

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Scene

A poster celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations has a photograph of an Australian Army soldier leading a young Somali child by the hand. The child is small, thin and dressed in rags and her expression shows the fear and confusion of her recent past. The soldier is dressed for war - he is covered in the equipment of war, camouflage uniform, kevlar helmet, flak jacket, basic webbing and a rifle. His expression clearly shows his concern for the child. The scene captures the experience of one Australian soldier on operational duty with the United Nations, but it is representative of the experiences of many. The caption on the poster reads:

Ambassador, Teacher, Peacekeeper, Soldier

The caption sums up much of the demand modern peace operations places on soldiers and officers asked to volunteer for Australian Defence Force (ADF) activities overseas.

THE PROBLEM

The caption is correct each individual is required to perform each of these roles on deployment, to perform on the world stage as representatives of their country.

To date, the performance of ADF peacekeepers has been commendable. This is particularly true when it is considered that their training prepares them for only one of the four roles ascribed to them. Indeed, the appropriateness of their training as soldiers could be questioned on the basis they have been prepared for combat - trained to prosecute war in a controlled, sustained manner with the aim of achieving victory over the enemy. Peace operations require a military force to perform in the role of third party mediator (Fetherston, 1994). A role that requires restraint in the use of force, impartiality in action, and resolution by mediation (British Army, 1994; Pinch, 1994a). These skills that are the anthesis of those required for war, and incongruent with military preparation and training.

The apparent disparity between training a soldier for war and employing them on peace operations is of concern in the context of adult education and training. A central tenet is that the skills gained in training, and the context in which they are gained, should as closely as possible reflect the context in which they are to be employed.

The traditional view of military peacekeeping is that the force is introduced with the consent of the parties to the conflict following the arrangement of a stable cease-fire or some other form of settlement (MacQueen, 1990; Goulding, 1993). The force is positioned between two recognised military forces representing two sovereign nation states. The role of the force is to establish a buffer zone between the opposing forces, to supervise the withdrawal of the opposing forces, and act as a source of reliable information on the adherence of the parties to the conditions of the settlement. The peacekeeping force is lightly

armed, and in general terms, is performing tasks appropriate to their training. That is, the tasks are likely to involve military forces dealing with other military forces to meet the demands of recognised political direction or agreement.

However, since the end of the Cold War the operational environment in which peace operations are conducted appears to have changed as have the role and tasks traditionally associated with military intervention (Eyre, 1993; Parsons, 1995). In particular, peacekeeping forces are involved in operations to restore peace within a nation, rather than between nations. The removal of the bipolar superpower influence appears to have resulted in bringing to the surface many previously controlled or repressed ethnic rivalries that have exploded into civil war. Peacekeepers are now asked to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, provide a secure environment for the conduct of elections, train military and police forces, and restore the rule of law in areas lacking central civil order. In these situations the force is, implicitly and explicitly, involved in nation building.

The nation building role places additional demands on peacekeepers in that it defines participation in terms of greater involvement with the local population. The force is no longer dealing exclusively with other military forces but is more intimately involved in creating the conditions under which the dispute can be settled, or rebuilding the stability of the nation. The actions of the force in this situation are often politically sensitive to the parties involved in the dispute and this in turn places increased emphasis on the need for impartiality and neutrality. Add to this situation the direct attention of world media, providing interpretative and opinionated coverage of every action of the force (K.E. Eyre, 1994). Media

coverage that at times appears to be driving the political agenda and thereby influencing the actions of the force. Media influence that can be manipulated by the parties to the dispute to limit the actions of the force, or manipulate the force to meet their own agenda (Badsey, 1994).

Under these conditions the modern peacekeeper is required to perform the roles of political ambassador; cross cultural communicator and teacher; negotiator, mediator as well as peacekeeper; and finally be able to quickly and reliably make the transition from peacekeeper to combat soldier. If the conditions under which peacekeepers operate are adequately captured by the poster caption there is a need to address the preparation and training of ADF personnel prior to deployment on peace operations.

The research described here will address questions about the adequacy of current policy and practice used to prepare Australian Defence Force personnel for peace operations. The research will concentrate on the Army, as in the main peace operations are land operations. It is not uncommon for an Australian contingent to a peace operation to be composed of personnel from all three services; however, the bulk of the force will be drawn from the Army. ADF preparation is conducted through one Army facility whatever service the individual may belong to, it is important that all three services understand the preparation and training issues associated with peace operations. The results of the study will be an important aid for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in assessing the skills required by their personnel to perform effectively on these operations.

The study will identify the types of skills required of a modern peacekeeper and suggest how the training and education system can accommodate the two complex and apparently divergent contingencies, peace operations and war.

AIM

The aim of this study is to improve the human resource policies and practices relevant to preparing Australian Defence Force personnel for peace operations.

This aim will be achieved by:

- a. reviewing the peace operations literature to clearly define the environment in which the operations are conducted and the issues associated with preparing individuals and units for that environment;
- b. evaluating the factors that contribute to success and failure of individuals or units on peace operations;
- c. evaluating the existing predeployment preparation policy and practice in the ADF; and
- d. determining the relevance of a Capability Model (Stephenson, 1992) of education in coping with the apparently divergent tasks of training for war and

deploying to peace operations and, if appropriate, expand the base of this model to consider the role organisational architecture plays in the development of individual capability.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is threefold:

- a. to determine those organisational factors that contribute to the development of individual capability, using the Australian Army on peace operations as a case study, and thereby contribute to the conceptual development of Organisational Capability;
- b. to evaluate the preparation, training and education of ADF personnel deployed on peace operations by completing a qualitative and quantitative analysis of ADF involvement in peace operations, highlighting the contribution of these activities to ADF strengths and deficiencies in performance; and
- c. to lay the framework for the development of a comprehensive “Peace Operations Task Analysis Survey” that can be employed to determine exactly what tasks are performed by ADF personnel on peace operations.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is sponsored by three areas of the ADF: The Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC); Land Headquarters Australia (LHQAUST) through Training and Operations Cells; and Deployed Forces Support Unit (DFSU). The importance of the study must then be drawn from its relevance to the three sponsors. Each sponsor plays a separate role in the process of preparing personnel for peace operations, and each will use the information gathered from the study to influence different aspects of the preparation of ADF personnel for peace operations.

The ADFPKC provides strategic level understanding of peace operations by conducting two International Peacekeeping Seminars per year. These seminars are designed to promote broader understanding of peace operations in the Australasian-Pacific region. ADFPKC also provides education on peace operations to the Services Command and Staff Colleges and the Joint Services Staff College. In addition to education they also produce the joint peace operations doctrine for the ADF. The ADFPKC will use the results of the study to augment the information they provide to middle ranking and senior officers who in the future will lead and manage peace operations both from Australia and overseas. Further, the study will identify areas of doctrinal concern that will be addressed by ADFPKC.

LHQAUST, Training and Operations Cells, serve two functions in preparing contingents for overseas deployment. The Training Cells function stems from responsibility for Army collective training. As an organisation they are interested in all aspects of preparing

teams and units for operations in which the Army is likely to participate. Operations Cell is responsible for the management of the contingent once it has been deployed and as such is interested in all aspects of how the operation is conducted once deployed. Training Cell will use the findings of the study to evaluate the relevance of current collective training to performance on peace operations. Operations Cell will use information gained about human resource issues associated with the conduct of the contingent in-country to improve management procedures.

DFSU is responsible for the preparation and training of personnel deployed on operations outside Australia. This unit develops and delivers the content of the training. They are also responsible for coordinating the welfare support to the families of personnel deployed overseas. For DFSU, the study will provide the first comprehensive evaluation of the course content, design and delivery since the inception of formalised predeployment preparation and training in the ADF. This will result in the improvements to the preparation of future overseas deployments.

Finally, from an academic perspective, the study will develop a theoretical framework that can be used to underpin efforts to design, develop and conduct the education and training of peacekeepers worldwide.

RESEARCH APPROACH

A grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) approach to data collection and analysis was employed throughout the study. The general goal of grounded theory is to construct theories in order to understand phenomena. The aim of using grounded theory in this study was to generate a descriptive and explanatory theory of the individual and organisational factors involved in preparing ADF personnel for peace operations. In this way, the process of preparing ADF peacekeepers could be described in terms of an interaction of contextual conditions, actions, and consequences, rather than explaining variance using independent and dependent variables. This approach was seen to be congruent with the aim and purposes of the study because it gives primacy to the realism of context, and theoretical and conceptual development, as the goals of the research.

To achieve the aim 41 officers and warrant officers who had held key positions in peace operations were interviewed on the following topics: Training; Leadership; Cohesion, Morale and Satisfaction; Selection; and Military Service and Career. These officers also received a pilot survey addressing Cohesion, Morale, Satisfaction and Predeployment Preparation.

The interview schedule was developed by following the basic systems model detailed in Figure 1.1. The process of deployment was seen as a system that begins with an individual being drawn from a peacetime unit involved in the process of training for war. The following areas were derived as critical points in the system:

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- a. ADF personnel are a product of a broader military education and training system from which he/she would draw skills to be applied to the peace operations environment. It is important to understand what elements of previous experience were relevant to peace operations.

 - b. ADF personnel are a product of a standardised selection process, and it is important to understand what issues of selection were a relevant to peace operations.

 - c. An examination of predeployment preparation, and the deployment environment was important in terms of their inter-relationship, and as a process embedded within the wider context of general military education and training.

 - d. The final phase of the deployment is the return to Australia, and re-integration into the peacetime military environment. The issues in this area are the impact of the operational experience on the individual, and the requirement for re-training to return to a peacetime role.




Figure 1.1. Systems model of a peace operations deployment.

The research approach was iterative in that at certain points a ‘thumb-nail’ analysis was conducted with the aim of refining the coding structure and the interview schedule. Depending on the findings at these points decisions were made about the viability of existing questions, and the prospect for developing additional questions to target issues consistently and spontaneously raised by the interviewees, but that at that time fell outside the structure of the interview schedule. In this way the interview schedule was dynamically refined to address the issues in the stage model presented above.

Finally, as a military psychologist and professional Army officer the researcher was able to draw on extensive personal knowledge of the issues examined and a current understanding of the needs of the organisation. The researcher has substantial experience in military education, training and development, and the psychological briefing and debriefing of

ADF personnel preparing for, or returning from, operational deployment. This background allowed the researcher to make a more informed personal contribution to the opinions expressed in the literature review, and the direction the research took at each analytical iteration.

STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

Chapter Two examines the changing nature of peace operations, particularly the changing environment in which the operations are conducted, and the subsequent expectations of military personnel. This chapter focus on determining the alignment between the strategic goals of the peace operations intervention, and the tactical guidance provided to peacekeepers through predeployment preparation and training.

Chapter Three follows the focus on predeployment preparation and training by reviewing the literature to determine the training need. This review highlights those skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKAs) that studies of experienced peacekeepers believe contribute to effective individual performance on peace operations. This determines whether peacekeepers require SKAs beyond the domain of conventional combat training, and if they are, the nature of those skills.

Chapter Four combines the issues raised in both Chapter Two and Three to determine those personal and environmental influences that impact on peacekeeper performance. This chapter takes the issues of skills development further to determine the interaction of the

individual with the environment, and the subsequent impact on performance and behaviour. Three areas are examined in detail: the potential impact of constant exposure to a peace operations environment on skills degradation; the factors that influence psychological adaptation to a peace operations environment; and issues in selecting personnel for peace operations.

Chapter Five reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the predominant education and training model employed in the ADF, and the Capability Model (Stephenson, 1992) of individual development through education. The relevance of the model to the peace operations environment and peacekeeper performance is detailed in Chapters Two to Four, and the conceptual base broadened to include consideration of the organisational factors that influence the development of individual capability.

Chapter Six provides greater detail on the method employed in the study as outlined above. Chapters Seven to Twelve discuss the findings and conclusions in the context of the expanded Capability Model, and in terms of their relevance to the ADF, and the wider peacekeeping community. The findings discuss individual capability in a cross-cultural setting, developing models of: the nature and extent of cross-cultural interaction on peace operations; the evolution of a peace operation and the implications for peacekeeper performance and behaviour; the relationship between the size of the contingent and the type of preparation required; and the obstacles in re-integrating peacekeepers into a peacetime military setting.

Throughout the thesis the convention of placing the acronym used in brackets after the first use of the term has been followed. However, considering the breadth of the target audience for this thesis, and that military organisations are 'acronym generators', a consolidated list has been provided for the benefit of all readers (pages xii-xvi).

Additional background information is provided on: a history of the UN (Appendix A); and those missions the participants in this study were drawn from (Appendix B). This information is readily available from a variety of sources, the approach here has been to consolidate that information, and to draw the readers attention to the sources employed. More detailed information on the missions is available from the UN website, <http://www.un.org/>.

The remaining appendices provide information that adds detail to the reviews, method or discussion that is not appropriate for inclusion in the body of the report. The instruments used in the study have been produced here to facilitate understanding of method employed, and to assist future researchers who may wish to adopt or adapt these techniques.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Each age has had its own peculiar forms of war... Each therefore would also keep its own theory of war ... (rather than undertake) anxious study of minute details (those who seek to understand war need to make) a shrewd glance at the main feature ... in each particular age.

Carl von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTION

The defence forces of first world nations are currently involved in a widespread debate on the nature of future military action and the resultant implication for force structure into the 21st Century. The debate titled a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has its philosophical basis in the writings of Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1980, 1995).

Toffler and Toffler (1980) describe human history as going through a series of waves. Each wave is based on the means by which wealth is created. The First Wave is associated with agriculture as the source of wealth and the development of agrarian society. The Second Wave was based on manufacturing as the source of wealth and coincided with the society that developed from the industrial revolution. The Third Wave is the one we are entering now and has been termed the 'information age' as the primary source of wealth will be knowledge.

Conflict or war in each period is characterised by the age in which it took place. First Wave war was a seasonal affair in which farmers became soldiers on the promise of land or food. The ends were short term, dictated by a lack of resources, organisation and commitment. Second Wave war is based on the principles of mass production. Mass production of weaponry allowed whole nations to be armed quickly at relatively low cost. With mass production came the principles of standardisation and reliability, principles that were extended beyond equipment production to human resources through standardised training, organisation and doctrine. Industrialisation led to the consolidation of the nation state with standing military forces and an enlarged scale for military operations. Theories of war during this time reflected these developments advocating 'absolute' or 'total' war that blurred the distinction between military and civilian targets. The ultimate result of Second Wave warfare evolution was the development of nuclear weapons and the age of 'mutually assured self destruction' which dominated the Cold War period.

