 'Pelagian tendency'.[50] Phillip Jensen criticised *APBA* as having a 'penchant for pre-reformation medievalism obscuring the word of Christ ...' He said, 'before the Reformation, the Church obscured the gospel with theatrical symbols, carrying

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[47] Professor Judge is an assistant supervisor of this thesis.

[48] Synod also resolved to allow experimental use of *APBA* services provided they were those consistent with the principles of *BCP* and the *39 Articles,* 'as advised where possible by the Doctrine Commission', *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 366.

[49] John Mason, in 'A Prayer Book for Australia? -The Aftermath', an address given at the ACL Conference, 2 September 1995.

[50] *Church Scene*, 8 September 1995.

around books, lighting candles, laying wreaths and pouring oil. All that has been re-introduced'.[51] More generally, *APBA* was criticised by Donald Robinson (arguably Australia's leading liturgiologist) as having 'no liturgical criteria except diversity, variety and flexibility and no self conscious role in the process of arriving at a revision of the *BCP*'.[52] Immediately prior to General Synod, Robinson had said that '[*APBA*] is too diverse as to its adherence to the doctrines and principles of *BCP* and the *Articles,* too open ended as to its future and too unclear as to its rationale to have this authority [of an alternative prayer book]. It plainly needs much more scrutiny as to its doctrinal rectitude'.[53] Robinson's views carried great weight.

Rejection of *APBA,* the phasing out of the 1978 *AAPB* and Sydney's growing desire to distance itself from the ACA, hastened moves for Sydney's own prayer book. To ensure theological dependability, the Doctrine Commission (on a motion by Ballantine-Jones) was asked by Standing Committee to review any proposed services. Delays meant that the Sydney book, *Sunday Services: A Contemporary Liturgical Resource* was not published till 2001, just after Goodhew had retired.

The 1995 *APBA* conflict is significant because it illustrated Sydney's growing impatience with the trend towards liberal catholicism in the ACA. More particularly it was another example of the growing distance between conservative evangelicals and Goodhew. It demonstrated his inability to carry the Synod with him on a major issue where there were perceived theological deficiencies. Following Pymble, this conflict further weakened his influence. It signalled to many his desire to keep Sydney firmly in the ACA camp, even if that meant alienating himself from the conservative heartland of Sydney.

To the question: how did Sydney Diocese change as a result of the *APBA* controversy? Not much. It was a significant step in Sydney's growing estrangement from the ACA. Sydney, more than ever, was looking to its own resources. It was another classic example of high level Sydney politics: pre-Synod conferences and the production of educational papers, press briefings, deferrals and referrals to

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[51] *Sydney Morning Herald,* 8 July 1995.
[52] Donald Robinson, 'The Principles of Doctrine and Worship in the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine Articles', an address given at the ACL Conference on *APBA,* 2 September 1995.
[53] Donald Robinson, a briefing paper for Sydney representatives to General Synod, 15 June 1995.

commissions, the use of debating tactics and appeal to core Sydney theological values to defeat what was thought to threaten Sydney's historic position on Anglican liturgy.

11.11 ACL's Victory over the Blue Ticket

The lead up to the 1996 Synod, from the ACL's point of view, was focussed on the triennial elections in October 1996. The recruitment campaign continued with special attention to Synod representatives. Regional chapters of ACL were created to take advantage of the new regionalism. In the April-May 1996 period, there were seven regional meetings, addressed by Phillip Jensen, John Chapman, John Woodhouse, Barry Newman, and Edwin Judge. A second round of meetings was held in the September-October period to consolidate ACL's regional base. Apart from the frequent editions of *ACL News*, another publication, *Synod Watch* was produced for ACL members of Synod to keep them in touch with Synod related matters and to encourage them to stand for election to the various committees. A special conference at Beverly Hills was organised in the middle of 1996 to allow members and other interested parties to discuss elections and to gather support for the new strategies.

In the lead up to Synod, there were negotiations between ACL and Blue Ticket to see if there could be peace. ACL was confident that its grass roots organisation would ensure success in the new regional elections to Standing Committee and that their strategies would bring success in the core section as well. Ballantine-Jones believed that the Blue Ticket did not realise how precarious their position had become. The negotiations broke down over the Blue Ticket's refusal to accommodate an arrangement to bring him back onto Standing Committee. They were prepared to support him for the Wollongong Region against two ACL members (Glenn Davies and Peter Tasker), but not for the core. ACL was prepared to support Robert Forsyth for South Sydney, but not the core.[54] As noted above, the Blue Ticket was not prepared to make peace. The upshot was that ACL won back control of

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[54] Following the regionalisation of the Diocese, Standing Committee was reconstituted to include 8 lay and 4 clerical members to be elected by the whole Synod (the core), and 4 lay and 2 clerical members were to be elected by Synod members from each of the five regions.

Standing Committee, though at the expense of Ballantine-Jones in a close vote. Worse was to come with respect to relations with Goodhew.

The ACL holds an annual dinner on the first night of each Synod. Around 250 Synod members attend. A prominent speaker is invited. Goodhew was invited to be the speaker in 1996. ACL reasoned it couldn't hurt the ACL to be associated with the Archbishop and it wouldn't hurt Goodhew either. However things didn't go as expected. In Goodhew's presidential address (just before addressing ACL), he broached the topic of the role of Synod in which he launched a broadside against ACL.

He said:

> I was greatly disturbed by an opinion piece in a recent ACL publication. It said, '**The syndical process is not based on truth but on numbers** [Goodhew's emphasis]. Decisions in Synod are made on the basis of majority opinion. Furthermore, Synod members are not always elected on the basis of their godly discernment and wisdom'. ... Do many here share that opinion? If that view of Synod is widely held we ought to stop meeting now ... Better that we discern who are the prophets ... and follow them.[55]

Two points: the comments in the ACL article were actually true. Standing orders require that votes be counted; that means numbers. Anyone familiar with parish meetings to elect Synod members knows how often people are elected on the basis of who is willing and available to attend, not necessarily on who is best qualified. In any case the context of the statement was not quoted. The author of the article, Ian Carmichael (Secretary of ACL), went on to say: 'Unfortunately, this means that part of the leadership involves not only fighting for the truth, but fighting for the numbers. It is possible to win the war for truth and yet lose the battle'.

The other point goes to the tone of Goodhew's remarks. Goodhew acknowledged that he was speaking with a measure of sarcasm. However, sarcasm has always been a powerful tool in the orator's kit, as it was in this case. He went on:

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[55] *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 336.

If the group or the party rule, liberty of thought and freedom of conscience will go. ... if you share my concern for this forum you can do three things, pray for guidance, give firm attention to all that is written and spoken. Have the courage to make you own assessments ... Sometimes, independence is hard to sustain. It requires strength of character, integrity and a sense of being accountable to Christ alone...

Given that the elections were about to be held and that ACL were contesting positions against the Blue Ticket, for the Archbishop to attack one party, when the only other party (Blue Ticket) could benefit, was deeply offensive to ACL members.

The ACL made no response to this attack, though the author of the article and the editor complained to him privately.[56] In fact throughout the whole period of differences with Goodhew, ACL was very particular *not* to publicly criticize him or attack anyone personally. To them, it was not only bad politics but unworthy in itself. As for criticisms of ACL, it was thought that to respond only gave such criticism further coverage and likely to raise the temperature even higher. Politics among evangelicals in Sydney is usually nuanced and subtle, more behind the scenes.

11.12 Conclusion

Goodhew's first three years (despite the difficulties) included many significant achievements, such as his successful creation of five fully functioning regions and the process of creating the Diocesan Executive Board (DEB) as an executive to the Standing Committee. He was passionate about expanding diocesan interest in evangelism, including Vision 2001. The re-marriage of divorced persons controversy settled down under his leadership, as a more pragmatic and pastorally oriented approach replaced Robinson's more rigid and unpopular policies.

In a study on the role that politics played in the Diocese, it can be reasonably argued that his problems, as they unfolded in the first half of his administration, were closely related to his political judgements, many of which were badly managed given the

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[56] Both letters are in Ballantine-Jones' possession.

prevailing mood for change. He paid a high price for these judgements in terms of influence and opportunities foregone.

This examination of the Goodhew era in Chapter Eleven is broken at roughly half way through his episcopate. Goodhew himself started to look to what legacy he might leave behind and the new balance of power (following the resurgence of the ACL) meant that the freedom that the Blue Ticket won for him in 1993 was over. As in the first half of his term, politics continued to dominate diocesan affairs up to and into the beginning of the next administration.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE GOODHEW YEARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY

12.1 Introduction

The lines were already drawn on the major policy questions for the second half of Goodhew's term. Supporters of lay administration were going to press on, and Goodhew was going to hold his position. ACL was determined to build on its gains of 1996 and to maintain its influence in the regions. With the moratorium on the issue of women's ordination coming to an end, that matter was certain to return as a political flashpoint.[57] The old REPA agenda items were working their way through the system, putting pressure on Goodhew to accept or reject them. The important new element was that Standing Committee would no longer reflect the *Church House* position and would be more open to alternative views on key policy and procedural questions.

12.2 1997 Synod

In his 1997 Synod address, Goodhew attempted to lay out an agenda for the remainder of his term. He noted surveys indicating attendances had grown by 4.5% since 1991 and that the age profile of active Sydney Anglicans was younger than the rest of the ACA. He suggested this relatively better performance could be explained by Sydney's concentration on youth ministries. He noted that the average size of a Sydney congregation was 126 compared to 57 in the rest of the ACA. He said that 1,000 people were in ESL classes in Sydney Anglican churches and that there were twelve Chinese congregations.[58] He concluded, 'This brief overview is no cause for

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[57] See page 237.
[58] *1998 Sydney Year Book*, 293-311. ESL is the acronym for English as a second language.

pride, complacency or triumphalism. It simply serves to remind us powerfully of the many gracious things God is doing in spite of our shortcomings ...'[59]

This address was followed up with a paper to the newly elected Standing Committee called *Looking to the Future.*[60] It asked how 'we' [the 'we' here must mean the central leadership] could assist the clergy and people towards a greater degree of unanimity on our convictions and distinctives. He said the Diocese must continue to innovate: 'How can we assist each congregation to be intentional, that is, planned, purposeful and determined in its mission and ministry ...?' This paper, and the Synod address, were Goodhew at his best. It set out a vision for his last five years, concentrating on values close to the heart of Sydney Anglicanism. The problem was context: three years of political conflict; Pymble, *APBA*, disappointment over lay administration, his pro ACA stance and frustration at his team's performance and the Blue Ticket, made it difficult for his voice to be heard.

The DEB was restructured in 1997 to provide that half its members would be elected by Standing Committee instead of *all* being appointed by the Archbishop.[61] The functions assigned to the DEB were to prepare the appropriation ordinances, to recommend mission and vision statements, and create an environment conducive to their achievement. Being the most powerful body in the Diocese and a symbol of Goodhew's administration and growing centralism, it was appropriate that its membership reflected the place of the Synod and its elected representatives on Standing Committee.

12.3 1998 Synod

Goodhew addressed the 1998 Synod on the nature of Sydney's structures. He criticised views which denigrated the *denomination* and the *structures* of the Diocese. He said neither was above criticism and change of a positive kind was to be welcomed, 'but', he said, ' studied negativism is corrosive and destructive ... it will

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[59] Ibid.
[60] Paper received by Standing Committee, 27 October 1997.
[61] *1998 Sydney Year Book*, 339-340.

deter good people from committing themselves to God for service within our ranks'.[62] He identified himself as an 'unrepentant denominationalist'. He related these comments to proposals before the Synod for parishes to cross-parish boundaries to plant churches. 'We have structures which can be flexible and supportive. They can support and encourage new initiatives if the goodwill of every participant is present to make it work for the advantage of all'.[63] These comments reflected the push for change and his desire for more caution. The experience of REPA in 1992-3, and the calls for more and more change during his own term should have signalled to him that what he was saying was not the message many wanted to hear. For example, Synod passed a Phillip Jensen motion calling for congregations without property to be made parishes and for a five-year trial of lay and diaconal administration.[64]

12.4 Point of Order: A Matter of the Separation of Power

Synod is the ultimate arena of Sydney politics. Sometimes questions of principle are debated in substantive motions and sometimes tangentially because of procedural disputes which involve substantial matters of principle. One such case occurred when a point of order was taken over whether a proposed ordinance should be ruled out of order because it proposed something alleged to be contrary to the law of the Church. In 1998, Synod was debating lay administration. Keith Mason took a point of order to this effect. The issue became whether the President (who happened to be the Archbishop) should decide, in advance, what legislation was lawful and what was not. During the debate on the point of order, Ballantine-Jones said the role of the President was not to determine the 'legality' of a matter, but to administer the standing orders. The point he was making was that in a system based on the concept of the separation of powers, to accede to Mason's point was to assert an authority Goodhew, as President, did not have. In effect, it brought into sharp focus the nature of diocesan government which divided power between the Synod and the Archbishop. When Goodhew upheld the point of order, another member (Laurie Scandrett) moved dissent from his ruling. That was passed, indicating that the Synod

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[62] *1999 Sydney Year Book*, 351.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid, 376 and 371.

did not accept Mason's point of order or Goodhew's action in upholding it. The bill itself subsequently passed as well. It was then vetoed by Goodhew.

In later correspondence with Goodhew in development of the arguments for dissent, Ballantine-Jones pointed out that the President's role is analogous to the Speaker in the House of Commons. His duty is to rule according to standing orders and nothing else. He quoted the famous case of Speaker Lenthall on 4 June 1642 when he refused to point out to King Charles the five members whom the King had forced his way into the chamber to arrest for treason. Lenthall said, 'May it please your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see, nor tongue to speak in this House, but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am here ...' In other words, he saw his role as the keeper of the rights of the House, not the arbiter of the law, as the King thought that law to be. In the same way, Ballantine-Jones argued that the President of Synod (as distinct from his other role as Archbishop) must do what the Synod directs in its standing orders and not make a personal judgement on the legal merits of a matter before the Synod. Later on, Ballantine-Jones argued, the Archbishop can exercise his right to withhold assent if he wants to. He quoted Robert Tong's comment in the debate, '... in the end, legality is something to be determined later by another body, namely, the secular courts'.

Goodhew responded with a lengthy and considered reply. He conceded that Ballantine-Jones might be right, but thought the analogy with the Speaker of Parliament might not be well based. He said 'the Speaker does not really form "a third house". The bishop in this Diocese is not quite "a third house" ... but he has a role that is something more than a Speaker'.[65] He pointed out that he can withhold his signature from legislation, 'this is not the role of a Speaker'. He said, 'It is not clear to me that the Bishop altogether sheds his role of Bishop when presiding over the Synod ...' The nub of his position was stated as:

> To indicate, as Bishop and President, that the opinion of an unchanged Appellate
> Tribunal would probably rule any such legislation to be out of order and that their

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[65] Personal correspondence between Goodhew and Ballantine-Jones.

given opinion might carry weight with the President, may well be construed as sufficient grounds for upholding that particular point of order.[66]

He recognised that this comment might be a bit rushed and would seek further opinion.

In response, Ballantine-Jones pointed out that the Bishop cannot be a third house since the *1902 Constitution Act*, Clause 2, says, '... it shall not be lawful for the President to vote on any question or matter arising in the Synod'. Reflecting further on the question, he said the Bishop's role (as distinct from his role as President of the Synod) is more analogous to that of the President of the United States, who is not a member of Congress, but signs into law legislation passed by the Congress. In Sydney's system, the Bishop has two distinct roles: that of presiding over Synod and that of signing legislation passed by the Synod. As President of Synod his role is analogous to the Speaker of Parliament, but as Archbishop his role is analogous to the President of the United States.

Politically, the matter was a manifestation of the tensions abroad at the time. That the rare step of dissenting from the President's ruling took place on the question relating to lay administration did not affect the constitutional question, but it did highlight the distance that had opened up between Goodhew and the Synod on that issue. Constitutionally, it affirmed the principle that the President's role is to apply the standing orders and not respond to one person's opinion on questions of legality, which are to be decided in other ways. For the purposes of this study, it illustrates the two-headed nature of diocesan governance and the difficulties that can arise when they are in disagreement.

12.5 1999 Synod

The 1999 Synod was a decisive moment for the Goodhew administration. It saw the end of the Blue Ticket and the consolidation of ACL's influence in Standing Committee. It also saw the beginning of the phase when attention began to turn to

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[66] Ibid.

questions of succession (due in 18 months time). Questions of Goodhew's legacy began to be reflected in his annual Synod addresses from that year.

Reviewing Vision 2001 (the follow up of Robinson's VFG), he said that the two programmes combined had raised a total of $14 million, purchased 11 new sites, built 14 churches, 12 ministers' houses and four ministries centres.[67] In today's dollar terms, this is a modest outcome, compared with the aspirations of Jensen's Diocesan Mission, but significant and measurable none the less. Perhaps with an eye on his legacy, he noted that the NCLS survey said the growth of Sydney Anglican churches was approximately 4%. Commenting on the Diocese, he noted its commitment to the Bible, the theology and the worship of *BCP* and the teachings of the formularies, evangelism and caring ministries. But he noted that Sydney had been described as 'legalistic and combative'. He quoted a state politician who said that to learn the art of politics, people should eschew Macquarie Street and go to the Diocese of Sydney! [68] The rest of the address is worth quoting in full as it sets out his view on the struggles he and the Diocese had been going through:

> Our determination to remain true to our theological moorings is seen by some to be accompanied by an attitude which conveys the impression that we have little to learn from anyone else, and that we are insensitive to the good in positions adopted by others. We appear to find it difficult to cope with difference. Friends remark on our capacity to factionalise and to fight internally. They wonder what we would do if there were no external foes to face. One such situation developed prior to the last episcopal election Synod. That episode damaged long-standing friendships, destroyed trust, and left a legacy of suspicion. Friends who observed from outside pressed us to repair our relationships. I pray that nothing similar will occur next time around. We are thought to act at times as if our only concern is with ourselves and that we think little of the circumstances of fellow evangelicals in other situations. All that having been said of us, many are extremely glad that there exists a diocese, which for all it 'Corinthians' like shortcomings, seeks to maintain the Catholic Faith in its Reformed, Evangelical, and Anglican expression.[69]

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[67] *2000 Sydney Year Book,* 357.
[68] Macquarie St is the seat of the NSW Parliament and is well known as the place of rugged political battles, especially on the Australian Labor Party side. Its nick-name is the Bear Pit.
[69] Ibid*,* 367.

There was pain in those words. But whatever their truth, *all* levels of leadership played a part in the shortcomings he described. Given that Sydney was as he described it, what was needed was a very skilled hand to navigate a way through those difficult currents. If one thing could be fairly said of Goodhew, it is that he did not have those particular skills.

12.6 The Blue Ticket Departs

Meanwhile the business of Synod continued. First there were the triennial elections. ACL had spent the years after the 1996 recovery consolidating those gains. Given the power of incumbency, it seemed likely that most of the sitting members of committees would be re-elected. The Blue Ticket had lost ground in 1996 and was likely to lose further ground in 1999. After the Archbishop and Standing Committee had made their appointments to Synod under special provisions available to them, Ballantine-Jones approached the Blue Ticket leaders for discussions.[70] The first meeting took place on 9 August. ACL was represented by Robert Tong and him, Blue Ticket by Peter Kell, Stephen Judd and Warwick Olson. ACL's approach was for minimal change to existing membership to the extent necessary to accommodate the main Blue Ticket leaders. ACL felt they had a strategic advantage and that the Blue Ticket leaders were likely to concede ground as long as their main names were protected. They on the other hand presented a list of proposals involving a bigger turnover of members. ACL indicated their minimalist position and many of Blue Ticket's suggestions were dropped straight away. As with 1996, the key point of contention was the final clerical position on the Standing Committee core. They wanted Robert Forsyth, ACL wanted Ballantine-Jones. Other names were discussed to make room for both, but ACL would not budge from supporting Peter Jensen, Phillip Jensen, Narrelle Jarrett and Ballantine-Jones. After further discussion, it was agreed that Forsyth would move to South Sydney. On that basis, the Blue Ticket agreed not to put out its ticket, ACL agreed to include their key people on its ticket and to make a public statement to *Southern Cross*. It had been a friendly process. At

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[70] Stuart Piggin, one of the Blue Ticket leaders, had lost his seat on Synod in this process as part of the ongoing conflict. Laurie Scandrett suffered a similar fate when the Blue Ticket had the numbers on Standing Committee before the 1996 elections.

the election itself, the only glitch was that in the South Sydney Region, Lindsay Stoddart lost to John Macintyre (later Bishop of Gippsland), despite being on the ACL ticket.

The results overall lifted the ACL strength to its highest level in its 90 years. Of those elected to Standing Committee, ACL estimated their support (when a *political* matter was under discussion) would be a minimum of 28-20, if every non-ACL aligned member voted against, which they rarely did. So from a position of minority in 1993 to comfortable control in 1996, to an even more influential position after 1999, attempts to dent ACL had failed.

The first move to take advantage of this situation occurred at the first meeting of the new Standing Committee in November.[71] Ballantine-Jones moved that the DEB be reconstituted so that *all* positions, except the Archbishop's and the CEO of SDS, would be filled by Standing Committee. The election would take place at the December meeting. This was in every sense a high level and a high risk political action. It involved taking away the automatic right of regional bishops to be members, and it was a direct challenge to the Archbishop's power to appoint half the DEB. There was at that time widespread dissatisfaction at the performance of the DEB, especially with some of the assistant bishops. Before proposing this change, Ballantine-Jones consulted widely and was surprised how much support it had, across the factions. It was only when he knew he had overwhelming support that he moved. There was a furious reaction from the bishops and some of Goodhew's supporters. In his speech, Ballantine-Jones said the reason the DEB should be an elected body was that its major role was to prepare the Synod's financial ordinances and should therefore be appointed by the Synod's Standing Committee. He said that that would bring it into line with other sub-committees.[72] The motion passed, with the election set for December.

Between the two meetings there were intense negotiations. Goodhew himself wrote to members of the Standing Committee expressing his displeasure at the proposal, arguing that the Bishops should be restored. He said he hoped the Standing

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[71] November 1999.
[72] Taken from Ballantine-Jones' speech notes.

Committee should either rescind the motion and go back to the previous model and add one or two additional members, but keep the bishops on. Alternatively, he suggested Standing Committee not elect a DEB at all and go back to short-term task forces.[73] In the end, Ballantine-Jones relented on the Bishops, but the other members were to be elected. The main point was that a clear majority of the DEB was henceforth elected by Standing Committee. The outcome was a further erosion of the power that Goodhew wielded in Standing Committee.

12.7 *Four Corners* Programme: 'An Unholy Beat Up'

Years before McGillion wrote *The Chosen Ones*, the dispute between Goodhew and the conservatives attracted media attention. Most notable was the ABC programme *Four Corners.* This was broadcast on 19 June 2000. Accepting that such programmes have short-term impact, what was said *then* gives an indication of what the players at the time were thinking. For example, on politics, Peter Carnley (by now Primate), said, 'Well, there are factions [in Sydney], well organised factions with names and I think it is not unheard of that they have voting tickets .... I think that is quite foreign in some other synods around the country'. Goodhew on episcopal power said, 'The notion that the Bishop's point of view will always prevail may be stronger in some dioceses than it is here. This has always been a robust diocese where the lay voice has been very strong, and to that degree, it's had a degree of health'. On the ACL, the moderator said, '[It is] a group led by Bruce Ballantine-Jones and which includes Peter Jensen. Although Goodhew himself is a member, he often finds himself outmanoeuvred by this conservative alliance'. John Woodhouse, on episcopal power, said: 'To be quite honest, I think that the Archbishop proposes things and sometimes he is supported and sometimes he isn't. It's just an open discussion'. For an outsider's perspective, Archbishop Peter Hollingworth said: 'It seems to me that an archbishop of Sydney is, looking at it from the outside, much more constrained and controlled by his Standing Committee and his Synod than any other diocese that we know of'. And the other view, by Ballantine-Jones: 'The Anglican Church is like any other large institution. It has power structures and it has therefore political methodologies. The bishops, for example, have enormous power and they use it politically. If you don't have people banding together to see that their

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[73] Taken from Goodhew's letter to Standing Committee members.

point of view is heard as well, of course the whole Church just becomes a thing of the bishops'.[74]

After the programme, the *ACL News* ran a story written by Robert Tong called 'An Unholy Beat Up'. It said, 'overall the *Four Corners* programme was balanced. The shortcomings of a television presentation do not allow for a measured consideration of issues. Hence the careful and detailed work on both women's ordination and lay presidency were unavailable to the viewer'.[75] On broader questions, the programme gave a fair and representative exposure to the many diverse views within the ACA. That it appeared at all was due to the fact that during Goodhew's term, Sydney experienced unprecedented levels of political controversy and conflict which typically attracted that kind of media attention.

12.8 Appointment of Robert Forsyth

On 14 May 2000, Bishop Peter Watson became Archbishop of Melbourne. That left a vacancy in the South Sydney Region. It was about a year out from Goodhew's retirement. The question was, should he fill that vacancy or leave it to his successor? There was speculation that he wanted to appoint someone who might be considered for election as his successor. When Standing Committee met in March, Goodhew said he wanted to appoint a replacement bishop and wanted Standing Committee's view. By arrangement, Bishop Paul Barnett moved that an appointment be agreed to. He said that such a motion did not commit anyone to vote for a name or to vote at all. During the debate, Goodhew indicated he intended to call a special session of Synod to deal with the matter. Ballantine-Jones asked that if that was so, why Standing Committee was discussing it at all. (The presumed answer was that If Standing Committee supported the motion, a nomination might have been made immediately). He said that since Synod was to be called anyway, it made the motion redundant. The debate proceeded on the basis that it was academic. When the vote

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[74] Quotations were from the transcript of the programme, www.abc.netau/4corners/s141770.htm
[75] *ACL News,* July 2000.

was taken, it passed, but not with the special majorities needed to make an appointment if one had been proposed.[76]

Synod duly met on 4 May. In a statement to Synod members, Goodhew referred to a recent article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* which said:

> Goodhew retires next March and could give a mate a good run at the top job. But the conservative group, with numbers on the Sydney Diocese's powerful Standing Committee, will veto any Goodhew candidate. The likely result? No bishop for South Sydney.[77]

In commentary, Goodhew said he could only presume that there would be some opposition to any name he proposed.[78] On the procedure, he quoted advice from the Diocesan Secretary, Mark Payne, to the effect that under the relevant ordinance, and because archdeacons cannot vote, it would be very difficult to get the required votes to make a valid nomination. Therefore, to deal with the procedural difficulty, he had called the Synod to seek support for his nomination.

Why fill the vacancy straight away? He said that regional bishops are integral to the life of the Diocese. He could not leave South Sydney without a bishop, and the Regional Council had asked for one. On the politics of the situation, he said:

> The claim that my action could appear to have 'political' overtones for the next archiepiscopal election is difficult. I presume any name I propose would be 'political' insofar as it will bring a person to people's attention. It would be surprising for any archbishop to appoint an assistant bishop so lacking in qualities that no one would ever think he might be someone's candidate in an election. In addition, opinions seem to vary as to whether or not my appointee would be helped or hindered by coming to this position at this time.

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[76] This description is based on notes taken by Ballantine-Jones at the Standing Committee meeting, April 2000.
[77] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 March 2000.
[78] sydneyanglicans.net. Follow links to SDS, Synods – Past Years, Special Sessions of Synod, May 2000, Presidential Address.

Consequentially, I do not believe I should refrain from seeking to make an appointment now.[79]

As for the nomination (which only became known at the special Synod), opinion was divided over whether Forsyth or Archdeacon Trevor Edwards would be proposed. Rumours were widespread that Forsyth would be chosen because it might be thought *he* had a better chance of election as Archbishop. At the special session, Forsyth *was* nominated and elected without debate.

This incident is significant because it made Forsyth a credible candidate for Archbishop. It illustrated the tense political climate in the lead up to the election and it showed how both sides played hard politics when it came to the appointment of an archbishop. The real casualty was Trevor Edwards, widely recognised as very able, but passed over. He left the Diocese not long into Jensen's term for a large parish in Canberra and was subsequently made an assistant bishop in that Diocese.

12.9 Goodhew's Response to Misconduct of Church Workers

A major area of reform under Goodhew concerned procedures relating to sexual misconduct among church workers and the Diocese's practices on child protection. In 1993, he set up a taskforce saying, 'it is heart breaking to contemplate such abuse of positions of trust. However should it occur, our protocols for dealing with victims and offenders need to be suitable to meet the circumstances of each and every case'.[80] In 1994, he indicated his intention (as an interim step) to appoint a doctor or similarly qualified person in three central locations as contact persons for complaints or advice on sexual abuse or harassment matters.[81] In 1995, he acknowledged that addressing these matters 'had not proved to be an easy task', but he said he expected to be in a position in 1996 to move forward.[82]

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[79] Ibid. Archbishop Goodhew's statement to members of the Synod, 12 April 2000.
[80] *1994 Sydney Year Book,* 312.
[81] *1995 Sydney Year Book,* 308.
[82] *1996 Sydney Year Book*, 324.

Events overtook him in 1996 in the form of the Royal Commission into Police Corruption in NSW, where he had been called to answer for the failings in Church procedures before he became Archbishop. He was forced to admit that actions in relation to a particular case were a 'disgrace'. This concerned complaints about sexual interference of a teenage girl by a rector in the early 1980s. The father had complained to the then Regional Bishop, Donald Cameron, whom he said told him that without proof, he (the parent), might be subject to proceedings for slander.[83] No action had been taken on the complaint. This, and other matters brought before the Royal Commission, showed that the Diocese had been slow to react when complaints had come to their attention.[84] Later that year, Goodhew set up his protocols dealing with sexual misconduct by Church workers and Synod passed the Church Discipline Ordinance 1996.[85]

The major instrument for addressing the problems of misconduct was the creation of the Professional Standards Board in 2001. Between 1996 and 2001, the NSW Government had passed a raft of legislation following the Royal Commission into Police Corruption.[86] The Diocese followed a rigorous policy of compliance, including the creation of the Professional Standards Unit. A leading Sydney layman and barrister, Philip Gerber, was appointed its first director and he and his support staff provided a facility for complaints, counselling and legal matters associated with both Church and State law. When Jensen took over, there was a mechanism in place which his 'Zero Tolerance policy' built on. Every edition of *Southern Cross* prominently displayed an advertisement advising readers of the procedures they could follow if they had information or complaints of abuse.[87] Reforms in this area can rightly be attributed to Goodhew's leadership and persistence.

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[83] The clergyman was the Rev Vic Cole, onetime President of ACL. He subsequently relinquished his holy orders at the Archbishop's request, effective from 12 February 2003.

[84] *Sydney Morning Herald,* 9 May 1996.

