Feeling Together

Can there be group emotion?

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Abstract

We commonly attribute emotions to groups: we speak of the anger of minority groups, the fear felt by cities after a terror attack, and the joy of sport fans when their team is victorious. Yet at the same time, we think of emotions as subjective, personal experiences that only individuals can feel. Emotions are feelings, and we do not think of groups as entities that can feel. The tension between these two positions gives rise to the central questions investigated in this thesis: What is a group emotion? And who is the subject that experiences a group emotion?

Philosophers of emotion are sceptical about group emotion, and pose what I term the Sceptical Challenge. Traditional philosophical accounts of emotion, whether cognitive or non-cognitive, hold that emotions are individual experiences. Sceptics assert that a group emotion refers to the individual emotions felt by group members. The challenge is to establish that a group emotion is a phenomenon that is distinct from individual emotion, and is not reducible to individual emotion.

In developing a response to this challenge, I draw on empirical findings in social psychology, which establish that individuals feel different emotions when thinking of themselves as members of different groups. I also discuss and draw on the significant contributions from several existing philosophical accounts of collective emotion. Margaret Gilbert develops her account of collective intentionality to argue that groups place normative constraints on their members, thereby committing them to a collective emotion. Hans Bernhard Schmid focuses on the phenomenology of emotion, arguing that group members experience themselves and their emotions as fused with other group members. Edith Stein, Dan Zahavi, and Thomas Szanto argue that the empathic intersubjective relations between individuals allow them to adopt a shared perspective and share an emotion. I bring these accounts together, to argue that groups can adopt a shared perspective on the world. When their members are in proximity with one another, they mutually influence one another through the process of emotional contagion and with normative pressure to respond in the same way to a particular situation. When group members gather together, they can co-constitute a shared perspective and share an emotion as a unified body. This is a group emotion that is not reducible to individual emotion, and which meets the Sceptical Challenge.

Declaration

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled "Feeling together: can there be group emotion?" has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of work and it has been written by me. Any help or assistance that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

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Introduction

…what has not been recognized sufficiently is that today the world faces what might be called a 'clash of emotions' as well. The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.

—Dominique Moïsi (2007), "The Clash of Emotions," Foreign Affairs

We are proud of all the people here today. We want to show the world we are united and we are not scared.

—Isabelle Gabarre, one of 3.7 million people who marched in France in response to the Charlie Hebdo terror attacks (Hanna, Davies, and Allen 2015)

An evocative image captures a vigil for the victims of the shooting in the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris on January 7, 2015. In the image, thousands of people are standing tightly together in the Place de la Republique, and in the middle of the crowd, some individuals are holding up illuminated letters that spell out the words, "[n]ot afraid." The caption accompanying this image describes the scene as one in which, "[t]ens of thousands of people, many holding signs saying 'Je suis Charlie,' rallied across France and around the world to show support and express grief after the killing of 12 people at the Paris headquarters of satirical weekly *Charlie Hebdo* yesterday" (2015). The shooting was confirmed as a terror attack by an Islamic group, targeting the magazine for its controversial depictions of the prophet Muhammad.

Later in the year, on November 13, 2015, several more coordinated terror attacks once again rocked Paris, with bombings and shootings occurring around the city, in cafes, restaurants, and a concert hall. This time the media reported that, "an unspeakable fear [had] silenced one of the planet's most vibrant, free and beautiful cities" (Hunt 2015). The earlier grief and solidarity that characterised the January demonstrations had become fear, particularly as these later attacks had targeted venues that ordinary citizens would be visiting, rather than government or media offices. Public gatherings were banned for security reasons, but people still gathered in churches, each expressing their shock and grief at the attacks, as well as the urge to show solidarity. These gatherings were not limited to Parisians, as vigils took place around the world. In Dunedin, New Zealand, French expatriates gathered, sobbing and hugging one another, and reporting outrage. French expatriate Paul Chameret said that the anger was because the attacks

hurt his countrymen deeply: "[p]revious generations have fought to free France, and now I feel that this is being taken from us…" (Lewis 2015).

Fear, grief, and anger are natural responses to terrifying events of loss and uncertainty, and this is no less true when the event affects a whole group. For terror attacks, we speak of whole nations experiencing emotional turmoil and shock, and this is considered part of the political aftermath of such an event. As Pierre Guerlain (2015) notes,

> Just after 9/11 Americans were, of course, focused on their pain, fear and search for answers. People in Madrid (2004) or London (2005) experienced something similar. The time for grieving always comes first and the collective emotion of pain and solidarity has to occupy the whole emotional and public space for a while… Feelings of despair, defiance and hatred for those who committed atrocious acts take center stage.

Americans were afraid after the 2001 September 11 attacks, as were Spaniards after the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the British after the 2005 London bombings. The fear is attributed not only to those directly affected by the violence, that is, the individual victims, but also to the broader target of the attacks: the nation.

Groups are often attributed with emotions in our everyday speech. A country is said to mourn the loss of a national figure; white people refer to their white guilt as a response to historical and ongoing racial oppression; sport fans celebrate their team's victories and lament their losses. When we speak of conflict between groups, we attribute these groups with anger and hatred, and when a group commits a wrongdoing, we speak of the shame this brings on the group members. This attribution is common, but what is meant by group emotion is not explicitly articulated. What does it mean to say that Israel hates Palestine, that Britain mourns the death of Winston Churchill, and that the official Australian policy toward asylum seekers brings shame on the country? Groups are made up of individuals, and when these groups are large, as in the case of nations or race and gender groups, the individuals within the group may be quite diverse. The individuals within the group may vary substantially in their emotional temperaments, and in their emotional reactions to particular events. When we attribute emotion to groups, it is not clear whom we take to be the subject of the emotion. Who do we think feels the emotion? Are we attributing the emotion to the individuals within the group, or are we referring to a completely different phenomenon when we refer to group emotion?

Sociologists and political theorists were the first to study the notion of group emotion. Historically, the investigation was initiated by an interest in crowd behaviour, with theorists such as Gustave Le Bon (1896) recognising that individuals can get caught up in the emotion of a crowd, and that the crowd's emotion could lead to destructive action. The crowd's emotion, Le Bon notes, is "a contagious power as intense as that of microbes" (1896, 78). The emotion gets passed from one person to the next, seemingly belonging to the crowd rather than the individuals. The emotion may continue even as members of the crowd change. In recognising the crowd's emotion, Le Bon also recognises the destructive power of group emotion. He notes that the crowd's emotion overwhelms the individual, and with it, his sense of self and his rationality. In the crowd, the individual becomes "an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will" (Le Bon 1896, 8). Later, social psychologists would call the loss of inhibition and sense of self "de-individuation" (see, for example, Hogg and Abrams 1988, 123-129). With the loss of self, the individual appears to become part of the crowd and acts as he would not otherwise act:

> Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. (Le Bon 1896, 4)

Le Bon argues that the crowd feels an emotion that is distinct from the emotion of the individual. It is a simplified and "greatly exaggerated" emotion that overwhelms the individual, for what she feels when part of the crowd is by no means indicative of her typical emotional response (Le Bon 1896, 22-24). Le Bon follows a long tradition in thinking of emotion as opposed to reason, and he emphasises the danger of group emotion.[1] He believes that if an individual is emotional, she is thinking irrationally, rather than calmly and coolly, and the same is true of group emotion. The crowd's sentiment makes the crowd an irrational, impulsive, and dangerous entity (Calhoun 2001, 48). Crowds, he argues, tend to violence, and this tendency is increased by the absence of a sense of responsibility felt by individuals (Le Bon 1896, 22). This thought is echoed by Friedrich Nietzsche, who writes that, "[i]nsanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule" (2009, aphorism 156). The group's emotion is dangerous not only to society but also to the

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[1] In Chapter 1, I will show that this long-standing dichotomy between reason and emotion is false.

individual, for it may overwhelm her and free the individual from the inhibitions and rational considerations that normally constrain her behaviour. As Emile Durkheim, the influential sociologist who spent a career studying the emotions in ritual, tells us, "[i]n the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces" (cited in Jasper 2014, 342).

There are many examples of cases where the emotion of a crowd has led to violence and the seeming loss of inhibition or self-control in individuals. Otherwise decent and law-abiding people might loot buildings, destroy property, and assault bystanders. In cases of mobs and crowds, an emotion appears to spread through the members of those groups and can lead individuals to behave in ways that they, as individuals, would not endorse. From the storming of the Bastille in 1789 to the Arab Spring protests that started in 2010, individuals appear to lose their ability to think coolly when acting as part of a group, instead getting swept away with the current of the group's emotion.[2] That these individuals would not have committed such behaviour as single individuals, nor endorse these actions were they thinking rationally, seems to show that group emotion is contrary to reason and overwhelms the individual. In the case of so-called negative emotions such as anger and fear, the potential for harm seems enormous, making such emotions particularly disastrous motivations for group action (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 3).

The notion of group emotion has thus been characterised as an irrational and destructive force, and has been greatly stigmatised in academic research. Despite the initial interest, political theorists and sociologists in the academy have, by and large, ignored the phenomenon of group emotion for many decades, failing to investigate the nature of group emotion or how it might motivate collective action.[3] Those who investigate social movements and political behaviour have instead developed rationalistic, structural, or organisational models of explanation, but not emotional models of explanation. These models analyse collective political actions such as policy

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[2] One recent example is the 2011 London Riots, where many of the looters were quite wealthy and "respectable" (see, for example, Geddes 2011). For a detailed case study of the loss of moral inhibition within crowds, see Eva Weber-Guskar (2017) on the violence committed by German teenagers against refugees in 1992.

[3] More than that, the demands of emotional groups could be dismissed as the demands of irrational and unthinking people, which need not be taken seriously. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta are careful to note that protest organisers continued to recognise and manipulate emotions to mobilise social movements and to attract further participants, despite emotions falling out of favour in theoretical explanations of social movements (2001, 3).

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decisions and social movements in terms of, for example, strategic consideration of the group's interests against competing claims from other groups, in the light of the group's structure, beliefs, resource allocation, power relations, and so on (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005, 470, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 4-5). While it is recognised that individuals may be motivated by emotion to act, academic theorists of political and social action have understood groups as social structures. These theorists hold that what drives a group's action depends on the structure and distribution of the group, on the political and social forces acting upon that group (such as class and resource allocation), and the decision-making mechanisms within the group.[4] For both formally organised groups (such as corporations), and spontaneous, disorganised groups (such as mobs and crowds that have no formal leadership), group emotions do not factor in explanations of their collective action.[5]

Although political theorists and sociologists have traditionally avoided attributing emotional motivations to groups, they have recognised that *individual* emotion in the political sphere can have significant impact in the collective sphere. Their analyses have focused on, for example, the emotional influence of particular individuals on fellow group members, and the role that emotions play in getting people to join social movements. Arlie Hochschild, a renowned sociologist, introduced the term "emotional labour" to discuss how leaders, organisers, recruiters, workers, and activists, both express and elicit emotion to achieve political and social aims (Wharton 2009, 148). Belinda Robnett analyses how Martin Luther King, for example, relied on emotional appeals to mobilise the civil rights movement in the United States (referenced in Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 14).[6] Various campaign and protest groups have been formed because many individuals are motivated by their own emotions to take action, and are joined by other like-minded individuals. Srirupa Roy (2016) analyses the public demonstrations that took place in India in April 2011 as part of the India Against

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[4] The role of culture in framing political action is recognised by sociologists, but not as culture relates to emotion: rather, explanations of group behaviour are made with reference to collective identity, cognitive framing, schemata, discourses, narratives, and so on (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 6).

[5] Chantel Mouffe (2002) develops a similar argument with respect to approaches in democratic political theory. She argues that the role of reason is emphasized and the role of the passions is ignored in the existing models of democracy, aggregative and deliberative. She goes on to offer a third model in which the passions are recognised and "tamed" in ways that conflict can be handled better and pluralism accommodated: the agonistic pluralism model.

[6] Paul Saurette argues that George W. Bush, as the president of the United States when the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the Twin Towers occurred, would have experienced 9/11 as a humiliating attack on himself, and so employed strongly emotional rhetoric in demanding that those responsible for the attacks on the Twin Towers be hunted down and killed (2006, 510-513).

Corruption Movement, and argues that the protesters took to the streets because of their "civic anger" at the way the government flouted the rules and acted against the interests of the citizens. Nancy Whittier (2001) explores how campaign organisers and recruiters manage individual emotions to further a campaign's ends and to achieve particular aims, such as raising awareness and bringing in new legislation. She gives a detailed case study of the campaign against child sexual abuse, and how the individual emotions of various members were strategically expressed to draw attention to the problem and to raise funds. In political and social theoretical literature, then, we see that emotions are considered to be politically and socially important when individuals are motivated to act because of their individual emotions.

While individuals may be motivated by their emotions to act in the political sphere, emotion has not been recognised in the theoretical literature as playing a role in the way groups, as groups, act (Calhoun 2001, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). The political and social debates about collective action have traditionally avoided attributing emotions to groups. This is in contrast with the popular explanations for why groups act, as we see in the media narratives about what motivates collective action. The media narrative about the Women's March in January 2017, for example, attributes the motivation for the march as the outrage felt by women (as a group) about the election of Donald Trump as the US President (Pollitt 2017). This discrepancy between academic and popular explanations for collective action suggests that another model of explanation should be developed, which can supplement the existing structural, organisational, and rational models. In fact, this suggestion has been taken up. In recent years, there has been a call to renew focus on emotions in studies on political action and social movements. This "affective turn" in political and social analysis has been prompted by social psychological research into intergroup behaviour (Gould 2010, 23-25, Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 495, see also Sasley 2011).

Social psychologists have been investigating the phenomenon of group emotion since the early 1990s. They have developed a theory of group behaviour called the Intergroup Emotion Theory, which seeks to explain the important role played by emotions in motivating the actions of groups (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1867).[7] They are interested in intergroup interaction, such as when groups are in conflict with one another, or when one group commits a wrongdoing against another group. Eliot

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[7] Eliot Smith's (1993) paper on intergroup prejudice is identified as triggering the development of the Intergroup Emotion Theory. I discuss his paper in Chapter 2.

Smith (1993), for example, focuses on racial prejudice in the United States and the interaction between black and white Americans, and argues that emotion may be what drives racial discrimination. Daniel Bar-Tal (2001) explores the interaction between Israel and Palestine, and argues that it is the emotional orientations of the two nations that have made the conflict intractable, and which undermine the peace process (see also Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007). There has been increasing attention to how terrorism affects countries emotionally, and how such emotions influence policy decisions. Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker (2008), who research international relations, argue that the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States caused great fear and anger, and this is what led the government to quickly implement policies to increase security and scrutiny of perceived outsiders (in accordance with the USA Patriot Act).[8] In another paper, Hutchison (2010) explores the impact that the 2002 Bali bombing had on Australia, arguing that as a nation, the country mourned the loss of the 88 Australian victims, and national grief led to changes in national security policies. These analyses suggest that emotions can provide a useful way of understanding how and why groups act, and that emotions may in fact play a central role in motivating collective action. The research from social psychology has thus provided the impetus to develop an emotional model of collective political action, and collective action more generally.

The renewed focus on the role of emotion in motivating group action, however, has not yet led to a theory of what a group emotion might be. The notion of group emotion is conceptually under-developed, and as such, several general but under-theorised ideas about a more general notion of collective emotion have emerged.[9] Some theorists refer to collective emotions as widely shared emotions within the group, which are connected with the group's identity.[10] Others refer to an emotional climate or culture, when the group's social norms, beliefs, and cultural practices predispose the group members to particular emotional responses, and as such those emotions are

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[8] See also Jack Barbalet's and Nicolas Demertzis' (2013) analysis of how collective fear motivates social change. They discuss the fear felt by British elites about the labour movement in the early twentieth century, and the fear felt by French elites about the French Revolution.

[9] In this thesis, I will discuss several accounts of collective emotion, which are broadly concerned with the ways emotion might be collective. A group emotion is an emotion that is felt by a group, as a group. It is a kind of collective emotion. I make the distinction between group emotion and collective emotion because I think that there are different ways an emotion may be collective without being a group emotion.

[10] See, for example, Bleiker and Hutchison (2008), Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006), Jasper (1998, 2014), Sullivan (2014a, 2014b), Wright-Neville and Smith (2009).

understood as characteristic of that group.[11] In international relations theory, cultural studies, and media studies, theorists point to the media representations of emotion and the public narratives about emotion as collective emotion.[12] These different conceptions of collective emotion reveal a tension in how we think of group emotion: sometimes we think of group emotion as an emotion that is experienced by individuals, and at other times, as an emotion that somehow transcends the individuals within the group.

The central aim of this thesis is to develop a model of group emotion that articulates the nature of group emotion and clarifies the conceptual ambiguity about who we take to be experiencing the emotion when we attribute the emotion to the group. I will argue that a group experiences an emotion when the individuals within the group experience that emotion together. My argument aims to ease the tensions in the literature by showing that a group emotion is a distinct phenomenon to an individual emotion and is properly attributed to the group. While individual group members experience a group emotion, this emotion is not an aggregation of the individual group members' emotions. Rather, the group is the proper subject of a group emotion, which the individuals within the group experience together as a group.

Fellow philosophers of emotion are strongly sceptical about the notion of group emotion, and as such, I find that I am presented with what I will call the Sceptical Challenge about group emotion. In Chapter 1, I show that the dominant philosophical and psychological view is that emotions are necessarily individualistic. This view holds that only individuals can experience emotions, because emotions are biologically based phenomena. While groups are composed of individuals, groups are themselves not organic, embodied entities that can experience feelings. Drawing on the work of William James (1884), Robert Solomon (1976, 1980, 1999, 2003, 2004), Ronald de Sousa (1987), and Jesse Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005), I argue that adherents of both non-cognitive and cognitive accounts of emotion view emotions as personal, subjective experiences. If we think of emotion in terms of bodily feelings, emotions are individualistic because they are experienced in individual bodies. If we think of emotions in terms of their cognitive component, as judgements or perceptions, emotions are individualistic because they are experienced from the individual's unique context

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[11] For example, Bar-Tal (2001), Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera (2007), Conejero and Etxebarria (2007), de Rivera, Kurrien, and Olsen (2007), de Rivera and Páez (2007), Hutchison and Bleiker (2015), Parashar (2015).

[12] See Ahmed (2004, 2014), Hutchison (2010), Hutchison and Bleiker (2008, 2014).

and situated point of view, and are about what is of concern to the individual. Either way, the individualistic nature of emotion persuades the sceptic about group emotion to argue that a group emotion simply refers to the emotions held by the individuals within the group. A group emotion is nothing more than aggregation of the members' individual emotions. For example, on this view when we say that, "London is fearful after the bombing," we mean that lots of people in London individually feel fearful. To respond to the Sceptical Challenge, I need to show that a group emotion is a distinct phenomenon from individual emotion, and is not explanatorily reducible to the emotions of the individuals within the group. In other words, I need to show that a group, as a group, feels an emotion: London city feels fear as a group, not as many Londoners individually.

I develop my response to the Sceptical Challenge by examining several existing accounts of collective emotion to demonstrate that they cannot adequately explain the phenomenon of group emotion. To this end, I begin with a detailed analysis in Chapter 2 of the way collective emotion is discussed by social psychologists such as Diane Mackie, Eliot Smith, and Devin Ray, along with many others.[13] In order to explain the behaviour of groups toward one another, these social psychologists have developed a theory of collective emotion that they term Intergroup Emotion Theory. They propose a type of collective emotion called "group-based emotion." Individuals feel group-based emotions when they think of themselves in terms of their membership of particular groups. These studies reveal that group membership has a significant impact on the kind of emotion that the individual feels, and that her level of identification with her group determines the degree to which she feels those emotions. The philosophical question that I am interested in is whether we can attribute group-based emotions to groups. The social psychologists argue that the individual feels group-based emotions because she belongs to a particular group, and that the individual represents what the group feels when she feels that emotion. However, I will argue that the empirical methodology used by the social psychologists limits the conclusions that can be drawn from their studies, and as such, we can only attribute group-based emotions to individuals and not to groups. These studies fail to show that the individuals feel group-based emotions as a

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[13] See, for example, Iyer and Leach (2009), Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2012), Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008), Maitner, Smith, and Mackie (2016), Ray, Mackie, and Smith (2014), Smith and Mackie (2008), Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007), Yzerbyt et al. (2002), Yzerbyt and Kuppens (2009).

group, rather than as isolated individuals, and hence cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge.

The empirical findings discussed in Chapter 2 drive me to seek out an account of collective emotion in which *the group* is the subject of the emotion, rather than the individual. Margaret Gilbert (1997, 2002) offers an account of collective guilt in which she argues that a group can be the subject of guilt because the individuals within the group have formed a joint commitment to feel guilt. I discuss Gilbert's work in Chapter 3. I call her account "plural-subject emotion," for she argues that individuals can form commitments to one another such that they together constitute the proper subject of a joint, or collective, mental state. On her account, if individuals are part of a group that commits a wrongdoing, the individuals, by virtue of their joint commitment to be part of the group, can be committed to bear guilt together. Gilbert's account is promising, but I argue that she cannot show that the group feels a group emotion. She establishes that a group can form a rule about how the members ought to act, given the group's commitments, but not that the group feels the emotion that it is committed to. Her account of plural-subject guilt cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge because she does not show that the group members feel an emotion together.

Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion denies the importance of feelings and as such cannot show that a group feels an emotion. I turn therefore in Chapter 4 to an account of collective emotion that focuses on the phenomenology of emotion. Phenomenologist Hans Bernhard Schmid (2009) argues that an emotion is collective when the individual experiences her emotion as shared. He argues that individuals can experience themselves as fused with one another, and the emotion that they experience when they are phenomenologically fused is a shared emotion. His account usefully draws out the different elements of emotion that can be shared, arguing that an emotion is intentional in three ways, and as such, can be shared in three ways. An emotion is intentional in its mode, content, and subject. Schmid draws on the literature on emotional contagion to show how a mode, or feeling, can be shared between individuals. He argues that the content of an emotion is shared when individuals recognise that they have the same concerns as one another. Most importantly for Schmid's account, he argues that the subject of an emotion can be shared when the individual experiences herself as phenomenologically fused with her group. However, I will argue that Schmid's account fails to meet the Sceptical Challenge, since his account of phenomenological fusion does not show that multiple individuals feel an emotion

together. By focusing on the individual's experience, he can only show that an individual can regard herself as a group member and feel an emotion accordingly.

In Chapter 5, I present an account of collective emotion that can meet the Sceptical Challenge. In this chapter, I discuss the arguments for shared emotion given by Edith Stein (1989), Thomas Szanto (2015), and Dan Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015, see also Zahavi and Rochat 2015, León and Zahavi 2016). They argue that empathy is an important aspect of shared emotion for it allows individuals to know how other individuals feel. When individuals enter into reciprocal empathic relations with one another, they can adopt a shared perspective on the world. As such, they are oriented to the world together, and respond to the world together. As I argue, on this account, the relations between the two individuals change the structure of the shared emotion, for each individual experiences an emotion while being aware of the other's emotion. The relationship between them means that the emotion experienced is a mutually constituted experience in which the individuals exert mutual influence on one another so that they feel the same emotion. Importantly, I argue that a shared emotion cannot be reduced to the individual emotions that each individual feels. Each individual must make reference to the other for she experiences her emotion *with* the other. However, the limitation of this account is that only small groups can feel shared emotion, for only individuals in close proximity to one another can share an emotion. Can we extend this account and attribute a shared emotion to larger groups, which we call group emotion?

In Chapter 6, I provide an overview of the different ways an emotion can be collective, drawing on Mikko Salmela's (2012) typology of collective emotion. This typology usefully illustrates that we can only attribute a non-aggregative notion of collective emotion to a group, in which the group members feel the same emotion together. As such, my model of group emotion is grounded in the model of shared emotion that I argue for in Chapter 5. I argue that a group can feel an emotion when the individuals share an emotion with at least one other member of the group in a way that is not reducible to individual emotion. Individuals can co-constitute a group emotion if they share an emotion with at least one other group member directly, and with other members indirectly; and we attribute this shared emotion to the whole group by means of certain top-down processes, such as a media narrative or governmental decision. This analysis can account for certain cases of apparent group emotion, but not all. It can account for those cases when a certain number of the group members are gathered in one place, and we deem their shared emotion to be representative of the group's

emotion. The Parisians gathered in the Place de la Republique, for example, are physically connected to one another by virtue of their proximity to one another, either directly or indirectly, and as such, can enter into reciprocal relations that allow them to share an emotion. This emotion is taken to be representative of the country's group fear. However, my model of group emotion cannot account for the emotion we attribute to groups whose members do not gather to share an emotion, as these group members are not connected to one another in a reciprocal relation that allows them to co-constitute a shared emotion together. As such, I think that in some cases of large-scale groups where we might want to attribute a group emotion to a group, we cannot legitimately do so. The group members may feel group-based emotions (as the social psychologists term emotions held by group members), but the group does not feel a group emotion. On my analysis, group emotion is a particular kind of emotion, for it is only experienced in situations where group members have gathered together and are focused together, as a single entity, on the same emotion-eliciting object. Their perspectives on the world are interlocked so that they respond emotionally together, constituting the group emotion that they share through processes of emotional contagion and mutual emotional-regulation. This conception of group emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, because the individuals are dependent on one another to feel this kind of emotion: they need to be reciprocally related to one another to constitute a single subject of group emotion.

My thesis does not investigate how group emotion can motivate collective action, which is a distinct philosophical question and not one that I can answer here.[14] My focus is on understanding what a group emotion is, and showing how a group, as a group, can feel an emotion. My account of group emotion clarifies some of the ambiguity in both the academic literature and in our popular talk, by establishing the conditions that need to be in place for an emotion to be shared by large groups. With these conditions established, it will be possible to account for the emotion felt by protestors and crowds, for example, in cases where large groups are gathered together. However, despite my best attempts, I will not be able to show that groups such as nations or race groups can feel group emotion, if these groups do not have public

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[14] Salmela and Nagatsu (2016, 2017) discuss how collective emotion may motivate collective action, and relatedly, how it feels to act together. See also John Michael (2011). On a related topic but in a different vein, Michael Brady (2016) argues that just as individual emotion can have epistemic value, so group emotion can have epistemic value: the group emotion can reveal what the group values, and be motivated to act accordingly.

gatherings. In these large groups, the group members do not have reciprocal relations with one another in a way that allows them to share an emotion with one another.

Chapter 1: Emotion

A day cannot live in infamy without the nourishment of rage. Let's have rage. What's needed is a unified, unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of purple American fury—a ruthless indignation that doesn't leak away in a week or two…

—*Lance Morrow (2001), "The Case for Rage and Retribution," TIME*

In the philosophical literature on emotion, the dominant position is distinctly individualist—only individuals can feel emotion. There is some debate about what kind of individuals can feel emotions. Can infants and animals feel emotion, or do they lack the required cognitive capacities? Can aliens and robots feel emotion, or are their bodies too different from the human body to experience what we recognise as emotion? However, there has been relatively little concern about whether or not groups can feel emotion. Groups do not have bodies or minds, and as such, most philosophers think that we cannot attribute emotions to groups in the way that we attribute emotions to individuals. Accordingly, the lay attribution of emotion to groups is either mistaken, or more charitably, is metaphorical, for we really mean that groups of individuals feel emotion. When we speak of American rage at the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York, we do not mean that Americans as a group feels rage, these philosophers would argue. No, our talk of American rage simply means that many Americans feel anger.

My aim in this chapter is to understand why the philosophical literature predominantly takes an individualist approach to emotion so that I can articulate what I call the Sceptical Challenge to group emotion. As I will show, different theories of emotion take different features to be central to what an emotion is. In the first section of this chapter, I outline three theories of emotion that broadly represent the different positions in the debate. Each theory brings out a different important feature of emotion, each of which needs to be accounted for in an analysis of group emotion. William James (1884) argues that an emotion is a change in bodily feeling, and as such, is a felt bodily experience. In complete contrast to James, Robert Solomon (1976, 1980, 2003, 2004) argues that an emotion is an evaluative judgement, and that we feel emotion about matters of importance to us. His account emphasises that emotions are cognitive phenomena. Ronald de Sousa (1987) and Jesse Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005) offer a hybrid account, arguing that emotion is both an embodied experience and a cognitive

experience. They argue that emotion is a quasi-perceptual capacity and, as perceptions, emotions are situated experiences, felt from the individual's unique point of view. These three accounts thus highlight three different ways that emotions seem to be individualistic—they are physically located in an individual body, mentally represented within an individual mind, and held from a particular subjective point of view.

All three accounts point to the subjective nature of emotion, as I discuss in the second section. The way an emotion feels depends on the individual's particular embodiment and her psychic history. Her emotional responses will arise from how she appraises what is of significance to her, and what she cares about. To the extent that she can give reasons for her emotional responses, these reasons are not evidential reasons but will be justified by whether or not her emotions are appropriate for her.

Given the dominance of this individualist view of emotion, the sceptic about group emotion will challenge me to explain how a group can feel an emotion. The sceptic thinks that a group emotion is nothing more than an individual emotion, except that many individuals appear to feel the same emotion. The sceptic can accept an aggregative account of collective emotion but does not think that a group, as a group, can feel an emotion. Meeting the Sceptical Challenge therefore requires giving an account of group emotion that establishes that a group emotion is a distinct phenomenon to individual emotion, and that the group is the proper subject of the emotion. Can a group, as a group, feel an emotion despite not being an embodied, thinking entity like an individual? I outline the Sceptical Challenge in more detail in the third section of this chapter.

1 Three accounts of emotion

The philosophical literature on the nature of emotion is vast, and I cannot provide a comprehensive survey of the various positions within this debate here. Rather, I pick out three theories of emotion that are useful for bringing out those components of emotion that appear to show that only individuals can feel emotion. These are the components of emotion that in turn feature in other theorists' accounts of collective emotion. I see these three theories as broadly mapping the philosophical terrain on the question of emotion and pointing to the different components of the emotion that I will need to account for in my analysis of group emotion.

The Jamesian account has been highly influential, shaping much of the debate about emotion within philosophy and psychology. James (1884) argues for a non-

cognitive account of emotion, according to which emotion is, essentially, a feeling of bodily change. Emotion is primarily a bodily, biologically based phenomenon. In response to the Jamesian view, several different cognitivist theories of emotion have been developed by philosophers such as Solomon (1976, 1980, 2003, 2004), Martha Nussbaum (2001, 2004), Peter Goldie (2000), Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005), and de Sousa (1987, 2004). These theories seek to show that emotions are, to some degree, cognitive, because emotions are responses that concern what is of importance to the individual. I focus on Solomon's judgementalist theory. Solomon criticises the notion of emotion as bodily feeling, which he thinks is "used as an excuse to ignore or neglect the significance of emotions in human life" (1999, 46). His theory seeks to explain why and how emotions are meaningful. What he and Nussbaum think is central to emotion is that emotions are evaluative judgments of the individual's situation.

Prinz argues that the bodily feeling and judgementalist theories define what he calls the Emotion Problem. He claims that an emotion is a complex experience—a feeling as well as a cognition about value. The problem, he thinks, is to show how a bodily feeling can contain information about what is of significance to the individual (Prinz 2003, 77-78).[1] In response to the Emotion Problem, Prinz argues for a quasi-perceptual theory of emotion, which brings together both the cognitive and non-cognitive components of emotion. I discuss both Prinz's and de Sousa's quasi-perceptual theories. They argue that an emotion is an automatic embodied response that represents a meaningful appraisal of the situation to the person. On this account, emotion is a way of interpreting and engaging with the world according to what is of concern to the person. Quasi-perceptual theories are perspectival. This account of emotion usefully illustrates the various aspects of emotion that lead the sceptic to assert that emotions are subjective and individualistic experiences.

1.1 The Jamesian account

When we think of emotions, one of the first aspects that comes to mind is that they are feelings, or bodily responses to the world. We think of emotions as being in contrast to

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[1] Goldie gives a cognitive (but not judgementalist) account of emotion to try to solve the Emotion Problem. He develops the idea of emotion as "thinking with feeling" and argues that emotions are complex processes of "feeling towards" (2000, 58, see 50-83). On his account, feelings are themselves intentionally directed to what we are concerned with, and the emotion process includes thoughts, desires, perceptions, feelings, bodily changes, and dispositions (2000, 12-13). I do not discuss Goldie's account in detail in this chapter, but I mention it here because it will come up again in Chapter 4 when I analyse Hans Bernhard Schmid's (2009) account of fused emotion.

the deliberate, rational responses of so-called clear thinking, and as requiring little, if any, cognition, for animals and babies seem to have emotions too. A trembling animal is easily attributed with fear and a bouncing baby is thought to be happy. Emotions are often experienced as immediate, involuntary bodily reactions, which we, as agents, have little control over, and with respect to which we are passive. The loss of a loved one causes a person to grieve, which may manifest as uncontrollable sobbing, or be experienced as a wave of sadness and despondency that washes over the individual at different times without any sort of prompt from her.[2] Sometimes it is due to the fact that we manifest certain bodily expressions that we realise we are feeling a certain emotion: the person may realise from her shaking hands and racing heart that she is afraid, or from her clenched fists and tensed jaw that she is angry.

These sorts of common experience lead James to argue that what is essential to emotions is the feeling of change in bodily experience to a situation, which is prompted by a perception of the situation (1884, 189-190). He argues that all emotions must involve some form of bodily expression, whether it is something noticeable like sobbing, or something barely detectable like a slight increase in heart rate. When a person perceives a particular situation, the perception will lead directly to a bodily feeling, of which she will be aware if this bodily feeling is different to what she felt just prior to the perception. On perceiving something frightening, for example, such as a great height, the person may feel her heart skip a beat and her breath catch. This change in bodily feeling from one state to another is, on James' account, the emotion of fear. The bodily feelings are essential to the emotion for without them, the emotion would simply be a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception," which we would not recognise as emotion (James 1884, 193). We may perceive danger, but unless we have the particular pattern of bodily feelings, we are not feeling fear.[3]

The idea of "feeling" is difficult to define. As James talks about it, a change in bodily feeling is a change in physiology. We may start to tremble or perspire. However,

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[2] For a lovely, clear anecdote of the bodily force of grief, see Nussbaum's personal account of her grief at her mother's death, in *Upheavals of Thought* (2001, 19-22). Nussbaum draws out an aspect of emotion that I will not explore, which is how some emotions have complex relations with other emotions. Grief for example, may give rise to anger at certain aspects of the loss, for example, or regret. I will, for the sake of this analysis, treat emotions as discrete entities, but I acknowledge that they are often very closely connected to other emotions.

[3] Henry Rutgers Marshall, a contemporary of James, thinks that James' argument is supported by a Darwinian view of emotion. He considers the emotions that animals and humans can feel, and argues that emotions have an evolutionary adaptive function. He concludes that, "[a]ll emotions are no more nor less than the feelings of the accompanying muscular actions" (1884, 617).

with some emotions, the feeling is a bit more difficult to identify as a specific physiological state. We may say that when we feel pride, our chest swells, but this is often a metaphor for that subjective sense of arousal that we feel. Sadness, particularly in depression, may be experienced as heaviness, which is a difficult feeling to locate spatially in the body. The body just feels more difficult to move.[4] Language gives us handy metaphors to describe these subjective states of what the psychologists would call arousal. For example, we may say that we have butterflies in our stomach (love) or perhaps knots (anxiety). In other cases, the name of the emotion identifies the feeling: the feeling of guilt is just that, pangs of guilt. That we cannot closely identify all of these feelings with a particular physiology does not mean that there is no physiological change occurring. It points instead to the complexity of the physiological state of arousal that occurs when we perceive certain situations.[5]

One implication of understanding emotions as being essentially about a change in bodily feeling is that we do not control our emotions, and we are passive in the experience. The emotions are immediate and involuntary reactions that are drawn from us directly upon perceiving something in the world. Using James' example, a child must feel fear upon encountering a trumpeting elephant for the first time, despite having no prior idea about elephants or the danger of elephants (1884, 191). Our emotional responses to certain situations in the world are direct physiological responses, unmediated by deliberation or thought. The implication is that emotions are involuntary and outside the bounds of reason. James describes this as follows:

> The love of man for woman, or of the human mother for her babe, our wrath at snakes and our fear of precipices, may all be described… as instances of the way in which peculiarly conformed pieces of the world's furniture will fatally call forth more particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and often in direct opposition to, the verdict of deliberate reason concerning them. (1884, 190)

James' description of emotion aligns with a common experience of emotion, which is that it can overwhelm us despite our thoughts or beliefs about the situation. A person behind a window in a skyscraper may tell herself that she is in no danger of falling from

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[4] Prinz mentions "the feeling of a buzz, glowing feelings, or unlocated pains" as examples of these sorts of feelings (2003, 70).

[5] These subjective feelings are referred to as the phenomenology of the emotion. At this point, however, I will refer only to feelings because "phenomenology" is a term that not only refers to physiological experience but also conscious experience, and so brings in elements of cognition.

the great height, and yet still feel fear. In this way, she is passive with respect to her emotion, seemingly having little control over it.

Yet, if we think that emotions are essentially a change in bodily feeling, then we can see that there is indeed one way to exert some control over our seemingly uncontrollable emotions. This is done through what de Sousa terms "bootstrapping" (1987, 238). Bootstrapping is when the emotions are controlled through the control of bodily feeling. A person who holds her head up, pushes her shoulders back, and so on, is able, to a degree, to prevent herself from falling into, or prolonging, sadness, for example (James 1884, 198). There is something to the idea of "putting on a brave face," for in doing so, we can prevent ourselves from being overwhelmed by emotion. Going through the outward motions of an emotion can also help bring about the emotion: smiling can lift the spirits, bringing us closer to happiness. As Charles Darwin notes in his discussion of emotions:

> The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as is possible of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree; and he who remains passive when overwhelmed with grief loses his best chance of recovering elasticity of mind. (2009, 386)

Of course, not all of our bodily feelings are under our control: we have little control over the pace of our heart rates, or the rate at which we perspire, for example. But to some degree, we are able to control our seemingly involuntary emotions through the training and habituation of our bodies.[6]

A further implication of James' account is that emotions are episodic. On this account, emotions track changes—it is the change from one pattern of bodily feeling to another that is the emotion. Fear is simply the feeling of an increase in heart rate, the change in breathing. When this feeling stops, as it must so that we do not exhaust ourselves physically, we are no longer in a state of fear. On this account, when we speak of long term or enduring emotions, such as love for a partner or pride about our success, we are not speaking of emotions per se. Rather, in times when there is no feeling of bodily change being experienced, we are no longer feeling emotion but may instead be disposed to particular emotions. Being in love means that we have the

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[6] The control of our emotions through our bodies is limited, and going through the motions of an emotion can remain pretence. Actor Robin Williams, famous for his comedy but who was severely depressed, is attributed with saying, "All it takes is a beautiful fake smile to hide an injured soul and they will never notice how broken you really are" (cited in Stewart 2016).

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disposition towards feeling love: the butterflies in the stomach, or the warmth in the chest. Living in fear means that a person is disposed to feel (episodes of) fear, not that she is constantly in a state where her heart rate and breath are fluctuating. For Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, emotions are transient states, and so are episodic. Emotions subside after a period and may become enduring states called sentiments, which are dispositional states (Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 40).

The distinction between episodic and dispositional states concerns the temporal nature of feelings, and the fact that a change in bodily feelings cannot be continually sustained. However, I think that defining emotions as episodic contradicts our common experience of emotion, and that this is a limitation of James' account. We think of grief, pride, and love, for example, as being emotions, and these are experiences that can endure for many years, perhaps even a lifetime. When we grieve, we may have many episodes in which we express grief—in which we sob, feel depressed or angry, experience pangs of heartache, and so on—but the periods in between these episodes are also experienced as grief. In between the episodes of change in bodily feeling, we remain concerned with the loss of our loved one, and the significance of this loss pervades our life. Although the experience of change in bodily feelings is episodic in nature, the emotion can extend beyond the episodes of feelings and be an enduring state. When we think of emotions, we think of states that encapsulate the episodes of change in bodily feelings, as well as the other periods in which we are still in some way focused on the object of our emotion.

That we think of emotions as more than just the episodes of bodily feeling points to the major objection to James' account of emotion as patterned changes in bodily feeling, which is that he cannot explain why emotions are meaningful to us. He cannot explain how it is that emotions are about events in the world external to our body (Deigh 2010, 24-25). Goldie compares the bodily feeling of emotion to the bodily feeling of a toothache. A toothache tells us only that our tooth is in need of attention—it is a pain that is about the body. Emotions, on the other hand, are about the world outside of the body (Goldie 2000, 20, 48). When we are afraid, we are not concerned (typically) with something inside our bodies, but rather by a danger that is external to us. A toothache is directed at the tooth, but it is not clear why an increased heart rate is directed at the trumpeting elephant that triggers our fear. Of course we can have emotions about our bodies—we can be afraid of our cancer spreading, for example, or be happy to be pregnant. But the objection remains: what connects the bodily feeling

with the object of the emotion? The object of the bodily feelings is not defined in James' account, and it is unclear how he can define this object if he thinks that emotions are just patterned changes in bodily feelings. In consequence, he also cannot explain how emotions motivate behaviour. He cannot show that an increase in heart rate is about a dangerous elephant, and so he cannot say why we may be motivated to flee.

James' account places primacy on the *feeling* of the emotion: he thinks that the change in bodily response to a situation is essential to the nature of emotion, distinguishing emotion from other kinds of reactions. In doing so, his account captures many of our common experiences of emotion: that they can overwhelm us; that we can recognise them through our bodily feelings; and that we may feel emotions that are seemingly at odds with our rational deliberations. What his account does not explain is why emotions are meaningful. We do not think that fear is simply a change in heart rate. We think that fear is about the perception of danger—it is a thought of some kind. It is this intuition that drives the cognitivists to offer an account of emotion that places primacy on the cognition in emotion, to explain how emotions are *about* something in the world. Solomon's cognitive account of emotion is judgementalist. He argues that emotions are essentially evaluative judgements. His account explains how emotions can be intentional, reason-responsive, and meaningful.

1.2 The judgementalist account

In saying that emotions are about an event or object, we are saying that emotions are intentional. Intentionality is what connects the emotion to an object that is external to the body. It is the direction of the emotion to something other than the physiological feeling of the emotion (Solomon 1980, 252, Nussbaum 2004, 188). Intentionality is a thought of some kind, and it makes the emotion a cognitive mental state, for there is information about the perceived situation that is being processed. If we think about anger, for example, anger is directed to a person or event, as we must be angry about something. If Celia perceives that John steals her car, she is not simply angry, but is angry *that* John stole her car. This is true of other emotions too. A person grieves *about* her mother's death; she feels grateful *that* a friend gave her assistance.

Solomon's starting position in his argument is to show that the object of an emotion can be minimally understood as a proposition, that-p (1976, 171-177). This object can refer to a true fact in the world, or to something that is not true, has not happened, or does not exist. Celia can be angry that John stole her car, when in fact he

is not the thief; she can be angry that he stole her car when she mistakenly thinks that her car has been stolen; and she can be angry that some fictional character steals a car in her favourite television show. What this means is that a person can have an emotion despite there being no perception of fact, although there is some form of perception. Perception, as I use it here, could refer to perceiving a fact in the world, misunderstanding facts in the world, or imagining a scenario. But in all these cases, the emotion is still about something: regardless of the truth or falsity of the proposition, it is the object of emotion.[7]

The proposition that-p is not a belief. Solomon, in what will turn out to be a problematic argument, argues that the object of the emotion is not a belief, but is necessarily the object of an entailed belief (1976, 178, 1980, 252-258). If Celia is angry that John stole her car, it is not that she believes that John stole her car and that she is angry about this belief. Instead, the emotion entails a belief, and both the emotion and the belief share the proposition that-p (see also Nussbaum 2004, 188-189). In this example, Celia has perceived that John stole her car and so she is angry that he stole her car. This perception gives an object to her emotion. It also gives an object to her belief, for if she is angry that John stole her car, she also believes that John stole her car. The relationship between emotion and reason is a necessary one on Solomon's account, for the belief accompanies the emotion through the relation of entailment. However, the relationship between emotion and belief is not a necessary entailment in both directions. Having the emotion means a person has the belief about that-p, but having a belief about that-p does not entail that she has an emotion about that-p. Celia can believe that John stole her car without being angry about it.

The necessary entailment between emotion and belief shows why emotions are often responsive to reason, and offers a way to control our emotions. If evidence is provided that a belief is false, the emotion is undermined for it is no longer supported by a relevant corresponding belief. The object of the belief, which is also the object of the emotion, is changed, such that the belief and the emotion should change (Solomon 1976, 178-186, 1980, 255-262). If Celia is shown that John did not steal her car, her anger against him should dissipate. On the other hand, if a person is provided with further evidence for the belief entailed by her emotion, her emotion should be given

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[7] In paradigmatic cases of emotion, a person knows what the object of her emotion is, but it is possible for her to not know what her emotion concerns. She may feel happy without having articulated what that happiness is about. This does not mean that her happiness is not about an object, but merely that she is unaware of the object of her emotion.

renewed force—not only has she perceived that-p, she has further evidence to believe that-p is true. The logical relationship between emotion and belief that Solomon argues for means that emotions are responsive to deliberation and reasons that affect the entailed belief. This is an advantage of this account, because it explains how we can control our emotion through deliberation, offering reasons for and against our emotion. But as we will see below, there is a decisive objection to this claim that there is a logical relationship between emotion and belief.

I said above that a belief does not entail an emotion. This is because it is possible to have many emotions about the same object, that-p. While the proposition that-p provides content to the emotion, which emotion is actually felt depends on the evaluation made about that proposition. Celia may be angry that John stole her car; on the other hand, she may be relieved (perhaps she needed the insurance payout quite desperately) (Solomon 1976, 177). To determine which emotion is experienced about the proposition that-p, the person needs to determine that the proposition has particular significance to her. In perceiving a situation, the person is evaluating and forming a judgement about the situation. As Solomon argues, Celia judges that John commits an offense against her when he steals her car, and so she is angry. It is important to note that emotion and evaluation are not separate processes, nor is judgement the object of the emotion. Rather, emotion is the judgement of the object.

It is the judgements, on this cognitive account of emotion, that individuate emotions. What distinguishes one emotion from another is not the object of the emotion, for we may have many emotions about the same object. Rather, it is the evaluation about the object that distinguishes one emotion from another (Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 56, Calhoun 2003, 237, Nussbaum 2004, 190, Solomon 1980, 273). If a burglar enters Vivian's house, she may feel fear if she judges him to be a threat, but she may feel anger if she judges him to be violating her home. The judgement of danger rather than wrongdoing is the important distinction between fear and anger. This is arguably a better way to individuate between emotions than by comparing the feelings of the emotion. How one emotion feels may easily be felt as being the same way another emotion is felt.[8] C.S. Lewis laments in *A Grief Observed*, "[n]o one ever told me that grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid but the sensation is like being afraid. The same

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[8] Brady gives the example of anxiety and excitement being experienced as the same bodily change (2013, 28). Prinz thinks that it is plausible that the phenomenology of complex emotions feels like the phenomenology of basic emotions—guilt feels like sadness, indignation like anger, disappointment like anger, contempt like disgust, pride like joy, and so on (2005, 19).

fluttering in the stomach, the same restlessness, the yawning. I keep on swallowing"
(1994, 3). Furthermore, how an emotion feels may change over time, which is why the
phenomenology of an emotion can be regarded as dynamic and complex. Lewis tells us
how his grief is sometimes experienced as numbness and at other times as agony. But at
all times his grief is an evaluation of loss.[9]

Emotion, then, is defined as being essentially the evaluative judgement of the
object, that-p. Emotion is thus cognitive for in evaluating, cognitive processes are
involved. Initially, Solomon argues that feelings do not play an essential role in
emotion, but he later revises this view, saying that he does not dismiss the idea that
emotion is bodily feeling (Solomon 1976, 178-179, 1980, 274, 1999, 42-47). Fellow
judgementalist, Nussbaum, however, argues that judgement is both a necessary and
sufficient constituent of emotion (Nussbaum 2004, 193-195, see also Nussbaum 2001,
24-48). She argues that bodily feelings are unique to the individual, and there is much
variance in how individuals experience emotion. As such, she does not think that
particular emotions have particular bodily feelings, and we may in fact have an emotion
without feeling. Contra James who thinks that an emotion is a bodily feeling, Nussbaum
thinks that an emotion is an evaluative judgement that we make about what is of
significance in our lives.

The implication of the judgementalist account of emotion is that we are not
passive to our emotions, despite it seeming so. A perception does not draw an emotional
reaction from the person, as on the Jamesian account. Rather, by having an emotion, the
person engages with her perception by evaluating it. In evaluating, she is being active
for she must make a judgement. This means that emotions are, in some sense, voluntary,
despite the experience of them being involuntary (Solomon 1976, 191, 1980, 276). The
perception may be involuntary, but the evaluation of the perception is something that
we do.

Thinking about emotion as evaluation helps us to understand exactly why
emotions are meaningful to us. In evaluating a situation (that is, in having an emotional
response to the situation), the situation is understood as being significant to us in some
way. As Nussbaum explains, in having an emotion, we recognise the importance of the
situation about which we are having the emotion, and in recognising that significance,
we understand the value of the situation and of the relationship we have with the person,

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[9] It is this consideration that leads Goldie (2000, 44) to think of emotions as processes. He develops a
"narrative account" of grief to describe this process (2011b).

object or event involved (Nussbaum 2001, 2004, 189-191, Baier 2004, 200, Solomon 1976, 179-186). Grief indicates that the loss we perceive is significant to us; anger indicates that the wrongdoing we perceive is one that we care about. Positive emotions such as joy and pride indicate that we evaluate the situation as being significant to us in a pleasurable way; negative emotions mean that we evaluate the situation as being painfully significant to us. In contrast, a lack of emotion may indicate that the situation is of no real concern to us.

One advantage of Solomon's account is that it can explain enduring emotions, unlike James' view.[10] As I argued above, if we think that emotions are essentially about a change in bodily feeling, the enduring experience of certain emotions cannot be explained. On Solomon's account, however, an emotion is a judgement and can stay in place for a long period, whereas bodily changes seem to be temporally limited. We cannot keep weeping when we lose a loved one: we would exhaust ourselves and perhaps even cause harm to our bodies by keeping them under such strain. We can, however, understand the loss of a loved one as a terrible event and maintain this judgement for an extended period. Ben-Ze'ev (who thinks that enduring emotions are sentiments) gives the example of hatred that endures because it is a judgement:

> Anti-Semites can be characterized as hating Jews in this sense even while they do not actively think about Jews. They may experience no emotion [emotional episode] of hate, but their persisting attitude includes intentional components typical of hate. (2001, 84)

On the judgementalist account, we need not distinguish between episodes of emotion and dispositions to emotion: an emotion is a judgement that stays in place even when the person is not consciously making the judgement, or experiencing an episode of bodily feeling.

Solomon's account picks out several important features of emotion that the Jamesian account cannot explain. Emotions are evaluative judgements and so are intentional. This makes emotions meaningful, for they are about something in the world, and more than that, the objects are evaluated as being of significance. For emotions that "work" correctly, the necessary relationship between belief and emotion is a good way to understand the control we can exert over our emotions, for emotions are responsive to reason. We can tell ourselves why we should or should not feel a

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[10] This is not Solomon's view initially. He initially thinks that emotions are "short-term responses," and are "necessarily hasty" (Solomon 1980, 256). But later he agrees that emotions are often long-term processes (Solomon 2004, 79).

particular emotion.[11] This account also shows us how emotions can be enduring as we can see that long-term emotions are evaluative judgements that remain unchanged over time. The object of our emotion is deemed to have a particular significance to us, which is why we continue to have the emotion. The idea of evaluation is the important contribution from Solomon, and is a significant development in the debate on what an emotion is.

However, there is a serious objection to the judgementalist account, which is that it cannot account for recalcitrant emotions (Deigh 2010, 27, see also Brady 2009, D'Arms and Jacobson 2003, de Sousa 2004, 62). A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that is resistant to reason and conflicts with belief. This may be because the emotion continues to be experienced despite there being contrary evidence, and despite the fact that the individual no longer believes the belief that was entailed by the emotion. It may also be that there is no evidence for the emotion. Or it may be that while there is some evidence for the emotion, there is much stronger evidence for the belief that the emotion is in conflict with. These emotions are sometimes called irrational emotions, because they are unjustified given the evidence available to the person (see, for example, Brady 2009, 413-414).

Phobias are good examples of recalcitrant emotions, as are emotions that endure despite new beliefs. A fear of heights, for example, may mean that when a person looks out a window of a skyscraper, she feels fear, even though she believes that she is not in any danger. Emotions acquired early in childhood may still be experienced, despite the person having formed a later belief that conflicts with the emotion. Cheshire Calhoun gives the example of a woman feeling shock and revulsion on discovering that a friend is lesbian, as she had been brought up to believe that homosexuality is unnatural (2003, 239). The woman has revised her beliefs and no longer believes that homosexuality is unnatural, but nevertheless, is revolted when she encounters homosexual people. There are other cases in which our emotions seem to conflict with our beliefs. We can feel guilty for putting our parents in an aged care facility, for example, even though we

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[11] By allowing that emotions are voluntary and reason-responsive, we allow that we can deliberate about which emotions we should feel. If we are presented with evidence for a particular evaluation of a situation, we can determine that we should feel a particular emotion in response to that situation. This will be an important aspect of emotion when I discuss the plural-subject (normative) account of collective emotion in Chapter 3.

believe that the facility will provide the best care for our ailing parents.[12] Recalcitrant emotions are common experiences, and give credence to the idea that emotions are, if not irrational, arational.[13] They appear to conflict with the evidence that gives rise to rational belief. This is why emotions can "cloud" our judgements, for they can steer us away from the conclusions we should rationally form.

Recalcitrant emotions are a particular problem for Solomon's judgementalist account. As we saw above, Solomon argues that there is a logical relationship between emotion and belief. The person who feels fear when looking out the window of the skyscraper should have the entailed belief that she is in danger of falling out of the window. She in fact believes that she is safe because there is a window to prevent her from falling. This belief that the window will prevent her from falling (or rather, the evidence for this belief) *should* undermine the fear that she is feeling. If she continues to feel fear in the face of believed evidence of her safety however, there is dissonance between her emotion and her belief. That recalcitrant emotions are accompanied by conflicting beliefs makes no sense in the context of Solomon's theory because his judgementalist account assumes a necessary relationship between emotion and belief.

The judgementalist may mount a defensive argument that the person with the recalcitrant emotion does have an entailed belief, but also has a conflicting belief. So the person who is afraid of heights believes both that she is in danger (and feels fear), and that she is safe. In this case, she has two conflicting beliefs, rather than a conflicting emotion and belief. Calhoun argues that the two beliefs may have been formed on the basis of different evidence (2003, 242-245). She suggests that the evidence for emotion is experiential evidence, and the belief that is entailed is an evidential belief. She contrasts evidential belief with intellectual belief, which is formed through inference, deliberation, and other rational tools. Intellectual beliefs can be confirmed by evidential beliefs. For example, a commuter could infer that it takes longer to walk home than to cycle home, but she will gain experiential evidence for this belief only when she

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[12] The conflict between emotion and belief has led philosophers to explore whether emotions can ground morality. For example, in some cases emotions motivate people to do morally good acts, while their beliefs lead them to act immorally. Huck Finn is often the example here: Huck holds racist beliefs, and thinks that he is doing the wrong thing by helping Jim, a slave, to escape. He believes that he is stealing property and thus doing wrong to the slave-owner. But his feelings of friendship and compassion for Jim lead him to help Jim (Bennett 1974, Jones 2004, 344).

[13] Prinz notes that responses to fiction face a similar problem. For example, with films, "a blood-curdling scream in a horror film can induce fear despite the fact that audiences know they are not in any danger" (2005, 15). I will not discuss responses to fiction specifically, because I suspect there is a complicated story to tell about the beliefs and emotions that are triggered by fiction. They are not paradigmatic cases.

actually discovers that it takes longer to walk home. It is possible for a conflict to exist between the evidential and intellectual belief, which means a defect has entered the belief system. This is the case with the woman who is repulsed by homosexuality. Calhoun thinks that her upbringing led her to an evidential belief that is connected to her emotion, and she later formed an intellectual belief that conflicts with her homophobia. The woman has a defective set of beliefs containing an intellectual belief that is not confirmed by, and is in conflict with, an evidential belief.

Positing two beliefs does not solve the problem of recalcitrant emotion for the judgementalist, however, because the person should then be able to deliberate and resolve the conflict in her beliefs. Rational agents are expected to deliberate on their beliefs and resolve inconsistencies and conflicts. This is because belief is concerned with truth, and if a person holds conflicting beliefs, at least one of those beliefs must be false.[14] In the case of recalcitrant emotion, though, the person may find that her emotion persists despite her deliberation and affirmation of a particular belief. Her emotion remains reason-resistant. The judgementalist cannot account for this fairly common emotional experience, and as Michael Brady points out (citing Patricia Greenspan), it is a poor strategy to ascribe unacknowledged, unconscious beliefs to an otherwise rational person, purely to try to save the judgementalist theory (Brady 2013, 35, see also Roberts 1988, 196-197).

A further objection to the judgementalist account is that it is an overly intellectual account of emotion (Goldie 2000, 22). Emotions are not necessarily connected to entailed beliefs, and they are also not evaluative judgements. Emotions and evaluative judgements are characterised quite differently: judgements are deliberative and articulate thought processes for which evidence can be gathered, whereas emotions are immediate, unreflective responses to the world. Judgements require certain cognitive capacities because evaluative judgements are propositional attitudes. In order to form a judgement, a person needs to be able to have concepts. Vivian needs to know what a burglar is in order to think that the burglar is a threat to her safety, for example. The need for some level of conceptual development, in order to form the evaluative judgements that constitute emotions, makes it very difficult to understand how infants

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[14] Unlike belief, we think it is permissible to hold conflicting emotions about the same object, and the presence of one emotion does not make the other emotion false. The phenomenon of conflicting emotions gives rise to ambivalence rather than irrationality (Greenspan 1980, 223, see also Tappolet 2005).

and babies can feel emotions within the parameters of a judgementalist model (Brady 2013, 34, Deigh 2010, 27).

The over-intellectualism charge is made clear when we ask what the difference is between responding emotionally and unemotionally to an event. Characterising emotions as evaluative judgements suggests that emotions are intellectual and unfeeling, almost like the cold neutral perception with which James contrasted emotions. Solomon's judgementalist account holds that emotion is an evaluation about what is of concern to us. We grieve over the loss of loved ones because they are significant to us, but not about the death of strangers. However, we can determine significance without feeling emotion. We can make (unemotional) judgements, or be either implicitly or explicitly biased about certain objects, for example, which allow us to understand the world as having a particular significance to us. A person cannot directly perceive the world except through a system of understanding and interpretation.[15] What is the difference, then, between doing this dispassionately and doing this emotionally? It is possible to say that we are always experiencing our world emotionally, but this moves away from our common understanding of what an emotion is. We refer to emotions as exactly those experiences that are passionate in some sense. Given the number of ways that we can determine what is of significance to us, and that we can do this passionately and dispassionately, the judgementalist account of emotion does not sufficiently define what an emotion is. It does not explain the passion, the feeling, that we intuitively think is involved in emotion.[16]

There is a further reason to question whether or not emotions are evaluative judgements, and that has to do with individuating emotions from one another. Solomon's account individuates emotions according to the evaluative judgement about the object, that-p. If Celia is angry that John stole her car, she forms a negative evaluative judgement about him stealing her car; if she is relieved, she forms a positive evaluative judgement about him stealing her car. It was in order to capture the idea that individuals could have different emotions about the same object that Solomon argued for the account of emotion as evaluative judgement. However, Justin D'Arms and

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[15] Calhoun talks of conceptual frameworks, which "restrict the range of perceptual salience and intentional descriptions" (2004, 114). The scientific framework and the artistic framework, for example, will lead the person to focus on what is of concern or value to the person as a scientist or artist, resulting in different interpretations of the same situation. I discuss this further below.

[16] In another paper, Solomon recognises that not all evaluative judgements are emotions. He argues that emotions are "self-involved and relatively *intense* evaluative judgements" about what is of concern to us (Solomon 2003, 69).

Daniel Jacobson point out that evaluative judgements do not always distinguish emotions in the way that we do so in practice. They call this the problem of type-individualism. According to D'Arms and Jacobson, evaluative judgement can be used to make fine-grained distinctions that will go against our experience of emotions, and "obscure their fundamental similarities" (2003, 133). While there is a major difference between anger and relief, the difference between something like "friendly and invidious envy," or pride for oneself and pride for another, pose a challenge. These emotions are classed together, and would feel similar, but the judgements involved are quite different. Pride, for example, concerns possession, in that what the person is proud of is in some way hers or is achieved thanks to her efforts. This means that, according to the judgementalist, pride for the achievements of a person's favourite sport team should not be thought of as pride, for the sports fan does not contribute to the sport team's success (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003, 133-135).[17] However, D'Arms and Jacobson think that this is the wrong position: we should maintain that the fan's emotion is pride, for it feels like pride for oneself.[18] The problem we are faced with is how to individuate emotions that feel phenomenologically similar but involve different evaluations (and conversely, how to individuate emotions that have similar evaluative judgements but feel phenomenologically different).

In summary, Solomon argues for a judgementalist account of emotion, claiming that emotions are evaluative judgements about an object. His argument makes an important contribution to the debate on what an emotion is. He shows that emotions must be intentional, are about objects that are significant in some way and they must be an evaluation of some kind. It is the evaluation of the object that makes emotion meaningful. However, Solomon's account falters in arguing that emotions are judgements and so his account becomes overly intellectual. By saying that emotions are essentially judgements, he cannot account for why we might feel emotions that conflict with our beliefs, and why emotions may not change in the face of reason. He also cannot distinguish emotions from dispassionate judgements. Thus we need to re-examine what is central to the concept of an emotion: it is not, as James argues, that

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[17] Christine Tappolet has a nice example of the difference in motivation between fear for oneself and fear for others: in the former, we are motivated to protect ourselves, but in the latter, we are motivated to help others, sometimes at some cost or harm to ourselves (2010, 340-341). The evaluation of danger, in these cases, is either to oneself or to another, yet both are considered fear.

[18] In later chapters, it will become clear that I think the fan's pride is like pride for oneself, because I think that a fan may be part of the group that feels the team's pride.

emotions are essentially feelings of bodily change, but it is also not, as Solomon argues, that emotions are essentially evaluative judgements. We need an account that brings the important contributions of these two accounts together.

In section 1.3, I will examine the quasi-perceptual account, argued for by de Sousa and Prinz. This account combines the empirical evidence that supports the Jamesian account with the insights from the judgementalist account that portrays emotions as intentional and meaningful. De Sousa and Prinz offer quasi-perceptual accounts of emotion according to which emotions are like perceptions, and involve embodied appraisals of the world.