According to Toffler and Toffler (1995) the Third Wave of war was ushered in with the 1991 Gulf War. Third Wave warfare has three main elements: advances in technology resulting in significant improvements in the relationship between accuracy and the distance over which military force could be applied through the use of long range weapons and precision strikes by stealth; advances in technology has improved the command, control, communications and intelligence capability such that complex military operations could be conducted across several theatres, as a result information has become a strategic asset to the extent that the capability to destroy the oppositions capacity to collect, process and disseminate information is vital; finally, the need to reduce casualties and collateral damage

resulted in the development of non-lethal weapons to support diplomacy, limit aggression and non-lethally disarm or destroy lethal capacity.

As highlighted by Clausewitz in the opening quotation it is important to understand the context in which war takes place. The futurist position of Toffler and Toffler (1995), while not without its critics (DiNardo & Hughes, 1995), suggests that in terms of civilisation and warfare we are at a point where civilisation and the way we make war are changing.

What is the relationship of Wave Theory to peace operations? The United Nations is essentially a product of the Second Wave. Its organisational systems and charter of operation reflect its Second Wave origins. It was designed to mediate conflict between nation states first, at a diplomatic level, and second with the concerted military action of the member nations. It is based on twin assumptions: that the global political system is self-correcting, where instability is the exception; and modern military nations are risk averse, to the extent that large scale military warfare will be avoided and all disputes can be settled through negotiation (Toffler & Toffler, 1995). The Cold War was not anticipated by those who founded the UN in 1945, and the relationship between the superpowers during that time effectively restrained the UN from meaningful action. As we shall see peacekeeping emerged as a method of circumventing the superpower dominance of the Security Council. If the nature of conflict has changed over time then it may be assumed that the nature of keeping the peace has also changed. But How? What are the implications for those who keep the peace?

This chapter will examine the notion that the nature of peace operations have changed

since the end of the Cold War. Consistently, the end of bi-polar superpower dominance of world politics is cited as a watershed in the evolution of the United Nations. Examination of information provided by the UN (<http://www.un.org>) on the number of missions conducted pre-1989 (16 in the period 1948 - 1988) compared with post-1989 (22 in the period 1989 - 1996) certainly bears testimony to the increased activity of the UN in peace operations post-1989.

Post-1989 operations have also become associated with terms such as “the evolution in peacekeeping” (Goulding, 1993; Lui 1993), “second generation operations” (MacKinlay & Chopra, 1993a, 1993b) and “peacekeeping as a growth industry” (Martin, 1993). These terms capture the image that not only has the number of missions increased but that there has also been a qualitative change in the nature of the operations. Moreover, the term “evolution” suggests that the new operations are based on, or are an extension of the old. Before understanding how the operations have changed over time it is important to understand the strategic role of the force in the international dispute settlement process, the principles that guide military action in relation to that role, and the environment in which those actions are taken. This chapter will briefly review the literature in these areas to place the military role in international dispute settlement into context.

PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

To review the peace operations literature to determine the nature of modern peace operations.

This will be achieved by:

- a. defining the different types of peace operations and placing them in the life cycle of a conflict;
- b. identifying the strategic role of a military force employed on a peace operation;
- c. identifying the principles that guide military action within the framework of the strategic role; and
- d. determining the qualitative change that has occurred in peace operations post Cold War.

TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The term 'peacekeeping' has popularly been applied to any operation that involves the United Nations resolving disputes between states or within states. However, the range of activities associated with the term is large, from the interposition of a force between two

nation states to ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian aid within a nation state. To ensure consistency within this thesis the following definitions of peace activities will be used throughout. The majority are definitions provided by the UN (United Nations, 1995a), any other definitions are those employed by the ADF (ADFPKC, 1996b).

The term **Peace Operations** is used throughout the thesis as a generic description of the activities associated with international dispute settlement. It is defined as:

Peace Operations encompass all types of operations and activities designed to support a diplomatic peace process.

The following definitions are taken from the United Nations document “General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations” of October 1995 and the forthcoming Australian Defence Force Joint doctrine on peace operations. In some cases the two documents concur that the UN definition of the operation is appropriate, in other cases the Australian definition as defined by the ADF Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC, 1996b) or Evans (1993) will be presented for comparison. In general, the Australian definitions are more pragmatic and provide greater clarity than the UN definitions, as such they will be adopted as the standard to be used throughout this thesis.

Peacemaking

Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated

agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is critical in the aftermath of conflict and includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

The UN definition of peacebuilding limits peacebuilding to actions undertaken post-conflict. Evans (1993) expands the term to include both pre- and post-conflict action. This approach will be adopted in this thesis:

Peacebuilding is a set of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and other major crises do not arise in the first place-or if they do arise they do not subsequently recur.

Pre-conflict peacebuilding is then defined as:

Pre-conflict peacebuilding refers to longer term non-military, economic, social and political measures which can help states deal with emerging threats and disputes.

While **post-conflict peacekeeping** is defined as:

Post-conflict peacebuilding is action taken after a conflict or crises in order to help ensure there is no recurrence of the problem.

Preventative Diplomacy

Preventative Diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a UN presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

It should be noted that (Evans, 1993) does not restrict this definition to a 'UN presence' rather preferring to include the consideration of unilateral, regional or multinational operations. With this in mind the Australian Defence Force defines peacekeeping as:

a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, non-combatant manner, to implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid operations.

This definition will be used throughout this thesis.

Peace Enforcement

Peace Enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

The Australian Defence Force definition of peace enforcement as:

the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention.

This definition will be adopted in this thesis.

Figure 2.1 clarifies the relationship between the types of operation and the life cycle of the conflict so that the reader can see the temporal relationship between the various types of operations.




Figure 2.1: The relationship between peace operation activities and the life-cycle of a conflict (adapted from ADFPKC, 1996b).

Military forces have a part to play in all the activities described in the definitions. The definitions highlight the inadequacy of referring to all peace activities as 'peacekeeping'. Peace operations cover a range of activities within the broader framework of dispute settlement. In the case of peacebuilding the settlement of the dispute is placed within the framework of nation building which involves creating or supporting the conditions necessary to ensure the stability of the state.

From the definitions of peace activities military forces can be placed into a variety of situations in support of political dispute settlement. In some cases peace operations have changed from one type of activity to another requiring the force to assume different roles within the settlement process. Given the range of activities that a peace operations force may be involved in, what is the role of the force in the conflict resolution process? To understand this question it is necessary to understand the origins of peacekeeping as a mediation process and its relationship to the UN Charter of operation.

THE EMERGENCE OF PEACEKEEPING

The mid-fifties was a time when superpower posturing was at its height. The UN became a political forum used by both powers to make ideological points. The UN Charter is based on the assumption of consensus among the Permanent Five (United States, United Kingdom, USSR, China and France) as a model for Security Council action (a background to the UN is provided at Appendix A). It became increasingly unworkable as the world, and the

Security Council became polarised around two emerging 'superpowers'. During this time the Security Council was unable to take action because each event was interpreted in relation to conflicting ideological positions. Veto powers of the Permanent Five were used extensively to block UN action.

The first indication that the UN might be able to achieve some kind of collective security role for itself which was both legitimate and effective came in 1956 (Fetherston, 1994). It followed an operation involving French, British and Israeli forces invading Egypt in response to Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The circumstances of the crisis were such that it presented an opportunity for a force level military response in a role generally accepted for the UN. Acting Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold set about planning a multinational military intervention. The United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) was despatched to the Suez in 1956, and 'peacekeeping' was born (MacQueen, 1990). The mandate of the force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, to oversee the withdrawal of British and French forces, and to remain as a buffer between the Egyptians and Israelis.

The credit for raising the force in the polarised environment of the Security Council goes to Dag Hammarskjold and a Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson and is referred to as the Pearson-Hammarskjold Model. The pair presented a document that contained five key principles: (1) the principle of consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission; (2) the principle of non use of force except in self defence; (3) the principle of voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force;

(4) the principle of impartiality and non-intervention; and (5) the principle of day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary General.

The success in establishing this mission hinged on two points. First, the conflict lay outside the central area of superpower strategic competition. Second, the ten contributing states were as Lester Pearson put it “middle powers, big enough to discharge with effect the responsibilities we undertake...but not big enough for others to fear us”.

UNEF I was quite successful in fulfilling its mandate of securing a cease-fire and supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. Based on this success the principles established for this mission became the model for all future multinational military intervention.

While peacekeeping is now readily accepted by the member nations as a legitimate action available to the UN to resolve a dispute it is not a part of the official UN Charter of operation. The political means by which the peacekeeping was established remains a subject of debate by those interested in the activities of the UN.

UN action as defined by the Charter is contained in Chapters VI - Peaceful Settlements of Disputes and VII - Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. These are the tools by which it was originally believed that the UN would achieve its first purpose:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principle of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes which might lead to a breach of peace.

Chapter VI provides that international disputes “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to recommend actual terms of a settlement. The actions of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting voluntarily to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression exists it may use the broad powers of enforcement measures at its disposal under Chapter VII of the Charter. To prevent the situation from deteriorating, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it considers necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide under Article 41, what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed by the Members of the UN, including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication and the

severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider those measures inadequate, it may take, under Article 42, “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. For this purpose, all members of the UN undertake to make available to the Security Council, the necessary armed forces assistance and facilities.

Peacekeeping as a concept is not described or defined in the UN Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI, but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. As former Secretary-General Hammarskjold stated, peacekeeping might be put in a new Chapter “Six and a half”. Peacekeeping has evolved over the years as a flexible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. This technique, was born of necessity, largely improvised, and used as a practical response to a problem requiring action, and partly compensated for the impaired ability of the Security Council to function fully during the Cold War.

Against this backdrop it can be seen that the original principles of peacekeeping as embodied in the Pearson-Hammarskjold Model were derived to overcome the political problems that existed in the United Nations in 1956. However, the principles also portray the role of the force as that of third party mediator, in that the force is required to settle the dispute while the diplomatic peacemaking process endeavours to resolve the conflict. At the time when they were derived it was expected that the force would resolve conflicts between nation states, conflicts that the Toffler and Toffler (1995) would refer to as traditional Second

Wave disputes. But more and more the UN is becoming involved in regional or ethnic conflicts within a nation state (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, Angola, Haiti). What is the role of a third party mediator? What implications does the increasing involvement in intra-state conflict have for the strategic third party role of the forces deployed on peace operations?

PEACEKEEPERS AS THIRD PARTY MEDIATORS

As we have seen the UN's first purpose is to maintain international peace and security. There are three methods available to the organisation to achieve this purpose and they are contained in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the more recently developed "Chapter Six and a Half". Essentially, the methods by which the UN achieves its purpose can be categorised as third party mediation. The following broad definition of mediation has been adapted from Folberg and Taylor (1984, p. 7):

Mediation is a process by which participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person, group, or organisation, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual resolution that will accommodate their needs.

There are many issues involved in clearly defining mediation, the intent in this case is to provide a general sense of the process involved. An alternative approach to understanding mediation is to consider the issue in terms of process and outcome. Mediators are used in situations where the parties to the dispute require assistance with the procedural or process

issues associated with the negotiation, while maintaining control over the outcome of the negotiation. Whichever approach to mediation is adopted, Bercovitch (1996) describes the main objective of international intervention in a dispute as the effective control of the conflict.

By this he means to:

- a. prevent the spread or escalation of conflict;
- b. achieve an early resolution of the conflict;
- c. minimise human suffering; and
- d. uphold international law and norms.

It is these objectives that the UN seeks to meet when intervening in a dispute. Chapter VI and VII of the Charter provide the authority, and the power, to achieve these objectives to meet its first purpose, 'the maintenance of international peace and security'.

Chapter VI methods of peaceful settlement might be referred to as methods of 'voluntary' mediation. In this case, the dispute has reached some form of impasse and the parties have recognised a need for third party intervention in order for the negotiation to proceed. The mechanism by which the UN becomes involved in the settlement of the dispute is by invitation. Traditional Chapter Six and a Half intervention as defined by the Pearson-Hammarskjöld Model can also be classified under the term voluntary mediation. Bercovitch

(1996) describes the conditions under which 'voluntary' mediation, as it is described here, is likely to take place:

- a. when disputes are long, drawn out and complex;
- b. when the disputants' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse;
- c. when neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute;
and
- d. when the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some contact and communication.

As the term enforcement suggests the role of the UN in the application of Chapter VII intervention is to impose 'mandatory' mediation on the parties to the dispute by forceful means. Involvement of the UN in the dispute is based on the observed impact or potential impact of the dispute on international peace and security. That is, the UN uses the authority of its first purpose to intervene and settle or contain the dispute. Boulle (1996) highlights two major concerns associated with mandatory mediation. First, it could result in the parties to the dispute participating in a perfunctory fashion and this would reduce the prospects of effective settlement. This problem stems from the mediator's lack of binding decision making powers which is inherent in the role of the mediator. Second, there is the concern that mandatoriness is incompatible with the values and assumptions of mediation and

as such distorts the true nature of the process. As we shall see these two issues are of particular importance to the UN in the modern intra-state conflict.

If we consider the types of operation defined earlier in this chapter with the methods the UN has to achieve its first purpose of 'maintaining international peace and security' we can see that mediation can be used for the following purposes:

- a. **To Resolve Disputes.** Dispute resolution is a non-coercive intervention that facilitates a self-supporting, long term end to violence within a framework that is beneficial to all parties (Fetherston, 1994). The aim is to bring an end to the dispute through the parties' joint decision making. Peace operations in this category include 'traditional' peacekeeping (for example, monitoring cease-fire agreements or troop withdrawal), pre and post-conflict peacebuilding and peacemaking.