[85] *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 333, Goodhew's statement and 403-505 for the report and text of the *Church Discipline Ordinance 1996*.

[86] The details of these are set out in the *2002 Sydney Year Book*, 489-492.

[87] The ACA also had been working on its response to the misconduct problem following some high level scandals affecting senior Church officials. This work culminated in decisions at the 2004 General Synod to adopt a statement on child protection and a professional standards unit. The Synod issued an 'Apology' on behalf of the Church for past failures and approved a code of conduct (*Faithfulness in Service*), for adoption by bishops and dioceses across Australia. See *Proceedings of the Thirteenth General Synod, 2004*, (General Synod Office, Sydney) 2005.

12.10 Women in Ministry and the Goodhew Years

The primary battles over women's ordination took place during the Robinson administration. By the time Goodhew became Archbishop in 1993 there was a feeling it was time to take a break. At the October 1993 Synod, the Rev Tim Harris (a strong supporter of women's ordination) successfully proposed a moratorium for three years.[88] Goodhew's first address to Synod indicated his then views on the subject: 'I have not been a supporter of the move for women to be priests'. Noting that others had different views, he said, 'The way forward is to continue the dialogue in the spirit of mutual respect ...' He supported the moratorium. 'I do think we need space to come to terms with what now prevails ... and give ourselves time to talk further'.[89] The motion passed.

In 1994, Goodhew noted that while women had been ordained deacons and licensed to preach, there were some [rectors] who refused 'to allow them to speak or minister to congregations'. He said he regretted this and he wanted to encourage women to see full-time ministry as a 'worthwhile and God-honouring vocation'.[90] He addressed this matter again in the 1995 Synod. He said that he felt at liberty 'under Scripture' to continue the practice of licensing women to preach but that it was up to rectors to act. He noted that the moratorium was coming to an end and expected that this and other issues may be re-opened then.[91] There was a feeling that the debate was going to take up where it left off.

At the 1996 Synod, there was a proposal to adopt the 1992 Clarification Canon but with the proviso that women presbyters could *not* be given charge of a parish. Goodhew suggested that the bill was likely to be seen by opponents as the 'thin edge of the wedge'. He was right. That was one reason why it was opposed. He noted the competing views, including a middle way, which asserted that there was room for 'reverent agnosticism'. He didn't come down on any side, saying, 'each of us is bound to decide on the basis of what we believe God is saying in the Scripture ...' He restated his 1993 view, adding that that was still his preferred position, while

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[88] In 2011, Harris, by then a minister in Adelaide, was made an assistant bishop in that Diocese.
[89] *1994 Sydney Year Book*, 309-310.
[90] *1995 Sydney Year Book*, 305.
[91] *1996 Sydney Year Book*, 313-314.

being strongly committed to advancing ministry of women in the church. He also said, 'he too had to listen carefully to the debate'.[92] To the extent that it expressed sympathy to any viewpoint, it was towards accommodating the views of those who supported the proposed ordinance. In any event the bill was lost.

At the 1997 Synod, Goodhew proposed a conference of all Synod members to discuss the matter. Opponents of change were wary. Phillip Jensen took the initiative. He moved to support a conference, but in a form that gave the Standing Committee control in the planning and agenda so that it included the *whole* question of women's ministry, not just ordination.[93] This political move was a reflection of the widespread tension between Goodhew and the conservatives. It also reflected the changed balance of power in the Standing Committee following the resurgence of ACL at the 1996 triennium elections.

The conference took place in May 1998 at Trinity Grammar School. Two primary papers were prepared, one by a group led by Stuart Piggin in favour of women's ordination, the other by a group against, led by Peter Jensen. Bishop Paul Barnett, an opponent of women's ordination, addressed the conference with his reflections on both papers. After lunch, another paper was presented on possible ways forward and that was followed by small group discussion, with results to be sent to the Synod Secretary. At the end, a motion was passed which asked the Synod to allow a five year experiment of lay and diaconal administration, as a 'principled means by which tensions and divisions over the ordination of women to the priesthood may be addressed'. That motion (and the whole programme) showed how much Goodhew had lost the political initiative. He expressed disappointment that the conference had not proceeded to find any real 'synthesis or a greater corporate mind to develop'.[94] The Synod subsequently passed a motion proposed by Phillip Jensen, and the required ordinance, which passed and Goodhew vetoed.

Realistically, the conference was never going to find a solution because the viewpoints on the central question of ordination were irreconcilable. In addition,

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[92] *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 326.
[93] *1998 Sydney Year Book*, 325.
[94] *1999 Sydney Year Book,* 473.

Goodhew had failed to position himself as an impartial mediator in the eyes of conservatives. Suspicions around 'thin edge of the wedge' arguments hardened them against any compromise.

Goodhew told the 1998 Synod that whatever the decision on women's ordination might be, he wanted to secure the employment position of women as church workers. He wondered that if ordination was allowed and each parish able to decide, 'as an exercise in liberty on a disputed point', might not that be another way forward?' Nobody took up that idea. On the wider question of ordination, he said he was open to consider a different approach. Noting that God had blessed ministries of women in the absence of men, he felt the weight of the argument that in a 'significantly changed social environment, faithfulness to God might mean that the same revealed truth needs to be experienced in a different way'. He quoted John Stott's change of position on the permanent validity of 'submission'. He said that if he [Stott] could change, so could Sydney. He asked; 'where do I stand? In fact I don't. I pray!' He said he could not speak with unqualified conviction for one position or another, but should Synod pass legislation to permit women's ordination, he would *not* withhold his consent.[95]

This was a courageous speech because he must have known that the majority of the Synod would see this as a major shift, signalling to them that their Archbishop (unlike Loane and Robinson) no longer stood with them on the principal question. It also signalled the end of any meaningful role for him on the issue in the concluding years of his administration. Was Goodhew finally showing his hand or was it that after years of trying to find a way forward, this was his last attempt to guide Sydney to a closer alignment with the ACA? Whatever Goodhew's motivation, the reality was that political opposition to him had so hardened that he could do nothing. At Goodhew's last Synod he said, '... we are still divided.' He said he hoped that no further restrictions be placed on women deacons.[96]

Goodhew's evolving attitudes probably suggested to many supporters of women's ordination that there was a chance of success while he was Archbishop. Opponents

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[95] *1999 Sydney Year Book,* 347-350.
[96] *2000 Sydney Year Book*, 401.

were always alert to this possibility and when necessary, took steps to preserve their ascendancy. More broadly, it fitted into perceptions of Goodhew as soft in issues that threatened Sydney's relations with the ACA.

12.11 Goodhew's Team

There was a notable decline in the strength of the leadership group under Goodhew. Reid and Cameron had retired. After a number had declined appointment and the nomination of Peter Kemp had failed, he nominated Brian King of Manly, Reg Piper from Holy Trinity Adelaide and Ray Smith, Rector of Wanniassa in the ACT. Michael Horsbourgh, a non-evangelical member of Standing Committee, said that Goodhew was 'forced to put up people who were ineffective'.[97] That assessment reflects a common view of his choices. As noted previously, Goodhew himself conceded as much: 'They [his bishops] were not on the whole great political operators in terms of operating with the Diocese... in a sense I may have forfeited some firepower in Standing Committee with the choices I made'.[98] Late in Goodhew's term, there was the controversial appointment of Robert Forsyth of St Barnabas Broadway. Forsyth had been an early supporter of REPA, but drifted from that circle after Goodhew was elected. Over time, he became a strong Goodhew ally and defender of Sydney's alignment with the ACA. When he was nominated, it was widely assumed that he was being groomed to stand against a Jensen. The details of this will be recounted elsewhere.[99]

12.12 Conclusion

At his final Synod in 2000, Goodhew set out what he had wanted to achieve during his episcopate:

> Primarily it has been to promote amongst God's people, love for their heavenly
> Father, holiness, faith and obedience. I have wanted to stimulate a caring

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[97] McGillion, *The Chosen Ones*, 22
[98] Ibid, 22.
[99] See page 245.

pastoral spirit in our churches that is consistent with the command to love one another and to promote the growth of the body to spiritual maturity. I have aimed at seeing new people won to Christ and the gospel made known to an ever increasing number of people at home and abroad. I have sought to encourage the work of showing loving care to others both inside and outside the churches and of meeting human need. I have wanted, where possible, to be a voice on issues affecting people generally and Christians particularly. These things I have wished to pursue within the context of a dynamic expression of Anglican faith, the public worship, and church order. Those five points have appeared annually in the *Year Book* of the Diocese and I have unashamedly run the risk of straining your patience by constantly repeating them. For that I make no apology. For me, they have expressed succinctly those things for which the church in this Diocese exists.[100]

Few could dispute that Goodhew achieved these objectives and they will stand to his great credit. In the same address he also nominated other matters he thought were significant: regionalisation, the process of clergy selection, the upgrading of post-ordination training and the growth of the network of diocesan schools (7 new schools since 1994). In addition, there was the expansion of special religious education in state schools, his liturgical panel and the impending publication of Sydney's own prayer book (*Sunday Services).* He also mentioned the expansion of indigenous and cross-cultural ministries.[101]

Friend and biographer Stuart Piggin gave his assessment of Goodhew as Archbishop:

There was, in Harry's time, a range of initiatives which safeguarded and strengthened the mission of the Church. These included the development of a sexual abuse protocol, the opening of a dozen schools in the Diocese which were low low-fee Anglican schools, the devoting of much larger resources to indigenous ministry, the strengthening of parishes. The last was one the chief reasons for Harry's appointment. He did not disappoint: he poured water on every initiative to grow churches, increased the opportunities for in-service training, and encouraged clergy and laity to attend evangelism and church

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[100] *2001 Sydney Year Book,* 387.
[101] Ibid, 385-411.

growth conferences. The result was that at the end of his time in office, the number of people attending Anglican services of worship increased by 11%, contrary to the experience of every other diocese in Australia, all of which shrank, some alarmingly, in this decade of rampant secularism. Diocesan discord focuses attention on the home front, but Goodhew was respected throughout the Australian Church and internationally. Reporting on the 1998 Lambeth Conference, Paul Barnett expressed the view [in *Southern Cross*, March 2001] that there was not a better-known or more respected archbishop in the world than Harry Goodhew. [102]

These accomplishments raise the question, what was it that drew Goodhew to the point of so breaking with his natural allies that it resulted in his episcopate becoming mired in controversy, conflict, and at many points, impotence?

One theory may be that he had deep within him an idea of the role of Archbishop as one which entitled him to be followed on major matters, as was Mowll and perhaps Loane. He may have thought that was *his* entitlement also. For example, Goodhew told the Synod in 1994 in relation to the Pymble matter:

> I have a responsibility for all the churches, all the people, all the clergy of the Diocese, for the flock of Christ, all of it. Clergy and laity alike and I did not believe that I could responsibly walk away from a situation and leave it acrimoniously to bleed to a shadow of its former self, in full view of the public eye ... I therefore took what appeared to me to be a gospel directed ordinance sanctioned approach.[103]

Apart from the unique but different personalities of Mowll and Loane, the times were different. Denominationalism (and with it reverence for ecclesiastical leadership) had suffered a major blow under the influence of D B Knox. Coinciding with that was the broader anti-authority mood of the 1960s and 1970s. Also, both Mowll and Loane enjoyed very strong electoral mandates, which gave them the opportunity to take initiatives that Goodhew and Robinson were not able to take.

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[102] Stuart Piggin, 'An update on the Sydney Anglican Brand of Evangelicalism: the Goodhew and Jensen Decades'*,* delivered at the Evangelical History Conference at Macquarie University, 23 July 2010.
[103] *1995 Sydney Year Book, 310-316.*

Reflecting on the office of Archbishop itself, it can be divided into two parts: the *powers* conferred by statutes and the *influence* beyond those strictly legal powers. This second part is often where bishops can get into trouble. For example, Marcus Loane proposed the sub-division of the Diocese. As noted, there was initial (polite) support but eventually that dried up and Synod chose another path. Nevertheless underlying support for him never wavered.

In Goodhew's case, to have used his legal powers (contested as they were) to remove the Rector of Pymble was seen by many to have gone beyond his accepted constitutional role in a matter which required a *broader* base of support. His smaller electoral mandate, the lack of personal relations with the clergy, which Loane, Robinson and Jensen had enjoyed from MTC days, meant that he was not given the slack they were given when they made mistakes. Pymble aside, the back flip on lay administration, taking on the ACL, his appointments and his support for *APBA,* all created an atmosphere of disillusionment and distrust. That deprived him of influence on other matters where there *were* shared values, such as his desire to mobilise support for his version of what later became the Diocesan Mission. If he expected too much of the office and went beyond its legal powers to try things that were not politically doable, then it should not be surprising that the negative reaction to them diminished his influence. This is a theory that does not make him (or those who opposed him) villains, just people reacting to different perceptions of the office.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE JENSEN YEARS: ALL ABOUT THE MISSION

13.1 Introduction

The timing of this study means that it is too soon to give a definitive assessment of the Jensen administration, but not too soon to lay out the key features that will have to be taken into account when making that assessment. On the key question of change in the Diocese, this period was not marked by significant innovation. The exceptions were the creation of formal links with non-Anglican churches, the planting of churches across parish boundaries and the establishment of a permanent diaconate.

At a policy level, the centrepiece of Jensen's administration was the Diocesan Mission (DM). The other major challenge was the fallout of the GFC and its impact on the EOS and the DE. At the political level, the concentration on evangelism meant that the largely conservative evangelical majority was happy to give their support to him, even when the DM did not turn out as many had hoped. He made certain he kept close to his political allies by holding regular, private and structured meetings with them on both domestic and external affairs. Jensen exercised significant influence internationally as Anglican leaders in the Global South reacted to pressure to accept practising homosexuals into the Anglican ministry.

This chapter will concentrate on Jensen's election, the extension of his term of office, the DM and how MTC, at last, came under the unfettered control of Synod, so that the Principal could be appointed without interference from the Trustees of the Thomas Moore Estate. Other matters pertinent to the Jensen era but which relate to the *whole* period under review, such as women's ordination, lay and diaconal administration and regionalism, have already been covered in earlier chapters.

Peter Jensen was converted at the 1959 Billy Graham Crusade. Before going to MTC he was a teacher. After ordination, he lectured at MTC, gained his DPhil at Oxford and became Principal of MTC in 1985. He was a member and a Vice-President of ACL.

13.2 Election of Peter Jensen

As the Goodhew episcopate was drawing to a close, the crucial question for the conservatives was who would be their candidate? Soundings indicated that most wanted Peter Jensen. Not as radical as brother, Phillip, he was considered more likely to beat Robert Forsyth, the expected nominee of Blue Ticket supporters. ACL played no direct role in this campaign because to take sides when no direct matters of ACL principles were involved would damage ACL's other interests.[1]

Once Jensen indicated he was prepared to stand, those who managed his campaign deliberately excluded him from any further involvement.[2] About six months out, a small organising group began to meet. Its existence was secret and comprised Phillip Jensen, Robert Tong, Bruce Hall, Glenn Davies, Andrew Mitchell (a layman from Gladesville parish) and Bruce Ballantine-Jones. The group met fortnightly at first, and from about three months out, weekly. The first few months were given over to taking surveys of the clergy on which candidate they preferred. Once it became clear that Jensen had sufficient support to ensure that Robert Forsyth would *never* gain a majority of the clergy vote, attention moved to the laity. A large number of them signified their support, but not enough to ensure victory before the debates in Synod took place.

Nearer the election, supporters of the main candidates published their promotional material. Jensen's brochure was drafted by Glenn Davies, with input from the group.

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[1] In *The Chosen Ones*, McGillion quotes a number of opponents of the Jensen nomination as saying that the ACL was involved in the behind the scenes actions during the election process, (81-82.) This is not correct, but is an example of how actions of Sydney conservatives are often attributed to ACL as an organisation. Ballantine-Jones, as a leader of the Jensen campaign and President of ACL at the time, ensured that ACL had no part in the process.
[2] The only exception was when Jensen was consulted to verify factual material in the promotional brochure

It was issued over the names of Davies and Tong and carried endorsements of the Deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, Roger Corbett, CEO of Woolworths, the Rev Dick Lucas of St Helens Bishopsgate, Professor Don Carson and R. Kent Hughes from the US, Bishop Frank Retief of South Africa and many Sydney and non-Sydney evangelical leaders. Forsyth's supporters published a series of publications entitled *Conversations with Forsyth* and also a paper by Forsyth, prepared for a virtually unknown group called Anglican Parishes Network.[3]

The established tactic to secure multiple nominations was followed by all parties; Jensen had 138, Forsyth 45, Trevor Edwards 24. Geoff Huard and Reg Piper had 31 each.[4]

A major (and not unexpected) problem for the Jensen campaign erupted when both Phillip Jensen and Glenn Davies were nominated. Notwithstanding their nominations, both Jensen and Davies continued to work to promote Peter Jensen, while at the same time wrestling with the pressures from others to let their names go forward. Phillip Jensen wrote to Synod members on why he was not standing. In part he said:

> ... Some time ago I was asked to help in the organisation of the nomination and promotion of my brother for the office of Archbishop. I happily agreed as I believe that Peter would make an excellent Archbishop ... However, I have received a great deal of encouragement to allow my nomination to go forward ... As I do not wish to see the votes divided between us, nor see the houses of Synod divided, and as I have every reason to wish to remain in my present labours, I have decided to decline nomination...[5]

Davies also declined to accept nomination. In a press release, he said, in part:

> I am firmly of the view that Peter Jensen is the man for the job. I have publicly supported his nomination and would want to speak on his behalf in the Synod.

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[3] This group, according to Forsyth was a small, non-political group of Central Churchmen that met for mutual prayer and support.
[4] *Sydney Year Book* 2002, 362-364.
[5] This letter was published and paid for by Phillip Jensen and the Parish Council of St. Matthias, Centennial Park.

> For my nomination to be active during the synod debate would only compromise my level of commitment to his election and would confuse people who may draw the inference that I was competing with Peter for the position. Accordingly, I cannot consider myself a nominee for the position while Peter Jensen is a candidate.[6]

After the nomination phase, Jensen supporters called tactics meetings under the provisions of the relevant ordinance to determine who would propose and second Jensen on the successive meeting days. It was decided that the mover and seconder on the first night would be Peter Tasker (later, Bishop of Georges River), and Narelle Jarrett (Principal of Mary Andrew's College).[7] All but Jensen and Forsyth were eliminated on the first night. Jensen had strong support from the clergy, but Forsyth actually outpolled Jensen among the laity.[8]

The tactic for Jensen was to put up the strongest speakers on the *second* night with a view to having only Jensen left on the Final List, thereby ensuring that the process would be over *that* night. Glenn Davies was to nominate and Karen Sowada (a former senator and a parishioner of St Matthias Centennial Park) was to second. Although there were strong anti-Jensen speeches on the first night and a few anti-Forsyth speeches as well, both sides brought out strong negative arguments on the second night.[9] As the debate continued, it was clear that the Jensen forces were better prepared and won the debate decisively. The voting showed the anticipated strong support for Jensen among clergy, 169 for and 89 against, compared to 101-157 for Forsyth. But it was among the laity that the surprise came; 259-188 for Jensen, 206-243 for Forsyth, a very strong turn-around from the night before.[10]

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[6] Press Release from St Luke's Miranda, 11 May 2001.
[7] There were strong anti-Jensen speeches on the first night which had the effect of troubling many lay members, leading to Jensen not securing a majority of the lay vote. On paper the voting figures seemed to signal strong support for Forsyth, however, it was soon realised that if only a dozen laypersons changed their mind and other supporters, not present on the first night, turned up on the next night, the problem would be solved. The word was put out for a 'ring around' to encourage clergy to talk with their lay representatives to support Jensen on the second night. Forsyth polled, in the House of Laity, 280 for 160 against, informal 2, in the House of Clergy, 144 for 109 against, informal 1, 2002. *Sydney Year Book*, 365.
[8] Ibid, 365.
[9] Debates at election Synods are always held behind closed doors to allow speakers to refer to anything they think are reasons why a candidate should not be elected.
[10] Under the ordinance, if only one candidate secured a majority in both houses for the Final list, the question that he should become Archbishop had to be put immediately and without debate.

It was later said that the Forsyth supporters were angry because they expected there would be a *third* night when they were going to bring out their best speakers. However the onus is on participants to know the rules and to work within them, not complain that they did not have an opportunity of a third night. The ordinance clearly states that once there is just one name left on the Final List, the question that the remaining name should be Archbishop has to be put *immediately* and without debate. Given that Jensen supporters expected Forsyth *not* to get a majority of clergy, in their minds, the matter was always going to be decided by the laity on the *second* night, and it was.[11]

It is impossible for high level political contests such as this to be waged without hard things being said and for feelings not to colour interpretation of events. In the case of the 2001 election (and remembering the lessons of the 1993 election), Jensen supporters had a steely resolve to plan, organise, and to work hard within the procedures laid down. Other elements behind the Jensen victory included the unity of the conservatives, the pent-up pressure for change that would not be denied, the disciplined implementation of a plan and the superiority of the Jensen forces on the floor of Synod.

13.3 Control of Moore Theological College: Trustees or Synod

When Sydney conservatives chat among themselves, they often muse over which is the most important job in the Diocese, Archbishop or Principal of MTC. Archbishops ordain and appoint rectors, but principals can mould the theology and attitudes of future rectors, and through them, their parishioners. When Jensen moved from MTC, the question of his replacement precipitated an intense, but mostly behind the scenes political struggle between the same forces that fought it out during the 'Holy Wars'. The battle was between the then Trustees of the Thomas Moore Estate and the MTC Council.

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[11] Other details of the election process and the opinions of some of the participants have been covered in *The Chosen Ones* and are worth consulting to catch some of the atmosphere.

The history of MTC was set out in the Explanatory Report for the MTC Ordinance 1984 Amendment Ordinance 2009.[12] It said that until 1985, MTC was conducted by the three Trustees of the Thomas Moore Estate, and from 1919 they were assisted by a committee of management established by ordinance of Synod. By the time of D B Knox, the management committee ran the College with minimal involvement of the Trustees, acting as trustees.

Under the procedures of the 1984 Ordinance, the appointment of Principal was made by the Trustees and the Council acting together, but with the initiative for proposing a name in the hands of the Trustees. They were a self-perpetuating group who were the executors of the Thomas Moore Estate. The Archbishop of the day was always one, plus two senior diocesan figures, usually a layperson and clergyman. It was always the case that retiring archbishops resigned as a trustee in favour of his successor. That was the expectation in this case. However Goodhew did not resign. The other two Trustees were Bishop Paul Barnett and Roderick West. Some on the MTC Council were known to favour Dr John Woodhouse, Rector of St Ives, as Jensen's replacement. He had been a leading figure in many of the controversial issues during Goodhew's term.

On 21 June, two weeks after Jensen's election, but before his installation, the Trustees Barnett and Goodhew (West was overseas) wrote to the Council stating:

> The Trustees note that the Principal of Moore College has an important role in training ordinands for the Diocese of Sydney but also for other ministries inside and outside the Anglican Church. Under the Moore Theological College Ordinance (Clause 16) at a vacancy of the Principalship the Trustees appoint the Principal in consultation with the College Council with the concurrence of a majority of other members of the College Council.[13]

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[12] sydneyanglicans.org.au, SDS, Synod Past Years, explanatory report for the MTC Amendment Ordinance 2009, 11.
[13] Moore College Theological Council Minutes for 21 June 2001.

This letter also proposed the terms of an advertisement for the position and said that responses should be directed to the Secretary of the Trustees. MTC Council meeting of 21 June 2001 referred this letter to a sub-committee, comprising John Creelman, Glenn Davies, Dr Bill Hurditch and Robert Tong, created to consider the appointment of the next Principal.[14] It was resolved at the same meeting that Peter Jensen's letter of resignation as Principal (to become effective on 29 June, the date of his installation) *not* be received. Instead he was requested to write a new letter of resignation, to take effect on 30 November 2001, to be binding *only* upon his becoming Archbishop. (It appears that some Trustees were concerned that there might be a period of time when Jensen was both Archbishop and Principal at the same time). This new letter was presented and received later that meeting.[15] This action signalled some concern within the Council that there might be a difference of approach between the Council and the Trustees.

Those difficulties materialised almost immediately. On 16 July 2001 (two weeks after Jensen became Archbishop) Barnett resigned as a Trustee. Instead of appointing Jensen to replace him, Goodhew and West appointed Mr Peter Kell, a close friend of Goodhew's. These three Trustees then appointed a fourth Trustee, the Rev Dr Roger Chilton of Pymble on 20 July 2001. This was the second time they passed up the opportunity to appoint the sitting Archbishop, even though the most important action Trustees ever take (the selection of the Principal) was before them. Although trust law permitted four trustees, the appointment of a fourth trustee was unprecedented in the history of the Trust. Goodhew's continued role as Trustee was creating serious concern at the MTC Council.

At a special Council meeting on 2 August 2001 (with West, Kell and Chilton present), the Council noted that there were now four Trustees and that this affected the voting balance on the Council. It also noted that Jensen was not consulted about the appointment of the new Trustees. It further noted that contrary to historical practice and custom, Bishop Goodhew (who had not resigned immediately in favour of his successor once he had taken office), and the remaining Trustees had appointed Kell

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

and Chilton as Trustees.[16] The Council then resolved to express its deep concern to the Trustees over this departure from the tradition of inviting the new Archbishop to become a Trustee immediately he became Archbishop. The Council asked its executive to examine the relationship between the Council and the Trustees with a view to identifying opportunities to streamline and improve the governance and administration of the College. It resolved that the Council note the role to the Trustees as set out in the MTC Ordinance 1984. It also affirmed the draft advertisement for a new principal. Significantly, the Council noted that the Trustees indicated that they would sign the relevant documents after the conclusion of the meeting to arrange for the appointment of Jensen as a Trustee.[17] On 8 August 2001, Goodhew resigned and the remaining three Trustees then appointed Jensen on the same day.

Tong (as Secretary of the Council) wrote to the Trustees on 14 August 2001 conveying the Council's concerns and that they had been given no explanation for the changes in the Trustees. He pointed out that in the 160 year history of the Thomas Moore Estate there had never been a fourth Trustee. He related comments at the Council indicating a belief that the Trustees had not wanted Bishop Goodhew to resign. He said that West's explanation for not appointing Jensen, namely that he was still the Principal, did not arise from the Ordinance, as Clause 5 contemplates that the Principal *could* be a Trustee. He criticised the Trustees for not consulting the Archbishop [Jensen], describing it as 'both insulting and offensive'. He pointed out that Goodhew had retired as Archbishop on 19 March, 'but obviously retained an active role in the retirement and selection of new Trustees for the nineteen week period to July'. Tong said that 'if Bishop Goodhew was reluctant to resign and the other Trustees were reluctant to accept his resignation, there would have been a situation where the four Trustees – excluding Archbishop Jensen – had the initiative in appointing the new Principal'. Tong cited various comments made at the Council meeting [of 2 August] to the effect that as far back as July 2000, Goodhew had indicated he would not resign if Jensen was elected Archbishop. Tong's letter said, 'the fact that the Executive has been asked to look at the continued utility of the connection between the Trustees of the Estate and the College Council is testimony

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[16] Moore Theological College Council Minutes for 2 August 2001.
[17] Ibid.

to the strong feelings of the Council'. He asked whether the Trustees had acted in this fashion in order to 'promote a certain name (as yet undisclosed)', or 'to prevent a certain name (as yet undisclosed)?'[18] The letter concluded:

> The Ordinance requires a high degree of co-operation between Council and Trustees in the appointment of a Principal. That co-operation will work best where there is goodwill and trust. If the Trustees cannot be frank about the issues raised then the foundation of goodwill and trust will not remain secure.

> The structural issue of whether the Trustees of the Estate should retain a role in the government of the College remains open for further examination. The Executive is preparing a report for the Council.[19]

Clearly this was a major rift between the Trustees and the Council.

The Executive met on 12 September and resolved to recommend that the next Principal be appointed for an initial five-year term with a mid-point review by the Council.[20]

The full Council met on 20 September 2001. A letter from the Trustees in response to Tong's letter of 14 August was distributed. It reiterated their earnest desire to work openly and sincerely with the Council. They were satisfied that no Trustee had a particular name to promote or to prevent. With respect to the apprehension surrounding Goodhew's reluctance to resign as a Trustee, they said that they were told by the Secretary to the Trustees that Bishop Goodhew had requested the registration documents to be drawn up in June, but because Roderick West had been overseas at the time they were delayed. They acknowledged that remarks at the 16 August Council meeting had been interpreted as evidence that the Trustees were reluctant to accept Goodhew's resignation to prevent the appointment of Jensen as Trustee. The Trustees had requested West to meet with Archbishop Jensen to discuss his appointment, which he did soon afterwards. On the appointment of a fourth Trustee, they said that that was done to give additional

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[18] Letter from Robert Tong, Secretary of MTC Council, 14 March 2001.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Notes of MTC Council Executive Meeting, 12 September 2001.

insight and wisdom in their task and not for any ulterior motive. They regretted that a step taken for positive purposes had caused grief and concern. Acknowledging the tensions between the Council and the Trustees, the letter conceded that it was caused in part from an acknowledged failure to communicate at the appropriate stages with the Archbishop in some cases and the Council in others. They said they would take steps to ensure that more open communication takes place in the future. They expressed the hope that the past could be put behind them and together they and the Council could go forward as a united body.[21]

Notwithstanding this letter and after further discussion, the Council then resolved:

> Though the Council appreciates the willingness of Dr Roger Chilton, Mr Peter Kell and Mr Rod West to serve as Trustees ..., and thanking them for their service to the College, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the changes of the Trustees, it respectfully requests Dr Roger Chilton, Mr Peter Kell and Mr Rod West to resign as Trustees.[22]

Jensen did not vote on any of these matters. Chilton and West (who had been present earlier) left during the discussions on this motion and did not return later because they both had other commitments. At the same meeting, the Council resolved to accept the Executive's recommendation on the terms of employment of the next Principal. It appointed a Selection Committee to consist of Bishop Glenn Davies, the Rev Bruce Hall, Robert Tong and Dr Bill Hurditch, if there were four Trustees, with the College Bursar in attendance.

On 31 October 2001, West, Chilton and Kell wrote to Tong informing him that they would not resign.

The Report of the 9 November 2001 Executive meeting stated that there were six applications to be considered by the Trustees and Council representatives. Over the following months, the Selection Committee and the Trustees worked their way through the applications. A special meeting of the Council was held at Bishopscourt

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[21] MTC Council Minutes, 20 September 2001.
[22] Ibid.

on 14 February 2002 and a 'consultation' between the Council and the Trustees took place on that occasion.[23] Another special Council was held on 8 March 2002. Jensen reported on a meeting of the Trustees who had asked him to present the name of Dr John Woodhouse to the other members of the College Council for consideration under Clause 16 (1) of the Ordinance. All non-Trustee members of the Council present agreed to the appointment of Woodhouse.[24]

The question of the continuing role of the Trustees in the affairs of the College, and in particular the appointment of the Principal, was left hanging following the appointment of Woodhouse in 2002. However, that the Executive of MTC Council had been asked to look at 'the continued utility of the connection between the Trustees ...' (as Tong said in his letter to the Trustees in 2001) was testimony to the strong feelings of the Council and that many on them would not be unhappy if the nexus with the Trustees was broken.