1.3 The quasi-perceptual account

Prinz presents us with what he calls the Emotion Problem. The Emotion Problem is that non-cognitivist accounts of emotion (such as the Jamesian account) are "explanatorily anaemic" while cognitivist accounts (such as Solomon's judgementalist account) are "explanatorily superfluous" (Prinz 2003, 77-78). I have shown that the account of emotions as patterned bodily changes is insufficient because it does not explain why emotions are meaningful. The account of emotion as evaluative judgement, on the other hand, while capturing the fact that emotions interact with thoughts and reason, goes too far by making emotions overly intellectual. The task is to develop an account of emotion in which emotions can be meaningful without being deliberative or conceptually demanding.

The empirical evidence from psychology supports the Jamesian account of emotion, showing that emotions are embodied. Prinz cites various studies that show that changes in the body can cause a change in the person's emotion, which establishes that bodily changes are connected quite closely with the emotion that is experienced. For example, citing Robert Zajonc's work, he claims that individuals have different emotions when they hold a pen in their mouth in different ways. When individuals are forced into a grimace by holding a pen between puckered lips and are asked to rate the amusement of comic strips, they rate the comics as less amusing than individuals forced to smile by holding the pen between their teeth (Prinz 2003, 75, 2004, 36). In another study, individuals are asked to read a story and report what they feel about the story. The stories have the same content, but one story is filled with sounds that cause a facial expression associated with negative emotion (the ü sound—the protagonist is named Jürgen), and the other with sounds that cause a facial expression associated with

positive emotion (the ee sound—the protagonist is Peter). 81% of participants reported the story with Jürgen was less pleasant (Prinz 2004, 35-36). The facial changes directly induce a change in the resultant emotion, which Zajonc calls "facial feedback." The idea of "facial feedback" has been utilised in recent studies on the effect of botox on depression. In controlled studies with people who are rated as having major depressive disorder, the participants who were given onabotulinumtoxin A injections in their frown lines were shown to have significant rates of remission as compared to participants in the placebo group, with a reduction in depression test scores on average of 47.1% (Wollmer et al. 2012, 574-581, Finzi and Rosenthal 2014, 1-6). These studies seem to show that the bodily aspect of emotion is very important.

Important though the bodily aspect of emotion is, there are reasons for thinking that emotion must still be cognitive in some way, to account for what the Jamesian account cannot explain. For example, we know that emotions interact with thoughts and reasons. In cases when an emotion is not recalcitrant, we know that emotions often respond to reason. It is also possible to bring an emotion about by having certain thoughts or by making certain judgements. A person can become nervous when she imagines possible exam results, for example, and she can remember an insult and become angry. So while Solomon is incorrect in arguing that emotions are judgements, he is correct to point out that emotions are cognitive. Emotions are thoughts, in some way, because they interact with other thoughts (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003, 132).

The idea of evaluation is also important. Intuitively, emotions are meaningful because they are about important features of the world. Psychologists such as Zajonc and Nico Frijda think that emotion involves appraisal, but when discussing what appraisal is, they point to a concept-laden notion like evaluative judgement.[19] Their accounts are thus subject to the same over-intellectualism charge as Solomon's judgementalist account. Nevertheless, Prinz thinks that the notion of appraisal can usefully explain why it is that certain patterns of bodily change are linked with the matters of concern that emotions are about. Trembling and perspiring co-occur with the thought of danger because a low-level cognition occurs in the form of a non-

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[19] There is a dispute within psychology about when appraisal occurs, as Prinz points out. Some psychologists, like Lazarus, Scherer, etc., argue that emotions are appraisals, but others, like Fridja, think appraisals necessarily occur before emotions. Both think appraisal is necessary, and so face the same problem of over-intellectualising emotion (Prinz 2003, 73, 2004, 24, see also Frijda 1993, see also Ellsworth and Scherer 2003, see also Scherer 2003).

conceptually-laden appraisal about threat. Prinz distinguishes between appraisal and evaluative judgement, arguing that appraisal is not as deliberative as judgement.

In order to distinguish between evaluative judgement and appraisal, Prinz makes an important distinction between cognition and cognitive acts. A cognitive act is a form of thinking or deliberation that involves an intellectual process. Cognitions, however, are less intellectual, being mental states that contain representations. These are thoughts that may or may not be conscious for they are produced automatically and without effort (Prinz 2003, 79-81, 2004, 45-50). What makes the cognitions in emotions meaningful is that they contain representations of relations between the individual and the environment. Sadness, for example, is about loss, which is a relational property that manifests when something of value has been eliminated from the environment. Fear represents that there is something of danger to the person in the environment. In this way, emotions are appraisals in that they represent that the environment is significant in some way to the person.

The representation of a relation (an appraisal) is not a deliberative act like judgement. Rather, Prinz and de Sousa argue that emotions are a kind of perception, but a narrower perception than ordinary perception (de Sousa 2004, 62, Prinz 2003, 79-80).[20] In (emotionally) perceiving the world, our attention is only given to certain features of the world. In narrowing our attention, we focus on what is of concern to us, disregarding much of the other information available to us. In perceiving these particular features, a particular pattern of bodily changes is triggered, which is registered as a representational cognition that contains information about the environment (Prinz 2004, 61-66). If we think back to James' trumpeting elephant, the child perceives the elephant (or probably more particularly, the size of the elephant and the noise that the elephant is making), which triggers physical trembling and a mental representation of threat in the child's mind. In this case of fear, the bodily feeling of trembling is connected to the cognition about threat to the child. The emotion is not a deliberation about the elephant: it is an automatic representation of threat when trembling is registered.

As Brady explains, emotions have a dual representation role (2013, 27). On the quasi-perceptual account, the perception of the environment represents an intentional

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[20] The quasi-perceptual account is a cognitive account of emotion, in that perception is cognition. In light of this, Brady thinks of such an account as a neo-judgementalist account (2009, 415, 2013, 39, Deigh 2010, 28).

object to the person, which directly triggers a bodily feeling (Prinz 2003, 76-77). The bodily feeling is then represented as being of particular importance to the individual, and so the bodily feeling is itself the appraisal of the intentional object. Thus we can see why Prinz, a quasi-perceptual theorist, argues that emotions are embodied appraisals. He thinks of emotions as gut reactions: he sees emotions as, "[using] our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world" (Prinz 2004, 69). We have, for some reason, connected certain patterned bodily states with matters of concern, and emotion registers the pattern of bodily change and represents the matter of concern (Prinz 2003, 79-80, 2004, 52-78).

The immediate question at this point in the argument is about how the bodily feeling comes to be connected to the matter of concern, if not through deliberation. What is the process by which trembling comes to represent threat? How do we make automatic appraisals without deliberating? What determines the information that is contained within the mental representation? Prinz and de Sousa offer a developmental explanation to argue that it is due to certain instincts, socialisation, and learning that we come to connect matters of concern with patterns of bodily feelings. We each have an internal library of what Prinz calls "core relational themes" and what de Sousa calls "paradigm scenarios." These libraries guide our emotional responses in two ways: in the way our perception is narrowed to particular features of the world, and in the way we represent the information we perceive.

De Sousa argues that our emotional capacity (a quasi-perceptual capacity) is developed from certain biologically based instincts through socialisation and learning in which certain bodily responses are connected with certain mental representations (1987, 182-187). He argues that we are born with particular instinctual responses, which initially seem to be simple evolutionary strategies without much meaning. These are basic responses such as crying or shivering, which we think that all infants can do. Some responses are not tied to particular environmental triggers, for de Sousa points out that smiling, for example, is initially a meaningless facial movement. But crying is, from the outset, connected to pain: hunger, cold, physical pain, and so on. With parental care, certain behaviours will become connected to particular meanings as they are reinforced (such that crying becomes a good response to pain for it brings about parental attention), or are associated with meaning (smiling becomes affiliated with pleasure, or minimally, positive parental attention). These responses are what we would call basic emotions, which are the emotions easily attributed to animals and infants:

anger at pain, contentment at satiation or the lack of pain, and perhaps other emotions such as fear, disgust, sadness, and joy, which are emotions that are learned quickly by children and animals.[21] They appear to be largely bodily responses. Although animals and children may have limited language and a limited conceptual capacity, they can experience particular responses that have been associated with particular environmental triggers, and with particular minimal meanings (pain, pleasure, and threat, for example). These basic associations between response and meaning are the first emotional frameworks with which we initially engage with the world.[22] De Sousa calls these frameworks "paradigm scenarios" (1987, 182).

As we develop, we continue to develop our paradigm scenarios. This occurs through parental training, the influence of social norms, including frameworks about cultural values and beliefs, and through education and learning. As we develop, our emotional repertoire develops, for we learn further paradigm scenarios. From the basic emotions, we can develop complex emotions. These are the emotions that we do not think that animals and infants can experience because they lack the cognitive capacities required. Guilt, for example, requires that a person can have cognition about a wrongdoing in the past, and hope requires some thought about a possible future. De Sousa argues that we learn the paradigm scenarios for these more complex emotions as we develop the cognitive capacities required (1987, 184). We internalise what particular responses mean, what the responses are triggered by, and what possible inferences and behaviour should proceed from the response. When confronted with a situation, our paradigm scenarios will guide us in how to perceive that situation by narrowing our attention to particular aspects of the situation, and will guide (according to our library of understandings) our bodily response and mental representation of the situation (de Sousa 1987, 196-198, Prinz 2004, 68-69). The infant, in a situation of pleasure, could learn that she should respond to pleasure with smiling or laughing, and that this is the feeling of happiness. When she is then confronted with pleasure, her learned paradigm scenario will guide her to respond with happiness. Adults, being more cognitively developed, will have more complex responses available to them. An adult who knows

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[21] Ben-Ze'ev outlines six ways to understand the distinction between basic and complex emotions. I use the developmental understanding, which is that basic emotions emerge early in human development. The other ways to understand basic emotions is that they are related to basic action tendencies; that they are universal; that they are the most prevalent; that they possess unique features of phenomenology; or that they occur without specific intentional objects (Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 104).

[22] Griffiths tells us that basic emotions appear in all human cultures. These biologically-based emotions are universal because of our common physiology (Griffiths 2003, 42).

what betrayal is, for example, in a situation of infidelity could be guided to perceive those features which are evidence for infidelity; to respond with increased scrutiny of the betrayer; and to mentally represent the situation as being one of infidelity. She could name the emotion as jealousy.

De Sousa and Prinz differ in their accounts of how complex emotions arise exactly, because they offer different arguments for how cognitive development affects our emotional responses. De Sousa argues that development of paradigm scenarios continues with the maturation of the individual, so that more complex paradigm scenarios are developed as the individual's cognitive capacities develop and she can grasp sophisticated concepts. Even in adulthood, the library of paradigm scenarios (and the resulting repertoire of emotions) is enlarged as the individual learns through engagement with society, literature, and education.[23] An infant may not be able to feel guilt or indignation, but as an adult, she gains concepts of obligation, time, self, other, and so on, and so more complex emotions become available to the individual. D'Arms and Jacobson call this process "cognitive sharpening" (2003, 137). On this view, basic emotions can develop into complex emotions as our cognitive faculties develop, and the basic responses that we are born with diversify into a range of complex, abstract, and more refined, value-laden responses. Anger at pain can develop into a variety of more complex emotions, such as moral indignation, jealousy, outrage, and so on. We learn that different situations call for different responses.

Prinz, on the other hand, thinks that the cognitive development of the individual does not change our initial basic emotional responses. Like de Sousa, he thinks that we have basic emotional responses in which particular bodily responses become triggers for particular mental representations. However, he thinks that we only learn a few of these paradigm scenarios, or what he calls "core relational themes" (Prinz 2003, 80, 2004, 63-69). We learn basic relational themes such as when we associate the bodily feelings of sadness with the relational representation of loss, and the bodily feelings of anger with the relational representation of offense. As we mature, we attach more complex environmental triggers with the core relational themes. He thinks we develop a library of "calibration causes" which are more complex ways of understanding situations, and these can trigger our core relational themes. We calibrate "infidelity" as being a kind of loss, and we file this understanding as a "calibrating cause." When

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[23] Social norms and beliefs play an important part in the development of the individual's emotions. I will discuss this aspect further when I discuss the subjectivity of emotions below.

infidelity is perceived, the response for sadness (which the core relational theme for loss) may be triggered.[24] Complex emotions are not refinements of basic emotions, but are basic emotions with cognitively complex causes (Prinz 2003, 83-84). In this way, the emotion itself does not involve an overly intellectual conceptual component. The environmental trigger that requires a particular conceptual understanding is filed away as an extra cause for a basic paradigm scenario.

One implication of Prinz's argument is that we need to make a distinction when thinking about the object of the emotion, namely between the formal object and the particular (or intentional) object.[25] The object, as we have understood it until now, is what the emotion is directed at. As discussed above, when John steals Celia's car, the object of her anger is the theft committed by John. Celia is angry towards John about the theft. However, Prinz thinks we need to be more careful in how we understand the object of an emotion, to avoid incorporating an overly intellectual requirement for conceptual understanding into the notion of emotion. He argues that formal objects should be distinguished from particular (or intentional) objects. Formal objects identify the core relational themes: loss, pain, pleasure, for example. Intentional objects identify the particular manifestation of that core relational theme (Goldie 2000, 21-22). The formal object for Celia's anger, in this case, is that of a "demeaning offense against me or mine" (Prinz 2004, 16). The intentional object is the theft. On this account, what the emotion represents is the formal object. When Celia perceives the theft, a bodily response of anger is triggered and she has a mental representation of "a demeaning offense against me." This is the emotion of anger. The intentional object is only attached to the emotion when the emotion is articulated.

The difference between de Sousa's and Prinz's accounts comes down to how basic emotions relate to complex emotions. On de Sousa's account, we develop a larger library of paradigm scenarios as we mature cognitively (2004, 65). On Prinz's account, we have a small stable library of paradigm scenarios that characterise our basic emotions. As we mature, we connect different causes to those basic responses. We respond to the world according to a few core relational themes. When we are able to

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[24] As Prinz notes, there are different ways to think about what infidelity is, and what core relational theme may be triggered by the perception of infidelity. He suggests that the discovery of infidelity may lead the person to have thoughts of loss (which is the core relational theme for sadness), thoughts of offense (the core relational theme for anger), thoughts of contamination (the core relational theme for disgust), or even some blending of all three thoughts (Prinz 2004, 148).

[25] This distinction will be important in Chapter 4, when I discuss different ways that the intentionality of an emotion can be shared.

articulate our emotions, we can identify the exact event that our emotion is about (the intentional object), but otherwise, our emotions concern only the relation between the individual and the environment. Complex emotions are refined from basic emotions, for de Sousa, or are basic emotions triggered by a complex cause, on Prinz's account. I will return to this distinction below. Before I can show why we should favour de Sousa's account over Prinz's account, it is important to understand why they both liken emotions to perceptions.

In arguing that emotions are appraisals, de Sousa claims that emotions involve a narrow perception in which we selectively focus on particular features of the environment. Paradigm scenarios guide perception, by narrowing our attention to particular features that can be construed according to a particular matter of concern. Perception, on this account, works in two ways. The paradigm scenario guides the individual to focus attention on particular features of the world, in that it guides the individual to recognise matters of concern. But by narrowing the individual's focus, it also restricts attention such that the world is regarded as being a particular way.[26] The paradigm scenario facilitates both recognition of salient aspects of the situation as well as interpretation, or construal, of the situation. The paradigm scenario for anger, for example, will guide the individual to recognise features of the situation that concern offense to the individual. At the same time, by focusing in this way on these select features of the world, by filtering out other features of the environment, the situation is construed by the individual as being one that is offensive. Robert Roberts draws on the Wittgenstein example of "seeing-as" to explain construal, making an analogy between emotional construal and perceptual construal. In the famous image of the duck-rabbit, it is possible to see the image in two ways: as a rabbit, or as a duck. How this occurs is that the attention is focused on certain aspects of the image. The image itself does not change, but the perceiver pays attention to particular features of the image so that it is seen in a particular way. Some people can easily switch attention so that they can in one instance see the duck and in another instance see the rabbit. Other people find this more difficult and are only able to see one image—they cannot shift their attention and, in Roberts' words, cannot bring to bear the alternative way of seeing the image. Construal,

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[26] In his review of de Sousa's book, *The Rationality of Emotion* (1987), Gordon objects to the idea that emotions are a perceptual capacity. He thinks that it is more appropriate to talk of "emotional seemings" rather than "emotional perceptions," for emotions concern how the situation seems to us. In making this objection, he highlights that our emotions are interpretive perceptions (which is why this account is quasi-perceptual, not perceptual) (1991, 287-288). I think that the notion of construal captures this distinction between perception and seeming.

then, is defined as paying attention to, or dwelling on, a particular way of perceiving that conforms to a particular paradigm (Roberts 1988, 187). Emotional construal works in the same way—the person pays attention to particular bodily feelings, to particular matters of concern, or to particular features of the situation, and ignores other features of the situation (Roberts 1988, 193). The employee who is asked to work late on a Friday may focus on the fact that she is the only employee asked to stay late and will perceive the request as unfair. In this case, her response will be of anger or resentment. However, if she pays attention to other details (perhaps other employees have previously worked overtime, or perhaps other employees do not have the required skills), she may construe the situation differently and respond differently.

Paradigm scenarios guide the individual to recognise particular features of the world, and to construe the world according to a particular paradigm. But the construal of the situation feeds back into how the individual pays attention to the world. By construing the situation as being of particular concern, the features of the world that are important for this construal are kept in focus. As Brady puts it, "emotionally significant objects and events capture and *consume* attention" (2009, 423). In this way, the person's emotion is sustained for she keeps her focus on those particular features that triggered her emotion while other aspects of the world are ignored. An angry person, for example, may find it difficult to calm down because while she is angry, she is guided to focus more intently on the wrongdoing that triggered her anger. By maintaining her attention on the wrongdoing, her anger is reinforced. The paradigm scenario for anger guides the person to recognise an unjust situation, and by responding with anger, her attention stays on the unjust aspect of the situation.

The ongoing feedback of recognition and construal because of narrowed perception can explain two features of emotion. Emotions can become habitual, in the sense that in having an emotion, it becomes easier to have the emotion again.[27] Having an emotion can create a disposition to feel that emotion again. We can see that on the quasi-perceptual account, a person who is angry will be guided to focus on those features of the world that she regards as offensive. Construing the environment as offensive can become habitual. In this way, she can become a person who is easy to offend for it is easy for her to perceive wrongdoing, and she can become an irascible woman, a woman disposed to anger.

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[27] For example, see Bushman's paper on how catharsis (thinking about and imagining venting one's anger on the offender) actually makes the person angrier and more aggressive (2002, 724-731).

Emotions are also occasionally unresponsive to reason, and this is explained by the reciprocal feedback between recognition and construal within the paradigm scenario. With her narrowed perception, the emotional person can become unreceptive to other evidence. In the case of anger, Celia may keep paying attention to the features that she thinks justify her anger towards John. If she is intensely angry about John stealing her car, the fact that John has a good reason for this theft, or that John did not actually steal the car, may not calm her down. Her narrowed attention may discount the counter evidence, privileging evidence for her anger over evidence against her anger.

I can now explain why I think we should favour de Sousa's account of complex emotion over Prinz's account. De Sousa's account of paradigm scenarios involves a mutually reinforcing relationship between recognition and construal, such that selective attention to the environment can be maintained. On perceiving a complex wrongdoing such as betrayal, for example, our attention is narrowed to the particular features of the world that indicate betrayal, a bodily reaction is triggered, and a relational property of betrayal is represented to the individual. The relational property of offense has been "cognitively sharpened" to one of betrayal. In perceiving the features that indicate betrayal, the situation is construed as being one of betrayal. The recognition and the construal of the situation reinforce each other, and attention is focused on the betrayal.[28] In this situation, the individual is jealous.

On Prinz's account, however, narrowed perception does not involve both recognition and complex construal of the environment, but only recognition and basic construal. He argues that we can have a complex understanding of a situation such that we know it is a case of betrayal. We store the notion of betrayal as a calibrating cause for the core relational theme of, for argument's sake, offense (Prinz 2004, 100). Understanding the situation as one of betrayal is a process that happens prior to the emotion, which is why the appraisal (construal) is stored as a calibrating cause. On his account, the understanding of betrayal calibrates the emotion of anger. The perception then, would be of wrongdoing (calibrated as betrayal) which would trigger the bodily feeling of anger, and the relational property of offense would be represented. The individual feels anger, which she understands as the more complex emotion of jealousy. But by feeling anger, the situation is construed not as being one of betrayal specifically,

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[28] Ben-Ze'ev thinks that the focusing of attention will intensify an emotion, but that this cannot be sustained for a long period. This is why he thinks of emotions as short episodes (2001, 47).

but as one of offense more generally.[29] The jealous person's attention would be focused on features of the world that signify wrongdoing, not betrayal more particularly. In order for the person's jealousy to be sustained, the calibrating cause would have to be re-invoked for the construal to be of betrayal. Thus it seems to me that recognition and construal come apart on Prinz's account. In order to say why we would maintain attention in such a way as to construe a narrower offense than anger identifies, the complex understanding of betrayal would need to be brought to bear on the situation, and this is what Prinz wants to avoid. He does not want a complex cognition involved in the process of emotion, as he does not want an overly intellectual account of emotion.

The advantage of de Sousa's account over Prinz's is that de Sousa's account of perception is more sophisticated, for it encapsulates both recognition and (complex) construal of a situation. The idea of perception as construal is attractive. It points to a further way to control emotion (despite the built-in feedback loop). We have seen that it is possible to control emotion by controlling our bodies, as when we smile to bring about happiness or push our shoulders back to instil confidence. We can also deliberate and offer reasons for feeling an emotion. By understanding emotion as construal, we can see that we can also control our emotion by controlling our attention (de Sousa 1987, 243). Think of being alone in an empty house on a dark night. The paradigm scenario for fear will guide our attention to features of the world that we regard as being frightening: our isolation and the shadows. We may understand the situation as being one of danger and will feel fear. But it is also possible to draw on other paradigm scenarios by attempting to control what we pay attention to, whether consciously or unconsciously (de Sousa 1987, 195). The creak on the steps that triggered the paradigm scenario for fear—the movement in the house must mean an intruder!—can be "re-perceived" as being the sound of a pet making its way downstairs. We can construe the slam of the window as a fearful sound, indicative of danger, or as being merely the sound of an impending storm. In both cases, our attention is focused on a particular aspect (a particular way of understanding the situation according to our concerns) and our attention can be shifted so that we change how we regard the situation. This may occur effortlessly, such that we easily or unconsciously switch emotions, or it may

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[29] D'Arms makes a similar objection to Prinz's account of emotion, by considering the motivational role of emotion. He thinks that complex emotion may motivate the person to act differently than she would act on the basis of the basic emotion from which the complex emotion developed. He does not think that what motivates the person is the independent evaluation that is stored in the calibration file, but rather the emotion itself (D'Arms 2008, 717).

require deliberate focus on particular evidence in an effort to forcibly trigger a different paradigm scenario or forcibly prevent the continuation of a particular way of focusing on a situation. If we are very fearful at being home alone, it may be difficult to feel safe, but by reminding ourselves that we have a night-prowling pet, we can force ourselves to move our attention away from the elements that we construe as threatening.

In summary, the quasi-perceptual account claims that emotion is a quasi-perceptual capacity that guides how the individual pays attention to the world. It narrows the attention to particular features of the world that can be construed as being of concern to the individual. The emotion is characterised by a paradigm scenario, which stores information about which perceptions should trigger which patterned bodily responses and what these bodily responses mean. The meaning of the bodily responses is a kind of appraisal: the paradigm scenario represents a particular relational property when a bodily response is experienced. These representations of relational properties identify the importance of features of the external world to the person, indicating that the environment contains a loss, a threat, or some other aspect that is of concern. By narrowing the focus, the paradigm scenario guides the individual to recognise the situation as being of concern, and at the same time guides the individual to construe the situation as being of concern. The recognition and the construal of the situation mutually reinforce each other so that the individual is guided to maintain focus on the important features of the world. Emotion, then, is a way of attending to an environment in such a way that it is construed according to a learned paradigm scenario, which entails an automatic and immediate response.

Recalcitrant emotions can be explained on this account, because emotion is an immediate response that need not make reference to belief.[30] The acrophobic can believe that she is perfectly safe when looking out the window of a skyscraper, but the paradigm scenario for the emotion of fear will guide her attention to recognise the features of the world that are dangerous: the great height, in this case. She will automatically begin to tremble and perspire, and will automatically have the mental representation of danger. That is, she will automatically feel fear. The features of the world that are evidence for her safety—and in this case, are evidence for the conflicting

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[30] As I argued above, recalcitrant emotions are a particular problem for the judgementalist account.

belief that she is safe, despite the great height—will not be given attention.[31] If her fear is very strong, it may resist her attempts to shift her attention from the danger, or to deliberate with herself about the evidence for her safety. This is because the paradigm scenario will guide her attention back to those features of the world that can be construed as presenting danger.[32]

Enduring emotions can also be explained by this account. A paradigm scenario ensures that a mental representation is associated with a bodily reaction to a particular environment, but this does not mean that the emotion itself requires that a bodily response be sustained for the duration of the emotion. The bodily response is an automatic response, but what characterises emotion is the narrowed perception that allows for a construal of the situation. To be angry is to construe a situation as being one of offense, and to be in love with someone is to construe the loved one as being an important person to us. The emotion concerns the significance of the external environment (a person, event, or situation) to the person. A particular phenomenology may be attached to the narrowed perception, but a continued experience of certain bodily changes is not required. The emotion is, ultimately, a way of attending to the world. There may be occurrences when an emotional episode is triggered, in which case a bodily response will be connected with a mental representation, but at other times, the emotion endures when a person is construing and attending to the world as guided by the paradigm scenario for that emotion.

The quasi-perceptual account of emotion brings together the important aspects of the Jamesian account of emotion as patterned bodily change and the judgementalist account of emotion as evaluation. We see that, broadly, emotions involve both bodily response and cognition. On the quasi-perceptual account, emotion is an embodied appraisal, in that the person engages with the world in accordance with how she construes the situation. I now turn from the question about the nature of emotion, to focus more specifically on the subjectivity of emotion. Emotions are typically regarded

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[31] Brady offers an interesting argument for why we should still regard recalcitrant emotion as irrational. He suggests that while emotions do not entail beliefs, as on the judgementalist account of emotion, emotions do incline the person to assent to belief. The person who believes she is safe but feels recalcitrant fear is irrational because she believes that she is safe, but remains inclined to believe that she is in danger. She has no reason for this inclination, given her conflicting belief about her safety (Brady 2009, 420-421, 428).

[32] Additionally, Tappolet argues that thinking of emotion as perceptions can explain ambivalent emotions, which occurs when a person feels two contrary emotions. She thinks that it is possible for a person to construe a situation in multiple ways because a situation can have multiple aspects, and each emotion will pick out these different aspects (Tappolet 2005, 229-232, see also Greenspan 1980, 228-230).

as subjective, and in the next section I will analyse how we can understand what this means. I will explore the relationship that emotion has to rationality, which is typically regarded as objective, as well as how we can criticise another's feelings. In doing so, I will make apparent the individualism inherent in the accounts of emotion given above.

2 The subjectivity of emotions

The sceptic about group emotion asserts that emotions are personal, and one reason they give for this assertion is that emotions are subjective. Emotions are typically contrasted with belief, and have traditionally been regarded as opposed to reason.[33] While belief is judged on the truth or falsity of its content, we do not judge emotions according to their truth or falsity. As we saw above, we can feel recalcitrant emotions that conflict with belief, which suggests we think that at least some emotions are irrational. Yet at the same time, we judge how people respond to particular situations, and we make demands of people to respond in particular ways. In this section, I will argue that emotions have a complex relationship with rationality. While emotions do not always align with what is rational, emotions are deemed appropriate or inappropriate by the kind of reasons the person gives for her feelings. For now, I will make the case for the sceptic's position, showing that we judge an emotion according to what constitutes reasons for the individual, not what constitutes (objective or rational) reasons for all. I will argue, as Calhoun (2004) does, that emotions are biographically subjective, but I will point to the suggestion that emotions are not epistemically subjective. I will pick up this suggestion again in Chapter 6 when I develop my account of group emotion.

Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that conflict with belief, and are not responsive to reason. They pose a particular problem for Solomon's judgementalist account, for on his account, emotions entail beliefs, and so should not conflict with those beliefs. The quasi-perceptual account of emotion can accommodate recalcitrant emotions for, according to this model, a person will be guided by her paradigm scenario to selectively focus on those features of the environment that provide evidence for her emotion, and to disregard other features that give evidence for a rationally formed belief. Nevertheless, emotions often interact with rational beliefs and are often responsive to reason. De Sousa argues that, rather than emotions being opposed to

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[33] Calhoun, for example, tells us that, "[a] cognitive emotion is a paradox because the conceptual terrain where 'belief' finds its home differs vastly from that of 'emotion'" (2003, 238). She argues against the judgementalist account of emotion because it cannot "bridge the conceptual gulf" between emotion and belief.

reason, they set the agenda for rationality and so have an important relationship with reason (1987, 196).

Solomon, who acknowledges that his judgementalist account is overly intellectual, suggests that emotions are a kind of know how (2004, 87).[34] In doing so, he points to the function of emotion that is implicit in the quasi-perceptual account: emotions are a way of engaging with the world without deliberation—a "fast and frugal" way to detect matters of importance (Brady 2013, 13). "Know how" is contrasted with semantic knowledge ("know that"), and involves a different cognitive process. "Knowing how" is knowledge about ways of doing things. It is often inarticulate knowledge, and is learned through experience (Ryle 1945, 10-13). A cyclist can know how to ride a bicycle, for example, without understanding what balance, gravity, and force are. "Knowing how," when we think of this in terms of emotion, is a matter of understanding how to respond to what is perceived in the world, by knowing how to recognise matters of concern in the world without deliberating or forming evaluative judgements (Solomon 2004, 87).

Emotions can supplement reason, because by narrowing our attention they filter out the mass of information that is available to us in every situation. Solomon argues that we ordinarily perceive an incredible amount of information through our senses—more than we can consciously register or articulate. The wealth of information that is available is difficult to engage with for it is overwhelming, and given this, it is difficult to determine what is most relevant in a given situation. Indeed, the task of rationally evaluating which information is significant could be paralysing, because reason alone cannot pick out what to pay attention to, what to notice, and what to inquire about (Solomon 2004, 87, de Sousa 1987, 191-198).[35] Emotion, however, can assist reason by helping to identify what is salient to the agent. In Karen Jones' words, emotions provide a means by which to "latch on" to reasons—that is, a way to supply what could become reasons for deliberation and action (2004, 342-344). When a person's fear paradigm scenario narrows her attention, for example, she focuses on the features of the situation

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[34] In his later work, Solomon amends his judgementalist account and argues that emotions are "judgments of the body:" evaluations or appraisals that occur below the level of consciousness, at the level of instinctual or habitual response (2004, 87). His amended account of emotion is very much like Prinz's account of embodied appraisal—that is, emotions are embodied experiences about matters of concern that are immediate and automatic.

[35] Zemach argues that autistic people often behave inappropriately given the social cues available because they do not feel emotions in the way that other people do. As such, the "autistic seem to have no emotion-generated beliefs about what reaction is apt; they do not directly see what response fits the situation at hand" (2001, 204).

that can be construed as dangerous, and so would provide justification or reason for feeling fear (Greenspan 1980, 234). Emotion makes deliberation possible, focusing attention on what is important in a given situation.[36]

Emotion often precedes belief. The content of a belief may arise from the narrowed focus that an emotion enables. Emotions, in the cases where they are unconscious and unarticulated, may not have any reasons attached to them: a situation may have caused the individual to pay attention to a matter of concern, but may not have led the individual to deliberate on reasons for the feeling. We can think of a situation where a person only notes after the occasion that she was afraid when she notes that she is trembling and perspiring. It is in acknowledging and articulating this emotion that she will come to regard certain aspects of the world as providing evidence for the emotion. She was afraid and did not know it, but now that she thinks about the situation, she can see why she was scared. Her narrowed attention led her to focus on the dangerous aspect of the situation, and now she can take the information perceived as reason for her fear.[37]

In other cases, emotions can be preceded by belief (Prinz 2004, 76). In these cases, an established belief may lead the individual to focus on certain aspects of the situation, and so her attention will be narrowed such that she comes to perceive and construe a given situation in a particular way, thereby triggering a bodily response. A woman may believe that her partner is cheating on her because a trusted friend has told her so. This will lead her to pay more attention to her partner's actions, his excuses for returning home late, and so on, and in doing so, she may become angry or jealous. By narrowing her attention, she focuses on those particular features of the environment that will trigger her response.

Emotions thus have a complex relationship with rationality. They may function to identify salient features of the world that can become reasons for particular beliefs and actions; and they may cloud rational deliberation by guiding the person's attention away from other important evidence that should inform rational deliberation. Emotions can be

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[36] I do not claim that emotion is required for deliberation. Other cognitive frameworks can also function to filter out much information.

[37] Baier (2004) discusses this phenomenon and argues that emotions reveal important information, for they concern matters that are of importance to us. She connects emotion with value. Greenspan takes the same position, telling us that, "emotions may sometimes embody more accurate perception of the value-laden world than we allow to affect our detached judgments" (2004, 128). See also Brady (2013) who is concerned with the epistemic value of emotion, and the evaluative knowledge that he thinks emotion can generate and justify.

in line with reason or obstruct reason. The question that arises at this point concerns the evaluation of a person's emotion, for what justifies an emotion is not whether or not it is rationally formed. A person's emotion is justified, or deemed appropriate, depending on the reasons she gives for her feeling. We expect people to be able to give reasons explaining why they feel as they do, and we may demand particular emotional responses from them in certain situations. There are rules about which emotions should be experienced in particular situations, and about how those emotions should be expressed (Elster 1994, 32). Do emotional norms mean that emotions have a degree of objectivity by which we judge them?

Social norms play an important role in shaping emotion, which has led to much research on cultural differences with respect to emotions. De Sousa and Prinz argue that emotions develop from basic responses, such that we attach meaning to particular bodily feelings. We associate meaning with bodily feelings by learning from others, and as such, we are influenced by the beliefs, values, and norms of our community (de Sousa 1987, 255-260). Nussbaum discusses how, in different communities, different emotional repertoires are developed as a result of differences in physical conditions, beliefs, practices, languages, and social norms (2001, 139-170).[38] She tells us about the Utku people, who are an indigenous Canadian group who must survive harsh living conditions and scarce resources. They value cooperation, and so do not value anger. In their community, anger is a shameful emotion, regarded as immature, and adults avoid expressing anger. They have what Paul Ekman calls a display rule about anger. A display rule determines how an emotion is expressed (Ekman 2003, 4). The Balinese grieve cheerfully, whereas the Ifaluk, a Micronesian people, wail, scream, pound the floor, and cry.[39] There are also differences in how each emotion is understood in different communities. Arlie Hochschild argues that each culture has an emotional dictionary that determines what sort of feeling should be attached to particular meanings, and which emotions are allowed within that community. A person may not

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[38] See also Markus and Kitayama (1994), who argue that culture has a strong impact on the experience of emotion. For a broad comparison between so-called collectivist cultures and individualist cultures, see Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, and Ric (2006) who argue that collectivist cultures are more likely to moderate emotional expression to facilitate social cohesiveness, whereas individualistic cultures see emotional expression as linked to the expression of individuality.

[39] In Albert Camus' *The Stranger*, the protagonist Meursault does not mourn the death of his mother (and on the day after the funeral, went swimming, had a sexual liaison, and went to comic film) and at the later murder trial, the Prosecutor draws on this information to argue that Meursault is "a criminal at heart" (1946, 52-56). Meursault should have mourned his mother, and he should have expressed his sorrow in an appropriate way. Had Meursault been Balinese, this trial may have ended differently.

be allowed to feel love for a person of the same sex, for example, for love is understood as the feeling between people of the opposite sex. This makes homosexual love "unfeelable" (Hochschild 1998, 5-7). Additionally, some cultures have words for emotions that do not translate into other languages, and are perhaps peculiar to that community. Japanese *amae* is the commonly cited example, which is described as a pleasurable feeling of submission or dependence on others with a desire to be loved.[40]

The literature on the cultural differences in emotion is vast, but what we take away from it is the idea that we develop our emotions within social rules. We attach meaning to our feelings according to how our community believes we should, learning from them which events should trigger which emotions, how those emotions should be expressed, and which emotions are valuable. It is according to these rules that we broadly judge one another's emotions. In our (broadly Western) society, injustice should trigger anger, another's death should bring about sorrow, and weddings are to be celebrated with joy.

Nevertheless, there is a strong individualism within the literature on emotion, for we think that emotions are subjective (Solomon 2004, 77, 1976, 188). Although we develop our emotions in a social context, and are influenced by the emotional norms of our community, we each have a unique history. How our emotional paradigm scenarios develop will be, according to de Sousa, idiosyncratic (1987, 247-251). One person's paradigm scenario for an emotion may not be the same as another person's. Not only is the bodily feeling that she experiences subjective to her because of her physiology, the meaning that she attaches to her feelings depend on her psychological temperament, the particular influence that her caregivers had on her emotional development, the particular education that she receives, and so on. As Antonio Damasio tells us,

> Your experience may be at subtle or at major variance with that of others; it is yours alone. Although the relations between type of situation and emotion are, to a great extent, similar among individuals, unique, personal experience customizes the process for every individual. (1994, 136-137)

As such, even in small groups such as families, there can be much variance in how each member responds to the same event. Each person may construe the situation differently, depending on which paradigm scenario is activated when that person encounters the

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[40] There is some debate about whether emotions can be peculiar to a culture. Social constructionists think this is possible, for emotions are essentially shaped by social practices. *Amae*, for example, seems to have no equivalent in Western culture (Averill 1980, 63). Griffiths argues against this view, claiming that the biological aspects of emotion mean that emotions are not as cross-culturally variant as they may appear (1997, 137-167).

situation. As in the case of the duck-rabbit image, one person may see a duck and another a rabbit. In the case of emotions, a situation may anger one person whereas another person may be amused. A group of friends may be told a joke, and one person may be angered by the inherent racism of the joke, whereas another is amused by the absurdity of the situation described. It is possible to reasonably explain many different responses to a given situation by picking out different aspects of that situation as evidence for an emotion.

How, then, do we criticise the emotions of others? It may seem that since the quasi-perceptual account of emotion argues that emotion is a way of perceiving the world, all emotions must be subjective as they are seen from a unique point of view. Only the person can know how the world appears to her in her particular context, and no other person can access her emotional perspective on the world (Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 15-16, Nussbaum 2013, 11, Solomon 2004, 77, 1976, 175, 2003, 61, 68). We may think that when emotional, a person skews how she perceives the world, which means that she cannot perceive and think about the world in a rational manner. Calhoun calls this epistemic subjectivity, and thinks that it is remarkable that emotions are routinely accused of this kind of subjectivity (2004, 107-109). She argues that we have many conceptual frameworks that guide how we construe the world, and while emotional frameworks (paradigm scenarios) are private and peculiar to the individual, this does not mean that they must be epistemically subjective. She gives the example of a public conceptual framework that is epistemically objective, the scientific conceptual framework, in which the scientist will interpret the environment according to what is of importance to scientists (that is, measurable facts). This public framework is shared between scientists, giving scientists the same point of view on the world (Calhoun 2004, 114). Despite being an interpretive lens through which to perceive the world, scientists can think rationally.[41]

The subjectivity of emotion does not arise from the personal point of view of the person but from the biographical subjectivity of emotion, or what Ben-Ze'ev calls the partiality of emotion. He argues that our emotion has "a personal and interested perspective" (Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 35). We get emotional about issues that are of concern to

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[41] This will be important for Chapter 5, when I discuss perspective shifting and empathy. I will argue that individuals can come to share a perspective.

us particularly: we love *our* children, we get angry at violations *to ourselves*.[42] Our emotions express our relation with the world. Emotions are a way of engaging with the world, and this means that the environment is construed as being of importance to the individual, as an individual. This is true even of emotions that have as their object other people: a person may get outraged at a wrong done to another person, but the outrage is an expression that she cares about the wronged person, not that she herself is wronged.[43] As Calhoun defines biographical subjectivity, the person's history will have determined what she cares about, and how one event affects another. Each emotional experience has a context that fits into a temporal history, and may become part of the person's narrative about what she values and believes (Calhoun 2004, 113-116).

Calhoun argues that emotions are biographically subjective, but can be epistemically objective. An emotion is epistemically objective when it "fits the facts" as given by the person's perception (Calhoun 2004, 118-120). If a person perceives a situation that she (perhaps unconsciously) construes according to a particular paradigm scenario, she should respond in accord with her paradigm scenario (de Sousa 1987, 201-202). If, for example, she has associated injustice with anger, she should respond with anger when she perceives cruelty to animals. This anger is appropriate, given what she has perceived, and she can justify her emotion with the evidence on which her selective attention led her to focus.

This means that we judge an emotion not by whether or not it meets an objective standard of truth but by how reliable the paradigm scenario for the emotion is at identifying what is of concern to the individual and triggering the associated response. As Jones argues, we judge beliefs as justified or unjustified (and true or false) according to the evidence that is available. With emotions, we judge them as appropriate or inappropriate according to how typical a particular response is, given what the person cares about. The person who cares about animals should, reliably, be angered at maltreatment and cruelty to animals, and a different response is inappropriate if she construes the situation as such. (There is some flexibility here, for the person may have multiple paradigm scenarios that fit the situation: she may feel revulsion or pity for example, instead of anger.) Animal cruelty is a reason for anger for that person, but is not necessarily a reason for another person. If the person responds with anger in a

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[42] As Nussbaum says, "[e]motions contain an ineliminable reference to *me*, to the fact that it is *my* scheme of goals and projects" (2001, 52).

[43] Nussbaum refers to what is of important to us as the "circle of concern" (2013, 11).

situation that should not give her a reason for anger, given her paradigm scenario, her anger is inappropriate. Emotions, Jones thinks, tracks reasons for that person, and we judge the emotion by how reliably it gives what the person should judge as a reason for her (2004, 342-344, see also Goldie 2000, 44).[44]

This account has an unattractive implication but one that brings out the tension between judging an emotion according to the reliability of the individual's paradigm scenarios, and judging an emotion according to what is rational. On Jones' account, an emotion could be appropriate and subjectively rational, but worthy of condemnation because it is not connected with what is true or moral. Some emotions arise from what we would want to call poorly developed paradigm scenarios. An individual may have come to connect certain feelings with features of the world that we would, from our perspective, think irrational or problematic. A person may have developed her paradigm scenario for joy where one possible trigger is the feeling of pain. Another may have been raised in a racist environment and feel fear when encountering a person of a different race. On de Sousa's account, and explicitly argued for by Jones, the emotion would be appropriate if the paradigm scenarios were reliably connecting the same kinds of situations with the same kinds of feelings, given the development of the individual. So the racist who reliably feels fear when encountering a person of another race would be appropriately (or understandably) fearful. On moral grounds however, and insofar as race is not an indicator of threat, we want to condemn this emotion. It does not track the truth about danger, or the moral truth about racial equality. Nevertheless, it does make sense given how the person developed her paradigm scenario for fear, and so her emotion is appropriate *for her*. Herein lies the tension. Her emotion is subjectively rational, because her fear paradigm scenario is working reliably. Yet we condemn the emotion for other reasons, but not according to the internal logic of her feelings. In Jones' words, "[p]ast experience makes for reliable or unreliable affective mechanisms.

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[44] Jones thinks that some emotions can be rational, but appropriate emotions are not necessarily rational. Appropriate ("apt") emotions are those that have reliably identified reasons for the way the person responds, but if these emotions obscure her attention to other issues of concern to her, she is no longer reliably responding as she ought to given what she values and believes. She gives the example of the grieving father who has construed the loss of one of his children as an irreparable loss, which is appropriate given that he is a parent and he is concerned with loving his children. This grief stems from parental love, but insofar as it diverts him from giving parental love to his remaining children, it is irrational. His grief is obscuring what should be a reason for him expressing care and affection to his children, who are also of concern to him. His grief prevents him from perceiving the world in what should be a rational manner for him, given his own ends of being a good father. The same grief in another parent who does not have any remaining children is not irrational, because it does not prevent her identifying reasons for her parental love (Jones 2004, 347-349).

And past experience makes for differing vulnerabilities and thus for differences in the reasons that the agents have" (2004, 347).[45]

The biographical subjectivity of emotion is what gives rise to the view that emotions must be subjective to the individual. Each person's emotional repertoire is unique to her, being rooted in her personal biology and developed by her unique history.[46] What justifies her emotion is not an external standard, although others may influence her in the development of her emotion. Rather, her emotion is appropriate or inappropriate depending on her own personality, the context that she is in, the history leading up to the triggering event, and whether or not she is responding according to how her personal paradigm scenarios have been developed. The subjectivity of emotion leads to the claim that I am concerned with, which is that emotions must be individual experiences. This claim will shape what I call the Sceptical Challenge—how can a group be attributed with an emotion if emotions are subjective, individual experiences?

3 The Sceptical Challenge to group emotions

The sceptic about group emotion argues that emotions are subjective and so only individuals can feel emotion. Emotions are biographically subjective, for each individual has a unique history, and she develops the paradigm scenarios for her emotions according to her innate instincts, her personal socialisation, and her particular education. This subjectivity about emotions means that even though we judge other people's emotions, and make demands of them to respond in particular ways to particular events, the emotion is appropriate or inappropriate depending on the reasons that the individual gives for her emotion. An emotion is appropriate if a person's paradigm scenario is reliably tracking what is of concern to her, rather than tracking the objective truth or falsity of the situation that she is responding to. The sceptic about group emotion makes a further claim. Given this biographical subjectivity, only

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[45] See also Calhoun, who says that, "[i]n short, the beliefs founding appropriate emotions are still biographically subjective. Securing the appropriateness of one's emotions does not require taking an objective, impersonal point of view and impartially surveying all the facts. It simply requires that the interpretive story one is subjectively most likely to tell about one's situation be true" (2004, 119).

[46] Markus and Kitayama point out that within society, each individual will be exposed to the norms of a number of different social groups. It is within the context of many social groups that the individual develops psychologically, giving rise to the notion of an "individualised" self that "provides a meeting point and a framework for the relation between the individual and the social world. Each person is embedded within a variety of sociocultural contexts or cultures… Each of these cultural contexts makes some claim on the person and is associated with a set of ideas and practices (i.e., a cultural framework or schema) about how to be a 'good' person" (Markus and Kitayama 1994, 91-92). Solomon has the same view of self, which he defines as, "the point of reference from which we interpret or constitute our world" within a network of relationships to other people (1976, 90, 104).

individuals can experience emotions. This individualist claim gives rise to the Sceptical Challenge, which takes the following form. If an emotion is subjective and individual, then no two individuals can feel the same emotion, and if group members cannot share the same emotion, how can a group have an emotion? As Neta Crawford forcefully tells us:

> Groups are not homogenous; nor do individual members of groups, such as tribes or nations, experience the same phenomena the same way or have the same reactions to it. It would be imprecise and perhaps even dangerous to argue that a 'group' feels something or even believes something. Individuals feel, and just as there is a diversity of beliefs in a group or organization, with one belief perhaps being dominant, there may be a diversity of feelings, with one dominating. (2014, 546 n12)

There are several features of emotion that frame emotions as individualistic experiences. Emotions are embodied experiences with a particular phenomenology, and as Jonathan Mercer points out, "[s]kepticism that one can feel like a [group] centers on the 'no body, no emotion' problem" (2014, 516). I have argued that emotions are a kind of perception, in which the world is construed, or appraised, in a particular way. In this way, emotions are a mental phenomenon like belief or intention. Of particular importance is the idea that emotions are subjective and reflect what is of concern to the bearer of that emotion, given the biography of that bearer (Brady 2016, 97-98). The individualism of emotion can be thought of in terms of *physical individualism*, in that an individual body experiences the emotion;[47] *ontological individualism*, in that the mentality of emotion is located in an individual's mind; and *subjective individualism*, in that the bearer of the emotion is an individual.[48] Over the next few chapters, I will make it clear that I am not arguing against the physical or ontological individualism of emotion. I cannot argue that a group has a body that can feel, in the way that an individual can feel. I will also not argue that the group has a mind that transcends the individuals within the group, or that a group can have a mental state like an individual has a mental state. I will, however, challenge the subjective individualism of emotion. In doing so I will argue that a group can be the subject of an emotion. A group is the subject of an emotion when the group members come together to jointly constitute the bearer of an emotion, and feel the same emotion with one another.

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[47] J.M. Barbalet thinks that the Sceptical Challenge is generated by the "psychological" (or physiological) approach to emotion, which is why structural and sociological accounts of collective emotion have focused on emergent patterns over time, rather than on the experience of emotion (1992, 155).

[48] I am adopting Hans Bernhard Schmid's argument that there are three ways emotions are individualist: ontologically individualist, epistemically individualist, and physically individualist (2009, 70-77).

The sceptic about group emotion, who thinks that emotions can only be attributed to individuals, can accept one particular account of collective emotion, the aggregative account. This is not the same as the account that I am developing. The aggregative account is a summative account, in that a group is attributed with a feeling when a significant number of the individuals within that group have that feeling (Bird 1999, 87, Pettigrove 2006, 491, Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 506, Salmela 2014b, 162-163, Sullivan 2014b, 270-271). If we can say that most Australians are feeling happy about the good weather on Christmas Day, we can attribute Australia with happiness. If enough Springbok rugby fans are outraged by a referee decision, we can say that the group of Springbok fans are angry about that referee decision. Here, the collective emotion merely refers to the (possibly coincidental) fact that many individuals happen to feel the same emotion. It need not be all the group members for this would be a particularly strict requirement and would require some sort of census to be taken for the collective emotion to be attributed to the group. This would make it very difficult to attribute a collective emotion to a group. Instead, we attribute a collective emotion to a group when it appears that individuals of a particular group, in general, have an emotion. This means that it is possible that a group may be attributed with an emotion when only a minority of individuals feel the emotion, but are a particularly visible proportion of the group and may be thought of as representing the group.

The aggregative account is often employed when we are speaking about collective emotion, and as I will argue, many of the other conceptions of collective emotion are ultimately versions of the aggregative account.[49] Emotions can be attributed to groups when group members have been surveyed, or when an emotion is apparent by the behaviour of the visible group members. Springbok rugby fans who are spectating the match at the stadium and are visibly expressing anger at a referee decision, will be regarded as representing all of the fans, including those watching at home and those that are not watching the game at all, and their anger will be attributed to the group. The aggregative account is therefore somewhat fluid, for while we would expect there to be a requirement about the number of individuals that should be experiencing the emotion that is being attributed to the group, there is no such requirement. Instead, we attribute the emotion based on the appearance that the emotion is one that is widespread within the group.

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[49] I will argue that the accounts of group-based emotion (Chapter 2), membership emotion (Chapter 3), feeling-together, and fused feeling (Chapter 4) are aggregative accounts of collective emotion.

On this account, the relations between the individuals do not change the nature of the emotion. The individuals may or may not be aware of their fellow group members, nor take into account what their fellow group members are feeling. This is the case when we say, for example, that teenage boys enjoy playing computer games. In this example, a significant number of teenage boys will report that they, as individuals, enjoy playing computer games. In other cases, such as with the rugby fans, the individuals will be aware of the other fans, but may still say that the anger that they have is an emotion that they feel personally. The sceptic about group emotion will say that the emotions of others may influence the individual's emotion, but this does not mean that the individuals feel a single emotion together. When others express an emotion, this may create a social norm whereby an emotion is deemed permissible or appropriate, but the emotion still belongs to the individual in her own capacity.

The aggregative account of collective emotion ultimately denies that there is a significant difference between collective emotion and individual emotion, which is why the sceptic about group emotion can accept it. The collective emotion is nothing more than the emotion that each individual feels. The report that a group feels an emotion is exactly the same as saying that each member of that group feels a particular emotion, or that the individual emotion is widespread within a group. Bryce Huebner argues that any account of collective emotion that is reducible to an account of individual emotion is not articulating a "genuinely" collective emotion. He argues that for a mental state (in this case, an emotion) to be genuinely collective, it needs to be the case that the group itself can have a mental state (Huebner 2011, 91). He is concerned with the ontology of emotion, and if an emotion is collective, the ontology of that emotion should be collective too—that is, it must be the group that has the emotion as a mental state, not the individuals that make up the group. Otherwise, he thinks, there is no explanatory power in the idea of a collective emotion. If an emotion can be described entirely by reference to the individual and her mental states, the attribution of that emotion to the collective is not explaining anything further.

Huebner sets the bar very high for what should be considered as a collective emotion. I will return to his argument in Chapter 3, because he makes an important claim about the ontology of collective emotion that I think we can reject. He argues that an emotion's *ontology* needs to be collective. However as we shall see when I discuss collective intentionality, this need not be a requirement for group emotion. I will argue that a group emotion need not be ontologically collective. This does not mean, however,

that a group emotion is reducible to an individual emotion, and therefore there is still some explanatory work that can be done when the subject of the emotion is the group. While I disagree with Huebner's view about what constitutes a collective emotion, I take on board the spirit of Huebner's challenge about the explanatory power of the notion of collective emotion. Is there a distinction to be made between collective and individual emotion, such that a collective emotion is not reducible to an aggregate of individual emotions? I maintain that this distinction is robust, and I will argue for this claim in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that emotions have both cognitive and non-cognitive components, because emotions are both embodied responses to the world and are about matters of concern to us. Prinz and de Sousa argue for a quasi-perceptual account of emotion in which emotions are embodied appraisals. When we feel an emotion, we perceive the world according to what is significant to us. This account of emotion explains how emotions are feelings and why emotions are meaningful to us, and it shows that emotions can interact with other thoughts, such as beliefs and reasons. My account of group emotion will embrace what is essential to our understanding of what an emotion is, which I think the quasi-perceptual account encapsulates. I will argue that a group can feel an emotion, by which I mean that a group of individuals can constitute the subject of an embodied appraisal together.

The primary aim of this chapter was to establish the position that I will be arguing against, namely, the sceptical view of group emotion. The dominant position in the philosophical literature on emotion is that only individuals can feel emotion. This is because emotions firstly, are biographically subjective experiences, and secondly, are physically, ontologically, and subjectively individual. As I showed, the sceptic about group emotion points to the embodied nature of emotion, the fact that emotions are a kind of mental state, and that emotions are experienced from a particular perspective. These three features lead the sceptic to assert that individual subjects feel emotions. A collective emotion, for the sceptic, is then nothing more than the summation of what the individuals within the group feel.

My thesis will be a response to the Sceptical Challenge. I will argue that a group *can* be the subject of emotion, without changing our understanding of the nature of emotion. While I will agree with the sceptic about the ontological and physical

individualism of emotion, I will argue that, in some scenarios, the emotion that individuals feel can only be explained if we consider the individuals as feeling the emotion *together as a group*. In such cases, group emotions cannot be reduced to the aggregation of distinct individual emotions.

Chapter 2: Group-based Emotion

In times of war the heart of a nation rises high and beats in the breast of each one of her citizens.

—*Omar Bradley (cited in Ben-Ze'ev 2001, 32)*

I feel hatred toward Arabs, and it is only natural. My hatred derives from their deeds. They are the enemy. I always say: cursed be them. You cannot trust them... This is our land, and they, the Arabs, should not be here. I would transfer them. They want this land, and so do we. I believe that this land is our land. Let them go to their own countries.

—*Adolescent Jewish girl at religious school in Israel that is affiliated with the national Zionist movement (Yanay 1996, 28)*

The history of humankind is, in many ways, a history of conflict between groups. We can catalogue innumerable wars, conquests, genocides, and revolutions, in which families, tribes, nations, and religions have been pitted against one another, and have committed atrocities against each other in the name of their groups. The Hutu people almost annihilated the Tutsi people in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide; Christians crusaded against Muslims in medieval times; Israel and Palestine have been at war with one another for decades. What we care about, what defines who we are and what we fight for, depends on the groups that we belong to.

Within the discipline of social psychology, researchers such as Eliot Smith, Diane Mackie, and Charles Seger have investigated the emotions that motivate conflicts between groups.[1] They are interested in how individuals form groups and how group membership in turn affects the individual's psychology and actions. What would cause individuals to join a war to kill strangers? Why are some groups marginalised, oppressed, and targeted by others? Why do we celebrate when sports teams win games, and mourn when public figures die? Social psychologists have undertaken many studies to record and measure the impact of group membership on emotion, and on the basis of their findings they argue that we feel group-based emotion when we identify with a particular group. In this chapter, I will critically analyse these studies and the notion of group-based emotion in order to evaluate the hypothesis that what psychologists call group-based emotions are group emotions.

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[1] For example, Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008), Ray, Mackie, and Smith (2014), Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007), Smith and Mackie (2008, 2015).

As I argued in the previous chapter, emotions are traditionally understood as personal experiences of individuals. Group emotions, loosely understood, are emotions experienced by groups. However, it is not clear what the notion of group emotion means, and the sceptic about group emotion denies that there is any significant difference between a group emotion and an individual emotion. The sceptic posits that a group emotion is simply an aggregation of the individual emotions felt by many group members. The studies that I investigate in this chapter seem to challenge this position, as social psychologists show us that group membership plays a significant role in the kind of emotions we experience, and how intensely we feel them. Social psychologists argue that some emotions, namely group-based emotions, are emotions felt at the group level rather than at the individual level. Their studies provide evidence for thinking that when individuals belong to a group, they feel emotions about what is of relevance to the group, rather than what is of relevance to them as individuals distinct from the group.

The particular theory that gives rise to the notion of group-based emotion is Intergroup Emotion Theory. This theory brings together two psychological theories: the appraisal theory of emotion, and the self-categorisation theory of social identity. The appraisal theory holds that emotions are appraisals of what is significant or of concern to us. Self-categorisation theory argues that individuals can regard themselves in different ways. We can regard ourselves as individuals, and we can regard ourselves as group members. In bringing these two theories together, intergroup emotion theorists argue that when individuals regard themselves as group-members, they appraise the world according to what is of concern to the group. This is group-based emotion.

Initially, Intergroup Emotion Theory posits that intergroup behaviour, such as the conflict between two groups, can be explained by the group-based feelings of group members. The argument is that by self-categorising, the group members come to feel the group's emotion, and so the member's group-based emotion is the group's emotion. There are suggestive findings in the studies by Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007) and by Seger, Smith, and Mackie (2009) that group members share group-based emotions. This would suggest that the group members feel the group-based emotion together, as a group. However, later studies by Amit Goldenberg, Tamar Saguy, and Eran Halperin (2014) seem to contradict this conclusion. Their findings show that as individuals, we make a distinction between the emotion we perceive to be the group's emotion, and the emotion that we think the group *should* feel. This means that a member may perceive a particular emotion as her group's emotion, but feel a different group-based emotion.

Her group-based emotion reflects what she thinks her group should feel, not what it does feel.

In discussing whether group-based emotions are shared, I make a fine-grained distinction between different notions of collective emotion. I will argue in Chapter 5 that individuals can, as a group, feel an emotion together, and that this would be a group emotion. This is what Goldenberg and his colleagues refer to as the collective emotion (2014, 582). In contrast with this notion of group emotion, I will refer to the emotion that individuals *perceive* to be their group's emotion as the perceived collective emotion.[2] Group-based emotions are the emotions that individuals feel as group members. The question, then, is whether group-based emotion is a group emotion or simply a specific kind of individual emotion, in which the individual thinks of herself in terms of a particular social identity. To put this question another way, is a group-based emotion in some way an indication of what the group feels, and felt by all group members such that we say that they feel it as a group?

I will argue that group-based emotions are not group emotions, but that they are group-level emotions. Individuals feel group-based emotions when they respond according to what is of concern to their group, making it a group-level emotion, but they do not necessarily share this emotion with the rest of their group. This is a significant response in itself to the Sceptical Challenge, for it shows how individuals can be concerned with more than what is simply of significance to them as individuals. Nevertheless, the methodological limitations of empirical investigation mean that these studies cannot show that the group members feel a group-based emotion because they are unified as a group. The findings by Goldenberg and his colleagues (2014) show that, in fact, the individual's group-based emotion may be mediated by what she perceives her group to feel, allowing that her group-based emotion may be different from the group-based emotions that other members feel. This means that an individual may feel a group-based emotion that is different to the emotion that her group feels.

In Section 1, I will outline Intergroup Emotion Theory, and explain how the process of self-categorising as a group member is thought to impact on, firstly, how the individual regards herself, and secondly, how the individual feels emotion. In doing so, I will explain why these theorists think that group-based emotions are group-level

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[2] As Goldenberg and his colleagues define a perceived collective emotion, it is the individual's perception of what most people in her group feel (2014, 582). Their concern in their studies is with what individuals think the collective emotion *should* be. I refer to this as a collective emotion.

emotions rather than individual-level emotions. In Section 2, I will critically examine three hypotheses about group-based emotion that theorists of Intergroup Emotion Theory investigate, and the conclusions that are drawn from the studies designed to measure group-based emotions. The first hypothesis is that group membership determines how an individual responds. The second hypothesis is that the degree to which the individual identifies with her group impacts on her experience of group-based emotions. My main focus is on the third hypothesis, which is that group-based emotions are *shared*, which would give support to the claim that group-based emotions are the group's emotion. The findings from the various studies concerning the third hypothesis are contradictory, however, and so in Section 3, I argue that this reveals that group-based emotions are felt by individuals as group members, and not by the group. The group members do not necessarily constitute a group and share the group-based emotion. I focus on the question of whether group-based emotions are shared, because in Chapter 5, I will argue that a shared emotion is a group emotion.

1 Intergroup Emotion Theory

In an influential paper published in 1993, Smith argues for a new conceptualisation of prejudice. In this paper, he argues that the dominant conceptualisation of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in terms of beliefs, attitudes, and attitude-driven behaviour cannot adequately account for the situation specificity of prejudice. He argues that attitudes and beliefs are typically stable, and should motivate consistent discrimination or other prejudicial behaviour towards a vilified outgroup. Many studies show, however, that prejudice is contextually specific, that is, that a person may treat another as equal in one domain yet discriminate against her in another domain. White people, for example, may treat black co-workers as equal in the work place, but oppose desegregation in white neighbourhoods and in schools. The prejudicial attitude thus seems to have a low correlation with discriminatory behaviour (Smith 1993, 297-301).

As an alternative to explaining prejudice by reference to prejudicial attitudes, Smith suggests that we develop a new conceptualisation of prejudice. He argues that we should think about the role that emotions play in driving discriminatory behaviour against outgroup members by combining the self-categorisation theory of social identity and the appraisal theory of emotion. We can better understand the situation-specificity and the variance in discriminatory behaviour if we understand how emotion drives discrimination, and how this emotion is linked with the individual's membership of her

ingroup and her relation to the outgroup (Smith 1993, 301-313). This suggestion has led to the development of what is now called Intergroup Emotion Theory, which concerns the relationship between group, or social identity, and emotion.