- b. **To Settle Disputes.** Dispute settlement focuses on stopping the fighting or violence, and promoting compromise. Settlement procedures are all coercive in that one or all of the parties are forced to give up something they otherwise want for the sake of the cessation of fighting (Fetherston, 1994). The aim of mediation is to contain the conflict by establishing appropriate rules, structures and processes for communication and interaction. Mediation provides an opportunity for the dispute to be dealt with through other methods. The peace operations in this category are some selective forms of peacekeeping (for example, delivery of humanitarian aid) and peace enforcement.

c. **To Prevent Disputes.** The aim of dispute prevention is to assist parties to anticipate problems, grievances and difficulties and to plan processes for dealing with them before they arise. Peace operations in this category are those defined as preventive diplomacy.

The popular belief is that to be successful in achieving an end to a dispute that the third party must be neutral. This is generally linked to the process/outcome description of mediation offered above in which the mediators role in the negotiation is to facilitate the procedure by which dispute is ended. The mediator is seen to have no stake in the final outcome of the negotiation. Clearly, this is not an accurate description of the role of the UN as third party mediator, in that, the organisation's intervention is based on the moral authority given by its 186 members who have agreed to adhere to the principles contained in the Charter, in particular, to maintain international peace and security. The UN is by no means a third party disinterested in the outcome of the dispute and therefore not neutral.

The role of the UN in resolving disputes extends from the moral authority given to it by the member states and as such relies on the impartiality with which it administers the process of dispute resolution. Where neutrality as described above refers to the relationship between the parties and the mediator, impartiality refers to the even-handedness, objectivity and fairness towards the parties during the mediation process. At an individual level research into mediation (Carnevale and Conlon, 1990) has shown that the parties will overlook the perception of bias that exists between a mediator and one party to the dispute either by general alignment, or previous association, if the mediator is impartial or even handed in mediating the

dispute. To be successful, the UN's credibility as a third party mediator stems from the credibility it gains from administering (and being seen to administer) international disputes in an impartial way. If this is the case, does the UN's impartiality suffer in those cases where the nature of the dispute has resulted in 'mandatory' mediation through the use of force?

As described earlier 'mandatory' mediation has two problems associated with it:

- a. the parties participate in a perfunctory manner that reduces the prospects for effective settlement; and
- b. the mandatory nature of the process is incompatible with the values and assumptions of mediation.

For the UN these issues relate to the use of force. In establishing the first peacekeeping mission the principles laid down by the Pearson-Hammarskjold Model refer to the minimum use of force. In this context the use of force was limited to self-defence. However, in recent times the environments in which peace operations have been mounted has led to the UN authorising what appear to be peacekeeping type missions with peace enforcement mandates (for example, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda) and this has caused considerable debate about the use of force in peace operations.

The debate is best examined by highlighting the viewpoints of two former UN force commanders: Lieutenant General John Sanderson, Force Commander UNTAC and General

Sir Michael Rose, Commander Bosnia-Herzegovina Command.

Lieutenant General Sanderson (1996) argues that the actions taken by the UN under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are political acts that are dependent on the moral authority of the Charter. The application of the principles of the Charter must occur in an objective and independent way, free from specific national interests, such that the collective consent of the nations is apparent. If the political purpose of the intervention is ambiguous, or is of questionable morality, the capacity for success in the operation is greatly reduced. He cites Somalia and Rwanda as examples in which the political situation was confused by having Chapter VI and VII operations run in parallel in an intra-state conflict. The result of these actions was to reduce the moral authority of the UN which is its basis for action. Enforcement actions in situations of internal conflict have an increased potential to destroy the UN's image of impartiality and in doing so make it another party to the conflict. If this occurs the UN will lose the war, because it is dependent on the individual member states. It does not have the will or resources necessary to sustain a war-fighting role. Lieutenant General Sanderson (1996, p. 184) highlights his argument by posing the following questions:

How can a mandate which draws its authority from a Charter designed to defend the sovereignty of states, and to promote human rights, authorise hostile intervention against any party or individual within a state? And if responses are not firmly based within a framework of the Charter, how can the UN Commander issue lawful and sustainable orders to soldiers of another member state, or indeed, of his own country? Where does that leave the

soldier who might have to make the choice between obeying or disobeying those orders, and bearing the consequences?

Clearly for Lieutenant General Sanderson the use of force on peace operations, particularly in intra-state conflicts, must be employed with absolute discrimination towards achieving a legitimate political objective within the context of international or domestic law. His arguments support the role of the UN as a third party mediator but question the validity of the 'mandatory' mediation role in relation to intra-state conflicts, as the impartiality of the organisation and its role are compromised.

Contrast this approach with that of General Rose who believes that "force has a clear role to play in a peacekeeping mission" (Rose, 1996, p. 172). He agrees that the central governing principle of peacekeeping missions is that force can only be used at a minimum level to achieve a specific aim. The use of too much force than that which is prescribed by the bounds of peacekeeping crosses the line which separates combatants from non-combatants, a line that General Rose refers to as the 'Mogadishu Line'. He suggests that this is the problem that occurred in Somalia after the peacekeeping force changed its aims halfway through the mission resulting in what is generally considered to be a peace operations debacle.

General Rose argues that force can be applied in a partial way within the confines of the principle of peacekeeping. In his own case the use of NATO air strikes against parties to the dispute was essential to the continued viability of the UN mandate without which the

mission would have failed. The use of force in this environment protected the credibility of the UN by allowing the peacekeepers to maintain their moral position by creating the conditions of 'peace, order and civilisation' that allow the achievement of the mandate. If you lose that moral position, General Rose would argue that the mission has no sense or purpose. To reinforce his point he comments:

If the food doesn't get through, people start to die. The 2.7 million people one is feeding there are the people most in need. They are the elderly, the displaced and the children. If food and fuel are not delivered, almost immediately people start dying. So if you do not use undue force, then they will block your convoys and people will start dying, and you have to balance what you are trying to do against the risk of that outcome.

General Rose then agrees that there is a place for 'mandatory' mediation as long as the force used to compel the parties to seek resolution is the minimum required to achieve a specific objective. Further, he argues that force applied in this way is impartial and supports the moral credibility of UN actions under the Charter.

The comments and opinions of these two commanders has been used to highlight the problems associated with the use of force on peace operations and the issues involved in 'voluntary' and 'mandatory' mediation. This is not intended to be a complete review of the issues associated with the use of force on peace operations, but is provided to give the reader a sense that the issue of 'mandatory' mediation either as part of a peacekeeping or peace

enforcement operation remains an area of contention.

The nature of the intervention then has significant implications for role of the force in the conflict resolution process. As a tool of UN third party intervention it is important that military personnel on peace operations understand their role and the nature of the deployment before they can successfully be employed. Fetherston (1994) argues that the approach taken to the preparation of personnel by the major troop contributing nations fails to acknowledge the role of the force as a third party mediator, and consequently it is not as effective as it could be in fulfilling its role in the conflict resolution process. She argues that because peacekeeping has been developed as an ad hoc response to international conflict it has little or no conceptual basis. She characterises the UN approach to peacekeeping as founded in traditional concepts of the nature of conflict which she suggests arises from competition for scarce resources, the result of which produces a winner and a loser. Violent conflict is regarded in the Machiavellian (Machiavelli, 1514/1995) sense as an inherent action of the human condition. In settling the conflict the aim is to produce a state of negative peace which equates to the absence of conflict. The focus of the process is on the objective elements of the dispute, generally the re-distribution of resources.

The alternative approach advocated by Fetherston is based on the work of Bercovitch (1986, 1991), Fisher and Keashly (1991) and Azar (1990). In the alternative approach the conflict may begin as a conflict over resources but its nature is altered over time by the subjective interpretation of the behaviour of each party over the course of the conflict. The subjective elements of a dispute might include the need for security, for identity, and for

distributive justice. The subjective elements of conflict appear to correlate well with the sources of ethnic or regional conflict which the UN has become increasingly associated with in recent times. In the early stages of the conflict resolution can be achieved by focusing on the objective issues, however, if the conflict becomes a protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990) resolution must focus on achieving a positive peace. That is, a peace in which the human (subjective) needs of the participants to the conflict are met. In this approach it is assumed that this need can be met without resorting to coercion and violence, the corollary being that violence is not an inherent part of human nature. Once a subjective conflict has resulted in overt violence all communication is lost and there is a need for third party mediation.

The traditional use of peacekeepers has been to deploy a force into disputes which are protracted and in which violence has been used and continues to be the norm. The UN employs the peacekeeping force, operating at the operational and tactical level, to separate the belligerents and stabilise the environment (conflict settlement) while at the strategic level diplomatic efforts are made to resolve the conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In this approach there is a link made between peacekeeping and peacemaking. However, Bercovitch (1996) analysed international conflicts to find that the one-third of all UN mediation took place in decolonisation conflicts with a success rate of just over 45 percent. Seventy-four UN mediations involved Cold War issues with an overall success rate of 24 percent. Sixty-three mediations took place where the main issue was internal with an overall success rate of 21 percent. Clearly, the success of the peacekeeping/peacemaking approach is dependent on the underlying causes of the conflict. In conflicts in which the primary causes are internal the peacekeeping/peacemaking approach is less effective.

Fetherston's (1994) analysis of peacekeeping results in the development of a conceptual approach aimed at what she terms the micro-level. That is, the level of the military personnel on the ground where she believes that there is a continuum between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Better coordination of these three roles is crucial to more effective conflict management. By concentrating on peacekeeping as an interface between peacebuilding and peacemaking the role of the force is more attuned to the resolution of the subjective elements of the dispute by focusing on conflict settlement (peacemaking), by mediating disputes at the community level and conflict resolution (peacebuilding), and through the development of the civil infrastructure. In this model the peacekeepers are seen to be acting as the first phase in a larger process that is true to their role as third party mediators while creating the conditions for positive peace and dispute settlement.

It should be noted that Fetherston's (1993, 1994) approach to third party mediation does not include peace enforcement as an option as she considers any form of 'enforcement' even for valid reasons is not peaceful. For further discussion of the limitations of peace enforcement as an intervention method see Fetherston and Nordstrom (1994).

If this is the strategic role of military personnel and forces on peace operations what guidance is available in how to perform the role? Essentially, the justification for third party intervention is moral. That is, since the mediator gains nothing from the resolution process other than resolution, it is not unreasonable to expect the mediator actions must then be guided by principles that will protect the justification of their role.

In war, armies provide guidance to commanders in taking action on the battlefield, these are known as the principles of war. These principles have evolved over time based on various factors such as, the role of the military in the society, the lessons learned from previous military encounters and the writings of military theorists. The application of the principles of war are reinforced through command level training and are an instinctive consideration by commanders making decisions about the courses of action available to resolve a problem. What principles then guide the military actions in peace operations?

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Application of the principles of war is dependent on the operational environment and problem encountered by the commander at a particular time. The Australian Defence Force employs ten principles of war to guide the planning and conduct of all operations. These are: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim; Concentration of Force; Economy of Effort; Cooperation; Security; Offensive Action; Surprise; Flexibility; Administration; and Maintenance of Morale. Consideration and application of these principles is a central feature of all officer and senior non-commissioned officer training in the ADF. When deployed on peace operations it is these principles that will guide the actions of Australian military commanders.

The principles of war are general enough to be interpreted as strategic planning guidelines for application in most environments, civilian and military (including peace operations), where leadership, management and planning are required. However, peace

operations differ from war in that the political context in which the operation are undertaken is more apparent and fragile.

The force operates as part of the international political process representing the interests of the international community which may, or may not, be of direct strategic interest to their home nation. The political component of the deployment is a paramount consideration as the force is not a true military force, but more a military force used in a political context. Military commanders deployed on peace operations must take the political context of the deployment into account in determining actions at the operational and tactical levels. Their actions then will be guided by the peculiarities of their current political environment, and the principles of peace operations that have been derived from the political and military history of peace operations.

The recent development of British Army doctrine on peace operations has taken this approach. Their doctrine referred to as Wider Peacekeeping (British Army, 1994) describes the wider aspects of peacekeeping that, for the British Army, have become more prominent post-Cold War. They have produced a tactical level doctrine aimed to meet the needs of field commanders and their staffs at a variety of levels within the Army. The doctrine provides the commander with a conceptual approach to the issues of post Cold War peace operations preferring to provide “reasoned principles in preference to prescriptive applications”. The doctrine for Wider Peacekeeping is embedded in the generic description of Peace Support Operations which is similar in definition to the term peace operations used throughout this thesis. Three categories of peace support operations are described:

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- a. **Peacekeeping.** Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential and actual conflict.

 - b. **Wider Peacekeeping.** The wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.

 - c. **Peace Enforcement.** Operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.

Wider peacekeeping operations are characterised as operations which are likely to take place in situations where there are: numerous parties to the conflict; the factions are undisciplined and not responsive to their own controlling authority; there exists an ineffective cease-fire; there is the absence of law and order; there are gross violations of human rights, the risk of local armed opposition to UN forces is high, there is a large number of civilian organisations both government and non-government; there is a collapse of the civil infrastructure; the result of which may be large numbers of refugees and displaced persons; and finally, there is an undefined area of operations. These are the characteristics of civil war, therefore the British Army anticipates that the Wider peacekeeping operations are likely to take place within a nation state at a time of civil unrest or war.

The British approach (British Army, 1994) to developing principles for this environment has been pragmatic. Essentially, the success of peacekeepers in this environment is likely to rest on extensive cooperation from the local population. The environment is one in which peacekeepers are required to use the minimum of force to achieve their objectives, so cooperation rests on the willingness of the local population to assist and, therefore, the peacekeepers must have the consent of the local population to perform those tasks. The compliance of the local population is a partnership in which there is mutual benefit. Consent is then the central key feature of peace operations because the failure to maintain consent is a corollary to the failure of the mission.

Consent is seen as the key feature which separates peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping from the more warlike peace enforcement. The aim of the peacekeeper is to protect the "consent divide" which separates peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping from peace enforcement. From this conceptual approach the British Army (1994) derived six principles of wider peacekeeping:

- a. **Impartiality.** Impartiality is primary among the principles as without it there is no prospect for preserving the confidence and cooperation of the conflicting parties. It is recognised that impartiality is a matter of perception and as such the peacekeeper must act impartially and be seen to act impartially.

- b. **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy derives from the perception that the mission is just. The higher the degree of legitimacy the greater the likelihood of success. Peacekeepers

must therefore act within the confines of domestic, national and international law as well as within the UN Mandate and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Failure to do so will result in the loss of legitimacy and authority and ultimately the withdrawal of consent by the local population and reduced force effectiveness.