Nothing much happened in this regard until 2006, when the NSW Department of Education and Training (DET), as part of negotiations over MTC's application to be recognised as a College of Higher Education, 'demanded some independence between the *owners* of the College (taken by DET to be the Council members) and its *governors*' as part on an arrangement to recognise MTC as a College of Higher Education under the relevant Act.[25] The solution was to create a council to manage, govern and control the College as a College of Higher Education, performing a role similar to the members of a general meeting of a company, and a governing board to perform a role similar to a board of directors. In effect this arrangement would give operational and academic independence (as required by DET) to the Council and responsibility for appointing the Principal, and general policy, to the Governing Board.

In the lead up to the preparations for making these changes, Tong wrote to the Secretary of the Trustees in 2008 saying, 'the veto right [regarding the appointment of the Principal] must be understood in the context of the Trustees of the Estate

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[23] MTC Council Minutes for 14 February 2002.
[24] MTC Council Minutes for 8 March 2002.
[25] Explanatory Report to Synod for the Moore Theological College Ordinance 1984 Amendment Ordinance 2009, sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, Past Synods, ordinances passed, 11.

continuing to be the legal owners of the property and the personal exposure to any claims against the College'. He referred to the advice (in 1984) pursuant to the *Anglican Church of Australia (Bodies Corporate) Act 1938*, which said the 'one consequence of the incorporation was that the title and personal property could be transferred out of the individual names of the Trustees of the Estate into the name of the College Council. He continued, 'I understand that this transfer is now complete so that the registered proprietor of all College land is "Moore Theological College"'. He then said:

> As a matter of history, the last two Principal appointments (Woodhouse and Jensen) were made with the close collaboration between the Trustees of the Estate and the College Council. In my own view, having been involved in both appointments, nothing of value was added by having the Trustees of the Estate acting in parallel to the College Council. In any event, under the ordinance, the Council has the final say.[26]

It was the view of the Council that 'all property derived from the Estate of the late Thomas Moore which was relevant to the operations of the College [had] been transferred to the ownership of the Council'.[27] This meant that there was no longer any need for the Trustees to be on the Governing Board at all, which (apart from the Archbishop, the Principal and the Chairman of the Board of Studies) was to be appointed by the Synod.

The matter of the relationship of the Trustees in the affairs of the College rested on whether its property was *still* bound up in some way with the Thomas Moore Estate. If so, it could have been argued that the Trustees retained a say in College policy and in particular the appointment of the Principal.

At least one of the Trustees disputed the claim that there was *no* residual property at Newtown belonging to the Estate. Attention centred on the ownership of the land on which the College Chapel and Principal's residence had been built. Expensive legal advice was obtained by the Trustees to substantiate the claim that the nexus

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[26] Letter from Robert Tong, Secretary of MTC Council, to John Chapman, Secretary of Thomas Moore Estate, 18 September 2008.
[27] Ibid, 12.

between the Estate and the College still existed. The then Diocesan Chancellor (Acting Judge Peter Johns) consequently undertook a detailed examination of the historical and legal basis for such a claim. He concluded that the funds required for the purchase of the subject land (Lot 3 in the deposited plan 111681) from a Mr John Grant in 1923, and the cost of the subsequent home for the Principal built upon it were provided from the proceeds of two funds specifically raised for the purpose and not from any residual funds related to the Thomas Moore Estate. He concluded that the overwhelming documentary evidence clearly showed that the contention by the 'Moore Will Trust that the Grant land was purchased from the proceeds of the sale of Trust property known as the Dwyer Farm could not, as contended, be sustained'.[28]

Johns said, 'It is completely inconsistent with all the history of this matter to conclude that the funds used to purchase the Grant land came from the Moore Will Trust'. In fact Johns doubted that the Thomas Moore Estate ever had any interest in the Newtown properties, because the documentary evidence revealed a number of the properties were acquired with funds from the same source as that which purchased the Grant land.[29] The proceeds of the Dwyer farm sale were invested by the Moore Will Trust in bonds and remained so until at least 1931 which was well after the purchase of the Grant land.

The information unearthed by Peter Johns supported the claim of MTC Council that the links with the Thomas Moore Estate had expired. This (along with the requirements of DET) provided the opportunity for the government of the College to be reconstituted to bring the College under the full control of the Synod. This was done by means of the 2009 Ordinance. The Rev Dr Mark Thompson was appointed Principal on the retirement of Dr John Woodhouse in 2013 under these new arrangements.

Another line of argument leading to the same conclusion (but apparently not noticed at the time of reconstitution in 2009) might have been the judgement of the NSW Supreme Court in 1989.[30] The judge said:

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[28] Statement by Peter Johns to Ballantine-Jones, 29 August 2013.
[29] Ibid.
[30] *Gotley v Robinson [1985] NSWSC No 3877.*

I consider ... that the funds of these trusts [bequests in support of scholarships] are properly to be regarded as held for the purposes ancillary to the purposes of the College itself, so that the moneys payable under the trusts here in question will constitute 'Church trust property' within the meaning of the 1917 Act if, but only if, the property comprising the College itself ... constitutes 'Church trust property' within the meaning of the Act. This makes it necessary to consider the status of the College as 'church trust property' under the 1917 Act'.[31]

The judge then reviewed the history of the College as disclosed in the evidence. He concluded, 'It is I think clear that the trust on which the College at Newtown has been held since its establishment is that declared in s8 of the 1886 Act.[32] This trust must in my view be considered as distinct from any trust established by the will of Thomas Moore, notwithstanding the identity of the trustees'.[33] He continued, 'I have little doubt, having regard to the terms of s8 of the 1886 Act that the College is subject to a trust for the use, benefit and purpose of the Anglican Church of Australia'.[34] On reviewing the scope of the words, 'Anglican Church of Australia', he concluded that 'the College does fall within the description of property subject to a trust for the purposes of the Church in the Diocese of Sydney within the meaning of the definition of "Church trust property" in the 1917 Act'.[35]

So it seems that if the court had before it evidence that *all* of the Newtown site was Church Trust Property in 1989, it appears that the Synod could have passed legislation at any time to assume full control of the College to the exclusion of the Trustees of the Thomas Moore Estate. That the College did not pursue this line of inquiry when the claim was made regarding the Grant land is more likely to have

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[31] Ibid, 6-7.
[32] St James' School Compensation Act 1886.
[33] McLelland Judgement, 12.
[34] Ibid,12. The 1886 Act related to a Church property in Elizabeth and Castlereagh Streets known as St James' School. The government paid 33,209 pounds to the Church of England Property Trust Diocese of Sydney by way of compensation for the resumption. The Judgement said '... a private Act which was assented to on 27 August 1886 as the St James' School Compensation Act 1886. The promoters of the bill were the Property Trust and the Moore estate Trustees. Bishop Barry gave evidence to the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly appointed to consider the Bill and conveyed the approval thereto of the Sydney Synod. The Act was described in its long Title as:
'An Act to declare the trusts of certain moneys in the hands of the Church of England Property Trust Diocese of Sydney representing the compensation paid by the Government of New South Wales for the resumption of St James' School. McLelland Judgement', 10-11.
[35] Ibid, 17.

been the result of an oversight. In any case, the desire to break the nexus with the Trustees was almost certainly sparked by the events leading up to the appointment of Woodhouse in 2002, and happily embraced by the requirements for recognition as a College of Higher Education.

As for the Thomas Moore Estate itself, the reality was that without any involvement in the affairs of MTC and the residual funds under the control of the Trustees by then having become so small, it was decided to wind it up altogether. The entry in the *NSW Government Gazette* of 23 October 2010 stated:

> The Trustees submitted that over time, the real value of the corpus of the Estate has diminished in size and no longer provides income to meet the charitable purposes set out in the will. The financial records provided by the Trustees support this conclusion.[36]

This brought to a close an arrangement (even if based on a misunderstanding) that had served the College and the Diocese well for over a hundred years. The circumstances of its discontinuance, involving as it did some raw political power plays and needless disputes over legal matters, was a reflection of the atmospherics of the time and the determination of the parties to pursue their objectives to exercise control over the most important organisation of the Diocese, Moore Theological College. With respect to changes in diocesan practices, this particular development represents one of the most significant changes in the period under review.

It is possible to think of this episode as the last battle in the 'Holy Wars' of the Goodhew era. It involved a stand-off between key individuals who had been in conflict for nearly 10 years. There was the use of legal, constitutional and political tactics and there was the battle over who should (or should not) occupy what some believe to be the most important position in the Diocese. That question was unambiguously resolved in favour of the Synod.

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[36] *New South Wales Government Gazette,* 23 October 2010, 5314.

13.4 Jensen's Extension

In a study on politics in the Diocese of that time, it is necessary to examine the matter of the five year extension of Peter Jensen's term in April 2003. The decision to seek the extension (and how it was to be achieved) emanated from Bruce Ballantine-Jones. His view was that it was in the interests of the newly adopted Diocesan Mission and the consolidation of culture change that Jensen should remain Archbishop for an additional five years. Under the Ordinance, archbishops had to retire at 65. But Synod had determined that their term could be extended to 70 if either Synod or Standing Committee gave approval by resolution.[37] The key question for him was one of timing. Should it be early in Jensen's term or towards the end? Ballantine-Jones' view was the sooner the better. In 2002, Jensen's popularity was very high, but no one could know what it would be in 2006, just two years before his scheduled retirement? The other question was, *which* body should grant the extension? Ballantine-Jones thought both would support it, but to go Synod would expose Jensen to hostile media and political opposition. He decided that it would be easier and cleaner to bring the matter to Standing Committee.

Ballantine-Jones' view was that it would be foolhardy to take such a high stakes political action without being sure of success. Accordingly he spoke confidentially to the known Jensen supporters and worked out to others till a comfortable majority of about 35 of the 50 members was confirmed. He chose the November 2002 Standing Committee meeting to act, nearly 18 months into Jensen's term, long enough to judge his performance, and early enough to get the matter resolved so everyone could get on with the Mission. He gave notice of the motion on November 11.[38]

Opposition took the form of an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on the day of the Standing Committee meeting.[39] It criticised Jensen for alleged nepotism following the appointment of his wife Christine to an unpaid position on a panel for women's ministry. The article juxtaposed that with the appointment of his brother Phillip as Dean of the Cathedral and Director of Ministry Training and Development. The

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[37] See Retirements Ordinance 1993, *Acts, Ordinances and Regulations, 2005*, 364.
[38] *Sydney Year Book,* 1994, 722.
[39] *Sydney Morning Herald,* 18 November 2002.

appointment of his son Michael as a chaplain at the Cathedral School was also mentioned. The Rev John Cornish of Epping, a leader of Anglicans Together, said that the most recent appointment [Mrs Jensen's] 'was yet another example of nepotistic behaviour by Sydney's power base'. The article was seen by many as an attempt to influence Standing Committee. It certainly had that effect. That morning Jensen rang Ballantine-Jones asking him in view of the article not to move the motion. He was hurt and embarrassed at the exposure of his family to such media attention. Ballantine-Jones had no choice but to agree.[40] When Standing Committee convened at 6pm he moved that the motion be deferred, saying:

> I deplore the scandalous and untrue media remarks. I entirely sympathise with the Archbishop and his family in this situation. It would never be my inclination to succumb to media pressure in these matters, except that this attack has been so personal that to persevere with this motion *at this time* would only worsen the situation created by the media. I give notice that I reserve the right to bring this back on a later occasion.[41]

He also indicated that a strong majority had personally indicated to him their support for the motion. That was where the matter rested. The notice remained on the agenda, and he intended to reactivate it at a time of his choosing.

That time came on April 20 2003. Ballantine-Jones, having checked that the numbers were substantially the same, asked for the motion to be placed on the supplementary agenda of Standing Committee for that month.[42] When the motion was called, Jensen left the room and Bishop Reg Piper took the chair. In his speech, Ballantine-Jones referred to the unqualified right of the Standing Committee to make

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[40] For the record, Christine Jensen completed three years full time study at Moore College before she was married. The appointment of Phillip to the Cathedral, far from being a move up, was in fact a step down. As Rector of St Matthias and Chaplain at the University of New South Wales, he led the largest Anglican parish in Australia *and* the largest Christian university work in Australia, plus the massive Matthias Media and related enterprises. As the founder of the Ministry Training Scheme (MTS), he had already been responsible for the largest Christian training programme in the Anglican Church in Australia. The Cathedral itself had fallen on hard times and anyone appointed to that position was destined for a very difficult task. As for the Archbishop's son, he had just completed his Moore College training and the chaplaincy was his first appointment. It had nothing to do with the Archbishop, and was certainly not a prestigious or privileged appointment.

[41] Taken from author's speech notes, 18 November 2002.

[42] The supplementary agenda is distributed on the night of the meeting, meaning that items on it could not be leaked beforehand, as had happened with the November 2002 meeting.

this decision. He said that *they* were in a better position to observe how he had performed in his nearly two years in office. To send such a matter to Synod would create tensions and even divisions because there would always be those who would want to undermine him. He said matters of timing were always subjective, but after two years in office 'we knew what kind of leader he was'. To delay would be to allow speculation that later actions by Jensen were influenced by the possibility of an extension and be open to interpretation that his own future was on his mind. 'Above all', he said, 'the question needed to be settled at *that* time for the sake of the Mission'. He pointed out that of the five Archbishops he had served under he had never seen ordinary Anglicans or the Synod more motivated about evangelism. 'To allow him to leave halfway through this great thing [the Mission] is unthinkable'. He pointed out that about two years out from retirement, a wind down process begins and as the time draws nearer archbishops begin to move into a kind of caretaker role. He said that when a new archbishop takes over it generally takes a year or two for him to get into stride, in other words, in the middle of a ten year mission when things are getting tough and momentum needed to be maintained, the Mission would slow down.[43] At the conclusion, someone moved the matter be referred to Synod. That was defeated 25-17. When the motion was finally put, it was carried 32-10.

Again the *Sydney Morning Herald* gave prominence to the matter, featuring a large photo of son, Michael, at the Cathedral School.[44] Other throwbacks to the earlier article on nepotism included a quotation from Cornish saying that the move 'was a cynical act by the Calvinist pro-Jensen Anglican Church League that controls the Standing Committee. ... It's all to do with the [*League*] assuring their agenda is in place before the next Archbishop is elected ... to turn the Diocese into an ultra-reformed group'. He also criticised the appointment of Michael Jensen to Moore College. 'If that's not looking after your family, then I don't know what is'.

Many expressed support for the extension, most notably Robert Forsyth, the defeated candidate in 2001. He said, 'the Standing Committee debate was extensive and covered all the issues very well. It was clear that we had a common mind in

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[43] Quotations are taken from author's contemporaneous notes, 29 April 2003.
[44] *SMH,* 5 May 2003.

believing that Peter has been a wonderful gift of God to the Diocese and in wanting to see him continue his leadership of the Mission, God willing, as long as he can'.[45]

That Jensen's term was extended also gave him the opportunity to play a significant role in the ongoing conflicts involving the Anglican Communion. The degree to which the conservative primates availed themselves of Jensen's counsel leading up to and following the GAFCON Conference in Jerusalem in 2008, and the way other Sydney leaders were able to provide theological and legal expertise, was due to the fact that Jensen was Archbishop *at the time* those events took place.[46] It ought to be noted that had he retired when he turned 65 in 2008, he would not have been able to play the role he did in these historic events.

13.5 The Diocesan Mission

The DM originated from a process in 2000 to find a strategy based approach to financial allocations in recognition that the previous systems had had no measurable impact on frontline activities.[47] This gave birth to the idea of a campaign to reach 10% of the Sydney population in ten years. When Jensen took over in 2001, he challenged the Diocese to join him in a mighty crusade. The DM was going to be the instrument to do this, and in magnitude, it became the most ambitious and expensive project the Diocese ever attempted. Coverage of the DM in this chapter will concentrate on Jensen's role as the source of inspiration and drive as well as the broad outlines of its operations.[48]

Jensen adopted and then proposed the idea of the Mission at the 2001 Synod. Quoting his own speech at the Deep Impact Rally at the Homebush Sports Stadium in August 2001, he said:

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[45] *Southern Cross*, June 2003.
[46] 'GAFCON' stood for the *Global Anglican Futures Conference*. It was held in Jerusalem immediately prior to the 2008 Lambeth Conference. It was attended by bishops and representatives from 75% of the world's Anglicans. Many, including all Sydney bishops, boycotted Lambeth in favour of GAFCON.
[47] See page 337.
[48] Details of how the DM was organised will be examined in Chapter Seventeen.

Church-going Anglicans in Sydney are about 1% of the population. We are becoming invisible. It is almost as unusual to have a friend who is a church-going Anglican, as it is to have a friend who is an animal-keeper in the zoo. We are poised to become exotic. Most people will never meet or know one of us; it is hard for our children to have sufficient friends to support them. How will our neighbours hear the gospel from us?

If we wish to have a deep impact on our society –humanly speaking – we need to aim in the next decade to have at least 10% of the population who are committed, more constantly prayerful, more missionary minded, more confident in God, better equipped, better educated in the Bible and more prepared to sacrifice time and money and worldly happiness than ever before.[49]

In support of the Mission he asked three prominent Synod members to speak to the Synod in favour of the idea. Ballantine-Jones was one of them. He said that in his opinion for it to succeed, it would require a revolution of attitude, culture and practice. In response to Jensen's challenge, Synod passed a resolution endorsing the principle of strategy-driven spending and requesting that future allocations be based on the report advancing the idea of a DM.[50] A year later, the 2002 Synod enthusiastically endorsed the DM.[51] The DEB was renamed the Mission Taskforce

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[49] *2002 Sydney Year Book*, 376.
[50] *2002 Sydney Year Book,* 402, and for the Report, 460 – 468.
[51] *2003 Sydney Year Book*, 398-399. Resolution 13/02 adopting the Mission strategy specifically laid down the initial goal of the Mission as 'To see at least 10% of the population of the region of the Diocese in Bible-based churches in 10 years'. On Jensen's understanding of the ten percent goal, in 2007 (before the GFC), he circulated an explanation and supplied it to the author in 2013 as evidence of its significance to him. In part, it said, 'One thing which everyone remembers about the Diocesan Mission is the idea of reaching ten percent of the population of our region in ten years. Now we have virtually reached the mid-point of that ten year program it is time to ask again about the ten percent figure. I have always explained it by using three reasons.
First, it is impossible. Such a growth rate of churches in a liberal secular society would be unheard of. The ten percent in ten years is a constant reminder to us that only God could do such a thing ... God is sovereign, not us, and he will bless our efforts as he sees fit ... It is still a worthwhile goal, not least because it lifts our prayers.
Second, the ten percent goal makes us face the reality of how little impact we have as yet made for the gospel in our society. The churches are prominent still, and many still wish to be known as Christians, but the truth of the matter is that the actual number of church-going persons in the community – and especially protestants is small – perhaps as low as 2%. That is why when we passed the motion about this in Synod the goal was changed to make 10% the *initial* goal. We need constant reminders that we live in a mission field ...
Third, the ten percent figure acts as a challenge to the local church to move from a model of growth to a model of outreach. Growth is fine. But our steady growth can deceive us into thinking that we are grappling with the reality of the community around us. When we look out to the community and ask about ten percent, we see things differently; we recognise the real effort which evangelism calls upon

(MTF) and a complex network of sub-committees, dealing with what was called the 4 major policies, was created.[52]

These four policies effectively expressed the *strategy* for the DM and around which the sub-committee structures were built:

- **Policy 1** Activities to urge the Diocese to call upon God to pour out his Spirit to help.

- **Policy 2** Activities to enable parish churches to expand numerically and plant as many other fellowships and congregations as possible and to create fellowships to penetrate structures of society beyond the reach of the parish church.

- **Policy 3** Activities to multiply the number of well trained persons.

- **Policy 4** Activities to reform the life of the Diocese, including its culture and the use of resources to enable the fulfilment of the fundamental aim of the DM.[53]

There were differences of opinion on whether these were actual strategies or a collection of categories that required further development. Also, there were differences of opinion in the MTF about how the DM should be structured.[54]

13.6 The Early Years of the Diocesan Mission

Two years into the DM, Jensen said that the numerical starting point for the DM was an average weekly attendance of 52,000 as at May 2001. He said this was an

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us to make .... Talk of ten percent is merely a vivid way of saying that our churches have a responsibility to the community of which they are a part ...

I sometimes hear of negative talk about the ten percent figure, almost as though people are willing us to fail so that they can make the usual 'I told you so' remark. To me this just indicates that they have not understood what is being said. If instead of using ten percent we had said that "we wish to engage in a dedicated, decade-long evangelistic effort, under God, which will not simply grow existing churches but create multiple new ones and penetrate the community in such a way that everyone will know at least one church-going Christian who can share the gospel," but I am not sure that it would have created the same sense of interest ...'.

[52] Ibid, 610.
[53] *The Diocesan Mission – Mid Point Report, (*Sydney Standing Committee, Sydney, 2008), 6.
[54] See pages 339-341.

increase of 11% on the figures in 1991, but if monthly attendance was taken into account, the real figure was more like 67,000 Anglicans regularly attending church in 2001. After the first two years, he said it was 'still too early to work out how the new figures stand'. What we do know is that in the first 18 months, something like 65-70 new congregations, fellowships and churches have begun in connection with our Anglican churches'. He said, '... we are entitled to draw the conclusion that if the Mission was beginning to make a difference it would look something like this in the early stages'.[55] He said, 'the task for 2005, and, of course, in the years that follow will be to translate the Mission into effective practice ...'[56] In effect, in the popular mind, the specific numerically based outcomes nominated at the inception on the DM, became the indicators for the Mission's success.

The experiences of 2004-2005 showed how difficult building up momentum was proving to be. Behind-the-scenes discussions were taking place over whether the structures and strategies outlined in the 4 Policies were working. These discussions resulted in changes to the central administration of the DM, including renaming the MTF the Mission Board (DM).[57]

13.7 The Lead up to Connect 09

In his Synod address in 2006, Jensen acknowledged the difficulties associated with the Mission and reflected on the nature and challenge of change.[58] Taking Moses as an example, he said, 'leaders for change must be both radical and conservative; indeed the more conservative they are, the more radical than can afford to be'.[59] He said the problem of change was a spiritual one; 'if God's mercy has gripped you and you trust in his unchanging word, it will demand constant change'.[60] The problem in a changing world is that 'Church may represent just about the [one] place in our lives where there is no variety ... at least here is a pew we can occupy without fear of challenge or demand. In the words of an old hymn: "Change and decay in all around

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[55] *2005 Sydney Year Book,* 373.
[56] *2005 Sydney Year Book*, 383.
[57] See pages 339-341.
[58] *2007 Sydney Year Book,* 363-380.
[59] Ibid, 366.
[60] Ibid, 366.

I see ..." For us, change, any change, *is* decay'.[61] He then asked, 'Is this still a problem in our Diocese? Is necessary change still resisted?' Jensen was not suggesting that change had not occurred, but that the characteristics of a church that was open to change were needed more than ever. Of them he said:

> Most of our churches have altered beyond recognition in the last twenty-five years - altered fundamentally in what we do when we meet. Dress has changed; formalities have changed; services have changed; architecture has changed; preaching has changed; music has changed; the content of services has changed. I have hesitations about some of the alterations, but, taken as a whole, I applaud them. Failure to make these changes would have shown a preference for church-culture rather than the gospel, for outward rather than inward, for elitism rather than universalism.[62]

This was vintage Jensen with his 'gospel first' heart on full display. This was the leader of Sydney Anglicans talking to the people in the front line, pointing them to the 'right' way to do church. In summation he said:

> I said this at the beginning: that 'my call today is for us to develop *leadership through change.* I give you this challenge: to fulfil our Mission we need leaders; we need leaders who are able to lead in the midst of change. We need leaders who will themselves create necessary change, and leaders who are driven by a vision for the gospel to go into the whole community. And we need people and structures who embrace such a vision, encourage initiative and support their leaders'.[63]

The whole address was a thoughtful analysis of the wider challenges the churches faced in their mission. It was a rallying call to address matters the diocesan grass roots had been doing in the DM, but it did *not* address the problems the centre was facing in helping the churches make the changes that Jensen was talking about.

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[61] Ibid, 367.
[62] Ibid, 370.
[63] Ibid, 378.

13.8 The DM Mid-Point Review

It was clear by 2007 that something had to be done to lift the tempo of the DM. Standing Committee published a booklet, *The Diocesan Mission - Midpoint Report,* outlining the achievements and challenges of the Mission. In summary, it acknowledged that they were yet to see radical change. While many new congregations had begun, most involved re-planting existing groups.[64] Noting the significant increase in people training for ministry, it said it was hard to identify and train entrepreneurial leaders. It noted that attendances had stabilised in the preceding three years.[65]

This was a fairly sombre assessment of progress for an enterprise which had such high hopes, so much money to spend and still very strong grass roots support, but with little quantifiable results to be seen.

Against this background, a new campaign was devised to be the instrument for getting the DM back on course. The *Midpoint Report* said:

> The next stage of the Mission is centred on the Connect09 initiative ... The focus is to re-direct ministry from congregational gatherings to parish outreach. We want individuals and churches to be intentional and creative in building connections with society, recognising that it will mean changes in our church programs and how our paid staff and others spend their time.[66]

Jensen told the 2007 Synod that in his assessment the Diocese had maintained a steady progress forward in the first five years:

> We seem to have added about 5,000 adult members since 2002. The far more reliable financial results show that from giving through the plate, we have advanced 33%, from about $38 million to $56 million. These figures are certainly cause for rejoicing. Furthermore, we are aware of many new ministries which

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[64] Church planting was a favourite idea of Phillip Jensen. With such strong support for such a strategy, many wondered why it amounted to so little. Suggestions included that it was the wrong strategy or was implemented the wrong way.

[65] *The Diocesan Mission – Midpoint Report*. (Sydney Standing Committee, 2008), 2.

[66] Ibid, 2.

have started during the course of the Mission and a rather extraordinary increase in the number of paid workers – we had 470 active licensed clergy in 2001 for example; we have now added 86 more, making 556, an 18% increase. In addition, of course, there are more [paid] lay workers in our parishes. Likewise there is a decline in the average age of parishioners, increasing numbers in small groups and the more frequent reporting of conversion experiences.[67]

Noting that there had been 'no general breakthrough yet', he spoke at length of the proposed Connect09 campaign, linking it to the 50th anniversary of the first Billy Graham Crusade in 1959. In launching the Archbishop's Mission Partnership Fund, he said:

I want to start off with donations from those who gave their own life to Christ in the 59 Crusade, and so the fund has begun already with donations of $5,000 each, from two men who were converted to Christ as teenagers on the same day in April 1959.[68]

2008 was to be the year of preparation for Connect09. The main effort was made by Jensen himself with a series of overnight conferences for almost every rector at Bishopscourt in an attempt to inspire them to rise to the challenge of Connect09. Arguably, this effort was the most significant individual action of the whole DM, with enormous investment of time and energy by Jensen himself. Had it been done in 2003, along with other clergy related development programmes aimed at assisting them to lead their parishes into the Mission, the DM might have taken a different course.

13.9 Connect09

It is possible only to give the briefest description of the CO9 campaign. Attention is drawn to the detailed reports to the 2009 and 2010 Synods. What follows are

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[67] *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 373.
[68] *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 377. It is relevant to state that Ballantine-Jones was one of those two men. This is mentioned here to indicate that differences of opinion over how the Mission was being conducted, as outlined in Chapter Seventeen, did not diminish his personal commitment to the DM or Connect09. See also *2008 Sydney Year Book,* 378.

extracts from those reports. CO9 was launched in 2007 and continued to mid 2010. The report of the CO9 Management Committee to the 2009 Synod summarised what it saw as its highlights:

1. Encouragement to pray involving the distribution of over 50,000 information leaflets with 115,000 prayer bookmarks...

2. The two-day-live conferences at Bishopscourt in 2008, attended by 240 ministers, regional briefings in 2008 attended by 1000 church delegates.

3. A special strategy directed at lay people was organised involving clergy conferences and a meeting of delegates from some 80 parishes at Bishopscourt.

4. The development of youth strategies to target high schools and the production of training kits.

5. Special evangelistic training workshops to train clergy and lay leaders to present the gospel to generations X and Y.

6. The formal launch of CO9 with a service featuring Peter Jensen and well known gospel singer, Colin Buchanan and broadcast live to over 200 churches.

7. New initiatives to connect with the community, such as stalls at community events, church open days, door knocking, neighbourhood street parties.[69]

The report concluded: 'ConnectO9 is shaping up as one of the greatest Make-Jesus-Known campaigns ever seen in Australia. This assertion is based not simply on its scale, but on the depth and significance of what the campaign seeks to do ... it is audacious, difficult and challenging...'[70]

Twelve months later, the Management Committee gave a slightly more sober assessment:

All indications suggest that the CO9 campaign has been far-reaching and influential in the community, as well as positive and motivating among our constituent churches and individuals – far beyond what we dared to hope... At the same time, there is a widely held belief that so much more could have been done.

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[69] www.sydneyanglicans.net. *Connect09 Progress Report*. Follow links to SDS, Synod – Past Years, 2009 Synod and Standing Committee, special reports to Standing Committee, Report of Management Committee to Synod, 84.
[70] Ibid.

At one level, the take-up by our parishes exceeded all expectations, yet (by the admission of the rectors of these very parishes) at another level it was less than it could and ought to have been.[71]

The final report of 2010 set out the costs of CO9:

2007 - $16,000

2008 - $368,000

2009 - $471,000

2010 - $290,000

Total - $1,145,000[72]

13.10 The Diocesan Mission and the GFC

While preparations for Connect 09 were in full swing, the GFC hit. The losses to the DE meant that central funds available to fund Mission-related initiatives fell from $10 million in 2009 to $5.5 million in 2010, meaning that grants to regional councils and other Mission related programmes had to be stopped. In response to the GFC, Standing Committee published a 31 page booklet, *The Diocesan Mission: Strategic Directions 2010-2012.* It announced the major post-Connect09 initiative called, 'Mission Areas'. The Diocese was to be divided into an initial 20 local areas. The aim was 'to enable the local churches and their leadership ... to give attention to the actual community in which it is set ...' Each Area would have a Mission Leader (a rector) appointed by the Archbishop from that Area. His task would be to draw the local leadership together and help them set the agenda. These leaders would be given extra training and receive a modest remuneration for their services.[73] A timetable was set for the system to be up and running in 2011. Against a difficult post GFC financial environment, $300,000 over three years was to be set aside to facilitate this programme. Desired outcomes were stated to be: a greater understanding of demographic and other local church information, new local

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[71] www.sydneyanglicans.net. *Connect09 Final Report.* Follow links to SDS, Synod – Past Years, 2010, Synod and Standing Committee, special reports to Standing Committee, 21.
[72] Ibid, 23.
[73] *The Diocesan Mission; Strategic Directions 2010-2012*, (Diocese of Sydney Mission Board, Sydney, 2009), 26-31. See sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, Past Synods, 2009 Synod, Reports, *Strategic Directions 2010-2012.*

strategies and partnerships between parishes and diocesan organisations. Rectors would be given opportunities to grow their leadership skills and church members would be assisted to be more active in the Mission. Bishop Ivan Lee was appointed to lead this programme, in addition to his other duties.

