

HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN THE LATE 1920s

By

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Abstract

In the late 20s Heidegger begins to speak continually of something called ‘transcendence’ and of its radical centrality to the problem of fundamental ontology. In particular he connects this problem back to the terse, enigmatic and somehow almost buried analysis of SZ §69. There has long been evidence for the importance of this problem for Heidegger, and there is mounting evidence for its centrality to the problem of division three of *Being and Time*.

And yet, as a question, transcendence has received even less dedicated attention than the similarly decisive problem of temporality. This thesis seeks to remedy the above deficiency by applying itself wholly to the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first offers a preliminary sketch for the problem by discussing *Being and Time* in general, along with the problems of the surrounding world in particular and the history of the concept of world. The second part is concerned with the *unity* of the problem and this means with the interpretation of transcendence as a radicalisation of the existential concept of world. The third part is concerned with the *completeness* of the phenomenon, thus it unfolds the previously won unity according to its connection with the problems of freedom, selfhood, historicity and the question of being. Throughout the whole analysis the phenomenon of transcendence will be clarified, and through this, the problem and the import of transcendence will be demonstrated.

Statement of Authorship

I certify that the following thesis is entirely my own original work and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or educational institution. All sources of information used in this thesis have been indicated and due acknowledgement has been given to the work of others.

Signed:

Adam Ronald Tate

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Finally I should like to acknowledge Heidegger research in general and pre-emptively apologise if I have at any point spoken unjustly or out of hand concerning this research. And in this regard I should like to be allowed the pretention of offering the following gesture of solidarity:

Φύσις μὲν κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, λόγος δέ κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, Αἰδεγῇ δέ κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ¹

¹ There is, of course, an allusion to Herakleitus Fr. 123 here. For the sake of clarity, Αἰδεγῇ is a necessarily imperfect transliteration of ‘Heidegger.’

Abbreviations

Abbreviation Schema:

MFL (E/D) 100 / 124

= *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (E for English) p100 / *Metaphysische Anfangsgründer der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (D for Deutsch) p124

SZ (S, D) 100

= *Being and Time* (S for translated by Stambaugh) p 100 & *Sein und Zeit* (D for the standard German edition) p 100

CPR (E, D: A/B) 170 / 212

= *Critique of Pure Reason* A170, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* A170 / *Critique of Pure Reason* B212, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* B212

Accordingly, when separated by commas, this means that both editions referred to use the same pagination, when separated by slashes this indicates that the pagination differs.

For those texts where there is only one translation available E stands for English and D for Deutsch. Where there is more than one translation available D stands for Deutsch and other letters either stand for the surname of the relevant translator (in the case of *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*) or some other distinguishing feature. Exceptions are marked in the abbreviations list.

Where no letter codes are appended to the citation this always refers to the English translation unless there is none available. Thus, “BP 30” refers to *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* p 30 whilst, since GA27 remains untranslated at the present time “EP 30” refers to *Einleitung in die Philosophie* p 30. Where a citation is too general to differentiate between editions (or it would be vacuous to specify which edition) such as in reference to sections (e.g. SZ §69c) this means that any edition is treated as supporting that which is referred to.

Works by Heidegger:

Being and Time:

SZ = *Sein und Zeit*

D = Deutsch; German (Gesamtausgabe)

EH = Erste Hälfte; First Half (the 1949 pre-Gesamtausgabe edition)

M&R = Macquarrie and Robinson

S = Stambaugh

S/S = Stambaugh with revisions by Schmidt

SZ I.1.i :

SZ = Being and Time,

I = capital Roman numeral to signify part (Teil).

1 = Arabic numeral to signify division (Abschnitt).

i = lower case Roman numeral to signify chapter.

Thus:

SZ I = *Being and Time part one*

SZ II.1 = *Being and Time part two, division one*

SZ I.3.iv = *Being and Time, part one, division three, chapter four*

Other Works:

AT: *Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität: aus den Jahren 1925 bis 1927* (Nachlass)

BP: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, or, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA24)

BCA: *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, or, *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (GA22)

Contributions: Contributions to Philosophy (from enowning), or, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (GA65)

CTD:¹ *the Concept of Time: the first draft of **Being and Time*** (in GA64)

CTL:² *the Concept of Time: lecture for the Marburg theological faculty* (in GA64)

DL: *a Dialogue on Language (between a Japanese and an Inquirer)* (in GA12)

EHF: *The Essence of Human Freedom*, or, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie* (GA31)