- c. **Mutual Respect.** The wider peacekeeping environment is likely to create friction between the recognised parties to the conflict and the peace force. The peacekeeper's role is to maintain the respect of the belligerent parties. Respect may be in terms of the culture, customs and religion of the country or region, as well as respect for the parties position in the dispute.
- d. **Minimum Force.** The way in which force is used is a critical determinant of the course that an operation may take. Imposed solutions will breed resentment which in turn will impact on consent and the effectiveness of the force.
- e. **Credibility.** Credibility derives from the perceived capability of the force to carry out its tasks. From this stems the confidence of the local population that the UN force is capable of being effective in the region.
- f. **Transparency.** The peacekeeper's action should never be misunderstood by the parties to the conflict or the local population. Any misunderstanding has the potential to breach the consent divide and escalate the conflict. Within the bounds of operational security the parties to the conflict and the local population must then be

fully aware of the motives, mission and intentions of the UN force.

This conceptual approach provides a military force with a set of guiding principles that can be applied to an environment with the characteristics of peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping. While similar in intention to the original Pearson-Hammarskjold Model principles, the British Army approach has removed the political origins of the principles and re-worked them into a conceptual model that gives the commander in the field a basis for action in the peace operations environment.

If the British Army approach is pragmatic, what are the examples to support the principles of consent? Dobbie (1994a) highlights many examples from the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia where the post-operational reports from British officers in this environment refer consistently to the need to obtain consent at the local level to avoid escalation in the conflict, to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and to ensure the freedom of movement and security of the force. Similarly, the UNAMIC and UNTAC missions to Cambodia required the consent and cooperation of all parties in achieving a successful cease-fire, disarmament of belligerents, and the monitoring of the election process. By contrast, the UN experience in Somalia is used to highlight the how the application of the principles of consent can produce markedly different results in the one operation. The approach of the US units operating in Mogadishu was to coerce cooperation from the local population, applying force in a proactive and non-discriminating way. The result of this action was that in Mogadishu the security of UN military forces and humanitarian relief personnel could not be guaranteed. There was a general increase in the level of violence in the region and a

subsequent restriction in movement in the area (Ingram, 1994).

Contrast this with the approach of the Australian Battalion in Baidoa where the military personnel were instructed to be 'firm, fair and friendly' (Ramage and Breen, 1994). Violence against Somali citizens was not tolerated, and the importance of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Orders for Opening Fire (OFOF) were heavily emphasised. Consistent with a third party mediator role, the aim of the Australian Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hurley, has been described (Ramage and Breen, 1994) as:

... Hurley emphasised the requirement to make a difference by showing that the Australians were following a strict code of personal and professional conduct.

The result of this approach was that Baidoa was considered one of the few successes to come out of the deployment to Somalia (Dworken, 1993). From a pragmatic perspective the real world application of the principles of consent is successful.

It should be noted that there has been a significant cross-pollination of ideas between the British and American doctrine writers. In the recently released American Doctrine *Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23* crossing the "consent divide" from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is seen as a decision that fundamentally changes the nature of the operation. In turn the American doctrine identifies the following principles of peace operations:

- a. **Objective.** Direct every military action toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- b. **Unity of Effort.** Seek unity of effort in every operation.
- c. **Security.** Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.
- d. **Restraint.** Apply military capability prudently.
- e. **Perseverance.** Prepare for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
- f. **Legitimacy.** Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

The immediately apparent difference between the British Army and American Army principles is that the British principles deal with the role of the force, or the individual, in terms of their conduct and relationship to the conflict, while the American principles reflect a narrower set of military objectives aimed at the application and protection of military capability. The American principles, while valid from a military perspective do not provide guidance that acknowledges the role of the force in the conflict resolution process. They reflect the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) issued by President Clinton that set out

a very narrow set of criteria for US involvement in peace operations, endorsing that US involvement in these operations will be more considered. In particular, U.S. involvement would depend on there being a definite advancement of US interests, a real threat to international peace and security, clear mission objectives and scope, an effective agreement to UN presence by all parties, and an identifiable end-point to the operation.

US policy direction (PDD, 1994) and doctrine development (US Army, 1994) reflect the philosophy that there is a continuum of operations, with traditional peacekeeping at one end and peace enforcement at the other. The assumption is that the force is able to step through the various graduations of the continuum. This is contrasted with the British approach (British Army, 1994) that sees a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement that is defined by the presence or absence of consent. The British doctrine (British Army, 1994) focuses on winning the 'hearts and minds' of the affected population to create an environment in which the objectives of the mission can be achieved. Additionally, it accepts the protracted nature of the conflict, and recognises the turbulence and uncertainty inherent to intra-state conflict. Contrast this with the US view expressed in PDD 25 (1994) that is insistent on having end-states before beginning a peacekeeping operation, and having them in writing as 'sunset clauses'.

It is at this point that the reader should recall the comments of Generals Sanderson and Rose on the use of force in peacekeeping. The British principles of consent are clearly related to the original Pearson-Hammarskjold Model but, are they appropriate or adequate in environments where the military is required to apply force to achieve its mandate?

The British Army doctrine clearly draws a line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but to be a true set of guiding principles they should be applicable to peace operations in general. General Rose might argue that in some cases the application of force can reinforce the position of the military and the principles by which it operates, while Lieutenant General Sanderson might argue that the use of force would breach the very principles from which the force draws its strength. Again, the reader is reminded of the problems in this area. Connaughton (1996) argues that in deriving the principles the doctrine has not gone far enough. He argues that the principles reinforce the UN position of consent without taking account of the demands of intra-state conflict in which he believes these principles do not apply. As we have seen it is a matter of perspective and level. At the tactical level there is some evidence to suggest that these principles are valid, while at the strategic level the concerns are greater.

In this thesis the principles of consent will be taken in a more general sense to apply to all peace operations, including peace enforcement, based solely on the argument that regardless of the issues surrounding the use of force the reality is that the UN continues to have two methods of action, voluntary and mandatory mediation, and there is likely to be continued problems for military personnel in the application of force to achieve a UN mandate. Use of force problems seem to stem from problems in defining the political objectives of the mission and how those objectives will be achieved at the strategic level. The British Army principles provide tactical guidance to military personnel that is consistent with the aims of the UN Charter and the intentions of the organisation as a third party mediator. In the real world, peacekeepers must have the flexibility to operate in both environments. As the intention of

this thesis is to deal with individual and force training at the tactical level further discussion of these problems is beyond the scope of the thesis.

By placing consent as the central tactical feature of Wider Peacekeeping the British Army approach implicitly acknowledges the strategic role of the force as a third party mediator in the broader context of conflict resolution. The principles that they have developed form a guide that is consistent with the strategic role but relevant at the operational and tactical level. Taken in concert with the broader military principles the force has an appropriate framework for conducting the operation. What type of environment are these operations conducted in? What implications does the environment have for the application of the principles?

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

There has been a number of models put forward in the academic literature advocating that the nature of peace operations has changed in the post Cold War period (Goulding, 1993; Lui, 1993; MacKinlay & Chopra, 1993b). There is quantitative evidence to support that the number of missions mandated by the Security Council has increased since the decline of superpower polarisation of world politics, but the evidence that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the operations is more difficult to justify.

Berdal (1994) argues that the changes that are advocated by these models are linked with a tendency to “downgrade the requirement of consent as the basis for UN action” and

this is the central argument of these models. Morrison (1993) comments that the pre Cold War UN held as sacrosanct the inviolability of a nation state's sovereignty. In the post Cold War environment, the Security Council became very active and interventionist, and with increased intervention there is a concomitant decline in the requirement for consent.

The most widely recognised and employed descriptive model of peace operations was developed by MacKinlay and Chopra (1993b). They recognised that each UN operation to restore peace was distinct in terms of political, military, geographic and legal characteristics. They argue that the apparent lack of commonality between operations had made it difficult for UN military contingents and other agencies to respond uniformly to each crisis. MacKinlay and Chopra (1993b) analysed UN tasks identifying operational concepts and concomitant legal ratification that could be used as standard operating procedure for each force. The result of the study was a comprehensive *Concept for Second Generation Multinational Operations* that has become widely accepted as a descriptive model for UN operations.

Each type of operation was identified in terms of its basic characteristics and the role of the deployed force. The model of peace operations developed from this analysis contains three levels which can be identified by the type of tasks required of the intervening force.

Level One

Level one comprises the well-defined tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. This level is characterised by:

- a. Observer Missions in which a small group of military or civilian observers are deployed to observe and report on a developing situation or on the execution of a pre-negotiated peace agreement; and
- b. Peacekeeping operations are defined by the UN secretariat as small lightly armed forces who are operating in the region with the consent of the parties to the conflict. The force is deployed between the belligerents acting as a physical and psychological deterrent to further hostility.

Level Two

Level two describes five categories of operation that usually occur in conflict between communities within a state. This level is characterised by:

- a. Preventive Deployment where the action of the UN force is to deploy when the potential for conflict between the parties is rising. The objective of the force is to deter the onset of conflict. The deployment may be between nations or within a nation and does not necessarily rely on a truce or peace between the

parties.

- b. **Internal Conflict Resolution Measures** are actions taken by a UN force to restore and maintain an acceptable level of peace and personal security in an internal conflict. Their successful action depends on obtaining a substantial level of popular support as distinguished from the consent of the parties, for conflict resolution to take place.

- c. **Assistance to (Interim) Civil Authority** usually involves a successfully conducted cease-fire. Once the cease-fire is reliable, the establishment of civil order becomes a priority for the role of the UN force. The role of the military element is to maintain a workable level of peace and security which allows the humanitarian, human rights, and civil administration elements of the force to function effectively.

- d. **Protection of Humanitarian Relief Operations** refers to operations that cannot be safely and effectively delivered without military assistance. It is expected that the delivery of relief will be contested locally and the normal process of negotiation has failed. The operation is characterised by speed and urgency in action, the consent and cooperation of the host nation and neighbouring states, a high level of coordination between UN agencies, NGOs and governments, and finite operation duration, based on the consent of the parties involved.

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- e. Guarantee and Denial of Movement include operations in which the UN force guarantee or deny freedom of movement by air, land, or sea in particular areas and routes. These are sophisticated operations that often rely on the most technologically advanced military equipment.

Level Three

Level Three refers to operations where UN military force with substantial heavy weapons capability are used to redress a major threat to international security and peace.

These level is characterised by:

- a. Sanctions denying supplies, diplomatic and trading privilege, and freedom of movement to an identified aggressor. They are usually only applied when diplomacy and less confrontational methods of conflict resolution have failed. The objective of the operation is to cause an aggressor to refrain or withdraw from a war-like activity.
- b. High Intensity Operations refer to actions sanctioned under Article 42 Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are deployed when all other means of conflict resolution have failed and a threat to international peace and security persists. This may involve a major operation of war against the aggressor state.

Level One operations are well-defined tasks generally associated with Observer Missions, they are designed as stop-gap measures against unwanted war and are employed to buy time for diplomatic measures. They generally take place in times of relative peace. They are also referred to as 'First Generation', as the tasks reflect the original intention of peacekeeping, that is, a lightly armed or unarmed military force interposed between the forces of the belligerents. By comparison, Level Two operations usually occur in intra-state conflict and require more heavily armed and effective contingents. These operations are referred to as 'Second Generation', as the tasking reflects the more recent application of military intervention. The majority of functions associated with Level Two operations are aimed at protecting the local population from the conflict either through the delivery of aid, protection of human rights or civil infrastructure. In some cases, while consent of the parties to the conflict is desirable, action may be taken without such consent relying either on the perception of popular or regional support. Level Three operations refer to the use of sanctions and peace enforcement operations which require military forces with a substantial capability required to redress a major threat to international peace. The role of the force as a third party mediator and the principles that govern action within the confines of that role can be practically applied to Level One and Two operations but are less relevant in Level Three operations which constitute operations more closely reflecting war.

MacKinlay and Chopra (1993b) conclude that future UN forces will need to be flexible in their range of military responses rather than was the case in the traditionally reactive approach of peacekeeping. They show that rather than performing one task exclusively the force may be required to perform several roles in one operation. They argue that the new

types of missions challenge the threshold of the principles that governed First Generation operations. Success in Second Generation operations is believed to rely less on the consent of the conflicting parties, as is the case in First Generation operations, and more on the ability of the force to impartially achieve its UN Mandate.

Marrack Goulding (1993) a former Under-Secretary General of Peacekeeping Operations defined six types of peacekeeping operations based on the functions that peacekeepers performed. His model arrives at a similar classification to MacKinlay and Chopra (1993b) and argues that the original principles of 'peacekeeping' have stood the test of time and have been successfully expanded to meet the growing range of peace activities. However, he argues that peace operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping operations which relied on a large military component to stop the hostilities and produce the conditions in which a permanent settlement could be negotiated. More often the force stood between two nation states. Modern operations are likely to be conducted within states and as such have a larger civilian component involved in activities that contribute to the re-establishment of the rule of law, political stability and nation building. In these cases there may be basis for going beyond the "established principles, procedures and practices of peacekeeping" (Goulding, 1993).

Both models of peace operations described above identify a change that has occurred in the nature of peace operations in terms of the nature of the environment in which they are conducted, the nature of the tasks, and the nature of the intervention. Both conclude that a greater number of conflicts are occurring *within* rather than *between* nations states, and this

has resulted in broader tasking of the military force. Additionally, the force is likely to have greater contact with civilian population and is likely to be one part of a UN response to the problem that also involves multiple UN agencies (for example, UNHCR, UNICEF) and Non-Government Organisations (for example, CARE Australia, MSF, ICRC, World Vision). Finally, both recognise that to enter this environment to achieve their mandated tasks the force will, at best, operate with the formal consent of only some of the parties to the dispute. This they argue represents a fundamental difference between pre- and post-Cold War peace operations.

James (1993) disagrees with the notion that modern peace operations are identifiably different from operations conducted by the UN prior to 1989. He argues that:

... in non-quantitative terms, there is a clear thread of historical continuity linking the recent expansion of internal peacekeeping activity with the earlier, less busy operational role. So far as the forms of peacekeeping are concerned, the operations of the last five years have broken very little new ground.