This programme (along with Jensen's overnight conferences) was the recognition that the key to success for the DM was the effective capacity of senior ministers to inspire and mobilise their people. It also was the culmination of the evolution of regionalisation, begun in Loane's time and fully instituted during the Goodhew administration. However, it was created alongside the existing (and ancient) Area Deanery model, with area deans, regional councils made up of representatives from each deanery, and the Standing Committee composed mostly of members elected from the regions. This anomalous situation continued until 2013, when the Synod abolished Area Deaneries and designated the new Mission Areas as the constituting structure for regional councils. This change was described as 'the last administrative detail' to cement this new Mission Areas arrangement. [74]

13.11 Statistics That Tell a Story

One way of assessing the DM is to identify what measurable results flowed from the efforts and resources applied to it. The DM set out to incorporate 10% of the Sydney population into Bible based churches in ten years. The attendance statistics compiled by the Diocesan Registry from 2002 to 2011 are set out in Table One. What they show is that there was little change in aggregate attendance over that period. For example under the category 'Total of Regulars', average attendance grew from 74,883 in 2002 to 80,211 in 2011. This barely matched population growth.

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[74] *Southern Cross*, November 2013.

Table One: Statistics of Diocese of Sydney 2002-2011

Church Statistics	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Church (incl child/yth 02-04)	62624		64306	54582	55835	55730	50682	52798	53923	53502
Fellowships	998		1279	1081	1161	1282	1234	1267	1116	1235
Children				8489	8143	8746	8454	8522	8220	8811
Youth				3548	2088	2088	2746	4106	4255	4601
Subtotal	63622		65585	67700	67227	67846	63116	66693	67514	68149
Total of Regulars (Subtotal x1.177)	74883		79682	79126	79855	74288	78498	79464	80211	
%change			3%	3.20%	-0.70%	0.90%	-7%	5.70%	1.20%	0.90%
Other Protestant	54400		54400	54400	54400	54400	54400	54400	54400	54400
GRAND TOTAL	129283		131594	134082	133526	134255	128688	132898	133864	134611
%of population of diocese	3.03%		3.02%		3.15%					2.98%

Note 1: Change of method of collecting statistics between 2004 and 2005 and then again between 2007 and 2008 may have accounted for an apparent decrease (e.g. Easter not included).

Note 2: In the absence of reliable data on other protestant attendance, the figure has remained constant.

These statistics show that for each category, the attendance in Anglicans churches in the Diocese did not vary significantly across the years indicated. With respect to the proportion of young people to the total attendance, Table Three below suggests that the headline figure for the attendance may need some further analysis.

Table Two: Income and Appropriation Statistics

	PARISH INCOME	SYNOD APPROPRIATIONS	MISSION GRANTS THROUGH REGIONAL COUNCILS	AVERAGE ATTENDANCE
Year				
1991	34.3	9.96		44,617
1992	33.9	8.86		
1993	Not stated	8.56		
1994	34.6	12.14		
1995	Not stated	13.03		46,521
1996	34.6	11.68		
1997	36.3	11.38		
1998	38.1	11.10		
1999	41.0	11.30		
2000	44.9	12.82		
2001	47.3	9.83		44,788
2002	39.8	9.38		
2003	48.6	9.90	1.56	
2004	55.7	9.40	2.19	
2005	58.7	9.80	2.41	
2006	66.7	10.10	2.34	47,388
2007	67.7	10.49	2.60	
2008	71.2	11.06	2.05	
2009	78.1	11.50	2.59	
2010	85.2	7.24	0.79	
2011	89.2	5.05	0.54	46,768
			Total 17.06	

Notes:

- Synod Appropriations for 2002-05 are stated as estimates.

- From 2012, a new system of setting out appropriations was put in place which combined EOS, PCR and Synod funded programmes, rendering future comparisons difficult. The figure for 2011 is arrived at by taking away all sums except Synod appropriations. See *Synod Proceedings* (Standing Committee of Synod, Anglican church of Australia, Sydney 2012), 275-276.

- The sources of this information are the Annual *Sydney Year Books* or the Synod reports found on the *Past Synods* reports, on the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat links on the Sydney Anglican website, sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, and follow links to Synod past years and regional councils annual reports to Synod. Variations in methodologies during the period and in the participation rates of parishes mean that

not all the statistics, as published, and provided by the Registry are identical. These differences do not affect the overall picture of what occurred during the DM.

- All amounts are in millions of dollars.

Table Two show that there was a dramatic increase in offertories in Sydney Anglican churches over the Mission period, indicating that parishioners responded significantly to the DM by way of increased offertories. Income available for distribution by Synod maintained a steady rate until 2010, when the impact of the GFC began to be felt. Of interest are the grants through regional councils. The table shows a total of $17.06 million from 2003 to 2011 was allocated. Anecdotally, this income was devoted to employing additional ministerial staff, but this staffing does not appear to have resulted in significant attendance growth, as shown in the official statistics. This raises questions about the value of those allocations and the basis on which they were made, and whether that was the best use of those resources.

Table Three: Youth and Children Attendance Statistics

	Total Attendance of Regulars	Total Attendance of Youth	Total Attendance of Children	Total Non Youth/Children
2006	79,126	2,088	8,143	68,895
2011	80,211	4,601	8,811	66,799
Total Change	1,085	2,513	668 [1]	-2,096
% Change	1.4%	120.4%	8.2%	-3.0%

Zac Veron (CEO of Youthworks) commented on church attendance as they related to youth and children in a paper to the MB in November 2012. He observed that since total growth in the period was 1,085, but children and youth numbers grew by 3,181, it appeared that the number of adults actually *declined*. He told the MB that over the relevant period, the Diocese did relatively better among teenagers compared to adults. He said this occurred in the context of most energy in the DM and Connect09 going into adult work. He quoted NCLS data that suggested that 46% of teenage converts came from outside the church-going community and that the majority of Sydney Anglicans (79%) reported that they became Christians prior to turning 20 years of age and that only 21% reported that they became Christians after they turned 20 years of age. His conclusion was that if the Diocese wanted to

increase the number attending Anglican churches, it needed to increase work among young people (and families) and deploy a disproportionate amount of time, talent and treasure to that work, at the expense of other good work.[75] Veron made a number of recommendations in this direction to the Mission Board, but he said that most members of the MB did not support his suggestions.[76]

13.12 Assessment of the Diocesan Mission

The statistics above indicate that the results of the DM were negligible when measured against the stated objectives in the original Synod resolution. In his final Synod address, Jensen outlined what he saw were the achievements of the DM. Taking each policy area in turn, he said on Policy 1, 'the Diocese had kept preaching and praying'. On Policy 2, he said, 'As far as we can tell, the growth during the decade has been approximately 7.2% from 75,000 to 80,000 regular attenders'. He said, 'As far as we can tell ... there have been 109 new church plants and congregations and at least 105 other groups initiated', noting that a number of other groups and plants had grown. Of special significance, he said, was that in 2002 'we had an impressive 18 ethnic congregations. In 2012 we have 60!' On Policy 3, he noted an increase of 26% ministers from 480 to 604. On Policy 4, he said:

> We have empowered change. There has been a mood change in the Diocese. I do not mean that the past was hopeless, but the Mission has given us permission to experiment to try new things, to adventure. ... Integral to this has been the insistence provoked by the figure 10% that we look outward ... and

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[75] 'Diocese of Sydney Statistics – Our Last Five Years', Paper given to the Diocesan Mission Board by Zac Veron, 7 November 2012.

[76] In private correspondence with Ballantine-Jones, in August 2013, Veron said that he argued in 2011 that the DM should no longer put as much energy into 'deserts' (unresponsive sectors of the population) and more effort into 'oases' (responsive sectors, such as children's and youth work). He said the MB did not support this on that occasion. He also said that at the meeting that Phillip Jensen announced his resignation from the MB, he said the DM should ramp up its efforts in children's ministry. Veron quoted him as saying that the future of the church rested in 'getting large numbers of kids now'. No action followed that call either, according to Veron, apart from the subsequent paper referred to above, and the dismissal of its main recommendations.

hence more able to penetrate the community around us with the gospel. The Mission is working.[77]

Commenting on what seems to be the most outstanding achievement of the DM, the dramatic increase in parish giving, he said:

> In spiritual terms the most important test of vitality is not our inherited money but the money generously given through the plate. In 2002, the figure was $47 million, but last year it was $89 million, an increase of 88%. ... At the same time, missionary giving through CMS has gone forward strongly, with an increase of 78% over the last 9 years.[78]

Having noted these positive results, he asked why progress had been so slow. He declined to blame secularism, saying that 'rejection of a relationship with the living God is natural'. He noted the fragmentation in society, which had affected support for community organisations generally. He said that the ideology which stresses the individual and is so contrary to family life and associations is also contrary to the gospel and to churches based on the gospel. In summary he asked, 'if the gospel contrasts so favourably with individualism in community life, family and death, why is evangelism so hard?'[79] He defended the 10 in 10 goal because 'it changed our mindset about evangelism and church ministry. [God] ... has yet to give us 10% of the population bur remarkably ... we have experienced numerical growth'.

That was Jensen's assessment. At the same time, Synod asked for an opinion survey to be taken on what a cross-section of diocesan and parish leaders thought about the DM. Of the approximately 1,100 forms circulated, 837 were completed. Bishop Peter Hayward said that 'the overall progress [of the DM] was generally viewed favourably, though only fair progress had been made'. He said that the most significant impact of the DM, according to respondents, was seen 'in the overall diocesan network, while the impact on individual parishes, though still positive, was smaller'. On the role of the DM, 3.9% said excellent, 40% said good, 39.7% said fair,

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[77] All quotations are taken from the 2012 Presidential Address found at sydneyanglicans.net. Follow the links to SDS, Synod and Standing Committee, Synod – Past Years, 2012 Synod Proceedings, and 3ff.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.

and 10.2%, poor. Of specific strategies employed, 53% said excellent or good. The Mission Areas initiative was rated good by 37%. On the four fold strategies, 45% viewed them as successful and 34% had mixed feelings.

At the top of the list of positive outcomes in the survey, from a diocesan perspective, was a greater sense of partnership around common goals, the maintenance of the priority of parish life and keeping 'mission' on the agenda. Respondents thought there had been a strategic alignment of resources. From a parish perspective, the DM scored a positive assessment on reducing feelings of isolation. Respondents said the DM had given an intentional focus on reaching into the community. It gave 'permission to begin new churches and it brought a sense of 'fellowship'.

On the negative side, on the diocesan level, the survey said the laity had not been mobilised, the 10% goal was unrealistic, there was too much focus on church planting, a narrowness of thought, small parishes were not well resourced, too much focus was put on the role of the senior minister and strategies were imposed from above. The whole project was not thought to be radical enough and many thought there was insufficient emphasis on prayer. On the negative side, from a parish perspective, respondents felt the reality of church planting was 'a mixed experience', the DM raised unrealistic expectations, energy wavered over the 10 years, there was too much focus on the role of the senior minister and paid staff, and there was insufficient sharing of ideas between parishes. The survey asked whether there should be another DM. Overall, there was a willingness to have another try. There was strong support for more cross cultural ministry and action in poorer areas.

While the survey represented the attitudes of respondents, the extent to which they were *informed* attitudes is problematic. How could respondents answer questions about diocesan implementation if their experience of them was restricted to their own parish or local area? Many of the responses were contradictory. How much respondents knew about what *other* parishes had done was limited, so that impressions about parish results were also based on too narrow a field of knowledge. Just aggregating them did not actually measure anything. However, what was apparent from the survey was that the heart for mission was still strong, even though feelings about the DM itself were lukewarm. As an instrument for measuring

the value of the DM or whether (and how) to do a new one, the survey was of little use and fell a long way short of what might be needed in assisting future policy.[80] Further analysis on factors which affected the outcome of the DM will be offered in Chapter Seventeen. It will be argued there that the most significant factor in determining the outcome was the structure that was created to prosecute the DM, leading to errors on strategy and management.

At the 2013 Synod, in speaking to the survey, Hayward said:

> We've basically still grown with the population but we haven't grown any faster than previously. ... What would have happened if we hadn't had a diocesan mission? That we have continued to grow at all is something for which we should give thanks to God ... that we have not grown as we expected should cause us to reflect and think hard.[81]

Hayward added that one of the blessing that did occur during the DM was the doubling of the number of people born overseas attending Anglican churches. He said that the Diocese was 'heading in the right direction in retaining children and youth'.[82]

It is difficult to escape the impression that the assessment of the DM in the Diocese was one of muted disappointment. The characteristic commitment to evangelism of the Diocese was not diminished, but the way the DM attempted to express that commitment did not meet the hopes and expectations that were evident when it was launched. The evaluation process referred to above would seem to have a long way to go. Arguably, foremost in such an evaluation would need to be the kind of management structure that was adopted and decisions as to what *other* strategies might have been pursued. As to the management question, this will be examined in detail in Chapter Seventeen.

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[80] For the full report, see *Review of the Diocesan Mission and the next phase of the Mission,* (Annual Report of the Standing Committee and Other Reports and Papers, Standing Committee of the Synod of the Anglican Diocese of Sydney, 2013), 64.
[81] *Southern Cross*, November 2013.
[82] Ibid.

13.13 Jensen's Team

Peter Jensen inherited Forsyth and Piper from the Goodhew era. His appointments followed the pattern set by Goodhew, except for Glenn Davies, who had been a senior faculty member at MTC, Rector at Miranda and had exercised significant influence at Synod and Standing Committee before he became a bishop. He was an obvious and popular choice. The next appointment was the Rev Peter Tasker of Dapto. He had been a CMS missionary and NSW General Secretary. He was a competent committee member and administrator, though not a recognised leader in Synod or Standing Committee, nor was he seen as an innovator in terms of local parish ministry. Jensen's other appointments were of men who had never been involved in leadership positions in the Diocese. The Rev Ivan Lee was Rector of the medium sized parish at Hurstville Grove. The Rev Al Stewart had worked for Phillip Jensen at St Matthias Centennial Park before becoming Director of Youth Works. After three years as Bishop, he resigned to take over Evangelism Ministries, with special interest in church planting. He resigned from that after two years. He was replaced at Wollongong by the Rev Peter Hayward, Rector of an aging parish at Beverly Hills. In common with the team under Goodhew, Jensen's appointments failed to match the 'fire power' of the Loane and Robinson administrations.

13.14 Reflections on the Jensen Era

In reflecting on the Jensen era, the first and most obvious point to make is that it is too soon to give what could be called a definitive assessment. Any comments made in 2103 need to taken as *preliminary* and subject to events yet to unfold. That aside, there are some observations that can be made which are likely to stand the test of time. The first relates to the personal impact of Jensen himself on the Diocese and its culture. Jensen epitomised the 'soul' of Sydney Diocese. There was the passion to see people become Christians. The DM means nothing, if it does not say that. Jensen's personal influence at the pastoral level was outstanding, as anyone who experienced it would know. His powerful intellect, directed towards explaining,

defending and promoting Sydney's brand of evangelicalism, was on a par with that of Sir Marcus Loane. More than any archbishop since Mowll, his advocacy of the Christian faith in the public square made him the most recognisable and influential Australian Churchman of his period.

As well as these, there was his contribution to the changing face of Sydney Anglicanism. Just the practice of wearing ordinary street clothes and rarely donning ceremonial robes contributed to the cultural shift away from traditional Anglicanism to one which said that Anglicans are part of the twenty-first century. He encouraged clergy to be daring in their approach to local strategies and to embrace change. While upholding Sydney's opposition to women's ordination, he affirmed and encouraged the role of women in the paid work force of parish ministry.

He was not one to actively pursue ecumenical enterprises or even to try to break down the barriers between Sydney and the ACA. He did however show himself to be a leader and statesman on the world Anglican stage, giving behind the scenes encouragement to Anglican leaders around the world in connection with disputes over the ordination and consecration of practising homosexuals and the blessing of same sex unions. His contribution (and those of other Sydney leaders) to the 2008 GAFCON at Jerusalem was pivotal to its success, and his frequent forays into the UK scene and the mission field were a source of great inspiration to Christians battling in those places. This role continued right up to the end of his term, as his meeting with GAFCON leaders in Nairobi in April 2013 to organise the next conference shows.

In political terms, Jensen enjoyed a relatively easy time. ACL was always supportive. MTC continued to produce ordinands strongly committed to the prevailing theological position of the Diocese. The one blip (and it was a minor one) was when the Rev Keith Mascord, a former MTC faculty member, failed to be appointed to the parish of South Sydney and addressed an open letter to the Diocese over what he saw as an injustice.[83] Standing Committee appointed a small committee to confer with him. In

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[83] Paul Egan, The Development of, and Opposition to, Healing Ministries in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney, with Special Reference to the Healing Ministry at St Andrew's Cathedral 1960-2010, (PhD thesis, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2012).

2012, he published a book outlining his grievances.[84] That incident aside, Jensen was never seriously challenged, and notwithstanding the disappointments related to the DM, he retired a popular and highly regarded leader.

The sphere of activity he found most difficult to deal with related to the government of the Diocese at the corporate and management level. He was not alone among his peers or predecessors in this. The inherited functions required of archbishops are such that few are equipped by training or disposition to excel in these areas. The peculiar character of Anglican polity is hard enough, but in a Diocese like Sydney, with its strong democratic culture and its bottom up power structure, it is especially difficult. The impact of the GFC was very hard for him to bear. He rightly felt let down at many points leading up to it, and he struggled to understand what was needed to put the central structures on a firmer footing afterwards. He was not alone in this either. Notwithstanding the difficulties he experienced in steadying the financial ship, it is reasonable to conclude that the solutions arrived during his administration have left the underlying processes in better shape than they were before the GFC. As long as they continue in that form, they are likely to prevent such disasters occurring in the future.

13.15 Conclusion to Part Three

In many ways, Part Three is the heart of this thesis. Its aim was to examine the major events and issues throughout the whole period under study as they related to

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[84] *A Restless Faith: Leaving Fundamentalism in a Quest for God*, Keith Mascord, (Xlibris Corporation, Bloomington, 2012). This is an intensely personal book. It records Mascord's struggles with biblical authority and traces his move away from conservative evangelicalism (which he calls fundamentalism) to what could be described as a more open and less dogmatic form of Christianity, though without breaking from underlying tenants of the faith. It also deals with his disappointment at not being made rector of South Sydney parish. He describes the sequence of events that led to another person being appointed. That experience, plus his own movement towards a more liberal position, coloured his attitude to Sydney evangelicalism and the power structures which he says keeps dissenting opinion under control.
In summary, he describes Sydney as a 'fear driven, suspicious, politicised, mono-chromed culture, and an un-self critical culture'. Some of his criticisms are insightful and valuable; others need to be read against the intensely personal response to his encounters with Peter Jensen and others over his non-appointment.
It is not a balanced book. Neither Peter nor Phillip Jensen is given an opportunity to put their side of the story. Its chief value is that it gives an insider's view of the Diocese and should be read by anyone wanting to discover how it looks from a non-establishment point of view.

change and politics. Chapter Nine was about the Loane era, which was in many ways the high point of diocesan fortunes. It had strong leadership, both from Loane himself and his able band of bishops, archdeacons and lay leaders.

Concern over the weakening position of the church in the community led to a plethora of inquiries and calls for changes in policy and practices to assist in achieving greater penetration of the community. These inquires set in train a series of reforms which changed the face of the Diocese from a stayed and compliant expression of evangelical Anglicanism to one that is almost unrecognisable in terms of traditional Anglican markers. Mostly this impetus for change was a bottom-up process, though not actually opposed by Loane.

Main features of the Loane era were his failed attempts to sub-divide Sydney into three separate dioceses, changes to rules to admit women to all administrative positions and the embrace of liturgical reform in the form of *AAPB* in 1978. Because of Loane's high standing in the Diocese and the yet to be influential impact of D B Knox's revolutionary thinking on church and denomination, political action was not a major feature of the period, except that stirrings against ACL dominance in elections led to unsuccessful attempts to create alternative parties. Notable among these was SACS. The other major development in Loane's term was the growth of influence of the 'centre' (represented by Standing Committee and an enlarged hierarchy) made possible by income from investments. This growing centralism gave rise to further tensions which later developed into calls for greater regional autonomy and the growth of diocesan ministry organisations.

Chapter Ten examined the Robinson years. That was when pressure for change had built up almost to breaking point. Noting that the women's ordination issue was a dominant feature throughout his term, other major developments were his VFG project, the standoff over the re-marriage of divorced persons and his failed attempt to sub-divide the Diocese into three. Frustration over the slow pace of change (and opposition to change by some) led to the emergence of new political parties to challenge ACL. First, there was the liberal evangelical group called Open Synod, which gave way to the more liberal, Anglicans Together. Then there was REPA, a conservative evangelical group calling for radical changes in diocesan policies and

practices. REPA was the instrument which launched Phillip Jensen onto the diocesan stage. The result of all these developments was that at the end of Robinson's term, the Diocese was a powder keg of frustrations, ready to explode.

The problems brought about by financial growth created difficulties in determining financial priorities and how to co-ordinate the work of the expanding diocesan organisations. These led Robinson to establish the Nicholson Commission to advise him on how central administration might be reformed. Few of its recommendations were adopted and, like other commissions, achieved little.[85]

The instability at the end of Robinson's administration found expression in the election campaign which pitted Phillip Jensen against Bishop John Reid at the extremes, with Harry Goodhew and Paul Barnett in the middle. Goodhew triumphed, but the hoped for tranquillity from his election gave way to an intense period of conflict, known as the 'Holy Wars'. Chapters Eleven and Twelve examined the Goodhew years.

On the positive side, Goodhew's success in resolving the impasse on re-marriage of divorced persons, the implementation of full regionalisation in the Diocese, the creation of the DEB and new procedures to deal with misconduct of Church workers stand out. On the negative side, there was disappointment over Goodhew's handling of the Pymble matter, opposition to *APBA*, Goodhew's turn-around on lay administration and resistance to his attempts to bring Sydney closer to the ACA. The emergence of a rival political party to ACL (the Blue Ticket) infuriated conservatives and resulted in a revival of ACL under Ballantine-Jones and a changed Standing Committee in 1996, which on many matters denied Goodhew the authority that Archbishops usually enjoy.

What lay behind many of these difficulties was a different vision of the denomination. The generation trained by Knox and Robinson had reached positions of influence in the Diocese in his time and they would not accept what they saw as Goodhew's attempts to contain change to fit within acknowledged Anglican norms. His refusal to

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[85] See Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen for a detailed examination of these matters.

support lay administration and his advocacy of *APBA* are examples of this. He was not helped by his team of bishops and archdeacons, which in his own words, 'lacked fire power'. By which he meant, political power. All parties to the conflicts share a measure of blame for these difficulties. Whatever the reasons for the difficulties, conservatives were determined to install one of their own as Goodhew's successor. That person was Peter Jensen. Some Goodhew supporters chose Robert Forsyth as their candidate. The resulting election campaign was the most highly organised and vigorously fought in diocesan memory, with Jensen supporters victorious on the second of three scheduled nights of debate.

Chapter Thirteen looked at the major features of the Jensen administration. Essentially, it was about the Diocesan Mission. Jensen called on the Diocese to connect with the community on a crusade to incorporate ten percent of the population into Bible believing churches in ten years. The operational features associated with the DM were examined. Overall, the results were disappointing. Why this was so, continues to be a matter of discussion. It was suggested that questions about strategy, leadership and management structure were important factors. Whatever the reasons, lack of resources was not one of them, with tens of millions of dollars devoted to the DM, with little measurable growth.

Jensen's term coincided with the GFC, which resulted in the Diocese losing about half the value of its central endowments at the depths of the downturn. This in turn led to resources available for the DM drying up and the size of the Archbishop's team of assistant bishops and archdeacons being halved. How Jensen and the Diocese responded to this crisis will be examined in Part Four, but what was notable about the period was that parish income actually grew during the DM, even though church attendance was fairly stable throughout the period. That, and other factors, were the subject of post DM reviews and led to changes being put in place with respect to how central funds were allocated.

Outstanding among Jensen's achievements was his contribution to opposition to the liberal tendencies in the North American and British branches of the Anglican Communion. This found expression in the 2008 GAFCON meeting in Jerusalem and the boycott of bishops representing 75 percent of world Anglicans at that year's

Lambeth Conference. Jensen's theological influence, and his steady hand within the inner councils of that movement, did much to contribute to its success and consolidate the movement in the years that followed.

In summary, Jensen's period as Archbishop was marked by a palpable change in culture away from traditional Anglicanism, toward ways which positioned churches to be more flexible and open to outsiders. That can be seen as a culmination of the changes in diocesan policy and practices set in train with the election of Marcus Loane in 1966 and the influence of D B Knox, with his emphasis on the local congregation over and against the denomination.

PART FOUR

THE STRUGGLE OVER POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE CORPORATE MACHINE

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE CORPORATE MACHINE: HOW TO RAISE THE MONEY

14.1 Introduction

When the GFC struck in 2008-9, that part of diocesan life, called here the *corporate machine,* suffered a massive drop in assets and reputation.[1] The corporate machine is an integral part of the political landscape of the Diocese because it provides the resources used for its mission and central administration. How such assets are managed includes political decisions about *who* should be in charge and *what* accountability mechanisms should be put in place. At their height in 2007, the SDS employed over 100 people and the DE was worth $265 million. GAB had funds for investment (including on behalf of others) of $769 million. Between 1994 and 2010, Synod distributed $160.7 million.[2]

This chapter (and the next) will trace the corporate machine's attempts to manage and apply its resources from the 1970s onwards. The key to understanding this complex process is to separate the generation of income (called here the *supply* side) from the expenditure of that income (the *demand* side). It was the blurring of these elements and the unhealthy influence of the demand side wanting ever more money to spend which contributed significantly to the many difficulties experienced over the period and which created an environment that led to losses following the GFC. The supply side organisations are the GAB, SDS, SAHC, ACPT and the Endowment of the See (EOS). The demand side are the Synod, Standing Committee and its sub-committees and recipients of financial support.[3]

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[1] Judd and Cable addressed this aspect of the Diocese in *Sydney Anglicans* in 1987 under the heading 'The Corporate Church', 267-282.

[2] The $769m included assets managed on behalf of the DE, the ACPT and Glebe Income Accounts, sometimes referred to as the 'Banking Business'.

[3] The EOS is a special case in that until 2012, the EOS Committee (EOSC) managed both income and the expenditure of funds associated the Archbishop's operations.

14.2 The Trigg Commission

Archbishop Gough established the first commission to look at the central organisations in 1959. Its purpose was 'to carry out a survey of administrative organisations, property and finances of the Diocese'.[4] The chairman was F E Trigg MBE. The Commission reported in 1964 and a special session of Synod met in 1965 to consider its recommendations.[5] It identified the 'lack of a co-ordinated and efficient centralised administration and management, capable of handling the vast volume of work, to be at the heart of the problems'.[6] It recommended that the administration of the Synod and its committees (along with investments) be transferred to the ACPT.[7] Another recommendation was the appointment of a CEO (quaintly named *Comptroller*) to oversee the central operations of the Diocese. After Gough resigned in 1966, Loane quietly let the Trigg Commission recommendations fade into the background. The significance of the Trigg Commission was in the recognition of the problems not its solutions, which were mostly disregarded.

14.3 The Reid Commission

The next attempt to address the questions posed to the Trigg Commission was a commission in 1970 under the chairmanship, first of Bishop Jack Dain, and then Bishop John Reid. It was called the Parochial Ministry and Organisation Commission (called here the Reid Commission).[8] Its groundbreaking report, *Looking into the Parish*, proposed radical changes to local parish ministry, clergy disciplinary procedures and the regionalisation of the Diocese. More relevant to this chapter is the work of the sub-committee on central diocesan organisations and structures. Its report in Appendix 'B' stated:

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[4] Membership included F E Trigg, partner of Price Waterhouse as Chairman, Bishops Kerle, Loane, Archdeacons Begbie and Fillingham. Among the laymen were Stacy Atkin, V C Fairfax, V Hughesden W Hutchison and N Jenkyn QC.

[5] Ballantine-Jones was a member of Synod during this period and attended the special session in 1965.

[6] *Report*, 21.

[7] Ibid, 22.

[8] Among its members were the Rev Dudley Foord, the Rev Harry Goodhew, Neil Cameron and Bruce Davies, soon to be the head of the NSW Premier's Department.

It would appear that unless there is a rationalisation ... and provision made for close co-ordination, it will become increasingly difficult to provide as effective and economic service to the parishes ... Considerable advantage would flow from unified management of the Diocese's borrowing and investment programmes. Much sounder investment policies could be followed, with safer and better returns ... Much the same considerations apply in respect of property development and management.[9]

Synod responded in 1972 by appointing a new committee under the chairmanship of Bruce Davies, at that time a senior public servant in the NSW Government, to review and recommend changes as requested by the Reid Commission sub-committee.

14.4 The Davies Inquiry into Diocesan Structures

The Davies Committee was a model of how complex structures and diverse organisations should be examined and proposals tested to produce good and lasting outcomes. It defined its task as 'to ascertain precisely the existing functions of the existing central diocesan organisations, and the organisational and operational means whereby these were achieved'.[10] The Committee said that 'this was a prerequisite ... and was going to be a lengthy task'. The Committee developed and reported its proposals to the Standing Committee for feedback, and then gave them to relevant organisations for their comments.[11] When the final proposals were ready, the Committee invited members of Standing Committee to meet informally with them for further discussion. Out of this lengthy consultative process, a new structure was created which brought considerable benefit to the Diocese and which continues to this day.

This review of inquiries will be interrupted here to consider events that led to the creation of the wealth that was to change the face the Diocese. Then it will return to examine the structures put in place as a result of the Davies Committee.

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[9] *Looking Into The Parish*, (The Parochial Ministry and Organisation Commission, Diocese of Sydney, Sydney, 1972), 44.
[10] Interim Report of Davies Committee to Standing Committee, 23 July 1974.
[11] On one occasion there was an impasse, Standing Committee invited Davies to address it and answer questions. Standing Committee Minutes, 23 February 1977.

