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CHAPTER FOUR

PERSONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON PEACEKEEPER PERFORMANCE

There is a body of opinion which suggests that professionally trained soldiers do not need to be indoctrinated in the role of peacekeeping or undergo special training to fit them for the task. Maybe not, but they certainly need to be familiarised as to the modus operandi of peacekeeping forces, the standing operating procedures governing third party interventions, and the personal characteristics and temperament they will be required to display.

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INTRODUCTION

The preceding review of the SKAs required by peacekeepers highlights that peacekeeper behaviour in peace operations is the key to success or failure. Individual behaviour on these operations is derived from the level of conceptual understanding of the mission, their role, and the context in which the operation is being conducted. Fetherston (1994) points out that peace operations have been beset with problems related to displays of inappropriate peacekeeper behaviour, the most serious of which are:

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- a. abuses of human rights by some UN personnel on the people they have been called on to protect; and
 - b. failure of UN operations to uphold, support and establish international human rights standards.

Australian soldiers have generally been praised for their performance on peace operations, but still they have not escaped criticism for some aspects of their behaviour. Kieseker (1993) describes situations that at best represent cultural naivety, and at worst are strong racist attitudes among Australian soldiers operating in Somalia. The majority of incidents and situations he describes suggest that at times Australian soldiers were culturally insensitive to the local people and other organisations, for example the HROs, participating in the operation. These incidents while small, undermined the Australian effort in their sector. He reinforces the message that every soldier should understand what the mission is about, and how important their role is in achieving it. Equally important they must understand the role of the other players, and the relationship between the military and those players.

In this environment, where political responsibility finds its way to the lowest possible level, where behaviour and the perceptions of behaviour are all important, it is essential to understand how the SKAs required by peacekeepers are affected by the environment in which they are performed. In this chapter, we will briefly examine:

- a. the relationship between the SKAs and the environment with particular emphasis on the potential for skills degradation with constant exposure over time;
- b. the factors influencing psychological adaption to the peace operations environment; and
- c. issues in selecting personnel for peace operations.

PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

To examine the interaction between the personal qualities required by peacekeeper and the environment in which they operate.

WORKLOAD DEMAND AND SOLDIER PERFORMANCE ON PEACE OPERATIONS

As discussed above, stress has been increasingly implicated as a major factor affecting peacekeeper performance on modern peace operations. Peacekeeper stress results from: immersion in a foreign culture, feelings of insecurity regarding personal safety, the nature of the unit, isolation, separation from family and the ambiguity of the role (Applewhite, 1994; Lundin and Otto, 1992; Pinch, 1994a). For some time it has been known that the level of

stress or arousal experienced by an individual has a direct impact on workplace performance.

In this section we will examine the impact of environmental stressors on the types of tasks peacekeepers are expected to perform.

The Yerkes-Dodson (1908) 'Law' (commonly referred to as the 'inverted U' hypothesis) is widely accepted as a valid basis for analysing and predicting human performance. The inverted U is derived by plotting performance on task against the level of arousal or task demand. The resultant curve (Figure 4.1) shows that there is a optimal level of performance at a particular level of task demand. If the task demand is too great performance declines, similarly if task demand or arousal is too low, performance declines. For simple tasks, the tolerance between performance and arousal is larger. That is, the individual is better able to adjust to optimal performance to meet increasing task demand. For more complex, or cognitive tasks the individual is less tolerant of changes to the task demand and resultant decline in performance. If we examine closely some of the tasks demands made of peacekeepers we find that many have a strong cognitive bias, for example, negotiation, liaison, and decisions regarding the use of force. These essentially cognitive tasks are performed in an environment that is ambiguous, stressful and dangerous, so we have a situation where peacekeepers are performing highly demanding tasks under high arousal conditions. From the preceding discussion of the Yerkes-Dodson Law, peacekeeper performance is likely to be negatively affected by slight changes in their environment.




Figure 4.1. Relationship between stress, arousal and performance according to the Inverted U Hypothesis.

The point at which the individual reaches task overload has been explored by Cummings and Croft (1973), and is usefully described in the following example (Clark, 1996):

Consider the assembly line worker with an easy task and a slow-moving conveyor belt. He or she will have no difficulty meeting the workload demand provided boredom can be overcome by activities such as chatting to workmates. The ideal response is indicated by the straight line starting from the origin in Figure 3.2. As the conveyor speeds up the worker can keep pace with the task up to some speed where the actual response will begin to fall below the demand. The difference between the demand and performance indicates the amount of load that is shed. At some higher speed, the worker will be producing a maximum output for the circumstances, but much of the work demand will not be met, eg letting items pass by untouched, or by omitting some parts of the process, or both. If even greater demands are

made, the worker's output will actually fall. This is an overload state in which the output is substantially reduced by load shedding. Reduction of the overload does not allow an immediate return to previous higher performance levels; instead, output follows lower paths such as those arrowed, until the demand has been reduced sufficiently for the worker to be able to try to keep pace with demand again.




Figure 4.2. Human performance as a function of workload demand. (Source: Cummings and Croft, 1973).

The form of the curves is purely notional but is taken to be applicable to the whole range of human responses to tasking. The reduction of performance followed by overload has been described as a 'hysteresis effect' by Cummings and Croft (1973). Clark (1996) points out that there has been little effective study of the hysteresis effect since 1973 but there are some observational facts of value relating to the way that subjects cope with overload. Firstly, it is known that in load shedding, it is not always the most appropriate load that is shed, which raises the question of what is shed and why? Second, individuals tend to revert to the earliest

learned behaviour in overload, which has significant implications for the structure and content of initial training.

If this model is generalised to situations in which peacekeepers regularly find themselves, for example, a situation where peacekeepers are attempting to negotiate freedom of movement through a roadblock, where the roadblock has two purposes, the first, is to deny movement, and the second is to deliberately provoke the peacekeepers. It is not difficult to see how with continual exposure to this type of situation, an officer or soldier, who has significant combat training, and limited peacekeeper training, might rely on previous trained experience to solve the problem as the demands of the tasks became more frustrating, complex and difficult. The resultant action might be an inappropriate use of force that has significant ramifications for all other activities being conducted in the mission area, and for all levels of command, as the belligerents exploit the UN force mistake or weakness.

Significantly, from Figure 4.2, it is apparent that after exposure to overload in this type of environment peacekeeper performance does not immediately return to the optimum. This may be particularly true in situations where the skill is primarily cognitive.

In this section there has been some speculation as to the impact of the peace operations environment on peacekeeper skills and performance. The point to be drawn from this speculation is that there is a significant body of research in human factors and psychology to suggest that excessive stress or arousal has a negative impact on individual performance. Consistently research into peace operations environments has highlighted that they are

characterised by a variety of cultural and social stressors (Moskos, 1976; Pinch, 1994a; Segal & Meeker, 1985). Peacekeepers are required to maintain a high level of vigilance, and they must be prepared to make complex decisions in ambiguous social settings, in an environment that can rapidly fluctuate between high threat and low threat without direct causal involvement from the peacekeeping force (D.P. Eyre, 1994, Pinch, 1994a). The body of research knowledge on stress suggests that the following may be features of peacekeeper performance:

- a. Peacekeepers performance will be highly sensitive to additional environmental or personnel arousal borne either of mission requirements or external factors such as family stress.
- b. Exposure to overload conditions will result in task shedding, and reliance on the most ingrained trained response, one that is potentially inappropriate to the situation.
- c. If overload is experienced, peacekeeper performance will not return automatically to peak performance, but will initially result in reduced performance.

Initial preparation and training in the key skill, knowledge and attitude areas associated with peace operations is likely to have a significant lasting impact on peacekeeper performance. It may be that much of the stress commonly associated with peace operations stems from a lack of understanding of the situation and a lack of confidence borne of an

insufficient skill and knowledge base. The comments (Hillingso, 1993) that predeployment training should result in changes in attitude from a combat orientation to a peace operations orientation are reinforced by this examination of the impact of workload demand on peacekeeper performance.

PEACEKEEPERS AND CULTURE SHOCK

In Chapter Three, one of the key characteristics of peace operations was immersion into a foreign culture, which in recent times is not supportive of the peacekeeper's presence (Moskos & Miller, 1995), where success is contingent upon the individual's ability to perform a role that contains a great deal of social ambiguity. Psychological adaptation is a characteristic response to novel situations and environments, peacekeepers immersed in the environment described here must pass through some process of adaptation but: What form does it take? Can training facilitate the process to limit the period of reduced effectiveness?

Culture shock was first introduced (Oberg, 1960) to describe the anxiety resulting from not knowing what to do in a new culture. The familiar cues have been removed or have been given a different meaning, resulting in responses ranging from a vague discomfort to profound disorientation. Culture shock applies to any new situation, job, relationship, or perspective requiring a role adjustment and a new identity. In a broader sense, culture shock applies to any situation where the individual is forced to adjust to an unfamiliar social system where previous learning no longer applies.

Oberg (1960) noted six negative aspects of culture shock:

- a. strain resulting from the effort of psychological adaptation;
- b. a sense of loss or deprivation referring to the removal of former friends, status, role, and/or possessions;
- c. rejection by, or rejection of the new culture;
- d. confusion in the role definition, role expectations, feelings, and self-identity;
- e. unexpected anxiety, disgust, or indignation regarding cultural differences between the old and new ways; and
- f. feelings of helplessness as a result of not coping well in the new environment.

There are several stage models of culture shock (Church, 1982; Lesser and Peter, 1957; Lsygaard, 1955; Torbiorn, 1982). Here we will examine only one model (Alder, 1975) in detail, it has been selected on the basis that it is derived from the work of the originator (Oberg, 1960) of the concept, and it describes the progression of culture shock in terms of a five-stage educational and developmental process with positive as well as negative consequences. This approach seems most closely aligned with the central interests of this study, and the situation that peacekeepers experience. The stages of Alder's (1975) model

are:

- a. **Stage 1, 'Honeymoon Stage'**. This is the initial contact where the newly arrived individual experiences the curiosity and excitement of a tourist, but where the person's basic identity is rooted in the home setting.
- b. **Stage 2, 'Disintegration'**. This stage involves the disintegration of the familiar cues, as the individual is overwhelmed by the new culture's requirements. The individual typically experiences self-blame and a sense of personal inadequacy for any difficulties encountered.
- c. **Stage 3, 'Reintegration'**. This stage involves the reintegration of new cues and an increased ability to function in the new culture. The emotions associated with this stage are typically anger and resentment toward the new culture as having cause the difficulties and being less adequate than the old familiar ways. Because of this outer-directed anger, people in this stage of culture shock are difficult to help.
- d. **Stage 4, 'Gradual Autonomy'**. This stage continues the process of reintegration toward gradual autonomy and increased ability to see the bad and good elements in both the old and new cultures. A balanced view emerges that helps the person interpret both the previous home and new host cultures.

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- e. **Stage 5, 'Reciprocal Interdependence'**. At this stage the person has ideally achieved bi-cultural status, or has become fluently comfortable in both the old and new cultures. There is some controversy about whether this stage is an unreachable ideal, or whether people can actually achieve this stage of multiculturalism.

This model is not a lock-step process in that the individual must pass through each stage in the order described, nor is progression through the model strictly governed by the time spent in each stage. It is possible that an individual may not reach the final two stages of the model, and as mentioned above there is some debate as to whether Stage 5 is ever reached. For peacekeepers, who spend as little as six months and as much as 12 months immersed in a foreign culture, it is not unreasonable to expect that the majority do not reach the latter stages of the model. However, the intense immersion and confrontation with the culture that is associated with the role of the peacekeeper might result in rapid progression through the earlier stages, or alternatively delayed progression.

As highlighted in the examination of the SKAs required by peacekeepers cultural knowledge is consistently highlighted as an important area. In investigating this area, researchers have determined the requirement for cultural knowledge was a direct impact on the peacekeepers' ability to effectively perform their tasks. The requirement for cultural knowledge as a sensitising concept to facilitate psychological adaptation to the environment, and thereby improve peacekeeper effectiveness, has been given scant attention. From this perspective, the purpose of presenting cultural knowledge in predeployment training is to

reduce the negative impact of psychological adaptation to the new environment, and thereby increase peacekeeper effectiveness. The question that arises from this approach is: To what extent does taking this view of the purpose of predeployment preparation determine the type of cultural information required by peacekeepers, and the way that information is presented? To date, no research has been conducted that clarifies this area.

Fetherston (1994) makes a clear link between the requirement for cross-cultural training and peacekeeper effectiveness. Her review of the cross-cultural training literature suggests that there are three factors which dictate success or failure in inter-cultural interaction, these are: skills or abilities, attitudinal factors and personality traits. Table 4.1 highlights the features of attitude, personality and behaviour that other researchers have found contribute to successful performance in cross-cultural settings. Skills and abilities are generally associated with training, while personality is inherent, and therefore addressed by the personnel selection process. In this study personnel selection will be treated as a separate issue in a later section of this chapter.

Table 4.1

Attitudes and Skills that Correlate *Positively* with Effective Cross-Cultural Performance, and the Personality Traits that Correlate *Negatively* with Effective Cross-Cultural Performance

(Source: Fetherston, 1994).

Positive Attitudes (Hannigan, 1990)	Positive Skills (Wehr, 1979)	Negative Personality Traits (Hannigan, 1990)
cultural empathy	conflict situation analysis/ fact finding	perfectionism
relativist orientation to knowledge	empathy	rigidity
acceptance of others as people	listening/active listening	dogmatism
non-judgemental attitude	sense of timing and appropriateness	ethnocentrism
respect for host culture	trust and credibility development	dependent anxiety
interest in nationals	mediation	task-orientated behaviour
appreciation of culture	communication	narrow mindedness
sense of politics	imagination	self-centred role behaviours
flexibility	joint-costing	
	crisis management	

Cultural knowledge given to peacekeepers prior to deployment should serve the following purposes, first; it should give them the conceptual understanding they require to function in a foreign culture; second; it should develop an attitude that is compatible with the culture and their role, third; it should practice them in the basic behavioural skills necessary to perform their role effectively in that environment; and finally, it should aim to facilitate the process of psychological adaptation to the environment, and consequently extend the period of

soldier effectiveness. Investigation of psychological adaptation in the modern peace operations environment has been limited. Previous work (Bartone & Adler, 1994; Miller & Moskos, 1995) has concentrated on examining attitude change towards the mission and military career in stable peacekeeping environments. The following section reviews this work along with two more recent investigations of modern peace operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Moskos (1976) found that soldier's attitudes changed from initial naive idealism to cynicism (towards the United Nations and mission), and finally to a pragmatic appreciation of the peacekeeping task. Similarly, studies (Harris & Segal, 1985; Segal, Harris, Rothberg & Marlowe, 1984; Segal, Rothberg, Harris & Marlowe, 1987; Segal & Weschler, 1993) of other stable peacekeeping settings (MFO, Sinai) have found that peacekeepers' attitudes move from initial high expectations to boredom, with some revival of spirits as the final days of the mission approached. Other studies of the MFO (Segal & Meeker, 1985) found that if soldiers believed the peacekeeping assignment would enhance their career, an attitude they subsequently discounted after the peacekeeping mission was completed (Segal, Rothberg, Harris & Marlowe, 1987), then their attitudes were more likely to reflect that the deployment was appropriate, interesting and required extra skills. In this study (Segal et al, 1987) the degree of adaptation to the mission environment was directly related to the degree to which the assignment was seen as career enhancing.

Another feature of participation in peace operations is the influence on soldier attitudes. The long term impact of training for, and participating in, a stable peacekeeping operation (MFO) has been found to increase soldiers' ability to differentiate level of conflict intensity among different military scenarios. There was an increase in their ability to differentiate gradations between the extremes of high-intensity conflict and low-intensity conflict as a function of the degree of participation in peacekeeping (Meeker & Segal, 1987, Segal, Furukawa & Lindh, 1990). Meeker and Segal (1987) conclude that participation in peace operations has a long term impact on the way that soldiers understand the military environment and their role.