Intergroup Emotion Theory claims that group membership has a powerful impact on the emotion that an individual feels, because when a particular social identity is activated for an individual, she will react to the situation according to the goals and concerns of that particular group (Maitner, Smith, and Mackie 2016, 111-112). Drawing on the self-categorisation theory of social identity, theorists of Intergroup Emotion Theory argue that when an individual regards herself in terms of one particular social identity, that is, as a member of a particular group, she will become oriented to the world as a representative of her group. When this theory is combined with the appraisal theory of emotion, the group member's emotion is an appraisal of what is of concern to the group, rather than to her in particular. The group member's concerns are broader than her concerns as an individual, as she takes into account the goals and interests of her group. On this theory of emotion, the group member has a group-level emotional response because she feels on behalf of the group. The emotion that the individual feels as a group member, this theory claims, is the group's emotion that she feels as a representative of the group. This final premise is the one that interests me, as it suggests that we can determine what a group emotion is by examining a group member's emotion. This premise, however, is not confirmed by the studies designed to confirm the hypothesis that the group member's emotion is shared with other group members.

The appraisal theory of emotion is a psychological theory that is broadly compatible with the quasi-perceptual account of emotion that I argued for in Chapter 1. The appraisal theory claims that emotions involve a cognitive component that makes our emotions meaningful. Appraisals are evaluations of specific situations, and so determine what is of concern or significance to the individual in a given context. There is much debate about whether appraisals are antecedent to the emotion or part of the content of emotion. Nico Frijda (1993, 2003), for example, argues that emotion is a response to an appraisal (see also Clore and Ortony 2008). Jesse Prinz (2003, 2004, 55-78), on the other hand, thinks that emotion is an embodied appraisal, in that the emotion itself is the representation of what is important in the situation. I do not take a stand on this debate here. What is important for this discussion is that when we appraise a situation, we evaluate the situation as representing a particular meaning to us, given our concerns, beliefs, interests, and so on. We feel anger when we perceive that a

wrongdoing is being committed against us, sadness when we perceive loss. The appraisal in emotion determines what is of salience in a given context and how those salient features are to be understood.[3]

Self-categorisation theory is concerned with social identity, specifically the interaction between the individual's personal and social identities, and her individual and group identities (Onorato and Turner 2001, 156-158).[4] On this theory, the individual's identity is composed of many different social identities, according to the groups that she is a member of and the roles that she plays in society, as well as a personal identity. In different contexts, different identities will be salient to the individual and will determine how she views herself. When her personal identity is salient, she regards herself as a unique individual, as a "me," and other people are categorised as other to her. In this situation, she thinks of herself in terms of her particular beliefs, values, attributes, goals, and so on. A social identity (and she will have several) will be salient when she thinks of herself in terms of her membership of a particular group, and as Onorato and Turner explain, she will categorise herself and her fellow group members as the same, and members of an outgroup as different.[5] When a social identity is salient, she thinks of herself as a group member that is part of a "we" (and the outgroup as a "them"), and defines herself by the attributes, features, beliefs, and so on that are common to the group members. She no longer thinks of herself as a unique individual, but focuses on that aspect of herself that she has in common with other group members (Smith 1993, 301-302, Maitner, Smith, and Mackie 2016, 112-113). She can shift between different identities, seeing herself in any given moment as a group member or as a unique individual. Each identity is part of who she is, but in different contexts, different identities will come to the fore.

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[3] See Chapter 1 for a discussion of Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005) and Ronald de Sousa's (1987) quasi-perceptual account of emotion, which argues that emotions are embodied appraisals.

[4] Onorato and Turner cite Turner and Oakes: "[t]he theory proposes that the group is a distinctive psychological process, but in so doing it reminds us that group functioning is part of the psychology of the person—that individual and group must be reintegrated psychologically before there can be an adequate analysis of either" (2001, 156).

[5] It is important to clarify that when we think of ourselves in terms of our personal identity, we do not think of ourselves independently of our social roles. An individual may think of herself as a mother, a philosopher, and a football fan, which is how her personal identity is constituted. However, the distinction made by these psychologists between personal and social identity has to do with how the individual categorises herself. Personal identity is constituted when an individual categorises herself as a unique individual, with everyone else as different to herself, while social identity is constituted when the individual categorises herself as a member of a group, in which she and her group members are categorised as sharing a particular feature.

In self-categorising as a group member, the individual undergoes a process called depersonalisation.[6] When the individual depersonalises and sees herself as a group member, she perceives similarity between herself and other individuals in the group (and difference between herself and members of the outgroup). She no longer sees herself as unique but rather, she regards herself as an "interchangeable exemplar" of the group, with characteristics and attributes that are typical of the group members.[7] By focusing on those attributes that she has in common with others and taking them to be the most salient aspect of herself, she takes herself to be a representative of her group. For example, an individual has several social identities. When a particular social identity is made salient to her, such as her identity as a woman, a teacher, a soccer player, and so on, she will define herself according to those traits that she shares with other group members, according to their common goals and interests.[8] The attributes and stereotypes associated with the group become her own attributes, and the concerns of the group become her own concerns.

Connected with, but not identical to, the process of self-categorisation is the process of identification. Self-categorisation occurs when the individual perceives herself as belonging to a particular group. Identification, on the other hand, is concerned with the *degree* to which the individual feels connected to her group, and takes her group membership to be an important aspect of who she is (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1868). There may be only minimal identification with a group when an individual self-categorises with a group—think of an employee who is concerned with her company's projects and goals, and considers these to be her own projects and goals, but does not regard herself as essentially a businessperson. Patriotic citizens strongly

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[6] See, for example, Hogg and Abrams (1988, 19), Livingstone, Haslam, et al. (2011, 1858-1859), Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008, 1868), Smith and Henry (1996, 635), Smith and Mackie (2015, 350), Voci (2006, 74-75), Yzerbyt et al. (2002, 70), Yzerbyt and Kuppens (2009, 145-148).

[7] Depersonalisation is not the same process as de-individuation. The de-individuation process is when personal identity is diminished, and as a result, individual responsibility is undermined. In self-categorising, the individual is focusing on, or privileging, one aspect of her identity, as one of her social identities is made salient, with her other social identities being pushed to the background. As Hogg and Abrams articulate the distinction, "[d]e-individuation theorists posit a loss of identity in the group, social identity theorists [employing the self-categorisation theory] posit a switch of identity in the group (from personal to social)" (1988, 132-134).

[8] Larry May talks about how being regarded by others as interchangeable also causes self-categorisation: "[t]he recognition that each is replaceable is intensified when there is an Other, an enemy or oppressor, who treats each member of the mob as being indistinguishable from each other member. The awareness of the Other creates a common interest for each member of the group. It is an interest in the sense that each member comes to care about how each other member is treated, for since each is treated as indistinguishable from each other, how your neighbor is treated counts as a strong indication of how you will be treated, or would have been treated had you been there instead of your neighbor" (1987, 39).

identify as members of a nation, whereas other citizens may not regard their nationality as important to them. They can self-categorise as citizens and as sharing certain attributes with their fellow citizens, but not identify strongly with that identity. Self-categorisation and identification are closely related processes, and not all of the studies distinguish between them. But as we shall see below, insofar as self-categorisation impacts on which emotion the person feels, her identification with her group plays a role in determining how intensely she experiences her emotion (Iyer and Leach 2009, 110-112, Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1870, Yzerbyt and Kuppens 2009, 153-154).

By combining appraisal theory and self-categorisation theory, social psychologists argue that individuals can appraise a situation according to the concerns of her group. In this way, what the individual cares about is extended to include what her group and fellow group members care about. Her attention is not only on matters that are relevant to herself, but on matters that are relevant to her group (Ray, Mackie, and Smith 2014, 238, Yzerbyt and Kuppens 2009, 145). The group member draws on the group's values, beliefs, and goals in order to appraise the situation, and forms a group-based appraisal rather than a personal appraisal of the system (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1870-1871, Maitner, Smith, and Mackie 2016, 114). A businesswoman may not have any children or intend to have any children, but when she regards herself according to her social identity as a career woman, she may become concerned with workplace treatment of women, some of whom are mothers. Company policies regarding parental leave, for example, could be a concern for her group as a whole. By recognising her commonality with other businesswomen, she takes on their concerns as her own.[9] In doing this, she appraises her context at the group level rather than the individual level, because she appraises the context according to what is of concern to her group.[10]

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[9] This example also brings out the fluidity involved in the definition of a social identity and the politics of intersectional identities. Some businesswomen may not think that the concerns of mothers should be the concerns of businesswomen, thinking of "mothers" and "businesswomen" as two distinct groups.

[10] It is worth noting a distinction between group-based appraisal and social appraisal. Smith initially refers to group-based appraisal as social appraisal, and the emotion that follows as social emotion (1993, 305). But this confuses matters, as social appraisals and social emotions are defined differently in the literature on emotion. Social appraisals are appraisals of a situation that incorporate an appraisal of how other people react to the same situation (see Manstead and Fischer 2001, 222, Parkinson 2011, 434-435). For example, we appraise a party as more enjoyable if our friends appear to be enjoying themselves as well, or a dark alley as less threatening if we are accompanied by a friend who is unafraid. Similarly, social emotions are those that depend on the way other people react or the way we relate to those people. These emotions, such as shame, jealousy, and embarrassment, serve a social function, for they concern the individual's relationships with others (see Hareli and Parkinson 2008, 131). I will refer to the appraisals and emotions that arise when the individual regards herself as belonging to a group as group-based appraisals and group-based emotions, to side-step potential confusion.

We thus have a distinction between individual-level appraisal and group-level appraisal that gives rise to a distinction between individual-level emotion and group-level emotion. At the individual level, appraisal concerns what is of importance to the individual personally, given her unique perspective on the world. At the group level, the appraisal concerns what is of importance to the group, and to the individual as a group member, given her perspective as a representative or typical group member (Smith and Mackie 2008, 431). The emotions connected with these appraisals are likewise either individual-level emotions or group-level emotions. Individuals feel individual-level emotions when they think of themselves as individuals, and react to the situation according to what is of importance to them personally. Individuals feel group-level emotions when they think of themselves as group members, and are oriented to the world as representative members of a particular group. When a particular social identity is salient, the individual responds to the world according to what is of importance to her given the shared concerns of the group.

With the notion of group-level emotion, social psychologists such as Mackie, Smith, Seger, Ray, Maitner, and others, have developed the theory that groups can feel emotions towards one another, which motivates the action that groups take. Intergroup conflict can be explained by the emotions of the group. Israel and Palestine's conflict is intractable because the countries hate or fear one another; black citizens are shot by the police because of the fear felt by white citizens; homeless people are moved out of cities because of the disgust felt towards them by the broader society. The implicit premise, and the one that I will argue against, is that group emotions are the emotions that are felt by individuals when they categorise themselves as belonging to a group. According to Intergroup Emotion Theory, the group member feels an emotion that she takes to be the group's emotion.[11] As Mackie, Smith, and Ray define intergroup emotions:

> Intergroup emotions are generated by belonging to, and by deriving identity from, one social group rather than another. They are shaped by the very different ways in which different groups see the world, and they come, with time and repetition, to be part and parcel of group membership itself. Once incited, such intergroup emotions direct intergroup behavior. (2008, 1867)

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[11] Smith and Mackie explicitly claim that they do not envisage a group mind that experiences group emotion, but rather that intergroup emotion is experienced by the individuals within the group (2008, 429). This theoretical claim is not discussed in this context, but it comes up again in the philosophical debate about collective intentionality. It concerns the ontology of collective mental states. I will address this issue in Chapter 3.

Intergroup Emotion Theory can explain why individuals feel emotions about matters or objects that are of no relevance to them personally. As I said above, this research arose in response to concerns about the nature of prejudice, and it seeks to explain acts of prejudice, at both the individual and institutional level. When an individual commits a hate crime against a person that she does not personally know, we can explain that she is motivated by the emotion she feels as a group member against a person that she regards as belonging to the vilified outgroup. For example, Ray, Mackie and Smith give the example of one particular crime that occurred in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York:

> On September 15, 2001 Mark Stroman, a resident of Dallas, Texas, shot and killed Waqar Hasan, a Pakistani Muslim, as Hasan was cooking hamburgers in his grocery store. In explaining his motives, Stroman indicated that he wanted to retaliate against local Arabs for the September 11 terrorist attacks on the world trade centre in New York. (2014, 235)

In this example, Stroman does not know Hasan and has no personal reason to kill him. They have not interacted personally and so Hasan should be of no interest to Stroman. The anger or hatred that drives this murder makes no sense if we think of emotions at the individual level. At the group level, however, we can see how this act is driven by one group member's anger (as a representative of his group) at the terror attack a few days before, and how this act is a retaliation against the group perceived to be responsible for the terror attack. Stroman, a Texan, is angered by an event in New York because he regards himself as an American, and feels American rage about the attack on his group. In Ray and his colleagues' words, "the murderer's animosity was categorical" (2014, 238). When Stroman encounters Hasan, he regards Hasan as an Arab (mistakenly, given that Hasan was Pakistani), not as an individual. Hasan is perceived as a member of the enemy group, and is deemed responsible for that attack as a member of that group. Given that Stroman takes himself to be representing America, Intergroup Emotion Theory posits that Stroman's emotion is representative of what (he thinks) America feels. Stroman even explained his actions by saying that, "I did what every American wanted to do but didn't. They didn't have the nerve" (Solís 2012). In short, Stroman murders Hasan because (he thinks) America is angry with Arabs.

Intergroup emotions are a subset of a broader typology of group-level emotions, as Aarti Iyer and Colin Leach (2009) take care to show. Iyer and Leach argue that Intergroup Emotion Theory is concerned with the relations between groups and the emotions that motivate intergroup behaviour. The subject and the object of an

intergroup emotion are both groups: America is angry with Arabs, for example. But this is only one kind of group-level emotion, for group-level emotions concern all emotions that have a group subject and/or a group object. As they explain, there are five types of group-level emotions, two of which are personal group-level emotions, and three of which are group-based emotions (Iyer and Leach 2009, 96-103).

The typology of group-level emotions is determined by considering whether or not the subject and object of the emotion is an individual or a group. If the subject of the emotion is an individual, and the object is a group, then the emotion is a personal emotion, and it is the object that makes the emotion group-level. There are two kinds of personal group-level emotions: the personal emotion directed towards an outgroup, and the personal emotion about the ingroup. These emotions are group-level because the relationship between the subject and object is not interpersonal. The object is a group, and the members of that group are regarded as interchangeable representatives of the group, not as particular individuals. I am not concerned with these two types of group-level emotions, as they are simply a variety of social emotion experienced by an individual. The emotion that is experienced by the individual is not attributed to a group. Of more interest for my project will be the remaining three cases—those emotions with a group subject.

When a group-level emotion has a group subject, then the emotion is group-based. This is because the individual feels her emotion when she self-categorises as a group-member, and takes on her group's concerns as her own (see also Yzerbyt and Kuppens 2009, 147). There are three kinds of group-based emotions. The first is intergroup emotion, which I have outlined above. When an individual feels an intergroup emotion, she feels an emotion as an ingroup member towards an outgroup. The second kind is when she feels an emotion as an ingroup member towards her own group. The commonly discussed emotions of this sort are guilt and shame that individuals feel because of the acts committed by their group, for example, or pride, as in the case of nationalism or sport victories. The third kind of group-based emotion is the emotion felt by the individual as a group-member towards an individual. Britain, for example, mourned the death of Princess Diana, and it was as British citizens that individuals wept at her funeral (Iyer and Leach 2009, 103).[12] My interest is in these three types of group-

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[12] With celebrities, people often feel that they have a personal connection to the famous individual. As such, an alternative explanation for the widespread grief about Princess Diana's death is that it was felt as individual grief, because people may have mourned for her as if she had been a personal friend to them.

level emotions, because I am interested in those cases where we attribute emotions to a group. My focus is on those cases of emotion where the subject is said to be the group. In this chapter, then, I will explore the phenomenon of group-based emotions, which includes but is not limited to intergroup emotions.

An implication of Intergroup Emotion Theory is that group-based emotions are genuinely experienced by the individual and belong to her. She is the subject of the emotion insofar as she is a group member and she is the person who feels the emotion. On the other hand, the subject is also the group because the individual regards herself in terms of the social identity that is shared with her group. As Smith and Susan Henry argue, the individual is not disassociating from herself in some sense when she self-categorises as belonging to a particular group—she is not losing a sense of who she is. Rather, she is incorporating her group into her sense of self, and aligning herself with the group (Smith and Henry 1996, 635, Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1867).[13] She is only depersonalising to the extent that she is focusing on what makes her the same as her fellow group members. As such, while we attribute the emotion to the group, we are taking this to mean that group members experience the emotion in their individual bodies and minds.

In summary, the Intergroup Emotion Theory attributes emotions to groups and explains intergroup relations by the emotions experienced by the members of those groups. They think of group emotions as group-based emotions, which are emotions experienced by individuals when they regard themselves as group members. Individuals feel these emotions when they self-categorise as belonging to a particular group, and in self-categorising, take on the group's concerns as their own. When interacting in the world as a group member, individuals form group-based appraisals which give rise to group-based emotions. In feeling group-based emotions, the individual regards herself as representing the group and takes herself to be feeling the group's emotions.

In order to test this theory, social psychologists have developed many studies to test for and measure group-based emotions. Driving their research are questions about whether or not these group-based emotions are distinct from individual (interpersonal) emotions, whether or not the emotions are caused by group-level appraisals, and

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[13] There is possibly a worry about the theory of self-categorisation, which is that it appears that an individual can only think of herself in terms of one social identity at a time, or in terms of a social identity or her personal identity. I do not engage with this worry here, and I assume that individuals can think of themselves in terms of multiple identities at once. For the purposes of this thesis, I think the value of Intergroup Emotion Theory is that it shows that the group's concerns can be experienced by the individual as her own concerns.

whether or not group members share group-based emotions. They also test the action tendencies connected with group-based emotions. I am concerned with the broader question of whether group-based emotions can account for the phenomenon of group emotion. Intergroup Emotions Theory sets out to explain the emotions that groups feel, and to test the theory by investigating what group members feel. I will outline selected studies that confirm many of the hypotheses of Intergroup Emotion Theory, and reveal that group membership is a very important factor in the way we react emotionally.

I will argue, however, that a group-based emotion is *not* a group emotion, because individuals do not feel group-based emotions *together*, as a group. Although an individual feels a group-based emotion when she thinks of herself as a group member, Intergroup Emotion Theory does not show that the individual necessarily shares her emotion with her fellow group members. If a group-based emotion is not shared by group-members, the members of the group may feel many different group-based emotions about the same object, making it implausible to attribute one or the other group-based emotion to the group as a whole. There is suggestive evidence that group members tend to feel the same group-based emotions when confronted with the same situation, but the conclusions reached from these studies are not conclusive. Nevertheless, these studies give us valuable insight into the extent of the impact that group membership has on individual emotional experience.

2 Group-based emotions

In order to confirm the phenomenon of group-based emotion, several studies have been designed to record and measure the emotions reported by individuals who self-categorise as group members. The research has been fruitful, as the combined product of the studies has been to confirm several hypotheses about the impact of social identity on an individual's emotions, and about the particular nature of group-based emotion that distinguishes it from individual emotion. The studies that I outline in this chapter will help me to define the features of group emotion I discuss in later chapters, namely, that group members feel the group emotion when regarding themselves as group members, and that the group's emotion is shared by the members of the group.

In this section, I focus on three hypotheses about group-based emotion:

1. Group-based emotions are experienced when individuals self-categorise as belonging to particular groups;

2. The degree to which the group member identifies with her group can increase or decrease the strength of the group-based emotion; and

3. Group-based emotions are shared by group members.[14]

These studies provide compelling evidence that there is a phenomenon of group-based emotion, that is distinct from individual emotion, and which is due to the fact that the individual self-categorises as belonging to a group and takes herself to be a representative of the group. This finding is complicated by the finding that the strength of the emotion varies according to how much the individual identifies with the group to which she categorises herself as belonging. As we shall see, strongly identifying members will feel positive group-based emotions quite strongly, and negative group-based emotions quite weakly. It is, however, the third hypothesis that is the most important claim for my thesis. The studies that I present here do not, however, conclusively confirm the hypothesis that group-based emotions are shared by group members. Indeed, the findings lend support to the claim that group-based emotions are not (by definition) shared. This means that group-based emotions are not, in themselves, group emotions because a group member may feel a group-based emotion that is different to what other group members feel. If group members do not feel the same group-based emotion, we cannot say that the group feels that group-based emotion.

2.1 Group membership determines an emotional response

The first hypothesis about group-based emotion is that self-categorised group membership influences the emotional reactions of individuals. The studies by Ray, Mackie, Rydell and Smith (2008) and Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2012) show that if individuals regard themselves as a member of one group and then as a member of another group, they will have different emotional reactions to the same target (in this case, another group). This suggests that the kind of emotion the individual experiences is not determined by the object that it is intentionally directed to, but by the way the individual self-categorises. Depending on which group she belongs to, she can have several different emotions about the same object. She can also have one kind of emotion as an individual, and another as a member of a particular group.[15]

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[14] These three hypotheses are from a list of four that Smith, Seger, and Mackie enumerate (2007, 432). The second in their list of four is that group-based emotions are distinct from individual emotions. The discussion of this fourth hypothesis is incorporated into the discussion of the other three hypotheses, and I do not address it separately.

[15] This can explain why at times we may have conflicting emotions.

Ray and his colleagues' study aims to show that the emotion an individual experiences is influenced by how she categorises herself (2008, 1210-1212). The influence of group membership is shown by comparing which emotions participants reported when they self-categorised as belonging to two different groups. 132 American undergraduates from University of California, Santa Barbara, were asked to self-categorise as either a student or non-student, or an American or non-American. They were asked to list three traits of their chosen group and to rate the extent to which they personally possessed those traits, to ensure that the self-categorisation process was effective. The participants (identifying as either students or Americans) were then asked to rate the extent to which they felt particular emotions in relation to Muslim people or to the police. Initial testing had shown that Muslim people were seen as being in a negative relationship with Americans, and in a more positive relationship with students, whereas the police were viewed positively by Americans and negatively by students. The participants were asked to rate how intensely they felt six emotions (angry, irritated, furious, admiring, appreciative, and respectful) on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). Once they had done this, the process was repeated for the other social identity (student or American).

Participants felt different emotions towards the police and towards Muslim people when they changed how they self-categorised. The results indicated that when the participants categorised themselves as Americans, they felt less anger and more respect towards the police than when they categorised themselves as students. Towards Muslim people, the participants felt more anger and less respect when they thought of themselves as American, than when they thought of themselves as students. What this shows is that the same individuals, when responding to one object (Muslim people), feel different emotions when thinking of their membership of the American group compared to when thinking of their membership of the student group.

The researchers acknowledge that one objection to this result is that the emotion that the individual felt changed because the object of the emotion was implicitly re-categorised, rather than because the individual re-categorised herself (Ray et al. 2008, 1212). While thinking of herself as a student, the participant may have viewed the police as the outgroup, but when she thought of herself as an American, she may have implicitly re-categorised the police as belonging to her own group, seeing them as fellow Americans. In order to determine whether the object of the emotion was re-categorised when the individuals changed their own self-categorisation, the participants

were asked to imagine the typical police officer and the typical Muslim person. The results showed that all of the participants imagined a typical police officer as American, and so it was possible that the change in emotion felt towards the police was due to the re-categorisation of the police from belonging to an outgroup to belonging to the ingroup. This could suggest that the participants felt more respect towards the police when they self-categorised as American because they felt respect towards fellow group members, rather than feeling respect towards members of an outgroup. However, when imagining the typical Muslim person, only 13.6% of the participants categorised as American and 37.5% of those categorised as students thought of the Muslim person as being either a fellow American or fellow student. In this case, it was unlikely that the change in emotional reaction to Muslim people was due to an implicit re-categorisation of Muslim people as belonging to the ingroup. By changing the way she categorised herself, the participant's emotion towards a Muslim person changed: as an American, she felt more anger and less respect towards Muslim people than as a student. This gives credence to the claim that an individual's group membership can change the individual's emotion when it is made salient to her.

Kuppens and Yzerbyt also show that group membership has an impact on the emotion experienced as they show that some social identities trigger strong emotions towards a particular target while others do not (2012, 20-33). In their studies, they measured the emotions of Dutch-speaking female Belgian students when thinking about Muslim people, and in this study, the participants were manipulated to self-categorise as either individuals, as belonging to a group that perceived Muslim people as a threat to the group (women), or as belonging to a group that had no relationship with Muslim people. Kuppens and Yzerbyt establish that it is not simply that the participants view themselves as group members rather than individuals that makes a difference to their emotions. The participants have to view themselves as belonging to a relevant group that has some relationship with Muslim people. Much like Ray and his colleagues' study, these participants filled out questionnaires and rated their emotions when thinking about Muslim people. Two studies were done, as the first did not sufficiently ensure that the target outgroup for each of the three groups of participants (individuals, women, and the non-relevant group) was identical. In the first study, it was possible that the individuals and the non-relevant group thought of both Muslim men and women as belonging to the group labelled Muslim people, whereas the group of women thought only of Muslim men (Kuppens and Yzerbyt 2012, 25). The second study ensured that

all three groups thought of Muslim men (as a group, not particular individuals), and that all three groups were provided with the same information about Muslim culture and the perceived inferior role of women within this culture. This study showed that when the participants identified as either individuals or as belonging to a non-relevant group, they did not feel strong emotions about Muslim men, but when they regarded themselves as women, they felt much stronger disgust, fear, and anger toward Muslim men (Kuppens and Yzerbyt 2012, 26-27). By viewing themselves as belonging to the group of women, they felt stronger emotions than otherwise.[16]

It is not controversial to claim that social identities, or group membership, can influence our emotions, and this is a claim that the sceptic about group emotion can accept. As Aaron Ben-Ze'ev tells us, for example, "[g]roup membership is one of the most powerful factors in our emotional lives: the mere act of assigning people to different groups tends to accentuate the perceived cognitive and evaluative differences between them" (2001, 26). For Ben-Ze'ev and his fellow sceptics about group emotion, the groups to which individuals belong incorporate particular norms that shape emotional development and emotional expression. But the claim being made in the studies by Ray and his colleagues, and Kuppens and Yzerbyt is stronger than that. They show that it is possible for an individual to have different emotions towards the same object and that this is because of the way she regards herself when she is responding. She can think of herself as an individual, or as a group member, and further than that, as a member of multiple groups. What we can conclude from these studies is that individual emotions are distinct from group-based emotions, because in group-based emotions, the individual has undergone a process of self-categorisation (and depersonalisation). According to the Intergroup Emotion Theory, when the individual feels a group-based emotion, she is responding to the object of her emotion as a representative of her group.

2.2 The impact of group identification on group-based emotion

The second claim about group-based emotions is that the level of identification with her ingroup will affect the strength of the participant's emotion. The identification

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[16] In this study, the second aim is to establish that the emotions arise because of the appraisals the participants made about the outgroup. As such, it did not record the emotions that the individuals felt as individuals or as belonging to the non-relevant group, only that the participants did not feel much fear, anger, and disgust. This is why the conclusion here is about the strength of the emotion, rather than the difference in kind of emotion felt.

hypothesis is that the more strongly a group member feels identified with a group, the more intensely she will feel positive emotions (and in an interesting converse, the less intensely she will feel negative emotions), because her group membership will play a larger role in how she defines herself.[17] An individual who feels that her American nationality is a central social identity for herself will feel immense pride when America does well in the Olympics, for example, whereas others who do not feel strongly about their American identity will not feel pride to the same extent. In confirming this hypothesis, the studies by Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007, Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009) show that there is a predictable relationship between the participant's individual emotion and her group-based emotion, which indicates that the experiences are distinct from one another.

Smith and his colleagues (2007) ran two studies in which the participants had to self-categorise as belonging to particular groups and complete a questionnaire in which they rated the extent to which they felt emotions on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Participants in the first study were 110 Indiana University students, and they were asked to complete the questionnaire three times (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 434-437). In the first questionnaire, the participants were asked, "[a]s an individual, to what extent do you feel each of the following [twelve] emotions?" In the second, they were asked, "[a]s an Indiana student, to what extent do you feel each of the following [twelve] emotions?" In the third, the students self-categorised as either a Republican or a Democrat, and were asked again about their emotions. These three surveys were given in random order, so the participant may have first regarded herself as an individual and then as a group member, or vice-versa. In the questionnaires measuring group-based emotion, the students were also asked to rate the extent to which they identified with that group on four criteria. The second study followed the same structure but had a larger sample size of 445 students, and instead of self-categorising as a student, the participants were asked to self-categorise as an American (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 437-441). The wording of the question was also changed to ensure that the students reported what they were actually experiencing, rather than what they supposed a typical group member would feel. So in these questionnaires, they were asked, "[w]hen you think of yourself as an American/Democrat/Republican, to what extent do

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[17] I will not examine the studies on group-based guilt in this chapter, but will discuss them in Chapter 3. These show that strongly identifying group members feel weaker group-based guilt than weakly identifying group members.

you feel each of the following [thirteen] emotions?"[18] In both studies, the researchers developed emotion profiles for each group from the results, showing the mean to which group members would feel each emotion. As such, the researchers could say that the average group member would feel a particular combination of emotions.

As with Ray and his colleagues' study and Kuppens and Yzerbyt's studies, Smith and his colleagues' studies confirmed that changing which social identity is salient for the participant impacts which emotion is felt (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 441-444). In these studies though, there was some overlap between individual and group-based emotions, in that participants would report experiencing the same kind of emotion (such as joy or pride) but to a different degree depending on the level of her identification with the salient social identity. The focus of these studies was to distinguish the strength of the individual emotion from the strengths of the various group-based emotions. The intensity of the emotion correlated with the degree to which the participant identified with her group. Individuals who identified quite strongly as a group member—a student, a Democrat, a Republican, or an American—would feel much higher levels of positive emotions such as joy or pride, and much lower levels of negative emotions such as guilt or fear. The opposite was true of individuals who did not identify strongly with their group. One individual, identifying as an individual, may feel pride to the degree of 3 (on the scale of 0 to 7), but when identifying as a student, to the degree of 6 if she strongly identifies as a student, or only 4 if she does not strongly identify as a student. This shows that the degree to which an individual identifies with a group will influence the degree to which she feels a group-based emotion.

The most interesting results from these studies emerge when the profiles of each group's emotions were examined. An emotion profile was developed for each group, which was the average of the emotions reported by the individuals when identifying as a group member. What emerged is that there were distinct emotion profiles for each group. The average profile for students was a distinctly different profile to that for Democrats, Republicans, and Americans. It is possible to say that, on average, Americans feel one particular profile of emotions, and that Democrats feel a different profile, for example, even though those groups are made up of the same individuals. This has predictive value for what the individual will feel when she categorises herself

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[18] The twelve emotions measured in the first study were the negative emotions of anger, fear, disgust, uneasiness, guilt, and irritation; and the positive emotions of satisfaction, hopefulness, pride, happiness, gratitude, and respect. The second study added a thirteenth emotion, as it divided anger into two emotions: anger at the ingroup, and anger at the outgroup.

as belonging to a particular group: she will come to feel something like the emotional profile of that group. Taking this further, there was a reliable correlation between the individual emotion and the group-based emotion. By taking into account the level of her identification with her group, the researchers could predict the degree to which a participant's individual emotion would change when she self-categorised as a group member. If she identified strongly with her group, she would feel group-based emotions that came very close to the group profile, whereas the less-strongly identifying individuals would not come as close to the group profile. Smith and his colleagues interpret this result as confirming the hypothesis that group-based emotions are distinct from individual-level emotions. Not only are the emotion profiles of the different identities distinct, the correlation between the profiles is consistent according to the level of identification (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 444).

Seger and his colleagues (2009) set out to confirm and extend the results of Smith and his colleagues' studies. Like Smith and his colleagues, they showed that there are statistically different emotions reported by an individual when she thinks of herself as an individual or as a group member, and that these differences correlate with the degree to which she identifies with her group. In their studies, they wanted to show that the emotions reported are genuinely experienced, even when the individuals were not explicitly asked to self-categorise as group members (Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009, 465). Rather than asking individuals to self-categorise as particular group members, they primed their participants through the use of music or pictures to take on particular social identities. When primed, instead of asking the participants, "[a]s a group-member, what emotion do you feel?", they simply asked, "[w]hat emotion do you feel?" By priming the individuals to self-categorise as group members rather than asking them explicitly to do so, the study circumvents the potential confound of individuals reporting what they thought they should feel, rather than reporting what they actually felt. Seger and his colleagues show that group-based emotions do not require explicit self-categorisation with a group in order to be experienced.

Their studies used the same questionnaire as Smith and his colleagues used in their 2007 studies, and the Indiana University students were asked to report their emotions when thinking of themselves as individuals. The participants were then primed to self-categorise with a particular group, using music in the first study and a photo in the second. In the music study, the 98 participants listened to four one-minute clips that included the *Star-Spangled Banner* (the US prime), *Indiana Fight!* (the

Indiana University student prime), and two filler songs (Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009, 462-463). After each song, the participants rated their emotions on the 7-point scale. For the photo study, the 82 participants were exposed to ten photographs, each relating to either America or Indiana University, and asked to identify the dominant colour of each photograph (Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009, 463-464). They then rated their emotions. In both studies, the participants also went on to identify their explicit group-based emotions, using the original questionnaire from Smith and his colleagues' study, with the wording, "[a]s an [American/IU student], to what extent do you feel each of the following emotions?"

What Seger and his colleagues show is that when subtly primed, participants converge to the same emotion profile as when they are asked to explicitly self-categorise as group members, which is a distinct emotion profile to that which they reported as individuals (2009, 465). The researchers conclude that the emotions are genuinely experienced (rather than being the report of an emotional stereotype), regardless of whether the group-based emotions are explicitly reported or subtly primed. The study also shows that it may be very difficult to distinguish between group-based and individual emotions by examining the phenomenological experience of the emotion. An individual may not know that she is self-categorising as belonging to a group, as she could be subtly primed to be thinking of herself as a group member and this social identity may be salient for an extended period. The individual emotion and the group-based emotion appear to be both genuinely experienced.

Which social identity is salient for an individual in any given moment depends on the individual's context. In considering the impact that group membership has on the individual's emotions in the real world as opposed to a laboratory environment, Ray and his colleagues remind us that the salience of a social identity can be prompted by subtle changes in the individual's environment. Much like the effect of priming, the individual's context can cause her to self-categorise differently, perhaps unconsciously. Ray and his colleagues give the example of a conversation between two men and two women. Initially, gender does not distinguish the conversationalists from one another, and so their gender identities may not be salient at that moment. But if a dispute arises and the men agree with one another but disagree with the women, this new context may trigger a change in self-categorisation for the individuals. The dispute may trigger an unconscious comparison of the conversationalists, and so lead the participants to self-categorise as being in the same category as the person who agrees with them. In this

context, the disagreement may lead the parties to regard their gendered identities as being most salient and come to feel group-based (in this case, gender-based) responses to the dispute (Ray, Mackie, and Smith 2014, 237).

One study in a real-life context confirms the findings of the studies presented above. Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) investigated how Dutch and Belgian participants responded to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States.[19] They conducted their studies one week after the attack, and what they found was that when the participants were subtly manipulated to self-categorise as belonging to different groups, the participants felt different group-based emotions. When self-categorised as being a member of the victim group (that is, Americans and Europeans were categorised together as Westerners, and as the victims of an attack by Arabs led by Osama Bin Laden), the participants felt much more fear than when they were self-categorised as being in a different group to the victims (in this case, the Americans were an outgroup, and were the victims of an attack). The feelings of anger and sadness were not affected by the identity manipulation.

What the studies have shown thus far is that individuals feel different emotions when self-categorising as belonging to different groups; that the intensity of the emotion depends on the level of identification with the group; and that with particular groups, particular emotion profiles arise that not only provide evidence that individual emotions and group-based emotions are distinct, but can also predict how much the individual's emotion will change when she categorises as being a group member. We can say that, on average, group members will feel a profile of emotions when that group membership is most salient, and that this means that individuals who regard themselves as group members will reliably change their emotions according to the degree to which they identify with that group. The salience of group membership appears to give rise to group-based emotions that are distinct from individual emotions.

2.3 Do group members share group-based emotions?

The third hypothesis about group-based emotion is the most important for the purposes of my thesis, which is the hypothesis that group-based emotions are shared. If group-based emotions were shared between the group members, this would support Intergroup Emotion Theory's initial assertion that group-based emotions are group emotions. We

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[19] See also Yzerbyt and Kuppens (2009, 151).

could say that when an individual feels a group-based emotion, she is feeling the group's emotion, because other group members feel the same group-based emotion.

Both Smith and his colleagues and Seger and his colleagues note that the group-based emotions individuals feel tend to converge towards the average emotion profile for the group, such that the emotion profiles for each individual when categorised as a group member are quite similar (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 436, 441, Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009, 464). This is especially true when the individual's profile is considered against her degree of identification with her group. Strongly identifying members converge much more towards the group profile than weakly identifying members. It appears that when individuals self-categorise as belonging to a group, they will come to feel something like what the rest of the group is feeling, for they appear to be converging towards the same emotional profile. There are some variations between members according to the degree of identification with the group, but by and large, it appears that the members in some way come to feel what other group members are feeling. Seger and his colleagues showed that this is true even when self-categorisation with the group is implicit rather than explicit—the participants' profiles of the primed group-based emotions were the same as the profile of their explicitly reported group-based emotions, both of which converged towards the average group profile (2009, 465). It is because of this convergence that it becomes possible to predict the emotions that individuals will feel when they class themselves with a group, given their membership and the level of identification with a group.

Is the convergence coincidental? It would appear not. Other studies have shown that when participants are given information about what other members are feeling, their group-based emotions change accordingly. Leonard, Moons, Mackie, and Smith (2011), for example, show that they can change how much anger their participants feel by manipulating the information available to the participant. In the first study, they asked participants how angry they perceived their group to be, and then they assessed how angry the participants reported themselves to be when they self-categorised as belonging to the group (Leonard et al. 2011, 102-104). 57 female students were asked, "[h]ow angry do [Americans/women] feel on average?" Two to four weeks later, the participants were asked to report their gender (to prompt self-categorisation with the group of women), and were presented with a vignette of an ambiguous situation where sexual discrimination may be occurring. The participants then completed a questionnaire about how they felt when thinking about themselves as women, on a scale

of 0 to 7. As predicted, the angrier the women perceived their group to be, the angrier they reported themselves to be when they self-categorised as women. The degree to which they perceived Americans to be angry, on the other hand, did not impact how angry they reported themselves to be when they were categorised as women.

The second study by Leonard and her colleagues replicated this finding, by giving different information about the group's anger to different groups (Leonard et al. 2011, 104-107). In this study, the 89 female participants were divided into two groups. Each group was given an example of the alleged level of anger felt by women on average, on a scale of 0 to 7, but the first group was shown that the group feels considerable anger (6 on the scale), whereas the second group was shown that the group feels little anger (2 on the scale). Each group was presented with a vignette of possible sexual discrimination and were then asked to report their emotions. Again, as predicted, participants in the first group (the high-anger group) reported experiencing significantly more group-based anger than the second group (the low-anger group). The conclusion reached in this study is that a group member is influenced by her perception of what her group feels, and she will tend to emotionally conform accordingly. Ray and his colleagues explain this conclusion by suggesting that when feeling group-based emotion, consensus between group members is subtly encouraged (2014, 245-246). By self-categorising, the individual takes herself to be homogenous with her fellow group-members and so may feel uncomfortable with a discrepancy between her reaction and other members' reactions.

It is telling that individuals appear to converge towards a common group emotion profile when they regard themselves as group members. However, this cannot yet establish that the reason they do this is because they *share* the group-based emotion with their fellow group members. It is not yet apparent what causes the convergence. The studies by Smith and his colleagues (2007), Seger and his colleagues (2009), and Leonard and her colleagues (2011) may lead us to think that merely by self-categorising, the individual is prompted to conform emotionally with the group that she belongs to. But Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin (2014) designed five studies that show that emotional conformity only occurs in certain instances when the individual self-categorises as a group-member. In some instances, the individual may have a sense about how her group should feel, and this sense may cause the individual to regulate her group-based emotion such that her emotion profile does not converge towards the group's emotion profile.

In the studies by Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin in both Israel and the United States, they show that whether or not an individual aligns her group-based emotion with the emotion she perceives in her group depends on whether or not she thinks that the group *should* feel that emotion. Their studies reveal that when an individual thinks that her group should respond in a particular way and she perceives that her group does not feel the appropriate collective emotion, she will not align her emotion with the perceived collective emotion. It is only in cases when she thinks that a particular response is not necessarily appropriate that she will conform emotionally to the perceived collective emotion, that is, to the emotion that she perceives her group to feel.

In their studies, Goldenberg and his colleagues make a distinction between group-based emotion and collective emotion (what I will call a group emotion) (2014, 582). Group-based emotions are emotions felt by the individual, determined by her group-level appraisal and her identification with her group. Collective emotions are group-based emotions that are shared and felt simultaneously by a large number of the group members and as such are attributed to the group. Goldenberg and his colleagues designed five studies to show how the participant's perception of the collective emotion makes a difference in the level of group-based emotion that she feels. In the first study, 97 Jewish Israelis (between the ages of 17 to 70) were approached on a train to complete a questionnaire (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 583-584). They were presented with a fictional article that would induce group-based guilt as it indicates that Israel commits a wrongdoing against an Israeli-Arab child. The perception of collective guilt was manipulated: the participants were told that according to a survey, 81% of Jewish Israelis felt guilt about this event (the high collective guilt condition), or that 81% of Jewish Israelis did not feel any guilt (the low collective guilt condition). The participants' recorded their responses according to a seven-point scale, which indicated to the researchers the degree to which they felt group-based guilt. The political stance and level of identification with their group (Jewish Israelis) was also recorded. The results showed that participants in the low collective guilt condition felt significantly higher levels of group-based guilt than the participants in the high collective guilt condition. The researchers conclude that if the participant thinks that her group has little collective guilt, she experiences more group-based guilt. The suggested explanation for this result is that the perceived collective emotion regulates the individual's group-based emotion, but not necessarily in the direction of conformity. Study 2 replicates these findings but with the case of collective and group-based anger rather than

collective and group-based guilt, again with 60 Jewish Israeli train commuters (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 584-585).

In the third study, Goldenberg and his colleagues wanted to further investigate why participants would not conform to what they perceive as the collective emotion of their group (2014, 585-586). In this study, the participants were not told what other Jewish Israelis felt, but had to indicate what they perceived the collective emotion to be, and what they thought the collective emotion should be. The hypothesis is that emotional nonconformity by an individual occurs when she perceives a discrepancy between her perception of how other members feel and what she thinks the appropriate collective emotion should be. If she thinks a particular collective emotion is appropriate but does not perceive that this is how her group responds, she may feel obligated to "up-regulate" her group-based emotion, that is, to feel group-based emotion more strongly in order to compensate for the inappropriateness of her group's response. If she thinks that a particular collective emotion is appropriate and that this matches her perception about how her group feels, she may feel relieved of her emotional burden (her obligation to feel her group-based emotion), and feel her own group-based emotion less strongly. In both cases, her group-based emotion does not align with her group's collective emotion. It is only in cases where she does not assume that a particular collective emotion is demanded by the situation that she aligns her group-based emotion to that of her fellow group members' group-based emotions.

The hypothesis that the individual does not emotionally conform when she perceives that her group does not respond as she thinks it ought to, was confirmed. Once again, 103 Jewish Israeli train commuters (ages 18 and 70) were approached, with the same fictional story as in Study 1 but without the survey information about how other Jewish Israelis felt about the event described. Instead, the participants recorded the degree to which they thought Jewish Israelis should feel guilty on a six-point scale, and the degree to which they thought Jewish Israelis actually felt guilty, again on a six-point scale. They then indicated on the same scale the degree to which they felt group-based guilt. It was clear that those participants who thought that Jewish Israelis should feel guilt tended to react in the opposite way to the way they perceived Jewish Israelis actually felt. If the participant perceived her group to feel a high level of collective guilt, she felt less group-based guilt, and if she perceived her group to feel a low level of collective guilt, she felt more group-based guilt (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 586). The participant's level of group-based guilt tended to converge towards her

perception of the level of actual collective guilt only in those cases where she did not think that guilt was necessarily the appropriate response.

The fourth study confirmed the findings and offered an explanation for the cases of non-conformity (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 587-590). 161 Jewish Israeli train commuters and 20 Jewish Israeli students (all between the ages of 17 and 69) were given one of two fictional articles: one to induce a high level of group-based guilt and the other to induce a low level of group-based guilt. For both articles, the participants were given survey information that told them that either 81% of their group felt guilt or that 81% did not feel guilt. The questionnaires were used to record the level of group-based guilt that the participants felt. However, in this study, the participants also had to indicate how they felt (as individuals) about their own group in response to this information: they were asked to report how guilty, disappointed, and ashamed they felt on discovering how much (or little) collective guilt their group feels. As with the previous studies, participants did not emotionally conform if they thought that their group was not responding with the appropriate level of collective guilt. The information provided about the participants' emotions towards their group as a result of the perceived collective emotion indicated that in those cases where the participant thought that her group should respond with collective guilt but did not, her group-based emotion was mediated by her individual emotion towards her group (that is, her guilt, disappointment, or shame about the collective emotion). She felt more group-based guilt about the event because she felt more negative emotions about her own ingroup. This process is called emotional transfer (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 590).

It would be labouring the point to describe Study 5, which took place in the United States and showed that the process of emotional transfer and that the sense of emotional obligation regulates the participant's group-based emotion, such that she does not align with her group's collective response when she thinks that it is not responding as it should (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 590-592). What I hope is clear from this discussion is that there is a clear distinction between group-based emotions and collective emotions: the group-based emotion is experienced by the individual when she thinks of herself as a group member, but this does not mean that she is experiencing the same group-based emotion that her fellow group-members are experiencing. Members of the same group may not share the same group-based emotion.

The studies by Smith and his colleagues (2007), Seger and his colleagues (2009), and Leonard and her colleagues (2011) showed that individuals converge towards a group's emotion profile, whether or not they have explicitly self-categorised as group members. Goldenberg and his colleagues' (2014) studies challenge the conclusion that group members will align with another's emotional responses. Their studies indicate that the mechanisms by which individuals regulate their group-based emotions, and the factors that impact their emotional regulation, need to be more closely examined.

It is worth noting that in the studies on emotional conformity and emotional nonconformity, the researchers were looking at how the intensity of the emotional experience was impacted. In Goldenberg and his colleagues' (2014) study, for example, they measured whether or not the participants felt more or less group-based guilt according to their perception of the group-based emotions of their fellow group members. I argued above that group-based emotion is determined by the way the individual self-categorises, but the strength of her group-based emotion depends on the degree to which the individual identifies with her group. As such, the conclusion at this point in the argument is not that individuals do not feel the same kind of group-based emotion when they self-categorise. Rather, the individuals do not feel the group-based emotion to the same degree. This would suggest that the individual's sense of how her group should respond to an event interacts with her level of identification with her group, but not with her self-categorisation. Further investigation would need to explore the interaction of the individual's perception of appropriate collective emotion on her level of identification, and her process of self-categorisation. We may still conclude from the evidence above that by self-categorising, individuals form the same kind of group-based emotion, although I think that this needs further investigating.[20] What we cannot say is that this group-based emotion is *shared*. The perception of how other group members feel can cause the individual to either align her emotional response with theirs or, in a sense, to emotionally distance herself from her group by regulating her own group-based emotion. Her group-based emotion is hers, not hers and her group's *together*.

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[20] I think that the studies by Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin (2014) throw findings by Smith and his colleagues (2007) into doubt. If individuals regulate their group-based emotion according to how they think that the group should respond, it seems possible that not only would the intensity of their emotion change but possibly the kind of emotion that they feel as well. The group member who thinks her group should feel collective guilt and perceives that it does not would feel stronger group-based guilt. We would then say that the group feels a collective emotion that is not guilt (complacency or pride perhaps), whereas the individual feels group-based guilt.

3 Is a group-based emotion a group emotion?

Intergroup Emotion Theory asserts that individuals feel group-based emotions when they self-categorise as belonging to a particular group, and so regard themselves as interchangeable members of that group. In feeling group-based emotion, the individual is concerned with her group's goals and projects, and appraises the world according to the group's concerns. As a member, she represents her group, and when she feels her group-based emotion, she takes herself to be feeling her group's emotion. In what sense is her group-based emotion her group's emotion?

I think that the intergroup emotion theorists attribute the members' group-based emotions to their group because of an implicit modelling of group emotion as a top-down phenomenon. A top-down model of group emotion is one that sees "group emotion as powerful forces dramatically shaping and exaggerating individual emotional response" (Barsade and Gibson 1998, 81). If we think back to the early research on crowd emotion that I mentioned in the Introduction, the literature is concerned with the overwhelming nature of the crowd's emotion on the individual. The individual is swept up by the crowd and takes on an emotion that is not initially her own. What she feels is the emotion that those around her feel. What causes the individual to feel her emotion is the perception of the crowd's emotion. This conception of crowd emotion forms the backdrop for the contemporary social psychology literature on group emotion, and may implicitly shape how we model group emotions.

One possible reason that these theorists think of group-based emotions as group emotion is indicated by their theory about how group-based emotions develop. In my discussion of group-based emotion, I have been guided by my understanding of emotion as embodied appraisal, as argued in Chapter 1. As such, I have focused on the claim that group-based appraisals give rise to group-based emotions. But Mackie and her colleagues distinguish two processes that give rise to group-based emotions. The first is by group-based appraisal, which occurs when the individual self-categorises as a group-member and appraises a situation in accordance with her group's concerns. The second process (that I did not discuss above) is by means of self-stereotyping (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1871-1873). An individual self-stereotypes when, by self-categorising, she not only regards the group's concerns as her own, but also adopts the emotion stereotype of her group as her own. As part of the group's identity, there may be a stereotype about the emotions that characterise the typical group member. We may

think of a particular group as being aggressive, having members that are typically quick to anger, whereas another group is characterised as easy-going with happy and fun-loving members. By categorising herself as a member of a group, the group member may adopt what she takes to be the typical emotion of her group by self-stereotyping.

In the studies by Leonard and her colleagues (2011), they gave their participants information about how their groups typically respond to such events. They did this to manipulate the process of self-stereotyping, and were able to show that different emotion stereotypes led to the participants regulating the intensity of their group-based emotions. But the interaction between the two processes triggered by self-categorising, self-stereotyping or group-based appraisal is unclear. Moons, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2009) distinguish between these processes, and in their studies, they show that individuals can self-stereotype without appraising a particular object. This means that an individual adopts an emotion due to a stereotype, without focusing on a particular object.

Moons and his colleagues' studies did not give their participants particular events to respond to. In a study with 87 undergraduate American women, participants were given a survey and told that they may need to answer questions multiple times to "ensure validity of the responses" (Moons et al. 2009, 761-763). They were asked to indicate their personal (individual-level) emotions on a 9-point scale, but importantly, these emotions were not directed to particular objects. Instead they were asked, "[w]hen you think of yourself as an individual, to what extent do you feel…" a particular emotion. They completed the survey a second time, this time by self-categorising as an American. Just before completing the survey a third time, the participants were presented with an emotion stereotype: they were told that the data collected so far indicated that Americans report very high (or very low) levels of fear (or anger). With only a minute between the second and third survey, the participants again indicated how they felt as Americans. They then re-categorised as individuals and completed the study a fourth time. The results from this study showed that the emotion stereotype changed the individual's group-based emotion—she reported a level of group-based emotion that was consistent with the level of the stereotyped emotion. The stereotype did not influence the participant's individual emotions, or her other group-based emotions such as sadness or happiness.

An emotion stereotype is not a group emotion. It is an individual's association of a particular emotion with a particular group. Mackie and her colleagues suggest that if a

group-based emotion is generated often enough, it may become linked to being a group member. It would then become an emotion stereotype for that group (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1872). The stereotype can be conveyed in many ways, and I think that the studies by Moons and his colleagues (2009) and Leonard and her colleagues (2011) show us that by giving an individual information about how her group responds, her own response may be powerfully impacted. This suggests that the representation of group emotion in media, for example, can be very influential in shaping the actual emotional experiences of individuals. Emma Hutchison (2010), a researcher in international relations, analyses several cases where the media play an important role in creating narratives about how groups feel. She gives the example of the response to the 2002 Bali bombing. On 12 October 2002, a bomb in a tourist bar in Kuta, Bali, killed 202 people, of which 88 were Australians. In the immediate aftermath, Hutchison shows how the media immediately depicted the event as one of national significance for Australia. The pain of the victims' families became the pain of the nation. The Australian media represented Australia as experiencing collective trauma and grief about the loss of citizens in Bali.[21] Media representation of group emotion, I suggest, can provide a powerful impetus for the individual to, firstly, consider the event as relevant to herself by virtue of her common group membership, and secondly, to regulate her response to it in accordance with the media's narrative about that group's emotion.[22] In this case, the Australian may genuinely experience group-based (Australian) grief about the deaths of fellow Australians in Bali.

Goldenberg and his colleagues' (2014) studies show us that when an individual is given information about how other group members feel, or perhaps an emotion stereotype, the individual may or may not self-stereotype accordingly. Some individuals do not emotionally conform, suggesting that in their cases at least, they came to feel a group-based emotion by forming a group-based appraisal of the event. In doing so, they establish what they think the appropriate response by the group should be, and then evaluate the perceived collective emotion according to the appropriate response. There is no suggestion that this evaluation is done by the group as a group. The individual, as a group member, feels that her group should respond with a particular degree of

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[21] In a paper with Roland Bleiker, Hutchison tells us that, "[media] [r]epresentation is the process by which individual emotions acquire a collective dimension and, in turn, shape social and political processes" (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 130).

[22] I return to this idea in Chapter 6, when I develop my model of group emotion.

emotion.[23] As an individual, she compares the response she deems appropriate with the perceived collective emotion, and regulates the degree to which she feels her own group-based emotion as a result.

I do not rule out that an emotion may be widely associated with a group, such that it is well known that a group feels a particular way. In these cases, it may well be that by self-stereotyping, the individual is taking on an emotion that other individuals also take on by self-stereotyping. Mackie and her colleagues give the example of being a sport fan. They tell us that anger and disgust at Boston Red Sox victories is part of the identity of being a Yankees baseball fan (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1872). I think this kind of emotion stereotype is a kind of emotional norm, and I will be analysing a normative account of collective emotion in the next chapter.

When Mackie, Smith, and their colleagues developed the Intergroup Emotion Theory, they were motivated by the idea that group prejudice could be explained by group emotions. As a result, they developed the notion of group-based emotion as a possible conception of collective emotion. With a background assumption that a model of group emotion would be a top-down model, they attributed the group-based emotion to the group. If members feel group-based emotion, it must be that the group feels that emotion. But Intergroup Emotion Theory is actually a bottom-up model of group emotion. On this model, a group emotion is in some way composed by the emotions of the individuals within that group (Barsade and Gibson 1998, 81). I have argued that as it currently stands, the theory about group-based emotion cannot show that group members share their emotions with one another. As such, I do not think that this account of group-based emotion is sufficient to establish that groups feel emotion. It may be the case that many group members feel the same group-based emotion, but then we can only establish that the group feels a collective emotion in the aggregative sense. It would not yet show that the group members feel that group-based emotion as a group, in a way that the group-based emotion is not reducible to their individual emotions. In a recent article, Ray and his colleagues reach the same conclusion, indicating a subtle shift from their initial argument:

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[23] It is implicitly assumed that the individual's own group-based emotion is of the same sort as the emotion that she thinks her group should feel, and initially of the same degree.

These [group-based or intergroup] emotions are not collective in the sense that they must be experienced with others or in the sense that they originate outside the psychology of appraisal and self-relevance… Intergroup emotions are collective, however, in the sense that they derive from the interests and perspectives of a self-definition [self-categorisation] that includes other people. (2014, 248)

Group-based emotions, then, are collective in the sense that they are experienced by individuals who identify as members of a collective. This identification with the collective does not entail that the collective itself feels group-based emotions.

Conclusion

Group-based emotions are emotions felt by individuals when they think of themselves as group members. When individuals regard themselves as group members, they take on the group's concerns as their own, which changes their orientation to the world. As a group member, the individual represents her group, and what she cares about is of relevance to her group rather than to herself as a unique individual. This is why she may be motivated to act on behalf of her group, or to participate in collective action.

The studies conducted by social psychologists such as Mackie, Smith, Ray, Seger, Leonard, Kuppens, Yzerbyt, and many others, show us that group-based emotions are a distinct kind of emotion. They are not merely individual emotions. Interpersonal emotions operate at the individual level, and concern the interpersonal interactions between individuals. When an individual responds personally, she is guided by her own concerns and what is of relevance to her particularly. Group-based emotions are group-level emotions. When an individual identifies as a group member, she becomes concerned with what is of importance to her group, and how her group interacts with other individuals and other groups. How intensely she cares about her group's concerns depends on how much she identifies with her group, and she may respond quite weakly or quite strongly. Insofar as she is a group member, what is of concern to her is broader than when she thinks of herself in terms of her personal identity.

Group-based emotions are experienced by group members, but may be experienced by group members alone. This account of collective emotion does not show that individuals experience a group-based emotion when they constitute a group, or that they feel a group-based emotion because their group feels that way. It is not required that group members feel as other group members do. The group-based emotion is experienced when the individual responds on behalf of the group as a group member, by

herself. This points to a methodological limitation of social psychology. These studies were conducted by investigating how group members feel. What we have here are individuals' self-reports of emotion. The researchers are able to prime and manipulate the individuals, triggering them to invoke their social identities and think of themselves as group members. However, these studies cannot measure how a group as a single entity feels emotion. As Bleiker and Hutchison tell us:

> … studies on psychology and foreign policy that do delve into historical dimensions, such as those that examine the formative psychological experiences of decision-makers, tend to do so at the level of the individual. Illuminating as they may well be, such scholarly inquiries are not designed to assess the broader societal dynamics through which emotions help to shape the constitution of community, and thus the context within which politics—domestic and international—takes place. (2008, 122)

We can survey individuals, but we cannot survey groups. Even large-scale surveys cannot establish that an emotion is held by a group as a group: they can show us that an emotion is widely held, but not that the group members feel an emotion as a group.

What this means is that the best account of group emotion that we can develop from the account of group-based emotion is an aggregative one. If a group-based emotion is held by many of the group members, we may attribute the emotion to the group. The group emotion is cumulative. That is, when enough members of the group feel the emotion, the emotion is regarded as the group's emotion. As I argued in Chapter 1, the sceptic about collective emotion who think that emotions are individual experiences can accept the aggregative account of collective emotion. An aggregative model of collective emotion does not show that a group has an emotion as a group.

In the next chapter, I will turn to the literature from collective intentionality, and examine Margaret Gilbert's (1997, 2002) argument that individuals can come together as a group and be the subject of an emotion together. Gilbert is concerned with collective guilt in particular, and how to attribute a group with an emotion that is not an aggregate of the group members' emotions. As such, she is attempting to develop a top-down account of group emotion, in contrast with the bottom-up account of group emotion that Intergroup Emotion Theory argues for. She argues that the group can commit individuals to an emotion and place constraints on the individual by virtue of her group membership.

Chapter 3: Plural-Subject Emotion

The Negro needs the white man to free him from his fears. The white man needs the Negro to free him from his guilt.

—Martin Luther King Jr., 1968[1]

On the witness stand I said that a thousand years would not suffice to erase the guilt brought upon our people because of Hitler's conduct in this war.

—Hans Frank, Nuremberg Trials (1946)

An emotion that is often attributed to groups is collective guilt. When groups commit a wrongdoing, we think of those groups as being guilty. German guilt is the guilt experienced by Germans in the aftermath of the Holocaust; white guilt is felt by those responsible for both historic and ongoing colonisation and racial oppression; and Catholicism is a religion that places emphasis on sin and so Catholics bear the cross of Catholic guilt. In many of these cases, the group's crime is the reason for the guilt, and the individual feels the guilt of her group.[2] This is irrespective of whether or not she has personally contributed to, or committed, the wrongdoing. The challenge in the case of collective guilt is to understand why individuals who have not committed the wrongdoing can feel guilty about it, just because they are associated with the wrongdoing by virtue of their group identity. One way to explain the phenomenon of "guilt by association" is to argue that a group can have an emotional mental state, which the group members jointly constitute.[3] The group member who feels guilt, then, would be feeling her group's guilt. Such an argument would be analogous to the argument about how groups can have collective intentions, such that the group members intend to perform an action together.

There is a vast literature on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, that is, how groups can form intentions to act as groups.[4] One of the central questions in this debate is how we can attribute a mental state like an intention to multiple individuals together. In the case of collective intention, it appears that individuals share this mental

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[1] Reported in Schumach (1968).

[2] As Marguerite La Caze notes, there is an ambiguity in the notion of guilt, for guilt refers both to the fact of having done something wrong, and the emotion associated with the fact (2013, 85). I will come back to this distinction later in the chapter.

[3] I borrow the term "guilty by association" from Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998).

[4] See, for example, Searle (2002a), Tuomela (2006, 2007), Pettit (1993), Pettit and Schweikard (2006), Gilbert (2000, 2006, 2013).

state, for the individuals have the same intention to act with one another. This raises concerns about the ontology of the collective intention, and the nature of the subject of that collective intention. How do individuals come together to constitute a single subject (a group) that has a shared mental state? If individuals can have a collective intention together, can they also have a collective emotion together, given that intentions and emotions are both mental states?

In this chapter, I will examine Margaret Gilbert's (1997, 2002, 2006) account of collective intentionality, which she then extends to develop an account of collective guilt. Initially, she seeks only to explain the guilt that individuals feel when their groups commit a wrongdoing. Yet in her argument, she gives an account of collective guilt that is much more ambitious, for she argues that a group can be attributed with collective guilt. She offers three models of collective guilt: the aggregative account of individual guilt, which I outlined in Chapter 1 and will not discuss again in this chapter; the aggregative account of what she calls membership guilt; and the non-aggregative account of collective guilt, which I will term "plural-subject guilt." She argues that this third model is the only collective account of guilt because the guilt is properly attributed to the group and not to the individuals who make up the group.

As we shall see, this ambitious account is an attempt to meet the Sceptical Challenge and is a top-down account of (possible) group emotion. Gilbert wants to establish that the guilt is felt at the group-level, and that the members feel this guilt because they belong to the group. If she can establish that the group is the primary subject of guilt, she can show that it is *as a group* that the group members feel guilt. But, as I will argue, Gilbert falls short of giving such an account. Her account of membership guilt is, like the account of group-based emotion in Chapter 2, an aggregative account that the sceptic about group emotion can accept. Her account of plural-subject guilt, on the other hand, is not aggregative and so offers an attractive new development in the debate on group emotion. But Gilbert fails to show that the guilt we attribute to the group is an emotion. As I will argue, she gives an account of an emotion rule, not a group emotion itself.

