

Fear of a Brown Planet

**The ‘Trump Effect’, Right-Wing Populism, and Islamophobia in
Australia**

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Abstract

This thesis will argue how the explicit Islamophobic stance Donald Trump embodied during 2016-17, influenced a resurgence of right-wing populism in Australia. Amidst a global environment, characterised by notions of insecurity, Trump emerged victorious in his bid to win the 45th United States Presidency. His presidential claim to fame centred on a populist premise of 'Making America Great Again' through mobilising the disenfranchised white fringes of US society.

The superpower's legitimisation of a nationalistic driven rhetoric presents a thriving area of interest within academia, specifically in localising the 'Trump effect' in the Australian context and examining its impact on Australian politicians and the media. The significance of my research project lies in the complexity of analysing the domestic media and political spheres, portraying a homogenous threatening perspective of the Othered identity, personified by Australian Muslims.


However, this is not a novel concept. Previous research into Australia's settler-colonialist history, reveals an embedded legacy premised upon systematically oppressing and demonising Indigenous and non-white bodies. In these deviations from the white majority, racialised manifestations of Islamophobia are justified: a public perception of the Muslim body as a sole aggressor in an otherwise peaceful world is reinforced through ethnocentric schemas advocated by those with political power.

Regarding the 'Trump effect' that is characterised by an overwhelming Islamophobic sentiment prevailing throughout the West, the thesis will analyse key public addresses recorded during Trump's pre-presidential and post-inauguration campaigns. Through a Foucauldian discourse and visual cultural analysis, the effects of his Islamophobic representations of Islam and Muslims are compared with the rhetoric of the Australian political and media spheres. As such, iterations of the transnational nature of the 'Trump effect' are best exemplified through the controversial personalities of Pauline Hanson and Cory Bernardi.

In concluding, my thesis evidences how Trump's position of power institutionalised a divisive rhetoric that normalised race hatred and hate speech in an unprecedented way. Therefore, the Australian populist response was legitimated in its overt adaptation of the 'Trump effect'.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed)  _____

Date: 15.10.2018

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And finally, my thesis's title pays homage to not only, the brown anti-racism activists who continue to challenge stereotypes, through various artistic forms. But it also pays respect to the Afrocentric, 90's hip-hop group, Public Enemy. Their widely influential album and songs which 'Fight the Power' continues to prove its relevancy.

Introduction

Towards the latter part of 2015, the election campaign for the United States 45th Presidency was gaining momentum. True to his character, as evidenced by his extensive business and showbusiness resume, Donald John Trump capitalised upon the divisive race. In appealing to Americans, based on a platform of populist principles, the then-Republican candidate exploited several global terrorist attacks to further his political agenda. In the days following the domestic San Bernardino attack, his solution to eradicate the terrorist threat was articulated in an early December rally. Standing in front of an ominous slogan that stated his promise to ‘MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN’, Trump was careful to recite a written statement:

“Donald J. Trump is calling for a complete and total shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the hell is going on. We have no choice. We have no choice.”

(Johnson 2015)

Trump called for voter support, grounded on a campaign unafraid to ‘Other’ Muslims, their Islamic faith and their ‘foreign’ religious and cultural practices. This statement acted as an indicator of Trump’s expansive anti-Islamic sentiments, which he employed throughout his 2016 pre-presidential campaign. However, Islamophobia – that is, the social process of learning to feel negatively affected by the presence of Islamic artefacts and Muslims – did not suddenly appear overnight. Rather, it has acted as a structural component of America’s frontier legacy, where innate suspicion is inscribed into the Islamic identity. This sentiment has increased in the aftermath of the 2001 Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks. Following Trump’s inauguration in 2017, the President normalised racist and prejudiced ‘critiques’ of anti-Islamic discourses. Irrespective of the domestic and global condemnation for Trump’s philosophies and politics, his campaign efforts, and presidential popularity has resonated amongst international, right-wing actors.

Regarding Australia, the political and media spheres dutifully appropriated qualities of the ‘Trump effect’: it sought to reinstate overt white supremacism while normalising the exclusion of ‘deviant’ and ‘barbarous’ Others. While only 2.6% of Australians identify as Muslim, almost half of the Australian population have voiced their approval of a Muslim immigration ban (One Path Network 2018: 7 -17). It is reflective of Trump’s statement above. Considering this, the ‘Trump effect’, is perhaps best exemplified in Pauline Hanson’s and Cory Bernardi’s political contributions to sentiments of this nature. While the senators come from different political backgrounds, their anti-Muslim discourse solidifies a populist allegiance: both actors pay tribute to Trumpian characteristics. As they work to undermine multiculturalism which defines the diverse Australian landscape, there is specific intent to incite a narrative of white marginalisation.

The intent of positioning this thesis from early 2016 to late 2017 is to analyse the ‘Trump effect’ in Australia. The project tracks powerful instances of Islamophobic representations of Muslims and the Islamic faith through a Foucauldian and visual cultural analysis of the media and political spheres. Moreover, it will demonstrate the similarities and differences, during Trump’s pre-presidential campaign and his post-inauguration presidency, which sanction Hanson’s and Bernardi’s Islamophobia. It is confined to only seminal examples exercised by Trump and his Australian counterparts. Given the recency of the ‘Trump effect’, my thesis aims to contribute towards the existing *and* developing literature. It emphasises Othered treatment within settler-states, inclusive of a pervasive rise of racialised modes of exclusion. However, before such an analysis can take place, examination of the large body of scholarship in which this multidisciplinary thesis is located, is needed.

The following chapter introduces critical scholars and their influential theories. It recognises: (a) how ‘Otherness’ is constructed, (b) Australia’s colonialist legacy and its residual effects that devalue multicultural flourishing, and (c), how a perceived ‘clash of civilisations’ encourages overt and covert modes of Islamophobia. Once this extensive body of scholarship has been addressed, the introductory chapter will also discuss the proposed methodology and its justification. Power is inherent within discourses and representations, and as such, this needs to be emphasised early: it provides genealogical reasoning for recognising modes of subjugation, employed by the white populist actors.

The following chapters constitute this thesis:

Chapter 1, Pre-Inauguration: Leader of the Pack, introduces a seemingly unlikely US political contender, Donald J Trump. His 2016 politics are considered as a reverberation of ignored historical injustices. The chapter provides an analysis of a semi-scripted CNN interview with Trump. Further, this chapter introduces his Australian counterparts and a description of their past political conduct. We see the re-emergence of Pauline Hanson and the revived popularity of her One Nation party. Her provocative maiden address to the Senate is analysed. The chapter also introduces, Cory Bernardi. The selected example displays his conservatism and his admiration for right-wing fringe movements. It is clear from this chapter that Islamophobia does not always need to be explicitly stated, as it manifests through micro-aggression and indirect speech.

Chapter 2, Post-Inauguration: Celebrity in Chief, describes the amplification of racial, cultural, ethnic and gendered divisions in the wake of Trump’s election. It is apparent when Trump assumed power in 2017 his absolute dominance is exerted upon Others within contemporary US society. It is evidenced through the raft of legislations he promptly enacts, with a specific focus on his executive order 13769. The chapter expresses the cross-cultural iteration of the ‘Trump effect’

within the Australian domestic spectrum. This is not only evidenced by the similarity in hate-crime statistics but also, seen through Hanson's parliament burqa 'stunt'. Bernardi again evidences the transnational effect. His public appearance at an overt right-wing fundraiser is analysed. The chapter demonstrates how Trump's Presidency licensed Islamophobia in an unprecedented way.

Conclusion: Weapons of Mass Distractions is this thesis's final chapter. It is an integration of the arguments that this thesis has explored. It concludes by providing a summary detailing the 'flow-on-effect' and its ability to sanction Islamophobia in (dis)similar ways, across shores and actors. Further, it also points to recent Islamophobic advances. It is essential to signpost these developments as they provide insight and predictive qualities of the global anti-Islamic movement currently taking place.

Introduction: Literature Review

Construction of the Other

For the widely influential French theorist, Michel Foucault, power, knowledge and the body are inextricably linked. Foucault discusses this in *The History of Sexuality* (1978: 93) stating that, “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere”. He continues to say that power is not “an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with” (1978: 93). In adopting a worldview influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault asserts that power is an overwhelming omnipresence that is limited in its reach: it is distribution through complex social networks, negating the static preconception of how power is exercised. Power is then understood to emulate from humanity’s past because it is something that circulates from one moment to the next (Rouse 2005: 110). Furthermore, Foucault (1977: 25) describes the body as being devoid of individuality, in its appropriation as a political vessel. Bodies are taught to perform rituals and to emit class-appropriate signs, undergoing a continual process of being marked, tortured and invested in.

In addressing the body’s position within capitalism, Foucault presents biopower and how it emerges as an “indispensable element” which acts as a normative guide, establishing clear markers of who is to be subjugated (Rouse 2005: 141). Biopower is a process where control is exerted onto the body, created from both disciplinary and regulatory power.¹ In its clear rejection of a humanist view, these systems of subjugation create struggles that occurs against (1) ethnic, social and religious forms of domination, (2) the methods allowing exploitation and categorisation, and (3) the confinements in which submission disregards subjectivity (Foucault 2000: 331). Essentially, within this Foucauldian analysis of the body as a malleable concept, the ‘subjugated knowledge’ is ignored: this serves to devalue and remove illusions of a body’s autonomy, thus emphasising the clear link between power/knowledge (Sawicki 2005: 381). It is a complex relationship which structures the experiences of the self, the world, and methods of overcoming social conformity by investigating “the knower, the kinds of objects that are said to be known, and how these relationships of power-knowledge constitute domains and fields of knowledge” (Hewett 2004: 22).

As public consensus is formed through truth claims that are assumed to be accurate representations of an epoch, event, place, or a collective, Foucault challenged this long-held assumption. The scholar insisted that critical reflection be required: the self and reality are historically and politically situated. As written in *The Order of Things* (1970: xxvi), Foucault argues that “the history of madness would be the history of the Other... for a given culture, is at once inferior and

¹ Regulatory power refers to the “species body”, inclusive of the legislature and intervening methods that are responsible for “governing the health and welfare of populations”. Disciplinary power ascribes universal standards of “self-understanding and [the] practices that render [the body] docile and useful at the same time” (Sawicki 2005: 382).

foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcize the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness)”.

Naming Foucault’s early research into Western modes of treating illness, Young (1995:3) accredits his work as a “founding study of the way in which European society has determined its forms of exclusion and the differences that limit it”. While Foucault “had a lot to say about power”, Young asserts that the academic was “curiously circumspect about...[how power] has operated in arenas of race and colonialism” (1995: 1). This is not to say that Foucault completely disregarded the relationship between biopower and race, as racism “is not a phenomenon in Western society that can be safely compartmentalized as an aberration...of sexuality” (Foucault 1978: 11). Rather, Foucault understood the connection between sexuality, class and race regarding “the survival class supremacy”, where eugenics are “deployed...with respect to control, ordering and supervision” of the exploited subjects (Young 1995: 11).

These racial divisions secure the purity of blood and ensure the triumph of a particular race (Foucault 1978: 149). Foucault’s research establishes how bodies are predisposed to modes of domination and regulation, because of a history where “species...[preserve] their strictly defined identity” (Foucault 1966: 145). It is a perspective that Edward Said would build upon in *Orientalism* (1978). While Foucault’s “virtual silence on these [colonial and race] issues is striking” (Young 1995: 1), Said advocated a counter-discursive position. His work challenged the embedded colonial assumptions of the Arab and the Muslim body, as well as Western knowledge of the Middle East (ME).

By investigating a variety of texts that were written and promoted by Western academics and institutions, Said’s comparisons found consistent colonial constructions of race, Arabs, Muslims and Islam. By Othering the Orient and its people, this served to fulfil a representation of a homogenised and inferior, brown body. The simple dichotomy of ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1993) was effectively applied through a systematic devaluation of the ME, within Western scholarship.² In creating a racist episteme of the ME and the Oriental Other, both Foucault and Said assert that these misrepresentations serve to empower Western structures: Orientalist ‘truths’ rationalise ongoing methods of colonising the Other, who is understood to be innately barbarous by showcasing a litany of evil attributes (Milton-Edwards 2011: 10). In valuing “power before truth” (Daldal 2014: 160), the hegemonic position of the West is understood through in a

² It has been achieved through the West’s proclaimed knowledge of “making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it...for dominating restricting and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1978:11)

Gramscian lens: the “ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over [exerted over] the subordinate classes, [come to] accept them as ‘normal’” (Carnoy 1986 in Daldal 2014: 156).

Schemas – a set of interrelated cognitions (Valian 1998: 111) – is then, a particularly important area of study. Schemas attempt to understand how a subject internalises and interprets a hegemonic position. It acts as the “abbreviated form” of inferring a body’s membership through the quick mental assessments which deduce a causal relationship across identifiable features (Valian 1998: 111). As Haslanger (2008: 213) emphasises, this consistent expectation of visual cues and exerted behaviour, are not only learnt through social institutions, but are also reproduced and adapted through an ongoing process of socialisation.

This reveals a fundamental concern. Individuals are less likely to critically reflect when confronted with conflictual schemas that deviates from their fixed assumptions (Oyserman 1993). While schemas can provide an efficient way to disseminate facets of an identity, hegemonic power lies in the guarantee that a body will emanate certain stereotypical traits and exert behavioural specific cues. This unconscious bias acts as a great classificatory system and serves to differentiate between racial and social subgroups. In this respect, the production of schemas is an inevitable colonial effect which permeates throughout the sociocultural sphere: they provide a necessary measure for human comparison.

In *Black Skin, White Masks* (1967), Frantz Fanon characterised this as a racialised, hierarchical structure. He describes how these binary distinctions label a perceived worth, where bodies understand themselves, regarding a colonial construction of what they are not. Fanon (1967: 111) describes this as a “historico-racial schema”, created from the “thousand[s] of details, anecdotes, [and] stories”. Echoing similarities to Foucault, from Fanon’s assertion there exists unequal relations of power inherent within structures of whiteness: the prevailing narrative constructed, serves to devalue and infantilise the Other body, due to an association of difference. Once these modes of racialised thinking become “embedded through the culture industry” (Kane 2007: 356), their wide acceptance gives birth to a stereotype.

Slow in nature to change and fuelled by a readiness to group bodies based on an over-exaggeration of racialised attributes, Hall (1997a) argues that stereotypes are central aspects of prejudice and discrimination. In recognising pre-existing patterns of binary logic, Hall identified how hegemonic portrayals of Othered bodies were akin to the inaccuracy of common sense logic: they “reduce people to a few, simple, essential characteristics...[and] are fixed by Nature” (1997a: 257). When delivering his seminal lecture *Race, the Floating Signifier*, Hall (1997b) reasoned that the fluidity of race becomes a function within “the systems of classifications...used to divide populations into different ethnic or racial groups, and to ascribe characteristics to these different groupings”. In his

critique of ethnocentrism within the media, Hall (1993: 510) contributed towards the reception theory: he argued how texts are hidden with certain values, produced by the author. This model of communication saw messages being encoded and decoded in socially specific ways, producing variations of meanings due to the diverse audience.³ By defining a body based on fixed, racialised traits, this is not just an over-simplification of those who share the Other signifier. The racialised stereotype is also, indicative of the disparity in power relations as normative conduct reflects assumed worthiness, and further justifies subjugated treatment.

Settler Colonialism and Multiculturalism

It should be emphasised that the social construction of race, gives validity to applications of biopower, which is inherent within colonising rule (Morgensen 2011: 52). However, colonialism, as a concept and as a method of exerting power, is not homogenous. A fundamental division lies in the management of colonised bodies. It is necessary to distinguish: hegemonic applications of power which forcefully cast out or exploit racialised Others, are justified in this violent response. Colonies and the colonised subject are stripped of its resources to fuel a superpower's net of influence. Disregarding the differentiation of franchise and settler colonialism, marginalises individual histories and experiences, while wrongfully assuming a shared, transnational, postcolonial response.⁴

For the Australian academic, Patrick Wolfe (1994), the British rule in India illustrates the epitome of franchise colonialism. This was due to a white reliance on a collaborative relation, albeit a forced one, with the Indigenous Other. Wolfe (1994: 129) addresses how settler colonialist rule was pragmatic. He characterises franchise colonialism through direct power, where the indirect influence of white rule permeates throughout all levels of the (post)colonised sphere. Here, white reliance was seen in the hyper-exploited and imported sources of labour, to alleviate dependency on the Indigenous subject (1994: 100). In their fundamental goal to eliminate the colonised, occurrences of Indigenous slavery was an inevitable by-product of colonialism: authority instructed the Indigenous Other to “work for me while we wait for you to disappear” (Veracini 2011: 8). As Wolfe writes in *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native* (2006: 389), by “establishing itself on their territory”, similarities can be made between the methods of institutionalised segregation inflicted upon Native Americans, to that of the atrocities committed against Indigenous Australians. Settler colonialism posits upon the complete eradication and replacement of the Indigenous Other.

³ The scholar theorised that the “‘message form’ is the necessary ‘form of appearance’ of [an] event in its passage from source to receiver. Thus... the mode of symbolic exchange is not a random ‘moment’” (Hall 1993: 509).

⁴ Simply described by Veracini (2011: 7), the prevailing logic of franchise colonialism opted a rhetoric of, “no, you work for me”, whereas settler colonialism that told the colonised, “no, you go away”.

As “power spoke through blood...[and] blood was a reality with a symbolic function” (Foucault 1978: 147), phenotypical markers of difference were assumed to be definitive cues of intelligence and personality.⁵ From this, the rights that privileged whiteness was under threat by the uncivilised Other, whom it was attempting to ‘emancipate’ by eradicating the Other’s cultural norms and values. Judith Butler (1993) describes this as a form of schematic racism: white paranoia is cultivated in the culturally segregated communities which served to legitimise the systematic force of white authority, over the colonised opposite. Through this preservation, whiteness and all the liberating connotations it conjures, is a facet that needs to be secured.