14.5 The Diocese Becomes El Dorado

The origins of the Diocese of Sydney are well known.[12] Relevant here are the colonial land grants of the 1850s. They were to provide income for the Diocese and its schools. Most of the land was let out for residences on 99-year leases on fixed rents. By the 1960s, these leases were falling due, and responsibility for managing these dilapidated properties fell on the Diocese through the GAB.

Neil Cameron was one of the key figures in the transition to today's corporate machine. His account on how these troublesome properties were converted into the moneymaking assets in the 1970's is an important primary source and is included here in full:

> The GAB which was established by the *Church of England Bodies Corporate Act* of 1938 began to acquire possession of the glebes as they fell due. The first properties in the new corporation were the St Phillip's and the St James' Glebes. Other glebes were added. The GAB then geared up as an active property developer. Management problems with both the GAB and the Property Trust required a major re-organisation and I suggested to Bishop Jack Dain that a new corporation be established called the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat (SDS) for the purpose of employing people who worked in diocesan offices and for keeping the accounts. By the end of Archbishop Gough's time [1966], there were three bodies: the Property Trust to deal with parish property, the SDS to employ staff and supervise Synod funds, and the GAB to deal with glebe properties.
>
> One of the major assets of the Diocese was the Cathedral site and the surrounding land. Adjacent to them were the Sydney Town Hall, a cemetery, a double story terrace, a building known as the Workers' Building and another building occupied by the Sydney County Council (SCC). The NSW Government resumed land nearby for the Railway and granted the other land to the Diocese as compensation. The SCC could occupy their building for as long as they liked. The Diocese took over the other buildings and located the St Andrew's School

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[12] Judd and Cable, *Sydney Anglicans,* (Anglican Information Office, Sydney) 1987, 1-19.

and the Cathedral organist in them. There was a Victorian mansion, once used as the Deanery, adjacent to the Cathedral, which was being used for diocesan offices.

When the leases on the glebe properties fell in and the SCC vacated their building, the idea was floated to erect a high-rise office building for both the Diocese and the School. For various reasons, that and other ideas fell through and the project, now known as St Andrew's House, was settled on. The question was: who would be the developer? The thought was that the newly formed GAB would do a great job. In 1971, Synod gave its approval to put up a modern office block, with the school to occupy the top two floors. In addition, there would be an arcade under what was to be Sydney Square and a multi-level car park. There were construction delays and cost blowouts related to one of the credit squeezes of those days, so there was a problem.

In 1974, the Whitlam Government offered to buy the glebe properties for $17.5 million and the Diocese was very glad to be free of them. The Bishopthorpe Estate, (another colonial grant) was sold off and the money used to meet the costs of SAH, but more was needed. Stacy Atkin, Chairman of the Finance Committee, went to Marcus Loane to get his okay for that money to be used for that purpose. Marcus was very loath to agree. He could see that SAH had problems and his arm was twisted by Stacy Atkin and Jack Dain, and he agreed to it.

This gave rise to the Endowment of the See (EOS) Committee. Marcus came to see me about the EOS Committee. He wanted a committee which would advise on the investments of the EOS, nothing more nothing less. They had no further role unless there was a proposal to sell something. Marcus sought out the advice of Sir Harold Knight as to how the proceeds of the Bishopthorpe Estate could produce money.[13] Knight came up with the proposal that the GAB should buy a half interest in SAH from EOS, That 'sale' was affected by GAB lending half of the net value to EOS to reduce the debt and the rest written off. It was then decided that SAH should become a separate corporation, half the members appointed by the Archbishop and half by GAB. The EOS members looked after EOS interests and GAB members looked after GAB's. St Andrew's House

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[13] Sir Harold Knight was a senior Sydney layman and later Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia.

Corporation (SAHC) was happy for GAB to manage the building and the Arcade, for which I think they paid a fee.

When the profits started coming in, it was agreed that adequate provision had to be made for lifts etc. The question was what about the profits? Bishop Donald Cameron and I formed the view that we needed to get rid of all debt; that was plan one. Plan two was to distribute half only of the net income to GAB and EOS and to repay part of the EOS and GAB loans. That would provide both bodies with extra cash to invest as they wanted.[14]

As indicated, there were delays and cost blowouts to the SAH project which required more money. A progress report in 1975 noted that the estimated cost would be $20.6 million and the estimated yield on capital cost would drop from 9.27% to 6.71% in the 1974-5 period.[15] In 1977, the then CEO of the GAB, Graham King, reported to the Synod that the project was complete, at a cost of $20.5 million, 50% higher than the feasibility study.[16] He foreshadowed difficulties in letting and said the EOS and the GAB were both required to advance $1.5 million to meet the operating deficit, with the hope of surpluses in 1979-80. Bank interest was 13% PA. The School was located on the top two floors and GAB was made manager of the rest. Once the debt was repaid it was anticipated that the proceeds would be split between the owners, EOS and GAB.[17]

It was against this background and the systemic organisational problems uncovered in earlier inquiries that the Davies Committee continued its work.

14.6 The Davies Committee makes it Recommendations

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[14] This account is taken from a taped interview with Neil Cameron, 29 April 2011, used with permission.
[15] *1976 Sydney Year Book*, 342,
[16] *1978 Sydney Year Book*, 283-4.
[17] A valuable summary of the background of the glebes, the SCEGGS group of schools disasters and the subsequent reorganisation of the central administration is given in *Sydney Anglicans* at pages 268 to 273.

The Committee's final report went to Synod in 1977.[18] The essence of its proposals was incorporated in amendments to the Sydney Diocesan Secretariat Ordinance 1973. The SDS was to provide administrative services to central organisations; the Sydney Anglican Church Investment Trust (SACIT) was to administer investable assets belonging to other diocesan entities. The GAB was to manage property and the investment business of the Diocese itself, known as the Diocesan Endowment (DE). Boards made up of the same people governed the three bodies. The CEO of these three corporations not only supervised their activities, but also became the de-facto 'CEO of the Diocese', being ex-officio member of Synod, Standing Committee and many other central bodies. The first full-time CEO was Neville Malone, a former senior executive of Ampol.

With respect to GAB, SDS and SAHC, the Davies Committee also recommended wide powers of delegation so that any of their suggested functions could be delegated to other committees as long as their membership included a stipulated number of the delegating committee.[19] This seemed a sensible idea at the time, but it created major problems later, such as loss of focus and conflicts of interest. That aside, it could be argued the Davies Committee was the first to come up with workable solutions to the problems which earlier inquiries acknowledged, but did not solve.

The main functions of the GAB were to manage the properties of the DE in order to maintain their real value and provide a reasonable income for Synod to spend. The SAHC was to manage SAH. It had the right to borrow for capital purposes. Net income from SAH was to be applied in equal parts to the DE and EOS. With respect to the EOS, its committee was to manage its mostly residential properties, give directions as to investments and to give advice to the Archbishop (the Chairman of the EOSC) on how he should exercise discretions conferred on him by the Trusts.[20] As for reporting, the SDS, GAB and SAHC were to report each year to Synod. The

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[18] *1978 Sydney Year Book*, 283.
[19] See report of the committee, *1978 Sydney Year Book*, 283-284.
[20] Endowment of the See Ordinance 1977, Clause 3.

EOSC was not required to publish an annual report, but its annual audited accounts were tabled at Standing Committee.[21]

Once the basic structures were in place and the crises of the 1970s out of the way, GAB settled down to providing income for the Synod. Under Neville Malone (CEO 1977-1991) most investment activity was through industrial, office and commercial properties. When he retired, the GAB capital balance had grown to $147,377,183.[22]

Malone was followed by David Fairfull from a merchant/investment banking background. He led a shift away from property to a balanced investment portfolio and the establishment of a number of business entities aimed at generating income from profits or fees. Fairfull submitted *A Business Plan for the 90s* to the Three Corporations in January 1992. It said 'the economic environment of the 90s for the most part will be 'flat' with no excessive growth. Interest rates will trend lower, unemployment will tend to be much higher than the norm and inflation will be much lower than that of the 80s ...' The Three Corporations functioned at the time as if the constituent bodies (SDS and SACIT and SAHC) were divisions of GAB. Fairfull said: 'Unfortunately the heavy bias of the property mix towards CBD office buildings "had no glee" for the Boards' future investment strategy'. He urged the establishment of a 'quality investment division whose main objective is the exploration and realisation of the potential for greater revenue production (rate of return) through an improved, well researched, balanced investment portfolio programme'.[23]

He suggested four options for the formulation of an operating strategy for the GAB during the 1990s:

1. Stay as they were (property based).

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[21] On the growth of the diocesan bureaucracy, *Sydney Anglicans* attributes it in part to the community wide expansion of administrative processes which Sydney Diocese mirrored in developments from the Trigg Commission to the implementation of the post Davies Committee reforms of the 1970s. See *Sydney Anglicans*, 274-5.

[22] *1992 Sydney Year Book,* 447.

[23] 'Business Plan for the 90s', 29 January 1992, in possession of the author as a member of the GAB at the time.

2. Streamline and establish an investment division to promote a balanced investment portfolio strategy.

3. A more aggressive stance on option 2, as utilised by the Church Commissioners in England.

4. Acknowledge that the Secretariat should only be an administrative and service function and outsource investment services.[24]

Fairfull said that provided GAB took its time (say over a three to four year period) and put in place right mechanisms and checks and balances, they should pursue Option 3, which they did. This was a fateful decision as it turned out, leading to a period of massive growth when the markets were strong, and in 2008-9, massive losses from the GFC. Fairfull had no role in the gearing strategy that was to come. After Goodhew retired in 2001, Fairfull also retired and was replaced by Rodney Dredge.

Dredge was a member of Standing Committee, DEB and (until his appointment as CEO) GAB/SDS and SACIT.[25] Under his leadership, the managed funds businesses (set up under Fairfull) were closed because their scale did not provide cost advantages justifying the risks and returns. Except for SAH, the remaining property holdings were sold off in favour of greater dependency on Australian and overseas equities. It was during Dredge's time that GAB adopted the gearing strategy, involving $140 million of bank debt to invest in more equities. Also the deposit taking business (GIA) was refined towards offering loans to diocesan and related entities such as SAH, the Cathedral School, Anglicare and parishes. Dredge's retirement in 2007 coincided with the high point of the Diocese's financial assets.

The scope of GAB/SDS operations under Dredge was described in the GAB annual report for 2006.[26] The gearing strategy was described as the 'most important change ... since the early 90s, when GAB moved from a property base to a balanced

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[24] Ibid.
[25] The Diocesan Executive Board was established under Archbishop Goodhew to be an executive to the Standing Committee.
[26] *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 687-712.

portfolio'.[27] The report acknowledged Dredge's heavy involvement in wider diocesan activities, such as the Diocesan Mission (DM) and the EOS Committee and noted his reduced involvement in these, which it said, 'removed areas of potential conflict for the CEO's office and so allowed focus on the charter responsibilities of SDS and GAB'.[28] GAB returned a surplus of $56 million in 2006 and the DE had grown to $272 million. On the gearing strategy, the report said 'it had worked well again in 2006, returning a little under $21 million'.[29] The inherent potential risk was noted:

> Whether we could have been more aggressive in our gearing strategies is debatable. On the one hand the 2006 markets would have strongly rewarded additional gearing. On the other hand, it is a fact that management resources were stretched very thin over the year and complications of any sort would have introduced considerable risk. On balance, the CEO's view is that we were correct in adopting a 'no change to gearing strategy'.[30]

With respect to GIA, the report questioned the considerable cost of managing this business as a service function and said that once or twice a year it was debated whether the cost was justified. As for their relationship with ACPT and EOS, GAB said it had no formal responsibilities for their investments, though they did offer 'informal advice' and monitored their performance on a regular basis.[31] On the key issue of risk, the expectation at the end of 2007 was of a relaxed risk minimisation policy and to 'seek a somewhat stronger return at potentially higher risk'.[32] This section of the report concluded, '... Probably most importantly – a full risk/return review of the DE will have been completed taking into account the options now available in the open market for additional or changed asset classes'.[33] Whereas under Fairfull, GAB was described as part of SDS, in this report, SDS was described as a 'division' of GAB, even though both were constituted as standalone corporations. The report reflected the optimism of those times, with no idea of what lay ahead in the disasters of the GFC, especially from gearing.

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[27] Ibid, 692.
[28] Ibid, 692.
[29] Ibid, 705.
[30] Ibid, 706.
[31] Ibid, 708.
[32] Ibid, 710.
[33] Ibid, 710.

14.7 Then Came the Global Financial Crisis

Dredge retired in 2007 and was followed by Steve McKerihan, formally Chief Financial Officer of St George Bank. He hardly had time to settle in before the markets began to fall in late 2007 and the GFC struck the following year. He became ill with brain cancer in February 2010, resigned in April and died in September 2011. He was followed by Mark Payne.

During the 'seven years of plenty' (2001-2008), the diocesan focus was on the DM. The underlying supply problems received little attention, as long as the rivers of gold continued to flow. Under pressure to support the DM, GAB decided to maximise income by borrowing against the value of the DE and invest in equities (the gearing policy). Between 2003 and 2009, Synod was able to appropriate $89 million from DE surpluses.[34] Then came the GFC.

World markets began to fall in late 2007, and in 2008, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US, the GFC swept across the world like a tsunami. This impacted the supply side dramatically, as earnings collapsed, and on the demand side, as money to spend dried up. In 2008, the DE lost $160 million or 26% of gross DE investments, a negative return of around 60%. Net assets fell from $265 million at 31 December 2007 to $105 million at 31 December 2008. $90 million of growth assets were sold off in a falling market to repay bank debt, the rest was invested in cash.[35] The reason for the extraordinary losses was a combination of the worst stock market performance in 100 years, the effects of the gearing strategy, serious failure of management and poor board oversight.[36] GAB reported to the 2009 Synod:

> Over a number of years, there had been discussion about the implications of the gearing in the portfolio. During 2007 a modification of the VAR (Value at Risk) calculation was explored as a possible way to measure the amount of risk generated by the level of gearing in the portfolio. This modified VAR measure

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[34] GAB Submission to the Archbishops Strategic Commission, December 2010.
[35] www.sydneyanglians.net. SDS, follow links to Past Synods, 2009 Synod, GAB Report.
[36] Ballantine-Jones was a member of GAB and SDS during this period.

was established and progressively refined during 2008. In hindsight we would have reduced our losses if we had applied this methodology earlier. The VAR number would not however have precisely measured our risk because it simply gives a probability of losses exceeding a certain threshold. It does not predict the maximum loss that can eventuate in extreme market conditions.[37]

In connection with that, GAB said:

When the markets started to turn down from late 2007 onwards, we did not envisage the severity of the falls that would ultimately occur. We thought we would be able to ride out the fluctuations in the market and hold the bulk of our market positions. Our scenario planning did not account for what had transpired, which was the worst calendar year in Australian equities in 100 years. These falls were more severe than had been anticipated when the gearing strategy was established. This meant our repayment of bank loans was too slow. In hindsight we would have been better to de-leverage more quickly. This would have meant that we would have crystallised losses at less severe levels and preserved more capital.[38]

Another possible action might have been to renegotiate with the bank to avoid having to sell assets in a depressed market. On this, GAB said, 'A number of key ratios and bank covenants were breached. GAB decided in mid November [2008] that all bank debt should be repaid, rather than seeking to negotiate any changes to bank covenants'.[39] The minutes of the Assets and Liability Committee (ALCO), a sub-committee of GAB, in November 2008 reveal that the decision to sell assets to repay debt was taken by *it* and only reported to the Board afterwards, who effectively ratified it at the next meeting. In effect, the biggest single financial decision ever taken by GAB was made by a few members of a sub-committee, with the Board as a whole, sidelined. This action crystallised losses and meant that no benefit came from the improvement of the markets in 2009. Arguably, it would have been better if they had not sold, but just waited it out like most superannuation funds did.

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[37] GAB Report to 2009 Synod, not printed in *2010 Sydney Year Book*, available from Sydney Diocesan Secretariat, SAH, Sydney.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

The GAB, at the 2009 Synod, through its Chairman, Phil Shirriff and CEO, Steve McKerihan, acknowledged that mistakes had been made. The Synod acknowledged that the gearing policies were exercised completely within the authorities given to GAB and had been clearly reported to Standing Committee and Synod. The CEO, the GAB, and the Standing Committee all acknowledged their respective mistakes, as did the Synod. Standing Committee was requested to report before the next Synod on corrective actions taken by GAB to address concerns on governance, risk management and board performance.[40]

One member of the GAB, Peter Berkley, in an analysis tabled at the February 2009 GAB meeting, gave his assessment of what went wrong. He said that there was a high risk investment strategy without a proper risk management framework or an adequate performance management system. He said the Board allowed management to pursue too many new initiatives leading to a lack of focus or delivering on 'the main game ... our ordinance charter'. He added that church culture operated to inhibit board performance and created 'a subtle but significant diminution in perceptions of personal obligation and responsibility'. He then gave a detailed analysis of the factors leading to the outcomes. They included, gearing (the source of extra risk), lack of risk management, no contingency plan for a market downturn, and confusion over responsibility between the Board and senior management. Other factors mentioned were a church culture which strives for consensus and avoidance of open conflict, distraction of other issues, including SAH refurbishment, the funds management business and other non-core activities, the perceived pressure for additional funds for the Diocesan Mission (demand pressures), the blended business models, where GAB and SDS functions were mixed together.

Berkley did not seek to absolve himself from these factors, but quite properly cited documentary examples from 2002 onwards where he warned of the dangers of gearing, including that he actually dissented from approving the drawdown of loans to facilitate that strategy. He cited decisions about reviews of gearing strategy, which did not appear to have been done, and the failure to produce promised contingency plans to deal with financial market disaster scenarios. Berkley's 15-page document is

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[40] www.sydneyanglicans.org, under Secretariat, Synod, 2009 Synod Proceedings.

the most detailed review of what went wrong. He lamented his failure to speak out more vigorously about potential risks and ongoing governance failures, but of all the directors, no member did more than he to warn and advocate for policies which would have minimised losses and left the DE in better shape to recover from the GFC.[41]

After the 2009 Synod, some members of the GAB determined to withdraw their support for the Chairman, Phil Shirriff. Others (including Ballantine-Jones) opposed this because the Board had supported his representing them at a series of pre-Synod meetings and at Synod in 2009. Shirriff wanted to remain to implement reforms and then go. Having lost the support of a majority of the Board, he decided to step down from the GAB immediately. When news of this leaked out, Ballantine-Jones suggested to Robert Tong that he give notice at the November Standing Committee that *all* board positions be declared vacant and that new elections be held in December. The reason for this suggestion was to ensure a fresh mandate for the GAB, not to get rid of anyone.[42] When a number of GAB members who had previously intended to stay, heard about the spill, they decided to resign in protest, notwithstanding that Tong had indicated he was willing to renominate all of them.

Standing Committee passed Tong's motion and reconstituted the Board from 12 to eight with a possibility of 10.[43] Three of the old GAB decided to renominate. Ballantine-Jones had retired from Jannali in 2006 and had always intended to retire from GAB in 2009. Immediately prior to the December meeting of Standing Committee, Tong asked him if he would stay on. He agreed, but on the basis that he took a leading role in the process of reform and reconstruction. The reconstituted board was duly elected, with four old and four new members. At its first meeting, Ballantine-Jones was elected Chairman and Laurie Scandrett Deputy Chairman. Ballantine-Jones indicated that the priorities he wanted for the new Boards were to complete the reforms of the GAB/SDS, to restore confidence in the organisations and to begin to rebuild the DE. 2010 was to be the year for this to begin. McKerihan

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[41] 'Thoughts on what went Wrong at the GAB' (2003-2009), undated. Other comments by Berkley cited with permission.

[42] Ballantine-Jones had previously indicated he would be retiring from the Board that year for reasons unrelated to GFC matters.

[43] www.sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, Synod Past Years, 2010 Synod, *2010 Standing Committee Report to Synod*, 18.

resigned in April 2010 due to ill health. Mark Payne (a senior member of SDS management) was made Acting CEO in February 2010 and confirmed as CEO in November 2010 after a full search process.

Two other factors affected income leading up to the GFC. One was the refurbishment of SAH, initiated by SDS management in June 2004. The purpose was to retain commercial tenants, upgrade parts of the Town Hall Arcade, provide for what was said to be a more efficient layout for the Archbishop's team, modernise church offices and upgrade the building to retain its value as a B grade asset. It appears there was no cost-benefit analysis made, and no attention paid to the possible impact on cash flows. Various changes and cost blowouts contributed to the increase in SAH's debt from $7.5 million in 2005 to $23.0 million in 2008. In addition, during that period, distributions to the EOS and GAB from SAH were funded in part by debt incurred by SAH. The new GAB determined (as a matter of commercial responsibility) that surpluses from SAH had to be diverted to repay those debts. Costs of refurbishment for new tenants on levels 3, 4 and 5 in 2010/2011 meant that GAB could not keep lending. Consequently EOS did not have funds to meet the costs of the Archbishop's operations, meaning they had to be radically cut back.[44]

The other factor was that the EOS was in long term decline, brought about by years of overspending on staff, partly financed through the sale of residences and borrowings. As early as 2004, the EOS Committee was informed of their cash flow deficit.[45] Synod was told that between 2004 and 2009, $8.7 million was raised through the sale of assets to fund recurrent expenditure.[46] This was an unsustainable situation. One suggestion to solve the EOS' chronic problems was to develop the backblock at Bishopscourt as residential units and sold to produce funds for investment. This was approved by Standing Committee in March 2004. GAB was appointed development manager. There were significant risks in this project, but the EOS Committee and the ACPT endorsed the arrangements and construction was completed in 2008, coinciding with the GFC downturn. Delays in selling the

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[44] One assistant bishop was not replaced when he retired, three fulltime archdeacon positions were discontinued and other support staff positions were made redundant.
[45] 'Submission to the ASC by GAB and SDS', 13 December 2010, 4.
[46] Answer to question on notice number 29, 2010, Proceedings of 2010 Synod, sydneyanglicans.net, SDS, Past Synod Proceedings, 2010 Synod.

apartments meant that the project (rather than generating investment funds for the EOS) made a loss of about $750,000 and the permanent loss of the valuable land on which they were built.[47] GAB/SDS' view was that the related nature of the organisations (including GAB as lender, project manager, and in the case of SAH, half owner and manager of the building) meant that the processes relating to EOS matters were sub-optimal.[48] In addition, at various times CEOs of SDS were members of the EOS Committee and ACPT, and various other board members had cross membership as well, raising conflicts of interest issues.

The disastrous effects of the GFC and the other matters described here, were like a perfect storm, with long term governance defects, mismanaged gearing strategies, faulty management practices, docile boards and committees, all combining to produce the losses of 2008-9. It was not that the GFC caused these problems. Rather it exposed the serious shortcomings which years of strong market-based returns had disguised. Clearly there was a need for major reform and the reconstituted SDS and GAB saw that as their immediate and prime responsibility.

14.8 The Reform Process Begins

When the reconstituted GAB/SDS took over in December 2009, the first task was to complete the internal reforms recommended by management consultants, Cameron Ralph. This was completed in 2010. The next task was to disentangle the different corporations so that they operated strictly according to the terms of their own particular ordinances, as proposed by the Davies Committee. For example, GAB gave up the management of SAH to the reactivated SAHC. GAB and SDS, which used to meet as a combined entity, in 2010 began to meet separately,, with each organisation as a standalone body. On the GAB side, investment management was outsourced to Mercer Investment (Australia) limited (as were the investment activities of ACPT), with regular meetings with Mercers to monitor their

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[47] The material presented here was taken from the submission to the Archbishop's Commission in December 2010 by GAB/SDS.
[48] Ibid.

performance.[49] A very risk averse policy was put in place with priority given to GAB's charter of maintaining the real value of the DE. The financial services business (which had held up very well during the GFC) was reformed to reduce risk and impose strict prudential guidelines on lending activities and liquidity.[50] As for SDS, the GFC had placed enormous stress on it, requiring massive downsizing of staff and other cost cutting measures. The shape of SDS changed to become a strictly fee for service organisation. SAHC outsourced its management function for St Andrew's House from SDS to external managers, thereby reducing costs and enabling them to keep up debt repayment. SAHC began to make distributions to EOS and DE again in 2013.

The traditional role of the CEO of SDS also changed, concentrating almost exclusively on GAB and SDS business and with less involvement in wider diocesan, political and organisational matters. The CEO from 2010, Mark Payne, led the implementation of all these reforms and was largely responsible for restoring confidence in SDS. Ironically, all these changes were completed *before* a Commission, set up by Jensen in 2010 to review central organisations, delivered its report in August 2011.

14.9 The Kell Commission and its Aftermath

When the reconstituted GAB/SDS got into stride in February 2010, they quickly assessed the financial situation of the central organisations and through the Acting CEO advised Jensen of the gravity of the financial situation, especially of the EOS. In particular, the refurbishment related debt that SAH owed to GAB meant that there would be no distributions to GAB or EOS. Aware of the problems of EOS, Ballantine-Jones suggested to Jensen that he appoint a short term commission to advise him on possible options he and the EOSC might consider.[51] Instead, he decided on a

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[49] This in effect was option 4 in Fairfull's original proposal in his *Business Plan for the 90s,* 29 January 1992.

[50] This business involved taking funds on deposit at market rates and lending them on first mortgage security, with the profits going back into the DE.

[51] This suggestion envisaged a three month time frame with membership to include a member each of the GAB, ACPT and EOS, an independent chairman (Peter Kell), plus one other with specialist accounting knowledge.

wider commission, the Archbishop's Strategic Commission (ASC) to examine *all* the relevant central organisations, with an 18 month time frame.

Jensen outlined his thinking on the ASC to the 2010 Synod:

> What the present problems have revealed is that at some key points we have allowed unconsidered and unhelpful relationships and habits to endure, especially with regard to the boards which have been charged with the administration of our endowments and the service of our central bodies. Structures and lines of responsibility and accountability have not been properly worked out.[52]

This was an accurate description of how central diocesan organisations had long operated up to the GFC, and in some cases after, but it was *not* accurate in relation to the reconstituted GAB, SDS, SAHC or the ACPT after the GFC. Apart from governance issues, the main problems that dogged the Diocese for many years were conflicts of interest and failure to adhere to Davies' original structure.[53]

The ASC made an interim report to the October 2010 Synod, recommending the sale of Bishopscourt for investment purposes to fund the Archbishop's operations. The ACPT strongly criticised the report and opposed the recommendation. Synod agreed and rejected the proposal. This was a humiliating beginning for the ASC.

The ASC then turned its attention to the GAB, SDS and SAHC. It asked GAB and SDS for a written submission (the only organisations mentioned in its terms of reference to be so asked). This was delivered in December 2010.

The submission included a summary of its own investigations into the GFC.[54] It then gave a detailed analysis of the structures of the relevant bodies, with the comment that it was the failure over 40 years to adhere to those *original* structures that contributed to the financial failures. The submission argued that the reforms of 2010

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[52] www.sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, *Synod Proceedings 2010*, Presidential Address, 8.

[53] On the demand side are, Standing Committee and its maze of volunteer committees. The conflicts of interest and inherent weaknesses of such processes persisted.

[54] This was the only investigation into the GFC undertaken by any diocesan organisation, including the ASC itself.

had corrected these problems and should be allowed to continue. The GAB/SDS heard nothing from the ASC for six months. Meanwhile the ASC was reporting in the *Southern Cross* from February 2011 onwards its intention to recommend radical structural change. When representatives of GAB/SDS and ASC eventually did meet in May of 2011, none of the Commission's proposed recommendations were raised with them. The Chairman of GAB, Ballantine-Jones, formed the view that the ASC had made up its mind very early in its life, and that the whole process was more political than organisational in nature.

The ASC handed Jensen its final report in August 2011, recommending the GAB be disbanded and its functions subsumed into a new investment organisation called the Central Investment Management Board (CIMB), which would take over *all* central investment matters including those of the ACPT. It also proposed that the membership of SDS no longer be coterminous with GAB (or the proposed CIMB) and that SDS functions be put out to tender. Recommendations on the EOS were of a minor nature, except that their investment functions should be handed over to the new investment body. The ACPT immediately issued a strongly worded critique of the report. GAB/SDS also made an initial and critical response, though more nuanced, holding back its major criticisms for later use.

What followed then was a classic example of high level politics, Sydney style. The ASC and Jensen wanted the recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible, even though Standing Committee had even not discussed the report. A number of its members were approached to sponsor a series of motions to Synod seeking in-principle approval for the recommendations and asking Standing Committee to begin to implement them. On learning of this, Ballantine-Jones indicated to some members of the ASC that this would be very controversial at Synod. Instead he suggested a motion welcoming the report and asking the Standing Committee to implement the recommendations 'where desirable and practicable'. This was agreed. He drafted the motion and Peter Kell and Glenn Davies moved it in Synod in 2011. It passed, with an assurance that representatives

of the affected organisations would be part of the Working Group to be set up to consider the ASC's recommendations.[55]

To ensure that the Synod resolution was followed, Ballantine-Jones asked Zac Veron (a member of Standing Committee) to take the necessary steps to ensure that the intention of the resolution was fully carried out. These steps included a motion at the November Standing Committee to constitute a working group to consider the ASC's recommendations, but with the membership from Standing Committee and representatives of the affected bodies to be determined at the December meeting. As it turned out, some ASC members wanted a working group of three, with the Chairman of the ASC (Peter Kell) as its chairman and central organisations to be present as observers only. Veron and the ASC members conferred and, with minor modifications, it was agreed that Veron's original proposal would be moved at Standing Committee. On the night of the November meeting, some ASC members wanted to move back to their original proposal for three members. Veron persevered with his motion, which was overwhelmingly adopted. Before the December meeting, Jensen wrote to Standing Committee urging them to appoint Kell as executive of the Working Group to facilitate implementation of the report. However, on an amendment by Dr Mark Thompson (President of ACL), it was resolved to refer Jensen's letter to the Working Group for its consideration. That was agreed and Veron's proposals passed, with his nominations elected. When the Working Group convened, it received Jensen's letter, but appointed Geoff Kyngdon as chairman.