These U.S. studies show that attitudes in stable peacekeeping operations, where the role of soldier is restricted to observation and incident reporting change during the course of the operation are influenced by factors unrelated to the conduct of the mission, and have a long term impact on the way the soldier views himself and the military. Miller and Moskos (1995) revisited the topic of attitude change in the constabulary model but this time in the context of a modern multinational peace operation in Somalia. Focusing on the American portion of this force, they found that soldiers' attitudes evolved through three stages characterised by: 'High Expectations' formed in the United States and fed by the media; 'Disillusionment' that grew when the soldiers did not find mass starvation and could not serve as primary givers of aid, and were often abused by the people they had presumably come to help; and finally, the complex stage of 'Reconsideration', in which two divergent groups emerged the first, a 'warrior strategy' in which the soldiers generalised the behaviour of the gunmen and rioters to all Somalis and treated the entire population as potential enemies, the

second, a 'humanitarian strategy' in which soldiers were offended by negative stereotypes of Somalis, shunned the use of force, and sought to contextualise Somali behaviour by seeking cultural and political explanations.

The Moskos and Miller (1995) model of soldier adaptation to second generation operations while similar to those described for first generation operations, suggest that the course of attitude change and eventual justification is related to the expectation created prior to deployment and this has implications for the nature and conduct of predeployment training. This study must be considered in context, in that the units studied were essentially support elements of the force, and the focus of the study was on black American soldiers and their return to the African continent. Despite these limitations the study provides a useful starting point for considering attitude change in second generation peace operations.

Another starting point for considering attitude development in second generation peace operations is provided by Bartone and Adler (1994). They developed a model for psychological adaptation to peacekeeping operations after studying the three separate U.S. Army units providing medical support to UN troops in Bosnia (UNPROFOR). The focus of the study was on identifying the key sources of stress for soldiers and delineating the impact of these on health, morale and mental readiness of soldiers. Their findings show that the *degree of overall stress* is correlated significantly with *days of depression* in all groups examined, indicating clear effects of stress on mental readiness and performance. A five dimensional model presents the key issues in psychological adaptation to peacekeeping operations as: Isolation; Ambiguity; Powerlessness; Boredom; and Danger (see Table 4.2 below).

The units studied were constituted around a core element with the majority of personnel drawn from other units in the US. As a result of constituting the unit in this way, the major stress factor in the pre-deployment was the uncertainty associated with getting to know peers and leaders, and finding out what was going on and when. In particular, there was confusion about the command and control of the unit, and organisational structure. Many of the soldiers and officers were complete strangers, and most of the key leaders were new in the job and not yet recognised by the soldiers. Similarly, issues related to family were important at this time.

During the deployment the critical success factor was the meaningfulness of activities engaged in. If the workload was not high, and travel restrictions imposed by the nature of the mission prevented a more proactive approach to their employment, boredom and isolation became significant issues. This was reinforced if there was a sense of deprivation relative to other sections of the force, the ambiguity about the mission, and its value. The opportunity for greater proactive work with the local population, while welcomed, heightened the sense of concern about the mission, in particular about why more could not have been done sooner. As the threat to personnel and force security increased, unit cohesion increased, and the realism provided by the threat was welcomed. Media attention that followed the threat was also welcomed. The main features of each dimension of the model are detailed in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2

Psychological Adaptation to Peace Operations (Source: Bartone & Adler, 1994)

Dimensions	Factors Influencing Dimension
Isolation	Physically remote environment
	Communication difficulties
	Culturally different
	Newly configured units
Ambiguity	Mission definition
	Command structure confusion
Powerlessness	Rules of engagement restrictions
	Limited activity or productivity
	Cultural and language difficulties
	Relative deprivation
Boredom	Repetition and predicability
	Lack of work
	Change in expectations
Threat or Danger	Threat to life and limb
	Mines, snipers, disease

Clearly, deployment to a peace operations environment has a psychological impact on the individual beyond the movement from the a peacetime (static) environment to an operational (dynamic) footing. The range of cultural issues to be confronted by peacekeepers is not limited to the contact with the host nation population but also involves other nations within a multinational force. Psychological adaptation to this environment is likely to follow a

stage model that is particular to peacekeeping as the conditions under which the soldier interacts with the culture is significantly different from that of other people. Cross-culture contact models of peace operations are at a primitive stage of development but with further research could benefit the preparation and training of peacekeepers.

The skills necessary for effectively dealing with cross-cultural contact are a mixture of a sound understanding of the local culture, high level inter-personal communication and personality characteristics (Wehr, 1979). Effective preparation in such skills is likely to take more than the fact based preparation that is a common feature of military predeployment training. However, if personality characteristics play a part in performance in this environment, can strict attention to personnel selection minimise the impact on the individual and the force?

APPROACHES TO PEACEKEEPER SELECTION

On March 16, 1993 a 16-year old Somali boy died as a result of ill-treatment at the hands of Canadian peacekeepers (Reuters, 1994; Trevena, 1994). The subsequent ramifications of this incident were felt at all levels of the Canadian Forces (CF). That the incident involved Canadian peacekeepers made it all the more shocking. The CF is widely accepted as the most experienced peacekeeping force in the world, and has a reputation for professionalism in the field. As detailed by Fetherston (1993, 1994) problems caused by peacekeepers are not new, but the message for other first world nations is that behavioural

problems in the field are not limited to nations whose personnel are drawn from poorly trained conscripts. The problem can occur at any time to any nation, and extensive experience and a previously unblemished record in peace operations does not mean that a nation is not at risk.

As a result of this incident the CF looked closely at the process of selecting personnel who participate in peace operations (Cotton & Grandmaison, 1993; Pinch, 1994a, 1994b).

The identification of personnel selection as an issue in peace operations raises two questions:

- a. Is it necessary to institute a secondary selection process to ensure that only 'suitable' personnel participate in peace operations? and
- b. Is it possible to develop a selection method to minimise the risk of deploying personnel that are not suitable for the demands of peace operations?

Prior to the Somali incident the CF selection process was, in broad terms, much the same as that currently used by the ADF.

Wenek (1984) described the evolution that takes place in general military selection and socialisation as a process from initial recruitment through preliminary training and occupational training. During this process the individual is subjected to powerful cultural socialisation conditions, where the appropriate norms of behaviour are shaped and reinforced through a formal system of reward and punishment. Individuals who are not compatible with

the values and norms of the organisation are removed or remove themselves.

Behavioural suitability for service “tends to be a default assessment in the absence of strong indications to the contrary” (Wenek, 1984, p 3). If the soldier is successful in passing through this process then he or she is deemed behaviourally suitable for military tasking. Wenek (1984) was referring to the CF general selection process, but the description he provides also adequately describes ADF selection.

Initial selection to the ADF is done on the basis of ‘negative selection’, a process where the individual is deemed suitable unless there are strong indicators to suggest that they may not cope with the demands of military environment. It is clear that in the military setting selection is not limited to the initial interview. The description provided by Wenek (1984) shows that selection, training, and cultural assimilation or socialisation, are all integral factors in the ‘selection’ of military personnel.

In the ADF and the CF (Pinch, 1994b) secondary selection occurs for personnel who apply, or are assigned to special roles where predicting adaptation to the environment is considered a requirement of the position. In the ADF, this may involve posting to remote locations, or application for particular duties such as bomb disposal. However, the principle of negative selection continues to apply.

Current selection of personnel for peace operations in the Australian Army occurs either on an individual basis, or as part of the selection of a formed unit. In the Australian

Army, individual selection for peace operations is conducted jointly by the individuals Corps and Army career managers. The decision is based on matching individual skills against probable tasking, and consideration of career development and availability issues. No formal assessment of the individuals psychological suitability for deployment to peace operations is made. Where a unit is selected to participate in a peace operation the responsibility for selection resides with the unit commander. Selection in this case is an individual assessment of the member's suitability, based on the commanders knowledge of the individual's performance in the unit. General policy guidelines on the factors to be considered, for example physical fitness, are provided by higher command.

ADF selection for peace operations deployments is at best ad hoc. There is no prescribed or consistent method for selecting out personnel who may not cope in a peace operations environment. Units have the scope to employ a variety of methods to decide who to deploy and these will be based invariably on decisions related to force composition. Cotton and Grandmaison (1993) arrived at similar conclusion about the CF peace operations selection process, but took the issue further by examining the methods employed by other countries. They discovered that a less than systematic approach to peacekeeper selection was not uncommon. The exception to the rule was the Austrian Army whose selection methods are discussed below.

Is secondary selection necessary for peace operations? Researchers from the CF believe it is. Cotton and Grandmaison (1993) went on to develop a Unit Screening Protocol that could be used by commanders to screen their personnel for impending service on a UN

mission. Development of the protocol was based on an understanding that deficiencies in social control (Hirschi, 1969) and/or self control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) are precursors to deviant behaviour. Additionally, people are habitual in their behaviours, such that they are behaviourally consistent over time. On the basis of these theories, it can be concluded that if there are indications in someone's past of a particular behaviour, it is probable that it will re-occur (Cotton & Grandmaison, 1993). As an example, if a soldier has a history of substance abuse, then it is more likely that this individual will abuse in the future than a soldier with no such history. The Unit Screening Protocol (Cotton & Grandmaison, 1993) is a list of weighted major and minor risk factors that are scored on a soldier by his commander. The resultant score gives an indication of the individuals risk for behaviour not compatible with deployment to an UN mission. In assessing major risk factors the commander scores the soldier on items such as a behavioural history of alcohol abuse, discipline problems, aggressive behaviour, and antisocial behaviour. Minor risk factors may involve an assessment of personality characteristics, family and social relationships, and job performance. If the soldier is rated in the Moderate Risk category it is suggested that he be referred for a detailed psychological assessment before further decision is taken. If the individual falls into the High Risk category then it is recommended that he not be deployed.

This approach to behavioural screening or selection assumes that the individual has successfully passed through the normative socialisation process associated with general military selection and initial training (Wenck, 1984) but in the intervening time the soldier has developed habits, or entered a social or family situation that can be tolerated in a peacetime situation but that will detract from performance in the isolated environment of an operational

deployment. As such it is a predictor of individual behaviour. If we relate this to the generalised version of Cummings and Crofts (1973) (Figure 4.2) findings on workload demand discussed above, we can see that in the high demand peace operations environment additional demand placed on the individual such as an unstable family environment or alcohol abuse problems, will also have a significant impact on performance. So, there are two elements to the screening process, first, it is important to screen out those who have exhibited behaviours that are incompatible with operational deployment generally, and the requirements of peace operations particularly, and second, to screen out those whose personal habits or current social setting will place additional demand on the individual such that it will effect his or her performance. This conclusion could apply to operational or exercise deployment generally, but for peace operations additional consideration needs to be given to the nature of the operation, the consequent nature of the tasking, and the demand on the individual.

After interviewing experienced Canadian peacekeepers Shorey (1994) and Pinch (1994a, 1994b) highlight selection as an issue in peace operations. Shorey (1994) notes that peace operations are characterised by small, autonomous teams who are geographically isolated in an environment of relative uncertainty. In this situation individual skills and personal qualities will have a significant impact on the value of the peacekeeper. His participants stressed the need for a comprehensive selection process where only those suitable for the environment are deployed. He determined four key areas of suitability: interpersonal skills; a varied base of experience; an operational mindset; and maturity and adaptability.

Interpersonal skills are related to the ability to communicate, verbally and non-verbally, in conjunction with an understanding of small group dynamics. The peacekeeper must be able to employ these skills effectively across the social spectrum. A varied skill base refers to the individuals professional military skills and experience. The peacekeeper must have previously demonstrated leadership, problem-solving and professional skills in diverse military settings. The term operational mindset refers to a mental set or action orientation that has as its base high levels of commitment and initiative. The ability to determine the most 'appropriate action' in a given situation. The final category refers to the maturity and adaptability to be able to adjust and be flexible under less than stable conditions. This category includes implies a sense of cultural sensitivity and understanding, but Shorey (1994) highlights that it is not dependent on age or seniority.

When the findings of Cotton and Grandmaison (1993) and Shorey (1994) are compared it is possible to develop a picture of the negative and positive features of peacekeeper selection. The former concentrates on the observable behavioural indicators of unsuitability, in line with the principle of negative selection, while the latter identifies a broad range of general features of personality, attitude and approach that are more difficult to consistently select, and may be by-products of individual training, education and professional development.

Sociological Fitness as a Factor in Peacekeeper Selection

Pinch (1994a, 1994b) recommends an integrative approach to peace operations selection where the demand characteristics of the peace operations environment are considered, first, in terms of the basic military skills, special skills, and knowledge required (for example, knowledge of conflict, negotiation), and second, in terms of psychological and sociological fitness. He suggests that the area of military and special skills is a matter of training and selection that, as a process, is fairly straight forward, while the areas of psychological and sociological fitness are more difficult. Similar to Cotton and Grandmaison (1993), he suggests that the essential difference between peace operations and conventional operations at the individual and group level is the different emphasis on discipline. In peace operations discipline has two forms, constraint in the use of force and impartiality (Moskos, 1975, 1976), both of which place considerable demands on the interpersonal skills of the individual and limits the range of acceptable behaviour. Group bonding then must be based on or reflect these norms as in the military setting group norms play a significant role in individual behaviour and performance. The greater autonomy at low levels in peace operations gives added importance to the establishment of appropriate group norms as the individual becomes a representative of the unit, force and home nation, where a display of inappropriate behaviour reflects negatively on all parties (Pinch, 1994b).

The US Army already employs a method of sociological fitness through the use of Combat Training Centers (CTCs). A CTC is designed to exercise the performance of whole units up to battalion size against a range of scenarios. Traditionally, CTCs were used to

exercise units in conventional operations but in the recent past some (CTC, Hoenfels, Germany) have been converted to focus solely on peace operations scenarios. While CTCs are designed purely to exercise the organisations it is apparent that they are also capable of providing an assessment of the sociological fitness of the unit to deploy on peace operations. It should be noted that as Pinch (1994a) suggests is appropriate, the U.S. Army does not use peace operations CTCs solely prior to deployment, they are an integral of unit preparation (Slater, 1995).

Pinch (1994a, 1994b) suggests that this assessment calls for greater emphasis to be placed on the sociological readiness of the units deployed to peace operations. This might be achieved by a process of qualitative screening of the unit following orientation training to group norms. Further, he suggests that this process while an integral part of pre-deployment training need not wait for a specific deployment, it could form an integral part of conventional preparation within formed units, where alternate scenarios would be used to establish the basis for this type of readiness.

Pinch (1994b) believes that an assessment of psychological fitness of the individual peacekeeper should be conducted in conjunction with appropriately qualified specialists. The Commanding Officer retains the right to the final decision after consideration of all the information. The factors that might be considered would include: social conduct in and out of the military; history and incidence of substance abuse; social and family stability and interpersonal skills; attitudes and behaviours towards other cultures and social groups (Pinch, 1994a).

Peacekeeper Selection in the Austrian Army

As mentioned above, the Austrian Army is the exception to the rule in employing a systematic approach to selection for peace operations. In 1980, they introduced psychological screening for reserve force members before deployment to peace operations (Lohwasser, 1993). The screening process was clinically based, attempting to screen out maladjusted behaviour. The member was subjected to a series of pencil and paper tests such as abstract and verbal intelligence, work performance and concentration tests, and a personality interview. This was followed by an interview with a psychologist who explored the member's attitude towards his assignment and whether there were additional circumstances that could put him under additional pressure during the mission. If there was still any doubt the member was referred to a psychiatrist for the final decision (Lohwasser, 1993). Over time this approach proved to be inadequate as everyone who did not show psycho-pathological symptoms was deemed fit for duty.

To redress this problem the Austrian Army Psychological Service developed a tailor made testing system that was based on practical-psychological rather than clinical-psychiatric factors (Lohwasser, 1993) that appears to address some of the features of psychological and sociological assessment suggested by Pinch (1994a). As in the CF and ADF situation described above, screening for clinical symptoms took place at induction, and general training methods selected out those who were not fit for military service, those who were left fell within the generally accepted concept of 'normal'.

Three major selection criteria that were determined in consultation with Austrian UN troops, these were:

- a. be able to perform their duties under the often stress-generating conditions of the mission area;
- b. be able to integrate into a military community; and
- c. not pose a potential danger to themselves or to others.