He argues that the role of civilians and police in peace activities has an extensive pre-1989 history adding to his conclusion that little has changed in peace activities conducted by the UN since its inception.

Similarly, Dobbie (1994a) argues that most peace operations tasks have been conducted during the Cold War under the label of 'peacekeeping'. In particular, the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC), deployed to the Congo in 1960-64, was concerned with the provision of military assistance, including the maintenance of law and order. In addition, for a brief time it became a peace enforcement operation that then reverted to a peacekeeping role in a way that is considered not possible in modern times.

Parsons (1995), after analysing UN interventions between 1947 and 1995, shows that the majority of interventions had local ethnic or religious hostility as the cause of the conflict. Superpower involvement generally acted to exacerbate or intensify the conflict rather than as a focus for the source of the conflict. Similar to James (1993) he argues that the heightened involvement of the UN in dispute settlement is part of a historical continuum rather than the beginning of a new period. Parsons (1995) concedes that the range of tasks required of peacekeepers has become consistently broader taking on humanitarian and nation building roles as well as the more traditional monitoring tasks. Again, ONUC is an historical precedent for the current operations, but it is the only example congruent with the demands of recent operations.

However, there is one area where there is agreement that modern operations do differ from those of the past and that is in terms of the environment in which they are conducted. Dobbie (1994) notes that more often the environment in which these tasks are undertaken in recent times is volatile and prone to escalation in violence.

To illustrate this point K.E. Eyre (1994) developed an environmental model of peace operations which highlighted that Second Generation operations (post-1989) are different from (pre-1989) on the basis of the environment in which they are conducted.

While the historical analysis conducted by James (1993) may not reveal any difference between First and Second Generation operations, the environmental description provided by K.E. Eyre (1994) identifies factors which clearly define a difference between First and Second Generation operations in terms of the conditions under which they are conducted. Table 2.1, below has been composed from K.E. Eyre's (1994) work to better compare and contrast the different operations.

Table 2.1.

Characteristics of First and Second Generation Peace Operations (adapted from K.E. Eyre, 1994).

First Generation	Second Generation
Single international peacekeeping force	Multiple UN agency involvement
Stabilised belligerents	Factionalised belligerents (government; rebel government, bandits)
Bi-polar belligerents	Multi-polar belligerents (more than two sides)
Low stress	Relatively high stress
Low/threat risk	Relatively high risk
Media focus on anecdotal/home interest; not real time	Real time local, Australian, and international multi media coverage; Interpretative and opinionated media coverage
Low international attention focused on mission	International media coverage; High world attention (CNN Technology)

Low UNHQ continuing attention	Higher UNHQ continuing attention, field operations more closely scrutinised and monitored with potential for UNHQ involvement
Primary external operational contacts with belligerents	Extensive operational contact with the local population
Belligerents recognised military forces	Poor military control/subordination of subordinate elements and/or poor civil control of the military
Simple stable mandate	Dynamic mandate or mandate lag
Contact with NGOs primarily social or peripheral	Extensive NGO involvement
Rules of Engagement (ROE) application relatively clear	ROE application complex or not clear

The most telling feature of the characteristics defined by K.E. Eyre (1994) is the change in status of the media. Modern operations are clearly characterised by high world attention through the international media. Attention that is interpreted, opinionated and ever present. The impact of the media on peace operations is succinctly summed in the following comment by Badsey (1994, p. 3):

It is the new global phenomenon of instantaneous news reporting, particularly by television, that has distorted the foreign policies of western countries in the aftermath of the Cold War by forcing military intervention in such areas as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia or Cambodia, while at the same time preventing that intervention from becoming effective by imposing arbitrary constraints on the level of the force used, and on the willingness to risk both taking casualties and inflicting them. The result has been what one European diplomat in Washington has described as 'The CNN Curve' of public demand for military intervention, followed by public protest when casualties are

suffered.

The power of the media may in turn contribute to some of the other characteristics of Second Generation operations noted by K.E. Eyre (1994), such as a greater likelihood for UN Headquarter involvement, a dynamic mandate and complex Rules of Engagement. As the media and public attention places pressure on politicians to be reactive this has a flow on effect for the military conduct of the operation.

The second feature of importance is the level of UN and NGO agency involvement in peace operations. As an example of the numbers of humanitarian organisations that may operate within a peace operation area in Somalia in December 1992, 31 separate Humanitarian Relief Organisations (HROs), comprised of International NGOs, Local NGOs, UN Agencies and representatives of the Red Cross, were operating in the country. By March 1993 the number had increased to 60 separate organisations all providing some form of humanitarian assistance to the local population (Dworken, 1993). Within the Australian Sector of Baidoa 12 HROs were represented. To add complexity to the situation there can often be a high turnover in the HROs due to the difficult and dangerous working conditions, and at times there can be a great deal of antagonism and competition between the different HROs (Dworken, 1993). The numbers of HROs, the lack of continuity, competition and rivalry, and in some cases antagonism towards the military, can make the military role of coordinating and protecting HROs more difficult and complex than in the past.

There has been a quantitative change in the number of operations being conducted by the UN in the post Cold War period and this has been paralleled by qualitative changes in the nature of the operations in terms of the conditions under which they are conducted. Second Generation operations are consistently larger in size in terms of both military and civilian components, they are more likely to mediate between belligerents within a nation state rather than between nation states, as a result the mandate and tasking are likely to be more complex, the operation is likely to receive greater scrutiny from the UN Headquarters and the world media, and the risks associated with the operation are likely to be greater because the environment in which it is being conducted is more volatile.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to determine the nature of modern peace operations. This was achieved by:

- a. defining the different types of peace operations and placing them in the life cycle of a conflict;
- b. identifying the strategic role of a military force employed on a peace operation;
- c. identifying the principles that guide military action within the framework of the strategic role; and

- d. determining the qualitative change that has occurred in peace operations during the post-Cold War period.

From the variety of operations that are encompassed by the term peace operations it is apparent that the role and tasks performed by the military are not generic. The variety in roles and tasking is a function of the nature of the intervention and the time that it occurs in the life-cycle of the conflict. Moreover, analysis of the descriptive models of peace operations suggests that the force can be asked to make the transition from one peace activity to another within the one operation. Clearly, to be successful, military forces operating within the framework of UN conflict resolution must be aware of their place in the resolution process and be flexible in the military response they are able to deliver.

Under the Charter the UN has two methods by which it can mediate a dispute. Chapter VI intervention is with the consent of the parties and is essentially diplomatic action. Chapter VII intervention is essentially coercive action. In the fifty years since the foundation of the organisation, the method most often employed has been peacekeeping - defined as "Chapter Six and Half", because it falls somewhere between purely diplomatic action and coercive action. While based on the principles of third party mediation and therefore consistent with Chapter VI action, the application of peacekeeping and peace enforcement under Chapter VII to intra-state conflicts has raised new problems, particularly with the regard to the use of force. It is clear that the strategic role of the force in the conflict resolution process is as a third party mediator. What is less clear at the strategic level is the role of the

force in resolving conflicts through mandatory mediation. At present, peacekeepers are employed late in the conflict life-cycle to settle the dispute while the diplomatic peacemaking process proceeds. When the cause of the conflict is based on internal factors we have seen that the prospects for diplomatic success decline sharply. Fetherston's (1994) approach offers a conceptual model that has the potential to amend this situation. Her proposal is to use the military earlier in the life-cycle of the conflict and to link the role to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This appears to be more consistent with the role of the force as a third party mediator. Clearly, improved conceptual understanding of the role of the force in the conflict resolution process is a requirement for effective operation, particularly in intra-state conflicts.

In accordance with improved conceptual understanding, the military force must have a set of guidelines for taking action at the operational and tactical level that is consistent with the strategic role. The British Army principles of consent provide that guidance. The conceptual nature of the approach provides the force elements with a framework within which they can take action that is appropriate to the situation. As the principles are implicitly based on an understanding of the role of the force in the conflict resolution process they are consistent with the intervention of the force at the strategic level. Historical analysis of peace operations shows that the roles and tasks performed by peacekeepers have not changed markedly over time, nor has the requirement for consent and impartiality at the tactical level.

What has changed is the environment in which the operations take place. Cold War peacekeeping history shows only one operation, ONUC, that is consistent in quality to modern operations. Modern operations are most likely to be intra-state, they are most likely to take

place in volatile environments, there is likely to be intense global media presence that will influence political decision making (home nation and UN) associated with the conduct of the operation, and the force is more likely to be sanctioned to use armed force to protect itself and its mandate. It is these changes to the conditions under which the operation is performed that places pressure on the role of the force and the principles by which it takes action.

In the same way that Toffler and Toffler (1995) describe a change in the conditions under which warfare takes place, changes in the conditions under which peace operations take place require military forces in peace operations to clearly understand the nature of their role, the principles by which they will act and the environment in which that action will take place. The next step is to determine what demands the strategic role, tactical principles and conditions under which the operation is performed have for the skill requirements of peacekeepers.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER THREE

THE NEED FOR SPECIALISED TRAINING

If we train for war we can easily handle the support for peace operations. The reverse is not true.

Lieutenant General John Sanderson

... often in United Nations operations serious escalation in violence has been avoided through the mediatory efforts of a young non-commissioned officer or junior commissioned officer. They have been called upon countless times to dissipate potential violence by a tactful and well judged approach which has required great patience and forbearance.

Michael Harbottle

INTRODUCTION

The military maxim that the conduct of war must be linked to the strategic aim at every level was extended to peace operations in Chapter Two. In this chapter, we will explore the operational and tactical level of peace operations, with particular emphasis on tactical, to determine what peacekeepers actually do, how they do it, and the demands this places on them.

The modern peace operations environment described in Chapter Two might be more clearly described as 'police action'. On the surface, uniformed police officers and peacekeepers have much in common. In both situations, they represent stability and the protection or restoration of social order. Their ability to intervene is based on the understanding that they act with the moral authority of the communities they represent. They operate with the support and cooperation of the local people, and are required to be impartial and objective in their approach. In settling, or intervening in disputes, they act as a third party mediator whose ability to take action is constrained by complex legal, moral and ethical considerations. Finally, the nature of the work means that the individual soldier or constable carries much of the responsibility for the overall success of the organisation.

This comparison is a broad generalisation of the roles of both parties, however, it serves two purposes: first, it shows that the role of the peacekeeper has different conceptual underpinnings than the traditional military combat role, and that performance in this environment is likely to require different skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKAs) than those that are provided in general combat training; and second, it provides us with an over-arching model that might be useful in further exploring the impact of participation in 'police type' activities on peacekeepers. Janowitz (1960) referred to this role as the 'Constabulary Model' of military activity.

Janowitz (1960) introduced the constabulary model of military forces to describe the implications of the nuclear weapon age for military roles and organisation. He argued that the èra of total war (see Clausewitz, 1832/1982) had ended, and as a result military forces were

more likely to fulfil a constabulary role, and this had significant sociological implications for the military profession. Janowitz (1960) described the shift from conventional warfighting to a constabulary role that involved a shift in the operational focus of the individual, and the force, from victory over an adversary to the stabilisation and elimination of the conflict. Moreover, he argued that the military, and in particular the U.S. military, would resist the constabulary role because they would see such peace activities as less honourable than more traditional military missions. Janowitz (1960, p. 418) described the constabulary role as:

The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.

While Janowitz (1960) was speaking of the broader adaptation of the military-political structure to a constabulary role, the situation he describes is similar to that of a peacekeeper deployed on a first, or second generation peace operation.

Moskos (1975, 1976) introduced the constabulary model to peace operations when he explored the adaptability of combat soldier attitudes to a constabulary role, using the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as a vehicle. While he expected that military image would be negatively related to peacekeeper effectiveness, he found that the adoption of a constabulary ethic that emphasises the primacy of viable international relations, the minimisation of the use of force, and impartiality, was a consequence of military

professionalism rather than of combat orientation. The effective performance of peacekeeping forces on this mission was facilitated by the standards and professionalism gained through normal military training and education.

Moskos's (1975, 1976) findings support the notion that the skills and professional attitudes gained through normal combat training can be adapted to first generation peace operations, in this case in Cyprus (UNFICYP). At the time of Moskos's (1975) study UNFICYP was clearly a traditional mission characterised by the qualities of first generation operations shown in Table 2.1. But, what impact has the changed nature of peace operations had on the peacekeeper, required to perform an expanded and more complex constabulary role, under environmental conditions that are characterised by second generation operations (Table 2.1).

It is clear that modern peace operations continue to be adequately described by the constabulary model of military activity, that is, 'police actions' where the force operates in an environment where there is no clear, tangible, identifiable enemy embodied in an opposing force. The enemy is the conflict itself, not the belligerents responsible for the conflict (Last, 1995).

It is also clear that the two themes of restraint and impartiality, identified by Moskos (1975, 1976), as underlying the role of a constabulary force continue to apply. Constabulary forces continue to be asked to demonstrate impartiality, in order to engender the trust of the parties to the conflict, and restraint, so as not to further escalate the conflict, and thereby

defeat the fundamental aim of the mission (Pinch, 1994b). As highlighted in Chapter Two, the themes of restraint and impartiality are central principles in the conduct of peace operations.

The constabulary model involves more than just a descriptive term for some forms of military intervention that might include peace operations, drug interdiction, search and rescue, and disaster relief (K.E. Eyre, 1993). As described above, the model has been used to explore attitude development and professionalism in the military. In this chapter, we will expand the utility of the constabulary model to:

- a. explore the disparity between a constabulary role and national defence priorities, with particular emphasis on the implication for the preparation of military personnel for peace operations; and
- b. review the literature to identify the tasks performed by peacekeepers, and the SKAs required to perform them.

PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the skills, knowledge, attitudes and personality traits required by military peacekeepers to perform tasks in a modern peace operations environment.