So, after months of intensive political manoeuvrings, the ASC recommendations were to be reviewed by a working group of five members from Standing Committee

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[55] Resolution 10/11 said: 'Synod welcomes the report of the Archbishop's Strategic Commission on Structures, Funding and Governance together with responses thereto of the GAB/SDS, the ACPT and SACS, and requests the Standing Committee to –
(a) undertake consideration of the possible ways in which –
    (i) the concerns raised in responses from the GAB/SDS, the ACPT and SACS may be addressed, and then
    (ii) the recommendations may be implemented, and
(b) in the light of (a), pass such legislation as may be desirable or practicable, excluding any sale ordinance, or otherwise report to the next session of the Synod on any future proposals'.
www.sydneyanglicans.org, SDS website Previous Synods, *2011 Synod Proceedings*, Resolutions passed.

and four representatives from the central organisations and the ASC, including Kell and Ballantine-Jones.[56]

14.10 Outcome of Working Group

The Working Group met from December 2011 to August 2012. It reviewed the ASC's report and recommendations, receiving submissions on behalf of GAB/SDS and the ACPT. On the basis of these submissions (and their own examination of the report), the Working Group made regular recommendations to Standing Committee, which, in every case were adopted. In summary they were:

1. Bishopscourt: It noted that Standing Committee had referred a proposal from EOS to sell Bishopscourt to the 2012 Synod, so it took no action.
2. St Andrew's House: It noted the work by SAHC and recommended only that Standing Committee be kept informed of developments by SAHC.
3. Matters relating to the 'Anglican' Brand: It advised that no further action be taken on this.
4. The replacement of GAB with a new central investment body: This was not supported, noting the technical difficulties involved, and GAB's reforms already in place. It advised Standing Committee to consider a further review after 2013 in the light of those reforms.
5. Other investment matters: These should be deferred in line with the previous item.
6. EOS: It recommended that Standing Committee re-constitute EOSC into two parts, administration (demand side), and investments (supply side) to be managed by ACPT, with amounts for expenditure determined by ACPT.[57] Both bodies were to report to Standing Committee and Synod. The necessary ordinances were passed in July 2012.
7. SDS: The ASC proposal to have separate members for SDS and GAB was not endorsed but Standing Committee was asked to reconsider this suggestion after 2013 in the light of developments.

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[56] The four organisations were GAB, SDS, represented by Ballantine-Jones, EOSC, represented by Dr Philip Selden, Registrar of the Diocese and ACPT, represented by Richard Neil, Deputy Chairman of ACPT, with Kell to represent the views of the ASC. Kyngdon had a banking background and had been full time Assistant to the Bishop of Wollongong before retiring.
[57] This brought EOS into line with other organisations where supply functions were separated from expenditure decisions.

8. Taking investment functions off ACPT: This was not supported, but could be reconsidered after 2013.

9. A Chairman's Advisory Committee to allow closer co-operation between central bodies: This was supported and acted on by Archbishop Jensen.

10. Governance and internal controls monitoring: The Working Group recommended this should be handled by a Standing Committee created body, reporting to them and the Synod. Recommendation adopted and implemented.

11. Conflicts of interest: It was recommended that this be handled by the body appointed under 10 above. Recommendation adopted.

12. Amendments to organisational ordinances: No further action was recommended.[58]

The outcome of the process begun with a suggestion of a short commission into EOS, leading to the ASC and then the Working Group was very satisfactory from the GAB/SDS point of view. ACPT also found the outcome satisfactory. Ballantine-Jones retired as Chairman of GAB and SDS in December 2012. On the sale of Bishopscourt, Synod resolved in 2012 to approve its sale with strict conditions to ensure it was sold for an appropriate price.

14.11 Conclusion

One way of categorising the diocesan experience on the supply side of the corporate machine after 1980 would be to compare it to a Greek tragedy. From the 1970s there grew up a form of collective **hubris,** as Sydney basked in its wealth. The media routinely described Sydney as the wealthiest and most powerful Diocese in Australia, and so it seemed. Synod and Standing Committee were so confident of the Diocese's financial position that at the height of the DM, they even raided the DE for $20 million to buy land for new church sites.[59] Warnings of what might happen if a down turn occurred were ignored. Money managers indulged in risky and exotic gearing strategies. The DE grew fat on easy money, and the EOS didn't seem to notice that it was living off its capital and debt. SAH, (at the time managed by GAB) was refurbished in 2004-2005 (lifting the debt to $23 million), without due

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[58] www.sydneyanglicans.org, SDS, *Report of the Standing Committee to Synod on Resolution 10/11, 2012 Synod Papers*, 100-109.
[59] In 2007, Standing Committee drew down $20 million from the DE to fund capital grants for local church buildings associated with the Diocesan Mission, *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 412.

consideration of its basic needs or the cash flow consequences, particularly relating to the potential of the 2010/2011 refurbishment to attract new tenants to the upper floors. If this wasn't hubris, what was?

Then came *nemesis*. It was called the GFC, and it wiped away more than half the DE and pushed the EOS over the edge so that even Bishopscourt was approved for sale.

Out of this experience (as well as collective soul searching, recriminations and inquiries) there was an authentic process of acceptance and renewal, *catharsis*. The reconstituted GAB and SDS adopted rigorous governance practices and followed strict commercial operating principles. SAHC operated as a separate corporation, responsible to its 'shareholders', GAB and EOS. The result was that the supply side organisations emerged from the GFC in better shape than they were before. How long this continues is dependent on the capacity of the Standing Committee to remember and preserve the reforms they adopted in 2012.

This thesis is concerned with changes in policy and practices in the Diocese since 1966. This survey of the supply side of central diocesan finances, when linked to the different ways the money raised was spent, raised questions of governance, structure and strategy. It is in the consideration of this corporate side of diocesan affairs that the working hypothesis of Chapter One is most relevant, especially element three on the limitations of the central committee led culture.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE CORPORATE MACHINE: HOW TO SPEND THE MONEY

15.1 Introduction

If ever there is a subject at the centre of political policy and political action, it is taxing parishes and spending their money. It includes considerations of the purposes expenditure is supposed to achieve, the vested interests of recipients, the influence of the leading elites in deciding the fate of others and the machinations employed in achieving all these outcomes. At times in the period under review, there were contests between the bishops lobbying for their favourite projects, diocesan organisations wanting more money for their programmes and the parishes wanting what they saw as their share of the diocesan cake while paying as little in taxes as possible. The working hypothesis (see Chapter One, section 2) on why Sydney finds it so difficult to initiate and sustain major projects from the centre has, direct relevance to this subject. This chapter will trace the major elements of these processes with a view to identifying what happened to the millions of dollars which began to flow like rivers of gold, but which after the GFC dried up like an Australian drought.

15.2 The Demand Side: How to Spend the Money

At the heart of the demand side is the question of how to spend the money. There is no shortage of good causes: parish grants, theological education, youth ministries, Christian education, church planting, caring ministries and many more. Indeed, trying to fix on a rational spending basis was *the* chronic problem throughout all the years of plenty. But before the question of *how* to spend the money could be answered, there was the prior question of how *much* money should be spent? If too much, there was the risk of eating into the endowments or over taxing the parishes, if too little,

the advocates of good causes would complain at the 'sin of hoarding'. Standing Committee, in theory, recommends to Synod how much is spent and how to carve up the pie, but it delegates the preparatory work to sub-committees whose recommendations are mostly rubber stamped. Initially this work was done by the Financial Priorities Committee (FPC), then the Diocesan Executive Board (DEB), and finally, the Mission Board (MB) and its sub-committee, the Mission Board Strategy Committee (MBSC). There is no other way of course, because the processes are so complex and tedious that only those with the time and access to the information can deal with the massive detailed work involved. Even so, the inherent weakness of volunteer committees, with cross membership, conflicts of interest and frequent turnover of members was the ever present problem.

Not including any parish taxation or income from special trusts, the mechanism that determined how much of the DE to spend is the distribution formula. In a submission to Standing Committee in June 2011, the re-constituted GAB outlined the history of distribution methods as background to requesting that a new, post GFC, method be adopted. It said:

> From 1984 to 2001, the amount of each distribution was calculated by reference to the 'Operating Surplus' of the DE, and from 2001 to 2007, the amount of each distribution was calculated by reference to the "Net Asset Value' of the DE. In 2008, the amount ... was calculated by reference to a 'Yale' type formula, the purpose of which was to minimise the impact of short term movements in investment markets on the amount of each distribution, and in 2009 and 2010, as a consequence of the GFC, the amount was specifically prescribed by the Standing Committee.[1]

In the place of this last method, GAB suggested a simpler approach which recognised three different characteristics of the asset classes, relative to their capacity to produce distributable income. This method applied income from equities and cash, after inflation, following a complex formula, and SAH would contribute

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[1] GAB paper to Standing Committee in June 2010. The 'Yale' formula was based on a formula used by the manager of the Yale University Endowment Fund in the US to determine annual distributions from that Fund. The 'Yale Formula' relates to the way Yale University determines the rate of draw down of its endowment surpluses to fund its expenditure

75% of its net receipts to the DE and EOS.[2] Whatever method used, the basic question was still: how *much* should be spent? After the GFC, it was widely acknowledged that the chronic mistake in the years of plenty was that *too much* money was spent and not enough retained in the DE. On top of that, there were the occasional raids on DE capital for emergencies or 'special purposes', which further diminished its real value and its ability to produce income.[3]

15.3 The Spending Process since 1980

On the demand side, the mood was usually to spend as much as possible. Occasional economic downturns required that short term reserves be set aside until markets recovered, but the idea of permanently taking less (and leaving more for future generations) was never seriously considered. What follows is a review of the many different methods used to make annual appropriations.

1)   Taking 1980 as a base year, the Standing Committee appointed the Financial Priorities Committee (FPC) to prepare recommendations on allocations. These were determined mostly by taking the previous year's allocations and adding for inflation. After non-discretionary expenses were provided for, grants were made to a list of diocesan organisations, such as MTC, the Youth Department and the Home Mission Society. The annual reports of Standing Committee disclose no strategy or principles for prioritising these grants, although they do disclose the policy that Synod grants were not intended to replace fund raising activities of recipient organisations.[4]

2)   By 1984, the process was for applicant organisations to be interviewed by the FPC, who were invariably assured that the money was being well spent. The FPC realised this was an inadequate approach and in 1986 suggested that

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[2] Income from equities and cash would be weighted at 70%, and 5% of the average value over the previous three years, weighted at 30%. As to surpluses from the banking business, the rate was to be 75% after expenses.
[3] For example, in 2007 Standing Committee drew down $20 million from the DE to fund capital grants for local church buildings associated with the Diocesan Mission, *2008 Sydney Year Book*, 412.
[4] *1984 Sydney Year Book*, 319, 'Organisations are expected to be self-supporting as far as possible and to live within their means. But by virtue of the nature of their work, some have a wider appeal than others and are better situated to raise funds',

Standing Committee establish the Structures and Priorities Investigations Committee (SPIC) to do a detailed audit of major organisations to ascertain whether they were functioning in an efficient and cost effective way and therefore suitable to receive grants. As a means of indentifying priorities this was totally ineffective because it measured the efficiency of each organisation but not *why* it should receive funding over and against other 'efficient and worthy' bodies. It was closed down in 1991.[5]

3) Throughout the 1980s there was a pervasive sense that there *was* no actual strategic purpose behind appropriations at all, and therefore no way to determine priorities.[6] As a result, in 1990 Price Waterhouse Urwick was engaged to examine FPC's methodology and advise on strategic allocations. Their suggestions may have been useful for ordinary top down commercial organisations, but because they didn't take into account the special and complex nature of a democratised body like Sydney Diocese, they proved to be of no help and were set aside. This meant that the FPC had to start again. Members were assigned to meet in twos to come up with ideas as to the basic purpose of the Diocese and how to make allocations. Standing Committee members were asked to give written submissions as well.

4) Out of this process a consensus started to emerge that the Diocese should be seen essentially as its parishes, with diocesan structures there to support the work of the parishes or do what parishes could not do on their own, such as theological education and community services. Still the question was left hanging: what function were diocesan initiatives intended to serve? (This question will be examined in detail in Chapter Sixteen). Also there was a growing feeling that henceforth *specific programmes* should be funded rather than organisations. Some felt that organisations might be taking the money but not turning it into outcomes related to what the framers of the expenditure ordinance wanted. The FPC then appointed a sub-committee comprising Ballantine-Jones as convenor, Bishop Harry Goodhew and Dr Laurie Scandrett

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[5] Ballantine-Jones was a member of SPIC.
[6] Ballantine-Jones was a member of FPC.

to devise ways to implement this idea of supporting programmes, not organisations. The FPC adopted the sub-committee's recommendations in February 1991. They were that after non-discretionary items were provided for, programmes which added value to the work of parishes should be given top priority and other less parish-related programmes would follow behind. Within these categories, individual programmes were rated by a secret balloting system to avoid conflicts of interest within the FPC. The income and expenditure ordinances from 1991 to 1995 were based on this methodology.

5) Towards the end of Robinson's term, and out of concern at the lack of co-ordination between many of the diocesan ministry organisations, he appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Peter Nicholson to review and advise him on how the organisations could better work together. The only outcome of this was that Robinson's successor, Goodhew, created what was called the Diocesan Executive Board (DEB) to take over general oversight of central activities of Standing Committee and replace the FPC in formulating funding priorities.

6) During Goodhew's time, the DEB recast the *Appropriation Ordinance* (as it came to be called) to reflect the principles of expenditure prevailing under his administration. They were in reality a series of vision statements based on aspirations for what was *hoped* would happen in the following ten years. For example, under the heading '[the Diocese becoming the] Fastest Growing Church in Sydney, Doubling in Ten Years', the goal of the allocations of money was identified as:

> The regular attendance in Anglican churches has increased by over 100% over the last 10 years. Much of this growth has come from new areas, from young people and from people with a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Traditionally strong Anglican areas have been revitalised through rationalisation and consolidation.[7]

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[7] *1996 Sydney Year Book,* 588.

This kind of statement was an attempt to give some overarching shape to the allocation of central funds. As a statement of desired outcomes it was defensible, but as a method of deciding how to spend millions of dollars in a strategic and targeted way, it was inadequate because there was no strategy or organisation put in place to implement those aspirations. Arguably, it undid the work of many years in trying to fund programmes strategically.

One important change that did take place at that time was the move to three year funding. This was to give recipients certainty in planning. However an unintended consequence of that was that it had the effect of removing Standing Committee (and Synod) from the process and obscuring details of what was being funded or whether the programmes were actually performing as hoped.[8] The full regionalisation of the Diocese under Goodhew meant that many allocations previously made to organisations, such as Anglicare, went to the new regional councils for distribution as parish grants or other regional initiatives. The form of the ordinance reflected the fact that different parts were prepared by different committees.[9] Towards the end of Goodhew's term, the DEB met for a special one day conference to discuss ideas for the future. Out of those discussions came the proposal to follow a 'strategy driven' model for appropriations. But what strategy? At that meeting, Phillip Jensen seized the opportunity to raise the idea of a special ten-year diocesan mission with the aim of reaching 10% of the population. That was well received, but could not be activated so late in Goodhew's term and was left for the next Archbishop to consider.

When Peter Jensen became Archbishop, he accepted the idea of the DM, and the DEB became the instrument to advance the objective of incorporating 10% of the population into Bible based churches in 10 years. It changed its name to

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[8] The process of separating direct parish costs (such as superannuation and insurances) from the rest continued, soon to reach the point of becoming a separate ordinance, known as the Parish Cost Recovery Ordinance.

[9] For example, programmes under Line Item *5* came from the Training and Ministry Committee. The explanatory statement said: 'A committee will review grant applications and make recommendations to the DEB at 3 levels. The levels would be set each year and could be, say, equal to last year plus inflation of 3%, + 10% on last year and + 20% on last year, depending on the economic climate', *1997 Sydney Year Book,* 544.

the Mission Task Force (MTF) and later to the Mission Board (MB), but the Appropriation Ordinances to implement the objectives followed a similar structure as the Goodhew model, and a similar process.

7) With the GFC of 2008, the basic assumptions behind appropriations had to be thrown out to take into account the massive drop in funds. In 2009, the MB issued a statement saying that '[the] priority of the parish should be maintained and therefore no assessments on parish giving are proposed to make up for the shortfall in central income'.[10] With respect to local projects, the statement said that they would need to be funded through local fund raising. Furthermore, it said, funding from EOS and the DE would be co-ordinated to serve the restructuring of the total services of the Mission, including the possibility that assistant bishops might need to be part of the allocations to the regions and funded by the Synod. The 2009 statement also said that the recruitment and training of gospel workers was still the best strategic use of central funds for church growth in the long term. The aspiration to hold organisations accountable 'for their performance against objectives ...' was restated, with the details on how this would be done to be worked out. They never were.

8) In the light of GFC losses, it was thought that a new approach to financial allocations had to be developed. So in 2011, the MBSC of the MB published a discussion paper on what this new approach might be. It had not gone to Standing Committee before going to Synod and it aroused strong feelings when it was debated there. Interested parties were asked to make submissions by February 2012, with the expectation that a new approach to funding would be presented to Synod later that year. The draft paper acknowledged that during the period of the DM, too much money had been appropriated for the long term sustainability of the endowments. It said that a new 'holistic' approach should be adopted, acknowledging that various reserves and endowments had been used in ways that have masked some of the costs. The concept of *Anglican Essentials* was introduced as a basis for applying new taxes on the parishes. Among Anglican essentials were said to be the Archbishop, Synod, the ACA

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[10] www.sydneyanglican.org, SDS Synod Reports 2009, *Strategic Directions 2010-2012*, 2.

and SDS. Nondiscretionary expenses, such as the Archbishop, were proposed to be paid for by parishes, leaving EOS to fund his bishops and staff. Discretionary programmes, such as MTC and DM related activities, were to be funded by the endowments. This proposed model was to be for years 2013 to 2015.

Many saw these proposals as a muddled attempt to address a short term funding problem, but without addressing fundamental questions of what the Diocese, and central operations were for. It looked to be a very centralist approach. One problem was that it appeared to have no memory of the previous models outlined above. The time set for submissions gave little opportunity for informed submissions or any effective opposition to be mounted. Ballantine-Jones took the political initiative and proposed that ACL hold a special conference on the draft paper in February 2012 for Synod members, with speakers from all sides and time for open discussion. Ballantine-Jones prepared a 7,000 word paper for the more than 120 participants.[11] He also addressed the conference, along with Phillip Jensen who spoke on behalf of the Strategy Committee.

The upshot was that at the 2012 Synod, a different model was adopted, taking into account many of the criticisms from the conference. The concept of *Anglican Essentials* was gone, as was funding the Archbishop through taxes. Other changes gave parishes a greater say on discretionary spending, such as agreeing to levy the parishes to fund the acquisition of land for new churches. This ACL process was a clear use of politics in relation to proposed changes in public policy and it could be described as a high level political action.

This brief survey of the history of funds allocation over a 30 year period gives an idea of the complexity and the political nature of the process of spending the millions of dollars the supply side of the equation generated for the Diocese.

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[11] http://acl.asn.au/pdf/fpc/BBJ statement on financial priorities.pdf.

15.4 Conclusion

In considering what impact the wealth that flowed to the Diocese after 1980 had, a preliminary question might be asked: what was *normal*? Was it El Dorado, with rivers of gold running through the streets, or was it the way things were before, and *after,* the GFC? Was it the case that during the good times a kind of unreality reigned, where the Synod thought it was their *right* to receive and spend the money raised by GAB? Goodhew signalled his awareness of this potential problem in 1996 when he addressed what he called, *dependency upon investment income.* He said, 'we can be grateful to God for this [investment income], but I ask the Synod to consider whether or not this is spiritually healthy. Is it good that parishes have no open and consistent fellowship in supporting work in the Diocese beyond parish boundaries?'[12] In the light of subsequent events, this was a perceptive comment.

That was not the only time questions were raised about diocesan enthusiasm to spend money. At the 2006 Synod (when opposing the appropriation of $20 million from the capital of the DE to finance DM related projects), Ballantine-Jones likened the prevailing diocesan mood to something like a cargo cult. By this he meant that as long as the mysterious airplanes (GAB and EOS) kept landing on the jungle airstrip (the Diocese), with food, clothing and trinkets (money to spend for diocesan purposes), the natives (everyone from archbishops down) were happy. Bringing the metaphor up to date; not too much thought was given to where the gifts came from, (even if some of it was provided by borrowings or spending EOS capital). As long as the planes kept landing, the grateful natives were happy. When the planes stopped coming (which they did with the GFC), the natives had to learn again how to live within their means and discover new (or old) ways to work their patch (support their programmes by local donations), or go without.

This parabolic interpretation was Ballantine-Jones' assessment of diocesan attitudes when it thought it had become El Dorado. Essentially, the demand for more funds had blinded the Diocese to the reality that there are no guarantees, when it comes to money matters. Difficulties in determining financial priorities, and reluctance to

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[12] *1997 Sydney Year Book*, 322.

require accountability on both the supply and demand sides led to sloppy supervision and undisciplined spending. The media and other critics were not always wrong in playing up the impact of the GFC on the Diocese. When easy money was available, the central organisations and the Synod acted much like the rest of society: it spent up, went into debt, and never took seriously the possibility that it might come to an end. This led to the waste of millions of dollars and the neglect of prudent governance on both the supply and demand sides. This meant that what became a vast corporate machine seriously underperformed, to reputational detriment and the loss of many worthy programmes.

The failings on the supply side had been largely addressed by 2011, as the recommendations of the Working Group confirm. But demand side problems were only beginning the same process of reform in 2012. Given the enthusiasm for good causes and the shortness of corporate memory, overspending on poorly formulated projects is always a possibility, as the working hypothesis suggests. Beyond these process questions, broader philosophical and political questions remain. They have to do with the most basic of questions: What are the essential purposes that a diocese (and its central structures) are intended to achieve? How should it organise itself to fulfil those purposes? These questions will be further considered in the following chapters.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE CORPORATE MACHINE: POLICY AND PURPOSE IN THE DIOCESE OF SYDNEY

16.1 Introduction: What Purposes Should the Diocese Serve?

Sydney Diocese could be likened to a body with skeleton, arms, legs and head. It has a synod, episcopal leadership, a bureaucracy, parishes and organisations. But such a description does not answer questions of purpose and utility. More particularly, it does not address the question of purpose as it relates to the central administration. Leading political philosopher Professor Jeremy Waldron, in a lengthy review of recent books on politics by Professor Alan Ryan, said:

> We are still not sure, exactly, what political systems are for: security, certainty, public goods, and the legal frame for a common life. But do polities also exist as vehicles for culture, language, and the embodiment of ethnicity? Is it the state's job to foster a particular national identity?[1]

Questions such as these came to occupy the attention of Sydney diocesan leaders once increased financial resources enabled them to initiate a string of projects never before possible. Was there an underlying purpose that those projects were meant to fulfil? Was it the centre's job to foster (and enshrine) a particular Sydney evangelical identity? Was it appropriate for the centre to spend tens of millions of dollars on a centrally directed mission? Are there limits to what a body like Sydney Diocese should attempt to do? What are they and why?

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[1] The book review appeared in the February 13 2013 issue of the *New York Review* of *On Politics: A History of Political Thought, Book One: Herodotus to Machiavelli, Book Two, Hobbes to the Present*, (Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York) 2012. *The Making of Modern Liberalism* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2012) Jeremy Waldron is Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, All Souls Oxford.

It was common ground among most diocesan leaders that supporting parishes is the fundamental purpose of a central diocesan administration. The search for some *wider* purpose (if there is one) could be boiled down to the question: what are the legitimate limits of central action beyond this fundamental function? If the nominated limits are narrow (a 'small government policy'), then concentrating diocesan activity on parish related infrastructure would seem to be a sufficient purpose. But if a wider purpose was accepted (a 'big government policy') then pursuing programmes associated with social services, running schools, retirement villages and a DM, could well be seen as appropriate. What could or should determine what choices are made beyond the parish support function?

Such questions of purpose are in one sense, subjective. Just as in other secular organisations where decisions are made on ideological or political grounds, so also in the Diocese. They involve opinions about what the Anglican Church's role in society should be. If Synod chooses to create a network of schools, a string of nursing homes, or anything else, the assumption is that they are, by definition, within the purposes of the Diocese. However, if someone asks if the proposal in question is *really* what a diocese is for, that is not always an easy question to answer.

This chapter will examine how the Sydney leadership struggled with questions of purpose, and therefore, what should be the limits of its central activities. It will trace the tentative expansion of such activities during the Loane administration, attempts under Robinson to work out how to fit them into some agreed purpose, the Goodhew approach of promoting outreach as its determining purpose, but without actually establishing a centralised programme to achieve it. Lastly, it will look at the Jensen era which was dominated by the DM.

Whether or not the search for some overall purpose is successful, there is always the other matter: *how* should the central structure organise itself to fulfil that purpose? That will be examined in Chapter Seventeen.

16.2 Evolving Vision of Diocesan Purpose in the Robinson Period

The expansion of central initiatives under Loane was typified by the creation of the New Housing Areas Committee in 1966, and in 1967, the parallel organisation, the Inner City Committee. Of this second body, Loane said that the purpose was to find 'the most efficient and economic way to deploy all the resources [of the Diocese] for the spiritual, moral and social welfare of the inner city as a whole'.[2] Implicit in this was the assumption that the Diocese *did* have a role in addressing major problems beyond the capacity of any one parish to handle.[3]

When Robinson took over in 1982, he linked perceptions about purpose to what he saw as the role of the Archbishop. He told Synod that he believed that *he* (as Archbishop) 'shared the cure of souls with every incumbent in the Diocese'.[4] He said that the (diocesan) Bishop had 'the same responsibility in a plurality of parishes [and] represents the unity in diversity of our Anglican diocesan tradition'.[5] Here is an idea of purpose that relates to the parishes, and with the Archbishop as the chief minister of each one of them. As for the Synod, Robinson said that it existed 'to provide machinery by which our many congregations can establish a proper relation with each other and get on with being the Church ...', in other words, help parishes function better.[6] But he then said, 'One can take a maximising or a minimising view of the Synod's role. *Anything* [italics added] which affects the order and good government can come within its view', that is, within its purpose.

Notwithstanding Robinson's generally minimalist view of central diocesan activity, the growth of diocesan income and the enthusiasm of those around him to expand central activity swept him up into projects such as VFG. Difficulties in harnessing

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[2] *1968 Sydney Year Book*, 356.
[3] In 1970, Loane asked, 'How long can the Diocese of Sydney with its evangelical tradition and its potential resources, afford to neglect or ignore the use of mass media without losing contact with the great bulk of the population?'[3] This question had to be based on the assumption that the Diocese, beyond being a network of parishes, *should* retain contact with the great bulk of the population, and mass media was the way to do it. In response, Dudley Foord moved that Synod establish a commission on the mass media.[3] During this period, the Diocese ran a TV production company and a radio recording unit. It is difficult to escape the impression that such activities were assumed to fulfil some overarching diocesan purpose and that the Diocese was going to get on and do it. The Synod did not object to this assumption. The lone voice questioning this trend at that time was D B Knox, who would often express concern at what he called 'centralism'. *1970 Sydney Year Book*, page 237.
[4] *1983 Sydney Year Book*, 215.
[5] Ibid, 215.
[6] Ibid, 219.

these enterprises to some coordinated purpose led him to establish the Nicholson Commission to advise him on how this might be done.

16.3 The Nicholson Commission

Between 1965 and 1990, the number, size and complexity of ministry organisations grew significantly. This led Robinson to conclude that a new commission was needed to 'examine the ministry organisations of the Diocese with a view to considering their interrelation so as to assist the Archbishop in determining the needs and priorities within the *general purposes of the Diocese'* [italics added].[7] But the question still hanging was: what *were* the 'general purposes of the Diocese'? The Commission began in August 1991 and concluded in May 1992.[8]

The Commission's report opened with an extended reflection on what it saw as the need for change in the Diocese:

1. [It asserted the need for] clarity about goals, priorities and strategies [for] a clear mission with deep commitment to the vision of the Diocese.

2. [From] confusion on funding priorities and enormous exposure on financial risks in organisations, [to] agreed objectives; adequately funded and resourced with sound reporting safeguards in place.

3. [From] overlapping organisations which lack accountability, [to] simplified focussed structure with appropriate authority and accountability.

4. [From] organisations which are inefficient: [with] too many members on committees/boards: meetings which are too long and lack direction, too bureaucratic and legalistic, to efficient, effective organisations which have strong management and leadership skills and a 'no nonsense' management style – action oriented.

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[7] *1991 Sydney Year Book*, 262.
[8] The Chairman was Peter Nicholson, Deputy Chairman of the GAB and SDS. Among other members were David Fairfull, CEO of GAB and SDS, Bishop Donald Cameron and Chairman of GAB and SDS, Bishop Peter Watson, Dr Stephen Judd, Geoff Kells, then CEO of CSR, and Bruce Ballantine-Jones. Fairfull and Kells were the dominant members.

5. [From a] perceived lack of relationship between parishes and St Andrew's House, parishes and ministry organisations, [with] individual parishes lacking a strong sense of belonging to the Diocese, [to] an acknowledged unified structure with each unit understanding its place in the whole and strongly developed trust/mutual support.[9]

This would appear to be a very negative assessment of the state of the central side of the Diocese. The Commission believed there was an urgent need to clarify what purposes the Diocese should pursue and what changes to diocesan practices should be made. The influence of contemporary corporate thinking was clearly evident, as was an instinctive awareness of the Diocese's many governance and process deficiencies, as posited in the working hypothesis. What it did not have (and its recommendations outlined below will show) was an appreciation of the first two elements of that hypothesis, namely the operational independence of parishes and organisations, and the complementary (and sometimes competing) roles of the Synod and the Archbishop.

The Commission recommended the creation of a new powerful body, called the Diocesan Executive Board (DEB). Its main tasks were to transmit the vision of the DEB and the Archbishop to the Diocese, to create an environment conducive to achieving that vision, and to build the necessary capabilities to achieve it. The DEB was to consist of 14 members, including the Archbishop and the CEO of SDS, six appointed by the Archbishop and six appointed by the Archbishop-in-Council (the Archbishop acting on the advice of Standing Committee), meaning the Standing Committee would have a consultative role in determining the membership of the DEB. This was a very top down structure. In effect it would be another committee of the kind the Commission's own report described as 'inefficient, bureaucratic and legalistic'. It envisaged that the DEB would work directly with the CEOs of diocesan organisations to set goals in the various areas of ministry. It recommended the retention of existing councils and boards but with these bodies reporting to the DEB.

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[9] *Report of the Archbishop's Commission of Inquiry* (Diocese of Sydney, Sydney,1992), 7-8.

Other organisations (not deemed to require a board or council) were to become departments, with their CEOs reporting and accountable to the DEB. [10]

It is probable that this model would have struggled to obtain Synod's support. Political organisations such as ACL would have opposed it strongly. Some members of the Commission (including Ballantine-Jones) were wary of it as well. Rather than argue about it in that forum, they decided to string out the process for as long as possible so that even if Robinson *did* like its proposals, there would be no time to implement them before his retirement. They need not have worried. When Robinson received the draft report, he was none too pleased. In a memorandum to the Commission, he cited three options open to him: to do nothing and leave it to his successor, to accept the main recommendations and begin to implement them, or to address one or two points such as improving accountability of ministry organisations and leave the rest to his successor. He noted that in the proposed leadership model, the roles of the Synod and Standing Committee were 'somewhat marginalised' (element two of the working hypothesis). Also he saw it as applying a 'business model' to the activities of the Diocese, with the 'Diocese itself considered as a productive enterprise'. He questioned whether 'a voluntary association like a diocese would, or could, or should adopt such a modus operandi'.