The Austrian Army Psychological Service developed the following categories to assess the selection criteria: social intelligence; ability for social interaction; accuracy and concentration and stress resistance. They instituted a range of standard test procedures appropriate to measure the categories, however, the most innovative aspect of the new selection procedure was the development of the "Shelter Test".

This test was designed to explore the group dynamic process under conditions of stress in the belief that more information could be gained about the candidate under the conditions created by this test than was available under normal conditions (Lohwasser, 1993). Additionally, the procedure was expected to educate the member on his or her ability to integrate into a new social group, and become accustomed to new situations. This test procedure is used for those members of the Austrian Federal Army for whom it is most necessary, that is, those low ranking volunteers about whom the Army has very little

information because of their short time in training or long periods of interruption to their service. Higher-ranking members of the reserve and regular forces, about whom the Army has significantly more information, are integrated into the selection process to promote identification with, and acceptance of, the testing methods within this group.

The member arrives in the test area on the afternoon of Day One and is subjected to a battery of standard tests and questionnaires that lasts approximately two hours. Following this (early evening) the test group is subdivided into two or three groups of approximately 12 (preferable of equal rank), the group is then assigned to a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Shelter, where they stay until mid-morning on Day Two. For each group a commander is appointed who is responsible for discipline and adherence to the rules of the test. Also from each group a moderator is appointed for each group dynamic task. If necessary, the commander has to support the moderator. The group dynamic tasks have to be solved according to a strict schedule that covers most of the night. All incidents during the night are recorded by a psychologist and form part of the assessment. Anyone who leaves the shelter is excluded from the test. Towards the end of the Shelter Test selected non-commissioned officers and officers, who are exempt from the test, assist as observers. Their opinion of the candidates forms another part of the assessment.

The group tasks, during which the observers are present, are on the surface games such as a quiz-type contest between two teams that have to be formed around two captains; or the assigning of more or less desirable animal names to each group member by his fellow players. The observers record the election of team captains, and the sequence in which the

team members are chosen by them, who gets the most desirable and who the most undesirable animal name, and the personal reactions of each group member to this.

After the results have been collated an exploration interview is conducted by a psychologist and decision is made as to whether the member is fit for UN service, temporarily unfit, or permanently unfit.

The Shelter Test is the an example of the specific development of a psychological assessment tool to determine peacekeeper suitability for deployment. The approach, and techniques employed, concentrate on individual assessment, but the process of assessment via observation of small group dynamics incorporates some of the suggestions and findings of the studies mentioned above into a practical selection technique. Essentially, it is based on the idea of selecting out those who are clearly unsuitable for deployment, an assessment of personality is made by traditional methods, and interpersonal skills, or in Pinch's (1994a, 1994b) terms skills related to a form of sociological fitness is made, through observation of performance in a small, isolated group operating under time pressure.

Selection and Training in the Swedish Armed Forces

Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) reported that one of the main motives for Swedish personnel to participate in peace operations was *tillragat*, or they were formally asked by a commanding officer to join a mission. The process of forming a Swedish battalion for a peace operation is that the commanding officer is identified and he formally accepts the task. He

then starts to select a group of officers that he wants to join him in the battalion. This process continues throughout the chain of command for officers until selection is finalised and confirmed four to five months before deployment with the group of officers creating the core of the new battalion. Simultaneously, advertising for volunteers in the local area of the battalion commanders original brigade is conducted, and former conscripts send in applications to the brigade.

This is a relatively new system that only applies to the selection of forces for peacekeeping duty. Selection of personnel for individual deployment, for example as UNMOs continues to be carried out by a central organisation.

Superficial external examination of the process would suggest that its strengths lie in the formation of a core element of officers with common bonds, understanding and expectations within a composite unit raised for a specific task. By encouraging personnel from a particular region to volunteer for service appears to further contribute to a higher level of internal cohesion than would be otherwise expected of a composite force.

The training process further reinforces the development of group cohesion. In general, officers undergo formal peacekeeping training at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) that offers skills and knowledge based preparation specific to peacekeeping. Following this those officers in command of soldiers start to prepare the training for their own units. In general, it was reported (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996) that they were allocated two weeks for this task. The training of soldiers is conducted by their officers

with the support and assistance of the central peacekeeping training centre, SWEDINT.

Training for soldiers lasts approximately three weeks and includes, administrative preparation, military skills relevant to the operation, and skills and knowledge development specific to peace operations.

Haberl-Zemljic et al (1996) report that the entire recruiting and training process allows commanders to 'get to know' their soldiers. The process of using a conceptually integrated selection and training system to develop internal cohesion in a composite unit is different from those selection methods described above. As Bartone and Adler (1994) noted one of the significant problems in forming a composite unit in the US Army was the lack of force cohesion prior to deployment. The Swedish approach would overcome this problem.

The other difference in the Swedish approach is that the responsibility for training falls to unit commanders with the support and advice of SWEDINT. In other countries where a central peacekeeping school or institution exists that training is generally conducted by that organisation. The Swedish approach is more consistent with the process of conventional conduct of military training, in that, those best able to make selection decisions can do so within the framework of the socialisation process described by Wenek (1984). That is, presumably the unit commanders are in the best position to identify and remedy, any personnel problems within the force prior to departure.

Selection Conclusion

It is appropriate at this time to note the apparent similarities between the positive and negative attitudes, and skills suggested as important for successful cross-cultural performance in Table 4.1, and issues of peacekeeper selection described in the preceding sections. Clearly, selection, training and preparing for peace operations are inter-related functions, and for peace operations in particular, they are related to issues of cross-cultural adaptability. The studies reviewed above suggest that there are a variety of factors to be considered in selecting personnel for peace operations and that for the most part these issues have not been addressed by the ADF. The prevailing military attitude that there is a convergence between the SKAs required for combat and peace operations extends to personnel selection, implying that the personality traits required for combat are similar to those required for constabulary roles. The preliminary investigations described above suggest that the two roles may converge in some areas, for example basic military skills, but in other areas there is a different emphasis on traditional SKAs, the requirement for new SKAs, and to successfully implement apply these skills and adjust to the peace operations environment may require close attention to personnel selection.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

ADF and Australian Army peace operations doctrine is currently under review. The official publication of Australian Army peacekeeping doctrine is contained in the Manual of

Land Warfare (MLW) 1.3.3 (Australian Army, 1980). When discussing Australian peace operations doctrine in this study reference will be made to the latest draft version of the developing Australian doctrine. The reader should note that these have not yet been endorsed by the ADF or the Army, and as such does not yet represent the official position of either organisation. The information presented here is provided to give an indication of the influences on peace operations doctrine in Australia.

Given the concurrent development of the two draft documents there is considerable conceptual overlap, this section will provide a general description of the common conceptual framework for both documents referring to individual differences where it is relevant to the discussion.

ADF doctrine will be published as Chapter 35 of the Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP), Volume 1, and Army doctrine will be published as MLW 1.3.3. Peace Operations. Both documents use the common peace operations definitions detailed in Chapter Two of this thesis. The ADF doctrine provides the strategic overview and conceptual basis for ADF involvement in peace operations, and the Army doctrine provides operational and tactical level guidance.

The ADF doctrine is conceptually similar to that described by the British Army (1994), in that a distinct separation is made between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is further divided into to include four distinct categories of operation (Figure 4.3), and peace enforcement into three categories of operation (Figure 4.4). The justification

for dividing peace operations into peacekeeping and peace enforcement is based on the notion that enforcement operations do not require the consent of the belligerents, and will involve sanctioned use of force in addition to self defence.




Figure 4.3. Australian Defence Force doctrine on peacekeeping (Source: ADFP 1, Volume 1, Chapter 35 (Draft, dated 10 July 1996).



Figure 4.4. Australian Defence Force doctrine on peace enforcement operations (Source: Draft ADFP 1, Chapter 35, dated 10 July 1996)

ADF doctrine goes on to introduce separate sets of principles for peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Table 4.3). The basic peacekeeping principles are similar to those developed by the British Army (1994), but ADF doctrine adds a range of ‘other considerations’ that reflect the UN guidance on peace operations (United Nations, 1995a). The principles of peace enforcement reflect the boundary separating peacekeeping and enforcement by removing the principles of consent and cooperation, and altering the terms under which the use of force is exercised.

While the principles are conceptually consistent, in their present form they appear to mix the political and military aspects of an operation. In particular, the ‘other considerations’ listed for peacekeeping include factors relevant to politicians and higher defence planning agencies, for which this doctrine is intended, such as, “continuing support of the security

council”, “commitment of troop contributing countries, clear and achievable mandates”. However, others in this same list appear to have some affinity with the first four basic “peacekeeping principles” and should guide the actions of all members of the force, for example, “transparency” and “mutual respect”. Similar problems exist in the “principles of peace enforcement”, with the inclusion of the principle of “credible force structure and composition” (a strategic consideration that will be decided for operational and tactical commanders by politicians and higher defence agencies), with three principles that are relevant to all levels of the force. There is a need to clarify what principles are relevant to which level of the organisation, and appropriately link them to function to underscore their importance.

Table 4.3.

Draft Australian Defence Force Principles of Peace Operations (Source: ADFPKC, 1996).

Peacekeeping Principles	Peace Enforcement Principles
Legitimacy Consent and Cooperation Impartiality and Objectivity Use of Force as a Last Resort	Legitimacy Minimum Use of Force Credible Force Structure and Composition Objectivity
Other Considerations	Other Considerations
Continuous and active support of the Security Council Sustained commitment of troop contributing countries Clear and achievable mandates Transparency Mutual respect Unity of effort Freedom of movement	The Principles of War

The ADF doctrine does less than British Army (1994) tactical doctrine to clarify the problems associated with the operational developments that have occurred in humanitarian missions (experienced by ADF personnel in the UNITAF and UNOSOM II force elements), which in ADF doctrine are grouped under peacekeeping. As we have seen, these operations involve the sanctioned use of force beyond self defence, and operation without consent of the parties to the conflict.

Where the British Army (1994) view a breach of the consent divide and the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as permanent alteration in the nature of the operation, resulting in the requirement for a replacement force, and the U.S. Army doctrine (1994), sees peacekeeping and peace enforcement on a continuum, the ADF doctrine offers no guidance on how such a transition is to be managed. The issue is further confused by Australian Army doctrine which emphasises that force structure and balance in humanitarian operations should reflect the possibility that the conflict could escalate. That is, the contingent should be equipped with the capability to use force beyond self defence from the outset, based on the reasoning that this (Australian Army, 1996, p. 3-4):

demonstrates strength and resolution, and deters organised opposition that might be tempted to interfere with the delivery of the aid to the extent that offensive operations become necessary.

This would suggest that the Australian Army approach is more consistent with the

U.S. understanding that peace operations are on a continuum, while the ADF principles reflect the British Army (1994) conceptual approach reflecting the understanding that a distinct divide exists between peacekeeping and enforcement. There is a need to clarify the approach to be adopted by the ADF, or alternatively develop an approach that better reflects policy. In this developmental stage, ADF doctrine appears to be caught between the conceptual clarity of the tactical level British Army (1994) approach, and the adaptation of common military thinking advocated by the U.S..

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PEACE OPERATIONS

PREPARATION AND TRAINING

The Army approach to training is that, as a professional Army, the professional skills of officers and soldiers are already at a high level, and additional preparation only need occur after the confirmation of a likely commitment to deploy. As discussed above, the general consensus is that the preparation, training and tactics employed for Short Warning Conflicts are immediately applicable to peace operations, and as such, additional resources need not be diverted to additional preparation for peace operations. In particular, preparation for these operations requires a disciplined approach to the application of ROE, which some (Hurley 1994; Moon, 1995; Simpson, 1995) believe made a significant contribution to the success of the Australian battalion group in Somalia (UNITAF).

Australian Army doctrine (Australian Army, 1996) offers a concept of training that separates the preparation and training of Army personnel into two categories: normal training and special training. Normal training is that training which the Army undertakes to teach, develop and practice the skills necessary to achieve success in battle. Special training is that training which is undertaken to satisfy the special requirements of peace operations. Special training is further divided into predeployment training and in-theatre training.

Predeployment training is conducted by the Deployed Forces Support Unit (DFSU), the functions, roles and training content of which are detailed below. In-theatre training is conducted by the contingent to overcome shortfalls in predeployment training, to maintain operational readiness and to assist in the maintenance of morale.

Individual predeployment training and preparation for ADF personnel participating in operational deployment overseas (including peace operations) is provided by DFSU.

Background to Deployed Forces Support Unit

DFSU was formed on 1 July 1995 as an amalgam of three existing organisations:

- a. Reinforcement Holding Company (RHC) which was formed in September 1992 to provide Land Headquarters Australia with an organisation responsible for the preparation, deployment and redeployment of ADF members deployed to Cambodia (UNTAC);

- b. Welfare coordination Cell (WCC), another cell formed to support the Australian commitment to UNTAC, providing welfare support to the families of deployed members; and
- c. 1 Amenities Platoon which originated in response to the Australian commitment to Vietnam, providing printed and recorded media support to all personnel deployed overseas.

The role of DFSU is to administratively prepare, train, deploy and redeploy all members on overseas operations including the provision and coordination of welfare support, in-country administration and philanthropic support. In addition, provide and coordinate philanthropic support to all other Army members deployed overseas to remote localities and, as directed, major exercises in Australia.

The tasks allocated to DFSU include:

- a. the direction and supervision of all administrative preparation of contingents, individuals and reserves warned for overseas deployment;
- b. the planning and coordination of all training necessary to complete an overseas deployment;
- c. the coordination of the deployment and redeployment of contingents and

individuals;

- d. the training of reserves, the monitoring of reserve readiness and their deployment as required;
- e. the provision and coordination of philanthropic support to deployed forces and individuals; and
- f. the coordination and supervision of welfare support to families of deployed members.

DFSU is responsible for the coordination and facilitation of all predeployment training.

With the exception of weapon training, the unit does not physically conduct any training, employing subject matter experts for this purpose. These experts are drawn from the wider ADF and other non-defence organisations such as the Australian Federal Police, Australian Bomb Data Centre, and the Australian Customs Service. Predeployment training may be conducted at DFSU, or alternatively DFSU may deploy to a mounting area as was the case for the preparation of the Rwanda contingent (UNAMIR).

The skills covered in the program are military related skills such as mine awareness (which may be a new skill for some); equipment operation; communications; and medical/first aid skills that involve an introduction to the individual medical kit and revision for most of basic first aid. The program also contains sessions on, “conflict resolution” and “stress

management” that supplement and reinforce each other. Conflict resolution focuses on the resolution of conflict at an interpersonal level. This information has practical application for interpersonal relations within the contingent, and provides some guidance and insight into contact with other cultures and agencies in the mission area. However, the session is information based providing limited opportunity for individual skills development. Similarly, stress management focuses on the sources of stress and its management at an individual level, but provides little in the way of skills development.

Briefings on the country and the mission are all fact based covering elements such as: geography; culture; religion; politics; military aspects of the mission; local traditions; and local government. Again, the information is purely fact-based, and presented in a lecture format.

Country briefs are presented against a broader framework provided by the ADFPKC, which includes information such as the causes and effects of conflicts; function and organisation of the UN; participants in peace operations; and general background to the types of peace operations.

This preparation time frames vary depending on the mission. Generally, the information is covered in a contingent concentration period of between seven days to three weeks. In addition to delivering the training programs in this time, DFSU is responsible for the administration of the contingent during the concentration period. Administration involves ensuring that all personnel administratively prepared for the deployment, this covers areas such as standards of fitness, health, pay and allowances; equipment issue and passports.

Administration can take up half the time allocated for predeployment training (Major A. Schmidt personal communication 1 August, 1996).

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PEACE OPERATIONS EDUCATION

Background to the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre

The need for a peace operations training facility was identified in the Australian Defence Department paper (1993) entitled: "Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role". The paper noted that Australia's involvement in complex, multinational peace operations required an additional attention to training. The Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC) was established January 1993 at the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, RAAF Base, Williamstown. The function of the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC) is to develop and manage peace operations doctrine and training for the ADF (ADFPKC, 1996). Its roles are to:

- a. develop doctrine, procedures and tactics for peace operations;
- b. act as a repository for peace operations expertise and experience, to monitor international peace issues and to assist ADF units and individuals to train for peace operations.
- c. to monitor international peace issues; and

- d. assist ADF units and individuals train for peace operations.