THE BASIS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Potentially, the constabulary model does not sit well with military forces at times when there is a reduction in national threat, as there is in Australia and elsewhere, at present (Australian Government, 1994). There may be concern by the military that political 'will' may see greater 'usefulness' for the defence forces through exclusive employment in constabulary roles (K.E. Eyre, 1993). The concern for military leaders is that a defence force trained to fill a constabulary role will find it difficult, and costly, to return to the original role of fighting to win the war, should the need arise, an attitude clearly expressed by Lieutenant General Sanderson in the quote at the beginning of this Chapter, and supported by others, such as Canada's, Lieutenant General Gervais (1993, p. 14):

Soldiers trained for combat are best suited for peacekeepers as discipline, self confidence and coolness under stress are essential qualities in uncertain, potentially explosive environments.

and in more general terms by Winston Churchill (1930/1944; p. 346):

Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.

A second facet of this argument is that peace operations are conducted in war zones where military skills, attitudes and awareness are important for survival. It is difficult to

predict, for example, when a peacekeeping mission will face a direct military threat, or the mission mandate will evolve into one of peace enforcement, such as occurred in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960's, or more recently in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II) in the 1990's. In these situations the foundation of professional combat training is essential to the individual's and force's ability to meet the new task demands.

It is clear that the constabulary roles that defence forces are required to perform, places them in a difficult situation in terms of force structure, training and preparation. First, priority of effort must be allocated to the defence of the nation, and that requires a particular force structure that flows onto the development of a particular set of military skills. However, in an environment where the threat to the national security is low, the greatest likelihood for operational deployment is in a constabulary role: a role that is conducted in an environment that appears to place different, or additional demands, on individuals and units.

In expressing the view that the skills of a combat soldier are appropriate to constabulary roles, in particular to peace operations, the military leaders quoted above are reinforcing the priority of the military role in defending the nation. The force structure and training of the nation's defence force are derived from this role, and preparation for, and participation in, constabulary roles are clearly of secondary importance. Additionally, if priority of effort is moved away from combat to concentration on constabulary roles, it is seen as a clear threat to military combat capability.

From this perspective, the basis of preparation for peace operations is that normal combat training provides the soldier and officer with the foundation skills necessary to perform successfully in a constabulary role. Conventional military operations such as Low-Intensity Conflicts (LIC), which are prepared for in some form by most professional defence forces, are seen as close in nature to peace operations, and as such the skills developed for these operations are readily transferable to the peace operations environment (Hurley, 1994; Mellor, 1993). The Australian Army also regularly cites training for Services Protected Evacuation (SPE) contingencies, which provide soldiers and officers with skills in, crowd control and civilian contact, as appropriate preparation for peace operations (Hurley, 1994; Moon, 1995; Post Operational Report 1 RAR, 1993; Simpson, 1995; Van Der Donckt and Wilson, 1993).

Fetherston (1994) argues that the military approach to peace operations has three major flaws. First, it is based on principles derived from first generation operations rather than second generation operations. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the environment in which peace operations are conducted has changed, placing additional demands on peacekeepers. While the first generation model of peacekeeping held, the expertise required by the military appeared to be a cost free by-product of training for war. The increasingly complex nature of second generation operations has broadened the task demands placed on peacekeepers, such that normal combat training is no longer sufficient (British Army, 1994; Pinch, 1994; Rihkye et al, 1974; Shorey, 1994). Essentially, this approach underestimates the complexity of modern peace operations, and the skills and attitudes required to perform effectively.

Second, this approach fails to take into account the role of the force in the conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter, the strategic role of the force, as derived from the role of the UN, is as a third party mediator, generally employed in conflict settlement. This role carries with it particular skill and attitude demands (negotiation skills, cross-cultural sensitivity or awareness, and skills of persuasion - less force) that are generally not catered for in military training. While there may be similarities between the basic skill demands of LIC, SPE activities and peace operations, the disparity lies in the role difference between a combatant and a mediator; as we shall see this has implications for the application of traditional military skills. The following comments from experienced peacekeepers support this view:

Soldiers in peacekeeping forces face a double challenge. In order to have the respect of the armed forces of the adversaries they must demonstrate military competence. On the other hand, non-military methods like dissuasion, persuasion, and negotiation constitute the essence of peacekeeping
(Skjelsback, 1989 p. 219)

...plain military expertise, though a considerable asset, is not itself the only prerequisite for peacekeeping; there are other attributes that are not found in military textbooks nor learned on the barrack square. Whether the peacekeeper be the lowest or the highest rank, his success will depend upon his ability to prevent conflict through every means other than force of arms. Tact, diplomacy, and quiet reasoning when negotiating or mediating between contestants; complete self-restraint, infinite patience, and tireless effort

regardless of provocation are the weapons of the peacekeeper's trade - not his self-loading rifle - and through judicious use of them he can defuse potentially dangerous situations, reduce tensions that could lead to violence, and thereby control and contain the conflict from escalating into something worse (Rihkye, Harbottle, and Egge 1974, p 267-268).

Fetherston's (1994) final argument against the military approach relates to the implications for individual preparation and training. She argues that from this approach flows fact-based preparation which does not address the conceptual issues associated with the deployment, such as the changes that are required in attitude and orientation from combat soldier to peacekeeper.

It is clear that the military only recognises the constabulary model of military activity as secondary to its role in defending the nation. The implication for preparation and training that flows from this stance is that a combat trained soldier has the basic skills, knowledge and attitudes required to perform effectively on peace operations. However, there is an equally strong argument to suggest that if military personnel are to deploy to peace operations the conceptual basis of their preparation and training, under the military approach, inadequately prepares them for their role as mediators, and they are therefore less effective in that role than they could be.

The disputed facts in this argument relate, first, to the type of tasks that are performed by peacekeepers, and second, to the compatibility of those tasks with traditional military

training. To address these issues, the next section will explore the questions: What tasks do peacekeepers actually perform? Which tasks are addressed in military training and which tasks are additional to military training? What are the implications for peacekeeper, skills, knowledge and attitudes?

PEACEKEEPER TASKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES

In introducing the constabulary model of military activity Janowitz (1960, p. 420) noted that:

In varying degree, military responsibility for combat predisposes officers toward a low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics, and leads to high concern for definitive solutions to politico-military problems.

The politico-military environment of the 1990's is peace operations, and the debate about the utility of employing combat trained soldiers in political environments continues unabated. Major General Lewis Mackenzie (1993, p. 21), former UNPROFOR (Bosnia) commander offers the following perspective on the additional preparation that should be provided to military personnel entering a peace operations environment:

As surprising as it may seem and, dare I say it, shocking for some academics, the last thing that a peacekeeper wants to know is the history of the region he is going into. It complicates the task of mediation, and obscures the immediate task, which may well be to deliver food or medicine.

However, a recent study (Haberl-Zemljic, Heje, Moxon-Browne, Ryan & Truger, 1996) of the training and preparation and subsequent deployment experiences of military personnel from Ireland and Sweden suggests that not only is background information to the history of the conflict important to peacekeepers, but there is also a need for information on the UN, and cultural information on the region. In addition to this there is a shortfall in cross-cultural 'contact skills'. Because peace operations are different in nature they require different preparation than is normally catered for by military training. Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) recommend a more holistic approach to preparation that includes skills as well as knowledge preparation. They also call for greater sophistication in the selection of military personnel for these operations as not everybody is suited to applying the new skills in this environment. This issue of selection is addressed in greater detail later in this thesis.

Pinch (1994b) discusses the issue of compatibility between peace operations and combat tasks in terms of the level of task convergence or divergence. Convergence implies continuity, compatibility, and stability, while divergence implies discontinuity, incompatibility, and the requirement for adjustment and change. As discussed in Chapter Two, the principles of consent outlined by the British Army (1994) appear to represent an argument for divergent tasks, while military arguments for the importance traditional combat training outlined above

represent an argument for task or skill convergence.

K.E. Eyre (1994) after conducting preliminary research in Bosnia concluded that at present there is limited information on the relative importance, and frequency of skills called on in peace operations. In essence, there is little formal, objective information on what peacekeepers actually do when they are deployed. The implication of his finding is that the preparation of military forces has been developed and conducted without the benefit of a complete understanding of the tasks demands that the environment makes on the peacekeeper, or the relative importance of those tasks to successful performance. He suggests that there is a requirement to collect post-operational task analysis information from peace operations as a matter of routine. Collection and analysis of this information would clarify exactly what individual and collective skills need to be prepared and trained for, prior to deployment.

This conclusion is supported by D.P. Eyre (1994) who interviewed over 100 American officers who had been involved in peace operations. He discovered that there was no clear consensus on what skills were needed on peace operations, and suggests that in the absence of a clear definition of the range of activities that are subsumed under the term peace operations, it is difficult to identify the skills needed to deal with them.

K.E. Eyre's (1994) preliminary research did show that the task demands made of peacekeepers in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) were divergent from those traditionally associated with combat training. Previous to this K.E. Eyre (1993) had commented that increasingly terms such as negotiate, mediate, conciliate and arbitrate were frequently used as descriptors of the

activities of peacekeepers at all levels. Brigadier Harbottle's quotation at the beginning of this chapter, support the view that interpersonal or 'soft' skills are in greatest demand on peace operations. To what extent are they required? What is the nature of the skill? At one level, these terms describe complex skills that are gained through specific education and training. At another, they are the skills of everyday life, skills that people gain (to a greater or lesser extent) through interacting with other people. To term what peacekeepers actually do at the tactical level as 'negotiation' may not adequately define what skill or attitude is required by the individual. Negotiation provides an example of the danger in applying general labels to the skills required by peacekeepers, without the benefit of formal investigation into what tasks are actually performed.

Research from two different types of investigation has shed some light onto the SKAs required by peacekeepers. The first type of investigation includes evaluative studies that seek to determine the validity of particular aspects of the deployment such as, predeployment training or selection methods (K.E. Eyre, 1994; Pinch, 1994; Shorey, 1994). The second are studies that concentrate on a particular mission area, either as part of broader sociological research (Moskos, 1975; Segal, Furukawa & Lindh, 1990; Segal, Harris, Rothberg & Marlowe, 1984), or to highlight a particular aspect of the mission (Last, 1995).

Despite the variety in the types of studies and methods of investigation, when the findings are compared they reveal that the following five areas are of particular importance in peace operations: orientation and attitude; cultural knowledge; negotiation; stress management; and military related skills. Each of these will now be addressed in turn.

ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDE

Janowitz (1983) noted that in the modern world a soldier's understanding of their mission is a crucial component of mission effectiveness. The need for greater conceptual understanding of the mission and the mission environment is a consistent finding of research into peace operations.

After interviewing over 100 American Army officers with peace operations experience, D.P. Eyre (1994) concludes that training an individual to be culturally aware, or how to negotiate effectively without an understanding of how cultural and political dynamics shape the conduct of peace operations is like "putting frosting on a cardboard cake". His findings support a conceptual approach to understanding the skills required by peacekeepers. He argues that the peacekeeper needs to understand the military and political dynamics of the conflict before they can perform effectively. He discovered that the leaders he interviewed found difficulty in discussing the dynamics of the operation they were involved in, the role of the force in them, the similarities and differences between conventional and non-traditional operations, the problem of escalation, the role of civil affairs and psychological operations, or the principals of these types of operations. He does not believe that this is a reflection on the individuals interviewed, but the result of a lack of framework from which they could consider their responses. His findings here are supported by the other investigations (Blechman & Vaccaro, 1994; Inspector General, 1994; Meeker & Segal, 1987), and are summed up in the following comment (Rihkye et al, 1974, p. 268):

... possibly more important than anything else is the peacekeeper's understanding of the problem at the root of the conflict, and of the human relationships involved; for this will determine his attitude and approach to the situations and problems that face him.

The British Army's (1994) doctrine described in Chapter Two is a conceptual approach to peace operations training that recognises and emphasises the need for all peacekeepers to have a broader understanding of the mission, and their role in supporting the mission. In adopting this approach, the British Army (1994) acknowledges and emphasises the added responsibility that will be placed on junior soldiers and commanders in these operations, in particular, they highlight that this responsibility stems the political nature of peace operations, and results in a compression of the traditional distance between strategic and tactical decision making, such that a tactical decision taken by a junior commander can have significant strategic implications for the mission. A notion that is widely supported by other peace operations commentators (Abizaid, 1993; Abizaid & Wood, 1994; Baker, 1994; Harbottle, 1978, 1980; Moon, 1995)

In an evaluation of Canadian peacekeeping, Pinch (1994a) found that some of the study participants believed that more attention should be given to the sociological and psychological dimensions of warfighting and peaceful conflict resolution, for example, the differences in organisation, group norms, and the values and attitudes of, and toward the belligerents.

Clearly, the importance of the appropriate orientation and attitude to peace operations is a consistent finding across military cultures. The research findings suggest that orientation and attitude has two dimensions, first, the peacekeeper needs a conceptual understanding of the political-military context of the deployment, and second, the peacekeeper needs to understand the social and psychological dimensions that distinguish combat from peace operations. As summed up by Lieutenant General Hillingso (1993) of Denmark, attitude change is a key factor in the successful preparation of peacekeepers:

The difference between peace operations training and normal combat training is that in peace operations training, we teach soldiers new attitudes. We teach them to react differently, often directly contrary to normal combat reactions.

An additional feature of the peace operations landscape, at the operational and tactical level, is the presence of a variety of non-government, government and other UN organisations ostensibly operating to achieve similar goals as the military, but often working at cross purposes. The clash of cultures between these types of organisations and the military is often a source of new problems on top of those that they are already there to solve (Last, 1994).

K.E. Eyre (1993) describes peacekeeping operations as characterised by significantly more players, and significantly less precise definitions of relationships than are typically found on the modern battlefield. Additional players can include other UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), diplomats, tourists, refugees, non-combatants, factions and multiple belligerents. He describes that each

element has “turf” and an agenda, and that this situation suggests that there is an imperative for some sort of mechanism that provides “cultural assimilation” to the theatre for troops both prior to deployment, and on call in-theatre when the need arises (K.E. Eyre, 1993).

Military intervention in humanitarian operations is based on the perception that in intra-state conflicts the ‘state’ is unable to ensure the safety of its civilian population or the aid workers supporting that population. In these situations the international community provides that protection through the presence of an international military force. For the aid agencies this raises particular problems, as their ability to deliver aid is based on their impartiality and neutrality (UNHCR 1995), through such impartiality they seek to minimise the strategic importance of the aid in terms of the conduct of military operations (Bouchet-Salnier, 1993). Any association with military forces deployed under the authority of the UN increases the risk that aid organisations will become identified with a party to the conflict (Doel, 1996). The problem is captured in the comment by the Director of Oxfam UK (Howard, 1989 p. 8):

What’s changed for Oxfam as a result of external military intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, is that ... our aid workers are increasingly being seen as targets for violence ... because in the eyes of the local population and militias, they are indistinguishable from the international governmental effort.