Of the DEB, he thought such an unelected body, centrally controlling ministry organisations, would attract 'a host of bad projections via the Synod who see themselves as 'proprietors' rather than 'customers'. He thought the distance of a DEB from Synod would be a major problem.[11] He noted that the Commission had not looked at the ministry organisations as he had wanted, and he felt he was 'left with a recommendation that some *other* body do the work he had set up the Commission to do'. He endorsed the concept of a *leadership team* approach to management, but in his mind he *had* such a team in his assistant bishops and other senior clergy. But he wondered how far the proposed DEB could be fulfilled by an episcopal team, not least insofar as the ministerial organisations were concerned.[12]

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[10] Ibid, 27.
[11] All quotations are from Robinson's memorandum to the Commission, August 1992, in Ballantine-Jones' possession as a member of the Commission.
[12] Ibid.

Robinson hoped his comments would assist the Commission before it delivered its final report so that he could table it, or at least comment on it in some way in his final address to Synod in 1992. The Commission did not change its recommendations, and in fact he only briefly referred to it, noting that it was not possible for him to begin to implement its recommendations.[13]

The recommendations of the Nicholson Commission, if accepted, would have destroyed the independence of diocesan organisations and significantly altered the balance of power between the two heads of government of the Diocese. Notwithstanding Robinson's own proclivities towards episcopal leadership, that was a step too far even for him.

Arguably, the Nicholson Commission was a failure for a number of reasons: it did not adequately address the core question of the overall purpose of the Diocese, let alone the role of the organisations within that purpose. Those who exercised the most influence on the Commission had little or no understanding of diocesan culture. To think that such a top down business model could be superimposed on a Synod that was passionate about its rights and suspicious about centralism was naive. It failed to address the relationship between the Synod and the Archbishop in deciding what the Diocese should do. Finally, to think that an archbishop at the end of his term could possibly consider such a countercultural and radical concept was unrealistic.

16.4 Robinson's own Attempt to Define 'Purpose'

Having brought questions of purpose and structure to the surface, Robinson decided to set out his own views of the purposes of the Diocese in his last address to Synod in 1992. He summarised its nature as '*the people* gathering for worship [italics here and following added] and mutual support, *a fellowship* through which members can love and witness to the world, and a *body* that seeks the welfare of the wider community, supports evangelism locally and beyond, offers care for the needy and seeks proper relationships with other Christians and churches'.[14] So, to Robinson, all

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[13] *1993 Sydney Year Book*, 268.
[14] Ibid, 269-70.

those extra-parochial activities *were* part of the purpose of the Diocese after all, even though he offered no justification for them in that context. He then proposed his own diocesan 'vision statement' for the following 5 to 10 years. It included the need to harness the resources of the Diocese for the 'development of churches and ministries in new areas'. But then he said 'It should not be thought that diocesan goals *necessarily* require central direction, control, or even resources. Some may'. This begged the whole question of purpose he set up the Commission to look at. He concluded:

> A few specific targets *may* [italics added] present themselves which will call for concentrated diocesan fire power. But it is the regular and constant life of congregations and parishes, with their own ministries and their own resources that will count for most in our being what we are, and doing what we ought to do.[15]

It could be argued that Robinson never did fix on a coherent and consistent concept of purpose as far as the central administration was concerned. In many ways Robinson was an enigma; radical in his congregationalism, conservative in his denominationalism, daring in his vision for the Diocese, tentative on whether or how it could be brought about. What he did do was open up the topic of diocesan identity and purpose in ways that Loane never did. He did this in an environment of increasing material wealth, growing pressure for change and difficulties in working out the role of the centre in achieving whatever Sydney Anglicans thought the purpose of the Diocese might be.

16.5 Standing Committee's Attempts to Find a Purpose

Meanwhile (as noted in Chapter Fifteen) Standing Committee was wrestling with similar questions. On the expenditure side, there were long standing problems of determining financial priorities in an environment where there was no agreed sense of purpose and strategy. In summary, it was noted that prior to the increases in the money flow, the parishes were assessed (taxed) to give modest support to various

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[15] Ibid, 272.

diocesan organisations. Increased appropriations were made by adding CPI increases to the previous year's amounts. Dissatisfaction with this approach led to the creation of SPIC to ascertain whether the money was being well spent. That did not help, and so FPC tried to work out what *it* saw the purpose of the Diocese to be in order to guide it in making funding decisions. Out of that process a view emerged that the centre existed to support parishes, and therefore specific programmes should be funded on that basis. The 1991 statement of funding principles encapsulated a view of diocesan purpose which focused on the parishes, with training of ordinands the first extra-parochial priority after that. Christian education, evangelistic programmes, media, chaplaincies and social work followed behind. At the time, they were justified on the grounds that they were beyond the capacity of parishes to achieve. But why do them at all? That was never seriously considered. It is not being argued here that these programmes should *not* have been supported, just that without a clear idea of diocesan purpose and the role of the centre, diocesan leaders always found it difficult to determine what place such programmes should have in the overall priorities of the Diocese.

16.6 Purpose in the Goodhew Years

When the Standing Committee in 2002 proposed that Synod might consider adopting the Diocesan Mission it noted that during the period covered by the Goodhew episcopate, approximately $83 million had been distributed by the Synod.[16] By any measure that is a large sum. What concept of purpose guided the Diocese during that period?

In Goodhew's address to the 1993 Synod, he outlined a broad vision for the Diocese and what he wanted to see happen in his time. He wanted the Diocese to develop fresh approaches to 'ministry, mission and services'. The proposed five regions were to enable assistant bishops to get closer to clergy and lay people to implement effective teaching and outreach. He called for significant restructuring of parishes and [local] church property for greater flexibility. He wanted the number of ministry workers to increase and he wanted 'these new initiatives to have the full co-operation

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[16] *2002 Sydney Year Book,* 462.

and focused resources of the central organisation'. He concluded, 'Together we are being called to find a common sense of purpose, of unity, and of determination to achieve what Christ is calling us to'.[17]

In correspondence with Ballantine-Jones in 2013, Goodhew said:

> The method by which we sought to bring this [common sense of purpose] about was to have regional bishops focus on the development of the churches and other growth activities in their regions. ... We did have particular aims for the diocesan organisations like Anglicare, schools, etc. We sought to have their governing councils focused on doing their individual missions effectively ...[18]

Explaining further his ideas on the nature and purpose of the Diocese, Goodhew said:

> A diocese is a geographical unit placed under the oversight of a bishop. His role is to care for the members of his diocese. He does that through the supply of clergy. The primary work of the diocese is done in the local parish, namely making disciples and nurturing their relationship with God. If the diocese did nothing more than this it would be doing its most basic work.
>
> The Synod is the forum in which tasks necessary for this work, and other ministries greater than one parish can do, can be undertaken to advance the cause of Christ. This makes necessary bodies like Standing Committee, boards of diocesan organisations and arrangements for managing central funds. What you have in an arrangement like this is an opportunity for people to bind together to do things they consider desirable. The work of interests groups takes place here in the same way it does in any other human organisation.
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> Where I differ from the Knox view (and I think Robinson does also) is that I do not see these lobbying activities, and the diocesan structure, as secular because whenever Christians meet, Christ in is their midst and that makes it more than secular.
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> I do not see the structural components of diocesan life, Standing Committee etc, as the primary focus of attention. From my perspective, to concentrate on those

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[17] *1994 Sydney Year Book*, 323-324.
[18] Correspondence 8 July 2013, quoted with permission.

aspects has done little good for the cause of the Diocese, namely, winning people to Christ and building them up in the faith.

While I followed VFG with Vision 2001 because of the obvious need to fund new centres, I was of the opinion that expending effort to make local churches increasingly effective, not in doing the 'big' central thing, was the important thing to do.

The Nicholson Commission report proposed a DEB that would have allowed a small group around the Archbishop to plan and execute significant developments. The Standing Committee would have none of it. What was left was reduced to an additional layer of time wasting committee activity.

I think the capacity of individuals and groups to develop ministries which later come under the aegis of Synod (so called diocesan organisations) is a good thing, providing, as they do, fine expressions of works of evangelism, mercy and education. Whether they should have access to the diocesan purse is another matter. However, as I said towards the end of my episcopate, the centre needs to argue a case for any new development it might have in mind. Doing that in Synod can be a messy and time consuming thing, but it is necessary if the decision is not to be a mere rubber stamp.[19]

16.7 Purpose in the Jensen Years

In November 2007, Peter Jensen wrote a paper entitled *Why is the Governance Structure of the Diocese an Issue?* He circulated it privately to senior diocesan officials (as well as to Ballantine-Jones) and later to the Mission Board. It set out his reflections on matters of purpose and structure as they appeared to him mid-way through his term and before the GFC struck.[20]

He described the Diocese of Sydney as a community with three obligations: 'to be faithful to the gospel in teaching and behaviour, to adorn the gospel to the world around and to support the preaching of the gospel wherever it can'. 'It follows', he said, 'that diocesan structures must reflect these priorities'.

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[19] Correspondence 30 January 2013, quoted with permission.
[20] The following summary of Jensen's paper is included with Jensen's approval as a correct summary of his views.

He described the Diocese as being made up of its parishes and churches, organisations, wealth, institutions, theology and people. Integral to it was its decentralised and locally responsible leadership ethos. He affirmed its congregationalist polity but said that the parishes are bound together by law and custom. This network, he said, works through policies (such as those that produce biblically minded ministers), through synodical legislation and through the allocation of its human and material resources. This network provides for joint action, especially in areas beyond the reach of local churches (for example MTC, ARV). The Synod (and the Standing Committee), in addition to their legislative and accountability functions, can also be a 'meeting of representatives of the churches' to develop a greater sense of vision, fellowship and prayer.

He noted the proposals of the Nicholson Commission for a top down diocesan executive board (DEB), but said 'the idea that the organisations would be accountable to the DEB was never going to work ... Did the architects of the DEB recognise the Diocese is basically run by volunteers, even paid volunteers?' The adaptation of the DEB, in Jensen's view, did not deliver what was needed either. He conceded however that it was from the DEB that talk of a 10 in 10 mission originated. 'In this I believe that they had struck something very important and capable of inspiring action'. In his view, the MB (and the Archbishop bringing together the CEOs of the organisations for consultation) accomplished far more towards the goals of the [Nicholson] Commission than the DEB. But the DM was not a 'team', with the Archbishop as chairman calling the organisations to heel. He said that whatever success there was for the DM, it was in the base recognition that the centre can only persuade not enforce and through the joint efforts of policy groups, bishops and organisations to 'sail in convoy'.

He noted a lack of clarity about the role of the Archbishop in the structures. Is he Chairman or CEO? He said the Archbishop has to set the vision and work with those around him to see that the vision is fulfilled. He thought his role is a mixture of a Chairman and a CEO, perhaps more like that of the Vice-Chancellor of a university, having to contend with powerful fiefdoms. He wondered whether there were too many people for the Archbishop to work with. Noting his concentration on regional

bishops, he asked if there were other leaders that might have merited more attention. 'More important than these difficulties', he said, 'was the Diocese's inability to resolve large issues such as where should new ministries be planted? Where are new church buildings needed? How can we do these things? Where is the money? Where are the men? How can we inspire our churches to evangelise their communities?'

On the question of financial risk (and with some foresight), he asked, 'are there not potential financial and accountability problems of the diocesan organisations, which could embarrass the Diocese if they collapsed? There are no effective accountability structures to monitor or call organisations to account'.

He questioned whether the diocesan leadership has failed to understand and operate their roles effectively: 'Despite the goodwill of the Diocese and the power of persuasion, there remains considerable strategic confusion. I would say that the policy groups run by the MTF and the action groups run by the MB have failed to deliver. Was this due to my intellectual weakness and the failure to understand what the Diocese is and what it is trying to accomplish'?

Despite the problems as he saw them, he believed the structure had done good things and was capable of doing much more, 'as long as we see that the MB is a policymaking and accountability body and as long as we can work with intention and discipline through its sub-committees and policy groups'.

'In the end', he said, 'it all comes down to people. The MB and its committees will fail if we have not got the right people involved, and will fail if the people are not prepared to act with energy, focus, wisdom and intellectual rigour. In short, I do not think that we are looking for further structural change, but the capacity to run what we have [now] more effectively than hitherto. And that will flow from a more decisive archiepiscopal leadership, the involvement of the right people and a greater understanding of, and commitment to, what we are attempting.'

In giving his approval for this summary of his 2007 paper to be quoted, Jensen said that it is important to know that it was a document relative to the times and not the

whole of what he might have to say. He also said that the structure he helped to develop was derailed by the crisis of the GFC. He said that the Diocese's best thinkers had to struggle with the loss of income, and the policy groups of the DM had to spend far too much time on those issues. He believed in the decentralisation of power and authority as well as a recognition of their real limits, and thought it important that archiepiscopal authority be exercised in a circumspect manner. He said, 'Our genius is in what happens through the volunteers in the parishes'.[21]

16.8 Conclusion

If it is the case that distinguished political philosophers such as Professor Jeremy Waldron acknowledged the difficulty of knowing 'exactly what political systems are for', it should not be surprising that diocesan leaders struggled with the same problem in relation to their system. What this examination of the corporate machine shows is that there never was a clear and consistent idea about what the purpose of the Diocese should be (outside of looking after parishes), nor how the central administration could use its instruments of power to accomplish whatever they thought they wanted to do.

This lack of clarity often led to decisions being made on intuitive and political grounds. Certainly it was a common view that the centre should support parishes, so that ACPT, SDS, GAB, MTC and AYW unquestionably were part of that core purpose, providing as they do, core support services to them. But as for deciding what *other* activities the Diocese should engage in, that was more problematic. Does a diocese *have* to run a network of schools to be a diocese? Does it *have* to run a chain of retirement villages, nursing homes, a counselling centre or a financial advisory service, to be a diocese? Obviously not. Many dioceses in Australia do not provide such services, yet in every sense they fulfil what it means to be a 'diocese'. So, if such activities are not of the *essence* of being an Anglican diocese, what

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[21] Private correspondence with Ballantine-Jones in October 2013.

justifies Sydney doing them, given the economic and reputational risks involved if things go wrong?[22]

It is not the function of this thesis to determine a view on what the purpose of the Diocese should be (beyond supporting parishes), nor what should be the limits of extra parochial activity. However, it is reasonable to say that if certain central initiatives *are* seen as legitimate expression of its purpose, there should be some coherent and agreed reason for doing them and a reasonable basis for thinking the Diocese can achieve what it sets out to do. Having done that, it then becomes a matter of working out *how* to do them properly. That involves questions of governance and structure. These will be examined in the next chapter.

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[22] The reputational and financial risks of a diocese running diocesan schools are well illustrated by the SCEGGS disasters in the 1970. See *Sydney Anglicans*, 272-274.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE CORPORATE MACHINE: PRACTICE AND STRUCTURE AT THE CENTRE

17.1 Introduction: How the Centre Should Structure Itself

Whatever Sydney Diocese might settle on as its purpose, the issue then becomes *how* it should go about fulfilling that purpose? With respect to the centre, this goes to questions of practice and structure. Many of the difficulties experienced in these areas have already been noted in Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen. In Chapter One, a hypothesis was posited to account for these difficulties. This chapter will address some of the central diocesan structures created to implement what was determined to be within the Diocese's legitimate purpose. As part of this examination, the DM will be taken as a test case for the working hypothesis proposed as a reason why the Diocese struggled to achieve its objectives.[1]

17.2 Management Tools and a Voluntary Association

To begin, it is noted that general management theory says that to successfully manage large, complex and prolonged enterprises, certain factors should normally be present.[2] First, there should be a goal (win the war, increase market share,

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[1] The working hypothesis is that the autonomous nature of parishes and diocesan organisations, the two headed nature of diocesan government (Synod and Archbishop) and the dis-functional nature of the central committee culture combine to make it difficult for the centre to manage major projects.

[2] For example, W J Reddin begins his book on effective management by saying that managerial effectiveness is multidimensional. 'Before a manager can operate with full effectiveness he must: Understand the overall contribution his unit should make, which means knowing what his superior is responsible for. Understand his role in his unit, which means knowing what he is responsible for achieving and knowing what his superior thinks is a good job. Establish specific objectives which he intends to achieve in a determined time period. Have the help of his superior in overcoming obstacles which may prevent the attainment of these objectives. These obstacles may lie in the organisation, the job, the superior, or the manager himself. Have a willingness to work to achieve his objectives, which may mean a preparedness to change his behaviour. Receive constant periodic feedback on his progress toward his objectives. Be held accountable for his action'. W J Reddin, *Effective Management by Objectives,* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1971), 5. See also Leonard

increase returns to shareholders, create an institution, undertake a diocesan mission). There must be resources available to achieve that goal. There has to be a plan (some might call that a strategy). There needs to be a suitable structure to manage the processes to implement the plan, and there needs to be people who understand and can communicate the strategy, and manage the process.[3]

In 2001, Standing Committee proposed the DM as the basis of a strategy-driven model to fund major initiatives. It said the features of such a model would be:

First, a diocesan mission which sets out a statement of purpose

Secondly, a diocesan goal which is what the Diocese wants to achieve in a given time

Thirdly, a series of diocesan strategies

Fourthly, a series of funding principles

Fifthly, a methodology for making funding decisions

Sixthly, principles for implementation[4]

Whatever one might think of this model, it is evidence that the Standing Committee saw the DM to be at the heart of diocesan purpose, and that it needed a management approach similar to other secular corporations. The question was whether the Diocese, being a voluntary association and not a business corporation,

Yong, *Lessons in Corporate Governance from the Global Financial Crisis,* (CCH Australia Limited, North Ryde, 2009) and William J Reddin *Managerial Effectiveness,* (McGraw-Hill Book Company (UK) Limited, London, 1970).
In 2009 Standing Committee appointed a committee to inquire into matters relating to diocesan corporate governance policy. See page 339. See also *Annual Report of the Standing Committee and other Reports and Papers* (Standing Committee of the Synod Anglican Diocese of Sydney, Sydney 2010), 61.
[3] A similar approach was expressed by Peter Costello, former Treasurer of Australia in the *Herald Sun* on 2 September 2013 in criticism of Prime Minister Rudd's performance as a corporate manager. He said, 'Rudd has never understood what it means to govern. He has never understood that to accomplish something, a minister or a prime minister must design it, think of the risks and take measures to prevent them, assemble resources, map out a plan for implementation, follow through on it, and deliver results'.
[4] *2002 Sydney Year Book, Focussing Resources for the Gospel: Principles and Concepts of Synod Funding for 2003-2005',* 460.

was up to this task? Further, was the particular management model it adopted up to the implementing that task? It is proposed to examine the DM against the working hypothesis to see if the hypothesis is a useful tool in determining whether the centre is able to manage large undertakings such as the DM. Reference is made to the coverage of DM operations in Chapter Thirteen. This examination will concentrate on structural and management matters.

17.3 The Diocesan Mission: A Test Case

Ongoing frustrations about financial priorities over the previous 20 years came to a head in a special daylong conference of the DEB on 8 November 2000. The main talking point was a proposal to adopt a *strategy-driven* model for centrally funded programmes. This led to the idea of a great diocesan mission becoming the basis for such a strategy-driven model. The figure of 10% of the population was mentioned. When Jensen became Archbishop in 2001, he adopted the idea of a DM and declared it to be the signature feature of his administration.

The 10% goal translated into a target of 500,000 *new* people in Bible believing churches in a decade. An enterprise of this magnitude (by definition) would have to involve radical changes to the culture and modus operandi at every level of diocesan activity. The threshold questions in 2001 were, *how* to do it and *what* organisational structure would be needed to drive it?[5] It is a truism to say that to succeed, such a structure would have to be efficient, flexible, properly resourced and attract the best and brightest people to lead it. As it turned out, these were the very factors that dogged the DM throughout its 10 years.

17.4 Early Attempts to Work Out Strategy

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[5] Questions of how to do such a mission are outside the scope of this particular examination. For the record, Ballantine-Jones believed that the strategy that was adopted (the Four Policies) was not adequate for the stated purpose of the DM.

Following months of preparatory work, Standing Committee proposed to the 2001 Synod a new method of financial appropriations as the driver of the proposed diocesan mission:[6] It said:

> Over the last 10 years approximately $83 million has been distributed for ministry programmes. However, the information available from the National Church Life Survey and from our own sources points to the fact that although attendance at [Sydney] Anglican Churches has risen, it has done so at a slower rate than the overall population growth.[7]

The report said that a strategy driven model would define the goals and describe 'what the Diocese wants to achieve in a given time in specific, measurable, articulated and realistic terms'. Putting the DM in terms of what the *Diocese* wants to achieve, brings it squarely within the terms of the ongoing search for meaning and purpose, as discussed in the previous chapter. The justification for such a specific goal was stated to be that churches needed to grow by a factor of 3 or 4 times before their size alone allows them to effectively impact the rest of the community. In retrospect, it seems clear that this goal should have been given more critical examination and a more realistic and achievable one adopted instead.

The initial 'strategy' to achieve the goal was said to involve the recruitment and training of up to 3,000 lay and ordained ministers.[8] Other strategies proposed were to provide larger and improved training facilities for MTC and Youthworks College, the planting of hundreds of congregations and creating ongoing opportunities for interaction with the community. Standing Committee recommended that Synod endorse the principle of a DM, including the strategy driven funding model, as the basis for the 2002 to 2005 appropriation ordinances. Synod accepted the recommendations.[9] In effect, the 2001 Synod gave the green light for the DM, the specific details to be presented to the 2002 Synod for final acceptance.

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[6] The Report was called, *Focussing Resources for the Gospel, 2002 Sydney Year Book*, 460-468.
[7] Ibid, 462.
[8] Ibid, 464.
[9] *2002 Sydney Year Book,* 402.

17.5 Differences over Structure

As the DEB got down to working out a detailed plan, there was a difference of opinion on how the DM should be structured. Essentially the options were either to base it on the standard diocesan committee model or to set up a mission specific organisation operating with a small board and a paid executive staff similar to other diocesan organisations and following normal corporate practice. In November 2001, Ballantine-Jones (then a member of the DEB) proposed such a model. His submission accepted the goals as stated in the 2001 report to Synod as the basis for planning. He said methodologies needed to be formulated involving wide consultation within Australia and overseas.[10] In June 2002, he submitted a more detailed proposal. He said the Diocese was such a complex web of administrative structures, split between the episcopal and synodical arms, that he doubted whether they (the committee based structures) could deliver what was needed to make the DM work. He said, 'We simply cannot afford to carry non-performing organisations if we want to succeed in what is actually the most ambitious and revolutionary enterprise ever conceived of by a diocese like ours'.[11]

In July 2002, the DEB considered *Draft Strategy Paper 3.* It outlined a strategy of ten initiatives, each with detailed action plans. In response, Ballantine-Jones tabled a discussion paper pointing out that to implement those initiatives would necessarily involve a large organisational structure.[12] 'Whatever the shape of the strategy ... it is

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[10] Taken from 'Further Reflections on the Mission for the DEB', Bruce Ballantine-Jones, 14 November 2001.

[11] Taken from 'Towards a Strategy for the Mission: A discussion Paper for the Mission Task Force, Bruce Ballantine-Jones', 12 June 2002.

[12] Ballantine-Jones said: Initiative 1, to create a mission ethos, would involve holding a major event in 2003 and the organisation of mission prayer fellowships across the Diocese. Initiative 2, sustaining community awareness of Christ, would involve liason between Archbishop and Anglican Media for such a campaign. Initiative 3, recruiting and educating mission agents, would be a massive undertaking, given that 10,000 people were said to be needed. Initiative 4, the renewal of parishes for mission activities, would at least involve production of manuals, seminars and training courses. Initiative 5, re-ordering the role of regions, would involve providing assistance to help regional councils fulfil their new role, including additional funding and the monitoring of progress. 'Who would do this?' he asked. Initiative 6, the reform of diocesan organisations would be a complex and difficult task. Initiative 7, the reform of diocesan structures, would be as big or as small as people would want but some coordinating mechanism would be needed to sustain momentum. Initiative 8, a research and communication facility, would likely involve the creation of a think tank. Initiative 9, providing specialist training across the board, would be a massive undertaking, involving planning, programming and implementation. An organisation would need to be created and funded. Initiative 10, the involvement with other denominations, would always be a complex and delicate task.

clear to me that we are embarking on a complex and massive project'. He proposed a mission office with a senior ranking person as CEO, working under the Archbishop, 'an office of four or five persons does not seem to be too unrealistic'.

In rebuttal, Bishop Robert Forsyth submitted a paper, *How much administrative help structure do we need?* He said 'such a large and expensive proposal was not going to work and is unnecessary, even counterproductive'. He said:

> The danger of one central, powerful structure trying to 'run' the mission is that instead of extending and enhancing the leadership role of 'Church House' it may effectively supplant it. The mission will only work if the diocesan community owns and develops and works with it at all levels. Centralism is unhelpful and may even be counterproductive. Our mission structure therefore from the centre should be as minimal as possible consistent with good management and as empowering as possible to all the various agencies and members of the Diocese.
>
> Extra administrative help will be needed to assist the Archbishop (with regional Bishops) and the Mission Task Force (with the Standing Committee) in fulfilling their role in enabling and developing the mission of our diocese. But by its very nature it will have to be low key and backroom and as far as possible, integrated into existing relationships and structures.[13]

Though many agreed with Ballantine-Jones, Forsyth's position prevailed. Being convinced that a mission with such ambitious goals, but managed through such a committee based structure, could not succeed, Ballantine-Jones withdrew from the DEB. In a private letter of resignation to the Archbishop, he said:

> I intimated to you in passing at last month's Standing Committee meeting that I was not optimistic about the prospects for the Mission. This pessimism is based on my assessment of the capacity of Church House, despite your own best intentions and efforts, to be able to really gear up for the Mission and carry it through. Rather than burn up with frustration, which would do nobody any good, I

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[13] Taken from 'How much further administrative help structure do we need?' Robert Forsyth, (Mission Taskforce, Diocese of Sydney, July 2002).

think it best to get out of the way and let you and your team get on with the job and hopefully prove me wrong.

This matter is dealt with in detail at this point because arguably the outcome of the DM was determined, at least partly, by the management structure that was adopted. Ballantine-Jones' contention was that the DM might not have succeeded with the right structure, but it certainly could not succeed with the *wrong* one and the structure that was adopted was the wrong one.

17.6 Synod Endorses the Mission

Standing Committee presented the proposed administrative structure for launching and running the DM to the 2002 Synod. It involved renaming the DEB, the Mission Taskforce (MTF), with up to five sub-committees dealing with what it called the Four Policies.[14] These four policies effectively expressed the *strategy* for the DM and around which the sub-committee structure was to be built. The MTF comprised 20 members. However, with respect to the resources needed to administer the work of MTF and its sub-committees, *no* additional funding was made available. The costs were subsumed within existing Synod allocations to Standing Committee. Why it was thought that the administration of such a complex and immense project would not cost anything extra to administer is difficult to work out, other than to see it as an example of the disfunctionality of a prevailing culture, incapable of addressing questions of sound management practice.

The 2002 Synod enthusiastically adopted the DM as diocesan policy (and thereby declaring it to be within its purpose). The requisite resolutions on strategy and funding were passed.[15] Optimism was at its highest, the Diocese was united, many parishes were beginning to gear up and the diocesan leadership had resources to use for whatever they determined was needed to help it work. If ever the centre was going to pull off a major project, this looked like it, as long as the committee structure was able to manage the complex processes involved.

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[14] *2003 Sydney Year Book,* 610.
[15] *2003 Sydney Year Book*, 398-399.

17.7 Calls for Rethink of Strategy and Structure

In Chapter Thirteen, early difficulties in building up momentum were noted. 2005 was going to be a pivotal year. The DM was three years old. The optimistic mood of 2002 appeared to be giving way to concerns that the DM was not taking root. Ballantine-Jones felt this and in late 2004, he wrote privately to Jensen to urge a rethink. He noted some 'mission fatigue' in the 2004 Synod. He said his feeling was that there was 'probably one year left to show significant progress towards the 10 in 10 goal before the knives start to come out'. He again criticised the committee-based approach:

> I cannot see ... the MTF, itself being a diffuse body made up of busy people, meeting the way it does, [providing] the energy and drive that is needed. At best, MTF can act as a board of reference, laying down broad strategy and assisting in the implementation of macro financial and legislative reforms needed to provide the environment for the mission to work. Of course none of this is new. I have said it before and the Standing Committee accepted the recommendation of the MTF to set up such a [command and control unit] ... Standing Committee was willing to allocate $150,000 for this purpose.[16]

Ballantine-Jones said that this letter was his 'last shot'. Jensen asked permission to refer it to the MTF. When the letter was discussed there, the bishops and archdeacons were asked to work on this issue and bring back a report with recommendations to the next meeting. Zac Veron (a member of MTF) was invited to write a paper to assist the bishops in this process. Veron wrote another paper (*The Mission – A view from the Trenches*) in November 2004, which was also critical of the pace of the DM. He said that the DM 'had not [to date] accelerated ... growth with respect to what is going on in the parishes: consequently we are venturing onto very thin branches ... Rhetoric continues to far outstrip present reality, (BBJ wrote of knives coming out)'. Veron said he believed that the vast majority of Anglicans at

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[16] Letter to Peter Jensen, 4 November 2004. The money mentioned here was never allocated.

church would not be able to say what the Mission was either. Of Ballantine-Jones' letter, he said:

> I agree with most, although not all of BBJ's points. In summary, he needs to be heard at this level. Something more needs to be done! Much more. What we are doing now, although worthy of praise and in parts outstanding, is not matching our goal. ... BBJ is right to assert that the Mission cannot be an add-on, it should be the issue around which all other matters are made to fit.[17]

In June 2005, Veron wrote again to the MTF (*Mission Taskforce: A Way Forward*), saying, 'we are waiting for exponential growth to come in the future yet it is hard to see much evidence that any growth would accelerate markedly ... under the current policy and strategies'. He proposed two groups to replace the MTF, one to deal with financial allocations and the other, which he called the *Mission Coalition*, to drive the Mission forward. He nominated a size of 15 members, made up of people of 'proven expertise'. In July 2005, he refined his idea further, (*Getting a Mission Coalition: A Way Forward for 2006-2008*), contrasting what he saw were the problems of the MTF style body [its slow pace] to 'something that would move quickly and fast track implementation of new strategies'. He said:

> Unless there is immediate change, this will happen next: the work will be done by a decreasing amount of people; ideas of the MTF will be rubber stamped; but others will contribute little, nor feel any commitment to the process. Eventually there will be less consensus on ministry matters, walls of passive resistance will arise, and ever fewer incremental changes will eventuate.[18]

One response to all these discussions was a rally at the Sydney Town Hall to begin the 2005 Synod, with the wider diocesan family invited to hear the Archbishop and see special presentations on Mission initiatives. Jensen acknowledged that some were feeling the pressure. 'But', he said, 'I am more convinced than ever that the decision of the Synod three years ago was of God ... This is not my personal

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[17] Taken from paper by Zac Veron to Mission Taskforce, Diocese of Sydney, 20 June 2005, cited with permission.
[18] Taken from paper by Zac Veron to Mission Taskforce, Diocese of Sydney, July 2005, cited with permission.