The ADFPKC conducts two “International Peacekeeping Seminars” annually to familiarise selected personnel from within the ADF, the Department of Defence, other Government agencies, non-government organisations and regional nations, in the factors affecting national participation in UN and multinational peace operations.

The Seminars target staff officers at strategic and operational headquarters responsible for planning or management of national involvement in UN and multi-national peace operations; representatives from government departments who have responsibilities for the planning or management of national involvement in UN and multi-national peace operations; representatives from NGOs, and inter government organisations with an interest in peace operations; and personnel selected for service with a UN or multinational force.

The Seminars are designed to be topical, and accordingly the content of some of the subject areas are dynamic. Case studies are included to address particular successes or shortcomings in current or past UN or multinational missions. The Seminar’s approach is specifically targeted at the strategic planning level.

The Seminars are regularly attended by regional countries such as Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, as well as, NGOs, Australian government organisation and UN organisations such as, ICRC, World Vision, CARE, and the Australian Federal Police. A feature of the Seminars is the opportunity they provide for interaction between military

participants and civilian participants. Moreover, they are designed to facilitate and support this process with the view that it will lead to a better understanding of the roles and emphasis of all parties participating in peace operations.

In addition to the Seminars, the ADFPKC presents information packages of varying length and depth (as determined by the client organisation) to military personnel at the rank of Major (or equivalent) attending either the Australian Command and Staff College (one week package in a 12 month course); Royal Australian Navy Staff College (3 package in a six month course, delivered twice per year); Royal Australian Air Force Staff College (one day package in a six month course); and to military personnel at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel attending the Joint Services Staff College (one day package in a six month course).

Conclusion

ADF preparation, training and education in peace operations is delivered at two ends of the spectrum; tactical and strategic. Information based preparation and training is provided by DFSU just prior to deployment, and strategic education is provided to select members of the ADF by the ADFPKC. There is mutual support between the two organisations at the tactical level for predeployment training, but within such a tight time frame when the individual is confronted with a range of military, administrative, peace operations, and family separation issues it is difficult to imagine that the assimilation of this type of information is effective. The obvious deficiency in ADF preparation, training and education appears in the skills acquisition relevant to other non-military aspects of the deployment, for example cross-

cultural contact skills, mediation or negotiation.

It is apparent that the acquisition of such complex skills cannot be effectively developed in the two weeks prior to deployment. However, examination of the skills commonly associated with cross-cultural effectiveness or mediation/negotiation shows that there is significant common ground. Moreover, they might be referred to as a set of 'soft' skills commonly employed in daily interpersonal interaction, that in a peace operations environment assume renewed levels of importance, and possibly require greater skill requirements. It is interesting to compare the importance of these skills in peace operations with the findings of the Karpin (1995) Report that showed that Australian management lacked depth in a similar range of 'soft' skills. It is unlikely that the ADF is any better equipped than the broader Australian community in equipping its personnel with these skills, but in a peace operations environment the presence or absence of these skills may be the key to success or failure.

CONCLUSION

This review of the personal and environmental factors that influence peacekeeper behaviours has shown that the interaction between the peace operations environment and tasks performed by peacekeepers has implications for both the individual and the organisation.

The cognitive basis of the advanced interpersonal skills and the complex nature of the

environment has the potential to result in 'psychological burnout' with prolonged exposure. The review of stress related issues in peace operations (Chapter Three) suggest that physical and mental burnout is a reasonably common post-deployment experience. This chapter examined the factors and conditions that could give rise to such a phenomenon concluding that peacekeepers performance will be highly sensitive to additional environmental or personnel arousal borne either of mission requirements or external factor. In particular, exposure to overload conditions will result in task shedding, and potentially, reliance on the most ingrained trained response, that in this context may be inappropriate to the situation. If overload is experienced, it should be recognised that the peacekeeper's performance will not return automatically to peak performance, but will initially result in reduced performance.

A contributing factor to both stress and reduced performance is the observation (Bartone & Adler, 1994; Miller & Moskos, 1995) that immersion in a foreign culture involves a period of psychological adaptation where the peacekeeper may pass through a set of distinct phases during the life of the operation. The skills and knowledge required to ameliorate the effects of this process appear to include a sound understanding of the local culture, a high level of inter-personal communication, and the personality characteristics of the individual.

Understanding of the impact of workload demand on individual performance in peace operations and the features of psychological adaptation to the environment are in a formative stage. Specific research in these areas is likely to reveal information that has implications for the way military personnel are prepared in the future.

The final reviewed was secondary personnel selection for peace operations. The review highlighted the need for greater sophistication in peacekeeper selection generally, however, specifically, there is a need to integrate selection and peace operations training to maximise the effectiveness of both processes. The combination of the two is not a new approach in most military forces, but does it does not appear to have been consistently applied to preparation for peace operations, where selection and preparation are often distinct.

The theme throughout this chapter is that new thinking in preparation and training of peacekeepers is required. While participation in these operations may be an 'add-on' task for most national defence forces it does not necessarily follow that conventional military training plus some 'add-on' fact based information is adequate preparation. Preparation and training for peace operations must be able to provide participants with the conceptual framework that will guide their actions, the knowledge to support the framework, and the skills and attitudes necessary for successful task achievement.

The first step is currently underway in the ADF, the development of coherent doctrine that provides guidance for action in peace operations. The second step, and the focus of this thesis, is the development of an appropriate education and training model from which the doctrine can be made explicit. Preparation for peace operations appears to require a greater effort in developing conceptual understanding and 'soft' skills that are not a common feature of conventional military training. The following chapter will explore the adequacy of the training models employed by the ADF to cope with the demands of preparing personnel for peace operations.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CAPABILITY: A MODEL OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPERS

...in no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military

General Douglas Macarthur

If the end product of the learning process can be rather precisely specified as, for example, learning to use a slide rule, then it can be said that a student is being trained to use a slide rule. On the other hand, if the behavioural end-products are complex and present knowledge of the behaviour that makes them difficult to specify, then the individual is educated by providing a foundation of behaviour it is wished that the student will eventually perform, for example, being a creative scientist.

Robert Glaser

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Three and Four have now described the features of peace operations environments, the skills required by individuals operating in that environment, and the impact the environment has on the individual. This chapter will explore the adequacy of current training theory and practice to cope with the problems faced by military organisations preparing for peace operations.

This examination shows that for conventionally trained military personnel, peace operations are conducted in an unfamiliar context, in that the individual and the force has no physical enemy to defeat, and where success is achieved through close interaction with the host population, and other non-military organisations. In turn, this impacts on the application of traditional military skills, and demands the development of new skills not previously considered part of conventional military training. How then does the military effectively prepare personnel for the dual requirement of:

- a. meeting the strategic military-political imperative of defending the nation, which requires constant training in conventional combat skills; and
- b. the more likely operational scenario of participation in peace operations that require additional SKAs that are the anthesis of conventional combat training?

In the previous chapter it was suggested that ADF and Australian Army doctrine lacks the comprehensive framework that could provide guidelines for an Australian approach to peace operations. Without such a framework, peace operations preparation, training and education tends to be superficial and disjointed. The aim of this thesis is not to determine ADF doctrine, but to provide an organisational and educational framework within which such a comprehensive doctrine could be presented. The purpose of the framework is to reduce the apparent disparity between the skills required for conventional operations and those required for peace operations. Just as there is no doubt that conventional military training is the most

appropriate foundation for individual skills in peace operations, there is no doubt that it is not enough to have the foundation alone. Military personnel at all levels need to be proficient in a complex range of additional skills, beyond the domain of conventional military training.

The development of a model that can achieve the goals set out here must also have the flexibility to incorporate the best features of the existing organisational and educational structure and culture, such that for individuals moving between training for peace operations and conventional operations, the shift in skills acquisition is relatively seamless.

PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

To develop a model by which the military education and training system can accommodate the two complex and divergent tasks of preparing for war and deploying to peace operations.

THE EMERGENCE OF COMPETENCE IN AUSTRALIA AND THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Competency based education and training (CBET) is the dominant paradigm in civilian vocational training, and has long been a feature of military training. Before introducing a new approach it is important to ensure that we examine the history, strengths and weaknesses of the existing paradigm.

Consistently, the idea of competence in education and training has arisen as a consequence of the dissatisfaction of government, industry and unions with the existing education and training models. Historically, competence has been used as a method to link educational product with national economic performance. Harris, Guthrie, Hobart and Lundberg (1995) trace the historical roots of the competency movement from The Industrial Revolution through to post World War II, and its elevation as a training and education standard with international status. As the basis of the concept and reason for its implementation are consistent across the nations supporting the movement, this thesis will focus on the impacts of the competence movement in Australia.

In Australia, the competence movement was funded and supported by the federal government from the early 1980's onward. A series of government sponsored studies into competence in vocational training culminated in agreement by Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in 1989, to the formation of the National Training Board (NTB) and among other decisions to implement a competency-based training system. In 1990, the strategic framework for the implementation of the competency-based system was drafted and began to be introduced into Australia's vocational and training system. The reasons for adopting a competency approach was similar to those in other countries, namely concern over the quality of training outcomes, coupled with the belief that standards of vocational training and education were in need of reform; the desire on the part of the government to achieve greater consistency and cohesion in training while allowing greater flexibility and choice in the modes of delivery; and finally, the OECD and World Bank were encouraging this focus on national vocational education and training systems (Harris et al, 1995, p. 52).

CBET was one of the four elements in a wider program referred to as the National Training Reform Agenda (NTRA), the other three elements of which were: national recognition arrangements; the development of an open training market; and new entry level training. At the encouragement of the federal government the vocational training sector took the lead in developing and implementing CBET within the context of the NTRA.

Subsequently, a series of reports and committees (Carmicheal 1992; Deveson, 1992; Finn, 1991; Mayer, 1992) have taken the concept and reinforced the need for greater alignment between the product of education, training systems and the needs of industry. The overwhelming message of these reports is that education and training should be vocationally or workplace based, and that this can be achieved by moving to a competency based approach. In theory, the Australian Army came into line with the tenets of NTRA in the early 1990's, however, in practice a competency based system had been in place in the Army since the 1970's.

Peacetime Army training is derived from the potential operational tasks that might be asked of the force. The nature of military operations means that training must ensure individual proficiency but also, small and large group proficiency. These forms of training are known in the Army as individual, team and collective training (Australian Army, 1996). Individual training provides military members with the skills and knowledge that are common to military operation, and specific to employment. Individual training also provides them with the basic competencies to perform specific tasks within a team. Team training takes those trained individuals and moulds them into teams of two or more whose performance is

governed by the unit. This training is provided either through occupation specific instruction at a formal military institution, but is more likely through training conducted within the unit. Collective training takes those teams and combines them with other teams to achieve the forces aims. Collective training involves working effectively with other units, Corps arms and services (Australian Army, 1996). Successful performance of collective tasks is the ultimate measure of the standard of training conducted.

To ensure that training at all three levels is co-operative and integrated, the Army has developed a systems design model of training known as the Army Training System (ATS) (Australian Army, 1994). The ATS is based on an Instructional Systems Design (ISD) model of training that was originally developed for the U.S. Army (Gagne, 1962, 1965). This model was one of the foundations for the later development of CBET. In an ISD approach, task analysis is seen as the most effective method for the determining the design of training and the basis for instruction in sequenced motor skills. The following provides a flavour of the approach at that time (Gagne, 1962, p. 90):

If I were faced with the problem of improving training, I should not look for much from the well-known learning principles like reinforcement, distribution of practice, response familiarity and so on. I should look instead at the technique of task analysis, and at the transfer, and the sequencing of sub-task learning to find those ideas of greatest usefulness in the design of effective training.

The Australian Army uses an ISD model for the following pragmatic reasons: it is simple in concept and therefore easily understood and implemented; it provides an effective system to manage the analysis, design and development of training in an organisation with a large training requirement; and it provides a means of monitoring the quality of training developed. An underlying premise of the ATS (Figure 5.1) is that while the general features of the model will remain stable, the methods used within each phase will be based on the most current theory and research. But, what is the competency-based approach? What does it consist of?




Figure 5.1. The Australian Army Training System "Wheel" (Source: Australian Army, 1994).

THE COMPETENCY-BASED APPROACH: AN OVERVIEW

The immediate problem in examining the competency-based approach is to arrive at a definition of competence that is generic. Dall'Alba and Sandberg (1993, p.3) have described four different views of competence in the competency-based approach. These are:

- a. the “individual-orientated” perspective, wherein the focus is on the attributes possessed and used by the individual;
- b. the “employment related task-orientated” perspective, where the focus is on the application of appropriate skill and knowledge in the scope of employment at a particular “standard”;
- c. the situational, practical “integration of skills and knowledge” perspective, where the focus is on appropriate use of skills and knowledge specific to the context of professional practice; and
- d. a perspective which sees “competence as conception of the work”, where skills and knowledge are the prerequisite for competence which is achieved only through direct work experience.

Each of these views of competence is valid within the competency framework, or as Harris et al (1995, p. 106) have aptly stated “the concept of competence is intangible”. It is

the intangible nature of the concept that has caused a variety of definitional and ultimately implementation problems. Harris et al (1995) go on to conclude that because of the difficulty in accurately describing or defining competence, understanding what it is to be competent is provided by the framework that is provided for its implementation and assessment.

There exists then a dichotomy within the competency based approach between a holistic theoretical concept of competence, that can be generally described, and the pragmatic framework for identifying, implementing and assessing competence, which has a well-defined structure and framework grounded in the real world. In between, or in conjunction with these definitions, are approaches related to the personal attributes of the individual and approaches based on a broader interpretation of context.

If as stated by Harris et al (1995) CBET is defined by the method of implementation, then it is important to focus on the application of CBET in the workplace. The immediate concern is that the model espouses a holistic approach to training and education, but advocates a structured approach to application and assessment.

The following give a sense of the range of definitions of competence that are available.

Benner (1984, p. 27)

a competent nurse is an experienced nurse who is able to perceive a global aspect of his/her actions who consciously plans and also manages the diverse

and often unpredictable events of a working day in the clinical setting.

Gonczi, Hager and Oliver (1991, p. 1)

competence is the ability to draw on and to integrate a variety of knowledge and skills to address realistic workplace problems.

Gonczi et al (1990, p. 4,9)

competency is a combination of attributes underlying some aspect of successful professional performance" where the attributes include "knowledge, skills and attitudes" and can be "specific and narrow or complex.

Heywood, Gonczi and Hager (1992, p. 3)

competency is the ability to perform activities within an occupation or function to the standard expected in employment.

Hager, Athanasou and Gonczi (1994, p. 5)

competency comprises the specification of knowledge and skill to the standard of performance required in employment. The concept of competency includes

all aspects of work performance. This includes; performance at an acceptable level of technical skill; organising one's tasks; responding and acting appropriately when things go wrong; fulfilling a role in the scheme of things at work; and transfer of skills and knowledge to new situations.

Houston and Howsan (1992, p. 3)

competency is the possession of required knowledge, skills and abilities or having adequacy for task.

The NTB (1992, p.29) defines competency as:

The concept of competency focuses on what is expected of an employee in the workplace rather than on the learning process; and embodies the ability to transfer and apply skills and knowledge to new situations and environments. This is a broad concept of competency in that all aspects of work performance, and not only narrow task skills, are included. It encompasses:

- * the requirement to perform individual tasks (task skills);*
- * the requirement to manage a number of different tasks within the job (task management skills);*
- * the requirement to respond to irregularities and breakdowns in routine (contingency management skills);*
- * the requirement to deal with responsibilities and expectations of the work*

environment (job/role environment skills), including working with others.

These definitions move from a global view of competency to a more specific or concrete understanding of the concept. The definitions highlight the problems that are encountered in describing and understanding the concept of competency that might best be overcome by examining competency in terms of its implementation. This approach provides a definition from the perspective of the practitioners and the participants.