In order to develop my criticism of Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt, I outline her account of collective intentionality in Section 1. I do not intend to critically evaluate her account of collective intentionality, nor do I contrast it with competing accounts by other philosophers. Rather, I will pick out those features of her theory that shape her accounts of membership guilt and plural-subject guilt. Once I have articulated

certain features and shortcomings of her theory, I will turn in Section 2 to her account of membership guilt. This provides a useful philosophical articulation of the kind of group-based emotion that social psychologists are interested in, but like group-based emotion, membership emotions are felt by individuals, not groups. My primary focus is on Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt, which I examine in Section 3 of this chapter. While this account shows that we can attribute plural-subject guilt to the group as a group, I will argue that plural-subject guilt is not an emotion. No one is required to actually feel guilt, on Gilbert's account, but only to behave as if they feel guilt.

1 Gilbert's account of collective intentionality

Gilbert develops her theory of collective intentionality by first focusing on how a small group of individuals can act together, and then expanding this theory to larger groups. She argues that two individuals can form a plural-subject group by forming a joint commitment to act together. By forming a joint commitment, they form a collective intention together, which is not simply a summation of two individual intentions. Bryce Huebner (2011) challenges her view on the grounds that she is not presenting an account of genuinely collective intentionality, as the intention is held in the minds of the individuals. I will show that his objection is misguided because Gilbert argues that collective intentions are not reducible to the intentions of the individuals within the group. The problematic aspects of Gilbert's view are exposed when she extends her theory to accommodate large groups, such as multi-national companies and nation-states. Her account of small plural-subject groups relies on the claim that the individuals are bound by their commitment to one another. In expanding her account to large groups, she makes a change to her notion of joint commitment without considering how this undermines the (crucial) normativity of her view. I will argue that her conception of large plural-subject groups is undermined by this change, because the individuals within the group are not obligated to the group in the same way as in the case of small plural-subject groups.

Gilbert claims that individuals form a plural-subject group when they form a collective intention to act. She argues for this claim by closely examining what it means for a couple to take a walk together, and how this differs from the case of two people coincidentally walking together (Gilbert 2006, 101-115). In her example, James and Paula want to walk to Central Park. They form the intention, "we will walk to Central Park," which includes them both in the subject of the intention. What makes the

intention collective is that the individuals form the intention together. Paula intends to walk with James, and James intends to walk with Paula. They do not each form separate intentions that happen to refer to the other ("I will walk to Central Park and think James will too").[5] Rather, Paula's intention is shared with James and is the same intention that he holds, for they form the intention together. The subject of the intention is the first person plural—"we" or "our"—and refers to them both (Gilbert 2006, 135). What Paula intends, and what James intends, is that they, as a unified group, will walk to Central Park.

A collective intention establishes the goal of the collective act, and is, to use Raimo Tuomela's term, an "aim-intention" (2006, 37). When Paula and James collectively intend to walk together, the goal is that they will both reach Central Park. The collective intention is the primary intention and is the intention that is held in the minds of each party. Gilbert argues that the collective intention is not a summation of individual intentions. It is not the case that Paula intends to walk to Central Park, and that James intends to walk to Central Park. If this were the case, their walking together would be coincidental. Rather, the collective intention captures that Paula and James intend to walk together, as a couple. It is, in Tuomela's term, an intention that is held in the "we-mode," in contrast to the "I-mode," for Paula and James "we-intend" their action (Tuomela 2006, 35-36).[6] From the primary collective intention, each party in the group derives an individual intention that would be an "action-intention," which is the intention that causes each individual to walk (Gilbert 2006, 136-138, Searle 2002a, 98-103, Tuomela 2006, 36-37). Another example makes the distinction between the aim-intention and action-intention clearer. A pianist and violinist intend to play a duet. They form the aim-intention to play the duet, which is the collective intention. But in order to satisfy this intention, each musician is required to do her part, and so each will form her individual action-intention: the pianist will intend to play her piano and the violinist will intend to play her violin. The individual intentions are explained by the collective

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[5] Searle defends the idea that a collective intention is not simply an individual intention that makes reference to the other. He argues that it is possible to refer to the other in our intention, for we may know what the other will do, without intending to act with the other. For example, I can know that my colleague intends to drive to work at a particular time, and that I also intend to do the same. This reference to the other does not make the intention collective. Searle's account of collective intention differs slightly from Gilbert's, in that he thinks that a collective intention is formed when there is cooperation between the individuals, rather than a joint commitment (2002a, 92-95, 102-103).

[6] The "I-mode" is when an individual intends as a single individual (Tuomela 2006, 35-36). The distinction between the I-mode and we-mode will be important when I compare Gilbert's model of membership guilt, which I will argue is held in the I-mode, and her model of plural-subject guilt, which is held in the we-mode.

intention from which they are derived, for the collective intention establishes why each intends as she does.

Gilbert's account of collective intentionality is a normative one, for she argues that in forming a collective intention, a joint commitment is formed. In the case of an individual intention, when an individual intends to do an action, she commits herself to doing so. By intending to make dinner, she commits herself to the task of making dinner. In the case of a collective intention, the individuals each commit to one another to do their part to act as a group. Each is committing to her individual action-intention in order to satisfy the collective aim-intention. Their commitment is not only to themselves but also to the other members of the group. Paula commits to James that she will walk with him, and James commits to Paula that he will walk with her. This means that they each place themselves under obligation to one another. With this obligation comes expectation and the standing to rebuke—Paula can expect James to walk with her and rebuke him if he does not do so suitably (if he walks too quickly for Paula to keep up, for example) (Gilbert 2006, 103-106). By forming a joint commitment to act together, the group as a whole is committed to that act and to carrying out the act. As a result, the individuals are bound to remain committed to the collectively intended action. As Gilbert argues, individuals cannot unilaterally rescind on the joint commitment (2002, 126, 2006, 106-115). Paula cannot walk away from James and go to lunch instead of going to Central Park with James: she is obligated to the whole group to walk to Central Park. If she fails to walk with James to Central Park, she is violating the joint commitment, and failing to meet her obligations to the other member of the group. The joint commitment, arising with the collective intention, places the individuals into mutual obligation to one another and binds them together, and individuals cannot simply remove themselves from this joint commitment.[7]

On this account, the collective intention is not reducible to the individual intentions (Gilbert 2006, 147-149). The pianist's intention to play the piano does not explain why she is playing, because the reason that she is playing is that she has a more basic collective intention—she, along with the violinist, intends to play a duet.[8] The

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[7] As I will discuss below, the obligation is not unconditional. There can be good reasons to violate the joint commitment.

[8] Larry May makes the same point when he discusses the intentions of corporations: "… there cannot be a complete reduction of the corporate intention to the individual, isolated intentions of the members (or even of the key members) of the corporation. The structure of the corporation does make a metaphysical difference in that it causes changes in intent for the members of this social group, thereby warranting the ascription of limited intent to the corporation" (1987, 69).

togetherness of the duet is captured in the collective intention. The satisfaction of a collective intention may not be satisfied by an individual's action either. If the pianist plays her piano, but the violinist fails to play her violin, the collective intention to play a duet will not have been fulfilled. Even in the case when the individual actions are the same, as in the case with Paula and James, the collective intention that "we" walk to Central Park is not carried out if only Paula walks to the park. The group referred to in the subject of the intention is the group that needs to carry out the intention.

The plural-subject group is the proper subject of the collective intention, on Gilbert's account. It is not simply the case that Paula intends to walk; the intention belongs to both her and James together. This is the "we"—the first-person plural pronoun. The plural-subject group is a single entity, comprised of the parties that make up the group (Gilbert 2002, 126-127, 2006, 137). Gilbert is careful not to posit that this is a distinct entity that exists apart from the individuals. The plural-subject group is an explanatory entity rather than a distinct ontological entity. She asserts that the explanation for what the collective does, when individuals are bound by a joint commitment to form a plural-subject group, cannot be reduced to an explanation of the individuals' intentions. The individuals' mental states make a crucial reference to the plural-subject group, of which they are a part, and the explanation for the intentions and actions that arise must make reference to that collective. The fact that the individuals intend together (and act together) must be referred to in an explanation of events.

Huebner (in a response to Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt) argues that Gilbert's account of plural-subject intentionality is not genuinely collective. He thinks that because the phenomenon of collective intentionality can be explained by the individual psychological states of the members that make up the group, there is no genuine collective mentality. Rather, he thinks that Gilbert's account is a holistic one, for it concerns "the causal and conceptual connections between the individuals in a collectivity" (Huebner 2011, 92). The intentionality of the plural-subject group is held in the minds of the individuals who exist in social relationships with one another, and who influence one another. There is no emergent collective mentality. For Huebner, Gilbert is offering an account of individuals intending together, not of a collective intending.

Huebner is confused to think that if an account is holistic, it is necessarily not collective. As Philip Pettit (1993) argues, collectivism and holism point to two separate

issues in social ontology.[9] Collectivism is opposed to individualism, and it concerns the relationship between social-structural regularities and the individual's intentional psychology. Collectivism is, in Pettit's words, "an exotic and extreme doctrine," in which it is held that the patterns that emerge in society (such as when there is an increase in unemployment, there is an increase in crime) are connected with the intentional psychology of individuals (1993, 112-113). Since these patterns appear to obtain reliably, the collectivist either asserts that the individual's agency in determining her own intentional psychology is overridden, or that individuals' intentional psychology is determined by those structural regularities. Holism, on the other hand, is a much more feasible theory, and is opposed, not to collectivism as Huebner thinks, but to atomism. Holism concerns the social relations between the individuals, and holds that individuals can influence one another's psychology. There are constitutive connections between the individuals, but even further than that, individuals depend on one another in order to think in a purposeful way (Pettit 1993, 112).[10] Pettit is a holistic individualist, for he argues that individuals can have autonomy in their intentional psychology, as this is not determined by social-structural regularities. However, individuals exist in relation to one another and influence one another (Pettit 1993, 169-175).

Although Huebner's objection is confused, as an account need not be collectivist in order to be collective, the challenge still remains whether or not Gilbert's account of collective intentionality is collective. Pettit and David Schweikard argue that Gilbert may be right that the collective intention is explanatorily prior to the individual's personal intention (2006, 29-32). Nevertheless, they argue that the fact that the subject of the collective intention is in the first person plural does not make the account collective. The plural-subject pronoun is part of the content of the collective intention, which is held in the mind of the individual. Multiple individuals have the intention (a psychological state) with the content that "we" intend to do an action.[11] The

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[9] My thanks to Onni Hirvonen for his kind assistance in helping me understand and articulate this discussion.

[10] As Pettit and Schweikard say, "[t]he atomism debate concerns the question of whether there are any aspects of our individual intentional psychology such that we depend noncausally *(sic)* on having certain relations with one another for instantiating those features; as usually formulated, the issue is whether we depend on such relations for having the capacity to reason and think in a purposeful way" (2006, 35-36).

[11] As we shall see in Chapter 4, when I discuss the sense of subjectivity that a person has when she experiences herself as phenomenologically fused with others, it cannot simply be the case that the individual has a psychological state with a collective subject in the content. She also needs to share this psychological state with another, such that we think she and another have the same psychological state.

psychological state is not held by the group but by the individuals within the group. Gilbert's account is holistic, for she is arguing that individuals intend to act together, but Pettit and Schweikard do not think that it is collective, in that a single we-intention is attributed to the individuals as a single group. Her account of the plural-subject group, when considered in ontological terms, is a holistic individualist one.

Gilbert would accept that on ontological grounds, her account is individualist. She herself denies that the plural-subject group has an ontological status independent of the individuals that make it up:

> In some places I have written that a joint commitment is the commitment of "two or more individuals considered as a unit or a whole" [the plural-subject group]. I do not mean to introduce the idea of a new kind of entity, a "unit" or "whole." I could as well have written "a joint commitment is the commitment of two or more individuals considered together" which would not carry any such suggestion. (Gilbert 2000, 34 n23)

I think Huebner's confusion arises because Gilbert calls her account of intentionality collective rather than joint. She has developed an account of joint intention, for she is arguing that individuals intend together. The joint intention is, for explanatory considerations, prior to and irreducible to the individual intentions that are formed by the group members to carry out the joint intention. The psychology of the joint intention is individual, but the explanation of why the individuals intend as they do (when they act together) must refer to this basic joint intention rather than to the individual's intentions to do their part. I will continue to refer to Gilbert's account as one of collective intention, taking this to mean "joint intention." This collective intention captures the normativity that arises when individuals form intentions together, and places them in positions of obligation to one another. Hers is an account of the cooperation that exists when individuals act together, as a group.[12]

Returning to Gilbert's account, we see that the plural-subject group is formed when a joint commitment is made, and is comprised of the individual parties together. The group is the owner of the joint commitment, and bears responsibility for the intentions and actions that arise by virtue of that joint commitment. The joint commitment is a "commitment of the wills" of the individuals, and this is where the obligation to one another arises (Gilbert 2006, 127-128). When Paula and James form a joint commitment to walk together, they are willing that they walk together. The

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[12] Searle's account is similarly committed to ontological individualism, while maintaining that the joint intention is collective and irreducible (2002a, 95-96).

intention no longer belongs to each alone, but to the group. This places the individuals in an interesting relation to the plural-subject group, for they are (together) creators of the plural-subject group, but at the same time, are each subject to it—they each need to do their part of what the plural-subject group intends (Gilbert 2006, 134-135). In other words, the individuals are obligated to all the other members of the plural-subject group to act so as to complete the act that they have jointly intended to do.

Gilbert's account does not require articulated or deliberate actions on the part of the parties involved. A joint commitment can be made when the parties express some form of readiness to be party to the commitment (Gilbert 1997, 68-69, 2006, 120-121, 141-144). The violinist who picks up her violin and seats herself near the pianist is expressing a readiness to play with the pianist. The pianist can refuse the unspoken entreaty to play a duet, or she can ready herself to play, so making herself party to the commitment to play the duet. The same is true of an individual attempting to rescind the joint commitment. The individual can express a readiness to remove herself from the joint commitment. James may, for example, start indicating that he cannot complete the walk because he is too unfit or is short of time. Paula can accept these expressions, and concur that they are unable to complete the walk. Together, they thus change the we-intention of the plural-subject group. Yet Paula may also reject the expressions, and feel that James is defaulting on his obligations to the group, or more accurately, to the other members of the group, in this case Paula. Gilbert goes so far as to say that a member of a group can justifiably feel betrayed when another member rescinds from the joint commitment (2006, 133).[13]

The joint commitment gives the individuals a reason to do as collectively intended. Paula and James, by jointly committing to walk together, have a reason to go for a walk, which Tuomela identifies as a we-mode group reason (2006, 39-41). Gilbert points out that this group reason has normative force, and absent special extenuating circumstances, should override reasons to do other actions. This is because the joint commitment places the individuals under obligation to one another (Gilbert 2006, 114-115). James may also have an individual (I-mode) intention to go to lunch at a particular café. This intention gives him a reason to go to the café, and it could be said that he is

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[13] I think that the feeling of betrayal will depend on how much the obligation is connected with the joint commitment. Gilbert does not discuss what kind of obligation arises from the joint commitment, just that there is a sense of obligation. I can imagine that Paula does not mind too much when James decides to abandon the walk to Central Park, but that an orchestra can feel quite affronted when the trombone player fails to play her part in the orchestration of a symphony. The obligation is the social pressure that we exert on one another when we have certain expectations of one another, and it can vary in strength.

obligated to himself to go to the café. But his obligation to the group (to Paula) is an obligation to another, and so, Gilbert argues, should trump his reasons for individual action. All things being equal, Gilbert thinks, an obligation to another provides a stronger reason to do a particular action than our own intentions. But Gilbert is careful to say that this is not always the case.[14] It may be justifiable for an individual to default on her obligation. If James should sprain his ankle, for example, he has a strong individual reason to no longer continue the walk as planned. It does not release him from his obligation, but it is an extenuating circumstance. It may seem strange to say that he is still under an obligation, but Gilbert argues that he can express to the other members of the group (in this case, Paula) that he cannot complete the walk without great pain, and the group can concur with him that the we-intention of the group needs to change. The group can release James from the obligation. But in the case where James' reason is weak (perhaps he is simply bored), the other members of the group can feel that he is obligated to continue with the collectively intentioned walk. They can feel affronted that he is failing to meet their expectations by wishing to default on the joint commitment to take a walk together (Gilbert 2006, 157-158).

I highlight the normativity of the joint commitment because it has interesting implications for the nature of collective beliefs, and later, collective guilt. In the case of collective intentionality, individuals are jointly committed to a particular collective action, and their individual intentions are derived from that collective intention. The joint commitment provides them with a group reason to enact that individual intention—they are obligated to the other parties of the plural-subject group with which they are jointly committed. Despite the obligation, there remains an important psychological boundary between the individual and the group. When a joint commitment is formed, there is a collective goal to achieve by performing a collective action. The individual will have a reason to act in a way that will contribute towards the goal being achieved and the collective intention satisfied. As Gilbert articulates it, the parties to the joint commitment are obligated to act in a manner that constitutes a single party. If an orchestra intends to play a particular symphony, each member of the orchestra is obligated to play her instrument such that we can say that a single body (the orchestra) plays a symphony. Nevertheless, the collective goal need not be an individual's personal goal (Gilbert 2006, 138). The trombone player's personal goal

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[14] I discuss a further case of justifiable violation of a joint commitment below, when I discuss protest.

may not be to play a symphony, but to simply play well, or to get out of the house on a Saturday night. The obligation that arises from the joint commitment places constraints on the individual's behaviour—she should act in a way that the collective intention can be carried out and the collective goal can be met. She is not obligated to endorse or take on the collective goal as her own personal goal.[15]

In the case of collective beliefs, this distinction between collective and individual becomes stark. Gilbert argues that individuals can also form joint commitments to collective beliefs. She gives the example of a group that commits to the collective belief that democracy is the best form of government. The obligation that falls on the individuals that make up the group is not to hold that belief personally, for individuals cannot be forced into belief. Rather, the individuals are obligated to behave in accordance with that belief. Their expressions and behaviour should uphold the belief that democracy is best. The obligation to do so is because, by forming a joint commitment, they are obligated to "constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that believes democracy is the best form of government" (Gilbert 2006, 137). Should an individual hold a different belief, she can express this belief as a personal belief. She is not personally committed to believe the collective belief, but she should distinguish that her actual belief is her own personal belief. By being party to a collective belief, the individual is only committed to behaving in accordance with that belief. An individual can thus say both that, "we believe X," and act in accordance with that belief, while at the same time saying that, "I believe Y," when Y is in conflict with X. These are not necessarily conflicting beliefs, for she may behave as though she believes X when she actually believes Y.

Gilbert's account of small plural-subject groups that are formed when individuals form a joint commitment with one another is plausible. On this account, individuals voluntarily bind themselves to others by forming a collective intention with others, and this makes them a plural-subject group. Problems emerge for Gilbert's account when she expands it to accommodate larger groups. Gilbert argues that larger groups can have the same plural-subject structure as the couple that forms a joint commitment that binds the individuals to one another. She develops her account of the plural-subject group to show that political groups such as nation-states can be plural-subject groups in which

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[15] Think of the employee who works for a company committed to maximising profit. The employee will do her part to achieve that collective aim, but not necessarily because she is striving for that goal. She may be doing her part to earn a salary, or to get a promotion.

each individual is bound to the group through a joint commitment. In doing so, she makes important refinements to her view, for she acknowledges that large groups are often "hierarchical, impersonal, and anonymous" (Gilbert 2006, 98). She argues that members can be unknowingly part of a group, and be unknowingly bound to particular joint commitments. This is because individuals may make basic joint commitments that can lead to non-basic joint commitments, in which certain members of the group have the authority to determine the intentions of the group as a whole.

A basic joint commitment is when all the members of the group mutually express their readiness to be party to the joint commitment, and have common knowledge of that readiness (Gilbert 2002, 126, 2006, 140-141). This is the kind of commitment that has been discussed above. A non-basic joint commitment is derived from a basic joint commitment. This is when members of a party agree to be committed to the operations of a specific mechanism and they hand over authority to a particular member or small group of members. Gilbert gives the example of a group that decides that Paula should determine the activities of the group.[16] By forming a joint commitment to let Paula make decisions for the group's activities, the group members also have a non-basic joint commitment to the activities that Paula decides the group will do. In this case, the members have not mutually expressed readiness to be jointly committed to these particular goals. For example, they know that they are jointly committed to whatever Paula decides that the group will do, but they do not know that they are jointly committed to a hike the following weekend. In the case of a large group such as a country, the mechanism that allows for non-basic joint commitments to be formed may be the democratic electoral system, where citizens vote for their representatives in parliament. These parliamentary members can then determine the intentions of the country as a whole—how citizens will be taxed, how those taxes will be spent, when the country will go to war, and so on.

In larger groups, Gilbert argues that the expression of readiness to form a joint commitment can be coerced or involuntary. She asserts that an expression of readiness can be simply the use of the first person plural pronoun in speech, in which the individual asserts her membership of the group. She may speak of "our country," or indicate that "we" (Australians) love cricket (Gilbert 1997, 69, 2000, 131-132, 2002, 126). These expressions of readiness can be made under duress. Citizens in

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[16] I have adapted Gilbert's example of Pam and Penny. Penny makes the decisions for their weekend activities (Gilbert 2006, 140-141).

authoritarian countries can be made to participate in marches and chants that meet the criterion of what an expression of readiness is. Even unwillingly, these citizens are now party to the joint commitment of that state. Employees of a company can be jointly committed, by the very fact of employment, to what the company intends, believes, and does, even when that employee does not know what the particulars are. While Gilbert's account of collective intention is a voluntarist one, since she argues that the group is formed when joint commitments are made, the joint commitments can include involuntary members, and they can arise from coerced expressions of readiness. Citizens who pay tax, for example, as they are legally required to do, are expressing their readiness to be jointly committed to how the tax gets spent. Should the government spend that money on warmongering, the citizens are obligated to behave in accordance with the country's intention to go to war.[17]

Gilbert's extension of her account of joint commitment in small groups to larger groups is the most problematic step in her argument. As Ann Cudd, Francesca Raimondi, and Paul Sheehy object, Gilbert's account of a plural-subject group is an intentionalist one in that the group is formed when individuals hold particular psychological states, in this case, a commitment of the will to other individuals (Cudd 2006, 35, Raimondi 2008, 293, Sheehy 2002, 378, 384). The plural-subject group is a voluntary group that is formed when individuals intentionally decide to join the group. The individuals create rules and norms that maintain the group, but all members of the group need to hold a particular mental state about the group to belong to it. Cudd calls this the "willed-unity condition" (2006, 39). However, by claiming that large groups, especially groups such as citizenry, are plural-subjects groups, just like small groups that are formed by the joint commitment of individuals, Gilbert attempts to argue for a plural-subject group that is not an intentionalist or voluntary group. Gilbert allows that some members may be involuntary members, for they express a readiness to commit to the group not by a commitment of their wills, but by participating in certain social practices or customs, such as paying tax or referring to the group as "our" (Raimondi 2008, 294). Raimondi argues that this has an important implication concerning the obligation that the individual is under when a member. On Gilbert's account of small plural-subject groups, the obligation to satisfy a collective intention arises from the joint

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[17] This does not rule out protest, or other personal responses to a collective intention. An individual who opposes war can protest it, but must do so in her capacity as an individual and not as citizen. I will discuss this in further detail below.

commitment that the individual forms. In committing to the other members of the group, the individual agrees to particular behaviour. But if involuntary members of the group do not become part of the group by a commitment that they form to the group, they cannot be subject to the obligations that arise when the group forms a collective intention (Raimondi 2008, 289, 294-295).

The plural-subject group depends on the psychological states of its members for its formation and continued existence. This means that, contrary to what Gilbert thinks, larger groups, particularly groups in which the members are anonymous, are unlikely to be plural-subject groups. Most individuals become citizens of a country not because of an expression of readiness to commit to that country, but by being born in it, for example. This undermines the argument that the members of the group are obligated to behave in ways that accord with the intentions of the group. Gilbert's account of a plural-subject group seems only to apply to groups where individuals form some sort of decision to join or form a group with others, by signing an employment contract or making an agreement (implicit or explicit), for example.[18] Raimondi is right to argue that if an individual has not become part of a group by means of a commitment, she will not be obligated to act in accordance with the group's collective intentions. In the case of the involuntary member, it may be that there is no joint commitment to serve as the basis for the obligation imposed on the individual (Raimondi 2008, 289). I agree with Gilbert that some members may be involuntary because they have formed a non-basic commitment and were ignorant of what they were committing to. Yet we should distinguish between those cases, and cases where an individual is a member of a group simply because she participates in certain practices or customs. The normativity of Gilbert's account relies on the commitment that individuals make, at some point, to be part of the plural-subject group.

In summary, Gilbert offers an account of collective intention in which individuals can collectively we-intend when they form a joint commitment to one another and become a plural-subject group. A *basic joint-commitment* is formed when the members have mutual knowledge of one another's expression of readiness to be party to the joint commitment. A *non-basic joint commitment* is formed indirectly, when a mechanism has been put in place to form intentions for the group. This means that members have a

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[18] I think we can allow that individuals may be coerced to commit to a group. A person with no other job prospects commits to a particular company, and the rules of that company, not because she shares the goal of the company, but because she needs a job. Nevertheless, she commits her will to do her part as required, and is obligated to act according to the intention of her company.

mechanism to indirectly form joint commitments, for they hand over authority to a representative or a leadership party to form the intentions for the group on their behalf. Individuals can thus be party to collective intentions that they do not know about or are coerced into committing to. A collective intention places obligations on the members of the group (regardless of whether the members know about the intention or not), such that the members are required to do their part to carry out the collective intention. The member's individual intentions are derived from the basic collective intention, for the collective intention is the aim-intention and plays an important explanatory role in why individuals intend as they do. This account is a normative one, and stipulates that individuals should behave in accordance with the joint commitments that the plural-subject group makes.

It should be noted that a collective intention can be carried out by certain members of a group, and does not require that all members participate directly in the collective action. When a country (a plural-subject group on Gilbert's account) goes to war, it is the members of the armed forces who will enter the conflict, whereas other citizens may continue their daily lives without much change. But insofar as the citizens have handed over authority to the government to form the collective intentions of the country, they remain party to the collective intention to go to war. They are under obligation to behave in a manner that accords with that intention. They should not, for example, stop paying their taxes.[19] Not only is this illegal, it is an attempt to rescind from the joint commitment of that democracy, and is a failure to meet their obligations to their fellow citizens. Should a citizen disagree with the country's actions, she can protest the action, but not in her capacity as a group member. She can protest as an individual, with individual actions, or as part of another group. But her obligations to her country remain in place.

Gilbert allows that there may be good reasons to violate a joint commitment through protest or other contrary behaviour (2006, 156-159). She argues that a moral objection to the collective intention may override the obligation to participate, for example. Whistle-blowers are a great example of such a situation. These individuals are obligated to their companies to keep company secrets, to support the company goals, and so on. But when these individuals discover that their companies have done wrong,

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[19] Actress Emma Thompson and actor Greg Wise boycotted paying taxes in 2015 to the UK government in protest against the government's failure to prosecute HSBC bank customers who avoided paying tax (Tran 2015). On Gilbert's account, Thompson and Wise are open to rebuke for this.

they violate their commitment (their contractual obligations) in order to expose the wrong. Yet we see that these whistle-blowers are then subject to rebuke, often with dire consequences. The company can regard the whistle-blower as requiring punishment because the obligation to the group still stands. It is just that for the individual, this causes a conflict that requires her to evaluate the reasons she has for different actions.

We can also see that in the case where members are party to a collective action involuntarily, as in the case of larger groups that are not plural-subject groups, the obligation to the group may be very weak. If the individual did not intentionally form a joint commitment, she may not feel that she has a reason to act as the group requires her to. The threat of rebuke may carry very little weight in preventing her from violating her joint commitment to the group. A joint commitment—and the obligation that arises from it—gives the individual a reason to act, and absent any counter reasons, she should behave as required. But should the individual have reasons to act differently, she can evaluate the strength of her obligation to her group against other concerns, such as moral concerns or obligations to herself or other groups.[20]

Gilbert provides an account of individuals forming a plural-subject group when the individuals jointly commit to a collective intention. By extending her account, she argues that plural-subject groups may include involuntary members, and members who are ignorant of the intentions of the group. Nevertheless, by being part of the group, each member is under obligation to behave as required in order to satisfy the group's intentions. I think that Gilbert's development of her account to include involuntary and ignorant members by means of certain practices rather than by means of a basic or non-basic joint commitment, undermines the normativity of group membership, and that

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[20] The normative power of a (indirect) joint commitment to an emotion also seems to lose force when the intersectionality of identity is considered. Individuals belong to multiple groups—small groups such as families and hobby groups, larger groups such as clubs and companies, and very large groups defined by citizenship, race, gender, or religion. Each of these groups will have a particular set of norms—perhaps through joint commitment—that will place obligations on the individual to behave in particular ways. The problem arises when we consider that multiple obligations may come into tension with one another. The faithfully devout religious person may also be a loyal employee of a company that is known to commit human rights violations. Gilbert has argued that an individual is open to rebuke when she violates a joint commitment to a particular group, but we see that when multiple groups have joint commitments that conflict, the member will be forced to violate one group's obligations in favour of another group's. For those individuals inclined to reflective introspection, this might be a painful experience, but for many, I suspect, it is relatively easy to navigate this conflict. Unless the group memberships are very important to the individual, she may ignore her commitments to a particular group. The soldier who is committed to killing his enemy, as a member of the army, may ignore his commitments as a Christian to not harm or kill others, for example. Particularly in large groups such as religions and nation-states, it appears the obligations that arise from certain joint commitments can in fact be easily ignored, if not actually rescinded from (as Gilbert as argues).

these members will not be under obligation to act in accordance with the will of the group. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, I will put this concern aside in order to investigate how Gilbert argues for the notion of collective guilt. In the next section, I will discuss Gilbert's account of membership guilt that has much in common with the account of group-based emotion that I examined in Chapter 2.

2 Membership guilt

The question of collective guilt arises when we acknowledge that groups can commit wrong acts. Countries can participate in unjust wars; corporations can use slaves in their manufacturing chain; governments can oppress particular groups. Since groups are made up of individuals, one approach to understanding collective guilt is to determine whether the group's wrongdoing can cause the group member to feel guilt. This is the approach that Karl Jaspers took in the aftermath of the Holocaust, for example. Given that Germany committed atrocities against millions of (predominantly Jewish) people, and that each German was involved in different ways in this atrocity, he asks, "in what sense each of us [Germans] must feel co-responsible" (Jaspers 1965, 55). Gilbert's initial approach to the question of collective guilt is similar: if the group has committed a collective wrongdoing, can the group member feel guilt for that wrongdoing? (1997, 65)

In this section, I analyse Gilbert's argument that by being party to a joint commitment to commit a crime, the individual is responsible for the crime and can thus feel appropriately guilty.[21] I draw a parallel to the argument about white privilege, in which theorists such as Barbara Applebaum (2010), John Warren (2001), and George Yancy (2012) argue that white people are guilty of racial oppression, irrespective of their personal beliefs and actions towards black people. I also compare Gilbert's account of membership guilt to the account of group-based emotion that I analysed in Chapter 2. Like Gilbert, I think that individuals can justifiably feel guilt for the group's wrongdoings, but that this can only provide an aggregative account of collective guilt.

An initial objection to the idea of collective guilt is that guilt is an emotion that is only appropriate in relation to an individual's own actions (Gilbert 1997, 66). Individuals can feel guilt over their own wrongdoing, but not another's. This is because guilt is an emotion that involves self-assessment, and concerns what is within the

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[21] Gilbert's initial argument is only to justify why an individual group member may feel guilty about a collective wrongdoing. She does not argue that group members *should* feel guilty.

individual's sphere of control, in the paradigmatic case (Gilbert 1997, 73). If Susan commits a crime against her neighbour, she should feel guilty about her own wrongdoing, assessing herself negatively because of it.[22] But if Susan hears about a crime committed against her neighbour, the mere recognition of wrongdoing should not make her feel guilty. She may feel regret, anger, or fear, perhaps, but she should not feel that she is in some way responsible for the wrongdoing and at fault. Guilt is a negative evaluation that the individual has not acted as she believes she should have, and that she is responsible for the harm done to another.[23]

In Gilbert's account of collective intention, she argues that individuals come together to perform a collective act. Individuals act as group members, contributing towards the collective act but not typically themselves performing the entire collective act.[24] The pianist plays her piano, but does not play a duet. She is the agent of her own actions, and does not control how other individuals act. She cannot control how the violinist plays, and is thus not able to control much of what is the collectively produced duet.[25] On the surface, then, it seems that an individual cannot feel guilty about a collective wrongdoing. She can only feel guilty about her role in that wrongdoing, and for the actions that she personally committed. A soldier can feel appropriately guilty about the soldiers and civilians that she killed, but not the war as a whole.

Yet this line of thinking needs to be closely examined. Although it is possible for guilt to be misplaced and felt inappropriately, the common experience of individuals feeling guilt about collective wrongdoing should give us pause. The presence of guilt feelings in response to collective wrongdoing may indicate that the individual feels sufficiently connected to the wrongdoing, and in some way responsible for that wrongdoing. Gilbert's account of collective intentionality offers a way for us to

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[22] As Lickel, Steele, and Schmader point out, shame and guilt are closely related, but are importantly distinct. Shame concerns the impact that the wrongdoing has on the individual's self, such that she sees her image as tarnished; guilt concerns the wrongdoing itself, and the person's responsibility for that particular action (2011, 154).

[23] Hannah Arendt argues that there is no such thing as collective guilt because guilt is a moral emotion. She tells us that guilt, "unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly personal." She allows that groups can be collectively responsible, but not that they can be morally at fault. The moral failing of the group is actually the moral failing of the individuals within the group (cited in Pettigrove 2006, 493-494).

[24] In the paradigmatic case of collective intention, individuals act together to perform the act. However, group members may also collectively intend an action that is ultimately only carried out by a single member. This is when a representative group member acts on behalf of the group, and her action is what her whole group collectively intends that she do.

[25] The violinist and the pianist do exert some influence on one another, such as keeping time with each another. But ultimately, if the violinist is not committed to playing the duet, or to playing well, the pianist cannot make the violinist do so.

understand how an individual might regard a collective wrongdoing as her own, despite not having participated in the wrongdoing, or even knowing about or contributing to the wrongdoing. The acknowledgement of group membership can give rise to what Gilbert calls "membership guilt" (2002, 133-138). As we have seen with the social psychology studies in Chapter 2, group membership has an important role to play in the emotions that we feel when we identify with a group.

Gilbert's account of collective intention allows us to see that it is possible for groups to do wrong. A group can be a plural-subject group that has formed a joint commitment to collectively intend to commit a collective act that is wrong. This act may be committed against other groups, as in the case of two factions warring against one another, or against individuals, such as when one individual is deliberately wrongfully convicted and punished for a crime she did not commit. Individuals can perform actions that are manifestations of the collective intention, as when civil servants each perform a task that brings about the government's oppression of a group, such as scheduling the running of the trains to concentration camps. What makes the wrongdoing collective is that the subject who committed the wrong is the group.

Members in a group can be active and voluntary when each member enters directly into a joint commitment and is a knowing party to the collective intention that is formed. These members directly contributed to the formation of the joint commitment to one another, and know what is required of them to satisfy the joint commitment. However, Gilbert's account allows that members may be passive and involuntary members. We have seen that she allows that members can be coerced into a joint commitment; they can be involuntary members of a group that has joint commitments; and through non-basic joint commitments, the members can be ignorant of what they are committed to (Gilbert 2000, 126-127). Alonso can be a member of a group by virtue of the fact that he has expressed some readiness to be part of the group, but which may be the result of coercion, or be something that he has no choice but to do. He may have given authority to a particular subset of the group to form the intentions of that group, and is himself unaware of the actual intentions formed. In this way, Alonso is a passive member of a wrongdoing collective. By contrast, the member who plays a direct role in the formation of the collective intention, such as a leader, is an active member of the group. Members can thus have varying degrees of knowledge of what the group intends

to do, varying attitudes about the intention, and varying roles to play in carrying out the intention.[26]

The member who dissents from the collective intention cannot rescind from the joint commitment of the group without the approval of the other members. This means that the individual who disapproves of the wrongdoing and wants to play no role in committing it is forced to remain party to the wrongdoing (Gilbert 1997, 82-83). She can protest but must do so in her personal capacity, or in her capacity as a member of a different group, in order to avoid rebuke from her fellow group members. For example, as an Australian, Bruno is party to the Australian government's policy on asylum seekers and refugees, for he participates in the democratic process that elects a government to determine the policies of Australia. This makes him part of the agent of wrongdoing. This is true whether he actively formed the policies as a parliamentarian; actively committed the abuse as a guard in the detention centres; knew about the policies and abuse as a citizen but did nothing either for or against the atrocity; is completely oblivious of the situation; or finally, actively protested the abuse. Bruno—as an Australian, not as an individual—is party to the crime because he has expressed his readiness to be part of a joint commitment with Australia by voting. As it happens, voting is compulsory in Australia and so Bruno is coerced (by threat of a fine) to participate in this process. Bruno can, as an individual, or as a member of a protest group, express that he disapproves of the policies, but this does not change the status of his membership of the country Australia, and the fact that he is committed to the policies that the government puts in place.

Gilbert's account is interesting, because she argues that people can be involved in wrongdoing to varying degrees, yet also allows no way for an individual to disassociate from a group. By being a member of a group, the individual is part of the plural-subject, and so the author and agent of, wrongdoing. What the individual, particularly one who is unable to contribute towards the formation of the collective intentions directly, thinks about the collective intention does not affect her membership and role in the wrongdoing.

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[26] I will not engage here with debates about collective responsibility and how much responsibility each group member is determined to have. The individuals may be personally blameless but part of the group that is collectively responsible. This raises the issue of whether the individual is personally responsible or rather complicit. I want to focus on the idea that an individual can know that she has done nothing wrong personally, but is still party to a group that has done wrong.

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We may think that the individual's involuntary membership of a group is an excusing condition for responsibility for a collective wrongdoing, and that only those who directly participate in the wrongdoing can be regarded as the subject of the wrongdoing. Yet I am sympathetic to the argument that we can sometimes be party to wrongdoing by virtue of our membership of a wrongdoing group. There is an analogous argument in the debate on white privilege and racism. Applebaum (2010), Warren (2001), and Yancy (2012), for example, argue that white people, by virtue of their skin colour, are perpetuating racism. White people are marked by their skin pigment as belonging to the group of white people, making membership of the group involuntary. Yet the feature of whiteness is not a neutral category, such as being grouped by shoe size or height might be. Whiteness is also a "mode of being," in that it includes a set of practices and habits that are connected to a history of racial oppression and injustice (Warren 2001, 452).[27] Whiteness encapsulates practices and habits that give privilege to white people, such that they can, for example, walk into a store without scrutiny from the security personnel (Yancy 2012, 164). White people are privileged for they benefit from a racial hierarchy (historical and systemic) that locates whiteness as superior to blackness, and so are free from the social constraints that impact the lives of people of colour.[28] One aspect of this privilege, as Applebaum argues, is that white people can ignore the privilege that depends on the racial hierarchy. In this way, systemic injustice is kept in place and perpetuated (2010, 46, 119, 131). Whiteness, then, is an embodied perpetuation of racism. But white people cannot choose not to be white. As Warren points out,

> … as I move through the world others will see me, cite me as white, and thus contribute to the performative reiteration of racial difference. Thus, the repetition of my own whiteness is not completely my own; others will participate in my naming without my knowledge or consent. (2001, 459)

Even the white person who opposes racism and takes steps to be antiracist cannot ever be free from the privilege that attaches to her by virtue of her skin colour. By virtue of

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[27] Warren continues: "[t]he color of one's skin cannot be separated from the practices that have historically constructed it—pigment is a product of a stylized repetition of acts" (2001, 462).

[28] Since the benefit arises from a historical and systemic racial hierarchy, it will differ in different countries. In South Africa, with the recent history of legal racial oppression, whiteness is strongly beneficial, but in China, for example, white people will have had a different relationship with people of other races.

her membership of the group of white people, and independently of her personal actions and intentions, she is implicated in systemic racial injustice.[29]

The important point to take away from the debate on white privilege is that an individual can be responsible for a wrongdoing even if she is unable to prevent the wrongdoing from occurring. In the case of white privilege, the injustice is the product of social structure, rather than individual intent. Individuals are located within that structure, and may thus become involuntarily and unknowingly party to wrongdoing. The individual in the plural-subject group is committed to the group but may be involuntarily and unknowingly party to the wrongdoing. In both cases, the individual may be unable to do anything about the wrongdoing directly, but this does not change the fact that a wrong is being done by a group that she belongs to and that she is thereby party to the wrong. The responsibility for that wrongdoing is that of her group, insofar as the wrongdoing is done in the name of her group and is perpetuated by the her group.

It is worth noting where the analogy between plural-subject collective wrongdoing and white privilege falls apart. In the case of white privilege, the race group is not a plural-subject group for the members do not become part of the group by virtue of a commitment. The individuals are not party to a collective intention to commit harm. Rather, each individual does harm with her own actions. So the white person is connected to racial wrongdoing in a different way from the individual in a plural-subject wrongdoing. The white person is involuntarily a member of a wrongdoing group, and it is her membership of her group that makes her own actions a manifestation of the wrongdoing. The plural-subject group member may be involuntarily party to a wrongdoing because she committed to the group and cannot withdraw her commitment, but she may not commit any action that contributes to the wrongdoing. In both cases though, the membership of the group connects the individual to the wrongdoing, and her inability to prevent the wrongdoing does not undermine this association.

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[29] One of South Africa's great anti-apartheid activists, Helen Joseph, recounts how she had to confront that despite fighting the racial oppression of South Africa, she herself benefitted from the injustice because of her white skin. She was arrested with her fellow great activist, Lilian Ngoyi, in 1956, and tells of the difference in how she was treated and how Ngoyi was treated. She tells us, "[i]t was as Lilian had said: my pink skin brought me a bed, sheets, blankets. The mattress was revolting, urine stained, but Lilian slept on a mat on the floor with only blankets. My food was better. I had a sanitary bucket with a lid. She had an open bucket covered with a cloth. *I learnt to hate my pink skin* but I could not change it nor expiate it" (cited in Musiiwa 2012, 78).

With this notion of collective wrongdoing, Gilbert proposes that individuals may feel membership guilt about that collective wrongdoing. This occurs when individuals recognise their membership of the wrongdoing group and recognise that they bear responsibility for that wrong by virtue of that membership. This may lead to the individual feeling guilt about the wrongdoing. Drawing on the work of Gabriele Taylor, Gilbert tells us that, "to feel guilt in relation to the acts of one's country is already in some sense to identify with one's country" (1997, 75). Regardless of whether or not the individual approved of or directly contributed to the collective wrongdoing, the individual categorises as a member of her group and so may recognise (joint) ownership of the intentions and actions of her group.

The individual feels membership guilt because of her membership of the group. This guilt becomes collective if most, or many, of the group members feel the same guilt. It is, as Gilbert points out, an aggregative account of collective guilt, for the collective guilt is nothing more than a summation of the individuals' membership guilt (2002, 136-138). This is because, in Tuomela's terminology, the individual group member is not in the we-mode (2006, 35-36). She is part of a group that committed a wrongdoing, and this wrongdoing was performed in the we-mode because it was the result of a collective intention. But the group member's membership guilt is not the result of a collective intention, and so is held in the I-mode. She has a group reason for her membership guilt, for her membership guilt arises when she thinks of herself as a group member. But her group reason is not jointly held with other group members, and so she feels her membership emotion privately (as a group member), in the I-mode. When many group members feel membership emotion as group members, but not jointly (with one another), they feel a collective I-mode emotion. A collective membership emotion is aggregative, because the group members do not hold the membership emotion together (that is, jointly).[30]

But the aggregative account of collective membership guilt is different from the aggregative account of collective individual guilt. On the aggregative account of collective individual guilt, the individuals feel personal guilt about their own contributions towards the wrongdoing, not the wrongdoing itself (Gilbert 2000, 127, 2002, 130-131). The soldier would feel guilt about killing an enemy soldier, for example, but not the war itself. On the aggregative account of collective membership

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[30] I will rely on this distinction between I-mode and we-mode emotion in Chapter 6, when I discuss Mikko Salmela's (2012) typology of collective emotion.

guilt, the individuals feel guilt about the collective wrongdoing that they take themselves to be jointly responsible for by virtue of their membership of the wrongdoing group. It is possible for individuals who did not directly contribute to the wrongdoing, or even protested against it, to feel membership guilt about the wrongdoing, for they regard themselves as the agent of the wrongdoing.

Other philosophers have given similar accounts of collective emotions.[31] Deborah Tollefsen, arguing for the rationality of collective guilt, defines collective emotions as "emotions we feel in response to the actions of groups" (2006, 222). She argues that certain emotions, like pride, guilt, and shame, are feelings of "self-assessment." When collective guilt is felt, the self being assessed is not the individual but the group. Feeling membership guilt would lead the individual to reflect on the nature of the group, and the motives and values of the group, and lead the individual to make demands of the group (Tollefsen 2006, 223, 234). Although it is the individual who experiences the emotion, the reasons for the guilt, and the self-assessment that proceeds, concern the group itself, and this is what makes the feeling collective. The group member feels guilty for a group reason.

Similarly, Samantha Vice, writing about white South Africans in the aftermath of Apartheid, draws on the arguments about white privilege to show that the privilege of white South Africans is a way of "enacting injustice in subtle ways" against black South Africans (2010, 328). In recognising her whiteness—that is, that she is a member of the white population—the individual should see that she has been morally damaged by the injustice committed by her group.[32] In response, she should adopt an attitude of shame, or what Gilbert would call membership shame.

Katie Stockdale (2013) considers the feelings of an oppressed group who are wronged by systemic harm and injustice, and argues that collective resentment is an appropriate response to such injustice. Using the example of Indigenous Canadians in relation to settler Canadians, she argues that all Indigenous Canadians (whether personally wronged or not) can feel that their membership of their group places them in

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[31] By the end of this thesis, it will be clear that membership emotions are not group emotions, but both are types of collective emotions.

[32] I thank Marguerite La Caze for drawing my attention to the notion of moral taint, which has much in common with the idea of membership shame. Marina Oshana, for example, discusses the idea of inherited moral taint, in which an individual inherits liability for a wrongdoing committed by her ancestors or fellow group members. She argues that people associated with or descended from wrongdoers deserve their moral taint, "because key aspects of their identity are bound up with the lives of particular other beings, and as a result of the wrongdoing of those persons with whom their identity is bound, their moral personalities are tarnished and compromised" (Oshana 2006, 267).

an unequal and unjust position in relation to settler Canadians, insofar as their economic and social status is linked to their group membership. Stockdale argues that the resentment felt in response to such structural injustice is collective resentment, because the individual Indigenous Canadian feels the emotion when she recognises that she is a member of the harmed group that is different from the resentment that other individuals might feel in response to injustice. The reason is that her group is harmed, and so the individual is harmed. She has a group reason for her resentment.

Gilbert's account of membership guilt—and by extension, membership emotions—captures the intuition that social identities have an important role to play in shaping what the individual feels. By recognising that she belongs to a particular group, the individual recognises that she is party to certain collective acts. Groups can act, and be acted upon, and the members of those groups can have feelings in response to those actions. The social psychology studies that I explored in Chapter 2 confirm this. When individuals categorise as belonging to one group, they feel emotions that may be different from the emotions they feel when they categorise as individuals or as belonging to a different group. Ray, Mackie, Rydell, and Smith (2008) showed that individuals that self-categorised as Americans felt more respect for the police and more anger toward Muslims, but when those same individuals self-categorised as students, they felt more anger toward police and more respect for Muslims. The work of Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007) yielded similar results and also showed that the more strongly an individual identified with a group, the more strongly she felt the group-based emotion. By self-categorising as part of a group, the individual feels that she is personally connected to the actions committed by her group, or personally affected by the actions done to her group.

The account of group-based emotions developed by social psychologists appears to support the account of membership emotions broadly. Yet the empirical studies on group-based guilt reveal an interesting result about which members will feel guilt about their group's wrongdoing. Studies by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) and Maitner, Mackie, and Smith (2007) show that when it comes to guilt, members of a wrongdoing group that strongly identify with the group are less likely to feel guilt than those members that are not as strongly identified with the group.

In their first study, Doosje and his colleagues established that individuals who did not feel personal guilt still felt group-based guilt about the crimes that their group committed. As a result, the individuals were more willing to compensate the victims of

the wrongdoing (Doosje et al. 1998, 877-878). This aligns with the results from other studies that I outlined in Chapter 2. Independently of their personal involvement in the wrongdoing, the members feel group-based guilt. In their second study, Doosje and his colleagues went one step further by exploring the degree to which identification with the group affects the degree to which the individuals feel group-based guilt. Social identity theory argues that strongly identifying members of a group should experience group-based feelings more strongly than the weakly identifying members. But guilt is a negative emotion, and can be threatening to the self-image of the individual, as it is an admission of having done wrong (Doosje et al. 1998, 879). Doosje and his colleagues predicted—and confirmed—that more strongly identifying members of a group would employ defensive strategies and so not feel group-based guilt as strongly as weakly identifying members.

The second study was designed to evaluate how the identification of the group member with the group impacted on the group-based guilt experienced, and what sort of defensive strategies were employed in order to avoid feeling guilt. In this study, 135 Dutch university participants were put into three groups, and presented with either a favourable, unfavourable, or ambiguous interpretation of the history of Dutch colonisation in Indonesia (a one page summary with two pictures of Dutch people from that colonial period) (Doosje et al. 1998, 879-880).[33] What the researchers found was that in the cases where the history was presented as unambiguously favourable or unfavourable, the degree to which the participant identified as Dutch did not mediate the degree to which she felt group-based guilt. If the summaries show that the Dutch improved the lives of Indonesians, the participants felt no group-based guilt, but if they showed that the Dutch oppressed and exploited the Indonesians, they felt group-based guilt. However, in the group with the summary presenting an ambiguous history, participants who did not identify strongly as Dutch felt stronger group-based guilt than the participants who strongly identified as Dutch. The researchers argue that this is due to the defensive strategies employed by the strongly identifying participants (Doosje et al. 1998, 882-884). These participants indicated that they thought Dutch people were quite heterogeneous, and the actions of the colonisers were not seen as a threat to the image of the participants. They removed their connection with the wrongdoing by distancing themselves from the colonisers.

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[33] It is not indicated whether or not the participants had any knowledge prior to the study about the history of Dutch colonisation of Indonesia.

Maitner and her colleagues (2007) showed similar results in their studies with American students from the University of California, Santa Barbara. They confirmed that the participants felt group-based guilt about American wrongdoing in their first study. In their second study, they found that the participants that strongly identified as American were more likely to spontaneously appraise the wrongdoing as justified (Maitner, Mackie, and Smith 2007, 226-229). They confirmed that this appraisal was the reason why the strongly identifying participants felt less group-based guilt in their third study, where they explicitly told the participants that the wrongdoing had been committed after careful consideration of alternatives and consultation with allies, or that the wrongdoing was done without consideration or consultation. By presenting the wrongdoing as justified, the degree to which the participant felt group-based guilt was decreased.

These studies by Doosje and his colleagues and Maitner and her colleagues concern historical wrongs rather than current wrongdoings, and were wrongdoings that the participants were unlikely to have had a personal involvement with. As such, the participants were passive parties to the wrongdoing, and in many, if not all, cases, were ignorant about the wrongdoing. By recognising their Dutch or American identity, they felt some degree of "guilt by association," or what Gilbert calls membership guilt. Yet the unpleasant nature of guilt—in terms of the negative self-evaluation and the phenomenology of the feeling—complicates the relationship between the degree to which a member identifies with the group and the degree to which she feels guilt, if there is scope for a defensive strategy. She may, as Doosje and his colleagues show, regard the members of her group as diverse and so feel that the members who directly committed the wrong are sufficiently different from her, despite the common membership. Alternatively, as Maitner and her colleagues show, the individual may attempt to justify the wrongdoing. Strongly identifying members—the strongly patriotic and nationalist members, for example—are more likely to think positively about their group, and to be defensive about any challenge to the image of that group.

These studies reveal that strength of membership emotions is influenced by other factors, and is not solely determined by the individual's membership of a group. These studies show that in the case of a wrongdoing collective, if there is any scope for defending the wrongdoing or undermining the commonality of group members, self-categorising as a group member may result in the weakly identifying members feeling more membership guilt than the strongly identifying members. In order to feel

membership guilt, it appears that there needs to be a bit of alienation from the group such that there is sufficient psychological distance from the group to enable the member to be critical of her group. High identifiers may hold pro-attitudes towards their group (such as loyalty, patriotism, or love) that will have some influence on the negative emotions that membership of the group might bring with it, whereas low identifiers may not experience the mediating influence of such attitudes. It seems then that membership emotions will necessarily need to be considered in light of the presence or absence of such pro-attitudes.[34]

This complication about which members feel membership guilt is not a problem for Gilbert's account. She is seeking to justify why members might feel membership guilt, rather than putting forward an argument that they should feel guilt (Gilbert 1997, 72). If a member feels membership guilt, she is justified in her feeling because, by virtue of her commitment to a wrongdoing group, she was party to a wrongdoing done. Gilbert does not argue that membership will cause guilt in the members of the wrongdoing group, nor does she explore the influence that other emotions and attitudes about the group will have on the feeling of membership guilt. I think, however, that the lack of a necessary connection between being a member and feeling guilt will be a problem for her account of plural-subject guilt, as I discuss in the next section.

The account of membership guilt is that members recognise they are party to a wrongdoing in virtue of their membership of the group, and feel membership guilt about the wrongdoing. Their guilt is appropriate because by recognising their membership, they recognise that they were part of the subject that intended the wrongdoing, and so each member is co-author of that wrongdoing along with the other members of their group. In this way, the member is feeling guilt about something that she has contributed to, either directly or indirectly. Yet Gilbert argues that, nevertheless, this account is not an account of collective guilt. Membership guilt is aggregative (Gilbert 2002, 137-138). Individuals may feel membership guilt, but they may do so in the I-mode rather than in the we-mode. This does not mean that the group feels guilt, or even that other members of the group feel membership guilt. The individual comes to feel membership guilt

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[34] Lickel and his colleagues have some evidence for this, in connection with group-based shame. Shame concerns an evaluation of the self, and so group-based shame is an ingroup-directed emotion that concerns the image of the group. In a study measuring Latino emotions about stereotypic behaviour of fellow Latinos, those Latinos who reported that their ethnic identity was important to them felt greater group-based shame, but those who reported that they were proud of their ethnic heritage reported less group-based shame. Pride undermines the feeling of shame in this study (Lickel, Steele, and Schmader 2011, 158-159).

"without their reactions being mediated or modified by other members of the group" (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 506). The group can be attributed with collective I-mode guilt (collective membership guilt) when a sufficient number of members feel guilty about the wrongdoing. Those members who are ignorant of the wrongdoing, those who do not identify with the group at all, and those who strongly identify with the group, may not feel any membership guilt about the wrongdoing. In order for the membership guilt to become widespread and then collective, Gilbert suggests that the guilt needs to become common knowledge before members can assert that the group feels guilty about their wrongdoing (2000, 134-135, 2002, 138).

Since the account of membership guilt is aggregative, the group's guilt is reduced to the guilt that individuals feel. The subject of the guilt is given in the first personal singular pronoun ("I"), for it is only when many individuals feel guilty that the first personal plural pronoun arises ("we"). The individual recognises the collective wrongdoing as her own (in that she was party to it), and so comes to feel membership guilt. She feels (individually) guilt as a member of the group, not *with* the group. Bruno may feel membership guilt as an Australian, but this does not mean that Australia feels guilty about its policies toward refugees and asylum seekers. The group committed the collective wrongdoing, which has put the member in the position to feel guilt about that wrongdoing, irrespective of what the other members of the group feel. This makes Gilbert's account of membership guilt an account of group-level guilt, for the guilt concerns the actions of the group, but she has not yet given us an account of a group feeling collective guilt.

The difference between an aggregative account of collective membership guilt and a non-aggregative account of collective guilt concerns the subject of the guilt. For membership guilt, the member feels guilt in the I-mode but for a group reason, which is formulated as "I as a group-member feel (membership) guilt." Collective guilt would be formulated as "we as a group feel (collective) guilt." It would be a we-mode emotion. This difference is made stark if we consider the consequences of the emotion. The subject of the guilt may be motivated to make reparations or amends to the victim of the wrongdoing. In the case of an individual feeling membership guilt about a collective wrongdoing, she would be motivated to make reparations, but as an individual. She would do what she could in her capacity as an individual to make amends. On the other hand, if a group feels collective guilt, the group would be able to make amends as a

group.[35] But in order for this to be the case, the group would need to form a collective intention to make amends. On an aggregative account of collective emotion in which the members feel membership guilt, the group would not make amends as a group. Rather, every member would make amends in their own capacity.[36] Gilbert does not make this argument, but I think it is an important one to make, and provides an important motivation for why a non-aggregative account of collective guilt could be useful.[37]

Gilbert thinks that she can offer an account of collective guilt that is non-aggregative. In order to do so, she argues that a plural-subject group can feel guilt. In offering this account, she intends to get around the problem that some members would not regard themselves as connected to the wrongdoing and so do not feel membership guilt. She offers an account of plural-subject guilt where the group is attributed with guilt as a result of a joint commitment to feel collective guilt. On this account, every member would be a party to the guilt of the group, and would be obligated to particular actions as a result of that plural-subject guilt. This would be irrespective of the way the member identifies with her group, and of her knowledge of the wrongdoing.

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[35] Ray and his colleagues have some empirical evidence for this claim. In their studies, they recorded what kind of compensation the individuals would be prepared to give as a result of their group-based guilt. What they found is that the participants supported making reparations both through collective action and with personal action. They argue that the group-based guilt makes the aim of the reparations collective, for the member is keen for the group to make reparations and would support policies that do this. However, the experience of the guilt is individual in nature, for the individual experiences the guilt as a member of a group, not *with* her group necessarily. This motivates the individual to make individual reparations despite having made no personal contribution to the wrongdoing in question (Ray, Mackie, and Smith 2014, 244). See also Lickel, Steele and Schmader, who survey the studies about group-based guilt, and report that feeling guilt for the group's actions leads the individual to support affirmative action policies, apology on behalf of the group, and reparations (2011, 155).

[36] If Bruno feels membership guilt about the way refugees and asylum seekers are treated by Australia, he may be motivated to offer assistance to the refugees and asylum seekers that he has access to. However, if Australia feels collective guilt about government policies concerning refugees and asylum seekers, it would not only change the policies, it would be able to implement policies that specifically help all refugees and asylum seekers (perhaps by offering education targeted at immigrants, job assistance, a formal accommodation scheme, and so on).

[37] This is why sociologists and international relations theorists are interested in the possible explanatory power of collective emotion, as discussed in the Introduction. As an example of the motivational power of collective emotion, J.M. Barbalet gives an analysis of class resentment, and argues: "[c]lass systems are based structurally on chronic asymmetries of power and reward, which nevertheless remains stable. Whereas structural contradiction is a necessary feature of class systems, antagonism and conflict are contingent and sporadic. Significantly, what converts structural contradiction to class antagonism includes the feeling of resentment which leads the members of social classes to action" (1992, 153).

3 Plural-Subject Guilt

Gilbert's second approach to the question of collective guilt is to argue that a group, rather than the group members, can feel collective guilt because the group has committed a collective wrongdoing. She gives an account of what I will call plural-subject guilt, in which she argues that just as a group can collectively intend to commit a wrongdoing, a group can also collectively intend to feel guilty about that wrongdoing. By virtue of their joint commitment to the group, the members of the group would be obligated to act in accordance with the collective intention to feel guilt. I will show that Gilbert's voluntarist and intentionalist account of groups limits the scope of her account of plural-subject guilt, for she can only show that particular kinds of groups can intend to feel guilty. Further to that, she cannot show that groups experience the emotion of guilt, but only that a group can impose a rule on its members about their conduct. As such, Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt is not an account of group emotion, but an account of a collective emotion norm.

In order to discuss the possibility of plural-subject guilt, Gilbert draws on Martha Nussbaum's judgementalist account of emotion, to argue that emotions are essentially an evaluation and need not involve feelings (see Nussbaum 2001, 19-88, 2004). Gilbert defines guilt as an evaluation of having committed a wrongdoing. Like Nussbaum, Gilbert denies that "feeling-sensations" are a necessary feature of emotion (2000, 125-126, 2002, 119-120). The feelings are at best an epiphenomenon, coming about as a by-product of the cognition that the agent has committed a wrong. On the basis of this cognitivist account of emotion, Gilbert argues that emotion is, minimally, a belief that the subject has committed a wrong (2002, 139).[38]

I have shown above that Gilbert thinks groups can have collective beliefs. A group can form a joint commitment to hold a collective belief, which means that the members of the group are under an obligation to behave in accordance with that collective belief. Since guilt is a belief that the subject has done wrong, a group can hold a collective belief that the group has done wrong. The collective belief is not reducible to the beliefs of the individuals that make up the plural-subject group for it is not a summation of their personal beliefs, but is rather the product of a joint commitment by the group members to hold the belief as a group. This means that the

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[38] I argued in Chapter 1 that a judgementalist account of emotion does not give a satisfactory account of emotion, for it fails to accommodate the fact that emotions are felt experiences. As such, I will argue below that Gilbert does not attribute an emotion to a group, but only a judgement.

collective belief is not an aggregate of the group members' beliefs and, Gilbert thinks, is a truly collective account of belief.

Gilbert argues that, in the case where a group has done wrong, the members of the group can form a joint commitment to hold a collective belief that the group has done wrong, which is to say that they jointly commit the group to feeling guilty. By virtue of this joint commitment to feel plural-subject guilt, the members of the group are obligated to act in ways that align with the evaluation that the group has done wrong. What this means is that if, for example, a company determines that it feels guilty for using child labour in its manufacturing chain, it should prevent any further manufacture by children and possibly make amends for this crime. Employees who express opinions that they think child labour is necessary or good (for profit), or attempt to hire children again, can be remonstrated with for violating the company's joint commitment to feel guilt.

Gilbert offers an example of plural-subject guilt, in which a married couple form a joint commitment to feel guilty (2002, 140). Lisa and Joe look after a friend's child, Mary, for the weekend. However, Lisa and Joe spend the weekend dealing with some marital problems and Mary has a horrible time with them. After the weekend, Lisa phones Mary's parents to apologise, stating that they (her and Joe) feel guilty about the unpleasant weekend that Mary had. Joe hears this, looks surprised, and says to Lisa, "we do?" Lisa nods sternly at Joe, and he assents, nodding his agreement that yes, they do feel guilty about their poor behaviour around the child. Joe clearly does not have any feelings of guilt that would indicate that he does feel guilty. Yet when he assents to Lisa, he is assenting to a joint commitment that they feel guilty.[39] What this means, according to Gilbert, is that, "[i]n Lisa's presence, at least, Joe will now feel constrained to do and say things that echo or conform to Lisa's claim that she and Joe feel guilty about the way they treated Mary" (2002, 140). Joe's actions and expressions should line up with the evaluation that they have done wrong.