Embedded within these racist modes of thinking, Perera (2009) argues that the colonial foundation of Australia can be understood in the cultural markers of differences – racialised schemas categorise and reinforce ‘worth’ of a body. She argues that these portrayals of the culturally and biologically inferior black body, reflected a white willingness to exert power over the Other. Therefore, this legitimised inhumane treatment and the denial of Aboriginal and Islander people’s sovereignty (2009: 16). Indigenous sovereignty was “never positioned as central to shaping the terms and conditions of...making the nation” (Moreton-Robinson 2009:101). By reserving sociopolitical and cultural privileges by the modes of schematic racism, mass removal of the Other body is justified: settler colonial dimensions of inequality reproduces a ‘logic of elimination’ which alleviates white panic by abolishing the threatening Other.

The “logic of elimination” coined by Wolfe (2006: 387)⁶, theorises that the systematic eradication of the Indigenous subject, is not solely confined to aspects of extreme violence, as evidenced in historical examples of genocide. It is a logic that stresses the fragility of the white identity, where the amalgamation of people, culture and land, reinforces the monopoly of a hegemonic position. It is understood in the founding rationale of settler colonialism that envisioned the disappearance of the Indigenous Other – a practice that Veracini (2011:101) describes as being varied in the degree of erasure.⁷ By entrenching schematic roles that dictate the behaviour of the Other subject, a reduction of Indigenous distinctiveness occurs. Recognising this, Moses (2000: 90) argues that the predatory nature of Western colonialism, specifically in managing the Australian Indigenous population, is best conceptualised in its modern form as both, ethnocide and cultural genocide. While biopower dictates that Indigenous populations and coerced labourers could never be granted the same sorts of privileges ascribed to the hegemon, this schematic representation still resonates within Australia’s postcolonial legacy. Colonial invasion then acts as a structure, not an event

⁵ European colonialism was empowered as “the best type of human being” (Hage 2000: 93), the belief legitimated a racist episteme of blood quantum laws (Wolfe 2006: 388).

⁶ The term embodies Raphael Lemkin’s notion of national patterns of genocide “ultimately aimed at annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944 in Moses 2000: 104).

⁷ Practices that purge the Other range from complete physical elimination and dispossession, to the absolute absorption of Indigenous cultural practices, replaced with that of the hegemon.

(Wolfe 2006: 388). Therefore, the enactment of an assimilationist agenda is understood, as a disguised form of ethnocide and cultural genocide (Short 2010; Wolfe 1994 & 2006).

Assimilation remains a controversial topic within the Australian landscape. It is defined as the expectation of attaining uniformity: sameness in living as Australians, where the cohesive Anglo-society enjoys the same rights, privileges, and customs, and are fundamentally influenced by the same ideological beliefs (Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland 2017). Through this policy that integrates and absorbs,⁸ the appearance of Australian citizenry relies upon the promotion of social cohesion and equality, through non-discriminatory legislature. However, Modood (2014: 203) raises a crucial contradiction: regardless of how assimilation is publicly debated and advocated by prominent spokespeople, it does not conceal a one-way mode of integration. Support of erasing heterogenic facets of difference, limits the disruption of racial Otherness and reinforces appropriate schemas for the Western context.

Defined by Ghassan Hage in *Multiculturalism and White Paranoia in Australia* (2002: 424), the essence of assimilation soothes white paranoia and increased fears of marginalisation. It is effective when promoted through cultural icons that are created in the image of white heroism.⁹ As assimilation eased the fears of reverse-discrimination, multiculturalism revived the dormant fear of white cultural extinction. Campaigns which advocated for multiculturalism sought to normalise the Other: the subject was now humanised and could dispel phantasmagoric portrayals of non-Anglo people (Hage 2002: 431). By moulding the dominant Anglo-sociocultural fabric, policies regarding the foreign body, accommodated and celebrated the co-existence of cultural differences. Within this multicultural society, the foreign Other was expected to adopt Western values and norms, but now had the privilege of embracing their culturally unique facets (Modood 2014: 205).

In empowering the Other through this autonomy of identity choice, great cleavages emerged throughout contemporary Australian society. While figurative divisions were charismatic of an adage which stressed the threat to the non-white migratory population, literal divisions manifested. It is reflected in the spatial segregation of the anxious white class and the presence of ethnic communities (Forrest, Johnston, Siciliano, Manley & Jones 2017). In this “geography of racism surrounding the inclusionary and exclusionary nature of space” (Itaoui 2016: 265), schematic racism occurs as it is permissible to hate based upon the culturally and linguistically diverse

⁸ Policies enacted under this guise of belonging, are not limited to, the forcible removal of Indigenous Australian children, creating a multitude of transgenerational damages (Short 2014: 839), to an aversion of dismantling the ethno-nationalist White Australian policy, spurred from World War II and the rise in globalised movements (Perera 2007:7).

⁹ These spokespeople serve to alleviate white anxiety through their public declarations: the emancipatory and modern values the State prides itself on, must not change or be perturbed by this reluctant rise in non-white bodies (Dean, Bell & Vakhitova 2016: 122).

communities: they reflect defiance against the assimilationist Anglo-values. Where traditional racism was justified in the pre-disposition of inferior sociobiological traits, political opposition to the multiculturalist policy embodied contemporary forms of prejudice. Embedded within this modern form of racism, actors advocate for egalitarian principles. They claim to be politically liberal, by regarding themselves as ‘progressive’ due to a sympathetic position towards historical injustices (Dovidio, Gaertner & Pearson 2017: 271).

Hostility towards the Other is not explicit, as aversive racism manifests in white discomfort and a heightened sense of panic which justifies reactive self-protection measures. This needs to be emphasised: Johns (2008: 4) identifies how multiculturalism disrupted the “rules of belonging...encoded...as white”. It is an ongoing debate that gives reason for the persistent rise in nationalism, encouraging the creation of white cultural heroes. Best illustrated with the 2005 Cronulla Riots, Johns (2008) argues that a fundamental cause of conflict was an innate, white tribe-like mentality to secure the South Coast beach. As “the politics of race became the politics of possession” (Perera 2005) in this “youthful masculine contestation over space” (Poynting 2006: 86), hysteria and moral panic over the increased presence of the brown, Muslim Other was justified. Cultural mixing of neighbourhoods was unwelcomed and, defined the Australian landscape in what Amin (2012) describes as the “land of strangers”.

Forrest and colleagues (2017) argue that schematic racism and minimal social interactions between the segregated neighbours, cultivates a skewed portrayal of Muslims and Islam. In disrupting whiteness, opposition from the “host societies...create[s] tensions between ‘them-and-us’” (2017: 469). Deputising white cultural heroes serves to protect the Anglo-Australian national identity: the image was created upon the exclusion of Indigenous Australians and the foreign Other (Moreton-Robinson 2005: 21)¹⁰. While multiculturalism enabled non-Anglo subjects to access some of privileges and liberties – previously reserved for the white identity – Others will continue to remain “outside the scope of the Australian identity” (Bastian 2012: 59).

Adopting Hall’s (1997a) theory of race as a floating signifier, whiteness was never imagined as part of multiculturalism. For Abdel-Fattah (2018: 22), herein lies the fundamental problem: there has been a persistent debate which is founded on a postcolonial legacy that continues to “single[s] out Muslims as a ‘problem’ in multicultural Australia”. Multiculturalism was birthed from a legacy of marginalising Indigenous Australians, where historical legislature favoured exclusionary

¹⁰ In elevating whiteness, key cultural icons emerged from this debate and encouraged the control and scepticism of a multiculturalist sentiment. Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey (1984: 55), has been cited as a leading voice in resurging the ethno-nationalist debate, in his ‘academic’ concerns of an Asian “invasion”, spurred during the 1980’s immigration influx. Birch (2001) argues that under the Howard-era, the narrative of the self-sacrificing Anzacs, imposed a particular history which purposely ignored white contributions of genocide against Indigenous bodies. Jakubowicz (2016: 151) compares how, like Blainey, Pauline Hanson emerged as a cultural icon, which furthered public xenophobia in her assertions of Australia being “swamped by Asians”.

politics (2018: 23). This endorsed control over and the eradication of ‘deviant’ bodies. The shortcomings of a multiculturalist policy are not because of the ‘uncivilised’ Other, who supposedly compromises the integrity of the Anglo-State through their ‘oppressive’ religious and cultural practices. Rather, the enduring legacy of colonialism – specifically the process of privileging binary distinctions – has significantly contributed towards Australia’s fractured and segregated sociocultural landscape.

Over the last decade, the ‘failure’ or ‘death’ of a multiculturalist doctrine has been a reoccurring theme employed by prominent nationalist figures (Dagistanli, Possamai, Turner, Voyce & Roose 2018: 14; Ossewaarde 2014: 173-174; Modood 2014: 201, 206; Kundnani 2002: 72). These are specific to construct the ‘unassimilable’ Muslim and their Islamic faith as an innately volatile identity. It is deeply problematic. This paranoia essentialises the segregation and construction of race, while cementing a perspective that homogenises Muslims and Islam as a sole aggressor in an otherwise peaceful world.

The Clash of Cultures and Islamophobia

Relations between whites and Others are conceived in terms of a power disparity, symbolic of the polarising cultures. In these depictions, the Muslim subject is framed as a physical embodiment of everything opposite to the West. Literature which best exemplifies this racist episteme can be analysed through Bernard Lewis’s commentary in *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (1990). “The Muslim”, considered by Lewis, is a body that retains disruptive cultural and religious practices, showcasing its reluctance to modernise. Lewis’s proposed arguments deviated from pre-existing discussions. This is seen in his assertion that “for a vast number of Middle-Easterners, Western-style economic methods brought poverty...political institutions brought tyranny, even Western-style warfare brought defeat” (1990: 8).

He predicates discontentment in the ME focused on resource exploitation, as well as Western military power and expansion. The foreseeable problem Lewis theorised focused on a “clash of civilisations...[between] our secular present and them” (1990: 7). This controversial claim which stressed an impending ideological conflict, is one that Samuel Huntington expanded upon in his thesis *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993). For Huntington, all identities are either a reflection of religious or cultural affiliations. Western powers act within rational means, and because of this, it is valid in its superiority over the East. In this arena where culture drives politics, there will be undoubtedly conflict within the global political sphere due to the diversity of ideologies, as “cultural differences exacerbate economic conflict” (1993: 14). However, Huntington declared that history dictates how Islamic barbarism will prevail in this tumultuous arena: it is entrenched into Islamic teachings, passed down to its Muslim subject (1993: 26). He asserted that Islam acts

as a catalyst for global anarchy and chaos due to its confrontational stance against the West and its Judaeo-Christian alliance (Yasmeen 2008: 42). This Occidentalist lens that popularises the dichotomy of the “West versus the Rest” (Huntington 1993: 18), purposely disregards humanising qualities, allowing bodies to act as symbolic differences of race and religion.

Despite the ethnocentrism within these controversial writings, Lewis and Huntington’s arguments would later justify the Bush administration’s prolonged military campaign of the war on terror (Kumar 2010: 255). In response to the widespread insecurity associated with a post 9/11 atmosphere, there has been a continual rise in academia that critically investigates media representations of Islam and the Muslim body (Ahmed & Mattes 2017; Allen 2012; Saeed 2007; Poynting & Mason 2006; Manning 2003; Poole 2002). Audiences consume theses mediated texts, embody its meaning, often unaware of the concealed racial schemas that exemplify social differences. For example, Said (1998) emphasised how Western representations of ME and Muslims “are really two things...villains and fanatics”: the Muslim body is “strewn all over the place”, signifying its disposability.

Behdad (2010) stresses the importance reconceptualising Said’s original Orientalist theory. This is in response to the violence associated with the post 9/11 Muslim subject. Orientalism and neo-Orientalism share similar critiques of the popularised portrayal of Western states: they are perceived as a liberal and progressive advocator of human rights. This facilitates a misrepresentation of the ME, Muslims and Islam. Territorial and social instability is not framed as a product of Western occupation, but rather, as a predictor of the innate hostility of ME and its Islamic identity (Behdad & Williams 2010: 283). Adopting the neo-Orientalist definition,¹¹ the social phenomenon of Islamophobia is considered as a politicised and racialised contemporary form of Otherness. It is broadly defined as an “exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility towards Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from... [the West’s] social, political and civil life” (Ali, Clifton, Duss, Fang, Keyes & Shakir 2011: 9).

In classifying Muslims as an emotionally ‘reactive’ collective, terrorism is understood as a symptom produced by the scriptures of the faith (Abdel-Fattah 2017: 398). Enforcing real and ideological divisions based on Otherness is justified in the overt, alien expressions of Islam, such as dress, grooming and dietary customs (Dilshad & Raj 2016: 5). However, Poole (2002:19)

¹¹ While both Oriental theories understand how stereotypes play a pivotal role in justifying sentiments of Otherness, the modern successor of Orientalism differs in fundamental ways. Further explained by Behdad and Williams (2010: 284), neo-Orientalism deviates in its: (1) fluid definition, (2) the shift in focus to stress dualism, political and ideological superiority of the West and the incompatible Islamic Orient, (3) the justification of neo-imperialism through Western military intervention, specifically in the ‘war on terror’, (4) the Orient solely being characterised by the homogeneity of Islam and the Islamic Middle East, and (5), the veil signifying female oppression, rather than sexual deviancy and mysticism.

disputes, that like Islam and Muslims, Western media and its reporters are not homogenous. Therefore, in simply stating that all Muslim related texts from Western outlets, opt for an Islamophobic stance, is a grave over-generalisation. Poynting and Noble (2003) recognise this complexity. However, the hegemony's careful arrangement of criminals, terrorists and jihadists, embodies a script affiliated with the "usual media cliché of Islam" (2003: 47). Media discourses employ portrayals that normalise public upheaval against the 'criminals' who corrupt and taint the white Australian society (Morgan & Dagistanli 2010: 592; Poynting, Noble, Tabar & Collins 2004: 61). Furthermore, Saeed (2007: 12) argues how these debilitating images are widely dispersed, and as such, "the media is guilty of reinforcing anti-Muslim racism".

In referencing the similarities of "dog-whistling politics and journalism" (Poynting & Nobel 2003: 41), Islamophobia need not be explicitly stated: embedded within texts and discourses are subliminal codes, intended to target a subgroup emotionally. Adopting Hall's theory of encoding and decoding, Poynting and Nobel (2003) highlight how mediated schemas stress the fundamental clash of the West and the Muslim Other. The accompanying text carries detrimental overtones of nationalistic and racial themes, through an "unnecessary emphasis" of an implied exclusion (2003: 45). As argued by Abdel-Fattah (2017: 401), the myths of this racist logic are insidious: it "quietly grooms racialised people, seducing them into a hegemonic narrative of racism". Abdel-Fattah draws from previous postcolonial discussions that identify how Australia has been negligent in disregarding the connection between Islamophobia and the pervasive colonial legacy. This is evidenced in the inhumane treatment of the Indigenous Other.

Islamophobia within the Australian context acts as an emotional response, rather than the "expression of systemised racial logics with complex and multi-routed underpinnings" (Lentin 2016: 36). What is of interest in Abdel-Fattah's (2018: 119) research is the sociocultural confinements assigned to the Muslim subject. In describing the inaccuracy of the mediated Muslim Other depiction, she describes how proactive measures are considered by Islamic communities and Australian-Muslim bodies to alleviate Islamophobic tensions. At the core of this social phobia is a clash that misrepresents the Muslim body. Therefore, normative Muslim behaviour is defined in its public and private response that delegitimises acts of terrorism as it distorts Islamic principles and its teachings. At a time when Islam is a regular subject of controversy within the media and political spheres, Islamophobia entrenches racialised schemas that dictate the type of social expressions which is permissible by the Muslim body.

The insidious nature is understood in the portrayals of Muslim women as the victims of patriarchal domination. These representations are explicit to frame them as powerless bodies, unable to challenge the patriarchal nature of Muslim men that enforce such strict dress codes (Waikar 2018:

156; Ossewaarde 2014: 176; Medina 2014: 877). As “Muslim women [become] the signifier of difference” (Sakai & Yasmeen 2016: 371), clothing acts as a symbolic function of individual expression, where the fundamental clash of cultures lies in the culturally modest garbs worn by the feminised Muslim body.¹² Ryan’s (2011) quantitative research into the “under-representation of [Muslim] women’s voices” (2011: 1046) attempts to rectify the West’s conception of the passive Muslim female subject.¹³ She identifies that the deliberate absence of Muslim women from the current controversial debate facilitates a culture which prominently ridicules those who retain Islamic signifiers. Furthering this, when the feminised Muslim body chooses to diversify their modest clothing choices, questions over the body’s religious moral status are raised (2011:1056).

This form of collective stigmatisation, where Islamophobic schemas act as a method of policing, is not only exerted onto the community – it also comes from within the Islamic community. It is Ryan’s assertion that reinforces Abdel-Fattah’s position that the support cultivated internally from the Islamic community, may equally contribute towards the facilitation of racialised stereotypes (Ryan 2011: 1058). Additionally, Poynting and Noble (2003) found that Islamic clothing was understood to be predictive of an Other’s inability to assimilate. They argue that when the feminised Muslim body seek to challenge the “cultural mainstream...stereotypes” (2003: 46), by stating that they do not conform to mediated representations of Islam or have chosen to not wear traditional garbs, it not only Otherises those that choose to do so. While their individual assertion of independence empowers them and the degree of their beliefs, it is detrimental for the collective Muslim conscious: it serves to reinforce how their Western citizenry and ascribed Anglo-privileges, are contingent on their level of assimilation.