Essentially, a competency-based approach is outcome focused, it is concerned with what the program and the individuals achieve. To meet this goal, the outcomes must be pre-determined and specified. This occurs through the development of competency standards that are based on the analysis of current practice. Harris et al (1995, p. 106) describe the process of determining a competency standard as follows:

Competency standards may relate to the industry, cross-industry or to the enterprise depending on the nature of the task within the organisation. The competency standard will then be broken into five components. First, 'Units of Competency' are developed to provide precise statements which describe the key areas of the competency expressed in outcome terms. Units of competency might be seen as providing descriptions of the major work roles or functions which are similar to the standard duty or task statement. Each unit of competency is further divided into a number of components which help to define further what the individual must be able to do in order to fulfil that

particular work role described by the unit of competency. These are described as 'Elements' and are outcome focused and comprehensive. The unit of competency is then given a 'performance criteria' which are evaluative statements which together with the elements make up a description of the expected outcome and a description of the criteria to use as a basis for making a judgement about whether the level of performance has been achieved or not. In addition to this each unit of competency takes place within a particular context constrained by the level of work the individual is performing at, equipment, facilities and the general environment in which the work is expected to take place. They describe the boundaries and context in which the units of competency are employed. The final 'evidence guide' element of the format is optional but can be used to ensure that the interpretation and assessment of standards is as uniform as possible, for example, it might provide advice on the contexts within which assessment takes place or which units of competency should be assessed together.

The key features of the analysis process to produce a competency-standard are that: it is clearly reductionist in nature; it is based on the present job or task conditions; content is clearly linked to task performance requirements; and it seeks to provide a consistent and reliable method by which individuals can be judged on task performance. This process appears to reflect the employment related task-orientated definitions of competence, rather than the global or holistic views of competence. There appears to be little scope in the implementation process described above for the less tangible elements of performance in the workplace.

ISSUES IN COMPETENCY BASED EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The development of CBET draws on a diverse range of educational rationale: Gagne (1962, 1965) emphasised the need for task analysis; Carroll (1963) emphasised the need for individual learning programs not fixed to time periods; Glaser (1963) consolidated an alternative approach to the existing norm referenced assessment process; Toffler (1971) and Illich (1971) proposed that the response to Postmodern education needs should be flexible, replacing the front end loading by continual learning; and Mager (1975) founded the basis of vocational education programs that were tied to workplace outcomes. Between them these researchers have contributed to the key aspects of CBET, however, application of the model has often driven by governments seeking to channel education and learning to suit the needs of the industrial sector. This narrow approach to competency is balanced by the philosophical platform on which CBET rests. There is no doubt that the original concept was designed to recognise individual differences in learning and the necessity for lifelong learning skills, but difficulties have arisen in the implementation of the concept. The two ends of the spectrum clash, creating confusion and dissatisfaction for all parties. Some practitioners have adopted the educational benefits of the concept and developed new approaches to facilitate learning, while institutions and governments have adopted a legalistic, bureaucratic approach with the creation of national standards.

Universities and professions have been loathe to adopt an approach to the acquisition of knowledge that appears to be entrenched in routines, content acquisition and outcome

achievement, while vocational educators (driven on by government and industry) have become the advocates of the new system. The result has been a deepening of the divide between vocational and higher education. Implementation of CBET has been driven by a government and industry desire for concrete assessment and consistent national standards, and this has resulted in a reductionist approach to learning. The higher ideals and broader issues in CBET have been the casualties of the process.

Barratt-Pugh (1995) characterises attacks on the shortcomings of CBET under the following descriptive headings: Analysts; Developists; Restrictivists; Philosophists; Structuralists and Processualists. This is a useful model for describing the shortcomings of CBET, but also for understanding what demands will be made of a new, or altered model of education and training.

ANALYSTS

Analysts argue that the underlying basis for competencies is wrong. They argue for more general competencies at the base of CBET, the testing of knowledge as well as skill to improve the effectiveness of the system, or the addition of levels of achievement within the system (Hager, 1994, 1995; NBEET, 1991; Stanley 1993; Strong 1995).

In Australia, the narrowness of the NTB's approach to competency based standards has caused some concern (Kearns, 1992; Kearns, Lundberg, Papadopolus & Wagner, 1992; Hall, 1994). The NTB's approach is considered to have too little regard for values, attitudes

and underpinning knowledge, and as being too fragmented and compartmentalised to assist integrated and holistic development of competence and expertise (Cornford, 1993; Hager, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Kingsland and Cowdroy, 1993; Watson, 1993).

The concern is that in taking such a narrow conception of CBET the NTB appears to be too concerned with setting minimum standards (Grant, 1979; Solomon, 1994). In adopting this approach, assessment is reduced to competent or not-competent, encouraging mediocrity by reducing the incentive for excellence. Harris et al (1995) argue that this is an oversimplification of the underlying competence concept. They argue that assessment is based on a large variety of attributes contributing to the decision about the individual's competence. The more complex the competency the more dependent assessment becomes on a variety of 'intangible' factors. O'Brien (1994) argues that there are at least seven separate different concepts which can be combined in the various ways to define competence, these include: skills, abilities, behaviour, personal qualities/characteristics, and performance. It is all of these factors that Harris et al (1995) argue should be assessed when considering whether a person is competent. This approach to assessment is clearly different from the narrow conception of competency attributed to the NTB (NTB, 1992).

Harris et al (1995) hold the ideal view of competency assessment, the reality is that by definition and implementation, competency has become an outcome focussed approach to education, where the performance of the task is valued above other factors. In such an environment, the competent/not-competent method of assessment prevails, and it is this approach which currently defines competency in the workplace.

These arguments highlight the disparity that exists between the purist notion of competence as advocated by Harris et al (1995), and the implementation of the concept in Australia as evidenced by the criticisms of the NTB's approach. The NTB needs to meet the demands of government and industry for competency standards that can be easily implemented and accurately assessed, as well as legally accountable. In practice, competency has been reduced into specific skill areas that are assessed in terms of outcome. In the process, the important intangibles that Harris et al (1995) consider important to fully assess competency are lost. If competency is to be defined by the method of implementation (Harris et al, 1995), then in Australia it must be defined as a narrow concept that focuses on skills development at the expense of knowledge acquisition.

DEVELOPISTS

Developists argue that performance is more than just competence. Competence alone does not produce performance, they encourage attention to the supporting system that builds trainee confidence in the workplace. Final performance is a function of more than competence (Hayes, 1992; Jones, 1992; Scott, 1991).

The role of knowledge in CBET is a particularly contentious point between competency advocates and those opposed to the concept. It should be noted that the holistic approach to competency sees a clear role for knowledge, the concerns of the Developists address the narrow conceptions of competency. The narrow view of competency has been

seen to deliberately focus attention wholly on what the person does in the workplace, by and large, ignoring the role of knowledge, which is generally perceived as no more than a factor on which the development of competence depends (Melton, 1995). Hyland (1993, p. 63) claims that in attempting to fit non-behavioural constructs such as knowledge and understanding into the competence framework, has resulted in a “conception of knowledge, understanding and human behaviour which is not just viciously reductionist but also utterly naive and simplistic”.

Research into how experts and novices approach problem solving highlights the importance of building a knowledge base from which to generate solutions. Stanley (1993) argues against Mayer’s (1992) attempt to introduce generic competency standards, one example of which is the general ability to solve problems, on the basis that research into expertise and novice performance shows that experts have a large body of specific knowledge on which they draw to generate efficient performance. Without this body of knowledge novices are unable to determine which pieces of information are relevant to their task, and which pieces of information are interrelated. The conclusions from these studies suggest that it is important to focus on knowledge acquisition in becoming competent rather than on the demonstration of generic abilities, or general problem solving and learning strategies.

Similarly, Stanley (1993) argues that present understanding on the factors influencing the transfer of training show that there are domain specific skills that are not easily transferred across domains. In the absence of specialised knowledge, non-domain specific skills are used as problem solving strategies, for example, generate-and-test procedures, trial-and-error search, and means-end analysis. These strategies are termed “weak” problem solving

methods, generating weaker solutions than those arrived at by experts. The development of domain specific knowledge is an important element in determining competence.

Melton (1995) takes an alternative approach by attempting to bridge the gap between competency assessment and knowledge by identifying four types of knowledge that contribute to the development of competencies. These are:

- a. **Knowledge that underpins competence** - this may include knowledge of concepts and process, as well as knowledge of people and situations. He argues that if individuals are to become competent they clearly need to acquire the knowledge on which such competence depends. Further, he argues that failure to acquire such knowledge will result in the failure of the individual to achieve competence, and conversely the absence of such knowledge provides a clear indication of individual shortfall that is required to achieve competence.
- b. **Knowledge that is an integral part of competence** - in this area he argues that competence is not a matter of simply observing behaviour in the workplace, consideration must also be given to the knowledge and understanding required to justify any action taken. In the case of a professional in particular, justification of action taken is an integral part of task performance and is based on a domain specific knowledge.

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- c. **Knowledge that facilitates the transfer of competence** - he argues that the issue of skills transfer is not as simple as might be implied by the use of the term. The transfer of skills developed in one context to another must take into account that further knowledge and skills may need to be acquired to make the transfer possible. The use of the term transfer is misleading in that it assumes that skills can be picked and wholly moved, unaltered to a new environment for immediate implementation. Melton (1995) argues that the process is closer to adaptation, where the individual is required to adapt or change existing skills and constructs to meet the demands of the new situation. The extent to which the change is managed determines the extent and speed with which the individual can learn to perform in the new task or situation.
- d. **Knowledge that facilitates change** - it is not sufficient to be highly competent in particular areas if they are unwilling or unable to adapt to changing situations. Melton (1995) argues that related knowledge does much to enable individuals to cope more easily with change. A highly skilled individual is more likely to develop and change the techniques they use if they have a good understanding of the concepts, theories and principles underlying a variety of techniques, and understands the advantages and disadvantages of each and why they have evolved.

Melton's (1995) analysis of knowledge in competence, combined with information from the novice/expert literature shows that there is more to task performance than observable

skills. The outcome focussed approach to competency minimises the importance of knowledge acquisition in favour of task performance, and this is neither appropriate, or in accordance with the original intentions of CBET (Harris et al, 1995).

RESTRICTIVISTS

Restrictivists argue that CBET is only relevant to lower order learning. Competence is suitable for lower level well defined skill areas enabling other domains to pursue the search for excellence. A system built upon mediocrity is only applicable to hard and limited vocational skills (Gayle, 1991, 1994; Gonczi et al, 1992; Johnson, 1975; Morrow, 1992).

According to Johnson (1975, p 46), there is a distinct difference between the technician and the professional. The professional uses technical skills in the course of work and brings values and judgements to their performance. The technician, on the other hand may demonstrate competency in the performance of various skills only. White (1992) reports the view of an Australian Vice-Chancellor on the place of CBET as appropriate for trades and workers, but that liberal education should be provided at university.

Harris et al (1995) argues that this view of CBET has more to do with social snobbery than a critique of educational philosophy. Those who subscribe to it seek to maintain the artificial divide that exists between education and training. The Restrictivists's argument is hard to maintain, when it is considered that both professions and trades have a need for

competence in domain specific skills and knowledge, where the task of determining competence becomes more difficult as the role of the individual becomes more complex.

However, in taking this view we are again adopting the ideals of competency as opposed to the practice of competency. It should be noted that in Australia the divide between vocational and tertiary education was actively deepened by the Australian Federal Government's approach to implementing CBET. It was seen as appropriate and necessary for all forms of vocational training, but exempted tertiary education. From this flowed a narrow conception of CBET in Australia, that in turn led a dogmatic application of the assessment principles in particular.

PHILOSOPHISTS

Philosophists argue that defined outcomes of CBET approach do not match the needs of Postmodern society and learners. There is incompatibility between the current Postmodern social needs of learners and a system that is based on "corporate rationality", viewing learners as "workbeings" (Collins, 1991). Restrictive outcomes will produce restricted and constructed learners (Jonassen, 1991, 1992).

Philosophists tend to view competency based training in one of two ways:

- a. the central tenets of CBET are incompatible with the way society is developing,

namely from a Modern to a Postmodern view of contemporary culture

(Bagnall, 1994); or

- b. as a rationalist approach to education and training that changes the power relationship between educators and industry, such that decisions about learning are increasingly dictated by industry (Jackson, 1993; Moore, 1987; Soucek, 1993).

The Philosophists see CBET as an educational system in the context of wider politics and society. The Postmodernist's concerns are that CBET will produce people who are not well equipped to cope with the demands of a changing society, while those who oppose the corporate/rationalist features of CBET are concerned that the administrative simplicity with which it can be employed will make it the dominant educational paradigm at the expense of more appropriate learning strategies.

Bagnall (1994) offers a philosophical argument to suggest that CBET has little to contribute, and is unlikely to be an important feature of education in the future as it is incompatible with the developments in Australian society. He believes that Australian society is Postmodern which tends increasingly towards:

heterodoxy, expressiveness, complexity, reflexive contextualisation, knowledge diversity, critical understanding, student independence, responsiveness, openness, interdeterminancy, participation, internal de-differentiation, and

phenomenalism.

He sees the outcomes driven nature of CBET, both descriptively and normatively, as based in modernist thinking which has as its main features:

*orthodoxy, rationality, simplicity, centralisation, knowledge technicisation,
pragmatism, learner dependence, reactivness, commodification, privatisation,
conformatism, internal differentiation, and instrumentalism.*

From this Bagnall (1994) argues that we should be wary of adopting CBET approaches as they may be rooted in an outdated definition of society.

Jackson (1993) argues against the economic rationalist nature of CBET, suggesting that it shifts the traditional power relationships between education and industry too much in favour of the latter. In this approach to CBET, the role of education and training is shifted from the long term vision of educators, to the short term needs of industry. The power of CBET in this argument is the shield of accountability it makes available to educators and industry by supposedly developing an 'objective' statement of training need, that provides legal 'insurance'. CBET is not seen as an educational or instructional technique, as it is often advocated, but a "method of making decisions and making them reportable" (Jackson, 1993, p. 158).

Soucek (1993) takes the Postmodernist and economic rationalist argument further by suggesting that CBET is flawed because it sees education and training purely in terms of preparing individuals for work. Education and training have a function that is about more than meeting the demands of the workplace. It also plays a significant role in providing the individuals with the knowledge to be able to cope with and adapt to change in the broader context of society. Soucek (1993) argues that competency cannot be defined in advance because it is situationally specific, and as a consequence learned performance might not guarantee a competent performance in altered circumstances.

The Philosophists arguments are based on the wider impact of CBET on society and the dangers in adopting it as the sole framework within which education and training are undertaken and assessed. In concert with the Developists the arguments presented here are based on the role of knowledge, but also include consideration of the broader development of the individual, and their ability to perform effectively in a society that appears to be undergoing fundamental change.

STRUCTURALISTS

Structuralists argue that the current system is too complex to work efficiently. They believe that there has been a pedantic and bureaucratic development of the system that has strangled its potential. The system needs to be simplified to speed reactivity to workplace change and learners needs (Curtain, 1993; Moran, 1994; Ramsey, 1993).

The Australian approach to implementing CBET has been criticised (Stevenson, 1993; Stevenson & Kavanagh, 1992) on the basis that the focus is too heavily on imparting procedural knowledge, to the neglect of domain and strategic control knowledge. Domain and strategic control knowledge equips students to diagnose problems and determine which types of procedural knowledge are required for effective solution. This approach to CBET implementation takes a reductionist approach to task performance, and does not focus on developing the strategic control knowledge in learners (Harris et al, 1995). Brown (1991) referred to this approach as “classroom Taylorism”, where task performance was separated into thinking and doing, with CBET focussing exclusively on doing, producing a task-orientated education and training for the learner.

The concern is that those elements that are not amenable to either measurement or observation are eliminated or ignored. Disregarding the importance of process in favour of outcome is seen to lead to a reductionist approach to education and training, where those features of education which are more difficult to measure, for example attitude, value and understanding, are reduced in importance.

PROCESSUALISTS

Processualists argue that the criterion based system is not being operated properly. They suggest that while the arguments above may be true there is a national system that is based on criterion referenced assessment, that has the capability to develop lifelong learning skills. As Winter (1993, p. 365) states:

The emphasis upon criterion-referenced assessment and upon the detailed elaboration of learning outcomes is part of a serious attempt to embody a number of educational principles: a learner centred pedagogy, access to educational opportunity for culturally disadvantaged, precision and justice in assessment, the encouragement of student autonomy, and the integration of theory and practice.