In this example, we see that the members are not required to *feel* guilty, but only that they commit to having plural-subject guilt as a group. Lisa and Joe may feel pangs of plural-subject guilt, but on Gilbert's account, these would be "phenomenological accompaniments" rather than a crucial element of the guilt experience (2000, 135-136,

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[39] It is presumed that a marriage is a form of joint commitment, which means that either Lisa or Joe can speak for both of them. However, even if there was no prior joint commitment in place, Lisa could propose to Joe that they should feel guilty, and he could express his readiness to commit with her to that belief, by nodding or agreeing with Lisa.

2002, 141). Gilbert acknowledges that the feelings of plural-subject guilt would be phenomenologically indistinct from feelings of personal guilt. Yet because the feelings accompany a guilt that has a plural-subject group as a subject and concern a collective wrongdoing, these feelings would be properly described as pangs of plural-subject guilt. Gilbert does not explain how the feelings may come about, but I think this could be explained by drawing on Ronald de Sousa's idea of bootstrapping (1987, 235-236). Should an individual accept that she is a party to plural-subject guilt, and so behave in a manner that indicates guilt, she may bring about the feeling of guilt. By going through the motions of guilt, she may come to feel the pangs of plural-subject guilt. Alternatively, she may sincerely acknowledge the collective wrongdoing and the consequent plural-subject guilt as her own, and so come to feel a phenomenologically richer experience of guilt than her fellow members who do not personally accept the plural-subject guilt as their own.

The members of the group are not required to feel personal (individual-level) guilt about the collective wrongdoing. This would be inappropriate if they regard themselves as personally blameless (Gilbert 1997, 76, 2002, 129, 136). The member can be guilty as a group member while individually blameless—she may have been party to a collective wrongdoing, perhaps unknowingly, but have never personally committed any wrongdoing. This is particularly true when large plural-subject groups are considered, which may include involuntary and ignorant members, and will include passive members.[40] If we return to Bruno, he is party to the abuse to asylum seekers and refugees because he participates in a democratic system that elected a particular government. Let us suppose that the government forms the collective intention that Australia will feel plural-subject guilt. Insofar as he is an Australian, Bruno is part of the group that commits to feeling guilty. He can believe that he has personally done no wrong, but he is committed (as an Australian) to behaving as a member of the guilty party. What this means is that he, with the rest of Australia, will take action to discontinue the wrongdoing (if it is ongoing) and to make reparation or compensation for the crime. Bruno is not required to do anything in his capacity as an individual, but as an Australian, he may be required to contribute to tax being spent on policy changes and reparations, for example.

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[40] I assume, for the sake of argument, that the involuntary and ignorant members have formed a joint commitment to be part of the group, and that the wrongdoing is the result of a non-basic joint commitment. That is, I am thinking of a large plural-subject group that is formed by the willed commitment of the members, not of groups that are formed by external factors.

Gilbert argues that this account of plural-subject guilt is collective because it is non-aggregative (1997, 81). Membership guilt becomes collective when enough members of the group feel it. With plural-subject guilt, the guilt is assigned to the group as a whole, which then acts as a constraint on the behaviour of the group members. The group is the subject of the guilt, which is to say that all of the group members together are the plural-subject of the guilt. As I argued above, Gilbert's is a holistic individualist account for it is an account of individuals joining together to hold a particular psychological state (an intention, a belief, or in this case, an emotion). Gilbert's notion of plural-subject guilt could perhaps be called joint guilt. She is arguing for an account of individuals jointly committing to hold guilt together, in the we-mode rather than the I-mode. Plural-subject guilt is collective we-mode guilt, attributed to the group members together as a group.[41]

I will present two objections to Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt. The first is that by focusing on plural-subject groups, Gilbert can only establish that particular kinds of groups may commit to an emotion. However, much of my impetus to develop an account of group emotion is that I am concerned with the emotions of groups that are acted upon by others, which may not be plural-subject groups. I do not think Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt can be developed into a general account of group emotion that accounts, for example, for the resentment and anger of the oppressed. My second objection is that Gilbert is not offering us an account of collective guilt as an emotion. She offers an account of a "feeling-rule" (Salmela 2012, 36). This means that Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge about group emotion because she fails to show that a group can feel an emotion.[42]

My first objection is that Gilbert's account of the plural-subject guilt only applies to groups that can form joint commitments. These are groups that can form collective intentions to act as a group, and can determine rules and intentions that constrain the actions of the members in a particular way. As pointed out in the second section of this chapter, Gilbert adopts an intentionalist approach to social groups, for what binds the members together as a group is the commitment of the wills of the individuals. Yet

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[41] This distinction between an I-mode and we-mode emotion is crucial for my investigation. In Chapter 6, I will show how Salmela (2012) classifies the different accounts of collective emotion according to this distinction, and argues that we-mode emotions are strongly collective emotions. I will argue that a group emotion is a we-mode collective emotion.

[42] As I argued in Chapter 1, the sceptic about group emotion think that only individuals can be attributed with emotion, because emotions are personal, subjective experiences.

some groups are not formed by willed commitments of the individuals that make up the group. Cudd argues that social groups can be voluntary (such as the plural-subject group) or nonvoluntary. Nonvoluntary groups are formed independently of whether or not the members commit to join the group, for they are formed as a consequence of some social fact or practice within that environment (Cudd 2006, 35, 40-46).

The structuralist approach to defining a social group takes into account that some groups are formed by the external social constraints that are imposed on particular individuals.[43] In Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's excellent novel, *Americanah*, her Nigerian protagonist Ifemelu tells the reader, "I came from a country [Nigeria] where race was not an issue; I did not think of myself as black and I only became black when I came to America" (2013, 290). She is pointing to the way external social constraints defined her group membership. When she came to America, the social (American) fact of race and racism placed her in an oppressed group. She became black, not because her skin changed in some way or because she decided to be black, but because she was viewed by Americans as being black. In America, black people are subject to racism and encounter obstacles in their daily lives, and Ifemelu comes to be subject to the same problems.

Groups that are acted upon, such as oppressed people and minorities, will speak of their anger and resentment towards the groups or institutions that do them harm. These groups are not necessarily plural-subject groups. Rather, they may be groups that are acted upon because they are perceived by the rest of society as being a group. It is because of their structural relations with other members of the society that the members of these groups may be treated in particular ways. Not only that, the members of these groups will have to behave in particular ways because of the social constraints that are placed upon them (Cudd 2006, 41-46). These groups do not necessarily have the mechanism to form a joint commitment to feel an emotion in response to what is done to them.[44] Yet it strikes me as strange to say that only groups that can form joint commitments can have group emotions. I want to be able to account for the emotions

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[43] Cudd advocates for a compatibilist approach to defining social groups, one that is both intentionalist and structuralist. She argues that social groups can be formed by the intentions of the members and by the external social facts that constrain particular individuals (Cudd 2006, 36).

[44] Gilbert thinks that we can express our readiness to be committed to a group by using certain expressions, such as referring to the group as "our group." This means that Indigenous Canadians, to borrow Stockdale's case study, could constitute a plural-subject group if the individuals communicate statements such as, "we are oppressed." However, as I argued above, these expressions, along with the practice of certain traditions, practices, etc., cannot meet the willed-unity condition of Gilbert's account, which is crucially intentionalist.

that individuals feel when their groups are acted upon, because, like Stockdale, I think the reason that the individual feels those specific emotions is because she belongs to that particular social group. Further than this, I want to be able to show that when we say that a nation feels fear after a terror attack or a minority feels resentment at the violence it receives, it is as a group that the group members feel the emotion.[45] Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt posits that a plural-subject group can commit to an emotion, but other groups cannot, and so her account only applies to plural-subject groups.[46] It is therefore not a sufficiently broad, or inclusive, account of collective emotion.

My second objection to Gilbert is that she does not provide an account of group emotion, but of a "feeling-rule," to use Mikko Salmela's term (2012, 36). The objection is two-fold: firstly, the judgementalist account of emotion that she endorses denies the centrality of feeling to emotion;[47] and secondly, even if we accept a judgementalist account of emotion, Gilbert cannot show us that the evaluative judgement that makes up the emotion is held by the group members. If we think of Gilbert as providing an account of "joint guilt" rather than of "collective guilt," we can see the problem more clearly. In the case of joint intention and in the case of joint guilt, she argues that the subject is a plural-subject group. In the case of intention, by forming the joint commitment to a joint we-intention, the individual comes to actually hold an intention and acts in accordance with that intention. The individual derives an individual intention from the collective we-intention so that she can act so as to bring about the collective intention. We can allow that she is unaware of the collective we-intention because of a non-basic joint commitment, but she will nevertheless hold an individual intention that derives from that (unknown to her) collective we-intention. The citizen who intends to pay her tax, for example, may be unaware that the tax will be used to establish detention centres for asylum seekers. In the case of joint guilt, by contrast, the plural-subject group forms a we-intention to feel guilty about this wrongdoing, but the group members do not necessarily derive an intention to feel guilt from this. Gilbert's account does not require that the group members actually experience any guilty

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[45] As will become apparent in Chapter 6, I can only partially show this. I will argue that groups whose members are in proximity to one another can feel emotion as a group.

[46] Gilbert does not deny she is only concerned with certain kinds of groups. She thinks that "feature-defined groups" whereby individuals are grouped by a feature such as race, class, sex, belief, and so on, do not have a collective (that is, unified) subject (Gilbert 2002, 123-124).

[47] As I argued in Chapter 1, the judgementalist account of emotion is overly intellectual, and does not capture our common understanding of emotion, which is that emotions are felt experiences.

feelings, because she thinks that feelings are not essential to what an emotion is. Guilt is the belief (the judgement) that the group has done wrong, but Gilbert does not think that the group members need to believe this either. When she discusses collective belief, she argues that individuals cannot be forced to hold beliefs that they do not believe. They only need to behave according to that belief, and the same is true when the belief concerns the guilt of the group. Gilbert argues that the individuals commit to behaving *as if* they feel guilt (which means, on Gilbert's account, that they behave *as if* they believe the group has done wrong), not that they commit to feeling guilty (or actually believing the group has done wrong). The individual group member does not need to feel pangs of guilt, nor believe that the group has done wrong.[48] She just needs to act according to how the plural-subject guilt determines the group's behaviour.

As Salmela argues, individuals cannot commit to actually feeling an emotion. I extend his argument by saying that an individual cannot commit to a belief that she does not believe. An individual can, at best, commit to preparing herself for an emotion or belief by attending to a reason for that emotion, and so *perhaps* come to feel or believe (Salmela 2012, 36). As I argued in Chapter 1, emotions are a way of perceiving the world, so if an individual commits to a belief, or a feeling-rule, she can come to construe the world according to that belief. By committing to a belief that her group has committed a wrongdoing, the group member is giving herself a reason to construe herself as having been party to the wrongdoing, and as having something to feel guilty about. She may bring about the feeling of guilt by focusing on the world in the way that the group's commitment to plural-subject guilt suggests. But this may not occur, especially in larger groups where an elected authority commits the group to the collective belief. In this case, the individuals may behave as obligated to, without attending to the (group) reason that is presented to them. Bruno, for example, may be party to Australia's commitment to increase tax that will be used to pay for reparations to wronged asylum seekers, which is the country's expression of its plural-subject guilt. However, he may simply pay his tax without considering the reason for his action, and yet meet the obligation that he is under. Bruno does not feel guilty, and even if we accept a judgementalist account of emotion, Bruno does not believe that the group has

[48] Tracy Isaacs' account of collective guilt is similar. As Ami Harbin reports, in her review of Isaacs' book, *Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts* (2011), "[c]ollective guilt neither is, nor requires, an agent's believing itself to be guilty, nor an agent's feeling guilty" (Harbin 2013, 37).

committed a wrongdoing. From the we-mode intention to feel guilt, Bruno derives an individual intention, rather than a we-mode emotion.

Pettigrove would identify Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt as a structuralist view of collective emotion (2006, 491). On this view, the group has a structure that "reinforces" the experience of the group members' emotions. The example that Pettigrove gives is of Pope John Paul II offering forgiveness to those who have wronged the Church, which is not an indication of how the Church members actually feel (2006, 492). Rather, as a representative of the Church, the Pope is committing the Church and the members of the Church to the emotion of forgiveness. Similarly to Gilbert, Pettigrove thinks that this commitment to forgiveness is a commitment to refrain from acts of anger towards the wrongdoers. The individuals within the group will be encouraged to forgive because of this commitment.

Alternatively, we could think of Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt as a network conception of collective emotion (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 512-513). On this conception, collective emotions are represented in various "nodes," in documents, policies, by the works of public figures, in symbolic artefacts, and so on. When the emotion is represented in these nodes, the emotion has become institutionalised. Pettigrove and Parsons favour this account of collective emotion when thinking about emotions in a political context, for they think that this can show how the collective emotion impacts on the political action taken by groups. As they say,

> Insofar as these expressions of fear and anger involve the creation of lasting institutions and protocols, these emotions are given a kind of permanence that will outlast the feelings of fear and anger that are part of the conscious experience of most of the individuals who make up the collective. (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 513)

On the network conception of collective emotion, an emotion is a disposition to a particular affective state rather than the affective state itself. The collective emotion will dispose the members of the group to act in particular ways and perhaps even to feel the emotion when confronted with a relevant situation.[49]

I, however, think that both the structuralist account and the network conception of collective emotion fail to be accounts of group emotion because the group does not experience the feeling of emotion. In my view, as discussed in Chapter 1, the phenomenology of the emotion is a crucial part of the experience. Burleigh Wilkins

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[49] I will refer to the network conception of collective emotion again in Chapter 6, as I will adapt it for my model of group emotion.

takes the same position, and offers an intuitively plausible suggestion for why this is so. He thinks that Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt would appear hollow to the wronged party, in the case where the members of the group did not experience feelings of guilt and only behaved as if the group felt guilty (Wilkins 2002, 153). He goes on to suggest that in the case where an authority commits the group to an emotion that its members do not feel, the presence of actual shared feelings amongst the members may serve as a destabilising force to the group. If the group members feel an emotion which is not what the authority commits the group to, this may be an indication that the authority no longer has the support of the members to represent and determine the actions of the group (Wilkins 2002, 154). Nussbaum makes a similar claim, telling us that public emotions (emotions that are concerned with the goals, principles, institutions, and so on, of the nation) are a "source of stability for good political principles and of motivation to make them effective" (2013, 2, 134).[50] When the emotions experienced by the members do not support the principles and intentions that the authorities commit the group to, the people will be motivated to change the status quo.

I think that the overall problem with Gilbert's account of collective guilt is that she grounds it in an account of collective intentionality. This seems initially attractive, as intentionality is a psychological state, just as emotion is. If individuals can intend together, an account of how they do so might help explain how individuals can hold other psychological states together. However, intentionality is a psychological state that an individual can commit to, whereas other psychological states, such as beliefs and emotions, are not. Gilbert's account of collective intentionality is about individuals forming a joint commitment to act, and it is this commitment that makes the intention of each individual joint. By forming the commitment, the individual has the intention. Beliefs and emotions, by contrast, are not psychological states that an individual can necessarily commit to. A belief is concerned with what the individual takes to be the truth, and she cannot commit to believe what she does not think is true. What makes a belief joint (that is, shared) is that individuals actually each believe the same claim. The

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[50] Nussbaum thinks that institutionalised emotion can reflect the emotions of the citizens, giving the example of a welfare system that she takes to embody sympathy to those in need. At the same time, institutionalised emotion can facilitate the experience of the same emotion in the individual. However, Nussbaum would be a sceptic about group emotion: as I understand her account, the institutionalised emotion would encourage the individual to feel a personal emotion. Because Nussbaum thinks that emotions are always from the individual's personal perspective, she thinks that different individuals may feel different emotions to the same instance of institutionalised emotion (2013, 127-136).

same is true of emotion. An emotion is about the way the world appears to the individual, and she cannot simply commit to perceiving the world differently if she does not actually perceive the world in that way. At best, she can commit to try to feel an emotion by committing to attend to reasons for that emotion, but this does not mean that she will come to feel that emotion. In order for an emotion to be jointly held, the individuals would have to actually feel the emotion together (or, in judgementalist terms, share the evaluative judgement together).

Gilbert could not argue that group members commit to a collective belief, only that they commit to particular behaviour, and the same is true of her account of plural-subject (or collective) guilt. She cannot argue that individuals commit to actually feeling guilty. By grounding her account of collective guilt in an account of collective intentionality, she is led away from giving an account of what it might mean for individuals to feel guilty together. I think that her misstep is unfortunately exacerbated by the fact that the concept of guilt is ambiguous. As Marguerite La Caze points out, guilt can be understood as a fact of having done something wrong (such as when a person is declared guilty of crime), and it can also be understood as a feeling or emotion (2013, 85). When a person has done something wrong, guilt can be attributed to her, but she may not experience the emotion of guilt. Gilbert argues that a group can be attributed with guilt when it commits to a belief about culpability, which she thinks is the same as saying that the group feels the emotion of guilt. Had Gilbert been developing an account of a different group emotion, this ambiguity would not have clouded the fact that she was not talking about an emotion per se.[51] She may then have realised her misstep in grounding her account of group emotion in the notion of joint commitment.

Gilbert's account is not one of group emotion, but of a feeling-rule that may bring about emotion in the members. We may grant that it is possible that an emotion may arise from a feeling-rule, making Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt an indirect account of group emotion. Her account would be that by committing to the feeling-rule, the members of the group might feel guilty. At this point, however, Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt appears to collapse into an account of aggregative membership guilt. The individual would only feel guilt if she endorses the commitment to feel guilty, and as the empirical studies show, members who strongly identify with the group are likely

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[51] Gilbert develops an account of collective remorse as well, however it is the same as her account of plural-subject guilt (2000, 123-140). She treats remorse and guilt as more or less the same phenomenon.

to adopt defensive strategies to avoid such a commitment. The endorsement of the joint commitment to feel guilty is contingent on how strongly the individual identifies with her group, and whether she is personally prepared to endorse such a thing. Some members would commit to having guilt only insofar as they commit to particular action, and so they would not come to feel guilty about the collective action. If this is the case, then the feeling of plural-subject guilt is only collective when a sufficient number of members feel guilty. Only then could we say that the group feels guilty. This means that Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt—amended to include the feeling of guilt—is aggregative rather than non-aggregative (that is, it is ultimately an I-mode emotion and not a we-mode emotion). The feeling-rule of the normative account of plural-subject guilt is non-aggregative, but the emotion of plural-subject guilt appears to be aggregative.[52]

The sceptic about group emotion could accept Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt. By giving an account of a feeling-rule, she is arguing for a behavioural rule or norm that may influence the emotions experienced by the members. It is not controversial that norms influence emotions, and so the sceptic about group emotion would not object to the claim that groups may commit to particular rules and policies. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, emotion is a quasi-perceptual capacity that is developed from certain genetic instincts. With input from caregivers and the people around us, each infant learns to attach particular meanings to particular feelings. This process will be influenced by the norms of the society in which the individual finds herself. Ronald de Sousa (writing in 1987) takes jealousy as an example to illustrate the impact of gender norms on the development of the emotion (1987, 259-260). He shows how the feeling of jealousy can come to have different meanings for men and women, when both experience infidelity from their partners. A man will experience jealousy because he sees his partner as belonging to him and he will express his jealousy in an

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[52] Peter Forrest argues that the feeling component of collective guilt cannot be collective but is aggregative. He says that the collective cannot *feel* guilt, even if the group has committed a collective wrongdoing and is attributed with collective guilt. He argues that the feeling of collective guilt will be the sum of the individual group members' feelings. Intriguingly, he argues that the individuals will feel individual shame, which is phenomenologically similar to guilt, as a result of their membership. By feeling individual shame, they participate in the collective guilt of their group. Collective guilt, on his account, is constituted by the belief that the group has done wrong plus the members' feelings of shame (Forrest 2006, 151-152). I think we can better understand the feelings of the members as those of collective guilt, which may give rise to a sense of group-based shame for being a person who belongs to a group that does wrong. Shame may be a response to the guilt, rather than the wrongdoing as such. For a discussion about the interaction of group-based shame and group-based guilt, see Lickel, Steele, and Schmader (2011).

angry fashion as an "assertion of his property rights" (over his partner). A woman, on the other hand, values herself by her relation to her partner, and so is more likely to experience jealousy that is akin to sadness: a loss of value of herself since she has lost her partner's love. Norms play a role in the development of the emotion—in the rules about the expression of emotions; in the meanings that emotions have; and in the way the emotions are felt. Norms also play a role more broadly in affecting how the individual interacts with the world, and the beliefs and values that she will have. This means that norms affect how the individual perceives the world around her. A feeling-rule can function in the same way. Gilbert's account is a normative one, and a feeling-rule is a kind of norm.

It thus appears that Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge because it is not an account of group emotion. She can give an account of a feeling-rule held by a group, but the sceptic can accept that a feeling-rule can influence the emotions experienced by individuals. She can give an indirect account of a collective emotion, if we amend her account to say that individuals may come to feel an emotion because they commit to a feeling-rule, but then her account appears to become aggregative. The sceptic can accept this too, for the emotion is attributed to the individual and not the group.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed Gilbert's account of membership guilt and her account of collective guilt, which I have referred to as plural-subject guilt. She develops both from her theory of collective intentionality, and as such, her account of collective guilt is a normative one in which the plural-subject group places obligations on its members to act in particular ways. Her account does not show that a group *feels* an emotion. Nevertheless, her account of collective guilt has been influential. As in the case of collective intention, she thinks that the subject of group emotion (that is non-aggregative and irreducible to individual emotions) must be the group members together, that is, the group. She wants to show how individuals experience an emotion because their group has that emotion. Hers is an ambitious account, and despite ultimately failing to be an account of group emotion, it is useful for pointing to a possible model for group emotion: a group emotion would be a we-mode emotion, in which group members jointly feel an emotion together, as a group.

Gilbert's account of membership guilt, although only a stepping-stone in her argument for collective guilt, accounts for a phenomenon in the world that has not received much attention in the philosophical emotion literature. She establishes that individuals can experience an emotion because they are members of a group. This account of membership guilt coincides with the account of group-based emotion that I analysed in Chapter 2. In both cases, I have argued that these remain aggregative accounts of collective emotion, as individuals are the subjects of the emotion. In these cases, the individual recognises her membership of a group, and by doing so, gives herself a reason to think of herself as connected to the event in question. In the case of guilt, the member of the wrongdoing group recognises that she is a representative of her group, and would be regarded as a wrongdoer when she interacts with the members of the victim group. She can recognise her association with the wrongdoing, for she can see how her relationship with people from other groups is impacted by the wrongdoing. The sceptic might assert that this account is the closest I can get to an account of group emotion, but I am not convinced by the failure of Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion that this is true. In the next two chapters, I will examine how individuals can share an emotion so that they come to feel the emotion jointly.

Gilbert's account of plural-subject guilt is an attempt at a top-down account of group emotion, in which the group's emotion is explanatorily prior to the emotion of the members. In the next chapter, I will turn to a bottom-up account of group emotion, by examining how emotions can be shared. I will be guided by the insights I have gleaned from Gilbert's work, which is that a group emotion is one in which the emotion of the group is not reducible to the emotion of the individuals: the group is the proper subject of the group emotion.

Chapter 4: Phenomenologically Fused Emotion

> *… calling it a women's march attracted far more people than it repelled, because it appealed to a deep sense of outrage and injury felt by women that went deeper than Trump's policy positions. That the least qualified man, a self-confessed harasser and molester to boot, beat the most qualified woman, despite getting fewer votes, told women that no matter how hard they tried and how excellent they were, they were always going to be second-class citizens, always going to be passed over in favor of men, and that disrespecting, insulting, and even assaulting them was perfectly okay in 21st-century America. The shock of that recognition awakened something profound in women, including many who had not been active in politics before.*
>
> —*Katha Pollitt (2017), The Nation, 23 January 2017*

The 2016 US election campaigns brought to the public's eye, among other things, the ongoing reality of sexism that even the most privileged and successful women have to face on a daily basis. The deeply misogynistic and disrespectful attitude to women of the now-elected US President, Donald Trump, and the overshadowing of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's political success and experience by the fact of her gender, made it strikingly apparent that a deep division still exists in society between men and women, despite the progress made in the last century.[1] Women everywhere were outraged, and many perceived the threat that the election of such a president poses to women. Would the support of Trump lead to the legitimisation and normalisation of outright discrimination, and the chipping away at hard-earned rights? All around the world, women marched. The Women's March was sparked by the common outrage felt by women.[2] This feeling, deep and intense, was widely experienced, and was connected to the gender identity of the individuals. This anger was women's anger. Women felt it because they were women, and they recognised the same anger in other women. They each knew how other women felt because they felt it too. More than that, they expected other women to share the same anger—after all, sexism potentially affects every member of the gender group.

In previous chapters, I have explored how group membership can influence the emotions that individuals feel. Social psychologists have shown that individuals feel

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[1] See, for example, Beinart (2016), Cottle (2016), and Robbins (2017).

[2] The Women's March took place the day after Trump's inauguration, which was on 20 January 2017.

different group-based emotions when different social identities are made salient to the individual. Margaret Gilbert (1997, 2002) gives an account of membership emotion that philosophically articulates what a group-based emotion is, which is an emotion that an individual feels when she recognises that she is a member of her group, and so is jointly responsible for what her group does. Gilbert attempts to give a non-aggregative account of collective emotion, in which she attributes an emotion to a group, but she cannot show that the group members necessarily feel the plural-subject emotion that the group commits to. As such, we do not yet have an account of group emotion that is not reducible to the individual emotions of the group members, and which is experienced by the group members as a group.

In this chapter, I will critically analyse Hans Bernhard Schmid's (2009) account of shared emotion. His is a phenomenological account, and as such is focused on the felt experience of emotion. He seeks to account for the kind of emotion that is felt by the women in the Women's March—the women actually feel outrage, and they feel it as women, with other women. For Schmid, a collective emotion is a shared emotion, as he wants to show that many individuals can feel a single emotion. He compares his account to Gilbert's account of membership emotion, contrasting his phenomenal perspective to the question of group emotion with her analytic perspective, and he thinks that he can solve the problems faced by her argument. Schmid argues that the phenomenological perspective is better able to account for the experience of shared emotion, and that the shortcoming of Gilbert's account is that she does not seriously take into account the experience of the individual within the group.

Much like Gilbert, Schmid argues that shared emotions are a kind of collective intentionality, but in contrast with her, he focuses on collective affective intentionality (2009, 59-64). As emotion is an intentional state, he approaches the question of shared emotion by considering whether each aspect of an intentional state can be shared. By focusing on the mode, the content, and the subject of the emotion, Schmid argues that an emotion is shared when the individual experiences the same kind of feeling as her group members, shares a concern with her group members, and most importantly, experiences herself as phenomenologically fused with her group. The individual feels a shared emotion when she thinks of herself as a group member, with the same concern and the same feeling as her fellow group members.

In Section 1, I will outline Schmid's account of phenomenological fusion, in which he examines how each aspect of the intentionality of emotion can be shared. In

section 1.1, I examine the phenomenon of emotional contagion, which is one way that a feeling can be shared. Like Schmid, I do not think that emotional contagion can account for shared emotion, but I think that it may foster shared emotion. In section 1.2, I look at how individuals can share a concern and come to feel an emotion together. I draw on Max Scheler's (1979) account of feeling-together and Schmid's interpretation of this account, and argue that common feelings can certainly bring people together as a group, but again, feeling-together is not the same as shared emotion. In section 1.3, I turn to the most important aspect of Schmid's argument, in which he challenges the subjective individualism of Gilbert's (2006) and John Searle's (2002a) collective intentionality accounts. Schmid argues that we should look at how an individual experiences her sense of subjectivity when she has an emotion, and that this phenomenal subject will be an indication of whether or not the emotion is a shared mental state. If the individual feels that she is experiencing her group's emotion, that emotion has a different phenomenal structure that indicates that the subject of the emotion is collective. In section 1.4, I briefly bring the different aspects of Schmid's account together.

In Section 2, I will argue that Schmid does not overcome the problems that are faced by Gilbert's account of membership emotion, because he cannot establish that many individuals feel an emotion together. Schmid justifies his account of phenomenological fusion on an overly broad conception of collective intentionality, and as such he cannot show that the phenomenal experience of an individual's subjectivity is an indication of the shared structure of an emotion. Ultimately, Schmid gives an account of membership emotion which is not shared: he shows that an individual can feel an I-mode emotion as a group member, but not that a group of individuals can feel a shared, we-mode emotion. As such, I do not think that his account of fused feeling can meet the Sceptical Challenge.

1 Schmid's account of phenomenological fusion

Schmid addresses the question of group emotion in the context of plural action. However, he starts his analysis from a different point than Gilbert. Rather than asking what it means to attribute an emotion to a group, as Gilbert does in her account of plural-subject guilt, he asks what it means for individuals to share emotion with other group members. He thus frames the question of group emotion as a question of shared emotion. In doing so, he can ensure that his account of shared emotion does not depart from our intuitive sense of what an emotion is. Like philosophers of emotion, such as

Ronald de Sousa (1987), Peter Goldie (2000), Jesse Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005), and other non-cognitivist theorists of emotions, Schmid regards feelings as central to emotion as emotions are felt experiences (2009, 60). Individuals feel emotions, and in order to account for feelings within an account of group emotion, he attempts to establish how an individual's (genuinely experienced) emotion can be attributed to her group. Schmid intends to show that a group can have the same sort of emotion as an individual because individuals can feel or share an emotion together.

Schmid takes the position that emotions are intentional, rather than mere changes in bodily feeling (2009, 60). He adopts Goldie's conception of emotions as "feeling towards," which he takes to be a general articulation of the view that the phenomenology of emotions is an important aspect of emotion, while at the same time recognising the importance of the intentionality of emotion (Schmid 2009, 63-64).[3] Goldie defines emotions as feeling towards, which he understands as "an essentially intentional psychological phenomenon with a special sort of emotionally laden content, and it is also one which essentially involves feeling" (2000, 4). Although there may be some fine-grained distinctions between Goldie's account of emotion and the quasi-perceptual account of emotion that I argued for in Chapter 1, I will take these accounts to be compatible with one another for the purposes of this argument. Emotions, for Schmid and for me, are intentional feelings, with a cognitive component and a feeling component that are tightly intertwined.

Schmid argues that emotion is an intentional state, and so has a mode, content, and a subject like other intentional states (2009, 64). The mode of the emotion concerns the kind of feeling that the emotion is. The content encapsulates the concern, or the meaning, of the emotion. The subject concerns the bearer of the emotion. Schmid argues that each of these features of the intentionality of emotion can be shared, and proceeds to examine each feature in order to determine how an emotion can be shared. I will do the same, and in analysing Schmid's argument, I will critically examine the closely related phenomena of emotional contagion and feeling-together, which occurs when individuals have an emotion in common with one another. Schmid builds on these accounts to argue that an emotion is shared when the individual fuses her subjectivity with another individual's subjectivity.

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[3] This is in contrast to Gilbert (1997, 2002), who adopts the judgementalist account of emotion in her account of plural-subject guilt and does not think that feelings are necessary for an emotion to be experienced.

1.1 Shared affect and emotional contagion

The first feature of the intentionality of emotion is the mode of emotion. The mode of emotion is about the kind of feeling that the emotion is, which is to say the mode of the emotion is the formal object of emotion (Schmid 2009, 64). As I argued in Chapter 1, emotions are intentional because they are directed at objects. In discussing Prinz's quasi-perceptual account of emotion, I pointed to a distinction in how we understand the object of an emotion. The object of an emotion has two dimensions: the formal object and the particular object. The formal object is, for Prinz, the core relational theme that defines the emotion (Prinz 2003, 71-72, 81). Schmid identifies the formal object as the mode of the emotion, as the mode characterises what kind of feeling a person is experiencing. Fear is about danger, for example. The formal object is that there is a threat, and the feeling is the associated phenomenology of fear. The particular object determines the target of the emotion. If I am afraid of the dog, my emotion will concern the particular object, the dog.

By sharing the formal object, individuals share the same kind of feeling. Psychologists have explained the phenomenon of shared feeling with the notion of emotional contagion, and Schmid suggests that this may be one way that a feeling can be shared (2009, 65-66). As will be quickly apparent though, emotional contagion cannot sufficiently account for shared emotion. However, it is worth examining this phenomenon as it identifies an important way that a shared emotion can be fostered or encouraged. Additionally, recent studies into the spread of emotion via online communication suggest that individuals need not be in physical or temporal proximity to one another in order to share a feeling.

Emotional contagion is the phenomenon whereby an individual appears to "catch" or be "infected" by another person's emotion. This is a well-documented phenomenon, occurring even in newborns as young as 2 to 4 days old, who begin to cry when they hear another newborn cry (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1992, 164-165, Battaly 2011, 285). Interacting with an angry person can cause another individual to become tense or anxious, or perhaps angry too. A depressive person can lower another's mood, such that the person interacting with the depressive person feels less joy or becomes weary. By interacting with another person, it appears that the feeling of the other can cause an individual to either feel the same emotion or feel an emotion of a similar valence (such as being tense in the presence of anger). In a sense, the other person's

feeling becomes the individual's own feeling, causing the individual to experience what the other person is feeling.

Psychological research into the phenomenon of emotional contagion has revealed that it occurs when individuals mimic one another automatically. Emotional contagion is defined by Elaine Hatfield, John Cacioppo, and Richard Rapson as "the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize movements, expressions, postures, and vocalizations with those of another person and, consequently, to converge emotionally" (1992, 153-154). This is an involuntary and unconscious process, whereby the individual observing another automatically mimics the facial movements and bodily movements of another, or brings her movements and speaking patterns into synchrony with the other person's movements and speaking patterns. Wincing at another's pain, matching our stride with another person's, or lowering our tone to match the other's low tone, are all examples of involuntary and reflexive mimicry (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1992, 157-159, 1993).

Neuroscientists call this form of mimicry "mirroring," and argue that mirroring occurs when the mirror neurons in the brain are activated and begin to transmit information (Goldman 2011, Iacoboni 2011, Parkinson 2011). When a person behaves in a particular way, an fMRI can map the parts of the brain that are activated in doing so. In the person observing the behaviour, her mirror neurons may be activated, which will cause the same parts of her brain to be activated, as if she were performing the same action or behaving in the same way. She mentally mimics the person that she is observing, and may then manifest that mental mimicry through physical mimicry (Goldman 2011, 33-36). For example, a 2003 study by Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, and Rizzzolatti showed that when participants watched a film clip that showed individuals smelling the contents of a glass (which smelled disgusting, pleasant, or had a neutral odour), the participants would spontaneously make the facial expressions that would be fitting if they were themselves smelling the contents of the glass (cited in Goldman 2011, 35). In the case where the contents smelled disgusting, the fMRI scans showed that the left anterior insula and the right anterior cingulate cortex in the brain were activated both when the participant inhaled a disgusting odour, and when she observed another inhaling the disgusting odour. Despite not personally smelling the contents of the glass, the participants reacted as if they had.

Mental mimicry can trigger a feeling. As I argued in Chapter 1, the expression of emotion is often connected with the feeling of emotion, and one way to arouse an

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emotion is to go through the motions of the emotion. De Sousa calls this process "bootstrapping" (1987, 235-246).[4] By smiling, for example, the individual can start to feel happy as the physical smile triggers the cognitive representation of happiness. Hatfield and her colleagues argue that when an individual mimics another's emotional expression, the processes of facial feedback, postural feedback, or vocal feedback can arouse the person's emotion (1992, 162-163). The observer mimics the other person's mental state due to the firing of mirror neurons, which may cause her to physically mimic the other, which may then trigger the corresponding feeling. By observing another individual's smile, the mental state for happiness is represented in the observer's brain, which may cause her to smile. This smile may then trigger the feeling of happiness within the observer, as part of the various feedback processes. This is a very quick process, and may not be observable (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1992, 167). Yet Alvin Goldman points out that mirroring "is a highly-reliable method of state-generation, one that preserves at least the sameness of mental-state type" (Goldman 2011, 42).

Psychologists and neuroscientists have studied the phenomenon of emotional contagion (mirroring) in settings when individuals are in physical proximity to one another. In these settings, the individuals can perceive one another, and this is what causes the mirror neurons to fire in the observer's brain. An individual feels another person's feeling when she is physically close enough to mimic her and insofar as that person is manifesting a feeling. There is an implicit conclusion that emotional contagion is restricted to individuals in physical and temporal proximity to one another. Hatfield and her colleagues note that emotions appear to disseminate via mass communication such as radio and television, but they only speculate that this may be a case of emotional contagion (1994, 126-127). Recent studies into the spread of emotions in online social media appear to confirm this speculation, by showing that emotions seem to spread via textual communication (Guillory et al. 2011, Kramer 2012, Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock 2014). If this were the case, it would challenge the implied conditions about the spatial and temporal proximity required for emotional contagion to occur between individuals. The investigations are still in the early stages, but studies suggest that emotions can be encoded into text and transmitted from one individual to

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[4] Joel Krueger considers five ways that an individual can self-regulate her emotion, and refers to the kinds of control an agent exerts over her attention, appraisal, and behaviour, as "embodied self-regulation" (2016, 264-265). Bootstrapping, then, is embodied self-regulation. This is in contrast with distributed self-regulation that I discuss below.

another via the textual medium online. A study by Jamie Guillory, Jason Spiegel, Molly Drislane, Benjamin Weiss, Walter Donner, and Jeffrey Hancock (2011) shows that emotion cues can be coded into text in computer-mediated-communication, while a study by Adam Kramer (2012) shows that the emotions expressed in Facebook status updates affect the emotions expressed by friends of the user for up to three days after the initial post.

The study by Guillory and his colleagues (2011) examined how feelings can be shared in online message groups. They designed a study in which participants were made to watch short film clips, and then listen to music and solve word scrambles while contributing to an online message group. The participant's task was to think, along with other members of the online group, of practical advice that they would give to new university freshmen. One participant, "the experiencer," watched a film clip depicting bullying and injustice, in order to induce anger and other negative emotions. This negative emotion was sustained with "loud, abrasive heavy metal music" and word scrambles that revealed anger-related words. The other participants, "the partners" (as well as the participants in the control group), watched a film clip that would have no effect on the feelings of the participant, and listened to light jazz while revealing words in the word scramble with neutral content. Linguistic analysis of the resulting text messages revealed that in comparison with the control groups, the participants in the group with the angry experiencer used more words in their discussion, and in particular, they used more words that indicated a discrepancy from reality (such as "should've," "wouldn't," "need").[5] Importantly, the partners to the angry experiencer reported feeling tense as a result of the online interaction, which is an emotion of the same valence as anger. The experiencer's messages did not express anger directly, but the number of words and the use of discrepancy words provided a cue that could arouse negative emotions in her partners.[6] These results suggest that the anger of one online user can infect the feelings of other online users while not being in physical proximity to them.

In his study, Kramer (2012) studied the impact of Facebook user posts with emotional content on the friends of the user. He found that the emotional content of a

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[5] Discrepancy words are one of the indicators of psychological distance in speech or text. A high percentage of discrepancy words can indicate "an abstract, impersonal, and rational tone" (Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker 2004, 689).

[6] Interestingly, the groups with the angry experiencer also performed better in their task of providing advice to new students. The advice they gave was of a better quality. By feeling negative emotion, the participants became stronger analytic thinkers and had a higher level of focus (Guillory et al. 2011, 747).

Facebook status update correlates with the friends of that user making valence-consistent posts of their own. It is significant that this effect was noted up to three days after the original post, which challenges the temporal condition of emotional contagion. In this study, the status updates of 61,289 randomly selected (English-speaking) Facebook users were analysed for particular emotion words (negative and positive) over a three-day period. The analysis revealed that the (positive or negative) emotion word usage of users would predict the (positive or negative) emotion word usage of their friends. If a user posted a status update with negative emotional content, the study predicted that her friends would post a status update (over the following three days) with negative emotional content. The effect was significant on the first day, and replicated on the second and third days. The effect for negative emotions was larger than the effect for positive emotions.[7] The study suggests that by observing the textually expressed emotions of a user, the user's friends will convey emotions of a similar valence in their own online postings. Not only is there no direct interaction between the individuals, the impact of the initial post can be felt over a temporally extended period.

The research into the possibility of online emotional contagion suggests that the feelings of an individual can be expressed in a textual medium in such a way that it can impact on the feelings of observers. It is not clear that the observer is mentally mimicking the other, as is the case with emotional contagion. The suggestion is that emotional cues can be encoded into text via word choice and the number of words used, such that an emotion is conveyed which the observer decodes. The observer may not consciously be aware of the emotion being conveyed, for as we saw in Guillory and his colleagues' study, the content of the words may not be concerned with what the user is feeling. Further research will need to be done to show that these encoded emotional cues give rise to mental mimicry in the observer. Yet I draw attention to this research because it offers an intriguing possibility about the kind of groups that can experience group emotions. If emotional contagion is required for individuals to share an emotion, and if it is possible that online and physical media can facilitate emotional contagion, it

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[7] The study could not control for whether or not the friends of the user saw the user's post. However, Kramer argues that this does not confound his results, because if the friend did not see the post, the initial post would not affect her emotions. Kramer does not indicate whether or not the posts contained only text, or text and pictures. For privacy reasons, the researchers never saw the actual user posts—they used software that recorded the text from the user posts and filtered out the relevant emotion words (Kramer 2012, 768). I suspect that Facebook would have tagged picture posts and status posts differently in the code, and so the software would have only accessed status posts (that is, text-only posts).

becomes possible that individuals separated by time and space can share an emotion. I will return to this possibility in Chapter 6.

Mental mimicry can thus lead individuals to experience feelings of the same kind, if not to the same degree (Coplan 2011, 6). This, however, does not mean that the individual knows what the object of the feeling is. Mimicry allows the sharing of the feeling, but not the content of that emotion. Goldie cites the example of overhearing strangers giggle, causing the listener to also feel amused. However, the listener will not know why the strangers are amused, or what they are giggling at (Goldie 1999, 406, 2000, 178, see also Zahavi 2010, 291).[8] Additionally, the individual may not be aware that she is engaged in mental mimicry. Irrespective of whether she knows that she is mimicking another, she will experience the feeling as her own, and may attribute the feeling to a different object (Salice 2015, 87). Emotional contagion is a mechanism by which the mode of a feeling can be transmitted from one individual to another, but it does not allow for the meaning (the content) of the emotion to be conveyed. When an individual "catches" a feeling, she does not necessarily "catch" the emotion, as she may not know what the particular object of the emotion is.[9]

Sharing the mode of an emotion does not entail that an emotion is shared. Rather, something like an atmosphere is conveyed. People at a music festival, for example, become happy when at the convivial event, but what each individual is happy about remains personal to that individual. Each individual may recognise that others are happy, and even that the happiness of others is lifting her own spirits so that she is happy too, but this happiness is experienced *as her own*. An emotion, as we saw in Chapter 1, is not simply a bodily feeling, but is instead a way of perceiving the world. It incorporates appraisal, as the world is construed as being of concern in a particular way. This aspect of emotion is not shared via contagion. At best, a feeling that is spread via emotional contagion may coincidentally give rise to individuals experiencing the same emotion. Because the content of an emotion is not shared via contagion, we therefore cannot say that emotions are shared via emotional contagion. As Goldie says, "[t]he

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[8] As Battaly points out, "mirroring is involuntary and automatic, and does not entail mindreading or epistemic output of any kind" (2011, 283-284).

[9] As we recall from Chapter 1, the objection to the Jamesian account of emotion as patterns of bodily change is that William James (1884) cannot explain why emotions are meaningful, and why the feelings are directed at objects in the world (Deigh 2010, 24-25, Goldie 2000, 48). Similarly, when the feeling of an emotion is spread from one individual to another, the feeling does not indicate what that emotion is concerned with.

metaphor of 'contagion' (after all it is just a metaphor) is quite inappropriate for emotional sharing" (1999, 407).

I do not, however, mean to dismiss emotional contagion as a way for an emotion to become shared. I think that sharing the mode of an emotion can foster a shared emotion, such that individuals come to regard themselves as holding the same emotion. Once an individual experiences a feeling that is caused by emotional contagion, she can be directed to give attention to a particular object and so can come to share the same concern as the other individuals around her. When an individual takes on the feeling of fear, for example, she will be guided (by her paradigm scenario for fear) to construe the world as dangerous and will seek out the source of that fear. By focusing her attention on what other people are afraid of, she may perceive what is causing others to feel fear, and come to feel fear about the same object. We could then say that she and other individuals feel fear about the same threat. In the Introduction, I pointed to the research by Gustav Le Bon, who argues that the emotion of a crowd is "a contagious power as intense as that of microbes" (Le Bon 1896, 78). His argument is that emotional contagion can foster unity between individuals, which allows them to "take on a particular identity" (Kingston 2011, 35).

There is an interesting analogous argument about the power of mimicry proposed by William McNeill (1995), in connection with the social cohesion that arises from ritual.[10] McNeill does not focus on emotional contagion but rather on what he calls "muscular bonding." He explores what happens when people participate in ritual (1995, 1-11). Reflecting on both his own and others' first-personal accounts of participating in military drills, dance, and religious rituals, he argues that by keeping time with one another, muscular bonding can be fostered. When individuals act in unison, as in military drills, or keep in time with one another, as in dance, a sense of solidarity emerges between the participants. This solidarity can cause differences between the participants to become insignificant and the sense of unity to become stronger than the racial, religious, and class differences that exist between the individuals. On McNeill's account, participating in ritual can be a powerful tool for enhancing social cohesion The argument here is not that the individuals come to share an emotion by sharing the same kind of feeling, but rather, they feel a sense of affinity with one another by engaging in the same kind of activity. Much like the way mimicry that arouses emotional contagion

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[10] See also Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan Lanman (2014), who argue that ritual promotes social cohesion.

may foster a shared emotion that unifies the individuals, the synchronous movement created by ritual creates a sense of mutual solidarity that unifies the individuals.[11]

In the literature on emotion, muscular bonding is referred to as affective attunement, or for Joel Krueger, affective entrainment.[12] Affective attunement is when individuals bring their emotions into alignment with one another, by synchronising their emotion expressions. It is a form of emotion regulation, but as Krueger explains, it is a distributed form of self-regulation because the individual regulates her emotion in accordance with another's emotion (2016, 266). Much like the way that people will begin to clap in time with one another, we can bring our emotional expressions into synchrony with one another when in a gathering with other people. As a result of this synchrony, the individuals feel a sense of connection and rapport with one another (Krueger 2016, 271). In mimicking one another and synchronising the expression of emotion, the individuals can create an atmosphere in which a feeling is shared. Affective attunement is very similar to emotional contagion, and in fact depends on it in order for synchrony to be established; but what emerges is a shared feeling, not a shared emotion necessarily (von Scheve et al. 2014, 5). It is, as Schmid points out, somewhat richer than emotional contagion, for rather than a feeling being merely transmitted from one individual to another, certain norms of emotion expression are also conveyed, due to the reciprocal nature of regulation that occurs (2009, 66). Like emotional contagion, affective attunement may foster a shared emotion, although not necessarily. The feelings that are attuned to one another may become a shared emotion if they are intentionally directed to the same particular object.

Sharing an emotion does not necessarily proceed from feeling the same kind of feeling as other individuals, because the individual may not know why the others feel as they do. She may connect her feeling to a different particular object, and so direct her feeling differently from those around her. Even if the individual comes to appraise the world as others do, she may experience the resultant emotion as her own, rather than as one that she shares with those around her. Thus, emotional contagion and affective attunement alone cannot ensure that individuals come to share an emotion. However, it

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[11] One particularly relevant example recounted by McNeil is of soldiers who go through battle together: "[m]any veterans who are honest with themselves will admit, I believe, that the experience of communal effort in battle, even under the altered conditions of modern war, has been the high point of their lives… Their 'I' passes insensibly into a 'we,' 'my' becomes 'our,' and individual fate loses its central importance" (1995, 10).

[12] See also Schmid (2009, 66), von Scheve (2012), von Scheve and Ismer (2013, 407), von Scheve et al. (2014, 4-5).

may foster shared emotions if the individuals share what the feeling is concerned with. In section 1.2, I will investigate how the content of an emotion can be shared.

1.2 Feeling-together by sharing a concern

In this section, I explore a different possible way of sharing an emotion, in which the individual shares the same concerns as another individual, and is situated in the world in the same way as another. Unlike sharing the mode of an emotion, which concerns the kind of affective feeling that can be transmitted via emotional contagion, sharing the content of an emotion occurs when individuals have an emotion that has the same meaning, or represents the same kind of appraisal. Schmid draws on Scheler's (1979) work on the phenomenon of feeling-together, which occurs when individuals have an emotion in common with one another. I will consider Schmid's examples, and compare his account of feeling-together with Gilbert's account of membership emotion.[13] Membership emotions are emotions felt by individuals as members of their group, and so are not emotions felt by individuals together. I will argue that by feeling-together, individuals feel emotions that they have in common with others, but nevertheless they feel these emotions as individuals. Feeling-together occurs when individuals recognise that they feel the same membership emotion, but this does not mean that they share the membership emotion. As such, the common emotion in feeling-together is still reducible to an individual emotion, and does not show that a group feels an emotion.

In addition to emotional contagion and shared affect, Schmid argues that the second way an emotion may be shared is via the *content* of the feeling (2009, 64-68). The content of the feeling includes both the target and the focus of the feeling, representing what the feeling is about and how it is of significance to the individual. The target of the feeling is what the emotion is intentionally directed at, namely, the particular object. The focus of the feeling is, in Schmid's words, "the object in the background" (2009, 64). It tracks what motivates the individual to appraise the target of her feeling as she does (de Sousa 1987, 116, Helm 2008, 23). If we think about fear of a dog, the individual's fear is targeted at the dog. But the individual's fear will be focused on what the dog presents a danger to—is he threatening the individual, for example, or a child? If the individual fears that the dog will harm her, her focus is on the danger presented to her. If she fears that the dog will harm the child, her focus is on the danger presented to the child. In both cases the *target* of the fear is the same (the dog), but the

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[13] I discuss Gilbert's account of membership emotion in Chapter 3.

focus is different (the individual, or the child). The content of the emotion captures the intentionality of the feeling, directing the individual to a particular object in the world and the significance of that object.

On the understanding that the content includes both a target and a focus, Schmid approaches the question of how the content of a feeling can be shared. He starts by outlining the phenomenon that Scheler calls "feeling-in-common" and which Schmid translates as "feeling-together" (Scheler 1979, 13, Schmid 2009, 66).[14] An initial description of feeling-together is of a case in which the target and the focus of the feeling for each individual is the same, in that they perceive the same object in the same way.[15] An audience enjoying a theatre performance can be said to be feeling amusement together. The audience is focused on the performance given by the theatre troupe, which they appraise as being entertaining and pleasant to themselves. The example that Scheler outlines is of two parents mourning the death of their child:

> Two parents stand beside the dead body of a beloved child. They feel in common the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish. It is not that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know that they are feeling it. No, it is a *feeling-in-common* [feeling-together]. A's sorrow is in no way an 'external' matter for B here, as it is, e.g. for their friend C, who joins them, and commiserates 'with them' or 'upon their sorrow'. On the contrary, they feel it together in the sense that they feel and experience in common, not only the self-same value-situation, but also the same keenness of emotion in regard to it. The sorrow, as value-content, and the grief, as characterising the functional relation thereto, are here *one and identical…* It may, however, be the case that A first feels sorrow by himself and is then joined by B in a common feeling. (1979, 12-13)

In this example, each parent is grieving for their child, who is the target of their grief. The focus of the grief is the parent, individually—the mother is feeling her grief and the father is feeling his grief. This means that each parent appraises the loss of their child in the same way. They are each in a parental relationship to the child, and so the significance of the death is of a parental loss. The nature of this grief is identical for both parents, and it is this recognition that makes their grief a feeling that they have in common with one another.[16] Their friend C cannot feel the grief that the parents feel, for she is not related to the child in the same way and the death of the child will not

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[14] I will use the latter term, "feeling-together," which is more common in the recent literature.

[15] As we will see below, Schmid argues that it is possible for individuals to share a concern despite their feelings each having different targets and focuses.

[16] Or more minimally, the nature of the grief for each parent is sufficiently similar. We may think that one parent's grief is a bit different from the other parent's grief, given the differences in parental roles or the particularities of each parent's relationship to the child.

have the same significance for her as it does for the parents. The father grieves his child as a parent, the mother grieves her child as a parent, and since both are a parent to the same child, this grief is the same.

It may sound like Scheler is making a stronger claim, which is that the parents are grieving as one entity. He says that the phenomenon of feeling-together is not simply two people feeling the same emotion with mutual knowledge that the other is feeling the same. He suggests that the commonality of the feeling is an important aspect of the emotion and that the individuals need to be bound together to feel the emotion. I want to suggest that this is too strong a reading. Scheler says that one parent can feel grief, and the other can join in her grief. This would suggest that each parent can grieve alone, for he says that, "the process of feeling in the father and the mother is given separately in each case; only *what* they feel—the *one* sorrow—and its value-content is immediately present to them as identical" (Scheler 1979, 37). The recognition of the other parent's grief does not change the parent's own grief in any way. The first parent grieves as a parent, and the second grieves as a parent. It is the recognition that the other is a parent in the same way as her—that is, parent to the same child—that encapsulates the commonality between them.[17]

Schmid argues that when the target of the feeling and the focus of the feeling are the same in two individuals, the content of the emotion is shared. He then considers a case in which the target and the focus of the emotion are different for the two individuals. He argues that these individuals nevertheless share the content of their feelings (Schmid 2009, 67-68). The content of the emotion is shared because the relation between the target and the focus of each individual's emotion is the same, meaning that the feeling has the same meaning for each individual. In making this argument, he broadens the definition of feeling-together—it is the sharing of a concern, rather than the sharing of a target and a focus. Schmid offers the example from Homer's *Iliad* of Achilles and King Priam sharing the feeling of grief when loss occurs between a father and son (2009, 67-68).

Achilles kills King Priam's son, Hector, and Priam goes to beg Achilles for the body of his son. Priam grieves about the death of his own son. Achilles, seeing Priam's

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[17] Krueger argues that the parents in Scheler's example do share an emotion, but that this is because the parents become affectively attuned to one another, and their emotions become entrained. As such, they are reciprocally regulating their emotion, which is held by both parents (Krueger 2016, 270-273). This argument is very similar to Edith Stein, Thomas Szanto, and Dan Zahavi's arguments for shared emotion, which I discuss in Chapter 5, and so I will not discuss it here. It is worth noting, however, that the commonality of emotion is not sufficient to say that the parents share their emotion, as I argue below.

grief, begins to weep with Priam. Schmid argues that Achilles comes to share Priam's grief, not because he is a parent like Priam, but because he thinks of his own father, Pelleas. In his quest to kill Hector, Achilles abandoned his father, and he knows that Pelleas will grieve Achilles' death as Priam grieves Hector's death. The target of Priam's grief is his son, and the focus is himself as a father. Achilles' grief is targeted at his own impending death, but is focused on his father. In this example, the focus and target of each individual's grief is different, but what they have in common is that the grief is about a father's loss of a son. Achilles thinks of himself as a son, Priam thinks of himself as a father, but the nature of the loss that defines their grief is a father's loss of his son.

The common grief of Achilles and Priam is shared in a broader sense than the common grief between the parents in Scheler's example. What Achilles and Priam share is a concern (the significance of loss), and it is this that they recognise in one another which brings them to share their grief. The parents in Scheler's example share the same concern, and also share the same target and focus of their grief. Achilles is the son that will die, not the father who will lose a son, but what he grieves—as Schmid sees it—is the father's loss. This is what Achilles and Priam have in common that allows them to grieve together.

This example is a challenging one. On the one hand, it is tempting to argue that what Achilles is weeping for is the suffering that will be inflicted on Pelleas, which is not the same as grieving for the loss of a son. We can argue that Achilles is not concerned with loss but with the suffering that his death will cause his father. Achilles' suffering is of something like torment, because he knows that his death will cause pain for his father. It may be that the torment Achilles feels has the same phenomenology that Priam feels in his grief, but this is not sufficient to show that the content of the feeling is the same. Achilles, after all, has no sense of what it is like to lose a son, even if he does know what it is like to abandon his father.[18] On the other hand, we may agree with Schmid that Achilles is grieving. As a son, he is grieving for the loss that will occur in the father-son relationship. He can know what it is like to be apart from his father and know that he will never meet his father again, which is a relationship-loss. By being concerned with the same type of concern, the feeling represents the same kind

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[18] Another interpretation is that Achilles is mourning his close friend, Patroclus, whose death he is avenging. In this case, Achilles is, like Priam, mourning the loss of a loved one, although not the loss of a son.

of appraisal, despite the target and the focus of each individual's emotion being different.

What I think Schmid wants to show with the example of Achilles' and Priam's common grief is that individuals can feel an emotion together despite the particularities of the emotion being different. Feeling-together is experienced in support groups, in which members share a similar concern if not similar situations. A support group for people who have lost loved ones, for example, may include parents of deceased infants, parents of deceased adult children, and adult children of deceased parents. The relationship that exists between each member and her loved one will be unique to that pair, and this relationship will nuance the member's grief. A parent of a deceased infant may grieve about the loss of a child that was denied a future; a child of a deceased parent may grieve the loss of a long-ailing parent who suffered for many years; another member may be grieving over a loved one who was murdered, rather than dying from natural causes. The nature of each member's grief may thus be quite different. What the members of the support group have in common, despite these differences, is the concern of the loss of a loved one. It is with this scenario in mind that I am thus inclined to agree with Schmid that individuals can have a feeling in common when the individuals have an emotion that is of the same significance to each of them.

Feeling-together is the phenomenon of individuals each feeling an emotion that has the same concern. It is akin to the account of membership emotion that I outlined in Chapter 3. In membership emotion, the member of a group feels an emotion because she recognises her group membership, which puts her in a particular relation to the world. The German who feels guilty about the Holocaust, for example, does so because she is German and not because she personally contributed to the atrocity. She is concerned with the crime that her country has perpetrated, and regards herself as a wrongdoer by virtue of her citizenship. In Scheler's example of parental grief, the parents feel grief as parents. In both the case of the guilty German and the case of the grieving parents, what makes their feeling potentially the same as the feelings of other members in the group is that other members may be oriented to the world in the same way. Yet we cannot conclude that by feeling the same concern, the individuals share the emotion. In both cases, the individuals feel the emotion by themselves. As I argued in the previous chapter, a membership emotion is an I-mode collective emotion, and

likewise, the emotion in feeling-together is an I-mode collective emotion.[19] The individual's emotion is independent of what other members feel, but is parallel to what other members feel.

What Scheler contributes to the account of membership emotion is the recognition that a sense of unity can arise when individuals feel the same kind of emotion and experience feeling-together. The mother's grief, in Scheler's example, is individual, but it becomes a common grief that she feels with the father when she sees that he grieves for their child too. Her grief does not change when the father joins her in grieving, but it becomes a feeling that she perceives as having in common with him. If membership emotion is an emotion felt by an individual as a member of a group, then feeling-together occurs when an individual feels an emotion as a member of her group and recognises that other members have the emotion in common with her. The commonality of feeling does not indicate that the emotion of each individual is connected with the emotion of the other, or that the individuals are sharing one emotion. Rather, there is a sense of affinity that is epiphenomenal to the experience of the feeling itself. Something like muscular bonding or affective attunement occurs, and the commonality of concern allows the individuals to seek comfort or solidarity with one another. This can be a powerful experience with important consequences. Individuals may form a group because of their common feeling, for example, as when a protest group is formed when individuals feel the same anger or when support groups are created for individuals with the same grief. However, because the emotions of the individuals are not connected to the emotions of other individuals, the account of feeling-together, like the account of membership emotion, can only be an aggregative account of collective emotion. The sharing of emotion is coincidental.

1.3 The fused subject

Having argued that sharing the mode and/or content of an emotion is not sufficient to establish that an emotion is shared, Schmid considers whether or not the third feature of affective intentionality, the subject, can be shared. If the subject of an emotion is shared by multiple individuals, the emotion may be shared by those individuals that constitute the shared subject. Schmid approaches the question of a shared subject by considering how the individual experiences her subjectivity when feeling an emotion.

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[19] This distinction comes from Salmela (2012), who develops a typology of collective emotion. An I-mode collective emotion is a moderately collective emotion, on his typology.

Schmid argues that an individual can experience her subjectivity as fused with the subjectivity of others when she regards herself as part of a group (2009, 78-83). He thinks that it is because she regards herself as part of a group that she feels a shared emotion. Schmid draws on Gilbert's account of membership guilt to argue for his account of shared emotion, and as such, encounters many of the same issues that Gilbert encounters. Whereas Bryce Huebner challenges Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion on the grounds that it is not "genuinely collective," Schmid challenges her account of membership guilt on the grounds that it inadvertently switches from being a holistic to an atomistic account of an emotion (Huebner 2011, 92, Schmid 2003, 204-208, 2009, 37, 82-83).[20] Schmid thinks that this means Gilbert does not recognise that her account of membership emotion is actually an account of shared emotion. Schmid approaches the question of shared emotion as a phenomenologist, and so his focus is on how an individual experiences her subjectivity when she is part of a group. He argues that the phenomenal subject (which he distinguishes from the ontic subject) is shared when the individual experiences herself as phenomenologically fused with other individuals (Schmid 2009, 65). I will argue that this account of fused feeling is not sufficient to establish an account of shared emotion, that is, an emotion shared by multiple individuals. It only shows that the individual can identify herself differently according to her different social identities and social roles.

As we saw in Chapter 3, Gilbert is committed to ontological individualism about mental states such as intentions and emotions (2000, 34 n23). Ontological individualism about conscious mental states is the claim that only individuals can have mental states (Schmid 2009, 72, Zahavi 2015, 85). As such, Gilbert argues that a group cannot have a mental state, but that the individuals within a group can commit to behaving *as if* the group has a particular mental state. As I argued, Gilbert could not establish that individuals feel an emotion as a group, but only that as a group, individuals commit to particular actions. Her account of plural-subject emotion, developed from an account of collective (or joint) intention, is not an account of collective (or shared) emotion.

Schmid is also committed to ontological individualism about consciousness, but argues that phenomenologically, mental states can be shared (2009, 74). Schmid argues that while ontological individualism about mental states means that only individuals can

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[20] Schmid does not use this phraseology to describe the problem, but says that, "Gilbert's turning away from phenomenology is based on a mistake that is due to an individualist understanding of feeling" (2009, 83). As we shall see, Schmid thinks the problem lies with Gilbert's subjective individualism, or as I understand it, the atomistic understanding of subjectivity implicit in her account.

have mental states, this does not mean that the individual will experience her mental state as individual. The phenomenology of her mental state may be that she experiences it as belonging to many individuals. In other words, she may experience her mental state—in this case, her emotion—as being shared with other individuals. The experience of a shared mental state arises from the relations that exist between her and other individuals (Schmid 2009, 42). This argument is a delicate one, and relies on three distinctions: atomism versus holism, formal individualism versus formal collectivism, and subjective individualism versus subjective collectivism.