Furthermore, the extent of Islamophobia does not cease when one is outside the public arena, as it prevails on all levels of being (Sayyid 2014: 11). This allows dominant media representations and political speech to continually repeat to the public who the enemy is, how to define the threat, teaching them to rely on established schemas and stereotypes. Van Dijk (1993) identifies the how selectivity of “facts”, strategically shapes a narrative to reproduce “white group dominance” (1993: 269). There is a fundamental need to “examine and evaluate” (1993: 253) sufferances of prejudice, racism and discrimination from the exclusive position of the Othered body. In emphasising this counter-discursive position, Van Dijk asserts that it is essential in rectifying

¹² It is imperative in understanding that while a fraction of Muslim women are forced to wear traditional garbs, largely indicative of their authoritative cultural surroundings, the female Muslim body has a choice in dressing modestly. Movements to counter the patriarchal culture include Muslim women protesting compulsory dress-codes, as seen with the Iranian inspired hashtag “#mystealthyfreedom”. It should also be noted that Muslim men, are too, showing solidarity with the feminised Muslim body by adopting the hijab to protest (Mirdamadi 2018; Saul 2016)

¹³ Researchers have found those who wear cultural garbs, are empowered through their overt display of faith, showcasing their social activism and self-control (Manson-McGinty 2014; Medina 2014; Janson 2011; Abu-Lughod 2002).

public consensus that is manufactured by colonialist history. Only after challenging this dehumanising subject position, autonomy can be bestowed upon the Other subject. However, Orientalism “inherits a set of structures from the past” (Samiei 2010: 1149). Eurocentric knowledge has not only taught the ways of perceiving and addressing issues and bodies of the ME – it has been successful in reproducing variants of the same, stagnant stereotypes. As Said (1978) refers to the limited “lenses through which the Orient is experienced” (1978: 57), consensus and credibility within Orientalist discourses are extended to the language and the imagery that shapes interactions of the ‘modern’ West and the ‘uncivilised’ East. This is a gatekeeping tendency. Aidi and Yechouti (2017) argue that when authority is exerted over the Orient in ways that deviate from the established parameters of discourses, works “are taken for granted [and] result in the production of ‘nonsensical knowledge’” (2017: 1068).

By attempting to dispel phantasmagoric portrayals to “prove a good image of Islam as a form of political resistance” (Abdel-Fattah 2017: 407), the collective Muslim conscious is met with scepticism. Specifically, in their quick reactions to condemn cases of fundamentalist terrorism to avoid the “politics of social transfiguration” (2017: 408), the response disregards the institutionalised nature of Islamophobia. It confines it as a problem that is exclusive to the identity. Concisely described by Abdel-Fattah (2017: 407), “Islamophobia makes the Muslim”. This is a sentiment that is especially true: the counter-discursive position adopted by the Muslim Other, defies the subjugated position. Their actions which revolt and challenge the hegemonic forms of sociopolitical and economic oppression, are repurposed and framed by the established stereotypes.

For example, the Muslim Other is still as ‘barbarous’ as Said initially conceptualised. Considering the global growth of insurgent campaigns, modern ways of accommodating their innate violence has been refashioned into ‘new barbarism’. It is a term that Tuastad (2003: 592) regards as the West’s definition for the Muslim body’s resistance to hegemonic forms of oppression. Discourses are still selective in their portrayals, continuing to ignore the longstanding political and economic contexts that incite activism, both online and offline. These demonstrations that challenge Western assumptions of Muslims and Islam are of significance: they are neither a violent nor docile entity, who are paralysed in their emotional states.

Having covered this wealth of literature that analyses the pervasive nature of societal institutions which reinforce power, ethnic and cultural disparities, significance is placed on Foucault’s critical stance that all forms of power has an inherent response to resist. While this important stance is further detailed in the methodology section, I situate this thesis within the arena of counter-discursive texts that work to challenge and dismantle hegemonic Orientalist discourses and practices.

Introduction: Methodology

Overview of Discourse Analysis and Orientalist Discourse

There is a consistent interaction between discourse and grammar: this complementary relationship sees that discourse is selective in its language production.¹⁴ However, as a term and as a theory, Foucault asserts that discourse is more expansive than a reflection of reality conveyed through texts, language or a set of cognitions. Rather, it is a critical practice revealing systematic regularity, where individual thought is constructed (Pitsoe & Letseka 2012: 24).

Importance is placed upon the social conducts that allow imaginative restrictions and constraints, as “discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak...[and] are not about objects, they don’t identify objects, they constitute them and in doing so, they conceal their own intervention” (Foucault 1972: 49). From this, the complexity of discourse is critiqued as a process of institutionalising the exclusion of Others. It is done through the authoritative methods that privileges and caters towards specified “organisational forms and practices” (Maguire & Ball 1994: 6). Inclusive are modes of interactions and types of relationships, as well as favourability in preferred methods of self-presentation and perception. The *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) identifies how “initiators of discursive practices” (Foucault 1969: 310) form worldly knowledge within the literal meanings of their works. Foucault asserts that they also assume an important role, more so than a common author. Their texts contribute towards the facilitation of spaces that allows the flourishing of “the rules of formation of other texts” (1969: 310). There is consistent dialogue, occurring from later texts that seek to form knowledge through the engagement and expansion upon original arguments and theories, presented by the initiators.

Foucault’s analysis presents how power is inherent within a discursive community, as the collective works to sustain the embedded “political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth” (1980: 133). Elite members govern the validity and refutation of “truth statements”, through the recognition of the implicit or explicit ‘discursive rules’ that orders the types of conversations that are allowed, within the context of a particular discourse (Olsson 2007). These are central to the body’s concept of the self, where knowledge/truth emerges as an intersubjective result from the “shared meanings, conventions, and social practices operating within and between discourses” (2007: 222).

Discourses are then, imposed upon the body and are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the social world, but rather, it is a perceived reality through the “mere creation of discourse” (Aidi &

¹⁴ In its most basic understanding, Ariel (2009: 5) explains how grammar is the “language-specific codes”, restricting individuals in the construction of sentences that guide effective communication. From these principles which teach coherency, discourse is a ‘natural’ occurrence emerging from the production of grammar: it is the “stretch of utterances [which are] (mostly sentences) organized in a non-random fashion” (2009: 5).

Yechouti 2017: 1046). As such, it can be considered as a critical practice that teaches bodies how their subservient subject position is justified within the inherently unequal structures of the social sphere. Subject positioning is then, a process of learning where one is in is in relation to the sociocultural sphere that defines and distinguishes bodies, where social hierarchies categorise a perceived 'worth'.¹⁵

This pre-existing repertoire that restricts freedom of thought and expression, power through a Foucauldian analysis is not an attribute: it is something that is exercised. In asking 'how does it work?', accountability needs to be placed through a discursive lens, precisely analysing the "forces [that] have a capacity for resistance, such that power is only exercised in relation to a resistance, each force having the power to affect and be affected by other forces" (Kendall & Wickham 2011: 34). Through this perspective, inherent within hegemonic discourses is a counter-discursive position that awaits to be investigated. This allows the refutation and the overwriting of dominant discourses. Foucault's influential methods of analysing the pervasiveness of subject positioning, discursive power, and how power-knowledge exists through a sociohistorical lens, is an approach adopted by Said (1978) in his counter-discursive analysis of Orientalism. As Foucault conceives discourse as a determinate of individual thought and speech over an object, Said builds upon this. He embodies Foucault's position in his cultural argument that Orientalist discourse places authoritative guidelines which define what is credible, in thought and speech, when discussing the Orient (Aidi & Yechouti 2017: 1067).

Said presents how the Middle East (ME), the Islamic faith and the subject positioning of the 'barbarous' Arab body, was strategically constructed through Eurocentric knowledge: the 'imaginative' portrayal creates destructive, real-world effects. In critiquing the "very large mass of writers...poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators", who accept the "basic distinction between the East and West" (Said 1978:10), he channels a Foucauldian analysis. Their hegemonic authority over the Orient and its subjects, allows power disparities to be reproduced and reinforced over epochs. This reveals a crucial implication when attempting to empower the Orient and its subjects. As the language and images of Orientalism are "inherited from a European past" (Said 1978: 45), those who attempt to accurately represent the region and the Muslim subject are often confined within these discursive limitations, if they are to be seen to speak with authority (Aidi & Yechouti 2017: 1068). The argument that appears is, to have credibility over the Orient, one must appear to conform to some

¹⁵ As "a person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position", more specifically, "in terms of the particular images, metaphors and story lines and concepts...made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned" (Davies & Harré 1990: 46) This facilitates methods that police autonomy and homogenise identity formation, a body's actions are determined by discursive limitations.

degree, to the very Orientalist discourse in which they critique. Through this perspective, significance is placed on Orientalist-research assuming a counter-discursive position.¹⁶

Adopted Methodology

Given this established context of discursive power, this thesis will employ the techniques of visual cultural analysis (VCA) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). These analytical approaches will be applied in their explanation of the concentric circles of influence the ‘Trump effect’ has had, in licensing Australian right-wing populism and Islamophobia. The scope of this research will localise the ‘Trump effect’ throughout 2016-2017, exclusive to Australian media and political spheres. This is not to completely disregard global patterns of anti-Muslim sentiments. Instead, the ‘Trump effect,’ has had global ramifications in its reach and is not a phenomenon that can be discussed in its full capacity within the confines of this thesis.

The following research will cite key instances of Trump’s Islamophobic rhetoric, conveyed during his pre-presidential campaign, followed by his post-inauguration presidency. These recorded addresses that are available through social media has been selected, where the transnational iterations of this effect are compared with Australian actors. Pauline Hanson and Cory Bernardi have both been selected in this analysis: they represent a similar political perspective to Trump’s and convey Islamophobia in an equally damaging way. While there is a catalogue of their anti-Islamic sentiments, expressed in both implicit and explicit forms, this thesis will analyse only 2 examples per the Australian politician’s Islamophobic speeches (1x pre-inauguration, 1x post-inauguration). These are listed below and have been limited to ensure that justice is done to these selected examples in terms of in-depth analyses of the issues they raise.

	Pre-Presidential Campaign <i>Donald Trump: “One-on-One with Anderson Cooper”</i>	Post-Inauguration Presidency <i>Donald Trump: “Executive Order: 13769”</i>
<i>Pauline Hanson</i>	“Senator Hanson’s Maiden Speech” (2016)	“Hanson’s Burqa ‘Stunt’” (2017)
<i>Cory Bernardi</i>	“7.30 Report with Senator Bernardi” (2016)	“Bernardi Defends Freedom of Speech” (2017)

¹⁶ As Foucault (1972: 133) asserts is “not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power...but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time”.

This thesis undertakes the FDA approach proposed by Kendall and Wickham (2011). They surmise that the initial step of this analysis is the acknowledgement that discourses are corpora of ‘statements’, formed through a systematic and regular organisation (2011: 24). Through the assumptions of the FDA,¹⁷ this allows the thesis to critique the egalitarian premise on which Western society establishes itself on, particularly in the legitimated exclusion of the Muslim Other.

It is equally significant in analysing the accompanying imagery that contributes towards an Islamophobic sentiment that resonates within the West. This thesis will also employ a VCA – however, caution is needed. A VCA is not the superficial and straightforward denotations made when consuming a visual text. It is a postmodern analysis that communicates through visual means, not only regarding the literal elements of what is conveyed. It employs what Mirzoeff (2015) asserts as the critical examination of the “invisible or kept out of sight” (2015: 11).¹⁸ This necessitates a reflective analysis as the ‘world-views’ that one forms, is through experiences of privileges that are ascribed and constructed by hegemonic “institutions that try to shape that view” (2015: 12).

As “all media are social media” (Mirzoeff 2015: 14) reflective of one’s position in the public sphere, what emerges is a methodological process. It acknowledges how a body’s reality is created through a culture of learnt images: targeted audiences consume visual texts that embody sociohistorical, political and cultural contexts of source production. Mitchell (2002) reinforces this sentiment in his claims that VCA emerged through a counter-discursive position of “politically motivated scholarship”, as a way to study “the construction of racial and sexual differences” (2002: 175).¹⁹ Power is inherent within the precise constructions that both, denote and connote, mediated ways of addressing and behaving around the presence of Others (Hall 1997a). The relation of image and speech creates public influence, where the selected content illustrates the emotive responses from right-wing actors and their addresses/actions, justified in that point of time. In addition to the FDA and VCA which analyse seminal anti-Muslim texts, policies and representations, this thesis will not discuss these findings without drawing on critical statistical evidence. It is needed to illustrate the pervasiveness of the ‘Trump effect’ and its influence of inciting Islamophobia within Australia.

¹⁷ After this recognition, it is followed by a critical focus on the various regulations which (2) allow the production of statements, (3) delimit permissible expression, (4) facilitate the creation of spaces in which new statements can be made, where the final step is the insurance that, (5) a practice/activity is a systematic combination of being material and discursive. This final stage of analysis places emphasis on knowledge which cannot simply be reduced to “thinking, thoughts, opinions, ideas” but rather, it is the “material practice” that yields “definite, public material conditions of operation” (Kendall & Wickham 2011: 28).

¹⁸ Mirzoeff (2015: 12) continues that visual culture is the study of “how to understand change in a world too enormous to see but vital to imagine”.

¹⁹ “Visual culture is the visual construction of the social, not just the social construction of vision...[where] question[s] of visual nature is therefore central and [an] unavoidable issue” (Mitchell 2002: 170).

The Orientalist schemas, in the form of media and political discourse and imagery, works to construct the Muslim Other as an inherently violent identity. These portrayals generate and legitimate Islamophobic practices that contradict the Australian myth of egalitarianism and inclusiveness: they demand the ever-increasing surveillance and control of Australian Muslims to secure the white nation's preservation.

The following chapters will provide an in-depth, contemporary case study of the 'Trump effect' within the Australian spectrum, and how it has incited Islamophobia through the resurgence of a nationalist movement, driven by both the media and political sphere.

Chapter One, Pre-Inauguration: Leader of the Pack

This chapter will analyse the pre-presidential platform of Trump's politics. It will look at his homogenous representation of the 'terrorist' Muslim subject, giving credence to his populist premise that is an affront to the religious principles of Islam. The chosen examples for this chapter include (a) Trump's interview with Anderson Cooper, (b) Hanson's 2016 maiden speech, and (c) Bernardi's brief appearance on the 7.30 report. Through a discussion of these examples, what follows is an analysis of how Hanson's and Bernardi's politics echoed Trump's Othered rhetoric.

Before this analysis can take place, importance needs to be placed upon Beydoun's (2017a) significant research: he details how Islamophobia existed as a structure, long before the popularisation of the term. Beydoun's work exposes a lesser known aspect of America's history that is seen in the federal legislature which institutionalised the exclusion of the Muslim subject. He cites how structural Islamophobia permeated through the courts, specifically through the policy of the Naturalization Act of 1790. It is proven that, alongside Native American, black, and migrant exclusion, Otherising Muslims also formed a part of America's founding democratic legacy. As "Islam conflicted with whiteness" (2017a: 1743), Muslim migrants were subject to extreme vetting measures enforced by the US judicial system.

Citizenship and its empowering privileges could only be gained through a case-by-case basis. This was only achieved when judges were satisfied that the Muslim migrant "fit[ted] within the statutory definition of [a] 'free white persons'" (2017a: 1741). These racial tests persisted for a "minimum of 162 years, and at maximum, 183 years", as the newly ratified Immigration Act of 1924 was effective in concealing "immigration quotas against African, Asian and Arab regions – home to significant Muslim populations" (2017a: 1746). Beydoun cites that these racist legislatures only dissolved once the "geopolitical interests in the Muslim world shifted" (2017a: 1746). Considering this, certain contemporary provisions need attention – they aided the flourishing of Trump's divisive rhetoric. The Global Terrorism Index reveals that within the last two decades, 2015 and 2016 are indicative of the second and third deadliest years for terrorism (Global Terrorism Index 2016; 2017).²⁰ This prevalence of global violence has also seen an increased rate of Islamophobic incidents and hate-crimes (Bayrakli & Hafez 2018: 218-219; Council of Islamic Relations [CAIR] 2017: 2; *Islamophobia in Australia* 2017: 42). Consistent against this Western backdrop, which evidences Islamophobia permeating throughout time and place, the politicised narrative of a "rivalry between the Orient and Occident, Muslims and

²⁰ It is a rise that attributed to the reactive response spurred from the unprecedented terrorist attacks occurring across France. The State was plagued with several devastating extremist attacks. In what would replace the hypothesized violent potential that only a fraction of believers of Islam appeared to adopt, the collective Muslim body was inscribed with an inescapable portrayal: the Islamic identity as a tangible and imminent danger, uniquely responsible for conflict occurring outside and within the borders of Western states (Global Terrorism Index 2017: 35).

Christians” (Beydoun 2017a: 1742), was effortlessly adopted by Trump in his pre-presidential rise to prominence.

Trump declared that he would, “drain the swamp” that is Washington (Overby 2018) by mobilising and exploiting the anxieties of the white working class. However, this white apprehension was not necessarily due to the current socioeconomic state of the American government. Although it was a genuine concern, Cox, Lienesch and Jones (2017) found that societal change was a key motivator for Trumpian voting preference.²¹ In attracting voters by his expansive use of the Other signifier, the pejorative term is characteristic of Trump’s pre and post-presidential campaigns. Within in his catalogue of demonising references extending towards Others, for Trump, there is a fundamental incompatibility within the teachings of Islam that renders any variation of rehabilitation redundant. At the essence of his arguments, the Muslim subject best personifies all the ‘deviant’ attributes associated with an imminent and potential threat. However, these discursive politics are in no way a new phenomenon. As supported by Beydoun’s claims, “fear of Muslims both in 1913 and 2016, shares a common threat and kindred orientation of Islam as emblematic of a national-security threat” (2017a: 1745).