Whether CBET assessment practices are simple binary competent/not-competent assessments, or criterion-referenced graduated assessments, will also have a critical bearing on whether CBET provides incentives to excel or merely encourages mediocrity (McGill 1993).

In criterion referenced assessment the learner is measured in relation to criteria and not in relation to their relative performance against other learners (norm-referenced assessment). As Wolf (1993, p. 5) points out:

The crucial idea underpinning criterion referenced assessment is that one should look at the substance of what someone can do, in effect, compare a candidate's performance with some independent, free-standing definition of what should be achieved, and report on the performance in relation to this criteria.

Harris et al (1995, p. 162) view competency assessment as a process that requires time to gather evidence, from both "formal and less formal processes". Assessment is seen as

flexible, making decisions from “formative assessment”, within the framework of the learning process, and “summative assessments”, which are concerned with more “watershed judgements”. Their vision of competency assessment is that it must be a comprehensive assessment of the individual’s competence.

This view of assessment is in stark contrast to the common theme of criticisms detailed above, at the heart of which are concerns over the implementation of assessment. CBET is seen as having a narrow, outcome driven focus that is derived from an approach to assessment that concentrates on skill learning rather than understanding.

Reflecting on the preliminary findings of their study into the implementation of CBET, Barratt-Pugh (1995) concluded that the introduction of CBET was not associated with increased flexibility in the process of learning. The essential elements of choice and reflection which should be operating to facilitate lifelong learning skills may not exist. This conclusion is in stark contrast to the anticipated benefits of criterion-referenced assessment espoused by Winter (1993).

CAPABILITY - BEYOND COMPETENCY

The arguments against the CBET approach outlined above have the following themes:

- a. it is difficult to have specificity of pragmatic performance based assessment and

holistic ideals in the practice of CBET, there is a disparity between the original concept and its implementation which has created conceptual ambiguity for institutions, trainers, educators and students;

- b. in practice the outcome focussed nature of CBET has resulted in an approach to education and training where understanding is assumed to develop through the process of learning and assessing skills, or as Soucek (1993, p.169) states: “The danger lies in the assumption that a limited number of specifically defined skills might demonstrate the presence of knowledge and understanding that supposedly underpins those skills”; and
- c. CBET does not prepare individuals well for future work demand because it is situation specific, in that it cannot be defined in advance because assessment is bound to the present; changes in the work environment will render a once competent person, not-competent - where the true skill may be the ability to successfully adapt to change rather than a set of specific job related criteria.

It is the broader implications of the last point that has driven the call for change in the process of education and training, where CBET has failed to produce the final solution.

Soucek (1993, p. 168) sees the key failing of the competency-testing approach is, “that it cannot anticipate all the possible permutations of occupational situations”. Like others (Hyland, 1993; Melton, 1995; Stanley, 1993) the focus on performance rather than knowledge is not enough to equip the future workforce with the capacity to be effective in an

environment with unforeseen, situationally specific problems.

The Regional Director of UNESCO in South East Asia, Professor Stephen Hill (1995) places the need to develop a workforce that is responsive to changes in the work and community environment into an international perspective. He believes that continuing advances in technology is producing a system of increasing complexity that is feeding a global demand for individuality. The environment created by the current “revolutionary technological change” is one in which markets are customised, sensitive to change and technologically sophisticated. He argues that in this environment the key to success will be effectively capturing the knowledge of a skilled workforce. The implications for training and education are in Hill’s (1995, p. 15) terms:

At every level of education and training therefore, new thinking is required to emphasise flexibility and responsiveness, quality, and the social and managerial knowledge to organise in new ways. In particular, education must recross the ‘two cultures’ bridge that C.P. Snow observed thirty years ago, between scientific-technical thinking and humanistic-social thought. Also bridging and valuing the relationship between informal and experience-based and formal technical knowledge is essential.

To meet the demand for change Hill (1995) sees a need for new thinking and cultural change in education and training, not just different training. The centrepiece of his argument is that in the immediate future the skills required by the workforce will be diverse, and will

cross traditional boundaries in education and training. Individuals will require more than skills to perform the job, they also require knowledge and understanding that enables them to adjust to changing circumstances. The examination of the literature discussed above suggests that in its present form CBET is not able to meet the demands of the environment described by Hill (1995).

Calls for education and training to better meet the demands of changing workplace and society are not new, the introduction of CBET is based on such a notion. Nor are calls for the apparent divide between education and training to be reduced new. However, in response to the latter the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufacture and Commerce (RSA) issued the “Education for Capability Manifesto” in 1979, introducing the concept of capability in education. The Manifesto introduced a new concept of education that respected the best features of both education and training (Stephenson & Weil, 1992). The aim was to develop people who “can do” as well as “know about”.

After 10 years of recognising capability in practice and establishing the basis of the Manifesto in vocational and higher education, the RSA found that within higher education there was scepticism about the appropriateness of the ideals of capability to that sector. A similar problem encountered by the advocates of CBET. In 1988, the RSA established a three year project titled, Higher Education for Capability (HEC) which took the capability debate directly to higher education. At that time in Britain, there was a widely held belief that higher education was not producing graduates that were able to meet the demands of the workplace. HEC in conjunction with industry sponsors, and tertiary and vocational institutions attempted

to urge the development of “student capability through giving students greater responsibility for their own learning, and requiring students to explore the relevance to their own wider community” (Stephenson & Weil, 1992, p. xv). HEC continues to operate today as Britain’s longest established network committed to learner autonomy in higher education, established and supported by the RSA. The development of capability in Britain has been watched with interest from Australia, and in recent times there has been an attempt to adapt the principles to develop industry, training and education in Australia (Cairns, 1995). But what is capability and where does it intend to lead us?

Capability, like competence, is an intangible concept that is difficult to clearly define. Stephenson (1992) notes that he has found widespread resistance to the temptation to define capability in reductionist terms. As we have seen with competency, the attempt to define an intangible concept has resulted in a variety of competing definitions and an implementation process that lacks the quality of the original idea. However, Stephenson (1992, p. 2) offers the following as useful in exploring the concept:

Capable people have confidence in their ability to (1) take effective and appropriate action, (2) explain what they are about, (3) live and work effectively with others and (4) continue to learn from their experiences, both as individuals and in association with others, in a diverse and changing society.

Capability is a necessary part of specialist expertise, not separate from it.

Capable people not only know about their specialisms, they also have the confidence to apply their knowledge and skills within varied and changing situations and to continue to develop their specialist knowledge and skills long after they have left formal education.

Capability is not just about skills and knowledge. Taking effective and appropriate action within unfamiliar and changing circumstances involves judgements, values, the self-confidence to take risks and a commitment to learn from experience. Involving students in the decisions which directly affect what they learn, and how they learn it, develops a sense of ownership and a high level of motivation.

Or as described by the HEC (1996):

Capability is the integration of knowledge, skills, understanding and personal qualities used appropriately and effectively. Capability involves the whole person, including values, self-esteem and emotional development. Capability develops key skills within a framework of academic, personal and proactive learning and self-development. Capability is autonomous learning for life and work.

Sir Toby Weaver, one of the originators of the notion of capability, defines it in terms of the qualities required of a capable person, or in his terms of the “6C’s” (Weaver, 1994, p.

11): comprehension; cultivation; competence; creativity; cooperation and coping. He describes a capable person as one who understands and acquires the necessary knowledge as the basis for sensible action (comprehension); a capable person must have a proper sense of values against which to judge right and wrong (cultivation); a capable person must understand the practice of their craft in a wide range of difficult circumstances (competence); a capable person must understand and be able to employ their capacity for creativity; a capable person must understand the importance and value of working with others (cooperation); and finally, a capable person must have the ability to manage their own life, to cope with the environment, to profit from experience to reach sensible decisions and act on them (coping).

The definitions of capability provided above, and Weaver's (1994) in particular, demonstrate that capability includes the skills based competence approach, but recognises that a more complete approach is required to be effective in a changing environment. Capability is about the confidence to take action in these conditions and is dependent upon achieving the right mix between the four key areas of: knowledge; skills; values; and esteem (Stephenson, 1987, 1995). As has been suggested by educationalists (Hill, 1995; Melton, 1995; Soucek, 1993) and business academics and practitioners (Covey, 1990; Handy, 1994; Naisbitt, 1994; Senge, 1992) a capability approach explicitly acknowledges the need for individuals to be adaptive to change in their environment. In a capability approach to learning the key elements in achieving this are considered to be: holistic development of the individual; a student centred approach that allows the student to develop ownership of the learning process; and an acknowledgment and commitment to lifelong learning.

Stephenson (1987) suggests that there are two types of capability, dependent and independent (Figure 5.2). Dependent capability (Position Y - Figure 5.2) is developed in systems where external power renders the individual powerless. In this situation the education deals with predictable situations and solutions; performance standards are based on past experience; the aim of instruction is to eliminate error in the performance of the task; it generally involves close supervision of established procedures; may be tied to the maintenance of standards and quality assurance. Dependent capability is similar to what is traditionally referred to as training, and has much in common with the implementation of CBET in Australia. Most of an individual's time in the workplace might be spent in Position Y, involved in system maintenance tasks where the problems, and the context from which they are derived are familiar (Stephenson, 1992).

However, as Hill (1995) and others (Handy, 1994; Naisbitt, 1994; Senge, 1992) have described we are living in a world where discontinuous change (Handy, 1994) is an increasing part of life. To deal effectively with change individuals must have the confidence to confront unfamiliar problems in unfamiliar contexts, and the ability to learn from their experience. This situation is described by Stephenson (1992) as Independent Capability (Position Z, Figure




Figure 5.2. Capability Model (Source: Stephenson, 1995).

5.2). To operate successfully in Position Z the individual must have flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness to adjust to unfamiliar environments that present unfamiliar problems. They must demonstrate that they are responsible for their actions and have the confidence to cope with the demands of the situation (Cairns, 1992; Stephenson, 1987). Educating for independent capability involves developing the ability to: confront uncertainty and change; explore new problems and test solutions; establish new standards and enhance quality; work as part of autonomous teams; and develop imagination, creativity, intuition, risk taking and courage; it is about intellectual agility and innovation. People operating in Position Z are constantly learning from their environment and improving themselves.

By definition there is a connection between Dependent Capability and Independent Capability in that, as is shown in Figure 5.3, the individual is constantly moving between the two areas. When a new problem is presented in a new context the capable individual develops

an appropriate solution, which if the solution is successful and the new situation is likely to be encountered again, the solution is transformed into a Dependent Capability or system maintenance task. Figure 5.3 shows the ongoing expansion and contraction in the relative importance of Position Y and Position Z in response to new events in the individuals environment.




Figure 5.3. Movement between Position Y and Position Z in response to novel contexts and problems.

Capability in education is intuitively a good idea, a commonsense statement, but how does it differ from competency? What does it add to what is already in place? Capability has much in common with the original ideals of the competency movement. The main difference is that competency is focused on developing skills for the present, based on the experience of the past, where the focus of capability is to prepare the individual for the future (Stephenson, 1995). Capability strikes a more equitable educational balance between the development of the person and equipping them for the specific demands of the workplace. As has been

discussed, CBET is seen by its critics to be too entrenched in the development of workplace skills at the expense of personal development that adds value to workplace performance in 'intangible' ways. Capability acknowledges that workplace performance is more than the sum of the individual skills that constitute task performance, but recognises that competence is an essential ingredient in developing capability.

The problems that have occurred in the implementation of CBET were the result of the disparity that exists between the holistic understanding of competence and the specificity with which the procedures have been applied. Capability has deliberately avoided a reductionist approach, instead recognising that it is a philosophical approach to education that seeks to offer guidelines for implementation within domain specific areas. Each domain is then required to interpret the guidelines and develop methods to achieve them, particular to that domain. Competency offers a 'one size fits all' method that gives no recognition of the differences in domain areas.

A key feature of the 'one size fits all' approach to competency is the implicit assumption that the development of work-based competencies is independent of the prevailing culture of the organisation. It is assumed that what is appropriate for one organisational context is appropriate for all, similar to the way that it is assumed that the competency approach is appropriate for all professions. It is difficult to imagine that the development and implementation of competency within an organisation or industry could be independent of organisational context, however, research on the relationship between organisational factors and the implementation of competency is not available, and stands out as a clear flaw in the

understanding the concept.

To ensure that this factor is addressed in the development of capability, the key focus of this thesis, and the remainder of this chapter, is the role organisational factors play in the development of individual capability. These factors will be collectively referred to in this thesis as organisational architecture which is considered to be composed of three inter-related elements culture, climate and structure. Definitions of all three elements are provided below.

While the definitions of organisational culture and structure represent a traditional interpretation equally appropriate to teams and organisations; the notion of organisational climate draws on foundation research into human motivation in organisations (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1968). Climate in this setting is seen as the environment created by the human resource policies and practices of the organisation (Litwin, 1984), rather than the team based representation of climate as a combination of the social and psychological interaction of the individuals (Shaw, 1971). Capability is a global concept that forms the basis of human resource policy development and accordingly should be considered from a broader frame of reference.

- a. **Organisational Culture.** Defined as the total inherited beliefs, values and knowledge which constitute the shared basis of organisational action within the specified domain of the organisation.
- b. **Organisational Climate.** Defined as those leadership and human resource

policies that constitute the prevailing trend for guiding individual action within the specified domain of the organisation.

- c. **Organisational Structure.** Defined as the arrangement and inter-relationship of parts in the construction of the organisation in response to the specified domain of the organisation.

Implicit to the definitions of capability is the development of values and esteem; these concepts are not exclusively the domain of education but are a function of group and organisational culture. It suggests that there may be key features of an organisation's structure, climate and culture that contribute to the development of capable individuals and therefore 'capable organisations'. Brown and Duguid (1991) appear to support the notion of a capable organisation by suggesting that there is a need for a unified view of working, learning and organisation in which learning is viewed as an expression of a community of shared and developing practices. The remainder of this review will focus on those features of the organisation that contribute to this process.

ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITY

There is the potential for considerable overlap between the notion of developing a 'capable organisation' and developing a 'learning organisation', but the difference between the two concepts is one of emphasis. In this thesis, the broad based definition of a learning

organisation below (Starkey, 1996, p. 2) most closely approximates the concept of a capable organisation.

The 'learning organisation' is a metaphor, with its roots in the vision of and the search for a strategy to promote individual self-development within a continuously self-transforming organisation.

This definition clearly links the development of the individual to the development of the organisation, and therefore the notion of capability and a learning organisation clearly have common ground. This thesis will determine those features of the organisation in terms of culture, climate and structure that might contribute to, or support the development of capable individuals. The difference between this approach to learning organisations and some other approaches (Argyris, 1992; Senge, 1992), is that capability focuses on the broader development of people rather than the analysis of individual process.

In the military there is a clear link between training, education and organisational culture. As outlined in Chapter Three, Wenek (1984) described the continuum of military selection, training and socialisation in the Canadian Forces (CF). The process he describes can be readily generalised to the Australian Army as the two organisations share a common military culture derived from the British regimental system of military organisation. It is clear from Wenek's (1984) analysis that training and culture are linked, and in terms of the capability model, the process aims to develop the whole individual, in that military culture carries with it standards of behaviour and traditions that form the basis of a value and belief

system for the individual. As an organisation, the military provides a useful model to further explore the features of organisational capability.

Before focusing on the Australian Army, it is worthwhile to note the applications of the capability approach that have been undertaken by British firms. The purpose in highlighting this work is to determine if there are common organisational changes that have taken place to support a capability approach. This will be followed by a review of work into learning organisations that supports what might otherwise be determined a capability approach.

HEC publishes a journal that features a section titled, "Employers for Capability". The aim of this section is to provide a forum for employers who are developing capability in their employees to describe their methods. The articles provides some insights into the features of organisational capability. A review of four articles detailing a capability approach in a car manufacturer (Rover Group, 1994); a car dealership (Cumber & Gibbs, 1995); IBM UK (Ashton, 1995); and a toiletries manufacturer (Elderkin, 1996) reveal the following common features for implementing organisational capability in terms of climate, culture and structure:

Organisational Culture

- a. Long term and genuine organisational commitment to employee development are not strictly bound by the job or task requirements.