In Chapter 3, I clarified that Gilbert's account of collective intention is ontologically individual and holist. She thinks, like Searle (2002a), that the collective intention is irreducible to the individual intentions of the members in the group (Gilbert 2006, 147-149). The individuals form a collective intention and derive their individual intentions from the collective intention. When we consider the form of the intention, we consider whether the intention is singular or plural in form. Gilbert's account of collective intentionality is formally collective. The we-intention is primitive, and the intention is in the first person plural form ("we") (Chelstrom 2013, 78). This is in contrast with formal individualism, when the intention is in the first person singular form ("I") (Schmid 2003, 205, 2009, 34). Closely connected with this distinction about the *form* of the intention is a distinction about the *subject* of the intention, and who *bears* the intention. Schmid critiques Searle's argument, and I think that this critique extends to Gilbert's argument for collective intentionality. He argues that although Searle is committed to the thesis of holism about mental states, he inadvertently undermines his position by slipping into an atomistic account of collective intentions. This is because he commits to subjective individualism, in that he thinks that the subject, or bearer, of the intention can only be an individual, not a group (Schmid 2003, 205, 2009, 34-35). Gilbert does the same, and this has important consequences for her account of membership emotion.

The distinction between the theses of atomism and holism about mental states concerns the structural relations between the individual and her social world. The Cartesian view of consciousness would be an atomistic view since the individual's thoughts can be entirely independent of her environment. The holistic view is that individuals are structurally dependent on their social world in order to have mental states and it is by interacting with one another and using language that the individual has particular mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, and emotions (Pettit 1993, 166,

Schmid 2009, 34). The individual needs others in order to be able to have particular mental states. Schmid claims that if we are committed to the atomistic thesis about mental states, then we are committed to *subjective individualism*—like Descartes, the thoughts of the individual are entirely her own (2003, 205, 2009, 34-35). She is the owner or bearer of her mental states. However, if we take the thesis of holism seriously, we should reject subjective individualism. That is, we should not restrict "the class of possible subjects or 'bearers'… to single individuals" (Schmid 2003, 205).

The problem, Schmid argues, is that in giving an account that is committed to both ontological individualism and holism, theorists like Searle and Gilbert inadvertently commit to subjective individualism; that is, they slip into a commitment to atomism (2003, 207-208, 2009, 37). As ontological individualists, they think that only individuals can have mental states. They want to say that individuals hold the collective intention together, that is, the individuals form their intentions by relating to other individuals. This means that Searle and Gilbert appear to commit to the thesis of holism. But then they avoid attributing the we-intention to multiple individuals as a unified entity, and slip into a subjectively individualist account (an atomist account). Searle, for example, wants to avoid attributing a mental state to a metaphysically suspect notion of a group mind, and so he argues that the collectivity of a collective intention is entirely in the mind of the individual, in the content of her intention.[21] An individual could have a collective intention that she and another will act together, but not have actually formed this intention *with* the other person (Schmid 2009, 37). Although the individual may have a we-intention, that is, a formally collective intention, she does not require that the other person forms this we-intention with her. The collective *form* of the we-intention does not affect the *subject* of the intention, on Searle's account, and so the individual is the sole subject of her intention. She can have a we-intention alone.

Schmid thinks that the commitment to subjective individualism, which appears to follow logically from the commitment to ontological individualism, is mistaken. He argues that when we form a collective intention, what makes the intention collective is not the *content* of that intention, but the fact that this intention is *shared* with other subjects. He gives a thought experiment of Ann and Beth, who contemplate a Matisse painting together (Schmid 2003, 209-210). This is a collectively intended

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[21] Searle tells us that, "[c]ollective intentionality in my head can make a purported reference to other members of a collective independently of the question whether or not there actually are such members" (2002a, 97).

contemplation. However, an evil scientist creeps up on them, and quickly subdues Ann, removes her brain, and then connects her brain in a vat to a computer that lets her continue her contemplation, seemingly unchanged. Beth, meanwhile, has run screaming from the scene. Schmid argues that if Ann's experience is unchanged, she continues to think that she is collectively contemplating the Matisse, that is, that she is sharing her experience with Beth. Her intentionality is completely inside her own head, and so is the collectivity of that intention. She alone is the subject of her intention, and she is simply mistaken that she shares her contemplation with Beth. Schmid continues this thought experiment. The scientist catches up with Beth and subdues her, placing her brain in a vat and connecting her to a computer that lets her think that she is contemplating the Matisse with Ann. Now both Ann and Beth have a collective intention that they are both looking at the artwork, and they are not mistaken about their intention. Schmid argues that this example shows why the subjective individualism of Searle's account is deficient. On this account, Ann and Beth independently form collective intentions that are only *coincident* with one another but not shared with one another. They have "matching illusions." This view, Schmid thinks, is completely implausible, for a collective intention is then only trivially collective.

Schmid does not discuss Gilbert's account of collective intention, but as I understand his argument, he would be worried that her account is also ultimately committed to subjective individualism.[22] We saw that Gilbert argues that the plural-subject group is not an independent ontological entity as there is no subject that is independent of the individuals that comprise it. Rather, the plural-subject (of the we-intention) exists when the individuals will that they belong to the plural-subject group (what Ann Cudd calls the willed-unity condition (2006, 39)). When the violinist and the pianist form a collective intention to play a duet, they each take themselves to be members of a group. But Gilbert thinks that the members each have a distinct we-intention and the collective intention is not one we-intention, but really two we-intentions that have the same content. The pianist and the violinist each have a we-intention that they will play a duet. This is where Schmid locates his problem with the account of collective intentionality given by Searle. By locating the collectivity of the intention in the content of the emotion, these theorists (Searle and Gilbert) deny that the

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[22] Schmid tells us that, "in [Gilbert's] book, *On Social Facts*, she explicitly bases her analysis on a concept of the individual that 'does not require for its analysis a concept of collectivity.' The conceptual basis of her account of 'joint commitment' consists of nothing but conditional personal commitments" (2009, 31).

structure of the intention is changed in any way (Schmid 2003, 208, 2009, 37). The collective intention has the same structure as the individual intention, which is that the subject of the intention is the individual, irrespective of whether she takes herself to be part of a group or not. As such, these theorists are denying that the relations between individuals really affect the intention that is formed.

Schmid thinks that by committing to the thesis of ontological individualism of mental states, theorists such as Searle, and by extension, Gilbert, do not recognise that the phenomenal structure of the collective intention is changed and is, as a result, shared between members. He claims that they are committed to subjective individualism (or the thesis of atomism), and not, as they think, to the thesis of holism. Schmid, on the other hand, commits himself to the thesis of holism, and focuses on how the individual is affected by her relations to other individuals. He cites Anthonie Meijers, saying that sharing a mental state is a matter of accounting for the relations between individuals, not the content of the mental state. He believes that sharedness "transcend[s] the boundaries of […] the 'brain in a vat'" (Schmid 2003, 210). The subject of a collective intention, then, is not the individual but multiple individuals together (a plural-subject group). Although the consciousness of the mental state is in the individual's mind, as per the commitment to ontological individualism, the subject of the mental state (the emotion) is not the individual. This impacts the way the individual experiences the mental state, or more particularly, the way she experiences the subject of her mental state. The subject of her mental state may not be herself as an individual, but herself *with* other individuals (her group).

To recapitulate, let us say that Ann and Beth form a collective intention to contemplate the Matisse. They form a collective intention, which is collective in form (it is a we-intention), but ontologically individual, as the intention is held in each individual's consciousness. However, Ann and Beth form the intention together, which means that the subject of the intention is Ann and Beth together. Both Ann and Beth, by virtue of their connection with one another, take themselves to be the subject of the contemplation together. Ontologically, the intention is in the consciousness of each individual, and so there are two intentions. But Schmid thinks that the collectivity of the intention changes the subject of the emotion, and the way the individual experiences her intention. Both Ann and Beth experience themselves as sharing a single mental state with the other. The question, then, is how to make sense of this experience?

I will put aside the question of whether or not Schmid is correct in his critique of collective intentionality theories, and whether or not Searle and Gilbert are ultimately committed to the thesis of atomism rather than holism. What we can take away from Schmid's critique is that he thinks the structural relations that an individual has with others mean that the subject of a mental state can be shared. I will focus on his argument that an individual's relations with others can change the structure of her mental state by changing the subject of her intention. He thinks that this structural change is reflected in the phenomenology of the mental state, and how the individual experiences the subject of her mental state. Even though he is committed to ontological individualism about mental states, Schmid argues that multiple individuals can share a single mental state. In the next section I will object to Schmid's argument on the grounds that he slips between two senses of collective intentionality. In order to do so, I first need to outline rest of his argument.

Schmid argues that the fact that individuals exert influence over one another and act in concert with one another presupposes the possibility that individuals can share a mental state. It is because we are responsive to the influence of one another and are able to impact on one another's mental states that we are able to share mental states (Schmid 2003, 212-214, 2009, 42-44). As Searle suggests in his account of collective intentionality, there is some background sense of cooperation between individuals that allows us to form collective intentions (Searle 2002a, 103-105). Schmid argues that the experience of sharedness that we have when we have collective mental states is not in the mind of the individual, but arises from the interrelations between the individuals.[23] It is because individuals can have a shared intentionality that social norms can be established, for example, and social facts such as currency can be created and observed.[24] As a community, we intend together that paper can represent a particular monetary value, which is equivalent to three chocolate bars or a carton of eggs. The fact that we are able to create a society with norms, rules, beliefs, and so on, means that we are able to share mental states by being subjects of a mental state together.

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[23] "Collective intentions are not intentions of the kind anybody *has*—not single individuals, and not some super-agent. For collective intentionality is not subjective. It is relational. Collective intentionality is an intentionality which people share" (Schmid 2009, 44). Schmid is arguing that a we-intention is a single intention that is shared in a straightforward sense: there is one mental state, which many individuals share.

[24] A social fact is, according to Searle, a fact that is constituted by the beliefs and terms that people use, and can only exist if people think that the fact exists (2002b, 136).

When individuals share a mental state, Schmid thinks that what is affected is the phenomenal structure of the mental state, and the way the individual experiences the subject of that shared mental state. The distinction between an ontological structure and a phenomenal structure of a mental state allows Schmid to argue that there are two ways of thinking about the subject of a feeling. The subject of the mental state (the emotion), Schmid argues, has two aspects: there is the ontic subject and the phenomenal subject (2009, 77-78).[25] The ontic subject is the individual who experiences the emotion in her consciousness. The phenomenal subject, on the other hand, is the way that the individual conceives of herself. To be in a conscious state, such as when an emotion is experienced, the individual has to conceive of who bears the mental state, or more simply, she needs to conceive of the subject of the mental state (Schmid 2009, 77). An individual can regard herself in many different ways: according to the roles that she plays, by the groups that she is a member of, and by the different relationships that she has with other people and entities in the world. She can think of herself as a mother, a Muslim, a businesswoman, a football fan, and a pet owner. Broadly, the phenomenal subject is the identity of the individual in any given moment, which reflects her relations with her social world at that time. The phenomenal subject of an emotion may be herself (as she perceives herself), and it may be a plural-subject that is larger than herself and includes her. For example, the woman who encounters a stray dog in the park can regard her phenomenal subject as "a person with a fear of dogs" or as "a dog-lover" (her ontic subject, in both cases, is simply herself as an individual). The phenomenal subject may also be a plural-subject. Schmid argues that the individual can experience herself as "phenomenologically fused" with others due to the interrelations between them, and when this occurs, she experiences her phenomenal subject as fused with the subjects of those others. As a result of this shared subjectivity, she takes the mental state to be a shared mental state (Schmid 2009, 78-80).[26] Her ontic subject, however, remains herself alone.

With respect to emotion, Schmid argues that the emotion the individual experiences when she is phenomenologically fused with others can be a shared emotion.

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[25] Eric Chelstrom, in his discussion of the plural-subject of collective intentionality, makes a similar distinction: "[t]he *intending* subject, the conscious subject, is not equivalent to the *subject of intention* or subject matter of acts of consciousness, i.e. it is not the syntactical subject referenced in and through an intentional act (2013, 81, see also Chelstrom 2011).

[26] Schmid tells us that, "[f]eelings can be ascribed to groups by virtue of their member's [*sic*] experiencing their feelings *as* members of the group" (2009, 68).

The phenomenal subject is a fused subject and refers to the group of individuals that bears the emotion. To give a simple example, imagine that a volleyball team win a game. The team is overjoyed, and Susan, who is a player on the team, feels joy. The ontic subject of Susan's joy is Susan, but the phenomenal subject is the team, of which Susan is a member. The joy that Susan feels is her team's joy, not her own joy. The next step in the argument is to show that the joy that Susan feels is shared joy. If all six players feel joy, Schmid argues, we can see that the joy is shared. If we count the emotions, from an ontological perspective, there are six individual emotions of joy (each player experiences joy in her body). From a phenomenological perspective, however, there is only one (shared) joy that is felt by six players. Each player is phenomenologically fused with the other players and feels the team's joy, the same joy that the other players are feeling. It is not simply that each player feels joy that coincides with the joy of the other players. Rather, each player experiences her joy as shared with her team, for it is as a member of her team that she feels her team's joy, and the team is the phenomenal subject of the joy (Schmid 2009, 78).[27]

Schmid allows that how the emotion physically feels may be different for each individual. The experience of being overjoyed about winning the game may differ for each member. Schmid's example is of the collective joy felt for an orchestral performance: "[i]t is essential to the shared feeling of joy at the success of a performance that the exuberant exaltation of the composer is not the delight of the member of the audience, or the silent contentment of the man at the triangle, etc." (2009, 81). Schmid accepts that we cannot know what a feeling feels like for another person, and that we need to accept what he refers to as individualism about bodily feelings (2009, 71). As we saw in Chapter 1, we learn emotions by associating particular sensations with certain meanings, but those initial bodily sensations are peculiar to the individual. Schmid is not disputing that the way an emotion feels may be unique. However for Schmid, this difference in how an emotion feels does not affect the phenomenological nature of emotion (Schmid 2009, 81-82). The individuals experience the feeling *as shared*, despite the difference in the qualitative nature of the feeling, and so she experiences her subjectivity as fused with the subjectivity of others. Each individual experiences herself as part of a group when she feels the shared emotion.

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[27] The joy that each member feels is not shared simply because it matches what others feel, Schmid thinks, but because each member feels the same (team) joy, a single emotion from the phenomenal perspective.

Phenomenologically, Susan feels that she is part of the team when she feels the team's joy.

The question of how the subject of a mental state can be shared is not such a puzzle for Schmid. He thinks that we simply need to examine how the individual regards her subjectivity when she experiences a mental state. If she has a sense that the subject of the mental state is a group—that is, her and at least one other individual—then the subject of the mental state is shared between her and the others in her group. Schmid is relying on the first part of his argument, that the fact of our influence on one another presupposes that we can share mental states, to make this latter argument, that our sense of fused subjectivity means that our emotion is shared with others. He argues that when individuals exist in certain relations with one another, they may form a collective mental state together, and this collective mental state will impact the structure of the phenomenal subject. When the individual perceives that the structure of her phenomenal subject as changed, that is, when she experiences her phenomenal subject as a fused subject, she can take the mental state to be a shared mental state. Her experience of her phenomenal subject is an indication of the shared subject of her mental state.

In the following section, I will argue that Schmid fails to show that the individual's experience of a shared mental state establishes the fact of a shared mental state. By pointing to the fact that we exist in society and interact with one another, Schmid has pointed to the wrong phenomenon to explain shared mental states. The broad collective intentionality that structures society, such as the collective intention to use money and establish laws, is not the same phenomenon as the collective intentionality that accounts for people doing a particular action together, such as when the violinist and pianist play a duet. As such, he cannot rely on the phenomenology of the emotion to indicate that an emotion is actually shared. However, before developing this objection I will first show how Schmid brings together the three ways of sharing the intentionality of an emotion to argue that an emotion can be shared. Schmid thinks that his account of shared emotion is an account of membership emotion, but with recognition that the phenomenal subject of a membership emotion is a shared subject.

1.4 Shared membership emotion

Schmid argues that the intentionality of an emotion can be shared in three ways, given that the intentionality of an emotion has a mode, content, and a focus. He brings these

aspects of intentionality together to articulate what a shared emotion is, and compares his account of shared emotion to Gilbert's account of membership emotion. Gilbert argues that her account of membership emotion is an account of I-mode emotion and that she can only establish an aggregative account of collective membership emotion (2002, 136-138). Schmid thinks that Gilbert has made an error, that her account of membership emotion is an account of shared emotion (that is, we-mode emotion), if only she would examine the emotion from a phenomenological perspective rather than an ontological perspective (Schmid 2009, 83). I will show that Schmid is mistaken. Just as with Gilbert's account of membership emotion, he cannot show that the emotion that the individual has when she experiences herself as a fused subject is actually held by other individuals as well. His account of fused emotion also cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge, for he cannot show that many individuals share a single emotion.

The intentionality of an emotion has three aspects that can be shared, according to Schmid, and he brings these three elements together in his account of shared emotion. He has argued that the mode, the content, and the subject of the emotion can each be shared. The mode can be shared via emotional contagion and affective attunement, which allows different individuals to have the same kind of feeling. The content is shared when individuals recognise that they have feelings that have the same concern. The subject is shared when the individuals phenomenologically fuse to form a fused subject. Schmid does not explain how these three elements can be brought together to account for the phenomenon of shared emotion, but he claims at the beginning of his chapter that they should be combined (2009, 65). Implicitly, the most important component in his account of shared emotion is the fused subject. Emotional contagion and affective attunement will not necessarily give rise to shared emotion, which means that a shared mode is not sufficient for shared emotion. A shared concern can give rise to feeling-together, but this only establishes that individuals can experience emotion in parallel to one another, not that they share an emotion. However, when an individual experiences her subjectivity as phenomenologically fused with the subjectivity of others, Schmid thinks that the emotion is shared. The unstated argument is that in sharing her subjectivity, the individual is sharing a concern with others, and is sharing the kind of feeling that she has with others (although there may be qualitative differences between them). It is the fused subject that allows for an emotion to be shared.

Schmid's account of fused emotion in terms of sharing a phenomenal subject is very much like Gilbert's account of membership emotion. He argues, in a few lines, that individuals can share a concern, which leads them to identify with one another or with a group. In doing so, they will have emotions as members of that group (Schmid 2009, 68). When the individual experiences a connection to others or recognises her relation to them, the phenomenal subject of her emotion phenomenologically fuses to include those others in her sense of subjectivity. What distinguishes Schmid's account from Gilbert's is that he places emphasis on how individuals *experience* the emotion. He argues that an emotion can be shared (and thus collective) because the individual conceives of herself as experiencing that emotion with others. Gilbert, recall, argued that a group could not require that the members commit to an emotion. A member could recognise her responsibility for a collective wrongdoing by virtue of her group membership and so feel membership guilt, but this would not require that other members feel the same guilt. This is why Gilbert argues that this is an account of an individual *as a group member* feeling an emotion, rather than a group feeling an emotion. Schmid, in contrast, thinks that the individual, by recognising her group membership, is feeling a shared emotion. When she identifies with her group, she experiences her subject as phenomenologically fused with her fellow group members, and she regards herself as being one member among many. In this way, she shares the phenomenal subject of her emotion with others, for she includes the others in the phenomenal subject (Schmid 2009, 77-79).

2 Objection: the lack of actual sharedness

The problem with Schmid's account of fused emotion, and phenomenological fusion, is that it is premised on an overly broad conception of collective intentionality. He argues that a mental state can be shared (from a phenomenological perspective) because the fact of our social interaction presupposes that all of our mental states are shared. The fact that we are able to form shared beliefs, norms, and institutions, and the fact that we can cooperatively interact with one another, arises from shared intentionality, rather than shared intentionality arising from cooperation. It is because we have a shared (pre-reflective) consciousness of one another as being able to influence each other that we are able to form agreements, develop social norms, and so on. As Schmid puts it, "[s]ocial normativity arises out of shared intentionality (and not the other way around)" (2003, 212, 2009, 42). What makes intentionality collective, in his view, is that we are

able to exist in relations with one another. But if this particular claim is false or unjustified, then Schmid's later claim—that we can look to the phenomenology of a mental state to determine whether the mental state is shared—is, I argue, unjustified.

There is a broad sense of collective intentionality that explains how we are able to form a society, and how individuals are able to cooperate and interact with one another. As a society, we are able to establish norms, practices, and institutions that shape the way we live, by agreeing to these norms, practices, and institutions. Money, as a system of exchange, requires that all the individuals involved agree that paper can be exchanged for goods or services. In order for two individuals to have a conversation, both individuals need to recognise the other as someone (a human being) who can have a conversation, and both need to implicitly agree to the norms of conversation. We cannot enter into the same social interaction with (most) animals and we have to teach it to people. At this broad level, collective intentionality is a presupposed requirement for society, for we need to be able to act together, place demands on one another, and share thoughts and experiences with one another to be able to form a society. It is a basic capacity that we have, for as Alfred Schutz says, "[t]he basic We-relationship is already given to me by the mere fact that I am born into the world of directly experienced social reality" (1967, 165).

However, there is a narrower sense of collective intentionality that is not concerned with our capacity to form society with others, but with our ability to perform particular acts together. I am concerned with this narrower sense of collective intentionality (in this case, collective affective intentionality), in which individuals share particular mental states. There is a difference between the kind of collective intentionality that allows individuals to participate in the social institution of monetary exchange, for example, and the narrower kind of collective intentionality that allows individuals to play instruments in concert with one another to perform a symphony. I think that there is a similar distinction to be made with shared emotion. A broad sense of shared emotion would be when individuals feel the same kind of emotion due to societal norms about emotions. We may say, for example, that weddings are joyful events, and as such, there are normative demands on individuals to feel joy at weddings. A narrower sense of shared emotion is when individuals are connected in some way such that they actually feel their emotion together, as a group. Much like the violinist plays a duet with the pianist, Susan the volleyball player feels joy with her team

members. Mikko Salmela has a similar view, and asserts that the latter kind is "more strongly collective" (2012, 38).

Salmela distinguishes the broader sense of collective intentionality from a moderate sense of collectivity in which individuals have overlapping private, or I-mode, concerns (Salmela 2012, 39-40). When individuals have overlapping concerns, they cooperate with one another in order to achieve their own ends. When individuals engage in economic exchange, for example, there is the implicit collective intention to deem abstract currency as equivalent in value to particular goods. By contrast, the strongest form of collective intentionality is when individuals intend together because they have committed to do so, in some sense. In this case, the individuals are in the we-mode: they have a collective we-intention in which the subject is in the first person plural form, and refers to multiple individuals.[28]

The broad sense of collective intentionality, in which we share intentions to create social facts, does not explain how we share mental states in the narrower sense. Schmid argues that the fact that we are able to form collective intentions in the broad sense presupposes that we can share mental states (2003, 212, 2009, 42). He argues we are able to come to certain agreements that structure our society and that this means that we can attribute a single (shared) mental state to multiple individuals because it is clear that we can share states. In doing so, he neatly side-steps the puzzle around what it means to say that two individuals form a single we-intention together, or feel a single shared emotion together. Schmid is equivocating about the sense in which a mental state is shared. In the broad sense of collective intentionality, individuals have common concerns, and act in a cooperative manner because of these common concerns that are shaped by the society that they live in. As Salmela terms this type of collective intentionality, it is I-mode collective intentionality (2012, 40). In the narrower sense, individuals form an intention together in which they think of themselves as forming a subject together. It is we-mode collective intentionality.

Schmid acknowledges this distinction between the broader and narrower senses of collective intentionality. He tells us:

> Shared intentions which are based on agreements exist [the narrower sense of collective intentionality]; these are special intentions of a special (and especially complex) kind. Therefore, it seems that they should not be chosen as the 'paradigm case' of an analysis of shared intentionality. (2003, 212)

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[28] Salmela (2012) distinguishes three degrees of collectivity, and argues that there is a spectrum of shared emotion. I will examine his argument further in Chapter 6.

His argument then, is that we should look to the broader sense of collective intentionality to understand how mental states are shared. However, I do not think that the way we cooperate in our social lives explains how we form intentions with other individuals for particular joint activities. In other words, Schmid cannot explain how we share emotions and intentions such that we take ourselves to be feeling or intending *with* others by pointing to the fact that we live with one another in certain social arrangements.

Since Schmid does not show that mental states can be shared, he cannot justify the claim that the phenomenology of a mental state indicates whether that mental state is shared. He argues that when a mental state is shared, the phenomenal subject of the mental state is changed. As such, if the individual experiences her phenomenal subjectivity as shared with others, that is, as phenomenologically fused, then we can attribute a single mental state to the group indicated in the subject. When Susan experiences herself as phenomenologically fused with her volleyball team, she experiences the phenomenal subject of her joy as the team. However, the phenomenal experience that Susan has of her joy does not establish that the other team members *actually* experience the same joy. She may be alone in her joy at winning the match, even though in her emotional experience, she thinks of herself in terms of her relation to her team. By not explaining how a mental state is shared in a narrow sense, Schmid cannot justify the claim that the changed phenomenal structure of the subject of the mental state points to other individuals actually having the same mental state. How one individual feels does not necessarily indicate that others feel that same emotion.

Ultimately, I think that the phenomenal subject can reflect that the individual regards herself as part of a group. She can feel an emotion as a group member. Susan feels joy at winning the match as a member of her team. However, this membership (or group-based) emotion cannot, on this basis, be attributed to other individuals. Schmid concedes that a truth condition needs to be attached to his account of shared feeling—an emotion is only shared *if* it obtains that multiple individuals experience their feeling as being shared, and that phenomenological fusion alone cannot indicate that an emotion is shared (2009, 80). He admits that an individual may be wrong that she is phenomenologically fused with others and is feeling an emotion with them, despite the fact that she experiences her feeling as such (Schmid 2009, 78). My objection to Schmid's account is not about the fallibility of an individual's experience though. Rather, I think that he has not shown how, when one individual experiences

phenomenological fusion of her subjectivity, she thus feels an emotion with other individuals. The phenomenal subject of the individual's emotion may be indicative of her relations to others but this does not mean that others have the same phenomenal subject and the same emotional experience. Schmid thinks that the individual's experience is an indication of a change in the phenomenal structure of the subject of that mental state. He points to the broad sense of collective intentionality to justify this claim, but this sense establishes that we can exist in interactive relations with one another, cooperating so as to satisfy our private I-mode concerns. The broad sense of collective intentionality does not show that we enter into the we-mode and hold mental states *with* one another. As such, the individual's experience of her subjectivity as fused is not an indicator of the phenomenal structure of her emotion. We still need to examine how others feel before we can determine if an emotion is shared. As Dan Zahavi objects, "emotional sharing [by means of phenomenological fusion] in no way presupposes the givenness of the other experiencer" (2015, 96).

Schmid's account of the shared (or fused) emotion that arises from a fused subject does not meet the Sceptical Challenge. When the individual conceives of herself in terms of a shared identity, she may be appealing to the group's values and norms to shape her response. Although Schmid seeks to show that the individual's relations with others structurally affects her feelings, and that she thinks of herself as joining in with an emotion that others experience, the individual's feeling is not necessarily held by others in her group. The individual who conceives of herself as an American and feels hostility towards Muslims is being influenced by public norms of intolerance to outsiders and patriotism to the nation. Construing herself as an American puts her in a particular relation to a group framed as a threat to the nation (currently, Muslim people). Construing herself as an American, however, is different from including other Americans in her subjectivity and sharing her hostility with actual other Americans. Schmid is forced to attach a truth condition to his account, noting that, "no feeling is in itself the criterion of its being shared" (2009, 78). In effect, Schmid's account of shared emotion is an aggregative account of collective emotion. An emotion is only shared if a certain proportion of a group have the same I-mode collective emotion, which in this case is an emotion which is experienced as phenomenologically fused, or put another way, is experienced as a group member. The emotion is not an indication of how others feel, and so it is only coincidental when many individuals feel the same sort of (fused) emotion. The sceptic can thus accept Schmid's account, saying that Schmid has shown

how an individual is affected by her relation to her group, but he has not shown how multiple individuals can share an emotion that is causally or structurally dependent on the other members of that group experiencing the same emotion. Schmid has not given us an account of shared (or group) feeling, but of membership emotion.

Conclusion

Schmid and Gilbert have different approaches in their aim to establish how a group can feel an emotion, in that Gilbert gives a top-down account of plural-subject emotion and Schmid gives a bottom-up account of fused emotion. Gilbert seeks to show that an emotion is a group emotion because it is properly attributed to the group and is not reducible to the emotions of the individual that make up the group. Schmid focuses on the individual, and asks how she can come to share her emotion with others. But what is striking is that despite their difference in approach, they are seeking to articulate the same idea, which is that a single emotion can be held by a collection of individuals. Schmid aims to show that many individuals can share an emotion. It is no surprise then that Gilbert's account of membership emotion and Schmid's account of phenomenologically fused emotion are so similar, and that they face the same challenge. For both, the question of group emotion concerns the subject of the emotion, and how to account for many individuals being the subject of an emotion together.

In analysing Schmid's account of phenomenological fusion, I examined two phenomena that are closely related to the phenomenon of collective emotion: emotional contagion, and feeling-together. While these are not cases of shared emotion, I think that both offer important explanations of ways in which a group emotion can be fostered and maintained. Both bring individuals into alignment with one another, but in different ways. Emotional contagion generates the same kind of feeling in those affected, and feeling-together generates a sense of commonality that can facilitate social cohesion between individuals.

By focusing on the phenomenology of shared emotion, Schmid has kept the focus on the individual's experience of the emotion as a group member. In doing so, he avoids the problem that Gilbert faces with her account of plural-subject emotion, which is that she does not show that the group emotion is actually felt by the group members. He argues that the individual can experience herself as a group member and feel the group's emotion. However, his account cannot show that this experience extends beyond the individual and is experienced with other group members. He does not show

that the individual's phenomenal experience of sharing her emotion means that she is actually sharing her emotion with others. Rather, Schmid shows that an individual can experience herself according to one of her social identities, and feel an emotion as a member of that group.

The challenge, then, is how to show that an individual genuinely feels a group emotion and that she feels this emotion with other individuals. How does her emotional response connect with other individuals such that they have the same emotional response together? In the next chapter, I turn to another phenomenological account of shared emotion, but one that is intersubjective and focused on the relations between individuals, rather than on the experience of one individual. Where Schmid argues that an individual experiences phenomenological fusion when she thinks of herself as a group member, Edith Stein, Thomas Szanto, and Zahavi argue that an individual can integrate her emotions with that of other individuals and bring about a new emotion as a result of that integration. That new emotion is a shared emotion held by many individuals together. They argue that in order to do so, the individuals need to be in reciprocal relations with one another and each needs to empathise with one another. Empathy, they argue, allows them to each feel what the other feels, and reciprocal empathy allows them to constitute a shared emotion together.

Chapter 5: Shared Emotion

For white people, who have been trained since birth to see themselves as individuals, the collective fear and collective grief that black Americans feel can be hard to grasp. …

How do you explain the visceral and personal pain caused by the killing of a black person you did not even know to people who did not grow up with, as their legacy, the hushed stories of black bodies hung from trees by a lynching mob populated with sheriff's deputies? …

How do you explain—how can you make those who are not black feel—the consuming sense of dread and despair, when one sees the smiling faces, captured in photos, of Mr. Castile and Mr. Sterling, and knows that but for the grace of God, it could have been your uncle, your brother, your child, you?

— New York Times Magazine writer, Nikole Hannah-Jones (2016), on the shooting of Alton Sterling by two police officers

In her *New York Times* article, "The Grief That White Americans Can't Share," Nikole Hannah-Jones (2016) talks about the intense collective grief that African-Americans feel when a black American is killed by the State, irrespective of whether or not the victim is known to the mourners. She writes in the wake of news of yet another police shooting of an unarmed black man, Alton Sterling, and she describes the pain that she feels and that she knows other black Americans feel too. It is a collective grief, but shared only by black Americans rather than all Americans. She argues that white Americans cannot understand this collective grief because they cannot understand that for black Americans, their sense of the collective experience, collective history, and collective connection to their race, is an important aspect of their identities. She tells us that, "the vast gulf between the collective lived experiences of white Americans and that of black Americans can make true empathy seem impossible."

My argument up to this point in the thesis has aimed to show that individuals can feel an emotion by virtue of their social group membership. The empirical evidence provided by social psychologists shows that when an individual thinks of herself according to a particular social identity, she may feel a different emotion than when she identifies according to a different social identity. Psychologists call the emotion felt when identifying with a group a group-based emotion. We have also seen that Margaret Gilbert (1997, 2002) develops an account of membership emotion that has much overlap with the notion of group-based emotion. She argues that when an individual

recognises that she is part of a group, she recognises that she is the (co-)author of the group's actions by virtue of her commitment to the group, and can respond accordingly. Similarly, Hans Bernhard Schmid (2009) argues that individuals can experience phenomenological fusion when they identify with their group, causing them to feel that their emotions belong to the group rather than belonging only to them as individuals. We have seen, however, that none of these accounts of group-based emotion can establish that the individual *shares* her emotions with her fellow group members. These accounts show that an individual can experience emotion by virtue of her group membership, but not that the emotion is experienced by a group. A group-based emotion is therefore not a group emotion because it is reducible to an individual emotion. Hannah-Jones' argument suggests an alternative avenue for developing an account of group emotion than those discussed so far, as she seems to be implicitly claiming that a group emotion is an emotion shared by members who are able to empathise with one another.

Empathy is traditionally understood as feeling another's emotion.[1] In one of the earliest accounts of empathy, Adam Smith (1759) defines empathy (or as he calls it, sympathy) as a process of experiencing another's emotion:

> By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive of ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something, which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (cited in Coplan and Goldie 2011, xi)

Empathy is a process that gives an individual access to what another feels, and enables her to understand what the other feels. How this process works, however, and what the nature of empathy is, has given rise to much debate within the philosophical literature. Is empathy mere emotional mimicry, or does it involve effortful and cognitive activity? How does an individual know that the emotion she feels belongs to another person? How does she gain understanding or knowledge about the other's emotion by empathising? I investigate the phenomenon of empathy because it offers a way to bridge a gap that exists between individuals. The suggestion is that when an individual empathises with another, she connects with that person in such a way that she has reliable information about what that person is feeling in a direct way. Empathy is an

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[1] For an account of the development of the concept of empathy, see Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie's overview (2011, x-xxx).

intersubjective experience, and phenomenologists such as Edith Stein (1989), Thomas Szanto (2015), and Dan Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015) see empathy as a means for transcending the subjectivity of emotion.

My aim in this chapter is to examine how individuals can share an emotion by reciprocally empathising with one another. In the previous chapter, we saw that Schmid was unable to establish that an individual's experience of her emotion as shared shows that her emotion is actually shared with other individuals. In this chapter, I will tackle this particular problem by arguing that an individual can know that her emotion is shared because she can feel (empathically) that the other feels the same emotion. In developing my argument, the model of emotion that I argued for in Chapter 1 will guide me, which is that emotion is a quasi-perceptual capacity. Emotion is a way of perceiving the world, according to what is of significance to the person.[2] In this chapter, I will ask how individuals can perceive the world *together*, according to what is of significance to them both. That is, I will be concerned with how individuals adopt a shared perspective, which allows them to feel one (shared) emotion together. By sharing an emotion, I propose, they feel an emotion as a group—they feel a group emotion.

It is worth noting immediately that in this chapter, I put aside the question about the ontology of the shared emotion. Like Schmid, I accept the thesis of ontological individualism about emotion, and I think that a shared emotion is experienced in the bodies of multiple individuals. This means that a shared emotion is, always, actually several ontologically distinct emotions. However, the experience of a shared emotion is distinctive because the individuals experience the subject of their shared emotion as a plural-subject group, consisting of multiple individuals.[3] In this chapter, I will show that this distinctive experience of shared emotion manifests when multiple individuals are in a relationship that allows them to feel the same emotion about the same object. Importantly, while the emotions are ontologically distinct, the individual cannot feel her shared emotion without the other feeling the same shared emotion. This suggests that the relationship between the individuals is not one of identification, but is reciprocal and collaborative. For this reason, a shared emotion (the group emotion) cannot be reduced to the sum of the individual emotion of the individuals. The shared emotion is a new experience that is only felt when the individuals come together as a group and each feel

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[2] In particular, this is the model of emotion that Ronald de Sousa (1987) and Jesse Prinz (2003, 2004, 2005) argue for.

[3] See Chapter 4.

as the others do.[4] As Schmid frames the question, I am challenging the thesis of subjective individualism, which is the claim that only individuals can be the bearers of an emotion (2003, 205, 2009, 34-35).

I begin by investigating how individuals can perceive the world together by briefly examining Alfred Schutz's (1967) argument for shared perception in Section 1. The phenomenon of perceiving together brings out the intuition that our subjective and situated perspective on the world is impacted by our sense of what others perceive. In order to delve into the question of whether or not we can know how another emotionally perceives the world, I will turn to the literature on empathy in Section 2. I consider the accounts of empathy given by Amy Coplan (2011) and Peter Goldie (1999, 2000, 2011a) in the analytic tradition, and Stein (1989) and Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015) in the phenomenological tradition. Their accounts vary substantially, because they disagree about whether empathy is a process of simulation of another's emotion, or a perceptual process that provides direct, unmediated access to the other's emotion. They also disagree about whether empathy requires feeling what the other feels, or more minimally, a shift in perspective to that of the other. I will argue that empathy is a perceptual process, a means of being receptive to another's experience. In Section 3, I will develop Zahavi and Szanto's arguments for shared emotion by showing how individuals can feel the same emotion when they enter into a reciprocally empathic relationship with one another that allows them to adopt a shared perspective on an object.[5] I will argue that when multiple individuals reciprocally empathise with one another, they come to constitute the (plural-)subject of their emotion together. I will show that the account of shared emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, and as such, a shared emotion is a group emotion.[6]

1 Shared perception: encountering another subject

Much of the scepticism about group emotion comes from the idea that since emotions are a way of perceiving the world according to what is of importance to the individual,

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[4] This is the phenomenological argument of shared emotion put forward by Stein (1989), Szanto (2015), and Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015). We can distinguish their argument from the one given in Chapter 4 by fellow phenomenologist, Schmid (2009), who argues that emotion is shared by a process of phenomenological fusion.

[5] Szanto (2015), Zahavi (2015), Zahavi and Rochat (2015), León and Zahavi (2016).

[6] In the next chapter, I will examine whether large groups of individuals can share emotion by reciprocally empathising, or whether the process of empathy restricts the possibility of sharing an emotion to small groups.

emotions must have a particular point of reference. The subjectivity of emotion is sourced in the idea that, like perception, an emotion is, in a sense, situated. The individual has a particular point of view on the world, and her particular context and particular emotional paradigm scenarios will lead her to perceive the world in a unique way. The individual's perspective is often a source of justification for her emotions—we may think that, from her point of view, the individual has a reason to respond in the way that she does.[7] In this section, I will challenge the idea that because emotions are a quasi-perceptual capacity, they cannot be shared. Although we cannot literally see through another's eyes, we do commonly refer to the experience of seeing *as if* through another's eyes. The experience of perceiving with another can influence the individual's own perception of the world.

Schutz argues that although the "lived experience" of perception is inaccessible to the other, a perceptual experience is shared when two individuals coordinate their experiences with one another:

> Suppose that you and I are watching a bird in flight. The thought "bird-in-flight" is in each of our minds and is the means by which each of us interprets our own observations… Nevertheless, during the flight of the bird you and I have "grown older together"; our experiences have been simultaneous. Perhaps while I was following the bird's flight I noticed out of the corner of my eye that your head was moving in the same direction as mine. I could then say that the two of us, that *we*, had watched the bird's flight. What I have done in this case is to coordinate temporally a series of my own experiences with a series of yours… And if you have in a similar way coordinated my experiences with yours, then we can both say that *we* have seen a bird in flight. (1967, 165)

Schutz's argues that we can attribute a shared perception to both individuals together, as a plural-subject ("we"), when both individuals are mutually aware that they both perceive the same object. We can imagine Schutz and his friend moving their heads in unison as they follow the bird with their eyes. They are each aware that the other is watching the bird, and perhaps pondering thoughts about the bird or about the nature of flight. What unites the two is both the coincidence of looking at the same object and mutual awareness of one another's perception.

This account of a plural-subject differs from Schmid's account of the fused subject in that each individual is aware of the other while perceiving the same object. Schmid argues that when the individual experiences her sense of subjectivity as fused with the other, she feels that her emotion has a subject that includes the other (2009,

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[7] See Chapter 1.

68). But as I argued, this phenomenal experience does not mean that the individual actually shares her emotion with another. Schutz makes it a requirement of his account that the individuals are mutually aware of one another when they phenomenally regard themselves as the same subject, which means that he requires that more than one individual experiences themselves as part of a plural-subject. Each individual needs to each know what the other perceives, and that the other's perception has the same content as her own perception.

Yet we can recall from the discussion of collective intentionality in Chapter 3 that mutual knowledge of the other's intention (a cognitive state like perception) is not sufficient to establish that the intention is collective.[8] I argued that an intention is collective when the individuals form the intention jointly, and that from the collective intention, each individual derives an individual intention for the part that she plays in the collective action. The pianist forms the collective intention to play a duet with the violinist, from which she derives the individual intention to play her piano. The collective intention is held by the individuals together, rather than merely at the same time. Compare this with the case of two colleagues, who each know that the other colleague intends to drive to work at 8 o'clock, just like she intends to do. This is a case of coinciding individual intentions, rather than a collective intention.[9] A similar argument can be made about Schutz's example of shared perception. The two individuals are merely coinciding in their experience of perceiving the bird in flight but they are not sharing a perception. They each perceive the bird (individually) while knowing that the other perceives the same bird. There are two individual perceptions, and the assertion of a plural-subject ("we") is only an aggregation of the two individual subjects of each perception.

I do not dispute that coordinating a perception can bring the individuals together, making them feel bonded together. It gives rise to a commonality between two individuals, particularly if what they perceive is rare or special. But the sense of solidarity that emerges when perceiving in parallel is akin to the feeling that arises from what William McNeill calls muscular bonding, or the social cohesion that is experienced in the phenomenon of affective attunement (1995, 1-11, von Scheve 2012,

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[8] Searle argues this explicitly (2002a, 92-95, 102-103).

[9] Schmid also describes the thought experiment of Ann and Beth, whose brains-in-vats each have coincident but independent we-intentions that are not collective intentions, because the intentions are not held by the brains together (2003, 209-210).

von Scheve and Ismer 2013, 407).[10] The parallel perceptions can give rise to the epiphenomenal feeling of commonality or affinity with the other. The experience itself is attributed to each individual separately.

Schutz's example is misleading, or perhaps just under-described, in that it does not capture what he is intending to argue for. He does not want an account of shared perception that is reducible to two individual perceptions with mutual recognition of the other's identical perception. Rather, the suggestion is that the individuals' perceptions become interlocked (León and Zahavi 2016, 224). David Carr (1986a, 1986b), influenced by the collective intentionality debate, argues that individuals can perceive together when an individual has a complex perception that is of both the individual's perception and of the other's perception.[11] Like Gilbert and John Searle (2002a), Carr wishes to capture the idea that the individuals hold a mental state together, and that the subject of the mental state is a plural-subject (1986a, 525). He argues that in the case of shared perception, it is not only the case that each individual perceives the same object, but also that the individual takes herself to be perceiving an object which is given to her through both the other's eyes and her own eyes. There is a sense in which the other's perception changes the way that the individual perceives the object.

There is some intuitive appeal to this idea. We can think of the case where a familiar object becomes interesting or wondrous again as one individual sees it afresh because she sees the object with another who has never seen it before. A parent visiting the aquarium with her child may see the octopus as a fascinating creature as she examines it with her child, as they mutually point out and discuss the features of the octopus. By seeing with the other, what the individual perceives as interesting or attention-worthy is affected by the other's perception.

We can ask whether the collectivity (or sharedness) of the perception is contained in the *content* of the perception, meaning that the subject of the perception is individual, or whether the collectivity of the perception affects the *structure* of the perception such that the subject of the perception is plural. This is the same problem that Schmid raised about Searle's account of collective intention (and by extension, Gilbert's account of collective intention) (Schmid 2003, 207-209, 2009, 37). Like Schmid, Carr thinks that

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[10] See Chapter 4.

[11] Carr (1986a, 1986b) considers the collective intentionality debate in the phenomenological tradition, rather than the analytic tradition. He refers to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and his article precedes the debate between analytic philosophers such as Gilbert, Searle, Pettit, and others.

what is important is the phenomenal subject of the perception, and in a shared perception, the individual "construes the action or experience in question such that its proper subject is not I but we" (1986a, 536). Carr thinks that the individuals implicitly constitute the plural-subject together, by the reciprocal awareness of the other's perception of the same object.

This brings us to the major shift in the argument for shared emotion. Schutz, Carr, and Zahavi turn to the literature on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in order to explain how an individual might see the world through another's eyes and adopt a shared perspective, that is, a perspective held with another individual. Phenomenology, as a method, is typically focused on the individual's experience, and we saw that this led Schmid to argue that an emotion is shared when an individual regards herself in terms of a relational identity (a fused subject) (Carr 1986b, 117). Schmid remains focused on how the individual experiences the world from the first person (singular but fused) perspective. However, when we consider the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, that is, how individuals relate to one another, we take seriously that the other person is not an object in the world that we perceive like any other object, but a conscious subject with a particular perspective. As Íngrid Vendrall Ferran says, "[t]he other individual is given to me as a body that belongs to an 'I' that senses, thinks, feels and wills" (2015, 499, see also Carr 1986b, 131). Given that the other is a person with her own mental states that are intentionally directed to the world, how can we access her mental states in order to know what that person is experiencing? Can we experience the other's mental state? If we can establish that individuals have reliable access to the mental states of another, we can establish how individuals might influence one another such that they constitute the plural-subject of a shared mental state.

2 Empathy: knowing how another feels

One way in which an individual gains knowledge of what another person is experiencing is by empathising with her. In Harper Lee's *To Kill A Mockingbird*, Atticus Finch tells his daughter Scout, "[y]ou never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view… until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it" (2002, 33). Empathy is a way to see through the eyes of another, in a sense, for it allows the person to adopt the other's perspective. When an individual empathises with another, she does not have an emotional reaction to that individual. Rather, she feels what the other is feeling, and comes to understand what and why the

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other feels what she is feeling. The question I am concerned with is how empathy allows for perspective-shifting. I will argue that empathy is a perceptual process in which the individual construes the situation as the other does by adopting the other's perspective. Empathy enables the individual to gain knowledge about the other's emotion, because, like Stein and Zahavi, I think that empathy is a way of comprehending what the other feels in a direct, unmediated way.

In the background to the debate on empathy is the debate about how we know other people's minds, that is, how we mind read. In the analytic tradition of philosophy, the debate is typically between two accounts of mindreading: theory-theory, and simulation theory (Coplan and Goldie 2011, xxxii-xxxiii, Goldie 1999, 394, Zahavi 2010, 286, 2014, 139). Theory-theory claims that an individual reads another's mind by inferring what the other's mental state is from the knowledge she has about that person and information about folk psychology. Mindreading is a theoretical process on this account. Simulation theory claims that we reconstruct the other's mental state by examining our own mental states. Mindreading is an imaginative process on this account. Phenomenologists offer a third account, in which mindreading is a perceptual activity by which we directly experience another's mind. Zahavi argues that the choice between theory-theory and simulation theory is a "false choice" as "both presuppose the fundamental opacity or invisibility of other minds" (2010, 286, see also Zahavi 2014, 132, 140). The difference between accounts of mindreading in the analytic tradition and the phenomenological tradition arise from different views about the kind of access we have to others' minds. Philosophers in the analytic tradition think that we can infer or simulate what the other's mental state must be, but ultimately we only ever have indirect, third person access to the other's mind. For phenomenologists such as Stein and Zahavi, we can directly experience what another is experiencing. When we mind read another's mental state, we may have direct and unmediated access (although not first-person access) which gives us experiential knowledge about the other's mental state.[12] As will be seen below, this difference influences how the different traditions of philosophy conceptualise empathy. I will examine the accounts given in both traditions. I focus here on the accounts developed by Coplan and Goldie in the analytic tradition, and the accounts argued for by Stein and Zahavi in the phenomenological tradition. I

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[12] Stein and Zahavi argue that empathy is a kind of perception, and so the emotion of the other is presented to the empathiser directly. I discuss this further below.

will ultimately favour the direct, perceptual account given by Stein, which emphasises the intentional focus that the observer has on the other.

Empathy is commonly understood as the experience of feeling what another feels. We talk of feeling another's pain when she is suffering, or of sharing another's joy when she is jubilant. When we empathise, we know what the other feels by feeling that emotion ourselves. This idea has led some theorists to argue that empathy is akin to, or a development of, emotional contagion. Neuroscientists such as Alvin Goldman (2009, 2011) and Marco Iacoboni (2011), for example, argue that empathy may occur because of mirroring processes, such as those explained in the previous chapter, in the discussion of emotional contagion. Studies show a correlation between activity in the mirror neuron areas of the brain, and a tendency to empathise (Iacoboni 2011, 55). The automatic mimicry that occurs when the mirror neurons are activated means that the observer can come to feel what another individual is feeling. What is not clear is how this can cause the observer to empathise with the individual, in that the observer knows that she is feeling another person's emotion. As I argued in Chapter 4, mirroring allows that an individual feels the same physiological feelings as the person she observes, but this does not mean that she will know that what she is feeling is caused by her mimicry of the other's emotion or what that feeling is concerned with (that is, what the object of the other's emotion is) (Salice 2015, 87, Zahavi 2010, 291). How does the observer recognise that her feeling is not, in a sense, her own emotion, because it is an imitation of the emotional expression of the other's emotion? When the observer feels sadness by empathising with her grieving friend, she knows that she is not herself in mourning, but is feeling her friend's sadness. There is a more effortful process that is part of the phenomenon of empathy that is not explained by the automatic mimicry that leads to emotional contagion. Empathy occurs when the observer feels an emotion that she understands to belong to another individual.

This leads Goldman to argue that there is a second route to empathy, what he calls the reconstructive route, in which higher-level effortful and cognitive processes are involved (2009, 246, 2011, 36-38). This second route is how philosophers such as Goldie (1999, 2011a) and Coplan (2011) articulate the nature of empathy. They believe that the empathic phenomenon occurs when the individual shifts her perspective to that of the other, feeling what the other feels. In empathising, the individual perceives the world through the eyes of the other. She takes on the perspective of the other, and is able to understand the other's emotional response to that situation. More than that,

empathy is an acknowledgement of difference, for the individual is implicitly acknowledging that the other is a subject with a different point of view. What the individual experiences in empathy is the emotion of a different subject (Coplan 2011, 5, 13-17, Goldie 1999, 408-419, 2011a, 303-306, Vendrell Ferran 2015, 486, Zahavi 2014, 138, Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 544).

Perspective-shifting (also called perspective-taking) is understood in two ways, which have important consequences for the argument about how we come to understand the other's emotions. The experience of perspective-shifting can be self-oriented, which is when the observer imagines what she would feel if she were in the position of the other person (Coplan 2011, 9-13, Goldie 1999, 408-414, 2000, 178, 195-200, 2011a, 305). If Olivia is grieving about the death of her parent, Bryony can understand her grief by imagining what it would feel like for Bryony if her parent were to die. Goldie calls this "in-his-shoes perspective-shifting" (2011a, 305). The experience of perspective-shifting can also be other-oriented, in which the observer imagines or simulates what it would be like to be the other person (Coplan 2011, 13-15, Zahavi 2014, 138, Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 544, Vendrell Ferran 2015, 484). If Olivia is grieving the death of her parent, Bryony can imagine what it is like to be Olivia, and to be grieving as Olivia. Bryony would have to draw on her knowledge of Olivia and Olivia's relationship to her parent to imagine Olivia's grief, so that she can imagine what kind of meaning the loss of her parent will have for Olivia. If Olivia's relationship with her parent was loving, Bryony can reconstruct that Olivia must be feeling an absence in her life; if Olivia's relationship was fraught with tension and bitterness, Bryony can imagine that Olivia would be more conflicted in her grief. Goldie calls this "empathetic perspective-shifting" (2011a, 305).

As Coplan and Goldie point out, self-oriented perspective-shifting does not reliably provide information about the other's perspective. Coplan thinks that self-oriented perspective-shifting can only give rise to quasi-empathy (2011, 9). Goldie argues that self-oriented perspective-shifting is an imaginative process that is distinct from empathy in which we try to understand what the other feels (1999, 412). The problem with self-oriented perspective-shifting is that by focusing on our own emotion, we are likely to project our own emotion onto the other, rather than intuiting what she feels. Zahavi calls this the projective theory of empathy, and as he points out, "[i]t fails to do justice to the genuine and true self-transcendence that we find in empathy; to the fact that empathic understanding can expand our life and lead us beyond the limitations

of our own actual experience" (2014, 133). The accounts of empathy that I explore below are thus other-directed, in that the perspective-shifting is other-oriented.

Empathy occurs when other-directed perspective-shifting allows the observing individual to experience the other's mental states. This process is a simulative or reconstructive one, in which the individual attempts to adopt the other's perspective and so to experience the other's mental state. Coplan and Goldie, in line with simulation theory, understand this as an imaginative exercise (Coplan 2011, 5-6, Goldie 1999, 411-419, 2000, 195-200, 2011a, 305-306, Nussbaum 2001, 301-302). The observing individual has to imagine what she takes the other to be feeling given what she knows about the other. On this view, we cannot have perfect knowledge of the other, and so in order to reconstruct and feel what that person is feeling we must imaginatively fill in the details. The observer then attributes the imagined perspective to the other. In doing so, she has imaginatively given herself a new view on the world, and because it is triggered by her observation of the other, she thinks that she perceives the world as the other does. If we think back to the account of emotion that I outlined in Chapter 1, what is occurring is that the individual has construed the situation in a way that she thinks matches how the other construes the world. Bryony, by empathically shifting perspective, may imagine that Olivia grieves because she construes the world according to the paradigm scenario of loss, and perceives the death of a beloved parent as an absence.

In order to attempt to shift perspective, there needs to be a clear distinction between self and other (Coplan 2011, 15-17, Zahavi 2010, 294, 2014, 138, Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 544). The observer experiences an emotion that she regards as being what the other person feels, rather than being her own emotion. When Bryony empathises with Olivia, Bryony does not herself grieve. She feels Olivia's grief. Bryony would not take herself to be the subject of the grief that she feels, for she is not experiencing a loss in her life. But she has encountered Olivia as another subject with her own perspective on the world, and by observing Olivia, she has come to feel what Olivia feels. Ontologically, there are two emotional experiences: Olivia's grief, and Bryony's (empathic) grief. Phenomenologically, however, Bryony attributes the grief that she feels to Olivia, who is the proper subject of the grief, and does not take *herself* to be grieving. This is why Stein tells us that "empathy is not a feeling of oneness" (1989, 17). Bryony has not phenomenologically fused with Olivia, but rather, has recognised

another's emotion by feeling it in her own body. Bryony is feeling an emotion which is not her own.

There is some debate about whether or not empathy requires the observing individual to actually feel what the other feels, that is, whether or not the observing individual's affect must match the other's affect. Coplan claims that affective matching is a requirement of empathy; Zahavi claims that it is not. Coplan argues that the observing individual must have the same kind of feeling as the target individual, although there may be some difference in the degree to which the feeling is felt (2011, 6-7, 17-18). If the observing individual has a different kind of feeling, she is reacting to the target individual, rather than empathising with her. On Coplan's account, empathy is a means to experiential understanding of the other's emotion, and as such, the feeling of the emotion must be replicated in the observing individual in order for the same emotion to be represented to the observing individual. The observing individual knows what the other feels because it is represented to her, in the same way that she knows what her own emotion is from the way her feeling is represented to her. Zahavi, on the other hand, thinks that affective matching is not required (2010, 291, 2014, 132). He argues that if we know what another feels because we feel the emotion in ourselves, we are not actually other-directed. The other's emotion is not being disclosed to us, but is rather felt as our own emotion. He thinks that if we feel the other's emotion as our own, we are reacting to the other by mirroring, or imitating, her emotion.

The difference between Coplan and Zahavi's view on the necessity of affective matching for empathy is starkly visible when we consider a vicious kind of perspective-shifting that Zahavi considers as an example of empathy. Drawing on Max Scheler, he tells us that, "empathic sensitivity is a precondition for cruelty, since cruelty requires an awareness of the pain and suffering of the other" (Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 544). On Zahavi's account, empathy is a way of gaining knowledge of the other's mental state by adopting that person's perspective, not by replicating her feeling. The cruel person, therefore, can adopt the perspective of her victim by empathising with her, and can thus enjoy the pain that she knows that she is causing. Coplan, on the other hand, would not include this kind of perspective-shifting as empathy. She thinks that we know the other's emotion by the way it is represented to us, and this representation is linked to the feeling. I agree with her. Although Zahavi thinks that "[e]mpathy is the experience of the *embodied* mind of the other," it is not clear to me how he can establish that we learn about the embodied aspect of the other's emotion (2015, 544 [emphasis added],

Zahavi 2014, 138). He is concerned with sharply distinguishing the perceptual theory of empathy, which I discuss further below, from the simulative or projective theory of emotion (such as Coplan's account), and as such, I think he sacrifices an important and distinctive feature of empathy. Empathy is experiential, embodied understanding of the other's point of view because it is a felt experience.

Empathy is thus a process of perspective-shifting, in which the target individual's emotion is represented to the observing individual as a feeling in her own body. This raises an epistemological question. How does the observer gain knowledge or understanding about what the other is feeling by having a feeling in her body? As Schmid points out, feelings are epistemologically exclusive as the individual has privileged access to her own emotions, but does not have the same kind of access to other peoples' emotions as she does to her own (2009, 74). An individual knows her own emotions by feeling them in her own body, but typically perceives what another feels by interpreting her emotional expressions from a third person perspective. This means that her access to another's emotion is indirect. As I have described empathy so far, it is an imaginative process by which another's emotion is reconstructed in the observer's own body. How does imagination give rise to knowledge of the other's emotion?

Goldie is sceptical that we gain knowledge of the other's emotion by empathising, because he is sceptical that we can engage in other-oriented empathetic perspective-shifting. He thinks it is impossible for us to know what it is like to be another person in a particular situation, and as such, empathy is an *imaginative* process in which we project an emotion onto the other. He does not think that we can truly adopt the perspective of the other and encounter the world as she does (Goldie 2011a, 308-311). In order to adopt another's perspective, we would need to adopt that person's characterisation, which is broadly defined as the historical facts, psychology, character, values, and so on, of the person. A person's characterisation shapes her unique point of view on the world (Goldie 1999, 411). Goldie tells us that,

> …empathy, if successful, does not involve any aspect of me in this sense, for empathetic understanding is a way of gaining a deeper understanding of what it is like *for him*, not of what it would be like for a person with some mixture of his and my characterization. (1999, 398)

Goldie's scepticism about the epistemological value of empathy is a variation of the Sceptical Challenge that I am seeking to meet in this thesis. His argument is that we can never take on the perspective of another individual in the first-personal stance (Goldie

2011a, 303). Just as we develop our emotions according to our unique history, who we are is the product of our unique history. The individual will perceive the world according to her characterisation. She will be disposed to kindness if she has a kind character, and will be disposed to perceive opportunities for kindness accordingly, for example. Her characterisation provides the lens through which she perceives the world, and shapes how she feels.

Goldie thinks that when an observer empathises with another, she would need to construe the world as if she were characterised like the other. In order to do that, she would need to abandon her own characterisation and perceive the world as the other does. However, Goldie argues that we cannot perceive the world as another does. He thinks that when we encounter the other, we encounter her characterisation as a fact about her, not as a mode of thinking (Goldie 2011a, 309). We cannot discard our own characterisation and adopt the other's characterisation, as if it were a mere coat. Rather, we accommodate the other's characterisation by engaging in "double-minded" thinking, by which the observer encounters the world with her own characterisation and the fact of the other's characterisation. The mean person who tries to empathise with the kind person will not be able to perceive the world according to the other's kind characterisation, but will try to perceive kindly with her mean characterisation. Goldie thinks that we can never shift perspective empathically such that we can encounter the world in the same way as another. As such, other-oriented perspective-shifting is of limited epistemological value.

I think that Goldie's argument points to an important limitation in our capacities for empathy, which is that we cannot empathise with all people. In some cases, we may be prevented from understanding another due to crucial differences between us. Radically opposed characters, such as the mean person and the kind person, may be unable to understand the other's perspective and emotion. Cultural differences, ideological differences, and so on may prevent the generation of knowledge by the process of empathising because there is a sense in which the other is alien to us. There are also experiences which are taken to be "unimaginable" until they have been directly experienced. Grieving parents, for example, might tell others that they cannot know what it is like to lose a child if they have not lost a child. Other experiences are "unimaginable" for moral reasons. Adam Morton (2011) argues that moral decency prevents us from empathising with those who commit atrocious acts, for example. However, the fact that we cannot empathise with *all* people, meaning that we cannot

understand *all* people's emotions, does not mean that empathy must be self-oriented and a projection of our own emotion onto the other. As Coplan notes, empathy is easier when the observing individual knows the other quite well or identifies with her, recognising similarity between themselves (2011, 13). She argues that we can engage in other-oriented empathy when we have some knowledge of the other, and this can generate knowledge about the other's emotion.

Coplan argues that other-oriented empathy is not a matter of adopting another's characterisation, but rather, a way of focusing on the other (2011, 13-15). When we focus on the other, our attention is on her and what we know about her, and this allows us to, in a sense, put ourselves in the background. Coplan thinks that we can take steps to disregard how we usually perceive the world, because by focusing on the other and what we know about her, we are guided by that information to determine what is of salience in the world. We use our knowledge of the other to reconstrue the world. Whereas Goldman thinks that there are two routes to empathy, either by mental mimicry or through higher-level reconstruction, Coplan thinks that empathy requires higher-level cognitive activity. Thus for Coplan, empathy is an effortful process, requiring mental flexibility and careful attention to the other. It is not the automatic process of mirroring, in which an individual involuntarily and unconsciously mimics the other and induces the feeling of the other in herself. Rather, the individual draws on her knowledge of the other to guide the imaginative reconstruction of what the other feels. The observing individual does not need perfect knowledge of the other, or the ability to adopt the characterisation of the other. Rather, empathy is an imaginative process that tracks what the individual knows of the other.

Coplan's account of empathy, which is a simulative theory of empathy, has much in common with the phenomenological accounts of empathy developed by Stein and Zahavi. However, the phenomenological account places more value on the idea that empathy is a way of focusing on the other, and is a way of experiencing the other's mental state. For Stein and Zahavi, empathy is a *perceptual* process rather than an imaginative process, which gives the observer direct access to the other's mental state (Stein 1989, 11, Zahavi 2010, 287, 294, 2014, 130-140). As such, it gives the observing individual a special kind of "knowledge by *acquaintance*," according to Zahavi and Philippe Rochat (2015, 544 [emphasis in original]). On this account, empathy is a kind of intentionality in which we are presented with the other's emotion as a foreign consciousness, in the same way in which an external object is presented when we

perceive it. We experience the emotion ourselves, giving us experiential understanding of that emotion, but we experience it *as foreign* (Zahavi 2010, 290-291, 2014, 140).