The Save the Children (1994) fund expresses a similar sentiment:

military intervention is no panacea... greater military intervention by the international community should not be automatically equated with rapid and durable solutions... once the United Nations intervenes militarily in a humanitarian emergency, as in Somalia, its actions can all too easily become part of the problem - another complicating ingredient.

For the humanitarian relief organisations (HROs) the presence or protection afforded by the military comes at the cost of restrictions in their freedom of movement and a perception of loss in their impartiality which translates into reduced effectiveness. The military tend to view the HRO organisations as disorganised and uncoordinated in their efforts, generating waste and confusion. While the HRO's tended to view the military as inflexible and bureaucratic creating unnecessary hurdles (Dworken, 1993). Most commentators on the relationship between the military and the HROs in peace operations have called for a greater understanding of the different attitude each organisation brings to the operation (Dworken, 1993; Groves, 1994; Kieseker, 1993; Pennell, 1994; UNHCR, 1995).

Last (1994) notes that interpersonal relations are the key to success for the military in working with NGOs, he argues that at the tactical level this is how problems have been solved, unfortunately much of this work has been achieved in isolation. Last (1994) argues that common and cooperative training can provide the means by which mutual awareness and understanding can be built, the resultant changes in organisational culture that will occur over time will enhance the effectiveness of the organisations in-theatre.

It is clear that appropriate orientation and attitude is not limited to a conceptual understanding of the conflict. It has many dimensions related to understanding the role of the other players in a multinational, multi-organisation operation. For the military, this involves a change in understanding as to their level of primacy in the mission area. In some peace operations the military role can be purely in support of non-military organisations, or it may evolve over the course of the deployment. To be effective in this ambiguous environment of changing roles, the individual must have a sound understanding of the stage of the conflict, their role in relation to that stage, and the attitude that is appropriate to their conduct.

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Cultural knowledge is the second area of importance consistently highlighted by research into peace operations as a base skill and knowledge requirement. D.P. Eyre (1994) believes that this area has two elements. First, he believes that what peacekeepers need is a 'topographical map of the population' that includes information on the economic systems, patterns of daily life, and social structure. The second element of cultural knowledge is basic information on population patterns, in particular, information on modes of communication, conflict and conciliation within the local population.

Shorey's (1994) investigation of Canadian maritime peacekeepers supports D.P. Eyre's (1994) findings. He notes that cultural knowledge was an important tool for the peacekeeper to use to gain the trust of the local population. By effectively displaying an understanding of the local culture, through sensitivity to community and religious customs,

peacekeepers believed that they significantly enhanced their effectiveness. Similarly, a basic understanding of the local language further enhanced local effectiveness and was another aspect of cultural knowledge. Survival skills in the local language were also regarded as important by peacekeepers from the perspective of personal confidence in a foreign culture, in that basic skills could be used for a range of activities from buying food, through to the effective use of interpreters, and the management of potentially dangerous situations. Similarly, D.P. Eyre (1994) noticed positive comments on the utility and increased effectiveness of soldiers who were able to rapidly pick up essential bits of the local language. He concluded that this was a skill that could be identified and fostered prior to deployment.

Pinch (1994) noted that participants in his study supported the requirement for cultural knowledge, and believed that the area was inadequately covered in Canadian predeployment training. They received no further attention as the deployment progressed. The participants felt that while Canadian people had a propensity for accepting and getting along with diverse peoples and groups, many noted that in the peace operations environment there is added difficulty because of the social ambiguity, danger and high stress.

In arguing for a more coherent long term approach to international conflict management based on a greater understanding of the link between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking, Fetherston (1994) argues for a balance between what she calls contact and non-contact skills. Non-contact skills include, those essential within normal military tasks such as checkpoint observation, weapon handling, driving and first aid. Contact skills are those skills associated with the concept of cultural knowledge discussed here, and

negotiation and mediation skills, discussed below.

Fetherston (1994) associates cultural knowledge with more than just a fact based understanding of the culture. She believes that cultural understanding must be supported by a skills base that includes cross-cultural awareness, empathy, sense of timing and appropriateness, conflict situation analysis and fact finding, trust and credibility development, active listening skills, communication and crises management. These contact skills form an integral part of many peacekeepers duties in dealing with the belligerents, local population and other elements of the peacekeeping force (Fetherston, 1993).

Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) found consistent support for the importance of adequate cultural knowledge and contact skills among peacekeepers from Ireland and Sweden. They concluded that training for peacekeepers should not be restricted to military techniques but also include contact skills, negotiating skills and inter-cultural understanding. Importantly they suggest that the emphasis in training and preparation should be on participative exercises such as role playing and less on written or lecture presentation. Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) call for the development of skills, as well as the delivery of information in predeployment preparation that clearly support Fetherston's (1993, 1994) contention that military preparation has been too dependent on fact-based preparation at the expense of appropriate skills development.

Cultural knowledge and understanding appears to be an important adjunct to peacekeeper effectiveness that can be defined at two levels. First is the need for a general fact based understanding of the culture of the host nation population; second is the importance of

the skills Fetherston (1993, 1994) highlights as significant to effectively employ cultural knowledge in the context of conflict settlement and resolution activities. The skills she describes are essentially interpersonal skills that must be adapted and honed to suit the modern peace operations environment.

NEGOTIATION

As discussed previously there is some danger in labelling what peacekeeper's do as 'negotiation' without a clearer understanding of the skill they employ. Some researchers (Fetherston, 1994, Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1994, Last, 1995) argue that despite the fact that military mandates in peace operations are generally limited to set objectives associated with conflict settlement, peacekeepers do become involved in conflict resolution at the community level. Both researchers support the notion that peacekeepers should be trained in tactical level negotiation skills, appropriate to peace operations to support their peacebuilding role.

In the study of Irish and Swedish peacekeepers, Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) found that while there was general support for the development of skills in negotiation and mediation there was some confusion among the participants of the study as to what term(s) appropriately described the activities of peacekeepers. In both case studies the majority of participants had not received any formal training in negotiation or mediation skills. Some of the Irish participants in the study suggested that aspects of normal military training provide some skills in this area that were appropriately transferred to the peace operations environment.

In describing their activities the Irish participants described the skill as one of 'commonsense' while others regarded it as the ability to 'keep talking', or a matter of 'self-confidence' and 'patience'. One of the Swedish participants in the study linked the development of negotiation skills with the acquisition of appropriate cultural knowledge of the belligerents. He suggested that while working in Bosnia it was important to understand that the local leaders worked in accordance with communist principles and thought in 'fundamentalist' terms. The participant suggested that training in how to negotiate and mediate within this particular cultural context was an important skill.

D.P. Eyre (1994) found that there was a need for two types of skills, first, negotiation skills, which were required when the peacekeeper was the party seeking something; and second, mediation skills, where the peacekeeper was a third party, without a direct interest in the outcome, seeking only to insure that the other parties involved arrived at a solution that was stable and satisfactory. It is apparent that the strategies and conditions under which these skills are employed will be different. At present, there is little definitive information on the nature of the skill, its relative importance, or the level it should be catered for within a contingent.

Despite this, the requirement for low-level or tactical negotiation skills has been supported by a variety of other studies (Blechman & Vaccaro, 1994; K.E. Eyre, 1994; Last, 1994; Shorey, 1994; Pinch 1994) and has been recognised for sometime by the UN. For

instance, the following comment, was made in 1965 on the operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP):

Even the most mundane tasks at the lowest level required negotiating ability as small incidents all carried the potential for escalation into more serious conflagrations (UN Doc S/6228, 1965).

Comments from operational commanders also support the need for comprehensive negotiation skills. Lieutenant Colonel Duncan (1993a), in his end of tour report as the commanding officer of the British battalion in Bosnia, comments that freedom of movement in Bosnia during his time could not be established by force; as a result there was a need for negotiations to be conducted at all levels. In a letter to his successor in Bosnia (Duncan 1993b), he clarifies the skills required at different levels of the battalion. He believes that all officers and senior non-commissioned officers need training in negotiation skills, and an understanding of the principles of power projection, showing presence, escalation and de-escalation of a situation and the principles of liaison. At the level of company commanders and commanding officers, he specifies the need to know how to organise and manage formal meetings. He links this skill requirement with the need to understand the cultural and political interaction between the participants. Insights of this quality into the skill requirements at different levels of the organisation are rare. It is apparent from Duncan's (1993a, 1993b) comments that the term negotiation covers a broad range of activities that have a different emphasis and skill requirements at different levels in the organisation.

Last (1995) takes a conceptual approach to the requirement for negotiation skills that

identifies the skill demand in relation to the life-cycle of the conflict. Following an historical examination of incident reports in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Last (1995, p. 183) argues that at the tactical level, strategies such as negotiation and meditation are used primarily as defensive tools. He argues that:

Peacekeeping can do more than keep belligerents apart if it is seen as a military operation in which the enemy of the force is violent conflict and the belligerents are allies. To defeat a conflict the balance of military and civilian involvement will change as the violence diminishes.

He supports Fetherston's (1994) contention that there is a contradiction in the role of peacekeepers in Cyprus, in that they are required to maintain a status quo in which the forces are segregated. This does not place them in an appropriate position to build trust and confidence between the parties at the community level in support of the strategic conflict resolution process. He argues that different third party activities are appropriate at different stages of the conflict. The use of defensive techniques is appropriate to the early stages of the conflict when the situation is unstable, but more interactive techniques become more appropriate as the situation becomes increasingly stable. Shorey (1994), in a similar finding, reported that military observers found that their roles shifted throughout the tour depending on the context of the local situation and the progress of the mission. This finding appears to support Last's (1995) comments that the skills required by peacekeepers and the application of those skills is related to the life-cycle of the conflict. While some of the participants in Shorey's (1994) study had previously been exposed to such training, it was generally believed

that training in mediation skills and 'information gathering' techniques were a definite asset to the peacekeeper. The broader implication of these findings is that different preparation in this skill area may be required for different contingents entering the same operation at different stages.

One of the only reports on the formal development and integration of a negotiation training course into predeployment training was reported by Capstick and Last (1994). They introduced negotiation skills into the preparation of a Canadian Forces battalion prior to duty in Cyprus (UNFICYP). At the time the package was developed and implemented UNFICYP was a mature, stable and fairly routine mission. The training only represented two percent of the training time of the battalion prior to deployment, and was focussed on senior non-commissioned officers and officers. Evaluation of the program in-theatre showed that enthusiasm for it was a direct function of rank; more senior personnel regarded it as more useful. The elements of training regarded as most useful were the explanations of how to conduct an investigation of an incident involving belligerents, and information on how to prepare for negotiation meetings. Clearly, the theme is that while all levels of the force require some exposure to this skill area, different levels have different needs, and at present there is no clear understanding of the relative importance of the skill at each level or the type of skill required.

The conclusions drawn in the studies described above raise three points about the negotiation skills required by peacekeepers; first, the peacekeeper must have some understanding of the life-cycle of the conflict, and the implications this holds for the courses of

action open to them, a conclusion which supports the requirement for peacekeepers to have a conceptual understanding of their mission; second, as the conflict becomes increasingly stable, for the peacekeeper to remain consistent with the strategic third party nature of the intervention, they must have or develop skills that support peacebuilding activities at a community level; and third, there may be other skills, as yet unidentified, that the peacekeeper requires that fall within the category of 'confidence building' at the community level of a peace operation that are not necessarily covered under negotiation and mediation.

Blechman and Vaccaro (1994) underscore the importance of negotiation and appropriate attitude by comparing two infantry battalions from two different nations operating on the same mission in similar roles. The first battalion was aggressive in their approach to dealing with the locals while the second tended to negotiate. The first battalion quickly discovered that the local para-military organisations with whom they had the greatest contact tended to thwart the battalion in achieving its mandate, while the second had very few problems. Blechman and Vaccaro (1994) believe that the casualty figures after 12 months operation underscored the relative approaches of the two battalions. The first suffered 34 casualties, while the second suffered nine. Clearly, tactical negotiation has benefits beyond achieving a particular set objective.

STRESS MANAGEMENT

Stress management is being increasingly recognised as an important factor in peace operations. The United Nations formally recognised the importance of the area through the

release of a Stress Management Handbook (United Nations, 1995), specifically designed for peacekeepers.

Hall (1996) suggests that the peacekeepers report markedly different complaints from those reported by combat soldiers, suggesting that a new nomenclature may be needed to describe the common psychiatric symptoms that occur during peacekeeping, low-intensity and rapid-resolution missions.

The unique stressors faced by military personnel supporting peace operations mission have been noted in a study of Swedish soldiers working in Lebanon (Calström, Lundin, and Otto, 1990). Whereas soldiers engaged in conventional combat are permitted to express aggressive impulse through acts of war, peacekeeping soldiers must restrain aggressive urges. Demands for passivity and restraint of aggression may become intensely distressing. In successive studies (Calström, Lundin and Otto, 1990; Lundin and Otto, 1989, 1992) of Swedish logistic and support battalions operating in stable first generation operations they reported that these soldiers experience relatively few stress symptoms. The 'at risk' groups to develop psychosocial or psychiatric disorders with delayed onset, were those who were repatriated early and those who regularly consumed alcohol to excess. The consistent complaint made by the soldiers in these studies was that the missions were 'boring'.

Ward (1995) following up on Australian soldiers who served with the UNITAF mission in Somalia found that at least a fifth of Australian soldiers who had served in Somalia had significant levels of psychiatric morbidity 15 months following their return. This rate was

almost twice that of their non-veteran peers. He found that the risk factors for the development of psychiatric morbidity included combat exposure and past psychiatric history. This level of morbidity was much higher than reported in previous studies on UN soldiers.

Shorey (1994) found that peacekeepers believed that stress management techniques were an important tool for dealing with the nature of their employment on peace operations. He found that the main sources of stress were:

- a. working in a potentially dangerous environment where an atmosphere of underlying tension is common;
- b. not being deployed or serving as a formed unit;
- c. being immersed in a foreign culture; and
- d. facing the challenge of working in a first-time employment of short duration outside one's normal experience and terms of reference.