In his stark departure from the conventional presidential role which presumptive nominees usually emanate, Trump’s persona and communicative style differentiated him from other candidates. His opponents shared a hyper-awareness of how their words and conduct would be under intense public and media scrutiny. However, critics have often commented that Trump’s background as a businessman was powerfully utilised to sell his casually racist opinions and unsubstantiated views (Joosse 2018: 16, Pew Research Center 2016). In marketing himself as a brand, awareness and recognition triggered an intended emotionally reactive response from a disillusioned audience. Given his extensive pre-presidential election media circuit, the ‘Trump effect’ is exemplified in a one-on-one interview. Anderson Cooper, sat down with the then front-runner of the Republican party for a half an hour interview (CNN 2016): the intimate conversation boasted an ostentatious setting at Trump’s resort, shown in figure 1. While he was quick to dispel the populist and conservative label, he contradicted himself in the same breath by declaring an affiliation with evangelicals that admired his “very conservative views”.

²¹ These fears extended to nearly half of the white Christian working-class reporting “feeling like a stranger in my own country”, where predictive attributes of Trump support disillusioned voters (1) fearing cultural displacement, (2) in favour of illegal immigration deportation, (3) perceiving university education as a high-risk investment, (4) affiliation with the Republican party, and above all, rallying behind a collective sentiment that American is in “need [of] a strong leader who is willing to break the rules” (Cox, Lienesch & Jones: Executive Summary).

Amongst his hyperbolic responses, when Cooper questioned about Trump's foreign policy position, he expressed admiration for Saddam Hussein's rule.



Figure 1: Trump One-on-One with Anderson Cooper

The candidate cited that the Middle East (ME) “was better off before” because the dictator was a “professional killer of terrorists”. When asked if Trump supported sentiments that Islam is at war with the West, Trump announced “Islam hates us” due to an inherent “sickness” within the religion that evoked “tremendous hatred”. He went on to repeat this buzz-phrase, calling for public vigilance and measures to bar the collective Islamic body, citing that they harbour a pre-existing “hatred of the United States...and of people that are not Muslim”. This statement would justify his blatant disregard for the distinction between radical or moderate Muslims, as he claimed that “you don’t know who is who”.

As Cooper questioned what measures Trump would adopt in alleviating the threat of contemporary terrorism, Trump responded that the US needed to “play the game the way they play the game”. Furthering this, Cooper asked if he supported more evasive measures of torture, which Trump replied that he was in “total support of waterboarding...so they are allowed to chop off heads and we aren’t allowed to waterboard?”. His expressive and repetitive opinions is a consistent technique when unveiling his inner thoughts about Others. It is again sampled in his response that “we have rebuilt China from what they’ve taken away from our country”. Decoded from a position of entitlement, his distaste is obvious in the language that dictates homogenised criminal identities. Trump employs racialised schemas to reinforce a subservient subject position of both, Muslim and Chinese subjects.

Throughout the interview, Trump’s accusations against Muslims and Islam was immediately encoded by either, an occasional shrug, a long pause, a defensive hand gesture, or a phrase that is akin to ‘I don’t know’. It is purposeful: this neoliberal hate-speech is disguised as common sense assumptions (Hall & O’Shea 2013: 11). Not only does the presumptive nominee employ oversimplistic language that aligns him with the ‘average person’, further cementing a populist position, but he produces a dog whistling effect. These subtle gestures and emotive overtones are

coded to elicit a reactive response from certain audiences. In stressing that ‘Islam hates us’, his deliberate exclusion of the Muslim subject qualifies the creation of an Islamophobic space. This allows American Muslim citizenry to be questioned. Trump replicates the old tropes of Orientalism by stating inclusionary group membership through ‘us’ versus ‘them’ sentiments, in addition to his views that opts for a barbarous explanation of the monolithic religion. While this is only one example of Trump’s hate-speech that samples his Islamophobia, it is no way a singular instance.²² As Trump’s sphere of influence expanded, allowing his inflammatory views to become more a norm, the top-down effect of his divisive approach was embraced by actors within the Australian media and political spheres.

For the most part, contemporary Australian society welcomes diversity: the Pew Research Center reported a consensus amongst Australians in their view that “cultural diversity makes their country a better place to live” (Poushter 2017).²³ However, these findings also show that Australians differ in whether they believe that the Muslim Other should adopt the national customs and the endorsed Anglo-lifestyle. Not only is it a statistic that mirrors the same trends as the US, but it echoes the trepidations expressed by Trump. In considering these findings, both Hanson and Bernardi capitalised on this division within Australian society, by fostering the fear of an Other in their political aspirations.

Hanson Drudging Through the Swamp

Right-wing actors have labelled Hanson's political career and personal hardships as a “phenomenal story of human endurance” (Brull 2016). Both the media and political spheres have promoted this narrative of the senator and her One Nation (ON) party as patriotic: Hanson is celebrated as the embodiment of the ‘true’ Australian “battler spirit” (Louw & Loo 1997: 6). In assuming a discursive agenda that identifies her views as voicing the concerns of ‘ordinary’ Australians, Hanson is a populist politician. She claims that there is a lack of government concern regarding the marginalisation of the white working-class, and the unheard, white rural voices (Hage 2002; Jakubowicz 2016). This is due to the establishment’s willingness to endorse pro-globalised politics at the expense of its own people. In appealing to this class-conscious reliant on a narrative of “reverse racism [that] is applied to mainstream Australians by those who promote political correctness” (Hage 2002: 430), Hanson’s political power gives validation to her racist views of Others. Past examples of this are evident in her comments regarding the Indigenous Australian and Torres Strait Islander population. The senator has argued that they are the recipients of

²² Trump’s inflammatory, pre-presidential rhetoric commonly flouted the idea of extreme Muslim surveillance through a mandatory registry system (CAIR 2017). He has also recounted his ‘experience’ of witnessing the “thousands and thousands” of Muslims, celebrating on domestic soil the collapse of the Twin Towers (Hilal 2018).

²³ When compared with the US and EU, it is a result that significantly deviates from larger cross-cultural developments, implying a positive inclination towards notions of multiculturalism and cultural acceptance.

preferential and special welfare treatment, which only fuels the high rates of unemployment, alcoholism and domestic violence within black communities (ABC 2016).²⁴ Hanson exemplifies the nation-state's "ascendancy of whiteness" (Puar 2007: 24): it is conceptualised as the engrained discursive structures which permit racial superiority to exist throughout time and institution. Explanations of usurping Indigenous sovereignty through this lens evaluate how the State encourages and maintains Anglo-settler goals. It is obvious in the policies which enact racist, xenophobic and prejudicial "ideologies and policies [which] fester" (2007: 26) and circulates throughout the Western public sphere. As Australia advocates, a national image of diversity and inclusion in a characteristically multicultural society, populist actors challenge this national portrayal of an "untarnished image of inclusion, diversity and tolerance" (2007: 26). Hanson's embodiment of white power shows how phenotypical and cultural influence continues to permeate through racialised structures within the settler-state.

Adding to Puar's claims, Moreton-Robinson (2009) evidences Australia's projection of whiteness and suppression of the black Other through the 1967 referendum. Citizenship is represented as a measure of equality and granting "this status would enable Indigenous people to overcome their poverty and become the same as other Australians" (2009: 62). However, as Moreton-Robinson explains, campaigns for Indigenous citizenship rights were pacified in the legislature of the federal government. The true intention of the settler-state's actions was done so for the benefit of the federal government, granting it newly legitimised and undisputed "power to make laws on behalf of any race" (2009: 62). There is a reluctance to make the necessary inclusive changes to the constitution (Wolfe 2006), allowing control over Indigenous bodies to be maintained through a system of impoverishment and the "'special' laws, regulations and policies that [are] racist" (Moreton-Robinson 2009: 62).

Hanson and her Anglo-imagination construct the systematic sociocultural and economic crises that impair Othered bodies, as a result of 'complacency' within the diasporic communities. Her claims relinquish responsibility of the settler-state through the social rights granted "in the form of welfare payments" (Moreton-Robinson 2009: 62). This appeases the Other's desire for full sovereign rights and ignores the influence of Anglo-atrocities committed against the Indigenous culture. Furthermore, claims of this racist nature work to consolidate the Anglo-settler colonial identity as the civilisational 'norm' within the collective Australian imagination.²⁵ As the "white identity is consequently experienced as a principle of hope" (Hage 2000: 90), Hanson still receives support

²⁴ Amongst these controversial claims, in Hanson's publication *The Truth* (1997), she asserted that the Indigenous Other, their cultural traditions and innate affiliations with the land, is founded on a collective Indigenous legacy of cannibalism (Milliken 1997).

²⁵ Moreton-Robinson exposes how policies of this kind reveal that "public attitudes towards Indigenous sovereignty have changed very little since 1788" (2009: xi)

from Othered bodies. Despite “epitomising racial hostility towards Aborigines” (Cowlshaw 2004: 65), Hanson’s black political appeal is understood by her embodiment as the “classical mythical figure of Anglo-Australians: the ‘battler’” (Perera & Pugliese 1997: 7). For one to experience the “privilege of belonging” (Hage 2000: 89) is to share traits of similarity, and as such, Hanson builds political rapport through populist speech and Australian vernaculars.

Similar to Trump, Hage (2000) describes how Hanson’s nationalistic speech cements her social significance. By advocating towards a “discourse of decline” (2000: 87), Hanson identifies those who are ‘un-Australian’ as a presence that threatens to destruct democratic principles: the decoded discourse is a loss of race control. The non-Anglo Others who support Hanson’s version of the ‘Australian lifestyle’, may do so as a safeguard technique - they seek to “preserve our way of life” in the face of a perceived “cultural [and] social slippage” (Marr 2017). While Hanson may appeal to a segment of the Othered population, her construction of the Other is one that is inferior to whites: they are fundamentally unworthy of attaining full citizenship rights.

It is a common feature that Hanson regularly adopts in her parliamentary speeches that address Others. Seen in the senator’s first maiden speech in 1996, she promoted an aggressive stance against Australia being ‘swamped by Asians’. This infamous phrase that would forever, label her as a xenophobe, was justified in Hanson’s address which cited the concentration of diasporic communities (Forrest et al. 2017: 459). As many of her sentiments are founded on the premise of an assimilationist discourse (Hage 2000: 94), Hanson negates the autonomy of the Othered body. Furthering these sentiments, Jakubowicz (2016: 160) describes Hanson as an “exemplary advocate of an ethnocratic hierarchy in Australia”. This is in reference to her demonising commentary of asylum seekers and refugees that is clear to police the privileges associated with the Anglo-identity. Her belief in an ethnocratic hierarchy legitimates Australia’s inhumane treatment of refugees while effacing the violent and oppressive circumstances that created the displaced population.

Illustrated in ‘Figure 2’, Hanson re-embodied her role as the model Anglo-citizen, delivering her much anticipated maiden speech (Australian Parliament House 2016).²⁶ While she acknowledged how her past maiden speech was not intended to be disrespectful towards “Asians”, Hanson went on to question Chinese interests. Specifically, why the State had allowed the “oppressive,

²⁶ Prior to Hanson’s 2016 maiden address, the media sphere had been priming audiences leading up to this event. The same week ushered in the newly elected Anne Aly, “Australia’s first female Muslim parliamentarian and one of only two practicing Muslim politicians,” (Romano 2017: 55) as well as Malarndirri McCarthy, “Australia’s first female Indigenous Senator, and one of three Indigenous politicians in the national parliament”. Media coverage over the next three days would be dominated by Hanson’s half an hour address. Regardless of McCarthy delivering her maiden speech immediately after Hanson, virtually no importance was placed on the monumental significance and successes of the two newly elected politicians.

communist regime” to have a monopoly over “our ports, utilities, services, agricultural land and industries”. This is symbolic of Trump discrediting China and the Eastern state’s increasingly competitive position as a superpower.



Figure 2: Senator Hanson's Maiden Speech 2016

What appears through Hanson’s commentary is that her embodiment of a national icon gives validation to recycling past racial discourses. True to the ‘Aussie battler spirit’ Hanson reproduces the rhetoric of an “Asian invasion from our north” (Ross 2006: 86). It is a learnt cultural anxiety and has prevailed through the collective imagination of the Australian settler legacy. Her sentiments reproduce a paranoid white narrative that stresses an impending invasion “detailed [by] a set of discourses centring on Australian vulnerability and [the] Asian menace” (Ross 2006: 86). It is selective narrative which fails to address Australia’s colonial legacy: the Anglo-Australian identity is established upon the deliberate erasure of Indigenous bodies, where colonial subjugation was done to secure an “attachment to ‘Britishness’” (Prokhovnik 2013: 4). In Hanson’s display of power, it is revealed that the binary privileges inherent within whiteness, are “generally only invisible to those that occupy this space of power: to white people themselves” (Willis 2012: 82).

Furthering her nationalistic defence against ‘them’, Hanson’s speech asserted that multiculturalism and inclusive immigration efforts are “rubbish”: political elitists promote this narrative as a way to distract. Hanson refuses to acknowledge the non-Anglo multicultural challenges that worked to reshape Australian identity, and in her neglect, she redeploys the white-settler discourse that carries a “colonialist definition of Australian nationhood” (Prokhovnik 2013: 4).²⁷ As she adopts similar language to Trump, Hanson identifies and generates support from “everyday Australians”. Both populist actors demand binary solidarity through an underlying narrative that stresses racial anxiety, and only when this solidarity is achieved, overt white power is once again able to flourish

²⁷ It is illegitimate in nature through its claims of “perfect territorial jurisdiction” (Ford 2010 in Prokhovnik 2013: 4). She exhibits a homogenised assertion of all immigration, furthered by an endorsement of Australia needing to “clean up your own backyard before flooding our country with more people who are going to be a drain on our society”. Foreigners in this aspect, is any non-white body.

within these settler states. Their emotive and homogenised descriptions serve to stoke the fears associated with an already occurring invasion.

What is also interesting about the Australian senator, is her ability to adopt various roles in legitimising her claims made through an authoritative parliament position. For Hanson, it is a chameleon-like quality in her embodiment of a “political prisoner”; a celebrated national icon; an ordinary Australian; and a heroine guarding the gate. Amongst these changing skins, Hanson also adopts a much more gendered position in her accusations against single mothers. These women opt to use children as “pawns” and the child support scheme as a “blatant” form of “vindictiveness...[against] their former partners.”

This ignorant statement serves to chastise and fails to account for the “complex, multifaceted” and “non-homogenous...perceptions of motherhood” (Bhopal 1998: 486). Hanson assumes a seemingly matriarchal position in declaring her views come “from experiences not only as a mum myself, but also as a grandmother” – a position that is, in fact, undermined by her Otherisation of single mothers, even as her position as a woman gives her this gendered authority. Her negotiation of this maternal role produces a belief that this population who deviates from traditional Anglo-norms and cultural values, serve to erode sociocultural cohesion: the State must accommodate for their *choice* of an unconventional family unit (Ajandi 2011: 422). Hanson’s power is not limited to her parliamentary position, nor to her whiteness. Power is inherent within her gendered role: she polices the ‘abnormal’ mothers who contribute towards the increasing compromised integrity of the white-heteronormative-patriarchal settler state.

However, the senator only identified these Others at the end of her half-an-hour address. Hanson began her maiden speech with a ten-minute, uninterrupted tirade, refashioning her adage that the ‘swamp’ Australia was now in, was not because of Asian immigration. Instead, Australia was now in “danger of being swamped by Muslims”. In recognising the metaphor of the ‘swamp’ which echoed her past maiden address, she used the Senate floor and the podium, as a figurative and literal stand, against the “intolerant” faith and its criminal subjects. In citing that Australia is “predominately a Christian country” that boasts a title as “one of the most multiracial nations on earth”, citizenship is conceptualised by Hanson as an inherent allegiance to the flag through a “commitment to fight for Australia”. She defended this by citing how the “national identity [established] before Federation...had nothing to do with diversity, and everything to do with belonging”. This sentiment has a two-fold interpretation.

Firstly, she disregards the extensive history of systematic denigration and the transgenerational impediments, uniquely faced by Indigenous people. Hanson pays no tribute to the institutionalised atrocities committed against Indigenous Others which occurred long before Federation and

continues to prevail today. Her speech showcased a belief that “the logic of elimination” (Wolfe 2006: 387) and its violent doctrine of assimilation, was a necessary sacrifice in forming a cohesive Australian identity. In Hanson’s “well-rehearsed collective forgetfulness” (Downing & Husband 2005: 131), Kane (1997: 119) asserts how “the political ideals of Australians at Federation were inseparably linked to deep racist beliefs”. Colonial power was contingent upon whiteness, and in advancing the goals of an Anglo-settler state, dispossession of Others is evidenced by the federal legislature of the ‘White Australia’ policy and its residual effect.