EP: *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (GA27)

ET: *On the Essence of Truth (Pathmarks)*, or, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Wegmarken)* (in GA9)

FCM: *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (GA29-30)

HCT: *History of the Concept of Time: prolegomena*, or, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (GA20)

¹ Concept of **T**ime: **d**raft, thus CTD

² Concept of **T**ime: **l**ecture, thus CTL

HPS: *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (GA32)

KPM: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, or, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA3)

KPM (T) = *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* as translated by Richard Taft

KPM (D) = Gesamtausgabe edition of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*

LH: *Letter on Humanism*, or, *Brief über den Humanismus* (in GA9)

L: H&A:³ *Letters: 1925-1975: Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*

L:H&J:⁴ *Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence*

L:H&L:⁵ *Letter Exchange with Karl Löwith on **Being and Time***

L:H&M:⁶ *Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente*

L:M&E:⁷ *Letters to his Wife: 1915-1970*

LQT: *Logic: the Question of Truth*, or, *Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (GA21)

Mindfulness: Mindfulness (GA66)

MFL: *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, or, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründer der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (GA26)

PIK: *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, or, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (GA25)

PR: *the Principle of Reason* (GA10)

Turning: the Turning, or, *die Kehre* (in GA7)

QCT: *Question Concerning Technology* (in GA7)

SHF: *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, or, *Schelling: Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit* (1809)⁸ (GA42)

S:WF:⁹ *Schelling: Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (WS 1927/28) (in GA86)

Vita: *A Recollective "Vita" 1957* (in GA1)

VWG: *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (in GA9)

VWG (ER) = *The Essence of Reasons* as translated by Terrence Malick

³ Letters between Heidegger and Arendt, thus L:H&A

⁴ Letters between Heidegger and Jaspers, thus L:H&J

⁵ Letters between Heidegger and Löwith, thus L:H&L

⁶ Letters between Heidegger and Müller, thus L:H&M

⁷ Letters between Martin Heidegger and Elfride Heidegger, thus L:M&E

⁸ Previously published in German as *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809)

⁹ Seminars on Schelling and the **W**esen of human **F**reiheit, thus S:WF

VWG (EG) = *The Essence of Grounds* as translated by William McNeill
VWG (D) = *Vom Wesen des Grundes in Wegmarken*

WM: *What is Metaphysics?* (in GA9)

WT: *What is a Thing?* (GA41)

ZS: *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols–Conversations–Letters* (GA89)

Works by Husserl:

Ideas I: *Ideas Towards a Pure Philosophy and Phenomenological Philosophy; First Book*, or, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: erstes Buch*

LI:I *Logical Investigations, volume I.*

LI:II: *Logical Investigations, volume II.*, or, *Logische Untersuchungen von Edmund Husserl: zweiter Theil, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*¹⁰

Works by Kant:

CPJ: *Critique of Judgement*, or, *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*:

N.B.: Because it was difficult to find an English and a German edition with a common marginal pagination, CPJ (E) refers to the marginal pagination for the English edition used herein. This pagination is the Akademie pagination. CPJ (D) refers to the marginal pagination for the German edition used herein, which is from the 1799 edition (3rd edition) published by F. T. Lagarde.

CPR: *Critique of Pure Reason*, or, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*

FSF: *the False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, or, *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen*

GMM: *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*

Works by Plato:

Sophist: Sophist: or, on being; logical.

Phdr.: Phaedrus

¹⁰ The English edition listed above only contains pp 222-715 of the German edition. That is, the English edition published as “Logical Investigations, Volume II” begins with the third investigation of *Logische Untersuchungen: zweiter Theil* and contains the rest thereof. However, no references are made to the first or second investigations of *Logische Untersuchungen: zweiter Theil* in this thesis.

Works by Aristotle:

Anim.: On the Soul

Cat.: Categories

Met.: Metaphysics

Poet.: Poetics

Pr. Anal.: Prior Analytics

Other Abbreviations:

Ch. = chapter

cf. = Compare

esp. = especially

et passim = and many other places

et seq. = and those subsequent (used for sections or chapters rather than pages herein)

f. = and the next page

ff. = and the following pages

infra = footnote or marginal note (*infra* = below)

et infra = main text and footnotes and/or marginal notes

herein = this thesis (e.g. “cf. Part I herein”).

(modified) = translation modified

passim = scattered frequently throughout (or else, as a whole under certain circumstances)