Mission. It is a proven and effective way of us uniting as a fellowship of churches in the mission which Jesus committed to his disciples'.[19]

17.8 Mid-Point Changes

Following the 2005 discussions, 2006 saw some organisational changes. The MTF was re-constituted as the Mission Board (MB), to comprise the Archbishop, the five assistant bishops, the CEOs of four diocesan organisations, 8 persons elected by Standing Committee and two appointed by the Archbishop, 19 in total.[20] The role of the Finance Committee of the MB (renamed as the Mission Board Strategy Committee, MBSC) was expanded to give strategic direction to the DM. The Mission Property Committee (dealing with land acquisition and development), the Board of Management of the proposed Connect09 campaign and four other policy committees were required to report to it. (These changes made the MBSC the most powerful body in the Diocese and could be seen as the most centralist innovation in the whole period under study). In reality, the MB was a refined version of the MTF, managing the same strategies with the same underlying committee structure.

The MB held its first meeting on 1 May 2006.[21] As if to acknowledge earlier submissions, Standing Committee agreed to fund a diocesan executive officer for two years. However instead of being funded from normal 'strategy driven' appropriations, this officer was to be paid for out of a one off appropriation of DE capital, suggesting the idea of a paid operative was still not fully accepted as a normal part of DM administration. (The DM noted that in-principle support for this position had been given in 2003 but never implemented).[22] The role of this officer was to ensure that decisions of the MB were implemented, to assist the Archbishop, and to liaise with diocesan entities, including parishes. Ballantine-Jones believed this job description fell far short of what he had proposed, was inadequate for such a massive enterprise and would not lead to any significant changes. This turned out to be the case and the person left after two years.

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[19] Quotations taken from Jensen's address, *2006 Sydney Year Book,* 392-395.
[20] The organisations were MTC, Youthworks, Anglicare and Evangelism Ministries.
[21] *2007 Sydney Year Book,* 408.
[22] Ibid, 408.

While preparations for Connect 09 were in full swing, the GFC hit. The losses to the DE meant that central funds available to fund DM initiatives fell from $10 million in 2009 to $5.5 million in 2010. This meant that grants to regional councils and other DM related programmes had to be severely curtailed. In response to the impact of the GFC, Standing Committee published a 31 page booklet, *The Diocesan Mission: Strategic Directions 2010-2012.* It announced a major post-Connect09 initiative called, 'Mission Areas'.[23] The MBSC also proposed a new basis for making financial allocations.[24]

17.9 Other Views on How to Manage the DM

On the matter of management and strategy as it related to the DM, Steve McKerihan, CEO of SDS, presented a paper to the MB in November 2009 entitled, *Towards a Strategic Plan for the Diocese.* Though typically nuanced to fit his audience, he expressed his concerns on how the DM was being managed, measured against how other organisations operated. He described what 'most organisations' do when working out a business plan: 'Once the Vision, Mission and Values are agreed by Board of Management, they provide the framework for the annual strategic planning cycle to operate'. He said the CEO plays the key role in the process: 'An effective CEO will inject some strong direction into the process but will also be very receptive to what can be learned from the bottom up elements'.[25] It should be noted that the DM didn't even have a CEO.

Taking normal business practice as the model, McKerihan said that depending on the size and sophistication of the organisation, an annual planning process would contain some or all of the following elements:

- An analysis of the economy, market conditions, competitors, organisational capability etc.

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[23] See page 270.
[24] See page 316.
[25] McKerihan's letter to the DEB, November 2009.

- A set of strategic objective initiatives to be explored and evaluated.

- A financial budget.

- Scenario and risk analysis.

- A series of planning workshops designed to gather collective wisdom and buy in.

- A summary document which is presented to the board for input and approval.

- An embedding of strategic objectives, both financial and non-financial into balanced scorecards for each level of management.

- Regular reporting and performance measurement.

- As effective process of communicating the strategic direction to all key stakeholders including staff.

He noted that a number of the larger diocesan organisations operate along similar lines. The question was whether the DM would be able to adapt these principles.

He noted that the Mission Statement of the DM 'had stood the test of time' and the four policy areas had provided 'a very helpful budgetary framework'. He said that the MBSC was working on a new process for establishing objectives and priorities for Synod allocations. These included translating general objectives, expected outputs and outcomes, and communicating these outcomes to 'shareholders'. It also involved establishing appropriate feedback, reporting and accountability procedures. He said that if the MB could make some meaningful progress in this area, the objectives at MB should move towards an integrated strategic planning process.[26]

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[26] Ibid.

That these basic management matters were live issues as late as November 2009 illustrates the chronic problems that the MB and MBSC structure had experienced in trying to work out how to manage the DM.

McKerihan concluded:

> If, however, we have broader ambitions to produce a more holistic plan that covers a wide range of activities outside Synod funding, it will be a more complex task... We need to decide whether we want to put more centralised planning and reporting rigour around these areas or whether we want to leave a number of these areas for leaders in the respective parishes and organisations to work out how to give effect to the broader sweep of the Diocesan Mission Policy.[27]

It is not difficult to detect a sense of frustration at the way the DM was being managed. McKerihan, having been stricken with a brain tumour in 2010, did not live to have a role in any attempts at implementing his approach.

As things turned out, Standing Committee, on the recommendation of the Mission Board, on 11 November 2013, voted to abolish the MB. Bishop Peter Hayward, Chairman of the MB's review committee, said that the Board's own evaluation was that 'it had been ineffective'.[28] He said that the MB had to straddle two major responsibilities: to exercise various functions on behalf of Standing Committee (especially finances) and to operate as a think-tank on mission. On the second task, he said, 'the composition of the Board was not conducive to frank discussion on the implementation and evaluation of progress in mission'.[29] Standing Committee created two new bodies to replace the MB. One was a new sub-committee, provisionally named the Diocesan Strategic Research Group. The focus of this group would be to 'research and develop high level vision/strategy/structure which optimises the capacity of the diocesan network to achieve measurable goals adopted by the Synod, and to oversee the objective measurement of progress in achieving

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[27] Ibid.
[28] *Southern Cross*, February 2014.
[29] Ibid.

those goals'.[30] This group is to be comprised of the Archbishop, three persons appointed by him, three lay persons and three clergy elected by Standing Committee.

The other body, called the Diocesan Resources Committee, was to make recommendations on funding priorities. This particular change substantially returns to arrangements to what they were between 1900 and 1995, before the DEB took over financial appropriations from the FPC.

17.10 Assessment of DM against Working Hypothesis

This examination of how the DM was managed was to consider whether the working hypothesis is a useful tool in assessing the capacity of central diocesan structures in achieving outcomes determined to be proper diocesan initiatives. It is argued here that the way the DM was managed supports the judgement of the MB in 2013 that it had been 'ineffective'. Further, it demonstrates the inherent limitations of the centre in running enterprises such as The Mission. The DM had the broad-based support of the parishes and organisations. Both Archbishop and Synod were onside, but the committee-based structure, with part-time members, meagre administrative resources and minimal reporting and accountability processes, could not provide the capability needed to accomplish what virtually everybody wanted it to achieve. Reference is made to other committee-led endeavours which suffered similar difficulties, for example, FPC, SPIC, and VFG.

The alternative would have been for a purpose built organisation to take charge, operating according to normal corporate practice, with realistic administration costs built into its budget, and with a different mission strategy. Within the Diocese at the time the DM was proposed, was such an organisation, the Department of Evangelism. It could have been adapted to become the engine room to drive the DM. It had staff, offices and resources. If not that option, another Mission specific

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[30] Diocesan Secretary, Robert Wicks to Ballantine-Jones, 14 November 2013.

organisation could have been created to drive the DM. That such an option was not followed is the responsibility of those who chose the other way.

17.11 Committee Culture Verses Corporatisation

As intimated above, the alternative to the traditional committee-led approach would have been to follow the successful examples of many of the Diocese's own organisations; in effect to follow the privatised or corporatised models put in place by many governments in recent years.[31]

Corporatisation has been defined as:

> The act of reorganising the structure of a government owned entity into a legal entity with the corporate structure found in publicly traded companies. These companies tend to have a board of directors, management and shareholders ... The main goal of corporatisation is allowing the government to retain ownership of the company but still enable it to run as efficiently as its private counterparts because government departments sometimes are inefficient with the level of bureaucracy involved.[32]

Many of the supply side diocesan organisations are such bodies corporate (GAB, SDS, SAHC, ACPT). Many of the demand side organisations are as well (ARV, MTC, SASC, Youthworks and Anglicare). However, some on both sides are not (EOSC, Standing Committee, regional councils, the MB itself, and Anglican Media).

Whilst all corporations are liable to make mistakes (as the pre-GFC practices of the GAB and SDS show), arguably, the chances of this are less if a corporatised model is followed, as long as they ensure they observe proper governance, management and reporting obligations and their governing boards are made up of qualified and attentive members.

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[31] An example of corporatisation in the government area is the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Many others have been fully privatised

[32] www.investopedia.com/terms/c/coporatization.asp#ax22zzLxgsb1S8

Jensen made an important point in this regard when he highlighted the volunteer nature of the boards and councils elected to lead the organisations operating on behalf of the Diocese.[33] As a matter of internal discipline and prudence, it was argued by the GAB/SDS in their submission to the ASC that additional monitoring processes should be put in place to ensure that rigorous risk management and accountability mechanisms are followed to compensate for the weakness associated with volunteerism.[34]

The question of governance attracted diocesan attention in the post-GFC period, following the GAB losses. For example, the same 2009 Synod which considered the implications of the GFC in relation to the GAB, also requested Standing Committee to review the financial and other circumstances surrounding the operations of its other organisations.[35]

Another response to the potential problem of diocesan bodies getting into trouble was the establishment of the Diocesan Corporate Governance Committee on 7 December 2009 to advise on how this could be done.[36] In pursuing its task, the Committee's first report to the 2010 Synod gave an outline of various theories on corporate governance as background to developing proposals for Synod to consider:

> The first was the *Managerialist Theory,* which said the board of directors are to represent the interests of the shareholders but that over-time they came to be dominated by management. Because of this, 'legislation was needed to protect the interests of owners, impose duties and obligations on directors and managers and require proper disclosure on corporate activities'.[37]

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[33] See page 331.
[34] 'Submission to the Archbishop's Strategic Commission on Structure, Funding and Governance', Glebe Administration Board and Sydney Diocesan Secretariat, 13 December 2010, 9.
[35] Resolutions 23/09, 29/09 and 32/09, found only in *The Proceedings of the 2009 Synod* on the SDS website www.sydneyanglicans.net.
[36] The members of the committee were Bishop Glenn Davies, Dr Bryan Cowling, Steve McKerihan, Peter Kell, Laurie Scandrett, Robert Tong, Bruce York and Robert Wicks. The report of the committee was presented at the 2010 Synod. See SDS website on *Synod Proceedings* and follow links to Reports to Synod 2010.
[37] www.sydneyanglicans.org, *Diocesan Corporate Governance Report,* (Standing Committee, Sydney, 2010), 62. The report included a draft Corporate Governance Policy at 73-70.

The second was the *Contractual Theory,* which said that 'competitive markets are more important than mandatory legal rules insofar as they provide managers with incentives to maximise owner (shareholder) wealth'.[38]

The third was the *Constitutional theory,* which suggested that a corporation 'should be seen as a body politic with a constitutional framework in which decisions are made ... Under this approach, the corporation's owners are encouraged to be actively involved in the corporation as members rather than investors'.[39]

The fourth was the *Policy Governance Model.* This model relates to not-for-profit boards which exist to represent and speak for the interests of the owners (as distinct from the staff), other agencies or the consumers of its services (students, patients or any affected group). This model requires that policy governance boards must learn to distinguish between owners and customers. As for who *are* the owners, the report quoted the formulators of this model: 'Who are the owners of a non-profit organisation? For a membership organisation, its members are the owners. For an advocacy organisation, persons of similar political, religious, or philosophical conviction are the owners'.[40]

Elements of each of these models can be found in many existing diocesan organisations. The Governance Committee suggested that the Synod should be regarded as the *owner* of each diocesan organisation on behalf of the Anglican community in the Diocese. As the owner, the Committee said, Synod has a right to expect boards to seek the highest standards of corporate governance and meet the specific objects for which they were created. These objects were said to be both general (to promote the Kingdom of God), and specific, with respect to the stated objectives in their constituting ordinances. A draft Diocesan Corporate Governance Policy was presented to Synod in 2010. This was referred back to Standing Committee to obtain feedback from stake-holders and other interested parties. During this process, the Federal Government initiated its own inquiries into not-for-profit charitable organisations. A prolonged process of submissions and negotiations

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[38] Ibid, 62.
[39] Ibid, 62.
[40] *http//carver governance.com/pg-np.htm.* This is a re-publication of an original article in 2001 by John Carver and Mirian Carver in governance-revue internationale Vol 2 No 1.

followed, meaning that the committee's final report was delayed pending the outcome of those negotiations.

The revised Diocesan Corporate Governance Policy was presented to the 2013 Synod for its consideration. In speaking to the report, the Chairman of the Committee, Laurie Scandrett, said that he found 'it remarkable that this Diocese still does not yet have a governance policy ... we are yet [in 2013] to have a common statement as to how we want our organisations to be governed'.[41]

The report proposed standardising governance and management procedures across diocesan incorporated bodies. It also wanted to bring them in to line with the requirements with the newly passed *Australian Charities or not-for-profits Commission Act 2012*. Many of its recommendations reflected actions already taken by the SDS and GAB in 2010. While there was disagreement at the 2013 Synod over some details in the report so that it was referred back again to the Standing Committee for further consideration, Synod agreed to approve in principle the governance policy set out in the report.[42] This drawn out process, going back to 2009, illustrates the difficulties a democratic Synod and the labyrinthine committee culture have in working out how to run the corporate affairs of the Diocese.

Another problem is the *political factor*. That has to do with the vulnerability which all volunteer based boards and councils experience in replenishing their membership and maintaining well qualified members. This is a problem that the ACL, other nominators, and the Standing Committee face all the time when seeking to fill positions.[43] Unless they constantly attend to their duty, the Diocese will always be susceptible to the kinds of problems exposed in the GFC, and at other times over the last forty years.

Heightened awareness of these matters, stimulated by the effects of the GFC, was a promising development, but whether it will result in any effective changes to the culture of corporate governance in the Diocese is a matter for the future to tell. The

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[41] *Southern Cross*, November 2013.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Reference is made to page 31, which described the nearly 600 positions in over 50 boards and councils that have to be filled by the process of Synod or Standing Committee elections.

nub of the issue can be stated as the problem many voluntary associations experience when they become involved in complex business activities. That has to do with what is called here, the loss of *corporate memory* and the affliction of what is called here, *corporate amnesia.* Corporate memory is what one generation needs to learn from its predecessors. Corporate amnesia is what people within the *one* generation forget from experiences *they* actually lived through. The most obvious example of this relates to the lessons arising from the GFC. The Standing Committee re-constituted the GAB and SDS, which made major changes to its governance and management practices. The challenge is not to forget what brought about the problems in the first place and what they did to correct them. On the demand side, diocesan leaders acknowledged that too much money had been spent over the years, and some of it was spent unwisely. The potential problem for them is that having gone through the painful experiences of dealing with reduced income, they may forget all that and make the same mistakes again when income begins to rise. That would be a case of both the loss of corporate memory and the recurrence of corporate amnesia.

17.12 Conclusion of Part Four

The four chapters under the general heading of the Corporate Machine are significantly different from the rest of the thesis in that they are not concerned with theological or ecclesiastical matters, but focused on the way central diocesan structures struggled to turn good intentions into good outcomes.

Chapter Fourteen dealt with the rise and fall of material wealth (the supply side), and the difficulties the centre had in sustaining an upward trajectory in value and income. This was devastatingly seen in the losses associated with the GFC. The irony was that the structures created in the 1970s to manage those processes were good structures, but poor governance and loss of commercial discipline led to 'sub-optimal' performance. It is argued that these deficiencies related to the invasion of a typical volunteer based church committee culture, which tolerated conflicts of interest, docile boards and dominant personalities. Many of those problems were corrected after the GFC, resulting in procedures which more closely reflected the

original intentions of the Davies Committee and the demands for commercial diligence and acumen.

Chapter Fifteen set out the history of the demand side, as successive committees struggled to work out how to spend the money for some good purpose. Apart from the limitations of a part time, volunteer based, committee culture, there was the more fundamental problem of diocesan authorities not being able to arrive at a diocesan strategy on which to base or make strategic financial allocations. Except for a brief period at the end of the 1990s, there never was such a strategy, and other attempts to arrive at one, failed. Why? The working hypothesis suggested that the dispersed nature of power and the incapacity of decision makers to work efficiently, were at the heart of these difficulties.

The question then was: what could such a strategy be? That would depend on what purpose the Diocese was supposed to serve?

Chapter Sixteen attempted to address that idea. Questions of purpose involve judgements about the Diocese as a whole and the role of the central organisations set up to serve such an entity. Taking the Diocese as a whole, questions of purpose go to what one thinks parishes and ministry organisations are for. That is a theological matter; after all the Diocese is nothing if not a Christian, Anglican network of churches dedicated to making disciples and providing pastoral care for its members. It could be argued that if the central diocesan structures did nothing more than facilitate those mission related functions, it had fulfilled the purpose of the Diocese.

However, given the mix of hierarchical and synodical structures and the culture of participatory democracy, it was inevitable that the underlying impulse toward mission would spill over to other (but less core) related initiatives, such as a network of schools, social support activities and specialist ministry organisations. With the arrival of the 'rivers of gold' in the 1970s and the shift of power to the centre, this tendency grew and dominated diocesan attention. But for what purpose? That was the question successive administrations struggled to answer. At one level, it is acknowledged that the Diocese is free to decide that *any* enterprise can be labelled

as within its purpose. But the follow up question is whether there should be limits to what it attempts?

Chapter Seventeen proposed that the limits of central activity should be determined by the capacity of the centre to manage effectively, whatever the Diocese decides to do. To put it another way, if the difficulties that have been noted in carrying out major and complex projects are a function of the inherent weakness as outlined in the working hypothesis, then caution should be exercised in taking on such projects. This hypothesis was applied to the largest enterprise the centre ever attempted, namely the DM. It was suggested that the DM (putting aside questions of divine grace) failed to achieve its stated purpose because the Mission Board structure was incapable of managing such an ambitious project. This was the case, even though it had widespread grassroots support and more than sufficient resources. But what it did not have was a suitable management structure, a workable strategy and enough of the right people to run it. The alternative model of a purpose-designed organisation, operating at arm's length from the central authorities, and following normal business methods, was proposed as an alternative. Whether it would have produced better outcomes will never be known, unless a DM type project is tried again, using such an approach.

This analysis of the diocesan corporate machine points to the conclusion that a body as large, complex and diffuse as Sydney Diocese, should follow a minimalist (small government) model of central action in preference to the more interventionist model followed over the last 40 years. But, if it *was* decided to attempt the 'big thing' again, it would be better to follow the corporatised models seen in bodies such as MTC, ARV, Anglicare, SASC and Youthworks, along with rigorous prudential governance and management processes.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

CONCLUSION: 'CHANGE AND DECAY'

How did Sydney Diocese change in policy and practices since 1966 and what part did politics play in those changes? That is the question this thesis has attempted to address. Part One gave an overview of the Diocese, the nature of change and the way of politics, as practised in Sydney Diocese. Chapter One described the anatomy of the Diocese and the major factors which drive it to be what it is and do what it does. The observation was made that the independence of all the operational entities (parishes and ministry organisations) plus the dual nature of its government (Synod and Archbishop) make it difficult to function efficiently to achieve centrally directed enterprises. Especially is this so given its volunteer based committee culture, which has the effect of creating poor governance and inefficient management. This proposition was developed into a working hypothesis to assess diocesan performance.

As for change (as described in Chapter Two), factors such as outside social influences, a radical ecclesiology related to Broughton Knox, the impact of some notable personalities and the expansion of central initiatives, all played their part. Ministry changes related to the transformation of local parish life, particularly the experience of going to church on a Sunday. For example, in 1966, *BCP* was the rule for all church services, and almost always led by the clergy. By 2013, they were predominantly non-liturgical in nature and mostly led by the laity, with traditional hymns giving way to contemporary music. Parish strategies became more about attracting outsiders, not simply maintaining existing membership. To this end, Anglican traditions gave way to a new pragmatism, where the need to reach outsiders took precedence. Political activity in these areas was mostly at low to medium levels. For example, changes were made to admit women to all administrative levels with little controversy.

In Chapter Three, the term *Politics* was defined to include considerations of power structures, policy choices and the tactics employed to implement them. In a secular organisation as large as Sydney Diocese, politics in the form of parties or factions, and sustained tactics in pursuit of religious objectives, was inevitable. However, over the relevant period, there was an intensification of such activity. The nature of political activity was classified into low, medium and high levels, and success generally identified in terms of the degree to which stated objectives were achieved.

Part Two looked at the two major policy proposals that occupied the attention of the Diocese in the period: women's ordination and lay and diaconal administration at the Lord's Supper. On the women's ordination question, for the Sydney majority, gender based issues were determined by what they saw as New Testament teaching on male headship of the congregation. As part of the changes relating to the diaconate, the acceptance of women to the diaconate facilitated another significant change to diocesan practice, namely a new category of so-called permanent deacons, whereby someone could become a deacon without any expectation of progressing to becoming a rector. Gender related matters relating to women's ordination generated high level political action. The conflicts associated with women's ordination were dealt with in Chapters Four to Six. Sydney opposition lost out with respect to the ACA, but was successful inside the Diocese.

The other pre-occupation relating to Anglican polity was lay and diaconal administration at the Lord's Supper, Chapters Seven and Eight. Though not directly related to women's ordination, it derived much of its impetus from the feeling that if women's ordination could be accepted by other parts of the ACA, why could Sydney not have lay and diaconal administration, when there is clearly no biblical teaching prohibiting it. The matter rested on whether Anglican rules would allow it. The Appellate Tribunal said 'yes', but only with General Synod legislation. Sydney disputed that and went ahead with diaconal administration anyway. No archbishop was prepared to authorise lay administration.

The women's ordination and the lay-diaconal administration issues brought Sydney into open conflict with the ACA, leading to the drying up of goodwill and co-operation

at the national level. Both sides employed high level political tactics to pursue their objectives with respect to both matters.

Part Three took the terms of each Archbishop as delineating a significant period to be reviewed. The Loane era (1966-1982) was arguably the most stable and successful. It saw a blossoming interest in change, typified by the extraordinary number of inquiries into what those changes should be and how they could be introduced. Outcomes took longer to materialise, but the seeds sown then, produced significant fruit in later decades. Loane made little attempt to interfere with these trends. The one big change he *did* propose was the sub-division of the Diocese into three. That was rejected by the Synod, following high level political action. It was during Loane's term that the Knox teaching on church and ministry began to take hold among the younger clergy. This led to tensions between them and their older colleagues. There was some political kick back, such as the Sydney Anglican Clerical Society, but time resolved most of that in favour of the Knox proponents.

The other major development under Loane arose out of problems with the central administration. Archbishop Gough had established the Trigg Commission in 1959. Its recommendations lay dormant until problems arising out of the construction of SAH led to another major inquiry in the 1970s, resulting in the formation of the SDS to provide administrative services, a reorganised GAB to manage commercial properties and SACIT to manage investment activity. Substantial income began to flow as a result, leading to a shift in the balance of power from the Synod to the centre and ongoing difficulties in working out how spend the money.

Arguably, the Loane term was the high point of diocesan fortunes in the period under review. There was stability at the top and very able clerical and lay leadership to guide the Diocese through the beginnings of change and the management of material wealth. It also saw relatively low levels of political action, mainly due the feeling that the affairs of state were in safe hands while ever Loane was in the 'White House'.

The Robinson years (1982-1993) were dominated by the women's ordination dispute. Sydney's opposition stiffened, but popular support elsewhere resulted in women being ordained in all but a few country dioceses and Sydney. Another contentious issue was the stand-off between the Synod and Robinson on the re-marriage of divorced persons. He would not budge. Then there was his unexpected view about the central role of the diocesan Bishop, leading among other things to his revival of Loane's sub-division proposal. That was defeated, but it prepared the way for full regionalisation under Goodhew, which as long as there were funds to distribute through regional councils, satisfied the yearning for more local control of diocesan affairs. Robinson's leadership on VFG was his most notable achievement. Despite minimal involvement of the Synod, it achieved significant success. The continued growth of financial resources and the expansion of central structures exposed difficulties in determining how to spend the money and how to co-ordinate the work of diocesan and central organisations. The Nicholson Commission was Robinson's response. Its top down centralised model of diocesan administration was unacceptable and it came to nothing. Robinson was generally unsupportive of radical change.

Emerging differences over what kind of evangelicalism should hold sway in the Diocese manifested itself in tensions between the supporters of John Reid and the conservatives aligned with ACL and MTC. These differences, the widening rift with the ACA, and the continual pressure for change at the local level, led to the re-emergence of political parties. A small liberal orientated group called Open Synod gave way to Anglicans Together. REPA sprung up to fill a vacuum that a sleepy ACL had created and MOW and Equal But Different fought it out over women's ordination. All these developments combined to produce an atmosphere of fear in those who opposed change and pent up frustration in those who wanted it. This resulted in the highly contested election campaign for Robinson's successor. The conservatives pitted Phillip Jensen against John Reid, leaving Paul Barnett and Harry Goodhew in the middle to pick up the pieces, with Goodhew, the hoped for peace-maker, winning the day. Politics in Robinson's term was almost always of a high level intensity.

The Goodhew episcopate (1993-2001), more than any other period, was marked by political struggles over power. Conservative opposition to some of Goodhew's initiatives led to Goodhew supporters forming the Blue Ticket to challenge the ACL ascendancy. Those battles (tagged *The Holy Wars*) began in 1993 when the Blue Ticket won enough places on Standing Committee (when combined with others) to outnumber ACL supporters. Points of contention included outrage at the Pymble matter, Sydney's deteriorating relationship with the ACA (particularly over *APBA*), Goodhew's apparent about face on lay administration and his belated willingness to accept women's ordination to the presbyterate. The episcopal team he assembled around him (by his own admission) lacked fire power and robbed him of influence and control of the diocesan agenda. Underlying all these was concern that many of the hoped for changes appeared to be fading away. Goodhew certainly wanted parishes to become more effective for growth, but the team he assembled, and his personal commitment to Anglicanism, put him offside with a new generation, disillusioned with the old ways and impatient with the centre. Goodhew's outstanding successes included the final establishment of full-blown regionalisation, the resolution of the re-marriage controversy and the creation of the Professional Standards Unit to deal with allegations of sexual abuse.

Politically, the Blue Ticket was the catalyst for the resurgence of the ACL to the point where its electoral successes reached the highest in its then, 90 years' existence. When Goodhew retired in 2001, the conservatives were determined not to split the vote as in 1993, and the campaign for Peter Jensen against Robert Forsyth (the Blue Ticket favourite) was probably the best organised in the history of the Diocese. Jensen was elected in a landslide.

The Jensen years (2001-2013) were dominated by one thing - the Diocesan Mission. Even though the outcomes (in aggregate terms) were disappointing, surprisingly, that did not diminish Jensen's political or personal standing in the Diocese. This was mainly due to his impressive pastoral qualities, his inspirational representation of Christianity in the wider community and his unswerving commitment to core evangelical values. His high international profile (GAFCON) also strengthened his reputation domestically. His major difficulties related to corporate management at the

centre and the calibre of the team he assembled around him, which, like Goodhew's, failed to exercise the leadership experienced under Loane and Robinson. Ballantine-Jones believes Jensen's main legacy will be the change in diocesan culture away from the rigidity of old fashioned Anglicanism to a more open face toward outsiders. It is a reasonable expectation that Archbishop Glenn Davies will continue in that direction.

The one big difficulty that characterised the Diocese throughout the whole period under study was how to harness the central administration and diocesan resources to achieve major diocesan objectives. Part Four examined why was this so. An analysis of the diocesan structure produced a possible explanation. This was turned into a working hypothesis. This hypothesis identified the autonomous nature of the operational entities (parishes and ministry organisations), the two-headed nature of central government (Archbishop and Synod) and the chronic inefficiencies of its committee culture as the problem. Even beyond these, there was confusion about what the Diocese (with respect to its non-parochial activities) was actually supposed to achieve.

This search for purpose boiled down to the question of what should be the legitimate limits of central power and action, beyond providing basic services to parishes. It was acknowledged that the Diocese is free to select any proposal as being within its purpose. However, it is the conclusion of this study that the inherent limitations of the diocesan structure and culture, and the fragility of corporate memory, all point to the desirability of a 'small government' approach, over one that looks to expanded central initiatives. But if it was to be decided to embark on major central initiatives, the lessons of recent decades point to the wisdom of delegating them to fully corporatised organisations, following proper governance and with sound risk management policies in place to compensate for the weaknesses of the voluntary nature of their governing boards.

While the changes noted in this thesis are many and varied, the core values of the Diocese did not change. These core values, defended as they were by determined political action, are likely to result in Sydney continuing to be the bearer of the reformed, evangelical and protestant brand of Anglicanism around the world. As for

the underlying structures, they are likely to continue to offer the main challenge to ongoing stability and prosperity.

In a study about politics in the Diocese of Sydney, the final word should be about that, *politics*. Synodical government requires some form of organised political activity or inefficiency or chaos will be the result. Everyone is free in a democracy to participate in the political process and if they feel deeply about the issues, they should do so. That applies to Sydney Anglicans. Historically, politics in Sydney has been mostly about the ACL. The key to its success stems from the fact that it represents mainstream conservative evangelical values, is disciplined in pursuit of its purpose, and generally operates like a well-oiled machine. It has always enjoyed the support of a sizeable majority of MTC trained clergy and key lay leaders. Other groups may come and go, but as long as the ACL retains those elements, it is likely to continue to be the dominant political force in the largest and most dynamic Diocese in the Anglican Church in Australia, which, to many outsiders, and not a few insiders, is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

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