Secondly, in this proudful assertion of Australia’s predominate Christian identity, Hanson marks Others through a colonial discourse of the ‘West and the rest’ (Hall 1997a: 259). This is clear to further Orientalist distinctions of ‘us versus them’, Islam against Christianity. In line with her ethnocentric tropes that portray Australia as a State that is yet to be overwhelmed by pollution, Hanson ostracises the Islamic faith in her claims that the sense of “respect” and “belonging” that is assumed within white Australian citizenry, is a fundamental facet that Muslims lack.²⁸ As Saeed and Drainville (2006 in Saeed 2007) emphasise, it is a form of binary labelling to “depict all things oriental as ‘other’”, extending to a definition of “Islam as the ‘other’ religion to Christianity” (2007: 11). They assert that these constant depictions which explicitly portray the Muslim subject “as inferior, even barbaric” (2007: 11), consensus is manufactured amongst Western audiences: an association is made that terrorism is an inevitable result of Islamic teachings. Hanson fuels these Islamophobic sentiments through her labels of the Muslim subject as intolerant and unapologetic (Jakubowicz 2016: 157; Saeed 2007: 2). She furthers this in a similar way to Trump’s declaration that ‘Islam hates us’, by insisting that “Islam does not believe in democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of press or freedom of assembly”.

Where Foucault asserts that “discourse is not about the individual agent...but rather, about the language events in specific institutional environments” (Zebroski 2006: 534), Hanson’s use of the ‘Trump effect’ is obvious. Both Hanson and Trump are indifferent to their racist comments which vilify Muslims and the Islamic faith. Power is inherent within these skewed representations that both populist actors employ. These types of phantasmagoric portrayals reveal how Hanson aligns herself with Trump, as they systematically dehumanise Muslims and homogenise Islamic teachings. Their collective use of power works to energise white paranoia and the consequences of catering towards the indistinguishable Islamic threat. While both politicians assert how

²⁸ She legitimises this by citing: (1) the unprecedented rise of global terrorist attacks that Australia had passively watched, now occurring on domestic soil, (2) the cultural laws, specifically ‘Sharia’, which render assimilative or integrationist practices redundant, and (3) the expression of culture that is alien and serves to compromise sociocultural cohesion of the settler-state.

‘political correctness’ has been a severe detriment in asserting border protection, they collectively call for white-cohesion to legalise the subservient subject position of the Muslim body.

Inactivity or accommodation of this radical, homegrown terrorist threat (Yasmeen 2008: 1-2), revives the past rhetoric of white genocide (Hage 2002: 429).²⁹ The ‘Trump effect’ is portrayed in Hanson’s maiden address by Otherising ‘deviant’ and ‘foreign’ identities.

Bernardi Bets on the Conservative Wave

Continuing with this transnational iteration, Bernardi is representative of the ‘Trump effect’ in his proud embodiment of conservative Christian values. They reflect his commitment and an allegiance to a populist agenda. Power is not only assumed by Bernardi in his parliamentary position but also through his past achievements as an Australian Olympian (Neighbour 2012). In embracing this portrayal as a prominent national icon, Bernardi continues to assume this representation in his fierce defence of traditional Anglo-Australian culture: the national identity is continually compromised by Others. Through his efforts to undermine the politically correct culture of the establishment, Bernardi implores the Australian public to gain a “dose of common sense” (Bernardi 2018). It is an inherently problematic assertion. Both Bernardi and Trump harness support through this common sense thinking that lacks critical thought.³⁰ The populist politicians simplify current issues occurring within the settler-states as a result of accommodating Others. Their political aspirations are premised on an inherent power of instilling divisive politics, or as Bernardi conceptualises it, power and notability gained through a reputation of “principle above political expediency” (Bernardi 2018).

Being no stranger to public, opposition and media scrutiny, Bernardi’s distaste for Others has prevailed in denying rights extended to those who identify from the LGBT+ community (Cullen 2012).³¹ While appearing to represent the concerns of ‘ordinary’ citizens, Bernardi imposes his privileged, affluent position in defending the State’s heteronormative foundation. His speech that incites fear of the non-normative sexualised Other is decoded to reveal a likeness with Hanson: both actors employ their political position of power to further the ascendancy of whiteness. Within the scope of the settler-colonialist society, expressions that deemed as ‘alien’ are justifiable as a point of Anglo-exclusion (Dovidio et al. 2016: 279; Bastian 2012: 58; Perera 2009: 16). Hanson’s and Bernardi’s entitled position that is inherent with privileges ascribed to white heterosexual

²⁹ Hanson’s proposed solution to combat the threat of the Muslim Other or to ‘drain the swamp’, is to enact Trumpian legislature. Halting Islamic signifiers and Muslim immigration would eradicate the epidemic that is the Muslim threat.

³⁰ Gramsci asserts that common sense “is not critical and coherent but disjointed and episodic” which continuously transforms given an epoch (Hall & Shea 2013: 2).

³¹ He defended his stance in parliament, voicing provocative views that allowing the population to marry would see an increased presence of abnormal sexual deviancy, particularly in the form of bestiality.

identities, grants the two politicians the power to regulate what is sexually, socially, and culturally permissible within Australia.

This endorsement of heteronormative authority is also seen in Bernardi's self-published book, amply titled *The Conservative Revolution* (2013). Within these writings, an additional similarity to Hanson is seen in their views that criticise single-parents and same-sex families.³² Much like Hanson's critique of divorcees through her maternal role, Bernardi assumes a patriarchal position in his condemnation of this unsavoury population. From this, it is essential to apply Puar's (2007) homonationalist lens in understanding how populist actors work to isolate and devalue the sole existence of Othered bodies.

By assessing the 'progressive' portrayal of Western nation-states and their endorsement of principles which appear to nourish the prosperity of a diverse and egalitarian society, Puar challenges these assumptions as she brings to light how "liberal...inclusion is highly mediated by the realms of exclusion" (2007: 25). Despite the Anglo-state enjoying a surplus of resources that would aid the sociocultural adjustment of foreign bodies and would dispel cohesion that is contingent upon physical and cultural schemas (Vieten & Poynting 2016: 536), Western democracies do not act as a benefactor towards all marginalised populations. While they possess the capacity to empower and liberate, these Anglo-states actively reproduce the discourses which compromise a body's legal and cultural citizenship, specifically by imposing racialised categories onto Others (Puar 2007: 4). Puar goes on to explain that the differences of an Othered body's treatment within the modern state, serves to benefit 'appropriate' bodies who are "complicit with this ascendancy [of whiteness]" (2007: 4).³³

This homonationalist critique demonstrates how Hanson's and Bernardi's commentary undermines the capabilities of those who identify as a non-normative sexual identity, as well as the bodies who are reared from and/or support non-traditional family units. The politicians employ biopower in their accusations against these Others: the population facilitates internal domestic insecurity through their efforts that compromise the sociocultural fabric of Australia. Their criticisms that are in a similar vein to the "Islamification of the West" (Abdel-Fattah 2018:3; Dagistanli et al. 2018: 13), acts as a mode of suppression in the "careful management of difference: of difference within sameness, and of difference containing sameness" (Puar 2007: 25). Bernardi's

³² Bernardi expressed his aversion for the sole parenting efforts of mothers: their children become criminals or display above-normal levels of promiscuity (Borrello 2014).

³³ An example can be seen in granting gay marriage: it is seen as a quasi-citizenship right, bestowed to reinforce soft diplomacy, while advancing the 'progressive' portrayal of Western democracies.

regular use of derogatory comments further endorses racial inferiority as he employs Orientalist schemas of the “uncultured, uncivilised, barbaric” Other (Saeed 2007: 6).³⁴

He constructs the ‘tribal’ Other as an inept body due to a difference of ethnicity, religion and non-white lineage. Further, discursive practices that reveal racist distinctions are exposed in the language used by Bernardi. It is what Dean and his colleagues (2016: 125) describe as an “emotive appeal to national pride as the cure” which stigmatises all the ‘deviant’ Other’s contributions to society. This samples an innate belief, common amongst populist actors as ‘pure citizens’ are “privileged over foreigners rather than regarded as human beings” (Dean et al. 2016: 124). Racialised discourses which echo Trump’s and Hanson’s anxieties of a perceived ‘Islamification of the West’, is further evidenced in Bernardi’s homogenised claims: Muslims believe in a “totalitarian, political and religious ideology” (McGhee 2017). While he has made various observations of this kind that is racially *directed* and *about* ethnically different others (Van Dijk 2004: 351), the senator defends his provocative statements as claims that he is not Islamophobe, because, in his eyes, he is merely staging “honest (and hence critical) assessment[s] of the threat of Islam” (Bernardi 2016a).

There should be no illusions held over Bernardi’s promotion of Islamophobia within Australia: one cannot ignore his explicit anti-Muslim behaviours extended beyond the pretext of political speech. The senator publicly exhibited these racist behaviours in 2015. Bernardi actively campaigned for the domestic arrival of the ultra-nationalist Dutch MP - Geert Wilders - who was to launch the controversial anti-Islamic political party, the Australian Liberty Alliance (ABC 2015).³⁵ In light of this, the ‘Trump effect’ and its polarised rhetoric is evidenced here in a short, satellite interview (7.30 Report 2016). It should be noted that this selected interview makes no explicit remarks to Islam or Muslims. It has been chosen as it not only illustrates the dog whistling strategy employed both by Hanson and Bernardi in appealing to the class-conscious of the Anglo right-wing population. Rather, the interview provides a clear catalyst for Bernardi’s impending defection from the ruling Coalition.

³⁴ Although Bernardi has Italian ancestral roots and is himself, a second-generation immigrant (Neighbour 2012), the senator has voiced his strong opinions against a perceived failure of multiculturalism. It is a common critique that he shares with Hanson, as Bernardi places the blame increased sociocultural divisions, reliant on Others.

³⁵ Despite international condemnation of Wilder’s racist views and how the extreme far-right MP has previously called refugees “scum” (Mckie 2017), amongst his claims that the Islamic culture is “retarded” (ABC 2015), who has further equated the holy scriptures of the Quran with that of anti-Semitic writings Hitler in *Mein Kampf* (ABC 2015), being rebuked by members of his own political party was not enough of Bernardi to reconsider his overt and extremist position.

ABC presenter Leigh Sales introduced the then-Liberal senator as an enthusiastic advocator of a “Trump-style movement” which is “ripe” for Australia. Bernardi, as seen in ‘Figure 3’, agreed with this association as he voiced admiration for the Republican candidate who is “anti-establishment [and is] bucking all the conventional political wisdom”.



Figure 3: 7.30 Report with Senator Bernardi

While he conveys admiration for Trump and his anti-establishment approach to political discourse, Bernardi presents himself and speaks in a manner that is aligned with public expectations of a politician. This feature distinguishes his political credibility from Trump and Hanson: their Islamophobic positions is boasted in their “grandiose, dynamic and informal” populist speech (Ahmadian, Azarshahi & Paulhus 2017: 52; Eroukhmanoff 2018). This is not to say that Bernardi does not employ emotive and informal terminology, or that he does not campaign for anti-Islamic policies. Bernardi assumes power differently. He engages with both, the political and gendered discursive practices: his stoicism and seemingly non-expressive demeanour masks true his political intentions. Sales questioned what the senator constituted as “mainstream concerns” which had seen a “disenfranchisement” amongst “the conservatives or the silent majority of Australians”. Bernardi voiced that politicians of “various shapes and stripes” had catered towards Others. This reference that stresses a loss of cohesion can be decoded to reveal its true meaning. Much like Hanson, Bernardi surmises that the increased presence and accommodation of non-white bodies is the predominant reason that there is a loss of whiteness within the Anglo-settler state.

As Hage (2002: 432) describes former Prime Minister John Howard’s “preservation of a predominately Anglo-Celtic society” which had “demographically, socially and culturally disappeared”, parallels can be drawn here. Bernardi employs this fantasised rhetoric which is popularised by right-wing actors. Pathological in its nature, it is evident in the conspiracies which stoke the crisis of white victimhood and the sociocultural paranoia associated with Others and their aspirations to shed subjugated class positions (Young & Sullivan 2016: 30). In essence, Bernardi defines the nation as a fractured “cultural community” where whiteness is the embodiment of being ethnically and culturally ‘pure’ (Gilroy 1992: 845). White entitlement is embedded within the divisive political assertions made by both Trump and Bernardi which - when challenged by the

interviewers - is either overlooked or taken as personal criticism. As whiteness is inseparably linked to the Australian national identity (Willis 2012: 85), it is an invisible, tangible quality which permits Bernardi to represent his white privilege in embodying a leader. For this reason, the discursive practices of race, gender, class and the tendency to appraise the authority and the superiority of the white-male “Anglo way” (Abdel Fattah 2017: 335) evidences Bernardi’s use of the ‘Trump effect’.

In preaching of the traditional Anglo-lifestyle and its compromised state due to the forces of Others, Bernardi’s imagery of the Australian national identity is one that promotes the tenants of the ‘battler’, specific to endorse values of egalitarianism, “mateship and compassion” (Willis 2012: 83). While this representation appears to instil aspiring qualities, as the Australian culture “proclaims to be ‘multicultural’ and ‘non-racist’” (Willis 2012: 85), the positive portrayal is deliberate in advancing white supremacy within the settler-state. White cultural heroes, like Bernardi and Hanson, define the extent of social control over non-white bodies: this legitimises permissible modes of cultural expression within the Anglo-state. In these demands of acceptable minority expression, this type of obedience is a ‘necessary’ measure used to alleviate apprehensions regarding the presence of Others.

More importantly, sociocultural exclusion of Others, particularly the Indigenous and Muslim subject, is implemented to protect and to “ensure white superiority...entrench[ing] whiteness in Australian society” (Willis 2012: 86). This discursive position is revisited by Bernardi’s mindful attempt not to employ labels that infer extremism: he does not explicitly state “what was happening in Europe...could happen here”. The senator channels Trumpian tendency by inferring that the problems Europe, was and is currently facing, is in the sociocultural and political spaces that aids and nurtures the empowerment of the Islamic threat. While his Islamophobic opinions are not made explicitly obvious, the senator encodes and repeats the increasingly popular rhetoric of Muslims disrupting the West. By unpacking this statement, there is a conscious attempt to “vandalize the Other’s identity to such an extent that the very legitimacy and humanity of the Other is called into question” (Waltman 2018: 261).

This is a common critique of populist actors to challenge the acceptance of the Muslim Other, sharing a commonality to abolish their presence within Western spaces (Dean et al 2016: 130) The flourishing of fringe parties that Bernardi refers to, allows him to cite the ‘Islamic European problem’ as a way to repeat restoring “faith” in politics. His hateful politics act as a method to not only combat the unwarranted force which fractures Anglo-sociocultural integrity, but to mainstream the Orientalist distinctions between the ‘civilised’ Christian and the ‘barbarous’ Muslim. Considering this assertion, the pervasive bond that solidifies a common allegiance

between Trump, Hanson and Bernardi, is a righteous alliance in eliminating the threatening Muslim subject and its foreign faith.

The ‘Trump effect’ is illustrated in Hanson’s and Bernardi’s prejudiced and racist portrayals. Support is rallied through a populist appeal to a class that is vulnerable to the precipice of a white ethnocide. In advocating for this ethnocentric monoculturalist view, Muslims are presented through Orientalist tropes that exaggerate non-Anglo lifestyles. Their unconventional cultural provisions disrupt Western democracies and their established sociocultural values. It is not just because of Bernardi’s and Hanson’s political power that allows them to promote a rhetoric that “bizarrely harks to another political era” (Puar 2007: xxii). It is because the State’s pre-existing legacy is premised upon the binary denigration of Othered bodies. Both Hanson’s and Bernardi’s whiteness has been inscribed and celebrated, privileging their voice and actions as prominent white Australian icons. This gives authority and validation to their (un)obvious racist and prejudicial speech against – not the first, nor second – but the *third* largest religious body in Australia (Abdel-Fattah 2018: 17).

All three populist actors conceptualise white entitlement as regaining a lost sense of prominence: the foreseeable solution is enforcing measures that would institutionalise ostracising foreign and unwanted bodies. Essentially, Hanson and Bernardi utilise the ‘Trump effect’ in the discourses that guide their opinion, presenting a premise that politics and problem solving is straightforward. Both politicians adopt this effect to legitimise overt forms of white rule and dominance in the seemingly multicultural, settler-colonialist society. They argue that complications arise through the establishment and how its representatives have sacrificed the nation’s unique sociocultural and economic identity. Elites have neglected to enact ‘necessary’ protective methods against the Muslim Other: this only serves to facilitate a politically correct narrative and culture, at the expense of internal and external security.

Chapter 2 will evidence and further discuss the amplification and legitimisation of the ‘Trump effect’ that followed the post-inauguration of the 45th US president, and how Trump’s now legitimated Islamophobic actions and speech was embodied and practised by both Hanson and Bernardi.

Chapter Two, Post-Inauguration: Celebrity in Chief

This chapter will discuss Islamophobia and its legitimisation through Trump, Hanson and Bernardi, in the wake of Trump's successful presidential campaign. It is achieved through a study of seminal Islamophobic instances and an analysis of how the reverberating 'Trump effect' influences the populist Australian senators. Specifically, this chapter will analyse (a) Trump and the 'Muslim Travel Ban', (b) Hanson and her burqa 'stunt', as well as (c) Bernardi and his appearance at a Q-Society fundraiser. Through a discussion of these events, the chapter will evidence how Trump's inauguration, licensed Islamophobia in an unprecedented way which was iterated by his Australian counterparts.

Throughout the 2016 US presidential race, the key slogan of the Trump campaign guaranteed that a vote for him was a patriotic choice that would 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA). This key campaign promise was one that Trump pledged he could deliver, based upon his extensive business resume. Since the inauguration of Trump in early 2017, the President *has* fulfilled a promise made to Trumpians: Trump runs the White House like one of his businesses.