Stein argues that empathy is "an act of perceiving" (1989, 11, 17-18, Zahavi 2010, 294, 2014, 132-134, 139-140). When the other's emotion is presented to the observer, the observer intentionally directs her attention to the other and comes to "feel-in" what the other feels, rather than "feeling-with" the other. It is by perceiving the other and being receptive to the other's emotion that the observer feels what the other feels. However, perceiving an emotion is not like perceiving an object in the world, as an emotion is not a tangible object in the world. Rather, when the observer perceives the expression of the emotion, she perceives the expression not as a bodily movement but as the target's inner mental state. Stein does not think that the observer interprets these expressions, which would mean that she is making an inference about the other's emotion (Zahavi 2010, 295). Rather, she thinks that when we perceive these expressions, we feel the emotion of the other within ourselves. She gives an example of empathising with a jubilant friend, telling us, "I comprehend his joy empathically; transferring myself into it, I comprehend the joyfulness of the event" (Stein 1989, 13). On Stein's account, the perception of the emotion is direct and intuitive, because while we only perceive the expression of emotion, the emotion is presented directly to the observer as the object of the (empathic) perception.

As I interpret Stein's account, which was written long before the current neuroscientific investigations into emotional contagion and empathy, she thinks that when we perceive the other, we directly feel the other's emotion but experience it as a foreign experience. This suggests that, firstly, the emotion is transmitted to us, and secondly, that there is a mechanism within empathy that allows us to attribute it to the other individual. She does not explain the first aspect, but I think it is in line with the neuroscientific investigations that show that we involuntary mirror the other's emotions when our mirror neurons are activated. While we can distinguish conceptually between emotional contagion and higher-level empathy, neuroscientists have noted that there is a correlation between mirror neuron activity (which indicates mental mimicry or mirroring) and a tendency to empathise (Iacoboni 2011, 55). Coplan also suggests that there may be some interaction between emotional contagion and empathy, and that emotional contagion can perhaps trigger empathy (2011, 14 n48). While emotional contagion is not sufficient for empathy (since emotional contagion does not necessarily mean that the individuals are concerned with the same intentional object), it may be one

way that the feeling of the other is transmitted to the individual, presenting the other's emotion to the observer directly.

The second aspect of Stein's account is that we have a sense that the emotion we feel is foreign to us, and belongs to the other individual (1989, 11). She argues that when we perceive the emotion of the other, we perceive it non-primordially. Kris McDaniel points out that Stein never explains what she means by "primordial" or "non-primordial" experiences, but he suggests that she is adopting Husserl's view of intentionality (2017, 211-213). On Husserl's account of intentionality, when a mental state is intentional, there is a sense that attaches to the content of that mental state. When the individual experiences her own emotion, an intentional state directed to an object, she experiences that emotion with a sense that it is primordial. When the individual empathises with another, an intentional state on Stein's account, she experiences that emotion with the sense that it is not primordial. The experience of the emotion is experienced as foreign to the observing individual, that it belongs to the person she observes (Vendrell Ferran 2015, 484). It is this sense that distinguishes empathy from emotional contagion, for as McDaniel says, "[i]f I experienced your joy primordially, your joy would be present to me in a way that (only) my joy can be present to me" (2017, 213). When we experience an emotion non-primordially, we experience that emotion directly, and so can gain knowledge about that emotion, but at the same time, we experience it as belonging to the other. This, I suspect, is also why the emotion we feel when empathising is "offline," for the emotion does not have motivational force and we do not act on that emotion.[13]

Stein does not consider empathy and perspective-shifting to be the same phenomenon, but I think that this is because she thinks of perspective-shifting in the sense of self-oriented "in-his-shoes perspective-shifting." She argues against thinking of empathy as the process by which we project an emotion onto the other, by imagining how we would feel in the same situation (Stein 1989, 14).[14] She thinks that empathy is a matter of being receptive to the other's feeling, rather than imaginatively feeling what

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[13] By contrast, an emotion that is "online" is one that readies the individual for action, that is, it has motivational force.

[14] Stein does not use the term "perspective-taking." This is my reading of the quote, "…if, as in memory, we put ourselves in the place of the foreign 'I' and suppress it while we surround ourselves with its situation, we have one of these situations of 'appropriate' experience. If we then concede to the foreign 'I' its place and ascribe this experience to him, we gain a knowledge of the experience. … Should empathy fail, this procedure can make up the deficiency, but it is not itself an experience. We could call this surrogate for empathy an 'assumption' but not empathy itself" (Stein 1989, 14). Stein is arguing against an entirely imaginative reconstructive account of empathy.

we think the other would feel. But I think she would accept the idea of perspective-shifting as other-oriented empathetic perspective-shifting, which is how fellow phenomenologist Zahavi understands empathy (2010, 290-291, 2014, 138, 2015, 86-91, Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 544). She asserts that we "comprehend" how the situation is construed by the other. We can thus understand Stein's account as involving a shift in perspective that is grounded in the feelings that we perceive in the other. We gain knowledge of the other's emotion by feeling what she feels and being guided by that emotion to construe the situation as the other does. What makes empathy a cognitive and effortful process is that the observer has to focus her attention on the other, and put aside her own construal of the situation so that she can be open to the information the other is expressing.

Empathy, then, is a way of perceiving the other's emotional expressions such that we directly feel that person's emotion. It is an intentional state in which the observer focuses on the other, and can then feel the other's emotion and perceive the world as the other does. It allows her to adopt the other's perspective, in an other-oriented way. By focusing on the other, our perception of the world is guided by both the feelings that are triggered by the automatic processes of mirroring, and by the sense that the feelings are foreign. We feel what the other feels, and are able to understand how the other perceives the world, because we are directly experiencing her emotion and are guided by that emotion to construe the world as she does. It is possible that we make a mistake—empathy is not an infallible means to understanding the other's emotion and the other's perspective—but empathy is often a reliable means to such knowledge about the other. The process of empathy, contra Goldie, does not require that the observer abandon her own characterisation. The observer's characterisation may prevent her from empathising in certain situations, and may cause her to make mistakes in some cases. However, in other cases, the observer's empathy will allow her to directly access the other's emotion, and as such, she will be able to perceive the world through the other's eyes and thereby see what is of significance to the other.

We are now ready to turn back to the question of how we can share a mental state such as an emotion. When an individual empathises, she is able to feel and understand what the other feels. Empathy gives us access to the emotions of others, allowing us to feel what they feel. This is not yet to say that the emotion is shared. The emotion belongs to the other, and the observer knows what the other feels because she feels that feeling. The emotion does not belong to both individuals as a group.

3 Sharing emotions

Empathy gives the individual access to the other's emotion, and enables her to have empathic understanding of the other's emotion. It is not, however, the same as sharing the emotion of the other. As Zahavi points out, if he empathically understands that his friend loves her partner by feeling her emotion of love, it does not mean that he loves her partner (2015, 89). In empathy, the emotion belongs to the other individual and not to both the observer *and* the other. Stein suggests that empathy allows individuals to recognise commonality in one another, and share an emotion together (1989, 17). Zahavi and Szanto develop this suggestion, and argue that when individuals enter into a reciprocally empathic relationship with others, the individuals can co-constitute the emotional experience that belongs to them both. When individuals mutually empathise with one another, they can interlock their perspectives and share an emotion.

There are some differences in the accounts developed by Zahavi and Szanto, but I regard them as broadly compatible. Zahavi is concerned particularly with how two individuals in a dyadic face-to-face relationship can interlock their perspectives and co-constitute their emotion (2015, 92). Szanto focuses on Stein's argument, and is concerned with how the mutual empathic recognition of commonality of emotion with another changes the structure of the emotion, making the shared emotion distinct from the individual emotion (2015, 507-508). This difference points to the fact that emotions can be shared in two ways: either by unifying as a (plural-subject) group and responding as a group, or by recognising a common response in others and unifying as a (plural-subject) group because of that common emotion. I do not think Zahavi and Szanto's accounts exclude each other as models of shared emotion. Rather, they approach the same problem from different starting points—they both seek to show that when individuals are unified as a group, the shared orientation to the world changes the nature of the emotion experienced. I will argue for an account of shared emotion that accommodates both of their arguments, in which a shared emotion is felt when individuals perceive the world together, by being intentionally focused on one another and intentionally focused on an object together. A major obstacle for this account, however, is that because the development of shared emotion is grounded in empathy, shared emotions can only be experienced by small groups whose members are in close proximity to one another. I will address this obstacle in the next chapter.

Stein argues that empathy plays an important role in how we come to share an emotion. She gives an example of shared joy, showing how many cases of individual joy can become unified as one emotion of shared joy:

> A special edition of the paper reports that the fortress has fallen. As we hear this, all of us are seized by an excitement, a joy, a jubilation. We all have "the same" feeling. Have thus the barriers separating one "I" from another broken down here? … I feel my joy while I empathically comprehend the others and see it as the same. And seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character of the foreign joy [the joy of the other] has vanished. Indeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respect with my real live joy, and theirs is just as live to them as mine is to me. Now I intuitively have before me what they feel. It comes to life in my feeling, and from the "I" and "you" arises the "we" as a subject of a higher level. (Stein 1989, 17)

For Stein, the individual's emotion can be interlocked with another individual's emotion, making it a shared emotion. The individual empathises with the other, which causes her to perceive that the other has the same emotion as her. She feels the other's joy just as she feels her own, and by experiencing both individual joy and empathic joy, she comes to see herself as part of a plural-subject group. She and the other, by virtue of their common emotion, are unified as a group and their emotions become a shared emotion that they feel together.

Initially, Stein appears to be describing the phenomenon of feeling-together. Feeling-together is the experience of affinity that exists when two individuals recognise that they feel an emotion in common with the other.[15] Scheler describes two parents both grieving for their deceased child, and the parents recognising that they feel the same grief (1979, 12-13). But feeling-together is a case of mutual recognition of the same experience, of feeling an emotion in parallel with another, rather than a case of shared emotion. As I argued in the previous chapter, when individuals have a feeling in common, they experience their emotions as individuals, but feel a sense of affinity with the other because of their commonality with the other. If Stein is arguing that individuals feel an emotion and mutually recognise the same emotion in others, then she is giving a model of shared emotion that is an aggregative account of group emotion. Each individual experiences an emotion, and the shared emotion is an aggregate of the individual emotions. The individuals do not feel an emotion together.

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[15] See Chapter 4.

However, Stein does not want to give an account of feeling-together. She argues that the mutual empathic recognition of a common emotion changes the structure of the emotion. Her example of shared joy continues:

> And it is also possible for us to be joyful over the same event, though not filled with exactly the same joy. Joyfulness may be more richly accessible to the others, which difference I comprehend empathically. I empathically arrive at the "sides" of joyfulness obstructed in my own joy. This ignites my joy, and only now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to others, we empathically enrich our feeling so that "we" now feel a different joy from "I," "you," and "he" in isolation. But "I," "you," and "he" are retained in the "we." A "we," not an "I," is the subject of the empathizing. Not through the feeling of oneness, but through empathizing, do we experience others. The feeling of oneness and the enrichment of our own experience becomes possible through empathy. (Stein 1989, 17-18)

In this passage, she suggests that the individual's experience of joy is changed by her empathic recognition of joy in others. She not only comes to see herself as being part of a first person plural-subject ("we"), but also has a sense that the joy she feels is enriched because it is shared. She experiences a new emotion as a result of her empathy, a shared joy that is experienced with others.

Zahavi and Szanto both develop this argument. Zahavi focuses on the idea that empathy enables the individual to shift perspective from the first-person singular to the first-person plural. Szanto focuses on how the emotion experienced by the individual is changed because it is shared with others. As I see it, these are two aspects of the same argument. The overall claim, I will argue, is that when individuals mutually empathise with one another, they can adopt a shared perspective and feel the same (shared) emotion. This emotion is a different kind of emotion to that which the individual feels alone, for she feels it when she is empathically attentive to the other and recognises that the other is empathically attentive to her. This allows them to constitute a doubly intentional emotion together, for each individual is intentionally directed both to the other individual and to the object of their emotion. In short, it becomes a we-mode emotion (Salmela 2012, 43).[16] As such, the individual cannot feel the shared emotion without the other also feeling the same emotion.

Zahavi argues that a plural-subject group is formed when individuals are able to reciprocally adopt the perspective of the other, and then together adopt a shared

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[16] As Salmela argues, a we-mode emotion is one in which the individuals adopt a shared perspective and appraise the object of the shared emotion in the same way (2012, 43). I discuss Salmela's typology of collective emotion in Chapter 6.

perspective (Zahavi 2015, 91-96, León and Zahavi 2016, 223-224). When an individual empathises with another, she encounters that individual as having her own perspective on the world. She recognises the other individual as a distinct subject, and, Zahavi argues, in recognising this difference, the individual encounters the other in the second person stance ("you"). This is the subject-subject relationship, of an "I" perceiving a "you," for in empathising, the individual understands that she feels and perceives what a different subject feels and perceives (Zahavi 2015, 92). When the two individuals are in a dyadic, face-to-face relationship, and they mutually empathise with the other, they will each adopt the perspective of the other. In doing so, they each perceive what the other perceives—they perceive that they are each the object of the other's empathic perception. In doing so, each individual, an "I," perceives herself through the eyes of the other as a "you." By reciprocally empathising with one another, both individuals see themselves in the second personal stance.

Zahavi argues that when the individual sees herself in the second personal stance, she experiences a degree of alienation from herself, adopting a foreign perspective to perceive herself (2015, 93). This is akin to the depersonalisation process that social psychologists describe, because the individual sees herself by those features that ascribe her with a social identity. The foreign (empathic) perception of herself is different from the way the individual perceives herself when she thinks of herself in the first personal stance, as a unique individual. By adopting a second personal stance, she can see similarity or difference between herself and the other (or as the social psychologists say, she self-categorises as belonging or not belonging in the same category with the other).[17] When there is sufficient similarity, she can regard herself and the other as being a group. In the dyad relationship, when both individuals mutually empathise with one another, both individuals may mutually regard themselves as being part of the same group as the other and they adopt the first person plural stance ("we"). This is the plural-subject group (Zahavi 2015, 94-95). Each individual recognises the other as a subject, establishing a subject-subject relation, and recognises themselves as being alike in the relevant manner, which establishes the plural-subject group.

What is important in Zahavi's argument is that mutual empathy allows the individuals to pay attention to one another in such a way that they interlock their perspectives. When the individuals have identified with one another as belonging to the

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[17] See Chapter 2.

same group, their perspective on the world changes—they do not approach the world from the first person singular perspective, but from the first person plural perspective. Each individual is aware that she encounters the world *with* the other, each as a member of the group, and this impacts how she perceives the world. The perspective is one of multiple individuals together, in which the individuals are jointly oriented towards the world, and perceive together (Zahavi 2015, 95-96).[18] The shared perspective is much like the joint gaze that exists between infants and caregivers in which the developing infant learns how to attend to the world, and what significance to give to the object of the gaze. With the plural-subject group, the individuals are mutually oriented towards one another, which allows them to orient to the world together. Zahavi argues that this allows for attentional modification (2015, 95). The individuals in the plural-subject group will appraise and construe the world according to the concerns of them both (the group members together), rather than the concerns of the individual. By sharing a perspective with others, the individual becomes focused on what is of concern to the group and not simply of concern to herself.

The reciprocity of empathy is important for two reasons. Firstly, in the face-to-face relationship, the reciprocal empathy allows the individual to see herself as the other sees her, and thus to depersonalise. In unilateral empathy, the individual would not be the object of the other's empathy, and so would not come to see herself as the other sees her. She would simply see what is of concern to the other. Secondly, in the case of unilateral empathy, the individual may identify with the other, and adopt the perspective of the other, and perhaps even adopt that perspective as her own. But she could not say that she *shares* that perspective with the other, for she and the other will not have interlocked their perspectives. The other will not identify with the individual, and will not see them as being a plural-subject group. The plural-subject group, on Zahavi's account, is formed only when each member empathises with the other.

We can see from Zahavi's account, then, that there are two requirements for emotional sharing, and these requirements distinguish shared emotion from cases of emotional contagion, (unilateral) empathy, and phenomenological fusion (2015, 89-90). The first is the plurality requirement, when the individuals in the mutual and reciprocal face-to-face relationship encounter the other as distinct from themselves (Zahavi 2015,

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[18] Recall Carr, who tells us that when we share a perception of the Eiffel Tower, "I may not see the tower through your eyes, but its being seen through your eyes as well as my own is part of the experience as *I* have it" (1986a, 525).

93-94). The individuals are unified, but not fused, for their plurality is preserved. They exist as a plural-subject group, as a result of the subject-subject relationship between them. The second requirement is the integrity requirement, when the individuals' perspectives (and emotions, as I will argue next) become interlocked as the individuals self-categorise as being members of the same group (Zahavi 2015, 95-96, see also Borden 2003, 49). As Zahavi notes, it is possible for two individuals to mutually encounter one another in the second person stance and to be aware that they each encounter the other in the second person stance, but to fail to unify as a plural-subject group.[19] Zahavi gives the example of the sadistic rapist whose enjoyment of his violation of the victim may come from knowing how the victim sees him (2015, 90). The rapist and the victim are in a dyadic relationship of reciprocal awareness of the other's perspective, but they do not identify with one another. To create a plural-subject group, the individuals need to both differentiate themselves from the other and unify with the other.[20]

Szanto agrees with Zahavi that when an individual shares an emotion with others, she adopts a first person plural perspective and sees herself as being part of a group, not as fused with the other members of the group (2015, 506-507). He also agrees that an emotion is shared when it is an integrated experience of the members. His focus is on this latter requirement, and in developing Stein's account of shared emotion, he is concerned with showing how mutual empathy changes the structure of the emotion that is experienced by the individuals in the group. I think of Szanto's account as developing Zahavi's account further, for where Zahavi is concerned with how individuals interlock their perspectives and their experience, Szanto is concerned with how the interlocked experience impacts the emotion's structure. Szanto argues that individuals can come together and co-experience an emotion without phenomenologically fusing (as Schmid

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[19] As we saw in Chapter 2 with the social psychology studies, the context of an individual can impact on the way that the individual regards herself, and which group she regards herself as being a member of. One individual may see herself as a student and include Muslim students as part of her group, or she may see herself as an American, and regard Muslims as part of an outgroup, for example. The context can influence whether or not individuals will unify as a group. Hogg and Abrams give a clear example of a singles bar, whereby men and women see themselves as belonging to different sex groups, but should the TV announce a war breaking out, the men and women include one another as all belonging to one national group (1988, 187).

[20] If we think back to Gustave Le Bon's (1896) discussion of crowd emotion, one of the worries was that the individual would lose her sense of self when part of a crowd. Zahavi and Szanto avoid this problem by including a plurality requirement for shared emotion, under which the individuals regard themselves as a member within a group, rather than as fused with the other members of the group. The individual depersonalises to self-categorise as a member of the group, but she does not de-individuate. (See Chapter 2.)

argues). In doing so, the emotion's structure is changed, such that the shared emotion is structurally distinct from the individual emotion.

Szanto argues that a shared emotion's structure is doubly intentional, as compared with an individual emotion that is singly intentional (2015, 507-508). Drawing on Stein's account of empathy and her account of shared emotion, he argues that when individuals reciprocally empathise with one another, they are mutually paying attention to one another and perceiving the feeling of the other. The object of each individual's empathy is the other, as each individual is intentionally oriented to the other. In constituting a plural-subject group (by empathically recognising a common emotion, as Stein suggests, or by unifying as a group by reciprocally empathising, as Zahavi argues), the individuals also become oriented to the world in the same way and respond together to the world. As Zahavi argues, the dyadic relationship between the two individuals becomes triadic as they mutually empathise with one another, and then they turn their common focus to an emotion-eliciting object, perceiving it together and responding to it together (2015, 96, León and Zahavi 2016, 226). For Szanto, this shared emotion is doubly intentional—each individual is intentionally focused on the other (by empathising with her) and on the object of the shared emotion (2015, 507). Zahavi's argument reinforces this point, because by adopting a shared perspective, each individual is attentive to how the other perceives the object of their joint focus. As he and Rochat tell us:

> To share an experience with someone else is not to have an experience of one's own and then simply to add knowledge about the other's perspective on top; rather a shared experience is a qualitatively new kind of experience, one that is quite unlike any experience one could have on one's own. The other's presence and reciprocation make all the difference. (2015, 547, see also Borden 2003, 49)

The difference between a shared emotion and an individual emotion, then, concerns the phenomenal structure of the emotion.[21] In ontological terms, each individual experiences the shared emotion in her own body, and as such, the shared emotion is (ontologically) several distinct emotions. However, the thesis of subjective individualism of emotion is undermined on this account because, according to the account, the subject of the emotion is the plural-subject and the individual feels the emotion when she adopts a shared perspective with other individuals. She is connected

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[21] Recall that Schmid attempted to argue for a similar claim: he tried to argue that the individual's experience of her phenomenal subject as fused is an indication of the fused emotion's structure, which is different from the structure of an individual emotion (2009, 68).

with other members of the plural-subject group, and experiences the shared emotion with them. Szanto talks of the individual "realising" the shared emotion, because she experiences the shared emotion in her body as a member of the plural-subject group (2015, 508). She experiences the shared emotion as a "we," and cannot experience this emotion if she is not in a reciprocal empathic relationship with the other members of her group (León and Zahavi 2016, 227-228, Szanto 2015, 506-507, Zahavi and Rochat 2015, 547). This means that the shared emotion is not attributed to a group mind, but to the individuals together as a plural-subject group. It is a we-mode emotion, held by multiple individuals within a group together.

The collectivity (or sharedness) of the emotion is not contained in the content of the emotion, as it is on Schmid's account, but is a fact of the structure of the emotion. Recall that one concern about collective intentions is that a single individual alone can have a collective we-intention.[22] We saw that Searle allows this possibility because he does not want to compromise his commitment to the theory of ontological individualism of mental states (2002a, 97). I argued, however, that the collective intention is jointly held, and is not reducible to the individual intentions of each individual. The same is true of shared emotion, for Stein, Szanto, and Zahavi. When feeling shared emotion, the individual does not feel an emotion that includes the others in the content of that emotion (she is not representing the cognition, "I feel that we feel shared joy about the fallen fortress"). The shared emotion is jointly experienced because the emotion is shared when the individuals are reciprocally oriented to one another, and are empathically concerned with one another. In feeling a shared emotion, the individual must be intentionally directed both to the object of the emotion and to the other individuals in her plural-subject group. If she is not oriented towards her fellow group members, she is not experiencing shared emotion.

Stein tells us that she may not feel exactly the same joy as the others initially, but that her joy is "ignited" and "enriched" (1989, 17-18). She is making two claims about shared emotion. The first is also made by Schmid, as discussed in the previous chapter, which is that each individual's phenomenal experience and her expression of an emotion may not be identical to the other members of her group (2009, 81). One member may feel a warm glow of contentment, whereas another is prompted to an excited display of exuberant cheering. This does not change the fact that they both feel

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[22] See Chapter 4.

joy: they are both experiencing a feeling that represents the meaning of joy. They are both appraising the fortress's fall as a joyful event. The second claim is that an individual's own joy is strengthened in some sense by the empathic perception of the same joy in others. By seeing the same joy in others, the individual's own experience is given a degree of justification, and the seeming consensus about what should be felt allows the individual to experience her emotion without hesitation or restraint.[23] There is an idea of "strength in numbers"—the individual can feel her emotion wholeheartedly because it is in conformity with others.[24] An extension of this claim is that in recognising an emotion in another, the individual may regulate her emotion, bringing it into alignment with the joy that she empathically perceives in others. Schmid calls this process affective attunement, and Joel Krueger calls it entrainment (Schmid 2009, 66, Krueger 2016, 6). By aligning her emotion with the other, or conversely, expressing her emotion in a way that allows others to align their emotions with her emotion, the individual is oriented to the other, and a shared emotion can emerge.[25]

Stein's example of shared joy shows that the recognition of the same emotion in others can transform that individual emotion into a shared emotion, despite the individuals not being unified as a group before responding to the event. This is an alternative way that groups can be formed—the emotion can be what bonds the individuals together.[26] We can think of activist groups, where individuals come together around the same issue that each has been affected by. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD), for example, is comprised of family members of victims of harms perpetrated by drunk drivers. These family members may find that the anger they feel towards the drunk drivers and towards the justice system, as well as the sadness at the loss they experience as a result of the crime (perhaps a death or a serious injury), is common to them all, which is what brings them together as a group. In Chapter 4, I discussed the

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[23] Salmela and Nagatsu discuss how awareness of feeling the same emotion as another is itself a pleasurable experience, even if the shared emotion is painful (2017, section 5.3).

[24] At the same time, it is worth recalling Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin's empirical findings that in cases of negative emotion, the perception that other group members feel the same emotion can facilitate the alleviation of the emotional burden, and allow the individual to not conform to the feelings that others express (2014, 585). That is, by perceiving the same emotion in her fellow group members, the strength of her own emotion may *decrease*.

[25] This may be why an individual who perceives that her fellow group members do not feel the emotion that she thinks they should, actually "upregulates" her emotion: she feels her emotion more intensely, and may, as a result, express her emotion more visibly or forcefully, to encourage affective alignment from her group members (Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin 2014, 585).

[26] Andrew Livingstone, Russell Spears, Antony Manstead, Martin Bruder, and Lee Shepherd (2011) provide empirical evidence to show that sharing an emotion can trigger self-categorisation to the same group.

case of feeling-together, and how support groups may be formed when individuals have feelings in common. What distinguishes feeling-together—or feeling-in-common—from a shared emotion is that the structure of the emotion changes when the emotion becomes shared. The emotion becomes one that is held by the members together, as a group, when the individuals have integrated into a plural-subject.[27]

It may be very difficult to distinguish feeling-together from shared emotion. If we think back to the case of Scheler's grieving parents, we can see how that example can be described as feeling-together or as shared emotion. If the parents identify with one another, and come to see the other as feeling the same grief, their grief may come to be shared. To the outsider, these cases of parental grief would appear to be the same. The difference between shared emotion and feeling-together is that, in feeling-together, the individuals are not empathically focused on one another, and as such, their emotions remain unchanged (structurally). The perception of the other's emotion does not affect the individual's own emotion, although she may feel a sense of affinity with the other because of their common emotions. When an emotion is shared, however, the individuals have empathically experienced one another's emotions, rather than merely recognising them. By feeling both their own and the other's emotions, or by perceiving the world with both their own and the other's perspectives, they have interlocked their experiences, and become the subject of their emotion together. The emotion's structure has changed, because the individuals are intentionally focused on one another and on the object of their emotion.[28]

In summary, individuals can share an emotion when they mutually empathise with one another and integrate as a plural-subject group. Zahavi argues that individuals do this by interlocking their perspectives to give rise to the first person plural perspective. It is as a "we" that the individuals encounter the world together, and feel a shared

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[27] Margaret Archer and Pierpaolo Donati argue that there is a distinction between a plural-subject and a relational subject. A plural-subject requires the individuals to think of themselves as part of a "we" but a relational subject can emerge without the individuals engaging in "we thinking" (Archer and Donati 2015, 50). I do not think that the account of shared emotion that I give here requires that the individuals explicitly identify as members of a plural-subject group, and so I do not make this distinction. Rather, my main concern is that the individuals establish a reciprocal relation between them, either implicitly or explicitly, such that they can share an emotion.

[28] Krueger argues that feeling-together is shared emotion, because he thinks that when the individuals have a common emotion, they will begin to influence how the other experiences and expresses that emotion. In other words, he thinks that feeling-together means that the individuals have interlocked their emotions to share a single emotion (Krueger 2016, 270-273). I do not think that the perception of a common emotion necessarily leads the individuals to unify as a plural-subject. This is because the individual also needs to know how the other feels, and so needs to empathise with the other.

emotion together. Szanto argues that individuals can recognise that they feel an emotion in common when they mutually empathise with one another, and this can change the structure of the emotion such that it becomes a shared emotion. What distinguishes the shared emotion from the individual emotion is its doubly intentional structure—it is intentionally directed to an object and it is also intentionally directed to the individuals that make up the plural-subject group. The individuals are mutually attuned to the emotions of one another and mutually recognise themselves as alike. They feel their emotion together. The shared emotion is dependent on the relations between the individuals, for it is in mutually empathising with one another that the individuals feel the shared emotion. The relationship between the individuals impacts on the phenomenal nature of the emotion that each experiences, making this an emotion that belongs to the individuals as a group, rather than as individuals.

The grounding of a shared emotion in the experience of reciprocal empathy means that (at least) two individuals feel a shared emotion together, as a plural-subject group, not as individuals. The individuals, by empathising, have become unified with one another, and this is reflected in the nature of the emotion that they hold together. When they feel a shared emotion, the individuals do not merely have a sense that the emotion is shared (as Schmid argues), but are oriented to the other individuals in the group and are empathically receptive to the feelings of the others. This is why Szanto talks about the experience of the plural-subject group as being co-constituted (2015, 509). The individuals within the group are responding not only to the environment, but also to the affective cues expressed by fellow members of the group. We can think of shared emotions as negotiated experiences, because the individuals are mutually responding to and regulating their emotions because they are attentive to their fellow group members.

I think that this model of shared emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, and is thus a model of group emotion. The sceptic about group emotion argues that emotions are subjective experiences, unique due to the developmental history of the individual and her unique perspective on the world, and that emotions are physically experienced in the individual's body. A group cannot hold an emotion because only individuals can experience emotions, and her emotional experience is unique to her. I can accept the thesis of ontological individualism about emotion on this account of shared emotion, because I do not dispute that emotions are experienced in the bodies and minds of individuals. The way the individual physically experiences and expresses the shared emotion may differ from the way others physically experience and express the shared

emotion because of the bodily individualism of the emotion. However, the shared emotion is only experienced when the individuals have unified with one another and feel that emotion together. The individuals need to be in a subject-subject relationship in which they are each empathising with the other and so know what the other feels. This empathic connection between the individuals means that they experience the shared emotion with one another and cannot attribute the emotion to themselves as individuals. They attribute a single shared emotion to a subject that includes multiple individuals—that is, they attribute the shared emotion to a group (of which they are part). Much like Gilbert's account of collective intention, although each individual feels the shared emotion in her own body, the shared emotion is not reducible to the individual emotions of the group members.

Although this account can meet the Sceptical Challenge, I do not think that it fully captures the phenomenon of group emotion that I am seeking to explain. The model of shared emotion that is grounded in reciprocal empathy seems to account only for the group emotion of very small groups, in which each individual knows every other individual. Empathy gives the individual direct access to the other's emotion, but it requires that she is in some sort of proximity to the other so that she can perceive the other (Zahavi 2014, 139). Zahavi's account of shared emotion is based on a couple in a face-to-face relationship, and Stein's example is of a room of individuals gathered around a newspaper. If we think back to the example I gave at the beginning of this chapter, I do not think that this account of shared emotion can explain the collective grief that Hannah-Jones (2016) feels with fellow African-Americans about the shooting of Alton Sterling. She tells us that white Americans cannot empathise with black Americans about this particular event due to a difference in how each race thinks of their racial identities. But we cannot conclude from this that she feels the grief of her fellow African-Americans by empathising with them. The sheer number of group members in this race group appears to rule out the possibility of reciprocal empathic relations between all, or most, of the members.

This question will be one of my concerns of my next chapter. I will develop this account of shared emotion, showing that it can be attributed to both small groups such as couples and larger groups such as large protest groups. Zahavi acknowledges that his account of shared emotion cannot yet account for emotions of larger groups (2014, 139, 2015, 97). Szanto, on the other hand, expands his account of shared emotion to an account of collective emotion in which individuals who are unknown to one another and

exist in different times can share an emotion (2015, 511-513). His account is ambitious but flawed, as I will argue in the next chapter, because in order to expand the account of shared emotion, he eliminates the process of reciprocal empathy that is crucial for sharing emotion.

Conclusion

As discussed in the previous chapter, Schmid argues that in order to show how multiple individuals can share an emotion, we should examine how the individual experiences the subjectivity of her emotion. He attempts to argue that individuals can share an emotion if they take themselves to be part of a subject that includes others. Schmid gives an account of phenomenological fusion, but ultimately, he cannot show that the individual's experience of her subjectivity as fused means that her emotion is shared with others. This chapter has been focused on the same question about subjectivity, but the approach has changed. I have drawn on the arguments by Stein, Szanto, and Zahavi to show that when individuals exist in an intersubjective relation, they can constitute a plural-subject of a shared emotion together. On this account, the individuals do not *fuse* with one another but *integrate* with one another, meaning that they maintain their plurality within their unified state. By arguing for a plural-subject account of subjectivity rather than a fused account of subjectivity, I am able to show that a shared emotion is not simply experienced by a single individual as shared but is actually felt by multiple individuals together.

In order to establish that individuals can constitute a plural-subject of an emotion, I have argued that individuals can directly access one another's emotions when they empathise with one another. This means that they can know how the other feels because they feel the other's emotion in the same way that they feel their own emotion, that is, in their bodies. When individuals reciprocally empathise, they establish a relationship between them that allows them to interlock their experiences. They interlock their perspectives and adopt a shared perspective, and they interlock their emotions and adopt a shared emotion, together. This mutual empathy means that the individuals within the plural-subject relation are attentive to one another, and are oriented to the world with one another.

The obstacle that I turn to in the next chapter concerns the limitation of this account of shared emotion. It appears, as the account currently shows, that only individuals in direct contact with one another can share an emotion. It is not clear how

individuals can know how other group members feel when those group members are out of empathic proximity, or are even unknown to one another. Can an individual empathise with an individual that she is not in direct contact with? Can media such as television and the Internet mediate her connection to her group members, such that she can know how they feel without necessarily empathising with them? The challenge is to show how an individual can consider herself part of a plural-subject when she is unable to reciprocally empathise with each member of her plural-subject group and confirm that each member feels as she does.

Chapter 6: Group Emotion

Today, Britain mourns the loss of Sir Winston Churchill, who in our years of greatest danger became the personification of the will of the British nation and the ultimate symbol of freedom throughout the world.

—Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister of the UK.[1]

On Saturday we stood, shoulder to shoulder, from Westminster to St Paul's, from St Paul's to the Tower of London, along the banks of the Thames, with one mind, united with those millions who quietly watched and listened in their homes – in common sorrow, as the passage of that small, flag-draped coffin through the streets of the capital burnt into the mind a strangely sudden awareness that a great chapter had finally closed.

—Michael Wall (1965), reporting on Winston Churchill's funeral.

Not since the war has there been such a shared emotion.

—Laurie Lee, on the death of Winston Churchill (2016, 21).

On a bitterly cold Saturday morning on 30 January 1965, the people of Britain gathered to pay their respects to their wartime Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill. He was given the rare honour of a state funeral, and had lain in state for three days at Westminster Hall. During this time, more than 321,360 people had filed past his body (Brown 2015). His funeral was a grand and extravagant ceremony, as befit a man who *The Guardian* (1965) described as "the greatest Englishman of his time." Patrick O'Donovan (2013), writing for the *Observer*, described the funeral as a beautiful performance of art, with ritual and ceremony that "obeyed secret rules." Big Ben fell silent after tolling at 9:45am, and an atmosphere of sombre and respectful sobriety fell upon London. The path of the funeral procession was lined with 7000 soldiers bowed over rifles, as well as a great crowd of civilians and uniformed veterans, who watched "with an eloquent and absolute silence," many with tears streaming down their faces (O'Donovan 2013). The shops were closed, football matches rescheduled. The funeral was held at St Paul's Cathedral, itself a symbol of "steely British determination" for having withstood the Nazi bombing during the Blitz (Klein 2015). Nicholas Soames, Churchill's grandson, tells us that when the coffin travelled to Churchill's family burial plot, along the railroad and up the river Thames, people were waiting in the fields and

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[1] Reported in Dodds (2015).

on the riverbanks to give a final salute or to doff their caps (Dodds 2015). The Royal Marine band played a musical salute, the Royal Artillery fired a 19-gun salute, and the Royal Air Force staged a fly-past of jet fighters. The dockworkers at Hays Wharf even arranged, on their own initiative, that the cranes dip in salute for the "man who had summoned back to life the spirit of liberty and hope in a world prostrate and stunned beneath the shock of the Nazi onslaught" (1965, Dodds 2015). By all accounts, it was a well-choreographed and emotional event.

The paradigm of group emotion is exemplified in the case of the sorrow that Britons felt for Churchill. In this example, we see that individuals genuinely grieved for the passing of their leader, who had become a powerful symbol of determination and resistance for the nation, and who had led the nation through a very difficult period of their history. Yet the individuals mourned as a group. Reporters tell us of the strong sense that the sorrow was shared, and that the crowds were united as a single body, focused on Churchill's coffin as it passed by them (Wall 1965, O'Donovan 2013). Despite the numbing cold, people waited patiently to bid farewell to this great man, listening on transistor radios to follow the progression of the funeral procession, which were then turned off as the procession approached. Many individuals expressed their sense of national identity, with veterans donning their old military uniforms, and others wearing black armbands and top hats (Brown 2015, Dodds 2015, O'Donovan 2013). The event allowed individuals to come together, and mourn together for the man whom they respected.

At the same time, we see how the staging of the funeral, and the narrative told about the death of Churchill, played a role in bringing the individuals together. Ritual plays an important role in any funeral, and in this case, the lavishness of the funeral, the grandeur of the military displays, the honour of Churchill being given a state funeral, and the unusual presence of the Queen, conveyed how significant this event was (O'Donovan 2013). The media contributed to the narrative about the importance of the funeral, printing much on the magnanimity of the man and his historical importance for the country. 350 million people were reported to have watched the funeral live on television, garnering more attention than the Kennedy funeral in 1963 (Brown 2015). The parliamentary decisions about how to pay respect to this man, and the media decisions about how to report the death and funeral, shaped the way that individuals understood the event.

In this final chapter, I will argue that group emotion involves both top-down processes and bottom-up processes. A group feels an emotion when individuals not only share a common emotion about a common object, but when the group makes decisions and acts in a manner that exerts pressure on all the group members to respond in a particular fashion. Britons were guided by the State and by the media to focus on Churchill's death, and to respond as a nation to his death. This experience is facilitated and enhanced by the powerful forces of emotional contagion and distributed emotional self-regulation that occur between the individuals, and by their shared sense of commonality. A group emotion, then, occurs when top-down processes encourage group members to unify as a group, and facilitate a particular response from the group members, while at the same time, bottom-up processes lead group members to become reciprocally aware of one another and to mutually orient to an emotion-eliciting object together. The emotion is attributed not to the members but to the group.

In developing this argument, I will first give a brief overview in Section 1 of the different accounts of collective emotion that I have analysed in this thesis, classifying them according to Mikko Salmela's (2012) typology of collective emotion. He argues that there are three types of collective emotion: weak, moderate, and strong collective emotion. This typology is a useful device for showing the connections between the various distinctions I have drawn in this thesis, and will highlight exactly what needs to be established in order for an emotion to be a strongly collective emotion, or what I call group emotion. Briefly, an aggregation of individual emotion is a weakly collective emotion; an aggregation of group-based emotion is a moderately collective emotion; and shared emotion, or group emotion, is a strongly collective emotion.

I then turn to the problem that I pointed to at the end of Chapter 5, concerning how large groups, with members not necessarily in empathic proximity to one another, can feel group emotion. I argued in Chapter 5 that the account of shared emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, because multiple individuals hold a shared emotion together. As such, the shared emotion is not reducible to the emotions of each individual. However, a shared emotion can only be held by small groups, due to the temporal and physical proximity required between individuals in order for them to be mutually aware of, and intentionally focused on, one another. The individuals can only come together and respond with one another to an emotion-eliciting object when they can reciprocally empathise with one another.

In Section 2, I will examine Thomas Szanto's (2015) argument for upscaling shared emotion to what he calls collective emotion. He tries to show that a group in which the members are not together with one another at a particular time and in a physical space can still experience an emotion together when a shared appraisal pattern has been established for the group. I will argue that Szanto's argument for collective emotion misses a crucial aspect of his analysis for shared emotion, namely, the knowledge of how others *actually* feel due to the reciprocal empathy process. As such, I think that Szanto's account of collective emotion fails to meet the Sceptical Challenge and is not an account of group emotion.

In Section 3, I turn to an alternative suggestion for expanding group emotion, Glen Pettigrove and Nigel Parsons' (2012) network conception of collective emotion. In analysing the example of Palestinian shame, they provide an account of collective emotion that does not require Palestinians to be in temporal and physical proximity with one another. Rather, according to their network account, each group member can be connected to the rest of the group through either another member or through some sort of emotional artefact. I argue that although their account allows members to be aware of an ongoing group ethos, that is, the narrative about the group's values, beliefs, norms, and so on, it is not an account of group emotion. Rather, theirs is an account of widely held group-based emotion.

Finally, in Section 4, I argue for a conception of group emotion that can be applied to some large groups. I will extend the account of shared emotion to groups of individuals that are larger than two or three members, and in which the members are not physically near to all other members and may be unknown to many other members. I do so by adapting Pettigrove and Parsons' network conception of collective emotions, to allow that members can be in indirect contact with one another and still share an emotion. However, when I extend my account in this way, I will not be able to establish that we can attribute a group emotion to a group whose members have neither direct nor indirect physical contact with one another. Ultimately, I will argue that a group emotion can only be experienced when group members are in physical proximity to at least one other member, and all members are connected to one another transitively. This is because emotions are embodied experiences, as I argued in Chapter 1, and as such, the group members need to share the non-cognitive feeling of emotion with one another, as a group, as well as the cognitive appraisal of an emotion.

1 Salmela's typology of collective emotion

In this thesis, I have analysed eight different accounts of collective emotion, each of which argues for a particular way that emotions can be attributed to, or be connected to, a group. In Chapter 1, I described the aggregative account of collective emotion that the sceptic about group emotion could accept, according to which a group emotion is simply a summation of individual emotions. In Chapter 2, I analysed the notion of group-based emotion, as discussed in the social psychology literature. In Chapter 3, I looked at two accounts of collective emotion developed by Margaret Gilbert, membership emotion and plural-subject emotion. In Chapter 4, I considered three ways an emotion's intentionality can be shared, which lead to three ways to share an emotion: emotional contagion, feeling-together, and phenomenologically fused emotion. In Chapter 5, I critically developed the phenomenological account of shared emotion by means of reciprocal empathy. With the exception of the account of shared emotion, each account of collective emotion fails to meet the Sceptical Challenge. Only shared emotion is experienced by multiple individuals together, as a group, in a way that means the shared emotion is not reducible to the emotions of the individuals in the group.

Salmela offers a typology of collective emotion, which establishes how each account compares with the others, and how each account is, in some way, collective (2012, 39-44).[2] Salmela argues that emotions can be shared weakly, in that individuals have the same emotion but as individuals; emotions can be shared moderately, when individuals recognise that they are group members; or emotions can be shared strongly, when individuals feel emotions together as a group. He adapts Raimo Tuomela's distinctions between the different ways that concerns can be collective, and as such, argues that weakly shared emotions are I-mode emotions; moderately shared emotions are I-mode collective emotions; and strongly shared emotions are we-mode collective emotions.[3] This typology clarifies why only shared emotions meet the Sceptical Challenge, because only shared emotions are held by multiple individuals in the we-mode, as a single group.

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[2] Salmela speaks of shared emotions rather than collective emotions, but I have changed his terminology for clarity's sake. I think he takes the terms to be, by and large, synonymous. In his chapter on emotional solidarity, he talks of collective emotions, which he defines as "collectively intentional shared emotions"(Salmela 2014a, 68). In his chapter on the function of collective emotion, he indicates that he now prefers the term "collective emotion" as "shared emotion" is ambiguous (Salmela 2014b, 159 n1).

[3] See Tuomela's work on I-mode and we-mode collective intentionality (2006, 2007).

1.1 Weak collective emotion

Weakly collective emotions are simply individual emotions that individuals have in common, due to widespread concerns that individuals share (Salmela 2012, 43). We can say that parents love their children, for example, because typically, individual parents tend to be concerned with their offspring. The collectivity of these emotions is *aggregative*. The individuals have an emotion in common, due either to shared feeling arising from emotional contagion or affective alignment, or due to shared concerns because the individuals' private concerns overlap. This type of emotion is an I-mode emotion, for the individuals feel their emotions as individuals (Salmela 2012, 39-40, 2014a, 65-66).

Salmela defines weakly collective emotions as having two features: a common but personal appraisal, and shared affect (2012, 43). Adopting Tuomela's notion of I-mode concerns, he argues that individuals have many common concerns that will give rise to the individuals appraising an object in the same way. He gives the examples of our concerns for security, happiness, health, sympathy for the poor, and so on, which are general and perhaps even universal. A common concern makes the emotion common, but not yet collective (Salmela 2012, 39-40). What makes the emotion collective (weakly), for Salmela, is that the emotions are in some way synchronised as well, in order to produce a shared feeling between individuals. He wants to ensure that both the cognitive and non-cognitive components of emotion are common, such that it is not simply an attitude or a physiological experience that is the same between individuals (Salmela 2012, 41-42). A common concern determines that the feeling is intentionally directed in the same way for each individual, so that the shared feeling can become an emotion that is the same in each individual.

We see that on this typology, cases of shared feeling due to emotional contagion, such as when a convivial mood is felt at a local festival, would be weakly collective, for the individuals all feel the same way, and take themselves to be concerned with enjoying the festival. Salmela includes cases of affective alignment, or emotional entrainment, when the behavioural synchrony of emotional expression brings about synchronous emotions. He also includes feeling-together. Feeling-together occurs when individuals recognise that they have an emotion in common with one another, and so feel some affinity with one another. In these three cases, the emotion is collective in an

aggregative way.[4] The individuals feel individual emotions—the feeling that they have, and what they are concerned with, coincides with how others feel, but they feel these emotions as individuals. Groups may emerge from this weak collective emotion. For example, self-help groups and support groups are made up of members with common concerns, who would appraise particular objects in the same way (Salmela 2012, 40).

Interestingly, Salmela includes phenomenologically fused emotion in this category of collective emotion (2012, 43). Phenomenologically fused emotion, as I explained in Chapter 4, is an emotion that the individual experiences as shared with those in her group. She thinks of her subjectivity as including others, and so feels an emotion that she takes to belong to them all. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2009) tried to argue that fused emotion is shared emotion; however, as I objected, the individual's experience of fused subjectivity does not mean that others feel as she does. Although I argue that the individual may feel fused emotion by herself, I disagree with Salmela's categorisation of fused emotion as weakly collective. I think that in fused feeling, the individual's concerns are broader than her own private concerns, and as such, she is thinking of herself as a group member. I would therefore argue that fused emotions are moderately collective.

Weakly collective emotions, then, are ontologically, physically, and epistemologically individual emotions, with individual subjects (making them I-mode emotions). The emotions are felt in the individuals' bodies, experienced in their individual minds, and are formed by the individual in her own capacity. The collectivity of the emotion emerges from the commonality of the emotion, and groups may form because the individuals have emotions in common with one another. On this account we have collective I-mode emotions that are reducible to the individual emotions of the individuals in the group, and so cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge. Weakly collective emotions are not attributed to groups as groups, but to individuals.

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[4] In Chapter 4, I argued that we can think of feeling-together as akin to group-based emotion, but this is because the individuals unify as a group by recognising that they have an emotion in common with one another. Salmela determines that feeling-together is weaker than group-based emotion, because the feeling arises in the individuals independently of one another. I think that this is right. Feeling-together becomes group-based emotion when the individuals recognise that their emotions arise because of their common membership of a particular social category. The parents, in Scheler's example, become a group by virtue of feeling-together, and their grief becomes parental grief that they have in common with one another.

1.2 Moderate collective emotion

Moderately collective emotions, on Salmela's typology, are those in which individuals share concerns, according to their membership of a particular group (2012, 43). As with weakly shared emotion, Salmela thinks that the individuals must experience shared feeling as well. The emotions on this account are I-mode collective emotions, distinguished from collective I-mode emotions (weakly collective emotions). On this account, the concerns are collective because the individuals take on the concerns of their group, but they hold these concerns as individual group members rather than *with* other group members (Salmela 2012, 40, 2014a, 66). As Salmela explains, individuals commit to these groups for personal reasons, and so commit to these concerns privately, but their concerns are for the interests of the group, not for themselves as individuals. The example that Salmela gives is of religious groups. The Christian woman may be committed to being a good Christian and so sees herself as representing her faith in her interactions with others, but she commits to her faith for personal reasons and as an individual (Salmela 2012, 40). She takes on the concerns of her group as her own.

The social psychological account of group-based emotion, and the philosophical articulation of group-based emotion as membership emotion (by Gilbert (1997, 2002)) or fused feeling (by Schmid (2009)), is classified as moderately collective emotion.[5] The individual self-categorises as a member of her group, and appeals to the values, beliefs, and so on that make up the ethos of her group when she responds as a group member. This leads her to feel an emotion as a group member, but she may not feel the same group-based emotion as other group members. She may not *share* her emotion with others, but she may recognise that she feels a group-based emotion in *common* with other group-members such that they coincide in their emotions. The emotion is in the I-mode, as the individual feels the emotion as an individual, but the collectivity of the emotion is moderate because the concerns are the group's concerns rather than the individual's concerns. Thus, by this account we have "I-mode collective emotions" (in contrast to "collective I-mode emotions" of weakly collective emotions of section 1.1). If we think back to the distinction made by social psychologists as articulated in Chapter 2, the group-based emotion is a group-level emotion, because it reflects what is of concern to the group.

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[5] Mackie and Smith (2002), Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008), Maitner, Smith, and Mackie (2016), Ray, Mackie, and Smith (2014), Smith and Mackie (2015, 2008), Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007), Gilbert (2002, 1997), Schmid (2009)

What Salmela does not explain is whether or not a group-based emotion is collective when it is felt by one group member, rather than by many group members. Salmela argues that shared affect is an important aspect of collective emotion, and so for each type of collective emotion, he points to the processes of contagion and affective alignment that bring about shared affect (2012, 42, 2014b, 171). I think he would argue that a group-based emotion is not collective when it is not widely held by the group members. He tells us that, "[s]hared group membership, when salient to group members, reinforces the synchronization processes, adding to the intensity of the shared affective experience" (Salmela 2012, 43, see also Salmela 2014b, 167, Salmela and Nagatsu 2016, 40). Given this view, group-based emotion only becomes collective when many members feel the emotion, and the *aggregation* of these group-based emotions can be attributed to the group as the group's emotion.[6]

Contra Schmid, I think that group-based emotion is collective not only when held by many individuals, but also in virtue of its nature as a group-level emotion. The single member of a group who feels group-based emotion is not experiencing a group emotion. Rather, she is experiencing an emotion that she thinks is appropriate for the group, which means that, as a group member, she has taken on the group's concerns as her own. She feels a group-level emotion, as a group member, but she does not feel what other group members feel. This shows that the notion of collective emotion comes apart from the notion of group emotion. This is because there are two senses of "collective" at play: a group-based emotion is collective because it is group-level, and it may be collective in an aggregative way when it is widely felt within the group. A group-based emotion may be collective in only the first sense when a group member feels a group-based emotion but other group members feel differently. A group-based emotion may also be collective in both senses, when a group-based emotion is widely held within the group. A group-based emotion is a moderately collective emotion if it collective in one or both senses. Given this, I also categorise fused feeling as a moderately collective emotion. Fused feeling may not be common (or shared) between group members, but it does reflect that the individual is responding as a member of her group, at the group level.

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[6] See also Gavin Brent Sullivan (2014a, 2015), who also thinks that a collective emotion requires "coordinated" feelings. This is how he distinguishes collective emotion from group-based emotion. For Christian von Scheve (2012), group-based emotions are not collective, as they are formed by processes of self-categorisation or identification, rather than via some sort of collective (affective) intentionality. That is, group-based emotion lacks a sense of "togetherness."

Moderately collective emotions, then, are ontologically, physically, and epistemologically individual. However, this type of collective emotion challenges the view that emotions are epistemically subjective, and thus is somewhat of a challenge to the thesis of epistemic individualism of emotion. As discussed in Chapter 1, Cheshire Calhoun (2004) distinguishes *biographical subjectivity* of an emotion from *epistemic subjectivity* of an emotion. Epistemic subjectivity concerns the way the individual perceives and appraises her situation, and how she determines what is of significance in a given context (Calhoun 2004, 107-110). Calhoun challenges the idea that the biographical subjectivity of emotion (that an emotion develops according to the individual's particular history and context) means that an emotion is necessarily epistemically subjective.[7] She argues that emotions may plausibly be epistemically objective, as individuals may be guided by a conceptual framework which they share with others, and may appraise the world according to the shared values, concerns, beliefs, and so on, of a particular group (Calhoun 2004, 110-113).[8] The examples she offers are of public frameworks, which are shared by members of the relevant group, despite each member having a unique point of view. The scientific and artistic point of view, she argues, is a public framework that guides how scientists or artists perceive what is of significance in the world (Calhoun 2004, 114-115). A scientist will be concerned with what is of relevance to her discipline, and the artist with what is important to her field. They would each share this framework with their fellow members, and would be able to share an evaluative stance to a particular object given their shared disciplinary ethos. This makes the framework epistemically objective, for it indicates what is of value to that group and not just the individual. Importantly, Calhoun thinks that an individual can bracket out a personal framework in order to take up the public (shared) framework. The surgeon who is called in to operate on a child, for example, can put aside her feelings of empathy, and adopt a surgical attitude about the

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[7] Calhoun would be a sceptic about group emotion, as she argues that emotions are personal (2004, 110). Although she thinks that emotions are not necessarily epistemically subjective, she thinks that the biographical subjectivity of emotion means that the individual appraises the world according to her concerns. The public framework that guides the individual gives epistemic weight to what she perceives as significant, allowing her to think that she gains knowledge about what is of value to her when she responds emotionally. I am thus appropriating and extending Calhoun's argument in a way that she may not endorse. I think that when an individual's emotion is guided by a public framework, her emotion may become a group-level emotion, because she may respond according to what is of value to her group and not simply herself.

[8] The notion of a conceptual framework sounds much like Ronald de Sousa's (1987) notion of a paradigm scenario.

medical tasks she needs to perform to achieve her goal. She could feel professional pride at a successful surgery, rather than guilt for having caused pain to a child.

A public framework such as the one that Calhoun describes may be what guides an individual's group-based emotion. In certain groups, especially those that have a public narrative in place about the beliefs and values of the group, the group's concerns could constitute such a framework. For example, a feminist is likely to be guided by feminist beliefs and commitments in her group-based emotions about issues relevant to women. The feminist framework will guide how the individual feminist perceives what is of salience in a situation, and give rise to her group-based emotion. The individual who regards herself as a group member may adopt such a public framework, which is why she is emotionally focused on what is of concern to her group and not simply herself. This is why she takes herself to be a representative of the group—she is appealing to concerns that she thinks her entire group share, and so she thinks she is feeling the emotion that her group would feel. I think that even in those cases where the individual group member recognises that her group does not feel as she does, she still takes her group-based emotion to be what the group should feel. For example, the Australian who feels shame about the country's asylum seeker policies can think that her group members are failing to respond appropriately, given the values and beliefs that the nation publically espouses.

Nevertheless, although group-based emotion may not be epistemically subjective, it remains an I-mode emotion. It is experienced by the individual as a group member, not by the group as a group. As such, it cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge, for the group would only be attributed with an aggregation of the members' group-based emotions if the emotion were widely held. If a group-based emotion is widely held, it does not yet mean that the group members feel that emotion together, as a group. The group-based emotion is reducible to the individual emotion. In order for the group-based emotion to be the group's emotion, the group members need to experience the group-based emotion in the we-mode.

1.3 Strong collective emotion

Strongly collective emotions, on Salmela's typology, are we-mode emotions, in which the individuals have constituted a group that is the subject of the emotion together.[9] As Salmela outlines a we-mode emotion, the individuals within the group have adopted a shared perspective, and have appraised the emotion-eliciting object from that shared perspective according to the concerns of the group (2012, 40-43, 2014b, 173-174, 2014a, 66). As with the other types of collective emotion, the feeling of emotion is shared via emotional contagion and affective alignment.[10] The individuals constitute the subject of the emotion together, and respond together, and so attribute the emotion to the group, not to the individuals within the group. The notion of a we-mode emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, for although the group members each feel the we-mode emotion, the we-mode emotion is not reducible to the emotions of the individual group members. This is because the group members experience the we-mode emotion *together*, as I explain below.

Two conceptions of collective emotion that I have examined may possibly be a we-mode emotion: the notion of plural-subject emotion articulated by Gilbert (1997, 2002), and the notion of shared emotion that I discussed in Chapter 5.[11] The former is a top-down model of collective emotion, in which the plural-subject emotion is attributed to the group. The group members, by virtue of their membership of the group, are under an obligation to behave in such a way that the group enacts or manifests the plural-subject emotion. The latter is a bottom-up model of collective emotion, in which the emotion is shared by the group members together. What these two conceptions of collective emotion have in common is that the subject of the collective emotion is a plural-subject (a "we"), and is not reducible to the emotions of the group members. As such, strongly collective emotions are collective in a *non-aggregative* way.

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[9] I do not discuss Tuomela's account of collective intentionality, but he argues that to have an intention in the we-mode means that the group members have formed a commitment to that intention, and the intention gives them a reason to act so as to bring about the intention. An individual's intention is a collective intention if and only if it is the collective intention of every other group member (Tuomela 2007, 18-20, 26). Tuomela's account has much in common with Gilbert's (2006) account of collective intentionality, which I discussed in Chapter 3. She argues that individuals can form joint commitments to a joint intention, which determines the actions that they take as individuals to bring about that joint intention.

[10] See also von Scheve and Ismer (2013, 410), who think that collective emotions involve both shared appraisal structures and emotional convergence (i.e.: shared feeling).

[11] See León and Zahavi (2016), Stein (1989), Szanto (2015), Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015), Zahavi and Rochat (2015).

Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion is a normative one, in which the group members form a joint commitment to hold an emotion together as a group. As I argued in Chapter 3, this account fails to be an account of collective emotion, and is instead an account of a feeling-rule. Gilbert argues that a group can commit to holding a plural-subject emotion, but that this plural-subject emotion does not need to be experienced by the group members. The group members are only obligated, by their commitment to the group, to behave *as if* they felt the emotion. Since some of the group members may be ignorant of the group's decision to commit to a particular emotion, they would not know they are acting in a way that manifests the plural-subject emotion. For example, the Australian citizens who contribute financially to the remunerations to Aboriginal Australians may not be aware that their payments are an expression of Australian guilt for oppressive policies that have harmed the Indigenous population. As such, I do not regard Gilbert's notion of plural-subject emotion as a collective emotion. Salmela would agree with me, as he objects to her argument on the same grounds, and additionally, argues that the group members must share the feeling of a collective emotion (2012, 35-36).

We thus have only one account of collective emotion that is a we-mode emotion, which is the model of shared emotion by the process of reciprocal empathy. As I argued in Chapter 5, a shared emotion is a single emotion felt by multiple individuals when they have entered into a relation of reciprocal empathy. Reciprocal empathy allows the individual to know how the other individual perceives the world, and to adopt a shared perspective on the world with the other. The shared perspective means that the individuals appraise the emotion-eliciting object together, according to the concerns that they share. The individuals become unified as a group, for by reciprocally empathising, they not only perceive the object of their shared emotion together, they remain intentionally focused on one another so that they can remain aware of how the other feels. This allows the individuals to mutually self-regulate their emotion, so that the shared emotion is an emotion that is implicitly negotiated between the individuals. The shared emotion is not reducible to the individual emotions of the group members, because it is an experience that depends on the group members coming together to perceive the world in the we-mode.

On this account, the shared emotion is felt by the group members, and as such remains physically individual, and ontologically individual. However, the reciprocal relation between the group members means that the shared emotion is not subjectively

individual. The subject of the shared emotion is not the individual but the group, which means that the individuals together constitute the bearer of the emotion. The individual cannot feel the shared emotion alone, for she experiences shared emotion only once she empathises with another and the other empathises with her in turn. The reciprocal relationship between the individual and the other is a crucial aspect, for it changes the emotion from an I-mode emotion to a we-mode emotion. The individual experiences the shared emotion *with* others. As such, a shared emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge, given that it is irreducible and held by many individuals together as a group.

A strongly collective emotion, then, is an emotion that is held by group members *as a group*, when they feel a we-mode emotion together due to a shared perspective and shared concerns. The difference, then, between group and individual emotions is not a difference in feeling, but a difference in structural relations between the individuals. It is because of these external structural features that a group emotion cannot be reduced to what the individual group members feel. The individuals feel the emotion with other members of a group, for they experience the emotion as belonging to both themselves and the group together. That is, the plural-subject group, the "we," feels the shared emotion. The account of group emotion that I am aiming to articulate in this thesis is a strongly collective we-mode emotion. It is an emotion felt by many individuals that belong to the same group. The conception of shared emotion can give us an account of group emotion. However, as I argue in the next section, shared emotion can only be experienced by small groups and so does not yet provide an adequate explanation of the way large groups appear to feel an emotion as a group.

2 Upscaling group emotion

It is tempting to argue that a shared emotion captures precisely the phenomenon of group emotion. When a few individuals share an emotion, there is a single emotion that they each feel, which is properly attributed to a plural-subject group. The group, then, is defined as the cluster of individuals who share the emotion. By feeling a shared emotion together, the group members' shared emotion constitutes a group emotion. If this is the case, a bottom-up approach to group emotion is all that is needed to develop an account of group emotion—a group emotion is simply a shared emotion, and is constituted by the individuals within the group together. However, this account cannot adequately explain how we might attribute a group emotion to a large group. There are two problems: the members in large groups cannot be in close proximity to all other

members; and for groups that are not defined or unified by the sharing of emotion, not all members will necessarily share the emotion. In this section, I analyse Szanto's (2015) model of collective emotion, which attempts to address these two problems. I will argue, however, that he fails to give an account of a we-mode group emotion, because he does not show that the group members feel the collective emotion together.

The first problem with the account of shared emotion is that individuals need to be in physical and temporal proximity to one another, which means that large groups cannot share an emotion. The proximity requirement for shared emotion is important for several reasons: 1) it facilitates the sharing of the feeling of emotion via emotional contagion and affective alignment; 2) it allows each member to be mutually aware of every other member; 3) it allows each member to know what the other members are feeling (through empathy); and 4) it establishes reciprocal relations between the members so that a shared perspective can be adopted. Every member feels the same emotion, and participates in regulating and shaping the expression of the shared emotion. Larger groups, however, have members that cannot be in proximity to one another, and each member may not know every other member in the group. If we think of sport fans in a stadium, the individual sport fan is only in close proximity to the fans around her, and most of the fans will be unknown to her. She cannot share an emotion by empathising with each of the other fans in the stadium. She also cannot share an emotion with the fans watching the game on television at home or in sports bars.