- b. An expectation that the benefits of the approach would be intangible, combined with an understanding that the organisation will eventually benefit in ways that may not be readily measured.

Organisational Climate

- c. Recognition of learning achievement.
- d. The provision of a facility and, or process designed to support employee's learning needs.
- e. A process where the responsibility for learning was passed to the employee.

Organisational Structure

- f. A flatter organisational structure, with a greater emphasis on integrated teams.
- g. Devolution of responsibility to lower levels.

In each of the case studies reviewed, the decision to implement a capability approach was in response to declining profitability through a loss of competitive advantage, or recognition that traditional approaches to employee development were no longer adequate. While these employers discuss their achievements in terms of the benefits to employees and

the broader benefits to the organisation, it is clear that in order to implement a process that supports the development of capable individuals, it was necessary to re-design key features of the organisation to support the process. The assumption is that the culture, climate and structure of a capable organisation facilitates the development of capable people. This would suggest that a first step in developing capable people is to determine a culture, climate and structure, appropriate to the organisation's domain, that will support the development of capable individuals.

The expected benefits of developing a capable organisation for these companies was the potential competitive advantage associated with a workforce that has a broad base of knowledge and skills, that they are *willing* and *able* to use in support of the organisation in the marketplace. The need for greater autonomy and flexibility in the workforce is a direct result of the perception that technological change is rapidly changing the nature of work and society. To remain competitive in this environment organisations must be able to quickly identify and exploit *ad hoc* niches that occur in the marketplace, this requires an organisation and workforce that can successfully meet the myriad of organisational and personal demands associated with change.

Peters and Waterman (1996) suggest that to meet the demands of change there is a need for a Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1970) paradigm shift in management thinking. They describe the current approach in objective, rationalist terms where the new paradigm should embrace a more content-orientated, more people focussed approach that is guided by appropriate values. The structural change Peters and Waterman (1996) are suggesting is reminiscent of the calls of

the Philosophists (Bagnall, 1994; Jackson, 1993; Soucek, 1993) described earlier, who argue against CBET as a product of economic rationalist thinking that is not appropriate preparation for the Postmodern society. The arguments for change are similar, as are the suggested solution.

Kanter (1996, p.44) argues that the “post-entrepreneurial organisation” that heralded a move away from large bureaucracies that function well in environments with known routines, to organisations that can adapt to dynamic and unpredictable environments. The changes in organisations that Kanter (1996) calls for, mirror the concepts that Stephenson (1987, 1992) describes for individual learning. At the individual level, the changes that Kanter (1996) and Peters and Waterman (1996) describe for organisations will result in an environment where successful individual performance will be based on a lifetime of continuous learning, as there is continual adaptation to changing circumstances.

Schuck (1996) argues that in this environment it is the amount of additional information that is produced that places a greater demand on the individual and the organisation. The key to success is to refine, process and use the information to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace. In this environment, there is a greater demand for workforce skills in abstract thinking, inductive reasoning and theoretical comprehension so that they can use the information to benefit the organisation. Schuck (1996) calls for changes in the way education and training are catered for in the workplace. She believes that current training methods are focused on objects and actions, where the workforce in an information rich environment need to develop skills in understanding before they can create new meanings

out of the information that is generated by technology. The implications for the workplace are that the traditional approaches to worker training and manager education need re-thinking; the workplace must encourage a learning environment; the role relationships between managers and workers will change; and the personal reward structure must be appropriate to the new environment.

In the changes that are taking place in society and the workplace, competitive advantage is directly linked to the individual's ability to learn and apply knowledge. The key to creating and sustaining competitive advantage is to create an organisation that supports the process of learning through individual development.

The pressure that is driving change in society, education and the workplace has the same root cause as that driving change in the military - technology. Toffler and Toffler (1980) described the third wave of change as driven by technology and detailed the impacts it will have on military roles and structure (Toffler & Toffler, 1995). Competitive advantage in business has its corollary in the military environment. The review of education and business suggests that competitive advantage and learning will be closely linked in the future, and that as a result new approaches to education, management and leadership will be required. Capability offers an educational approach to meet the demands of the new society and there is evidence that organisational culture, climate and structure will be key factors in sustaining capable individuals. The development of a capable organisation is likely to be domain dependent. The culture, climate and structure that works for an organisation that specialises in information technology, may not be the same as for an organisation in tourism. However,

there may be guiding principles common across domains that form the basis of capable organisations.

The operation of the ADF in peace operations provides an opportunity to explore those features of the organisation that allow it to adapt to unfamiliar environments. In organisational terms the ADF is a large hierarchically structured, bureaucratic organisation with an entrenched training system based on the CBET model. What features of this organisation in an unfamiliar context might contribute to the development of capable individuals?

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AS A CAPABLE ORGANISATION

From the outside looking in, the military does appear to be the ideal bureaucratic organisation. It is highly ordered, involves elaborate routines, rules and regulations, it is hierarchically structured and authority is supported by a codified set of laws and regulations, breaches of which are punished. However, the fundamental purpose of the organisation, for which all members of the military regardless of specialisation must prepare, is to fight and win wars. This task takes place in a completely different environment from the bureaucratic model of organisation. The combat environment requires those who have been trained to be orderly to respond to the immediate demands of a complex and changing environment. The ongoing problem of the military is that in peacetime the military task is maintenance of preparedness over a long period, a task that requires highly routinised activities. However, the final

validation of effective performance takes place in combat situations that require comparatively few routine activities. The latter is an environment that to some extent requires individuals that are independently capable (Position Z, Figure 5.2).

The disparity between peacetime military organisation and combat requirements is similar to the central distinction made in this thesis between training for war and participation in peace operations. The two are similar because in both cases a peacetime organisation is required to perform in an operational environment that has different features to the environment in which it regularly operates. The two concepts differ in that, preparing for war and gaining operational experience in peace operations, elements of the fundamental skill set of the organisation are deficient, further exacerbating the problem of organisational adaptation to a new environment.

It could be expected then that given the need for the organisation to be able to successfully manage the transition between a peacetime and wartime function, some features of the culture, climate and structure of the Australian Army would support the development of individual capability. The key elements of the Australian Army that potentially contribute the development of individual capability are explored in turn: culture, which considers the power of the ANZAC legend as a defining factor in the character of the Australian soldier; climate, which considers two elements: the combined impact individual, team and collective training make on individual development; and the adoption of directive control as a command imperative and, structure, which looks at the emphasis the Army has always placed on small operational teams. Each of these factors potentially contributes to the development of the

individual capability.

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

In the Australian Army the ANZAC legend is a defining cultural feature of the organisation, and some would argue one of the key defining features of Australian national identity (Ross, 1985, Beaumont, 1995). The ANZAC legend developed from reports of the efforts of Australian and New Zealand soldiers in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. The early reports were made by a British journalist (Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett) and an Australian journalist (Charles Bean) who witnessed the ANZAC landing and subsequent engagement at Gallipoli. However, it was Bean who was largely responsible for the propagation of the legend as a key feature of Australian society. Bean prodigiously documented ANZAC involvement in World War I from Gallipoli to France, concentrating on the tactical level of war. Throughout the war he published a periodical titled, "The Anzac Book" which was a compilation of poems, anecdotes and writings by soldiers at Gallipoli, the book was enormously popular and probably more than anything else established the image of the ANZAC in Australian culture (Kent, 1985).

To the Australian Army the ANZAC legend represents a standard of performance to be achieved, a value system, and code of conduct. It is reinforced subtly, and not-so-subtly in all forms of Army induction training, and is a common theme of service in the modern professional Army. The key elements of the legend are simple, but the emotional overtones that it carries make it a powerful motivating force.

The key features of the legend are: individual qualities ascribed to Anzacs (derived from their bush heritage); the uniquely egalitarian nature of Australian society; and the concept of mateship (Beaumont, 1995).

The individual qualities ascribed to Australian soldiers included: independence of mind, inquisitiveness eagerness to learn, resourcefulness, an ability to make decisions and a skill at scrounging, no matter how difficult the circumstances (Beaumont, 1995). General Sir John Monash an Australian commander of the time reinforced Bean's perceptions of the key qualities of the Australian soldier commenting that Monash (1920, p. 291-293), the Australian soldier had a:

curious blend of a capacity for independent judgement with a readiness to submit to self-effacement in a common cause ... he was intelligent, physically superior, adaptable, imaginative and brave - his bravery being founded upon his sense of duty to his unit, comradeship to his fellows, emulation to uphold his traditions, and a combative spirit to avenge his hardships and suffering upon the enemy ... easy to lead but difficult to drive ... the Australian soldier was proof that individualism is the best and not the worst foundation upon which to build up collective discipline.

However, Beaumont (1995) believes that it is the second factor that takes precedence as the determining factor in the ANZAC legend, the role of democratic egalitarianism and the implications this had for discipline and leadership. In the legend, this quality of society

resulted in soldiers that were socially conditioned not to accept orders unquestionably, nor to blindly accept the authority on the basis of status. Leadership was seen as based on the demonstration of functional competence in battle, informal authority was a feature leadership in the Australian Army of World War I (Beaumont, 1995; Ross, 1985). This approach to leadership assumes intelligence, competence and motivation on the part of all individuals, or as put by a British commentator (cited Ross, 1985, p. 198):

[The 'fraternal' type of organisational authority] involves the recognition of the equality of unequals in the military hierarchy while preserving the functional necessity of the command-obedience structure. Such a system permits the development of initiative and creativity in the unit, and the officer ceases to exercise his functional authority as if he assumed a lower level of intelligence among his subordinates. The spread of knowledge is of crucial importance here.

The final element of the legend is the role of mateship. Mateship is the social glue that bonds small teams together, and links them to their wider community, in this case the Australian force. Mateship is seen as having an almost religious quality in the Anzac legend (Beaumont, 1995), where in the absence of more formal and traditional discipline, the peer-group pressure associated with the notion, in particular the fear of letting others down, provided an informal discipline bonding the group into an effective team. In the words of Bean (1921, p. 607) commenting on the reasons why Anzacs hung on after the Gallipoli landing the answer:

lay in the mettle of the men themselves. To be the sort of man who would give way when his mates were trusting to his firmness; to be the sort of man who would fail when the line, the whole force, and the allied cause required endurance; to have made it necessary for another unit to do his own unit's work; to live the rest of his life haunted by the knowledge that he had set his hand to another soldier's task and had lacked the grit to carry it through - that was the prospect which these men could not face. Life was very dear, but life was not worth living unless they could be true to their idea of Australian manhood.

Subsequent Australian involvement in conflict shows that there is a sense of responsibility in the following generations to maintain the Anzac traditions. The responsibility is not felt any less keenly by the members of the ADF, and in particular the Australian Army. There are constant reminders that, particularly in relation to operational deployment, the performance of the present generation of soldiers will be measured by the qualities of the Anzac legend.

In terms of the development of independent capability it is plain that many of the personal qualities attributed to the Anzacs are the same as those called for in an independently capable individual. Similarly, egalitarianism as a social concept provides a framework for independent action and thought that is tempered by the recognition of competence in others, particularly leaders, and the positive personal and social values associated with mateship.

Daws (1994) provides an interesting perspective of the features of the Anzac legend in operation during World War II. He describes the way in which national stereotypes emerged in the situations of extreme deprivation, such as suffered by those who were prisoners of the Japanese. He describes characteristic Australian national behaviour as acting to “preserve the tribe” (Daws, 1994, p. 298). The following description by a British soldier provides an insight into the behaviour of Australian soldiers who had been surviving at sea for three days, after the Japanese ship on which they had been prisoners was sunk:

As we drew nearer we saw there were about two to three hundred men gathered on a huge pontoon of rafts. They had erected a couple of lofty distress signals, coloured shirts and other bits of clothing fixed to spars of wood. As we paddled up we saw there was a large outer ring of rafts linked to each other with pieces of rope and the attachment tapes of life jackets. Inside the circle were other rafts, unattached but safely harboured. They seemed organised compared to the disintegrated rabble we had become during the last two days. They may have been drifting as aimlessly as we had; but at least they all drifted together. A lot of them still wore those familiar slouch hats. We had caught up with the Aussie contingent. One of them looped us in with a dangling end of rope. “Cheers, mate”, came the friendly voice. “This is no place to be on your lonesome.”

This description shows that the key features of the Anzac legend, positive individual qualities, egalitarianism, and mateship were features of Australian soldiers in World War II.

Similar examples to depict the key features of the legend can be found in descriptions of other deployments of Australian military personnel.

Active promotion of the legend as the behavioural standard in the Australian Army combined with a selection and socialisation process that reinforces the fundamental elements of the concept is likely to result in behavioural modelling by soldiers and officers, and in this way contribute to the development of capability. Organisational culture and traditions that are relevant to the domain function of the organisation have the potential to result in behavioural modelling that supports the development of individual independent capability.

ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE

Individual, Team and Collective Training

Previous discussion of training in the Australian Army highlighted three elements: individual, team and collective training. This section will examine the interaction of the three types of training with the view to the contribution they make to organisational climate and thereby the development of individual capability.

As discussed previously the Army has had the basic features of a competency based approach to training in place since the 1970's. This model underwent significant reform in 1994 to bring it into line with the emerging trends in the NTRA and the more recent developments in CBET (Australian Army, 1994). However, application of this model is not

the complete picture of training officers and soldiers, the final outcome is a combination of individual, team and collective training.

In the Army, individual training is used to prepare personnel to the base entry standards for their employment. As an example, following entry to the Army a recruit will attend basic training, which has two purposes socialisation to the military culture and developing competence in the minimum skills required to function as a soldier in a unit. Successful completion of basic training is followed by basic preparation in the individual's trade area. Again, the aim is to impart the minimum skills required to perform in that trade.

On successful completion of basic trade training the soldier is posted to a unit where they perform the basic functions of the position (soldier and trade), in the process, skill is developed under the guidance of their supervisor on the job. Within the unit environment, team and collective training are an ongoing activity such that individuals are continually developing their individual skills in an environment of team and collective action which invariably involves simulation of potential employment conditions other than the usual work environment.

This cycle of skills development and experiential work based learning forms a structured part of career development such that an individual is continually developing and updating their skills, both as a soldier and trade specialist, in order to progress in the organisation. It is the passage through this cycle of development that is a key feature of military training that ensures that individual competence is maintained, but also that they are

regularly required to practice those skills in a variety of circumstances under a variety of conditions.

In terms of the capability model, military training might be seen as initially establishing competence or dependent capability in Position Y, then independent capability is developed through active participation in structured experiential learning and work-based development. The process might be similar to that depicted in Figure 5.4, where the individual's experience base is developed, as a feature of career progression, by continual movement along the path shown. While no single scenario or work-based learning method will exhibit the features of Position W and X (Figure 5.5), it could be assumed that the process of developing capable individuals from a sound basis of skilled competence would be derived by providing scenarios that selectively altered the administrative (Position X) or cognitive (Position W) features of task performance.




Figure 5.4. A path to Independent Capability (Position Z) provided by individual, team and collective training.




Figure 5.5. Administrative and cognitive capability as features of the capability model.

After meeting the basic prerequisites for skills competence, continued exposure through work-based learning situations is provided that present the individual with successive or varied levels of controlled adjustment in the administrative and/or cognitive demands of the task that may, over time, contribute to the development of independent capability. The combination of individual, team and collective training in the Australian Army provides the basic features of such a scenario. Institution-based and work-based training and education are a feature of career progression in the military, and therefore form a significant part of the fabric of organisations' climate; it may be that such a climate could play a role in the development of individual capability.

Directive Control

In 1988, the Australian Army introduced “Directive Control” as a philosophy for command (Australian Army, 1988). Directive control is a term used to describe a decentralised approach to command and control (Australian Army, 1988). Given that the likely nature of operations in defence of Australia will involve small, independent, geographically dispersed units, a decentralised command and control system was a functional necessity. Directive control is used to overcome the inherent problems in planning for a dynamic situation such as conflict. Correct application of the concept affords maximum responsibility for decision making to the lowest possible level in the organisation, recognising that it is at this level that initiative is required to recognise and exploit opportunity.