It is a promise that he has delivered by appointing "some of his oldest friends – and biggest donors" to esteemed positions within the White House (Peterson-Withorn 2017). Adding to this, much of his administration has come from an "extremist faction of the corporate class" who have undoubtedly pursued "a policy agenda that serves the interests of the corporate class" (Welssman 2017). As Trump disregards soft power in his aggressive pursuit of an agenda which places 'America First', the newly elected President's political aspirations have ushered in a period of extreme divisiveness. In implementing policies which serves to fulfil the power elites' concerns (Welssman 2017), it is unsurprising that his acquisition of state power signposts the amplification of racial, ethnic, class and gender tensions.³⁶ These enactments deepen societal divisions by exacerbating a perceived difference between 'our needs *trumps* theirs'. Recognising this, permissions which grant access to privileges and resources, are, therefore, reliant on sociohistoric and cultural embodiments of social stratification (Puar 2007: 25). This reveals a critical genealogical observation: contemporary distinctions of citizenship are premised upon a system of social rankings – a system that maintains traditional structural inequalities (Itaoui 2016: 275). The disparity of Othered treatment was proven consistently throughout Trump's first year in office.

³⁶This is not to say that Othered subjects did not initially support his politics. Despite mobilising Trumpians in his plans to fortify the state which would separate Mexico from the US, Gambino (2016a) found that a small fraction of Hispanic voters were enticed to vote for the Republican candidate. It is akin to Hanson's black political appeal as these populist sentiments and the attitudes they espouse, superficially appear to 'protect' national interests.

The ‘Trump effect’ and its blatant disregard for black Other is illustrated in the wake of the ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville (Merica 2017). As neo-Nazis across America banded together, with many donning Trump’s MAGA slogan, violent protests erupted (Heim, Silverman, Shapiro & Brown 2017). The source of mobilisation was based on a premise of white victimisation and an impending ethnocide. Trump failed to label the violent actions and destructiveness of the white nationalist rally as an act of domestic terrorism.³⁷ Apparent here is the President’s inability to explicitly condemn the overt racist protest as he validated this sentiment of Othered divisions.

His consolidation of white male authority is also seen in advancing the development of the Dakota Access and Keystone XL pipelines (BBC 2017a). In effect, Trump posited these developments to create exponential growth in domestic employment.³⁸ The ‘Trump effect’ is replicated in the President’s clear aim to reaffirm a historical legacy of white supremacy, while dismissing Native American sovereignty. The Indigenous subject is excluded and disregarded from a crucial decision that will impede Native Americans’ flourishing of cultural norms, customs, and traditions (BBC 2017a). These examples highlight what Ravenscroft (2004: 7) emphasises as a resonance of settler-colonialism: the erasure of Indigenous subjects and black dispossession acts as a legitimate Western structure that forms a cohesive white settler-state. While the above examples only represent a portion of Trump’s divisive presidential actions, they illustrate how the President mainstreams an exclusion of Othered bodies and ‘deviant’ characteristics from contemporary American society.

Given Trump’s rhetoric, it is expected that there was a 12.5% rise in reported hate-crimes, across America’s largest cities in 2017 (Levin & Reitzel 2018: 3). Seen in this increase is an intention to divide along racial, sexual and religious lines, as anti-Black, Hispanic, Muslim, Jewish and LGBT+, hate prevailed as a critical motivator for bias (2018: 3). It is no coincidence that these post-election results ushered in an “alt right umbrella movement” as a “mainstreamed socio-political force”. Organised by the “hatemongers” who exploit the disenfranchised and normalise a “strain” of “Euro-nationalism”, they teach to avoid, degrade and to assert physical and verbal attacks against Others (2018: 32). Within this new wave of legitimated right-wing political expression, anti-Muslim discourses which repeat sentiments that ‘Islam hates us’ are behaviours that are cultivated within Trump’s America.

His pre-presidential campaign marked the most active year of hate crimes inflicted upon the Muslim Other, which surpassed recorded hate-crime statistics gained in the wake of the 9/11

³⁷ He proclaimed in his *third* statement to the press, that there were “very fine people, on both sides” (Merica 2017).

³⁸ Trump worked to reverse previous regulations that guaranteed future “responsible” explorations of “alternate routes for the pipeline crossing” (Beaumont 2016). In promising to boost the US economy, these successes could only be achieved at the expense of marginalising Native Americans.

attacks (Kishi 2017). His presidential victory has seen aggressions against the Muslim subject, manifesting beyond violent actions that are specific to target spaces and individuals with religious visibility (CAIR 2017).³⁹ It is a normative tendency as indicated by three-quarters of US Muslim citizens that report of the everyday occurrences, in both, overt and covert forms of racism and religious discrimination (Kishi 2017). The continual rise in hate-crimes is a disturbing trend that has come to characterise Trump's rule in America. This is again, seen in the commander in chief's appointment of vocal anti-Islamic figures to esteemed White House positions: many officials had publicly voiced resentment for the "cancer" that is the Muslim body and its Islamic faith (Hilal 2017).⁴⁰ It should be reiterated that the scope of this thesis does not permit a discussion of all instances and political enactments of President Trump's Otherisation and Islamophobia. Instead, there has been a dedicated effort to analyse one exemplary representation of the 'Trump effect', sampling its inherent inclination of racialising power relations. By considering this provision, Trump's licensing of Islamophobia is best exemplified a mere week after being sworn into the presidency.

Trump commemorated this 'historic' week by signing off on several executive orders (EO). These forces of law that were rapidly signed off and effective immediately, sought to instil confidence in his leadership by repealing many of his predecessor's policies.⁴¹ Within the raft of legislations that attempted to deliver on key campaign promises, he legitimised public scrutiny and social exclusion of Othered subjects. The fifth EO signed by Trump, further reinforced privileging white power and supremacy: EO 13769 authorised a complete cessation of Muslim migration (Beydoun 2018). A short, press conference was scheduled to swear in General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis, honouring Trump's pick for secretary of defence, as seen in figure 4 (Factbase Videos 2017). In his boastful descriptions of the US military as "the greatest" peaceful force that "[walks] the face of the earth", Trump guaranteed that the insurance of security, that is, the protection of "our home", would be the utmost important pledge that the government would deliver on.

³⁹ Fitting the description of a stereotypical 'terrorist body', Sikh men are targeted by Islamophobes. As they are "turban, bearded and brown-skinned" they embody the schemas associated with the Muslim caricature, more so "than the majority of Muslim men" (Beydoun 2017a: 1738). Because of this homogenous portrayal, adherents of the Sikh faith also fall victim to Islamophobic hate-crimes/speech and racial profiling (Waltman 2018: 260).

⁴⁰ Trump repeats this narrative, following a series of terrorist attacks occurring across England, where he made the unsubstantiated claim that there needed to be global movement in eradicating "Radical Islamic terror" (Hamid 2017). Although he was reprimanded by British politicians, it further prompted the President in retweeting several anti-Muslim propaganda posts from right-wing English politicians, who have been convicted of perpetuating Islamophobia and hate-crimes against Muslims (BBC 2017b).

⁴¹ This included overturning Obamacare, the invasive advancement of illegal 'alien' control, the commencement of constructing a wall along the Mexican-US border, as well as the efforts that fast-tracked developments to the Keystone XL and Dakota pipelines (Zoppo, Santos & Hudgins 2017).

In addition to boosting the defensiveness of the Western state, Trump's "dedication to peace" was illustrated through "new vetting measures". What appears is that his commitment to global 'peace', could only be achieved by keeping all "radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America". The President signed off on EO 13769 and declared that "we don't want them here".



Figure 4: Executive Order 13769

Despite his articulation that national security prompted his enactment of the EO, the religious motivators perturbing the cessation of all Muslim migration cannot be denied. This unconstitutional EO was deemed by media and political commentators as a "Muslim Travel Ban" for ample reason (Jones & Sun 2017). In only admitting entry to migrants and refugees who "support our country and love deeply our people", religious preference was bestowed upon the Othered body who faced non-Muslim persecution (Gopalan 2018a). The order also suspended the domestic refugee program, while indefinitely ceasing America's intake of Syrian refugees (Jones & Sun 2017: 1362).

Regardless of his justification that "we will not forget the lessons of 9/11", the EO additionally placed a 90-day block on individuals entering from Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Iran, Iraq and Syria (O'Brien 2018). Within this oddly specific list, these Islamically defined states had no hand in orchestrating the 2001 terrorist attacks (O'Brien 2018).⁴² In effect, the ban which supposedly honoured the "heroes" whose lives were "lost", failed to appropriately reprimand the states guilty of the terrorist attacks (O'Brien 2018). Irrespective of Trump's personal assurance that it was "not a Muslim ban" (Eroukmanoff 2018: 6), clear within the EO was a presumption of collective guilt that the Trump administration extended onto the whole Muslim body. The Islamophobic policy and its immediate implementation was met with chaos. It became clear that the lack of cohesive organisation, on the White House's part, meant that individuals who were supposedly unaffected

⁴² The ME states which have been found to be responsible for the collapse of the Twin Towers and the assaults against the Pentagon, were not included within this list of restrictions. Because of this obvious failure, valid speculation surrounds whether Trump's overseas business affiliations impeded a conscious decision not to include the guilty states responsible (O'Brien 2018).

by the ban, were directly affected (Islam 2018).⁴³ In the days that followed, spontaneous anti-Trump movements erupted through the country, as multicultural communities rallied together to show solidarity with their Muslim neighbours. Hordes of demonstrators, including faith leaders, legal aids and members of Congress, flocked to airports and demanded accountability from airport staff and border control agents (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] 2017: 61).

The overwhelming response to EO stated that not only was the doctrine unconstitutional, but also, criticism identified how Trump's 'Muslim travel ban' validated racial divisiveness and profiling as a legitimate security measure (Bayoumi 2018; Beydoun 2018: 18). This homogenised representation of immigrants and refugees as a potential 'terrorist' body, echoes a pre-presidential Trumpian trepidation: Others from Islamically orientated states are symbolic of a "trojan horse" (Gambino 2017b). All prospective terrorist bodies *must* be blocked from entry. This is due to the collective sharing an innate temperament that seeks to compromise domestic security, from within the state (Waikar 2018: 166). The 'Trump effect' permeates through this discussion: the more a body appeared to denote a schema attributed to a Muslim, such as brownness and/or Islamic dress, the more likely their American citizenry was questioned, and their liberties were rescinded (Beydoun 2017a: 4).

In Trump's "unabashed assertion of white male power", Görkariksel (2017: 469) describes the enactment of the 'Muslim travel ban' as a legitimisation of Islamophobia that is "thinly disguised" as political legislature. Its authorisation is reflective a larger narrative which continues to homogenise and denigrate Othered subjects: the policy reverberates a Western legacy of elevating whiteness and promoting its inherent superiority (Hall 1997a: 263). It is not without purpose that Trump relies on Orientalist distinctions to echo the old tropes of a 'clash of civilisations' between the Anglo and 'Mohammedan' world (Lewis 1990: 56; Huntington 1993: 39). When considering the litany of exaggerated stereotypes, signifying the Muslim body's intrinsic need to destruct and overpower, anti-Islamic sentiments flourish through this skewed Westernised construction of the Muslims and Islam (Said 1978: 7).

In effect, Waikar (2018: 161) asserts that Islamophobia act as a "structural organising principle" where the West is always above and will continue to exert dominance, over the "subalternized" Muslim body (Spivak 1988). The EO exemplifies this point: experts have stressed that the exclusion of the Muslim subject based on national security is fundamentally counterproductive. It has an adverse effect, where this cultural segregation encourages propaganda promoted by

⁴³ Though it was in no way a singular occurrence, one example of this identifies how a large Syrian-Christian family had fled their home, to avoid persecution and to seek refuge. Although the family was an identified religious minority, who had obtained all the correct legal visa requirements, upon arrival in the US, the brown family was denied entry and forced to return to the ME (Jorgensen 2017).

religious extremist fractions who “falsely claim the United States is at war with Islam” (Seipel 2017). Waikar (2018: 151) emphasises that a perceived “clash with the West” provided Trump with a justification for a world-system characterised through the “global racial and global religious hierarchies” (2018: 161). It works to ensure that the Islamic faith and the Muslim subject is conceived through a lens which places the collective “beneath dominant Western power” (2018: 161). The polarisation of the two seemingly incompatible cultures perpetuates a myth that the West is indeed a liberating force, by espousing the “neoliberal values of freedom, dignity, and peace” (2018: 161). From this, the religious teachings, as well as the cornerstone values of the Islamic faith, are disregarded. Through this neoliberal lens, the Othered body is rendered as a docile subject which is transformed and exploited, to entice fear of the anti-democratic Islamic world and its criminal subjects (Foucault 1977: 25; Said 1978: 38-39).

The travel ban implicated Others who connoted Muslim-like-qualities, effectively denying them the ‘privilege’ of experiencing America and its liberties. The administration contributed towards an existing rhetoric, effectively “fan[ning] the flames of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism, convincing many white, Christian Americans that they need to fear immigrants [and] Muslims” (Austin 2018: 1). Through the ‘Muslim Travel Ban’, the White House institutionalised social exclusion of ‘incompatible’ characteristics from civic and social life. Support from his right-wing voters understood his presidency, as an authorisation to act maliciously towards Trump’s ‘enemies’— foes who could be quickly identified in the public sphere for displaying their ‘foreignness’.

Trump’s policies and his justifications licenced Islamophobia in an unprecedented way.⁴⁴ It is unsurprising that international supporters of Trump’s politics, such as Hanson and Bernardi, took his presidential victory as a personal triumph. In appropriating many of his Islamophobic positions, both senators conveyed fidelity to the President. The rest of this chapter will analyse Hanson, Bernardi and their use of the ‘Trump effect’, following his inauguration.

Hanson’s Gatekeeping of the Invisible Population

On domestic shores, both Bernardi and Hanson celebrated Trump’s presidential victory publicly. In an ominous warning, Bernardi cited this as an unexpected success, which allowed the public to experience a “taste of it... [and] there will be more to come in elections to follow” (McIlroy 2016).

⁴⁴ Despite EO 13769 eventually being blocked by Washington and Minnesotan courts for its unlawful discriminatory treatment against a group (Winsor 2017), at the time of writing this thesis, the EO is in its third iteration. The US Supreme court has upheld the Trumpian measures that bar several Muslim nations from US entry. However, the travel ban has added North Korea and Venezuela to its list of indefinite suspension. Yet, the inclusion of these two countries is at face-value: the ban is still persistent in targeting Muslims as North Korea allows only a few citizens to travel outside the country, while the ban imposed upon Venezuela is only applicable to a “handful of officials and their families” (Gladstone & Sugiyama 2018).

Members of ON stood outside of Parliament, literally toasting the US election results (McGhee 2016). Hanson cited his win as a powerful global message that showed how “people’s power is now happening” (McGhee 2016). Her support would persist throughout Trump’s first year in office.

One example points to the aftermath of EO 13769. Following Trump’s decision to share anti-Muslim content in the wake of the ISIS-inspired attacks in London (BBC 2017b), Hanson adopted this rhetoric (Sharaz 2017). Rather than calling for community cohesion and cultural empathy in a similar matter that the Mayor of London had implored, she took this opportunity to ask her followers on social media to pray. It was not for peace, nor for the lives lost. Instead, Hanson exploited this tragedy as she pushed her Islamophobic agenda, pleading that Hansonites pray for a Muslim ban (Sharaz 2017). While Hanson’s continuous attacks against the Islam and Muslims continued, having ON labelled as a “threat to religious freedom” by the Trump administration, did not perturb Hanson’s Islamophobia (SBS 2017).

Herein lies the significance of the chosen example: the very next day after the US had branded her party as a threat impinging religious freedoms, the senator had ignored this. As seen in figure 5, Hanson attended Question Time in the Senate, dressed in full Islamic wear (Belot & Yaxley 2017). Despite her fellow senators’ audible gasps of disbelief at her appearance, the senator chose to remain silent until called.



Figure 5: Hanson's Burqa "Stunt"

However, the specific choice to don a completely black, full-face covering burqa, speaks volumes about Hanson’s political agenda. Given Australia’s profitable Islamic garment industry (Shepard 2018) and the categories of Islamic dresses, this religious custom is representative of a female’s *choice* to showcase a commitment to their faith and modest principles (Medina 2014: 877; Yasmeen 2013: 255; Janson 2011: 185; Abu-Lughod 2002: 785). Hanson was spoilt for options. Her *choice* to dress in a black burqa is explicit in symbolising moral panic of a foreign presence, amongst the predominately white faces of the Senate. As she dramatically removed her ‘costume’, she questioned whether the Attorney-General, George Brandis, would implement security measure

to ban the burqa across society. Abdel-Fattah (2018: 31) describes this type of Islamophobic rhetoric as the wrongful “conflation between national security and the Muslim body”. In these instances, moral panic is encouraged as the politicised Other is hyper-targeted for its foreign practices. Hanson’s actions were not without consequence as Brandis was quick to reprimand the senator and her “stunt”. Further analysis is needed, regarding the connotations of “stunt”.

In the news coverage of Hanson’s actions, the media sphere quickly adopted Brandis’s descriptor. The term “stunt” was strategic in its overuse by the media (One Path 2018: 37-41): it lessened the gravity of the senator’s overt racism. Instead, “stunt” inferred an Australian banter-like quality, that Others and their diverse cultural practices are “fair game” within the settler-state (Maley 2017). The media’s use of the term worked to neutralise her aggressive Islamophobic actions, allowing the senator to normalise a hate-crime without serious legal and moral repercussions. The lack of consequences reveals a crucial assertion: Hanson’s parody of the female Muslim subject is akin to the symbolic violence of burning religious scriptures and defacing places of worship (Maney 2011: 52; Tustad 2003: 597).