The second problem is that, for groups that exist prior to an emotion being shared, not all members will necessarily share the emotion. The account of shared emotion does not explain how we can attribute an emotion to a group when the group members do not all feel the shared emotion. To be clear, a shared emotion is attributed to those individuals that share the emotion, and the group is thus defined by the shared emotion. However, we cannot yet extend this attribution to other individuals. The spectators at a soccer game may share exultation at a winning goal, which means that the group that is the subject of that shared emotion consists of the spectators at the game. It does not include other team supporters who are not present at the match, nor those spectators who feel differently about the goal. How, then, can we say that a group such as a nation, with many anonymous and heteronomous members, share a group emotion?

One way to upscale the model of shared emotion so that larger groups can be attributed with a group emotion would be to supplement the bottom-up model of shared emotion with a top-down process that facilitates the attribution of that shared emotion to

other members of the group. As Sigal Barsade and Donald Gibson (1998) argue, there are two approaches to developing an account of group emotion that show the dynamic between the group and the individual. There is the top-down approach, in which a group emotion is seen as moving from the group level to the individual level, such that the individual takes on the group's emotion. Alternatively, there is the bottom-up approach, in which the group members constitute the group's emotion (Barsade and Gibson 1998, 81). They argue that for both of these approaches, the extant accounts are incomplete. Instead of favouring one approach or the other, they propose that we think of group emotion as involving both top-down and bottom-up processes (Barsade and Gibson 1998, 98). Szanto adopts this strategy in his argument for upscaling shared emotion to what he calls collective emotion.

Szanto distinguishes a shared emotion from a collective emotion (Szanto 2015, 511-513). He argues that a shared emotion is a short-lived experience for it must be felt by individuals together and exists only as long as the individuals are collectively focused in the same way on the same object. I have also argued that the we-mode shared emotion is limited to small groups because the individuals need to be in physical proximity in order to share the feeling of the emotion and to establish reciprocal relations between them. A collective emotion, on Szanto's account, is experienced when a narrative for the group is established, which directs the group members' emotional experiences when responding to particular objects. He develops his account of collective emotion from Stein's account of shared emotion, and argues that the group members can create a narrative about the significance of this shared emotion for the group.[12] By creating a narrative about the shared emotion, and incorporating it into a narrative about the group, the group members create a *shared appraisal pattern* that members can appeal to for guidance in their future responses. Szanto thinks that this shared appraisal pattern means that group members do not need do be in physical or temporal proximity to one another in order to share an emotion. The members can know how the other members feel (or would feel) by appealing to the narrative and its established appraisal pattern, rather than by empathising with each other. The narrative, then, allows members to feel an emotion in the we-mode. I will object to this argument. The shared appraisal pattern is something like what Calhoun calls a public framework,

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[12] Szanto claims that a collective emotion is not necessarily grounded in a shared emotion, but he does not develop an account of collective emotion where this is the case. The account that he gives is based on the account of shared emotion (Szanto 2015, 511).

and as such, I think the group members feel an I-mode group-based emotion when they appeal to the narrative.

Szanto explains his argument with an example of a family emotion that is shared and then becomes collective. Two parents go to watch their daughter at an important college basketball game (Szanto 2015, 511-512). At the game, the parents share an emotion of joy. They are each empathically aware of how the other parent feels, and they mutually regulate one another's expressions of the shared emotion. As such, both parents are focused on their daughter's game, and on one another. In feeling shared joy, the parents understand the emotional significance of this specific event. Their joy indicates that they are enjoying the game and that they think their daughter is a good athlete. This shared emotion predisposes the parents to creating an emotional norm, that is, that the emotional significance of the game means that they should express their joy in a particular way. By mutually regulating one another's expression of joy, each parent exerts normative pressure on the other to cheer and clap, for example, rather than yawning and checking her phone. The parents become obligated to one another to behave in a particular way.

The parents can then change the shared emotion into a collective emotion by creating a narrative about the event, in which they convey the emotional significance of the game and their daughter's performance. This creates a shared appraisal pattern and the daughter and other family members will be given this narrative, which will guide how they respond to this and other similar events. The narrative attributes the shared emotion to the family, and other family members can be included in the subject of that familial joy, even if they were not present at the event that triggered the joy. The absent brother, for example, can belatedly share the familial joy when he hears about the game later, including himself in the plural-subject of the emotion after the game.[13] The morose sister who is an unwilling spectator at the game is also included in the plural-subject of the familial joy, and her parents will rebuke her for not feeling or at least expressing (that is, acting as if she felt) joy about her sister's performance. At future events, family members who attend similar events will be able to appeal to this narrative in order to determine how their family feels about such events, and will know how the family feels without reciprocally empathising with one another. Should one of

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[13] I am extending Szanto's example when I speak of the brother and sister, but I do not think I am changing his account.

the parents be unable to attend the next game, for example, the other parent could still experience familial joy, because she knows that the other parent would feel as she does.

Szanto's argument, then, is that the narrative allows for the plural-subject group of the shared emotion to extend to members who are not physically present at the time when the shared emotion is felt (2015, 513). The shared emotion is a we-mode emotion because the individuals are reciprocally aware of how the other feels. This knowledge of how other group members feel is then encoded into the narrative as a shared appraisal pattern. The narrative indicates the way the group construes the event and the significance that the group assigns to that event. Group members can then appeal to this narrative and know how their fellow group members feel about particular events, according to Szanto. This means that members who are not in physical and temporal proximity to one another can, by appealing to the narrative, feel a we-mode emotion without entering into the reciprocally empathic relationship with other group members that is available to those in physical and temporal proximity. They simply adopt the shared appraisal pattern of the group.

This argument raises many questions, and I have a number of worries about the role of narrative in particular. Which group members have standing to create a narrative? What if group members create competing narratives about the same sort of event? Who can legitimately be included in the plural-subject group when a narrative about the shared emotion is created? When the parents attribute their shared joy to the family, we can question who may be legitimately included in the family group, and whether the parents have sufficient authority to be representatives of their family group. Can they attribute the shared emotion to the immediate family, or also to the extended family? On what grounds can the morose sister contest her inclusion in the subject of the familial emotion? Szanto does not address all of these issues. He does, however, address some of these worries when he discusses who can be included in the subject of a collective emotion, and it quickly becomes apparent that he is quite liberal about the (lack of) restrictions for his account of collective emotion. Szanto wants to show that we can attribute a collective emotion to a group whose members are not physically and temporally together when a collective emotion is elicited. He ultimately argues that the subject of a collective emotion includes all members of the group, including, as we will see, the deceased and the unborn (Szanto 2015, 513). I will focus on the premise of Szanto's argument that a we-mode emotion can be encoded into a narrative, which

allows members to share an emotion with every member of a group that existed or will exist.

Szanto's notion of collective emotion is similar in some respects to Gilbert's conception of plural-subject emotion. Gilbert (1997, 2002) argues that individuals who are jointly committed to one another can be jointly committed to a plural-subject emotion. The plural-subject emotion is attributed to the group, and as such, each group member is under an obligation to behave as if they feel that emotion. The plural-subject emotion is attributed to all members of the group, including those who are ignorant about the commitment to the emotion, and those who are unwilling members of the group. On Szanto's account of collective emotion, the implicit premise of his argument is that the narrative indicates who is included in the group. All group members are attributed with the collective emotion by virtue of their inclusion in the group in the narrative, even if they were not present when other group members felt the shared emotion that gives rise to the collective emotion. The narrative allows each group member to feel the emotion in the we-mode, even if she is not with the others. On Gilbert's account, she argues that large groups can hold a plural-subject emotion because all of the members, by virtue of a joint commitment, are part of the subject of the group's emotion. On Szanto's account, large groups can hold a collective emotion because the members, by virtue of the group's narrative, are included in the subject of the group's emotion. The narrative, for Szanto, defines the group, and as such, allows that a shared emotion can be attributed to a group that is larger than the cluster of individuals who actually share the emotion.

The narrative plays an important but understated role in Szanto's argument, for it defines the subject of the collective emotion. We see the extent of the narrative's role when we look at which groups Szanto thinks can be attributed with a collective emotion. In the case of the family, the narrative extends the familial joy to members who are not present at the game, and to members who do not feel the familial joy. The narrative connects these members with one another when they respond to the event, allowing them, Szanto thinks, to experience the emotion in the we-mode. What I infer from Szanto's argument is that he thinks that the narrative keeps the we-mode structure of the shared emotion intact. By appealing to the narrative, the group member feels an emotion that is doubly intentional, for she is intentionally focused on both the object of the collective emotion and the other group members. For some unstated reason, Szanto thinks that the narrative allows the individual to be intentionally focused on her fellow

group members, despite not empathising with them. She becomes oriented to the world, not merely as a group member (as in the case of group-based emotion), but as part of a group with a shared perspective and with a common concern. She is still, by virtue of the shared appraisal pattern encoded in the narrative, in a reciprocal relation with her group that allows for mutual awareness. Szanto concludes that the members of a group have a collective emotion when they have a shared appraisal pattern and when they are mutually aware "in a direct perception-based or mediate manner (e.g., via technology, or cultural artefacts) of such shared appraisal patterns" (2015, 511).

Szanto takes this argument and runs with it. His account of collective emotion is not constrained by whether or not the group members are in physical or temporal proximity to one another, and so he argues that we can include both deceased and potential future members in the subject of the collective emotion (Szanto 2015, 513-514). The subject of the collective emotion is the group, which can exist for many generations, and can continue to exist when there are no members in the group. A group can include members who all exist at the same time who do not know one another, and can include members who exist at different times and do not know one another. The collective joy of Liverpool football fans, for example, is shared not only with those who record the game to watch at a later stage, but also those members who supported the team previously in history and who are now deceased, and future fans who may not yet be born. The plural-subject group does not require that every member of the group exists at the time of the event that is the object of the emotion. What it requires is that those members share the appraisal pattern that establishes a relation between the individuals. Szanto cites Stein on collective grief:

> Certainly, I, the individual ego, am filled up with grief [over the loss of our member]. But I feel myself not alone with it. Rather, I feel our grief. The experience is essentially coloured by the fact that others are partaking in it, or better, by the fact that I am partaking in it only as a member of a community. We are affected by the loss, and we grieve over it. And this "we" encompasses not only those who feel the grief as I do, but all those who are included in the group; even those who perhaps do not know of the event, and even the members of the group who live earlier or will live later. (2015, 514)

The argument is not that, in feeling a collective emotion about a particular event, the group is said to feel that emotion for all time. The group does not grieve for the loss of their member before the event, and after a sufficient mourning period, the group may no longer grieve. Rather, the argument is that in attributing the collective emotion to the

group, the subject of that collective emotion includes all the members of the group. For Szanto, a member is not excluded from the subject of the emotion because she is not physically or temporally in contact with her fellow group members at the occurrence of the event. By extension, her own lack of existence at the time of the event does not exclude her from the subject of the group either. If we think back to the familial joy about the daughter's basketball game, Szanto thinks that the subject of this collective joy will include existing family members, deceased family members, and unborn family members, insofar as those family members did or will share the appraisal pattern about what elicits joy for the family. The father may feel familial pride with his deceased mother, for example, because the father may think that his mother would feel familial pride if she were with him, given that they share a concern that family members achieve success.

Szanto challenges our intuitions further, arguing that a collective emotion can be attributed to a group even when the group currently has no members. These groups are "(occurrently) empty-set experiential groups" which have a long multi-generational history (Szanto 2015, 514). This group may have no members at a particular moment, but by virtue of the narrative, can continue to exist as a group and be attributed with a collective emotion. We can think of a political group that is defined by its (emotional) opposition to government intervention, and so can be attributed with collective anger about gun control laws, despite there being no members in that group at a particular time. Other examples include ethnic groups with an identity that references the grievance it has with other groups, which can endure for centuries. These groups may have no members that feel the collective emotion, or even no members at all, but the group is still attributed with that collective emotion which defines it as a group.

The non-cognitive component of emotion is not shared on Szanto's view, and he does not sufficiently account for the way the feeling of an emotion can be shared. As I argued in Chapter 1, an emotion is an embodied appraisal, and involves both cognitive and non-cognitive components. It is experienced as a bodily feeling. Szanto ignores the embodied aspect of emotion, which lets him argue for a model of collective emotion that is attributed to groups that include deceased and unborn group members who cannot feel an emotion, as well as groups with no members to feel the emotion. For Szanto, I think, an emotion is essentially an appraisal, not an *embodied* appraisal. Szanto's notion of collective emotion thus has a further similarity with Gilbert's notion

of plural-subject emotion—like plural-subject emotion, the group members attributed with collective emotion may not necessarily *feel* the collective emotion.

Szanto thinks that the narrative about the shared appraisal pattern connects the group members with one another, allowing them to feel a we-mode emotion without reciprocally empathising with one another. As such, members who are physically and temporally distant from one another can still share a collective emotion, because they each share the appraisal pattern given to them by the group's narrative. The father who feels familial pride with his deceased mother about his daughter's success does not share a feeling, but, Szanto thinks, is still intentionally focused on his mother and on the success of his daughter. He knows his mother would be proud, and by thinking of her while responding, Szanto thinks that the father's emotion is a doubly intentional, we-mode emotion. However, I do not think that the appeal to the narrative creates a reciprocal relation between group members, and as such, I do not think the group member is actually experiencing a doubly intentional we-mode emotion.

The comparison to Gilbert's account brings out the problem with Szanto's notion of collective emotion. In Chapter 3, I detailed how Gilbert (2006) upscales her account of plural-subject groups from small groups to large groups, and how in both groups, the members are obligated to carry out the group's intentions. As Francesca Raimondi argues, when Gilbert does so, she loses a crucial aspect of her initial argument, what Ann Cudd calls the willed-unity condition (Raimondi 2008, 293-295, Cudd 2006, 39). For small groups, the group members constitute a plural-subject group because they form a joint commitment to one another, and as such, are obligated to carry out the group's intentions. But for larger groups, members constitute a plural-subject group by virtue of certain practices, rather than by a joint commitment, and despite what Gilbert thinks, are not obligated to carry out the group's intentions. Gilbert loses the essential normativity of her theory of joint commitment for large groups.

Szanto similarly loses a crucial feature of his account of shared emotion when he upscales it to give an account of collective emotion. He fails to keep on board the premise that the shared emotion is actually experienced together with other group members, and that reciprocal empathy allows the group members to know what the other members feel. The reciprocal relations between the group members is what makes a shared emotion a we-mode emotion, because the reciprocal relations allow the group members to empathically know what the others feel, and to adopt a shared first person plural perspective (a we-perspective) together. A narrative can then be told about the

group and the shared emotion, which conveys the shared appraisal pattern that emerges from that shared emotion. This narrative, however, does not ensure that group members remain in the we-mode, and that the emotions experienced by the group members are we-mode emotions. As Deborah Tollefsen and Shaun Gallagher argue, a narrative can create a stable identity for a group, and each member can be aware of this narrative, but the narrative does not itself contain the first person plural perspective (2017, 106-108). It is a record of the beliefs, emotions, values, and so on that are shared by the group members, but when the group members appeal to the narrative to guide their responses, they are not given access to the emotions of their fellow group members. We can think of the shared appraisal pattern as something like the public framework of the group that Calhoun talks about. The narrative may indicate what the group is concerned with, and guide the group member's reaction when she self-categorises as a group member. That is, the narrative allows the individual to respond as a group member, but not with the group. She responds with a group-based emotion rather than a shared (or collective) emotion, which means that she feels an I-mode collective emotion, and not a we-mode collective emotion.

The problem, then, is that much like Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion, Szanto's account of collective emotion is not an account of a group that actually feels an emotion. Gilbert gives an account of a feeling-rule; Szanto gives an account of a narrative that provides a public framework about how to appraise objects.[14] In order to upscale the notion of shared emotion to a collective emotion, Szanto attempts to provide a possible top-down process that can include other group members in the subject of the we-mode emotion, such that we can attribute a we-mode emotion to the whole group. In doing so, he substitutes the process that allows for a we-mode emotion to be experienced (reciprocal empathy) for a narrative that group members can share. This narrative does not, contra Schmid, enable reciprocal relations between individuals, such that the group members can experience a we-mode emotion together. Rather, it allows that the group members can think about what the group is concerned with, and respond

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[14] Szanto's account of collective emotion is a normative one, but he distinguishes his account from Gilbert's normative account of collective emotion. He tells us that for Gilbert, normativity plays a constitutive role for plural-subject emotion, but on his account, normativity plays a procedural or regulative role. He indicates that normativity is not a separate issue from emotional sharing, and that the two are "essentially interlocked" (Szanto 2015, 518). Nevertheless, his examples do not bear this out, as he does not think that the father and the deceased grandmother share an emotion as such, but the father does experience a collective emotion. As such, I think he has not sufficiently accounted for how his account still shows that a collective emotion involves group members sharing an emotion as a group.

as a group member. Szanto has actually taken a step back from, rather than toward, a notion of shared emotion for larger groups (that is, a group emotion). His notion of collective emotion is an I-mode collective emotion (a group-based emotion), not a we-mode collective emotion (a shared emotion, or eventually, a group emotion).

In the next section, I analyse a different strategy for attributing an emotion to a large group. Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) argue that we can attribute a group-based emotion to a group when group members mutually influence one another. On their account, the members do not need to know all the other members nor enter into reciprocal empathic relations with each group member. Rather, the group members exist in a network of mutual influence, which allows the entire group to be transitively connected to one another, and to transitively share the group-based emotion as a group. Pettigrove and Parson's network model of collective emotion is useful in establishing how members might be unified as a group that can feel an emotion together, despite the lack of proximity between members.

3 Extending group-based emotion

Pettigrove and Parsons develop an account of collective emotion in which the relations between individuals allow for an emotion to be communicated between group members. They offer a network model of collective emotion, rather than a top-down or bottom-up model (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 512-514). On their account, they think of a group as a network of nodes, in which each node influences the nodes connected to it. What is attractive about their account is that the group can be very large, for the nodes within the network need not be connected to every other node. That is, their account can get around the problem of proximity that limits the account of shared emotion to small groups. However, I will show that Pettigrove and Parsons' account cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge. Although focusing on the relations between individuals, this account does not establish that the group members feel a we-mode collective emotion (a shared or group emotion, on Salmela's typology). Rather, the network creates what Daniel Bar-Tal calls a collective emotional orientation, which guides how the group members respond as group members (2001, 605-607, see also Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007). That is, it shows how group members can come to feel group-based emotions, which is an I-mode emotion.

Pettigrove and Parsons give a detailed case study of Palestinian shame in which Palestinians refer to the nation's sense of shame in relation to their history with Israel

(Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 514-525). In this case study, they outline how, given the history of Palestine, individual Palestinians feel ashamed by the way they are treated as Palestinians. They describe how: 1) Palestinian land was ceded to Israel, forcing many Palestinians to become refugees; 2) the country suffered military defeats which the Palestinians experienced as "lying down and submitting too easily to a strong and cunning enemy" (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 516); 3) as refugees, Palestinians have been made dependent on others and are given little opportunity to find jobs and build their personal independence; 4) Israeli interrogators have subjected Palestinian prisoners to sexual torture which shames them particularly given their cultural beliefs; and 5) policies of surveillance and restriction of movement are a form of administrative violence that further diminishes the esteem of Palestinians. In short, individual Palestinians experience group-based shame, for it is as Palestinians that they are humiliated and diminished, rather than as unique individuals. Palestinians are shamed because of their group membership, and the way their group is treated by Israel. But Palestinians confidently attribute this group-based shame to the whole group, and would regard this shame as shared because of the way collective shame is publicly expressed.

On their account of collective shame, Pettigrove and Parsons argue that the group of Palestinians should be understood as a network of nodes, whereby each node within the network is connected to some other nodes. The node may be the group member, but can also be documents, policies, institutions, buildings, and other practices and artefacts that contribute to the architecture of the network (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 512-513, see also Crawford 2014, 546-553). Palestinian shame is expressed publicly via certain artefacts, policies, and so on and the individuals are influenced by the expressions of shame in certain public symbols and practices. These nodes symbolically represent what Nussbaum calls public emotion—the nodes may not themselves experience the emotion but represent that emotion in some form (Nussbaum 2013, 203).[15] On this account, the collective emotion is not an affective experience, but an expression of what is emotionally salient to that community.[16] The group members within the network, by virtue of their connection to these nodes that represent the collective emotion, are guided to respond in accordance with this public expression of

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[15] See also von Scheve et al. (2014, 5-6).

[16] This is one problem with the account: Pettigrove and Parsons do not think of collective emotion as an embodied experience. Collective emotion encourages or produces embodied emotion in the individuals (Pettigrove and Parsons 2012, 512-513, 525).

collective emotion. They can speak about what the group feels because they appeal to what is publicly expressed in their group's various emotional artefacts.

For the network model of a group, each node is connected to at least one other node. Some group members may be connected to other members, but some group members would be connected to some form of institutionalised or public emotion, such as a media item perhaps, or a policy that symbolically expresses the collective emotion. The collective emotion is attributed to the whole network, within which each member is in either direct or indirect contact with each of the other group members. This means that the network establishes that the group members have a relation with one another, although not necessarily a reciprocal relation. For those members who are in direct contact, they may be intentionally focused on one another such that they experience a we-mode shared emotion together. For these members, they are reciprocally aware of the other's emotion and they reciprocally influence and regulate one another's expressions of emotion. As such, these members may experience a shared emotion with other members. For those members that are not in direct contact with other members, however, this is not true. The members that are connected to the group by the nodes that represent the group's emotion do not exist in a reciprocal and mutual relationship with that particular node. The connection those members have to other members is mediated by the emotional artefact that stands between them. The journalist, for example, is connected to her readers through her media articles, and she is exerting influence over their emotional experience through her articles. Her readers, however, do not reciprocally regulate her emotional experience. Her readers may go on to influence other members and share a we-mode emotion with those other members, but they do not experience a we-mode shared emotion with the journalist.

The influence of the emotional artefacts can be quite powerful, as Bar-Tal points out. He terms the network conception of collective emotion a "collective emotional orientation," and analyses the collective fear orientation of Israel (Bar-Tal 2001, 610-621). The communication of public fear via the media, the security practices in which the group members perceive that the country is under surveillance, the destroyed public property that reminds Israelis of their dangers, and so on, all "cuts deeply into the psychic fabric of society members" (Bar-Tal 2001, 609). This architecture that constitutes the network guides each group member to be hypervigilant, constantly ready for potential danger, and quick to attend to signals of possible danger. The individuals are thus disposed to perceive their environment as one of danger. The emotional cues

encoded into the emotional artefacts can do much to bring about the emotion in the group members that come into contact with these nodes. I think that we see this kind of collective emotion in the public displays of grief and anger via the media and online social media, as when Facebook users convey sympathy for victims of terrorism by sharing particular images or slogans. War memorials in which fallen soldiers are commemorated are symbols of collective grief and horror about war. Anti-loitering policies that prevent the youth and/or the homeless from comfortably remaining in certain public areas are expressions of dislike, or possibly even disgust. These sorts of symbolic expressions of collective emotion certainly have an enormous influence on the individuals who are exposed to them.

However, the group members within the network are not experiencing their emotion in the we-mode. Although the members are connected with one another, and can exert pressure on one another via the transitive network that constitutes the group, the emotion that the group members feel is not necessarily experienced with other members.[17] As on Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion, it is not necessarily the case that the group members feel the emotion that the group publicly expresses via the emotion artefacts. As on Szanto's account of collective emotion, it also seems possible that a network may have no members who feel that emotion. We can think, by way of analogy, of the injustice of institutionalised racism, whereby no individual within the particular justice system may be racist or have racist feelings towards minority groups, but nevertheless follows practices and policies that discriminate against a minority in racist ways.

The network model of collective emotion, then, is not an account of a we-mode emotion, but rather, refers to the symbolic representations of the group's emotion, the group-based emotions that members within the group may feel, and the shared emotion between some members of the group who are in a reciprocal relation with one another. It captures a cluster of phenomena, rather than a single we-mode emotion that we attribute to a group. It is a "collective emotional orientation," as Bar-Tal describes it, in that it predisposes members to a particular response, and as such, it is much like what Calhoun calls a public framework. The group does not experience a we-mode group emotion. Rather, the group members may come to feel an I-mode collective emotion, a

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[17] I will develop this argument below as I think that these members cannot feel an emotion in the we-mode unless they are in physical proximity to one another. This is because, as I argued in Chapter 1, emotions are felt experiences and as such, involve bodily feeling.

group-based emotion as a result of the collective emotion that is expressed around them. In some cases where the members are reciprocally related, the members may share the group-based emotion as a we-mode shared emotion, but we cannot attribute this shared emotion to the entire network, if the members do not share the emotion with every other member within the network.

4 Finally, group emotion

The problem that I am faced with is explaining how a notion of shared emotion can be upscaled to a notion of group emotion. A shared emotion is an emotion in which the group members: 1) share a bodily feeling due to processes of emotional contagion; 2) share their group's concern due to adopting a shared perspective, or alternatively, by self-categorising as a group member and appealing to the group's ethos or public framework; and 3) share a subject due to the group members reciprocally empathising with one another. The shared emotion is a strongly collective emotion, held in the we-mode, and has a doubly intentional structure as the group member is focused both on the object of the emotion and on those with whom she shares the emotion.[18] On this model of shared emotion, the group members share both the non-cognitive and the cognitive aspects of emotion when they unify as a plural-subject group. As I argued in Chapter 5, this account can meet the Sceptical Challenge, because a shared emotion is only experienced when the individuals enter into a reciprocal relation with one another and constitute the emotional experience together. As such, it explains the group emotion attributed to small groups. How can this account be extended from small groups of two or three individuals, to large groups?

I have analysed two arguments that attempt to accommodate large groups. Szanto attempts to upscale the notion of shared emotion to a notion of collective emotion by supplementing the account of shared emotion with an additional top-down process. He argues that a group can create a narrative about their shared appraisal patterns, which allows group members to feel we-mode emotion with other members who are not in empathic proximity to them. This approach fails, for Szanto gives an account of group-based emotion rather than group-emotion, and slips from a strongly collective we-mode

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[18] My definition of group emotion is the same as Salmela's definition of a collectively shared emotion: "a collectively intentional shared emotion is an emotion that individual group members with a collective concern feel together about the same object as members of the group in a phenomenally similar manner, being aware that other group members are feeling the same" (2014a, 68-69). This is a strongly collective emotion as it is a we-mode emotion.

concept to a moderately collective I-mode concept of collective emotion. Pettigrove and Parsons do not upscale the concept of shared emotion, but argue that we can attribute the members' group-based emotion to the group when the group members exist in a network in which they are all connected to one another. This approach also fails to give an account of group emotion, for the group members do not feel a we-mode emotion together, and so cannot meet the Sceptical Challenge.

Neither of these two arguments show that members in large groups can be in reciprocal relations with one another and can co-constitute the emotional experience such that they feel a we-mode emotion together. Neither account can establish that members who are not in direct proximity to one another can feel an emotion together. It appears that the group members who are not in empathic proximity to their fellow group members are related to their group by means of self-categorisation or identification, which is not a reciprocal relation between individuals. Thus far, I have only established that the member of a large group can self-categorise as a group member and appeal to a shared narrative about the group—its beliefs, values, and so on—but can only feel a group-based emotion as a result. She cannot feel a strongly collective we-mode emotion with her fellow group members.

Schmid (2015) tells us that Max Scheler faced the same problem when he tried to extend his notion of feeling-together to explain how a nation might feel a group emotion. In 1915, Scheler gives an analysis of collective national war enthusiasm, arguing that it is a case of shared emotion that is not reducible to the emotions of the individual citizens.[19] (We can see that Scheler thinks that feeling-together is a we-mode shared emotion rather than an I-mode emotion that individuals have in common with one another, as I argued in Chapter 4.) He tells us that the war enthusiasm felt in Germany is:

> …a total experience, a co-experience! For we have actually experienced it as a new *form* of experience that had grown unknown to us… Away, therefore, with the arbitrary constructions of a mistaken analysis that claims a total experience is just a very complicated composition of experiences of individual people, complemented with mutual knowledge or belief that "the other", too, has similar experiences. No! It has become as plain as the sun to us that this *togetherness* of experiencing, creating, suffering itself is a particular ultimate form of all experiencing, that positive and new contents arise in this form of a truly "communal" form of thinking, believing, and willing… (cited in Schmid 2015, 111-112 [italics in original])

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[19] As Schmid reports, this particular text was a piece of German war propaganda (2015, 113).

Scheler asserts that Germany, a plural-subject group, feels national war enthusiasm, and that this plural-subject group can include Germans all over the world. He tells us that Germans, whether in "America, Japan, India" can co-experience war enthusiasm, and feel it together with other Germans (cited in Schmid 2015, 112). For Scheler, the feeling-together by two grieving parents in an intimate and direct way is comparable to the enthusiasm that German citizens feel, and is in fact the same phenomenon. However, as Schmid points out, Scheler does not justify this argument, and so, "Scheler's short cut from intimate parent relations to national unity is suspicious, and really a huge sociological leap that can only be driven by a strong sense of purpose" (2015, 115). After the Second World War, Scheler recognised this problematic extension of his account of feeling-together, and revised his account of national war enthusiasm. He admitted that national war enthusiasm is not a case of feeling-together, but a case of emotional identification with the country (Schmid 2015, 117).

I think that we can solve the problem of upscaling a shared emotion to a group emotion by focusing on the role that narrative and norms play. Szanto's strategy is basically correct. That is, we can extend a bottom-up account of shared emotion to larger groups by supplementing it with a top-down process. However, Szanto takes a misstep when he elides the crucial feature of the account of shared emotion, which is that group members enter into reciprocal empathic relations with one another to feel an emotion together. I intend to maintain this integral feature of shared emotion in my account of group emotion. I will argue that the top-down processes of narrative and ritual can allow for looser, transitive, relations between individuals, such that group members do not need to be in direct empathic proximity to every other member. The group members only need to be in empathic proximity with one other group member, who in turn is connected to other group members. I will appropriate the network conception of a group, and argue that group members can be in a relation with all other members of their group via a network in which there is relational transitivity. However, each group member is only in a *reciprocal relation* with the group members with whom she has a direct connection.

I propose that we adopt Pettigrove and Parsons' network model of collective emotion, but adapt it in an important way. On Pettigrove and Parsons' model, the nodes in the network could be group members who feel the collective emotion, or emotional artefacts that represent the collective emotion. As I argued above, the emotional artefact can influence the group member such that she feels a group-based emotion, but it does

not facilitate a reciprocal relation between group members. The artefact mediates the relation between group members, and prevents the group members from empathising with one another. As such, I propose that we consider the nodes of a network only as group members, and not as emotional artefacts. The group members are in direct contact with some group members, and in a transitive relation with the rest of the group members. Each group member has some connection to all fellow group members, with no mediation by an emotional artefact that may prevent a reciprocal relation from being established.

If we allow that group members are connected to one another by means of a network, we can allow that each group member can enter into a potentially reciprocal relation with another group member, and so can potentially feel a we-mode emotion with that group member. The reciprocal relation between group members needs to be direct due to the embodied nature of emotions. An important component of emotion is the physiological feeling of emotion, and direct contact facilitates the process of emotional contagion. Physical proximity to other group members can bring the group members' emotions into alignment with one another, due to the processes of mimicry and synchronisation. It also allows individuals to reciprocally empathise with at least one other group member, which means they can switch from the I-mode to the we-mode and co-respond with another group member.

I pause at this point in my argument, to consider the kind of proximity that must exist between group members in order for the members to exist in a reciprocal relation that allows the group members to share a feeling. We have developed certain technologies that allow individuals to communicate immediately and bilaterally with one another, despite a lack of physical closeness. We have video communication and online messaging, which allows individuals to communicate in much the same way that they would if they were physically together. There is a possibility that this technology allows for group members to have an indirect, mediated reciprocal relation. As I noted in Chapter 4, there is some empirical research indicating that individuals can affect each other's feelings when they communicate textually, in particular, via online message boards or Facebook (Guillory et al. 2011, Kramer 2012, Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock 2014). These studies suggest that emotional cues can be encoded into text, to which the reader responds. These cues may be expressed in the choice of words that the writer uses, the number of words she uses, or in the emotions that she expresses in her writing. The suggestion is that we may be able to experience something like emotional

contagion and share the embodied feeling of an emotion without physical closeness. If we can allow that group members can exist in reciprocal relation with other group members by virtue on an online connection or a video connection, it becomes possible that dispersed group members can share both the cognitive and non-cognitive aspect of emotion.

This question is largely an empirical question, because we would need to investigate how much the technology mediates the unconscious processes of emotional contagion and affective alignment. But I think that I can offer a few brief speculative remarks about why I am sceptical that we can share a feeling via technology. In the case of textual communication, I think the necessary delay between reading and writing means that the individuals are not mimicking one another's feelings. Rather, they are interpreting the other's emotion indirectly, and are perhaps influencing one another's emotion. Online visual communication, such as via video conferencing or Skype, is perhaps better suited for emotional contagion. As such, it may allow for a feeling to be shared. If Gillian calls her family over Skype, and discovers that they are all celebrating, she may find that her own mood lifts in her interaction with them.[20] In this case, I think that perhaps the feeling of emotion can be shared via online emotional contagion. I am, however, sceptical that such a communication can allow for a shared we-mode emotion. This is because, in order to share an emotion, the individuals need to not only be intentionally directed to one another, they also need to be intentionally directed to the object of their emotion. That is, the group members need to shift their attention from one another and adopt a shared perspective on something external to them. I suspect that online video communication is dyadic in nature, and does not facilitate a triadic relationship (that is, when an individual is focused on her fellow group member as well as the object of her emotion). Given these doubts, I put aside the possibility that group members can share an embodied we-mode emotion with one another via online textual or visual communication. On my account of group emotion, group members need to be in direct physical contact with at least one other group member in order to have a reciprocal relation with the other, and to share the feeling of the we-mode emotion.

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[20] As von Scheve and his colleagues note, mediated rituals, such as when sport fans watch matches over public screens rather than at the stadium, offer "a participatory role… and most likely contribute to the emotional entrainment of the viewers" (2014, 8). But even though they argue that viewers can affectively align with the fans that they see on television, he tells us that these remote viewers crucially gather in crowds of varying sizes so that there is a physical co-presence that allows for collective emotion.

I return then to the network model of a group that I am appropriating for my argument. In the argument for shared emotion in Chapter 5, I claimed that individuals had to empathise with all of the other group members, so that group members could know which members can be included in the plural-subject group that feels the shared emotion. The individual group member feels a shared emotion only with those members with whom she can reciprocally empathise, and has no reason to include other individuals in the subject of her shared emotion. On my model of group emotion, I propose that the network connections between group members make it permissible for the members to attribute their shared emotion to the whole group. The individual group member can potentially share an emotion with at least one other member, because she is in direct contact with that member. She is also transitively connected to all the other members of her group, by means of the network, and I think that the shared emotion can be distributed to all the members in this way. The network allows for each group member to co-constitute the group's emotion by means of her reciprocal relation with another member, who in turn is connected with other members. Each member can regulate the group's emotional expression by regulating her shared emotion, and she can influence how the group determines what is of salience by means of the influence that she has on the members with whom she has contact. Through these connected, reciprocal relations, each member co-constitutes the group emotion. Some members may be more influential for they may have a position of authority within the group or be directly connected with many members. But since each member is connected with the group, she can feel a we-mode emotion, and since she is connected to every other member, she can include those members in the subject of the emotion.

The network model, then, allows the individual group member to include many more group members in the plural-subject of her shared emotion. She feels a shared emotion with another member, and by means of the transitive connections that she has with other members, she can know that they too feel the shared emotion. She thus extends her we-mode emotion to members with whom she does not have a direct reciprocal relation. Group member Alannah shares an emotion with Brianna, who in turn shares it with Ciara, and so Alannah can include Ciara in the subject of her shared emotion. This indirect connection means that all three group members are co-constituting and reciprocally regulating the shared emotion. However, it is not yet clear that group member Alannah can attribute the shared emotion to group members who do not feel the same emotion, and thus are not feeling a we-mode emotion like her. On this

model of group emotion, the group is defined by the members who share the emotion, and does not include individuals who feel differently.

For this reason, the network model of group emotion needs to include a top-down process that allows members who do not feel the shared emotion to be included in the subject of the group emotion, and for the shared emotion to be attributed to an entire group as a group emotion, rather than simply to those members who feel the shared we-mode emotion. The top-down processes would play a role in firstly, predisposing the group members to feel a particular emotion, and secondly, exerting some normative pressure on the group members to respond as a group to a particular event (Sullivan 2014a, 114-115). These processes would include the decisions made by the group's authorities about what is an appropriate response, as well as the narrative told about the particular object of an emotion, by the media or a similar information-provider within the group. In contrast with Gilbert and Szanto, I think the top-down process must work in conjunction with the bottom-up process, and cannot replace the bottom-up process. The top-down process can extend the shared emotion so that a group emotion can be attributed to a group. Additionally, my account of group emotion is distinguished from Pettigrove and Parsons' collective emotion in two ways: I only include group members as nodes in a network, rather than group members and emotional artefacts, so that it is possible for a reciprocal relation to connect every group member to the group; and I include a top-down process that facilitates and encourages the group members to respond in a particular way to particular events.

The role of the top-down process is made clearer if we think about Churchill's funeral, and the two processes that shaped the British response to Churchill's death. The parliament, which is democratically elected as the authority to make decisions for the country, determined to hold a state funeral for Churchill, and to close trade in London. This decision conveyed the significance of Churchill's death. The funeral, already a ritualistic practice, was given additional emotional significance by certain displays that symbolically conveyed respect: the various military salutes, the postponement of football matches, and the live broadcast of the whole event to national and international audiences. The parliament decided which rituals and practices would be appropriate for Churchill's funeral, and these rituals and practices conveyed to the citizens how they should appraise the funeral. Not only is a narrative told about Churchill's death, the rituals and practices serve to foster particular emotions in those attending the funeral.

The second top-down process is the role that the media played in shaping how the citizenry thinks about Churchill's death, and in attributing an emotion to the group. The media, prior to the funeral, presented a narrative about the importance of the funeral and the significance of Churchill's life. They posited what Churchill's death would mean for the country. In doing so, they exerted normative pressure on the nation to respond in a particular way. The media shaped what it thought was the appropriate response, and those Britons who were not saddened by Churchill's death were implicitly encouraged to adopt this attitude. The media gave a narrative about the group, and as Tollefsen and Gallagher argue, such a "we-narrative" can stabilise and deepen the group's agency. The we-narrative unifies the individuals further as a group, and places pressure on the individuals to conform to their roles as group members (Tollefsen and Gallagher 2017, 103-104).[21] It thus facilitates that group members feel group-based emotions about the event. When group members then share an emotion about that event, the we-narrative can extend this shared emotion to the whole group. For Churchill's funeral, the media reported on the shared emotion felt by mourners at the funeral. It then, importantly, attributed the shared emotion to the group. The papers proclaimed that "Britain honours Sir Winston" with the "[s]orrow shared by millions" and so extended the shared emotion felt by the funeral mourners to the entire country (Wall 1965). It is this top-down process that allows us to attribute an emotion to a group that includes members who do not feel the strongly collective shared emotion.[22]

A group emotion, then, is experienced when a certain proportion of the group feels shared emotion via a bottom-up process, and a top-down process attributes the shared emotion to the whole group.[23] The bottom-up process of sharing an emotion means that the group members experience a strongly collective emotion together, in the we-mode. The top-down process facilitates the bottom-up processes by conveying what an appropriate response is, and by shaping how the object of a shared emotion can be understood. The top-down process also attributes the shared emotion, which is actually experienced by some group members, to the whole group as a group emotion.

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[21] Tollefsen and Gallagher are not allies of mine though, as they argue that group members cannot adopt a we-perspective (the first person plural perspective), which is what I argue for (2017, 106-108).

[22] Recall that Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison tell us, "[r]epresentation is the process by which individual [group-based] emotions acquire a collective dimension and, in turn, shape social and political processes" (2008, 130, see also Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 505-507, 2015, 212-214). See also Hutchison (2010, 2014).

[23] I discuss the question of what proportion of a group is considered representative of the whole group below.

What distinguishes my notion of group emotion from Szanto's notion of collective emotion is that I think a group emotion must reflect what some group members actually feel. The top-down process can facilitate and supplement the bottom-up process by which members share an emotion, but it cannot be entirely independent of that bottom-up process. I do not think the top-down process is sufficient to enable individuals to feel a we-mode emotion. Rather, the bottom-up process makes the emotion a we-mode emotion, and the top-down processes allow that we-mode emotion to be considered representative of the whole group's experience, such that we include the whole group in the subject of the group emotion. If we think back to Gilbert's account of plural-subject emotion, she argues for a top-down process in which the group determines that it will commit to a plural-subject emotion, and this joint commitment obligates the group members to behave in a particular way. On her account, the plural-subject emotion does not necessarily reflect what the group members actually feel. Burleigh Wilkins responds to Gilbert's account, and argues that when the shared emotion of the group members does not mirror the group's plural-subject emotion, it indicates that a moral gulf exists between the "rank-and-file" members of the group and the authorities, and may in fact be quite destabilising (2002, 154). Some actors within a group can, by means of certain top-down processes, attempt to facilitate a group emotion, but a group emotion can only be attributed to the group if (some) group members actually experience that emotion.

I am faced with a similar challenge about the top-down process as the one that Szanto faces with his notion of a narrative of a shared appraisal pattern. What makes a narrative legitimate, in the sense that the creators of the narrative can include other individuals in that narrative as part of the group? Similarly, we can ask when certain top-down processes can legitimately attribute the shared emotion of some group members to the whole group. On what basis does the British media determine that the funeral mourners' shared grief is the country's grief?

I think that this problem partly concerns the issue of representation and proportionality. If we think back to the aggregative account of collective emotion that I outlined in Chapter 1, we saw that it is unclear at what point an emotion is widespread enough within the group to be considered the group's emotion. Do we require that a majority, perhaps 51% of the group, feel the same emotion in order for it to be attributed to the group? Or are certain group members simply more visible than others, and as such, their emotion appears to be the group's emotion? Sport fans in the stadium,

for example, may be regarded as representing the entire group of sport fans, because they are publicly expressing their emotions about their team's performance. Perhaps the mourners at Churchill's funeral are simply more visible than the rest of the British citizenry, despite not constituting a majority of the group.

The second issue that the problem of legitimate attribution of a group emotion points to is that of contestation. Within a group, I think that there will often be several top-down processes at play, and they may be in conflict with one another. In my example of Churchill's funeral, I refer to the media as a single entity with a single narrative, but in reality, various media outlets will give different narratives about the same event. Churchill was celebrated in many newspapers, but perhaps many others had a different story to tell about his death and the significance it would have for the country. Individuals or particular groups can contest the attribution of a group emotion to them. In the aftermath of the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, some public narratives attributed the attacks to Muslims people, as a group, and attributed Muslim people with group hatred for white, Christian, Western society. Many Muslim people contested the attribution of hatred to their religious group by posting images of themselves with posters saying "#NotInMyName." In doing so, they indicated that they did not see themselves as part of the group that committed the attacks. The Islamic State was responsible for the attacks, but Muslim people took it on themselves to publicly contest this attribution, denying that the hatred that the Islamic State manifests is representative of what Muslim people feel (see, for example, Mosbergen 2015).[24]

I do not think that the possibility of contestation about the attribution of a group emotion undermines my account. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the difficulty in attributing a group emotion, especially for heterogeneous groups. I do not attempt to outline what conditions need to be met in order for a shared emotion to be legitimately attributed to a group. This would involve a complex analysis of the way competing narratives and public (top-down) practices interact in shaping a public framework about what is of concern to a group, as well as an investigation into when a particular subsection of a group is considered representative of the whole group. These are complicated and intricate issues, and fall beyond the scope of my thesis. I thus only

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[24] Similarly, many white women have denied that they need protection from white men against other races, and as such, white men should not justify their racist attacks by reference to white women. For example, Dylan Roof, who massacred African-American churchgoers in South Carolina in 2015, reportedly asserted that African-American men rape white women. As Lisa Wade (2015) retaliates, "I am a white woman. I am not yours to protect. No more murder in my name" (see also Angyal 2015).

point to the problem that in many cases, we may contest that a shared emotion of a particular subsection of a group can be attributed as a group emotion to the whole group.

A group emotion, then, is the shared we-mode emotion felt by a certain number of group members that is attributed to the whole group by means of a top-down process. It is a fairly broad model of group emotion, as I do not stipulate what kind of top-down processes are required for a shared emotion to be attributed to a group, nor the conditions by which that attribution is legitimate. I have mentioned two kinds of processes, namely, the public media narrative about an event, and the parliamentary decisions about particular practices that foster shared emotion. There may be other processes that can similarly facilitate that group members share an emotion, and which attribute that shared emotion to the group.

Yet my account of group emotion is limited in an important way, which is that a group emotion must be grounded in a shared emotion, and as such, a certain number of group members need to be in proximity to one another so that they can share an emotion. This means that I can only attribute a group emotion when a certain proportion of the group gathers together such that those group members have direct contact with one another. Public gatherings, then, are an important aspect of group emotion. This is a fact acknowledged by social activists, who facilitate group emotion by arranging public protests or social gatherings in which the members are brought together (Jasper 1998, 416-419, 2011, 14.10). By gathering together, group members can "amplify" and "transmute" their initial group-based emotion into group emotion (van Troost, van Stekelenburg, and Klandermans 2013, 198). In the aftermath of significant events, groups often gather together to respond to the event together. In the aftermath of the *Charlie Hebdo* terror attacks, Parisians gathered in churches to be together and give expression to their grief and horror. The publicity around the police shootings of African-Americans in the United States has led to many public protests for the BlackLivesMatter movement. Women gathered around the world in various locations to march against Donald Trump's public endorsement of sexism. In gathering together, the group members create the reciprocal relations between them that allow them to feel shared emotion with their fellow group members. By coming together, the group

members feel their emotions as a group, and their shared emotion becomes a group emotion.[25]

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have sought to respond to the sceptic about group emotion, who claims that a group cannot feel an emotion because emotions are individual and subjective.[26] Only individuals can feel emotions, and for the sceptic, a group emotion is nothing more than a summation of the group members' individual emotions. In order to meet the Sceptical Challenge, I needed to show that a group emotion is a distinct phenomenon from an individual emotion. An individual emotion is an embodied cognitive state, in which the individual has a bodily feeling that represents how she perceives and construes the world, according to what is of concern to her. The sceptic about group emotion claims that a group is not an entity that can feel an emotion because a group cannot have bodily feelings or cognitions. The sceptic thus challenges me to show that a group, as a group and not simply an aggregation of individuals, can feel an emotion. For sceptics such as Bryce Huebner (2011), in order for a group emotion to be genuinely collective, the group emotion must not be reducible to the emotions of the group members.

The dominant view in the philosophy of emotion about the nature of emotion is that emotion is individualistic. Emotions are personal, subjective experiences, according to most philosophers. This is because emotions are physically experienced in the person's body and mind, for emotions are feelings that cognitively represent particular meanings to the person. Emotions are biographically subjective, as each individual develops her emotions in the context of her particular, unique history. How each individual learns her emotion is determined by her unique upbringing, socialisation, education, and particular history. The emotions are also particular to the individual because emotions are a form of perception (as I argued in Chapter 1), in which the individual perceives and construes her situation as being of particular significance, according to her particular concerns. This means that her emotions have the particular individual as a point of reference: to make sense of the individual's response to a

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[25] This sort of account of collective emotion is what Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin have in mind in their studies of group-based emotion, for they argue that group-based emotions are not the same as collective emotion, and that collective emotion is "group-based emotions shared and felt simultaneously by a large number of individuals in a certain society" (2014, 582).

[26] See Chapter 1.

situation, we need to understand how she perceived the situation, and how she appraised the situation given her biography and her concerns.

Following Schmid, I distinguished three versions of individualism about emotion, which shape the Sceptical Challenge. The sceptic about group emotion points to the personal and subjective nature of emotion to argue that emotions cannot be attributed to groups. Groups do not have minds and bodies, and so cannot feel or have mental representations of meaning, as groups. Emotions are experiences, and so must be felt by entities that can feel. This is the thesis of *physical individualism* of emotions (Schmid 2009, 70-71). Since emotions are experiences, only embodied individuals can feel emotions. Additionally, emotions, like other mental states, are *ontologically individual*. Emotions belong to particular individuals, for there must be somebody who can cognise or have the mental state (Schmid 2009, 72-74). Finally, emotions are often regarded as epistemically subjective (Calhoun 2004, 107). They reflect the person's particular point of view and her particular appraisal of the situation. An individual can only feel her own emotions, and her access to her own emotions is privileged. Her access to other individuals' emotions is indirect: although she may know what others feel, she cannot feel what they feel. This is the thesis of *subjective individualism* (Schmid 2009, 74-76).

My account of group emotion can meet the Sceptical Challenge. I have argued that group members can feel a shared we-mode emotion together, by virtue of reciprocally empathising with one another. They can know how another group member feels, and can include all group members who feel the same emotion in the plural-subject of the shared emotion. The group members cannot feel a shared emotion unless they are reciprocally feeling what another group member feels, and as such, group members constitute the shared emotion together. This means that the shared emotion is not reducible to the individual emotions of the group members. A shared emotion is not a summation of the members' feelings, but arises when the group members have established a relation that allows them to adopt a shared perspective and respond as a single entity. The shared emotion is attributed to a larger group when the group members exist in a network relation with other members, and a top-down process of some sort includes all of the group members in the subject of the shared emotion.

My argument does not challenge the thesis of bodily individualism. I have argued that emotions are embodied experiences, and as such, I think that only entities with organic bodies can experience emotions. Groups are made up of individuals, and groups can act as a body, but groups are not embodied entities in the way that individuals are.

A group cannot have a heavy heart or a sense of agitation in the way that individuals can, or feel pangs of guilt as a group. As such, I argue that group members, rather than groups as such, experience group emotions. As Schmid tells us, "[e]motional feelings involve the body in an adverbial way—they are bodily experiences, not experiences of the body. Thus, if we experience an emotion as ours, collectively, we may do so bodily without assuming some collective body of which there is an experience" (2015, 108). A group can, as a group, feel an emotion, but it does not require a body to do so: the emotion is felt in the bodies of the group members.

I ultimately accept the thesis of ontological individualism about emotion, but I think that an emotion can be "genuinely collective" when the group emotion is ontologically holistic. That is, we cannot explain the nature of a group emotion without referencing the relations between individuals. Contra Huebner, I do not think that an emotion is only genuinely collective when the mental state that holds the emotion is itself a collective state (2011, 92). The collectivity of group emotion arises from the way individuals come together to respond together. It is the holism of group emotion that makes it irreducible to individual emotions. Individuals feel a group emotion together, as a unit, and the group members cannot feel the group emotion unless they are in a reciprocal relation with one another. I thus accept the thesis of ontological individualism about emotion, as I think that the group emotion is held in the minds of the group members.

The group emotion, while ontologically individual, is not *subjectively* individual. I have argued that a group emotion is a we-mode emotion and is properly attributed to multiple individuals together, as a single subject. The individuals exist in a holistic relation to one another, and this reciprocal relation means that they constitute a plural-subject group. When they do so, they orient to the world as a single entity, a group, and each member is concerned with the interests of the group, rather than simply her own interests. The individual in a plural-subject group does not think of herself simply as an individual, but broadens her perspective such that she thinks of herself as a group member, and includes other people in her subjectivity. When she responds with a group emotion, she is intentionally directed not only to the object of her emotion, but also to those group members with whom she is in a reciprocal relationship. The group member, when feeling a group emotion, is responding with other group members, and together, they feel a single emotion.

Since individuals feel a group emotion together, the group emotion is not reducible to individual emotions, although it is experienced in the bodies of individual group members. As such, my account of group emotion is a non-aggregative account of collective emotion. The group emotion is not attributed to many individuals, but to a group of individuals as a single entity. A group emotion is not a summation of the group members' emotions, and thus, can meet the Sceptical Challenge. I have established that many individuals can constitute a plural-subject group, and feel a single emotion together, by adopting a shared perspective and responding as one group to the world.

Conclusion

My argument in this thesis was motivated by the common attribution of emotion to groups that we find in the popular media and the public sphere. In our everyday talk, we explain the actions of groups and the policies of institutions by referencing the emotions that seemingly motivate them. Anti-immigration policies are motivated by the country's fear of foreigners; protest marches express collective anger at some wrongdoing; sport fans erupt with joy when their team scores a goal. Yet in the philosophical literature on emotion, emotion is understood as an individual, subjective phenomenon, and there are few conceptual theories available to explain the seeming phenomenon of group emotion. The philosophical debate thus seems ill equipped to explain a common and persistent theme in public discourse about emotion. I think this arises from the strong individualist stance that predominates in Western philosophy. My thesis has sought to challenge this individualism in emotion theory.

In Chapter 1, I outlined the broad spectrum of theories that characterise the philosophical debate about what an emotion is. I showed that much of the debate has centred on articulating how an emotion can be both a physiological feeling, as William James (1884) argues, and meaningful to us in a way that an itchy feeling is not, as judgementalists such as Robert Solomon (1976, 1980, 2003, 2004) and Martha Nussbaum (2001, 2004) argue. I argued that emotion is a way of perceiving and appraising the world in an embodied manner (de Sousa 1987, Prinz 2003, 2004, 2005). We associate particular meanings with particular feelings, and as a result, emotions are a way of determining what is of significance to us in a particular situation. By canvassing three different accounts of emotion, I argued that we think of emotion as both a cognitive and a non-cognitive experience. I then drew out why the sceptic about group emotion thinks that only individuals can feel emotion. The dominant view about emotion within philosophy is that emotions are subjective, individual experiences. This is because emotions are physically individual, ontologically individual, and subjectively individual. Emotions are felt in the body, represented as mental states in an individual's mind, and attributed to a single bearer. The sceptic about group emotion thinks that when we speak of group emotion, we simply mean to attribute an aggregation of individual emotions to a group. The sceptic thus challenges me to show how a group,

which does not have a body or a mind like an individual, can feel an emotion in a way that is not reducible to the emotion that individuals within a group feel.

I find it curious that much of the philosophical debate about emotion is guided by our common understanding and intuitions about emotion, and yet is unmoved by the common attribution of emotion to groups. Given this, I turned to a different discipline, social psychology, to begin my investigation of group emotion. In Chapter 2, I critically analysed the Intergroup Emotion Theory as well as several studies that illustrate the significant impact that an individual's group identity has on her emotion, such that she feels group-based emotion. Intergroup Emotion Theory asserts that individuals feel different group-based emotions when they identify with different groups; that the strength of the group-based emotion depends on how strongly the individual identifies with her group; and that group members share these group-based emotions.[1] The results of the studies are compelling, as they show that, as individuals, we can think of ourselves as group members, and be concerned with what is of significance for our group. As group members, we appraise the world as representatives of our group, and feel what we think our group should feel. Our group-based emotions are thus group level rather than individual level. Yet I argued that group-based emotion is not group emotion. Although there is some evidence to show that group members tend to converge towards the same emotional profile for their group, the studies by Goldenberg, Saguy, and Halperin (2014) give much more compelling evidence that we do not share group-based emotions with our fellow group members necessarily. A group member appraises the world according to group-level concerns, but she appraises the world in her capacity as an individual. She does not feel group-based emotion with her group, and as such, a group-based emotion is, as Mikko Salmela (2012, 2014a) argues, an I-mode emotion. A group-based emotion is attributed to the individual group member, and as such, is reducible to individual emotion.

In Chapter 3, I assessed Margaret Gilbert's (1997, 2002) argument by analogy for plural-subject emotion. She argues that, just as individuals can jointly commit to a collective intention that they hold together, individuals can jointly commit to collective guilt together. She develops three models of collective guilt: the aggregative account of individual emotions; the aggregative account of membership guilt; and the non-

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[1] See, for example, Mackie and Smith (2002), Mackie, Smith, and Ray (2008), Maitner, Smith, and Mackie (2016), Ray, Mackie, and Smith (2014), Smith (1993), Smith and Mackie (2015, 2008), Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007).

aggregative account of what I distinguish as plural-subject guilt. We had already seen that the sceptic could accept the first model, and so I focused on the latter two. The account of membership guilt aligns with the theory of group-based emotion that I outlined in Chapter 2. Gilbert argues that when a group commits a wrongdoing, a group member can recognise that, by virtue of her joint commitment to her group, she is co-author of the wrongdoing. She, with her group members, is the plural-subject of the crime. This means that she can feel guilty, as a group member, about that collective wrongdoing. However, Gilbert argues that membership emotion is collective only aggregatively: the group member feels guilty when she identifies with her group, and may not share her guilt with her group. It is an I-mode collective emotion, as she feels the guilt as an individual group member. In order to attribute an emotion to a group, Gilbert develops a non-aggregative model of collective emotion. She argues that a plural-subject group can commit to plural-subject guilt for the wrongdoing that it has committed. The group's commitment to guilt obligates the group members to behave as if the group, as a single unified body, feels guilty. As I argued, plural-subject emotion is not a group emotion. The group members may not feel the emotion, which means that the plural-subject emotion is not an embodied experience. Rather, Gilbert establishes that a group can commit the group members to behaving according to an emotional norm. Nevertheless, although a plural-subject emotion is not an emotion per se, it is in the we-mode. That is, it is attributed to the group in such a way that we cannot reduce it to an individual's commitment to behave in a particular manner. Gilbert's argument is thus an important contribution to my investigation.

Gilbert could not establish that when a group commits to a plural-subject emotion, the group members feel that emotion. The phenomenological debate about shared emotion maintains focus on the group members felt experiences. In Chapter 4, I critically outlined how an individual can feel that she is phenomenologically fused with her group, as Hans Bernard Schmid (2009) argues. His argument usefully shows that we need to consider three ways that an emotion can be shared. The feeling of an emotion can be shared via emotional contagion or affective alignment, such that many individuals feel the same kind of bodily experience. The content of an emotion can be shared when individuals appraise the world according to the same concerns, and thus experience feeling-together. Finally, the subject of an emotion can be shared when the individual experiences her subject as shared. I argued that Schmid's account did not establish that individuals could feel an emotion together, as a single group, as the

individual's fused emotion is not an indication of how other group members feel. Yet Schmid subtly reframes my investigative purpose. He argues that an emotion is shared when the subject is shared, and argues that even if we are committed to the theses of physical and ontological individualism about emotion, we can still challenge the subjective individualism thesis about emotion. That is, even if we think that an emotion must be experienced in the mind and body of an individual, we can still think that the subject of the emotion is not actually the individual. The subject of an emotion may be multiple individuals together, as a single group.

I thus developed the phenomenological theory of shared emotion in Chapter 5. Drawing on arguments by Edith Stein (1989), Thomas Szanto (2015), and Dan Zahavi (2010, 2014, 2015), I argued that individuals can come together and adopt a shared perspective which allows them to respond to the world together. I argued that individuals can enter into a reciprocal relation with one another when they reciprocally empathise with one another. This allows each individual to know how the other feels, and to feel the same emotion as the other. They both adopt a shared perspective, in which they appraise the world in the same way, while remaining intentionally focused on one another so that they can mutually regulate their shared emotion. This model of shared emotion, I argued, can meet the Sceptical Challenge. The individuals come together to share the emotion, and so experience the shared emotion in the we-mode. They can only experience this emotion together, which means that together, they constitute the subject of the shared emotion. We cannot reduce a shared emotion to an individual emotion, as a shared emotion is not simply a summation of what each individual is feeling. It is, rather, a new experience that arises from the relation between the individuals.

In Chapter 6, I tackled the final challenge for my thesis, which is to upscale the model of shared emotion between two or three individuals in a direct, face-to-face relationship to a model of group emotion in which large groups with members who are not in direct contact with one another can be attributed with a single emotion. Throughout my thesis, I have given examples from the media of seeming group emotion: the fear felt by the French after the 2015 terror attacks in Paris; the call for American fury after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York; Israeli hatred for Palestinians, and German guilt for the atrocities of the Holocaust; white guilt, women's outrage, and African-American grief; and finally, Britain's shared sorrow when Winston Churchill died. The groups in these examples are large groups: race

groups, gender groups, and nation groups. The members of these groups cannot reciprocally empathise with every other member, as they cannot have direct contact with the entire group. I therefore needed to show that we can attribute a shared emotion that is held by some members of the group to the entire group. To do so, I adapted Glen Pettigrove and Nigel Parsons' (2012) network conception of collective emotion, and argued that group members may not have a reciprocal relation with every other group member, but they constitute a group together in a network of relations. When some of those members gather together, they can share an emotion with each of those members by virtue of the network of relations between them. Each member at the gathering needs only to be in a reciprocal relation with at least one another member, and in an indirect, transitive relation to the rest of the group. This allows for each member that is gathered together to co-constitute a shared emotion. Importantly, we can then attribute this shared emotion to the group as a whole with a top-down process. I pointed to the role that media narratives and governmental decisions can play in both facilitating a shared emotion, and in attributing the shared emotion to the whole group. The group emotion, I argued, is grounded in a shared emotion, and as such, is a we-mode emotion that is held by a single group, and is actually felt by a certain proportion of the group.

My thesis has been singularly focused on establishing how an emotion can be shared by a group, such that a group can be attributed with a single emotion. Several questions emerge from this discussion that are beyond the scope of my argument, but suggest several intriguing possibilities for future research. Having established that emotions can be shared, the next question is to ask which emotions can be shared. Can all emotions be shared, or is the nature of some emotions such that only individuals can experience them? We may wonder whether spiritual emotions, such as awe, for example, can be shared by multiple individuals as a group, or whether the experience that triggers such an emotion is inherently a personal one. A related question concerns the degree to which emotions are experienced. Can a group experience mild happiness, or does the process of emotional contagion and other bodily feedback processes mean that all shared emotions are necessarily amplified such that groups tend to experience extreme emotions? Much of the fear about crowd emotions concerns the overwhelming nature of group emotion, in which an individual can get swept up in the frenzy of a group. More investigation is needed to determine how much an individual is able to contribute to and resist the affective forces of her group, and how the processes of

identification and dissociation from her group can impact the overall strength of a group emotion.

As with personal emotions, there are also questions about the role that group emotions play in motivating action. I suggested in Chapter 3 that collective guilt could motivate collective action by the wrongdoing party (as opposed to actions by individuals), and in Chapter 4, I pointed to the Women's March which ostensibly occurred as a result of shared outrage. Yet I suspect that the connection between group emotion and collective action may be fairly complex, particularly in heterogeneous groups. While a group emotion may be shared by many individuals, each individual will experience a unique set of personal and group emotions, and the interaction between her different personal and shared emotions may impact on the motivational force of group emotion. Given this, there may be reason to doubt whether group emotions are necessary or efficacious in the public, political sphere. Must a country experience collective guilt for its wrongdoing against their indigenous population in order for political reconciliation to be achieved, or is it simply more efficient to legislate political reparations? Should activists focus on harvesting shared outrage at political corruption, or are there better ways to deal with such problems?

Our emotions play an important role in our lives. Our different social identities and group memberships also play an important role, and shape much of our interaction with one another. What we care about and how we feel is not as personal or as individual as philosophers suspect. We make our way in the world with one another, and we rely on one another to help us make sense of the world. In offering a model of group emotion, I take this fact seriously. Sometimes, my emotion is not simply *my* emotion. Sometimes, my emotion is *our* emotion.

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