In simple terms directive control requires the superior commander to outline their *intention* in terms of what is to be achieved, they then allocate *tasks* to subordinate commanders, the *resources* they have to carry it out, and the *constraints* on their ability to achieve their tasks (Simpkin, 1985). How the subordinate commander achieves the task is entirely a matter for them. In this approach to command, the superior commander’s intention is the guide and underlying purpose for all the subordinate commander’s actions, while the immediate aim may have to be modified in accordance with changing circumstances, the higher intention remains sacrosanct (Simpkin, 1985). In this way the necessity for detailed planning is eliminated as the commander closest to the leading edge of the conflict is responsible for taking the initiative.

Directive control is a loose translation of the German term *Auftragstaktik*. The roots of *Auftragstaktik* can be traced to the Prussian-German command and control procedures of the 19th and 20th centuries (Dupuy, 1978). Dupuy (1978) examined the Prussian-German armies between 1807 and 1945 and found that they were consistently superior to their opponents in terms of quality, command and control procedures. The results of this study were supported by a follow-up (Creveld, 1982), and prompted calls for the adoption of the concept in the U.S.. The challenge of the modern battlefield is a high level of asset manoeuvrability and battles fought over geographically large fronts, or on several fronts simultaneously (Leahy, 1995; Toffler & Toffler, 1995). In such an environment effective command and control is a critical component of success.

Offerdal and Jacobsen (1993) describe two possible organisational reactions to such a dynamic environment. The first is the stereotypical bureaucratic approach that aims to reduce uncertainty through advance planning. The key element is to ensure that close relationships are maintained between various levels of the command and control structure such that the relationships become part of the routine, so that every individual knows what to do in any situation. This process centralises decision making, which places a high premium on gaining correct information from lower levels about local conditions. The alternative is to decentralise command and control, effectively acknowledging that it is difficult to plan for the uncertainty inherent in conflict. What is required is people of initiative who are prepared to take action. The superior commander places trust in the judgement of the subordinates. The problem with decentralisation is that it can lead to fragmentation in the organisation, and a consequent loss of economy in effort. Directive control fills the middle ground between these alternatives

Like all apparently simple concepts directive control is difficult to master. A variety of key elements have been identified to underpin the implementation of the concept, all of which are similar (Australian Army, 1988, Bateman, 1996; Bergman, 1987; Hoffman, 1994; O'Brien, 1990; Silva, 1989; West, 1993). The key elements will be discussed here under the headings provided in the implementation of the concept in the Australian Army (1988), these are Trust, Understanding and Command Qualities. To these we will add the notion of Risk which from the literature seems to be fundamental to success, but is often left as implicit to the concept.

The need for a high level of trust and mutual respect between commanders at all levels is seen as a key element of directive control (Australian Army, 1988). The superior must be able to trust that the subordinate will remain true to the commander's stated intention, and the subordinate must trust that the superior will not give a task that cannot be achieved. Trust in the application of directive control is derived from training and professional development (Silva, 1989; West, 1993). The original notion of *Auftragstaktik* was based on education aimed to raise the level of skill in analysis, technical knowledge, and appreciation of military history (Silva, 1989). The expected outcome was that this would enhance creativity and result in innovative battlefield solutions. Mistakes in this learning environment were an expected part of the learning process with students critiqued on the reasoning for their actions rather than the action itself. The aim was to develop leaders with self confidence who would not hesitate to exercise initiative (Silva, 1989). Silva (1989, p. 7) summarises trust in directive control as:

The superior trusted his subordinate to exercise his judgement and creativity

and to act as the situation dictated to reach a specified goal. And the subordinate trusted that his superior would support whatever action he took in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole.

Silva (1989) also points out that in the German Army a subordinate's failure to act in the absence of orders was "illegal", or at the least not acceptable in the eyes of peers and superiors.

The second element of directive control is understanding. Subordinate commanders must have a clear understanding of the intentions of their superiors so that as the situation develops, their actions are in accord with those higher intentions. Central control in planning the purpose of the operation is maintained, but the actual conduct is left to subordinate commanders. The onus is on superior commanders to be clear in their intention, and provide a depth of understanding about it such that, as Hoffman (1994, p. 54) puts it, the subordinate thinks the following, automatically in response to changed circumstances:

When my superior gave me this mission he (or she) could not foresee this situation; so I will not follow an obsolete mission but will follow the intention of my superior.

Understanding contributes to unity of purpose in the collective action of the force, avoiding the fragmentation associated with decentralisation. However, action in these circumstances will be based on the previous development of a high level of professional

capability and the development of mutual trust.

The third element of directive control is command qualities. A key element of directive control for subordinate and superior commanders moves around the notion of responsibility. Subordinates must be prepared to accept responsibility for making quick decisions based on minimal and sometimes conflicting information, and then act decisively (Australian Army, 1988). Superior commands must accept that the passage of responsibility for the conduct of the operation moves from them to their subordinates. Repeated and/or forceful intervention by a superior in the conduct of the operation on the premise of avoiding mistakes stifles independence and destroys the confidence of subordinates (Hoffman, 1994).

The final element of directive control that is worthy of mention, even though it is implicit in the three elements already discussed is risk. In adopting directive control the organisation accepts a degree of risk in the achievement of success (Bergman, 1987). Subordinate commanders must have the depth of experience and professional capability to successfully assess risk in attaining the goal. Superior commanders must accept that where there is risk, errors will be made. Punishment of errors without consideration of intention will develop 'risk aversion' in subordinates and undermine foundations of directive control.

It is clear that implementing directive control is a complex process that is fundamental to culture and structure of the organisation. Education and training are the key elements to success in implementing the process. The organisation must provide an environment in which understanding, initiative and risk taking are encouraged as a matter of course, not just in when

faced with unexpected circumstances. Directive control provides the organisational climate within which decision making and action take place, but it is apparent that successful implementation requires changes in culture and structure. There are similarities between the basics of directive control and the key features of the Anzac legend, suggesting that Australian military culture already has a climate that potentially fosters directive control. Similarly, the reader is advised to compare the key features of directive control with the discussions of organisational structure detailed below.

The similarity between directive control and capability is obvious and striking. In different domains (education and conflict) both concepts aim to produce individuals that have the confidence and initiative to adapt to changing circumstances. Both concepts are based on the notion that success is derived from developing confidence and understanding, and that learning from errors is an essential part of the process. The importance of directive control is that it has been developed as a command and control structure for organisations, the general features of which can be applied or adapted for use in most organisations. Further examination of the application of the concept in the Australian Army will provide information on the success of the method in fostering the development of capable individuals.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Ross (1985) notes that in the ideal peacetime bureaucratic structure that is often attributed to the military, authority runs downwards in neat channels according to a systemised flow chart. People obey their superiors because of the rules, and the rules cover all functions

of the organisation. There is a clear division of labour and skills to cover the uniform and recurrent events with which the bureaucrat deals. However, this is a simplistic view of the way the organisation operates. Like all organisations the military has a series of “unwritten rules” that act to create lateral links within the organisation. Common military training, particularly in the initial training of officers, and ongoing all-Corps or common professional training, means that much of what is achieved in the military is done through lateral communication among peers and friends. These contacts are used to by-pass obstructive or unsympathetic channels within the traditional hierarchical structure of the organisation.

Similarly, command in the military does not necessarily follow the authoritarian model that often accompanies common perceptions of hierarchically organised, bureaucratic organisations. Janowitz (1957) noted that in the changing nature of armies the increased complexity of the organisation has led to a move away from authority based on status to authority based on morale. He states (Janowitz, 1957, p. 476):

An authority system based on status is an expression of a simple division of labour where co-ordination involves no more than compliance or adherence to rules; the morale system implies that co-ordination is too complex to be mechanical and requires positive involvement and incentives.

To make this system effective Janowitz (1957) argues that military authority must make combat units its organisational prototype. To make the system of manipulative non-dominative authority work there needs to be three organisational rules (Janowitz, 1957, p.

490-491):

- a. there must be no organisational rigidity, each soldier must be considered to be a potential officer;
- b. there must be a concern with technical competence rather than rank; and
- c. the commands must be explained.

These conditions are advanced in the modern Australian Army through a combination of the application of directive control, an emphasis on technical competence as a prerequisite for attaining rank, and a doctrinal approach that emphasises the need for small, multi-skilled, units operating in response to SWC. The concentration on combat units as the prototype for Australian Army operation has recently been re-emphasised in major restructure of the organisation, where the emphasis has been on shifting more of the Army's capability toward an operational unit structure that has greater self-sufficiency and manoeuvrability (McLachlan, 1997).

It is clear that while the Army might be seen from outside as an ideal bureaucratic organisation, all the assumptions implicit to that model do not necessarily hold. In relation to the development of individual capability the structure and function of the Australian Army supports the need for technical competence and responsibility to be devolved to a low level. The organisation is expected to operate in small, geographically dispersed groups in a

decentralised command environment. Authority in this environment is based on morale rather than status, suggesting that leadership will emphasise the development of individual responsibility in achieving group tasks.

The Army develops skills in peacetime that will allow it to successfully defeat an enemy in conflict. In terms of capability, the Army prepares for an historically familiar context (combat), in which a range of familiar problems are expected to be encountered (as defined by strategic policy). In terms of Stephenson's (1992) model, the Army is preparing for dependent capability. However, brief examination of the culture, climate and structure of the organisation shows that in the detail there are features of the organisation that potentially contribute to the development of independently capable individuals.

In defining the boundaries of the Army's dependent capability in terms of familiar context and content, it is necessary to consider the way the organisation perceives the nature of that environment, the way it intends to operate, and the organisational structures that support its activities. In the case of the Australian Army, while the features of its primary function are relatively easily defined in terms of dependent capability, the organisational structure appears to support the development of independent capability. The reasons for this are twofold.

First, the role of the Army is to prepare for potential conflict and act as a visible deterrent to potential aggressors. In Australia in particular, the requirement to fulfil defence of Australia tasks have been few and far between, similarly, combat deployments overseas in

protection of Australia's national interests have also been rare. Despite this, the military serves as a deterrent, continually preparing for an operational scenario that is essentially unpredictable. The Army is constantly preparing for an environment in which independent capability is a prerequisite.

Second, the nature of conflict is unpredictable. Clausewitz (1832/1982) expressed a sentiment that war was perpetual conflict with the unexpected. For this reason, military organisations must equip personnel with the ability to function in a dynamic environment where individual responsibility and confidence are important in confronting unfamiliar problems.

Examination of the Army's organisational culture, climate and structure suggest that it is continually preparing personnel for scenarios in which they must exhibit the features of independent capability. However in terms of peace operations the following question may be relevant: Do the features of organisational architecture described here hold true for peace operations? How does development of independent capability in the military apply in peace operations? If the tasks soldiers and officers are required to perform on peace operations are different from those anticipated in war, do peace operations place an emphasis on individual independent capability that is different to that supported by the prevailing organisational architecture? If so, what are the features of the new organisational architecture?

CAPABILITY AND PEACE OPERATIONS

In terms of Australian Army's organisational culture, climate and structure,

- deployment on peace operations represent merely another type of military engagement. This is the view expressed by the senior defence personnel discussed in Chapter 3, and forms the basis of military preparation, training and education on peace operations. It could be expected that any military deployment will reflect the culture of the organisation, that the processes employed will be the same as have been trained for in the past, and that the structure of the organisation will be flexible enough to cope with most situations. In general terms, the conditions of a peace operations deployment are not unlike those are could be expected in conflict. The conditions are harsh, the organisation must be able to support and protect itself, and in most cases the level of threat will be high.

Similarly, at the individual level personnel are expected to perform the tasks outlined for them, given the resources that are available. The processes associated with the passage of information, intelligence gathering, coordination, and command will not change. The requirement for individual initiative is still a key element of the organisation, so in these terms the need for independent capability remains the same.

However, the devil is in the detail. The key element underlying the three organisational themes (culture, climate and structure) discussed above is the need to develop professional competence through individual and team training, and understanding through

education. The concepts and methods applied by the Australian Army rely heavily on relevant and comprehensive education and training, and common tactical doctrine. As we have seen the Australian Army training and education in peace operations is generally superficial, in that it does not include the development of skills and understanding appropriate to this type of operation. We have also seen that in a fundamental way the conceptual basis of peace operations differs significantly from war, suggesting the need for appropriate common doctrine and comprehensive education and training. Without catering for these factors, the key features of the organisation that appear to contribute to the development of independent capability are undermined. It could be expected that organisational performance would be reduced.

For military organisations, individual capability on peace operations is clearly linked to the development of a domain specific quality that might be called “cross-cultural capability”. If the Australian Army is to continue operational deployments to peace operations, it is this quality that must be developed and fostered within the framework of the existing organisational culture, climate and structure.

Fetherston (1994, p. 174) concludes from her examination of the cross-cultural literature that:

cross-cultural effectiveness is not necessarily tied to technical competence, but instead has more to do with positive and effective communication. The critical point for peacekeepers is the need to establish a definition of

effectiveness which includes technical competence but which goes beyond it.

In these terms, Fetherston (1994) is discussing a capability approach to the skills required for peace operations. There is an obvious need to develop basic competence in the skills associated with cross-cultural communication and behaviour, however effectiveness requires more than competence alone. There is a need to develop a cross-cultural approach that reflects the roles and goals of military organisations deployed to peace operations, and this approach must be developed within the existing organisational framework. Doctrine, training and education in peace operations should reflect a distinctly Australian approach to operations that is compatible with an organisational framework that supports the development of independently capable individuals. At present, there is little understanding of the role two key areas in the development of individual capability specific to peace operations: What tasks are performed by officers and soldiers on peace operations, and what level of broader understanding do they require? What features of the current organisational framework contribute to the development of individual capability on peace operations?

RESEARCH AIMS

Table 5.1 outlines raises potential research questions into capability. These questions have been developed from the preceding literature reviews, and as such reflect the orientation of this researcher. At present, capability is not a well tested concept; there are elements of psychology, education, and management that reflect a capability approach, but which do not contain all facets of the capability approach. The learning organisation is the closest

approximation of these, but as with competency, the mainstream focus (Senge, 1992) has been on process as opposed to a more complete model. The literature review shows that the concept of capability has implications for individuals, workgroups and organisations, but more work is required to effectively understand the issues and integrate them into a more complete understanding of the concept. The questions in Table 5.1 are separated by functional level on the basis of convenience. It is anticipated that there is significant interaction and overlap between the three functional levels, and that an investigation in one level would inevitably result in information relevant to other levels.

Table 5.1

Research Questions in Capability

Individual Level	Group Level	Organisational Level
How should organisations select for capability?	What are the characteristics of capable work groups?	Is there an ideal structure, climate and culture for capability?
Can training enhance capability in the workplace?	How are capable work groups best employed?	What impact does a capable individual and/or capable performance have on organisational performance?
How is individual capability related to organisational performance?	How can the performance of capable work groups be assessed?	How can capability be implemented?
What individual skills are necessary to successfully lead a capable group?	What implications have psychological, education, leadership and management theory for understanding capability in groups?	What organisational resources do capable people require?
How can the performance of capable people be assessed?		

In Chapter One, the aim of this thesis was stated as the improvement of human resource policies and practices relevant to preparing ADF personnel for peace operations. This

was to be achieved by:

- a. reviewing the peace operations literature to clearly define the environment in which the operations are conducted and the issues associated with preparing individuals and units for that environment;
- b. evaluating the factors that contribute to success and failure of individuals or units on peace operations;
- c. evaluating the existing predeployment preparation policy and practice in the ADF;
- d. determine the relevance of a Capability Model of education and training in coping with the apparently divergent tasks of training for war and deploying of peace operations.

These goals have been addressed in the preceding chapters; what remains is to fulfil the purpose of the study which is threefold:

- a. to determine what organisational factors contribute to the development of individual capability, using the Australian Army on peace operations as a case study, and thereby contribute to the broader understanding of organisational capability;

- b. to examine the preparation, training and education of ADF personnel deployed on peace operations by completing a qualitative and quantitative analysis of ADF involvement in peace operations, highlighting the contribution of these activities to ADF strengths and deficiencies in performance, and recommending solutions;
- c. to develop the framework for a “Peace Operations Task Analysis Survey” that can be employed to determine exactly what tasks are performed by ADF personnel on peace operations.