Brandis did not fuel Hanson’s trepidations of Islam and the Muslim subject, but advised that she ought to be “caution[ed] and counsel[led]”. When the Attorney-General eluded to his classified experience, with both the Prime Minister and national security agencies, the reference served to remind Hanson about her position within the Senate and her lack of parliamentary power. She promoted an “appalling” position of racial division, and in recognising this, Brandis asserted that it is “vital for...intelligence and law-enforcement...[to] work cooperatively with the Muslim community”. Hanson’s graphic substantiation of Islamophobia – intended to divide Australians – instead, united the opposition. In a rare display of bipartisan support, Brandis received cheers that congratulated him for chastising Hanson’s actions. What is even more unusual about Brandis’s scolding, is that he has chosen to back measures that would revise the controversial section 18C of the Racial and Discrimination Act (Poynting 2015: 5). Specifically, Brandis cited that inherent within democracies is the “right” to be bigoted.

This discrepancy was made clear by the Islamophobic Register Australia (2017) in their open letter that thanked Brandis for standing against Hanson’s Islamophobia.⁴⁵ However, in this thesis, it is argued that this uncharacteristic display of emotion on Brandis’s behalf, was a genuine response to Hanson’s demonising appearance and questions. It is evident that Hanson regards terrorism and its reverberating effects, wholly attributed to the perpetrator’s faith and culture. Bernardi has reiterated this concern in his past arguments that challenge the practice of adopting

⁴⁵ The letter also asked the Attorney-General to reflect upon the ways he has “encouraged and emboldened persons like Pauline Hanson to engage in deplorable behaviour against the Australian Muslim community” (Islamophobic Register Australia 2017).

culturally specific garbs: wearing the burqa recreates an oppressive environment that is “alien to the Australian life” (Yasmeen 2013: 259). In invoking this populist position, both senators employs a prevalent form of neo-Orientalist demonography which collectively criminalises Islam, further characterising Muslims as a collective ‘problem’ in need of management.

This form of direct securitisation is clear through Hanson’s political speech and her aggressive actions to don a burqa. Eroukhmanoff (2018: 6) explains how this mode of direct securitisation “magnifies” a potential threat and stresses an innate inclination to disrupt and destruct, “thereby lifting the issue ‘above politics’”. It is a position repeated by Hanson in her supplementary and final question which appropriates a European critique of Islamic dress, regarding the “security risk” of a concealed face in public and within parliament (Yasmeen 2013: 257). Conversely, Eroukhmann differentiates this from indirect securitisation. Power elites are strategic not to employ terminology that could be inferred as hate-speech or religious minority persecution. There is a dedicated effort to use covert security language, as labels which categorise Others as a potential ‘threat’ are publicly discouraged (2018: 18).⁴⁶ Eroukhmann describes how (in)direct securitisation of Muslims prevails as a mobilising tool for far-right populist movements. The homogenous Islamophobic narrative Hanson and Bernardi adopt, shares Trumpian qualities: the correlation between the ‘terrorist’ Muslim subject and its inevitable ‘threat’ to national security, is not perceived as racist, nor xenophobic (2018: 22).

Instead, they embody the role of patriots that continue to legitimise and further a legacy of invisible “white sovereign violence” (Perera 2007: 5). By redefining normative practices of what is (un)acceptable within public and political discourses about Islam and Others, the ‘Trump effect’ works to subversively monitor the types of acceptable bodies within settler societies. In Hanson’s discourse, Muslim women are perceived as either a helpless victim of a hyper-patriarchal ideology, or as a culturally stubborn Other who snubs the Anglo-lifestyle and its endorsed values of belonging (Janson 2011: 187; Darvishpour 2003: 59). She embodies western-centric discourses, capitalising upon a significant absence of Muslim women represented in public debates about Islam and the female attire (Ahmed & Matthes 2017: 233). As Hanson presents herself as an educated figure who is knowledgeable about Islamic practices and its inherent oppression, she justifies this exclusion through her racist appropriation, of what is identified as “brownface” (Sanghani 2017).

⁴⁶ Trump’s pre-presidential and post-inauguration campaigns best personify his transition of power, as well as his movement between the two forms of Muslim securitisation. His first statement articulating a plan that would see “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” has twice been deleted since becoming president (The Memory Hole 2 2017). Additionally, Trump vehemently defended his enactment of EO 13769 was “not a Muslim ban”, despite articulating to his counsel that he wanted to be shown how to ban ‘them’ “legally” (Savransky 2017).

In this caricature that forms a part of the white supremacist repertoire of denigrating Othered bodies, Sundstrom (2008: 296) characterises this as a homogenised reduction that both inferiorises and relays a disgust about an Other's sociocultural commitments. Sanghani (2017) furthers this perspective, in her assertion that this "stereotypical approach to race" promotes a submissive portrayal of Islamic women of colour – they are a population which is 'invisible' and underrepresented within the media. While criticisms exist that veiled Muslim women are often "appropriated in the name of resistance" (Gökarıksel 2017: 417), the point remains: the diminishment of coloured Muslim women's voices allowed Hanson to apply a gendered authority that further stripped autonomy and agency from feminised Muslims subjects.

Whether the feminised Muslim body is used as a prop, juxtaposed with images of Anglo-women enjoying their sovereign liberties, irrespective of the portrayal, the oppressive Orientalist narrative remains the same: Muslim women are seen to be inept of self-liberation. Symbols, like the burqa and the beard, are amplified in their meaning that signifies difference (Yasmeen 2008: 66). In producing "visible minorities" (Modood 2003: 100), physical representations of faith are reappropriated and stigmatised. These newfound meanings serve to fulfil xenophobic anxieties that Islamic symbols impede acts of assimilation and prevent women's liberation (Saeed 2007: 1-2). In her appropriation of 'brownface', Hanson exemplifies an anti-Muslim, Eurocentric argument which is evoked to justify laws banning Islamic garbs within the public sphere. With specific reference to the feminised Muslim subject, Moors (2009) identifies how the term 'burqa' has stimulated public discourses to frame "face-veiling as a threat to security" (2009: 404). In their choice to don Islamic wear, the female body is perceived as both an objective and subjective threat.⁴⁷ Within this emphasis of securitisation, a subtext exists that conveys how the hyper-vigilant surveilling of Muslims reflects a "broader trend towards a control state" (Moors 2009: 404).

Moreover, Hanson's dramatic actions and her speech are reflective of the 'Trump effect' and its European iteration. It is no new concept that across Europe, there has been a steady increase in the number of populist movements: support is garnered for nationalistic and xenophobic politics (Bayrakli & Hafez 2018: 16; Goplan 2018b). However, academics like Poynting and Vieten (2016: 535), assert that the type of moral panic and race-hatred advocated by Trump and his presidency, invokes the same type of Islamophobic arguments articulated by prominent European nationalists, like Geert Wilders. While her 'stunt' eludes to the subjugation of the feminised

⁴⁷ The body poses as objective threat as Muslim women and their modes of "portable seclusion" (Papanek 1982 in Abu-Lughod 2002: 785), undermining electronic surveillance and recognition methods. Moors (2009: 402) additionally describes female Muslims as a subjective threat on an interpersonal level: the occluded view does not permit an accurate assessment of whether an Other's mood is volatile or behaving suspiciously, implying their criminality.

Muslim body, her actions to ban the Islamic garb shares parallels to Wilder's: both populist politicians endorse a claim that prohibiting the burqa "advances the emancipation and autonomy of Muslim women" (Moors 2009: 403).⁴⁸ As Poynting and Vieten (2016: 539) explain, anti-Islamic and Muslim discourses recruit the "politics of gender and sexuality to its populism". This furthers a view that presents the West's Islamophobia as 'progressive'. It is inherently counterproductive to assume that barring religious wear will liberate the 'un-enlightened' female Other. These "gendered politics of populist ethno-nationalism" (Poynting & Vieten 2016: 539), subjugates the feminised Muslim body and further ostracises her as a 'passive' Other. The populist arguments which posit veiled Muslim women as a tool for Islamist nationalism, fail to recognise that "active expression and adherence to their [Islamic] faith [acts] as a new means of independence" (Milton-Edwards 2011: 217).⁴⁹

Foucault asserts that power is "exercised through its invisibility" within our "disciplinary" society, revealing how power relations are pervasive and inescapable (Foucault 1977: 187). Those power elites who influence agendas and institutions, impose a subservient subject position onto Others. This is based on "a principle of compulsory visibility": authority over the "subject" is achieved through "mechanism[s] of objectification" as they are marked as bodies who are to be "constantly seen" (Pugliese 2009: 26; Sluga 2005: 233; Foucault 1977: 187). In its essence, Islamophobia acts as a social process of learning to *feel negatively affected* by the presence of Islamic artefacts and the Muslim body. When considering how the principle of compulsory visibility is forced upon the Orientalist Other, there is an adoption of the 'Trump effect' used by populist actors. Hanson, Bernardi and Trump exploit Islamic expressions of faith, to construct the Muslim body as a hyper-visible target of racially motivated crimes and hate-speech.

As is evidenced in the *Islamophobia in Australia* (2017: 46) report, the overwhelming data indicates lone Muslim women are the predominant victims of Anglo-aggression. The alarming findings state that 79.6% of Australian Muslim women were wearing headscarves during the time of the hate-crime (2017: 5).⁵⁰ This evidences a disturbing trend witnessed in the US as Trump solidified his presidency. The CAIR (2017) found that, soon after Trump's presidential victory, veiled Muslim females enrolled in college, were the pronounced victims of hate-crimes and

⁴⁸ At the core of this argument exists a cynical assertion that "white men are saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1988: 92).

⁴⁹ There should be no confusion whether female Muslims lack agency in their choice to wear Islamic clothing. Abu-Lughod (2002: 786) identifies how this voluntary custom is enforced by the women with a strong moral compass, who have "sense of honor tied to family". She goes on to state that the "gross violation" of simply denouncing the "burqa as a medieval imposition" is effective in reducing "the diverse situations and attitudes of millions of Muslim women to a single item of clothing".

⁵⁰ In more than half of the cases, the victim's Islamic garbs were directly referred to by the offender (Islamophobia in Australia 2017: 85).

violence.⁵¹ The ‘Trump effect’ and its divisive qualities, promote an appearance that the Anglo-state is religiously tolerant and accommodating towards Othered bodies and their needs. It is obvious that the feminised Muslim body is simple to identify with their clothing, and as such, they are more likely to be disempowered through Islamophobic harassment and violence. Hanson’s facetious ‘stunt’ essentially dog-whistled the legitimatisation of Islamophobia, and further illuminated longstanding racial tensions and gendered inequalities.

Bernardi’s Defection and his Righteous Crusade

After witnessing first-hand Trump’s successful pre-presidential campaign, Bernardi arrived in Australia inspired by his several month stint in the US (Bernardi 2016b). The South Australian senator was unashamed to voice his populist support of Trump’s “mainstream politics”, whom he considered as a “catalyst for change” (Berlot 2017). Ultimately, Trump’s victory prompted the senator to defect from the ruling Coalition and launch his right-wing political party, the Australian Conservatives (AC) (Berlot 2017).

His choice to establish the conservative political party is reflective of a trend that capitalises on disenfranchised voters, who opt to choose “obscure” right-wing parties (Manwarning 2018). The trend is illustrative of the ‘Trump effect’ as 2016 ushered in its highest domestic numbers, as seen with the re-election of Hanson (Markus 2016: 1). Within this normative increase of visible populist parties, followers no longer need to conceal resentment towards Othered bodies and a perceived ‘Islamification’ of Australia. These movements mobilise those who are in favour of campaigns which sponsor hatred across various sociocultural determinants. They serve to revive Anglo-anxieties of reverse-racism, white marginalisation and ethnocide (Dean et al. 2016: 122). This increased popularity of “pseudo political parties” showcases voters and a wider acceptance of “extremist movement[s]”, as they pledge to uphold social cohesion in the policies that target “Muslims and Islam under a thinly veiled guise of protecting Australia” (Aly 2015).

While Bernardi’s anti-Islamic sentiments are extensively catalogued through his social media posts, his first public appearance as an Independent senator best evidences his overt Islamophobia. As seen in figure 6, his attendance at the ‘Defending Freedom of Speech’ fundraiser, organised by the Q Society of Australia (QSA), holds significance (Q Society 2017). Not because the QSA is the most mainstreamed anti-Islamic organisation within the country, which boasts a membership with prominent Australian icons (Maley 2017).

⁵¹ Aggressions ranged from taunts to their Islamic garbs being “touched, pulled or forcibly removed” (CAIR 2017: 23). Amongst these findings, 2016 witnessed a 90% increase in reported incidents of Islamophobia, against Muslim women wearing headscarves.

Nor because of the secrecy surrounding the event's location, or the police presence who guarded the conservative and alt-right attendees (ABC 2017). It is because, when Bernardi introduced himself, it was with a disclaimer. Given the "controversies" of his past public appearances, this was *not* an occasion that the senator would have to qualify that his views do not reflect that of the Liberal Party or the government.



Figure 6: Bernardi Defends Freedom of Speech

Bernardi's presence at the fundraiser – especially as a promoted, key guest speaker – conveys a symbolic Anglo-allegiance to support the association's pursuit of eliminating "medieval" Islamic demands and its system of "apartheid" from Australian society (Q Society 2013). Despite attending an event that claimed to defend Australians and their liberties, what is revealed is a monoculturalist defence of Anglo-Australian privileges. A significant sample of this is Bernardi's early and indirect reference of Islam as a "nightmarish regime": it is decoded to reinforce the xenophobic and racist discourses endorsed by the QSA. The insidiousness of this racist rhetoric underpinned the theme of the night. While he endorsed the fundraiser as a safe space for the populist crowd, Bernardi sought to distance himself from the inflammatory comments made at the previous Sydney QSA fundraiser.⁵²

Irrespective of the "humour" behind the abhorrent homophobic and racist remarks, the senator referred to "some of the comments" made at the previous QSA fundraiser as "absolutely out of line". The lack of specificity in condemning the derogatory references made at the overt right-wing fundraiser exposes an indifference within his rhetoric. Considering Bernardi's failure to rebuke sincerely, it is useful in revisiting Puar's (2007) homonationalist critique – it provides a valuable insight into the logic underpinning this homophobic and racist logic. As discussed within

⁵² The senator chose not to reiterate cartoonist Larry Pickering's racist and derogatory inference that, while he "starts shaking" at the sight of Muslims, not all are bad "because some do chuck pillow-biters off buildings" (Knaus 2017). He did not repeat how Ross Cameron, a former Liberal MP, turned cable news presenter and pro-Trump advocate, referred to his former party as a "gay club". Bernardi made no reference about Cameron's speech which went on a tirade about homosexuals, where he asserted that he did not "mind that they are gay". But instead, Cameron wished that the sexually 'deviant' would "build a wall" as a measure of self-exclusion and regulation (Knaus 2017).

the previous chapter, Bernardi continues to exemplify an absence of empathy extended to those of the LGBT+ community and those who identify as Muslim.

The senator's position on alternative sexualities echoes an ascension of whiteness in distancing itself from the sexually deviant and the Muslim subject. Puar emphasises it is necessary to elevating whiteness within an increasingly multicultural society. Displacing the non-normative sexualities from heterosexual whiteness gives the required leverage to retain a "demonizing capacity to perversely racialize bodies" (Puar 2007: 140). Moreover, the consolidation of white, heterosexual, male power, prevails in his newly established political party. While AC mobilised those attracted to his populist message that there is a "better way...a conservative way" (Bernardi 2017), there should be no misconceptions about the divisiveness of Bernardi's rehashed politics. They are founded on principles of heteronormativity and its elevation of "traditional marriages" (Conservatives 2017). The 'natural' families who are yielded from heterosexual relationships are attributed as a sole force that upholds the foundations of a "prosperous and civil society" (Conservatives 2017).

In instilling patriarchal and gendered roles, the AC also boasts a commitment to uphold the cultural norms and the values which invoke "the Judeo-Christian tradition" (Conservatives 2017). The 'alternative' beliefs fracture sociocultural cohesion, where management is needed over the "significant threat" (Conservatives 2017), that is the terrorist brown body.⁵³ Bernardi replicates the Trumpian biopolitics that polices a heteronormative conception of the white settler-state and its privileges imparted onto its preferred citizenry. Given the long history of hostility the QSA harbours towards Others (Maley 2017), Bernardi's pleas for freedom of speech, is a self-serving narrative of white heterosexual marginalisation. Quick to establish that attendees were victims of "violent nut job protestors" that had "broken through the ring of tyranny", the 'Trump effect' is seen in his mobilising efforts to share and foster experiences of white victimhood.

The displacement of anxiety is exploited by Bernardi to fuel a nationalistic struggle to regain "control over the home" (Hage 2000: 87). In the face of a politically correct culture, Hage describes this as an attempt for white nationals to reclaim an "acute sense of social and existential loss" (2000: 89). Crises of social and physical control occur as an Othered body's moves "across classes and status groups" (Hage 2000: 89): it effective in conveying the subject's resistance to the discursive structures and countering the embedded power disparities. When reflecting upon the purpose of the fundraiser itself, Hage's point proves to be invaluable. The event was organised to fund the legal aftermath of a 2-year long settlement, against publications made by an individual

⁵³ Others who do not conform to this tradition, "gradually [dismantle] Western culture ...[and] undermine our way of life" (Conservatives 2017). Clear within its party's policies is Bernardi's righteous crusade for a conservative movement that espouses many of the aggressions he had previously been condemned for.

board member of the QSA (Whyte 2017).⁵⁴ Bernardi revisits this position of white victimisation throughout his speech. As he discussed his plans on reforming the contended section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, Bernardi continued to cite a 2013 controversy at Queensland University (Chan 2016).