Pinch (1994a) reports on a similar range of factors that had a negative impact on the individual, or that were the source of a cumulative negative effect on morale. These were:

- a. changes in the climate, experienced at the start of the deployment and extreme weather variations during the deployment;

- b. feeling insecure and unprotected from being subjected to artillery fire,
- c. delays in repatriation for which no explanation is given; uncertainty about the mandate, ROE, and the conflict (which has generally occurred at the start of the operation); and
- d. individual rotation and the break-up of sub-units.

Applewhite (1994) reported on the study of American soldiers deployed to the MFO (Sinai). He found that the major stress producing conditions could be represented by the categories; environmental, operational and interpersonal.

Environmental stressors included:

- a. the climate, which for the MFO stemmed from the invariability of desert conditions and contributed to the monotony associated with the duty;
- b. the confined living conditions; and
- c. unfamiliar cultures of the host nation and the other MFO contributing nations.

Operational stressors included:

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- a. apprehension over terrorist attack;
 - b. the ambiguity of the setting in which the soldiers were required to maintain a high state of vigilance while outside the fence tourists relaxed on the beach; and
 - c. the pressure to perform created by the frequent visit of dignitaries and inspections by the chain of command.

Interpersonal stressors resulted in strains in command structure caused by the close quarter living, constant contact with each other and the increased responsibility placed on junior leaders. Those personnel with family problems at home were the largest source of referrals for mental health assistance.

Those at greatest risk of psychosocial distress were personnel who became alienated from the group either by withdrawing or exclusion, those who abused alcohol as the main source of frustration release, and those who received stressful information over the telephone from home. Telephone use has been the subject of a separate study (Applewhite and Segal, 1990) highlighting that direct real-time communication with family can have both a positive and negative impact on individual performance on deployed operations.

The Irish and Swedish defence forces provide their personnel with psychological debriefing services that are similar in concept to that provided by the ADF. Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) in evaluating the adequacy of these services found that psychological debriefing after

peace operations was well accepted and considered effective and important in both countries. An interesting point raised in both the Irish and Swedish case studies was that the debriefing process should focus on the stress associated with prolonged exposure to conditions that result in 'psychological burnout', rather than on 'bad' experiences in-country. Clearly, the psychological demands of peace operations for some individuals are extreme, and on return home there is likely to be the need for mental recovery. The debriefing process, and any follow-up support, should be flexible enough to address both issues.

The Swedish participants also demonstrated strong support for the debriefing process, but added that the effectiveness of the process was increased if the psychologist had some personal experience of the operation area in terms of the physical and mental conditions under which the operation was conducted, and the basic operating procedures of the contingent. Further, support for psychological support in-country came from a commander who found that he felt a need to participate in an individual debrief during the operation, but because of his position in the contingent he felt that it was not information that could, or should, be discussed with subordinates.

This raises the question of the necessity for regular psychological debriefing for commanders. In larger contingents in particular, the structure of the organisation ensures that at all other levels each individual has peers with whom they can discuss the issues surrounding the operation. However, the higher the level in the organisation the smaller the number of peer equivalents, and presumably the greater propensity for emotional self-control. It could be argued that it is at this level that the benefits of psychological debriefing by an independent

third party are potentially the greatest, as the commanders influence on the all aspects of the mission is fundamental. Do peace operations make additional, or different, physical and emotional demands of commanders than would be expected in conventional operations?

It is hardly surprising that peacekeepers experience considerable cumulative stress during a deployment when the interaction between the peacekeeper and the peace operations environment is considered. Peacekeepers are placed into a politically charged environment in which they experience considerable role ambiguity; where they must achieve their objectives through methods with which they are unfamiliar, and that appear to be the anthesis of their trained skills; in an environment where there is no opportunity for a physical release of frustration or tension; they are immersed in a foreign culture that continually presents them with novel problems; and they are exposed to trauma's and atrocities that they are unable to prevent, facing direct threats to their existence and the confusion, disappointment and anger that stems from the hostile reactions they receive from those they are trying to assist (Ethell, 1994; Miller & Moskos, 1995; Pinch, 1994a; Shorey, 1994).

Training and education clearly have a significant role to play in preparing or inoculating soldiers against some of these stressors. Many UN troop contributing nations (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States) now recognise the importance of managing and dealing with stress that is created by operational deployment on peace operations, and they have attempted to deal with the results of stress through effective policy and practice. However, it may be that some of the stress created by expectation that is incompatible with the reality of the deployment could be alleviated through more

comprehensive pre-deployment preparation.

MILITARY RELATED SKILLS

A feature of all military preparation for peace operations is refresher training in basic skills, and exposure to military skills or information that might be relevant to the mission area. For example, these skills may include a basic refresher on the peacekeepers personal weapon, or exposure to relevant mine awareness information and skills. These are areas where peacekeeper training is generally well catered for, however, some research shows that some deficiencies in this area that are worth highlighting.

Medical

Shorey (1994) found that the participants in his study felt that there was a need for peacekeepers to have advanced first aid skills. They highlighted that they were often deployed in situations where the potential for injury through either mine incidents or vehicle accidents was high. In this environment a seemingly minor medical condition could become a crises due to lack of efficient medical evacuation and as such advanced medical skills were required by individual peacekeepers. As an example of the type of skills required, Shorey's (1994) participants suggested that the ability to administer intravenous solution to an individual in shock due to blood loss is a key skill worth possessing.

Conduct When Detained

Another area identified by Shorey's (1994) study included personal conduct if detained. Peacekeepers are regularly taken hostage or temporarily detained by the belligerents for periods that can extend from hours to weeks (Glenny, 1995). Shorey's (1994) participants suggested that given the likelihood that this would occur in future missions it was worth considering as an area for inclusion into predeployment preparation. In particular, the management of stress and anxiety in these situations was considered important.

Media Contact

In terms of media relations, many reports, commentators and operational commanders (Badsey, 1994; Duncan, 1993b, 1996; Moon, 1995; Shorey, 1994) alike advocate the need for media relations training aimed at providing insights into issues like the danger of misrepresentation, the tendency of the press to focus on the negative or sensational aspects of the deployment, and the difference between what is said and what is printed (Shorey, 1994). Similarly, others (Badsey, 1994; Duncan, 1996; Moon, 1995) stress the importance of the role of the media in all future military operations, highlighting that technology allows the media interpretation of events to be instantly reported to the world. In particular, commanders at all levels must be educated in the role of the media and its relationship to the military force on operations. Additionally, they must have the confidence and skills to perform efficiently and effectively when they come under the spotlight of media attention. Duncan (1993b) stresses the need for all peacekeepers to understand that the media has a legitimate

function to perform, with the associated warning that just because the journalist comes from the peacekeepers home country does not mean that he or she is on the peacekeeper's side.

Rules of Engagement

Underlying peacekeeper performance throughout a deployment is the application of the Rules of the Engagement (ROE) and a comprehensive understanding of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). As discussed in Chapter Two, issues surrounding the use of force in peace operations are ambiguous and complex at all levels. Inappropriate use of force can have a significant negative impact on the course of the operation, but importantly can also place the individual peacekeeper in significant legal difficulty.

The documents that define and give legal authority to a peace operation are the: UN Mandate; Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); Secretary General's Directive; Force Regulations; and Rules of Engagement (ROE). These documents are inter-related but it is the ROE that has the greatest daily impact on the performance of peacekeepers. ROE are directions which detail the circumstances under which armed force can be applied by a contingent to achieve military objectives. They are not law, but they detail the action allowed under the LOAC. Australian Defence Force units train with ROE that have been drafted for defence of Australia tasks, but when deployed with a multinational force the ROE are likely to be drafted by another nation or organisation, requiring ADF compliance.

In peace operations the ROE are often restrictive and complex (K.E. Eyre, 1994), and

understanding the ROE for a mission is critical to the conduct of all other aspects of the operation. Successful application of ROE in peace operations is a function of soldier discipline, professionalism and a complete and thorough understanding of the Orders For Opening Fire (OFOF), ROE and the SOFA depending on the level of the individual within the deployment. A breach of ROE can have significant implications for all levels of the deployment, and has in the past resulted in hostage taking, restrictions in the freedom of movement and withdrawal of consent by the parties. Several studies and commentators (Adams, 1993; Duncan, 1993b; Dworken, 1993; Henshaw, 1993; Hunter, 1994; Moon, 1995) have stressed the importance of the thorough training in the correct application of the ROE and LOAC the peace operations. Consequently, this area should receive considerable attention prior to deployment.

Job Specific Information

The study by Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) elicited the interesting perception from their participants, to the effect that current preparation methods focus on preparing personnel for 'worst case' scenarios without recognising that because of the nature of the operation the 'normal' daily routines of a peace operation may differ from those trained for in general military training. These participants were discussing their experiences in established missions where their deployment was a unit or individual rotation as opposed to an initial deployment.

The tendency of military training is to focus on preparing for 'worst case' scenarios on the understanding that experience of anything less will be catered for by the combination of

general training and experience and knowledge of the actions to be taken in the 'worst case'. However, participants in the Haberl-Zemljic (1996) study offer the alternate opinion that training in the daily routine of a mission is equally important in establishing the framework for effective performance in-country, and as such, where it is appropriate it should be considered as an element of predeployment preparation.

CONCLUSION

Examination of the five skill areas outlined above shows that the peacekeeper needs to be adept in 'soft' skills. Fetherston (1994) referred to these as contact skills. Skills in interpersonal relations, relationship building, networking, listening, liaison, observation, communication and facilitation. Underlying this skill base there must be clear local culture knowledge that translates into cultural awareness or empathy, and mission knowledge that translates into the basis for taking action. Understanding that 'soft' skills are key features of effective peacekeeper performance gives some credibility to the application of the constabulary model to these types of operations. The application of this model in turn has implications for the way in which military personnel are prepared. This review suggests that traditional military preparation is a sound foundation but more is required that is particular to peace operations.

It might be argued that these are not military skills at all, that the military role is to meet a particular objective that supports the peacemaking process, and that the skills required

to achieve this are essentially military skills. This argument is undermined by the humanitarian justification often provided for military intervention in second generation operations. To be successful in this role, the individual and the force must engage, and be engaged, by the host of other players in the environment (local population, belligerents, HROs, and other military nations) if they are to succeed.

That basic military training is the foundation of effective peacekeeper performance is a given. However, as D.P. Eyre (1994) concludes, while 90 percent of the skills required for peace operations are already in the training schedule of the average military unit, the 10 percent skill shortfall may prove to be disproportionately significant in the ambiguous environment of peace operations. As Berdal (1993, pp. 45-46) puts it:

It is estimated that 90% of the training for peacekeeping is training for a general combat capability ... Contemporary operations nonetheless demonstrated the critical importance of the remaining 10% of training for peacekeeping. Several areas of weakness stand out ... training for UN operations must also emphasise strict standards of discipline and sensitivity to cultural factors, including an appreciation of languages, ethnic groups, religious and local customs in the area of deployment.

The difficulty has been in clearly identifying the 10 percent skill shortfall. To date, very little effort has been put into gathering task analysis information from peace operation deployments. In a climate where traditional combat skills are seen as readily transferable to

peace operations, it is not difficult to see that support for such an analysis might be difficult to obtain. However, the importance of the requirement is highlighted by the broad indications of the skills shortfall provided in the studies outlined above. The SKAs required of peacekeepers are essentially cognitively based interpersonal skills, that can be difficult to define and analyse. D.P. Eyre (1994) noted from his study that when it came to discussing the requirement for 'soft' skills he was presented with two responses from the subjects. The first type of response was that there was a great need for 'soft' skills that required individual training. The second type of response was that there was no need for 'soft' skills and that the focus should be on military skills. When he followed up on what type of 'soft' skills, were required the respondents found it difficult to clarify the exactly what they needed. He commented that this pattern of response is interesting in itself, in that if the skill in question was specifically military related, clarification of what was required to make up the shortfall would be detailed and exact. In the case of 'soft' skills, the respondents were aware that their skill base was deficient, but were unable to describe exactly in what way it was deficient.

In the application of 'soft' skills there are no definitive textbook answers that allow the peacekeeper to know that he or she is right or wrong. Much depends not only on what is done, but what is seen to be done. The skills required are complex, cognitively based and difficult to teach, because they rely on the individual to strike a balance between their assessment of the situation, the moral authority of the role, their personal ethical responsibility, and the military imperative. From a training perspective tackling these issues might be considered 'too hard'.

However, the importance of some form of specialised training is underscored by statistical research conducted by Blechman and Vaccaro (1994). They examined the correlation between specialised training and casualty rates, finding that specialised training seems to reduce casualties among UN forces. As an example, they compare the operation of two European countries (Belgium and Denmark) in Bosnia (UNPROFOR). These two countries contributed roughly the same type and amount of forces to the mission since its inception. Both countries armed forces are well equipped, well trained for combat, highly professional, and members of NATO. Within UNPROFOR, both contingents were deployed in Croatia, and both conducted similar missions under similar circumstances. These similarities would seem to dictate similar performance of the mission and comparable casualty rates. However, Blechman and Vaccaro (1994) found that Belgium incurred casualties disproportionate to its level of participation in the mission, while Denmark's casualties are proportionally lower than its participation level. Denmark conducts extensive specialised peacekeeping training and Belgium conducts none. It is impossible to prove that specialised training led to the difference in the casualty rates, but the absence of other major differences between the two countries' forces, or circumstances of deployment strongly suggest a causal relationship.

The following chapter takes the analysis of peacekeeper preparation and training one step further by considering the personal and environmental influences that might impact on peacekeepers in the performance of their duties.

Chapter Two identified the general features of the peace operations, and the general implications this has for peacekeeper preparation. This chapter has identified those skill, knowledge and attitude areas that differentiate peace operations preparation from general military preparation. The review has highlighted that improvements could be made by introducing SKAs that are more closely aligned to a constabulary model of peace operations, and improving some aspects of the skills catered for by general military training.

Chapter Four will combine this information and add a new dimension to the problem by considering the relationship between the SKAs and the environment, with particular emphasis on the potential for skills degradation over time; the factors influencing psychological adaptation to the peace operations environment; and the issues in selecting personnel for peace operations.