He surmised that “a group of blokes walked into a computer lab...[and] were kicked out for having the wrong colour skin. No one can defend that. And because they got on Facebook and wrote things like ‘fighting segregation with segregation’...and a few other things, the person who threw them out became the instant victim”. This essentialist description is inconsistent in its account. The three white students were asked to leave the computer facility by an Indigenous staff member because it was reserved for Indigenous and Torres-Strait Islander students (Chan 2016). This is not uncommon in Australia: the Othered subject remains significantly underrepresented within domestic higher education rates (Pechenkina, Kowal & Paradies 2012: 59). As a technique to restructure this institutional inequality, certain funds are allocated to peer support and academic facilities, made exclusive to the Indigenous Other. Furthermore, these white students did not go on online to air their quips in a virtual space. Instead, they publicly posted racist and bigoted comments directed at the university’s affirmative policies (Chan 2016). There was clear intent to undermine its inclusive efforts of supporting students from marginalised backgrounds. However, Bernardi ignored these truths in his recount. Mainly, because it did not fit within his narrative that fuels moral panic and the pervasiveness of white victimisation.

Young and Sullivan (2016) describe this inclination that compares ingroup oppression to a perceived outgroup (or an identified Other) as a form of competitive victimisation. They argue that an individual is likely to have a distorted worldview that their group has experienced ongoing sufferances, when they are led to believe that an Other is responsible for these residual pains (2016: 32). In addition, the researchers explain that cultural diversity and its qualities which transform landscapes, create the necessary conditions that facilitate privileged, superordinate groups to feel discriminated against. In relation to Bernardi’s colonial Othering of the Indigenous subject, Leach, Iyer and Pedersen’s (2011) study proves to be significant. They found that non-Indigenous people that hold power, often believe that Indigenous subjects enjoy a surplus of freedoms compared to that of their group membership. They are then, less likely to back legislature in favour of Indigenous sovereignty. Amongst the multitude of sufferances the Indigenous subject has experienced, Bernardi fails to recognise the plight of Indigenous dispossession carried out by the settler-state. As he disregards the “generational flow-on effect” that perpetuates “low socio-

⁵⁴ These public posts overtly inferred that the affluent Halal industry and its Muslim director was guilty facilitating terrorist conspiracies through the Islamic dietary practices.

economic condition[s] of many Indigenous Australians” (Lawson 2010: 24-25), he contributes towards reverberating modes of oppression that facilitate culturally specific trauma.

Bernardi exhibits the same indifference Trump displayed when advancing construction upon sacred Native American territories. From this, the ‘Trump effect’ and competitive victimisation are divisive tendencies that reproduce structural inequalities and the pervasive forms of symbolic and overt racism that follows. Additionally, Young and Sullivan (2016: 34) conclude that there is a clear association between competitive victimisation and growing acceptance of fundamentalist groups and nationalistic attitudes.⁵⁵ This capitalises upon perceived racial (and Other) differences, where Anglo-control and management over the ‘outsider’ is not a sole responsibility of the State.

The citizens who mutually support this Othered management are deputised by the State: their white anxieties are channelled into enforcing modes of alienation and societal exclusion (Austin 2018: 1). The encouragement of extremist and violent behaviours reliant on self and group identification, motivates the colonial dichotomy of the ‘West versus the Rest’. It works to normalise grotesque caricatures, as evidenced by Hanson’s racialised burqa ‘stunt’. As Bernardi posits how Aboriginality is impinging upon Anglo-Australian freedoms, he repeats this when showcasing his racial anxieties of Islam and Muslims. Careful in his references to not directly refer to the ‘barbarous’ religion and its subjects, the senator invoked a populist position. Bernardi recounted the “very mainstream concerns” he has heard, regarding the ineptness within “migrant communities” in their efforts to “integrate and assimilate”.

Concerning section 18C and freedom of religion, he admits that it is “risky situation” in imparting these privileges onto “them”. He again revisits this imposing position, where he grants the Muslim subject the quasi-privilege in practising their “backwards” religion, but they must “comply with our laws...customs...way of life”. Non-compliance with these regulations feeds suspicions about the innate criminality of Muslims and their beliefs (Poynting, Noble, Tabar & Collins 2004: 62). Parallel to Hanson’s preoccupation with Islamic practices and the Halal label (*Islamophobia in Australia* 2017: 17), Bernardi shares a mutual distrust of the Islamic-orientated industry. In their pursuit to assert dominance over the practice and legitimacy of the Halal accreditation, both populist actors have invoked moral and ethical positions, serving as a fear-mongering tactic (Abdel-Fattah 2018: 30).

In Bernardi’s conscious effort to reproduce Orientalist stereotypes, he frames the Muslim Other as radical and unable to withstand criticism against their ideology: their reactivity will continue to be perceived as culturally and morally inferior within the West (Ossewaarde 2014: 173; Ahmed &

⁵⁵ Oaten’s (2014) seminal investigation into the anti-Muslim rhetoric produced from the far-right political group, the English Defence League, competitive victimisation can become a core category of self-identification.

Matthes 2017: 221). In these populist arguments which promote a perspective of competitive victimisation, white power is asserted over Muslims and Indigenous Aboriginals, who are positioned as being responsible for the adverse conditions affecting white prosperity.

As Trump, Hanson, and Bernardi, consolidate white supremacy through their political discourse, they impinge upon civil rights for Othered subjects. The discussed examples in this chapter are representative of their populist justifications for inciting Islamophobia. However, it needs to be reiterated that these are in no way single occurrences, but rather, they reflect how Islamophobia is a part of a greater infrastructure of Othering. The Conclusion of this thesis will attempt to integrate this thesis's arguments while providing a summary commentary on the 'Trump effect' and its Australian iteration.

Conclusion: Weapons of Mass Distraction

Australia prides itself on the world's stage as being "the most ethnically diverse country in the world" (Ethnic Communities' Council of Victoria 2017). Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated, there has been a resurgence in Australia of an overtly white supremacist movement that has flourished within the white settler state, spurred by the so-called 'Trump effect'. Within both American and Australian contexts, there is a clear goal to consolidate white supremacy by modes of subjugating an Other.

By presenting Othered issues, framed with an emphasis of imagined insecurity, both the political and media spheres contribute towards mainstreaming expressions and actions of race-hate (Waikar 2018: 153). Disguised as passionate expressions of nationalism, these neoliberal politics are supposedly "common-sense": they appeal to voters disillusioned by the political 'elites' in government (Hall & O'Shea 2013: 1). White actors – such as Trump, Hanson and Bernardi – embody the role of the patriotic, 'ordinary' citizen, as they persuade public opinion through their extreme solutions. Their campaigns capitalise upon the residual insecurities advocated by the elite's inclusive and multicultural efforts, which transforms white cultural landscapes. Despite the national image celebrating Australia's multiculturalism, Hanson and Bernardi undermine the inclusive image. They share commonalities with Trump, in that, their palpable demagoguery distracts voters by endorsing a perceived 'loss'. Whether it be the fall of monoculturalism, the deterioration of border control, a loss of tradition, status and associated privileges, the different narrative discourses produces the same result: moral panic and fear of the 'threatening' Other is cultivated through the "excessively fragile conception of the [white] self" (Hage 2002: 419).

With a specific focus on the transnational iteration of the 'Trump effect' and its perpetuation of Islamophobia within Australia, a danger is identified through Trump and the repetition of his populist politics. When elected officials espouse bigoted, xenophobic and racist logics, these views gain public traction and are perceived as credible (Hage 2000: 88). Beyond the discussed rise of overt and covert public aggressions, the insidiousness of Islamophobia is legitimated by policy paradigms and the political ideals of elected officials (Modood 2014: 203). Structural in nature, it is achieved through a common goal to "subtly push the normative boundaries...[of] public and political discourse[s]" about Muslims and their Islamic faith: Trump, Hanson's and Bernardi's individual campaigns, collectively worked to "reinforce democracies' fear of radical Islamic terrorism" (*Islamophobia in Australia* 2017: 16).

The 'progressive' political stance that they assume has been challenged in this thesis, where it is revealed that it is anything but. It has been evidenced throughout this project that the regular use of damaging descriptors, specific to Muslims, clearly reproduces Orientalist critiques of the

collective as “backwards” (Abdel-Fattah 2018: 6). Constructive conversations between the two polarising bodies cannot occur. Islamophobes construct the Muslim religion, characterised by an innate hostility and criminality, born through Islamic teachings: the Muslim citizen incapable of adopting white civic commitments (Morgan & Dagistanli 2010: 591). Established discourses of this nature justify Western powers abrogating the rights of the Muslim Other.

This thesis has argued that out of the observed populist politicians, Trump best inherits and executes this type of power. In routinely conflating Islam as the antithesis of all things democratic, Christian and Western, Trump openly homogenised all Muslims as a dangerous and indoctrinated collective. As I have argued throughout this thesis, both Hanson and Bernardi have employed, in turn, this divisive dichotomy of ‘us versus them’: their rhetoric was clear to aggravate ideological and cultural difference between white and brown bodies (Van Dijk 2004: 352). This thesis’s argument has emphasised that there has been, thanks to the election of Trump, a significant increase in the level of vitriol towards Islam and Muslims. At no time in recent US history has there been a presumptive nominee, let alone a commander in chief, who has extensively relied on (neo)Orientalist tropes to legitimate an overt disdain towards Muslims and their Islamic faith (Eroukman 2018; Beydoun 2017a).

The presidential nominee disregarded soft diplomacy, early in his campaign. References which ascribed to Muslims a ‘tremendous hatred’ for the West, formed a crucial part of mobilising right-wing supporters. Once bestowed with a catalogue of constitutional powers, the White House authorised the president’s racist logic through enacting various legislature, under the guise of alleviating terrorism (Hassan 2017: 187). It is unsurprising that Trump surrounded himself with well-known Islamophobes, who would help orchestrate and support EO 13769. This is imperative to understand how Trump deviates from his Australian populist counterparts. As Beydoun (2017a: 35) succinctly surmises, “Trump converted Islamophobia into a campaign strategy that helped deliver him the presidency”.

This thesis has further evidenced that both Hanson and Bernardi, in the wake of the election of Trump, have gained notoriety and support for their platforms that exemplifies an aggressive anti-Islamic stance (Romano 2017: 53; Markus 2016: 41; Yasmeen 2013: 259). The Australian senators *can* express admiration for the president’s hard-line politics and philosophies. This achieved through their public praises and propositions of similar Trumpian legislature. But, because the senators *do not* occupy positions of executive power, as Trump does, they are *unable* to successfully enact their proposed exclusions of Islamic signifiers and the Muslim Other from Australian society. As such, Hanson and Bernardi sanction their Islamophobia, by way of appropriating the proposed flow-on effect. Hanson’s expressions police the boundaries of what

she believes is (un)Australian: behaviours which foster anti-social lifestyles and attitudes, are visible through phenotypical attributes and religious signifiers. Given her controversial political persona, the caricatures of Muslims and their religious practices are motivated by her white entitlement and parliamentary authority. By embodying his conservative Christian beliefs, Bernardi further contributes towards the deterioration of Australian Muslims. These beliefs guide his political conduct, and in doing so, he invokes a righteous argument: Bernardi's religiosity authorises his various 'immoral' attacks. These views dog-whistle distrust of Others and call for community cohesion in abolishing alternative lifestyles, specifically, Islam's presence from the Anglo-settler state.

Both senators 'criticisms' exaggerate notions of cultural segregation, to cultivate fear of the increased visibility of non-white bodies. Their shared narrative posits a fundamental belief of white marginalisation. Not only does this entrench a warped incompatibility between 'them' and 'us'. The public sphere is led to believe that Others are solely responsible for the various impairments that plague the prosperity of society. The select narrative which weaponises Muslims as a volatile identity and Islam as inherently oppressive distracts voters: their alien culture and ideology are an (in)visible security threat that undermines mainstreamed white-values (Saeed 2007: 17). There is, then, no need to pay attention to the embedded modes of institutionalised racism and social inequality, which permeate throughout Anglo-structures and elevate white supremacy (Edwards 2014: 193). The body's 'Muslimness' is made to stand in opposition to Western values. Hanson and Bernardi channel Trump and this transnational effect, as they acquire their "political profit from the post-9/11 market of fear, suspicion and hysteria" (Beydoun 2017b: 600). In their racialised speeches and performances, as I have demonstrated, they argue that Islam and the Muslim subject are threats and dangers to Western democracies.

Recent Developments and Future Research

There is a final need to address recent world developments. While I was unable to examine these occurrences within this project, the last section of this thesis will point to some contemporary examples of Otherisation. These provide an insight into critical avenues of future research, concerning the transnational iterations of Islamophobia.

In the last months of writing this thesis, America's and Australia's political landscape has been tumultuous. Trump's presidency has continued to mould and push the boundaries of Othered exclusion. While his 'travel ban' is in its third iteration and is now in effect (Hamedy 2018), Trump's latest disdain for Others is visible in the administration's "zero-tolerance enforcement policy" (Davis 2018). This policy marks an inhumane decision to separate young children from their families: these 'aliens' are guilty of illegally crossing the Mexico and US border (Davis

2018). The divisive effects of his term in the White House are yet to be fully realised, and as such, future research is needed.

Within Australia, there has been a revival of radical pro-white commentary. A recent defector of One Nation sparked bipartisan condemnation in his maiden address: Senator Fraser Anning romanticised Anglo-whiteness. Anning called for the renewal of a White Australian policy, and further suggested that the solution to unwanted migration, is the anti-Semitic “final solution” which would “resolve” the Muslim “problem” (Yaxley & Borys 2018). Following his speech, the Bernardi was one of the first to express congratulations, solidifying a future populist alliance. Hanson’s chameleon-like qualities made an appearance. In condemning her former constituent, she regarded herself as an advocator of Australia’s “multiracial society...where you do not have to be white to be Australian” (SBS 2018). Within the very same day, Hanson proposed an immigration plebiscite to cull migrant numbers: citizenry preference was granted upon those with Western values. Her disgust for Anning’s rhetoric was a clear façade.

The increased visibility of far-right political discourses is energised by the voters who are receptive to a romanticised rhetoric of a previous era. Drawing similarities between “Make America Great Again” and the Brexit campaign’s “Vote Leave” slogan, Romano (2017: 52) reveals how these populist “motifs become part of the popular consciousness due to their repeated exposure, [and] warrant media attention as a real social phenomenon”. Voters who are mobilised by this nationalistic sentiment, express nostalgia in their political preferences. They are melancholic for an era characterised by political and cultural suppression of the Indigenous Other; a period defined by the legislature excluding non-Anglo migrants; a time where gender and sexuality could be defined in binary terms; and where those who did not adhere to the phenotypical and religious qualities of the ethnocracy, were justifiably demonised. In this ‘simpler time’, Othered voices and bodies were considered as the lowest tier of being. And so, the multicultural state will continue to see variants of the “white ethnocide” narrative, embolden by the populists who license overt discrimination and racism as a way to subjugate Others liberties (Young & Sullivan 2016: 32-33; Abdel-Fattah 2007: 1; Poynting & Mason 2006: 366).

Hanson and Bernardi prove their relevance in instigating this rhetoric. Considering the rise of the radical right, future research may involve a cross-sectional comparison of anti-Islamic sentiments in a Trumpian and post-Brexit era. It would also be beneficial in analysing how non-Western states perpetuate this Islamophobic sentiment. One only needs to look at current world examples of Muslim genocide, as evidenced by the recent efforts to ethnically cleanse the Rohingya and Uyghur minority groups (Bloomberg 2018).

Additionally, future attention is needed in unveiling Australia's divisive trajectory and the normalisation of Islamophobia, under the helm of the current PM. Scott Morrison has been active in voicing his admiration for Trump's presidency. The new evangelical PM has complimented the populist politics the US president enacts, as "very practical" (Dowd 2018). Specifically, he characterised Trump's enactment of EO 13769 to mimic Australia's border deterrence policies – policies in which Morrison orchestrated. Considering this, his former immigration ministerial role has been described by humanitarian advocacy groups as a "black record" (Baker 2018). As he championed Australia's contentious Operation Sovereign Borders, Morrison launched legislation that 'stopped the boats' by effectively militarising a humanitarian issue.⁵⁶ It is clear that the new PM continues to celebrate these past 'accomplishments': he boasts a trophy of a model migrant boat, decorated with an arrogant message that "I stopped these" (Dowd 2018).

Finally, I want to emphasise that there are strong resistance movements against the damaging Islamophobic campaigns that I have outlined in the course of this thesis. The transnational counter-discursive rise provides Muslims with various outlets to express personalised stories of hardship while dispelling harmful stereotypes. It is not only confined to creative and intellectual modes of expression such as music, art and literature. More Muslims, specifically Muslim women, are being elected into the US Congress and parliaments around the world (Tønnessen 2018: 3; BBC 2018). The overall rise in brown, multicultural voices are entering the white stronghold of the political and media spheres.

As these voices challenge the actors who seek to delegitimise collective capacity, speaking back to the discourses which institutionalise racial and gender inequality, these "radical skins" rebel (Morsi 2017). They choose not to conform to modes of subjugation, by shaping culture and counter-discourses. It is for this reason that this resistance can best be perceived as a 'brown renaissance': the term is reflective of a constructive Muslim movement, empowered to act through the stories of Islamic oppression. While it is no way a new phenomenon, the coined term represents the expansive modes of brown resistance. This has arguably garnered more support and public attention due to Trump's inflammatory political presence. Future attention is needed to evaluate this concept of a 'brown renaissance' and how (in)effective these various modes of resistance are.

⁵⁶ In addition to this, the infamous campaign video which relayed these messages and was explicit to demonise asylum seekers, was faithfully appropriated by Geert Wilders (Tovey 2015). The ultra-nationalist praised this graphic anti-Islamic and refugee rhetoric in using the "No Way" slogan to further his crusade against the growing presence of Muslims and Islam in Europe.

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